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THE SERVICE-RELATED EXPERIENCE OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS

Report No. 74-12

X. FINAL REPORT

PART I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HISTORIES OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
IN PREDICTING ADJUSTMENT IN MILITARY SERVICE

PART II. THE POST-SERVICE RECORDS OF INDIVIDUALS WITH HISTORIES
OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

Merrill Roff
Institute of Child Development
University of Minnesota

July, 1974

Support by

U. S. Army Medical Research and Development Command
Washington, D. C. 20314

Contract No. DADA 17-69-G-9163

University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455

NCJRS

MAR 16 1975

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S U M M A R Y

Report No. 74-12

P A R T I

An overview is presented of earlier work reported for this contract. The already known importance of education in relation to outcome in service was demonstrated for a second Vietnam sample. The most effective single predictor of those studied in this project was confinement in a State or Federal Training School.

Work on a coordinate project under other sponsorship indicates clearly that rejections for moral reasons were, with few exceptions, made only for confinement or parole status following the eighteenth birthday. The juvenile delinquency histories which have been employed in the present project were, in general, totally disregarded. This was true for a large sample from the Korean War period, (born 1928-1935) and it is still true on the most recent sample, of individuals born 1950-1951, which it is possible to study in this way. With this most recent sample, it was found again that almost never was anyone rejected because of his juvenile offenses, no matter how long or how serious.

P A R T II

Post-service offense histories have been obtained, also as part of a coordinate project, for our Korean War period sample and for an earlier Control sample (born 1915-1923). Follow-up was made of those rejected for moral reasons and of those who entered service. The percentage of individuals with civilian arrests following rejection from service, or discharge from service, is presented. The largest satisfactory yield of those with a history of juvenile delinquency came from those who were non-confined as juveniles and who had a good service outcome. The experience for this group was not much worse than that for the Control group. At the other extreme were those who were confined as juveniles with a bad service outcome. These had post-service arrests 70 to 80 percent of the time. If they had trouble in service, they had trouble after.

PART I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HISTORIES OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
IN PREDICTING ADJUSTMENT IN MILITARY SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

This is the final report of a series (Roff, 1961, 1963, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972A, and 1972B) which has been concerned primarily with the experience of individuals in different branches of the armed services with earlier histories of juvenile delinquency. Evaluations have been made of the significance of amount of education completed before entering service, induction as compared to enlistment, age at entrance, type of juvenile offense, and most important of all, a history of juvenile confinement. These groups of former delinquents have received attention because this population is large enough to be of practical significance to the services, and the information used in predicting outcome in service is obtainable. Follow-up in service has included those who entered the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines. Information has also been presented about those rejected or deferred for military service.

Earlier work was conducted with a Korean war period sample, some time after that war ended. The population sampling was broader than in the post-Korean war period.

Recent work involves individuals with histories of juvenile delinquency as recent as possible for them to have entered and completed their terms of military service. The last report replicated the findings reported earlier for the Korean war sample on a Viet Nam war period group. Only part of the total eligible Minnesota sample had then been completed; results were reported for these. Results for the second part of this Minnesota sample are presented below as part of this report.

An even more recent sample has been studied in conjunction with a coordinate project being carried out under the sponsorship of the Minnesota Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control. This parallel project follows up a total four-year school sample of individuals born in the years 1950 to 1953 in terms of both their civilian crime records and their adjustment in military service. Because this sample is so recent, only the results for rejection and deferment for service will be presented in this report. These give a clear picture of both the similarities and differences of current procedures as compared with an earlier period.

REVIEW OF EARLIER REPORTS

Some of the main findings of earlier reports in this series can be reviewed at this time. This will pull together the information obtained from various samples of former juvenile delinquents in terms of either their acceptance or rejection for military service, or their outcome in service. The first report of this series (No. 61-1, January, 1961) employed a sample of former juvenile delinquents, born between January 1, 1928 and December 31, 1935, from two large

cities in Texas. Results were presented for both a juvenile delinquent sample and for a control sample randomly selected from the public school populations of the two cities. These two samples contained 470 and 828 cases, respectively, found in selective service records. A little more than one half (126) of all rejections for military service for the juvenile group were moral rejections, based on a history of offenses in the civilian community. For the controls, on the other hand, only about seven per cent (17) were rejected for moral reasons.

Those entering service were followed into the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Outcome in service was classified into four categories which may be described as follows:

1. The noncommissioned or petty officer or officer group includes all those who had such status at the completion of their period of active duty, with an honorable discharge. It does not include any who reached that level and were reduced. Individuals were not excluded from this outcome group for single minor disciplinary offenses. This represents the group that achieved and held this level in one of the four services. They are also referred to as the "Promoted."

2. Recruit-Private-Private First Class (Rct-Pvt-Pfc) or equivalent includes cases who did not achieve noncommissioned status, but were not disciplinary problems. Some of these cases had rather brief terms of service; the small number who received medical discharges are almost exclusively in this group.

3. The minor disciplinary problems group includes those who had multiple disciplinary offenses that were not serious enough or numerous enough to result in a discharge. They had definitely more trouble than the average; whether or not they would have been accepted if their difficulties could have been predicted is uncertain.

4. The unsatisfactory group includes all those who received a discharge other than an honorable one, with a disciplinary component in the picture. A few additional cases are included here who had more than sixty days "bad time" (primarily AWOL or confinement) but still received an honorable discharge.

Detailed information was presented for outcome in all four of these categories in the different branches of service, but the main point of interest is a comparison of the first category, the promoted, who made a definite positive adjustment in service, with the fourth group, who were definitely unsatisfactory. Category two, the unpromoted group, contained most of those who were not in service long enough to have an opportunity to get promoted, so that it is not possible to say that this group adjusted well or poorly in service. The third category is relatively small in number compared to the other three and is minor in significance compared to the fourth.

Enlistment and induction, age, and service outcome.

Outcome in service is indicated in a modification of Table 5 from that report. It deals with the Army only, and presents results for the juvenile and control groups, divided into those who enlisted (Regular Army) and those who were

inducted (Army of the United States). A breakdown is also made on the basis of age at entrance--19 or less vs. 20 or more. A comparison of those promoted in service and those with unsatisfactory outcomes is given in Table 1. It may be noted that about two-thirds of the former delinquents enlisted at the age of 19 or less, while about two-thirds of the draftees did not enter service until age 20 or more. Of the juveniles who enlisted by the age of 19, there were more than six unsatisfactory outcomes for each promoted case. For the control group drawn from the general population, those drafted at age 20 or later had nine promoted individuals to each unsatisfactory one. There were more unsatisfactory cases in the delinquents enlisting early than in the entire control group.

Table 1
Outcome in Army in Relation to Component and Age, Texas Sample

JUVENILE					
	<u>RA</u>		<u>AUS</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>19 or Less</u>	<u>20 or More</u>	<u>19 or Less</u>	<u>20 or More</u>	
Non-commissioned or Officer	9	2	3	16	30
Unsatisfactory	57	6	3	8	74
Total	66	8	6	24	104

CONTROL					
	<u>RA</u>		<u>AUS</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>19 or Less</u>	<u>20 or More</u>	<u>19 or Less</u>	<u>20 or More</u>	
Non-commissioned or Officer	20	7	7	108	142
Unsatisfactory	19	2	3	12	36
Total	39	9	10	120	178

The second report in this series, 61-2, December, 1963, contained the same kind of results for a Minnesota sample with histories of juvenile delinquency. The results presented in these first two reports have also been presented as a chapter, "Juvenile Delinquency and Military Service" in a book, Selective Service and American Society, Roger W. Little, Editor: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969.

A third large sample of delinquents was obtained from a second Minnesota city. Results for this were presented in Report 67-6. The results for this third sample correspond closely with those from the first Minnesota sample, so that for some of the tables to be presented here, the combined results from both cities are employed. For some information, the tables were not repeated for the second city so that the results refer to one Minnesota city only.

The total Minnesota sample was drawn to include a more broadly defined sample of juvenile offenders, including milder cases than had been included in the delinquency sample from Texas. For these the percentage rejected for moral reasons was 28 per cent, compared to 60 per cent for juveniles and seven per cent for the controls from Texas.

A comparison of those enlisting with those drafted, for those age 19 or less and age 20 or more, parallel to Table 1, is given in Table 2 for the entire Minnesota Korean war Army sample. (Table 2 is a modification of Table 5 from

Table 2
Minnesota Delinquent Sample, Army Only: Korean War Period

	<u>RA</u>				<u>AUS</u>			
	<u>19 or Less</u>		<u>20 or More</u>		<u>19 or Less</u>		<u>20 or More</u>	
Non-commissioned or Officer	171	55.2%	38	61.3%	76	84.4%	278	92.7%
Unsatisfactory	139	44.8%	24	38.7%	14	15.6%	22	7.3%
Total	310	100.0%	62	100.0%	90	100.0%	300	100.0%

Total number of cases: 762

Report 67-6.) It should be emphasized that the Minnesota delinquents had been selected to include those with briefer or less serious histories of delinquency than had been specified for inclusion in the Texas sample. The outcome in service was not much worse than that of the Texas control group. Of the 310 former delinquents who enlisted at the age of 19 or less, a little more than half, 55.2 per cent, were promoted. For those drafted at the age of 20 or more, there were 12 promoted cases to each unsatisfactory case. This compares favorably with the Texas control group. At both age levels those drafted had a higher yield of satisfactory cases than those enlisting.

Obviously it would be undesirable to eliminate persons simply because of a history of juvenile delinquency. The problem thus becomes one of finding out whether there are any sub-groups within the total delinquency sample whose service experience would be sufficiently adverse to make it seem desirable to reject them.

EDUCATION IN RELATION TO OUTCOME IN SERVICE:
A SECOND VIETNAM PERIOD SAMPLE

Amount of education has long been regarded by the military services as an effective screening device. This information is easily obtainable and it has had enough validity to assure its continued use. The interaction between education and history of confinement in relation to outcome in service were described in Report 68-7 and 69-8 for the Korean war period sample. A replication of the findings in one Minnesota city for a Viet Nam war period sample was given in Report 72-10.

Table 3
 Preservice Education in Relation to Rejection and to
 Outcome in Service in a Second City *

1. Total Number of Juvenile Cases Found in Selective Service Records: N = 1307
2. Moral Rejects Compared to Others Rejected and Deferred by Level of Education

	School Years Completed				Total
	8th Grade or Less	Grades 9, 10, 11 (H.S. Dropout)	High School Graduate	1 Year College	
Moral	2	46	58	7	113
Other than moral	6	158	323	126	613
Drugs	1	16	31	5	53
Total	9	220	412	138	779

3. Preservice Education in Relation to Outcome in Service: Second Vietnam Period
 Delinquency Sample

Service Outcome	8th Grade or Less	Grades 9, 10, 11 (H.S. Dropout)	GED H. S. Equivalency	High School Graduate	1 Year College +				
1	2	38	35.2%	10	50.0%	218	62.3%	36	76.6%
2	1	23	21.3%	1	5.0%	67	19.1%	6	12.8%
3	0	9	8.3%	5	25.0%	21	6.0%	1	2.1%
4	0	38	35.2%	4	20.0%	44	12.6%	4	8.5%
	3	108	100.0%	4	100.0%	350	100.0%	47	100.0%

Total: 528

* This is a replication of results reported earlier in report number 72-10, "A
 Replication of Some Earlier Findings on a Vietnam War Period Sample."

A main objective of the final stage of this project was to replicate the results reported in 72-10 for one Minnesota city on a sample of former juvenile delinquents from a second Minnesota city. The results obtained in this most recent work for 1307 cases are shown in Table 3. This is similar enough to earlier findings that it can represent them fairly well. It differs from earlier reports in that the number of persons with an eighth grade education or less has almost vanished, so that individuals formerly in that category now occur among the high school dropouts. For the high school dropouts the proportions promoted and unsatisfactory are equal. For the high school graduates there are about five promoted to one unsatisfactory. For those with at least one year of college, the ratio is nine to one.

JUVENILE CONFINEMENT

The third report in this series dealt with "The Predictive Significance of Juvenile Confinement" (March, 1964). Following a review of regulations concerning rejection for moral or character reasons in different branches of service, a table was presented of the relation between juvenile confinement and acceptance or rejection into one of the services. (The present report gives much more nearly complete information about the significance of post-juvenile confinement for acceptance or rejection, as will be shown below.) In the 1964 report the conclusion was emphasized that less than seven per cent in each state were rejected for moral reasons because of juvenile offense(s) unaccompanied by either juvenile confinement or subsequent adult offenses. Outcome in service in Minnesota was presented for those with a history of confinement in a state training school. The ratio of unsatisfactory in service to promoted for those with a history of confinement in the state training school was almost five to one.

THE DISREGARD OF THE PREDICTIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF JUVENILE CONFINEMENT

Report No. 58-7, "The Relation Between Education, Number of Juvenile Apprehensions, and Outcome in Service," presented information on the predictive efficiency of these variables. Earlier work had indicated that confinement in a state training

Table 4
Juvenile Confinement and Non-confinement in Relation to Outcome in Service
Most Serious Confinement*

<u>Service Outcome</u>	<u>Not Confined</u>		<u>County Training School</u>		<u>State or Federal Reformatory</u>	
	1	927	50.5%	127	34.8%	14
2	541	29.5%	86	23.6%	31	23.8%
3	100	5.4%	27	7.4%	8	6.2%
4	267	14.6%	125	34.2%	77	59.2%
Total	1835	100.0%	365	100.0%	130	100.0%

* Includes some cases with no information on education.

school or reformatory before the age of 18 was highly predictive of subsequent outcome in service. Analysis of the total Minnesota sample indicated that juvenile confinement in a state or federal training school gave a more precise identification of those unsatisfactory in service compared to those promoted (category 4 vs. category 1) than either highest school grade completed or number of juvenile apprehensions. The predictive effectiveness of this variable is shown in Table 4.

Attention is invited to the numbers of cases in categories 1 and 4 under the headings, Not Confined, County Training School, and State or Federal Reformatory (juvenile). For those not confined, 927 cases were promoted while 267 were unsatisfactory. This is a favorable ratio of about 3.5 to 1. It would obviously not be desirable to eliminate individuals with a history of juvenile delinquency who had not been confined as juveniles. Of those who had been sent to county training school there were 127 promoted to 125 not promoted. This is close to a 50-50 split and it would depend on the manpower situation at the time whether it was desirable to take individuals where an unsatisfactory person would be taken for every satisfactory person obtained, when there are other samples with much more favorable ratios (for example all those with no history of juvenile delinquency at all). Of those who had been sent to state training school or reformatory as juveniles there were 14 promoted persons to 77 unsatisfactory in service, an unsatisfactory-satisfactory ratio of more than 5.5 to 1. If individuals in this category had been rejected, 77 unsatisfactory persons would have been eliminated at a cost of 14 satisfactory persons. Such elimination would be profitable from a manpower point of view in all but extreme circumstances.

In the first report of this series, which employed a sample of juvenile delinquents from two Texas cities who were born between 1928-1935, and were thus of military age during the Korean war, it was noted that the greatest ratio of unsatisfactory to promoted cases occurred in those who enlisted in the Regular Army at the age of 19 or less. This ratio was slightly more than 6 unsatisfactory to 1 promoted. In a subsequent study of the "Predictive Significance of Juvenile Confinement" (Report 64-3), it was noted that "less than 7 per cent" in each state (Minnesota and Texas) were rejected for moral reasons because of juvenile offense(s) unaccompanied by juvenile confinement or subsequent adult offenses. Since those rejected were not a primary source of concern in that series of studies, no attempt was made to obtain complete legal histories of those rejected for military service. Those who entered one of the services were the primary concern.

Now, in conjunction with a coordinate project under other sponsorship, follow-up information of the legal histories of those rejected for service in the Korean war samples and in later samples has been obtained. This work has led to the following conclusion. For the Korean war sample almost no one in these samples was ever rejected because of his history of juvenile offenses no matter how long or how serious. Rejections for moral reasons were made only for confinement or parole status following the eighteenth birthday. If several years elapsed after the eighteenth birthday before the individuals entered service, there would be a separation into those who continued to get into trouble and those who straightened

out. However, when, as very frequently occurred, the most severe delinquents enlisted immediately after their eighteenth birthday or even before, there was actually no moral screening of these persons. This was especially striking in the cases of those who went directly from a reformatory into service.

A similar tabulation has been made of the status at the time of rejection for moral reasons of the large total school population sample born in 1950 and 1951. These results are shown in Table 5. This indicates clearly that 76 out of the 98 cases shown were either in confinement or on probation or parole at the time of the 4-F classification for moral reasons. The cases tabled under "Psychiatric" were not handled uniformly by psychiatrists, but they have been tabled this way to make allowance for the increased prominence of drugs in the youth culture in recent years. Some of the 15 drug cases listed under "Psychiatric"

Table 5
Moral Rejections--Large Total School Population Born 1950-1951

	<u>N</u>
Confined at time of 4-F classification	41*
Probation or parole at time of 4-F classification	35**
Psychiatric:	
Drugs	15
Homosexual	3
Psychotic	1
"Personality Disorder"	3
	<hr/>
Total cases	98

* Five of these were cases which include a drug involvement.

** Six of these were cases which include a drug involvement.

were rejected administratively. All drug cases who were either in confinement or on probation or parole at the time have been tallied in the first two categories. The single psychotic case is not, of course, a moral case at all but he has been included here as a psychiatric reject. This leaves the three "personality disorders" which were disqualified by a psychiatrist on the basis of "passive aggressive" personality, based in part on a history of juvenile delinquency. This gives three cases out of 98 in which a history of juvenile delinquency contributed to a rejection for behavioral reasons. The statement made earlier about the Korean sample is still true. Almost never was anyone rejected because of his history of juvenile offenses, no matter how long or how serious.

If an individual committed an offense at the age of 17 years and 364 days, this was in general a matter of indifference to the military services. If he committed the same offense on his eighteenth birthday and entered post-juvenile channels of confinement, probation or parole, this normally led to rejection.

While some sharp cut-off of this kind may be desirable from a legal point of view in the civilian world, it makes no sense at all in relation to the selection of personnel for military service. There would be a significant improvement in the personnel of the Armed Services if attention were given to serious histories of juvenile delinquency of men being evaluated for admission to service. The series of research reports from this contract have provided information which could contribute to the definition of "a serious history of juvenile delinquency."

PART II. THE POST-SERVICE RECORDS OF INDIVIDUALS WITH HISTORIES
OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

Post-service arrest histories have been collected for some samples studied earlier in this program. This current work is part of a coordinate project by the Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control (related nationally to LEAA). Since this post-service follow-up uses data on juvenile delinquency and on outcome in military service which had been obtained earlier on this contract, these results are reported here.

One sample described here consists of individuals with records of juvenile delinquency in two large Minnesota cities who were of military service age during the Korean war period. Complete probation office histories and follow-up military-service-connected records had been obtained for this sample as part of the earlier work of the present contract (see reports listed below). Members of this sample were born in the years 1928-1935, so that on the average they would now have reached the age of 43. The second part of this report is a follow-up into civilian life of this Korean war period sample, down to the present time. We have also obtained current follow-up offense information for an earlier control sample (born 1915-1923) of 684 cases (the number found in selective service records of an original sample of 900) who would now have reached an average age of 55. This control sample was a random sample of pupils from the Minneapolis schools which was selected as a cross-section of the school population at that time. Since this report makes use of the juvenile records, military records, and later civilian arrest records, it gives a picture in some detail of the relation between events in these three different periods.

The results presented here are based on history of arrests and no attempt is made here to consider the seriousness of the offenses or the number of offenses for each individual. A more detailed consideration of the seriousness and frequency of post-service offenses will be made as part of the Governor's Crime Commission project report. For the present report, only the presence of arrests will be employed. (Analysis has progressed far enough to indicate that those high in frequency of arrests also have more serious offenses.)

The results to be discussed here are almost all presented in Table 1. This gives the number of known arrests after rejection for service for moral reasons or after military service, for the Korean war period sample. It is possible to compute the proportion of individuals with later arrests in two ways. The first of these is to take the number with known post-service arrests and divide by the total with juvenile records. This percentage shown in column III, (column II divided by column I), understates the amount of post-service trouble with the law because it does not include the possible arrests of those who have left this area.

In an attempt to adjust to this, a search has been made of indications of residence here to obtain the number without post-service arrests who are still in this area. This is column IV of Table 1. When those still residing here



Table 1
 Follow-up of Persons Born 1928-1935 with Histories of Juvenile Delinquency:
 Number and Per Cent with Arrest Records after Rejection for Moral Reasons or Discharge from Service

<u>Rejected for service for moral reasons</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III(II/I)</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>V(II+IV)</u>	<u>VI(II/V)</u>
Non-confined as juveniles, but confined or on probation or parole at time of rejection	107	45	42%	30	75	60%
Confined as juveniles and confined or on probation or parole at time of rejection	210	119	57%	25	144	83%
<u>In Service</u>						
Non-confined as juveniles:						
good outcome in service	651	41	6%	331	372	11%
poor outcome in service	294	103	35%	106	209	49%
Confined County Home School only:						
good outcome in service	100	5	5%	52	57	9%
poor outcome in service	117	52	44%	24	76	68%
Confined State or Federal Training School:						
good outcome in service	17	1	6%	3	4	0
poor outcome in service	78	54	69%	11	65	83%

- I. Total with juvenile records
- II. Number with known post-rejection or post-service arrests
- III. Per cent of total possible with known post-rejection or post-service arrests
- IV. Number without post-rejection or post-service arrests showing, still residing in area
- V. Number with arrest records plus those still residing in area
- VI. Per cent with arrest records for those whose post-service-age information is available

are added to those with arrest records (column V) a somewhat higher percentage with arrest records is obtained (column VI). This is imperfect in that (a) not all who are actually present here may have been located and (b) sometimes there is arrest information available from other states. Thus the "true" values probably lie between those presented in column III and those in column VI. These two computational procedures rank the different categories (confined, non-confined, etc.) in very much the same way.

The following comments may be offered concerning the percentages for the category of Table 1. As indicated in Part I of this report, almost no one was rejected for moral reasons unless he was confined or on probation or parole after his eighteenth birthday. Thus the difference between confined and non-confined juveniles among those rejected for service is not as large as it would be if those not confined as juveniles had not had to be confined as adults to be rejected.

For those who entered service, those with a good outcome had a relatively small number of known post-service arrests if we take the percentage shown in column III, which disregards the problem of post-service residence in this area. The percentages are only 5 or 6 per cent for those either not confined or confined as juveniles. For the percentages in column VI those with a good outcome in service compared with the total still residing in the area, the percentages were 11 and 9 respectively for the non-confined and those confined only within the county; this value rose to one out of four for those confined in a State or Federal Training School, but the number of cases is too small to justify a percentage. (There were not many to begin with who were confined in either of these training schools and subsequently had a good outcome in service.)

For those with a poor outcome in service, the percentages of arrests in column III are 35, 44, and 69 for those not confined as juveniles, confined only within the county, or confined in a State or Federal Training School. The percentages for these same categories shown in column VI are 49, 68, 83 respectively.

Follow-up arrest information has also been obtained for an even earlier control sample for 684 cases, born in the years 1915-1923. These had been studied as a control sample for a population of former child guidance clinic cases who were in service during World War II; they were not selected as a "good" sample but as a cross-section of the school population at that time. At a present average age of 55, they have had almost all the arrests they are ever going to have. The current arrest histories for this sample are as follows:

Number found selective service	Number with known post-rejection or post-service arrests	Percent arrested of total possible
684	21	3

This value of 3 per cent is lower than that of those with records of delinquencies who had good service histories, but not very much.

The general conclusion indicated is that those rejected for service committed subsequent offenses in the civilian community at a frequency roughly comparable to that of those with poor service outcomes. This frequency was much greater than that of a control group drawn at random from the general population, or that of non-confined delinquents with a good service outcome. The number of post-service arrests is the highest, by a substantial margin, for those with a poor outcome in service who had earlier been confined in a State or Federal Training School. These individuals were unsatisfactory in service by a ratio of more than 4 to 1 (column I). Their post-service histories show at least 69 per cent with later arrests, and these individuals had more frequent and severe offenses than those in other categories. This rather small group caused a disproportionate amount of trouble in service and after service.

They could have been rejected from military service with relatively little effort.

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