



INSTITUTE OF
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MONOGRAPH

First National Conference
on
Private Security



UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
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Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology
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First National Conference

on

Private Security

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Proceedings

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The Conference was convened by
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**Project Director — Peter P. Lejins
Conference Coordinator — David L. Marvil**

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PREFACE

It is hoped that these Proceedings of the First National Conference on Private Security provide important documentation for the stage in the development of the field of private security in this country at which this Conference took place. At the same time, hopefully, its record of the presentations and discussions will contribute in some measure to the further crystallization of ideas, further identification of problems and the search for solutions in this field.

Although, on one hand, the activities which are labelled as private security are as old as mankind itself, and for the United States as old as the first colonial settlements, the phenomenal growth of private security, self-awareness of its existence as a conceptually and functionally unified entity, and attempts at organization and self-study are quite new and do not look back on very many years. The inclusion by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency of private security representatives in its Council on Law Enforcement, the signal event of the creation by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of a National Private Security Advisory Council, and the appointment, also by LEAA, of the Task Force on Private Security as part of the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Phase II, represent the important milestones testifying to the recognition of private security by planners of national scope for the field of criminal justice and security.

The idea of such a conference on private security by the Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology of the University of Maryland was conceived a good while before the appointment of the above-mentioned Task Force. The Conference itself took place during the period of that Task Force's remarkably intensive and creative activity. Both the Chairman of the Task Force, Dr. Arthur J. Bilek, and its staff Director, Clifford W. Van Meter, were consulted in all phases of the preparation of the Conference, both in its structuring and in the selection of the participants. Their enthusiasm for the Conference was an important factor. As a matter of fact, it was at their urging that the somewhat pretentious title of "First National Conference on Private Security" was selected. They also took part in the Conference, and their presentations are part of these **Proceedings**. It is hoped that in some small measure this Conference has contributed to the efforts of the Task Force in producing its monumental document, which may well mark the beginning of a new era in the American private security field. Likewise, the wholehearted support of Mr. Irving Slott, who represented the interests of the National Private Security Advisory Council of LEAA, played a determining role both in the early stages of planning and throughout the Conference.

The two themes explored in the Conference, Education and Training for Private Security Personnel,

and Polarization of Private and Public Security, a certain amount of which has recently been commented upon with concern, should here be singled out for special mention as urgent issues in planned development of private security. Although several presentations by some of the best-known experts on these topics in the country were the backbone of the Conference agenda, the ensuing discussion in a free give-and-take between the representatives of private security practitioners, the law enforcement agencies, and academia were the most unique contribution of this meeting, registered perhaps more effectively in the minds and memories of the participants than in this printed account.

While some of the participants gave prepared papers, the presentations of others were recorded on tape. In one or two cases the prepared statements could not be obtained. Mr. David L. Marvil, the Conference Coordinator, made a supreme effort in assembling and editing the materials for these conference **Proceedings**. Unfortunately, Mr. Marvil had to leave the continental United States before the manuscript saw publication, and some further editing and arranging of the materials was done by other Institute staff. Mr. Marvil deserves a great deal of credit and appreciation for his enthusiasm and hard work in making this Conference a reality.

An important aspect of the Conference was the work of the Resolutions Committee and the set of resolutions produced. The Resolutions Committee was elected by the Conference and worked throughout its duration. The Resolutions were presented at the closing session. Since the feeling of the participants was that, while correctly reflecting the sense of the Conference, they should be further refined in their formulation, the Resolutions Committee was authorized to continue its work after the Conference. The energetic Chairman of the Resolutions Committee, Mr. James Calder, pursued this task with dispatch, and his report is made part of the **Proceedings**.

The Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology wishes to acknowledge its indebtedness to LEAA for funding this Conference and thus making it possible. Appreciation is also due the administration of the University of Maryland, which gave its usual full support, especially Dr. Mary F. Berry, the then Provost of the Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences. The faculty of the Institute contributed greatly by chairing the eight general sessions of the Conference, and the staff of the Institute provided the usual excellent support.

Peter P. Lejins
Director

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OPENING SESSION

Welcoming Remarks

After the Chairman, Dr. Peter P. Lejins, Director of the Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology, declared the Conference convened, Dr. Mary F. Berry, Provost of the Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences, welcomed the participants on behalf of the University of Maryland and the Division. Since Dr. Arthur J. Bilek, Chairman of the Task Force on Private Security was delayed, Mr. Clifford W. Van Meter, Staff Director, welcomed the participants on behalf of the Task Force.

Welcoming Remarks

Clifford Van Meter

While I was sitting here reviewing my notes for my comments this morning, I was reminded that I am now in the State of Maryland which has a baseball team that plays in the American League. Many of you may find this a rather unusual start for my talk but you must recall that my background includes being from St. Louis, Missouri, where I was a member of the Police Department. In Illinois for the last ten years, I have become an avid roofer for both the St. Louis Cardinals and Chicago Cubs in the National League. I now know what it must feel like to end up in the "designated hitter" role since my chance to give the welcoming comments is a direct result of the fact that the Chairman of our Task Force, Art Bilek, cannot be with us at this time due to flight scheduling difficulties. Art will be in later this morning and will be able to participate in our symposium.

Many of you are familiar with the work of the Private Security Task Force and as I look out over those who are here at this time I am somewhat happy to note that many of you, both personally or by reading your writings, are known to myself and the other members of the Task Force. I recognize the great difficulty that Peter Lejins and David Marvil must have gone through in trying to narrow the list of possible people to come to this conference and I am very glad to note that in addition to myself and Art, the Task Force has Walt Burns, John Klotter, and Joe Rosetti in attendance. Also Art Kingsbury, Dick Post, and Leon Weaver have been very beneficial as consultants to us in developing our training and education standards.

Possibly the main point I should discuss in my opening comments is the expectations that we at the Private Security Task Force have for this conference. I think the two issues which have been selected as the main themes, namely training/education and the relations between public law enforcement and private security, are significant issues for which we will

all have much to say. You may be interested to know that both of these issues constitute chapters in the Task Force Report and very significant, I feel, is that none of the standards and goals have been written or prepared since we are hopeful that much of what is said here can become useful to us as we work toward completing our report.

The Task Force has undertaken several research projects and I am hopeful that some of the information may be useful at this conference. I see Perry Norton, the Executive Director of the American Society for Industrial Security, in the room and many of you may have participated in the survey we did of the membership of the American Society for Industrial Security, last summer. We were very pleased to receive approximately 1,800 responses to our questionnaire and the project is completed and will be published as part of our Task Force Report. We have also completed a biographic study of all registered private security personnel in New Orleans, Louisiana and St. Louis, Missouri and feel that there is significant new information about the private security personnel that is quite different from that which was reported in the Rand Report. Our study included over 7,000 private security workers in those two communities and we feel that this research activity will be a significant new contribution to the literature in the field of private security. We have also completed another study of the consumers of private security services in the greater Philadelphia area; however, the final results of that study are not done yet and it will be some time before that study will be completed. All three of these reports will appear as appendices to our Task Force Report.

From my vantage point as Executive Director of the Task Force I feel that this conference gives us the opportunity to talk among ourselves and hopefully come out with some position papers or resolutions which will help identify, clarify, and provide assistance to those who are concerned with the issue of private security training/education and public law enforcement and private security relationships. I feel the holding of this conference is excellent and I would at this time to compliment the University of Maryland, Peter and David in particular, and I know I speak in this regard with the full support of Art Bilek and the other members of the Task Force because all of us have been concerned about the lack of literature and serious discussions in this field.

Art and I were very enthusiastic about the possibilities of having this meeting funded by the University of Maryland in conjunction with their grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and we certainly spent considerable time while Art, Peter and I were together at the State Planning

Directors' Conference in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, last summer. I recall that one of our lengthy discussions about the possibility of this conference was held in a driving rain storm as we were on a boat floating around the lake. I feel that the Task Force participation in this conference is significant and I want to assure all here that we are here to learn, help, and certainly hope that you ladies and gentlemen will give serious thought to these issues and that the work of our Task Force in preparing standards and goals in this area will be enhanced. I think that we should all recognize that there are somewhere in excess of one half million people who we generally call "private security" who have long been waiting for some type of a national conference like this to be convened. We also think that our Task Force Report, which is scheduled for publication in the late fall of 1976, will provide a source document for private security people throughout the country, at the state level, county level, and local level to get together and debate the standards and goals which we will recommend. I am very pleased to note that the attendees at this conference involve those in the academic community, practitioners, as well as the executive directors of a series of national associations in the field of private security. I think it is an excellent mix and match of personnel who can really

address the issues from a number of perspectives and come up with some reasonable answers.

So on behalf of the chairman of the Task Force, Art Bilek, the members of the Task Force, and myself, we're proud to be included as participants in this endeavor and at the sake of being overly repetitive I would like to once again compliment Peter and David for seeing that such a meeting finally occurred. To my knowledge, based on the research we have been conducting for the Task Force Report, I feel that there has never been a similar symposium in the United States. I guess it may be significant that, as we sit here one month before the start of our 200th year as a republic, it is "high time" for such a conference to begin. Personally, I am very humble and proud to be here and certainly will try to participate in whatever way I can to make the work of this conference a success. We're all together in this conference and the work and results of the conference will be based on our individual and collective efforts. We are most optimistic that what happens here will be beneficial to our Task Force and more importantly to private security, public law enforcement, and the reduction of crime in our country. I would like to now be quiet, and turn the program back over to Peter. Thank you.

INTRODUCTION: SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE

Peter P. Lejins

It is indeed a pleasure for me to say a few words of introduction to the Conference on Private Security, which this Institute has been hoping to bring about for some time. Now it is a reality, and it is most gratifying to see so many of the leaders of this field in the United States among the participants.

The interest in the field of private security on the part of the Institute dates back to its early planning stages. The Curriculum Planning Conferences of nationally recognized criminal justice educators, convened by the University of Maryland to plan the Institute, invariably included a course in private security in the core curriculum. Thus a course in this field was among the first 10 courses offered in the Institute. There were some who considered this unusual, but many saw in it an early anticipation of a future need, deserving of being brought to the attention of the students in the very beginning of their studies.

The Institute was fortunate to engage an instructor with considerable expertise in the field. He was charged with the task of exploring the interest of the students in the various aspects of private security and to develop additional courses with the potential ultimate objective of developing a specialization in private security. A second, more advanced, course was soon added.

When the National Criminal Justice Education Consortium grant for the University of Maryland came up for discussion in 1973, a special point was made by the Institute to include a budget line for a Private Security Conference, so as to have a forum in which national leaders could share their knowledge, exchange views, and help clarify the guidelines for a curriculum in private security and for the role which university-level education might best play in order to contribute to the important and growing field. Accordingly, "education for the field of private security" suggested itself as the first topic for the Conference.

The image of a man who responds to an ad for a guard, is hired on the spot, given a gun and told to guard a warehouse is frequently invoked when talk turns to private security. What is the specialized education or training for the higher echelons who are supposed to manage this line personnel? And it is not only the question of a guard, of course. There is an endless variety of functions and specialists within the private security field. Organizationally there is the distinction between the private security industry on one hand, and the private security measures which are undertaken without the intermediacy of the industry by the citizen or owner him/herself,

employing guards, building or purchasing security devices or engaging personnel for investigation purposes. In terms of specific functions performed, there is the guard service, the investigation service, the production, distribution and management of various mechanical devices, etc. There are such specialized areas as airport and plane security, commercial establishment security, hotel security, bank security, sea-cargo security, the security of housing complexes or private one-family homes. What kind of training or education do these various types of personnel need? Should there be a general type of educational or training establishment for this purpose? If so, how should the necessary facilities be provided? Should there be a core curriculum, such as has by now crystallized for law enforcement personnel? If so, at what point and in which way should the specialized training come in? Some of the functions performed by private security personnel appear to be so simple as hardly to require any training or education. Others, on the other hand, require the handling of the most intricate kinds of modern technology or involve complex organizational, management or legal matters. Even if the functions might be simple, the private security personnel easily overflows into the functions of the law-enforcement officer and may readily become involved in controlling the conduct of other citizens in a quasi-police way. At the same time, the regular law enforcement officer is beginning to be viewed more and more as a professional, with the Standards and Goals of 1973 recommending a college education for him. Should the private security personnel follow this same standard? That training and education must be the order of the day is more than obvious before any progress can be made.

It seemed, however, that consideration of the issues of education and training is not enough. In order to plan for the curricular matters, a clear view is needed of the role of private security, and for that purpose its relationship to public security — that is, law enforcement — must be clarified. With regard to that relationship, certain alarming trends have been making themselves felt. Therefore, as a useful second topic for the Conference, the issue of "polarization" appeared to be very appropriate. These, then, were the two topics which appear in the original Consortium grant with regard to the Private Security Conference. They still appear to be appropriate topics with which to begin.

The preparatory work for the Conference was immediately started after the Consortium grant was received, but, unfortunately, after preparations had progressed, the faculty member in charge left the

University for an attractive position in the field. Consequently it took a while for his successor to pick up the threads. By this time LEAA itself had placed considerable emphasis on the subject of private security. In addition to the National Private Security Advisory Council it appointed, somewhat later, the Task Force on Private Security as part of the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Phase II. The Institute cooperated very closely with the Chairman of both the National Private Security Council and the Task Force on Private Security, Dr. Arthur J. Bilek; with Mr. Irving Slott, who staffed the Advisory Council; and with Mr. Clifford W. Van Meter, Staff Director of the Private Security Task Force. Their advice was sought and followed both in the structuring of the Conference and in selecting the participants.

Following the suggestions of the above advisors, the Conference was called the First National Conference on Private Security, a somewhat ambitious title, but presumably it correctly describes our meeting here. Leaders from the field of private security, some from the field of public security, and several representatives of academia were invited, 40 in all. All of the Consortium universities were invited to participate, and we see among us here the representatives of three of those who have developed a

special interest in the private security field. Mr. David L. Marvil, who in the meantime joined the staff of the Institute, is functioning as Conference Coordinator, both in the preparatory stages and in the management of the meeting.

It is planned to elect a Resolutions Committee, if the participants wish, so that, if recommendations crystallize as the result of the discussions, they can be captured in a set of resolutions which the Conference may wish to adopt.

The Conference is structured around the two above-mentioned issues: "Education and Training for Private Security Personnel" and "Polarization of Public and Private Security." On each of these two topics, four participants have agreed to make presentations, each to be followed by a discussion period. Eight faculty members of the Institute have consented to function as chairmen of these eight sessions. These will be followed by a closing session in which the Resolutions Committee will present for discussion and potential adoption whatever resolutions it may have prepared.

Let me express satisfaction on behalf of the Institute that this Conference is now a reality and thank especially the participants for taking time from their busy schedules to take part in it.

TOWARD RATIONAL CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PRIVATE PROTECTIVE SERVICES

Richard S. Post

A number of important milestones have been reached in the past two decades in delivering educational services to those engaged in various aspects of what we currently call the "criminal justice fields". Prior to the advent of federal funding to upgrade law enforcement, courts, and correctional personnel, the divisions and cleavages among operational systems were accentuated and used to provide the total focus for educational programs. Universities were replete with departments of law enforcement, corrections, and criminology, while law schools produced graduates who would control the judicial and administrative processing of social deviants.

The development of criminal justice education programs was an attempt to broaden the scope of the educational services being delivered and a recognition of the diversity, complexity, and administrative reality in which various components of the system operated. In many institutions, the conflicts between philosophical approaches to the individual and his relations to society as a criminal exacerbated the long standing prejudices between practitioners and academicians. The significant infusions of federal funds for research, fellowships, scholarships, grants and aid, etc. produced diversity, the majority of which tended toward academically acceptable, yet in many cases, practically unresponsive programs of education.

Academic specialists, like other specialists, tend to view the world through their particular perspectives. The criminologist looks for causation while the administrator looks at problems with the hope of solving them through administrative imagination. The sociologist studies areas of interest or those that are well funded and the political scientist looks at policy or political reality and decision-making. These positions are often contradictory and present communication problems within the educational community which have resulted in many delivery system problems which could have been resolved but were not. The term "criminal justice" in this country is relatively new. The idea of having an "integrated" justice system is still an unproven hypothesis. I am not completely convinced that we want to have the (security) field, the discipline, or the profession, whichever term you want to use, of security, loss prevention, or whatever term each of you represents here today, tied to the criminal justice field exclusively.

In 1968, I was involved in developing a criminal justice education program for a state that did not have one. I was hired for some unexplained reason without any experience at all in curriculum development and not that much experience in the field. As it turned out, LEAA looked at our program and said, "Isn't that wonderful! You have a model program here!" Well, I was shocked, our school was shocked, and we thought, well maybe we did something right!

Since that time, the number of educational programs in criminal justice, police science, or police administration has increased from 125 to the present

1,265. In looking at the proliferation of criminal justice programs, I was somewhat concerned about the inevitable problems of such a proliferation of programs in terms of how the system would operate and would be identified. To my mind, we are in about the same situation with the security field at this time.

Four years ago there were less than a dozen private security programs in the United States offering a B.A. or higher degree program. Now, we have 119 offering different kinds of programming. At this point, I am not sure where we are going because of the nature of the industry we are trying to deal with, the historical background of the profession (if there is in fact a profession), and the academic discipline (if there is in fact one of those). The direction of academic program development will reflect, as most institutions do, the personalities of the people who are in leadership positions, as well as the political and economic situations.

I am sure that anybody who is involved in developing educational opportunities for students is going to look at three major points of concern: (1) relevancy of programming, (2) responsibility for developing programs, (3) reliability of programs.

Let us spend a few minutes and look at three areas: the field of security, the profession, and the industry, and get some baseline data. The field has approximately a half million men engaged in the activity called private protection. The relationship between that group of people and the public agencies of protection is relatively ill-defined. The perception of users of public policing, and the perception of users of private policing, is extremely relevant to the identification and emergence of a field called security separate and apart from criminal justice. If you look at the literature in the criminal justice field, which is itself relatively new, as late as the First President's Commission Report, there was virtually no mention made (about twenty words) of private security as being something worth considering. It is entirely possible that the paradigm that has been put together to explain how our "non-system" of justice operates in this country excluded an extremely relevant and meaningful portion of it from its definition. If you look at the flow charts and graphics in the First President's Commission Report, you will notice absolutely no mention of private security when, at that time and according to the data now available, there were probably as many private security people as public law enforcement people.

In addition, the first National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals excluded from its definition this entire body of people who are involved in providing protection.

This morning we briefly looked at the problems of criminal justice and the seeming breakdown of that system. I would like to submit that the system has really never worked very well and people are looking at it a little more closely today, expecting more from it and finding it lacking! And I do not

think it is a question of the system being any less effective; the perceptions of people about its efficacy has, however, changed considerably. The growth of the security industry and of the field is a result of the desire to respond to the individual needs of the users of protective services. The major question, however, is "Can the industry develop a relationship between itself and the public sector and engage in a more meaningful kind of service to people?" At this time it is an open question. The answer will be determined by the kind of guidelines or standards that are laid down for allocating protective resources in any given community.

I am a little concerned that the popular definition of the field is based on a law enforcement model, and in many instances identifies the private security field as being a law enforcement body. I do not in fact think that this is a role that private security would particularly like to fill, or that it is even a desirable function from a social policy viewpoint. The establishment of a meaningful curriculum for a program erroneously viewed at the national level as having a law enforcement function will institutionalize within the security field undesirable educational and operational outcomes.

Is security a profession? No, probably not even to the extent that law enforcement or many of the other areas of criminal justice are professions. What constitutes a profession? The standards governing membership or entry into the field, e.g., literature, research, discipline, and educational attainment, are all lacking, or at best are in an embryonic state. The literature in the security field, and most of the educational programs to date, are what I would consider first-generation literature and first-generation programs. The programs are at a step slightly above a police training academy approach in telling people how to solve "here and now" problems. If you look at the development of security literature you will find that 90% of all the books that have been written about security have been written in the last three years. That does not say a great deal for either the practitioners or the academicians who have been in the field for these many years. The lack of literature and research, and even the lack of LEAA support for research in this field, which comprises at least half of all the protective resources in the United States, has been abysmal. The amount of money currently allocated for the current Standards and Goals Private Security Task Force, again in my opinion, is totally inadequate to do the kind of job that should be done. But, we have made a start. Things are beginning to move forward. And it is entirely possible that security may be considered a profession in the future.

The professional characteristics of the industry, or even the image of the "security profession", has been (quite honestly) less than desirable. The history of security in the commercial setting, in particular, has been extremely violent and bloody in this country. The use of security forces for obtaining corporate ends as opposed to promoting social good has been a regular feature of business. The kinds of abuses which can creep into any business, particularly one where social control is a major outcome, have been present historically to a very large degree in the industry, the field, and the profession. In terms of an historical perspective, we have come a long way by means of legislative control, but we

still have a long way to go towards internal control of the profession.

In terms of the educational response, what does it mean for developing programs to prepare people to professionalize a field? I think there are some things that can be done. As far as the security industry is concerned, I think there is a basic problem in the structure itself. It is a highly fragmented industry, embracing the diverse interests of commerce, industry, and government. This presents problems of horizontal and vertical stratification which must be dealt with in order to obtain some common ground for the allocation of protective resources and for the development of relations between public and private organizations. A coherent educational system would be forced to deal with the various needs of industry, the retail trade, institutions, transportation, government, and public protective programs, as well as the various subdivisions within each category. This is in addition to the needs of executives, policymakers, supervisors, managers, specialists, investigators, and operators, all of whom have different kinds of training and educational needs.

In the criminal justice field, and particularly in law enforcement, policing is generally uniform, with the possible exception posed by state statutes and some local modifiers. The policemen in Upper Volta or in Ecuador reaches in the same "tool bag" as a policeman in the United States to carry out his social control responsibilities. Admittedly, the legal and political structures are different, but the basic techniques and technology are about the same. Much the same is true in the private sector, except that, when we start looking at the problems of developing a coherent approach, we have to look at some of the practical considerations in developing and maintaining a program that is **relevant, responsible**, and in some way **reliable**.

What then is the role of an educational institution in providing this responsiveness? I think that if you look at the characteristics of the field, you will see that the field is extremely diverse. You have a field that is growing at a rate between 12% and 16% a year. It has been doing that for the last five years, and is expected to continue at that rate for the next five years. Much of the security in either the field or industry is considered a cost center or a profit center depending upon your point of view as either a user or a supplier. If you are looking at it from society's point of view, I think that most of the users feel that it is desirable in some way to have it, and I do not really think they are too concerned about who provides it to them as long as they get it at a reasonable cost and it does what they want it to do.

Some of the problems that have developed during this growth have been the result of the lack of definition. What is security? We do not have a definition that is meaningful, and in fact, the term "security" is not even present in some corporate structures anymore. The function is now referred to as prevention, or another term that is looked upon as being more positive in a management sense than "security" (which is often considered a negative term). There has been a lack of common goals, and even a lack in defining problems within the industry, and because of high fragmentation (particularly in the commercial sector), it has been extremely difficult to get people to agree on what they would like to

have done. We noted that the President's Commission in producing **The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society** made little mention of the role of private protective services, their effect on crime control or prevention, and their role in relation to the public and formally recognized agencies of social control. Since the publication of this record (1965-1975), the private protective services industry grew in response to the increased prevalence of political violence, urban crime, terrorism, and rising incidents of industrial and commercial theft. It was not until the publication of the Rand Report in 1971 (**The Nature and Extent of Private Police in the United States**) that there was any realization of the scope and pervasiveness of the private sector protective services. The projections made by the Rand Report have been not only met but also exceeded with a complement of the private protective personnel of over a half a million, surpassing all public police officers to the United States.

The development of a national or local policy regarding particular functional activities in society is controlled by the policy-makers and influenced by the pressures placed upon them. In the case of private protective services, proposals were made to LEAA and the Police Foundation, as early as 1968, to finance studies of the private sector and their relationship to the public police. These proposals fell upon deaf ears until 1970. Since 1970, there has still been little more than token interest and support for developing complete data about the nature and extent of private policing and private protective services in the United States or identifying major areas of concern and developing appropriate policy responses to these problems.

Much of the rationale for the Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP) was that the type of services demanded of public law enforcement officers by their communities required well educated and trained personnel. Programs to provide this education and training were developed with a growth of from 125 programs in 1965 to over 1265 programs in 600 institutions in 1975. A similar growth did not take place in programs for private protective services personnel during the same period although tremendous growth in the number of protective personnel took place. This was because their visibility was low and there were no particular pressures to have decisive action taken to fund or support education or training for them. In many ways, the current private protective services officer is in a position comparable to that of his public counterpart ten years ago. The private officers are ill trained, educated, and equipped for the roles they are asked to perform on a daily basis in society.

The average citizen today is more likely to come into contact with a private protective services officer than he is with the public policeman. The private guard patrols a residential area, checks identification cards at places of work, searches packages at airports, patrols a retail store, shopping mall, hospital, hotel, or public building. He is more visible and is in more intimate contact with the public than his public police counterpart. The public police are busier responding to calls for service dealing with breakdowns in social order, than dealing with the formal processes of the administration of justice. The private officer has been assigned the role of prevention, deterrence, and in many cases, apprehension

of persons attempting or having committed a crime. It is the private officer who is for all practical purposes society's first line of defense, even though he is paid by private individuals for specific protective assignments in areas such as airport security (where a national public policy was generated which required searching people prior to flying an interstate aircraft on domestic flights). Private security officers were put in intimate contact with people and given authority to search, screen, and detain people.

The private officer is generally paid from private funds to perform specific services which may be either for public or private purposes. Consequently, the question of curriculum development and course content are more difficult and sensitive than those for the education of the public officer. Private officers often need the broad social science background currently provided in many of our criminal justice programs. They also require the technical knowledge provided by many of our police science or administration programs at the four-year level as well as the specific procedures and technological skills provided at the community college level. Similarly, the protective function is often provided within the unique operating environments of business, commerce, or industry. The skills of business management are often required in addition.

The principles and techniques of security can be taught quickly to guard personnel. This is technical training. The development of skills for program development and management are, however, another matter. In security, particularly in proprietary applications, there is little mobility from operations to management, unlike the practice of most police departments. Guards tend to remain guards or guard supervisors primarily because the qualifications for entry into this position are unlike those required for management positions. Thus the pool of experienced security officers is not developed internally for management positions as is currently the predominant practice in police departments. Thus, to develop educational program for the field of security is to develop a differentiated curriculum for entry-level skills training or preparation for entry into operations, as well as a distinctive management oriented program.

This is not to imply that both programs should not be available to anyone interested in learning about a particular aspect of security, but rather that programs must be developed to serve specific needs of the field. There are also jobs for which training must be provided. There are positions which require the development of program development and management skills. There are likewise needs for the development of informational programs about the field of security and crime prevention.

Since there is currently a wide range of existing private sector programs, including Associate degree, Certificate, Baccalaureate programs of various kinds, and Graduate programs of various kinds, I think they deserve some particular investigation. Of what should one of these programs consist? What kinds of positions are we preparing people for in each one of these different levels? Should you have Associate degree programs only to prepare technical people? Should you have Baccalaureate degree people only hired into management positions? Should they start as we do in public law enforcement at the entry

level? Criminal justice has not answered this yet in the 1200-odd programs that are partly in operation around the United States. A number of studies indicate that people have been overprepared for positions, have left criminal justice employment, and have successfully entered other occupations because of overpreparation for this field.

The commercial security sector cannot afford to hire people who have advanced training; at least many organizations do not feel that they can afford to hire people with advanced training for entry level positions because these people will not work for the wages that are presently available. Now, it might be a little different with the current economic condition but, under other (normal) economic conditions, the entry level position in commercial security does not attract people with college degrees. In fact, at least one study that I have read clearly points to the fact that most employers of commercial security officers do not want to have people with anything beyond a high school diploma. They think that they will be overprepared and unwilling to work for the wages offered.

While diversity in the university environment is essential, the disciplinary needs in each one of the fields are going to dictate very different kinds of program requirements. We must address the business needs, the training of specialists and administrators, and the preparation of future educators. Can these divergent needs be served with one curriculum? Probably not. The developing programs are going to have great diversity, and I think, rightly so. There is a great deal of room for basic research to be done on what society expects from the protective function: what protective functions are going to be performed and by whom. Again, in my view, looking at the security industry or the field, we have followed for the most part a law enforcement model. Much of the leadership in the private sector has come from public law enforcement. Many of the people who have made the transition have made it very painfully, and there was a great deal of reassessment and rethinking of prior backgrounds and experience. And, in fact, many industrial groupings in this horizontal framework of protection have taken the position of not hiring people with any kind of security background. They want "manager types." They want people who have managerial experience. The problem that they see is that they have to retrain a policeman to either learn their business or to be a manager in their particular business. It is much easier to train a management person to obtain security expertise than the other way around, and many organizations have taken that direction in developing their career programs.

Can a university program offer the kind of diversity that is necessary? I question whether it can be done exclusively within the framework of a criminal justice program. I believe that there are many elements in current criminal justice programs that are integral to developing the background knowledge and expertise in understanding how the particular function that is being performed by a person or his organization relates to the other things that are involved in protecting society. For example, the elements of the legal structure that control the per-

formance of security functions are certainly necessary as are some police technology and investigative skills. But I think that is far from developing the kind of background that we need, particularly at the managerial, policy-making, and executive levels in the security field.

In essence, what I am saying is that we probably require the development of a series of programs to meet different needs rather than a single curriculum to meet the total needs of the field. It is possible that the needs can be met within the confines of one program, but I think we are going to have a great deal of difficulty in "force fitting" them under the departmental and organizational patterns that have been historically present in American institutions of higher learning, and particularly within the criminal justice field. Quite frankly, I am very concerned with the **near future** in developing the security and loss-prevention programs. I am concerned because I see the same development that took place in criminal justice occurring in a field that is on the threshold of emerging as a very viable force in and of itself, and having it not co-opted but forced into a mold which I do not think is appropriate. The forcing will result from the reduction of funding that will very likely come about in criminal justice programs within the next five years. The growth of a field such as security, which will have a great deal more emphasis placed on it, could very well be flooded with police practitioners who are not terribly sensitive to the needs of the diverse groups that represent the totality of protection, but do need jobs. I am extremely concerned about that occurrence.

At this point in the development of educational opportunities for the protective services field, there is a need for diversity in programming, experimentation and discussion, and research into the feasibility of establishing disciplinary guidelines. The specializations within the protective services have yet to be adequately defined, no research base yet exists, and there is not as yet an adequate paradigm for integration of protective services into the mainstream of what is currently referred to as "the criminal justice system."

The lack of a research base, having been compounded by the lack of federal funding from LEAA while public sector technology and expertise advanced, has also compounded the difficulty in not only attracting able researchers, but also in focusing attention on the protective services fields as being worthy of scholarly concern. The absence of research data, and the loss of the development time afforded to public sector program development has and will hamper adequate educational program development for the private protective services. Since the field is, while technologically advanced, merely in its infancy in growth and sophistication, a strong case might be made for Hutchin's observation that:

The more technological (the society) the less **ad hoc** education can be. The reason is that the more technological the society is, the more rapidly it will change and the less valuable **ad hoc** instruction will become. It now seems safe to say that the most practical education is the most theoretical one.(1)

(1) Robert M. Hutchins, *THE LEARNING SOCIETY*, (Mentor, New York, 1969), p.19.

Thus a theoretical basis for program development, management, and operations appears to be the best and most reliable method of insuring the appropriate application of social control principles and techniques. Ten years ago the major technology in the security industry was electro-mechanical; today it is microwave-computer. The advances are much too rapid for the presentation of hardware uses and applications directly. They may certainly be taught, but as a function of learning the theoretical basis for protection and environmental control.

Diversity of offering is essential. The variety of industry and disciplinary needs dictates that academic programs at all levels — Associate degrees,

undergraduate and graduate programs — be developed and offered on a wide basis. The Associate degree programs should be responsive to the entry level needs in the geographical areas they serve but should also provide a core of courses common to all the protective services. Undergraduate programs should likewise adhere to a core with opportunities for diversity consistent with program excellence. Graduate programs should provide opportunities for advanced study in protective services policy analysis and development, management and administrative skill development, and research in methods, systems, and programs for effective protection.

DISCUSSION

Dr. Post indicated that police departments have developed a great many expectations for dealing with crime due to the infusion of massive amounts of federal dollars for research, programs, and services development. The viability of this approach seems to be in question as evidenced by, for example, a 20% clearance rate in the property crime area which involves the security industry.

Later in the discussion session, Mr. Rosetti voiced his opinion that the best location for a security curriculum is not within a criminal justice program but within the field of business administration. He also felt that most universities would be unable to establish a school for security administration as a curriculum. This situation is responsible for security having remained in criminal justice. Even if the school of business administration is unable to offer such a degree, it should be able to graduate security professionals at the executive level. Specifically, this would provide cross-pollination between security and non-security people who are taking degree courses. This is especially true on the graduate level.

At the University of Cincinnati there are numbers of non-security students in other specialized areas, such as hospital administration, who are obtaining a certain basic knowledge of what the security function is in their area of interest. This can be true for numbers of specialized areas if security courses are offered outside of the school of criminal justice. This potential for cross-pollination is important for two reasons. First, it offers the supervisor of security personnel some understanding of the security function on the administrative level. Second, it familiarizes the corporation's security department with the potential benefits of officer promotion from

security to management. So the security curriculum, for these reasons, should very definitely be in the management end of the business school.

Another point raised here concerns whether the security field can or wants to reach the point where all personnel are considered professionals in law enforcement. In response, Jerry Wilson's book entitled **Police Command** was cited. Wilson made the interesting point that the journeyman or patrolman in police work should not necessarily be a professional but rather look upon himself as a skilled craftsman. This comment is restricted to the security officer and does not apply to the executive level of security. It is unlikely that Baccalaureate degrees will be the general rule for security officers so the concept of becoming a skilled craftsman should be encouraged.

Dr. Post's final comments were directed to the problem of the lack of evaluation of the security industry which makes it impossible to demonstrate the kinds of benefits resulting from the money being spent in this area. Subjectively, it seems that the security director is viewed as a necessary evil in most companies. His own career goals are viewed as restricted to security, without examining available options in other areas of management. His self-perception, whether justly or unjustly, is that as a policeman he is not quite as acceptable as other management personnel. This turns out to be self-fulfilling with companies restricting his activities and budget on a level commensurate with a necessary evil. This points to the positive effectiveness of having security in a business related program enabling people to move laterally into strictly business operations within their companies.

TWO YEAR ASSOCIATE DEGREE IN SECURITY AND LOSS PREVENTION

Arthur Kingsbury

There are seven specific areas that I would like to discuss in regard to planning for a two-year Associate degree in security and loss prevention: (1) program concept, (2) historical development, (3) advisory committees, (4) curriculum development, (5) scheduling, (6) program interface, and (7) course objectives.

PROGRAM CONCEPT

With regard to the program concept, it is important to make a distinction between security and law enforcement. In essence, the emphasis in the security field is on the prevention area, while law enforcement tends to concentrate its efforts in the investigatory and apprehension stages. A graphic representation of this concept is included in the academic guidelines of the ASIS publication.

The comment has been made that police do not function in a prevention manner. When speaking of crime prevention, we are talking about the functional definition, that is, the anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of the crime risk, and the initiation of action to reduce or remove said risk.

The second area of importance with regard to program concept is the problems we face in program development. One such problem is that the terminology tends to be vague in our field with a number of differing terms used about which there is not much agreement. Another such problem is that we are faced with a poor image of our field. Primarily people just do not know of what the security field consists. To my mind security is one form of social control with law enforcement being a formalized subunit of the total concept of security.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Macomb County (Michigan) Community College is chosen as an example of the historical development of a two-year Associate degree in Security and Loss Prevention because it is the program with which I am most familiar. The academic program in security started in 1968. It is advantageous that we have about a five million population base in the metropolitan area from which to draw our student population. Our academic program in security is well established, having approximately 150 majors. It is an Associate Degree program and tends to be functionally oriented rather than a theoretical and philosophical program.

One of the concerned critics raised the point that we may run into some problems in the future if we intend to expand and start a large number of academic programs for the security field. If care is not taken, the job market will not be able to absorb all of the potential graduates. Likewise, in Michigan, we have approximately 29 community colleges and 20 criminal justice academic programs. There is danger we cannot absorb this many graduates, a danger we have recognized in the past and must continue to consider.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The inclusion of an advisory committee as part of the planning team is imperative in that you cannot start an academic program — Associate, Baccalaureate, or graduate — without receiving solid input from knowledgeable persons. An advisory committee to the program is a way of obtaining this input both from within the college as well as from the community.

CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

This aspect involves three areas that should be considered. One is staffing. Needless to say, there are many advantages to finding and employing good staff from our field. One of the difficulties of the security field is that our institutions and universities are not preparing people, possibly because of the lack of academic programs at the graduate level for security personnel, to phase into the community colleges and universities to teach security or to handle security courses. In our case, we utilize part-time faculty. In fact, this practice has a number of advantages because the faculty is closer to the community. Many of these people hold senior positions in the community and may hire our students or guide them into appropriate careers.

The second area of importance with regard to curriculum development is programming sequence, i.e., offering such courses as Security 110 (Introduction to Security), 111 (Principles of Security), etc. When you are involved in sequencing it is imperative to offer said courses at appropriate times. If you work in a community where your students are full-time employees, it is good policy to run your courses at different times to facilitate an individual's attendance. As an example, we will run a course in the morning, perhaps Security 110, and that same course will be repeated at night. The same instructor teaches the same material twice, the rationale being that if the student is on a change of shifts he can come to either class.

Thirdly, with regard to curriculum development, it is important that you have supplemental support for the program, such as training aids, films, hardware, and so on.

The courses which have been developed at Macomb College are:

1. Introduction to Security
2. Principles of Security
3. Introduction to Industrial Security
4. Industrial Fire Protection
5. Security Administration
6. Criminal, Civil, and Administrative Law in Security
7. Comparative Security Systems

SCHEDULING

Closely related to the topic of sequencing mentioned above is that of course scheduling. Careful

scheduling is imperative! Our particular courses and programs draw certain people who are not always free from 8 to 5, Monday through Friday. As a result, we must schedule evening and weekend courses, as well as day courses. Interestingly enough, we run classes on Saturday and Sunday and at all hours, and find absolutely no difference in enrollment from a Sunday afternoon class to a prime time class on Monday at nine o'clock.

PROGRAM INTERFACE

If you are fortunate enough to have a large academic program, we think it is important to interface your program, especially if you have separate law enforcement, fire, crime lab, and business programs. It is most important that you have one administrator to insure some amount of harmony between the programs and their faculty. At Macomb County Community College there is one administrator that performs this function as an Associate Dean.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

If you take Richard Post's eleven categories as they identify the functional job analysis, you will find that a number of academic programs around the United States, including the one at Macomb, utilize these different categories in determining course objectives. We also recognize that not all students

need an academic degree. We have what we call a certificate program, which requires 30 semester hours, in which the students take security, fire prevention, law enforcement, business, and so on. The certificate does not include the liberal arts or science courses.

As an example of course objectives, the following are the articulated objectives of the introduction to Security course at Macomb:

1. The learner will be introduced to relevant literature and the state of knowledge which it represents.
2. The learner will recall and explain the elements of the concept of "security" as protection against various hazards.
3. The learner will recall and describe the principal security subspecialties and subsystems.
4. The learner will list and describe the principal occupational subspecialties and job opportunities in the various security subspecialties.
5. The learner will recall and list the minimum essential qualifications for level-of-execution jobs in a security subspecialty of interest to him as a career.
6. The learner will list and describe elementary relationships between the various security subspecialties and other parts of the criminal justice system (police, courts, corrections).
7. The learner will display a knowledge of the role of security in a democratic society.

DISCUSSION

It was Dr. Weaver's feeling, following this presentation, that there exists a rather artificial distinction between public and private security given the similarities in their activities. This distinction is evident in and perpetuated in each area by the development of separate terminologies. This point was addressed in the 1974 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica under the title "Security and Protection Systems" regarding the alternative distinctions of crime related security versus non-crime related security. It was suggested that perhaps the development of a separate rhetoric for private security is more the result of a need for separate identification in that industry rather than from an effort to identify separate areas of activity. There seemed to be a general consensus that some of the problems of polarization may be accounted for by separate professional terminologies.

Mr. Potter returned to the idea of educational training programs for law enforcement. He mentioned the idea of a law enforcement certificate program, a vocationally oriented program differing from the Associate Degree in that it offers only field related courses omitting any general liberal arts study. Questions and comments on the necessity of such program components were solicited.

Mr. Kingsbury's response indicated that there is no academic credence for such a component, but that its practical value lies in its ability to attract students. The certificate granted after 25 or 28 hours in security or loss prevention often means a pay raise, with subsequent degrees also receiving compensation, indicating that the professional field itself has placed some value on this training. It was felt that academic credit should be given only where deserved, but that there may be advantages to structuring vocational security training programs so that

one is eligible for some type of academic credit. Specifically, this might act as an incentive for students to continue their study past the certificate level and, secondly, companies are willing to reimburse students for college credit where they might not reimburse them for simple security training per se. Mr. Larkins provided support for this position by indicating that his experience with a certificate program at the Community College of Baltimore showed that students, overwhelmingly, studied past the certificate level, and that the certificate did have value as an initial motivator and later as a professional recognition of achievement.

Mr. Moran provided an extension of this same concept citing an examination practice used at Northeastern University. This was developed in response to the numbers of students in the program who had extensive years of experience. In order to accommodate them a series of examinations were developed in the areas of security, corrections, and law enforcement. This provided them with an opportunity to transpose any experience or training from diverse sources into college credit. On the university level Mr. Post acknowledged the difficulty of handling a diversity of backgrounds. Being responsible for the last two years of undergraduate education and Master's work requires accommodating students from the most diverse backgrounds even in related fields. In order to address this problem, one must find commonalities among students who have completed their education at a community college level. This problem of transferability is handled in Illinois by an open admissions policy for anyone with a degree from a community college. They then employ variety of testing programs to evaluate an individual's level of competency either

for the purpose of advanced placement, tailoring a program to his needs, or denying admission altogether.

On an even higher level, there are the problems which result from the conflict between educational philosophy and the daily requirements imposed on educational institutions. Mr. Weaver acknowledged the emergence of laws governing equal opportunity in employment and a concomitant deemphasis by hiring agencies toward degrees and certificates. Educators have not been able to substantiate claims that college-educated employees are more competent. Graduates themselves will need to prove, either through tests or actual job performance, that they are in fact better performers. It is predicted that the next several years will see employers becoming less and less degree conscious, and relying more and more on alternative screening mechanisms.

In another area, Mr. Kingsbury expressed his concern that the future of academia is in jeopardy in the area of security education and training as there is a conspicuous lack of preparation of future college professors, faculty, and instructors. There are very few people who entered academia with the goal of becoming teachers. In his opinion, the lack of people in education will hurt the field of security, and the shortage will be made up by people from the field, which is not as strong a situation as one would want. It was then argued that the discipline of security is in an evolutionary phase and lacks the organization of the behavioral and social sciences. These problems are normal in the development of a field rather than unique to security education. In another dissenting opinion, Dr. Repetto felt that the fulfilling of teaching slots with field professionals from police science, security, or corrections may in fact be advantageous in terms of increased credibility on the basis of their experience.

Mr. Calder raised a series of questions regarding the appropriate place of security in academics and its relevant importance. Mr. Kingsbury offered his program as an example in response to the above questions. The program is a separate degree program with no real difference between it or an Associate degree in another field. Administratively all of them are under one person and there is no conflict. Students can come from many academic areas. Being functionally oriented, the Associate degree level for security is recommended. If a student wishes to go on, and approximately 75% of the community college students do continue for a B.A., they are encouraged to pursue a Bachelor of Arts or Science degree in business with as many supporting security courses as possible. On the master's level, the MBA is recommended.

The problems mentioned by Dr. Weaver, Mr. Post, and Mr. Moran are avoided, according to Mr. Kingsbury, by treating each degree as a special entity. The program is mid-management oriented and students are generally at the technician's level. The program is very narrow compared to most of the other academic programs mentioned. It is inter-

disciplinary, but as a career choice, security stands as an individual area, and as such creates a need for an Associate degree in that area.

Mr. Kingsburg noted further that it is interesting that the new structure of the University has done away with programs as defined by traditional departmental lines. His program offers an interdisciplinary degree in what is called a social justice profession which includes the entire range of human services and detective services. Students enter with diverse backgrounds, including in-service as well as pre-service. The curriculum offers enough flexibility to provide the individual time (faculty-student ratio is 10:1) to guide master's work and placement activities, as well as testing services.

Dr. Post indicated that the curriculum employed is subject to wide diversity and the exact nature of a program is a function of the perspectives of the faculty and staff. In his mind the purpose of this conference is not to establish a consensus on curriculum but to reach some agreement as to what is generic to the discipline of loss prevention and security.

Mr. Kingsbury's response to the above comments indicate his agreement with the idea of education in security as long as careful consideration is given to its objectives. Training and degrees should be justified by their relevance to the perceived career ladder of the individual student in security. Neither minimum training nor current overkill in law enforcement is the proper solution.

As a complement to what Mr. Kingsbury said, Mr. Rosetti reiterated the issue of the interdisciplinary nature of the subject. The field requires that courses not only be provided to update security careerists but also to provide courses in other departments which seem appropriate to current societal needs. There is a need to introduce security to the architect, lawyer, sociologist, psychologist, engineer, and interior designer. Security should respond to this role in education in addition to preparing people to enter the management area.

Dr. Post raised several practical problems with the interdisciplinary approach at the university level. One of the problems is that there are security applications and issues in almost every field today. The problem is finding the available expertise or market for the relevant information. Since the industry is so diverse with each field having its own needs, the problem becomes how do you satisfy the practical delivery system problems in the university environment. Economically, politically, and educationally it may not be practical for the university to provide the courses and maintain the kind of credibility required.

In a closing comment, Mr. Larkins indicated that in his opinion schools or centers for structural training should be encouraged to develop courses in their own program for security as it relates to their field. This is in lieu of setting up a center or institute of security as an autonomous department.

SECURITY TRAINING FOR THE GUARD FORCE

Richard A. Lukins

The private security field is entering a new era — an era of governmental regulation — and training of the guard force, be it contractual or proprietary, is a major focus of this regulatory thrust.

While this statement may keynote my subject and, in its emphasis on training at the guard level rather than higher education for security management, differentiate my topic from some of the other papers being presented, I need hardly emphasize the point. You are aware of the trends of which I speak. The draft of the Justice Department's LEAA Model Statute deals with training requirements for armed and unarmed guards — not training for Security management or investigators. The Private Security Task Force, with the assistance of the American Society for Industrial Security, solicited information from our industry on a variety of topics; on the matter of training, it was the rank and file security officers that the Task Force was concerned about.

On the local level, governmental regulation dealing with training is proliferating. Cities, counties, and states are contemplating or have already enacted legislation or ordinances mandating standards for private security guards within their jurisdiction — standards that rarely fail to include training requirements.

The affected components of the private security industry, the guard services, and proprietary guard force operators have not been caught flatfooted by this trend, but it does not appear that they were totally prepared either. And certainly no one can say that our industry has established an imposing record of self-regulation.

I am not privy to all the councils behind the scenes and cannot speak as an authority on the early debates. I am neither a member of the Private Security Task Force nor of the Guard and Investigation Committee to the National Private Security Advisory Council, or any other instrumental bodies. But neither am I completely "in the dark." I can see quite clearly what is going on within my industry.

State organizations of licensed guard and investigation companies are becoming galvanized to meet the mounting challenge. Some are out in front, some are too late. At this very moment, attempts are being made to form national associations of contract security companies to meet a two-fold threat — special taxation and regulation. The recent ASIS National Convention featured a session on the proposed LEAA Model Statute. The International Security Conference in New York had an all-day seminar on Guard Forces Training. I chaired the latter seminar and it was well attended by guard force management people anxious to get "with it."

My purpose today is not to evaluate, from my viewpoint, the merit or desirability of the training regulations already in effect or proposed. The situation is dynamic, and what I say today may be dated tomorrow. Neither do I feel, as was the case with the New York seminar, that we should explore precisely how a training program for guards can be formulated.

Rather in considering the position and composition of the attendees of this Conference, I would prefer to discuss and question the implications of this regulatory trend, particularly as it affects those who actually operate security guard departments or guard service companies. I have long believed that while the forces of change can rarely be arrested, they can be shaped and guided. Since the attendees of this conference include some of the secondary, if not the prime movers behind this trend, as well as some of those industry leaders who should and will deal with the consequences, an exploration such as I have proposed might prove fruitful.

More specifically, I would like to provoke discussion on these relevant questions:

Do training requirements represent an undue burden or threat to the orderly operation of private or commercial security guard forces — that is, is it necessarily bad for business?

Correlatively, can training costs be reasonably maintained and can training be made, in a commercial sense, cost-effective?

As an additional consideration, what can and should be done to help standardize the standards, that is: (1) to avoid dramatic variations in requirements between various state or local areas, and (2) to make certain that, within any given area, all appropriate security employees are uniformly and effectively covered. In other words, can something approximating a single, rather than a multi-standard, be achieved?

And lastly, how might the private security industry, in concert with the public sector and the academic community, help establish realistic goals in the area of training standards, and can we then generate the means to achieve those goals?

Do mandatory training requirements represent "bad news" or "good news" for the business of security? Can such requirements be a blessing in disguise? I do not wish to imply that I am the Statesman of the private security field — or that I am here to articulate some moral imperative to this trend. But I do consider that while I am a concerned security professional, I am also a responsible citizen, and I can understand the public and political motivations behind the drive for minimum training standards and other regulations. The statistics and studies evidencing the growth and significance of the private security sector abound. And most of this growth has been minimally monitored. The occasional, but extremely well reported, abuses of security guards are all too evident. There is no question in my mind that some of the exposes of poorly trained guards — particularly armed men — have given impetus to this regulatory trend.

But what about the good news? Proprietary guard force managers attest that productivity increases dramatically with proper training. The security director of a large university tells me that he convinced the Board of Trustees that he could justify a substantial portion of his department's budget as measured by the tangible value of stolen property recovered.

Contract guard force operators find that training can build a sense of professionalism within the ranks which provides real economic benefits. Promotions can be more easily made, the cost of turnover and replacement of personnel may be reduced. In addition, there is a decided sales and service advantage if trained guards can be provided.

If reasonable training standards are enacted and fairly applied, a natural concomitant should be a general upgrading of the quality of security personnel and performance. Guard agencies, unable or unwilling to observe minimum standards, will simply not be able to operate. And assuming that legislation applies equally to contract and proprietary guards, in-house forces will likewise be made more responsible.

Perhaps it will be a boon for contract services who can and do meet the challenge. Perhaps some guard services will find themselves operating training schools for guards employed by others.

Already, we have seen the appearance of a number of firms offering Home Study courses designed to meet existent or anticipated statute requirements. Every crisis gives birth to techniques and new business interests designed to cope with the problem.

What about the cost of training? Someone has to pay! Involved are employee wages for training time, the cost of printed materials, an instructor's time, etc. One of the reasons I believe there has been some resistance on the part of the private security industry to the establishment of training standards is, undoubtedly, concern over the direct or indirect costs that are involved in compliance.

In one municipality in Kentucky, a license fee has been levied for every guard employed within the county. This fee is applied to a training program created and operated by the municipality. Here we have an indirect cost of training for the guard employers — plus a coupling of the twin issues of taxation and training.

The industry, and by that I mean those most affected, must consider the financial implications of training requirements. While this suggests a dialogue between the appropriate government and industry representatives, other relevant parties may have to be reached as well. My own company, for example, prevailed on the union representing our guard employees to agree that, as a condition of an employee receiving an otherwise automatic wage increase, the employee must have completed a basic 8-hour training program during his probationary period. This is a start.

Within my own experience, I have also found that a substantial percentage of employees will voluntarily, without compensation for their time or the promise of wage increases, undertake expanded training courses. About 20% of my employees are just completing a 10-week fifty-hour program combining classroom and home study. The only "promise" was an announcement that graduates of the program would be given first consideration for pistol permits or supervisory promotions both of which do involve higher pay and greater prestige. But I am convinced that an equally strong incentive was the desire to be more knowledgeable about their work and the security field in general.

In considering direct or indirect cost increases, one thing should be borne in mind: once established and uniformly applied, at least everyone is in the same boat. When and if training requirements are the law within a given locality, then whatever costs involved must be universally "passed along" to clients by contract guard agencies and built into the budgets of in-house security departments.

On the subject of universality or standardization, we face some considerable obstacles to achieving the convenience of a universal or model set of training requirements. There is no constitutional or traditional delegation of licensing or regulatory powers to either the state, county, or municipal government level. Already we see overlapping and conflicting requirements established by a state and a county within the state, or a city within a county, and the differences in training requirements between one state and another are likely to be comparably divergent.

There is no question that a contract guard service operating on a regional or national basis, or a manufacturing company with in-house guards protecting facilities in different states, will have difficulty establishing one uniform training program to meet all localized requirements.

At this stage of the game, there may be a role for this body — the National Private Security Conference or some similar group — to develop an outreach program to work with local government on this problem. There is certainly a need. I understand that one state passed regulations for security guards which include training, but the execution of the statute has been delayed because neither the State Police who are the mandated enforcement unit, nor the private security industry, know how to effect compliance.

Armed or unarmed, uniformed or non-uniformed, contract or proprietary, guards who have public contact versus those who don't, there are already the elements, perhaps necessarily, of double or multi-standards. But in the interests of economical and practical compliance by our industry, and in the public interest as well, I believe we must find ways to standardize the standards as much as possible.

As a practical aid, I would like to raise the question of testing — as a means to evaluate the effectiveness of a particular training program and to measure industry-wide compliance with any promulgated regulations. Given the significant difference in employment standards within the guard industry, wide divergence can be expected in intelligence and experience levels of security officers. If, in addition to this, you apply a relatively general training syllabus, then perhaps industry-wide testing of security guards is a way, if not the only practical way, to measure compliance. And if we believe that the challenge is not really to simply effect compliance with the law, but rather to professionalize the private security industry, then some objective measurement technique must be employed. The public interest isn't served by every guard completing a certain number of hours of training on the subject of, say, the security officer's legal rights. The public interest is served by the fact that security guards actually **know** what are and are not their rights within a given jurisdiction. The public doesn't care if a guard "knows" because of his past employment, classroom

instruction, or home study; both the public interest and the business interests of the security industry are best served if we can verify that the guard actually understands or can do whatever it is that is deemed important.

Lastly, there is work cut out for all of us — from the public, academic, and private sectors — work that has just begun. If security training for guards is to be meaningful on a local, regional, or national basis, then some basic changes in the way we all work together will be necessary:

1. The polarization between public law enforcement and the private security sectors will have to be mitigated.
2. The academic community must recognize that the subject of private security is not simply a cognate of criminology or law enforcement, but a full fledged discipline in its own right.
3. Components of the private security sector, themselves alienated, estranged or just incommunicado, must work together and in concert with the public and academic sectors.

On the first point, public and private interests must be joined on the issue of guard force training. If public law enforcement officials think of a guard as "half a cop," the security guard will never be a whole security guard. If the private sector views the public law enforcement and regulatory agencies simply as an impediment to the laissez faire conduct of business, we are all in trouble.

Unless and until our industry has educational systems and academies similar to those operated by law enforcement agencies, we are going to have to "borrow" the expertise and skills of law enforcement personnel to the extent that our private work parallels or dovetails the work of the police. And there are opportunities for creative learning partnerships — partnerships that can benefit both the private and public interests.

As an example from within my own company, we have as clients a number of hotels for whom we provide uniformed and plainclothes security personnel. Hotel burglaries are a problem to these clients, and learning the best methods to deal with such cases was a problem to us. We reached out to the New York Police Department who sent the Commander of the Manhattan Burglary Squad, which includes a special hotel unit, and six detectives to our security training classes to teach our hotel plainclothesmen and uniformed hotel guards. After the classes, we and they were convinced that our men could do a better job of helping the police prevent burglaries and apprehend burglars. And we, of course, were better able to serve our clients and the public.

What is particularly interesting is that these detectives had not previously been asked to participate in an educational program at the security officer level and they knew of no precedents within the Police Department. Rather than unique, this kind of cooperation should be common. And on an organized basis, it can be repeated for many security problems which border police concerns. Who is in a better position than law enforcement agencies to teach and monitor the capabilities of guards to handle deadly weapons? Yet many municipal police departments issue and renew pistol licenses without offering or requiring any instruction in the handling of a gun.

My second point concerns the need for greater attention from the academic community to the needs of our industry. Guard force managers need assistance and instruction in how to teach their guards and how to develop meaningful training programs — with or without the impetus of governmental compliance. Educators from universities, community colleges, law enforcement academies, or private training schools must recognize that the security industry's training needs are real and often unique. New and economic methods of teaching must be fostered if our educational goals are to be achieved. The development of the testing procedures I mentioned earlier could undoubtedly be best accomplished with the assistance of professional educators.

And the last part of the trilogy, the components of the private security industry themselves, must work together more closely than in the past. Proprietary managers and contract guard operators must recognize that their interests coincide on the matter of training. Otherwise competitive contract services must cooperate if training standards are to be realistic and effective within their industry.

Trade associations and professional societies also have an important role to play. They can monitor legislative developments on the local and national levels and seek to guide these efforts into realistic and enforceable regulations. Responsible organized groups may even be able to help draft legislation and monitor compliance.

This new era — an era of regulation for the private security industry — offers a great challenge and that challenge will be met if the interested parties recognize their common business interests as well as their collective responsibility to the community at large. If we work in this manner, we may attain an even more important goal: to claim the recognition and respect we merit for the important role we play in our society.

DISCUSSION

Dr. Ingraham began the discussion with his hopes that regulation through public police agencies will someday be eliminated in favor of self-regulation by the security industry. Mr. Lukins' reply was that the security industry has not had a very good record of self-regulation.

Mr. Van Wagoner stated that he found Mr. Lukins' remarks most helpful and requested additional aid with two big problem areas which are as follows: 1) "How do you bring about compliance with regulations?" 2) "How do you deliver the training package and deliver it equitably?" He went on to state that

he has been in touch with private detective agencies of three, four, and five men, as well as large national companies like Globe Security. The problem among the small companies is that they fear that the cost of training and regulation will put them out of business and benefit the bigger companies.

Mr. Lukins replied that, due to the entrepreneurial nature of the security industry, if a new law were about to be enacted, you would find that private industry would work with government or take up the planning to open a school that would satisfy the requirement of the law. In some areas, for example

Pennsylvania, the State Police have been mandated to provide training for a fee. In Kentucky, the State operates a school which includes an appropriate home study course. The license fees that are charged to guards are applied directly to the curriculum costs of the school.

In response to Mr. Van Wagoner's second question, Mr. Lukins expressed his belief that compliance can be effected through a licensing statute which makes it mandatory after a certain period (within thirty days or more) for a private detective or guard to have attained the required training in order to be licensed and continue working.

Mr. Wathen felt that, in response to Mr. Van Wagoner's questions, it is essential to keep in perspective that training requirements are most commonly unique to the requirements of the client. He felt that it is essential to remember that the customer is the final arbiter. Other than general areas such as tact and courtesy, Mr. Wathen felt that the customer will decide of what the training will consist because he will require different duties from the guards, such as luggage inspection, checking groceries, making fire patrols, and many other duties. He stated that there cannot be a commonality of training which has been suggested by the previous comments. Mr. Lukins stated that he had a serious problem accepting such a viewpoint. Although he felt that the public interest has been excluded, he also felt that the customer is not in the position to establish across the board policies which is what the conference was attempting to do.

Mr. Wathen agreed that there are some things that serve the public interest, such as firearms training, but in general the man who is the user of contract guards is the one who will decide on the training. He can, as any other customer, choose to utilize another company's guard service if the one

he is using does not comply with his wishes. In this way the customer, in reality, forces the supplier of guards to give the kind of training which the customer demands.

Mr. Larkins expressed his belief that the opportunities available for education and training, particularly at community colleges, should be utilized. He stated that in his community college they could design a twenty-hour course specifically to fit the needs of any client, be it a hospital, school, hotel, or whatever. Furthermore, with state aid and oftentimes the G.I. Bill, students can usually make more money attending these courses than they can actually earn working as a guard.

Mr. Gray commented on the complexity of a training program on a national basis which must prepare guards for a variety of jobs, from guarding a warehouse to providing security for a computer center. Also, the great variation in existing statutes concerning private security as well as labor, complicate matters when an attempt is made to establish training criteria on a national level.

Mr. Lipson suggested federal legislation for the private security industry rather than state and local legislation. He feels that it could be patterned after the legislation concerning safety standards which exist today.

Mr. Potter expressed his objection to federal legislation, for he felt that it is an impossible task to get something through the federal bureaucracy in Washington. He stated that at the federal level you would not be dealing with elected representatives after the bill is passed. You would instead be dealing with civil service bureaucrats who have had, in most cases, absolutely no background in the field, and whose sole criteria for continued survival is empire building.

LITERATURE REVIEW — LAW ENFORCEMENT/ PRIVATE SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS

Arthur J. Bilek

Crime in the United States, as measured by the Uniform Crime Index Report, has gone up over 30% in the last two years. The economic impact of crime totaled 88.6 billion dollars in 1974, of which \$8.6 billion went for federal, state, and local activities, and \$6 billion for private security personnel and equipment. There are about a million people involved in the activities of these prevention and enforcement groups of which approximately 53% are private security and 47% are public law enforcement.

These component parts of society's efforts to protect itself are rarely conceived of as a unified group. Very little is known and very little has been written about the interaction between members of these two units as compared to other areas in the fields of criminology and criminal justice. Given the nation's crime figure, the costs of crime and coping with crime, it becomes both appropriate and essential to review and address the issue of public law enforcement — private security relationships at this time.

The mission, role, and operation of public law enforcement have been described and analyzed in many articles in professional, technical, and academic publications, texts, and periodicals during the past ten years. Very little review and discussion have appeared, however, on the relationship between the mission, role, and operation of public law enforcement and private security. Only a handful of publications, addresses, and articles have appeared since 1965. These provide only the barest outline of a most critical area in the nation's approach to crime prevention and to dealing with the crime problem. As a starting point in learning about and improving police-private security relationships, it should be helpful to summarize the various articles which have been published on this topic.

In an address made to the International Association of Chief of Police at their annual meeting held in October, 1963, the late William H. Parker, who was at that time the Chief of Police of Los Angeles, made several comments about police-community relations which involved the private sector. Specifically, the relationship between the police administrator and private security was analyzed. Chief Parker itemized a classic list for police administrators to consider. First, the chief must have a familiarity with the agencies and activities of private security within his jurisdiction. Secondly, a liaison must be established with private security. Thirdly, the chief must learn to utilize the services of private security in accomplishing the police mission. Finally, due to the high cost of government, the chief must evaluate methods of transferring functions of police services to private security agencies.

Another Los Angeles Police Department administrator, Thomas Reddin, made a major address in 1964 before the members of the American Society for Industrial Security. In his speech titled, "Com-

pany and Law Enforcement Relations," Reddin pointed out that:

"A number of legal provisions restrict the accessibility of the public police information. There are prohibitions against distribution of arrest information that are compiled by local police departments. Prohibitions against providing them to private citizens for the carrying on of personal interest."

Reddin's comments reviewed the restriction of the dissemination of police data to private security. This data transfer is one of the important issues today in private security.

Nat Brown, an LEAA spokesman, wrote an article entitled "Types of Assistance Available," which appeared in the November 1974 issue of **Police Chief**. Brown stated that a number of California Police Departments have formulated departmental policies in the area of interrelationships which prohibit the use of police on private premises or on public premises when used for private purposes. These policies are specially significant in view of the widespread use of police in private sporting arenas and other centers operated by private enterprise which are frequented by large crowds.

Chronologically, the next published article was a study by Dr. Richard S. Post titled "Relations with Private Police Services," which was published in the March 1971 issue of **Police Chief**. Dr. Post surveyed a number of police departments concerning their relations with private security. Of 121 respondents, 11% indicated that their relationship with private security was excellent, 39% said it was good, 40% said fair, and 5% said poor. Regarding the value of establishing a close, well-defined working relationship with private security with definitions, clarity, and understanding on both sides: 83% opposed it. Finally, it is interesting to note some of the comments made by certain police officials regarding private security:

1. Private agencies pay minimum salaries and therefore do not attract employees who can assist the police investigations. Reports must still be done by police officers even when there is private security involved.
2. Public services are still required to perform regular police duties for businesses that have contracted for private security officers.
3. There is no interacting communication link between the groups.

A major treatment of the entire field of private security was completed in 1971. It was a five-volume study developed by the Rand Corporation under a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Titled **Private Police in the United States**, it was authored by James S. Kakalik and Sorrel Wildhorn. The Rand Report, as it came to be called, was the subject of considerable discussion and debate. Various individuals and groups within

private security indicated disagreement with portions of the report. The authors surveyed sixteen state and twenty-six local agencies that had regulations concerning private security. Among the recommendations made by the state and local regulatory agencies which related to police-private security relationships were the following:

1. Private security should report all crimes to the police.
2. There should be pre-determined policy for public police and private security interaction.
3. The police should be called by private security whenever there is an arrest.
4. Every private security agency should have a 24-hour communications link with police.
5. Private security personnel should be deputized by the police and taken under police control in the event of an emergency such as riot, flood, tornado, or uncontrolled fire.

The Rand Report also pointed out that a "persistent minority of responding public police agencies, both in the Post survey and in our regulatory-agency survey, opted either for the status quo or reduced interaction" between the police and private security. The report cited some of the grounds for such positions:

1. Closer relationships would be unnecessarily burdensome and would create a responsibility for training.
2. Private security personnel cannot be trusted because low-quality untrained personnel are attracted to private security.
3. The private policeman's lack of training would reflect on the public police.
4. The private police tend to become overzealous.
5. The high turnover in private security precludes close working relationships.
6. Private agencies would use public police services to further their own interests and profits.
7. It would be impossible to control the private police.

Another area of potential conflict between police and private security treated in the report involved the so-called "false alarm problem." Various police agencies have reported that many alarms received from private security installations are found upon investigation to be false. Kakalik and Wildhorn stated that "false alarm rates are generally very high — usually over 95% and sometimes over 99%." It was indicated that some police officials felt that alarm systems were beneficial and justified their existence even though many of the alarms received and responded to turned out to be false. Other police officials took a more negative view by refusing to allow the new direct dialer-type alarms to be transmitted to their stations.

A number of private security executives were interviewed by the Rand researchers. Among their comments were the following:

1. All crime should be reported to the police.
2. Moonlighting police officers present unfair competition to private security. Besides the issue of unfair competition, there are some legal liability questions to be considered by the clients. Plus, there seemed to be differential response by public police to calls from

moonlighting police as opposed to calls from private security personnel.

3. Private security should have access to police records.

Concluding their section on interactions between public and private police, Kakalik and Wildhorn comment that:

"In short, the relationships between the public police and the private police parallel those that exist between any 'professional' and 'paraprofessional' groups. Some public police will tend to look on the private police as relatively unqualified persons who might be mistaken for public police by citizens, and who might create an unfavorable reactions to the public police in general. The likelihood of improved relationships between the two will depend upon, among other things, a clarification of roles, opportunities for cooperative ventures, and the degree to which private police are supervised or regulated locally (i.e., at the municipal or county level rather than at the state level.)"

In the area of governmental reports, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals produced a five-volume report in January 1973 under the direction of Governor Russell W. Peterson. The private security sector is the subject of only one recommendation among hundreds of recommendations listed in these five volumes dealing with a national strategy on crime, police, courts, correction, and community crime prevention. The Commission recommended that a national research study be conducted to determine the duties, responsibilities and interrelationships of public and private police agencies and to develop mechanisms to enhance the cooperative delivery of service. The Commission pointed to several shortcomings in the private security fields:

1. Excessive use of force.
2. Illegal arrest and detention.
3. Impersonation of police.
4. Invasion of privacy.

Considering these problems, the Commission recommended state control of private security with operating revenue raised through state licensing procedures. Additional legal revenue could be raised by fines for private security involved in any of the above activities. The Commission further recommended specific criminal laws to cover the commission of offenses by private security personnel, as well as possible civil recourse for victims of such offenses.

A symposium held in October 1973 by the Center of Criminology at the University of Toronto had as its topics private policing and private security activities in Canada. Joseph E. Thurston, president of Community Guardian Association, Limited, spoke on the legal aspects of private security in Canada. He named private security problem areas in Canada which are very similar to the United States situation:

1. Private security personnel do not have the same degree of accountability as public police and therefore may engage in activities in which public police may not.

2. Private security practices regarding arrest show greater discretion than public police.
3. Private security employees do not really understand the law as it relates to them.

A second paper was delivered at this same workshop by Fred Davis, an advisor to the Ontario Police Commission. Among several comments he made was his observation that police in Canada look upon private security as trespassers, a necessary evil, and far lower than police, based on their scale of efficiency and authority. Davis also said the private security sector, in choosing to dress like police, has confused the public because their way of handling situations is decidedly different than the police.

In July 1974, the Institute for Local Self Government of the State of California, located in Berkeley, California, conducted a survey of private security across that entire state. The survey was titled **Private Security and Public Interest**. The Institute found that most of the 158 cities surveyed did not have working relationships between the police and private security. However, most police agencies felt the establishment of formal cooperative relationships would be valuable even though they did not have them. A statistical summary indicated that 5% of police felt relationships with private security were poor, while 12% indicated the relationship was not valuable. One-hundred and fifty-eight cities and police departments were surveyed. Two complaints cited by survey respondents were:

1. Private security did not notify police or provide information to the police in criminal matters.
2. Private security took justice into their own hands without involving those who were legally responsible.

Also surveyed by the Institute were contract security executives and proprietary security executives, directors, and supervisors. Eighty per cent of those surveyed admitted they did not report certain types of criminal incidents to police such as petty theft, shoplifting, and assault.

The California report indicated that a number of police agencies were against increasing the formalization of relationships with private security as the roles of the two groups could become confused. Some police officials felt that new formalized, comprehensive relationships might confuse the public as to who is responsible for what and who is supposed to do what.

In other areas, the report evidenced a general feeling of distrust by police about the quality and training of private security employees. The police felt that they could not really be comfortable with private security employees because of low quality of types of employees, inadequate training, the high turnover rate, and the general transiency of private security employees. Police also felt that formalized interaction between the two groups might be manipulated to the private security advantage. Finally, a working relationship and division of tasks would require monitors which would present other problems because, while the police have some built-in monitors, "how can private security be monitored."

A report was published in 1975 titled **Final Report, Private Security and Ordinance for St. Petersburg, Florida**. This project was undertaken by Public Systems, Inc., under a grant from the Florida

state criminal justice planning agency. A survey, much like the California survey just discussed (except that it was restricted to the one city), was conducted. Workshops were the basis for some of the content of the report. Some of the comments from private security representatives included:

1. Private security relationships with the police were close and yet formal and businesslike. The attitude of the police was that private security is a help to the police and plays an important complementary role. However, some police are indifferent to private security employees, believing themselves (the police) to be superior.
2. There have been several instances of negativism by police toward alarm systems that have gone off accidentally.
3. One workshop participant said that as he perceived police attitudes, 80% thought private security a hindrance to police. Further, he said he believed 40% of police were hostile to private security.

Public law enforcement officials indicated in the workshops that it was generally felt the police themselves disagreed on what the proper degree of relationship should be between the police and private security. Police representatives indicated that proprietary security employees "got along" much better with the police than did contract security employees.

Dennis T. Brennan is the author of another regional study titled **The Other Police, The Private Security Services in Greater Cleveland**. Issued in 1975, the report proposed that the greatest single problem in the area of private security was the practice of public law enforcement officers engaging in secondary employment as private security personnel. Brennan summarized various complaints obtained from police departments about private security personnel:

1. Improper conduct.
2. Negligence.
3. Operating in an unlicensed fashion.
4. Impersonating the public police.
5. Use of excessive force.
6. Use of incorrect uniform contrary to regulations.
7. Failure to perform properly.
8. Improper identification.

In September 1975, at the annual meeting of the American Society for Industrial Security, which was held in Denver, Colorado, a very brief survey, which included references to police-private security relationships, was conducted by the local ASIS Chapter. Survey forms were given to all attendees. Of those who responded, 71% opposed giving police power to private security. On the question of whether private security personnel should be armed, 59% opposed such action.

During 1975, the Private Security Task Force to the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals conducted a detailed survey of all ASIS members in the United States. Questionnaires covering many areas of private security were sent to 5,400 ASIS members. Responses were received from 1,788 members (a 33% response rate—more than adequate for validity) of whom 175 indicated that they were from contract security. A

summary of the replies to the questions most closely related to police-private security relationships indicates:

1. What is the frequency of contact between police and private security: Daily — 47%, weekly — 24%, other replies — 29%.
2. How would you classify your company's relations with the police: Excellent — 57%, good — 30%, other replies — 13%.
3. What is the attitude of police in support of your private security efforts: Positive — 66%, neutral — 24%, negative — 3%, other replies — 7%.
4. Under ordinary circumstances, how often are your private security officers mistaken for public police officers by private citizens: Often — 3%, not quite often — 4%, once in a while — 9%, rarely — 33%, never — 47%, other replies — 4%.
5. How often do you utilize criminal justice information records: Never — 16%, daily — 27%, weekly — 30%, other replies — 27%.

Since 1972, the Private Security Advisory Council of the U.S. Department of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, has been reviewing many critical areas involving private security. One of the most important concerns of the Council is the relationship between private security and the police. The Council's Law Enforcement-Private Security Relationships Committee has been moving steadily toward a clearer understanding of the problems and appropriate resolutions in this area. In November 1975, the Committee submitted a report to the Council which outlined the major barriers to positive and professional private security-law enforcement relationships. These barriers were identified as:

1. Lack of mutual respect. Some police feel private security is corrupt, unprofessional, inefficient, and ineffective. Some members of private security feel the police do not give them their fair share of support and are corrupt as well.
2. Secondary corruption. The committee reported that both the police and private security, in various instances, jointly engaged in the purchase and sale of information. The committee reported that police and private security engage in "seduction." "Seduction" is defined as the action of private security in which company executives provide individual police personnel with favors or gifts in order to maintain a positive working relationship between private security and public law enforcement.
3. Lack of cooperation. The private sector believes police are interested only in activities which will lead to successful apprehension, will not cross property lines, and accept one-way, while rejecting two-way communications. Private security believes that police put a lower

priority on burglar alarm calls than their normal response to general calls from the public. Finally, private security feels police are seeking overregulation and control of their activities. The police counter with arguments that private security is motivated only by profit.

4. Lack of two-way data flow. This was seen not so much a problem of private security or police as much as a political and social problem area.
5. Competition. Private security believes the police exercise deliberate restraint of trade over private security by over-exercising authority over private security personnel and by allowing their officers to moonlight even to the extent of forming private security firms composed entirely of moonlighting police officers. The police hold that private security cannot handle police-type, critical situations that are bound to occur, sooner or later, on premises protected by private security.
6. Police have inadequate knowledge of the functions, missions, and problems of private security.
7. Unlike the police, private security does not have a unified professional voice. The few associations of private security people cannot have, in the judgement of the Committee, the same kind of professionalism, the same kind of staff and public visibility that police groups have on the state and national level.
8. Finally, the police and private security need better-formulated and articulated standards of professionalism.

This report of the Law Enforcement-Private Security Relationships Committee of the Private Security Advisory Council was the last published item in this field in 1975.

Of special significance is the steadily increasing number of studies, reports, and articles on police-private security relationships which have appeared over the last ten years. Also of note is the increasing candidness of the questions posed and answers received. Finally, there still exists uncertainty over the actual police-private security relationship picture due to the often conflicting information provided depending upon whether the questions are reflective of how good the relationship is (see Private Security Task Force ASIS survey), or how problematical it is (see Private Security Advisory Council Committee report on relationship barriers).

Much additional information-seeking, fact-finding, and problem identification are needed in order to properly place this important area of concern in a professional perspective so that informed debate and progress toward improvement and increased effectiveness can be achieved in police-private security relationships.

DISCUSSION

The first point of discussion, which was initiated by Mr. Weaver, addressed the use of a law to resolve the problem of non-reporting of crime by private security. Comments were asked for on the possibility of requesting private security management to develop uniform record-keeping systems with sub-

sequent compilation of information resulting in some type of yearly report. Mr. Bilek's response to this point was that in reviewing all private security proprietary operations, only one had comprehensive internal, let alone external, reporting. Most record-keeping and reporting was entirely individual, in-

formal, and not done in a serious professional manner, even among highly professional, large budget agencies.

This specific problem area and subsequent discussion seemed to indicate a broader problem area of interface which could be called availability of data and dissemination of knowledge. The police area is replete with many studies, articles, researches, and textbooks while the private security area is not. This is the direct result of a lack of baseline data to make coherent research possible. Additionally, what is needed is a viable system for the dissemination of this and subsequent information so that the problem area may be efficiently studied by individual factions. The use of the National Criminal Justice Reference and Referral Service was raised by Mr. Calder as one possibility in providing the dissemination mechanism.

Mr. Bilek indicated that the Private Security Advisory Council has succeeded in influencing LEAA to adopt a security component to the NCJRR program to deal with this problem of dissemination. The present status of this change is uncertain, but Irving Slott has reported that new cards are being created for all new categories of information, and the service can be provided if all reports are collated and cards made up and made available to the public. This will probably be on an individual cost basis rather than paid for through the Justice Department.

On another point, the issue was raised that the difference between public police and private security is often observed in the aegis of the public and creates problems for their interrelationship. Mr. Bilek commented that this is a consistent strain running through the literature and that a specific example would be the book entitled **The Other Police**. This same lack of differentiation is apparent in the Canadian seminar and the Rand Report mentioned in the presentation.

This confusion exists despite the fact that in actuality the police use tools which are not legally available to private security. Thus, real differentiation exists but not so much in the eyes of the public. This confusion is being perpetuated by the current popular use of a uniformed, private security man to guard small businesses in the inner-city which are particularly subject to criminal attack. In two recent polls of customers at such businesses, the theory of public confusion was substantiated with most people assuming the guard is in fact a policeman rather than a private security look-alike. Interest-

ingly, at the same moment these small businesses are looking to protect themselves in this way, the larger more professional organizations are looking to disarm their security people. The result is a rather schizoid situation with an increase in police look-alikes in small businesses and at the same time a decrease in armed personnel in large organizations.

In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Repetto feels that despite any real differences, the majority of the private security activities are very similar to police and hence perceived as such by the public. Dr. Post supported this notion of identical tasks. It was suggested that an historical perspective may be helpful in examining the role of these groups in relation to the client's being served. About 50 years before reforms, protection was solely the individual's responsibility which meant he either protected himself or paid someone else for the task. Then through a series of statutory changes, he was required to pay for public protection while retaining a private security option. This has remained the situation up until the present. This option was convenient for private security companies to use as a basis for asking for police powers for a private profit-making interest. In terms of a public policy issue, the questions are: 1) should the public have this choice, 2) how do you define individual roles, 3) how is this paid for equitably, and 4) how do you provide protection for people who require more protection than the protective service society experts?

To Mr. Lipson, this indicated a need for basic research in the area, perhaps starting from the conclusions of the Rand Report. In terms of money, there are LEAA funds on the one hand counterbalanced by a tremendous lack of interest in research on the part of private security. It is suggested that perhaps money and interest in such endeavors should be sought from the insurance companies as they stand to immediately benefit.

In conclusion, there was a feeling of general consensus as to the validity of the barriers cited earlier, but this leaves unanswered the question of responsibility for future developments. How and who should cause the next steps to occur and in what direction? In his closing remark, Mr. Bilek reiterated that the private security force consists of one million men and that the most effective ways to utilize them must be found and used so that ultimately crime can be reduced and the quality of life in our country maintained.

AMERICAN SOCIETY AND THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE SECURITY

Irving Slott

This is the bicentennial year, the year in which we celebrate the establishment of our democracy and our commitment to the equal rights of the individual. Somehow implicit in these rights is freedom from the fetters which were and are characteristic of the old autocratic regimes. Even if this is an historically inaccurate view of the United States, it is the view that I, and I believe most of you, were taught to believe was an American blessing and distinction.

Traditionally, Americans did not require an identification card. Americans could enter any non-military or nonprivate area without challenge. American privacy and freedom were important and considered inviolate. Search warrants were made part of the Constitution of the United States. We had the freest country in the world. Sure there was violent crime; lots of it, but it either (1) took place "somewhere else," such as in the wild west, on the other side of town (the poor side), or in Chicago; (2) was either not so terrible, or involved graft, controlled rackets (illegal commerce), or bad kinds (who grew out of it); or (3) even if terrible (murders, rapes, etc.), crime did not happen often enough for us to spend significantly great funds in an attempt at control.

When I was a teenager in the late 1930's, I worked for a large wholesale grocer in Jacksonville, Florida. Each afternoon an employee carried the cash (a lot in that day) and check receipts to the bank. This employee was a black man who rode to the bank on his bicycle. It has been many years since that would have been the procedure. Today, an armored car with at least two armed officers would handle the cash, despite our increasingly cashless society.

When I enter my office building, I must show my identity card to a uniformed guard. Visitors sign in and out. Due to security precautions, you cannot enter the building's offices from the parking garage as originally designed. There is a uniformed armed guard in the drug store of our building similar to the one in every other city branch of this drug chain.

I have a number of friends who live in the city. When I visited one recently, I was stopped and checked at the entrance to the parking area while I was in my car. The elevator of the building would only operate with the apartment key. My brother-in-law in New York City has an alarm system and an elaborate system of lights which go on and off at odd times simulating occupancy when his family is away. A close friend, to whom he loaned a set of keys, lost them, and my brother-in-law immediately changed the two special double locks that he had installed on the door.

All businesses and institutions of size have security officers and alarm systems. Many utilize private investigators, honesty shoppers, and undercover persons to prevent crimes of every sort; from strangers, from customers, from vendors, and possibly most importantly from employees.

I do not have to tell you again of the indicators that there are many more persons and dollars spent in private security for crime prevention than in law

enforcement in the United States. But who do you think is really spending this money for "private security?" The bank? The department store? The store owner whose insurance company requires an alarm system? Wealthy people, rather than middle class or poor? In short, those who can afford protection? No! It is the citizen who pays. He always pays. When costs rise, prices rise. I would like now to raise an important question: What are the limits to what the citizen will spend for security?

Law enforcement is also intensifying its special crime prevention efforts and I would not be surprised to see the situation of imbalance turn around. That is, law enforcement may soon catch up with private security in terms of the amount of resources going into crime prevention and reduction. Well then, again I ask, what are the limits to what the citizen will spend for security through private security in addition to taxes for law enforcement? At what point will the citizen begin to desperately grasp at more promising panaceas?

Another problem is that, possibly without perceiving it, without planning for it, we just may be building so secure a society that we ourselves may no longer be free. This has been a matter of increasing concern for those involved in criminal justice planning. Some persons are affected most by increased surveillance, others by constantly being screened and challenged, still others by walls and securely locked doors. From time to time, people actually die in a burning building because the exits have all been secured.

Computerized information systems and rapid data transmission have provided opportunities for investigation and screening of persons to prevent crime, but at the same time the same opportunities are provided for learning about persons and organization operations for less legitimate purposes. This is the cause of the greatest debate in the area of security versus freedom.

But just a moment: who are these criminals from whom we are defending ourselves? I am certainly not one; I perceive myself as an honest person. Most assuredly all of you rightfully think of yourselves as such.

Nevertheless, criminal behavior of one sort or another — burglary, robbery, shoplifting (this is done to a great extent by the middle class), employee theft (from the data I have seen, I would bet there are even guilty persons here), frauds of various sorts, purchasing stolen goods, etc. — pervades all social levels. "We are meeting the enemy and he is us."

But why? How can the same citizen who tells Messrs. Gallup and Harris that crime is the most important problem, be the one who is paying for that crime and at the same time committing it? The answer is obvious to this audience at any rate — crimes are really what other people do, not what the ordinary citizen does. We do not see our actions as crimes. Our actions are justified. Either there is no victim or the victim deserved it.

A recent self-reporting test survey, however, has given us some startling indications that not only do a large proportion of people commit crimes, and I mean felonies albeit of the non-violent sort, but also they are willing to talk about it. If you are interested, this study was performed by the Mid-Atlantic Research Institute of Bethesda, Maryland, in November 1975, for LEAA's National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service. Although the study was intended to develop and test self-reporting methodologies in this area and the results cannot be considered statistically definitive of the population, they were indeed startling. About one-third of those interviewed at the randomly selected households reported the commission of one or more of the following offenses: shoplifting, employee theft, receiving stolen property, illegal drug use, insurance fraud, credit card fraud, passing bad checks, and breaking and entering. I shall pause one long second while you reflect on this. I would bet that quite a number of you, despite your stature as professionals, reflected particular biases in immediately thinking thoughts such as, "That is illegal drug use—so many people do that," or "they probably are including many black people, rather than white," or "maybe it includes many poor people buying stolen goods."

Well, please divest yourselves of those notions, if you can. Shoplifting led the list followed by receiving stolen property. Illegal drugs was third closely followed by employee theft. These four popular crimes are committed by people in every income strata, regardless of education, race, or sex. Furthermore, a veracity test was given and it was significant that the high veracity respondents reported having committed most of the crimes, so the statistics might even be worse.

I spoke with the researchers and they indicated

that many people, far from resenting the questions, treated the session as if it were a confessional. There were also indications that older people reported having committed somewhat less crime, possibly because they had simply blotted the events from their minds.

So here are the appropriate dilemmas facing society in this bicentennial year: (1) to reduce opportunity for persons to commit crime but not to tie ourselves up so securely in the process that we have difficulty obtaining liberty and the pursuit of happiness, or, (2) to strive to dissuade the people from their criminal behavior, a task that has only succeeded under undemocratic repressive regimes, if there.

Perhaps it will all stop. Perhaps my doomsday fears are a passing mood based on insufficient data. Perhaps when the postwar babies are middle-aged, there will be less crime. Perhaps. Before I stop to let you attack me or these questions, I do want to tell you this: LEAA is intensifying its efforts to find and fund practical crime prevention strategies of all sorts, particularly those of opportunity reduction. Among the most promising is that of environmental security design. We are committed to furthering this effort within the (we believe) compatible framework of enhancing the quality of life and use of the environment. I hope that as our programs in this area expand, the double objectives of security and quality of life are kept together.

Several years ago, Herbert Simon, a fine psychologist, wrote that man almost eliminated the horse by introducing automobiles and then by introducing tractors, but that man would not eliminate himself with the introduction of the computer. I think Simon was correct; I am afraid, however, that we are able to tie ourselves up very, very securely, if we do not watch out.

DISCUSSION

Dr. Post commented that the government as well as the private sector deals primarily with either opportunity and deterring opportunity or reducing the threat to a target. Little is done, however, with the problem of ability or desire to commit crime. He believed that the government neither deals with these matters nor is it capable of it. If anything, Dr. Post felt that what we have done is simply to increase the ability level or the need for increased sophistication of criminals to commit crimes due to our efforts "in trying to tinker with the system." A great deal of crime has been displaced and been shifted around so that instead of robbing banks, now many learn how to manipulate computers and to rip off credit cards. Dr. Post further stated that "the absolute most we're doing is trying by the security measures to give the illusion that the police system is working when in fact it isn't working." He felt that the security system isn't going to work once it is completely implemented. Crime is still going to be here and people are going to say that the security system doesn't work any better than the police did.

Dr. Lejins then commented "that no society ever existed without crime, and I don't think that we should be thinking or planning in terms that our task is to eliminate crime from the society. It would be absolutely impossible. If we do have more crime

than before, there should be an effort to diminish the type of crimes which are more prevalent today, which is really the socialization of the incoming members of the society." Although the criminal justice system is also trying to combat crime, Dr. Lejins doubted that it could ever be successfully eliminated, for in every society there are some criminal acts included in the normal function of that society, with a certain level of crime always present because there will always be some individuals who will commit these criminal acts. There is always going to be some crime and with that a need for protection. He felt that we are presently in a situation where there is some kind of a crest in the crime wave.

Dr. Klotter stated that the first thing he would like to see is a "crime prevention school." He went on to say that he has had much to do in the last five years developing such a school with a philosophy of crime prevention and deterrence. He has also encouraged the police to go back to their departments and work more closely with private security after they leave school.

With regards to the desire, ability, and opportunity to commit crime, Dr. Klotter did not believe that the means to combat this were available at the present time. He did not feel that we had the means or the

ability to change a person's attitude, for this has to be done over a long period of time, and apparently the sociologists have not been able to solve this. Criminologists also have not been able to do much to affect the recidivism rate which continues to go up instead of down. Dr. Klotter felt that at the present time we are getting immediate results through the reduction of opportunity, and that this is not a temporary measure as some one previously stated.

Mr. Slott mentioned that there has been much criticism of LEAA programs such as the funding of the National Crime Commission Institute at the University of Louisville. People have said, "You are going to make good technical assistance experts of police, then go to the homes of householders who appreciate this kind of expertise, and they will put better locks on, and the lights in the right place, change the window latches or whatever it may be, and their home isn't going to be burglarized. But you are not going to stop crime, because next door, and down the block, or someplace else, someone didn't do that, couldn't afford it, or they didn't feel like it. They were not afraid or whatever it was, and you are not doing anything to crime at all." Mr. Slott feels that the response to this type of criticism should be similar to the response from people who treat drug addicts. They realize that they are not going to eliminate drug addiction by treating addicts, but like a good doctor's approach, if a person presents himself and says he is ill and wants treatment then you treat him. It isn't a matter of eliminating disease, it's a question of treating a person. Mr. Slott felt that if a person is wise enough or farsighted enough to install better locks, whether it may be to protect himself, his home, store, bank, or whatever, then by all means he should avail himself of the opportunity.

Dr. Post stated that the real issue is that society has always had crime and it always will have crime. If we need crime prevention institutes to deal with short term problems, we often build what is referred to as a crime control strategy. He feels that in this case we are dealing with tactics rather than strategy in using short term kinds of approaches. A lot of things that we are doing are not due to the fact that the security industry has grown up, but rather they are relatively short term responses to particular problems. Dr. Post went on to say that since society cannot eliminate crime, it is trying to manage it in order that the people who are dealing with it can feel that they are making some progress. We are not really going to do much with crime other than keep it within accessible limits so that "people are not in the streets screaming and shouting that we are not doing anything for it."

Dr. Repetto spoke of his recent research and what he feels might happen if government doesn't do anything. He discussed the block security program in New York where a block association can get up to \$10,000 for security of various sorts, such as walkie-talkies for their patrols to call the police when they see some thing wrong. In others, three or four fellows with baseball bats might deal with a situation in their own way. Although we have heard of problems with public law enforcement and private security, it certainly cannot be as bad as having untrained groups patrolling with baseball bats. Yet if government does nothing or there is no way of purchasing security, then the people will do their own

thing, and in some cases they will do it very badly and at much greater threats to liberty than could ever possibly be posed by public law enforcement or private security.

Regarding crime displacement, Dr. Repetto observed that if certain types of strategies are initiated the displacement will be at a minimum. For example, people who can do simple burglaries cannot in fact become computer criminals. It is way beyond their capabilities, and so maybe they would have to go on welfare. He would much rather have an individual who commits muggings on welfare, rather than out mugging someone, because the consequences to society in terms of fear are much less.

Dr. Repetto was pessimistic about the crest of the wave. He felt we were on the crest about ten years ago, and last year he also thought so. He, however, no longer feels that we are at the crest of the wave, even though he recently said so in a national magazine. Government, he stated, has to do short term kinds of things even though they will probably not be done very well, and there will be a lot of criticism. A lot of people will say, "You spent \$100,000 on cops." "Well I was a cop for 18 years and we didn't have 100 cents spent for us over that period of eighteen years, so I don't think that these expenditures on police or security are necessarily excessive. They are making up for what failed in the past. We, as a society, did not support law enforcement or security in the past, and I don't take this view that LEAA has squandered money."

Mr. Slott mentioned that LEAA is prohibited from funding private security, yet private citizen patrols can be funded to organize and buy equipment. He wondered how much difference there is between a block association or a merchants' association getting funds for security and a private security company.

Mr. Potter commented that, in his opinion, he did not think private security was looking for LEAA funding in terms of providing systems, manpower, and the like such as LEAA is providing for public law enforcement agencies. He felt, however, that "a very good case can be made for continued research and development in the private security sector today." The same thing was true of public law enforcement agencies some years back until there was enough federal money to sponsor creative research and development efforts in the field of public law enforcement.

Mr. Slott said that he looks forward to a lot more expenditure in the private security area by the states as a result of the Private Security Task Force Standards and Goals. "The Task Force Report is going to stimulate quite a bit of interest and understanding of private security in the states. I hope that it will also reflect back on LEAA," stated Mr. Slott. He further commented that there is research going on now in private security. "It's not non-existent, although it was non-existent before LEAA. I think it's an important resource to allow this to go on, which would be the case in a meeting of this sort, and this is the first meeting of this level that I know of."

The concluding remarks of Dr. Minor, Chairman of this session were as follows. "A couple of important points have come up during the discussion generally relating to the issue of the constancy of crime. Some of you have brought up the issue of displacement. Others have mentioned the problem

of the mutual escalation which results in the increase of crime and prevention strategy which is followed by an adoption of a new strategy. The history of crime is probably a classic example in this respect. Now if this theory of the constancy of crime holds, then one implication of that would seem to be that what we're doing in trying to prevent crime is somewhat futile. I don't believe that the argument of the constancy of crime necessarily holds but we do find three things.

When we try to prevent crime by environmental design or increased police control or private security or whatever, one of these is the possibility of some counter-escalation. We know that previously Mr. Potter mentioned an example in that respect, and while many skyjackers, or potential skyjackers, have apparently been thwarted by the increased security measures, apparently some others have been spurred to more severe violence in terms of shooting their way on to airplanes.

A second possible consequence of prevention increase is that of displacement which has been mentioned. We know that only some displacement

will have occurred. I am also inclined to believe that, as Dr. Repetto mentioned, not all of the crime is displaced. Some of it is displaced and some of it is prevented.

The third thing, which I think was the point that Mr. Slott was raising initially, is that we have social cause by our increased isolation, our increased wall into isolation, our increased wall into ourselves and calling in of ourselves. I think that is a consequence that we need to be aware of. We are, in many cases at least, preventing some crime. It's a very complex situation in which, when you try to do something about crime, we end up with some prevention, some escalation and displacement and some social cause. I think perhaps we need to be simply aware of these different consequences and try to build into our intervention strategies a very vigorous and carefully planned research component, which will take all of the consequences into account, and try to evaluate them and hopefully allow us to determine whether in fact a particular intervention strategy works or whether the side effects are perhaps worse than the initial crime that was committed".

PRIVATE SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERFACE

Thomas W. Wathen

Private Protection is a whole new stratum of law enforcement. The evolution of this profession reveals how fast and how far it has advanced. Prior to World War II, a firm was typically protected by a night watchman. Practically his only concern was to smell smoke and detect fire. During World War II, the government, mostly the military and the FBI, became deeply involved in plant protection. Uncle Sam sharpened safeguards to protect against sabotage. Following World War II, the Department of Defense accelerated research and development — much of it under tight security wraps. Rules to protect military secrets proliferated. Partnership with the government heightened awareness of the importance of security in industry. Out of the military-industrial complex emerged a new class of talented security executives, many of them former police officers, FBI agents, and military intelligence officers. They expanded and improved plant protection. (Tom Reddin, **Security Subjects, An Officer's Guide to Plant Protection**, in the Foreword)

The 1960's can be hailed as the decade of enlightened management. Business leaders recognized full-scale company protection as a necessity vital to the success of any enterprise. Today the plant protection officer's role has widened to around-the-clock protection of all business assets — people and property, as well as sensitive information. These increased responsibilities demand qualifications far above those a security guard needed just a few years ago — more acumen, better training.

The Space Age and the Age of Aquarius met head-on in the past few years and promise to clash even more in the near future. Cities are more crowded, life moves at a faster pace, anarchists abound, guerrillas hijack and kidnap and bomb — and the word **security** has taken on new meaning.

Management and industry, business and governmental agencies of all kinds now recognize a tangible value in a program to protect their assets — a security program and thus, Private Security has come of age.

The night watchman of yesteryear was a forerunner of modern security programs, but today he is nearly gone from the scene — replaced by increasingly reliable electronic alarm systems that guard against fire and intrusion. The old-time watchman is replaced also by a new breed of security officers with more education, training, motivation, and pride. The new security officer has infinitely broader responsibilities — requiring superior proficiency.

So, I am here to discuss the interface between private security and law enforcement. Let me first discuss the historical aspects of the relationship of "interface."

I remember a talk given by the Commander of the New York Police Department Training Academy in about 1968. The scene was one of the early international security conferences. He spoke of a project in which he had measured the degree of knowledge/understanding of purpose/appreciation of private security by the officers of the NYPD. He had polled a broad cross-section of New York's finest and came to the unmistakable conclusion that there was practically **no** meaningful understanding of the role of private security by his department.

Times have changed — but only slightly — in the knowledge held by the lower ranks of the working officers of duly constituted law enforcement agencies. On the management level, however, great

strides have been made and have permitted a growing effectiveness in the interface between security and law enforcement.

First, I must comment that the "interface" is primarily of an informal rather than "official" nature. What is the "official" interface? Except for some remote and segregated "commission" or "license" office, used primarily to regulate contract security guards and street (merchant, mobile) patrols, there is no official relationship — very little cooperation of a formal nature between the two bodies. Aside from rather routine enforcement of those state and/or local regulations which govern private security, the police officer has little other contact of a formal nature.

My experience, in fact, leads me to believe that even the geographical considerations play a part in the degree of interface. Cooperation, nonetheless, runs high on an **informal** basis, particularly during natural disasters and labor unrest.

There is a higher or lower degree of interface by individual security managers/private security agencies depending on the personal bent of the security manager or the police chief or precinct area commander."

Is there such a thing as polarization between private security and law enforcement? I would say, obviously! But I would hasten to add that I do not see polarization as a large problem. I find it only natural to be attracted to those specialized areas of interest to which our **purpose** is directed. Police are involved primarily in the solution of crimes and apprehension of wrongdoers whereas security personnel are directed toward prevention of problems — the protection of assets.

Let me cite some common security/police relationships which lead to a more secure community.

During the 1971 earthquake in Los Angeles, we found many security companies and individual officers volunteering their efforts to maintain order, direct traffic, conduct searches, relay communications over their private radio systems, etc. The police welcomed these services which relieved them for the most critical rescue and control operations.

In many major cities and counties in the West, we find "Metropolitan" or "Industrial Relations" squads which are designed to serve the private sector with specialized protective and/or investigative skills and tools. The interface with private security by these squads is still an unofficial one, but it is

nonetheless structured. The law enforcement officer usually has little real authority until some infraction of law has occurred, but he can and frequently does give freely of his advice and counsel in planning to insure labor disturbances are less volatile than would be the case without security.

Examples of such cooperation are manifold with only a few examples of hostility.

I frankly feel that private security misses opportunities to inform/educate the police officer during his academy training — and fails to promote the proper image of our industry in an aggressive manner. I also feel, however, that the police miss great opportunities in most cases to enlist support of all those extra eyes and ears.

The private security field — as you well know — is highly fragmented. In this brief paper alone, I have mentioned the contract guards, patrols, proprietary forces, alarms, investigators, etc. It is all the more difficult, therefore, to structure the relationships one with the other, not to mention with law enforcement agencies. One thing that will assist the effectiveness of both is the centralization of registration, licensing, and rule making of the private security industry by the individual states. We still find some states permitting local (municipal/county) control of these functions for private security. The nature of many security businesses usually means functioning in several governmental jurisdictions every day or week. Worse, we find discriminatory laws/ordinances existing throughout the United States, such as regulating only the contract guards, not the tavern owner who hires his own gunslinger.

I am personally proud of our basic regulatory statutes in California. The state preempts localities and registers/licenses all contract guards at present. It has dictated the type and amount of training for contract guards (and will control armed, non-contract (in-house) guards in 1977). The training will, I am certain, begin to familiarize the formerly untrained guards in their role and general responsibilities.

I should mention that many law enforcement agencies are frequently involved in security type activities, and also that most of private security management personnel have come from law enforcement backgrounds. These facts render the communication between private security and law enforcement highly effective.

I disagree with law enforcement agencies which permit or condone the actual protection of specific private properties within their jurisdiction. However,

only the taxpayers of that community have any real stake in the matter. I further disagree with police policies that permit off-duty officers to "moonlight" while in the full uniform of their respective departments. I am confident that the International Association of Chiefs of Police does not condone this practice and that it will not proliferate but recede under professional ethics scrutiny.

The police agencies have mostly been receptive to the occasional and generally sporadic offers by our industry members to speak in police academies and other such forums. Private security, being generally unorganized, has been derelict in providing such training or training materials to the police, and we have been missing a great opportunity to tell our story to the men and women who might be benefitted the most — and who can benefit us so highly. I am hopeful that the new state training requirements we see proliferating now will give both security and law enforcement an opportunity to indoctrinate one another.

I have some conclusions and propositions to offer for your consideration.

1. Informal interface is all that is really needed at this point in time. I see a need for much improvement, but no need for an official or statutory liaison at this time.
2. The private security sector has been derelict in its organization and therefore in its efforts to inform and advise the law enforcement community of its scope, nature, purpose, and capabilities. It should organize promptly and have as a primary goal the preparation of indoctrination materials.
- 3a. There should be further study of the subject of security/law enforcement interface by the academic communities. The purpose of such studies would be to provide suggestions and materials for cross training and better relationships between the two.
- 3b. Community and state colleges/universities which offer training in police administration and criminal justice, should provide training/indoctrination about private security to the law enforcement students. Indoctrination of security students in law enforcement is almost always automatic.

I want to thank you all for the opportunity to present this paper and I would like to extend my special thanks to Mr. David L. Marvil, the chairman of this committee, and Dr. Peter P. Lejins for their support and assistance.

*Please note that I must restrict my comments/findings to those areas of the West Coast with which I am most familiar — principally California and Arizona. Please also note that my discussion here of "private security" is limited to the uniformed security officer — primarily of the stationary guard (assigned to one physical plant or facility). The merchant patrol/private patrol/mobile patrol services have a different degree of interface with law enforcement than the stationary guards and should be considered a separate specialty of private security (along with alarm services, armored car services, courier services, private or "licensed" investigators, locksmiths, etc.).

Because the vast majority of our citizenry think of the stationary guard or the mobile patrolman when we mention private security, I have restricted my comments to these aspects of the business.

And, just as I qualify the type of security service we speak of, I must also limit my discussion to municipal and county police agencies. The relationship of the many state and federal agencies to private security is usually very highly specialized or dictated by statute or high-level regulations (such as the Department of Defense Industrial Security Regulation).

CLOSING SESSION

The Closing Session, chaired by Peter P. Lejins, was devoted to a discussion of the resolutions prepared by the Resolutions Committee. This committee, elected by the Conference participants, was composed of Messrs. James Kelley, Arthur Kingsbury, Perry Norton, Thomas Wathen, Clifford Van Meter, and Chairman James Calder.

A draft of the resolutions was presented at the Closing Session. After detailed discussion, both the Conference participants and the membership of the Resolutions Committee felt that it would be desirable to incorporate a number of the suggestions made during this session into the resolutions so that the

resolutions might more fully reflect the views of the participants. The conferees unanimously voted to extend the tenure of the Resolutions Committee so that a modified set of resolutions could be prepared. Mr. James Calder, Chairman of the Resolutions Committee, assumed responsibility for this assignment and for communicating the outcome to Dr. Peter P. Lejins, Director of the Project, and to Mr. David L. Marvil, Coordinator of the Conference.

A second draft of the resolutions was mailed to the participants for their comment. The final resolutions as formulated and submitted by the Chairman are as follows:

RESOLUTIONS

PREAMBLE

Whereas, the conferees of the First National Conference on Private Security recognized the need for the protection of citizen rights and their enterprises and organizations, through the cooperative and competent efforts of the private security field and public law enforcement.

Whereas, the Conference was given the charter to examine and formulate resolutions relating to education and training for the private security field, and the relationships between private security and public law enforcement.

Whereas, the resolutions set forth herein were developed and approved as an aggregation of thought, philosophy, and recommendations of the conferees in the above cited areas of education, training and relationships.

It is resolved that:

EDUCATION

1. There is a body of knowledge about the private security field sufficient to support realistic and meaningful 2-year, 4-year, and graduate-level college and university programs.
2. A multidisciplinary and scholarly approach should be the core concept for the development of degree programs in private security.
3. There is a need to assess the manpower, training and education requirements (managerial as well as technician level), both present and future, for the purpose of planning and developing academic programs.
4. A systematic effort is needed to develop guidelines for academic programs in private security, serving to design career development programs for technician level positions and educational programs for supervisory/managerial positions.

TRAINING

1. Training, alone, cannot meet the need for improving the level of private security services without

- proper consideration of complementary personnel selection, salary, and career development policies.
2. Training in private security must recognize and incorporate the unique needs of the field.
3. Consumers of private security services be encouraged to stimulate training and higher education for security personnel through position descriptions and specifications in contracts, requirements, incentive provisions, and other means.
4. Shared or cooperative training programs utilizing the resources of private security, public law enforcement, educational and training institutions be pursued to meet the training needs of private security.
5. The conferees adhere to the principle of state-level advisory councils with adequate resources to assist in the development and implementation of state regulatory standards on private security education and training.
6. The conferees adhere to the principle of minimum general training standards, and that the development of such standards should involve an assessment of job descriptions, job-related tests, and the cost impact of training.
7. State training standards or regulations must recognize that the security field encompasses "proprietary", "contract," and governmentally-employed security organizations.

RELATIONSHIPS

1. The term "private" security be replaced by a term that is more inclusive of the scope and nature of the entire security field.
2. Security and public law enforcement are separate but closely related fields.
3. The security and public law enforcement fields both are integral parts of our society's concern for the maintenance of social order.
4. The security and public law enforcement fields are responsive to distinct legal, economic, organizational, and other related dynamics.

5. A concerted effort be made to carefully examine the role and the ends served by the security and public law enforcement fields.
6. Encouragement be given for the development of positive state statutes designed to maximize the combined efforts of security and public law enforcement as follows:
 - a. Access by regulatory boards to public criminal justice information systems (Note: It is suggested that the California model be examined);
 - b. Minimum salaries on bids for security services;
 - c. Background investigations for all security and public law enforcement personnel, based on legal and ethical principles;
 - d. Minimum general training standards;
 - e. National reciprocity for security services (Note: It is suggested that the National Education Association model be examined.)
 - f. Non-distinction between "proprietary," "contract," and governmentally-employed security with respect to regulation and minimum general training standards.
7. Extensive emphasis be placed on the development of state-level regulatory bodies for the security field.
8. State-level bodies for the security field include representatives of the community at large, public law enforcement, labor groups, consumers of security services, and security personnel.
9. Additional research be conducted to examine the special needs and approaches of the security field.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES

1. An extensive definition of terms be established to serve as a foundation for the interrelationships of the security field as well as for research and development.
2. An intensive search be made for information dissemination resources for documents that address the development of the security field.
3. A need exists for a scholarly research journal for the security field.
4. A concerted effort be made to secure public and private funds for research and development.

5. The National Criminal Justice Education Consortium, the Institute of Criminal Justice and LEAA consider convening follow-on conferences and symposia similar to the First National Conference.
6. A most urgent issue before the security community is the creation of a national forum for the purpose of generating resources to develop the planning and implementation of education and training, and general standards.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

The conferees express an appreciation for the efforts of all members of the Resolutions Committee. Those members are as follows:

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CONCLUSIONS

David L. Marvil

Indications are that the Conference was far more successful than anticipated. From all reports received from the participants as well as observers, the Conference appears to have been highly successful. Everyone was in accord that the Conference served as an important vehicle to bring together leading authorities from the fields of public law en-

forcement, private security, and academia, to discuss for the first time on a national level, important issues confronting the vast area of security. The police officials, private security specialists, and academicians were able to establish an intense dialogue whereupon members of each group could speak and be heard by participants of the other groups. These

important discussions and exchanges of ideas have contributed greatly to the future development of professionalism in private security.

The consensus of opinion was that the two themes chosen for the Conference were felt to be the most appropriate as areas of greatest concern for the leaders in both public law enforcement and private security. The areas covered by the two themes are also believed to be ones which have an important impact on society's efforts to combine all available means, both public and private, in order to combat the forces of crime which increasingly threaten the rights and safety of individual citizens as well as enterprises and organizations.

A major goal of contributing to the efforts of LEAA in its private security endeavors was met. Leaders of the LEAA Private Security Advisory Council and the Private Security Task Force assisted in the planning of the Conference and also attended as participants. Individual Task Force and Security Advisory Council members who participated stated that they individually benefitted from the knowledge gained during the Conference.

An important highlight of the Conference was the development of significant resolutions by a profes-

sional and well-qualified group of experts who comprised the members of the Resolutions Committee.

The Institute, in taking the initiative to organize and conduct a private security conference of this type, has contributed to the progress and future development of private security, its direction toward the emergence of an important discipline, and its relationship to the crime prevention efforts of public law enforcement.

It is hoped that the First National Conference on Private Security will establish a precedent and begin a trend for future meetings wherein important contributions can be made toward the field of private security, which will be of benefit to both the public as well as the private sector of our society. The consensus reached during the Conference concerning these matters is well illustrated by two of the resolutions adopted by the participants, which read as follows: "The National Criminal Justice Education Consortium, the Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology, and LEAA consider convening follow-on conferences and symposia similar to the First National Conference," and "A most urgent issue before the security community is the creation of a National forum for the purpose of generating resources to develop the planning and implementation of education and trainings, and general standards."

APPENDIX I

FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY

EDUCATION AND TRAINING POLARIZATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECURITY

Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology
University of Maryland

December 1-3, 1975

at the

Center of Adult Education

FINAL PROGRAM

All sessions will meet in Room 1123 of the Center of Adult Education
Hospitality Suite 209-11

Monday - December 1, 1975

10:-11:00

Opening of the Conference

Dr. Peter P. Lejins, Director
Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology

Welcoming Remarks

Dr. Mary F. Berry, Provost
Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences
Mr. Clifford VanMeter, Executive Director
Private Security Task Force

11:00-12:00

General Introduction

Scope and Purpose of the Conference

Dr. Peter P. Lejins

Election of Resolutions Committee

12:00- 1:30

Lunch

1:30- 3:00

General Session 1

Chairman: Mr. David L. Marvil

Presentation by: Dr. Richard Post

"Toward Rational Curriculum Development for the
Private Protective Services"

Discussion

3:00- 3:30

Coffee Break

3:30- 5:00

General Session 2

Chairman: Dr. Knowlton W. Johnson

Presentation by: Mr. Arthur Kingsbury

"The Two-Year Associate Degree in Security and Loss Prevention"

Discussion

5:30- 7:00

Reception hosted by Dr. Mary F. Berry, Provost, Division of Behavioral and
Social Sciences, Room 2141, Tydings Hall, University of Maryland, College
Park Campus

Tuesday, - December 2, 1975

8:30-10:00

General Session 3

Chairman: Dr. Barton L. Ingraham

Presentation by: Mr. Richard Lukins

“Security Training for the Guard Force”

Discussion

10:00-10:30

Coffee Break

10:30-12:00

General Session 4

Chairman: Dr. Peter R. Maida

Presentation by: Mr. Anthony Potter

“Professional Training for Private Security Problems
Pitfalls and Practical Solutions”

Discussion

12:00- 1:30

Lunch

1:30- 3:00

General Session 5

Chairman: Dr. Julius Debro

Presentation by: Mr. Arthur J. Bilek

“Law Enforcement and Private Security Interrelationship —
A Missing Link in the War on Crime”

Discussion

3:00- 3:30

Coffee Break

3:30- 5:00

General Session 6

Chairman: Dr. Richard R. Butler

Presentation by: Mr. James Kelly

“Private Security from a Police Viewpoint”

Discussion

Wednesday - December 3, 1975

8:30 - 10:00

General Session 7

Chairman: Dr. W. William Minor

Presentation by: Mr. Irving Slott

“American Society and the Growth of Private Security”

Discussion

10:00-10:30

Coffee Break

10:30-12:00

General Session 8

Chairman: Dr. Ray A. Tennyson

Presentation by: Mr. Thomas W. Wathen

“Law Enforcement/Security Interface”

Discussion

12:00- 1:30

Lunch

1:30- 4:00

Closing Session

Resolutions

APPENDIX II

FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY

Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology
University of Maryland

December 1-3, 1975

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