Law Enforcement and Private Security Sources and Areas of Conflict and Strategies for Conflict Resolution

A REPORT PREPARED BY THE PRIVATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY SOURCES AND AREAS OF CONFLICT AND STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Prepared by the
PRIVATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL to the
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

June 1977

Points of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of the Private Security Advisory Council, and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Justice.
Mr. James M.H. Gregg  
Acting Administrator  
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration  
U.S. Department of Justice  
633 Indiana Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20531

Dear Mr. Gregg:

As Chairman of the Private Security Advisory Council, it gives me pleasure to forward the attached document, Law Enforcement and Private Security Sources and Areas of Conflict and Strategies for Conflict Resolution, developed by the Council for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. This document is the culmination of many hours of volunteer effort by members of the Council and the members of the Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationships Committee.

Two major efforts undertaken by the Council and the Committee have been joined to produce this report. The first segment, which was previously published as Law Enforcement and Private Security Sources and Areas of Conflict, contains a candid discussion of the role conflict and other specific areas of dissonance between law enforcement and private security. The second segment, recently completed by the Committee and the Council, contains 60 strategies for the resolution of conflict between these two groups. Clearly, these conflictive areas must be eliminated or minimized in order to improve and increase the cooperation between these two vitally important groups in their respective missions to prevent and reduce crime.

The Council feels that the understanding and resolution of these conflicts is vital to the nation's crime fighting efforts and has therefore combined both of these reports into one document. Further, the Council feels that the importance of this issue warrants the widest dissemination of this document to law enforcement, private security, state planning agencies and other interested parties.

Sincerely,

Arthur J. Bilek  
Chairman  
Private Security Advisory Council

Enclosure
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Outline of Resolutions to Areas of Conflict Between Law Enforcement and Private Security
Since its inception, the Private Security Advisory Council has achieved a balanced perspective by the representative nature of its membership. All members of the Council and its six Committees are appointed by the Administrator of LEAA and serve without compensation. Members of the Council and its Committees include leaders and executives from both proprietary and contractual private security; public law enforcement; federal, state and local governments; as well as attorneys, insurance and business executives.
PREFACE

This document, Law Enforcement and Private Security Sources and Areas of Conflict and Strategies for Conflict Resolution, was developed by the Private Security Advisory Council and its Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationships Committee to identify those sources and areas of conflict between law enforcement and private security and to develop strategies for the resolution of this conflict.

In preparing this report, the Committee and the Council undertook two major efforts. The first, to identify the sources and areas of conflict, resulted in the preparation of a report entitled, Law Enforcement and Private Security Sources and Areas of Conflict, which was initially published in August 1976. The second effort centered around the design of 60 strategies to assist in resolving the identified sources and areas of conflict. Both the Committee and the Council felt that the importance of this issue and the need for understanding both the problem and possible solutions warranted the consolidation of these two efforts into one document.

The major effort in developing this document was performed by the Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationships Committee and special acknowledgement and appreciation is due the Chairman and members of that Committee: Garis F. Distelhorst (Chairman), Robert L. Arko, Dale G. Carson, George A. DeBon, Joseph M. Jordan, Herbert C. Yost, and the three Council Liaison members: Richard C. Clement, Howard C. Shook and John L. Swartz.

The Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationships Committee was assisted in preparing this document by members of the Council's staff support contractors: PRC Public Management Services, Inc., and William C. Cunningham, Philip J. Gross and Todd H. Taylor of Hallcrest Systems, Incorporated.

The Advisory Council owes a special debt of gratitude to Irving F. Slott and William F. Powers, Government Project Monitors to the Council, for their encouragement in the development of this document.

Arthur J. Bilek
Chairman
Private Security Advisory Council
THE PRIVATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL

The Private Security Advisory Council was chartered by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) from 1972 to 1977 to improve the crime prevention capabilities of private security and reduce crime in public and private places by reviewing the relationship between private security systems and public law enforcement agencies, and by developing programs and policies regarding private protection services that are appropriate and consistent with the public interest.

The Council was an outgrowth of a meeting of private security sector representatives, called by LEAA in December 1971, to discuss the research and development efforts of LEAA that related to the private sector and the role of private security in the national effort to reduce crime. During the initial meeting, representatives from the private security sector overwhelmingly recommended that LEAA establish a national advisory committee, made up of persons with expertise in private security, to provide LEAA with continuing advice on matters of appropriate concern. LEAA followed that recommendation, and the Private Security Advisory Council was created shortly thereafter.

In September of 1974, the membership of the Council was broadened to include representation from the public law enforcement agencies and from consumers of private security services. Since its inception, the Council has worked on a number of tasks related to security services provided by the private sector. As established in 1974, the goals and objectives of the Council were:

- To act as an advisory to LEAA on issues of national importance which impact, or are impacted by, the private security industry;
- To raise the standards and increase the efficiency of the private security industry;
- To increase cooperation and understanding between the private security industry and public law enforcement; and
- To provide a viable national forum and point of leadership for matters relating to private security.
To achieve those goals, six committees were established: Alarm Committee, Armored Car Committee, Environmental Security Committee, Guards and Investigators Committee, Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationships Committee, and the Prevention of Terroristic Crimes Committee. Each committee was assigned specific objectives related to accomplishment of Council goals.

The responsibilities and duties of the Private Security Advisory Council were advisory in nature. It could not prescribe or promulgate rules or regulations. Its findings or recommendations were not official; they could be accepted or rejected by LEAA.

Prior to the expiration of its charter in June of 1977, the Council operated pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Standards Act, Public Law 92-463, LEAA Notice NI300.2, OMB Circular No. A-63, and any additional orders and directives issued in implementation of the Act. The Council was established under the authority of Section 517 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-351) as amended by Public Law 91-644 and the scope of its functions was limited to the duties specified in its charter.

The Council has published a number of advisory reports to LEAA on a variety of issues. These include:

- A Report on a Model Hold-Up and Burglar Alarm Business Licensing and Regulatory Statute;
- Terroristic Crimes: An Annotated Bibliography;
- Potential Secondary Impacts of the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Concept;
- Private Security Codes of Ethics for Security Management and Security Employees;
- Prevention of Terroristic Crimes: Security Guidelines for Business, Industry and Other Organizations;
• Law Enforcement and Private Security Sources and Areas of Conflict and Strategies for Conflict Resolution;

• Scope of Legal Authority of Private Security Personnel;

• Model Security Guard Training Curricula;

• Standards for Armored Car and Armed Courier Services;

• Guidelines for the Establishment of State and Local Private Security Advisory Councils.

Copies of these reports are available without cost from LEAA.
I. INTRODUCTION

The prevention and control of crime has traditionally been viewed by many citizens as a function of government provided by public law enforcement agencies. The private sector, however, has played a major role in crime prevention efforts in the United States since the mid-nineteenth century. The private sector provides a broad range of products and services to protect persons and property from injury, hazards, damage, loss and criminal acts. The delivery system for private security products and services is commonly referred to as private security. Today, the provision of products and services by the private sector for the protection of persons and property is one of the largest growth industries in the country, an industry which is now a larger employer than public law enforcement. However, despite this predominant role of private security in crime prevention, the recent emphasis placed on crime prevention programs by law enforcement agencies has largely excluded recognition of or participation by the private security sector.

In recognition of the major role of private security in crime prevention, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, established the Private Security Advisory Council (PSAC) to advise LEAA on how the vast resources of the private security sector could be most effectively utilized in the development of a national strategy and programs to prevent and reduce crime in the United States. The PSAC has been concerned with the development of advisory positions for LEAA on issues of national importance which impact or are impacted by the private security industry, and on ways in which the private security industry, in cooperation with public law enforcement could enhance and improve its effectiveness as a crime prevention tool. The Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationships Committee of the Council was formed to increase understanding of the respective roles of private security and public law enforcement and to foster improved and increased cooperative efforts in their mutual mission of crime prevention.

In general, available literature and survey research indicate that a positive relationship exists between law enforcement and private security personnel and that they respect their complementary roles. One survey of public law enforcement agencies indicated that 88 percent of the respondents felt that the presence of private security adds to the effectiveness of public law enforcement by increasing the level of protection for private property.\(^1\) In another smaller survey, all of the public law enforcement respondents considered private security personnel resources in the fight against crime.\(^2\) The Private Security Task Force to the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Stan-
standards and Goals surveyed the membership of the American Society for Industrial Security and found that 87 percent of these security managers expressed a highly acceptable relationship with public police; however, only 66 percent of the responding membership perceived a positive attitude of law enforcement toward private security.  

This research data gives rise to the more penetrating question which asks whether these assessments of relationships merely imply a healthy respect between private and public sector protection activities or rather an effective working relationship. Other available data indicated that in some cases only the former is the correct interpretation. In the same survey in which all of the law enforcement respondents valued private security as a resource, approximately 55 percent viewed the performance of private security personnel in general as incompetent. A limited survey of law enforcement agencies in 41 states conducted by the Private Security Task Force disclosed that only 25 percent of the law enforcement agencies had some policies or procedures for defining working roles with private security, and fewer than 20 percent had some procedures for cooperative actions with private security.  

In order to fulfill the objective of improving and increasing cooperation between private security and law enforcement, it was necessary initially to identify and examine any major barriers which would preclude the establishment of effective working relationships. Following the identification of sources and areas of conflict between public law enforcement and private security, suggested strategies for the resolution of the existing conflicts between these two groups could be developed. The limited availability of survey data for contractual private security and law enforcement imposed constraints on this analysis, but in these instances, discussions were guided by staff field research and the experience of the Committee membership.  

The major barrier to improved law enforcement-private security relationships is a role conflict which manifests itself in the lack of clear role definitions, perceptual distortions, and mutual negative stereotyping between private security and law enforcement. Role conflict problems appeared to be the basis for several barriers to cooperation and understanding. The areas of conflict identified in a ranked order of pervasiveness and intensity are:

- lack of mutual respect
- lack of communication
- lack of cooperation
- lack of law enforcement knowledge of private security
- perceived competition
- lack of standards
- perceived corruption

This document has been prepared to examine, from the perspective of both private security and law enforcement, those sources and areas of conflict between these two major crime prevention groups and to suggest a number of programs and strategies to deal with the specified areas of conflict. The strategies outlined have been grouped into the following major categories based upon the similarity of the techniques and mechanisms involved or the desired outcome:

- Increased Interaction
- Legal Considerations
- Institutional Support
- Policies and Procedures
- Personnel Improvement Programs
- Training Programs
- Research and Development Efforts

Each of the proposed strategies has a bearing on the areas of conflict described in the first part of this report, or on the standards and goals developed by the Private Security Task Force. To graphically display the relevance of the proposed resolution strategies, a matrix is appended to this report which integrates and cross-references these elements.

This report lays the foundation for the design and implementation of programs for the most effective use of public and private sector resources in the nation's efforts to control crime and provide a safe environment for its citizens. The problems of crime are too great and the resources too limited for these groups to continue operating on a mutually-exclusive or negative basis. Law enforcement and private security both have significant responsibilities in crime prevention and reduction, but their most effective role will be one which combines their respective talents and resources in a complementary and coordinated attack on crime.
II. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY ROLE CONFLICT

The concept of role is generally used to define a person's position within an organization or society and his relationship with others. It prescribes certain standards or norms of behavior and serves as a set of expectations to govern both what a person does in his job and how he is to carry out the responsibilities of his job. A person interprets his role and also places expectations on the roles of others, especially upon those with whom he interacts and who perform similar roles. Status or the value and esteem placed on the role by the person and others is closely identified with the concept of role.

Role conflict can occur when there are differing expectations placed on a role or when a person carries out his role with an interpretation of the role that differs from the prescribed norms and behavior of that role. A form of role conflict is intergroup or interorganizational conflict. This frequently occurs when members of different groups or organizations have varying aims and objectives or have different expectations and interpretations of their respective roles.

The resources of private security organizations and law enforcement agencies are both directed toward protective functions in society. Both private security and law enforcement have as their central mission the prevention of crimes and criminal activity and the protection of property and/or persons, but there are clear differences in their organizational structures, their protective roles and the primary beneficiaries of their services. These differences are the major underlying reasons for conflicts between private security and law enforcement. The major areas of conflict stem from role conflicts between the two groups. Private security personnel and law enforcement officers often have differing expectations and interpretations as to their respective roles. This role conflict produces misperceptions, mutual negative stereotyping, distrust, status differentials, lack of cooperation, and competition. Effective cooperation and understanding between law enforcement and private security cannot be established unless both groups have a clear understanding of the nature of their respective roles.

The role of public law enforcement is generally accepted as encompassing the prevention of crime, detection and apprehension
of criminals, protection of life and property, maintenance of public order, and regulation of traffic. Law enforcement agencies provide a general level of protection and security for the public and serve the public interest by regulating behavior considered offensive or contrary to the common good of society. This is accomplished in large part through the enforcement of laws. Law enforcement agencies have a wide range of responsibilities to protect essentially public concerns and their efforts are closely tied to statutorily mandated duties and the criminal justice system. The U.S. Constitution places limitations on the manner in which they conduct their activities and also, through Court decisions interpreting the rights of citizens, imposes certain guidelines of the performance of law enforcement. The ability of law enforcement to perform their role and carry out their responsibilities is hampered by the very fact that they are a public agency. They must operate with the resources provided to them within the constraints of public budgeting and finance, and must allocate these resources among their varied responsibilities according to the interests and needs of the community they serve and its elected officials.

A major distinction between private security and law enforcement is that private security consists of private concerns protecting private property and interests. Individuals and privately-funded organizations and businesses undertake measures to provide protection for perceived security needs which involve their private interests, not in the public domain. Private security is an option exercised to provide an additional or increased level of protection than that afforded by public law enforcement which must respond to the larger concerns of the public. This option is exercised by purchasing equipment and hiring employees to perform protective services (proprietary security), or contracting with an external organization (contractual security).

Public law enforcement agencies direct their activities toward violations of state statutes and local ordinances. Private security directs its protective activities not just toward violations of law but also toward a much broader range of hazards, including fire, industrial safety, and natural and man-made disasters. In addition, the security needs of private interests often include regulation of employee conduct and protection of production processes, business operations, trade secrets, events and activities held on private premises, as well as the safety of employees, visitors and patrons.

Law enforcement is a services-oriented delivery system for public protective services to the community, and its most visible components are patrol officers and investigators. But private security is a delivery system for private protective services such as alarm monitoring and response activities; armored car and armed courier delivery services; and guards/watchmen, patrols
and investigators. These services of the private sector are private concerns establishing security measures for protection of private interests and thereby ensuring a level of protection not afforded by public law enforcement. For example, while law enforcement is concerned with the prevention of theft, it would not be feasible to allocate resources to meet the specialized needs and interests of every movement of valuable items desired by business entities in their communities. Thus, armored car and armed courier firms provide these services for companies and organizations requesting an increased level of protection for valuable items. Similarly, it would not be economically feasible for law enforcement to provide intrusion alarm and fire detection devices for all businesses, organizations and private property owners in their community.

Private security generally embraces organizations within businesses providing protection for private interests and property, and profit-making companies that provide protection to a restricted clientele who purchase or retain the companies' products or services for a fee. Public law enforcement, on the other hand, provides mandated protection services with public funds to serve the public interests. Some law enforcement officers believe that being a "public servant" is of a higher moral order than serving private interests. This attitude or belief results in situations where some law enforcement officers attach a higher level or degree of status to the role of a police officer in society than that of private security personnel. They then relegate private security to an inferior status and social class position and assign a less important role to private security in their similar missions of prevention of crimes and criminal activity and the protection of property and/or persons.

This perceived status differential by law enforcement personnel manifests itself in lack of respect and communication which precludes effective cooperation. It also results in negative stereotyping of private security personnel by law enforcement. Negative stereotyping is most evident in the patrol officer's contact with the uniformed security guard, particularly when the officer is responding to a criminal complaint or breach of the peace committed in the presence of the security guard. The patrol officer may not see the utility or legitimate function of the security guard since the security guard, in most instances and states does not have the full arrest powers of law enforcement, resulting in the guard having to call upon public law enforcement to effect the arrest. If the security guard is a retiree, does not present a commanding physical presence, or does not conduct himself in the manner in which the police officer has been trained, then there is a tendency to pass a negative judgment on the competence of the security guard. Once a negative stereotype is formed,
it becomes self-reinforcing unless there are new experiences and contacts, but there is an additional tendency to let past experiences prejudice future encounters. Also, most law enforcement personnel do not have exposure to the broad range of both proprietary and contractual security services and personnel, so that the negative stereotype is then applied to the entire sector of private security.

Law enforcement and private security are both concerned with crime prevention and reduction and order maintenance, but the primary role of private security is crime prevention in the protection of their assets and those of their clients. In a membership survey conducted by the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) at its 1975 annual conference, 95 percent of the responding security managers stated that crime prevention is the single most important function of private security, not crime investigation and apprehension. Private security directs their operations toward the protection of corporate or client assets and the reduction of losses which affect profitability as a business enterprise. The first obligation of private security is to their employer or client. Primary security emphasis is placed on extensive preventive measures and then taking corrective actions when patterns or incidents of loss, damage and theft of assets occur. Criminal prosecution is viewed primarily as one of several remedial options available, and the decision to pursue criminal charges must be weighed against the personnel time consumed, demands of other security functions, and its contribution to the primary goal of assets protection. For example, the development of internal security procedures and controls in a receiving area of a warehouse may minimize losses in the long run more effectively than seeking prosecution for a few minor thefts which occurred.

The primary role of crime prevention for private security is often misunderstood and misinterpreted by law enforcement personnel. In its membership survey, the ASIS found that 74 percent of the responding security managers stated that they did not want the same legal authority as public police, and correspondingly, only 9 percent felt that laws, rules and regulations were their most important crime prevention techniques. But, many law enforcement personnel feel that private security is trying to compete on a profit-making basis in a law enforcement function; question the motives of private security in not pursuing criminal prosecutions of all incidents; and interpret use of private security as a dissatisfaction with the performance of public protection provided by law enforcement agencies. It is difficult for some law enforcement personnel, then, to understand or accept the role of private security as responding to private interests and needs and to perceive private security efforts as complementing and assisting public efforts in crime prevention and reduction.
Due to its limited resources, law enforcement must primarily be in a response mode in dealing with the large volume of criminal activity which confronts them. Although crime prevention is an important concern for law enforcement, it generally receives less emphasis compared to other demands for service by the public. Private security often sees law enforcement in its role of investigation of crimes and apprehension of offenders and thus does not interpret the role of the police as one of crime prevention. In recent years, in large part due to the availability of federal funding through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, law enforcement agencies have been increasingly implementing crime prevention programs. Law enforcement agencies have established formal crime prevention planning units and interacted with the private sector to reduce criminal opportunities through vulnerability surveys, target hardening, and public information programs. The LEAA, through the National Crime Prevention Institute of the University of Louisville, provides comprehensive training programs for law enforcement personnel in crime prevention techniques and planning. Private security, then, incorrectly perceives law enforcement as not sharing their interest in crime prevention, and often fails to consider the fact that law enforcement is constrained in its ability to allocate resources by the total demands for service imposed by the public.

The concept of status symbols is an important issue related to role definition, expectation and interpretation. While status symbols are most commonly discussed in the context of upward mobility of social classes, status symbols very often serve a useful purpose in visually communicating the authority and power of a position or role. Status symbols confer a mark or distinction that relates to the status or value of a particular role. In the case of law enforcement, it is particularly appropriate to have status symbols which in a unique manner communicate visually to the public the legal authority vested in the role of sworn law enforcement officers. The public identifies the uniform, insignia, shield and firearm with the power and responsibilities of a police officer's role in society; and, further, they will seek certain forms of assistance and protection and respond to directives commensurate with their expectations placed on the role of the law enforcement officer.

Many private security personnel and most contractual private security guards wear uniforms, insignia and sometimes shields and firearms similar to law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement officials frequently complain that the public mistakes similarly uniformed and attired private security guards for police officers. In a survey of law enforcement agencies in 41 states conducted by the Private Security Task Force, 71 percent of the agencies reported that they had received complaints from the public about
the mistaking of private security personnel for public law enforce-
ment officers. In the Task Force survey of membership of the
American Society for Industrial Security, the respondents indicated
that 79 percent of their private security personnel are uniformed.
In contrast to law enforcement officials who had received public
complaints on mistaken identity, 80 percent of these private
security management officials stated that their security personnel
are never or infrequently identified mistakenly as public police
by citizens. However, in the ASIS survey of its membership, 75
percent of the responding security managers favored state statutes
and local ordinances which would require that private security
personnel wear uniforms and shields noticeably distinct from those
of law enforcement agencies.

Law enforcement officials often feel that the desire of private
security to wear uniforms, shields and firearms similar to public
law enforcement is substantiation for their belief that private
security is trying to compete with them on a profit-making basis
in a law enforcement function. Private security points out, however,
that the uniforms worn by their personnel may have a deterrent
effect on crime similar to the presence of a uniformed patrol
officer. Complaints are also voiced by law enforcement that
private security personnel tend to associate the similar status
symbols with the authority possessed only by public police.
Frequently this leads to unwarranted and illegal use of police
powers reserved for public law enforcement such as "stop and
frisks," detentions and searches. This issue is particularly
evident in the carrying of firearms by private security where both
their authority to carry firearms and the use of deadly force
by them is legally questionable in a number of circumstances under
criminal and tort law in many states. The Task Force survey of
ASIS security managers revealed that 45 percent of their uniformed
private security personnel carry a firearm. Firearms training
for private security personnel is minimal at best when compared
to mandated law enforcement training in most states, and often
consists of little more than "weapon familiarization." There
have been numerous firearm incidents involving private security
personnel which resulted in death or serious bodily harm. Many
law enforcement personnel feel that these incidents reflect
unfavorably on the public's association of firearms with public
law enforcement.

Role conflict, then, is a major source of areas of conflict
between private security and law enforcement. It impedes effective
working relationships and understanding, and hampers efforts to
more effectively collaborate their respective resources, expertise
and roles in a comprehensive strategy and programs for crime pre-
vention and reduction. The varying definitions of respective roles
in their mutual missions and the different expectations and inter-
pretation placed on each other's role, results in a lack of respect and cooperation, mutual negative stereotyping, failure to communicate, and a sense of competition rather than a shared sense of mission and meaningful collaboration. In the following sections the major areas of conflict resulting from this underlying role conflict between law enforcement and private security are briefly explored.
III. AREAS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY

In studying the relationship between law enforcement and private security, seven major areas of conflict have been identified. The understanding of the causes of these conflicts by both groups should greatly enhance their ability to work together toward their mutual goal of crime prevention and reduction. The following discussions concerning these areas of conflict should serve as a basis for both groups to begin to understand and accept the crime prevention role of the other. These areas of conflict are presented in the order of their pervasiveness and intensity, and in the order of priority most appropriate for resolution.

A. LACK OF MUTUAL RESPECT

A lack of mutual respect has been identified between law enforcement and private security. Much of this is attributable to the perceived status differential of law enforcement--police attach a higher level or degree of status to the role of law enforcement than private security. In addition, mutual lack of respect is nurtured by the existence of mutual negative stereotyping which reinforces itself and is rooted in misinformation, suspicions, distrust, and prejudice.

Law enforcement officers consider themselves "professionals" because they have undergone rigorous screening for employment in a competitive process; have generally completed a minimum of a hundred hours of required training; have chosen law enforcement as a career; subscribe to a comprehensive code of ethics; must adhere to a strict system of discipline; and continually upgrade and improve their job-related skills through in-service training and higher education. Because many law enforcement personnel incorrectly perceive private security as providing a law enforcement function for profit, police tend to apply these same standards of selection, training and work performance in their judgment of private security personnel. This process inevitably leads law enforcement to the conclusion that private security personnel are "non-professionals," and inadequately prepared to be "policemen for hire."

Thus, a status differential is created by law enforcement and they form a negative stereotype of private security personnel. These attitudes are based on incorrect assumptions that private security personnel perform the same job duties as patrol officers and investigators in law enforcement, and that a broad generalization can be made about the nature and personnel of all components of proprietary and contractual security--guards, private patrol services, private investigators, armored car guards and armed couriers, and alarm response runners and installers. While
private security guards in general do have lower selection standards and little or no training compared to law enforcement uniformed personnel, selection standards and training vary considerably among contract guard firms and proprietary security operations. Some private security supervisors and managers receive far more in-service training and attend more seminars in loss prevention and security techniques, than the in-service training provided in many law enforcement agencies. In addition to the educational background and skills required of some alarm technical and engineering personnel far exceed the median educational attainment of law enforcement personnel.

Law enforcement personnel, however, sometimes complain that the generally lower standards of selection for private security guards often do not include criminal history record checks which allows convicted felons to "play policeman." Similarly, they see the lower level of wages creating an inducement for private security guards to steal from their employers and clients, and creating an undependable and inexperienced security presence as a result of the high turnover rate of personnel. Within this context, the, the issue of uniformed private security personnel being mistakenly identified by the public as law enforcement personnel can be seen in a different light. Law enforcement administrators are primarily concerned with the issue because of the potential for adverse consequences in an emergency situation or illegal actions on the part of private security, i.e., the police authority and role expectations imparted by uniforms as status symbols. But for many uniformed law enforcement personnel, the uniform is a status symbol in its colloquial meaning, i.e., the law enforcement officer considers himself a professional, and he does not want private security personnel as non-professionals mistakenly identified as meeting his higher standards.

Private security is aware of this status differential imposed by many law enforcement personnel and deeply resent it since they feel that law enforcement neither understands nor empathizes with their crime prevention role. This in turn leads to a lower level of esteem by private security for law enforcement personnel. Private security views law enforcement conduct as non-professional when they are slow to respond to calls for assistance from security guards and when they reluctantly cooperate with private security investigative personnel.

Law enforcement perceives the increasing trend toward utilization of all components of private security as a dissatisfaction with the performance of public protection provided by law enforcement agencies. In some cases this is an accurate perception. Some private security executives state that high crime and commercial victimization rates notwithstanding, a major reason that their clients have turned to them for their crime prevention technology and expertise is the failure or inability of public law enforcement to provide adequate protection.
While many law enforcement personnel perceive the role of a "public servant" as being of a higher moral order than serving private interests, and denigrate the provision of protective services for profit, some private security personnel view this as hypocrisy. Complaints have been voiced by private security that law enforcement personnel will often expect or demand some form of a financial reward, discounts or free merchandise for assisting private security. Police union strikes and preoccupation with compensation and fringe benefits rather than working to reduce crime and delinquency, is perceived by private security as an indication that law enforcement is as financially motivated as the private sector. Yet their actions and attitudes show disdain for the profit-making aspect of private security firms and their clients.

B. LACK OF COMMUNICATION

The status differential assigned to respective roles of private security and law enforcement by some law enforcement personnel creates major problems in effective communications. Extensive research studies on the relation between status and communication indicate that communication is generally directed toward those individuals perceived as having equal status or higher status; and where there is uncertainty as to the equality of status, there is a tendency to avoid communication. Since many law enforcement personnel perceive themselves as having a higher degree of status than private security, and do not properly appreciate the role of private security in crime prevention, there will be a tendency to avoid communication with private security personnel. One might expect that private security would communicate freely with law enforcement as a perceived higher status group. But the intensity of feelings expressed by private security and the ambiguity of their relationship with law enforcement discussed in other conflict areas in this document, would seem to indicate an uncertainty as to the equality of status with law enforcement. Private security, then, would generally tend to avoid communication with law enforcement personnel; without effective communication, cooperation cannot be imposed.

Problems of communication have been most evident in the area of criminal history records. Private security expresses a need for such information for clients and employers and to screen their own security personnel. This information has often been obtained by private security through the use of "sub rosa" channels of communication with law enforcement agencies. Some private security personnel have been able to win the influence of certain law enforcement agencies and personnel through outright corruption or "corruption by seduction," i.e., trading upon personal relationships. This occurred, for example, under earlier LEAA guidelines prohibiting the dissemination or confirmation of the existence of criminal history records to non-criminal justice agencies or their use for purposes of licensing. The revised LEAA regulations now permit the release of criminal conviction records and also arrest records...
where there is an interpretation of a state statute requiring an arrest record check. However, law enforcement agencies are not otherwise required to provide this information, and "sub rosa" channels of communication will probably continue to exist. The existence of stereotypes also tends to adversely affect patterns and lines of communication, so law enforcement personnel may provide greater access to some private security personnel than others.

C. LACK OF COOPERATION

Available data indicates a lack of formal mechanisms to facilitate cooperation, but demonstrates a desire of both law enforcement and private security to increase the level of cooperation between them and establish more formal methods of cooperation. A limited survey of law enforcement agencies in 41 states conducted by the Private Security Task Force on law enforcement relationships with private security, revealed in general a low level of involvement as measured by the following key items:

- less than one-half had conducted a survey to find out how many and what type of private security agencies operated in their areas;
- only one-third of the agencies stated they had an office or officer to provide liaison with private security;
- only 25 percent of the agencies had policies or procedures for defining working roles of law enforcement and private security;
- only 25 percent had policies covering interchange of information with private security;
- less than 20 percent had procedures for cooperative actions with private security.

In another survey which compared role relationships between private security and law enforcement in a single county, both law enforcement and private security agreed that the degree of cooperation could be increased and that "some form of business or professional association might help bring representatives of industrial security and law enforcement together for greater awareness of the other's views." In contrast to the Task Force survey where only one-third of the law enforcement agencies had established an office or officer for liaison with private security, in the single county survey 60 percent of the agencies had a formally designated person whose primary responsibility was liaison with private security. In addition there was overwhelming
agreement by private security and law enforcement in response to a question as to whether law enforcement agencies should have an investigative specialist designated solely to the crime problems of private industry.15

The study also highlights the difficulty of police understanding or acceptance of private security's primary orientation toward assets protection and loss prevention, and the use of the criminal justice system as only one of several means of meeting these objectives. Approximately 90 percent of the surveyed law enforcement personnel felt that private security officially reports less than half of the criminal incidents which occur. Private security admitted that they generally report all serious crimes occurring on private property such as burglary, robbery, rape and assaults, but exercise discretion on offenses such as theft, embezzlement, and theft of trade secrets. Some companies have policies that require employees to be terminated rather than prosecuted, and other firms felt that minor or first offenses could be more effectively handled by their security personnel.16

This data coincides with other informal input that the private sector often feels their assets protection function will be better served and that they can provide more effective sanctions for employee wrongdoing by handling many criminal incidents internally. Private security often feels that the criminal justice system is a "revolving door" for offenders in not providing adequate sanctions and that judges do not appreciate the serious impact of crime on the viability of business operations. Also, private security is often reluctant to pursue criminal prosecutions for some offenses because of the amount of security personnel time consumed in prosecutions which result in relatively ineffective sanctions imposed on offenders by the courts.

Law enforcement questions the motives and integrity of private security personnel when they comply with corporate and organization preferences and policies for the private adjustments of criminal acts. When law enforcement assistance is requested, then, often they do so reluctantly, with a minimum level of cooperation, and with an underlying feeling that no prosecution will result from their investigation.

Private security frequently cites another area of lack of cooperation as inadequate law enforcement response to burglary and hold-up alarms. Law enforcement, however, complains of the drain on police patrol units responding to numerous false alarms, and cites numerous tragic instances where patrol officers and alarm runners have had serious traffic and other accidents in responding to false alarms under emergency conditions. Private security shares the concern of law enforcement with false alarms, but feels that
law enforcement develops a feeling of complacency which results in a low priority being placed upon responses to alarms. Private security sees a tendency for law enforcement to classify every alarm as a false alarm in which there is no perpetrator caught or no physical evidence of a breaking and entry. In these instances the alarm may have been tripped by a person who did not leave visible traces of entry or who was able to avoid capture at the scene. In general, private security feels that law enforcement does not give sufficient credit to the preventive or deterrent value of alarms nor to the successful apprehensions which have resulted from alarms.

Law enforcement also experiences difficulties in obtaining expedient service from alarm companies who have alarm systems or installations with recurring malfunctions; with alarm system sales companies that do not service their products after installation or that have gone out of business; and with automatic phone dialer alarms which have a tendency to be easily set off and repeatedly call the police telephone number, thus tying up their emergency communications system.

Law enforcement feels that private security needs an industry-wide association encompassing both contractual and proprietary security and all functional components of the private security industry, that can provide a unified professional voice for private security and facilitate cooperation and interaction with law enforcement. Some law enforcement officials feel that the absence of such an association, for example, makes it difficult for the private security industry to take a unified position in expressing private security needs for access to criminal history records to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration; private security was denied access to this information in the original LEAA proposed guidelines for dissemination of criminal history records.

The existence of one major organization would enable law enforcement administrators through their respective professional associations to develop programs to foster increased cooperation with the private security industry. At the present time there are more than thirty private security trade associations throughout the country organized on a national or international basis with state and regional affiliated chapters. The organization representing the largest cross section of components of the private security industry is the American Society for Industrial Security with a membership of approximately 5,000. The other organizations are either dedicated to a specific functional component of private security or are security committees or operating divisions of the large business and industry associations. This fragmentation makes it difficult for private security to develop unified positions on issues affecting private security and law enforcement where improved cooperation is desired.
Further, private security sees a tendency for public law enforcement to lobby for regulatory control of the private security industry and for regulatory control to generally be delegated to a law enforcement agency at either a state or local level. This control by public law enforcement agencies is considered over-regulation of the industry by private security. Private industry feels that since some law enforcement agencies do not view their industry as performing a worthwhile function, any regulatory control should be vested in a more responsive and understanding board.

D. LACK OF LAW ENFORCEMENT KNOWLEDGE OF PRIVATE SECURITY

It is apparent from a variety of sources that law enforcement misinterprets the role of private security; has difficulty in accepting the constraints that apply to private sector assets protection and loss reduction; has limited exposure to the broad range of private security products, services and organizations; and develops negative stereotypes of private security which are reinforced by limited contacts with private security personnel.

Private security executives attribute many of these problems to the fact that law enforcement personnel receive most of their training in statutory laws, ordinances, criminal and procedural law, criminal investigation, patrol techniques, field interrogation, traffic law, accident investigation, and community relations. Law enforcement personnel have crime prevention cited as part of their role definition, but in practice are given little training in this area so as to have them interpret their role as including crime prevention; they have crime reduction cited as part of their role definition, but the resources discussed are generally within the criminal justice system. Less than 10 percent of the law enforcement agencies in the Private Security Task Force survey included any information on private security in their training programs. The lack of private security content in training curricula and the orientation toward crime response provides law enforcement with a limited view of crime control strategies and techniques. As noted earlier, crime prevention seminars and institutes provide training in crime prevention planning and techniques for law enforcement personnel but diffusion of this knowledge throughout the law enforcement agency is dependent upon the commitment of the agency to crime prevention.

E. PERCEIVED COMPETITION

Earlier it was stated that some law enforcement personnel perceive private security as competing with them in the provision of protective services. Private security similarly perceives law
enforcement as competing with them in the provision of security to private interests and concerns. This competition is more prevalent in the practice of law enforcement personnel moonlighting in private security. Law enforcement personnel take outside employment as security guards, store detectives, armed couriers, and private detectives. In some cases law enforcement personnel have formed their own private security firms. Private security strongly objects to law enforcement using their uniform and equipment in accepting private security jobs from individual proprietors or merchants, and perceives moonlighting of law enforcement in private security as unfair competition.

This area of law enforcement moonlighting in private security is further complicated when the public observes police officers in full uniform working in stores and other businesses. The public does not realize that these police officers are not on regular duty and accordingly become confused and negative about these officers. The public often feels that these law enforcement officers are favoring one individual store owner and are just "laying around" instead of conscientiously performing their police duties.

The vast majority of law enforcement agencies permit secondary employment or moonlighting in private security and this raises important issues of conflict of interest and unfair competition with private enterprise using public resources. The use of police uniforms and equipment by law enforcement personnel creates an impression that they are "on duty," although employed by private interests. There are temptations for law enforcement personnel to use their official positions for personal gain, and to disclose or exploit confidential police information. When law enforcement officials are principals or managers of private security operations or business ventures there are similar temptations, but, more importantly, it places them in direct competition with private security firms.

Many law enforcement personnel in the past were able to depend on a substantial amount of overtime duty and off-duty assignments for private businesses, construction sites, private parties, dance halls, weddings, and sporting contests. Now many of them find that with union contract settlements over the years which increased wages and stipulated overtime pay for such off-duty assignments, they are losing these assignments to contract security firms who pay significantly lower wages to their guards. Private security feels that law enforcement strongly resents the loss of these off-duty assignments, and that private security guards as a result are often subjected to harrassment by law enforcement.

Another area of direct competition is the practice in some communities of ownership of burglar alarm systems by local units of government. Although not a widespread practice, some law enforcement agencies have established their own alarm sales, installation and service capabilities in direct competition with existing alarm companies in the private sector. Private security is vehemently opposed to this practice as a violation of the
principle of free enterprise in America and feels that in some cases it may constitute restraint of trade with the provision of alarm systems to some businesses at preferential rates and with free installations. An important issue raised by governmental ownership of alarm systems is the provision of alarm systems and servicing to a small segment of the community--the expense is distributed among the tax burden of all citizens in the community even though they do not accrue direct benefits from the alarm systems. The private alarm industry on the other hand must operate under competitively established prices and must absorb its operating overhead. Further, the private alarm industry must absorb research, product development and testing costs while government-owned alarm systems reap these benefits and then establish uncompetitive prices. Another related issue is the potential for the withholding or of providing inadequate law enforcement services to those firms which continue to maintain or purchase alarm systems for private firms.

F. LACK OF STANDARDS

The single most recurring theme in the discussion of the preceding areas of law enforcement and private security conflict is that law enforcement considers itself a "professional" organization in their approach to protection activities and views many components of private security as being "non-professional." This is reflected in stringent selection standards, rigid and comprehensive screening processes, educational background, and extensive training prior to duty assignment which far exceed that of the private security industry. Law enforcement feels that there will be no substantial upgrading of the quality of private security personnel unless there are minimum standards of professionalism which are adopted and implemented nationwide. In its survey of the membership of ASIS, the Private Security Task Force discovered that 87 percent of these private security managers saw a need for a "set of standards" for private security.18

In an LEAA-funded effort closely related to the work of the Private Security Advisory Council, the Private Security Task Force to the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals developed a comprehensive set of standards and goals for private security. The major areas addressed were Security Services Personnel--selection, training, conduct and ethics, and working conditions; Crime Prevention Systems--alarm systems and environmental security; Relationship of the Industry with Others--law enforcement agencies, consumers of security services, the insurance industry, higher education and research, and the general public; and Governmental Regulation--licensing, registration, and regulatory agencies.

In an earlier effort of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, comprehensive standards and goals were developed for law enforcement agencies. Private security executives note that the standards and goals developed for law enforcement identified a number of areas where law enforcement agencies could significantly upgrade the quality and content of their services to the public. They point out that
there have been only fragmented efforts by law enforcement to implement or field test the standards and goals.

Both private security and law enforcement need to have better defined and articulated standards which will reflect themselves in the day-to-day operations of their respective roles of crime prevention and reduction. Only then will there develop mutual respect and understanding of the distinctions in their complementary approaches to crime prevention and reduction.

G. PERCEIVED CORRUPTION

Both law enforcement and private security perceive corruption by the other, and this limits cooperation in many cases to personal relationships. Two forms of corruption involving both law enforcement and private security were identified, although it was not possible to assess their pervasiveness. The most common form of corruption is the use of payoffs, bribery, kickbacks, and protection and extortion schemes. These devices are inducements to permit criminal activity, foster collusion, ignore testimony or evidence, to withhold recovered property, to ignore criminal violations, to obtain private security licenses, and to influence regulatory activities governing private security.

Another form of corruption is "corruption by seduction," where personal relationships are traded upon to cause a diversion of services. For example, a private security firm or employer might hire a retired law enforcement officer who maintains strong personal relationships with personnel in his former agency from whom the firm or employer needs more information or assistance than currently provided. By hiring the retired law enforcement officer, the firm would be in a position to acquire a disproportionate share of the resources which the public law enforcement agency can make available to private security.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The following discussion, concerning strategies for the resolution of conflict between law enforcement and private security, has been prepared based upon a variety of sources, including the standards and goals of the Private Security Task Force. The problems of crime are too great and the resources too limited for these two groups to continue operating on a mutually-exclusive basis. Law enforcement and private security both have significant roles in crime prevention and reduction, but their most effective role will be one which combines their respective talents and resources in a complementary attack on crime.

These strategies have been grouped into major categories either based upon the similarity of techniques and mechanisms involved or upon the desired outcome. Each of the proposed strategies has some bearing on either the areas of conflict earlier described, or on the standards and goals of the Private Security Task Force. The appendix to this report outlines the 60 resolution strategies and identifies the relationship of each to the conflict areas and/or to the appropriate standard of the Task Force.

A. INCREASED INTERACTION

1. Familiarization Techniques

The most important action that can be taken by private security and law enforcement together is, simply, to get together, that is, to become familiar with the roles, capabilities, and responsibilities of the other. Stereotypes are reinforced unless there are new experiences and contacts to alter perceptions. This exposure can be of both a formal and an informal nature. On a formal basis, seminars, conferences, and workshops can be set up to discuss the respective roles of private security and law enforcement. These formal gatherings offer private security an opportunity to explain to law enforcement the major crimes against and the unique protective needs of businesses, industry, and other institutions. It is most important that law enforcement understand and respect the efforts of the private sector to protect persons and property from a much broader range of hazards than the criminal, traffic, and order-maintenance problems with which law enforcement typically contends. The assistance provided to local law enforcement agencies in both crime prevention and apprehension could be demonstrated by using, for example, fixed security equipment and lighting, electronic article surveillance devices, closed circuit television monitoring stations, and access control systems. The significantly differing levels of salary and career orientation between armored car personnel (who in most cases receive higher salaries than the average law enforcement
officer) and contract security guards (who frequently are compensated at or slightly above the minimum wage level), could be used to dispel broad categorical stereotypes of private security personnel. This example could also be used to demonstrate how the different functions and responsibilities of these personnel should result in different law enforcement response patterns to criminal incidents such as armed robberies.

These formally organized meetings could be jointly sponsored by private security firms, law enforcement agencies, professional or trade associations, or by a neutral party interested in crime prevention such as the Chamber of Commerce or a retail merchants' association. A formal conference or seminar enables private security to present, in an open forum, a definitive statement of its role in crime prevention and reduction, without first having to confront the stereotypes frequently held by law enforcement. A workshop, while formally structured, would provide the opportunity for both groups to discuss stereotypes, compare perceptions of each other's stated roles, and arrive at a mutual understanding and acceptance of those roles. One of the objectives of these formal strategies of familiarization is to depersonalize the issues and to eliminate the prejudices which may have grown out of prior experiences and contacts among private security and law enforcement personnel.

It is equally important, however, that these groups become more familiar with each other on an informal basis, since the adherence to stereotypes, in many instances, precludes any effort to get to know an individual and thereby dispel false impressions. On an informal basis, "dutch-treat" luncheons could be held, tours of respective facilities could be arranged, and private security supervisors could participate in "ride-along" programs with police officers on patrol.

In preparation for this process of familiarization, instructional aids could be prepared for the participants which would outline respective roles and desired outcomes. Case histories could be developed to demonstrate how law enforcement and private security have worked together effectively in the past. These case histories might describe, for example, how a large retail store conducted an investigation into internal theft patterns during shipment of ready-to-wear merchandise; or how private security personnel provided information on illegal drug use which resulted in the subsequent arrest of individuals involved in an illegal fencing operation. Training films, brochures, pamphlets, annual reports, and other materials of a descriptive nature could be exchanged to provide a general orientation on roles and services provided.

After this initial process of familiarization, law enforcement agencies should prepare an inventory of both contractual and proprietary private security locations and operations in their communities. This inventory could be used to gauge both the extent of private security operations in the communities and the number of security personnel employed. The
inventory should identify those key security managers and supervisors who would formulate policies for interaction and who could communicate the unique requirements for law enforcement services. A similar survey of the local, state and federal law enforcement agencies could be prepared by or for private security concerns which operate in large metropolitan areas or in several geographically-dispersed jurisdictions to familiarize them with the responsibilities and jurisdiction of the respective law enforcement agencies.

2. Improved Service Delivery

   a. Community Awareness and Utilization of Protective Services

   Private security and law enforcement, through a combined effort, must develop ways to enhance the delivery of services to clients and to the public. One method of improvement would be to establish a referral service by distributing a list of security firms and products readily available in the community. Such a list of protective services and products could be made available to the public through community and business organizations like the Chamber of Commerce, Jaycees, Better Business Bureau, or the local or state consumer affairs agency.

   Some private security officials have suggested that law enforcement arrange meetings to inform citizens of both private security as well as law enforcement services available to them. At an initial meeting various protective measures could be demonstrated and the alternatives explained, for example, the differences between local and central station alarm systems. At a follow-up meeting, sales representatives of private security firms could be brought together with the potential private security customers and clients. Most private security firms would welcome the open competition, and would undoubtedly appreciate the free marketing effort on their behalf by law enforcement. But the true benefit would be realized by the law enforcement agencies in the added crime prevention services and products likely to be utilized within the community.

   Greater use of protective measures depends in large part upon the information provided to potential users regarding the risks they face, as well as the means of minimizing those risks. Such information might best be communicated through a joint private security/law enforcement "checklist" describing the vulnerability of residential and commercial areas to specific crime types and listing the protective measures which could be taken. This checklist should cover even the elementary--but important--hardware items such as lighting and locking systems, with a list of hardware or other stores in the community or
mail-order firms that provide suitable equipment. Many law enforcement agencies have initiated local crime prevention programs with LEAA funds, and some have used a checklist based upon physical surveys of businesses and homes. The emphasis in this proposed strategy, however, is to make the availability and sources for protective measures known and then, hopefully, to increase their use.

The joint law enforcement/private security sponsorship of the checklist would increase community familiarization with private security products and services. Familiarization can also be increased by publicizing successful cooperative efforts between private security and law enforcement--efforts which have resulted in a significant criminal apprehension, or the thwarting of a crime in progress. This exposure can be enhanced and future cooperation encouraged by simultaneously rewarding the participants through certificates of merit or letters of commendation. Individual firms and agencies or trade and professional associations could develop these award programs.

b. Alarm Response

Burglar and hold-up alarm systems are used to instantly detect criminal activity and to signal a law enforcement response. The response of law enforcement agencies to alarm signals is a frequent complaint of the alarm industry and other components of private security. Law enforcement generally labels all alarms without apprehensions or signs of forcible entry or penetration as being false, and discusses false alarms in terms of false alarm rates. When police dispatch calls are "backed-up" or "stacked," law enforcement occasionally assigns a low response priority to active alarm signals or responds in a non-emergency mode. Private security points out that many alarms classified as false actually do involve penetrations of the alarm system. Superficial law enforcement investigations often result from lack of standard field response procedures or from quick perusals by responding officers. In addition, the two major alarm industry trade associations report that the ratio of false alarms to the total number of alarm installations is actually quite small.

Resolution of this type of conflict is a good example of how the beneficiaries are not only private security and law enforcement, but also the crime-ridden public. A coded and secure, call-back signal for police patrol units should be devised for those instances when the alarm company or the proprietor is aware that a false alarm has occurred. Communication with the responding patrol unit could be improved by the use of signals devised to indicate conditions at the alarm site. The conditions might be such that a subject is known to be present on
the premises or that an "alarm response runner" is on the premises awaiting the police officer's arrival. Law enforcement supervisory personnel should be acquainted with the general layout and major entrance and exit points of facilities using security guards and alarms. Each of these measures could measurably increase the opportunities for criminal apprehension.

Law enforcement agencies do, however, have legitimate demands for services other than responding to alarms and various requests for service and assistance from private security. The chief executive officer of these agencies should discuss with private security the patrol assignments, coverage, and service demands affecting the ability of police officers to respond to requests from private security for service. Private security could then more readily understand the operational problems of law enforcement and develop realistic expectations of requests for service and response time.

c. Contact/Liaison Procedures

The most effective strategies for improving cooperation and service delivery are those strategies which formalize the contact and liaison procedures between law enforcement and private security firms. The use of "sub-rosa" channels of communication and "corruption by seduction" would be minimized. No longer would situations exist in which personal relationships could be traded upon, in which personalities rather than needs determine cooperation, and in which a disproportionate share of law enforcement resources is diverted to a few private security firms at the expense of the others.

Law enforcement should assign one or more officers, depending upon the size of the agency, to act as a formal liaison to all private security operations within the community. Qualifications of the liaison officer should include a general knowledge of all laws and registration requirements pertaining to private security operations and proprietary private security segments. The success of the liaison officer will depend largely upon the ability of the individual to firmly grasp specific operating policies of the department and of private security firms and installations. Using this knowledge as a foundation, policies of interaction can be recommended and the impact of operational policy changes on private security can be conveyed to the chief executive officer of the department. The liaison officer should be of sufficient rank to relate well and command the respect of principals and managers of private security organizations. A person who is nearing retirement or who is not career-oriented should not be assigned to this position because of the potential for becoming a victim himself of "corruption by seduction" through acceptance of employment with a private security firm. Private security is encouraged to designate a
liaison person or committee to formalize the point of contact for the law enforcement liaison officer.

One of the first tasks that could be undertaken by the liaison officer in concert with the private security liaison person or committee is the preparation of the previously mentioned inventory of private security firms providing products and services in or near the community. The liaison officer could also serve as the coordinator of manpower deployment in operations which require coordination of resources with private security such as public events, labor unrest, and demonstrations. Day-to-day contacts between private security and law enforcement should also be formalized in specialized areas of law enforcement agencies such as narcotics, burglary, and youth crime. The liaison officer could prepare a list or information card of police personnel to be contacted by private security to report matters of a suspicious nature, to provide investigative information, to request investigative assistance, and to obtain information from police records and files. Information fliers and "hot sheets" on modus operandi of known criminals in the area, stolen or wanted vehicles, merchandise, credit cards, and the like, could be prepared and distributed through the liaison officer to private security. Similarly, private security personnel may possess investigatory skills in specialized areas such as securities, credit card theft, computer crimes, and so forth, that may be of assistance to law enforcement investigators. The criminal investigation resources of law enforcement would be greatly expanded if they were provided with an inventory of these skills and a list of contact persons.

B. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Licensing and Regulation

It is in the best public interest that regulatory boards at the state level be established to monitor private security activities within each state and to license and register entities and persons engaged in private security. In this manner the public, both as clients and as citizens of the community, can be assured that those individuals entrusted with the protection of person and property are mentally competent, morally responsible, honest, and properly trained to perform their duties and to render assistance. The standards on regulation and licensing established by the Private Security Task Force should be implemented by statute in each state. Earlier, LEAA published Private Security Advisory Council reports on a Model Hold-up and Burglar Alarm Business and Licensing Regulatory Statute and a Model Private
Security Licensing and Regulatory Statute. These reports were based upon considerable input from both private security and law enforcement in public hearings across the country. The use of these statutes as models for regulatory and licensing statutes is encouraged.

The integrity of employees is an essential prerequisite in private security, one that can be assured only if employers have access to criminal history information for purposes of employment screening. As of January 1978, access to non-conviction data from information systems funded in whole or in part with LEAA funds by entities other than criminal justice agencies will be permitted only when authorized by statute, ordinance, executive order, or court rule. The Council feels that authorization for access to arrest as well as currently available conviction data should be made a part of the regulatory body's enabling legislation.

2. Competition

Several of the conflicts between private security and law enforcement concerning competition can be resolved if other regulatory powers were granted to the state regulatory and licensing boards. In the section on areas of conflicts, information was provided regarding the law enforcement view that private security is in competition with them by rendering protective services on a profit basis. This was reflected in private security's use of titles, company names, uniforms, badges and firearms similar to those of law enforcement. The public identifies these symbols with the power and responsibilities of a police officer's role in society. The use of these symbols (and advertising on vehicles and company logos) by private security firms capitalizes on the psychological impacts of a police officer's authority. The regulatory body should develop regulations for all of these items to assure that clear distinctions are made between private security and law enforcement uniformed personnel. In the Council's model regulatory licensing statute, for example, the use of "security officer" name tapes was advocated to clearly identify the individual as a private security employee. Regulations regarding this area and conforming to those recommended by the Private Security Advisory Council and the Private Security Task Force should be adopted.

The issue of uniforms and other symbols is more an issue of perceived competition by law enforcement, but private security is correct in stating that law enforcement personnel are in direct competition with private security when they engage in the municipal sales and installation of private alarm systems, participate in civil or criminal private investigations, or act as principals and managers of private security firms. The PSAC Alarm Committee, in an earlier PSAC
report, was unequivocally opposed to the municipal competition in sales, installation or operation of alarm systems. In their opinion, the private sector has already demonstrated its capability to provide such services, and the use of government funds for these purposes would result in discriminatory treatment of businesses, conflicts of interest, and a diversion from more important law enforcement program needs. The Council's Law Enforcement/Private Security Relationships Committee recommended that government ownership or operation of alarm systems be restricted in regulatory statutes to 1) temporary or emergency situations, such as the use of portable tactical alarms on stakeouts, and 2) proprietary systems in publicly owned or leased buildings.

3. Moonlighting

When a law enforcement officer is permitted to moonlight in private investigative work, he has an immediate and unfair competitive advantage: access to police information and other resources. More importantly, this type of secondary employment creates a potential conflict of interest. Should a subject later become the suspect in a criminal investigation, his constitutional right to the appropriate warnings could be violated. The regulatory statutes should state that because of inherent conflicts of interest law enforcement officers may not perform any private investigatory work, regardless of his law enforcement assignment or position. The Council is not opposed to law enforcement personnel obtaining secondary employment unless the position or assignment generates unfair and direct competition with private security or represents a conflict of interest with private security.

When law enforcement personnel are secondarily employed in private security, the state regulatory statutes should require that they obtain a certificate of registration as a private security employee. Notification of application for such a certificate should be given to the law enforcement officer's chief executive officer as an additional safeguard against conflict between the obligations of the officer's primary and secondary employment. In addition, the regulatory statute should prohibit law enforcement officers from accepting secondary employment in private security which would permit or allow the use of law enforcement equipment, badges, and uniforms, except when it can be clearly shown that such use is in the public interest and where it is mutually beneficial to both law enforcement and private security. Examples of this exception might include quasi-public events like parades or sporting contests. Otherwise, this practice is not only a potential conflict of interest but also creates the improper impression that 1) the local law enforcement agency supports the policies, rules and regulations that the off-duty officer is enforcing for his secondary employer, and 2) that their tax
dollars are being diverted to the benefit of private business.

The law enforcement officer who obtains secondary employment as a principal or manager in a private security organization represents the most severe case of direct competition and conflict of interest. As stated by the Private Security Task Force, virtually "every on-duty decision made by the official needs to be examined for any indication of improper motives." In his dual role, the law enforcement official may be tempted to 1) utilize law enforcement resources, 2) withhold or discriminatingly bestow law enforcement services when requested or needed, 3) fail to act in an incident or situation requiring law enforcement action, and 4) solicit business from victims of crime by recommending protective measures from the private security firm with which the official is affiliated. In general, this dual role creates the impression that there is a direct relationship between the private security firm and the availability of law enforcement resources. Some law enforcement officials may be tempted to capitalize on this impression to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other private security firms. Thus, the regulatory statutes should specifically prohibit law enforcement personnel from accepting secondary employment as principals and managers in private security.

To minimize conflict with and to improve relationships between law enforcement and private security, off-duty law enforcement officers who engage in private security should work for, and receive compensation directly from, the private organization or private security firm, and not from a municipal or local government in the form of a "revolving fund." By achieving this goal, the element of direct law enforcement or governmental competition with free-enterprise private security would be substantially reduced.

C. INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT

1. Government and Regulatory Agencies

To aid in the resolution of existing conflicts, the State Criminal Justice Planning Agencies (SPA) should widely disseminate this report as well as the standards and goals of the Private Security Task Force. The SPAs should then support and sponsor a survey to determine both the extent of all segments of contractual and proprietary security in the state and the nature of private security relationships with law enforcement. These surveys would be similar to the inventories taken by law enforcement and private security in their immediate areas. The emphasis of the SPA-sponsored surveys, however, would be on the specific areas of conflict within a particular state, successful resolutions for past conflicts, exemplary areas of
cooperation and communication, and levels of private security personnel selection and training. An assessment should be made of the private sector's willingness and capability to meet the standards established by the Private Security Task Force and of law enforcement agencies' willingness to work with private security in the adoption of the conflict resolution strategies suggested in this report.

A logical result of these initial efforts to develop a statement of problems and needs in each state would be the formation of state and local level private security advisory councils. SPAs are encouraged to form such advisory councils to develop position papers, to implement programs and policies of improved cooperation, and to provide a valuable input to the development of SPA programs funding activities in crime prevention. A sincere commitment to this undertaking might include funding of support staff for these councils.

The development and use of training programs is a key strategy for upgrading the quality of private security personnel, since, in addition to enhancing the effectiveness of private security, such programs would undoubtedly raise law enforcement's regard for private security. These strategies are discussed later in this report, However, the state regulatory board should specify, regulate and monitor the training of private security employees because training is essential to the improvement of private security efforts in crime prevention and reduction. The regulatory board should have the authority to establish administrative rules for the accreditation of training schools, for the specification and approval of curriculum content, and for the certification of instructors. The assignment of this responsibility to state entities currently responsible for law enforcement training is discouraged because of the unique training needs of private security and the potential to sublimate these needs to those of law enforcement. However, to achieve economies of scale and where feasible, it would make sense to share training facilities and certain training materials.

When developing training requirements, law enforcement and private security regulatory boards are encouraged to utilize vocational training and continuing education programs. In this manner, training programs would provide to participants some pre-employment exposure to private security or would enable them to meet requirements for a certificate of state registration prior to seeking or accepting employment in private security.

It is a commendable accomplishment that as of January 1976, 45 states had some form of legislation on training standards for law enforcement, and 40 states specified mandatory training for recruit officers. All states, however, must enact legis-
lation on training standards for law enforcement, if private security is to be encouraged to establish training programs for its personnel.

Some private security managers maintain that the standards for education and training should not be raised since the market will not sustain a level of salaries commensurate with higher standards. On the other hand, many consumers of private security services indicate that they would be willing to expend additional funds for security services if the quality of the personnel were higher. This juxtaposition of viewpoints is addressed later in the report under strategies for Personnel Improvement Programs. Here it is important to note that when private security services are obtained on a strictly lowest-bid basis, this stalemate is perpetuated. Government agencies are among the worst offenders of this practice. Government agencies should adopt detailed bid performance specifications for the procurement of their private security products and services, not primarily based upon low-bid criteria.

2. **Trade and Professional Associations**

A survey conducted by the Private Security Task Force disclosed that less than one-fourth of the supervisors of contract private security firms in a major metropolitan area received classroom training and less than one-half received on-the-job training. Further, consumers of the services provided by these firms felt that the training of supervisors was inadequate. There is a need for training programs for supervisory and managerial personnel in private security since they are responsible for the direction and control of employees who perform protective functions in the community. The first priority for mandated training programs should be for line personnel, and private security trade and professional associations should become more active in offering security training programs at the basic, line level as well as developing management training for security supervisors and managers. As a corollary strategy, trade and professional associations, in conjunction with the regulatory boards, should develop professional certification programs for private security managers similar to the certification requirements proposed by the American Society for Industrial Security.

As previously stated, law enforcement advocates the adoption of mandatory standards of selection and training for private security as a means of eliminating disrespect for private security personnel. This position is tenuous at best, since there have been only sporadic and fragmented attempts by law enforcement agencies to implement or field test the law enforcement recommendations of the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Law enforcement
professional associations should formally review the progress made by agencies in adhering to these standards and goals, and that these associations act as catalysts where such efforts have suffered from inertia or lack of interest. Joint meetings should be held between law enforcement and private security trade and professional associations to provide a continuing forum for and dialogue on problems and issues. Law enforcement's equivocation on widespread implementation of standards and goals will make it difficult both to pursue this strategy and to achieve meaningful results. The creation of state or local level private security associations which encompass all major segments of private security would greatly assist this effort by providing a focal point for communication with the various elements of private security.

D. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Under strategies of Increased Interaction, it was recommended that law enforcement agencies discuss the total demands for service which affect their ability to respond to private security needs and requests for assistance. Specific response policies and procedures should be established once the inventory has been completed by the private security liaison officer and he has become familiar with the operational policies of the private security elements and locations throughout the area. The response policies and procedures should be developed for common problems such as civil disturbances and protests, strikes, bomb threats and other terroristic crimes as well as for routine requests for service by private security. A response plan should be formulated for each type of emergency incident likely to be encountered for each installation utilizing private security services. The plan should contain information describing the criteria for the dispatching of a patrol officer and the number of response units, how patrol officers will respond when they are dispatched, and how private security personnel should respond until the patrol unit arrives.

If the adoption of statutes and ordinances covering law enforcement secondary employment in private security, municipal sales and installation of alarm systems, and access to criminal history arrest and conviction data by private security employers is not feasible, then policies should be established by law enforcement agencies addressing these practices. Policies should be adopted that permit the use of alarm systems that transmit signals via automatic telephone dialing devices, provided they are not interconnected with law enforcement agency emergency telephone lines. The concern of law enforcement about the malfunction of directly keyed/programmed systems which overload emergency trunk lines is acknowledged, but ordinances prohibiting such devices may deny an affordable level of protective device to many citizens. Earlier, measures were suggested for improving alarm response and interaction with private security in the field.
However, there is a definite need to formulate a policy on response to alarm signals, and once formulated, this policy should be made known to alarm firms and to alarm subscribers. A classification system for alarm efficiency should be developed which is based upon the ratio of total alarm actuations to total alarm system installations, and procedures for determining the causes of false alarms should be specified.

Business and industrial firms should develop, according to types of crimes, prosecution policies for persons apprehended or investigated by their security personnel, and such policies should be communicated to the responsible law enforcement agency. Law enforcement agencies will then be better able to respond to requests for assistance; they will also know which types of incidents require their assistance. In this regard, an earlier Council report entitled, Scope of Legal Authority of Private Security Personnel would be especially helpful to private security. Further, private security officials must be cognizant of what constitutes a moral or legal transgression, and must appreciate the seriousness of the judgments they are frequently called upon to make. Therefore, it is recommended that private security employers adopt the employee and management Codes of Ethics prepared by the Council in a previous report, Codes of Ethics for Private Security Managers and Private Security Employees. These codes were derived from an evaluation and synthesis of a number of existing codes of various groups within private security and public law enforcement.

Concern has already been expressed over the attempt by private security to capitalize on the psychological impact of police titles, uniforms, badges, and firearms. The existence of situations in which private security personnel should be entitled to carry firearms is acknowledged, but in no case should personnel be required or permitted to carry unloaded weapons or fake replicas of weapons. All private security personnel who are issued firearms should have an obvious need to carry them; they should be properly trained; and they should be well aware of the legal and ethical implications of using firearms.

Further, the private security industry is urged to adhere to advertising standards that accurately portray to the public the nature and quality of the service to be provided.

E. PERSONNEL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

The strategies outlined in this section have a single objective: to enable private security to attract qualified, efficient and career-oriented employees. According to the Private Security Task Force, private security expenditures for personnel, products, and services are estimated at $6 billion annually and more than one million persons are employed in private security, contrasted to an estimated 670,000 federal, state and local law enforcement officers. Private security will likely continue to assume greater protective
responsibilities throughout the country as its extensive participation in crime prevention and reduction are increasingly recognized. The responsibility of this increased role lies primarily with line personnel, and they must be prepared to earn and maintain the respect and trust of their clients, law enforcement, and the general public. The strategies in this section represent a synthesis of the personnel standards developed by the Private Security Task Force, and the Council strongly urges their adoption. The importance of upgrading private security personnel was most succinctly stated by the Private Security Task Force in their introductory remarks on personnel selection:

Personnel selection is the basic component for increasing the industry's effectiveness in crime prevention. Implementation of personnel selection standards can form the basis for such other components as training, ethical behavior, education, and acceptance and approval by regulatory boards. The selection of quality personnel smooths the way for implementing all other industry standards and is important to the industry's ability to maintain good relationships with public law enforcement agencies, consumers of security services, governmental agencies, the public, and others. Therefore, strengthening personnel ultimately will result in the increased ability of the private security industry to prevent crime in the Nation.

The initiative for breaking the cycle of low-bid contract awards, low salaries, and low quality personnel must be undertaken by the private security industry, with governmental support. Career path opportunities are essential. The goal should be to minimize the number of employees who are temporary, part-time, moonlighting from other primary employment, or drawn from a transient or marginal labor pool. The marketing and sales goals of private security firms should not be met at the expense of not providing quality personnel who are competent, morally responsible, and well-trained. Varying economic conditions, available labor markets, and free enterprise competition will determine to a large extent the wage levels of private security employees. However, salaries should be offered which are commensurate with employee job skills and responsibility, with training and education, and with the nature of the client and job assignment. When the majority of private security firms upgrade personnel and pay equitable salaries, private security will regulate its own industry; that is, the firms offering inferior quality personnel and services at lower than fair market wages will become readily apparent to the intelligent and scrutinizing consumer.

The two major approaches to upgrading private security personnel are the use of preemployment screening techniques and a more thorough background verification of applicants. Preemployment screening techniques should include in-depth interviews, honesty testing, and background investigations based upon a formal job.
description for each position (PSTF, Standard 1.3). Background verification should include an employment application, fingerprinting, criminal history checks, and employment verification. Where prior private security employment is listed, private security employers should willingly exchange employment history information (PSTF, Standards 1.4, 1.6, 1.8).

While the strategies in this section pertain to private security, law enforcement should increase its emphasis on upgrading the supervisory and managerial skills of middle management personnel. These personnel must relate to private security managers who exercise budgetary control and have responsibility for profitability. Private security managers also implement corporate policies which set parameters for the policies and procedures of the branch or regional offices, and thus for law enforcement interaction.

F. TRAINING PROGRAMS

In this section, the training standards developed by the Private Security Task Force are synthesized. The adoption of these programs is recommended in order to provide the selected personnel with the knowledge, skills, and orientation to effectively perform their job assignments.

- At least eight hours of pre-assignment and 32 hours of basic training, of which only 16 hours can be on-the-job training, should be provided to all security employees. This training should involve more than simple instructions on the daily mechanics of a duty post or assignment; the training should provide participants with an understanding of the various private security functions, especially those they will be performing (PSTF, Standards 2.4, 2.5). All personnel who are issued firearms should complete a firearms training course, including legal and policy constraints (PSTF, Standard 2.6).

- In-service training should focus on employee awareness of such issues as company and client policies, legal constraints on operations, incident response procedures, and police liaison and interaction. Substantive knowledge on various aspects of private security can be communicated in the training process through the use of training keys and roll-call training (PSTF, Standard 2.7).

- Private security and law enforcement personnel should participate in training and/or orientation sessions which highlight their respective roles and interaction policies (PSTF, Standard 6.4).

G. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

The following strategies are designed to develop support
functions for many of the conflict resolution strategies listed throughout this report:

- To support personnel selection and training standards, job analyses of the specific skill requirements for major job types in all components of private security should be conducted (PSTF, Standard 2.4).

- Case studies, audio-visual aids, training keys, roll-call training bulletins, and other training devices specifically oriented toward private security responsibilities, roles, and job assignments should be developed (PSTF, Standards 2.4, 2.7).

- Experts in the fields of private security and behavioral science should develop criteria for the selection of private security personnel; personnel screening tests should be developed and validated (PSTF, Standard 1.1).

- A history of the private security industry and its current role in crime prevention and reduction should be prepared and distributed to law enforcement agencies to encourage the implementation of "Increased Interaction" strategies.

- Conflict resolution models should be developed to provide guidelines for use in the recommended seminars, workshops, and conferences designed to foster familiarization between law enforcement and private security and to discuss conflict areas.
V. CONCLUSION

The list of resolution strategies presented in this report is not intended to be all-inclusive or to suggest a precise ordering of events. The strategies which can be utilized in each state and community will vary considerably, depending upon the nature and intensity of the conflicts which exist, the available resources, and the degree of commitment to work toward the common goal of comprehensive crime-prevention services. A logical first step, then, is for State Criminal Justice Planning Agencies and law enforcement and private security trade and professional associations to serve as catalysts by distributing copies of this and previous PSAC reports and by promoting the discussion groups and meetings suggested under familiarization strategies to define the scope of conflict at the state and local level.

The most effective strategies for resolution of conflicts will be those which upgrade selection and training of private security personnel and those which improve the day-to-day working relationships of law enforcement and private security in community crime prevention and reduction. The quality and training of private security personnel will not be significantly upgraded until the legal strategies suggested are universally enacted. This does not preclude, however, well-organized efforts to adopt the Council's recommended strategies and the standards and goals of the Private Security Task Force pertaining to personnel and training. In the aggregate, a substantial commitment in time and money will be required of private security to pursue these strategies.

Interaction in daily operations will not occur until the negative stereotypes are explored and dispelled. The strategies involving familiarization are of immediate priority in order to establish lines of communication, discuss issues and problems, and gain a better perspective of each group's role in crime prevention and reduction. This will require a substantial change of attitude by law enforcement toward private security; law enforcement must be willing to recognize private security as a vital resource in the community.

Significant commitments, then, are required from both private security and law enforcement if existing areas of conflict are to be resolved. Yet, the ultimate benefits of increased cooperation and understanding between these two very vital protective forces are larger than any existing differences in roles, attitudes, or personnel.
VI. FOOTNOTES


10. ASIS, Membership Survey, op. cit.


15. Jahr, op. cit., p. 69, 73.


APPENDIX

OUTLINE OF RESOLUTIONS TO AREAS OF CONFLICT
BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY
### OUTLINE OF RESOLUTIONS TO AREAS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY

(and citations of relevant standards developed by the Private Security Task Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOLUTION STRATEGIES</th>
<th>RELATED PSTF STANDARDS AND GOALS</th>
<th>CONFLICT AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INCREASED INTERACTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminars and meetings on respective roles in community crime prevention should be jointly sponsored.</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal, dutch-treat luncheons, open houses, and facility tours should be held to acquaint the groups with their respective managers and supervisors.</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific security and protective needs of business, industry, and institutions in the community should be identified and be discussed with law enforcement.</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past areas of operational interaction should be identified and the need for policies clarified.</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A-1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOLUTION STRATEGIES</th>
<th>RELATED PSTF STANDARDS AND GOALS</th>
<th>CONFLICT AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Positive case histories&quot; of cooperation in operational and support functions should be developed.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive material and media of general orientation on respective roles and services should be exchanged.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement and private security should prepare an inventory of private security firms and proprietary security organizations in the community.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and business agencies should provide referral service/list for inquiries on availability of private security goods and services.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement should sponsor meetings of potential private security users and make security firm representatives available.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

A-2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOLUTION STRATEGIES</th>
<th>RELATED PSTF STANDARDS AND GOALS</th>
<th>CONFLICT AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A crime vulnerability checklist for residential and commercial interests should be</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of Mutual Respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jointly developed.</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private security should identify areas of expertise available to complement and</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supplement law enforcement.</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificates of merit to reward and encourage interaction should be awarded to both</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups.</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication should be improved when responding to an alarm or crime in progress.</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement should know the physical layout of premises protected by private</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security.</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement should identify resource allocation and service demand constraints on</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response to private security assistance requests.</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OUTLINE OF RESOLUTIONS TO AREAS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY
(and citations of relevant standards developed by the Private Security Task Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOLUTION STRATEGIES</th>
<th>RELATED PSTF STANDARDS AND GOALS</th>
<th>CONFLICT AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A high-ranking person in law enforcement and private security should be designated to act as formal liaison.</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement and private security should maintain active liaison in public events, labor unrest, demonstrations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A law enforcement personnel contact list should be distributed to facilitate private security crime reporting, investigative information and assistance requests.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement should provide information on modus operandi and hot sheets for stolen vehicles, wanted persons, suspects, crime rings.</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A-4
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOLUTION STRATEGIES</th>
<th>RELATED PSTF STANDARDS AND GOALS</th>
<th>CONFLICT AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State level private security regulatory bodies should be created for licensing; PSAC model guard regulatory statute should be adopted.</td>
<td>9.1-9.5 10.1-10.8 11.1-11.8</td>
<td>x x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State statutes should be enacted authorizing private security access to criminal history information for employee screening.</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State statutes should be enacted regulating private security equipment, badges and insignia.</td>
<td>6.5 6.6 9.1 11.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State statutes should be enacted restricting municipal sales, installation and operation of alarm systems.</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State statutes should be enacted prohibiting law enforcement personnel from engaging in private investigations.</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A-5
# Outline of Resolutions to Areas of Conflict Between Law Enforcement and Private Security

(and citations of relevant standards developed by the Private Security Task Force)

## Resolution Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution Strategies</th>
<th>Related PSTF Standards and Goals</th>
<th>Conflict Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State statute should be enacted requiring law enforcement personnel to possess private security registration certificate, when so employed.</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinances should prohibit the use of police equipment and uniforms in private security employment.</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State statutes should be enacted prohibiting law enforcement employees from becoming principals/managers in private security firms.</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement agencies nor governments should compete in providing private security services</td>
<td>6.7, 6.8</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Institutional Support

SPA's should survey extent of private security activity and law enforcement and private security relationships.

| | 8.1 | |

---

A-6
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOLUTION STRATEGIES</th>
<th>RELATED PSTF STANDARDS AND GOALS</th>
<th>CONFLICT AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State private security regulatory body should approve training curricula, materials and instructors.</td>
<td>2.1 2.9</td>
<td>Lack of Mutual Respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement should share training facilities with private security, where appropriate.</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State statutes mandating minimum levels of law enforcement training should be enacted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal and state governments should adopt performance specifications when procuring private security services, where low-bid is not the primary criteria.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private security associations should encourage and support training at all levels including supervisors and managers.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A-7
### OUTLINE OF RESOLUTIONS TO AREAS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY

(and citations of relevant standards developed by the Private Security Task Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOLUTION STRATEGIES</th>
<th>RELATED PSTF STANDARDS AND GOALS</th>
<th>CONFLICT AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private security associations should develop professional certification programs for supervisors and managers.</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations should hold joint meetings.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

| Law enforcement should adopt specific response policies and procedures for each location and type of incident. | 6.3 | x | x | x |
| Law enforcement agencies should establish policy on moonlighting, and criminal history access, where statutes and ordinances are not feasible. | 6.7 | x | x | x | x | x |

A-8
## Outline of Resolutions to Areas of Conflict Between Law Enforcement and Private Security

(And citations of relevant standards developed by the Private Security Task Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution Strategies</th>
<th>Related PSTF Standards and Goals</th>
<th>Conflict Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Automatic telephone dialer alarm systems should not be connected to law enforcement emergency trunk lines.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific policies on law enforcement alarm response and interface with private security should be established.</strong></td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private security should inform law enforcement of their prosecution policies.</strong></td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private security (contractual and proprietary) should adopt PSAC Codes of Ethics for private security.</strong></td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private security firms should require armed personnel to carry real weapons and successfully complete firearms training.</strong></td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| A-9 |

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### Related PSTF Standards and Goals

- **4.7**
- **6.3**
- **3.3**
- **3.1**
- **3.2**
- **2.6**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOLUTION STRATEGIES</th>
<th>RELATED PSTF STANDARDS AND GOALS</th>
<th>CONFLICT AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private security firms should accurately advertise goods and services to permit consumer evaluation and comparison.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of Mutual Respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Law Enforcement of Knowledge of Private Security</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private security should seek widespread compliance with PSTF standards on personnel selection and training.</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career path opportunities in private security should be created.</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private security should pay wages commensurate with job skills, responsibilities and assignment.</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private security preemployment screening should include an application, fingerprints, criminal history check, employment verification.</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A-10
OUTLINE OF RESOLUTIONS TO AREAS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY (and citations of relevant standards developed by the Private Security Task Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESOLUTION STRATEGIES</th>
<th>RELATED PSTF STANDARDS AND GOALS</th>
<th>CONFLICT AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private security employers should willingly exchange information on applicants.</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TRAINING PROGRAMS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Private security employers should commit necessary financial resources to training of employees.</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-assignment and basic training should be required of private security employees in addition to on-the-job training.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private security personnel carrying firearms should complete an approved 24-hour training course which includes legal and policy constraints on use.</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervisors and managers in private security should receive training according to job positions and assignments.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>x</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>CONFLICT AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-service training in the form of training keys and roll call training should be encouraged for private security.</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private security and law enforcement should receive training at all levels on the nature of their respective roles and interaction policies.</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFForts</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform job analysis of specific skill requirements for major job types in private security.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop training materials for private security.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop selection criteria; develop and validate personnel screening tests.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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### OUTLINE OF RESOLUTIONS TO AREAS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY

(and citations of relevant standards developed by the Private Security Task Force)

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Construct conflict resolution models for use in familiarization process.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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