This volume, Private Security, is one of five reports of the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.

The National Advisory Committee was formed by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in the spring of 1975. Governor Brendan T. Byrne of New Jersey was appointed Chairman of the Committee. Charles S. House, Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court, was named Vice-Chairman. Other members were drawn from the three branches of State and local government, the criminal justice community, and the private sector. Four of the 12 members were elected officials of general government.

The purpose of the Committee was to continue the ground-breaking work of its predecessor organization, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. In 1973 the Commission published a six-volume report setting forth standards and goals for police, courts, corrections, the criminal justice system, and crime prevention. Two years later, the National Advisory Committee addressed several additional areas of concern: juvenile justice and delinquency prevention, organized crime, research and development, disorders and terrorism, and private security. Task forces were established to study and propose standards in each of these areas. The task forces were comprised of a cross section of experts and leading practitioners in each of the respective fields.

The Committee reviewed the standards proposed by each task force and made suggestions for change, as appropriate. The process was a dynamic one, with an active exchange of views between task force and Committee members. In almost all instances, the Committee and the task forces ultimately concurred on the standards adopted. In a few cases, there were differences in philosophy and approach that were not resolved. Where such discrepancies exist, each view is presented with the Committee's position noted either in the Chairman's introduction or in a footnote to the particular standard.

Standards and goals is an ongoing process. As standards are implemented, experience will dictate that some be revised, or even discarded altogether. Further research and evaluation will also contribute to growing knowledge about what can and should be done to control crime and improve the system of criminal justice.

Although LEAA provided financial support to both the Committee and the task forces, the recommendations and judgments expressed in the reports do not necessarily reflect those of LEAA. LEAA had no voting participation at either the task force or Committee level. And, as with the 1973 report of the previous Commission, it is LEAA's policy neither to endorse the standards nor to mandate their acceptance by State and local governments. It is LEAA policy, however, to encourage each State and locality to evaluate its present status in light of
these reports, and to develop standards that are appropriate for their communities.

On behalf of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, I want to thank the members of the National Advisory Committee and the task forces for their time and effort. Those members of the Committee who did "double-duty" as task force chairmen deserve special thanks.

I want to express LEAA's sincerest gratitude to the Chairman of the National Advisory Committee, Governor Byrne. Much of the success of this undertaking is directly attributable to his leadership, hard work, and unflagging good humor.

Finally, it is also appropriate to pay tribute to William T. Archey of LEAA for his outstanding and dedicated service to the Committee and for bringing this entire effort to such a successful conclusion.

RICHARD W. VELDE
Administrator
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

Washington, D.C.
December 1976
Foreword

There are more than 1 million people involved in private security in the United States. The private security industry is a multibillion-dollar-a-year business that grows at a rate of 10 to 12 percent per year. In many large cities, the number of private security personnel is considerably greater than the number of police and law enforcement personnel. Of those individuals involved in private security, some are uniformed, some are not; some carry guns, some are unarmed; some guard nuclear energy installations, some guard golf courses; some are trained, some are not; some have college degrees, some are virtually uneducated.

This report is the first attempt to codify standards dealing with all of the divergent persons and things associated with private security. There are great difficulties necessarily attached to such a project. Priorities of spending inevitably come into play, and the questions of whether uniform standards should apply to all those involved in private security or only to some, such as those who are armed, are vigorously debated.

The National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals is pleased to present this comprehensive report of the Task Force on Private Security. Crime prevention has long been a joint venture of the public and private sectors in the United States. There has, however, been relatively little research done over the years in the area of private security. This report, therefore, fills a long-standing void and provides a reference tool that will be most useful in evaluating the role played by private security in the law enforcement effort as well as in developing ways and means of improving the quality of private security services.

There is virtually no aspect of society that is not in one way or another affected by private security. A business may employ guards to protect persons and property from damage, injury, or loss. Special security services are obviously required in places of public accommodation, such as airports, schools, and commercial complexes. The pervasive involvement of private security plays a vital role in efforts to create a safe environment in which to work and live. The interrelation between public and private law enforcement agencies illustrates the obvious importance of striving to achieve uniformly high standards of quality for both personnel and performance.

This report deals not only with people involved in private security but also with things, such as burglar alarm systems and sophisticated and innovative concepts for environmental protection. As noted, this report is the first attempt to codify standards. There are included herein recommendations for the selection and training of private security personnel, the development of technology and procedures for crime prevention systems, such as burglar alarms; and the relationship of the private security industry with law enforcement agencies.
Discussion among members of the Committee included the questions of whether or not the standards and goals should apply to both large and national firms as well as the smaller security businesses and whether the standards and goals should be addressed exclusively to the problems presented by armed personnel. Also discussed and debated was the issue of whether or not governmental regulation of private security beyond that presently existing and on a uniform basis is indicated.

The Task Force concluded that in fulfilling the mission of improving the quality of private security, it was necessary to give equal importance to all firms, whether large or small, but to endeavor to establish standards and goals that would not have the effect of eliminating small businesses or pricing security services beyond the reach of the consumer. As to the personnel who implement the private security services, the Task Force determined that attention should be focused upon both armed and unarmed personnel, it being recognized that both play significant roles in crime prevention and control. The same philosophy resulted in a determination by the Task Force that the standards and goals would be made applicable to proprietary security personnel (those employees hired by a business to protect the assets of such businesses) as well as the contract security operation (those businesses that provide security services to others for a fee).

A minority of the Committee, considering these issues, determined that registration, etc., was not necessary for unarmed personnel. Those subscribing to this view believed that the unarmed security guard does not pose as great a potential hazard to the public that an armed guard does where an abuse of authority and power occur. A particular fear was that across-the-board regulations would result in costs that would be prohibitive to the public as well as to some components of the private security industry that would not be able to carry the financial burden of meeting such standards. The minority viewpoint expressed in the Committee was that licensing by government in this area was inappropriate and that private security would be adequately supervised through the natural forces of civil liability remedies and free competitive enterprise.

In a subject as vast and complex as private security and in an innovative report such as this, it would be unrealistic and indeed surprising were there unanimity of thought. However, unanimity is not in and of itself important. What is important is that as a result of the work of this Task Force, all those involved in law enforcement and crime prevention now have an added tool with which to work. The Committee is content to leave to the States and to local governments final decisions on the priorities of spending and the determination of whether an orderly regulatory process necessitates the inclusion of all elements of the private security industry, whether armed or unarmed, and whether presently licensed or not.

The Committee pays tribute to the members of the Task Force who have worked so diligently and with such competence in this formidable project. This report is an integral part of the national effort to improve the quality of criminal justice.

Brendan T. Byrne
Chairman
National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals

Trenton, N.J.
December 1976
Preface
Over the past 25 years, this country has become the unwilling victim of a crime epidemic. The present seriousness of the disease has outstripped even the most pessimistic prognosis. Coupled with a steadily rising numerical frequency of crimes is a savage viciousness that has rendered the American public almost immune from further shock. The ten-million-plus major felonies that annually occur have seriously debilitated the quality of life in the United States.

Citizens do not feel safe and, in fact, are not safe in their own homes or on their own streets. Businesses are rocked to bankruptcy by the high cost of crime committed by their own employees as well as by hordes of outsiders. Downtown areas at night are all but deserted. Large cities are viewed as jungles of criminality.

In a valiant but vain attempt to stem this massive tide of criminality, government officials, scholars, politicians, and a vast array of other professionals have responded with plans, programs, and projects all designed to reduce crime, ensure justice, and rehabilitate offenders.

One great hope was vested in increases in the numerical strength of the criminal justice system. More police, more prosecutors, more public defenders, more judges, more corrections workers, and more probation and parole officers soon swelled city, county, State, and Federal budgets but did not cause a reduction in crime.

A second approach involved upgrading the quality of the criminal justice system personnel. College education for police, training programs for prosecutors, sentencing conferences for judges, and seminars and institutes for corrections officers served to professionally upgrade criminal justice personnel but did not result in lowered crime or recidivism rates. Nor did the quality of justice noticeably improve.

Technology and applied sciences were also thrown into the fray, resulting in sophisticated police communications, computer-assisted court calendar control, and a wide variety of sociologically and psychologically oriented offender-adjustment programs.

Finally, millions of dollars were used to reshape the criminal justice system through the addition of new practices and the deletion of old processes. Thousands of projects—ranging from team policing to neighborhood legal aid services, from discrimination to new laws for new crimes; from diversion from the system to the police, prosecutor, judicial, and correctional stages to additional input into the system by more rapid police response; from methadone treatment centers for heroin addicts to satellite justice centers bringing criminal courts to the suburbs—were designed, heralded, and initiated. Unfortunately, although many of these programs were improvements over outdated practices, crime, the cost of crime, the damage from crime, and the fear of crime continued to increase.

One massive resource, filled with significant numbers of personnel,
armed with a wide array of technology, and directed by professionals who have spent their adult lifetimes learning how to prevent and reduce crime, has not been tapped by governments in the fight against criminality. The private security industry, with over one million workers, sophisticated alarm systems and perimeter safeguards, armored trucks, sophisticated mini-computers, and thousands of highly skilled crime prevention experts, offers a potential for coping with crime that can not be equaled by any other remedy or approach.

The application of the resources, technology, skills, and knowledge of the private security industry presents the best hope available for protecting the citizen who has witnessed his defenses against crime shrivel to a level which leaves him virtually unprotected.

Underutilized by police, all but ignored by prosecutors and the judiciary, and unknown to corrections officials, the private security professional may be the one person in this society who has the knowledge to effectively prevent crime.

Not represented on the boards or staffs of State Planning Agencies, rarely used by municipal or county planners, only infrequently consulted by elected officials, these members of a six-billion-dollar-a-year industry have crime prevention answers desperately needed by homes, schools, businesses, neighborhoods and communities.

The application of the resources, technology, skills, and knowledge of the private security industry constitutes a massive resource that holds great promise for aiding the Nation in a joint effort to prevent and reduce crime. The purpose of this report is to propose how to upgrade the ability, competence, relationships, and effectiveness of that resource for the anticrime effort.

Up to the present, the anticipated role of private security generally has been ignored. Admittedly, there are important differences between the private security industry and the formal criminal justice system, although the two fields share many of the same goals. The private security industry exists to make a profit in return for the provision of services. It is not supported by public taxes. It is not an arm of the government.

Nonetheless, in serving its clientele, the private security industry serves all of society. Its personnel often are as much "on the line" as are sworn officers. The industry is responsible for the safety and well-being of the public in many locations and situations and for the protection of billions of dollars of assets and property.

There was no advisory task force on private security to assist the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals when it undertook its historic work in 1971. The concept of proposing standards and goals for private security is of more recent origin.

The specific proposal to develop standards and goals for private security arose during the work of the Private Security Advisory Council, which recommended to Richard W. Velde, Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, (LEAA), U.S. Department of Justice, that such a group be formed. (The Council advises LEAA on aspects of the private security industry.) When Mr. Velde decided in 1975 to initiate Phase II of the National Standards and Goals Program, the present Task Force on Private Security was included.

The members of the Task Force were drawn from a wide range of backgrounds, including the formal criminal justice community. Overall, the membership constituted a vastly experienced and highly qualified group of professionals. The Task Force was provided with a staff located at Western Illinois University, Macomb, Ill.

The standards and goals proposed can, if adopted, achieve greater and more effective use of the private security industry in the prevention and reduction of crime.

Little formal literature exists in the field of private security, a fact that both limited research in that area and added to the Task Force's sense of the significance of its study.

To ensure validity and acceptance as well as to forestall criticism and rejection, the Task Force vigorously and ardently pursued a course of open meetings and public discussions. Every identifiable national organization in the field was notified of the project and their assistance, consultations, and review were sought. Many detailed research projects on national, regional, and local levels involving thousands of participants and tens of thousands of data units were designed and implemented. Interim reports were issued and work-in-progress was made available to all interested parties. Non-Task Force members attended every meeting and entered into many discussions and debates on standards and commentaries. The end product reflects the conflux of a myriad of private security, public law enforcement, government, business, and public positions and opinions.

Special appreciation and thanks should go to the thousands of persons without whose assistance and cooperation this report would not have been possible:

- Task Force members.
- Mr. Clifford Van Meter, executive director, and the professional and clerical Task Force staff.
- Dr. Leslie F. Malpass, President, and Dr. Rodney J. Fink, Dean of College of Applied Sciences, Western Illinois University.
- Mr. Dennis Chesshir, Chairman of the Board, and Mr. O. P. Norton, Executive Director, and all of the members and staff of the American Society for Industrial Security.
- Mr. Irving Slott, Federal representative, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
- Consultants and contributors.
One final note of caution should be provided. As with the thousands of changes made in the criminal justice system, the application of private security know-how, manpower, and techniques to public crime prevention will not provide the ultimately desired goal of reducing crime to levels that are consistent with an orderly and free society unless certain other measures are also pursued. Although it is hoped that private security infusions will reduce the work load of the criminal justice system to manageable proportions, so that the enlarged, highly professionalized, and scientifically equipped police, courts, and corrections can best perform their vital missions, baseline change is necessary to bring the crime epidemic fully under control.

No group of individuals, since the beginning of time, has been able to exist without agreed-to rules and understandings. These rules must be the best product of society's combined competencies. The rules must be uniformly upheld and obeyed. The rule enforcers must be respected and assisted. Inappropriate rules must be promptly and correctly changed. Only then can a society of free men exist—persons exercising self-restraint and self-discipline in their conduct. Permissiveness, individual rights, and self-determination of which laws to obey and which laws to ignore must be replaced by responsibility, understanding, and obedience to the law. No police force can ever be large enough, no court system can provide adequate justice, no correctional scheme can afford the necessary services to cope with a society in which citizens do not respect or obey the laws.

The simple truth obscured by the massive anticrime program is that the criminal justice system, by and of itself, cannot and does not prevent crime and criminality. This vital goal can only be achieved by individuals not committing crime because of their respect for law and their acceptance of the ultimate wisdom of that behavior.

The report of the Private Security Task Force was developed in the hope that these standards and goals will provide the necessary impact to reduce crime to manageable levels, so that this Nation's citizens can then rebuild into our society the missing understanding and respect for law.

Arthur J. Bilek
Chicago, Ill.
December, 1976

ARThUR J. BILEK
Chairman
Task Force on Private Security
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  - Governor of New Jersey

**Vice Chairman**
- Charles S. House
  - Chief Justice, Connecticut Supreme Court

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**Glossary of Terms**

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Statement to the Reader

This report is directed to the field of private security and its employees and employers; professional associations; educators; consumers; Federal, State, and local government officials; and the public. To aid in the use of this report, the following chart is supplied listing the fields of interest and the standards and goals most aligned to those fields. Individuals are encouraged to identify their interest area on the chart and to read carefully those standards and goals indicated.

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Alarm Respondent. A person employed by an organization to respond to an alarm condition at the protected site of a client, to inspect the protected site to determine the nature of the alarm, to protect or secure the client's facility until alarm system integrity can be restored, and to assist law enforcement according to local arrangement. The alarm respondent may be armed and also may be a service.

Alarm Sales Personnel. Persons in alarm sales who engage in client contact, provide security surveys, and post-sale customer relations. This does not include selling self-installed alarm devices over the counter.

Alarm Systems (See Part III, introduction to Chapter 4.)

Alarm System Installer. Trained technician who installs and wires alarm systems.

Alarm System Servicer (Repairer). Trained technicians who performs scheduled maintenance and provides emergency servicing of alarm systems.

Armed Courier Services. Providing or offering to provide armed protection and transportation, from one place or point to another place or point, of money, currency, coins, bullion, securities, bonds, jewelry, or other articles of value. This transportation is provided by means other than specially constructed bullet-resistant armored vehicles.

Armed Personnel. Persons, uniformed or nonuniformed, who carry or use at any time any form of firearms.

Armored Car Services. Providing or offering to provide protection, safeguarding, and secured transportation of money, currency, coins, bullion, securities, bonds, jewelry, or other items of value. This secured transportation, from one place or point to another place or point, is done by means of specially constructed bullet-resistant armored vehicles and vans under armed guard.

Central Station. A control center to which alarm systems in subscribers' premises are connected, where circuits are supervised, and where personnel are maintained continuously to record and investigate alarm or trouble signals. Facilities are provided for the reporting of alarms to police and fire departments or to other outside agencies.

Central Station Alarm System. An alarm system or group of systems, the activities of which are transmitted to, recorded in, maintained by, and supervised from a central station.

Contractual Security. Security service provided by a private organization on a contractual basis for the protection of assets and personnel belonging to either a private or governmental client.

Couriers. Armed persons assisting in the secured transportation and protection of items of value.

Criminal Arrest Records (Criminal History Records). Information on individuals that is collected, processed, preserved, or disseminated by criminal justice agencies and consists of identifiable descriptions and notations of any arrests, detentions, indictments, informations, or other formal criminal charges regardless of disposition, and formal disposition if such resulted.

Criminal Conviction Records. Information on individuals that is collected, processed, preserved, or disseminated by criminal justice agencies and consists only of identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests, detentions, indictments, informations, or other formal criminal charges that resulted in actual conviction, and any disposition arising therefrom.

Criminal History Record Information. Includes both criminal arrest records and criminal conviction records.

Criminal Justice Information System. The system used for the collection, processing, preservation, or dissemination of information on individuals. This information, collected by criminal justice agencies, includes criminal conviction records and criminal arrest records. The system includes the equipment, facilities, procedures, agreements, and organizations used.
Criminal Justice System (Agencies). Courts and government agencies or subsidiaries thereof performing any of the following activities pursuant to a statute or executive order: detention, apprehension, detention, pretrial release, posttrial release, prosecution, adjudication, correctional supervision, or rehabilitation of accused persons or criminal offenders.

Detection of Deception Services. Providing or offering to provide personnel, devices, or instruments to test or question individuals for the purpose of determining the veracity of their responses.

Detective. See Investigator.

Employment Records. Normal business information including employment application, health records, job performance records, and other records maintained on employees.

Felony. A crime of a greater or more atrocious nature than those designated as misdemeanors. The term has no very definite or precise meaning except where it is defined by statute. Under U.S. Criminal Code 333, 18 U.S.C.A., a felony is defined as an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year.

Fleas. Any baited, revolve, other handguns, rifle, shotgun, or other such weapon capable of firing a missile.

Guard. Any person who is paid a fee, wage, or salary to perform one or more of the following functions:
- Prevention or detection of intrusion, unauthorized entry or activity, vandalism, or trespass on private property;
- Prevention or detection of theft, loss, embezzlement, misappropriation, or concealment of mercantile, money, bonds, stocks, notes, or other valuable documents or papers;
- Protection of individuals from bodily harm and/or enforcement of rules, regulations, and policies related to crime prevention.

Investigator. Any person who is paid a fee, wage, or salary to obtain information with reference to any of the following matters:
- Crime or wrongs done or threatened; or
- Identity, habits, conduct, movements, whereabouts, associations, transactions, reputation, or character of any person, group of persons, organization, society, other group of persons or partnership or corporation;
- Preemployment background check of personnel applicants.

- The conduct, honesty, efficiency, loyalty, or activities of, employees, agents, contractors, and subcontractors;
- Incidents and illicit or illegal activities by persons against the employer or employer's property;
- Retail shoplifting;
- Internal theft by employees or other employees criminally;
- The truth or falsity of any statement or representation;
- The whereabouts of missing persons;
- The location or recovery of lost or stolen property;
- The causes and origin of or responsibility for fires, thefts, or disasters, losses, accidents, damage, or injuries to real or personal property;
- The credibility of information, witnesses, or other persons;
- The securing of evidence to be used before investigating committees or boards of review, or in any arbitration or in the trial of civil or criminal cases and the preparation thereof.

Job Functions. Those specific assigned duties or activities for which a person is employed.

Job-Related Tests. Tests designed to measure an individual's capability to perform duties, activities, and functions performed during employment.


Law Enforcement Liaison Officer. A law enforcement officer whose assigned duty is to serve as an agent between law enforcement agencies and the private security industry for fostering cooperativeness and providing referral capability for all private security requests.

Licensing. The Act of requiring permission from an individual's primary employer before being employed as an investigator, detective or investigator, guard or watchman, courier, or alarm system installer, repairer, or respondent. Includes both contractual and proprietary employees.

Professional Association. A group composed of individuals with similar occupations and organized for the purposes of furthering the goals and objectives of the occupation.

Proprietary Alarm System. An alarm system that is similar to a central station alarm system except that its annunciator (see Part III, Introduction to Chapter 4) is located in a constantly manned guard room maintained by the owner for his own internal security operations. The guards monitor and respond to all alarm signals and/or alert local police or law enforcement agencies.

Proprietary Security. The method instituted, equipped owned, personnel employed by a private entity for the exclusive protection of its assets and personnel.

Operational. The duties, activities, and functions performed that lead to the accomplishment of a mission. Commonly referred to as line activities rather than staff activities.

Part-Time Employee. Any person who is employed fewer than 40 hours per week.

Principal. Any person who is an officer, director, partner, or shareholder owning a 10 percent or greater interest.

Private Security. Self-employed individuals and privately funded business entities and organizations who provide security-related services to a restricted clientele group for a fee, for the individual or entity that retains or employs them, or for themselves in order to protect persons, private property, or interests from varied hazards.

Private Security Personnel. Individuals who are paid a wage or salary to perform the functions of a guard or watchman, detective or investigator, courier, or alarm system installer, repairer, or respondent. Includes both contractual and proprietary employees.

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Proprietary Security. The method instituted, equipped owned, personnel employed by a private entity for the exclusive protection of its assets and personnel.

Qualifying Agent. An individual named by a licensee applicant, who engages in the everyday affairs of the applicant's security services business and who participates in the managerial decisionmaking process of the applicant. This individual must also meet certain statutory requirements.

Registration. The act of requiring permission from a State authority before being employed as an investigator or detective, guard or watchman, courier, alarm system installer or repairer, or alarm respondent.

Resident Manager. Any person responsible for policy and procedural decisions relating to the operation of an office of a security services business.

Secondary Employment. Work or a job that provides a supplemental income to the main income derived from the individual's primary employment. Also referred to in this report as moonlighting.

Security Services. Those means, including guards or watchmen, detectives or investigators, couriers, and alarm system installers, repairers, or respondents, that are provided on a contractual basis to deter, detect, and prevent criminal activity.

Security Services Business. An entity that provides or offers to provide security services on a contractual basis.

Supervisor. A person who directs or inspects the work performance of others and is primarily responsible for carrying out policies and procedures developed by managers and administrators.

Uniformed Personnel. Persons who wear distinctive attire that is intended to identify the wearer as a member of a specific group, as one who performs a specific function, and/or as one who holds special authority within an organization.

Watchman. See Guard.
In the midst of this Nation's high priority struggle to prevent and reduce crime, a massive resource exists for crime prevention and reduction that holds promise of great assistance to the traditional criminal justice agencies. That resource is the private security industry.

Recently, several significant statistics relevant to the private security industry have emerged:

- The U.S. Department of Commerce, in a report released in 1976, estimated that ordinary crimes cost business more than $23.6 billion in 1975.
- U.S. News and World Report estimated that $6 billion was expended for private security in 1974.
- Research indicates that more than 1 million persons were employed in 1975 in the private security industry in the United States, as contrasted with 650,000 persons employed in local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies, based on research conducted by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

From these statistics, it can be reasonably concluded that:

- Crime against property and individuals results in businesses and citizens absorbing vast amounts of losses. No single component, such as the private security industry, law enforcement agencies, or the public, can independently effect the necessary improvements to combat this crime problem. All parties must coordinate their efforts.
- Billions of dollars are annually expended for private security services. If these resources are effectively used, the private security industry can have significant impact on crime prevention and reduction.
- There are more private security personnel than public law enforcement personnel in the United States. Combined, these personnel offer a large resource for the fight against crime.

This report represents the first national effort to set realistic and viable standards and goals designed for the objective of maximizing the ability, competency, and effectiveness of the private security industry for its role, indicated above, in the prevention and reduction of crime. All of the standards and goals contained in this report can assist in reaching this objective, but certain areas that require most improvement are:

- Government licensing and registration can be more effective in improving the private security industry and, thus, the protection of citizens.
- Architects, designers, and builders need to learn more about the use of private security crime prevention techniques in their work.
- Private security industry salaries are not reflective of the responsibilities assumed by their personnel and should be adjusted accordingly.
- Training and education for private security personnel are inadequate, and should be upgraded and implemented industrywide.
- The false alarm problem needs to be remedied through improved application of alarm systems and better maintenance and use by consumers.
- The absence of input from private security professionals in local and State government should be remedied through the addition of this group to planning and development of crime-safe communities.
- Proper working relationships of police and private security need to be identified and implemented.

The standards and goals are aimed at increasing the crime prevention benefits of the private security industry, both to its clients and to the public. It is hoped that all segments of the industry, as well as local and State governments and concerned citizens, will evaluate and appropriately assist in implementing those standards and goals applicable to their specific situations and needs.

Structure of the Report

This report is divided into five major parts. Part 1 is an overview of the private security industry and is intended to establish the setting for the standards and goals that follow. The seven sections in this introductory material cover the following topics: (1) definition of the term "private security," and its use and scope within the report; (2) explanation
of the background of the Private Security Task Force and its work; (3) discussion of the role of the private security industry in crime prevention and the criminal justice system; (4) definitions and functional descriptions of private security components encompassed by the report; (5) summary of research conducted to date by and for the private security field; (6) discussion of the history and development of the private security industry in the United States; and (7) discussion of unique security problems of specialized areas, such as airports, retail establishments, universities and colleges, and so forth.

The remaining parts of the report address specific topics and contain the standards and goals developed by the Private Security Task Force:

- Part 2 sets forth issues related to private security personnel. It includes chapters and standards and goals relating to law enforcement agencies, consumers of security services, and higher education.
- Part 3, entitled "Crime Prevention Systems," includes chapters and standards and goals on the use of alarm systems and environmental security in crime prevention efforts.
- Part 4 addresses the relationship of the industry with others and chapters and standards and goals relating to law enforcement agencies, consumers of security services, and higher education and research.
- Part 5, entitled "Governmental Regulation," contains chapters and standards and goals concerning private security regulatory boards and licensing and registration of private security businesses and personnel.

Eleven appendices are also included, containing research findings of studies conducted by the Private Security Task Force and model statutes developed by the Private Security Advisory Council.

Recognizing time restraints and budgetary limitations, the Task Force believed that only those areas that could be carefully studied should be included in the report. The areas covered in the above five parts, therefore, represent the most important aspects of the private security industry that could be sufficiently and properly dealt with at this time.

SECTION 1

WHAT IS PRIVATE SECURITY?

Defining Private Security

Private security has many meanings for many people. Colloquially, the term "private security" describes individual and organizational measures and efforts (as distinguished from public law enforcement agency efforts) that provide protection for persons and property. It also describes business enterprises that provide services and products to achieve this protection.

A universally acceptable and explicit definition is difficult to construct because private security is not only identified with the performance of certain functions and activities of a public nature, but also encompasses many activities for the private sector. Development of a realistic working definition of private security is important, however, in order to establish parameters upon which to base use and understanding of the term and its components, as well as to indicate the intent and applicability of the standards and goals that follow. To this end, specific elements of private security are explored and analyzed to evolve the working definition adopted for this report by the Private Security Task Force.

Security. Ensuring the security of lives and property is the motivating force of private security. Richard S. Post and Arthur A. Kingsbury define the general concept of security as follows:

... security provides those means, active or passive, which serve to protect and preserve an environment which allows for the conduct of activities within the organization of society without disruption.

This definition of security implies a stable, predictable, and orderly environment in which a person may pursue individual goals without fear of disruption through the use of protective measures. Within this context, security could be ensured by the actions of military forces, law enforcement agencies, fire departments, civil defense units, organized private enterprises, or individual self-help measures. Although military, fire prevention, and civil preparedness activities contribute to a safer environment and many private security firms provide such services and products, these security-oriented elements become the concept beyond the purview appropriate to the development of this report's standards and goals. The involvement of law enforcement agencies (public security) in security matters is explored later in this section.

Hazards. Various types of hazards can, and do, occur that severely limit or disrupt security. Leon Weaver perceives security as protection of persons and property from a broad range of these hazards:

- ... including crime; fire and atmospheric risks, such as explosion; accident; disaster; espionage; sabotage; subversion; civil disturbances; terrorism (both aerial and terrestrial); and, in some systems (of protection), attack by external enemies. Most security and protection systems emphasize certain hazards more than others.

This range of hazards falls into two categories—natural and man-made. Private security, for the purposes of this report, is primarily concerned with man-made hazards—those that do not occur without introduction of the human element.

Among the man-made hazards are accidents, theft and pilferage; fraud; employee disloyalty and subversion; espionage; sabotage; strikes, riots, and demonstrations; and violent crime. Because the purpose of the standards and goals is to promote the greater use and effectiveness of the private security industry in crime prevention, deterrence, and detection, only crime-related hazards are relevant to the working definition.

Protection and Detection Services. Most private security definitions include the provision of protective services to safeguard life, property, and
Proprietary security is defined as the protection of assets and personnel belonging to a private entity rather than public or quasi-public entities. Private security forces are paid for, in most cases, by privately held dollars. The profit motive of private security and the source of those profits (clients) are basic elements of private security.

Delivery Systems. Security services are provided by private security through two distinct delivery systems—proprietary and contractual. Contractual security involves the provision of security services by a private organization on a contractual basis for the protection of assets and personnel belonging to a specific client. Proprietary security is defined as the method instituted, equipment owned, and personnel employed by a private entity for the exclusive protection of its assets and personnel. Both proprietary and contractual delivery systems are important elements of private security, as defined by this report.

Industry Diversity. Security services in the private security industry are provided by proprietary and contractual systems through a variety of sources for a wide range of clients. Figure 1 illustrates the industry components (both individuals and business and organizational entities) that provide the various security services (e.g., guards, investigators, armored cars) and products (e.g., alarm systems, intrusion detection devices) for specific, but varied, clients (e.g., individuals, financial establishments, government agencies). The private security industry encompasses not only proprietary and contractual security services, but also the manufacture, distribution, and sale of security products.

The RAND Corporation offered the following definition of private security: the terms private police and private security forces and security personnel are used generally in this report to include all types of private organizations and individuals providing all types of security-related services, including investigative, guard, fire, detention, alarm, and armored transportation.

The RAND definition is inadequate for this report because it extends private security to essentially all police and security functions being performed by entities and individuals other than law enforcement agencies. Although their work is similar or identical to that of private security officers, certain groups of quasi-public police, such as housing authorities, park and recreation police, and so forth, are not included in the standards and goals unless they are paid by profit-oriented businesses. This issue of quasi-public police, and other such exclusionary issues related to the scope of the Task Force standards and goals is discussed more extensively later in this section. Further, the RAND definition omits key elements: the client relationship and the profit motive of private security.

For the purposes of this report, the Private Security Task Force formulated the following composite working definition of private security, based on various elements:

Private security includes those self-employed individuals and privately funded business entities and organizations providing security-related services to specific clients for a fee, for the individual or entity that retains or employs them, or for themselves, in order to protect their persons, private property, or interests from varied hazards.

The Task Force believed that this definition of private security best describes the missions and roles of private security as the term applies to the standards and goals.

Public and Private Security

The Post/Kinshro and Weaver definitions of security included both public and private sectors—government agencies, private organizations, and individuals—only protective, deterrent, and detective services. However, public and private security differ in three basic areas: (1) the employer—public funded agencies and profit-oriented businesses and individuals, (2) the degree of statutory power possessed—great or limited police powers, and (3) the specific functions performed. An exploration of these differences between public and private security offers further clarification of what is private security.

The terms public and private security can be distinguished primarily by the interests served—public or private. Private security basically is concerned with loss reduction and the prevention, deterrence, and detection of crime against private property—private interest concerns. On the other hand, public security (or public law enforcement agencies) mainly concentrate on the prevention and detection of serious crime, the investigation of criminal activities, traffic safety, and the apprehension of criminals.
dated criminal justice system. Although, in theory,
the goal of public law enforcement agencies is to
prevent and reduce crime through efforts tied to
the criminal justice system, in practice, most of their
resources are spent on response to, rather than pre-
vention of, crime. (This issue, as well as the respec-
tive roles of the public law enforcement and private
security sectors, is explored in greater depth in
Section 3 of this introduction.)

Although the provision of protective services to
the public or private sectors is a basic difference be-
tween public and private security, these sectors are
often served by both security forces. Private security
firms and individuals provide contractual security for
governmental agencies, facilities, and installations—
elements of the public sector. Similarly, law enforce-
ment agencies, although primarily functioning in the
public sector, have increasingly become involved in
crime prevention planning and programs that enlist
the cooperation and assistance of citizens and busi-
ness enterprises. Quasi-public police—such as air-
port, housing, transit, and park police, operating in
limited geographical areas and often possessing lim-
ited police powers—further cloud the distinction.
Thus, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate be-
tween the efforts of the public and private security
elements in crime prevention.

It is important that distinctions between public
and private protective efforts be understood. To that
end, if the provision of security is viewed as a com-
mon characteristic of protection and detection ser-
vice providers for the public and private sectors by
public and private security, distinctions between the
two can be drawn at the following levels (see Figure
3):
1. Input—the manner in which the service is ini-
niated. (Citizen or client.)
2. Role or Function—predominant activity or pur-
pose. (Crime response or crime prevention.)
3. Targets—the beneficiaries or objectives to which
services are provided. (Government agencies or
specific client.)
4. Delivery System—the mechanism through which
services are provided. (Law enforcement/criminal apprehension or loss
reduction/asset protection.)
5. Output—the end product of services performed.
(Law enforcement/criminal apprehension or loss
reduction/asset protection.)

In the public sector, law enforcement agencies do
not respond to specific clients or interest groups but
provide services, through public funds, for the gen-
eral public. (However, public law enforcement does
respond on an individual basis when delivering its
services.) Additionally, although the goal of public
law enforcement agencies is the protection of life
and property, and much of their effort is spent on
patrol activities, most of their output is directed
toward enforcement of laws and the apprehension of
law violators.

Private security services and products are provided
by private, for-profit organizations for specific clients
to effect crime prevention and reduction for selected
targets (e.g., stockroom, loading platform, labora-
tory) and thereby reduce economic losses.

Scope of Private Security Services

Private security provides a broad range of services
to a clientele composed of individuals, institutions,
businesses, and some governmental agencies. A num-
er of authors described these services in terms of

three functional areas: (1) information security, (2)
personnel security, and (3) physical security. Serv-
ices performed in these functional areas include
gathering information, maintaining order, and per-
spectives on and private by public and private
security sectors is a basic difference be-

Figure 2. Common Objectives of Private Security
and Public Law Enforcement

- Private Security
  - Crime Prevention
  - Crime Reduction
  - Order Maintenance

- Public Law Enforcement

- Crime Reduction
- Crime Prevention
- Order Maintenance

Figure 3. Security Continuum

- Private Security
- Security Services
- Public Security

Table 1. Security Services

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<tr>
<th>Type of Service</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Protection</td>
<td>Protection of customers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Access Control</td>
<td>Control of access to facilities</td>
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<td>Physical Security</td>
<td>Security of physical environment</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Figure 4. Protective Alternatives

- Identifying protective needs
- Assessing protective risks
- Selecting protective measures

Three alternatives are available. Figure 4 illustrates
these

1. Physical security encompasses those measures nec-

ecessary to protect the facility against the effects of
unauthorized access, theft, fire, sabotage, loss, or
other intentional crime or damage. Some of these
measures include:

1. Prevention of unauthorized access by means of security
officers, barriers, fences, lighting, and alarms;
2. Control of authorized entry by personnel identification;
3. Prevention of employee crime and theft;
4. Fire prevention and control;
5. Protection of employees;
6. Implementation of traffic control and parking regula-
tions;
7. Implementation of security surveys;
8. Control of keys, tags, and files;
9. Control of materials;
10. Procedures of control; and
11. Emergency measures.

When an individual or business entity perceives a
security need, a number of protective choices or
alternatives are available. Figure 4 illustrates these

- Identifying protective needs
- Assessing protective risks
- Selecting protective measures

Three alternatives are available. Figure 4 illustrates
these

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- Identifying protective needs
- Assessing protective risks
- Selecting protective measures

Three alternatives are available. Figure 4 illustrates
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1. Physical security encompasses those measures nec-

ecessary to protect the facility against the effects of
unauthorized access, theft, fire, sabotage, loss, or
other intentional crime or damage. Some of these
measures include:

1. Prevention of unauthorized access by means of security
officers, barriers, fences, lighting, and alarms;
2. Control of authorized entry by personnel identification;
3. Prevention of employee crime and theft;
4. Fire prevention and control;
5. Protection of employees;
6. Implementation of traffic control and parking regula-
tions;
7. Implementation of security surveys;
8. Control of keys, tags, and files;
9. Control of materials;
10. Procedures of control; and
11. Emergency measures.

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When an individual or business entity perceives a
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alternatives and the dimensions of services resulting from selection of an alternative. Traditionally, one may turn to a public law enforcement agency for assistance; these agencies can provide patrol services, investigative services, and, in some communities, alarm monitoring. However, because of the magnitude of the crime problem and the mandate to provide protection to the public, it is increasingly difficult for law enforcement agencies to respond to every perceived security need.

In light of the limited availability of public assistance for perceived security needs, individuals and businesses engage in self-help measures. On occasion, these measures are encouraged by or incorporated with public law enforcement agencies. Examples of self-help measures would be an individual making his home more burglar resistant or joining together with neighbors to establish a cooperative community protective program. Or an individual may turn to commercial private security firms to meet perceived security needs.

The same self-help alternatives are exercised by business enterprises. A business may attempt to meet its security needs internally by creating a proprietary or in-house security force or contract with a specialized firm to provide security services for a fee. A brief examination of the number of methods and devices available to an individual or business to meet security needs illustrates the diversity and complexity of private security.

Guard Services. One of the more traditional methods of providing security services is through the use of uniformed guards or watchmen. They are employed at retail stores, industrial plants, hospitals, airports, banks, railroad depots, government facilities, educational institutions, apartment complexes, clubs, residential areas, special event sites and numerous other locations. The function of guards and watchmen is to protect persons or property during specified times or around-the-clock from damage, injury, loss, or other criminal acts. Their duties often include patrol and inspection, theft prevention and detection, traffic control, access, control, and personal and physical safety.

Electrical Device Services. Another method for providing security services is through electrical and electronic devices. Use of this equipment has expanded rapidly over the last 15 years, and it is estimated that their increased use will ultimately curtail the growth rate of guard, armored car, and courier services. One form of electrical security is central station alarm companies, which also provide alarm response and patrol and investigation services. One study estimates that there are approximately 300 central alarm stations in the country, as well as nearly 4,000 local or regional installers of alarms. The National Burglar and Fire Alarm Association estimates the number of central stations listed by Underwriters' Laboratories at 350, modified central stations at 700, and nearly 4,000 installation firms of local and/or police connected alarms.

There are many other types of electronic security devices. For example, 1974 industry revenues for sales and service of access-control equipment have been estimated at $57 million. The range of electronic security devices available is extensive:

1. Fire, smoke, water, heat and refrigeration sensors.
2. Outdoor perimeter control devices.
3. Motion-detection devices.
4. Proprietary alarms.
5. Fire and vault-protection systems.
7. Closed-circuit television monitoring and surveillance.
8. Comprehensive security systems integrating many of the above devices as components.

Investigative Services. Many agencies and individuals provide criminal, civil, and general investigative services to business and management, including corporations, legal and financial firms, and private individuals. Investigative services may include preemployment investigation, surveillance, internal theft problems, undercover investigations, criminal investigations, polygraph examinations, and personnel and property protection.

Armored Car and Courier Services. The security service provided by armored cars and couriers is distinguished from that provided by guards and watchmen in that armored cars usually use armed personnel, with the carrier assigned liability for valuables being transported from one location to another or while in storage. Armed couriers also transport valuables and are similarly liable for shipments. One study estimated 1975 revenues for these services at $35 million.

Another study estimated revenues for armored car services at $30 million in 1974.

Ancillary Services. A number of ancillary services also are provided by security companies, including crowd control, canine patrol, and bodyguard services.

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In a 1975 survey of licensed security personnel in New Orleans and St. Louis (Appendix 2), both cities granted police powers to all the licensed security personnel. In New Orleans, private security personnel are referred to as "special officers," and each special officer is granted limited police powers that extend to the actual premises of the company or establishment. In St. Louis, private security personnel are licensed as "watchmen," and, once licensed by the Board of Police Commissioners, are duly constituted police officers who may exercise police powers in an assigned, specified area. If the argument that all security personnel with police powers be excluded from these standards and goals was accepted, virtually all private security personnel in these two major American cities would be excluded—some 7,000 plus.

Another important issue questions whether the standards and goals should be equally applicable to private and public security. Some private security community spokesmen advocate a differentiation between contractual and proprietary security personnel in the standards and goals. There is a differentiation made between contractual and proprietary delivery systems in some of the standards and goals, as appropriate, but generally proprietary private security personnel are treated exactly as are contractual security personnel.

Both contractual and proprietary private security personnel have a significant impact on crime prevention and are subject to the criminal justice system. For example, the rights of a citizen must be protected upon apprehension or arrest by private security personnel, just as when the arrest is made by a public law enforcement officer. The rights of an individual must be protected, whether security personnel work the same standards of conduct developed by the public law enforcement agency granting the arrest warrant or the police officer, and auxiliary police officers. Unlike the special-function police and special police forces, however, very little direct control is exercised over these officers by the public law enforcement agency granting the special powers. The police status is often confined to a very narrow spatial area, usually the place of assignment.

Arguments have been made for the exclusion of other private security personnel who have special police commissions or peace officer status. Private security personnel often derive their authority to carry firearms through designations such as special deputy sheriff, special police officer, or auxiliary police officer. Unlike the special-function police and special police forces, however, very little direct control is exercised over these officers by the public law enforcement agency granting the special powers. The police status is often confined to a very narrow spatial area, usually the place of assignment. Often the status is simply a mechanism to afford legal protection to the guard for apprehension and detention actions taken by private security personnel until law enforcement officials take formal custody of suspects.

Private security personnel with special police powers would be included in the scope of the standards and goals, depending upon the extent to which they meet the following criteria:

1. The personnel are primarily employed by a for-profit organization or contract guard firm, as distinguished from their rights as employees of private or governmental employers.
2. The personnel receive their salaries from the private sector.
3. The personnel perform primarily proprietary security (clien- or oriented) as opposed to public law enforcement (citizen-oriented) functions.

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SECTION 2
DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR PRIVATE SECURITY

The Need for Standards and Goals

Residents of America’s largest cities listed crime as the number one problem in their community in a nationwide poll conducted during the summer of 1975. Crime has infiltrated every part of the Nation’s structure—its cities and neighborhoods, its transportation and recreational areas, its schools and libraries, and its homes and commercial establishments. It has been estimated that before the end of 1976 one of every four Americans will be victimized by a crime.

Faced with alarming rises in crime and the constant fear of crime, Americans have reached out for protection beyond that which can be provided by the Nation’s overcommitted, and often understaffed, public law enforcement agencies. As a result, the number of private security personnel now exceeds that of public law enforcement and the number of companies doing business in security products and services has increased dramatically, along with the number of businesses employing proprietary security forces. Recent studies reveal that Americans pay more for private security services than Federal, State, and local governments pay for the criminal justice system.

This significant growth has not been accompanied by a growth in measures devoted to evaluating and upgrading the private security industry in relation to its efficiency and effectiveness. The security industry is plagued by a variety of potential and actual problems, including low wages, poorly qualified and untrained personnel, bias of authority, lack of regulation, and excessive false alarms, to name a few. Yet, little attention has been focused on providing effective remedies for these problems. In fact, there is an alarming paucity of research available for the purpose of studying and improving the operations of this vast industry.

Undoubtedly, the private security industry provides an important and necessary service in this country. It has developed and increased revenues attest to its prominence as a vital force against crime. Although its benefits are directed primarily toward the private sector, it also provides certain public benefits and its potential for increased contributions to national crime prevention and reduction is apparent. Therefore, in the interest of the clients the private security industry serves, as well as the general public, uniform standards and goals to increase its efficiency and effectiveness as a crime-preventive force are essential.

The security industry itself has indicated a strong desire to establish standards to upgrade its operations. For example, in a 1975 survey of the membership of the American Society for Industrial Security, 87 percent of the respondents expressed a need for the development of a “set of standards.”

One security consultant recently described the problems of the industry as a “vicious circle” (see Figure 5). Within this vicious circle, factors such as low salaries, marginal personnel, lack of promotional opportunities, high turnovers, and little or no training, lead to one another and result in ineffective performance. To attract and keep highly qualified personnel, salaries must be commensurate with experience, training, education, and job responsibilities. However, competition by private security companies tends to keep wages low because of the bidding process. This, in effect, creates a vicious circle where higher caliber personnel cannot be provided unless there are higher wages, but the consumer has been reluctant to foot the bill. However, competition can still exist with a higher level of wages. In fact, a 1975 study of consumers of private security services in the Greater Philadelphia area revealed that 72 percent of the respondents (industrial, commercial, and financial businesses) indicated their willingness to expend additional funds for security if the qualification and effectiveness of the personnel were improved. The establishment of standards and goals is an important step toward improving quality and effectiveness in the private security industry, thus eliminating the vicious circle.

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Low Enforcement Assistance Administration Role

Since 1968, the Low Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), U.S. Department of Justice, has sponsored programs at all levels of government in its national commitment to reduce crime, protect society, and increase public safety. In 1970, LEAA sponsored programs at all levels of government in its national commitment to reduce crime, protect society, and increase public safety.
The initial work of the Private Security Task Force focused on the resolution of certain important issues that would influence the structure of the report and the development of appropriate standards and goals. The first issue addressed was whether the emphasis of the report should be directed toward legal enforcement or private security personnel, whether the emphasis on the development of private security standards and goals should be directed at all important problem areas. Therefore, the Task Force determined that only those standards and goals that would not eliminate competition, small security businesses or make it impossible for small businesses to establish proprietary security businesses in the private industry. In this regard, the Task Force was very careful to limit itself to requirements that are in the public interest and to consider all at times the value of maintaining competition in the private security industry. However, it was equally concerned with users' interests and the belief that citizens and clients must be afforded the same high quality of protection, whether delivered by large or small security firms. A third issue facing the Task Force in its development of standards and goals involved armed versus unarmed personnel. Arguments were presented advocating the inclusion of a n by those private security personnel who are armed in its standards and goals. The Task Force rejected these arguments, however. The function of private security personnel cannot be measured only in terms of the weapons they do or do not carry. The important issue is the nature of the private security functions that the personnel perform or are capable of performing. Clearly, the nature of any private security activity is situation-specific—the activity tailored to specific needs. It is the matching of the private security needs with appropriately selected personnel that is the highest quality of protection. Thus, the dual objectives of the Task Force in resolving this issue were:

1. To provide standards pertaining to the nature of security functions, and
2. To describe reasonable criteria for the screening and hiring of armed versus unarmed personnel.

Finally, it was suggested to the Task Force that its study and report be directed solely at contract security personnel in the for-profit sector and that provisions be made for security services to others for a fee. Remembering that the purpose of the report was to establish standards and goals that would improve the private security industry's role in crime reduction and prevention, the Task Force saw no valid reason for eliminating any particular segment. Proprietary security personnel—employees hired by a business to specifically protect the business's assets—perform services similar to those performed by government employees as personnel who are hired by a contract security business. However, the differences between these two segments have been delineated for years, the Task Force believes that there is more commonality than difference. This commonality is clearly visible in responses to the Task Force survey of the American Society for Industrial Security (Appendix 1). Except for wages, there were no significant statistical differences between the responses of people in contract security and those in proprietary security. Private security professionals basically have the same attitudes, opinions, and goals on important issues affecting the provision of security functions. Therefore, the Task Force decided to address itself in its standards and goals to the industry—both contractual and proprietary.

In addressing the issue of the private police, the Task Force was cognizant of the valuable role that the proprietary police was expected to play in combating crime. It was also aware that the role of the Task Force was to make recommendations to facilitate the development of the industry's full potential to assist in reducing crime in the United States.

Procedure in Development of Standards and Goals

The following profile of procedures used by the Task Force to develop the standards and goals indicates the thoroughness and comprehensiveness of the development process. Initially, a working group was established to extract the suggestions and recommendations of professional associations, the Private Security Advisory Council, subcommittees of the Private Security Advisory Council, literature and publications concerning the field, and opinions. In addition, the Task Force was also aware that the private security industry is expected to play a significant role in combating crime. It was also aware that the role of the Task Force was to make recommendations to facilitate the development of the industry's full potential to assist in reducing crime in the United States.
A large number of individuals throughout the private security industry made numerous suggestions to the Task Force, including approximately 50 persons sending written comments to the Task Force. These comments were reviewed by the staff and members of the Task Force and proved very beneficial in the development of the final standards and goals. The staff of the Task Force also attended meetings of the Private Security Advisory Council and its various subcommittees, visited contract security operations, as well as police employing proprietary security, and met with or had telephone contact with a cross section of security industry persons and people working in regulatory agencies. Many of the persons contacted or who contributed input are listed as consultants or contributors at the back of this report. Numerous other individuals provided specific input, on a one-to-one basis, through the staff and members of the Task Force.

Task Force meetings were held in April 1975 in Washington, D.C.; July and October 1975 in Chicago, Ill.; January 1976 in New Orleans, La.; April and July 1976 in San Francisco, Calif.; and finally in July 1976 in Atlanta, Ga. (The meetings were held at various locations to enable interested persons in different geographic areas to attend.) At these meetings, speakers representing broad constituencies were invited to appear before the Task Force and present their positions and, as appropriate, that of their association on matters related to the standards and goals effort. Their input was carefully reviewed by the Task Force and provided invaluable assistance in the development of the standards and goals.

The primary purpose for the six Task Force meetings, however, was to develop and vote on the standards and to review and discuss the standard commentaries. Recognizing the importance of the standards and goals, it was determined at the first meeting that a simple majority vote should not be sufficient for approval of a standard or goal; it was decided that no standard or goal could be approved unless it received at least 9 to 14 votes. After each standard and goal was approved, it was forwarded to the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NACCJSG). Only statements that adhered to that principle.

Utilization of the Report

The Private Security Task Force report is designed as a reference tool and guidance document for use primarily by three major groups: (1) State and local justice officials, (2) members of the private security community, and (3) consumers of private security services and citizens. It is intended to serve as a focal point for the greater interaction of the private security community with the criminal justice system and its component agencies.

State and local criminal justice officials should examine the standards and goals in order to adapt them to their local situations, for the increased coordination of private security services in crime prevention. The private security industry should find the standards and goals useful as a means of evaluating the industry's position and role in the criminal justice system and also as a means for improving the quality of its services and upgrading its image. Citizens and consumers of security services should read this report for a better understanding of the services and products available from the private sector, thus enabling them to explore new options in their individual efforts to reduce crime.

Limitations of the Report

Although the Task Force believes this report will be a significant contribution to the literature on private security and will serve as a useful planning document for private security practitioners, government officials, and citizens, it realizes that the report has certain limitations. The lack of definitive and comprehensive research regarding private security activities in the United States greatly handicapped the Task Force in its analysis of the industry. In an attempt to augment the available data, the Task Force undertook three major research activities. These research activities (reported in Appendixes 1, 2, and 3) are as follows: (1) "American Society for Industrial Security (AIS) Survey Results," (2) "Characteristics of Licensed Private Security Personnel in Two American Cities," New Orleans, La., and
SECTION 3

THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN CRIME PREVENTION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Although the formal responsibility for crime control in this country rests with the traditional criminal justice system, many other organizations and citizens are involved in reducing and preventing crime. Indeed, the sheer magnitude of crime in our society presents a criminal justice system itself with adequate controlling and preventing crime. The cooperative efforts of every citizen, business, and institution are needed to effectively deal with the problem. As recently stated in U.S. News and World Report, "the number one need is to overcome the public's misconceptions that they can leave crime fighting entirely to the police." One major force that over the years has been consistently and directly involved with crime prevention is the private security community. As can be seen from the significant growth of the private security industry and the large amount of money expended for security services and products, the industry fulfills an important function in our society. Its importance is intensified through a look at the magnitude and impact of crime on the private sector.


Unfortunately, many are still unaware of the magnitude of the loss problem. Velde said, "There is so much to be done in the area of crime prevention that we who are concerned with the police and private security in this area, in fact, I visualize a tremendous program of mutual, effective crime prevention in which private security and police departments complement each other. We have a common base of expertise and this is something we can do together." Velde went on to say, "The private security industry . . . their resources must be evaluated, regulated, and integrated into community crime prevention programs." If this increased cooperation is to become a reality, the relationships between the two forces must be carefully examined and appropriate measures taken to resolve conflicts.

A survey of the membership of the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) indicates a positive relationship between the private security community and public law enforcement agencies. The respondents classified relationships with public law enforcement as excellent (57 percent) and good (30 percent) for the most part. Additionally, 66 percent of the respondents believed that public law enforcement was supportive of private security efforts. It should be noted, however, that these respondents were from the upper management/supervisory level. The relationship may not be perceived the same at the operational level.

The Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationship Committee of the Private Security Advisory Council, in the other hand, in its examination of the relationship between private security and public law enforcement, found that friction between these two groups does exist. Specifically, the committee listed the following barriers to an effective relationship between the two sectors:

- Lack of mutual respect;
- Corruption;
- Lack of cooperation;
- Lack of two-way communication; and
- The need for better formulated and articulated standards of professionalism on both sides.

The level and intensity of existing problems in the above areas vary greatly. In some communities, private security and public law enforcement personnel enjoy a close, positive working relationship; in others, this relationship is strained and conflictual. Time and financial constraints prevent a closer study of the relationships at this time; however, it is important to establish standards and goals designed to promote and ensure improved relationships at all levels in order to create a more effective interface between the public law enforcement and private security sectors.

The crime prevention role of private security also provides public benefits. For example, successful actions taken by the private sector to prevent and reduce crime against their property decrease the number of crimes to which public law enforcement agencies must respond, and thus frees valuable law enforcement resources for other important activities.

Clearly, it is in the economic interests of the private sector to undertake additional protective measures, and, most often, the private security industry is called upon to provide this additional protection. Through its various components, the security industry provides crime prevention services and products aimed at controlling and preventing increasing profits. As stated by the head of a national security company, "A properly developed security plan can make to assure continuity of earnings." The crime prevention role of private security also provides public benefits. For example, successful actions taken by the private sector to prevent and reduce crime against their property decrease the number of crimes to which public law enforcement agencies must respond, and thus frees valuable law enforcement resources for other important activities.

Terrell, for example, are many places frequented by the public where a public law enforcement presence cannot be established, and there are types of crime beyond the scope of the protective measures public law enforcement can provide, e.g., corporate theft, counterfeiting, and retail fraud. The Bureau of the Census statistics reflect some 12.4 million commercial and business establishments in the United States. The approximate 500,000 local law enforcement personnel in this country can not possibly provide protection for all of these establishments.

Although concerned with crime prevention, public law enforcement agencies have been mainly placed in a crime response mode by ever-growing crime rates and limited resources. Most public law enforcement agencies have neither the resources nor the time to engage in protective activities, but, instead, must focus primarily on order maintenance and criminal apprehension. Moreover:

- Crime prevention role of private security also provides public benefits. For example, successful actions taken by the private sector to prevent and reduce crime against their property decrease the number of crimes to which public law enforcement agencies must respond, and thus frees valuable law enforcement resources for other important activities.
- Velde's views are echoed by Richard S. Post.

- "Private security industry . . . their resources must be evaluated, regulated, and integrated into community crime prevention programs." If this increased cooperation is to become a reality, the relationships between the two forces must be carefully examined and appropriate measures taken to resolve conflicts. A survey of the membership of the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) indicates a positive relationship between the private security community and public law enforcement agencies. The respondents classified relationships with public law enforcement as excellent (57 percent) and good (30 percent) for the most part. Additionally, 66 percent of the respondents believed that public law enforcement was supportive of private security efforts. It should be noted, however, that these respondents were from the upper management/supervisory level. The relationship may not be perceived the same at the operational level.

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The International Association of Chiefs of Police has recently taken a strong, positive attitude toward the general function and value of private security employment in law enforcement, improving relations and communication. This posture represents a significant step forward in the direction of cooperation and assistance between the two forces in their common struggle against crime. Such action can open the path to resolution of the problems that have hindered mutual cooperation and respect in the past.

One problem that has consistently caused friction between public law enforcement and private security is false alarms. It has been suggested that up to 90 percent of all alarm response calls received by law enforcement agencies are false alarms. Although this figure is a much-abused statistic, false alarms clearly do create a burden. In fact, because of the frequency of false alarms, many law enforcement agencies have been reluctant to create a public law enforcement role.

Although the largest percentage of false alarms appears to result from user error, inadequate installation and faulty equipment also cause them. For the most part, problems of installation and poor equipment are found in inexpensive systems, not in the more expensive, sophisticated installations, such as those used in banks and jewelry stores. Therefore, consumers should be educated on the nature and use of the alarm systems they purchase and should have reason to have confidence in their reliability. Public law enforcement agencies also should do their part by providing timely response to alarms and cooperating as closely as possible with industry in informing users of the seriousness of false alarms.

The need for mutual cooperation and acceptance between the alarm industry and public law enforcement agencies was emphasized by Glen D. King, executive director of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, in an address before the 28th annual convention of the National Burglar and Fire Alarm Association, Las Vegas, Nev., March 20, 1975.

Training, conduct, and so forth, private security employees are subject to little or no control in these areas. Furthermore, many consider their private security employment as employment by an employer rather than by the client. A major distinction between public law enforcement and private security powers is that police make arrests on behalf of the public and private security personnel make arrests on behalf of the client.

Another area of conflict between public law enforcement and private security is that of account­ability. Public law enforcement officers are accountable to the public (citizens); private security personnel are primarily accountable to the individual or corporation employing their services (clients).

Greater respect by public law enforcement agencies for the crime prevention role of the private security sector can be achieved through training and goals designed to upgrade the quality of private security personnel and encourage career paths in the field. ASIS has made significant efforts in this direction through its professional education programs. Respect for the crime prevention role of the industry is also fostered at the LEAA-sponsored National Crime Prevention Institute in Louisville, Ky. The institute, staffed by private security personnel with expertise in criminal activity, brings in private security leaders from various fields to address mutual problems with the law enforcement students. This interaction promotes not only greater respect but also a greater understanding of the function of the industry.

A misunderstanding on the part of public law enforcement agencies revolves around a belief that private security personnel are trying to provide public law enforcement services for profit. However, a survey of the ASIS membership found that the private security community clearly does not want to perform a public law enforcement role. For example, 74 percent of the respondents indicated that private security should not have the same legal authority as public police. This viewpoint is further supported in a position paper by Claude E. Hinds, president of the National Association of Pastors, a group of private security personnel in retail establishments, who strongly believe that private security personnel should report all crimes.

Although the private security industry interacts most frequently with the public law enforcement complexion of the criminal justice system, it also interacts with other components. For example, when a shoplifter has been caught by private security personnel regarding a suspect under arrest or in formal custody, the alarm industry is to a much greater extent not serving the community. He is to a much greater extent not fulfilling the criminal justice role. He is to a much greater extent not fulfilling the public law enforcement role. For example, 74 percent of the respondents indicated that private security should not have the same legal authority as public police. This viewpoint is further supported in a position paper by Claude E. Hinds, president of the National Association of Pastors, a group of private security personnel in retail establishments, who strongly believe that private security personnel should report all crimes.

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Another substantive barrier to effective interaction between private security and public law enforcement agencies has been some law enforcement agencies' qualms about the qualifications of private security personnel to perform police-related functions. Whereas public law enforcement officers are subject to a variety of controls concerning employment, private security personnel are granted limited police powers generally restricted to the premises of employment. However, private security personnel often work closely with investigators from law enforcement agencies and prosecutors' offices in investigating and preparing cases for arrest, prosecution, fraud, and external theft by organized criminal groups. For example, in large retail establishments (department stores, discount houses), security personnel have an interest in removing organized criminal rings that systematically prey upon the stores. The private security personnel can exchange information among themselves and provide information to law enforcement investigators to assist them in the development of criminal cases. Law enforcement officers frequently provide information to the store security personnel regarding a suspect under arrest or investigation, who may have been involved in criminal activity at other stores. Private security personnel can commonly provide information to law enforcement agencies or investigators who observe or suspect that are not directly related to their protection function, such as narcotics, gambling, and other white-collar crimes.

It is clear that the private security industry does indeed play a major role in crime prevention and interrelates with the criminal justice system. Its potential for significant contributions to national crime reduction is considerable. The standards and goals in this report will reinforce the primary role of private security in crime reduction and, at the same time, foster a public/private partnership in crime control by improving the quality and delivery of private security services.

One last important concern is the industry's need for criminal history information for purposes of preemployment screening. Because arrest data in many instances may be more significant than conviction data, this information should be provided to private security employers. Employers who hire personnel to protect their assets and to prevent crime need to have some means of researching their background and verifying their integrity. Law enforcement agencies have similar concerns, because some private security personnel received limited police powers upon employment.

Private security organizations may be responsible for obtaining criminal history information from investigat­ ing other employees as well; cashiers, tellers, sales clerks, and other persons responsible for handling transactions and the handling of merchandise. In retail settings, for example, employees theft is a major contributor to losses of as much as $2.3 billion annually, according to the National Retail Merchants Association. 22 Retailers and managers are faced with the need to have some means of researching their background and verifying their integrity. Law enforcement agencies have similar concerns, because some private security personnel received limited police powers upon employment.

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a compelling need to obtain conviction information on prospective employees:

In our view the pertinent question is ultimately one of selecting qualified personnel to perform a certain job in which trust and deportment are the crucial requirements. In addition to the need for verification of a prospective employee's honesty, we emphasize that persons convicted of certain crimes must be excluded from particular positions.*

The prudent provision of this information to private security organizations reduces the opportunity for the commission of crimes by excluding from certain positions those persons with a history of criminal activity in employment situations.

* Ibid., pp. 3-4.

In summary, the crime prevention function of the private security industry is an effective complement to public law enforcement agencies. The industry provides services that cannot be furnished by public law enforcement because of limited resources and various other constraints. Significant benefits in national crime reduction and prevention are possible through the increased cooperation and coordination of the two forces. Existing barriers to closer unity between them must be removed if this goal is to be achieved. The development of standards and goals for the increased effectiveness of private security services is viewed as a method of facilitating a mutually productive working relationship in which conflicts can be resolved and progress toward cooperation and coordination enhanced.

SECTION 4
DEFINITIONS AND FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTIONS OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPONENTS TO BE COVERED IN THE REPORT

In Section 1 of this introduction, basic parameters were established to define the types of products, services, and activities referred to as "private security." The objectives of this approach are twofold:

1. To ensure the specificity of the standards and goals, and
2. To enable the private security industry, State and local criminal justice officials, and citizens to clearly understand the applicability of the standards and goals.

In this section, the private security industry is divided into major generic groupings that represent the primary components to which the standards and goals are directed.

Generally, considerable commonality exists in the definition of the functions and duties of police personnel across the country, and there is substantial consistency in job descriptions for law enforcement positions, such as patrolman, sergeant, and detective. Yet, a review of applicable licensing procedures, local ordinances, and State statutes throughout the country shows an absence of such commonality in the use of terms for private security personnel. In some instances, clear distinctions are made among such terms as private policeman, private patrol service, guards, and watchman, but there are many other instances of overlap and redundancy in job functions, responsibilities, and/or powers. For example, a position defined as an investigator in one State might be classified as a guard in another. The following definitions and functional descriptions, therefore, are necessary to avoid any misinterpretation in terminology and functions.

Major Private Security Components

In order to establish uniformity in the use of terms related to private security, four major industry components involving services and personnel are defined:

1. Guard and patrol services and personnel,
2. Investigative services and personnel,
3. Alarm services and personnel,
4. Armored car and armored courier services and personnel.

Throughout this report, the term "private security personnel" refers to persons engaged in the performance of these services. Although there is considerable variance among States in the application of these terms, the important point is not the use of the terms but, rather, the functions they encompass. Admittedly, this breakdown of private security components is not exhaustive. Other related areas are discussed only peripherally in the first three sections of this introduction; still others are not identified specifically. However, States are encouraged to apply the standards and goals to those functions described in each of the four major private security industry components outlined below. Although the term private security "industry" is used, it is emphasized that proprietary security services are included in the standards and goals.

Guard and Patrol Services and Personnel

Guard and patrol services include the provision of personnel who perform the following functions, either contractually or internally, at such places and facilities as industrial plants, financial institutions, educational institutions, office buildings, retail establishments, commercial complexes (including hotels and motels), health care facilities, recreation facilities, libraries and museums, residence and housing developments, charitable institutions, transportation vehicles and facilities (public and common carriers), and warehouses and goods distribution depots:

- Protection of individuals from bodily harm;
- Control, regulation, or direction of the flow or movements of the public, whether by vehicle or otherwise, to assure the protection of property;
- Prevention and/or detection of theft, loss, embezzlement, misappropriation or concealment of merchandise, money, bonds, stocks, notes, or other valuable documents or papers;
- Control, regulation, or direction of the flow or movements of the public, whether by vehicle or otherwise, to assure the protection of property;
- Prevention of unauthorized entry or activity, vandalism, or trespass on private property;
Investigative Services and Personnel

The major services provided by the investigative component of private security may be provided contractually or internally at places and facilities, such as industrial plants, financial institutions, educational institutions, retail establishments, commercial complexes, hotels and motels, and health care facilities. The services are provided for a variety of clients, including insurance companies, law firms, retailers, and individuals. Investigative personnel are primarily concerned with obtaining information with reference to any of the following matters:

- Crime or wrongs committed or threatened;
- The identity, habits, conduct, movements, whereabouts, affiliations, associations, transactions, reputation, or character of any person, group of persons, association, organization, society, or other group of persons or partnership or corporation;
- Unemployment background checks of personnel applicants;
- The conduct, honesty, efficiency, loyalty, or activities of employees, agents, contractors, and subcontractors;
- Incidents and illicit or illegal activities by persons against the employer or employer's property;
- The theft or destruction of the employer's property;
- Internal theft by employees or other employee crime;
- The truth or falsity of any statement or representation;
- The whereabouts of missing persons;
- The location or recovery of lost or stolen property;
- The causes and origin of or responsibility for fires, libels or slander, losses, accidents, damage, or injuries to real or personal property;
- The credibility of information, witnesses, or other persons;
- The security of evidence to be used before investigating committees, boards of award or arbitration, or in the trial of civil or criminal cases and the preparation thereof.

Detective or investigative activity is distinguished from the guard or watchman function in that the investigator obtains information; the guard or watchman usually acts on information (or events).

Alarms Services and Personnel

Alarms services include selling, installing, servicing, and emergency repair. Alarm systems are generally provided at one central location for one client or employee. Patrol functions, however, are performed at several locations, often for several clients.

Alarm services include the provision of protection, safeguards, and secured transportation of currency, coins, bullion, securities, bonds, jewelry, or other items of value. Alarm services are provided by companies that install and wire alarm systems, perform scheduled maintenance, and provide emergency services, as well as regular repair, of alarm systems. (Alarm installers and services may be the same department of the employer.) Alarm systems are designed to provide the customer's facility for protection against theft or damage. The alarm systems are monitored by specially constructed bullet-resistant armored vehicles and vehicles under armed guard. Armored courier service also include the transportation and protection, from one place to another place or point, of currency, coins, bullion, securities, bonds, jewelry, or other articles of unusual value. Armored courier services are distinguished from armored car services in that the transportation is provided by means other than specially constructed bullet-resistant armored vehicles.

There are also alarm service companies that employ unarmed persons to transport documents, business papers, checks, and other time-sensitive items of limited intrinsic value that require expedient delivery. These services are concerned with the delivery of documents that are not intended to be covered by this report's standards and goals.

Other Components

It is recognized that there are private security components and practitioners in addition to those described here. As previously indicated, the majority of the standards and goals in this report apply to guards and watchmen, private investigators and detectives, alarm systems and alarm personnel, and armored car and armored courier services. This report also includes within the scope of private security the fields of:

- Detection-of-deception (polygraph examination, psychological stress evaluation, lie detection);
- Private security management (principals, owners, managers, and supervision of security firms);
- Forensic sciences (practitioners in private practice); and
- Management consulting (private security specialists).

Some of these nondirect private security activities are subject to licensing and regulation by State and/or local governmental agencies. For example, 17 States require practicing polygraph examiners to be licensed, and 14 States restrict or prohibit detection-of-deception tests. Additionally, in some jurisdictions, security firm owners and principals are required to obtain licenses, post bonds, and/or submit personal and corporate documentation to State and/or local governmental agencies. Developing specific standards and goals for these security-related activities was considered, but the time and financial resources necessary to develop a report on such a project. Furthermore, the material available makes apparent that major research is needed before realistic and viable standards and goals can be developed for these activities. However, in a broad sense, many of the standards and goals do apply to these activities; for example, Chapter 3—Conduct and Ethics—is certainly applicable. From time to time throughout the report, specific mention is made of the relationship to the above fields, but the general intent is that the professionals in these areas will take the initiative to improve their activities by adopting the applicable standards and goals. Thus, those involved in the specific areas are encouraged to review, apply, and even exceed the standards and goals contained in this report.
SECTION 5
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH IN PRIVATE SECURITY

Private Security Task Force Research

In its initial research, the Private Security Task Force found that it was entering a field that has not had extensive research and analysis. There are comparatively few books, treatises, or scholarly papers concerning the diverse and complex private security field. Recognizing the minimal amount of specific information available, the Task Force undertook over a half-dozen studies to provide a data base for its standards and goals. Summaries and information on the studies are contained in the Appendices to this report.

On a national basis, the Task Force distributed questionnaires to the United States membership of the American Society for Industrial Security to collect data concerning types of security functions performed by the members, education and training of personnel, uniforms, salaries, private security/public law enforcement relationships, and the need for a set of standards for private security (Appendix 1).

Regionally, the Task Force gathered information concerning the characteristics of licensed private security personnel in New Orleans, La., and St. Louis, Mo. (Appendix 2) and, in cooperation with an Ad-Hoc Committee of the Citizens Crime Commission of Philadelphia, conducted a survey of consumers in the Greater Philadelphia area to determine their attitudes toward the security services they were receiving (Appendix 3).

It should be recognized, however, that the Private Security Task Force studies and report are not the first of their kind. Several valuable studies have been previously conducted on national, state, and regional levels and in foreign countries. These other reports and studies have been most useful in building a research base and in assisting in the preparation of standards and goals by the Task Force. The Task Force does not necessarily support all of the findings and recommendations of the research methodology used in these other reports, yet their usefulness in studying the private security industry must be recognized.

Because of the lack of information and the need for further study, the Task Force believes it is necessary to outline the major studies that were brought to its attention. These other reports can be helpful to anyone conducting research on various aspects of the private security industry. Although some of the works, to date, have been described more briefly, and to summarize their contents, these synopses may not reflect the specific nature of the studies.

Private Security Advisory Council Model Statutes

Although not studies in the traditional sense, the Private Security Advisory Council has prepared two model statutes: A Model Burglar and Hold-Up Alarm Business Licensing and Regulatory Statute and Model Private Security Licensing and Regalatory Statute. These model statutes were used extensively in the preparation of standards and goals and are included as Appendices 10 and 11 to this report.

The Private Security Advisory Council and its various committees also have produced, and continue to produce, special-purpose documents related to private security interests. These reports can be obtained through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA, Washington, D.C. Some of these are referenced in the Appendices in summaries for standards and goals contained in this report.

National Research

At the national level, only one major study of the private security industry in the United States was conducted prior to establishment of the Private Security Task Force. This initial study was begun in 1970 by the RAND Corporation (1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, Calif. 90406) and took 16 months to complete. The study, supported by a grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA, U.S. Department of Justice, was primarily conducted by James S. Kalatik and Sorel Wildflehr. The purposes of this seminal study, as stated in the report's preface—"to describe the nature and extent of the private police industry in the United States, is, its present regulation, and how the law impinges on it. . . . [and] to develop preliminary policy and statutory guidelines for improving its future operations and regulation."

In order to achieve its stated purposes, the RAND Corporation conducted interviews, undertook surveys, and used other generally accepted research techniques. The findings of this research were published in February 1972 in five volumes (RAND Report) as follows: Private Police in the United States: Findings and Recommendations, The Private Police Industry: Its Nature and Extent, Current Regulatory Approaches and Experience and Views, The Law and Private Police, Special-Purpose Public Police. These volumes cover the nature, size, growth, and operation of the industry and its personnel; the results of a survey of private security employees; licensing and regulation of the industry in every state and several cities; data on regulatory agency experience, compliances, disciplinary action taken, and the agency views on needed changes in regulation; the law as it relates to the private police industry, including a general discussion of the sources of legal limitations upon private police activities and personnel and sources of legal power, and an examination of specific legal problems raised by these activities and relationships between the users and providers of private security services; descriptive information on certain types of public forces not having general law enforcement responsibilities, including reserve police, special-purpose Federal forces, state and local law enforcement agencies, and campus police; and, the overall findings and recommendations of the study.

State Research

In addition to the RAND Report, several studies, designed to study the industry in a single State, have also been conducted. The most comprehensive statewide study to date was conducted by the Institute for Local Self Government (Hotel Claremont Building, P.O. Box 32304, La. 90406). Completed in 1974, the report, entitled Private Security and the Public Interest, was funded by the California Office of Criminal Justice Planning and was directed by Robert E. Kandt.

The purpose of the California study was "to define and elose the problem of private security in California state and local governments' in their legal obligation to provide for the public safety . . . to determine the actual and potential economic and social impact of private security operations and their relationships to local government. . . . [and to develop] a Design for Action." In achieving its purpose, the Institute conducted systematic research by surveying employers, employees/supervisors, and clients; interviewing regulatory agency personnel; studying ordi- nances and State laws, and using other generally accepted research techniques.

The 350-page report covers the present status and growth of the industry in California; patterns of relationships between private security firms and police and sheriffs' departments and other ele- ments of the criminal justice system; descriptive characterization of the type of activities in which private security agencies engage; examination of present minimum qualifications for employment to determine their sufficiency, efficiency, and effectiveness; and suggested duties, responsibilities, powers, restraints, and regulations that are desirable to the public interest; the legitimate role of private security services in protecting the Nation's social and economic well-being; and the status of regulation and control of the industry at both the State and local levels; and a suggested training program for private security personnel.

A statewide research project of a more limited scope was conducted in Virginia during 1972. "The Private Security Industry in Virginia" was prepared by the Research Department of the Division of Justice and Criminal Justice Policy, Commonwealth of Virginia (8501 Maryland Drive, Richmond, Va. 23229).

The purpose of the study was to identify the private security industry and its problems associated with its regulations. Using the RAND Report as a primary source and guide, the division conducted interviews, gathered and analyzed documents and census statistics, studied complaints received by various agencies, and gathered local ordinances and statutory material. The 115-page report contains statistical data on the number of security agencies and employees, a profile of private security personnel, training programs and policies within the State, an overview of State and local legislation and the brief summary of the law and the private industry, and proposed model legislation.

State legislative committees often conduct research and make reports concerning matters of legislative concern. One such report was prepared by the Florida Senate Judiciary Committee staff (Senate Office Building, Tallahassee, Fla. 32304). The "Report on the Private Security Industry in Florida" was completed in September of 1974 and principally was prepared by Maria L. Ketchum.

Recognizing the enormous growth of the security industry in Florida and increasing problems this growth has caused, the Florida Senate Judiciary
Committee requested its staff to determine the seriousness of the problem and what measures should be taken to correct them. In conducting their study, the committee staff relied on a questionnaire mailed to all licensed security agencies in Florida; interviews with appropriate government agency personnel, heads of security agencies, State legislators, and journalists; news articles; the RAND Corporation study; and an investigation of security guard statutes from the other 49 States.

One other limited statewide basis study was conducted by the Maine Criminal Justice Planning and Assistance Agency (295 Water Street, Augusta, Maine 04330). That agency conducted a survey of all licensed security agencies in Maine in 1975. The survey covered the employee selection process, minimum employee requirements, training programs, weapons use, uniforms and badges, and State regulation. The report was designed to obtain certain statistical data but made no attempt to reach any conclusions or make recommendations as a result of the data collected.

Local and Regional Research

The first study of the private security industry, conducted in any regional metropolitan area, has received national attention. Covering the industry in the Greater Cleveland, Ohio, area, The Other Police, Private Security Services in Greater Cleveland, was published in 1975 by the Administration of Justice Committee of the Governmental Research Institute (Suite 511, Ten-Ten Euclid Building, Cleveland, Ohio 44115). This full-scale research project, directed by Dennis T. Brennan, was funded cooperatively by the A.H.S. Foundation, the Nationwide Foundation, the Oglesby Norton Foundation, and the General Electric Lamp Division.

The general purposes of the Cleveland study were "to portray the numbers, types, benefits, risks and regulations of Clayohga County, Ohio's private security forces ... and to reduce the overall costs to society of current private security arrangements by evaluating alternative guidelines for improving the quality of such services.

One other regional study was published in 1975 by Public Systems Incorporated (1137 Kerr Avenue, Sunnyvale, Calif. 94086). Prepared for the City of St. Petersburg, Fla., and funded by a grant from LEAA and the Florida Governor's Council on Criminal Justice, the project was directed by Kai R. Martensen. The purpose of the study was to identify and assess the private security resource operating within St. Petersburg and to draft an ordinance based on the study's findings and recommendations. To achieve this purpose, questionnaires were mailed to private security employers, employees, clients, and customers and to law enforcement agencies; a detailed analysis was completed regarding existing and proposed legislation and its impact on security operations; and three workshops were conducted with representatives from the private security industry and public police.

The 101-page study, entitled Final Report, Private Security Survey and Ordinance for St. Petersburg, Florida, includes a model regulatory ordinance and comments, a mandatory gun training program, a private security advertising ordinance, a survey of security resources, a model building security ordinance, questionnaire survey results, and a proposed State statute.

International Research

Three reports covering private security services in other countries were also brought to the attention of the Task Force. One concerned Canada, one dealt with security in the United Kingdom, and the last was a short paper emanating from the United Nations.

The Canadian report, The Legal Regulation and Control of Private Policing and Security in Canada, was prepared by Philip C. Stenning and Mary F. Cornish, Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, under a student program financed by the Ministry of the Solicitor-General of Canada. As the Canadian report states, its principal purposes were to make a preliminary examination of the legal regulation and control of the private security industry and to provide an information base and framework from which more detailed research could proceed. The major sources of information for this report were library research; a questionnaire sent to the seven existing provincial regulatory agencies for the industry; extensive interviews with industry representatives, regulatory agencies, local registrars, and law enforcement personnel; and a workshop conducted at the Centre of Criminology in October 1973.

In July 1971, the University of Cambridge, Institute of Criminology, conducted a conference on security. The papers presented at that conference were edited by Paul Wiles and F. H. McClintock and published in 1972 as The Security Industry in the United Kingdom. The 105-page document is not as comprehensive as other studies reported herein, but it does include some very valuable information concerning views of the private security industry within the United Kingdom.

Another report, which was the result of a conference, was released following the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Geneva, Switzerland, in September 1975. The short working paper released following that assembly skitthly covers government regulation of security in many different countries and was designed to address the problem of establishing a framework of preventive cooperation and mutual support between the security industry and the appropriate public law enforcement authority. The congress also considered several resolutions addressed to various aspects of security and made recommendations concerning regulation.
SECTION 6
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Although the greatest growth in the private security industry has occurred in recent years, a review and understanding of the historical aspects that led to this growth are significant. Through the history of the review, the present day state of the industry can be better understood.

Early History
The concepts and security practices that form the basis for modern American security can be traced to early England. Colonists settling in a new and alien land banded together under a system of mutual protection and accountability that stemmed from early Anglo-Saxon times. Prior to American Independence, protection of the colonists and their property was the responsibility of town constables and sheriffs, supplemented in many towns, in English tradition, with watchmen who would patrol the streets at night. These watchmen remained familiar figures and constituted the primary security measures of full-time police forces in the mid-1800s.

To ensure adequate protection, most local governments formalized the watch system and required each adult male inhabitant to serve a period of time on watch at night. These watchmen who would patrol the streets at night. These watchmen remained familiar figures and constituted the primary security measures of full-time police forces in the mid-1800s.

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The emergence of public police departments, however, did not mean an end of the private citizen involvement in the protection of life and property. Public law enforcement agencies were in their most primitive stage and could not keep pace with the mounting problems of crime in their communities. The incidence of crime against property had become acute. The coupling of these facts forced industrial and business organizations to recognize the need for some form of effective security to protect their assets. Thus, in the 1850s major components of the private security industry were developed in answer to this need.

Allan Pinkerton formed the North West Police Agency in 1855 to provide a private watchman service. For more than 50 years, Pinkerton's was the only company in the country engaged in interstate activities, such as the protection of security for many of the railroads. Pinkerton's also provided security for industrial systems and was even hired as an intelligence-gathering unit for the Union Army during the Civil War. Today, Pinkerton's, with numerous services and activities, is the largest security organization in the world.

In 1859, Edwin Holmes began the first central office burglary alarm operation, which evolved into Holmes Protection, Inc. When the American District Telegraph Company (ADT) was formed in 1874, use of alarms and detection devices spread to provide protective services through the use of messengers and telegraph lines. By 1889, the use of electric protection for industrial and commercial enterprises in New York City was well established.

In 1859, Washington Perry Brisk formed his travel agency service in Chicago. He transported his first payroll in 1881, thereby initiating armored car and courier service. By 1900, Brisk's* security service operated 85 wagons. Seventy-five years later his security business was grossing more than $35 million in revenue each year.

During the 1800s, with the westward expansion of the United States, railroad lines moved into sparsely populated areas that had little or no public law enforcement. Trains were subject to attack by Indians and roving bands of outlaws who robbed passengers, stole cargo, damaged track structures, and disrupted communications. In order to provide adequate protection for railroad and passengers from the constant dangers, various States passed railway police acts that allowed railroads to establish proprietary security forces, with full police powers, for the protection of assets. In many towns and territories, the railway police provided the only protective services until governmental units and law enforcement agencies were established. By 1914, U.S. railway police numbered between 12,000 and 14,000. Although railway police were associated with public law enforcement for a long time, they are, in fact, private security forces granted law enforcement powers.

At the turn of the century, labor unions began to proliferate and to use strikes as a forceful tool for change. Because many factories were located in areas and urbanization spread. Without training or legal support, and with little or no pay, many of these chosen to stand duty as watchmen would hire others to perform the watchman's task for them. And, although the role of protecting the streets and property was never as dangerous as the watchman's, the days of the watchman were numbered.

Prior to and during World War I, the concern for security intensified in American society, not only to urbanization and industrial growth but also to sabotage and espionage by political opponents, industrialists, and labor nationalists. Security services expanded to meet the demands, but tapered off when demands lessened after the war, reaching a low point during the Depression era. At the end of World War I, there were other significant developments in private security. A Burglary Protection Council was formed and held its first meeting in 1921, the results of which thrust Underwriters' Laboratories into the business of establishing specifications for, testing of, and certifying burglary alarm systems and devices.

During the 1940s, World War II proved to be a significant catalyst in the growth of the private security industry. Prior to the awarding of national defense contracts, the Federal Government required that munitions contractors implement stringent and comprehensive security measures to protect classified materials with a high degree of success. The FBI assisted in establishing these security programs. Additionally, the Federal Government granted the status of auxiliary military police to more than 400,000 private watchmen. Their primary duty included the protection of war goods and products, supplies, equipment, and personnel. Local law enforcement agencies were responsible for their training. As a result of the heightened emphasis on security within the government/military sphere, industry became increasingly aware of the need for plant security, and its value in protection of their assets.

After the war, the use of private security services and products expanded into the area of protection of the private and public sector.

Industry Formation


Assumptions of the private security industry are important. Through the review of these figures and the primary security measures, it is evident that had become more difficult and demanding, watchmen were vilified and disdained in the eyes of their fellow citizens.

As security problems kept pace with the rapid growth of the country, public pressure mounted for increased and more effective protection. Attempts were made to provide a means to supplement and support the night watch system, but it soon became apparent that the watch system was neither adequate nor effective. Thus, the proliferation of public police departments with full-time, paid personnel.

The first public police force in the United States was established in 1844 in New York City, and by 1856 police departments had been set up in Detroit, Cincinnati, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Dallas. Although these early police departments were generally inefficient and often corrupt, and their personnel poorly trained, they represented an important improvement over the old watchman system. The particular service of 1883 was instrumental in rectifying many of the problems of the early police departments.

The coupling of these facts forced industrial and business organizations to recognize the need for some form of effective security to protect their assets. Thus, in the 1850s major components of the private security industry were developed in answer to this need.

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One of the reasons for the growth of private security services was the proliferation of alarms and detection devices, which had become more difficult and demanding, watchmen were vilified and disdained in the eyes of their fellow citizens.

As security problems kept pace with the rapid growth of the country, public pressure mounted for increased and more effective protection. Attempts were made to provide a means to supplement and support the night watch system, but it soon became apparent that the watch system was neither adequate nor effective. Thus, the proliferation of public police departments with full-time, paid personnel.

The first public police force in the United States was established in 1844 in New York City, and by 1856 police departments had been set up in Detroit, Cincinnati, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Dallas. Although these early police departments were generally inefficient and often corrupt, and their personnel poorly trained, they represented an important improvement over the old watchman system. The particular service of 1883 was instrumental in rectifying many of the problems of the early police departments.
Wackenhut and three other former FBI agents formed the Wackenhut Corporation as a private investigative and contract security firm. In just 20 years this firm has established itself as the third-largest contract guard and investigative agency in the country. Wackenhut also provides central station alarms, screening of passengers in airports, and, most recently, security services for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.6

Wackenhut achieved its growth, in large part, through the acquisition of smaller contract security firms, as did the William J. Burns International Detective Agency. Baker industries used this technique (notably in the acquisition of Wells Fargo) to expand beyond its electronic detection and equipment origins into guards, armored car, patrol, and investigation services. (Today Baker Industries' security guard and armored car service groups account for about 25 percent of its revenues.) Burns used its acquisitions and industry reputation to move into central station alarms and electronic security equipment. Pinkerton's, on the other hand, concentrated on guard and investigative services and achieved most of its growth internally.6 Other companies developed along similar lines; these were selected merely to illustrate the historical growth patterns of the earliest private security firms.

Proprietary security, although not as visible as contractual and other forms of security, has experienced equal if not greater growth. From an historical aspect, the greatest growth occurred as a result of World Wars I and II, with the increased governmental concern for heightened security for contraband.

Although no accurate data are available, Federal Government regulation has been a significant factor in the growth of proprietary security over the years. Another major factor has been the increased awareness of companies of the importance of crime reduction and prevention as it relates to company property.

In response to this need, both small and large companies have increased proprietary security functions. Thus, it can be concluded that the growth of proprietary security has paralleled that of contractual security.

Industry Composition

Several market studies suggest (on the basis of reported earnings of the publicly held corporations engaged in private security) that a half-dozen firms control more than 50 percent of the total market for protective services and products. This statistic, however, does not present the true growth trends that are occurring. One study indicates that since 1939, when industry records were first kept, more than 2,400 new firms have entered the private security field. The number of such firms doubled in the 9-year period from 1963 to 1972.7

In Figure 6, some of the major firms are categorized according to security service and product lines and 8 shows that several companies are diversified in the types of services that they provide. More importantly, it illustrates that the growth of private security has become technologically intensive over time. A number of firms appearing in Figure 6 were not originally active in the traditional business areas of private security (i.e., guards, investigative, armored car and courier, and central station alarms). Moreover, some of these firms' major activities are in other industries, such as consumer products, electronics, arms manufacturing, and engineering.

An analysis of the data from a 1975 security survey in St. Louis (Appendix 2) offers further support that major firms do not control the private security marketplace. This survey indicated that there are only eight major national security firms or their subsidiary companies providing contractual guard, armored car and courier, investigative, and alarm services in this major market area. Their employees represent about 23 percent of the total number (1,962) of contractual, licensed private security personnel in St. Louis supplied by contractual security companies. The remaining 77 percent (1,511) are provided by 78 local contractual security companies.

Sufficient resources were not available to determine if this same situation exists throughout the United States. However, if St. Louis is representative of other market areas throughout the country, it is questionable whether a few major national firms consistently control more than half the total market for protective services and products. The number of guards, investigative, and other protective service contractual firms, as shown in Table 1, also suggest that smaller firms with fewer than 100 employees have experienced significant growth in this area.


**Kazalk and Withorn, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

Table 1. Number of Protective Service Establishments by Size of Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>1-4 employees</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>+122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-7 employees</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>+219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-19 employees</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>+376</td>
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<tr>
<td>20-49 employees</td>
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<tr>
<td>50-99 employees</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>+249</td>
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<tr>
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<td>155</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>+139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250-449 employees</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>+51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500+ employees</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>+34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 2,558 4,182 +1,624


Technological Impact

Technology has played an important role in the growth of the private security industry. For example, with the application of advanced technology to the security industry, even one of the oldest security devices, the lock, was revolutionized. Changes: combination locks, combination time locks, delayed-action time locks, combination locks with electronic controls, and eventually access-control systems that use the technology of television and minicomputers.
The advances in electronics technology that improved the quality of television and radio have had significant impact upon the security market. 

Technological developments include additional consumer uses. This new technology has fostered development of high-speed, totally integrated security systems run by computers that control not only access but also refrigeration, heating, air-conditioning, and fire detection. The proliferation from vacuum tubes to transistors to today's subminiaturization age of hybrid integrated circuit technology has played a major role in the growth of the industry.

Additionally, technological advances have reduced component cost and size, leading to the introduction of security measures now commonly in use, such as low-light-level, closed-circuit television cameras and clandestine article-suspect devices. A number of recent technological advances in electronics and computer science have not yet been applied to the development of security products and systems. Electronic security will likely become more prevalent as applications are developed and become cost effective.

Other factors, in addition to the rising crime rate, account for this technologically intensive growth in private security services. For example, the Insurance Services Office recommends that insurance companies offer a premium credit or reduction when commercial and industrial property is protected by burglary and detection systems certified by Underwriters' Laboratories.


In some instances, the sheer magnitude of an enterprise's assets requires highly sophisticated security measures. For example, art museums in the United States and Canada employ advanced electronic protective technology to protect their $7 billion collection of collective value. In fact, nearly half the budgets for special security at major art museums as well as 10 to 20 percent of normal operating budgets, are expended for security measures.

The "concurrent use of electronic technology," growth rates for guards, armored car, and courier services grew at a rate comparable to the 10 to 12 percent annual growth of the past few years.

Industries and Revenues

The private security community is often referred to as the "private security industry" or "private security services." For example, various art museums and Federal banks after they had sustained 23 deaths, 61 injuries, and $15 million in losses from robberies, burglaries, and larcenies in 1967.

For example, a recent study in Cuyahoga County, Ohio found 8,000 private guards and detectives compared with 4,150 sworn police officers in 1975. This study found 8,000 private security officers were utilized on the local level, being allowed by police departments as private security officers. The number of private security personnel is even larger. The contention that private security personnel out-number public law enforcement officers is further supported by the results of Private Security Task Force surveys conducted in two cities—New Orleans and St. Louis. Because police department licensing of private security persons is required in these two cities, it was possible to obtain reasonably accurate figures for the number of licensed private security personnel. This 1975 study revealed that private security personnel outnumber public police. In New Orleans, there were 4,187 licensed private security personnel and 1,413 police officers. In St. Louis, the number of licensed private security personnel was 2,977, compared to 1,413 police officers. In St. Louis, private security personnel (1,000) have approved secondary employment in private industry.

During the 15-year period from 1960 to 1975, there was a dramatic 2,312 percent increase in the use of contract guards in St. Louis, as measured by the number of persons. At the same time, there was a significant decrease in the number of in-house guards as a percentage of total private security personnel. During this same 15-year period in St. Louis, the number of private security personnel increased 226 percent. Publicly-manned security officers increased only 11 percent. The Private Security Task Force also gathered employment figures for private security. The annual Senate effort is in Appendix 9.) The most significant conclusion reached in this research was that there are at least a million persons presently employed in private security.

Although figures are inherent in comparing sets of figures and determining the validity of data, the important point is that the delivery systems for providing private security services and products are a large-growth industry. Americans are spending millions of dollars annually on security, not only in law enforcement expenditures, to protect themselves and their families.

Much of the growth of private security can be attributed to a rising crime rate, coupled with the fact that public law enforcement does not accommodate the specialized needs of business and industry for asset protection. The average annual growth rate of security services and products over the past several years of 10 to 12 percent has approximated the annual increase in the rate of crime, as measured by the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. According to preliminary reports for Crime Index offenses in 1975, crime in the United States rose by 9 percent in 1975, as compared with 1974. Robbery and aggravated assault by reference to each; larceny-theft, 12 percent; and burglary, 7 percent.

As crime-related losses in business communities grew to an estimated $25 billion in 1974, expenditures for security were projected at $6 billion (contractual and proprietary). The sales of contractual services were expected to advance rapidly in the 15-year period from 1958 to 1973; from $48 million in 1958 to nearly $2 billion (See Figure 7). In the 5 years from 1967 to 1972, total protective service receipts increased from $522 million to $1.4 billion.

As mentioned earlier, market research studies by Arthur D. Little and Frost and Sullivan estimated the 1975 sales for security products and services at approximately $3 billion. Figure 3 outlines the major user segments of this market. These estimated figures are based on the rather consistent market estimates.

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1. Kalkaik and Wildhorn, op. cit., p. 11.
made by Predicasts, Inc., the RAND Corporation, A. D. Little, and Frost and Sullivan.

In reviewing Figure 8, it is significant to note the enormous cost of crime in selected areas of each market segment:

* Financial, commercial, and retail interests represent approximately 30 percent of the total market. The U.S. Department of Commerce cites $6.5 billion in retail losses from crime during 1975, and the FBI Uniform Crime Reports placed nonresidential losses from burglary at $423 million in 1974.

* Industrial and transportation segments account for 50 percent of the total market. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Small Business fixed annual cargo theft at $2.5 billion.

Discount department stores report that losses of cash and merchandise would reach $845 million in 1975. And the hotel-operated industry estimates millions of dollars lost during 1975 to souvenir hunters alone.


Security services to provide in the 1850s: guards, investigators, and armored car and courier services. These services, according to the Arthur D. Little, Inc., market report, continue to center most of its services in the areas from which it originated—property.

Terroristic acts, however, have continued to increase in other segments of society. The FBI reported 42 persons killed, 242 persons injured, and $23.4 million in property damage from 1,274 bombing incidents in the first 9 months of 1975. These figures show the sharp increase in deaths, personal injuries, and property damage since 1972, when the FBI established the National Bomb Data Center to monitor such incidents. A majority of these bombings, especially those involving extensive property damage, were directed against corporations. Companies have had to initiate elaborate, and often costly, procedures to protect their assets and key executives. For example, private security firms, as mentioned in Section 1, provide an estimated 20,000 persons as bodyguards and frequently install electronic devices to aid in protecting corporate executives, other VIP's, and their families and personal property.

Despite its growth, periodic expansion into other areas, and increasingly sophisticated products, the private security industry continues to center most of its services in the areas from which it originated in the 1850s: guards, investigators, and armored car and courier services. These services, according to the Arthur D. Little, Inc., market report, cost to account for nearly 50 percent of industry revenues (Figure 9). The market study by Morton Research estimated the service mix among protective services, based upon the percentage of total receipts by type of service in 1974: detective agencies (including contract guards and watchmen), 61 percent; armored car services, 17 percent; burglar and fire alarm services, 22 percent.

Security Trade Associations

The growth of private security services and products has been accompanied by a growth in security-related national trade associations. Currently, there are more than 30 private security trade organizations, plus a number of security committees or divisions of major national associations, such as the American Bankers Association, the Association of American Railroads, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Hotel and Motel Association, the American Transportation Association, and the National Retail Merchants Association. (See Appendix 5 for a listing of security-related associations.) There are also numerous state and regional security associations. Functionally, the trade associations cover the full range of private security activities, with one or more in areas such as alarms, armored cars, credit card fraud, private detectives, computer security, educational security, detection of deception, insurance, and security equipment.

The American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS), a professional society with a membership, was established as a separate organization in 1976, in about 7,000 security executives, supervisors, and administrators, has made significant contributions to the professionalization of the private security industry. To further the objectives of crime prevention and the protection of assets, ASIS is concerned with all aspects of security in the private sector and emphasizes the education and professionalization of its members through publications, workshops, and seminars. The ASIS Foundation, Inc., was established as a separate organization in 1966 to receive grants and donations for programs to further upgrade security professionalism.

Conclusion

Private forces have been used to provide security in America from the earliest colonial times. Even with the establishment of public police forces, many businesses and industries sought the assistance of private security services to provide additional protection for their property and assets. Industrialization, urbanization, and prewar and postwar security demands intensified the need for additional protection. Many contractual private security companies and proprietary forces emerged in response to this need, resulting in a substantial growth of the industry. Advances in electronic technology have also contributed significantly to the industry's growth pattern.

Today, as a result of ever-rising crime rates, coupled with the numerous demands placed upon public law enforcement agencies and their lack of adequate resources to deal with these demands, private security has become a multibillion-dollar-a-year industry, and the number of private security personnel surpasses that of public law enforcement in many localities. Moreover, present crime and financial sta-
the investment in private security services and products has grown significantly, very little attention has been directed toward research in this area. Accounting for the inability to provide concrete figures on its exact extent and revenues, this paucity of information is highlighted throughout this report in the interest of establishing a reliable data base for future focus on upgrading the industry and its components.

## SECTION 7

### UNIQUE SECURITY PROBLEMS OF SPECIALIZED AREAS

- Airports/Airlines
- Commercial Complexes
- Educational Institutions
- Financial Institutions
- Health Care Facilities
- Hotels/Motels
- Housing
- Manufacturing
- Museums and Libraries
- Railroads
- Retail Establishments
- Special Events
- Transportation

### Introduction

The major components of private security services and products and the major security user groups have been discussed in previous sections. Organizations, facilities, and business establishments utilize varying combinations of proprietary and contractual personnel, services, and hardware depending on their individual characteristics or security needs. This section presents a brief overview of selected areas to demonstrate both the prevalent use of private security services in specialized areas and the diversity of security problems encountered in protecting persons and property.

### Airports and Airlines

The need for security at airports and airlines was dramatically brought to public attention by the sudden emergence of the skyjacking of commercial aircraft and by the bombings, bomb threats, and accompanying extortion attempts using aircraft and hostages in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Between 1963 and 1967, there were only four attempted skyjackings of U.S.-registered aircraft. However, in the following 5-year period, 1968 to 1972, there were 134 attempted skyjackings of U.S.-registered aircraft; 82 of these were successful. The skyjackers were able to control the flight of the aircraft and either reach their destination or achieve their criminal objective. Although diversion of aircraft from international airports in New York, Miami, Los Angeles, and Chicago to destinations in Cuba and South America were the most frequent and highly publicized acts, attempted skyjackings also occurred during this period at 54 other U.S. airports.

Deviated individuals, mentally deranged persons, inebriates, and practical jokers are frequently the perpetrators of bomb threats and skyjackings. Terrorist groups, however, have increasingly used these means to advance their causes. One of the most notable terroristic actions occurred in 1970 when Palestinian terrorists diverted three aircraft to Zerka, Jordan, and subsequently demolished them. Sensational incidents such as this were responsible for the doubling of aircraft bomb threats the following year, according to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (In 1971, 1,145 bomb threats were made against U.S. and foreign aircraft in the United States.)

In 1974, there were four bomb explosions at U.S. airports and two aboard U.S. aircraft. In the same year, the FAA reported 1,453 bomb threats against domestic aircraft and foreign aircraft in the United States, including 48 attempts at extortion. Additionally, 397 bomb threats were reported against domestic airports. Of these, 89 percent were made by anonymous persons.

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2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.
The security problems associated with response to bomb threats are immense, because in only half of the incidents is the area of the airport specified, and very often little advance warning is given before the announced time of detonation. Air carriers experience delays in air traffic, and often it has been necessary to evacuate an entire section or terminal of an airport as a result. Some explosions have occurred without warning, causing serious injuries, loss of life, and extensive property damage. In December 1975, during the holiday traveling season, an explosion at a LaGuardia International Airport terminal in New York City killed 11 persons and injured 75. The immediate cause of this bomb was the President of the United States to direct Cabinet-level selected individuals to develop improved countermeasures against such terrorist actions.

Federal and state government agencies already had bomb squads at airports before 1973, the increasing frequency of skyjackings and bomb threats prompted the development of improved security measures and procedures for greater protection and safety of persons aboard aircraft and in airports. In December 1972, the FAA initiated compulsory screening of persons and carry-on baggage prior to entering the departure area of an airport. Federal legislation also was enacted providing specific criminal penalties for unauthorized access to an aircraft. Since the implementation of tight security measures, there have been only two successful skyjackings of a common carrier aircraft in the United States—in November 1972 and September 1976.

The responsibility for screening passengers and baggage rests with the air carriers, and, in most of the major airports, this service is provided by contract firms. Many of these firms are involved in general security, including guard, alarm, and armored car/courier service, as well as handling of baggage in airport facilities, credit card, and merchandise from airport retail shops, and processing of credit card transactions. Because of the large number of persons using airport facilities, order, maintenance, crowd control, VIP escort, and traffic control functions must be provided by airport and airline security personnel.

Extensive use is made of access-control systems and closed-circuit television monitoring. The Air Transport Association of America has established 48 local security committees at principal airports in the United States. These security committees are composed of representatives from every air carrier serving an airport, the management, airline companies, catering services, every law enforcement agency serving the airport, and the Civil Aviation Security Service of the FAA. The major objective of these committees is to establish and maintain specific levels of security in the airports and/or buildings to meet the requirements stipulated for certain government contracts. Similar measures may be used for nongovernmental work that the company deems highly sensitive, such as trade secrets.

Both interior office buildings and commercial and industrial parks (usually suburban office complexes that include nonmanufacturing businesses, such as law firms, laboratory space, medical buildings, corporate tenants need special security precautions because of threats of terrorist activities). In addition, bank and credit unions, law firms, corporate tenants need special security precautions because of threats of terrorist activities. In addition, banks, credit unions, law firms, insurance companies, industrial parks, and manufacturing and distribution centers, corporations that include nonmanufacturing businesses, such as laboratories, insurance companies, industrial parks, and manufacturing and distribution centers, corporations that include nonmanufacturing businesses, such as laboratories, research laboratories, sales facilities, medical buildings, and tenants of such buildings. The private security firm to ensure the protection of the entire building. Many new office buildings are constructed and owned by a private security firm to ensure the protection of the entire building. Many new office buildings are constructed and owned by a private security firm to ensure the protection of the entire building. Many new office buildings are constructed and owned by a private security firm to ensure the protection of the entire building. Many new office buildings are constructed and owned by a private security firm to ensure the protection of the entire building.
larger shopping centers generally have a director of security, and the proprietary security force is often used to protect computer areas. Data base security involves the design of program verification and usage procedures by computer specialists.

Shopping Centers

The migration of central city residents to the suburbs was largely responsible for the commercial phenomenon known as the shopping mall. These large, open-plan shopping centers capitalized on the concept of a large number of retail, entertainment, professional, and other business concerns in a central location with ample parking and easy access for thousands of customers. Shopping centers are microcosms of the communities in which they are situated and reflect many of their crime problems. Management of shopping centers has become a specialized field, and the International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) certifies the qualifications of managers for shopping centers of varying sizes.

Shopping malls are usually discussed in terms of gross leasable space, ranging from less than 100,000 square feet to more than 800,000 square feet. The major security problems of shopping centers are order maintenance in the common areas and traffic control. Each tenant is usually responsible for implementing security provisions within individual leased space. Guards are usually employed by virtually all open and enclosed shopping malls with more than 50,000 square feet of gross leasable space. About two-thirds of shopping centers with less than 100,000 square feet of leasable space also employ security personnel according to a 1975 ICSC survey of 117 shopping centers.

In shopping centers, various combinations of local law enforcement personnel and proprietary and/or contractual guard forces provide security. Some of the larger shopping centers are assigned local law enforcement officers, and in other jurisdictions security personnel of the shopping center are given limited police powers through local ordinance.

Shopping centers with less than 100,000 square feet of leasable space tend to use only part-time guards and limited security personnel, whereas the larger shopping centers (more than 300,000 square feet) frequently use contractual security personnel on a part-time and seasonal basis to supplement proprietary security forces. In addition, the larger shopping centers usually have a director of security, and the proprietary security force is often supplemented with CCTV and supported by a communications system and mobile patrols of the parking areas.

Educational Institutions

Secondary Schools

Security in secondary school systems has received increasing national attention in the last few years. In addition to the number of incidents of crime and vandalism against schools, court-ordered desegregation of local school systems has resulted in security problems in both the schools and their surrounding communities. Several large city school systems experienced violence as a result of these court actions.

Following their 1975 hearings and surveys, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency and Crime recommended that the Federal government, in consultation with the states, establish a uniform training and certification program for school security personnel. The National School Board Association (NSBA) passed a resolution favoring a national program for school security personnel, and the National School Safety Council of the United States was established to promote national programs for student safety in schools. Several states have established state programs to provide training for school security personnel, and many of these programs have resulted in the certification of school security personnel. The National School Safety Council has also developed a national certification program for school security personnel. The council has awarded certification to over 10,000 school security personnel in the United States.

There are two primary objectives in school security: (1) the protection of school property, personnel, and students and (2) the protection of the community in which the school is located. The school security program should be designed to meet the needs of both the school and the community. Security personnel should be trained in the principles of community relations and should be knowledgeable about the laws and regulations governing their jurisdiction. School security personnel should be able to interact effectively with law enforcement personnel and proprietary and/or contractual security forces.

College and Universities

The security problems of colleges and universities are somewhat different from those of secondary schools. The campus security problem is often complicated by the almost continual use of facilities of a college or university. Except at community colleges, which generally have close by night, access control is a major problem. In addition, large numbers of residential housing units for students, faculty, and staff create a densely populated community within the city or town in which they are located. Some college or university campuses are larger than many towns. For example, the campuses of Michigan State University and the University of Michigan are larger in population than many cities in Michigan. The school systems alone exceeds 70,000 students, and nearly 20 percent of these students, including at least 100,000. The report cited one incident in which an eighth grade pupil armed with a .45-caliber and .38-caliber handguns killed his principal and wounded a school security officer.

School systems have used varying combinations of contract and proprietary personnel to establish security in secondary school systems. Some school systems have assigned local law enforcement officers to the schools, while others have employed school security personnel. In some cases, school security personnel have been given police powers in some states through county or city ordinances. In other cases, school security personnel have been assigned to the schools under civil service laws or have been employed by the schools.

In addition, there are two primary objectives of school security: (1) the provision of security personnel, and the installation of alarm systems and other security measures to protect the school. The installation of an alarm system for school security personnel is often supplemented with CCTV and supported by a communications system and mobile patrols of the parking areas.

The major emphasis being placed on school security is the recent formation of the National Association of School Security Directors, with members from 200 school districts in the United States. The largest school systems have negotiated contracts for proprietary security forces. The major emphasis in the collective bargaining process for teacher contracts. Their concerns include improved security policies, as well as adequate security personnel and equipment.

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pases. (Unlike secondary schools, vandalism—with the exception of graffiti—is not a major problem.)

The primary concern, according to a recent survey of some 700 attendees at security conferences sponsored by the National Association of College Auxiliary Services, is safety of individuals. There has been a dramatic increase in the past few years in armed robberies, assaults, muggings, and rapes at college campuses throughout the country. On some campuses, the students have organized rape crisis centers to provide counseling and assistance to rape victims; on other campuses, male students have formed protective night escort services for female students.

In more recent years, population density created by the construction of high-rise dormitories has increased local crime, resulting in providing protection for students and their personal property. This high concentration of students makes it virtually impossible for them to be familiar with all other residents of the dormitory, and, thus, it is easier for an intruder to assume the identity of a student. In answer to this problem, many colleges have installed extensive locking and access-control systems to restrict access to residential areas.

In addition to theft of student property, college campuses sustain significant losses from theft of college property, most commonly audiovisual and laboratory equipment, typewriters, calculators, and educational materials such as books and art objects. Another major concern is theft of examinations.

Security officers

The security and stability of the Nation's financial institutions is a major concern to Government agencies that regulate federally insured banks and savings and loan institutions. Many bank administrators found these to be useful tools, especially in establishing a unified alarm system, once cameras have been installed. The same observations are made with a two-way radio and arm patches identifying them as "student security personnel." On other campuses, there is more formal organization of student patrol or student marshals' programs. Some such programs at Syracuse University service students to patrol parking areas and general residence halls. They are equipped with two-way radios and arm patches identifying them as "student security personnel." The same observations are made with a two-way radio and arm patches identifying them as "student security personnel." On other campuses, there is more formal organization of student patrol or student marshals' programs. Some such programs at Syracuse University service students to patrol parking areas and general residence halls. They are equipped with two-way radios and arm patches identifying them as "student security personnel." On other campuses, there is more formal organization of student patrol or student marshals' programs. Some such programs at Syracuse University service students to patrol parking areas and general residence halls. They are equipped with two-way radios and arm patches identifying them as "student security personnel." On other campuses, there is more formal organization of student patrol or student marshals' programs.

A recent trend in campus security has been the active involvement and participation of students in crime prevention. On some campuses, such as athletic and student unions, laboratories, and residence halls, student security officers have been assigned the responsibility of crowd control and traffic direction at large public events, such as concerts and sporting contests.

On other campuses, these are more formal organization of student patrol or student marshals' programs. These are organized as athletic and student unions, laboratories, and residence halls, or as student security personnel. In some cases, the students are used on an informal basis to assist in crowd control and traffic direction at large public events, such as concerts and sporting contests.

Financial institutions

The security and stability of the Nation's financial institutions (commercial banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, loan companies, and drive-in teller equipment) are critical to a lasting and healthy economy. In contrast to the rising number of armed robberies and robberies attempts, these areas generally serve as central collection points for cash from other financial institutions, such as stock brokerage houses. Security services, such as security personnel, are used only at these main entrances and exits, however, theft of books increased by more than 200 percent. In 1967, 23 persons were killed and 61 persons were injured as a result of bank robberies, burglaries, and larcenies, and $40 million in losses occurred. A wide variance in the number and type of security measures employed by banks caused great concern to Government agencies that regulate federally insured financial institutions. Surveys by the FBI, results of bank robbery statistics, violations, disclosed that many banks had totally inadequate protective and preventive measures against these crimes. In 1968/1969, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board conducted a survey of 194 banks that revealed that fewer than 50 percent had alarm systems, only 17 percent used cameras, and just over 10 percent used security guards. The same agency surveyed 60 banks that had been burglarized and found that only 20 percent used a centralized alarm system, only 3 monitored the premises with cameras, and cameras were just over 10 percent used security guards.

The significance of bank robberies, larcenies, and burglaries, and the lack of standardized or adequate protective measures, led Congress in 1968 to enact the Bank Protection Act. This act required federally insured banks and savings and loan institutions (provisions were subsequently extended to federally insured credit unions) to (1) designate a security officer, (2) cooperate with and seek security advice from the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, and (3) develop comprehensive security programs and implement preventive measures to meet or exceed certain federally approved standards. The act is administered by four federal regulatory agencies: the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In a study conducted in July 1968 and ending in February 1970, each federally insured financial institution covered by the act was required to (1) develop, for approval by its board of directors, a written security plan or program meeting minimum requirements, (2) designate a security officer, (3) file a formal report with the appropriate regulatory agency on current security measures at bank facilities, and (4) install and maintain vault area lighting systems, tenant-resisting exterior doors and windows, and automatic and drive-in teller equipment.

The net effect of the Bank Protection Act was a mandated increase in the range of security services and hardware utilized by most financial institutions. Market research studies, in fact, reflect a sharp rise in spending for security services, beginning in 1969 and 1970 for Bank Security equipment, electronic surveillance equipment, and proprietary and contractual alarms systems and security guard forces. Banks and other financial institutions represent a major segment of the market for fixed security equipment such as vaults, lock-boxes, tamper-resistant locking systems, and video and drive-in teller equipment. In addition, financial institutions are a major market for armored car and counter service equipment.

Compliance with the Bank Protection Act requires that financial institutions implement comprehensive, effective security programs, and that they maintain records of all security officers and employees. The banks are responsible for the development of protective measures and for the implementation of such measures. The banks are responsible for the development of protective measures and for the implementation of such measures. The banks are responsible for the development of protective measures and for the implementation of such measures.

On some campuses, the students are used on an informal basis to assist in crowd control and traffic direction at large public events, such as concerts and sporting contests.

Another major concern is theft of examinations.

The security and stability of the Nation's financial institutions is a major market for armored car and counter service equipment.

Increased compliance with the Bank Protection Act. This act required federally insured banks and savings and loan institutions (provisions were subsequently extended to federally insured credit unions) to (1) designate a security officer, (2) cooperate with and seek security advice from the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, and (3) develop comprehensive security programs and implement preventive measures to meet or exceed certain federally approved standards. The act is administered by four federal regulatory agencies: the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In a study conducted in July 1968 and ending in February 1970, each federally insured financial institution covered by the act was required to (1) develop, for approval by its board of directors, a written security plan or program meeting minimum requirements, (2) designate a security officer, (3) file a formal report with the appropriate regulatory agency on current security measures at bank facilities, and (4) install and maintain vault area lighting systems, tenant-resisting exterior doors and windows, and automatic and drive-in teller equipment.

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altering face amounts on legitimate checks, by forging bank officials' signatures of approval on large checks to increase their face amounts, and by engaging in fraudulent health care transactions through the theft of blank payroll checks and check-writing machines, and through the practices of kiting. Kiting has become particularly difficult to detect since the advent of computerized banking. It involves the use of two or more banks to make simultaneous deposits and withdrawals and thereby obtain credit before sufficient time has elapsed to clear the checks. Prior to the use of computers, bank personnel were able to sicusslate such transactions at the time of processing. However, kiting practices can now be detected only by using special computer programs to monitor unusually large transactions and continuous activity involving accounts with small running bal-

ances. Some of the more important regulations set forth by the Bank Protection Act include the maintenance of bills money for potential robberies, the periodic removal of excess cash from tellers' windows and bank premises, and the development of security procedures opening and closing procedures and stringent security inspections. The act also requires that bank security officers be trained to use security de-

vices and to follow specified procedures in the event of a robbery; however, many of them undertalke no more comprehensive training. This broader perspec-
tive is significant, because bank security programs must be closely interfaced with all aspects of banking
opera-
tions, not just limited to areas where money and valuables are exchanged or stored. 

In addition to the changes occurring as a result of the Bank Protection Act, the movement toward elec-
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Officers of the International Association for Hos-
pital Security stress the importance of preemployment 

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hosp
that security negligence resulted in harm to a guest, 
a tradesman, or an employee. In many of these cases, 
hotel liability insurance is becoming difficult to ob-
tain.

In general, the security practices established at a parti-
cular hotel or motel are the responsibility of the in-
dividual owner or management concern. The larger, na-
tional lodging chains usually have corporate security 
senior managers or directors who manage these proper-
ties. The corporate security staff conducts security 
surveys; investigates specific loss problems; estab-
lishes guidelines for security policies and staffing; and 
makes recommendations on cash-handling proce-
dures, preemployment screening techniques, and 
emergency plans; and maintains liaison with local law 
enforcement agencies.

Hotel/motel industry executives and security di-
rectors agree that greater emphasis should be placed 
on security in training managers, owners, and fran-
chise holders. Clearly, providing free movement and 
open facilities to guests must be balanced with the 
need to provide security in buildings and residential 
areas, ancillary lobbies, and elevators; they also have 
begun to use central access-control systems for guest 
rooms.

Hotels and motels in resort areas encounter secu-
ritv problems of a slightly different nature because 
many of their guests are occupied with recreational or 
sightseeing activities and spend considerable time 
away from their rooms. Similarly, hotels and motels 
that regularly host large conventions and conferences 
must adapt their security procedures to accommodate 
the special demands created by such situations.

Housing

Although crimes of violence have received consid-
erable attention because of their dramatic and tragic 
nature, reported burglaries of residential dwellings are 
now second only to robbery as a property crime. In addi-
tion, victimization studies conducted for the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Admin-
distration (LEAA) indicate that the increase in home-
robbery for the last two years has exceeded that of any 
other type of crime. Clearly, there is a need for more 
research to understand the extent of this crime and its 
effects. The increase in the number of armed robberies 
at entry points, such as doors and garages, raises 
concerns about the potential for other violent crimes.
ing plants throughout the country, goods and products shipped from production facilities were valued at $757 billion in 1972 and nearly 18 million Americans, representing one-fourth of the total labor force, were employed in manufacturing. The term "manufacturing" encompasses a range of primary products, including those related to food processing, transportation (automotive, aerospace, shipbuilding), textiles, primary metals (steel and aluminum), fabricated metal products, machinery, consumer electrical products, and heavy durable goods.

The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that manufacturers incurred losses of more than $2.5 billion in 1972 from crime, which represents an increase of 60 percent since 1971. Manufacturing losses result from internal employee theft and pilferage, external theft of production materials and finished products, arson, and burglary and sabotage of machinery and equipment. Internal theft by employees is a major contributor to manufacturing crime losses. The items most frequently stolen include tools; electronic components; assembly parts; consumable items such as cleaning supplies, oil and grease, paint, wire, and so forth; plumbing and electrical supplies; and manufactured products, including consumer products that can be readily used by employees. External theft losses include not only cargoes and containers of finished products but also raw materials in usable form; silver; gold; platinum; precious gems; small machinery and power tools; and office equipment from administrative offices located at production facilities.

In addition to the protection of classified information, manufacturing plants often use production processes and techniques that are patented or considered to be trade secrets of the firm. Special procedures are undertaken to protect these production areas, formulas, materials, blueprints, and so forth from observation or theft by vis-à-vis unauthorized persons.

Production areas, in general, are protected by plant security personnel to prevent disruption of work flow or damage to materials and to facilitate product delivery schedules. The responsibilities of security guards in manufacturing plants often include the monitoring of electrical and utility systems for failure or malfunction of automated machinery, fire prevention, and inspections for Occu­pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) violations. These responsibilities, coupled with the need for detection functions, essentially comprise manufacturing security, which is often referred to as "plant protection."

A major emphasis of plant security protection is in the regulation and screening of visitors; service, repair, delivery, and maintenance personnel; vendors; truck drivers; and employees. Access control at manufacturing plants may include the use of card key and color-coded photo identification badge systems for restricted areas; closed-circuit television monitoring on shipping and receiving platforms and in high-security storage and production areas; perimeter fencing and high-intensity lighting; vehicle and pedestrian checkpoints and security barriers; and employee access control. Other security concerns are the prevention of crimes such as petty thefts and assaults among employees and the protection of employees, vehicles, and their contents in parking areas.

In many large corporations, a director of security is responsible for managing an overall corporate security program. The corporate director of security administers one-fourth of the total labor force that provides support services to subsidiary companies and production plants; conducts internal investigations and analysis of major thefts, security violations, losses, and reported shortages; establishes corporate security policies and employee awareness training; and implements security operations at manufacturing plants and facilities.

At the plant level, there frequently is a supervisor of security who may report to either the corporate director of security or to the plant manager. The plant security supervisor is responsible for maintaining the daily operations of the plant.

Security costs are often a function of the plant's profit center. In smaller corporations, the security director at the corporate level is responsible for developing security policies and internal investigations, and the plant manager assumes the security responsibility. In other instances, each plant has a security manager with no centralized corporate security function or the plant manager provides security services through contract security firms.

Guard services were first used in plants on a large scale prior to World War I. Amid concerns of sabotage and espionage by politically active nationals. During World War II, many proprietary security forces were established in manufacturing plants, and more than 200,000 plant guards were granted the status of auxiliary military police because their primary duties included the protection of war goods and products, supplies, equipment, and personnel.

Larger manufacturers have continued to maintain proprietary security forces, but recently there has been an increase in the use of contractual security guards because proprietary forces have become more expensive in comparison with the rising costs of employees earning fringe benefits. Plant managers and facility security supervisors often enter into contracts for security services, which may be supervised by a small proprietary force and follow procedures established at the corporate level.

Plant security personnel maintain liaison with local, county, and state law enforcement agencies in the investigation of internal theft and criminal incidents, and the police frequently perform their duties at manufacturing plants. Defense industry security personnel maintain an active liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Defense Investigative Service, Office of Industrial Security, and are required to report all security violations and theft of classified materials and products to the Defense Supply Agency.

**Museums and Libraries**

**Museums**

In 1974 the aggregate investment of fine arts museums in the United States and Canada was estimated to be several billion dollars, including permanent collections of artifacts and art objects of $4.5 billion, loan collections worth $550 million, and special exhibitions that averaged more than $10 million per year. Although fine arts museums have a favorable loss excess ratio from an insurance point of view, the annual insurance premiums for their collections are estimated to be $12 million. Nearly half of the total budget for special exhibitions at major art museums, as well as 10 to 20 percent of normal operating budgets, is expended on preventative security measures.

The criminal problems most frequently encountered by fine arts museums are theft of collection pieces and the inadvertent purchase of works of art fraudulently presented as authentic or that have been stolen. Museums also experience order-maintenance and vandalism problems, but the trend toward charg­ing admission fees has reduced these problems. The most common thefts involve small items that are easily concealable and items that can be easily converted to cash. In some cases, precious metals and gems are cut away from artifacts, reset, and sold.

The theft of valuable items and small concealable items occurs during the hours when the museum is open to patrons, but the theft of the more valuable items generally occurs at night.

Theft of major works of art involve a complex distribution channel often consisting of a thief, a buyer, and a middleman or art dealer. The return of stolen art is often impeded because once a dealer has acquired a work of art, few people question the integrity of the dealer. They assume that any work of art purchased from the dealer is authenticated and not stolen. In some cases, invaluable masterpieces have been stolen and held for ransom. Museum directors and insurance companies point out that the loss of a work of art or an artifact can never really be valued because the historical, cultural, and artistic value of the artifact is inestimable.

The problem of stolen or fraudulent art is met in various ways. In the art trade, the theft...
Such systems are generally used in conjunction with security personnel. Security officers are extensively maintained in libraries to deter disorderly behavior and vandalism and to maintain a fire and security watch against other forms of theft. Some libraries also have security cameras or other devices for monitoring the facilities.

The mutilation of books is also a problem but has been minimized somewhat by providing photocopying machines at the libraries so that material can be reproduced rather than removed from the books. Larger circulation libraries sometimes have extensive intrusion- and fire-detection systems. One method that is being used to retrieve library books is the automated system whereby overdue books are allowed to be returned without penalty.

Libraries

Libraries experience a major problem with the theft of books. It is difficult to assess the dollar volume of losses in libraries due to book theft because many libraries infrequently or never take inventory. As with books, the value of certain library losses cannot accurately be estimated, for example, the theft of special collections, rare or historic books, out-of-print or irreplacable books, manuscripts, and periodicals. Generally, these invaluable books and periodicals are kept in closed stacks and are subject to restricted-use policies and close supervision. The introduction of electronic marking of books and the use of detection sensors at main exits have significantly reduced the incidence of book theft.

Certain security difficulties are unique to railroads, as illustrated by the following examples:

- A freight train loaded at one rail point of the country may move over several different railroads to its final destination in another part of the nation. However, the railroad police are not examined unless an exceptee is a tarp or road during the movement of the car or is listed on a special bulletin as a high-value load.
- Many railroads pass through the most crime-ridden areas of our largest cities. When in similar and high rail yards which are difficult to monitor or control railcars.
- Railcars belonging to railroads are usually stolen and "re-registered" through common carrier companies or other railroads.
- The physical nature of railroads makes them vulnerable to acts of vandalism by teenagers, especially by juveniles.

Security techniques utilized by railroad police to prevent theft and criminal damage as well as to enhance security include:
- Radio-equipped foot and vehicle patrol, including canine patrols
- Patrolled by helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft;
- Exchange of intelligence information with public law enforcement agencies;
- Employee security-consciousness programs;
- Investigation of criminal acts committed on or in railroad property;
- Criminal investigations aimed at prosecuting persons for criminal acts against railroads;
- Railroads have been termed "parapublic." However, the railroad police are proprietary private security forces.

Railroad security administrators suggest that engineering improvements to rail cars and rail yards may be required to carry out the effective control of the most likely targets. Several factors make it difficult to cover by saturation of manpower:
- The industry's relationship with public law enforcement agencies can be improved.
- The exchange of intelligence information with public law enforcement agencies.
- The establishment of railroad police departments.

Retail establishments

Retail establishments comprise perhaps the largest segment of business with which the average citizen comes in contact on a daily basis. Retail establishments include not only general merchandise departments, specialty stores and appliance stores but also drug and food stores, appliance and furniture stores, radio and television stores, hardware stores and lumberyards, restaurants and fast-food shops, automobile dealers, and downtown businesses. The Department of Commerce estimates that retail merchant losses amounted to $6.8 billion in 1974, an 11 percent increase over 1973. This loss is almost twice that experienced by other industries such as manufacturing, wholesale, services, and transportation.

The types of retail businesses that absorb the greatest losses are general merchandise and apparel, $3.3 billion; food stores, $1.2 billion; and department stores, $0.6 billion. Loss figures in retail businesses are generally reported in terms of gross sales or receipts and inventory shortages as a percentage of them.

The Cost of Crimes Against Business

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and medium-sized goods, cosmetics, phonograph records and tapes, and portable radios. Based on the National Retail Merchants Association estimates that the average shortage ratio for retail sales is 2 percent. The average shortage ratio per type of retail business varies from 1 to 5 percent, with some of the high-loss items ranging as high as 10 percent. An average shortage ratio of 3 percent for drugstores is nearly at the margin of profit, any higher percentage being uncompetitive higher prices.

Many retail security experts and store executives believe that the problem of internal theft by employees is as great or greater than shoplifting and other forms of external theft. Although the Small Business Administration indicates that only 13 percent of retail losses are due to employee theft, others estimate that it accounts for as much as 50 to 60 percent of all retail losses. Employee theft occurs primarily by sales, stockroom, cashier, shipping and receiving, and delivery and mail order personnel who steal actual cash and store merchandise. For example, a customer may act in collusion with a customer who is shoplifting, ticket switching, or writing over prices on sales tickets. A buyer may take a markdown on items without recording them or set in collusion with vendors in shorting goods or taking kickbacks on inflated prices. Store personnel may also be responsible for the creation of fraudulent charge accounts or merchandise department accounts in computers.

Large retailers, a major internal theft problem, operate on such a large scale that management has found it necessary to maintain an organized surveillance operation. Shopping techniques include concealing items in handbags and shopping bags, stealing additional items identical to the one purchased, occupying the salesclerk with a special order or request while others remove items, wearing stolen garments under clothes and switching labels, exchanging bulky or expensive street clothing for expensive store clothing in fitting rooms. Modern merchandising techniques, which change the item classification problem in retail operations by emphasizing customer accessibility to merchandise. As a result, many departments are managed primarily by sales, stockroom, cashier, shipping and receiving, and delivery and mail order personnel who steal actual cash and store merchandise. For example, a customer may act in collusion with a customer who is shoplifting, ticket switching, or writing over prices on sales tickets. A buyer may take a markdown on items without recording them or set in collusion with vendors in shorting goods or taking kickbacks on inflated prices. Store personnel may also be responsible for the creation of fraudulent charge accounts or merchandise department accounts in computers.
improved merchandise display
cooperation with law
association shows conventions, parades, festivals, public arenas. In recent years, long-term seasonal basis (for example, to a professional football, basketball, or hockey franchise) is part of the facility's operations.

security directors and operations managers of such facilities agree that sporting events attract a crowd different from that of other events. Sports spectators tend to exhibit more antisocial behavior, i.e., they get caught up in the emotion, competition, and aggressiveness of an athletic contest. The major problems at sports events involve restriction of ticket sales and crowd control. A major problem is the theft of high-value merchandise and exhibits from theft and vandalism. The theft and redistribution of stolen goods is involved in actual theft and redistribution of stolen goods as well as in the consummation of goods in the businesses it controls or owns.

The remainder of the theft occurs primarily as the theft of employee collusion among themselves or with persons outside the transportation system and organized fences. Transportation security experts point to the large dollar amount and size of claims as indications of the extent of employee theft. Fences are often organized along both geographic areas and product lines; the operation can be very small, with a single person acting as a broker, or quite large, with several persons having cash readily available for the purchase of stolen goods. Thieves can generally expect to receive a fixed percentage of the value of stolen goods and freight rates to absorb the loss in operating expenses.

security measures undertaken by the transportation industry include the use of proprietary and/or contract guards in shipping, receiving, and storage areas; access-control systems and perimeter fencing; and rubber products. The Office of Transportation Security, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), estimates that the sources of cargo theft: losses are hijacking (5 percent); breaking and entrapping and external theft (10 percent); and internal theft, collective theft, and unexplained shortages (85 percent). Cargo theft occurs at all points of the distribution system, including loading and unloading facilities, transportation, receiving and shipping platforms, storage areas, depots, distribution centers, including terminals. It is estimated that organized crime activities account for 19 to 20 percent of the value of all cargo stolen. Cargo theft and redistribution of stolen goods as well as in the consummation of goods in the businesses it controls or owns. The remainder of the theft occurs primarily as the theft of employee collusion among themselves or with persons outside the transportation system and organized fences. Transportation security experts point to the large dollar amount and size of claims as indications of the extent of employee theft. Fences are often organized along both geographic areas and product lines; the operation can be very small, with a single person acting as a broker, or quite large, with several persons having cash readily available for the purchase of stolen goods. Thieves can generally expect to receive a fixed percentage of the value of stolen goods and freight rates to absorb the loss in operating expenses.

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posts in selected locations. High-security storage bins or areas have been established by various modes of carriers for high-value and high-loss classes of commoditity; security guards, electronic surveillance, and intrusion-detection systems are used extensively in these high-security areas. Due to the high incidence of employee involvement in cargo theft, security officials believe that obtaining criminal history information on applicants for employment is essential to screening out potential thieves.

DOT makes several publications available on cargo theft countermeasures. These publications were developed from a series of studies that DOT conducted on pilferage, theft, and hijackings. In addition, DOT administers a special City Campaign Program in 15 key cities that are heavily industrialized and have major transportation centers for goods. In these cities, representatives of the major motor carriers shipping the largest volume of goods. In this program DOT establishes working relationships among carriers and government and law enforcement agencies, with emphasis on prevention of theft and prosecution of perpetrators as well as on increased accountability of goods.

The American Trucking Association has a Trucking Industry Committee on Theft and Hijacking that sponsors preventive programs for its member State trucking associations. Similarly, the Transportation Cargo Security Council is involved in the analysis of cargo theft and the development of preventive programs. The membership of this independent organization includes carriers, shippers, consignees, insurers, and labor groups.

Mass Transit Systems

Millions of Americans depend on public transit systems as their primary or only mode of transportation. Public transit systems evolved from the congested living conditions in major cities at the beginning of the 19th century with the establishment of horse-drawn streetcars that were eventually replaced by cable and electric cars, buses, and the rapid transit system of today. Gradually, these early transit systems began to experience the crime incidents of the congested urban environment in which they operated, including vandalism, roving gangs of youths, and pickpockets. By the early 1950s several States had authorized transit companies to establish security forces, some with full police authority. As crime has increased in the Nation over the last 20 years, it has increased at comparable levels in transit systems. Consequently, most transit systems have established full-time security forces with full or limited police powers.

A 1970 survey, conducted by the American Transit Association of 37 transit systems in the United States and Canada, estimated that between 33,000 and 37,000 criminal incidents occur each year on transit systems.6 The same survey placed the value of property loss and destruction due to vandalism on transit systems at between $7.7 and $10 million annually.

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INTRODUCTION

Private security personnel now outnumber public law enforcement officers in this country. The dramatic growth rate of the private security industry over the past 15 years has far surpassed that of public law enforcement. This rapid increase can be attributed primarily to the growing concern of Americans for the welfare of their personal, business, and industrial holdings in light of constantly spiraling crime rates.

As crimes against property and person continue to rise and place staggering demands upon public law enforcement agencies, the private security industry should be prepared to take on added responsibilities to both its clients and the public. To meet these responsibilities, it should examine its past performance and current operations and identify goals and standards that will lead to provision of higher quality services. Because the ability of the industry to provide its services depends largely on the competence of its personnel, improvements in the quality of service directly correlate with improvements in the quality of personnel.

Both in numbers and dollars, personnel is the most significant part of the private security industry. As indicated in Appendix 9, recent estimates suggest that more than a million persons in this country are employed primarily in the occupation of private security. Countless others profess private security to be a form of secondary employment. These personnel account for approximately half the total expenditures for providing private security services, an estimated $3 billion annually. The magnitude of these figures alone shows the potential for improving private security's effectiveness through its greatest resource—its personnel. To advance its professional status and to meet the challenge of crime, the private security field should focus on the quality of its personnel.

The selection process is a crucial step in determining personnel quality. Inferior or improper selection methods lead to inferior personnel. Therefore, the standards in this chapter are devoted to the establishment of sound, realistic personnel selection guidelines that successfully can be used by the private security industry as a whole and by individual employers.

Goal 1.1 provides the basis for the selection process. It stresses the selection of employees who are qualified, efficient, and career minded. It also points out the importance of developing incentives to attract the most qualified personnel for all levels of operation. Because personnel are the foundation of the private security industry, the importance of their careful selection cannot be overemphasized. Unqualified personnel may make errors of judgment; inefficient workers reduce productivity; uninterested personnel will have high absenteeism; and all of these, in turn, ultimately will result in high turnover rates and poor-quality services.

On the other hand, qualified personnel who can do the job assigned and enjoy their work will not only perform more effectively but also create a favorable public attitude toward private security.

If the industry is to attract and retain high-quality personnel, employment incentives should be developed. Goal 1.2 indicates that salaries for private security personnel need to be commensurate with job qualifications and competitive with salaries for other occupations. Career paths also should be developed in order to attract and motivate quality personnel. Such career path development is particularly important at the entry level.

Preemployment screening is a vital component of the selection process. Because of the nature of the private security employer's obligations to the public, to his employer, and to private security clients, the applicant's capability and integrity should be determined prior to employment and/or assignment. Preemployment screening procedures should include face-to-face interviews, honesty and other job-related tests, and intensive background investigations. Although the preemployment screening process is costly, it can prevent even more costly and sometimes dangerous errors stemming from the employment of dishonest or incapable personnel.

An exchange of job-related information pertaining to prospective personnel can aid in the process of preemployment screening. High mobility of em-
employees between companies is a problem in the industry, but if employers exchange data about criminal history records to assist in the selection process. As set forth in the selection standards, governments should cooperate with employers in making this information available.

Private security employers need to cooperate with the Federal Government by complying with equal employment opportunity guidelines. Statistics indicate that females and minority group members are becoming an increasingly significant part of the private security labor force. These trends should be encouraged and supported by selection standards that preclude discrimination based on sex, race, creed, or age. Minority members can increase the pool of qualified applicants for private security employment.

Another valuable screening tool is the employment application. A common problem in the selection process has been the rapid transition from the time the applicant walks in the door, to assignment, to the job. Although there is a recognized need to place personnel on the job rapidly, appropriate applications should be used and essential information verified and supported by selection standards that preclude discrimination based on sex, race, creed, or age. Minority members can increase the pool of qualified applicants for private security employment.

Perhaps one of the most important standards for the selection process is the establishment of minimum preemployment qualifications. Too often employers view the selection process as merely a vehicle for finding "bodies" to fill predetermined slots. Qualification standards that are either ill conceived or nonexistent. Clearly, the lack of minimum standards has had a detrimental effect on the industry's image and, even more importantly, on its ability to deliver efficient, effective services. If this image is to be improved and the quality of services upgraded, minimum qualifications should be adopted throughout the private security industry.

The qualifications listed in Standard 1.8 are considered by this report to be the minimum requirements for prospective private security personnel. They basically establish age, education, conviction record, and physical criteria for operational-level personnel. As are the public police, the industry is evaluated by citizens on the basis of one-to-one contact with an employee. Private security personnel functioning at the operational level day after day establish the image of the industry. These representatives of the industry should possess, at the minimum, basic qualifications indicating their suitability to carry out the protective duties for which they were employed.

In summary, personnel selection is the basic component for increasing the industry's effectiveness in crime prevention. Implementation of personnel selection standards can form the basis for other components, such as training, ethical behavior, education, and acceptance and approval by regulatory boards. The selection of personnel who are well suited to the job smooths the way for implementing all other industry standards and is important for the industry's ability to maintain good relationships with public law enforcement agencies, consumers of security services, governmental agencies, the public, and others. Therefore, strengthening personnel ultimately will result in the increased availability of the private security industry to prevent crime in the Nation.

Considering the significant crime deterrent potential of personnel selection standards, it is important that employers, consumers of security services, public law enforcement officials, and government agencies recognize their specific roles and responsibilities in the selection process. Private security employers, of course, have the most obvious role because they directly implement the standards through acceptance or rejection of applicants. Consumers of security services, however, also can assume a significant part in implementing personnel selection standards by demanding that employers follow established guidelines. Because government agencies, especially regulatory boards, hold licensing, and/or registration powers, they also can demand adherence to standards before granting licenses and/or registration powers. Law enforcement officials can cooperate within their legal and ethical constraints to provide private security employers with vital information to assist background investigations. The smooth integration of these standards into the selection process will depend on how well each of these agencies and individuals carries out its role.

Goal 1.1
Selection of Qualified Personnel

Primary emphasis in the screening process should be placed on selecting qualified personnel who will perform efficiently and preferably make a career in private security.

Commentary
Private security has experienced significant national growth and has become a multibillion-dollar-a-year business, but it is generally recognized that its personnel quality is often inferior and personnel turnover rates excessively high. Actions to correct this situation can be made at the personnel selection level.

As pointed out in Effective Personnel Security Procedures, executives in all fields need to take action to improve the personnel situation:

- Some facts are so obvious as to be commonplace. The accepted fact that people are the most important asset of any business (") is generally recognized. The key to the success of personnel security programs is the amount of professional and technical training provided.
- Management should be made aware of this lack of incentive and should promote benefits to attract more competent personnel.

The lag between the acceptance of this fact and the implementation of procedures that would assist in such professional training is one of the most important reasons that private security personnel turnover rates are so high.

The key to the success of personnel security programs is the amount of professional and technical training provided. If more of the government and private security industry was aware of this fact and the implementation of procedures that would assist in such professional training is one of the most important reasons that private security personnel turnover rates are so high.

One significant step that can be taken immediately is to provide more incentives to attract the most competent personnel. According to the RAND Report, a survey of private security employees indicated that 40 percent accepted a private security position for the following reason: "I was unemployed, and this was the best job I could find." Management should be made aware of this lack of incentive and should promote benefits to attract more competent personnel.

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One significant step that can be taken immediately is to provide more incentives to attract the most competent personnel. According to the RAND Report, a survey of private security employees indicated that 40 percent accepted a private security position for the following reason: "I was unemployed, and this was the best job I could find." Management should be made aware of this lack of incentive and should promote benefits to attract more competent personnel.
Incentives also are needed to attract career-oriented personnel at all levels. Career Development for Law Enforcement notes that “career-development emphasis is placed on developing managers and not on career growth of all employees per se.” If the present high turnover rate of private security personnel is to be curbed, career growth needs to be emphasized at all levels. The lack of potential career growth is especially evident at the operational levels.

If the private security industry is to improve its competitive position in the marketplace and provide better services to the public, it should actively seek qualified, efficient, and uninterested. Only in this way will the industry be able to meet the increasing need for higher quality services.

**Selected References**


**Related Standards**

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Goal 1.1:

1.2 Commensurate Salaries
1.3 Preemployment Screening
1.4 Employer Exchange of Information
1.5 Equal Employment Opportunity
1.6 Application of Employment
1.7 Availability of Criminal History Records
1.8 Minimum Preemployment Screening Qualifications
2.1 Training in Private Security
2.2 Job Descriptions
2.3 Ongoing Training
2.4 Training of Supervisors and Managers
3.1 Code of Ethics
3.2 Employer Responsibilities
8.3 Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses
8.4 Degree Programs for Private Security
9.6 Regulatory Board Access to Criminal Record Information
11.2 Registration Qualifications
11.6 Registration Renewal

**Goal 1.2**

**Commensurate Salaries**

In an effort to reduce the attrition rate of the industry, salaries for private security personnel should be commensurate with experiences, training and/ or education, job responsibilities, and other criteria related to the job performed.

**Commentary**

To attract and keep high-quality personnel, most private businesses offer competitive salaries commensurate with an individual’s experience, education, skills, responsibilities, performance, and other job-related variables. Many also offer merit or incentive pay plans and other benefits to raise performance levels and to promote job satisfaction.

In contrast, private security personnel—who assume important responsibilities in the performance of their duties and often must make serious decisions affecting the safety of life and property—often are only paid minimum wages regardless of qualifications or other job-related criteria. There is also a noticeable lack of incentives or opportunities for advancement for private security personnel. These factors have created serious problems in attracting and retaining quality personnel.

Unless salaries and incentives for private security personnel are upgraded, many qualified applicants may look elsewhere for employment. “A Survey of Experiences, Activities, and Views of the Industrial Security Administration Graduates of Michigan State University” indicated that 32 percent of the graduates were not employed in the private security field because of “lack of employment opportunities” and 22 percent because of “better pay and/or opportunities in other fields.” Fewer than half the qualified graduates actually took jobs in industrial security.

Present high attrition rates also indicate that wages and incentives need improvement if quality personnel are to remain employed in the private security industry. It would be more cost effective in the long run to offer competitive salaries rather than to absorb the high costs of constant personnel turnover. The present attrition rate in the industry is primarily caused by resignations rather than by deaths or retirements.

If these conditions are so well known and so commonplace, why, then, are private security salaries so low? The following excerpt from an article in Security World portrays one view—that qualification standards are not adequate:

"The only qualification for the lowest salaried guard is that he is alive and breathing... any additional abilities raise the price significantly. Management personnel in all aspects of the industry, who were interviewed in an attempt to discover
the reason for the lack of adequate salaries, indicated
that low salaries are due to clients or higher man-
agement personnel being unwilling to pay for higher
quality security services. Accepting their statements
at face value places heavy responsibility for low
salaries on persons outside the industry. The private
security industry, however, cannot take a passive
position; it should take the initiative to adequately
inform the public of the dangers inherent in this
situation. In many instances, private security per-
sonee have sole responsibility for protecting assets
worth millions of dollars; in other cases, they are
armed with weapons that can cause serious injury
or death. Rather than merely providing low-cost
protection, the private security industry should in-
form the public of these facts.

Attempting to identify a recommended national
minimum wage would, at best, be questionable be-
cause local salaries are related to multiple factors,
such as general economic aspects of the area, labor
pool availability, and competitive aspects of private
security services. However, the following data were
gathered from three different sources to illustrate
the need for wage improvement in the industry:
The Other Police reported that security guards
received only $80 to $84 weekly gross pay in the
Cleveland, Ohio, area in 1974. However, on a
more positive note, it also reported that in 1969
573 of 3,888 guards had salaries in excess of
$10,000 a year.

Members of the American Society for Industrial
Security provided the data on wages documented in
Table 1.1. It readily can be seen that operational-
level personnel, both proprietary and contractual,
receives minimal wages.

Table 1.2, from Security Letter, indicates that salary
problems are not limited to the operational
levels of the private security industry. Compared
to national salary medians for comparable employ-
ment, the security executive earns less than most
of his counterparts in other occupations.

It is recognized that salaries must be upgraded
in order to attract and maintain high-quality per-
sonee and that no realistic, nationwide minimum
wage can be recommended due to varying economic,
labor, and competitive factors. Therefore, it is recom-
manded that major efforts be initiated by the secu-

Selected References
1. Brennan, Dennis T. The Other Police. Cleve-
land, Ohio: Governmental Research Institute, 1975.
2. "Exclusive Fourth Annual Report on Com-
pensation of Corporate Loss Prevention Manage-
3. Larkin, Hayes Carlton. "A Survey of Experi-
ences, Activities, and Views of the Industrial Secu-

ity Administration Graduates of Michigan State
State University, 1966.
4. Private Security Task Force. "American So-
ciety for Industrial Security (ASIS) Survey Results." (See Appendix 1 to this report.)
5. Schnabolk, Charlel. "Protection Against a

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applica-
table in implementing or providing additional informa-
tion regarding Goal 1.2:
1.1 Selection of Qualified Personnel
1.3 Preemployment Screening
1.5 Equal Employment Opportunity
1.6 Application of Employment
1.8 Minimum Preemployment Screening Qualifica-
tions
2.1 Training in Private Security
2.2 Professional Certification Programs
2.3 Job Descriptions
2.4 Training Related to Job Functions
2.5 Preassignment and Basic Training
2.6 Arms Training
2.7 Ongoing Training
2.8 Training of Supervisors and Managers
2.10 State Boards to Coordinate Training Efforts
3.1 Code of Ethics
3.4 Employer Responsibilities
8.3 Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses
8.4 Degree Programs for Private Security
Table 1.1. Comparison of Wage Data for Subcategories of Private Security Personnel, Proprietary and Contractual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 16: What is the approximate monthly wage for the following security personnel within your enterprise?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None Employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigators/detectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle management/supervisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner/general manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| | Prop. | % | Cont. | % | Prop. | % | Cont. | % | Prop. | % | Cont. | % | Prop. | % | Cont. | % | Prop. | % | Cont. | % | Prop. | % | Cont. | % |
| Unarmed uniform guards | 16 | 9 | 7 | 39 | 24 | 18 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 29 | 17 |
| Armed uniform guards | 18 | 15 | 3 | 19 | 17 | 15 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Investigators/detectives | 14 | 16 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 18 | 12 | 14 | 6 | 14 | 12 | 3 | 38 | 39 |
| Middle management/supervisors | 3 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 14 | 23 | 27 | 26 | 36 | 18 | 16 | 19 |
| Owner/general manager | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 9 | 49 | 46 | 34 |

* Sample size: Proprietary N = 888; contractual N = 469.
Source: Private Security Task Force, "American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) Survey Results." (See Appendix 1 to this report.)
Table 1.2. National Salary Medians of Selected Job Titles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Title</th>
<th>Small Companies*</th>
<th>Medium Companies*</th>
<th>Large Companies*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant/Factory Manager/Supervisor</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Internal Auditor</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit and Collections Executive</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Relations Executive</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>21,800</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief EDP Executive</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>18,400</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Security</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee Training Manager</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>18,300</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Director</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>18,700</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Assistant</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>11,700</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Services Executive</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>15,100</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Size designations of small, medium, and large generally are related to sales: less than $100 million (small), $100 to $500 million (medium), and more than $500 million (large). In some cases, however, payroll, production, and number of employees were used to determine classification. Salaries do not indicate the wide variance possible according to specific situations, organizational policies, and exceptional individuals.


Standard 1.3
Preemployment Screening

In order to determine whether prospective personnel are trustworthy and capable, preemployment screening should be initiated. Preemployment screening should include screening interview, honesty test, background investigation, and other appropriate job-related tests.

Commentary

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Regulatory Guide (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) of January 1974 clearly states the rationale for this standard:

Preemployment screening provides a means to determine whether a prospective security employee is trustworthy and capable of performing the security tasks that will be assigned to him.

Private security work demands that employees be both reliable and capable when carrying out assigned tasks and meeting emergencies. Individuals who are dishonest, corrupt, lazy, or emotionally or physically unstable, for example, are unfit for employment in the field.

The intent of this standard is to preclude the employment and/or assignment of personnel until a reasonable preemployment screening has been conducted. Preemployment screening techniques should be used to detect characteristics that would prevent or hinder satisfactory job performance. Individuals who display such characteristics should be rejected for employment. In a field as vital to the safety of individuals and property as security work, the time to discover persons unsuitable for the job is before they are hired. This timely discovery can eliminate costly, dangerous, and even deadly mistakes. For example, a newspaper article from Phoenix, Ariz., April 20, 1975, reported that a 70-year-old guard was killed trying to stop a grocery store robbery. The article explained that the security guard had informed his employing agency that he was 50 years of age. Some form of preemployment screening possibly could have eliminated exposing this guard to the hazard that ultimately caused his death. Many employers accept statements made on application forms without attempting verification. These employers are failing in their responsibilities to both their clients and the public.

Although a thorough, complete screening process is desirable, the extent of preemployment screening is logically controlled by a number of factors, such as the following:

1. The amount of time available for the screening process, from the time of application to the time the employee is scheduled to start work;
2. The amount of funds an employer can economically allocate for the screening process; and
3. The availability of the needed information.
Employers often are required to fill vacancies on very short notice. Several security workers interviewed indicated they started work within 24 to 72 hours after interviewing. Obviously, no thorough screening can be accomplished in this timeframe. In these instances, however, requiring proof of stability is the process can be accomplished in this timeframe.

Economically, the employee must logically limit the scope of screening because of employment instability in some segments of the private security industry. The RAND Report (Vol. 1) indicated turnover rates as high as 200 percent, and other studies have documented similarly high rates. Although other sections of this report deal with this problem, its effect on the screening process must be recognized; high turnover rates result in added expense to screen new applicants for vacated positions. Although full field investigations and extensive credit and criminal record checks may not always be economically feasible because of high turnover, employers must take reasonable screening steps to ensure that capable, trustworthy employees are hired.

Availibility of necessary information is another limiting factor. The private security industry has very limited access to criminal justice records. Also, in many States, fingerprint record searches on new security personnel take 6 to 9 months.

Despite the above limitations, every effort should be made by employers to develop complete and effective preemployment screening procedures. Use of screening interviews, honesty tests, and background investigations as measures of trustworthiness usefulness of the screening techniques should be tempered by logic and economics. Used together, however, these three techniques form a sound nucleus for preemployment screening.

The screening interview also allows the employer to assess the applicant's character. Although such an assessment is admittedly highly subjective, the applicant's demeanor and attitude during the interview may indicate the need for more careful background investigation or even psychological testing.

Honesty Test
For the purpose of this standard, honesty tests refer only to written tests that allow employers to gain insights into a prospective employee's honesty without extensive costs. In general terms, honesty tests are designed to measure trustworthiness, attitude toward honesty, and the need to steal.

Several paper-and-pencil honesty tests were reviewed for this report, this indepedent section determined that the tests appear to have high face validity. Several validity and reliability studies sup­porting such tests have been published in scholarly journals. However, it should be noted that much of the supporting evidence is based on subsequent detection-of-deception examinations of persons who had taken the written honesty tests. Nevertheless, honesty tests used with background investigations should furnish a reliable method of determining honesty.

Background Investigation
Background investigations should be conducted prior to employment and/or assignment. The em­ployment application information stated in Standard 1.6 and the qualifications stated in Standard 1.8 provide guidance regarding background investiga­tions. Valuable background data can also be attained through employer exchange of information (Stand­ard 1.4).

Too often, employers do not conduct any background investigations or investigations are sketchy. Many employers use only the telephone and/or form letters for background information. Such meth­ods do not provide sufficient data for effective verification and evaluation. Although costly, field investiga­tions should be encouraged to provide valuable information about an individual's character and ability that cannot be gained by other means.

Selected References
Standard 1.4

Employer Exchange of Information

Employers should cooperate in exchanging information on previous work performance and other data relating to selection criteria.

Commentary

Although the current legal restraints on pre-employment screening may seem overwhelming, much improvement can be made. One area in which there is great potential for improvement involves employer cooperation in exchanging previous work performance information and other data related to selection criteria. Studies made for this report (Appendix 2) of licensed private security workers in New Orleans, La., and St. Louis, Mo., revealed that 15 percent and 20 percent, respectively, of the employees had previous private security employment. Based on these percentages employer cooperation could be extremely important in obtaining previous work performance records and other data for almost one out of every five applicants, giving the employer a practical frame of reference to establish the applicant's suitability for the job.

Mutual cooperation among private security companies can help improve overall personnel quality. Employers often possess information about a former employee's work performance or character that would be helpful and pertinent to another employer in the personnel selection process, because there is an extremely high movement of individuals from one employer to another in the private security industry. Thus it is especially important to share such information when the person being considered is unsuited for private security employment. For example, a private security employee fired for stealing should not be placed in another private security firm.

An exchange of information among employers can not only speed the selection process but also help professionalize the private security industry and protect clients and the public. Because of the competitive nature of the industry, however, many argue that such an exchange of information is unrealistic and could hurt a cooperating company if others fail to do likewise.

The need for total cooperation must be understood and petty jealousies put aside for the betterment of the industry. Employers should realize that the advantages from cooperative efforts benefit everyone involved. Indeed, because such cooperation can help eliminate unqualified, inefficient, and unreliable personnel, the industry, the public, clients, and employers would all benefit through increased efficiency and more effective crime prevention. Even applicants would benefit, because prompt exchange of information between employers can help qualified personnel quickly gain employment in new locations and continue their career in private security.

It is the responsibility of the prospective employer to initiate the actions necessary for any exchange of information. If an applicant indicates previous private security employment on the application form, the employer should contact the previous employer for information regarding past work performance and other selection criteria. As referred to in Security Management Systems, information about the following personal characteristics should be exchanged:

1. Honesty
2. Dependability
3. Loyalty
4. Judgment
5. Initiative
6. Appearance

Where permitted by law, information should be exchanged on the following additional items:

1. Arrest and/or conviction information,
2. Use of drugs and/or alcohol,
3. Poor interpersonal relations with clients or fellow workers,
4. Poor credit rating,
5. Improper use of force, and
6. Psychological unsuitability.

Cooperative arrangements for exchange of information can also be made between the public law enforcement and private security sectors. The previously mentioned studies (Appendix 2) show that 6 percent of the private security personnel in New Orleans and 7 percent in St. Louis had previous public law enforcement experience. Many applicants for law enforcement employment likewise have experience in private security. Cooperation in exchanging pertinent work-related data about former employees could enhance the screening process for both sectors. The constant interaction, in both operational and administrative matters, between public and private security personnel should provide a strong motivating influence of mutual interest in the effort to obtain high-quality personnel.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 1.4:

1.1 Selection of Qualified Personnel
1.2 Commensurate Salaries
1.3 Preemployment Screening
1.4 Equal Employment Opportunity
1.5 Minimum Preemployment Screening Qualifications
1.6 Application of Employment
1.7 Availability of Criminal History Records
1.8 Conduct of Private Security Personnel
Standard 1.5

Equal Employment Opportunity

Employers should comply with equal employment opportunity guidelines and other Federal, State, or local guidelines that preclude discrimination based on sex, race, creed, or age.

Commentary

Many minority group members are qualified for jobs in the private security field. Sound personnel procedures require that employers seek qualified personnel regardless of sex, race, creed, or age, because these factors are of no importance to the employee's responsibility to select applicants who can perform effective and efficient security services.

Private security employers should, therefore, constantly seek ways to attract qualified minority applicants for open positions.

The Federal Government, through legislation and administrative regulations, provides equal employment opportunity (EEO) guidelines for employers, such as the rules and regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These guidelines are provided to promote job opportunities for minority groups and to eliminate discriminatory hiring and employment practices.

Private security employers should develop procedures to ensure that their selection activities are within these guidelines. They also should keep abreast of court and administrative decisions to make certain their current selection practices do not violate the law.

By examining past employment records, individual employers can determine if qualified minority workers are applying for jobs and being utilized within their work forces. If these records indicate a lack of minority employers, steps should be taken to ensure that current hiring practices are free of discrimination based on sex, race, creed, or age.

An attempt at evaluating past equal opportunity employment practices of the private security industry as a whole would, at best, be speculative, because only recently have accurate statistics become available. However, a representative indication of the present status of minority employment within the industry can be obtained from pertinent studies and reports and may prove helpful for comparative analyses. Perhaps the most current of such studies are those conducted for this report (Appendix 2) of licensed private security workers in New Orleans, La., and St. Louis, Mo.

Most Federal, State, and local EEO guidelines suggest that the proportion of minorities employed by an agency equal the proportion in the available labor market. The studies mentioned above found that 52 percent of the private security workers in New Orleans are Caucasian, 40 percent are black, and 8 percent are classified as "other," which includes Spanish-Americans. In St. Louis, 50 percent of the private security workers are Caucasian and 50 percent are black. These percentages are proportionate with race ratios in the two cities.

The study also gathered information on the age of private security employers in two cities. The following table, based on the data developed in the study, illustrates that age is apparently not a criterion for denial of employment in either city.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at Time of Employment</th>
<th>New Orleans</th>
<th>St. Louis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 and under</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 64</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 to 74</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 and over</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

The study also found that females account for 7 percent of the private security personnel in both New Orleans and St. Louis. Because women only recently have begun to enter police and security work, this data are difficult to evaluate. Undoubtedly, changing social attitudes and the women's liberation movement will make a noise and more qualified women available in the private security labor market. The following excerpts from the RAND Report (Vol. II) and the Wall Street Journal indicate their potential is already being realized by private security employers:

Many of the larger private security firms claim that the relative dearth of and employment of female security workers has risen over the past several years, especially in hospitals, educational institutions, and retail trade. (RAND Report, Vol. II)

Female guards gain more acceptance in private security firms leading companies say 10% to 15% of their guards are females. In the past, from less than 5% a few years ago. Officials say guards perform tasks such as providing protection in courts and armed with less than 5% a few years ago. Officials say guards perform tasks such as providing protection in courts and armed with tear gas to deters... (Wall Street Journal, Vol. II, R-870/DOJ, 1972)

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 1.5:

1. Selection of Qualified Personnel
2. Commissions
3. Employment Screening
4. Preemployment Testing
5. Application of Employment Practices
6. Availability of Criminal History Records
7. Minimum Employment Screening Qualifications
8. Training Related to Job Functions
9. Code of Ethics

Selected References

An employment application should be used to provide a basis for the screening process and should reveal the following information:

1. Full name.
2. Aliases.
3. Proof of age.
4. Statement of U.S. citizenship or work permit number for aliens.
5. Current residence and phone number.
6. Prior residences.
7. Educational background.
8. Previous employment.
9. Armed Forces of the United States Report of Transfer or Discharge (DD214), if appropriate.
10. A set of fingerprints.
11. Record of traffic and criminal convictions and pending criminal charges and indictments.
12. Credit information relevant to the job.
13. A set of fingerprints.

Commentary

The employment application form often is the only formal document that appears in an employee's personnel file. It is the only document that many employers have providing information about the applicant's work history, educational preparation, and former residences. Particularly during the pre-employment screening process, it often is the only information employers have readily available to assist investigations. Every applicant should be required to complete all items on the application, as well as provide the following documents:

1. Proof of age.
2. Proof of education.
3. Armed Forces of the United States Report of Transfer or Discharge (DD214), if appropriate.
4. Other job-related documents.
5. Current residence and phone number.
6. Prior residences.
7. Educational background.
8. Previous employment.
9. Physical conditions as they relate to the job, including age, weight, and height.
10. Record of traffic and criminal convictions and pending criminal charges and indictments.
11. Credit information relevant to the job.
12. A set of fingerprints.

A basis for background investigations, but also guards against verbal misrepresentation by the applicant. For example, The Other Police cites a case of a five-time convicted felon who, by simply stating he had no criminal record, was able to get four out of six jobs he sought. A written application form would have made it more difficult for this applicant to misrepresent himself, if for no other reason than the psychological implications of a written statement.

The employment application form often is the only document that appears in an employee's personnel file.
Standard 1.7
Availability of Criminal History Records

Criminal history records for offenses, specified by statute or other authority as grounds for denying employment, should be made available to employers to assist them in the screening of private security personnel.

Commentary

Access to criminal history records is one of the key issues in personnel screening. Many employers have expressed concern over their inability to access criminal history information:

- Disseminated through support under this title shall contain
- Other lawful purposes. In addition, an
- Data where arrest data is included
- Place
- All such information is kept current
- Disposition as well as
- Within
- Maintained in violation of this title,
- Additional enforcement officials. This would provide a uniform
- Framework of reference for government officials and pri-
- Vate security employers.

The fact that an applicant has an arrest or conviction record should not be automatic grounds for disqualification. In some instances, particularly with regard to minor offenses, persons with records may perform most satisfactorily in private security serv-
- In practice, it is important that employers have access to the information to enable them to make sound determinations regarding both employment and job assignment. Employers should also assume the responsibility to ensure that the information is used only for the intended purpose—to determine an individual's suitability for private security em-

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 1.7:

1.1 Selection of Qualified Personnel
1.3 Preemployment Screening
1.5 Equal Employment Opportunity
1.6 Application of Employment
1.8 Minimum Preemployment Screening Qualifications
3.2 Conduct of Private Security Personnel
3.3 Reporting of Criminal Violations
9.6 Preemployment Background Check to Criminal Record Information
11.2Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel
11.3Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel
Minimum Preemployment Screening Qualifications

The following minimum preemployment screening qualifications should be established for private security personnel:

1. Minimum age of 18;
2. High school diploma or equivalent written examination;
3. Written examination to determine the ability to understand and perform duties assigned;
4. No record of conviction, as stated in Standard 1.7;
5. Minimum physical standards:
   a. Armed personnel—vision correctible to 20/20 (fifteen) in each eye and capable of hearing ordinary conversation at a distance of 10 feet with each ear without benefit of hearing aid;
   b. Others—no physical defects that would hinder job performance.

Commentary

In order to improve the effectiveness of private security personnel, minimum preemployment screening qualifications should be established. At present, criteria for employment vary among employers, if they exist at all. This standard presents a set of criteria that can be used by all private security employers in their preemployment screening.

The qualifications suggested are minimum. Certain employers may wish to establish stricter criteria, depending on the nature of assignment. Also, the qualifications are directed to operational personnel and generally would be inappropriate for supervisors, managers, and other specialized personnel whose duties would require more advanced knowledge and/or experience.

Age Requirements

A minimum age of 18 is recommended for all personnel. Public law enforcement agencies have constantly been hampered in recruitment by the lack of opportunity to employ sworn personnel immediately upon completion of high school. Likewise, the private security industry should not restrict itself from obtaining qualified personnel by setting unrealistic minimums or maximum ages. Many individuals are capable of performing as efficiently at age 18 as at age 21. The military services, for example, have effectively used personnel in security assignments under the age of 21 for many years.

Because the establishment of career paths is an important need in the industry, age requirements need to be low enough to attract qualified applicants before they are committed to other careers. It is likely that an individual reaching age 21 would have already identified career aspirations, and a job in private security would, at best, be only a secondary interest. As mentioned previously in Goal 1.1, personnel will function more effectively when they are performing the job they want to do.

Educational Requirements

The RAND Report (Vol. I) stated that, in response to a survey questionnaire, two-thirds of the regulatory agencies indicated that minimum educational requirements should be mandatory for private security personnel. Of the two-thirds favoring minimum educational requirements, one-third indicated that private security personnel should be high school graduates. Others thought education beyond high school would be a more appropriate requirement for some categories. For example, two recommended college education for investigators; two proposed polygraph-school graduation for lie-detection examiners; one believed that supervisors should have some college training. Significantly, one-third of the survey respondents thought no minimum educational requirement should be established.

For the purpose of this standard, educational requirements are classified in two main categories: (1) basic educational qualifications and (2) ability to understand and perform duties assigned. The basic educational qualifications can be met by a high school diploma or an equivalent written examination designed to measure basic educational aptitudes. The employer should be careful, however, to utilize only those tests that have been proven valid and reliable.

The second educational requirement—the ability to understand and perform duties assigned—is determined through a written examination. Here, again, the employer should use only validated tests. Furthermore, there should be a close cause-effect relationship between the tests and the job description in accordance with the following Equal Opportunity Employment Commission guideline on employment testing procedures:

The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed ability test" to mean a test which fairly measures those knowledge or skills outside the private security employee's job description, and he may, therefore, not be able to handle the emergency situation. Also, in the furtherance of the development of a professional private security industry, high-school-level education is considered necessary in the judgement of the Task Force.

Conviction Records

Conviction records, except for certain minor offenses, should preclude private security employment. Standard 1.7 discusses this topic fully and points out the responsibilities assumed by an employer security personnel to the public and to the role of crime prevention. For the public to have confidence in private security personnel, employers should not hire persons of high moral integrity. In order to facilitate implementation of this standard, this report makes the following recommendations which are necessary to the cooperation of government agencies in supplying pertinent conviction records.

Physical Requirements

Physical requirements should not be unnecessarily restrictive. In most cases, specific physical qualifications, such as height and weight, would be inappropriate. The results of a study released by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Police Foundation, and published in the Dec. 1, 1975, issue of Crime Control Digest, confirm that...
height requirements, for example, have little relation
to performance and tend to unnecessarily reduce the
available pool of qualified applicants:

The authors say that they found no data, either from
their survey of five police departments or from their search
of literature on the subject, that show that the height of a
police officer is related to performance.

Height requirements can vastly reduce the pool of
applicants who have personal qualities needed by police
departments. For example, 56 percent of young adult males and 99
percent of young adult females would be excluded from
employment by a minimum height requirement of 5 feet 9
inches.

Although the authors of this study were hampered
in their research by the lack of a large comparative
population, the results point the way to a selection
system without height requirements.

However, private security employers should not
totally disregard physical standards or take them
lightly. One employer cited in the RAND Report
(Vol. 1) said, "Some standards are a joke. While we require a
physical exam for employment, if the
man can take three steps he passes the physical."
In general, physical requirements should be deter-
mimed by the nature of the job the applicant would
be performing. Any physical defect that would inter-
fere with ability to perform assigned duties would
disqualify the applicant.

Differentiation should be made physical qualifica-
tions for armed personnel and others. Obviously,
good eyesight and hearing are vital to anyone who
uses a weapon; therefore, specific vision and hear-
ing qualifications should be established for armed
private security personnel in consideration of pro-
tecting both themselves and the public.

Selected References

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dations, Vol. 1, R-869/DOJ. Washington, D.C.: Govern-
2. "No Effect on Performance Seen But Study
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ton, D.C.: Washington Crime News Services, Dec. 1,
1975.
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Washington, D.C.: Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, 1975.
of Licensed Private Security Personnel in Two
American Cities: New Orleans, La., and St. Louis,
Mo." (See Appendix 2 to this report.)
5. Schnabolk, Charles, "Protection Against a

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applica-
tible in implementing Standard 1.8:

1.1 Selection of Qualified Personnel
1.2 Commensurate Salaries
1.3 Preemployment Screening
1.4 Employer Exchange of Information
1.5 Equal Employment Opportunity
1.6 Application of Employment
1.7 Availability of Criminal History Records
2.3 Job Descriptions
11.2 Registration Qualifications
11.3 Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel
INTRODUCTION

Training is a vital determinant of job performance. Yet, every major research project reviewed and every study conducted for this report points to a serious lack of personnel training at all levels of private security. This situation needs to be reversed if the industry is to assume a respectable and effective role in crime prevention.

Chapter 1 emphasizes the importance of personnel to the private security industry and outlines the steps necessary to select qualified personnel who have strong potential for providing security services efficiently and effectively. Although the selection of well-qualified personnel is crucial for the advancement of private security, equal emphasis must be given to the importance of training the selected personnel in order that they might be provided with the knowledge, skills, and judgment needed for effective performance. The aim of this chapter is to establish realistic standards that promote the development, implementation, and maintenance of training programs for all private security personnel.

As noted in the licensing and registration chapters of this report, private security regulatory agencies at the State level can play an important role in encouraging and enforcing training. If States take the initiative to require training, they should be responsible for using whatever resources are appropriate to ensure that such training becomes available. As will be discussed later, two standards focus on the role of State participation in the administration, guidance, and delivery of private security training. However, the industry itself has a major role in seeing that training is provided. Private security companies should strengthen and expand their training programs and create new training opportunities. Cooperation among companies and personnel also can help ensure that a wide variety of training becomes available for all employees.

In developing training programs, it is important, at the outset, to recognize that all levels of training are interrelated. Preassignment and basic training for operational personnel is, in and of itself, an important and progressive step. But the full potential of such training cannot be realized unless supervisors and managers are trained to lead and motivate their personnel. Recognizing this relationship, Goal 2.1 provides a framework for the standards that follow. Based on the great responsibilities assumed by private security personnel in both crime and noncrime situations, the goal calls for training at all levels of the industry and stresses the need to allocate the resources necessary to make such training applicable and meaningful.

To achieve this objective, the industry must do more than provide the most minimal of training services. Unfortunately, the attitude of a former contract guard supervisor illustrates that of many employers:

Everyone wants trained guards. Untrained employees are . . . a cause for wasted money and lost business and a danger to themselves and others. But, the demand for manpower is so great, the wages and bids so low, that training standards have to be altered, with a little misrepresentation to salt it. (Institute for Local Self-Government, Private Security and the Public Interest, Berkeley, Calif.)

If the industry is to improve its capacity for crime prevention and gain the respect and confidence of the public, these negative attitudes need to be replaced through positive training measures. Although the problems of low wages and high training costs are recognized, the private security industry cannot afford to let these factors blunt the overriding need for training at all levels.

The professional certification programs outlined in Goal 2.2 can do much to promote training throughout the industry. These programs offer great potential for increasing the professionalism of the industry through training. However, in developing certification programs, the private security professional associations need to be aware that certification should be job related in order to have significant impact. Job-relatedness is essential for the success of any training program. In this respect, Standard 2.3 stresses the importance of preparing job descriptions as the first step in developing meaningful training programs. Because private security personnel perform extremely varied services, clear job descriptions
are invaluable tools for selecting and assigning personnel and for developing training programs related to the specific functions of each type of security position. Once the activities and responsibilities of a job are identified, the objectives and content of training programs fall readily into place and courses can be designed, presented, and evaluated, as outlined in Standard 2.4.

The second step in program development is establishing standards for training. Standard 2.5 contains guidelines for preassignment and basic training. A minimum of 4 hours of preassignment training is recommended for all private security personnel, including investigators or detectives, guards or watchmen, armored car personnel and armed couriers, alarm system installers or servicers, and alarm respondents. In addition, during the first 3 months of assignment, these personnel should be required to complete a basic training course of a minimum of 32 hours.

Disagreement exists in the private security industry as to the importance of preassignment training. Many individuals in the industry will accept and support it as a reasonable and viable standard. Some will argue that the requirements are overly optimistic and may cause financial hardship on smaller companies. Others will assert that the requirements are totally inadequate and should include extensive contact hours in a broader curriculum. These types of reactions were anticipated in establishing this standard.

The private security industry performs a necessary and important function in our society, and it is not the purpose of this standard to set overly stringent requirements that would drive competitive companies from the business. But the compelling need to upgrade training throughout the industry cannot be ignored. Therefore, considering the present state of training, it is believed that Standard 2.5 provides a realistic starting point for improving the quality of private security services through the training of its personnel. It also is believed that, in the long run, the cost of training will pay for itself through greater efficiency and effectiveness.

In summary, adequate training for private security personnel at all levels is a matter of immediate concern. If the industry is to meet the increasing demands placed on it because of rising crime and overcrowded law enforcement agencies, it should concentrate on positive measures for advancement. One such measure—and a crucial one—is training. The decisions they make are no less important than those made at the operational level. Through training, supervisors and managers can develop the ability to maximize security resources, and thereby improve the overall operations of the industry.

Previous research has revealed that training for private security personnel is either minimal or nonexistent. Recent studies support these findings. For example, a survey of members of the American Society for Industrial Security revealed that only 68 percent of the respondents provided formal training for new employees and only 48 percent required annual formal training. The results of the "Survey of Consumers of Private Security Services in the Greater Philadelphia Area" were even more discouraging: Only 18 percent of new security personnel and 23 percent of supervisors received classroom training. Also, approximately 50 percent of the respondents answered "did not know" or failed to respond to the questions about training. Significantly, the same respondents ranked "inadequate training" as their most frequent and important problem.

The important responsibilities of private security

Goal 2.1
Training in Private Security

The responsibilities assumed by private security personnel in the protection of persons and property require training. Training should be instituted at all levels to ensure that personnel are fully prepared to exercise their responsibilities effectively and efficiently.

Commentary

The demand for private security services has reached new heights in the United States. Due to rising crime trends, the Nation is increasingly aware of the need for additional protection of life and property. Private security personnel are called upon more and more to fulfill this need, and in so doing, assume major responsibilities to employers and the public. Many times, when performing their varied duties, security personnel are confronted with problems that call for instantaneous action. The magnitude of their responsibilities is clearly stated in The Police Yearbook, 1973:

"The huge numerical [sic] superiority of private guards working today in the community makes it inevitable that in many instances containing crimes or emergency situations will fall to the first contacted individual on the scene. His reactions to the situation determine the difference between successfully protecting the lives and property or disaster."

Clearly, private security employees should be trained in view of the serious consequences that could arise from mistakes or inaction. Supervisory and managerial employees also need training to deal effectively with the problems of operational personnel. The decisions they make are no less important than those made at the operational level. Through training, supervisors and managers can develop the ability to maximize security resources, and thereby improve the overall operations of the industry.

The important responsibilities of private security
personnel demand that this situation be changed. To make better use of private security resources in crime prevention and to protect consumers, employers, and the public, as well as employees themselves, training should be instituted at all levels of the private security industry.

To attain this goal, all employers should allocate the necessary personnel and physical resources to make training relevant and meaningful. Security companies also should develop more cooperative efforts—for example, combined training would be cost effective and encompass a larger number of personnel. Finally, governmental agencies also should take an active role by setting progressive training requirements and taking a responsibility for delivery of training.

Failure to reach the goal of increased training will have a serious detrimental impact on the credibility and reliability of the private security industry. Conversely, its attainment should lead to increased acceptance of the industry as a major force.

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Goal 2.1:

1. Selection of Qualified Personnel
2. Commensurate Salaries
3. Professional Certification Programs
4. Job Descriptions
5. Training Related to Job Functions
6. Preassignment and Basic Training
7. Arms Training
8. Ongoing Training
9. Training of Supervisors and Managers
10. State Authority and Responsibility for Training

Selected References

4. Private Security Task Force. "American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) Survey Results." (See Appendix 1 to this report.)

Goal 2.2

Professional Certification Programs

Professional associations should study the feasibility of developing voluntary certification programs for private security managerial personnel.

Commentary

Certification programs can strengthen the role of private security personnel and increase the professionalism of the industry. In addition, such programs encourage training and motivate career-minded employees. Other professional groups have used certification as a means of promoting personnel quality. Private industry professional organizations should follow their example.

The benefits of certification to both employers and employees are apparent. Employers could use certification as an independent evaluation of a person's qualifications for employment and/or promotion. Employees would benefit, because, in effect, certification would be an endorsement of competence, providing the opportunity for better positions.

The industry has indicated support for pursuing the establishment of certification programs. The American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) surveyed 5,000 of its members in the spring of 1975. Responses were received from 40 percent (2,031) of its members, with 91 percent (1,815) indicating that there should be a professional certification program for security personnel. Additionally, 89 percent (1,657) indicated they would consider applying for security certification, and 16 percent (1,697) responded in favor of ASIS having the responsibility for conducting the program. (See Table 2.1 for details of the survey.)

The development of certification programs that will be accepted as valid and reliable is a recognized problem. To achieve validity and credibility, the legal, medical, and teaching professions have established a pattern that can be useful as a model. Their requirements incorporate three key concepts: (1) an appropriate educational background; (2) appropriate examinations, developed through input from professional organizations; and (3) legal sanctions. From a practical and historical perspective, the legal sanction concept has been the key ingredient. Legal sanctions are not recommended as part of the certification program administrators would have to be able to provide information indicating that the certificate is job related. If the certificate does not become a
generally accepted credential, it will serve no useful purpose.

ASIS, through its Professional Certification Board, has developed "A Proposal to Establish a Program for Certification of Security Professionals," which should provide a useful guide for other professional security organizations wishing to set up certification programs. The requirements for testing, experience and education, and endorsement are as follows:

II. TESTING REQUIREMENT

1. Successful achievement of passing grades on a battery of eight (8) tests, each approximately fifty (50) minutes in length shall be necessary. These batteries, chosen from a list of nineteen (19) tests, shall include three (3) required and five (5) optional tests on the theory and principles in the following fields of security, protection and loss prevention:

- A. Security Management
- B. Physical Security
- C. Investigations

2. OPTIONAL SUBJECTS

- A. Legal Aspects of Security
- B. Protection of Proprietary Information
- C. Transportation and Cargo Security

D. Fire Resource Management
E. Restaurant and Lodging Security
F. Banking Security
G. Educational Institutions Security
H. Protection of U.S. Classified Defense Information
I. Protection of Special Nuclear Materials and Facilities
J. Retail Security
K. Computer Security
L. Health Care Facilities Security
M. Disaster Control
N. Public Utilities Security
O. Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Control
P. Credit Card Security
Q. Technical testing shall be accomplished at least annually in each A.S.I.S. region and in conjunction with the annual national seminar of the American Society for Industrial Security.

C. Certification fees shall be established, based upon the costs of the certification program.

III. EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS

A. An earned associate degree from an accredited college or university and five (5) years security experience, at least half of which shall have been in responsible charge of a security function, or

B. An earned bachelor's degree from an accredited college or university and four (4) years security experience, at least half of which shall have been in responsible charge of a security function, or

C. An earned master's degree from an accredited college or university and three (3) years security experience, at least half of which shall have been in responsible charge of a security function, or

D. An earned doctoral degree from an accredited college or university and three (3) years security experience, at least half of which shall have been in responsible charge of a security function.

E. The (10) years security experience, at least half of which shall have been in responsible charge of a security function.

F. "Responsible Charge" shall mean that charge exercised by an individual who makes decisions for the successful completion as to specific methods or techniques. An applicant must not have held a supervisory position in the positions(s) on which the application relies shall have included responsibility for independent decisions or acts.

IV. ENDORSEMENT REQUIREMENT

A. Each applicant for certification as a Professional Certification Board shall be endorsed by an individual who makes decisions for the successful completion as to specific methods or techniques. An applicant must not have held a supervisory position in the positions(s) on which the application relies shall have included responsibility for independent decisions or acts.

B. Certified Protection Professionals shall be endorsed by either a member of the Professional Certification Board or a person who shall himself already have been certified as a Professional Enforcement of an endorsement shall apply to that person only while the endorsement is being employed by the place on the application for certification are complete and accurate, and, that in the considered opinion of the person making the endorsement, the applicant is fully qualified for consideration for certification.

Another certification program, which may be used for reference purposes, is that initiated by the International Association for Hospital Security to provide basic training for operational hospital security personnel. A senior member of the International Association for Hospital Security must certify to the association's training committee that a person has completed the 40-hour basic course and recommend that person for certification. Russell Colling, chairman of the training committee, stated that approximately 21 persons had been certified and 130 enrolled for certification as of Jan. 1, 1976.

Other private security associations should initiate activities to develop similar programs for their designated operational and management personnel. The feasibility of these associations and their members should coordinate their efforts with the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, International Association of Chiefs of Police, and others that have initiated certification programs.

To achieve this goal, the concentrated efforts of a wide variety of private security interests is necessary. The leadership of professional associations and their members should coordinate their efforts with their respective individuals in the security field to provide meaningful, validated, job-related certification programs that receive general acceptance by all parties. The establishment of accepted certification programs could be a positive contribution to the professionalization of the private security industry.

Selected References


3. International Association for Hospital Security, "Basic Training Certification," Chicago, Ill.: Merchandise Mart Station, P.O. Box 3776.

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Goal 2.2.

1.2.2.1. Code of Ethics
1.2.2.2. Nonresident and Credit Cards and Courses
1.2.2.3. Degree Programs for Private Security

1.2.2.1.2. Professional Certification Board estimates expenditures of $90,000 for the first year, $53,000 for the second year, and $44,300 for the third. Persons responsible for the development of such programs can obtain assistance in budgetary estimates and developmental factors from organizations, such as the American Bar Association, American Medical Association, International Association of Chiefs of Police, and others that have initiated certification programs.

To achieve this goal, the concentrated efforts of a wide variety of private security interests is necessary. The leadership of professional associations and their members should coordinate their efforts with their respective individuals in the security field to provide meaningful, validated, job-related certification programs that receive general acceptance by all parties. The establishment of accepted certification programs could be a positive contribution to the professionalization of the private security industry.

Selected References


3. International Association for Hospital Security, "Basic Training Certification," Chicago, Ill.: Merchandise Mart Station, P.O. Box 3776.
Job Descriptions

Private security employers should develop job descriptions for each private security position.

Commentary

Private security is a complex and diverse field, with personnel assigned to numerous kinds of security functions. Problems in selecting personnel and establishing training programs arise unless job descriptions are carefully prepared.

In the preemployment screening process, it provides a method of determining if an applicant's qualifications match job requirements. This practice should be discouraged, because it detracts from the overall effectiveness and morale of private security personnel.

In summary, the preparation of high quality job descriptions is a critical step in the personnel selection, assignment, and training processes. Without job descriptions, the employee, employer, and person responsible for developing training programs are at a tremendous disadvantage. Further, the need to relate training to the job is vital if training is to carry more significance than mere hours spent sitting in a classroom.

Selected References

4. Private Security Task Force. "American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) Survey Results." (See Appendix 1 to this report.)

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 2.3:

1. Selection of Qualified Personnel
2. Commensurate Salaries
3. Preemployment Screening
4. Minimum Preemployment Screening Qualifications
5. Training in Private Security
6. Professional Certification Programs
7. Training Related to Job Functions
8. Preassignment and Basic Training
9. Arms Training
10. Training of Supervisors and Managers
11. Conduct of Private Security Personnel
12. Reporting of Criminal Violations
13. Employee Responsibilities
14. Maintaining Data on Criminal Activities
15. Policies and Procedures
16. State Regulation of Private Security Uniforms, Equipment, Job Titles
17. National Private Security Resource and Research Institute
subject of procedures for bomb threats should relate
fact, private security employers, eager to place per­
must not occur in a vacuum. Instruction needs to
theoretical discussions are interesting, private secu­
their duties. For example, training for guards in the
that they can directly apply to the performance of
the level at which the guards will be functioning
prepared, and tests given without any direct cause­
are meaningful and relevant to the jobs to be per­
job functions students will be performing.
2. At the conclusion of each section of the cur­
cumulus is geared to preparing personnel for their specific
job functions, the purpose of training will be lost
in its mechanics.
To ensure that training fulfills its purpose, several
factors need to be considered in the process of its
development. One key factor is the preparation of
descriptions. As discussed in Standard 2.3, job
descriptions pave the way for training programs that
are meaningful and relevant to the jobs to be per­
formed. The following guide is provided to further
assist in designing, presenting, and evaluating effec­
tive training programs.
Prior to Determining Curriculum
1. Review job descriptions prepared for the posi­
tions in which the students are or will be employed.
2. Conduct a job analysis to provide a systematic
and precise identification of the skill requirements
of the various job categories identified through
review of job descriptions.
3. Determine the frequency and importance of the
functions so that appropriate training time can be
assigned to prepare the student for the job.

During Curriculum Preparation
1. Ensure that each job function is identified in
both the curriculum and individual lesson plans
within the broad curriculum.
2. Ensure that the teaching objective is to prepare
the student for the job to be performed and not
simply to successfully complete the course's final
test.
3. Contact present employees who perform the
functions, their supervisors, and others who can pro­
vide input into the subject matter.

During Curriculum Presentation
1. Use audiovisual resources, practical exercises,
and case studies to relate the subjects to the actual
job functions.
2. At the conclusion of each section of the cur­
riculum, develop a feedback mechanism to ensure
that the students are prepared for the next phase
of instruction. For example, in preparing the student
for the job function of "controlling personnel access
to a given location," the student could receive
information in the following order:
   a. Legal and/or policy authority to restrict
   b. Techniques for gaining cooperation from others
   c. Use of minimal force to stop persons from
   d. Procedures to follow if someone has ille­

During Curriculum Evaluation
1. Ensure that the testing procedures are aimed
at determining the students' understanding of the
material, so that it can be applied to the job rather
than being mere recitation of abstract facts.
2. Allow students an opportunity to review their
performance through contacts with them and their
supervisors.
3. After the students are on the job, check their
performance through contact with them and their
supervisors.
4. At necessary, provide input at the appropriate
place (i.e., curriculum preparation) to assure that
training remains job related. This is extremely im­
portant because job functions change from time to
time and training should adapt to these changes.
The above guide is intended to serve only as an
explanation of the broad scope of the standards.
Obviously, implementation will be a more compli­
cated process, involving a wide variety of resources,
such as private security personnel, training consul­
tants, psychologists, and others. Persons responsible
for training are encouraged to build and expand
training programs in response to the various job­
related needs of personnel, remembering that job
performance—not test performance—determines the
final effectiveness of any training program.

Selected References
1. Epstein, Sidney, and Richard S. Laymon. 
Guidelines for Police Performance Appraisal, 
Promotion and Placement Procedures. Washing­
ton, D.C.: Law Enforcement Assistance Administra­
2. Fine, Sidney. Functional Job Analysis. Wash­
3. Landry, Frank J., and James L. Fair. Police 
Performance Appraisal. University Park, Pa.: Penn­
Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police 
5. Wilson, Brooks W. The P.O.S.T. Training 
Program—A Review and Critique. Sacramento, 
Calif.: The Commission on Peace Officer Standards 
and Training, 1972.

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be ap­
licable in implementing Standard 2.4:
1.2 Commeratuate Salaries
1.3 Preemployment Screening
1.5 Equal Employment Opportunity
2.1 Training in Private Security
2.2 Professional Certification Programs
2.3 Job Descriptions
2.5 Reassignment and Basic Training
3.2 Training of Supervisors and Managers
2.3 State Authority and Responsibility for Train­ing
2.10 State Boards to Coordinate Training Efforts
3.2 Conduct of Private Security Personnel
8.2 National Private Security Resource and Re­
search Institute
8.3 Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses
8.4 Degree Programs for Private Security
11.2 Registration Qualifications
11.3 Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel

Standard 2.4
Training Related to 
Job Functions

Private security employees should ensure that training programs are designed, presented, and evalu­
ated in relation to the job functions to be performed.

Commentary
The purpose of training is to provide the trainee 
with the necessary skills, knowledge, and judgment 
to perform specific job functions. However, all too 
often training subjects are determined, lesson plans 
prepared, and tests given without any direct cause­
effect relationship to actual job performance. In 
fact, private security employers, eager to place per­ 
sonnel on the job, often are more concerned with 
theoretical discussions of how bombs are constructed and detonated. Unless the curricu­
ulus is geared to preparing personnel for their specific
job assignments, the purpose of training will be lost
in its mechanics.
To ensure that training fulfills its purpose, several
factors need to be considered in the process of its
development. One key factor is the preparation of
descriptions. As discussed in Standard 2.3, job
descriptions pave the way for training programs that
are meaningful and relevant to the jobs to be per­
formed. The following guide is provided to further
assist in designing, presenting, and evaluating effec­
tive training programs.

Prior to Determining Curriculum
1. Review job descriptions prepared for the posi­
tions in which the students are or will be employed.
2. Conduct a job analysis to provide a systematic
and precise identification of the skill requirements
of the various job categories identified through
review of job descriptions.
3. Determine the frequency and importance of the
functions so that appropriate training time can be
assigned to prepare the student for the job.
Standard 2.5

Preassignment and Basic Training

Any person employed as an investigator or detective, guard or watchman, armed car personnel or armed courier, alarm system installer or service, or alarm respondent, including those presently employed and part-time personnel, should successfully:

1. Complete a minimum of 8 hours formal preassignment training.
2. Complete a basic training course of a minimum of 32 hours within 3 months of assignment. A maximum of 16 hours can be supervised on-the-job training.

Commentary

Other standards have highlighted the lack of training in the private security industry. This lack has inspired much criticism, most of it directed specifically at the failure of the industry to provide adequate training. The industry has barely taken a step in this direction.

Due to the complexity of functions performed by private security personnel, the final determination of subject content for preassignment training will need to be made by employers and regulatory agencies; however, the following topical outline is recommended as a general guide. It is based on a model originally prepared by the Private Security Advisory Council, included in their Model Private Security Licensing and Regulatory Standards, and designed for professionals in the private security industry.

Private Security 8-Hour Preassignment Training Course

Section I—Orientation: 2 hours that include the following topics:

- What is security?
- Public relations
- Appearance
- Maintenance and safeguarding of uniforms and/or equipment
- Notetaking/Reporting
- Role of public law enforcement

For $1.60 per hour I wouldn't stick my neck out again. Anybody who does is crazy. I stand around looking cute while the bell is going on.

Private security professionals do recognize the importance of training. The previously mentioned ASIS survey revealed that 79 percent of the respondents believed training standards were "very important," 15 percent, "somewhat important," and 1 percent, "not important." Yet, until specific standards are required, private security training is not likely to improve.

Preassignment Training

This standard recommends that training requirements be initiated for all operational private security personnel. A RAND survey of private security personnel in California revealed that 65 percent of the respondents had received no training prior to beginning work. Because the instruction received at this stage familiarizes the employees with the responsibilities of the job and establishes certain basic skills and concepts, it is recommended that every private security employee successfully complete 8 hours of preassignment training before commencing work.

Due to the complexity of functions performed by private security personnel, the final determination of subject content for preassignment training will need to be made by employers and regulatory agencies; however, the following topical outline is recommended as a general guide. It is based on a model originally prepared by the Private Security Advisory Council, included in their Model Private Security Licensing and Regulatory Standards, and designed for security professionals in the private security industry.

The following model preassignment training programs are intended to explain how the program could be implemented for guards or watchmen or alarm respondents. Again, specific recommendations are not established because of the complexity of training needs, but the outlines may prove helpful as a general guideline. The hour designation used in all training standards is a 50-minute block of instruction that is standard for training and education curriculums.

Model Preassignment Training Program for a Guard or Watchman

Section I—Orientation (2 hours) Minutes

- What is security? 15
- Public relations 15
- Appearance 10
- Maintenance and safeguarding of uniforms and/or equipment 20
- Notetaking/Reporting 15
- Role of public law enforcement 10

Section II—Legal Powers and Limitations (2 hours)

- Prevention versus apprehension 40
- Use of force 25
- Search and seizure 15
- Arrest powers 20

Section III—Handling Emergencies (2 hours)

- Procedures for bomb threats 40
- Procedures during fires, explosions, floods, riots, and so forth 60

Table 2.2, from the Industrial Security (Vol. II), further illustrates the wide range and general inadequacy of initial training in a sample of 11 private security companies. Obviously, some additions in content were indicated to be expanded to meet the broader spectrum of personnel included in this standard.

Other findings from the RAND Report (Vol. II) indicate that a large percentage of private security guards do not know their legal powers to detain, arrest, search, or use force. Frequently, in fact, they lack understanding of the basic policies and procedures of their functions. The following comment from a former guard, who was beaten during a robbery, vividly illustrates the need for additional training:

Section III—Handling Emergencies: 2 hours that should include the appropriate topics pertinent to the job functions to be performed by the employee:

- Crimes in progress
- Procedures for bomb threats
- Procedures during fires, explosions, floods, riots, and so forth
- Responding to alarms

The following model preassignment training programs are intended to explain how the program could be implemented for guards or watchmen or alarm respondents. Again, specific recommendations are not established because of the complexity of training needs, but the outlines may prove helpful as a general guideline. The hour designation used in all training standards is a 50-minute block of instruction that is standard for training and education curriculums.

Private security 8-hour preassignment training course.
### Table 2.2: Current Private Security Guard Training Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Talking with Superiors (hours)</th>
<th>Read Manual</th>
<th>View Films/Slides (hours)</th>
<th>Class (hours)</th>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Firearms Range</th>
<th>Trained on Previous Job (hours)</th>
<th>By Supervisor (hours)</th>
<th>By Fellow Employee (hours)</th>
<th>Written Post Orders (hours)</th>
<th>Total Initial Training (hours)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company A: Small Contract Guard Firm</td>
<td>1 1/2 to 2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 1/2 to 1</td>
<td>8 to 16</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8 to 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B: Small Contract Guard Firm</td>
<td>1 to 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3 1/2 to 4</td>
<td>8 to 16</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8 to 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C: Medium Contract Guard Firm</td>
<td>1 to 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1 1/2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3 1/2 to 4</td>
<td>8 to 16</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company D: Large Contract Guard Firm (full- and part-time)</td>
<td>1 to 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>4 1/2 to 6</td>
<td>1 to 8</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company E: Large Contract Premium Guard Firm</td>
<td>1 to 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40 to 80</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>4 1/2 to 6</td>
<td>8 1/2 to</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company F: Large Contract Guard Firm</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1 to 8</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company G: Large Contract Guard Firm</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1/2 to 1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company H: Large Contract Guard Firm</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:*
- Initial Prework
- Initial On-the-Job Training
- Initial Initial Training (hours)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Contract</th>
<th>Patrol</th>
<th>Guard</th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>19 to 20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>1 to 2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3 to 4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19 to 20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>2 to 4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Occasionaly</td>
<td>5 to 7</td>
<td>80 to 120</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>80 to 120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>1 to 4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3 to 6</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>163 to 166</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>½ to 1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Mandatory</td>
<td>½ to 2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23½ to 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Section IV—General Duties (2 hours)

- Patrol
- Fire prevention and control
- Safety

### Model Preassignment Training Program for an Armed Car Guard

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section I—Orientation (2 hours)</th>
<th>Minutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is security?</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public relations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearance</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance and safeguarding of uniforms and/or equipment</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonassignment/Reporting</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of public law enforcement</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section II—Legal Powers and Limitations (2 hours)</th>
<th>Minutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preventing apprehension</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of force</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and seizure</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest powers</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section III—Handling Emergencies (2 hours)</th>
<th>Minutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency situations (an overview)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining the threat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the sidewalk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In customer's premises</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the truck</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political terrorists versus conventional criminal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb threats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section IV—General Duties (2 hours)</th>
<th>Minutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fire prevention</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic accidents</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules and regulations</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniforms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment (familiarization)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored truck</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handtruck</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats and bags</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaults</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deportment</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In implementing the suggested preassignment training programs, the following figures should be noted:

1. All topics in Sections I and II should be covered in some portion of the 2 hours assigned.
2. Only pertinent topics in Sections III and IV need to be included in the 2 hours assigned.
3. Supervised, on-the-job training cannot be used to meet preassignment training.

## Basic Training

Upon successful completion of preassignment training, the employee should be allowed to begin work, but training should not stop at this point. Additional training is needed to provide the skills, knowledge, and judgment necessary for efficient, effective job performance. Although the importance of this training cannot be overemphasized, it is recognized that the high cost of training may place a heavy economic burden on some employers. Therefore, a realistic minimum of 32 hours of basic training is recommended in addition to preassignment training. This training should be completed over a 3-month time period and may include a maximum of 16 hours on-the-job training.

Although many may believe that the 32-hour training standard is totally inadequate, it is a progressive step in terms of the amount of training presently provided. Admittedly, it is far short of the 400 hours recommended in 1973 for sworn police officers by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. It should be understood, however, that Federal, State, and local tax dollars support training for public law enforcement officers, but only limited monetary resources are available to provide training for private security personnel. Ultimately, a large portion of the cost would have to be borne by the consumer. Although, in some instances, employees are required to pay the cost of their own training, this practice is discouraged unless such training is personally sought by the individual to prepare himself for private security employment. The 32-hour minimum basic requirement is believed to be economically feasible for implementation by all; those employers financially capable of providing additional training should surpass the 32-hour minimum.

Basic training requirements, as stated in this standard, should be applied to both presently employed and part-time personnel. Because of the prevalent lack of training throughout the private security industry, many present employees are not adequately prepared for the responsibilities of their positions. Thus, they should be required to have the same training as newly hired personnel if uniform quality of performance is to be achieved. Part-time employees also assume the same responsibilities and need the same amount of training.

By allowing 16 hours of the basic training to be completed on the job, employers can maximize the training effect. However, it is very important that close supervision is provided for employers to meet the intent of the standards. With appropriate supervision, an employee can effectively relate classroom instruction to the specific job performed. In this manner, training can take on added significance and reality.

Responsibility for implementation of private security basic training would rest with employers and State regulatory agencies. As with preassignment training, these persons ultimately would have to determine the actual subjects presented in basic training. However, to provide general guidance in determining curriculums, the following topical outlines for a 32-hour basic course of training is offered:

### Private Security 32-hour Basic Training Course

#### Section I—Prevention/Protection

- Surveillance
- Techniques of searching
- Crimes in progress
- Drug/Alcohol
- Burglary
- Robbery
- Theft
- Wages and benefits
- Organizational structure
- History of employer
- History of armored car industry
- Interface with the financial community
- The company
- The resources
- Wages and benefits
- Driver/guard
- Uniform

#### Section II—Enforcement

- Fire fighting
- Communications
- Crow/counter
- Crimes in progress

#### Section III—General emergency services

- First aid
- Defensive tactics
- Crowd control
- Basic training
- Law enforcement/Private security relationships

#### Section IV—Special problems

- Escort
- Vandalism
- Arson
- Burglary
- Robbery
- Theft
- Drugs/Alcohol
- Shoplifting
- Sabotage

1. This preassigment training program was prepared by the Training Committee of the National Armored Car Association at the request of the Private Security Task Force.
Section I-Prevention/Detection

The National Armored Car Association presented to the Task Force by the Training Committee of the National Armored Car Association.

Providing basic knowledge and skills. This model for teaching the needs; however, 4 classroom hours can be modified in any way that is appropriate to job training should be permissible.

The following models explain how the basic training course can be implemented:

Model 1. Maximum classroom hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classroom hours</th>
<th>Minimum Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevention/Detection</td>
<td>4 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>4 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General/Emergency services</td>
<td>4 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special problems</td>
<td>4 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion: The maximum of hours in each section can be modified in any way that is appropriate to the training needs; however, 4 classroom hours should be provided in each section. For example, an alarm response runner could follow these courses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classroom hours</th>
<th>Minimum Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevention/Detection</td>
<td>20 or 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>4 or 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General/Emergency services</td>
<td>4 or 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special problems</td>
<td>4 or 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Model may use a combination provided a minimum of 4 classroom hours are in each section and the total hours are 32.)

Model 2. Minimum classroom hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classroom hours</th>
<th>Minimum Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevention/Detection</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General/Emergency services</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special problems</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Should include 16 hours of supervised on-the-job training.)

Discussion: In many cases needs can best be met by training the employee in the job setting after providing basic knowledge and skills. This model provides the necessary latitude for these situations.

Model 32-hour Basic Training Course for Armored Car Guards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operating procedures—6 hours</th>
<th>Minutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crew operations</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the terminal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On customer's premises</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored truck and equipment</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packaging</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipting system</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting and forms preparation</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police liaison</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section II—Enforcement (Robbery and violence)—4 hours

| Case studies of attacks on men and equipment | 50 |
| Role playing | 150 |

Section III—General/Emergency services (Emergency response)—4 hours

| Training—10 (minimum medicines | 100 |
| Gunshot | |
| Explosion | |
| Burns | |
| Vehicle accidents | |
| CPR training | |
| Basic firefighting techniques | 25 |
| Basic self-defense | 75 |
| Bomb threats | 50 |
| Bomb recognition | |
| Tactical reaction to a bomb | |
| Customer premises threat | |
| Suspect device located | |
| On the vehicle | |
| In the terminal | |
| To the customer's premises | |
| Use of communications | 50 |

Section IV—Special problems (Emergency drivers)—4 hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deafness driving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy of offensive driving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterambush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night driving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hands-on driver training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Should include at least 12 hours of supervised on-the-job training to include examination and course evaluation.)

Note: A number of industry representatives indicated that more than 12 hours of supervised on-the-job training would be provided to meet employers' needs.)

Discussion: Because the vast majority of armored car guards are armed (and to meet the firearms training of Standard 2.6), the Training Committee of the National Armored Car Association included the following outline as part of the basic training program:

Firearms Training

Company and industry policy on use of weapons

Legal limitations

Firearms safety

Care and cleaning

Basic revolver training

Combat firing

Use of gasperts

Use of shotgun

Qualification and certification

The following list is presented to illustrate the types of specific subjects that could be included in the additional training:

- Background investigation.
- Civil court procedures.
- Civil damage suits.
- Criminal court procedures.
- Collection and preservation of evidence.
- Crime prevention.
- Custody and control of property.
- Fingerprints.
- Follow-up investigations.
- Identification of persons.
- Industrial investigations.

Specific Forensic investigations.

Interviews.

Investigation and security as a profession's vocation.

Investigator's notebook.

Mock crime scene.

Modus operandi.

Motion and still cameras.

Obtaining information from witnesses.

Plaintiff investigations.

Preemployment investigations.

Preliminary investigations.

Preventive security.

Principles of investigation.

Purpose of private investigation.

Report writing.

Retail store investigation.

Rules of evidence.

Search and seizure.

Sources of information.

Surveillance and stakeout.

Taking statements.
• Testifying in court.
• Undercover assignments.

Although many of these topics may seem more important to public law enforcement investigators, they are also relevant to private investigators. For example, many cases developed by private investigators end up in civil court while others are filed in criminal court. Thus, the training of private investigators should properly prepare them for this eventuality.

Guards or watchmen, couriers, alarm system installers or repairers, and alarm respondents may also require additional training, and similar, expanded subject outlines can be developed to provide the needed training. The use of investigators and detectives as one example should not be construed as an indication that they are the only categories of private security personnel who might need specialized training.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 2.5:

1.2.1 Comprehensiveness and Salaries
2.1 Training in Private Security
2.3 Job Descriptions
2.4 Training Related to Job Functions
2.5 General Arms Training
2.6 Ongoing Training
2.8 Training of Supervisors and Managers
2.9 State Authority and Responsibility for Training

2.11.2 State Boards to Coordinate Training Efforts
3.1 Code of Ethics
4.2 Certified Training of Alarm Sales and Service Personnel
8.2 National Private Security Resource and Research Institute
8.3 Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses
8.4 Degree Programs for Private Security
11.2 Registration Qualifications
11.3 Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel

Standard 2.6

Arms Training

All armed private security personnel, including those presently employed and part-time personnel, should:

1. Be required to successfully complete a 24-hour firearms course that includes legal and policy requirements—or submit evidence of competence and proficiency—prior to assignment to a job that requires a firearm.
2. Be required to qualify at least once every 12 months with the firearm(s) they carry while performing private security duties (the requalification phase should cover legal and policy requirements).

Commentary

Armed personnel are defined as persons, uniformed or nonuniformed, who carry or use at any time any form of firearm. The serious consequences, for both employers and employees, when untrained personnel are assigned to jobs that require firearms are obvious. These consequences can be generally outlined as:
1. Self-injury because of mishandling of the weapon.
2. Injury to others, often innocent bystanders, because of lack of skill when firing the weapon; and
3. Criminal and/or civil suits against both employees and employers resulting from the above actions.

A 1974 study by the Institute for Local Self Government revealed that 45 percent of licensed California private security agency heads admitted to providing no formal pretainment instruction in firearms use, and 40 percent indicated a lack of weapons retraining. Even more revealing and disturbing, 55 percent of the employees surveyed said they sometimes carry firearms, but only 8 percent had received firearms training in their present jobs. The RAND Report (Vol. II) indicated that 49 percent of private security personnel carried firearms, but only 15 percent had received any firearms training in their present jobs. The following statement from the Philadelphia Magazine poignantly reveals one employer’s feelings:

"One person who sent two people within two weeks in Philadelphia complained that the detective agencies were taking advantage of the fact that putting guns in their hands and giving them no training. The companies are cleaning up, man, and they ought to spend some of that money to train us."

Statistics and reports, such as the above, emphasize the vital necessity of adequate training for all personnel who are to carry firearms in their private security duties, even if they are instructed never to use them. Employers cannot ignore this need or
Topic II

Room-range outline. In coordinator, Southwestern Illinois Law Enforcement require modification for other weapons or for adapting private security duties unless they can in their use and legal implications.

issued to private security personnel, unless the semitrained personnel. The consequences of this article, 

Police and/ or prior experience can demonstrate com­

Minimum passing score: 43 hits

Distance: as outlined below

Target: silhouette

Courses fired:

Stages of the course:

1. Shooting stance
2. Gripping and cocking the revolver
3. Sighting
4. Trigger control
5. Breathing control
6. Speeding loading and unloading techniques

Range:

1. Principles of marksmanship—2 hours
2. Shooting stance
3. Gripping and cocking the revolver
4. Sighting
5. Trigger control
6. Breathing control
7. Speeding loading and unloading techniques

The intent of this standard is that employees should not be allowed to carry firearms while performing private security duties unless they can demonstrate competency and proficiency in their use.

In attempting to construct an appropriate training course for firearms instruction, many existing courses were reviewed. The recommended course that follows is designed for persons armed with revolvers and may require modification for other weapons or for adaptation to local situations. Dick Mercurio, training coordinator, Southwestern Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, indicated that persons were trained in 1974 and 1975 with about a 90 percent successful completion rate by generally following this classroom-range outline. In general, the recommended course is one hour of classroom and 18 hours of range firing.

CLASSROOM

Topic I

Legal and policy restraint—3 hours
1. Rights of private security personnel to carry weapons and powers of arrest
2. Statutory references
3. Policy restraints

Topic II

Firearms safety and care and cleaning of the revolver—2 hours
1. Nomenclature and operation of the weapon
2. Performance of cartridge
3. Safety practices on duty and at home
4. Range rules
5. Care and cleaning of the weapon

Topic III

Successful completion of written examinations—1 hour
1. At least 20 questions on the above topics with a minimum passing score of 70 percent
2. Should be designed so that persons with other and/or prior experience can demonstrate competency in the subject areas.

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 2.6:

1.2 Commensurate Salaries
1.2.1 Training in Private Security
1.2.2 Job Descriptions
1.2.3 Training Related to Job Functions
1.2.4 Payroll and Basic Training
1.2.5 Ongoing Training
1.2.6 Training of Supervisors and Managers
1.2.7 Security Authority and Responsibility for Training
1.2.8 State Boards to Coordinate Training Efforts
1.2.9 Cods of Ethics
1.2.10 Employer Responsibilities
1.2.11 National Private Security Resource and Research Institute
1.2.12 Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses
1.2.13 Degree Programs for Private Security
1.2.14 Registration Qualifications
1.2.15 Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel
1.2.16 Permanent Registration Card
1.2.17 Registration Renewal
employees may forget certain important aspects of improvements, relating to their job functions. Also, policies, legal aspects of their jobs, and technological conditions change. Therefore, ongoing training in this chapter are designed to give private security personnel the basic skills, knowledge, and judgment needed to perform their duties. But situations and conditions change. Therefore, ongoing training also is needed to keep employees currently informed on issues, such as changes in company policies, legal aspects of their jobs, and technological improvements, relating to their job functions. Also, employees may forget certain important aspects of their training and need to have their memories reinforced. Several methods can be used to provide training on a continuing basis. One method that has been effective for public law enforcement agencies is rollcall training: Personnel receive 15 or 20 minutes of training at the start of a shift. The supervisor usually provides training through lectures, handouts, or other techniques meeting specific needs. The programs can be repeated the necessary number of times.

Another useful ongoing training method is the training bulletin. Such bulletins can be read by personnel during free time, on- or off-duty, with the supervisor answering any questions later. These bulletins can provide inexpensive ongoing training for private security workers. Other possible ongoing training media include slides, audio cassettes, video tapes, films, and correspondence courses. A unique training program in California provides constant updating via recorded training messages. By dialing a phone number, an employee can hear these messages at any time. The messages also are made available in printed form.

Although not all inclusive, the above training methods show the scope of possibilities. Still other possibilities for providing ongoing training should be explored. The best ongoing programs will draw on the strong points from all types of training delivery systems. For example, a slide presentation could be prepared to illustrate a new report form, be supplemented by a training bulletin, and finally discussed at rollcall.

To ensure that employees understand the content of ongoing training, a feedback system should be developed. Feedback can be provided by question-and-answer sessions after rollcall training, true-false or short-answer questions relating to training bulletins, practical exercises, specific responses for programmed instruction courses, and other appropriate techniques.

Ongoing training should not be confused with inservice training. There are certain basic differences between the two. Ongoing training, unlike inservice training, is not classroom-oriented, and does not require a specific number of hours during a specific timeframe. It is a flexible, continuous program that should be individualized. For example, if an employee is efficiently and effectively performing all job functions on a routine basis, there is little need for training. However, if some aspects of the job are not performed routinely, the information received in preassignment or basic training should be reinforced periodically. The main thrust of ongoing training should be to provide training on important subjects that are not part of the day-to-day routine.

The structured formalized classroom nature of most inservice training programs in terms of regulated subject selection and specified classroom hour requirements precludes the type of individualized instruction needed for private security personnel. For example, in a traditional inservice course, the subject of legal aspects of the job may call for classroom time of 2 hours. Depending on the security function being performed, this time requirement may be too little, about right, or too great for an individual employee. Also, because of the structured timeframe, the training may not be presented until after the employee has experienced an on-the-job need for the information.

Inservice training is also considered impractical for private security personnel for the following reasons:

1. Inservice training may not be economically feasible.

2. Employees who are performing their services efficiently and effectively may not need formal inservice training.

3. Formal inservice training often is used to avoid continuous ongoing training.

In summary, the need for training is continuous. Rollcall training, training bulletins, and other training media should be used on a continuous basis to provide private security personnel with the necessary skills, knowledge, and judgment to perform efficiently and effectively.

Selected References
5. Private Security Task Force, "American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) Survey Results." (See Appendix 1 to this report.)

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 2.7:

1.1 Selection of Qualified Personnel
2.1 Commmenatary Salaries
2.2 Professional Certification Programs
2.4 Training Related to Job Functions
2.5 Preassignment and Basic Training
2.6 Arms Training
2.8 Training of Supervisors and Managers
3.4 Employer Responsibilities
8.3 Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses
8.4 Degree Programs for Private Security
Training of Supervisors and Managers

Private security employers should provide effective job-related training for supervisory and managerial employees. Appropriate prior training, education, or professional certification should be accepted to meet this requirement.

Commentary

Because the quality of an organization is determined largely by personnel quality, all personnel should be well trained for their respective roles. Training should not stop at the basic level but should be available and encouraged at all levels.

Private security supervisory and managerial personnel perform important functions, yet there is a definite lack of advanced training for them. Previous private security training is not likely to have prepared them for the responsibilities they now face.

The Police Manager states qualities of a successful police manager that are also applicable to private security supervisors and managers:

1. Patience—the manager must be calm and steadfast, professional in his beliefs, opinions, and actions.
2. Wisdom—the manager must have the ability to judge fairly and equitably the behaviors and actions of his subordinates.
3. Virtue—the manager must show moral excellence, not only by word of mouth, but by his everyday actions in dealing with department problems and his private life.

Many of these qualities can be developed, or in some cases originated, through training. Supervisors and managers need supervisory training if they are to have a positive influence on the personnel they direct. A recent study, "Survey of Consumers of Private Security Services in the Greater Philadelphia Area," contained questions designed to determine the police supervisory level of training for supervisors. The survey results are summarized as follows:

1. Only 23 percent of the supervisors received classroom training.
2. Only 42 percent of the supervisors received on-the-job training.
3. 26 percent of the respondents felt that the amount of training supervisors receive is "inadequate."

Admittedly, the number of respondents to this survey (163) is small and the geographical area limited, but the results do illustrate the lack of supervisory training in the private security industry. It is encouraging to note that 59 percent of the respondents believed that the best security supervisors are persons who "have specialized training, education, or experience in security services."

Defining the scope and depth of supervisory responsibilities, as related to training, is not possible because of the wide variations of duties, assignments, and responsibilities. Some suggestions are:

1. Private security supervisors and managers should perform line functions, such as organizing, directing, and controlling uniformed and nonuniformed personnel.
2. Supervisors and managers should include persons in an organization who have, as an assigned duty, the overall responsibilities for security services. All other supervisors and managers in an organization, regardless of their functions, should be familiar with the responsibilities and duties of private security supervisors and managers.
3. The current lack of training for security supervisors and managers calls for employers to undertake the steps necessary to provide training opportunities.
4. At some future time, requirements for supervisors' and managers' training should be designed along similar lines to those established for paramedics, basic, and firearms training.
5. Although the private security industry offers few training opportunities for supervisors and managers, they are available from other organizations. The Traffic Institute at Northwestern University and the Southern Police Institute, School of Police Administration at the University of Louisville, for example, provide excellent training programs. College and university credit and noncredit courses for supervisors and managers should be accepted as fulfilling the requirements of this standard.

There is a definite need, however, for advanced training, specifically geared to the needs of private security supervisory and managerial personnel. Employers should actively seek such training for their personnel. Existing management training schools might be encouraged to develop appropriate courses of study.

In the meantime, employers should encourage their supervisors and managers to seek existing training opportunities.

Professional private security associations can also encourage training for supervisors and managers. For example, the certification efforts of the International Association for Hospital Security have made a significant contribution to the training of security personnel working in health care facilities; the American Society for Industrial Security, through its professional board certification program, has encouraged high-quality training at all levels of the industry.

The complexities of the problems related to private security supervisors and managers, from identifying who they are through enunciating their training needs, are beyond the scope of this report. Research is needed to determine curriculum issues, to design delivery systems for training, and to evaluate ongoing training activities. However, at this time, employers should make every effort to give supervisors and managers the training they need, and employees themselves should seek any available training to increase their efficiency and effectiveness.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable:

1.1 Selection of Qualified Personnel
1.2 Commensurate Salaries
2.1 Training in Private Security
2.2 Professional Certification Programs
State Authority and Responsibility for Training

A State government regulatory agency should have the authority and responsibility to accredit training schools, approve training curriculums, and certify instructors for the private security industry.

Commentary

The importance of training, in the overall effort to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of private security personnel, requires specific placement within a State regulatory agency of authority and responsibility for overseeing and evaluating training activities. States that have a private security regulatory board should assign this authority and responsibility to that agency.

It is recognized that it sometimes may be advisable to assign this authority and responsibility to the agency within the State responsible for accrediting schools, approving curriculums, and certifying instructors for public law enforcement officers. However, in such cases, it should be recognized that private security personnel have unique training needs. To place these personnel in public law enforcement courses is grossly inappropriate and does not comply with the intent of this standard. The few subjects that might be compatible are the exception, rather than the rule. For example, one of the most consistent criticisms of Ohio's private security training is that the approved course in that State is the same as that required for public law enforcement officers.

Some assistance in developing a model for State regulation of training for private security personnel can be found by examining the statutory provisions in selected States concerning authority and responsibility for public law enforcement training. The following excerpts from the Illinois police training act provide one example:

506. (Selection and certification of schools.) Section 6.

The Board shall select and certify schools within the State of Illinois for the purpose of providing basic training for probationary police officers, and advanced or in-service training for permanent police officers, which schools may be either publicly or privately owned and operated.

507. (Rules and minimum standards for schools.) Section 7.

The Board shall adopt rules and minimum standards for such schools which shall include but not be limited to the following:

a. The curriculum for probationary police officers which shall be offered by all certified schools shall include but not be limited to the following:

i. The curriculum for probationary police officers which shall be offered by all certified schools shall include but not be limited to:

ii. Minimum courses of study, attendance requirements and equipment requirements.

iii. Minimum requirements for instructors.

iv. Minimum basic training requirements which a probationary police officer must satisfactorily complete before being eligible for permanent employment as a local law enforcement officer for a participating local governmental agency.
The Board may, either, amend and rescind such roles and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. A copy of all roles may be obtained by the Secretary of the State, and any person interested in the subject may request a copy. The Board shall also establish a procedure for the certification of instructors or the most relevant curriculums alone in modern, and instruction are poor. Nor can the best qualified instructors be developed with the assistance of the Board. The duration and content of the training program approved, and quality controls should be placed on the record of the training program. As of Jan. 1, 1976, 45 States had some form of legislation concerning training standards. The capability of the State to set and maintain effective law enforcement training standards has been established in most States. The same approach could be followed regarding private security training. Each State should begin to set specific standards, appropriate to State and local needs, to provide cost-effective training for private security personnel. By doing so, States can help ensure that facilities, curriculums, and instructors are adequate to provide high-quality training for these personnel.

Selected References
1. Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter 85, sections 501-516.

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 2.9:
1. Training in Private Security
2. Training Related to Job Functions
3. Preassignment and Basic Training
4. Area Training
5. State Boards to Coordinate Training Efforts
6. Certified Training of Alarm Sales and Service Personnel
7. Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses
8. Degree Programs for Private Security Personnel
9. Certification Qualifications
10. Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel

Commentary
Research conducted for this report reveals that few States have coordinated efforts to make training available to private security and/or persons interested in entering the field. This problem can be corrected by a statewide, coordinated effort to provide such training, using the physical and personnel resources of area vocational schools, colleges, and universities, in addition to the training provided by private companies and proprietary schools.

This standard may seem to conflict with Standard 2.9, which proposes placement of the responsibility and authority to accredit training schools, approve curriculums, and certify instructors with State private security regulatory agencies. However, it is believed that both standards are appropriate and should be separate. Standard 2.9 provides guidance to ensure quality training; the main thrust of this standard is to provide a catalyst for the coordinated efforts of State boards and agencies in providing that training.
Figure 2.1.

Responsibilities of Administration
- Accredit Schools
- Approve Training Curricula
- Certify Instructors

Responsibilities of Coordination:
- Coordinate Training Activities to Maximize Physical and Personnel Resources for Private Security Training
- Provide Guidance to the Private Security Regulatory Board to Fulfill Responsibilities Assigned to Board

Responsibilities of Delivery:
- Provide Physical Resources
- Provide Personnel Resources for
  - Basic Training
  - Firearms Training
  - Supervisory and Management Training
  - Ongoing Training

proprietary schools in providing physical and personnel resources for private security training. Basic- 
ally, these schools should provide opportunities for the following:
- Preassignment Training.
- Basic Training.
- Firearms Training.
- Supervisory and Management Training.
- Ongoing Training.

Consideration should be given to allowing prospective employees to enroll in preassignment, basic, and, if appropriate, firearms training to enable them to qualify for registration by the private security regulatory board before they enter the employment market. This action should benefit both the prospective employee and employer. Because the prospective employee would have successfully completed the required training, the employer can assign him to a job immediately after completion of other registration requirements. Considering the present high turnover rate, low salary scales, and limited opportunities for career advancement, this concept may seem ideal- istic. However, until the opportunity exists, the concept of preparatory training should not be auto-

matically rejected.

The coordinated efforts of various State agencies and boards can significantly enhance the success of private security training. For government agencies to merely establish private security training standards and not fully use all available physical and personnel resources would be self-defeating.

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 2.10:
1.2 Commensurate Salaries
2.1 Training in Private Security
2.2 Professional Certification Programs
2.4 Training Related to Job Functions
2.5 Preassignment and Basic Training
2.6 Arms Training
2.8 Training of Supervisors and Managers
2.9 State Authority and Responsibility for Train-
ing
4.3 Certified Training of Alarm Sales and Service Personnel
8.3 Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses
8.4 Degree Programs for Private Security
9.1 State Regulation

Selected References
Chapter 3
Conduct and Ethics

INTRODUCTION

It has been said that personnel are a business's most valuable asset. How they conduct their activities, to a large extent, determines the success or failure of an enterprise. Competent personnel who perform their duties in a conscientious, ethical manner do much to promote a favorable image and build public confidence. On the other hand, dishonest or unethical personnel create a poor public image and destroy existing trust or confidence in an organization.

Because private security personnel are entrusted with the protection of valuable assets and human lives, ethical standards and a high degree of integrity should be required. An analogy can be drawn with the medical profession. A person engaging the services of a doctor has a right to expect the doctor to exercise good moral and ethical conduct in protecting his life. The consumer of security services should be able to expect the same qualities in the protection of his property and life. Yet, whereas the medical profession and other groups entrusted with protecting life and property have formulated and adopted professional codes of ethics, the private security industry has made little progress in this direction.

As a logical starting point, Goal 3.1 recommends codes of ethics for both private security employers and personnel. Industry-wide development and enforcement of these codes can promote an awareness by employers and employees of their obligations to consumers and society and add significant to their effective performance and sense of pride. The guides for conduct provided in a code of ethics would also allow private security personnel to carry out their duties with discretion and in a professional manner, thereby advancing the professionalism of the entire industry.

Adoption and enforcement of a private security code of ethics would afford many additional benefits. Current personnel turnover rates (sometimes as high as 300 percent) need to be reduced if private security is to be a productive force in preventing crime. By promoting a climate of professionalism in which one can experience personal satisfaction and worth, a code of ethics can help the industry retain efficient, capable personnel, as well as attract new personnel of a higher caliber. Because a code of ethics is a step toward increased professionalism, public law enforcement agencies would view private security personnel with greater respect and trust, thus enhancing cooperative services between the two.

This goal, a unifying code, encouraging attainment of professional status, furnishes a basis for the remaining standards in this chapter. The manner in which private security personnel perform their duties has a direct bearing on the attainment of professional status. Therefore, Standard 3.2 states that private security personnel should perform their security functions within generally recognized guidelines for the protection of individual rights. Incidents of excessive force, false arrest and detainment, illegal search and seizure, impersonation of a public officer, trespass, invasion of privacy, and dishonest or unethical business practices not only undermine confidence and trust in the private security industry, but also infringe upon individual rights.

Although not bound by many of the formal legal restraints applicable to public law enforcement officers, private security personnel have an inherent responsibility to uphold the basic principles of American personal liberties. Suspects should be civilly treated and informed of their rights. Security personnel should know the limits of their authority and not abuse these limits. Due to fundamental differences between the private security and public law enforcement areas, it is not recommended that private security personnel be required to conduct their activities within the same guidelines as public law enforcement officers. However, specific guidelines should be established to ensure the protection of individual rights and the elimination of abuses of authority. Employers should research areas that are subject to abuses of authority and develop appropriate policies and procedures to guide the conduct of their personnel in these areas. Because of the complex nature of the industry and varying State and local regulations, procedures may necessarily differ.
according to the area in which security personnel are operating, possibly even within the same company. But if guidelines are absent, certain personnel, through confusion or irresponsibility, may continue to abuse their authority.

Another important aspect in ethically conducting private security operations is the reporting of crime (Standard 3.3). Existing data suggest that private security personnel do not report a large percentage of known and possible perpetrators to the appropriate criminal justice agencies. Although private concerns is sometimes more expedient, it is, in reality, unfair. Unless all criminal violations are reported to the criminal justice system and prosecuted, appropriate reduction of crime is not likely. In addition, violations of criminal justice rights are more apt to occur when a crime is not reported to the proper agency. Perhaps most importantly, use of the criminal justice system can serve as a common denominator to bring public and private crime efforts together for increased efficiency and effectiveness.

Standard 3.4 focuses on the responsibilities of private security employers to provide their employees with suitable working conditions and adequate equipment. It is neither realistic nor ethical to assign workers to duties without supplying them the equipment and resources to perform their services safely and efficiently. Even the best selected and trained employee is at a disadvantage if equipment and working conditions are not conducive to effective job performance. It is just as unreasonable to assign a guard to function effectively within a darkened building as it is to expect a surgeon to operate without proper lighting.

All equipment issued should be the best available; productivity and safety cannot be sacrificed for cost. This is particularly applicable to firearms. Transfer or improper use of firearms are a danger to both the employee and those with whom he comes in contact. Firearms and other equipment should be periodically checked to ensure safety and to protect against malfunctions. The employer who overlooks these responsibilities is also overlooking professional ethics.

Finally, the industry has a responsibility to maintain records of criminal violations if it is to make honest decisions about effectiveness. Private security management has a moral obligation to its clients to use every method available to effectively deter crime. A good records system is one such method. Used as a planning tool, records can predict future needs and allow efficient tactical and operational plans to be made. They can also pinpoint areas that need immediate attention so that increased surveillance and patrol can be allocated accordingly.

Records are a yardstick of performance. Used to measure effectiveness, they can reveal whether the private security industry is meeting its goals and objectives. If achievement falls short in certain areas, every effort should be made to determine the cause and search for effective remedies.

The private security industry can serve as an effective supplement to public law enforcement agencies, providing necessary crime prevention services that cannot be afforded by local governments. It has been estimated that one of every four retail corporations in the United States subscribes to some protective service. Unravel members of small businesses, individuals, and other agencies also use security services. Yet, numerous ill's plague the industry.

The private security industry is to continue as a viable crime prevention resource and best serve its consumers and society, steps need to be taken to remedy these ills. Acceptance and enforcement of the standards in this chapter are a partial remedy. The professionalism to be attained from honest and ethical conduct should lead to better protection of both consumers and the public, while at the same time providing a better working relationship with public law enforcement agencies in pursuit of the increasingly important goal of crime prevention.

Goal 3.1

Code of Ethics

A code of ethics should be adopted and enforced for private security personnel and employers.

Commentary

A code of ethics is a statement that incorporates moral and ethical principles and philosophies. It is a necessary prerequisite for any profession, providing guidance to its members so that their activities can be measured against a standard of behavior. The need for a private security code of ethics is apparent. Private security personnel come into almost constant contact with human frailties and make decisions that can affect the welfare of many. For example, a private investigator may receive information that is unrelated to an investigation but damaging to a person's character and reputation. The investigator should keep the information confidential to protect the person. This ethical philosophy can be reflected in the code of ethics.

The need for a code of ethics is supported by the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS). In a recent study conducted for this report (Appendix 1), 51 percent of ASIS members rated an industrywide voluntary code of ethics as "very important" and 27 percent as "somewhat important." Additional support and justification for establishment of a code of ethics for private security employees and personal are contained in the following excerpt from an article appearing in the July 1974 issue of Security Management:

Without a code of ethics, a company will lose its most talented employees who will either become disillusioned within the company and leave to find a better climate for personal achievement or growth. Without a code of ethics, every tough decision is agonized, and one must expend energies coping with crises on a treadmill rather than taking a real leap forward. Even worse, without a code of ethics you must spend yourself in self-defense, losing face and fortune, when you're finally caught. Most important for the security industry, however, is the fact that without a code of ethics for ourselves, our own status as a profession will be in jeopardy. Every individual and company who make the decision to adopt a code of ethics will be serving the law enforcement and public interest. In doing so, you will have made a valuable contribution to the betterment of our communities.

We would merely be automatons, reacting automatically to repetitive stimuli, unworthy indeed of ever achieving the status of a profession.

Some private security associations have adopted codes of ethics. They include the American Society for Industrial Security, Council of International Investigators, National Council of Investigation and Security Services (draft), National Burglar and Fire Alarm Association, Inc., and World Association of Detectives, Inc.

The Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationship Committee of the Private Security Advisory Council has developed and adopted the following code for management and employees. The adoption
of the committee codes for private security management and employees is recommended.

**Code of Ethics for Private Security Management**

As managers of private security functions and employees, we pledge:

I. To recognize that our principal responsibilities are, in the service of our organizations and clients, to protect life and property as well as to prevent and reduce crime against our businesses, industry, or other organizations and institutions; and in the public interest, to uphold the law and to recognize the constitutional rights of all persons.

II. To be guided by a sense of integrity, honor, justice and morality in the conduct of business in all personal matters; in relationships with government agencies, clients, and employers; and in responsibility to the general public.

III. To avoid faithfully to adhere security services of the highest quality and to work continuously to improve our personnel and skills and thereby improve the overall effectiveness of private security.

IV. To uphold the trust of our employees, our clients, and the public by performing our functions within the law, not engaging in the violation of laws, and ensuring that our security personnel conduct their assigned duties lawfully and with proper regard for the rights of others.

V. To respect the reputation and practice of others in private security, but to expose to the proper authorities any conduct that is unethical or unlawful.

VI. To apply uniform and equitable standards of employment to recruiting and selecting personnel regardless of race, creed, color, sex, or age, and in providing them with training, education, and experience.

VII. To cooperate with recognized and responsible law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies; to comply with security licensing and registration laws and other statutory requirements that pertain to our business.

VIII. To respect and protect the confidential and privileged information of employers and clients beyond the term of my employment, except where their interests are contrary to law or to the Code of Ethics.

IX. To conduct myself professionally at all times, and to perform my duties in a manner that reflects credit upon myself, my employer, and private security.

X. To strive continually to improve my performance by seeking training and educational opportunities that will better prepare me for my private security duties.

**Code of Ethics for Private Security Employees**

In recognition of the significant contribution of private security to crime prevention and reduction, as a private security employee, we pledge:

I. To accept the responsibilities and fulfill the obligations of my role: protecting life and property; preventing and reducing crimes against my employer's business, or other organizations and institutions to which I am assigned; upholding the law; and respecting the constitutional rights of all persons.

II. To conduct myself with honesty and integrity and to adhere to the highest moral principles in the performance of my duties.

III. To be faithful, diligent, and dependable in discharging my duties, and to uphold at all times the laws, policies, and procedures that protect the rights of others.

IV. To observe the precepts of truth, accuracy and precision, without allowing personal feelings, prejudices, emotions or friendships to influence my judgments.

V. To report to my superiors, without hesitation, any violation of the law or of my employer's or client's regulations.

VI. To respect and protect the confidential and privileged information of my employer or client beyond the term of my employment, except where their interests are contrary to law or to the Code of Ethics.

VII. To cooperate with recognized and responsible law enforcement and government agencies in matters within their jurisdiction.

VIII. To accept no compensation, commission, gratuity, or other advantage without the knowledge and consent of my employer.

IX. To conduct myself professionally at all times, and to perform my duties in a manner that reflects credit upon myself, my employer, and private security.

X. To strive continually to improve my performance by seeking training and educational opportunities that will better prepare me for my private security duties.

Employers, private security personnel, and professional organizations should not stop at adopting and publishing these codes, but should seek to enforce the codes to the best of their ability through peer pressure, discipline, procedures, and, as appropriate, criminal and civil actions.

Employees, private security personnel, and professional organizations should not stop at adopting and publishing these codes, but should seek to enforce the codes to the best of their ability through peer pressure, discipline, procedures, and, as appropriate, criminal and civil actions. Indeed, a combined effort of all parties involved is required if the codes are to truly represent a standard of excellence for the industry. Employers should insist that all employees perform in accordance with the principles stated in the code of ethics for personnel. Both employers and employees should adhere to the principles themselves and exert peer pressure against their colleagues who may not be abiding by the codes.

Under certain circumstances, if the codes are continually violated or if serious violations occur, enforcement can be referred to the courts. For example, if an employee is not fulfilling his or her duties, or if serious violations occur, the matter should be referred to the courts for inquiring the appropriate criminal statues. Professional associations can also assist by requiring adherence to codes as a prerequisite for membership and by imposing appropriate sanctions against individuals who violate moral and ethical principles contained in the code. Finally, the public can assist by reporting unethical conduct to the appropriate persons, companies, agencies, or associations.

The adoption of industrywide codes of ethics for private security employers and personnel is a necessary and worthwhile goal. It can be a significant advancement toward improved crime prevention, better protection of public rights, and professionalization of the industry.

**Selected References**


**Related Standards**

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Goal 3.1:

1.1 Selection of Qualified Personnel
1.2 Communication Skills
1.3 Employment Screening
1.5 Equal Employment Opportunity
2.1 Training in Private Security
2.2 Professional Certification Programs
2.5 Preassignment and Basic Training
2.6 Arms Training
3.2 Conduct of Private Security Personnel
3.3 Reporting of Criminal Violations
3.4 Employer Responsibilities
3.5 Maintaining Data on Criminal Activities
4.3 Certified Training of Alarm Sales and Service Personnel
7.4 Private Security Advertising Standards
11.2 Registration Qualifications
11.3 Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel
Standard 3.2

Conduct of Private Security Personnel

Private security personnel should perform their security functions within generally recognized guidelines for the protection of individual rights.

Commentary

The development of a standard relating to the moral and ethical conduct of private security activities and investigations is a complex problem. Most personnel are law abiding, and most activities serve no useful purpose here, therefore, to present facie evidence of a need for this standard should not be provided unless (1) there is State involvement in the investigation, or (2) security personnel are directly commissioned by State, county, or local governments to act as policemen. Private security personnel usually are free to interview suspects without warning about the possible consequences resulting from information obtained during the interview.

To protect individual rights in interviewing suspects and all other activities, it has been suggested that private security personnel conduct their activities within the same guidelines as public law enforcement officers. However, this approach ignores two significant differences: (1) private security personnel are not, unless specifically authorized, have the same enforcement powers as public law enforcement officers, and (2) their primary function is to protect private property, which has a different historical base for legal decisions.

Guidelines for the protection of individual rights should be developed if individual rights are to be protected. Without such guidelines, continued improper actions could be accepted as permissible. This report, therefore, recommends that private security employees research the issues and develop reasonable performance guidelines to protect individual rights in all areas. Examples of areas needing research and guidelines follow:

1. General private security functions:
   a. Arrest,
   b. Detention,
   c. Use of force (including firearms),
   d. Impersonation of and confusion with public law enforcement officers, and
   e. Directing and controlling traffic.

2. Specific investigatory functions:
   a. Search and seizure of private property;
   b. Wiretapping, eavesdropping, and other forms of surveillance;
   c. Access of private security personnel to public law enforcement information and procedures for the safeguarding of the information;
   d. Obtaining information from private citizens and safeguarding of the information;
   e. Interrogation.

This outline is intended as a frame of reference only. Conflicting State laws and varying civil and criminal court decisions prevent establishment of a universal set of guidelines to protect individual rights. Also, additional subclassifications may be necessary within any given area. For example, search and seizure of private property may require one set of guidelines for an area within a plant that contains classified government-issued documents and a different set of guidelines for other areas of the same plant. Accordingly, the private security industry should research all areas where abuses may occur and develop guidelines as they apply to individual operations.

If this standard is to succeed, all parties of interest need to do their part. Employers need to research the issues as they pertain to their operations; prepare written policies and procedures to issues in conformity to the guidelines for the protection of individual rights. In the final analysis, this standard can provide a positive cause-effect relationship toward the ultimate goal of crime prevention.

SELECTED REFERENCES

1. Brennan, Dennis T. The Other Police. Cleveland, Ohio: Governmental Research Institute, 1975.

RELATED STANDARDS

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 3.2:

1. Employee Exchange of Information
2. Availability of Criminal History Records
3. Job Descriptions
4. Training Related to Job Functions
5. Code of Ethics
6. Reporting of Criminal Violations
7. Maintaining Data on Criminal Activities
8. Interaction Policies
9. Policies and Procedures
10. Degree Programs for Private Security
11. Suspension and Revocation
Standard 3.3
Reporting of Criminal Violations

All felonies and serious misdemeanors discovered by private security personnel should be reported to appropriate criminal justice agencies. Private security personnel should cooperate with those criminal justice agencies in all subsequent actions relating to those crimes.

Commentary
It is generally recognized that the private sector does not report all criminal violations to appropriate criminal justice agencies. The following three examples illustrate this point.

The RAND Report (Vol. I) stated:
Almost half of the respondents stated that there are some criminal activities that are handled by the employer and not reported to the police. Of these, employees dealt accounts for almost 60 percent; 8 percent involve shoplifting (recall that few respondents worked in retail security), 17 percent involve more minor thefts, 3 percent involve shoplifting, 17 percent are cases of fighting, theft, or involving drinking.

"Survey of Consumers of Private Security Services in the Greater Philadelphia Area" (Appendix 3) revealed that 45 percent of respondents indicated that "certain types of criminal activities (employee thefts, disorder, assault, etc.) that security personnel encounter are not reported to public law enforcement agencies."

Private Security and the Public Interest, a study conducted in California, reported that "90 percent of the employers/supervisors indicated there were certain types of criminal incidents which were not reported to the police. These included petty theft, shoplifting, and assault."

Considering the above information, it would appear that a large percentage of criminal violations known to private security personnel are not referred to the criminal justice system. A logical conclusion would be that there is a "private" criminal justice system wherein employer reprimands, restrictions, suspensions, demotions, job transfers, or employment terminations take the place of censure by the public system.

It is recognized that most criminal incidents uncovered by private security personnel occur on private property and management has certain rights and obligations to decide what actions should be taken. Also, in many instances private action is more expedient, less expensive, and less embarrassing to the company. Few of lawsuits or protecting the offender from a criminal record may be important. However, violations of due process, right to counsel, and other individual rights are more likely to occur under such a system. The criminal justice system is established for the purpose of resolving criminal offenses and can be a viable resource for the private security sector in this regard. Perhaps even more important, reporting incidents of criminal activity can be an important step toward coordinating the activities of the private sector and law enforcement sectors through a common denominator—the criminal justice system. Employers should also be willing to support the process by compensating employees, especially private security personnel, for the time they spend in preparing for and appearing in court.

This standard aims at coordinating activities between private and public law enforcement agencies for the improvement of crime prevention. It is not within the purview of the private security industry to establish a microcosmic version of the criminal justice system. Management is ill equipped to provide probation systems or comprehensive rehabilitation programs for persons convicted of crimes, but the criminal justice system does have those resources. Some companies have drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs, but these are limited in number and scope. In short, internal handling of criminal punishment may resolve the immediate problem but offers no long-range benefit to the company, the individual, or the public. If all felonies and serious misdemeanors are reported to the appropriate criminal justice agencies, the criminal justice system can initiate appropriate actions and, thus, help reduce reported incidents.

Although private security personnel should provide the major resources in preparing cases for prosecution, public law enforcement agencies can help by offering technical expertise in such areas as fingerprinting, preparation of crime scene diagrams, analysis of evidence, and so forth. They can also help locate witnesses and others who can provide valuable input into the cases. Of course, it is assumed that sufficient probable cause exists before issuance of arrest warrants. If all parties exhibit a cooperative spirit, the包含 action for the improvement of crime prevention. This standard sets realistic parameters for the time they spend in preparing for and appearing in court.

Selected References
4. ———. "Private Security and Citizen's Arrest Authority." (See Appendix 9 to this report.)

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 3.3:
1. Availability of Criminal History Records
2. Job Descriptions
3. Codes of Ethics
4. Conduct of Private Security Personnel
5. Reporting of Criminal Violations
6. Interaction Policies
7. Procedures and Policies
8. Regulatory Board Hearing Procedures
9. Regulatory Board Access to Criminal Record Information
10. License Denial, Revocation, or Suspension
11. Registration Qualifications
12. Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel
13. Suspension and Revocation
14. Sanctions
A store had been burglarized on several occasions. This complexity of security services precludes a detailed listing of all conditions and equipment necessary to perform diverse security functions, but one example follows. If private security personnel are assigned to patrol a warehouse after dark, the employer should provide (1) an adequately lighted building, (2) communications equipment necessary to make contact with other personnel in the area or with the police, and (3) emergency lighting equipment in case of power failure resulting from natural causes or an overt act. Safe vehicles, fencing, locks, alarm systems, and an adequate number of personnel to accomplish the mission are further examples of items requiring employer consideration.

On a broader scale, the employer should provide the necessary training to enable private security personnel to react appropriately to routine and emergency situations. Along with this training, the employer should provide an officers' manual listing guidelines for handling all general and specific situations. Finally, as indicated by a study of private security organizations in St. Petersburg, Fla., adequate supervision is needed to coordinate training and performance as new situations arise.

Employers who provide a reasonable working environment and adequate equipment are directly affecting the ability of private security personnel to perform their assigned security services. Employers, employees, and citizens can only be adequately protected when these conditions are met.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 3.4:

1. Selection of Qualified Personnel
2. Professional Certification Programs
3. Job Descriptions
4. Training Related to Job Functions
5. Arms Training
6. Ongoing Training
7. Training of Supervisors and Managers
8. Code of Ethics
9. Adequate Security Lighting
10. Mistrust Identity of Private Security Personnel
11. State Regulation of Private Security Uniforms, Equipment, Job Titles
12. Degree Programs for Private Security

Employer Responsibilities

Employers should provide a working environment, including adequate and serviceable equipment, conducive to the efficient performance of security functions assigned.

Commentary

Most occupations require a suitable working environment and adequate equipment if their functions are to be performed satisfactorily. Employers must meet certain safety requirements in regard to personnel—i.e., hard hats for personnel in heavy equipment areas, facial protectors for welders, and so forth. Yet, safety related to the mission and activities of private security personnel, who often face life-or-death situations, is often overlooked. Identification and recognition of the dangers inherent in the performance of security services are two primary areas the employer should take to protect his employees.

The private security employer has a moral responsibility to provide a safe working environment. For example, instances in which police officers have been attacked by persons using darkness for cover are well known. In one recent case, a police officer was killed by burglars hiding in a darkened area. A store had been burglarized on several occasions, yet the store owner, although knowing that the officers were watching the area closely, disconnected a mercury-vapor lamp at the rear of the store. This officer's life might have been spared had the store owner provided proper lighting of the area. The same principle would apply to private security personnel.

The employer has an equal moral responsibility to provide safe equipment. This is particularly true for firearms. It is not intended here to infer that firearms are necessary in the performance of all private security assignments, but, if they are, firearms need to be adequate and serviceable in relationship to the security functions assigned. Several instances are recorded in which private security personnel have been issued fake, inoperative, or model firearms. In some instances, the personnel were not even aware of this situation.

Government reaction to this type of problem is reflected in the Pennsylvania Lethal Weapons Act, which was signed into law in October 1976. Section 10 of the act states:

Prohibited Act—No individual certified under this act shall carry an inoperative or model firearm while employed and he shall carry only a powder actuated firearm approved by the commissioner.

The complexity of security services precludes a detailed listing of all conditions and equipment necessary to perform diverse security functions, but one

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Standard 3.5

Maintaining Data on Criminal Activities

The private security industry has a responsibility to maintain internal data on criminal activities to develop, improve, and assess effectiveness of crime reduction programs.

Commentary

The constantly increasing recorded crime rate in the United States has caused justifiable concern to government and to the American people. Many attribute the recent growth in private security services to a perceived or actual need by businesses for additional protection that public law enforcement cannot give because of limited resources. Also, citizens' perceived and actual fears about crime have led to increased concern for protection. The increase in numbers of home burglar alarm systems is prob-

ably greatly a result of this concern. Nowhere has the United States has caused justifiable concern to


Selected References

1. Brennan, Dennis T. The Other Police. Cleveland, Ohio: Governmental Research Institute, 1975.
2. Day, Frank D., Robert Gallati, and A. C. Gormann. Introduction to Law Enforcement and

Accuracy record systems are as important for the private security industry as for public law enforce-


5. Green, Gion, and Raymond C. Farber. Introduction to Security. Los Angeles: Security World

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applica-

2. Job Descriptions

3.1 Code of Ethics

3.2 Conduct of Private Security Personnel

5.2 Adequate Security Lighting

5.3 Computer Security

5.4 Environmental Security in Comprehensive Planning

5.9 Crime Impact Forecast
INTRODUCTION

Two persons out of every hundred are victimized by burglaries each year. The annual cost exceeds $1 billion. In the 5 years from 1969 to 1974, the number of reported burglaries in the United States rose by 53 percent. An average of 8,000 burglaries are committed daily.

These are startling figures and many American citizens and businesses, seeking more protection than our criminal justice system can supply, have turned to alarm systems. Correspondingly, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of alarm system companies. It has been estimated that the alarm industry is expanding at a rate of 10 percent a year.

Substantiated figures show that alarm systems do affect crime. In communities where such systems are used extensively, the burglary rate has been significantly reduced. Further, most insurance companies offer lower premiums to businesses that are protected by alarm systems. Various federally insured institutions, such as banks, are required by law to install systems.

Because alarm systems have become an irreplaceable tool in crime prevention and are a significant part of the private security industry, the standards in this chapter aim at developing guidelines for their most effective use. To better understand the intent of the standards, a basic knowledge of alarm systems and their characteristics is needed.

Defining Alarm Systems

The use of alarm systems dates back to 390 B.C. and the Roman Empire when squawking geese alerted the Romans to surprise attack by the Gauls. Carl Kellem of the National Crime Prevention Institute, Louisville, Ky., has adapted this historical account to make physiological analogies to geese in describing the three fundamental parts of modern intrusion detection systems (alarm systems) (see Figure 4.1):

1) Sensor—that function of the intrusion detection system which detects or senses a condition which exists or changes, be it authorized or uncontrolled. This definition can be related directly to the animal senses of touch, hearing, sight, smell and taste. This definition includes all actions that occur since the senses have no means of distinguishing authorized or uncontrolled actions. This is easily pointed out in one of the most common and simplest sensor devices—the magnetic contact on a door. This device is activated each time the door is operated and has no means of determining whether the operation of the door is authorized. The next fundamental part is assigned that function.

2) Control—that function of the intrusion detection system which provides the power, receives the information from the sensors, evaluates the information and transmits the required information to the annunciation function.

The control function is related directly to the physiological functions of the brain and nervous system and also to the circulatory system. The nervous system collects and evaluates information from the various senses and transmits signals to the muscles for appropriate action. The circulatory system provides the power source (i.e., nutrients and oxygen from the blood) to maintain the ability of the system to function.

3) Annunciation—that function of the intrusion detection system which alerts a person to initiate a response that will result in an investigation of the sensor environment.

This could be bell, buzzer, light flashing, etc. This function is analogous to the squawking of geese, barking of dogs or man calling for help.

When these three fundamental parts are combined, they form an alarm system that, upon detection of an intrusion, transmits and articulates a message for help. Numerous types of alarm systems are available—simple or complex. A user's choice of systems is limited only by the dollars he has available.

Devices for the sensor function of an alarm system range from simple magnetic switches to sensitive ultrasonic Doppler and sound systems. Other available equipment includes electronic, electromechanical, and photoelectric devices; microwave Dopplers; closed-circuit television cameras; and ionization detector systems. The more sophisticated devices are used primarily in large industrial or business complexes; simpler devices are used in residences or small businesses.

Incorporated in the control function is equipment necessary for power, energizing, signal transmission,
and circuitry. Depending upon the level of security desired, various devices are available for each component. For example, power to operate the alarm system can be supplied by either battery or public utility electricity, but a combination of both is necessary if the system is to function during public power failures. Possible energizing equipment includes shunt key-operated control panels, and time delays. Signal transmission may be accomplished through interaction of electronic equipment, amplifiers, telephone dialers, and so forth. A choice of telephone lines, radio waves, or coaxial cables is available to channel information to the annunciator system.

There are four basic systems of annunciation: local alarm, central station alarm, proprietary alarm, and police department alarm. All except local alarms are transmitted through either direct or indirect connections with the police. In the local alarm system, the alarm is to be seen or heard only at the protected premises; police notification depends upon the presence of responsible persons in the vicinity of the alarm. Upon detection of an intrusion, a device (bell, siren, siren, flashing light) is activated, alerting anyone within hearing or seeing distance to initiate the response by notifying the police.

The central station alarm uses an independently owned and operated monitoring facility. An alarm device is installed in a location and wired directly to the central station. When an alarm is received at the central station, the signal is interpreted and appropriate action taken, i.e., maintenance or police notification. The monitoring facility also offers its subscribing services such as records of openings and closings, guard response, and key access, with charges corresponding to the number of services provided.

The major goal of alarm systems is to prevent crime by reducing criminal opportunity. In many instances, the presence of an alarm system serves as a psychological deterrent to crime—most would-be offenders stay away from premises they suspect are protected by alarm systems. Another goal is to reduce crime through apprehension of offenders. A reliable alarm system increases the likelihood of apprehension and prosecution of criminals. In addition to protection against burglary, alarms can also provide protection against other criminal intentions, as well as smoke, fire, and other life- and property-threatening hazards. In short, alarms provide a valuable, viable means of achieving overall security.

The Problems of Alarm Systems

Although alarm systems have been proven effective in deterring and apprehending burglars, they are not without problems. A traditional and still-to-be-resolved problem is that of false alarms. From 90 to 98 percent of all alarms transmitted are said to be false. This high percentage can be basically attributed to three factors: (1) user error; (2) poor installation or servicing; and (3) faulty equipment. More than half of all false alarms are estimated to result from user error or negligence. Users often do not understand how to properly operate their systems, or they may not set them off by persons who fail to lock doors or windows or who enter a secured area when the system is engaged. Alarm systems are also activated accidentally by workers, contractors, domestic help, or even pets. Added to these false alarms are those from improper use, such as Example, merchants have been known to use their alarm systems to summon the police to deal with bad checks or suspicious individuals. Some users even set off their alarms to time police response to their premises.

The second factor leading to false alarms is poor installation or servicing. In order to function as intended, an alarm system must be properly installed and maintained. Equipment that is installed in an inappropriate environment or improperly positioned, set, or wired produces false alarms. Likewise, if equipment is not adequately maintained, the chances of false alarms increase. Too often installers and service personnel lack the necessary skills and knowledge for today’s more sophisticated equipment.

The third condition leading to false alarms is faulty equipment. If equipment is electronically or mechanically defective, the alarm can be activated when, for instance, the equipment breaks or short out the circuit. The use of cheap, substandard equipment that is especially vulnerable to breakdowns or can be easily set off by a variety of extraneous conditions leads to frequent false alarms.

In addition to false alarms that can be traced to the above causal factors, there are a certain number of false alarms whose cause cannot be determined. Based on the results of various studies, roughly an average of 25 percent of all false alarms fall into this unknown category. It is possible that they may, in fact, be the result of user error; faced with probable sanctions, a user may deny responsibility for a false alarm. Another possibility is that a burglary or other unauthorized intrusion may have been successfully prevented, leaving no visible evidence of intrusion or attempted entry.

The continued high incidence of false alarms, whatever the cause, has led to other problems. In the use of automatic telephone dialer alarm systems, a large number of storm-caused false alarms simultaneously occurring can tie up police trunklines and switchboards, seriously hampering police capacity to respond to genuine emergencies. Malfunctioning of such systems can lock-in police communications for considerable periods of time. Although telephone dialers offer effective, low-cost protection, errors and problems have created negative police reaction toward their use.

Another problem is that of police attitudes toward alarm systems in general. Often the police, faced with repeated false alarms, tend to give alarms a low priority. The intense and repeated calls, or "false" responses, reduce the likelihood of apprehension and limit the value of alarms. Further, police officers, bailed by the high incidence of false alarms, may not conduct thorough on-the-scene investigations or be alert to the risks of valid alarms.

In addition to the problems of attitude, many police departments have documented the high costs of false alarms in terms of salaries, wear and tear on police vehicles, and loss of manpower for other activities. There is no question that false alarms waste valuable police resources and often divert coverage from more important areas. However, it should be noted that whatever the nature of a police response, these same factors are involved. The false alarm would be no more costly, for example, than checking out a disturbance call when there is no disturbance.

A more serious problem is that of the personal risks involved in false alarms. The high-speed response to false alarms unreasonably endangers the personal welfare of police officers, drivers and innocent bystanders. False alarms often also bring to the scene alarm company representatives who are frequently armed, presenting a further
threat to personal life and safety. The gravity of such situations is apparent; the problems involved, manifold.

Another problem of false alarms is the burden of expense to the users of alarm systems. When a system fails, false alarms, servicing is usually required, resulting in increased costs that are eventually absorbed by the users. Further, some local governments directly impose fines upon users whose systems repeatedly produce false alarms.

Alarm companies also are faced with cost problems. Denied the special telephone rates granted to government organizations serving the public, they are presently unaffordable. Assistance is needed. A clear understanding of the roles of alarm systems, their costs, and the problems they entail is necessary. The users should exercise every caution to ensure that they lack the capacity to install and service the systems they sell, dealers have an obligation to disclose where the user can obtain competent installation and maintenance services. To further ensure the effectiveness of the systems they sell or lease, alarm dealers should be required to instruct users and their employees in the proper operation of the system and the serious consequences of false alarms.

Although manufacturers have primary responsibility for reliable equipment, the assistance of others is vital to its being correctly and effectively used. Beginning at the sales level, personnel should be trained in the concepts and operation of alarms. Often, because of inadequate technical knowledge or possibly the desire to consummate a sale, sales personnel tend to either oversell or undersell equipment, or they may sell equipment ill-suited to users' needs. These errors can result in improper application of the system and subsequent malfunction or failure. Similarly, alarm system installers and servicing technicians need to possess adequate skills and knowledge for proper installation, use, and maintenance. Law enforcement agencies should make similar efforts to improve alarm response rates, including both valid and false alarms. While alarm companies service the systems they sell or install, the need for competent installation, use, and maintenance, law enforcement officials should also make efforts to improve alarm response rates, including both false and valid alarms. While alarm companies work toward developing more reliable equipment, law enforcement agencies should also work to improve the effectiveness of false alarms.

Finally, to solve problems of cost and transmission, the joint efforts of many agencies are required. Currently, research and development directed at developing new ideas for low-cost equipment and new means of transmission will be worthless unless facility rates are lowered. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has expressed an objective of encouraging the use of alarm systems at a cost that can be afforded by small businesses and individuals. To achieve this objective, the cooperation of telephone companies and local governments, such as the Federal Communications Commission and State Communications Commissions, is required.

**Government Control of Alarm Systems**

Government regulation becomes necessary whenever the public interest or welfare must be guarded. Because false alarms affect the public welfare, it is believed that local governments should take part in developing mechanisms to control the number of false alarms. One of the ways to regulate the use of false alarms is periodic inspection of alarm systems. Accordingly, it is recommended that local governments require all alarm system users to submit an application that is inspected annually. If that equipment is to be correctly and effectively used, these inspections should be developed, and false alarm rates are lowered. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has expressed an objective of encouraging the use of alarm systems at a cost that can be afforded by small businesses and individuals. To achieve this objective, the cooperation of telephone companies and local governments, such as the Federal Communications Commission and State Communications Commissions, is required.
so forth. The purpose of the permit should be to encourage user caution, not to penalize users for protecting their property.

The problems of telephone dialer alarm systems have prompted some communities to seek government regulation regarding their use. The problems in this area and the advantages of government regulation are recognized. However, because telephone dialer systems provide valuable services to small businesses and others unable to afford more expensive alarm systems, serious consideration should be given to the consequences of government regulation before it is enacted. If the results of such legislation would force many users to discontinue alarm service, other methods of control would prove more advantageous. In no instance, however, should telephone dialer alarm systems be connected to a law enforcement agency's primary emergency telephone trunk-line. These lines must be kept available for citizen emergency calls. Special trunklines should be installed to handle all telephone dialer calls, reducing unnecessary interference with police communications and improving police attitudes toward automatic dialer systems.

Through regulation in the suggested areas, governments can significantly help reduce the problems of false alarms. However, government ownership or operation of alarm systems should be discouraged. It is inappropriate for governments or law enforcement agencies to engage in the business of selling, installing, or servicing alarms. Governments competing with private enterprise in selling goods or services is an infringement of private rights. Furthermore, government operation of private alarm systems could lead to an abandonment of the field by private enterprise.

Standard 4.1

Alarm Systems

Research

Appropriate research should be conducted to develop new methods and techniques to transmit alarm signals and enhance alarm systems capabilities.

Commentary

It is a proven fact that alarm systems deter crime and enhance criminal apprehension. However, substantial research is needed to develop more cost-effective alarm transmission, to conserve resources, and to improve preventive capabilities.

Considerable resources are required to undertake effective research. Because funds required to meet this standard are beyond the means of many competitive alarm systems manufacturers, government involvement is needed. As pointed out by the Small Business Administration's report to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Small Business, there is a distinct need for government to "sponsor a central point of contact for manufacturers to evaluate and encourage research and development . . . " Such a facility could be especially beneficial in alarm systems research.

Various other reports likewise have indicated the need for government support in the establishment of a research facility. The RAND Report (Vol. II), for example, suggests the Federal Government fund a research center to evaluate the effectiveness and costs of private security personnel and equipment. The Law Enforcement Standards Laboratory, in conjunction with the National Bureau of Standards, is to a limited degree doing such research, but no work is planned in the area of alarm transmissions.

Sound advice in establishing a research facility is offered in a document by the Alarm Industry Committee for Combating Crime. Among other things, it is suggested: "The clearing-house or private security center should give due regard to practical and economic considerations, as well as technical or hypothetical concepts, and should conduct its activities so that no competitive advantage is given to any person or organization in the private sector."

The need for research in alarm transmission is apparent. It has been suggested, however, that at this time research should not be focused on new systems, methods, and techniques but, rather, on improving the application of those systems currently in use. Carl Kellem of the National Crime Prevention Institute has stated, "There is very little need for new technology except in the area of alarm transmission. Right now we are not using all the technology available." What Kellem means is that there is a sufficiency of detection devices being developed, but, no matter how innovative the detection device, it must rely on the same transmission methods as all previous systems. These are wire,

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cable, or radio frequency. Realistically, there are probably no other plausible transmission methods except laser applications.

Use of the FCC-allocated 950-960MHz band may offer improved alarm transmission signals. As stated by Anthony Grosso, vice president of engineering of ADT Security Systems, "The costs have reached the point where ADT and possibly others feel the frequencies can be used for some applications."

There appears to be interest, Grosso points out, in using lower range frequencies because of broader applications and because the equipment required would be less expensive. Grosso also indicates that some technical development by telephone companies for the alarm transmission field might be appropriate.

Another view, in regard to the use of radio frequencies, is that of Harold Gray, vice president and general manager of Pacific Fire Extinguisher Co.:

The complications of security alarm systems have, over these many years, involved all system components. More recently, the major problem has been the communication link between the protected premises and the control station, and/or police communications center. With the low cost metallic circuits being withdrawn from service, by the nationwide telephone system, it has become necessary for other methods of transmitting signals to be applied. These applications are primarily in the area of multiplexing: the resultant investigation into this area of communication signaling has brought to light the possibility of using radio. The FCC over the past ten years has recognized the need for use of radio frequencies for alarm company use. They first allocated clear channel frequencies in the 450 MHz band for voice communication, and then subsequently allocated frequencies in the 900 MHz band for point-to-point signaling. Once these frequencies were available, the industry began to look at the potential that research and development in this area. Today the various multiplexing and scanning systems are all designed to operate over either the telephone carrier system or over clear channel radio frequencies.

It is absolutely imperative that the use of radio frequencies be known in all consideration of future alarm reporting. Moreover, the alarm system designer, the alarm field person, the alarm field technician, etc., should be aware of the need for these communication links.

Other alarm transmission methods developed by central alarm stations use a computer. One such method was described in Security World magazine. The article reported that, because multiplexing is still relatively new, the older McCulloh Loop configuration has been altered to tie in with a computer. "The computer is 'writing out' an alarm ticket giving the location of the alarm, specific point and kind of alarm, appropriate authority to notify, name of firm," and so forth. A second method for possible future development mentioned in the Security World article was direct-diode communication to a computer.

Cable television also should be mentioned as a medium for alarm transmission. An unusual channel could be leased from the cable television operator by the alarm company and subleased to the individual alarm subscriber.

As initially stated, research to develop new methods or techniques to transmit alarm signals should be encouraged. Past efforts in this area have been fragmented or have come about by driving necessity. Personnel, money, and facilities exist to achieve success in this field. They need to be combined to initiate research.

Selected References

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 4.1:
1. 4.4 Compatibility of Sensors
2. 4.6 Joint Cooperation to Reduce Transmission Costs
3. 8.2 National Private Security Resource and Research Institute

Standard 4.2
Backup Power for Alarms

All alarm systems terminating at a law enforcement agency should be equipped with a standby power source.

Commentary

Installation of a suitable backup power source for alarm systems operating on publicly supplied power and terminating at a law enforcement agency is the aim of this standard. The concern is not with law enforcement agencies—virtually all have some type of emergency power—or with wholly battery-operated systems or systems not connected directly to a law enforcement agency. This standard is directed at alarm users whose systems are wired directly into a law enforcement agency for monitoring service. These users should ensure that their systems have the capability to function continuously, even under the most adverse power conditions.

Proprietary and local alarm systems also have a need for backup power, but those systems terminating at a law enforcement agency have been identified in this standard, because, in most cases, public law enforcement officials receive criticism from citizens when alarms are activated, or not activated, as a result of a power failure. Also, in the case of alarm activation, law enforcement agencies have an immediate problem in determining if an officer is needed to respond to the location of the alarm. Many leaders in both the alarms industry and law enforcement have expressed concern regarding these matters.

A review of recent literature on security systems reveals a widespread awareness of the need for backup systems. Richard J. Scaryard, chief engineer, special products, Globe-Union, Inc., accurately and succinctly summarized the situation:

"Most emergency power for security systems has become increasingly important in the past few years as power blackouts have highlighted the fact that previously thought to be highly reliable power systems could be troublesome as sophisticated, less tolerant electronic equipment is added to security systems."

Two articles in Security World, Vol. II, No. 3, point out the backup power problem in regard to fire and burglary alarm systems. The first, written by James C. Shanahan, vice president of marketing at Gameswel, advocates reappraisal of existing backup power supply codes:

The electrical utilities in New York and New England have announced voltage reductions of a minimum of 15%. These same utilities have indicated that they have to program intentional power blackouts in various communities at various times. As may be the time to begin thinking of revisions to both the NFPA standards and the UL standards for burglar alarm systems.
If there are going to be intentional, repetitive power failures, dry cell batteries which are not rechargeable will become less reliable for burglar alarm systems and there will be many schools, nursing homes, etc., without an automatic fire alarm system during these periods of power breakdown. . . . a storm in New England . . . caused power failure in the Boston Metropolitan area that affected approximately 80,000 subscribers. The power was out in the Boston area up to 36 hours. Power was not available for many subscribers in the Hartford, Connecticut area for as long as five days.

The second article, written by Roy Longworth, general manager of fire and security group, Johnson Service Co., is primarily concerned with fire alarm systems backup power codes, but the same holds true for burglar alarms.

There is presently no national code requiring backup power sources, although some local codes require them for institutional, commercial, and industrial structures, in the event of a brownout or blackout, therefore, fire alarm systems in many buildings will fail unless a battery backup system has been installed . . . .

Observations from a survey by F. C. Heckman of security alarm systems further emphasizes the need for backup power supplies:

. . . a good security control should have ample power supply reserves to run the entire system both on a continuous basis where comparatively little current is drawn, and on an alarm basis where heavy currents are drawn.

In addition, it is most advisable that the control have automatic switchover to standby power capabilities. Standby power can be in the form of dry cells or continuously charged standby batteries.

Certain problems may be encountered in upgrading current alarm systems to meet these needs. The quoted authors have not overlooked these problems. For instance, Longworth discussed the problem of battery life:

Batteries, however, must be checked on a regular basis to be sure they will function properly during a crisis. Battery life should be determined, and if batteries are nearing the end of their useful life, they should be discarded and replaced. Batteries should also be tested from time to time to be sure they will run through the required standby period.

Shanahan's article mentioned another problem area—obtaining a reliable system at a reasonable cost:

The problem with upgrading the fire alarm and security systems will be to determine the compromise required to supply a system at an economical price and still cover most power outage. It is not reasonable to assume that the standby power should be capable of handling a system for as much as five to seven days; however, 60-72 hours may be a very good compromise.

Such problems need to be met in order to provide a reliable backup power source for alarm systems terminating at a law enforcement agency.

Requirements to ensure the continued operation of law enforcement agency-linked alarm systems in the event of power lapses or failures should be established. Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., states the following specific requirements for standby battery power in their standard entitled "Police Station Connected Burglar Alarm Units and Systems":

1. If a power supply with standby battery is provided, the battery shall have sufficient capacity to operate the system for periods as follows:
   A. Bank alarms—72 hours.
   B. Messaline alarms in areas served by power facilities which can usually be reliable through the 1980's. Because of such energy problems, backup power supply has become a serious issue calling for immediate action. Shanahan points out:

Revisions to standards require many months—sometimes several years—to accomplish, due to the economic impact on manufacturers, suppliers, and end-users. Therefore, the time has arrived when we should start to upgrade the standby power capability of both local fire alarm and security alarm systems.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 4.2:

4.8 Annual Alarm Inspection

7.1 Consumers Responsibility for Selection of Security Services
Certified Training of Alarms Sales and Service Personnel

There should be a certified training program for alarm sales personnel and alarm service technicians.

Commentary

A major cause of problems involving alarm systems can be traced back to inadequacies of the person selling, installing, or servicing the system. The alarm committee of the Private Security Advisory Council found:

Too often, individuals or companies attracted into the alarm industry because of apparent inability to gain employment in other trade, have little understanding, knowledge and experience in the alarm business. This may result in improper selection and installation, either of which may lead to frequent false alarms.

A contributing factor to the problem of inadequacies in alarm sales and servicing is the lack of effective codes, guidelines, or standards to ensure competence in these careers. Almost any individual can open an alarm systems business with no test required of his knowledge or ability to operate such a business. Although the system he sells may be reliable, he may have no experience or knowledge concerning correct installation and servicing, not be able to obtain proper training in such matters through on-the-job activities.

Many basic arguments support establishment of a certified training program for installation, sales, and service personnel. First, new alarms are being installed every day. Installers have varying degrees of skill, depending on company training. Many are not knowledgeable of installation methods required for the more sophisticated systems on the market; many may even lack the necessary basic skills. This lack of training or skill not only results in ill will on the part of consumers and law enforcement agencies but also creates problems for alarm companies and manufacturers of alarm equipment. Norval Poulson of Certified Burglar Alarm Systems, Inc., described this problem in the following manner:

The equipment now being installed by many alarm companies is quite technical and far more sophisticated than the alarm systems of the past 30 to 40 years. Many of the old-time employees are not trained—or are untrained—on the new equipment. This is a serious problem facing both the alarm companies and the manufacturers of alarm equipment. Frankly many alarm companies are not purchasing newly-developed equipment because they realize they do not have the personnel, either in management or their department, who can properly maintain and properly diagnose trouble in these sophisticated systems.

Alarm sales personnel, too, need to keep abreast of newly developed equipment, as well as possess a technical knowledge of the systems they sell. Many salesmen tend to be more sales oriented rather than technically oriented, but the consumer depends on the salesman’s advice regarding which system to buy. If the consumer, through lack of technical knowledge, sells the wrong type of device, no amount of skilled servicing can make the system work properly.

Carl Kellem, instructor at the National Crime Prevention Institute and an electrical engineer, suggests that alarm dealers should be trained in security concepts, risk management, capabilities and limitations of protection devices, and seriousness of false alarms. For alarm installers and servicepeople, he recommends minimum training in electrical fundamentals, seriousness of false alarms, and sensitivity of the proprietary equipment and information. He also believes that sales, installation, and service personnel should be encouraged to work together in order to build a better understanding of each other’s jobs.

Another argument for certified training is that consumers need clear and understandable guidelines for selection of a reputable alarm company. Certification of alarm company personnel to a minimum level of training increases the ability of consumers to choose reliable companies to sell, install, and service their alarm systems.

A final argument in favor of a certified training program for alarm company personnel is that such a program would upgrade the industry’s public image. This is an important consideration in today’s marketplace.

A complex question in establishing a certified training program in the alarm systems field is who will implement it and how. One possibility would be government implementation and certification. An alternative is government certification for the alarm industry to develop its own program and implement it on a local, State, or national level. An industry group might invite experts in the alarm industry to draft minimum guidelines for training. An alarm company applying for a business license or renewal would have to file a training program outlining meeting these minimum draft guidelines. By this method, the company, rather than the individual, would be certified, and occasional field inspection would be made to ensure compliance.

Representatives of the alarm industry were asked their opinions on a certified training program. Their responses were mainly negative. In their opinion, there already is enough licensing and certification, and the cost of such a program could be a threat to their business life. Without concrete proposals on the length, content, and cost of such a program the alarm industry is not likely to lend its support.

Another approach to training could be through independent individual action. Certain standards for alarm sales, servicing, and installing personnel could be developed and "hired as courses at local vocational or junior colleges. Perhaps completion of the course work would possess more marketable skills and be an asset to the company hiring them.

The need to upgrade the level of skill of some alarm companies’ sales, service, and installation personnel is evident, even though many highly professional alarm companies already have training programs that would surpass any minimum recommendations. It should also be noted that some training may be inappropriate for alarm companies that deal solely with specialty devices. But for the overall good of the public the alarm industry serves, a program of certification requiring minimum training should be adopted for alarm systems personnel.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 4.3:

2.2 Training in Private Security
2.5 Preassignment and Basic Training
2.8 Training of Supervisors and Managers
2.9 State Authority and Responsibility for Training
2.10 State Boards to Coordinate Training Efforts
3.1 Code of Ethics
4.5 Training and Instruction of Alarm Users by Alarm Companies
8.3 Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses
8.4 Degree Programs for Private Security
11.2 Registration Qualifications
Standard 4.4

Compatibility of Sensors

Alarm companies and alarm users should only use those sensor devices in alarm systems that are operationally compatible with the area in which the system is located.

Commentary

Of the numerous types of alarm devices available, those referred to as sensors are cited because of the numerous problems that may occur with their use. For the purpose of this standard, sensors generally can be defined as detection devices for space protection and include those that work on the Doppler, ultrasonic, optical, or stress principle. This type of equipment is far more complex in makeup than simple contacts and switches, and a higher degree of skill is required for proper installation of such equipment.

Thus, sensors are more susceptible to false alarming. For example, installing vibration detectors in a bank vault located above a subway would be futile. Factors such as the state of repair of a building and the type of heating (radiators, air currents, and so forth) can affect the successful operation of sensory equipment. Table 4.1, as developed by F. C. Heckman, lists factors having a causal effect on the triggering of sensors. This list should be updated and used as an application guide for assemblers, installers, and purchasers of alarm systems.

Heckman states that security engineers contacted believed that, “through conservative design and utilization of only the best components, the sensitive amplifiers used in space intrusion detectors can be brought to a point where they will be as stable as the current state of the art will permit.”

Improper installation is another factor that must be considered with respect to sensor applications. As stated by Carl Kellem of the National Crime Prevention Institute, “The major problem we are having now with sensors and will in the future is the individual installing the system. He needs to have the knowledge to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of the system.” Norval Poulson, in an article dealing with false alarms, broadens this definition, as follows:

Thomas M. Lewin agreed with Poulson in an article in Security World magazine: “Equipment should be operated within its design limitations. The limits of rated photo-electric beams and modern detection equipment, for example, are clearly defined. Stretching their coverage range invites false alarms.” Lewin warned the alarm companies of an additional problem:

Table 4.1 False Alarm Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>False alarm causing Phenomena</th>
<th>Radio</th>
<th>Frequency Ultrasonic</th>
<th>Sonic</th>
<th>Infrared</th>
<th>Stress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lightning</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent power failure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittent power switching</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC sparks from switches, lights</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortwave transmitters (police, cabs, etc.)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot and cold air currents</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotating machinery (fans, etc.)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randomly moving objects (chandeliers, blinds, curtains, etc.)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small animals</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noises (telephone, radios, etc.)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural member failure</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavering in large metal surfaces (walls, roofs, air and heating ducts)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random heat sources (lights, radiators, sunlight)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Improper installation includes poor workmanship, improper equipment improperly installed, and installation of equipment unsuitable for the specific application.

Further concerns of Poulson are described in the same article:

Another cause is what I call "over-extension of equipment." For example, a manufacturer may sell a photo-electric beam system with the claim that it is effective for 300 feet. Under ideal conditions, it may be, but under normal everyday working conditions, 300 feet is "over-extending" the equipment to the point where it will cause false alarms. A variation of "over-extension" of equipment is the sale of the "next best thing" when protecting problem areas for which there is no equipment available to do a proper job; "the next best thing" is sometimes a good source of false alarms.

An "economy" that is sometimes resorted to in order to offer the most competitive price is to ignore Underwriters' Laboratories specifications when making installations which do not require UL certification. By skimping here and there to be competitive an installation is produced which will in the long run be a source of false alarms.
sional groups and research teams. One example of corrective recommendations is found in the RAND Report (Vol. I):

The sensitivity adjustment of the sensory mechanism shall be so as to suppress false alarms as a result of short flashes of light, wind noises, vehicular noises, or other forces unrelated to genuine alarms.

In an attempt to alleviate application problems, the standards’ subcommittee of the Alarm Industry Committee for Combating Crime prepared the following model legislation section for the International Association of Chiefs of Police:

Electronic Protection Units

A.10 Electronic intrusion-detection equipment includes a variety of operating principles that are used in combination with or in lieu of other protection forms. Sensors, such as photoelectric beams, ultrasonic devices, microphones, vibration detectors, pressure-sensitive mats, and other similar devices as provided for herein, shall be incorporated into the installation, false alarms will be minimized by strict adherence to the manufacturer’s application and installation recommendations. (12.3)

A.11 Systems of infrasonic, ultrasonic and sound vibration detection systems, shall be applicable only when the protected area is provided with a physical boundary. (12.4)

A.12 When a sound detection system is used to protect a premises, the following conditions and requirements shall apply. (12.10)

A.4.3 All such systems shall be limited to buildings of substantial construction in which a feasible entry through ceiling, roof, walls, or floor will create a significant amount of sound energy. Also, the construction shall be such as to reduce extraneous outside noise. (12.11)

A.4.4 The preceding paragraph is intended to restrain applications of such systems to buildings or areas constructed of concrete, masonry, or glass. (12.12)

There is no question that a properly installed alarm system using sensors can greatly benefit crime prevention. Yet, until manufacturers can produce sensors with improved ability to discern stimuli correctly and until alarm sales and installation personnel upgrade their knowledge and skills in working with sensors, false alarm problems caused by errant sensors will continue to plague law enforcement officials, alarm users, and the alarm industry.

**Selected References**


**Standard 4.5**

**Training and Instruction of Alarm Users by Alarm Companies**

Companies and others installing alarm systems should be required to instruct or train users and their employees in the proper operation of the systems and to provide continued guidance when needed.

**Commentary**

The responsibilities inherent in the use of an alarm system do not end with proper selection and correct installation. A user must understand the system’s operation, as well as the problems and dangers inherent in a false alarm. The problem of false alarms due to user error emphasizes the need for improving user responsibility. A study by Cedar Rapids, Iowa, documented that 76 percent of all false alarms during the study period were the result of error or negligence on the part of the alarm owner.

Several other studies of false alarms have also documented the common problem of user error. One, entitled “Feasibility Demonstration of the Citizen’s Alarm System,” conducted by the Aerospace Corporation, found that alarm user error totaled 35.9 percent of all false alarms received at one central station in a 6-month period. Further, 58.4 percent of these false alarms were of unknown origin, and it can be safely assumed that some portion of that figure could be assigned to alarm user error.

An extensive study of false alarms was conducted by the Alarm Industry Committee for Combating Crime (AICCC). Involved in a 1-month pilot study were 178 central alarm stations serving 152,425 alarms. During that period there were 35,992 false alarms. Forty-four percent, or 15,994 false alarms, were labeled internal alarms, defined as any alarm initiated from the protected premises and caused by anything other than equipment failure. Of this figure 66.5 percent, according to the AICCC, were caused by alarm user error. An additional 20 percent, or 7,212 unknown alarms, were logged by the central alarm stations during the study period. A portion of these alarms may be assumed to have been caused by alarm user error.

Another research report by the National Crime Prevention Institute, entitled “False Alarm Study,” indicated that 1 percent of all false alarms of a selected bank’s branches were caused by alarm user/employee error. The report further cited a survey of false alarms from general businesses and residences in which a 50 percent alarm-user-error rate and a 9 percent unknown-reason rate were discovered.

Data on the percentage of false alarms from unknown causes reported by various studies has been included, because alarm industry professionals have suggested that users may deny responsibility for false alarms in order to avoid sanctions imposed by local government authorities or central alarm stations.
Thus, it is probable that a portion of false alarms whose causes are listed in the unknown category are attributable to user error. As was the case with user error resulting in false alarms, the figures given for this type of error were assumed to be correct. In view of the exceedingly high percentage of false alarms attributable to user error, the causes that contribute to these high percentages should be more closely examined. This was done by the AICOC in their study of false alarms:

Percent

- Failure to lock doors and windows: 21.2
- Custodial or other personnel improperly entering security areas: 17.8
- Improper operation by user: 14.8
- Failure to notify alarm company of lapse in service: 12.7
- Total percent of internal causes: 66.5

This breakdown reflects that user-generated false alarms are caused by a lack of training and occasional negligence in the operation of the system. It also reflects the need for an ongoing training and communication program between the alarm company or central alarm station and alarm users.

Recognition of the need for proper training is cited by the Small Business Administration. In a report entitled “Crime Against Small Business,” they recommend:

"...attention be directed to abatement of the serious operational problems of alarm systems including: training of businessmen and their employees on procedures to reduce the number of false alarms caused by human errors.

The alarm companies are also aware of the need for user training. The previously mentioned AICOC study of false alarms stated:

"An intensive study of the largest category, 'Internal Alarms' has shown that a substantial portion of these alarms could very likely be eliminated with improved cooperation between alarm users and the alarm company.

In an attempt to deal with alarm user error, AICOC strongly urges alarm companies to initiate educational programs with their subscribers and report to AICOC on the success of their efforts. Workshops are being held to acquaint the alarm professional with the alarm operation and to provide meaningful programs to the subscriber. These programs are designed to provide the alarm user with a meaningful understanding of the system to which he has paid. The alarm company or central alarm station, and fellow citizens. Therefore, at the time of installation, it is imperative that the proper attitudes and operating skills be instilled in the alarm user. Accordingly, all companies and others installing alarm systems should be required to provide appropriate instruction and proper training in the operation of the system.

In addition to instruction on the basic operations of the alarm system, all users should know how to stop the operation of the system. The user also may not be able to change the proper mental attitude in his third or fourth generation employee toward alarm system procedure.

When this point is reach (it will be obvious because of frequent employee-actuated false alarms), the principal user should request assistance from the alarm company to request assistance. In response, the company should send a representative to provide a refresher course to the user and employees. This training should be, and is in many cases, provided free. If such service is now unavailable, capability to deliver it should be developed. If it is not feasible for an alarm company to provide this service free of charge, it should be included in the service arrangement at minimal cost.

It is clear that if the problem of false alarms is to be effectively dealt with, alarm companies and others who install alarm systems need to take an active role in providing the proper use and operation of their systems. Glen D. King, executive director of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, summarized the role of alarm companies in a speech delivered to the National Burglar and Fire Alarm Association:

"Your own part in this, it seems to me, lies in educating your customers about the system he has purchased and in making sure he understands what he has been told. You false alarms annually, every officer's safety is probably endangered many times. False alarms unnecessarily place his life and lives of other drivers in jeopardy. If such calls were valid calls for help, this overall response would be justified—but that is not the case.

From January through July, 1971, SPD vehicle accidents occurred during 'emergency response' of which 17 were ruled 'successful' by the court. These incidents involved 23 of the 157 SPD accidents recorded during this period, and 43 compared favorably to 1970's figure of 37%. There are no available statistics on how many such responses involved false alarms.

Alarm users need to be informed that false alarms may result in the alarm company or central alarm station sending out a serviceman or, in some cases, an armed agent of the company. This response means increased costs for all alarm users and, in the case of armed alarm respondents, can pose a threat to life should confusion develop at the scene involving customers, police, and respondents.

As a part of their service, alarm companies or other installers should provide not only instruction at the time of installation but also continued guidance or training in the use and operation of the system as needed. Between the months or years following the purchase of an alarm system, the principal user may forget all he was taught at the time of purchase. Additionally, the third of fourth generation employee may receive inadequate training from the user in the operation of the alarm system. The user also may not be able to instill the proper mental attitude in his third or fourth generation employee toward alarm system procedure.

Selected References
6. National Crime Prevention Institute, "False Alarm Study," Louisville, Ky.: University of Louisville, School of Police Administration, undated.

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 4.5.

2.1 Training in Private Security
4.3 Certified Training of Alarm Sales and Service Personnel
4.10 Alarm User Permit Systems and the False Alarm Problem
7.1 Consumers Responsibility for Selection of Security Services
Joint Cooperation to Reduce Alarm System Costs

Governmental agencies such as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Federal, State, and local regulatory agencies, the alarm industry, law enforcement agencies; and the telephone companies should work together to reduce the cost of alarm systems and improve the efficiency and reliability of operation and transmission.

Commentary

Alarms offer a proven method for crime reduction and criminal apprehension. Unfortunately, at the same time crime is rising, the costs connected with the provision of alarm systems and services also are steadily increasing. If alarm systems become so costly that only the wealthy and large companies can afford alarms for their homes and businesses, respectively, the poor and small businesses will suffer a serious injustice. To achieve the two-pronged objective of deterring crime and increasing the availability of alarm systems, many diverse groups will have to join together to search for meaningful and just solutions to reduce the cost of alarm systems.

The goal of reducing the cost of alarm systems and improving reliability of transmission appears to be hampered by the economic considerations of both telephone companies and central alarm station operators. The problem from the telephone companies' point of view is that provision of high-grade metallic transmission lines to alarm operators is not cost effective. Telephone companies are moving to overcome this problem by increasing their fees for this category of service. To illustrate this point, Anthony J. Gross, vice president of engineering, ADT Security Systems, pointed out that between 1972 and 1975 a rate increase of 300 percent occurred for metallic facilities used by alarm services in Florida. He further noted that 100 percent increases were imposed in Ohio, New York, and North Carolina.

Alarm operators are seeking rates comparable to those assigned to common carriers. Grosso pointed out that one telephone company agreed to a 25 percent reduction in local facility tariffs for common carriers, but became alarm companies are not interstate common carriers, they did not qualify for the reduction.

Cost problems sometimes are accompanied by unsatisfactory alarm transmission. Norval Poulson of Certified Burglar Alarm Systems cites industry problems with the telephone companies in terms of reliability of transmission:

For many decades alarm companies have used "signal grade" telephone lines for alarm transmission. These are lines of a lower grade not satisfactory for voice transmission. While signal grade lines were entirely adequate for the older alarm systems, the new sophisticated equipment... is not always compatible with the lower grade line—and more false alarms occur.

Poulson further observed that telephone company personnel working on the lines sometimes interfere with the tagged alarm lines, resulting in false alarms. The alarm industry is attempting to overcome some of these problems. The AC multiplex system was developed to take advantage of the more readily available voice-grade facilities. In 1969, Bell Lab operators, with alarm industry encouragement, began work on equipment that hopefully will provide low-cost McCallum-type service. However, for alarm company operators to adopt this systems and equipment to a type using the less expensive telephone lines, takes time and money. For the near future, alarm companies require lower line rates if they are to continue to provide affordable services. To obtain these lower rates, the full cooperation of telephone companies is needed.

To achieve the objective of low-cost, efficient, and reliable alarm systems the assistance and cooperation of more than telephone companies and alarm station operators is needed. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) also should become involved, because it regulates the telephone companies and radio and television frequencies—alternates to leased telephone lines.

Although the relationship between the FCC and the alarm industry dates back 15 years, only recently has the FCC displayed an understanding of the alarm industry's problem. In a pamphlet entitled "Alarm Systems, FCC, and You," by Jeremiah Courtney, credit is given to the Central Station Radio Committee and Frequency Advisory Committee for being "about FCC understanding and obtaining the allocation of "five pairs of mobile radio service frequencies..." Also, FCC cable accessied television rules may allow, as early as 1977, unused CATV channel for nonvoice return alarm system service.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) is also involved with the alarm industry. Because various statutory mandates assigned to LEAA under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the agency has a logical involvement in crime prevention systems. For example, to the National Burglar and Fire Alarm Association, LEAA Administrator, Richard W. Valde, announced that LEAA has established liaison with the FCC in order to maximize the effectiveness of the alarm industry in reducing crime.

Two meetings have been held between LEAA and the FCC, and monthly meetings between the two organizations have been set up. Grosso, acting on behalf of the alarm industry, developed the following list of activities where LEAA assistance could be used:

1. Encouraging availability of telephone lines.
2. Encouraging reductions in the cost of telephone facilities.
3. Reducing the time required by telephone companies to provide new facilities and repair existing facilities.
4. Encouraging technical development by the telephone company.
5. Assisting in procurement of new frequencies from the FCC.
6. Assisting in avoiding the imposition of costly technical restrictions by the FCC.

LEAA interaction with the FCC has not, as yet, involved these issues. However, there are indications that, in the near future, LEAA will move into a more active role with the FCC and the alarm industry.

Not all problem areas have been presented, but those that have been presented illustrate how the alarm industry views the FCC, and how the FCC views the alarm industry. The problem areas include: FCC interaction with the alarm industry, FCC responsibility for legislation, FCC responsibility for standards, FCC responsibility for radio and television frequencies, FCC responsibility for alarm system transmissions at reduced costs.

Although not all inclusive, this standard recognizes the multifold problem of achieving alarm system transmissions at reduced costs. Considerations of the several positions have been presented. Efforts by individuals and organizations in terms of time, money, and hard work have brought about a situation—a climate where reconciliation of problems is possible if appropriate executives can sit down in a neutral atmosphere and engage in joint efforts, progress toward reduced costs, and improved reliability of transmission should occur.

Selected References

2. Grosso, Anthony J. "Central Station Signal Transmission Methods." Address before the City

Central Alarm Task Force of Dallas, Tex., 1975.
Standard 4.7

Special Trunklines Into Law Enforcement Facilities and Automatic Dialers

Consistent with existing technology, automatic telephone dialing services that are connected to alarm systems should not be keyed or interconnected with emergency law enforcement agency telephone lines.

Commentary

Telephone dialer systems are alarm systems that upon activation, normally use existing telephone lines to relay recorded messages to police or fire stations. In a master's thesis by F. C. Heckman, the following simple operational explanation of the automatic dialer system is given:

As an automatic dialer is connected, usually through a telephone coupler which is rented from the phone company, to an existing regular telephone line. The dialer contains a tape cartridge which is programmed to dial a series of telephone numbers in the event the dialer is triggered. In addition to dialing the programmed numbers, the dialer also gives a prerecorded message. Some use double channel tapes whereby separate rate calls and messages can be made in event of fire or burglary.

The telephone dialer system can provide a business with an alarm service at a cost lower than a central alarm station or a police department alarm. However, for various reasons, many police departments and municipalities have become disillusioned with the dialer. A proposed ordinance in Washington, D.C., would require dialers to go through telephone answering services; attempts have been made in other localities to ban dialers altogether.

It is the manner in which the automatic dialer transmits the alarm message that so disturbs law enforcement officials. When activated, the dialer plays a prepped message to the number dialed. Thus, the system can tie up police telephone lines until the dialer completes its program, or until someone at the scene resets the system. Telephone communication can be disrupted considerably when several dialers attempt to deliver their messages simultaneously or when a malfunction occurs. The RAND Report (Vol. II) cited an example of one dialer making 22 calls to the Los Angeles police communication center in one day. Also, police communications officers experience frustration when they are not able to question the prepped message or learn additional details regarding the emergency.

In an effort to counter this problem with the telephone dialer system, the RAND Report (Vol. I) made a recommendation consistent with this standard:

No automatic protection device shall be keyed to a primary or secondary telephone trunk line to the public police department, i.e., such devices should be keyed to a special trunk line.
It is essential that the law enforcement agency’s primary trunkline and special emergency lines be kept available for the fastest possible handling of person-to-person calls. Various cities throughout the country have adopted some variation of the above recommendations. Excerpts from existing telephone dialer system ordinances are:

**Dallas, Tex.:**

Sec. 158. Automatic protection devices—restrictions on keying.

(a) No automatic protection device that is installed after the effective date hereof, that any person on the premises of any kind in the City of Dallas shall be keyed either to a primary or secondary trunkline.

(b) After the effective date hereof, any alarm equipment supplier who installs automatic protection devices in the City for the purpose of sending pre-recorded emergency messages directly to the Fire Department or the Police Department shall first have keying instructions, including a direct number telephone number, from the particular Department concerned with the type of messages, in order to key such devices to a special trunkline into that Department.

(c) Within sixty (60) days after the effective date hereof, all automatic protection devices in the City that were keyed on that date in a primary or secondary trunkline shall be disconnected therefrom. The owner or lessee of any such device shall be responsible for the disconnecting of it.

(d) As owner or lessee of an automatic protection device who has in any manner as required by (c) of this Section, may authorize an alarm equipment supplier who has a temporary permit or a license, as required by this Chapter, to key the automatic protection device to a special trunkline into the Fire Department or the Police Department, provided the device shall meet minimum operational requirements, as set forth in this Chapter.

Sec. 159. Issuance of permits.

Automatic protection device installed on premises of any kind in the City that are key in a special or operator trunk lines or are interconnected to the communication center is required to be subjected to the following requirements, as determined by the Director, as follows:

(a) The content of the recorded messages to be transmitted by such automatic devices must be intelligible and in a format approved by the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company or its successors; and

(b) The sensory apparatus and hardware comprising such a device must be capable of transmitting an alarm to the police via the special trunk line to be designated in the registration of said equipment as required by this Ordinance.

F. All dial alarm devices shall be capable of disconnecting the owner to call the Police to indicate that a false alarm has occurred.

**Labadie, Mo.:**

Automatic dialers must be installed on a separate telephone line within within the city, and shall be equipped with capability of sending the telephone line and a method to abort a false alarm. Automatic dialer systems shall be capable of being transmitted to the fire department and the police department by the owner or lessee of such device, upon the request of the (police department) or to a workable alternative to total prohibition of dialer systems. Thus, if a tremendous natural disaster, such as an earthquake, occurs on a single dialer malfunction, only the special trunklines will be tied up.

**Tenafly, N.J.:**

(a) The sensory appurtenances and hardware comprising such a device shall be capable of being transmitted to the (police department) via the special trunk line. No such device shall be longer than one minute fifteen seconds in length.

(b) The sensory appurtenances and hardware comprising such a device shall be capable of being transmitted to the (police department) via the special trunk line. No such device shall be longer than one minute fifteen seconds in length.

(c) Messages transmitted during such calls, stating the location and nature of the alarm condition, shall not exceed fifteen (15) seconds in length.

(d) No alarm signal shall be transmitted unless a signal has been received by the (police department) concerning the procedure to be followed after such a call and the (police department) agrees to receive such a call.

(e) The contents of the recorded message to be transmitted by such device must be intelligible and in a format approved by the (police department) as appropriate for the type of emergency being reported.

(f) Upon a single stimulus of the alarm device, an automatic dialing device may place two separate calls to the (police department) via the special trunk lines. No such call shall be longer than one minute fifteen seconds in duration. There must be at least three minutes between the completion of the first call and the initiation of the second, and the second call must be identified as a second call.

(g) This Section shall apply only to those automatic dialing devices interconnected to the communication center of the (police department), any other municipal office or to telecommunication operators.

These ordinances represent a positive response to difficulties encountered by the police with telephone dialer systems. Thus, if a tremendous natural disaster, such as an earthquake, occurs on a single dialer malfunction, only the special trunklines will be tied up.

Another feasible alternative involves sending the preprogrammed messages from all automatic dialers to central stations or answering services for routing to law enforcement agencies. This method may provide a workable alternative to total prohibition of dialer alarms by localities as a result of the concern over overburdened law enforcement communication facilities.

Before law enforcement officials or government authorities enact any action involving automatic telephone dialers, consideration should be given to the result their actions may have on overall crime prevention in the community, especially the cost trade-offs between handling an automatic dialer alarm or investigating a burglary.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and guides may be applicable in implementing Standard 4.7:

4.2 Backup Power for Alarms
4.8 Annual Alarm Inspection
4.10 Alarm User Permit Systems and the False Alarm Problem
7.1 Consumers Responsibility for Selection of Security Services

Before law enforcement officials or government authorities enact any action involving automatic telephone dialers, consideration should be given to the result their actions may have on overall crime prevention in the community, especially the cost trade-offs between handling an automatic dialer alarm or investigating a burglary.

Additional comments on the selected references:


Related Standards

The following standards and guides may be applicable in implementing Standard 4.7:

4.2 Backup Power for Alarms
4.8 Annual Alarm Inspection
4.10 Alarm User Permit Systems and the False Alarm Problem
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The following standards and guides may be applicable in implementing Standard 4.7:

4.2 Backup Power for Alarms
4.8 Annual Alarm Inspection
4.10 Alarm User Permit Systems and the False Alarm Problem
7.1 Consumers Responsibility for Selection of Security Services
Annual Alarm Inspection

Local governments should require all alarm system users whose systems ordinarily result in a law enforcement response to have their systems inspected at least once each year.

Commentary

False alarms not only reduce the efficacy of using alarm systems as a primary crime prevention tool, but also are a threat to both citizens and law enforcement officers. Users of alarm systems that alert other citizens or law enforcement officers to a criminal attack should do everything possible to ensure their systems will not false alarm due to mechanical failure or malfunction. In the absence of a servicing and maintenance contract, the user should arrange for annual inspection service.

Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. (UL) has included an annual system inspection requirement in many of its standards; some UL standards even require inspection more frequently than once a year. UL standards require inspections of police station connected burglar alarm units, local burglar alarm units, central station burglar alarm units, holdup alarm units, mercantile and back burglar alarm systems, and proprietary burglar alarm system units.

A representative example of the language used in UL standards requiring inspection follows:

43.1 All alarm installation and alarm receiving equipment shall be maintained under contract by the operating company and shall be inspected at intervals sufficiently frequent to ensure continuous reliable service. In no case shall the interval between regular maintenance inspections exceed 1 year. (UL Standard 363, Police Station Connected Burglar Alarm Units and Systems, March 1973)

A document prepared by the Alarm Industry Committee for Combating Crime provides a sample of the language found in servicing and maintenance contracts:

The company agrees to install and maintain during the term of the agreement all necessary transmitters, wire connections and instruments necessary to convey signals from the subscriber's premises to the alarm company (or the police communications center) (or in the case of local alarm systems for proper operation of the system) and all sensing devices, appliances, cabinets, cables, conduits, fuses, screens, springs, tubing, switches, wire and all other materials specified in the schedule of protection (the schedule of protection is part of the contract and it spells out the nature and extent of protection provided by the alarm company) and the alarm company will maintain such system in good working order.

The Texas Municipal League's "Burglar Alarm Code for Texas Cities" extensively incorporates the standards of the Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., and the American National Standards Institute. The League's code mandates annual inspection of alarm systems.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 4.8:

4.2 Backup Power for Alarms

4.4 Compatibility of Sensors

4.7 Special Trunklines into Law Enforcement Facilities and Automatic Dialers

4.9 Alarm Systems Servicing Capability

7.1 Consumers Responsibility for Selection of Security Services
Standard 4.9
Alarm Systems Servicing Capability

Every jurisdiction should have a disclosure law requiring persons in the business of alarm systems sales to make known prior to a sale where the alarm system can be serviced or where a service arrangement can be obtained. Proof that a servicing arrangement, such as a contract or agreement, is in existence should be submitted to a law enforcement agency by persons desiring to transmit alarm signals to that agency.

Commentary
The recent rise in burglaries across the country has brought a corresponding rise in the business of alarm systems sales. A major problem confronting users of these systems is obtaining adequate service. There is no way we can figure out how the circuit went, particularly if the wires are concealed within the walls. . . .

There are reasons other than technical difficulties cited by the above for the reluctance of alarm companies to service equipment other than their own. Carl Kellem of the National Crime Prevention Institute points out that to service other companies' systems requires available spare parts, and most companies are not willing to bear this additional expense. Therefore, unless the owner agrees to an extensive service and maintenance contract allowing replacement of most of the original equipment, alarm companies usually will refuse to service an alarm system they did not sell or install. Kellem points out that reputable alarm companies do not wish to service equipment sold or installed by other companies, because they do not wish to encourage alarm systems sales by companies that cannot or will not provide maintenance.

A police regulation cannot arbitrarily invade private property or personal rights. There must be some clear and real necessity between the desired goal of the law and its actual provisions . . . .

Actual examples of ordinances requiring service capabilities of alarm systems do exist. For example, a Dallas, Tex., ordinance requires alarm companies to promise 24-hour-a-day, 7-days-a-week servicing capability, and to provide a maintenance manual and schematics to the purchaser of the alarm system and the director of public utilities. Similarly, a Las Vegas, Nev., ordinance states that all suppliers leasing, selling, or installing alarm systems must be able to repair the systems and provide purchasers with written material on how the devices operate.

In summary, a servicing disclosure law is necessary to reduce problems arising from lack of knowledge about the need for servicing, to help eliminate dealers capitalizing on the fear of crime to sell faulty or poor-quality alarm equipment, and to reduce unnecessary burdens on law enforcement agencies.

Selected References
6. McQueeney, James. "New Jersey Alarm Firms


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 4.9:

7.1 Consumers Responsibility for Selection of Security Services

8.1 Annual Alarm Inspection

7.2 Consumers Responsibility for Selection of Security Services

4.8 Annual Alarm Inspection

4.9 Goals for Action

Standard 4.10

Alarm User Permit Systems and the False Alarm Problem

Local governments should establish and enforce an alarm user permit system to regulate and reduce false alarms. Verified excessive false alarming ordinarily resulting in a law enforcement response should be grounds for permit revocation, suspension, and other appropriate penalties.

Commentary

The most common problem with all types of alarm systems is false alarms. This drawback has lessened the alarm systems' role in crime prevention. But it is not a problem without a remedy, because experience has demonstrated that where strict control by municipal government over alarm users exists, statistics show a reduction in false alarming.

The sanctions exercised by governments over alarm users should focus on control of false alarming. The goal of the permit system is to bring about more effective crime prevention.

False Alarm Definition

To understand the advantages and desirability of the alarm system permit, there first must be comprehension of the false alarm problem. In the case of "false alarms," it is difficult to develop a simplistic definition of the problem. Bernard Beerman, counsel for the Alarm Industry Committee for Combating Crime (AICCC), states:

"The most volatile issue that affects the alarm industry today is the issue of false alarms. We believe that any report on private security must address itself to standards and goals on this issue... A primary question which is raised is, "What exactly is a false alarm?" The alarm industry believes that the mere use of the term "false alarm" is inherently misleading.

There is no single definition of false alarms that is accepted by the various entities involved in or affected by alarm systems. This lack of an accepted definition makes discussion of the problem difficult among law enforcement personnel, alarm industry representatives, and alarm users. The sampling of definitions that follows illustrates how confusion may result when referring to false alarms:

"False alarm means an alarm signal received that was not caused by a burglar..." (Cedar Rapids Second Year Report)

"False alarm means an alarm signal necessitating response by the police department where an emergency situation does not exist..." (Multnomah County, Ore., Alarms Ordinance)
A false alarm is an emergency alarm activated by inadvertence, negligence, or unauthorized action to which the city police or fire department responds, including malfunction of the alarm system. The definition excludes alarms caused by: malfunction of the indicator at the police station; testing or repair of telephone equipment; force; acts of God; vandalism; thunder; or lighting; or unauthorized illegal entry of which there is visible evidence; the resident acting under a mistaken belief that a need exists to call the police or fire department; a call to police cancelling the alarm by giving proper code number prior to arrival of the police or fire department. A false alarm is a term reserved for the number of alarms that are not provable criminal attacks out of the total number of alarms received in a given period. For example, if there were one alarm in one month and it was false, the false alarm rate is 100 percent. This false alarm rate may have come from one alarm system out of a thousand systems operating in a given location. Using the term without proper qualification and agreement will not foster cooperation and good will between law enforcement agencies and the alarm industry.

Need for Alarm User Permit

The justification for government control over alarm systems arises primarily from the thousands of man-hours and law enforcement dollars wasted in answering false alarms. Examples from the commentary of the Texas Municipal League's model ordinance vividly illustrate the cost of false alarms: In a 9-month period the Waco, Tex., Police Department handled 2,088 false alarms, expending 1,125 man-hours, at a cost of $7,710. In a 6-month period the Corpus Christi, Tex., Police Department handled 2,320 false alarms, expending 2,820 man-hours, at a cost of $21,850. An article appearing in Security Systems Digest stated that the false alarm problem in Washington, D.C., was costing the city $7,100. A more recent article stated that the police budget of the alarm business is stated to be $21 million of the $29 million alarm business in Washington, D.C., is unnecessary.

The size, scope, and nature of the false alarm problem provide the rationale for the need for regulation. The alarm user permit system can provide a degree of regulation which is superior to the monetary fine approach. As an illustration of what an alarm user permit system can do, we illustrate the need for regulation. The alarm user permit system can provide a degree of regulation which is superior to the monetary fine approach.

A false alarm is an emergency alarm activated by inadvertence, negligence, or unauthorized action to which the city police or fire department responds, including malfunction of the alarm system. The definition excludes alarms caused by: malfunction of the indicator at the police station; testing or repair of telephone equipment; force; acts of God; vandalism; thunder; or lighting; or unauthorized illegal entry of which there is visible evidence; the resident acting under a mistaken belief that a need exists to call the police or fire department; a call to police cancelling the alarm by giving proper code number prior to arrival of the police or fire department. A false alarm is a term reserved for the number of alarms that are not provable criminal attacks out of the total number of alarms received in a given period. For example, if there were one alarm in one month and it was false, the false alarm rate is 100 percent. This false alarm rate may have come from one alarm system out of a thousand systems operating in a given location. Using the term without proper qualification and agreement will not foster cooperation and good will between law enforcement agencies and the alarm industry.

Enforcement of Alarm User Permit

Enforcement of a permit system is the most perplexing problem. Any sanction incorporated in a user permit system should be aimed at the control of false alarms, not designed to punish the user. The examination of several user permit systems imposing monetary fines are any more effective than systems relying on suspension or revocation. Revocation and suspension of permits used as an enforcement system to control the false alarm problem is without giving users into giving up their leading procedures. Many user permit systems incorporate monetary penalties for false alarms. However, monetary penalties are not believed to be effective in enforcing a permit system for the following reasons:

1. Lacking a proper definition of false alarm, it is not proper to impose a monetary penalty.
2. The person making the determination of the cause of the false alarm may be unqualified.
3. Fines may force a small businessman to give up his alarm system but not affect a large corporation.
4. Fines may cause a reduction in new alarm systems. This is contrary to the goals of crime prevention, i.e., as many systems in operation as possible.

5. No data exist proving user permit systems imposing monetary fines are any more effective than systems relying on suspension or revocation.

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4. Fines may cause a reduction in new alarm systems. This is contrary to the goals of crime prevention, i.e., as many systems in operation as possible.

5. No data exist proving user permit systems imposing monetary fines are any more effective than systems relying on suspension or revocation.
The Multnomah County, Oreg., ordinance requires a charge of $180 for the third suspension of a user’s permit. The IACP model ordinance provides a penalty of up to $300 a day for continuing to use a system on a revoked permit. These stiff monetary penalties reflect the severity of the problem as seen by the authorities.

The revocation and suspension sanction method chosen for the IACP model ordinance was worked out over 2 years of negotiation and discussion between the alarm industry and IACP. Although acceptance was not by any means unanimous, IACP and the alarm industry have agreed to proceed with this system of sanctions as an initial model.

Many reasons have led various cities to adopt permit systems. However, regardless of the nature of the causative reasons, positive results generally have been achieved with the application of closely monitored permit systems. An article in the July 1975 issue of Police Chief pointed out:

After two years of experience, Pasadena, California, police personnel are delighted with the dramatic results of the 1973 Burglary and Robbery Permit Ordinance passed by the city council. In the five-month period between November, 1974 and April, 1975, there were only 786 false alarms (5.2/day) as compared to 1,841 (12.85/day) during a five-month period prior to the ordinance. This 60 percent reduction represents approximately $10,178 worth of police resources conserved. It is worth noting that during the 15-month period from April, 1974 to 1975, the number of alarm systems in the city increased 27 percent.

The alarm industry, like any other industry, wants minimum regulation and would prefer to accept the user permit system only after attempts to achieve low false alarm rates through the cooperative efforts of all involved have failed to resolve the problem. The alarm industry is also on record as opposing a system of fines, except as a last resort.

Steven Watts, Multnomah County, Oreg., Police Department, in a speech to the Western Burglar and Fire Alarm Association, stated the case for permit systems:

I strongly believe that a program which brings the alarm industry and law enforcement together, and which incorporates a functional alarm ordinance into the community will cause the following to occur:
1. Total number of false alarms will decrease.
2. The inordinate number of police man hours expended in responding to false alarms will decrease.
3. The quality of alarm systems and companies will increase causing the number of arrests for burglary to increase.
4. The opportunity for crime to be committed will decrease.

The user permit system appears to be a necessity. It is the only effective tool for weeding out alarm systems that are improperly installed, inadequately maintained, and improperly operated. Without an alarm user permit system, a cycle can emerge where the law enforcement officer or agency reduces the priority of the response, resulting in less likelihood of capture of a suspect and an increased number of alarms that appear false.

Selected References
5. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Police Department. Installation, Test, and Evaluation of a Large-Scale Burglar Alarm System for a Municipal Police Department. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Police Department.
Standard 4.11
Ownership and Operation of Alarm Systems

Ownership or operation of alarm systems should be the province of private enterprise, and government ownership or operation of alarm systems should be discouraged provided, however, that government should not be precluded from:

1. Operating such systems in temporary or emergency situations;
2. Owning or operating alarm systems that are located in publicly owned or leased buildings, announce in the same or other government buildings, and are responded to by government employees;
3. Providing private individuals and businesses with funds for the acquisition of crime prevention devices provided that such devices are purchased on the open market and remain the property of the consumer.¹

Commentary

Almost all of the standards in this chapter encourage some degree of positive government involvement in the alarms industry. Government involvement is appropriate and needed to bring uniformity of regulations to the industry, to ensure the maintenance of a certain level of professionalism, to share the cost of research on alarm equipment and transmission methods when such activities would be of mutual benefit, and, in general, to further and foster a cooperative relationship between persons employed in the public and private sectors. This standard, although couched in negative phrasing, has a positive purpose in seeking to ensure that government refrains from providing alarm service in competition with the private sector. Such competition ultimately would result in the demise of the private sector's role in the alarm system field.

Chapter 6 states a similar concept in regard to prohibiting law enforcement personnel from holding certain private security jobs. Employment of a law enforcement officer as a private detective is prohibited because implicit conflicts are inherent in that job. The same is true of local governments providing alarm services, because the nature of such an arrangement leads directly to conflicts with private business and results in inappropriate use of tax dollars. This practice has occurred in the past, and all involved parties have become wiser from the experience. Governments should not continue or start this activity but should move on to the positive areas of involvement outlined in this chapter.

Concerning the question of government ownership of alarms, all parties agree on one point—there are valid exceptions to the rule. The first exception is a temporary and emergency situation that might require government involvement with alarms. In this regard, this standard is in agreement with the following position of counsel for the Alarm Industry Committee for Combating Crime (AICC):

In situations where crime has reached critical and unreasonable levels, where national security is involved or where vital industries are threatened, there may be emergency justification for "coiled and temporary governmental involvement with alarm systems.

Also included in this area are portable tactical alarms (stakeout alarms) employed by many law enforcement agencies for temporary use in small businesses located in high-crime areas or warehouses suffering frequent criminal attack. Because these alarms are not permanent installations, they are excluded from the prohibition rule. In fact, these installations may inspire the person whose property has been protected to acquire an alarm system.

The second exception is the use of government-owned and operated alarm systems located in publicly owned buildings that annunciate in the same or different building, resulting in a government employee response. This would protect existing practices by the General Services Administration and military installations, for example.

The third exception would allow cities to accept grants for experimentation when adequate and fair provisions are spelled out for disposition of the equipment and subscribers at the conclusion of the grant. Giving grants and providing funds to small businesses and citizens in high-crime and economically depressed areas for the purchase of protection devices would come under this exclusion. Allocation of government funds to private citizens for the purchase of alarm systems would be contingent on their acceptance from the public marketplace.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has gone on record as opposing government involvement with alarm systems. Among the reasons cited is that the alarm industry is a competitive industry, and the second exception is the use of government-owned and operated alarm systems located in publicly owned buildings that annunciate in the same or different building, resulting in a government employee response. This would protect existing practices by the General Services Administration and military installations, for example.

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points of agreement were likewise reviewed. On the question of government operation of alarms in com-
petition with private alarm businesses, both a point of view and an agreement were found to exist. In its
stand against the practice of government opera-
tion of alarm systems, the alarm industry was sup-
ported by the IACP.

This agreement is further evident in the Private
Security Advisory Council's "Model Burglar and
Hold-up Alarm Business Statute" (see Appendix 10).
This document is the result of the public and
private sectors working together to obtain the terms
of industry improvements advocated in this chapter.

Among the industry groups opposing government
ownership is the Alarm Industry Committee for
Combating Crime (AICCC). This group is made up
of representatives of national companies and
associations of small regional companies providing
alarm systems sales installation and service. In 1974, the
AICCC (then composed of the Central Station
Electrical Protection Association; National Burglar
and Fire Alarm Association; American District Tele-
graph Corp.; Burns International Security Services,
Inc.; Diebold, Inc.; Holmes Protection, Inc.; Mosler
Safe Company; and Wells Fargo Alarm Services)
expressed their opposition to government ownership
of alarm businesses in a position paper:

The Alarm Industry Committee for Combating Crime
believes that it is not in the public interest to permit govern-
ment ownership of alarm system detection devices on private
premises; that it is not in the public interest to establish
government owned systems to compete with or to the exclusion of
private enterprise; that it is not in the public interest to permit govern-
ment units or public bodies to sell goods or services to the public
in competition with or to the exclusion of private enterprise
for the following reasons: . . .

The AICCC listed reasons for their opposition,
explaining that the use of unofficial authority to sell
the government's system, the selective allotting of
alarm systems paid for by tax dollars, and the unfair
competition created when government provides lower
installation line, servicing, and maintenance costs
than are available to industry. Further, the AICCC
has certain philosophical and practical objections
to government involvement in the alarm business in
any but temporary emergency situations. Among
these objections is the erosion of the principle of
sovereign immunity. Private companies currently
are held liable in suits where an alarm system failed
during a burglary. The AICCC asks whether the
taxpayer would have to cover the judgment in a
lawsuit against a government-owned alarm business.
Another question posed is whether government-owned
alarm system businesses would be subject to the
same sanctions as nongovernment businesses
for excessive false alarming.

Also siding with opposition to government owner-
ship is the monthly security publication in Distribution
and Marketing. A 1972 editorial dis-
cussing a federally funded alarm system project
in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, took the following positions:

On the surface, however, it certainly seems to us that the
Committee (AICCC) has a point . . . in fact, several of them. We agree wholeheartedly that (1) "the best interests of the police are not served when a municipality takes over a service business," and (2) "that the private alarm industry is more capable of competition than are available to industry." The low-cost competition (in the form of reduced transmission rates not available to
private business) and the eventual disposition of
alarm systems, the low-cost competition (in the
form of reduced transmission rates not available to
private business) and the eventual disposition of
taxpayer's hard-earned dollars being

But to see the taxpayer's hard-earned dollars being
poured into systems that appear to do nothing more than
crumble favored special interest groups goes against the grain of
every manufacturer and dealer (in the alarm business)
trying to make a go of it.

In this editor's opinion, the competition within the indus-
tory is tough enough without it being made even more difficult
by granting municipalities Federal funds for the purpose of
drawing municipalities into direct competition with established
alarm companies which have forgotten that these are
tools of that equipment in competition with private enterprises;
and that a tax in the public interest to permit govern-
ment units or public bodies to sell goods or services to the public
in competition with or to the exclusion of private enterprise
for the following reasons: . . .

Three examples of what has occurred when govern-
ment ownership of alarm systems has been attempted
are cited here to highlight some of the possible pitfalls.

Perhaps the oldest example is found in an AICCC
conference report from 1930's.

One example occurred in 1968 when a Federal
grant was awarded to the city of Cedar Rapids,
Iowa. It provided for the acquisition of an alarm
system and subsequent study of the crime prevention
effectiveness of burglar alarms. Although the results
received from the project were a worthwhile con-
tribution to the growing body of knowledge about
alarm systems, the low-cost competition (in the
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...
INTRODUCTION

Despite the efforts of upgraded and expanded agencies of the criminal justice system, crime in the United States continues to rise both in numbers and in seriousness. Even the value of police as a crime deterrent seems to be in question. The existing practices aimed at rehabilitation of offenders are not producing meaningful accomplishments. To find approaches with high potential for success for a resolution of the crime problem, criminal justice professionals are turning to new areas and to new technologies.

One approach developed through scientific research impacts crime through adjustment of the environment. Called by some as environmental security, this embryonic field applies various technologies to either structure the environment to discourage crime or to deter and prevent crime from occurring. Although most people are familiar with the use of locks and bars as a means to prevent crime, newer and more sophisticated environmental security techniques have been developed. These techniques involve placement of buildings on project sites, introduction of specific types of business establishments and community programs to certain neighborhoods, using theories regarding human behavior to determine which categories of people can best live in proximity to other groupings, and a myriad of other environmental management approaches.

One approach that has recently gained attention and consideration throughout the country is known as crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). The basic aim of CPTED is to anticipate and prevent crime through physical and environmental planning. It seeks the cooperation of private security and public law enforcement sectors to assist planners, architects, builders, and other local officials to identify and eliminate points of criminal opportunity before they are built into a community. CPTED also seeks to identify positive structural and layout designs that can be incorporated into buildings and projects to discourage would-be criminals. Within this framework, CPTED uses physical security measures and community awareness to provide a safer atmosphere.

Although integrally related in nature, the private security industry has not become involved with the concept of CPTED. Most of the standards in this chapter were developed to initiate such involvement. The following overview of the development of CPTED provides added meaning for the standards.

Development of CPTED

CPTED as a concept is a recent development, although its roots extend back to the early 1960's. It has evolved from the work of individuals who recognized certain relationships between the environment and people. They studied these relationships and hypothesized about their general applicability. Among the earliest contributors to the body of knowledge forming CPTED was Elizabeth Wood. Her background work in Chicago's public housing prompted Wood to develop a "Social Design Theory," which stressed the importance of physical design considerations in achieving social objectives. Recognizing the need for both privacy and community involvement, Elizabeth Wood recommended that public housing facilities be designed both inside and outside with areas for exercise, play, and littering that would be private yet allow for surveillance by the tenants. To encourage a sense of community, she advocated the inclusion of meeting places, stores, churches, and pub-type establishments on project grounds.

Jane Jacobs, a contemporary of Wood, was interested in making the streets a safe part of the environment. Throughout her career as a journalist, she pointed out that because streets were for everyone it was necessary for everyone to feel that antisocial acts would be observed and reported or countered by those present on the street. Like Elizabeth Wood, Jane Jacobs was aware that a sense of community was necessary for a safe environment. She suggested that store owners, whose businesses brought people out on the streets should be active in ensuring the security of persons on the street through surveillance. She endorsed street play for...
In early 1968, Shlomo Angel did a study of crime occurring on the streets of Oakland, Calif. He theorized that high-density-use areas had more potential victims and other elements for likelihood of apprehension—thus lower crime rates. Lower crime rates also appeared in low-density areas that theoretically did not provide enough potential victims and had inadequate crime targets. It was the intermediate or CPTED zone near zones that Angel believed was most susceptible to crime.

To reduce this crime potential, Angel proposed "oceaning squares" which would serve as commercial, self-contained areas. These sections would have no sides, and streets would be located on main thoroughfares, provide direct pedestrian route, maximize surveillance capabilities, and require active law enforcement coverage. Although his ideas were geared to the design of the City of Oakland and were not universally applicable or desirable, his work was important because it contained the embryonic use of design, citizen involvement, and law enforcement coverage to create a safe and secure environment.

In 1964 at Louis, Mo., two architects, Oscar Newman and Roger Montgomery, and two sociologists, Robert Clason and Roger Walker, met with members of the St. Louis Police Department to discuss the infamous Pruitt-Igoe housing project. From this meeting evolved the concept of defensible space. When this hypothesis is implemented it fosters territorial recognition through design; maximizes surveillance; eliminates fear and crime; enhances the safety of adjoining areas; and reduces the stigma of public housing. Not until 1970, with the aid of a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) grant and extensive preparatory work, was Oscar Newman able to conduct a major defensible space study. From this work, the Westinghouse Housing Foundation, New York City, funded projects in St. Louis, Mo., and Cleveland, Ohio. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (the research arm of LEAA) was so encouraged by Newman's thesis that the Institute moved to expand its commitment to studying the relationship of crime prevention techniques to the environment. It is now a major concern of LEAA-funded studies.

In 1970, the School of Criminal Justice at the State University of New York at Albany published a study, entitled "Elements of CPTED," which set the stage for the rise of the professionalization of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED).

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LEAA funded a study by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, entitled "Elements of CPTED." The report of the study, which was conducted by the University of Southern California, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). The purpose of this study was to determine the feasibility of implementing a comprehensive crime prevention program in the city of Baltimore, Maryland. The results of this study indicate that a CPTED program has the potential of raising the level of personnel security and the quality of urban environments. The report of the study also emphasized the benefits of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). The LEAA-funded study by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, entitled "Elements of CPTED," was characterized by the following steps:

1. The identification of the crime-environment problem in a specific design modality; 2. The design of a strategic model (containing a set of coordinated and interrelated design strategies) that appropriately responds to the identified crime problem through persistent design concepts; 3. Adaptation of the strategic model to a specific site, resulting in a tactical model (containing a set of coordinated and interrelated design directives) that identifies the environmental elements to be manipulated; 4. The implementation of the tactical model; and 5. Evaluation of the results achieved.

To evaluate the effectiveness of this concept, LEAA has since funded CPTED projects in various localities. These projects include the following:

- Setting points for increased involvement, of course, is becoming knowledgeable about the concepts, methodologies, and practices of CPTED. The starting point for increased involvement, of course, is becoming knowledgeable about the concepts, methodologies, and practices of CPTED. This activity would ensure that the security industry's voice is heard in CPTED planning, which would benefit the total crime prevention efforts of the community.

Private Security Involvement with CPTED

In the preparation of the standards in this chapter, it was necessary to examine the CPTED concept for the purpose of identifying the role of the private security industry in its past and further development. A review of existing literature revealed very few references to any relationship between the security industry and CPTED, either indirect or direct. One fact became clear: Here was a developing concept with a goal of crime prevention and reduction that was leaving out one of the largest sources of crime prevention knowledge—the private security industry.

By not including the security industry in the early development of CPTED projects, potential in practical implementation may occur. The private security industry can play an important role in the successful application of CPTED concepts. For maximum effectiveness, this role should be developed through the security industry's involvement in the following areas:

- Direct involvement:
  - Introduction to CPTED concepts,
  - Participation in CPTED total plan,
  - Advising others, and
  - Teaching CPTED.
- Indirect involvement:
  - Assisting participants with others.

Another step toward increased involvement is participation in the planning stage of CPTED programs. If invited to participate in a CPTED program, private security representatives should comply, if not invited, they should ask to participate. CPTED planners should use the knowledge of the private security industry regarding crime prevention techniques because this area is an important consideration in developing the total design. Further, if the security industry does not participate in CPTED planning, it is conceivable that private security executives will have to face a rise in crime through displacement as CPTED is applied in nearby areas.

Once private security experts have developed a working knowledge of CPTED, there can be positive advice on utilizing CPTED in police service in CPTED methodologies, they will be in a position to offer advice on CPTED on a consulting basis. This activity would ensure that the security industry's voice is heard in CPTED planning, which would benefit the total crime prevention efforts of the community.

Private security personnel also should be involved in teaching security methods used in business and industry. Schools of architectural and urban planning should seek to contract with them as instructors for the purpose of introducing students to the concepts and practices of the security industry. In this way, future architects and planners will be trained to give adequate consideration to security measures in their designs and practices.

The indirect relationship between the private security industry and CPTED is characterized by informal involvement and advice to others. Informal involvement includes practices such as the employment of surveys to ascertain the application of CPTED-related standards to standard measures. Informal advice to others is the passing along of CPTED concepts in professional meetings with peers or employers. Word of mouth carries great weight when it comes from respected individuals or professional societies with which the security executive is familiar.

CPTED is an emerging discipline. In order to be fully effective, it will require that private security executives keep up with new study results and developments. CPTED is a new concept that builds on the strengths of older proven disciplines.

The standards in this chapter represent government, business, and citizens to become more aware of crime prevention through environmental design. They emphasize specific needs for locations in such areas as door and window security, lighting,
and computer security, as well as stress the importance of incorporating considerations for CPTED into planning, education, and regulation. These standards do not represent the only aspects of private security involvement with CPTED. They do represent what is believed to be the most immediate needs of the private security field in relation to CPTED concepts.

References

1. Crime Prevention through Environmental Design—Schools. A program sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice in cooperation with the Broward County, Fla., School Board.

Standard 5.1

Improvement of Door and Window Security

Governments should examine those standards developed for protection of doors, windows, and other openings. Those standards that provide the most economical level of effective protection and deterrence should be considered for incorporation into building codes.

Commentary

Physical security measures play an important role in preventing many crimes. Nationally, crime against property averages 90 percent of all reported crime. By determining likely points of attack, action can be taken to physically secure or harden these points. Estimates indicate that in the majority of all burglary cases entry was gained through doors or windows.

The Texas Municipal League, quoting Underwriters' Laboratories' "Field Service Record" for 1967, showed doors and windows as the points of attack in 66 percent of the surveyed burglary attempts. In the 1974 "Field Service Record" survey, the figure jumped to 80 percent. A 1973 Dallas, Tex., study of burglaries of businesses showed an 85 percent rate of entry through doors and windows. In Scarsdale, N.Y., approximately 89 percent of burglaries reported between 1967 and 1971 involved doors or windows as the points of attack.

In addition to knowing the likely target, it is helpful to have some knowledge of the potential burglar. It is generally believed that more than half of all burglaries are committed by persons under the age of 25, within a half mile of their homes. These burglars use simple handtools to overcome barriers as quietly and as quickly as possible. Many youthful burglars simply search for an unlocked door or open window.

Knowing the modus operandi of these burglars provides a solid basis for taking measures designed to foil or frustrate entry attempts. The Texas Municipal League's model code points out that a burglar delayed only 4 minutes generally gives up the attempt. Coupling this information with the high probability that the would-be burglar will attempt entry through either a door or a window, it is apparent that if increasingly high burglary rates are to be curbed, door and window security needs to be improved. Citizens and businesses should be informed by government of proper door and window security measures and urged to reduce this opportunity for crime.

Door and window security is a sound, simple, proven way to make a facility more secure; yet, builders consistently use inferior low-security hardware and materials, manufacturers continue to make locks that can be easily and quickly opened, and citizens do not voluntarily act to make their facilities more secure. Because of low security standards by
builders and widespread public indifference, society must pay an over-growing law enforcement services bill; the costs of police protection. Further, the quality of life in this society is significantly lowered by fear of crime.

Establishment of door and window security standards can provide a positive step toward increased security at lower costs for all involved. In light of the failure of individuals, organizations, manufacturers, and others to take voluntary measures, local governments must examine security standards for doors, windows, and other openings and select those most burglary resistant and cost effective for incorporation into building codes.

The following examples of building security code contents can assist government agencies interested in enacting door and window security requirements. It is not suggested that these examples represent the best; they are presented as a source of useful reference for governments wishing to move forward in this area.

The "Commercial Burglar Prevention Ordinance" of the City of Oakland, Calif. (now available in pamphlet form) was the first security code of its type. The new pamphlet contains an overview of the ordinance in layman's language, the formal wording of the ordinance, a security checklist to determine compliance, and an example depicting the ordinance requirements as applied to a small business establishment. City officials indicate that the code has contributed significantly to reduction in crime in Oakland, leading to a 4.4 percent decrease in burglary between 1969 and 1973 compared with the 38 percent national increase between 1969 and 1974.

The Texas Municipal League's "Building Security Code" contains a discussion of the burglary problem, legality of security codes, and the text of the model code. Also, an extensive bibliography would interest persons working on an ordinance or desiring to increase their knowledge of protection. Several other publications that contain helpful information for those considering the establishment of building security codes are available. Security Planning for HUD-Assisted Multifamily Housing is published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Chapter 4 of this booklet presents commonplace information on target hardening that could be transposed into ordinance form.

A National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice publication entitled "Federal Security Code" is a model ordinance covering anti-burglary measures for commercial, single-family residential, and multifamily developments (including hotels and motels). A most significant part of the document provides a cost estimate guide for the recommended security features. The individual can use the generalized guideline figures when considering the purchase or installation of specific locks and security measures.

Another useful reference source is the voluntary national standard for physical security of door assemblies and components prepared by the Law Enforcement Standards Program of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Included in this report are tests for doors and assembly components that can be replicated locally. The requirements are fully delineated.

Further, the quality of life failure of individuals, organizations, manufacturers, and governments can assist government agencies interested in enacting door and window security requirements. Excerpts from various ordinances and studies on the protection of other openings follow:

Skylights: best protection is installation of metal bars, grills, or mesh; bars should be steel not less than 14 inch in diameter not more than 5 inches apart; mesh should be at least 1½ inch thick with spaces no larger than 2 inches, secured firmly by machine or machine-hardened bolts that cannot be removed from the outside; or special burglary resistant glass should be used.

Elevators: where feasible an elevator operator should be used; CCTV, continuous open listening device connected to a security control station, or special keys or cards held only by those requiring access can be used.

Hatchways: if good, cover with 14-gauge steel screwed to wood, secure with slide bars or bolts from the inside or padlock.

Air ducts and vents, transoms: those more than 8 by 12 inches on roof side or rear should have round or flat iron or steel bars secured by nonremovable bolts.

Note—all the above can be protected by various electrical and mechanical alarm devices.

Governments considering incorporating security requirements into building codes should carefully study local need for measures or adequate protection would be afforded at a reasonable cost. The expense of implementing these measures is small compared to the potential loss to the individual, the community, and society from criminal attack.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applica­ble in determining Standard 5.1: 5.6 Environmental Security in Comprehensive Planning

5.8 Inclusion of Crime Prevention Measures into Existing Codes and the Consideration of Building Security Codes

7.1 Consumers Responsibility for Selection of Security Services

8.2 National Private Security Resource and Research Institute
Adequate Security Lighting

Where appropriate, property should be adequately lighted to discourage criminal activity and enhance public safety.

Commentary

Since man first discovered fire, he has had a method of bringing light into the dark of night. Lighting has been more secure in his environment. As pointed out in the National Crime Prevention Institute's course on lighting:

In the fourth century B.C., the Greeks used oil lamps and candles, and in the sixth century the Arabs proved and lighted miles of streets in Constantinople. 

Adequate lighting has always been accepted that the governmental unit—kingdom, city, state, county, etc.—has the responsibility for good lighting.

In response to growing street crime problems, many cities have funded major relighting programs or have increased their lighting programs. They recognized the energy, and customer satisfaction of improved lighting.

Relighting programs have evidenced significant success in reducing crime. For example, as a result of a relighting program, the City of Indianapolis, Ind., reported crime reductions as much as 85 percent in specific neighborhoods. As added plus achieved, the lowered incidence of crime was accompanied by a reduction in accidents. A 40.9 percent reduction in crimes against persons, a 28 percent reduction in crimes against property, a 12.8 percent reduction in burglary, and a 49.0 percent reduction in larceny.

Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). Results showed crimes against persons (LEAA). 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Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 5.2:

- **3.4 Employer Responsibilities**
- **3.5 Maintaining Data on Criminal Activities**
- **5.6 Environmental Security in Comprehensive Planning**
- **5.8 Inclusion of Crime Prevention Measures into Existing Codes and the Consideration of Building Security Codes**
- **7.1 Consumers Responsibility for Selection of Security Services**

Standard 5.3

Computer Security

Possessors of computers should have a comprehensive protection plan for both physical site and data, regardless of whether the computer is used solely for their own needs or for providing computer services to others.

Commentary

More and more, computers are becoming part of our everyday environment. There are 140,000 computer systems currently in use in this country. *Introduction to Security* by Glen Green and Raymond C. Farber cites a study that states 7 percent of the United States work force of 84 million work directly with computers and an additional 15 percent work indirectly with them. It is projected that by 1980 computers and their related fields will represent 14 percent of the gross national product.

One of the largest computer users is the Federal Government. Computers are used in nearly every aspect of its operation, from simple bookkeeping procedures to complex space technology. Data collection on individuals alone demands tremendous computer capacities. A 3-year study by a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives found 854 data banks in 54 agencies with more than 1.25 billion files on individuals. The personal data include police and military records and tax, intelligence, job, political, and religious information.

Other major computer users include banks and large public and industrial corporations. More than 60 percent of all banks are computerized, and large corporations, such as A.T. & T., Standard Oil, U.S. Rubber, and so forth, rely heavily on computers for their efficient overall operations. In addition, countless smaller private and public organizations use computers daily.

Computers represent a large investment for governments, banks, and other users. The following breakdown presented by Richard Cross, vice president, the Bank of New York, gives an idea of the extent of the fiscal investment of one corporation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment value</th>
<th>$3,150,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tape replacement</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly rental for backup time for minimal operations</td>
<td>$550,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the enormous number of computers now in use, their importance to operational procedures, and their huge financial investment, the need for a comprehensive protection plan for both physical site and computer data is apparent.
Introduction to Security, points out that computers are vulnerable to many problems, including embezzlement, programming fraud, program penetration, operator error, input error, program error, theft of confidential information, simple carelessness, fire, riot, flood, and sabotage. Despite the apparent need for computer security, many agencies and businesses do not take adequate measures to protect their installations. Not only is physical security inadequate but also, in many cases, data is vulnerable to criminal attack and misuse. Dr. Ruth Davis, director of the National Bureau of Standards Institute for Computer Sciences, lists an additional problem found in Federal Government computer operations. Dr. Davis advises that the "overwhelming majority . . . do not possess the security to meet data confidentiality conditions required by law." (Security Systems Digest)

With the lack of sufficient security, computer-related crimes are prevalent. Brandt Allen, in his article "Embezzler's Guide to the Computer," pointed out two very interesting facts about committing crimes with computers—it is relatively safe, and those who are caught usually are uncovered by chance or accident. To illustrate, he cites the case of a welfare department data center employee who stole $2.75 million in a 9-month period by issuing checks to fictitious persons. The scheme was uncovered "when a policeman discovered a batch of over a hundred of the fraudulent checks in an overdue rental car he found illegally parked." Brandt also includes the case of a "15-year-old boy who completely cracked the security system of a major London computer time-sharing service. . . . He used no special technical gadgets and started with no special knowledge of the computer's inner workings—instead he relied only on ingenuity and a teletype terminal in his school."

To effectively deal with such crimes, data security capabilities need to be strengthened and developed. Data security training programs should be set up for both public law enforcement and private security personnel. All available expertise should be called upon to develop materials and techniques that lead to maximum protection of security sites and data. Assistance in security planning is available from personnel and publications of large computer companies. IBM defines data security as "the protection of information from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction whether accidental or intentional." IBM states that the keys to data security are reducing exposure to an acceptable level and ensuring a recovery capability.

The following points apply to security of the computer site and should be developed and expanded in training and practice:

1. Physical Security:
   - Site selection
   - Fire and other damage controls, and Access control
2. Controls and Procedures:
   - Audit for security
   - Separation of responsibilities, and
   - Machine room policies
3. Recovery and Backup:
   - Record protection
   - Disaster provisions, and
   - Installation backup
4. Computer Hardware and Software Facilities:
   - Identification devices, and Programmed devices, and
   - Software integrity

Law enforcement agencies are becoming increasingly aware of the growing need for expertise in combating computer crime. Examples of training for law enforcement personnel in this area are pointed out in Datamation, a computer journal. One involved computer training for the Los Angeles County district attorney's major-fraud-section personnel. A second example was a 2-week computer security program implemented by the FBI at Quantico, Va. This program consisted of two separate courses—one aimed at agents presently in the field and the other offered as an elective at the FBI national academy. There is a need for expanding programs like this to make them available to public security personnel as well as public law enforcement personnel. More courses, such as those discussed, are needed as a starting point for improved computer security.

In the private sector, some courses also are offered. The American Society for Industrial Security, several colleges and universities, companies such as IBM, and various privately operated programs have presented various aspects of computer security in workshops, seminars, and conferences. Class offered at local educational institutions and discussions with computer programmers and operators can teach security executives the principles, languages, and methods of computers. Following . . . they can search the literature to ascertain types of crimes involving computers and to find additional information about current developments in computer security. Security executives could become involved in advance computer training concerned with data protection. Development of competency in computer usage and security is perhaps the most valuable protective function security professionals could perform for clients possessing computers.

The expanding use of computers places responsibility on users to provide a comprehensive protection plan for both the physical site and the computer data. This commentary gives ample evidence that disregarding computer security is inappropriate and often causes difficulties for persons with no control over the situation. Also, law enforcement agencies should increase their knowledge and activity for protecting against computer crimes.

Selected References

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable to implementing Standard 5.3:

1. 3.5 Maintaining Data or Criminal Activities
2. 5.5 Development of Environmental Security Expertise

Standards of security in design. In doing so, they should manage and actual construction to determine the effects of structures. Interaction with law enforcement agencies and architectural features and spatial arrangements on building security and security costs.

Against administration made a similar recommendation:

"Primary consideration in the design and construction of new design to reduce the opportunity for the commission of .....

Community Crime Prevention, in Design

We recommend that the architectural profession develop the advice of law enforcement agencies in physical security measures would be considered at the very beginning drawing upon the experiences of the commercial central stations, the manufacturers of security devices, the police, the construction industry and building code officials, and other relevant agencies at all levels of government.

One example of what has been accomplished by architectural practitioners is illustrated by Oscar Newman's study, Defensible Space, published in 1972. In this study of New York's public housing, Newman set forth ideas and applied strategies for "getting persons to and from their living quarters without the fear (or occurrence) of crime or harassment." (Progressive Architecture, October 1972) Newman's work has led to an awareness of the relationship between physical design and crime. Progress has also been made by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. In 1975 Westinghouse established a methodology for planning crime prevention that included the use of strategies based on interdisciplinary fields, such as architecture, law enforcement, and sociology. This methodology is presently being evaluated by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in four test areas—schools, transportation, commercial business, and residential housing.

The Westinghouse and Newman studies discuss examples of what can be done when architectural and crime prevention concepts are combined in environmental design. Since the early 1960's, this body of knowledge has grown, culminating in the concepts of defensible space and crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), as discussed in the introduction to this chapter. Others contributors to the development of these concepts include Jane Jacobs, Elizabeth Wood, John G. Kerwin, and Schlimo Angel and agencies, such as LEAA, National Bureau of Standards, Southern California Association of Governments, and the Environmental Security Committee of the Private Security Advisory Council.

The concepts of crime prevention in architecture and design need to be disseminated to all involved with planning, design, and construction. Because materials on CPTED have not yet fully evolved, evaluations of these concepts are lacking. A substantial investment of money and time is needed to evaluate all new crime prevention concepts and security hardware. As the art of CPTED advances, evaluations and appropriate modifications should be made.

An important part of the CPTED concept involves the assistance of both public law enforcement and private security experts when architects, governmen...

Community Crime Prevention, in Design

In 1973 the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, in its book Community Crime Prevention, made the following recommendation:

"The Commission recommends that agencies and professionals involved in building design actively consult with and seek the advice of law enforcement agencies in physical design to reduce the opportunity for the commission of crime. These agencies and firms should make security a primary consideration in the design and construction of new buildings and the renovation or renovation of older structures. Interaction with law enforcement agencies and security experts should be sought during preliminary planning and actual construction to determine the effects of architectural features and spatial arrangements on building security and security costs..."

In its report to the U.S. Senate, entitled Crime Against Small Business, the Small Business Administration made a similar recommendation:

"We recommend that the architectural profession develop standards of security in design. In doing so, they should

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... and always engage the services of other engineers. These men have proved their efficiency, and I feel a security consultant should qualify in the same category.

Some security problems get to be quite monumental, and there is a need for a person who keeps abreast of what is happening on the market. Also, we must have a good knowledge of the criminal and the way the criminal operates. This is the task I am referring to as the "Security Consultant."

The assistance of security consultants should be obtained for more specialized areas, depending on specific local needs. A list of areas in which private security and/or law enforcement representatives can provide expertise follows:

• Alarm systems.
• Antiburglary strategies.
• Antisniffing strategies.
• Crime displacement.
• Employee theft control.
• Law enforcement/security force in support of design.
• Personnel control techniques and systems.
• Security hardware for access points.
• Security lighting techniques.
• Shoplifting control design.
• Special security needs (i.e., computers).

Much has been done, in a relatively short time, by architects and builders to develop new strategies for the war on crime. Their efforts should be commended. It is hoped that others in these professions and their associations will join in the fight against the rising crime rate. By becoming more knowledgeable about crime prevention, they can contribute to a safer environment for all.

Selected References

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 5.4:

5.6 Environmental Security in Comprehensive Planning

5.10 Crime Prevention Courses as a Job Requirement

8.2 National Private Security Resource and Research Institute

Standard 5.5
Development of Environmental Security Expertise

Those companies selling security services should develop the expertise necessary to offer environmental security planning services.

Commentary

Security companies often provide a variety of services—everything from guard service to security planning encompassing internal/external loss prevention plans made up of human and mechanical deterrents. However, a review of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice publication, Directory of Security Consultants, and the literature of security service companies shows that very few offer services incorporating the concept of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED).

Security service companies are not at fault, because it is a relatively new concept. Although its roots were established in 1961 in Jane Jacobs' book, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, not until the early 1970's did CPTED begin to take shape in viable concepts. Today, alarming increases in crime and strong public concern for safety have led more and more researchers and planners to look at CPTED in the search for new and better methods of protection. In fact, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration currently is funding four major projects to test its effectiveness in different areas.

Although meaningful, evaluative results are not readily available because of the youth of CPTED projects, early reports indicate the significant crime-reduction potential of CPTED. For example, the article "Security: A 24-Hour, Seven-Days-A-Week Affair" discusses the benefits of the planned community of Deerwood, Fla. Included within its security system are a variety of mechanical devices, a security guard force, liaison with law enforcement agencies, and citizen involvement. The article indicates that the community so far has been successful in keeping crime out, with the resulting dividend that "The excellent security record of the Deerwood community has, of course, been a major sales factor for the condominiums."

If such indicators are correct, the concept of CPTED likely will be used more and more in both government and private planning. Companies selling security services should, therefore, develop the necessary expertise to offer environmental security planning services. This would not only increase the salability of services but also ensure viable crime prevention techniques in new communities and business developments. The development of environmental security expert will know the special problems relating to private security services and will be able to offer advice to other members of the interdisciplinary team, thus reducing risks for private security guards.
and police officers, and providing for better consumer protection and greater public safety.

Expertise in environmental security could be offered not only for design but also for site selection. A crime impact statement could be prepared evaluating the impact of the new site in terms of crime attraction, displacement, types of crimes, and so forth. It should include proposals to involve the company and contiguous citizens and businesses in crime prevention programs.

All security executives should study CPTED concepts for application to their own situations. Companies providing security services should consider hiring an architect, urban planner, or sociologist/criminologist to be responsible for CPTED. The development of CPTED expertise in this manner would considerably enhance the level of security services offered and contribute to safer environments for everyone.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 5.5:

5.3 Computer Security
5.4 Crime Prevention in Design
5.7 Crime Prevention Course in Schools of Architecture and Urban Planning
5.9 Crime Impact Forecast

Standard 5.6

Environmental Security in Comprehensive Planning

Environmental security should be a part of comprehensive planning from the design phase to the completion of construction projects.

Commentary

What do mud houses in Sudan, Neolithic settlements in Turkey, and rowhouse streets in 19th century American cities have in common? As Oscar Newman explains in his book Defensible Space, they all employ elements of security through building design. Man has learned, through the ages, numerous ways to protect his being and belongings-building design is one basic way.

The lessons learned over the years can now be applied on a more professional and advanced level. As discussed in Standard 5.4, the concept of crime prevention through environmental design is emerging as an effective tool in crime prevention. As a result of pilot projects and indepth research, new technology and information is becoming available for incorporation into building design. Standard 5.5 encourages the private security industry to gain expertise in environmental security. The objective of this standard is to recommend ways in which this expertise can be used for the maximum benefit of all concerned.

The proprietary security executive whose employer is planning a new facility should involve himself in the project from the planning and design stage to the end of construction. If not specifically asked (or in the case of consultant or contract security company, not hired) to function as part of the planning team, he should request that his input be considered; it is at this point that basic decisions are made and the involvement of security is clearly established. The goals and objectives established in the planning stage provide direction for all remaining phases of the project. At this stage, the security executive needs to familiarize the planning team with past security problems of the locals, offer methods to overcome these problems, point out the benefits of the expected results, and estimate what resources are required to attain the desired security objectives.

In the next step of the planning process—selection of the building site—the security executive's input again is needed. As pointed out by Richard B. Cole, president of Loss Prevention Diagnostics, Inc., "...security in design can assume new dimensions when it is considered in site selection." The security executive should consider the proposed site based on area crime statistics obtained from the local law enforcement agency. He should then conduct informal talks with other security executives in the area of the proposed site, and, finally, should visit the proposed...
site to contribute his personal expertise in the evaluation of its crime potential.

Once a final decision has been made regarding the site, the design phase allows the security executive to recommend parameter barriers and internal controls for the protection of equipment, inventory, and personnel. This phase can be accomplished by reviewing past criminal confrontations and considering how design might have deterred them. The security executive should then present a proposed list of security hardware necessary for protection of the new facility, with appropriate justification.

In some instances, security equipment can be effectively incorporated with other necessary equipment. For example, if management is considering an electronic control center for the facility's environmental, security, and personnel systems, it should add security personnel to the design. Such a facility should be constructed with the intention of providing security personnel with access to as many systems as possible. This is often the most cost-effective approach for providing security for the facility.

During construction, the security executive should prepare training materials for all personnel engaged in construction activities, including the many advantages of these systems is the long-term reduction in security and maintenance personnel achieved through the use of computers and electronics for manpower.

Careful consideration of security needs in the design phase of a building will also provide more effective security at lower cost in the long run. As pointed out by Al Buckner in his article, "Designing Security into Retail Facilities":

Security can be built into a store at little or no additional cost if it is considered prior to construction. The construction phases can provide your security staff the tools which will enable them to multiply the effectiveness of their function—many times over.

Buckner further points out that careful design of a facility can cut back on manpower requirements. This can be a powerful argument in favor of acquiring the latest in surveillance technology. A guard's salary, insurance, benefits, and retirement fund for a 20-year period can be considerably reduced. The design of a facility should also take into account the cost of training security personnel, as it is usually less expensive to train security personnel than to hire them from outside the company.

Standard 5.7
Crime Prevention Courses in Schools of Architecture and Urban Planning

Schools offering courses in architecture or urban planning should include in their curriculums courses on architectural design for crime prevention.

Commentary

"Attention by the profession of architecture to designing systems that provide for virtual nonexistence" concluded the Small Business Administration in its report, Crime Against Small Business. If schools of architecture had included courses in crime preventive techniques in their curriculums, this statement would not have been made. This same admonition could be applied to urban planning.

In the past, little relationship has existed between the fields of architecture and urban planning and the field of criminal justice. However, as increasing numbers of citizens and businesses have become more aware of crime, architects and planners are recognizing the importance of crime prevention in design. To bring about the broadest perspective possible, these subjects could be team-taught, using a combination of architects, urban planners, sociologists, criminologists, psychologists, police officers, and private security consultants.

The curriculums should also include a study of the effect of architecture on deterrence and displacement of crime. To bring about the broadest perspective possible, these courses should cover the influence of architecture on crime prevention in urban design. Courses should cover the historical development of crime prevention in design up to crime prevention in environmental design (CPFD) and defensible space.

The following courses, suggested by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, should be included in the course of study:

1. Promoting opportunities for surveillance
2. Strengthening the differentiation of private and public space
3. Fostering territoriality
4. Controlling access
5. Separating incompatible activities
6. Providing alternative outlets for potentially delinquent and criminal energies

The curriculum should also include a study of the effect of architecture on the displacement of crime. To bring about the broadest perspective possible, these courses should include specific tactics, alarm systems, barriers, lighting, and security patrols—all traditional and proven protective devices.
Course content for the study of crime displacement would be more difficult to quantify because little data are available; nevertheless it is an important and necessary subject for the architecture or urban planning student. If, through design, certain crime is prevented, will some even more heinous crime take its place? Will persons coming to and from the site or building now be subject to a greater level of criminal attack because of displacement, causing people not to use the site or building? Questions such as these should be confronted in architectural and urban planning courses. These subjects traditionally have been in the purview of the criminologist, law enforcement officer, and sociologist; now students of architecture and urban planning also must understand and be able to work with them.

Various divisions of the U.S. Department of Justice have been instrumental in publishing monographs and studies dealing with subjects ranging from target hardening to Oscar Newman's defensible space efforts with New York City's public housing. A review of these publications would prove helpful in crime prevention courses. Individual buildings and residential developments that have incorporated security-in-design concepts should be used for case studies, and law enforcement and private security personnel should be used as guest lecturers or instructors.

Standard 5.10 recommends that a certified course in CPTED be provided for architects or urban planners as a job prerequisite or as partial preparation for a license. Educators can ensure their students meet this requirement by making CPTED courses a degree requirement. Another approach would be to make these courses mandatory for accreditation in architectural and urban planning.

To avoid charges such as that leveled by the Small Business Administration, crime prevention concepts need to be given general exposure in urban planning and architectural schools, perhaps as a required interdisciplinary course. If educators fail in implementing this measure, increases in human misery and economic loss will consist as a direct result of their oversight. Further, the security executive will have the continuing burden of attempting to convince planners and architects of the need of lessons over and over again.

Selected References

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 5.7:
2.8. Training of Supervisors and Managers
5.5 Development of Environmental Security Experiments
5.10 Crime Prevention Courses as a Job Requirement
6.1 Interaction Policies
8.3 Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses
8.4 Degree Programs for Private Security

Standard 5.8
Inclusion of Crime Prevention Measures in Existing Codes and the Consideration of Building Security Codes

Crime prevention measures should be an identifiable part of existing or proposed regulatory codes. Building, fire, and safety codes should be reviewed by regulatory bodies and private security representatives to avoid conflict with implementation of effective crime prevention measures.

Commentary
Throughout the 50 States there exists a myriad of codes and regulations at the local, State, and national level covering fire, building, and safety. They spell out "dos and don'ts" that affect the lives of everyone. Often provisions within these codes conflict; occasionally they complement one another. For example, San Francisco currently adheres to four different electrical codes relating to alarm systems. The latest development in regulations and codes is to draft building security codes. Some successes in crime reduction have been documented where security codes have been implemented. However, it is preferable to incorporate crime prevention measures into existing building, fire, and safety codes. Additional codes only create another bureaucratic burden for the businessperson and the citizen. Further, it appears likely that the future direction of building codes is toward developing a single code covering building, fire, safety, and possibly other environmentally related topics.

There are two very serious concerns to consider when discussing the incorporation of security provisions into existing codes. The first concern is the fear that crime prevention measures would become a stepchild among the traditionally strong fire, electrical, and plumbing provisions and be lost in the verbal foliage of the code. The second concern is the problem of conflict between crime prevention measures and fire, building, and safety codes. For example, security principles may clash with various safety code tenets and may generate construction expenses in excess of estimated budgets and aesthetics that do not correspond to conventional building codes. Also, as any security executive knows, the principles of good security frequently run counter to fire regulations. The Howard Johnson hotel case that occurred in New Orleans, La., in January 1973 illustrates this conflict. A gunman gained entry to a motel through a door that connects the building's garage with the upper-story guest room area. As required by fire regulations, an emergency exit for a building-connected garage, the door was equipped with a crash bar that allowed access to the motel fire stairwell. If the crash bar_empresa did not allow exit from the garage in the event of fire had not been used, the sniper may have been prevented from reaching the gun area.

The establishment of a review body should enable such conflicts to be reasonably and rationally re-
selected and should dispel the concerns of those who envision security measures facing in impact by the terminology of the code. This review body should be established by local government and be responsible for reviewing current fire, building, and safety codes and mediating any conflicts created by the incorporation of crime prevention regulations. This body would also ensure that the wording of the code clearly identifies each requirement. Membership of the review body should consist of representatives from each of the areas being regulated and include private security representatives.

The private security members should be selected by screening the area's firms to find those individuals with the greatest expertise in current security hardware, alarms, and crime prevention techniques. These representatives would be able to identify current prevention techniques that might conflict with fire, safety, and building codes. Further, the private security representative could give advice on new developments in security hardware, as well as suggesting techniques that would be compatible with other code provisions.

Through this interaction with government, private security's expertise can be used to benefit the public. Participation of the private security industry in activities, including reviewing fire, building, and safety codes, would help develop mutual respect and cooperation between government bodies and the industry. When conflicts between proposed security measures and existing building, fire, and safety codes occur, the presence of a private security expert would tend to ensure a fair crime-prevention representation in the evaluation of the conflicting prerogatives.

Although incorporating crime prevention measures into existing fire, building, and safety codes is favored, this may be thought impossible in the immediate future for some jurisdictions. In these jurisdictions, a separate crime prevention or security code should be enacted.

The drafting of such a document does not present a formidable problem. In 1975, at least one State (California) and nearly two dozen cities in 12 States became involved in developing or implementing building security codes, the purpose of which was to safeguard buildings and occupants against vulnerability to crime. Sample codes are available for reference from these communities. Additional guidelines can be obtained from A Building Security Code for Texas Cities, published by the Texas Municipal League. According to the League, security building codes are legal documents developed to "to require construction methods that result in increased security and the addition of security hardware and other protective devices which make a structure less vulnerable." They also point out that security buildings have their roots in "building and related codes (i.e., fire, life safety, etc.) that have been operative for decades." Building security codes also have been advanced by organizations, such as the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and the Schlage Security Institute. Existing security codes vary in their explicitness of definition and requirement for security hardware and its application, particularly regarding doors, windows, and locks. Some building security codes specify lighting requirements. Others offer detailed specifications for construction of doorframes.

The scope of security building codes also varies. Hollis DeVines, director of the Schlage Security Institute, points out two examples: In Indianapolis, Ind., single-family dwellings are included in the security building code; in Montgomery County, Md., the code is retroactive for motels, hotels, and multi-family dwellings. Other codes specify only commercial buildings. The National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice's Federal Security Code has provisions that are so broad that they apply "to all existing and future buildings or structures."

Although building security codes vary as to types of buildings included and types and applications of security hardware required, the drafting bodies have had a common characteristic—lack of private security representation. Not even the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in their recommendation, "9.2 Security Requirements for Building Codes in Community Crime Prevention," included private security experts in the list of persons to be consulted in preparing building security codes. The private security industry's everyday business is crime prevention. To exclude these professionals from groups drafting building security codes is a grave oversight.

Crime prevention measures should be incorporated into existing building, fire, and safety codes to reduce crime and serve the common good of the community. By including private security representatives in the development of regulations, the government allows those with expertise in crime prevention to exercise their civic responsibility.

Selected References
it is important that the crime impact forecast be prepared for the design phase of planning.

Crime is committed by humans, not laboratory specimens under controlled environmental conditions. It is not possible to accurately predict which person will commit what crime and when. But, enough is known about crime so that reasonable projections can be made as to what generally will occur when the environment is altered. A crime impact forecast can be made, but it is just that—a forecast. Because of the nature of crime, there should be no attempt to attach legal significance to the crime impact forecast or liability to those preparing it.

The responsibility for drafting the impact statement would vary, depending on whether the forecast is for public or private building or development projects. If the project concerns public buildings or developments, the local law enforcement agency would be the appropriate body to prepare the crime impact forecast, with input from urban planners. In the case of private buildings or developments, private security people should prepare the forecast.

Because the crime impact statement for public projects would be an extension of government's responsibility to provide its citizens a safe environment, it should be open to public scrutiny. Considering the highly emotional issue crime presents, the forecast could become a controversial community issue. The crime impact forecast could be used to rally community opposition to a public building or development to achieve some personal gain. Thus, a neutral project whose benefits would outweigh other considerations could be forced aside because of negative community response. Persons interested in local political offices could use the forecast as a steppingstone for their ambitions by attracting attention to themselves through rancorous opposition to a project.

Therefore, before government undertakes any construction, it should ensure that satisfactory responses are ready for each problem posed by the crime impact forecast. In this way, when the first shovelful of dirt is covered in the statement are those outlined by the Environmental Security Advisory Council:

- The crime impact forecast is a new concept. Its development and use stem from the environmental design approach to crime prevention. As envisioned, the forecast will be a planning instrument used to determine what changes in crime patterns may result from building and development projects. It can be used to ensure that government and private business give consideration to public protection when planning new building projects. Crime impact forecasts should be included in the planning phase of all new public and private building and development projects.

The crime impact forecast is a written statement that projects expected results of a new building or development project in terms of criminal activities. As suggested in a Westinghouse Electric Corporation study, "Elements of CPTED" (crime prevention through environmental design), it should include the following projections:

1. Time of crime, and
2. Place of crime, and
3. Type of crime.

Other equally important points that should be covered in the statement are those outlined by Michael B. Barker, chairman of the Environmental Security Advisory Council:

- Other equally important points that should be covered in the statement are those outlined by Michael B. Barker, chairman of the Environmental Security Advisory Council:

4. Should the crime impact forecast be incorporated into existing environmental impact statements at the State and Federal levels?
5. What type of sanctions would be used to ensure that the crime impact forecast was made?
6. Would requiring forecasts result in a new breed of experts and consultants who would perform this service for private business, and would they be licensed and regulated?

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards may be applicable in implementing Standard 5.9:

3.5 Maintaining Data on Criminal Activities
5.5 Development of Environmental Security Experiences
5.6 Environmental Security in Comprehensive Planning
6.3 Policies and Procedures
Standard 5.10
Crime Prevention Courses as a Job Requirement

Architects and urban planners should be encouraged to attend seminars or classes in crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). Proof of successful completion of a CPTED seminar or course could then become a necessary prerequisite for employment or the obtaining of a license.

Commentary
Since the early 1960's, a quiet evolution has been taking place in the field of crime prevention. It emerged from the work of individuals who recognized certain relationships between the environment and people and who studied this relationship and hypothesized about its general applicability to the prevention and reduction of crime.

Early activities in the field include the defensible space efforts of Oscar Newman and George Rand with the New York Public Housing Authority, a Westinghouse study entitled "Elements of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design," numerous professional papers, and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration publications on the effect of design on crime.

In addition to numerous texts, articles, and reports on crime prevention through modification of the environment, the Federal Government has an Environmental Security Committee as a standing committee of the Private Security Advisory Council. And there have been seminars conducted in several States for the purpose of making these new concepts available to architects and urban planners in the field.

The urgency for activating all available weapons against crime makes it essential that architects and urban planners become versed in these concepts. Acquisition of this knowledge can be achieved by making it a requirement for obtaining or renewing a license or as a prerequisite for a job as an architect or urban planner.

This requirement would necessitate that the architect or urban planner successfully complete a course in CPTED. The precise content of that course should be designed by professionals in the various fields. The selected references in this chapter, as well as the CPTED annotated bibliography by the Westinghouse Corporation should be consulted for source material.

The first courses and seminars should concentrate on informing architects and urban planners regarding the new CPTED concepts. When schools and universities have incorporated this material into their curricula, the scope of the courses and seminars could be broadened with the inclusion of extensive, crime-related materials. The immediate goal of this standard, however, is to rapidly bring the basic CPTED concepts to the architects and urban planners already working in the field.

Selected References

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 5.10:
5.4 Crime Prevention in Design
5.6 Environmental Security in Comprehensive Planning
5.7 Crime Prevention Courses in Schools of Architecture and Urban Planning
8.4 Degree Programs for Private Security
INTRODUCTION

The recent escalation of crime in the United States and the resultant fear of personal harm, loss of property, and public disorder have caused considerable resources to be directed to law enforcement activities. In response to mounting demands for more and better protection, total Federal, State, and local expenditures for police services climbed to more than $6.5 billion in 1973 and are continuing to increase.

Clearly, Americans are experiencing a growing concern for personal and public safety. Just as clearly, already strained government budgets alone cannot provide the resources necessary to effectively deal with the upward trend in crime. In New York, Detroit, and many other cities, police manpower is being reduced because of community budgetary limitations. In other locales, planned increases or expansions of services are being halted.

Police expenditures now constitute the largest single item in many municipal budgets. A grave dilemma is arising across the Nation. In the face of ever-rising crime rates, communities are finding that the limits of their fiscal resources have been reached. Additionally, it is now apparent that police alone cannot control crime. As aptly pointed out by Louis Radelet, Michigan State University professor of criminal justice, in the Dec. 8, 1975, issue of Crime Control Digest, "The police alone are futile in the prevention of crime ... They need to work in partnership endeavors with community forces." One such force possessing the potential to significantly contribute to the reduction of national crime is the private security industry.

The crime preventive role of the private security industry, and the benefits it provides to both the private and public sectors, have been recognized by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and serve as the catalyst for this report. The purpose of this chapter is to serve as the catalyst for this report. The purpose of this chapter is to serve to promote increased cooperation and the development of mechanisms to improve working relationships between public law enforcement agencies and the private security industry in their mutual objective of crime prevention.

If this objective is to be realized, interaction between the two agencies must be strengthened. As stated in Goal 6.1, "Effective interaction between the private security industry and law enforcement agencies is imperative for successful crime prevention and depends to a large extent on published clear and understandable policies developed by their administrators." In examining the existing interaction between the two forces, very limited interaction was found, with the exception of informal contacts at the upper supervisory and management levels. If the public law enforcement and private security spheres are to work in unity and not at cross-purposes, interaction is required at all levels.

Significantly, research has indicated that most public law enforcement agencies believe that the establishment of close, well-defined working relationships with private security agencies would be valuable. Clear written guidelines aimed at improved understanding and cooperation on the part of both agencies are needed to promote and maintain effective interaction.

In order to aid interaction, public law enforcement personnel need to be knowledgeable of private security operations within their jurisdiction. To this end, law enforcement agencies should survey private security components within their jurisdiction and designate at least one officer as liaison to provide guidance and to coordinate services (Standard 6.2). The exchange of information resulting from such a liaison would not only aid reciprocal cooperation but also provide a framework for the subsequent establishment of written policies and procedures covering the delineation of respective roles, interchange of information, and cooperative actions. As outlined in Standard 6.3, the formulation of such policies and procedures can eliminate the confusion and uncertainty that act as barriers to improved understanding and cooperation. For example, police adminis-
turers are often unaware of how private security services can assist them. Similarly, private security firms do not know how to obtain specific assistance from law enforcement agencies. Clear policies and procedures can provide the sense of direction necessary for decisive judgments and improved interaction between private security and law enforcement agencies.

Another area that can strengthen the bond between the two fields is education. Misunderstanding of the respective roles of law enforcement officers and private security personnel often leads to a lack of acceptance or respect of one another. Standard 6.4 proposes a multilevel training program for public law enforcement officials, covering the respective roles of the two agencies and the nature of their mutual contacts. This training can provide a basis for future cooperative actions, as well as dispel common stereotypes and misconceptions.

Those first four standards are aimed primarily at establishing the administrative groundwork for a close working relationship between the private security and public law enforcement sectors. The remaining five standards in this chapter deal with eliminating possible sources of conflict that may serve as barriers to professional interaction.

One source of conflict is the use by private security firms and organizations of terms, verbal representations, and visual items that cause the public to mistake private personnel for law enforcement officers. Although private security personnel are uniformed and may be armed, their powers differ significantly from those of public police. Therefore, for the protection of the public and security officials, private security companies and organizations should ensure that their personnel and equipment are easily distinguishable from public law enforcement personnel and equipment. Too close a resemblance to public police not only causes confusion for the public and resistance from public law enforcement agencies but also may lead to the imposition of liability from practices, such as "impersonating a public police officer." Therefore, it is recommended that each State develop regulations on the use or wear of private security uniforms, equipment, company names, and personnel titles that avoids any possible conflict with those of public law enforcement forces.

An area that has created much controversy and has suppressed interaction between public law enforcement and private security agencies is the practice of public law enforcement officers moonlighting in private security jobs. As the demand for increased protective services has continued to grow, especially in the industrial area, many public law enforcement officers have turned to private security activities for secondary employment. This practice has created many problems, including the private security industry's belief that such a situation creates unfair competition.

Other problems associated with moonlighting are discussed in detail in the last three standards of this chapter. To guard against situations in which moonlighting may generate unfair competition, involve the use of public resources for private gain, or create serious conflicts of interest, it is recommended that policies developed by their administrators. Policies should be developed to serve as guides for modification by appropriate agencies.

**Goal 6.1** Interaction Policies

Effective interaction between the private security industry and law enforcement agencies is imperative for successful crime prevention and depends to a large extent on published clear and understandable policies developed by their administrators. Policies should be developed to serve as guides for the interaction by appropriate agencies.

**Commentary**

Over the past decade, the resources devoted to both public law enforcement and the private security industry have increased as the awareness of the need for greater crime prevention and control has grown. National leaders have called upon every private citizen, institution, and business to join their efforts with the criminal justice system to prevent crime. Although a closer cooperation between the private security and public law enforcement spheres offers a special opportunity for improved crime prevention, the relationship has often been ignored, overlooked, or restrained.

Recently, however, the potential of a meaningful working relationship between law enforcement and private security personnel has been recognized. To promote a positive, ongoing relationship, formalized open interaction between the two agencies needs to be developed. On the national level, the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) have taken significant steps to provide a forum for such interaction. And in the fall of 1974, the Private Security Advisory Council formed a standing committee to study the law enforcement-private security relationship. Some of the goals and objectives of this standing committee are reflected in its minutes of March 7, 1975:

**Goal 2.** Outline proposals to improve understanding and cooperation between Private Security personnel and public law enforcement officers.

**Objective 2-2.** Develop guidelines for cooperation between private security and public law enforcement.

A study of the existing interaction between the private security industry and public law enforcement agencies reveals the need for clear guidelines. Surveys conducted by both the RAND Corporation and the Institute for Local Self Government, Berkeley, Calif., indicated that fewer than 25 percent of responding private security personnel had contacts more than once or twice a year with law enforcement agencies. However, a third survey, recently completed by ASIS, is in direct opposition to these findings. The results of the three surveys are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Interaction of Private Security and Public Law Enforcement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Contact with Law Enforcement</th>
<th>Rand 1972</th>
<th>Institute 1974</th>
<th>ASIS 1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once or twice a week</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once or twice a month</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whichever necessary</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declined to answer</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccounted for</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The contrast between the results of the first two surveys and the ASIS survey can be explained by the fact that respondents to the latter were from upper supervisory and management levels. The contacts they frequently mentioned were informal meetings with law enforcement personnel at the local clubs, associations, luncheons, and so forth, and indicate interaction primarily at the upper management level. Although these interactions are higher desirable, the results of such contacts should be formulated into clear policies that increase interaction between security guards and law enforcement officers at the lower levels of the two fields. Because the ultimate missions of the two fields are parallel and, to some degree, overlap, effective interaction at all levels should be sought to achieve this interaction, certain obstacles need to be overcome. One such obstacle—the problem of lack of mutual respect—was discussed at a meeting of the Private Security Advising Council's Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationship Committee. Some of the concerns discussed at this meeting follow:

1. Private security believes:
   a. Law enforcement does not respect them.
   b. Law enforcement is primarily concerned with arrests and not with crime prevention.

2. Law enforcement believes:
   a. Private security is nonprofessional, and
   b. Private security is client-oriented and not society-oriented.

What is important here is that, as long as lack of respect for each other's profession exists, effective interaction remains an uphill but doable task. The frank and open discussion that took place at the committee meeting is a significant step toward solution of the problem. Identification of weaknesses and areas of misunderstanding are the necessary initial steps to achieving greater mutual respect and cooperation. For example, some comments disclosed that law enforcement lack of respect is directed primarily at the lowest level of private security personnel. A major portion of this lack of respect is based on a substantial difference in salary levels. Therefore, general upgrading of private security training and salaries may offer one means of increasing respect.

Another obstacle to the development of interaction can be attributed to existing laws. Laws often hinder the degree to which law enforcement agencies and the private security industry can interact, particularly in the area of exchange of information. Law enforcement and private security agencies need to voice the need for changing such laws. Their respective legal staffs should meet with others in the criminal justice system to define and resolve the legal constraints on information interaction.

Specifically, private security firms should have appropriate access to criminal justice information and status systems. The information in Table 6.2, taken from the ASIS survey, indicates the need for such information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 23:</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 24:</th>
<th>Yes %</th>
<th>No %</th>
<th>response %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Arrest verification</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Conviction verification</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Alleged misconduct</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Driver license check</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Vehicle check</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Other</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Private Security Task Force, "American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS) Survey Results." (See Appendix I of this report.)

The results of such contacts should be formulated into clear policies that increase interaction between security guards and law enforcement officers at the lower levels of the two fields. Because the ultimate missions of the two fields are parallel and, to some degree, overlap, effective interaction at all levels should be sought to achieve this interaction, certain obstacles need to be overcome. One such obstacle—the problem of lack of mutual respect—was discussed at a meeting of the Private Security Advising Council's Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationship Committee. Some of the concerns discussed at this meeting follow:

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Another obstacle to the development of interaction can be attributed to existing laws. Laws often hinder the degree to which law enforcement agencies and the private security industry can interact, particularly in the area of exchange of information. Law enforcement and private security agencies need to voice the need for changing such laws. Their respective legal staffs should meet with others in the criminal justice system to define and resolve the legal constraints on information interaction.

Specifically, private security firms should have appropriate access to criminal justice information and status systems. The information in Table 6.2, taken from the ASIS survey, indicates the need for such information.

Obstacles to interaction between the two fields are not limited to laws and lack of respect. Other obstacles exist. Through positive interaction, all such obstacles can be identified and policies developed to help surmount them. Only through the formulation of clear, understandable policies can effective cooperation occur.

One area in various need of formal guidelines to promote effective interaction is that of crime reporting. In this respect, several questions are raised. Should private security personnel be required to report crime like ordinary citizens? Should they report all crime to police? Who should be given credit for an important arrest, the law enforcement or private security party? These are questions that need to be resolved through the mutual efforts of the law enforcement and private security sectors.

A significant figure from the "Survey of Consumers of Private Security Services in the Greater Philadelphia Area" highlights the lack of interaction between the private security industry and law enforcement agencies in regard to crime reporting. (This survey was the first major attempt to document interactions to the private security industry.) In the survey, question 19, asking if certain activities were interpreted to law enforcement agencies, drew a 45 percent affirmative answer. In some areas, existing interaction has brought about desirable results. In one Virginia community,
for example, law enforcement and private security professionals meet monthly to discuss topics of mutual concern. A list of cooperative actions appearing in the RAIND Report (Vol. 1) included:  
1. Call-in service for guards,  
2. Shoplifter bulletins;  
3. Installation of alarms in police stations;  
4. Providing law enforcement information, and  
5. Serving as law enforcement's added eyes and ears.

In an article in The Police Chief, Raymond M. Abtherton, chief, special agent, Standard Oil Co. of California, mentions a study that "identifies 39 types of businesses, educational, and industrial organizations having plant protection, security, or other specialized units responsible for maintaining liaison with law enforcement agencies." In the same issue of The Police Chief, an article by Thad F. Brown, deputy chief, Los Angeles Police Department, identifies 200 areas of assistance that private security personnel can provide to law enforcement agencies. The citations indicate that the number of complex interrelationships of services and agencies, alone justifies the need for development of clear interaction policies.

Although the positive efforts and good will of those employed in law enforcement and private security will promote some level of interaction, there is still a need for clear policies to provide an ethical, legal, and professional framework to channel such interaction. Henry Armstrong, in his article in Security Management, sums up the situation well: "First of all we should reach an acceptable understanding as to who and what industrial security men are, then we should consider appropriate ways of improving the liaison between police and industry officers. Finally, we should recognize how effective liaison between the two groups can help the individual community . . ."

Law enforcement and private security sectors working together enhance each other's role and ability. Citizens indirectly benefit through more "eyes" on the streets, better and faster handling of persons committing criminal acts, and closer observation of those persons who may intend to commit criminal acts. In short, effective interaction can produce a greater degree of safety and security for the community.

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Goal 6.1.

2.1 Training in Private Security  
2.2 Conduct of Private Security Personnel  
2.3 Reporting of Criminal Violations  
5.7 Crime Prevention Courses in Schools of Architecture and Urban Planning  
5.9 Crime Impact Forecast  
6.3 Policies and Procedures  
6.4 Multilevel Law Enforcement Training in Private Security

Selected References

7. Minutes: Nov. 6 and 7, 1974, meeting of Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationship Committee of the Private Security Advisory Council to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
9. Private Security Task Force, "American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) Survey Results." (See Appendix 1 to this report.)

Commentary

Existing relationships between the public law enforcement and private security sectors range from close working arrangements to limited and sometimes strained contacts. Often law enforcement agencies are unaware of the extent or nature of private security operations within their jurisdictions. Many times private security services are unaware of correct crime reporting procedures or do not know the proper agency to contact for assistance. Regular liaisons between law enforcement and private security agencies within a jurisdiction can eliminate these problems and lead to a mutually productive working environment and, further, to greater crime prevention and reduction capabilities.

For law enforcement agencies, the benefits of the establishment of formal liaison enhance the delivery of police services. Through liaison, the potential for positive cooperative measures can be explored, and those that are found to be feasible can be implemented to obtain greater law enforcement effectiveness. The private security sphere would also benefit from the increased guidance and flow of information resulting from regular liaisons. The Institute for Local Self Government stated in their report on the California private security industry, "Lacking the prerogatives of full police power, many private security operations find public law enforcement liaison to be an absolute necessity."

Recognizing the important potential benefits of intercommunication between law enforcement agencies and the private security industry, this standard recommends that law enforcement agencies conduct periodic surveys of the nature and extent of private security operations in their jurisdictions. These surveys would be a first step toward effective liaison. Because in some areas, such as New Orleans, St. Louis, and Cleveland, public law enforcement personnel are outnumbered by private security personnel four to one, it is suggested that law enforcement agencies conduct the surveys to determine the amount of private security resources available to assist them.

The suggested survey would be uncomplicated and inexpensive. Companies selling private security services and equipment would be identified by consulting the local telephone book, chamber of commerce, and so forth. Identification of stores, factories, and buildings with their own private security systems poses more of a problem. However, time and labor can
yield identification of all private security operations in the jurisdiction, and a roster can be prepared and updated periodically.

Private security associations could perform a similar activity. They could prepare a roster of all local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies operating within the jurisdiction, including phone numbers and persons to be contacted for assistance or information, and distribute this roster to all local private security operations.

Depending upon the size of the jurisdiction, at least one staff officer should be designated by law enforcement agencies as a liaison with private security concerns. This officer would be responsible for conducting the survey, as well as establishing and maintaining an open line of communication with all private security operations in the jurisdiction. Such action is in line with the recommendations of the Institute for Local Self Government for improving law enforcement-private security relationships:

Local law enforcement agencies having private security activity within their jurisdiction should establish an authority (either a mini bureau or an individual security coordinator) reporting on the status of private security activities.

Much of the success or failure of law enforcement/private security relations in a given area depends on the selection of liaison personnel. For this reason, the individual assuming this duty should possess certain skills and knowledge. As private security liaison, a law enforcement officer should be able to deal with owners of private security companies or representatives of national and/or international private security operations. The officer should, therefore, be of a high enough rank to be on an equal footing with the private security contacts. Private security executives may hesitate to confide in a patrol officer, regardless of competence, simply because they feel the officer is at too low a level in the power structure to effect any action.

The law enforcement officer selected for liaison also needs to be knowledgeable about the functioning of the private security industry. This representative should not only develop a working knowledge of all laws and registration requirements applicable to private security operations, but also understand the workings of a contract guard company, an armed car company, an alarm company and central station, and their related technical problems, as well as be familiar with the operations of proprietary security organizations.

One realistic consideration should be given to the selection of the law enforcement officer responsible for liaison. The job should be given to an officer in midcareer who is aware of his or her advancement potential in the agency. An individual near retirement or near the highest probable level of advancement may be inclined to accept a position with a private security operation dealing in contacts, knowledge, and skill the officer can offer.

The exact duties of the liaison officer and the amount of time required can be more clearly discerned after contact with the private security industry yields an awareness of their local needs. Initially, however, the officer should prepare, with direct input from the chief law enforcement official, long- and short-term goals for liaison and procedures to be followed to achieve them. In developing these goals, the chief and the liaison officer should discuss and determine what the agency can and cannot do to aid the private security industry.

Private security operations also are encouraged to select at least one individual to work in a liaison capacity with law enforcement agencies. Here again a great degree of care should be exercised in the selection of liaison personnel. If mutual trust and rapport are to be achieved, the private security liaison should be knowledgeable about phases of the private security operation and have a working knowledge of law enforcement activities and operations. The liaison representative should use restraint in requests for assistance from law enforcement personnel as a measure to avoid withdrawal of the agency from the program.

When the law enforcement liaison officer and agency are ready to begin the survey of private security operations, three objectives should be met: (1) gather together all available information on private security resources operating in the jurisdiction; (2) prepare an inventory of police services available to private security concerns and methods of obtaining them; and (3) determine how the survey is to be conducted.

In small jurisdictions, a survey of private security operations could similarly be organized by contacting a local private security industry (either a mini bureau or an individual security coordinator) reporting the status of private security activities.

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Standard 6.3 Policies and Procedures

For law enforcement agencies and the private security industry to most effectively work within the same jurisdiction, policies and procedures should be developed covering: (a) the roles and procedures that provide a framework for interaction between law enforcement agencies and the private security industry.

Commentary

Policies provide the necessary guidance for achievement of an organization's goals and objectives. Effective management calls for the establishment of a sense of direction; written policies provide further direction. Policies and procedures are the steps necessary to achieve objectives. For example, with the objective of increasing arrest rates, a police agency would adopt a policy of providing prompt response to all calls. Several procedures would then be established to ensure prompt response. These procedures might include the use of deployment forces, personal alarms, computerized data retrieval, and so forth—all these steps provide prompt response and, at the same time, achieve the desired objective of increasing arrest rates.

In this standard, the desired objective is closer unity between law enforcement and private security forces. The realization of this objective relies on the development of clear policies and procedures of operation. These policies and procedures need to cover the aspects of respective roles, interchange of information, and other cooperative measures between law enforcement and private security agencies. Once clear policies and procedures are provided in these areas, both law enforcement and private security personnel can better understand their overall commitment, and prescribed actions can be taken to promote coordination of efforts.

Although good working relationships have been found to exist at certain levels in the private security and law enforcement areas, (see ASIS survey, Appendix 1), the need for closer unity and increased interaction will always be present. Government officials, private security personnel, and researchers have voiced the need for establishing policies and procedures that provide a framework for interaction between these two entities. One of the primary recommendations of the RAND Report (Vol. 1) was that, "There should be a predetermined clear-cut policy for public/private police interaction."

Numerous other reports and surveys have also recognized the importance of establishing policies and procedures covering various aspects of the private security/law enforcement relationship. The Other Police reported that results of a survey of municipal officials working in 17 communities in the Cleveland, Ohio, area showed that these officials most frequently indicated (in agreement with the RAND report quoted above) that "There should be a predetermined, clear-cut policy for municipal-private security interaction."

A survey conducted by Dr. Richard Post, former chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice, University of Wisconsin, Platteville, indicated that 82.6 percent of the law enforcement officials responding believed that the establishment of a close, well-defined working relationship with the private security industry would be valuable. In his article, "Relations with Private Policy Services," Dr. Post concluded that "Policy must be developed at the municipal and county level to insure a clear understanding of the role and responsibilities of private protective services in the protection of the individual and his property."

The Institute for Local Self Government in its report, Private Security and the Public Interest, gives further support to the development of policies and procedures. The Institute recommends:

1. Local law enforcement agencies should coordinate their activity with private policy service operations within their jurisdiction. Extensive study should be made of the possible ways these services might assist the police in preventing criminal activity.

2. There should be a predetermined policy as to the mutual cooperation between public and private security forces; definite policy statements should be established and maintained; procedures for crime reporting should be established to insure total reporting. Mutual cooperation between public and private security forces should be sought.

3. Private security firms, watchmen and patrol agencies should be required to inform and involve the local law enforcement agency.

Just as various reports and studies point out the need for policies and procedures for relationships between law enforcement and private security agencies, other research indicates the lack of existing written policies and procedures. Vernon G. Jabr, in his master's thesis entitled Relations between Law Enforcement and Industrial Security, found that approximately 60 percent of the respondents to his questionnaire stated their companies did not have formal written policies regarding relationships with law enforcement agencies, and the same 60 percent believed there is a need to establish more definitive policies regarding interaction.

Further, another of his survey questions revealed that 96 percent of the respondents favored cooperative liaison with law enforcement agencies.

In developing the necessary policies and procedures for the most effective working relationship, all possible duties, responsibilities, and interrelationships of the public and private agencies involved should be considered in order to provide written directives covering all areas of operation.

Thad F. Brown, deputy chief, Los Angeles Police Department, in his article, "Types of Assistance Available," listed 40 types of service the private security industry could provide law enforcement agencies—for example, accident data, baggage information, credit card information, fugitive leads, implant surveillance, and property identification. Interaction on these items can lead to not only a better relationship but also a potential for increased security, because private security and law enforcement professionals share a common enemy. Although these reports are not specific to the development of policies and procedures rests with management personnel, input from all levels should be encouraged and evaluated. This input can be gathered through surveys conducted by both fields during the liaison phase. Further, a law enforcement liaison officer with a good understanding of private security operations can help in the process of developing goal-oriented policies and procedures that are understandable and acceptable to both sectors.

Delineation of Roles

The roles of both law enforcement officers and private security personnel should be clearly defined. Clearly the need for interaction between the private security and law enforcement spheres is acknowledged by professionals in both fields. In developing the necessary policies and procedures for the most effective working relationship, all possible duties, responsibilities, and interrelationships of the public and private agencies involved should be considered in order to provide written directives covering all areas of operation.

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To achieve a delineation of roles, law enforcement and private security administrators within a jurisdiction should inventory and develop the services they are capable of delivering. This process should be done at the executive level, where decisionmaking powers rest. Executives from both fields should examine this inventory for:

1. Duplication of services,
2. Crime prevention and deterrent activities,
3. Crime detection and investigatory services,
4. Jurisdictionally defined duty, and
5. Areas lacking the needed law enforcement and private security services.

Duplication of services is not in itself negative when referring to protection. It does, however, point to questions of potential size of duplication that can be eliminated without the public or private entity suffering a decrease in crime-prevention or other services.

Crime prevention and deterrent activities have long been the dominion of the private security industry, but they are capable of delivering. This process should be done at the executive level, where decisionmaking powers rest. Executives from both fields should examine this inventory for:

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Standard 6.4
Multilevel Law Enforcement Training in Private Security

There should be multilevel training programs for public law enforcement officials, including but not limited to:

1. Role and mission of the private security industry.
2. Legal status and types of services provided by private security companies.
3. Interchange of information, crime reporting, and cooperative actions with the industry, and
4. Orientation in technical and operating procedures.

Commentary

The "American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) Survey Results" (Appendix 1) indicates that 83 percent of the respondents believed that a set of standards was needed for the formalization of law enforcement/private security relationships. However, the Private Security Advisory Council's Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationship Committee determined that law enforcement agencies often are not informed of the role, mission, and nature of the private security industry. If there is to be formalization of any type of relationship, the first step should be a training program that reaches all ranks of law enforcement and private security personnel. The program should define the respective roles of each group, as well as their contacts with each other.

To provide the optimum dissemination of information about private security functions, training requires a multilevel approach. Law enforcement personnel at various responsibility levels have differing informational needs. A model training program on private security should consist of recruit-and supervisory-level instruction, and ongoing instruction for all law enforcement ranks.

The goal of recruit training is to provide a general familiarization with private security services. The length of this training should be tailored to the local situation, with time allotted, as necessary, to ensure adequate coverage of all subjects.

Recruit-level training generally should provide data explaining the role, mission, and function of the private security industry. Particular emphasis should be placed on industry components within the law enforcement agency's jurisdiction. Training should include information on state and local laws applicable to private security, such as jurisdiction and authority. In this respect, the Institute for Local Self Government, in its study "Private Security and the Public Interest," recommends instruction on private security's rights, privileges, and duties and, most importantly, on its limitation of authority.

A format for development of instructional areas...
that should be covered in recruit training follows. Instruction subareas can be developed as appropriate.

- The private security industry: Who and what is it.
- Role and mission of the security industry.
- State and local laws affecting the security industry.
- Authority of private security personnel.
- Field-level relationships with private security personnel.

When this phase of instruction is completed, the law enforcement patrolman will be able to deal more effectively with private security personnel encountered during daily duties.

The goal of training in private security for law enforcement supervisors is to prepare them to deal with security management counterparts or executive-level private security personnel, as well as to handle private security request and referral activities. Training for law enforcement supervisors should reinforce the knowledge already gained in recruit-level training. Law enforcement supervisors and detectives would be working with upper-management-level private security personnel and need to know how to relate to these individuals and their needs. They must be prepared to handle requests for information interchange, crime reporting on requests for investigative services, and cooperative actions. These topical areas should adequately meet day-to-day, operational interactions of local law enforcement and private security personnel.

A format for supervisory instruction follows. Only general headings are given, because development of various subheadings may vary for specific jurisdictions. Much of the course content also may depend on the developed policies and procedures of a particular law enforcement agency relating to private security services.

- Interchange of information.
- Crime reporting and channeling.
- Cooperative actions.
- Role and mission of the private security industry.
- Management-level relationships with private security personnel.

Interchange of information is a course designed to improve the flow of information between law enforcement and private security agencies. The course should inform law enforcement supervisors about the types of information obtainable from private security sources and the information law enforcement agencies can legally make available to private security services.

Crime reporting and channeling refers to activities reported to law enforcement agencies by private security sources. This area is both important and delicate, because most private security personnel want to protect their employer's reputation. Businesses may have policies that pertain to the reporting of crime. Where legal and possible, law enforcement agencies should honor these policies. Instruction in this area, among other things, would cover how to properly give credit for reported criminal activities and the procedures for reporting criminal activities to the appropriate criminal justice system section for action.

Instruction in cooperative action could be combined with material covering management-level relationships. The two areas are closely related but do have basic differences. Cooperative action should primarily outline department policy on the extent to which the agency could jointly work with private security operations. Successful examples of cooperative actions, and suggestions for locally implementing these actions, could be included. Management-level relationships, on the other hand, should cover joint planning, ethics, and other appropriate subjects.

Role and mission of the private security industry should expand the general informational course offered at the recruit level. It would serve as a refresher course for the supervisor and should develop in greater detail the specific private security operating procedures within the jurisdiction.

The goal of orientation in technical and operating procedures is to provide a necessary, although limited, understanding of the types of security equipment currently used in the jurisdiction and of some fundamentals on how private security systems operate. All law enforcement officers should receive this training. The depth of course content should be limited to orientation in the type of alarm systems and other security systems the law enforcement officer may be reasonably expected to encounter. Further, the training should impart a general knowledge about private security operating procedures, i.e., if an alarm sounds, does the alarm company respond to it? This portion of the training should not attempt to disclose all procedures of all private security operations within the jurisdiction, because such disclosure conceivably could imperil the security of various businesses and companies.

Ongoing training refers to nonformal, noclasseoom training for all law enforcement personnel who are active in day-to-day operations. The areas selected for ongoing instruction dealing with private security should include the impact on law enforcement of (1) new laws pertaining to private security services, (2) new private security technology, and (3) new private security procedures. Instruction in these areas can be achieved by rollcall training, special orders, training bulletins, or monthly commander's call.

A training technique that should be maximized at all levels is the use of private security personnel as instructors. In addition to the use of existing experts, this practice can enhance law enforcement officers' perception of their counterparts. Also, formal presentations by private security personnel should be followed by informal learning situations, giving all levels of personnel from both sectors a chance to get to know each other on a less restricted basis and to freely exchange ideas. Finally, law enforcement should consider including private security personnel as students where feasible and permissible. Face-to-face encounters between private security personnel and law enforcement officers can help enhance the relationships at all levels within a jurisdiction.

The multilevel approach of training law enforcement personnel to understand the work of the private security industry: Who and what is it. By removing common misconceptions and stereotypes, the two forces can achieve the understanding necessary for coordinated crime-reduction efforts.

Selected References

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 6.4: 6.1: Instruction Policy and Procedures, 6.3: Policies and Procedures
Horizontal Line

Standard 6.5

Mistaken Identity of Private Security Personnel

Title terms, verbal representations, and visual items that cause the public to mistake private security personnel for law enforcement officers should be eliminated; security employers should ensure that their personnel and equipment are easily distinguishable from public law enforcement personnel and equipment.

Commentary

Citizens seldom realize that their own powers of arrest and detention are equal to those of security officers. Uniforms give security officers the appearance of authority, which often gains the consent of arrest and detention are equal to those of security compliance with legitimate requests, as it is for public law enforcement officers should give security officers the uniform is an aid in controlling their identity. These problems usually can be traced to particularly when expelling uniformed persons and equipment and who they represent. The public often cannot differentiate between their own tax dollars and privately uniformed and equipped security guards. A second factor adding to confusion is caused by public law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement agencies have consistently purchased uniforms that differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The sole exception is the State law enforcement agencies. Third, the private security industry contributes to mistaken identity problems by using uniforms and equipment similar to those used by local law enforcement. The industry realizes the effect of uniforms on the public and, therefore, utilizes as closely as possible local law enforcement uniforms. Finally, the problem of mistaken identity is magnified by unscrupulous security personnel and private detectives and investigators who impersonate and misrepresent themselves to the public.

Several investigatory reports have touched upon the problems created when private security personnel wear uniforms similar to those of local law enforcement officers, or when they operate vehicles of a similar color bearing a similar logo. The Private Security Industry of Virginia stated... guard, typically in a uniform of police blue or gray, carry guns, wear badges and shoulder patches. This camouflage technique has an appropriate title: "Jeans and Blue." Continuing in this vein, the Report on the Private Security Industry in Florida, prepared by the Florida Senate Judiciary Committee staff, held, "Almost every agency stated that their guards wore a police-type uniform with a metal badge. This may explain at least partly why impersonating a police officer is one of the most frequently recurring problems in the security guard industry." Finally, the RAND Report (Vol. I) cited improper uniform or identification as the second most commonly reported complaint made to State private security regulatory agencies. In the effort to solve identity problems, many municipalities across the Nation have developed ordinances that attempt to establish specific guidelines for private security uniforms, items of equipment, and titles or words conflicting with local law enforcement standards. Some examples of local ordinances follow:

City of St. Louis, Mo.

XII. UNIFORMS

A. A complete and distinct uniform in the formal sense is not required, but if and when such a formal uniform is worn it shall not be of such a cut, design, color, or decoration as to allow the wearer to be mistaken for a St. Louis police officer. Security agencies may be held responsible for any mistaken identity claims brought against them.

B. The Commander, Watchman Division, has the authority to cause the agency to obtain written approval for the use of the following uniform symbols: shoulder patches bearing the name of the agency; shoulder patches bearing the name of the agency and any other combination of such words on any shoulder patch or other part of the uniform.

C. The commander of a company badge may be the Watchman Division of The Watchman Division, licensed private watchmen performing beat duties may be allowed for limited periods to wear plain clothes or other ordinary civilian attire for realistic duties. For such limited periods, exemption by the Board is not necessary.

D. The use of a company badge is prohibited to those agencies performing their security services at multiple locations and premises in the City of St. Louis. Such agencies are restricted to wearing the badge issued by the Watchman Division of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department.

City of Chicago, Ill.

II. POLICY

Members will take enforcement action against persons who, while in the uniform of a guard service or other security agency:

A. Wear the Chicago flag shoulder patch on shirts or coats.

B. Display the shoulder patches in any color scheme, black, blue, or red, or the same color or scheme upon a cap, device, button, or uniform unless approved by the Superintendent of Police.

III. CITY ORDINANCES CONCERNING THE OFFICIAL UNIFORM

A. The Municipal Code of Chicago, Chapter 11, Section 47-12 states, "No person shall falsely assume or pretend to be a police officer, or a member of the Department of Police of this city, or, without being a member of the Department of Police of this city, wear in public the uniform adopted as the police uniform.

B. The commander of the Watchman Division, or his designee, shall not authorize, permit or license any person to counterfeit or imitate, any badge, sign, signal or device adopted by the Department of Police. Nor shall any person, when compelled and unusual circumstances. Nor shall any person copy, counterfeit, or imitate, any badge, sign, signal or device adopted or used by any Department of Police in the City of Chicago, and who shall not be the same as or deceptively similar to those used by the Lake Oswego Police Department or any other public law enforcement agency in the area. All uniforms and vehicle designs and identifying marks shall be approved by the Chief of Police prior to use.

Bakersfield, Calif.

7.140 UNLAWFUL TO WEAR UNIFORM SIMILAR TO POLICE OR FIREMEN-APPROVAL OF UNIFORMS

The following section:

14.57 Uniforms and vehicles: Uniforms and vehicles used by a licensee or permit holder shall not be the same as or deceptively similar to those used by the Lake Oswego Police Department or any other public law enforcement agency in the area. All uniforms and vehicle designs and identifying marks shall be approved by the Chief of Police prior to use.

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FORM. It shall be unlawful for any person to wear, or cause or permit to be worn, any uniform in the operation of a private patrol system that is similar in the uniform used by the Bakersfield Police or Fire Department, and no uniform shall be worn unless the same shall have been first approved by the Chief of Police.

7.14.190 UNLAWFUL TO WEAR BADGES SIMILAR TO POLICE OR FIREMEN—APPROVAL OF BADGE. It shall be unlawful for any person to wear or display, or cause to be worn or displayed, any badge or insignia similar in design to that used by the Bakersfield Police or Fire Department, and no badge or insignia shall be worn, displayed or used in any manner unless the same has been first approved by the Chief of Police.

7.14.200 RANK AND INSIGNIA. It shall be unlawful for any person to wear, or cause or permit to be worn, any rank or insignia of rank, or cause or permit to be used, worn or exhibited any rank or insignia of rank, by any person operating, or employed by a person operating a private patrol system, except such as may be approved in writing by the Chief of Police.

7.14.201 COLOR SCHEME AND INSIGNIA ON VEHICLES. It shall be unlawful for any private patrol operator to paint any vehicle used in his operation with such a color scheme that is similar in design or color of vehicles used by the Bakersfield Police Department, the California Highway Patrol, or the Kern County Sheriff's Department. No painted badges, stars or decals, or badges, stars or other insignia will be affixed on such vehicles used by a private patrol operator unless such badges, stars or insignia have first been approved by the Chief of Police.

One interesting feature that the above ordinances, and many others, have in common is that the chief of police is the official who determines what uniform, equipment, and accessories private security personnel can wear in the jurisdiction. Given the concern for the problem, the number of abuses cited in reports and by the media, suggests that this preoccupation is not being exercised by local chiefs of police. It appears that too much latitude is being given to private security services in terms of similar uniforms, titles, and markings, or that perhaps enforcement of these laws is lax or ineffective.

It is recommended that verbal and visual items causing mistaken identity be eliminated. The intent is not to take private security guards out of uniform, but simply to replace these items creating problems with others that would not create problems. Some specific suggestions for distinguishing private security forces without causing confusion follow.

Security personnel should be required to wear name tags for two reasons. First, when a citizen is confronted by a uniformed individual, establishment of the identity of the individual is the clearest possible fashion is a basic premise supported by all professionals. A name tag clearly identifies a uniformed person otherwise indistinguishable from others similarly attired. Second, a uniformed individual is less likely to misrepresent himself if required to wear a tag bearing his true name. Private security personnel not wearing name tags would become suspect of attempting to conceal their identity.

Another way to clearly identify persons in uniform is to require shoulder patches of a uniform color, size, and design. The wording on the patch should be limited to the name of the private security employer. The wording on the patch should be limited to the name of the private security employer. No design should be allowed. In the past, certain companies have used on shoulder patches words such as “police” or the name of the community in which they do business. Designs similar to State or city seals have been used. These practices tend to confuse the public, because law enforcement officers wear similar patches.

In regard to equipment, private security vehicles should bear no resemblance to those used by law enforcement agencies within the same jurisdiction. Similar colors and color patterns, emergency light arrangements, and positioning, shape, and wording of any company logo should not resemble those used by local law enforcement agencies. All other equipment should be evaluated for possible conflicts.

One other item necessary to the private security uniform is a tag that clearly indicates the individual’s capacity, such as “security officer,” “security technician,” and so forth. When a title is spelled out on the uniform, little doubt remains as to the status of the uniformed individual.

The terms “police,” “law enforcement,” “special police,” and the name of the local city, county, or State should not appear on uniforms, insignias, or vehicles of a private security company. These changes would hopefully make private security personnel readily distinguishable from law enforcement officers, thus reducing public confusion and other problems resulting from mistaken identity, and improving the relationship between law enforcement and private security agencies.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 6.5:

5.4 Employer Responsibilities

6.6 State Regulation of Private Security Uniforms, Equipment, Job Titles
Standard 6.6
State Regulation of Private Security Uniforms, Equipment, and Job Titles

Each State should develop regulations covering use and wear of private security uniforms, equipment, company names, and personnel titles that do not conflict with those in use by law enforcement agencies within the State.

Commentary

Standard 6.5 establishes guidelines for the private security industry regarding the use of uniforms and other visual and verbal items that may lead to mistaken identity of their personnel. This standard recommends that States develop regulations to control the use of these items so that they do not conflict with those items used by public law enforcement agencies.

Because the responsibilities and powers of private security and law enforcement agencies significantly differ, the public should be able to clearly distinguish between private security personnel and law enforcement officers. When uniforms, metal or metal-like badges, titles, equipment, and other items of identification are similar to those of the public law enforcement, the private security officer wears a metal badge which in many respects is similar to that worn by a police officer; and vehicles used by private security are marked in a way that they are similar to police cruisers. This "identity" imitation is seen as creating confusion in the public mind as to whether the public is dealing with private security personnel or public police officers. This fact tends to irritate the police officer.

A survey of California law enforcement officers showed that about one-third were bothered by impersonation by private security personnel as one of the most frequent problems.

A potential problem that has been brought out is that of impersonation of a public police officer by a private security officer as a means of "deceiving the casual observer" by anyone who is not a public police officer. The Institute for Local Self Government, in its findings, states that from a survey conducted by the American Society for Industrial Security, 80 percent of the respondents to a survey who had complained about private security personnel wearing uniforms which might be mistaken for law enforcement officers had complained because of the casual observer's confusion as to whether the individual was private security personnel or a police officer.

In contrast to these findings, 80 percent of the respondents to a survey conducted by the American Society for Industrial Security that from whom there was never any personnel mistaken for police personnel. To the question, "To differentiate private security personnel and public police personnel, which of the following do you prefer?" 80 percent of the respondents answered as follows:

A second study conducted 2 years later by a private security industry task force found:...
Article VI. REPRESENTATIVE OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT—PROHIBITED

No person, other than regular police officers of the city, sheriff, for any purpose whatsoever, represent himself, or falsely represent another, to be a member of the police department of this city or within any city, town, city and county, or city and town, or the police department of the city of San Petersburg, Fla. Also, no person shall in connection with any private business, trade, profession, or activity use the title "Police Chief," "Chief of Police," "Detective," "Detective," or any other title or designation, badges, or uniforms that are designed to mislead or confuse the public or may necessitate a change in uniform color by some law enforcement agencies.

The color should be different from that act state:

1. Designated size, shape, and color bearing only the name for an agency or a person, firm, company, corporation, or employee, or licensee of an alarm system contractor, alarm system agent, or a private security guard, or agency is not authorized to carry a deadly weapon unless he is licensed to do so in accordance with the laws of the State.

3. All security personnel shall be required to be licensed by the State, or the local government where they are employed.

4. A tape identifying the security function performed by the individual shall be worn on the uniform. This tape should match the color of the shoulder patches.

5. All security personnel in uniform should wear name tags matching the color of shoulder patches and job description labels.

6. In no case should the word "police" or the name, emblem, or seal of a State, county, or city appear on any uniform item or commercial paper, with the exception of propriety operations where such a name belongs to the company or corporation.

A most important consideration involves badges worn by private security personnel. Metal or metal-like badges are used by law enforcement officers as a readily understood symbol of authority and power, and to distinguish the right of the officer to act in line with the law enforcement officer, i.e., desire to hold a II or III rank in the police force or some rank in the government in any way.

No person shall use any uniform designed to resemble the uniforms worn by the San Mateo police department, San Mateo County Sheriff's Office, or the California Highway Patrol as to reasonably induce the belief that he represents or is employed by the police department, the sheriff's office or the California Highway Patrol.

Article VIII. UNIFORMS

No person shall wear any uniform designed to resemble the uniforms worn by the San Mateo police department, San Mateo County Sheriff's Office, or the California Highway Patrol as to reasonably induce the belief that he represents or is employed by the police department, the sheriff's office or the California Highway Patrol.

The following actions should be initiated to deal with these problems:

1. States should deny the use of advertisements that are designed to mislead or confuse the public and in which personnel titles or jobs or agency functions could be confused with those of law enforcement agencies.

2. All private security uniforms that are not aligned with civil clothing patterns should be of a color designated by the State. The color should be different from that act state:

3. All private security personnel should have a patch of designated size, shape, and color bearing only the name for an agency or a person, firm, company, corporation, or employee, or licensee of an alarm system contractor, alarm system agent, or a private security guard, or agency. A person, firm, company, partnership, or corporation shall not distribute an identification card or certificate of license in this state except as provided by this act. No person shall knowingly or willfully write or receive from a person a signature identification or an identification device calculated to induce a false or mistaken belief that he is acting or purporting to act as the officer of the police department of this city or within the scope of any purporting duty thereof.

5. All security personnel in uniform should wear name tags matching the color of shoulder patches and job description labels.

4. A tape identifying the security function performed by the individual shall be worn on the uniform. This tape should match the color of the shoulder patches.

5. All security personnel in uniform should wear name tags matching the color of shoulder patches and job description labels.
Total configuration of the recommendations for private security uniforms could appear as shown in Figure 6.1.

**Figure 6.1. Suggested Private Security Uniform Configuration**

Total Configuration of Recommendations Would Appear:

*Optional*

![Diagram of uniform configuration with recommended patches and colors]

A State uniform regulation for private security personnel should be aggressively enforced and should be backed by appropriate penalties for those private security firms and individuals not in compliance after the expiration of a grace period. A period of sufficient length (perhaps 24 months) should be given for the phasing out of uniforms and equipment not in compliance. In time, this type of regulation not in compliance. In time, this type of regulation would eliminate public confusion and possibly spark law enforcement into adopting similar guidelines for their dress. The ideal result would be to ensure the type of uniformity existing in England and Scotland, where an individual can travel from John-O-Grots (northernmost Scotland) to Dover (northernmost England) and find law enforcement officers dressed in the same uniform, leaving no doubt as to identity.

**Selected References**

1. Brennan, Dennis T. The Other Police. Cleveland, Ohio: Governmental Research Institute, 1975.
6. Private Security Task Force. "American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) Survey Results." (See Appendix 1 to this report.)

**Related Standards**

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 6.6:

2.3 Job Descriptions
6.5 Mistaken Identity of Private Security Personnel
9.1 State Regulation

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**Standard 6.7**

**Law Enforcement Personnel Secondary Employment**

Law enforcement administrators should ensure that secondary employment of public law enforcement personnel in the private security industry does not create a conflict of interest and that public resources are not used for private purposes.

**Commentary**

Secondary employment (commonly referred to as moonlighting) by law enforcement personnel is one of the foremost problems facing the contemporary law enforcement administrator. Yet, as common as it is, the extent of secondary employment is virtually impossible to accurately measure. Only a limited number of studies, in isolated areas, have been undertaken to determine the number of policemen moonlighting. An early study, cited in *The Police Chief*, gives some idea of the problem:

A 1964 survey of 11 cities found an average of 24 percent of the policemen working at outside jobs. The more definitive and recent studies of the Bureau of Labor Statistics sets the police percentage at 14.2. This is well above the 1964 rate of 9 percent for the general population. As a matter of fact, there seems to be no question that a large percentage of law enforcement personnel who moonlight was stated by Dennis T. Brennan in *The Other Police*:

A 1970 study done for the United States Justice Department asserts that any survey of public police agencies about moonlighting would almost certainly underestimate its extent due to non-reporting by policemen disobeying departmental regulations.

In spite of the lack of statistical data setting out the specific number of law enforcement personnel who have secondary employment across the Nation, there seems to be no question that a large percentage of police officers do in fact moonlight and that many problems arise because of this activity.

**General Problems of Secondary Employment In Any Position**

Initial problems associated with moonlighting arise because of law enforcement officers' primary obligation to their departments. Circumstances may develop in secondary employment that would prohibit officers from giving their full time and energy to the department. An officer employed in a secondary...
occupation may be unavailable in a public emergency, thus breaching his or her official oath and leading to serious problems. Dividing loyalties between the police department and the secondary occupation may affect a moonlighting officer's obligation to the department. A law enforcement officer's job is important and delicate, and demands allegiance at all times. Secondary employment can have an adverse effect on an officer's obligation to the department and to the public. Alacrity may be jeopardized by lack of police preparedness, physical and mental rest between shifts, impeded judgment and reflexes brought on by months of 16-hour work days can jeopardize the lives of law enforcement partners and fellow officers. The public may also be placed in danger if an officer has not had sufficient rest time to be alert for his primary duties.

Finally, a law enforcement officer has an obligation to improve and upgrade the department's image. Secondary employment in certain areas—for example, a business associated with alcohol—could have a degrading effect on the law enforcement department's image.

The second set of general problems deal with the question of liability. If a law enforcement officer is injured while moonlighting and is unable to function in his or her primary occupation, a question arises as to who would pay compensation—the law enforcement agency, the secondary employer, or both. It is unfair to expect taxpayers to help compensate for an injury sustained during off-hours employment.

No one is liable for law enforcement personnel's actions against persons or property other than during moonlighting time. Because a law enforcement officer may take an oath to perform 24-hours-a-day duties, some argue that an additional liability obligation as a law enforcement officer. Whatever decision is made, one employer is not receiving the job performance the officer is paid for.

A third serious problem arises because of the appearance of law enforcement officers as authoritative figures and is particularly prevalent when a policeman moonlights in private security work. Normally, private security guards are licensed as do ordinary citizens. Off-duty law enforcement officers are often hired for private security jobs because their appearance, with their law enforcement gear, civilian, and uniform, indi­cate they are vested with great power by ordi­nary guards. Thus, the public is led to believe that the company is being protected by an off-duty law enforcement officer is supported totally by local law.

A similar image problem arises because law enforcement officers performing private security functions may have demands placed on them to, for example, show cigarettes to those who have purchased them, to keep others from stealing them. Even though other States have recognized the many problems inherent in allowing such moonlighting, particularly in the field of private security, many States have not.

Steps should be taken by law enforcement admin­istrators, government bodies, and citizens to ensure that they will not be liable for actions of law enforcement officers while engaged in secondary employment. These steps should include eliminating practices that endanger tax dollars, passing corrective ordinances or statutes and voicing objections to questionable law enforcement practices.

The case of Buckley v. State, 47 S.E.2d 116 (1945) ruled that it was not possible for law enforcement duties to serve private clients, investi­gate private disputes, and support a client's case in court. The police commander, when testifying before the Knapp Commission's hearing on police corruption: "The "rent-a-cop" business is a growing and corruptive influence on many metropolitan police forces around the country."

Solutions to the Problem

Although very few State statutes restrict law enforcement personnel from moonlighting, Con­necticut and Kansas, among other States, have specified the obligation for a law enforcement employee to a person vested with police powers. These States have recognized the many problems inherent in allowing such moonlighting. Even though other States do not specifically...
restrict law enforcement personnel from moonlighting in private security work, many private security regulatory statutes do not grant special status to law enforcement personnel. According to a 1975 survey of legislation (Appendix 6), 33 States regulate some aspect of the private security industry. Of these, 32 States do not treat off-duty law enforcement officers differently from anyone else. The private security legislation concerning law enforcement officers and private policing is similar to that found in Illinois, where an off-duty law enforcement officer who desires work as a guard or detective must obtain a certificate of registration in the same manner as any citizen.

The courts also have recognized the problem inherent in moonlighting and have upheld the validity of regulations prohibiting off-hours employment that would conflict with a law enforcement officer's duties or work otherwise be incompatible with the officer's professional responsibility. Flood v. Kennedy, 12 N.Y.2d 345 (1965), upheld a municipal rule of New York City that precludes policemen from engaging in outside occupations except when suspended without pay or on vacation or other leave. Chief Judge Desmond's opinion states that "the rule is essential or at least appropriate to implement the Commissioner's control of a tightly disciplined group of employees with special duties and obligations to protect the safety and order of the city and to be available to cope with emergencies."

State v. Denby, 118 Ind. 449 (1963), points out that the chief function of the police officer is to aid in the enforcement of local police regulations and that they are paid for such services by local taxpayers. The case also held that police powers and equipment were not to be used for any purpose other than municipal one. Other cases concerning this problem include Hopkins v. Padlock, 424 S.W.2d 134(1965), which limits the total number of hours that a policeman can work during one week, and Jurgen v. Department, 249 Ind. 711 (1958), which upheld a restriction against outside employment and a city ordinance that stated a police officer could not receive compensation from any outside source. There are countless other cases that directly or similarly relate to these cited.

A 1964 opinion rendered by the Iowa Department of Public Safety also condemns and restricts public law enforcement officers from moonlighting in the private detective business. In addition, the opinion does not allow the use of police equipment, police uniforms, or of similar uniforms in the business of private security. A Michigan attorney general's opinion concurs with this point.

Basic to the Department of Law Enforcement's operation is the rule that law enforcement officers should not be authorized to engage in the private security sector. The Other Police suggests that State legislation should be enacted or revised to determine and set nonoverlapping law enforcement wage scale; to limit total hours police officers may work in outside employment; to have moonlighting police officers controlled by the private employer, who should also provide private legal defense and liability insurance; to mandate the local safety director to specify what types of law enforcement equipment and assignments are unacceptable when moonlighting; and to make the law enforcement administrator responsible for ensuring that no police officer works in an area incompatible with his public police duty.

An article in The Police Chief illustrates how one law enforcement agency—the Seattle, Wash., Police Department— handles this problem:

"A recently revised general order requires a Seattle officer to apply for permission to work outside the department. A standard form is submitted to the individual's division head for initial approval. If the applicant has an adequate work record, the form is then reviewed by the division chief and division for final approval or disapproval. One of the prime considerations at this point is the man's sick leave record. An above average incidence of sickness may result in disapproval.

A permit authorizes only the employment specified and under conditions listed. Compensation and hours are specified. Permits are valid for only one year or less.

In all cases, an officer remains primarily obligated and responsible to the Department. This means that police action cannot be taken by an officer even while engaged in off-duty employment if a situation arises which requires such a course. Further, all police duty, including additional assignments on days-off and after hours, takes total precedence over a second job.

The Seattle Department further requires assurance that the applicant will be insured against all civil suits stemming from police action he might take while working on an extra job. Two forms are acceptable. The employer can agree in writing to defend the officer and to assume liability for any judgment or the officer may retain private counsel who has $100,000 of "false arrest insurance" which covers off-duty employment.

Finally, a limit is imposed on the number of hours a Seattle policeman may work each week. The total hours on regular assignment and outside employment cannot exceed 70.

All law enforcement administrators have an obligation to develop and maintain controls over the behavior of their personnel. Clear policies should be developed concerning secondary employment. Law enforcement administrators should formulate and enforce policies that provide appropriate restrictions and regulations covering secondary employment in private security work by their department personnel. Specifically, controls should be exercised in regard to law enforcement personnel employed as guards, principals, or managers of private security operations. Chief law enforcement officers must ensure that none of their personnel is performing private investigative functions. By taking active steps in this direction, law enforcement administrators would be protecting the public interest, as well as the law enforcement department and its employees.

Selected References

2. Brennan, Dennis T. The Other Police. Cleveland, Ohio: Governmental Research Institute, 1975.
3. Correspondence from Iowa Department of Public Safety to John Duffy, April 21, 1964.
4. Correspondence from Frank J. Kelley, attorney general of the State of Michigan, to Col. Frederick E. Davids, director of the Department of State Police, State of Michigan, March 26, 1970.

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 6.7:

6.8 Law Enforcement Officer Employment as a Private Security Principal or Manager
6.9 Private Investigatory Work
10.1 Licensing of Security Businesses
11.1 Registration of Private Security Personnel
Standard 6.8
Law Enforcement Officer Employment as a Private Security Principal or Manager

No law enforcement officer should be a principal or manager of a private security operation where such association creates a conflict of interest.

Commentary

Law enforcement officers who are principals or managers of private security operations may impede the improvement of the law enforcement/private security relationship by creating unfair competition and conflicts of interest. Law enforcement officials with secondary employment in these positions can disrupt the balance between the law enforcement and private security sectors that is necessary for cooperative efforts, interchange of information, and delineation of roles. Because the scope and potential for behavior damaging to the public are much greater in such employment than, for example, with an individual law enforcement officer working as a private security guard, this question merits special scrutiny.

More than just the questions of use of a duty uniform and/or service weapon or the exercise of police powers is involved when a law enforcement official becomes a principal or manager of a private security operation. Every on-duty decision made by the official needs to be examined for any indication of improper motives. If an officer acts in a manner appropriate with the facts in a given situation, but is later questioned because of his private security interests or position, the reputation of both the individual and the employing law enforcement agency may be irreparably damaged, despite the fact that the official acted in genuine good faith as a law enforcement officer.

The Private Security Advisory Council's Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationship Committee, discussing those items hindering the development of the most productive possible relationship, cited the following:

- A number of public law officers have actually formed guard businesses of their own. Problems that are created by this type activity are numerous.
  - Dual roles are not separated. Their use of official form creates an "on duty" look. There is no indication that they are in fact off duty and working special duty.
  - Misunderstanding of crime prevention work.
  - Conflicting interest.
  - Temptation to perform his public police task so as to conform less to justice's requirements and more to his private security interests.
  - May use his official position for personal gain.
  - Inference of competition.

A review of several specific problems concerning the propriety of law enforcement officials acting as principals in private security operations illuminates those areas in which unfair advantage and conflict of interest lie. First, law enforcement officials who are principals or managers of private security operations may be tempted to use law enforcement resources in their private business activities. Among these resources would be criminal justice information, law enforcement technical services (e.g., crime lab, ballistics), clerical assistance (e.g., typing, reproduction, case preparation), and, on a larger scale, as mentioned in the previous standard, law enforcement equipment.

Law enforcement officials who are principals or managers of private security operations may be tempted to withhold law enforcement services, may fail to act, or may act in such a manner as to favor their private security interests. An example of withholding services or failing to act would be the law enforcement official who, when notified by a firm of a suspected embezzlement, informs the firm that the law enforcement department does not make that type of investigation and recommends the private security operation. An example of acting to favorably affect the private security interest could occur when a law enforcement officer at a policy or decision-making level governs law enforcement actions to best serve the private interest.

An atmosphere of unfair advantage is often engendered by the law enforcement official's use of his police identity to generate more private business. When prospective clients learn that one or all of the principals and/or managers of a private security operation are off-duty law enforcement officials, they may get the impression that they will receive law enforcement level attention of the private security staff plus the resources of the public law enforcement agency.

Finally, a law enforcement official who is a principal or manager of a private security operation could solicit business from victims of crime. In an attempt to prevent a recurrence, these victims may ask law enforcement officials how to better protect themselves. The law enforcement officer with private security connections could then recommend the private operation at interest.

These examples are areas in which the problems of conflict of interest or unfair advantage can be created. These problems are potentially more damaging to law enforcement agencies and the public than are the problems created when law enforcement personnel merely work as employees of private security firms, unconcerned about the firm's profit levels. These types of acts contribute to the growing climate of mistrust, loss of faith, and disrespect for public institutions. Police executives must act in a manner that ensures that such cases do not occur.

Selected References

Related Standards
The following standards may be applicable in implementing Standard 6.8:
6.7 Law Enforcement Personnel Secondary Employment
6.9 Private Investigatory Work
10.1 Licensing of Security Businesses
Standard 6.9
Private Investigatory Work

Law enforcement officers should be strictly forbidden from performing any private investigatory work.

Commentary

One particular job within the private security industry is consistently inappropriate for law enforcement personnel to hold as secondary employment: private investigator. It is almost impossible for a law enforcement officer to perform private investigatory functions as secondary employment without creating a conflict of interest. A study by the Institute for Local Self-Government, Private Security and the Public Interest, reached the same conclusion. The study specifically states: "There should be a prohibition against moonlighting by public law enforcement personnel. Active public police officers should be prevented from functioning as private detectives."

An explanation of successful investigatory work closely indicates why it is such a highly objectionable secondary job for law enforcement officers: Good investigators must be able to gather information. Information available to a private investigator depends on the individual's ability to ferret out facts from all possible sources. A good investigator will try to develop a contact inside a law enforcement agency to obtain arrest and conviction data, information from field investigations, fingerprint checks, or National Crime Information Center checks. A law enforcement officer working off-duty as a private investigator might be tempted to use law enforcement information and, thus, would be able to deliver better service than a private investigator without access to such information. This action would be both improper and unprofessional.

Other aspects of good private investigatory work include surveillance and undercover work. The nature of law enforcement appears to make private surveillance by a public law enforcement officer inappropriate. A citizen might file a defamation-of-character suit against a city, law enforcement agency, or office by claiming that surveillance conducted by an off-duty law enforcement officer working as a private investigator gave others the impression he was the target of a law enforcement criminal investigation.

With regard to undercover work, a solid case might be lost because an officer, in pursuit of public duties, by chance comes into contact with those persons he has been deposing during his off-duty time. A case might be lost in the courts because the requirements for adequate safeguards of an individual's rights were not adhered to by the officer, believing that, because he was acting in a private capacity, they need not apply to him. A situation especially subject to conflict of interest is created by private investigators' use of informants. Informants are an necessary tool to a private investigator as they are to a law enforcement officer. A law enforcement officer, specializing as a private investigator, would certainly be tempted to use his law enforcement informants, because the cultivation of an informant is a lengthy and expensive process. In his private work the law enforcement officer would have neither the time nor the money to develop a second set of informants.

Because of these potentials for conflicts of interest, States, such as Connecticut and Kansas, have disallowed by statute those persons empowered with law enforcement authority from obtaining private-investigator licenses. In other States, the practice has been banned on the basis of an attorney general's opinion. For example, in Iowa, where just such a question was asked, an assistant State attorney general responded:

Finally, you have asked whether or not the Department of Public Safety may issue a private detective license to a person holding a special police commission or a special police sheriff commission. In answering this question, it is well established that the duties of a special policeman or special police sheriff are to maintain law and order, prevent and detect crime, and enforce the law. Since the duty of a special policeman is to enforce the law, and a private detective is engaged in enforcing the law, it would be improper to issue a private detective license.

Informants are as necessary a tool to a private investigator as they are to a law enforcement officer. The only effective way to ensure that the integrity of law enforcement agencies and law enforcement officers is maintained and citizens' rights protected is to ban law enforcement officers from employment as private investigators.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 6.9:

6.1 Interaction Policies
6.7 Law Enforcement Personnel Secondary Employment
6.8 Law Enforcement Officer Employment as a Private Security Principal or Manager
11.1 Registration of Private Security Personnel
INTRODUCTION

As the incidence of crime in the United States continues to rise, the need has become evident for citizens, acting individually or collectively, to participate in the creation of a safer environment. This view is supported by the Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), Richard W. Velde, who would ideally unite all forces in the public and private sectors in a partnership to reduce crime. Velde views the potential role of the citizen as a security resource that must be nurtured:

"Consumers can help effect improvements in those products and services, leading to more effective crime reduction results for both themselves and the public. Because their choice of security services affects the safety and well-being of the public, consumers of private security services have an added responsibility to seek high-quality services and to carefully evaluate alternative systems and services prior to acquisition. Quality and performance standards should not be sacrificed for cost if inferior private security services are to be discouraged and the goals of crime prevention attained."

Another major area that can and must be tapped for crime control and prevention is, of course, the individual. The citizen can have a significant impact on crime either through his institutions or organizations, national or local, or as a home owner who leaves his garage door open or a car owner who leaves the key in his automobile.

When we talk about law enforcement, we should not confine our discussions only to what we as law enforcement officials can do for the citizen. We also should ask: What can the citizen do for law enforcement? In my view, the citizen has a great potential for preventing crime and that potential can be drawn on through an effective community crime prevention program.

Consumers of private security goods and services are one part of society that can play a major role in combating crime. Alert and concerned consumers can play an important role in improving the quality of products and services in the marketplace. More than ever before, the consumer's role is having a forceful impact upon American businesses. Consumer movements have produced tangible results in the form of government legislation, consumer protection offices, and various consumer education programs.

The purpose of this chapter is not to generate new consumer-oriented legislation but rather to stimulate greater consumer responsibility in the selection and acquisition of private security products and services. By assuming a more positive and constructive role, consumers can help effect improvements in those products and services, leading to more effective crime reduction results for both themselves and the public. Because their choice of security services affects the safety and well-being of the public, consumers of private security services have an added responsibility to seek high-quality services and to carefully evaluate alternative systems and services prior to acquisition. Quality and performance standards should not be sacrificed for cost if inferior private security services are to be discouraged and the goals of crime prevention attained.

As is true of the relationship between private security and public law enforcement sectors, a two-way communication between the private security industry and its consumers is necessary for maximum productivity in crime prevention. It is urged that the expertise and assistance of private security professional associations and organizations be applied toward this goal through their development of consumer assistance committees. These committees could collect and disseminate data concerning private security products and services, handle consumer inquiries, and perform other public services.

The goal of promoting increased consumer responsibility in the selection and acquisition of private security products and services also can be enhanced through the assistance of private and governmental consumer agencies, such as consumer protection bureaus and better business associations. By developing private security expertise, these agencies can provide valuable services to consumers in a variety of areas, including the development of comparative data on private security systems and services, the establishment of complaint referral procedures, and the review of private security legislation.

Finally, in order to strengthen the relationship between the private security industry and its consumers, it is recommended that the security industry set standards for advertising that accurately portray to the public the nature and quality of services provided. Advertising by private security businesses should include the business license name, specify training levels of personnel, indicate the amount of
supervision security personnel will receive, reflect compliance with insurance and regulatory requirements, and other items. Through this action, private security businesses can assist consumers in selecting the service that will best fit their particular private security needs. Honest and informative advertising is an effective, positive tool for building a reliable image and fostering credence for the industry in the marketplace. Dishonest or misleading advertising, on the other hand, only succeeds in degrading the industry as a whole and may lead to increased government regulation of private security advertising.

The standards in this chapter offer direction for positive interaction between the private security industry and consumers of its services. Active involvement by consumers has produced desirable results in other areas of the marketplace; similar results are possible in the private security sector. Clearly, it is in the best interest of both the private security industry and consumers to execute their respective responsibilities in an environment of mutual aid and cooperation.

Goal 7.1
Consumer
Responsibility for
Selection of
Security Services

The consumer of private security services has a responsibility to evaluate systems and services prior to acquisition in order to ensure the best crime reduction results for himself and other members of the public affected by those systems and services.

Commentary

In today's marketplace, the consumer is better able to select the correct lawnmower than obtain the proper private security services. To select the correct lawnmower, the consumer can refer to any one of a half-dozen consumer magazines, government consumer publications, or a neighborhood hardware store. Should this same consumer desire private security services, the task of making an informed choice is both more complex and difficult.

The roadblock to making an informed choice is the scarcity of consumer information on private security. Few consumer magazines have carried articles on how to select security services. Even the two or three national security publications have published only a few dozen articles over the past 10 years aimed at assisting consumers. A search for government publications dealing with selection of security services would prove fruitless, with one exception—the recently published Director of Security Consultants. And there is no neighborhood security dealer to offer friendly advice.

The lack of informative data does not diminish consumer responsibility in the choice of security services. There can be no lessening of this responsibility, because the consumer's decision affects the public's safety and general well-being. Ensuring that the consumer is able to properly and adequately meet this responsibility is the purpose of this and other standards in this chapter.

Checklists for obtaining security services are presented that should serve to encourage further work in expanding the material presented and in developing additional viable, extensive, and cost-effective guides. These checklists are targeted on the acquisition of guard and alarm services and home protection. The consumer considering the purchase of security services should find these lists a helpful starting point.

Some preliminary considerations need to be mentioned before the checklists are given. First, the decision to acquire security services should be followed by the consumer's evaluation of his personal needs. Based on the responses to a study prepared for this report (Appendix 3), the five main reasons for engaging security services are:

1. To prevent (and detect) potential criminal activity.
2. To protect property.
3. To detect fire and safety hazards.
4. To check entry and exit of personnel and vehicle.
5. To reduce actual criminal activity.

Robert Schuur's article, "The Guard Force (Direct Hire or Contract)," outlines several relevant points. To determine the need for and the size of a guard force, he suggests the consumer consider the following factors: (1) what is to be protected, (2) what degree must it be protected, (3) how much can be spent, and (4) what are management's expectations. These suggestions also apply to the acquisition of protective devices and alarm services.

Acquiring Alarm Systems

When considering the acquisition of alarm system protection or other protective-device systems, the consumer should attempt to become as familiar as possible with available systems. This can be accomplished by: (1) contacting a security consultant, (2) consulting security and general interest periodicals, (3) reviewing books on physical security and alarm systems industry, (4) obtaining brochures from alarm sales companies, and (5) contacting organizations, such as the National Burglar and Fire Alarm Association (NB&FAA).

The NB&FAA has published a consumer guide, entitled Considerations When Looking for a Burglar Alarm System. This pamphlet outlines a good procedure for the consumer to follow once familiar with available alarm systems. When the consumer has examined potential candidates as possible, a procedure primarily consisting of the NB&FAA prescribed process should be followed:

1. Locate reputable alarm companies by contacting:
   a. Local law enforcement agency.
   b. Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., and the NB&FAA.

2. Set appointments with reputable dealers for:
   a. Visit between the sales representative and appropriate management personnel, and
   b. Visit between the sales representative and all appropriate members of the family, and
   c. Conduct a security survey to determine alarm needs.

3. Consider all available systems to determine:
   a. Type of alarm devices required, and
   b. Type of total alarm system required.

4. Check local laws for:
   a. Type of alarm systems permissible,
   b. Compensation of time an alarm can sound, and
   c. Penalties for false alarms.

5. Study any contract or sales agreement prior to purchase for:
   a. List of points of protection,
   b. Itemization of equipment to be installed, and
   c. Service arrangements and fees.

Consumer role in the use of an alarm system is:

1. Thorough working knowledge of the system by all persons in contact with it, and
2. Responsibility for ensuring that public law enforcement officers are not endangered by improper use.

A consumer of alarm systems protection following the procedures outlined would greatly reduce the likelihood of falling prey to the less-than-reputable alarm companies that are a problem in the industry. Further, the consumer's dollar will have been spent on a reasonably cost-effective system, with no over-selling or underselling of the acquired system.

Acquiring Guard Services

In some situations, guards may be more appropriate than a mechanical device. However, the consumer faces a different set of problems when acquiring guard services. Among these problems is the question of whether to employ a guard or contract for this service. Consumers in the study conducted for this report (Appendix 3) were fairly split: 51 percent hired contract guards, 30 percent employed their own guards, 19 percent used both contract and proprietary guards, and 44 percent had changed their source of guard services.

In the consumer's quest for guard services, a review of available literature as possible, a procedure necessary for familiarization. Security periodicals, various studies listed in this report, local law enforcement agencies, better business bureaus, and books on security will provide valuable background data that can influence the consumer's decision on guard services.

Among the problems a consumer can anticipate with a guard force, either employed or contracted, are the complaints and criticisms listed in two studies: the Private Security Task Force Philadelphia Study (PSTF Philadelphia Study) (Appendix 3) and a survey of the California Peace Officers Association (Appendix 4). The top five criticisms from each study follow:

PSTF Philadelphia Study
1. Inadequate training.
2. Poor wage scale.
3. Undependability of personnel.
4. Inadequate supervision.
5. Inadequate background checks on personnel.

Private Security and the Public Interest
1. Generally inadequate training.
2. Generally unqualified personnel.
3. (Inadequate) initial screening and background check.
4. Low wages, and
5. "Playing cop" or misuse of authority.

When the consumer has completed the familiarization process, and has perhaps received a security consultant's recommendations on manpower requirements, the question of whether to contract for security guard services or to create a proprietary guard force must be resolved. To aid the consumer in this task, several positive and negative aspects of contract and proprietary guard services, based on the Schuur article and an article entitled "Company Guards vs. subcontractor Guards," are listed below. They are neither comprehensive nor intended to favor either of the choices.

Advantages of Contract Guard Services
1. Selectivity—employer retains only those persons personally approved.
2. Flexibility—more or fewer personnel, as required.
3. Absenteeism—replacement of absences on short notice.
4. Supervision—supervised by the client at all times.
5. Training—supplied at no cost to the client.
6. Objectivity—judgment not clouded by personalities.
7. Cost—20 percent less than inhouse, not counting administrative savings (e.g., insurance, retirement pensions, social security, medical care).
8. Quality—may be higher compared to an inhouse guard.
9. Administration and budgeting—budget borne by guard company.
10. Union—very little problem, because contract guards are usually not unionized.
11. Variety of services and equipment—guard companies can specialize in various criminal justice skills or expensive equipment unavailable to inhouse security.
12. Hiring and screening costs—borne by guard company.
13. Better local law enforcement contacts—may know more law enforcement personnel.

Disadvantages of Contract Guard Services
1. Turnover—extremely high industrywide.
2. Divided loyalties—serve-two-masters quandary.
3. Moonlighting—low salary for guards may force them into secondary jobs, resulting in tired and unalert personnel.
4. Reassignment—some agencies send in the best men at inception of contract, and then replace with others as new contracts open.
5. Screening standards—may be inadequate.
6. Insurance—determining liability and ensuring individual guards are bonded and insured.

Advantages of Proprietary Guard Forces
1. Loyalty—a positive attribute.
2. Incentive—promotion possibilities within the company structure.
3. Knowledge—operation, products, personnel of the company because of permanent employment.
4. Tenure—less turnover than contract guards.
5. Control—stays inside company structure.
7. Training—can be specifically geared to the job performed.
8. Company image—may become a status symbol.

Disadvantages of Proprietary Guard Forces
1. Unions—may go out with the company union, refuse to cross picket lines, and so forth.
2. Familiarity—may become too familiar with personnel to be effective on the job.
3. Cost—expensive (salary, benefits, Workmen's Compensation, social security, liability insurance, work space, equipment, training).
4. Flexibility—hard to replace absent personnel.
5. Administrative burdens—must develop an upper-level staff to handle personnel.

If the decision is made to hire a contract guard service, it is based on the consideration of criteria such as the above, the next step is to ensure that the contractors selected are reliable. To aid in this judgment, 12 points, based on those presented in an article entitled "To Make an Informed Choice of a Security Contractor," are listed:

1. Is the security contractor licensed and bonded, as required by law?
2. Is there proof of adequate insurance to protect the client?
3. Can the contractor show a positive relationship with law enforcement?
4. Can the contractor provide multiple services?
5. What is the background and experience of the security contractor's staff?
6. Does the contractor maintain security contractor's staff?
7. Does the contractor have a specific evaluation process of client's problems?
8. What minimum personnel standards does the contractor maintain?
9. Can the contractor provide multiple services?
10. Does the contractor have supervisory personnel available on an immediate 24-hour-a-day basis and offices in each local area where business is solicited?
11. What type of reporting procedures are used to inform the client of the time?
12. Is the contractor able to provide free information on costs of specific services?

After ascertaining the answers to these and other questions, the consumer should invite bids from those appearing in a Guard Service contracted to a list of past and present clients?

6. Does the contractor have a specific evaluation process of client's problems?

2. Clients should be advised of the quality of the service. However, until private and public consumer agencies and professional security organizations fill the information gap, the information contained in this standard should assist in the selection of security services and serve as a springboard for development of useful guides and information.

5. Acquiring Residential Protection

Perhaps the area where the consumer is best able to make effective decisions is that of residential protection. A large body of literature on this subject exists in physical security books, periodicals of all types, government publications, and pamphlets by business and industry. Almost all of this data are geared to buildings. Residential security consists primarily of hardening of doors, windows, and walls and installation of alarms, secure locks, special glass, adequate lighting, and appropriate landscaping. The material available for securing a residence is so voluminous that, rather than a specific checklist, a bibliography of selected resources follows:

Pamphlets
5. "National Neighborhood Watch Program, How to Protect Your House." The National Sheriffs' Association funded by a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
9. "Your Home Is Secure...Isn't It?" Schlage Security Institute, P.O. Box 3324, San Francisco, Calif. 94119 (1971).

Governments Publications

Films
1. "No Place to Rest His Head." Director, Architectural and Engineering Division, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C.
2. "Horizon—Defensible Space." For information—Regional Office, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

Magazines
Back issues of General category periodicals.

Books

The content of this report should form a good basic document for consumer review, because the standards and goals highlight many significant points relating to private security services.

The consumer is expected to exercise care in any marketplace where the credit is "let the buyer beware." A consumer needs to take more care when selecting security services for a business or residence than when seeking services that affect only himself. The consumer's selection of security services can affect any person coming in contact with the service. However, until private and public consumer agencies and professional security organizations and associations fill the information gap, the consumer selecting private security services will encounter difficulties meeting his responsibility. The information contained in this standard should assist the consumer in meeting his responsibility in the selection of security services and serve as a springboard for development of useful guides and information.

References
1. Brennan, Dennis T. The Other Police. Cleveland, Ohio: Governmental Research Institute, 1975.
Standard 7.2
Consumer Assistance Committees

Private security professional associations and organizations should form permanent committees or sections to develop useful guides for the evaluation and acquisition of goods and services and to provide clearinghouses for professional response to consumer inquiries.

Commentary

Mrs. Virginia Knauer, Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs, says she receives some 4,000 letters of complaint a month, out of a total of 12,000 letters. The New York City State Consumer Affairs Bureau, for example, handled more than 250,000 complaints and recovered more than $1.5 million dollars for consumers in a six-month period. The New York City Department of Consumer Affairs opened what is believed was the nation's first government-financed neighborhood consumer complaint office. In the first two months of operation it reportedly processed 450 complaints from consumers, recovered $7,000 in refunds and uncovered five cases of fraud termed "important."

These quotes, from Goodly L. Solomon's book, The Radical Consumer's Handbook, points to a trend in American society—the active and concerned consumer. These figures indicate that consumers will no longer tolerate being "taken" in the marketplace. They also highlight the need for consumer-oriented data that is accurate, unbiased, and, above all, helpful for arriving at an intelligent choice of goods and services.

Contributing to the volume of consumer complaints are the realities that the consumer is frequently unable to achieve adequate pre-purchase familiarization of materials and that some businesses providing goods and services have inadequate consumer inquiry and complaint procedures. The private security industry is not free of these types of problems. A study conducted for this report of consumers of private security services (Appendix 3) found that 44 percent of the respondents had changed their source of security services. An average of 29 percent of the respondents did not know if the security workers and supervisors had any training for the jobs they performed. Overall, 72 percent of the consumers indicated that they would be willing to invest additional funds if qualifications of personnel and/or quality of services were improved.

These figures point to the need for private security associations and organizations to become active in the field of consumer assistance. These associations and organizations have the expertise and ability within their membership to render an invaluable aid to society through the development of a consumer assistance capability. However, a very strong caution is given: To avoid possible violations of any antitrust regulations, associations and organizations should...
obtain legal advice both prior to, during, and after development and operation of consumer assistance programs. One taboo to avoid is the creation of standards that force membership in the association by business entities in order to obtain association approval of and recommendation to consumers of their private security goods and services. Private security groups should take care to impartially examine the goods and services provided by all business entities, members and nonmembers alike. Positive recommendations to consumers should not be reserved for members only. With these cautions in mind, a review can be made of the composition of consumer assistance committees and of the types of actions these committees can take to aid consumer selection of private security goods and services.

An important consideration in formulating a consumer assistance committee is that such a committee be permanent. This is the only way to demonstrate genuine commitment. The members of the committee should represent a cross section of the association or organization, in terms of geographical location and size of business operations served. Moreover, its members should be recognized by their peers as experts, respected both inside and outside of the association, and capable of dealing with and relating to people.

When ready to proceed, the committee members should establish communication links with consumers in order to be truly effective, because committee objectives will depend largely upon consumer needs. These needs can only be directly learned from the consumer. Three methods are suggested to gather necessary data:

1. Surveys. Survey instruments could be developed that indicate consumer problems and needs. Questionnaires could be sent to users of security goods and services, based on customer lists supplied by the membership of the association or organization.
2. Personal Meetings With Consumers. Consumer assistance committees could learn firsthand of the problems, needs and questions of consumers by holding meetings with past and present clients of the membership. These meetings also should be publicly advertised to attract potential consumers.
3. Government and Private Data on Consumer Complaints. Data from government consumer bureaus, better business bureaus, and prosecuting officials could help determine the nature of consumer complaints about the goods and services provided by the association or organization members.

When the data collection process is complete, the draft should be distributed to the association or organization membership for review and approval. Interested and knowledgeable persons outside of the association or organization might also be given a draft for their reactions. Second, when the material is published, steps should be taken to ensure its dissemination. The committee might recommend the designation of consumer representatives from the association or organization membership to service the geographical area covered. The duties of the consumer representative could range from handling consumer complaints against association or organization members to speaking to groups about the nature and role of private security in crime prevention. The level of resources allocated to providing response to the needs and inquiries of consumers should not, however, surpass the need indicated in the consumer surveys.

Private security professional associations and organizations have great potential to provide an important service to the consumer. Several private security associations and organizations already have put both time and money into programs and publications to educate, inform, and assist consumers. The everyday business of the private security professional is the prevention, detection, and deterrence of crime. The professional, through his association and organization memberships, can be of great assistance in helping consumers select the proper goods and services from the private security industry. This assistance will, in turn, contribute to greater public safety.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 7.2: 7.1 Consumers Responsibility for Selection of Security Services 7.3 Development of Expertise by Private and Governmental Consumer Agencies
Standard 7.3
Development of Expertise by Private and Governmental Consumer Agencies

Governmental consumer protection bureaus, better business associations, and private consumer groups should develop sufficient knowledge of the private security industry to enable them to intelligently evaluate complaints and advise consumers.

Commentary

In a review of the history of the consumer movement, Goody L. Solomon points out, in The Radical Consumer's Handbook, that the late President John F. Kennedy created a national Consumer Council and issued a buyer's bill that included the following:

1) The Right to Safety: "To be protected against the marketing of goods which are hazardous to health or life."

2) The Right to Be Informed: "To be protected against fraudulent, deceitful, grossly misleading information, advertising, labeling, or other practices, and to be given the facts to make an informed choice."

3) The Right to Choose: "To be assured, wherever possible, access to a variety of products and services at competitive prices and services, and in those industries in which competition is not effective and government regulation is substituted, to be assured satisfactory quality and service at fair prices."

4) The Right to Be Heard: "To be assured that consumer interests will receive fair and sympathetic consideration in the formulation of government policy, and fair and expeditious treatment in its administrative tribunals."

The work of this Council laid the cornerstone for private consumer action committees and State and local government consumer bureaus.

For continuing support of this mandate, public and private consumer agencies should develop expertise in the private security industry as it grows in size and importance. A study by Arthur D. Little, Inc., estimated 1975 revenues of $3 billion for "security products and services," based upon a growth rate of 12 percent per year. A study by Frost and Sullivan, Inc., estimated revenues of $2.5 billion in 1974 for "loss prevention products and services." Based upon their projected growth rate of 10 percent annually, 1975 revenues would have been $2.8 billion. Figures of this magnitude indicate that the private security field is indeed big business and, as such, can affect many people's lives.

There are three relevant areas concerning the development of private security expertise that would enhance the role and mission of government and private consumer bureaus and associations: consumer information, complaint referral actions, and legislation. Consumer information should be developed, providing prepurchase advice and listings of reliable private security firms. Expertise in methods of civil and legal recourse for complaints against private security firms should also be developed. Familiarization with local, State, and Federal legislation and studies of private security recommendations are important prerequisites to planning and initiating any needed action programs aimed at achieving improvement in the security market.

One of the most important functions that consumer bureaus and better business associations can undertake is preparing useful consumer information. Development of comparative data on private security goods and services, such as comparisons among various alarm systems, is perhaps the most important contribution that could be made. This service would be particularly useful in the area of guard and investigative services, because no evaluative method has yet been devised to compare these services. Perhaps the second most necessary information is local listings of reliable private security firms, based on professional association memberships, including number of registered complaints, out-of-court settlement data from insurance companies, and other data deemed appropriate. The development of this type of consumer information can, over time, improve the goods and services of the private security industry.

The next area in which private security expertise needs to be developed concerns referrals by consumer bureaus and better business associations. The nature of the referral would depend on the type and the monetary amount of the complaint. Even more basic is the process of informing consumers that a complaint procedure exists. Although avenues for recourse may vary from State to State, the possible directions a person with a complaint may take fall into five general categories:

1) Source of goods and services,
2) Consumer protection methods,
3) Legislative, regulatory,
4) Enforcement, and
5) Judicial.

Figure 7.1 provides an overview of interrelationship that may exist between the categories. Obviously, considerable expertise will be required to ensure that the proper referral is made.
The third need for development of knowledge of private security activities is in legislation. In 1975, 33 States had private security legislation, and all States presently have some local private security ordinances. Consumer bureaus and better business associations should prepare compendiums of legislation in each State to better inform, advise, or refer consumers. Having developed a knowledge of legislation, the recommendations for private security legislation contained in several national and State studies of the industry should be reviewed. Recommendations for improving existing legislation can be made to appropriate bodies. However, if research reveals that laws and ordinances already exist, the thrust of efforts should not be toward developing new laws but rather toward applying and enforcing the existing legislation.

Consumer bureaus and better business associations have, in a very short time, substantially contributed to improving the quality of life in the United States. It is in keeping with the avowed purposes of these organizations that they now undertake the task of developing expertise and services in the private security field.

Selected References

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 7.4:

7.1 Consumers Responsibility for Selection of Security Services
7.2 Consumer Assistance Committees
7.4 Private Security Advertising Standards

Standard 7.4
Private Security Advertising Standards

The private security industry should adhere to advertising standards that accurately portray to the public the nature and quality of the service to be provided.

Commentary
Regulation of Advertising by the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) states that:

For markets to operate effectively, buyers must have accurate information about the quality and other characteristics of the products offered for sale. Otherwise there can be no basis for confidence that the market will enable consumers to make purchases maximizing their welfare within the limitations of their resources. The production of information about products is therefore of fundamental importance to the effective operation of a market system.

These words ring with reason and well introduce the purpose behind this standard. The consumer of security services has to rely heavily on information supplied by the industry itself because of the paucity of readily available resource materials. The accuracy and completeness of information and advertising have a direct relationship on how the consumer perceives the private security marketplace and how effectively consumer dollars are spent for security services.

The lack of information on private security services can make the consumer vulnerable to advertising claims. Consumers could be misinformed about the nature and quality of private security services and led into unwise choices of services by advertising practices relying on the fear of crime.

A consumer may not know what to look for when considering private security guard services and be misguided about their quality and nature. Some guard company brochures heavily stress that the company has personnel capable of performing many different security functions, from special event duty to retail store security. This advertising of across-the-spectrum capability may be of interest to a consumer, but it does not furnish the consumer with data on the qualifications of personnel for specific security functions, the amount of supervision guards receive, whether governmental regulatory requirements have been met, or if insurance or bonding is in effect. A consumer of private security guard services should review advertising copy for the following positive indicators:

- Does advertising:
  - Give the business license number?
  - Offer a list of references (past and present clients)?
  - Give specific information on the training guard personnel receive?
Private investigative agencies have been most commonly associated with this type of advertising. Abuses in or confusion created by private security advertising is likely to result in government control. A study of private security services in St. Petersburg, Fla., included a recommendation for advertisement content and a model private security advertising ordinance. Included in the model ordinance was a provision that private security advertisements carry information regarding the location for filing citizen complaints. Both the RAND Report (Vol. 1) and the study, Private Security and the Public Interest, offer recommendations for private security advertising practices. According to a study of legislation (see Appendix 6), nine States regulate private security advertising and six States take punitive action for false advertising.

To avoid further government encroachment into the area of private security advertising, the industry should develop and adhere to advertising standards that are helpful to consumers and that attempt to win them by providing the most accurate and complete data possible. Interesting, informative, intelligent advertising can succeed as well as that which misleads or utilizes fear of crime. A study of private security advertisement section in Fortune, by the Fortune marketing research department, found that 71 percent of the respondents took some form of positive action in response to the advertisements, most of which had imaginative well-written copy, relying not on the negative aspects of crime but on the positive aspects of the service or product being sold.

As stated in Regulation of Advertising by the FTC:

As a result of increases in the complexity and variety of products and in the value of people’s time (time being the principle resource consumed in search) it can be assumed that there has occurred a major shift from consumer to seller in the comparative advantage of supplying consumer product information.

The private security industry should heed this message and enhance its image and credibility in the marketplace by drafting and adopting advertising standards.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 7.4:

3.1 Code of Ethics
6.5 Mistaken Identity of Private Security Personnel
6.6 State Regulation of Private Security Uniforms, Equipment, Job Titles
7.1 Consumers Responsibility for Selection of Security Services
7.2 Consumer Assistance Committees
7.3 Development of Expertise by Private and Governmental Consumer Agencies
INTRODUCTION

Although the growth of the private security sector has paralleled and often exceeded that of public law enforcement, there is a paucity of information and research for or about the industry and its operations. Educational and degree programs, specifically geared to the needs of private security employment, are also minimal. If the problems of the private security industry are to be overcome, allowing it to emerge in its proper role as an effective force against both private and public crime, these deficiencies in research and education need to be corrected.

This report highlights some of the problems of the private security industry and addresses methods by which the industry and other concerned groups can improve the quality of security services and performance. Most chapters are directed toward a more or less distinctive audience—i.e., chapter 1 chiefly concerns private security employers, chapter 7 is directed toward consumers. The standards in this chapter, however, have broad applications for all the persons for whom this report is intended, namely, members of the private security industry, governmental agencies, educators, and citizens in general. Their increased awareness of the need for basic research and expanded educational opportunities in private security subjects is required for the implementation of the standards in this chapter.

Although, at first glance, the general population would appear to play a passive role, a closer examination discloses that citizen encouragement of mechanisms to implement this report and advocacy of educational programs can directly assist the purpose of the standards. The inclusion of Standard 8.1 emphasizes the belief that State review and implementation of standards offer a unique opportunity for further exploration and increased use of the private security industry in crime prevention and reduction.

The Federal Government has made significant contributions to criminal justice planning through the implementation of State Planning Agencies, Citizens' crime commissions, colleges, universities, and other agencies. However, there has been little emphasis on research as it relates to private security services. The absence of reliable research has made planning and decision-making difficult in the field. Therefore, Standard 8.2 proposes the development of a national private security resource and research institute and encourages the administrative and financial assistance of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in its establishment. This institute would significantly enhance the activities advocated in Standard 8.1, further the development of a body of knowledge for use in educational institutions, and provide a foundation for the development of new and improved strategies to optimize private security capacity in crime prevention and reduction.

Standards 8.3 and 8.4 were formulated in response to the alarming lack of comprehensive, private security educational programs in the United States.
Basically, their intent is to institute a cooperative plan under which educational institutions can contribute significantly to the professionalism of the private security industry. Standard 8.3 addresses the need for noncredit and credit seminars and courses designed to meet the unique needs of private security personnel. Standard 8.4 broadly outlines the need for associate, baccalaureate, and graduate degrees designed to prepare people for entry into the field and to enlarge the professional, educational experiences of those already so employed.

The national experience in making educational opportunities available for public criminal justice professionals may form a model for private security education. A decade ago there were limited opportunities throughout the country to help public criminal justice officials meet their preemployment or professional development needs. Since that time, a wide-ranging, academically sound program has been developed. It is hoped that educational institutions will respond correspondingly to private security needs, thereby contributing to a safer society for all.

Standard 8.1
State Review of Private Security Task Force Report

Each State should provide a mechanism to review and recommend implementation, as appropriate, of the standards and goals contained in this report.

Commentary

The Private Security Task Force was one of five major task forces formed under the Standards and Goals II program of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to develop national standards and goals for the prevention and reduction of crime. The recommendations of these task forces were reviewed by the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. If the deliberations and work reflected in this report are to accomplish more than serve as a reference book, each State needs to provide a statewide mechanism to encourage and facilitate meaningful and workable action programs for these standards and goals. State Planning Agencies (SPA) and/or other statewide organizations already in existence can be used or new organizations developed for this purpose.

The composition of the State organizations necessarily varies. However, if the proper balance of viewpoints is to be achieved, the members of the organization should be representative of the industry, government, and general population. Although it is almost impossible to set a model for the composition of the organization, representatives from the following groups are suggested:

• Proprietary security agencies.
• Contracted security agencies.
• Alarm systems industry.
• Urban planning and/or architecture.
• Public law enforcement agencies.
• State registration and licensing authority (if one exists).
• State attorney general's office.
• General public.

The exact number of members and support staff would need to be determined at the State level.

Two States, California and Virginia, already have organized State private security task forces to make recommendations for the improvement of private security services. Perhaps these same groups could assume the responsibility of reviewing the standards and goals contained in this report and make further recommendations to support the better use of private security resources for crime prevention and reduction.

Although the remaining States do not have private security task forces, some States, such as Pennsylvania, have formed committees for criminal justice standards and goals. It would appear reasonable that such committees could well assume the task of reviewing this report and implementing its suggestions. In other States, the SPA might be the catalyst for
the beginning of State private security task forces. Naturally, to make effective recommendations based on this report's standards and goals, States need reliable base data. A private security survey was conducted by the Maine Criminal Justice Planning and Assistance Agency to provide information requested by the Private Security Task Force. The information gathered in this survey could serve as a starting point for a private security data base in Maine. If similar, current information is available in other States, it also could provide valuable base data for their evaluation of private security needs and recommendations for implementation of appropriate standards and goals. A national private security resource and research institute, as proposed in Standard 8.2, would significantly enhance the efforts of States.

It is recognized that the scope of work and priorities of each State organization would differ, based on their specific needs. First, urban and rural States may set different priorities because of varying needs. For example, a rural State may not view regulation as important but may see a high-priority need for training. Second, some States already have licensing and/or registration requirements that are effective, rendering unnecessary the national standards for licensing and regulation. Third, some of the problems identified in this report may not exist within a given State. For example, the standards regarding consumer protection associations or organizations may not apply if there are no substantiated complaints about security services. It is doubtful that all of the standards could, or should, be adopted by each State. Processes used by the States to react to the previous standards and goals program of the LEAA can be used as models for the present effort. These processes have resulted in States accepting, modifying, or rejecting the standards and goals in terms of their individual needs.

State committees or SPAs would be restricted in their affect because, like the national Private Security Task Force, they would be advisory in nature. However, they can have several advantages over the national Task Force. One advantage would be their greater impact on State legislative processes. Because this report has recommended that government regulation be conducted at the State level, this affords a definite advantage in any given State. Also, because State organizations have more direct access to local and State law enforcement agencies and associations and various private security associations, they can provide a more effective catalyst for improving the relationship between the two sectors. Finally, being more familiar with local conditions and resources, organizations at the State level could provide more effective guidance for review and/or implementation of the standards in this report.

In summary, it is strongly urged that each State provide a mechanism to review and, when appropriate, to implement the standards and goals contained in this report. Through this process, a significant contribution can be made toward the improvement of the private security field and its efforts in crime prevention. In the absence of activity by appropriate State organizations, this report could become merely another contribution to the literature on private security and not an action document intended to assist in the reduction and prevention of crimes.

Selected References


Related Standards

All standard and goal statements in this report can serve as a basis for implementing this standard.
Burglar Alarm Requirements Analysis—Equipment Systems Improvement Program Report

Title: Burglar Alarm Requirements Analysis—Equipment Systems Improvement Program Report

Author: N. H. Hines

Accession Number: 09900.00.014970

Annotation: The requirements that need to be met to reduce the number of false alarms to an acceptable level on systems are installed.

Available Through: National Criminal Justice Reference Service, P.O. Box 24036, S.W. Post Office, Washington, D.C. 20024

(Borrowable from the NCJRS through a library using the Interlibrary Loan System.

Title: Commercial Robbery in a Medium-Sized City—Columbus, Georgia—Equipment Systems Improvement Program Report

Author: E. G. Guar

Accession Number: 09900.00.014958

Annotation: Study of armed robbery of business establishments, using the series of events surrounding the crime and the action and reaction of the participants.

Available Through: National Criminal Justice Reference Service

Title: Deterrence of Crime in and Around Residences

Accession Number: 09900.00.009652

Annotation: Papers dealing with overall impacts of architectural design on criminal activity, legislation as a deterrence factor, and community involvement.


Title: Minimum Building Security Guidelines and Cost Estimate for the Security Features—Initial Draft

Accession Number: 09900.00.010758

Annotation: Guidelines to secure commercial and residential property (including multiple-family dwellings, hotels, and motels) against burglary, and including replacement cost estimates.

Available Through: National Criminal Justice Reference Service

Title: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice—Summary of Institute Research Results and Recommendations on Housing Security for the Elderly

Accession Number: 09900.00.016706

Annotation: A study of LEAA statistics indicated that the elderly generally are no more likely to become the victims of crime than are other population groups, although they do report more cases of pocket-picking and purse-snatching.

Available Through: National Criminal Justice Reference Service

Title: Need for and Projected Contents of a Suggested Property Security Code

Author: J. E. O'Keefe

Accession Number: 09900.00.000279

Annotation: Property security regulations for existing structures and new construction are designed to limit the scope of research.

Available Through: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D.C. 20531

Title: Project for Security Design in Urban Residential Areas—Annual Report, June 1, 1970-June 30, 1971

Author: Oscar Newman

Accession Number: 09900.00.008815

Annotation: New York University's project for security design reports completion of its monograph, defensible space—architectural design for crime prevention.

Available Through: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

Title: Prototype Device Systems

Author: E. S. Krendel

Accession Number: 09900.00.010034

Annotation: Shortcomings in present security systems for retail businesses and residences, with a suggested functional (not gadget-oriented) attack on these weaknesses.

Available Through: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

Title: Residential Security

Accession Number: 09900.00.011166

Annotation: Assessment of security measures, focusing on deterrents to burglary, discussing cost-effectiveness, physical security and design, group action, and public policy.

Available Through: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

Title: Role of Campus Security in the College Setting

Author: S. Gulbre

Accession Number: 09900.00.008966

Annotation: Role of the campus security officer in terms of historical origins, legal structures, and operational functions.

Available Through: Superintendent of Documents

As envisioned by the Private Security Task Force, the national resource and research institute would serve as a catalyst for the distribution of private security information, as well as a repository for available literature. The graduate seminars and discussions received from Professor A. E. Brandstatter and Dr. Leon Weaver of Michigan State University, along with journals, tests, research reports, and other publications gathered by the Task Force, could provide a nucleus for this effort. Building upon these resources, the potential for additional research to meet the needs of private security is almost limitless. The following list is intended to reflect potential research areas, and not to set priorities, nor to limit the scope of research.

1. Development of job-related tests for private security employment.
2. Accurate determination of the number of persons employed in the private security industry.
3. Development of private security job descriptions.
4. Development of model training programs for private security personnel.
5. Development of private security policy and procedure manuals.

6. Development and evaluation of private security equipment and systems.

7. Material for architects and urban planners to use in the design of new buildings or in remodeling of existing buildings to promote the use of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) concepts.

8. Model guides to improve the relationship of the private security industry and the law enforcement agencies.

9. Checklists for consumers of security services to use in selecting and evaluating services.

10. Checklists for managers in proprietary companies to evaluate their security programs.

11. Development of associate baccalaureate and graduate curricula in security.

12. Model statutes for the licensing, regulation, and operation of private security regulatory agencies.

13. Evaluation of effectiveness and use of detection—deception (polygraph) and psychological stress evaluation (PSE) techniques.

14. Legal issues in the private security field.

15. Development of model record systems for private security companies.

The following activities should be implemented on an individual basis by entities concerned with private security; however, no single university, company, organization, association, or individual can supply the resources to conduct all of the research needed in even a single area. Thus, the concept of a national resource and research institute provides a focus for these research activities. The exchange process is schematically illustrated in Figure 8.1.
The organizational structure of the national resource and research institute can be conceptualized in a variety of ways: (1) centered at one college or university, or several colleges and universities under a consortium arrangement; (2) as a research component of a professional association; (3) as a not-for-profit corporation supported by both government and private funding sources; (4) as a separate unit under the National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Research, or (5) as a combination of two or more of the foregoing concepts.

The main concern of this standard, however, is not how the institute should be organized, but why it should be organized and what it should accomplish. If the private security industry and its services are to be more effectively used in crime prevention, reliable information about and research for the industry needs to be available. The institute can be the catalyst for literature collection and dissemination, applied and/or pure research, and other functions normally associated with a research operation.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration can play a major role in the development of the institute by providing guidance, technical assistance, and, if appropriate, funding.

Selected References

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 8.2:
2.3 Job Descriptions
2.4 Training Related to Job Functions
2.5 Preassignment and Basic Training
2.6 Arms Training
4.1 Alarm Systems Research
4.6 Joint Cooperation to Reduce Transmission Costs
5.1 Improvement of Door and Window Security
5.4 Crime Prevention in Design
8.3 Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses
8.4 Degree Programs for Private Security

Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses

Colleges and universities should develop and offer noncredit and credit seminars and courses to meet the needs of private security personnel.

Commentary
As established throughout this report, there is a need for education and training in the private security field. Participants at the First National Conference on Private Security (held at the University of Maryland in December 1975) resolved that "shared or cooperative training programs utilizing resources of private security, public law enforcement, education and training institutions [should] be pursued to meet the training needs of private security." In this respect, one of the most obvious contributions educational institutions can make is to develop and offer noncredit and credit courses for private security personnel.

Educational institutions throughout the United States have physical and personnel resources that can be used to effectively provide programs with reasonable cost, location, and scheduling. For example, a college or university could: (1) offer courses to students at a reduced enrollment fee because they are residents of the college district, (2) schedule the courses at a central location convenient to students' residences and/or places of work, and (3) offer the courses in day, evening, or combination sessions. Although such arrangements are most appropriate for community and junior colleges, they often can also be handled by private and State-supported, 4-year institutions. Of course within each geographical area, all educational institutions need to coordinate activities to maximize enrollments, limit costs, and meet the private security needs.

The American Society for Industrial Security, other professional organizations, and private schools occasionally offer short courses, but these programs are inaccessible for many because of cost, geographical location, and scheduling. The need for short courses, available to all levels of private security personnel, from guards and watchmen to security executives, cannot be met by courses seeking students from across the Nation. Small companies cannot pay the tuition, travel, and per diem costs, and they have difficulty replacing personnel while they attend the courses. Thus, short courses need to be offered by colleges and universities located near the students.

Academic Guidelines for Security and Loss Prevention Programs in Community and Junior Colleges outline four phases of program development: (1) noncredit course(s), (2) credit course(s), (3) subordinate credit programs, and (4) autonomous programs. The first two phases—credit and noncredit courses—apply to this standard. Both should
Courses forOperational Personnel

- Arson investigation.
- Background investigation.
- Bomb threats.
- Civil disturbances.
- Cooperation with public law enforcement agencies.
- Employee security.
- Fire and safety.
- Firearms training.
- First aid.
- Internal theft investigations.
- Interviewing.
- Law and the private security industry.
- Note-taking and report writing.
- Patrol methods.
- Physical security measures.
- Preliminary investigations.
- Public relations aspects of service.
- Security training.
- Shoplifting prevention.
- Surveillance techniques.
- Visitor control.

Courses for Management Personnel

- Crime prevention through environmental design.
- Disaster and emergency planning.
- Establishing a bomb threat plan.
- Establishing a more effective employee security awareness.
- Lawmanagement relationship in security services.
- Private securitylaw enforcement relationship.
- Protection of key personnel.
- Security administration and management.
- Security problems discussion seminar.
- Strengthening business security.
- The role of the security administrator in research and development.

(Most of these courses and more can be found in Academic Guidelines for Security and Loss Prevention Programs in Community and Junior Colleges."

For this list, or any list, to be meaningful for courses development, survey respondents should be requested to set priorities. If need in particular areas is established, separate courses could become subjects contained in a longer seminar. For example, first aid, firearms training, and patrol methods might be covered in one seminar or workshop for operational personnel.

There are short courses which fill the present short-range need for educational opportunities while the academic programs recommended in other standards are being developed. Later, these courses can support the regular academic classes and, at the same time, give educational institutions a mechanism to provide information to meet continually changing private security situations.

The opportunities for innovative use of seminars and short courses to meet private security needs are apparent. Educational institutions, in cooperation with the private security industry, should take the initiative to provide the physical and personnel resources to implement this standard.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 8.3:

1. Selection of Qualified Personnel
2. Commensurate Salaries
3. Training in Private Security
4. Professional Certification Programs
5. Training Related to Job Functions
6. Firearm training
7. Ongoing Training
8. Training of Supervisors and Managers
9. State Authority and Responsibility for Training
Standard 8.4

Degree Programs for Private Security

The private security industry and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) should cooperate in the encouragement and development of:

1. Certificate, associate of art, or associate of science degree programs designed to meet local industry needs.
2. Undergraduate and graduate programs designed to meet private security needs.

Commentary

Although there is presently no comprehensive involvement by colleges and universities to provide educational opportunities for private security personnel, it should also be recognized that there is little evidence that the security industry or government agencies have encouraged their development. This standard is based on the premise that the industry, LEAA, and educational institutions can cooperate for mutual benefit.

Certificate and associate degree programs designed to meet the needs of the private security industry are a recent, but potentially significant, resource for improving the delivery of security services. Academic Guidelines for Security and Loss Prevention Programs in Community and Junior Colleges (1) published in 1973, identified 5 certificate programs, 2 associate programs, and 58 junior or community colleges offering at least one security course. Research (see Appendix 4) revealed 6 certificate programs, 22 associate programs, and 49 junior or community colleges offering at least one security course. The number of junior and community colleges offering some form of private security education has grown from 65, in 1972, to 77, in 1976. However, a closer look beyond these positive indicators of the growth of private security education reveals a need for much greater effort. Only five States (California, Illinois, Michigan, New York, and Virginia) have five or more programs at the junior and community college level; 24 States do not have even one institution that offers one course. Thus, although there has been growth in educational programs, the future offers great challenges to junior and community colleges to help develop the skills, knowledge, and judgment needed by private security personnel through appropriate courses.

Senior colleges are also involved in private security degree programs. However, educational programs at the baccalaureate and graduate levels designed to prepare persons for private security employment are totally inadequate. A survey (Appendix 4) located only five bachelor of science programs: Biscayne College, Niagara University, northeastern Michigan University, and Wichita State University. Two 4-year schools—Eastern Kentucky University and John Jay College of Criminal Justice—offer associate degrees. Western Illinois University has a formal minor in security administration, with options for (1) students majoring in law enforcement administration, and (2) students majoring in other than law enforcement administration. Thirty-two 4-year institutions, without formal private security degree programs, have at least one course that could be classified under security administration. In summary, the survey revealed only sixty 4-year institutions offering courses designed specifically for private security personnel.

The situation regarding graduate degrees is even more discouraging. No educational institution offers a graduate degree in the private security field, although Michigan State University offers graduate courses that may be designated as one of several concentrations by a masters candidate, and many students have written graduate theses on private security subjects. As a result of circular revision in 1973 in an area of specialization in security administration, the baccalaureate level once offered at Michigan State has been discontinued. This is especially significant, because Michigan State is generally recognized as a leader in private security education at the baccalaureate and graduate levels. "A Study of the Placement and Utilization Patterns and Views of the Criminal Justice Graduates of Michigan State University" revealed that 15 percent of all graduates identified security administration as their area of specialization. Further, Arthur F. Broderstadt, director of the school of criminal justice at Michigan State, in response to a questionnaire, indicated 310 graduate students specializing in security administration at the baccalaureate and graduate levels. Thus, although there has been growth in educational programs, the need for private security degree programs is further revealed that 15 percent of all graduates identified security administration as their area of specialization. Further, Arthur F. Broderstadt, director of the school of criminal justice at Michigan State, in response to a questionnaire, indicated 310 graduate students specializing in security administration at the baccalaureate and graduate levels. The need for private security degree programs is further supported by John J. Condon, chairman, department of law enforcement administration at Western Illinois University, who indicated that approximately 10 percent of all baccalaureate graduates of his program were presently employed in the private security field.

Certain critics have voiced the opinion that because degree programs in business administration, criminal justice, law enforcement, and other related fields have provided appropriate educational backgrounds in the past to persons in private security, there is no need, at this time, for specific private security degree programs. This position is incorrect. Private security degree programs will not only enhance the professional movement in private security but also foster needed research and technological advancements.

Three significant resolutions passed at the First National Conference on Private Security are pertinent to the future development of educational programs. These resolutions are:

1. A multidisciplinary and scholarly approach should be the core concept for the development of degree programs in private security.
2. There is a need to meet the requirements of both private industry, LEAA, and educational institutions with the differentiation made by most educational institutions.
3. There is a body of knowledge about the private security field sufficient to support realistic and meaningful 2-year, 4-year, and graduate-level college and university programs.

The following commentary is divided into two subheads—(1) associate degree programs, and (2) baccalaureate and graduate programs—to correspond with the differentiation made by most educational institutions.

Associate Degree Programs

A useful starting point in program planning is the Suggested Curriculum for Associate Programs contained in Academic Guidelines for Security and Loss Prevention Programs in Community and Junior Colleges (see Figure 8.2). A number of educators have indicated that this curriculum could serve as an excellent guide. Detailed course descriptions and other relevant information about designing and implementing programs can be found in the publication.

It would be inappropriate to recommend a set curriculum, because any program of private security education should be developed to meet the needs of local industry. Also, before developing and implementing degree programs, a review should be conducted of the assistance that colleges and universities should provide for training suggested (Chapter 2) and for seminars and courses (Standard 8.3). Immediate local industry needs can be better met by these forms of education. In any event, educational programs in appropriate forms should be designed with the specific needs of local industry in mind.

When developing degree programs, it may be difficult to identify the target population and to determine appropriate course content. However, it is strongly suggested that certificates, associate, and associate of science degree programs be developed that include subject matter as the following:

- Conducting security surveys
- Historical, philosophical, and legal bases of the security field
- Information security
- Interviewing and report writing
- Loss prevention techniques
- Personnel security
- Physical security
- Principles and practices of fire prevention and safety
- Supervision and leadership
- Unique security problems of hotels/motels, banks, manufacturing facilities, and so forth.
Figure 5.2. Suggested Curriculum for Associate Programs

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<tr>
<th>First Semester</th>
<th>Second Semester</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Credits</strong></td>
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<td>English I</td>
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<td>General Psychology</td>
<td>Introduction to Sociology</td>
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<td>Criminal and Civil Law I</td>
<td>Criminal and Civil Law II</td>
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<td>Security Administration</td>
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<td>Economics I</td>
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<td>Science I</td>
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<td>Administration of Justice</td>
<td>Civil Rights &amp; Civil Liberties</td>
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<td>Principles of Interviewing</td>
<td>Report Writing</td>
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<td>Industrial Relations</td>
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<td>Security Education</td>
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<td>Industrial Health &amp; Safety</td>
<td>Special Security Problems</td>
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Baccalaureate and Graduate Programs

The lack of viable baccalaureate and graduate degree programs is both a handicap and an advantage. On the negative side, no curriculum model is presently available comparable to that which exists for associate degrees; therefore, each institution would have to develop its own curriculum without an historical frame of reference. This handicap, with proper remediation, is also an advantage because no precedents exist that might need to be removed or modified during the developmental process. The following "Task Force Viewpoints for Development of Baccalaureate and Graduate Programs in Private Security" (not listed in order of importance) are offered for consideration by educators:

1. Core Requirements. (24 quarter hours)
2. Electives. (4 quarter hours)

Implementation Phase

Each institution should determine the most appropriate way to implement private security curriculums, depending on available personnel and physical and financial resources; the following three-step process is recommended:

1. Introduce private security courses; then, if needed:
2. Develop private security minor; then, if needed,
3. Develop baccalaureate and/or master degree program(s).

Model for Minor

An innovative model for a minor in security administration exists at Western Illinois University. It is a coordinated program with the College of Business and the Department of Health Sciences. Plan A is for students whose major is other than law enforcement and Plan B is for students who major in law enforcement administration.

Plan A

Minor in security administration for students whose major is other than law enforcement. Total hours—28 quarter hours.

1. Core Requirements. (24 quarter hours)
2. Survey of Criminal Investigation. Criminal investigation theory and procedure; case preparation, methodology, and techniques; problems in criminal investigations. (4 quarter hours)
3. Administration of Justice I. Summation of previous courses in administration of justice with emphasis on constitutional rights; related responsibility of police; special emphasis on amendments to the Constitution as related to the rights of the individual. (4 quarter hours)
4. Security Administration I. Overview of security systems found in retail, industrial, and governmental agencies; legal framework for security operations; detailed presentation of specific security programs. (4 quarter hours)
5. Fire Protection. Organization and function of fire prevention organizations; inspections; techniques of hazard analysis; economics of fire protection; survey of fire protection equipment and application to hazards found in businesses and industrial situations. Development of Standard Operating Procedures. Responsibilities under Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970. (4 quarter hours)
6. Disaster and Civil Defense. A course of instruction to prepare one for leadership and action in case of nuclear and natural disasters, as well as man-made disasters. Techniques of survival, operation of radiological instruments, shelter management training, medical self-help, and rescue operations are covered. (4 quarter hours)
7. Electives. (4 quarter hours)
8. Accounting Theory I. Fundamentals of accounting theory and practice, with emphasis on introductory financial accounting techniques applicable to income determination and asset accounting. (4 quarter hours)
9. Physical Distribution. A study of the physical distribution function of marketing, including transportation, storage, warehousing, inventory control, plant location, and government regulation. (4 quarter hours)
10. Management and Organizational Behavior. An introduction to the study of organization theory. The managerial process is introduced, as well as
topics related to human behavior in the organizational setting. (4 quarter hours)

Personnel Management. This course focuses on the selection, development, maintenance, and use of personnel in business and in industry. (4 quarter hours)

Plan B

Minor in security administration for students whose major is law enforcement. (See Plan A for course descriptions.) Total hours—28 quarter hours.

1. Core requirements. (16 quarter hours)
   Security Administration I—4 quarter hours.
   Security Administration II—4 quarter hours.
   Fire Protection—4 quarter hours.
   Disaster and Civil Defense—4 quarter hours.
2. Electives. (12 quarter hours)
   Accounting Theory I—4 quarter hours.
   Physical Distribution—4 quarter hours.
   Management and Organizational Behavior—4 quarter hours.
   Personnel Management—4 quarter hours.

Model for Bachelor's

It is believed that the most effective approach would be an interdisciplinary degree with emphasis on courses in security administration and business administration. In general, the degree structure should be as follows:

- 10 percent of courses in sociology and psychology.
- 10 percent of courses in law enforcement/criminal justice.
- 20 percent of courses in security administration.
- 20 percent of courses in business administration.
- 40 percent of courses in general education.

Model for Masters

- 20 percent of courses in sociology and psychology.
- 40 percent of courses in security administration.
- 40 percent of courses in business administration.

It is recognized that many of the suggestions regarding curriculum design are arbitrary; however, it is believed that security administration degree should be interdisciplinary. These course outlines also serve as a basis for discussions between the various departments in colleges and universities.

The Roles of LEAA and the Private Security Industry in Implementing This Standard

LEAA can make significant contributions toward implementing this standard. One of the highest priority efforts that LEAA should initiate is a national manpower study to determine the need for private security programs. This study should survey businesses and government agencies to determine the anticipated need for persons with security administration degrees, from certificates to master's; salary levels; skills, knowledge, and judgment requirements; and opportunities for promotion. The study results would be an invaluable aid to educators in determining need for programs which degree would most appropriately meet employment opportunities. LEAA can also assist by providing research grants to aid educational institutions in developing degree programs. However, it is not the intent of this report that Law Enforcement Education Program funds be made available for students majoring in security administration.

Individuals, companies, and professional associations should alert colleges and universities of their interest in obtaining educational opportunities for private security personnel. Once these opportunities are available, the industry should continue its assistance by providing guidance on curricular-identifying qualified instructors, and, as appropriate, offering tuition assistance to employees. The industry should also provide career incentives—higher salaries and promotions—to persons who avail themselves of the educational opportunities. Moreover, private security interests need to be willing to assist in the following four specific ways:

1. Cooperate to the fullest extent during the manpower survey to provide reliable information that would be of benefit to educators preparing degree programs.
2. Provide security-related equipment and materials to the educational institutions for use in classroom and research activities.
3. Establish policies and procedures to encourage the personnel to act as resource persons, guest speakers, and, as appropriate, members of teaching faculties on a part-time or full-time basis.
4. Provide internship experiences for students majoring in security administration. An internship program would provide students an opportunity to be participants/observers in security activities that would help to achieve their career objectives, and also provide the business an opportunity to learn from the educational experiences of students. The concept of internship has been well established in the legal, teaching, and medical professions.

With the encouragement and support of both the industry and LEAA, it is believed that sound academic programs can be developed by colleges and universities to meet the needs of all private security personnel. The teaching process and the supporting research efforts would further the development of a body of knowledge that can be used to enhance the effectiveness of private security services, ultimately benefiting both the industry and the public.

Selected References

10. Private Security Task Force. "Survey of Colleges and Universities Offering Educational Programs for Private Security." (See Appendix 4 to this report.)

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 8.4:

1.1 Selection of Qualified Personnel
1.2 Commensurate Salaries
2.1 Training in Private Security
2.2 Professional Certification Programs
2.4 Training Related to Job Functions
2.5 Preassignment and Basic Training
2.6 Arms Training
2.7 Ongoing Training
2.8 Training of Supervisors and Managers
2.9 State Authority and Responsibility for Training
2.10 State Boards to Coordinate Training Efforts
3.2 Conduct of Private Security Personnel
3.4 Employer Responsibilities
4.3 Certified Training of Alarm Sales and Service Personnel
5.7 Crime Prevention Courses in Schools of Architecture and Urban Planning
5.10 Crime Prevention Courses as a Job Requirement
8.2 National Private Security Resource and Research Institute
8.3 Noncredit and Credit Seminars and Courses
INTRODUCTION

Increased government regulation of business and industry has come under fire as a threat to America's system of free enterprise and a suppressor of the health and growth of national economy. Social critics, as well as staunch supporters of existing institutions, have voiced a need for regulatory reform to curb inflation and restore competition, efficiency, and innovation in the American marketplace. Professional groups and concerned citizens have urged that government regulation be reduced in light of the high costs and mountains of paperwork involved. This widespread concern with overregulation prompted President Gerald R. Ford to request that Congress establish a National Commission on Regulatory Reform.

Despite this justifiably strong concern, specific regulation in appropriate fields is both necessary and advantageous. A society without rules produces anarchy. The complexity of our industrial environment particularly demands that the public be protected against certain abuses in the marketplace. Consumers need to be assured that the products and services they pay for meet reasonable standards, and the public's health and safety must be safeguarded. The province of government's regulation is protecting the public interest.

The real issue is not whether government regulation is needed; most people agree that government should set rules that protect the public interest. However, who should be regulated and to what extent are debatable questions. The current proliferation of regulation, its high costs and more stringent requirements, have prompted many to reevaluate the benefits of regulation.

It becomes important for proponents of new legislation and regulation to carefully consider the impact upon consumers, the industry to be regulated, and the public.

The rationale supporting regulation in the field of private security is based on four major factors:

1. Private security services primarily exist to protect life and property from criminal attack. With a mission of this importance, it is vital that some control other than laissez-faire capitalism should be present to ensure that these services can be reasonably expected to provide that which is claimed.

2. A major percentage of all private security services used by businesses involved guards and investigators. These persons are placed in positions in which they have direct contact with the public for the purpose of preventing crime. In fulfilling their mission, actions may be taken that could violate constitutional guarantees of individuals in the areas of detention, arrest, search, seizure, self-incrimination, confessions and statements made under duress, and a wide variety of other serious matters.

3. Because of the potential of dangerous criminal attack, certain private security personnel—armed guards, armed investigators, armored car personnel, alarm respondents, and others—carry weapons capable of killing. Even security personnel who do not carry firearms may be equipped with night sticks, billies, or other weapons that can kill or certainly inflict great bodily harm. Controls are needed to ensure that these weapons are only used under conditions conforming to the exact letter and spirit of the law.

4. Because uniforms and equipment of private security operations may resemble those used in public law enforcement, controls are needed to protect the public from situations in which private security personnel may inappropriately adopt the posture or appearance of public law enforcement personnel.

Over the many years that private security companies and units have been operating in this country, it has become painfully apparent that although many companies and operations in this field adopt standards that engender respect for the law and for the public, other companies and operations do not. Traditional civil remedies are neither adequate nor responsive to resolving the abuses that can occur as a result of improper actions by private security personnel. A judgment against a company incapable of paying the amount awarded is meaningless. Also, the time, effort, and dollars involved in pursuing civil remedies are often not available to low-income individuals, who are frequently the victims of improper actions by security personnel.
The standards recommended in these chapters were developed with those considerations in mind. This guide recognizes the dangers of overregulation and does not advocate regulation merely for the sake of regulation. Nor does it promote the special interests of any or all segments of the private security industry. Rather, the standards in the following chapters were developed in response to the many problems the industry, as a whole, needs to overcome if it is to ensure the delivery of ethical, competent, and responsible services. These standards not only can protect the public and consumers of security services, but also can have a significant impact on the industry's attaining the professional stature necessary for success, growth, and improved crime reduction efforts.

The lack of standardized regulation and accountability in the private security industry has led to serious indictments against it. Charged of incompetence, unethical conduct, and poor-quality services are common throughout the news media. Public concern has been aroused by recent exposés that have focused on the large numbers of poorly trained, incompetent, and unregulated personnel. News accounts, such as the following, have further contributed to growing public alarm:

A tragic example of lax supervision of private police occurred here in July. Sidney Bennett Jr. was hired as a private security guard and given a gun. His employer, the National Industrial Security Corp., did not know Bennett or his mentally unstable past. Bennett was found mentally incompetent. Three days after he was hired, Bennett was accused of murder. Two Chicago police officers shot a man who had confessed to the 1970 sniper killing of two Chicago police officers but was freed when he was found mentally incompetent. That same month, a private police captain was shot and was fired when he was found mentally incompetent.

In October, it [California Bureau of Collection and Investigation] revoked the licenses of 41 persons engaged in collecting debts. Bennett was one such person. Bennett was appointed to the task force but was fired when he was found mentally incompetent.

The regulatory process proposed in these chapters may provide solutions to many of the serious problems of the private security industry. However, as licensing and registration progress, it is hoped that regulatory agencies would evaluate the results in terms of benefits and costs. If legislation and regulation increase costs to the point of discouraging the use of private security resources or to the point of eliminating small but reputable businesses, regulators should consider the added benefits. If the costs outweigh the benefits, other more creative and intelligent means of regulating the industry should be sought.

This report does not state that government regulation is the ultimate answer to the varied problems of the private security industry. However, the need for improvement is commonly acknowledged and government regulation affords a realistic hope for realizing that improvement. If legislation fails to produce the desired results, other methods should be tried. If the public is to be truly protected both by and from the private security industry, the nature of regulating the industry should be sought.

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INTRODUCTION

The standards in this chapter are designed to assist in the establishment of a regulatory body to oversee the necessary regulation of various security services and functions. This body would be responsible for enforcing specific laws, would promulgate necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of the laws, and would make recommendations for necessary legislative changes. It should be the goal of the regulatory body to engage in conduct that would protect the consumers of security services, protect the public from possible abuse by security employees, and ultimately assist in the overall crime prevention effort.

A common complaint directed against government regulatory bodies is that they are often corrupted by regulated interests. To guard against this possibility, as well as to encourage cooperative efforts, the regulatory board should be made up not only of representatives from private security but also of others not directly involved with the private security industry. It is recommended that public law enforcement representatives also be appointed to the regulatory board, because interactions between the police and private security sectors are often affected by board decisions.

Current concern over invasion of privacy, emphasized by the Watergate scandal, has prompted a deluge of pending legislation restricting the release of confidential information. In some States, legislation is already in effect, denying access to criminal history information. However, State regulatory boards should be allowed to examine past arrest and conviction records to assist in background investigations, and, therefore, granted statutory authority for access to the information it regards necessary for licensing and registration.

Often, the consumer and/or public are unaware of the existence and purpose of private security regulatory boards, so valid complaints are never heard and abuses may continue, without penalty. To ensure that acts of misconduct, incompetence, and impropriety are properly adjudicated, the regulatory board should establish a hearing and appeals procedure and publicize its existence and purpose.

The regulatory board should also establish licensing and registration fees. This report recommends that these fees be based on the number of licensees and registrants to be processed and cover operating costs only. It has been suggested in the research that registration fees for operational-level personnel earning minimum wages should be less than those for higher-level personnel with higher salaries. However, the method of establishing licensing and registration fees should be determined by each State according to specific circumstances.

Every effort has been made to propose standards that would not become an economic or operational hardship on small businesses in the private security industry. The standards are considered those necessary for the protection of the public.
Standard 9.1
State Regulation.

Regulatory of the private security industry should be performed at the State level with consideration for uniformity and reciprocity among all the States.

Commentary

Over a period of years, numerous local jurisdictions have passed varied private security regulatory ordinances and rules. In California, 63 cities and 8 counties have separate and diverse ordinances. In Virginia, four counties and six major cities are known to have separate ordinances regulating some aspect of the private security industry. Similar examples can be found in many States. A study of these ordinances shows a lack of uniformity and comprehensiveness.

Because many security service businesses operate locally, logic suggests that local government units would play a crucial role in successful regulation. However, local regulation proliferation and diversity creates many problems for security service employers and businesses. For example, a security officer working in an urban area might have to register with many jurisdictions before commencing work. Diverse requirements also make security service businesses where it is important for security employees to be readily transferred, sometimes on an emergency basis, to different assignments through-out a State. Similarly, a merchant with several branch stores in a city and surrounding jurisdictions, who maintains a proprietary security unit at each location, would face similar problems, because meeting more than one set of requirements can easily restrict the movement of his security employees between stores. Finally, diverse regulation poses constant problems for an armored car or armed courier business transporting valuables throughout a State. Although there is a definite need for statewide uniform regulation replacing varied local regulatory schemes, certain regulatory functions may be performed best at the local level. The quality of alarm installation, alarm user activity, and false alarm responses are a particularly local concern (Chapter 4), and regulation of such performance standards may require local assistance, e.g., passage of user permit ordinances. In setting performance standards on a local basis, however, statewide uniformity should be the ultimate goal. Additional assistance also may be provided on the local level by fingerprint and preliminary background checks. A State regulatory board should be able to delegate certain functions to the local level when they can be more efficiently performed there, but overall, licensing, registration, and rulemaking should be conducted on a uniform, statewide basis.

As statutes, rules, and regulations are established for private security services in the State level, every consideration should be given not only to uniformity within the State but also to uniformity with other States. As licensing and registration requirements become more uniform, efforts also can be made to add reciprocity actions. With more uniformity, the licensing of a security service business or registration of security personnel in one State could be accepted in another State as prima facie evidence of competence.

The benefits that accrue to States that create uniform regulation and reciprocity are great. The necessity of a complete background check is eliminated when a previously registered individual moves into a new State, or a business previously licensed, seeks to do business within a new State. The burdens and the costs of administering private security regulation are greatly reduced where reciprocity exists.

Regulatory agencies are not the only beneficiaries of reciprocity and uniformity among the States. Licenses, registrants, and consumers also benefit. Companies operating in numerous States may incur vast expenses, ultimately passed on to consumers, when attempting to comply with the diverse statutes and ordinances across the country. With uniform regulation, these costs would be reduced for both the company and the consumer. Similar problems exist for businesses operating in several contiguous States, causing difficulty in the deployment of employees to contract jobs in adjoining States. Here again, reciprocity and uniformity would benefit the licensee and the consumer. Finally, with increased family mobility, uniformity and reciprocity significantly benefit the individual registrant seeking to move to a new job in another State.

Reciprocity is of particular concern to armored car and armed courier services. They have a recurring need to assign crews to transport valuables throughout one State or in a number of States. So as not to impair interstate commerce, businesses licensed in one State, and their registered personnel, should be granted reciprocity by other States while in transit, making pickups, or completing deliveries of interstate shipments.

This report stresses that private security regulation should be performed at the State level; the need for uniformity and reciprocity is secondary to the need for each State to determine its own needs. Each State should analyze the private security services offered within its boundaries, consider the problems and abuses, balance various factors, and shape regulation accordingly. Uniformity among the States is important, but, again, such nationwide uniformity is secondary to individual State needs.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 9.1:
2.10 State Boards to Coordinate Training Efforts
4.10 Alarm User Permit Systems and the False Alarm Problem
6.6 State Regulation of Private Security Uniforms, Equipment, Job Titles
10.1 Licensing of Security Businesses
11.1 Registration of Private Security Personnel
Standard 9.2

Regulatory Board for Private Security

State level regulation should be through a regulatory board and staff responsible for the regulation of private security activities within that State. This board should have sufficient personnel to perform adequately and promptly their tasks of licensing and investigating.

Commentary

Regulation of the private security industry is presently conducted by a variety of State agencies. Of the 34 States that licensed some aspect of the industry in 1975, only 11 had specific private security regulatory boards. The remaining States conducted their regulation through such diverse agencies as the State police department, the secretary of state's office, the attorney general's office, the department of licensing, the Governor's office, the department of consumer affairs, or the department of commerce. Two States had established special boards to act strictly in an advisory capacity on security matters for their regulatory agency.

It is recognized that a few States have established excellent private security regulatory sections within larger administrative agencies. Where that is true, there is no need to set up a separate regulatory board. However, if a separate board is not established, it is recommended that a private security advisory board be created to assist the regulatory agency in establishing its private security procedures and policies.

There is a trend in some States to consolidate administrative agencies under one unit. However, a separate regulatory board and staff, with expertise in the regulated area, can best serve the public interest. It is felt that proper and meaningful private security regulation can be performed best by an agency whose sole responsibility is that regulation.

It is recognized that many factors need to be weighed by legislators prior to establishing a regulatory board and staff. In some States, laws may require that all licensing be administered within a particular agency, or State constitutions may set forth other restrictions. In some sparsely populated States, the number of private security personnel may not warrant funding a separate board and staff. In other States, an adequate job may be done by existing agencies. Where possible, however, a regulatory board and staff whose sole responsibility is the regulation of private security activities should be set up to best perform this necessary function.

Selected References

2. Private Security Task Force. "Regulatory Agency Survey." (See Appendix 7 to this report.)

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 9.2.

9.3 State Regulatory Board Membership
9.5 Regulatory Board Funding
10.1 Licensing of Security Businesses
10.2 License Applications
10.3 Qualifying Agents
10.5 License Renewal
10.8 License Denial, Revocation, or Suspension
11.2 Registration Qualifications
11.3 Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel
11.6 Registration Renewal
11.7 Suspension and Revocation
11.8 Sanctions
Standard 9.3

State Regulatory Board Membership

The State regulatory board should include, as a minimum, representatives of licensed security service businesses, local police departments, and consumers of security services; members of the general public; and individuals who are registered with the board and presently employed in the private security field.

Commentary

The proper composition of the State private security regulatory board is important for successful regulation. The board should not only act in an advisory capacity but also its responsibilities should encompass many other important aspects—enforcing minimum qualifications established by law; promulgating administrative rules and regulations; considering special situations where rules might be modified in the interests of fairness and efficiency; voting to suspend, revoke, or deny licenses and registration cards; making recommendations for statutory changes; establishing standards; certifying training programs; and supervising the administrative operation of its staff.

Because of the diversity and complexity of the field being regulated, individuals with differing backgrounds need to be included on the board.

A 1975 survey of private security regulatory legislation showed that nine States had separate regulatory boards with powers beyond that of advisors. Board memberships ranged from three to eight persons, averaging five per board. Eight of the boards were required to include certain experienced private security licensees; six were required to have a police or law enforcement representative; six required that a public representative be included; four States required that the attorney general or designate be on the board; and one required that a proprietary security representative be appointed.

No recommendation is made as to the specific number of individuals who should be appointed to the regulatory board. It is strongly suggested, however, that certain areas of competency of representation should be present on each board. Because the private security industry is composed of diverse segments and many different services are to be regulated, it is suggested that a representative from each security segment should be appointed to the board.

The list includes guards, watchmen, patrolmen, canine handlers, polygraph operators, investigators, electronic surveillance personnel, alarm personnel, armored car personnel, and armored couriers. Also, small local security companies have interests different from those of large national companies; contract security companies differ from companies that use proprietary security systems. Including representatives from each segment of this diverse and complex industry, however, would result in an extremely unwieldy and perhaps inoperable board.

To narrow the cumbersome list of representatives, it is suggested that the six general areas that are affected by the actions of the regulatory board should be represented on the board:

1. Contract security companies.
2. Proprietary security organizations.
3. Police.
4. Consumers of security services.
5. Members of the general public.
6. Registered security employees.

Representatives from these areas each have a different perspective of the industry and its regulation. Additionally, the suggested board composition prevents domination by private security industry interests. Domination of regulatory boards by the industry being regulated is a growing concern of the Federal Trade Commission and the public. Thus, to assure compliance with applicable laws and reasonable concerns, care should be taken not to allow the board to be dominated by security industry representatives or any other group.

Private security is often divided into two broad categories—contract and proprietary. Although both categories are concerned with loss prevention contract security companies provide their services to others for a fee, while proprietary security services are provided by employees for their employer. Many distinctions have been made in regulatory statutes based on this division, and many arguments over the validity of these legislative distinctions have been presented. Nonetheless, contract security companies and proprietary security organizations do have different problems and are affected in different ways by legislative provisions. Each should have a representative on the board.

Of major importance in crime prevention is the relationship between law enforcement and private security agencies. At present, this relationship ranges from close cooperation in some jurisdictions to strong animosity in others. This standard, as written, uses the term police representative rather than law enforcement. Although the term law enforcement is generally considered to be limited to local police, sheriffs, and deputies, it also includes prosecutors who are considered the chief law enforcement officials of their respective jurisdictions. However, it is the interaction between private security personnel and the police that would be most affected by the board decisions and policy; therefore, a representative of the police should be appointed to the private security regulatory board.

The interests of consumers and the public are often diffused and forgotten when issues are considered by regulatory boards. Representatives of these two segments have different perspectives on private security regulation that can be valuable in the board's decision-making process. The needs and concerns of these two important segments should not be ignored in the administrative process of regulating private security.

A security employee also should be included on the board. It is assumed that management- and executive-level persons would be appointed as representatives for licensed security service businesses and those using proprietary security. However, the individual who works at a guard post, responds to an alarm, confronts shoplifters, or investigates employer theft often has a different perspective on regulation than the security executive or manager; the views of the registered employee should be represented on the board.

No recommendation is made for a specific method for appointment of the regulatory board. Selection of this procedure is best left to the individual State. In the nine States that have separate regulatory boards, membership appointment is generally made by the Governor, with one State requiring that two appointments be made by the speaker of the house and president pro-tempore of the Senate. With this arrangement for appointing the regulatory board may vary according to State procedures; however, whoever makes these appointments should be apprised of the importance of the selection. With appropriate representatives of the six major areas, the regulatory board should be able to function efficiently, effectively, and without undue influence from the area being regulated.

Selected References

Legal requirements for the retention of a license. The power to use a subpoena as an investigative tool can be misused. Accordingly, its use should be carefully limited to proper legal purposes.

Once the private security regulatory board has made its decision following the hearing, the individual who has had a license or registration denied, suspended, or revoked should be allowed to appeal the decision. The regulatory board's decision should not be final. This method for appeal varies from State to State. Many States have adopted the Uniform Administrative Review Act that sets up an independent review for all administrative decisions; other States allow appeal to local courts for parties aggrieved by administrative decisions. Whatever method is chosen for appeal, an independent body should be established to review the actions of the regulatory board.

The hearing procedures previously discussed were concerned with licenses, registrants, or applicants aggrieved by board decisions. However, it is just as important that specific procedures be established by the board for processing and maintaining records of complaints made by consumers and the public. Many complaints can be handled by an initial consultation. Others, however, may require a thorough investigation that may ultimately result in a revocation or suspension hearing. Processing of complaints are best handled by the investigative section of the board.

Establishment of a procedure for hearing complaints is a private security and the public are unaware of the board's existence or proper steps to take in the event of a complaint. The hearing procedure has little value. Therefore, the private security regulatory board should maintain a high level of visibility. Every effort should be made to publicize the purpose of the board and the procedure for filing complaints against businesses or registrants.  

Selected References

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 9.4:

- Adjudicatory hearings must have a legislative character.
- Administrative hearing procedures are described in the Uniform Administrative Law Act of 1960.
- The regulatory board should be well informed, obtaining information from sources such as government agencies, private security employers and employees, and private citizens. There may be times, however, when needed information is not given voluntarily, thus requiring some method of compelling disclosure. The private security regulatory board should be granted the means necessary to require the appearance of witnesses and the production of documents.

Three methods often used to obtain factual information by various administrative agencies are listed by Gellhorn and Byse. The methods are: (1) issuing subpoenas, which direct the recipients to testify or to produce documents they possess; (2) inspecting records or premises, either periodically or randomly; and (3) requiring the filing of reports. Care should be taken, however, in granting the regulatory board strong investigative powers, particularly unlimited subpoena power. The power to use a subpoena as an investigative tool can be misused. Accordingly, its use should be carefully limited to proper legal purposes.

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Standard 9.5

Regulatory Board Funding

The State regulatory board should be funded by nonrefundatory license and registration fees and such general revenue funds as may be necessary for the effective operation of the board.

Commentary

The purpose of licensing and registration, as recommended by this report, is to protect consumers of security services and the public. Too often, however, the primary function of the regulatory agency becomes revenue generating rather than regulatory. It is reported in The Other Police that the Ohio division of licensing advertised that it returned money to the State treasury by collecting more on fees than it spent on its own operation. Licensing and registration are not designed to be a means of generating revenue; every effort should be made by the regulatory board to ensure that fees collected are used solely to defray operating costs.

In a field where regulation is needed to protect the public from harm and constant investigation is necessary to ensure compliance, generating revenue should not be a basis for consideration of the amount of fees. In fact, in most States it is unusual to find a surplus in this activity, because it is difficult to set fees that cover all costs and still allow entry into the regulated profession. In States with a small number of potential licensees and registrants, it may be prohibitive to set fees that alone would cover administrative costs. The fees should be moderate enough that all responsible individuals or entities can afford to enter business but substantial enough to cover most of the administrative costs.

Where the cost of effective regulation cannot be covered solely by fees, it is necessary to seek additional funds from State general revenue funds. A 1975 survey of private security regulatory legislation (Appendix 7) indicated that licensing fees ranged from $10 to $500, with a mode of $200. Alaska charged a percentage of gross business receipts. The survey further indicated that the fees charged for registration of individuals ranged from $2 to $300, with a mode of $100.

The RAND Report (Vol. III) survey, conducted in 1971, found that the average license fees were $145 for contract guard agencies and $154 for investigative agencies, with renewal fees generally slightly lower. It is impossible to recommend a specific fee schedule because of the varying factors that need to be weighed by each State before establishing fees. An effort should be made to predict the number of licensees and registrants to be processed and the approximate cost of operating the agency—from processing to investigating. These figures would vary from State to State and result in different fee charges. It must again be emphasized that the primary con-
cerns in setting fees should not be one of generating revenue but one of attempting to cover regulatory costs.

Selected References
1. Brennan, Dennis T. The Other Police. Cleveland, Ohio: Governmental Research Institute, 1975.

Related Standards
The following standard may be applicable in implementing Standard 9.5:
9.2 Regulatory Board for Private Security

Standard 9.6
Regulatory Board Access to Criminal Record Information

The State regulatory board should be granted statutory authority for access to all criminal history record information so that it can conduct the necessary criminal history record check of all applicants for licenses and registration.

Commentary
In recent years the American public has become concerned about the power that may be improperly wielded by governmental agencies straying beyond the bounds of their proper missions. Stories of invasions of privacy, attempted use of investigative agencies for political purposes, misuse of criminal history data, and dissemination of erroneous and incomplete personal and financial information have created a general sense of urgency and concern, resulting in the introduction of a number of recommended privacy laws, regulations, and administrative rules.

As of June 1975, there were 80 pieces of legislation pending in the U.S. House of Representatives relating to various aspects of privacy and 9 pending in the U.S. Senate. One of these bills, introduced by Senator John V. Tunney (D., Calif.) and Representative Don Edwards (D., Calif.) and known as the "Criminal Justice Information Control and Protection of Privacy Act," would severely restrict access by law enforcement agencies to arrest record information, by allowing dissemination of such information for investigative purposes only after a reasonable suspicion test has been met. This bill further provides for: (1) Sealing and purging of police investigative information after expiration of the statute of limitations, (2) placing restrictions on the exchange of intelligence data, and (3) allowing an aggrieved person to bring a civil action for violations. Many other bills are under consideration to further restrict the dissemination of criminal record information.

One of the first laws to be enacted in this area was the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), which became effective on Sept. 27, 1975. The act protects individuals from the misuse of Federal records by providing for access, challenge, and correction of those records affected. The new statute also established a 2-year Privacy Protection Study Commission to consider extending these new Federal principles.

U.S. Department of Justice regulations, issued pursuant to sections 501 and 524 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (42 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.), provide that conviction data and criminal history record information, relating to the offense for which an individual is currently within the criminal justice system, may be disseminated without limitations. The regulations...
require that after Dec. 31, 1977, most access to non-
conviction record information would require autho-
ration pursuant to a statute; ordinance; executive order; or court rule, decision, or order.
In enacting legislation, rules, and regulations pet-
aining to matters of privacy, three often-cited in-
terests must be balanced: (1) The right of individ-
ual citizens not to have reputations damaged by im-
proper dissemination of inaccurate or incomplete
security personnel are hired to prevent crime
and control loss, hold positions of trust, and often are
assigned sensitive duties protecting valuable assets.
Because of the importance of these protective
positions, the State regulatory board should be given
statutory authority to evaluate the criminal arrest
and conviction records of security personnel to
determine if these records would adversely affect
the performance of security services and to deter-
mine the trustworthiness of applicants for licensing
and registration. For proper evaluation, the records
should show arrests as well as convictions. The issu-
ance of certificates of license or registration cards is,
in effect, a seal of approval. Granting permission for
persons to perform protective services without fully
and carefully evaluating their criminal records would
be a disservice to employers of security personnel,
consumers of security services, and the public, who
are so often affected by the actions of security per-
sonnel. Access to and subsequent evaluation of
criminal arrest and conviction records may help
determine essential information regarding an in-
dividual's criminal propensities. The optimum way
to protect both the individual involved and the
public from improper police arrest charges is not to
bury the arrest record but to initiate meaningful
reforms against those police officers who engage
in improper arrest and initial booking charges. It
would be folly for a regulatory board to make a
decision for certification based upon a criminal rec-
ord that showed only two misdemeanor convictions
for theft, when, in fact, the individual was arrested
five times for burglary, with three charges dropped
prior to conviction and two charges reduced (through
pleas bargaining) to larceny misdemeanors. The same
would hold true of a conviction record for damage
to property that was plea bargain ed down from arson
or, of two misdemeanor assault convictions that were the only conviction record for an individ-
ual arrested five times for rape and attempted rape.
It is also unfair to the individual under review to
exempt him from all security services if he has any
conviction record. It may be that an individual,
who has several minor arrests and convictions, can
perform honorably and successfully in a specific
security assignment. But unless the regulatory board
has full access to an individual's complete arrest and
crime record, the board may, out of a need to
protect the public, adopt unnecessarily rigid rules,
prohibiting approval of any individual with a mis-
demeanor conviction.
Two possible safeguards should be included in
legislation permitting access to criminal records by
the regulatory board. One would be to properly in-
form the applicant for a license or registration that
it will be necessary to obtain a criminal record check,
including arrests and convictions. The applicant
should then complete a written authorization for
release of the information to the regulatory board.
Second, a penalty should be imposed upon any
regulatory board employee who releases criminal
record information to unauthorized persons. With
these safeguards, certain privacy concerns can be
eliminated and the regulatory board can have access
to the much-needed criminal history record in-
formation.

Selected References

Greater Atlanta Chapter, American Society for Indus-
trial Security

5. Prepared Statement for the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate Concerning the Criminal Justice Infor-
mation Control and Protection of Privacy Act,
Guilderland, Md.: Research Division, Interna-
Keep on You. Briarcliff Manor, N.Y.: Stein and

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applica-
bale in implementing Standard 9.6:
1. Selection of Qualified Personnel
2. Preemployment Screening
3. Availability of Criminal History Records

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Greater Atlanta Chapter, American Society for Indus-
trial Security

5. Prepared Statement for the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate Concerning the Criminal Justice Infor-
mation Control and Protection of Privacy Act,
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Chapter 10
Licensing

INTRODUCTION

As defined for legal purposes, Corpus Juris Secundum says that a license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to perform a particular action, to exercise a certain privilege, to carry on a particular business, or to pursue a certain occupation that, without such license, would be illegal. In common usage, the term "license" often indicates the written document by which the right or permission is conferred, but strictly speaking "license" refers only to the right or privilege conferred and "certificate of license" refers to the written document that evidences such right.

Licensing is therefore an arrangement under which permission must be obtained from a recognized authority in order to engage in a particular occupation or activity. Usually, the issuance of the license is more than a formality and noncompliance with licensing requirements may result in a fine or jail sentence.

The courts, in cases such as Northern States Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission (7th Cir.), have held that license grants can be justified only on the theory of a resulting benefit to the public. An additional restriction imposed by the courts, and stated in Allen v. Kilforan, is that license requirements may be imposed on occupations or privileges that may affect the public health, morals, or welfare. In spite of these apparent restrictions, the courts have upheld statutes licensing a variety of occupations. As of 1968, the Council of State Governments estimated that there were approximately 1,912 State licensing statutes. Among the 70 or more licensed professions listed in Corpus Juris Secundum are abstractors of titles, architects, attorneys, automobile dealers, barbers, cigar dealers, goal dealers, contractors, doctors, electricians, insurance agents, junk dealers, masseurs, miners, pilots, plumbers, real estate brokers, retail stores, travel agents, and undertakers.

A 1975 survey of State legislation (Appendix 6) indicated that many States have also chosen to license certain private security services. Investigative agencies and guard companies, in particular, are subject to State license requirements, with 34 States licensing investigative agencies and 32 requiring a license for guard companies. Additionally, five States license armored car companies, eight license detection-of-deception examiners, three license central station alarm companies, five license guard-dog services, three license couriers, and one licenses counter-intelligence services.

Licensing is established to protect the consumer of security services. Therefore, any person or legal entity engaged in the business of providing security services for a fee should be required to be licensed. The standards in this chapter are designed to ensure that consumers receive the services they pay for and that they are delivered in a professional manner. Guidelines are established for license applications, qualifying agencies, notification of change in the licensee's status, license renewal, and display of the license certificate. In addition, it is recommended that a license be denied, revoked, or suspended in the event of violation of any of the licensing requirements or for other serious abuses, such as fraud or misrepresentation.

References
5. Private Security Task Force, "Summary of Private Security Legislation." (See Appendix 6 to this report.)
Standard 10.1

Licensing of Security Businesses

Appropriate licensing should be required for any person or legal entity engaged in the business of:

1. Selling, installing, or servicing alarm systems;
2. Providing respondents to alarm signal devices;
3. Providing secured transportation and protection of valuables from one place to another under armed guard;
4. Providing guard or patrol services;
5. Providing investigative services; and/or
6. Providing detection-of-deception services, for the benefit of others.

Commentary

A primary objective of requiring a license is the protection of the consuming public. It has been stated that consumers need to be protected from their own ignorance. This axiom is especially applicable in the private security field. Its diversity and complexity make it difficult for consumers to be knowledgeable in choosing competent, reliable businesses that provide security services. When dealing with a licensed security entity, consumers are at least assured that the business or individual has met minimum standards and is qualified to provide the security services being purchased.

This standard is specifically designed to cover a wide range of businesses, including single individuals, acting as one-man operations, as well as corporations, partnerships, and associations. Any person or legal entity engaged in the business of providing a security service should be licensed. The standard is not designed, however, to include the licensing of security departments of private businesses whose general purpose is the protection and security of their own property, employees, and grounds. Private corporate entities should not have to obtain a license to protect their own assets. Licensing should be designed to protect consumers of security services. Therefore, if a business is not offering or providing a security service for the benefit of others, it need not be licensed. Employees of security departments of private businesses, however, are covered in the registration standards.

Licensing appears to be a remedy for many problems encountered by consumers of security services. Failure of security businesses to perform contracted services is one such problem according to the RAND Report (Vol. 1) and other private security studies. For example, a study conducted by the Florida Senate Judiciary Committee included the mailing of questionnaires to 310 security agencies in that State. The respondents listed one of the major problems in the security industry to be the failure of security companies to provide the services contracted for, and their most common suggestion for remediating this problem was to require licensing.

A 1972 study conducted in Virginia by the Division of Justice and Crime Prevention pointed out:

... there are a large number of personnel of the security industry lacking skill, training, and motivation. In total they are poorly equipped to render safe or professional protective services. The victim of poorly prepared, inadequate security personnel is most often the one who has contracted the security services. Contractual complaints appear frequently.

During the past several years, there has been an increasing emphasis upon community crime prevention and self-help methods of crime prevention. As the emphasis on an increasing crime rate, consumers will also be an increase in the number of individuals and businesses turning to private security for protection—consumers who may be frightened, concerned, and ignorant about security matters. These circumstances have created an area for unprecedented opportunity in consumer abuses, fraud, and misrepresentation. As has been noted, licensing is one method for preventing such consumer abuses. Security businesses have a direct effect upon the safety of the public. The licensing of those businesses appears to result in a benefit to the public, particularly the consuming public. Licensing ensures the delivery of ethical, competent, and responsible services.

This standard covers six types of security services that involve some aspect of crime prevention and control and that should be licensed for the protection of consumers:

1. Sell, install, or service alarm systems;
2. Provide alarm respondents;
3. Provide secured transportation of valuables from one place to another;
4. Provide guard services;
5. Provide investigative services;
6. Provide detection-deception services.

Because of the diversity of these services, a general license that allows a person or legal entity to engage in providing all of these security services should not be issued. The regulatory board issuing a license should specifically determine those security services the licensee is qualified to provide. The certificate of license should specifically state which of the listed activities the license is qualified to perform. Under this provision, consumers can have reasonable assurance that the business is capable of performing the security services enumerated on the license.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards may be applicable in implementing Standard 10.1:

6.7 Law Enforcement Personnel Secondary Employment
6.8 Law Enforcement Officer Employment as a Private Security Principal or Manager
9.1 State Regulation
9.2 Regulatory Board for Private Security
Standard 10.2
License Applications

License applications should include sufficient information about the applicant to enable the regulatory agency to determine if ethical, competent, and responsible services can be provided. Such required information should include:

1. The full name and business address of the person or legal entity applying;
2. The name under which the applicant intends to do business;
3. A statement as to the general nature of the business in which the applicant intends to engage;
4. A statement of the specific security services to be provided by the applicant;
5. The full name, residence address, and two classifiable sets of fingerprints of the following:
   a. The applicant applying as an individual
   b. The qualifying agent and resident managers of each office within the State if the applicant is a corporation or partnership
   c. Each director when the corporation is not listed on a national securities exchange or registered under section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
6. A verified statement of the qualifying agent's experience qualifications.

Commentary

To ensure that licensing achieves its principal purpose of protecting consumers of security services, certain information needs to be available to the regulatory agency. The information should be sufficient to enable the regulatory board to perform efficient background checks and make other actions and decisions to determine if an applicant is able to deliver ethical, competent, and responsible services.

The first two requirements—full name and address of the person or legal entity applying and the name under which the applicant intends to do business—are general administrative questions that should be asked of applicants for any type of license, in order to determine with whom the regulatory agency is dealing. Security service businesses often operate under a trade name different from that of the actual owner, so it is important to have both the name of the applicant and the name under which the applicant intends to do business. The name and address also are needed so that initial processing can be started, and, once the license is granted, an address must be on file so that complaints can be easily investigated.

Throughout the licensing and registration standards, requirements differ depending on the security service offered for sale. For this reason, the regulatory board needs to have a record of the general nature of the business being performed by the applicant. The statement as to the services to be provided should be functionally specific so that the regulatory board can determine that the qualifications and requirements for each service being offered are met.

Requiring the name, address, and fingerprints, of the officers, directors, partners, 10-percent shareholders, resident managers, and qualifying agent may at first seem excessive. Yet, because each person listed has a critical role in the conduct of the security service business, the regulatory board needs to educate itself on the individuals background through investigations. The information obtained from these investigations may help the board determine if organized crime has any interests in the business, or if threatening conflicts of interest or other improprieties exist. The individuals involved only need to supply fingerprints once, because they could be maintained on file at the regulatory board for updating at renewal time.

It is not intended, however, that officers, directors, partners, and 10-percent shareholders of publicly held corporations, listed on a national securities exchange or registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, be listed for scrutiny or investigation by other agencies. It is the officers, directors, and partners of the small privately held companies who should be checked by the private security regulatory board.

Because no residency requirement has been placed upon the qualifying agent, large national companies may have one person acting as their qualifying agent in several States. Although this individual may supervise the branches within the licensing State, some additional clearances within each State are needed. To assure closer scrutiny of the local branch officers, the name, address, and fingerprints of the resident manager of each office within the State should be required.

To effect and attest the qualifying agent's security-related experience, the regulatory board should require that a statement concerning qualifications be verified by the agent and accompany the license application. The statement should include the names and addresses of each person who employed the qualifying agent in a security-related job, a brief functional description of each security-related job corresponding with each employer previously listed, and the period of time each job was held. Because some educational training may be substituted for experience, this statement should also list any security-related education received, the school where such education was received, and the dates of attendance. This statement should be in a form that would impart the legality of an oath.

The information needed in connection with the license application is both necessary and reasonable. This information would allow the regulatory board to conduct a proper and sufficient investigation to determine if the applicant can provide ethical, competent, and responsible security services to consumers.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards may be applicable in implementing Standard 10.2:
9.2 Regulatory Board for Private Security
9.4 Regulatory Board Hearing Procedure
Standard 10.3
Qualifying Agents

License applicants should be required to name one individual who will act as the licensee's qualifying agent. The qualifying agent should meet the following qualifications:
1. Be at least 18 years of age;
2. Be an active participant in the business of the licensee;
3. Not have been convicted of any felony or crime involving moral turpitude or have any criminal charges and/or indictments pending, unless pardoned or granted a special exemption by the regulatory agency;
4. Not be under any present adjudication of incapacity to act or granted a license;
5. Be experienced in some area of security relevant to the license being sought.

Commentary

In order to protect consumers of private security services, certain minimum standards should be established. Establishing these minimum standards, however, the impact upon the licensed business should be considered. Any licensing process should be neither disruptive nor unnecessarily inconvenient to the business being licensed.

To require every partner, officer, stockholder, and manager to meet a list of qualifications would be impractical. One practical method for ensuring that certain minimum standards are met is to require that at least one participant in the business meet the necessary qualifications. The designated individual, acting as the applicant's qualifying agent, should be an active participant in the business.

The qualifying agent should be of legal age to ensure legal competence to contract and act for the business. As 18 is now the generally accepted age of responsibility, an 18-year-old could reasonably be named as a qualifying agent. It is recognized that, because few individuals of that age can meet the experience requirements, few qualifying agents would be that young.

Second, the individual representative of the business for licensing purposes should not be a nominal figure or a front-man with no actual control. The purpose of establishing minimum qualifications is to assure consumers that there is a qualified, knowledgeable, and competent individual actively participating in the affairs of the security service's business. Therefore, the business should certify that the qualifying agent is one who engages in the everyday affairs of the business, as in some supervisory capacity, and participates in the managerial decisionmaking process of the applicant. Because of varying business practices, this person need not be the officially designated manager.

The third qualification deals with any criminal incidents in the agent's background. It is recognized that assisting the rehabilitation of convicted offenders by removing restrictions upon their ability to obtain employment is in the public interest. Gainful employment is vital to any exoffender's chance for returning freely to society. But, it also should be recognized that the business being licensed is one that provides security services. An article in the August 1975 issue of Top Security Magazine sums up the beliefs of many: "Whilst it is one thing to give a man a second chance it is another thing to put him in a position where he can fail to temperature and success again."

The best method for aiding exoffenders, yet safe-guarding consumers, is to give the regulatory agency the power to grant special exemptions based upon the careful consideration of criminal convictions and the adverse effect they might have upon the business of providing security services. In making this determination, the regulatory agency should consider the following factors outlined in the New Jersey Statute, P.S. 1968, c. 282 (C.2A:168A):
1. The nature and duration of the exception, trade, vocation, profession or business, a license for which the person is applying;
2. Nature and seriousness of the crime;
3. Date of the crime;
4. Age of the person when the crime was committed;
5. Whether the crime was an isolated or repeated incident;
6. Social conditions which may have contributed to the crime; and
7. Any evidence of rehabilitation, including good conduct in prison or in the community, counseling or psychiatric treatment received, acquisition of additional academic or vocational skills, successful participation in correctional work-release programs, or the recommendation of persons who have had the applicant under their supervision.

The fourth qualification—not to be under any present adjudication of incompetency—is intended to preclude persons from acting as a qualifying agent if they are awaiting adjudication for previous acts that, in the opinion of the regulatory board, would render these persons incompetent to perform the duties, and/or meet the qualifications, of a qualifying agent. Each regulatory board should determine the specific actions that would be considered appropriate to rendering persons incompetent.

The final requirement that the qualifying agent meet relates to prior experience and education in an area of security relevant to the license being sought. The type and amount of experience and education required should be determined by the regulatory board and based upon the specific security services being offered. In a field as important and sensitive as security, at least one person within the business organization should be adequately qualified to advise on pertinent security procedures. Adequate experience should include work as an employee with any type of business or governmental unit providing security services. Governmental units would include work with various Federal law enforcement agencies or military security units. Adequate education might include as a minimum a security or law enforcement associate degree from a 2-year college or a bachelor's degree with a security or law enforcement major or minor. A combination of experience and education might be most effective and should be accepted as meeting the experience requirement.

Many States require additional qualifications for licensees, often including U.S. citizenship, State residency, good moral character, no dishonorable discharge from the military service, minimum education, and written examinations. These additional qualifications do not serve the purpose of protecting consumers or are too difficult to administer for the resulting benefit.

Selected References

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 10.3:
9.2 Regulatory Board for Private Security
9.4 Regulatory Board Hearing Procedure
Standard 10.4

Notification of Changes in Status of Licensee

The licensee should be required to notify the regulatory board within 14 days of any change in the status of the licensee previously reported in the license application.

Commentary

Licensing cannot maintain its viability if the regulatory board is not aware of changes occurring within the licensed entity. Therefore, some provision should be made to notify the licensing authority of changes as they occur. These changes would include: a change of address of the principal place of business or a branch office; a change of the name under which the licensee does business; if the qualifying agent ceases to act for the licensee; any addition or deletion of officers, directors, partners, resident managers of offices in the State, or shareholders who own a 10 percent or greater share in the licensee. Because a license is granted to the security business based upon the qualifications and background investigations of these individuals, when there is a change in the status of any of them, the original basis for granting the license is altered.

The regulatory board should be notified whenever one of the above listed officials ceases to serve in the official capacity, for whatever reason—death, resignation, or removal from office. The regulatory board also should be notified of the name and address of the individual designated to replace a former official or added to one of the official positions. Such persons should file fingerprints with the agency so that a background investigation can be conducted. Failure to notify the regulatory agency of these changes should result in the suspension or revocation of the license.

One reason for the license applicant to appoint a qualifying agent is to ensure the regulatory agency that at least one individual within the organization meets the necessary minimum qualifications. If this qualifying agent later ceases to act for the licensee, there is no longer any guarantee of a qualified individual assisting in the operation of the security service business. Therefore, it is necessary to promptly obtain a substitute who meets the qualifications outlined in Standard 10.3.

No time limit is specified for obtaining a new qualifying agent, and it is not intended that the licensee be forced to replace an individual within the 14-day notification period. However, a replacement for the qualifying agent should be found within a reasonable period, consistent with good business practice for personnel replacement. The Model Private Security Licensing and Regulatory Statute of the Private Security Advisory Council suggests a maximum time period of 6 months for the replacement of the qualifying agent; this timeframe appears reasonable.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards may be applicable in implementing Standard 10.4:

10.2 License Applications
10.3 Qualifying Agents
10.5 License Renewal
Standard 10.5
License Renewal

The license to engage in a security service business should be renewed every year.

Commentary

Once a license has been issued, the level of contact between the regulatory board and the licensee drops dramatically. Only if some change requiring notification occurs within the licensee or a complaint is made during the currency of the license is a licensee likely to come into contact with the regulatory board.

In order for licensing to be effective, a license cannot be a perpetual grant. The security service business should seek periodic renewal of its grant to do business, giving the regulatory board an opportunity to learn of any unreported changes in the business, to update the board's records, and to evaluate the licensee's performance with particular emphasis on any complaints, arrests, or convictions.

License renewal forces periodic contact between the licensee and the regulatory board. Of the 34 States licensing some aspect of the private security industry in 1975, 22 required annual renewal and 12 required renewal every 2 years. No State granted a 5-year license. A 1-year license period is recommended as most appropriate. The prime factor for requiring a yearly license renewal is monetary. An annual renewal assures the agency of a continuing flow of funds that should be dedicated to the regulatory board for its continued operation.

Rather than requiring the resubmission of information previously submitted and the fingerprinting of the same individuals, the license renewal process should be automatic, entitling the licensee to a renewal of the privilege to do business unless adverse information has been filed that reflects upon his ability to perform competent and ethical services. This automatic renewal process is possible because of several safeguards.

One safeguard for the continued evaluation of the licensee's competence is through periodic field investigations to verify the accuracy of information on file about the licensee and to check on any changes that should have been reported. Another safeguard is the complaint procedure. When complaints are received from consumers or the public, resulting investigations would involve contact between the regulatory board and the licensee.

A simplified renewal procedure need not preclude an updated background check of the individuals involved with the licensee. Fingerprints of the officers, partners, resident managers, qualifying agent, and 10-percent shareholders on file may be randomly resubmitted for updated criminal record checks during different renewal periods.

Related Standards

The following standards may be applicable in implementing Standard 10.5:
9.2 Regulatory Board for Private Security
10.2 License Applications

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards may be applicable in implementing Standard 10.5:
9.2 Regulatory Board for Private Security
10.2 License Applications
Standard 10.6
Display of License Certificate

The licensee should be required to display the license certificate in public view in the licensee's principal place of business as well as displaying a copy of the certificate in each branch office.

Commentary

Consumers of security services should be able to walk into any security service business and determine immediately if it is licensed. It should not be necessary for consumers to search for evidence of a license, or to ask about the status of the business. Display of the license certificate also is one indication to consumers that the licensee is capable of providing ethical and competent security services. When no certificate of license is on display, consumers should realize they may be dealing with a disreputable business. Thus, the certificate of license, which states the name and number of the licensee, or a facsimile, should be prominently displayed in each branch office. If a facsimile is on display, consumers can tell the regulatory board the official number of the certificate in each branch office.

Selected References


Related Standards

The following standards may be applicable in implementing Standard 10.6.

10.1 Licensing of Security Businesses
10.4 Notification of Changes in Status of Licensee

Standard 10.7
Bonding and Insurance

When appropriate, due to the nature of the work, the applicant should file a surety bond and proof of public liability insurance with the regulatory agency before a license is issued.

Commentary

If an employee of a security services business acts wrongfully or negligently or the business fails to perform a service contracted for, the person injured needs some assurance of obtaining redress for damages suffered. Any business engaged in activities that may inflict injury should be prepared to restore any injury it causes. Adequate bonding and personal-liability and property-damage insurance are common means of compensating persons injured by business-related abuses. Bonding and insurance can create a measure of recourse for an aggrieved third party or consumer and discourage dishonest business practices and abuses of authority. Mandatory bonding and insurance also can have the practical effect of screening out uninsurable applicants. Although it may be argued that bonding and surety requirements add to the operating costs of the small private security business, not requiring these provisions leaves the public at a grave disadvantage. The potential for improper, illegal, or harmful conduct by security operations and security personnel has been discussed at length. A single act of one guard may evoke the same amount of damage, regardless of the size of the security organization. The failure of an alarm or detection device may result in the same loss, whether the company that provided the equipment was a national organization or a small local company. A small, marginally operating company does, indeed, have a legitimate right to conduct its business, but the right of the public to be protected from wrongful torts must prevail when the business involves the protection of life and property and the potential for denial of constitutional guarantees. Although the small businessman may be the most economically impacted by requirements for insurance, surety bond, or similar protection, the public may find it has, in fact, no recourse against such a company if the company's capital worth is less than the amount of awarded damages.

Of the 34 States presently licensing some aspect of the private security industry on a statewide basis, 85 percent require a minimum surety bond conditional so that any person, injured by the willful, malicious, or wrongful act of the security service licensee, agents, servants, officers, or employees can bring a personal action for damage sustained. A few States supplement the bond by requiring personal-liability and property-damage insurance designed to protect the injured party; some States offer the applicant an option of bonding or insurance.
No State licensing statute makes reference to fidelity insurance or prohibit and prove that the cause of loss was specifically covered by the policy, that the loss occurred as a result of the type of transaction that was insured, that the loss was caused by the person or entity who was insured, and that the person caus-
ing the injury or damage was acting in the scope of his employment. In addition, bond premiums are often less expensive than insurance premiums, be-
cause a surety bond, unlike public liability insurance, allows the surety to seek reimbursement of any claims from the bonded security service business. Insurance companies, however, cannot expect the insured to directly repay claims, except through increased premiums.

Surety bonds for large amounts may restrict the entry of smaller, less affluent security businesses into the market. This primary disadvantage arises because the surety company expects to be repaid for any claims, and therefore, carefully considers the financial responsibility of the company seeking to be bonded. This disadvantage should be carefully weighed against the advantage of allowing an injured party to seek recovery of damages as a result of the actions of the security business or its employees.

In addition, to the study of the feasibility of requiring a security bond, serious study also should be made of requiring each license applicant to file proof of public liability insurance. However, many private security companies are finding it difficult to obtain insurance, to be bonded. This disadvantage should be carefully considered. Bruce W. Brownyard, in his article "Surety Bonding," published in 1972, states that surety bonds for large amounts may restrict the entry of smaller, less affluent security businesses into the market. In addition, to the study of the feasibility of requiring a security bond, serious study also should be made of requiring each license applicant to file proof of public liability insurance. However, many private security companies are finding it difficult to obtain insurance.

Private Security Legislation. See Appendix 6 to this report.


Related Standards

The following standards may be applicable in implementing Standard 10.7:

10.2 License Applications

10.8 License Denial, Revocation, or Suspension
Standard 10.8

License Denial, Revocation, or Suspension

A license may be denied, revoked, or suspended if the licensee; its qualifying agent; resident manager; or any officer, director, or shareholder owning a 10 percent or greater interest in the licensee (provided the licensee is not listed on a national securities exchange or registered under section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) does the following:

1. Violates any provisions of the regulatory act or of the rules and regulations promulgated under the act;
2. Commits any act resulting in the conviction of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude, where such conviction reflects adversely on fitness to engage in a security service business;
3. Practices fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;
4. Makes a material misstatement in the application for or renewal of the license; and/or
5. Demonstrates incompetence or untrustwor-thiness in actions affecting the conduct of the security services business.

Commentary

To be effective, regulation needs to include strong sanctions. The revocation or suspension of a permit to engage in business is a sanction that can be very effective. Being aware of this serious consequence, a licensee would take great care not to violate any listed restrictions.

Because the enforcement of this sanction can result in the denial or loss of the privilege to do business, due-process requirements should be met. The various acts that may result in license denial, revocation, or suspension should therefore be delineated and enforcement standardized. Also, administrative procedures should be established to give notice to the applicant or licensee of the intent to deny, suspend, or revoke a license and of the procedure for requesting a hearing prior to that denial, revocation, or suspension.

Although its wording is permissive, this requirement should be strictly enforced and applied. Unless there are important and valid extenuating circumstances, a license should be denied if there is sufficient proof that the listed individuals have committed any of the enumerated acts. When a provision of this requirement is violated, the investigation and review process should be promptly initiated and completed. Early suspension should be invoked if evidence indicates such action is necessary for the protection of the public. Only through prompt and strict enforcement can denial, revocation, and suspension maintain their validity as useful sanctions and deterrents.

Several factors should be considered by the regulatory board before a decision to deny, suspend, or revoke a license. The board must first consider to what extent the action under consideration affects the conduct of the business. It also should determine if the action is an isolated incident or one that has occurred repeatedly. Additionally, the regulatory board should consider which individual committed the act and determine what action has been taken by the applicant or licensee to remedy the situation.

In considering these various factors, the regulatory board should remember that the purpose of licensing is to assure consumers that the licensee is capable of providing ethical, competent, and responsible security services. If the action of the licensee does not affect the continued performance of his type of service, then no reason may exist to revoke or suspend the license. However, if the action has an affect and no extenuating circumstances exist, then denial, revocation, or suspension should occur.

The five actions outlined in this standard can adversely affect the conduct of a security service business, but they can be controlled by the judicious, yet unsparing, use of the sanctions of license denial, suspension, and revocation.

Selected References

2. Regulatory Board for Private Security
3. Regulatory Board Hearing Procedure

Related Standards

The following standards may be applicable in implementing Standard 10.8:

3.3 Reporting of Criminal Violations
9.2 Regulatory Board for Private Security
9.4 Regulatory Board Hearing Procedure
INTRODUCTION

In Chicago a confessed murderer, judged mentally incompetent for trial, was hired as a security guard. Three days later, while on duty, he shot and killed a person. A private security guard in an Oakland, Calif., theater shot and killed a person allegedly causing a disturbance. In a Phoenix, Ariz., night-club parking lot, a security guard shot a 17-year-old boy during a fight. Although these incidents are extreme, their occurrence is rising. Several pages could be filled with similar examples of abuses involving security personnel that resulted in death or serious bodily harm.

The RAND Report (Vol. I) provides an estimate of the frequency and nature of less serious incidents in which security personnel overstep their authority or are threatened with criminal charges or civil suits. The most frequent types of incidents seem to be assault and unnecessary use of force, false arrest or imprisonment, defamation, improper detention, trespass, and invasion of privacy. The above report concluded that, based on certain evidence and analysis, a variety of potential and actual problems exist involving security personnel.

Another area where problems arise is in the protection of the property of the employer or contracting party. Security personnel's access to many valuables, including money, important assets, and trade secrets, poses serious problems. In an interview conducted for CBS' "60 Minutes," Dec. 21, 1975, Philadelphia district attorney Emmett Fitzpatrick, whose office conducted a 1975 investigation of the private security industry, summed up what may occur:

One of the biggest problems that we have with private security guards is that they end up stealing things. They have access to all kinds of goods within the business establishments themselves; and hardly a month goes by that we don't have a complaint from a security agency somewhere, or from a store, that the security agents within the stores have been caught stealing things.

Obviously, action should be taken to reduce the number of potential and actual problems involving private security personnel. This reduction can come about only when security personnel are above reproach in character, background, and honesty. Several suggestions have been made for improving the personnel caliber, with previous standards recommending thorough screening of job applicants by employers, increased wages, and improved training. These recommended policies already have been instituted by many reputable organizations. Yet, because of the intensely competitive nature of the industry, marginal companies are unable or refuse to institute programs needed for improvement. Government registration of private security personnel is, therefore, necessary to help set minimum qualifications to protect all persons affected by the acts of security personnel—consumers of security services and the public.

The standards for registration, as presented in this chapter require that every individual performing private security functions be registered with the State regulatory agency. Because the purpose of registration is to protect the public, certain qualifications should be met before registration is granted. These qualifications should include minimum age, physical, intelligence, character, and training requirements. Qualification for armed personnel should be higher than those for unarmed personnel and should include additional training in the use of firearms. Obviously, any individual who carries a firearm needs to be properly trained in its use, if serious mishaps are to be prevented, and must fully understand the legal aspects connected with the use of the weapon. And to ensure that all required persons are registered, any person permitting a nonregistered individual to perform private security services should be subject to criminal penalties.

Because of emergency situations, provisions should be made for issuance of temporary permits pending issuance of permanent registration cards. Temporary permits, however, should be valid only for 30 days and should not be issued until applicants have had favorable local law enforcement background checks. After applicants have met all other requirements, including training, permanent registration cards should be issued. These cards would belong in
Standard 11.1

Registration of Private Security Personnel

Every person who is employed to perform the functions of an investigator or detective, guard or watchman, armored car personnel or armed couriers, alarm system installer or service, or alarm respondent should be registered with the private security regulatory board.

Commentary

Every person employed to perform one of the listed security functions should meet certain minimum qualifications, with no distinction based on an employer/employee relationship. It does not matter whether the person is employed by a contract company or a company using a proprietary security organization. The security function, not the employer/employee relationship, creates the problem that needs to be remedied by registration.

The effectiveness of this regulatory plan would be nullified if personnel working for proprietary security organizations are excluded from registration. Both contract and proprietary security personnel are drawn from the same labor market, with personnel having similar education and rates of pay. The work performed and problems confronted by each are similar, and, most importantly, the potential threat to the public from abuses of authority, such as assault, unnecessary use of force, false imprison-
do, violate. A recent case, in which a guard handcuffed an individual to a railing for 6 hours, did not involve deadly force but clearly illustrates the potential of other possible substantive damages inflicted on a person by a guard. Guards in supermarkets, liquor stores, and retail establishments have been alleged to have physically assaulted customers; guards have conducted unconstitutional searches of vehicles, lunch boxes, and persons at factories and warehouses; guards have obtained confessions under threat or duress from employees charged with theft. Although a college-educated, physically powerful proprietary security director may not become a victim of a proprietary guard employed at another place of business, that same guard may improperly act toward a 16-year-old boy or an uneducated, minority group member.

It may be that the proprietary security director forgets that proprietary guard forces are employed by dancehalls, drive-in movies, insecely liquor stores, automobile junkyards, apartment houses, and so forth. Regulation of these businesses without regulation of large, well-staffed corporations is prohibited under the due-process clause of the Constitution.

The public would be the principal beneficiary of the registration of private security personnel. If proprietary personnel are exempted from this registration, public protection would be vitiated, because the number of proprietary personnel far exceeds the number of contract personnel. There is no reason to assume that a person employed by a proprietary security organization would act any differently toward the public than a person employed by a contract security organization.

There can be beneficiaries of the registration program other than the public. A prime beneficiary is the employer of security personnel. It is becoming very difficult, and, if the trend toward strict privacy legislation continues, it may become impossible for employers to learn anything about an applicant's past, particularly the applicant's character. However, with registration required, the prospective employer would need only to ask to see the applicant's security service registration card to be assured that certain minimum qualifications had been met. The possession of a valid card would indicate that the individual had been investigated, been judged dependable, and met certain training requirements.

In 1975, 12 of the 34 States regulating some aspect of the private security industry required registration of security employees of contract security organizations. Generally, the States required that the employer register the employees immediately upon hiring, and, if the person failed to meet the necessary qualifications, the employment relationship would be terminated. Often, because of delays in processing registration applications, a person conceivably could work several weeks, or even months, before receiving regulatory agency approval. In one State, processing took over 9 months.

It has been estimated that between 300,000 and several million persons could be involved in the registration process. Although no specific figures are available, statistics provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the U.S. Bureau of the Census, private security regulatory agencies, and industry representatives indicate that a conservative estimate of the number of security personnel that would need to be registered is more than a million.

Before making a final recommendation for security personnel registration, various aspects of the problem were carefully considered: the large number of persons to be registered and the bureaucratic problems this could create, the desire not to overregulate, the abuse cited concerning security personnel, and the positive role the industry can play in crime prevention. Balancing all factors, it was determined that a registration program should be established.

A registration program with minimum qualifications, including training and background screening, cannot end all abuses and automatically eliminate crime. Effectively operated and strictly enforced, however, it can begin to weed out undesirable and can help professionalize this important segment of the business community, leading to more effective private security services and improved crime prevention.

Selected References
1. Brennan, Dennis T. The Other Police. Cleveland, Ohio: Governmental Research Institute, 1975.
5. Private Security Task Force. "Summary of Private Security Legislation." (See Appendix 5 to this report.)

Related Standards
The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 11.1:

318
Standard 11.2

Registration Qualifications

Every applicant seeking registration to perform a specific security function in an unarmed capacity should meet the following minimum qualifications:

1. Be at least 18 years of age.
2. Be physically and mentally competent and capable of performing the specific job function being registered for.
3. Be morally responsible in the judgment of the regulatory board.
4. Have successfully completed the training requirements set forth in Standard 2.5.

Commentary

The 1967 Task Force Report: The Police of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice stated that "policing a community is personal service of the highest order, requiring sterling qualities in the individual who performs it... Few professions are so peculiarly charged with individual responsibility." Although the quote is directed toward law enforcement personnel, it is equally applicable to private security personnel, who are charged with making daily decisions affecting lives and property.

As pointed out in the preceding standard, the nature of the role of the private security industry demands that steps be taken to upgrade the quality of its personnel. Research has indicated that far too many security personnel, charged with protection of life and property, are either incompetent or of questionable character. Yet, existing personnel selection requirements and procedures do not screen out the unfit. If costly and dangerous losses both to business and society are to be prevented, measures for improvement need to be devised.

Chapter 1 of this report makes a number of recommendations for improving the quality of private security personnel. These recommendations reflect reasonable standards that should be established. However, despite the validity of the recommendations, it is recognized that certain actions may never be instituted unless mandated by law. Therefore, in order to improve the quality of security personnel, it was felt that certain minimum qualifications should be established for registration.

Recognizing the desire to attract high school graduates who might make a career in the private security field, a minimum age requirement of 18 is suggested, thus enabling businesses to compete for qualified young people. It is believed that personnel who do not possess the necessary maturity so often associated with age would not meet other requirements. No attempt is made, however, to impose a maximum age restriction. Any individual who can meet the physical and mental qualifications established by the regulatory board should be allowed to perform security functions, regardless of age. Physical qualifications are not specifically enumerated, because each particular job function requiring registration calls for different physical qualifications. For example, performing the duties of a guard may require a higher level of hearing and better eyesight than are necessary for an alarm servicer. Similarly, certain physical deformities or limitations may adversely affect performance as an alarm respondent but have no appreciable effect upon performance as an investigator.

The area of physical qualifications should be carefully studied by the private security regulatory board. These qualifications should become part of their rules and regulations after careful consideration of the relationship between specific duties to be performed by the registrant and any physical problems. Provisions should be made to consider questions of physical competence on an individual applicant basis.

The need for private security personnel to have emotional stability and sound judgment is apparent because of their role in maintaining order and protecting lives and property. Whether a person is guarding a remote rectory quarry, patrolling a residential area, or investigating business losses, a certain level of mental competence is required. This does not infer that a specific level of educational accomplishment alone would qualify the individual; some people with high school diplomas possess neither commonsense nor emotional stability. Persons whose background investigations indicate they possess sound judgment and emotional stability should be allowed to register as security personnel, regardless of the level of formal education.

Measuring or determining mental competence is not easy, particularly when such determinations must be made for thousands of applicants in the initial stages of registration. Two recommended methods that perhaps can be gradually worked into the registration process are psychological tests and interviews by trained professionals. The present limitations of these methods are recognized, but their validity and usefulness may be increased through continued research. Private security regulatory boards, therefore, should study these methods and keep abreast of research so that the best available means of measuring mental competence can be determined and applied.

The need for morally responsible security personnel cannot be argued, but questions over what, in fact, constitutes being morally responsible are likely. One solution is to demand an indication of the degree to which the person is morally responsible. That term would be to require that no person who has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor that reflects upon ability to perform security work should be allowed to register. However, in many cases, the regulatory board may find that an individual has a long list of criminal charges that have never resulted in a conviction but the nature and number of charges may indicate that the person is not morally responsible.

Finally, this standard incorporates the specific training recommendations set forth in Standard 2.5. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, training can significantly improve the competence of security personnel to aid in crime prevention and control. Training is one of the most common areas in the private security industry needing the most improvement. However, unless requirements are mandated by law, the majority of private security personnel may never receive the necessary training. The benefits of training to employers, private security workers, consumers of security services, and the public are too great to be left to the option of employers or individual workers.

It would, of course, be preferable if all security personnel met stringent, professionally mandated requirements. However, this report recommends that the initial government-mandated qualifications should be a minimum. It is impossible to determine the number of people who would have to register with the private security regulatory boards. It is also impossible to accurately assess the impact of strict qualifications upon the industry. If the requirements are too high and cannot be met by those applying for registration, a serious shortage of available manpower could occur, adversely affecting the industry and those who seek to use it for protection. Thus, the requirements set forth in this standard are minimally designed as an initial step for eliminating undesirable applicants. The regulatory board should constantly evaluate the requirements. If a particular requirement is too restrictive and is keeping competent and ethical persons out of the field, that requirement should be eliminated. Likewise, if serious problems are occurring that could be corrected by a different or more stringent requirement, it should be added.

Although constant evaluation requires maintenance of records and careful analysis, such efforts are necessary in order to balance the interests of the private security industry and society.

Selected References

1. Brennan, Dennis T. The Other Police. Cleveland, Ohio: Governmental Research Institute, 1975.
Standard 11.3
Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel

Every applicant who seeks registration to perform a specific security function in an armed capacity should meet the following minimum qualifications:

1. Be at least 18 years of age;
2. Have a high school diploma or pass an equivalent written examination;
3. Be in good health and capable of performing in an armed capacity;
4. Be morally responsible in the judgment of the regulatory board;
5. Have no felony convictions involving the use of a weapon;
6. Have no felony convictions involving the use of a weapon;
7. Have no physical defects that would hinder job performance; and,
8. Have successfully completed the training requirements for armed personnel set forth in Standards 2.5 and 2.6.

Commentary

Some of the most serious problems in the private security industry are caused by the use of weapons. Throughout this report, various tragic examples have been cited in which injury or death resulted from weapons abuse. Other private security studies have cited similar incidents. Although no statistics are available to determine the frequency of these incidents, it remains unquestioned that the carrying of a firearm includes the potential for serious and dangerous consequences.

Armed security personnel take on an awesome responsibility. Split-second decisions with lethal consequences are commonplace. Violent actions can result in death or serious injury, and the lives of armed security workers are constantly endangered. Walter M. Strobl stated, in "Private Guards Arm Them or Not?" "the very fact that a weapon is visible will cause the criminal to assume a more violent attitude that could trigger the most violent actions."

Many responsible individuals within the private security industry have long argued against arming security personnel. Proprietary security executives have encouraged executives within their organizations to abandon the use of weapons, and contract organizations have discouraged consumers from requesting armed personnel. One large contract company actually offers incentives to sales personnel who set up contracts that do not require armed personnel; this action should be commended and encouraged. It is a sad truth reflected on our society that some situations require the arming of certain security personnel. It would be foolish in situations in which lives are under constant threat to forbid the use of firearms. But it is not unwise to place firm restric-
such formal education or equivalent does not prevent psychopaths or other seriously mentally ill persons from being certified as armed guards.

It is difficult to list the specific acts that would indicate that an individual was not morally responsible to carry a weapon. Sometimes a person may meet the listed qualifications, but a review of his records may indicate a very questionable background. A long list of criminal charges or a series of jobs that ended in firing would perhaps be incidents to watch for. Because of the requirement for a hearing before denial, this requirement is not believed to be too general. Any applicant denied registration on this ground would have an opportunity to be heard and to show if the decision was arbitrary and capricious.

A person who has been convicted of a felony involving the use of a weapon should not be registered in an armed capacity. No exception should be made, regardless of extenuating circumstances, passed time of, or indications of rehabilitation. The responsibility of carrying a firearm is too grave to take the chance that a person previously convicted of a gun would not do so again.

Although no flexibility is recommended for felony convictions involving weapons, convictions for other offenses should be carefully studied before denying registration. It is in the public interest to assist the rehabilitation of convicted offenders by removing restrictions upon their ability to obtain employment. But it also must be recognized that the offender is being registered to perform a security function in an armed capacity. Therefore, if an applicant has a conviction record, the regulatory board should carefully consider whether such convictions reflect upon the applicant's ability to perform a security function in an armed capacity. In making its determination, the regulatory board should consider the following:

1. The specific security function the applicant is registering to perform;
2. The nature and seriousness of the crime;
3. The date of the crime;
4. The age of the applicant when the crime was committed;
5. Whether the crime was an isolated or repeated incident;
6. The social conditions that may have contributed to the crime; and
7. Any evidence of rehabilitation, including good conduct in prison or in the community, counselling or psychiatric treatment received, acquisition of additional academic or vocational schooling, successful participation in correctional work-release programs, or the recommendation of persons who have, or have not, the applicant under their supervision.

The next qualification concerns physical requirements. Such requirements should not be unduly restrictive and should not include height and weight specifications or other requirements that have little relation to performance in an armed capacity. Physical standards, however, cannot be totally disregarded. Obviously, good eyesight and hearing are vital to anyone who carries a weapon. In order to protect the individual and the public, specific vision and hearing requirements should be carefully considered and delineated by the regulatory board.

Finally, this standard incorporates the specific training recommendations set forth in Standards 2.5 and 2.6. As pointed out in Chapter 2, training can greatly improve the competence of security personnel to aid in crime prevention and control but needs perhaps the most improvement of any private security area. However, unless requirements are mandated by law, the majority of private security personnel may never receive such training. The benefits gained through training to employers, private security workers, consumers, and the public are too
Standard 11.4

Permanent Registration Card

So that employers, consumers of security services and the public know that an individual is registered to perform specific security job functions, armed or unarmed, a permanent registration card should be issued and strictly controlled by the regulatory board. This card should not be issued until the applicant has met the minimum qualifications for registration in an armed or unarmed capacity.

Commentary

There are times when persons who come in contact with security workers need to see some form of identification. For example, a person being asked questions by an alleged investigator should be able to ask for some form of official identification. Official proof of identification should also be requested before allowing alarm sales, installation, or service personnel into a home or place of business. A policeman who sees a uniformed guard carrying a gun is justified in asking for identification and authorization to carry a weapon. Finally, an employer should be able to ask a security applicant to show a valid registration card and thereby know the person has met the minimum qualifications of the private security regulatory board, has had a background check, and has been trained to perform the specific job listed on the card. There are many similar situations in which a registration card would benefit registrants, employers of security personnel, consumers of security services, and the public who may come in contact with security workers.

The registration card should include the registrant’s name, signature, and address; the specific security functions the holder is qualified to perform (i.e., guard, investigator, alarm respondent, courier); whether the registrant may be armed; and the expiration date of the card. A recent, full-color picture also should be required on cards for security personnel who enter homes, act as plainclothes investigators, or carry weapons.

Several States also require that the name of the registrant’s employer be included on the card. When this is done, however, a person has to refile with the regulatory board a list of those persons who have successfully completed the training and those who failed. The list should state the specific security functions the individuals have been trained to perform and those individuals who have successfully completed arms training. Once the board is satisfied that an individual has completed the training requirements, the list with all other qualifications, and received a proper fingerprint check, it can issue an official card allowing the registrant to perform certain security functions within the State.

Selected References

1. Brennan, Dennis T. The Other Police. Cleveland, Ohio: Governmental Research Institute, 1975.

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 11.4:

2.6 Arms Training
11.1 Registration of Private Security Personnel
11.2 Registration Qualifications
11.3 Qualifications for Armed Security Personnel
Standard 11.5
Temporary Permit

Pending the issuance of the permanent registration card, provision should be made for the issuance of a nonrenewable temporary permit to allow an applicant to perform a specific security job function, in an amount capacity, only for a maximum of 30 days. This permit should be issued immediately upon completion of a favorable preliminary check of the applicant with the local law enforcement agency and other available sources.

Commentary

In many States that regulate the private security industry, the processing of applications for licensing or registration can take several months; in several States, this process can take a year or longer. Much of this delay is due to the time required for fingerprint checks by State and Federal officials. Other delays may be caused by insufficient staffs and heavy workloads.

Whatever the reasons for delay, the consequences can create serious problems. Cases have been cited in which an individual with a serious criminal record takes a security job, only to be fired by the employer while fingerprints are being checked, then quits before the results of the check are returned to the employer from the regulatory board. In the meantime, the individual takes a security job with a second company. By the time the information on the serious criminal record becomes available, the first employer is no longer concerned, because the individual has left. Without employer exchanges of information, the second employer may not become aware of the criminal record until after the person has once again quit and moved on to new employment. It is conceivable that an individual following this procedure could hold security positions for several years, even indefinitely, without being officially registered or having a current employer learn of the criminal record. Such a situation presents the potential for grave abuse.

A person of poor character or little competence can do much harm while performing various security functions during an interim period, waiting for approval or denial of registration. For this reason, some security professionals have suggested that no person be allowed to begin performing security functions until all registration qualifications have been met. Denying any type of temporary permit, however, creates an important problem for applicants. A waiting period seems inevitable before a person can receive a registration card and begin employment. Until the process for obtaining criminal history record information is streamlined, the waiting period may be several months long. Often times those who desire security employment have a need to supplement their incomes, are on a temporary lay-off from their regular positions, or are unemployed. Asking these people to wait for a prolonged period during the registration process may be unfair. Therefore, it has been suggested that temporary cards be issued while registrations are being processed, thus eliminating the prolonged period when applicants are unable to work.

Contrast security companies and businesses that use proprietary security organizations also can experience serious problems if they are forced to wait long periods before personnel can begin employment. They are often faced with immediate, short-term demands for increased numbers of private security personnel. These situations may include special sporting events, conventions, natural disasters, riot conditions, shiploads of valuable merchandise, large sales, or similar unusual and temporary events. In these instances, finding a sufficient number of unemployed, registered individuals to perform security functions would be virtually impossible unless temporary employment or some form of temporary registration is allowed.

On a more permanent basis, a shortage of registered persons may arise that can create a problem for employers trying to maintain a certain security manpower level. James Ellis, former president of the Private Police Association of California, estimated that about 35 percent of guards are part-time workers, and the annual turnover rate is as high as 300 percent. The RAND Report (Vol. 1) indicated turnover rates as high as 200 percent. The California Institute for Local Self Government's study of permanent security personnel showed a turnover rate of approximately 80 percent per year. Whether the high or low figure is accepted, the turnover rate in the private security industry is serious. If this high turnover continues, it will be very difficult for employers to find available registered security personnel to meet their manpower needs.

It is not the purpose of this standard to delay or deny entry into security employment to qualified, competent individuals of good character, to unnecessarily complicate the hiring process, or create a shortage of qualified personnel. Therefore, in considering the various problems that can arise because of registration delays, it is recommended that temporary permits should be issued. Such permits would allow applicants for registration to work for 30 days while the regulatory board completes the registration process.

In order to protect consumers and the public and to improve the overall capability of security personnel to help combat crime, some initial screening should be permitted before a person can begin to work in security, either temporarily or permanently. It is therefore recommended that no person be allowed to begin performing any security function until the private security regulation board has had at least a preliminary check of the applicant with the local law enforcement agency and other available sources.

This type of check should include a name check and a local fingerprint check. According to law enforcement officials, this type of local check could be completed in several hours or days. If the applicant has recently moved into the jurisdiction, other sources might be checked—such as former employers, references, or other State regulatory boards with which the applicant may have been registered. It should be the goal of the board to complete the necessary preliminary check and to issue the temporary card within a few days.

The temporary permit being recommended should be nonrenewable. Therefore, a person who wants to continue private security work should begin to meet the training requirements for registration within the regulatory board is completed investigation.

Allowing persons to perform security functions before minimum background checks have been completed totally violates the purpose of registration. In the time it takes to complete a background check, a security worker can cause much harm. So that employers of security personnel, consumers of security services, and the public can have some assurance of the character of those personnel, no person should be allowed to begin security work until at least a local background check has been completed. There is no guarantee that this would automatically eliminate all personnel problems in the industry. It is, however, a necessary step towards improving the quality of security personnel and eliminating potential problems.

Selected References

1. Brennan, Dennis T. The Other Police. Cleveland, Ohio: Governmental Research Institute, 1975.
Standard 11.6
Registration Renewal

Individuals who are registered as armed security personnel should be required to renew their registrations annually. All other registrants should be required to file for renewal of registration every 5 years.

Commentary

Once an individual has met the necessary requirements and been approved for registration as a private security worker, it is conceivable that the regulatory board could have no further contact with that registrant. For registration to be completely effective, methods should be designed to keep the regulatory board informed of the registrant's performance and any changes in his background that might affect ability to perform security functions.

One method for increasing contact between the regulatory board and the registrant is to require the registrant to carry a weapon. Registration of a registrant's competence is the only automatic, revenue-generating device. When administratively feasible, armed registrants seeking renewal should undergo updated fingerprint checks to verify that no unreported criminal actions or convictions have occurred. All of these actions, of course, result in more administrative work, but granting a renewal of permission to carry a weapon is too important to become merely an automatic, revenue-generating device.

There is less need for a yearly renewal of registration for unarmed personnel. Certain safeguards can help the regulatory board maintain some contact with them. One safeguard for the continued evaluation of a registrant's competence is the use of intensive field investigations. Investigators also can verify the accuracy of information on file about the registrant and check on any unreported changes.

Another safeguard comes with the complaint procedure. When complaints are received by the regulatory board from anyone—consumers of security services; supervisors, managers, or employers of security personnel; or the public with whom security personnel come in contact—resulting investigations would involve contact between the regulatory board and the registrant. In this context, the board should require employees of registered security personnel to report any complaints about individual registrants, any questionable incidents involving them, or any criminal charges filed against them. But the employee is aware of.

It has been pointed out that a yearly renewal system would earn additional funds for the board's operation from the renewal fees. Estimates of the current number of private security personnel range from 300,000 to several million. By requiring the registration of contract and proprietary personnel, the figure could realistically reach a million. According to a survey of 33 States that regulated private security personnel, a total of 300,000 personnel were registered in 1975. This figure includes only contract guards and detectives. It does not include proprietary security personnel; contract alarm sales, installation, or service personnel; or armored car and armored counter personnel. Using additional figures from Frost and Sullivan (220,000 proprietary security personnel), the Alarm Industry Committee for Combating Crime (4,000 alarm installers), and the National Armed Car Association (30,000 armored car employees), the figure reaches 554,000. It is not hard to imagine, with the addition of 17 more States, that the number of persons to be registered would easily reach a million. The fees that could be generated from the annual renewal of these members would provide significant funding for the board. However, the administrative burdens of yearly renewal outweigh the monetary benefits. By instituting the safeguards previously outlined, a 5-year renewal period should reduce paperwork, yet allow for some periodic contact with the unarmed registrants.

Selected Reference

5. Private Security Task Force. "Regulatory Agency Survey." (See Appendix 7 to the report.)
6. ——. "Summary of Private Security Legislation." (See Appendix 6 to this report.)

Related Standards

The following standards and goals may be applicable in implementing Standard 11.6:

1.1 Selection of Qualified Personnel
2.6 Arms Training
9.2 Regulatory Board for Private Security
Standard 11.7  
Suspension and Revocation

Registration cards and temporary permits may be suspended or revoked for good cause, after a hearing, when a registrant:

1. Is convicted of a misdemeanor or felony which reflects unfavorably on his fitness to perform a security function.
2. Has been formally charged with a criminal offense which makes him unable to meet the minimum qualifications of registration.
3. Fires a weapon without justification.
4. Engages in conduct detrimental to the public safety or welfare or any individual's security.
5. No longer meets the requirements of any provisions of the act.

Commentary

As was pointed out in the licensing chapter, regulation should include strong sanctions in order to be effective. The suspension or revocation of a permit can work as a type of sanction that can be very effective. Serious consequences arise when a person cannot continue to perform a particular job function. For example, the individual may be without income, causing serious personal hardships. The employer may not have a registered person available to replace the suspended or revoked worker, leading to an ineffective security program until a replacement can be found. Realizing these consequences, a registrant hopefully would take great care not to violate any of the listed restrictions, and, likewise, supervisors would take care not to allow any violations.

To be effective, this standard should be strictly enforced. Without important and valid extenuating circumstances, registration should be quickly suspended or revoked after a hearing if there is sufficient proof that the registrant has committed any of the enumerated acts. Only through strict enforcement can suspension and revocation maintain their validity as useful sanctions and deterrents.

Several factors should be reviewed by the regulatory agency before deciding on revocation or suspension. The agency should first consider to what extent the violation would affect future performance of security functions. This agency also should determine if the action is an isolated incident or one that has occurred repeatedly. If in these deliberations, the agency should keep in mind that the purpose of registration is to protect the public. If the action of the registrant under review does not affect the continued performance of this type of security function, there may be no reason to revoke or suspend registration. If the action has an affect and is not accompanied by extenuating circumstances in the registrant's favor, suspension or revocation should occur.

The incidents listed in this standard as cause for suspension or revocation can vary matters that can adversely affect the performance of security functions. The frequency of occurrence of these incidents can be controlled by the judicial, yet unsearing, use of the sanctions of license suspension and revocation.

The first listed incident is conviction of a misdemeanor or felony. The regulatory board should carefully consider the particular misdemeanor or felony, as well as the surrounding circumstances, to determine if the conviction reflects unfavorably on the registrant's ability to perform security functions. Examples of convictions which reflect badly include retail theft, robbery, burglary, larceny, arson, assault, battery, carrying a concealed weapon, and discharging a weapon in public.

It is possible for public interest to assist the rehabilitation of convicted offenders by removing restrictions upon their ability to obtain or maintain employment. Gainful employment is vital to any ex-offender's chance for returning to a useful and active role in society. It should be recognized that registered individuals are performing security functions—protecting persons and property. The convicted individual should not be allowed to work in a position that could allow a similar act affecting lives and property.

The regulatory board should also consider suspending registration when an individual is formally charged with a criminal offense that may reflect unfavorably on the registrant's ability to properly perform security functions. Several months may pass between a formal charge and conviction. During that time, the board will want to learn of such circumstances and determine if the incident reflects unfavorably on the registrant's ability to properly perform security functions.

The regulatory board should establish an administrative procedure for learning when a registrant is charged with or convicted of a crime. Employers should be required to inform the board whenever they learn of a formal charge or conviction. A staff member may then conduct the task of checking criminal records. As burdensome as this task might be, some type of procedure needs to be established to learn of such cases.

The third incident that might result in suspension or revocation of registration is the unjustified firing of a weapon. Anytime a firearm is used, it can result in death. Large numbers of security personnel are performing functions in an armed capacity. Forty-nine percent of respondents to the 1970 Rand Corporation survey of private security employees said they were armed. An even larger number of armed security personnel answering the 1974 California Local Self Government survey indicated they sometimes carried firearms while on duty. The 1975 Cleveland Administration of Justice Committee study found that 60 percent of the greater Cleveland area security personnel sometimes carried firearms while on duty. With such a large number of security personnel carrying firearms, abuses seem inevitable. The California Bureau of Collection and Investigative Services reported that, in October of 1975, it revoked the licenses of 11 persons because of improper use of a weapon. Tragically, two of these incidents resulted in death.

For the regulatory board to learn about weapon firings and to evaluate if they were justified require some form of mandatory reporting procedure. An example of a possible procedure can be found in the law enforcement field, where many police department procedures manual's set out specific requirements for reporting the firing of a weapon, intentional or accidental.

Private security personnel who fire a weapon while on duty, either accidentally or intentionally, except on a firing range, should report the circumstances as soon as possible. Within 8 hours, the involved personnel should file a written report with the appropriate regulatory personnel. The employer should then file an investigative report with the private security regulatory board within 36 hours. This report should include a synopsis of the situation, conclusion, and recommended action.

Based on this report, the board should take whatever action it considers appropriate—conduct an investigation, hold a hearing, or accept the firing as justified.

To determine if a weapon firing was justified, the regulatory board should carefully consider the surrounding circumstances and facts. However, the board should limit its consideration to what reasonably appeared to be the facts known or perceived by the individual at the time of firing. For example, if a security worker fires a weapon, perceiving that there was personal danger from an armed assailant, the action is justified, even if it is later proven that the individual fired at had committed a starter's pistol. However, if a security worker fires at an individual quickly walking across the plant grounds, firing is not justified, even if it is later proven that the individual fired at had committed, unknowingly to the security worker, a starter's pistol. Facts unknown at the time of firing, no matter how compelling, should not be considered.

There are only two specific instances in which it generally can be said a weapon firing is justified: (1) to protect one's life or the lives of others from imminent peril of death or from what reasonably appears to be an immediate threat of bodily harm, or (2) when reasonably necessary to effect an arrest of a person who is, in the opinion of the person firing the weapon, in the presence of the person firing the weapon. Carrying a weapon is an important responsibility;
firing a weapon is a serious action than can result in death. Any security worker who does not recognize this danger and fires a weapon without justification should not be registered to perform security functions in an armed capacity.

The fourth type of incident that could result in a suspension or revocation of registration, as stated in this standard, is engaging "in conduct detrimental to the public safety or welfare." This is a general statement, a catchall for conduct that does not result in conviction but is serious enough to have an adverse effect upon the performance of a security function. One example is in the area of alcohol and drug abuse. An individual security worker under the influence of or actually using narcotics or intoxicants while on duty is clearly not properly performing assigned protective duties and is probably jeopardizing public welfare. If this worker were armed, there would be no question concerning the seriousness of the detrimental conduct. Additional examples of the type of actions that might be termed detrimental conduct include abuses of authority, general and constant negligence in the performance of security functions, falsification of facts within an investigative report, and release of confidential information.

The language within this section is general because it would be impossible to list every action that might be classified as detrimental to the public peace or welfare, and all varying factors and extenuating circumstances cannot be foreseen. This general terminology, however, is not included in the standard to enable the regulatory board to wield arbitrary power, suspending and revoking registration at will. If that happens, the aggrieved party could have a remedy through the judicial system. This item on detrimental conduct can give the regulatory board the necessary power to protect the public by suspending or revoking registration for a serious action not otherwise delineated in the statute.

The fifth action that could result in a suspension or revocation of registration, as stated in this standard, is that a registrant "no longer meets the requirements of registration or violates any provisions of the act." Individual circumstances will dictate the circumstances that would be considered before invoking this provision. For example, it could be determined that the registrant fulfilled proof of birth documents at the time of application and was, and in, not at least 18 years of age. Also, a person could become physically incapacitated and not able to perform a specific job function.

Because the enforcement of this standard can result in the loss of a person's privilege to work, due-process requirements should be met. The various actions that may result in registration suspension or revocation should be delineated and enforced standardized. Administrative procedures should be established to give notice to the registrant of the intent to suspend or revoke his registration and to set up a hearing, if requested, prior to the revocation or suspension.

Within due-process and administrative guidelines, however, the regulatory board should strictly enforce this standard. The incidents enumerated reflect upon an individual's ability to perform security functions. For the protection of all employers of security personnel, consumers of security services, and the public, the registration of any security worker who engage in the conduct listed should be suspended or revoked.

Selected References
1. Brennan, Dennis T. The Other Police. Cleveland, Ohio: Governmental Research Institute, 1975.

Related Standards
The following standards may be applicable in implementing Standard 11.7:
1.1 Preemployment Screening
2.2 Conduct of Private Security Personnel
3.3 Reporting of Criminal Violations
9.2 Regulatory Board for Private Security
9.4 Regulatory Board Hearing Procedure

Standard 11.8
Sanctions

Nonregistered persons who perform a security function requiring registration should be subject to criminal penalties. Any person authorizing or permitting a nonregistered person to perform a security function requiring registration should be subject to criminal penalties.

Commentary
No governmental regulation can be effective without some type of sanction to act as a deterrent. In fact, some courts have defined a law as "that which must be obeyed and followed by citizens, subject to sanctions or legal consequences." Without a penalty or punishment, there generally is no obedience to a law.

The principal sanction of licensing and registration is suspension or revocation. An individual or company licensed to engage in a security service business knows that violation of certain laws, rules, or regulations may result in the loss of the privilege to do business. Likewise, a registrant is aware that certain conduct can result in a withdrawal of the privilege to work in a security position. Actively enforced, these sanctions can act as strong deterrents.

These sanctions, however, do not affect a business that uses a proprietary security organization, administrative personnel within a contract agency who need not be registered, or an individual who fails to register. Without the type of sanction recommended by this standard, it would be very easy for a supervisor or manager, fearing no sanction, to put a nonregistered person in a security position requiring registration or for a nonregistered individual to perform a security function requiring registration.

This standard is intended to include "any person authorizing or permitting." This stipulation includes supervisors, managers, vice presidents, and even presidents. The president who says "That new contract must be filled now, so go out and hire as many temporary people as necessary, whether they are registered or not," is as guilty of authorizing a nonregistered person to perform a security function as is the supervisor who assigns a nonregistered person to a security post without checking on registration.

A stronger sanction should be imposed upon any person who authorizes or permits a person not registered as an armed security worker to perform in an armed capacity. Strong consideration was given to recommending that such action be a felony, but that was decided too severe a penalty. Nonetheless, the criminal penalty should be greater than that for allowing a nonregistered person to perform in an unarmed capacity.

The purpose of registration is to help improve
the overall quality of the security function being performed and, thus, improve crime prevention. Unless there are serious consequences for acting in contravention of the law, the security field will continue to be filled with marginal workers. It is therefore recommended that criminal penalties be imposed upon persons employing nonregistered persons to perform private security services and upon non-registered persons who perform security functions.

**Selected Reference**


**Related Standards**

- The following standards may be applicable in implementing Standard 11.8:
  - 3.3 Reporting of Criminal Violations
  - 9.2 Regulatory Board for Private Security
APPENDIX 1
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY (ASIS) SURVEY RESULTS

Acknowledgments

The Private Security Task Force wishes to express its gratitude to those members of ASIS who responded to our questionnaire. Our appreciation is also extended to ASIS Executive Director O. P. Norton, Dr. Kenneth Fauth, Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, Northern Michigan University; and to the members of the Research Committee of ASIS for their suggestions and support. The principal investigator for this report was William C. Cunningham, President of Hallcrest Systems, Incorporated, McLean, Va.

Survey Background

At the April 1975 meeting of the Private Security Task Force in Washington, D.C., Task Force members expressed concern that, in many areas in which standards and goals were to be developed, there were little or no statistical data dealing with many of the issues that are important to private security. The Task Force members directed its staff to develop some input regarding many of the private security issues. The executive director of the Private Security Task Force met with the executive director of ASIS, who agreed to the distribution of a questionnaire to the entire U.S. membership of ASIS. The questionnaire was prepared by the staff and consultants and presented to Task Force members for review in July 1975 at the Private Security Task Force meeting in Chicago. In addition, the questionnaire was distributed to members of the National Research Committee of ASIS. The questionnaire was mailed from the staff offices in Macomb, Ill., on Aug. 12, 1975, and the members of the ASIS had until Sept. 19, 1975, to return it. A total of 5,412 questionnaires were mailed, and 1,788 were returned in a form that enabled the data to be analyzed, representing a very satisfactory 33 percent response.

Questionnaire Description

The major purpose of the questionnaire was to give members of ASIS an opportunity to respond, regarding the organizations they represent, in terms of type of security responsibility, number of personnel, salary, and security training levels. The questionnaire also solicited their opinions regarding relationships with public law enforcement agencies, the problem of uniform needs, salary levels, their relationship and needs regarding the criminal justice information systems, and the extent to which they use various Federal, State, local, or credit records. It further solicited their comments regarding the need for a set of standards in private security.

The design of the questionnaire and the handling of the data were specifically set up to guarantee the anonymity of the respondents. Survey data reduction and processing were performed by the Department of Marketing and Finance at Western Illinois University; data analysis was prepared by the Task Force staff and its consultant.

Summary of Results

Responses were received from every State, with 14 percent of the respondents indicating they did business in more than one State. Also, with the exception of security responsibilities for "library," there were respondents from the entire private security field represented by the ASIS member classification. It is significant to note that 10 percent (175) of the respondents were members of contractual service firms—a classification that is not used in the membership listings of ASIS.

A limiting factor of this survey was the number of nonresponses to specific questions. This appears to have resulted from two main factors: (1) several of the questions did not pertain to all of the respondents; (2) some members, even though anonymity was clearly indicated in the questionnaire, might have been reluctant to provide information regarding salaries, liability insurance, and use of criminal justice records and information systems.

Information regarding the number of security personnel presented a special problem in terms of questionnaire analysis. Because the entire membership of
ASIS was used, it is obvious that several of the same companies had multiple respondents. Therefore any specific analysis of the total numbers employed in various companies could be inaccurate.

The area of private security/public law enforcement relationships is most revealing. Although textbooks and articles have strongly indicated that there is a major problem in this relationship, that notion is not borne out by the results of the survey. Because of budget and time restraints, it was not feasible to survey public law enforcement's attitudes in this area; however, it is recommended that, at some point in the future, a similar study be conducted of public law enforcement on the issues of cooperation and information exchange with the private security industry.

The salary data received would indicate that there are, as commonly thought, disparities between the salaries paid by contractual companies and those paid by proprietary companies. This difference is more significant at the lower operational levels than at the managerial and supervisory levels.

The general series of questions regarding the use of agencies, such as Federal, State, local, or private, for investigatory purposes is most revealing. The results show a heavy reliance on local agencies for most records and information sources, with a trend toward more use of State and local data sources and less use of Federal data. In short, it appears that the private security industry uses both State and local law enforcement and private security agencies for their information needs, rather than Federal agencies.

One of the most significant results of the survey is the expressed need for the development of a set of standards for private security. With only one exception—regulation by insurance companies—the membership strongly supported standards.

Survey Highlights

Although the total response for each of the 27 questions follow, the major significant results are summarized:

**Highlights (N = 1,788)**
- Responses from all 50 States.
- Four top respondents, by industry group:
  1. Manufacturing security,
  2. More than one industry description,
  3. Contractual security, and
  4. Retail security.
- 62 percent are involved in nonclassified security.
- 79 percent are nonunionized.
- Respondent’s security force is contractual (26 percent), proprietary (50 percent), both (24 percent).
- 79 percent are uniformed, 45 percent are armed.
- 71 percent have frequent contact with public police.
- 87 percent enjoy a highly acceptable relationship with public police.
- 66 percent perceive a positive attitude of police toward the private security industry.
- 68 percent provide inhouse training.
- 75 percent use public criminal justice records at least monthly.
- 84 percent believe there is a need for conviction data.
- 74 percent believe there is a need for arrest data.
- 87 percent believe private security needs a set of standards.

**Response by Item**

There was no statistically significant difference, in responses to all questions, between respondents who are identified as contractual security or proprietary (inhouse) security except as noted in Table 2, which relates to salary data.

Figure 1 and Table 1 portray the percentage response for each of the 27 survey questions by the 1,788 respondents.

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**Figure 1. ASIS Respondents by Group** (Survey Question 1)
Table 1. Summary of Responses to ASIS survey, 1975
(N = 1,788)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 2a. Does your security responsibility include safeguarding U.S. classified materials?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 2b. Is your security force unionized?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 3. The activities of my firm are basically:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Question 4. The security force in this firm is:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contractual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietary (inhouse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 5a. Among your security personnel, how many are uniformed?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>79%</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 5b. Of the uniformed personnel, how many carry a firearm?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45%</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 5c. Among your security personnel, how many are not uniformed?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 5d. Of the not uniformed personnel, how many carry a firearm?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 6. With what frequency do security personnel in your firm have contact with public police personnel?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About twice a month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 7. Would you classify your firm's relationship with the public police as:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excellent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<tr>
<th>Question 8. Have public police attitudes towards support of your private security efforts been:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 9. Which of the following items could foster improved communication between public police and private security?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hold periodic meetings with supervisor/manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold informal meetings between police officers and security personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have formal training sessions on each other's roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have formal written policy regarding operating procedures of security personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 10. In general, should private security personnel have the same legal authority as public police?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Question 11. Under ordinary circumstances, how frequently are your security personnel mistakenly identified as &quot;public&quot; police by private citizens?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 12. To differentiate private security personnel and public police personnel, which of the following do you prefer?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Style of uniforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Color of uniforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloth badges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinctive color of hat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 13. Are credentials carried by your security personnel:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Similar to public police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different from public police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 14. Does your organization carry personal liability insurance which will protect the &quot;individual security worker&quot; from:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>False arrest action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liability as a result of negligent action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63%</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 15. What type of legal assistance is available for your security personnel?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formalized legal training courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal counsel of corporation or company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training obtained prior to employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 16. What is the approximate MONTHLY wage for the following security personnel within your enterprise?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None employed</th>
<th>Less than $500</th>
<th>$501-$750</th>
<th>$751-$1,000</th>
<th>$1,001-$1,250</th>
<th>More than $1,250</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed uniform guards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed uniform guards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigators/ detectives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle mgmt./ supervisors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner/general manager</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 17. Are written job descriptions available in your firm?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes—for all security job functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes—for most security job functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes—for a few security job functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No job descriptions available for security job functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 18. Do you have different hiring qualifications (other than age) for an individual performing the following functions?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carrying a firearm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requiring primary contact with general public and employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrequent contact with public or employees (monitor controls, patrol during nonworking hours, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Table 1. Summary of Responses to ASIS survey, 1975

(N = 1,788)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 19. Indicate the percentage of your present security personnel with previous police, military security, and/or intelligence experience prior to joining your organization.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No such experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-25 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-50 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-75 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-99 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 20. Do you provide a formal inhouse training program for newly hired security personnel?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Amount of training ranged from 4 hours to 2 weeks.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 21. Do you require formal training on an annual basis for all security personnel?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Inhouse training:

| Yes | 43% |
| No | 2% |
| No response | 55% |

(Number of hours of training ranged from 2 to 80.)

b. Externally conducted training:

| Yes | 21% |
| No | 10% |
| No response | 69% |

(Number of hours of training ranged from 2 to 80.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 22. With what frequency do you utilize public criminal justice record systems?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

---

Table 1. Summary of Responses to ASIS survey, 1975

(N = 1,788)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 23. Indicate your accessibility to public criminal justice records for private security business.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accessible:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 24. Indicate the types of information you need to know from the criminal justice system.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Arrest verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Conviction verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Alleged misconduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Driver license check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Vehicle check</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 25. Which information agencies do you utilize for the given types of investigations?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

(Continued on next page)

347
Table 1. Summary of Responses to ASIS survey, 1975
(N = 1,788)

**Question 26.** Do you feel the private security industry needs "A Set of Standards"?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If yes, indicate the relative importance of having "a set of standards" developed in each of the following areas.

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Not important</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel selection</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and education</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance standards for security personnel</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance standards for security equipment</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensure and regulation</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulations by insurance companies</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry wide voluntary code of ethics</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formalization of private/public police relationships</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

**Question 27.** In what State is your business located?

Responses were received from ASIS members in every State and 258 (14%) indicated they do business in more than one State.

*Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unarmed uniform guards</th>
<th>Armed uniform guards</th>
<th>Investigators/detectives</th>
<th>Middle management/supervisors</th>
<th>Owner/general manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None Employed</td>
<td>$500-$750</td>
<td>$751-$1000</td>
<td>$1001-$1250</td>
<td>More than $1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sample size: Proprietary n = 888; contractual n = 469.
APPENDIX 2

CHARACTERISTICS OF LICENSED PRIVATE SECURITY PERSONNEL IN TWO AMERICAN CITIES: NEW ORLEANS, LA., AND ST. LOUIS, MO.

Jasm C. Cunningham, President of Hallcrest Systems, Incorporated, of McLean, Va.

Introduction

Based on a review of published literature, unpublished documents, and opinions of private security executives, practitioners, educators, and consumers of security products and services, the staff of the Private Security Task Force realized the need for realistic standards and goals for this rapidly growing industry. In response to this need, the biographical characteristics of licensed private security personnel in two large American cities were analyzed. The results of this analysis are contained in this appendix.

To obtain relevant and timely data, the Task Force chose two cities with more than 500,000 population that had formalized licensing and regulatory responsibility over private security personnel—New Orleans, La., and St. Louis, Mo.

At the suggestion of Task Force member Sidney H. Cane III of New Orleans, that city was selected as the first city for analysis because a revised municipal ordinance, enacted in 1971, provided the basis for a formalized and structured licensing; and regulatory function over the private security industry, with pertinent data readily available.

Because St. Louis's police department has had licensing responsibility for 100 years and also has a formal and comprehensive licensing and regulatory program, it was selected as the second city for analysis. A biographical assessment of private security personnel was conducted for St. Louis in 1960, providing an additional advantage for determining variance and trends in the current analysis. Furthermore, the principal investigator of this study effort was responsible for conducting the 1960 study of private security in St. Louis and, therefore, was familiar with both the licensing practices of St. Louis and the available data base.

Clearly, sufficient time and financial resources were not available to conduct an analysis, such as the one reported herein on a national level. However, the data reported in this study can serve as a basis for an enlarged analysis of the characteristics of private security personnel, and this same research methodology can be employed by cities, States, or other interested and concerned researchers.

The purpose of this analysis was to determine the biographical characteristics of private security personnel, in order to better understand the types of persons entering the private security field. In both cities, some security personnel have not complied with licensing requirements. It was the opinion of the Task Force that data, such as sex, race, age, height, weight, education, marital status, arrest record, and work experience, were relevant in establishing meaningful standards and goals. Also, the information collected might prove useful in objectively assessing the numbers and expenditures involved in providing protection in American cities by public and private agencies. Finally, through the use of the 1960 St. Louis study, it was felt that certain shifts might be revealed in the demands of security service consumers.

Study Approach

Using the 1960 St. Louis study of private security personnel as a guide for data elements and information gathering, the Task Force staff and their consultant began, in May of 1975, to confer with responsible administrators in the police departments of New Orleans and St. Louis. These initial conferences were set up to gain an understanding of licensing and regulatory practices and procedures, to determine the availability of desired data, and to plan data collection, coding, and data processing requirements.

During June, July, and August 1975, with the assistance of the two police departments, the relevant data, without name, address, or specific organizational identifiers, were obtained from the files for the 7,164 licensed private security persons in the two cities. Subsequently, the data was coded, key-punched, and verified for computer processing, using both standardized and customized statistical programing systems. September and October 1975 were spent in data analysis and report preparation.

This study is arranged so as to provide a summary and commentary of the 1975 New Orleans data, followed by the 1975 St. Louis data. The reader will quickly observe that more data were available in St. Louis than in New Orleans, and, therefore, greater analysis and comparison are made from both the 1960 and 1975 St. Louis data. Because data were available for both periods in St. Louis, several tables were developed to compare the characteristics of today's private security practitioners with those of 15 years ago. Finally, composite data comparing New Orleans and St. Louis licenten is presented and explained.

Where possible, the biographical characteristics were analyzed in three major subgroups—contractual, proprietary, and governmental. The contractual subgroup includes guards (New Orleans and St. Louis), detectives/investigators (New Orleans), truck drivers for firms, hotels, and so forth. The third classification—governmental—represents all guards employed by public or quasi-public agencies of local, State, or Federal government.

The term "licensed" is used throughout this appendix in the context used in New Orleans and St. Louis. However, it should be noted that, in the Task Force report, these individuals would be registered rather than licensed. Businesses providing security services would be licensed. (See Glossary of Terms.)

New Orleans

Although Louisiana has collected an occupational license tax for guards and related private security services for many years, it has not been involved in regulating these agencies; however, individual municipalities were allowed to regulate guards and detectives. In 1971, New Orleans revised a municipal ordinance, establishing standards for the licensing of guards and detectives and requiring the police department to screen applicants. Currently within the New Orleans Police Department, the Special Officers Unit, staffed by a commander and three clerks, is responsible for licensing and regulating private security agencies or "special officers," as they are referred to in New Orleans.
There are presently 4,173 licensed special officers in New Orleans—a city of 600,000. Of the total, 68 percent (2,838) are contractual, 22 percent (1,043) are employed by the city, and 10 percent (466) are employed by other governmental organizations. These individuals are employed by the different companies or agencies of government. Surrounding parishes also recognize the license issued by the New Orleans Police Department, which may tend to show a false ratio between private security personnel and population, because no accurate figures could be provided that would reflect how many of the licensed personnel work exclusively in the surrounding parishes.

Once licensed, each special officer in New Orleans is granted limited police powers that apply to the actual premises of the company or host assigned. It is important to note that only armed personnel are licensed in New Orleans. (Armed is defined to include hand guns, shotguns, and handoffi.) A comprehensive manual of policies and information has been developed by the Special Officers Unit to clearly explain these police powers and duties.

Copies of these manuals are provided to each company, and individual licenses are issued. A limited number of licenses are also granted to many non-licensed personnel for the purpose of providing personal security to host companies.

The Louisiana Board of Police Commissioners has developed a comprehensive and formal system for the issuance of licenses. Although an average age of 42 is presented in Table 2, it is significant to note that during this 15-year period, the annual increase in total licensees was 9 percent, yet the annual percentage growth for contractual licensees doubled that figure—18 percent. It is also noteworthy that security personnel in governmental agencies have increased significantly more than have public law enforcement personnel in the City of St. Louis. The Watchman Division has developed a comprehensive manual of policies and procedures for licensed watchmen. In addition, St. Louis has a mandatory 3-day training program of 21 hours, including 9 hours of firearms training, at the St. Louis Police Academy.

The commander of the Special Officers Unit is responsible for disciplinary action against licensed personnel. Disciplinary actions generally include (1) rejection of application, (2) issuance of a probationary license for a specified period of time, (3) suspension of license, and (4) revocation of license. The probationary license is suspended or revoked if any arrests occur during the period, or if the licensee violates established rules and regulations. In the event of probationary personnel being rejected, suspended or revoked, with approximately one-third being rejected. Figures are not available on the number issued probationary licenses.

Table 1 depicts the characteristics of those individuals selected to receive licenses in both St. Louis and New Orleans. The biographical characteristics of these licensed individuals, listed in Table 3, are compared in Table 4 with the licensees in St. Louis.

**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>St. Louis Summary and Comparisons</th>
<th>1960 and 1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| In 1975, the Missouri Legislature granted the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners the responsibility and authority for regulating and licensing all private security personnel in that city. Departmental history records (see Table 2) that since 1960, there has been a significant increase in the number of arrests (not necessarily convictions) that have increased significantly since 1960. More important, however, is the percentage of those individuals whose licenses were not revealed by applicants and discovered only during department investigation. Whereas 7 percent of those individuals receiving licenses in 1960 had prior arrests revealed only by investigation, by 1975 this figure had dropped to 4 percent. Further, it is interesting to note that 25 percent of these licensed in the contractual subgroup, 20 percent of the proprietory licensees, and 31 percent of those licensed for government security work had arrests revealed by investigation that were not reported at the time of application.

**Table 5** reveals a significant change in licensees who have prior relevant experience in either law enforcement or private security during the 15-year period. The data presented in Table 6, similar to Table 1, depicts the biographical profile of licensees in St. Louis in 1975. The data table is discussed in the New Orleans and St. Louis complete section.

**Table 6** presents a comparison of the biographical data in Table 5. It considers the data presented in Table 6. Both the descriptive data and the percentages of these two classifications. Finally, beat watchmen personnel in these classifications in 1960. It should be noted that the educational level has increased slightly. Although an average age of 42 is presented in Tables 2 and 3, it is interesting to note that the average age of those individuals receiving licenses in 1960 was 32 years, in 1975. The decrease in educational institution, prison, and hospital personnel is significant. A most revealing finding is the 2,312 percent increase in private security personnel. Not only was this 2,312 percent change for the 15-year period dramatic, but also it was a 24 percent annual growth over the 15-year period. Other significant increases occurred in educational institutions, retail establishments, private hospitals, and apartments and office buildings.

The percentage of private security personnel now licensed in St. Louis is much higher than in 1975. This is evidenced by the fact that this 15-year period.

A major consistency is also noticeable when one considers the data presented in Table 6. Both the data and 1975 studies reveal that a majority of private security personnel fall within 3 of the 18
job classifications: contract security guard, plant protection guard, and bank guard. Fifty-five percent of all licensed watchmen fell within these three categories in 1960, and 75 percent were represented in these three classifications in 1975.

Table 7 portrays the educational attainment of the private security licensees during the two studies. As is also shown in Table 5, years of education completed by licensees have clearly increased from 1960 to 1975. However, in spite of increasing educational achievement by the general population during the period under study, the majority of private security personnel in St. Louis still fail to complete a high school education.

Interestingly, in St. Louis the ranges for several biographical characteristics have not changed during the 15-year period. For example, the age of licensees ranges from 21 to 82, height from 4 feet 8 inches to 6 feet 9 inches, weight from 195 to 370 pounds, and years of education from 2 to 16.

**Composite—New Orleans and St. Louis**

Table 8 presents a comparison of the biographical characteristics of a combined total of 7,164 licensees in New Orleans and St. Louis. It is interesting to note that, although there are slight differences in various characteristics, similarities are indeed more common. For example, of the licensed personnel, 68 percent are contractual in New Orleans and 66 percent are contractual in St. Louis. Proprietary account for 22 percent in New Orleans and 23 percent in St. Louis. Governmental account for 10 percent in New Orleans and 11 percent in St. Louis. Also, 93 percent of licensees are male and 7 percent are female in both cities; the racial composition of Caucasian and minorities are almost equal; age variance is slight; and height and weight variances are statistically insignificant, as are those of education and marital status. Table 8 does reflect a difference between the two cities in the number of licensed persons with arrests and/or conviction records.

Discussions and information obtained from police officials in the two cities indicated that approximately 15 to 20 percent of all licensees have prior experience in private security or public law enforcement, indicating that a substantial majority of those entering private security in the two cities have no relevant training or experience in private security.

Table 9 compares New Orleans with St. Louis in population, index crime, public and private security resources, and labor expenditures. As is quickly noted, there are wide variances between the two cities in virtually all of these characteristics, but the total estimated labor or salary base for public and private protective services in each city is remarkably close.

Using three figures, an attempt was made to estimate the annual per capita expenditures for public law enforcement and private security services in each city. The total expenditures for private security services for each city was derived by extending the private security labor base into a revenue figure, resulting in an annual per capita expense for security services of $148. For St. Louis, the combined estimate was $78,638,000 resulting in an annual per capital expense for security of $340. It is reasonable to conclude that annual expenditures for private security services and goods in both cities exceed the police budgets by at least two million dollars, meaning that the traditional police per capita expenditure is at least doubled when private security is included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Characteristics of Licensed Private Security Personnel, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profile Data</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (American Indian, Spanish-American, Oriental, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (in yrs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 and under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 to 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 and over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Height (average)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weight (average)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital status</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arrests (felicity and misdemeanor)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total arrests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total years of experience</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior public law enforcement experience</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior private security experience</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

* Based on incomplete data.
Table 2. Comparative Data Regarding St. Louis Population, Index Crime, and Public Law Enforcement, And Licensed Private Security Resources and Labor Expenditures, 1960 and 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Elements</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>Percent Change 15-Year Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>560,000</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index crime</td>
<td>23,349</td>
<td>67,736</td>
<td>+190%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned police officers</td>
<td>1,956</td>
<td>2,177</td>
<td>+11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensed private security personnel</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>+263%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis police department salary (labor) budget</td>
<td>$12,988,000</td>
<td>$32,776,000</td>
<td>+132%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated licensed private security payroll (labor) expenditures</td>
<td>$3,664,000</td>
<td>$24,149,000</td>
<td>+562%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Estimated figure.

Table 3. St. Louis Licensed Private Security Personnel 15-Year Comparison by Type of Employer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer Category</th>
<th>1960 No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1975 No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Increase from 1960 to 1975</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Annual Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contractual</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1,062</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietary</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,077</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Characteristics of Licensed Private Security Personnel, St. Louis, Missouri, 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profile Data</th>
<th>Combined Total N=2,977</th>
<th>Contractual N=1,962</th>
<th>Proprietary N=682</th>
<th>Governmental N=333</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Male 93</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female 7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Caucasian 50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black 50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other (American Indian, Spanish-American, Oriental, etc.) 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Average (in yrs.) 42</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 and under 13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55 to 64</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65 to over 25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height (average)</td>
<td>5'9&quot;</td>
<td>5'9&quot;</td>
<td>5'9&quot;</td>
<td>5'9&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight (average)</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (average in yrs.)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>Married 74</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single 13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Divorced 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Separated 4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Widowed 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrests (felony and misdemeanor) 37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traffic arrests 66</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior public law enforcement experience</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior private security experience</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note. Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5. Comparative Profile of St. Louis Licensed Private Security Personnel 15-Year Period, 1960 and 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profile Data</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>+40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (average)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height (average)</td>
<td>5'8&quot;</td>
<td>5'8&quot;</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight (average)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (average years)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests (felony/misdemeanor)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>+11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic arrests</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior law enforcement experience</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior private security experience</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6. St. Louis Licensed Private Security Personnel, 15-Year Comparison by Job Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contract security guards</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,881</td>
<td>+1,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant protection</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank guards</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>+26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College and school security</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>+1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private hospital guards</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>+24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public housing guards</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>+18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apartment and building guards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>+60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail store security</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>+60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City guards</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>+86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park guards</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>+123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored car</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public hospital guards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>+52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alarm guards</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>+13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel and entertainment security</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>+120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church and cemetery guards</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beat watchmen</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction site guards</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad police</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>licensed by Missouri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTALS** 819 100.0 2,977 100.0 +263

Note: Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

### Table 7. Years of Education Completed by St. Louis Licensed Private Security, 1960 and 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest Level Attained</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>+250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 (High school graduation)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>+132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 and above</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

### Table 8. Composite Characteristics of Licensed Private Security Personnel in Two American Cities (New Orleans and St. Louis), 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job</th>
<th>New Orleans</th>
<th>St. Louis</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profile Data</strong></td>
<td>N=4,187</td>
<td>N=2,977</td>
<td>N=7,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 and under</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35 to 44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45 to 54</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55 to 64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65 to 74</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75 and over</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height (average)</td>
<td>5'9&quot;</td>
<td>5'9&quot;</td>
<td>5'9&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight (average)</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (average years)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martial status</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests (felony and misdemeanor)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic arrests</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior law enforcement experience</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior private security experience</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Elements</th>
<th>New Orleans</th>
<th>St. Louis</th>
<th>Percentage Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>600,000*</td>
<td>560,000*</td>
<td>+ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index crime</td>
<td>41,674*</td>
<td>67,736*</td>
<td>-38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned police officers</td>
<td>1,413</td>
<td>2,177</td>
<td>-35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensed private security personnel</td>
<td>4,187</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>+29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police departments’ salary (labor) budget</td>
<td>$22,846,000.00</td>
<td>$32,966,000.00</td>
<td>-30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated licensed private security payroll (labor) expenditures*</td>
<td>$33,965,000.00</td>
<td>$24,149,000.00</td>
<td>+29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


APPENDIX 3

SURVEY OF CONSUMERS OF PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICES IN THE GREATER PHILADELPHIA AREA

Acknowledgments

The Private Security Task Force wishes to express its gratitude to the persons who responded to the questionnaire. Our appreciation is also extended to Task Force member Ian H. Lennox, Executive Vice President, and the members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Private Security of the Citizens Crime Commission of Philadelphia. Committee members participating were: Fred E. Braemer (Chairman), Executive Committee, Walter Kidde & Company. Inc.; William Bixby, Protection Manager, Gimbel Brothers; Albert L. Foerter, Managing Director, Lord and Taylor, Jenkintown, Pa.; Robert L. Lompe, Regional Sales Manager, Burns International Security Services, Inc.; Robert Frederick, Pennsylvania Joint Council on the Criminal Justice System; Thomas F. McDermott, President, General Security System, Inc.; Millard Meers, Security Specialist, School District of Philadelphia; and William C. Miller, William C. Miller and Associates. Special acknowledgment is due to Patricia Murray and Belle Matricardi for their assistance in the preparation of the mailing of the questionnaire.

Historical

At the first Private Security Task Force meeting in April 1975, members expressed concern over the lack of research in private security generally, and specifically in terms of consumers of those services. (As used in the context of the report as well as in this survey, the term "consumers" refers to those persons who employ contract security services or employ their own security personnel.)

The Task Force staff began preparation of the questionnaire in June 1975, and it was reviewed by the Task Force at its July meeting. Through the cooperation and assistance of Ian H. Lennox, Task Force member and executive vice president of the Citizens Crime Commission of Philadelphia, the Greater Philadelphia area was selected as the target for the questionnaire. In August 1975, the executive director of the Task Force met in Philadelphia with Lennox and the Ad Hoc Committee on Private Security of the Citizens Crime Commission of Philadelphia to review the questionnaire and determine the sample.

The questionnaire was distributed with a cover letter in October 1975, and the respondents had until Nov. 15, 1975, to return the questionnaire.

Methodology of Study and Research Analysis

In preparing the questionnaire, the staff conducted research to determine if any similar consumer studies
had been completed. The main resources located were surveys conducted by the Institute for Local Self Government and published in their report, Private Security and the Public Interest. They identified three targets for their research: (1) employers, (2) employees, and (3) clients. The Task Force study was directed to a combination of employers and clients and, therefore, comparison of responses to this study would be statistically inaccurate. However, the Task Force urges others, who contemplate research regarding consumers, to use both studies as base references.

After preparation, as outlined in the historical section, the questionnaire was mailed from the Citizens Crime Commission to 1,100 companies, firms, organizations, and so forth, in the Greater Philadelphia area. Five hundred and fifty were sent to businesses that were identified by the Ad Hoc Committee on Private Security as reasonably certain to have a security firm. (Throughout this study summary, these respondents are referred to as the control group.) The remaining 550 questionnaires were sent to businesses randomly selected, by taking every eighth name from a mailing list of 4,000 businesses in the Greater Philadelphia area. (These respondents are referred to as the random group.) Both groups, for analysis purposes only, were identified through the codes "Survey of" or "Survey—" at the beginning of the questionnaire. Complete anonymity of specific respondents was maintained, except as stated above.

The questionnaires were returned by the respondents to the Citizens Crime Commission of Philadelphia in stamped, self-addressed envelopes that had been mailed with the questionnaire. The computer analysis was conducted at Western Illinois University in Macomb, Ill.

A statistically significant process has been applied to most of the data in an effort to more clearly reflect the information and opinions of respondents. In the question-by-question summary, the percent of nonrespondents is identified; thus, the percentages presented in a different format to provide more meaningful information, because a percentage presentation would be inaccurate. Questions 5 and 21 are on a weighted scale with 1 = 5, 2 = 4, 3 = 3, 4 = 2, and 5 = 1. Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Response by Item

It should be noted that questions 3, 5, and 21 are presented in a different format to provide more meaningful information, because a percentage presentation would be inaccurate. Questions 5 and 21 are on a weighted scale with 1 = 5, 2 = 4, 3 = 3, 4 = 2, and 5 = 1. Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

### Question 1. Indicate the general nature of your business activity. (Check one.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Retail store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Banking/Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hotel/Motel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Educational institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Multiple answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Restaurant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Office building management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Public utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shopping center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Government agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number indicating only one response</th>
<th>Number indicating more than one response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93 Other or multiple</td>
<td>120 Guard or watchman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68 Central station alarm respondent</td>
<td>68 Central station alarm respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 No response</td>
<td>31 Armored car service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Armored car service</td>
<td>21 Investigator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Roving car patrolman</td>
<td>18 Special event guard (i.e., exhibitions, sports events, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Retail store guard</td>
<td>16 Roving car patrolman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 K-9 (dog) patrol</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 4. Our business utilizes the following to perform security services. (Check as many as appropriate.)

- Contract Security Personnel
  - Full time
  - Less than full time
  - Both
- Proprietary security personnel (own personnel)
  - Full time
  - Less than full time
  - Both

Percent of those responding:

- Contract Security Personnel: 51
  - Full time: 54
  - Less than full time: 40
  - Both: 6

- Proprietary security personnel (own personnel): 30
  - Full time: 68
  - Less than full time: 22
  - Both: 10

Question 5. For which of the following reasons does your business employ private security services? Please rank them numerically as to the five most important with number one as most important.

- To prevent (and detect) potential criminal activity
- To protect property
- To detect fire and safety hazards
- To check entry and exit of personnel and vehicles
- To reduce actual criminal activity
- To reduce insurance rates
- To monitor equipment and/or processes
- To meet compulsory insurance requirements
- To comply with Federal, State, or local regulations
- Requirement for business contract(s)

Weighted Points:

- To prevent (and detect) potential criminal activity: 417
- To protect property: 404
- To detect fire and safety hazards: 297
- To check entry and exit of personnel and vehicles: 252
- To reduce actual criminal activity: 234
- To reduce insurance rates: 92
- To monitor equipment and/or processes: 81
- To meet compulsory insurance requirements: 59
- To comply with Federal, State, or local regulations: 35
- Requirement for business contract(s): 13

Number marked with "X" only—not ranked:

- Requirement for business contract(s): 0

Question 6. How often do you have personal or telephone contact with your private security personnel?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervisors</th>
<th>Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hourly</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About twice each week</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About twice each month</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 7. Do new security personnel receive classroom training? (If yes, please indicate number of hours.)

- No: 50
- Yes, 1 to 100 hours annually—26% receive 6 hours or less: 18
- Yes, 1 to 100 hours annually—47% receive 16 hours or less: 50
- Yes, 1 to 100 hours annually—83% receive 40 hours or less: 32
- Do not know: 15%

Question 8. Do new security personnel receive on-the-job training? (If yes, please indicate number of hours.)

- No: 13
- Yes, 1 to 100 hours annually—32% receive 12 hours or less: 65
- Yes, 1 to 100 hours annually—58% receive 24 hours or less: 22
- Yes, 1 to 100 hours annually—80% receive 40 hours or less: 22
- Do not know: 13%

Question 9. Do supervisors of security personnel receive classroom training? (If yes, please indicate number of hours.)

- No: 43
- Yes, 1 to 100 hours annually—36% receive 6 hours or less: 50
- Yes, 1 to 100 hours annually—50% receive 16 hours or less: 34
- Yes, 1 to 100 hours annually—86% receive 40 hours or less: 16
- Do not know: 16%

Question 10. Do supervisors of security personnel receive on-the-job training? (If yes, please indicate number of hours.)

- No: 28
- Yes, 1 to 100 hours annually—28% receive 24 hours or less: 42
- Yes, 1 to 100 hours annually—69% receive 40 hours or less: 30
- Yes, 1 to 100 hours annually—86% receive 60 hours or less: 30
- Do not know: 30%
- No response: 17%

Question 11. In your opinion, the amount of training security personnel receive is: (Please place "X" on scale.)

- Too much: 11%
- About right: 48%
- Inadequate: 33%

Question 12. In your opinion, the amount of training supervisors of security personnel receive is: (Please place "X" on scale.)

- Too much: 12%
- About right: 57%
- Inadequate: 26%
Question 13. The best security supervisors are persons who:

Percent of those responding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have specialized training, education, or experience in security services</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have public law enforcement experience</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are promoted from nonsecurity positions within your business</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 14. Do security personnel carry a firearm while on duty?

Percent of those responding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. No</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Yes (Please check.)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. at all times</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. nearly always</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. about half the time</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. seldom</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. No response</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 15. Do you feel it is necessary for security personnel to carry firearms while on duty?

Percent of those responding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. No</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Yes</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Occasionally</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. No response</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 16. If security personnel carry a firearm, did you request that they be armed?

Percent of those responding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. No</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Yes</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. No response</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 17. Have you requested the discharge or discharged any security personnel for misuse of firearms?

Percent of those responding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. No</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. No response</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 18. Have you ever witnessed security personnel overstepping authority while handling an incident (such as using excessive force, detaining someone falsely, conducting illegal search, etc.)?

Percent of those responding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. No</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Yes, but only once</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Yes, several times</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Yes, frequently</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. No response</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 19. Are there certain types of “criminal” activities (employee theft, loitering, assault, etc.) which security personnel encounter which are not reported to public law enforcement agencies?

Percent of those responding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. No</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Yes</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. No response</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 20. I have found our private security services are more efficient or effective when:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Weighted points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Color, style, etc. of uniforms and badges are not very important in</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terms of efficiency and effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniforms and badges are very similar to public law enforcement</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniforms and badges are clearly different from public law enforcement</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 21. Of the following criticisms of private security, which in your view are the most frequent problems occurring in your business? (Please rank them numerically as to five most important with number one as most important.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criticism</th>
<th>Number marked with &quot;X&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate training</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor wage scale</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undependability of personnel</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate supervision</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate background checks or personnel</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel unfamiliar with legal powers</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of concern by management for interests of personnel</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonreporting of criminal justice</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel dishonesty</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking or drug problem</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management dishonesty and poor business practice</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misuse of weapons</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive use of force</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 22. Indicate if you have measured the effectiveness of security services within your business in terms of the following possible variables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Reduction in volume of crime</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Reduction in direct dollar loss to crime</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Increased number of criminal suspects</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apprehended</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Greater maintenance of peace and order</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of those responding: 61%, 39%, 27%, 55%, 45%, 31%, 30%, 70%, 36%, 71%, 29%, 26%, 5%

Question 23. What is your opinion as to the overall effectiveness of your security services? (Please place "X" at any appropriate place on scale.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>13%</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>43%</th>
<th>13%</th>
<th>6%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very effective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not effective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 24. Have you ever changed your source for security services?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Percent of those responding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. No</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Yes (Please indicate type of change.)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of those indicating yes:

1. company personnel to contract personnel | 17 |
2. contract personnel to company personnel | 12 |
3. one contract company to another contract company | 62 |
4. not applicable | 3 |
5. Please describe reasons for changes indicated above._ Primary reasons given were economic and lack of qualified personnel. | 6 |

c. No response | 10% |

Question 25. If the qualifications of the personnel and/or the quality of the security services could be improved, would you be willing to invest the additional funds?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willing to invest</th>
<th>Percent of those responding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. No (Please briefly state your reasons.)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most indicated broad economic reasons such as lack of funds because of general business climate or concern that they were spending the maximum allowable for security services. | 12% |

c. No response | 12% |

Question 26. As a user of private security services, do you feel the benefits of private security outweigh the costs?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinions</th>
<th>Percent of Those responding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. No (Please briefly explain.) Most felt that neither the personnel or equipment, or combination of both, were effective.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. No response</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 27. Please indicate additional recommendations, criticism or other comments which may contribute on how to improve security services at your business or security services in general.

23 persons responded to the question and their comments can broadly be defined as concern for personnel, equipment, economic issues, and the interrelationships of these items.
APPENDIX 4
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES OFFERING EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR PRIVATE SECURITY

Reference Key
AA—Associate of Arts
AAS—Associate of Applied Science
AS—Associate of Science
BS—Bachelor of Science
CERT—Certificate
CO—Courses Only

Institution

ALABAMA
Jacksonville State University
Pelham Road
Jacksonville (36265)

Jefferson State Junior College
2601 Carson Road
Birmingham (35215)

ARIZONA
Phoenix College
1202 W. Thomas Road
Phoenix (85013)

Note: Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of this information. For specific information about programs, contact the colleges or universities.


Institution

Address

Programs offered

Two year

Four year

CALIFORNIA
California Lutheran College
60 Olton Road
Thousand Oaks (91360)
CO

California State University—Los Angeles
5151 State Univ. Dr.
Los Angeles (90032)
CO

California State University—Sacramento
6000 Jav
Sacramento (95819)

Chabot College
2555 Hesperian Blvd.
Hayward (94545)
AA

Fresno City College
1101 E. University Ave.
Fresno (93741)
AS

Golden West College
15744 Golden West
Huntington Beach (92647)
AA

Long Beach City College
4901 E. Carson
Long Beach (90808)
AA

Mira Costa College
One Barnard Drive
Oceanside (92054)
CO

Ohlone College
650 Washington Blvd.
Fremont (94537)
CO

Passadena City College
1570 E. Colorado
Pasadena (91106)

Rio Hondo College
3600 Workman Mill Road
Whittier (90608)
AS

San Joaquin Delta College
5151 Pacific Ave.
Stockton (95207)
CO

San Jose State University
125 S. Seventh
San Jose (95192)

Santa Ana College
1530 W. Seventeenth
Santa Ana (92706)
CO

West Hills College
300 Cherry Lane
Coalinga (93210)
CO

COLORADO
Arapahoe Community College
3900 S. Santa Fe Drive
Littleton (80120)
CERT

CONNECTICUT
Housatonic Community College
510 Breakfast Ave.
Bridgeport

Rts. 6 and 177
Farmington (06032)
CERT

371
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Programs offered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two year</td>
<td>Four year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLORIDA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bexar County College</td>
<td>16400 N.W. 32nd Ave. Miami (33054)</td>
<td>BS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broward Community College</td>
<td>3501 S. W. Davie Road Fort Lauderdale (33314)</td>
<td>AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manatee Junior College</td>
<td>P.O. Box 1849 Bradenton (33506)</td>
<td>AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm Beach Junior College</td>
<td>S. Congress Isle Lake Worth (53460)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Fe Community College</td>
<td>P.O. Box 1530 Gainesville (32601)</td>
<td>AA &amp; AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEORGIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus College</td>
<td>Algonquin Drive Columbus (31907)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valdosta State College</td>
<td>Valdosta (31601)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLINOIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belleville Area College</td>
<td>2555 West Blvd. Belleville (62221)</td>
<td>AAS &amp; CERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College of Lake County</td>
<td>19351 W. Washington Grayshale (60020)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois Central College</td>
<td>P.O. Box 2400 East Peoria (61611)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joliet Junior College</td>
<td>1216 Houcholt Ave. Joliet (60436)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis and Clark Community College</td>
<td>Godfrey Road Godfrey (62035)</td>
<td>AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loop College</td>
<td>64 E. Lake Chicago (60601)</td>
<td>AA &amp; AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McHenry County College</td>
<td>6200 N.W. Hwy. Crystal Lake (60014)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moraine Valley Community College</td>
<td>10900 S. 88th Ave. Palos Hills (60465)</td>
<td>AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie State College</td>
<td>1970 S. Halsted Chicago Heights (60411)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sangamon State University</td>
<td>Shepherd Road Springfield (62708)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Illinois at Chicago Circle</td>
<td>Box 4548 Chicago (60608)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOWA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Des Moines Area Community College</td>
<td>P.O. Box 1849 Ankeny (50021)</td>
<td>AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muscatine Community College</td>
<td>152 Colorado Muscatine (52761)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Ambrose College</td>
<td>518 W. Locust DePaul (52803)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Iowa Tech</td>
<td>4647 Stone Ave. Sioux City (51106)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANSAS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wichita State University</td>
<td>1845 Fairmount Ave. Wichita (67208)</td>
<td>AS &amp; BS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENTUCKY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Kentucky University</td>
<td>Richmond (40475)</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAINE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Maine Vocational Technical Institute</td>
<td>Port Road South Portland (04106)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARYLAND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne Arundel Community College</td>
<td>101 College Pk. Arnold (31012)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community College of Baltimore</td>
<td>2901 Liberty Heights Ave. Baltimore (21215)</td>
<td>AA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery College</td>
<td>51 Mannsake Rockville (20850)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Maryland</td>
<td>College Park (20742)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASSACHUSETTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunker Hill Community College</td>
<td>Charlestown (02129)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holyoke Community College</td>
<td>303 Homestead Ave. Holyoke (01040)</td>
<td>AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Address</td>
<td>Programs offered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middlesex Community College</strong></td>
<td>3 Essex Beverly (01915)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Shore Community College</strong></td>
<td>13 Spring Road Bedford (01730)</td>
<td>CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northeastern University</strong></td>
<td>360 Huntington Ave. Boston (02115)</td>
<td>AS &amp; BS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MICHIGAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpena Community College</td>
<td>Alpena (49707)</td>
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<td>Union College</td>
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**Institution**

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<td>City University of New York (John Jay College of Criminal Justice)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Main St. &amp; Younts Road Buffalo (14221)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>College Road Batavia (14020)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hudson Valley Community College</td>
<td>80 Vandenberg Ave. Troy (12180)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamestown Community College</td>
<td>Jamestown (14701)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monroe Community College</td>
<td>1000 E. Henrietta Road Rochester (14623)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>St. John's University, St. Vincent's College</td>
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<td>S.R. 305. Is. 96 Mentor (44003)</td>
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<td>Cincinnati (45221)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>410 Wick Ave. Youngstown (44503)</td>
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<td><strong>OREGON</strong></td>
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**IY: 9974**
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<td>Huntsville (77340)</td>
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<td>Southwest Texas State University</td>
<td>Sun Marqoi (78666)</td>
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<td>The University of Texas at Arlington</td>
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<td><strong>WASHINGTON</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Highline Community College</td>
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<td>Seattle University</td>
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<td>Shoreline Community College</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington State University</td>
<td>Pullman (99103)</td>
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<td><strong>WEST VIRGINIA</strong></td>
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<td>Parkersburg Community College</td>
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<td>West Virginia State College</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WISCONSIN</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Blackhawk Technical Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Wisconsin-Platteville</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Hotel &amp; Motel Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Insurance Association</td>
<td>85 St. John Street</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Box 74</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Retail Federation</td>
<td>1616 H Street, N.W.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>American Society for Industry Security</td>
<td>2000 K Street, N.W., Suite 651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>American Trucking Associations, Inc.</td>
<td>1616 P Street, N.W.</td>
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<td>Washington, DC 20036</td>
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<tr>
<td>Americans for Effective Law Enforcement</td>
<td>State National Bank Plaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suite 960</td>
</tr>
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<td>Associated Locksmiths of America, Inc.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1920 L Street, N.W.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canadian Society for Industrial Security</td>
<td>926 Cansongth Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ottawa, Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K2B SMD</td>
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<td>Central Station Electrical Protection Association</td>
<td>1000 Vermont Avenue, N.W.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee of National Security Companies (CONSCO)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3280 Ponce De Leon Blvd.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Computer Security Institute</td>
<td>43 Boston Post Road/West Main Street</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insurance Crime Prevention Bureau</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Toronto, Ontario</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MIZ 182</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insurance Crime Prevention Institute</td>
<td>21 Charles Street</td>
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<td>Insurance Information Institute</td>
<td>110 William Street</td>
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<td>International Association of Security Services</td>
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<td>International Graphoanalysis Society</td>
<td>325 West Jackson Blvd.</td>
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<td>International Guards Union of America</td>
<td>1070 S. Knox Court</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Denver, CO 80219</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America</td>
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<td>Loss Executives Association</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3426 N. Washington Blvd., Suite 100</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>213 Southwest Jefferson Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suite 231</td>
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<td>Peoria, IL 61602</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Association of Manufacturers</td>
<td>1776 F Street</td>
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**APPENDIX 6**

**SUMMARY OF PRIVATE SECURITY LEGISLATION**

*Primary Source: Responses to a questionnaire distributed by the Private Security Task Force staff in July 1975 to appropriate regulatory agencies in the States and/or the attorney general of those States where regulatory agencies for private security do not exist.*

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<td>National Association of Private Security Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Association of Retail Grocers of the United States</td>
<td>2000 Spring Road, Suite 620, Oak Brook, IL 60521</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Association of School Security Directors</td>
<td>1320 South West Fourth Street, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Auto Theft Bureau</td>
<td>30 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Builders' Hardware Association</td>
<td>1815 N. Fort Myer Drive, Suite 412, Arlington, VA 22209</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Burglar &amp; Fire Alarm Association</td>
<td>1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20006</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Council of Investigation and Security Services</td>
<td>1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, DC 20006</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Crime Prevention Association</td>
<td>1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20006</td>
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<td>National Fire Protection Association</td>
<td>470 Atlantic Avenue, Boston, MA 02210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Retail Merchants Association</td>
<td>100 West 31st Street, New York, NY 10001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Safety Council</td>
<td>425 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, IL 60611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Industrial Association</td>
<td>Union Trust Building, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Sheriffs' Association</td>
<td>1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 320, Washington, DC 20036</td>
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<tr>
<td>Property Loss Research Bureau</td>
<td>20 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, IL 60606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Security Administrators</td>
<td>P.O. Box 358, North Hollywood, CA 91603</td>
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<td>Surety Association of America, The</td>
<td>123 Maiden Lane, New York, NY 10038</td>
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<td>Surety Manufacturers National Association</td>
<td>366 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security Equipment Industry Association</td>
<td>233 East Erie Street, Chicago, IL 60611</td>
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<tr>
<td>Universal Detective Association</td>
<td>P.O. Box 8180, Universal City, CA 91608</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Burglar &amp; Fire Alarm Association</td>
<td>325 7th Street, Oakland, CA 94607</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Association of Detectives</td>
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Private Security Task Force To The National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key To Numbers Used In Summary Of Private Security Legislation

1. Exempt if regulated by public service commission
2. Require 1 year as guard or 3 years as policeman
3. Investigator must have 2 years related experience; guard or watchman must have 1 year related experience
4. 1 year of the 3 year requirement must be met in Florida
5. Require 3 years as police investigator, 5 years as full-time licensed investigator, or 10 years as a police officer.
6. Require 2 years experience for investigator license; require 1 year experience for private patrol operator license
7. Investigator must have 3 years related experience; security patrol operator must have 3 years experience
8. Licensee must have 2 years experience in security or 3 years experience as policeman
9. Require photograph only
10. Require fingerprints only
11. Require a maximum of 10 hours
12. Armed security guards employed in a police capacity shall receive not less than 16 hours
13. Require 30 hours
14. Require 16 hours beyond the 97 hours required for security commission
15. Hours deemed necessary by the Board
16. Require minimum of 16 hours
17. Unarmed guard—4 hours; in-house investigators—28 hours; private detectives—45 hours
18. A person employed by and compensated by a private organization for the purpose of enforcing the ordinances and laws they are empowered to enforce, to secure the premises of their employer and to enforce their rules must complete a 118 hour training program

Source: Responses to a questionnaire distributed by the Task Force staff in July 1975 to appropriate regulatory agencies of the States and/or the attorney general of those States where regulatory agencies for private security do not exist.
APPENDIX B

MINIMUM PRIVATE SECURITY AUTHORITY AS PROVIDED BY CITIZENS' ARREST AUTHORITY

Primary Source: Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, Professor at Law, DePaul University College of Law, Chicago, Ill.


Foreword

Unless specifically provided by commission, deputation, ordinance, or State statute, the arrest authority of private security personnel is the same as the authority for citizens' arrest. This appendix does not summarize those other types of authority (commission, deputation, etc.) but does summarize citizens' arrest authority. Therefore, this appendix should be considered as providing minimum authority for private security personnel in the States indicated.

Introduction

The importance of private security personnel in crime prevention has been emphasized throughout this report. There are times when private security personnel must engage in a variety of protective functions, including arrest and detention of suspected criminals. However, many employers strongly discourage their private security personnel from forming protective functions, such as arrest. Employees are advised to call for the assistance of local law enforcement personnel whenever possible. Nonetheless, sometimes there may be no reasonable opportunity to obtain police assistance. Circumstances such as the time and location of an incident may require that an arrest be made by security personnel. It is, therefore, important that security personnel be aware of what actions to take when confronted with criminal activity.

Generally, unless deputized, commissioned, or provided for by ordinance or State statute, private security personnel possess no greater legal powers than any other private citizen. As a practical matter, however, because of training, experience, and position, security personnel have a greater opportunity to use their citizens' powers.

The power of citizen's arrest is not a simple matter. The arrest power is complex and often ambiguous. It may be filled with legal pitfalls and may depend on a number of legal distinctions, such as the nature of the crime being committed, proof of actual presence, and the time and place of the incident.

Because of these difficulties, the private security worker has to know the laws of the local jurisdiction. Improper action in making an arrest can expose the security worker and his employer to civil suits, involving charges of false imprisonment, battery,
assault, and malicious prosecution. An example of this process is the issuance of improper arrest warrants.

Citizens' Arrest Power

The power of individual citizens to make arrests is derived from the common law, wherein a private citizen under certain circumstances is authorized to perform an arrest by authority of the law should more restrictive and limited statutes not be applicable. The citize...
an arrest on reasonable grounds or belief that such an offense had been committed even though outside his presence. With respect to a felony, a peace officer and a private citizen could make an arrest, regardless of whether the offense was committed in or out of their presence, provided that they had reasonable grounds to believe that the arrestee had committed or was committing a felony. Some cases, however, held that a private person could arrest only for the commission of a felony committed in whole or in part in his presence.3

Although the common law recognized citizens' right to enforce the law, that right was balanced with the danger that officious intermeddlers might abuse the rights of other citizens. Hence, the conflict between these two rights was resolved by judicial limitations to the recognized common law privilege to arrest. This ultimately led to a dual policy bearing limitations to the recognized common law privilege to arrest. This ultimately led to a dual policy bearing

Statutory Analysis of Citizens' Arrest in the United States

To date, 30 States have legislation dealing with arrest by private persons. (See Table 1.) A feature that is common to all of these statutes is the ability of the private person to initiate the arrest wholly on his own authority, as distinguished from other types of statutes that allow or require citizens to assist law enforcement officers when so requested. A large majority of these States allow an arrest for any offense that is made by a peace officer, so long as the felony was, in fact, committed, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the arrestee committed the offense. For lesser offenses, the action resulting in arrest must have been committed in the arrestee's presence. Although 22 States have legislation, only 22 allow arrests for lesser offenses.

The critical problem is what constitutes reasonable grounds. Under the statutes that authorize an arrest based on "reasonable cause" or "reasonable grounds," an arrest can be had in most jurisdictions that these terms generally mean sufficient cause to warrant suspicion in the arrestee's mind at the time of the arrest. In some jurisdictions, these safeguards have been expanded to the rule of suspicion to require a higher standard. Yet, there are no uniform criteria emerging from the numerous decisions on the question. Some of the cases that follow are illustrative of this proposition.

In Poole v. State (Florida),4 the defendant was arrested by a deputy sheriff and charged with stealing a cow. The watchmen had followed the defendant's truck after a game warden had seen the defendant near the pasture from which the cow was taken. The arrest was found to have been on reasonable grounds.

State v. Sorell (Arkansas),5 was a case involving a shoplifter. Store detectives followed the defendant out of the building after suspicious conduct by the latter in the store. The defendant, on confrontation, abandoned the goods, but the female store detective arrested her. The court ruled that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested committed the unlawful act.

An early Illinois case, Kindred v. Stir,6 condemned an arrest based on mere suspicion. Shortly before the arrest, the plaintiff had been seen in the company of several of the area's less reputable characters. The plaintiff's own character was somewhat tainted. The court held that facts insufficient to constitute probable cause for apprehension by a peace officer.

No jurisdiction, with the exception of Texas, holds that an arrest by a private person should be construed as requiring the same standard of probable cause as that required of a peace officer. The exception in Texas appears in the case of Hill v. State, which touches broadly on the Constitution and illegal search and seizure, and illustrates unlawful citizens' arrests. Hill, a black man, was arrested by private cattle watchmen on suspicion of stealing cattle. The watchmen had followed the defendant's truck and arrested the defendant in his presence.

The court held that an arrest by a private person should be construed as requiring the same standard of probable cause as that required of a peace officer. The exception in Texas, however, held that a private person could arrest on reasonable grounds.

At common law, false imprisonment was indictable for lesser offenses, crimes, and indictable arrestee committed the offense. For lesser offenses, the right was balanced with the danger that officious intermeddlers might abuse the rights of other citizens. Hence, the conflict between these two rights was resolved by judicial limitations to the recognized common law privilege to arrest. This ultimately led to a dual policy bearing limitations to the recognized common law privilege to arrest. This ultimately led to a dual policy bearing

### Responsibility for Mistake in Making Citizens' Arrest

The right of citizens' arrest is a very real and comprehensive privilege throughout the United States. It has seldom been abused in the Nation's history and, in fact, has protected parts of the country before public agencies developed to assume the responsibility of law enforcement. Perhaps one major reason for contemporary noninterventionism is the penalties invoked by society when a Good Samaritan errs.

Civil liability for mistake of fact in an arrest by a private person finds its expression in the tort of false imprisonment. Illegal detention or restraint without due process constitutes false imprisonment. Therefore, a lawful arrest without a warrant by a private person does not constitute false imprisonment. An action for false imprisonment does not lie when a private person acts on a reasonable belief that another has committed a public offense.

In Texas appears in the case of Poole v. State, 122 Fla. 841, 177 So. 195 (1932). The arrested was found to have been on reasonable grounds.

The case of People v. Bruchheimer, 133 App. Div. 649, 118 N.Y.S. 188 (1909), holds that reasonable grounds is not a defense but only a factor in mitigation of damages.

The case of People v. No. 35 Check Exchange, Inc., 27 Ill. App. 2d 25, 212 N.E. 2d 133 (1965), holds that reasonable grounds is not a defense but only a factor in mitigation of damages.

An arrest by a private person for a misdemeanor or breach of peace in his presence is justified by statute and common law, with no liability for false arrest, regardless of the strength of the defendant's belief.

For lesser offenses, the right was balanced with the danger that officious intermeddlers might abuse the rights of other citizens. Hence, the conflict between these two rights was resolved by judicial limitations to the recognized common law privilege to arrest. This ultimately led to a dual policy bearing limitations to the recognized common law privilege to arrest. This ultimately led to a dual policy bearing

### Criminal Liability for Mistake of Fact in Citizen's Arrest

An arrest by a private person for a misdemeanor or breach of peace in his presence is justified by statute and common law, with no liability for false arrest, regardless of the strength of the defendant's belief.

For lesser offenses, the right was balanced with the danger that officious intermeddlers might abuse the rights of other citizens. Hence, the conflict between these two rights was resolved by judicial limitations to the recognized common law privilege to arrest. This ultimately led to a dual policy bearing limitations to the recognized common law privilege to arrest. This ultimately led to a dual policy bearing limitations to the recognized common law privilege to arrest. This ultimately led to a dual policy bearing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poole v. State</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>FL 841, 177 So. 195 (1932)</td>
<td>Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State v. Sorell</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>AR 420, 434 p. 429 (1964)</td>
<td>Arkansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindred v. Stir</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>IL 401 (1869)</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164 Tex. Cr.</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>94 S.W. 357 (1907)</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 Poole v. State, 122 FL 841, 177 So. 195 (1932). See also 1 ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF ARREST, 351.

5 See 1 ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF ARREST, 351.

6 Poole v. State, 122 FL 841, 177 So. 195 (1932).


8 Kindred v. Stir, 51 IL 401 (1869).

9 164 Tex. Cr. 225, 94 S.W. 357 (1907).


14 35 CR False Imprisonment, sec. 71.
A mistake of fact negates the existence of the required criminal intent. Thus, the accused is judged according to the facts as they reasonably appeared to him at the time. The following test is applied to determine whether there has been an actual mistake of fact:

1. Would the ordinary reasonable man, in like circumstances, have based his conduct on such an erroneous (though reasonable) assumption of facts?

2. Did the accused, in fact, act under such an erroneous assumption and, in fact, not formulate a criminal intent?

The general defense of mistake of fact is available to a person who is charged with a criminal offense arising out of the erroneous exercise of the privilege of making citizens' arrest. The execution of citizens' arrest is a privilege not a right; therefore, the margin of error is the reasonable-man standard for civil and criminal responsibility. There is, however, considerable discrepancy in the application of this standard in these two areas of the law, and the problem is compounded by wide variations in State practice. Nonetheless, a corollary is to be found between the allowable margin of error in performing an arrest and that of self-defense in defense of others. 25

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>sec. 47, pp. 113-114.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supra</td>
<td>note 23, Bassiouni, pp. 121-122.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Table 1. Statutory Arrest Authority of Private Citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minor Offense</th>
<th>Major Offense</th>
<th>Certainty of Guilt Required</th>
<th>Expectations of Reasonableness</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Minor Offense</td>
<td>Type of Major Offense</td>
<td>Type of Knowledge Required</td>
<td>Type of Knowledge Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alabama</strong></td>
<td><strong>Alaska</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arizona</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arkansas</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For specific authority see referenced state code.

*Table summarizes use of mind arrest and replaces with discretion.

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APPENDIX 9

SUMMARY OF SELECT AVAILABLE DATA ON PRIVATE SECURITY EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS


State legislators, criminal justice planners, private security personnel, and other groups interested in examining the private security industry in their States will find the information in this appendix useful in understanding the numerical impact of private security. Although governments considering implementation of private security legislation will need a more accurate accounting of private security employers and employees than appears here, the data provide a reference point in what otherwise is a statistical void. The figures presented are not comprehensive but rather factual building blocks from which the industry's structure can be determined through further effort.

In addition to the above statistics, the Private Security Task Force conducted two studies that provide useful information on employment in private security. In a study of State regulation of private security, the Task Force reports that in 1976, the private security industry employed 202,000 people in 2,650 service agencies and 1,877 detective agencies nationwide.

The Morton Research Corporation report estimates that there are 222,400 persons employed as contract guards and investigators. In a survey by the editor of Security Letter, data were gathered on 2,121 guard firms and 3,675 detective agencies nationwide. An Alarm Industry Committee for Combating Crime study estimates that there are 300 central alarm stations nationwide as well as nearly 4,000 local or regional installers of alarms. A Wall Street Journal article by Raymond A. Joseph estimates 20,000 persons employed as bodyguards. The American Association of Railroads estimates 3,500 railroad police nationwide. The National Armored Car Association estimates there are 30,000 employed in that industry.

In the United States, private security employment is described in the following manner:

- Alaska: 1,250 persons
- Arizona: 11,300 persons
- Arkansas: 1,600 persons
- California: 19,400 persons
- Colorado: 1,700 persons
- Connecticut: 3,000 persons
- Delaware: 200 persons
- District of Columbia: 2,700 persons
- Florida: 35,000 persons
- Georgia: 1,100 persons
- Hawaii: 1,000 persons
- Idaho: 1,400 persons
- Illinois: 42,000 persons
- Indiana: 1,000 persons
- Iowa: 2,000 persons
- Kansas: 300 persons
- Kentucky: 1,800 persons
- Louisiana: 2,200 persons
- Maine: 100 persons
- Maryland: 2,200 persons
- Massachusetts: 2,000 persons
- Michigan: 35,000 persons
- Minnesota: 1,500 persons
- Mississippi: 1,000 persons
- Missouri: 3,000 persons
- Montana: 100 persons
- Nebraska: 1,300 persons
- Nevada: 1,000 persons
- New Hampshire: 50 persons
- New Jersey: 2,800 persons
- New Mexico: 100 persons
- New York: 40,000 persons
- North Carolina: 1,700 persons
- North Dakota: 100 persons
- Ohio: 14,000 persons
- Oklahoma: 1,300 persons
- Oregon: 2,000 persons
- Pennsylvania: 5,000 persons
- Rhode Island: 100 persons
- South Carolina: 1,000 persons
- South Dakota: 200 persons
- Tennessee: 1,600 persons
- Texas: 27,000 persons
- Utah: 1,000 persons
- Virginia: 1,500 persons
- Washington: 2,500 persons
- West Virginia: 200 persons
- Wisconsin: 1,000 persons
- Wyoming: 100 persons

These figures show considerable variation. However, these estimates do provide a foundation for study and are therefore summarized again as follows: The RAND Report, 1969, stated 222,400 persons were employed in proprietary security and 67,800 persons were employed as contract guards and investigators. The Morton Research Corporation report estimates the total number of private guards and watchmen and private police and detectives at 350,243 in 1970. Frost and Sullivan, 1974, indicated there were 226,300 persons employed in proprietary security and 71,200 persons employed as contract guards and investigators. In a survey by the editor of Security Letter, data were gathered on 2,121 guard firms and 3,675 detective agencies nationwide. An Alarm Industry Committee for Combating Crime study estimates that there are 300 central alarm stations nationwide as well as nearly 4,000 local or regional installers of alarms. A Wall Street Journal article by Raymond A. Joseph estimates 20,000 persons employed as bodyguards. The American Association of Railroads estimates 3,500 railroad police nationwide. The National Armored Car Association estimates there are 30,000 employed in that industry.

In summary, the private security industry in the United States is a large and diverse field with a significant number of employees. The data provided in this appendix offer a reference point for understanding the industry's size and scope.
Table 1. Provides background information on detective and protective services—legal forms, size by receipts, employment size, and single units multisite.

Key points:
- The least number of firms are in the $250,000 and under receipts category.
- Firms in the $100,000 to $999,000 category have the most employees.
- The corporation is the most common legal form.
- Establishments having between 20–49 persons are the most common, followed by employee entities, 10–14 employees, 50–99 employees.

### Employment Size of Establishments

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<th>Number of Establishments</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 employee</td>
<td>632</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 employees</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 employees</td>
<td>284</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 or 5 employees</td>
<td>366</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 or 7 employees</td>
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<td>8 or 9 employees</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 14 employees</td>
<td>399</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 to 19 employees</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 49 employees</td>
<td>803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 99 employees</td>
<td>382</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 or more employees</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 employee</td>
<td>312</td>
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</table>

(Continued on next page)

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The following nine tables summarize data that are considered relevant to a general understanding of the numerical size of private security within their State.

### Receipts Size of Firm

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Firms</th>
<th>Establishments</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
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<tr>
<td>Less than 1,000,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>75,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000,000-9,999,999</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>30,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000,000-99,999,999</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7,062</td>
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<tr>
<td>100,000,000-999,999,999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>50,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000,000-999,999,999</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>19,541</td>
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<tr>
<td>250,000,000-499,999,999</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>19,922</td>
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<td>100,000,000-249,999,999</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>19,561</td>
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<td>50,000,000-99,999,999</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>8,082</td>
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<td>10,000,000-24,000,000</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>749</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less than 10,000,000</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>704</td>
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</table>

### Legal Form of Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Form of Organization</th>
<th>Establishments with Payroll (not all est.)</th>
<th>Employees for week Including March 12</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,026</td>
<td>211,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Proprietor</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corporation</td>
<td>3,325</td>
<td>192,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other or Legal Form Unknown</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>64,54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 | Definition: Standard Industrial Category 7395 establishments primarily engaged in providing personnel for detective, investigative, patrolling, night watching, or personal protection services for businesses and/or individuals. Establishments primarily engaged in maintenance and monitoring of mechanical protective devices, such as burglar and fire alarm systems, are classified elsewhere, but instrumentation of such devices is included in construction. Armored car services are also included in this industry.


3 | Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Ibid., Table 3.

4 | Includes estates, joint ventures, and other legal forms not specifically shown.

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Table 1. Selected Abbreviated Tables for Detective and Protective Services in Standard Industrial Category 7395 (continued)
Table 2. Number of Reporting Units In Standard Industrial Category 7393


<table>
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<tr>
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<td>75</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>473</td>
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<tr>
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<td>298</td>
<td>223</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
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<td>182</td>
<td>269</td>
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<td>97</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>Kentucky</td>
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<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>76</td>
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<td>Maine</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Maryland</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td>97</td>
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Table 3. Number Of Employees In Reporting Units In Standard Industrial Category 7393


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Table 4. Number of Public Law Enforcement Officers in Reporting Units In Standard Industrial Category 7393


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Table 3. Number Of Employees In Reporting Units In Standard Industrial Category 7293 (continued)  

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Table 4. Private Security Task Force Regulatory Agency Survey  

Provides State breakdown of the number of license applications processed and the number of employees registered in those States responding to a Private Security Task Force survey.

Key points:  
- The State with the most processed license applications in 1975 is Florida, followed by California, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and New Jersey.
- The State with the most employees of licensees is California, followed by Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, and Maryland and Michigan (equal).
- The total license applications processed in 1975 is 7,421 in the 31 States responding.
- The total number of employees of those licensed in the 31 States responding is 276,165.

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* Detectives only
** Excludes the private detective licenses and 20 private detective license renewals.
*** Detectives only
**** None
***** Licensed private detective.
****** Total = 12 new licenses, 315 renewals.
******* Total = 20 new licenses, 297 renewals.
******** Total = 20 new licenses, 78 renewals.
********* Security checks—no registration.

(Continued on next page)
Table 4. Private Security Task Force Regulatory Agency Survey (continued)

11 Agencies, private detectives and investigators.
12 Figures as of Jan. 1, 1975.
13 240 private investigative and 32 guard/watchmen and patrol agencies (1975).
16 Figures as of Jan. 1, 1975.
22 304 guard/watchmen and patrol and 1087 private investigative agencies. Employees are not registered at the state level.
23 152 agencies, 159 agents (detectives).
24 Figures for Maryland use the 14,000 total.

Table 5. State Breakdown of Security Consultants Listed in Directory of Security Consultants

Provides a State breakdown of security consultants into three classes who were solicited or volunteered for inclusion in a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration publication.

Key points:
- 28 States are represented.
- 128 consulting entities are covered.
- There are 6,422 employees of the 128 consulting entities.

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Instances where figures for employees showed an estimate, i.e., 4-10, the average between the two figures was used, i.e., 4-10 = 7.

Sources were solicited or screened after voluntarily submitting for consideration.

The three categories of consultants used in the Directory combined (1) private consultants; (2) consultants associated with colleges or universities, and (3) specialized resources, i.e., associations, institutes, schools, authors, publishers, and film producers.

Does not include 5,500 nationwide employees of a California based firm.

* Includes a firm with private security personnel other than consultants.

Does not include 2,800 employees of a government research organization.

* Includes a firm with security personnel other than consultants.

Does not include a 52,000 staff figure for a testing organization based in Maryland.

* Includes a firm with security personnel other than consultants.

Does not include a 5,500 nationwide membership figure for a Washington based association.

1 Does not include 3,500 nationwide employees of a California based firm.

* Includes a firm with private security personnel other than consultants.

Does not include 2,800 employees of a government research organization.

* Includes a firm with security personnel other than consultants.

Does not include a 52,000 staff figure for a testing organization based in Maryland.

* Includes a firm with security personnel other than consultants.

Does not include a 5,500 nationwide membership figure for a Washington based association.
Table 6. American Society For Industrial Security Membership By Region and Subunit, March 31, 1976

Provides data on guards and watchmen in major population centers for the periods 1973-74 and 1975 for which comparable data exist.

Key points:
1. In 57 cities for which comparable data exist, 36 registered increases in the number of persons employed, 21 registered decreases in the number of persons employed.
2. The reporting unit with the largest increase is Houston, followed by Boston.
3. The reporting unit with the largest decrease is Paterson-Clifton-Passaic, followed by Philadelphia.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>REGION III—SOUTHEASTERN</th>
<th>REGION IV—MIDWESTERN</th>
<th>REGION V—SOUTHEASTERN</th>
<th>REGION VI—CENTRAL</th>
<th>REGION VII—GREAT LAKES</th>
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<td>No. of Members</td>
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</table>

Table 7. Guards and Watchmen in Selected SMSA's July 1973 to June 1974 and January 1975 to December 1975

Provides data on guards and watchmen in major population centers for the periods 1973-74 and 1975 for which comparable data exist.

Key points:
1. In 57 cities for which comparable data exist, 36 registered increases in the number of persons employed, 21 registered decreases in the number of persons employed.
2. The reporting unit with the largest increase is Houston, followed by Boston.
3. The reporting unit with the largest decrease is Paterson-Clifton-Passaic, followed by Philadelphia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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(Continued on next page)
Table 7. Guards and Watchmen in Selected SMSA's July 1973 to June 1974 and January 1975 to December 1975 (continued)

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South

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North Central

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Table 8. Guards and Watchmen in SMSA's July 1973 to June 1974 and January to December 1975 (cont.)

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South

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Table 8. Guards and Watchmen in SMSA's July 1973 to June 1974 and January to December 1975 (cont.)

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North Central

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<td>Cincinnati</td>
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<tr>
<td>Davenport-Rock Island- Moline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayton</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Des Moines</td>
<td>7,399</td>
<td>4,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Bay</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>1,562</td>
<td>1,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>2,372</td>
<td>1,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis-St. Paul</td>
<td>2,171</td>
<td>1,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogadore-Muskogee</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omaha</td>
<td>437</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockford</td>
<td>332</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>3,226</td>
<td>2,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sioux Falls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Bend</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>1,283</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterloo</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wichita</td>
<td>217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngstown-Warren</td>
<td>509</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

West

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Industries¹</td>
<td>Non-Manufacturing¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albuquerque</td>
<td>315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaheim-Santa Ana</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakersfield</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued on next page)
Table 8. Guards and Watchmen in SMSA's July 1973 to June 1974 and January to December 1975 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>All Industries</th>
<th>Non-Manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>345''</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles-Long Beach</td>
<td>13,756</td>
<td>12,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaheim-Santa Ana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>1,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>1,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside-San Bernardino</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento</td>
<td>297''</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt Lake City</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>979''</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco-Oakland</td>
<td>3,773</td>
<td>3,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jos</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle-Everett</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>131,997</td>
<td>101,080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 SMSA—Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
2 All Industries includes manufacturing and nonmanufacturing.
3 Nonmanufacturing includes subcategories of public utilities, retail trade, finance, and services.
4 August 1974.
5 November 1974.
6 December 1974.


Table 9. ASIS Survey Of Employment Data

Provides data on the number of persons employed in security organizations of which American Society for Industrial Security members are a part as of September 1975.

Key points:
- The total U.S. membership as of August 1975 is 5,412.
- The total number of responses to the survey questionnaire is 1,788 or 33 percent.
- The percentage of the sample indicating contract security is 26.2 percent.
- The percentage of the sample indicating proprietary security is 49.6 percent.
- The percentage of the sample indicating both forms of security is 24.1 percent.
- The total security employees indicated in all forms is 291,143.
- The total employee projection based on 5,412 members as of August 1975 is 881,245.
- The total employee projection based on 6,439 members as of March 1976 is 1,039,796.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total ASIS Membership in August 1975—5,412</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of contract members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of uniformed employees in members' organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number ununiformed employees in members' organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of proprietary members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of uniformed employees in members' organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number nonuniformed employees in members' organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of both contract and proprietary members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of uniformed employees in members' organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number nonuniformed employees in members' organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Member Responses—1,788

Grand total of number employed in member organization—291,143 (100%)

414
APPENDIX 10

A MODEL BURGULAR AND HOLD-UP ALARM BUSINESS LICENSING AND REGULATORY STATUTE

The Private Security-Task Force believes the importance and significance of this model statute justifies its inclusion as an appendix. However, it should be noted the model statute and commentary were developed and approved by the Private Security Advisory Council (PSAC) and, accordingly, do not necessarily reflect the views of the Task Force.

The following chart is provided to enable the reader to determine which standards and commentaries relate to certain sections of the PSAC Model Burglar and Hold-Up Alarm Business Statute.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSAC Sections</th>
<th>Task Force Standard</th>
<th>Standard Relation to PSAC Sections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Title</td>
<td>Glossary of Terms</td>
<td>Major differences—PSAC more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Purpose</td>
<td>9.1 Addresses need for state regulation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Definitions</td>
<td>3.2 Significant difference in regulatory authority.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Licensing Authority Seal</td>
<td>9.2 Addresses need for subpoena power.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Authority of the Licensing Authority Relating to Rules and Regulations: Petitions</td>
<td>10.1 Task Force licensing includes more security services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Subpoenas; Oaths; Contempt Powers</td>
<td>10.2 Several minor differences in amount of information required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Requirements for Alarm Business license</td>
<td>9.2 Commentaries address investigation aspects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Form of Application</td>
<td>10.1 Task Force licensing includes more security services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Experience or Examination Requirement</td>
<td>10.2 Several minor differences in amount of information required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. License Application Investigation</td>
<td>10.3 Major differences—PSAC more.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

License Application Investigation

PSAC Sections

Task Force Standard

15. Procedure for Approval or Denial of Application; Hearing 10.7 Recommend both surety and insurance. Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
16. License-Surety Company Bond 10.5 Difference in recommended renewal period. Commentary addresses hearing.
17. Renewal of License 9.5 Commentary addresses hearing, notice, and appeal.
18. Application, License and Renewal Fees 9.4 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
19. License—Transferability 11.5 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
20. Licenses—Revocation; Hearing; Appeal; Notices 10.6 Commentary addresses license form.
21. Form of License 10.6 Addresses license certification and its display.
22. Posting and Surrender of license certificate 10.4 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
23. Change in Status of Licensee 11.5 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
24. Issuance 10.4 Difference in time period for notification.
25. Investigation 11.5 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
27. Request for Hearing Upon Receipt of Notice of Denial of I.D. Card Application by Licensing Authority 9.4 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
28. I.D. Cards—Suspension or Revocation; Hearings, Notices 11.7 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
29. Non-Transferability of I.D. Cards 11.6 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
31. Expiration and Renewal During Suspension of Use of an I.D. Card 4.2 Commentary addresses aspect of local regulation.
32. Activities of I.D. Cardholders after Notice of Suspension or Revocation of I.D. Card 4.8 Commentary addresses aspect of local regulation.
33. Local Governmental Regulation of Alarm Businesses or Alarm Agents 4.1 Commentary addresses aspect of local regulation.
34. Judicial Review 4.10 Commentary addresses aspect of judicial review.
35. Reinstatement of a Revoked License or I.D. Card 9.1 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
36. Penalties 9.4 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
37. Severability Clause 9.2 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
38. Creation of Licensing Authority 9.3 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
39. Licensing Authority Membership 9.3 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
40. Oath of Office 9.4 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
41. Terms of Office 9.4 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
42. Vacancies 9.4 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
43. Delegates or Delegated Representatives 9.4 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
44. Compensation of Licensing Authority Members 9.4 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
45. Licensing Authority Seal 9.4 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
46. Authority of the Licensing Authority to Promulgate Reasonable Rules and Regulations 9.4 Commentary addresses hearing aspect.
Table 1. Entity Employment Figures

Based on Directory of Security Consultants¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Represented</th>
<th>Entities Providing Consultant Services²</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>5,780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


²Consultants in the industrial/commercial environment, consultants in the college/university environment, and consultants with specialized functions.
Mr. Richard W. Velde
Administrator
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
633 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20531

Dear Mr. Velde:

As Chairman of the Private Security Advisory Council, it gives me great pleasure to forward this Model Burglar and Hold-Up Alarm Business Licensing and Regulatory Statute developed by the Private Security Advisory Council for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

This document is the culmination of many man-months of volunteer effort by members of the Advisory Council and the Alarm Committee of the Council. To obtain as many divergent views as possible, drafts of the Statute were widely disseminated to interested citizen groups, public law enforcement agencies, the alarm industry, and the private security industry generally. Public hearings on the Model Statute were held during the December meeting of the Advisory Council and all interested parties were invited to present data or views on the Statute. This final document is the end result of the extensive drafting process.

The Advisory Council firmly believes that this Model Statute serves a demonstrated need. It will provide an increased level of protection for the consumers of alarm services, a noteworthy accomplishment. The Advisory Council recommends that LEAA gives the widest possible dissemination to this document. Hopefully, the many states which have indicated an interest in an Alarm Business Regulatory Statute will be guided by this effort of LEAA's Private Security Advisory Council.

With best personal regards,

[Signature]

Private Security Advisory Council
The Model Burglar and Hold-Up Alarm Business Licensing and Regulatory Statute was developed by the Private Security Advisory Council and its Alarm Committee in response to a demonstrated need for state-level legislation to aid the public in the prevention and reduction of crime, protect the consumer of alarm services and products, and improve and upgrade the alarm industry.

Crime has been on the rise for a number of years. To protect itself from the threat of crime, the public has turned to private security for increased protection. The alarm industry, those firms selling, installing and maintaining burglar and hold-up alarm systems, has been providing a significant portion of the private security services now being purchased by the public.

The largest segment of the alarm industry in this country provides honest, efficient, and reliable services. With the increasing demand for alarm services, however, the market opportunities have attracted persons who are not qualified to provide reliable alarm system services or who have no overriding desire to do so. The public and the consumer do not have the knowledge and background to judge the qualifications of an alarm business or to evaluate the installation and performance capabilities of different alarm systems. Thus, the fear of crime provides a target for quick-money opportunists and fly-by-night operators.

The Private Security Advisory Council was established by LEAA to assist in the national strategy to reduce crime. As one of its first projects, the Council, recognizing its obligation to make a meaningful contribution to the nation's effort, selected the development of model legislation designed to upgrade the segment of the alarm industry most deeply involved with the public.

The development of this Model Statute has been a dynamic process and it is expected that the process will continue as the legislation is considered for adoption by those states who choose to accept the recommendations contained in this document.

This Statute was developed through the sincere efforts of many dedicated persons and organizations. These efforts are sincerely appreciated by the Advisory Council.
and the Alarm Committee. Particular appreciation is extended
to Irving Slott, Office of National Priority Programs, LEAA,
whose support, interest, guidance, and patience were critical
to the accomplishment of this document.

The major effort on this Statute was performed by
the PSAC Alarm Committee and special appreciation is due to
the members of that Committee: Robert O. Donnelly, AOP Company,
Chairman; Art Foell, Foell-McCoo Alarm Company; John F. Gibson,
Dictograph Security Systems; Leo A. Guthart, AMERCO; Norval
E. Foulson, Certified Burglar Alarm Systems Inc.; John Feille,
Honeywell Protection Services; Martin H. Reiss, Camwell-Alarmtronics;
W. E. Riker, Holmes Protection, Inc.; Norman Rubin, Supreme
Burglar Alarm Corporation; Robert J. Sweeney; and
R. E. Wilkie, Diebold, Inc. These individuals with hundreds
of years of combined expertise, unselfishly donated several
thousand man-hours of personal time to this project.

The Council also extends its appreciation to Bernard M.
Beerman, Counsel for the Alarm Industry Committee for Combating
Crime, and Dennis M. Crowley, Jr., of The New England Bureau
for Criminal Justice Services, both of whom provided the legal
assistance necessary to this legislative drafting effort.

The Council owes special thanks to the many agencies
and organizations which reviewed and commented on the various
drafts of this Model Statute: the International Association
of Chiefs of Police; the Alarm Industry Committee for Combating
Crime; the Central Station Electrical Protection Association;
the National Burglar and Fire Alarm Association; the Committee
of National Security Companies; and the American Society
for Industrial Security.

Arthur J. Bilek, Chairman
Private Security Advisory Council

1. GENERAL COMMENTARY

HISTORY

The Private Security Advisory Council (PSAC)
was chartered and established by the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (LEAA) in March of 1972
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

This Council, (PSAC), was an outgrowth of a meeting
of private security sector representatives called by LEAA
in December 1971, to discuss the research and development
efforts of LEAA that related to the private sector, the
role of private security in the national effort to reduce
crime, and mutual problems as seen by the private sector.
During the meeting, representatives from the private security
sector overwhelmingly recommended that LEAA establish a
national advisory committee, made up of persons with ex-
pertise in the private security sector, to provide LEAA
with continuing advice on matters of mutual concern. LEAA
followed that recommendation and created PSAC shortly
thereafter.

In September of 1974 the membership of PSAC was
broadened to include representatives of public law enforc-
ment agencies and of consumers of private security services
in addition to the suppliers of such services. Since its
inception, PSAC has worked on a number of tasks related
to security services provided by the private sector, and
has created several committees for such purpose.

On October 2, 1972, PSAC created its Alarm Committee.
The membership of the Alarm Committee was drawn from knowl-
edgeable and experienced individuals from the private alarm
industry. The selection of members was based upon individual
credentials. Committee members were appointed to the Committee
as individuals, not as representatives of their employers.
The mandate to the Alarm Committee from PSAC was to examine
and identify current problems facing the alarm industry in
its efforts to prevent crime and to protect its clients
(who are, largely, members of the public) from criminal
activity.

The Alarm Committee met, catalogued specific problems,
and reported back to PSAC with eleven recommendations for
projects related to problems facing the alarm segment of
the private security industry. Among the problems were:
The false alarm problem,
Lack of statistical data to identify effectively
primary causes of false alarms,
Proliferation of legislation being passed at
several different levels of government to regulate
the alarm industry, and
The absence of governmental regulation entirely
in many areas.

The Alarm Committee recommended that PSAC encourage the
development of legislation at the state level to provide
needed regulation and assure uniformity of requirements and
enforcement.

In February 1973, PSAC voted to draft model state
legislation for the private security industry. It asked
its Alarm Committee to prepare a report on specific areas
where regulation was needed, and to begin drafting model
legislation.

FINDINGS OF THE ALARM COMMITTEE

In August 1973, the Alarm Committee reported its
findings to the PSAC. The following is a verbatim extract
from that report:

"The Alarm Committee believes, on the basis of
its experience, that there are relatively few cities
in the United States which have licensing ordinances
covering the alarm industry. However, in the past
decade a variety of ordinances have been enacted and the
trend seems to be accelerating. Since the Alarm
Committee believes there are no objective facts
upon which to base broader recommendations, the
Committee makes the general recommendation that LEAA
should fund a project whereby a State Model Statute
would be drafted. The Committee believes that where
possible, State preemption is preferable to numerous
city, town and village ordinances because of the
inordinate burden a proliferation of regulations
would place upon the industry and, in turn, the con-
suming public. However, it recognizes that various
'home rule' laws already exist and that some conflict
may be inevitable. The Committee recommends that the

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT MODEL STATUTE

As indicated in its recommendation to PSAC, the Alarm
Committee requested assistance from the Alarm Industry Committee
for Combating Crime (AICCC) and its counsel in drafting the
State Model Statute. Such action proved to be most helpful. Use
of AICCC counsel provided expertise not otherwise available
to the Alarm Committee or PSAC, both of which were operating
without staff support at that time. In addition, counsel for the
AICCC had been working with the International Associa-
tion of Chiefs of Police (IACP) since 1972 in a review of
existing alarm-related legislation and the false alarm problem.
Together they had researched existing and pending legislation
throughout the country. By making use of AICCC counsel's
expertise and experience, the Alarm Committee did not have
to duplicate the research AICCC's counsel had already

PSAC. "Report to Private Security
Advisory Council", August 1973
accomplished. In addition, AICCC and its member organizations had also previously critically reviewed IACP’s model burglar and hold-up alarm systems ordinance, released on May 15, 1974, and thus had experience with the problems associated with legislation in this field.

Working together, the Alarm Committee and counsel to the AICCC prepared a tentative draft Model Statute. The focus of this state-level Model Statute is significantly different from that of the IACP municipal-level model ordinance. The IACP model ordinance had been designed as a practical strategy:

"...to reduce the kind of false alarms which are avoidable by the exercise of reasonable caution in operating alarm systems, by employing proper maintenance and servicing techniques, and by requiring alarm businesses to meet minimum requirements for safety and performance." 5

The Alarm Committee position was that the state-level Model Statute should license the people who are in the business of selling, installing, and maintaining alarm systems, and provide a means for identifying qualified and authorized alarm business employees.

A first draft of the present state-level Model Statute was made available for review by the Alarm Committee in January 1974. Within the Committee there were disagreements on several sections of the Statute. The following were found to be particularly troublesome points:

- Defining the businesses to be regulated;
- Defining the individuals to be regulated and
- Establishing the qualifications for receiving a license under the Statute.

There was also disagreement on whether a state should be given the authority and responsibility to conduct complete background investigations (including Federal fingerprint record searches) under emerging national security and privacy legislation. On this point, the final decision of the Committee was that the consumer is entitled to have reasonable assurance that the person who comes into his home or place of business to install an alarm system does not have a criminal record. It, therefore, recommended

5/"Model Burglar and Hold-Up Alarm Systems Ordinance", IACP (1973), p. 26

fingerprint record searches. All of the above and other language of the Statute was reworked. This process continued until there was a consensus acceptance of the state-level Model Statute by the Alarm Committee.

A Version #2 draft of the Model Statute was then circulated for comment by alarm companies, police departments, and other interested parties. A major re-draft was prepared from the comments received, and this Version #3 of the Model Statute was then submitted again to the Alarm Committee for its review and approval. The Alarm Committee reviewed this new draft of the Model Statute on October 17, 1974. Certain further changes were incorporated in it as a result of this review. That revised draft, Version #4 of the Model Statute, was then forwarded to PSAC as the Model Burglar and Hold-Up Alarm Business Licensing Statute recommended by the Alarm Committee.

The Alarm Committee's final version of the Model Statute was made the subject of public hearings by PSAC on December 17, 1974, at its meeting in Williamsburg, Virginia. Testimony from the industry and from the public was received at that meeting. Following the hearings, PSAC reviewed the draft Model Statute section by section. Drawing upon the expertise of its own members, as well as the testimony received and prior comments of the Alarm Committee, PSAC members recommended certain further changes. Those changes were made, and the final revised draft was reviewed and approved by the PSAC at its meeting in February 1975.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This final version of the state-level Model Statute represents the best efforts of a dedicated group of professionals. Just as there was a spectrum of differing opinions about various sections of the Model Statute within the Alarm Committee and the Private Security Advisory Council itself, as the Statute was being developed, so can one expect a spectrum of opinions about the Model Statute to be voiced as it is placed in the hands of legislators and others at the state level throughout the United States. The Model Statute is not a cure-all. The philosophy behind its development was to identify the real needs for legislation and then to write statutory language to meet those needs. It will provide a mechanism by which a state will know who is in the alarm business within its borders; and it will

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provide consumers with some protection in that it requires alarm businesses and their employees to meet minimum standards. Given its scope, the Model Statute is an excellent start in the right direction; it should now be followed by the development of clear standards and goals for the industry.

Many hours of discussion and debate were involved in the development of this Statute. It is virtually impossible to set forth in this report the "pros and cons" of every point discussed or debated. This section was prepared, however, to present readers with the "legislative intent" of the Alarm Committee and Private Security Advisory Council on key issues which arose.

SECTION 3

The definitions of "alarm businesses" and "alarm systems" do not apply to proprietary systems. The term "Proprietary System" means an alarm system sounding and/or recording alarm and supervisory signals at a control center under the supervision of the proprietor of the protected premises and operated solely for his benefit.

The definition of a Proprietary system was intended to include systems in which one central control center receives signals from numerous protected premises, all owned by the proprietor of the alarm system, but not necessarily under one single roof. However, the term "Proprietary System" was not intended to include "metro" or "cooperative systems" in which a group of proprietors get together and operate an alarm system for the benefit of themselves. Other proprietors are then invited to join the system as owners of the system and to connect their premises to the system. In a sense, they are selling services to themselves. When there is more than one proprietor involved in the supervision and control of the alarm system, the Council intended that such an operation be considered an "alarm business". Another type of system which the Council intended to be characterized as an alarm business is an alarm system owned by the proprietor of a shopping mall or similar entity, and which is available, usually for surcharge, to all establishments renting space within the mall.

Some "Proprietary Systems", as defined in the Statute, have backup signals which transmit to a police department or central station after first having signaled the control center. The Council agreed that if a system met all other requirements of a "proprietary system" and the transmission outside was a backup or delinquency reporting signal only, then the system should not be licensed. The Council equated the backup signal with a control center employee picking up a telephone after receiving an alarm signal and calling the police.
The PSAC intended the definition of "alarm businesses" to include door-to-door salesmen. The definition does not purport, however, to include mail order houses, department stores and the like which sell over-the-counter but do not install, maintain, service, alter, repair, or replace alarm systems at the premises to be protected or a protected premises.

The problem of how to handle subcontractors was raised by the Council. Neither the PSAC nor its Alarm Committee intended to include subcontractors who do not install complete "alarm systems." "Alarm system," as defined, connotes a complete operating system, fully installed. In many states, alarm businesses are required by law to use licensed electricians to place wiring or switches. The alarm business, in such cases, will subcontract that placement, but will retain responsibility for the terminals and final connections at the central station or police department. In cases where a subcontractor is placing equipment only and is not responsible for the installation of the "system," the subcontractor need not be licensed and his employees would not be required to have I.D. cards. In all such cases, the alarm business would be responsible to the consumer for protection of information, the release of which could lead to compromise of the alarm system. However, if a person is responsible for complete installation of the alarm system, he does fall within the definition of "alarm business" even though he is a subcontractor to another alarm business.

Some burglar and fire alarm systems function together as a unit, and in some communities a single communication center receives both burglar and fire alarms. This situation may require that the definition of "alarm system" receive further consideration from a technical standpoint.

SECTION 6 (b)

The Alarm Committee of PSAC in submitting the draft Model Burglar Alarm Statute to the Council explained that the proposed statute provided for the licensing of dealers and minimum qualifications for, alarm businesses and persons employed or engaged by alarm businesses who had access to homes and businesses and to information that could be used to compromise alarm systems. The Alarm Committee stated that it recognized that there is a need to develop what it termed "performance standards" in order to effectively reduce false alarms and upgrade alarm systems generally. It took the position that the development of such standards may take a considerable amount of time and research and that, rather than delay the development and dissemination of a model licensing statute, the Statute and Commentary should emphasize licensing and qualifications for alarm businesses and alarm agents.

PSAC, however, takes the position that in order for the model statute to fully protect consumers, the Licensing Authority should be charged with the responsibility for developing equipment, performance and installation standards and, for this reason, the Council instructed its staff to draft a new section in the Model Burglar Alarm Statute, giving the Licensing Authority the authority to promulgate and enforce standards and specifications for alarm systems after public hearings have been held affording all interested parties an opportunity to be heard and to submit data and views concerning proposed standards.

PSAC has recognized, however, that if each state which adopts the Model Burglar Alarm Statute should immediately begin to hold hearings for the purposes of developing standards for burglar alarm equipment, the installation of alarm systems and for alarm businesses, the result could be a "hodgepodge" of legislation that would result in chaos, not only for alarm businesses and alarm equipment manufacturers, but for the many users of alarm systems throughout the country. Accordingly, the Council has requested that the Alarm Committee of the PSAC consider the protection of life as well as the protection of property. The Council recommends that Section 6(b) of the Statute not be made effective or that hearings not be held until the Alarm Committee has reported to the Council with respect to model standards and the Council has reviewed and recommended such standards to LEAA.

SECTION 7

Within the Alarm Committee, there were conflicting views on whether the Licensing Authority should have subpoena power or be required to go into court to compel attendance of witnesses and production of books, accounts and records. On balance, the Committee felt the Licensing Authority would be better able to administer this statute if it had subpoena power. The PSAC agreed with the Committee.

The PSAC wished to ensure that any trade secrets or information that could possibly compromise the security of an installation would not be generally available to the public under State Freedom of Information Statutes. The language intended to protect such information was hoped that any court holding hearings to compel testimony will hold such hearings "in camera" to protect information from unauthorized disclosure.
SECTION 9

In the testimony of witnesses before the Council during the public hearings, there was a request that the Statute provide for reciprocity. The Alarm Committee had discussed the issue in preparing the Model Statute and concluded that a business that wants to operate in two or more states should get two or more licenses. The Council agreed with the Alarm Committee and rejected that suggestion that reciprocal licensing arrangements be part of this Statute. The same issue was raised and rejected by the Council in regards to Section 24, the issuance of Identification Cards to individuals.

SECTION 10 and 24

The PSAC and the Alarm Committee were in favor of a licensing Statute, however, some members were concerned that the total availability to the public of information required to be furnished under those sections could lead to compromises of security systems. Therefore, the language in Section 7 (b) was included to protect information furnished under these sections as well as information furnished under subpoenas.

SECTION 11 (a)

It was the feeling of the PSAC and Alarm Committee that those employment (such as accountant, administrative clerk, etc.) with an alarm business should not be the experience test. The applicant should have actual experience in the nature and operation of alarm systems.

SECTION 11 (c)

The purpose of the examination requirement is to provide a means whereby individuals who lack actual experience are offered an opportunity to obtain a license if they demonstrate competency. The examination should be developed with the assistance of persons knowledgeable in the alarm business, perhaps industry members.

SECTION 12

The Alarm Committee and PSAC felt that it was important for the public to know that the individuals coming into their home or business to sell, install, or maintain alarm systems were not persons with a criminal history.

SECTION 16

The purpose of the bond is to make applicants demonstrate financial responsibility. Wrongful acts of a material nature which might cause the Licensing Authority alarm business engaging in a criminal conspiracy with a thief to burglarize a protected premises.

Both the Alarm Committee and the Council wrestled with the size of the bond to be required. Since the basic purpose of the bond was to require a showing of financial stability, it was decided that the Statute would call for a $10,000 bond, that amount was the minimum amount for comparably sized businesses and apply those standards to this Statute.

SECTION 19

PSAC tried to provide for the orderly transfer of temporary licenses to facilitate such transfers even if the alarm business engaged in a criminal conspiracy.

The Model Statute intends that temporary I.D. cards be issued only in conjunction with applications for permanent I.D. cards, with the same or similar forms being temporary cards issued. It was suggested that a pre-numbered could be given to the applicant as a temporary I.D. card.
SECTION 25

The Alarm Committee did not want to create a multiplicity of fingerprint records. The Committee expects that once an individual is fingerprinted, the fingerprint cards will be permanently maintained by the Licensing Authority. Upon receipt of a renewal application, the fingerprints on file can be resubmitted to the FBI for a file search, but re-fingerprinting of the individual will not be necessary unless the Licensing Authority has reason to believe the applicant was applying under an alias of a previously approved individual.

SECTION 29

The Council rejected the idea of "portability" for I.D. cards, agreeing with its Alarm Committee that when a person leaves an employer, his I.D. card should be withdrawn. The I.D. card is directly related to the licensing program and links employees with employers. If a person is dismissed and no longer employed when he changes employment, the records of the Licensing Authority will not get updated. Further, the retention of the card may permit its illegal use after a person has terminated with a licensed alarm business.

SECTION 30 (a)

The Alarm Committee recommended, after extensive dialogue, either a three-year or five-year validity period for identification cards. The Committee found no valid justification for a shorter period except the intention of a state to use the cards for revenue production. The Committee did not believe the administrative burden or cost of a shorter period was justified. The Council, after extensive dialogue, recommended a one-year validity period. The Council's actions were based on its intent to maintain control over the issuance of cards and to update, on an annual basis, the licensing Authority records of persons who are going into homes and businesses to sell, install, maintain, or respond to alarm systems.

SECTION 30 (b)

This Section was intended to place a burden on the alarm business to notify the Licensing Authority of serious changes in employee status, such as arrest and conviction, when the alarm business has notice of such changes.

SECTION 33

This Model Statute preempts the authority of municipalities and local governmental subdivisions in the area of licensing alarms companies. The issuance of identification cards to alarm agents, to include the issuance of identification cards to alarm agents, is in conflict with this Statute. In some states, however, the legislatures have given broad authority under charter provisions to certain municipalities or counties. Some states may have legislation which regulates the powers and duties of police and other public officials. Therefore, it is important that this Model Statute be measured against charter, home rule provisions, and existing state law which may affect or be affected by the enactment of this Model Statute.

Most states have laws which to some extent regulate every business operated in the state. Furthermore, municipalities often have licensing laws for businesses operating in the municipality. Therefore, consideration should be given to the manner in which businesses are generally regulated within the state or within local subdivisions of the state. For example, in New York State, there are existing provisions which regulate the conduct of door-to-door salesmen. There are also Federal laws which should be considered. On June 7, 1972, the Federal Trade Commission of the Federal government put into effect a regulation which, among other things, gives a householder a period of 3 days to reconsider a purchase of $25.00 or more made by a door-to-door salesman.

SECTION 33 (a)

Cities and municipalities should be allowed to petition for revocation of a license. The Statute, as originally drafted, did not provide for that and no resolution of the issue was made by the Alarm Committee. Some members of the Committee felt that the purpose of the Statute was to introduce the statewide licensing concept to an industry where none existed and sufficient authority existed in this Statute to cover the area of revocation. PSAC, however, felt that a municipality should be able to petition a Licensing Authority for revocation and added Section 20 (a)(3) to provide that capability.

SECTION 33 (d)

This Section was intended to prevent the proliferation of ordinances. However, the Alarm Committee and PSAC do support the concept of one ordinance adopted by all municipalities which feel the need for regulation at the municipal level.

PART VI, SECTION 38

This Part of the Statute suggests an alternative form for a Licensing Authority. In some states, the commission form might be adopted and could have responsibility for licensing and regulating all components of the private security sector. In such cases, where there is a single agency for all components (alarm, armored car, guard service, and investigations) the Council recommends that all four components be represented on the board. In this Model Statute, the Council has provided an example of a board concerned only with the alarm industry.
PART I. TITLE, PURPOSE AND DEFINITIONS.

Section 1. TITLE.

This Statute shall be known and may be cited as "The Burglar and Hold-Up Alarm Business Statute."

Section 2. PURPOSE.

The purpose of the Statute is to provide uniform procedures and qualifications throughout this State for the licensing and regulation of alarm businesses and the issuance of identification cards to alarm agents and certain other individuals.

Section 3. DEFINITIONS.

For the purpose of this Statute, the following terms, phrases, words and their derivations shall have the meaning given herein:

(a) The term "Alarm Business" shall mean and include any person engaged in the sale, installation, maintenance, alteration, repair, replacement, or servicing of alarm systems or which responds to, or monitors, such alarm systems at a protected premises or at a premises to be protected, and shall include businesses which only manufacture or sell alarm systems and do not sell, service, install, alter, maintain, repair, replace monitor or respond to alarm systems at a protected premises or at a premises to be protected and shall not include "Proprietary Systems."

(b) The term "Alarm Agent" shall mean any individual employed within this State by an alarm business whose duties include the altering, installing, maintaining, moving, repairing, replacing, selling, servicing, responding to, or monitoring an alarm system.

(c) The term "Alarm System" shall mean an assembly of equipment and devices (or a single device such as a solid-state unit which plugs directly into a 100-volt AC line) designed to detect and signal an unauthorized intrusion into a premises or to signal an attempted robbery at a protected premises, and with respect to such signal, public police or private guards are expected to respond.

Fire alarm systems and alarm systems which monitor temperature, humidity or any other condition not directly related to the detection of an unauthorized intrusion into premises or an attempted robbery at a premises are excluded from the provisions of this Statute.

(d) The term "Misdemeanor" shall mean all misdemeanors, except a traffic violation for which the penalty imposed does not exceed One Hundred Dollars ($100.00). If the term "Owner" shall mean a person who holds an interest of 25 percent or more in an alarm business.

(e) The term "Person" shall mean an individual, firm, partnership, corporation, or organization of any nature.

(f) The term "Proprietor" shall mean a person who holds an interest of 25 percent or more in an alarm business.

(g) The term "Subscriber" shall mean a person or business which buys or otherwise obtains an alarm system and has a contract with an alarm business to monitor and/or service the alarm system.

(h) The term "Principal Corporate Officer" shall mean the president, vice president, treasurer, secretary, and comptroller as well as any other person who performs functions for the corporation corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers.

(i) The term "Proprietary System" shall mean an alarm system sounding and/or recording alarm and supervisory signals at a control center solely under the supervision of the proprietor of the protected premises.
PART II. THE LICENSING AUTHORITY.

Section 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF A LICENSING AUTHORITY FOR ALARM BUSINESSES.

The Secretary of State or other appropriate department, agency, or bureau of the State shall constitute the "Licensing Authority" referred to herein and shall have the powers and duties set forth in this Statute.

Section 5. LICENSING AUTHORITY SEAL.

The Licensing Authority shall have a seal, the form of which it shall prescribe.

Section 6. AUTHORITY OF THE LICENSING AUTHORITY RELATING TO RULES AND REGULATIONS: PETITIONS.

(a) The authority to promulgate rules and regulations which are reasonable, proper and necessary to carry out the functions of the Licensing Authority; to enforce the provisions of this Statute; to establish procedures for the preparation and processing of examinations, applications, license certificates, identification cards, renewals, appeals, hearings and rulemaking proceedings are hereby vested in the Licensing Authority.

(b) The Licensing Authority shall promulgate and enforce regulations establishing standards and specifications for alarm systems and alarm equipment sold within this State and for the installation, maintenance, and adjustment of such systems/equipment. Proclamation of regulations pertaining to such standards shall not take place until after public hearings on such proposed standards are held and all interested persons are given an opportunity to submit data and views orally or in writing at the public hearings. Notice of the public hearings shall be given in the manner prescribed by Section 8.

(c) Any interested person may petition the Licensing Authority to enact, amend or repeal any rule or regulation within the scope of paragraph (a) of this Section. The Licensing Authority shall prescribe by rule the form of such petitions and procedures for submission, consideration and disposition.

7/See specific comments on page 8 related to this paragraph and its implementation.
The publication or service of any notice required by this Section shall be made not less than thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of the proposed adoption, amendment, or repeal of the rule or regulation, as the case may be, except as otherwise provided by the Licensing Authority upon good cause found and published with the notice.

PART III. LICENSING.

Section 9. REQUIREMENTS FOR ALARM BUSINESS LICENSE.

(a) It shall be unlawful and punishable as provided in Section 36 of this Statute, for any person to engage in the alarm business within this State without having first obtained an alarm business license from the State Licensing Authority, subject to paragraph (b) hereof.

(b) Every person engaged in the alarm business within the State on the effective date of this Statute shall have sixty (60) days to apply to the Licensing Authority for a license to operate an alarm business. Any such person filing a timely application may continue to engage in the alarm business pending a final determination of such application.

Section 10. FORM OF APPLICATION.

(a) Application for licenses required by the provisions of this Statute shall be filed with the Licensing Authority on a form provided by the Licensing Authority. If the applicant is an individual, the application shall be subscribed and sworn to by such person. If the applicant is a corporation and does not reside, operate any business or is not employed within the State, or in the event the applicant is a firm or partnership and no owner or general partner resides, operates a business or is employed within the State, then the application must also be subscribed and sworn to by the individual having the authority and responsibility for the management and operations of the alarm business within the State. The name and address of the alarm business and the location or locations where it intends to operate shall be specified.

(b) If the applicant is a corporation, the application shall specify the date and place of its incorporation, the location of the applicant's principal place of business, a list of the principal corporate officers and the business address, residence address and the office or position held by each principal corporate officer.

(c) If the applicant is a partnership, the application shall specify the location of the applicant's principal place of business and the names, business addresses and residence addresses of each partner.

(d) The application shall include the following information for each individual required to subscribe and swear to:

(1) The individual's full name, business address, and residence address;

(2) The individual's business telephone number;

(3) The individual's date and place of birth;

(4) The individual's social security number;

(5) The name and address of the individual's present place or places of employment or self-employment for the past three (3) years and the length of time engaged therein;

(6) A list of all felony and misdemeanor convictions of such individual in any jurisdiction;

(7) Two sets of classifiable fingerprints; and

(8) A statement as to whether the individual has ever been denied a license or permit in any jurisdiction to engage in the alarm business or has had such license or permit revoked.

(e) The application shall include the following information concerning the applicant:

(1) The name and address of the alarm business and the location or locations where it intends to operate within the State.

(2) A statement as to the length of time the applicant has been engaged in the alarm business and where engaged, and the date when the alarm business or businesses commenced operation in the State or when the alarm business intends to commence such operation;
INVESTIGATION.

reasonably deem necessary to determine whether the applicant or

Statute or to establish the truth

of the facts set forth in the

individual signing the application meets the requirements of this

state

section 11.

requirement of paragraph (c) of this section

in the alarm business.

date of this statute shall

requirements of this section. If the applicant is

for a reasonable time the period within which the applicant shall

(c) and (f) the licensing Authority

comply with this section.

(f) The licensing Authority may require that the application

include any other information which the licensing Authority may

reasonably deem necessary to determine whether the applicant or

individual signing the application meets the requirements of this

Statue or to establish the truth of the facts set forth in the

application.

(g) Any individual signing a license application must be at

least the legal age that licensing generally established in the

state years of age.

Section 11. EXPERIENCE OR EXAMINATION REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Every alarm business shall meet either the experience

requirement of paragraph (c) of this Section before it may engage

in the alarm business.

(b) Applicants engaged in the alarm business on the effective

date of this statute shall have six (6) months to comply with the

requirements of this Section. If the applicant is unable within

two months to name an individual meeting the requirements of paragraphs

(c) and (f), the licensing Authority may, for good cause shown, extend

a reasonable time the period within which the applicant shall

comply with this Section.

(c) Experience Requirement: To comply with this requirement,

at least one individual who is an owner, officer, partner or employee

of the applicant shall establish that he was engaged in, or employed

by an alarm business, in sales, service or installation for an

aggregate period of three (3) years prior to filing this application

or was employed by the owner of a proprietary system to

install the system for a similar three (3) year period. Such

individual shall file with the licensing Authority sworn statements of

such experience by at least two citizens of the community or commu-

nity

such individual was so engaged or employed. The

individual in which such individual was so engaged or employed, the

paragraph shall be a person who devotes a substantial portion of

his time to engaging in and/or supervising the sale, installation

or servicing of alarm systems on behalf of the applicant.

(d) For the purposes of the three-year experience requirement

of paragraph (c) of this Section, employment by or engagement in an

alarm business or a proprietary system in one or more communities

within the State may be aggregated. However, in the event that the

individual upon whom the applicant relies to comply with paragraph

(c) of this Section also possesses experience performed in two or more

states, the applicant must submit sworn statements of two or more

citizens from each such state as to the experience of such individual.

(e) If the licensing Authority determines that the applicant

has not satisfactorily complied with paragraph (c) of this Section

or that the prior experience of the individual when the applicant

relies upon to comply with paragraph (c) of this Section is not

sufficient to permit the applicant to engage in the alarm business.

it may require applicant to comply with paragraph (f) of this Section.

(f) Examination Requirements: The licensing Authority shall

prepare and administer at least twice annually an examination designed

to measure an individual's knowledge and competence in the alarm

business. It may administer separate examinations to test an individ-

al's knowledge and competence with respect to the type and nature

of the alarm business in which the applicant proposes to engage. The

individual who qualifies under this paragraph shall be required to

devote a substantial portion of his time to engaging in and/or

supervising the sale, installation or servicing of alarm systems

on behalf of the applicant.

(g) In the event that the individual upon whom the applicant

relies upon to comply with paragraph (c) to qualify under paragraph

(f) of this Section shall, within a period of three years after

such compliance or qualification, for any reason cease to perform

his duties on a regular basis, the alarm business shall promptly

notify the licensing Authority by certified or registered mail and

shall obtain, as promptly as possible, a substitute eligible indivi-

dual acceptable to the licensing Authority. If the alarm business

cannot obtain such substitute eligible individual within six (6)

months from and after the disqualification of such individual, the

licensing Authority may revoke the alarm business license or, in

its discretion, extend for a reasonable time the period for

obtaining a substitute qualifying individual; or the licensing

Authority may determine, based upon the experience and performance

of the alarm business, that the alarm business need not obtain such

substitute qualifying individual.

Section 12. LICENSE APPLICATION - INVESTIGATION.
request that the appropriate State agency compare the fingerprints
of the individual or the individuals signing the application with
fingerprint files filed with the Division of Criminal Identification,
Records and Statistics of the State Department of Correction, or its
equivalent. The Licensing Authority, or the state agency comparing
the fingerprints, shall also submit the fingerprints to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for a search of the fingerprint files of that
agency to determine if the individual fingerprinted has any convictions
recorded in the FBI files.

Section 13. ACTION ON LICENSE APPLICATION.

Within thirty (30) days after receipt of an application,
the Licensing Authority shall determine whether the applicant has
met the requirements of this Statute. In the event that additional
information is required from the applicant by the Licensing Authority
has not submitted all of the
information, the thirty (30) day period for action by the
Licensing Authority shall commence when all such information has been
received by the Licensing Authority.

Section 14. GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF APPLICATION.

The Licensing Authority may deny the application for alarm
business license if it finds that the applicant, or the individual
having the authority and responsibility for the management and
operation of the applicant's alarm business within the State, or the
individual upon whom the applicant relies to comply with paragraph (c)
or (f) of Section 11, or any of the applicant's owners, partners or
principal corporate officers have:

(a) Committed any act, which, if committed by a licensee,
would be grounds for the revocation of a license under Section 20(a)
of this Statute;

(b) While unlicensed, knowingly and willfully committed, or
aided and abetted in the commission, of any act for which a license
is required by this Statute;

(c) Been convicted in any jurisdiction of a felony or a mis-
demeanor, if the Licensing Authority finds that such conviction
reflects unfavorably on the fitness of the applicant to engage in
the alarm business.

Section 15. PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OR DENIAL OF APPLICATION;
HEARINGS.

(a) The procedure of the Licensing Authority when approving or
deny an application shall be as follows:

(1) If the application is approved, the Licensing Authority
shall notify the applicant in writing that, upon compliance
with Section 16 of this Statute, a license will be
issued. Such notification shall state that the license
so issued will expire in two (2) years, unless renewed
in accordance with Sections 17 and 18 of this Statute,
and shall set forth the time within which application
for renewal must be made.

(2) If the application of the Alarm Business is denied,
the Licensing Authority shall notify the applicant
in writing and shall set forth the grounds for denial.
If the grounds for denial are subject to correction,
the applicant shall be given ten (10) days after
receipt of such notice (or upon application, a reason-
able additional period of time) within which to make
the required correction.
SURETY TRANSFERABILITY.

Section 16. LICENSE - SURETY COMPANY BOND.
(a) No license shall be issued under this Statute until the applicant files with the Licensing Authority a surety bond made payable to the State in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) conditioned to recover against the principal, by reason of wrongful acts of any material nature knowingly engaged in by the licensee in the conduct of its business. No party other than the Licensing Authority may recover against the bond required by this Section except that customers or subscribers of such licenses may also file to recover against the bond in the event of the bankruptcy or financial insolvency of the surety. The surety bond must be written by a company authorized to do business in this State and approved by the Licensing Authority with respect to its form, manner of execution and sufficiency.
(b) At all times every licensee shall maintain in full force and effect on file with the Licensing Authority the surety bond required by this Statute. Failure to do so shall be unlawful and punishable as provided in Section 36 of this Statute.
(c) A bond executed and filed with the Licensing Authority pursuant to this Statute shall remain in force and effect until the surety has terminated future liability by notice to the Licensing Authority thirty (30) days in advance of termination.
(d) The sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) in cash may be deposited with the State in lieu of the surety bond required by this State.

Section 17. RENEWAL OF LICENSE.
Each license shall expire two (2) years after its date of issuance. Application for renewal of a license must be received by the Licensing Authority on a form provided by the Licensing Authority not less than thirty (30) days prior to the expiration date of the license. Application for renewal of a license may be made by any person other than the original licensee. The successor, heir, devisee, or personal representative of the original licensee is entitled to file an application for renewal of the license. The Operator shall be subject to the same requirements and procedures set forth in Sections 11 through 16 of this Statute to the extent such Sections are applicable.

Section 18. APPLICATION, LICENSE AND RENEWAL FEES.
(a) A non-refundable application fee of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) shall be remitted with each application to cover investigative fees.
(b) There shall be a biennial license fee of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) which shall also be remitted with the application but which will be refunded if the application of the alarm business is denied.
(c) The licensee shall submit a completed renewal application form not later than thirty (30) days before the expiration of the alarm business license.
(d) The fee to cover the cost of processing the renewal application and the biennial fee of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00).

Section 19. LICENSE - TRANSFERABILITY.
(a) No license issued pursuant to the provisions of this Statute shall be assigned or transferred, either by operation of law or otherwise, to any other corporation, firm, or individual.
(b) If the license is held by an owner other than a corporation and Such owner shall die, become disabled or otherwise cease to engage in the alarm business, the successor, heir, devisee, or personal representative of Such deceased owner shall file an application with the Licensing Authority, which form shall include the same general information required by Section 16 of this Statute. The successor, heir, devisee, or personal representative shall be subject to the same general requirements and procedures set forth in Sections 11 through 16 of this Statute to the extent such Sections are applicable.
(c) In the event that a sale, assignment or transfer of an alarm business license is consummated then the purchaser, assignee or transferee shall be subject to the same general requirements and procedures set forth in Sections 11 through 16 of this Statute to the extent such Sections are applicable.
(d) The Licensing Authority may, within its discretion, extend the period of time for filing the application required by (b) and (c).
Section 20. LICENSES - REVOCATION; HEARINGS; APPEALS; NOTICES.

(a) Licenses for alarm businesses may be revoked by the Licensing Authority in the manner hereinafter set forth if the licensee or any of its officers, partners, principal corporate officers, or the individual having the authority and responsibility for the management and operation of the alarm business within the State, are:

1. Found to have violated any of the provisions of this Statute or any rule or regulation of the Licensing Authority which violation the Licensing Authority determines to reflect unfavorably upon the fitness of the licensee to engage in the alarm business;

2. Found to have knowingly and willfully given any false information of a material nature in connection with an application for a license or a renewal or reinstatement of a license or in a notice of transfer of an alarm business licensed under this Statute;

3. Found to have been convicted in any jurisdiction of a felony or a misdemeanor if the Licensing Authority determines that such conviction reflects unfavorably upon the fitness of the applicant to engage in the alarm business;

4. Found to have committed any act while the license was not in effect which would be cause for the revocation of a license, or grounds for the denial of an application for a license;

5. Upon petition to the Licensing Authority by a local governmental subdivision, found to have been convicted of violation of a municipal ordinance which violation the Licensing Authority determines to reflect unfavorably upon the fitness of the licensee to engage in the alarm business.

(b) Prior to revocation of a license, the Licensing Authority shall promptly notify the licensee of its intent to issue an order for revocation, setting forth in reasonable detail the grounds for revocation. Within Fifteen (15) days of receipt of such notice, the licensee may request a hearing. Within ten (10) days after the filing of a request for hearing by the licensee, the Licensing Authority shall, upon due notice to the licensee, schedule a hearing to be held within Fifteen (15) days after such notice is mailed to the licensee, unless extended at the request of the licensee. The licensee shall have the right to make an oral presentation at the hearing, including the right to present witnesses and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The licensee may be represented by counsel. If the hearing is held before a hearing officer, such officer shall submit his report in writing to the Licensing Authority within ten (10) days after the hearing. The Licensing Authority shall issue its decision within ten (10) days after the hearing or within ten (10) days after receiving the report of the hearing officer. The decision of the Licensing Authority shall be in writing and shall set forth the Licensing Authority's findings and conclusions. A copy thereof shall be promptly mailed to the principal office of the licensee within the State.

(c) Within ninety (90) days after the licensee has exhausted all rights of appeal under this Statute, or, if the licensee does not seek a hearing after receipt of a notice of intent to revoke from the Licensing Authority then within sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice, the licensee shall notify all of its subscribers within the State of such revocation and maintain in its records a copy of such notice. The licensee shall cease to perform any services for which it has been licensed under this Statute within sixty (60) days of its receipt of the final notice of intent to revoke from the Licensing Authority.

(d) Under circumstances in which the Licensing Authority determines that the public health, welfare or safety may be jeopardized by the termination of a licensee's services, the Licensing Authority may, upon its own motion or upon application by the licensee or any party affected by such termination, extend the time for the termination of the licensee's operations, subject to such reasonable, necessary and proper conditions or restrictions as it deems appropriate.

(e) After the Licensing Authority has issued a notice of intent to revoke a license, the licensee may request that it be permitted to continue to operate subject to the terms of a written order of consent issued by the Licensing Authority, requiring the licensee to correct the conditions set forth as grounds for revocation in the notice of intent to revoke and imposing reasonable conditions and restrictions on the licensee in the conduct of its business. The Licensing Authority may, in its discretion, grant or deny such a request and may stay or postpone any proceeding being conducted pursuant to paragraph (b) of this Section. If the Licensing Authority grants an order of consent may be requested at any time during revocation proceedings and stay of pending proceedings during such negotiations shall be within the sole discretion of the Licensing Authority. If revocation proceedings are before a court and the Licensing Authority and licensee have agreed upon the terms of the proposed consent order, the Licensing Authority shall submit the proposed order to the court which may approve or disapprove the proposed order or require modification of the proposed consent order before approval.
[f] The Licensing Authority shall enact reasonable rules and regulations for determination of whether the licensee has complied with a consent order issued pursuant to paragraph (e) of this Section. If the Licensing Authority determines that the licensee has failed to comply, it may revoke such order and conduct proceedings for revocation of the license. If the consent order has been approved by a court, then the Licensing Authority shall petition such court for vacation of the order. The court shall hold a hearing to determine if the order should be vacated. If the court vacates the consent order, the Licensing Authority may conduct proceedings for revocation of the license.

Section 21. FORM OF LICENSE.

The license, when issued, shall be in a form prescribed by the Licensing Authority and shall include:

(a) The name of the licensee;
(b) The nature and type of service to be performed;
(c) The business name under which the licensee is to operate;
(d) The addresses of the locations where the licensee is authorized to operate; and
(e) The number and date of the license and its date of expiration.

Section 22. POSTING AND SURRENDER OF LICENSE CERTIFICATE.

(a) Within seventy-two (72) hours after receipt of the license certificate, the licensee shall cause such license certificate to be posted and to be displayed at all times in a conspicuous place in the principal office of the licensee within the State and copies thereof to be displayed at all times in any other office within the State where the alarm business transacts business with its customers, so that all persons visiting such place or places may readily see the license. Such license certificates or copies thereof shall be subject to inspection at all reasonable times by the Licensing Authority.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person holding such license certificate to knowingly and willfully post such license certificate or permit such license certificate to be posted upon premises other than those described in the license certificate or to knowingly and willfully alter such license certificate. Each license certificate shall be surrendered to the Licensing Authority within seventy-two (72) hours after it has been revoked or after the licensee ceases to do business, subject, however, to Paragraphs 20(c) and (e) of Section 20.

Section 23. CHANGE IN STATUS OF LICENSEE.

The licensee shall notify the Licensing Authority within thirty (30) days of any material change in the operations of the business or information previously furnished or required to be furnished to the Licensing Authority or any occurrence which could be expected to affect the licensee’s right to a license under this Statute.

PART IV. IDENTIFICATION CARDS.

Section 24. ISSUANCE.

(a) It shall be unlawful and punishable as provided in Section 36 of this Statute for any individual to function as an alarm agent or to perform the duties described in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Section without first obtaining the identification card (hereinafter referred to as “I.D.” card) required by this Section.

(b) Owners, principal corporate officers, partners, and managers of all alarm businesses shall be required to obtain I.D. cards if they directly engage in selling, installing, altering, servicing, maintaining, repairing, replacing, monitoring, responding to, or causing others to respond to an alarm business.

(c) Any individual engaged in the alarm business or employed by or associated with an alarm business within the State who is not an alarm agent but who has access to confidential information relating to a customer or subscriber of an alarm business or who monitors radio equipment used in connection with an alarm business shall also obtain an I.D. card.

(d) Individuals required to obtain an I.D. card under this Section shall file a joint application for a temporary and permanent I.D. card and upon completion thereof, the alarm business shall immediately forward the permanent application portion of the form to the Licensing Authority and retain the temporary application portion in its files.

Alarm businesses shall issue temporary I.D. cards in the manner prescribed by this Statute.
A person engaged in the alarm business on the effective date of this Statute and whose application for an alarm business license is pending shall have authority to and shall be required to issue temporary I.D. cards to its alarm agents or other individuals required to obtain I.D. cards under this Section. If the license application is finally denied, such alarm business shall no longer have authority to issue temporary I.D. cards and all temporary I.D. cards issued by such alarm business shall become void and shall be returned by the temporary I.D. cardholders to the issuer.

Application for an I.D. card shall be on a form prescribed by the Licensing Authority and shall include the following:

1. Full name and signature;
2. An I.D. number and date of issuance of the card;
3. Date and place of birth;
4. Name and address of the alarm business employer;
5. Two recent color photographs of a type prescribed by the Licensing Authority;
6. Two sets of classifiable fingerprints recorded in such manner as may be specified by the Licensing Authority;
7. The name and address of the alarm business which employs or will employ or otherwise engage the I.D. card applicant;
8. A statement, to the best knowledge and belief of the I.D. card applicant, as to whether the alarm business which employs the I.D. card applicant or with which such applicant is associated: a) is licensed under this Statute; b) has a license application pending before the Licensing Authority; c) or is unlicensed and does not have an application pending before the Licensing Authority but was engaged in the alarm business within the State of on the effective date of this Statute and intends to file a timely application for an alarm business license under this Statute;
9. A statement as to whether the alarm business has issued or will issue a temporary I.D. card to the I.D. card applicant. If the alarm business has issued a temporary I.D. card, the applicant shall state the date of issuance of the card and the card number;
10. The I.D. card applicant's employment record for the prior three (3) years;
11. A statement whether the applicant has been denied an alarm agent permit or I.D. card in any jurisdiction or such permit or I.D. card has been revoked;
12. A statement that the I.D. card applicant will inform the Licensing Authority of any material change in the information set forth in the I.D. card applicant's form within ten (10) days after such change; and
13. Any other information which the Licensing Authority may reasonably deem necessary to determine whether an applicant for an I.D. card meets the requirements of this Statute.

A temporary I.D. card shall be issued by an alarm business licensed under this Statute to any of its alarm agents or any other individual required to obtain an I.D. card prior to the issuance of a permanent I.D. card for any such individual by the Licensing Authority. The form for temporary I.D. cards shall be prescribed by the Licensing Authority and shall include the following concerning the I.D. cardholder:

1. Full name and signature;
2. An I.D. number and date of issuance of the card;
3. Date and place of birth;
4. Name and address of the alarm business employer;
5. The date of commencement of employment with the alarm business; and
6. A recent color photograph of the I.D. cardholder.

Before issuing a temporary I.D. card, an alarm business shall require the prospective I.D. cardholder to submit the names of at least two references and the names and addresses of employers of such individual for the past three (3) years and shall make reasonable and prudent inquiries to determine whether such individual meets the requirements of this Section. If the alarm business has reason to believe that the individual required to obtain a temporary I.D. card does not meet the requirements of this Section, no temporary I.D. card shall be issued by the alarm business.
Authority shall conduct an investigation to determine whether the facts set forth in the application are true and shall cause the applicant's fingerprints to be compared with fingerprints filed with the department or agency maintaining the fingerprint files of the FBI for any record of convictions of the individual to whom it has issued a temporary I.D. card.

Section 25. INVESTIGATION.

After receipt of an application for an I.D. card, the Licensing Authority shall conduct an investigation to determine whether the facts set forth in the application are true and shall cause the applicant's fingerprints to be compared with fingerprints filed with the state department or agency maintaining criminal history records. The Licensing Authority or that agency shall forward a copy of the fingerprint card of the applicant to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and request a search of the fingerprint files of the FBI for any record of convictions of the applicant to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and request a search of the fingerprint files of the FBI for any record of convictions of the individual to whom it has issued a temporary I.D. card.

Section 26. ACTION ON I.D. CARD APPLICATION.

Action to approve or deny an application of an individual for an I.D. card shall be taken as expeditiously as possible by the Licensing Authority but such action shall be taken within ninety (90) days after receipt of the application unless the Licensing Authority shall require additional information from the I.D. card applicant. In that event, or if additional facts are required to satisfy the requirements of this Statute, or if the applicant has not submitted all the information required, the ninety-day period for action by the Licensing Authority shall commence when all such information has been received by the Licensing Authority.

Section 27. REQUEST FOR HEARING UPON RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF DENIAL OF I.D. CARD APPLICATION BY LICENSING AUTHORITY.

After receipt of written notice from the Licensing Authority of denial of an I.D. card, the I.D. card applicant may request a hearing in the same manner and in accordance with the same procedure as that provided in Section 12(b) of this Statute.

Section 28. I.D. CARDS - SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION.

(a) The Licensing Authority, the licensee may request a hearing of the Licensing Authority to function as an alarm agent;

(b) I.D. cards may be suspended or revoked by the Licensing Authority in the manner hereafter set forth if the cardholder has:

(1) Been found to have violated any of the provisions of this Statute or if any rule or regulation of the Licensing Authority if the Licensing Authority determines that such violation reflects unfavorably upon the fitness of the I.D. cardholder to function as an alarm agent;

(2) Knowingly and willfully given any false material information to the Licensing Authority in connection with an application for an I.D. card or in the submission of any material fact to the Licensing Authority.

(c) Prior to suspension or revocation of an I.D. card, the Licensing Authority shall promptly notify the I.D. cardholder and the alarm business with which the cardholder is employed or associated of the proposed action setting forth in reasonable detail the ground or grounds for suspension or revocation. The I.D. cardholder may...
request a hearing in the same manner and in accordance with the
same procedures as that provided in Section 20(a) of this Statute.

(d) In the event that the Licensing Authority suspends or revokes
an I.D. card, the cardholder, upon receipt of the notice of suspension
or revocation, shall cease to perform any services related to the alarm
business.

(e) Both the I.D. cardholder and the alarm business which employs
him or with which he is associated shall be notified by the Licensing
Authority of final action to suspend or revoke an I.D. card.

Section 29. NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF I.D. CARDS.

No I.D. card issued pursuant to the provisions of this Statute,
shall be transferable. I.D. cards issued by the Licensing Authority
must be surrendered to the Licensing Authority by the I.D. cardholder
upon termination of employment. A new application for an I.D. card
must be submitted to the Licensing Authority if the I.D. cardholder
is subsequently employed by another alarm business. Temporary I.D. cards
issued by alarm businesses must also be surrendered by the I.D. cardholder
to the alarm business issuing such card upon termination of employment
or association with such alarm business. Willful and knowing refusal,
upon request of the Licensing Authority or the alarm business, to return
an I.D. card shall be a misdemeanor [under appropriate section or statute
criminal code].

Section 30. RENEWAL OF I.D. CARD - NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES.

(a) I.D. cards issued by the Licensing Authority shall be valid
for a period of one (1) year. An I.D. card renewal form must be filed
by the cardholder with the Licensing Authority not less than thirty (30)
days prior to the expiration of the I.D. card. The fee for renewal of
the I.D. card shall be Five Dollars ($5.00).

(b) The Licensing Authority may refuse to renew an I.D. card for
any grounds set forth in Section 28(b) of this Statute and it shall
promptly notify the I.D. cardholder of its intent to refuse to renew
the license. The I.D. cardholder, may within fifteen (15) days after
receipt of such notice, request a hearing on such refusal in the same
manner and in accordance with the same procedure as that provided in
Section 20(a) of this Statute.

(c) An alarm businesses shall notify the Licensing Authority within
ten (10) days after the death or termination of employment of any of its
employees, or of any individual associated with the said alarm business
who holds an I.D. card issued by it or by the Licensing Authority.

PART V. GENERAL PROVISIONS.

Section 31. EXPEDITION AND RENEWAL DURING SUSPENSION
OR REVOCATION OF I.D. CARD.

An I.D. card shall be subject to expiration and renewal during
the period in which the holder of the I.D. card is subject to an order
of suspension.

Section 32. ACTIVITIES OF I.D. CARDOHOLDERS AFTER NOTICE OF SUSPENSION
OR REVOCATION OF I.D. CARD.

After an alarm agent or any other individual required to obtain
an I.D. card under this Statute has received a notice of suspension or
revocation of his I.D. card, such individual shall not engage in the alarm
business unless specifically authorized to do so by order of the Licensing
Authority or [by a court of competent jurisdiction within the state].

Section 33. LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF
ALARM BUSINESSES OR ALARM AGENTS.

(a) Immediately upon the effective date of this Statute, no local
governmental subdivision within this State shall enact any legislation
or promulgate any rules or regulations relating to the licensing of alarm
businesses, alarm agents or other individuals required to obtain an I.D.
card under this Statute.

(b) Sixty (60) days after the effective date of this Statute, any
provision of any legislation or rules or regulations of any local govern­
mental subdivision within this State requiring the licensing of alarm
businesses, or requiring that alarm agents or other individuals employed
by or associated with an alarm business obtain I.D. cards shall no longer
be effective.

(c) The provisions of this Section are not, however, intended to
and do not prevent the legally constituted authority of any local govern­
mental subdivision within the State by legislation, rules or regulations,
and within the police power of such local governmental subdivision, from
requiring alarm businesses and/or alarm agents to register their names,
addresses and license certificate number or I.D. card number with the
The Licensing Authority shall promulgate rules and regulations setting
local governmental subdivision within which they operate. Such local
governmental subdivision may also require that alarm businesses and
alarm agents give reasonable notice of termination or suspension of
licenses and I.D. cards. No fee may be charged nor any application
be required by any local governmental subdivision for such registration.

(d) Although this Statute preempts local governmental subdivisions
from enacting any licensing legislation or promulgating licensing rules
or regulations applicable to alarm businesses or alarm agents, such
local authorities may, within the police power of such localities, by
legislation or reasonable rules or regulations require alarm system users
in their jurisdiction to obtain permits, fix a normal fee for such per­
mits, and subject alarm businesses, alarm agents, and the users of alarm
systems to reasonable equipment and performance standards and impose
reasonable requirements in the use of alarm systems so long as such
standards and/or requirements in the use of alarm systems are not
contrary to standards and requirements established under this Statute.

(e) Local governmental subdivisions within the State which promul­
gate legislation and rules or regulations pursuant to paragraph (d) of
this Section may petition the Licensing Authority to revoke the
operating authority of an alarm business licensed under this Statute
within such local governmental subdivisions or to revoke or suspend
the right of an individual to use an I.O. card issued pursuant to this
Statute within such local governmental subdivision if such alarm
business or individual is convicted of violating such local legislation.
The petition of the local governmental subdivision shall be required
to state that the conviction reflects unfavorably on the fitness of
the alarm business or the alarm agent to engage in the alarm business.
The Licensing Authority shall promulgate rules and regulations setting
forth procedures for implementing this paragraph.

Section 36. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

(a) Any person aggrieved by any final action of the Licensing
Authority under this Statute shall have the right to judicial review
by a court of competent jurisdiction within the State.

(b) In proceedings in any court pursuant to the provisions
of this Statute, trial shall be de novo. When a court has acquired
jurisdiction, all administrative action taken prior thereto shall be
stayed, except as provided in Section 32 of this Statute. The rights
of the parties shall be determined by the court upon a trial of the
matter or matters in controversy under rules governing the trial of
other civil suits in the same manner and to the same extent as though
the matter had been committed to the court in the first instance and
there has been no intervening administrative or executive action or
decision.

Section 35. REINSTATEMENT OF A REVOKED LICENSE
OR I.D. CARD.

The Licensing Authority shall have authority to consider a
petition for reinstatement of a revoked alarm business license or I.D.

Section 36. PENALTIES.

(a) Any person found guilty of violating any of the following
provisions of this Statute shall be subject to a fine not to exceed
Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or to imprisonment for a period not to
exceed ninety (90) days, or both:

1. Engaging in the alarm business without complying with
   Section 9;
2. Failure to obtain an I.O. card as required by Section 24;
3. Wilful and knowing failure to file the surety bond
   required by Section 16;
4. Wilful and knowing failure of an alarm business to
   notify its subscribers of revocation of its license
   required in Section 20;
5. Wilful and knowing failure to surrender a license
   certificate as required by Section 22 (b); or to surrender
   an I.O. card as required by Section 29;
6. Wilful and knowing submission of false information
   of a material nature in any application for an alarm
   business license or an I.O. card, or renewal
   applications thereof.

(b) It shall be a misdemeanor [as defined in the Criminal Code
of the State] for any person to release any confidential information
concerning an alarm system or a subscriber to any unauthorized person
if such release or disclosure could lead to a compromise of the security
of such alarm system.

SEVERABILITY CLAUSE.

If any provision of this Statute or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall
got affect other provisions or application of this Statute which can
be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to
this end the provision of this Statute are declared to be severable.
ALTERNATIVE FORM OF LICENSING AUTHORITY.

The PSAC and its Alarm Committee recognize that the nature of a Licensing Authority may vary according to the structure of the executive administration within a state. In certain states, such as New York, the Secretary of State constitutes the Licensing Authority for private guards and investigators and has a staff to enforce the Act. Other states have a general licensing department or board for all business licensing within the state. In other states, such as Texas and New Hampshire, private guards and alarm companies are regulated by a board or commission with broad regulatory powers.

Part VI of this Statute creates an alternative form of licensing authority which is based upon the board or commission concept for use in states where this form of administrative structure may be more appropriate. Sections 45 through Section 47 of Part VI are identical to Section 5 through Section 8 in Part II of this Statute and appropriate changes should be made if Part VI is followed.

PART VI. CREATION OF STATE LICENSING AUTHORITY.
Section 42. VACANCIES.

The governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall fill vacancies occurring among appointed members of the Licensing Authority appointments for the duration of unexpired terms.

Section 43. DELEGATED REPRESENTATIVES.

(a) The Attorney General and the Director of the Department of Public Safety (or comparable office) may each delegate to a personal representative from his office the authority to represent him on the Licensing Authority.

(b) The delegated representative shall have all of the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the member while engaged in the performance of official Licensing Authority business, but a member shall be responsible for the acts and decisions of his delegated representative.

Section 44. COMPENSATION OF LICENSING AUTHORITY MEMBERS.

Members of the Licensing Authority appointed pursuant to paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) of Section 38 of this Statute shall be reimbursed for their reasonable, necessary and actual expenses. The number of employees of the Licensing Authority and their salaries shall be fixed by [consideration legislative legislation].

Section 45. LICENSING AUTHORITY SEAL.

The Licensing Authority shall have a seal, the form of which it shall prescribe.

Section 46. AUTHORITY OF THE LICENSING AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE REASONABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS.

(a) The authority to promulgate rules and regulations which are reasonable, proper and necessary to carry out the functions of the Licensing Authority, to enforce the provisions of this Statute; and to establish procedures for the preparation and processing of examinations, applications, license certificates, I.D. cards, renewals, appeals, hearings, and rulemaking proceedings are hereby vested in the Licensing Authority.

(b) Any interested person may petition the Licensing Authority to enact, amend or repeal any rule or regulation within the scope of paragraph (a) of this Section. The Licensing Authority shall prescribe by rule the form for such petitions, and the procedure for their submission, consideration and disposition.

Section 47. ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS; CONTEMPT POWERS.

(a) In any investigation conducted under the provisions of this Statute, the Licensing Authority may issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books, accounts, records and documents. The officer conducting a hearing may administer oaths and may require testimony or evidence to be given under oath.

(b) Relevant books, accounts, records, and documents required to be produced by this Section shall be maintained in the files of the Licensing Authority and access to said records shall be limited to the Licensing Authority only or a court of competent jurisdiction.

(c) If a witness refuses to obey a subpoena or to give any evidence relevant to proper inquiry by the Licensing Authority, the Licensing Authority may petition a court of competent jurisdiction within the state to compel the witness to obey the subpoena or to give the evidence.

Section 48. PUBLIC NOTICE AND PARTICIPATION IN RULEMAKING.

(a) The Licensing Authority shall, prior to the adoption of any rule or regulation or the amendments or repeal thereof, notify all licensed alarm businesses with the State, publish in the State Register a notice with the State Register, a newspaper of general circulation within the State, notice of the intended action; shall give publicity to the proposal in such other manner as it regards as appropriate; and shall afford interested persons opportunity to submit within a reasonable time and within either orally or in writing in a manner prescribed by the Licensing Authority, unless all persons subject thereto are named and either personally served with such notice or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. Such notice shall include:

(1) A statement of the time, place, and nature of the public rulemaking proceedings;

(2) Reference to the authority under which the rulemaking is proposed, and
Either the terms or substance of the proposed rulemaking or a description in reasonable detail of the subjects and issues involved. The publication or service of any notice required by this Section shall be made not less than thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of the proposed adoption, amendment, or repeal of the rule or regulation, as the case may be, except as otherwise provided by the Licensing Authority upon good cause found and published with the notice.
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APPENDIX 11

A REPORT ON THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SECURITY GUARD SERVICES

Including a Model Private Security Licensing and Regulatory Statute

The Private Security Task Force believes the importance and significance of this model statute justifies its inclusion as an appendix. However, it should be noted that the model statute and commentary were developed and approved by the Private Security Advisory Council and, accordingly, do not necessarily reflect the views of the Task Force.

The following chart is provided to enable the reader to determine which Task Force standards and commentaries relate to certain sections of the PSAC Model Private Security Licensing and Regulatory Statute.

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A REPORT ON THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SECURITY GUARD SERVICES including a MODEL PRIVATE SECURITY LICENSING AND REGULATORY STATUTE

preparing by the PRIVATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL to the U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION

May 1976

Points of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of the Private Security Advisory Council, and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the Department of Justice.
Dear Mr. Velde:

As Chairman of the Private Security Advisory Council, it gives me pleasure to forward the attached document, Report on the Regulation of Private Security Guard Services, including a model private security licensing and regulatory statute, developed by the Council for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

This document is the culmination of over two years of volunteer effort by members of the Private Security Advisory Council and members of the Guards and Investigators Committee of the Council.

In response to genuine concerns expressed regarding the quality of services provided by private security guards and the present lack of minimum screening, selection and training standards, extensive discussions, public hearings, committee and Council reviews were held to develop this model statute.

The Private Security Advisory Council firmly believes that this model statute serves both a vital and a demonstrated need. Hopefully, the many states which have indicated an interest in a private security licensing and regulatory statute will be guided by this effort of LEAA's Private Security Advisory Council.

Sincerely,

[Remainder of the letter includes the names and titles of the individuals involved in the council.]
Mr. Richard W. Velde  
May 17, 1976  
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The Advisory Council recommends that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration give the widest possible dissemination to this document.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Arthur J. Bilek
Chairman
Private Security Advisory Council

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PREFACE

Since 1972, the Private Security Advisory Council of the United States Department of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has been meeting on a regular basis to provide advisories to LEAA on the more effective utilization of private security in the national strategy to reduce crime.

The twenty-one member Council with representatives from public law enforcement, business, industry, state criminal justice planning agencies, local government, and all segments of private security has worked with its five committees to analyze various critical issues and concerns relating to private security and its proper role in preventing crime. Reports and recommendations have been developed and submitted to LEAA containing the findings and conclusions of the Council.

It was clear to the Council from its earliest discussions that an agenda item of highest priority was the development of professional standards and model legislation for private security organizations and their personnel.

The startling crime increases throughout the past decade were overwhelming the nation's criminal justice agencies. The general public, as well as business and industry were turning increasingly to private security as a defense against criminal attack. The resulting spectacular growth of private security was accompanied by allegations of improper actions on the part of security personnel and companies.

The Rand Corporation prepared a report for LEAA on Private Police in the United States which was sharply critical of abuses of authority and which detailed a variety of misconduct by untrained and unscreened private security personnel. The daily press carried accounts of alleged criminal behavior by guards particularly involving shooting incidents. Relationships between the public law enforcement officer and the private security guard were considerably less than optimum in some communities.

City and state legislators, responding to the alarming incidents cited by the media and the growing concern of the public, wrestled with the complex problem of how to regulate the private security industry without negatively impacting its potential for crime prevention. Various states enacted security laws buttressed by administrative regulations. Cities and counties considered or passed local security control ordinances.

Frequently, the effect of these hastily promulgated laws, regulations and ordinances was one of conflict, confusion, omission and duplication.

The security field found that self-regulation and improvement on the part of many companies was not sufficient to upgrade industry-wide standards to desirable levels of professional conduct.

Reacting to those perceived needs, the Council directed its Guards and Investigators Committee to develop professional standards for private security. After a year of deliberations, the Committee returned a set of professional standards which were subsequently revised and transferred into statutory format.

After extensive discussion, two sets of public hearings and various substantive revisions, the Council held a final drafting session and achieved consensus on a model statute. This document contains the Council's report on the regulation of private security guard services and a Model Private Security Licensing and Regulatory statute which is recommended for adoption at the state level.

The purpose of the model statute is to provide a mechanism designed to produce increased levels of integrity, competency and performance of private security personnel in order to safeguard the public from illegal, improper or incompetent actions and to serve to improve the crime prevention effectiveness of security forces.

This statute was developed as a result of the sustained efforts of many dedicated persons and organizations whose efforts are sincerely appreciated by the Council.

Dennis M. Crowley, Jr. and Richard D. Bickelman of the New England Bureau for Criminal Justice Services were primarily responsible for the legislative drafting effort, translating into statute format the work of the Guards and Investigators Committee and the Council.
INTRODUCTION

The crime problem in the United States has become a dangerous threat to the American way of life and a matter of the highest concern to the public over the past twenty-five years. A vast army of workers are employed in local, state and federal government to prevent crime and to deal with criminal activity. Generally thought of as the country's major crime prevention force are the more than 40,000 public law enforcement agencies with their 475,000 employees. While they constitute the largest and most visible component of the criminal justice system, another group has been fast rising in both numbers and responsibility in the area of crime prevention. With a rate of increase exceeding even that of the public police, the private security sector has become the largest single group in the country engaged in the prevention of crime.

Although exact nationwide statistics are not available, samplings of private security employees in selected major cities reflect that in those jurisdictions there are at least two private security employees for each publicly employed police officer. If the 2:1 ratio holds nationally, and there is little reason to believe that it does not, approximately one million persons in this country are employed privately to prevent and deter criminal activity.

Private security services are provided by armed and unarmed security guards, investigators, armored courier service personnel, armored car guards, and alarm business employees. Private security personnel maintain public order at stadiums, arenas, and outdoor rock concerts; they provide crowd control at major sporting events and shopping centers; they respond to alarms at financial institutions and retail stores; they guard factories, office buildings and businesses of all types; and they investigate arsons, frauds, larcenies, burglaries, and other crimes of all types. Private security services play a highly significant role in crime prevention. Professional security managers design and implement loss prevention and asset protection programs, while security officers and guards provide protection for employees, currency and valuable assets.
Private security services are provided by contract security companies (companies who sell their services to the public) and proprietary (in-house) security organizations. It is estimated that 25% of the private security employees in the country are proprietary personnel. Although nationwide data are not available, projections indicate that as many as 50% of the private security employees carry firearms in their private crime prevention roles.

Americans have come to rely very heavily on private security to protect them from crime. Private security personnel safeguard the lives of employees and other persons and protect private assets from loss or damage. In the process, they frequently come in contact with many persons, e.g., a group of shoppers in a large shopping mall or employees in an organization which provides its own internal security or customers in a retail store. Such persons may be subjected to an unnecessary danger if the armed private security guard is not trained in the proper and legal use of the weapon he carries. Other dangers exist, although to a different degree, with unarmed guards. If the guard has not received any training whatsoever with regard to the limits of his authority and his role as a private security officer, additional problems may arise. There are a number of recorded incidents of serious violations of the rights of individuals by untrained or improperly selected private security employees. A few states have moved to set minimum standards for screening, selecting and training private security personnel. Those states that do regulate private security almost invariably exclude proprietary security personnel, even if armed.

In spite of the danger posed by use of security personnel who are not required to meet any minimum selection, training or operational standards, private security does perform a necessary and increasingly important function in our society. Without the presence of private security, the current shocking rate of increase in crime would certainly be far greater. "Workplace" crime and other crimes within and against business would certainly increase. The present cost of crime to business, estimated at $7.3 billion dollars in 1974 by the United States Department of Commerce, would certainly go even higher. And that added cost would be passed on to the consumer. Further, if private security were to be removed from the crime prevention scene, significant additional burdens would be placed on already overburdened public law enforcement agencies which would ultimately result in higher taxes for the public.

As important as the contribution now made by private security is in the battle against crime, private security would become even more effective if its personnel were screened, selected, and trained in accordance with carefully developed and operationally realistic professional standards.

The Private Security Advisory Council to the United States Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, was established to examine the current role of private security in crime prevention and in the apprehension of persons committing criminal acts and to make recommendations as to approaches for improving its effectiveness and efficiency in these tasks. The Council examined the many barriers to more effective participation by private security in the national strategy to reduce crime. It was clear to the Council that increased levels of integrity, competency and performance by private security personnel can be achieved by improved screening and selection techniques in the hiring of all private security officers, mandatory firearms training for armed personnel, and close regulation of equipment, appearance and operations.

To encourage acceptance of certain minimum standards, the Private Security Advisory Council has developed a model licensing and regulatory statute designed to be adopted at the state level. This statute is only a model and does not represent an attempt to achieve federal regulation of the private security industry; nor does the Council recommend federal-level legislation. Individual states can review the model statute and choose for themselves whether they wish to adopt any or all of the provisions of the model.

In the development of this model statute, the Council recognized and provided reasonable balance between: the public interest in crime prevention by virtue of the presence of private security; the rights of ordinary citizens to be protected from wrongs and invasions of their privacy by ill-trained, unregulated persons functioning as private security personnel; and the rights of private security organizations and present (and prospective) private security personnel to pursue an occupation of their choosing without unreasonable restraint.
THE PRIVATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL

The Private Security Advisory Council was chartered by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in 1972 to further public protection, improve and strengthen law enforcement, and reduce crime in public and private places by reviewing the relationship between private security systems and public law enforcement agencies, and by developing programs and policies regarding private protection services that are appropriate and consistent with the goals of public law enforcement and the public interest.

The Council was an outgrowth of a meeting of private security sector representatives, called by LEAA in December 1971, to discuss the research and development efforts of LEAA that related to the private sector and the role of private security in the national effort to reduce crime. During the initial meeting, representatives from the private security sector, overwhelmingly recommended that LEAA establish a national advisory committee, made up of persons with expertise in the private security sector, to provide LEAA with continuing advice on matters of appropriate concern. LEAA followed that recommendation, and the Private Security Advisory Council was created shortly thereafter.

During 1973, the Council met several times to identify and define its objectives as well as to begin initial discussions of major areas of concern. Three committees were established: Guards and Investigators, Alarms and Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationships. The committee chairmen and members were selected by LEAA from outside of the Council, thereby providing a broader spectrum of viewpoints to the Council and allowing for assignment of professionals with high levels of skills in each committee's field of responsibility. Two liaison persons from the Council were assigned to each committee.

In September of 1974, the membership of the Council was broadened to include representation from business, the public and consumers of private security services.

Since its inception, the Council has worked on a number of tasks related to security services provided by the private sector. As identified and selected in 1974, the goals and objectives of the Council were:

- To act as an advisor to LEAA on issues of national importance which impact, or are impacted by, the private security industry;
- To raise the standards and increase the efficiency of the private security industry;
- To increase cooperation and understanding between the private security industry and public law enforcement; and
- To provide a viable national forum and point of leadership for matters relating to private security.

To assist in achieving those goals, the Council added two new committees: Environmental Security Committee, and the Prevention of Terroristic Crimes Committee. Each committee was assigned specific projects related to the accomplishment of Council goals.

The responsibilities and duties of the Private Security Advisory Council are advisory in nature. It cannot prescribe or promulgate rules or regulations. Its findings or recommendations are not official; they can be accepted or rejected by LEAA.

The Council operates pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Standards Act, Public Law 92-463, LEAA Notice NI300.2, OMB Circular No. A-63, and any additional orders and directives issued in implementation of the Act. The Council was established under the authority of Section 517 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-351) as amended by Public Law 91-644 and the scope of its functions is limited to the duties specified in its charter.

The Council has published a number of advisories to LEAA on a variety of issues. These include:

- A Report on a Model Hold-up and Burglar Alarm Business Licensing and Regulatory Statute
- Terroristic Crimes: An Annotated Bibliography
- Potential Secondary Impacts of the Crime-Prevention-Through-Environmental-Design Concept
- A Resolution on Dissemination of Criminal Justice Record Data to Private Security Organizations
- Prevention of Terroristic Crimes: Security Guidelines for Business, Industry, and Other Organizations

In addition to the above reports, the Private Security Advisory Council is preparing other advisory reports to LEAA on societal impacts of environmental security, the legal limits on the authority of private security personnel, and countermeasures against and prevention of domestic terrorist crimes.

In 1975, the Council reviewed and updated its objectives to focus more sharply on improvement of private security's competency in crime prevention. The creation of a sixth committee dealing with armored cars and protected shipments was recommended to LEAA.

Meetings of the Council and its committees are open to the public. Full notice of proposed meetings is published at least fourteen days prior to the meeting date in the Federal Register. Meeting minutes, publications, and reports of the Council are available through the LEAA.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL STATUTE

Background

The Model Private Security Licensing and Regulatory Statute was initially drafted by the Guards and Investigators Committee, which was established by the Private Security Advisory Council in 1972. The Guards and Investigators Committee is composed of knowledgeable and experienced individuals drawn from contract security companies, proprietary security organizations, and the general public. Selection of committee members was made by LEAA and was based on individual credentials; committee members were appointed to the committee as individuals, not as representatives of their employers.

The Council directed this Committee to review the criticisms of the operations of private security guards and private investigators as described in the report on the private security industry commissioned by LEAA and performed by the Rand Corporation. The committee was also asked to develop positions on industry problems which Committee members felt needed attention. Among the areas to be considered were standards for selection and training of private security personnel and the regulation of private security guards.

Findings of the Guards and Investigators Committee

On July 16, 1973, the Guards and Investigators Committee reported by letter to the Council that, after eight meetings between October 1972 and July 1973, it had completed a report containing the Committee's findings and recommendations. The Chairman of the Committee advised that the report recommended effective and practical solutions to the most glaring deficiencies and urgent needs of the private security sector as disclosed by the Rand Study.

In November 1973, the Council reviewed and accepted the report of the Guards and Investigators Committee. The initial and subsequent reports of the Guards and Investigators Committee set forth several important findings concerning problems faced by certain segments of the private security industry, and recommended specific solutions for those problems.

A major finding and recommendation of the Committee was that the term "private security" should properly encompass both contract and proprietary (in-house) security personnel and that any legislation with regard to registration, minimum personnel standards, training requirements, and sanctions should apply to both contract and proprietary security personnel. Further, the report recommended that any such legislation should also encompass the security service personnel of armored car and alarm response organizations.

A legal problem identified in the Committee report was the proliferation of ordinances regulating some or all segments of the private security industry. To reduce this problem, the Committee recommended that legislation regulating the industry be at the state level. Legislation at that level would do much to eliminate proliferation, duplication, inconsistencies, and operational barriers.

Another finding of the Committee was that the private security officer is not a police officer; the work performed by private security personnel is not police work; and, therefore, regulations which prevent or discourage private security officers from impersonating or being mistaken for public law enforcement officers need to be adopted. To control impersonation and the possibility of mistaken identity, the Committee recommended the following:

- That all private security organizations and/or individuals be prohibited from using any business name, including initials, which project the image of a public law enforcement agency; and that all private security company names or titles clearly designate them as relating to private business organizations;

- That the use of any designation of an individual as a private policeman or police officer be prohibited, and that the term "private security officer" be used to identify private security guards;

- That all uniforms and equipment, including weapons and badges, be the property of the employer; and that a statute be adopted to make failure to return the uniforms and equipment a misdemeanor; and

- That the use of metal badges and cap devices be prohibited; and that a permanently affixed cloth type badge be worn and a cloth name tape bearing words "Security Officer" be sewn to the right breast pocket.

To overcome some of the criticisms of the Rand report relating to recruitment standards for private security officers, the Committee recommended minimum qualifying standards, including a thorough background investigation conducted by the employer, a minimum employment age, a "clean" criminal history, minimum physical and mental requirements, and character and credit reference checks. An additional qualification for armed security officers was that the applicant must be a high school graduate or the equivalent and not have any physical or mental difficulties which would interfere with his ability to use a firearm properly.

It was the recommendation of the Committee that every private security officer be registered with the state regulatory body within fifteen (15) days of employment and that registration would be based upon the prescribed qualifications for a private security officer. The employer would be permitted to hire an applicant on the basis of a signed, sworn notarized statement that the applicant had not been arrested or convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that the application form signed by the applicant would indicate that any falsification of the above would subject the applicant to criminal penalties. The employer would be required to submit a certification that a background investigation was completed in compliance with the regulations and that the applicant had completed eight (8) hours of pre-assignment training. Further, the employer would be required to certify later that the security officer had completed a thirty-two (32) hour in-service training program within one hundred twenty (120) days of employment.
The Committee also dealt with the problem of gun control in relation to the private security industry. It found that employment in the private security industry today may afford access to authorized possession of firearms by unqualified persons, or allow persons to obtain a firearm legally which can subsequently be used illegally. The Committee recommended that such problems should be dealt with by: (1) discouraging the use of lethal weapons by private security officers, requiring those who must carry firearms to obtain a firearms user permit from a regulatory body, require pre-issue classroom and range training, require annual, in-service, follow-up range training, and require that all firearms used by private security personnel be owned and issued by the employer.

Finally, to deal with the problem of untrained personnel performing duties as private security officers, the Committee recommended eight (8) hours of basic pre-assignment training for all private security officers, plus thirty-two (32) hours of annual in-service specialized training within the first one hundred and twenty (120) days of employment, and eight (8) hours annual refresher in-service training. In addition, all armed security officers would be required to complete a prescribed classroom and range program recommended by the Committee.

Development of this Model Statute

Following its acceptance of the standards, the Council directed the Guards and Investigators Committees to develop a model statute for the regulation and licensing of certain activities of the private security industry. The Guards and Investigators Committees then began to develop model legislation, based on the standards which had been accepted by the Council. The Committee sought assistance from attorneys in drafting the model legislation, since Committee members did not feel qualified to translate the layman's version of the standards into the format of a model statute. In addition, members of the Guards and Investigators Committee were requested to enlist assistance from their firm's attorneys to draft a model statute. A legislative drafting sub-committee was established to work under the guidance of the Committee in the development of the model statute. The drafting sub-committee produced initial draft documents which translated portions of the Committee standards into statutory format.

In September 1974, the Committee Chairman recommended to the Council that the Council appoint or hire a firm or individual to develop a statute which would accurately reflect the standards developed by the Guards and Investigators Committee. The Council agreed with that recommendation and assigned Dennis M. Crowley, Jr., the attorney who directed the Council's staff, to work with the Committee for such purpose.

In January 1975, the Guards and Investigators Committee met with the Council staff and members of the drafting sub-committee. The draft statute which emerged from that meeting was forwarded to the Council for review. The draft statute was disseminated widely and comments were invited from all interested parties.

A public hearing on the Guards and Investigators Committee's draft statute was held by the Council on February 19, 1975, in Austin, Texas. Following that public hearing, the draft was further reviewed by the Council. Changes were recommended in the committee draft, and the Council's staff was directed to re-write the model statute to reflect those changes. Upon completion of a new draft, the document was again widely disseminated; comments were invited; and a second public hearing was scheduled.

On July 9, 1975, the second public hearing on the model statute was held at the Council's meeting in Chicago, Illinois. This meeting was well attended by the public. Written and oral comments were presented by more than 100 interested parties. Extensive review and discussion by the Council followed this hearing, and Council staff then prepared a summary of all pertinent oral and written testimony. In October 1975, the Council held a special meeting to conclude its deliberations on the model statute. Each section of the model statute was discussed and debated until there was Council consensus on the entire document.

The Model Private Security Licensing and Regulatory Statute which appears in Chapter 7 of this report is the final work product of more than two years of Private Security Advisory Council activities relating to this matter. This Model Statute, together with the introductory material and commentary, constitute an advisory report from the Private Security Advisory Council to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U. S. Department of Justice, on "Regulation of Private Security Guard Services".
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE STATUTE

While unanimous consensus or majority approval was ultimately achieved on every provision of this Model Statute, not all members of the Private Security Advisory Council agreed with every one of its provisions. As with any proposed legislation, the drafting process resulted in significant changes as each provision of the proposed statute was debated.

As finally approved by the Council, the Model Statute does the following:

- Requires licensing of all contract security companies, but exempts proprietary security (in-house) organizations from the licensing requirements;
- Defines "Proprietary Security Organization" as a Person who provides security services solely for the benefit of such Person, thereby making some organizations, such as shopping mall and stadium operators, who provide such services for other than themselves, Contract Security Companies, which must be licensed;
- Requires applicants for a license to possess at least three years of security supervisory experience or pass an examination;
- Details license application, investigation, approval, denial and appeal procedures;
- Creates a Private Security Industry Regulatory Board to promulgate regulations, review and pass on license applications, and enforce the provisions of the statute;
- Gives the Private Security Industry Regulatory Board subpoena power over witnesses and records;
- Recognizes two categories of private security personnel without regard to the nature of their employer (contract or in-house): armed private security officers; and unarmed, uniformed, private security officers;
- Includes in its coverage security guards, armored car guards, armed courier service guards and alarm response runners;
- Grants watchmen and railroad police from the provisions of the statute;
- Requires all armed private security officers to be registered with the Licensing Authority before beginning employment;
- Establishes minimum criteria for registration to include: eight (8) hours pre-assignment orientation training, and added pre-assignment firearms examination and marksmanship qualification; eight (8) hours annual refresher training, plus firearms qualification, and certification of such training by a trainer approved by the Licensing Authority;
- Requires unarmed, uniformed private security officers to apply to the Licensing Authority for an Identification Card, but permits their employment while the application is being processed;
- Requires the Licensing Authority to conduct criminal history record checks, including FBI fingerprint file searches, on all applicants for a Registration or Identification Card;
Prohibits the hiring of any person as a private security officer who fails to meet the minimum selection criteria of the Statute, which include conviction for a felony, any crime involving moral turpitude, or illegal use or possession of a dangerous weapon, for any of which a full pardon has not been granted;

Requires all training to be given and certified by a state-approved Trainer, who may be an individual, corporation, or institution;

Places strict insurance and reporting requirements on employers of armed private security officers, without regard to the employer's status as a Contract Security Company or Proprietary Security Organization, and requires all firearms to be owned and issued by the employer;

Sets minimum uniform and vehicle appearance standards to eliminate possibly mistaking private security personnel for public law enforcement officers;

Pre-empts local governmental units in the area of licensing and regulating private security activities and organizations;

Prescribes criminal penalties for violations of the Statute; and

Provides a transition period for the implementation of the provisions of the Statute.

This section of this report provides commentary on specific sections of the Model Statute. Many hours of discussion and debate were involved in the development of this Model Statute. The transcripts of the Council meetings and public hearings concerning the Model Statute amount to more than 2,000 pages. It is impossible to set forth all of the issues debated and the subsequent voting on each provision of the Model Statute in this report. Nevertheless, this section has been written to provide readers with the intent of those responsible for drafting this proposed Model Statute, namely: the Private Security Advisory Council and its Guards and Investigators Committee.

Differences Between the Initial Model Standards and the Committee-Recommended Statute

The Model Statute forwarded by the Guards and Investigators Committee to the Council in February 1975 deviated in certain aspects from the original private security guard standards developed by the Committee and approved by the Council. It is important in this commentary to note the differences between the recommendations of the Committee in July 1973 and those of February 1975.

1. Non-Application to Proprietary Security Organizations

The original standards recommended that all legislation with regard to registration, minimum personnel standards, training requirements and sanctions should apply to both contract and proprietary (in-house) security personnel unless specifically excluded. In January 1973, the members of the Committee recommended that the licensing provisions apply only to contract security agencies. However, there was no unanimous consensus on this point. Committee members present from the proprietary (in-house) side of private security stated that they could not support any model statute which required the licensing of business firms using proprietary security forces. The argument put forth by those members was that such firms were not in the business of supplying security services to the general public.
Their security forces were used solely for the protection of their own assets, and it should not be within the purview of the state to regulate such companies. They argued that licensing carried with it the presumption of powers to prevent a company from protecting its assets by revoking or suspending its license to employ security personnel.

In their opinion, licensing of proprietary security organizations was not necessary to correct the criticisms of the Rand Report. Those criticisms were directed mainly at security guards, not companies employing security personnel solely for the protection of their own property. Therefore, it was felt that the statute should be directed at the individual guard, not the employer.

The counter argument of the Committee members from contract security companies was that the ultimate goal of licensing legislation was to protect the general public. No matter how small a company is, if it employs a security guard, that guard will come in contact with the public in the performance of his security duties. It is necessary to make someone responsible for recruiting, selecting, training and supervising security guards, particularly those who are armed, to prevent the continuation of problems as cited in the Rand Report. This responsibility should be borne equally by all employers of security guards, not just those companies which offer those services for hire.

The final outcome of this debate was that only contract security companies would be licensed. However, all private security officers, as defined in the Model Statute, would be registered, regardless of whether they are employed by a contract security company or by a proprietary security organization, and no person could employ a guard who is not properly registered.

2. Responsibilities for Background Investigations

The standards required a background investigation conducted by an employer within fifteen (15) days of employment. Also, the license would be revoked if any officer, including any supervisory personnel, would have been convicted of a crime other than a traffic violation. The standards required a background investigation conducted by an employer within fifteen (15) days of employment. All security personnel would be required to be registered at all. Committee members for contract security companies argued that the Committee was now significantly diluting the standards previously approved by the Committee and the Council. Furthermore, those members could see no difference in the functions actually performed by proprietary security guards and those assigned by a contract firm. The sanctions and requirements levied on an employer in the interest of the public should, therefore, be the same without regard to the employer's main line of business.

This argument was rejected by Committee members from proprietary security organizations except as to armed guards. The final compromise was that proprietary security organizations which employ armed guards would be required to obtain and file evidence of minimum insurance coverage, and would be required to purchase and issue the weapon carried. However, proprietary security organizations would not have any other responsibilities or be subject to any sanctions as long as they employed registered private security officers.

Concerning the issue of background investigations, there was consensus among the members that a fingerprint record check was necessary for all security personnel. The responsibility to conduct the background investigations was assigned to the state licensing authority.

3. Temporary Permits and Training

Since only a licensee could issue temporary permits, proprietary security organizations would not be able to perform this function by virtue of their license. Therefore, they would have been required to either hire private security officers with permanent registration cards who had already completed all pre-assignment and annual in-service training or have prospective employees trained by an outside institution or firm. The contract security company personnel argued that this would open the licensed contract security companies to "raids" on their personnel after they had gone to the expense of selecting, training and processing applications for them. This argument was rejected by proprietary security organization personnel, who thought it was more likely that the proprietary organizations would retain the licensed firms to conduct the training for proprietary security personnel.

Finally, although the issue was never brought to a vote, the question was raised whether security guards should be registered at all. Committee members employed by proprietary security organization personnel argued that they should be registered.
proprietary security organizations had doubts about both the legality of registering guards and the necessity for the process. Although various members expressed these doubts, no vote was taken because of the opposing responses of all the other Committee members. The Committee assumed a consensus existed on the need to register private security officers as defined in the Model Statute.

Differences Between the Committee-Recommended Statute and the Council-Approved Statute

This section reflects the differences between the Guards and Investigators Committee recommended Statute and the Model Statute ultimately adopted by the Council.

1. General

First, the Council recognized two categories of private security guards - armed and unarmed. Since armed security officers present the greatest threat to the public if they are not carefully selected, properly trained, and closely supervised, the Council placed stringent insurance and reporting requirements on employers of armed guards without regard to their status as a contract security company or proprietary security organization. However, the Council called for the licensing of only contract security companies. Council members felt that, since such companies offer their services for sale to the general public, they are different from proprietary organizations and that the primary purpose of licensing is to provide an increased level of protection for consumers of such services.

2. New Definition of "Security Guard"

A new definition of "Security Guard" was drawn. That definition which is set forth in Section 3 of the Model Statute includes all persons who are involved in the protection of groups of persons and/or property from criminal activities and excludes persons whose duties are limited to custodial, observation, reporting, or enforcement of only administrative regulations. This definition excludes persons performing fire-watch duties, spotters in retail stores watching for shoplifting, provided they are required only to report the act to a guard, and monitors of fire and burglar alarms if they do not respond to the alarm.

3. Registration Requirements for Armed Private Security Officers

Using the new definition of "Security Guard" in Section 3, the Council required the registration of all armed private security officers. To qualify for registration, an individual must meet minimum qualifying criteria including: minimum age; eight (8) hours pre-assignment training; pre-assignment training in firearms orientation; annual firearms qualifications; no conviction for any felony or any crime involving moral turpitude or illegal use of a weapon; good moral character; and no physical disabilities. All registrants will be subjected to a background investigation conducted by the state licensing authority. No armed private security officer may begin employment until he has been issued a registration card.

4. Identification Requirements for Unarmed, Uniformed Private Security Officers

All unarmed, uniformed private security officers must complete an employment application and submit two (2) sets of classifiable fingerprints to an employer. The employer must submit the fingerprint cards and a copy of the application to the state licensing authority which will issue an identification card to the employer to give to the applicant if the applicant has not been convicted of a crime as set forth in the statute. There are no training requirements for unarmed personnel.

5. Authority to Conduct Training

All training for armed private security officers must be given, and certified to, by a trainer approved by the state licensing authority. The certified trainer may be an individual, educational institution, corporation, or any other legal entity. Therefore, both contract security companies and proprietary security organizations may have a certified trainer on their staffs.
SPECIFIC COMMENTARY ON STATUTE PROVISIONS

Definitions (Section 3)

The definition of "Security Guard" in this Model Statute is critical. It limits application of the Statute to those who perform specific duties related to prevention of criminal activities. It excludes those whose duties are primarily related to observation and reporting.

"Armed Private Security Officer" is defined as a person whose principal duty is that of an armed security guard, armed armored car guard, armed courier service guard, or armed alarm response runner and who carries a firearm in the performance of his duties. Definitions of "Armored Car Service", "Armed Courier Service", and "Alarm Response Runner" are also provided.

An "Unarmed Private Security Officer" is defined as a security guard, armored car guard, and alarm response runner who does not carry a firearm, but who does wear clothing of distinctive design (uniform). The "unarmed" provision does not apply to armed private security officers.

Sworn peace officers are not required to comply with this Model Statute if they are performing duties for the agency from which they derive law enforcement powers. Railroad police, who have full police powers in most states, will be exempt when performing their regularly assigned duties in those states where they have statutory police powers. Sworn officers of federal, state, county and municipal police agencies will also be exempt when performing duties assigned to them by the employing police agency. They will not be exempt, however, when they are acting in the employ of a contract security company or proprietary security organization, or when they offer their services on an individual basis to the public. The Model Statute excludes industrial security management personnel who are not armed or who do not wear clothing of a distinctive design (a uniform).

The term "Proprietary Security Organization" covers the so-called 'in-house' security sector. However, the definition is drawn so that firms which provide security services other than 'solely' for themselves are not "Proprietary Security Organizations". An example would be a shopping mall operator who employs individuals in an employer/employee relationship to provide security for all tenants of the mall. In such a case, the services are not "solely" for his benefit even though no fee, separate from annual rental and maintenance fees, is charged. In the example given, the Council intention was that a person or organization furnishing such services would be considered a 'Contract Security Company'.

The problem of covering every example of a "Proprietary Security Organization" in the definition was recognized. There has been considerable growth in recent years of the apartment complexes which provide security services for the benefit of all tenants. In many retail stores, floor space is rented under franchise to outside individuals and corporations but is given the same protection as all departments by the retail store security force. Hotels rent lobby and office space to outside organizations, but hotel security personnel do not discriminate when providing security throughout the hotel property.

While recognizing that the present definitions may cause some problems in those situations, the Council agreed that definitions which encompass all foreseen and unforeseen circumstances are impossible to prepare. Rather than create loopholes in the Model Statute, the Council chose to offer the best definition possible and to leave interpretation and enforcement to the individual states, courts, and licensing authorities. Hotels and retail stores, when faced with becoming contract security companies, and thus licensed, can rewrite contracts with their tenants and franchisees to eliminate requirements to provide security services for such persons, if they elect not to become licensed.

Private Security Industry Regulatory Board (Section 4)

Two forms of a licensing authority were considered by the Council: (1) an existing state agency, such as the secretary of state; and (2) a specially created board. The form selected for presentation is a specially created board, called the "Private Security Industry Regulatory Board", which would have as members representatives of:
the industry, users, public law enforcement, and the public-at-large. This representation should provide the Board with sufficient expertise on all issues which can be expected to arise. A board which is dominated by the organizations to be regulated was deemed not to be in the best interest of the public. By the same token, a regulatory board which does not have any representation from the groups to be regulated was also deemed undesirable, as it might promulgate unrealistic or unenforceable rules and regulations. It was the consensus of the Council that the form of licensing authority recommended is the one which best serves all interests.

Subpoenas, Oaths and Contempt Powers (Section 12)

The Council did not want to create a licensing authority which did not have sufficient power to enforce the provisions of the Model Statute. By giving subpoenas, oath, and contempt powers to the Board, the licensing authority should be able to properly administer the statute. The Council also intended to insure that any trade secrets or information which could possibly compromise the security of an installation would not be available to the public under state-level Freedom of Information Acts. The language is intended to protect such information. It is also hoped that any court holding hearings to compel testimony will hold such hearings "in camera" to protect information from unauthorized disclosure.

Licensing (Section 14)

This section reflects the elimination of proprietary security organizations from the requirements to obtain a license. The license requirement applies to contract security companies only. A transition period of 180 days is provided for contract security companies which are in business on the effective date of the Statute to apply for a license. This grace period was provided because many existing companies might not be able to meet the requirements of a licensees and will need time to either make necessary corporate changes or hire a qualifying agent.

During the public hearings, representatives of the alarm and armored car industries argued that dual licensing would occur if the provisions of this Statute were applied to their industries. The armored car industry is already regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission and many state public utility or transportation commissions. The Model Hold-Up and Burglar Alarm Business Licensing and Regulatory Statute, previously developed and adopted by the Council, already calls for licensing of alarm businesses.

However, neither industry could demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Council that current regulations applicable to them met the objectives of the presently proposed statute, or that its personnel currently met its stringent selection and training requirements. The Council, therefore, did not agree that those industries shall be exempt from the Statute. Section 14(c) does provide, however, that if there is an existing regulatory statute covering armored car and alarm personnel which has provisions at least equal to this Statute, then those businesses can be exempted from the requirements of this Statute. This matter can be reviewed on an individual state-by-state basis.

Application (Section 15)

To ease the administrative burden of license application preparation and processing, only one person in each organization to be licensed, the qualifying agent, is required to meet the licensing qualifications in that state. Some states now require all principal corporate officers to meet the qualifications for licensing. This latter approach places an unnecessary burden on both the applicant and the licensing authority. This Model Statute requires only the names of principal corporate officers to be filed with a license application. Furthermore, the qualifying agent need not be a resident of the state.

Examination (Section 16)

This section provides an alternative for those who do not meet the experience requirements to obtain a license. The intent of the Council was that the scope of the examination should include not only pertinent laws and regulations, but also operational techniques.

Procedures (Section 20)

The procedural details in this and other sections of the Model Statute dealing with notice, hearings, and appeals may need to be governed by existing administrative procedures and laws in the state.
License Transfers (Section 24)

Although licenses are not transferable, this section allows for the orderly transfer of a license in the case of the sale or other transfer of ownership of a business. In either event, the transferee must make application for a new license and is subject to the same general requirements for a license.

Armed Private Security Officers (Part IV)

Part IV of the Model Statute deals with the employment, registration and training of armed private security officers, and it is probably the most important part of the Model Statute. No person can be employed as an armed private security officer unless he has been registered with the licensing authority. There is no distinction made between contract and in-house employees. Every person, regardless of employer, must meet certain minimum requirements before he can be employed in an assignment in which he will, or may, be required to carry a firearm. There is no grace period permitting an employee to work as an armed private security officer while his application for a registration card is being processed. While some earlier drafts permitted the issuance of temporary permits to armed personnel, the Council felt it was not in the best interests of the public to have untrained personnel, or those who had not had a criminal history records check, work with a firearm. Those clauses from earlier drafts of the Model Statute do not appear in this final, approved version.

There is no prohibition against employing an applicant for a registration card and assigning his duties as an unarmed private security officer while his application is being processed, provided the individual has fulfilled the requirements of an unarmed private security officer.

Applicants for a registration card deliver the application to either a licensee or the licensing authority. The application must include a statement from a certified trainer that the applicant has completed the minimum training required by the Statute and must furnish two sets of classifiable fingerprints.

Section 29 requires that the licensing authority submit the fingerprints to that agency of government in the state which is responsible for conducting criminal history checks and to the FBI for a search of the records of that agency. This is a crucial section of the Model Statute, in view of existing and emerging security and privacy legislation.

Section 30 requires the licensing authority to complete action on applications for a registration card within thirty (30) days. In many states, the application review process takes six (6) months to one year to complete. Such a delay places an unnecessary hardship on both employers and employees. The Council was of the opinion that states can streamline the review process and should be required to do so. If the Model Statute is to achieve its objectives related to protection of the public, employers must be able to obtain critical information on prospective employees on a timely basis.

Section 33 provides for limited transferability of registration cards when the holder of a registration card changes employment. Some contract security company personnel argued that registration cards should not be portable and should be valid only while the registrant is working for the licensee or employer by whom he was trained. They were concerned that this section would encourage private security organizations to "raid" their personnel and place an unfair economic burden on contract companies. However, the consensus of the Council was that a registered armed private security officer should not be required to apply for a new registration card, de novo, simply because of a change in employment, provided no significant lapse occurred between employments.

Section 36 provides that private security officers who are properly registered are authorized to carry firearms. All firearms issued must be approved by the licensing authority and owned by the employer. The registration card authorizes carrying of the firearm when on duty or travel to or from work. This section of the Model Statute was designed to provide positive control over the ownership and issuance of firearms. It will prevent private security officers from carrying personally owned weapons and will place responsibility for purchase and issuance of weapons directly on the employers who require their employees to carry firearms.

Section 37 describes the training requirements for armed private security officers. The amount and type of training to be required of armed security personnel was debated extensively by the Council. Early drafts required...
Comment received on these early drafts of the Model Statute suggested that armed personnel should receive more than the 32 hours, with recommendations ranging all the way to 120 hours, the current level in the State of Ohio for commissioned private security personnel. The debate showed there was no consensus either on the type of training which should be given, since many of the suggested courses were police-oriented, or on the total number of hours. The Council thought that recommending 32 hours of training without specifying the courses would be counterproductive. However, to call for a curriculum which fit the 32-hour block was not feasible without further study. Finally, the Council voted to require orientation and firearms training only, and to appoint a special study committee to make a separate report at a later date on a model private security officer training program.

Unarmed Private Security Officers (Part V)

All unarmed, uniformed private security officers must submit an employment application and two sets of classifiable fingerprints to their prospective employers before beginning employment. The employer must forward these documents to the licensing authority on or before the date the person begins employment. However, the unarmed private security officer can work while the licensing authority is processing the documents. As with armed personnel, the licensing authority must complete a criminal history record check within thirty (30) days. If the record check does not reveal conviction data which would preclude employment, the licensing authority must issue an identification card to the applicant through the employer.

There are no training requirements in the Model Statute for the unarmed private security officer.
(a) The term "Alarm Response Runner" means any individual person employed by a Contract Security Company or a Proprietary Security Organization to respond to security system signals, other than a person whose sole function is to maintain or repair a security system.

(b) The term "Armed Courier Service" means any Person that transports or offers to transport under armed security guard from one place or point to another place or point, valuables, currency, documents, papers, maps, stocks, bonds, checks, or any other item that requires expeditious delivery.

(c) The term "Armed Private Security Officer" means an individual employed by a Contract Security Company or a Proprietary Security Organization; whose principal duty is guard; armed courier service guard; or armed alarm response runner; and who at any time wears, carries, possesses or has access to a firearm in the performance of his duties.

(d) The term "Armored Car Service" means any Person that transports or offers to transport under armed security guard from one place or point to another place or point, currency, jewels, stocks, bonds, paintings, or other valuable motor vehicle which offers a high degree of security.

(e) The term "Branch Office" means any office of a Licensee within the State other than its principal place of business within the State.

(f) The term "Certified Trainer" means any Person approved and certified by the Licensing Authority as qualified to administer and certify to successful completion of the minimum training requirements for Private Security Officers required by Section 37 of this Statute.

(g) The term "Contract Security Company" means any Person engaging in the business of providing, or which undertakes to provide, a security guard, an alarm response runner, armored car service, or armed courier service, as defined in this Statute, on a contractual basis with another Person.

(h) The term "Employer/Employee Relationship" means the performance of any service for wages or under any contract of hire, written, oral, expressed or implied by an individual, and provided the employer has control or direction over the performance of such service both under this contract or service and provided that such service is performed personally by such individual.

(i) The term "Identification Card" means a pocket card issued by a Licensing Authority to a Private Security Officer as evidence that the individual has met the minimum qualifications required to perform duties of an unarmed Private Security Officer.

(j) The term "Licensee" means any Person to whom a license is granted in accordance with the provisions of this Statute.

(k) The term "Licensing Authority" means the Secretary of the State or other appropriate department, agency or bureau of the State designated to administer and enforce this Statute.

(l) The term "Person" includes individuals, firms, associations, companies, partnerships, corporations, non-profit organizations, institutions, or similar entities.

(m) The term "Police Chief Executive" means the elected or appointed police administrator of any municipal, county, or State police department or sheriff's department, such department having full law enforcement powers in its jurisdiction.

(n) The term "Principal Corporate Officer" means the president, vice president, treasurer, secretary or comptroller as well as any other person who performs functions for the corporation corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers.

(o) The term "Proprietary Security Organisation" means any Person or department of that Person which employs a security guard, an alarm response runner, armored car service, or armed courier services, as defined in this Statute, solely for such Person; and wherein an employer/employee relationship exists.

(p) The term "Qualifying Agent" means, in the case of a corporation, an officer or an individual in a management capacity, or in the case of a partnership, a general or unlimited partner, meeting the experience qualifications set forth in this Statute for operating a Contract Security Company.

(q) The term "Registrant" means an individual who has a valid Registration Card issued by the Licensing Authority.
The term "Registration Card" means the permanent permit issued by the Licensing Authority to a Registrant as evidence that the Registrant has met the minimum qualifications required by this Statute to perform the duties of an Armed Private Security Officer.

The term "Security Alarm System" means an assembly of equipment and devices (or a single device such as a solid-state unit which plugs directly into a 110-volt AC line) designated to detect and/or signal unauthorized intrusion, movement, or exit at a premises, or to signal an attempted robbery, or other criminal acts at a protected premises; and with respect to such signals, police and/or security guards or alarm response runners are expected to respond. Fire alarm systems and alarm systems which monitor temperature, humidity or any other conditions not directly related to the detection of an unauthorized intrusion into premises or an attempted robbery at a premises are excluded from the provisions of this Statute.

The term "Security Guard" means an individual principally employed to protect a person or persons and/or property from criminal activities and whose duties include, but are not limited to the prevention of unlawful intrusion or entry, larceny, vandalism, abuse, arson, or trespass on private property; or control regulation or direction of the flow or movements of the public, whether by vehicle, on foot or otherwise; and street patrol service or merchant patrol service. Persons whose duties are limited to custodial or observational duties or the reporting of administrative regulations only are specifically excluded from this definition.

The term "Street Patrol Service" means any Contract Security Company or Proprietary Security Organization that utilizes foot patrols, motor vehicles or any other means of transportation in public areas or on public thoroughfares in the performance of its security functions.

The term "Sworn Peace Officer" means any individual who derives plenary or special law enforcement powers from, and is an employee of, the Federal Government, the State (or Commonwealth), or any political subdivision, agency, department, branch or service of either, of any municipality, or of any other unit of local government.

The term "Unarmed Private Security Officer" means an individual employed by a Contract Security Company or a Proprietary Security Organization; whose principal duty is that of a security guard, armored car service guard, or alarm response runner; who never wears, carries or has access to a firearm in the performance of those duties; and who wears a distinctive design or fashion, or dress having any symbol, badge, emblem, insignia or device which identifies or tends to identify the wearer as a security guard, alarm response runner, or armored car service guard.
PART II. THE LICENSING AUTHORITY

Section 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF A LICENSING AUTHORITY
(a) There is hereby created a Private Security Industry Regulatory Board, hereinafter called the Licensing Authority or Board, designated to carry out the duties and functions conferred upon it by this Statute.
(b) The Position of Director of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Board is hereby created. He shall serve as the chief administrator of the Board. He shall not be a member of the Board but shall be a full-time employee of the Board, fully compensable in an amount to be determined by the Legislature. The Director shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Board except those duties vested in the Board by Section 11 of this Statute, and shall have no financial or business interests or affiliations, contingent or otherwise, in any person rendering private security services.

Section 5. LICENSING AUTHORITY SEAL
The Licensing Authority shall have a seal, the form of which it shall prescribe.

Section 6. BOARD MEETING
The Board shall consist of the following members:
(a) The Attorney General or his duly designated representative shall serve as an ex officio member of said Board, and such service shall not jeopardize that individual’s official capacity with this State; and
(b) The Director of the (State) Department of Public Safety or his duly designated representative shall serve as an ex officio member of said Board, and such service shall not jeopardize that individual’s official capacity with this State; and
(c) One Police Chief Executive appointed by the Governor, nor subject to legislative confirmation; and
(d) Two members shall be appointed by the Governor subject to legislative confirmation, who have been engaged for a period of three years in the rendering of private security services, and who are not employed by or affiliated with any other member of the Board; and
(e) Two members shall be appointed by the Governor subject to legislative confirmation, who are selected from the public at large, who are citizens of the United States and residents of this State, and who are not now or in the past employed by or affiliated with a person rendering private security services; and
(f) Two members shall be appointed by the Governor subject to legislative confirmation, who are citizens of the United States and residents of this State and who are full-time managers responsible for a Proprietary Security Organization Function.

Section 7. CHAIRMANSHIP OF BOARD
The Governor shall designate one appointee to sit as Chairman of the Licensing Authority for that member’s full term.

Section 8. VOTING POWERS AND PROCEDURES
(a) No action shall be taken by the Board unless a quorum of the membership of said Board is present and accounted for.
(b) All powers, duties and responsibilities conferred upon the Board by this Act may be exercised or taken by a majority vote of the necessary quorum then present and accounted for.

Section 9. TERMS OF OFFICE
(a) The Director of the Department of Public Safety and the Attorney General, or their representatives, shall serve on the Board during their terms of office and shall perform the duties required by this Act in addition to those duties required of them in other official capacities.
(b) The appointed members of the Board shall serve six-year terms; said terms to be staggered by the appointment of the initial appointees as follows: The police chief executive and one Proprietary Security Organization Manager for an initial term of two years; one licensee and one public at-large member for an initial term of four years; and the remaining members for initial terms of six years.
Section 10. VACANCIES

The Governor shall, subject to legislative confirmation, fill vacancies occurring among appointed members of the Board with appointments for the duration of the unexpired term. Said appointees must meet the qualifications for that position to be filled as stipulated in Section 6.

Section 11. POWERS OF THE LICENSING AUTHORITY RELATING TO RULES AND REGULATIONS, PETITIONS

The following powers are hereby vested in the Licensing Authority:

(a) Fromulation of rules and regulations which are reasonable, proper and necessary to carry out the functions of the Licensing Authority; investigations limited to determinations as to whether the provisions of this Statute are being complied with or violated; enforcement of the provisions of this Statute; establishment of procedures for the preparation and processing of examinations, applications, license certificates, registration and identification cards, renewals, appeals, hearings and rule-making proceedings; and determination of the qualifications of licensees and Private Security Officers consistent with the provisions of this Statute.

(b) Any interested person may petition the Licensing Authority to enact, amend or repeal any rule or regulation within the scope of paragraph (a) of this Section. The Licensing Authority shall prescribe by rule the form for such petitions and procedures for their submission, consideration and disposition.

Section 12. SUBPOENAS, OATHES; CONTEMPT POWERS

(a) In any investigation conducted under the provisions of this Statute, the Licensing Authority may issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books, accounts, records and documents. The Director conducting a hearing may administer oaths and may require testimony or evidence to be given under oath.

(b) If a witness refuses to obey a subpoena or to give any evidence relevant to proper inquiry by the Licensing Authority, the witness may be cited as contempt. If the witness then refuses, without reasonable cause or legal grounds, to be examined or to give evidence relevant to proper inquiry by the Licensing Authority, the court may cite the witness for contempt.

Section 13. PUBLIC NOTICE AND HEARING ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING

(a) The Licensing Authority shall, prior to the adoption of any rule or regulation or the amendment or repeal thereof, or holding of any public hearings, notify in writing and by mail all licensees and Proprietary Security Organizations which have registered employees within the State, publish in the State Register (or if there is no State Register, a newspaper of general circulation within the State) notice of the intended action; shall give publicity to the proposal in such other manner as it regards appropriate; and shall hold a public hearing at which all interested persons are given an opportunity to submit data and views either orally or in writing. Notice shall include:

1. A statement of the time, place and nature of the public rulemaking proceedings;
2. Reference to the authority under which the rulemaking is proposed; and
3. The exact wording of proposed rules or rule changes; or
4. Either the terms or substance of the proposed rulemaking or a description in reasonable detail of the subjects and issues involved.

The publication or service of any notice required by this Section shall be made not less than thirty (30) days prior to the date of the public hearing. The hearings shall be held not less than thirty (30) days prior to the proposed adoption, amendment, or repeal of the rule or regulation as the case may be, except as otherwise provided by the Licensing Authority upon good cause found and published with the notice.
PART III. LICENSING OF CONTRACT SECURITY COMPANIES

Section 14. REQUIREMENT FOR LICENSE.

(a) It shall be unlawful and punishable as provided in Section 42 of this Statute, for any person to engage in the business of a Contract Security Company within this State without having first obtained a Contract Security Company License from the State Licensing Authority, subject to paragraph (b) hereof.

(b) Every person engaged in the Contract Security Company business within the State on the effective date of this Statute, however, shall have 180 days to apply to the Licensing Authority for a license to operate a Contract Security Company. Any such person filling a timely application may continue to engage in business pending a final determination of such application.

(c) Unless there is a separate statute currently in effect in this State by which an alarm or armored car business is licensed and regulated, all provisions of this Statute shall apply equally to said businesses which shall be considered as Contract Security Companies. If there is a separate statute in effect in this State by which alarm and armored car businesses are licensed and regulated, the licensing provisions of this Statute shall not apply to such businesses unless such businesses are also engaged in the business of providing security guard services.

Section 15. FORM OF APPLICATION.

(a) Applications for licenses required by the provisions of this Statute shall be filed with the Licensing Authority on a form provided by the Licensing Authority. The application shall be subscribed and sworn to by each applicant. If the applicant is a corporation, the application shall be subscribed and sworn to by at least one principal corporate officer.

(1) The full name and business address of the applicant and, if the applicant is a corporation or partnership, the name and address of the Qualifying Agent;
b. As to every required person, a statement of experience that meets the qualifications of Section 16.

(7) As to each applicant which is a corporation or partnership, the names and addresses of each principal officer, director, or partner, whichever is applicable and unless the stock of such corporation is listed on a national securities exchange or registered under Section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, the names and addresses of all stockholders.

(b) The Licensing Authority may require that the application include any other information which the Licensing Authority may reasonably deem necessary to determine whether the applicant or individual signing the application meets the requirements of this Statute or to establish the truth of the facts set forth in the application.

(c) Any individual signing a license application must be at least (the legal age for licensing generally established in the State) years of age.

Section 16. LICENSER QUALIFICATIONS.

(a) Every applicant, or in the case of a partnership each partner, or in the case of a corporation the Qualifying Agent, shall meet the following qualifications before it may engage in the business of a Contract Security Company:

(1) Be of legal age;

(2) Be a citizen of the United States or a resident alien;

(3) Not been convicted in any jurisdiction of any felony, or any crime involving moral turpitude, or illegal use or possession of a dangerous weapon, for any of which a full pardon (or similar relief) has not been granted;

(4) Not been declared by any court of competent jurisdiction incompetent by reason of mental defect or disease and has not been restored;

(5) Not suffering from habitual drunkenness or from narcotics addiction or dependence;

(6) Be of good moral character;

(7) Possess three (3) years experience as a manager, supervisor, or administrator with a Contract Security Company or Proprietary Security Organization or possesses three (3) years supervisory experience approved by the Licensing Authority with any Federal, U. S. military, state, county or municipal law enforcement agency.

(b) If the Licensing Authority determines that the applicant or Qualifying Agent has not satisfactorily complied with paragraph 16 (a) (7), it may require compliance with paragraph (c) of this Section.

(c) Examination Requirement: The Licensing Authority shall prepare and administer at least twice annually examinations designed to measure an individual's knowledge and competence in the Contract Security Company business. An applicant or Qualifying Agent successfully passing the Licensing Authority's examination may substitute that for the experience requirement of paragraph (a) (7) of this Section.

(d) In the event that the Qualifying Agent upon whom the Licensee relies to comply with paragraph (a) (7) or to qualify under paragraph (c) of this Section shall cease to perform his duties on a regular basis, the Licensee shall promptly notify the Licensing Authority by certified or registered mail and shall obtain, as promptly as possible, a substitute eligible individual within six (6) months from and after the disqualification of such individual. The Licensing Authority may revoke the license or any, in its discretion, extend for a reasonable time the period for obtaining a substitute Qualifying Agent.

(e) A corporation seeking a License shall be incorporated under the laws of this State or shall be duly qualified to do business within this State with a valid certificate of authority issued by the Secretary of State and an agent for service of process designated as required by law.

Section 17. LICENSE APPLICATION - INVESTIGATION.

After receipt of an application for a license, the Licensing Authority shall conduct an investigation to determine whether the facts set forth in the application are true and shall compare, or request that (the appropriate State agency) compare the fingerprints submitted with the applica-
Authority or of Investigation for a search of the fingerprint files of a State agency to determine if the individual fingerprinted has any convictions recorded in the FBI files.

Section 18. ACTION ON LICENSE APPLICATION.

Within thirty (30) days after receipt of an application, the Licensing Authority shall either issue a license to the applicant or notify the applicant of a denial of the license application. In the event additional information is required from the applicant by the Licensing Authority to complete its investigation or otherwise to satisfy the requirements of this Statute, or if the applicant has not submitted all of the required information, the thirty-day period for action by the Licensing Authority shall commence when all such information has been received by the Licensing Authority.

Section 19. GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF APPLICATION.

The Licensing Authority shall deny the application for a license if it finds that the applicant or the Qualifying Agent or any of the applicant's owners, partners or principal corporate officers have:

(a) Violated any of the provisions of this Statute or the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder;

(b) Practiced fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

(c) Knowingly made a material misstatement in the application for a license; or

(d) Have not met the qualifications of Section 16, paragraph (a) of this Statute.

Section 20. PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OR DENIAL OF APPLICATION: HEARINGS.

(a) The procedure of the Licensing Authority in approving or denying an application shall be as follows:

(1) If the application is approved, the Licensing Authority shall notify the applicant in writing that a license will be issued. Such notification shall state that the license so issued will expire in two (2) years, unless renewed in accordance with Sections 21 and 24 of this Statute, and shall set forth the time within which application for renewal must be made.

(2) If the application is denied, the Licensing Authority shall notify the applicant in writing and shall set forth the grounds for denial. If the grounds for denial are subject to correction by the applicant, the notice of denial shall state the time within which application for correction may be made.
the business, the successor, heir, devisee, or personal representative of such owner shall, within thirty (30) days of such death, disablement, or other termination of operation by the original licensee, apply for a license on a form prescribed by the Licensing Authority, which form shall include the same general information required by Section 15 of this Statute. The transfer shall be subject to the same general requirements and procedures set forth in Sections 16 through 21 of this Statute to the extent such Sections are applicable.

(c) If a sale, assignment, transfer, merger or consolidation of a business licensed under this Statute is consummated, the purchaser, assignee, transferee, surviving or new corporation who is not already a licensee shall immediately apply for a license on a form prescribed by the Licensing Authority which shall include the general information required by Section 15 of this Statute. The purchaser, assignee, transferee, surviving or new corporation shall be subject to the same general requirements and procedures set forth in Section 16 through Section 21 of this Statute to the extent such Sections are applicable and may continue the operation of that licensed business until notified by the Licensing Authority of its final decision on the new application for a license.

(d) With good cause, the Licensing Authority may extend the period of time for filing the application required by paragraph (b) and paragraph (c) of this Section.

Section 25. LICENSES - REVOCATION; HEARINGS; APPEALS; NOTICES

(a) Licenses may be revoked by the Licensing Authority in the manner hereinafter set forth if the licensee or any of its owners, partners, principal corporate officers or Qualifying Agent are:

(1) Found to have violated any of the provisions of this Statute; or any rule or regulation of the Licensing Authority which violation the Licensing Authority determines to reflect unfavorably upon the fitness of the licensee to engage in the Contract Security Company business

(2) Found to have knowingly and willfully given any false information of a material nature in connection with an application for a
license or a renewal or reinstatement of a license, in a notice of transfer of a business licensed under this Statute.

(3) Found to have been convicted in any jurisdiction of a felony or a misdemeanor if the Licensing Authority determines that such conviction reflects unfavorably on the fitness of the applicant to engage in the Contract Security Company business; or

(4) Found to have committed any act while the license was in effect which would have been cause for the revocation of a license, or grounds for the denial of an application for a license.

(b) Prior to revocation of a license, the Licensing Authority shall promptly notify the licensee of its intent to issue an order of revocation, setting forth in reasonable detail the grounds for revocation. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of notice of intent to revoke from the Licensing Authority, the licensee may request a hearing. Within ten (10) days after the filing of a request for hearing by the licensee, the Licensing Authority shall, upon due notice to the licensee, schedule a hearing to be held before the Licensing Authority or an officer designated by the Licensing Authority. The hearing shall be held within fifteen (15) days after such notice is mailed to the licensee, unless postponed at the request of the licensee. The licensee shall have the right to make an oral presentation at the hearing, including the right to present witnesses and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The licensee may be represented by counsel. If the hearing is held before a hearing officer, such officer shall submit his report in writing to the Licensing Authority within ten (10) days after the hearing. The Licensing Authority shall issue its decision within ten (10) days after the hearing or within ten (10) days after receiving the report of the hearing officer. The decision of the Licensing Authority shall be in writing and shall set forth the Licensing Authority’s findings and conclusions. A copy thereof shall be promptly mailed to the principal office of the licensee within the State.

(c) Within ninety (90) days after the licensee has exhausted all rights of appeal under this Statute or, if the licensee does not seek a hearing after receipt of a notice of intent to revoke, the licensee shall notify all of its clients within the State of such revocation and shall maintain in its records a copy of such notices. The licensee shall cease to perform any services for which it has been licensed under this Statute within sixty (60) days of its receipt of the final notice of intent to revoke from the Licensing Authority.

(d) Under circumstances in which the Licensing Authority determines that the public health, welfare or safety may be jeopardized by the termination of a licensee’s services, the Licensing Authority may upon its own motion or upon application by the licensee or any party affected by such termination extend the time for the termination of the licensee’s operations, subject to such reasonable, necessary and proper conditions or restrictions as it deems appropriate.

(e) After the Licensing Authority has issued a notice of intent to revoke a license, the licensee may request that it be permitted to continue to operate subject to the terms of a written order of consent issued by the Licensing Authority, requiring the licensee to correct the conditions set forth as grounds for revocation in the notice of intent to revoke and imposing reasonable conditions and restrictions on the licensee in the conduct of its business. The Licensing Authority may in its sole discretion grant or deny such a request and may stay or postpone any proceeding being conducted pursuant to paragraph (b) of this Section. Negotiations for such an order of consent may be requested at any time during revocation proceedings and stay of pending proceedings during such negotiations will be within the sole discretion of the Licensing Authority. If revocation proceedings are before a court and the Licensing Authority and licensee have agreed upon the terms of a proposed consent order, the Licensing Authority shall submit the proposed order to the court which may approve, disapprove or modify the proposed order or require modification of the proposed consent order before approval.

(f) The Licensing Authority shall enact reasonable rules and regulations for determination of whether a licensee has complied with a consent order issued pursuant to paragraph (e) of this Section. If the Licensing Authority determines that a licensee has failed to comply, it may revoke such order and conduct proceedings for revocation of the license. If the consent order has been approved by court, the Licensing Authority shall petition such court for vacatur of the order. The court shall hold a hearing to determine if the order should be vacated. If the court vacates the consent order, the Licensing Authority may initiate proceedings for revocation of the license.
Section 26. POSTING AND SURRENDER OF LICENSE CERTIFICATE.

(a) Within seventy-two (72) hours after receipt of the license certificate, the Licensee shall cause such license certificate to be posted and to be displayed at all times in a conspicuous place in the principal office of the Licensee within the State and copies thereof to be displayed at all times in any other offices within the State where the Licensee transacts business with its customers, so that all persons visiting such place or places may readily see the license. Such license certificates or copies thereof shall be subject to inspection at all reasonable times by the Licensing Authority.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person holding such a license certificate to knowingly and willfully post such license certificate or permit such license certificate to be posted upon premises other than those described in the license certificate or to knowingly and willfully alter such license certificate. Each license certificate shall be surrendered to the Licensing Authority within seventy-two (72) hours after it has been revoked or after the licensee ceases to do business, subject, however, to Section 25 paragraph (d) and paragraph (e). If, however, the Licensing Authority or a court of competent jurisdiction has pending before it any matter relating to the renewal, revocation or transfer of a license, the Licensee shall not be required to surrender the license until the matter has been adjudicated and all appeals have been exhausted. When the Licensee receives final notice that its license has been revoked, a copy of such notice shall be displayed and posted in close proximity to the license certificate until the Licensee terminates its operations.

Section 27. CHANGE IN STATUS OF LICENSEE.

The Licensee shall notify the Licensing Authority within thirty (30) days of any change in its officers, directors, or material change in the information previously furnished or required to be furnished to the Licensing Authority or any occurrence which could reasonably be expected to affect the Licensee’s right to a license under this Statute.

Section 28. APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Statute, no person shall perform the functions and duties of an armed Private Security Officer in this State without first having been registered with the Licensing Authority and issued a Registration Card in the form prescribed in the Statute.

(b) Individuals required to obtain a Registration Card under this Section shall file for a Registration Card and, upon completion thereof, the Licensee or Registrant shall immediately forward the application to the Licensing Authority.

(c) Every applicant for a Registration Card shall make and deliver to the Licensee or the Licensing Authority a sworn application in writing upon a form prescribed by the Licensing Authority, containing the following information:

1. The name and address of the person which employs or will employ the applicant;
2. Applicant’s full name and current residence address;
3. Date and Place of Birth;
4. Social Security Number;
5. Telephone number, if any;
6. Complete addresses for the past five (5) years;
7. List of all employers for the past five (5) years;
8. List of all arrests, convictions and pending criminal charges in any jurisdiction;
9. Type of military discharge;
10. General physical description;
11. All names used by the applicant other than the name by which he or she is currently known, with an explanation setting forth the place or places where each such name was used, the date or dates of each use and an explanation of why such names were used.
(d) To be eligible to apply for a Registration Card an individual must:

1. Be at least of legal majority age;
2. Be a citizen of the United States or a resident alien;
3. Not have been convicted in any jurisdiction of any felony or any crime involving moral turpitude or illegal use or possession of a dangerous weapon for any of which a full pardon (or similar relief) has not been granted;
4. Not have been declared by any court of competent jurisdiction incompetent by reason of mental disease or defect and has not been restored;
5. Not suffer from habitual drunkenness or from narcotic addiction or dependence;
6. Be of good moral character; and
7. Not possess any disability which in the opinion of the Licensing Authority prevents him from performing the duties of an Armed Private Security Officer.

(e) The Registration Card shall be carried by an individual required to be registered under this Statute whenever such individual is performing the duties of an Armed Private Security Officer and shall be exhibited upon request.

(f) Application for a Registration Card to the Licensing Authority shall be accompanied by a Fifteen Dollar ($15.00) fee.

g) A Registration Card shall entitle the Registrant to perform the duties of an Armed Private Security Officer provided the Registrant continues in the employ of the employer listed on the Card and maintains his eligibility to hold a registration card under the provisions of this Statute.
Registrant's application, the Licensing Authority shall enter
the Registrant on its permanent register and shall issue to
the Registrant a permanent Registration Card which shall be
valid for one (1) year.

Section 31. REGISTRATION CARDS - DENIAL, SUSPENSION
OR REVOCATION; HEARINGS, NOTICES.
(a) Registration Cards shall be denied, suspended or
revoked by the Licensing Authority in the manner hereinafter
set forth if the cardholder has:
(1) Failed to meet the qualifications of Section 28,
paragraph (d) of this Statute;
(2) Been found to have violated any of the provi-
sions of this Statute or any rule or regulation of the
Licensing Authority if the Licensing Authority determines that such violation
reflects unfavorably upon the fitness of the
Registrant to function as an Armed Private
Security Officer;
(3) Knowingly and willfully given any material
false information to the Licensing Authority
in connection with an application for a Regis-
tration Card or a renewal or reinstatement of
a Registration Card or in the submission of
any material fact to the Licensing Authority;
(4) Been convicted in any jurisdiction of a
felony or a crime involving moral turpitude
or illegal use or possession of a dangerous
weapon, for any of which a full pardon (or
similar relief) has not been granted.
(b) Prior to denial, suspension or revocation of a
Registration Card, the Licensing Authority shall promptly notify
the Registrant and the employer with whom the cardholder is
employed of the proposed action setting forth in a reasonable
detail the ground or grounds for denial, suspension or revoca-
tion. The Registrant may request a hearing in the same manner
and in accordance with the same procedures as that provided in
Section 25 (b) of this Statute.
(c) In the event that the Licensing Authority denies,
suspends or revokes a Registration Card, the cardholder, upon
receipt of the notice of denial, suspension or revocation, shall
immediately cease to perform the duties of an Armed Private
Security Officer.

(d) Both the cardholder and the employer shall be noti-
fied by the Licensing Authority of final action to deny, sus-
pend or revoke a Registration Card.

Section 32. RENEWAL OF REGISTRATION CARD -
NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES
(a) Registration Cards issued by the Licensing Authority
shall be valid for a period of one (1) year. A Registration
Card renewal form must be filed by the cardholder with the
Licensing Authority not less than thirty (30) days prior to
the expiration of the card. The fee for renewal of the Card
shall be Five Dollars ($5.00). The renewal application shall
include a statement by the Registrant that the Registrant con-
tinues to meet the qualifications for an Armed Private Security
Officer as set forth in Section 28, paragraph (e). The renewal
application shall be accompanied by a statement from a Certi-
fied Trainer that the Registrant has satisfactorily completed
the prescribed refresher training required by Section 37 of
this Statute. A renewed Registration Card shall be valid for
one (1) year.
(b) The Licensing Authority may refuse to renew a Regis-
tration Card for any of the grounds set forth in Section 28,
paragraph (d) of this Statute and it shall promptly notify the cardhol-
der of its intent to refuse to renew the license. The cardholder may, within fifteen (15) days after receipt of such
notice, request a hearing on such refusal, in the same manner
and in accordance with the same procedure as that provided in
Section 25 (b) of this Statute.
(c) Licensees and employers subject to this Statute
shall notify the Licensing Authority of final action to deny, sus-
pend or revoke a Registration Card, of the expiration of the card,
termination of employment, or death or termination of employment of any of its
employees who are Registrants.
(d) Licensees and employers subject to this Statute
shall immediately notify the Licensing Authority of receipt of
information relating to a Registrant's continuing eligi-
bility to hold such a card under the provisions of this Sta-
tute.

Section 33. TRANSFERABILITY OF REGISTRATION CARDS
(a) In the event that a Registrant terminates employment
with one employer and is re-employed within five (5) business
A Registration Card shall be subject to expiration and renewal during the period in which the holder of the card is subject to an order of suspension.

Section 35. ACTIVITIES OF REGISTRANTS DURING SUSPENSION
OF USE OF A REGISTRATION CARD.

After a Registrant has received a notice of suspension or revocation of his Registration Card, such individual shall not perform the duties of an Armed Private Security Officer unless specifically authorized to do so by order of the Licensing Authority or by a court within the state.

Section 36. FIREARMS.

(a) Any individual who changes his permanent residence to another state shall be subject to an order of suspension.

(b) A Registration Card will grant authority to the holder, while in the performance of his duties, to carry a firearm in the performance of those duties without having first been issued a Registration Card by the Licensing Authority.

(c) The Registrant must be in possession of the Registration Card when carrying a firearm and shall exhibit it upon request. Registration Cards shall authorize possession of an approved firearm only when the Registrant is on duty or travelling directly to and from work.

(d) All firearms carried by authorized Armed Private Security Officers in the performance of their duties shall be registered with the proper agency or government. Personally-owned weapons will not be carried by Armed Private Security Officers in the performance of their duties.

Section 37. ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER TRAINING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Prior to being issued a Registration Card, all Armed Private Security Officers shall receive at least eight hours of general training as prescribed by the Licensing Authority and be required to successfully pass an examination
on the prescribed material which include the following topics:

1. Orientation: Two (2) hours;
2. Legal powers and limitations of a Security Officer - two (2) hours;
3. Emergency procedures - two (2) hours; and
4. General duties - Two (2) hours.

(b) All Armed Private Security Officers shall also receive firearms training before being issued a firearm. The following minimum firearms pre-assignment training shall be required:

1. Pre-issue weapon instruction and successful examination including but not limited to the following topics:
   a. Legal limitations on use of weapons;
   b. Handling of a weapon; and
   c. Safety and maintenance.
2. Minimum Marksmanship Qualification Requirement:
   A minimum of 60% on any approved silhouette target course prescribed by the Licensing Authority.

(c) All Armed Private Security Officers must complete an annual eight (8) hour refresher course in the subjects prescribed by paragraph (a) above and be re-qualified in the use of firearms prior to applying for a renewal Registration Card under the provisions of Section 32.

(d) Upon a Registrant's completion of any training required above, the Licensor, Registrant or employer shall furnish to the Licensing Authority a written notice of such completion signed by a Certified Trainer.

(e) All training required by this Statute shall be administered by a Certified Trainer who is approved by the Licensing Authority and meets the following minimum qualifications:

1. Of legal age;
2. Have a minimum of one (1) year supervisory experience with a Contract Security Company, Proprietary Security Organization or with any Federal, U.S. Military, State, County or Municipal law enforcement agency; and
3. Who is personally qualified to teach the training required by this Act.

(f) The Certified Trainer may, in his discretion, instruct personally or use a combination of personal instruction, audio and/or visual training aids. The Certified Trainer shall have authority to appoint one or more instructors to assist in the implementation of the training program.

Section 38. EMPLOYMENT BY NON-LICENSEES.

It shall be unlawful, as provided in Section 42, for any person, other than a Licensee, to employ an Armed Private Security Officer unless prior to such employment such person shall notify the Licensing Authority on a form prescribed by the Licensing Authority of its intent to employ an Armed Private Security Officer; designate an individual who will be responsible for the compliance with the applicable provisions of this Statute on behalf of such person; furnish the Licensing Authority with evidence of insurance required by Section 41 of this Statute; and furnish such other information as the Licensing Authority may require regarding the names, titles, business and resident addresses and other pertinent background of such person, the officers, principals, as appropriate of such person and the individual designated by such person.
PART V.  EMPLOYMENT OF UNARMED PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS

Section 39.  FINGERPRINTING AND APPLICATION

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Statute, no person shall perform the duties of an Unarmed Private Security Officer without having first submitted two sets of classifiable fingerprints to his employer and having completed an employment application on a form approved by the Licensing Authority.

(b) On or before the date an Unarmed Private Security Officer begins employment, the employer must submit the employee's fingerprints and the application to the Licensing Authority. The Licensing Authority shall compare or request that the appropriate State agency compare the fingerprints filed with the application to fingerprints filed with the Division of Criminal Identification, Records and Statistics of the State Department of Corrections, or its equivalent.

The Licensing Authority or the State agency comparing the fingerprints shall also submit the fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a search of the fingerprint files of that agency.

(c) The application for an Identification Card shall be accompanied by a Five Dollar ($5.00) fee.

(d) Within thirty (30) days after an employment application and fingerprints have been submitted by an employer, the Licensing Authority shall inform the employer of any criminal conviction data resulting from the records search.

(e) No person may employ an individual as an Unarmed Private Security Officer if the individual has been convicted in any jurisdiction of a felony or of any crime involving moral turpitude or illegal use or possession of a dangerous weapon, for any of which a full pardon (or similar relief) has not been granted.

Section 40.  IDENTIFICATION CARD.

(a) The Licensing Authority shall issue an Identification Card for every individual who has been subjected to a criminal history records check and does not have a conviction for a felony or any crime as stated in Section 39(b). The Identification Card will be sent to the employer submitting the fingerprint records and the card will then be issued to the employee if he is still employed. Identification Cards issued by the Licensing Authority under this paragraph shall be carried by that individual while performing his duties and shall be exhibited upon request.

(b) In the event that a holder of an Identification Card terminates employment with one employer and is re-employed within five (5) business days as an Unarmed Private Security Officer with another employer, the holder shall within twenty-four (24) hours of such re-employment submit to the Licensing Authority a notice of the change on a form prescribed by the Licensing Authority, together with a transfer fee of Five Dollars ($5.00). The Licensing Authority shall issue a new Identification Card reflecting the name of the new employer.

Upon receipt of that new card, the holder must immediately return the old card to the Licensing Authority. The holder may continue to work as an Unarmed Private Security Officer for the new employer while the Licensing Authority is processing the application.

(c) The holder of an Identification Card who terminates employment, and who is not re-employed as an Unarmed Private Security Officer within five (5) business days, shall within twenty-four (24) hours of the fifth (5th) business day surrender the Identification Card to the employer. The employer shall return the cancelled Identification Card to the Licensing Authority within five (5) business days by placing the card in the U. S. Mail addressed to the Licensing Authority.

If the holder fails to surrender the card as required by this paragraph, the employer shall notify the Licensing Authority of that fact within ten (10) business days after the holder has terminated employment.
PART VI. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 41. UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT.
(a) No individual, while performing the duties of an armed or unarmed private security officer shall wear or display any badge, insignia, device, shield, patch or pattern which shall indicate or tend to indicate that he is a sworn peace officer or which contains or includes the word "police" or the equivalent thereof, or is similar in wording to any law enforcement agency in this State.
(b) No person shall, while performing any private security services, have or utilize any vehicle or equipment distinct in design, shape, or size, or have any sign, shield, marking, accessory or insignia that may indicate that such vehicle is a vehicle of a public law enforcement agency.
(c) If a Private Security Officer is required to wear a uniform, it shall be furnished by the employer. All military or police style uniforms shall, except for rainwear or other foul weather clothing have:
1. Affixed over the left breast pocket, on the outermost garment and on all cape worn by such persons, badges, distinct in design from those utilized by law enforcement agencies within the State and approved by the Licensing Authority;
2. Affixed over the right breast pocket of such outermost garment a plate or tape of the size 5" x 1" with the words "Security Officer".
3. An employer may require a reasonable deposit to secure the return of the uniform, weapon, or any equipment provided by the employer.

Section 42. INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
All Licensees and employers of Armed Private Security Officers shall file with the Licensing Authority a certificate of insurance evidencing comprehensive general liability coverage for bodily injury, personal injury, and property damage with endorsements for assault and battery and personal injury, including false arrest, libel, slander, and invasion of privacy, in the minimum amount of $300,000 for bodily or personal injury and $100,000 for property damage. Licensees shall also file endorsements for damage to property in their care, custody and control and for errors and omissions. Licensees and employers of Armed Private Security Officers shall also file a certificate of Worker's Compensation Insurance as required by the statutes of this State. The certificates shall provide that the insurance shall not be modified or cancelled unless ten (10) days prior notice shall be given to the Licensing Authority. All persons required to be insured by this Statute must be insured by a carrier licensed in the State in which the insurance has been purchased or in this State.

Section 43. UNLAWFUL ACTS.
(a) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly commit any of the following:
1. Provide Contract Security Services without possessing a valid license;
2. Employ any individual to perform the duties of an Armed Private Security Officer who is not the holder of a valid Registration Card or to employ any individual to perform the duties of an Unarmed Private Security Officer who has not filed an application for an Identification Card as required by Section 39;
3. Publish any advertisement, letterhead, circular, statement or phrase of any sort which suggests that the Licensee is an official police agency or any other agency, instrumentality, or division of this State or any of its political subdivisions or of the Federal Government;
(1) Issue any badge or shield not in conformance with this Statute;

(2) Designate an individual as other than a Private Security Officer;

(2) Knowingly make any false statement or material omission in any application filed with the Licensing Authority;

(4) Falsey represent that the person is the holder of a valid license or registration;

(5) Violate any provision of this Statute or any rule or regulation of the Licensing Authority.

(b) It is unlawful for any Private Security Officer to knowingly commit any of the following:

(1) Fail to return immediately on demand or within twenty-four (24) hours of termination of employment, a firearm issued by an employer. Violation of this provision shall constitute a felony;

(2) To carry a firearm in the performance of his duties if not the holder of a valid Registration Card. Violation of this provision shall constitute a felony;

(3) Fail to return immediately on demand or within seven (7) days of termination of employment any uniform, badge or other item of equipment issued to the Private Security Officer by an employer;

(4) Make any statement which would reasonably cause another person to believe that the Private Security Officer functions as a sworn peace officer or other official of this State or of any of its political subdivisions or agency of the Federal Government;

(5) Fail to comply with the regulations issued by the Licensing Authority or with any other requirements under the provisions of this Statute;

(6) Divulge to anyone other than his employer or to such persons as his employer may direct or as may be required by law, any information acquired during such employment that may compromise the security of any premises to which he shall have been assigned by such employer;

(7) Fail to return to the employer or the Licensing Authority a Registration Card or Identification Card as required by the provisions of this Statute;

(8) Possess a License, Registration Card, or Identification Card issued to another person;

(9) Use any badge or shield not in conformance with this Statute.

(c) The violation of any of the provisions of this Section, unless otherwise specified, shall constitute a misdemeanor punishable by fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) or up to one (1) year of imprisonment, or both. The Licensing Authority is also authorized to suspend or revoke a License, Registration Card or Identification Card issued under this Statute.
Section 46. LOCAL GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF CONTRACT SECURITY COMPANIES OR PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS.

(a) From and after the effective date of this Statute, no governmental subdivision of this State shall enact any legislation, code or ordinance or promulgate any rules or regulations relating to the licensing, training or regulation of Contract Security companies or individuals functioning as Private Security Officers, Armed or Unarmed, other than the imposition of a bonafide business tax.

(b) Upon the effective date of this Statute, any provision of any legislation, code or ordinance or rules promulgated by any local governmental subdivision of this State, relating to the licensing, training or regulation of Contract Security companies or individuals functioning as Private Security Officers, Armed or Unarmed, shall be deemed superseded by this Statute.

Section 47. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

(a) Any person aggrieved by any final action of the Licensing Authority under this Statute shall have the right to judicial review by a (court of competent jurisdiction) within the State.

(b) In proceedings in any court pursuant to the provisions of this Statute, trial shall be de novo. When a court has acquired jurisdiction, all administrative action taken prior thereto shall be stayed, except as provided in Section 35 of this Statute. The rights of the parties shall be determined by the court upon a trial of the matter or matters in controversy under rules governing the trial of other civil suits in the same manner and to the same extent as if the matter had been committed to the court in the first instance and there had been no intervening administrative or executive action or decision.

Section 48. RECIPROCITY.

Full reciprocity shall be accorded to Armed and Unarmed Private Security Officers who are properly registered and certified in another state having selection and training requirements at least equal to the requirements of this State when the duties of such individuals require them to operate across state lines.

Section 49. SEVERABILITY CLAUSE.

If any provision of this Statute or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this Statute which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this Statute are declared to be severable.

Section 50. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Statute shall become effective ninety (90) days after its approval by the Governor or by operation of law without the Governor’s approval. On or after the effective date of this Statute, no person shall engage in any activity regulated by this Statute unless said person is in compliance with the provisions of this Statute; except, any person who, on the effective date of this Statute, is engaged in the business of a Contract Security company shall have One Hundred Eighty (180) days from the effective date to apply for a license; and any individual who is required by this Statute to have a Registration Card or Identification Card, and who is employed as a Private Security Officer on the effective date of this Statute, shall have One Hundred Eighty (180) days after the effective date to comply with the provisions of this Statute.
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Brendan T. Byrne

Brendan T. Byrne was elected as the 54th Governor of New Jersey on Nov. 6, 1973, by the largest plurality ever awarded to a gubernatorial candidate in State history.

Governor Byrne was born on April 1, 1924, in West Orange, N.J. He was educated in West Orange public schools.

Governor Byrne was commissioned a lieutenant in the Army Air Corps in March 1943, and served as a squadron navigator in the European Theater. He was honorably discharged in September 1945, having been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and four Air Medals.

He was graduated from the Princeton University School of Public and International Affairs in 1949. He received his law degree from Harvard University, served his legal clerkship with Judge Joseph Weintraub (who later became Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court) and, upon admission to the bar, practiced law in Newark and East Orange.

Governor Byrne was appointed an Assistant Counsel to Governor Robert B. Meyner in October 1955, Governor Meyner's Executive Secretary in 1956, and Deputy Attorney General in charge of the Essex County Prosecutor's Office in 1958. Governor Meyner named him to a full 5-year term as Essex County Prosecutor in July 1959, and he was reappointed by Governor Richard J. Hughes in 1964.

While a prosecutor, Governor Byrne served as president of the County Prosecutors' Association of New Jersey and as vice president of the National District Attorneys' Association.

In 1968, Governor Hughes appointed him to be president of the New Jersey State Board of Public Utility Commissioners.

In 1970, he was appointed to the Superior Court by Governor William T. Cahill and served as Assignment Judge for Morris, Sussex, and Warren Counties until he became a candidate for Governor in April 1973.

Governor and Mrs. Byrne, the former Jean Featherly, reside with their seven children at Morven, the Governor's official residence in Princeton, N.J.

Charles S. House

Charles S. House has served as Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court and as chairman of the Connecticut Adult Probation Commission since 1971.

From 1933 to 1953, Chief Justice House conducted a general law practice. He served in the Connecticut General Assembly as a member of the House of Representatives from 1941 to 1943, and as...
a member of the State Senate from 1947 to 1951. He was Assistant State's Attorney for Hartford County, Conn., from 1942 to 1946; chairman of the Connecticut Legislative Council from 1949 to 1951; and legal advisor to Governor John Lodge from 1951 to 1953. Chief Justice House served as a judge in the Connecticut Superior Court from 1953 to 1965, when he was named Chief Judge. He became an Associate Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court in 1965. He was chairman of the Conference of Chief Justices in 1975-1976.

Chief Justice House received the bachelor of arts degree from Harvard College and the bachelor of laws degree from Harvard Law School.

Arthur J. Blik

The biography of Mr. Blik appears below with those of other members of the Task Force on Private Security.

Allen F. Breed

Allen F. Breed has been director of the Department of Youth Authority, State of California, since 1967.

Mr. Breed began work in the field of juvenile justice in 1945, as group supervisor at the Stockton Camp. Subsequently, he served in nearly every capacity in juvenile corrections including superintendent of three youth facilities and as administrative superintendent of the Northern California Youth Center. Mr. Breed is chairman of the Center for Correctional Association's Council on Youth Correctional Services, a board member of the American Justice Institute and the American Correctional Association, and a member of the Council on Corrections of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.

Mr. Breed also serves on numerous advisory groups, including the National Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the National Assessment Study of Correctional Programs for Juvenile and Youthful Offenders, and the American Bar Association's Juvenile Justice Standards Project Joint Commission. He holds the bachelor of arts degree from the University of the Pacific.

Doris A. Davis

Doris A. Davis was elected Mayor of Compton, Calif., in 1973, thus becoming the first black woman to hold the office of chief executive of a large metropolitan community.

Prior to her election as mayor, she served as Compton City Clerk for 8 years. Mayor Davis is a member of the State of California Joint Committee for the Revision of Election Laws and of the State of California Joint Committee on the Revision of the Election Code. She is a member of the board of directors of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. She also is director of Daisy Child Development Centers, a nonprofit organization that provides services to unwed teenage mothers.

Mayor Davis holds a bachelor of arts degree from the University of Illinois, a master of arts degree from Northeastern University, and a doctor of philosophy degree in public administration from Laurence University, Santa Barbara, Calif.

Lee Johnson

Elected Attorney General of Oregon in 1968, Lee Johnson is currently completing his second 4-year term. He was appointed Judge of the Oregon Court of Appeals in 1976 for a 6-year term beginning January 1977.

Mr. Johnson was selected under the Attorney General's Honorable Recruitment Program, in 1959, to serve as an assistant attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. In 1961, he returned to Oregon and began private law practice in Portland. He was elected to the Oregon House of Representatives in 1964 and reelected in 1966. Mr. Johnson has served as a member of the Oregon Criminal Law Revision Commission and the Governor's Commission on Judicial Reform, as well as of the Oregon Law Enforcement Council and the Governor's Commission on Organized Crime.

Mr. Johnson received the bachelor of arts degree from Princeton University and the bachelor of laws degree from Stanford Law School. He is admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court.

John F. Keohoe, Jr.

John F. Keohoe, Jr., is commissioner of public safety for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. He was appointed to this office in 1971 and was reappointed in 1975.

Mr. Keohoe joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1941. During his 28-year career with the FBI, he served as special agent in charge of the field office in Boston and in charge of the organized crime section of the Boston field office.

From October 1970 through August 1971, Mr. Keohoe served as executive director of the New England Organized Crime Intelligence System in Wellesley, Mass. He holds the bachelor of science degree in education from Boston College.

Cal Ledbetter, Jr.

Cal Ledbetter, Jr., is serving his fifth term in the Arkansas House of Representatives. He also is chair-

man of the department of criminal justice and crimi-
nal justice at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock.

From 1955 to 1957, Professor Ledbetter served in Germany with the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps. He was chairman of the Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Task Force of the National Conference of State Legislatures for 3 years and was a member of the Arkansas Legislative Council. He is a co-author of Politics in Arkansas: The Constitutional Experience.

Professor Ledbetter received the bachelor of arts degree from Pomona College and was graduated from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton. He received the bachelor of laws degree from the University of Arkansas and the doctor of philosophy degree in political science from Northwestern University.

Peter F. Lejins

Peter F. Lejins is director of the Institute of Crim­

inal Justice and Criminology and a professor of sociology at the University of Maryland. Dr. Lejins has held many appointments to major international conferences on crime prevention and treatment of offenders. He has served as a member of the U.S. Government Delegation to the six United Nations Congresses on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders since 1950. In 1965 and 1972 he received Presidential appointments for 6-year terms as a U.S. Correspondent to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in the area of crime prevention and treatment of offenders. Dr. Lejins is a member of the board of directors of the National Criminal Justice Education Consortium and is one of the two official United States representatives to the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation. He is president of the Scientific Commission of the International Society for Criminology. Dr. Lejins has been an associate professor at the American Correctional Association and a long-time chairman of that association's research council. He is a president of the American Correctional Association and is a director of the International Center of Biomedical and Medico-Criminological Journal of Sao Paulo, Brazil, a position he has held since 1974.

Dr. Lejins studied philosophy and law at the University of Latvia. He received his doctorate from the University of Chicago.

Richard C. Wertz

For the past 6 years, Richard C. Wertz has served as executive director of the Maryland Governor's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Adminis­

tration of Justice. In September 1976, Mr. Wertz was also appointed to serve as special assistant to the Governor of Maryland for Criminal Justice and as a member of the task force of the State's serious crime commission. Mr. Wertz was an adjunct professor at the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C., since 1975.

From 1966 to 1970, Mr. Wertz was director of public safety for the Metropolitan Washington Coun­

cil of Governments. He is immediate past chairman of the National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators and a current member of the Advisory and Evaluation Committee of the Coun­

cil of State Governments' Criminal Justice Research Project. Mr. Wertz is a member of the Advisory Committee on Corrections Reform of the Governor's Conference and the Criminal Justice Advisory of the State Council of State Governments' Southern Legislative Conference.

Mr. Wertz holds the bachelor of arts degree in political science from Knox College and the master of business administration degree in public administration from the Wharton Graduate School, University of Pennsylvania.

Jerry V. Wilson

For the past 2 years, Jerry V. Wilson has been project director of a study, conducted by The Ameri­
can University Institute for Advanced Studies in Justice, of the efforts to control crime in the District of Columbia for the period 1955 through 1975.

From 1969 to 1974, Mr. Wilson served as chief of police of the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. He joined the force in 1949 and was promoted through the ranks during his 25-year career with the department. He served as chief of the department from 1960 to 1965, when he was appointed to head the first field operations unit and the data processing division. He was named assistant chief of police for field operations in 1968.

He is the author of two books, Police Report and Police and the Media. Mr. Wilson was graduated magna cum laude from The American University in 1975, with a bachelor of science degree in adminis­

tration of justice.

Pete Wilson

Pete Wilson was elected the nonpartisan mayor of San Diego in 1971 and served until 1975. Mayor Wilson began his political career in 1966 when he was elected to the California Assembly. A Republican, he won reelection twice. He served on
Task Force on Private Security

Arthur J. Bilek

Arthur J. Bilek has been a vice president of Pinkerton's, Inc., since 1974. Mr. Bilek served in the Chicago Police Department from 1953 to 1962, rising through the ranks to lieutenant and acting director of the training division. He was appointed chief of the Cook County Sheriff's Police Department in 1962 and was instrumental in professionalizing and reforming that agency while replacing patronage practices with the merit system.

Mr. Bilek was cofounder of the Illinois State Police Emergency Radio Network (ISPERN), an all-department, statewide emergency police system. He founded the first degree program in administration of criminal justice in the United States at the University of Illinois, where he was professor of criminal justice from 1967 to 1969. He served as chairman of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission from 1969 to 1972 and later, as corporate security director, developed the security program of the Hilton Hotels Corporation.

Mr. Bilek is chairman of the Private Security Advisory Council of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. He is a member of the board of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. He is a member of the board of the Law in American Society Foundation. He received bachelor of science and master of social work degrees from Loyola University in Chicago.

Walter J. Burns

Walter J. Burns has been director of the Operational Services Division, Federal Protective Service, General Services Administration, since 1972. Mr. Burns' career in law enforcement and security has spanned the past 25 years. From 1950 to 1955, he was a special agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He was a supervisory criminal investigator for the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), U.S. Air Force, from 1955 to 1967. In 1967 he joined the General Services Administration as assistant to the director of the Office of Investigations, a position he held until assuming his present office. He is a member of the American Society for Industrial Security; the National Private Security Advisory Council of LEAA; the Interagency Task Force on Theft of Government Property; the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism; the International Association of Chiefs of Police; the Society of Former Special Agents of the OSI, U.S. Air Force; and the Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI. He also is past president of the Association of Federal Investigators.
Mr. Burns received the bachelor of social science degree from Georgetown University and the master of science degree in special studies from George Washington University.

Dale Carson

Dale Carson is sheriff of Duval County, Fla., an office he has held since 1958. Sheriff Carson began his law enforcement career as a member of the Columbus, Ohio, Police Department. In 1940, he became a detective for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. From 1951 to 1958, he was an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, an experience that was to lead him to become sheriff of a major metropolitan area.

Carson received the bachelor of arts degree from Ohio State University.

R. Keegan Federal Jr.

R. Keegan Federal Jr., is Judge of Superior Court for DeKalb and Rockdale Counties in Decatur, Ga. Judge Federal is a past Executive Council Member of the State Bar of Georgia, Young Lawyers Section, and also served on the American Bar Association's Advisory Council to the Committee on Youth Education for Citizenship. Until his election to the bench, he was a member of the Gravine Tribunal for the Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit. A member of the Atlanta Municipal Health Association, Judge Federal served as a board member and is past vice president of that association for DeKalb County. He also is vice president of the -ship Atlanta Alumni Association, an advisory -ship member of the Georgia Department of Human Resources, and has served as associate counsel for the Atlanta Crime Commission. Judge Federal attended undergraduate school at Loyola University, New Orleans, La., and received his law degree from Emory University Law School, Atlanta, Ga.

Don R. Deming

Don R. Deming has been Chief of Police of the Wilmington, Ill., Police Department since 1953, having joined the force in 1947.

Chief Deming has served as treasurer and lecturer for the Northwestern University Police Traffic Institute, the University of Illinois, and the FBI National Academy. He is a member of the American Association of Chiefs of Police, the Illinois North Senior North, Save Our Schools, and the Illinois Chapter of the FBI National Academy Association. He also has served as chairman of the Illinois Local Governmental Law Enforcement Officers Training Board. He was chairman of the National Advisory Committee for the FBI National Academy and the Committee of the FBI National Academy Association of the International Private Security Council.

Chief Deming attended Lake Forest College and is a graduate of Northwestern University Traffic Institute and the FBI National Academy.

Paul L. Douglas

Paul L. Douglas is attorney general for the State of Nebraska.

Douglas was elected county attorney for Lancaster County, Neb., in 1960 and was reelected to that office in 1962, 1966, and 1970. He is past president of the Lincoln Bar Association and the Nebraska County Attorneys Association. He has been a member of the Nebraska Bar Association, the American Society of Trial Lawyers, the National Association of Counties, and the American Bar Association and is a member of the Douglas County Association of Attorneys. He serves as chairman of the Nebraska Bar Association, chairman of the Douglas County Bar Association, and the Nebraska County Attorneys Association.

Paul L. Douglas holds the degrees of bachelor of science and juris doctor from the University of Nebraska.
Police Athletic League, the American Committee for Economic Education, and the American Missionary Fellowship.

Mr. Lennox received the bachelor of arts degree in sociology from the University of Pennsylvania.

Joseph R. Rosetti

Joseph R. Rosetti is director of security for the IBM Corporation.

Mr. Rosetti was an accountant for the Marriott Corporation from 1957 to 1960. He was with the Internal Revenue Service from 1960 to 1968 as special agent and group supervisor and special assistant to the Assistant Commissioner for Compliance. From 1968 to 1971, he was a regional director of LEAA. He joined the IBM Corporation in 1971 and served as program manager of security before assuming his present position. He was staff director for the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals and a member of the National Chamber of Commerce Panel on Crime Prevention and Control.

Mr. Rosetti received the bachelor of science degree from Widener College and the master of commercial science degree from Southeastern University. He was National Institute of Public Affairs Fellow at the University of Southern California during 1967-1968.

Task Force Staff Director

Clifford W. Van Meter

Clifford W. Van Meter is director of the Police Training Institute, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana.

Mr. Van Meter joined the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Force in 1962 as personnel assistant and was assistant director of training from 1964 to 1965. In 1965, he became director of Safety and Security at Western Illinois University and also acted as school director for State of Illinois Basic Police Training courses. From 1969 to 1975, he was assistant professor and chairman of the Department of Law Enforcement Administration and director of the Research Center in Law Enforcement Education at Western Illinois University. He was chairman of the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners at Macomb, Ill.; a past officer of the Illinois Law Enforcement Education Association; and is an active member of the International and Illinois Associations of Chiefs of Police. He is the author of a drug identification guide and Case Study in Police Administration and Criminal Investigation and numerous articles in professional journals.

Mr. Van Meter holds the bachelor of science degree in industrial security administration from Michigan State University, the master of arts degree in history from Western Illinois University, and is a doctoral candidate in higher education at Southern Illinois University. From 1972 to 1973, he studied the British police system on a special program arranged through the Home Office.