




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
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"We are compelled by new conditions in the community to introduce new services or to expand and improve current services. We have to improve our tools for planning and analysis and coordination to insure that every tax dollar yields a dollar of service to the citizen. We need to anticipate crises and problems as private enterprise does."
(Mayor Wes Uhlman, last annual budget message delivered before the Seattle City Council on September 28, 1977.)

Past Efforts and Effects

The 1978 Criminal Justice Plan is published at a time when some apparent success has been realized for certain strategies to reduce crime. In general, index crimes in Seattle decreased 13 percent from 1975 through 1976. These data can be taken as evidence that serious crime is on the decline in Seattle and may be expected to continue that decline in the near future. Murder decreased 19.2 percent; forcible rape stayed virtually the same; robbery increased 2.9 percent; aggravated assault increased 7.2 percent; burglary decreased 9.1 percent; larceny decreased 17 percent; and auto theft showed the largest decrease, 22 percent. Arson, although not a Part I index crime, is a serious concern to Seattle; it declined 14 percent.

For the past several years, the Law and Justice Planning Office has used Law and Justice/LEAA dollars in a demonstration or test capacity, in order to learn as much as possible about the dynamics of crime reduction while using available discretionary resources. Based on learning which has occurred, Law and Justice/Office of Policy Planning has influenced major budget decisions of the City and has helped the Executive Department make progressive resource allocation decisions in an atmosphere of serious budget constraints. These decisions have been influenced through three means: Demonstration Projects, Policy Recommendations and Policy Analyses.

Demonstration Projects

The most encouraging development in Seattle has been the success which has been achieved in showing real statistical crime reduction impact for several varied crime reduction strategies. When crime control planning is conducted in an atmosphere of honesty, it must be said that success, even on a modest scale, is infrequent and slow developing. The planning model used by the City of Seattle focuses efforts to reduce specific crimes as opposed to reducing crime in general. This crime specific planning has a relatively short history on any but the smallest of scales. For the priority crimes of burglary and robbery, the 1978 planning year marks a time when certain programs and strategies which were developed through past planning efforts are yielding optimistic alternative directions for the future. Examples of this encouraging trend are summarized below.

Hidden Cameras Project: This project, designed to photograph commercial robberies in progress to facilitate apprehension of robbery suspects and to reduce the rate of robbery, has demonstrated that the suppression of commercial robbery is possible. Between 1966 and 1975, robbery in Seattle increased from 650 reported cases to 2,103, or by 224 percent within ten years. The large increases in robberies resulted in robbery being chosen as a priority crime in Seattle. The Hidden Cameras Project was begun December 1, 1975. Following analysis of Seattle robbery data, commercial robbery (comprising 22 percent of all robberies in 1975) was selected as the specific target crime for this project. Two factors led to this selection: (1) the distribution of commercial robberies is concentrated within relatively few "high-risk" types of businesses; and (2) the recidivism rate among commercial robbery offenders was judged to be much higher than for other offender groups.

The Hidden Cameras Project operates within the Crimes Against Persons Section of the Criminal Investigations Division of the Seattle Police Department. A police officer serves as project director, supervising a full-time installation and service technician. Project operation began with the selection of 150 commercial sites identified as those


most likely to be robbed. These sites were then randomly assigned to either experimental or control conditions. Seventy-five disguised, portable and police-owned cameras were placed within the experimental sites enabling victims to record any robbery-in-progress by activating the camera unit. Camera activation occurs at no risk to store employees when a "trip bill" is removed in complying with a robber's demand for money. The resulting series of photographs serve as evidence and are used in the identification, apprehension and prosecution of robbery offenders.

The goal of the Hidden Cameras Project--to reduce commercial robbery by increasing the apprehension of robbery offenders and to test the feasibility, efficiency and effectiveness of the portable, police-owned surveillance camera strategy--was measured by the following criteria: (1) the number of robbery cases cleared; (2) the number of convictions; (3) cost effectiveness; (4) safety of victims, police and offenders; and (5) a comparison of pre- and post-project rates for commercial and non-commercial robberies in Seattle.

Evaluation of the Hidden Cameras Project after almost a year of field operation indicates the following:

1. The project was able to photograph 84 percent of the 38 robberies occurring in the target sites. Each of the 75 cameras can be expected to be in position to record a robbery every 1.7 years.
2. The clearance rate in experimental-site robberies (68 percent) was significantly higher than the clearance rate of control-site robberies (34 percent) caused by conventional means. An additional 21 percent of control-site robberies (for a total of 55 percent) were cleared by arrests or identifications brought about through photographs taken at experimental-site robberies.
3. Arrest data show clear and statistically significant differences. While 55 percent of all experimental cases were cleared by arrest (20 of the 21 cleared cases being photographed), only 25 percent of control cases were cleared by arrest. Of the 48 offenders in experimental cases, 56 percent were arrested, while of the 78 control-site offenders only 22 percent were arrested.
4. Conviction rates were not examined as a function of whether photographs of the crime were available because of an abnormally high rate for both groups (100 percent conviction for all adult cases disposed of). However, significantly more of the robbers in the experimental group (48 percent) were eventually identified, arrested and convicted than was true in the control group (19 percent).
5. The presence of robbery photographs resulted in cases being processed from arrest to conviction significantly faster (1.65 months, versus 2.60 months).
6. Using conservative cost estimates (tending to overstate project costs) resulted in an estimate of \$1,228.41 to have a camera present during a robbery. Using average victim loss and average detective case investigation costs only (which excludes the average one-month savings in jail costs between arrest and conviction), project-conviction cost was estimated to be \$811.74. Including photographic costs, total project-conviction cost was \$2,040.15. Estimated conviction costs in directly comparable cases without hidden camera photographs was between \$1,835.02 and \$2,607.09. This represents a range (conservatively estimated) in which project-conviction costs were from 22 percent lower to 11 percent higher than conventional investigation costs.
7. The decline in all reported robberies (both commercial and non-commercial) following project onset was not significantly lower than that of comparable cities. However, given various methodological problems, this was not judged to be a conclusive indication of project effect.

A more precise analysis of just commercial robbery data using local non-commercial robbery rates as comparison data resulted in finding a statistically significant



Seattle Police Department Photo

38.8 percent decline in commercial robbery following project onset, while non-commercial robberies increased by 6.7 percent. The decline in commercial robbery was found to be significantly correlated with the number of robbers arrested and convicted during the project period ($r = -.63, p < .05$).

8. Project objectives were achieved without significantly increasing risk to either victims, police or offenders. In fact, the presence of photographs prevented one ex-offender from being wrongfully charged on the basis of eyewitness testimony.
9. Persons arrested and convicted as a result of project photographs are not less "serious" offenders in terms of past criminal history than those arrested through other means. There are indications that the project may, in fact, identify more serious offenders as indicated by local arrest history.

To the best of our knowledge, no other similar project has effected such a highly significant decrease (38.8 percent) in commercial robbery in such a cost-effective manner. The basic elements which led to the comparative success of the project are as follows:

1. Thorough analysis of commercial robberies leading to the selection of high-risk sites.
2. Cooperation of store owners, managers and employees.
3. Competitive selection of a police officer as the project director.
4. Employment of a full-time installation and service technician.
5. Appropriate data collection techniques and evaluation design prior to project implementation.

Robbery Offender Recognition Project: This project provided a large file of color photographs of potential offenders, to aid robbery victims and witnesses in identifying robbers. Color pictures were taken of all adults arrested for Part I offenses, vice or narcotics offenses, and these were included in the file along with black-and-white pictures of parolees. Pictures were classified by sex, race, age and height of offender, to facilitate reference. Color pictures were used in place of black-and-white photographs to aid in victim/witness identification of suspects.

Project funds were used to provide the following:

1. Photographic equipment to provide color photographs in place of black-and-white, and to expedite the processing of the photographs.
2. Color prints of arrestees for the project file (prior to the project, prints were sent only in response to specific requests by detectives).
3. Clerical help to set up and maintain the categorized file of color photographs, plus black-and-white parolee photographs.
4. Office furniture and supplies for clerical personnel hired by the project and to house the file.

Beginning in November, 1974, through December, 1975, equipment was acquired and the picture file was established. Since January, 1976, this project has been in full operation.

During the operational period, robbery detectives have used the photo file to select pictures to show robbery victims and witnesses. When a robbery is reported to the Seattle Police Department, robbery detectives are dispatched to the scene, taking with them the categories of pictures suggested by the reported suspect description. These pictures are shown to the victim and witnesses at the scene of the crime. Viewing of such pictures occurs at the Robbery Unit when the robbery is reported between midnight

and 8:00 a.m., when the suspect description is unavailable or incorrect, when a victim or witness is unable or unwilling to view pictures at the scene or when a detective feels viewing more pictures would be useful.

The goal of the Robbery Offender Recognition Project was to reduce the amount of commercial robberies committed by adult offenders. This was to be achieved by increasing the rate of suspect identification, apprehension and prosecution.

The objectives were as follows:

1. To increase significantly the number of Seattle Police Department clearances of cases involving adult offender commercial robberies.
2. To increase significantly the number of commercial robbery cases successfully prosecuted.
3. To produce an eventual significant reduction in commercial robberies.

Although the goal of the project was to reduce commercial robbery by adult offenders, project resources were applied to all types of robbery cases: commercial or personal, armed or strong-arm. For this reason, it was felt that the evaluation should deal with the project's effects upon clearance rates for all robberies, rather than clearance rates for commercial robberies alone.

To determine whether or not the project increased the percentage of robbery cases cleared by the Seattle Police Department, a two-step analysis was done. First, a test to determine whether or not the percentage of robbery cases cleared had significantly increased after the project began was performed. Second, the same test was applied to determine whether or not this change was due to the specific clearances made by project resources or was due to other factors or trends.

The Robbery Offender Recognition Project did not by itself increase Seattle Police Department clearance of robbery cases to a significant degree. Because clearance was not significantly increased, convictions and crime rates were not significantly affected by the project.

Felony Warrant Service Project: This project attempted to increase the clearance of warrants through arrest or cancellation of Seattle felony warrants by providing additional personnel and resources to the Seattle Police Department Fugitive Unit.

Additional personnel were provided as follows:

1. A full-time clerk to assist with clerical duties, operate the computer terminal and answer the telephone.
2. Two light-duty detectives to examine the backlog of outstanding Seattle felony warrants in order to return obsolete warrants to the King County Prosecutor's Office for cancellation.
3. Two to four active-duty detectives to increase the number of detectives available to make arrests and to allow extension of detective working hours to cover more of the day.

The project operated from January 1, 1976, through January 31, 1977, with the goal to improve and expand the capability of the Seattle Police Department to serve felony warrants generated in Seattle.

The objectives of the project were as follows:

1. The number of Seattle Police Department unserved arrest warrants would be significantly lower at the end of the project than at the beginning of the project period.

2. The number of warrants served and resulting in arrest during the project would be significantly higher than for the comparative period of time immediately prior to the grant period.

The first objective was to reduce the number of unserved outstanding Seattle felony warrants. The number of outstanding warrants can be reduced in two ways: through cancellation of old warrants by the prosecutor's office, or through clearance of warrants by arrest. This project provided resources to both methods of warrant reduction. Two light-duty detectives reviewed old warrants to select those to return to the prosecutor's office for cancellation, and additional active-duty detectives (assisted by the clerk and computer terminal) were provided to increase clearance of warrants by means of arrest.

Records of total outstanding warrants for each month are kept by the Seattle Police Department. For a 12-month period (February, 1975, through January, 1976), the average number of outstanding warrants per month was 843.92. For a 12-month post-project period (February, 1976, through January, 1977), the average number of outstanding warrants per month was 802.50. Although this change represents a decrease in outstanding warrants, the decrease is not statistically significant. One reason for this lack of significance is the fact that new incoming warrants increased during the post-project time period. There were 1,513 new warrants issued during the post-project period, so the number of warrants was increasing more rapidly during the time of the project than during the pre-project.

To allow for this problem, it was decided to consider the number of warrants cleared each week during each time period, rather than the total number of outstanding warrants. For the pre-project period, the number of warrants cleared per week averaged 22.65; during the post-project period, they averaged 33.48, a highly significant difference. Thus the project significantly increased the number of warrants cleared each week.

The second objective was to increase significantly the number of warrants resulting in arrest. Because the Seattle Police Department does not differentiate between warrants cleared by arrest and warrants cleared by prosecutorial cancellation in its statistical records, we could not obtain statistics on the number of arrests on warrants for all of the department. However, the Fugitive Unit keeps records of Seattle warrant arrests made by unit detectives, so data on these arrests were used to measure progress towards this objective.

The average number of arrests per month made on Seattle felony warrants by Fugitive Unit detectives was 8.64 for the pre-project period of April, 1975, through February, 1976. For the post-project period of April, 1976, through February, 1977, the average number of such arrests per month was 27.27. This increase was highly significant. Thus Fugitive Unit detectives showed a significant increase in the number of arrests they made on Seattle felony warrants during the project period.

The Felony Warrant Service Project provided the Seattle Police Department's Fugitive Unit with additional manpower and equipment to increase the clearance of Seattle felony warrants. Significant increases in warrant clearance, in total arrests made by Fugitive Unit detectives and in Fugitive Unit detective productivity occurred during the project period. The presence of the project-provided computer terminal was the most important factor in these increases in arrests and in detective productivity. The average cost per arrest decreased from \$875.59 during a pre-project comparison period to \$363.30 during the project period, including the costs of additional resources provided by the project.

Target Hardening Project: Another successful program--target hardening to reduce residential burglary in the high risk Seattle public housing areas--appears to have substantial burglary reduction potential. The project attempted to reduce burglary rates in four Seattle Housing Authority housing projects by making housing units more difficult for burglars to penetrate.

Specific hardening measures employed were the following:

1. Installation of exterior solid-core doors or reinforcement of existing doors.
2. Installation of one-inch dead-bolt locks on all exterior doors.
3. Pinning of sliding glass windows to limit opening to less than nine inches.
4. Construction of stub walls to prevent exterior access to interior door latches.

The goal of this project was to reduce, through target hardening, the incidence of burglaries committed in Seattle Housing Authority housing projects. This was to be achieved through deterrence by making forced entry physically more difficult and time-consuming and, in cases of attempted or committed burglary, by leading to increased time for suspect observation.

Four specific objectives of the project were the following:

1. To reduce significantly the number of burglaries involving forced entry within the following Seattle Housing Authority housing projects: High Point, Holly Park, Rainier Vista and Yesler Terrace.
2. To increase significantly the arrest-per-burglary rate within Seattle Housing Authority housing projects.
3. To increase significantly the proportion of witnessed burglaries involving forced entry into "hardened" housing units. (Rationale: The installation of solid-core doors, one-inch dead-bolt locks and the construction of walls or replacement with non-shattering material for all existing glass windows within a 32-inch radius of door latches will lead to increased noise and longer time periods required to make forced entry. This will result in increased exposure for offenders and a higher likelihood of being observed.)
4. To increase significantly the proportion of witness- and/or victim-identified suspects of forced-entry burglaries into "hardened" housing units. (Rationale: Increased offender exposure time would enable witnesses to observe more and subsequently describe suspects in more detail.)

Target hardening produced a significant reduction in burglary rates for hardened SHA housing. This reduction ranged from 44.4 percent (Seattle Police Department reports) to 59.2 percent (Seattle Housing Authority reports). This reduction in burglary compares favorably with a 5.8 percent reduction for Seattle as a whole during these time periods.

Hardening of the projects did not displace burglary into surrounding areas. Non-SHA housing in the same census tracts as the hardened Seattle Housing Authority projects showed an 8.9 percent decrease in burglary rates after hardening. This decrease exceeds the 5.8 percent decrease for Seattle as a whole.

Individually, High Point, Holly Park and Rainier Vista projects all showed significant reductions in burglary rates from pre- to post-hardening, according to both Seattle Police Department and Seattle Housing Authority data sources. Yesler Terrace, which had an extremely low pre-hardening burglary rate, showed no significant change in rate after hardening, using the same data sources.

Burglars' mode of entry for these census tracts was tabulated for pre- and post-hardening time periods, using Seattle Police Department reports. Hardening was successful in decreasing the percentage of burglaries by forcible means: after hardening, a significantly higher percentage of burglaries was perpetrated through unlocked doors or windows than before hardening. Significant reductions in entries through doors reflected hardening's emphasis on door security, while the increase in entries by means of removing glass or frame slows down the entry process, making burglars more conspicuous and observable.

Clearance rates for burglaries in hardened SHA housing increased slightly but not significantly.

There were decreases in robbery and vandalism rates for hardened SHA housing, indicating that no displacement from burglary to these crimes took place after hardening. It is also now apparent that target hardening associated with neighborhood block watch activities will, in fact, reduce the crime of burglary in a particular area.

Community Crime Prevention Program: The Community Crime Prevention Program, which successfully reduced residential burglary for three years of demonstration operation, has now been institutionalized in the City's Department of Community Development as a permanent public safety service of the City of Seattle. An extensive evaluation has shown that in participating neighborhoods, the incidence of burglary can be reduced by as much as half. An extensive policy development report drafted by the Law and Justice Planning Office projects that this burglary reduction potential can be extended citywide on an 8.4 year schedule when the city has been covered once by the project's primary sweep.

In late 1972 and early 1973, the Law and Justice Planning Office conducted an extensive analysis of the crime of burglary. That analysis revealed the following:

1. that the majority of residential burglaries occur during daylight hours when it is possible for citizens to witness them;
2. that in about 40 percent of Seattle's burglaries, entry is gained through open doors and windows;
3. that police patrols cannot be reasonably expected to prevent many burglaries; and
4. that the majority of victims were not able to provide identifying numbers of their lost property which would aid police in apprehending offenders and returning recovered property.

These findings became the basis for the Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP) design. The program employs Community Organizers and Home Service Technicians who, on a block-by-block basis, perform the following tasks:

1. Organize block watch groups. These block watch groups are made up of eight to twelve neighboring families who mutually agree to watch their neighbors' homes and report unusual occurrences to police.
2. Conduct home security inspections. CCPP staff go through the residence and point out security weaknesses and offer advice on how the weakness could be remedied.
3. Perform property marking. CCPP staff engrave an identifying number, usually the driver's license number, on frequently stolen items and post a decal that so informs would-be burglars.

Like almost all metropolitan areas, Seattle has experienced a rapid increase in reported residential burglary. During the ten years from 1965 through 1974, reported burglary, both residential and non-residential, increased from 4,965 to 14,219--an increase of 186 percent, while the population decreased by 7 percent (from 545,000 to 507,000).

The Community Crime Prevention Program is an attempt to use citizen-based action as a burglary reduction strategy. The project consists of a number of community organizers who help neighborhood residents plan and carry out burglary prevention, and reporting measures consisting of three primary activities. First, organizers offer to engrave an identifying number (usually the driver's license number) on certain types of easily stolen property such as typewriters, television sets and stereo equipment. Second, the organizers offer to conduct a security inspection of the residence, looking at common points of entry by burglars and suggesting various improvements in security devices. Third, a system of block watch organizations is set up in which members of the neighborhood agree to watch neighbors' residences and to report any suspicious circumstances or probable burglaries.

The basic hypothesis tested by CCPP activities is that the establishment of block watch organizations and the provision of home security inspections and property marking will significantly reduce the occurrence of residential burglary for those residences and areas receiving CCPP services, when compared to residences and areas not receiving these services.

The program's goal has been to involve at least 30 percent of the single-family and duplex residences in a neighborhood in at least one of the above activities, or primary services.

A maintenance service is also provided. It is designed to sustain established block watches at regular intervals in order to rejuvenate anti-burglary interest in a community.

The Community Crime Prevention Program was initially supported by a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grant since September, 1973. Its purpose has been to test the strategy outlined above to see if it would reduce residential burglary.

From the time of the program's inception to June, 1976, approximately 20 census tracts (20 percent of all residential tracts in Seattle) received the program's primary service (block watch, home security inspection and property marking).

By June, 1976, the program had involved 8,708 households in block watch, conducted 8,047 home security inspections, performed 8,765 property markings and provided educational and informational services and materials to an additional 2,000 citizens.

The overall goal of the Community Crime Prevention Program is to reduce residential burglary. The objectives of the program are as follows:

1. To produce a statistically significant decrease in the number of residential burglaries in the program's target areas.
2. To demonstrate a statistically significant increase in the number (or percentage) of burglary-in-progress calls received by the Seattle Police Department.

To determine whether the objectives were achieved, data from three separate and independent sources were analyzed. The sources were official Seattle Police Department records on reported residential burglaries, three separate victimization surveys and official Seattle Police Department dispatch records. Analysis of these data allow the following conclusions:

1. Participation in the Community Crime Prevention Program significantly reduces the risk of residential burglary victimization, by between 48 percent and 61 percent.
2. The proportion of actual residential burglaries that are reported to the police increases from about 50 percent to 76 percent following CCPP activities. This also holds for the proportion of burglary-in-progress calls, which increased 27 percent in areas of the city treated by the Community Crime Prevention Program.
3. No evidence of residential burglary displacement to either adjacent non-CCPP households or non-CCPP treated census tracts was found.
4. The Community Crime Prevention Program successfully achieved its objectives.

The Policy Development Report prepared by Law and Justice Planning/Office of Policy Planning explored several policy alternatives for the Community Crime Prevention Program. These alternatives for the future of the Community Crime Prevention Program ranged from cancellation of the program to large-scale expansion. Using productivity quotas of the existing program and a goal of 40 percent acceptance of offered CCPP services, the following projections were made based on the productivity models and policy options which were considered.

1. Maintenance of current CAPP resource commitment (ten field staff) will allow primary service to be offered citywide in eight and one-half years.
2. With a 50 percent expansion to 15 field staff, the entire city would be serviced in five and two-thirds years.
3. To complete the entire city in three years would require an expansion to a level of 28 field staff.

Relatively little is known about methodologies which depend upon the use of volunteers, recruitment via media campaigns and how these compete with Seattle's systematic door-to-door provision of services by civilian paid staff. The national experience suggests, however, that participation would be substantially less (2 percent to 17 percent).

The crime impact evaluation of the program shows that its greatest advantage accrues to households which accept property marking, home security inspections and become part of a block watch. This suggests that high rates of participation are desirable.

Projections using evaluation data show that if program effects can be maintained, the contribution of single-family and duplex households to the city's burglary problem can be reduced substantially. While the proportion of victimizations reported to police will increase, the number of reported residential burglaries will decline.


Maintenance of program effects is the most questionable assumption of the CAPP strategy. Citizens change their places of residence at a surprisingly high rate (about 50 percent in a five-year period), and evaluation results suggest a decay of program effect between six to 18 months after services are provided. Future program planning and evaluation should focus upon remedies for this weakness.

Law and Justice Planning/Office of Policy Planning offered the following recommendations based on its analysis of the Community Crime Prevention Program.

1. The Community Crime Prevention Program should continue. The Community Crime Prevention Program has been shown to be an effective means of reducing the priority crime of burglary. It makes extensive use of citizen initiative, as envisioned by the Seattle 2000 Commission.
2. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be funded with City general fund resources when its present grant funding expires in August, 1977. The project will have been supported by LEAA grant funds for approximately four years at the expiration of the present grant. Enough experience has been gained to determine if the project is worthy of City support.
3. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be institutionalized into the Department of Community Development as of January 1, 1977. During its demonstration phase, the Community Crime Prevention Program has been managed by Law and Justice Planning, and the project's personnel positions are created in the Office of Policy Planning/Law and Justice Planning Office. OPP/LJPO is not the proper organization to manage a fully operating project.

Of the possible departments--including the Department of Human Resources, the Seattle Police Department, the Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs and the Department of Community Development--it was recommended that the Department of Community Development be chosen to house and manage the Community Crime Prevention Program. DCD's management style, characterized by strong neighborhood improvement orientation, strict adherence to achievement of goals, objectives and schedules, and flexibility of staff working hours, was viewed as best able to accommodate the Community Crime Prevention Program, which has similar characteristics.

4. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be funded and maintained at its present level. The program operating at its present level will achieve full city coverage at the 40 percent level of participation in eight and one-half years. The 40



Stephen Noe

percent level represents an increase from the present goal of 30 percent participation. This increased goal is due, in part, to the increased experience and skills of project staff.

5. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be continually monitored and evaluated. To insure continued success along with further controlled experimentation and to deal with decay effects and maintenance efforts, the Community Crime Prevention Program should continue to be monitored and evaluated.

The Office of Management and Budget should require a strict program budget, Law and Justice Planning should continue its crime impact evaluation and a project steering committee should be formed made up of representatives of the Seattle Police Department, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Community Development and Law and Justice Planning, to provide oversight of the project.

Policy Recommendations

In the area of City policy, several Policy Resolutions have been adopted by the Seattle City Council based upon work of the Office of Policy Planning/Law and Justice Planning. In addition to Policy Resolutions which were passed based on formal Policy Development Reports (i.e., the Policy Development Reports on the Community Crime Prevention Program and the Consumer Crime Prevention Project), City policy work on use of police patrol, criminal justice planning in Seattle, citizen participation in crime prevention and crime reduction programs, and juvenile justice planning were all acted upon by the Executive and City Council in 1977. These Policy Resolutions, along with the Resolution adopting priority crimes and the 1978 Criminal Justice Plan, are reprinted at the end of this summary.

Consumer Crime Prevention Project: In the area of consumer crime prevention, a policy position was recommended by the Office of Policy Planning/Law and Justice Planning based upon three years of experience through the Consumer Crime Prevention Project.

The Seattle Consumer Crime Prevention Project is a City response to commercial crime which began with the creation of the Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs by ordinance in June, 1973, and the award of a Law and Justice contract to that department in November, 1973. The program was designed to reduce the incidence of illegal commercial activity by establishing a law enforcement unit within the Consumer Protection Division.

Since its inception, the Consumer Crime Prevention Project has steadily increased the number of successful investigations, prosecutions, license revocations and suspensions. The program evolved a focus on consumer crime reduction, rather than more general public service or advocacy. This increase was established by a systematic assessment of project productivity. In addition to the Consumer Crime Prevention Project's success in achieving investigation and enforcement objectives, the functions performed by the project do not duplicate, but compliment, the work of other jurisdictions and consumer protection agencies.

The recommended City position was based on the premise that the Consumer Crime Prevention Project provides the City with a sophisticated mechanism for enforcing City ordinances and the license code, which has greatly enhanced the City's ability to respond to consumer fraud. The Consumer Crime Prevention Project represented the best choice available to respond to city-based consumer victimization. The following three policy considerations were offered based on this premise. These recommendations utilize the project's proven crime reduction strategies in fulfilling overall City goals.

1. The Consumer Crime Prevention Project should be institutionalized within the Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs. Past City policy decisions resulted in institutionalization of complaint mediation and information/referral activities, services benefiting both consumers and the business community. The decision to institutionalize the Consumer Crime Prevention Project represents a choice to maintain the current comprehensive consumer protection program. By institutionalizing the

Consumer Crime Prevention Project, the City can continue to impose legal sanctions by investigating and prosecuting City ordinance and license code violators.

2. The Consumer Crime Prevention Project should focus more of its resources toward increased investigation and case development in the licensing area. Licensing is a regulatory tool and an exclusive City responsibility. The power to license and regulate encompasses a broad spectrum of illegal acts responsible for more economic loss than other City ordinance violations investigated by the project. The successful use of administrative subpoenas to investigate license applications, to review license compliance and for license suspension/revocation actions has facilitated enforcement efforts. Increased project involvement in licensing is also consistent with the Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs priorities.
3. The primary objective of the Consumer Crime Prevention Project is investigation and enforcement of consumer crime statutes, and staffing should reflect that function. With program efforts focusing on investigation, case development and enforcement, particularly in the licensing area, public education and public relations tasks should be delegated to the Consumer Protection Unit. Under the LEAA grant, one employee was assigned to perform public education, public relations and press relations duties. These duties are no longer project targets or Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs priorities. However, the Consumer Protection Unit should continue an aggressive press relations program to insure media coverage of the Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs' successful investigations and prosecutions as a crime prevention and crime deterrent strategy.

It was recommended by the Office of Policy Planning/Law and Justice Planning and approved by the Mayor and City Council that the Consumer Crime Prevention Project should continue to operate in essentially the same manner which had been tested. The project's ability to achieve a measurable degree of success in attaining crime impact was seen as providing empirical evidence to recommend that the program methodology continue.

Seattle Community Accountability Program: Some of the most intractable areas of concern have been juvenile delinquency and juvenile crime. Nothing seemed to work, and recidivism among juveniles was very high. Ordinary criminal justice system sanctions appeared to have little effect on juveniles. The Seattle Community Accountability Program (CAP) strategy was based on a hypothesis that criminal behavior might be affected if sanctions were imposed by a group of persons from the community in which the offense took place. It now appears that this program has been able to impact juvenile crime and reduce recidivism substantially.

The Seattle Community Accountability Program has been successfully institutionalized using State and local funds. The juvenile crime control value of this program can be expected to continue so long as this model program continues to operate in the city. Since a large portion of Seattle's priority crime is believed to be attributable to juveniles, the net worth of this juvenile correctional strategy goes well beyond narrow interpretations of jurisdictional responsibility.

Historically, the Community Accountability Program represented an attempt on the part of the City to test a juvenile corrections strategy which would provide two ingredients which seemed to be missing in the existing juvenile justice system, i.e., accountability for youthful offenders and a mechanism for meaningful citizen participation on the neighborhood level. The temporary assumption by the City of what traditionally has been a county and state function, i.e., the City's Community Accountability Program testing a corrections strategy, was based on the premise that if the City could demonstrate a more effective means of correcting delinquent behavior and reducing juvenile crime, those jurisdictions which have responsibility for the problem would be willing to incorporate that methodology into their ongoing activities. To date, evaluation indicates that the community accountability strategy is potentially more effective in reducing juvenile crime, for certain groups of offenders, than traditional juvenile justice system processing. Cost benefit analyses indicate that the costs of handling youths through the community accountability process compare favorably with traditional processing and, in

fact, would represent a cost savings to the State, if this system were used in place of probation subsidy or institutionalization.

It has been the position of the Executive that (1) the Community Accountability Program should be continued, in that it has adequately demonstrated success; and (2) that permanent funding should be sought from the State to institutionalize the program, in that the State has ongoing responsibility for juvenile corrections programming.

In an effort to educate others regarding the program, and to develop a base of support for institutionalization, a reference group of key actors was formed by Law and Justice Planning in early December, 1975. Juvenile justice agency representatives and elected officials from Seattle, King County and the State were presented with program description, evaluation and budget materials on the CAP strategy. The response of this group was quite favorable.

The Executive recommendations regarding the Community Accountability Program were detailed in a status report submitted by the Office of Policy Planning in July, 1977. These recommendations were as follows:

1. The Community Accountability Program should be continued. Evaluation indicates that the community accountability strategy is potentially more effective in reducing juvenile crime, for certain groups of offenders, than traditional juvenile justice system processing. The Community Accountability Program has demonstrated success in reducing juvenile crime in three city neighborhoods. It makes extensive use of citizen initiative, as envisioned by the Seattle 2000 Commission. The crime reduction strategy that the Community Accountability Program represents has gained wide acceptance from all segments of the community.
2. Permanent funding should be sought from the State to institutionalize the Community Accountability Program. The City of Seattle has adequately demonstrated to the State that the community accountability strategy is a more effective means of correcting delinquent behavior and reducing juvenile crime than traditional approaches. Cost benefit analyses indicate that the cost of handling youths through the community accountability process compare favorably with traditional processing and, in fact, would represent a cost savings to the State if this system were used in place of probation subsidy or institutionalization. The State has ongoing responsibility for juvenile corrections programming.
3. The City should provide a minimum of 20 percent cash match for State funds allocated to the Community Accountability Program. The recently passed State legislation which authorizes funding of local programs such as the Community Accountability Program requires that at least 20 percent of the amount of funds provided by the State shall be provided from local funds. The intent of the legislature was to assure local support and verification that the program is perceived as needed by local government. City funding and control will insure that the program maintains its focus on the City problem of juvenile crime. Maintenance of effort in meeting a City need justifies at least partial City funding. The Community Accountability Program represents a successful City public safety response to juvenile crime, particularly burglary and larceny, and is therefore worthy of City support.
4. The Community Accountability Program should operate at a reduced funding level when its present grant funding expires on August 31, 1977. The Community Accountability Program will have operated as an experimental demonstration program supported by LEAA grant funds for nearly four years. Some of the program costs, e.g., the level of evaluation, implementing liaison with other juvenile justice agencies and educational program costs, have been tied to the experimental phase of the project. Total program cost should be reduced to the maximum extent possible while still maintaining program integrity, in an effort to minimize the impact on City funds.
5. The Community Accountability Program should continue to be operated by the City, under contract with the State, and should continue to be housed in the City's Department of Human Resources. The Community Accountability Program operates within

the city, serves a population of city youths and citizens and addresses a city problem, i.e., juvenile crime. In order to maintain the crime reduction objectives of the program and the integrity of the program design, the City (as opposed to the County or State) must maintain control over the operation, monitoring and evaluation of the program. Original placement of the program in the Department of Human Resources was based upon the recommendation of a task force composed of representatives of the Seattle Police Department, the Office of Management and Budget, Seattle Public Schools, the Department of Human Resources, Law and Justice Planning, the affected city neighborhoods and other juvenile justice system agencies.

6. The Community Accountability Program should continue to be monitored and evaluated. To insure that the Community Accountability Program continues to meet its juvenile crime reduction objectives or to identify any decrease in continued success, the program should continue to be evaluated for crime impact. The Office of Management and Budget should require a strict program budget (which responds to crime reduction objectives) and Law and Justice Planning should continue its crime impact evaluation.

Policy Analyses

During 1977, Policy Development Reports on Sentencing of Adult Felons and Police Use of Deadly Force were developed.

Sentencing of Adult Felons: The sentencing analysis originated as a response to the need to know what specific changes would result from several proposals placed before the 1977 State legislative session which attempted to modify this state's adult felony sentencing process. Numbers of local elected officials had expressed interest and concern about sentencing and its impact on crime and criminal justice.

The vehicle used in the City's analysis was first a description of three different proposed modifications in sentencing procedures and their (1) intended impact; (2) comparative potential assets and shortcomings, and a description of existing sentencing procedures to be replaced; and (3) considerations of what sentencing policy ought to convey, adopt as objectives and strive to accommodate. Based on these considerations, a potential City position was recommended.

The recommended City position which is developed in the Policy Development Report relies on five recommended criteria to be considered in a felony sentencing model. Based on analysis, it was Law and Justice Planning's contention that a sentencing policy should, among other things:

1. support the concept of certainty of punishment but not necessarily the severity of punishment;
2. support uniformity wherever possible;
3. limit displacement of discretion from visible judges to prosecutor, police and other criminal justice agencies;
4. contain mechanisms for a reasonable case review process to avoid overburdening appellate courts;
5. be implementable and potentially responsive to social change and new learning.

Police Use of Deadly Force: The need for a policy on police use of deadly force is more closely tied with day-to-day operational impact on City business, liability and the public safety of city residents.

Upon entry into the sworn ranks of the Seattle Police Department, each officer is issued a handgun that is to be worn at all times, except when special assignments dictate otherwise. A handgun is a deadly weapon that when used against a human target can cause serious or fatal injury. Prior to being issued a deadly weapon, the officer is certified

as proficient in its use and will have been thoroughly schooled on the conditions and circumstances under which it may be used.

Any time police officers resort to the use of deadly force, dire consequences may result. Therefore, it is incumbent upon City policy makers to take any reasonable steps that would tend to minimize the cumulative risk to all persons which accrues when police resort to deadly force.

The specific underlying purposes for a City policy on police use of deadly force are as follows:

1. to provide a well defined framework from which City policy makers and administrators may review police shootings on an incidental or policy basis;
2. to serve as a restraint against arbitrary resort to deadly force; and
3. to limit the risks of all parties to a police shooting incident.

The purpose of Law and Justice Planning's work in the area of police use of deadly force was precipitated by a need to provide a framework for the selection of a City policy. Several alternative shooting policies were described and discussed. The Policy Development Report on Use of Deadly Force represents perhaps the best Law and Justice Planning example to date of an extremely complex issue of interrelated cause and effect comparisons being made understandable in order to facilitate public discussion.

Planned Efforts for 1978

The 1978 Criminal Justice Plan represents something of a change in structure for the plan document in that the basic organization is not totally crime-specific. Recent analysis shows that the matter of suspect/offender processing, adjudications and corrections can best be taken as an object apart from specific crimes and analyzed as a process. Thus it is that this plan, while still analyzing in detail the major priority crimes of burglary, robbery, rape and aggravated assault, deals in a separate section with suspect/offender processing, adjudications and corrections. This change of direction comes from the identification of problems common to all classes of offenders once they have been apprehended.

Problem and Strategy Summary: The 1978 Criminal Justice Plan contains ten new or substantially revised problem statements. The statements relate, in the main, to crime-specific issues, with some new statements in adult suspect/offender processing, adjudications and corrections, and in special problems. There were no new juvenile problem statements.

In the Crime Specific section, Problem Statement B notes that a number of new or one-time burglary offenders appear to be entering the burglar population each year. Seattle Police Department burglary detectives estimate there are fewer than 60 full-time adult burglars who are active recidivists. Discussion suggests that the risk associated with committing a burglary is not high enough to discourage potential burglary offenders.

Continuing in the Crime Specific Category, Problem Statements D and E both deal with crime-scene evidence. Problem Statement D concludes that fingerprint evidence is not used to its full potential in solving burglary cases, and Problem Statement E indicates physical evidence in rape cases is not consistently collected by the Seattle Police Department. Proposed strategies involve the development (for rape evidence) of a Uniform Person Crime Offense Report with prescribed questions. To facilitate better evidence collection, an Evidence Collection, Processing and Management Project will be organized, with the goals of increasing the value of fingerprint evidence in solving burglary and rape cases and demonstrating the utility of having a full-time project manager to supervise operations.

The Investigations Bureau of the Seattle Police Department is the focus of Problem Statement L, which indicates that the bureau may not utilize its resources in a way that

maximizes productivity. Noting that the system of specialized assignments in the Investigations Bureau developed over a period of years, rather than in response to a rationalized plan, the discussion notes several significant problems arising from specialization. These include problems in workload management, particularly with respect to the seasonality of certain crimes, and the difficulty under the current arrangement of reviewing cases on the basis of the amenability to solution prior to assignment to detectives. The proposed project will develop information relating to organizational restructuring, case screening, case monitoring and increased police/prosecutor cooperation decisions. The project stemming from these strategies, Managing Criminal Investigations, has a goal of developing and implementing an organizational structure for the Criminal Investigations Division that facilitates the most rational management of the resources of that division.

Problem Statement M notes that the probability of a juvenile being apprehended for committing a burglary continues to be very low. A number of projects relate to this problem statement, including the management of police investigative resources described in Problem Statement L, the Burglary Victim-Witness Callback Project, the Anti-Fencing Project, the Evidence Collection Project and the Commercial Burglary Reduction Project.

In the Suspect/Offender Processing, Adjudications and Corrections section, Problem Statement E indicates that, due to practices of other criminal justice agencies, the City's success in increasing the number of adult offenders arrested may not achieve a desired crime reduction impact. This problem statement is particularly concerned with the predominant use of probation as a sanction by the King County Superior Court, pointing out that, currently, some 78 percent of convicted burglars receive probation. The discussion also points out that the sanction of probation seldom has a sufficient deterrent effect for either offenders who receive probation or potential offenders in danger of committing crime. The proposed strategies to answer this problem include greater certainty and uniformity in the imposition of all sanctions, particularly with respect to those imposed for repeated predatory criminal activity. Also part of the strategy are recommendations for a sentencing policy which accommodates the notion of deterrence and which also has a crime reduction objective.

A related problem as described in Problem Statement F indicates that sentencing options relied upon by the criminal justice system involve little more than a choice to incarcerate an individual for a crime or to hold the incarceration in abeyance with certain court-ordered stipulations for which evidence of effectiveness is lacking. The project associated with this strategy is the Alternative Corrections Model, which has an objective of significantly reducing the rate of rearrest and reconviction of a group of randomly selected adult felony burglary, robbery (armed robbery), auto theft and larceny offenders receiving project treatment when compared with a control group. Participants in the experimental section of the project will be placed in a residential medium security facility. Daily routine will be structured and will include an eight-hour work day for which residents will receive \$4 per hour. Program participants will pay a portion of their earned wages to an account set up to accumulate money to pay restitution to crime victims, court costs and program-imposed fines.

In the Special Category, Problem Statement C notes that, although the City operates a number of programs which involve citizens directly in crime control, overall participation by citizens with government in crime reduction may still be less than adequate. A proposed strategy to increase the level of citizen participation includes implementation of a demonstration effort to pool such information as is now available on protection of persons and property against crime. In addition, a central telephone number will be established to receive and refer calls from citizens requiring assistance or information about dealing with the criminal justice system. The third part of the strategy involves seeking out witnesses and making the best use of their information to assist in the development of criminal cases. The fourth part of the strategy calls for citizen participation in the criminal justice planning process, revolving around certain identifiable issues. Although it has been decided that LEAA funds will not be used to create a citizens' information project, the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office is seeking other funds to develop a citizen action program.

According to Problem Statement E in the Special Category, detectives in the Investigations Bureau and support staff in the Records and Evidence Sections of the Seattle Police Department spend too much time manually assembling, transmitting and retrieving data which are necessary for detectives to carry out investigations. With respect to strategies, it is indicated that in the long run, the only reasonable response to the problem is to develop an automated system to process and retrieve information. Accordingly, it is proposed to seek discretionary funding to assist in the development and implementation of the REPORT system. This system is a records processing system to index, store and retrieve data about individuals, incidents and property related to events that are formally reported to the Seattle Police Department.

1978 Projects

Specific projects generated during the 1978 planning process and continued from previous plan years are as follows.

Domestic Assault Reduction Project: a project which tests a strategy for reducing the incidence of domestic assault and assault on police officers arising from domestic disturbance calls.

Reduction of Aggravated Assault: a project to develop information about the crime of aggravated assault, offenders, criminal justice system response; with the purpose of identifying, recommending and implementing more effective responses to this priority crime.

Criminal Justice Evaluation: a project which provides for evaluation of crime reduction demonstration projects carried out by the City.

Automated Data Processing: a project providing for the basic data processing needs of Law and Justice Planning.

Managing Criminal Investigations: a project which seeks to develop improved management techniques and tools for case screening and assignment, case monitoring and allocation of investigative resources.

Alternative Corrections Model: a project to test an alternative to current corrections models (incarceration and probation) as a means of reducing recidivism of adult offenders.

Mentally Disordered Misdemeanant Offender Study: a project which will develop and analyze alternatives for removing the non-criminal mentally disordered from the adjudications and corrections process.

Juvenile Restitution Analysis: a project to determine the efficacy of continuing, expanding or revising local restitution programs and to develop local responses to the revised Juvenile Code.

Commercial Burglary Reduction: a project which will test the viability of systematically providing target hardening and security information to operators of commercial establishments.

Burglary Victim-Witness Callback: a project which tests a strategy for increasing the number of witnesses and amount of witness information for burglary investigations.

Evidence Collection, Processing and Management: a project which seeks to improve the utility of physical evidence (predominantly fingerprints) in the solution of priority crimes.

Anti-Fencing - B: a project which tests the viability of reducing burglary through interruption of organized markets for redistribution of stolen property.

Robbery Reduction - Cash Controller: a project which substantially reduces the availability of cash, the object of most commercial robbery, and tests this method as a means of preventing robbery.

Robbery Victim Assistance: a project which seeks to maximize the quality and quantity of investigative information obtained from victims of street robbery.

Increased Detective Productivity: a project which tests various methods of increasing the amount of detective time devoted to investigation.

Criminal Victimization Survey: a project which collects information from victims about crime, perceptions of crime, satisfaction with the City's response to crime.

REPORT: a project to replace the police department's use of the Sea-King computer, thereby improving the department's access to investigative information.

RESOLUTION 25553

A RESOLUTION establishing the criteria to be used in selecting crime reduction priorities for the City of Seattle; selecting burglary, robbery, rape, aggravated assault, and arson as Seattle's priority crimes for 1978; approving certain strategies and projects for reducing the City's priority crimes; approving the 1978 Seattle Criminal Justice Plan; and setting forth general policies for programming and budgeting City and other resources, based on the City's crime reduction priorities.

WHEREAS, Goals for Seattle, The Report of the Seattle 2000 Commission, contains the following goal and objectives which were adopted on September 4, 1973 by the Seattle City Council, the Mayor concurring, in Resolution 24283:

GOAL C: REDUCE CRIME

OBJECTIVES:

1. Incentives to commit crime should be reduced.
2. Opportunities to commit crime should be minimized.
3. Recidivism should be reduced.

WHEREAS, the Mayor and the City Council select crime reduction priorities and review and adopt an annual Criminal Justice Plan to qualify for research and demonstration grants from the State of Washington and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA); and

WHEREAS, the City's law and justice planning process has led to a greater understanding of crime problems in the City of Seattle and has led to improved methods for selecting crimes for priority attention and for evaluating crime reduction strategies, programs, and projects; and

WHEREAS, the City has limited resources available to address crime problems, causing the City to seek through demonstration and responsible experimentation new and potentially more efficient and effective means to reduce the City's priority crimes; and

WHEREAS, the City's funds for reducing crimes are used most effectively if planned, programmed, and budgeted to reduce selected high priority crimes; and

WHEREAS, based on the crime reduction priorities selected by the Mayor and City Council, the City's Office of Policy Planning, Law and Justice Planning Division, prepared the 1978 Criminal Justice Plan for review and approval by the Mayor, the City Council, and the State of Washington; and

WHEREAS, in Phase One of the 1978 Criminal Justice Plan, the Mayor recommended criteria for selecting the City's crime reduction priorities, as well as the priority crimes for 1978; and

WHEREAS, in Phase Two of the 1978 Criminal Justice Plan, the Mayor recommended that certain strategies and projects be identified as eligible for federal funding in 1978; and

WHEREAS, after due public notice, the City Council's Public Safety and Justice Committee held two public hearings and numerous public discussions on Phases One and Two of the Mayor's proposed 1978 Criminal Justice Plan; Now, Therefore,

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE, THE MAYOR CONCURRING:

Criteria for Selecting Crime Reduction Priorities

The criteria for selecting crimes to receive priority attention and resources from the City of Seattle are: (1) the frequency of occurrence, (2) the

Resolution 25553

June 20, 1977

severity and level of public fear and intolerance, (3) the relative threat of offender groups, and (4) the potential for crime reduction. These criteria are described and documented in Phase One of the 1978 Seattle Criminal Justice Plan contained in Comptroller File 284607. These criteria for selecting priority crimes in 1978 shall be the basis for selecting priority crimes in future years, unless modified in a joint resolution by the Mayor and City Council.

Seattle's Priority Crimes for 1978

The priority crimes in the City of Seattle for 1978 shall be burglary, robbery, rape, aggravated assault, and arson.

Strategies and Projects for Reducing the Priority Crimes

The approved strategies and projects for reducing the City's priority crimes in 1978, described in detail in Phase Two of the 1978 Seattle Criminal Justice Plan, as amended (Comptroller File 284607), are as follows:

<u>Approved Project</u>	<u>Estimated Budget</u>
Commercial Burglary Reduction	\$ 56,781
Burglary Victim-Witness Call Back	56,482
Evidence Collection, Processing, and Management	136,426
Anti-Fencing-B	98,848
Robbery Reduction - Cash Controllers	27,778
Robbery Victim Assistance Project	50,000
Robbery Reduction -- Increased Detective Productivity	79,233
Domestic Assault Reduction Program	25,091
Reduction of Aggravated Assault-B	35,479
Criminal Justice Evaluation	69,092
Automated Data Processing	6,825
Managing Criminal Investigations	69,662
Criminal Victimization Survey	21,053
Alternative Corrections Model*	265,000
Mentally Disordered Misdemeanant Offender Study*	34,751

* These two projects will not be submitted to the State of Washington for funding with the City's allocation of Part C LEAA funds; the City will seek alternative non-City funding for these projects.

Resolution 25553

June 20, 1977

<u>Approved Project (continued)</u>	<u>Estimated Budget</u>
Juvenile Restitution Analysis	\$ 40,879
REPORT Data System	100,000

In recognition of the City's limited law and justice planning resources and discretionary funds, in 1978 the City will not seek research and demonstration grants from the State of Washington and LEAA for reducing the priority crime of arson.

The Mayor is authorized to submit to the Governor's Law and Justice Committee, the State Law and Justice Planning Office, and other appropriate agencies and individuals the 1978 Seattle Criminal Justice Plan contained in Comptroller File 284607 -- including the strategies and projects recommended for reducing the City's priority crimes of burglary, robbery, rape, and aggravated assault -- and to address the problem statements identified for each priority crime. The Mayor is also authorized to furnish any additional information and documents which may be needed to explain, support, or implement the 1978 Seattle Criminal Justice Plan and to act as the representative of the City of Seattle in connection with the Plan.


1978 Annual Budget/1978 Criminal Justice Plan

In preparing, reviewing, and adopting the 1978 Annual Budget, the City shall focus its attention on the adopted priority crimes and to the extent possible: (1) encourage and fund well-designed programs which have as their objective the reduction of the City's priority crimes; (2) discourage reductions in City, State, and Federal funds which are presently applied in an effective way to reducing the City's priority crimes; (3) discourage increases in police investigative resources allocated to solving non-priority crimes; and (4) use the City's crime reduction priorities to assess the relative public safety value of activities, functions, programs, and services provided by the City of Seattle, taking full account of the need for sound fiscal, organizational, and management practices. As a general policy, the City's future resource allocation decisions (such as those made in the City's Annual Budget and Capital Improvement Program) shall be consistent with the City's crime reduction priorities and annual Criminal Justice Plans.

Resolution 25553


June 20, 1977

ADOPTED by the City Council of the City of Seattle this 20th day of June, 1977 and signed by me in open session in authentication of its adoption this 20th day of June, 1977.




President of the City Council

Filed by me this 22 day of June, 1977.

ATTEST: 

City Comptroller and City Clerk

BY: 

Deputy

THE MAYOR CONCURRING:



Wes Uhlman, Mayor

RESOLUTION 256A1

A RESOLUTION adopting policies for the City of Seattle's public safety and criminal justice planning, programming, and budgeting process.

WHEREAS, decisions on the use of scarce City resources should be made, wherever possible, on the basis of the best available data and analysis; and

WHEREAS, the City of Seattle tries to use the best available data and analysis in making planning, programming, and budgeting decisions; and

WHEREAS, the crime reduction strategies and programs currently implemented and/or contemplated by the City of Seattle are amenable to quantitative analysis; Now, Therefore,


BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE, THE MAYOR CONCURRING:

The following policies shall govern the City of Seattle's public safety and criminal justice planning, programming, and budgeting process:

- (1) The City of Seattle's crime reduction priorities shall be determined by the informed judgments of the Mayor and City Council, based in large part on quantitative analyses of relevant data;
- (2) The City's public safety and criminal justice planning, programming, and budgeting resources shall be used primarily to develop solutions to the City's priority crime problems, and to define the levels of public safety services to be provided by the City;
- (3) The City's crime reduction strategies and programs shall have as their priority objective the control of crime and, wherever possible, the reduction of a specific priority crime or crimes;
- (4) The City of Seattle's Law and Justice Planning Office shall be responsible for conducting the aforementioned analysis and shall -- with the help of the Seattle Police Department, the City's Office of Management and Budget, and other criminal justice agencies -- formulate hypotheses and devise practical experiments to test the effectiveness of selected crime reduction strategies and programs;
- (5) Based on the information derived from the process described above, recommendations shall be presented to the Mayor and by the Mayor to the City Council in order to provide a sound basis for the City's public safety and criminal justice planning, programming, and budgeting decisions; and

- (6) Any recommendation to change the City's public safety and criminal justice priorities (that is, to reallocate the City's public safety and criminal justice resources) must be accompanied by an analysis that discusses what services, if any, will therefore be reduced; what crime problems, if any, will therefore receive less attention or resources; what compensating economies may be realized in other areas; or what additional resources, if any, will be required to implement the recommendation.

ADOPTED by the City Council of the City of Seattle this 7 day of November, 1977, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its adoption this 7 day of November, 1977.




 President of the City Council

FILED by me this 7 day of November, 1977.

ATTEST: 

 City Comptroller and City Clerk

BY: 

 Deputy

THE MAYOR CONCURRING:



 Wes Uhlman, Mayor

RESOLUTION 25698

A RESOLUTION establishing policies governing the City of Seattle's response to consumer crime.

WHEREAS, Ordinance 48022 established a Seattle License Code which regulates a wide variety of businesses operating within the City's jurisdiction; and

WHEREAS, the City of Seattle is empowered by State statute to enforce criminal laws, including State statutes which relate directly to consumer fraud; and

WHEREAS, Ordinance 102252 created a Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs; and

WHEREAS, Ordinance 102494 and Ordinance 102495 established a City Consumer Crime Prevention Project; and

WHEREAS, the City's 1976 Annual Budget, enacted on November 26, 1975, "institutionalized" the Consumer Crime Prevention Project by transferring from grant funds to the General Fund the positions of Chief Investigator, Investigator, Community Service Representative, and Legal Secretary in the Consumer Affairs Division of the Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs; and

WHEREAS, the three-year operation of the Consumer Crime Prevention Project has given the City of Seattle valuable insights into consumer crime prevention and reduction; and

WHEREAS, the City's Office of Policy Planning recently issued a "Policy Development Report on the Consumer Crime Prevention Project"; and

WHEREAS, the comprehensive consumer protection services provided by the Consumer Crime Prevention Project are a substantial improvement over the limited consumer complaint mediation and referral model used by the City prior to development of the Project; and


WHEREAS, the foregoing City decisions have resulted in the institutionalization of consumer fraud investigation, complaint mediation, and information referral, thereby benefiting consumers and the business community; Now, Therefore,

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE, THE MAYOR CONCURRING:


- (1) The Consumer Crime Prevention Project shall be continued as a regular City program within the Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs.
- (2) The City shall continue to seek legal sanctions by investigating and prosecuting City Criminal Code and City License Code violations and State statutes, consistent with the City's general police authority to enforce State statutes, including theft by deception and other commercial crime.
- (3) Because the License Code is an effective regulatory tool for which the City has exclusive responsibility, the consumer crime prevention efforts of the City shall place a high priority on preventing, investigating, and developing cases on violations of the License Code.


- (4) The Consumer Affairs Division's successful use of administrative subpoenas to investigate license applications, to review license compliance, and to deny, suspend, or revoke licenses shall continue.
- (5) The primary objectives of the Consumer Protection Unit of the Consumer Affairs Division shall be investigating consumer crime and enforcing appropriate provisions of the Seattle Criminal Code, License Code, and State statutes.
- (6) To maximize any potential crime prevention impact, public education and public relations programs conducted by the Consumer Affairs Division shall focus on facilitating general public information and awareness about successful investigations and prosecutions, as well as promoting public awareness of illegal consumer activities.

PASSED by the City Council this 28th day of November, 1977, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its passage this 28th day of November, 1977.


 President of the City Council

Filed by me this 28th day of November, 1977.

ATTEST: 
 City Comptroller and City Clerk

BY: 
 Deputy

THE MAYOR CONCURRING:


 Wes Uhlman, Mayor

RESOLUTION 25718

A RESOLUTION adopting City of Seattle policies for citizen participation in crime prevention/reduction programs.

WHEREAS, Resolution 25387, adopted by the City Council and concurred in by the Mayor on December 2, 1976, establishes general policies for and encourages citizen participation in City decision-making; and

WHEREAS, Resolutions 23760, 24638, 24700, 24966, and 25232, approving the City of Seattle's Annual Criminal Justice Plans for 1973-1977, establish experimental crime prevention/reduction programs which must be proven effective at reducing crime before they are funded as regular City programs; and

WHEREAS, in implementing the Community Crime Prevention Program, the City has demonstrated that citizens can play an important, active, and meaningful role in reducing crime; and

WHEREAS, in implementing the Community Accountability Program, the City has demonstrated that citizens will donate their time and talents to helping government hold juvenile offenders accountable for their actions and thereby reduce juvenile crime; and

WHEREAS, Seattle citizens gain important knowledge about crime prevention/reduction and the City of Seattle gains valuable assistance in reducing crime when citizens participate in crime prevention/reduction programs; Now, Therefore,


BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE, THE MAYOR CONCURRING:

The following policies shall govern citizen participation in the City of Seattle's crime prevention/reduction programs:

- (1) The City of Seattle shall involve citizens directly in the operation of crime prevention/reduction programs whenever it is demonstrated that citizen participation in the program contributes to reducing crime; and
- (2) The City of Seattle shall share crime prevention/reduction information with citizens and educate citizens about proven methods for reducing urban crime in order to improve the cooperative involvement of government and citizens in crime prevention/reduction programs; and
- (3) The City of Seattle shall involve citizens in crime prevention/reduction programs only where there exists no foreseeable risk to the citizens from personal harm or financial/legal liability; and
- (4) Whenever practical and consistent with other City policies, the City of Seattle shall encourage existing citizen organizations and resources to participate in crime prevention/reduction programs; and

(5) The City of Seattle shall assist -- and shall not duplicate or supplant -- citizen-initiated crime prevention/reduction methods or strategies.


ADOPTED by the City Council of the City of Seattle this 27 day of December, 1977, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its adoption this 27 day of December, 1977.



President of the City Council


Filed by me this 27 day of December, 1977

ATTEST:



City Comptroller and City Clerk

BY:



Deputy

THE MAYOR CONCURRING:



Wes Uhlman, Mayor

RESOLUTION 25719

A RESOLUTION adopting policies for City of Seattle funding of juvenile crime prevention, reduction, apprehension, and diversion programs.

WHEREAS, "juvenile crime prevention" is used in this Resolution to mean the prevention of non-offenders from becoming juvenile offenders by removing or affecting the causes of delinquency, or by making it impossible for the crime to occur; and

WHEREAS, "juvenile crime reduction" is used in this Resolution to mean the reduction of recidivism of identified juvenile offenders; and

WHEREAS, decisions on the use of Seattle City resources should be made on the basis of the best available data and analysis; and

WHEREAS, because most Part I arrests in the City of Seattle in 1974, 1975, and 1976 were juvenile arrests, the prevention and reduction of juvenile crime continues to be a high City priority for research, planning, and action; and

WHEREAS, the local juvenile justice system consists of three elements -- law enforcement, adjudications, and corrections -- which are the responsibility of the Seattle Police Department, the King County Juvenile Court, and the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, respectively; and

WHEREAS, the City of Seattle undertakes juvenile corrections demonstration programs because if the City can demonstrate more effective and efficient means to correct delinquent behavior and reduce juvenile crime, those jurisdictions with the responsibility for adjudicating and correcting juvenile delinquency problems will have the opportunity to incorporate the results of the demonstration programs into their ongoing operations, thereby helping to reduce juvenile crime in Seattle; Now, Therefore,

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE, THE MAYOR CONCURRING:

The City of Seattle will support only demonstration programs for reducing juvenile crime which include the following elements: (1) specific, identifiable, and quantifiable crime reduction objectives; (2) an evaluation process for measuring crime reduction effectiveness over time; (3) demonstrated effectiveness elsewhere or a high likelihood of demonstrating effective juvenile crime reduction locally; and (4) funding provided by discretionary resources available to the City. Substantial General Fund resources will not be applied to a demonstration program until it has been fully evaluated and compared with other demonstrated programmatic needs.

The following guidelines shall govern the use of City resources for juvenile crime prevention:


- (1) Programs which provide social services to youths, but do not have a specifically identified target group about whom reasonably accurate predictions of delinquency can be made, should be rejected as juvenile crime prevention strategies;

- (2) The City of Seattle will not fund activities unless they have demonstrated crime prevention success or unless they are capable of being evaluated on specific crime prevention objectives;
- (3) The City of Seattle supports the reexamination by state, county, and city planners and local elected officials of current delinquency prevention strategies which are based upon hypotheses, rather than upon demonstrated effectiveness; and
- (4) The City of Seattle will support research efforts aimed at developing better techniques for predicting which youths in the general population are likely to become juvenile offenders.

The following guidelines shall govern the use of City resources for juvenile crime reduction:


- (1) The apprehension and diversion functions of the Seattle Police Department's Juvenile Division shall be adequately supported and funded;
- (2) The City supports the development of a state policy on the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 which is consistent with the crime reduction objectives in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended;
- (3) The City will support and encourage activities aimed at increasing the risk to juvenile offenders, such as improved crime detection and increased apprehension; and
- (4) The City supports and encourages research efforts aimed at developing a better understanding of possible means for effectively controlling juvenile crime.

ADOPTED by the City Council of the City of Seattle this 27 day of December, 1977, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its adoption this 27 day of December, 1977.




 President of the City Council

Filed by me this 27 day of December 1977


ATTEST: 

 City Comptroller and City Clerk

BY: 

 Deputy

THE MAYOR CONCURRING:



 Wes Uhlman, Mayor

RESOLUTION 25721

A RESOLUTION adopting City of Seattle policies removing routine preventive police patrol as a basis for City decisions on police patrol manpower allocations and deployments.

WHEREAS, patrol by marked police cars has long been a basic strategy used by law enforcement officers to prevent crime; and

WHEREAS, a well designed and implemented experiment, conducted in Kansas City in 1973, demonstrated that traditional, routine, preventive police patrol did not have a significant impact on crime or the citizens' sense of safety; and

WHEREAS, though not subjected to rigorous tests in Seattle, the results of the Kansas City experiment are applicable to Seattle; Now, Therefore,

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE, THE MAYOR CONCURRING:

City of Seattle decisions on police patrol manpower allocations and deployments shall not be based on the assumptions that routine preventive patrol deters crime, prevents crime, suppresses crime, or increases the citizens' sense of safety.

Although the Kansas City experiment demonstrated that routine preventive police patrol does not have a significant impact on crime or the citizens' sense of safety, this does not necessarily imply that the number of patrol units available to respond to emergency calls in the community should be reduced.


City decisions on police patrol manpower allocations and deployments shall not be based on routine preventive patrol considerations.

ADOPTED by the City Council of the City of Seattle this 3 day of January, 1977, and signed by me in open session in authentication of its adoption this 3 day of January, 1977.


President of the City Council

Filed by me this 3 day of January, 1977.

ATTEST: 
City Comptroller and City Clerk

BY: 
Deputy

THE MAYOR CONCURRING:


Wes Uhlman, Mayor

SECTION II: A HISTORY OF LAW AND JUSTICE PLANNING IN SEATTLE

On June 1, 1971, the City of Seattle was awarded two Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) grant contracts to support City criminal justice and crime reduction planning. Prior to that time, criminal justice planning in the City was scattered among several different agencies in City government, including the Seattle Police Department and what was then the Office of Human Resources. No comprehensive philosophy for criminal justice planning existed, nor was there any unified approach to learning about how to reduce criminal activity in Seattle.

In June, 1971, the Law and Justice Planning Office began on a small scale to attempt to develop ideas and information about crime and crime control. In January, 1972, the availability of additional funds made possible the hiring of additional staff to support project monitoring, baseline research and data collection, as well as evaluation of Law and Justice funded projects. Expansion was undertaken with the objective of using the LEAA program to support the development of information about crime control; to provide the within City government a centralized repository for meaningful criminal justice data; and to test methods of reducing crime in the city.

LEAA projects operated by the City in 1971 and 1972 reflected a large range of strategies based on conventional wisdom--that is, the commonly held but untested assumptions of law enforcement, corrections professionals and lay persons as to what would work to reduce crime.

Examples of assumptions and projects during this period included the following:

1. Police could do a better job in reducing crime if they had better equipment; therefore, money was spent on helicopters and such communications equipment as portable radios.
2. Offenders would commit less crime if they had increased social service opportunities such as drug treatment, half-way houses, employment counseling, etc.
3. Juveniles would be less likely to become delinquent if they have enough to do or positive places to go; therefore, numerous drop-in centers were funded, as well as counseling, recreation and job programs.

Traditionally, programs such as these were either not evaluated at all or were evaluated on the basis of operational objectives such as how many clients were served, how much service was delivered, how much equipment was acquired, how many staff were employed, etc. Over time, Law and Justice Planning crime impact evaluations of these traditional crime reduction strategies found the impact of these programs to be questionable.

Some of the early projects were planned by and transferred from the Model City Program. A number of objectives identified for projects during the period June 1, 1971, to June 30, 1972, were what today would be called methods or performance standards. Moreover, Law and Justice Planning often inherited programs as fully developed packages. Due to limited staff during this time, evaluations of project impact tended to rely more upon information developed and provided by project operators than by independent evaluators. For programs developed by others as complete packages, opportunities for redesign by City Law and Justice Planning staff were obviously limited. Although monitored to assure accuracy, information compiled by operators was often sketchy and not focused on crime reduction impact. Based in part upon these early experiences, the need for an evaluation capacity as part of the planning process was identified.

Planning is a process dependent upon the acquisition of information. Good information was not readily available when early City law and justice planning was undertaken. Where available, the best information resided with the operating agency, which often guarded its release to outsiders. Using the LEAA program to fund, evaluate and redesign projects, the information reserve from operations began to develop. With each

successive cycle of the planning process, learning increased. The Law and Justice Planning Office began to understand more about the dynamics of Seattle's crime problems and, over time, a different approach to planning began to take shape. Rather than continuing to select projects for funding from a broad array of programs competing for scarce resources, the City began to move in the direction of developing funding priorities based on comprehensive strategies believed to represent the best opportunities for the reduction of crime.

During the early period of law and justice planning in the City, goals and objectives for projects tended to fall into four broad categories, when such were identified.

1. Prevention through elimination of crime causes.
2. Enhancement of the criminal justice operations system.
3. Reduced opportunities to commit crime.
4. Reduction of recidivism.

The LEAA program was embryonic during this period, and philosophy for directed planning in the field of crime control was just beginning to be developed. A need to prioritize activities based upon identification of problems in local jurisdictions was not yet developed.

The period July 1, 1973, to June 30, 1974, represents the first comprehensive planning milestone for the Law and Justice Planning Office. During this period, a more completely staffed office was able to consider a broad range of strategies identified in national literature and based upon information developed and compiled through earlier project activity. In the summer of 1972, the first comprehensive criminal justice plan for the City of Seattle was written, the Comprehensive Plan for Criminal Justice 1973.

The ambitious Comprehensive Plan for Criminal Justice 1973 identified five general goals:

1. To minimize significant and undesired interference with property or persons of another.
2. To minimize loss or suffering by victims, and to minimize the benefit from crime by offenders.
3. To minimize regulation of that conduct or activity which does not seriously interfere with property or persons of another.
4. To improve speedy and fair processing of suspected offenders through the criminal justice system.
5. To develop a high level of public confidence in the criminal justice system, and to develop substantial public participation in the operation of the criminal justice system.

Projects included in the 1973 Plan were specifically designed to increase knowledge about crime in the city, and to produce information about the criminal justice system.

The development of the 1974 City Plan for Criminal Justice first utilized the crime-specific approach. This meant that strategies from which projects were developed were identified and grouped according to specific priority crimes which had been selected. In addition, projects which were not aimed at the reduction of specific priority crimes but were considered as having potential to enhance a particular part of the criminal justice system were classified as "systems improvements." This basic approach was continued in the 1975 Plan.

The 1974 and 1975 Plans marked not only the beginning point in crime-specific planning, but also the beginning of the application of specific information developed to contribute to understanding the overall crime concerns of the City. These plans were not yet intended as specific City policy guidance documents; rather, they were still program summaries, as the 1974 Plan stated: "The principal purpose of the Criminal Justice Plan is to provide guidance for the expenditure of approximately 1.3 million dollars available from the Federal government to reduce serious crime in Seattle." However, during this period of time, the planning process made extensive use of local research and a national literature search to identify both the parameters of local crime problems and potential applications of strategies which seemed to present reasonable opportunities to impact the City's crime problems positively.

By 1974, a reasonably comprehensive data base had been developed, and the ensuing projects could be described as the first true demonstration projects. The use of demonstration projects to test a specific hypothesis or to demonstrate the potential of a particular strategy has been used since that time in the planning process. Rather than looking to LEAA funding for systems improvements or permanent solutions to Seattle's crime problems, these discretionary resources were used in order to learn more about the dynamics of a particular crime or particular crime problem, or to test a specific hypothesis and then to direct the City's decision making process based on that learning.

In this way, the LEAA program provided the seed for institutional change--the opportunity to risk new programs and experimental strategies. Examples of projects which evolved from the planning process of this period were the Community Accountability Program (CAP) and the Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP). Both programs exemplify a process where crime analysis led to the identification of specific problem statements. After having rejected several potential strategies, the structured testing of a hypothesis through the operation of a project was undertaken.

In the case of the Community Accountability Program, the data suggested that youthful offenders, particularly those apprehended for the priority crimes of burglary and robbery, were not being held sufficiently accountable by the criminal justice system. The recidivism rates for both juvenile burglars and robbers were intolerably high. It was hypothesized that a new means of holding youths accountable for their crimes in and by their own communities would potentially reduce the likelihood of those offenders becoming recidivists. Having tested that hypothesis for almost four years, the City has found that, in fact, juveniles being held accountable in this manner are statistically less likely to become recidivists.

The Community Crime Prevention Program was founded even more directly on an analysis of burglary data. In the planning process which led to the creation of the Community Crime Prevention Program, it was discovered that a number of Seattle burglaries occurred through unlocked front and side entrances during daytime hours or in situations requiring minimal force for the burglar to gain entry. It was hypothesized that if residential burglary targets could be made more secure and less vulnerable to opportunistic entry, residential burglary rates could be reduced. Furthermore, it was learned that when burglaries were cleared and suspects arrested, this action was most often facilitated through suspect identification by witnesses or by quick witness action.

The Community Crime Prevention Program was designed to test the hypothesis that a systematic program of making residential burglary targets more secure through target hardening measures (home security inspections and property marking) and by orchestrating neighborhood watchfulness that (1) the opportunity for burglary, and thus the occurrence of burglary, could be reduced; and (2) more burglary-in-progress calls and arrests could be facilitated.

After four years of testing this strategy, this hypothesis has proven to be correct. Both the Community Accountability Program and the Community Crime Prevention Program have been successfully institutionalized--that is, they have received permanent, non-federal funding. The Community Accountability Program has received special State funding, while the costs of the Community Crime Prevention Program have been assumed in the City's General Fund budget.

The 1976 and 1977 Criminal Justice Plans saw the application and use of learning about specific crime problems facilitated through the LEAA program and various demonstration projects translated into City policy choices. During this period of time, the City began to utilize the collective experience and knowledge generated by the operation of the various demonstration programs and began a process of systematically analyzing those issues which had clear policy implications for the City. The utility of the annual Criminal Justice Plan, as well as that of the overall planning process, broadened substantially during this period.

Policy development based on Law and Justice Planning's work took two forms. First, information reserves which had been developed served as a basis for providing City policy decision makers with background information on an issue-specific basis. Work in this area was often unanticipated in the annual work agenda for the office, coming about either because of a decision making crisis or the need for analysis to guide an unanticipated policy choice by the City.

Two examples of this type of issue-specific policy were the Guns and Ammunition analysis and the analysis of Carrying Concealed Weapons in Seattle. In the first case, a proposed change in police ammunition and a perceived escalation in police handgun fire power caused considerable controversy. Inevitably, City policy decision makers requested information and an analysis regarding how much handgun fire power was represented by several choices in ammunition available to the Seattle Police Department. An underlying policy issue throughout the analysis itself was the question, "How much handgun fire power is appropriate for police work?"

Because of a potential change in Municipal Court sentencing policies for persons carrying concealed weapons, an analysis of carrying concealed weapons was conducted by this office at the request of members of the Seattle City Council. The purpose for the analysis was, in part, to ascertain what statistical connection there was between persons carrying concealed weapons (principally handguns) and the commission of serious crimes in the city.

The second type of policy development work which emerged during this period of time was the office-generated analysis. This work was often part of the annual work program. It was intended to present information to the City to engage discussion and, it was hoped, to elicit a specific policy choice or series of choices based on that analysis. During this period of time, the Policy Development Report on the Community Crime Prevention Program was presented to the Seattle City Council by the Mayor. Based upon four years of testing and this Policy Development Report, a decision was made that the Community Crime Prevention Program should become a permanent public safety response by the City to the crime of burglary.

Additional policy development work during 1976 and 1977 included a Policy Development Report on consumer crime in Seattle, a Policy Development Report on sentencing of adult felons, a Policy Development Report on the use of deadly force by police and recommendations on institutionalization of the Community Accountability Program.

A third, and perhaps most important, application of the City's annual Criminal Justice Plan developed in 1977. The specific use of information developed through the annual planning process was applied to the City's annual budget process this year. In past years, the integration of information presented in the Criminal Justice Plan with the policy choices exercised by the City in the preparation of the annual budget was not always evident. This separation was due in large part to differences in timing between the preparation of the annual Criminal Justice Plan and the preparation of the City budget. Often, information which may have been useful in the budget process was not available prior to the budget choices being made. As the City's criminal justice planning process became more sophisticated, a wealth of accumulated information was available which could be used to direct budget choices. Planners from Law and Justice Planning participated in Executive Department budget deliberations for the Seattle Municipal Court, the Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs and the Seattle Police Department. Several issues were identified as part of these budget deliberations, including the need for more definitive information about the operation of the Seattle Municipal

Court and the type of cases with which they deal; assurances that the Consumer Affairs Division of the Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs retain strong consumer crime violation enforcement and prosecution objectives; and several recommended changes in the police department budget.

SECTION III: SELECTION OF PRIORITY CRIMESSummary of Serious Crime Reports in Seattle

During 1976, reported serious crime in Seattle decreased by 13 percent from 46,111 reported incidents to 40,009 reported incidents. As defined by the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program established in 1930, serious crimes include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny theft, and motor vehicle theft. These seven crimes are referred to as crime index offenses and are collected in a standard fashion from the majority of United States law enforcement agencies. These data are perhaps an indication that progress is being made with regard to reduction of crime in the City. The decreases in 1975 (0.2 percent) and 1976 (13 percent) do not reflect the general trend for Seattle established over the last thirteen years (see Table 3-1). Comparable national data for the first half of 1975 and 1976 from cities between 250,000 and 500,000 population show an increase of three percent, with crime index information for western states showing an increase of two percent.

Murder: Murder decreased by 19.2 percent during 1976: 52 cases were reported in 1975 compared to 42 reports in 1976. As Table 3-1 indicates, murder has consistently followed the 13-year serious crime trend, increasing 82.6 percent.

The clearance rate for murder during 1975 was 78.8 percent, 41 of 52 reported cases. These 52 cases represent a murder rate of 0.1 crimes per 1,000 population for the city. For 1976, the clearance rate increased slightly to 83.3 percent (or 35) of all cases. The 42 cases represent a decreased murder rate of 0.08 crimes per 1,000 population.

Forcible Rape: Reported forcible rape showed a very small decrease of 0.6 percent. Although reported rape cases have shown the same general upward 13-year trend as the overall index crimes (72 cases of reported rape in 1964 to 332 in 1976), it is difficult to determine the extent to which this increase is caused by the occurrence of rape as opposed to an increased willingness of victims to report rape incidents. In any case, reported rape cases have shown the second largest increase of any of the index crimes during the 1964-1976 period, 347.2 percent.

Of cases reported in 1975, 122 or 37.6 percent were cleared. The 324 reported cases represent a rape rate of 1.28 crimes per 1,000 female population in the city during 1975. In 1976, the clearance rate was unchanged (37.3 percent or 120 cases). The 322 reported cases represent a slightly decreased rate of 1.23 rape cases per 1,000 female population in the city.

Robbery: Robbery increased by 2.9 percent from 2,103 reported cases in 1975 to 2,163 in 1976. Although robbery has shown the same upward trend as the total crime index, it has tended to increase almost four times as fast as the overall index. Between 1964 and 1976, robbery increased by 340.5 percent, while the total index increased 86.9 percent. During 1975, \$529,972 worth of property was taken in robberies.

Of this, \$147,961 (28 percent) was recovered. There were 604 (28.7 percent) cleared cases. The robbery rate in 1975 was 4.2 crimes per 1,000 population for the city. In 1976, 14 percent of stolen property was recovered (\$76,987 of \$541,433 in the first eleven months), while 30.5 percent (659) of the cases were cleared. The total robbery rate per 1,000 population increased to 4.3 crimes in 1976.

Aggravated Assault: Aggravated assault has shown the largest annual percentage increase (7.2 percent) for index crimes between 1975 and 1976. (Because of a UCR change from the reporting of "threats of firearms" within the non-aggravated assault category to reporting within "aggravated assault" during 1974, the figures on the annual number of aggravated assault reports prior to 1974 are not comparable with subsequent data.) In 1975, there were 1,493 reports, while in 1976 there were 1,601. For the 13-year period, this crime has reflected the general upward trend but has increased more rapidly than the total crime index or any other index crime (388.1 percent for aggravated assault, 86.9 percent for all crimes).



Table 3-1--Reported Serious Crime, 1964-1976, Seattle Police Department

Offense	Year													Percent Change	
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1975-1976	1964-1976
Murder	23	24	32	48	45	58	42	42	42	54	55	52	42	-19	82.6
Forcible Rape	72	78	109	116	167	248	184	208	278	276	276	316	324	- 1	347.2
Robbery-- Total	491	516	650	1,050	2,297	2,559	1,984	1,801	1,564	1,702	2,041	2,103	2,163	+ 3	340.5
Armed	-	-	-	-	-	1,517	1,015	777	749	921	1,196	1,220	1,126	- 8	-
Strong-arm	-	-	-	-	-	1,042	969	1,024	815	781	845	883	1,037	+17	-
Aggravated Assault	328	394	450	714	788	1,096	954	1,093	949	880	1,334	1,493	1,601	+ 7	388.1
Burglary-- Total	4,932	4,965	5,456	8,013	9,933	14,820	14,770	12,455	11,339	12,926	14,219	13,021	11,835	- 9	140.1
Residential	-	-	-	-	5,748	10,048	10,597	9,145	8,355	9,540	10,714	9,917	8,870	-11	-
Non- Residential	-	-	-	-	4,185	4,772	4,173	3,310	2,984	3,386	3,505	3,104	2,965	- 5	-
Larceny	13,669	12,539	14,513	21,691	19,375	23,906	22,131	21,111	18,864	20,696	24,308	25,452	21,186	-17	55.0
Auto Theft	1,889	1,911	2,656	3,360	3,968	5,891	4,300	3,510	3,440	3,740	3,927	3,666	2,860	-22	51.4
Arson	-	-	361	413	499	588	530	442	477	607	662	569	579	-11.7	N/A
Total Index Crime (not in- cluding arson)	21,404	20,427	23,866	34,992	36,573	48,578	44,365	40,220	36,476	40,274	46,200	46,111	40,009	-13	86.9
Percentage Change	-	-4.6	+16.8	+46.6	+4.5	+32.8	-8.7	-9.3	-9.3	+10.4	+14.7	-0.0	-13		

In 1975, the clearance rate for aggravated assault was 49.9 percent, the second highest for the index crimes. The rate per 1,000 population was 2.96 crimes for 1975. In 1976, while the clearance rate increased to 56.2 percent, the rate per Seattle residents also increased, to 3.18 per 1,000 persons.

Burglary: Burglary decreased by 9.1 percent between 1975 and 1976 (13,021 and 11,835 reported cases respectively). For the 13-year period, it increased 140.0 percent. Burglary has followed the 13-year trend of index crimes quite closely. During 1975, 1,366 or 10.5 percent of the burglary cases were cleared. These clearances and other enforcement activities resulted in the recovery of property worth \$683,639 (12 percent) of the total \$5,669,532 taken in burglaries. There were 25.9 reported burglaries (including residential and non-residential) per 1,000 population in 1975.

In 1976, 13.1 percent of all reported burglaries (both residential and non-residential) were cleared with 12.7 percent (\$697,837 of \$5,485,214) of property taken being recovered. As a per capita rate, there were a total of 23.5 reported burglaries (including residential and non-residential) per 1,000 Seattle population in 1976.

Larceny: Larceny decreased 17 percent in 1976 (25,452 in 1975 to 21,186 in 1976), and for the 13-year period, it increased 55.0 percent. For 1975, in terms of property value, \$3,055,733 was taken, of which \$388,842 (11 percent) was recovered.

Of 25,452 reported cases, 5,263 or 20.6 percent were cleared in 1975. The risk factor for reported larceny was 50.6 crimes per 1,000 population in 1975. In 1976, 26.5 percent of reported cases were cleared with 15.4 percent of stolen property being recovered (\$537,949 of \$3,493,649). The reported occurrence of larceny in 1976 was 42.1 crimes per 1,000 population.

However, it should be noted that the decrease in larceny is mainly due to a change in the reporting of thefts from coin machines (see Table 3-2). If this category is excluded from 1975 and 1976 data, reported larcenies increased by 9 percent. In January, 1976, the Seattle Police Department changed its data recording policy for parking meter thefts. Prior to this time, each independent parking meter theft was counted as a separate larceny. Beginning January, 1976, incidences of multiple parking meter thefts occurring in the same location at the same general time were counted as one case of larceny.

Table 3-2

<u>Offense</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>Percent Change</u>
Larcenies minus theft from coin machines	19,203	20,773	+ 8.2
Theft from coin machines	6,249	413	-93.4

Auto Theft: Auto theft showed the largest decrease (22.0 percent in 1976; 2,860 in 1976, down from 3,666 in 1975) and the lowest increase over the 13-year period (51.4 percent).

While the clearance rate for auto theft in 1975 (487 cases or 13.3 percent) was not high, the majority of vehicles are recovered without clearance as can be seen from the value of property stolen (\$3,572,385) compared to that recovered (\$3,281,644 or 92 percent). However, the recovery figure does not take into account damage to the vehicle prior to its recovery. For 1975, the auto theft risk factor was 7.3 thefts per 1,000 population for the city.

In 1976, the clearance rate was unchanged at 13.1 percent (375) of reported cases, with 88.5 percent of the value of stolen autos being recovered (\$2,474,321 of \$2,794,649). The estimated 2,860 auto thefts in 1976 represent 5.7 thefts per 1,000 population.

Arson: In 1975, Seattle arson incidents decreased 14 percent from 1974 (569 arson fires in 1975 from 662 in 1974). There was a 1.7 percent increase from 1975 to 1976 with a

total of 579 arson fires in 1976. Since 1971, the number of arson incidents has increased 31 percent (from 441 in 1971 to 579). The total estimated direct loss in 1976 due to arson was \$1,929,000, down 28 percent from 1975, for an average of \$3,331 per occurrence. During 1976, there were 1.15 arson incidents per 1,000 population.

Table 3-3--Arson Fires in Seattle

Year	Total FIB*	Arson FIB	Accidental Loss** FIB	Arson Loss FIB	Total Loss FIB	Percent Arson Loss
1971	1,757	441	\$2,278,302	\$ 621,203	\$2,899,506	21%
1972	1,838	477	\$2,414,779	\$1,253,056	\$3,667,835	34%
1973	1,993	607	\$3,341,026	\$2,208,884	\$5,549,910	40%
1974	1,976	662	\$2,796,577	\$3,238,328	\$6,327,103	51%
1975	1,787	569	\$2,604,000	\$2,689,000	\$5,293,000	50%
1976	1,773	579	\$2,771,000	\$1,929,000	\$4,700,000	41%

*Fires in buildings.

**Only the direct estimated loss from FIB is shown.

As shown in Table 3-3, the direct estimated loss from arson fires increased approximately 210 percent from 1971 to 1976, although the total number of arson fires increased only 31 percent. The estimated direct loss includes only the loss of burned property.

SECTION III: SELECTION OF PRIORITY CRIMESSeverity of Specific Crimes

To state that crime has increased or decreased over time as measured by the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) index does not take into account the relative seriousness of different offenses. The UCR index is based upon the total number of seven serious offenses: murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and auto theft.

Since the index is based only on the total number of offenses, two separate cases of shoplifting 15-cent candy bars are given twice as much importance as one murder. Obviously, the loss to individuals and society is not accurately reflected by such simple counting of the total number of these crimes. Additional factors should be considered.

Three measures are characteristically used to determine the relative impact of these crimes upon society and crime victims. The first measure deals with the direct injury, suffering and loss experienced by victims (the Sellin-Wolfgang Severity Scale). The second measure deals with the criminal sanctions imposed upon convicted offenders by the judicial and correctional system within the State of Washington. The third measure is based upon the risk of being a crime victim and the fear of such crimes by Seattle residents.

Victim Injury and Loss (Sellin-Wolfgang Scale): Researchers have used various ways to measure the degree of physical and monetary loss experienced by victims of different offenses. They attempt to use such factors as the degree of physical injury, the amount of monetary or property loss, the extent of intimidation used by offenders in carrying out the crime, and the presence or absence of weapons. While many severity scales are available, one scale that has been constructed using the accepted measurement and scaling procedures is that of Sellin and Wolfgang (T. Sellin and M. E. Wolfgang, The Measurement of Delinquency, New York, Wiley, 1964). The advantage of this particular scale is that it has been the focus of much subsequent examination, use and modification by other researchers, both within the United States and in other countries. The results of these subsequent investigations by independent researchers tend to substantiate the usefulness of Sellin and Wolfgang's severity scale (SW scale) for the United States, Canadian and Western European societies. The research has shown that different groups within these societies tend to view the relative seriousness of offenses in the same fashion. (A discussion of the consistency and validation research on the Sellin and Wolfgang Severity Scale can be found in "Symposium on the Measurement of Delinquency," The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1975, 66, 173-214.)

Using Seattle data on average monetary loss, the extent of weapon use in commission of crimes for UCR index crimes, and information on the amount of victim injury from random samples of rape, robbery, and aggravated assault cases, the average SW scale value for each index crime and arson has been determined for the index crimes reported in Seattle during 1975.

Table 3-4 indicates that in terms of victim injury and loss, the most serious offenses are the following:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Rank of Seriousness (1 = most serious)</u>	<u>Mean Average S-W Score</u>
Murder	1	30.9
Rape	2	16.7
Robbery	3	8.3
Aggravated Assault	4	7.6
Arson	5	4.0
Burglary	6	3.7
Auto Theft	7	2.2
Larceny-Theft	8	2.0




Table 3-4--Sellin-Wolfgang Severity Scores for Potential Priority Crimes
(Values in parentheses represent actual and/or estimated number of cases)

Offense	Number Reported in 1975**	Number of Deaths (26 points each)	Forcible Intercourse (10 points each)	Victim Injury*			Intimidation**		Forcible Entry (1 point each)	Average Financial Loss**	Theft of Motor Vehicle (2 points each)	Total Severity Points	Average Severity
				Hospitalized (7 points each)	Treat & Discharge (4 points each)	No Treatment Required (1 point each)	Weapon Used (4 points each)	No Weapon (2 points each)					
Murder	52	1,352					196 (49)	6 (3)		52 (\$5)		1,606	30.9
Rape	324		3,240	112 (16)	388 (97)	211 (211)	300 (75)	498 (249)		648 (\$23)		5,397	16.7
Robbery	2,103			1,323 (189)	1,600 (400)	1,514 (1,514)	4,880 (1,220)	1,766 (833)		6,309 (\$252)		17,392	8.3
Aggravated Assault	1,493			4,494 (692)	836 (209)	642 (642)	4,896 (1,224)	538 (569)				11,406	7.6
Burglary	13,021								9,115 (9,115)	39,603 (\$429)		48,718	3.7
Larceny-Theft	25,452									50,904 (\$120)		50,904	2.0
Auto Theft	3,666									870*** (\$1,000)	7,332	8,202	2.2
Arson	569****									2,276 (\$4,726)		2,276	4.0

*Source: Victim injury information from City of Seattle 1977 Criminal Justice Plan.

**Source: Seattle Police Department 1975 Statistical Report: Number and average loss, p. 19; Intimidation, p. 22.

***For auto theft, financial loss is computed only if the vehicle is not recovered unharmed. The unrecovered and "totaled" loss in 1975 was approximately \$290,000 or 290 vehicles at a standard value of \$1,000 per vehicle.

****Source: Arson Task Force Report.

Court and Corrections Response (Sanctions Imposed Upon Offenders): A second indication of the relative severity of the index crimes and arson can be obtained by examining the response of the judicial and correctional agencies to individuals convicted of committing these crimes. It is presumed that both the decision to incarcerate versus release on probation and the length of time incarcerated reflect society's response to these crimes.

Four separate measures are combined in Table 3-5 to arrive at a ranking of the seriousness of these crimes: first, the percent of convicted offenders sentenced to prison from King County from 1965 to 1975; second, the average minimum term set by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles; third, the median length of stay in prison for these crimes; and fourth, the maximum possible length of incarceration.

When index crimes and arson are ranked within each of the four measures and the average rank is computed for each crime, the serious offenses are the following:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Rank of Seriousness (1 = most serious)</u>	<u>Mean Rank</u>
Murder	1	1.5
Rape	2	3.1
Robbery	3	3.3
Aggravated Assault	4	3.4
Arson	5	3.5
Burglary	6	4.8
Larceny	7	6.8
Auto Theft	8	6.8

Citizen Concern (Degree of Risk and Fear): A third indication of the relative severity of different crimes is both the risk or extent to which persons may actually be the victims of such crimes, and the degree to which they fear such risk.

1. Risk of Becoming a Crime Victim

Risk or probability of becoming a victim of serious crime can be estimated in two ways; either in terms of the number of offenses reported to the police, or in terms of the number of offenses estimated to have occurred irrespective of their being reported. While the criminal justice system deals in the main with reported crimes, an examination of the amount of serious crime and its impact on Seattle residents would be incomplete without taking into account the actual occurrence of crime. National LEAA and Seattle victimization surveys have shown that much crime occurs which is not reported. Victimization reporting data taken from the Sea-King Victim Information Project and the United States Department of Justice, LEAA, "Criminal Victimization Surveys in the Nation's Five Largest Cities," 1975, were used to estimate the true incidence of index crime in Seattle during 1975 (see Table 3-6).

The estimated number of incidents provides a more precise assessment of actual crime within the city than reported figures. It is an estimate of actual occurrence which more appropriately indicates the potential risk to the residents of Seattle than reported crime figures. The last column of Table 3-6 presents the estimated risk of becoming a victim of either an index crime or arson in Seattle during 1975.

2. Fear of Becoming a Crime Victim

In mid-1976, a survey conducted by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office of residents in federal census tracts 28, 96, 97, 98 and 105 (West Seattle and Green Lake area) included the questions: Of the crimes of burglary, robbery, theft-stealing and assault, "...which do you feel is the biggest problem Seattle residents face?" Of 950 interviewed, 912 (96 percent) responded (see Table 3-7). Of the two most frequently occurring crimes with which respondents would have had either personal experience or know of others' experiences (larceny and burglary), burglary was considered to be the more important problem by almost half (49 percent) of the respondents.



Table 3-5--Courts and Corrections Response
(Rank of importance within each measure given in parentheses)

Measure	Offense for which Person Convicted							
	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Burglary	Larceny	Auto Theft	Arson
Percent of Convicted Offenders Committed to Prison from King County, 1965-1975*	95 (1)	69 (3)	71 (2)	40 (5)	36 (6)	24 (7)	41 (4)	Unknown
Average Minimum Term set by Board of Prison Terms and Paroles** (Fiscal 1975)	15 yrs. (1)	9-1/4 yrs. (3)	5-3/4 yrs. (6)	12 yrs. (2)	6-3/4 yrs. (5)	3-1/12 yrs. (7)	2-3/4 yrs. (8)	7-11/12 yrs. (4)
Median Length of Stay in Prison: All Offenders Incarcerated as of June 30, 1976	2-1/4 yrs. (1)	1-11/12 yrs. (3.5)	2 yrs. (2)	1-11/12 yrs. (3.5)	1-7/12 yrs. (5)	1-1/2 yrs. (6)	1-1/2 yrs. (7)	Unknown
Maximum Sentence Possible under RCW**	20+ yrs. (3)	20+ yrs. (3)	20+ yrs. (3)	20+ yrs. (3)	20+ yrs. (3)	10 yrs. (7)	5 yrs. (8)	20+ yrs. (3)
Average Rank Value	1.5	3.1	3.3	3.4	4.8	6.8	6.8	3.5

*Based upon: Murder 1 and Murder 2, Assault 1 & 2, Burglary 1 & 2, Larceny--General and Grand

**Based upon: Murder 1, Assault 1, Burglary 1, Arson 1

Table 3-6--Estimated Risk of Becoming a Crime Victim in Seattle During 1975

Offense	Number Reported 1975	Population at Risk* Number Reported per 1,000 Persons/Residences/ Commercial Establishments	Victim Reporting Rate (Percent) ²	Estimated Number	Population at Risk* Estimated Number per 1,000 Persons/Residences/ Commercial Establishments
Murder	52	0.10	100.0 ³	52	0.10
Rape	324	1.23	54.0	600	2.28
Robbery	2,103			3,634	
Non-commercial	1,517 ¹	3.01	51.4	2,951	5.86
Commercial	586 ¹	43.08	85.8	683	50.21
Aggravated Assault	1,493	2.97	53.0	2,817	5.59
Burglary	13,021			23,170	
Residential	9,917	47.93	52.2 ⁴	18,998	91.82
Non-residential	3,104	228.18	74.4	4,172	306.70
Larceny	25,452				
Personal ⁶	14,803	29.40	30.0	49,343	98.00
Commercial ⁶	10,649	782.84	Unknown ⁵		782.84
Auto Theft	3,666	10.47	93.0 ⁵	3,942	11.26
Arson	569			569	
Residential	253	1.22		253	1.22
All other	316	23.23		316	23.23

¹Based upon SPD robbery unit logbook.

²Based upon LEAA victim surveys in five largest cities, Table 6, pp. 61-62.

³Assumed that all homicides known to police.

⁴Based upon 1975 Sea-King victimization survey; LEAA national data indicate a 54.0 percent reporting rate.

⁵Based upon completed thefts only; attempted auto theft reported in 73.4 percent of cases.

⁶Personal equals total larceny minus commercial; commercial includes shoplifting and theft from coin machines. However, this underestimates commercial offenses and overestimates personal offenses.

*Population at risk figures were derived using the following population figures:

Total population (1975)	503,500
All females (1975)	262,800
Residences (1975)	206,900
Passenger cars (1975)	350,000
Businesses (1972 Census)	13,603
(includes retail, service, and wholesale establishments)	

Table 3-7--Citizen Perception of Crime as a Problem
and Actual Risk of Becoming a Victim

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Percent Choosing Offense as Biggest Crime Problem</u>	<u>Risk of Occurrence per Person Years</u>
Murder	Not Asked	9,683
Rape	Not Asked	438
Robbery	6%	171
Aggravated Assault	15%	179
Burglary	49%	11
Larceny	10%	10
Auto Theft	Not Asked	89

SECTION III: SELECTION OF PRIORITY CRIMESRelative Threat of Crime Specific Offender Groups

To assist in the selection of priority crimes and to gain a more complete understanding of offender groups, adult suspect arrest profiles were developed for the offenses of murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and auto theft. Larceny was not included with other Part I offenses because of the nature of this offense. Profiles were generated by obtaining total local Seattle Police Department arrest histories for the period January 1, 1973, through August 31, 1975, for all adults arrested either for suspicion or charged for one of the target offenses in calendar year 1974. Within each arrestee group, each suspicion arrest (the cause for the initial arrest) during the entire 32-month period was recorded for each Part I offense. These data are included in Table 3-8.

The following example using the crime of rape is included to clarify Table 3-8. Ninety-one persons were arrested on suspicion of rape in calendar year 1974. During the period from January 1, 1973, through August 31, 1975 (a 32-month period), these same persons were arrested for a total of 171 Part I crimes including 1 murder, 136 counts of rape (including 1974 target rape arrests), 3 counts of robbery, 9 counts of aggravated assault, etc.

Table 3-8--Total Part I Arrests Including Target Offense, January 1, 1973 - August 31, 1975, for Adults Arrested During 1974

Arrests Between 1-1-73/8-31-75	Individuals Arrested in 1974 for the Offense of:					
	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Burglary	Auto Theft
Murder	63	1	1	7	4	1
Rape	0	136	19	28	18	5
Robbery	2	3	477	69	68	32
Aggravated Assault	5	9	29	298	34	8
Burglary	8	11	72	37	771	55
Larceny	13	8	137	44	190	80
Auto Theft	1	3	19	12	41	324
Total Part I	92	171	754	495	1,126	505
Average Part I Arrests/Arrestee	1.53	1.88	1.93	1.81	2.05	1.95
Number of Individuals Arrested in 1974 for Target Offense	60	91	391	273	549	259

Table 3-9 carries the analysis one step further. Using the data presented in Table 3-8, the SW Severity Scale is applied to each of the Part I arrests accumulated by each of the target offense arrest profiles and presents total severity times frequency, and average severity times frequency per arrestee.

In terms of average harm to victims and society in general, suspects arrested for murder provide the largest threat. These suspects are followed in decreasing seriousness by those arrested for the offenses of rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, and least serious - auto theft.

If the average number of offenses is multiplied by the average seriousness of offenses charged to the six groups (Table 3-10), the preceding ranking is changed only in that rape suspects become the most serious group, followed by homicide, then robbery, then aggravated assault.

Table 3-9--Suspect Group Profile Accounting for Frequency
of Part I Arrests and Severity

Offenses Charged Between 1-1-73/8-31-75	SW Severity	Total Offenses times SW Severity for Adults Arrested During 1974					
		Murder	Rape	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Burglary	Auto Theft
Murder	30.9	1,947	31	31	216	124	31
Rape	16.7	0	2,271	317	468	301	84
Robbery	8.3	17	25	3,959	573	564	266
Aggravated Assault	7.6	38	68	220	2,265	258	61
Burglary	3.7	30	41	266	137	2,853	204
Larceny	2.0	26	16	274	88	380	160
Auto Theft	2.2	2	7	42	26	90	713
Total (Severity x Frequency)		2,060	2,459	5,109	3,773	4,570	1,519
Average (Severity x Frequency per Arrest Arrestee/n Arrestees)		34.33	27.02	13.07	13.82	8.32	5.86

Table 3-10--Average Number of Arrests times Average Seriousness
for Offender Groups Arrested in 1974

	Suspect Groups					
	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Burglary	Auto Theft
Average Number x Average Seriousness of Crimes Charged (Rank Order)	47.9 (2)	50.8 (1)	25.2 (3)	25.0 (4)	17.1 (5)	11.4 (6)

SECTION III: SELECTION OF PRIORITY CRIMESAbility to Impact Serious Crime

An important consideration in selecting priority crimes for reduction and prevention program is the ability of the criminal justice system and related agencies to make a difference in the occurrence of these offenses. While all crimes are capable of being prevented if a massive enough effort is made, there are a number of different factors that make some offenses more or less likely to be impacted.

The following sections summarize several factors that influence ability to impact serious crime.

Murder: Factors influencing the ability to affect murder include the following:

1. Murder is the least frequent of serious crimes in Seattle. During 1976, the 42 cases represented a risk rate of one person out of every 11,988 within the city. This means that, on the average, one would expect to find one homicide victim for every 11,988 city residents during 1976. Because of this ratio, it is extremely difficult to determine who may become a victim or when the crime would occur.
2. It is assumed that all homicides become known to the police; therefore, official police statistics on its occurrence are believed to accurately represent the number of homicides in Seattle.
3. Homicide most frequently occurs among acquaintances and family, and within private residences and out of view of potential intervention.
4. Offenders frequently surrender themselves to law enforcement agencies, greatly simplifying investigative efforts.
5. Approximately 80 percent of all homicides are cleared by the police. In 1975, 11 of 52 cases were unsolved as of mid-February, 1976. As of mid-January, 1977, 8 of the 42 cases in 1976 were unsolved.

Because of the extremely low frequency of occurrence, the circumstances in which it occurs, the fact that many offenders apparently do not actively avoid capture, and most cases are at present solved using regular police resources, murder appears to be a crime with little chance of being successfully affected by any new efforts at a practical level to either prevent its occurrence or apprehend homicide offenders more efficiently.

Rape: Factors influencing the ability to affect rape include the following:

1. Rape is one of the least frequently occurring crimes in Seattle. In 1976, the 322 cases represented a risk rate of one for every 816 females in the city. This incidence rate makes it difficult to identify potential victims.
2. Not all rape cases become known to the police because approximately half are never reported. The estimated actual occurrence of rape in 1975 was one in 438 females. In 1976, the reported 322 cases probably represented 596 cases, or one rape for every 441 females. Because of victim non-reporting, there is substantial room to increase victim action (reporting) that would assist the criminal justice system in identifying and dealing with offenders.
3. As a crime involving direct confrontation, victims should be able to provide suspect descriptions, enabling identification and arrest of more offenders. In addition, approximately 40 percent of reported cases involve offenders who are acquaintances or relatives of the victims.
4. Approximately 63 percent of reported 1976 cases are not cleared. This leaves a substantial proportion of these offenses (approximately 200) available for improved investigative efforts.

While rape occurs with relatively low frequencies, there is substantial victim non-reporting which may be dealt with to improve the criminal justice system response. The present rate of suspect identification, arrest and case clearance leaves much room for improvement given victim ability to provide offender descriptions, especially in those instances where prior acquaintance with the offender exists.

Rape is a crime with a moderate chance of being successfully impacted by new and practical efforts to increase reporting of offenses and apprehension of offenders. However, because of its low relative occurrence, criminal justice system efforts aimed directly at rape prevention appear to have little chance of success.

Robbery: Factors influencing the ability to affect robbery include the following:

1. Robbery occurs with moderate relative frequency. In 1976, the 2,163 total commercial and personal occurrences represented a rate of one for every 233 persons in Seattle. While this is a low frequency in absolute terms, it may be possible to identify high-risk groups in the general population. In the case of commercial robberies, it is possible to identify high robbery risk establishments and classes of business.
2. Not all occurrences of personal robberies (as opposed to commercial) become known to the criminal justice system because approximately half are not reported by victims. During 1976, there were an estimated 3,029 actual occurrences of personal robberies (1,557 reports divided by a 51.4 percent reporting rate). This represents a rate of one robbery for every 166 persons in the city. Because of victim non-reporting, there are substantial numbers of cases in which the criminal justice system presently loses the opportunity to identify and deal with robbery offenders.
3. As a crime of direct confrontation, victims should be able to provide suspect descriptions and identify arrested offenders.
4. Approximately 70 percent of reported personal cases are not cleared. This leaves a substantial number of reported cases (approximately 1,500) available for improved investigative efforts.

Robbery occurs with moderate relative frequency and is characterized by substantial non-reporting of personal robberies. This non-reporting may be dealt with to improve the criminal justice system response. In the case of commercial robberies, there is a capability to identify high-risk individual businesses and classes of business establishments for prevention efforts. The present rate of suspect identification, arrest and case clearance leaves much room for improvement given victim ability to provide offender descriptions.

Robbery is a crime with a moderate to good chance of being successfully impacted by new practical efforts to increase the reporting of offenses and apprehension of offenders. In addition, because of the ability to identify high-risk business establishments, there is a moderate chance of preventing the occurrence of commercial robberies.

Aggravated Assault: Factors influencing the ability to affect aggravated assault include the following:

1. Aggravated assault occurs with moderate relative frequency. In 1976, the 1,601 cases reported represent one occurrence for every 314 persons in Seattle. While this is a low frequency in absolute terms, it may be possible to identify high-risk subgroups.
2. Not all aggravated assaults are reported. During 1976, there were an estimated 3,021 actual occurrences (1,601 divided by a 53 percent reporting rate), or one aggravated assault case for every 167 persons in Seattle. Because of victim non-reporting, the criminal justice system loses a substantial number of opportunities to identify and deal with aggravated assault offenders.
3. As a crime of direct confrontation, victims should be able to provide suspect descriptions and identify arrested offenders. This is especially true with aggravated

assault because approximately 65 percent of offenders are either acquaintances, friends or relatives of the victim. In addition, about half of all cases have witnesses other than the victims.

4. Approximately 44 percent of reported cases are not cleared. This leaves approximately 700 cases available for improved investigative efforts.

Since aggravated assault occurs with moderate relative frequency and with substantial non-reporting, the present rates of suspect identification, arrest and case clearance leave room for improvement given victim and witness ability to provide offender descriptions.

Aggravated assault is a crime with a moderate chance to be successfully impacted by new practical efforts to increase reporting of offenses, and offender arrests. At present, it is unknown if sufficient ability exists to identify high-risk persons for possible crime prevention efforts.

Burglary: Factors influencing the ability to affect burglary include the following:

1. Burglary occurs with high relative frequency. In 1976, the 8,870 reported residential burglaries represented a rate of one for every 23 Seattle residences. The 2,965 reported commercial burglaries represented a risk rate of one in every 4.5 business establishments. With this high relative frequency, prevention strategies aimed at the general population can be expected to reach appreciable numbers of potential victims.
2. Victim reporting of residential burglary is low, causing the criminal justice system to lose substantial numbers of opportunities to identify and deal with burglary offenders. In 1976, there were an estimated 16,992 residential burglaries (8,870 reports divided by a 52.2 percent reporting rate), or one in every 12 Seattle residences.
3. Only 10 to 20 percent of reported burglaries have identified witnesses. This means that little offender description information is typically available.
4. The nature of the crime is such that physical evidence (e.g., fingerprints) may frequently be available.
5. Approximately 30 to 40 percent of residential burglaries involve entry through unlocked doors and windows. Increasing the use of existing security devices may serve to substantially prevent this crime.
6. Approximately 87 percent of all burglaries are not cleared. This leaves approximately 10,300 cases available for improved investigative efforts.

Burglary occurs with high relative frequency and with substantial non-reporting. The lack of suspect information available from victims and witnesses complicates suspect arrests and case clearance rates and results in the lowest clearance rate of the index crimes. However, the possibility of physical evidence and increased witnessing of burglary may increase these rates. Since approximately one-third of residential burglaries occur through unlocked doors and windows, substantial prevention possibilities exist.

Burglary has a good to excellent chance of being affected through increased reporting and offender arrests. In addition, there are excellent chances to prevent its occurrence.

Larceny: Factors influencing the ability to affect larceny include the following:

1. Total larceny-theft occurs with high relative frequency and is the most frequent of reported index crimes. In 1976, there were a total of 21,186 cases, representing a rate of one per every 24 persons in Seattle. Because of its high frequency, prevention strategies directed at the general population can be expected to reach appreciable numbers of potential victims.

2. Victim reporting of non-commercial larceny is very low, causing the criminal justice system to lose extremely large numbers of opportunities to identify and deal with larceny offenders. In 1976, there were an estimated 53,343 non-commercial larcenies (16,003 non-commercial larceny reports divided by a 30 percent reporting rate), or one larceny for every nine persons in Seattle.
3. Approximately 75 percent of reported larceny cases are not cleared. It can be expected that about 15,500 reported larceny cases for 1976 will remain unsolved.
4. Larceny is an omnibus classification of many different types of thefts including shoplifting, theft/car prowling, theft/auto accessory, theft from coin machines, bicycle theft, purse snatching, till tap, larceny from buildings, pickpocket, use of stolen credit cards and checks, etc. While this list is not exhaustive, it does indicate the diversity of theft described by the term larceny. The most frequent type of larceny is larceny from buildings (excluding shoplift). In 1976, this offense accounted for 22.6 percent, or 4,795 of the larceny cases. In addition, it presents the highest dollar loss of the larcenies (\$1,025,726 or 29.4 percent of total larceny losses). The second most frequent larceny, shoplifting, accounted for 22.5 percent, or 4,770 cases, with an average loss of \$49.85 per case and \$237,788, or 6.8 percent of total larceny losses. The most costly average loss is for theft/car prowling which represents 3,643 cases (17.2 percent of total larcenies) with a total loss of \$871,766 (25 percent of larceny loss), or an average loss of \$239. (Strictly speaking, the most expensive form of larceny is that classified as "miscellaneous," 1,796 or 8.4 percent of all larceny cases with a total loss of \$484,581 or 13.9 percent of all larceny loss for a mean average loss of \$269 per case. However, for present purposes of identifying specific subtypes of larceny, such a miscellaneous category was felt to be inappropriate for analysis.) The most feared form of larceny, purse snatch, is represented by 1.1 percent or 241 of all larcenies. The nature of these three types of larceny are quite different and therefore would require at least three, and perhaps more, different strategies to deal with them.

Larceny occurs with the highest relative frequency and has the highest amount of non-reporting. There is substantial room for improvement in larceny clearance rates overall. However, the larceny classification includes many different types of thefts against many different types of targets (e.g., individuals, autos, businesses, residences and coin machines). Therefore, different approaches would be required to reduce or control the various types of larceny. Because of their similarity to other types of crimes, some forms of larceny may not require new and separate approaches. For example, there may not be a need to develop new programs aimed at reduction of thefts from buildings and residences, because these crimes are quite similar to burglary. Similarly, larceny/purse snatch can be treated in most instances as a robbery. With regard to larceny/shoplift, the police clearance rate is 89 percent and consequently does not offer much opportunity for an improved police response.

It appears that overall larceny has a good to excellent chance of being affected through increased or special efforts, especially with regard to increased reporting of the offense. However, it appears that the most threatening form of larceny, purse snatch, can best be treated as robbery. A similar condition applies to larceny from buildings and residences which may be dealt with as if it were burglary. Shoplift does not appear to offer much room for an improved police or prevention response.

Auto Theft: Factors influencing the ability to affect auto theft include the following:

1. Auto theft occurs with moderate to high relative frequency. In 1976, there were 2,860 reports, representing a rate of one per every 176 Seattle residents.
2. Auto theft victimization is reported to the police in almost every instance. Of completed thefts, 93 percent are reported. In 1976, this would mean that approximately 3,075 auto thefts occurred, or one for every 164 Seattle residents.
3. While offender description information is usually lacking in these cases, the stolen vehicle is easily identifiable.

4. The majority of auto thefts result in the recovery of stolen vehicles as can be seen in value-stolen and recovered figures for 1976. Of the \$2,794,649 loss, 88.5 percent (\$2,474,321) was recovered.
5. Approximately 87 percent of auto thefts are not cleared; this would represent about 2,500 unsolved cases in 1976.

Auto theft occurs with moderate relative frequency and is consistently reported by victims. While clearance rates are very low, leaving much room for improvement, the vast majority of vehicles are recovered and returned to owners.

Auto theft has a low chance of being affected by efforts to increase reporting (since most are already reported) and a moderate chance to increase arrests of offenders. The chances of preventing its occurrence are unknown at present.

Arson: Factors influencing the ability to affect arson include the following:

1. Arson is one of the least frequent offenses reported or discovered, with 569 occurring in 1975.
2. For residential arson, the 253 cases in 1975 represent a rate of one in every 818 private residences. This makes it difficult to identify potential residential targets.
3. A similar condition exists with regard to arsons against business establishments. During 1975, the 72 incidents of arson against businesses represent a rate of one in every 189 businesses in the city. This makes it more difficult to identify potential business targets.
4. A dramatically different condition exists for arsons against educational institutions. The 128 arsons in 1975 against educational institutions represent approximately one arson per public school. It is, therefore, a practical certainty that arsons will occur in school buildings. An arson reduction target of this type is, therefore, easy to identify.
5. A similar condition pertains to arsons against vacant residences. The ratio of arsons to vacant buildings makes it possible to target efforts against such structures.
6. There is no absolute way to determine which fires are arsons and which are not. No doubt some fires which are in fact arsons are not classified as such; while no doubt some fires which are not in fact arsons may be mistakenly classified as arsons. In the first case, arson investigators make no attempt to identify an arsonist when in fact one exists. In the latter case, arson investigators search for an arsonist that does not exist.
7. Approximately 92.5 percent of classified arsons are not cleared. This left approximately 526 cases in 1975 available for improved investigative effort. There is no readily available information on the extent to which arson incidents are witnessed, which often contributes to case clearance. Physical evidence that could be of value in identifying the arsonist is often destroyed or severely distorted.

Arson occurs with relatively low frequency and with some unknown probability of error in classifying the crime properly. Some categories of arson may have a good chance of being affected by new effort, while other categories of arson do not appear to be amenable to impact by any practical amount of new effort.

SECTION III: SELECTION OF PRIORITY CRIMESPriority Crimes

The preceding analyses in this section provide substantial information regarding the crimes under consideration for selection as priority crimes or those offenses for which discretionary and additional efforts may successfully reduce or prevent their occurrence. Following is a summary of this information and recommendations for city policy regarding priority crimes.

Murder

Murder is not selected as a priority crime, even though it is the most severe crime. The severity of this crime is reflected in the harm done to victims, the response shown by courts and corrections, and the average seriousness of all crimes committed by homicide offenders. The fact that murder occurs extremely infrequently, decreased 19 percent between 1975 and 1976, and is cleared in the vast majority of cases, offers little comfort to friends and relatives of these victims and society in general.

However, murder is not chosen as a priority crime because there is no evidence that murder can be reduced through either prevention or arrest strategies. If aggravated assault is considered as an "unsuccessful" murder, it is possible that the homicide problem might respond to strategies aimed at reducing aggravated assault.

Rape

Rape is selected as a priority crime.

Frequency: There were an estimated 596 occurrences of rape in Seattle during 1976, or 2.27 for every 1,000 females. Since 1964, rape has increased 347 percent.

Severity/Fear: Rape is a crime that involves direct confrontation, frequent injury, and personal invasion of the victim. In 1973 through 1975, more than one in three rape victims sustained additional injury. Approximately 20 percent of rapes involve at least one additional felony, the most frequent being armed and strong-armed robbery. The seriousness of the crime of rape is shown by the fact that it causes the second highest amount of victim loss and injury and the second highest level of sanctions applied against offenders and citizen fear. This fear is exemplified by the high level of interest on the part of citizen groups in rape prevention.

Relative Threat of Offender Group: Persons arrested for rape in 1974 averaged 1.88 Part I arrests per arrestee during a 32-month period. Among the violent crimes, this rate was exceeded only by robbery arrestees. In addition, the average seriousness of all crime committed by this group is second only to homicide offenders.

Reduction Potential: Rape appears to be amenable to reduction through increased reporting by victims, improved police investigation, and improved evidence collection procedures.

Robbery

Robbery has been selected as a priority crime.

Frequency: Robbery is the most frequently reported violent crime (2,163 in 1976). Since 1964, reported robbery has increased 341 percent. Non-commercial robberies are not always reported. It is estimated that 1,557 reports in 1976 reflect an actual occurrence of 3,029 separate instances, or 6.0 per 1,000 city population.

Severity/Fear: Robbery is a crime which, by definition, involves a direct confrontation between the offender and victim. This confrontation frequently results in injury to the victim. The seriousness of this crime is shown by the fact that it causes the third highest amount of victim loss and injury and third highest level of criminal justice sanctions imposed upon offenders.

Relative Threat of Offender Group: Persons arrested for robbery during 1974 averaged 1.93 arrests for Part I crimes during the period from January 1, 1973, through August 31, 1975. This arrest rate was the highest among the violent crimes.

Reduction Potential: Robbery appears to be amenable to reduction and increased offender arrest rates. Every robbery has at least one witness (the victim) who may be able to identify the offender if provided an opportunity to do so. Technology is available to record and/or report commercial robberies while in progress.

In addition, it is possible to identify both individual establishments and groups of commercial establishments which have a high risk of robbery occurrence.

Aggravated Assault

Aggravated Assault has been selected as a priority crime. The following facts have led to this decision.

Frequency: In 1976, aggravated assault was reported in 1,601 instances, representing the highest annual increase (7 percent) among the index crimes. Over the period 1964-1976, this offense has increased more than other index crimes (388 percent), or over four times the increase in total index crimes. Considering victim non-reporting, the actual occurrence of this offense is much higher, at an estimated 3,021 incidents, or 6.0 cases per 1,000 Seattle residents.

Severity/Fear: By definition, aggravated assault is an actual or attempted attack upon a victim with the intent to inflict severe bodily harm. An estimated 57 percent of reported aggravated assaults are serious enough to require medical treatment ranging from first aid to hospitalization. This crime ranks fourth highest of the eight crime types both in terms of victim loss and injury and criminal justice system sanctions.

Relative Threat of Offender Group: Adults arrested for aggravated assault were arrested for Part I crimes an average of 1.81 times in the 32-month period mentioned in Part IV. Although this ranks as the second lowest average number of offenses in the six offender groups examined, the average seriousness of these offenses is the third highest.

Reduction Potential: The reduction potential for aggravated assault is not as clear as the other priority crimes of burglary, robbery and rape. However, because of the fact that there is at least one witness to the assault, the victim, possible reductions may reside in techniques and strategies applied to robbery and rape crimes. In addition, there are additional witnesses available in more than half of the aggravated assaults. This is an indication that information from victims and witnesses could provide for an improved response to aggravated assaults.

Burglary

Burglary is selected as a priority crime.

Frequency: Burglary is the second most frequently occurring Part I crime. In 1976, reported residential and non-residential burglary (11,835 cases) accounted for almost 30 percent of reported Part I crime in Seattle. Reporting rates for residential burglary arrived at through local victimization studies suggest that approximately 16,992 residential burglaries occurred in Seattle in 1976, or approximately 33.7 residential burglaries per 1,000 Seattle citizens, or one residential burglary for every 12 residences.

Severity/Fear: The crime of burglary represents an invasion of personal security as well as property loss. According to a Seattle victimization study, citizens feared burglary more than any other crime. In terms of severity, burglary exceeds all other property crimes because the element of forcible or unauthorized entrance is present in addition to theft or other felonious acts which occur after entry to the premises has been gained. In addition, burglary is the most costly crime against property in terms of total dollar loss.

Relative Threat of Offender Group: Persons arrested for burglary in 1974 averaged 2.05 Part I arrests per arrestee over a 32-month period. This arrest rate exceeds that associated with all other Part I property crime arrestees.

Reduction Potential: Burglary seems particularly amenable to reduction through better protection of potential targets, increased citizen actions, and improved police services. There is an indication that the City's response to burglary is improving in that reported burglary decreased from 1974 to 1975 by approximately 8 percent. This decrease continued in 1976 in that burglary further decreased by an additional 9 percent.

Larceny

Total larceny is not selected as a priority crime even though it is both the most frequent index crime and also the least likely to be reported. However, to the extent that subgroups of different types of larcenies are subject to reduction or prevention, they will be dealt with as a special case of either burglary or robbery. The reasons for this decision are given below.

Frequency: Despite its high frequency both of reported and non-reported incidents (42.1 total reported larcenies per 1,000 population, and 105.9 actual occurrences of non-commercial larceny per 1,000 Seattle residents in 1976), larceny is not a single crime. It is an omnibus classification of many different types of thefts occurring in many different fashions with many different sorts of targets (e.g., persons, residences, businesses, and coin machines). As such, larceny is better dealt with as subgroups of the larger classification.

1. The most frequent (22.6 percent of all larcenies) and largest dollar loss of larceny, theft from buildings (excluding shoplift), can be dealt with as a special case of burglary.
2. The second most frequent form of larceny (22.5 percent), shoplift, is presently cleared in 89 percent of reported cases. As such, there appears to be little room for improved apprehension strategies.
3. The most feared form of larceny, purse snatch (1.1 percent of all larcenies), is an offense which, if it involves violence, is classified as a robbery. Therefore, robbery strategies would address this form of larceny.

Severity/Fear: Of the eight crimes examined, total larceny involves the least amount of victim loss and injury, elicits the least severe criminal justice sanctions, and is seen as the most important crime problem by only 10 percent of the population.

Relative Threat of Offender Group: No data are currently available on the relative threat of larceny offenders.

Reduction Potential: To the extent that reduction potential exists, it resides within the area of theft from buildings (which may be treated as a special instance of burglary prevention/reduction strategies) and purse snatch (which may be treated as a special instance of robbery).

Auto Theft

Auto theft is not selected as a priority crime. The primary reason for this decision is that most victims of this crime do not permanently suffer loss. While the temporary loss of one's vehicle is a matter of great inconvenience, approximately 87 percent of the victims suffer no permanent loss as in other property crimes, nor personal injury as in crimes against persons.

Frequency: In 1976, auto theft showed the biggest decrease (22 percent) in reported index crimes with 2,860 occurrences. Over the last 13 years, it has shown the smallest increase (51.4 percent) of all index crimes. Reported occurrences accurately reflect the actual occurrences of this crime since 93 percent of victims report the offense. In 1976,

the estimated actual occurrences (3,075) of this crime represented a rate of 6.1 occurrences per 1,000 Seattle residents.

Severity/Fear: In terms of victim loss and injury, auto theft is the second lowest of eight crimes examined, and lowest in terms of criminal justice system sanctions imposed upon offenders.

Relative Threat of Offender Group: In terms of average number of Part I arrests, auto theft offenders were second highest of six groups examined. However, the severity of these offenses was the lowest of all six groups.

Reduction Potential: Despite an 87 percent recovery rate, clearances are extremely low and offer much room for improvement for arrest strategies. The potential for preventing this crime is unknown at present.

Arson

Arson was not originally selected as a priority crime through analysis by the Law and Justice Planning Office due to an analysis which showed that arson occurred with low frequency. In addition, 37 percent of arson involved no direct loss to victims and another 5 percent of arson caused losses of under ten dollars. For residential arson, the type of arson which would on the surface cause the greatest anxiety among citizens, the apparent ability to reduce the incidence of this crime is quite low. Based upon these factors, and others which are itemized in the following, Law and Justice deemed arson would not represent a good selection as a priority crime. Therefore, the Executive version of the Criminal Justice Plan, which was transmitted to the Seattle City Council, did not include a discussion on arson as a priority crime. After discussion of the arson issue, the Public Safety and Justice Committee of the Seattle City Council elected to recommend to the full Council that arson be elevated to priority crime status. The reason for this reevaluation was in large part founded upon the work that Public Safety and Justice Committee Chairman Randy Revelle was involved in through the Mayor's Task Force on Arson. Law and Justice's reasoning for excluding arson as a priority crime follows briefly in the next four paragraphs. A full discussion of arson in Seattle immediately follows the reduction potential discussion.

Frequency: Total arson fires occur with a very low frequency. In 1976, there were only 1.15 arson fires per 1,000 population. However, for arsons against educational facilities and vacant buildings, the risk of an arson attack is extremely high. In the case of educational facilities, in 1975, there was an average of approximately one arson per structure.

Severity/Fear: In terms of victim loss and injury, the arson average was higher than the other crimes against property but lower than the crimes against persons as analyzed earlier. That average loss and injury is misleading, however. Approximately 37 percent of all arson cause no direct loss, and another 5 percent cause losses under \$10. In terms of sanctions imposed by the criminal justice system, arson ranks higher than all other property crimes but lower than crimes against persons.

Relative Threat of Offender Group: No data are available on the relative threat of arson offenders.

Reduction Potential: Depending upon the specific target of arson, reduction potential varies from extremely poor (residential arson, one per 819 residences) to extremely good (educational structures, approximately one per structure). With regard to targeting new arson reduction efforts on schools, there is little opportunity to reduce losses because most arsons in schools do not cause any loss. Therefore, it would not appear to be a high priority arson reduction target after all. It is doubtful that arson reduction programs aimed at residences would have much of a chance of having any effect, because of the large number and wide distribution of residences.

The risk presented by arson is identifiable in terms of bodily harm to victims, forcible/unauthorized entry of premises, and loss or damage to property. Table 3-11 shows the incidence and dollar loss of arson from 1971 through 1976.

Table 3-11--Arson in Seattle: 1971-1976

Year	Total FNIB ¹	Arson FNIB	Total FIB ²	Arson FIB	Accidental Loss FIB ³	Arson Loss FIB ³	Total Loss FIB ³	Percent Arson
1971	1,901	415	1,757	441	\$2,278,302	\$ 621,203	\$2,899,505	21%
1972	2,032	486	1,838	477	\$2,414,779	\$1,253,056	\$3,667,835	34%
1973	2,404	645	1,993	607	\$3,341,026	\$2,208,884	\$5,549,910	40%
1974	2,214	651	1,976	662	\$2,796,577	\$3,238,328	\$6,327,103	51%
1975 ⁴	2,059	530	1,787	569	\$2,604,000	\$2,689,000	\$5,293,000	50%
1976 ⁴	1,802	474	1,773	579	\$2,845,000	\$1,929,000	\$4,774,000	40%

¹Fires Not In Buildings.

²Fires In Buildings.

³Only the direct economic loss from FIB's is shown because it is very difficult to estimate direct economic loss from FNIB's (such as fires in vehicles, school yards

⁴The risk factor for arson in 1976 was 2.1 crimes per 1,000 population.

As described by the foregoing table, the direct economic loss from arson fires was more than three times greater in 1976 than in 1971. During the six-year period from 1971 through 1976, it is believed that arson fires caused five civilian deaths, 204 civilian injuries, 236 injuries to fire fighters, and two injuries to police officers. Arson raises the cost of fire protection services and results in increased fire insurance premiums. Arson costs the community in lost buildings, lost goods and services, lost revenues and sometimes loss of life.

The City of Seattle may have more information about the arson problem than any jurisdiction in the country. On June 6, 1975, the Mayor of Seattle announced the formation of a Task Force on Arson to "bring together representatives of various organizations and agencies directly affected by arson fires to try to find ways to reduce the dollar loss and incidence of arson in the Seattle/King County area." The Task Force, chaired by Fire Chief Frank Hanson, included representatives from a wide variety of public agencies and private organizations concerned about the arson problem in Seattle/King County including the Seattle Mayor's Office, the Seattle City Council, the Seattle Fire and Police Departments, the King County Prosecutor's Office and Department of Public Safety, the King County Fire Chiefs, the Seattle Chamber of Commerce, and the Washington Insurance Council.

On November 5, 1975, the Task Force submitted the "First Report of the Mayor's Task Force on Arson," which included the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. Arson is a serious and growing crime in Seattle/King County, resulting in significant economic and personal loss.
2. Arson is one of the most difficult crimes to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute successfully.
3. Since March, 1975, the Seattle Fire Department has implemented a number of operational improvements to control arson more effectively, including improvements to the Arson Investigation Unit, initiation of an arson analysis program, refinements to the arson patrol program, delegation of increased responsibility to fire combat

units for arson prevention and detection, some initial improvements in arson training and better communication through the Task Force on Arson.

4. To assure closer cooperation and coordination between the Seattle Police and Fire Departments and to improve the quality of investigations, the Task Force recommended assigning two to four police detectives to the Arson Investigation Unit in the Fire Department.
5. To improve the Fire Department's performance in prevention, detection and investigation of arson, the Task Force recommended implementing a three-phase arson investigators training program--including Arson Investigators Basic Training, Crime Scene Investigation and Advance Arson Investigation--at a cost of about \$10,700.
6. The Task Force developed and evaluated other proposals, including refinements to the arson analysis program, the development of a County-wide arson data system and various improvements in the role of the insurance industry in arson prevention and investigation.

As a result of the Arson Task Force's deliberations and recommendations to the Mayor, a number of strategies were implemented using in-City resources to combat arson. The Seattle Fire Department's Arson Investigation Unit was placed under the supervision of the Fire Chief, thus enabling the Chief to establish operational control over the unit. This action gave the arson investigators greater visibility and emphasized the City's commitment to controlling arson.

Initial steps were taken toward establishing an arson analysis program in the Fire Department. This program is designed to provide better and more usable data on when and where arson incidents are likely to occur, thereby enabling the Fire Chief to better allocate the Fire Department's resources for combating arson. A mapping program was also established to graphically display arson incidents by type and location.

Based on the initial results of the arson analysis program, the Fire Department formed arson reduction and prevention patrols--called "Community Fire Alert Patrols." These patrols send combat fire fighters and equipment to identified problem areas during the night hours. Patrol in a predetermined area in a highly visible, plainly identified vehicle is the principal mode of operation for the Community Fire Alert Patrols. When patrol members detect suspicious activity, they call a police unit for assistance.

In selected "high risk" neighborhoods, the efforts of the arson patrols have been aided by using combat fire fighters to distribute "Community Assistance Bulletins" which inform local residents how they can help control the arson problem in their neighborhood.

While considering the issue of allocating responsibility for arson investigations, the Arson Task Force recommended transferring two Seattle police detectives to the Fire Department's Arson Investigation Unit. The detectives serve under the operational command of the Fire Chief, while remaining under the administrative control of the Police Chief for such matters as pay, promotion and discipline.

The Arson Task Force recommended using the police detectives in the Arson Investigation Unit only until the regular arson investigators' skills could be improved to the level of a well trained police detective. To speed the acquisition of these skills, the Task Force developed and implemented a three-phase training program for arson investigators.

Phase I, an arson investigator's basic training course, was 166 hours in length. The course was taught by Police Academy personnel. The course was essentially identical to the 11-week basic law enforcement course, eliminating only those classes deemed unnecessary for arson investigation.

Phase II consisted of a 40-hour crime scene investigation course. This was identical to a Police Academy course known as the "detective school."

Phase III was an advanced arson investigation course lasting 80 hours. The course began with a series of lectures by knowledgeable experts in arson-related field work and concluded with in-depth, on-the-scene investigations of accidental and arson fires.

The intensive 286-hour program, training 14 Seattle arson investigators and 14 fire fighters from outside Seattle, was completed at a cost of \$10,700.

In November, 1975, the Institute for Puget Sound Needs, a public, non-profit scientific research institute, submitted to the Mayor's Task Force an unsolicited proposal to undertake a comprehensive computer research program on arson in Seattle and the environment in which it occurs. Based on arson incidence data available from the Seattle Fire Department, a ten-year period from 1965 to 1975 was suggested as a statistically significant block of time in which to examine the incidence of arson in the city. The Institute further proposed to study socio-economic, spatial and census-derived data to measure relationships between changes in these variables and corresponding changes in the frequency and location of arson. The Institute planned to examine all available arson arrest records during the ten years under study and trace the cases through the local criminal justice system to determine strengths, weaknesses and possible bottlenecks in the system. Finally, the Institute proposed to construct a computer-based model of variables, factors and relationships pertinent to the incidence of arson in Seattle to provide a means to forecast future arson frequencies and potential problem areas in Seattle. With the Mayor's concurrence, on May 21, 1976, the Seattle City Council authorized the Seattle Fire Chief to contract with the Institute for Puget Sound Needs for an analysis of arson in Seattle. The City appropriated \$7,500 to provide half of the funding, and the Safeco Insurance Company generously donated the other half. The arson analysis, entitled "Arson in a Socio-Economic Framework," was published in November, 1976, and provided information about the following:

1. the arson incident (information about when, where and why arson occurs);
2. the arsonist (the person who sets the fire); and
3. the local criminal justice system's response to arson and the arsonist (what has been done by local criminal justice authorities).

In addition to collecting, organizing and analyzing the foregoing information, the Arson Analysis tried to improve the City's current arson prevention and control strategies by providing the information needed to predict when and where arson fires will occur, and to identify arson-prone elements in the population.

The Arson Analysis is based on 11 years of arson data, recorded by the Seattle Fire Department from 1965 through 1975. The 11-year time span was also chosen as the baseline for the socio-economic data and most of the other variables used in the Arson Analysis and was used to develop useful information on the following:

1. the types of structures that are the most frequent targets of arson;
2. when and where arson occurs in the City of Seattle;
3. the dollar losses due to arson fires in Seattle;
4. who commits arson;
5. the motivations for committing arson; and
6. the relationships between arson variables and socio-economic, spatial and weather variables.

General Findings and Conclusions of the Arson Analysis

1. Frequency of Arson Incidents. The frequency of arson incidents in Seattle increased from 1966 to a peak in 1969, dropped for two years, from 1971 rose to a higher peak in 1974 and dropped moderately in 1975. Residential structures were, by far, the most frequent arson targets, followed by vacant and educational structures. The frequency of arson fires in residential and vacant structures followed the same general pattern as did all arson incidents. Arson in educational structures also followed the same trend, except it continued to increase in 1975. Residential arson actually declined as a percentage of total arson incidents, from 65.7 percent in 1966 to 44.5 percent in 1975. Meanwhile, arson in educational structures took over a much larger share of total arson incidents, increasing from 3.6 percent to 22.5 percent during the 11-year period.
2. Dollar Loss Due to Arson. Comparing dollar losses due to arson with the frequency of arson incidents revealed that the two variables are not necessarily related. A number of structure categories (especially storage, office and industrial structures) provided many examples where the frequency of arson for a given year rose sharply, while the dollar loss dropped just as sharply.

The dollar losses for various categories of arson targets did not form a consistent pattern. For example, during 1966, losses due to arson fires in storage facilities amounted to \$243,000; in 1967, losses were only \$38,000; in 1968, the losses rose to \$256,000. That inconsistent pattern continued, dropping to a low of \$27,300 and rising to a high of \$1,046,000 during the 11-year period. With the exception of residential losses, a similarly inconsistent pattern occurs with each of the categories of arson targets. Residential losses due to arson clearly increased from 1965 to 1975, although not consistently throughout the 11-year period.

The annual dollar loss attributable to arson fires in Seattle was analyzed and broken down into a number of dollar loss ranges by year and by building use. This exercise illustrated and reinforced the finding that, although a large percentage of total arson incidents resulted in little or no dollar loss in certain categories, a small number of large-loss fires each year have significantly affected aggregate arson loss amounts.

The fact that dollar loss ranges have now been statistically associated with the numbers of arson incidents and by type of building use should facilitate future monitoring of dollar loss categories by the City of Seattle. Furthermore, the Arson Analysis proposed a number of ways to further refine the dollar loss figures by considering them as constant dollars (real dollars, adjusted for inflation), per capita and by type of building use.

3. Who Commits Arson. The Seattle Fire Department's records divide arsonists into four categories: (1) children with matches (birth to 8 years old), (2) juveniles (9 to 17 years old), (3) firebombings, and (4) adults; this category includes arsons for which the Department cannot determine who was responsible. Juvenile and adult arson were chosen for special emphasis in the Arson Analysis because these categories contain the highest frequencies of arson in Seattle over the 11-year period.

During the 11-year period, adult arson comprised a growing share of the total number of arson incidents, reaching a peak in 1974. Juvenile arson was the largest cause in 1966, but did not keep up with the increase in adult arson. Still, with many ups and downs, the number of juvenile arson incidents has increased moderately since 1975. The number of arson fires caused by children has shown a steady and significant decrease during the 11-year period. In 1975, there were less than half the number of child-caused arsons than there were in 1966. The number of firebombings increased significantly in 1968 and 1969, but since then, they have occurred quite randomly from year to year, and in insignificant numbers.

4. Where Arson Fires Occur. Arson fires occur all over Seattle. There are certain areas, however, where arson fires are relatively infrequent. During the 11-year

period covered by the Arson Analysis, the census tracts listed in Table 3-12 below experienced the greatest number of total arson fires in the City of Seattle.

Table 3-12--Census Tracts with Relatively High Arson Fire Rates (Shown by Area of City and Alphabetically by Neighborhood)

<u>Area of the City</u>	<u>Neighborhood</u>	<u>Census Tracts</u>
North Seattle	Ballard	47
	Haller Lake	6
	North Park/Greenwood	17
	University District	53
	West Woodland	33
Ship Canal to Yesler Avenue	Central Area	77, 78, 79, 87 and 88
	Central Business District	81
	Queen Anne	68
Southwest Seattle	East of Fauntleroy	115
	High Point	107
	North of White Center	114
	South of Admiral	89
	South Park	108
Southeast Seattle	Beacon Hill	100
	Brighton	103
	Columbia	103
	International District	90, 91
	Lakewood	101
	Mt. Baker	89, 95
	Rainier Beach	118

Other census tracts gained temporary notoriety because of a relatively high number of arson fires during a one- or two-year period, but they tended to subside to average levels. In general, arson has been relatively static in terms of where it occurs (that is, arson does not appear to move significantly from one neighborhood to another).

5. Motives for Arson. It is difficult to determine why the crime of arson is committed, and any explanation of motives is necessarily subjective in nature. From an analysis of 336 cases where arrests were made and a determination of cause or motive was possible, the Arson Analysis found the distribution of motives for arson fires as listed in Table 3-13.

Table 3-13--Motives for Arson Fires

<u>Motives</u>	<u>Percentage of Total Arrests</u>
Undetermined	41.0%
Mental/emotional problem	20.0%
Juvenile vandalism	19.0%
Revenge	14.0%
Pyromaniac	2.0%
Personal fraud	1.0%
Business fraud	1.0%
Destruction of evidence of another crime	1.0%
Eliminate business competition	0.3%
Political protest	0.3%
	<u>99.6%</u>

The number of arson arrest records in the Arson Analysis (384) must be compared with the total number of arson incidents examined (about 10,000). Based on such a small sample, it is impossible to arrive at firm conclusions about the motives of Seattle arsonists.

6. Criminal Justice System's Response to Arson. The Arson Analysis focused on the Seattle-King County criminal justice system's response to arson and the arsonist. This research involved a careful examination of Superior Court, Justice Court and Juvenile Court records for persons charged with arson or arson-related crimes during the period 1965 to 1975. For that 11-year period, the Seattle Fire Department's records include information on a total of 10,506 arson incidents. Table 3-14 summarizes the local criminal justice system's response to adult arson during that period.

Table 3-14--Adult Arson Arrest/Conviction History
(City of Seattle, 1965 to Present)

<u>Explanation of Category</u>	<u>Adults</u>
Arson suspects (arrest records)	235
Information not available (missing records)	-48
Valid study cases	187
Other charges	-19
Cases with arson charge	168
Cases remanded to Justice Court	-19
Cases referred to King County Superior Court	149
<u>Superior Court Cases with Convictions</u>	<u>Adults</u>
First degree arson	23
Second degree arson	25
Malicious destruction of property	5
Possession of incendiary device	1
Conviction of other charge	15
Vagrant arson	1
Injury to property	1
First degree arson, committed to mental institution	3
Possession of fire bomb	1
Deferred sentence, guilty first degree arson	13
Deferred sentence, guilty second degree arson	12
Deferred sentence, guilty malicious destruction of property	1
	<u>101</u>
<u>Superior Court Cases without Convictions</u>	<u>Adults</u>
Not guilty	9
Insufficient evidence	11
Not convicted, case dismissed	12
Ordered to undergo mental treatment	13
Final disposition pending	1
Unable to locate files	2
	<u>48</u>

Table 3-15 illustrates how the local criminal justice system responded to juvenile arson from 1965 to 1975 (see Table 3-15).

One of the results of the analysis of the Seattle-King County criminal justice system's response to arson and the arsonist was an observation on the poor quality record keeping system. Out of 150 cases of juvenile arson arrests reported by the Seattle Fire Department from 1965 to 1975, 35 cases could not be located anywhere else in the criminal justice system. Furthermore, out of a total of 235 adult arson arrests reported by the Seattle Fire Department, 48 file cases and court dockets

Table 3-15--Juvenile Arson Arrest/Conviction History
(City of Seattle, 1965 to 1975)

<u>Explanation of Category</u>	<u>Juveniles</u>
Arson suspects (arson records)	109
Information not available (missing records)	-32
Valid study cases	<u>77</u>
No arson charges filed	- 5
Cases with filed charges	<u>72</u>
Cases with non-arson charges	- 3
Cases with arson charge	<u>69</u>
<u>Superior Court Cases with Convictions</u>	<u>Juveniles</u>
Second degree arson	2
Malicious destruction of property	1
Juvenile Court probation	10
Referred to parent for adjustment	8
Committed to juvenile rehabilitation institution	14
Injury to property	1
Delinquent arson	3
Attempted arson	1
Deferred sentence, guilty first degree arson	1
Deferred sentence, guilty second degree arson	2
	<u>43</u>
<u>Superior Court Cases without Convictions</u>	<u>Juveniles</u>
Not guilty	2
Insufficient evidence	2
Not convicted, case dismissed	6
Ordered to undergo mental treatment	6
Outcome not specified	7
Unable to locate files	3
	<u>26</u>

could not be traced. The Arson Analysis also concluded that personal data on arrested arson suspects contained in the Seattle Police Department's person investigation reports is rather poor in quality due to careless and incomplete entries on the report forms. This makes systematic analysis very difficult and the results rather tenuous.

7. Socio-Economic Trends and Arson. The Mayor's Task Force on Arson and the Institute of Puget Sound Needs initially speculated that the frequency of arson would be negatively correlated with economic trends. In other words, worsening business conditions and a decreasing standard of living were expected to provide the motives for, and therefore an increase in, arson incidents. This expectation was not supported by the Arson Analysis. Many indicators of an improving economy--increases in employment, retail sales, per capita income and business starts--showed highly positive statistical relationships with arson. As the Seattle economy improved, arson incidents increased. The few indicators of a worsening economy, such as the number of business failures and mortgage foreclosures, show negative correlations with arson.

It is important to emphasize that the observed relationships between arson and the economy are statistically valid, but they do not indicate causative relationships. For instance, one cannot conclude from the Arson Analysis that an expanding economy causes arson to increase.

The Institute's analysis of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of arrested arson suspects also provided other interesting findings. Where motives

could be determined--and in many cases, this was not possible--the data suggest that mental/emotional problems, vandalism and revenge are important factors motivating arsonists to set fires. In addition, while adult arsonists tend to set fires at night, juvenile arsonists concentrate their activities in the late afternoon (after school) and the early evening. Such findings, of course, are subject to a number of different interpretations, and one must be very careful in jumping to unwarranted conclusions with regard to such statistics.

8. Predicting Arson Incidents. The Arson Analysis attempted to develop an arson frequency probability model for Seattle, incorporating a number of statistically significant socio-economic and spatial variables as they relate historically to the incidence of arson in Seattle. Two main statistical computer-based techniques, multiple regression analysis and factor analysis, were used in this effort. The first methodology was applied to monthly economic variables and to weather data; the latter to 42 census-derived variables and percentages measuring changes between 1960 and 1970.

Multiple regression analysis involving juvenile arson showed that 37 percent of the variation in monthly juvenile arson incidence rates in Seattle between 1965 and 1975 can be explained by six variables and their behavior over time. Multiple regression analysis applied to adult arson showed that 73 percent of the variation in monthly "other suspicious fires" incidence rates over the 11-year period can be explained by 15 variables and their behavior over time.

Multiple regression analysis involving meteorological variables and arson produced the most concrete results. The Analysis found that weather factors explained almost 13 percent of the variance in juvenile arson for the year selected, while these same factors accounted for only 3.4 percent of all "other suspicious fires" (including adult arson). This tends to confirm the belief that the motivation behind adult arson is less dependent on whim and "kicks" in the out-of-doors than is the motivation for juvenile arson.

The findings of the factor analysis involving census tract data were inconclusive. The Institute tried to isolate and group together certain census tracts whose arson rates tended to behave in a similar fashion over time in order to identify common elements influencing the incidence of arson. A comparison of these tracts based on 1970 census data alone failed to show much similarity between these tracts in any of the key variables considered. This suggests that the commonality between these tracts may involve dynamic elements, such as rates of change over time, rather than static "one-time" elements contained in only one set of census data. Further study at a more detailed level of analysis of variance would have to be conducted on the ten most significant factors in order to be able to support or refute this preliminary conclusion.

With regard to the predictive aspects of the multiple regression analysis, more meaningful results may be found by the application of two additional approaches: (1) an examination of lead and lagged variables which may present a more causal versus "coincidental" relationship with arson categories over time; and (2) an examination of non-linear models, which are common techniques used in predictive model building. Financial and time constraints prevented these techniques from being explored in the Arson Analysis.

Based upon the Institute's work and their own interpretations, the Mayor's Task Force on Arson concluded that the Arson Analysis represented a significant contribution to the City's store of information about arson and is a potential starting point for further investigation. Seattle generally reflects the proportionate types of arson and arsonists found in other parts of the United States: children with matches, juvenile vandalism, "protest" firebombs, revenge fires, domestic and commercial insurance fraud fires, racketeering arson, intimidation fires and psychologically disturbed "pyromaniacs." The Institute's study also concluded that Seattle, because of its physical layout, lack of large slum areas, quality of housing stock, almost total lack of huge low-income housing projects and welfare policies which do

not encourage arson to collect large "resettlement stipends," has been "spared the ravages of arson which have been inflicted in other large American cities." There are indications, however, that a tendency towards higher frequencies of arson exists in certain census tracts which have a mix of multi-family units, poverty and delapidation.

SECTION III-A: BURGLARYIntroduction

The Survey of Burglary is a descriptive and statistical overview of burglary in Seattle. It contains what is currently known about burglary trends, frequency of occurrence, time of occurrence, how entry is made, extent of damage and loss, profiles of adult and juvenile offenders, what leads to offender arrests, and an analysis of how commercial and residential burglaries differ as committed by adult and juvenile offenders. In addition, the section contains a general analysis of the criminal justice system's response to the crime of burglary.

The major sources of data used in this section are the following:

1. FBI's Uniform Crime Report, 1966-1976 (UCR 1966-1976).
2. Seattle Police Department's annual statistical reports from 1966 to 1976 (SPD Statistical Report).
3. Seattle Police Department's report entitled "Monthly Crime Capsule" (SPD MCC).
4. Criminal Victimization in the United States: A Comparison of 1973 and 1974 Findings, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1976 (LEAA Victimization 1973-1974).
5. Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office's 1975 Criminal Victimization Survey (Seattle Victimization Survey 1975).
6. Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office sample surveys conducted between 1972 and 1976 from Seattle Police Department records of adult and juvenile arrestees and offense reports (LJPO Sample Surveys 1972-1976).
7. C. Clawson and S. Chang, "Impact of Response Delays on Arrest Rates," Seattle Police Department Inspectional Services Division, September, 1975 (Clawson and Chang, 1975).

A Survey of Burglary

Definition: By the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting definition, burglary is an offense in which illegal entrance into a structure is made or attempted in order to commit a theft or felony. In most jurisdictions, burglaries are classified as residential or non-residential. Residential burglaries include illegal entrances into houses, apartments, garages and sheds used as dwellings or attached to dwellings; non-residential burglaries refer to illegal entrances into structures used for commercial purposes or used by governmental, religious and private agencies. For purposes of this document, commercial burglary will be defined to include all such non-residential structures, even though strictly speaking they include a small proportion of non-commercial establishments.

Burglary is more frequently a crime involving residential rather than non-residential structures. In 1975, for example, residential burglary accounted for 64 percent of all burglaries in the United States (Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C., 1975, p. 28). In 1975, residential burglaries in Seattle accounted for 76.2 percent of total burglaries while in 1976, residential burglaries made up slightly less of the total burglaries (74.9 percent). Nationally, for cities over 250,000 population, the 1975 burglary rate per 100,000 population was 2,368.4 (Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington D.C., 1975, p. 28). Seattle's 13,021 burglaries in 1975 represent a 2,586.1 per 100,000 rate.

Trends

Five-year National Trend, 1970-1975: In 1975, there were an estimated 3,252,100 burglary cases reported, or 15.26 residences and commercial establishments burglarized for every 1,000 persons in the United States. This represents an increase of 47 percent in reported cases and a 41 percent increase in per capita occurrence since 1970.


Thirteen-year Local Trend, 1964-1976: On an annual basis, burglary has declined 9.1 percent from 1975 to 1976 (13,021 to 11,835). On the basis of a thirteen-year trend (see Figure 3A-1), burglary has increased 140.0 percent (from 4,932 to 11,835 between 1964 and 1976). In this time, burglary has risen from its lowest point in the thirteen-year period in 1964 to an all time high in 1969, declined through 1972, began rising to a peak in 1974 and declined to its present level in 1976.

When compared to national data, Seattle's 1970-1975 trend indicated a decrease of 11.8 percent. However, the per capita risk rate for burglary in Seattle during 1976, 23.51 burglaries for every 1,000 persons, is 54.1 percent higher than the total national rate for 1975 and 4.4 percent lower than the rate for comparable sized cities of 500,000 to 1,000,000 population (24.60 per 1,000) in 1975.

Victimization Survey Data: Victimization surveys conducted for the years 1973 and 1974 by the Census Bureau for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration interviewed a representative national sample of up to 65,000 households and 15,000 commercial firms (LEAA Victimization 1973-1974). Based upon these surveys, it is estimated that during 1973, 91.5 burglaries occurred for every 1,000 households. In 1974, this increased to 92.6 per 1,000 households. Of those victimized, 46.5 percent reported such occurrences in 1973. Reporting rates increased to 47.8 percent for victims of this crime in 1974.

Similar victimization surveys of residences conducted in Seattle for victims of crime in 1975 (Sea-King 1976) in five of the 121 census tracts comprising Seattle found 91 burglaries within 1,263 residences interviewed, or a rate of 72.05 per 1,000 residences. Of the 91 incidents, 47 (51.6 percent) were reported to the police, while 44 (48.4 percent) were not reported.

Figure 3A-1--Thirteen-year Trend of Reported Burglary Offenses in Seattle
(Seattle Police Department)



The reason most frequently given by victims for not reporting burglary incidents was the feeling that police could not do anything (83.3 percent of those responding, or 35 of 42). When asked the single most important reason for not reporting, 30 (71.4 percent) still indicated this response (see Table 3A-1).

Table 3A-1--Reasons for 1975 Burglary Victims Not Reporting to the Police

Reason for Not Reporting	All Reasons Given		Most Important Reason	
	Number	Percent of Respondents	Number	Percent
Didn't want to take time to report	7	16.7	3	7.1
Didn't wish to harm/punish offender	2	4.8	2	4.8
Fear of reprisal	3	7.1	1	2.4
Private/not criminal matter	6	14.3	4	9.5
Police couldn't do anything	35	83.3	30	71.4
Police wouldn't want to be bothered	11	26.2	2	4.8
Didn't know how or if to notify the police	3	7.1	0	0.0
Too confused/upset to report	0	0.0	0	0.0
Feared insurance cancellation	2	4.8	0	0.0


Of the 32 (76.2 percent) who felt the police could not do anything or would not want to be bothered, the reasons for this perception were as follows:

Respondent felt there was a lack of proof	24 (66.7 percent)
Not important enough	17 (53.1 percent)
Reported to someone else	3 (9.4 percent)
Private matter	2 (6.3 percent)
Too inconvenient	2 (6.3 percent)
Feared reprisal	1 (3.1 percent)
Felt police don't care	1 (3.1 percent)

Short-term Trend of Occurrence

By Month: The patterns of reported residential burglaries in Seattle by month were consistent with observations published by criminologists such as Herbert A. Block and others (Block and Geis, Man, Crime and Society, New York, Random House, 1962, pp. 167-168). The frequency of property crimes was relatively low in "warm weather" months, began to climb in autumn and peaked in December (see Figure 3A-2). However, for commercial burglaries, no clear or consistent pattern was detectable for the years 1975 and 1976.

Figure 3A-2--Frequency of Reported Burglary, By Month of Occurrence




--BURGLARY REPORTS--

Residential												
1975	859	757	935	771	769	775	876	794	755	909	805	912
1976	792	742	693	737	723	673	804	734	760	704	696	812

Commercial												
1975	252	270	296	248	273	255	271	212	249	258	232	288
1976	274	264	284	256	253	234	218	281	261	233	204	207

Seattle data on residential burglary show a pattern similar to national data on the reporting of all burglaries (see Figure 3A-3). Burglary reaches a peak in the November through February months, reaches a low in the May and June months and then increases during the mid-summer months of July and August before dropping slightly in the early fall.

Figure 3A-3--National Reporting of Burglary by Month (Source: 1975 UCR, p. 39)



By Day of Week: A particularly notable pattern of occurrences by day of week based on 1972 data (see Figure 3A-4) emerged from a computer analysis of Seattle Police Department (SPD) records. Relatively few burglaries were reported on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays; the frequency of burglaries increased on Fridays and reached a peak on Sundays--in part because many residential burglaries occurred during weekend absences and were not discovered and reported until Sunday. It is clear, however, that most burglaries occurred on Fridays and weekends, dropped precipitously on Mondays and gradually began to rise throughout the week to repeat the same cycle.

A similar analysis was conducted separately for residential and non-residential burglary cases using 1974 SPD data. While the day of week analysis for non-residential burglary in 1974 was similar with 1972 data, the residential burglary cases showed a different pattern. Throughout the week and weekend, the level was relatively stable, with a marked peak in occurrence appearing on Friday (Figure 3A-4).

By Time of Day: Computer analysis of 1972 SPD offense reports also indicated a strong correlation between the frequency of burglary and time of day. Relatively few burglaries occurred between midnight and 11:00 a.m. Frequency increased dramatically at noon, dropped slightly throughout the day until 6:00 p.m., and then peaked again at 7:00 p.m. Thus, burglaries occurred during daylight and early evening hours between noon and 9:00 p.m. (see Figure 3A-5). A similar analysis conducted on 1974 data indicated that the 1972 finding held true for 1974 residential burglary but that the opposite pattern held for non-residential burglary; that is, the vast majority occurred during the late evening/early morning hours (8:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m.).

Since most burglaries are not observed by witnesses or victims, the exact time of occurrence may frequently be inaccurate. It is possible to argue that Figure 3A-5 illustrates time of discovery more accurately than it describes time of occurrence. Because of this concern, other data were analyzed to determine possible time patterns. The findings of the 1972 burglary sample offenses, burglary offender interviews and burglary victim studies, and the 1975 studies, were examined to determine time of occurrence, day or night (UCR standards apply: "day" means 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., "night" means 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.). The results of this analysis (Table 3A-2) suggested that patterns did develop, but that the patterns were dependent upon the burgled target; that is, whether it was residential or non-residential. More than 60 percent of residential burglaries occurred during the day; in contrast, only 29 percent of non-residential burglaries occurred during the day.


A similar analysis performed on all 1974 SPD burglary cases with a reported time of occurrence confirms this general pattern of more residential burglaries occurring during the day, while the vast majority of non-residential burglaries occurred at night.

Using random samples of both residential and commercial burglaries which occurred in 1975, data were collected both on estimated time of burglary occurrence and actual time of report to the Seattle Police Department (see Table 3A-3).

While 53.7 percent of the residential burglaries with known times of occurrence were estimated to have occurred between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., only 26.5 percent of non-residential burglaries occurred within the same time period. For residential burglary,

Figure 3A-4--Frequency of Burglary in Seattle, by Day of Week
(Computer Analysis of 1972 and 1974 Seattle
Police Department Offense Reports)


Burglaries by
Day of Week



	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY	SUNDAY
1974 Res.	1494	1461	1521	1500	1654	1453	1481
1974 Non-Residential	395	440	449	400	392	532	843
1974 Total	1889	1901	1970	1900	2046	1985	2324

Figure 3A-5--Frequency of Reported Burglary in Seattle by Time of Day (Computer Analysis of Seattle Police Department Offense Reports)

Number of Burglaries



- 1974 Total Burglary
- 1974 Residential Burglary
- - - 1974 Non-Residential Burglary
- · - · 1972 Total Burglary

Table 3A-2--Number and Percent of Residential and Non-Residential Burglaries by Day and Night

	1972		1974*	
	<u>Day</u> Number and Percentage	<u>Night</u> Number and Percentage	<u>Day</u> Number and Percentage	<u>Night</u> Number and Percentage
<u>Residential:</u>				
	85 ¹ (64%)	48 ¹ (36%)	3502 (52%)	3240 (48%)
	35 ² (61%)	22 ² (39%)		
	9 ³ (64%)	5 ³ (36%)		
	22 ⁴ (52%)	20 ⁴ (48%)		
<u>Total Residential:</u>				
	151 (61%)	95 (39%)		
<u>Non-Residential:</u>				
	18 ¹ (44%)	23 ¹ (56%)	274 (19%)	1179 (81%)
	4 ² (13%)	27 ² (87%)		
	4 ³ (24%)	14 ³ (76%)		
	2 ⁴ (44%)	5 ⁴ (56%)		
<u>Total Non-Residential:</u>				
	28 (29%)	69 (71%)		

*All reported burglaries in 1974

- ¹Sample of burglary offense reports
²Sample of arrest reports
³Burglar interviews
⁴Victim survey

Table 3A-3--Time of Burglary Occurrence and Reporting
(Random sample of 1975 cases)

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Type of Burglary</u>			
	<u>Residential</u>		<u>Non-Residential</u>	
	<u>Estimated Time of Occurrence*</u>	<u>Reported</u>	<u>Estimated Time of Occurrence*</u>	<u>Reported</u>
Midnight up to 3 a.m.	2 (5%)**	9	6 (18%)**	7
3 a.m. up to 6 a.m.	3 (7%)	3	9 (27%)	20
6 a.m. up to 9 a.m.	1 (2%)	4	1 (3%)	10
9 a.m. up to Noon	2 (5%)	12	1 (3%)	30
Noon to 3 p.m.	11 (27%)	16	1 (3%)	10
3 p.m. to 6 p.m.	8 (20%)	21	6 (18%)	11
6 p.m. to 9 p.m.	8 (20%)	15	3 (9%)	5
9 p.m. to Midnight	6 (15%)	14	7 (21%)	4
Unknown	59	6	34	3
Total	100	100	100	100

*Estimate taken from offense report as determined by victim and responding police officer. If occurrence time was indicated as a range, it was counted as occurring within a time period only if it was entirely within one of the specified three-hour time periods. All other cases were recorded as "unknown."

**Percent given as percent of known times.

reporting follows much the same time pattern as occurrence (56.4 percent reported between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.). However, for non-residential burglaries, 73.2 percent were reported during the day, while approximately 74 percent occurred at night.

Geographical Area of Occurrence: In 1975, the 10 census tracts with the highest number of reported burglary cases were concentrated in four areas (see Map 3A-1). These were the Mt. Baker-Rainier Valley area (federal census tracts 95, 101, 103, 104, 110, and 111), Capitol Hill (74 and 75), East Central (78) and downtown (81). These 10 tracts accounted for 2,435 reports or 18.7 percent of Seattle's burglaries in 1975.

During 1975, there were only six census tracts with fewer than 20 reported residential burglaries. However, two of these tracts (55 and 23) are comprised primarily of former federal military reservations (Ft. Compton and Sand Point Naval Station). Two additional tracts (91 and 92) are downtown business tracts while the remaining two (25 and 71) are residential tracts.

Clearance/Arrest Rate: According to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, an offense is cleared when police have identified the offender, have sufficient evidence to charge him and actually take him into custody. In addition, crime solutions are also recorded in exceptional instances when some element beyond police control precludes the placing of formal charges against the offender, such as the victim's refusal to prosecute or local prosecution is declined because the subject is being prosecuted elsewhere for a crime committed in another jurisdiction. The arrest of one person can clear several crimes or several persons may be arrested in the process of clearing one crime (UCR 1971).

National Clearance/Arrest Rate: In 1975, 17.5 percent of 2,237,286 cases of burglary reported nationally from jurisdictions representing 127,068,000 persons (Table 18, 1975 FBI UCR) were cleared by arrest. This represents a clearance rate of 3.08 per 1,000 population compared to an occurrence rate of 17.61 per 1,000 persons. For cities with populations between 500,000 and 1,000,000 (those comparable to Seattle), there were 300,356 reported cases from a total population of 12,297,000, or 24.43 per 1,000 population. Of these, 18.8 percent were cleared for a rate of 4.59 per 1,000 population.

Seattle Clearance/Arrest Rate (1964-1976): In 1976, 1,549 (13.1 percent) of the reported 11,835 cases in Seattle were cleared. This represents a clearance rate of 3.08 per 1,000 population with an occurrence rate of 23.51 per 1,000 population. As can be seen in Table 3A-4 clearance rates reached a peak in 1971, declined through 1975, and increased in 1976.


Table 3A-4--Clearance Rates Between 1964-1976 for Burglary

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>	<u>Percent Cleared</u>
1964	4,932	19
1965	4,965	19
1966	5,456	14
1967	8,013	17
1968	9,933	15
1969	14,820	12
1970	14,770	15
1971	12,455	21
1972	11,339	19
1973	12,926	12
1974	14,219	10
1975	13,021	10
1976	11,835	13


Characteristics of Residential and Commercial Burglary in Seattle

The following sections discuss characteristics of victims and suspects for residential and commercial burglaries in Seattle. The data on which these tables are based are

Map 3A-1--Ten Census Tracts with the Highest Number of Reported Burglaries in 1975



CITY OF SEATTLE
1970 CENSUS TRACTS



derived from SPD offense reports from 1975. Random samples of 100 residential burglaries and 100 commercial burglaries were taken from these offense reports. Residential and commercial statistics will be presented in separate tables.

Characteristics of Burglary Victims

Age: Table 3A-5 gives the age distribution of the person reporting residential burglary from the 100-case 1975 Seattle sample.

Table 3A-5--Age of Residential Burglary Victims

<u>Age Category</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
0-14	0	0.0	17.7
15-19	3	3.3	7.8
20-24	13	14.4	10.0
25-29	14	15.6	11.8
30-34	6	6.7	7.3
35-39	14	15.6	4.6
40-44	9	10.0	4.2
45-49	1	1.1	5.1
50-54	8	8.9	6.3
55-59	6	6.7	6.2
60-64	5	5.6	5.8
65+	11	12.2	13.5
Unknown	10		
Total	100		

Table 3A-5 shows that the median age for residential burglary victims is 35 to 39 years of age. In comparing the age distributions for these victims with age distribution for Seattle as a whole, one sees that people aged 20 through 44 have more than their share of Seattle burglaries. People in this age group represent 37.9 percent of Seattle's population but represent 62.3 percent of residential burglary victims. The reason for this pattern may be that people in this age group are usually working away from home, providing more opportunity for burglary.

Race: Table 3A-6 gives the racial distribution of these victims.

Table 3A-6--Race of Residential Burglary Victims

<u>Race</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
Caucasian	77	84.6	82.8
Black	10	11.0	8.6
Asian American	2	2.2	3.9
Chicano	1	1.1	2.0
Native American	1	1.1	0.9
Filipino	0	0.0	1.3
Other	0	0.0	0.5
Unknown	9		
Total	100		

As Table 3A-6 shows, victims are fairly evenly distributed across Seattle's racial categories, as there are few differences between the Seattle and victim distributions. Blacks apparently have a slightly higher rate of burglary than other groups, while Asian Americans have a slightly lower rate of being victimized by burglary.

Sex: Table 3A-7 shows the sex of residential burglary victims in this sample.

Table 3A-7--Sex of Residential Burglary Victims

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
Male	64	68.1	47.6
Female	30	31.9	52.4
Unknown	6		
Total	100	100.0	100.0

Males are more often listed as victims than females, probably because burglary is primarily a crime against a household, and males are more often heads of households than females.

Occupation: Table 3A-8 gives the occupational distribution of the person reporting a residential burglary victimization in this sample.

Table 3A-8--Occupations of Residential Burglary Victims

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
Student (18 and over)	5	6.1	9.2
Unemployed	4	4.9	4.8
Welfare	1	1.2	1.8
Retired/Disabled	10	12.2	16.0
Blue Collar/Laborer/Service	5	6.1	9.8
Sales/Clerical/White Collar	14	17.1	16.5
Skilled/Technical/Managerial/ Professional	39	47.6	26.5
Housewife	4	4.9	15.0
SPD Officer	0	0.0	0.2
Military Service	0	0.0	0.2
Unknown	18		
Total	100		

Table 3A-8 shows that burglary victims are likely to be employed in well-paid jobs; people employed in skilled, technical, managerial or professional fields account for only 26.5 percent of those employed, but for 47.6 percent of the burglary victims in this sample.

Characteristics of Burglary Suspects

Data for this section are drawn from the same random samples used as data sources in the previous section.

In most cases of burglary, there was no information on suspects, so large numbers of cases fell into the "unknown" category. For this reason, data in tables in this section have been converted to percentages; first including "unknown" cases as a category and second excluding the "unknown" cases in order that known characteristics may be compared with those of the total Seattle population. The large number of suspects with unknown characteristics makes it necessary to use great caution in interpreting these tables.

Age: Table 3A-9 gives the age distribution for residential burglary suspects for those cases in which such information was available.

Table 3A-9--Ages of Residential Burglary Suspects

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Excluding Unknown</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
9 and under	0	0	0	11.3
10-14	1	1	6.7	6.4
15-19	6	6	40.0	7.8
(15-17)	(4)	(4)	(26.0)	(4.6)
(18-19)	(2)	(2)	(13.3)	(3.2)
20-24	4	4	26.7	10.0
25-29	3	3	20.0	11.8
30-34	0	0	0	7.3
35-39	1	1	6.7	4.6
40-44	0	0	0	4.2
45-49	0	0	0	5.1
50 and up	0	0	0	31.8
Unknown	85	85		
Total	100			

Table 3A-10 gives the age distribution for commercial burglary suspects.

Table 3A-10--Ages of Commercial Burglary Suspects

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Excluding Unknown</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
9 and under	0	0	0	11.3
10-14	0	0	0	6.4
15-19	8	8	42.1	7.8
(15-17)	(4)	(4)	(21.0)	(4.6)
(18-19)	(4)	(4)	(21.0)	(3.2)
20-24	5	5	26.3	10.0
25-29	3	3	15.8	11.8
30-34	1	1	5.3	7.3
35-39	1	1	5.3	4.6
40-44	0	0	0	4.2
45-49	0	0	0	5.1
50 and up	1	1	5.3	31.8
Unknown	81	81		
Total	100			

Tables 3A-9 and 3A-10 show that suspects aged 15-24 account for much more than their share of residential and commercial burglaries. This age group represents 17.8 percent of the total Seattle population but 67.6 percent of the burglary suspects. The 15-19 age group is the most overrepresented; 7.8 percent of the Seattle population but 41 percent of the suspect population. In contrast, people aged 40 and over are underrepresented in the suspect population, comprising 41.1 percent of Seattle's population but only 2.6 percent of the suspect group. However, age of suspect is unknown in 83 percent of these cases, so these conclusions are very tentative.

Race: Table 3A-11 gives the racial distribution of residential burglary suspects while Table 3A-12 gives the racial distribution of commercial burglary suspects.

Tables 3A-11 and 3A-12 show that blacks and filipinos account for 9.9 percent of the Seattle population but for 45.0 percent of burglary suspects. Caucasians and Native Americans are underrepresented in the suspect group, accounting for 83.7 percent of the Seattle population but for only 49.6 percent of the suspect population. Caucasians tend to be commercial rather than residential burglary suspects, while blacks tend to be residential burglary suspects.

Table 3A-11--Race of Residential Burglary Suspects

<u>Race</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Excluding Unknown</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
Caucasian	7	7.0	41.2	82.8
Black	8	8.0	47.1	8.6
Asian American	1	1.0	5.9	3.9
Chicano	0	0.0	0.0	2.0
Native American	0	0.0	0.0	0.9
Filipino	1	1.0	5.9	1.3
Other	0	0.0	0.0	0.5
Unknown	83	83.0		
Total	100	100.0	100.1	100.0

Table 3A-12--Race of Commercial Burglary Suspects

<u>Race</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Excluding Unknown</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
Caucasian	11	11.0	57.9	82.8
Black	6	6.0	31.6	8.6
Asian American	0	0.0	0.0	3.9
Chicano	1	1.0	5.3	2.0
Native American	0	0.0	0.0	0.9
Filipino	1	1.0	5.3	1.3
Other	0	0.0	0.0	0.5
Unknown	81	81.0		
Total	100	100.0	100.1	100.0

Since race was unknown in 82 percent of the cases, conclusions are tentative. The disproportionate number of black and Filipino suspects may be partly due to their visibility in predominantly Caucasian neighborhoods.

Sex: Table 3A-13 shows the sex distribution of residential burglary suspects.

Table 3A-13--Sex of Residential Burglary Suspects

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Excluding Unknown</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
Male	7	7.0	77.8	47.6
Female	2	2.0	22.2	52.4
Unknown	91	91.9		
Total	100	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 3A-14 shows the sex distribution of commercial burglary suspects.

Tables 3A-13 and 3A-14 show that males markedly predominate in the suspect group. Males form only 47.6 percent of Seattle's population but 83.9 percent of the group of suspects. For the few women who are burglary suspects, they are more likely to be residential rather than commercial burglary suspects. Again, sex is unknown for 85.6 percent of the sample.

Height and Weight: Height information was available for 12 residential burglary suspects. Their heights ranged from 4'10" to 6'2" with a median height of 5'10".

Table 3A-14--Sex of Commercial Burglary Suspects

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Excluding Unknown</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
Male	18	18.0	90.0	47.6
Female	2	2.0	10.0	52.4
Unknown	80	80.0		
Total	100	100.0	100.0	100.0

For commercial burglary suspects, height information was available in 18 cases. Heights ranged from 5'3" to 6'2", with a median of 5'10½".

Weight information was given for ten residential burglary suspects. Their weights ranged from 90 pounds to 200 pounds, with a median of 147 pounds.

For commercial burglary suspects, weight information was available for 18 cases. Weights ranged from 105 pounds to 180 pounds, with a median of 157 pounds.

Occupation: Table 3A-15 provides the occupational distribution for residential burglary suspects.

Table 3A-15--Occupations of Residential Burglary Suspects

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Excluded</u>	<u>Percent of* Seattle Population</u>
Student	2	2.0	40.0	9.2
Unemployed	0	0.0	0.0	4.8
Welfare	0	0.0	0.0	1.8
Retired/Disabled	0	0.0	0.0	16.0
Blue Collar/Laborer/Service	1	1.0	20.0	9.8
Sales/Clerical/White Collar	0	0.0	0.0	16.5
Skilled/Technical/Managerial/Professional	2	2.0	40.0	26.5
Housewife	0	0.0	0.0	15.0
SPD Officer	0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Unknown	95	95.0		
Total	100	100.0	100.0	100.0

*The Seattle distribution includes people aged 18 and over.

Table 3A-16 provides the occupational distribution for commercial burglary suspects.

Tables 3A-15 and 3A-16 show occupations for only 12 out of 200 cases (those suspects either known to witnesses or arrested at the scene of the burglary), so these distributions must be viewed tentatively. Students and blue collar workers appear to be over-represented in the group of suspects, however. Retired or disabled people and housewives are markedly underrepresented, as fits with the age and sex distributions for suspects given earlier in this section.

Number of suspects: Table 3A-17 presents the number of suspects per case for the 18 residential burglary cases in which information was available.

Table 3A-18 presents the number of suspects per case for the 19 commercial burglary cases in which information was available.

Tables 3A-17 and 3A-18 show that for 59.4 percent of all burglaries in the sample, there was one suspect per burglary. The percentage of cases with two suspects is 32.6 percent, and larger numbers than two are rare. Thus it appears that most burglars work alone, judging from the 37 cases in which information was available.

Table 3A-16---Occupations of Commercial Burglary Suspects

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Unknown Excluded</u>	<u>Percent of* Seattle Population</u>
Student	3	2.0	42.9	9.2
Unemployed	0	0.0	0.0	4.8
Welfare	0	0.0	0.0	1.8
Retired/Disabled	0	0.0	0.0	16.0
Blue Collar/Laborer/Service	3	3.0	42.0	9.8
Sales/Clerical/White Collar	1	1.0	14.3	16.5
Skilled/Technical/Managerial/Professional	0	0.0	0.0	26.5
Housewife	0	0.0	0.0	15.0
SPD Officer	0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Military Service	0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Unknown or "None"	93	93.0		
Total	100	100.0	100.1	100.0

*The Seattle distribution includes people aged 18 and over.

Table 3A-17--Number of Residential Burglary Suspects Per Case

<u>Number of Suspects</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Unknown Excluded</u>
1	10	10.0	55.6
2	7	7.0	38.9
3	1	1.0	5.6
4 or more	0	0.0	0.0
Unknown	82	82.0	
Total	100	100.0	100.0

Table 3A-18--Number of Commercial Burglary Suspects Per Case

<u>Number of Suspects</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Unknown Excluded</u>
1	12	12.0	63.2
2	5	5.0	26.3
3	0	0.0	0.0
4 or more	2	2.0	10.5
Unknown	81	81.0	
Total	100	100.0	100.0

Extent of Loss

Dollar Value of Property Stolen: Table 3A-19 shows the average values of property stolen per residential and commercial burglary for 1974 through 1976 in Seattle. These data are from the Seattle Police Department's Crime Capsule Reports.

While Table 3A-19 shows that the average loss per burglary is from \$355 to \$485 during the past three years, it is important to remember that this average figure is biased upward by a few very expensive burglaries. For example, the median value loss for residential burglaries for two weeks of 1974 was \$325, considerably lower than \$410.97 annual average loss per residential burglary.



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Table 3A-19--Average Dollar Loss Per Residential and Commercial Burglary

<u>Year</u>	<u>Average Residential Loss</u>	<u>Average Commercial Loss</u>
1974	\$410.97	\$355.10
1975	\$459.96	\$357.00
1976	\$485.34	\$398.07

Table 3A-19 shows that the average loss per burglary has increased each year, and that residential burglaries are more expensive than commercial.

In considering Table 3A-19, it is important to remember that nothing is stolen in a number of burglaries. In the 1975 samples, 13 of 100 residential burglaries and 27 of 100 commercial burglaries involved no losses.

Type of Object Taken: Tables 3A-20 and 3A-21 show listings of type of object stolen according to two samples of residential burglary. The 1974 sample includes all residential burglaries which occurred during two weeks of that year (311 cases) and the 1975 sample includes 100 cases randomly selected from SPD residential burglary offense reports. The most frequently stolen items are listed first.

Table 3A-20--Objects Frequently Stolen in Residential Burglaries, 1974 Sample*

<u>Items Stolen in Order of Frequency</u>	<u>Percent of Total Items</u>
Home entertainment equipment (television, stereo, tape recorder/player, radio)	52.6
Cash	13.2
Home furnishings and small appliances	6.0
Jewelry	5.1
Guns	4.3
Antiques or coin collections	3.0
Clothing	3.0

*This 1974 sample includes only those burglaries in which one type of property was stolen.

Table 3A-21--Objects Frequently Stolen in Residential Burglaries, 1975 Sample*

<u>Items Stolen in Order of Frequency</u>	<u>Percent of Total Items</u>
Home entertainment equipment (television, stereo, tape recorder/player, radio)	25.1
Jewelry (including watches)	13.8
Home furnishings and appliances	12.6
Cash	11.3
Clothing	5.4
Tools or mechanical equipment	3.3
Cameras or photographic equipment	2.9

*This 1975 sample includes all items taken (even if more than one type was taken) from the 100-case random sample of residential burglaries.

In comparing the categories of items frequently stolen for the 1974 and 1975 samples, it is important to remember that the 1974 sample only included cases in which a single type of property was taken, while the 1975 sample included all cases randomly sampled. Considering this difference in sampling, the ordering of the categories is remarkably similar for both samples.

Table 3A-22 shows the objects most frequently stolen in commercial burglaries. These data are from the 1975 random sample of 100 commercial burglary cases. The most frequently stolen items are listed first.

Table 3A-22--Objects Frequently Stolen in Commercial Burglaries, 1975 Sample

<u>Items Stolen in Order of Frequency</u>	<u>Percent of Total Items</u>
Cash	16.4
Calculators, typewriters, office equipment	14.3
Furniture, small appliances, decorations	12.1
Tools or mechanical equipment	8.6
Home entertainment equipment (television, stereo, tape recorder/player, radio)	7.9
Recreation equipment	5.0
Clothing	4.3

Although cash and furnishings/appliances are among the first four categories of items stolen for both residential and commercial burglaries, items stolen in commercial burglaries are more varied. Home entertainment equipment accounted for 25.1 percent of items stolen in residential burglaries, but cash accounted for only 16.4 percent of the items stolen in commercial burglaries.

Property Damage Reported: Table 3A-23 shows the types of property damage reported for the 1975 samples of residential and commercial burglaries.

Table 3A-23--Types of Property Damaged During Burglaries

<u>Site of Damage</u>	<u>Residential</u>		<u>Commercial</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
No damage	46	46.0	21	21.0
Windows	33	26.6	44	32.2
Doors	16	12.9	18	13.2
Locks	8	6.4	12	8.8
Damage to contents	1	0.8	23	16.8
Other	9	7.2	11	8.0
Total	113*	99.9	129*	100.0

*These numbers are greater than 100 because some homes and businesses had more than one type of damage. For example, the door and the door lock could have been damaged.

Table 3A-23 shows that 46 percent of the residential burglaries resulted in no property damage at all, but this was true for only 21 percent of the commercial burglaries. When damage occurred, it was usually related to forced entry (door, window, and lock damage). However, 16.8 percent of the business sites reported damage to contents, such as safes, cash boxes, pop machines, display cases, etc.

As Table 3A-23 shows, there were 67 instances of property damage reported for residential burglaries and 108 for commercial burglaries. This means that the average number of items damaged was 0.67 in residential burglaries and 1.08 in commercial burglaries.

Property damage costs in residential burglaries ranged from \$0 to \$160, with a median cost of \$10. For commercial burglaries, property damage costs ranged from \$0 to \$450, with a median of \$20. The higher median damage costs for commercial burglaries are probably due to the better security measures used by businesses. On commercial premises, the burglar has to force an entry and then often force open containers to obtain valuables or cash, while in residential burglaries, doors or windows are more often left unlocked and valuables are more readily accessible without property damage.

Dollar Value of Recovered Items: Table 3A-24 shows the average values for items stolen in residential and commercial burglaries which were later recovered. These averages are from the SPD's Crime Capsule Reports for the years 1974 and 1976.

Table 3A-24--Average Values of Property Recovered from Burglaries

Year	Residential		Commercial	
	Average Value Recovered	Average Percent Recovered	Average Value Recovered	Average Percent Recovered
1974	\$57.49	12.5	\$50.64	14.3
1975	\$49.18	10.7	\$63.12	17.7
1976	\$59.39	12.2	\$57.69	14.5

Table 3A-24 shows that between 10.7 percent and 17.7 percent of the stolen property's total value is recovered. The percentage recovered is slightly higher for commercial burglaries than for residential burglaries.

Considering the two random samples of 100 residential burglary offense reports and of 100 commercial burglary offense reports, it was found that no items were recovered in 94.2 percent of the residential cases and in 89.0 percent of the commercial cases. This percentage includes only those cases in which items had been reported stolen.

Location of Incident: Table 3A-25 shows the location of residential and commercial burglaries. Data for this table were taken from the 1975 samples of offense reports: 100 cases of residential burglary and 100 cases of commercial burglary.

Table 3A-25--Locations of Burglaries

Location	Residential		Commercial	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Residence*	67	67.0	1	1.0
Apartment (so specified)	19	19.0	2	2.0
Auto (in garage or carport)	4	4.0	0	0.0
Hotel Room	3	3.0	1	1.0
Retail Business	0	0.0	15	15.0
Gas Station	0	0.0	6	6.0
School or School Grounds	0	0.0	8	8.0
Business Office	0	0.0	14	14.0
Warehouse	0	0.0	3	3.0
Business, Commercial or Medical Premises	0	0.0	18	18.0
Tavern	0	0.0	10	10.0
Restaurant	0	0.0	5	5.0
Public Building (church, golf club, community center)	0	0.0	10	10.0
Drive-in Cafe	0	0.0	3	3.0
Other or Unknown	7	7.0	4	4.0
Total	100	100.0	100	100.0

*"Residence" means private apartment or home.

Because individual police officers can choose to write "residence" or to be more specific and write "apartment" or "single-family house," one cannot tell from Table 3A-25 what percentage of burglaries occur in apartments as contrasted with single-family homes, duplexes, etc.

In commercial burglary, the most popular targets appear to be business offices (including commercial and medical premises), which account for 32.0 percent of the locations. Retail businesses comprise 15.0 percent of the sites. Taverns and public buildings each accounted for an additional 10 percent of the sample burglaries.

Relationship of Victim to Suspect: Data for this section are from the two 100-case samples of residential and commercial burglary offense reports from 1975.

Table 3A-26 shows the relationship of the victim to the suspect in the residential burglary sample. Because the suspect is unknown in a large percentage of burglary cases, tables in this section contain percentages computed both with and without the large "unknown" category.

Table 3A-26--Relationship of Victim to Suspect in Residential Burglary

<u>Relationship</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Unknown Excluded</u>
Relative	3	3.0	27.3
Friend	0	0.0	0.0
Neighbor	2	2.0	18.2
Acquaintance	4	4.0	36.4
Business Associate	1	1.0	9.1
Total Stranger	1	1.0	9.1
Unknown (no information)	89	89.0	
Total	100	100.0	100.1

In the few cases in which the relationship between the victim and suspect is known, acquaintances and relatives predominate, while there were no cases in which friends were the suspects. Acquaintances may use their knowledge of a victim's habits or possessions in their burglaries. The cases in which relatives were the suspects usually involved runaway or delinquent juveniles who came back to their parents' home and stole money or other desired items.

Table 3A-27 gives the relationship of the victim to the suspect for the sample of 100 commercial burglaries.

Table 3A-27--Relationship of Victim to Suspect in Commercial Burglary

<u>Relationship</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Unknown Excluded</u>
Acquaintance of Owner, Employee	1	1.0	5.9
Business Associate*	3	3.0	17.6
Total Stranger	13	13.0	76.5
Unknown	83	83.0	
Total	100	100.0	100.0

*"Business Associate" includes customers.

For the 17 cases in which the relationship is known, total strangers predominate and comprise 76.5 percent of the relationships.

How Event Occurred: Data in this section are from the two 100-case random samples of residential and commercial burglary cases from 1975 Seattle Police Department sites.

Mode of entry is an important aspect of burglary. Table 3A-28 shows the modes of entry used in the residential burglary sample of 100 cases from 1975 and in another sample of 180 cases from 1972.

Table 3A-28--Mode of Entry in Residential Burglary

Mode of Entry	1972		1975	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Forced window	59	32.7	20	24.7
Forced door	54	30.7	18	22.2
Opened door by breaking window in or near door	--	----	15	18.5
Other forced entry	0	0.0	2	2.5
Open or unlocked window	41	22.2	14	17.5
Open or unlocked door	22	12.2	9	11.1
Key used	4	2.2	3	3.7
Total	180	99.8	81*	100.0

*For 19 cases in this sample, mode of entry was unknown, or entry was only attempted.

Table 3A-29 shows the modes of entry used in the commercial burglary sample of 100 cases from 1975.

Table 3A-29--Mode of Entry in Commercial Burglary

Mode of Entry	1975	
	Number	Percent
Forced window	27	34.2
Forced door	25	31.6
Opened door by breaking window in or near door	11	13.9
Other forced entry	6	7.6
Open or unlocked window	4	5.1
Open or unlocked door	3	3.8
Key used	3	3.8
Total	79*	100.0

*For 21 cases in this sample, there was incomplete information on mode of entry or entry was only attempted.

As can be seen from Tables 3A-28 and 3A-29, forced or broken windows are the most common mode of entry for both residential and commercial burglars. Forced doors are the second most common mode of entry for all three samples, while breaking a window in or near the door to reach in and open the door is the third most common mode.

Commercial burglaries differ from residential burglaries in mode of entry because there were fewer entries through unlocked doors or windows at commercial sites.

Table 3A-30 collapses and contrasts the modes of entry shown in Table 3A-28 to show the percentages of forced versus non-forced and window versus door entries. (Entry was classified by first place forced, so breaking a window near a door in order to reach in was classified as a forced window entry.)

Table 3A-30--Mode of Entry in Residential Burglary - Collapsed

<u>First Place Forced or Entered</u>	<u>Forced</u>		<u>Not Forced</u>	
	<u>1972*</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1975</u>
Window	32.7%	45.7%	22.7%	17.3%
Door	30.0%	22.2%	14.4%	14.8%

*Information was not available on how the "break window near door - reach in to unlock door" mode of entry was classified in the 1972 sample. It may have been called forced window entry as in the 1975 sample, or it may have been called forced door entry.

Table 3A-31 gives the collapsed mode of entry data for the 1975 commercial burglary sample.

Table 3A-31--Mode of Entry in Commercial Burglary - Collapsed

<u>First Place Forced or Entered</u>	<u>Forced</u>	<u>1975</u>
		<u>Not Forced</u>
Window	48.1%	5.1%
Door	31.6%	7.6%

Tables 3A-30 and 3A-31 show that windows are the most common first point of entry for all three samples, forming 55.4 percent of the 1972 sample, 63.0 percent of the 1975 residential sample, and 53.2 percent of the 1975 commercial sample. Considering unforced entries, we see that these include 37.1 percent of the 1972 sample, 32.1 percent of the 1975 residential sample, and only 12.7 percent of the 1975 commercial sample. Entries into commercial sites are more likely to require force, and this accounts for some of the higher cost of property damage in commercial burglaries as compared with residential burglaries.

Witness Information

Data for this section come from the two 100-case samples of residential and commercial burglary cases from the Seattle Police Department's 1975 files.

Witnesses are important sources of information on suspects in burglary cases because the victim himself is usually not in the building when the crime occurs and can provide little suspect information.

Number of Witnesses to Event (Eyewitnesses): Of the 100 residential burglary cases sampled, only two reported eyewitnesses (people who had seen or heard the actual burglary). Of the 100 commercial burglary cases sampled, eight reported eyewitnesses.

Number of Corroborating Witnesses: There were 11 cases of residential burglary reporting corroborating witnesses (or individuals who observed some aspect of the incident but not the actual illegal act) out of the sample of 100 cases. For the 100 cases of commercial burglary, 13 cases were listed as having corroborating witnesses.

Relationship of Witness to Victim: Table 3A-32 shows the relationship of the witness to the victim for those residential and commercial burglary cases in which there were witnesses.

As seen in Table 3A-32, neighbors are the most frequent witnesses of residential burglaries. This is probably due to the neighbors' proximity to the crime scene and their ability to distinguish between the legitimate inhabitants of the neighborhood and possible burglary suspects.

Table 3A-32--Relationship Between Victim and First Listed Witness in Burglary Report

Relationship	Residential		Commercial	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Neighbor	10	76.9	2	11.1
Business Associate	0	0.0	7	38.9
Stranger/Passerby	1	7.7	7	38.9
SPD Officer	0	0.0	2	11.1
Unknown	2	15.4	0	0.0
Total	13	100.0	18*	100.0

*Does not add up to the total number of witnesses (n = 21) because of multiple witnesses per case.

For commercial burglaries, most witnesses are business associates or passersby. The large number of business associates (7 cases) may be partially explained by the three cases in which private security guards or patrols reported the burglary. These employees work during the times businesses are closed and are especially aware of suspicious circumstances.

Reporting Person's Relationship to Victim: Table 3A-33 describes the relationship between the person reporting the offense and the victim of the offense for the sample of residential and commercial burglary cases occurring in 1975.

Table 3A-33--Relationship Between Victim and Person Reporting Burglary

"Person" Reporting	Residential		Commercial	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Self (Victim or Owner)	87	87	23	23
Witness	0	0	2	2
SPD Patrol	0	0	6	6
Employee or Apartment Manager	3	3	49	49
Victim's Relative or Roommate	3	3	0	0
Neighbor	5	5	1	1
Private Security Guard or Patrol	0	0	3	3
Silent Alarm	0	0	1	1
Audible or Unspecified Alarm	0	0	4	4
Unknown or Other	2	2	11	11
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 3A-33 shows that an overwhelming majority (87.0 percent) of residential burglaries were reported by the victim or owner himself. Since the victim is rarely present during a burglary, that means reporting was delayed until the victim returned home. Burglaries reported by SPD Patrol or by alarms are burglaries in progress, but residential burglaries in this sample showed no reports from these sources.

Of commercial burglaries, 72.0 percent were reported by owners or employees who were rarely present during the crime. However, 11.0 percent of the commercial burglaries were reported by alarms or by SPD Patrol as burglaries in progress, so the report and the crime were simultaneous.

The lack of witnesses in most burglary cases can be related to these delays in reporting; often nobody realizes a crime has been committed until the owner/victim/employee returns some time later.

Police Response Time and Victim Satisfaction: Only estimates of police response time to the scene of all burglary offenses were available. In most instances, burglaries were reported some time after commission and response time to the scene was probably not a significant variable in apprehension. The only estimates of overall response time

to burglary reports was provided by victims in the victimization surveys. These estimates were subject to considerable error and must be accepted with caution.

Since 1972, three separate victimization surveys have been conducted by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office which included questions regarding burglary victimization during calendar years 1972, 1974, and 1975. In each survey, those victims who reported to the police were asked how long it took the police to arrive (see Table 3A-34). For the three years, from two-thirds to half the respondents said the police arrived within 15 minutes (68 percent in 1972, 50 percent in 1974, and 47 percent in 1975; by median test, the 1972 to 1975 change is marginally significant, $\chi^2 = 3.13$, $df = 1$, $p < .10$. However, the significance of faster or slower response time in terms of arrest is of questionable worth; see below). Of more concern are victims' claims (16 percent in 1974 and 11 percent in 1975) that police never came.

Table 3A-34--Police Response Time as Indicated by Burglary Victims

Victim-Reported Response Time	1972		1974		1975	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Right away	6	21	5	7	4	9
Few minutes	5	18	14	20	13	29
About 15 minutes	8	29	16	23	4	9
About 30 minutes	5	18	8	11	10	22
About 1 hour or more	2	7	13	19	6	13
Not that day	1	4	1	1	1	2
Never	1	4	11	16	5	11
Don't know	0	0	2	3	2	4
Total responses	28		70		45	
Total reporting	28		70		47	

When 1975 burglary victims were asked about satisfaction with police response, 36 of 40 responding (90 percent) were very or somewhat satisfied with the promptness of response, three (7.5 percent) were neutral, and one (2.5 percent) was very dissatisfied. The same 40 indicated that 38 (95 percent) were very or somewhat satisfied with police courtesy, with two (5 percent) being neutral. When asked about police competence, of the 38 burglary victims who responded to this question, 36 (95 percent) were very or somewhat satisfied while two (5 percent) were neutral.

A second indication of police response time is available from dispatch data. However, the present analysis is only for those cases reported to the police during the commission of the crime, or "in-progress".

For burglary-in-progress calls, data for the period April, 1974, to March, 1975, from the Seattle Police Department computer dispatch system were analyzed to determine the relation between response time (period of time between initially receiving a call from the reporting person to arrival of first police unit) and arrest rate (Clawson and Chang, Impact of Response Delays in Arrest Data, Seattle Police Department Inspectional Services Division, September, 1975).

For those cases in which total response time was available (604 cases), response time for burglary-in-progress calls averaged 4.96 minutes (mean average, excluding 15+ category) with a median average time of 5.26 minutes (see Table 3A-35).

An additional source of information (K. E. Mathews, Jr., Third-Year Evaluation of The Community Crime Prevention Program, City of Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, October, 1976) regarding the potential for patrol response time to make a difference in case clearance rates can be seen when residential burglary-in-progress calls are considered as a proportion of all residential burglary reports received by the police. Using police dispatch data from 50 (87.5 percent) of the 57 patrol car beats for the period September 30, 1974, through August 8, 1976 (22½ months), it was found that 1,407 or 9.2 percent of the 15,325 residential burglary calls were reported in progress. While 911 (64.7 percent) of the 1,407 in-progress calls included either suspect or vehicle

Table 3A-35--Burglary-in-Progress Response Time and Arrests
 $\chi^2 = 15.27/.01$ $t = -1.49/n.s.$

<u>Response Time (Minutes)</u>	<u>Number of Calls</u>	<u>Number of Arrests</u>	<u>Percent Arrests</u>	<u>Accumulated Percent Arrests</u>
0-2	74	21	28.4	28.4
3-5	215	49	22.8	24.4
6-8	127	17	13.4	20.9
9-11	69	6	8.7	19.2
12-14	37	2	5.4	18.2
15+	82	14	17.1	18.0
Total	604	109	18.0	18.0

descriptions, 250 (17.8 percent) of the in-progress calls resulted in the arrest of suspects by the end of the initial police response to the call. While this is a substantial arrest rate for the group of residential burglary cases that are reported to the police while still in the act of being committed, it represents only 1.6 percent of the total residential burglary calls received during the same time period.

Adults Arrested for Burglary

This section describes the personal and criminal characteristics of people aged 18 or over who have been arrested or charged with burglary.

Data for this adult arrestees section have been gathered from annual Seattle Police Department Statistical Reports and four samples of burglary offenders:

1. 92 cases randomly selected from 1972 SPD burglary arrest records;
2. Interviews with a random sample of 32 offenders convicted of burglary in 1972;
3. 50 cases of residential burglary randomly selected from 1975 SPD adult arrest records;
4. 49 cases of commercial burglary randomly selected from 1975 SPD adult arrest records.

When samples 1 and 2 are combined, they are called the 1972 sample, and the combination of samples 3 and 4 is called the 1975 sample.

Because the 1972 sample does not distinguish between residential and commercial offenders, separate tables will provide distributions for:

1. All adult burglary offenders, separated by 1972 and 1975 samples;
2. Adult residential burglary offenders (1975 sample only);
3. Adult commercial burglary offenders (1975 sample only).

Characteristics of Arrested Adult Burglary Offenders

Age: Table 3A-36 gives the age distributions for the 1972 sample and 1975 total of adult arrestees.

Table 3A-36--Ages of Adults Arrested for Burglary

<u>Age</u>	<u>1972 Sample</u>		<u>1975 All Adults</u>		<u>Percent of Seattle Adult Population</u>
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	
18-19	26	21.0	99	25.3	3.9
20-24	54	43.6	161	41.2	12.6
25-29	23	18.6	79	20.2	14.9
30-34	4	3.2	23	5.9	9.2
35-39	4	3.2	13	3.3	5.7
40-44	6	4.8	3	0.8	5.3
45-49	3	2.4	10	2.6	6.4
50 and up	4	3.2	3	0.8	40.1
Total	124	100.0	391	100.0	100.1

Table 3A-36 shows that the greatest percentage of adult burglary arrestees are aged 18-24 years; 64.6 percent of the 1972 sample and 66.5 percent of the 1975 sample fall into this age group. While this age group comprises only 16.5 percent of the Seattle adult population, it includes 64.6 percent to 66.5 percent of the adults arrested for burglary. Arrested burglars thus tend to be much younger than the general population.

Comparing Tables 3A-37 and 3A-38, one sees that the 18-24 year old age group predominates for both types of crimes, but that adult residential burglary suspects are slightly younger than adult commercial burglary suspects. Residential burglary suspects averaged 22.8 years of age in this sample, while commercial burglary suspects averaged 24.3 years.

Table 3A-37--Ages of Sample Adults Arrested for Residential Burglary

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Adult Population</u>
18-19	15	30.6	3.9
20-24	23	46.9	12.6
25-29	7	14.3	14.9
30-34	1	2.0	9.2
35-39	1	2.0	5.7
40-44	2	4.1	5.3
45-49	0	0.0	6.4
50 and up	0	0.0	40.1
Unknown	1		
Total	50	99.9	100.1

Table 3A-38--Ages of Sample Adults Arrested for Commercial Burglary

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Adult Population</u>
18-19	12	26.1	3.9
20-24	17	37.0	12.6
25-29	8	17.4	14.9
30-34	5	10.9	9.2
35-39	3	6.5	5.7
40-44	1	2.2	5.3
45-49	0	0.0	6.4
50 and up	0	0.0	40.1
Unknown	3		
Total	49	100.1	100.1

Race: Table 3A-39 gives the racial distributions of arrestees for the 1972 sample and total 1975 adults arrested for burglary.

Table 3A-39--Race of Sample Adults Arrested for Burglary

<u>Race</u>	<u>1972</u>		<u>1975</u>		<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	
Caucasian	72	58.0	212	54.2	82.8
Black	45	36.0	152	38.9	8.6
Native American	7	6.0	17	4.3	0.9
Other	0	0.0	10	2.6	7.7
Unknown			5		
Total	124	100.0	396	100.0	100.0

Table 3A-39 shows that Blacks and Native Americans are overrepresented in the samples of adults arrested for burglary, while Caucasians and "Others" (primarily Asian Americans) are underrepresented, relative to their proportions in the general Seattle population.

Tables 3A-40 and 3A-41 show the separate racial distributions for adults arrested for residential and adults arrested for commercial burglary, as gathered in the 1975 sample.

Table 3A-40--Race of Sample Adults Arrested for Residential Burglary

<u>Race</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
Caucasian	18	37.5	82.8
Black	29	60.4	8.6
Asian American	0	0.0	3.9
Chicano	0	0.0	2.0
Native American	1	2.1	0.9
Filipino	0	0.0	1.3
Other	0	0.0	0.5
Unknown	2		
Total	50	100.0	100.0

Table 3A-41--Race of Sample Adults Arrested for Commercial Burglary

<u>Race</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
Caucasian	26	56.5	82.8
Black	13	28.3	8.6
Asian American	0	0.0	3.9
Chicano	2	4.4	2.0
Native American	4	8.7	0.9
Filipino	1	2.2	1.3
Other	0	0.0	0.5
Unknown	3		
Total	49	100.1	100.0

A comparison of Tables 3A-40 and 3A-41 shows that Caucasians are much more often arrested as commercial burglars than residential burglars. Caucasians make up 56.5 percent of arrested commercial burglars but only 37.5 percent of arrested residential burglars. In contrast, blacks form 60.4 percent of the residential burglary offender population, but only 28.3 percent of the commercial offender population.

Sex: Table 3A-42 gives the sex distributions for the 1972 sample and total 1975 adult burglary arrestees.

Table 3A-42--Sex of Sample Adults Arrested for Burglary

<u>Sex</u>	<u>1972</u>		<u>1975</u>		<u>Percent of Seattle Adult Population</u>
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	
Male	120	97.0	376	96.2	46.4
Female	4	3.0	15	3.8	53.6
Total	124	100.0	391	100.0	100.0

As shown in Table 3A-42, 96 to 97 percent of all adults arrested for burglary were male.

Height and Weight: The heights and weights of adult burglary offenders are not available from the 1972 sample. The 1975 sample showed a range of 5'4" to 6'3" among adults arrested, with a median height of 5'9". The weights of this sample ranged from 100 pounds to 240 pounds, with a median weight of 151 pounds.

Occupation: Table 3A-43 gives the occupations of adult burglary offenders, including the 1972 and 1975 samples.

Table 3A-43--Occupations of Sample Adults Arrested for Burglary

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>1972</u>		<u>1975*</u>		<u>Percent of Seattle Adult Population</u>
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	
Student (18 and over)	13	10.7	4	14.3	9.2
Unemployed	46	38.0	4	14.3	4.8
Welfare	0	0.0	0	0.0	1.8
Retired/Disabled	0	0.0	0	0.0	16.0
Blue Collar/Laborer/Service	54	44.6	15	53.6	9.8
Sales/Clerical/White Collar	4	3.3	2	7.1	16.5
Skilled/Technical/Managerial/Professional	4	3.3	3	10.7	26.5
Housewife	0	0.0	0	0.0	15.0
SPD Officer	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.2
Military Service	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.2
Total	121	99.9	28	100.0	100.0

*1975 Sample: 64 "Unknown," 7 "No Occupation"

One should be very cautious in interpreting Table 3A-43 because there was no information on occupation for 64 of 99 arrested offenders in the 1975 sample. Unemployed people and blue collar workers are overrepresented among the arrested burglars, while housewives and white collar people are underrepresented.

Interviews with a sample of burglars convicted in 1972 yields an occupational distribution very different from the occupational distribution from the sample of arrest records of that year. The two distributions are contrasted in Table 3A-44.

Table 3A-44--Arrest Record Sample Versus Interview Sample: Occupational Distributions of Sample Adults Arrested for or Convicted of Burglary, 1972

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Arrest Record Sample</u>		<u>Interview Sample</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Student	13	14.6	0	0.0
Unemployed	23	25.8	23	71.9
Laborers	47	52.8	7	21.9
Sales/Clerical	3	3.4	1	3.1
Professional/Managerial	3	3.4	1	3.1
Total	89	100.0	32	100.0

Police arrest records do not always differentiate between previous occupational experience and present employment status. For example, a person who had worked as a laborer but was currently unemployed might be listed as "laborer" rather than "unemployed". For this reason, arrest records probably underestimate the number of currently unemployed suspects. From the interview sample, one can see that nearly three-quarters (71.9 percent) of the convicted burglars were unemployed at the times of their arrests, but only 25.8 percent of the arrest record sample had been listed as "unemployed". Because the 1975 samples were also taken from arrest records, one should be aware that the "unemployed" are probably underestimated in these samples as well.

Marital Status: Table 3A-45 compares the marital status of adult burglary suspects with marital statistics for the general Seattle population. Data are from the 1972 random sample of 92 Seattle Police Department burglary arrest records.

Table 3A-45--Marital Status of Adults Arrested for Burglary

<u>Marital Status</u>	<u>1972 Arrest</u>		<u>Percent of</u> <u>Seattle Male</u> <u>Adult Population*</u>
	<u>Records</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Sample</u> <u>Percent</u>	
Single	65	70.6	34.3
Divorced and Separated	13	14.1	7.9
Married and Together	14	15.2	57.8
Total	92	99.9	100.0

*For marital status purposes, the census defines adults as 14 years old and up.

Table 3A-45 shows that very few burglary arrestees are married as compared with the general adult male population, and a large proportion of burglars are single.

Educational Background of Adults Arrested for Burglary: Interviews with 32 burglars convicted in 1972 showed a range of formal educational training from 8 years to 14 years, with an average education of 11.7 years. The median years of education for Seattle adults is 12.5 years, and since the burglars belong to the younger and usually better-educated part of Seattle's population, it is clear that convicted and imprisoned burglars are well below the average educational level for their age group.

Relationship of Victims to Adults Arrested for Burglary: Table 3A-46 shows the distribution of relationships between victims and adult burglary suspects for the 1975 sample.

Table 3A-46--Relationship of Victims to Sample Adults Arrested for All Burglary

<u>Relationship</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>Excluding</u> <u>Unknown</u>
Relative	3	3.0	6.0
Friend	3	3.0	6.0
Neighbor	4	4.0	8.0
Acquaintance	6	6.1	12.0
Business Associate	3	3.0	6.0
Total Stranger	31	31.3	62.0
Unknown	49	49.5	
Total	99	99.9	100.0

Tables 3A-47 and 3A-48 show the relationships between victims and adult offenders for residential and commercial burglaries. In comparing the tables, it can be seen that total strangers and business associates/customers account for 100 percent of the known victim-offender relationships in the commercial burglary sample, but only 46.7 percent of known relationships in the residential burglary sample. In contrast, relatives, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances make up 53.3 percent of the residential burglary suspects for those cases in which the victim-offender relationship is known.

Degree of Violence: Interviews with the 32 burglars convicted in 1972 showed that seven of them (21.9 percent) had taken weapons with them to the burglary site. These weapons included four handguns, two shotguns, and one crowbar.

The 1975 samples of arrest reports showed that weapons were used to injure burglary victims in two of the 99 cases sampled. (Per FBI UCR classifications, these cases would have been expected to be classified either as robberies or assaults.) One commercial

Table 3A-47--Relationship of Victims to Sample Adults
Arrested for Residential Burglary

<u>Relationship</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Excluding Unknown</u>
Relative	3	6.0	10.0
Friend	3	6.0	10.0
Neighbor	4	8.0	13.3
Acquaintance	6	12.0	20.0
Business Associate	0	0.0	0.0
Total Stranger	14	28.0	46.7
Unknown	20	40.0	
Total	50	100.0	100.0

Table 3A-48--Relationship of Victims to Sample Adults
Arrested for Commercial Burglary

<u>Relationship</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Excluding Unknown</u>
Neighbor	0	0	0
Acquaintance, friend, relative of owner, employee	0	0	0
Business Associate	3	6.0	15.0
Total Stranger	17	34.7	85.0
Unknown	29	59.2	
Total	49	100.0	100.0

burglar used bodily force but no other weapon, and one residential burglar used a knife on his victim. ("Knife" includes knives, razor blades, and other sharp weapons in the coding system used.) Neither of these two victims required medical attention for their injuries.

Extent of Loss

Dollar Value of Property Stolen: Table 3A-49 shows the average mean and median values of property stolen per residential or commercial burglary for the 1975 arrest report sample.

Table 3A-49--Value of Property Stolen per Adult Burglary (1975 Samples)

<u>Average</u>	<u>Residential</u>	<u>Commercial</u>
Mean	\$356.00	\$392.00*
Median	\$318.00	\$150.00

*This mean average value is high primarily because of one case in which property valued at \$2,865 was stolen.

Both mean and median average values are provided in Table 3A-49 because a few very expensive burglaries bias the mean value upwards, while the median (the case which has 50 percent of the cases below it and 50 percent of the cases above it) is not influenced as much by a few extreme cases.

Table 3A-49 shows that \$318 or less is lost in half of these residential burglary arrest cases, while only \$150 or less is lost in half of these commercial burglary arrest cases.

Type of Object Taken: Table 3A-50 lists the objects most frequently taken in the residential burglaries of the 1975 adult arrestees sample, while Table 3A-51 lists those objects most frequently taken in commercial burglaries of the 1975 adult arrestees sample. Objects most frequently stolen are listed first.

Table 3A-50--Objects Frequently Stolen by Sample Adults
Arrested for Residential Burglary

1. Home entertainment equipment (television, stereo, tape recorder/player, radio)
2. Home furnishings or small appliances
3. Watches
4. Cash
5. Photographic equipment or cameras
6. Clothing/Jewelry
7. Guns

Home entertainment equipment was stolen in at least 54 percent of these residential burglaries in which anything was stolen and represented 40 percent of the items stolen.

Table 3A-51--Objects Frequently Stolen by Sample Adults
Arrested for Commercial Burglary

1. Home entertainment equipment (television, stereo, tape recorder/player, radio)
2. Cash/Small appliances
3. Car parts or accessories/Clothing
4. Calculators/Household items
5. Tools/Food/Cars

Although home entertainment equipment again tops the list, it accounts for only 12 percent of the items stolen and represents a much smaller portion of the stolen items in commercial burglary as compared with residential burglary. Small appliances again appear as the second most frequently stolen item.

Identification of Adult Suspects

Table 3A-52 shows how the suspects in the adult burglary arrestees sample of 1975 were identified.

Table 3A-52--Identification of Sample Adults Arrested for Burglary

Method	Victim	Suspect Identified by:		
		Witness	Detective	Patrol
By SPD on scene	--	--	--	45
Name	7	7	--	--
Mug shots	2	3	--	--
Lineup	0	2	--	--
Other	4	11	3	--
General Address	0	1	--	--
Modus Operandi	--	--	1	--
Fingerprints	--	--	8	--
Vehicle License	--	--	3	--
Vehicle Description	--	--	2	--
Physical Evidence	--	--	5	--
Informant	--	--	1	--
Tip	--	--	2	--
Total*	13	24	25	45

*These numbers add up to more than 99 because some suspects were identified in multiple ways.

Comparing Tables 3A-53 and 3A-54, we see that Seattle Police Department identification on the scene of the crime occurred in 73.3 percent of the cleared commercial burglary cases but only in 19.4 percent of the cleared residential burglary cases. Detective, witness, and victim identification were much more important in identification of suspects in the cleared residential burglary cases than in the commercial cases.

Table 3A-53--Identification of Sample Adults Arrested for Residential Burglary

Method	Victim	Suspect Identified by:		
		Witness	Detective	Patrol
By SPD on scene	--	--	--	12
Name	7	6	--	--
Mug shots	2	3	--	--
Lineup	0	2	--	--
Other	4	4	1	--
General Address	0	1	--	--
Modus Operandi	--	--	1	--
Fingerprints	--	--	7	--
Vehicle License	--	--	3	--
Vehicle Description	--	--	2	--
Physical Evidence	--	--	5	--
Informant	--	--	0	--
Tip	--	--	2	--
Total	13	16	21	12
	(21.0%)	(25.8%)	(33.9%)	(19.4%)

Table 3A-54--Identification of Sample Adults Arrested for Commercial Burglary

Method	Victim	Suspect Identified by:		
		Witness	Detective	Patrol
By SPD on scene	-	-	-	33
Name	0	1	-	--
Mug shots	0	0	-	--
Lineup	0	0	-	--
Other	0	7	2	--
General Address	0	0	-	--
Modus Operandi	-	-	0	--
Fingerprints	-	-	1	--
Vehicle License	-	-	0	--
Vehicle Description	-	-	0	--
Physical Evidence	-	-	0	--
Informant	-	-	1	--
Tip	-	-	0	--
Total	0	8	4	33
	(0%)	(17.8%)	(8.9%)	(73.3%)

How the Arrest of Adult Burglary Suspects Occurred: Table 3A-55 lists how the arrests occurred, by type of burglary, for the 1975 sample of adult burglary offenders.

Table 3A-55 shows that 61.2 percent of the commercial burglary arrests occurred on or near the scene of the crime, while only 31.3 percent of the residential burglary arrests occurred in this fashion. Arrests for commercial burglary also more frequently occur as "patrol on-view arrests" than do residential burglary arrests.

Table 3A-56 (person reporting the offense) indicates why more commercial burglary arrests are made on or near the crime scene, as compared to residential burglary arrests. Alarms reported 30.6 percent of the commercial burglaries in this sample and none of the residential burglaries. Alarms enable police to reach the scene during or immediately

after a burglary when the suspect is still in the area. In contrast, 60 percent of the residential burglaries were reported by the victims. Because victims are nearly always away from the residence during a burglary in these victim-reported cases, the police usually learn of the burglary some time after the burglar has left the scene.

Table 3A-55--Circumstances of Adult Burglary Suspect Arrest

Circumstance	Residential		Commercial	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
On scene	9	17.6	23	46.9
Near scene	7	13.7	7	14.3
In arrest of other case	10	19.6	5	10.2
On a warrant	3	5.9	1	2.0
As a citizen capture/hold	1	2.0	0	0.0
In different jurisdiction	0	0.0	0	0.0
Patrol on-view arrest	2	3.9	8	16.3
As a traffic stop	1	2.0	0	0.0
As a "shot" arrest	0	0.0	1	2.0
Suspect surrendered self	2	3.0	1	2.0
Detective arrest	5	9.8	1	2.0
Other type of arrest	11	21.6	2	4.1
Total	51*	100.0	49	99.8

*One case was coded in two classifications.

Table 3A-56--Person Reporting Burglary (for adults arrested as burglars)

"Person" Reporting	Residential		Commercial	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Victim (owner)	30	60.0	4	8.2
Witness	7	14.0	6	12.2
SPD on-view	2	4.0	11	22.4
Apartment Manager/Employee	3	6.0	3	6.1
Neighbor	4	8.0	1	2.0
Private Guard/Patrol	0	0.0	6	12.2
Relative of Victim	1	2.0	0	0.0
Silent Alarm	0	0.0	13	26.5
Alarm (audible or unspecified)	0	0.0	2	4.1
Other Means or Unknown	3	6.0	3	6.1
Total	50	100.0	49	99.9

Mental Capability Problems in Adult Burglary

Mental Capability of Adult Arrestees: Table 3A-57 shows the number of arrestees described as having various mental capability problems based on arrest reports and detective followup reports for the 1975 sample of arrested adult burglary offenders.

Table 3A-57--Mental Capability Problems of Sample Adults Arrested for Burglary

Problem	Residential		Commercial		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Mentally Retarded or Developmentally Disabled	1	2.0	1	2.0	2	2.0
Mental Illness	1	2.0	2	4.1	3	3.0
Use of Alcohol	4	8.0	4	8.2	8	8.1
Use of Drugs	0	0.0	4	8.2	4	4.0
None of the above	44	88.0	38	77.6	82	82.8
Total	50	100.0	49	100.1	99	99.9

The percentages of adults arrested as burglars who show obvious mental capability problems do not markedly differ from the percentages of people in the general population who have such problems. For example, 8.0 to 8.2 percent of those arrested showed evidence of alcohol use, but an estimate of the alcoholism rate for Seattle adults is 8.9 percent (estimate from the King County Division of Alcoholism Services).

It is possible that a number of such problems would not be easily perceived by police officers engaged in the investigation of a crime. In general, however, adults arrested for burglary show no more obviously apparent mental incapability than the general population.

Mental Capability of the Victim: There were no mental capability problems listed for the victims of these adult residential burglars. There was no information on victims' mental capabilities in the case of commercial burglary.

Supplementary Information from Adult Burglar Interviews

Data in this section are from the 1972 sample of 32 convicted burglars who participated in interviews. These interviews yielded more extensive information than did the arrest report samples, and this additional information appears below. However, it should be noted that this sample of offenders is highly biased, that is, relatively few burglars are arrested, charged, convicted, and then actually incarcerated as a result of their criminal involvement. In 1974, while 23,170 burglary incidents occurred in Seattle, only 37 adults were incarcerated for burglary, or one person for every 626 burglaries.

Familiarity with Target: The correlation between location of burglary and location of suspect residence suggested a degree of potential familiarity with the burgled target. This observation was partially confirmed by interview respondents. More than 30 percent of the offenders reported that the conviction burglary occurred in their own neighborhood, while 51 percent responded that they were familiar with the place or person burgled.

Many offenders who were interviewed also professed a knowledge of police surveillance and neighborhood or commercial crime prevention activities. More than 30 percent of the respondents said they were aware of the routes and times that police were likely to appear; some 20 percent said they were aware of the presence or absence of neighborhood or commercial crime prevention activities.

Strategies Used to Commit Burglary: Offender interviews provided considerable information about the strategies used to commit burglaries, i.e., degree of planning, characteristics sought, peer group support, object of burglary, presence of weapons, plans for disposal of burgled goods and perception of the possibilities of apprehension.

Degree of Planning in Relation to Burglary: Perhaps the most surprising result of the burglar interviews was the consistent admission that very few burglaries were planned in advance; twenty-one of the offenders (65 percent) reported that no planning had occurred. The remaining 11 respondents (35 percent) reported that some planning had gone into the act. None of the offenders felt that considerable planning had occurred. In most instances, the target was selected on the spur of the moment.

Characteristics Sought: More than half of the interviewed offenders reported they did not seek out particular characteristics when they selected a burglary target. These offenders who responded affirmatively demonstrated no pattern of characteristics which were consistently observed. The characteristics were reported as follows: night (3); isolated residences (2); alarms (2), lights, dogs, alarms (1); day (1); open windows (1); no automobile (1).

Peer Group Support: Most offenders (62 percent) admitted they were with others at the time of the offense. In most instances, the "others" represented friends or siblings. Only four offenders were with acquaintances, and none reported that the burglary was committed with strangers.

Presence of Weapons: Seven of the persons interviewed (21 percent) admitted the possession of weapons at the time of the burglary. The weapons ranged from handguns (4) to shotguns (2) to a crowbar (1).

Perception of Apprehension Possibilities: The overwhelming majority of offenders (88 percent) indicated that they felt that there was no chance of being caught or apprehended. When asked why they chose burglary rather than some other crime, their responses were as follows:

Easiest	11	(34%)
Don't know	7	(22%)
Skill	3	(9%)
Depression/anger	3	(9%)
Least risky	2	(6%)
Drugs as objects	2	(6%)
"Robin Hood" syndrome	1	(3%)
Lack of employment	1	(3%)
Less personal than other crimes	1	(3%)
Paid well	1	(3%)

Arrest Profile (Adult): To determine the nature and extent of involvement in further or other criminal activities, recidivism rates for two samples of adult burglary arrestees were analyzed. Although the term "recidivism" means to relapse to a previous mode of behavior, it is subject to a number of different operational definitions within the criminal justice system. Recidivism rates "may represent arrests, allegations of corrections agents that their clients' adjustment is unsatisfactory, court convictions following illicit behavior, or other procedural variations among supervisory personnel or police agencies which result in different levels of detecting violations or revoking parole" (David O. Moberg and Richard C. Erickson, "A New Recidivism Outcome Index," Fed. Prob., June, 1972).

Regardless of the definition used, any official statistic underestimates actual recidivism since the vast majority of burglaries (and other offenses) are never solved or result in the arrest of offenders. From rearrest to reconviction to revocation, rates of recidivism rapidly diminish. More people are rearrested than are reconvicted, and more people are reconvicted than are revoked. Although rearrest rates are subject to considerable criticism, they represent the least conservative estimate of actual recidivism.

For the analysis of the first sample, recidivism was defined as a second arrest. Previous arrests were further divided into juvenile contacts and adult arrests.

On the basis of the sample of 92 persons arrested for burglary in 1972, a total of 23 persons (25 percent) had previous juvenile records on file in the Seattle Police Department. The offenses included burglary (11), auto theft (8), larceny (4), robbery (3), curfew (2), narcotics (1), runaway (1), assault (1), minor consumption of alcohol (1), and mischief (1).

When analysis was extended to previous adult arrests, it was clear that the rate of recidivism was very high; of 92 persons interviewed, 79 (86 percent) indicated previous arrests for "serious" crimes (Table 3A-58). Previous arrests for serious crime totaled 4.3 per person. Eleven persons (12 percent) had no previous arrests and one person had been arrested for a misdemeanor only.

Note that in both the previous juvenile and adult arrest records, burglary arrests outnumbered any other offense. Of the 92 arrest records studied, 45 had previous burglary arrests--a burglary-to-burglary recidivism rate of 49 percent.

A second sample of adult burglary suspects (again using arrest data as an index of criminal involvement) was obtained by taking all adults either arrested for suspicion of burglary and/or charged with burglary in 1974 (n = 548) by the Seattle Police Department. For each person, all local (SPD) arrests for the period January 1, 1973, through

Table 3A-58--Number and Percentage of Previous Arrests for Persons Arrested for Burglary, 1972

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Burglary	149	37.8
Larceny	67	17.0
Forgery	42	10.6
Robbery	41	10.4
Auto Theft	40	10.1
Assault	28	7.1
Narcotics	23	5.8
Rape	3	.7
Arson	1	.2
Total	394	99.7

August 31, 1975, were obtained. Suspicion arrest charges were recorded separately by calendar year (1973, 1974, and 1975) with 1974 target arrests (those bookings including a burglary charge and any other charges) listed separately from other 1974 arrests (see Table 3A-59).

Table 3A-59--Number of Bookings by Year for Individuals Arrested for Burglary in 1974 by Seattle Police Department (n = 548)

<u>Offenses Arrested for between Jan. 1, 1973, and Aug. 31, 1975</u>	<u>Arrests Occurring in Calendar Year</u>				<u>Arrests per 100 Offender Years</u>
	<u>1973 Arrests</u>	<u>1974 Arrests</u>		<u>1975 Arrests First Eight Months</u>	
		<u>Target*/Non-Target**</u>		<u>Total</u>	
Murder	1	3	0	4	0.27
Rape	5	13	0	18	1.23
Robbery	20	34	14	68	4.65
Aggravated Assault	4	25	5	34	2.33
Burglary	55	662	54	771	52.76
Larceny	42	2	38	190	13.00
Auto Theft	7	27	7	41	2.81
Non-agg. Assault	60	68	37	165	11.29
Weapons	12	22	11	45	3.08
Drugs	39	77	14	130	8.90
Vandalism	10	9	4	23	1.57
All Other***	287	2	68	674	46.12
Total Criminal Charges	542	666	252	2,163	148.02
Additional Charges:					
Contempt of Court	155	187	0	342	23.40
Failure to Appear	0	0	75	75	5.13
Escape	2	1	1	4	.22
Grand Total	699	666	328	2,584	176.83

*1974 arrests for burglary plus additional crimes arrested for at the same time

**1974 arrests not involving burglary

***Includes 203 and 192 drunkenness charges in 1973, 1974 respectively

The data indicate that as a group, burglary offenders were arrested for an average of 4.72 total offenses per offender. If only Part I index offenses (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft) are considered, the average per offender was 2.356. Given the 32-month time period, this is an average annual arrest rate of 1.77 total offenses per offender year, and 0.88 Part I offenses per offender year.

Juveniles Contacted for Burglary

The following information refers to burglaries for which juveniles (age 17 and under) were contacted. A juvenile contact is similar to an adult primary charge arrest. A contact is defined as the one major or most severe charge (as defined by FBI standards) for which a juvenile is arrested. When there is only one charge, only one contact is recorded. However, if a juvenile is arrested on multiple charges (e.g., burglary and bicycle theft), the major charge (burglary) is the only recorded "contact." Similarly, if a juvenile is arrested for burglary and then confesses to prior offenses, only the one main arresting charge is recorded as a contact.

An incident is defined as any charge involved in an arrest. In the case of a juvenile's being arrested for burglary and that alone, one burglary contact and one burglary incident would result. In the case of an arrest for burglary and bicycle theft, a burglary contact would be recorded while a burglary incident and a separate bicycle theft incident would be recorded. In the case of a juvenile being initially arrested for burglary and then admitting to 14 bicycle thefts, 1 burglary contact and 1 burglary incident plus 14 bicycle theft incidents would be recorded.

Juveniles comprised 66.4 percent of the people arrested for burglary in 1975. If the arrest population adequately represents involvement in burglary, most burglaries in Seattle are committed by juveniles.

Data on juveniles contacted for burglary have been drawn from four sources: (1) a random sample of 92 juvenile burglary contact records from 1972, (2) a random sample of 49 juvenile residential burglary contact records from 1975, (3) a random sample of 50 juvenile commercial burglary contact records from 1975, and (4) Seattle Police Department statistics on juvenile crime.

Because the 1972 sample did not distinguish residential and commercial burglars, tables will be presented for total juvenile burglary offenders (including 1972 and 1975 samples) followed by separate tables for residential and commercial burglars (separated in the 1975 sample only).

Characteristics of Juvenile Burglary Offenders

Age: Table 3A-60 lists the ages of juveniles contacted for burglary for the years 1974 and 1975.

Table 3A-60--Number of Juvenile Burglary Contacts by Age

Age	1974		1975		Percent of Seattle Juvenile Population
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
9 and under	29	3.2	37	4.8	51.1
10	21	2.3	14	1.8	5.6
11	37	4.1	34	4.4	5.8
12	55	6.0	66	8.5	6.1
13	89	9.8	99	12.8	6.1
14	181	19.9	149	19.2	6.1
15	190	20.9	149	19.2	6.4
16	172	18.9	147	19.0	6.4
17	136	15.0	79	10.2	6.4
Total	910	100.1	774	99.9	100.0

Table 3A-60 shows that contacts for burglary are highest for the 14-16 year old group. This age group includes 57.4 percent (1975) to 59.7 percent (1974) of the juveniles contacted but represents only 18.9 percent of the Seattle juvenile population.

Table 3A-61 gives the age distribution for the 99 juveniles contacted for residential and commercial burglary from the 1975 sample.

Table 3A-61--Age of Juveniles Contacted for Residential or Commercial Burglary

Age	Residential		Commercial		Percent of Seattle Juvenile Population
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
9 and under	0	0.0	0	0.0	51.1
10	0	0.0	0	0.0	5.6
11	0	0.0	0	0.0	5.8
12	6	12.2	3	6.0	6.1
13	5	10.2	8	16.0	6.1
14	9	18.4	11	22.0	6.1
15	10	20.4	11	22.0	6.4
16	11	22.4	5	10.0	6.4
17	5	10.2	8	16.0	6.4
Unknown	3	6.1	4	8.0	
Total	49	99.9	50	100.0	100.0

Table 3A-61 shows that residential and commercial juvenile burglars do not differ much in age, with the greatest frequency of contacts again occurring in the 14-16 year age group.

Race: Table 3A-62 shows the racial distribution of juveniles contacted for burglary for the years 1973 through 1975.

Table 3A-62--Race of Juveniles Contacted for Burglary

Race	1973		1974		1975		Percent of Seattle Population
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Caucasian*	411	48.0	559	62.0	473	61.1	84.8
Black	377	44.0	286	31.7	238	30.8	8.6
Asian American	4	0.5	3	0.3	0	0.0	3.9
Native American	20	2.3	28	3.1	33	4.3	0.9
All Others	45	5.2	26	2.9	30	3.9	1.8
Total	857	100.0	902	100.0	774	100.1	100.0

*The "Caucasian" category in this table includes Chicanos.

Table 3A-62 shows that blacks, Native Americans, and "others" (primarily Filipino) account for 37.7 percent to 51.5 percent of the juvenile burglary contact population but these groups represent only 11.3 percent of the Seattle population. Asian Americans and caucasians are underrepresented in the juvenile burglary contact population relative to their proportions in the general Seattle population.

Table 3A-63 shows the racial distributions for the samples of juveniles contacted for residential or commercial burglary in 1975.

There seems to be little difference in racial distributions for residential as compared with commercial juvenile offenders. The contributions of the various races in this sample are similar to those displayed by the total juvenile burglary contact population in Table 3A-62.

Sex: Table 3A-64 shows the sex of juveniles contacted for burglary for the years 1973 through 1975. These statistics are from Seattle Police Department records for all juvenile burglary contacts and indicate that juveniles with police contacts for burglary are overwhelmingly male. The percentage of females contacted has increased in recent years, from 4.3 percent in 1973 to 7.6 percent in 1975.

Table 3A-63--Race of Juveniles Contacted for Residential or Commercial Burglary

Race	Residential		Commercial		Percent of Seattle Population
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Caucasian	29	59.2	26	52.0	82.8
Black	13	26.5	14	28.0	8.6
Asian American	0	0.0	1	2.0	3.9
Chicano	1	2.0	0	0.0	2.0
Native American	3	6.1	4	8.0	0.9
Filipino	0	0.0	1	2.0	1.3
Other	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.5
Unknown	3	6.1	4	8.0	
Total	49	99.9	50	100.0	100.0

Table 3A-64--Sex of Juveniles Contacted for Burglary

Sex	1973	1974	1975	Percent of Seattle Juvenile Population
	Percent	Percent	Percent	
Male	95.7	95.1	92.4	51.7
Female	4.3	4.9	7.6	48.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 3A-65 gives the sex distribution for the 1975 sample of juveniles contacted for residential or commercial burglary and shows that the few females contacted for burglary in the 1975 samples were all for residential burglary.

Table 3A-65--Sex of Juveniles Contacted for Residential or Commercial Burglary

Sex	Residential		Commercial		Percent of Seattle Juvenile Population
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Male	43	87.8	46	92.0	51.7
Female	3	6.1	0	0.0	48.3
Unknown	3	6.1	4	8.0	
Total	49	100.0	50	100.0	100.0

Height and Weight: The two groups of juveniles contacted for residential and commercial burglary differed little in height and weight. For both groups combined, height ranged from 4'1" to 6'8", with a median height of 5'6". Weights ranged from 70 pounds to 260 pounds, with a median weight of 128 pounds.

Occupation: Table 3A-66 presents the occupational distributions of juveniles contacted for burglary. These data are from the 1972 and 1975 samples of arrest reports. Each sample has two percentage columns, one including the "unknown" cases and the other excluding the "unknown" cases.

Table 3A-66 shows that, as one might expect, nearly all the juvenile burglars are students.

Table 3A-67 gives the occupational distributions separately for residential and commercial burglaries for the 1975 sample.

Table 3A-67 shows there is little occupational difference between the sample of juveniles contacted for residential burglary and the sample contacted for commercial burglary. In both cases, students account for 89.5 percent to 93.9 percent of the samples.

Table 3A-66--Occupations of Sample Juveniles Contacted for Burglary

Occupation	1972		1975		Percent Excluding Unknown	Percent of Seattle Male Population Aged 16-21
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		
Student	70	86.4	48	48.5	92.3	70.6
Employed	0	0.0	1	1.0	1.9	25.1
Unemployed	11	13.6	3	3.0	5.8	4.3
Unknown	0	0.0	47	47.5		
Total	81	100.0	99	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 3A-67--Occupations of Sample Juveniles Contacted for Residential or Commercial Burglary

Occupation	Number	Residential		Commercial		Percent of Seattle Male Population Aged 16-21
		Percent	Percent Excluding Unknown	Number	Percent	
Student	17	34.7	89.5	31	62.0	70.6
Employed	1	2.0	5.3	0	0.0	25.1
Unemployed	1	2.0	5.3	2	4.0	4.3
Unknown	30	61.2		17	34.0	
Total	49	99.9	100.1	50	100.0	100.0

Marital Status of Parents: Table 3A-68 shows the marital status of the parents of juveniles from the 1972 sample.

Table 3A-68--Marital Status of Parents of Sample Juveniles Contacted for Burglary

Parents' Marital Status	Number	Percent	Percent of Seattle Adults* Excluding Those Never Married
Divorced	31	37.8	9.7
Separated	17	20.7	2.6
Widowed	8	9.8	12.3
Total	82	100.0	100.0

*For census marital statistics, "adults" are aged 14 and over.

Parents of these juveniles show a 58.5 percent rate of divorce or separation. In contrast, the Seattle adult population (excluding those never married) has only a 12.3 percent rate of divorced or separated adults. A majority of juveniles contacted for burglary come from broken homes, in contrast with the total population in which unbroken homes form the majority.

Living Situation: Table 3A-69 shows the percentages of juveniles in the 1972 sample living with both parents and in other situations, as compared with Seattle averages for children under 18.

Table 3A-69 shows that only 27.0 percent of the juveniles contacted for burglary live with both parents, in contrast with 77.9 percent of the general Seattle juvenile population. Juveniles living with their mothers only or in some other household arrangement are overrepresented in the group contacted for burglary. The "other arrangements" category is most overrepresented among juveniles contacted for burglary.

Table 3A-69--Living Situation of Sample Juveniles Contacted for Burglary

<u>Living Situation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Juvenile Population</u>
With both parents	24	27.0	77.9
With mother only	34	38.2	14.5
Other arrangement	31	34.8	7.6
Total	89	100.0	100.0

Relationship of Victims to Juveniles Contacted for Burglary: Table 3A-70 shows the distribution of relationships between victims and juveniles contacted for burglary from the 1975 sample.

Table 3A-70--Relationship of Victims to Sample Juveniles Contacted for Residential or Commercial Burglary

<u>Relationship</u>	<u>Residential</u>			<u>Commercial</u>		
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Excluding Unknown</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent Excluding Unknown</u>
Relative	3	6.1	9.7	0	0.0	0.0
Friend	2	4.1	6.4	0	0.0	0.0
Neighbor	6	12.2	19.4	0	0.0	0.0
Acquaintance	1	2.0	3.2	1	2.0	7.1
Business Associate	1	2.0	3.2	0	0.0	0.0
Total Stranger	18	36.7	58.7	13	26.0	92.9
Unknown	18	36.7		36	72.0	
Total	49	99.8	100.0	50	100.0	100.0

Degree of Violence: Of the 99 residential and commercial burglaries in the 1975 sample of juvenile burglary contacts, there was only one commercial burglary case in which a "weapon" was used. This was a mock handgun. In addition, one victim of commercial burglary was injured by means of bodily force alone, but did not require medical attention. By FBI UCR crime definitions, these would be normally classified either as robbery or assault cases. There were no victim injuries and no use of weapons in the residential cases sampled.

Extent of Loss

Dollar Value of Property Stolen: Table 3A-71 shows the mean and median average values of property stolen per residential or commercial burglary for the 1975 samples of juvenile burglary contacts.

Table 3A-71--Value of Property Stolen Per Juvenile Burglary, 1975 Samples

<u>Average</u>	<u>Residential</u>	<u>Commercial</u>
Mean	\$355.42	\$225.07
Median	\$220.00	\$ 22.50

Table 3A-71 shows that the mean and median amounts stolen were greater for residential than for commercial burglaries for the samples. In half of the residential burglaries, \$220.00 or less was lost, while in half of the commercial burglaries, \$22.50 or less was lost.

Type of Objects Taken: Table 3A-72 lists the objects most frequently reported stolen in residential and commercial burglaries in the 1975 sample of juvenile burglary contacts. Objects most frequently stolen are listed first.

Table 3A-72--Objects Frequently Stolen by Sample Juveniles Contacted for Burglary

<u>Residential</u>	<u>Commercial</u>
1. Home entertainment equipment (television, stereo, tape deck, radio)	1. Liquor and food
2. Cash	2. Cash/Auto or motorcycle/ Home entertainment equipment
3. Camera/Photographic equipment	3. Office equipment/Clothing/ Household items, furniture
4. Household items, furniture	
5. Food and liquor/Jewelry	
6. Watches	

Table 3A-72 shows that objects frequently stolen in residential burglaries in the juvenile sample differ from those frequently stolen in commercial burglaries, although cash ranks second in both cases. Items stolen from commercial premises were much more varied than items stolen from residential premises. Home entertainment equipment represents 22.6 percent of items stolen in residential burglaries in this sample. Liquor and food represent 14.0 percent of items stolen in the sample of commercial burglaries.

Identification of Juvenile Suspects

Table 3A-73 shows how juveniles in the 1975 sample were identified.

Table 3A-73--Identification of Sample Juveniles Contacted for Burglary

<u>Method</u>	<u>Victim</u>	<u>Suspect Identified by:</u>		
		<u>Witness</u>	<u>Detective</u>	<u>Patrol</u>
By SPD on scene	-	--	--	51
Name	6	10	--	--
Mug shots	0	0	--	--
Lineup	0	0	--	--
Other	3	7	7	--
General Address	0	0	--	--
Modus Operandi	-	--	1	--
Fingerprints	-	--	1	--
Vehicle License	-	--	0	--
Vehicle Description	-	--	0	--
Physical Evidence	-	--	4	--
Informant	-	--	4	--
Tip	-	--	3	--
Total*	9 (9.3%)	17 (17.5%)	20 (20.6%)	51 (52.6%)

*There are 97 "cases" in Table 3A-73 because there was no information on how the suspect was identified for three cases and one case was identified in two ways, accounting for the 99 cases in the combined 1975 samples.

Table 3A-73 shows that juveniles contacted for burglary were most likely (52.6 percent) to have been identified by SPD patrol at the scene of the crime. Detective and witness identification are second and third in frequency, which together are less than the frequency of SPD patrol identification.

Tables 3A-74 and 3A-75 present the means of suspect identification for residential and commercial burglaries separately.

Comparing Tables 3A-74 and 3A-75, we see that means of suspect identification differ for residential and commercial juvenile burglaries. Although SPD on-scene identification is the most common means for each sample, it accounts for 38.0 percent of the residential cases and 68.1 percent of the commercial cases. Detective identification occurred in 30.0 percent of the residential cases and 10.6 percent of the commercial cases. Victims identified 18.0 percent of the residential but none of the commercial juvenile burglary suspects.

Table 3A-74--Identification of Sample Juveniles Contacted for Residential Burglary

Method	Victim	Suspect Identified by:		
		Witness	Detective	Patrol
By SPD on scene	-	-	--	19
Name	6	6	--	--
Mug shots	0	0	--	--
Lineup	0	0	--	--
Other	3	1	5	--
General Address	0	0	--	--
Modus Operandi	-	-	0	--
Fingerprints	-	-	1	--
Vehicle License	-	-	0	--
Vehicle Description	-	-	0	--
Physical Evidence	-	-	4	--
Informant	-	-	3	--
Tip	-	-	2	--
Total*	9 (18.0%)	7 (14.0%)	15 (30.0%)	19 (38.0%)

*These identifications total 50 for 49 cases because one suspect was identified in two ways.

Table 3A-75--Identification of Sample Juveniles Contacted for Commercial Burglary

Method	Victim	Suspect Identified by:		
		Witness	Detective	Patrol
By SPD on scene	-	--	-	32
Name	0	4	-	--
Mug shots	0	0	-	--
Lineup	0	0	-	--
Other	0	6	2	--
General Address	0	0	-	--
Modus Operandi	-	--	1	--
Fingerprints	-	--	0	--
Vehicle License	-	--	0	--
Vehicle Description	-	--	0	--
Physical Evidence	-	--	0	--
Informant	-	--	1	--
Tip	-	--	1	--
Total*	0 (0%)	10 (21.3%)	5 (10.6%)	32 (68.1%)

*These identifications total 47 cases because it was unknown how the suspect was identified in three cases.

How the Arrests for Juveniles Contacted for Burglary Occurred

Table 3A-76 shows how the arrests occurred for the juveniles contacted for residential or commercial burglary in the 1975 sample.

Contrasting arrests for commercial and residential burglary, one sees from Table 3A-76 that 70.2 percent of the commercial arrests occurred on or near the scene and 44.9 percent of the residential arrests occurred on or near the scene. Similarly, 8.5 percent of commercial arrests were "patrol on-view" arrests which are also at the scene, while 2.0 percent of residential arrests fell into this category. In contrast, residential burglary arrests are more likely to occur as "arrest of other case" or "detective arrest" than are commercial burglary arrests.

Table 3A-76--Circumstances of Sample Juvenile Burglary Suspect Arrest

Circumstance	Residential		Commercial		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
On scene	12	24.5	27	57.4	39	40.6
Near scene	10	20.4	6	12.8	16	16.7
In arrest of other case	11	22.4	4	8.5	15	15.6
On a warrant	1	2.0	1	2.1	2	2.1
As a citizen capture/hold	3	6.1	1	2.1	4	4.2
In different jurisdiction	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Patrol on-view arrest	1	2.0	4	8.5	5	5.2
As a traffic stop	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
As a "shot" arrest	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Suspect surrendered self	2	4.1	0	0.0	2	2.1
Detective arrest	5	10.2	1	2.1	6	6.2
Other type of arrest	4	8.2	3	6.4	7	7.3
Total	49	99.9	47*	99.9	96	100.0

*There was no information on how arrest occurred in three of the commercial burglary cases.

Table 3A-77 shows who reported the burglary for the 1975 samples of juveniles contacted for residential or commercial burglary.

Table 3A-77--Person Reporting Burglary (for samples of juveniles contacted for burglary)

"Person" Reporting Burglary	Residential		Commercial		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Victim (owner)	33	67.4	3	6.0	36	36.4
Witness	4	8.2	5	10.0	9	9.1
SPD on view	1	2.0	3	6.0	4	4.0
Apartment Manager/Employee	0	0.0	8	16.0	8	8.1
Neighbor	5	10.2	2	4.0	7	7.1
Private Guard/Patrol	0	0.0	1	2.0	1	1.0
Relative of Victim	1	2.0	0	0.0	1	1.0
Silent Alarm	0	0.0	6	12.0	6	6.1
Alarm (audible or unspecified)	0	0.0	8	16.0	8	8.1
Other means or unknown	5	10.2	14	28.0	19	19.2
Total	49	100.0	50	100.0	99	100.1

Table 3A-77 shows that of the commercial cases, at least 34.0 percent were reported while the burglary was in progress (this figure includes SPD on-view and alarm reports), while only 2.0 percent of the residential cases were reported in this way. By contrast, 67.4 percent of the residential cases were reported by the victims and 36.4 percent of the commercial cases were reported by the victims.

Mental Capability Problems in Juvenile Burglary

Mental Capability of Juveniles Contacted for Burglary: Table 3A-78 shows the numbers of juveniles from the 1975 burglary samples described as having various mental capability problems.

Table 3A-78 shows that juveniles contacted for burglary have very low rates of obvious mental capability problems. These figures are based on the impression of the arresting officers. Because there was no specific question concerning drug use on offense and arrest report forms during the first half of 1975, drug use may be underestimated. The 1972 sample of juveniles contacted for burglary showed that 10.9 percent of the juveniles had been previously contacted on narcotics charges.

Table 3A-78--Mental Capability Problems of Sample Juveniles Contacted for Burglary

Problem	Residential		Commercial		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Mentally Retarded or Developmentally Disabled	1	2.0	0	0.0	1	1.0
Mental Illness	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Use of Alcohol	1	2.0	1	2.0	2	2.0
Use of Drugs	1	2.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
None of the above	46	93.9	49	98.0	96	97.0
Total	49	99.9	50	100.0	99	100.0

Mental Capability of the Victim: There were no mental incapability problems listed for the victims in the 1975 juvenile burglary samples except for one residential burglary victim who was listed as mentally retarded or developmentally disabled.

Arrest Profile (Juvenile): As in the case of adult burglary arrestees, recidivism data for two samples of juvenile arrestees (1972 and 1973-1974) were examined.

The first sample consisted of a 10 percent random sample (n = 92) of juveniles contacted for burglary by the Seattle Police Department in 1972. For each youth, the number and kind of juvenile arrests occurring before the 1972 target burglary arrest were analyzed by Part I offenses (FBI index crimes), Part II offenses, and by status offenses, or those which would not be illegal if committed by adults (see Table 3A-79).

More than two-thirds (69.0 percent) of all previous contacts were for Part I, or serious, offenses. Approximately one-third (31 percent) of the previous contacts were for Part II offenses. Status offenses (runaway, curfew and truancy), which are also Part II offenses, accounted for 14 percent of the previous contacts.

All 394 previous offenses were committed by 66 of the 92 sample contacts. This represents a delinquent recidivism rate of 71.7 percent, while 28 percent of the sample had no prior police records. If total offenses are divided by the sample size, the average or mean previous delinquent contacts was 4.28 per juvenile, most of which were serious offenses.

The burglary-to-burglary recidivism rate was 45.6 percent. This rate very nearly approximates that of the 1972 adult burglary arrestee sample.

The second sample (Juvenile Cohort Study, Table 3A-80) consisted of all youths contacted for burglary between October 1, 1973, and March 31, 1974. For these 263 individuals, all prior and all subsequent Seattle Police Department arrests through May, 1975, were recorded and analyzed.

As a group, the youths arrested for burglary had a total of 1,755 Part I and II offenses, or 6.67 per offender. At the time of contact for the target burglary bringing them into the cohort, they had an average of 3.61 offenses. In the time from a target contact until May, 1975, they were recontacted an average of 2.08 times.

The Juvenile Cohort Study of burglars contacted between October 1, 1973, and March 31, 1974, examined police dispositions on the basis of whether juveniles had prior or subsequent Seattle Police Department contacts for burglary (see Table 3A-81). Of the 77 juveniles adjusted at the police level, 17 (22.1 percent) had subsequent burglary contacts through May, 1975. Of the 142 referred to court, 39 (27.5 percent) had subsequent Seattle Police Department contacts for burglary during the period studied.

If recidivism is examined in terms of subsequent Part I offenses (murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, or auto theft), 115 of the 263 juveniles (43.7 percent) were recontacted by May, 1975 (see Table 3A-82).

Table 3A-79--Number and Percentage of Previous Juvenile Contacts for Juveniles Contacted for Burglary (Seattle Police Department, 1972 Sample, n = 92)

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<u>Part I "Serious" Offenses</u>		
Burglary	102	25.7
Rape	1	.2
Robbery	30	7.5
Assault	23	5.8
Larceny and Shoplift	84	21.2
Prowl	8	2.0
Auto Theft	24	6.0
Total	272	
<u>Part II Non-status Offenses</u>		
Arson	4	1.0
Narcotics	10	2.5
Consuming (Minor)	6	1.5
Property Damage/Vandalism	33	8.3
Threats	2	.5
Extortion	1	.2
Possible Stolen Property	2	.5
Throwing Things	1	.2
Peddling	1	.2
Mischief	2	.5
Obscene Phone Calls	1	.2
Trespass	1	.2
Discharge Firearms	1	.2
Total	65	
<u>Part II Status Offenses</u>		
Runaway	39	9.8
Curfew	16	4.0
Truant	2	.5
Total	57	

Table 3A-80--Youths Contacted for Burglary by SPD from October 1, 1973, through March 31, 1974, and Followup through May, 1975 (Juvenile Cohort Study, n = 263)

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Pre-Target Charges</u>	<u>Target Booking Charges</u>	<u>Post-Target Charges</u>	<u>Total</u>
Murder	0		0	0
Rape	1		0	1
Robbery	32		15	47
All assaults	35		24	59
Burglary	185	263	127	575
Larceny	215		104	319
Auto Theft	56		23	79
Weapons	9		9	18
Drugs	17		25	42
Vandalism	84		33	117
Runaway	159		76	235
Other Status	64		99	163
All Other	92		13	105
Total Parts I and II	949	263	548	1,760
Part IV	53		2	55
Grand Total	1,002	263	550	1,815

Table 3A-81--Prior, Subsequent Burglary Contacts by SPD Disposition for Juvenile Burglary Contactees, October 1, 1973, through March 31, 1974; Followup through May, 1975

Juveniles Having Burglary Contacts		Investigated and Released	SPD Disposition		Referred to Court	Total
Prior	Subsequent		Adjusted	Exceptionally Cleared		
No	No	8	49	12	70	139
No	Yes	5	11	3	18	37
Yes	No	4	11	3	33	51
Yes	Yes	7	6	2	21	36
Total		24	77	20	142	263

Table 3A-82--Subsequent Part I Offenses by SPD Disposition

Subsequent Part I Contacts	Investigated and Released	SPD Disposition		Referred to Court	Total
		Adjusted	Exceptionally Cleared		
None	8	51	13	76	148
At least one	16 (66.7%)	26 (33.8%)	7 (35%)	66 (46.5%)	115 (43.7%)
Total	24	77	20	142	263

Criminal Justice System Response (Adults)

Complete information on criminal justice system responses to adults arrested for burglary was not available for 1973. The information presented is based on the 1972 disposition records maintained by the Seattle Police Department. The analysis proceeds from burglary frequency and arrests (Level I) to various decision points in prosecution (Level II) and adjudication (Level III). Additional data for 1974 and the first eight months of 1975 are presented with an estimate of the actual occurrence of burglaries during 1974 and 1975.


1972 Burglary Case Flow: Figure 3A-6 presents the flow of offenders through the "system." Level I decisions were police functions, e.g., persons actually arrested for burglary. Level II decisions were made at the level of prosecution. At this point, 27 percent of those arrested were not charged with any offense and exited from the system. Of those arrested, 42 percent were subsequently charged with burglary and 58 percent were charged with other offenses or released without charge.

Level III decisions are judicial functions. Of the 191 persons actually tried for burglary in 1972, a large number exited the criminal justice system through decisions which involved suspended sentences and court releases (19.3 percent) or verdicts of not guilty, dismissals or stricken charges (16.0 percent). Those persons who remained in the system did so through decisions which involved juvenile court referrals (1.6 percent), "other" (39.8 percent) or sentences in jail or correctional facilities (18.3 percent).

Persons who were arrested for burglary but charged with another offense tended to exit the system in great numbers. Of the 143 persons tried for other charges in 1972, more than 66 percent exited the criminal justice system via decisions of not guilty (38.4 percent), suspended sentence and court release (22.3 percent), bail forfeiture (0.6 percent) or fines (4.9 percent). Only 23 persons were sentenced to jail or a correctional facility (16.1 percent) and 25 persons (17.4 percent) received unspecified dispositions.

It was obvious that only a very small proportion of people remained in the system from arrest to sentenced incarceration. This dramatic funnel effect diverted persons from the criminal justice system throughout the decision making process.

Figure 3A-6--Flow Chart of Criminal Justice Decisions as They Related to Adults Arrested for Burglary in 1972




1974 Burglary Case Flow: Figure 3A-7 presents data on all burglary cases for calendar year 1974. Based upon victim reporting rates (52.2 percent for residential and 74.4 percent for non-residential burglary; reporting rates from Sea-King Victim Information Project and national LEAA victimization surveys), an estimated 23,170 burglary incidents occurred of which 14,219 (61.4 percent) were reported. During this period of time, 548 individuals were either initially and/or subsequently charged with a total of 661 suspicion of burglary counts and 314 counts of burglary were filed with the prosecutor and court. Of 216 burglary cases known by the Seattle Police Department to have been disposed in court, 170 (78.7 percent) were found guilty. Of those found guilty, 128 (75.3 percent) had a deferred, suspended, or probation sentence, while 37 (21.8 percent) received either jail or penitentiary time.

1975 Burglary Case Flow: Figure 3A-8 presents data on all burglary cases for the period January 1 through August 31, 1975. An estimated 15,313 burglaries occurred of which 8,613 were reported. During this time, 438 individuals were arrested for 563 suspicion of burglary counts and subsequently charged with burglary on 314 counts of burglary. Of 125 cases known to have been disposed of in court, 85 (68 percent) were found guilty. Of these, 65 (76.5 percent) received a suspended, deferred, or probation sentence and 19 (22.4 percent) received either a jail or penitentiary sentence.

Criminal Justice System Response (Juveniles)


As in 1974, again in 1975 it was not possible to follow juveniles through the juvenile court system. However, information on SPD disposition of cases is available.

Figure 3A-7--Burglary 1974; Data Based upon SPD Data Processing Offense and Arrest Files, Sea-King Victim Information Project



*Estimated on the basis of 52.2 percent victim reporting rate for residential burglary and 74.4 percent for non-residential burglary obtained from Sea-King Victim Information Project surveys and LEAA national victimization surveys.

Figure 3A-8--Burglary, January, 1975, through August, 1975: Data Based upon SPD Data Processing Offense and Arrest Files, Sea-King Victim Information Project



*Estimated on the basis of a 52 percent victim reporting rate; obtained from Sea-King Victim Information grant survey conducted in summer, 1975.

**Includes one individual whose previous suspension was revoked.

Seattle Police Department disposition of burglary contact cases was provided by the sample contact records in 1972. Of 87 cases with recorded dispositions, 30 were referred to Juvenile Court, 7 were investigated and released, 41 were adjusted with parents or victims, and 13 were placed in the youth center, group homes or institutions (Table 3A-83).

Table 3A-83--Number and Percentage Juvenile Burglary Contacts by Disposition (Seattle Police Department, 1972; n = 87)

<u>Contact Disposition</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Juvenile Court Referral	30	34.4
Investigated and Released	7	8.0
Adjusted with Parents	28	32.1
Adjusted with Victim	2	2.2
Adjusted (General)	3	3.4
Victim Refused Prosecution	4	4.5
Youth Service Center, Group Home, Institution	13	14.9

If sample dispositions represented the total population of burglary dispositions, approximately 50 percent of the juveniles proceeded to the level of court or institutionalization in the juvenile justice system. The remainder of the juvenile burglary dispositions were handled informally. More complete data on juvenile dispositions for 1974 and 1975 at the Seattle Police Department level is available (Table 3A-84).

Table 3A-84--Number and Percentage Juvenile Burglary Cases Received* by Disposition (Seattle Police Department, 1974 and 1975 Annual Activity Report, Juvenile Operations Section)

<u>Disposition</u>	<u>1974</u>		<u>1975</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Adjusted	92	6.0	70	5.4
Exceptionally Cleared	151	9.0	109	8.4
Unfounded	5	.3	15	1.2
Inactive**	683	41.0	705	54.4
Referred to Court	394	24.0	370	28.5
Pending	330	20.0	27	2.1

*Corresponds to neither incidents nor contacts (from Data Processing Section, SPD).

**Predominantly those cases for which there is a juvenile suspect but no arrest occurs.

At first glance it appears that the referral to Juvenile Court rate for burglary is considerably less (28.5 percent) than the average referral rate for all contacts (approximately 50 percent). However, the percentage was computed with inactive cases included in the total number of cases. When those cases in which a contact is made and disposition is completed are tabulated (this number excludes pending and inactive cases), then 370 of 564 cases or 65.6 percent of active juvenile burglary cases were referred to court during 1975.

Adult Versus Juvenile Involvement in Burglary

When a burglary is cleared by arrest, police can determine the age of the burglar. Only 10 to 14 percent of burglaries are cleared, however, and it is not known what proportion of juveniles is involved in the majority of burglaries which are not cleared.

In an attempt to estimate the percentage of all residential or commercial burglaries committed by juveniles, a comparison was made between characteristics of random samples of these burglaries and the characteristics of the burglaries cleared by adult arrest and the characteristics of burglaries cleared by juvenile arrest.

Table 3A-85 shows the estimates of adult and juvenile involvement in residential burglary, while Table 3A-86 does the same for commercial burglary. These tables are followed by a detailed discussion of how the estimates were calculated and the assumptions which were made.

Table 3A-85--Estimates of Adult Versus Juvenile Involvement
in Residential Burglary

<u>Source</u>	<u>Percent Adults</u>	<u>Percent Juveniles</u>	<u>Completeness of Data</u>
Average value of first item of property damage	26.2%	73.8%	90.4%
Percentage of day versus night burglaries	22.8%	77.2%	78.9%
Time period of burglary occurrence	53.3%	46.7%	57.8%
Mode of entry	51.7%	48.3%	84.4%
Mode of reporting	45.9%	54.1%	95.0%
Type of items stolen	51.0%	49.0%	98.0%

Weighted combined estimate: 41.6% adult, 58.4% juvenile
Range of estimates: 22.8% to 53.3% adult, 46.7% to 77.2% juvenile
Standard deviation of estimates: 13.7*, 12.3**

*This was calculated by considering each estimate as one observation.

**This was calculated by considering each person contributing to each estimate as one observation.

Table 3A-86--Estimates of Adult Versus Juvenile Involvement
in Commercial Burglary

<u>Source</u>	<u>Percent Adults</u>	<u>Percent Juveniles</u>	<u>Completeness of Data</u>
Percent day versus night burglaries	51.0%	49.0%	78.4%
Time period of burglary occurrence	46.9%	53.1%	58.3%
Mode of entry	59.3%	40.7%	80.9%
Mode of reporting	36.3%	63.7%	85.9%
Type of items stolen	52.8%	47.2%	98.5%

Weighted combined estimate: 49.4% adult, 50.6% juvenile
Range of estimates: 36.3% to 59.3% adult, 40.7% to 63.7% juvenile
Standard deviation of estimates: 8.5*, 7.8**

*This was calculated by considering each estimate as one observation.

**This was calculated by considering each person contributing to each estimate as one observation.

The specific estimates given in Tables 3A-85 and 3A-86 were calculated by one of two methods. The first method was used for characteristics measured numerically (such as average value of first item of property damage) and the second was used for characteristics measured categorically (such as mode of entry).

For the first method, average values from the random sample of burglaries, from the sample of burglaries cleared by adult arrest, and from the sample of burglaries cleared by juvenile arrest were used. For example, assume the average losses were as follows for residential burglary: random sample, \$24; juvenile cleared sample, \$18; adult cleared sample, \$28. If you assume that these arrested adults and juveniles stole the values typical for their age groups, you can find the percentage of 100 burglars in each age group (x = percent of juveniles, y = percent of adults, then $x + y = 100$; $[\$18][x] + [\$28][y] = [\$24][100]$).

Solving this example, one can see that these figures give 60 percent adult and 40 percent juvenile estimates of the burglar population. This method can only be used when the random sample average falls between the adult and juvenile sample averages.

The second method uses the percentage of each sample falling into a given category to estimate the percentages of juveniles and adults. For example, assume that residential burglaries occur at the times listed below for the three samples:

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Random Sample</u>	<u>Juvenile Arrests</u>	<u>Adult Arrests</u>
4 a.m. - Noon	20%	20%	60%
Noon - 8 p.m.	60%	60%	20%
8 p.m. - 4 a.m.	20%	20%	20%
	100%	100%	100%

Taking each time period separately, one calculates the proportion of burglaries attributable to each age group for that period. For the 4 a.m. to noon period, adults account for three times as many of the burglaries as do the juveniles, so the 20 percent of the random sample gets split up; 15 percent to the adults and 5 percent to the juveniles. For the noon to 8 p.m. period, juveniles would get three times as many as the adults: 45 percent to juveniles and 15 percent to adults. This method assumes that adults and juveniles have an equal chance of being arrested in each time period.

The weighted combined estimate was calculated for Tables 3A-85 and 3A-86 by weighting each estimate by the completeness of the data for that estimate, and then averaging across estimates.

A number of characteristics could not be used for estimates because the random sample average did not fall between the averages for the juvenile and adult arrest samples. Based on the analysis of usable offense characteristics of reported burglaries, 58 percent of residential burglaries are committed by juveniles, while 50 percent of non-residential burglaries are committed by juveniles.

Introduction

This Survey of Robbery is essentially a descriptive and statistical overview of robbery in Seattle. It contains much of what is currently known about robbery trends, frequency of occurrence, time of occurrence, how robberies are committed, resultant robbery losses and a profile of robbery offenders. In addition, this section contains a general analysis of the criminal justice system's response to the crime of robbery.

Data used in this section came from the following sources, which are identified by the short title listed in parentheses within the text:

1. FBI's Uniform Crime Report, 1966-1975 (UCR 1966-1975).
2. Seattle Police Department's annual statistical reports from 1966 to 1976 (SPD Statistical Report).
3. Seattle Police Department's report entitled "Monthly Crime Capsule" (SPD MCC).
4. Criminal Victimization in the United States: A Comparison of 1973 and 1974 Findings, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1976 (LEAA Victimization 1973-1974).
5. Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office's 1975 Criminal Victimization Survey (Seattle Victimization Survey 1975).
6. Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office sample surveys conducted between 1972 and 1976 from Seattle Police Department records of adult and juvenile arrestees and robbery offense reports (LJPO Sample Surveys 1972-1976).
7. C. Clawson and S. Chang, "Impact of Response Delays on Arrest Rates," Seattle Police Department Inspectional Services Division, September, 1975 (Clawson and Chang, 1975).

A Survey of Robbery


Definition: Robbery is defined as a crime which takes place in the presence of the victim to obtain property or something of value from the victim by use of force or threat of force.

Trends

National 5-year Trend (1970-1975): In 1975, there were an estimated 464,970 robbery cases reported to all law enforcement agencies within the United States, or a rate of 2.18 robberies per every 1,000 population. This represents an increase of 33 percent in reported robbery since 1970 and a 27 percent increase in the per capita rate during the same period.

Seattle 13-year Trend (1964-1976): On an annual basis, robbery has increased 2.9 percent from 1975 to 1976 (2,103 to 2,163). On the basis of a 13-year trend (Figure 3B-1), robbery has increased 340.5 percent (from 491 reports in 1964 to 2,163 in 1976). In this time robbery rose from its low point in 1964 to its maximum in 1969, decreased through 1972, and has risen slowly up through 1976. When compared to national data, Seattle's 1970-1975 trend indicated an increase of 6.0 percent which was substantially below the national average of 27 percent. The per capita rate for robbery in Seattle during 1976 (4.30 robberies for every 1,000 population) was almost twice as high (80.7 percent) as the national rate (2.38 per 1,000) for 1975; however, when compared with similar size cities (500,000 - 1,000,000 population), Seattle's rate is 27.4 percent lower than the 5.92 per 1,000 rate of these cities.

Figure 3B-1--Thirteen-year Trend of Reported Robbery Offenses in Seattle (Seattle Police Department)



Victimization Survey Rate (reporting rates): Victimization surveys conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration interviewed a representative national sample of up to 65,000 households and 15,000 commercial firms (LEAA Victimization 1973-1974). Based upon these surveys (see Table 3B-1), it is estimated that during 1973, 6.7 robberies per 1,000 persons age 12 and over occurred. In 1974, this increased to 7.1 per 1,000 persons age 12 and older. In these years, 52.2

Table 3B-1--LEAA/Bureau of the Census Estimates of National Victimization and Reporting Rates for Robbery during 1973 and 1974

Type of Robbery	Number of Robberies per Year per 1,000 at Risk		Percent Reported	
	1973	1974	1973	1974
Personal (age 12 and older)	6.7	7.1	52.2	53.6
Commercial	38.8	38.8	85.9	90.1


and 53.6 percent of the incidents were reported to police. Commercial establishments were much more likely to be victims (38.8 per 1,000 in both years) and more likely to report (85.9 percent in 1973 and 90.1 percent in 1974) than were non-commercial victims. Similar victimization surveys of private residences in Seattle for victims of crime in 1975 (Seattle Victimization Survey 1975) in 5 of the 121 census tracts comprising Seattle found 12 instances of robbery victimization within 1,263 residences (9.50 per 1,000 residences) or 3.90 per 1,000 population (assuming an average of 2.43 persons per residence). However, given the small number of incidents reported, these data are statistically unreliable in determining the proportion of cases reported to the police by victims.

The 95 percent confidence limits of this estimate are 1.73 to 6.09 per 1,000. That is, because of the sample size and relatively rare occurrence of robbery, the sample estimated rate (if the actual rate were in fact 3.90 per 1,000) could be expected to vary between 1.73 and 6.09 per 1,000 people in 95 percent of similar surveys conducted within the same population.

Short Term Trend of Occurrence

Time of Occurrence (Month): On a national basis, robbery typically occurs most frequently during the last three months of the year, October through December (See Figure 3B-2). In Seattle, this pattern has been observed consistently from 1973 through 1976 (Figure 3B-3). The one notable exception has been the consistent tendency for robbery to drop during the month of November in each of the four years.


Figure 3B-2--National Reporting of Robbery by Month (Source: UCR 1975, p. 39)



Time of Occurrence (Day of Week): A computer analysis of all 1974 SPD robbery cases (Figure 3B-4) shows that the day of the week with the highest likelihood of robbery occurrence in 1974 was Friday (18 percent above the average of 291.5), closely followed by Tuesday. The remaining days of the week were equally less likely for the occurrence of robbery (see Figure 3B-4). Monday, the least likely day for robbery occurrence, was 10.5 percent below the average.


Time of Occurrence (Hour of Day): A sample of 1972 robbery offense reports was examined to evaluate characteristics of robbery offenses, victims, and offenders. On the basis of this sample, it was possible to provide day or night estimates of the time of robbery

Figure 3B-3--Total Reported Robberies during 1973-1976 (Seattle Police Department Data Processing Unit)



Months and Number Reported

Figure 3B-4--Occurrence of 1974 Robberies by Day of Week (Seattle Police Department, n = 2,041)



occurrences. The results of this analysis (Table 3B-2) indicated that commercial and non-commercial robberies taken together occurred more frequently at night (62.3 percent) than during the day (37.6 percent).

Table 3B-2--Number and Percentage of Sample Robbery Offenses by Time and Occurrence (Seattle Police Department Offense Reports from 1973)

Robbery Category	Number		Percentage	
	Day	Night	Day	Night
Non-commercial	57	75	43.1	56.9
Commercial	16	46	25.8	74.2
Total	73	121	37.6	62.3

An analysis of all 1974 robbery cases indicates that time of occurrence has not changed over the last several years (see Figure 3B-5). For 1974 robbery cases, 41.7 percent occurred between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. The most likely time of robbery occurrence in 1974 was from 10:00 p.m. to midnight.

Geographic Area of Occurrence: In 1975, the 10 census tracts with the highest number of reported robbery cases were concentrated in three areas (see Map 3B-1). These were the downtown area (federal census tracts 72, 80, 81, 82, and 92), Capitol Hill (74, 75, 79, and 87) and Southeast Seattle (111). These 10 census tracts accounted for 712 robberies, or 33.9 percent of all reported cases in 1975.

During the same time, there were 7 census tracts with no reported robbery cases. These were primarily located in the northern half of Seattle (census tracts 2 and 5 or extreme north Seattle, tracts 23, 40, and 41 or Sand Point Area, 55 or Fort Lawton area, and tract 121, the lone area in south Seattle).

Clearance/Arrest Rates

National: In 1975, 27.0 percent of 403,351 cases reported nationally from jurisdictions representing a total population of 127,068,000 persons were cleared by arrest (UCR 1975, Table 18). This represents a clearance rate of 0.86 per 1,000 population out of an occurrence rate of 3.17 per 1,000.


For cities between 500,000 and 1,000,000 population (those jurisdictions more comparable with Seattle) representing a total population of 12,297,000, there were 73,691 reports of which 25.8 percent were cleared by arrest. This represents a clearance rate of 1.55 per 1,000 population-out of an occurrence rate of 5.99 per 1,000 population.

Seattle (1964-1976): In 1975, 604 (28.7 percent) of the reported 2,103 cases in Seattle were cleared. This represents a clearance rate of 1.20 per 1,000 population with an occurrence rate of 4.18 per 1,000. On a per capita basis in 1975, there were approximately 30 percent fewer robberies in Seattle than occurred in comparably sized cities nationally.

As can be seen in Table 3B-3, clearance rates over the 13-year period of 1964 through 1976 have varied from a high of 35 percent (1965) to a low of 21 percent (1969). The clearance rates for 1975 and 1976 are slightly higher than both the average for this 13-year period in Seattle (mean average = 27.3 percent) and the 1975 average for cities of comparable size.

Offenses are cleared when the following elements are present in a case: (1) identification of the offender, or (2) sufficient evidence to charge an offender, despite victim refusal to prosecute or decline of local prosecution. Thus several offenders may clear one robbery or one offender may clear several robberies.


Figure 3B-5--Time of Occurrence of 1974 Robberies, n = 2,041



According to a 1972 sample of 46 commercial offenses cleared, more than two-thirds of the cases were cleared by a combination of "arrest" and "tacit or oral confession" (Table 3B-4).

Most sample non-commercial robberies were cleared by Arrest (63.3 percent). The next largest clearance category was Exceptional. Extenuating Circumstances and Confessions accounted for approximately 15 percent of the clearances. No sample non-commercial robberies were cleared by Modus Operandi.

Map 3B-1--Ten Census Tracts with the Highest Number of Reported Robberies in 1975



CITY OF SEATTLE
1970 CENSUS TRACTS




Table 3B-3--Clearance Rates for Robbery (1964-1976)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>	<u>Percent Cleared</u>
1964	491	30
1965	516	35
1966	650	27
1967	1,050	26
1968	2,297	23
1969	2,559	21
1970	1,981	27
1971	1,801	25
1972	1,564	31
1973	1,702	26
1974	2,041	25
1975	2,103	29
1976	2,163	30

Table 3B-4--Frequency and Percentage of Sample 1972 Robbery Clearances by Category (Seattle Police Department, n = 94)

<u>Clearance Category</u>	<u>Commercial</u>		<u>Non-commercial</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Arrest	16	34.8	31	63.3
Oral/Tacit Confession	16	34.8	4	8.2
Extenuating Circumstances	7	15.2	3	6.1
Modus Operandi	6	13.0	0	0.0
Exceptional	1	2.2	11	22.4
Total	46	100.0	49	100.0

There was a noticeable difference between frequency of non-commercial and commercial robbery clearances. The sample uncleared offenses (194) consisted of 132 non-commercial offenses and 62 commercial offenses. If the sample were truly representative of all robberies reported in 1972, non-commercial robberies occurred more than twice as often as commercial robberies. However, the probability of clearance did not reflect this difference. The sample of cleared offenses indicated that approximately the same number of commercial and non-commercial robberies were cleared. This suggested that the probability of clearing a commercial robbery was twice as good as the probability of clearing a non-commercial robbery.

Victim Characteristics

Age: Based upon a random sample of 63 non-commercial robbery offenses reported in 1975 (Table 3B-5), the age of robbery victims closely paralleled that of the general population. The only large discrepancy found was within the 0 to 24-year-old range. While persons up to age 9 are under-represented as robbery victims, those from 10 to 24 years old are over-represented.

Race: Sample data for the 63 non-commercial robbery cases occurring in 1975 indicate that various racial groups are represented as victims approximately equal to their representation within the total population except for Native Americans, who were victimized four times as frequently as would be expected from their representation in the population (Table 3B-6).

Sex: Of the 63 sample cases, the first identified victim in 33 cases (52.4 percent) was a male, while the remaining 30 cases (47.6 percent) had female victims. During 1975, the female population of Seattle was estimated to be 52.4 percent of the total. However, the difference in the population of male victims to the proportion of male population is within the range of normal sampling error.

Table 3B-5--Age of Robbery Victims, 1975 Sample

<u>Age*</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percentage of Seattle Population 1975</u>
0- 9	1	1.6	11.3
10-19	12	19.1	14.2
(10-17)	(9)	(14.3)	----
(18-19)	(3)	(4.8)	----
20-24	10	15.9	10.0
25-29	8	12.7	11.8
30-34	5	7.9	7.3
35-39	2	3.2	4.6
40-44	3	4.8	4.2
45-49	4	6.3	5.1
50-54	3	4.8	6.3
55-59	3	4.8	6.2
60-64	6	9.5	5.8
65+	5	7.9	13.5
Unknown	1	1.6	----
Total	63	100.1	100.3

*Age as recorded for first victim identified within the offense report.

Table 3B-6--Race of First Identified Victim in Sample 1975 Robberies (n = 63)

<u>Race</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percentage of Seattle Population</u>
White	54	85.7	82.8
Black	6	9.5	8.6
Native American	2	3.2	0.9
Filipino	1	1.6	1.3
Other	0	0.0	6.4
Total	63	100.0	100.0

Occupation: Victims of personal robbery within the sample cases were most likely to be either students or be employed in either unskilled or semi-skilled occupations (41.2 percent of the total sample). The most over-represented victim groups were those employed within "Service/Waitress/Blue jobs (see Table 3B-7).

Number of Victims: Within the sample of 63 robbery cases, the majority (51, or 81.0 percent) involved only one victim. Ten cases (15.9 percent) involved two victims, while two cases (3.2 percent) had three victims each.

Offender Characteristics: Based upon the 1975 sample of robbery offense reports, the following information about offender characteristics was obtained. To the extent that these data differ from information obtained about arrested suspects, they may indicate difficulties both in victim observation and reporting, and differences between those who commit robberies and those who get arrested.

Age: Based upon the 101 sample offense reports, an age distribution for the first identified offender is presented in Table 3B-8. When total robberies are examined, it can be seen that offenders from the age group 15 to 29 are over-represented as compared with their proportion of the total Seattle population. The age range most heavily over-represented is the 20-24 year olds who account for about four times as many offenses as their representation in the population. Of the total sample, juveniles between the ages of 10-17 represented 20.4 percent of all robbery suspects while comprising only 11.0 percent of the total population.

Table 3B-7--Occupation of Victims of Personal Robbery, 1975 Sample

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population (18 or older)</u>
Student	12	19.0	9.2
Unemployed	4	6.3	4.8
Retired/Disabled	10	15.9	16.0
Service/Waitress/Blue Collar/Labor	14	22.2	9.8
Sales/Clerical/White Collar	7	11.1	16.5
Skilled/Technical/Professional/ Managerial	7	11.1	26.5
Housewife	3	4.8	15.0
Military	1	1.6	3.2
Unknown	5	7.9	----
Other	--	----	2.0
Total	63	99.9	100.0

When age of offenders is examined on the basis of type of robbery, there is a significant tendency for juveniles to be offenders in personal but not commercial robberies.

Table 3B-8--Suspect Age as Determined from Sample 1975 Offense Reports

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number of Persons Committing Robbery</u>			<u>Percent*</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population (10 or older)</u>
	<u>Personal</u>	<u>Commercial</u>	<u>Total</u>		
10-14	3	0	3	3.2	7.2
15-19	20	3	23	24.7	8.8
(15-17)	(15)	(1)	(16)	(17.2)	(5.2)
(18-19)	(5)	(2)	(7)	(7.5)	(3.6)
20-24	21	16	37	39.8	11.2
25-29	8	9	17	18.3	13.3
30-34	1	6	7	7.5	8.2
35-39	2	1	3	3.2	5.2
40-44	1	1	2	2.2	4.7
45-49	0	1	1	1.1	5.7
50+	0	0	0	0.0	35.7
Unknown	7	1	8	----	----
Total	63	38	101	100.0	

*Based on total n = 93, excluding 8 cases in which offender age was unknown.

Race: Of the 97 cases in which race of the first identified offender was known, there was a significant tendency for whites to be suspects more frequently on commercial robberies than in personal robberies. However, for blacks, the opposite was true (see Table 3B-9). Given the relative proportion of the different racial groups within the general population, the total survey sample data indicate an over-representation of blacks (8.6 percent of Seattle population) and Native Americans (0.9 percent).

Sex: In 98 of the total 101 cases, sex of the first offender was known. Of those known cases, 89 (90.8 percent) were male with 9 (9.2 percent) female. Of the 38 commercial robberies, 37 (97.4 percent) were committed by males and 1 by a female. Personal robberies in 52 cases (86.7 percent) were committed by males while eight were committed by females and three cases did not list sex of offender.

Height and Weight: For commercial robberies, the first identified offender ranged in height from 5'5" to 6'6" with a median average of 5'10". In terms of weight, offenders were from 125 to 240 pounds with a median average of 170.

Table 3B-9--Suspect Race by Types of Robbery, 1975 Sample

Type of Robbery	Race of First Identified Suspect (Percent)*				Total
	White	Black	Native American	Unknown	
Commercial	25 (65.8%)	12 (31.6%)	1 (2.6%)	0	38
Personal	12 (20.3%)	43 (72.9%)	4 (6.8%)	4	63
Total	37 (38.1%)	55 (56.7%)	5 (5.2%)	4	101

*Percentage computed on the basis of total known cases for each row.

In personal robberies, the height range was 5'3" to 6'2" with a median of 5'8", while the weight range was from 120 to 225 pounds with the median average equal to 155 pounds.

Occupation: Suspect occupation data were given in eight of the sample offense reports (7.9 percent). Of the eight, four listed "Student" as offender's occupation. However, because of the small proportion of known occupations, the comparison of this offense report data with subsequent information on occupation of arrested suspects is not reliable.

Number of Offenders: Almost half of both commercial (54.1 percent) and personal (45.0 percent) robberies are committed by lone offenders (see Table 3B-10). While there is a tendency for personal robberies to include more offenders (mean average = 1.92) than commercial (1.57), this difference was not significant.

Table 3B-10--Number of Offenders by Type of Robbery, 1975 Sample

Type of Robbery	Number of Offenders (Percent*)					Unknown	Total
	1	2	3	4	5		
Commercial	20 (54.1%)	13 (35.1%)	4 (10.8%)	0	0	1	38
Personal	27 (45.0%)	18 (30.0%)	9 (15.0%)	5 (8.3%)	1 (1.7%)	3	63
Total	47 (48.5%)	31 (32.0%)	13 (13.4%)	5 (5.2%)	1 (1.0%)	4	101

*Percentages computed using row total minus unknown category.

Degree of Violence

Weapon Used: Of the 101 offense reports examined, 76 (75.2 percent) contained sufficient information to determine the type of weapon used by offenders. Where no weapon was specifically mentioned, it was assumed that bodily force or the threat of bodily force was used. Overall, 39 cases (38.6 percent of all cases) involved the use of a firearm. Of these 39 cases, only one was a firearm other than a handgun. When type of weapon was examined by type of robbery, there was a significant difference in the type of weapon used (Table 3B-11). While 76.3 percent of commercial robberies were committed with a firearm, only 15.9 percent of personal robberies involved firearms.

Extent of Injury: Within the 38 commercial robberies, only one case (2.6 percent) involved injury to a victim. (In this case, the manner in which the injury was inflicted could not be determined from the offense report and the victim did not require medical treatment or attention.) However, in the 68 personal robberies, 29 (42.6 percent) involved injury to at least one victim. In 21 of the 29 cases, it was possible to determine the manner in which the injuries were inflicted. In 17 cases (81.0 percent of the determinable cases), the weapon used to inflict harm consisted of bodily force, while a knife was used in one case (4.8 percent), and a club or blunt object in three cases (14.3 percent). In 16 cases, the injuries were not serious enough to require medical treatment. An additional 11 cases (17.5 percent of all, 37.9 percent of injury cases) required some form of medical treatment and two cases (3.2 percent of all, 6.9 percent of injuries) included injury of unknown severity. All 11 cases requiring medical treatment were hospitalized for at least initial examination and emergency room care.

Table 3B-11--Type of Weapon Used by Type of Robbery, 1975 Sample

Weapon	Type of Robbery (Percent*)		
	Commercial	Personal	Total
Bodily force	5 (13.2%)	42 (66.7%)	47 (46.5%)
Club, blunt object	1 (2.6%)	3 (4.8%)	4 (4.0%)
Knife, cutting instrument	3 (7.9%)	8 (12.7%)	11 (10.9%)
Firearm	29** (76.3%)	10 (15.9%)	39 (38.6%)
Total	38 (100.0%)	63 (100.1%)	101 (100.0%)

*Percentages were computed using column total.

**Includes three cases in which no weapon was visible but offender said he was armed, 1 case of threatening to shoot but no visible weapon.

Extent of Loss

Dollar Value: Based upon the 1975 sample of commercial robbery offense reports, the range of total dollar losses was from \$0 to \$8,000 with a mean average of \$664.09 and median of \$90.00. The difference between the two averages indicates that the relatively few robberies which involve large losses raise the arithmetic (mean) average substantially. For personal robberies, the range of loss is from \$0 to \$700 with a mean of \$100 and a median of \$40 (see Table 3B-12).

Table 3B-12--Total Dollar Value Loss by Type of Robbery, 1975 Sample

Amount	Type of Robbery			
	Commercial		Personal	
	Number	Percent*	Number	Percent*
No loss	5	15.2	4	8.0
1-10	2	6.1	8	16.0
11-100	10	30.3	27	54.0
101-1,000	11	33.3	11	22.0
1,001-10,000	5	15.2	0	0.0
Unknown	5	---	13	---
Total	38	100.1	63	100.0

*Percentages were computed by column, excluding unknown cases.

Type of Object Taken: For both commercial and personal robberies in the 1975 sample, the item taken most frequently was cash (73.7 percent of all commercial and 74.6 percent of all personal robberies, see Table 3B-13). For commercial robberies, the next most frequently taken item was drugs (10.5 percent of all commercial robberies). For personal robberies, the second and third most frequently taken objects were wallets and/or purses (31.7 percent of the sample cases) and personal papers, licenses, and registrations (19.0 percent of sample cases).

Property Damage: Based upon the sample offense reports, relatively few robberies involve property damage. Within the commercial sample, four cases (10.5 percent of the total) involved four types of damage: telephone rendered inoperative (1 case); vehicle damaged (1 case); stolen item recovered in damaged condition (2 cases); and damage to building (1 case).

For the sample of personal robberies, five cases (7.9 percent) involved four types of property damage: broken windows (3 cases), house interior (1 case), phone rendered inoperative (2 cases).

Table 3B-13--Relative Frequency* of Items Taken by Type of Robbery (1975 Sample)

Item	Type of Robbery	
	Commercial	Personal
Cash	28 (73.7%)	47 (74.6%)
Wallet, purse	1 (2.6%)	20 (31.8%)
Watch, jewelry	1 (2.6%)	2 (3.2%)
Television	0	1 (1.6%)
Alcohol	2 (5.3%)	1 (1.6%)
Clothing	2 (5.3%)	1 (1.6%)
Medical coupons, checkbooks, food stamps, checks	1 (2.6%)	2 (3.2%)
Vehicle	2 (5.3%)	0
Bike	0	4 (6.4%)
Weapon	0	4 (6.4%)
Credit cards	0	5 (7.9%)
Drugs	4 (10.5%)	2 (3.2%)
Camera	0	1 (1.6%)
Personal papers, licence registration	0	12 (19.0%)
Keys	1 (2.6%)	3 (4.8%)
Sunglasses	0	1 (1.6%)
Total Number of Cases	38	63

*Percentages do not add up to 100.0 percent because more than one type of item is frequently taken.

Property Recovery: Property was recovered in two of the commercial robberies (5.3 percent). One case involved the recovery of clothing valued at \$22 while the other was the recovery of a vehicle of unspecified value. For personal robberies, eight cases (12.7 percent) involved property recovery. Specific items recovered included purse and/or wallet (5 cases), credit cards (1 case), personal papers/registration/license (1 case), cash (1 case), and food stamps/medical coupons/welfare checks (1 case). Value of these items was reported in four instances with a range of \$19 to \$60 and a mean of \$32.25.

A similar analysis of 1972 sample robbery offense reports combined the value of stolen goods with the value of property damaged and obtained a figure which represents total cost associated with a robbery (estimates of values associated with robberies were based entirely on victim statements in both the 1972 and 1975 samples; it was not possible to determine the accuracy of these estimates).

The 1972 data (Table 3B-14) show the same substantial difference in value associated with commercial and non-commercial robberies as was found in 1975. The median value associated with commercial robberies was approximately \$150, with an average (mean) value of \$393.

Nearly 60 percent of non-commercial robberies resulted in losses of less than \$50. The median value associated with the 131 sample non-commercial robberies was approximately \$35; the average (mean) value was \$92. National data for 1974 indicate that the average dollar loss was \$321. The average (mean) loss for all robberies in Seattle in the 1972 sample was \$189. Seattle Police Department data for 1975 indicate that the 2,103 reported robberies were associated with a total dollar loss of \$529,972 or \$252 per robbery.

The total dollar value of property taken by the 1972 sample juveniles contacted for robbery was \$3,822. This represented an average or mean value of \$68 per robbery, approximately one-third the average value of the sample offense and adult arrest data to be presented later.

Table 3B-14--Total Dollar Value of Property Stolen and Damaged in Seattle Robberies (1972 Sample)

Value	Commercial		Non-commercial	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
\$ 0 - \$ 49	18	29.0	78	59.5
\$ 50 - \$ 99	10	16.1	18	13.7
\$ 100 - \$199	14	22.6	20	15.3
\$ 200 - \$299	6	9.7	6	4.6
\$ 300 - \$399	1	1.6	0	0.0
\$ 400 - \$499	1	1.6	3	2.3
\$ 500 - \$999	4	6.4	2	1.5
\$1,000 and above	8	12.9	4	3.0
Total	62	99.9	131	99.9

Similarly, the median value associated with the juvenile contacts was only \$20, a fraction of the value associated with the adult arrest and offense sample.

On the basis of 1972 contact samples, juvenile robberies netted considerably less than juvenile burglaries. The average juvenile burglary was worth approximately four times the average robbery. Even if the rule of thumb ratio of one-third return on disposal of stolen property were considered, juvenile burglaries "paid" better than juvenile robberies.

Location of Incident: Both the 1972 and 1975 sample offenses were examined to determine robbery locations. In 1972, more than two-thirds of all non-commercial robberies were committed on streets (Table 3B-15). A relatively large number (27.0 percent) were committed in private residences. The 5.1 percent remainder were committed in parks, schools, autos or at bus stops.

Table 3B-15--Number and Percentage of Sample Non-commercial Robberies by Location

Location	1972 Sample		1975 Sample	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Street/Sidewalk/Alley	90	67.7	32	50.8
Private Residence	36	27.1	17	27.0
Park/Public Recreation Area	3	2.2	2	3.2
Bus Stop	1	.8	0	0.0
School	1	.8	3	4.8
Auto	2	1.5	2	3.2
Hallway/Lobby/Yard of Hotel or Apartment	--	----	3	4.8
Tavern/Bar	--	----	2	3.2
Parking Lot/Garage	--	----	1	1.6
Retail Business	--	----	1	1.6
Total	133	100.1	63	100.2

In 1975, this pattern of location of occurrence had changed slightly. While "Street/Sidewalk/Alley" continued to make up the majority (50.8 percent) of locations, the percentage had decreased from 1972 levels. Robberies within private residences remained the second most frequent location (27.0 percent) while other sites increased in frequency.

In the 1972 sample, the primary targets of commercial robberies appeared to be grocery stores (24.2 percent). Other frequent targets included service stations, taverns, restaurants, and small businesses. Bank and taxi robberies accounted for eight percent of all commercial robberies (Table 3B-16).

Table 3B-16--Number and Percentage of Commercial Robberies by Location
Using 1972 and 1975 Sample Data

Location	1972 Sample		1975 Sample	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Grocery Store	15	24.2	11	28.9
Tavern	8	12.9	1	2.6
Service Station	6	9.7	1	2.6
Restaurant	7	11.3	3	7.9
Liquor Store/Lounge	3	4.8	1	2.6
Motel	4	6.5	0	0.0
Pharmacy	4	6.5	5	13.2
Small Business/Office	6	9.7	1	2.6
Bank	2	3.2	5	13.2
Taxi	3	4.8	3	7.9
Laundromat/Dry Cleaner	2	3.2	1	2.6
Clothing Store	2	3.2	0	0.0
Theater	--	----	1	2.6
Department Store	--	----	1	2.6
Retail/Unspecified	--	----	3	7.9
Church	--	----	1	2.6
Total	62	100.0	38	99.8

The 1975 sample indicates that grocery stores remained primary targets of commercial robberies. Data from the robbery unit's log book (Table 3B-17) indicate that almost half of all 1975 commercial robberies occurred either in a grocery store (26.6 percent) or restaurant (20.3 percent).

Table 3B-17--Robbery Unit Log of Location of Commercial Robberies in 1975

Location	Number	Percentage
Grocery Store	156	26.6
(Convenience)	(135)	(23.0)
(Chain)	(21)	(3.6)
Tavern	30	5.1
Service Station	41	7.0
Restaurant	119	20.3
Liquor Store	17	2.9
Motel/Hotel	28	4.8
Pharmacy	51	8.7
Bank	37	6.3
Taxi*	27	4.6
All Other	80	13.7
Total	586	100.0

*Estimated on basis of first seven months, projected five additional months for total year.

Degree of Relationship Between Victim and Offender: Sample 1975 data (Table 3B-18) indicate that while the overwhelming majority of reported robberies are committed by strangers, there is a tendency for more personal robberies than commercial robberies to be committed by someone known by the victim (19.1 percent). However, when the category "acquaintance" is examined, four of the nine personal robbery suspects met for the first time on the day of the robbery.

How Event Occurred: Of the 38 commercial robberies, 30 (78.9 percent) occurred during regular business hours and involved a direct demand for money or goods backed by the threat or use of force. Five cases (13.2 percent) actually began as shoplifting incidents in which the offender was observed, and when challenged, used either force or

Table 3B-18--Relationship between Victim and Offender by Type of Robbery (1975 Sample)

Relationship	Commercial		Personal	
	Number	Percent*	Number	Percent*
Friend	0	0.0	1	2.1
Customer/Acquaintance	1	3.3	9	19.2
Stranger	29	96.7	37	78.7
Unknown	8	----	16	----
Total	38	100.0	63	100.0

*Percentage based upon cases with known relationship.

the threat of force to attempt to escape. In two cases (5.3 percent), businesses were forced to open to allow the robber to obtain money and goods, while in one case (2.6 percent), the robber hid until the store was closing prior to robbing the store.

Of the 63 personal robberies, 13 (20.6 percent) were robbery/pursesnatch cases whose 15 victims ranged in age from 22 to 86 years with a median average of 62 and mean average of 55.5 years. An additional 27 cases (42.9 percent) consisted of direct confrontations of victims in outside, public areas while two (3.2 percent) were in inside, public areas. Four cases (6.3 percent) occurred either while victims were inside or entering or exiting private vehicles. Of the 17 cases occurring in private residences, seven (11.1 percent) involved a legal entry, while the remaining ten (15.9 percent) happened following an illegal entry. Four of the illegal entry cases (6.3 percent) appear to have been initially burglaries in which suspects when challenged used force or threat of force to attempt to obtain money or goods.

Since there were 1,517 non-commercial robberies in 1975, the present sample estimates of 6.3 percent robberies being initiated as burglaries (based upon a sample size of 63 cases) indicates that the total number of such incidents was between 5 and 187 (based upon 95 percent confidence limits of 0.3 percent to 12.3 percent). This in turn means that besides the 8,870 offenses classified as residential burglaries in 1975, there were from 0.06 percent to 2.1 percent additional cases begun as burglary but resulting in a confrontation between the victim and offender with threat or use of force, making the incident a robbery rather than a burglary.

Witness Information: Robberies almost always involve at least one eyewitness, the victim. The presence of the victim as witness has obvious implications for identification and apprehension of the offender.

Non-victim witnesses appeared to be particularly important to robbery clearances. In a 1972 sample of 148 non-commercial robberies, 66 non-victim witnesses observed the offenses. When witnesses were present, the clearance rate doubled. The effect of non-victim witnesses was even more pronounced in cases of commercial robbery. The presence of witnesses increased the probability of clearance by a factor of 10 in these cases.

Number of Witnesses: When 1975 sample robbery cases are examined on the basis of the number of witnesses, not counting victims in personal robberies, or individuals upon whom robbers focused in commercial robberies, there is a significant tendency for commercial robberies to be observed more often (65.8 percent of cases) by individuals who are not the focus of the robbery attempt than is the case for personal robberies (27 percent of cases, see Table 3B-19). Considering that the vast majority (78.9 percent) of commercial robberies occur during the normal business operating hours, this is not too surprising.

Quality of Witness Information: Within the sample data, witnesses were subdivided into two categories: eyewitnesses who had actually seen the incident, and corroboration witnesses who were capable of verifying portions of victims' statements but had not seen the actual incident.

Table 3B-19--Number of Witnesses Other Than Victim* by Type of Robbery Case (1975 Sample)

Type	Number of Witnesses					Total Witnessed Cases	
	0	1	2	3	4		5
Commercial	13 (34.2)**	10	7	6	1	1	25 (65.8)**
Personal	46 (73.0%)	16	0	1	0	0	17 (27.0%)

*When commercial robberies were examined, individuals were counted as witnesses unless they were the focus of the robbery attempt.

**Percentages were computed by row.

Of the 25 witnessed commercial robberies, 14 (56 percent of witnessed, 36.8 percent of total) were observed by eyewitnesses. Of the 17 witnessed personal robberies, six (35.3 percent or 9.5 percent of total) were seen by eyewitnesses.

Relationship of Witness to Victim: In the commercial robbery cases sampled, the majority of witnessed cases (19, or 7.6 percent) were observed either by other employees or customers, with the remaining cases being observed by passers-by. For personal robberies, the victim was most frequently (7, or 41.2 percent) known to the witness with two each being friends, neighbors, or acquaintances, and one a relative. Strangers were witnesses in five (29.4 percent) of the cases with the remaining being of unknown relationship to the victim.

Reporting Person's Relationship to Incident: Within both types of robberies, as determined from the 1975 sample cases, the major source of crime reporting is the victim (86.8 percent of commercial robberies being reported by either employees or owners and 92.1 percent of personal robberies reported by the victim). The relevant statistics follow in Table 3B-20.

Table 3B-20--Person Reporting by Type of Robbery, 1975 Sample

Reporting Person's Relation to Incident	Commercial	Personal
Victim/Owner/Employee	33 (86.8%)	58 (92.1%)
Relative	--	1
Witness	3	1
Police on view	--	1
Unknown	2	2
Total	38	63

Police Response Time: Most robbery victims are capable of initiating a rapid call to police. Since offenders may still be in the geographical vicinity of the crime and potentially identifiable, one would expect police response time to a robbery report to be a critical variable in immediate apprehension.

Using Seattle Police Department SELECT Computer Dispatch Data for the period April, 1974, to March, 1975, the relationship between response time (the time interval between receipt of the call until the first police unit arrived on the scene) and subsequent arrest for robbery-in-progress calls was analyzed (Clawson and Chang). (See Table 3B-21.) For in-progress calls on which total response time was available, the median response time was 3.80 minutes. The mean average response time, excluding the 15+ minute response category, was 5.26 minutes.

An analysis of the response time and arrest data failed to find a significant relationship. That is, the data do not support the view that decreasing response time increases arrests.

Table 3B-21--Relationship between Response Time and Arrest for Robbery-in-Progress Calls (Clawson and Chang) $\chi^2 = 2.27/NS$ $t = -1.98/.10$

<u>Response Time in Minutes</u>	<u>Number of Calls</u>	<u>Number of Arrests</u>	<u>Percent Arrests</u>	<u>Accumulated Percent Arrests</u>
0- 2	56	4	7.1	7.1
3- 5	132	12	9.1	8.5
6- 8	87	5	5.7	7.6
9-11	29	1	3.4	7.2
12-14	15	1	6.7	7.2
15+	32	1	3.1	6.8
Total	351	24	6.8	6.8

Suspect-Victim Mental Impairment: Where information on possible factors that could impair individuals' mental capabilities was reported by investigatory officers within the 101 sample cases from 1975, data were recorded for analysis. It should be noted that the accuracy of these observations is not verifiable and that the four factors (mental retardation, mental illness, alcohol or drug consumption) are not equally easy to detect, especially given the circumstances under which the observations were initially made.

Analysis of these data (Table 3B-22) indicates that offenders are apparently in full control of their mental processes and do not have grossly noticeable mental impairment. In the cases of personal robbery, victims had been drinking in five cases (7.9 percent).

Table 3B-22--Mental Impairment by Type of Robbery, 1975 Sample

	<u>Type of Robbery</u>	<u>Impairment Present</u>			
		<u>Mental Retardation</u>	<u>Mental Illness</u>	<u>Alcohol</u>	<u>Drugs</u>
Victim	Commercial	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Offender	Commercial	0	0	0	0
Victim	Personal	0	0	5	0
Offender	Personal	0	0	1	1

Arrested Offender Characteristics

Survey and Random Sample of Cleared Offenses by Adult Offenders: For this section, data were obtained from the following sources: SPD Annual Reports, 1973-1975; a random sample of 82 adult robbery arrest reports, 1972; interviews with 16 adult robbers, 1972; a random sample of 51 adult commercial robbery arrest reports; and a random sample of 49 personal robbery arrest cases.

Age: In 1973, the median age of those arrested for the primary charge (most serious charge resulting from a given arrest) of robbery was 24.3 years with 72.6 percent of all those charged under the age of 30. In 1974, the median age was 23.7 years, with 76.8 percent of those charged under the age of 30. This slight tendency for robbery arrestees to be increasingly younger continued through 1975, with the median age remaining 23.7 years, but with 80.3 percent of all arrestees being under age 30 (see Table 3B-23). This trend is of special note given that the age range of 18 to 29 accounts for only 33.3 percent of the adult Seattle population.

Race: In all three years (1973-1975), in terms of absolute numbers, the race of arrested persons whose primary charge was robbery was most likely to be black, followed by white, then Native American (see Table 3B-24). When race of charged arrestee for all of the last three years is ranked in terms of representation within the general population, the order changes in the following fashion: Native American (7.6 times their population representation), blacks (5.7 times their representation), other (1.8 times), whites (0.4 times their representation), and Asian/Oriental (0.2 times their representation). Thus, Native Americans, blacks, and "others" are overrepresented among robbery arrestees, while whites and Asian/Oriental are underrepresented.

Table 3B-23--Age of Adult Offenders Charged with Robbery 1973-1975
(Source: Annual SPD Reports)

Age	1973 n=208	1974 n=228	1975 n=233	Percent of Seattle Adult Population
18	15	26	14	2.0
19	13	22	33	2.0
20	17	13	17	2.0
21	18	19	10	2.0
22	23	19	24	2.1
23	15	22	26	2.4
24	12	9	20	2.7
25-29	38	45	43	14.9
30-34	23	23	16	9.2
35-39	15	11	12	5.7
40-44	10	9	10	5.3
45-49	5	4	3	6.4
50+	4	6	5	40.1
Median	24.3	23.7	23.7	

Table 3B-24--Race of Arrestees Charged with Robbery
(Source: SPD Annual Reports)

Race	1973	1974	1975	Percent of Seattle Population
White	86 (41.4%)	75 (32.9%)	105 (45.1%)	84.8
Black	94 (45.2%)	125 (54.8%)	111 (47.6%)	8.6
Native American	20 (9.6%)	18 (7.9%)	8 (3.4%)	0.9
Asian/Oriental	1 (0.5%)	2 (0.9%)	2 (0.9%)	3.9
Other	7 (3.4%)	8 (3.5%)	7 (3.0%)	1.8
Total	208 (100.1%)	228 (100.0%)	233 (100.0%)	100.0

Sex: From 1973 through 1975, the vast majority of robbery arrestees have been male (from 88.5 to 90.6 percent); see Table 3B-25. This overwhelming preponderance of males is consistent with national data. In 1975, approximately 93 percent of all persons arrested for robbery within the United States were male (UCR 1975).

Table 3B-25--Sex of Robbery Arrestees (Source: SPD Annual Report; Primary Charges, Adult)

Sex	1973	1974	1975	Percent of Seattle Adult Population
Male	184 (88.5%)	203 (89.0%)	211 (90.6%)	47.6
Female	24 (11.5%)	25 (11.0%)	22 (9.4%)	52.4
Total	208 (100.0%)	228 (100.0%)	233 (100.0%)	100.0

Number of Offenders: For commercial robberies, 31 (60.8 percent) were committed by a single suspect, 17 (33.3 percent) by two offenders, 2 (3.9 percent) by three offenders, and 1 (2 percent) by four offenders. For personal robberies, 25 (51.0 percent) were committed by a single suspect, 13 (26.5 percent) by two suspects, 5 (10.2 percent) by three offenders, and 6 (12.2 percent) by four offenders. These figures are from the 1975 sample of offense reports.

Arrest Profile: Two separate LJPO surveys are available to indicate the nature and extent of robbery arrestee involvement in other crime. The first survey was based upon a sample of 82 robbery suspects arrested in 1972. For the purposes of this analysis, recidivism was operationally defined as a second arrest. In this case, recidivism occurred when more than one arrest was recorded on the Seattle Police Department or FBI "rap" sheets obtained from arrest packets.

Of these 82 persons arrested in 1972 for robbery, a total of 18 persons (22 percent) had previous juvenile records on file in the Seattle Police Department. The offenses included robbery (4), burglary (11), assault (8), auto theft (5), larceny (6), narcotics or alcohol (4) and runaway (7).

When the analysis included only previous adult arrests, the rate of recidivism was very high. Of the 82 histories sampled, 62 (76 percent) indicated previous arrests for "serious" crimes. Previous arrests for serious crimes averaged 3.3 per person across the sample and 4.4 per person across recidivists for each person's entire available history. Ten persons (12 percent) had no previous arrests, and 10 persons (12 percent) had been arrested for misdemeanor offenses only. The distribution of previous adult arrests indicated that robbery was the most frequent offense (41 percent); robbery and burglary arrests combined accounted for two-thirds of all previous offenses (Table 3B-26).

Table 3B-26--Number and Percentage of Previous Arrests for Persons Arrested for Robbery in 1972 (Seattle Police Department; n = 82)

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Robbery	111	41.0
Burglary	77	28.4
Auto Theft	23	8.5
Larceny	31	11.4
Forgery	14	5.2
Narcotics	11	4.1
Rape	2	.7
Arson	1	.4
Homicide	1	.4
Total	271	100.1

Just as persons arrested for burglary in 1972 tended to have the highest burglary-to-burglary recidivism, persons arrested for robbery also demonstrated like-offense recidivism (Table 3B-27). The 38 persons with previous robbery offenses indicated a robbery-to-robbery recidivism rate of 46 percent. Thus the 1972 data indicated arrested burglary suspects tended to be arrested again for burglary and arrested robbery suspects tended to be arrested again for robbery.

Table 3B-27--Number and Percentage of Recidivism Patterns for Sample Persons Arrested for Robbery in 1972 (Seattle Police Department, n = 82)

<u>Recidivism Pattern</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Robbery-Robbery	38	46.3
Burglary-Robbery	26	31.7
Assault-Robbery	23	28.0
Larceny-Robbery	20	24.3
Auto Theft-Robbery	16	19.5

While the early 1972 sample data suggested a strong crime-to-crime recidivism, more current data strongly indicate this is not currently the case within Seattle.

The second study was performed as a total survey (rather than a sample) of all adults arrested for robbery in 1974. To determine the number and type of arrests of more current robbery arrestees, local SPD arrest histories for the period January 1, 1973, through August 31, 1975, for all persons arrested suspicion and/or charged robbery in 1974 were obtained from the SPD Data Processing Unit. For these 391 individuals, all suspicion arrests were separately recorded for 1973, 1974 target bookings (arrests involving a robbery in 1974 and any other associated charges at that booking), 1974 non-target bookings, and the first eight months of 1975 (see Table 3B-28). For this group, the average number of total arrests per offender was 4.35 and 3.63 for Part I arrests. On an annual basis of arrests per offender, this represents a rate of 1.63 for total arrests and 1.36 for Part I arrests.

Table 3B-28--Number of Bookings by Seattle Police Department
for 391 Robbery Arrestees in 1974

Offenses Arrested for between Jan. 1, 1973, and Aug. 31, 1975	1974 Arrests		1975 Arrests		Arrests per 100 Offender Years
	1973 Arrests	Target*/Non-Target**	First Eight Months	Total	
Murder	0	---	1	0	0.10
Rape	1	2	16	0	1.82
Robbery	10	449	---	18	45.75
Aggravated Assault	3	3	13	10	2.78
Burglary	21	2	36	13	6.91
Larceny	43	---	69	25	13.14
Auto Theft	7	---	8	4	1.82
Non-Agg. Assault	33	---	34	27	9.02
Weapons	7	---	20	10	3.55
Drugs	22	---	54	14	8.63
Vandalism	4	---	3	8	1.44
All Other***	138	2	200	39	36.35
Total criminal charges	289	458	454	168	1,369
Additional charges:					
Contempt of Court	95	---	113	0	19.94
Failure to Appear	0	1	1	68	6.71
Escape	0	---	2	1	0.29
Grand Total	384	459	570	237	1,650

*Target bookings for offenses other than robbery occur when suspects are booked on multiple offenses (e.g., robbery and burglary).

**Non-target bookings occur when robbery suspects are booked for other offenses prior or subsequent to their robbery bookings in the year 1974.

***Includes 84 charges of drunkenness in 1973, 127 in 1974, and 8 in 1975.

Relationship to Victim: Within the random sample of robbery cases with adult arrests from 1975, a stratified sample was used to obtain approximately equal numbers of both commercial and personal robbery cases. This procedure resulted in 51 commercial robbery cases and 49 personal robbery cases, or a total of 100 cases.

In both types of robbery, the victim and offender were highly likely to be strangers (see Table 3B-29).

Table 3B-29--Relationship between Victim and Offender;
Adult Arrest Sample, 1975

Relationship	Type of Robbery	
	Commercial	Personal
Relative	--	1 (2.2%)*
Friend	--	2 (4.4%)
Neighbor	--	--
Acquaintance	2 (4.9%)*	9 (20.0%)
Business Associate/Customer	--	--
Stranger	39 (95.1%)	33 (73.3%)
Unknown	10	4
Total	51	49

*Percentage based upon column totals minus unknown category.

Occupation: The occupational status of persons arrested for robbery is subject to the qualification that it is impossible to determine precisely whether the information recorded on the arrest referred to typical occupation when employed or whether it referred to actual employment at time of arrest.

With this qualification in mind, a general concept of occupational skill and employment status of persons arrested for or convicted of robbery was developed. From Table 3B-30 it was apparent that the percentage of unemployment varied greatly from one sample to the other. In all samples, it is obvious that many persons were unemployed or possessed occupational skills which qualified them as laborers.

Table 3B-30--Occupational Status of Persons Arrested For or Convicted of Robbery (Seattle Police Department Sample Arrest Records, 1972; Offender Study, 1972; n = 95)

Occupation/ Status	Arrest Sample		Interview Sample	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Unemployed	27	34.2	15	93.7
Laborer	30	38.0	1	6.3
Clerk/Sales	3	3.8	0	0
Professional	4	5.1	0	0
Student	12	15.2	0	0
Housewife	1	1.3	0	0
Welfare	2	2.5	0	0
Total	79	100.1	16	100.0

When the 1975 sample of adult arrest reports for commercial and personal robbery was analyzed, it was found that occupation was not determined or at least not recorded in 92 percent (47) of the 51 commercial cases. Of the 4 recorded instances, these were all laborer or service occupations. Within the personal robbery sample, 55 percent (27) of the 49 cases did not have any indication of occupation. Of those 22 cases with information, 9 (40.9 percent) were in laborer or service occupations, 5 (22.7 percent) were unemployed, 4 (18.2 percent) were students, 3 (13.6 percent) were in professional/managerial occupations, and 1 (4.5 percent) was retired.

Degree of Violence

Weapons Used in Commission of Crime: Adult commercial robbery arrestees were most likely to rely upon firearms as a means of obtaining victim compliance (see Table 3B-31). In contrast, adult arrestees for personal robbery used bodily force most frequently. However, in those instances in which victims within the sample were actually injured, there were no instances of the use of a gun as a gun (that is, the gun was not fired although it may have been used as a club).

Table 3B-31--Weapon Used by Arrested Adult by Type of Robbery; 1975 Sample

Type of Weapon*	Type of Robbery	
	Commercial	Personal
Gun	34 (66.7)**	15 (30.6)**
Knife; sharp or cutting instrument	5 (9.8%)	8 (16.3%)
Club, blunt object	1 (2.0%)	4 (8.2%)
Bodily force	5 (9.8%)	20 (40.8%)
Weapon implied, not seen	6 (11.8%)	2 (4.1%)
Total	51 (100.1%)	49 (100.0%)

*If more than one weapon was used, the case was categorized as involving the more deadly weapon.

**Percentages based upon column totals.

Extent of Injury: Within the sample of cases involving adults arrested for commercial robbery, there were 5 cases (9.8 percent) involving victim injury. One case involved the use of a club to inflict injury, two used bodily force, and in two it was not possible to determine the weapon used from offense and follow-up reports. Of those injured, only one case (20 percent) required medical attention for treatment, which consisted of hospitalization for at least medical examination.

In the personal robbery sample, there were 17 cases (34.7 percent) involving victim injury. Of these, injury was most frequently inflicted through the use of bodily force, 72.7 percent (8 of 11 cases in which weapon used was known); followed by a club, 19.2 percent (2 cases); and a knife, 9.1 percent (1 case). Of those cases with injury, eight (47.1 percent) refused medical attention, six (35.3 percent) required medical attention which consisted of hospitalization for at least examination, while three (17.6 percent) did not require any treatment.

Extent of Loss

Dollar Value: Based on the sample of adult arrest reports for robbery for which there were known loss values (see Table 3B-32), the range of total dollar loss for commercial robberies was from \$0 (10 cases or 19.6 percent) to \$58,656 with a mean average of \$1,552.94 and a median average of \$100. For personal robberies, the range of loss was from \$0 (7 cases or 14.3 percent) to \$4,197 with a mean average of \$446.08 and a median average of \$50.

Table 3B-32--Total Dollar Value Loss by Type of Robbery
for Adult Arrest Cases, 1975 Sample

<u>Dollar Value</u>	<u>Type of Robbery</u>	
	<u>Commercial</u>	<u>Personal</u>
No loss	10	7
\$1-10	3	3
\$11-100	11	11
\$101-1,000	18	13
\$1,001-10,000	4	5
\$10,000-100,000	1	0
Unknown	4	10
Maximum loss	58,656	4,197
Median average	100	50

Type of Items Taken: When robbery cases cleared by the arrest of adults are examined for type of item taken (Table 3B-33), the distribution is quite similar to that found for the random sample of cases. The most frequently taken item in both sorts of robbery is cash, followed by drugs in commercial robberies (11.8 percent) and by wallets or purses (26.5 percent) in personal robberies.

Suspect Identification and Arrest

1972 Adult and Juvenile Arrest Sample: When the sample of 1972 cleared robberies was analyzed, 47 of the 95 cases were seen to be cleared by arrest. Of those 47 arrests, only two resulted from police patrol intervention ("on view") and arrest. Most arrests resulted from information about or identification of the offender by witnesses or victims and police response to calls for robbery-in-progress (Table 3B-34).

Finally, an additional sample of 78 arrest reports was analyzed to determine the method of apprehension (Table 3B-35). Consistent with observations discussed above, witnesses and victims were the primary agents in providing information which subsequently led to arrest. Only one on-view arrest was made in these sample cases.

1975 Adult Arrest Sample

Suspect identification may occur in many different ways within the same case. Table 3B-36 presents data on all the different ways in which suspects were identified (to the extent it was possible to determine) in the sample adult arrest cases for commercial and non-commercial robberies.

Table 3B-33--Type of Items Taken by Robbery (1975 Sample of Adult Arrest Cases)

<u>Objects Taken</u>	<u>Type of Robbery</u>	
	<u>Commercial</u>	<u>Personal</u>
Cash	36 (70.6%)**	33 (67.3%)**
Drugs	6 (11.8%)	0
Wallet/Purse	0	13 (26.5%)
Jewelry/Watch	0	6 (12.2%)
Clothing	0	5 (10.2%)
Musical Instrument	0	4 (8.2%)
Television	0	4 (8.2%)
Stereo Components	0	4 (8.2%)
Keys, cosmetics, personal papers, registration, ID, license	0	5 (10.2%)
Vehicle	1 (2.0%)	2 (4.1%)
Weapons	0	2 (4.1%)
Other*	9	12

*"Other" represents a number of items, none of which were taken in more than two cases in either type of robbery; this included alcohol, food, food stamps, cigarettes, radio/CB radio, credit cards, cameras, household/kitchen items, checks or checkbooks, stationery, hearing aid, briefcase, and luggage.

**Percentages do not add up to 100 percent because more than one type of item is frequently taken in one robbery.

Table 3B-34--Circumstances of Sample Robbery Arrests (Seattle Police Department, n = 47)

<u>Circumstances of Apprehension</u>	<u>Commercial</u>		<u>Non-Commercial</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Witness/Victim Information	12	75.0	25	80.6
Call - Robbery-in-progress	0	0	3	9.7
Witness/Victim Apprehension	0	0	2	6.4
Informant	1	6.2	0	0
Police Investigation (Evidence)	2	12.5	0	0
On-view	1	6.2	1	3.2
Total	16	99.9	31	99.9

Table 3B-35--Circumstances of Sample Robbery Arrests (Seattle Police Department, 1972; n = 78)

<u>Circumstances of Apprehension</u>	<u>Commercial</u>		<u>Non-Commercial</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Witness/Victim Information	25	56.8	25	73.5
Call - Robbery-in-progress	7	15.9	2	5.9
Informant	5	11.4	1	2.9
Police Investigation	3	6.8	1	2.9
Arrest - Other Charge	1	2.3	3	8.8
Witness/Victim Apprehension	0	0	2	5.9
Surrendered	2	4.5	0	0
On-view	1	2.3	0	0
Total	44	100.0	34	99.9

Table 3B-36--Method of Suspect Identification

<u>Means of Identification</u>	<u>Suspect Identified by:</u>			
	<u>Victim</u>	<u>Witness</u>	<u>Patrol</u>	<u>Detectives</u>
<u>Commercial Robbery:</u>				
On-view arrest	--	--	0	0
Name/identified at scene	4	1	--	--
Mug shots, other pictures	1	11	--	--
Lineup	7	14	--	--
MO	--	--	--	1
Car description	--	3	--	3
Physical evidence	--	--	--	1
Informant tip	--	--	--	2
Surrendered self	--	--	--	--
Seen later/general address	1	--	--	--
Fingerprints	--	--	--	1
<u>Personal Robbery:</u>				
On-view arrest	--	--	2	--
Name/identified at scene	24	--	--	--
Mug shots, other pictures	4	2	--	--
Lineup	3	--	--	--
MO	--	--	--	1
Car description	--	--	--	2
Physical evidence	1*	5*	--	--
Informant tip	--	1	--	2
Surrendered self	--	--	--	--
Seen later/general address	2	--	--	--
Fingerprints	--	--	--	--
Held for police	1	--	--	--

*Victim/witness later identified stolen property in suspect's possession.

In commercial robbery cases, the most frequently successful means of identifying suspects is by having either victims or witnesses view lineups, mug shots, or other pictures. For detectives, the most frequently successful means (3 cases, or 6.0 percent) of suspect identification is through vehicle description (including car license numbers). While victims or witnesses remain the primary source of identification of offenders for personal robberies, the means of this identification changes to either knowing the suspect by name or actually pointing the suspect out at the scene of the incident (24 cases, or 49.0 percent of the cases). For commercial robberies, half of the arrests for cases with known circumstances of arrest (50 percent, or 19 of 38) were arrests on or near scene and citizen capture/hold and thus occurred with little or no delay from the time of the incident (see Table 3B-37). An additional 31.6 percent occurred as the result of information or leads from other cases. For personal robberies, the comparable circumstances of arrest were 70.3 percent occurring with little or no delay and 18.9 percent as the result of information or leads from other cases.

Suspect/Victim Indications of Mental Impairment: Where information on possible factors that could impair an individual's mental capabilities was reported within the sample cases, it was recorded. It should be noted that the accuracy of these observations is not verifiable nor are the four factors equally easy to detect (see Table 3B-38). For types of robberies in which arrests occur, there appears to be a relatively higher degree of suspect alcohol use when these cases are compared with a random sample of all robbery cases (19.6 percent of commercial and 16.3 percent of personal robberies).

Interview Data

In 1972, 16 adults convicted of the charge of robbery were interviewed to gain additional information regarding factors influencing offender behavior. However, given the small number of persons interviewed, the selectivity and highly likely bias of the group,

Table 3B-37--Circumstances of Arrest by Type of Robbery
(1975 Robbery Arrest Sample)

Circumstances	Type of Robbery			
	Commercial		Personal	
	Number	Percent*	Number	Percent*
Arrest on scene	4	10.5	9	24.3
Arrest near scene	12	31.6	16	43.2
Arrest other case	12	31.6	7	18.9
Arrest other jurisdiction	1	2.6	1	2.7
Warrant	2	5.3	2	5.4
Citizen capture/hold	3	7.9	1	2.7
Traffic stop	2	5.3	0	0.0
Shot	1	2.6	0	0.0
Surrendered self	1	2.6	1	2.7
Unknown	13		12	
Total	51	100.0	49	99.9

*Percentages based upon column total minus unknown.

Table 3B-38--Indication of Mental Impairment (1975 Robbery Arrest Sample)

Type of Robbery	Person	* Type of Impairment			
		Mental Retardation	Mental Illness	Alcohol	Drugs
Commercial	Victim	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Commercial	Suspect	0	2	10	5
Personal	Victim	1	0	5	0
Personal	Suspect	0	2	8	1

and the questionable accuracy of their responses (since information they provided might be used in the future to make future robbery attempts more difficult), these data should be viewed with caution.

Familiarity with Target: Interviews with convicted robbers suggested that a familiar neighborhood location was frequently chosen for the commission of robbery. Of the 16 offenders interviewed, seven respondents (43 percent) reported that the conviction robbery occurred in their own neighborhood, while eight persons (50 percent) reported that they were familiar with the place or person robbed.

One-half of the offenders who were interviewed claimed to be aware of the frequency and routines of police surveillance. Only 13 percent indicated awareness of the presence or absence of neighborhood or commercial crime prevention activities.

Education: Formal education among interviewed offenders ranged from 9 years to 14 years, with an average (mean) of 11.7 years. Four of the respondents (25 percent) reported at least one term of college experience.

Strategies Used to Commit Robbery: The offender interview provided considerable information about the strategies used to commit robbery: degree of planning, characteristics sought, peer group support, the object of the robbery, presence of weapons, plans for use/disposal of goods thus obtained, and perception of the possibilities of apprehension.

Degree of Planning in Relation to Robbery: The results of the Offender Study indicated that the interviewed robbers tended to plan their offenses much more frequently and thoroughly than interviewed burglars. Although seven robbers (43 percent) reported that no planning had occurred, six persons (37 percent) reported some planning, and three persons (18 percent) reported considerable planning. Thus the choice of robbery targets

or victims seemed more premeditated and considerably less spontaneous than burglary offenses.

Characteristics Sought: Exactly one-half of the interviewed offenders reported that they did not seek any particular characteristics when they selected a target for robbery. Those persons who reported seeking particular characteristics tended to report very general characteristics, such as night or seclusion (4); no witnesses or customers (3); and dogs (1).

Peer Group Support: The majority of offenders (62 percent) admitted that they were with others at the time of the robbery. This represented the same proportion of peer support reported by burglary offenders. In all instances, "others" consisted of friends. No robberies were committed with siblings, acquaintances or strangers.

Object of the Robbery: All robbery offenders reported that they were after something specific at the time of the offense. Fifteen persons stated that money was the sole object of the offense. One offender reported that the object sought was a television set.

Plans for Use/Disposal of Stolen Goods: Since the primary object of most robberies was money, there was no need to sell or fence the goods (with the exception of the television set). In response to a question on plans for stolen goods, the following answers were noted: keep (4); give away (1); share (5); sell (1).

Presence of Weapons: The majority (68 percent) of the interviewed offenders were armed at the time of the conviction offense. These weapons were: handguns (8 cases), knives (2 cases), and a shotgun (1 case).

Perception of Apprehension Possibilities: The overwhelming majority (81 percent) of the robbery offenders felt there was no chance of being caught or apprehended. Most appeared to express a defiant confidence that their competence or lack of fear would somehow shield them from apprehension.

The Offender Study asked each of 16 robbers interviewed how they were caught. This sample indicated that the primary information which led to apprehension was provided by witnesses and victims. Although it was police investigation and expertise which generated the apprehension, they seldom observed robberies in progress (Table 3B-39).

Table 3B-39--Method of Apprehension as Reported by Convicted Robbers
(Offender Interview Study, 1972; n = 16)

<u>Circumstances of Apprehension</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent*</u>
Witness/Victim Information	9	60.0
On-view	1	6.7
Arrested/Other Charge	2	13.3
Informant	1	6.7
Shot	1	6.7
Surrendered	1	6.7
Unknown/Not Reported	1	
Total	16	100.1

Arrested Juvenile Offender Characteristics

Survey and Random Sample of Cleared Juvenile Offenses: For this section, data were obtained from the following sources: SPD annual reports, 1973-1975; a random sample of 55 juveniles arrested for robbery in 1972; a random sample of 67 juveniles arrested between October, 1973, and March, 1974, for robbery (called the Juvenile Cohort Study sample); and a random sample of 50 robbery cases cleared by the arrest of juveniles in 1975.

Age: For the period 1973-1975, there has been a consistent tendency for youths not to be involved in robbery cases prior to the age of 13. However, 89.1 percent of juvenile

robbery suspects are from age 13 on up to and including age 17, while this age group comprises only 32.2 percent of the juvenile population (see Table 3B-40).

Table 3B-40--Age of Juveniles Contacted for Robbery, 1973-1975
(Seattle Police Department Annual Reports)

Age	1973	1974	1975	Percent Arrested 1973-1975	Percent of Seattle Juveniles
10 and under	6	7	7	3.7	56.4
11-12	17	8	14	7.2	11.4
13-14	50	42	41	24.5	11.4
15	46	43	31	22.1	6.9
16	34	45	24	19.0	6.9
17	60	34	33	23.4	6.9
Total	213	179	150	99.9	99.9

Race: For the period 1973-1975, the racial group most frequently arrested for robbery was blacks (66.4 percent) followed by Caucasians (26.0 percent, see Table 3B-41).

Table 3B-41--Race of Juveniles Contacted for Robbery 1973-1975
(Seattle Police Department Annual Reports)

Race	1973	1974	1975	Percent Arrested 1973-1975	Percent of Seattle Population
Caucasian	63	35	43	26.0	84.8
Black	134	129	97	66.4	8.6
Native American	6	8	5	3.5	0.9
Asian/Oriental	1	0	0	0.2	3.9
Other	9	7	5	3.9	1.8
Total	213	179	150	100.0	100.0

This rather high degree of black involvement compared to adult robbery cases is partially explained by the fact that the majority of juvenile robberies tend to be personal as opposed to commercial (see Table 3B-8, 28.6 percent of personal robberies were committed by juveniles as opposed to only 2.6 percent of commercial robberies) and that personal robberies tend to be committed predominantly by blacks (72.9 percent) while caucasians are more likely to commit commercial robberies (65.8 percent, see Table 3B-9).

Sex: Juvenile offenders, as in the case of adults, overwhelmingly tend to be male (see Table 3B-42). While males make up 47.6 percent of Seattle's population, 81.2 percent of all juveniles arrested for robbery in 1973-1975 were male.

Table 3B-42--Sex of Juveniles Contacted for Robbery
(Seattle Police Department Annual Reports)

Sex	1973	1974	1975	Percent Arrested 1973-1975	Percent of Seattle Population
Male	182	138	120	81.2	47.6
Female	31	41	30	18.8	52.4
Total	213	179	150	100.0	100.0

School Status: Most 1972 sample contacts were enrolled in school at the time of the robbery incident (Table 3B-43). The remainder of the juveniles were either suspended from school (4 percent) or had dropped out (12 percent).

Table 3B-43--School Status of Juvenile Contacts for Robbery
(1972 Random Sample, n = 49)

<u>School Status</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
In School	40	81.6
Special Program	1	2.0
Dropout	6	12.2
Suspended	2	4.1
Total	49	99.9

Parental Marital Status: Of the 43 juvenile contacts for whom parental marital status was known, approximately one-third came from intact families. The majority of parents were divorced (44 percent), separated (14 percent) or widowed (7 percent). These percentages show a marked overrepresentation of children from broken homes, because in 1970, 77.8 percent of Seattle children under 18 years old lived with both parents (U. S. Census Bureau Report, 1970).

Living Situation: The living situation of the 1972 sample juvenile contacts indicated that 82 percent of the youths lived with one or both parents (Table 3B-44). The frequency of single parent homes, however, accounted for one-half of these placements. Relatively few juveniles lived with relatives (8 percent), friends (2 percent), in group homes (2 percent) or in foster homes (2 percent).

Table 3B-44--Living Situation of Juveniles Contacted for Robbery
(1972 Random Sample, n = 50)

<u>Living Situation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Parents	15	30.0
Mother	22	44.0
Father	2	4.0
Grandmother	1	2.0
Aunt and/or Uncle	3	6.0
Friends	1	2.0
Group Home	1	2.0
Foster Home	1	2.0
Mother & Stepfather	2	4.0
Youth Service Center	1	2.0
Guardian	1	2.0

Familiarity with Victim/Target: A relatively small number of the 1972 sample contacts were familiar with the victim/target prior to the robbery. Only 12 percent of sample juveniles had prior relationships with victims (schoolmates, neighbors, acquaintances, etc.).

Drug/Alcohol Involvement: Two variables were investigated to estimate the degree of drug or alcohol involvement within the sample contacts: (1) previous juvenile contacts for drug violations, and (2) the presence of drugs or alcohol at the time of contact. On this basis, it was determined that 6 of the 55 juveniles (11 percent) demonstrated a previous history of drug use or demonstrated the possession/influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of contact.

Number of Offenders: Within the 1972 sample cases cleared by the arrests of juveniles, seven of the ten commercial robberies (70 percent) included single suspects while two cases (20 percent) involved two offenders and one case (10 percent) involved three offenders. In the personal robberies, 17 cases (42.5 percent) involved single suspects, 14 (35 percent) had two suspects, 6 (15 percent) had three suspects and 3 (7.5 percent) involved four suspects each.

Arrest Profile: Two separate LJPO samples of juvenile robbery offenders are available to indicate the nature and extent of their involvement in other crime. The first survey was based upon a sample of 55 youths contacted in 1972 for robbery. The number and kinds

of all previous juvenile contacts for the 1972 juvenile robbery sample were separated into Part I offenses ("serious") and Part II offenses. Part II offenses were further subdivided to separate out status offenses, which are crimes when committed by juveniles but not when committed by adults. From Table 3B-45, it was determined that 73.5 percent of all previous offenses were "serious" offenses. Of the 26.5 percent of previous Part II offenses, status offenses (truant, curfew, runaway, etc.) accounted for eight percent of the total offenses and 30.5 percent of the Part II offenses.

Table 3B-45--Number and Percentage of Previous Juvenile Contacts for Juvenile Robbery Sample (1972 Random Sample; Total n = 55)

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<u>Part I "Serious" Offenses</u>		
Burglary	60	19.4
Rape	2	.6
Robbery	38	12.3
Assault	30	9.7
Larceny & Shoplift	71	23.0
Prowl	3	1.0
Auto Theft	23	7.4
Total	227	73.4
<u>Part II Non-status Offenses</u>		
Narcotics	8	2.6
Consuming (minor)	3	1.0
Property Damage/Vandalism	33	10.7
Extortion	2	.6
Peddling	1	.3
Mischief	2	.6
Hindering	1	.3
Disturbing the Peace	4	1.3
Fraud	1	.3
Discharge Firearms	1	.3
Joy Riding	1	.3
Total	57	18.3
<u>Part II Status Offenses</u>		
Truant	1	.3
Curfew	3	1.0
Runaway	16	5.2
Injurious Living Conditions	5	1.6
Total	25	8.1
Grand Total	309	99.8

The 309 previous offenses were committed by 47 of the 55 sample juveniles contacted for robbery in 1972. This represents a delinquent recidivism rate of 85.4 percent. When total offenses were divided by sample size, the average, or mean, previous delinquent contacts exceeded 5.6 per juvenile for all offenses and 4.1 per juvenile for Part I offenses.

A second and more recent sample of juveniles contacted for robbery, the juvenile cohort study (see Table 3B-46), examined prior and subsequent contacts for youths contacted between October 1, 1973, and March 31, 1974. Recidivism data (all arrests following the robbery contact) were recorded through May, 1975, for these offenders. Contacts were separately recorded for all contacts prior to the target robbery offense, the specific target contact, and all subsequent contacts, resulting in a total arrest history separated into three time periods.

The 67 juveniles identified had a total of 650 Seattle Police Department contacts through May, 1975, or a mean average of 9.70 per offender. Of these 650, 449 contacts were for Part I offenses, or an average of 6.70 per offender. Of the Part I offenses, 263 (3.93

Table 3B-46--Total Arrest History for Youths Contacted for Robbery by SPD from October 1, 1973, through March 31, 1974, and Followup through May, 1975 (Juvenile Cohort Study, n = 67)

Offenses Arrested For:	Time Period in which Arrest Occurred			Total
	Pre-Target Charges	Target Booking Charges	Post-Target Charges	
Murder	0		0	0
Rape	1		2	3
Robbery	34	67	12	113
All Assaults	36		19	55
Burglary	60		36	96
Larceny	99		43	142
Auto Theft	33		7	40
Weapons	4		0	4
Drugs	6		7	13
Vandalism	26		11	37
Runaway	38		11	49
Other Status	30		1	31
All Other	48		17	65
Total Part I and II	415	67	166	648
Part IV	2			2
Grand Total	417	67	166	650

per offender) were committed prior to the target robbery offense. Another 119 (1.78 per offender) were committed subsequent to the robbery contact during an approximate 17-month followup.

Of the 67 robbery contactees, 38 (56.7 percent) had no prior or subsequent robbery contacts; 22 (32.8 percent) had prior robbery contacts, and 10 (13.2 percent) had subsequent robbery contacts. Of those with either prior or subsequent contacts, three (4.5 percent) had both prior and subsequent contacts.

Relationship to Victim: Within the random sample of 50 juvenile robbery cases cleared by arrest in 1975, an attempt to stratify by type of robbery was made. However, due to the extremely low number of juveniles involved in commercial robbery (only 1 juvenile suspect in 38 sample cases) coupled with a 29 percent clearance rate, this resulted in only 10 commercial robberies with juvenile clearances being sampled while 40 personal robbery cases were obtained. Within both types of robberies, arrestees are highly likely to be strangers to victims (88.9 percent of commercial and 67.8 percent of personal robberies). However, it is interesting to note that over a third (38.2 percent) of personal robbery victims were acquainted with the offender. These victim/offender relationships are detailed in Table 3B-47.

Violence and Loss in Juvenile Robberies Cleared by Arrest

Weapons Used in Commission of Crime: For those cases in which juveniles were arrested, there was substantially less use of firearms (40 percent of commercial and 2.5 percent of personal robberies) and more reliance upon bodily force (40 percent of commercial and 60 percent of personal robberies) when compared to the sample of adult arrestees (see Tables 3B-48 and 3B-31). Within the juvenile arrestee sample, the same tendency found in the adult sample for firearms to be used more frequently in commercial robberies and less often in personal robberies was repeated.

Table 3B-47--Relationship between Victim and Offender
(1975 Juvenile Arrest Sample)

Relationship	Type of Robbery	
	Commercial	Personal
Relative	0	0
Friend	0	0
Neighbor	0	0
Acquaintance	0	13 (38.2%)*
Customer/Acquaintance	1 (11.1%)*	0
Stranger	8 (88.9%)*	21 (61.8%)
Unknown	1	6
Total	10	40

*Percentages based upon column totals minus unknown categories.

Table 3B-48--Weapon Used by Arrested Juveniles by Type of Robbery, 1975 Sample

Type of Weapon*	Type of Robbery	
	Commercial	Personal
Gun	4 (40.0%)**	1 (2.5%)**
Knife; sharp, cutting instrument	1 (10.0%)	4 (10.0%)
Club; blunt object	1 (10.0%)	9 (22.5%)
Bodily force	4 (40.0%)	24 (60.0%)
Weapon implied, not seen		1 (2.5%)
Other		1 (2.5%)
Total	10	40

*If more than one weapon was used, the most deadly weapon was recorded.

**Percentages based upon column totals.

Extent of Injury: In the 50 sample cases involving juvenile arrestees, 15 (30 percent) resulted in some injury to the victim. In the 10 commercial robberies, three cases (30 percent) included victim injuries inflicted through bodily force. However, none were serious enough to require medical attention. In the 40 personal robberies, 12 cases (30 percent) included victim injuries. All but one case of victim injury was produced by offender use of bodily force with the exception being the use of a club. Of those injured, in ten cases injuries were not serious enough to require medical attention, while two cases required either hospitalization or attention from a private physician for at least medical examination.

Extent of Loss: For the ten juvenile-committed commercial robberies cleared by arrest, the range of dollar loss was from \$0 (2 cases, or 20 percent) to \$2,371, with a median average loss of \$46, or about half that of cases cleared by adult arrests. For personal robberies, the range in dollar loss was from \$0 (7 cases, or 7.5 percent) to \$295 with a median average loss of \$4.50 or about one-tenth of the personal robberies cleared by the arrest of an adult (see Tables 3B-49 and 3B-32).

Type of Item Taken: For both commercial and personal robberies, cash is the most frequently taken item (60 percent of commercial, 57.5 percent of personal robberies). The next most frequently taken item was purses and wallets (25 percent of personal robberies; see Table 3B-50).

Table 3B-49--Total Dollar Value Loss by Type of Robbery for Arrested Juvenile Cases, 1975 Sample

<u>Dollar Value</u>	<u>Type of Robbery</u>	
	<u>Commercial</u>	<u>Personal</u>
No loss	2	7
\$1-10	1	13
\$11-100	3	12
\$101-1,000	2	2
\$1,001-10,000	1	0
Unknown	1	6
Maximum loss	2,371	295
Median average	46	4.50

Table 3B-50--Type of Items Taken by Type of Robbery, 1975 Sample Juvenile Cases

<u>Objects Taken</u>	<u>Type of Robbery</u>	
	<u>Commercial</u>	<u>Personal</u>
Cash	6 (60%)*	23 (57.5%)*
Wallet/Purse	0	10 (25.0%)
Jewelry/Watch	0	6 (15.0%)
Alcohol	1 (10%)	0
Clothing	1 (10%)	1 (2.5%)
Food	0	1 (2.5%)
Foodstamps, welfare checks, medical coupons	1 (10%)	1 (2.5%)
Bicycle	0	2 (5.0%)
Radio	0	1 (2.5%)
Credit cards/gifts	0	1 (2.5%)
Checks, checkbooks	0	2 (5.0%)
Toys	0	1 (2.5%)
Miscellaneous	0	3 (7.5%)

*Percentages do not add up to 100 percent because either nothing or more than one item may have been taken in any single robbery case.

Suspect Identification and Arrest

1972 Juvenile Arrest Sample: Most juvenile contacts within the 1972 sample resulted from victim information or identification of the juvenile offender (Table 3B-51). No "on-view" contacts were made from the sample studied, although three juveniles were contacted for suspicious behavior while fleeing the scene of a robbery.

Table 3B-51--Circumstances of Sample Juvenile Robbery Contacts (Seattle Police Department, 1972, n = 55)

<u>Circumstances of Contact</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Victim Information/Identification	35	63.6
Witness Information/Identification	7	12.7
Call - Robbery in Progress	5	9.1
Possession Stolen Property	4	7.3
Caught Fleeing Scene	3	5.4
Evidence	1	1.8
Total	55	99.9

1975 Juvenile Arrest Sample: Suspect identification may occur in many different ways within the same case. Table 3B-52 presents data on all the different ways in which suspects were identified (to the extent that it was possible to determine) within the

sample juvenile arrest cases for commercial and non-commercial robberies. For the commercial robberies, the most frequent means of identification was through patrol on-view arrests (3 cases or 30 percent of the commercial robbery sample but only 10 percent of total cleared cases). None of the other means of identification was used in more than one case.

Table 3B-52--Method of Suspect Identification by Type of Robbery,
1975 Sample of Juvenile Arrestees

<u>Means of Identification</u>	<u>Victim</u>	<u>Suspect Identified by:</u>		
		<u>Witness</u>	<u>Patrol</u>	<u>Detectives</u>
<u>Commercial Robbery:</u>				
On-view	-	-	3	-
Name/identified at scene	0	0	-	0
Mug shots, other pictures	1	1	-	0
Lineup	0	1	-	0
General address	0	0	-	0
Held for police	0	1	-	0
Physical evidence	-	-	-	-
Car license	0	0	-	0
Offender's clothing/description	-	-	-	-
Informant	0	0	-	1
Confession	-	-	-	-
Polygraph	-	-	-	-
<u>Personal Robbery:</u>				
On-view	-	-	2	-
Name/identified at scene	19	1	-	0
Mug shots, other pictures	5	4	-	0
Lineup	0	0	-	0
General address	1	0	-	0
Held for police	0	0	-	0
Physical evidence	-	-	-	1
Car license	0	0	-	1
Offender's clothing/description	-	-	-	1
Informant	-	-	-	1
Confession	-	-	-	1
Polygraph	-	-	-	1

For personal robberies, the single most frequent means of identifying suspects was the victim either knowing the suspect by name or pointing out the offender at the crime scene (19 cases or 47.5 percent); the second most frequent means was through the viewing of mug shots or other pictures (5 cases or 12.5 percent). When compared to robberies cleared by adult arrests, the method of suspect identification was very similar for personal robberies. For commercial robberies, there were too few juvenile cases for meaningful comparison.

For both commercial and personal robberies, half or more of the cases involved little or no delay between the occurrence of the crime and suspect arrest (see Table 3B-53).

For commercial robberies, four (50 percent of the known circumstances of arrest) were the result of either on-view arrests or citizen capture and hold. For personal robberies, these two categories plus arrest on or near scene accounted for 16 (61.5 percent) of the known arrest circumstances.

Suspect/Victim Indications of Mental Impairment: When information on possible factors that could impair an individual's mental capabilities was reported for a sample case, it was recorded. It should be noted that the accuracy of these observations are not verifiable nor are the four factors (Table 3B-54) equally easy to detect. For the entire sample, only two cases (4 percent) involved any sort of apparent mental impairment of offenders (two cases of alcohol use in two commercial robberies) while only one case (2 percent) included a victim whose mental functioning was impaired (in this case by alcohol).

Table 3B-53--Circumstances of Arrest by Type of Robbery,
1975 Juvenile Arrest Sample

Circumstances	Type of Robbery			
	Commercial		Personal	
	Number	Percent*	Number	Percent*
Patrol on-view arrest	3	37.5	2	7.7
Arrest on scene	0	0	2	7.7
Arrest near scene	0	0	10	38.5
Citizen capture/hold	1	12.5	2	7.7
Arrest other case	2	25.0	2	7.7
Warrant	1	12.5	0	0
Detective arrest	1	12.5	7	26.9
Turned in by school authorities	0	0	1	3.8
Unknown	2		14	
Total	10	100.0	40	100.0

*Percentage based on column total minus unknown category.

Table 3B-54--Indication of Mental Impairment, 1975 Juvenile Arrest Sample

Type of Robbery	Person	Type of Impairment			
		Mental Retardation	Mental Illness	Alcohol	Drugs
Commercial	Victim	0	0	0	0
Commercial	Suspect	0	0	2	0
Personal	Victim	0	0	1	0
Personal	Suspect	0	0	0	0

Criminal Justice System Response

Information on the processing of adult offenders arrested for robbery in 1974 and the first eight months of 1975 is presented in Figures 3B-6 and 3B-7.


1974 Offender Processing: Based upon reported robberies, an estimated 3,527 robberies occurred in Seattle during 1974 (this figure was derived by using national LEAA victimization reporting rates for commercial and non-commercial robberies). Of this estimated number, 2,041 were reported to the Seattle police which led to the arrest of 391 adults for either suspicion and/or charged robbery; these arrestees accounted for 445 suspicion robbery charges (21.8 percent of reported robberies). There were 244 actual charges filed with the court for robbery, of which dispositions were available on 151 at the time of data collection. Of these, 115 (76.2 percent) had a guilty finding. Of those found guilty, 62 (53.9 percent) received either a jail or penitentiary sentence while 53 (46.1 percent) received deferred, suspended, or probation sentences.

1975 Offender Processing: For the first eight months of 1975, an estimated 2,297 robberies occurred with 1,329 being reported to the Seattle Police Department. During this time, 314 suspicion of robbery arrests were made (13.7 percent of reported robberies). A total of 185 actual robbery charges were filed, of which dispositions were available for 79 cases. Of these, 55 (69.6 percent) were findings of guilt with 35 sentences to jail or penitentiary and 20 suspended, deferred, or probation sentences.

Criminal Justice System Response (Juvenile): Again in 1975, as in 1974, access to information on court case disposition of juveniles referred to King County Juvenile Court for robbery was subject to the limitations discussed in the burglary analysis.


The data available in regard to the Seattle Police Department disposition of robbery contacts were provided by the sample contact records for 1972 and total 1974 to 1975. Of the 51 cases with recorded dispositions in the 1972 sample, 27 were referred to

Figure 3B-6--Robbery, 1974



*Based upon an overall reporting rate of 57.87 percent for commercial and non-commercial robberies (51.4 percent for non-commercial, 85.8 percent for commercial; source - LEAA national victimization surveys).

Figure 3B-7--Robbery, January through August, 1975



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*Based on overall reporting rate of 57.87 percent (51.4 percent for non-commercial, 85.8 percent for commercial; source - LEAA national victimization surveys).

Juvenile Court, 13 were investigated and released, and 7 were adjusted. In the remaining four cases, victims refused prosecution (see Table 3B-55).

Table 3B-55--Number and Percent of Juvenile Robbery Contacts by Disposition
(Seattle Police Department, 1972; n = 51)

<u>Contact Disposition</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Referred to Juvenile Court	27	52.9
Investigated and Released	13	25.5
Adjusted with Parents	3	5.9
Adjusted with Victim	1	2.0
Adjusted with Prosecutor	1	2.0
Adjusted (General)	1	2.0
Victim Refused to Prosecute	4	7.8
Put in YSC, Group Home or Institution	1	2.0
Total	51	100.1

If sample dispositions represented the total population of robbery dispositions, approximately 50 percent of the juveniles proceeded to the adjudication level of the juvenile justice system. The remainder of the juvenile robbery dispositions were handled informally.

Seattle Police Department disposition data available for 1975 (see Table 3B-56) at first glance suggest only a slight increase in juveniles being referred to court as compared with 1974. However, the inactive category includes predominately those cases in which there has been no juvenile arrest made or the case is pending. When inactive and pending cases are excluded, the percentage of cases referred to Juvenile Court is 73.6 percent in 1974 and 75 percent in 1975. Presumably many of the pending cases will eventually result in a referral to court which will further increase the percentage referred.

Table 3B-56--Number and Percent of Juvenile Robbery Cases Received* by Disposition (SPD 1974 and 1975 Annual Activity Report, Juvenile Operations Section)

<u>Disposition</u>	<u>1974</u>		<u>1975</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Adjusted	11	2.8	14	5.3
Exceptionally Cleared	17	4.4	7	2.6
Unfounded	6	1.5	5	1.9
Inactive**	195	50.1	161	60.5
Referred to Court	90	23.1	78	29.3
Pending	70	18.0	1	0.4
Total	389	99.9	266	100.0

*Corresponds to neither incidents nor contacts, but to cases reportedly involving juveniles.

**Predominantly those cases for which there is a juvenile suspect but no arrest occurs.

The juvenile cohort study of robbers contacted between October 1, 1973, and March, 1974, examined police dispositions on the basis of whether juveniles had prior or subsequent SPD contacts for robbery (see Table 3B-57). Of those ten adjusted at the police level, nine (90 percent) had no prior robbery arrests. Of those 48 referred to court, 29 (60.4 percent) had no prior robbery contacts. Of those adjusted, none had subsequent contacts for robbery (through May, 1975). Of those referred to court, eight (16.7 percent) had subsequent contacts.

Table 3B-57--Prior, Subsequent Robbery Contacts by SPD Disposition for Juvenile Robbery Contactees, October 1, 1973, through March 31, 1974

Juveniles Having Robbery Contacts		Investigated and Released	SPD Disposition		Referred to Court	Total
Prior	Subsequent		Adjusted	Exceptionally Cleared		
No	No	1	9	4	24	38
No	Yes	2	0	0	5	7
Yes	No	1	1	1	16	19
Yes	Yes	0	0	0	3	3
Total		4	10	5	48	67

Introduction

This Survey of Rape is essentially a descriptive and statistical overview of rape in Seattle and presents much of what is currently known about rape, including reporting rates, trends, time of occurrence, relationships between rape victims and offenders, victim injuries and a profile of rape offenders. In addition, this section contains a profile of the criminal justice system's response to rape.

Data used in this section came from the following sources, which are identified by the short title listed in parentheses within the text.

1. FBI's Uniform Crime Report, 1966-1975 (UCR 1966-1975).
2. Seattle Police Department's annual statistical reports from 1966 to 1976 (SPD Statistical Report).
3. Research and Development of Model Procedures for Criminal Justice System Involvement with the Crime of Forcible Rape, progress reports on LEAA discretionary grant, to D. Schram, Ph.D., Battelle, Seattle, 1976 (Battelle Model Procedures, 1976).
4. Seattle Police Department's report entitled "Monthly Crime Capsule" (SPD MCC).
5. National crime victimization surveys conducted by LEAA (LEAA victimization).
6. Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office sample and total surveys conducted between 1972 and 1977 from Seattle Police Department records of adult and juvenile arrestees and rape offense reports (LJPO Sample and Total Survey 1972-1977).
7. Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office evaluation of the Seattle Rape Reduction Project (LJPO Rape Evaluation).

A Survey of Forcible Rape

Definition: By UCR definition, forcible rape is the carnal knowledge of a female through the use of force or the threat of force. Included in this definition are assaults to commit forcible rape. Statutory rape (without force) is not included.

Trends

Trends Over Time: A 13-year trend analysis of reported forcible rape in Seattle illustrates that its frequency has steadily increased from 1964 to 1976 (see Figure 3C-1). The only marked deviation from the overall trend occurs between 1969 and 1970, during which time rape increased very rapidly in 1969; in 1970, it dropped back to the prior established trend level.

Of all forcible rape cases reported nationally in 1974 (UCR 1974), 74 percent were actual rape cases, with the remaining 26 percent either attempted rape or assault to commit rape cases. Of the 316 reported cases of forcible rape in Seattle in 1974, a study of 306 found that 78.4 percent were actual rapes and 21.6 percent were attempts (Battelle Model Procedures, 1976).

In 1975, the 324 reported cases represented a 2.5 percent increase over the prior year's 316 cases. The 324 cases represented a risk rate of 1.28 per 1,000 female population. Nationally, for cities with a population of 250,000+, the comparable risk rate for 1974 (the most current year available) was 1.10 per 1,000 female population. In terms of national experience, the Seattle rate is 16.4 percent higher than the national reported rape figure.

Short Term Trend of Occurrence

Time of Occurrence (Month): Nationally, forcible rape is most likely to occur during the summer months, July through August, based upon data reported to the FBI UCR system between 1970 and 1975 (see Figure 3C-2). Locally, the occurrence of rape by month has not presented such a consistent pattern. In 1973 (see Figure 3C-3), rape was most likely to occur in the last three months of the year. However, in 1975, the local pattern was quite consistent with national data, in that the peak months were July and August. However, the 1976 data again diverge from the national pattern with the peak months being September and December (see Figure 3C-4).

Time of Occurrence (Day of Week): In 1973, approximately 41 percent of all rape offenses occurred on weekends, i.e., Saturday or Sunday. It should be noted, however, that many of these offenses actually represented activities which probably began the previous day. For example, rapes which occurred between 12:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. Saturday or Sunday morning frequently resulted from the extension of activities which began Friday or Saturday evening. In contrast, relatively few rape offenses were reported on Tuesdays and Thursdays (see Figure 3C-5).

In 1974, the day of week was not so strongly related to the occurrence of rape, in that 31.3 percent of offenses occurred on weekends (see Figure 3C-6).

Time of Occurrence (Time of Day): For 1973, most rape offenses occurred between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. (see Figure 3C-7). This six-hour interval accounted for 56 percent of all reported offenses. Relatively few rapes were reported during the day, i.e., between 6:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. This was particularly true at 7:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., when almost no rape offenses occurred.

In 1974, 46.4 percent of rape offenses occurred between 8:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m., with 25.5 percent occurring between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. and the remaining 28.1 percent occurring between 7:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.

Figure 3C-1--Number of Reported Cases of Forcible Rape




Figure 3C-2--National Reporting of Forcible Rape by Month, 1970-1975
(Source: 1975 UCR, Chart 16, pp. 38-39)




Figure 3C-3--Month of Occurrence of Reported Rape Offenses in 1973
(n = 264 of 276 reported cases)




Figure 3C-4--1975 Rape Cases as Reported by Month




Figure 3C-5--Percentage of Offenses by Day of Week, 1973
(n = 263 of 276 reported cases)




Figure 3C-6--Percentage of Offenses by Day of Week, 1974
(n = 306); Source: Battelle





Figure 3C-7--Percentage of Reported Rapes by Hour of Occurrence, 1973
(based upon 212 of 276 cases)



Geographical Area of Occurrence: In 1975, the 10 census tracts with the highest number of reported rape cases, with the exception of two census tracts, were concentrated within two areas (see Map 3C-1). These were the downtown area (tracts 81 and 85) and the Capital Hill-Central Area (tracts 62, 74, 75, 78, 79 and 87). There were 35 census tracts in which no cases of rape were reported in 1975. In 1976, the 10 tracts with the highest reported number of rape cases included tracts 81, 74, 75 and 79 (which were also in the top 10 tracts in 1975). The "new" tracts were 82, 84, 88 and 95 (adjacent to at least one of the 1975 high frequency tracts) and tracts 101 and 102.

Clearance/Arrest Rate

National: In 1975, nationally for cities in excess of 250,000 population (UCR 1975), 51 percent of total forcible rapes were cleared by arrest.

Seattle (1964-1976): For Seattle in 1974, 125 of the 316 reported cases were cleared (39.6 percent). In 1975, of the 324 reported cases, 122 were cleared (37.7 percent). In 1976, of the 322 reported cases, 120 were cleared (37.3 percent). When clearance rates are examined for the past twelve years, a consistent downward trend can be noted from 1970 through 1976 (see Figure 3C-8).

Although clearance rates have declined consistently from 1970 to 1976, it should be noted that what constitutes a cleared case changes, depending upon internal police department procedures. (See Table 3C-1 for Seattle Police Department clearance criteria for rape cases in 1974.) A more consistent index of police success in the investigation of rape cases is the number of formal charges made for rape cases. Using Seattle Police Department annual reports for 1968 through 1975 (1976 not available at this time), the number of adult primary charges and juvenile contacts, by year, are plotted (see Figure 3C-9).

Map 3C-1--Ten Census Tracts with the Highest Number of Reported Rape Cases in 1975

CITY OF SEATTLE
1970 CENSUS TRACTS





Figure 3C-8--Twelve-Year Clearance Rate Trend
Source: SPD Annual Reports





Table 3C-1--1974 Seattle Police Department Case Dispositions
Source: Battelle

<u>Case Disposition</u>	<u>Percent of Cases</u>
<u>Inactive</u>	51.4
Pending further leads	(20.0)
No known suspect	(13.0)
No reason specified	(11.7)
Pending further victim information	(6.7)
<u>Cleared</u>	21.7
Arrest	(15.0)
Summons	(3.7)
Referred to juvenile court	(1.3)
At large warrant	(1.0)
Unspecified	(0.7)
<u>Cleared Exceptionally</u>	16.3
Victim: uncooperative/refused prosecution	(12.0)
Prosecutor declined	(3.0)
Insufficient evidence	(1.0)
Suspect deceased	(0.3)
<u>Unfounded</u>	3.3
<u>Reclassified</u>	0.3
<u>Unknown Disposition</u>	6.7

Figure 3C-9--Adult Primary Charges and Juvenile Contacts*
Source: SPD Annual Reports



*Data for juveniles for 1970-1972 include juvenile incidents; therefore, they are not directly comparable with data for preceding and succeeding years.

From 1968 to 1975, the reported number of offenses increased by 93 percent. During the corresponding time, the total primary charges for adults and juveniles increased by 400 percent.

Figure 3C-10 below and Table 3C-2 compare the number of adults charged with rape per 100,000 population in Seattle with national UCR data (see Table 3C-2). While charge data for cities of population size comparable to Seattle are not available, total national data indicate a relatively stable charging rate (5.09 to 6.28 per 100,000 population, or a 23 percent increase between 1966 and 1975), while per capita reported cases increased 122 percent (12.58 to 27.95 per 100,000 population from 1966 to 1975). During the same time period, the Seattle charging rate increased 2,483 percent (0.36 to 8.94 from 1966 to 1975), while reported rape increased 224 percent (19.89 to 64.35 from 1966 to 1975).

Figure 3C-10--Adults Charged Rape per 100,000 Population in Seattle and Nationally
Source: SPD Annual Reports and UCR, 1966-1975

Adults Charged Rape per 100,000 Population




Table 3C-2--Reported Rape and Adult Charge Information, 1966-1976

Year	Reported Rape Cases per 100,000 Population		Nation	Adults Charged Forcible Rape in Court per 100,000 Population	
	Seattle	Cities of 250,000		Seattle	Nation
1976	63.95	55.00	27.95	14.70	*
1975	64.35	55.56	27.95	8.94	6.28
1974	62.33	55.40	27.17	6.90	5.46
1973	53.59	50.34	26.16	5.05	6.50
1972	53.98	47.07	24.26	5.63	5.76
1971	39.62	43.57	21.80	2.29	5.18
1970	34.66	39.59	19.77	1.88	5.57
1969	45.67	37.66	19.18	2.39	4.53
1968	30.31	31.00	16.33	0.91	4.46
1967	21.05	27.45	13.64	0.36	4.10
1966	19.89	23.72	12.58	0.36	5.09

*Not available

Victim Characteristics

Based upon offense reports for 1973 and 1974, age and race information was consistently reported, and to a restricted extent, occupation data were available for analysis.

Age: The majority of rape victims were very young, i.e., more than 50 percent were between the ages of 15 years and 25 years. In 1973, 66.6 percent of all reported victims were age 24 or younger. In 1974, those 25 and younger represented 65.4 percent of all victims (Table 3C-3). An evaluation of the Seattle Rape Relief Project (1973 through 1975 data) indicated that 69 percent of the project's clients were under 25 years old.

Table 3C-3--Percent of Victims by Age, 1973 and 1974

1973 (n = 275)		1974 (n = 306)	
Age	Percent	Age	Percent
0-9	1.1	0-17	21.6
10-14	6.6	18-20	22.2
15-19	25.1	21-25	21.6
20-24	33.8	26-30	15.0
25-29	18.6	31-40	10.5
30-39	7.3	41-50	2.9
40-49	3.3	51+	5.6
50-59	1.5		
60+	3.0	Unknown	0.7

Race: The racial distribution of forcible rape victims very nearly mirrored the racial distribution of the Seattle population. The 1970 Census Data Book estimated that 12.6 percent of the Seattle population was non-white. This closely approximated the 18.4 percent of rape victims in 1973 who were non-white (see Table 3C-4). The Seattle Rape Reduction Project's evaluation reported that 15.9 percent of its clients between 1973 and 1975 were non-white. Black victims and American Indian victims were somewhat over-represented.

Occupation: Information on employment status or victim occupation was not always available. In those instances in which occupation was recorded, "Student" was the most frequent single occupation consistently given for 1973 and 1974 (see Table 3C-5).

Table 3C-4--Percent of Victims by Race, 1973 and 1974

<u>Race of Victim</u>	<u>1973</u> <u>(n = 278)</u>	<u>1974</u> <u>(n = 306)</u>
White	81.6	79.7
Black	13.0	13.4
American Indian	3.6	3.3
Asian American	1.8	2.3
Other/unknown	0.0	1.3

Table 3C-5--Percent of Victims by Occupation, 1973 and 1974

<u>Victim Occupation</u>	<u>Percent of Victims</u>	
	<u>1973</u> <u>(n = 242)</u>	<u>1974</u> <u>(n = 306)</u>
Student	28.5	26.3
Housewife/unemployed	27.3	6.9
Unemployed	----	9.2
Welfare recipient	5.8	4.6
General professional	6.2	8.2
Sales	5.0	----
Laborer	4.6	5.6
Waitress	4.1	----
Nurse	1.7	----
Teacher	1.7	----
Barmaid	1.7	----
Retired	1.7	----
Dancer/body painting	1.6	----
Babysitter	1.2	----
Technical/clerical	----	12.8
Service	----	12.8
Other	----	3.0
Unknown	----	10.5

Offender Characteristics

Using offense reports and victim statements regarding rape suspects, race and approximate age of rape offenders have been estimated for 1973 and 1974.

Age: In 1973, almost two thirds (63.9 percent) of offenders were estimated to be between 20 and 29 years of age. For 1974, similar results were obtained in that 59.6 percent of offenders were estimated to be within the age span of 21 to 30 years. For both years, a very small percentage of offenders was estimated to be age 40 or older (see Table 3C-6).

Race: Analysis of 1973 offense reports indicated that the offender population was composed almost entirely of whites and blacks, with the latter in greater proportion than the former. Black suspects exceeded white suspects in absolute numbers, as well as in terms of their proportion in the general population (Table 3C-7). Black offenders were named nearly twice as often as all other racial groups combined.

For 1974, the results were much the same, with a slight decrease in the amount of black involvement.

Occupation: The Battelle report of 306 reported rapes in 1974 presented suspect occupation identification in 20 percent of the cases. The majority of suspects (8.2 percent) were identified as laborers.

Table 3C-6--Percent of Offenders by Age as Estimated by Victims, 1973 and 1974

1973 (n = 291)		1974* (n = 306)	
Age	Percent	Age	Percent
10-14	1.0	0-17	3.6
15-19	13.4	18-20	7.6
20-24	34.7	21-25	37.7
25-29	29.2	26-30	21.9
30-39	16.5	31-40	1.3
40-49	3.1	41+	1.7
50-59	1.7		
60+	0.3	Unknown	14.6

*Source: Battelle

Table 3C-7--Percent of Offenders by Race, based upon Victim Report, 1973 and 1974

Race of Offender	1973	1974*
	(n = 312)	
Black	64.4	59.0
White	32.4	33.8
American Indian	1.9	2.3
Asian American	1.0	1.0
Mexican American	0.3	2.0
Other/unknown	----	2.0

*Source: Battelle

Degree of Violence

Weapons Used: In 1973, 38 percent of all offenses involved the use of weapons. The most frequent weapons used to threaten victims were guns (42 offenses) and knives (39 cases). Objects used to threaten victims included broken bottles, rocks, sticks, forks, scissors, belt buckles, wrenches and hammers (21 cases).

Presence of a weapon was very much a function of the relationship between the victim and offender. Weapons were involved in 49 percent of all stranger-to-stranger rapes and only 19 percent of the offenses which involved persons known to one another.

For 1974 Seattle Police Department rape cases, the Battelle analysis indicated that more than 33 percent of all offenders were armed with some weapon. The percentage of cases involving weapons was as follows:

Not armed	44.6 percent	Other sharp	
Gun	11.1 percent	object	2.6 percent
Knife	16.4 percent	Other	2.0 percent
Blunt object	1.0 percent	Unknown	22.3 percent

The 1975 Seattle Police Department Annual Report indicates that of the 324 reported rapes, 77 percent were not armed (bodily force used); 15 percent involved knives; 5 percent, firearms; and 3 percent, other types of weapons.

Extent of Injury: In 1973, more than one victim in every three was injured. Although some injuries were relatively minor, the following were noted on offense reports: lacerations (42 victims), bruises (38 victims), internal injuries (nine victims), sprains

(four victims), broken bones (three victims), broken teeth (three victims) and shock (two victims).

Victims were most likely to be injured if threatened with an object (68 percent). Injuries were less frequently associated with offenders armed with either knives (28 percent) or guns (21 percent). Indeed, victims threatened with guns or knives were less likely to be injured than victims assaulted by offenders with no weapons at all.

The relationship between the victim and the offender was not related to the likelihood of victim injury. Victims raped by offenders known to them were as likely to be injured (38 percent) as victims raped by strangers (38 percent).

The 45 victims raped by multiple offenders were somewhat less likely to be injured than victims raped by single offenders (36 percent). Although only 13 rape offenses were reported which involved multiple victims and single offenders, more than one-half of these cases resulted in victim injury.

In 1974, injuries noted on offense reports indicated that 35.4 percent of victims were injured. The injuries included the following:

Bruised or cut slightly	28.2 percent
Bruised or cut extensively	5.9 percent
Vaginal tears	1.3 percent
Internal injuries	1.6 percent
Broken bones	1.6 percent
Knife wounds	1.3 percent
Broken teeth	0.7 percent
Other injuries	6.6 percent

Extent of Loss

Dollar Value: Forcible rape offenses in 1973 were often associated with other crimes. The most serious of these crimes included armed robbery (27 percent), strong-armed robbery (23 percent), auto theft (3 percent), abduction (3 percent) and attempted murder (1 percent). A total of 21 percent of all rape offenses were accompanied by at least one additional felony.

Forcible rape cases in 1974 were associated with the following additional crimes in the course of the rape offense: robbery (16.1 percent), burglary (0.7 percent), other assault (10.27 percent), kidnap/abduction (12.5 percent) and other (3.3 percent).

Based on offense reports, forcible rape in 1974 was accompanied by theft in approximately 20 percent of the cases. Stolen items included the following: money (14.1 percent), clothing (2.0 percent), jewelry (2.3 percent), weapon (0.3 percent), auto (0.3 percent) and household items (2.0 percent).

The Seattle Police Department Annual Report presents dollar amounts of property stolen in connection with forcible rape in 1974 as \$5,678 and 1975 as \$7,321. The reported dollar amount recovered was \$1,744 (30.7 percent) in 1974, and \$2,690 (36.7 percent) in 1975. In 1976, loss associated with rape increased to \$12,459, of which \$2,257 (18 percent) was recovered.

Location of Incident

An examination of the location of 1973 and 1974 offenses (see Table 3C-8) clearly demonstrates that rape occurs most frequently in the home of the victim or the home of the offender. The next most frequent locations included the offender's vehicle, the street, the park and a home other than that of the victim or offender. Less than 10 percent of all offenses occurred in buildings, motels/hotels and the vehicle of the victim.

The location of the 1973 rape offenses appeared to be influenced by the relationship between the victim and the offender (see Table 3C-9). Rape offenses which involved

Table 3C-8--Location of Offense Occurrence, 1973 and 1974

Location	1973	1974
	(n = 266) Percent	(n = 306) Percent
Victim's home	33.8	32.2
Offender's home	19.6	14.1
Other home	7.5	7.2
Offender's vehicle	14.7	16.8
Victim's vehicle	2.3	2.0
Street	8.7	10.2
Park	6.4	3.9
Building	4.1	6.6
Hotel/motel	3.0	1.6

Table 3C-9--Relation between Degree of Acquaintance and Location of Rape Offense for 1973 Seattle Police Department Rape Cases

Location	Degree of Acquaintance		
	Stranger	Acquaintance	Friend/Relative
	(n = 168) Percent	(n = 72) Percent	(n = 25) Percent
Victim's home	36.3	22.2	52.0
Offender's home	10.1	34.7	28.0
Other home	7.1	11.1	8.0
Offender's vehicle	15.5	16.7	4.0
Victim's vehicle	3.0	1.4	----
Street	10.7	6.9	----
Park	8.9	2.9	----
Building	5.9	1.4	----
Hotel/motel	2.4	2.9	8.0

strangers occurred in locations which would appear to minimize discovery of the offender's identity. Thus stranger-to-stranger rape was likely to occur in the home of the victim (36 percent), on streets (11 percent), in parks (9 percent), in the victim's vehicle (3 percent), in buildings (6 percent), etc. Less than one third of all rapes occurred in situations in which the identity of the offender might become known, i.e., offender's home (10 percent), offender's vehicle (16 percent), other home (7 percent) or a hotel/motel (2 percent).

The location of rapes between persons known to one another is somewhat different, i.e., a shift from locations which suggest a low probability of suspect identification to locations which more frequently could lead to identification. Thus victims who were acquainted with offenders were most often raped in the home of the offender (35 percent) or the offender's vehicle (17 percent). Victims who were acquaintances of or related to their offenders tended to be raped in their own homes (52 percent) or the home of the offender (28 percent).

Relationship between Victim and Offender

Examination of Seattle Police Department offense reports of both 1973 and 1974 reported rape cases indicates that approximately 60 percent of all rapes were committed by strangers and approximately 25 percent were committed by acquaintances (see Table 3C-10).

The relationship between victim and offender was further explored through examination of investigative follow-up reports of 1974 reported rape cases. This examination indicated data similar to that presented above (strangers, 62.7 percent; acquaintances, 25.7 percent; friends, 7.3 percent; and relatives, 3.0 percent).

Table 3C-10--Degree of Acquaintance between Victim and Suspect, 1973 and 1974

<u>Degree of Acquaintance</u>	<u>1973 Cases</u>	<u>1974 Cases</u>
	<u>(n = 268)</u> Percent	<u>(n = 306)</u> Percent
Strangers	63.4	59.0
Acquaintances	26.9	24.6
Friends*	7.0	10.2
Relatives	2.2	3.3

*Including ex-boyfriends and ex-husbands for 1973 data

An evaluation of the Rape Reduction Project in Seattle covering the period September, 1973, through December, 1975, indicates that only 46.7 percent of the project's clients reported rapes by strangers. However, 32.6 percent of the clients reported rapes by acquaintances. The percentages of clients reporting rapes by friends (8.6 percent) and relatives (4.5 percent) are consistent with the data presented in Table 3C-10.

More than one-half of all reported rapes in 1973 were interracial, i.e., the victim and the offender were of different races. The largest single category of interracial rape consisted of white victim-black offender (Table 3C-11). This racial combination accounted for 47 percent of all forcible rapes. In general, interracial rape also accounted for the majority of offenses perpetrated against American Indian and Asian American victims.

Table 3C-11--Race of Victim by Race of Offender as a Percentage of Total Combination, 1973 Seattle Police Department Rape Cases (n = 330 combination)

<u>Race of Victim</u>	<u>Race of Offender</u>				
	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Asian American</u>	<u>American Indian</u>	<u>Mexican American</u>
White	31.5%	47.3%	1.0%	1.5%	0.3%
Black	0.6%	13.0%	---	---	---
Asian American	---	1.8%	---	---	---
American Indian	1.2%	1.5%	---	0.3%	---
Mexican American	---	---	---	---	---

In general, for 1973 Seattle Police Department rape cases, victims tended to be younger than offenders. Approximately 80 percent of the victims judged the offenders to be more than two years older than themselves (49 percent), or within two years of their own age (30 percent). Only one victim in five indicated that the offender was two or more years younger.

How Event Occurred

Data based upon offense reports were available for 1973 Seattle Police Department rape cases and from the Battelle study of 306 Seattle Police Department rape cases occurring in 1974.

Many misconceptions and misunderstandings which surround rape discussions center upon the behavior of offenders and victims prior to the offense. In an effort to understand those circumstances better, an attempt was made to categorize those behaviors into independent "leading events."

Most offenses were rather easily classified into one of 12 categories of leading events. The information contained in 16 of the 266 reports for 1973 was so limited or the cases so unusual, however, that this information was omitted. The information in Table 3C-12 was based upon the 250 reports for which the method of contact between offender and victim could be established (see Table 3C-12).

Table 3C-12--Leading Events (1973) and Location of First Contact
Prior to Offense (1974)

1973 (n = 250)*		1974 (n = 306)**	
Leading Event	Percent	Location of First Contact Prior to Offense	Percent
Victim's home	37.2	Victim's home	33.1
Forced	(12.8)	Offender's home	3.0
Broke in/entered unlocked	(14.4)	Other home	3.9
Admitted	(10.0)	Victim's auto	2.3
Auto	28.8	Offender's auto	18.0
Forced	(14.0)	Street	21.0
Requested/offered	(6.0)	Park	2.3
Hitchhike	(8.8)	Building/business	4.3
Accosted	17.6	Social gathering	1.6
Street	(15.6)	Tavern/bar	8.2
Building	(2.0)	Common carrier	0.7
Met same day	7.2	Motel/hotel	0.3
Date/party	5.6	Other	1.3
Suspect and victim: Drugs/alcohol	2.0		
Babysitting	1.6		

*Source: LJPO Survey

**Source: Battelle Study

Category 1: The first category refers to forced entry into the victim's home. As used here, "force" meant that the offender(s) gained entry through force or threat against the victim. Such force was used in 13 percent of all cases to make contact with victims.

Category 2: The second category, while not totally unrelated to the first, is differentiated on the basis that access to the victim was made through illegal entry; i.e., the offender broke into the dwelling or entered via unlocked doors or windows. This method accounted for nearly 15 percent of all events leading to forcible rape.

Category 3: The third category refers to a variety of circumstances in which the victim voluntarily allowed access to her home. These circumstances included access to persons already known or acquainted with the victim, but also involved a variety of cases in which the offender was allowed entrance to use a phone, phonebook or seek information from the victim. This method of victim-offender contact accounted for 10 percent of reported offenses.

Category 4: The fourth category, defined as "forced - auto" and involving 14 percent of the offenses, refers to cases in which either the victim was forced into the offender's auto, or the offender forced himself into the victim's auto. Although this category included these two different methods of victim-offender contact, the former was much more frequently the case than the latter.

Category 5: The fifth category refers to those leading events which involved either the offender or the victim offering or requesting a ride. It should be noted that this category was differentiated from hitchhiking if the following were present: (a) victim and offender were known to one another, and (b) neither was soliciting rides from the street. Thus all offenses in this category (6 percent) involved persons known to one another prior to the rape.

Category 6: Approximately 9 percent of all offenses were hitchhike related, i.e., as a result of solicitation of a ride from a stranger. It should be noted that all but one offense involved a hitchhike victim. Only one driver was the victim of hitchhike rape.

Category 7: A substantial number of victims were accosted on the street or in a park. This particular category accounted for more victim-offender contacts (16 percent) than any other single category.

Category 8: Relatively few victims (2 percent) were accosted in buildings. In most instances, the initial contacts were made in public places such as banks, department stores or restrooms.

Category 9: This category refers to a variety of cases in which the victim and offender became acquainted on the day of the offense. These meetings often occurred in the home of mutual friends or in more public places such as taverns. Thus 7 percent of all offenses were preceded by a brief acquaintance.

Category 10: This category also involves persons known to one another prior to the offense. The leading events in these cases included victim-offender dates or party-going (6 percent of the offenses).

Category 11: Approximately 2 percent of all offenses involved victim and offender use of drugs or alcohol. All cases in this category were required to possess the following: (a) victim and offender known to one another for more than one day, and (b) an indication that both persons were involved in drug or alcohol use.

Category 12: The final category refers to those cases or instances in which the victim was raped by her employer or other household member. This category accounted for approximately 2 percent of all leading events.

In summary, it was obvious that the greatest number of rapes involved events centered around access to the victim's home. Nearly 40 percent of all offenses were preceded by various methods of illegal and legal entry. In addition, a substantial number of victims were accosted on streets by offenders on foot, or were accosted and forced into automobiles. Despite popular belief to the contrary, relatively few offenses were hitchhike related.

Seattle Police Department data for 1974 summarized by the Battelle Law and Justice Study Center (Table 3C-12) that analyzed location of first contact prior to the offense tend to be consistent with the 1973 data.

Witness Information

How Many Witnesses to Event: The summary of 1974 cases by Battelle indicates that about three-quarters of rape incidents have no witnesses (Table 3C-13). Eyewitnesses were defined as those persons having seen the rape in progress. Corroborating witnesses were defined as those able to substantiate some portion of the victim's report regarding the suspect. "ID" referred to whether the witness could identify the offender and place the offender on the scene, but not having observed the actual commission of the rape.

Table 3C-13--Number of Witnesses and Type of Witness
for 1974 Seattle Police Department Cases

<u>Number of Witnesses</u>	<u>Percent of Cases with Witnesses</u>	<u>Type of Witness</u>	<u>Percent of Cases</u>
0	74.8	Eyewitness	6.2
1	19.7	Corroborating-ID	16.1
2	3.3		
2+	1.6	Corroborating-No ID	3.6
Unknown	.3	Unknown	2.3

CONTINUED

2 OF 5

Reporting Person's Relationship to Incident

Based upon the Battelle study of 1974 offense reports, the vast majority of rape incidents were reported by victims (91.8 percent), with the next most frequent reporting party being parents or relatives (3.9 percent). Friends reported 1 percent, while witnesses accounted for 0.7 percent and other/unknown persons reported 1.4 percent of the cases. Police reported 1.3 percent of the occurrences.

The time between occurrence and reporting indicates that 86.9 percent were reported within 24 hours of occurrence (Table 3C-14).

Table 3C-14--Time between Offense and Reporting

<u>Time Delay</u>	<u>Percent of Cases</u>
0-6 hours	72.4
6-24 hours	14.5
1-3 days	5.6
4-30 days	3.9
30+ days	3.0
Unknown	0.7

Police Response Time

The time between the initial report of a rape incident and the arrival of the police unit on the scene is not known at this time. Some data are available, however, in regard to the delay between time of report and initiation of follow-up (Table 3C-15).

Table 3C-15--Time between Report and Initiation of Follow-up for 1974 Cases; Source: Battelle

<u>Time Delay</u>	<u>Percent of Cases with Report to Follow-up Time</u>
Within 1 day	26.7
1-2 days	32.0
3-7 days	22.8
7+ days	10.2
Unknown	8.3

Arrested Offender Characteristics: Adult and Juvenile

Age: For suspects actually arrested for rape, age and race information from the 1973, 1974 and 1975 Seattle Police Department Annual Reports was used in the following analysis (see Table 3C-16). In 1973, the median average age of arrestees was 22 years, in 1974, it was 21.5 years and in 1975 it was 23.7 years. However, in 1976, the median age of arrested suspects was older, 27.5 years.

Race: Again using adult primary adult charges and juvenile contact data, race information for 1973 through 1975 was summarized (see Table 3C-17). As in the case of victim data, arrest information presents a relatively stable pattern, with a slight decrease in black involvement from 1973 to 1974, and a decrease in white involvement from 1974 to 1975.

Adult Arrest Profile: For the 91 adults arrested suspicion and/or charged for rape in 1974, Seattle Police Department arrest histories for the period January 1, 1973, to August 31, 1975, were obtained. Suspicion arrests (the offense charge for which the offender was initially arrested) for 1973, 1974 target arrests (those bookings including a rape charge in 1974), 1974 non-target arrests and the first eight months of 1975 were separately recorded (see Table C3-18).

Table 3C-16--Seattle Police Department Adult Primary Charges and Juvenile Contact Arrestees, 1973 to 1976

<u>Age</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
<u>Juvenile</u>				
11-12	1	0	1	0
13-14	3	1	0	2
15	4	3	5	1
16	2	4	3	2
17	4	0	1	3
<u>Adult</u>				
18	1	4	0	2
19	1	4	5	5
20	0	1	3	1
21	0	4	6	1
22	6	1	1	5
23	1	1	3	1
24	0	3	1	3
25-29	11	12*	14	18
30-34	4	2	7	12
35-39	0	2	1	7
40-44	1	0	2	3
45-49	0	0	0	4
50-54	1	0	0	0
55-59	0	0	0	2
60+	0	0	2	1
<u>Total</u>	40	43	55	73

*Plus one female accomplice

Table 3C-17--Number of Offenders, by Race, Arrested in 1973 to 1976

<u>Race</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
Black	25 (62.5%)	25 (58.1%)	32 (58.2%)	36 (49.3%)
White	14 (35.0%)	16 (47.2%)	22 (40.0%)	33 (45.2%)
American Indian	--	1 (2.3%)	--	--
Asian American	--	--	--	--
All other	1 (2.5%)	1 (2.3%)	1 (1.8%)	3 (4.1%)
Total	40	43	55	73

Table 3C-18--Number of Bookings by Year for 91 Individuals Arrested for Rape
by Seattle Police Department during 1974

Offenses Arrested for between Jan. 1, 1973, and Aug. 31, 1975	1974 Arrests		1975 Arrests		Arrests per 100 Offender Years
	1973 Arrests	Target/Non-Target	First Eight Months	Total	
Murder	1	0	0	1	0.41
Rape	7	119	0	135	56.04
Robbery	0	2	0	3	1.24
Aggravated assault	1	3	5	9	3.71
Burglary	2	1	5	11	4.53
Larceny	1	0	4	8	3.30
Auto theft	1	0	2	3	1.24
Non-aggravated assault	4	0	7	12	4.95
Weapons	4	0	3	9	3.71
Drugs	1	0	7	11	4.53
Vandalism	0	0	0	3	1.24
All others*	25	6	14	50	20.60
Total criminal charges	47	131	47	216	105.50
Additional:					
Contempt of court	18	1	14	33	13.60
Failure to appear	0	0	0	9	3.71
Escapee	1	0	0	1	0.41
Grand Total	66	132	61	299	123.21

*Includes Drunkenness charges: 11 for 1973; 8 for 1974

As a group, the 91 individuals had a total of 299 offenses, of which 256 were criminal offense charges (or an average of 3.29 and 2.81 offenses per offender, respectively). For Part I offenses, rape arrestees had 171 separate charges (or 1.88 per offender). Based upon the 32-month period examined, this represents an annual Part I rate of 0.70 offenses per offender. Of the 91 individuals arrested in 1974, six (6.6 percent) had been arrested at least once for rape in both 1973 and 1974; an additional five (5.5 percent) had been arrested both in 1974 and the first eight months of 1975 for rape.

Juvenile Arrest Profile: For the seven juveniles contacted for rape in 1974, Seattle Police Department contact histories were obtained for the period January 1, 1973, through December 31, 1975 (see Table 3C-19). These contact histories were tabulated in the same manner as for adult offenders (1973, target 1974, non-target 1974 and 1975 arrests). As a group, the seven juveniles had a total of 71 contact charges (mean average of 10-14 offenses per offender) and 36 Part I charges (mean of 5.14 per offender). For 1973, the year preceding the 1974 target, for the target offense of rape, the average number of Part I offenses was 1.86; for 1975, the year subsequent to the 1974 target, for the offense of rape, the average number of Part I offenses was 1.14. On an annual rate basis, the seven juveniles had an average of 1.71 Part I offenses per year and 3.38 total Part I and Part II offenses per year.

An examination of the contact histories shows that none of the seven offenders had more than one arrest for rape, although one individual was charged with two counts of rape.

Suspect Identification and Arrest: Adult and Juvenile

Of the 306 forcible rape complaints made to the Seattle Police Department in 1974, patrol officers arrested offenders in 28 cases (9.2 percent), according to the Battelle report. A description of the suspect was available in 89.3 percent of the 28 patrol officer arrest cases. The full name of the suspect and the suspect's residence were each provided in 67.9 percent of the 28 arrest cases. Only 14.3 percent of the arrests occurred on-view.

In connection with 1974 reported rapes, 79 suspects were arrested, or an arrest attempt was made. In 54.4 percent of the cases, the method of arrest was patrol officer acting

Table 3C-19--All Juveniles Contacted for Rape in 1974: Seattle Police Department
Contact History from January 1, 1973, through December 31, 1975;
(n = 7)

Offenses Arrested for between Jan. 1, 1973, and Dec. 1, 1975	1973		1974		1975	Total
	Arrests	Target/Non-Target	Arrests	Target/Non-Target	Arrests	
Murder	--	--	--	--	--	0
Rape	--	8	--	--	--	8
Robbery	--	--	1	--	1	2
All assaults	--	2	--	--	--	2
Burglary	5	--	1	--	2	8
Larceny	4	--	1	--	2	7
Auto theft	4	--	2	--	3	9
Total Part I	13	10	5	--	8	36
Weapons	--	--	3	--	1	4
Drugs	--	--	--	--	--	0
Vandalism	3	--	1	--	--	4
Runaway	3	--	--	--	1	4
Other Status	--	--	--	--	--	0
All other	11	--	5	--	7	23
Total Part I and Part II	30	10	14	--	17	71

on probable cause. The suspect surrendered to a warrant in 8.9 percent of the cases and responded to a summons in 8.9 percent of the cases.

Criminal Justice System Response (Adult)

The ability to follow particular offenders through the criminal justice system is an extremely difficult task. The State of Washington has no central information agency which is capable of monitoring arrests, charges and court dispositions across jurisdictions. As a result, each jurisdiction is responsible for its own record system, and records are seldom accessible or useful to investigators. This makes it difficult to follow a given offense report, in terms of subsequent arrest, investigation, filing of charges, prosecution, court disposition, court sentencing and actual sentence imposed.


Despite these difficulties, data on case flow were obtained from the 1972 Seattle Police Department Annual Report. For 1974 and the first eight months of 1975, rape arrest data and dispositions (to the extent then known to the police department) were obtained from the Seattle Police Department Data Processing Section and manually tabulated to provide information on the criminal justice system.

In 1972, there were 278 reported rapes. The police cleared 136 cases (49 percent) within the year. Offenses were cleared when they were no longer under investigation; i.e., suspects were arrested, the victims or prosecutor refused prosecution, the cases were unfounded, modus operandi tied particular offenses to identified offenders, etc.

In the same period, 78 persons were arrested for suspicion of rape. However, only 30 of these persons were charged with the same offense. The other 48 persons were released (21) or charged with other offenses.

By the end of 1972, dispositions were available for only 18 cases. Of the 18 defendants in those cases, nine were found guilty or dismissed; eight were found guilty and sentenced to jail or the penitentiary; and one was given probation. At the end of 1972, 13 cases were still pending. (See Figure 3C-11).

Figure 3C-11--Flow of Rape Cases through the Criminal Justice System, 1972



For 1974 and 1975, arrest disposition data were current as of August 31, 1975. Because of this, fewer 1974 arrest cases were pending than was true of 1975 (first eight months) arrest cases.

In 1974, there were an estimated 585 forcible rape incidents, of which 316 were reported to the Seattle Police Department. (The number of incidents is based upon a national reporting rate of 54 percent of rape victimizations, as determined by Law Enforcement Assistance Administration victimization surveys.) By the end of 1974, 125 (40 percent) of the reported cases had been cleared by the Seattle Police Department. During 1974, 115 separate counts of suspicion of rape arrests were made. Of these, 47 plus one additional arrest initially suspicion-of-some-other offense were charged by the prosecutor's office as forcible rape, or 41.7 percent of the initial arrests. The 48 charges are equivalent to 15.2 percent of the 316 reports to the Seattle Police Department. Of the 48 charges for forcible rape, 26 had been tried as of August 31, 1975, resulting in 15 (57.7 percent) being found guilty (or 4.7 percent of all cases reported to the Seattle Police Department in 1974). Of those found guilty, six (40 percent) received either jail or penitentiary sentence, while eight (53.3 percent) received suspended, deferred or probation sentences. (See Figure 3C-12.)

In the first eight months of 1975, an estimated 404 rape incidents occurred, of which 218 were reported to the Seattle Police Department. As of August 31, 1975, 87 (40 percent) were cleared by the police department. During the corresponding time, 91 counts






Figure 3C-12--Rape 1974: Data Based upon SPD Data Processing Unit Information and LEAA Victimization Surveys



of suspicion-of-some-other offense charges were filed by the prosecutor's office as forcible rape charges. Of the 39 charges, nine had been tried as of August 31, 1975, with five being found guilty (55.6 percent). Of those found guilty, four received jail or penitentiary sentences. (See Figure 3C-13).

Figure 3C-13--Rape, January 1, 1975, through August 31, 1975: Data Based upon SPD Data Processing Unit Information and LEAA Victimization Surveys



SECTION III-D: AGGRAVATED ASSAULTIntroduction

The problem statements developed for the crime of aggravated assault are broader in scope than those for burglary, robbery and rape. The principal reason for this difference is that 1978 represents the second planning cycle in which extensive planning analysis has occurred for this crime. In past years, other priority crimes have received more attention.

Aggravated assault assumes a higher priority status in the development of the 1978 Plan because estimates of the relative public safety risk which can be attributed to aggravated assault offenders are relatively high compared with other offender groups. This higher risk was especially true of the juveniles contacted for aggravated assault. Further, aggravated assault was deemed a good choice for further inquiry because reported incidents of aggravated assault are increasing, especially those involving juvenile perpetrators.

Although the information presented in the Survey of Aggravated Assault is a good starting point for analyzing the crime, the information is limited compared with information available for burglary, robbery and rape. For the crimes of burglary, robbery and rape, which have been target crimes for the last four years, substantial information has been accumulated as a result of demonstration programs, and evaluation findings from these programs have served as a springboard for additional inquiry. It is hoped that demonstration programs and research inquiries dealing with the crime of aggravated assault will lead to development of additional information useful in improving the City's response to this crime.

The problem statements for aggravated assault are divided into four areas: (a) deterrence, (b) prevention, (c) apprehension, and (d) suspect/offender processing. These choices for problem statement areas reflect the extent of our knowledge for the crime of aggravated assault. Some evidence indicates the criminal justice system does not work in a manner which discourages the potential offender from committing an aggravated assault through imposition of sanctions. The system does not appear to deter the potential offender. It is also evident that insufficient means exist to prevent the crime of aggravated assault. Third, it appears reasonable to inquire as to why, if 18 percent of aggravated assault activities are stopped through police intervention, only 9.5 percent of the 1,165 reported incidents result in an arrest for which a charge of aggravated assault is filed. We may need to inquire as to what the dynamics of aggravated assault apprehension strategies are.

The fourth area of problem statements addresses the way the criminal justice system processes aggravated assault suspects. Case tracking information indicates that the system may fail to recognize the serious risk for potential additional criminal involvement of the aggravated assault offender group.

Due to a lack of information about this crime, certain categories of problem statements have been omitted; these categories are detection and corrections. Detection is omitted because we believe, where at least one witness (the victim) is present and in a number of cases other witnesses are also available, detection of the crime does not appear to present a problem. Corrections is omitted due to a present lack of information on how aggravated assault offenders are handled in the correctional process.

Data Sources: Information regarding aggravated assault used in this section was obtained from the following sources which are identified by the short title listed in parentheses within the text:

1. FBI's Uniform Crime Report, 1975 (UCR 1975).
2. Seattle Police Department's annual statistical reports from 1964 through 1975 (SPD Statistical Report).

3. Seattle Police Department's report entitled "Monthly Crime Capsule" (SPD MCC).
4. Seattle 1975 Victimization Survey (Seattle Victimization Survey 1975).
5. Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office's random sample of 66 cases (6 percent sample) reported to the police in 1974 (Seattle LJPO Sample Cases 1974).
6. Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office's random sample of 102 cases (6 percent sample) reported to the Seattle Police Department in 1975 (Seattle LJPO Sample Cases 1975).
7. Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office's random sample of 50 cases (18 percent sample) cleared by the arrest of an adult offender in 1975 (Seattle LJPO Sample and Clearance 1975).
8. Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office's random sample of 40 cases (57 percent sample) cleared by the arrest of a juvenile offender in 1975 (Seattle LJPO Sample and Juvenile Clearance 1975).
9. Criminal Victimization in the United States: A Comparison of 1973 and 1974 Findings, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1976 (LEAA Victimization 1973-1974).
10. Herbert A. Block and Gilbert Geis, Man, Crime and Society, New York: Random House, 1962, p. 167 (Block and Geis, 1962).

SECTION III-D: AGGRAVATED ASSAULTA Survey of Aggravated Assault

Definition: Aggravated assault is defined for purposes of the FBI Uniform Crime Reports as an "...unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe bodily injury usually accompanied by the use of a weapon or other means likely to produce death or severe bodily harm. Attempts are included since it is not necessary that an injury result when a gun, knife or other weapon is used which could and probably would result in serious personal injury if the crime were successfully completed."

For report purposes, the Seattle Police Department has traditionally counted charges of first and second degree assault as aggravated assault and all other assault charges as non-aggravated assault. In 1974, the FBI UCR system changed the manner in which aggravated assault was defined. Locally, this change caused non-aggravated assault cases involving firearms, with either the showing or threatening of their use to be counted as an aggravated assault. If the offender only claimed to have a firearm, but did not show or threaten to use it, the extent of injury determines the case classification. When other weapons (e.g., knife) are shown or threatened to be used, actual use or attempted use must occur before the case would be classified as an aggravated assault.

Trends

National 5-Year Trend (1970-1975): In 1975, there were an estimated 484,710 aggravated assault cases reported, or 2.27 victims for each 1,000 persons in the United States. Between 1970 and 1975, this reflects an increase of 45 percent in reported cases and an increase of 38 percent in per capita occurrence.

Seattle 13-Year Trend (1964-1976): On an annual basis, aggravated assault increased 7.2 percent from 1975 (1,493 reported cases) to 1976 (1,601 reported cases). This increase is the largest percent increase for any of the Part I index crimes in Seattle for 1976. On the basis of a 13-year trend (Figure 3D-1), aggravated assault has increased 388.1 percent, again the largest percent increase of any index crime.

For the population at risk (total Seattle population), the 1,493 reported cases in 1975 represented 2.97 reported aggravated assaults per 1,000 population. In 1976, the 3.18 per 1,000 population represented a 7.2 percent increase when adjusted for estimated population change during the corresponding years. On a national basis for cities between 500,000 and 1,000,000 population, the 1975 rate was 3.31/1,000 (UCR 1975, Table 10); 1976 data are not currently available. The local 1976 rate was 3.9 percent below the national 1975 rate for cities of comparable size.


Victimization Survey Data (Reporting Rates): Victimization surveys conducted for the years 1973 and 1974 by the Bureau of Census for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration interviewed a representative national sample of up to 65,000 households and 15,000 commercial firms. Based upon these surveys, it is estimated that during 1973, 10.0 persons per 1,000 population age 12 or older were victims of aggravated assault. In 1974, this increased to 10.3 per 1,000 population age 12 or older. Of those victimized, 51.0 percent reported such occurrences in 1973. Reporting rates increased to 52.9 percent for victims of this crime in 1974 (LEAA Victimization 1973-1974).

Similar victimization surveys conducted in Seattle for victims of crime in 1975, in five of the 121 census tracts comprising Seattle, found 19 assault victimizations (both aggravated and non-aggravated) within 1,263 residences interviewed, or a rate of 15.04 per 1,000 residences. Of the 19 incidents, 11 (57.9 percent) were reported to the police, while eight (42.1 percent) did not report (Seattle Victimization Survey 1975).

Short Term Trend of Occurrence

Time of Occurrence (Month): On a monthly basis in 1975 and 1976, aggravated assaults occurred primarily during the summer months, which is consistent with criminologists Ferri and Lacassagne's observations that warmer months are associated with higher rates

Figure 3D-1--Reported Cases of Aggravated Assault to Seattle Police Department, 1964-1976 (Source: Seattle Police Department Annual Report)




*The definition of aggravated assault was changed in 1974, thus changing the manner in which the number of aggravated assaults is calculated.

of crime against the person (Block and Geis, 1962). (See Figure 3D-2.) However, prior years (1973-1974) data which show a peak during the early winter months (1974) and relatively uniform occurrences throughout the year with a large drop in the early winter months (1973) raise some questions regarding the consistency of this generalization.

Data based upon national reporting (Figure 3D-3) are more consistent with Ferri and Lacassagne's findings. However, local data do not appear to present a consistent pattern of monthly occurrence over the four years examined.

Time of Occurrence (Day of Week): Based upon a random sample of 66 aggravated assault cases reported to the Seattle Police Department in 1974, the following pattern of occurrences was found (Table 3D-1). Saturday was the most likely day for the occurrence of aggravated assault (23.9 percent). In general, incidents occurred Thursday through Monday with relatively few happening on Tuesday and Wednesday.

Figure 3D-2--Reported Aggravated Assault Cases by Month, 1973-1976
(Source: Seattle Police Department Data Processing Unit)



*Figures based upon old UCR definition of aggravated assault

Figure 3D-3--National Reporting of Aggravated Assault by Month
(Source: 1975 UCR, p. 38)




Table 3D-1--Day of Occurrence for 1974 Sample of Aggravated Assault Cases (66 Cases*)

	Day of Week						
	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
Number	12	9	5	2	14	12	17
Percent	16.9	12.7	7.0	2.8	19.7	16.9	23.9

*n = 71 because data for each victim were recorded as if for individual cases

Time of Occurrence (Time of Day): The most frequent time of occurrence for the 1974 sample of cases was between midnight and 3:00 a.m. (27.3 percent). The six-hour time period of 9:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. accounted for almost half (48.5 percent) of all the incidents reported in the sample.

Table 3D-2--Time of Occurrence for Sample Aggravated Assault Cases (1974 = 66 cases, 1975 = 102 cases)

	Number		Percent			Number		Percent	
	1974	1975	1974	1975		1974	1975	1974	1975
Midnight-3 a.m.	18	17	27.3	16.7	Noon - 3 p.m.	6	8	9.1	7.8
3 a.m. - 6 a.m.	6	7	9.1	6.9	3 p.m. - 6 p.m.	6	9	9.1	8.8
6 a.m. - 9 a.m.	0	1	0.0	1.0	6 p.m. - 9 p.m.	11	22	16.7	21.6
9 a.m. - Noon	5	6	7.6	5.9	7 p.m.-Midnight	14	26	21.2	25.5
					Unknown		6		5.9

Data from the 1975 sample of cases (n = 102) show a pattern consistent with 1974 time of occurrence, as shown above, with about two-thirds (63.7 percent) of offenses occurring between 6 p.m. and 3 a.m.

Geographical Area of Occurrence: In 1975, the ten census tracts with the highest number of reported aggravated assault cases were concentrated within three areas (see Map 3D-1). These were the downtown area (tracts 81, 82 and 92), Capitol Hill-Central Area (tracts 74, 77, 87 and 88), and Southeast Seattle (tracts 110, 111 and 118). There were five tracts in which no cases were reported (19, 20, 39, 40 and 55).

Clearance/Arrest Rate

National: In 1975, 63.5 percent of 340,213 cases reported nationally from jurisdictions representing a total population of 127,068,000 persons (1975 FBI UCR, Table 18) were cleared by arrest. This represents a clearance rate of 1.70 per 1,000 population out of an occurrence rate of 2.68 per 1,000.

For cities between 500,000 and 1,000,000 population (those jurisdictions more directly comparable with Seattle) representing a total population of 12,297,000, there were 42,570 reported cases of which 60.1 percent were cleared. This represents a clearance rate of 2.08 per 1,000 with an occurrence rate of 3.46 per 1,000 population (1975 FBI UCR, Table 18).


Seattle (1964-1976): In 1975, 745 (49.9 percent) of the reported 1,493 cases in Seattle were cleared. This represents a clearance rate of 1.48 per 1,000 with an occurrence rate of 2.97 per 1,000. As can be seen in Table 3D-3 (see Table 3D-3), clearance rates in Seattle reached a peak in 1971 and then declined to 1974. In the past two years, this rate has improved but remains behind both the overall national rate and the rate for comparable cities.

Victim Characteristics

Age: The majority of victims (42, or 61.1 percent) of aggravated assault in the 1974 sample were between the ages of 15 and 29. There were no victims under age 15 in the sample offense reports. In the 1975 sample, the majority of victims were again in the 15 to 29 year-old age groups (54, or 52.9 percent). Unlike the preceding sample, there were six victims under the age of 15. Two were age 14, three were age 13 and one victim was 9 years old (see Table 3D-4).

Race: The majority of 1974 sample case victims were white (51.49 percent); 37.5 percent were black (see Table 3D-5). The 1975 sample shows a virtually identical distribution of victim race characteristics.

Map 3D-1--Ten Census Tracts with the Highest Number of Reported Aggravated Assault Cases in 1975



CITY OF SEATTLE
1970 CENSUS TRACTS




Table 3D-3--Clearance Rate between 1964 and 1975 for Aggravated Assault

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>	<u>Percent Cleared</u>
1964	328	68%
1965	394	66%
1966	450	52%
1967	714	55%
1968	788	62%
1969	1,096	64%
1970	954	64%
1971	1,093	74%
1972	949	69%
1973	880	61%
1974	1,165	47%
1975	1,493	50%
1976	1,601	56%

Table 3D-4--Victim Age as Determined from 1974 and 1975 Sample Cases; Age for All Victims in 66 Cases in 1974 and Age for First Victim in 102 Cases in 1975

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>		<u>Percent</u>		<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	
0-14	0	6	0.0	5.9	17.7
15-19	12	12	16.7	11.8	7.8
20-24	16	20	22.2	19.6	10.0
25-29	16	22	22.2	21.6	11.8
30-34	4	10	5.5	9.8	7.3
35-39	5	6	6.9	5.9	4.6
40-44	2	5	2.8	4.9	4.2
45-49	2	8	2.8	7.9	5.1
50-54	3	5	4.1	4.9	6.3
55-59	4	3	5.5	2.9	6.2
60-64	2	0	2.8	0.0	5.8
65+	1	1	1.4	1.0	13.5
Unknown	5	4	6.9	3.9	0.0

Table 3D-5--Race of Victim, 1974 and 1975 Sample Cases; Race Determined for All of 66 Cases in 1974 and Race Determined for First Victim of 102 Cases in 1975

	<u>Number</u>		<u>Percent</u>		<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	
White	37	55	51.4	53.9	84.8
Black	27	36	37.5	35.3	8.6
Native American	4	7	5.5	6.9	0.9
Asian	1	1	1.4	1.0	3.9
All Other	0	0	0.0	0.0	1.8
Unknown	3	3	4.1	2.9	0.0

Sex: Of the 72 victims within the 1974 sample, 45 (62.5 percent) were male, 24 (33.3 percent) were female, and for three victims it was not possible to determine sex from the sample offense reports. For the 1975 sample, 68 victims were male (66.7 percent), 33 were female (32.4 percent), and for one victim (1.0 percent) it was not possible to determine the individual's sex from the offense report.

Occupation: Employment status was either not recorded or was recorded as unemployed for almost half of the 1974 sample cases (47.2 percent). Of the occupations listed, there were no groupings making up more than 20 percent of the sample (Table 3D-6).

Table 3D-6--Occupation, Employment Status of Victim

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Number</u>		<u>Percent</u>		<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	
Unemployed	11	8	15.3	7.8	4.8
Student	4	13	5.5	12.7	9.2
Housewife	3	4	4.1	3.9	15.0
Blue collar/waitress/ laborer*	7	22*	9.7	21.6*	9.8
Clerical/secretarial**/ sales/service/white collar	12	9	16.6	17.6	16.5
Skilled/technical/ managerial/professional self-employed	9	8	12.4	7.9	26.5
Retired	2	3	2.8	2.9	16.0
Unknown	23	24	31.9	23.5	0.0
Welfare		3		2.9	1.8
Other		8		7.8	0.4

*Includes "service" category for 1975 sample.

**1975 data included in "sales/service/white collar" category.

The 1975 sample again found that unknown and unemployed employment status accounted for most of the cases (32, or 31.4 percent). Within the known occupations, the category "Blue collar/waitress/laborer/service" accounted for about one-fifth of victims (21.6 percent) with "Student" (12.7 percent) being the next most frequent.

Number of Victims: For the 66 sample cases in 1974, 61 (92.4 percent) had a single victim; in four cases, there were two victims (6.1 percent); and in one case, there were three victims (1.5 percent); for a total of 72 victims.

In the 1975 sample of 102 cases, 84 (82.4 percent) had a single victim; 16 (15.7 percent) had two victims; one (1.0 percent) had three victims; and one (1.0 percent) had five victims; for a total of 124 victims.

Offender Characteristics

Based upon the 1975 sample of 102 cases randomly selected from all reported cases, the following information regarding offenders was available from offense reports. To the extent that these data differ from suspect arrest data, it may indicate difficulties in victim observation and reporting, and differences between who commits aggravated assault and who is arrested.

Age: Based on sample offense reports, ages of the first identified offenders are presented in Table 3D-7. The mean average age was 29.5 years, with a median average age

Table 3D-7--Suspect Age from Sample 1975 Offense Reports

<u>Age of First Offender</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
10-14	4	3.9	6.4
15-19	16	15.7	7.8
(15-17)	(6)	(5.9)	(4.6)
(18-19)	(10)	(9.8)	(3.2)
20-24	16	15.7	10.0
25-29	15	14.7	11.8
30-34	11	10.8	7.3
35-39	6	5.9	4.6
40-44	9	8.8	4.2
45-49	6	5.9	5.1
50-54	4	3.9	6.3
55-59	1	1.0	6.2
60+	2	2.0	19.3
Unknown	12	11.8	0.0

of 26.5 years. Of those suspects with an estimated age (n = 90), 26 (28.9 percent) were juveniles (age 17 and under).

Race: Of the 102 first identified suspects in the 1975 sample of total offense reports, 39 (38.2 percent) were white, 45 (44.1 percent) were black, nine (8.8 percent) were Native American, one (1.0 percent) was Chicano, one (1.0 percent) was Asian and seven (6.9 percent) were of unknown race.

Sex: Males comprised 84.3 percent (86) of the suspects identified within the offense reports, while 10.8 percent (11) were females. The remaining five cases (4.9 percent) did not identify the sex of the suspect.

Height and Weight: Height estimates were available from all but 24 (23.5 percent) of the 102 sample offense reports. Height of the first identified suspect ranged from 4'1" to 6'5", with a median average of 5'8½".

Weight was not available in a third of the cases (n = 33, 32.4 percent). Of those available, the range was from 100 to 250 pounds, with the median weight being approximately 150 pounds.

Occupation: Suspect occupation data were available on 34 (33.3 percent) of the offense reports. Since 22 (21.6 percent) of the offense reports were taken at the same time an arrest was made, this relatively high degree of knowledge concerning suspects is not surprising. Of the suspects with known occupations (see Table 3D-8), the "Student" and "Blue collar/laborer/waitress/service" categories made up 47.1 percent of the sample (16 of 34 known occupations), with "Unemployed" and "Skilled/technical" comprising 35.3 percent (12 of 34) of the remaining known occupations.

Number of Offenders: The number of offenders identified in the 1975 random sample of 102 offense reports found that 76 (74.5 percent) involved a single offender. In 15 cases (14.7 percent), there were two offenders, while in four cases (3.9 percent) each, there were three and four offenders. In three cases, the number of offenders was unknown.

Degree of Violence

Weapon Used: An analysis of the 1974 sample cases on the basis of most deadly weapon involved in the offense (not necessarily used) indicates that firearms were involved in 24 (36.4 percent) of the cases (see Table 3D-9). The next most frequent type of weapon used was bodily force (30.3 percent). Of the 24 cases involving firearms, 18 (75 percent) were identified as handguns, two (8.3 percent) were shotguns and the remaining four (16.7 percent) were identified as "guns."

Table 3D-8--Occupation of Aggravated Assault Offenders
(Source: 102 randomly selected offense reports, 1975)

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Number of Suspects</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
Student	8	7.8	9.2
Unemployed	6	5.8	4.8
Welfare	2	2.0	1.8
Blue collar/laborer/waitress/service	8	7.8	9.8
White collar/sales/clerical	1	1.0	16.5
Skilled/technical	6	5.9	26.5*
Disabled	2	2.0	Unknown
Military service	1	1.0	0.2
Unknown	68	66.7	0.0

*Includes managerial/professional

Table 3D-9--Type of Weapon Involved in Assault Cases,
1974 and 1975 Samples

<u>Type of Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>		<u>Percent</u>		<u>UCR, 1975%</u>
	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	
Unknown	6	5	9.1	4.9	--
Threat	2	0	3.0	0.0	--
Body (hands, fists, feet, etc.)	20	19	30.3	18.6	26
Club, blunt object	5	13	7.6	12.7	25
Knife, cutting instrument	9	25	13.6	24.5	24
Firearm	24	35	36.4	34.3	25
Other	--	5	----	4.9	--

In the 1975 sample, guns were again the most frequent weapon in 35 (34.3 percent) of the cases. The next most frequent weapon was knives or other cutting instruments, 25 cases (24.5 percent of the total). Of the 35 cases involving firearms in 1975, 20 (57.1 percent) were handguns.

Compared to the national data (UCR 1975, p. 20), aggravated assault cases in Seattle are consistently more likely to involve firearms and less likely to involve clubs or other blunt objects.

In terms of actual injury to victims, the most frequently used weapon to inflict harm was bodily force (27, or 38.0 percent) followed by knives or other cutting instruments (22, or 31.0 percent) and clubs or other blunt objects (12, or 16.9 percent). See Table 3D-10.

Table 3D-10--Weapon Actually Used to Inflict Harm
in Assault Cases, 1975

<u>Type of Weapon</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Total Cases</u>	<u>Percent of Cases with Injury</u>
Bodily force	27	26.5	38.0
Knife, cutting instrument	22	21.6	31.0
Club	12	11.8	16.9
Gun	6	5.9	8.5
Other, unknown	4	3.9	5.6
No injury	31	30.4	----

Victim Injury: The extent of injury to victims as determined by the sample 1974 offense reports indicates that 31 (43.1 percent) required hospitalization, two (2.8 percent) required professional medical attention, five (6.9 percent) received first aid on the scene which was judged sufficient, and 31 (43.1 percent) either had no injuries or had injuries not requiring medical or first aid treatment. In three cases (4.2 percent), it was not possible to determine victim injury.

Within the 1975 sample, 54 cases (52.9 percent) were serious enough to require some sort of medical treatment for victims, seven (6.9 percent) involved injury of unknown seriousness, 10 (9.8 percent) were minor injuries not requiring medical attention and 31 (30.4 percent) involved no physical injury to victims. Of those requiring medical attention, 45 (44.1 percent) involved hospitalization for at least medical examination.

Extent of Loss

By definition, aggravated assault does not include the loss of property. If a particular case involved both injury to the victim and theft of property, it would be classified as a robbery under the uniform crime reporting standards. However, property damage may occur during the course of the crime. In the 102 sample cases from 1975 reported aggravated assault cases, 92 (90.2 percent) gave no indication of property damage. The 10 cases with property damage included five instances of broken windows; two instances of damage to the exterior of the residence; two instances of damage to telephones, making them inoperable (pulling them from the wall); one instance of damage to vehicles; two instances of damage to contents of a house and furniture; and one instance of damage to luggage.

The cost of damage done ranged from a low of \$5 to a high of \$5,000, with a median average loss of \$35-40.

Location of Incident

The most frequent location for the sample assault cases in 1974 was within private residences or their immediate surroundings (Table 3D-11). Of the 66 cases, 25 (37.9 percent) were within the victim's and/or suspect's residences. The next most frequent locations--street/sidewalk/parking lot--account for 21 (31.8 percent) of the cases. The third most frequent location was restaurants/bars/taverns (16.2 percent).

Table 3D-11--Location of Assault Cases, 1974 and 1975 Samples

<u>Location</u>	<u>Number</u>		<u>Percent</u>	
	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Street/sidewalk/parking lot	21	38	31.8	37.3
Restaurant/bar/tavern	11	11	16.7	10.8
Residence and/or surroundings--unspecified whose	9	44	13.6	43.1
Residence and/or surroundings--suspect's	3	--	4.5	----
Residence and/or surroundings--victim's	11	--	16.7	----
Residence and/or surroundings--victim's/suspect's	2	--	3.0	----
Public building/school/hotel	--	6	----	5.9
Suspect's car	--	2	----	2.0
Miscellaneous/other/unknown	9	1	13.6	1.0

In the 1975 sample, 44 (43.1 percent) cases occurred within either the victim's or the offender's residence or immediate surroundings. The second most frequent location was street/sidewalk/parking lots (38, or 37.3 percent) of the cases). Restaurants/bars/taverns accounted for 11 (10.8 percent) of the assault locations.

Pre-Assault Activity: Based on 1974 sample offense reports, the majority of the cases (34, or 51.5 percent) involved some type of victim/offender interaction prior to initiation of the assault. Of these 34, half (17) involved arguments (see Table 3D-12). A subjective recording of offense narrative as recorded by responding officers determined that 50 (75.8 percent) were entirely offender initiated, 11 (16.7 percent) were at least partially victim initiated, and five cases (7.5 percent) were not determinable.

Table 3D-12--Victim/Offender Interaction Prior to Assault

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Unknown	4	6.1
No interaction	28	42.4
Interaction	34	51.5

Relation Between Victim and Offender

In 47 (65.3 percent) of the 1974 sample cases, the offender was either related to or known by the victim prior to the assault. Only 22 (30.6 percent) of offenders were not known to the victim (Table 3D-13).

Table 3D-13--Victim Relationship with Offender, 1974 and 1975 Samples

<u>Relationship</u>	<u>Number</u>		<u>Percent</u>	
	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Stranger	22	26*	30.6	25.5
Acquainted/neighbor/friend	29	44	40.3	43.1
Girl-boy friend/related/"ex-"	18	17	25.0	16.7
Unknown	3	15	4.1	14.7

*Includes three Seattle Police Department officers as victims of assault

For the 1975 sample, a highly similar result was found. The offender was either known by or related to the victim in 51 (59.8 percent) of the cases, with only 26 (25.5 percent) involving strangers.

Assault Cessation: Of some interest in examining the occurrence of aggravated assault cases is how the assault was stopped (Table 3D-14). The most frequent reason in the 1974 sample was offender fleeing from the scene prior to police arrival (43.9 percent). The next most frequent reason was police intervention in the assault (18.2 percent).

Table 3D-14--Reason for Cessation of Assault

<u>Reason</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Unknown	8	12.1
Offender stopped	2	3.0
Offender fled	29	43.9
Victim resistance	3	4.5
Witness intervened	5	7.6
Police arrived	12	18.2
Victim fled	6	9.1
Other	1	1.5

Police Injury: Associated with police intervention (18.2 percent of the 1974 cases) is the potential risk to the officer. In the 66 cases studied for 1974, two (3.0 percent) involved an attempted or actual assault against the responding officers as indicated by the officers' completion of hazard reports. However, neither of these two incidents resulted in injury to a police officer.

For the 1975 sample, three cases (2.9 percent) involved assaults against police officers. While one case did not involve any injury, the remaining two cases required hospital attention resulting from injuries from a firearm and a knife or cutting instrument.

Witness Information

Number of Witnesses: In almost half of the 1974 sample cases (45.5 percent), there were no witnesses other than the victim. In 16 cases (24.2 percent), there were at least two

witnesses listed on offense reports (Table 3D-15). The 1975 sample cases show much the same pattern. Slightly less than half (44.1 percent) had no witnesses other than the victim, while 55.9 percent had at least one witness who could provide information regarding the offense.

Table 3D-15--Number of Cases with Witnesses, 1974 and 1975 Samples

Number of Witnesses	Number		Percent	
	1974	1975	1974	1975
None	30	45	45.5	44.1
1	20	33	30.3	32.4
2	14	10	21.2	9.8
3	2	4	3.0	3.9
4+	0	10	0.0	0.0

Quality of Witness Information: Within the 1975 sample, witness status was broken down into eyewitness (actually viewing the incident) as opposed to corroborating witness (being capable of verifying portions of victim statements but not having viewed the actual incident).

In 37 of the cases (36.3 percent), at least one person could provide an eyewitness account, while in 20 (19.6 percent) of the cases, witnesses could only corroborate victims' statements.

Relation of Witness to Victim: Of the 127 total witnesses in the 57 witnessed cases for the 1975 sample, the most frequent type of relationship between the victim and witness was "Friend," followed by "Relative" and "Business associate/customer" (Table 3D-16).

Table 3D-16--Relationship between Victim and Witness, 1975 Sample

Relationship	Number of Cases
Friend	20
Relative	16
Business associate/customer	9
Acquaintance	8
Stranger/passersby	5
Police officer	3
Neighbor	2

Reporting

Relation of Reporting Person to Victim: In the majority of the 1975 sample cases (74, or 72.5 percent), the reporting person was the victim (Table 3D-17). The next most frequent categories were witness (six, or 5.9 percent) and relative (four, or 3.9 percent).

Table 3D-17--Relation between Reporting Person and Victim

Person Reporting	Number of Cases	Percent
Victim	74	72.5
Relative	4	3.9
Witness	6	5.9
Victim and offender	2	2.0
Friend	1	1.0
Police	2	2.0
Passerby	1	1.0
Suspect	1	1.0
Unknown	11	10.8

Police Response Time: Data on overall response time for all aggravated assault cases are not available at this time. However, Clawson and Chang's (1975) study of Seattle Police Department dispatch data indicates that for assault-in-progress calls, the median average time between initial receipt of a call by police 911 operators and the arrival of the first police unit is 6.3 minutes (Table 3D-18).

Table 3D-18--Police Response Time

<u>Response Time in Minutes</u>	<u>Number of Calls</u>	<u>Number of Arrests</u>	<u>Percent Arrests</u>	<u>Accumulated Percent Arrests</u>
0-2	41	23	45.1	45.1
3-5	140	50	35.7	38.2
6-8	106	28	26.4	34.0
9-11	67	20	29.8	33.2
12-14	35	9	25.7	32.6
15+	77	15	19.5	30.5
Total	476	145	30.5	30.5

When SEA-KING victimization data are examined for the 11 assault cases reported to the police during 1975, respondents gave the following answers to the question, "About how long did it take for the police to arrive after they were notified?": few minutes - three victims; within 15 minutes - two victims; one hour or more - one victim; didn't come at all - three victims; unknown - two victims.

Suspect-Victim Mental Impairment: Where information on possible factors that could impair mental capabilities was reported by investigatory officers within the 102 sample cases, data were recorded for analysis. It should be noted that neither the accuracy of these observations is verifiable, nor are the four factors (mental retardation, mental illness, alcohol or drug consumption) equally easy to detect, especially given the circumstances under which the observations were initially made.

Analysis of these data indicates that in 10 (9.8 percent) of the cases, offenders had been drinking, while in nine (8.8 percent) of the cases, the victim had also been drinking (Table 3D-19).

Table 3D-19--Assault Suspect-Victim Mental Impairment

	<u>Mental Retardation</u>	<u>Mental Illness</u>	<u>Alcohol</u>	<u>Drug</u>
Victim	0	1	9	0
Offender	0	2	10	1

Identified Adult Arrestees

Age: In 1973, of those persons arrested for a primary charge of aggravated assault, the median average age was 27.8 years, with 61 percent of the offenders under age 30. For 1974, the median age was 31.2 years, with only 46 percent of the offenders under age 30 (see Table 3D-20). In 1975, the median age for offenders was 30.5 years, with 48.7 percent under the age of 30.

Race: In 1973, the race of arrested persons whose primary charge was aggravated assault was most likely to be white (47 percent), followed by black (46 percent). American Indian and the category of All Other made up the remaining 7 percent of arrested suspects. In 1974, this pattern changed slightly with blacks making up 53 percent of the arrested persons and whites 41 percent. In 1975, white offenders made up 51 percent of adult arrestees, while blacks made up 43 percent of the total arrestees (see Table 3D-21).

Sex: For 1973 to 1975, Seattle Police Department arrest information shows that males have consistently accounted for over 90 percent of the primary charges for aggravated assault (see Table 3D-22). This overwhelming preponderance of males is consistent with

Table 3D-20--Age of Adult Offenders Charged with Aggravated Assault, 1973-1975 (Source: Seattle Police Department Annual Report)

Age	1973 (n = 101)	1974 (n = 106)	1975 (n = 117)	Percent of Seattle Adult Population
18	2	6	3	2.0
19	3	3	6	2.0
20	6	4	2	2.0
21	5	3	5	2.0
22	6	2	5	2.1
23	8	6	5	2.4
24	5	3	6	2.7
25-29	27	22	25	14.9
30-34	10	17	20	9.2
35-39	7	8	15	5.7
40-44	5	8	6	6.4
45-49	8	6	6	6.4
50+	8	18	13	40.1
Median	27.8	31.2	30.5	

Table 3D-21--Race of Suspects Arrested for Aggravated Assault, 1973-1975 (Source: Seattle Police Department Annual Report)

Race	1973	1974	1975	Percent of Seattle Population
White	47 (47%)	43 (41%)	60 (51%)	84.8
Black	46 (46%)	56 (53%)	50 (43%)	8.6
American Indian	5	3	5	0.9
Chinese/Japanese	0	0	0	3.9
All Other	3	4	2	1.8

Table 3D-22--Sex of Adult Aggravated Assault Arrestees (Source: Seattle Police Department Annual Report; Primary Charges)

	1973	1974	1975	Percent of Seattle Adults
Male	91 (91.1%)	101 (95.3%)	107 (91.5%)	47.6
Female	9	5	10	52.4

national data. In 1975, approximately 86 percent of all persons arrested for aggravated assault were male (UCR 1975).

Arrest Profile (Adult): To determine the nature and extent of involvement in other criminal activities, arrest histories for all adults either arrested on suspicion and/or charged with aggravated assault by the Seattle Police Department in 1974 were obtained from the Seattle Police Department data processing unit. The arrest histories covered the period January 1, 1973, through August 31, 1975. All suspicion arrests were separately recorded for 1973, target 1974 bookings (all those 1974 arrests which included an aggravated assault charge), non-target 1974 bookings and arrests in the first eight months of 1975 (see Table 3D-23).

As a group, the 273 adults had a total of 1,069 charges, of which 554 were Part I charges. This is an average of 3.92 total charges per person and 2.029 Part I charges.

Table 3D-23--Number of Bookings by Year for 273 Individuals Arrested for Aggravated Assault in 1974 by the Seattle Police Department

Offenses Arrested for between Jan. 1, 1973, and Aug. 31, 1975	1973 Arrests	1974 Arrests		1975 Arrests		Arrests per 100 Offender Years
		Target*	Non-Target**	First Eight Months	Total	
Murder	1	---	5	1	7	0.96
Rape	8	3	16	1	25	3.43
Robbery	2	3	58	6	69	9.48
Aggravated assault	4	291	---	3	298	40.93
Burglary	8	1	19	9	37	5.08
Larceny	7	---	25	12	44	6.04
Auto theft	4	---	8	0	12	1.65
Non-aggravated assault	19	3	26	14	62	8.52
Weapons	11	1	11	6	29	3.98
Drugs	13	---	15	3	31	4.26
Vandalism	3	1	5	3	12	1.65
All others***	123	3	142	33	300	41.21
Total criminal charges	203	306	330	91	930	127.74
Additional:						
Contempt of court	47	---	54	0	101	13.87
Failure to appear	0	---	0	0	37	5.08
Escape	0	---	1	0	1	0.14
Grand Total	250	306	385	128	1,069	146.84

*Arrests for aggravated assault plus other crimes arrested for at the same time.

**1974 arrests not involving aggravated assault.

***Includes 90, 92 and six charges for drunkenness in 1973, 1974 and 1975 respectively.

On an annual rate basis for the 32 months examined, this represents 1.47 total charges per person/year and 0.76 Part I charges per person/year.

Offender Relationship to Victim: Based upon an 18 percent random sample (n = 50) of all 1975 aggravated assault cases cleared by arrest of an adult, the most frequent relationship between the victim and adult arrestee was that of acquaintance/neighbor (22 percent) followed by stranger (20 percent) and police officer (18 percent); see Table 3D-24.

Table 3D-24--Relationship between Adult Offender and Victim

Relationship	Number of Cases	Percent
Relative	8	16.0
Acquaintance/neighbor	11	22.0
Friend	3	4.0
Business acquaintance/customer	3	6.0
Stranger	10	20.0
Police-officer victim	9	18.0
Unknown	6	12.0

Degree of Violence: Threatened or actual weapons used in the cases involving adult arrests were as follows: guns (13 cases, 26 percent); knives (13 cases, 26 percent); clubs (10 cases, 20 percent); bodily force (nine cases, 18 percent); motor vehicles (two cases, 4 percent); thrown objects (two cases, 4 percent); and one instance of unknown weapon.

In those 34 of 50 cases (64 percent) in which victims were actually injured, the weapons used were as follows: guns (two cases, 4 percent); knives or other cutting or piercing instruments (12 cases, or 24 percent); club (10 cases, or 20 percent); bodily force (four

cases, or 8 percent); and other weapon (six cases, or 12 percent). Of the 34 cases with injury, 25 were serious enough to require hospitalization for medical examination; of these 25 cases, one victim subsequently died from injuries sustained, six cases were not serious enough to require medical attention and the remaining cases did not include sufficient information to determine the seriousness of victim injuries.

Extent of Loss: Damage to victims' property occurred in 16 (32 percent) of the cases. Items damaged included windows (eight cases), doors (one case), home interiors (two cases), telephones (two cases), cars (two cases), victim's clothes and watch (one case), and luggage. The dollar value ranged from \$10 to \$505, with a median value of approximately \$30.

Suspect Identification and Arrest: Suspect identification may occur in many different ways. Table 3D-25 presents data on all the different ways in which suspects were identified (to the extent it was possible to determine) within the 50 sample adult arrest cases. For victims and witnesses, the most frequent way was to provide police with the offender's name or physically point out the offender at the scene. For patrol, "on-view" (seeing the crime being committed) was the only means of identifying suspects. For detectives, the primary source of identification was through vehicle descriptions or license numbers.

Table 3D-25--Method of Suspect Identification (Adult Sample)

<u>Means of Identification</u>	<u>Victim</u>	<u>Suspect Identified by:</u>		
		<u>Witness</u>	<u>Patrol</u>	<u>Detectives</u>
On-view arrest	--	--	3	--
Name/identified at scene	21	15	--	--
Mug shots	3	1	--	--
Lineup	2	--	--	--
MO	--	--	--	--
Fingerprints	--	--	--	--
Car description	--	--	--	3
Physical evidence	--	--	--	--
Informant tip	--	--	--	--
Surrendered self	--	--	--	1

The circumstances of the actual arrest were as follows:

Arrest on scene	21 cases	42 percent
Arrest near scene	9 cases	18 percent
Patrol on-view arrest	3 cases	6 percent
Suspect surrender	2 cases	4 percent
Detective arrest	2 cases	4 percent
Arrest on other case	1 case	2 percent
Warrant arrest	1 case	2 percent
Arrest by other jurisdiction	1 case	2 percent
Unknown	10 cases	20 percent

For adult arrests, the majority (33 cases, or 66 percent of the sample) occurred either at or near the scene of the crime with little elapsed time between the commission of the offense and the subsequent arrest.

Suspect/Victim Indications of Mental Impairment: To the extent that information was available on offense reports, data on factors that might diminish either victim or suspect mental capacities were recorded (see Table 3D-26).

In 16 (32 percent of the cases), there was some indication that the person arrested had been drinking, while in nine cases (18 percent), the victim had been drinking.

Table 3D-26--Indications of Mental Impairment

	<u>Mental Retardation</u>	<u>Mental Illness</u>	<u>Alcohol</u>	<u>Drug</u>
Victim	1	0	9	0
Arrestee	1	0	16	0

Identified Juvenile Arrestees

The following analyses are based upon Seattle Police Department annual statistical reports and Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office sample case studies of juveniles arrested for aggravated assault in 1975, and an arrest profile of those arrested in 1974.


Age: In 1973, the median average age of juveniles charged with aggravated assault was 15.2 years; for 1974, 15.9 years; for 1975, 15.4 years (Table 3D-27).

Table 3D-27--Age of Juveniles Contacted for Aggravated Assault, 1973-1975 (Source: Seattle Police Department Annual Report)

<u>Age</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Juveniles</u>
10 and under	0	0	4 (5.7%)	56.4
11-12	1	0	7 (10.0%)	11.4
13-14	10	7	16 (22.9%)	11.4
15	5	10	16 (22.9%)	6.9
16	9	6	11 (15.7%)	6.9
17	9	9	16 (22.9%)	6.9

Figure 3D-4 illustrates the frequency of juvenile aggravated assault incidents by age of offender for the years 1974 and 1975.

Figure 3D-4--Number of Juvenile Aggravated Assault Incidents by Age of Juvenile for 1974 and 1975 (Seattle Police Department)



The frequency in 1974 was zero for under 13 years, but increased to a peak at age 15, followed by a decline for 16 and 17 year olds. In 1975, the 76 reported incidents of aggravated assault peaked at ages 15 and 17.

Race: From 1973 to 1975, there has been a slight shift in relative involvement of whites (50 to 53 percent) and blacks (47 to 39 percent); see Table 3D-28.

Table 3D-28--Race of Juveniles Contacted for Aggravated Assault, 1973-1975
(Source: Seattle Police Department Annual Report)

<u>Race</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Population</u>
White	17 (50%)	15 (47%)	37 (53%)	84.8
Black	14 (47%)	15 (47%)	27 (39%)	8.6
American Indian	1	0	2	0.9
Chinese/Japanese	0	0	2	3.9
All other	2	2	2	1.8

Sex: Based upon Seattle Police Department juvenile contact information (a juvenile contact corresponding to an adult primary charge), males committed 82 to 73 percent of the juvenile aggravated assault crimes in 1973 to 1975 (Table 3D-29). The relative involvement of juveniles by sex parallels national data and local adult data, although there is a tendency for female juveniles to be more likely involved in aggravated assault.

Table 3D-29--Sex of Juveniles Charged with Aggravated Assault, 1973-1975
(Source: Seattle Police Department Annual Report)

	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>Percent of Seattle Juveniles</u>
Male	28 (82%)	27 (84%)	51 (73%)	51.7
Female	6	5	19	48.3

Arrest Profile (Juvenile): To obtain information on the nature and extent of involvement in other criminal activities, juvenile arrest histories for the period January 1, 1973, through December 31, 1975, were obtained for all 37 juveniles initially charged with aggravated assault in 1974. Offenses were separately tabulated for each calendar year (1973, 1974 and 1975), with 1974 being broken into target arrests (those charges including aggravated assault and other charges arising from that same arrest) and non-target arrests (see Table 3D-30).

As a group, the 37 juveniles had a total of 283 Part I and Part II charges and 139 Part I charges, or a mean average of 7.65 total offenses and 3.76 Part I offenses per offender. On an annual basis, this represents 2.55 total offenses per person per year. For the three consecutive years, the annual Part I rates were 1.05 (1973), 2.41 (1974) and 0.30 (1975). If one excludes the aggravated assault charges during the target year (since these charges had to occur before an individual would be included), the 1974 Part I rate was 1.59.

The low total and Part I rates for 1975 most likely were due to individuals becoming 18 years of age and subsequent records of arrests being recorded as adult offenses, which are separately maintained by the Seattle Police Department. Of the 37, 13 (35 percent) were 17 years of age in 1974. An additional possibility may relate to juvenile court dispositions. That is, considering the number and severity of offenses, many of these youths may have been detained. Unfortunately, data on court dispositions for these individuals are not available.

In terms of crime commission rates, juvenile aggravated assault arrestees present approximately twice the risk to society as adult arrestees. While the adult arrest rate for Part I offenses was approximately 68 per 100 offender years, juveniles had a rate of 125 per 100 offender years.

Offender Relationship to Victim: Based upon a 57 percent random sample (n = 40) of all 1975 aggravated assault cases cleared by arrest of juveniles, the most frequent relationship between the victim and juvenile arrestee was that of acquaintance (30 percent), followed equally by neighbor and stranger (both 17.5 percent); see Table 3D-31.

Table 3D-30--Juvenile Arrest Histories during January, 1973,
to December 31, 1975, for 37 Juveniles Arrested
on Aggravated Assault Charges in 1974

Offenses Arrested for between Jan. 1, 1973, and Dec. 31, 1975	1973	1974 Arrests		1975	Total	Arrests per 100 Offender Years
	Arrests	Target*	Non-Target**	Arrests		
Murder	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rape	2	2	0	0	4	3.60
Robbery	4	4	6	0	14	12.71
Aggravated assault	0	38	0	1	39	35.14
Burglary	13	4	11	1	29	26.13
Larceny	14	0	20	4	38	34.23
Auto theft	6	0	4	5	15	13.51
Total Part I	39	48	41	11	139	125.23
Weapons	1	1	5	0	7	6.31
Drugs	3	0	2	3	8	7.21
Vandalism	3	0	6	1	10	9.01
Runaway	9	0	16	11	36	32.43
Other status	5	0	4	1	10	9.01
All other***	16	0	39	18	73	65.77
Total Part I and Part II	76	49	113	45	283	254.95

*Arrests include aggravated assault charges.

**Arrests not including aggravated assault charges.

***Includes two charges of "Missing person."

Table 3D-31--Relationship between Juvenile Arrestee and Victim

Relationship	Number of Cases	Percent
Relative	2	5.0
Friend	3	7.5
Neighbor	7	17.5
Acquaintance	12	30.0
Stranger	7	17.5
Police-officer victim	2	5.0
Unknown	7	17.5

Degree of Violence: Threatened or actual weapons used in the cases were as follows: Knives or cutting/piercing instruments (13 cases, or 33 percent); bodily force or hands, feet, fists, teeth, etc. (10 cases, or 25 percent); clubs (nine cases, or 23 percent); guns (six cases, or 15 percent); other and unknown (one case, or 2.5 percent each).

In the 33 of 40 cases (83 percent) in which injury actually occurred, weapons used to inflict harm were as follows: guns (two cases, or 5 percent); knife or other cutting/piercing instrument (10 cases, or 25 percent); clubs (nine cases, or 22.5 percent); bodily force (nine cases, or 22.5 percent); other weapon (one case, or 2.5 percent); and unknown weapon used to inflict injury (two cases, or 5 percent).

Of the 33 cases with injury, 12 of all 40 cases (30 percent) were not severe enough to require hospitalization, 15 (38 percent) required some sort of medical attention, two (5 percent) involved considerable injury but no indication of the extent of medical treatment was available, and four (10 percent) involved injury of unknown seriousness.

Of those requiring medical attention, 13 (33 percent) involved hospitalization, at least for medical examination; one case (2.5 percent) was treated by a private physician; and one case (2.5 percent) received unknown medical treatment.

Extent of Loss: Damage to victims' property occurred in five cases (12.5 percent). Items damaged in these cases included: windows (two cases), doors (one case), contents of home (one case), car (one case) and victim's clothing (one case). The range in cost of this damage was from \$2 to \$3,000, with a median average of \$40.

Suspect Identification and Arrest: Where it was possible to determine from the sample offense and arrest reports for juvenile-committed aggravated assault cases, the means by which suspects were identified were analyzed (Table 3D-32). Suspects were frequently identified through either victims (22 cases, or 55 percent) or witnesses (eight cases, or 20 percent) naming or pointing out the offender.

Table 3D-32--Method of Suspect Identification (Juvenile Sample)

<u>Means of Identification</u>	<u>Victim</u>	<u>Suspect Identified by:</u>		
		<u>Witness</u>	<u>Patrol</u>	<u>Detectives</u>
On-view arrest	--	--	3	--
Held by friend of suspect	--	1	--	--
Name/identified on scene	22	8	--	--
General address	1	--	--	--
Mug shots	1	--	--	--
Surrendered self	--	--	--	1

Circumstances of arrests (only 16, or 40 percent, were determinable from offense and arrest reports) were as follows:

Arrest on scene	10 cases	25.0 percent
Arrest near scene	2 cases	5.0 percent
Patrol on-view arrest	3 cases	7.5 percent
Detective arrest	1 case	2.5 percent

Suspect/Victim Indications of Mental Impairment: Based upon offense and arrest information, data on factors which might impair mental capacity were analyzed. From available data, six (15 percent) of the cases involved drinking juvenile offenders and three (7.5 percent) involved drinking victims (Table 3D-33).

Table 3D-33--Indications of Mental Impairment

	<u>Mental Retardation</u>	<u>Mental Illness</u>	<u>Alcohol</u>	<u>Drugs</u>
Victim	1	0	3	0
Arrestee	2	1	6	0

Criminal Justice System Response (Adult)

To obtain information on the criminal justice system response to the crime of aggravated assault, a manual analysis was performed of Seattle Police Department adult arrest data for 1974 and the first eight months of 1975. These data provide information on initial (or suspicion) charges, what charge was filed by the prosecutor in superior court (or the court unit in the case of municipal court) and eventual court disposition of the charge.

During 1974, an estimated 2,198 aggravated assaults occurred in Seattle, of which 1,165 were reported to the police. Actual incidents (2,198) were computed based upon national reporting rates of 53 percent, as determined by LEAA victimization surveys. During this corresponding time, 273 adults were arrested and charged with 292 counts of suspicion of

aggravated assault, or a number equivalent to 25.1 percent of the reported cases. (Some of the arrests relate to cases reported in 1973.)

Of the initial suspicion of aggravated assault charges, 63 (21.6 percent) were subsequently investigated and released, 118 (40.4 percent) were charged with some other offense and 111 (38.0 percent) were filed with the court as initially charged by the arresting officer.

Of the 141 filed aggravated assault cases (111 plus 30 charges in which the initial arrest was for some other charge but filed aggravated assault), 45 (32 percent) were still pending as of August 31, 1975. (In fact, some unknown proportion had been disposed of, but the Seattle Police Department Data Processing Section had not yet received disposition information.) Court dispositions were available for 96 charges, with 25 (26 percent) being found not guilty, stricken, dismissed or acquitted. A plea or finding of guilty was obtained in 75 cases (74 percent), of which 33 received jail or penitentiary sentences. The remaining 38 sentences were either deferred, suspended, and/or probation (see Figure 3D-5).

For the first eight months of 1975, an estimated 1,796 aggravated assaults occurred, of which 952 were reported to the Seattle Police Department. In this same period of time, 210 reports of suspicion of aggravated assault arrests were made (22.1 percent of total reported cases). Seattle Police Department disposition included 49 cases (23 percent) investigated and released, 66 (31 percent) charged other in court and 92 (44 percent) charged as aggravated assault in court.

In addition to 92 cases arrested aggravated assault and charged the same, 14 other charges of aggravated assault were filed that had originally been charged as suspicion of some other offense by the arresting officer. Of these 106 charges, 52 were still pending as of August 31, 1975, and court dispositions were available for 54 cases. Pleas or findings of guilt occurred in 38 cases (70 percent), while 16 were found not guilty, stricken, dismissed or acquitted. Of those cases with a finding of guilt, 10 (26 percent) were sentenced either to jail or penitentiary, while 27 (71 percent) received deferred, suspended or probation sentences (see Figure 3D-6).

Criminal Justice System Response (Juvenile)

Information regarding the disposition of juvenile cases once beyond the jurisdiction of the Seattle Police Department is not available. Data regarding juvenile court handling and disposition of aggravated assault cases have not been available for previous years.

Of the 38 reported counts of aggravated assault brought against juveniles by the Seattle Police Department Juvenile Division, 34 (89.5 percent) were referred to juvenile court. Two (5.3 percent) were adjusted with parents and/or guardians, and two (5.3 percent) were investigated and released.




Figure 3D-5--Aggravated Assault, January 1, 1975, through August 31, 1975






Figure 3D-6--Aggravated Assault, 1974





SECTION IV-A: CRIME SPECIFIC CATEGORYCrime Specific Problem Statements, Strategies and Programs

Problem Statement A: Non-residential burglary targets are too easily penetrated.

Discussion

Seattle tests of target hardening strategies for residential burglary targets in the city have produced evidence that extra security measures can prevent residential burglary. It would be useful to know the extent to which these strategies can be applied to reduce commercial burglary.

Reported non-residential burglary declined 12 percent in 1975 and 5 percent in 1976 (1974--3,515; 1975--3,104; 1976--2,965). In spite of these decreases in reported non-residential burglary, the risk of non-residential burglary appears to be a significant problem.

When the risk of residential burglary as a function of the number of residences in the city (206,900) is compared with the risk of commercial burglary as a function of the number of businesses (13,603), the results are somewhat surprising. The average risk of burglary to a city household is about once every 10.9 years; the average risk to Seattle businesses is about once every 4.8 years.

While it is unreasonable to argue that inadequate security measures are responsible for all commercial burglary, some of the approximately 3,000 instances which occur each year might be prevented by target hardening. In addition, it may be possible to fortify a non-residential burglary target to such an extent that penetration would be absolutely discouraged, but practical and financial considerations are likely to rule out a number of those potential target hardening measures.

A principal consideration in estimating the opportunity for non-residential burglary prevention through improved extra security and target hardening measures is information about who commits burglary. A large number of burglaries in the city may be committed by non-professional burglars. If non-professional burglars are committing substantial amounts of Seattle burglary, the existence of reasonable commercial security measures may have prevented a number of those burglaries. Non-residential burglary targets are, therefore, too easily penetrated by persons who could reasonably be discouraged from committing non-residential burglary.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement ARejected Strategies

Community Crime Prevention Program Expansion. To apply the technology of target hardening to commercial burglary targets, expansion of the Community Crime Prevention Program could be viewed as one option to reduce commercial burglary. Since the Community Crime Prevention Program already conducts security inspections of homes, one possibility would be to add a function or component to this program to facilitate security inspections of commercial establishments, as well.

This strategy is rejected for several reasons.

The complexion of residential target hardening is different in character from non-residential target hardening. While basic, minor structural modifications are likely to discourage the residential burglar, commercial establishments are likely to present more complex security and target hardening problems. Community Crime Prevention staff would require additional training in order to cope with these more complex target hardening problems.

It makes sense to borrow the methodology used successfully by the Community Crime Prevention Program for the last four years and apply it to commercial burglary targets; specifically, the security inspection methodology has application to commercial burglary prevention. During calendar year 1978, the Community Crime Prevention Program will be undergoing a crucial first year under permanent City funds. To add a new component to the Community Crime Prevention Program could potentially dilute its capacity to continue a high productivity quota in dealing with residential burglary.

Diversion of focus from residential burglary to other crime problems has been a concern to community crime planners. Since the work of the Community Crime Prevention Program is repetitious in nature, an opportunity to divert attention to other interests could present an inherent challenge to staff. If enough energy is diverted, the rigorously charged citywide residential burglary target coverage could be jeopardized.

Commercial target hardening is more technical and carries with it more of a bias in favor of security hardware and security equipment. Residential target hardening relies on block watch, as well as security inspections and property marking. A substantial portion of Community Crime Prevention Program field effort revolves around the block watch organization activity. Because commercial burglaries occur in a manner not conducive to observation by others, block watch obviously is inappropriate for a commercial burglary prevention strategy. Similarly, property marking has only limited utility for commercial burglary prevention. Thus the envisioned method of operating for commercial burglary prevention would differ substantially from Community Crime Prevention Program operation for two program component elements, block watch and property marking. It is the methodology of security inspections and target hardening which may offer the best opportunity to protect commercial establishments from burglary.

Patrol Security Inspections. One means to provide target hardening information to businesses in the city would be to give patrol officers maps of their patrol sectors which display businesses and to assign them the task of providing security inspections for all commercial establishments in an area while they are on patrol.

A number of Seattle businesses have some manner of burglar alarm protection. The number of burglar alarms which are on the market has grown geometrically in the last several years. Not all types of alarms afford equal protection to the business where they are placed, even when they are of comparable price. One type of alarm may be better suited to one situation than to others. The technology involved for many alarm systems is complex and varied to the needs of physical layout and type of commercial establishment. The Seattle Police Department Security Unit is the best repository for this type of technical information. The Security Unit keeps current on the technology of alarms and other commercial target hardening information.

It could be argued that, because patrol officers are provided portable radios, they could provide this service without decreasing their availability to respond. This argument is further advanced by the fact that the average number of calls per shift is about three. Since patrol is only asked to respond to an average of three calls per shift, and since preventive patrol is not a useful strategy, "free" time could be spent in providing commercial security inspections. However, this strategy is rejected for the following reasons.

1. There would need to be training of patrol in the technology of security requirements for non-residential burglary targets.
2. There would have to be training of patrol in different hardware options and burglar alarms and technologies of placement and triggering of those alarms.
3. Training 300 or so patrol officers in these technologies would mean an ambitious and costly training program extending over a long period of time and requiring a great deal of money and manpower.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement A

Current Strategies

Security Unit Security Information Dissemination. The Security Unit of the Seattle Police Department is composed of one sergeant and two detectives. With the number of commercial establishments in Seattle, it would obviously be difficult for these two detectives to sweep the city and provide target hardening assistance to all commercial establishments. Although the Security Unit attempts to be a burglary prevention force, the sheer volume of activity, compared with the number of persons assigned, precludes sufficient coverage.

The resources of the Seattle Police Department Security Unit could be bolstered to facilitate proactive security inspections by that unit. This strategy is rejected for two reasons:

1. The Security Unit operates reactively when a commercial burglary has occurred. It would be inconsistent with the current Security Unit methodology for detectives to spend time contacting businesses as a believed preventive measure.
2. The costs of acquiring additional detectives and additional space to house the additional detectives mitigates against this strategy.

The Security Unit conducts approximately 90 commercial security inspections a month. These inspections are, for the most part, conducted for victims of commercial burglaries, to provide target hardening information to protect against future burglary.

Commercial Burglary Reduction. To take advantage of the successful physical security improvement methodology which was developed in the Community Crime Prevention Program, it is proposed that this methodology be applied to commercial burglary targets. The City has attempted to recommend various physical security improvements in the past. These have been performed by the Seattle Police Department Security Unit. This unit has a number of other responsibilities and, therefore, is usually not able to apply proactive techniques but rather responds in reaction to a burglary. Insufficient time, physical space problems and the need for Security Unit field personnel to carry out security checks on a continuous basis would seem to mitigate against the Security Unit carrying out the proactive function required.

The current strategy, first formulated in the 1977 planning process, consists of hiring two Community Service Officers from grant fund resources and matching them with two currently available Community Service Officers, to be assigned to perform commercial security inspections. For this proposed continuation phase of the project, an attempt will be made to acquire two CETA-funded CSO positions to allow the present two City-funded matching CSO positions to return to their regularly assigned duties. The four project Community Service Officers will receive maps displaying commercial burglary targets in a specific area and will be responsible for visiting each site for the purpose of inspecting and recommending physical security improvements. Prior to making the first field contact, the four project staff will have been trained by Security Unit staff and Community Crime Prevention staff on what to look for and how best to present themselves to gain access to businesses in their areas. The principal advantages of using Community Service Officers over detectives are as follows:


1. The field orientation of the Community Service Officers.
2. The fact that Community Services Officers cost less than detectives.
3. By utilizing Community Service Officers, two grant-funded Community Service Officer positions are matched with two general fund Community Service Officer positions, or possibly two CETA-funded Community Service Officer positions, on a one-to-one basis.

Target Selection Process. The research and evaluation staff of the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office will assist in selecting both an implementation schedule and site

selection. Site selection will involve choosing geographical areas which are similar enough to facilitate comparison, and providing the security recommendation service in one while not making the service available in the other area. The individual targets for which security recommendations are made will also be pre-selected. This target selection will be made on the basis of burglary vulnerability. The general basis for pre-selection will be based upon the following:

1. Types of goods available at target.
2. Burglary victimization history for the type of business and type of goods.
3. Burglary victimization history for particular area/for particular businesses.
4. Comparability of characteristics of the commercial establishments in a particular geographical area compared with another (one for experimental, one for control).

Project staff will place emphasis on physical improvement or target hardening.



Seattle Police Department Phot

Burglary Crime Scene

Project: Commercial Burglary Reduction

Goal: To reduce non-residential burglary in the City of Seattle.

Objective: To decrease commercial burglary by a statistically significant extent in target areas of the city when compared with other areas of the city.

Methods

1. Project staff consisting of four Community Service Officers (CSO's) will be trained for no more than a six-week period by Community Crime Prevention Program staff and Seattle Police Department Security Unit staff.
2. The four CSO's will receive pin maps displaying commercial establishments in a specific geographical area and be asked to conduct security inspections systematically for those potential non-residential burglary targets in their areas.
3. After the initial training period, additional in-service training and technology transfer may be required.
4. Project staff will report to and file monthly reports with the Community Service Officer director, who is also the project director. The CSO director will record the businesses inspected and monitor the number of inspections conducted and recommendations made.

Evaluation

The effectiveness of the Commercial Burglary Reduction Project in reducing commercial burglary significantly will be assessed by three measures. The first will consist of a comparison of post-period non-residential burglary rates by census tracts for control and experimental areas. The second will compare pre- and post-project entry burglary rates for individual commercial establishments treated. The third comparison will consist of a burglary rate comparison by type of target unit for experimental and control areas and individual identified targets.

To insure that valid comparisons of non-residential burglary rates by census tract will be possible, the tracts with the highest non-residential burglary rates have been identified. From those tracts, some are randomly selected as target areas and some are selected to be maintained as control areas. Project staff systematically inspect, or attempt to inspect, all commercial establishments within an assigned census tract until at least 80 percent of identified potential target sites are visited. Upon contacting a minimum of 80 percent, project personnel will be assigned an additional target census tract.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
LEAA	\$51,103	\$58,257	\$ -0-
State	2,839	3,237	-0-
City	2,839	3,236	-0-
Total	\$56,781	\$64,730	\$ -0-

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$36,554	Federal (LEAA)	\$51,105	90%
Supplies	200	State Buy-In	2,839	5%
Other Services and Charges	20,037	Local Cash Match	2,839	5%
Capital Outlay	0	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
Total Cost	\$56,781	Total Funds	\$56,781	

Problem Statement B: A number of new or one-time burglary offenders appear to be entering the burglar population each year.

Discussion

There appears to be a population of one-time non-professional adult burglars who contribute to the city's burglary problem. These offenders are not included in adult recidivism strategies because, for these "new" offenders, burglary may be a crime of opportunity, in the same sense it is for non-professional juvenile burglars.

In order to verify or refute tentative information contained in last year's Plan that suggested a large number of Seattle burglars were one-time burglary offenders, additional analyses were performed. As part of the Systems Response to Burglary Project, 1,409 Seattle Police Department burglary arrestees for the period January 1, 1973, to September 30, 1975, were studied.

Of the 1,409 arrested between January 1, 1973, and September 30, 1975, 636 (45 percent) had no other arrest. Another 332 (24 percent) were arrested (both prior to and subsequent to entering the sample burglar population) for only misdemeanors. Thus a total of 968 (69 percent) out of 1,409 could be considered potential one-time only burglars. These 968 out of 1,409 arrestees were either one-time only burglars or persons who had not been apprehended for any felony except the single burglary during a risk period of up to 2.6 years. This leaves 31 percent of the 1,409 burglars who were arrested at least twice during the period for a burglary plus another felony offense.

Of the 1,409 arrestees, 161 (11 percent) were arrested again for a non-Part I felony. This crime category includes arson and narcotics, among other felonies. Another 234 (17 percent) of the 1,409 were arrested for the crime of burglary. These two categories total 395 offenders, and together they account for another 28 percent of the total. The 395 arrested for burglary or another felony added to the 968 who were not arrested for another offense or who were arrested only for misdemeanors total 1,363 (97 percent of the 1,409).

Finally, 45 of the 1,409 arrestees (3 percent of the total) were also arrested for a Part I person crime. This crime category includes murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery and assault. These 45 offenders represent the greatest danger to the community, both because of the nature of the crimes they were alleged to have committed and because the extent of their criminal activity cannot be gauged from their identity as burglars.

The data presented above are based on the number of burglary arrestees who were also arrested for other crimes between January, 1973, and September, 1975. Most of these arrestees were adults on January 1, 1973, and thus were "at risk" for the full 32-month period.

In preparing last year's Plan, it was found that in 1974, of 290 adults charged with a burglary at the prosecutor level, six of these people had also been charged with burglary in 1973. Thus it appeared that few burglars were charged consecutively in two years. Based upon 1974 Seattle Police Department arrest data estimates, there were 6,500 "adult burglars" in that year. It is also estimated, based upon other data which show from 55 to 75 percent of burglaries are committed by juveniles, that these 6,500 adult burglars are responsible for approximately 7,000 burglaries committed in 1974. This number is arrived at by estimating a total of 23,170 burglaries in the base year 1974 (a combination of reported and non-reported burglaries), based on national LEAA and Sea-King Victimization Survey data. This indicates that somewhere between 5,800 and 7,700 burglaries are probably committed by adults.

It is more than an educated guess that a large proportion of the 6,500 adult burglars committing 7,000 burglaries were one-time only or new burglary offenders. Seattle Police Department burglary detectives estimate that some number less than 60 adult city-resident burglary offenders are active recidivous burglars. That is, police estimate that approximately 60 burglars commit multiple burglary offenses in any given year.

Given that the difference between 6,500 adult burglars and 7,000 adult burglaries is only 500, if 60 burglars are considered active burglars, the range of average burglaries these persons commit would be between 12.5 and 8.3 burglaries per year, to leave a minimum of one burglary each for the other 6,440 approximate burglars. In other words, it may be the case that the distribution of adult burglars to adult burglaries is either that each of the 6,500 burglars commit 1.07 burglaries a year, or that some number less than 60 "consistent burglars" commit a larger portion of burglaries and a large number of the 6,500 adult burglars commit only one burglary in a year.

Since it appears that a large amount of Seattle "adult" burglaries are committed by one-time or non-habitual burglary offenders, we may conclude that the risk associated with committing a burglary is not sufficiently high to discourage the first-time potential offender from committing the crime, or that reasonable prevention or target hardening to reduce burglary opportunity has not occurred.

Almost half (45 percent) of the persons arrested for suspicion of burglary between January, 1973, and September, 1975, were not arrested for any other crime during that period. About 70 percent in all were either not otherwise arrested or were arrested for only misdemeanors during the period. The 30 percent who remain break down as follows: about 10 percent were arrested for non-Part I felonies, about 17 percent were arrested for burglary and about 3 percent were arrested for person crimes. These data indicate that a majority of the sample 1,409 burglary arrestees are not active career criminals. Of those whose records show arrests for felonies, most of the arrests are either burglary or a non-Part I felony. Only 45 persons, or 3 percent of the 1,409 total, were arrested for a person crime.

Problem Statement C: Witness information is not used to its full potential in the solution of burglary cases.

Discussion

The availability of witnesses seems to have a significant bearing on the solution of burglary cases. From a sample of 972 burglary reports, it was determined that witnesses were noted in 14 (8.5 percent) of the residential burglaries and seven (20.6 percent) of the non-residential burglaries. All seven witnessed non-residential burglaries were subsequently cleared, and 13 of the 14 residential burglaries were cleared. It appears, therefore, that when witnesses are available, they contribute in a major way to case clearance.

It is possible, and somewhat likely, that more burglaries are actually witnessed than offense reports indicate. Most burglaries are committed during the daytime, when it is at least possible for the burglar to be seen by neighbors of the burgled residence. Furthermore, approximately 62.7 percent of all residential burglaries require the use of force to gain entry, indicating that it is likely that burglars make a certain amount of noise. Such noise can call attention to the burglary.

Under present operating practices, witnesses are not sought with consistent intensity. That is, field personnel do not, on a routine basis, conduct neighborhood canvasses for witnesses when burglaries occur, thereby not routinely locating "reluctant" or "unwitting" witnesses. Some people will not voluntarily come forward with information but would provide the information if asked directly. Some people observe burglaries occurring but do not know that they are, in fact, observing an actual burglary. All such witnesses are lost to the investigative process at present.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement C

Proposed Strategy

Victim-Witness Information Development. The strategy recommended for addressing this problem is to have police personnel maximize use of telephones in the conduct of burglary investigations. That is, an attempt will be made to locate and interview witnesses to burglaries by phone.

When a burglary report is received in the Burglary/Theft Unit, the report will go to a special unit made up of non-sworn police personnel who, using a street directory, will attempt to call all of the residences in the immediate vicinity of the burglary to locate and interview witnesses. Those cases for which witnesses are located will then be assigned to detectives for followup.

The assumptions that underlie this proposal are as follows:

1. Some burglaries are witnessed and the witnesses do not come to the attention of police investigations; further, the witnesses would be willing to provide information, but only if asked.
2. Witness information is one of the most useful tools for solving burglary cases.
3. Field personnel will not, on a routine basis, conduct neighborhood canvasses for witnesses when burglaries occur.

Other underlying assumptions are as follows:

1. Citizens are sometimes unaware that their neighbors have been the targets of burglary; upon this realization, they may take preventive measures themselves, thereby preventing an undetermined number of burglaries.

2. From time to time, burglars themselves will be called and may be deterred from committing future burglaries because of the impression that the police are serious about apprehending burglars.
3. Police public relations benefit from the project may be substantial.

Project: Burglary Victim-Witness Callback

Goal: To decrease burglary.

Objectives

1. To increase significantly the number of residential burglary cases with witness information.
2. To increase significantly arrests of residential burglary suspects resulting from victim information.
3. To reduce significantly the unit cost of burglary followup investigations.
4. To reduce significantly the unit cost of detective arrests for burglary.

Methods

When a burglary report is received in the Burglary/Theft Unit of the Seattle Police Department, police personnel use a reverse telephone directory to call residences in the immediate vicinity of the burgled residence for the purpose of developing witness information. These personnel forward any information developed to detectives who then conduct normal followup investigation of the burglaries. This project provides for non-sworn personnel.

Prior to the implementation of the initial phase of this continuation strategy, it was determined that a preliminary test of the strategy, in advance of full implementation, would be conducted. During the first three months of the project, only one clerical person was hired. This procedure permitted a careful review of the amount of training required to acquaint clerical personnel with the techniques of eliciting information from citizens which would be useful to burglary detectives during their followup activities, as well as providing some information as to the possibility that the project will achieve any discernible impact on locating witnesses, once it is fully implemented. If negative indications regarding project impact had surfaced during the preliminary phase (not to have exceeded three months), project operations would have been suspended. On the other hand, it was anticipated that the result would be full implementation.

Evaluation

The proposed project will be evaluated as a level "C" evaluation.

Objective 1, to increase significantly the number of burglary cases with witness information, will be evaluated by comparing the proportion of residential burglary cases with witness information on the primary offense report (pre-project data) with the proportion of the same cases with witness information after victim-witness callback attempts (post-project data).

Objective 2, a significant increase in arrests, will be evaluated by comparing the proportion of reported residential burglaries resulting in arrests which involve witness information for the pre-period of 12 months immediately prior to project start with the first 12 months of project duration.

Reduction of the unit cost of residential burglary followup (Objective 3) will be determined by a pre-post comparison of the number of assigned cases per detective month, on a monthly basis, for the year prior to and the project year. In addition to the total number of cases assigned, the number of cases cleared per detective month will be examined.

Reduction of unit cost per detective residential burglary arrest rates (Objective 4) will be evaluated using the same comparison periods as for Objective 3.

Data to evaluate Objective 1 (number of total cases received, number with initial witness information and number with additional witness information gained through project operation) will be collected and maintained by project personnel as part of their normal operating procedures. Information to evaluate Objective 2 will be obtained by randomly sampling 200 residential burglary cases which resulted in an arrest during the pre-project period. Based on the primary report and detective followup report, the number of those resulting from or involving witness information will be determined. This rate will be compared with 200 cases randomly selected from those occurring during the project period. Information on detective mandays, number of cases assigned and cleared for the Burglary Unit are presently available through the Expanded Investigation of Burglaries Project. These data are anticipated to continue to be recorded by the Burglary Unit during the proposed period of this project. Information on the number of burglary arrests made by detectives is available through the Seattle Police Department Data Processing Section's computerized arrest file system.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	
LEAA	\$50,834	\$58,460	\$ -0-	
State	2,824	3,248	-0-	
City	2,824	3,247	-0-	
Total	\$56,482	\$64,955	\$ -0-	
<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$52,816	Federal (LEAA)	\$50,834	90%
Supplies	500	State Buy-In	2,824	5%
Other Services and Charges	3,166	Local Cash Match	2,824	5%
Capital Outlay	0	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
Total Cost	\$56,482		\$56,482	

Problem Statement D: Fingerprint evidence is not used to its full potential in solving burglary cases.

Discussion

While in the process of committing burglaries, burglars from time to time leave impressions of their fingerprints (latents) on various items in the burgled residence. Those latents can be lifted and compared against master fingerprint cards to establish the identity of the burglar.

Fingerprints, therefore, offer law enforcement an opportunity to improve its performance in arresting burglary suspects and developing cases for the prosecutor.

Several other jurisdictions have demonstrated that the fingerprint process can be successfully implemented, most notably Miami, Florida. That jurisdiction reports that approximately 40 percent of burglary scenes yield usable, codable and classifiable prints.

The experience in Seattle falls far short of Miami's level of success. From a sample of 8,103 burglaries reported during the period March 1, 1974, through September 31, 1974, fingerprint evidence was collected in 222 burglary cases--2.7 percent of all burglaries. From those 222 burglary cases, a total of 585 latents were collected, of which 244 (41.7 percent) were illegible. Another 182 (31.1 percent) were legible but could not be coded and classified. It is not suggested here that Miami should be used as a standard, because the conditions under which fingerprint processing is carried out in Miami differ substantially from Seattle's. However, the Miami experience shows that opportunities and possibilities for improvement exist.

A more recently drawn 1976 Seattle sample shows a similar result.

Past Experience with Problem. During the past several years, several efforts have been undertaken to increase utilization of fingerprint evidence. None of those efforts has been totally successful, and all have experienced substantial problems.

Patrol Investigative Training. The Patrol Investigative Training Project began in March, 1975. This project attempted to improve the crime-scene investigation skills of the entire patrol force by way of an intensive one-week training course. It was believed that one of the primary reasons so few crime scenes were processed was that officers did not have the necessary skills. The Patrol Investigative Training Project also responded to the problem of patrol officers not having adequate crime-scene investigative equipment and supplies. The project responded by providing fully equipped crime-scene kits to all patrol units. To date, that project has not been successful in substantially increasing the number of crime scenes processed nor in the quality of physical evidence collected.

In retrospect, it would appear that the Patrol Investigative Training strategy, as it was implemented, should have been expected to fail. It was assumed that if patrol officers were given adequate fingerprint training and adequate equipment and supplies, they would successfully process crime scenes and produce good, usable evidence.

This naive assumption does not take into account a long tradition of not processing crime scenes; nor does it take into account the competing pressures on patrol officers to become available quickly for the next call; nor does it take into account the fact that dusting for prints gets black powder on the officer's clothes and person; nor does it take into account the fact that there is no reward to the individual officer in doing a superior job in processing crime scenes; nor does it take into account that upper management of the Seattle Police Department has other functions to perform that preclude total dedication to maximizing the usefulness of a limited activity; nor does it effectively address the fact that, in virtually all other cities where similar programs have been implemented, the outcome was failure.

In addition to the above, the Patrol Investigative Training Project did not address in any serious way the fact that patrol officers who have been assigned to street duty from

five to 25 years have the impression that fingerprints are useless unless there is a known suspect, and that to spend a considerable time processing crime scenes is a waste of effort.

The Patrol Investigative Training Project also experienced an unusual number of implementation problems. During an 18-month period, the project had four different project directors, three different training directors, four different lieutenants and four different sergeants assigned to the key positions. Continuity was broken as a result. The project also experienced equipment procurement problems. The supplier, after having been several months late in receiving a procurement award, added several months delay of his own making to the delivery date. Consequently, several training classes were held before basic training equipment and supplies were available.

There are several lessons on how not to run a project contained in the Patrol Investigative Training experience. Among the more important lessons are the following:

1. If a program is to be successful, there must be some reinforcement built into the design that makes operators want to participate in the activity. Any effort that requires management to apply a heavy hand to make the operators do the particular job is likely to be defeated. That reinforcement may be as simple as recognition or it may require an increased opportunity for promotion or more money or, as a last resort, loss of something desirable if the work is not done. Patrol Investigative Training offered nothing as incentive, either positive or negative.
2. If a program is to be successful, personnel should not be rotated into and out of key project positions. In addition, it is often preferable to have a project director whose principal task is to make the project a success. In some cases, this may mean that the project director should be relieved of all other duties. In the case of Patrol Investigative Training, the project director was the first watch patrol captain, with the project being an added responsibility.

Detective Call-Out. It has long been police department policy for burglary/theft detectives to be available to respond to burglary scenes upon patrol officers' requests or when the loss associated with the burglary is very large. The detective call-out policy was formalized to a greater extent under the Expanded Investigation of Burglaries Project. That project provided for a small amount of detective overtime to permit detectives to respond at night and on weekends. For a number of reasons, this response capability was used infrequently. More recently, a night shift was added for burglary/theft investigations. The night shift, while not created exclusively to provide crime-scene assistance, treats crime-scene assistance to patrol officers as one of its principal responsibilities. That unit provides citywide crime-scene assistance at approximately three crime scenes per day. The range is from no scenes per day to as many as six crime scenes per day. Generally, the unit tries to provide on-the-job training to the responding patrol officer, rather than actually processing the scene themselves, unless the involved patrol officer wishes them to do it. The theory of this approach is that, if patrol officers can be provided with real-life training, in time the officers will become sufficiently proficient to operate independently.

Patrol Officer Specialist (Informal). In at least one sector of the city, an informal process involving particular patrol officers has developed. Apparently, a few patrol officers like to process crime scenes and have informally taken on the responsibility of doing much of the crime-scene processing in that sector, although other officers may be assigned as the primary response unit. This informal program, of course, has many limitations. The first, and probably most significant, limitation is the "specialists" have other duties that necessarily preclude their being involved in large numbers of investigations. The "specialists" are limited to only one sector and are available only during one watch, while burglaries occur on all three watches and in all sectors. The "specialists" also must leave their districts in order to provide crime-scene support to other units.

Civilian Technicians (Call-Out). The department employs several civilian identification technicians whose primary job is to process evidence; that is, evidence submitted

by others is analyzed by civilian technicians. Those technicians are always available to respond to special situation crime scenes upon request by patrol officers or detectives. This is a little-used resource; however, if technicians were called out with great regularity, there would be no one available to process collected evidence.

In addition, identification technicians should not be expected to be especially skilled in crime-scene processing because that is not really their speciality. Technicians should not be expected to know as much about how burglars gain entry or where to look for evidence as do patrol officers who respond to many more burglaries than technicians.

Civilian Technicians (In-House). It has been a long standing practice for patrol officers and detectives to physically remove items that may bear physical evidence from the crime scene and take those items to the police property room for processing by civilian identification technicians. Generally, identification technicians dust such items for prints.

This process, while apparently efficient, often deprives the owners of their property for long periods of time and sometimes causes the owners some inconvenience in getting their property back.

Summary of Problem. It becomes readily apparent that much has been and is being done to increase collection of physical evidence. It also becomes readily apparent that a cohesive, coherent and effective strategy needs to be implemented.

The foregoing discussion treats the problems associated with collecting physical evidence from crime scenes. The equally important parallel problem is what to do with the evidence after it is collected. At present, the department would not be able to process all the evidence effectively if it were somehow collected from substantially more burglaries.

Processing Fingerprints (Comparison). During the past four years, the Seattle Police Department has successfully developed and implemented a system that is capable of using a single fingerprint latent to determine the identity of an unknown suspect. The system is called the Single Fingerprint System.

The Single Fingerprint System is dependent for its workability upon having a large file of codeable and classifiable prints of previously arrested adult and juvenile suspects on base file. In addition, it relies upon having high quality latent prints lifted from crime scenes. At present, neither of these conditions is adequately provided. The latter deficiency is discussed above; a discussion of the base file follows.

Juvenile Prints. It is forbidden by State law to fingerprint juveniles, except by special court order. In the past, the courts have been willing to give permission to fingerprint particular identified juveniles to assist in the investigation of particular identified offenses. However, such prints were not to be stored for future reference, but destroyed.

In mid-1974, the juvenile court gave somewhat broader authority to fingerprint juveniles. At that time, Seattle was in the process of experimenting with reducing burglary through the Burglary Reduction Program. The principal target area for the program was the East Central precinct. As a key element of the Burglary Reduction Program, juvenile court permitted, by court order, the fingerprinting of juveniles contacted or arrested for burglary and "burglary-related" crimes. The constraints were that (1) the juvenile must be contacted or arrested for a crime committed in the East Central precinct; (2) the juvenile must be fingerprinted at the Youth Service Center only, in the presence of a court worker; and (3) the juvenile fingerprint card must be stripped of all information that identifies the juvenile by name, age, race, sex, height, weight and general address. Only an identifying number could be placed on the fingerprint card, with only the court knowing which juvenile corresponded to the number.

More recently, the court has allowed juveniles from any area of the city to be fingerprinted. However, the court still requires that juveniles be printed only at the Youth


Service Center and that personal identifiers be stripped from any stored police records. Lack of personal identifiers presents no serious problems. However, the requirement that juveniles can be fingerprinted only at the Youth Service Center requires a change in police department operating procedure. At present, not all juveniles are "booked" into the Youth Service Center. Many are released to parents or guardians from precinct stations or elsewhere. Of the juveniles actually taken to the Youth Service Center, not all of them are fingerprinted for various reasons. Of the juveniles that are actually fingerprinted, the quality of the prints taken is such that many cannot be used.

Adult Fingerprints. The conditions surrounding the fingerprinting of adult suspects are not as restrictive. However, sometimes adult suspects are released from custody prior to being fingerprinted, for various reasons related to operating procedures of the King County Department of Rehabilitative Services. Of the adult suspects that are actually fingerprinted, the quality of the prints is often such that they cannot be used.

Management. The problems associated with collecting and processing fingerprint evidence are recognized by many sections of the Seattle Police Department, and several attempts have been made to solve them. Solutions, however, have not yet been produced, mainly due to the fact that the problems spread across all bureaus of the department, and there is no single management entity at the operations level that has the mandate, access and authority necessary to cause an integrated and comprehensive solution to these problems to be developed and implemented.

Future Considerations. Coding, classifying and comparing fingerprints are labor-intensive activities. As such, as utilization of fingerprints as an investigative tool increases, it will naturally follow that increased supporting staff resources will be required. The long-term prospects for adding and maintaining increased staff are not promising.

In order to anticipate this support staff expansion, new technology will be required. Recent developments of automatic fingerprint scanners may offer opportunities in this area. There are substantial capital investment costs associated with the automatic scanners, and their impact toward reducing labor costs is more likely to occur after several years of startup activity. However, early investments in the technology which may offer the best long-term opportunities are proposed in the Project Statement for Evidence Collection, Processing and Management, which follows Problem Statement E.



Stephen Noe

Problem Statement E: Physical evidence in rape cases is often not collected by the Seattle Police Department.

Discussion

The first respondent to a rape dispatch call is patrol. Patrol officers, while responding to rape calls quickly, are often confronted with unfamiliar circumstances once they arrive at the scene. The number of rapes which occur and get reported and the number of patrol officers potentially available to respond to rape calls make it mathematically likely that a patrol officer will be called to the scene of a rape only about once every year. The patrol officer thus is responding to an atypical crime situation and may not be aware of the types of evidence and procedures to collect evidence available to the police.

It is particularly important that, in addition to the victim statement and a canvassing of the crime scene for belongings possibly dropped by the suspect, fingerprint latents be searched out, torn and soiled clothing be collected, photographs be taken and the police attempt to identify potential witnesses to corroborate any part of the victim's statement. These steps are included as vital police evidence collection practices in recent work done by the Law and Justice Study Center/Human Affairs Research Center of the Battelle Research Institute under a discretionary grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. This grant contract studied the crime of rape and developed manuals for use by police, among other criminal justice system components.

The determination of potential for additional evidence and information leading to suspect identification is a second step and is a responsibility of the Seattle Police Department Sex Crimes Unit. This step is more difficult to complete if the initial report does not detail what type of physical evidence is available and does not assist the detectives by pointing them in the most potentially useful direction for collecting evidence and information. In the recent past, only five Sex Crimes Unit detectives were responsible for investigating about 300 rape cases, as well as 700 other sex crime cases a year. With such resource limitations, it is particularly important that detective time not be wasted following an evidence trail which earlier could have been determined to be unlikely to yield results.

According to the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Study Center Report (Lisa Brodyaga, et al., Rape and Its Victims: A Report for Citizens, Health Facilities and Criminal Justice Agencies, United States Department of Justice, LEAA, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, November, 1975), it is vitally important that a "systematic" police response be available particularly for the crime of rape. The report claims that:

...in reacting to a report of rape, the more effective law enforcement agencies put in motion a series of activities engaging several different units within the department and involving a number of variably integrated procedures. Tactful treatment of the victim by the police officer, for example, facilitates the detectives' work: good lab procedures are needed to make use of carefully collected evidence; the better the system for sharing information between patrol and investigative units, the higher will be the rate at which rapists are identified and arrested.

In part, the Battelle rape research compares the response of five police jurisdictions for the crime of rape. In all five of the police jurisdictions from which rape reports were collected, the initial complaint in rape cases was responded to by patrol officers. Rape cases are assigned a high dispatch priority and, consequently, patrol officers responded to rape calls within ten minutes in all five sampled police jurisdictions.

In contrast to the speed with which sex crimes are responded to by patrol officers, there was a great range of sex crime investigator (detective) response from one jurisdiction to another. The range of detective response for rape is facilitated by the speed with which cases are assigned based on the patrol officer's report. In the National Institute's study of rape and its victims referenced above, the activities

within a police agency are cited as vital to successful identification and apprehension of rapists. With this in mind, the comparison from the Battelle study shows that less than 5 percent of the rape cases reported to Detroit police required three or more days for investigative assignment. By comparison, Seattle Police Department data show that approximately one-third of all cases were assigned for followup investigation three or more days after the initial report was taken by patrol officers. Having reported the Battelle findings on Seattle's response to rape, it will be important to record the fact that Battelle conducted its assessment of the Seattle Police Department's response based on 1972 data. Sex Crimes Unit personnel rightly claim that a number of changes instituted in recent years make a number of Battelle's comparisons less than valid. Not wanting to diminish the general usefulness of the Battelle work, it is included here with the Seattle Police Department's view. The reader may come to the conclusion that some level of problem exists, irrespective of specific levels of quantification.

The time delay for rape reports reaching the detectives from patrol, if true, would have a direct impact on reduced efficiency in evidence assembling and identification of potential suspects. According to the Battelle study, "the speed with which cases were assigned appeared to have a significant impact on the kinds of evidence collected and the methods used to identify alleged offenders." It must be indicated, however, that Seattle Police Department detectives are not likely to be in a position to identify potential evidence as has been detailed in the above descriptions. This situation appears to be describable as follows.

Patrol is ill-equipped to look for and collect physical evidence (photographing the scene, collecting soiled and torn clothing and searching out fingerprints). Patrol officers individually do not respond to rape calls with sufficient frequency to be familiar with the unusual evidence requirements unique to the prosecution of rape cases. Patrol officer may not have the time to collect fingerprints and may be embarrassed to canvass for evidence instead of spending time calming down or interviewing the victim. Patrol officers rarely carry cameras for taking photographs at crime scenes.

The rape scene situation is obviously emotionally charged. The currently used offense report form leaves much of the decision making with respect to the type of and phrasing of questions asked rape victims up to individual officers. While the Seattle Rape Reduction Project reports that, generally, patrol officers approach the crime-scene victim interview with sensitivity, there is some amount of variation in the information recorded on offense reports. In other jurisdictions, a specialized rape offense report is used. In these police jurisdictions, the rape offense report serves as both a checklist and a quality control mechanism for gathering information from rape victims which, due to its uniformity, can be more easily used by the Sex Crimes Unit sergeant to screen for the more "solvable" rape cases, based on availability of information.

The Sex Crimes Unit may make case decisions, often being unaware of the existence of evidence which could lead to the identification of a suspect. Since the collection of evidence and information does not always occur in a consistent manner, the decisions made by the Sex Crimes Unit detectives may result in a loss of potentially solvable cases due to lack of information contained in an offense report. In other cases, evidence which could have been collected and used to develop a case has not been collected and is lost to the detectives. Evidence may be lost by (1) the delay in patrol reports reaching detectives, (2) the method of detective/victim interaction, and (3) the quality and opportunity for evidence collected. The Seattle Police Department Sex Crimes Unit believes there has been a steady advancement in the quality of patrol rape reports. The claim is also made that delay is not usually a factor.

For the five police jurisdictions studied by Battelle, the frequency with which victim clothing was collected as evidence varied greatly. Victim clothing can be, like victim photographs, instrumental in getting prosecutors to file charges and, if the case goes to trial, can be persuasive evidence to be placed in the trial record. In Detroit and Phoenix, physical evidence (victim clothing) was collected and placed in evidence two to three times more often than in Seattle. The Battelle study reports the frequency with which fingerprint latents were lifted appeared to be a function of the availability of trained patrol officers or evidence technicians responding to the scene. This is of

particular importance in Seattle where, over the past several years, a number of Law and Justice programs have been designed to increase the utilization of fingerprints in crime control efforts. The most recent project aimed at increasing the use of fingerprints in Seattle was the Patrol Investigative Training Project, which sought to train and equip every patrol officer with the technology to lift latents from crime scenes. The result of this training does not appear to be overwhelming.

According to the Battelle research, fingerprint latents were lifted for rape cases by patrol officers four times as often in Phoenix as in Seattle. The collection of evidence in addition to the photographs of victim bruises and abrasions which are collected at the Sexual Assault Center is also important. When available, crime scene evidence such as broken glasses, furniture and towels or sheets can be useful in the prosecution of rape offenders. Such evidence shows graphically that the victim resisted the rapist's attacks. Overall, for all five cities studied by Battelle, physical evidence was collected approximately 60 percent of the time. The range of physical evidence and crime scene photographs collected and taken ranged from a high of 91 percent in Phoenix to a five-city low of 40 percent of reported cases in Seattle.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement E

Rejected Strategy

Detective Evidence Collection. In other cities, detectives are dispatched to rape scenes and they canvass for physical evidence. While the Seattle Police Department's Morals Unit/Crimes Against Persons Section has the responsibility for investigation of all reported sex crimes in which adult offenders are thought to be involved, the process of identifying a potential suspect almost always begins with the Seattle Police Department patrol officer. Since the process begins at the patrol level, the process for identifying and collecting physical evidence, taking photographs and taking down as much information as is available at the scene of the crime and the writing of the report is the responsibility of patrol.

The Morals Unit consists of five detectives (two females and three males) who work a shift schedule of Monday through Friday from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., with one detective on duty Saturdays from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. The crime of rape, however, occurs most frequently from 5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. It is readily discernible from the differences in shift schedules worked by detectives and the time of occurrence of rape that detectives are not readily available to respond to rape calls at the time they come in. Another reason why the initial crime scene investigation falls solely on the patrol officer is that only five Morals detectives are available to cover all sex offenses which occur in the city. These five detectives are responsible for more than 1,000 sex crime cases a year. Rape has been a priority crime of the City for the last four years; therefore, according to the Crimes Against Persons captain, rape cases receive priority attention. The five Morals detectives, however, are also responsible for cases which involve intrusions which are of some alarm to citizens. For example, in addition to handling all cases of homicide which involve sexual assault, the unit also handles incest and child molestation cases, window peepers, obscene phone calls, etc. The use of detective resources on sex cases is further reduced by the fact that two detectives frequently work together on a case.

This strategy is rejected for the following reasons:

1. Approximately 300 cases of rape are reported every year to the Seattle Police Department.
2. Only five Morals Unit detectives are available to do an investigation in a rape case.
3. These five Morals Unit detectives also have responsibilities for other sex crimes, including homicides involving sexual molestation.

4. Morals detectives work shifts which do not coincide with the occurrence of the crime of rape.
5. The best opportunity to collect evidence which could be relevant to the solvability of a case, therefore, resides at the patrol level.

Proposed Strategy

The answer to the evidence collection problem is twofold:

1. For the purpose of consistent taking of victim information, a uniform person crime offense report containing prescribed questions to be asked and observations to note as possible evidence should be developed. An administrative decision on the part of the police department has already been made to revise Seattle Police Department forms. It is believed that a "person crime" specific report form offers advantages over both a "rape specific" form and over a general "all crime" report form, as well. These revisions will necessitate no expenditure of new funds.
2. For the purpose of facilitating better evidence collection, the evidence collection strategy described in the Project Statement which follows this Problem Statement will be available in 1978 for rape case evidence collection. This project will create evidence collection specialists who will be available and trained to respond to crime scenes.

Specialized equipment and training are required for rape scene investigations.

Training. Training will be provided for evidence technicians using resources currently available within the police department, and possibly using local rape researchers. The Battelle Research Center/Law and Justice Study Center produced a manual for police use in rape evidence collection. This document, although not currently available, was produced under contract with the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Suggested methodologies which may be applicable for use in Seattle could be used for training evidence technicians when the document is released by LEAA. The training should be cooperatively engineered with the King County Prosecutor's Office to facilitate collection of evidence which is particularly useful to facilitate filing and prosecution of rape cases, from the prosecutor's point of view.

Equipment. There is a need to photograph crime scenes, as well as victims, in rape cases. As stated above, signs of physical resistance by the rape victim (broken and overturned furniture, weapons used, etc.) often will be very useful in encouraging the prosecutor to file a case, as well as being useful to obtain a conviction or guilty plea. The type of cameras required are the ones currently used in homicide and rape cases. These are technically advanced cameras and cost \$2,000 each. Ten cameras are required, one per each shift for each police sector. In addition, materials for rape evidence collection, such as large polyurethane bags for collection of soiled and torn victim clothing, are required. These costs are included and reflected in the following Project Statement.

Project: Evidence Collection, Processing and Management

Goals

1. To increase the value of fingerprint evidence in solving burglary and rape cases.
2. To demonstrate the utility of having a full-time dedicated project manager.

Objectives

1. To increase significantly the amount and quality of fingerprint evidence collected from burglary and rape scenes.
2. To increase significantly the arrest rates for burglary and rape.
3. To increase significantly the quantity and quality of fingerprints collected on juvenile felony suspects taken into custody.
4. To increase significantly the quality of fingerprints collected on adult felony suspects taken into custody.
5. To provide the technological basis for future reductions in labor costs associated with processing fingerprint evidence.

Methods

This is a multifaceted project that attempts to solve several associated problems using several integrated methods. It provides for the following:

1. collection of fingerprint evidence from burglary and rape crime scenes;
2. increasing the quantity and quality of juvenile suspect prints stored in master files;
3. increasing the quality of adult suspect prints stored in master files;
4. reduction of labor costs involved in comparing prints; and
5. high quality project management.

Collection of Evidence: Approximately 50 to 60 patrol officers will be selected to process all burglary and rape crime scenes for fingerprint evidence. These officers will be selected on a volunteer basis or will be selected by virtue of their being on the list of eligibles for assignment to detective. It is believed that this selection process will choose officers who will perform at the highest possible effectiveness. Volunteers can be expected to perform well by virtue of their interest. By selecting from the detective-eligible list and making detective assignment conditional to a high quality performance in the evidence specialist assignment, a higher than normal quality of performance would be encouraged. These specially selected officers will be deployed in such a way that at least one specialist will be assigned to each sector on each watch.

Juvenile Prints: Special efforts will be made to standardize the processing of juvenile suspects so that all eligible juveniles are fingerprinted by skilled personnel. The alternatives include (1) seeking a broader court order, (2) training court personnel in "rolling" prints, and (3) assigning the task of fingerprinting juveniles to on-site detectives.

Adult Prints: Booking procedures will be revised so that suspects will be fingerprinted by the Seattle Police Department prior to being turned over to the King County Department of Rehabilitative Services.

Automatic Fingerprint Scanner: An automatic fingerprint scanner will be leased/purchased and the long and tedious task of creating an automated system will begin.

Management: A full-time project manager will be selected and assigned to coordinate the various components of the project. The manager will have the rank of captain or acting captain and will be selected from the list of currently available lieutenants and captains. The project will fund the pay differential between a lieutenant and a captain.

The project will also provide for three additional identification technicians, two for processing increased amounts of evidence submitted and one to be dedicated to "gearing-up" the automatic fingerprint scanner system.

Evaluation

Objective 1, to increase the amount and quality of fingerprint evidence from burglary and rape scenes, will be assessed by two measures: amount, or the number of cases in which at least one fingerprint is obtained from the crime scene; and quality, or the number of cases in which at least one codeable fingerprint is obtained from the crime scene. The two measures will be separately analyzed within a non-equivalent control group design in which three types of offenses (burglary and rape as separate experimental cases and auto theft as comparison cases) will be sampled from two periods (both before and after project implementation). The time periods will consist of corresponding months and be not less than six nor more than twelve months, depending on time required to implement the project. The number of cases sampled will be 100 percent of reported rape cases for the time period and a percentage sample that will yield corresponding numbers of reported burglary and auto theft cases.

Objective 2, increased burglary and rape arrests, will be evaluated using two methods. The first method is the same design (a non-equivalent control group design) as used for Objective 1. The measure used will be whether fingerprints were instrumental in identifying the suspect. (In those instances in which a person is identified through fingerprints, not arrested but an arrest warrant is issued, it will be counted as an arrest, for evaluation purposes.) Measures to assess project impact will be obtained for the same time periods used in Objective 1. As in the case of Objective 1, all rape arrest cases will be sampled and a percentage random sample of burglary and auto theft cases to yield equal numbers will be performed.

The second method will consist of project personnel recording the offense case number of offenses in which suspects are identified. This information will be used within the evaluation to identify the number of burglary and rape cases with suspect identification produced through means of fingerprints as a proportion of reported cases. This measure will be computed on a weekly basis and be compared on a pre-post project basis.

Objectives 3 and 4 will be evaluated by a pre-post project comparison of the number (quantity) of fingerprinted felony arrestees to non-fingerprinted felony arrestees. This will be performed separately for juveniles and adults. Time periods to be used will be the same as those used for Objectives 1 and 2.

For juvenile suspects, quality of fingerprinting will be assessed pre- and post-project implementation by comparing codeable to non-codeable prints within the two time periods.

Objective 5, provision of technological bases for future labor cost savings, will be considered to have been met if the automatic scanners are shown to have sufficient "cost avoidance" characteristics to justify their purchase. Cost avoidance is defined here as performing fingerprint processing more efficiently (more prints processed per unit cost, with both the number of prints and cost being computed over the useful life of the equipment) than is possible with the present manual system.

Sufficient cost avoidance is defined as a projected net savings in cost to the City (projected manual processing cost minus projected automatic processing cost) that is greater than the total cost of the equipment over the useful life (lease/purchase, maintenance, repair, operation costs).

Data collection for Objective 1, random stratified sample of rape, burglary and auto theft reports, will be performed by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office research and evaluation staff using Seattle Police Department data processing listings of offense case numbers. From police department offense reports and detective followup reports, item 6 (physical evidence) will be used to determine if fingerprints were obtained.

For Objective 2, increased arrests due to fingerprint evidence, sample data collection will be performed in the same manner as for Objective 1, but using Seattle Police Department data processing listings of cleared cases. The second method of evaluation of this objective will use evaluation data presently collected by the Single Fingerprint Project. The Single Fingerprint Project will continue to collect data for the duration of that project.

Objectives 3 and 4 will require that data be collected on adult and juvenile felony arrestees and matched with fingerprint unit records to determine whether prints were submitted for coding and if they were of sufficient quality for coding. This will be done by obtaining a listing of felony arrestees by J and JM numbers from Seattle Police Department Data Processing Section and matching these with fingerprint unit records.

Data to determine unit cost of fingerprint processing for manual and automated processing (Objective 5) will be collected by project staff.

Project evaluation will be performed by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, with personnel and data analysis costs being funded by the Criminal Justice Evaluation Project. Data collection costs for samples will also be funded by the evaluation project, while data collecting regarding normal Evidence Collection, Processing and Management Project operation will be funded through this project.

Costs

	<u>Burglary Evidence Collection & Management</u>	<u>Rape Evidence Collection & Management</u>	<u>Summary - Evidence Collection & Management</u>
	<u>1978</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1978</u>
LEAA	\$102,020	\$20,764	\$122,784
State	5,668	1,154	6,822
City	5,667	1,153	6,820
Total	\$113,355	\$23,071	\$136,426

Burglary Evidence Collection and Management

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$ 52,507	Federal (LEAA)	\$102,020	90%
Supplies	1,120	State Buy-In	5,668	5%
Other Services and Charges	55,398	Local Cash Match	5,667	5%
Capital Outlay	4,330	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
Total Costs	\$113,355	Total Funds	\$113,355	

Rape Evidence Collection and Management

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$ 0	Federal (LEAA)	\$ 20,764	90%
Supplies	1,000	State Buy-In	1,154	5%
Other Services and Charges	1,099	Local Cash Match	1,153	5%
Capital Outlay	20,972	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
<hr/>		<hr/>		
Total Cost	\$ 23,071	Total Funds	\$23,071	

Summary - Evidence Collection and Management

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$ 52,507	Federal (LEAA)	\$122,784	90%
Supplies	2,120	State Buy-In	6,822	5%
Other Services and Charges	56,497	Local Cash Match	6,820	5%
Capital Outlay	25,302	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
<hr/>		<hr/>		
Total Cost	\$136,426	Total Funds	\$136,426	



Seattle Police Department Photo

Problem Statement F: The recently implemented Anti-Fencing Project, which attempts to identify and apprehend dealers in stolen property (fences), has not operated long enough to determine its effectiveness.

Discussion

Since October, 1976, the Seattle Police Department has operated an LEAA-funded Anti-Fencing Project. That project responds to the problems of identifying and apprehending dealers in stolen property.

The problems relating to stolen property disposition were first identified through a research study by Dr. Marilyn Walsh of Battelle and reported in "Stolen Property and Its Redistribution in the Seattle Metropolitan Area." That study formed the basis for further study by a Seattle Police Department Anti-Fencing Task Force, chaired by Lt. H. M. Slessman and reported in "Final Report: Anti-Fencing Program." Those two reports support the belief that a significant amount of the unrecovered property taken in burglaries is disposed of through "fences."

The presently operating Anti-Fencing Project is funded through March, 1978, for a total of 18 months. In order to determine the project's impact on burglary, it would need to operate for at least 24 months. The 24-month milestone will be reached on September 30, 1978. The City's budget year begins January 1. In order to allow for the project's cost to be assumed by the City's budget, in the event that it is a successful approach to burglary reduction, the most convenient time for that to occur will be January 1, 1979. Therefore, the Anti-Fencing Project will be continued on grant funds until December 31, 1978.

Project: Anti-Fencing - B

Goal: To reduce the number of burglaries committed in Seattle by reducing markets for stolen property.

Objective: To significantly increase arrests and convictions of dealers in stolen property.

Methods

The presently operating project assumes, as will this continuation phase, the following:

1. There are fences operating in Seattle who are essential to the burglar population for conversion of stolen goods; if a substantial number of fencing operations are curtailed, some burglars will lose their incentive to commit burglary.
2. Fences are used by both adult and juvenile burglars.
3. The current Washington State criminal statutes provide a sufficient basis for arresting, prosecuting and convicting fences.
4. Seattle police investigators have sufficient skills to develop and prepare fencing cases.

The process that takes a fencing case from initial suspicion through adjudication has, in varying degrees, the following steps. Each step has alternative facilitating activities associated with it; each activity has a resource requirement.

Step 1: Generate Fencing Unit Suspicion. The Fencing Unit can pursue cases only after there is a suspicion on the part of fencing personnel that an individual or group may be involved in illegal fencing activity.

Activity: To generate initial suspicion, the Fencing Unit will perform varying combinations of the following:

1. Interview Burglary, Certain Larceny and Certain Narcotics Suspects. Selected burglary, larceny and narcotics suspects will be interviewed for the purpose of developing fencing leads. Special efforts will be made to interview as many burglary suspects as possible. In addition, special efforts will be made to interview juvenile suspects, the assumption being that juveniles commit a high percentage of residential burglaries. During 1975, approximately 2,000 arrestees fit into the above categories.
2. Interview Patrol Officers and Other Detectives. Patrol personnel and detectives not assigned to the Fencing Unit are believed often to have information on fences which, if solicited, would be given to fencing detectives. The Fencing Unit will proactively seek information from these patrol officers and other detectives.
3. Obtain Information from Informants. The Fencing Unit will actively recruit and develop informants who will be expected from time to time to provide information on fences, as well as participate in other operations of the unit, including controlled buying from and selling to suspected fences.

Resources: The resources for this activity consist of a full-time liaison specialist, part-time services of four field investigators and payments to informants.

Step 2: Filter or Reduce Information. It is clear that the activities of Step 1 above will generate far more information than can reasonably be followed up. The information would need to be sorted, organized and prioritized in terms of its validity and worth.

Activity: An information analysis component of the project will have responsibility for providing this data reduction service. Techniques common to intelligence analysis

and systems analysis will be applied through this component. Cross-indexed name files and criminal network charts will be developed and maintained by this component.

Resources: A full-time intelligence analyst will be responsible for this activity.

Step 3: Validate or Solidify Suspicion. Once a fencing suspect has been tentatively identified, serious concentrated investigation can begin, the interim result being a search warrant or an arrest or a determination that the tentative identification was valid.

Activity: There are several alternative approaches to accomplishing Step 3.

1. Preponderance of Information. Information may be provided by multiple, independent, non-conspiring sources that is sufficient to persuade a prosecutor to support issuance of a warrant, without further suspicion-validating activities.
2. Surveillance. Field investigators will attempt visual observation of activities surrounding a suspected fence, with the objective of monitoring traffic patterns in and out of the location and possibly gathering evidence of buying and selling transactions between the suspected fence and suppliers or customers and between the suspected fence and police agents or informants.
3. Buy or Sell Transactions. Field investigators will initiate or cause to be initiated incriminating buying or selling transactions between the suspected fence and police agents or informants.

Resources: The resources required for this activity are as follows.

1. Services of the intelligence analyst.
2. Field investigators, undercover cars, surveillance equipment.
3. Buy money to purchase goods from suspected fences and to purchase goods that can be represented as stolen and sold to suspected fences, services of agents or informants.

Step 4: Secure Search/Arrest Warrant and Conduct Search/Arrest. This step involves presenting information to the King County Prosecutor's Office of sufficient quality and quantity to persuade the prosecutor to give permission to proceed with the case.

Resources: The resources required for this step include field investigator time and, above all, an available and responsive prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting attorney would need to be attuned especially to the laws regarding fencing. This point is raised because most prosecutors have little occasion during their normal work routine to be particularly sensitive to the needs accompanying such cases.

Finally, this step requires the expertise of a property identification specialist who can quickly determine if property discovered during a search or arrest is, in fact, stolen.

Step 5: Identify and Return Stolen Property. Once property is determined to be stolen, special efforts will be made to return it to its rightful owners.

Activity: To facilitate this step, a cross-indexed card file of identifiable stolen property will be created and maintained.

Resources: The property identification specialist will have responsibility for this activity.

Step 6: Prepare Reports and Testify in Court. This step, of course, represents the culmination of the investigative process, and the resources required consist of dedicated and patient detectives.

This entire methodology is summarized in the following table.

<u>Program Process</u>	<u>Program Activity</u>	<u>Program Resources</u>
1. <u>Generate initial suspicion</u>	Interview burglars, larcenists and drug operators	Liaison specialist
	Interview patrol officers and detectives	Field investigator
	Work with informants	Informant payments (cash) Transportation
2. <u>Filter information</u>	Intelligence and criminal network analysis	Intelligence analyst
3. <u>Validate or solidify suspicions</u>	Preponderance of information	Intelligence analyst
	Surveillance	Field investigators
	Buy and sell transactions	Undercover cars Surveillance equipment Buy money Informant payments
4. <u>Secure search/arrest warrants</u>	Self-explanatory	Prosecutor Property specialist Field investigator
5. <u>Return stolen property</u>	Property file	Property specialist
6. <u>Reports and courts</u>	Self-explanatory	Prosecutor Field investigator

Resources

Staff and Organization: The project will be operated by the Crimes Against Property Section of the Seattle Police Department Investigations Bureau. The project director will be the commander of the Vehicle/Commercial Theft Unit. He will devote approximately 30 percent of his time as project director.

The total composition of the anti-fencing squad will be one sergeant, six detectives and one clerk-typist. The six (one grant-funded, five City-funded) detectives will serve as follows: one intelligence analyst, one property recovery specialist, one liaison specialist and three field investigators.

Responsibilities of project personnel are as follows.

Intelligence analyst: will coordinate case information and prepare necessary statistical data. He/she will review available burglary/theft crime reports and intelligence culled from detectives, patrol officers and their informants. This information will aid the planning of which suspects and places deserve investigation and surveillance.

Property identification specialist: will trace ownership of recovered stolen property, identify stolen property at locations served with search warrants and establish and maintain a file of identifiable stolen property. In addition, he/she will see that recovered property is returned to its rightful owners.

Liaison specialist: will maintain frequent contact with individual patrol officers/detectives who have information on currently operating burglars and their fences. He/she will also collect information from the Anti-Fencing Unit's own detectives and insure that they also maintain close communication with other department personnel.

Field investigators: will have flexibility to perform numerous project duties, which will vary from time to time but will include the following:

1. Interviewing arrested burglary, certain larceny and narcotics suspects regarding their acquaintances and fencing contacts.
2. Organizing and meeting with informants to develop information on fences, their MO's and accomplices.
3. Seeking fencing information from other detectives and patrol officers, as well as relating useful information about burglary suspects to them.
4. Conducting surveillance of burglars and fences.
5. Buying and selling purportedly stolen property as undercover agents to develop cases against fences.
6. Preparing case information for presentation to the prosecutor and subsequently testifying in court.

Sergeant: will serve as supervisor of the Anti-Fencing Squad, supervising the daily operations of the eight unit personnel. The sergeant will also assist unit personnel on highly sensitive or potentially controversial investigations.

Cooperating Agency

The King County Prosecutor's Office will play a vital role of legal support in this project, particularly in the securing of search warrants and in the prosecution of arrested fences. The prosecutor has expressed full support and has pledged full cooperation with the Seattle Police Department in the conduct of this project.

Evaluation

The crime impact evaluation will be performed at the end of the first year of operations of the Anti-Fencing Project and will assess the extent to which fencing arrests have increased and the project's subsequent effect upon burglary rates.

To determine the extent to which the project is successful in its efforts to increase the number of arrests and subsequent convictions of dealers in stolen property, the following comparisons will be made. First, a pre-post comparison will be made of the number of arrests and convictions for buying, selling or possession of stolen property. Since this comparison will include some number of burglars rather than fences, an examination of these cases is planned to determine how many are actually fences. This number will also be analyzed within pre-post comparisons. Additional data available on the value of stolen goods recovered and the number of separate burglaries represented by those stolen items will be analyzed. The data base for determining the number of separate burglaries involved in such arrests will depend on the prior implementation of the Property Accountability Project.

The second comparison will involve an analysis to determine the effect of fencing arrests on the incidence of burglary. This will consist of normal and time-lag correlations between monthly fencing arrest and reported burglary rates. Such analyses will

indicate whether fencing arrests precede (cause) changes in burglary rates, or if they are a response to burglary rate changes (effect), or if both arrest and burglary rates co-vary (are caused by some other factor).

Costs of evaluation staff, data collection and data analysis are funded through the Criminal Justice Evaluation Project. All necessary data are available as part of the Seattle Police Department's normal record-keeping procedures, with the exception of information concerning the number of burglaries represented by recovered goods. The Property Accountability Project will provide this information, if it is implemented prior to the Anti-Fencing Project.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
LEAA	\$52,963	\$ -0-
State	2,943	-0-
City*	2,942	-0-
Total	\$58,848	-0-

*In addition to 5 percent grant match, the City's cost of operating this project on an annual basis is approximately \$185,000. A City budget decision to continue the project past LEAA funding would cost approximately \$263,000.

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$32,877	Federal (LEAA)	\$53,963	90%
Supplies	300	State Buy-In	2,943	5%
Other Services and Charges	25,671	Local Cash Match	2,942	5%
Capital Outlay	0	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
Total Cost	\$58,848	Total Funds	\$58,848	

Problem Statement G: Cash is too readily accessible to robbers of commercial establishments.

Discussion

Approximately 62 percent of commercial robberies in 1975 were against convenience markets, taverns, restaurants, service stations and liquor stores--all rather small businesses which tend to stay open late in the evening. Robbery offenders usually try to commit their robberies when there are few, if any, witnesses--which is probably the reason why small businesses are the preferred targets. Also, smaller businesses usually have fewer means of protecting themselves from robbery. Most cannot afford a security staff.

The small business is generally in a defenseless position. A commercial establishment must keep itself open to the public in order to carry out its business function. The more obstacles that are put in the way of a potential robber, the less attractive the establishment will be to its patrons. Thus the business remains somewhat vulnerable to potential robbers. During 1975, robbers took advantage of that vulnerability to cause an average loss of \$393 per robbery.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement G

Current Strategy: The most promising method of reducing robberies under these circumstances is to make the cash in the store unavailable to the robber. The exact change machines on transit busses have virtually eliminated robberies of bus drivers. Similarly, some service stations have gone to exact change after 7:00 p.m. While most stores cannot require exact change of the customers, it may be possible to control the cash in such a way that it is still relatively inaccessible to the robber.

A machine has been invented to be used in conjunction with a cash register in a store. The store's money is kept in the machine, which acts as a safe with a vending capability. Money of relatively small amounts, for example \$15, is placed in the machine in capsules which are retrieved by pushing a button. Once money has been taken from the machine, it is possible to push the button again only after a certain pre-determined time period has elapsed; for example, one and one-half minutes. All money taken from customers is put into capsules and into the machine. Therefore, at any given time, only \$15 or less is available in the cash register to a robber. To obtain any more money, the robber must wait for one and one-half minute periods to pass. It is expected that few robbers will be willing to stand around and wait for the money to be produced.

Because the machine is built like a safe, and because the clerk does not have a method of opening the safe, there is little chance that the robber will be able to bypass the time release and gain access to all the cash in the machine. If the lock on the machine is forced, a silent alarm rings at a security agency.

There are problems with this strategy, however. The first problem with the cash controller is that its estimated price is \$900 to \$1,000. Although the machine is not in mass production and available on the market, it can be foreseen that the price probably will make it beyond the reach of many of the store owners who would have a need for it. Therefore, steps are being taken to see if the machine can be redesigned and produced at a much lower cost.

The second problem with the machine is its operational compatibility with the requirements of small businesses. While the machine has been tested in at least one food retail establishment, it has not yet been ascertained whether the machine is fully compatible with most of the types of businesses that would need the kind of protection it provides.

The third problem is whether use of these machines would simply cause the offender to choose another target for the crime. This might include causing offenders to shift from robbery of commercial establishments to robbery of individuals and residences.

Both of these other targets can provide the offender with cash, although in lesser quantities than would be available from commercial establishments. This problem is present in virtually all target hardening strategies, and there are no solutions available.

Even though there are problems with this strategy, it is recommended for immediate implementation, because there are no strategies available that offer potential for preventing commercial robbery against small establishments.

The General Counsel of LEAA has been requested to render an opinion as to whether this proposed strategy violates any LEAA regulations. Receipt of a favorable opinion is pending.

Project: Robbery Reduction - Cash Controller

Goal: To reduce robbery against small commercial establishments.

Objectives

1. To reduce significantly the number of robberies committed against establishments that have cash controllers when compared to control establishments.
2. To reduce significantly the monetary loss in robberies against cash controlled establishments when compared to control establishments.
3. To test the cash controller's compatibility with cash operating practices in small commercial establishments.

Methods

Approximately 50 cash controllers will be leased during the first phase of the project, for temporary installation in potential robbery targets selected by the technique used for selecting targets for the Hidden Cameras Project. An additional 25 machines will be added during the continuation phase.

Evaluation

Assessment of this project will occur as a level "B" evaluation.

Objective 1, reduction in robbery incidents, will be measured within a randomly assigned experimental-control group design using pre- and post-measures. A group of high robbery risk establishments will first be selected on the basis of prior reported robberies. Of those indicating willingness to participate in the project, a number "n" equivalent to the number of cash controller machines will be randomly selected as experimental sites. An equal number of sites will be randomly selected as a control group. To determine if the cash controller is effective in preventing robberies, a comparison will be performed of robberies occurring in the experimental and control groups before and during the project.

Objective 2, reduction in monetary loss, will be assessed on the basis of average loss due to robberies for control and experimental groups before and during the project.

Objective 3, compatibility with operating practices of small businesses, will be assessed by interviews with site operators immediately, four and eight months after cash controller installation. This will include questions concerning operator satisfaction, ease of use, amount of cash kept immediately available and perceived customer reactions. In additions, records will be kept of requests for cash controller removal and reasons for such requests, if they occur.

All data processing, analysis and evaluation costs will be funded through the Criminal Justice Evaluation Project.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
LEAA	\$25,000	\$ -0-	\$ -0-
State	1,389	-0-	-0-
City	1,389	-0-	-0-
Total	\$27,778	-0-	-0-

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$ 0	Federal (LEAA)	\$25,000	90%
Supplies	0	State Buy-In	1,389	5%
Other Services and Charges	27,778	Local Cash Match	1,389	5%
Capital Outlay	0	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
Total Cost	\$27,778		\$27,778	

Problem Statement H: Arrest and clearance rates for non-commercial robbery are approximately one-half arrest and clearance rates for commercial robbery.

Discussion

During 1975, there were 2,103 robberies reported to the police. Approximately 70 percent of the robberies were non-commercial; the remaining 30 percent were against commercial establishments. Approximately 199 (34 percent) of the commercial robberies were cleared by the police. However, only 258 (17 percent) of the street and residential robberies were cleared.

There may be several explanations for this apparent disparity. Robberies committed in a commercial setting may be more amenable to solution than non-commercial robberies. Most commercial settings have good lighting, thereby enabling the victim or witness to see the robber better than would be the case in a nighttime street robbery. There is also the possibility that a commercial robbery victim is generally a "better" witness than a street or residential victim. Commercial victims are more likely to have anticipated the threat of robbery and are, therefore, less distraught when a robbery actually occurs; a street or residential victim is more likely to become completely unnerved. This factor may account for more frequent injuries to street and residential victims than to commercial victims.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement H

Rejected Strategies

Increased police patrols (on-view arrest). On-view arrests are those made by a police officer who has witnessed the commission of a crime without being alerted by a prior call from a victim or witness. In a sample of robbery arrest cases, 4.7 percent of the arrests were made in this fashion. The low percentage of on-view arrests should come as no surprise. The probability of an officer being in a position to observe a robbery is very low, bearing in mind that there are an average of five robberies committed each day in the entire city.

Substantially increasing the number of police officers on patrol to increase the percentage of persons apprehended in this fashion has often been recommended. Although some portions of the city have a higher probability of robbery than others--which would suggest there are areas in which saturation patrols could be undertaken--even in the census tract (incorporating most of downtown Seattle) which has the highest rate of robbery, there is only one robbery every three days. The next highest census tract has one robbery every five days. The cost of providing heavy patrol coverage under these conditions is too high.

For the present, therefore, a strategy of increasing police patrols for the purpose of increasing apprehensions of robbery offenders is not recommended.

Decoys. Some cities have attempted to disguise police officers to look like "good" street robbery targets, or decoys, and deploy them in areas that have a high incidence of street robberies. When an offender attempts to rob the decoy, other officers who are stationed nearby can make an immediate arrest. Success with this strategy in New York has been highly praised. The strategy has been applied in the past in Seattle on a limited scale.

The problems with this strategy are similar to those of increased police patrol. First, as discussed above, it is very difficult to isolate high street robbery areas. Second, manpower costs associated with decoy deployments are extremely high and cannot be justified on an ongoing basis.

Current Strategies

The strategies currently operating in Seattle to arrest non-commercial robbery offenders are (1) patrol in marked cars, making an occasional on-view arrest, and (2) standard

follow-up investigation by detectives. Both of these strategies are about as successful as can reasonably be expected. The deficiencies of the latter strategy, detective follow-up, are discussed under other problem statements relating to apprehension problems and, therefore, will not be repeated here.

Proposed Strategy

The best opportunity to solve robbery cases is to maximize the usefulness of eye-witness identification by victims and witnesses. Experience has shown that victims or witnesses can identify robbery offenders by looking at mug shots of previously arrested persons, if given the opportunity to do so in a timely manner.

The strategy proposed here is both to provide the opportunity and to facilitate the timeliness element through the Robbery Victim Assistance Project.

Project: Robbery Victim Assistance

Goal: To reduce non-commercial robberies.

Objectives

1. To increase significantly the arrest and clearance rates for non-commercial robbery.
2. To decrease significantly the time lag between the non-commercial robbery offense and the beginning of follow-up investigation for the offense.
3. To determine if non-commercial robbery offenders are identifiable as commercial robbery offenders, through use of the Seattle Police Department Offender Recognition identification procedures.

Methods

This will be a continuation project.

This project attempts to achieve the above objectives by providing transportation for victims and witnesses to non-commercial robberies, when the circumstances warrant, from the scene of the robbery to downtown police headquarters so victims and witnesses can look at mug shots for the purpose of possibly identifying a suspect.

When a non-commercial robbery occurs, patrol officers will respond as usual. The officer establishes that the victim or witness could possibly identify the offender, if given an opportunity. The officer will call for a Community Service Officer (CSO) to transport the victim/witness to the Central Robbery Section to look at mug shots. Meanwhile, using the IDMO selection process, the Robbery Section will select photos that best fit the description of the suspect.

If the victim or witness is able to make an identification, appropriate statements will be taken. The CSO will then provide return transportation for the victim/witness.

Evaluation

This project will be assessed using a level "C" evaluation design.

Objective 1, to increase arrest and clearance rates, will be evaluated by comparing pre- and during-grant period arrest and clearance rates for non-commercial robberies. Comparison periods will consist of each of the 12 months immediately prior to implementation of the project with the first 12 months of the project period. A paired t-test will be used to compare similar months' arrest clearance rates (e.g., the number of arrests and clearances as a percent of all non-commercial robbery reports for the month of January of the pre-period compared with the January of first-year project operation).

Objective 2, to decrease the time between offense occurrence and initial detective follow-up, will be assessed by randomly selecting 100 pre- and grant-period cases and determining the time between offense occurrence and first attempted detective contact with either the victim(s) or witness(es). Assuming a normal distribution of time values, a t-test will be performed to test for significance. If non-normal distributions are obtained, either a corresponding non-parametric test or an appropriate data conversion to achieve normality (e.g., reciprocal time scores) will be used for data analysis.

Objective 3, to determine the applicability of Offender Recognition Project identification procedures to non-commercial robberies, will be assessed by comparing suspect identification rates of non-commercial with commercial robbery cases. Due to different circumstances of commission and assumed differences in population of offenders, it may be found that non-commercial robberies do not provide as many potential suspect identification leads. Specific factors that may influence this are the proportion of cases in which victims do not see the suspect (e.g., robbed from behind, or offense occurs in unlighted area), and different offender populations (e.g., non-commercial offenders may

include more juveniles and, therefore, mug shots would not be available, or non-commercial offenders may be more likely to lack a prior arrest and subsequent mug shots for identification purposes). Comparison of identification rates, along with overall clearance rates, will allow an assessment of the relative merit of this project, when contrasted with commercial robbery cases.

Data to perform the evaluation will be obtained from the Seattle Police Department records unit, robbery unit log book and case files and the Robbery Offender Recognition IDMO log. Data processing and analysis costs will be funded from the Criminal Justice Evaluation Project.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
LEAA	\$45,000	\$49,500	\$ -0-
State	2,500	2,750	-0-
City	2,500	2,750	-0-
Total	\$50,000	\$55,000	-0-

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$30,614	Federal (LEAA)	\$45,000	90%
Supplies	500	State Buy-In	2,500	5%
Other Services and Charges	13,170	Local Cash Match	2,500	5%
Capital Outlay	5,716	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
Total Cost	\$50,000	Total Funds	\$50,000	

Problem Statement I: Robbery detectives spend large amounts of their time performing clerical functions, thereby causing a reduction in the amount of their time available for investigations.

Discussion

The typing speed of the average robbery detective is estimated at less than 20 words per minute. Estimates of the amount of time detectives devote to typing at this speed and on other clerical functions range from a low of 20 percent to a high of 40 percent of total detective time.

The net results of this time commitment to clerical functions are significant. The unit cost of conducting robbery investigations is unnecessarily high. In addition, detectives feel that they are not given adequate opportunities to work at conducting investigations as they had expected before becoming detectives. This causes an undetermined level of disillusionment.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement I

Proposed Strategy

Increased clerical support. The most obvious strategy for addressing this problem is to provide clerical support for robbery detectives, which is what is being recommended here. Somewhat less obvious is why this problem was allowed to develop and, further, why it has been allowed to persist over many years. The answers to these questions are based, in part, in tradition and in budget considerations. Detectives have always done their own typing and other clerical work. The natural tendency has been to continue as always since there was no pressure to change and no perceived opportunity to change, the latter being a function of a tight budget. Under tight budget conditions, as have prevailed in the past several years, police administrators have opted to protect to the extent possible sworn positions over non-sworn or clerical positions. The basis for this choice is that the department's investment for training in a sworn position is substantial, often exceeding \$20,000, plus the immeasurable value of any working experience an officer may have acquired; whereas, there is an ever-present pool of clerical persons that can be drawn from on short notice as budget constraints become less of a factor.

These arguments may have lost some of their soundness given the long-range projections of budget authorities to the effect that tight budgets will prevail in the foreseeable future.

In addition, police administrators faced with budget cuts tend to prioritize sworn personnel above non-sworn personnel because sworn personnel offer the administrator greater flexibility of assignment. That is, sworn officers may be assigned to functions which do not require the above mentioned training and which might more efficiently be carried out by clerical personnel, but they are also available for temporary reassignment for tasks which do require law enforcement authority.

The strategy proposed here--to provide clerical support to robbery detectives--while lacking in absolute brilliance and which can hardly be seen as innovative, attempts to achieve the long-term objective of causing a break with the tradition of detectives doing their own clerical work and the short-term objective of demonstrating productivity increases for the Robbery Section.

Project: Robbery Reduction - Increased Detective ProductivityGoal: To increase apprehension of robbery offenders.Objectives

1. To reduce significantly the average amount of detective time required to prepare file cases.
2. To demonstrate a significant increase in the number of robberies cleared by arrest through detective investigation.

Methods

This project will continue the previously implemented methodology. Five secretarial personnel were added to the robbery unit for the purpose of increasing the productivity of detectives in the Crimes Against Persons Section of the Seattle Police Department. While the principal intent of the addition of these clerical personnel was to provide detectives in the robbery unit with more time to develop and follow-up leads, detectives investigating rape, assault and homicide cases will also benefit from the additional clerical capacity.

The initial project provided for clerical staff personnel costs, as well as for the purchase of labor-saving equipment (dictation equipment, transcribers, electric typewriters) and clerical support equipment (desks and chairs). This project provides continued support for maintenance of labor-saving equipment and continues to pay personnel costs for the staff hired under the initial project.

Evaluation

This proposed project will receive a "C" level evaluation.

Objective 1, to reduce the average amount of detective time required to prepare file cases, will be assessed by comparing the number of hours detectives spend performing clerical, as opposed to investigative, activities while preparing robbery file cases. Data will be collected on case file activities and preparation time for no less than 40 cases both before and six months after the beginning of the project. Significance tests for this comparison will consist of t-tests to determine if the amount of time performing clerical activities has decreased.

Objective 2, to increase the number of robberies cleared by arrest through detective investigation, will be assessed by comparing pre-project and project-period robbery cases cleared by arrest. These data will be obtained by reviewing robbery file cases and identifying the primary lead which resulted in an arrest and the police unit generating that lead.

Evaluation personnel, data processing and analysis costs will be funded through the Criminal Justice Evaluation Project. All required data are either currently available or will be accessible from the Seattle Police Department's Crimes Against Persons Section.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
LEAA	\$71,310	\$72,000
State	3,962	4,000
City	3,961	4,000
Total	\$79,233	\$80,000

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$71,656	Federal (LEAA)	\$71,310	90%
Supplies	0	State Buy-In	3,962	5%
Other Services and Charges	7,577	Local Cash Match	3,961	5%
Capital Outlay	0	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
	<hr/>		<hr/>	
Total Cost	\$79,233	Total Funds	\$79,233	

Problem Statement J: The traditional criminal justice system response to assaults arising from domestic circumstances fails to protect victims adequately and fails to provide adequate, long-term conflict resolution.

Discussion

There are two types of victims of domestic assault: participants in the original dispute and police officers responding to the family disturbance calls.

Because the Seattle Police Department annual report does not distinguish between family disturbance calls and other disturbance calls, the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office did a survey of patrol officer assaults for a six-month period in 1976, including all officers in the North and South precincts. In this survey, family disturbance calls were listed as a separate category from other disturbance calls, and officers were instructed to report assaults and attempted assaults by the type of activity at the time of assault. In the survey, family disturbance calls accounted for 19.4 percent of assaults/attempted assaults on officers in the North precinct and 38.0 percent in the South precinct. The assaults/attempted assaults on officers which occurred during family disturbance calls were very often not officially reported; only 22.2 percent (North precinct) and 32.4 percent (South precinct) resulted in police reports. Family disturbance calls were the single most frequent category of activity cited in the survey of officer assaults for both precincts.

The second type of domestic assault victim is a participant in the original dispute. The results of a police crisis intervention project in Oakland, California, show that 41 percent of their family disturbance calls involved actual physical violence between the participants. A preliminary tally of the first three months in which the Seattle Domestic Assault Reduction Project has been operating shows 56.5 percent of the calls involve physical violence (based on 39 checklists returned by patrol officers), while another 7.7 percent involve attempted violence. Thus a majority of family disturbance calls in Seattle involve physical assault.

There appears to be a fairly high rate of recurrence in family disturbances. A Seattle Police Department printout of family disturbance, child abuse/neglect and mental illness calls showed 33.5 percent of the calls were to addresses with two or more such calls during the first nine months of 1976. This printout included calls from three sergeant sectors (George, Robert and William). An earlier computer printout analysis of 2,101 calls from Robert sector in Southeast Seattle indicated that a significant number of family disturbance calls were repeat calls to the same address and/or were close enough to that address to assume the calls were generated by the same ongoing situation. Out of the total of 2,101 calls, 896 (42.5 percent) were multiple calls.

In summary, there are three problems associated with domestic disturbance situations which require a more adequate response. These are as follows: (1) the high number of assaults on police officers resulting from domestic disturbance calls, (2) the high number of assaults between participants in the dispute, and (3) the chronic development of family conflict which results in a high number of repeat calls to incidents of domestic disturbance at the same location.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement J

Rejected Strategy

Arrest of offenders. A possible strategy for increasing protection for victims of domestic assault would be to arrest the offender in all cases. This strategy is rejected as being unresponsive because (1) an arrested person will not remain arrested forever, and upon release, the problem is often exacerbated, and (2) the victim often does not wish to see an arrest made.

Current Strategy

Domestic assault intervention. Traditionally, when a domestic disturbance call was received by the Communications Division of the police department, two police officers were dispatched to the scene. The officers generally attempted to handle the situation in one of three ways: (1) they could arrest one or more of the parties involved; (2) they could advise one or more of the parties to leave until he/she cooled off; or (3) they could use their presence as authority figures to reduce the crisis via implied threat of arrest. Failing to see any potential for violence at the immediate time, the officers often would advise the parties involved that the incident was a "civil" matter rather than criminal (i.e., police-related) and would not proceed further with the matter.

For 30 percent of the dispatched domestic disturbance calls, Community Service Officers (CSO's) were used. Those calls were ones which were determined by the dispatcher to have the least potential for violence. Because CSO's do not have arrest powers, they normally relied on discussion and mediation in handling the disturbances.

In an effort to provide a more adequate response by the Seattle Police Department to domestic disturbance calls, a new intervention strategy was proposed in the 1976 Criminal Justice Plan and continued in the 1977 Plan. The intent of the strategy was to provide disturbance participants with increased and improved mediation and referral services, with the ultimate goal of reducing the incidence of repeat disturbance calls. This strategy was implemented by the Domestic Assault Reduction Project. The project utilizes CSO's as providers of mediation and referral services for participants in domestic disturbances. CSO's are uniquely suited for this task. As civilian members of the Seattle Police Department, they have immediate access to police resources, but they are unarmed and, therefore, present a less threatening and less authoritarian image to the public. Training of CSO's routinely has included mediation, conflict intervention and interviewing techniques. CSO's are also familiar with local social service agency resources, have compiled a resource book and have gained experience in contacting and utilizing those resources. CSO's often mediate landlord/tenant disagreements, neighborhood disputes and juvenile disturbances. Their knowledge and ability in these areas of conflict are readily acknowledged and utilized on a regular basis.

The Domestic Assault Reduction Project is intended to cause a significant reduction in the number of repeat calls to incidents of domestic disturbance and, consequently, to reduce the number of assaults arising out of the chronic development of a family conflict into assaultive behavior.

The Community Service Officer Section is ideally suited to provide follow-up and, where imminent violence is not considered a factor, some initial responses to domestic situations. CSO's previously responded to a small number of domestic disturbances per month. These responses are capsulated under categories of civil disputes and conflict management. Past breakdowns for such calls were as follows: 106 incidents in August, 88 in September and 68 in October, 1975. The ongoing strategy will be to isolate those incidents that are family-related conflicts and identify the factors involved, i.e., husband-wife, boyfriend-girlfriend, parent-child, etc.

Under the continuing Domestic Assault Reduction Project, Community Service Officers conduct interviews in order to identify chronic problems such as alcoholism, drug addiction, mental illness, poor parent-child relationships, etc. The purpose is to diminish those situations creating such calls. Community Service Officers utilize their mediation and interviewing skills to persuade the parties involved to undertake either short-term or long-term counseling to alleviate their problems. Other types of intervention are utilized as needed by working through other agencies and through referral.

The support of patrol officers is vital to success of this project for two reasons: (1) patrol officers determine whether or not CSO's become involved in a family disturbance call, and (2) patrol officers are the only source of information concerning the current family situation, information which is important in determining the success of the CSO follow-up interview visit.

Traditionally, patrol officers have infrequently called CSO's to the scene of a family disturbance call. The project has begun to change this by making officers aware of CSO interest and ability in responding to such calls, by fostering personal acquaintance between patrol officers and CSO's assigned to the same beats and by providing routine CSO follow-up calls to the sites of repeat family disturbance calls. Such follow-up calls will help demonstrate to patrol officers the interest and capability of CSO's in handling such problems.

Because CSO's need information about the participants, problems and level of violence present in a given family disturbance call, officers have been requested to fill out a checklist containing such information for all family disturbance calls. As of March 30, 1977, three months after beginning active project operation, 39 completed officer checklists had been received, indicating an increase of available information over the pre-project period. However, the amount of information that has been obtained from checklists is small compared to what is potentially available. The project supervisor is directing an effort to develop that additional information.

The action phase of the project began January 1, 1977. During the first three months of operation, CSO's were already assigned 40 follow-up interviews. CSO's are provided with interview forms to fill out after the interviews, to encourage standardized data collection without jeopardizing rapport with the clients. In addition, CSO's are provided with referral follow-up forms to be filled out within a few days following a client's first agency appointment.

In January, 1978, police report data on domestic assault during the first year of active operation of the Domestic Assault Reduction Project will be compared with baseline data which were gathered for the last three months of 1976.

Because the project had been in active operation for only three months at the time of writing, there are no definitive results to report.

Due to our belief that substantial new learning can be generated from the domestic assault reduction strategy, no new strategies are contemplated for FY 1978. It is hoped that, based on the Reduction of Aggravated Assault Project and the Domestic Assault Reduction Project, sufficient new information on this crime can be developed. This new information would be used as a baseline upon which to develop potential future action programs.

Project: Domestic Assault Reduction

Goal: The goal of the project is to bring about a reduction in the number of repeat domestic disturbances and the number of domestic-related assaults within the project target area.

Objectives

1. There will be a statistically significant reduction in the instances of domestic assault among persons receiving program services for multiple domestic disturbances as compared with persons receiving normal police and CSO responses for such multiple disturbance calls.
2. There will be a statistically significant reduction in the number of requests for police to return to residences which have had prior multiple disturbance complaints and received project services when compared to other residences with multiple disturbance histories which do not receive project services.
3. Assaults upon police officers, as measured by official hazard reports and an officer victimization survey, will be lowered by a statistically significant level for residences having received project services when compared to other residences with similar prior multiple disturbance histories which have not received project services.
4. The number and proportion of domestic disturbance calls resulting in a police officer request for CSO assistance will be significantly increased in the project target area when compared to the rest of the city.

Methods

This project continues the expansion and refinement of the Seattle Police Department's capability to respond to assaults arising from domestic disturbances. This continuation project is operated by the Community Service Officer (CSO) Program of the Seattle Police Department. Project staff will do the following:

1. Develop a methodology for identifying participants in multiple disturbances. This information will be obtained through a referral system, from a visual check of police officers' log sheets and through the Select computer dispatch system.
2. Develop a procedure to follow-up and contact those families and individuals identified as being repeatedly involved in domestic disturbances.
3. Increase the number of referral sources and update the directory indicating where persons in need of follow-up assistance can be referred.
4. Provide supplementary training for CSO's, as needed.
5. Provide briefing sessions for patrol officers on the criteria to be used for referrals to the Community Service Officer Program and to inform patrol officers of the increased capacity of CSO's to respond to domestic disturbance calls.
6. Develop a follow-up procedure to determine if referrals are used by persons involved in domestic disturbance calls, and if referral services are actually provided by referral agencies.

Evaluation

Development and refinement of the project design continued throughout the early stages of the initial year of project operation. The following design description is the product of intensive cooperative efforts between the Seattle Police Department Community Service Officer Program and members of the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office evaluation unit. Data collection procedures and forms were devised jointly by project staff and staff of the Law and Justice Planning Office.

The target area for this project includes portions of south and west Seattle, coinciding with the boundaries of the Seattle Police Department's South precinct. The South precinct is divided into two sergeant sectors, William and Robert sectors, which have high rates of family disturbance calls to police.

A computer printout of family disturbance calls (this figure includes family disturbance, child neglect/abuse and mental problem calls) for these two sectors for the first nine months of 1976 yielded 2,700 such calls. The average number of such calls per specific address ranged from 2.00 to 3.25 (depending on the particular car beat), which indicates the prevalence of repeat calls within a nine-month period.

On the basis of demographic data for each car beat and the correlation of each demographic characteristic with rate of occurrence of family disturbance calls, car beats in Robert and William sectors were assigned to experimental or control treatment conditions. Assignment was done by matching beats on the relevant characteristics and assigning one of each pair of matched beats to experimental treatment and the second member of that pair to control treatment. Beats R2 and R3 were treated as a single beat because their populations were small and quite homogeneous across the two beats. Car beats in the experimental treatment condition will receive CSO follow-up on all family disturbance calls; beats in the control condition will receive no follow-up services.

Given these assignments of car beats to the various experimental treatments, specific CSO's can be assigned to certain car beats. For example, a CSO assigned to Robert 4 (or to both Robert 4 and Robert 5) could discuss the project with patrol officers from the specific beat(s). Frequent communication and personal acquaintance between officers and the CSO assigned to the same beats and watches would increase patrol officer cooperation with the project, provide important information to both CSO's and patrol officers and increase the project's impact on family disturbance problems.

<u>Experimental Condition</u>	<u>Control Condition</u>
R4, R5, R6 W2, W3, W7	R2 and R3, R7 W1, W4, W5, W6

Data collection will be partially accomplished by having personnel assigned to the project assist in obtaining data and maintaining logs of their activities. Additional data collection, along with costs for evaluation staff and data analysis, will be funded through the Criminal Justice Evaluation Project.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
LEAA	\$22,582	\$ -0-	\$ -0-
State	1,255	-0-	-0-
City	1,254	-0-	-0-
Total	\$25,091	-0-	-0-

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$21,358	Federal (LEAA)	\$22,585	90%
Supplies	0	State Buy-In	1,255	5%
Other Supplies and Charges	3,733	Local Cash Match	1,254	5%
Capital Outlay	0	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
Total Cost	\$25,091	Total Funds	\$25,091	

Problem Statement K: The criminal justice system appears unable to deter persons from committing aggravated assault, and there is not enough information on how to prevent aggravated assault.

Discussion

Based on 1,165 reported incidents of aggravated assault in 1974, we can estimate 2,198 total incidents of aggravated assault. This estimate is computed using both national and local victimization reporting data. For these 2,198 estimated incidents of aggravated assault, 292 persons (13 percent) were arrested on suspicion of aggravated assault. Of these 292 persons, 63 (22 percent) were investigated and released, leaving 229 persons (10 percent of estimated incidents) charged with aggravated assault or another offense. Of these 229, 111 persons (49 percent) were charged with aggravated assault; 18 persons were found not guilty or had their cases stricken or dismissed; 33 cases are still pending; and 60 persons were found guilty as charged with aggravated assault. Of those 111 persons charged with the crime, 54 percent were found guilty.

In addition to the 111 persons arrested and charged with aggravated assault, 30 persons were arrested on suspicion of another offense and charged with aggravated assault in 1974. Twelve of these cases are still pending, and seven were stricken or dismissed, or the offender was determined not guilty. Eleven of the 30 persons were found or pleaded guilty of aggravated assault. Thus 36 percent of persons arrested on suspicion of another offense but charged with aggravated assault were found guilty.

Considering all persons charged with aggravated assault in 1974, a rough computation of risk or threat of sanction from the offender's viewpoint is possible. Of 2,198 incidents, 71 persons (3 percent) were found guilty of the offense. Thus 3 of every 100 incidents of aggravated assault resulted in a finding of guilty. As we have argued for the crimes of burglary and robbery, the deterrent effect of three chances in 100 of being found guilty of aggravated assault for each incident of aggravated assault is not sufficiently high risk to generate a deterrent effect or to discourage the potential offender from committing an aggravated assault because of the perceived risk. In addition to the estimate that three of every 100 incidents result in a determination of guilty of aggravated assault, only 33 of the 71 persons found guilty (46 percent) received a sanction of jail or penitentiary time. Stating this another way, for every incident of aggravated assault in 1974, an offender's chances of being arrested for suspicion, charged with the crime of aggravated assault, being found guilty and receiving a period of incarceration as a sanction for committing the offense is about 2 percent, or two chances in 100 of receiving a sanction involving loss of liberty.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement K

Current Strategy. There exists a need to learn as much as possible about the crime of aggravated assault: where it occurs, who commits the crime and what interventive measures could be initiated for prevention. The Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office began a planning effort to obtain this information. In 1977, the City intends to begin the Reduction of Aggravated Assault Project, which is designed to learn more about coping with aggravated assault.

A deterrent effect for aggravated assault might be achieved if the criminal justice system response to the crime were consistent, swift and certain. A strategy to encourage a swift and certain response to the crime of aggravated assault, similar to responses we have suggested for other crimes, would need to rely on some standard of expectation or performance by the criminal justice system, including all component parts of that system. For example, the risk of detection and apprehension, prosecution, adjudication or other determination of guilt, and appropriate sanction would have to be increased. If the perceived risk from the offender's viewpoint is sufficiently high, it might discourage the potential offender or recidivating offender from committing the criminal act or subsequently repeating the criminal act.

The necessary informational base to determine how the criminal justice system should respond to the crime of aggravated assault is currently not available. In 1977, such information should be developed.

The areas of the current lack of information upon which to develop action strategies to reduce aggravated assault can be remedied through addition of limited resources to enable us to obtain sufficient understanding of the following:

1. The dynamics of how aggravated assault occurs (location, time of day and in what type situations).
2. The current police response to aggravated assault (for both juvenile and adult offenders)--how the police might respond more effectively, if appropriate or necessary. It may be that the current response of the City affords the best opportunity to make those apprehensions which are necessary, while not diminishing the overall resource-response capacity of the police department.
3. The information currently at hand shows that aggravated assault offenders (both juvenile and adult) are a high risk offender group. Information on possible offender-oriented responses should be collected (both local programs currently operating and a survey of the national literature carried out) to determine a range of possible responses to aggravated assault. Strategies which offer a potential of reducing recidivism among this offender group should be sought.

No one is currently able to identify more specific action strategies to reduce aggravated assault. Such specific strategies should, however, be possible given more complete information. Opportunities may be identified to reduce the incidence of this crime based on knowledge developed from the FY 1977 project.

Principally, the extent of knowledge regarding present procedures, responses and processing of cases of aggravated assault needs to be identified. The response of the Seattle Police Department, the historical premise for those responses and potentially different policies will be identified in 1977. The point of departure for this line of inquiry will begin with examination of information available. The current procedures will be examined and potential refinements suggested jointly by planners, police, prosecutors and the courts.

Aggravated assault may be viewed as an unsuccessful homicide. This appears to be an accurate assessment, based on a comparison of the 47 homicide cases which occurred in Seattle between July 1, 1974, and June 30, 1975, with a random sampling of 66 aggravated assault cases reported in 1974. In 43 percent of the aggravated assault cases, injuries were extensive and serious enough to require hospitalization. In the view of some law enforcement personnel, the difference between the two offenses may frequently be determined by the speed and adequacy with which medical treatment is provided.

In terms of circumstances surrounding the offenses, assaults and homicides tend to happen in similar settings. For aggravated assault, 40 percent occur in residences; for homicides, the comparable figure is 57 percent. The relation between victim and offender also tends to be similar. In 65 percent of aggravated assault cases, the victim is acquainted with, a neighbor to, friend of or related to the offender. In the 38 homicide cases in which the victim-offender relation was determined, 63 percent of the cases involved offenders acquainted with, neighbors to, friends of or related to the victim.

While these comparisons point out the severity of the nature of aggravated assault, the 66 sampled cases indicate some of the problems associated with both victim and criminal justice system response to this offense. While 43 percent of the victims were injured extensively enough to require hospitalization, and 59 percent had been victims in past Seattle Police Department cases, only 54.5 percent of the victims indicated willingness to prosecute the offender. This may be partially due to the fact that 51.5 percent of the victims had long-term prior contacts with the offender.

Even in those cases in which arrests occur, police and court dispositions do not appear to reflect the severity of the crime. Based on an analysis of all crimes against persons (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault) reported to the Seattle Police Department between January, 1974, and August, 1975, an initial suspicion arrest was least likely to result in an actual charge for the same offense in aggravated assault cases, 40 percent. (For the other three offenses, the corresponding figures were as follows: murder--64 percent; rape--41 percent; robbery--52 percent.) Of those cases resulting in guilty findings or pleas, aggravated assault was least likely to result in a sentence involving incarceration, 40 percent. (Corresponding figures were the following: murder--71 percent; rape--53 percent; robbery--40 percent.)

It should be noted that the data cited above do not necessarily reflect negatively upon the criminal justice system. National victimization surveys have shown that victims of aggravated assault report such incidents to law enforcement agencies in only 41 to 55 percent of the cases. This initially low reporting rate in relation to the severity of the offense may indicate that victims are reluctant, in many instances, to bring such matters to the attention of the police. This reluctance may be overcome in some cases but later results in the victim deciding not to press charges, or requesting leniency for the offender.

For all cases of aggravated assault, at least one witness (the victim) is present. In 6 percent of aggravated assaults, more than one victim was involved. In more than half of the reported incidents of aggravated assault, additional witnesses were present. In 24.2 percent of the cases reported, at least two witnesses other than the victim were present to observe the crime.

It appears that the crime of aggravated assault is more suited to successful development of a case than most Part I offenses because of the presence of observers who could assist in identification and prosecution of the offender. Yet as already discussed, the number and percentage of cases cleared (22 percent) and the number of cases successfully prosecuted is lower than what one might expect, based on the availability of witnesses.

Perhaps the system problem of witness treatment discussed under the robbery problem statements also applies to aggravated assault. That is, perhaps witnesses are exposed to negative experiences in their dealings with the criminal justice system and, therefore, do not wish to assist in development of a case. It is also possible that victims and witnesses fear subsequent harm from the offender.

There is not enough information on the extent to which witness and victim information is successfully used in processing aggravated assault cases. The Reduction of Aggravated Assault Project, due to start in 1977, will attempt to obtain information on the extent to which underutilization of witness and victim information in aggravated assault cases is a potential detriment to the successful development of aggravated assault cases for arrest, prosecution and successful adjudication.

Project: Reduction of Aggravated Assault-B

Goal: To develop information regarding the crime of aggravated assault, aggravated assault offenders and police and criminal justice system procedures for impacting assault, for the purpose of recommending and implementing a more effective response to this problem.

Objectives

1. To conduct an analysis of current policies and procedures related to victim and/or witness reporting; police investigation, apprehension, case clearance; prosecution and conviction; and offender processing in regard to assault cases.
2. To conduct an analysis of existing and proposed strategies for the reduction of assault, such as crisis intervention; referral to social services; and victim/witness assistance, for the purpose of developing City and police policy influencing County and State policy in relation to these activities.
3. To identify weaknesses in the current criminal justice system response to aggravated assault for the purpose of improving the system's effectiveness.

Methods

1. Compile and analyze available Seattle Police Department data on aggravated assault cases. These data will include victim and offender characteristics, relationship of victim to offender, circumstances of offense, police response to the offense, adequacy of investigation and followup and disposition of cases.
2. Organize a task force including Seattle Police Department command staff and others, to determine what police response policy and procedures have been in relation to aggravated assault (both juvenile and adult), and what procedural changes can be implemented.
3. Search national literature for existing and potentially effective responses to aggravated assault and aggravated assault offenders.
4. Conduct offender interviews to better determine offender characteristics, motivation and contributing circumstances for the crime of assault.
5. Conduct interviews with victim groups which appear to have a low reporting rate, to determine contributing factors to that problem. For example, service agencies for the elderly report that older people are victims of assault to a much higher degree than offense reports reflect. The elderly are fearful of recrimination if they report; their typical response is one of fear and withdrawal; and they have little confidence in the system's ability to assist them.
6. Examine the relationship between assault and homicide. Elderly groups report that many deaths which are the secondary result of an unreported assault are officially recorded as having been due to natural causes. For example, an elderly assault victim dies of heart failure after being hospitalized or fails to recover from injuries sustained in an assault.
7. Given that an assault can be viewed as a homicide which was not completed, determine the potential impact on homicide of improved assault reduction procedures.
8. Develop potential points of intervention and strategy implementation.
9. Develop better system alternatives (prosecution, courts and corrections).
10. Develop consensus among affected agencies (law enforcement, prosecutors' and public defenders' offices, Municipal Court, Superior Court, County Division of Rehabilitative Services, Department of Social and Health Services and other social service agencies) regarding procedural improvements.

11. Present findings and formal recommendations regarding policy and procedures issues to the Mayor and City Council and other appropriate County or State legislative bodies.

Evaluation

The evaluation of this project will be at level "E."

The evaluation will be conducted in the form of independent validation of written information and results produced, as well as by the extent to which the information generated is used as a basis for City policy and new criminal justice procedures.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
LEAA	\$31,931	\$ -0-	\$ -0-
State	1,774	-0-	-0-
City	1,774	-0-	-0-
Total	\$35,479	-0-	-0-

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$20,549	Federal (LEAA)	\$31,931	90%
Supplies	500	State Buy-In	1,774	5%
Other Services and Charges	14,520	Local Cash Match	1,774	5%
Capital Outlay	0	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
Total Cost	\$35,479	Total Funds	\$35,479	

Problem Statement L: The Investigations Bureau of the Seattle Police Department may not utilize its resources in a way that maximizes the productivity of those resources.

Discussion

Organizational Considerations. The Seattle Police Department conducts criminal investigations through a variety of specialized units which include the following:

Crimes Against Property Section
 Burglary/Theft Unit (four squads)
 Auto Theft Squad
 Fencing Squad
 Pawnshop

Crimes Against Persons Section
 Homicide, Sex and Assault
 Robbery Unit
 Morals Unit

Special Assignments Section
 Fugitive Unit
 Security Unit
 Bomb Squad
 Checks and Bunco
 General Assignments

Vine Section

Narcotics Section

Juvenile Division

This system of specialization developed over a period of years and through several different police administrations. It is entirely possible that the reasons for establishing this level of specialization are no longer valid. First of all, specialization along these lines assumed that criminal careers were along specialized lines, but there is ample evidence to suggest that criminals do not always specialize along crime lines. For example, we find from persons arrested for burglary in 1972 that approximately 62 percent of the arrestees had been previously arrested for crimes other than burglary. A similar pattern emerged in an analysis of persons arrested in 1974. For that period, approximately 73 percent of the arrestees had been arrested during 1973 for crimes other than burglary.

Diversification by crime type does not appear to be peculiar to burglary arrestees. Similar patterns are also evident with robbery offenders. The same 1972 study showed that approximately 60 percent of the robbery arrestees had been previously arrested for crimes other than robbery. This was further confirmed when robbery arrestees were analyzed again in 1974. Of 458 persons arrested for robbery in 1974, approximately 60 percent had been arrested during 1973 for crimes other than robbery.

Specialization among detective units also assumes that the skills required to investigate various crimes differ substantially. It also assumes that the level of skills required to investigate certain crimes are far higher than those required to investigate other crimes.

As a practical matter, a detective in the Seattle Police Department spends a large part of his or her time on file cases (cases for which there is a suspect in custody). During 1974, approximately 75 percent of the arrests for burglary originated from patrol. A somewhat similar pattern is also evident with robbery arrests. Of the cases that result in detective arrests, the majority are characterized by good victim or witness information, rather than by an intensive deductive process by investigators.

The assumption that there are widely differing skill levels between detectives of the various special units is further challenged when one considers that detectives rotate between units. It is believed that the progression of a detective's career is to begin in burglary/theft and gradually progress through homicide. So, one would expect that of the robbery detectives who are presently assigned, there is a high chance that some would have worked in burglary/theft at some time or another.

There are several significant problems that arise from specialization. For example, workload management is hampered. During 1975, the frequency of burglary ranged from a low of 1,004 to a high of 1,200 per month. The frequency of reported robbery also had a wide range. During 1975, the low month for robbery showed 138 robberies and the high month showed 239. Consequently, detectives have slow periods and busy periods. When reported crime is up, all detectives are kept busy conducting followups; when crime is down, the work is spread out. When a particular unit finds itself with fewer cases than normal, it still tends to have all of its personnel working, either by investigating less important cases or by having them work in pairs on the cases they do have.

The Burglary/Theft Unit considers itself always busy because of the very high volume of cases, even during low frequency months. However, only a small portion of the cases has any investigative leads at all. If a detective has an above average number of cases to followup, he or she will try to give each as much attention as it deserves. However, when caseloads are below average, detectives will devote more time to each case than when they are busy, to keep work activity at a normal level. In a sense, individual detectives are managing their workloads by spreading out their time during slow periods, to keep busy. Then again, a detective may have a heavy load of casework but spend two hours in the office waiting for a telephone call that is crucial to one case.

A similar set of circumstances applies to Crimes Against Persons units. When Crimes Against Persons detectives have a high number of cases, they are very busy; but when the caseload is light, they remain busy by sharing whatever work there is among themselves. This expanding and contracting effort is not in any way due to lack of incentive, but rather, it is solely a function of workload fluctuations. It is interesting to note, however, that the low month for burglary is September, whereas the low month for robbery is June.

On the surface, there appears to be little sound basis to maintain separate, highly specialized units to investigate different crimes.

Case Assignment Considerations. Not all cases assigned to detectives for followup are amenable to solution with any amount of effort. Others may be amenable to solution with extraordinary levels of effort. Still others may be amenable to solution with a minimum of effort. Currently, the Seattle Police Department's investigative units have no standard technique to determine in which of the above categories a case is likely to fit. As a result, detective manpower utilization may not be optimized.

A primary factor contributing to the caseload burden on most detectives is that they are assigned at least to review, if not investigate, all cases sent to their respective units for their particular district of assignment. The Burglary/Theft Unit is the best example in which each individual sergeant of a district personally reviews each burglary offense report for the district. After marking those cases without sufficient leads as inactive, all cases are distributed to the detectives responsible for particular sectors within that district. Each detective reviews every burglary occurring in his or her sector, even though the supervisor has already decided there is no value in trying to followup inactive ones. Detectives believe such a second and third review of cases is necessary because it may lead to recognition of a crime pattern or modus operandi. In addition, this review process keeps each detective aware of the total number of burglaries and their locations.

Detectives readily agree that without initial witnesses or some immediate lead to a suspect, it is unlikely that a case will be cleared. Assignment sergeants also recognize this from many years of experience. Most such cases are classified inactive when first received and will always remain so unless additional information is provided. Currently,



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even these cases receive attention when time permits. Most often, a check is made with the victim by telephone to learn if any additional information exists beyond that initially recorded by patrol on the offense/arrest report.

The rules regarding case inactivation, informal though they are, are often suspended when the loss from the crime exceeds a certain level. That is, if a crime generates a loss measured in thousands of dollars, irrespective of whether or not there are "good leads," the case is assigned for extensive followup. Followup often includes performing, even though somewhat belatedly, crime scene search and search for witnesses.

Experience also suggests there are many cases that, even though there are good leads, will not result in a prosecution. Cases that fit into this category are low-loss defraud of an innkeeper, drunks rolled and hit on the head, property "stolen" by acquaintances, assaults by "boyfriends," thefts by prostitutes from customers' wallets and many other crimes. The controlling factor here is that the victim decides quite regularly not to proceed with the prosecution--so regularly, in fact, to make the outcome of such cases quite predictable.

Most detectives treat all cases assigned them as if they deserve equal attention, regardless of the likelihood of a case becoming unfounded or "dropped" by the victim until it is actually dropped. Perhaps this is as it should be. However, the decision as to whether or not a case deserves investigative attention should be made by management rather than by individual detectives. It is the responsibility of management to decide, based on the best analytical tools available, which cases or which category of cases should be assigned. Currently, management lacks the analytical tools to make these decisions.

Case Monitoring and Information Considerations. Once a case has been determined to be solvable, the issue then becomes to which of the many detectives it should be assigned and what progress is being made as time passes. In other words, management needs to be able to monitor, over time, what has been done on a case or group of cases, and by whom it was done.

Different levels of management have differing management information needs. Line supervisors need information to monitor the activities of individual detectives, their workloads and progress of individual cases. Unit commanders need information to enable the monitoring of the progress of groups of cases, performance of line supervisors and the performance of groups of detectives. Section and division commanders need broad-based information to assist in determining policy and resource requirements. Researchers, evaluators and planners also have broad-based information needs. At present, there is little capacity to provide the information needs of any of the above.

Police/Prosecutor Considerations. Historic practices in the King County Prosecutor's Office have given the Seattle Police Department long experience with constructing complete case files. Before a charge is filed, complete documentation of the case is required, including signed witness statements, crime scene sketches, lab reports, lists of physical evidence, etc. As a local deputy prosecutor puts it, "At the time a charge is filed, we are prepared to go to trial."

The basic concern is whether it is an efficient practice to prepare a case to the point where it is ready to go to trial prior to the prosecutor's filing decision. It is not entirely clear that there is a necessary and cost-effective basis for requiring such extensive pre-charge preparation. This requirement consumes tremendous amounts of detective time.

Crime Reduction Strategy for Problem Statement L

Proposed Strategy: The strategy selected for addressing this broad-based problem is to develop and implement a research and development program, to be operated by the Seattle Police Department's Criminal Investigations Division and monitored by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office. The program will include the following key features.

1. Organizational Restructuring. This element will consist of an analysis of issues relating to the organizational structure of the Criminal Investigations Division culminating in a decision on whether or not to restructure that division and the manner thereof.
2. Case Screening. This element will consist of development, test and implementation of a case screening system that improves upon and rationalizes the decision process used to decide whether or not to assign incoming cases to detectives for further investigation. In addition, this component will include development of processes aimed at increasing communication and sharing of information between followup investigators and patrol officers.
3. Case Monitoring. This element will consist of development, test and implementation of a case monitoring system that improves the capability of investigations management and others to receive and use comprehensive and timely reports on the progress of cases through the investigations process.
4. Police/Prosecutor Cooperation. This element will consist primarily of a broad scale exploration into the relationships between police and the prosecutor, for the purpose of ascertaining if the needs of both may be served at lower manpower costs without sacrificing quality and fairness of the overall investigations and prosecutorial processes.

This strategy will be implemented in the continuing Managing Criminal Investigations Project.

Project: Managing Criminal Investigations

Goal: To develop and implement an organizational structure for the Criminal Investigations Division that facilitates the most rational management of the resources of that division.

Objectives

1. To produce a statistically significant increase in detective productivity as measured by detective-caused arrest and prosecutor acceptance of file cases as a proportion of all cases received for investigation.
2. To develop and implement a case screening system that facilitates the assignment of cases so that the cases with the highest likelihood of solution are assigned for further investigation and the ones with the least likelihood are not.
3. To develop, test and implement a case monitoring system that provides management with the capability to "track" the progress of case investigations.
4. To reduce unnecessary detective labor expended for the purpose of preparation for prosecution.

Methods

The project will employ two systems analysts and supporting resources and will use traditional systems analysis techniques which generally involve the following:

1. Development of a detailed work plan that outlines the scope of work and the schedule by which it will be accomplished.
2. Collection of data both from existing documents and through discussions with operators involved in criminal investigations activity.
3. Analysis of data using standard data management techniques.
4. Development of recommendations as indicated by the data, the analyses and experience of the principals.
5. Reporting of results in written and oral form for the purpose of gaining needed support for the recommendations.
6. Assisting with implementation of whatever recommendations are adopted by management.

Evaluation

Objective 1 (increased detective productivity) will be assessed by a pre-post comparison of the rate of detective arrests (number of arrests excluding those occurring on or near the scene of the offense by responding or alerted patrol units divided by the total number of cases reported) and the rate of prosecutor acceptance of file cases. The latter rate (prosecutor acceptance) will be measured in much the same fashion as detective arrests, that is, number of accepted file cases divided by number of reported cases. The productivity rates will be compiled on a weekly basis for at least the six months immediately preceding project implementation and will be compared with weekly rates following implementation.

Objective 2 (development of a case screening system for the assignment of cases on the basis of potential for solution) will be assessed by conducting a short-term study to occur no later than two months after the initial use of such a system. The study would consist of comparing the performance of at least three detective squads (as measured by arrests) for at least six weeks.

Within each squad, cases will be screened and assigned for investigation on the basis of the case screening system for two weeks. For two additional weeks, cases will be assigned on the basis of squad sergeant determination. During a third two-week segment, cases will be assigned for investigation on a totally random basis. Within the test period, the three test conditions will be varied in the three (or multiple of three) detective squads in a latin square design.

If it is determined that a particular case screening system does not represent a significant improvement, it is assumed that additional system(s) will be developed and tested in a similar manner.

Objective 3 (development of a case monitoring system) will be evaluated no less than two months after its implementation. To assess the adequacy of such a system, an operational test will be conducted by requesting the status of 33 cases picked at random with a stratification on the basis of days elapsed since assignment (three cases for each day, from 1 to 10, 15, 20 and 25 days prior assignment). All status information maintained by the system will be manually verified. An error rate greater than 2.0 percent will be grounds for declaring the monitoring system inaccurate for use by line supervisors.

A similar test of the usefulness of the system for unit commanders will be performed. This test will consist of verifying the accuracy of data regarding number of cases received, assigned and current status by individual squad and type of cases received 1 to 10, 15, 20 and 25 days prior to the test. To the extent that such a system is accurate for line supervisor use, unit commander use will be assessed by the accuracy of the programming necessary to group data correctly from individual cases.

The assessment of adequacy of such a system will include the requirement that individual case data be maintained for at least three years.

Objective 4 (reduction of unnecessary detective labor in preparation of file cases) will be assessed by randomly selecting (with stratification on type of offenses) 50 cases declined by the prosecutor's office before and 50 cases after successful project implementation. Comparisons of the amount of work performed and estimated time spent on file cases will be made on the basis of such indices as number of formally prepared statements, number of lab reports and listings of physical evidence.

Data collection costs will be funded from the proposed project and collected by project personnel, with guidance provided by Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office research and evaluation staff. The cost of analyzing the data, provision of evaluation personnel and preparing the final evaluation report will be funded through the Criminal Justice Evaluation Project.

Costs

		<u>1978</u>			
	LEAA		\$62,696		
	State		3,483		
	City		3,483		
	Total		\$69,662		
<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>	
Personal Services	\$66,020	Federal (LEAA)	\$62,696	90%	
Supplies	325	State Buy-In	3,483	5%	
Other Services and Charges	3,317	Local Cash Match	3,483	5%	
Capital Outlay	0	State Agency Match	0	0%	
Construction					
Total Cost	\$69,662	Total Funds	\$69,662		

Problem Statement M: The probability of a juvenile being apprehended for committing a burglary continues to be very low.

Discussion

Data presented elsewhere indicated that juveniles were responsible for approximately 60 percent of reported burglaries in 1975 as compared with an estimated 70 percent in 1974. These estimates were based on the assumption that arrests of adults and juveniles generally reflect the relative involvement of each in the actual commission of reported burglaries. It would seem safe to assume that if such estimates are valid for reported burglaries, they would hold true for unreported burglaries, as well.

There were 13,021 reported burglaries in 1975 as compared with 14,219 in 1974, and an estimated 23,170 actual occurrences of burglary in 1975. This estimate is based on victimization data which show that only 56.2 percent of total residential and commercial burglaries are reported.

If juveniles were responsible for 60 percent of the burglaries in 1975, they committed 15,385 out of the 23,170 total, or 8,646 out of the 13,021 reported burglaries. This is somewhat of an improvement over 1974 when juveniles were estimated to have committed 16,219 of the total burglaries (reported and unreported) and 9,953 of the 14,219 reported burglaries.

The apprehension rate for juvenile burglars also improved somewhat from 1974 to 1975. Although juveniles were responsible for fewer of the burglaries in 1975, more of them were apprehended. In 1975, 774 juveniles were apprehended for burglary as compared with 725 juvenile apprehensions in 1974. The probability of an individual youth being apprehended for the commission of a burglary changed from about one in 22 in 1974 to one in 20 in 1975. However, these figures indicate that a youth still is likely to be caught only one out of 20 times. Youths who are prone to getting involved in burglary, or who are already involved, very likely have a rough perception of these odds, either from their own experience or that of friends.

If we could increase the apprehension rate, we would at the very least intervene in the activity of more repeat juvenile burglars. In all likelihood, we would also deter more youths who are thinking about committing burglaries.

The low apprehension rate for juvenile burglars may be related, in part, to the assignment of burglary cases within the police department, in that the majority of burglary cases are assigned to the Burglary/Theft Unit rather than to Juvenile Division. The Burglary/Theft Unit is responsible for the general investigation of burglaries, those committed by juveniles and adults. Detectives have no a priori methods of determining whether a juvenile or an adult committed the burglary, except when a witness to the burglary is able to estimate the burglar's age. In some instances where the witness does not have a high degree of familiarity with the burglar, errors in their estimates of age are likely to occur. Many case reports do not show any witnesses.

The cases in which the burglar is either known to be a juvenile and the juvenile's name is known, or those in which the burglar's age is estimated to be under 18 years, are referred to Juvenile Division for either processing or followup. During 1975, 1,296 out of the 13,021 reported burglary cases had a named or unnamed juvenile suspect and were forwarded to the Juvenile Division. The remaining 11,725 cases were retained by the Burglary/Theft Unit. If the estimate that juveniles committed 60 percent of all burglaries in 1975 is accurate and Juvenile Division detectives received only 9.95 percent of the burglary cases, at least two problems become obvious. First, Juvenile detectives fail to get a clear picture of the overall burglary problem and are, therefore, unable to discern patterns of burglary in a particular area that may have been committed by persons with whom the detectives are familiar. Second, Burglary/Theft detectives find themselves dealing with cases in which their day-to-day knowledge of the offender group is of limited value.

The general problem of police resource allocation is discussed at greater length in Problem Statement L.

Crime Reduction Strategy for Problem Statement M

Proposed Strategy: Strategies described in response to Problem Statement L which are aimed at improving the productivity of police investigative resources should have an impact on increasing the apprehension of juvenile burglars, as well as adults.

A number of projects described elsewhere in the City's 1978 Criminal Justice Plan which are aimed at increasing the apprehension of burglars in general can be expected to have an impact on the apprehension of juvenile burglars. These include the Burglary Victim-Witness Callback Project, the Anti-Fencing Project, the Evidence Collection Project and the Commercial Burglary Reduction Project.

SECTION IV-B(a): SUSPECT/OFFENDER PROCESSING, ADJUDICATIONS AND CORRECTIONSAdult Suspect/Offender Problem Statements, Strategies and Programs

Problem Statement A: Recidivism rates for Seattle-King County burglary probationers are unacceptably high.

Discussion

Last year's Plan described recidivism for probation-returned populations in Seattle-King County. For a burglar sample, a minimum of 26.4 percent of the probationers had one or more admissions to the Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation juvenile correctional institutions. Of those 861 probationers for whom juvenile history was reported, 611 (71 percent) had a juvenile criminal history.

For 722 probationers in this same burglar sample, over 46 percent had prior jail terms. For first degree burglary probationers, 67 percent had at least two prior jail terms. For second degree burglary offenders, 219 out of 710 (31 percent) had at least two prior jail terms. Eighteen percent of the sampled second degree burglars had from 10 to 57 prior jail terms.

These figures are consistent with data contained in a staff report to the Washington State House Judiciary Committee (Bob Naon, "Redirecting the Sentencing System," a report compiled for the Committee in December, 1975). Of 180 felony offenders sentenced to probation from King County in August, 1974, 62 (34 percent) had a prior felony record.

Having a prior criminal record apparently does not play a major role in determining whether an offender is sentenced to prison or whether jail time is invoked as a condition of probation, since the data indicate that significant numbers of the burglary probationers are recidivating offenders. Many have had previous terms of probation or prison terms as adults. Over 70 percent had fallen under the jurisdiction of the juvenile system. About half had spent at least one term in jail prior to sentencing. Available data, therefore, indicate that sentencing policies do not consistently reflect the prior record of the offender: probation is not used merely as a sanction for first-time offenders. Furthermore, prison is not used merely as a sanction for those who fail in probation. The sanction imposed by the sentencing judge does not appear to be predicated on the criminal history of the offender nor the offender's prior probation failure history.

To identify previous probation and parole status for the burglar sample, 860 probationers were examined. Of the 860, 373 (43 percent) had at least one prior felony conviction resulting in probation. For second degree burglary probationers, 69 of 846 (8 percent) had more than one prior probation. Of the probationers, 44 percent were already on probation at the time they were sentenced again. At least 210 of the probationers were on parole for another felony at the time of sentencing for the following offenses:

	<u>Burglary I</u>		<u>Burglary II</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Murder	0	--	1	0	1	0
Robbery	1	25	12	6	13	6
Assault	0	--	7	3	7	3
Burglary I or II	3	75	95	46	98	47
Grand larceny	0	--	21	10	21	10
Auto theft	0	--	12	6	12	6
Forgery	0	--	13	6	13	6
Other	0	--	45	22	45	22
Total	4		206		210	

In addition to these felony parole violations, 80 burglar probationers had misdemeanor parole violations, and 199 had technical parole violations.

These data indicate that a large number of offenders placed on probation were not first-time offenders. Nearly half (43 percent) had at least one prior felony probation. Furthermore, about the same percentage were on probation at the time they committed the burglary offense.

These data compare with the figures contained in the staff report to the State House Judiciary Committee, where 34 percent of felony offenders receiving probation had a prior felony record. The sample for these figures contained all felony convictions in King County for August, 1974, and thus represented all offenses.

Since the extent of an offender's criminal history and failure on prior criminal sanctions do not seem to determine the nature or severity of the sentence, an attempt was made to determine what information a sentencing judge takes into account in handing down a criminal sanction.

First, the judge considers the sentence recommendation of the prosecutor's office. In many cases, the prosecutor's recommendation is made as part of a plea bargain. The effectiveness of negotiations between prosecution and defense counsel is dependent upon a high degree of cooperation between the prosecutor and the sentencing judge. Were judges to follow sentencing policies substantially different from the prosecutor's recommendation, plea bargaining would become an ineffective procedure for disposing of criminal cases. Since it is advantageous to most everyone concerned in the adjudicatory process to minimize the number of trials, the sentence must converge with administrative practices of the prosecutor's office. Conversely, administrative practices of the prosecutor must converge with the policies of the courts for the same reason. It sometimes has been suggested that sentencing practices are primarily solutions to administrative problems, i.e., case overload, and that the efficacy of a particular sanction is not the major concern of the parties involved in the sentencing.

Second, the sentencing judge considers the pre-sentence report on the offender prepared by the pre-sentence unit of the Department of Social and Health Services. Since this unit as presently constituted began operation in King County, pre-sentence investigations have been done on 208 burglary offenders. Of these 208, 27 (13 percent) were sentenced to prison, and 181 (87 percent) were sentenced to probationary terms. Judges order pre-sentence reports at their discretion; therefore, a number of sentencings may have been done in the absence of a Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI) report.

Factors taken into account in reaching a pre-sentence report determination evolve through a series of conferences asking for information regarding the offense, the individual's motivation and attitude. In addition, collateral information is collected by the pre-sentence report writer. Such collateral information includes police information, the opinion of an employer, school information and may also involve direct interviewing of family members. Following another conference with the pre-sentence report writer, community resource persons, a probation and parole supervisor (staffing chairman) and others who may have an interest or have been involved in the case (such as psychologists, caseworkers, etc.), a Pre-Sentence Investigation report is issued.

In addition to the Pre-Sentence Investigation report, which depicts a wide range of resources available to an individual offender if the community retention option is taken, the public defender's office maintains a file of community treatment organizations which may take a convicted burglar into their programs. The defense counsel or the public defender's office may additionally recommend other treatment options to benefit a client. The judge confronted by staff work of the pre-sentence investigation unit and with specific recommendations for treatment by the defense may be less likely to impose an incarceration sanction out of a desire not to be overly punitive. A judge may be disposed to believe that, due to the numbers of recommendations for community retention, such decisions would be in the best interest of the offender.

The fact that a number of the options which are traditionally suggested have failed repeatedly to demonstrate any impact on reducing the likelihood that the offender will become a recidivist and thus are not likely to protect the local community has, insofar as can be determined, not been consistently presented for the court's consideration. Judges often end up making numerous decisions based on incomplete and often erroneous information, and judges lack a feedback mechanism by which they can learn of the success or failure of a particular community retention decision that they have made. Offenders who have been retained in the community and have failed are still often reinstated on probation.

Problem Statement B: The perceived risk of apprehension, conviction and loss of liberty for the priority crimes of burglary and robbery are not sufficient to discourage new offenders or reduce recidivism.

Discussion

An estimated 23,170 burglaries were committed in Seattle in 1974. Not all of these burglaries were committed by adult offenders. In addition, the relationship between offense and offender is not likely to be one-to-one: one burglary committed by 23,170 offenders.

Taking 1974 as a base year, however, a crude risk factor for each burglary offender can be calculated. Using calculations that between 55 and 70 percent of the estimated 1974 burglaries were committed by juveniles, this means that (say) 30 percent were committed by adults. If no adult committed more than one burglary, this would mean there were no more than 7,000 adult burglars that year.

In 1974, 314 burglars were charged either as a result of being arrested for suspicion of burglary or for suspicion of another offense with a subsequent charge of burglary. Thus 4.48 percent of "adult burglaries" committed in 1974 resulted in a charge of burglary being filed with the King County prosecutor. Of the 314 burglars charged, 170 were found or pleaded guilty, or 54 percent of burglars charged were determined guilty of the offense.

The data show that 2.43 percent of the estimated 7,000 burglaries committed by adults were resolved with a finding of guilt. Of the 170 persons found guilty of burglary in the first or second degree, 37 (21 percent) received a sentence other than probation, deferred sentence or a fine. Thus for 7,000 offenses, the chance of that burglary offense resulting in a term of confinement is 0.30 percent, or less than one out of every 333 burglaries committed by adults results in a term of confinement for the offender.

In order to assess whether or not the risk to burglars in 1974 is representative for more than one year, the following data were available for all burglars arrested by the Seattle Police Department from January 1, 1973, to September 1, 1975.

There were an estimated 65,000 burglaries in Seattle from January 1, 1973, to September 1, 1975. If we assume that the true number of adult burglaries is about 40 percent for any given year (using 40 percent as the mean between from 30 percent to 50 percent of burglary being committed by adults on an annual average basis), an estimate of 26,000 can be used as the number of burglaries committed by adults during this period.

For these 26,000 adult burglaries, 1,409 adults were arrested. Of these 1,409 arrestees, 778 (55 percent) were charged either with burglary or with another crime arising from the burglary arrest. Of the 778 charged with a crime, 524 (67 percent) were sentenced as felons. Of these 524, 96 (18 percent) were sentenced to prison; 82 percent were sentenced to probation.

The likelihood of an adult burglary offender being arrested, charged and sentenced to prison for 26,000 burglaries committed by adults during the 2.6 years sampled is as follows:

- No more than 5 percent of adult burglars are arrested.
- No more than 3 percent of adult burglars are arrested and charged.
- No more than 2 percent of these burglars are sentenced as felons.

For the crime of burglary, 0.3 percent, or three in one thousand, are arrested, charged and sentenced to prison.

It would be reasonable to conclude that the risks to burglars described by these data are not sufficient to discourage persons from committing the crime.

A significant number of burglary arrests do not result in the filing of charges. Of the 1,409 arrestees from January 1, 1973, to September 1, 1975, 468 (33 percent) were "investigated and released." In some cases, suspects are investigated and released because the prosecutor deems the evidence is inadequate to file charges. Occasionally, the arrest or evidence gathering process may be questionable for a trial setting.

In some instances, the detective assigned to the case makes the decision to release the suspect without first bringing the case to the attention of a prosecutor. Of the 1,409 arrests for suspicion of burglary between January 1, 1973, and September 1, 1975, only 70 cases were brought to the attention of the King County prosecutor where charges were "declined." For over 80 percent of these 70 arrests, no charges were filed in any court. The remaining 14 cases (20 percent) were filed in Seattle Municipal Court for adjudication as misdemeanors. Therefore, the police and prosecutor together appear to select the "best" two-thirds of the total arrests for adjudication. The rest, though apprehended for suspicion, are not charged.

Of the 1,409 arrestees, 468 drop out of the system with no charges being filed. The remaining 941 arrestees are charged for an offense that arises from the arrest, but not necessarily for burglary.

Of the 1,409 arrestees, 166 (12 percent) are charged as misdemeanants in Seattle Municipal Court. Certain non-felony crimes are related to burglary. The crimes of prowling, criminal trespass, property destruction and petty theft are some possible reduced charges when cases do not warrant prosecution as a felony. Seattle Municipal Court adjudicates virtually all of the crimes committed in the city that are charged as misdemeanors. The 166 cases that were filed in Municipal Court represent the number of felony arrests which resulted in misdemeanor charges. Of these 166 cases, 154 (93 percent) were filed in Municipal Court without a previous decline on felony charges by the prosecutor's office. The other 12 cases (amounting to 7 percent of the 166) were filed in Municipal Court following a felony decline. Misdemeanors carry a maximum penalty of one year in jail and/or a \$1,000 fine. No information is presently available on how many of these 166 were found guilty, or on dispositions.

Of the 1,409 arrestees from January 1, 1973, to September 1, 1975, 45 percent were either released without charges or charged as misdemeanants in Municipal Court. This leaves 775 suspects (55 percent) who were charged with some felony by the county prosecutor. Not all of these 775 were charged with burglary.

Data on charges are available for 714 of the 775 felony filings. Of these 714, the first counts (or most serious offense charged) are as follows:

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Burglary, First Degree	18	3
Burglary, Second Degree	525	74
Possession of burglar's tools	5	1
Attempted burglary	28	4
Grand larceny	96	13
Other Part I crime	6	1
Other felony	36	5
Total	714	101*

*Due to rounding error

What began as 1,409 arrests for suspicion of burglary diminished to approximately 543 burglary charges. From the information presented above, 74 percent of the 775 felony filings were for burglary in the second degree, and 3 percent were for burglary in the first degree, for a total of 77 percent of the 775 felony charges being for burglary.

The likelihood of an offender being charged with burglary following an arrest for burglary is 42 percent. Even before the adjudication process begins, a majority of the

burglary arrestees have exited the felony level criminal justice system through "investigate and release," Municipal Court or being charged with other, though related, offenses.

The county prosecutor may elect to file charges in either District or Superior Court. In most cases, District Court is used to test the strength of a case in a preliminary hearing. Cases are also filed in District Court where it is anticipated that the offender will plead guilty in exchange for a reduction in the charges to misdemeanors. Of the felony charges, 41 percent were filed in District Court, while 59 percent were filed in Superior Court (based on 742 of the 775, for whom data are available).

Some of the charges filed in District Court are disposed of on the District Court level, while others are either "bound over" to Superior Court or "dismissed and filed direct." Of the 307 District Court filings for whom data are available, 142 (46 percent) were disposed of in District Court, while the remainder were "bound over" or "dismissed and filed direct." These 142 cases disposed of in District Court were either reduced to misdemeanors or dismissed. (It is also possible that some of these District Court cases resulted in "not guilty" verdicts. However, the county prosecutor does not tend to file cases in District Court with the intent of conducting a trial. If the defendant refuses to enter a plea for the "charge down" to a misdemeanor and the case survives the preliminary hearing, the charge will be bound over to Superior Court as a felony.)

Although District Court cannot adjudicate felony charges (jurisdiction is limited to misdemeanors and felony preliminary hearings), Superior Court can reduce felony charges to misdemeanors without remanding them to District Court. Therefore, misdemeanors that were initially charged as felonies and later reduced can be adjudicated in either District or Superior Court.

Of the 775 defendants against whom felony charges were filed, 141 (18 percent) had their charges reduced to misdemeanors. Of these 141, 103 persons (73 percent) were sentenced as misdemeanants. The remainder either absconded, were found not guilty or had their cases dismissed prior to sentencing. These 141, who constitute 10 percent of the 1,409 arrestees, represent those initially charged as felons and whose charges were reduced to misdemeanors. Adding this 141 to the 166 who were directly charged for misdemeanors in Municipal Court, a total of 307 arrestees (22 percent of the original 1,409) are not adjudicated as felons. This 22 percent added to the 33 percent who are released without charges means that 55 percent of the persons arrested for suspicion of burglary are never adjudicated as felons. (See Table 4B-1.)

Table 4B-1--Charges Reduced to Misdemeanors and Charges Adjudicated as Felonies

	Reduced to Misdemeanors	Not Reduced	Total
Burglary, First Degree	1 (5%)	17	18
Burglary, Second Degree	70 (13%)	455	525
Possession of burglar's tools	0 --	5	5
Attempted burglary	3 (11%)	25	28
Grand larceny	14 (15%)	82	96
Other Part I crime	0 --	6	6
Other felony	5 (14%)	31	36
Total	93*	621	712
Percentage	13%	87%	100%

*This number is less than the 141 reported in the text because of dismissals, not guilty verdicts, absconders and those defendants whose first counts on the filing information were dismissed and who were subsequently sentenced on other than the first count.

Comparisons of the severity of the types of charges described in the table above show that charges which are reduced are not less severe than those that are not reduced,

i.e., a more severe charge has no greater likelihood of being reduced than a less severe charge.

Sentencing data are available on 103 persons who exited the system at the District or Superior Court level.

A suspended sentence permits the offender to remain at liberty under probationary supervision. Violations of probation are reported to the sentencing judge who may elect, but is not bound, to revoke the suspension (impose the period of incarceration that had been suspended). Of the 103 offenders who were sentenced as misdemeanants, 42 (41 percent) received a suspended sentence.

A deferred sentence also places the offender on probation. What distinguishes a deferred sentence is that upon successful completion of the probationary period, the case is dismissed, with the formal conviction being expunged. Of the 103 misdemeanor sentencing, 53 (51 percent) received deferred sentences.

For the remaining eight offenders (8 percent of the 103), a sentence was imposed with neither a suspension nor deferral.

The following data show the number of misdemeanants who received jail time, along with the amount of jail time they received. The amount of jail time reported below is the actual length of the sentence to be served in jail. Many of these 103 misdemeanants received sentences including jail time. A substantial number of these jail sentences, however, were suspended or deferred, in whole or in part. For instance, a misdemeanant may receive a 90-day sentence with all but 15 days suspended. This case would appear below under the "1-15 days" category.

<u>Jail Time</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
None	69	67
1-15 days	1	1
16-60 days	10	10
61-180 days	21	20
Over 180 days	2	2
Total	103	100

As the data indicate, two-thirds of the misdemeanants received no actual jail time. These 69 offenders were placed on straight probation, were sentenced to treatment or vocational programs in the community or were required to pay a fine, court costs and/or make restitution.

Assuming that the 141 sample defendants charged with misdemeanors in District or Superior Court are comparable to the 166 defendants charged in Municipal Court, the following data on total misdemeanor dispositions is presented. Of the 307 original burglary arrestees processed as misdemeanants, 224 (73 percent) were sentenced. Of these 224, 206 received a suspended or deferred sentence; 76 (34 percent) received jail time.

These 307 misdemeanants, together with the 468 who were released without charges, represent 775 (55 percent) of the 1,409 who were arrested for suspicion of burglary between January, 1973, and September, 1975. Only 307 (40 percent) of these 775 arrestees were charged with any crime. Only 141 (18 percent) were charged as felons. None was convicted of felonies; only 76 (10 percent) of the 775 received any jail time. Three groups of arrestees--those released without charges, those charged in Municipal Court and those charged in county courts with a misdemeanor--represent over half of the 1,409 total arrested between January, 1973, and September, 1975.

Thus far, we have accounted for a loss of 55 percent of the original group of 1,409 arrestees from the felony level criminal justice system.

The remaining 634 original burglary arrestees were charged and adjudicated as felons. Of these 634, 143 (23 percent) were not sentenced. These 143 are found not guilty at trial, abscond before sentencing or have their cases dismissed.

Thirteen (13) percent of the first counts on felony filing informations are reduced to misdemeanors. In addition to these, another 3 percent are found "not guilty" at trial.

Felony charges were filed against 775 defendants. Of this number, charging information is available on 742. Of these 742 charges, 513 (69 percent) were resolved by a plea of guilty. Trials were held for only 116 (16 percent) of the defendants. Of these 116, 43 trials were decided by a judge and 68 were decided by a jury. Only 19 defendants (3 percent of those charged) were acquitted. Judges convicted 37 of the 43 (86 percent of the defendants), while juries convicted 60 of the 68 (88 percent of the defendants).

Acquittals may result from any number of reasons unique to each particular case. One of the reasons is "not guilty by reason of insanity," which occurred in five cases (26 percent of the total "not guilty" cases). In these five cases, the defendants were exonerated from the burglary charge but, in turn, faced civil commitment procedures.

The conviction rate of over 87 percent illustrates how the selectivity of the criminal justice system appears to select out the best cases for filing and adjudication. It is impossible to determine how many of the charges not tried would have resulted in a guilty finding. Perhaps some number of cases in the "investigate and release" category could have resulted in charge and conviction. The selective procedure of the system, to arrest only those suspects where "probable cause" exists, to charge only those suspects where a conviction can be fairly assured, appear to be designed to exclude the weaker cases, as well as the not guilty cases. The 87 percent conviction rate attests to the quality of these selective procedures.

Dismissals accounted for 113 (15 percent) of the charge dispositions for both felons and misdemeanants. This compares with 3 percent who were acquitted, 69 percent who pleaded guilty and 13 percent who were convicted at trial. Of these 113 dismissals, 34 offenders (30 percent) were sentenced as felons on other charges. Almost half of the 34 offenders were sentenced to prison on the other charges. It would appear to be appropriate to view these dismissals as administrative convenience, rather than as evidence that the system has failed to prosecute, convict and impose a sanction.

In all, 143 of the 775 who were charged as felons whose charges were not reduced to misdemeanors were not sentenced. This figure does not include the 34 offenders whose charges were dismissed to facilitate sentencing on other charges. These 143 account for 10 percent of the 1,409 arrestees. Adding these 143 to the 468 who were released without charges, the 166 who were charged in Municipal Court and the 143 who were adjudicated as misdemeanants following an initial felony charge, the total figure for these four groups is 920 (65 percent of the 1,409 arrestees). Thus from an original arrest group of 1,409, only 491 (35 percent) were actually sentenced as felons.

These 491 fall into two groups--those offenders who are sentenced to prison and those sentenced to probation. Of the original burglary arrest group, only eight percent received a prison sentence. Probationers accounted for 385 (27 percent) of the total arrest group. Probation is the sanction imposed for most offenders sentenced as felons. Of the 491 offenders who were sentenced as felons, probation was granted to 78 percent, while only 22 percent went to prison.

For the crime of robbery, the risk of apprehension, conviction and loss of liberty is higher than for burglary, but also relatively low. Using estimates based on national victimization data and the ratio of non-commercial to commercial robberies for Seattle in 1975, a general estimate of the number of actual occurrences of commercial and non-commercial robbery in the city for the base year 1974 was computed to be 3,527; this figure is based on 2,041 reported incidents of commercial and non-commercial robbery.

In Seattle in 1975, 72 percent of all robberies committed were non-commercial robberies. The national reporting data on robberies show that non-commercial robberies are reported to the police 51.4 percent of the time, while commercial robberies are reported 85.8 percent of the time. Using these calculations and based on 2,041 reported incidents in 1974, the projected number of occurrences of commercial robbery in 1974 is 667, and the actual number of incidents of non-commercial robbery is computed at 2,860 for the base year.

Out of the total 3,527 robberies believed to have occurred in Seattle during 1974, 2,041 were reported to the police. This resulted in 427 adult suspicion arrests for robbery and 228 adult primary charges for robbery; in addition, 179 juveniles were contacted (formal contact for robbery excludes investigated and released cases). Depending on whether one is discussing total suspicion arrests, primary suspicion arrests, total charges or total primary charges, the number of adult arrests will vary. To compare adult with juvenile arrests, the most comparable figures would be juvenile contacts and adult primary charges.

The following figures are based upon a manual analysis of computer data obtained from the Seattle Police Department Data Processing Section for 1974 robberies. According to this manual analysis, there were 445 adult suspicion of robbery arrests. Of these 445 arrests, 127 were investigated and released and 13 were released to another authority (committed to mental hospital or suspension or revocation of prior status). Of the 318 persons arrested on suspicion of robbery who were not released to another authority or were not investigated and released, 226 were charged with the offense of robbery and 79 were charged with another offense. In addition to the 226 persons arrested on suspicion of robbery and charged with robbery, 18 persons were arrested on suspicion of another offense and charged with robbery in 1974. Including these 18 persons, the total 1974 adult robbery charges amount to 244 persons. (Of these 244, the 1974 Seattle Police Department Annual Report identified 228 as primary charges--that is, the most serious charge for which an individual was arrested.)

Given 3,527 incidents of robbery in the base year 1974 for which 244 adults were charged with robbery and 179 juveniles were contacted (423 total), any offender's chances for any single incident of being apprehended and charged with the crime were approximately 12 percent. In other words, 12 robbers, adult or juvenile, were apprehended and charged with robbery for every 100 occurrences of robbery in the city in 1974. (Of the reported robberies, the 423 charges would correspond to 20.7 percent of reported robberies, or approximately one in every 4.8 reported occurrences. However, from an offender's viewpoint, it is more appropriate to calculate risk on the basis of total incidents, rather than reported incidents.) It could be argued, as for the crime of burglary, that the perceived risk for the potential robbery offender may not be adequate to deter that person from committing the offense.

The current rate of adult involvement in robbery can be estimated (based on those arrested), assuming the arrest of an adult or a juvenile offender to be a somewhat random process. Using 1974 data, the amount of juvenile-to-total-adult-and-juvenile involvement in robbery is 44 percent. If roughly 55 percent of robbery is "adult robbery" in any year, of the 3,527 robberies committed in 1974, an estimated 1,389 were committed by adults.

In 1974, using the above method of computation for determining adult robberies, there were 1,389 adult robberies and 228 adult robbers arrested. Thus the risk to a robber of being arrested for a given robbery was 15.4 percent, or 16 in 100 chances of arrest for each robbery. A 16 percent risk of apprehension and charge for each adult committing a robbery appears to be minimal. Beyond being charged with robbery, of the 228 robbers, 103 were found or pleaded guilty. Of these 103 guilty robbers, 54 were incarcerated. Thus the risk of being arrested, charged, found guilty and sentenced to incarceration for the crime of robbery is 3.88, or 4 chances in 100.

To increase the deterrent effect of sanctions imposed for robbery and to reduce recidivism, it is reasonable to expect the criminal justice system to operate in a way that increases the perception of risk from the offender's point of view. This could be done in a number of ways, including making the system as it now operates respond more efficiently in each of its component stages. Such a strategy, or set of strategies, would in essence reflect a sum total of suspect/offender processing, apprehension, detection and corrections crime reduction strategies. In other words, if police were able to apprehend more robbers and the criminal justice system could increase the negative consequences of such apprehensions to the robbery offender, a general deterrent effect would probably occur and recidivism would probably be reduced, as well.

Some amount of constant refining of the criminal justice system's response to robbery is currently occurring across several jurisdictions. The problem with redoubling current efforts throughout the criminal justice system in responding to robbery offenders is that the cost of such a strategy is unreasonably high. This is of particular concern given current budgetary crises faced by most governmental jurisdictions with responsibility over portions of the criminal justice system. Temporarily increasing the ability of current robbery reduction efforts through application of large sums of non-permanent discretionary resources may be a short-sighted solution, if long-term cost is not considered from the beginning.

To have substantial impact on robbery, careful refinement of current strategies or development of more effective strategies must occur. Such strategies could inevitably replace the old, less efficient robbery reduction efforts at the same or reduced total cost. For such strategy development to occur, however, it must be based upon empirical evidence or a data base which has not been available. The currently operating Systems Response to Robbery Project is a means to develop such a baseline of information. Once areas of system weaknesses are identified and new strategies tested, more permanent and lasting change is more likely to be facilitated.

Problem Statement C: While a large number of burglars appear to be one-time offenders, there appears to be a core of recidivious felons contributing to the City's crime problem.

Discussion

For a sample of all Seattle Police Department burglary arrests between January 1, 1973, and September 1, 1975, the following other crimes were committed by 1,409 burglary arrestees during that period.

Crime Category	Number of Arrests			Total Number of Arrests	Total Number of Charges
	1	2	3 or more		
Person	44	1	--	46	24
Burglary	193	38	15	317	154
Other felony	179	40	3	270	245
Misdemeanor	317	134	12	1,022	1,000
(None)				(636)	(680)
Total arrests and charges				1,655	1,423

The total of 1,655 represents the number of crimes (not counting the 1,409 arrests for suspicion of burglary) for which the 1,409 burglary arrestees committed between January, 1973, and September, 1975. When this total of 1,655 is added to the 1,409 arrests for suspicion of burglary, the grand total of 3,064 represents the total number of crimes allegedly committed by the 1,409 persons arrested for suspicion of burglary between January, 1973, and September, 1975. Of the 1,409 burglary arrestees, 636 were arrested only once. The remaining 772 (one case was missing, accounting for the discrepancy in figures) arrestees accounted for 2,428 total arrests in the time period sampled. This is an average of slightly more than three arrests per person for this group.

Available prosecution data suggest a relatively low charging rate, as well as a tendency to "charge down" to a less serious offense. Out of the sample of Seattle Police Department arrests between January, 1973, and September, 1975, only 24 of the 46 (52 percent) arrests for a person crime resulted in person-crime charges. Only 154 of 317 (49 percent) of the burglary arrests resulted in burglary charges. (This 154 includes those who were arrested for a person offense and charged with burglary, so it can be regarded as a generous indicator of the actual percent who are arrested for and charged with burglary.) On the other hand, the 270 arrests for other felonies resulted in 245 charges. This is a 91 percent charging rate and shows how frequently crimes are charged at a lower level than arrests. Similarly, 1,000 charges for misdemeanors resulted from 1,022 arrests. This 98 percent rate of charges to arrests suggests that the tendency to "charge down" may again be operating at the misdemeanor level. Overall, the total of 1,655 arrests resulted in 1,423 charges. This 86 percent rate of charges to arrests strongly suggests that those 772 persons who did commit other offenses were very likely to be charged with some offense, if only a misdemeanor.

The information on the number of arrests and charges for rape, robbery and aggravated assault, which is summarized from the 1977 Plan, appears in Table 4B-2.

Of the 2,347 arrests for rape, robbery and aggravated assault during the time period sampled, the 45 burglary arrestees who were arrested for a person crime accounted for 46 arrests, or about 2 percent of the total number of arrests for these crimes. This small number suggests that the crimes of rape, robbery and assault are, for the most part, committed by other than these 45 persons. By and large, those persons who are arrested for burglary tend not to be the same who are arrested for Part I person crimes.

Of those who were arrested for rape, robbery and assault, 40 percent were charged with the crimes for which they were arrested. By comparison, 52 percent of the 45 burglars who were arrested for a person crime were charged with a person crime. This 52 percent charging rate, while higher than the 40 percent charging rate for rape, robbery and assault arrestees as a whole, may have been inflated somewhat by the manner in which the data were recorded.

Table 4B-2--Arrests and Charges for Rape, Robbery and Aggravated Assault
January, 1974, to September, 1975

<u>Crime</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Projected Total Including 1973-1975*</u>
Rape				
Arrests	115	91	206	330
Charges for rape	47	37	84	134
Charges - other	32	33	63	101
Robbery				
Arrests	445	314	759	1,214
Charges for robbery	226	79	305	488
Charges - other	172	62	234	374
Assault				
Arrests	292	210	502	803
Charges for assault	111	92	203	325
Charges - other	118	66	184	294

Summary of Totals

	<u>1974 + 1975</u>	<u>Projected 1973-1975</u>
Arrests	1,467	2,347
Charges for the offenses as arrested	592	947
Percent charged with the of- fense as arrested	40%	40%
Charges for other offenses	481	769
Percent charged with other offenses	33%	33%

*Projected totals were derived by multiplying the totals for 1974-1975 by 1.6, adding 12 months' projection to the 20 months of actual data.

Relatively few of the 1,409 burglary arrestees were arrested for a person crime. Of those who were arrested for a felony (in addition to the burglary arrest), this felony was most commonly burglary. That is to say, burglars tend not to cross over from one offense to a more serious offense. However, a small group--3 percent of the 1,409--do cross over into the person crimes. Table 4B-3 takes a closer look at the cross-over tendencies of persons who were arrested for another offense in addition to burglary. The data that appear in this table show the offense categories for the 772 who were arrested for another crime in addition to the burglary. Of the 772, 332 (43 percent) were arrested for only misdemeanors. Another 161 (21 percent) were arrested for another felony only, or another felony and a misdemeanor. These groups account for 64 percent, almost two-thirds, of the 772 who were arrested for another offense. Most of the 772 do not, therefore, cross over to more serious crimes. Most are not recidivating burglars.

Of the 772 who were arrested for another crime, 245 (32 percent) were arrested for another burglary. This number exceeds the 226 total who were arrested for another felony. Of the 245 who were arrested for another burglary, 57 (23 percent) were also arrested for another felony (other than burglary or a person crime). Of the 245 arrested for another burglary, only 11 persons (4 percent) were arrested for a person crime. However, 127 of the 245 (52 percent) were also arrested for a misdemeanor. Those 245 arrested again for burglary do not tend to cross over into person crimes. To a limited extent,

Table 4B-3--Cross-Over Tendencies for the 772 Persons Arrested for Another Offense in Addition to the Burglary (Misdemeanor = M, Other Felony = F, Burglary = B, Person Offense = P)

<u>Crime Category</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of 772</u>	<u>Percent of 1,409</u>
M only	332	43	24
F only	74	10	5
F + M only	87	11	6
B only	93	12	7
B + M only	91	12	6
B + F only	23	3	2
B + F + M only	27	3	2
P only	16	2	1
P + M only	10	1	1
P + F only	6	1	0
P + F + M only	2	0	0
P + B only	---	---	---
P + B + M only	4	1	0
P + B + F only	2	0	0
P + B + F + M	5	1	0
Total	772	100	54
No other arrest	636	---	45
Grand total	1,408*	100	99**

*One missing case

**Rounded off

they do cross over into the other felony category. More than half cross over into misdemeanors. When recidivating burglars do cross over, they tend away from felonies and toward the least serious offenses. Recidivating burglars are not the same persons who commit a substantial number of the person crimes.

Cross-over patterns of the 45 persons arrested for a person crime indicate that almost 60 percent of the 45 crossed over only from the burglary to a person crime only or to a person crime or a misdemeanor only. About 40 percent crossed over into the two other felony categories: burglary and another felony. The 23 persons who represent this 40 percent are the most serious threats to the community, as indicated by the number of times they were arrested and the severity of the crimes for which they were arrested. These 23 persons amount to only 3 percent of the 772 persons arrested for another offense, and only 1.5 percent of the 1,409 total arrestees. These data further support the claim that most burglars do not tend to cross over into more serious crimes. The extent of the crime cross-over for these 1,409 persons is strictly limited by their tendency to be rearrested for crimes of lesser severity (especially misdemeanors only), or not to be rearrested at all. Those persons who are rearrested for any felony can be identified mainly as recidivating burglars, not burglar/robbers, burglar/rapists, burglar/assaultists, etc.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement C

Rejected Strategies

In order to intelligently divert non-recidivous or one-time offenders who would not be likely to repeat their criminal activity, more needs to be learned about this one-time offender population. In order to sell the idea of "doing nothing" with a certain class of offenders, we need to develop actuarial data which would allow reasonable predictions

of risk for identified offender groups. These actuarial data could form an empirical basis upon which to make decisions regarding the risk an individual offender may represent to the community. Data should include past criminal history and demographic variables which are commonly believed to be associated with differential criminal risks.

In the juvenile area, the Youthful Offender Study has been useful to develop a further understanding of youthful offenders and has, as well, facilitated the development of actuarial data which are useful in evaluating juvenile crime reduction programs. Based on the two-phase Youthful Offender Study, we are able to determine statistically what a given offender's likelihood of recidivism is, based upon the number and type of previous or prior criminal contacts. In order to determine who commits priority crimes in Seattle, and in order to have a baseline of data to evaluate potential offender-oriented burglary and robbery reduction strategies, a similar type of inquiry could provide a useful predictive measurement applied to the adult burglar and robber populations.

Such a study might help us identify if, in fact, a number of one-time burglary offenders are largely responsible for the high burglary rate in Seattle. If so, target hardening strategies directed at non-professional burglars, for example, might be more prudent than large scale and more expensive offender corrections programs. In addition, such information might be used to determine points of potential intervention prior to the commission of the more serious criminal offenses.

Several studies have sought to develop prediction models of recidivism. Looking at the results of these studies, only a small percent of the variability in recidivism can be predicted from the best available composite of predictors. For example, the Washington State Base Expectancy Study, used by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles to determine high and low risk parolee classifications, did not account for over 90 percent of the variance. Until more accurate predictor composites are available, the information developed in such prediction studies would have limited utility for development of deterrence strategies. Such studies are based on actual recidivism data. Prediction models have not been developed that would dictate a course of action designed to discourage commission of an offense before the fact. No study currently available is able to predict the timing of a criminal act, beyond specifying very large ranges; for example, from six months to two years. Prediction models may legitimately play a role in various parts of the criminal justice process; for example, the prosecutor's decision of whether a case should be filed for adjudication, a judge's decision of the most appropriate sanction, the parole board's decision setting minimum terms. These are system predictors and are different in character from asking a model to predict when an offense is likely to be committed.

Increase the perception of risk associated with commission of a crime for priority crime offenders. Since it is very likely that the perceived risk from the offender's point of view is not sufficiently high to discourage an offender from committing a crime either for the first time or to discourage recidivism, strategies aimed at increasing the perceived risk associated with commission of burglary should be considered. One approach might be to publicize those instances where burglars are apprehended, charged, found guilty and sentenced in a manner which represents unpleasant consequences to the offender. Such a publicity campaign might be mounted in order to counterbalance the substantial "street wisdom" among robbers, burglars and potential offenders that the risk of being apprehended and found guilty is reasonably low. However, such a strategy inevitably could not help but misrepresent the actual risk, from the offender's point of view, and could, thereby, have an impact only upon the uninformed or uninitiated potential offender. In addition, such a strategy would have little long-term impact, as once an offender is exposed to the criminal justice system, the true risk is easily recognized.

In 1976, the Washington, D. C., CBS affiliate station WTOP produced a crime/criminal justice segment as part of the local evening news show. This program was designed, in part, to acquaint the public with the workings of the criminal justice system. The program emphasized the lack of consistency in the criminal justice system's response to criminal offenses.

One suggested strategy to deter burglary and robbery offenders was to produce locally a similar crime segment which depicts burglars being apprehended or publicized actual burglary cases through criminal justice processing. In this way, information could be presented to the public on how the criminal justice system functions and expose serious criminal offenders to public scrutiny. Such a program could also depict consequences to potential offenders which show the unpleasantness of being arrested, prosecuted and even sentenced to prison.

Such a program might arguably have a deterrent effect. While the City might encourage the local public media to attempt such a program on a demonstration basis, the City would not be a viable funding entity for this project. Since it is important to maintain the adversary relationship between the public media and government, a joint venture of this type may be viewed as in danger of jeopardizing a necessary separation between government and the media. For this reason, this strategy is rejected for City support, although there are potential merits in the idea for demonstration purposes to convince persons, especially younger offenders, of the consequences of committing crime. The City should support such an endeavor by local broadcasting or other public information media, if an opportunity materializes.

If exposure to the criminal justice system has little, if any, deterrent effect, one could reasonably argue that offenders exposed to the process might be more likely to commit another burglary. If this were true, extra surveillance efforts directed at the identified burglar might be used to increase the negative features of being charged and convicted for burglary, from the offender's point of view. An offender's knowledge of such surveillance might also add to the perception of risk. Thus surveillance might arguably have a deterrent effect.

The argument presented above does not differ substantially from a part of the rationale in support of probationary "supervision" of identified offenders. Supervision of probationers may cause persons to believe they are subject to more oversight scrutiny as a result of their status. The numbers of persons carried on the probation caseload, and the resultant mechanical opportunities for probation officers to become aware of subsequent deviations from conditions of probation or new law violations, make intensive oversight supervision unlikely in the majority of cases.

This same condition would apply to extra surveillance efforts by police. Each year approximately 214 burglars are identified, charged and convicted. Surveillance of that number of persons would be costly and is not likely to produce substantial deterrence, due to the impossibility of continuous surveillance.

Adding the information about burglars to the surveillance argument, it appears even less likely that a deterrent effect could be achieved. Research shows that only six burglars charged with burglary in 1974 were also charged with burglary in 1973. Evidence has been presented to suggest that 6,500 adult burglars committed 7,000 burglaries in 1974. This could mean that each of the 6,500 burglars commit 1.07 burglaries each per year; or it has been hypothesized that most adult burglars commit only one burglary in a year and some small number of burglars commit several in a year. It would make little sense to direct surveillance efforts at all burglars charged in a year, since we expect only a few will commit another burglary in that year. Until we have more information to identify the high-risk, multiple burglar, we are not likely to be able to implement surveillance efforts with a reasonable chance for success. Thus this strategy should be rejected.

In other cities where surveillance was aimed at a group of high-risk offenders who were identified as "high risk" by local law enforcement, such surveillance did not yield either increased apprehension or fewer burglaries.

A project designed by the Office of Adult Probation and Parole will soon be implemented to test the workability of an intensive supervision program for parolees. The plan of this project is to select a sample of offenders committed to the State Department of Institutions and recommend that they be paroled directly from the Shelton Reception Center. The caseload for this project will be 20 parolees per parole officer. This

compares with the present caseload of approximately 90-120, depending on geographical area.

In principle, this project will enable parole officers to intensify their supervision of parolees who would otherwise be incarcerated. A matched control group of offenders who are sent to institutions through normal channels will be used for purposes of comparison and followup. The design of the program poses questions of how the offenders will be chosen, the mechanics of how surveillance of these offenders will operate, how the parole officer and police operation will be coordinated, how to distinguish between actual and perceived surveillance, and how to measure the increment of actual and perceived surveillance over the present system. For example, increased surveillance for burglary offenders might result in an increase in burglary arrests because particular offenders under surveillance are considered prime suspects because of their status in this program. This would increase the arrest and clearance rates, without necessarily affecting the rate of burglaries.

Although from the parole officer's point of view the decreased size of a caseload from 100 to 20 would enable more intense supervision, the workability of having a single parole officer conduct simultaneous surveillance on 20 offenders appears dubious. Similar intensive supervision caseloads which were attempted by Juvenile Parole Services did not produce a significantly lower recidivism rate for these caseloads as compared with regular-sized caseloads.

Current Strategy

King County Work Release: The use and expansion of King County work release was proposed by King County in their 1977 Criminal Justice Plan. Although work release presumably saves the county money (when inmates are working away from the jail, they require no supervision), evidence is lacking which suggests this program has statistically significant impact or likelihood to reduce crime or recidivism. Where crime reduction cannot be demonstrated, such programs may serve to add to the city's crime problems. For example, the King County work release program participants were, for the most part, city residents (61 percent) or employed in city work sites (71 percent). King County planners feel that jail work release is necessary as an alternative to probation. Work release advocates claim judges will either sentence offenders to jail and work release or will release them to probation. Unfortunately, the data available on sanctions imposed in King County indicate this reasoning may be correct.

According to King County data, 27 percent of the felony offenders on work release became recidivists. Work release candidates are selectively screened at the point of intake; thus persons placed on work release represent the believed "good risk" candidates. If 27 percent of the good risks become recidivists, one may want to ask how this good risk recidivism rate compares with the 32 to 34 percent recidivism rate for the acknowledged bad risk Department of Social and Health Services prison group. The conclusion reached has even more impact when one considers for what offenses the work release offenders were convicted. (See Table 4B-4.)

The principal concept which underlies work release is that offenders who are working should not have to give up their employment to serve jail time. In some rare cases, offenders who do not have employment are assisted in obtaining employment, but most work release persons are previously employed.

The jail work release program is intended to be responsive, in part, to the overuse of probation. Judges who want to retain control over cases may be reluctant to sentence offenders to the authority of the State parole board. Without local jail, the only current option available to judges is probation. In other words, the situation may be that either an offender gets up to a year in the local jail, or the offender gets low level supervised release back to the community. Given that the jail is at almost full capacity now, an expanded work release program would, theoretically, facilitate room for more offenders; therefore, more sanctions involving loss of liberty could be imposed.

Table 4B-4--King County Work Release Offenders - by Crime Type and Prior Felony Convictions*

Crime	Number of Prior Felony Convictions				Total
	0	1	2	3 or more	
<u>Against Persons</u>	25	9	1	3	38
(Rape)	(2)	-	--	--	
(Robbery)	(4)	(3)	--	--	
(Other)	(19)	(6)	--	--	
<u>Against Property</u>	19	13	13	9	54
(Burglary)	(6)	(5)	(5)	(3)	
(Grand larceny)	(6)	(2)	(6)	(3)	
(Other)	(7)	(6)	(2)	(3)	
Narcotics	22	7	3	1	33
Alcohol/Traffic	15	5	1	0	21
Other	5	2	0	0	7
Total	86	36	18	13	153
Percent	56	24	12	8	100

*Source: Report on the King County Department of Rehabilitative Services Work Release Program, King County Law and Justice Planning Office, April, 1976.

Jail work release is also an administrative response to increased jail populations. Although for some offenders work release may be a viable option, two points are critical. First, programs which retain criminal offenders in the local communities must show evidence of success in order to remain credible and to survive public concerns about safety. Thus it would be valuable, given these concerns, to develop more controlled screening criteria for determining eligibility for work release. Some offenders are less severely criminal than others, and obviously some offenses are less severe than others in terms of degree of force or threat or implicit danger to the persons or property of others. A reasonable program choice may be to screen actively the best work release candidates, based upon prior criminal history and the type of crime committed. Public animosity toward rapists and armed robbers being returned to the community on work release, theoretically to "prey on new victims," should be anticipated if work release is to survive as a practical administrative sanction.

Second, once the appropriate population has been selected for work release by the listed criteria and other programmatic considerations, there is an increasing need to evaluate work release by comparing the crime-to-crime recidivism rate of this population with other comparable offender populations. Increasingly, the crime control value of corrections programs has emerged as a principal concern to the public and elected officials. Programs which attempt to sell themselves on lower cost and offender opportunities alone have lost considerable ground in the current environment.

Problem Statement D: The present practice of having the State Board of Prison Terms and Parole establish terms of confinement for State felony prisoners has resulted in substantial inconsistency.

Discussion

The range of minimum terms set for burglars is from three to 144 months for the same offense. Since the minimum term is reviewed annually, the actual term may often be different. This information is based upon Department of Social and Health Services research data on time of confinement at the point of parole for burglary offenders. The range of periods of incarceration served in State adult institutions is described in Table 4B-5.

Table 4B-5--Burglars' Time Served - Fiscal Year 1974*

	Months									Average
	More than: Less than:	12	18	24	30	36	48	60	120	
Washington State Penitentiary	14	25	9	14	6	5	3	5	0	19.0
Washington State Reformatory	14	44	18	3	2	1	0	1	0	15.8
Washington State Corrections Center (Institutions)	10	47	24	0	0	0	0	0	0	15.9
Washington State Corrections Center (Reception)	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15.0
Indian Ridge	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6.0
Washington State Women's Corrections Center	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10.5
Larch Mountain Honor Camp	4	9	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	14.0
Total Average Time Served for Offense of Burglary	44	128	52	17	8	6	3	6	0	13.7

Total Burglars
Released to Parole: 264

*These data do not take into account the factor of number of prior stays or convictions as a function of time served.

As is evident from the data presented, the clear majority of burglary offenders serve less than 24 months of incarceration, with an average of 13.7 months term of incarceration for all institutions. These data are computed using a base of burglars paroled in fiscal year 1974. For all burglars from King County, the mean minimum term set was 35.85 months, with a standard deviation of 22.71. In other words, there is a large variance, implying a lack of consistency in minimum terms set for burglary offenders.

A variance of this magnitude is precisely reflective of the function of the Board of Prison Terms and Parole. The Board, after reviewing all the facts and based upon a personal interview with the offender, should exercise this range of discretion in setting

the term. However, such a large variance in time must take into account more than prior criminal history and further complicates the overall systemwide discretion which has occurred prior to the time the Board of Prison Terms and Parole sees any burglary offender. It should be remembered that the King County burglars reviewed by the State Board represent approximately 20 percent of the burglary offenders convicted and sentenced in King County. The other 80 percent of the burglars received community retention (probation) as their sanction. For the burglary offender who is incarcerated, it could safely be assumed that the prosecutor and sentencing judge felt the offender represents a substantial risk to the local community. Since the majority of felons received probation, those who do not must have been viewed by the court as posing particular danger.

Additional information is required to determine whether an optimal time for incarceration is identifiable. Even if one does not ascribe to the fixed and certain punishment model for a corrections system and believes that a corrections system must enjoy wide discretion to consider individual circumstances in fixing a term or sanction, it could be argued that such a wide degree of variance has the effect of further encouraging a belief that the criminal justice system can be manipulated, and that the equal justice maxim of criminal law is not practically applied.

With few exceptions, the State Board of Prison Terms and Parole is empowered to parole an offender at any time the Board deems appropriate. The Parole Board has provided a written statement that explains the Board's criteria for identifying an offender's progress, with regard to the conditions of granting parole (Bruce Johnson, "Board of Prison Terms and Paroles," 1975 Annual Report, State of Washington Human Resources Agencies, pp. 53-64). These stated criteria are seven factors that the Board considers in rendering a decision to parole an offender. The seven factors are as follows:

1. The extent of a threat to society posed by the offender.
2. The offender's response to correctional programming--insight and attitudes as a function of incarceration.
3. The stability and responsibility of the offender, as evidenced by behavior while in the institution and ties to the community.
4. The extent to which the offender has overcome personal deficiencies, such as educational and psychological, during incarceration.
5. The psychological and sociological characteristics of the offender and the impact of these on the offender's value system.
6. The attitude of the community to which the offender would be released toward the offender.
7. Board consensus that the offender is rehabilitated.

Of these seven factors, only the first has been subject to developing consistent criteria, by use of the base expectancy score developed by the Parole Board or by any other criteria. Each requires an assessment of the psychic character of the offender, as well as an assessment of the tolerance of the community. In the absence of explicit criteria, the Board assumes a position not unlike that of a clinician. Although the Board does not formally acknowledge this role, persons familiar with the medical model recognize such indices as "insight," "accepting responsibility," "psychological deficiencies and characteristics" as terms borrowed from theories of psychopathology. Numerous authorities have noted the rampant unreliability in assessing factors such as these, even by experts under ideal conditions. (For reference, see Lewis R. Goldberg, "Five Models of Clinical Judgment: An Empirical Comparison between Linear and Non-linear Representatives of the Human Inference Process," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 6, 458-479, 1974.)

In a prison setting, the medical model is often superceded by custodial and punitive considerations that may inhibit effective clinical practice. More importantly, the "patient population" is composed of a captive audience--persons who, by definition, are not voluntarily committed to receive treatment but compelled to participate and accept what is recommended in order to obtain a parole. Such coercive "treatment" cannot help but produce a certain amount of "game playing" by offenders. The assessment of the offender's "insight" into the dynamics of new behavior is a concept borrowed from Freudian "psychodynamic psychotherapy." Practitioners have emphasized that insight is predicated on an active involvement of a patient in therapy, beginning with a person's dissatisfaction with a present condition, and relies upon the person's conscious cooperation. This model of treatment assumes a setting quite different from that of involuntary criminal incarceration.

Parole officers have indicated that behavior learned in prison and adaptive to the prison setting may be counterproductive with respect to the principal objective of the Parole Board, "a reduction of the recurrence of crime" (Bruce Johnson, "Board of Prison Terms and Paroles," 1975 Annual Report, State of Washington Human Resources Agencies, pp. 53-64). An offender may leave the prison setting with a repertoire of new behavior directed toward essentially the same criminal ends. An offender may be in a better position to manipulate the conditions of parole; to convince employers, family and friends of "rehabilitation" when, in fact, the offender may have become more refractory to positive change than before. There is a need to examine the process by which the Parole Board determines the extent to which its seven factors are assessed and its objectives are accomplished, considering the absence of reliable actuarial data.

The absence of hard data on how these seven factors are assessed and on how the behavior of inmates and prison staff are used by the Parole Board to reach a consensus with respect to these factors makes any definitive statement regarding their effectiveness premature. In light of criticisms noted here, State policy makers should ask, "Are the seven factors noted by the Parole Board realistic and practical criteria for determining release via parole?" and, "To what extent do these factors, when practically implemented, achieve the stated goals and objectives of the Parole Board?"

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement D

Current Strategy

Use of base expectancy prediction in defining minimum terms. The State Board of Prison Terms and Parole has proposed guidelines (March 31, 1976) for fixing minimum terms of confinement for all persons committed to the jurisdiction of State adult institutions. These guidelines were due to go into effect July 1, 1976, in concert with a new Washington criminal code.

The need for an "explicit policy" for setting minimum terms of confinement is established by general guidelines promulgated by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (R. W. Peterson, Chairman, Report on the Criminal Justice System, National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Washington, D. C., January, 1973).

The absence of written criteria by which decisions are made constitutes a major failing in virtually every parole jurisdiction. Some agencies issue statements purporting to be criteria, but they usually are so general as to be meaningless. The sound use of discretion and ultimate accountability for its exercise rest largely in making visible the criteria used in forming judgments. Parole boards must free themselves from total concern with case-by-case decision making and attend to articulation of the actual policies that govern the decision making process.

Washington State is one of the few states in the nation to assign the authority to fix minimum terms of incarceration to a State Parole Board. The State constitution, which vests this authority in the State Board of Prison Terms and Parole, thus facilitates a potential for less variation, due to the exercised discretion of superior court judges

from many different jurisdictions in fixing terms for offenders. Some have argued that it is this lack of discretion by judges which is, in some instances, responsible for the large number of persons in some counties who are retained in community treatment programs. The argument is made that, if a judge feels strongly about a case, he or she may be likely not to sentence the offender to the custody of another authority, but may instead impose a sanction over which the judge has a review capability.

Data provided by the Department of Social and Health Services indicate that some sentences have the effect of producing terms of probation that exceed the statutory maximum sentence. This occurs when probationary terms are run consecutively for several counts or charges. One second degree burglary probationer was sentenced to 20 years on probation, as was one first degree burglary probationer. Three first degree burglary probationers were sentenced to 30 years on probation. Complete data for 669 King County probationers from 1964 to 1975 are presented below.

	<u>Burglary I</u>		<u>Burglary II</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
6 months or less	0	--	9	1	9	1
7-12 months	0	--	38	6	38	6
1-2 years	2	10	150	23	152	23
2-5 years	7	35	410	63	418	62
5-10 years	5	25	36	6	41	6
10-15 years	2	10	4	1	6	1
Over 15 years	4	20	1	0	5	1
Total	20		649		669	

The variance in the terms of confinement which have been set by the State Board of Prison Terms and Parole in the past has been very great. It should be remembered that 20 percent of the convicted burglars in King County are not sentenced to the institutional authority but are screened out, to be placed on probation via a deferred or suspended sentence. The 20 percent of all convicted King County burglars whom the State Parole Board sees are those whom a judge has determined are the most potentially dangerous, requiring the extraordinary sanction of prison. It should also be remembered that judges have the authority to confine offenders in county jails for up to 12 months. Thus logic would dictate that the intent of a judge's decision to sentence a burglar to the State Parole Board's authority was based upon the judge's belief that the offender required confinement for more than 12 months.

In the past, the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office has supported, and continues to support, the Parole Board's intent to set rigorous guidelines for determining minimum sentences. This support is qualified only by some questions about the practical application of the prediction criteria or "actuarial data" developed by the Board for determining the range of time to be served, based on past evidence. The Board's proposed "explicit guidelines for establishing minimum sentences" ("Proposed Guidelines for Fixing Minimum Terms of Confinement," Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Parole, March, 1976) use a statistic derived from a previous study. This research, the "Base Expectancy Study," was intended to enable criminal justice professionals to predict the likelihood of success on parole for criminal offenders committed to the Department of Institutions, both directly from the courts and through parole revocation hearings ("Washington State Parole Base Expectation Study," Office of Research, Department of Social and Health Services, Volume 7, Number 1, July, 1974).

Using established and consistent measures to predict outcome increases the reliability of decisions. It eliminates the arbitrary decisions and provides the concerned public and the criminal offender, as well as other criminal justice agencies, with visible information about what the Board is doing and how it is operating. However, the benefit of using established criteria in a consistent manner is strictly limited by the extent to which the criteria can be applied uniformly. The Board is planning to base its sentencing decisions on recidivism criteria; thus the more likely an offender is to become recidivous, the more time the offender should be confined.

The value of using a method founded on established and consistent criteria must be weighed against a number of factors, including the consequences of false predictions and a cost-effectiveness comparison between alternative methods. The most basic issues in making these policy decisions are how accurately does the proposed method accomplish its purpose, to predict the likelihood of recidivism for prospective parolees; and how does it affect the setting of minimum sentences? Board of Parole researchers conducted a validation study of the base expectancy prediction (BES) on parole outcomes.

The Base Expectancy Study, from which the BES is derived, was conducted on males paroled from State adult correctional institutions from July, 1968, to January, 1969. The predictive power of the BES was found to be unstable when applied to other groups of parolees, and the authors of the study suggested that the use of the BES for future parolee populations should be accompanied by additional validation studies on these populations. Most significantly, the authors noted that the BES predictions cannot be used to determine the most appropriate times for granting a parole.

One of the dangers of using statistical information in applied decision making is the possibility that persons not sufficiently familiar with the qualifications and limitations of the methodology may tend to overvalue statistical data. Although the BES can be used to predict based on outcomes which are already known and is a powerful tool for setting minimum terms, caution should be taken that this tool not be applied too routinely.

Problem Statement E: Due to practices of other criminal justice agencies, the City's success in increasing the number of adult offenders arrested may not achieve a desired crime reduction impact.

Discussion

Information compiled by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, based on Department of Social and Health Services data for admissions to probation and commitments to adult institutions for 1969 through 1973, shows that for all burglary admissions to institutions for that period, 56.3 percent were first admissions, with the majority of others being either readmissions or parole violations. Of the readmissions, 20.9 percent had one prior admission, 11.8 percent had two prior admissions, 4.5 percent had three prior admissions, 3.3 percent had four prior admissions and 1.6 percent had five or more prior admissions.

Currently, an estimated 78 percent of convicted burglars in King County receive a sanction of probation (Seattle Police Department data). Of the 255 offenders arrested by the Seattle Police Department in 1974 and 1975 who were charged with burglary, 199 (78 percent) received a suspended or deferred sentence, were fined or forfeited bail. The remaining 22 percent were sentenced to jail or prison.

This 78 percent probation rate should be viewed as an estimate, rather than a hard count. An unknown portion of the 597 persons charged with burglary in the first or second degree pleaded or were found guilty of misdemeanor charges (i.e., reduced by plea negotiations). Some of these misdemeanants were sentenced to the King County jail; others were placed on probation. Some may have received both sanctions (the six persons who were fined or forfeited bail would fall into these categories). Therefore, the figure of 597 may overstate the number of persons who were actually sentenced for first or second degree burglary.

The 56 persons sentenced to jail or penitentiary include felony probationers sentenced to more than 90 days in jail as a condition of probation, misdemeanants sentenced to more than 90 days in jail either as a probationary condition or as a sole sanction, and all felons sentenced to prison. Therefore, the total of 56 may overstate the number of persons actually sentenced to adult institutions.

These data also include 86 persons who were found not guilty, or whose charges were stricken or dismissed. Since a dismissal is often used as an administrative convenience by the King County Prosecutor's Office, an unknown number of dismissals were likely to have been concomitantly sentenced on other charges. In addition, 282 persons charged were listed as pending. Some of these pending cases involve charges not completely disposed at the time the data were gathered. Others may be cases where defendants have failed to appear and for whom there are outstanding bench warrants. Still others have, in fact, been disposed but disposition information has not been received by the Seattle Police Department.

For the offender being sentenced, probation represents an opportunity for community retention. Together with the mechanics of probation (reporting, restitution, potential restrictions, etc.), the community retention option is often coupled with a myriad of combinations of "treatment" alternatives, ranging from drug rehabilitation treatment and alcoholism programs to counseling, employment, vocational training and education. Whether the sanction imposed by the court reflects an order that the offender "get help" for an underlying problem or simply repay monetary loss resulting from the criminal act, the practical effect of these sanctions does not appear to produce a sufficient deterrent effect for either the offender so processed or for potential offenders in danger of committing burglary.

The 1977 Plan described failure rates for probation as a sanction. The analysis was based on Department of Social and Health Services data over an eleven-year period. Most criminal history and recidivism studies are based on a much shorter time frame, usually from six to 24 months. Thus failure rates as a whole might be considerably higher than what would be expected from past research.

Of the total number of offenders sentenced to prison, 89 percent were first admissions to the Division of Adult Corrections. This figure compares with 56 percent of the probationers who were first admissions to the Office of Probation and Parole. As a group, then, almost half of the probationers had been on probation at some time prior to sentencing, compared with about 10 percent of the prisoner group who had previously served time in an adult institution. Data regarding the number of prior probations are available for 860 of the 1,017 probationers. These data are tabulated below.

	<u>No Prior Probation</u>	<u>One Prior Probation</u>	<u>More than One Prior Probation</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number	373	417	70	860
Percent	43	48	8	99*

*Percentages do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.

Of 727 of the 1,017 probationers for whom data are available, 321 (44 percent) were on probationary supervision at the time they were sentenced. This group of 321 is the most visible illustration of where probation failed to deter subsequent criminal activity. However, this 44 percent failure rate may be a conservative estimate when the number of probationers who had been on probation at some point prior to sentencing are considered. It could be argued that the 57 percent readmission rate of probationers (which included those not on active probationary status at the time of sentencing) more accurately reflects the efficacy of probation as a deterrent to subsequent criminal activity.

To provide contrast for the above data, recidivism rates for the 1,707 offenders sentenced to prison can be obtained by determining the current status of these offenders within the Department of Social and Health Services. Of these 1,707, 1,424 are listed as having a current status with the Office of Probation and Parole. Of these, 179 (13 percent) have an outstanding bench warrant, and 341 (24 percent) have had their parole revoked. Combining these groups, the "failure rate" for these paroled prisoners is 520 (37 percent) of the 1,424. The remaining 904 (63 percent) show no evidence of failure. This figure compares with a 57 percent success rate for parolees, as reported in a study by the Department of Social and Health Services ("Who Returns? A Study of Recidivism in the State of Washington," Office of Research, Department of Social and Health Services, [draft] 1975). The Department of Social and Health Services study was based on all felony offenders paroled from the Department of Adult Corrections in 1965, and thus represents all offenses. The success rate was based on returns to the Division of Adult Corrections from the time of parole through at least the end of 1974. Considering the time span of the Department of Social and Health Services study, this 57 percent success rate may be considered conservative when compared with other data that use a far shorter critical time span of from six to 24 months. Both of these success rates--derived from Department of Social and Health Services data--compare favorably to the prior probationary success rate of the 1,017 King County burglary probationers. These data support the conclusion that a probationary term may be relatively ineffective as a deterrent, even though probation is, by far, the most commonly imposed sanction for burglary offenders sentenced in King County.

It could be maintained that probationers and prisoners do not comprise distinct groups, since large numbers of offenders receiving probation may have spent up to one year in the county jail as part of their suspended or deferred sentence. In a report to the State House Judiciary Committee (Bob Naon, "Redirecting the Sentencing System," report compiled for the Washington State House Judiciary Committee, December, 1975), data were obtained from the King County Prosecutor's Office for the 202 felony sentencings in August, 1974. It was reported that 180 of these offenders (89 percent) received probation. Of these 180, only 57 (32 percent) spent any time in jail as a condition of probation. This group of 202 sentencings included 62 repeat felony offenders (31 percent of the total). Of the 62 repeaters, 51 (82 percent) received a sanction of probation. Of these 51, only 18 spent time in jail as a condition of probation. Although jail time may be imposed for probationers, Naon's data indicate that this option is exercised in sentencing for only about a third of the probationers. It may thus be argued that probation and prison are distinct, though not mutually exclusive, sanctions.

A Chi-square test was used to determine from these data whether having a prior felony record had a significant effect on whether offenders were given probation or sentenced to prison. Naon's data are tabulated below.

	<u>Had Prior Record</u>	<u>Had No Prior Record</u>	<u>Total</u>
Received probation	51	129	180
Received prison	11	11	22
Total	62	140	202

Chi Square = 4.33, 1 df, $p < .05$
Contingency Coefficient = .14

These data indicate a small but statistically significant relationship between sentencing an offender to prison and the offender's prior felony record. Another Chi-square test was used to determine whether those offenders who were given probation were required to spend any time in jail as a condition. These data are presented below.

	<u>Had Prior Record</u>	<u>Had No Prior Record</u>	<u>Total</u>
Served jail time	18	39	57
Served no jail time	33	90	123
Total	51	129	180

Chi Square = .43, 1 df, n.s.
Contingency Coefficient = .05

Contrary to the case above with the table describing the relationship between sentencing an offender to prison and a prior felony record, these data fail to disclose any relationship between the prior record of an offender and time spent in jail as a condition of probation.

Overall, these data show a lack of consistent response to recidivous offenders. The more severely criminal group may be only slightly more likely to go to prison for their burglary offenses and are no more likely to receive jail time as a probationary condition.

It should be noted that Naon's data were derived from the felony sentencing for a single month and, therefore, may be atypical of sentencing patterns overall. Persons in the prosecutor's office have suggested that this sample of data was incomplete when gathered for Naon's report. Considering this possibility, the above statistical analysis should be weighed very tentatively in comparison with other figures reported here. Moreover, none of these data generated an overall recidivism rate for probationers. Rather, the data reported here were derived from the past history of offender groups. It is likely, therefore, that the success rate for probationers as a whole would exceed the figures reported here. However, as the data suggest, it is possible that prison compares favorably with probation as a deterrent sanction. This indication is extremely relevant, since probation is so widely used (for an estimated 78 percent of burglary offenders, for example) and even reused for persons for whom probation has repeatedly failed as a deterrent. These data further corroborate the position that probation may be an inappropriate, ineffective sanction in comparison with some form of incarceration in meeting an objective of deterrence.

The following conclusions are based on data presented in the foregoing discussion.

1. For all felony convictions, the prior criminal record of an offender exerts a statistically significant but relatively small impact on the decision of whether to incarcerate or grant probation.
2. For all felony convictions, the prior criminal record of an offender exerts no significant impact on the decision to give jail time as a condition of probation.

3. A significant majority (89 percent) of burglary offenders sentenced to prison from King County from 1964 to 1975 are first admissions to the Division of Adult Corrections.
4. The success rate for burglary offenders sentenced to the Division of Adult Corrections from King County during this period, as measured by the number of offenders for whom paroles have not been revoked or who do not have revocation hearings pending, is 63 percent.
5. A significant majority (57 percent) of burglary offenders sentenced to probation from King County from 1964 to 1975 had previously been placed on probation for a felony offense. Eight percent of the burglary probationers have had more than one prior felony probation. Forty-four percent of burglary probationers were on probation at the time the burglary offense was committed. For a substantial number of these offenders, it could be argued that probation had already proved itself a failure.

From the statistics above, the following can be inferred.

1. For a significant proportion of burglary offenders, incarceration could be argued to be more effective than probation. For 57 percent of the burglary offenders sentenced to probation from King County from 1964 to 1975, probation already had failed as an effective sanction. The success rate of 63 percent for persons sentenced to prison for burglary offenses from King County during the same period suggests that, for a substantial number of offenders, prison may serve as an effective criminal sanction.
2. While incarceration can be imposed as a condition of probation, available data indicate that for all offenders sentenced to probation from King County in August, 1974, their likelihood of receiving a period of incarceration is not dependent upon their prior criminal record. Thus those offenders for whom past sanctions have already failed are no more likely, as a group, to receive jail time than those sentenced to probation for their first offense.
3. For all felony convictions in King County in August, 1974, the decision to sentence an offender to the Division of Adult Corrections was not strictly dependent upon consideration of the effectiveness of a criminal sanction that had already been imposed. The obtained correlation coefficient of .14 between having a prior criminal record and receiving a sentence of prison leaves a majority of the sentencing variability unaccounted for. Since 80 percent of burglary offenders sentenced from King County receive probation, an overwhelming tendency exists to rely on probation as the predominate sanction for convicted burglars. The decision to use this sanction may, therefore, be predicated on considerations other than its effectiveness.

Offenders appear in court within 24 hours of arrest. At this "preliminary appearance," a judge decides whether the arrestee should be released on bond or personal recognizance (PR) and when the offender will next appear in court. The deputy prosecutor present at the hearing may be unfamiliar with the case. The only information the prosecutor possesses is a police arrest report and the results of a standard interview regarding the arrestee's employment and residential status in the community. The information that appears on this form is derived directly from the arrestee and may not be independently verified. If there is no evidence from this information to suggest that the arrestee will abscond or fail to appear at the next hearing, the chances of being released are very strong.

While the police and the prosecutor are deciding whether sufficient evidence exists to bring charges, the offender is free to commit more offenses. If arrested for one of these subsequent offenses, the offender could be released again on personal recognizance. The police may recommend against the release of the arrestee on the grounds that he or she will likely commit more crimes; but, this issue is not relevant to granting bail, unless the arrestee is considered an imminent danger to self or others.

Often, even when a person is believed to have committed a number of offenses, the prosecutor must decline to bring charges for lack of evidence, or the prosecutor chooses not to prosecute because the offender has other cases pending. As a result, an offender may be charged for only a fraction of the actual number of crimes committed. If charges are brought for multiple offenses, several of these may be reduced, dropped or aggregated through plea bargaining. Thus whether an offender has been arrested for two, three or more burglaries may not have a direct bearing on the sanction imposed. Even if convicted for multiple counts, the likely outcome is for the sentence on each count to run concurrently. The actual sanction for having been convicted of three or four burglary offenses might not exceed the sanction for having been convicted of only one.

In King County, as elsewhere, the number of criminal cases which go to trial is limited. Most cases are resolved through plea negotiations. The following reports Department of Social and Health Services data on the 2,724 burglary offenders sentenced in King County from 1964 to 1975. Plea data were available for only 1,262 of the total. Of these 1,262, 855 (68 percent) entered pleas of guilty. These data indicate that the decision to go to trial is a high-risk option for the defendant, if found guilty: whereas only 29 percent of those who pleaded "not guilty" received a sentence of probation, 48 percent of those who pleaded "guilty" received probation. Thus 52 percent of offenders offering guilty pleas go to prison, while 71 percent of offenders offering not guilty pleas and found guilty at trial go to prison.

It might be claimed that the association between type of plea and sentence imposed is unique to this particular offense. To determine how the above description applied to other offenses, similar statistical tests were conducted on prison and probation referrals from King County for robbery and rape offenders from 1964 to 1976. For both of these offenses, the Chi-square statistic indicates a significant relationship between type of plea and sentence imposed by the court. The tables from which these tests were conducted follow.

Burglary

Sentence:	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Prison</u>	<u>Total</u>
Plea of guilty	612	243	855
Plea of not guilty	116	291	407
Total	728	534	1,262

Chi Square = 209.63, 1 df, $p < .001$
Phi coefficient = .38*

*While the Phi coefficient may be interpreted as an index of correlation, this statistic tends to underestimate the actual relationship between these factors, when compared with the usual (product-moment) coefficient of correlation. For this test, the maximum value that Phi may take is .707, even if the two factors were perfectly correlated. This compares with the maximum value of 1.0 for a product-moment correlation coefficient.

Robbery

Sentence:	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Prison</u>	<u>Total</u>
Plea of guilty	384	30	414
Plea of not guilty	144	41	185
Total	528	71	599

Chi Square = 27.23, 1 df, $p < .001$
Phi coefficient = .21

Rape

Sentence:	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Prison</u>	<u>Total</u>
Plea of guilty	14	1	15
Plea of not guilty	6	4	10
Total	20	5	25

Chi Square = 4.17, 1 df, p = .041*

*Because of the small sample size in the rape offense group, an exact probability test was used to compute the significance of the obtained Chi Square value.

Commonly, when an offender is sentenced to prison, information regarding the extent of actual criminal behavior (over and above the offense for which the offender is arrested, charged and sentenced) is forwarded to the Board of Prison Terms and Parole. The Board takes this information into account when setting minimum terms, reducing time and granting parole. However, the Board does not appear to treat this information systematically. The Board makes decisions on a case-by-case basis, which often means there are wide discrepancies in the use of information. Further, after the minimum term is set, the main source of information available to the Board comes from institutional staff who recommend good time and parole on the basis of institutional adjustment, rather than on past criminal behavior.

Data presented above demonstrate some of the inadequacies of probation as an effective criminal sanction. To some extent, the failure of probation might result from inadequate supervision and monitoring of probationary conditions. While procedures are built into the criminal justice system that allow probationary conditions to be monitored and reported back to the court, some prosecutors and some judges have complained that where an order for restitution is made by the court, no workable mechanism exists to assure that such restitution orders are actually complied with on a large scale. Most persons in the prosecutor's office who have talked with victims agree that orders of restitution are almost always forgotten or set aside. Probation officers with large caseloads are incapable of devoting enough time to each restitution arrangement to assure themselves and the court that there is compliance to the order. There is a general problem that restitution, when ordered by the judge, is almost never taken seriously. This is, in part, due to no one agency having responsibility for oversight of restitution performance by offenders.

For the other type of options which are taken under either a suspended or deferred sentence, most treatment programs do not report back to the presenting court on the effectiveness of the treatment which they offered for a specific offender. While a judge may believe that a particular drug rehabilitation program is successful in resolving deep-rooted problems of addict burglars, the effectiveness of these programs may be scrutinized only in selected cases where, for instance, a judge hears an offender on a subsequent charge or makes a specific request for information. Even in such instances, the necessary information may be provided only in summary form (e.g., "failed to respond to treatment"), and the judge is left to make inferences and decisions based on little information.

The criminal justice system is guided by procedures and policies which, over time, have been amended, modified and realigned. A determination of which groups or individuals actually superintend the complex operations of the criminal justice system is, therefore, difficult. No single agent or agency controls the process, generally, or even the processing of a given offender. There is ample opportunity for relevant information to fall through without being acted upon. The jurisdiction of each agency is limited strictly, both by rules of procedure and by inherent adversary relationships.

Policy makers in the criminal justice system have emphasized the lack of coordination and communication between the various agencies of the system. In some cases, police have not informed the prosecutor or courts of procedural changes that might result in

a rapid acceleration of filings. The Parole Board does not inform the prosecutor or court of a change in the minimum sentence of an offender and may not consider information derived from the pre-sentence report conducted by the Office of Probation and Parole. Prosecutors often do not inform police about the relevance of information they gather for subsequent adjudication. The legislature may not inform the various agencies in advance about statutory changes that affect how the system operates. As a result, each criminal justice system agency is continually reacting to other agencies. Changes in the system most often tend to occur as a result of a crisis brought about by sudden and unanticipated change. This poses a severe difficulty for criminal justice policy makers and creates an environment where offenders continue to commit crimes and where the system operates to perpetuate its own sense of operational values and needs without providing effective sanctions for criminal offenders.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement E

Proposed Strategies

Greater certainty and uniformity in the imposition of criminal sanctions: Recent criticism has been directed at the criminal justice system with regard to sentencing of serious criminal offenders. Sanctions imposed for repeated predatory criminal activity by identifiable recidivating offenders have been of particular concern. Public criticism has been directed predominantly at the sentencing policies of judges. However, the current felony sentencing procedure in Washington is complex and involves many non-judicial decision points. Thus judges should not reasonably be expected to bear the entire burden of questions currently being asked about sentencing.

The impact of sentencing on the City's crime problems can be made clear by way of example. Of the nearly 65,000 burglaries in Seattle from January 1, 1973, to September 1, 1975, somewhere between 30 and 50 percent were committed by adults. Assuming that the actual number of adult burglaries lies somewhere between 30 and 50 percent, an estimate of 26,000 (40 percent of the 65,000 total) can be used to calculate the number of burglaries committed by adults during this period.

For 26,000 adult burglaries committed, 1,409 adults were arrested. Of these 1,409 arrestees, 778 (55 percent) were charged either with burglary or with another crime arising from the burglary arrest. Of the 778 charged with a crime, 524 (67 percent) were sentenced as felons. Of these 524, 96 (18 percent) were sentenced to prison; 82 percent were sentenced to probation.

To determine the likelihood of an adult burglary offender being arrested, charged and sentenced to prison, consider these figures in light of the 26,000 burglaries committed by adults: 5 percent of all adult burglars were arrested; 3 percent of adult burglars were arrested and charged; 2 percent of these burglars were arrested, charged and sentenced as felons. For the crime of adult burglary, .3 percent, or three in one thousand, were arrested, charged and sentenced to prison. A three in one thousand chance of losing liberty for burglary is not a high risk. If we are ever to be able to put meaning behind the adage that "crime doesn't pay," the risk to the criminals must be increased. The certainty must include the risk of being caught, the risk of being charged and found guilty; but also, the risk of punishment must reasonably be increased if offenders are to be discouraged.

The City's interest in corrections and sentencing policies is basic to the City's crime reduction goals. The City has, for the past several years, operated numerous demonstration programs which seek to increase the number of arrests made for the City's priority crimes of burglary, robbery, rape and aggravated assault. More arrests represent an incomplete response to the City's crime problems; sentencing policy must be viewed from the crime reduction perspective and must reinforce the advantages gained from arresting more offenders. As an example, if substantial increases in the number of City-generated arrests are met with sentencing policy which overuses suspended or deferred sentences, the number of offenders at large in the city might not be noticeably affected. For these reasons, it is appropriate for the City to form a position on adult felony sentencing.

Several major issues will be debated in reaching a resolve on sentencing. The policy issues likely to be considered in the debate fall into four categories: offense versus offender-specific sentencing; determinate versus indeterminate procedures; displaced discretion; and impact on crime and victimization. These issues are discussed in detail in Policy Development Report on Sentencing of Adult Felons, prepared by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office in January, 1977.

Problem Statement F: Sentencing options relied upon by the criminal justice system involve little more than a choice to incarcerate an individual for a crime or to hold the incarceration in abeyance, with certain court-ordered stipulations for which evidence of effectiveness is lacking.

Discussion

Felony probationers fall into two categories: those offenders whose sentences were deferred, and those whose sentences were suspended. A deferred sentence is technically not a "sentence," although the conditions of a deferred sentence may include jail time, payment of fines, court costs and/or restitution to the victim. Offenders with deferred sentences may also be required to participate in community-based vocational and/or treatment programs, or do community service work. These are the same conditions that may be imposed on probationers with suspended sentences.

All probationers placed under probationary supervision are, for caseload purposes, treated alike. The type and extent of supervision for probationers is determined by their individual needs and not whether the sentence was deferred or suspended.

The critical difference between suspended and deferred sentences is that a deferred sentence technically means the sentencing judge has deferred imposition of a sentence. Theoretically, the success of the probationer under a test situation will determine the eventual sentence, or whether the charges will be dismissed upon completion of the probationary term.

If a sentence is suspended at the discretion of the sentencing judge, the offender may be required to fulfill the same conditions as for a deferred sentence. Offenders with suspended sentences are technically given the statutory term of incarceration in the Department of Adult Corrections, but the execution of the sentence is suspended. Theoretically, the probationary term denotes the conditions under which the sentence will not be executed.

For an estimated 14,500 burglary incidents committed by adults in Seattle from January, 1973, to September, 1975, 1,409 suspects were arrested. Of those who were arrested, one-third were not charged with any offense. Of those who were charged, about one-third were charged with misdemeanors or had their charges reduced to misdemeanors. These two selective steps effectively exited more than one-half of the arrestees from the criminal justice system. When the dismissals, absconders and "not guilty" from felony cases were added to these figures, the number who remained in the system to be sentenced as felons shrank to about one-third of the original group.

Almost 80 percent of those offenders who were sentenced as felons received probation. Less than one-third of these probationers received jail time as a probationary condition, and only one-sixth of the probationers received a jail term of more than 180 days. This means that the risk for loss of freedom as a consequence of burglary was about 12 percent for those arrested, and 2 percent for those adults who committed burglary.

The change in the use of probation is exemplified in data compiled by the Office of Research, Department of Social and Health Services (Adult Corrections Population Data, Office of Research, Department of Social and Health Services, Volume 8, Number 1-1, June, 1975) which traces a pattern in sentencing from King County and court commitments from King County from 1965 through 1974, inclusively. In 1965, 349 adult felons were sentenced to prison from King County. The number of court commitments from King County did not change significantly from 1965 to 1974. In 1974, there were 345 persons committed from King County; in the interim years, the number of court commitments to incarceration held numerically stable. However, in comparing the number of court commitments, which remained constant, with the number of comparative admissions to probation from King County, a quite different pattern emerges. In 1965, only 367 persons were admitted to probation for a felony offense. By 1974, that number had increased to 1,622 admissions to probation. While 367 persons were sentenced to probation and 349 persons were sentenced to incarceration in 1965, by 1974, 1,622 persons were sentenced to probation, as compared with 345 sentenced to incarceration.

It is apparent that, while in 1965 a felony offender's chance of being incarcerated was approximately 49 percent, by 1974, an offender's chance of being incarcerated upon being found guilty was approximately 18 percent. The number of persons sentenced to probation as opposed to incarceration as a result of a court determination of guilt has increased each year to the point where it is safe to conclude that for all felony offenses, probation is the sanction imposed in the great majority of cases.

Probation may be combined with a multitude of treatment programs designed to reduce an offender's likelihood to become a recidivist by improving the "quality of life." With few exceptions, no empirical evidence exists which would indicate that such treatment programs serve the interests of protection for the community, nor that they have a positive impact on reducing recidivism. The extent to which probation is used by King County does not apply to first-time convicted offenders who are being given a less punitive opportunity to change their behavior by being retained in the community. In 1965, out of 367 persons admitted to probation by decision of the King County Superior Court, all 367 were first admissions to probation. By 1969, 61 of the 868 persons admitted to probation were readmissions to probation. In other words, an offender had committed an offense, received probation, committed another offense and was readmitted to probation or received an additional term of probation. By 1974, out of the 1,622 persons granted probation by the King County Superior Court for felony level offenses, 270 were readmissions to probation. In other words, 17 percent of the population of persons granted probation had demonstrated failure during at least one prior term of probation and yet were readmitted to probation in lieu of incarceration.

Using data available on 1,409 Seattle burglary arrestees for the period January 1, 1973, to September 1, 1975, and following these through the criminal justice system, some statistical information is available regarding probation. Of the 385 probationers, 29 percent received suspended sentences and 71 percent received deferred sentences.

For the total sample group of 385 felony probationers, the average length of the probationary period was 45 months. Probationers with suspended sentences received an average of 72 months on probation, while those with deferred sentences received an average of 33 months of probation (a statistically significant difference). Thus a practical distinction between the suspended and deferred sentence appears to be that the deferred sentence implies less time will be spent under probationary supervision.

For the entire group of probationers, 67 percent received no jail time as a probationary condition. For those who did receive a jail term, about half were sentenced from one to 180 days, while the other half received more than 180 days in jail. Felony probationers with suspended sentences received an average of 69 days in jail. Probationers averaged 30 days in jail. Actual jail time served, however, is not represented in these data, since a judge can review a case and amend a previous order and release a jailed prisoner early. A suspended sentence carries a statistically significant greater likelihood for more time in jail as a probationary condition.

The decision by judges to rely upon probation as the main criminal sanction has recently generated controversy. For the 1973-1975 burglary arrest sample, the 491 offenders sentenced as felons resulted in 385 (78 percent) receiving probation. Of the 385 probationers, only 127 (33 percent) received any jail time as a probationary condition. Adding these 127 to the 106 offenders who were sentenced to prison, only 233 of the 491 offenders (47 percent) received a sanction that removed them from society for even a single day. Adding these 233 to the 34 misdemeanor offenders who received jail time, only 267 of the original 1,409 arrestees (19 percent) spent time in jail as a sanction for their criminal offense. Adding the 166 offenders charged in Municipal Court, and assuming that 33 percent of these offenders received some jail time, this adds 55 more offenders to those who received jail time, bringing the total to 322. These 322 offenders account for only 23 percent of the 1,409 arrestees. Basing the jail time statistic on only those offenders who were charged in municipal or county courts, the figure of those who received jail time became 34 percent. At best, only one-third of those who could legitimately have received jail time were, in fact, incarcerated.

Furthermore, substantially less than half of those offenders who were incarcerated spent more than 180 days in jail. For the group of burglars sampled here, data were not available on the length of the sentence actually served by offenders sentenced to prison. Assuming all of the 166 who were sentenced to prison spent at least six months in jail, and adding to these 166 the (estimated) two misdemeanants and the 23 felony probationers who received more than six months in jail, the total of 191 represents only 20 percent of those charged in either municipal or county courts, and only 14 percent of the 1,409 total arrestees.

Jail is infrequently used as a criminal sanction. It may be suggested that some judges are more lenient than other judges. Some judges may be prone to sentence offenders to probation alone, while other judges may sentence offenders to prison and require probationers to spend time in jail.

This explanation cannot be supported by data for the 491 offenders who were sentenced as felons. Almost every Superior Court judge sent some offenders to prison and retained other offenders in the community. Furthermore, a recent analysis shows that judges who are more likely to sentence offenders to prison are less likely to impose jail time as a probationary condition. It appears that other factors are operating that determine whether felons will be incarcerated or will remain in the community.

Conclusions about the relative merits of probation compared with prison were the product of offender research conducted in Denver, Colorado. The Denver High Impact Anti-Crime Program conducted a study of their local justice system and issued a report in 1975 ("Characteristics and Recidivism of Adult Felony Offenders in Denver," Adult Recidivism High Impact Anti-Crime Program, Denver Anti-Crime Council, 1975). Part of that study revealed a comparison between a probation population, a parole-reformatory population and a parole-penitentiary population. Based on the differences between the groups, it was expected that probationers should be less likely to become recidivists than parolees from the reformatory, who should be less likely to become recidivists than parolees from the penitentiary. These likelihoods are based on the fact that probationers had more favorable prior arrest and adult felony conviction records. The results of the probation treatment do not favorably reflect on the use of probation as a meaningful way to reduce recidivism. Probationers had a 26 percent revocation rate due to rearrest or reconviction which resulted in their being incarcerated. Parolees had a 30.3 percent revocation incarceration rate; however, only 25 percent were revoked and reincarcerated because of rearrest and/or reconviction. The others were returned to the institution because of a technical violation of parole. Thus in terms of crime-to-crime recidivism rates, probationers had a 26 percent failure rate, as compared with a 25 percent failure rate for parolees who had a more extensive criminal history and were, at least in terms of one measurement (determination by the sentencing court), determined to be more of a risk to their communities than persons placed on probation.

For purposes of the comparison made in Denver, the "at risk" time for both the probation and the parole population was comparable. In addition, the Denver study indicates that persons who are most likely to become recidivists, by offense type, are those individuals initially charged and convicted of burglary. Of the 193 burglary offenders sampled, 55 percent were rearrested; 26 percent of the 193 were reconvicted within two years.

The two-year reincarceration rate, by disposition, comparing parolees to probationers revealed the following: for parolees, 19 percent were reincarcerated in a two-year followup period; for probationers, 28 percent were reincarcerated. By comparison, persons who received a sanction of county jail time or other disposition had a 10 percent reincarceration rate.

Essentially, the findings on recidivism by the type of sanction imposed by the court reveal the following information. An analysis of rearrest and reconviction rates after one and two years performed in consideration of the type of sentence or sanction imposed by the court (i.e., probation, parole or local jail time) revealed a reversal from what one would expect, based on the differences in risk ascribed to offenders in populations of probationers, parolees and those who were incarcerated.

It was found that for a one-year period, although the parolee group had a 42 percent rearrest rate compared to the probationers' 32.8 percent rearrest rate, the reconviction rate resulting from these rearrests was actually lower for the parolee group, 19.6 percent as opposed to 24.2 percent.

For a two-year followup, the rearrest rate was 51.4 percent for the parolee group and 51.6 percent for the probation group. However, again considering reconviction rate, it was found that the parolee group was less likely to have been reconvicted than the probationers; parolees had a 32.1 percent reconviction rate, compared to the probationers' 41.9 percent reconviction rate. This finding is somewhat surprising in that, based on the demographics and prior criminal history of the parolee group, one would have expected them to have a much higher recidivism rate than the probation group; the parolee group was characterized as being a younger group of offenders having more prior arrests and convictions, lower education level, less favorable employment status and more self-reported drug and alcohol use. All of these factors were shown by the Denver study to have a positive correlative influence on likelihood to become recidivists.

The available Denver data seem to imply that those who claim that probation is successful in reducing recidivism, compared with other options, are not correctly analyzing available information. Additional local data on relative system decision making are still being collected to determine if King County probationers recidivate more or less often than parolees in King County. Such information should be obtained as part of the final and complete Systems Response to Burglary findings. Given that in King County the probation decision is made for the majority of felony offenders, and specifically for the majority of burglars--who according to the Denver study are the most likely Part I offender group to recidivate--this information seems to be of vital consequence to local justice system policy. Although the authors of the Denver study did not address the issue specifically, their data would seem to support the contention that incarceration of some form, even a short period of incarceration, protects the community, not only for the period of time the offender is incapacitated by removal from the community. Such incarceration apparently also serves community protection interests in the longer term.

The problem of large numbers of burglars being sentenced to sanctions which are alternatives to incarceration where such decisions to divert offenders are based upon dubious information regarding the efficacy of such diversionary sanctions is a problem which is founded in a current strategy. Recent criminal justice literature on evaluation of alternative or diversionary sanctions clearly indicates that the success or utility of such decisions is far from evident. Nevertheless, large numbers (80 percent) of burglars sentenced in King County are sentenced to probation or deferred sentences. Usually, such a sanction is imposed in combination with court-ordered participation in a treatment program, employment and the like. While individual burglary offenders may have a need for such "treatment," there appears to be no evidence which suggests that any one of these treatment alternatives, or all of them in combination, serves to reduce recidivism for any offender group. The Denver High Impact Program study showed that burglars, as a group, have a high likelihood of recidivism, evidently independent of any particular sanction imposed. The Systems Response to Burglary Study will perform a recidivism comparison similar to that done in Denver. At present, the Denver data point to at least the possibility that probation is less effective than prison. It is hoped that some other unknown sanction option is preferable over both prison and probation. The perhaps archaic choice of prison for all types and levels of offenders or probation for apparently the same population does not appear to offer the corrections community the most creative range of choices.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement F

Current Strategies

The controversy surrounding criminal sentencing seems to focus predominantly on the use of prison. Proponents of mandatory sentencing, or certainty of punishment, seem to be advocating greater use of prisons, while people advocating indeterminate sentences often advocate probation in combination with other non-prison sanctions in criminal sentencing.

As has been said elsewhere in this document, the decision facing a judge in the State of Washington is only (1) a choice to incarcerate to the State authority under the Board of Prison Terms and Parole, or (2) to retain the offender in the community under some type of community treatment or community corrections program. Almost always, such community retention options are coupled with the use of probation. As stated earlier, in approximately 80 percent of the judicial decisions for all felony sentencings in King County, probation is relied upon as a criminal sanction.

Nationally, the use of prison as a criminal sanction began being questioned during the 1960's and early 1970's. During this time, a number of incidents occurred in prisons which raised public consciousness about prison conditions. The sometimes extreme conditions which existed in prisons nationally resulted in anti-prison temperament. This in turn often translated into judicial policy by the early 1970's. Locally and nationally, judges toured and even lived in prisons for a period of time, in order to learn more about the conditions in places to which they were sentencing offenders. Thus prison became a sanction of last resort.

Today most criminal justice literature discusses the use of prisons in a manner which debates incarceration as an unnecessary versus a necessary evil in our social structure. Due to the work of Robert Martinson, Norval Morris, David Fogel and others, the "myth" that prisons can rehabilitate is no longer considered within the current corrections literature.

In simplified language, the current dilemma facing criminal justice professionals seems to be the following: prison is a "bad" place and probation often involves "nothing." The opportunity for probation officers to set structured supervisory requirements around individual offenders, given the size of their caseloads, precludes a likelihood that persons on probation will receive any corrective, norm-setting guidance. On the other end of the continuum, prison is very structured and involves functional restriction as the form of supervision.

It is the belief of a number of criminal justice professionals that the sentencing choice involves two options--the option of incarceration and the option of community retention. In response to the two-option corrections description, we have said that where so little supervision can be provided to offenders on probation, and because so many questions regarding the crime control and public protection value of probation have yet to be answered, the real choice involves only one option: the choice to incarcerate. Probation involves predominantly a choice not to incarcerate where, as stated, little or no information exists to show that the various treatment options normally included under probation have a likelihood to reduce recidivism. Information is available at least to suggest that probation is significantly less successful in reducing recidivism than the sanction of incarceration, even after the period of incarceration. The choice between probation and prison, as exemplified in the recidivism rates of both offender groups, may not represent the ultimate best choices available to a progressive criminal justice system. Comparing a 61 percent success rate with an 83 percent success rate (based on reappearance in the State adult corrections system for probationers as opposed to felony prisoners) does not take into account that crime-to-crime recidivism for both groups may be substantially higher and, therefore, that those two "success rates" may represent little more than a two-point comparison which, due to lack of experience with additional options, could be considerably outdone by a third as yet untested choice.

Among other things, prisons provide the following:

1. Prisons provide secure spaces for removing from society persons who have demonstrated harmful interaction with social norms.
2. Prisons reduce recidivism, at least to the extent that:
 - a. During a period of confinement, an offender is incapacitated from committing crime in the community.

- b. Once released from prison, it is hoped that the prisoner has a propensity toward less criminality as a result of the punishment and "lesson-teaching" and unpleasantness of incarceration. Some data are available to suggest that recidivism for parolees is less than recidivism for probationers.
3. Prisons cause a loss of normal social function and interaction for prisoners, including a loss of income-producing opportunity, loss of normal exposure to diverse stimuli.
 4. Prisons cause physical and social deprivation under a planned schedule, i.e., offenders are physically restrained, confined for fixed periods and are socially deprived of rights of unrestricted movement and behavioral freedoms normally granted to individuals.

Nationally, a number of criminal justice scholars and professionals concede that prisons often perpetuate an environment that may be harsh and inhumane. It is the intent of prison to create an atmosphere of physical and social deprivation and loss of some civil rights. Beyond these personal restrictions, however, it is accepted that a number of prison settings additionally perpetuate an atmosphere of: (1) great likelihood for criminal victimization; (2) emotional trauma beyond what is reasonable, given a situation involving loss of liberty and social deprivation; (3) poor health standards and unclean conditions; and (4) sexual perversions resulting from physical deprivations which become a basis for subcultural control mechanisms.

Another criticism of prisons is that they are extremely expensive compared to numerous other "options." This negative cost factor must be considered in light of the fact that no other currently available corrections option offers the non-criminal community the protections that prisons offer.

In summary, prisons can claim three points in their favor, compared to the other known corrections options:

1. Prisons protect society from predatory criminal activity of offenders while they are incarcerated.
2. Prisons structure the imposition of punitive sanctions for retribution resulting from conviction for specific offenses.
3. Based upon Department of Social and Health Services return-to-institutions and probation-revocation rates, at least prison can claim a high relative success rate when persons leaving prisons are compared with persons placed on probation.

In looking at facts available, one could conclude that prisons are often inhumane and unduly harsh. On the other hand, prisons represent the best crime reduction corrections option. Additional research and evaluation of a multitude of treatment programs and alternative corrections strategies may yield some new learning about programs which offer opportunities for greater success than prisons. Until such time as these data are available, however, the quandary appears to be that, although we may not like placing people in prisons because of our belief about conditions, it does appear to be the best crime control mechanism.

Rejected Strategies

Drug treatment programs to reduce burglary: A number of burglars and other Part I offenders are sentenced to drug rehabilitation programs based upon the belief that addiction to narcotics or habitual drug use is causally linked to commission of other more serious criminal violations. Frequently during the sentencing process, the matter of the more serious offense with which the person has been charged is lost in a discussion of causation. While it may be true that a number of burglary offenders, robbery offenders, and so on, are also narcotics law violators (as has been noted in past years), a causal inference or link can in no way be established. A more reasonable argument to be presented regarding the relationship between narcotics use violations and Part I

criminality is that criminal behavior of certain forms often occurs together. This has been substantiated with respect to burglars and robbers. Burglars, for example, are more likely to commit a burglary or a robbery. Narcotics violators, auto thieves, burglars, robbers and aggravated assault offenders are, however, all more likely to have committed Part I offenses than murderers and rapists, bicycle thieves and other types of law violators. This more obvious causal link between burglars and robbers, or burglars and repeat burglars, is not abundantly evident in looking at sanctions imposed in King County. While the obvious is ignored, the unsubstantiated but believed causal link between narcotics involvement and burglary is more evident in court dispositions.

The strategy of dealing with burglars as narcotics addicts is rejected, due to the lack of any information that dealing with a narcotics addiction problem is in any way related to a reduction of recidivism rates among burglar addicts. The City should maintain the posture that the criminal justice system should deal with the presenting offense, such as burglary, and not become confused by arbitrary computations and discussions of etiology which have no empirical evidence of success.

Corrections programs which do not have crime reduction objectives and which should be evaluated for crime impact: The problem of a lack of information on what works is exemplified in recent criminal justice literature, predominantly in the work presented by Robert Martinson and others. The points made in recent Seattle Criminal Justice Plans and in the national literature suggest two unsophisticated facets of the criminal justice system's response to the processing of suspects and offenders. The first area displaying a lack of sophistication is evaluation. Most traditional responses by the criminal justice system to the criminal offender have not been adequately evaluated by crime reduction and reduction of recidivism standards. Thus a determination of success and/or failure cannot reasonably be made. Secondly, those programs and alternatives that have been evaluated consistently have shown no statistically significant impact on reducing either crime or recidivism for those persons exposed to the tested treatment.

Proposed Strategy

Ideally, the choice between prison and community retention options (including probation in combination with treatment programs, employment and other possibilities) might be more easily accepted if conditions in prisons could be improved so that minimum standards of public safety can be maintained within the prison setting. There seems to be no doubt that judges use prisons as a last resort because of the "bad press" prisons have received, and because of real events which corrections personnel relate back to the courts about criminal activity which exists in prisons.

Persons who reside within the city limits of Seattle have a choice, for the most part, as to where they reside. In the prison setting, however, freedom of choice obviously is restricted. Were the city, or any other comparable residential entity, to experience the per capita rate of murder, aggravated assault, rape and drug abuse prevalent in most prison settings, the general population would have good reason for universal alarm. As the City has set crime control objectives which seek to reduce the rate of victimization within the city boundaries, so too should the administration of prisons set similar crime control objectives to reduce the much higher rate of criminal victimization for inhabitants within its jurisdictional boundaries. It is worth note that, where citizens have a freedom of choice to move if the City fails in its attempt to reduce victimization, prison populations do not have the same choice. Since governmental authority forces persons to live together in a confined setting, it should be incumbent upon that government to maintain a decent level of safety for this captive population. Standards for health care and the state of repair of facilities are not as great a concern for this state as they are nationally. It is realistic to hypothesize that were prisons to maintain an acceptable standard of safety, criminal justice decision makers would not be as apparently reluctant to sentence persons to realistic periods of incarceration within those settings.

Alternative Corrections Program: If the use of prison and the use of probation are the current corrections strategies, it may be possible to speculate that a third strategy which demonstrates utility (measured by effectiveness in reducing recidivism, fairness

and humane treatment) may have a reasonable chance for adoption as a corrections model. In the preceding pages, we have explored two relatively high failure rates for both probation and prison populations as a group. While the prison and probation options represent two points of reference, they do very little to tell us what we might expect as a measurement of success for a third option. Suffice it to say that a program which represents a third corrections option and demonstrates a recidivism rate which is lower for comparable populations than prison or probation could reasonably be expected to be embraced by the corrections community looking for alternatives that are more effective, less costly and more humane.

In the juvenile area, this type of reasoning became the basis for the creation of the Community Accountability Program (formerly the Youth Service Bureau System). In 1973, it was found that the juvenile justice system was doing little to hold youthful burglars and robbers accountable for their criminal activity and that the average recidivism rate among juvenile burglars and robbers was intolerably high. The City developed and operated a demonstration juvenile corrections program that was intended to increase the accountability of youthful offenders and, through a structured evaluation methodology and design, to show to other governmental agencies with the jurisdictional responsibility for juvenile corrections that a better alternative method of disposing of juvenile offenses could ultimately produce lower recidivism rates, more fairness and better opportunities for youths to learn non-criminal behavior patterns. This was the basis for the youth accountability model for which the City is currently seeking funds from the State to continue operation on a permanent basis. The selling point to the State is, in part, that the Community Accountability Program represents a more effective juvenile corrections strategy than other programs for which State dollars are available.

In the adult area, a similar hypothesis might be applied. However, the methodology of holding youthful offenders accountable in and by their own communities may not be replicable for adult offenders. While a community board of citizen volunteers may be willing to donate their time to hear the cases of juveniles brought before them, it may be that citizens are less inclined to sit in judgment over persons whom they believe to be "hard core" adult offenders set in their ways.

The experience of the Community Accountability Program has been two-fold: (1) while success in reducing recidivism among youthful offenders presented to the program experience has been demonstrated, and while the hypothesis that holding juveniles accountable in and by their own communities seems to be verified by three years of experimentation with this project, a second and unexpected result has occurred; (2) the juvenile justice system which we had claimed was not holding youthful offenders accountable for their behavior has become increasingly more concerned with the accountability of youths. While the term accountability and the concepts of restitution and recompensatory work were used infrequently at Juvenile Court prior to the Community Accountability Program experience, due to the encouragement of the project, success and the cooperative relationship that has developed between Juvenile Court and the City program, the term juvenile accountability is now part of the jargon of a number of Juvenile Court administrative staff and caseworkers. Elsewhere in the juvenile justice system, accountability is a theme which, although it cannot reasonably be claimed to be entirely due to the Community Accountability Program, has developed since the operation of that program began.

The operation of a juvenile corrections program founded on a specific hypothesis has had the side effect of achieving recognition within the traditional juvenile justice community and the adoption of, at least in part, a similar philosophy and method of operation. Thus this juvenile corrections program has done through influence what confrontation between different philosophies could never accomplish.

Since we have reason to believe that when juvenile offenders are held accountable for their behavior they are less likely to recidivate, it is reasonable to expect that the application of a similar strategy to adult offenders may yield similar results. What is required in developing a third alternative for adult corrections may be to begin at the point at which the City began its work in the juvenile area. In looking at the juvenile justice system as stated above, a pervasive lack of accountability was noted. In looking at the adult criminal justice system, a pervasive tone of inconsistency and lack of

uniformity seem to underlie what we believe to be a situation in which adult offenders could not reasonably be expected to be accountable for their behavior. Even if a program to encourage such accountability were developed, the years of being exposed to an inconsistent system may make short-term success unlikely to be achievable. Basically, the data noted in the material presented above show that any two offenders who have committed the same offense could be treated differently. Furthermore, the data show that there is a general lack of consistency as to who gets probation and who goes to prison, and that many people who have served terms of incarceration and reoffend are placed back on probation, in some cases prior to the expiration of their terms of parole. Clearly, the message which would be received by an adult offender given these two examples and the numerous other examples cited in the material above is that the ability to manipulate the system is always present, and that there are no firm risks presented by being a recidivist.

In short, the system as it currently functions does not appear to hold adult offenders accountable for their criminal activity. The inconsistent application of criminal sanctions, the well documented gaps in criminal justice information systems, make it possible, in fact numerically probable, that an offender can avoid certain identifiable negative consequences simply by knowing or learning how the criminal justice game is played.

In the area of corrections specifically, the data would seem to imply that an offender who has been in prison may be given probation because criminal justice professionals feel that the prison situation did nothing to cause the offender to desist in his or her criminal activity. Thus the belief goes, since we have tried one thing which failed, let us try another and see how that works. Although the Parole Board has developed base expectancy data, and although criminal justice planners use data and information available in a manner to suggest we have knowledge regarding which group of offenders represents the most serious danger, in reality, insufficiently sound data exist to suggest that we know which offenders we should retain in the community and which we should send to prison. In each case, it would appear that a decision is made subjectively based upon the presentation an individual offender can make, or persons acting in behalf of the offender can argue successfully. A study commissioned by the Washington State Bar Association with the assistance of the State Law and Justice Planning Office (Current Status of Defense Services in Washington: A Report by the Washington State Bar Association, Olympia, Washington, 1976) showed that with "better" legal counsel in some areas of the state, less severe penalties and sanctions often result for persons who were "well represented."

The inconsistencies that exist in terms of sentences and lengths of sentences handed down are exemplified in the corrections option as follows: (1) there is a tremendous range and variance in minimum terms and actual terms of confinement set by the State Board of Prison Terms and Parole; (2) it may be that the terms of incarceration themselves do nothing to assist offenders in making a clear connection between the punishment which is being imposed and the criminal event that has taken place.

In the State of Washington, the criminal code specifies two categories of penalty for the commission of felony offenses. The first category of offenses is maximum terms of confinement which can be imposed, and the second category is a separate schedule of monetary fines which are also available for most of the felony offenses covered by the current criminal code. Most sanctions that are imposed for felony level offenses are handed down in terms of time to be served in a restrictive setting. In some cases, it is possible to say that probation is also the imposition of time, even when combined with restitution, because judges almost always impose a probationary term with the stipulation and condition that the offender not become a recidivist. Therefore, theoretically, if an offender satisfactorily completes a period of time on probation without coming to the attention of the criminal justice system again, the satisfactory completion of that interval of time would be a basis for releasing the offender from the probationary terms and conditions. The imposition of a sanction of time either spent in incarceration or time spent serving a term of specialized supervision-probation may not, although it is a traditional punishment, serve current needs of behavior teaching corrections alternatives.

Although we expect the punishment for the offense to fit the crime which was committed, the imposition of time as loss of liberty or time on probation as recompensatory for commission of the offense is not necessarily letting "the punishment fit the crime." While we would not advocate that criminal law revert to the Judaic eye-for-an-eye principle, there may be a better opportunity to have sanctions imposed relate more directly to the offense committed than is currently done. The disadvantages of the current imposition of time, especially where that time is spent in confinement, are fourfold: (1) very little of value is gained from dead time spent in confinement, in terms of redeemable goods or services; (2) rehabilitation in the prison setting is, at best, uncertain and, according to current literature available on a national basis, the indication is that rehabilitation does not work at all as an objective of prison; (3) the learning of trades in prison is not practical and, for the most part, the range of trades and learning opportunities available--even in the most modern and ideal prisons--is limited; usually those things learned in prison are not applicable to the outside world, nor do they involve a basis for finding employment after the offender leaves prison; (4) clearly, prisoners who have difficulty understanding the relationship between committing an offense for personal profit or monetary gain and paying retribution on a schedule of time served in prison under circumstances where the inducement to change behaviors or attitudes is, at best, limited may have substantial problems understanding the cause/effect relationship by which the social order imposes the sanction. This is especially true where the population of persons likely to end up in prison has demonstrated through past behavior that they lack understanding and judgment about the relationship between cause and effect.

The proposed solution to the overuse of probation and the limitations of incarceration may be to develop a demonstration of a new mechanism whereby offenders can repay their debt to the social order in a more meaningful way. Since the current criminal code imposes both monetary fines and maximum periods of confinement as reasonable outcomes for sentencing decisions, it is proposed that an economic standard, rather than a time standard, be adopted for determining when an offender is released from confinement. What is envisioned is a work program which provides the opportunity to offenders to earn a certain amount of dollars for services provided in a confined or work release setting to repay costs for restitution to the victim and a fine. Where an offender is not employed or where, for reasons of security, confinement appears to be appropriate, an offender could be given work within a confined setting and earn his or her way out of confinement by paying off the fine. Fines and wages would both need to be realistic, in order that offenders do not spend inordinately long periods of time in confinement. However, where an offender has the ability to buy his or her way out of confinement, the relationship between performance within the structured setting or under the structured supervision and the recompensatory nature of the sanction imposed could be made more clear.

There are a number of problems with the corrections model being proposed here. One of the problems stems from potential criticism that some persons could afford to pay the courts, the victim for the loss and the fine for the infraction, out of their pockets. In such a case, the espoused punitive basis for criminal sanctions would be missing. Thus for these persons, the monetary sanction would lose its validity. This is not unlike the situation confronted by City planners when similar criticisms were made regarding the Community Accountability Program. Where a monetary type of restitution, as opposed to work-task assignment, was imposed, youths whose parents were so disposed could simply pay the fine for the juvenile offender. Obviously, a juvenile whose parents paid the restitution would not be held accountable in a direct way.

An additional persuasive argument against use of a monetary sanction for adult felons would be that those hard-core offenders who were committed to criminal life styles would simply commit more crime in order to secure enough money to repay the fine. This complaint has been registered occasionally under the current system for imposing monetary sanctions. A number of criminal justice professionals claim that when the court orders restitution as a condition of probation, and when the probation officer demands that the restitution be paid prior to the expiration of the probationary term, the criminal offender under pressure is likely to commit crime in order to fulfill this obligation.

What may be required in order to satisfy both these criticisms regarding monetary sanctions is a confined-structured or open-structured sentence whereby the work done becomes the guiding criteria for satisfactory completion of the monetary sanction. What is envisioned as a possible monetary sanction model would be for an offender in a confined "sheltered workshop" type of situation to earn \$4 an hour for work performed, \$3 of which would automatically go towards repaying each, in order: (1) restitution to the victim, (2) court costs, and (3) the amount of court fine imposed. The fourth dollar an hour earned can be used by the offender for personal use, or that dollar or a portion of that dollar may be used to pay the fine more quickly. In order to avoid offenders pressuring other offenders in the confined setting and relieving each other of money held back for personal use, the maximum which could be paid toward paying down a fine under this model would be \$4 an hour. This would be tightly monitored to assure that no undue pressure or theft was occurring. This would also be a reasonable mechanism whereby offenders with cash reserve could be expected to work for their fine rather than borrowing the money, committing more crime in order to pay the fine more quickly or having other persons pay the fine for them. In addition to a confinement program, a work release type minimum security recompensatory work-and-pay program could be used.

The King County Department of Rehabilitative Services is currently drawing up plans to build a new jail facility. Since they are entertaining a number of ideas regarding architecture and jail facilities design needs, there may be an opportunity to test on a limited basis the monetary sanction program briefly described here. Ideally, a certain portion of a new county jail facility could be set aside for such a program. Referrals to the program could be screened by random assignment either to program participation as an experimental group, or to the normal range of criminal penalties (including probation with a jail term, probation only, prison) as a control group. There would be an opportunity to learn and demonstrate the potential utility of an alternative corrections program based upon monetary standards rather than a time standard.

The way the program would get referrals needs to be described. Currently, both the prosecutor's office and the Pre-Sentence Investigation Unit of the Department of Social and Health Services, Adult Probation and Parole Office, report over an 80 percent concurrence rate between their recommendations and the sentences handed down by the King County Superior Court. In this situation, it is safe to conclude that the recommendation to the court made by the prosecutor and Pre-Sentence Investigation staff carry much weight with respect to the inevitable outcome and disposition of those cases. Therefore, if a third alternative program model were well received by both the prosecutor and the Pre-Sentence Unit, a number of referrals would be made. Currently, prior to a recommendation being made to the court, the pre-sentence investigator contacts those agencies which are believed to be appropriate and useful referrals for the offender, and a determination is made as to the offender's eligibility for participation. The program model described above could receive referrals in the same manner. Added to the normal sets of eligibility requirements might be the condition that once meeting general eligibility requirements, the offender would be selected based on a random draw. Thus the evaluation of the program would be based on documentable comparability between randomly selected control and experimental groups. Since under a demonstration effort this project would have space for only approximately 50 persons, it can safely be assumed that given no random assignment and screening, the program would very quickly fill to its capacity, and a number of offenders otherwise eligible would be turned away. Since we expect more offenders than can be accommodated by the program, it would seem reasonable to propose random assignment as a means of turning down applicants, thereby gaining the added advantage of being able to evaluate the program impact.

The general eligibility requirements envisioned for this program include all persons convicted of burglary, persons convicted of robbery other than armed robbery with a deadly weapon, persons convicted of first degree larceny and persons convicted of auto theft. Evidence presented earlier in this document with regard to characteristics of offenders and offender profiles suggests that these offense categories often occur together, with an identifiable group of offenders. Evidence also suggests that these property crime offenders tend as a group not to be person-crime offenders, that is, aggravated assault offenders, rapists, murderers or armed robbers. Since it is the expectation that monetary sanctions are best suited for crimes committed for direct personal monetary gain, it is

this offender group which should be the target population for such a demonstration effort. Persons convicted of rape, homicide, aggravated assault, armed robbery and other person crimes such as sex offenses shall not be eligible for this program.

The work-for-pay program would require either expenditure of considerable and scarce revenue or would have to operate in a manner which assists in providing support funds. The best opportunity to develop such support funds would be the creation of an industry which produces products which could be sold on a closed market. There would exist an added advantage of training offenders in realistic work situations to develop both skills and good work habits.

Other groups concerned with the state of the art in corrections are calling for similar program models to be tested. The Law and Justice Committee of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce recently developed a "Position Paper on Corrections." In this paper, the Chamber advocates as follows:

The Chamber urges the re-establishment of appropriate prison industries to provide adequate employment for inmates. Some time ago, several such industries in the State Penitentiary were discontinued by the Department of Social and Health Services because it felt the specific jobs did not provide meaningful training for outside employment. The closing down of these industries, however, was not replaced by any work program that might be considered more meaningful. Even if these specific industries (sock making, clothing manufacture and food processing) were not training for specific employment, they did provide for the acquisition of work habits and discipline which could be transferred to work on the outside. Without such industries, even that opportunity is lost.

The Washington Council on Crime and Delinquency advanced proposed legislation to create more structured "supervised" probation in a confined (residential) setting. Senate Bill 2926 sponsored by Senator Day creates in Section 4 a mechanism for the funding of residential facilities in counties ("supervised probation facilities"). If enacted by the legislature, Senate Bill 2926 could provide a portion of the funding to establish a sheltered industry facility for felony offenders.

It is the intent of the current design that no clinical treatment modality be combined with the program effort being proposed here. The proposed model, which involves a real economy conditioning program, could be said to bring with it advantages of token economy behavior modification programs. Although this is not the intent of the proposed program, the learning of behaviors afforded by behavior modification would also be theoretically achievable under the program model.

Current corrections programs which employ offenders in similar ways, such as the Pioneer Cooperative Affiliation industry program and the PIVOT Program, would be potentially available as additional resources to this program.

There is evidence to indicate that the building of social skills and good work habits, combined with supportive guidance, can have a behavior changing effect which reduces recidivism. A study conducted in Utah by Murdock and Howell at Brigham Young University (Maxine L. Murdock and Robert J. Howell, Insulating an Ex-Offender Against Recidivism, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah) found that there were identifiable and quantifiable indicators for parole success when they looked at successful parolees compared with unsuccessful parolees (recidivists versus non-recidivists).

The Utah recidivism study compared 28 paroled prisoners who had successfully remained out of prison for at least three years with a group of 46 who returned. On 23 of 25 quantitative indicators, there was a statistically significant difference in the predicted direction between the successes and the failures. The conclusions reached in the study are that 11 variables can be claimed to account for success rather than failure after leaving prison. These are as follows: (1) appropriate behavior in crisis situations, (2) freedom from drug and alcohol abuse, (3) non-criminal associates and opportunities for appropriate socialization, (4) good work habits, employment skills and a healthy attitude towards work, (5) personal and financial responsibility for oneself and dependents, (6)

maintenance of hope, (7) a stable home, (8) freedom from harrassment of law enforcement officers, (9) appropriate behavior toward people in authority, (10) a healthy self-concept, and (11) concern and interest of others.

The individual assessments were reached based upon personal interviews with the two groups. The research was intended to allow both successful and unsuccessful parolees to assess their own situations and indicate by a controlled set of questions their believed reason for the outcome of their parole, either positive or negative.

The Brigham Young University research shows that the differences between the successful and unsuccessful groups for economic indicators is quite great.

In the good work habits and financial responsibility sections of the questionnaire, the following findings were reported:

<u>Questions Tested Listed by Variables Studied</u>	<u>χ^2</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>Probability Less Than:</u>
Good work habits, employment skills and a healthy attitude toward work			
Dependability as a worker	17.14	1	.0005
Diligence as a worker	7.04	1	.005
Interest in work	3.61	1	.05
Adequate work training	4.32	1	.025
Amount of money earned per month	3.77	3	n.s.
Number of jobs held	6.14	4	n.s.
Reasons for changing jobs	29.01	5	.001
Amount of time worked while on parole	17.99	3	.001
Personal and financial responsibility for oneself and dependents			
Responsible for paying bills and living within income	12.43	1	.0005
Responsible for behavior	12.29	1	.0005
Feelings of being a responsible person	7.28	1	.005
Amount of money subjects had when released	6.27	3	n.s.
How release money was spent	20.29	4	.001

Project: Alternative Corrections Model

Goal: To reduce recidivism among adult felony property crime offenders.

Objective: To reduce significantly the rate of rearrest and reconviction of randomly selected adult felony burglary, robbery (other than armed robbery), auto theft and larceny offenders receiving project treatment when compared with a control group.

Methods

1. Referrals will be made to the program by the court. The program will accept as eligible all burglars, robbers, auto thieves and larceny offenders and will randomly select persons for participation, keeping the names of all referred individuals. Those persons whose names are drawn will be in the experimental group; those not drawn will be placed in a control group. Those persons selected as experimentals who are not referred to the program by the court will be maintained as a separate subgroup of the experimental group.
2. The Pre-Sentence Investigation Unit of the Department of Social and Health Services, Adult Probation and Parole Office, and the prosecutor recommend to the sentencing judge that an offender is eligible and has been selected for program participation.
3. The judge sentences the offender to program participation, formally deferring imposition of a sentence pending satisfactory program completion. This is understood to mean payment of restitution to the victim, court costs and the program-imposed fine. It is also understood that upon satisfactory program completion (however long it takes), the form of sentence will be dismissed charges. Unsatisfactory program performance or a new offense will result in the offender's deferred sentence being revoked or rescinded, and the case being sent back to court.
4. Experimental subjects will be placed in a residential medium security facility.
5. Daily routine will be structured and will include an eight-hour work day, with no opportunity to work extra hours or earn overtime pay.
6. Residents will receive \$4 per hour; room and board charges will not be assessed.
7. Residents must pay to their fine account a minimum of \$3 per hour of their earned wages; FICA and withholding tax will be deducted as in a normal work setting. The remaining \$1 an hour may be retained in an individual credit account for personal use by the resident. The resident may elect to deposit the full \$4 an hour toward repayment of the fine.
8. No actual currency will be permitted to be in the possession of residents.
9. Since the residents can pay up to \$4 per hour or \$160 per week, the length of time served in the structured work facility will be influenced somewhat by the offender's eagerness to "buy out."
10. A maximum of \$4 per hour will be accepted as payment toward the fine. Residents may not use their own funds (money earned outside the residential setting and program) to pay toward their fines.
11. The fines for all offense types will be fixed by a schedule of payments which can only be influenced by the absence of court costs or exceedingly high restitution and court costs. For example, the uniform schedule may be as follows:

First Degree Burglary - court costs and restitution and \$6,000
 Second Degree Burglary - court costs and restitution to victim and \$4,000
 Second Degree Robbery - court costs and restitution and \$5,000
 Auto Theft - court costs and restitution and \$2,000
 Larceny - court costs and restitution and \$1,000

12. Upon satisfactory completion of the program, program staff will endeavor to find a work placement for the resident, if the resident requests such assistance.

Evaluation

Random assignment of offenders to experimental and control groups will be performed by a researcher located in the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, following the determination that referred offenders meet program eligibility requirements. At that time, project personnel will record (and maintain throughout the duration of the project, regardless of offender status) data on both experimental and control group individuals. To insure that recidivism followup can occur, the data will include as a minimum: full legal name and aliases; birthdate; race; sex; other social, economic and demographic variables that are related to recidivism; court cause number of offense convicted; referral date; Department of Social and Health Services number and Seattle Police Department "M" number (if any); prior arrest, conviction and incarceration history as an adult (and juvenile, if available).

It is anticipated that some persons accepted as eligible and randomly selected for project participation will not be sentenced to the project by the sentencing judge. These individuals will be maintained in the experimental group, but as a separate subgroup. Data analysis will be performed including this subgroup, to prevent possible selection biases producing misleading conclusions regarding project impact.

Analysis of recidivism data will be performed using the following measures: rearrested or not rearrested, number of rearrests, severity of first and most serious offense(s) rearrested for (as measured by Sellin-Wolfgang severity scale), and latency (how soon) of rearrest. These measures will be reported for reconviction data. Technical violations (incarceration for actions that would not normally be grounds for arrest or incarceration) will not be counted as recidivism.

If a significant difference between experimental and control groups in the proportion of offenders sentenced to prison occurs, recidivism analyses will be performed with statistical models that do not assume random assignment to treatment condition (e.g., multiple regression, or analysis of covariance). If non-significant differences on prison-probation assignment between the two groups occurs, statistical tests assuming random assignment will be used (t-test, analysis of variance).

Since the project is assumed to have a recidivism reduction effect through removing criminal justice system inconsistencies and building opportunities for new behavior learning, measures of these characteristics will be obtained for each person at program entry and bi-monthly until program exit. Changes in the measures will be correlated with recidivism data to determine if the hypothesized effect is, in fact, responsible for observed impact. In addition, the data will serve as the basis for monitoring program operation to determine if the project is having the desired and planned effect upon offenders.

Recidivism data (Seattle Police Department arrests, Department of Social and Health Services commitments and FBI "rap" sheets) will be collected one month prior to the end of first-year funding and analyzed. It is anticipated that there will be insufficient data to determine program impact at that time. However, the first-year evaluation will serve to summarize and evaluate first-year project operations and identify necessary changes in project operation, data collection and analysis procedures. Sufficient data for project impact assessment are anticipated to be available by the end of the project's second year of operation.

Data collection costs will be funded out of the project operation budget. Data analysis and evaluation personnel will be funded through the Criminal Justice Evaluation Project. Data collection instruments will be designed by Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office planning and program evaluation staff, with assistance from project personnel.

Costs

The Alternative Corrections Model is not intended to have any long-term adverse impact upon the City's General Fund or other funds available for City projects that fall more directly within the City's administrative span of control. It is also not intended as precedence for involving the City in cost assumption for corrections endeavors. The intent of the Alternative Corrections Model is to demonstrate, if possible, better means of imposing punitive sanctions and reducing crime for the benefit of other jurisdictions and for the ultimate benefit to Seattle and Seattle residents in reduced crime through lower criminal recidivism and, perhaps, deterrence. Budgeted costs reflect a local match which would have to be negotiated with either King County or the State, or both, providing the local match funds. It is not the current intention of the City to spend its target allocation to fund this project. Rather, the City hopes to capture Part E discretionary funds to test this experimental corrections model in some sponsoring jurisdiction.

	<u>1978</u>
LEAA	\$238,500
Match requirement	26,500
Total	\$265,000

Problem Statement G: The Involuntary Commitment Act has apparently resulted in a number of persons who require mental health services being handled in the criminal justice system.

Discussion

In March, 1969, a graduate student at the University of Washington School of Social Work did an analysis of the Seattle Municipal Court client population as his Master's thesis. That analysis describes a population (in 1969) of clients who were predominantly young (average age 20 years), well educated (compared on an average basis with other offender groups, e.g., felony level probationers), and predominantly employed (69 percent at the time of their placement on probation, which is a high percentage for employment compared with other offender groups). The study also indicates, however, that a fairly high proportion of the Municipal Court probationers had prior contact with the mental health community (A Report of an Exploratory Study Performed on the Client Population of the Seattle Municipal Court Probation Department, option thesis for Master of Social Work at the University of Washington, Phil Canup, March, 1969, p. 12).

During 1975, Municipal Probation Services completed a total of 270 "in-custody" pre-sentence reports. There was a significant increase in mental evaluations, from 186 in 1974 to 301 in 1975. Much of the increase was due to increased availability of staff, while part was attributed to a larger number of defendants with mental or emotional problems. The evaluations range from brief interviews to determine a defendant's functioning to a lengthy interview, historical investigation and consultation with the jail psychiatrist. Post-sentence investigations increased from 115 in 1974 to 222 in 1975.

The King County Department of Rehabilitative Services has verified that a large number of persons who are predominantly mental health cases, rather than criminal cases, are being "stored" in the jail due to a lack of other options available. According to jail personnel, an identifiable growing number of mental health cases are brought into the jail population, with well over half of them being referred from the Seattle Municipal Court for relatively minor offenses. It is commonly agreed among jailers, mental health staff and law enforcement officials that these people do not belong within the criminal justice system, let alone in the county jail.

The principal problem, according to corrections staff, is that the mental health community has abdicated its responsibility for this population as a result of the changes in law pertaining to justifiable grounds for committing persons for mental health treatment against their wishes. The change in the involuntary commitment laws for this state mirror national trends. In order to get a person involuntarily committed to state mental health hospitals, a person must present "clear and present danger to himself and to others" and to be diagnosed as having a "psychosis." A history of psychotic behavior and dangerous actions does not constitute a basis for an involuntary commitment. In an example recently, a jail prisoner set fire to mattresses in his cell and endangered the lives of himself and others, but there was not sufficient basis for an involuntary commitment of that person when he appeared again in jail 14 days later upon being released from Harborview Hospital.

Because mentally disordered persons seem to "gravitate to" the city center, Seattle Police Department enforcement policy has substantial impact on the number of mentally disordered persons presented to the courts.

No effective universal criteria exist for deciding who is mentally disordered and who is not, where no overt dangerous act has occurred. Such universal criteria are vital to satisfy civil libertarians' arguments which led to a change in the involuntary commitment law in the first place. The mental health community differs on a case-by-case basis with diagnosis of individuals. Few legally acceptable standardized means have been developed to show conclusively that "bizarre public behavior" or "acting crazy in the jail" constitutes a basis for a commitment to a mental hospital. Enough questions on individual cases are pertinent so that substantial legal objections could accrue any time a person is confined to a mental hospital for an indeterminate period of time based on the observations of non-conforming, but non-criminal and non-dangerous, behavior.

Crime Reduction Strategy for Problem Statement G

Proposed Strategy: The ideal resolution for this problem would be for the County and the City together to take a stance with respect to mentally disordered persons, similar to the stance taken in past years with respect to the drunk-in-public problem. Although law enforcement and the courts still object to removal of drunk-in-public ordinances, and although a drunk problem still exists, the problems are not exacerbated by continued attempts to make drunkenness alone a law enforcement issue. The removal of drunk-in-public laws is a product of local governments with ever shrinking resources not being seduced by another jurisdiction's failure to live up to its obligations. In the case of drunkenness, like mental disorders, the medical community must provide the necessary services. In mental health, the County may wish to contract with private, non-profit agencies for the provision of services. Since the principal problem presented by the mentally disordered Municipal Court offender is that insufficient services exist for this population, the best resolution may be to identify discretionary resource funds for mental health problems which could be made available on a contract basis through the Department of Rehabilitative Services. Such contracts would be drawn up between the County and private, existing non-profit agencies or a new non-profit agency which could deal with this population of offenders on a residential and out-patient basis. This would have the advantage of not setting a bad precedent with respect to public safety, criminal justice funds being dedicated to non-criminal justice problems, and further, this solution may be a shortcut to solving the basic problem facing the City without expenditure of resources on research, as is proposed in the Municipal Court's proposal.

What is required in order to shift the responsibility for this population back to the mental health field is a study of the following: (1) the number of persons who (by some uniform criteria) can be judged mentally disordered; (2) the current availability of services to this population, and what potential bolstering of those resources may serve to solve fundamental problems; and (3) the extent that the involuntary commitment laws place undue and uncompensated burdens upon local government (both law enforcement and the local corrections community). This study will obtain demographic and historical data, as well as define current degree of psychiatric impairment to answer questions, in two major areas. The first area is characteristics of the mentally disordered offender where factors such as age, race, sex offense, area of residence, previous treatment for psychiatric impairment, family support system, present source of income, origin, current degree of psychiatric impairment and identification of predominate patterns of behavior will be determined to assess the probability and severity of psychiatric impairment in a group of misdemeanor offenders. Psychiatric data will be compared with that of other population groups where comparable survey methods have been employed, and the community treatment history of the mentally disordered offender will be documented.

Secondly, the study will examine disposition of court cases, identify community agencies involved in the disposition, examine arrest records in an attempt to document the movement of these persons through the lower court system, and compare court data for mentally disordered persons to that of non-mentally disordered offenders. Recidivism rates for the two groups will also be compared.

The collection of the above data and subsequent statistical analysis will test the following hypotheses:

1. That misdemeanor courts form an important link in the network of community resources for the mentally ill.
2. That a proportion of misdemeanants have severe psychiatric handicaps.
3. That the recidivism rate increases with the degree of psychiatric impairment.
4. That diversion of the mentally disordered offender into the mental health care system results in decreased recidivism.
5. That the processing of the mentally disordered offender through the mental health care system is more humane and less costly than through the criminal justice system.

6. That the processing of the mentally disordered offender through the criminal justice system is more expensive than processing the appropriate criminal justice system population.

Project: Mentally Disordered Misdemeanant Offender Study

Goal: To remove the non-criminal mentally disordered from the criminal justice system.

Objectives

1. To gather data on the number of mentally disordered persons currently in the criminal justice system.
2. To develop and apply universally acceptable criteria for determining who is a mentally disordered person.
3. To develop strategies and identify mental health funding for the removal of the mentally disordered non-criminal from the criminal justice system.

Methods

1. One research aide will be hired (supervised by the research and planning staff of the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office).
2. The research aide, with the assistance of the mental health professional community, will identify criteria which could be used to identify mentally disordered offenders in the criminal justice system.
3. The Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office will gather relevant data on this population.

Evaluation

The evaluation of this program will consist of a determination of usefulness based upon the dissemination and use of data and information generated by the project. The ultimate evaluation of the project will be based upon the criteria that, if successful, the non-criminal mentally disordered offender should be removed from the criminal justice system upon completion of the project.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
LEAA	\$31,276	\$35,029	\$39,557
State	1,738	1,946	2,198
City	1,737	1,946	2,197
Total	\$34,751	\$38,921	\$43,952

SECTION IV-B(b): SUSPECT/OFFENDER PROCESSING, ADJUDICATIONS AND CORRECTIONSJuvenile Suspect/Offender Problem Statements, Strategies and ProgramsProblem Statement A: Juveniles are not being prevented from becoming burglars.Discussion

Seattle Police Department data indicate that each year a new group of juvenile offenders comes to the attention of the criminal justice system. A rough estimate of the number of new juvenile offenders can be obtained by looking at the issuance of new "JM" numbers by the police department. These numbers reflect new contacts for all juvenile offenders and, consequently, include non-criminal police contacts. Based on new "JM" numbers, approximately 4,546 new youths entered the system during 1975, as compared with 4,728 in 1974. This represents a 3.84 percent reduction in the number of new juveniles entering the system in 1975 as compared with 1974. During this same period, however, the number of school-age juveniles in the city, as measured by Seattle Public Schools population statistics, has also been declining. In 1974, there were 64,588 school-age youths in Seattle, while in 1975 there were 62,884 for a reduction of 2.64 percent. Of the 10,834 total Part I and Part II juvenile contacts in 1975, 5,318 (or 49.1 percent) were attributable to juveniles who became offenders for the first time in 1975.

Information has not been previously compiled on how many of the new youths entering the system each year came to the attention of the police for the commission of a burglary. However, of the 4,546 new offenders in 1975, 268 were contacted for burglary--over 42 percent of the total 627 juveniles contacted for burglary in 1975--indicating a failure to deter juveniles who have not previously been offenders from committing burglary.

In addition, there is an apparent failure to deter youths who have had previous contact with the system for other, frequently less serious, offenses from becoming burglars. Of the remaining 359 juveniles contacted for burglary in 1975 (after new offenders have been subtracted from the original 627), 192 had not previously been contacted for burglary in 1973 or 1974. Thus a total of over 73 percent of youths contacted for burglary in 1975 had either never been contacted before for any offense or had not been contacted for burglary in the previous two years.

Juvenile offense histories were analyzed for 263 randomly selected juvenile offenders who had been contacted by the Seattle Police Department for burglary between October 1, 1973, and March 31, 1974, as part of the Juvenile Cohort Study. Of that group of 263 burglary offenders, 178 (or 67.7 percent) had no previous contact for burglary at any time in their total juvenile history.

The problem of the failure to prevent youths from becoming burglars takes on added significance when the proportion of burglaries committed by juveniles as opposed to adults is estimated. There are several ways to compare the relative involvement of adults and juveniles in the commission of burglary through the use of arrest statistics. One way is a comparison of adult suspicion arrests (which do not exclude investigate and release dispositions) with juvenile burglary incidents (which do exclude investigate and release dispositions). This method tends to underestimate juvenile involvement.

The second way is to compare adult primary charges with juvenile contacts. In the latter comparison, only those cases judged to be legally sufficient by the Seattle Police Department are counted. However, for adult primary charges, a prosecutor review is not included. Therefore, the second comparison tends to overestimate juvenile involvement.

In 1974, there were 918 juvenile burglary incidents and 798 in 1975, as opposed to 661 adult suspicion arrests in 1974 and 769 in 1975. If these figures roughly represent the actual number of juveniles versus adults involved in burglary, it appears that approximately 55 percent of burglaries were committed by juveniles in 1974 and 49 percent in 1975. For 1974, there were 294 adult primary burglary charges and 902 juvenile burglary contacts. For 1975, there were 391 adult charges and 774 juvenile contacts. If this

second method of comparison is used, approximately 75 percent of burglaries were committed by juveniles in 1974 and 66 percent were committed by juveniles in 1975. These two comparisons produce a range of from 55 to 75 percent of burglaries being committed by juveniles in 1974 and from 49 to 66 percent being committed by juveniles in 1975. Based upon the relative error introduced by the two types of comparisons, the contact/primary charge is viewed as being more accurate. Therefore, the estimate of 70 percent for juvenile involvement in burglary for 1974 and 60 percent for 1975 was taken for subsequent use in discussions regarding the relative involvement of juveniles and adults in the commission of burglaries.

Juvenile involvement in burglary appears to have decreased from 1974 to 1975 both in total numbers of contacts and proportionately when compared with adult involvement. This may be a reflection of efforts on the part of the juvenile justice system to increase accountability of youthful offenders and to redefine the system in such a way that it will be taken more seriously by youths who may be contemplating burglary.

The question of why juveniles are not deterred from committing burglary was discussed with approximately 30 youths who are members of a local juvenile advisory group. Many of these youths have either committed burglary themselves or have friends who commit burglary. The consensus of the group was that there was very little to deter potential juvenile burglars and much to encourage them. The reasons given for becoming a burglar included the following: (1) to acquire something the youth wanted and could not get otherwise, like a tape recorder, stereo, etc.; (2) to get money by selling items taken in burglaries, usually to friends or neighbors; (3) to be part of the group, i.e., peer pressure; or (4) for fun and excitement. The most convincing reason seemed to be that friends had committed a burglary and told others how "easy it was to get away with it," i.e., it was relatively easy to enter a house or building; it was easy to complete the burglary without being detected; it was easy to get away without being caught; it was easy to sell the items taken; and even for those who were caught, nothing particularly negative happened.

From this discussion, it appears that the failure to deter youths from becoming burglars is directly related to the lack of an expectation on the part of the potential offenders that they will be held accountable for their acts.

The problems raised by the above will be discussed in the sections that follow on burglary prevention (target hardening), detection, apprehension, offender processing and corrections.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement A

Rejected Strategies: Deterrence has been defined in the above set of problem statements as "discouraging the potential offender from committing the crime." Since that is the aim of delinquency prevention efforts, the terms deterrence and prevention are interchangeable for purposes of the following discussion.

Programs which provide social services to youths but which do not have a specifically identified target group should be rejected as juvenile crime prevention strategies.

An underlying assumption of many social service programs for youths is that, if certain services are provided, young people will be deterred from becoming criminal offenders. A juvenile crime prevention rationale is often given when funding is being sought for programs aimed at increasing opportunities for recreation, employment, education, vocational training, counseling, health care services, etc. Although these activities may have social value for youths in and of themselves, there is no hard evidence to support the belief that these services will prevent youths from becoming criminals.

There are two major problems in designing strategies to deter or prevent juveniles from becoming criminals. The first is that it is very difficult to ascertain which juveniles are likely to become offenders. Consequently, there seems to be no way of knowing to which youths, out of the general population, to apply specific prevention strategies.

At present so little information is available as to factors that contribute to a non-delinquent becoming a delinquent that any prevention strategy selected might have to be applied to the entire pre-delinquent population, i.e., to all youths in the age group who might reasonably be expected to become delinquent. Not only is this not feasible because of sheer numbers, but it would risk applying a strategy to youths who did not need it and who might benefit more by being left alone.

The second problem is that it is very difficult to determine whether a particular strategy has been effective, because its success means that something did not happen--that is, a juvenile did not come to the attention of the authorities. If there is no way to predict with a high degree of accuracy that the youths selected for treatment have a high likelihood of becoming offenders, there is no way to evaluate the deterrent effect of the strategy applied.

In spite of these problems, millions of dollars are spent each year on programs aimed at preventing juvenile delinquency. A search of the literature has not identified any programs which have been able to demonstrate success in preventing those juveniles who otherwise would have become offenders from committing crimes. Most of the "prevention" programs are based on conventional wisdom, such as "kids who take drugs or drink or are incorrigible will go on to become criminals," or "if we had more recreation, special education, employment, etc., we would have less juvenile crime." There are no facts to support these assumptions.

At present time, there is little ability to predict which youngsters will become delinquent and which will not. The juvenile delinquency literature is filled with material suggesting that combinations of juvenile characteristics, including sex, age, race, parental marital status, school status and economic status can be used to identify the pre-delinquent population. It is true that groups of youths with certain common characteristics will have a higher percentage of their number participating in crime than other groups with somewhat different characteristics. However, even in the high risk group, it is likely that only a small percentage of the youths will actually become juvenile offenders. Therefore, a prevention strategy directed toward the high risk group will still involve the participation of many youths who would never have become criminal offenders and who might better be left alone. Even if the strategy were relatively effective, it might be extremely expensive for the number of youths affected if the target group were fairly large and the actual number of pre-delinquent youths within it were fairly small.

Another approach to identifying the pre-delinquent is to have persons working with young people select those whom they believe will become offenders. Yet there will be as many opinions about the future of certain youths as there are individuals making the judgments. In these situations, it would be difficult to verify the accuracy of predictions made. It would be very risky, at best, to select one or two people who would begin to identify the juveniles to whom special treatment should be directed.

A program aimed at deterring a target group of youths from committing crime would either have to be inexpensive enough so that it could treat thousands of "high-risk" subjects, or be able to predict with a high degree of accuracy which youths are likely to become offenders. At the present, there are no strategies available which meet these criteria, and programs aimed at deterring "pre-delinquents" from becoming offenders have not been able to demonstrate effectiveness in preventing juvenile crime.

The Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office recommends that the City of Seattle not fund as juvenile crime prevention strategies those activities which have not demonstrated crime prevention success or are not capable of being evaluated on specific crime prevention/reduction objectives.

Current Strategies: The City of Seattle is currently testing the strategy of holding juvenile offenders more accountable for their offenses through the Seattle Community Accountability Program (CAP). Although this strategy is aimed primarily at the reduction of recidivism, and its primary target group is therefore identified offenders, it

is thought to have a general prevention effect on pre-delinquent youths in the neighborhoods served. It is hypothesized that the project will increase the expectation that one will be held accountable for criminal behavior and that this will serve as a deterrent to youths in the area who are contemplating becoming offenders.

Once youths are exposed to the juvenile justice system, either by word of mouth from friends or directly, they often find that it does not really hold them accountable. As a result, the system undoubtedly becomes less of a deterrent and breaks down in its effectiveness and its ability to prevent and reduce criminal behavior. If youths expected that criminal behavior on their part would result in immediately holding them responsible for their acts, they might be deterred from engaging in such behavior. (Undoubtedly, this is the expectation of many of the youths who never do become delinquent.) The accountability program described in the section of this plan on juvenile recidivism attempts to create such an atmosphere in selected target areas of the city.

As mentioned earlier, it is extremely difficult to measure the effects of strategies aimed toward the prevention of delinquency. However, one can look at the relative number of new offenders coming into the system from areas served by the Community Accountability Program before and during its operation, as compared with the rest of the city. Prior to establishment of CAP, the number of new offenders (as measured by assignment of new Seattle Police Department "JM" numbers) appeared to be increasing in the CAP census tracts, while the rest of the city appeared to be experiencing a decrease. In fact, an increase in new offenders was one of the criteria used to select target areas for testing the accountability strategy. A recent analysis of new "JM" numbers indicates a relative decrease of new offenders in the CAP census tracts, as compared with the rest of the city. The use of new "JM" numbers to measure the actual number of youths committing crimes for the first time is subject to limitations. One of the more serious of these is that the majority of offenders are never caught and, therefore, are not reflected in official statistics. For example, the probability of a youth being apprehended for the commission of a burglary has been estimated to be about one in 22 times. Because of the limitations of data based on arrests, an analysis of reported crime in the CAP areas was done for time periods before and during project operation, as compared with the rest of the city. Burglary was one of the offenses examined because data indicate that juveniles are responsible for a high proportion of that offense. (It is estimated that 70 percent of the burglaries in the city are committed by juveniles.) Although reported burglary increased 16.7 percent in the combined census tracts served by CAP, it increased 40 percent for the rest of the city. This difference is statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level. The difference for the individual CAP projects (i.e., Mt. Baker, Ballard-Fremont and Southeast), as compared with the rest of the city, appeared to increase as a function of length of time the project had been in operation. If part of the relative reduction in reported burglary is attributable to non-offenders being deterred from committing burglaries for the first time, it is not surprising this effect would improve with time. That is, the creation of an atmosphere in which there is an increased expectation for accountability would improve over time as the word got around.

This sort of analysis is, at the very best, presumptive. However, since new offenders were responsible for 49 percent of the total juvenile contacts in the city in 1975 and 42 percent of the juvenile burglary contacts, and juveniles are responsible for approximately 70 percent of reported burglaries, it seems reasonable to assume that some proportion of the reduction in reported burglaries in the CAP areas is attributable to a reduction in the number of new offenders.

At the present, supporting a strategy which has some potential for creating a general deterrent effect seems a better course of action for the City than trying to isolate a pre-delinquent target group whose members have a high probability of becoming offenders. The latter raises serious moral and ethical questions, particularly in relation to the potentially negative consequences of "labeling."

Proposed Strategies

A Reexamination of Delinquency Prevention Strategies which are based on Conventional Wisdom: Such a reexamination should be undertaken by State, County and City planners. It should be a particularly important part of the decision-making process for allocating Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act monies. For example, is there any evidence that the "advanced techniques" listed in the Juvenile Justice Act can actually prevent, redirect or control an otherwise delinquent/criminal career? By means of a study or in-house staff work, a determination should be made as to which of these techniques hold some promise and should, therefore, be encouraged; which should be rejected on the basis of having failed to show any positive effect; what new techniques need to be added; what the relative costs are; what "success" rates can be demonstrated, etc. (Many of these techniques have already been rejected by Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office on the basis of having tested them with LEAA-funded programs.)

This information should be the basis for setting priority for funding and for determining what kinds of funding activities should be excluded.

The "advanced techniques" listed in the Act are as follows:

- Short-term foster care
- Short-term group homes
- Health services
- Homemaker services (for families of pre-delinquents)
- Individual counseling
- Group counseling
- Improved work opportunities
- Improved recreational opportunities
- Drug/alcohol abuse education programs
- Youth alcoholism programs
- Youth drug treatment programs
- Improved educational opportunities such as "alternative learning situations"
- Probation (as a therapeutic device)
- Diversion
- Retention in school when suspensions or expulsion would normally occur

The Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office is not proposing a specific project to examine delinquency prevention strategies because it is felt that leadership in this area should come from the State. The City of Seattle can, however, contribute information to such an effort, based on local data analysis and local experience in testing strategies such as subsidized employment, early diversion, etc. A starting point for prevention strategy analysis might be for State staff and State Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee members to review Dixon and Wright's review of the literature. (Michael C. Dixon, Ph.D., and William E. Wright, Ph.D., Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Programs: Report of an Evaluation of the Literature, Office of Educational Services, Peabody College for Teachers, Nashville, Tennessee.)

Develop a State Policy Position on the Juvenile Justice Act which is Consistent with the Crime Reduction Objectives of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act requires that juvenile status offenders (youths guilty of offenses which would not be considered crimes if committed by adults--primarily incorrigibility) must be removed from State juvenile correctional facilities within two years after submission of a state's plan. Therefore, a top priority for use of Juvenile Justice Act monies has become deinstitutionalization of status offenders, i.e., diversion from the juvenile justice system. The responsibility for this task and any possible benefits lie with the County and State, as they are the ones who currently are incarcerating status offenders. Other than the vague possibility that over the long term (several years) this would prevent this group of juveniles from becoming criminals (by negative association or labeling or whatever), there will be little or no immediate, direct benefit to Seattle citizens who are concerned about crime by funding diversion programs for status offenders.

Removal of these youngsters from the juvenile justice system is a needed system improvement. Such action is supportable on the premise that the present practice of handling dependent children, status offenders and criminal offenders through one juvenile justice system dilutes the effectiveness of that system in substantially reducing serious crime. However, it should be kept in mind that this effort is directed toward system improvement and cannot be considered a crime prevention or reduction strategy. Efforts in the past to demonstrate a positive relationship between early diversion programs and crime reduction have failed. A local example of this was the Seattle Police Department Social Agency Referral Project, which was carefully researched over a three-year period and was unable to demonstrate a positive relationship between pre-adjudicative diversion and crime reduction. Other examples abound in the national literature.

There is a danger of the State developing priorities and program areas which relate only to diversion of status offenders and "prevention" of delinquency, thus, in effect, excluding action aimed at measurable crime reduction (LEAA's number one priority). There is no good evidence available to support the notion that status offenders go on to become criminal offenders. Programs aimed at this population will not be able to demonstrate any impact on juvenile crime. Any "prevention" efforts which are aimed at youths who have not already been identified as criminal offenders would be unable to establish a direct correlation between activity undertaken (or services provided) and reduction in criminal activity.

Although diversion of status offenders should be a priority, it should not be the only priority. The danger in that would be that a wide variety of traditional social services to non-delinquent youths would be funded. A lot of money would be spent to do the same sorts of things that are done now, i.e., counseling, recreation, education, etc. There is no way to evaluate the effectiveness of these activities other than operationally: i.e., "we counseled x number of kids, families or diverted x number of kids, etc." Even traditional programs which are currently operating in this area and which state crime reduction as their primary objective are not adequately evaluated.

Major Questions

Question: How can LEAA and Juvenile Justice Act emphasis on crime reduction be maintained (and encourage planning and programming toward that end) while still meeting the mandate to remove status offenders from institutions and detention?

Recommended Solutions: First, it is necessary to make sure of the correct interpretation of the intent of the bill. Different people (including legislators, prosecutors, planners, juvenile court personnel, etc.) are interpreting this differently as regards the minimum level of detention which the Act will tolerate. For example, the King County Prosecutor feels detention is permissible if all other community resources have been exhausted. Some State staff feel that 90 days at Cascadia is acceptable if it is for evaluation and diagnosis only. State staff have requested LEAA General Counsel and State Attorney General opinion as to the correct interpretation of the Act. Once the opinion is received, there is a need to support legislation in the form of a new Washington State Juvenile Court Code, which will mandate removal of status offenders to the extent required by the Act.

It will be necessary to maximize and expand the capacity of existing resources to deal with this problem, while minimizing expenditure of new resources. For example, there is a need to expand the number of bed spaces available in present receiving homes, shelter care facilities, group homes, etc. Several currently funded projects are already working on coordinating and expanding these resources.

The LEAA planning requirements (M4100.1F, p. 57) indicate that the direct approach is expected.

For example, the requirements ask for a description of procedure and a timetable assuring that community based alternatives be available within two years after submission of the Juvenile Justice Plan.

Coordination with other funding sources, for maximum application of resources to deinstitutionalization, should be emphasized. Juvenile Justice Act monies should not be used to duplicate activities for which resources are available elsewhere.

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has categorical funds available which could be used to provide resources for those whose status offense is runaway. These monies are being applied for by private agencies in Seattle. Referendum 29 monies should be used for new group homes. LEAA discretionary monies for status offenders have already been applied for by the State Department of Social and Health Services for Spokane, Benton, Franklin and Clark counties.

The following plan requirement (M4100.1F, p. 54) speaks to this issue.

The utilization of existing programs is recommended in the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act requirements which in Section 223 (a) (9) requires that the State Plan "Provide for coordination and maximum utilization of existing juvenile delinquency programs and other related programs...."

The plan requirement specifies that all state efforts related to delinquency prevention and rehabilitation whether federal, state, locally or privately funded be identified. The State Planning Agency is charged to demonstrate its intended coordination and utilization of these services.

Efforts aimed at sharpening the system's ability to sort out those youths who are not in need of treatment should be supported so that resources are not applied to youths who do not need them and who might benefit more by being left alone.

The degree to which criminal offenders are labeled as status offenders should be determined, and guidelines to prohibit people from mislabeling in this way in the future in an effort to make more youths eligible for status offender resources should be strengthened. (The result of this kind of mislabeling could be an increase in juvenile crime because more criminal offenders would be returned to the community.) Mislabeling certainly would be counterproductive to achieving the goal of reducing numbers of "status offenders" who are incarcerated.

The State, in cooperation with County juvenile courts, should develop a very specific plan for achieving deinstitutionalization with the minimum expenditure of new resources. Emphasis should be on maximizing capacity of existing resources. Definite measurable objectives should be set, i.e., x number of status offenders will be out of King County Juvenile Detention by the end of 1976; x number will be out of State correctional facilities, etc.

This task can be accomplished, in great part, through administrative policy backed by a new State juvenile court code which says that status offenders shall no longer be housed in detention facilities or be committed to State correctional facilities. (This is already being accomplished to some extent administratively in King County.)

At any rate, it should not take all the monies that likely will be available over the next few years through the Juvenile Justice Act to accomplish this task.

Question: How can we best address the emphasis which the Juvenile Justice Act seems to place on crime prevention?

Recommended Solution: Since no one is now able to predict which youths, out of the general population, will become delinquent, priority for funding should be given to research aimed at developing a better predictive capacity, rather than to funding "prevention" programs based on conventional wisdom. The expenditure of action monies aimed at crime prevention should be restricted to programs for youths who are already identified offenders. (See excerpt from LEAA planning guidelines, M4100.1D, in the following problem statement.)

Question: How can we best address the emphasis which the Act places on training?

Recommended Solution: The State should develop a rationale for restricting training activity to those things which relate to educating people as to the state of the art, i.e., strategy analysis, program design, research and evaluation, etc., rather than training people to deliver services which hold little promise of being effective.

This would likely not be in conflict with the planning requirement from M4100.1E, (p. 116).

"An adequate training capacity' is the capacity to meet the training needs identified through the State's juvenile justice planning process. The Plan must indicate those needs identified which can best be met by training of existing or future juvenile justice and other youth service personnel, the resources which the State will utilize to meet these needs, and, if they are not presently adequate to the task, the steps which will be taken to augment them. This plan should take into account and make maximum use of the training programs provided by the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Needs which cannot be met at the State level should be communicated to the NIJJDP for use in planning future programs."

General Recommendation: The Juvenile Justice Act also emphasized the reduction of juvenile crime. It is our feeling that crime reduction was the primary motivation behind the development of this legislation, and that crime reduction is the basic intent of the Act. That is one of the reasons why the administration of the Act was placed with LEAA rather than HEW.

The State should act swiftly and authoritatively to establish juvenile crime reduction as the primary emphasis in developing guidelines for use of Juvenile Justice Act funds. It took LEAA five years of wasted time, energy and money to come to the conclusion that crime-specific planning and action, as opposed to system improvements based on conventional wisdom, was the only viable, rational approach to solving the crime problem. The juvenile area should benefit from that experience and use the resources available where these will have the greatest measurable impact.

Priority for funding should go to those actions which are capable of demonstrating a direct relationship between the strategy employed and crime prevention or reduction. These strategies must be testable over time, and evaluation must contain information on the degree to which crime has been impacted. As mentioned above, programs which meet these criteria must be preceded by research to identify specific target groups for which it makes sense to apply crime reduction/prevention strategies.

Taking this kind of action will not be an easy task. The Act is currently being interpreted in a one dimensional fashion by some, and this will have to be overcome. Strong leadership is needed in interpreting the Act in a way that will maximize its effectiveness in Washington. The State, with the assistance of the Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee and regional planners, has the opportunity to provide that kind of leadership now in the juvenile justice area. The opportunity exists now to establish a rational, crime-reduction approach to planning and funding from the beginning, in regard to the Juvenile Justice Act, so that the early mistakes that were made in implementing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act will not be repeated. It should be possible to do this and still meet the basic requirements of the Act in relation to status offenders.

Monies which are available for programming in the juvenile area should be used to create an atmosphere in which identified offenders are held accountable for their crimes. This strategy seems much more likely to produce a general deterrent effect for pre-delinquents than providing social services to "youths in need."

Strategies Aimed at Increasing the Risk of Becoming an Offender: If it becomes more difficult for youths to commit crimes such as burglary, the chances of being caught increase and the probability that a negative sanction will quickly and consistently follow

being caught increase, the prospect of committing an offense will become much less attractive to many pre-delinquent youths. Strategies aimed at accomplishing the above are proposed in the Burglary Problem Statement and Strategy Sections on Prevention (target hardening), Detection, Apprehension, Suspect/Offender Processing and Corrections. In addition to proposing strategies to make burglary targets less accessible and to increase identification and apprehension of all offenders, the continuation of the City's Community Accountability Program is recommended along with a redefinition of the juvenile justice system to be more consistent with crime reduction objectives and other strategies aimed at tightening the operation of the juvenile justice system.

Problem Statement B: There is no known way to predict which youths out of the general population of juveniles are likely to become burglars.

Discussion

The failure to prevent youths from becoming burglars is related to the inability to predict which youths are likely to become offenders at all, much less which youths are likely to commit burglary.

Problems which arise from trying to implement offender deterrence strategies, when predictive abilities are so poor, are discussed in the following excerpt from the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act LEAA planning guidelines (4100.1E, p. 115).

"Youth in Danger of Becoming Delinquent: A major goal of some delinquency prevention programs is to identify those youths who are most likely to commit delinquent acts in the future in order to give them special services designed to decrease that likelihood. While laudable in concept, this approach has serious drawbacks. Existing prediction mechanisms and instruments lack the accuracy needed to avoid large numbers of false positives and false negatives in the youths selected for and excluded from prevention programs. In addition, some theories argue that early prediction of delinquency, when communicated to youths and others with whom they interact, can produce a self-fulfilling prophecy effect which increases the likelihood of delinquency, thereby undercutting the purposes of the prevention program itself. Consequently, until further study identifies and validates effective means of predicting delinquency, or discredits the fears of negative consequences from even the most accurate labeling programs, 'youth in danger of becoming delinquent' shall be interpreted to refer only to youths who have demonstrated actual behavior which itself is grounds for their adjudication as 'delinquent.' The State should also avoid usage of terms such as 'pre-delinquent' in reference to particular youths."

Although the above recommendation for caution is well founded, attempts to increase predictive abilities should not be abandoned so that a strategy to treat juveniles before they become offenders can be developed. Data collected in 1975 from the Seattle Police Department Data Processing unit suggest that this would, in fact, be a potentially useful strategy. In 1975, the 4,546 juveniles who were arrested for the first time by the Seattle Police Department accounted for 5,318 out of the 10,384 total Part I and Part II contacts, or approximately 49 percent of the total juvenile contacts during the year. As discussed earlier, of the 627 juveniles arrested for burglary in 1975, 268 (or 42 percent) were new offenders and a total of 192, or an additional 31 percent, were youths who had not previously committed burglary.

Attempts to identify pre-delinquent youths and to treat them effectively to prevent them from becoming offenders should take the following information into consideration. Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin's study of delinquency in a birth cohort indicated the following probabilities of youths in different age groups becoming delinquent. (Wolfgang, Figlio, Sellin, "Delinquency in a Birth Cohort," Studies in Crime and Justice, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1972, Table F.2.)

<u>Age</u>	<u>Probability of Committing an Offense and Being Arrested for the First Time</u>	
8	.005	1 in 200
10	.018	1 in 55
12	.032	1 in 31
14	.056	1 in 18
16	.095	1 in 11

As the above table indicates, the proportion of the population of 12 year olds who are likely to commit an offense in one year is 3.2 percent, or approximately one in 31 twelve-year olds will be contacted within their twelfth year of age by the police for a criminal offense. If one is going to prevent pre-delinquents from committing delinquent activities, one of the following two conditions must be met: Either the program must be

cheap enough in terms of its operation and scope so that it can treat literally thousands of individuals before it can prevent an appreciative number of juveniles from committing crimes, or a valid prediction technique would have to be developed so it would be possible to identify, with a high degree of accuracy, individuals who are likely to be contacted by the police during the project period. The reasoning behind the first condition is as follows. If a program is focused at twelve-year old pre-delinquents and the goal of the project is to reduce the number of twelve year olds committing any first offense, the following conditions must be met:

1. To get one twelve year old who would offend, it would be necessary to treat 31 individuals.
2. If it is assumed the program will be effective in reducing crime by one-quarter for this population, it will be necessary to treat four times 31 (or 124) youths to prevent successfully one individual from committing crime. As can plainly be seen, to affect significantly the overall crime rate for an area, let alone the city of Seattle, it would be necessary to treat literally thousands of individuals.

The probabilities discussed above are for a given age youth to commit any offense. If we try to apply a prevention strategy to a group of youths to prevent a specific offense, such as burglary, the problem would be magnified considerably.

The second condition requires an accurate prediction technique. A review of the prediction literature relating to delinquency indicates that such techniques are not currently available. Any strategy attempting to use prediction techniques would have to present data that would substantiate claims being made that the prediction technique is, in fact, accurate, valid and reliable.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement B

Rejected Strategies: As discussed above, those prediction strategies which rely on conventional wisdom must be rejected on the basis of there being no way to validate such predictions. In addition, using such predictive methods could lead to singling out many individuals for special treatment who might better be left alone.

Current Strategies: The Youthful Offender Criminal History Survey performed by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office examined approximately 100,000 separate juvenile contact records maintained by the Seattle Police Department Data Processing unit. These data were used to generate 1,371 tables giving the actuarial probability of youths recidivating (being recontacted) within six, 12 and 18 months after some number (n) of prior contacts. Each table is based upon a specified age, race and sex group (e.g., white females, age 13), who have a certain number of prior contacts (e.g., one), who were contacted for a specific charge (e.g., larceny/shoplift). Use of these actuarial tables allows one to predict with a high degree of accuracy the probability of certain groups of identified offenders from reoffending. However, they do not allow one to predict the probability of a single individual offender reoffending; nor do they allow one to predict delinquency for even specific groups of youths out of the general population of non-offenders.

Groups representing particular age, race and sex combinations do appear to contribute a greater proportion of their numbers to the delinquent population than others. However, this information is not accurate or conclusive enough to be the basis for providing specialized treatment to members of these groups who have not yet demonstrated delinquent behavior. For example, Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin (1972) found that the probability of a 16-year-old male becoming delinquent within one year's time was three times that of a 14-year-old male; however, it obviously would not make sense to apply a delinquency prevention strategy to all 16-year-old males.

The data tables generated by the Youthful Offender Criminal History Survey provide an excellent source of baseline data for planning purposes and program evaluation. These data are particularly valuable in evaluation of delinquency reduction projects where it is not possible or feasible to establish randomly assigned contact groups. However,

neither this information nor any other generally accepted procedure is particularly useful in predicting with any degree of accuracy which youths out of the non-offender population are likely to become offenders.

Proposed Strategy: It appears that the only reasonable strategy at this time is to try to determine the state of the art in regard to predicting delinquent behavior, so that State and regional Law and Justice Planning staff and the State Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee can better determine what sort of activities should be encouraged or discouraged in the area of delinquency prevention.

While much research has been performed and reported on the prediction of delinquency, the results are neither conclusive nor consistent. For example, Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin (1972) have found that prediction of delinquency for 3,350 youths using such variables as race, number of address changes, reason for leaving school, whether handicapped, highest grade completed, number of school moves, absenteeism, achievement, first IQ measurement and income can predict 19.5 percent of the variance in who will be contacted by the police between age 7 and 17. (If 100 percent of the variance can be accounted for, every prediction made is correct; if 0 percent of the variance can be predicted, the predictions are no better than chance.) Carr, Molof and Weller (Carr, Molof, and Weller, "Characteristics and Recidivism of Juvenile Arrestees in Denver," Denver Anti-Crime Council, Denver, Colorado, 1974, p. 80) reported that sex, number of arrests, number of juvenile court referrals, race, number of prior "impact" arrests (burglary, robbery, assault, rape and sexual assault, auto theft and joy-riding), and age of 2,203 youths predicted 20.1 percent of the variance in who was rearrested within one year. However, other researchers report much more favorable results. For example, Glueck and Glueck, (Glueck, and Glueck, "Predicting Delinquency and Crime," Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959, p. 259) claim to be 83.5 percent to 96.7 percent accurate in predicting subsequent delinquency for 497 youths 7 to 18 years old.

The magnitude of these discrepancies is such that it is extremely difficult to determine readily how accurate predictive techniques may be in selecting youths who will subsequently commit criminal acts.

In recognition of the need for a better understanding of existing prediction techniques, so that the best direction for future activity can be determined, the following strategy and proposed project are being recommended to the State Standards and Goals Project.

A researcher will search the available literature for delinquency prediction studies, assemble them, evaluate their merit in terms of correctly predicting subsequent behavior; prepare abstracts; and create a library as a product of the project. The researcher will also use this information to prepare a report which will summarize the reliability and validity of their statistical and practical significance. If predictive variables with practical significance are found, the researcher will prepare sample data recording forms and coding rules for the collection of identified variable information.

The expected impact of this project is to determine if programs intended to prevent pre-delinquents from committing criminal acts will actually be able to identify individuals for treatment accurately. If this is not possible, funding of pre-delinquent programs will not be recommended by the City of Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, since the proportion of the general population of juveniles who commit their first delinquent act within a given year is, at most, 9.5 percent (Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin, 1972).

The basis of the statement above is that, if prediction techniques do little better than chance to evaluate pre-delinquent programs, a prohibitively large number of pre-delinquents would need to be treated. For example, if the goal of a program is to prevent true pre-delinquents from committing offenses within a given year, and the correct identification rate is 10 percent of a sample, the number of youths needed to be selected would be 1,000, in order to obtain 100 youths who would commit crimes. This would mean that resources would have to be allocated to 900 youths who did not need program services to prevent delinquency.

Project: Delinquency Prediction Study

Goal: To predict which non-delinquent youths subsequently will commit delinquent acts.

Objective: To determine whether present predictive techniques are accurate enough to be used in client selection for "pre-delinquent" (i.e., prevention) programs.

Methods

The following tasks will be performed:

1. Literature search for studies, articles, papers, reports and books relating to the prediction of criminal acts by non-delinquent youths. This will include both manual and computer use of criminal justice, psychological, sociological, educational, medical and mathematical abstracting services.
2. Obtain copies of all relevant literature to form a library of source documents to be provided to the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office and to be available to the State Law and Justice Planning Office, State Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee and other interested parties.
3. Review all literature in terms of statistical and measurement reliability and validity, statistical and practical significance in client selection for "pre-delinquent" treatment programs and assess predictive techniques in terms of accuracy for correct rejection, correct identification, false positive and false negative rates.
4. Prepare abstracts of all literature and an indexing system, including criteria specified above.
5. Prepare a report summarizing the state of the art in "pre-delinquent" prediction, and identify variables of practical, as well as statistical, significance.
6. If practically significant variables are identified, prepare data recording format sheets and coding rules, along with a description of the appropriate statistical procedure.

Evaluation: Evaluation will consist of an expert review of the results of the project, two months prior to the end of the project. The review committee will consist of a minimum of three individuals with research and/or predictive training and experience in the criminal justice system and/or predictive techniques. One reviewer will be from the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, one could be from the State Law and Justice Planning Office, and one will be a person with training and experience in predictive assessment.

Evaluation costs will consist of not less than two nor more than four days consultant fees (2 or 4 x \$135), plus per diem, depending on State Law and Justice Planning Office participation. This will consist of three reviewers spending one day two months prior to the project and one day at the end of the project reviewing the reports.

Cost: State Standards and Goals Project \$8,967

Problem Statement C: Recidivism. Youths who have come into contact with the juvenile justice system for the commission of burglary continue to commit burglary and other serious offenses at an alarmingly high rate. Thus the system appears to be ineffective in its ability to stop the identified juvenile offender from repeating a crime.

Discussion

We have four sources of juvenile burglary recidivism information. They are as follows: (1) A 10 percent sample of juvenile burglary offenders contacted in 1972. This analysis examined offender characteristics from the records of 92 juveniles. (2) The first phase of the Youthful Offender Study which involved an analysis of 45,952 Seattle Police Department juvenile contacts. These contacts represent all juvenile Seattle Police Department contacts for individuals who were under the age of 18 as of December 31, 1973. (3) A continuation of the Youthful Offender Study (Youthful Offender Criminal History Survey, 1976). This was based on approximately 90,000 juvenile police contacts occurring in Seattle over a twenty-year period. (4) A Juvenile Cohort Study which examined prior and subsequent offenses by the Seattle Police Department for burglary between October 1, 1973, and March 31, 1974.

All four sources of information use the same definition of recidivism. Recidivism is defined as a second (or third, fourth, etc.) arrest, as reported by Seattle Police Department juvenile contact records. Different agencies in the juvenile justice system have different definitions of recidivism. For example, Juvenile Court may consider as recidivism a re-referral to court; the State Department of Social and Health Services may consider as recidivism a recommitment to a juvenile institution. Data gathered on the basis of any recidivism definition will underestimate the actual rate at which juveniles (or adults) re-engage in criminal behavior. Many offenses are never reported (approximately 44 percent in the case of total burglary in 1975). Many arrests do not result in referral to court (approximately 41 percent of juvenile burglary arrests in 1975). An even smaller proportion of the cases which are referred to court ever result in commitment or recommitment to a correctional institution.

Unreported offenses and those for which there is no arrest do not appear in official recidivism data based on police contact statistics. However, these data give the best estimate of recidivism available and are certainly preferable to estimates based on referrals to court or commitments to institutions. The following recidivism information is all the more startling when one considers the degree to which it underestimates the actual problem.

In the 1972 sample of 92 juveniles contacted for burglary, the majority of juvenile burglars were Part I offense recidivists: in the sample, more than two-thirds of all previous contacts were for Part I or serious offenses. This represents a delinquent recidivism rate of 71.7 percent. If total offenses are divided by the sample size, the average or mean previous delinquent contacts exceeded four per juvenile, most of which were serious offenses. The burglary-to-burglary recidivism rate was 45.6 percent. This rate very nearly approximates that of the adult arrest sample.

If the goal of the juvenile justice system is the reduction of juvenile crime, a delinquent recidivism rate of 71.7 percent for burglary is clearly unacceptable. The seriousness of the problem is further exemplified by the fact that this population had not committed only one additional offense, but an average of four to five additional serious offenses. This may well indicate a delinquent habit pattern which could carry over into the development of an adult criminal career.

The first phase of the Youthful Offender Study analyzed 45,952 Seattle Police Department juvenile contacts. Of these contacts, 20,027 (43.6 percent) were first contacts. Approximately one-third (.341) of offenders commit a second offense. However, as the number of prior contacts increase, the probability of a juvenile being contacted again increases. That is, if a juvenile is contacted for the first time, the probability of being recontacted is .341. If the juvenile has been contacted three times, the probability of being contacted a fourth time is .669. Once a juvenile is contacted ten times by the police, there is a 92 percent certainty of another contact.

Probability Factors with Increasing Contacts

	<u>Number of Prior Contacts</u>			
	1	3	5	7
Number of juveniles	20,027	3,770	1,800	1,085
Probability of being recontacted	.341	.665	.764	.813

However, if one looks at those individuals for whom the first, third, fifth or seventh contact is burglary, the probability of subsequent contacts is significantly higher than if one looks at juveniles for whom their most recent contact is any offense.

Probability Factors with Increasing Contacts with Burglary Contact

	<u>Number of Prior Contacts When Burglary is the Most Recent Contact</u>			
	1	3	5	7
Number of juveniles	723	317	231	168
Probability of being contacted again	.531	.769	.870	.910
Percent more likely than general offender to be contacted again	55.7%	14.9%	13.9%	11.9%

This analysis indicates that juveniles who are involved in the commission of burglaries are more likely to continue to be involved in criminal activities than the general population of contacted delinquents. This analysis, in conjunction with the 1972 sample data, would also seem to indicate that juvenile burglars are both more likely to continue to commit offenses and commit serious offenses.

A continuation of the Youthful Offender Study (Youthful Offender Criminal History Survey, 1976) has produced more detailed data on juvenile offenders. Based on approximately 90,000 juvenile police contacts occurring in Seattle over a twenty-year period, probability tables have been developed which provide the probability of a given youth committing a subsequent offense within six, 12 and 18 months based on the age, race, sex, type of offense and number of prior contacts. These data show that for both white and black males, age 10-16, whose first contact is burglary, the probability of being recontacted (for any offense) within 12 months is .49. That is, 49 percent of those youths whose first contact was burglary were recontacted within 12 months. In addition, the average number of subsequent contacts within 12 months is 6.2 for white males and 3.14 for black males. In the case of white males, 85 percent of the subsequent contacts were for Part I offenses; 77 percent of the subsequent contacts for black males were for Part I offenses. (There were not enough cases of other race males nor of females to provide meaningful data.) These data not only substantiate that juvenile burglars are likely to continue to commit offenses and to commit serious offenses, but they are likely to reoffend within a relatively short period of time.

The Juvenile Cohort Study examined prior offenses of 263 juveniles contacted for burglary between October 1, 1973, and March 31, 1974. As a group, they had a total of 1,755 Part I and Part II offenses, or 6.67 per offender. At the time of contact for the target burglary that brought them into the cohort, they had an average of 3.61 offenses. In the time from target contact until May, 1975, they were recontacted an average of 2.08 times. Most of the information in earlier analyses of recidivism documented the extent to which identified juvenile burglars commit any other serious offense. The Cohort Study is attempting to provide better information on the burglary-

to-burglary recidivism rate. Of this sample of 263 burglary offenders, 124 (47 percent) had committed another burglary offense at some time in their criminal history. Within 15 months following the offense which brought them into the sample, 71 of the 263 (27 percent) were recontacted for burglary.

The data presented above indicate that juveniles who were contacted for burglary by the Seattle Police Department continued to commit serious offenses at a greater rate than the general offender population. They committed many additional offenses within a relatively short period of time, and an unacceptable number committed additional burglaries. Obviously, something is very wrong with the system when youths who have come in contact with the police for the commission of a burglary continue to reoffend at the rate described above.

In an effort to get at the root of this problem, an attempt has been made to examine the juvenile justice system's response to the problem. The Juvenile Cohort Study examined the relationships between different police dispositions and recidivism. For 263 youths contacted for burglary between October 1, 1973, and March 31, 1974, 77 (29 percent) of the group were adjusted by the police; 142 (54 percent) were referred to court. The remainder were either investigated and released or exceptionally cleared. Of the group who were adjusted by the police, 26 (33.8 percent) had a subsequent Seattle Police Department Part I contact within the fifteen-month follow-up period, and 17 of those (22.1 percent) had a subsequent contact for burglary. Of the group who were referred to court, 66 (46.5 percent) had a subsequent Part I contact for murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny or auto theft within the fifteen-month follow-up period, and 39 (27.5 percent) had a subsequent contact for burglary. (It should be kept in mind that these data do not include offenses committed by youths after they turned 18, if they did so during the follow-up period. These figures, therefore, underestimate official recidivism.) Obviously, during this period of time, decisions to adjust cases on the police level were not consistent with the goal of reducing recidivism. It is also obvious that the juvenile court process was not successful in reducing the recidivism of those youths who were referred to juvenile court. Data for 1974 and 1975 indicate that the decision to adjust juvenile burglary cases is being made with less frequency by the police. Juvenile Division statistics indicate that only 6 percent of the active burglary cases were adjusted in 1974, with 61.4 percent being referred to court. (The remaining cases were exceptionally cleared, unfounded or inactive.) In 1975, 5.4 percent of the active burglary cases were adjusted and 65.6 percent referred to court. Because the problem of reducing juvenile burglars' recidivism seems to have been shifted almost entirely to the court, an attempt was made to determine the relationship between court disposition and subsequent recidivism. We had hoped to follow the 142 youths from the Cohort Study who were referred to court, to determine court disposition. We encountered a considerable time delay in obtaining court clearance to examine case records. Because of this difficulty, it was decided to reduce this part of the study to an analysis of a randomly selected 32 cases. Out of the 32 cases, it was possible to locate files and disposition information on only six cases. The remaining cases either had no file, the file had been destroyed or checked out, or it was missing. (In the case of files being checked out, there was insufficient time and research personnel to track down these files to obtain the relevant data.) There was no central source of data from which disposition information could be obtained. Six cases were considered too small a sample from which to make any assumptions about the relative effectiveness of different court dispositions on the reduction of recidivism. However, the little data and information which are available indicate that a substantial proportion of burglary cases are being adjusted at the Juvenile Court case-worker level.

While today it is fashionable to divert offenders to community-based programs, it is logical to expect the actions taken by the court to be consistent with public safety interests of Seattle citizens. Clearly, if the decision is made not to incarcerate a young offender, that decision should result from weighing concern for the offender against the offender's potential to repeat serious crime. The data analysis shows that juveniles referred to court for burglary have a high likelihood of committing additional serious crimes and of committing more burglaries. This should be taken into account when the decision of whether or not to incarcerate is made. If the decision of the court is to divert the juvenile burglar back to the community, the youth should

be diverted only to those community programs which have demonstrated, or are capable of demonstrating, effectiveness in reducing recidivism.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement C

Rejected Strategies

Pre-adjudicative Diversion to Social Services. With the assistance of LEAA, the Social Agency Referral Project, attached to the Juvenile Division of the Seattle Police Department, has tested a model of referring randomly selected first-time offenders to community social services in lieu of further juvenile justice system processing. This group was compared to a matched control group which was processed in the traditional way. The project was founded on the assumption that diversion of first offenders to social services is more effective in reducing recidivism than traditional legal, judicial system processing. At the end of the first year of operation, rates of recidivism for subjects in the control and experimental groups were compared. The results did not show a statistically significant difference between the two groups. Project evaluation suggested, however, that the randomly selected first-time offender group was not the population of youthful offenders with which the project could expect to realize optimum success, but rather that more effective client screening procedures should be utilized.

During the second year of the project's operation, improved screening and case selection procedures were instituted, relying primarily on the direct detective referral method. Direct detective referral provided a referral population composed of youths involved in serious delinquent activity and also exhibiting the following characteristics: (a) the existence of serious personal, family or environmental problems; (b) the likelihood of future and more serious delinquent activity if assistance in dealing with those problems was not provided; and (c) an indication of a willingness on the part of the youth and his or her family to participate in the Social Agency Referral Program and to receive some benefit from that participation.

During the third year of Social Agency Referral Program operation, the Social Agency Referral method was definitively evaluated through the use of experimental and control groups, with the direct detective referral population. To assess the impact of direct detective referral, three hypotheses were adopted and tested:

Hypothesis One: Significantly fewer of those youths involved in referral programs will also become involved in subsequent criminal contacts.

Hypothesis Two: The average number of contacts for youths involved in referral programs will be significantly lower.

Hypothesis Three: The average seriousness of contacts for youths involved in referral programs will be significantly lower.

Upon evaluation, it was found that in no instance was the performance of the referred group superior to the control group. (Social Agency Referral, Project Evaluation, Seattle Police Department, February 28, 1975). Based on these findings, the hypotheses regarding the effectiveness measures of the social work program were rejected, i.e., results of this research failed to show a significant decrease in recidivism for the diverted experimental group as compared with the nondiverted control group. Therefore, one must conclude that early diversion of identified offenders to social services is not effective in reducing recidivism and therefore is not an effective crime reduction strategy.

Social Casework. Social casework implies professional work with a youngster, including the delivery of needed services to youths and intervention to alleviate family and school problems. A recent literature review and evaluation of juvenile delinquency prevention programs published by the National Science Foundation (Dixon, Wright, "Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Programs, Report on the Findings of an Evaluation of the Literature," Nashville, Tennessee: Institute for Youth and Social Development, George Peabody College) discusses the failure, historically, of social casework as a means of reducing

delinquency. This book reviewed all of the juvenile justice literature from 1965 through early 1974 regarding programs to prevent or reduce juvenile delinquency. This review covered over 6,600 abstracts plus an additional 350 reports received from various governmental agencies. The researchers analyzed these reports and abstracts to determine which of these had sufficient internal validity, i.e., the conclusions were plausible given the design of the report, to make some statement regarding the efficiency of these programs in reducing or preventing delinquency. Based on this review, they identified 95 articles and reports that were sufficiently good in terms of internal validity within nine areas to draw conclusions. The nine identified areas were juvenile court programs, volunteer and indigenous non-professional programs, individual and group counseling programs, social casework programs, streetcorner workers, area project and youth service bureau programs, educational and vocational programs, community treatment programs, and a miscellaneous category.

Social casework was represented by six reports. The results of these evaluations indicate that the programs were not successful. The review cites as evidence the work of Craig and Furst (Craig and Furst, "What Happens After Treatment? A Study of Potentially Delinquent Boys," The Social Service Review, 1965, 39 (2), pp. 165-171) and Tait and Hodges (Tait and Hodges, "Follow-up Study of Predicted Delinquents," Crime and Delinquency, 1971, 17 (2), pp. 202-212) who reported ten years' follow-up of the subjects in two social work projects. In both studies, the experimental and control groups yielded the same number of delinquents during the follow-up interval. Neither study offered encouragement for child guidance therapy or social casework as a means of reducing serious delinquency.

The most extensive reports concerning social casework have come from the Seattle-Atlantic Street Center Delinquency Prevention Experiment (Berleman, Seaberg and Steinburn, "The Delinquency Prevention Experiment of the Seattle-Atlantic Street Center: A Final Evaluation," The Social Service Review, Chicago, 1972, 46 (3), pp. 323-346) and (Berleman, Steinburn, "The Execution and Evaluation of a Delinquency Prevention Program," Social Problems, 1967, 14 (4), pp. 413-423) and (Ikeda, Project Follow-up Summary: "Effectiveness of Social Work with Acting-Out Youth," Seattle-Atlantic Street Center, Seattle, Washington, 1969.). Intensive social services, lasting from one to two years, were given to experimental boys and their families. The evaluation used randomly assigned control groups of central city junior high school boys. After an eighteen-month follow-up, school discipline and police records showed that the experimental group performed worse, i.e., they were more delinquent than the untreated control group. As a form of labeling, social casework may have a negative effect on potential delinquents. At the very least, intercity youth "...are simply unaffected by social service if school-disciplinary and police measures are used to assess possible behavioral change." (Berleman, Seaberg and Steinburn, "The Delinquency Prevention Experiment of the Seattle-Atlantic Street Center: A Final Evaluation," The Social Service Review, Chicago, 1972, 46 (3), p. 343.).

Social casework may be beneficial when applied to youths who come into contact with the juvenile justice system at an early age, and it may be helpful for less serious problems such as those associated with school adjustment. But, in general, it has not proven effective; therefore, its use as a delinquency prevention or crime reduction strategy is not recommended.

Individual and Group Counseling. Individual and group counseling programs were represented by eight project evaluations and/or reports in the Dixon and Wright review, beginning with the Cambridge Summerville program which began in 1934 and other reports through 1974. The results of these evaluations are consistent in that they show that individual or group counseling has no significant effect upon juvenile delinquency in terms of either preventing it or reducing identified delinquents. Furthermore, some of the data indicate that counseling may actually increase delinquency.

In summary, the review stated that "individual and group counseling has not proven to be an effective treatment modality for the reduction of further delinquent behavior; therefore, these treatment approaches are not recommended unless accompanied by stringent evaluation designs." (Dixon and Wright, "Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Programs,

Report on the Findings of an Evaluation of the Literature," Nashville, Tennessee: Institute for Youth and Social Development, George Peabody College, p. 18.)

Locally, the City of Seattle is in the process of testing the effectiveness of counseling as a component of the Seattle Community Accountability Program (CAP). Preliminary evaluation of the counseling component does not indicate a positive relationship between counseling and reduction of recidivism. On the contrary, it appears that those youths who received CAP counseling services were actually more likely to commit subsequent offenses than would be predicted (Mathews and Geist, "Seattle Youth Service Bureau/Accountability System: Two-Year Evaluation and Crime Impact Analysis," Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, February, 1976 - Revision: April, 1976). However, the Community Accountability Program as a whole does have a positive impact on the reduction of recidivism. At this point, it is not clear whether counseling is a necessary ingredient to making the project work. This aspect will be further evaluated. If it is determined that the counseling component is not necessary and/or that it has an overall negative effect, then counseling in its present form will not be continued.

Streetcorner Workers. Dixon and Wright's review examines six evaluations of programs which used streetcorner workers. These programs involved gaining entry into youth gangs, achieving some sort of confidence with the youths and redirecting their activities into areas other than crime, usually in the area of recreation. This traditional approach, i.e., increasing cohesiveness of gang membership to redirect activities, has the unexpected effect of increasing crime. One attempt which was a non-traditional approach, i.e., to try to decrease cohesiveness or actually to disrupt the gang membership, had the positive effect of decreasing crime among the group members. Therefore, the traditional approach of streetcorner workers must be rejected as a strategy for the reduction of recidivism.

Subsidized Employment. With the assistance of LEAA, the Career Employment Research Project (CERP) administered by the Seattle School District, was implemented to test whether the provision of reasonable employment opportunities to delinquents would reduce their future criminal involvement.

The CERP Project was a carefully designed program which used randomly selected experimental and control groups of 16- and 17-year-old youths who met certain criteria. The juveniles in both the experimental and control groups were to have at least one prior Part I or Part II offense and were to be out of school seeking full-time employment. Youths meeting these criteria were randomly assigned to experimental and control groups. The youths in the experimental group were offered job placements with businesses which were subsidized to hire and train the youths on the job. The types of jobs were selected to maximize the career potential of the youth in that field. The youths in the control group were not provided any specialized services.

The results of this program indicate that the provision of subsidized employment in and of itself does not result in a statistically significant reduction in later police contacts for criminal behavior (Mathews, "Non-Coercive Employment and Delinquent Recidivism," City of Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office). During an approximately eight-month long follow-up period, 41.8 percent of the control youths committed an average of 2.58 offenses, while 36.4 percent of the experimental youths committed an average of 2.30 offenses each. The average severity of offenses (rated on a scale of from 1 to 7, with 7 being the most severe) for control was 4.19 compared to 3.78 for experimental group youths. Although these differences favor the experimental group, they are within the range of chance fluctuation and are not statistically significant.

In addition to a lack of statistically significant crime impact, the experience gained through the operation of the program raises some questions concerning the feasibility of this approach. First, it was anticipated that there were 1,000 youths in the City of Seattle potentially eligible for this program. However, despite intensive efforts by project personnel, only 208 youths entered the project. Second, the ability to place and keep youths on jobs was overestimated. Initially, the grant proposed to place 75 youths on jobs and subsidize their employers for 20 weeks. In fact, only 54 youths were placed for an average of ten and one-half weeks.

At this time, the strategy of providing full-time subsidized employment to delinquent youths (16 and 17 years old) does not appear to be a viable strategy to reduce crime when used in isolation.

Dixon and Wright found that job-finding and training had more positive effects; however, these tend to be selective, i.e., they are not beneficial for all delinquents but appear to be effective only with selected subgroups of delinquent populations. For example, one study of the Neighborhood Youth Corps conducted within four separate cities indicated they were effective in reducing recidivism for black females but ineffective for black males, white males and white females (Dixon and Wright, "Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Programs, Report on the Findings of an Evaluation of the Literature," Nashville, Tennessee: Institute for Youth and Social Development, George Peabody College, p. 29).

Preliminary analysis of the effects of the employment component of the Seattle Community Accountability Program indicates a positive relationship between employment used in conjunction with an accountability process and reduction in recidivism. Clients of that program who either were involved in the employment component or appeared before the accountability board or both were less likely to be contacted within six months for subsequent delinquent acts than what was predicted by actuarial data. Further evaluation and follow-up of the effects of employment in the Community Accountability Program is being undertaken.

Current Strategies

Community-Based Residential Treatment. Community treatment programs were represented by fifteen reports in the Dixon and Wright review. These were classified as alternatives to incarceration such as group homes, foster homes, residential youth centers, differential community parole and guided group interaction programs. They found that evaluation reports of the community treatment approach are not consistent nationally. However, community treatment can be supported on theoretical grounds. Institutions are much less likely to be in a position to deal with whatever environmental situations contribute to delinquent behavior. This is particularly true when youths are removed from a unique environment such as the Central Area of Seattle and placed in rural institutional settings. In addition, budgetary considerations alone make community projects worthy of further funding and evaluation research.

In 1971, the Law and Justice Task Force of the Seattle Model City Program identified a need and placed a high priority on the establishment of a Central Area Group Homes Program, which began in April of that year, funded by the Seattle Model City Program, the State Department of Social and Health Services, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. It has continued to date, having been totally revised and placed under new leadership in August, 1973.

Following an initial program operation that was beset by administrative, programmatic, staff and evaluation problems, the last two and one-half years have marked a time of great positive change at Central Area Group Homes. There have been large scale changes in funding, in staff and in program design. In November, 1973, a new treatment director and program director instituted a unique staged therapeutic community program stressing the use of a token economy behavior modification program. Strong emphasis was placed on consistency and careful limit setting for residents. Attempts were made to effect change in all aspects of the total life space of the residents with the use of a unique "seven fields" concept and record keeping system. Strong and active staff supervision and education programs were initiated. The staff was reorganized to give definite responsibilities for life space areas to specific staff. Careful record keeping was established.

A recent evaluation of police contacts for youths who have been or are presently in group home programs reveals a significant reduction in contacts and severity of felony offenses for Central Area Group Home residents.

Although the results are very encouraging, final evaluation of outcome is dependent not only on the ability of the program to control behavior, but the long-term benefits.

Different types of data analysis are planned of school attendance and performance data, behavior rating scales, job performance and others. Also, the project's offense data are being compared with actuarial tables developed by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office.

Evidence to date indicates great progress in the effectiveness of Central Area Group Homes. It appears that delinquent behavior of residents is being significantly reduced by the Group Home Program.

The City Law and Justice Planning Office will continue to assist in a more thorough external evaluation of the Group Homes' impact on juvenile crime during the coming year.

Funding. During the past two years, funding from LEAA for the Central Area Group Homes has been completely eliminated, while funding from the State Department of Social and Health Services, in the form child care payments, has increased. The project will receive \$40,000 in local Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds for the period of July, 1976, through June, 1977. This represents a \$10,000 decrease in CDBG funding from the previous year. Increased State funding for the next biennium is anticipated as a result of efforts being made by the State Legislature on behalf of community residential treatment programs.

At the present, the cost of institutionalizing a youth in one of the State juvenile correctional institutions ranges from \$11,000 to \$25,000 per year per child, with Echo Glen Children's Center costing \$25,500 per year per child. The cost of Central Area Group Home residency per year per child is \$8,000. Given the number of committable youths in the Central Area Group Home program, this represents a saving to the State of approximately \$927,500 over the past two years. Not only does support of the Group Homes represent a cost-effective strategy for the State, but the project also appears to be more effective in reducing recidivism than traditional State programs.

Supervision/Service Delivery Strategies (Juvenile Court Programs). A number of traditional programs such as probation and parole are currently operating in the Seattle area. However, they are not being evaluated in a way which allows us to determine whether they should be accepted or rejected as crime reduction strategies.

Juvenile court programs, which were defined primarily as probation programs which compared official or unofficial or special probation, were represented by seven evaluation reports in the Dixon and Wright review. The researchers concluded that because of selection problems, i.e., the individual receiving experimental treatment within these programs, the results may have been due to picking youths who had less risk to begin with of recidivism. They conclude that juvenile court programs have yet to be shown to be effective in terms of reducing recidivism (Dixon and Wright, "Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Programs, Report on the Findings of an Evaluation of the Literature," Nashville, Tennessee: Institute for Youth and Social Development, George Peabody College, p. 13).

Juvenile Court Prosecution Program. The Rapid Referral and Monitoring Project (RAM), described in the following problem statement, should contribute substantially to the reduction of recidivism through (1) an increase in referral of serious criminal offenders to juvenile court, (2) an increase in filing of petitions, (3) a decrease in informal adjustment of serious criminal cases, (4) an increase in prosecutions, (5) a decrease in the time lag between referral to court and action taken, and (6) an increased emphasis on protection of the community. All of these things should contribute to the development of a juvenile court system in which the offender is held accountable for criminal acts, and therefore decrease his/her propensity to reoffend.

Seattle Community Accountability Program (CAP). This program and its crime reduction impact are described in detail later in this section. CAP client recidivism rates are significantly lower than comparisons with actuarial recidivism. When clients are separated into accountability board appearance groups versus CAP service-only groups, the reduction is significant for only the accountability board youths. That is, the provision of services alone did not have a significant impact on the reduction of recidivism.

A review of the literature reveals that an extremely small percentage of delinquency reduction efforts are ever evaluated, even minimally. Furthermore, even when adequate evaluation is performed, few studies show significant results. Finally, information which policy makers are most interested in is virtually nonexistent.

Youth service bureau type community projects represent one of the newest and least evaluated areas of delinquency reduction. As one of the bright new stars on the horizon, such projects should be carefully evaluated in a manner appropriate to their goal of general reduction of juvenile delinquency rates. We are attempting to conduct such an evaluation of the Community Accountability Program in the City of Seattle. We will continue to look at the effects of different types of services provided by the CAP on subsequent delinquent behavior of those served, as well as the effect of the accountability concept on juvenile crime rates in the neighborhoods served.

The City is philosophically committed to the notion that what the present juvenile justice system lacks is immediate and direct offender accountability for crimes committed. Therefore, we are committing the major portion of resources available to us for reduction of juvenile crime to the continued test of a system which is designed to provide accountability.

If this project continues to be successful, it is hoped that its methodology will influence the way the entire system operates, as well as having a positive impact on other similar systems locally and nationally.


Proposed Strategies

Prevention (Target Hardening) Strategies. Those proposed strategies which are aimed at making the targets of burglary less accessible should impact juvenile recidivism by making it more difficult for the offender to commit another crime. These include home security inspections, property marking, citizen awareness, publicity of burglary prevention technology, the Community Crime Prevention Program, the Commercial Burglary Prevention Project and the Mobile Citizen Involvement Unit.

Continuation of the Juvenile Court Prosecution Program (RAM) and Implementation of Modification Hearing Procedures for Repeat Offenders. These strategies are described in the following problem statement. The combination of increased accountability, streamlined processing and increased availability of evaluative data represented by these strategies should contribute substantially to the development of a juvenile court system which will have a greater likelihood of impacting recidivism.

Redefinition of the Juvenile Justice System. A juvenile justice system which is defined and recognized as having crime reduction as its primary goal and which operates in a manner which reflects that goal should experience increased effectiveness in the reduction of recidivism.

Continuation and Expansion of the Seattle Community Accountability Program (CAP). It is our opinion that the accountability strategy represents an innovative and very promising approach to dealing with juvenile crime in local communities, and that the institutionalization of this strategy will benefit all segments of the juvenile justice system.



Laura Stokes

Problem Statement D: The time lag between referral to juvenile court and action taken by the court in response to the offense for which a youth was referred may have contributed to recidivism for serious crimes.

Discussion

Cases referred to juvenile court frequently used to take up to three months before they were heard by a judge. In the interim, the youth may have committed a new offense, or at least may have forgotten the significance of the original offense. A variety of methods are available to a youth to evade responsibility for a crime. The most frequent is to indicate present or intended participation in a "program." The program may be counseling, school, work or an alternative placement. Thus the focus of the youth's attention is directed toward getting a social service rather than toward accepting responsibility for a delinquent act. Repeatedly "getting out from under" the system in this way often results in a youth's losing respect for the law, for the rights of others and for the system in general. The present system may actually encourage continued delinquent activity when some youths begin to view playing this game as a challenge. Unfortunately, at age 18, they come under the jurisdiction of the adult judicial system; many youths have been committed to adult institutions for behavior which had come to be viewed by them (because of "game playing") as not particularly serious.

Data indicate that a considerable decline in the commission of crime occurs at about age 17. Many feel this is a result of youths being faced with the prospect of turning 18 and the threat of adult court. It has been suggested that, if a system could be devised to hold youths accountable at an earlier age, the crime decrease which occurs prior to adult court jurisdiction could be made to occur earlier, thus reducing juvenile crime significantly. It appears that many potential delinquents are weeded out prior to juvenile justice system intervention by being faced with the prospect of juvenile court. However, once youths are actually exposed to the system and find it does not really hold them accountable, it breaks down in its effectiveness and in its ability to reduce recidivism and is not taken seriously by juveniles involved in the commission of target crimes.

If the system is to be taken seriously and is to be perceived by youths as having crime reduction as a goal, it must act in as rapid and consistent a manner as possible to hold youths accountable for serious criminal offenses.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement D

Rejected Strategies

Strategies which emphasize speedy processing, for the purpose of crime control, to the exclusion of due process and rehabilitation. A recent issue of the Criminal Law Bulletin describes three hypothetical models of juvenile justice (Katkin, Kramer and Hyman, "Three Models of Juvenile Justice," Criminal Law Bulletin, Volume 12, Number 2, March/April, 1976, pp. 165-188). These are a "Crime Control Model," a "Rehabilitative Model" and a "Due Process Model."

The following excerpt from the Criminal Law Bulletin, which summarizes the crime control model, points up the problems which this type of strategy presents.

The model is concerned primarily with the repression of crime. Thus efficiency in detecting and processing delinquents is its highest priority. Youthful wrongdoers would be processed quickly and dealt with harshly in an attempt to discourage lawlessness. The operation of a crime control model has been well described by Herbert Packer (Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Stanford University Press, 1968, pp. 159-160).

"The model...must... (place) a premium on speed and finality... The process must not be cluttered up with ceremonious rituals that do not advance the progress of the case. Facts can be established more quickly through interrogation in a police station than through the formal process of examination and cross-examination in a court. It follows that extra-judicial processes should be preferred to judicial processes, informal operations to formal ones... (A) successful conclusion is one that throws off at an early

stage those cases in which it appears unlikely that the person apprehended is an offender and then secures, as expeditiously as possible, the conviction of the rest, with a minimum of occasions for challenge, let alone post-audit.

"By the application of administrative expertness, primarily that of the police and prosecutors, an early determination of probable innocence or guilt emerges. Those who are probably guilty are passed quickly through the remaining stages of the process. The key to the operation of the model regarding those who are not screened out is... a presumption of guilt."

The word "guilt" is hardly neutral in meaning. It is value-laden, charged with connotations of unacceptability and blameworthiness. Thus when we say that the crime control model presumes guilt, we mean not merely that it presumes that children brought into the system have actually committed delinquent acts, but also that such acts are evil, and that such children are bad.

Adjudication in a Crime Control Model: The hearing would be perceived as a relatively unimportant part of the entire process: "In this model...the center of gravity for the process lies in the early, administrative fact-finding stages. The complementary proposition is that the subsequent stages are relatively unimportant and should be truncated as much as possible. This too, produces tensions with presently dominant ideology. The pure Crime Control Model has very little use for many conspicuous features of the adjudicative process..." (Packer, p. 162).

The assumption that the police have done a fair and efficient job of identifying guilty youngsters would justify informality at the hearing stage. With managerial efficiency (that is, the speedy resolution of cases) as its primary goal, the crime control model would seek to minimize the sources of delay. Defense attorneys would probably be permitted to participate in the process, but their presence would not be encouraged; and legal technicalities would not be of great interest to the court. Virtually all evidence would be admissible without concern for the manner in which it had been collected. Thus while police might still be discouraged from performing illegal searches, illegally obtained evidence would be admissible in court.

Although the strategy which the hypothesized crime control model represents would cut down the time lag in offender processing, it sacrifices too much in the area of due process.

Strategies which emphasize speedy processing, for the purpose of rehabilitation, to the exclusion of due process and crime control concerns. The following excerpts from the Criminal Law Bulletin article describing the hypothetical rehabilitative model point up the problems which that strategy represents.

The notion of guilt never enters into the rehabilitative model. Children may commit anti-social, even violent acts, but they can never be "guilty" because guilt presumes maturity and responsibility. (For an excellent discussion of the relationship between guilt and responsibility, see Stapleton and Teitelbaum, In Defense of Youth 9-23, Russell Sage Foundation, 1972.)

A juvenile justice system based exclusively on the rehabilitation model seeks to provide psychosocial aid and support to children whose development is perceived to be in difficulty or danger. The delinquency of children is seen primarily as evidence of their need for care and regenerative treatment. The "saving" of children is justified, not primarily as a way to make the streets safe for today, but as a way to assure the future well being of those children and the society in which they will eventually be adults. Thus the primary objective of a juvenile justice system based on a rehabilitation model is to make it the duty of the State, "instead of asking merely whether a boy or a girl has committed a specific offense, to find out what he is, physically, mentally, morally, and then if it learns that he is treading the path that leads to criminality, to take him in charge, not so much to punish as to reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen." (Mack, "The Juvenile Court," 23 Harvard Law Review, 104, 110, 1909).

In many respects, the operation of the rehabilitative model would be similar to the operation of the crime control model. In both models, it is important to identify delinquents and probable delinquents efficiently, and to process them speedily. It is primarily in intent that the models differ.

The Law in a Rehabilitative Model: As in the crime control model, the legal definitions of delinquency would be expansive. Crimes with victims, victimless crimes and status offenses would all be maintained on the law books. The law's concern would be not only with children whose behavior was harmful, but also with children whose behavior indicated problems of psychosocial adjustment which might result in future delinquency or criminality. Thus the processing of children who ran away from home or were truant, or who drank alcohol, or whose moral development was endangered by bad companionship would be permitted. Unlike the crime control model, the purpose of intervention in the rehabilitative model is not to punish, intimidate or control; it is to help, uplift and cure--to create mature, responsible adult citizens.

The basic goal of this model is to provide supportive and regenerative services to children in trouble. The well being of each child is seen as paramount even to the well being of the community. The best interests of society, it is believed, will eventually be realized by protecting the best interests of its children. At intake, adjudication and disposition, procedures will emphasize informality. The rehabilitative model will "emphasize investigation of the juvenile's background in deciding dispositions, (it will) rely heavily on the social sciences for both diagnosis and treatment, and...(will be) committed to rehabilitation of the juvenile as the predominant goal of the entire system." (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

In a pure rehabilitative model, there would be great confidence in the capacity and effectiveness of the educators, social workers, and juvenile specialists who would provide intake services. At subsequent stages in this model, it would be assumed that there was a high probability that children brought into the system were actually in need of services. Accurate determination of innocence or guilt would not be considered overwhelmingly important, since the worst that could possibly happen would be that a child who had not committed a delinquent act would be provided with treatment and services that could only prove beneficial. While the crime control model operates on a presumption of guilt, the rehabilitative model operates on a presumption of neediness.

Although the strategy which the hypothesized rehabilitative model represents would cut down the time lag in offender processing, it sacrifices far too much in terms of due process and crime control objectives to be a desirable strategy. Accountability for criminal behavior is almost totally lacking in such a model.

As mentioned earlier, the two models described above are hypothetical extremes. In the real world of juvenile justice, emphasis seems to shift from crime control to rehabilitation to due process, with the system reflecting some mix of the three types at any given time. What is needed is a well thought out system which provides a proper balance of the three concerns and which does not sacrifice important elements in the effort to provide others.

Current Strategy

King County Juvenile Court Prosecution Program (Rapid Referral and Monitoring--RAM). The RAM Project was created and implemented in 1975 in an effort to increase prosecutorial review of serious criminal cases and to decrease the time lag between court referral, petition filing and case disposition. The following description of the project is taken directly from the King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office proposal which requests continuation funding from LEAA.

Problem to be Addressed by the RAM Project: The juvenile justice system has undergone enormous change in recent years, primarily as a result of a series of Supreme Court decisions, starting with the 1967 Gault decision which rejected the old "parens patriae" role of the juvenile court and substituted the due process model. This change resulted

in the system becoming more adversarial in nature. As these changes occurred, the role of lawyers in juvenile court changed, with prosecutors and defense attorneys becoming an integral part of the proceedings.

On the defense side, representation of juveniles in King County has shifted from a few lawyers in private practice serving on a pro bono basis, after a request of the judge in individual cases, to a full-time Public Defender office, with eight attorneys, one intern and three corrections counselors. On the prosecution side, in 1974 the Juvenile Section of the King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office expanded to four deputies who attempted to provide the same level of representation as is provided in adult criminal prosecutions.

Participation by a professional prosecutor in the preparation and presentation of juvenile court cases and the resultant balancing of the adversary system in juvenile court is favored by the judiciary. A national study conducted by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U. S. Department of Justice, established that a majority of judges favored the use of attorney-prosecutors in all juvenile cases (Prosecution in Juvenile Courts, Guidelines for the Future, page xi, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U. S. Department of Justice, December, 1973). In King County, the judiciary has requested the services of the King County Prosecutor's Office to represent the State in juvenile court matters and proceedings (letter of April 27, 1971, to Mr. Christopher T. Bayley, King County Prosecutor, from George Revelle, Chairman of Board of Managers and Juvenile Court Committee).

Juveniles are responsible for a large proportion of the national crime problem (Prosecution in Juvenile Courts, Guidelines for the Future, p. 1). The Seattle-King County area is no exception to the national juvenile crime problem (Criminal Justice Plan for 1975, Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, pp. 116 and 117; and Criminal Justice Plan for 1975, King County Law and Justice Planning Office).

In the past, many police referrals of juveniles for conduct which would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult simply disappeared after being referred to juvenile court. Unfortunately, some cases of robbery, burglary, assault, etc., were "adjusted" by caseworkers and, as a result, the case was not presented to a judge for disposition. In 1971, of 4,111 cases referred to juvenile court, only 1,215 were filed (Annual Report of the Prosecuting Attorney for King County, Washington, for the year ending December 31, 1971, pp. 35 and 36). This practice became so prevalent that it was a major cause of a deep-seated and pervasive feeling by law enforcement agencies throughout King County that referral of a case to juvenile court was a useless proceeding.

Because there was no established procedure for handling delinquency referrals prior to the implementation of the RAM system, many cases which were presented to the Prosecuting Attorney's office for presentation to the court were presented weeks and even months after the underlying incident occurred. Thus the result of these practices was that many serious cases were being informally adjusted without being presented to a judge, and other cases were being rejected on evidence sufficiency grounds because a referral to the prosecutor came too late to allow the police agency to conduct the necessary follow-up work.

...On September 16, 1974, local King County Juvenile Court rules came into effect. These court procedural rules make it mandatory for a juvenile to be brought to trial within 60 days and to disposition within 30 days after the finding that the juvenile has committed the offense alleged in the petition. In a further attempt to resolve cases without a formal court hearing, the rules provide that the prosecutor and the defense attorney must engage in a mandatory conference prior to the child's appearance at a hearing where he/she must either admit or deny the allegations in the petition. The new rules also establish two new in-court hearings on the petitions: (1) an answer hearing, at which time the juvenile either admits or denies the petition's allegations, and (2) an omnibus hearing, at which time both parties are required to appear and clarify both the legal and the factual issues which will be presented at the trial on the petition. These requirements for a conference and two new in-court appearances place further demands on the prosecutor.

The juvenile adjudication process does not end with the determination that a juvenile is a delinquent because he or she has committed certain criminal acts. The next, and perhaps the most important, step in the process is the disposition hearing. Until recently, this stage was primarily the province of the social worker. That is no longer true. Public defenders and their correction counselors consider the disposition the most important stage of the case and invariably appear on behalf of their client with a detailed proposal, which they believe is in the best interests of the client. In an adversary system of justice, this is a very healthy development and a juvenile has a right to be fully represented by an advocate at every step of the proceedings so his position may be forcefully presented to the judge. But, for the adversary system to work properly by providing the judge with full information, the State should also be represented by a professional prosecutor. The merits of having a professional prosecutor appear at the disposition hearings were recently endorsed by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in Prosecution in the Juvenile Court, Guidelines for the Future (p. xviii).

Project RAM

Description of Project: Project RAM has existed for felonies since October, 1973. The other aspects of the project were begun in 1975. Project RAM was developed by the Office of the King County Prosecutor in conjunction with the judges and juvenile court administration to deal with the problem of the lack of accountability within the juvenile justice system, and to guarantee that serious delinquency cases were presented to the court.

Under Project RAM, every delinquency referral based on conduct which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult is referred to and evaluated by a deputy prosecuting attorney within 48 hours of the time the case reaches juvenile court (excluding weekends and holidays). This guarantees that time is not wasted on cases that are legally insufficient, and that those cases which need further investigation receive it immediately while the case is still fresh. If the deputy prosecuting attorney determines that the case is legally sufficient for presentation to the court, the case is returned to the caseworker involved who then has 20 workdays in the normal situation, or five business days if the juvenile is on probation, to investigate the case and make a determination as to how best to handle the case. If the caseworker determines that a petition alleging a delinquency should be filed, that is done immediately. If the caseworker determines that an informal "adjustment" is indicated by all the facts, that decision is communicated to the deputy prosecuting attorney; if he or she agrees, that course of action is immediately followed. If a disagreement arises, the case is immediately brought before a judge for determination as to whether or not an informal adjustment is adequate under the particular circumstances. This process guarantees that no cases are lost within the system and insures that no decision can be made by an inaction.

In summary, the RAM system has these dramatic effects on the juvenile justice system:

1. Accelerates the processing of juvenile delinquency cases in the pre-filing stages by establishing a firm deadline for all pre-filing decisions.
2. Diverts from the juvenile justice system at the earliest possible point referrals which were legally insufficient to justify the filing of a petition.
3. Guarantees that requests directed to police agencies for additional investigation or information are made as early as possible after the case has been received by juvenile court.
4. Establishes a system of accountability for referrals entering the juvenile justice system.
5. Insures that the prosecutor will be involved in every felony and serious misdemeanor type delinquency referral during the pre-filing stage.

In further attempt to have an immediate impact upon recidivists, the RAM time limit of 20 days (during which the social worker makes a social investigation and decides whether to request a petition or informal adjustment) was reduced to five business days for

juveniles on probation. This reduction in time was made at the recommendation of the prosecutor's office and in cooperation with the juvenile court administration.

During 1975 (the first project year), 4,922 RAM referrals were screened and 2,502 delinquency petitions were filed.

Purpose of Project

Target Crimes: The project will provide the resources to enable the King County prosecuting attorney to review, selectively prosecute and influence dispositions of an increasing number of alleged delinquency referrals to juvenile court, many of which could directly result from the implementation of target crime reduction strategies in Seattle, various suburban cities and unincorporated King County. Furthermore, the project will directly, though perhaps not measurably, impact target crimes by increasing the chances of successful prosecution of the more serious target crime offenders. (Seattle target crimes are burglary, robbery and rape; King County target crimes are burglary and robbery.)

Objectives: Following are the project objectives.

1. Maintain the RAM system for felony cases and serious misdemeanors.
2. Eliminate inappropriate informal adjustments and dispositions.
3. Renew law enforcement confidence in the juvenile court system and thus increase the number of referrals to the juvenile court.
4. Increase prosecution of serious misdemeanor offenses.
5. Provide for the attendance of the prosecutor at pre-trial hearings and trials and for the prosecutor's participation in pre-trial attorney conferences.
6. Provide for the attendance of the prosecutor at disposition hearings where there is a strong community interest.
7. Prosecute delinquency cases within the 60-day speedy trial time frame.
8. Obtain disposition orders which provide for the rehabilitation of juveniles and the protection of society and, where appropriate, restitution for the victim or victims of the crime.

A final report prepared by the project director will be submitted at the end of the project period. The report will focus on the following objectives:

1. Project RAM: (a) Assuming an increased caseload, maintain the time between the initial referral date and the filing or adjusting date for all RAM referrals to 20 and five workdays; (b) reduce informal adjustments and dispositions; (c) increase the number of referrals to juvenile court; and (d) increase prosecution of serious misdemeanors.
2. Proposed New Juvenile Court Procedures: The King County Court Judge's Committee has adopted two sets of "Court Procedures" relating to the handling of delinquency referrals concerning (a) juveniles subject to established court jurisdiction (modification or order procedures), adopted December 22, 1975, and effective February 1, 1976; and (b) juveniles not subject to court jurisdiction, adopted February 4, 1976, with an effective date of April 5, 1976.

It is difficult to anticipate the exact impact of these procedures, for they are in the process of being implemented and are subject to change. They do not become official court rules until adopted by the entire Superior Court Judge's panel, of which the Juvenile Court Judge's Committee is a subcommittee. It appears that the prosecutor will be asked to screen all delinquency referrals to the court for legal sufficiency which would

be a substantial additional burden. Other changes may include: an elimination of most pretrial hearings; a reduction in the pre-filing-preadjustment time period for case-workers from 18 to 10 days; a reduction in the classification of offenses where the prosecutor will review adjustment proposals (but perhaps an increase in the number of proposals reviewed, since law enforcement agencies may be encouraged by the procedures to refer more complaints). It appears that the probation staff will be encouraged by the new procedures to develop a referral monitoring system which perhaps would insure greater accountability. Furthermore, the procedures are intended to result in speedier filing and trial and disposition of criminal complaints.

Proposed Strategies

Continuation of the Rapid Referral and Monitoring Project (RAM): Continuation funding for this project is being requested by King County in the 1977 King County Law and Justice Plan (King County Law and Justice Plan, King County Department of Budget and Program Planning, Law and Justice Planning Office, April, 1976). The City of Seattle supports the continuation of the RAM project as a strategy to reduce the time lag in processing of juvenile offenders and, secondarily, as a recidivism reduction strategy.

Implementation of New Court Procedures Aimed at Speedier Processing of Repeat Offenders. The Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office and other City agencies are in the process of reviewing the proposed new King County Juvenile Court Procedures. It is possible that Seattle may officially disagree with some of the proposed changes. However, we recommend support of the proposed "modification hearing" procedures for repeat offenders.

The rationale for this support was very well stated by King County Prosecutor Christopher T. Bayley in a recent article in the Seattle Police Department Journal (Christopher T. Bayley, "Juvenile Court Changes Worthwhile," Seattle Police Department Journal, Volume 3, Number 11, Seattle, Washington, March/April, 1976, p. 8). His comments were as follows:

Until recently, the King County Juvenile Court utilized the same legal proceedings for repeat criminal offenders as are used for juveniles who come before the court for the first time. This meant that a juvenile over whom the court already had jurisdiction would be entitled to a full trial of all issues, suppression of evidence found inadmissible at trial, and full social investigation. This process lent itself to long delays from the time of arrest to the time of disposition and the only result was a finding of jurisdiction that allowed the court to do the very same thing it already had jurisdiction to do.

Another problem was that a caseworker had the same authority to informally dispose of a probationer's case as he or she has on a child referred for the first time. This meant that many times judges were not aware of criminal acts committed by juveniles they had previously placed on probation.

During 1975, the prosecutor's office advocated a change to the adult probation revocation model. On February 1, 1976, new juvenile court procedures adopted by the Judges' Juvenile Court Committee became effective, which provide that Juvenile Court proceedings for these alleged repeat offenders will resemble the adult probation revocation model. This transition to the adult model and the other provisions in the new procedures should have several benefits for the people of King County and law enforcement agencies.

As police officers are aware, a small segment of the juvenile population is responsible for a disproportionately high percent of the crimes committed by juveniles. A respected research project conducted by Marvin Wolfgang on 10,000 Philadelphia youths under the age of 18 disclosed that six percent of the individuals studied were each responsible for five or more offenses before becoming adults, and that this small group was responsible for more than one-half of all the recorded crimes and about two-thirds of all the violent crimes committed by juveniles. The research also established that a juvenile who had been arrested three times had over a seventy percent chance of being arrested a fourth time. In December, 1974, the

Seattle Police Department Journal discussed similar conclusions reached through research done by the Juvenile Division of the Seattle Police Department. According to that article, approximately 35 percent of all multiple offenses were committed by a small number of delinquent youths who had committed 10 or more offenses. There was a 55 percent probability that a juvenile who had been arrested twice would be arrested a third time. Therefore, given the high risk to the community, it is logical to conclude that the juvenile justice system should give top priority to holding repeat offenders accountable as quickly as possible and in an effective manner.

Under the new juvenile court procedures, when a juvenile repeat offender (a probationer who commits another crime) is brought before the court on a new referral, he will be identified as a repeat offender and treated as one. Since the state has previously been required to run the gauntlet of a full-blown adversary proceeding and required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it will not be required to do so again. A motion for a "modification hearing" will be filed within three days of the receipt of a referral. At such a hearing, hearsay evidence may be received by the court and the burden of proof on the new crime is a preponderance of evidence. Only if the juvenile raises a material question concerning the evidence will he be entitled to confront witnesses against him. These principles have long been recognized and used in adult probation revocation hearings.

In the past, the King County Juvenile Court has often been criticized for taking an unreasonable period of time to hear and dispose of criminal complaints. Under the new procedures, referrals from police departments involving juveniles who are already subject to juvenile court jurisdiction will have a hearing set and heard within ten days of the date that the referral is received by the Juvenile Court. Only if there is a specific reason for doing so, will the hearing be set over for further evidence or more information on the sentencing question. This rapid processing of cases involving repeat offenders should result in juveniles being held accountable at the time when they can relate the consequence for their criminal conduct to the conduct itself. Furthermore, cases will be brought to court when the facts of the crime are still fresh in the minds of the witnesses.

As indicated, the new procedures require that criminal complaints on repeat offenders be processed very quickly. Although this new requirement places time pressures on the prosecutor's office, we feel that it is well worth it. Law enforcement agencies in King County are also required by the new procedures to prepare and transmit police reports to the juvenile court without an unreasonable delay. The prosecutor's office intends to develop means to communicate to the police exactly what kind of information is necessary in each case, to avoid unnecessary case preparation. It is hoped that resulting time savings will permit quicker referrals. Of course, while the speedy handling of referrals involving repeat offenders and the application of the adult probation revocation standards are a substantial improvement in the juvenile justice system in King County, the most important question is what the juvenile justice system will do with juvenile repeat offenders. The prosecutor's office has implemented a program of providing the court with a report which details the juvenile's prior police contacts (including those where the police department has adjusted the case and referred to parental authority or other outside agencies), referrals to the juvenile court (including those which were informally adjusted and never brought to a judge's attention), and referrals which were filed in a petition.

Research conducted on those juveniles who have appeared before the court on the "modification" calendar indicates that the average number of prior arrests for these juveniles is approximately five. It is our hope that the juvenile justice system will recognize that these juveniles are extremely high risks to the community and that the probability that these juveniles will commit a new crime, if not deterred, is likewise very high. If the juvenile justice system responds with a meaningful consequence for these offenders, then perhaps further recidivism can be prevented. In cases where the demonstrated risk to the community is too great, the juvenile should be removed from it.

Problem Statement E: It is difficult to determine the relative effectiveness of different juvenile court dispositions in reducing the recidivism of juvenile offenders.

Discussion

The juvenile court has not traditionally evaluated its effectiveness in reducing juvenile crime in general, much less the impact of its actions on specific crimes such as burglary. One can make the assumption that, since so many youths who are referred to court for burglary continue to commit offenses, the juvenile court process is not particularly effective in reducing recidivism of burglary offenders. However, this likely is an oversimplification of the problem. A proportion of the burglary offenders referred to court do not reoffend. It seems important to know what the relationship is, if any, between different types of action at the juvenile court level and the offender's propensity to reoffend. This could be done if court case disposition information was available in a consistent manner. The problems involved in obtaining this information were described earlier. The King County Law and Justice Planning Office is also attempting to obtain this information, as part of an effort to evaluate the prosecutorial review system (RAM) at the court. Their staff is encountering similar problems. Juvenile court administration is aware of the data availability problems and is concerned that a solution be found. They are currently working on the development of a computerized data collection system.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement E

Rejected Strategy: Evaluation of juvenile court effectiveness solely on the basis of operational objectives, rather than on crime reduction objectives, is unacceptable. It seems reasonable to expect that, since the juvenile court is responsible for handling the majority of seriously delinquent youths in King County, the court system should provide some analysis of the extent to which it is impacting the continued criminal behavior of youths it serves.

Current Strategy: The Rapid Referral and Monitoring (RAM) Project described in the preceding problem statement has been keeping case records, including juvenile court disposition information. This information should contribute substantially to the evaluation of the relative effectiveness of different dispositions on the reduction of recidivism.

Under the 1975 project, which permits the prosecutor's office to be involved in all post-petition filing stages of the juvenile court proceedings, a case and calendar coordinating system was implemented and maintained. The system monitors petitions from filing through disposition. A case and calendar coordinator maintains a tickler card file which is used to insure that cases are brought to hearing and that the speedy trial rule is not violated.

Currently, a RAM log is used to keep track of the action that is taken on each and every felony and serious misdemeanor case prior to filing, as well as post-filing; i.e., there is now a record on every juvenile court case, whether the case is adjusted or a petition is filed. If a petition is filed, the subsequent disposition of the case is recorded.

A review of the disposition orders in delinquency cases for the month of May, 1974, indicated that there were 99 disposition orders entered in delinquency cases during that month. Of these 99 disposition orders, in only 32 cases were written conditions of probation specified in the order. In May, 1975, there were 110 disposition orders entered in delinquency cases during the month. With increased deputy prosecutor participation at the disposition hearing, 85 of the 110 disposition orders contained written conditions of probation. It is expected that the number of disposition orders with written conditions of probation will continue to increase in 1977 with increasing prosecutor involvement.

The King County Law and Justice Planning Office is conducting a follow-up evaluation of the RAM project. As part of this evaluation, a comparison is being made of recidivism rates for a sample of cases referred to juvenile court by the Seattle Police Department. The analysis will compare subsequent recidivism rates of juveniles whose cases were

informally adjusted at juvenile court with recidivism rates for juveniles whose cases were prosecuted.

Proposed Strategy: The juvenile court is working on the development of a computerized record-keeping system. Case record information would be kept by law enforcement jurisdiction and would include, at the minimum, youths' police referral number, juvenile court number, referring offense and juvenile court disposition. Such a system is badly needed, and its existence should contribute to the development of an adequate evaluation of the relative crime reduction effectiveness of different juvenile court actions.

Problem Statement F: State institutional and parole programs for juvenile offenders are not evaluated on the basis of specific crime reduction objectives; therefore, it is not possible to determine the relative effectiveness of different programs on the reduction of specific crimes.

Discussion

Evaluating program effectiveness on the basis of recommitment or parole revocation does not give an accurate picture of a program's specific crime reduction impact. Instead, program effectiveness should be determined by client involvement in subsequent law violations as reported by law enforcement agencies. This determination should include adult, as well as juvenile, police contacts for those youths who are over 18 at the time the evaluation takes place. Reinstitutionalization, which may or may not occur as a result of new law violations, is not an adequate measure of recidivism.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement F

Rejected Strategies: Program evaluation based on operational objectives should be rejected. Traditional programs which have operated as parts of the juvenile justice system are often accepted at their face value and are often not directly accountable for their crime reduction effectiveness. While new programs are expected to produce data that show their merits as crime reduction programs as a funding contingency, many traditional programs enjoy virtual autonomy from specific crime reduction evaluation. Apparently, when demonstrated crime reduction is not a funding contingency, either data are not collected or "success" is arbitrarily defined.

In place of evaluations on the degree to which crime is reduced, a number of programs are evaluated on the degree to which they meet operational service delivery objectives. Questions frequently asked in these evaluations include: How many clients are served? How are clients processed? Which services were provided? What is the current caseload size, etc. As juvenile crime in the city continues to be a problem, and as the impact of juvenile crime gains more national priority, more programs need to develop accountability to the public for their crime reduction effectiveness. Therefore, the strategy of evaluating programs solely on the basis of the degree to which operational objectives have been met should be rejected.

Current Strategies: Efforts currently aimed at measuring the crime reduction effectiveness of traditional programs suffer from different definitions of success and inconsistent measures of recidivism. The success of probation services is measured on the basis of rereferrals to court; the success of probation subsidy is determined by the reduction of commitments to State correctional institutions. Statewide, Juvenile Parole Services has traditionally kept their success-failure information in terms of recommitment to State institutions or parole violations as a measure of recidivism, rather than using rearrest data.

Because of these differences, there is a real need (1) to document the different measures of recidivism currently in use, and (2) to develop a working definition of recidivism which can be used across programs to measure crime reduction effectiveness. Rearrest likely will emerge as the most useful measure of crime reduction across all program categories.

Proposed Strategies: This is a State problem, and any strategies to deal with it would need to be developed by the State Department of Social and Health Services or the State Law and Justice Planning Office. However, if a strategy is developed which requires police contact data from Seattle, the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office will assist in the provision of that information.

Problem Statement G: The Seattle Community Accountability Program (CAP)--formerly the Seattle Youth Service Bureau/Accountability Board System--which has demonstrated success in reducing residential burglary and juvenile recidivism, needs to be institutionalized as an ongoing strategy.

Discussion

A two-year evaluation of the Community Accountability Program was completed in 1976 (Kenneth E. Mathews, Jr., Ph.D., and Ariene M. Geist, Seattle Youth Service Bureau--Accountability System: Two-year Evaluation and Crime Impact Analysis, Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, February, 1976). The project continues to demonstrate a positive effect on the reduction of burglary for the neighborhoods served and on the reduction of recidivism for the clients served.

Historically, the Community Accountability Program was developed by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office in response to the rising rate of juvenile crime. Data indicated that a large proportion of that crime was being committed by repeat offenders who were not being deterred from continued criminal activity by their interaction with the juvenile justice system. The rationale for the development of the community-based accountability system was founded on the assumption that a high percentage of juvenile crime was attributable to the failure of the existing system to hold youths accountable for their offenses through the prompt and appropriate application of social sanctions on the local level. It was further assumed that uniformly requiring a community obligation for youths who have committed offenses would reduce the likelihood of subsequent criminal behavior for those youths, as well as providing a deterrent to other youths in the area. These assumptions led to the following specific hypothesis, upon which the Community Accountability Program is based.

Hypothesis: That by holding juveniles residing within a given community accountable for their criminal activities, there would be a statistically significant decrease in Part I and Part II juvenile contacts: (a) within the community, and (b) for individuals appearing before an accountability board.

The first of the three branches of the Community Accountability Program currently operating was in the Mt. Baker community, which was suffering from a substantial juvenile crime problem in September, 1973. Mt. Baker thus became the initial test for a concept which has had far reaching implications for changing the way the juvenile justice system (police, courts and institutions) traditionally operated. Working together, community residents and City staff determined that an accountability board could not operate in a vacuum. It not only required full cooperation of local citizens, the police and the court, but services were needed to support the accountability board concept. Youths could not reasonably be expected to make restitution for their offenses if opportunities for employment were not available to them, or if their family or school situations were totally disabling. Therefore, a service delivery system was established in Mt. Baker which included a restitution/employment component, an alternative school and individual and family counseling. It should be noted, however, that the program was designed in such a way that there would be a complete separation between the accountability process and the delivery of services.

Through the accountability process, a youthful offender comes before the accountability board composed of residents of the youth's community and is assigned restitution in the form of monetary payment or service directly back to the victim of the offense, or community work such as clean-up activities. The accountability board does not become involved in directing youths or families to participate in services. They are only involved in holding a youth accountable for his/her offense.

Once having agreed to fulfill a restitution assignment, the youth is offered various services at the CAP center. An offender has the choice of whether or not to participate in services. Some youths simply fulfill the restitution assignment and choose not to become involved in the services program. The Community Accountability Program is unique in that it never recommends services to compensate for an offense.

It took approximately five months to hire staff and operationalize the service delivery system in Mt. Baker. Once this was accomplished, the Mt. Baker accountability board became operational in February, 1974. The Community Accountability Program was expanded to two additional neighborhoods in September, 1974: Ballard-Fremont and Southeast Seattle. The two new projects benefited substantially from the Mt. Baker trial experience and were able to implement their service delivery systems and operationalize their accountability boards within a short period after start-up. The Ballard-Fremont Accountability Board began hearing cases in October, 1974; the Southeast Board began in November, 1974.

The CAP system is now composed of four elements: three neighborhood accountability board projects and a Central Administration, located within the Seattle Department of Human Resources. In addition to these components, there is a full-time research/evaluation position located in the Law and Justice Planning Office.

The Central Administration element consists of the following: a project manager, an accountability coordinator and a social service coordinator. The accountability coordinator, who is located at the juvenile court, tracks cases from police to court, coordinates materials to the CAP clients. The social service coordinator develops and coordinates employment, vocational training and volunteer services.

Each neighborhood project has a director, a restitution/outreach worker and social service staff. In addition, each project has approximately 20 community residents who serve on a policy board and an additional 20 people who serve on an accountability board.

A two-year evaluation of the CAP was done to determine the degree to which the project has been implemented and has achieved its crime reduction goals.


During the initial operation of the Mt. Baker Accountability Board (late 1973 and early 1974), referrals of youths from police and court for the recent commission of offenses were minimal. (During the first eight months of operation, the Mt. Baker board received only 15 referrals.) Attempts to implement the community accountability system revealed a certain degree of resistance on the part of traditional justice system agencies to allow communities to assume increased responsibility for their juvenile crime problems. During the second year start-up period for the two new projects in September and October, 1974, an additional 23 referrals were made to the three accountability boards.


In the first five months of joint operation of all three accountability boards (November, 1974, through March, 1975), they received 206 referrals. (See Figure 4B-1 for start-up dates and cases referred.) This represents a total of 244 referrals, with a rapidly accelerating referral rate during the second year of project operation. Referrals to the accountability boards continue to be substantial to date. An additional 255 cases were received during 1976, and it is anticipated that 1977 referrals will total approximately 400.

From September, 1974, through March, 1975, within the CAP census tracts there were 525 Seattle Police Department juvenile contacts. Of those 525 juvenile contacts, 328 youths were referred to juvenile court, and 211 of the 328 court referrals were referred by the court to CAP (40 percent of the total police contacts; 64 percent of the referrals to court). These data indicate that a substantial number of offenders were being referred to the accountability boards, and that a test of hypothesized effects is appropriate.

The goal of the Seattle Community Accountability Program is to reduce juvenile crime in selected target areas of Seattle. The implementation of CAP, through the operation of Community Accountability Boards (CAB's) was designed to achieve this goal through both direct and indirect effects upon juvenile offenders. The direct, or primary, effect of preventing an offender from committing additional crimes was hypothesized to occur when individual youths were obligated to perform either monetary or community service restitution for their offenses. The indirect, or secondary, effect of preventing others from committing crimes was hypothesized to occur by locating accountability boards within CAP census tract areas; the accountability boards would deal with all (or as many as

Figure 4B-1--Time Line between September 1, 1973, and March 31, 1975, Showing Program Beginning Dates and Number of Cases Referred to Accountability Boards





possible) of the juvenile offenders residing within those areas, regardless of where the actual offenses may have occurred. It was assumed that the knowledge of such a program would become known to the youths in the CAP area, and that the expectation of accountability would serve as a deterrent.

To measure crime impact, three measures were chosen: individual youths' Seattle Police Department contact histories (a contact being equivalent to an adult primary, or major, charge); total number of juvenile contacts, by census tract of offenders' residence; and the reporting occurrence of residential burglary, larceny and auto theft, by census tract, regardless of whether suspects may have been identified or arrested. The reason for the latter measure is that data indicate that juveniles have a high degree of involvement in those offenses. The results of the analysis of Seattle Police Department juvenile contacts in the target area are presented in Table 4B-6.

Table 4B-6--Number of Part I Juvenile Contacts Occurring in CAP Target Areas versus S- (Seattle minus CAP Target Areas)

	Number of Contacts Jan-Aug, 1973	Number of Contacts Jan-Aug, 1975	Percent Change	Paired t-test Probability (One-tailed)
Mt. Baker	223	159	-29	p < .005
Ballard- Fremont	138	132	- 4	n.s. (p = .25)
Southeast	154	154	0	n.s. (p = .46)
S-	2,065	2,246	+ 9	-----


The total number of juveniles contacted for crime within the CAP census tracts is down significantly within the Mt. Baker area. In the Ballard-Fremont and Southeast CAP areas, juvenile contacts have shown a promising (although not statistically significant) reduction, as compared to the rest of the city. The reduction in police contacts appears to be directly related to the length of time the individual project has been in operation.

Recidivism rates for CAP clients are significantly lower than comparisons with actuarial recidivism (see Table 4B-7). When clients are separated into accountability board appearance groups versus CAP service-only groups, the reduction is significant for only the accountability board youths. That is, the provision of services alone did not have a significant impact on the reduction of recidivism.

Reported crime with a high juvenile involvement is down significantly in Mt. Baker (relative to the rest of the city) in two of the three crime indices (burglary and larceny). In Ballard-Fremont, crime is down significantly in one of the three indices (larceny). In Southeast, no statistically significant trends have been established as yet (see Table 4B-8).

It should also be noted that when the relative reduction in reported burglary is combined for the three projects, we find a 16.7 percent increase for the combined census tracts served by CAP, as compared with the 40 percent increase for the rest of the city. This difference is statistically significant at the .001 level. That is, the probability of that difference occurring by chance is only one in one thousand. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Community Accountability Program represents an effective burglary reduction strategy.

Additional Information: The Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office is responsible for the evaluation of the Community Accountability Program and has available additional information including the seriousness of the offenses, the number of subsequent offenses and offender data broken down by components; i.e., education, counseling, employment. In the future, the Law and Justice Planning Office will be receiving information for 12- and 18-month followup periods, as well as six-month periods.



CONTINUED

4 OF 5

Table 4B-7--Six Month Recidivism Follow-up for Combined First- and Second-Year Community Accountability Program

	Number of Offenders Who Qualify*	Recidivists	Recidivists**	Is the Difference between Column 2 and 3 Statistically Significant?
Total CAP Accountability Board Services only	170 72 98	22 (13%) 4 (6%) 18 (20%)	43 (25%) 21 (29%) 22 (23%)	Yes Yes No

*Number with sufficient followup time (six months) in addition to having committed an offense within three months prior to entry in the project and fitting the probability tables in terms of age, race, sex, type and number of prior offenses.

**Data based on the Youthful Offender Criminal History Survey Project's probability table, which compiled the data of over 90,000 juvenile contacts and enabled the prediction of the probability of a juvenile offender committing a subsequent offense based upon the juvenile's age, race, sex, type of last contact and number of previous contacts.

Table 4B-8--Number of Reported Burglaries, Auto Thefts and Larcenies in CAP Target Areas versus S- (Seattle minus CAP Target Areas) from September, 1972, through August, 1975

	Sept., 1972 through Aug., 1973	Sept., 1974 through Aug., 1975	Percent Change	Paired t-test Probability (One-tailed)
<u>Reported Residential Burglary</u>				
Mt. Baker	433	481	+11	p = .05
Ballard-Fremont	370	411	+11	p = .12
Southeast	543	679	+25	p = .17
S-*	6,055.32	8,490.49	+40	-----
<u>Reported Auto Theft</u>				
Mt. Baker	74	111	+49	p = .08**
Ballard-Fremont	270	249	- 8	p = .13
Southeast	122	151	+24	p = .28**
S-	3,057	3,507	+15	-----
<u>Reported Larceny</u>				
Mt. Baker	401	436	+ 9	p = .035
Ballard-Fremont	806	947	+17	p = .032
Southeast	483	662	+37	p = .12**
S-	18,497	23,995	+30	-----

*For the burglary analyses representing Seattle minus the CAP target areas (S-) and "C" Sector, the location of a burglary reduction project.

**Since the direction of change in reported incidents was opposite from what was predicted, a two-tailed probability was used in the case of Mt. Baker and Southeast.

In 1973, Seattle chose to use a portion of its limited federal LEAA resources to develop and test the community accountability concept as a new approach to reducing juvenile crime in the city. As with all LEAA projects implemented in Seattle, this was to serve as a demonstration. The intent of the City was to assume responsibility temporarily for

correctional services to a selected segment of the identified juvenile offender population, in an effort to demonstrate a more effective means of reducing continued criminal behavior (recidivism) for this group of youths; i.e., more effective than the existing County and State correctional efforts. It was also hoped that the existence of such a program in a youth's immediate neighborhood (with its well publicized expectation for youth accountability) would have a greater deterrent effect for potential offenders in the area served than the existing system.

Traditionally, the City's only responsibility for the juvenile crime problem has been in the area of law enforcement; i.e., the Seattle Police Department is responsible for identifying and apprehending juvenile offenders under its mandate to enforce the law. Historically, serious offenders have been referred to juvenile court; the County then assumes responsibility for correcting the youth's criminal behavior or chooses the option of committing the offender to the State correctional institution, in which case the State assumes responsibility for correctional services.

The temporary assumption by the City of what traditionally has been a County and State function was based on the premise that, if the City could demonstrate a more effective means of correcting delinquent behavior and reducing juvenile crime, those jurisdictions which have responsibility for the problem would be willing to incorporate this methodology into their ongoing programs. It was also thought possible that some less effective activities might be abandoned and replaced with this methodology.

In order to assess the crime reduction impact of the accountability strategy, CAP has been very carefully evaluated by criteria which reflect the project's impact on juvenile crime in the neighborhoods served, as compared to the rest of the city which receives traditional juvenile justice system services. The program has proved to be a more effective approach. We know of no other project of a similar nature which has (1) identified the reduction of juvenile recidivism (police contacts), and particularly juvenile burglary, as primary objectives, and (2) achieved a measurable degree of success in the reduction of recidivism and in the reduction of residential burglary.

Cost data are available which would indicate that the cost of the Community Accountability Program is equal to or less than other comparable programs. Moreover, this project has yielded the desired benefit, that is, a reduction in juvenile crime.

It appears that the accountability strategy represents an innovative and very promising approach to dealing with juvenile crime in local communities, and that the institutionalization of this strategy would benefit all segments of the juvenile justice system. However, the institutionalization of a successful strategy represents a substantial change in the way the system has traditionally operated. Widespread use of the community accountability approach would represent a considerable shift in the direction of allowing community residents to deal with their own neighborhood juvenile crime problems.

The problem is of particular significance to Seattle because, as stated above, CAP has impacted crime via a corrections, as opposed to a law enforcement, strategy. The problem is also significant because its solution depends on the validity of the LEAA program concept that, if adequate planning resources and support are provided, local jurisdictions will develop and test new strategies for reducing crime. The LEAA program concept further assumes that those projects which succeed in providing better alternatives will compete successfully for scarce revenues.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement G

Rejected Strategy

Permanent funding by the City of Seattle General Fund. As discussed above, it was never the intent of the City to incur an ongoing funding obligation for a juvenile corrections program, but rather to demonstrate a more effective methodology to those jurisdictions which have funding responsibility for juvenile corrections. To date, evaluation strongly indicates that the community accountability strategy is more effective in reducing juvenile crime than traditional juvenile justice system processing. Preliminary cost benefit

analyses indicate that the costs of handling youths through the community accountability process compare favorably with traditional processing and, in fact, would represent a cost-savings to the State, if this system were used in place of probation subsidy or institutionalization.

The average cost-per-client for the Community Accountability Program was \$1,027.91 for the period September 1, 1974, through August 31, 1975. During the same time, the costs of institutionalizing youths in State correctional facilities ranged from \$11,000 to \$25,550 per year per client.

The Probation Subsidy Program demonstrated a reduction in commitments to State institutions but has not, to date, demonstrated a positive crime reduction impact. (This is due, in part, to evaluation methodology. To our knowledge, the impact of the Probation Subsidy Program on continuing police contacts for its clients has not been examined in this way.)

The Community Accountability Program has had a positive crime reduction impact to date. It seems safe to assume that this will have the secondary effect, over time, of reducing commitments to State institutions and, therefore, will represent a cost-savings to the State. Based on the availability of commitment data, an examination will be undertaken to determine the impact of the Community Accountability Program on the reduction of commitments to State juvenile institutions from the areas served by the program.

Current and Proposed Strategies

The Community Accountability Program, a successful City-based juvenile recidivism reduction program, has received permanent funding. On August 29, 1977, the Seattle City Council adopted recommendations of the mayor regarding institutionalizing the program, with the city providing the necessary matching funds to be eligible to receive special Department of Social and Health Services funds to continue the Community Accountability Program.

It has been the position of the executive that (1) the Community Accountability Program should be continued, in that it has adequately demonstrated success; and (2) that permanent funding should be sought from the State to institutionalize the program, in that the State has ongoing responsibility for juvenile corrections programming.

In an effort to educate others regarding the program, and to develop a base of support for institutionalization, a reference group of key actors was formed by the Law and Justice Planning Office in early December, 1975. The task force's efforts and the cooperation of the Department of Social and Health Services resulted in a 1.5 million dollar budget item for "Special Grants and Block Grants to Local Governments for Juvenile Services" being included in the State Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation's proposed budget for the 1977-1979 biennium. The intent of the Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation was that a portion of that money should go to fund projects which have demonstrated success while under LEAA funding and for which funding will no longer be available. Two projects were cited as examples: The Seattle Community Accountability Program and the Snohomish County Alternatives for Youth Program. The budget request stipulated that the State would provide 80 percent funding, with local government providing 20 percent match.

A full description of these events and the status of the Community Accountability Program are contained in a report compiled by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office in July, 1977 (Current Status Report on the Seattle Community Accountability Program [CAP]).

In summary, the executive recommendations which were adopted by the Seattle City Council on August 29, 1977, were as follows:

1. The Community Accountability Program should be continued.
2. Permanent funding should be sought from the State to institutionalize the Community Accountability Program.

3. The City should provide a minimum of 20 percent cash match for State funds allocated to the Community Accountability Program.
4. The Community Accountability Program should continue to be operated by the City, under contract with the State, and should continue to be housed in the City's Department of Human Resources.
5. The Community Accountability Program should continue to be monitored and evaluated.

For full discussion of each executive recommendation, please refer to the full status report referenced above.

Problem Statement H: The Seattle Community Accountability Program (CAP), which has demonstrated success in reducing juvenile burglary, does not cover enough of the city.

Discussion

As discussed in Problem Statement G, the juvenile accountability strategy is showing a positive effect on the reduction of residential burglary and on juvenile recidivism in the geographical areas served, as compared with the rest of the city. The project has been limited to small, definable areas of the city in order to test the effects of the concept, in comparison with other neighborhoods which did not have an accountability program. (If the test continues to show positive results, upon completion, the residents in the remainder of the city may want to have similar programs in their neighborhoods. Many requests from neighborhood leaders have already been made to the City. In addition, many King County neighborhoods have expressed interest in developing an accountability program. These include Shoreline, Mercer Island and Highline communities.) As can be seen from Map 4B-1, the Community Accountability Program covers only 12 out of 121 city census tracts at present.

The efficacy of expanding a program which treats juvenile offenders in their own neighborhoods in an effort to reduce burglary is supported by recent studies. The studies examined the relationship between juvenile offenders' places of residence and the location of the commission of an offender's crime. Both Turner (S. Turner, "Delinquency and Distance" in Delinquency: Selected Studies, edited by T. Sellin and M. E. Wolfgang, New York: Wiley, 1969, pp. 11-26) using 502 cases and Mathews and Mobley (K. E. Mathews, Jr., and J. Mobley, Relationship between Juvenile Delinquents' Census Tract of Residence and Census Tract of Occurrence of Crime, Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, in preparation) using 8,990 cases found that over 50 percent of all juvenile crimes occurred within less than half a mile from the residences of juvenile offenders. Preliminary analyses indicate that this is even more true for burglary than for some other offenses, such as auto theft.

It appears that juveniles are committing crimes in their own neighborhoods, against their neighbors. A strategy which involves neighbors quickly and fairly holding offenders accountable should have more impact than the traditional strategy of sending them out of the neighborhood to juvenile court, or out of town to an institution. It is hoped that the widespread expansion of this strategy--city, county or statewide--would prove as successful in reducing recidivism as the limited test in selected Seattle neighborhoods has been.

If this were the case, we might be able to stop the flow of youths into our State correctional institutions. Institutionalization has not proven to be either the most cost-effective--it costs up to \$25,500 a year to institutionalize a youth in Washington--or the most productive answer to the juvenile crime problem.


Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement H

The development of expansion strategies for the Community Accountability Program concept is dependent in great part on resolution of funding questions in regard to the existing system. However, there are existing agencies that would like to incorporate this strategy into their operations. For example, the City has received requests from three County Youth Service Bureaus for assistance in training staff and community people to develop accountability boards. It is possible that a training program can be developed using CAP staff and financial assistance from King County.

It is hoped that the philosophical and operational aspects of the Community Accountability model can be incorporated into existing juvenile justice programs. The proposed reorganization of juvenile services in King County could facilitate expansion of the accountability concept.

A. King County Department of Juvenile Services, to be under the administration of the Executive Department, is being developed. Such reorganization will place Juvenile Court Services, Conference Committees, County Youth Service Bureaus and other County juvenile

Map 4B-1--Census Tracts Served by
the Community Accountability
Program



programs under one agency. It is hoped this reorganization will be accompanied by reexamination of the effectiveness of various activities; it is further hoped that reallocation and prioritization of resources will follow, based on program effectiveness. Available training monies could be reallocated to provide assistance in developing accountability boards, and anticipated savings in administrative costs could be used to provide staff assistance. Juvenile Court Conference Committees and the County Youth Service Bureaus appear to be structures which could easily accommodate the development of accountability boards in local neighborhoods.

There is a growing emphasis on decentralization of court services, in general, and on increased community involvement in dealing with the juvenile crime problem. The community accountability strategy provides a natural vehicle for both.

Problem Statement I: Insufficient information is available on the effects of restitution as a juvenile crime reduction strategy.

Discussion

The 1978 King County Law and Justice Plan presents a detailed discussion of the use and effects of accountability and restitution as a delinquency reduction strategy in Seattle and King County and identifies the need for additional research on the use of restitution (Study of the Use of Accountability as a Delinquency Reduction Strategy at the King County Youth Service Center. 1978 King County Law and Justice Plan, King County Law and Justice Planning Office, February, 1977, pp. 207-224). The plan reviews the effects of King County Juvenile Court's Prosecution Program--JJPP (Shelly M. Wein, Evaluation Report - King County Prosecuting Attorney's Juvenile Court Prosecution Program, King County Law and Justice Planning Office, August, 1976), and the City of Seattle's Community Accountability Program--CAP (Kenneth E. Mathews, Jr., Ph.D., and Arlene M. Geist, Seattle Youth Service Bureau/Accountability System: Two-Year Evaluation and Crime Impact Analysis, Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, April, 1976).

Both of these programs are aimed at holding juveniles accountable for their offenses, and both use restitution as a tool to accomplish that objective. Both programs have shown a positive impact on the reduction of juvenile crime and recidivism. As discussed in the King County Law and Justice Plan, restitution is being utilized in differing degrees in many parts of the juvenile system locally, e.g., as a condition of probation, as part of informal adjustments. Use and adequacy of follow-up and monitoring of restitution assignments also differ substantially from one situation to another.

The King County report further indicates that there is some evidence that current restitution activities have already resulted in some general improvements in the juvenile justice system in King County. In the past three years, the King County Prosecutor's Office has had a stated office policy that it will attempt to obtain restitution for victims who have suffered a monetary loss. The increased emphasis on accountability locally is demonstrated by the marked increase in the amount of restitution paid. While in 1973 only \$119.59 was paid through the registry of the King County Superior Court Clerk, \$46,834.89 was paid through the registry in 1976.

Legislation recently passed by the Washington State Legislature in the form of SHB 371 mandates that the majority of juvenile offenders be required to pay restitution if they are able to make restitution, or can reasonably be expected to be able to obtain employment and make restitution.

On the federal level, LEAA's Office of Juvenile Justice is planning to demonstrate its support of the general concept of restitution by making it one of its Special Emphasis funding categories during the coming year.

Obviously, there is considerable momentum developing in the direction of increasing the use of restitution as a juvenile crime reduction strategy. There is a growing body of evidence that this would be a proper course of action. However, at present we do not know enough about restitution as a strategy to be able to identify the best course of action, or to pinpoint the areas in which we should concentrate our efforts for revision or refinement of existing activities. There is inadequate information regarding at what decision making point in the juvenile justice process restitution would have the greatest impact. There is inadequate research on the relative effectiveness of different restitution models on the reduction of juvenile crime and recidivism, as well as the relative cost effectiveness of different models.

Proposed Strategy for Problem Statement I: More and better information is badly needed by planners, program operators and decision makers so that the most efficient and effective course of action can be determined in the restitution area. The project proposal which follows is designed to answer the questions identified in this problem statement.

Project: Juvenile Restitution Analysis

Goal: To determine the efficacy of continuing, expanding or revising existing local restitution programs, based upon an examination of the national literature on the subject and of the currently operating local program models, which include the Seattle Community Accountability Program, the King County Juvenile Court Conference Committees and the King County Department of Youth Services informal adjustment and probation programs.

Objectives

1. To identify critical program operation and juvenile justice system factors which affect the feasibility of using restitution as a sentencing alternative.
2. To develop information on the relative effectiveness and impact of different restitution models on the reduction of recidivism.
3. To determine and design what future action and activity should occur in juvenile restitution programming locally.

Methods

1. Identify the decisions and activities that significantly affect the degree to which juvenile offenders are held accountable through the use of restitution.
2. Identify implementation and program operation problems, particularly those that relate to time lag between offense and sanction, followup and verification of restitution orders, etc.
3. Identify potential solutions to implementation and program operation problems in existing restitution programs.
4. Determine whether the use of restitution can be increased by existing programs such as the Conference Committees.
5. Develop information on the relative satisfaction of law enforcement, the victim and the non-victim members of the community with different restitution program models.
6. Design and implement an evaluation which will provide comparable pre- and post-restitution police contact and court referral data for clients of existing restitution programs. This should include a six-, twelve- and eighteen-month followup for clients participating in the different restitution models, and for a control group of non-restitution clients, for the purpose of comparing recidivism rates.
7. Develop information on the comparative cost-effectiveness of different types of restitution models relative to their effectiveness in reducing recidivism.
8. Develop specific recommendations for improvements in existing programs based on the above analysis.
9. Develop recommendations and design for new action programs, if appropriate.

Evaluation

1. Independent validation of project results.
2. Followup assessment of implementation of policy and procedural changes, as recommended by the results of the analysis.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
LEAA	\$36,791	\$42,310	\$48,657
State	2,044	2,351	2,703
City	2,044	2,350	2,703
Total	\$40,879	\$47,011	\$54,063

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$22,282	Federal (LEAA)	\$36,791	90%
Supplies	450	State Buy-In	2,044	5%
Other Services and Charges	18,147	Local Cash Match	2,044	5%
Capital Outlay	0	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction	<u>0</u>			
Total Cost	\$40,879	Total Funds	\$40,879	100%

Problem Statement J: The present practice of handling dependent children, status offenders and criminal offenders through one juvenile justice system dilutes the effectiveness of that system in substantially reducing target crimes.

Discussion

Juvenile involvement in the target crime of burglary continues to be substantial in the Seattle area; meantime, the Seattle Police Department Juvenile Division is forced by present juvenile law into a position of spending an inordinate amount of time dealing with family and social problems such as runaway, parent-child conflicts and so on. The division does not have adequate staff to deal with these problems, and this situation taxes resources which should more appropriately be directed toward the reduction of actual crime.

In its attempts to regulate a wide variety of social and moral behavior, the juvenile court loses its effectiveness in dealing with serious criminal behavior. Because of the divergent clientele served, the emphasis of the probation department and court action has shifted toward the delivery of social services and meeting children's needs, rather than holding serious criminal offenders accountable for their actions.

Because they are not held accountable, juveniles involved in the commission of crime do not take the system seriously. In addition to its not being taken seriously, the present system is viewed by many youths as being unfair because of the practice of committing non-delinquents or "status offenders" to State juvenile correctional institutions. (In 1971, the probability that a King County Juvenile Court disposition resulted in commitment was 2.8 times greater for an incorrigible referral than for a delinquent referral.) This proportionately higher commitment of non-delinquent youths is in contrast to recommendations of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency and most experts in the field of juvenile crime.

Current figures are not available on the ratio of non-delinquent-to-delinquent commitments. It appears that in King County, commitments of incorrigible youths have been substantially reduced since 1971. However, the practice of committing status offenders has not been completely eliminated to date.

Non-criminal juvenile offenders should be removed from the juvenile justice system and be dealt with directly through social service agencies. At the present time, dependent children, status offenders and criminal offenders are all processed through the same juvenile justice system. At the very least, this creates ambiguity as to the purpose of the juvenile justice system and spreads its resources over very divergent populations. Many persons are willing to go further and state that the mixing of these populations has decreased the ability of the juvenile justice system to affect the criminal juvenile offender and has increased the involvement in crime of the dependent youths and status offenders. It is argued that for the delinquent, the juvenile justice system becomes a large amorphous social service agency that does not hold a person accountable for the crime committed. For the dependent or status offense violator, this system is seen as a negative influence, either by causing the youth to identify as a delinquent for having been in the juvenile justice system or to remove the juvenile's fear of the juvenile justice system once it is actually experienced. In either case, the system is seen to encourage criminal involvement by otherwise non-delinquent youths.

There is no demonstrable evidence to support any of these contentions. However, they are strongly held by many persons in the juvenile justice system and by many national organizations concerned with juvenile justice.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement J

Rejected and Current Strategy: The present practice of handling all problems related to troubled youths and families through the juvenile justice system should be abandoned.

Any strategy which employs a uni-jurisdictional approach to this problem should be rejected. Planning by one governmental agency, such as the City Law and Justice Planning Office, without the full cooperation of others who have primary responsibility for decision making and service in this area, would be counterproductive. A number of governmental agencies should be involved in the development of a more consistent and meaningful response to problems in this area, and uncoordinated or random programming should be avoided.

Proposed Strategies

Redefinition of the Juvenile Justice System: If we wish to bring social and legal sanctions to bear on real criminal behavior and to begin to hold youths accountable for criminal acts, we need a system which acts in a well defined manner to enforce the criminal law. To accomplish that, new legislation has been needed to redefine the way in which the juvenile justice system operates. The strategy for the City has been to support actively legislation which will remove status offenders from the system and which will redefine specific operating procedures. A part of this was accomplished during the 1976 legislative session through enactment of Senate Bill 3116, which prohibits the commitment of status offenders to State correctional institutions.

The groundwork for a major restructuring of the juvenile justice system along the lines the City has been proposing has been established as a result of the passage of Engrossed Third Substitute House Bill 371 by the 1977 session of the legislature. The following excerpt from the legislature's bill digest summarizes the changes that are contained in SHB 371.

In over sixty years since its enactment, there has been no major substantive revision of Washington's outmoded Juvenile Court Code. For the past nine years, there have been repeated attempts to obtain legislation which would comprehensively reform the Juvenile Court Code. This year, after extensive work and compromise, SHB 371 has been formulated. On April 21, 1977, this bill passed the House of Representatives with an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 83 to 8 in its favor. This bill has also been supported by bipartisan and diverse groups and persons interested in the improvement of the juvenile justice system. (The bill later passed the Senate and was signed into law by the governor on June 18, 1977.)

Under SHB 371, statewide standards for filing, due process and disposition will help assure consistent treatment for juveniles accused of crime. Most minor and first offenders will be diverted from the formal court process though they may be required to pay restitution and do community service work. On the other hand, juveniles accused of serious crimes will be prosecuted and, if found delinquent, normally will be committed to the Department of Social and Health Services. For juveniles who are not obviously serious or minor offenders, judges will retain substantial discretion to impose community supervision (probation), rehabilitation services, or fixed punishment. Failure to comply with court ordered supervision, restitution or diversion agreement may result in the imposition of further sanctions.

The sentencing standards will be promulgated by the Department of Social and Health Services and subject to periodic legislative review. This bill acknowledges that there may be exceptional cases where the standards should not apply. In these cases, a judge may sentence outside the standard range but this decision must be justified in writing and subject to appeal. By establishing standard ranges of punishment based on age, offense and prior delinquent history, this bill will provide more even-handed and predictable consequences for delinquent acts. This is not only fairer to juveniles, but it has practical advantages for the criminal justice system as well. Increased predictability with regard to community supervision and commitment should facilitate state-wide planning and the allocation of resources.

Coordination of Services to Status Offenders: A number of services are currently available to the "dependent/rebellious" youth and his or her family. These include programs

sponsored by the King County Juvenile Court, the State Department of Social and Health Services and various City, County and private agencies. However, there has been little in the way of comprehensive planning or coordinated provision of services to this client group, nor has there been adequate evaluation as to the relative effectiveness of different services. While in many areas services are inadequate, lack of coordination and overlapping areas of responsibility have resulted in the duplication of efforts, the failure to provide certain important services and a general lack of understanding and communication between programs.

The following analysis, problem identification and proposal of strategies and projects has been prepared by the King County Law and Justice Planning Office in cooperation with the City of Seattle, State Department of Social and Health Services, King County Juvenile Court and other related agencies. It represents a major step toward providing for the removal of status offenders from the juvenile justice system in King County.

Analysis of Status Offenders in Detention

Various private citizens, legislators and individuals working within the juvenile justice system believe the practice of temporarily detaining or institutionalizing juveniles who are alleged to have committed or have committed acts which would not be considered illegal if committed by an adult ("status offenses") is inappropriate. It is believed to be inappropriate in that it is unfair or unjust to lock up juveniles who have committed no crime. One of the apparent reasons for the practice of locking up such nondelinquent juveniles is lack of appropriate service alternatives.

One response to this problem was the inclusion in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of a provision that within two years after submission of a state juvenile justice plan, status offenders "shall not be placed in detentional or correctional facilities, but must be placed in shelter facilities." A condition of State eligibility for JJDP funds is substantial compliance with this provision of the plan.

Another response to this problem was the amendment of State law (contained in SB 3116) to prohibit the incarceration of incorrigibles in State institutions except for a diagnostic commitment not to exceed 30 days. (This amendment became effective July 1, 1977.) SB 3116 also assigns responsibility to the Department of Social and Health Services to "develop, administer and supervise a plan that establishes, extends aid to, and strengthens services for the protection and care of...incorrigible children..." While previous law (RCW 74.13.031) assigned responsibility to DSHS to provide services to delinquent and dependent juveniles (inclusive of dependent-incorrigibles) the amendment more clearly defines the responsibility of DSHS for providing services to incorrigible juveniles.

The mandatory responsibilities of county governments for incorrigible (and other) juveniles are limited to the juvenile court functions of investigation, adjudication, probation and detention. State law provides that a juvenile "in need of detention either by reason of assaultive conduct or because of probable failure to appear for further proceedings, whether alleged to be dependent or delinquent" may be held in the local juvenile court detention facility (RCW 13.04.053). Thus, the detention of alleged dependent-incorrigibles is permitted and is, in fact, practiced at the King County Youth Service Center. The practice of detaining these juveniles is a problem, not because the practice is illegal, but because it is regarded by many as an inappropriate public response in terms of the acts committed by these juveniles and in terms of the needs exhibited by them.

For the purpose of analyzing this problem the target population was initially defined as juveniles who are inappropriately detained at King County Youth Service Center after being presented for having committed a so-called status offense: truancy, running away from home or being out of control of one's parents or guardians. One of the difficulties in further analyzing the problem presented by this group of juveniles, and in designing a solution, is that the actual size and characteristics of the target population had not previously been determined. Therefore, the analysis concentrated first on developing a methodology to classify juveniles presented for detention to determine the size and characteristics of the target population.

Juveniles admitted to detention at Juvenile Court have been traditionally classified by detention staff as either delinquent, dependent or dependent/rebellious based on the reason for referral to detention. (A new classification system which includes other categories was begun in 1976 but this system also has limitations.) The latter two categories include, but are not limited to, the target population. It has been indicated by some Juvenile Court staff that, due to the procedures used in classifying juveniles presented for detention, the data based on the traditional classification system are inconsistent. In addition, the vagueness of the categories used makes it difficult to precisely define the target population.

In order to obtain reliable data on the target population a set of operationally defined categories was devised and applied to a randomly selected sample (n = 131) of dependent and dependent/rebellious juveniles admitted to detention in 1975 (hereinafter referred to as Sample A). The following categories were used:

1. Delinquent: A juvenile who is referred for a criminal-type offense or, having been adjudicated delinquent, is being detained for further proceedings.
2. Status Offender/Delinquent: A juvenile who is referred for a status offense but is active with the Court or the Department of Institutions for a criminal-type offense.
3. Status Offender/Dependent: A juvenile who is referred for a status offense and is not active with the Court for a criminal-type offense.
4. Dependent: A juvenile who is referred for neglect, abuse or abandonment.
5. Other: Insufficient information to determine status.
6. Out of Jurisdiction.

A status offense is an act which would not be considered illegal if committed by an adult. There is no legal definition of the term "status offense," but the definition of "dependent child" in RCW 13.04.010 includes juveniles who commit certain actions which are commonly called status offenses. These actions are as follows: being truant, running away from home, being out of control of one's parents or guardians, violating curfew and frequenting "the company of reputed criminals, vagrants or prostitutes." Violations of liquor laws are not included in the definition of status offense as used here. (See section on Detention Classifications for more specific definitions of these categories.) The categories were applied to the sample of dependent and dependent/rebellious juveniles admitted to detention and the following results were obtained:

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Delinquent	0	0
Status offender/delinquent	54	41
Status offender/dependent	45	34
Dependent	1	1
Other (insufficient information)	13	10
Out of jurisdiction	18	14
Total	131	100

Further analysis of these data require that certain assumptions be made as to the appropriateness of detaining certain types of juveniles. There are no clear guidelines in the law for determining this. The assumptions used here are based on the value judgment that it is unjust to detain a juvenile who has neither committed a crime nor is suspected of having committed a crime. The assumptions are as follows:

1. It is inappropriate to detain dependents or status offender/dependents.
2. It may be appropriate to detain a status offender/delinquent if there is reason to believe that the juvenile may not appear for further proceedings on an active delinquency referral.

3. It is appropriate to detain out-of-jurisdiction or "other" juveniles until the juvenile's status can be determined.

(The practical and ethical validity of the assumptions are considered in the section dealing with Recommended Solutions.) The categories in Sample A may be collapsed to fit the categories delineated by these assumptions and the resulting percentages applied to the total number of dependent and dependent/rebellious juveniles admitted to detention to obtain an estimate of the target population.

Statistics kept by Juvenile Court are in terms of admissions to detention without regard for multiple admissions. To calculate the number of individuals, data were used to determine the average number of detention admissions per juvenile. Data on the average number of admissions for dependent and dependent/rebellious juveniles are not available; however, data obtained from a sample of the Rebellious Youth Project population (Sample B) provide an average number of admissions (per year) for the project population which is somewhat similar to the dependent and dependent/rebellious population. (The Rebellious Youth Project began in 1975 under joint funding from DSHS, King County and the City of Seattle. The intent of the project was to examine the population of dependent/rebellious youth presented at the Youth Service Center and work with Juvenile Court intake screeners and various service providers to match up the rebellious youth with appropriate services. At the start of the project it was believed that these services were already in existence and that coordination only was needed to match up the youths and the service. However, as the project progressed, it became apparent that the available services could not meet the needs of this population.)

The project population sample had an average of 1.8 admissions to detention in one year. There were 1,712 dependent and dependent/rebellious admissions in 1975 and 2,062 in 1976. (This 1976 figure is actually an estimate which was obtained as follows: the total number of admissions [including delinquents] was obtained by a straight-line projection of eight months data. The percentage of dependent and dependent/rebellious admissions in 1975 [48 percent of all admissions] was applied to the projected total for 1976. This method was used because the system for classifying juveniles presented for detention was changed in 1976. The use of this estimate for 1976 admissions makes the two years data comparable.) Dividing these figures by 1.8 we obtain total population estimates of 951 and 1,145 for the two years. The following results are obtained from these population estimates.

	<u>Sample Percent</u>	<u>1975 Estimate</u>	<u>1976 Estimate</u>
Inappropriately detained (dependents and status offender/dependents)	35	333	401
May be appropriately de- tained (status offender/ delinquent)	41	390	469
Appropriately detained (out of jurisdiction or insufficient information)	24	228	275
Total dependent and dependent rebellious detained	100	951	1,145

Further research was undertaken to determine more specific characteristics of the target population. This research provides, among other things, information as to what portion of the juveniles that "may be appropriately detained" are in fact appropriately detained and the average number of detention admissions per year for the target populations. For this research, data were collected on a sample (n = 93) of juveniles who were detained and who were identified as part of the Rebellious Youth Project population. (The sample was drawn from Rebellious Youth Project juveniles who were detained at some time during

the period from September 1, 1975, through April 30, 1976. The reason for using this time period was to obtain data from the Rebellious Youth Project needs assessment forms which were used only during that period. Unfortunately, not much data were obtained from these forms because they were in fact used only sporadically by detention intake screeners.)

The Rebellious Youth Project identifies youth with certain characteristics who may be in need of services other than those provided by Juvenile Court. The project population consists of "youth (who) are brought to the Youth Service Center, not as delinquents, but as a result of family and personal problems." This definition excludes "youth who are parole violators or under active supervision of the Juvenile Court (and) are seen as primarily delinquent... (and) youth who are from jurisdictions outside King County" (Rebellious Youth Project progress report for August 1, 1975, through April 30, 1976). The project population is roughly similar to those juveniles identified as inappropriately detained (status offender/dependents and dependents) with the exception that juveniles who are under active supervision of the Juvenile Court (e.g., status offender/delinquents) may be included in the project population if they are not seen as primarily delinquent. Apparently the determination of whether or not such a juvenile is "primarily delinquent" is based on the opinions of detention intake screeners and Rebellious Youth Project staff. Accepting prima facie the Rebellious Youth Project identification of youth in need of services other than those services provided by Juvenile Court, we can use the data obtained from the sample of the project's population to refine the estimate of the target population (i.e., juveniles who are inappropriately detained).

In the sample taken from the Rebellious Youth Project population, 88 percent ($n = 82$) of the juveniles are dependents or status offender/dependents (i.e., had the same characteristics as the "inappropriately detained" juveniles identified in Sample A). The remaining 12 percent ($n = 10$) fall into the category of juveniles who are active with Juvenile Court for a delinquency but, presumably, are not primarily delinquent. (The sample contained one out-of-jurisdiction juvenile.) If the estimated 333 dependents and status offender/dependents detained in 1975 (401 in 1976) equals 88 percent of the population of juveniles who are inappropriately detained, it follows that the estimated total number of juveniles who are inappropriately detained is 378 ($333/.88$) for 1975 and 456 ($401/.88$) for 1976. Since the average number of admissions per year for the target population is 1.8, this group accounts for an estimated 599 detention admissions in 1975 and 920 admissions in 1976, or 18 percent of the total number of admissions in those years.

In addition to providing data which were used to calculate the target population estimate, the Rebellious Youth Project sample provides data which indicate some characteristics of the target population. Some of these data are summarized below.

Age: average = 14.6, range = 11 to 17

Sex: 52 (56 percent) female, 41 (44 percent) male

Reason for (sample) referral to detention: 54 (58 percent) for status offenses (while residing at home); 28 (30 percent) for status offenses (while in shelter care); 6 (7 percent) for delinquency in addition to status offense; 5 (5 percent) for other reasons

Number of prior court referrals: 19 (20 percent) had no prior court referrals; the remaining 74 (80 percent) had an average of 3.6 prior court referrals

Reason for prior referrals: Of total number of prior referrals, 109 (41 percent) were for behavior problems at home; 73 (28 percent) were for behavior problems while in shelter care; 49 (19 percent) for dependency; 28 (11 percent) for delinquency; 4 (1 percent) for other reasons; (for) 263 total prior referrals

Prior services received (juveniles may have received more than one type of service; therefore, percentages do not add to 100 percent): 54 (57 percent) have been in a group home; 30 (31 percent) have received some type of counseling; 19

(20 percent) have received some type of psychiatric care (therapy, psychiatric evaluation, etc.); 11 (12 percent) have received other services (e.g., special education)

Extent of court involvement (inclusive of a minimum six months follow-up after sample referral): 24 (26 percent) delinquency petitions filed; 22 (24 percent) dependency petitions filed; 2 (2 percent) incorrigible petitions filed; (for) 48 (52 percent) total petitions filed; (of those 48 petitions filed), 8 (17 percent) petitions dismissed; 40 (83 percent) petitions found correct

Court dispositions for petitions found correct: 2 (5 percent) unknown; 11 (28 percent) supervised probation; 5 (12 percent) diagnostic commitment; 3 (8 percent) commitment to institutions; 12 (30 percent) out of home placement; 7 (17 percent) other; (for) 40 (100 percent) total correct petitions

Although these data provide a profile of the target population, they do not directly indicate the probable service needs for this group. Some subjective interpretation of the data (not all of which have been presented here) is required to obtain a better picture of this target population. For example, on the basis of a record of referrals to Juvenile Court for being runaway, and intake screeners' mention of other runaway incidents not reported to Juvenile Court, it appears that about 21 (22 percent) of the juveniles in Sample B are chronic runaways. Because of the detention policies of Juvenile Court, these chronic runaways are often placed in DSHS receiving homes (emergency, short-term foster homes) rather than detained. Often, too, these same juveniles run again from the receiving home before a DSHS caseworker is able to plan appropriate services for the juvenile. On the basis of the referral history and intake screening reports, it also appears that a small portion (7 percent) of the target population are severely emotionally disturbed; these youths are frequently detained only because they are out of control and suitable alternatives do not exist.

In summary, the population of juveniles who are admitted to detention for reasons of having committed a status offense (an act that would not be illegal if committed by an adult) has been examined to determine how many of these juveniles are inappropriately detained. The determination of whether detention is an appropriate option for particular groups of status offenders is based on a value judgment that it is not appropriate to detain juveniles who have committed no crime, but it may be appropriate to detain status offenders who are active with the Court for a previous criminal offense or whose offense history is unknown at the time of presentation for detention. On the basis of this judgment, a target population of status offenders who are inappropriately detained has been identified. The estimated size of the target population was 378 in 1975 and 456 in 1976; the projected target population for 1977 and 1978, based on the same rate of increase (20 percent) is 547 and 656, respectively. A small portion (12 percent) is active with the Court for a delinquency but is not considered "primarily delinquent" and is therefore inappropriately detained. Approximately 21 percent of the target population are chronic runaways; it may be that for practical purposes, detention is an appropriate option for the handling of these chronic runaways. (The use of detention as a "service" alternative is discussed in the section on Proposed Activities Addressing the Problem.)

Problem Statement: Approximately 378 status offenders were inappropriately detained in 1975 and 456 in 1976. It is projected that 547 status offenders will be inappropriately detained in 1977 and 656 in 1978.

Problem Statement: The system currently used by the King County Juvenile Court to classify juveniles presented for admission to detention is subject to inconsistency in application and does not provide significant information about the juveniles presented.

Activities Addressing the Problem: The existence of a problem with the detention and incarceration of status offenders has been recognized for some time and some activities to address the problem have been undertaken. One such activity is the Rebellious Youth Project. The Rebellious Youth Project started in 1975 under joint funding from DSHS, King County and the City of Seattle. The project was initiated largely as a response to

citizen concern for the plight of status offenders in detention at the King County Youth Service Center. At the initiation of the project it was believed that most of the services needed by this group of juveniles were already available somewhere in the community and that with a project to coordinate the services and to provide information about the services to instake screeners most status offenders could be kept out of detention. The project therefore was not designed to provide direct services but to act as a coordinator between service-providing agencies and Juvenile Court intake screeners. However, as the project progressed it became apparent that many of the services (shelter care in particular) that are crucial to keeping status offenders out of detention were simply not available. Although the Rebellious Youth Project has not been able to directly solve the problem of status offenders in detention, it has been instrumental in providing information which is necessary to determine the needs of these youths and in initiating new services which address the service needs of this group (e.g., the YMCA receiving facility).

The problem of the incarceration and detention of status offenders has been addressed on a statewide level by DSHS as a result of the provision in Senate Bill 3116 that the Department develop a plan to provide services to dependent-incorrigible youth. The DSHS report on "Alternatives to the Commitment of Dependent-Incorrigible Youth" recommends budget increases for some specific service areas which are required for the adjudicated dependent-incorrigibles that are currently in State institutions. The DSHS policy as expressed in the report is as follows:

The Department, because of the uncertain dependent-incorrigible statistical data base, proposes a progressive address of the problems of dependent-incorrigibles by concentrating initially upon the committed adjudicated dependent-incorrigible population and moving knowledgeably and systematically toward an address of the issues of all status offenders. It is recommended that an initial six-month period of DSHS service development and delivery be observed and then re-evaluated. Whatever alterations or appropriations may become necessary can then be addressed to the supplemental legislative session at that time.

The activities proposed in this plan would address a specific group of status offenders (status offenders who are inappropriately detained at the King County Youth Service Center) and would therefore complement DSHS efforts to further address the problems of all status offenders.

Detention Practices and Policies: The decision to admit a juvenile to detention at the King County Youth Service Center and to keep him or her in detention for a certain length of time is based on a number of factors. Basically the decision to detain is a response to the need presented by a situation rather than to the particular act committed by a child. The decision is made by detention intake screeners subject to review and approval by Juvenile Court judges. Detention guidelines promulgated by the Juvenile Court judges (dated April, 1976) provide that a child shall not be admitted to, or detained at, the Youth Service Center unless:

1. The child's past conduct or statements give reason to believe that:
 - a. The child will probably fail to appear for future proceedings; or
 - b. Detention is required to protect the persons or property of others; or
 - c. Detention is required to protect the child who is dangerous to himself or herself; or
2. The child requests detention and detention is necessary to protect the child; or
3. A court has ordered detention at the Youth Service Center.

In general, these guidelines are closely followed by detention intake screeners. However, when a status offender is admitted to detention, the decision to detain appears

often to be a response not only to these guidelines but also to the lack of any alternative to detention. An example of such a situation is when a juvenile is brought to detention by his or her parents for being "out of control" and the parents refuse to let the child return home; the child has also been unable to adjust in a number of receiving home placements so that such a placement is no longer possible. The only alternative in such a situation is detention because appropriate service alternatives do not now exist.

Once a juvenile is in detention the length of time that s/he may spend there is limited by State law and by State Juvenile Court rule. State law requires that a petition be filed on any child who is held in detention longer than 72 hours.

As a matter of policy the Prosecuting Attorney rarely files incorrigibility petitions. Partly because of this policy, a large portion of status offenders who are admitted to detention are released in 72 hours. It appears that more incorrigibility petitions could be filed for the repeat status offender who is admitted to detention and who needs to be detained longer than the 72-hour period in order for the DSHS and the Court to plan for long-term services to the juvenile. It is therefore recommended that Juvenile Court and the Prosecuting Attorney re-examine current policies on the filing of incorrigibility petitions.

Any changes in Juvenile Court detention policies which address the problem of status offenders in detention must be preceded by the provision of appropriate service alternatives through DSHS. If such services are provided, the Juvenile Court would be able to change its policies in order to eliminate the inappropriate detention of some status offenders. It is recommended that the option to detain be eliminated for most status offenders but remain open for some types of status offenders. This recommendation is based partly on a value judgment that while it is unjust to detain a juvenile who has committed no crime, in some circumstances it may be justifiable to detain a status offender who is active with the Court for a delinquency if there is reason to believe the juvenile would not appear for further court proceedings on the delinquency matter. The recommendation is also based on certain practical considerations: In the case of some chronic runaways temporary detention may be the only alternative which will allow DSHS to plan for appropriate long-term services for the runaway. Furthermore, in the opinion of many people who have worked with chronic runaways, detention provides a suitable, highly structured temporary living environment for such juveniles; if another alternative for short-term shelter care were provided for these juveniles it might have to be much like detention. It is therefore recommended that the option to temporarily detain a status offender remain open for status offenders who are (a) active with the Court on a delinquency matter, (b) chronic runaways, (c) out of jurisdiction juveniles, and (d) juveniles on whom there is insufficient information to determine status.

A secondary problem related to the detention of status offenders is the use of a classification system for juveniles presented to detention which is subject to inconsistency in application and does not provide significant information. One of the reasons this system does not work well is that the classification is done by detention staff who have no direct responsibility for determining the reasons for which juveniles are presented. Rather, their responsibility is for the juveniles already admitted to detention. Another reason that the system is unsatisfactory is that the categories used do not provide a fine enough breakdown to determine precisely what kinds of juveniles are being presented and what kinds are being detained. An effort has been made to improve the classification system with the result that in 1976, the original three categories ("delinquent," "dependent" and "dependent/rebellious") were changed to seven categories: "delinquent," "dependent," "dependent/rebellious," "away without leave or parole violator from Department of Institutions," "courtesy shelter for government agency," "courtesy shelter for private agency" and "out of jurisdiction." One problem with this newer system is that the categories are not mutually exclusive; the system therefore lends itself to inconsistent application. In order to make available more useful data and to allow for the monitoring of the detention of status offenders, the following changes in the Juvenile Court detention classification system are recommended:

1. That operationally defined categories be used to classify juveniles. The categories recommended here have been reviewed by Juvenile Court staff and appear to be appropriate. Six major categories are defined each with sub-categories further specifying the juvenile's situation. The six major categories are as follows: delinquent, status offender/delinquent, status offender/dependent, dependent, other (insufficient information) and out-of-jurisdiction. (See section on Detention Classifications for a complete definition of these categories.)
2. That original classification be done by detention intake screeners and recorded on the detention intake log. This would assure more accurate classification of juveniles since the detention intake screeners are responsible for reviewing any court files on the juvenile and conducting the detention intake interview. Reason for referral is already indicated on the detention intake log; an added column could be used to indicate classification.

Service Alternatives: It is apparent that efforts to change the practice of detaining status offenders must be accompanied not only by changes in the detention policies of Juvenile Court but also in the type and quantity of services which are provided by DSHS. The histories of juveniles who are inappropriately detained indicate that they place a large demand on the resources of both Juvenile Court and DSHS. Of the sample of the target population (Sample B), only 20 percent had no prior referrals to Juvenile Court and 80 percent had an average of 3.6 prior referrals to Juvenile Court. The majority of the juveniles in the target population have been or currently are active with DSHS. For example, in the sample of the target population, 57 percent had been in some type of foster home (usually a receiving home). The fact that most of these juveniles have received the services of both DSHS and Juvenile Court and yet are repeatedly presented at detention because of continuing behavioral problems indicates that the services currently being provided for this group are either inappropriate or inadequate.

Estimates as to what type of services are needed for what number of juveniles in the target population are difficult to make on a purely objective basis even with the data that are available. The reasons for this are that (1) there is no precise way to match an individual juvenile with a particular type of service so as to guarantee success in changing the juvenile's behavior, and (2) many of the possible service alternatives have not been tried before and it is therefore unknown whether they might be successful in changing the behavior of these juveniles. In spite of these limitations, reasonable estimates of certain service needs can be made using both quantitative and qualitative information that is available.

Estimates of the quantity of the different kinds of services that are needed are based on a somewhat arbitrary system of classifying the target population on the basis of the number of prior referrals to Juvenile Court (using sample data). Obviously, an individual juvenile would not be matched to a particular service only on the basis of the number of prior referrals to Juvenile Court; numerous other factors would be considered. However, the number of prior referrals to Juvenile Court does provide a reasonable indicator of the intensity of intervention (i.e., the kind of service) that might be required for a juvenile. The data on the target population (Sample B) indicate the following breakdown: 20 percent had no prior referrals; 40 percent had one or two prior referrals; 40 percent had three or more prior referrals.

Two groups of juveniles with particular characteristics requiring particular services, chronic runaways and severely emotionally disturbed juveniles, should be separated out in the above classifications. As indicated in the problem analysis, it is estimated 21 percent of the target population are chronic runaways and 7 percent are severely emotionally disturbed. The chronic runaways are most likely to fall into the group with three or more prior referrals; the emotionally disturbed are likely to fall into the group with one or two prior referrals. By separating out these groups accordingly, the following breakdown is obtained: 20 percent had no prior referrals; 40 percent had one or two prior referrals (7 percent emotionally disturbed, 33 percent other); 40 percent had three or more prior referrals (21 percent chronic runaways, 19 percent other).

These sample percentages can be applied to the projected target population in 1977 and 1978 (547 and 656, respectively) to estimate the quantity of services needed.

Juvenile Court staff, Rebellious Youth Project staff and DSHS Court Intake Unit staff were interviewed in order to determine what kinds of services seem to be needed for the target population. On the basis of qualitative information such as this, a variety of needed services were identified and are placed here in a continuum beginning with the less extensive types of service and, generally, the less expensive.

Crisis Intervention: Crisis intervention is a service which provides counseling on a 24-hour emergency basis. Many of the juveniles in the target population are presented to detention during other than regular working hours and by parents or foster parents in what may be characterized as a family crisis. Some of these crises might be resolved through several hours of continuous family counseling provided on an immediate basis, i.e., crisis intervention. Resolution of a crisis through this method could make further intervention, such as detention or referral to shelter care, unnecessary. This service would be appropriate for the 20 percent of the target population with no prior court referrals, estimated at 109 in 1977 and 131 in 1978.

Short-Term Shelter Care: For most of the juveniles in the target population, some type of short-term (less than 30 days) shelter care is needed as an immediate alternative to detention. The only such service that is currently available is DSHS receiving homes. These receiving homes are private foster homes which provide temporary shelter (up to 30 days) on short notice or on an emergency basis. The purpose of providing this type of shelter is to allow DSHS caseworkers the time to develop a service plan which either enables the juvenile to return to his or her home or, if necessary, provides a long-term out-of-home placement. However, it is apparent from the number of juveniles in the target population who are referred to detention for being runaway or "unable to adjust" while they are placed in a receiving home that this type of service is inadequate. The juveniles in the target population seem to require more intense supervision than is provided in a receiving home. (Four) types of short-term shelter care are proposed here.

1. Detention: For the 21 percent of the target population who are chronic runaways, detention appears to be the most appropriate short-term shelter care available. These are juveniles who have already exhausted available shelter care resources and have repeatedly run away from their own home, foster homes and group homes. The current practice of either not detaining these juveniles or releasing them from detention prior to the mandatory 72-hour detention review does not allow DSHS caseworkers sufficient time to perform service planning for the juvenile. Detention is not only a practical alternative for chronic runaways but, in the opinion of many of the people who work with these juveniles, it is an alternative which meets the needs these juveniles have for a highly structured environment. It should be emphasized that this is a short-term alternative only. Guidelines should be developed for determining which juveniles are chronic runaways to insure that the use of detention is not abused. Detention could be used as a short-term shelter care alternative for an estimated 115 juveniles in the target population in 1977 (138 in 1978).
2. Group home for short-term care and diagnosis: This alternative would provide shelter care on an immediate basis for juveniles in the target population requiring a structured environment and supervision by trained staff. This service would be appropriate for the 19 percent of the target population who have had three or more prior referrals to juvenile court but who are not chronic runaways (104 in 1977, 125 in 1978). If the average length of stay in this facility is 15 days and if these juveniles continue to "repeat" but at a decreased rate of 1.5 referrals to detention a year, then a minimum of six to eight bed spaces would be required for these juveniles.
3. Specialized receiving homes: This alternative would provide short-term shelter on an immediate basis for juveniles who cannot be returned home and who require greater supervision than is currently provided in regular receiving homes. A specialized receiving home would differ from a regular receiving home in three aspects: (a) higher foster care rates would be paid, (b) fewer juveniles (one to two) would be placed in

a single home, and (c) foster parents would have special training. This service would be appropriate for 33 percent of the target population who have had one or two prior court referrals (181 in 1977, 216 in 1978). If the average length of stay in a receiving home is 15 days and these juveniles repeat at a decreased rate of 1.5 referrals to detention per year, then a minimum of 11 to 13 specialized receiving home spaces will be required to meet the needs of this population in King County. To allow for turnover, another three spaces would be required (i.e., 14 to 16 spaces with 80 percent occupancy).

4. Group home for severely emotionally disturbed adolescents: This alternative would provide both short-term care on an immediate basis and longer-term care for a small group of juveniles (an estimated 38 in 1977 and 46 in 1978). A group home of this sort could provide out-of-home care for juveniles who have been under intense psychiatric care at, for example, the Child Study Treatment Center in Tacoma or the University of Washington Adolescent Clinic, and have been released from these programs but are not yet ready to return home. In these cases the group home would be a type of half-way house. The home could also provide emergency short-term shelter for juveniles who exhibit emotionally disturbed behavior that requires further diagnosis. Although the number of juveniles with these requirements is small, the special nature of their problems makes it extremely difficult to provide appropriate services given the current lack of alternatives. If the average length of stay for these juveniles is 45 days (long-term stays for some, short-term stays for others), then a group home with six bed spaces would be needed for this group.

Long-Term Shelter Care: Among the population provided short-term shelter care on an emergency basis, some juveniles will be able to return home and some will require longer out-of-home placement. These possibilities apply to 73 percent of the target population (21 percent chronic runaways in detention, 19 percent juveniles in group home for short-term care and diagnosis, 33 percent juveniles in specialized receiving homes) or 400 in 1977 and 479 in 1978. An optimistic estimate of the "success rate" for this group, i.e., the portion of juveniles that can be returned home, is 25 percent. This leaves 300 juveniles that would need long-term shelter care in 1977 (359 in 1978). Two options are proposed for this group: specialized foster homes for approximately 200 juveniles in 1977 (239 in 1978) and group homes for 100 juveniles in 1977 (120 in 1978).

1. Group homes for long-term placement: The group home is considered a temporary placement; the underlying goal of most group home programs is to enable the juvenile to be returned home or, in the case of some older juveniles, to begin living on their own. A variety of group home programs seem to be needed for the target population. There is a need for a program which provides a highly structured environment, particularly for chronic runaways. There also seems to be a need for group homes with emancipation programs. Group homes for these juveniles would also need to incorporate intensive family counseling, as many of the problems exhibited by these juveniles stem from the family. If the average length of stay in a group home is six months (with no repeats), then a minimum of 50 spaces would be required for this group of juveniles. Not all of this need represents new group home spaces, as some of these juveniles have been or are currently placed in a group home facility. The need for group home spaces could be met by reorganizing some existing group home facilities to dedicate space to the target population and by phasing in new group home facilities. One-third of the need for group home spaces (17 spaces) could be met by reorganizing existing group homes to better handle juveniles in the target population. Two-thirds of the need for group home spaces (33 spaces) could be met by new group homes.
2. Specialized foster homes: As with group homes, the underlying goal of most foster care placements is to enable the juvenile to return home. To attain this goal the out-of-home placement is combined with a variety of services provided by or through DSHS caseworker staff. Specialized foster homes, like specialized receiving homes, would differ from regular foster homes in three aspects: (a) higher foster care rates would be paid, (b) fewer juveniles would be placed in a single home, and (c) foster parents would have special training. If the average length of stay in specialized foster care is six months, then 100 spaces would be needed for 200 juveniles in 1977 (120 spaces in 1978 for 239 juveniles).

Training for Specialized Foster Parents: It seems unlikely that the need for specialized foster homes (both receiving homes and homes for long-term placement) can be met by merely decreasing the number of juveniles placed in a single home and by increasing the vendor rates for such homes. Although the higher payments may motivate some foster parents to take in juveniles in the target population, (these payments) will not assure that the placements will be successful. An increase in DSHS casework and other staff support, as recommended in the DSHS report on SB 3116, should help to increase the number of successful placements. One means of further increasing the likelihood of success would be to provide special training to foster parents who are willing to take in juveniles in the target population. For example, workshops could be provided which would teach foster parents about adolescent behavior and techniques that might be used for handling rebellious adolescents. Some followup workshops in addition to an initial one would provide continuing support to the foster parent. Training could not only increase the effectiveness of foster parents in handling juveniles in the target population but also might decrease the turnover rate for such foster parents. Assuming a mix of one and two placements per foster home and a mix of two-parent and single-parent foster homes, training would be needed for an estimated 200 foster parents in 1978.

...King County has placed a high priority on the problem of status offenders in detention for the purposes of recommending allocation of 1978 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act block grant funds. This problem has been given priority because (1) a condition of State eligibility for JJDP funds is substantial compliance with the requirement of the JJDP Act that status offenders be removed from detention within two years of the acceptance of JJDP funds; (2) the passage of SB 3116 expresses the State's intent to address the problems presented by status offenders; (3) private citizens and individuals within the juvenile justice system have expressed concern over the problem of status offenders in detention (as evidenced at the initiation of the Rebellious Youth Project); and (4) the State Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee since its inception has given much attention to the status offender population. Since the kinds of service required to remove status offenders from detention (e.g., crisis intervention and shelter care) are clearly the responsibility of the Department of Social and Health Services, King County's involvement in addressing the problem is exclusively for the purpose of providing local input to DSHS and not for the purpose of applying for 1978 JJDP funds. This intent of King County to limit its involvement in the JJDP grant process was expressed in the 1977 King County Law and Justice Planning grant application which was approved by motion of the King County Council and approved by the State Law and Justice Planning Office in the form of a contract.

Accordingly, it is recommended that DSHS apply for 1978 JJDP funds for projects proposed in this section for the purposes of addressing the problem of status offenders in detention in Region IV (King County). At the time formal applications for funding would be submitted by DSHS, King County would also submit any waivers required to demonstrate that the use of funds would be consistent with local interest. The following services have been identified as being needed in order to remove most status offenders from detention at the King County Youth Service Center.

1. Crisis intervention services for a projected 131 juveniles in 1978.
2. A group home for short-term care and diagnosis for a projected 125 juveniles in 1978. This need could be met by eight group home spaces.
3. Specialized receiving homes (up to 30 days placement) for an estimated 216 juveniles in 1978. This need could be met by 16 receiving home spaces.
4. A group home for both short-term and long-term care of severely emotionally disturbed adolescents (an estimated 46 in 1978). This need could be met by a group home with six spaces.
5. Group homes for long-term shelter care for an estimated 120 juveniles each with an average six-month stay in 1978. This need could be met by reorganizing 17 spaces in existing group homes and by developing new group homes to provide 33 new spaces.

6. Specialized foster family homes are needed for an estimated 239 juveniles in 1978. This need could be met by 120 foster home spaces.
7. As an adjunct to specialized foster homes, training is needed for an estimated 200 foster parents in 1978.

These recommendations assume that the need for group home spaces could be met by remodeling existing facilities.

Since shelter care and crisis intervention services for these youths are among the statutory responsibilities of the Department of Social and Health Services, it would be appropriate for DSHS to provide the services needed to remove status offenders from detention. It is recognized, however, that the responsibilities of DSHS are many and the demands on the budget of that agency are great. In arriving at the estimates of service needs, the recommendations of DSHS contained in the report entitled "Alternatives to the Commitment of Dependent-Incorrigible Youth" were taken into consideration. Most of the identified service needs do, in fact, coincide with the types of services recommended by DSHS. It would be appropriate, therefore, for DSHS to act as the grantee for 1978 JJDP block grant funds, to provide direct services or to subcontract with private nonprofit agencies. The following are advisory recommendations for both 1978 JJDP funding and increases in DSHS funding from other sources.

For the purposes of calculating the costs of services, the following assumptions about costs are used:

1. The cost to DSHS of specialized foster care (receiving homes or long-term foster homes) is \$262 per month per child. "A specialized rate of \$98 per month to be added to the basic \$164 per month for a child over 12 years of age" was recommended by DSHS in its report on SB 3116 ("Report on Alternatives to the Commitment of Dependent-Incorrigible Youth"). In addition, a retainer fee (\$25 a month) is required for empty spaces to allow for turnover ("Child Foster Care Program Review," September, 1976, DSHS).
2. The average cost (to DSHS) of group home care for the target population is estimated to be \$700 per month per child. This average approximates the DSHS vendor rates currently being paid for similar group homes in King County.
3. The start-up cost for the first year of operation for a small (five to six space) group home is estimated at \$50,000. This figure is based on similar group home project proposals previously submitted for JJDP funding. Start-up costs include costs such as remodeling and operation expenses which are not covered by the standard DSHS payment of \$285 per child per month which is provided during the first year of a group home's operation.

Under each service area, it is indicated what the cost of providing that new or expanded service would be in 1978. Also indicated are the amounts that are recommended for 1978 JJDP grant funding and the estimated incremental increases in the DSHS budget which would result from provision of the recommended services.

Crisis Intervention: An application for 1976 LEAA grant funds under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act has been made by Mental Health North for a crisis intervention project. The grant amount requested is \$56,934. The proposed project would provide crisis intervention to status offenders presented for detention at the King County Youth Service Center. The project would handle not only the first-time status offenders in the narrowly defined target population (i.e., first-time status offenders who are currently being detained) but also those first-time status offenders who are presented and not admitted to detention.

If the Mental Health North crisis intervention project is started in 1977 under 1976 LEAA (JJDP) funds, and if the project appears to be effective in reducing recidivism among first-time status offenders, then 1978 JJDP funds should be requested to continue the project (\$56,934). If the project is not funded in 1977, then 1978 JJDP funds should be requested to start the project in 1978.

According to the report on SB 3116, DSHS is currently experimenting with the use of 24-hour crisis intervention to divert dependent-incorrigible (status offender) youths from foster home placement (Tacoma Homebuilders). The results of this experiment and the results of the Mental Health North project (if funded) should indicate whether crisis intervention is an effective service. If it is shown to be effective in reducing recidivism and out-of-home placements, then crisis intervention would be an appropriate service for DSHS to provide on a regular basis.

Group Home for Short-Term Care and Diagnosis: A shelter care program of this type is expected to begin operation in early 1977. The program will be located in the Downtown YMCA and will have 16 spaces for juveniles of both sexes. Space for the YMCA Receiving Facility will be provided by the YMCA; funds for starting up the program have been provided by the Medina Foundation and funds for operating the program will be from private sources and DSHS payments. In addition, liaison staff is to be provided by DSHS. The program will provide, in conjunction with the shelter care, intensive family counseling with the goal of enabling the juvenile to return home. Since this program will handle juveniles for whom neither detention nor receiving home placement is appropriate, it is expected that the program will serve not only some of the status offenders who are currently being detained (the target population) but also some of the status offenders who are presented and not admitted to detention. Since the YMCA Receiving Facility will provide 16 spaces, it is expected to be sufficient for both populations. Assuming that DSHS will be paying \$700 per month per child for this group home facility in 1978, and assuming that the facility has a 90 percent occupancy rate, the new YMCA Receiving Facility will create an estimated incremental increase of \$120,960 to the DSHS annual budget in 1978.

Specialized Receiving Homes: In its report on SB 3116, DSHS has identified specialized foster homes as one of the service areas where augmentation is needed. The report states that, "staff and foster care persons involved with this population (dependent-incorrigibles) require not only specialized training but specialized resources as well." The report recommends that (1) placement of dependent-incorrigible youths be limited to one or two youths in a single foster home, and (2) specialized rates be provided for foster care for these youths. If the increase recommended in the report is implemented, the cost of these specialized receiving homes would be assumed by DSHS. A total of 16 receiving home spaces with 80 percent occupancy would cost DSHS \$41,203 per year in King County. Assuming these spaces do not represent an increase in the current number of regular receiving home spaces, this specialized receiving home program would create an incremental increase of \$15,053 in the DSHS budget for 1978.

Group Homes for Long-Term Care: One-third of the need for group home spaces (17) could be met by reorganizing existing group home spaces. It is recommended that DSHS increase the group home vendor rates for dependent-incorrigible youths in order to motivate existing group homes to establish programs for these youths. This increase should be incorporated in any new rate setting system which is established by DSHS (as is currently being considered). The differences between the estimated average payment for group homes for dependent-incorrigibles (\$700) and the average for all group homes as reported in the DSHS report, "Foster Care Program Review," is \$225. Therefore, it is estimated that the incremental increase created by the re-orientation of 17 existing group homes would be \$45,900 in 1978.

Approximately two-thirds of the need for group home spaces (33) could be met by new group homes. To meet this need, it is recommended that the start-up costs be covered by JJDP funding. Proposals for five small group homes (five to six spaces each) should be submitted by DSHS. The grant requests would be approximately \$45,000 per home or a total of \$225,000. Since this is a considerable amount, given the total JJDP funds available, it would be appropriate to phase in these group homes over a two-year period. A total of \$135,000 in 1978 JJDP funds should be requested to start up three group homes in 1978. These projects would cost DSHS \$13,500 in match funds and approximately \$51,300 in vendor rate payments (for the first year). These new group homes would create an incremental increase of approximately \$64,800 to the DSHS budget in 1978.

Specialized Foster Family Homes: (See the section on specialized receiving homes for DSHS recommendations for this service area.) The 120 spaces needed for long-term foster

care would cost DSHS \$377,280 per year at the recommended vendor rate of \$262 per month per child. Assuming that these spaces do not represent an increase in the current number of regular foster homes, this specialized foster home program would create an incremental increase of an estimated \$236,160 to the DSHS budget in 1978.

Training for Specialized Foster Parents: Workshops for training 200 foster parents could be provided either directly through DSHS or subcontracted to private trainers (educators and/or counselors). It would be appropriate to fund the training project with 1978 JJDP funds. This project would cost approximately \$50,000 (\$250 per foster parent), \$45,000 in JJDP funds and \$5,000 in DSHS matching funds.

It is proposed that 1978 JJDP funds be made available to fund some of these services as part of a program to remove certain types of status offenders from detention at the King County Youth Service Center. It is proposed that:

1. DSHS apply for 1978 JJDP funds as indicated below and at its discretion either provide these services directly or sub-contract with private service providers in King County.
2. Local citizen participation in the selection of particular service providers be provided through the DSHS Region IV Advisory Council which is composed of private citizens and representatives of public agencies in King County.
3. 1978 JJDP funds be included in the 1978 State Juvenile Justice Plan for DSHS for the following projects:

<u>Project</u>	<u>1978 JJDP Grant Request (Excluding Match)</u>
Crisis Intervention (Mental Health/North)	\$ 57,000
Group home (five-six spaces) for emotionally disturbed alleged and adjudicated "status offenders"	45,000
Three group homes (five-six spaces each) for alleged and adjudicated "status offenders"	135,000
Training for specialized foster parents	45,000
Total	\$282,000

Detention Classifications

1. Delinquent: A juvenile who is referred for a criminal-type offense or, having been adjudicated delinquent, is awaiting transfer to another agency.
2. Status Offender/Delinquent: A juvenile who is referred for a status offense and is active with the Court or the Department of Institutions for a criminal-type offense.
3. Status Offender/Dependent: A juvenile who is referred for a status offense and is not active with the Court for a criminal-type offense.
4. Dependent: A juvenile who is referred for neglect, abuse, lack of shelter or lack of proper guardianship.
5. Other: A juvenile who is referred to detention but there is insufficient information to determine classification.
6. O.J.: An out-of-jurisdiction juvenile (including illegal aliens).

Working Definitions

Status Offense: An act that would not be considered criminal if committed by an adult. These actions are as follows: being truant, running away from home, being out of control of one's parents or guardians, violating curfew, and frequenting "the company of reputed criminals, vagrants or prostitutes."

Criminal-Type Offense: The violation of "any law of this state or any ordinance of any town, city, or county of this state defining a crime or the violation of any federal law or law of another state defining a crime." (From RCW 13.04.010, definition of "delinquent child.")

Delinquent:

- 1.0 A juvenile who is referred to detention for a criminal-type offense.
- 1.1 A juvenile who is awaiting transfer to another agency after having been adjudicated delinquent.
- 1.2 A juvenile who is placed in detention by Court order after having been adjudicated delinquent.
- 1.3 A juvenile who is placed in detention pending further Court action after having been adjudicated delinquent.

Status Offender/Delinquent:

- 2.0 A juvenile who has been referred for a status offense and also has a current referral to Court for a criminal-type offense for which a final disposition has not yet been determined.
- 2.1 A juvenile who is referred for a status offense and is in violation of an informal adjustment agreement for a criminal-type offense.
- 2.2 A juvenile who has been referred for a status offense and is in violation of probation, parole or any Court ordered conditions after having been adjudicated delinquent.

Status Offender/Dependent:

- 3.0 A juvenile who is referred for a status offense and has had no previous referrals to court.
- 3.1 A juvenile who is referred for a status offense and also has a current referral to Court for a status offense for which a final disposition has not yet been determined.
- 3.2 A juvenile who is referred for a status offense and is in violation of an informal adjustment agreement for a status offense.
- 3.3 A juvenile who is referred for a status offense and is in violation of probation, parole or any Court ordered conditions after having been adjudicated incorrigible.
- 3.4 A juvenile who is referred for a status offense and has had a previous referral for a criminal-type offense but is not active with the Court for the criminal-type offense.
- 3.5 A juvenile who is referred for a status offense and has been adjudicated delinquent in the past but is not in violation of probation, parole or any Court ordered conditions.

Dependent:

4.0 A juvenile who is not referred for any offense but is referred because of abuse or neglect.

Other:

5.0 A juvenile who is referred to detention and there is not sufficient records information to determine status.

O.J.:

6.0 Out of jurisdiction.

6.1 A juvenile who resides outside of King County and is referred for a criminal-type offense.

6.2 A juvenile who resides outside of King County and is referred for a status offense.

6.3 An illegal alien.

SECTION IV-B(c): SUSPECT/OFFENDER PROCESSING, ADJUDICATIONS AND CORRECTIONSSpecial Category

Problem Statement A: Crime reduction programs operated by the City need to be objectively evaluated to enable the development of additional information on crime reduction strategies, and to assist local policy makers in choosing more efficient and effective means to reduce and control crime.

Discussion

The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to provide guidance and funds to state law enforcement planning agencies. The states, in turn, disperse monies to improve the quality of law enforcement and criminal justice. As of June, 1976, approximately five billion dollars have been provided for the administration and funding of projects in the criminal justice system to implement the intent of the Act. Unfortunately, the impact of such projects on crime or the system of criminal justice has infrequently been demonstrated in a conclusive or objective fashion.

Assessing the impact of these programs or their crime reduction effectiveness requires the evaluation of the operation and/or the outcome of projects. However, as Kimberling and Fryback (William C. Kimberling and John T. Fryback, "Systematic Evaluation of Criminal Justice Projects: A State of the Art in the United States," J. Crim. Justice, Vol. 1, 1973, p. 146) have pointed out, the term "evaluation" is subject to a variety of interpretations.

To some it implies a procedural evaluation--i.e., the monitoring of a project in order to determine if funds are properly expended, if the project is proceeding as planned, and if it is generally operating in an orderly and efficient manner. Such an approach usually results in only a measurement of internal project activity...A more generally accepted interpretation of "evaluation" is the measurement of effectiveness of a project in achieving external objectives...e.g., a reduction in a specific crime.

To achieve an evaluation of project effectiveness in meeting external objectives of reducing crime, three general approaches to evaluation have been used nationally. These are subjective, baseline and scientific evaluation. More specific definitions of these methodologies are given below.

1. Subjective evaluation: Subjective evaluation usually requires the review of project operation by persons experienced in program monitoring. Evaluations of this kind rely upon on-site inspections and discussions with project personnel or clients. Since these evaluations frequently depend upon impressions of success or failure gained from program personnel and/or recipients of program services rather than objective data, their value is extremely limited and the conclusions questionable.
2. Baseline evaluation: Baseline evaluation represents a considerable improvement over subjective evaluation. This method relies upon the measurement of program effectiveness against baseline data established either from a comparable sample population or from prior operation. To the extent that different programs share common sample populations or common objectives, projects may sometimes be compared to one another. Since control populations are not usually examined simultaneously, however, the results of such projects are weakened and the evaluation loses power.
3. Scientific evaluation: Scientific evaluation requires experimental design, data collection and data analysis. For maximum usefulness, the experimental design and data collection efforts should occur prior to program implementation, to insure that adequate and valid data will be available for program evaluation. Unfortunately, most project staff are not capable of such rigorous quantitative analysis. In most

instances, project personnel lack the confidence and sophistication to design experimental tests of effectiveness. As a consequence, very little "solid" evaluative information on a national basis has been forthcoming from project personnel of LEAA-funded programs.

The preferred evaluation method, scientific evaluation, provides information on crime impact, efficiency and cost effectiveness that is not influenced by the occurrence of non-program or extraneous events, trends in crime, selection or other factors. Obviously, in making continued-funding decisions, it is important that the demonstrated success of a program be due to its actual operation rather than non-program events.

In addition to providing reliable and valid data on eventual program impact, well designed scientific evaluations allow program modification and redesign to occur by periodically assessing program operation and impact. These interim or formative evaluation aspects of adequate scientific evaluation allow program operators to identify operational problems early within a program cycle, while there remains an opportunity to resolve or modify them and still have an opportunity to demonstrate program impact prior to continued-funding decisions.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement A

Rejected Strategies

Evaluation performed by program staff. A frequently suggested and implemented approach to program evaluation nationally has involved the use of personnel originally employed to implement and operate programs. The advantage of this approach is that they are familiar with the program and are aware of various actual, as opposed to official, operational procedures and non-project factors that influence the apparent success or failure of their efforts. However, there are several factors that counterbalance the advantages gained by project personnel evaluating their own program. First, it is usually the case that these individuals are hired on the basis of skills, abilities and professional qualifications relevant to the day-to-day operations of programs. For this reason, it is rare that these individuals also have the appropriate training and expertise in the use of accepted scientific methodology necessary for objective evaluation. Second, the results of such first-party or self-evaluations performed internally by project operators typically are not considered as credible and authoritative as evaluations performed by non-project personnel.

Evaluation performed by consultants. Another frequently chosen approach to evaluation involves the use of professionals employed as consultants to specific projects. The advantage of this strategy is that it results in objective, second-party evaluations performed by individuals trained and experienced in scientific assessment of program operations. The disadvantages of this approach are threefold. First, such individuals usually have minimal knowledge of the overall environment in which a program is operating and the various factors or other programs influencing such programs. Although this difficulty can be remedied somewhat by intensive study of the program and interviews with staff, this increased time commitment leads to the second disadvantage of this strategy. Second, the use of professionals acting as consultants on specific programs or groups of programs is the most expensive manner of obtaining acceptable program evaluations. Third, once outside consultants have completed these evaluations, frequently, they are not available for further discussion.

Evaluation performed by State Planning Office. A third alternative is that the State Planning Office assume the major responsibility for evaluation of City programs. The two advantages of this approach are that objective second-party evaluations would be conducted, and that they would be performed by trained professional personnel. However, there are two disadvantages to this approach. First, as in the case of professional consultants, state evaluators who are not in contact with project directors and program operation will have minimal knowledge concerning both program operation and environmental influences upon such operation. Second, at present, the State Planning Office does not have sufficient staff capacity to perform the quantity and quality of evaluation presently required for LEAA-funded projects.

Current Strategy

Evaluation performed by the City of Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office. The current approach attempts to combine the advantages of the rejected strategies while maintaining objective second-party evaluations for a relatively lower cost. This approach involves funding trained and experienced researchers and evaluators who, because of their continued contact with project directors and personnel, are aware of information sources, program strengths and weaknesses, and the total operation of various projects currently operating within the local criminal justice system. This continuing contact with all the projects allows evaluations to be performed that take into account many of the factors that usually are known only to project operators. However, while gaining an "insider's" knowledge of program operation, these individuals are independent of the program and, therefore, are able to maintain an "outsider's" objectivity.

By employing trained and experienced personnel, the evaluations performed are conducted in an objective and acceptable scientific manner. In addition, by maintaining this "in-house" capability, evaluation designs, data collecting and recording procedures and methodological considerations can be introduced into programs before they are implemented. Thus it is possible to implement programs with the assurance that when they are completed, it will be possible to give definitive answers concerning impact, efficiency and cost effectiveness.

A further advantage of this approach is that it provides a continuing resource, both in terms of knowledge concerning prior evaluations, research and evaluation methodology and data gathering capabilities, to the planning staff of the City of Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office and others within the local criminal justice system.

Proposed Strategy

The suggested approach is to continue to maintain the presently funded level of research and evaluation staff within the City of Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office.

Project: Criminal Justice Evaluation

Goal: To establish and maintain a research and evaluation capacity capable of adequately assessing the effectiveness of crime reduction strategies.

Objectives

1. Development of a research design for each crime reduction project capable of either baseline or scientific evaluation of external project objectives.
2. Development of internal evaluations of all system improvement projects. In most instances, such projects have no direct influence upon crime reduction. Instead, these evaluations require measurements of the efficiency of internal operations compared to baseline data prior to project funding.
3. Continuation of efforts to examine and analyze general crime reduction strategies which may or may not be funded through LEAA; i.e., examine current practices and assumptions of law enforcement, adjudications and corrections.

Methods

In response to the type of problems identified in this problem statement and the lack of clarity concerning the type or degree of evaluation to be conducted on LEAA projects, the Washington State Law and Justice Planning Office has established relevant criteria. These guidelines, which are used in the review of grant applications, specify the intensity and nature of evaluation to be conducted dependent upon the nature of the grant. Furthermore, they require that all grant applications contain procedures for their own measurement or evaluation.

The purpose of this grant is to continue the capacity of the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office to perform objective evaluations of crime reduction and system improvement projects in a manner consistent with LEAA and Washington State Law and Justice Planning Office guidelines. This is to be achieved by the provision of two researcher/evaluators capable of incorporating baseline and scientific evaluation designs in the initial development of projects. Strict adherence to such "front-end" evaluation design will insure that essential data collection needs and procedures are identified during program planning efforts, and that implementation of data and design procedures occur at the same time program operation begins. In addition to these activities, the researcher/evaluators examine other programs and operational practices of the criminal justice system which are intended to prevent or reduce criminal activity.

Past Results

All the objectives mentioned above are in various stages of accomplishment. New projects being submitted by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office contain rigorous research designs and are capable of baseline and scientific evaluations whenever possible. This capacity is being expanded to encompass all crime reduction projects presently administered through the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office. This is possible with experienced researcher/evaluators who are familiar with experimental design, statistical analysis and probability theory. Since June, 1974, baseline and scientific evaluation designs and data collection procedures have been initiated or improved on all new crime reduction programs proposed by this office.

During the first year of this grant, evaluation designs were initiated or improved on the following projects by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office: Automated Court Calendaring, Burglary Reduction, Narcotics Buy Money, Rape Reduction, Records Development, Remote Protective Surveillance, Robbery Reduction-Offender Recognition, Target Hardening and the Youth Service Bureau System.

In the second year of this grant, evaluation designs were initiated or improved on the following projects: Consumer Crime Prevention, Community Service Officer, Domestic Assault Reduction, Hidden Cameras, Stakeout Alarms, Patrol Investigative Training, Career

Employment Research, Expanded Investigation of Burglary, Mobile Citizen Involvement Unit and Systems Response to Burglary.

Major evaluations that have been completed through this grant include the following projects: Community Crime Prevention (first-year, second-year), Rape Reduction (first-year, second-year), Career Employment Research (combined first- and second-year projects), Consumer Crime Prevention, Community Service Officer and Narcotics Buy Money.

As a result of the Criminal Justice Evaluation Project, baseline information concerning criminal justice system operation has been begun or completed in the following areas: victimization within low-income housing (Seattle Housing Authority); victimization within the general Seattle population (SEA-KING Victim Information Project); adult offender arrest history profiles for murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, auto theft, heroin/cocaine, carrying concealed weapons and vandalism; convenience store robbery survey; relation between juvenile offender's place of residence and location of crime occurrence; and the effect of spring vacation upon the occurrence of crime.

The Community Crime Prevention Program has been designated as an Exemplary Project--one of only 23 projects among the thousands funded by LEAA which have been so designated. The Exemplary Project designation is based not only on the merits of what a project attempts to do, but also on the project's ability to document conclusively that it has achieved its objectives.

In the third year of this grant, major project evaluations that have been completed or are near completion include Single Fingerprint, Robbery Offender Recognition, Expanded Investigation of Burglaries, Rape Reduction, Community Crime Prevention, Youth Service Bureau/Community Accountability Program, Felony Warrant Service, Consumer Crime Prevention and Target Hardening. In addition, a joint study with Municipal Probation Services of the ability to predict misdemeanants' rearrest risk and effect of probation on rearrest rates was completed. Also, a study design and data analysis were performed for a victim needs assessment survey conducted cooperatively with the Seattle Junior League and the Seattle Police Department.

Evaluation

Evaluation of this grant by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office will be limited to the extent to which the identified objectives are achieved and will, essentially, consist of reporting of activities. More extensive evaluation would be desirable and consistent with the intent of the project. However, as the State Law and Justice Planning Office guidelines point out, "First-party or self-evaluations performed internally by project operators will not be considered as credible or authoritative." Therefore, it is suggested that an evaluation of this project be conducted by the State Law and Justice Planning Office.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
LEAA	\$62,183	\$69,645	\$78,002
State	3,455	3,869	4,334
City	3,454	3,869	4,333
Total	\$69,092	\$77,383	\$86,669

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$54,702	Federal (LEAA)	\$62,183	90%
Supplies	340	State Buy-In	3,455	5%
Other Services and Charges	14,050	Local Cash Match	3,454	5%
Capital Outlay	0	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
Total Cost	\$69,092		\$69,092	

Problem Statement B: Automated data processing capabilities of the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office need to be expanded.

Discussion

With increased evaluation activities and more in-depth data analysis currently underway and anticipated for the coming years, the past reliance upon manual data collection, manipulation and analysis has become increasingly cost ineffective. Currently, the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office is either maintaining or in the process of collecting and updating information for the following programs undergoing evaluation. The extent of this effort in regard to program evaluation can be seen in the following listing:

1. Community Crime Prevention: 10,000 residences (as of December, 1976) requiring five computer cards each, with up to 32 separate data entries per card.
2. Community Accountability Program/Youth Service Bureau System: 1,000+ youths (as of January, 1977) requiring four computer cards with a total of 141 separate data entries per youth.
3. Victimization Survey Information: As of January, 1977, 5,500+ victimization surveys requiring four computer cards per survey have been completed. In mid-1977, an additional 1,000 surveys will be performed.
4. Hidden Cameras Project: To maintain high probability of target sites for camera placement, a record must be kept on the location, date, type of establishment, etc., of each commercial robbery within the city. To date, approximately 1,000 such records have been developed. As time passes, these records will be updated and added to, in order to insure cameras are located in establishments likely to be robbed.
5. Domestic Assault Reduction Project: Records will be maintained on repeat domestic disturbance sites, police and Community Service Officer response and subsequent number and nature of Seattle Police Department reinvolvement with those sites. By the end of the project's final year of operation, it is anticipated that at least 300 experimental and 300 control sites will have been identified, and no less than 35 separate data items per site will have been recorded to allow an evaluation of the project's impact upon assault and homicide.
6. Systems Response to Burglary: Over 1,500 cases of arrested burglary suspects with complete Washington State criminal justice system information, requiring four cards per case.

Other projects requiring much the same magnitude of data collection, manipulation and analysis are the following: Rape Reduction Project, Patrol Investigative Training, Stakeout Alarms Project and Robbery Offender Recognition Project.

In addition to project-specific data collection, data currently being keypunched and maintained by the Seattle Police Department Data Processing Section are available and used for both program evaluation and planning purposes. However, due to the computer language programming limitations and limited Seattle Police Department programmer resources, much of these data is currently obtained by means of computer printouts, or "data dumps," and then manually tabulated and analyzed by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office. Increased data capabilities would allow the information presently organized on computer tapes to be reformatted and analyzed using more "powerful" scientific computer languages and programs available locally.

Other data that are currently available regarding Seattle's 121 census tracts are social, economic and demographic information (from the United States Census Bureau, City Office of Policy Planning, Chamber of Commerce and other sources). This information could be obtained and integrated with both project and Seattle Police Department crime data to allow more refined and accurate assessments of program impact, as opposed to changing social, economic and other factors' influence upon crime occurrence.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement B

Rejected Strategies

Manual data analysis. Continued reliance upon manual data tabulation and analysis is both more costly and less reliable than the use of automated data processing equipment when more than several hundred cases with multiple data entries are involved. Based upon past experience of this office, the cost of preparing coding for 200 data cards, keypunching and computer analysis using existing statistical programs may cost from \$200 to \$300. To achieve the same results by relying upon manual methods (with the associated increased likelihood of human error) would probably require at least several work weeks for a trained statistician. In some instances, the type of analysis required by the nature of the data being analyzed may not be capable of manual solution (e.g., matrix algebra procedures used in typical regression analysis).

For less complex statistical analyses or instances involving fewer data entries, manual data analysis is more cost effective and will be the continued method for analysis.

Funding data processing costs in individual project budgets. In the past, data processing costs have been included within individual project proposals. To the extent that such estimated costs are accurate in terms of the actual data processing work to be performed and will reflect the actual programming and computer costs when used, this is a preferred strategy which has the effect of including all project costs within the proposal. Where possible, this procedure will be continued.

There are data processing needs and costs, however, which are neither anticipated nor covered by this procedure. Much of the data analysis performed for planning purposes in the preparation of the annual Plan does not come from individual projects (e.g., all 1975 sample data for burglary, robbery and aggravated assault of the present Plan, data analysis of juvenile and adult arrest history profiles). In the past, data such as the arrest history profile were provided to this office free of cost. This was possible because certain portions of police data are routinely keypunched and maintained by the department. Therefore, the additional cost involved to the department in the past consisted of programmer and computer time. Due to a recent reorganization of data processing services throughout the City, and a corresponding increase in cost of approximately 250 percent, this office currently must pay \$20 to \$35 an hour for programmer time and all computer time costs at a rate of \$150 an hour.

Additional costs not covered by this strategy include those instances in which project proposals do not adequately anticipate data processing costs. This may occur because of a lack of adequate evaluation or program planning in the grant proposal stage, the availability of more different types of data than initially anticipated in the proposal stage or the necessity to perform additional analyses that were impossible to anticipate. These latter possibilities may occur because of policy changes affecting the operation of a project, decisions to increase the magnitude or nature of operation or the need to collect additional data to assess adequately the crime impact objectives.

A further difficulty in relying upon this strategy is that, for the last funded year of a particular project, there is essentially no way to pay for all data processing costs. If one makes the reasonable assumption that an evaluation of a project should include an assessment of its effect for its entire more recent year of operation, some data processing and all data analysis costs would not be incurred until after completion of that project period. However, when a project reaches the end of its contract period, all remaining funds revert to the State Law and Justice Planning Office. This difficult can be resolved in some cases (those projects not funded by money which must be deobligated back to the federal government at project end) by requesting program extensions solely to complete final evaluations. However, such an extension procedure is time consuming and costly in that it requires additional administrative procedures for both City and State Law and Justice Planning Office staff.

Current Strategy

Up to this time, computer services have been performed at the University of Washington Computer Center using available canned or pre-written, general-use statistical programs. The advantage of this procedure has been that three of the staff of the Law and Justice Planning Office are proficient in the use of the available general-use programs. This has enabled the office to do much of the necessary computer analysis without paying for computer or program consultants.

Proposed Strategy

The current strategy is proposed here for continuation in 1978.

Project: Automated Data Processing

Goal: To provide basic and essential data processing capabilities to support program planning and evaluation activities within the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office.

Objective: To provide data coding, keypunching and computer processing of project, crime and crime-related data.

Methods

Project funds will be used to purchase services of data coding or data preparation, keypunching, programmer time and computer time. Data to be prepared in this fashion will consist of project-related and other criminal justice system information. The purpose of the project is to provide information for project planning and evaluation which would not otherwise be available from individual projects or criminal justice system agencies.

Evaluation

The project will be assessed as a level "E" evaluation and will consist of the collection and reporting of the type, cost and purpose of data processing events.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
LEAA	\$6,143	\$6,750	\$6,750
State	341	375	375
City	341	375	375
Total	\$6,825	\$7,500	\$7,500

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$ 0	Federal (LEAA)	\$6,143	90%
Supplies	200	State Buy-In	341	5%
Other Services and Charges	6,625	Local Cash Match	341	5%
Capital Outlay	0	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
Total Cost	\$6,825		\$6,825	

Problem Statement C: Although the City operates a number of programs which involve citizens directly in crime control, overall participation by citizens with government in crime reduction may still be less than adequate.

Discussion

During the latter part of 1976, a telephone interview of crime victims was conducted to obtain information about the various needs or services that result from having been the victim of rape, assault, robbery and purse snatch. This needs assessment survey was a cooperative venture between the Seattle Junior League, the Seattle Police Department, the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office and the Seattle Crisis Clinic.

Survey respondents talked to volunteer telephone workers who explained the purpose of the survey and then conducted the interview. When respondents were asked what type of assistance they needed immediately following the crime (primary assistance), the most frequent response was medical (31.6 percent of all respondents), followed by police (23.7 percent), emotional (15.8 percent), financial/money/food stamps (11.8 percent) and transportation and other (10.5 percent each).

	Priority of Primary Assistance Needs			
	1	2	3	Total
	Emotional	6	5	1
Police	15	3	0	18 (23.7%)
Legal	0	0	0	0
Medical	13	8	3	24 (31.6%)
Financial/money/food stamps	5	4	0	9 (11.8%)
Aid for dependents/children	0	1	0	1 (1.3%)
Someone to talk to	6	0	0	6 (7.9%)
Transportation	5	2	1	8 (10.5%)
Revenge, capture of offender	2	1	0	3 (3.9%)
Someone to intervene	4	0	0	4 (5.3%)
Protection	1	0	1	2 (2.6%)
Professional medical/ emotional counseling	1	0	0	1 (1.3%)
Assistance to improve security	0	1	0	1 (1.3%)
Other	7	1	0	8 (10.5%)
None	11	50	70	131
Total	76	76	76	

In addition to immediate or primary needs, respondents were asked to indicate all needs relating to the victimization that had occurred, whether they had received such assistance and the quality of that assistance. When the number of those who say they received assistance is subtracted from those indicating a need, both legal advice and temporary income were unmet needs for 22.4 percent (17) of the sample. Someone to talk to and transportation were unmet needs for 18.4 percent (14) of the sample, while food or food stamps (11.8 percent) and medical assistance (10.5 percent) comprised the remaining needs not met for 10 percent or more of the sample.

Overall, the 76 victims reported a total of 231 needs (an average of 3.04 per person), of which 132, or 57.1 percent (an average of 1.74 per person), were met.

When given the opportunity to talk to a Crisis Clinic worker or receive a referral at the time of the interview, 28 (36.8 percent) of the respondents desired to do so.

Rating of Public Safety Services: Victims were given the opportunity to rate the police department. Of those rating the police department, 23 of 48 persons (47.9 percent) rated the department as good, 11 (22.9 percent) rated it as satisfactory and 14 (29.2 percent) rated it as unsatisfactory.

When asked whether they were aware of the Washington State Victim Compensation Act, only 18 (23.7 percent) of the sample expressed knowledge of the program. The most frequent means of learning about victim compensation was through the media and "other" (7.9 percent each of the total sample, and 33 percent of those aware of the program). The next most frequent means was through the survey letter and the police department (5.3 percent each of the total, and 22.2 percent of those informed). When the requirements for receiving Victim Compensation were explained, 10 (13.2 percent) said they met those requirements, 41 (53.9 percent) did not know if their cases met eligibility requirements, 17 (22.4 percent) said their cases made them ineligible and eight (10.5 percent) did not respond.

When asked if they would have called a victim assistance program if it existed, 48 (63.2 percent) said "yes," three (3.9 percent) said "maybe," five (6.6 percent) said they did not know and 20 (26.3 percent) said "no." Asked if they would be willing to assist such a program as a volunteer and in what capacity, the following responses were obtained from survey participants.

	<u>No Answer</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Yes</u>
Willing to assist in general	5 (6.6%)	11 (14.5%)	11 (14.5%)	49 (64.5%)
Telephone worker (referral/crisis)				22 (28.9%)
Office work				10 (13.2%)
Visit or direct aid to victims				20 (26.3%)
Other				17 (22.4%)

In past Plans, the City has described the undeniable utility of victim/witness (citizen) information for solving crimes. This fact is the basis for a number of Seattle programs including the Community Crime Prevention Program, which utilizes citizen watchfulness to make neighborhoods less vulnerable to the crime of burglary.

Citizen action represents a potentially potent crime reduction technique for other crimes, as well. For example, reliance on victim/witness information for robbery cases is important, in view of the low on-view apprehension rate of 4.7 percent for robbery arrests. Of the 445 arrests for suspicion of robbery in 1974, about 21 were on-view arrests; the majority of the remaining arrests were the result of police action, i.e., arrests by patrol at or near the crime scene, a large number of which were based upon victim/witness information.

A study conducted by the City of Miami Police Department on factors involved in successful robbery apprehensions shows support for use of witnesses and victims. In comparing cleared cases with uncleared or "open" cases, the Miami Police Department contends that victim-initiated followup for which the victim came in to view photographs, video recordings or lineups resulted in a 64 percent clearance rate, compared with a 25 percent clearance rate when victims did not participate in suspect identification. The report claims that "this appears to be the most significant factor in the entire follow-up investigation process--the presence of a victim at the police station to assist in the investigation" ("Study of Factors Involved in Robbery Arrests," City of Miami Police Department Robbery Control Project, Lt. Philip E. Doherty, Project Manager, 1972).

In speaking about general citizen involvement as assistance in police investigation of robbery, the Miami Police Department displays the following data (Table 4B-9).

Table 4B-9--Robbery/Citizen Involvement--Miami (Other than Victim)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Cases cleared	40 percent	60 percent
Not cleared	12 percent	88 percent

The Miami study concludes, "...the clearance rate on robberies depends overwhelmingly on the citizens, either victim or witness."

In Seattle, the manner in which robbery cases are cleared (suspects identified) essentially parallels the Miami experience. Robbery case suspect identification methods described in the Survey of Robbery show that victim/witness identification (from license plate identification to mugshots and lineup identification) is by far the most productive method for identifying robbery suspects.

The results are reformatted and presented in Table 4B-10.

Table 4B-10--Suspect Identification

<u>Suspect Identification</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
<u>Commercial Robbery</u>		
By police (patrol/detective)	8	16%
By citizens (victim/witness)	42	84%
<u>Person Robbery</u>		
By police (patrol/detective)	7	14%
By citizens (victim/witness)	43	86%

For both commercial and person robbery cases, citizens identified 85 suspects, compared with 15 suspects who were identified by police methods.

Locally and nationally, subpoenaed witnesses have been exposed to an array of negative experiences, including appearance as requested, only to find the hearing had been delayed; or, failure to appear--resulting in case dismissal--because the principal witness or victim did not receive the notification to appear.

In response to this sort of administrative problem, several cities have initiated programs to identify problems in witness-victim handling in the adjudication process and to make recommendations for improvements. According to a report compiled in Cincinnati, Ohio ("Report on Why Victims Fail to Prosecute," Cincinnati Police Division Case Information Unit, City of Cincinnati Department of Public Safety, October, 1975), a victim survey analysis to determine why numerous serious felony cases were dropped after entering their local criminal justice system revealed the following:

Of the 45 prosecuting witnesses who were contacted, 13 stated that they discontinued prosecution because they did not wish to have the defendants punished further; six others said they were promised restitution by the defendants; ten said they were not notified to appear, were late for court and could not find the designated courtroom prior to dismissal of their cases; and four indicated they did not feel the courts could provide the "justice" they sought.

Reasons given for dropping the cases were as described in Table 4B-11.

The conclusions reached in Cincinnati were that the witness notification system was not adequate, and that a number of witnesses did not appear in court due to their notifications "getting lost" in the courthouse. In Chicago and Philadelphia, witness-victim advocacy programs have been designed to offer assistance and promote improved handling of witnesses and victims by the criminal justice system.

These programs range in design from citizen court watch to a special community private prosecutor for more severe offenses and offenders. One aim of these measures, obviously, is to bring general attention to community concerns over what is perceived to be an all too offender-oriented adjudication process. However, the principal objectives appear to be offering assistance to victims and witnesses to avoid needless trips and interviews, avoid premature pleas and to "press hard" in instances of victim-witness intimidation by offenders or the offenders' friends or families.

One program operated nationally to encourage better use of witnesses and victims is a citizen advocacy model program. Under this model, paid professional staff act as ombudsmen for citizens forced by circumstances to interact with the criminal justice system.

Table 4B-11--Why Victims Fail to Prosecute--Cincinnati

<u>Reasons Why Cases Were Dropped</u>	<u>Cases Dismissed for want of Prosecution</u>	<u>Cases Dismissed at Request of Prosecuting Witness</u>
Witness in hospital	2	0
Witness stated feelings that the courts would not give "justice"	0	4
Corroborating witness did not appear at preliminary hearing	2	0
Prosecuting witness not notified	5	0
Did not wish to punish defendant any further (relative, friend, misunderstanding)	2	11
Prosecuting witness threatened by defendant	1	1
Did not want to get involved	1	1
Promised restitution by defendant	0	6
Could not find courtroom, late for hearing	5	0
Prosecuting witness working, could not make it to hearing	3	0
Total	22	23

Such programs use varying methodologies, but all essentially rely upon informed professional (sometimes legal) intervention on behalf of citizens, with the aim of increasing the likelihood that "justice will be served" and that citizens interacting with the criminal justice system will be treated fairly.

In Seattle, the King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office operates a witness assistance program which has provided guidance and answers for basic system questions to witnesses (including some victims) as these persons interacted with the prosecution and post-prosecution stages of the criminal justice system.

The Seattle Citizens Service Bureau, which is contacted about criminal justice matters among other complaints, receives approximately 3,000 yearly complaints and inquiries regarding the two City-operated criminal justice system components. A review of 1976 office statistics relevant to the Seattle criminal justice system indicates that in 1976, 1,184 people contacted the Citizens Service Bureau to complain and/or inquire about the Seattle Municipal Court, while another 1,828 people complained and/or inquired about the Seattle Police Department. Calls received by the Citizens Service Bureau which are pertinent to another jurisdiction's responsibility (e.g., prosecution, defense attorney's actions or parolee/probationer problems) are normally referred to the appropriate agency.

The problem of public agencies underutilizing valuable citizen resources is part of a larger problem. In Seattle, over the last four years, demonstration programs have tapped citizen initiative and citizen participation with government in practical strategies to reduce crime. Such efforts have relied upon the donation of volunteer hours on the part of citizens and equally numerous hours of professional staff time providing training. Information provided to citizens is necessary so that their volunteer efforts

may be directed towards maximum utility. It is common for criminal justice agencies to request volunteer workers to perform a multitude of inadequately defined services.

To be effective, citizen participation with government in implementation and operation of strategies to reduce crime relies upon an educational process requiring a commitment by government. The criminal justice system is besieged by conventional wisdom which dominates even the professional community. As new information is made available through experimentation and demonstration efforts, that information should be recycled to be available to citizens, as well as professionals and elected officials. The information on what works to reduce crime and, more commonly, what does not work to reduce crime, is normally not available to citizens. Most citizens desiring information on how to protect themselves from predatory criminal activity do not know where they can receive correct advice. A number of times, citizens are likely to observe suspicious activity which is a prelude to a criminal act, but due to uncertainty, they hesitate to react. Lack of information about crime may lose a number of potential witnesses to street robbery, aggravated assaults and even attempted rapes.

The desire of citizens for information on how to protect themselves and their property from victimization is exemplified in the various requests received by Seattle's Community Crime Prevention Program. Although the focus of the Community Crime Prevention Program is on burglary, in numerous community meetings, citizens have requested information about how to protect themselves from other crimes. In response to these requests, the community organizers of the Community Crime Prevention Program have felt compelled to develop information which could be disseminated to Seattle citizens seeking assistance. The problem with the information currently made available by the Community Crime Prevention Program is that it lacks the precision and utility which have become the program standard for crimes other than burglary. Community Crime Prevention Program staff are burglary prevention experts. It is not reasonable to expect them to develop similar detailed expertise in other crime categories. What is required is a mechanism through which the type of information the program makes available regarding burglary can be made available for other crimes of concern to Seattle citizens.

Another level of citizen participation in crime control problems deals with citizen involvement in concept development and policy making on criminal justice issues. The principal problem in involving citizens in policy development can be exemplified by last year's citizen participation in public hearings held by the Seattle City Council on the Criminal Justice Plan. Although some citizens with concerns about one particular issue or program identified in the Plan may attend meetings, by and large, the Criminal Justice Plan is received with little expressed public interest. In all likelihood, this is not a reflection on the content of the document. More likely, it is a comment on the incomprehensibility of a large document which contains a number of analyses and descriptions and covers a diverse range of criminal justice topics. By comparison, citizens have expressed great interest in attending public hearings regarding individual projects with which they have been involved (Community Crime Prevention and Community Accountability Programs are two examples).

For citizen participation in policy discussions to be meaningful and useful in the decision making process, government must realize that it is the lack of a mechanism to educate citizens with basic information which often obstructs meaningful citizen participation. Criminal justice topics are complex and involve issues about which information is not readily available to citizens. Where government has taken time to inform the public, or where the press has focused the public's attention on a particular issue (for example, on the public hearing on police guns and ammunition), public attendance and participation in the criminal justice policy decision making process has been extensive.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement C

Proposed Strategy

Citizen Crime Control Participation Mechanism. What appears to be required from the above analysis is a four-part solution.

1. Citizens desire information on how to protect themselves and their property from criminal victimization. Such requests are now handled on a piecemeal basis by the Community Crime Prevention Program, the Seattle Police Department, the prosecutor's office, etc. The City should implement a temporary demonstration effort which, although not designed to become a permanent program of City government, begins to pull together such information as is available on how to protect persons and property against criminal victimization and organize this information in a format which may be presented to Seattle citizens.
2. Citizens exposed to the criminal justice system are often confused and frustrated. There is no central agency which can provide generic information to citizens regarding what to expect and what to do when dealing with the criminal justice system. A central telephone number could be used for receiving and referring calls from citizens requiring assistance or information.
3. Citizens who are a potential criminal justice resource to witness crimes and identify potential suspects need to be sought out in order to make the best use of witnesses' and victims' information in the development of criminal cases. Witness information is required in every possible stage of criminal justice processing, from police and prosecution to development of a pre-sentence report for use by the judge in sentencing an offender upon conviction. In a number of cases, witnesses may fail to recognize that they have, in fact, witnessed a crime or that an observance they made may be instrumental to the solvability of a criminal case.
4. Citizen participation in policy development and in the planning process needs to revolve around identifiable issues. Such involvement is facilitated by providing citizens with information about how the criminal justice system works and about crime problems in the city. In addition, the public should know what measures the City has been engaged in to reduce crime. Over the course of the last four years, the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office has been able to provide such information to citizens best through the mechanism of a community meeting in which citizens have been sought out for participation on a voluntary basis and a particular program effort. Through the involvement of citizens on an issue-specific basis, interest has been generated, based upon an informed position.

Although it has been decided that LEAA/Law and Justice funds should not be used to fund a citizen information project, attempts have been made to secure funding. During the current year, Community Development Block Grant funds will be sought to develop a citizen action program designed to facilitate points (1) through (4) above.

Project: Citizen Crime Control

Goal: To achieve useful standards for involving the public in continuous efforts to control and reduce criminal activity.

Primary Objectives

1. To increase to a statistically significant extent the number of witnesses available to police and prosecutors for the crimes of robbery, rape and aggravated assault as a result of project citizen education efforts.
2. To increase citizen perception and understanding of criminal justice system procedures, policies and issues.

Secondary Objectives

1. To disseminate on a broad basis information about crime, where and how it occurs and how it may be prevented, to Seattle citizens.
2. To increase citizen participation in public hearings on criminal justice matters.

Methods

1. Hire program coordinator to collect and assimilate all current technology and information of crime prevention patterns, descriptions of activities, as preludes to criminal acts.
2. Program coordinator writes and has printed for general distribution descriptive materials on crime control.
3. Program coordinator distributes materials to community organizations and speaks as requested to community groups about crime protective measures.
4. Program coordinator enlists volunteer support for further distribution of information and to answer telephones to provide information and referral to citizens seeking assistance.
5. Program coordinator prepares for distribution and public media information campaign a series of crime-specific descriptive packages on how to be a better witness and whom to call.
6. Program coordinator helps develop public service announcements telling persons whom to call for assistance if they have witnessed a crime or require information about criminal justice procedures.

Evaluation

While project staff will be responding to citywide requests to provide information, the majority of proactive, or project-initiated, efforts will be focused within geographically restricted areas. Because of this semi-restriction of project activity to take place primarily within target areas, a non-equivalent control group design to evaluate Objective 1 (increased witnessing of robbery, rape and aggravated assault) will be used. Data on the number of witnesses will be obtained by taking a random sample of 100 each of the three offenses occurring during the year preceding and the year of project operation within both the target and non-target areas. Since this will entail sampling 1,200 offense reports, the only information to be collected for all cases will be the total number of witnesses indicated on the offense report (the "witness number one" line and "item 3"). Of those sampled cases in which a suspect is charged and, therefore, witnesses are available to the prosecutor, the number of witnesses included in the detective investigation summary will be recorded.

To determine if the increase of witnessed offenses is due to an individual's being more likely to identify ambiguous situations correctly as crime occurrences (rather than a family argument, neighborhood quarrel, etc.), a content analysis offense report and witness statements for 30 pre- and 30 post-period cases (ten of each offense type) for target and control areas (a total of 120 cases) will be performed. These will be randomly selected from the initial sample of 1,200 cases with the restriction that the victim and witness be strangers to one another.

Objective 2 (to increase perception and understanding of criminal justice procedures, policies and issues) will also be evaluated using a non-equivalent control group design. Data for this analysis will be obtained through a pre-project and post-project implementation telephone survey conducted through the Criminal Victimization Survey Project.

Secondary Objective 1 (to provide information) and Secondary Objective 2 (to increase citizen participation in public hearings) will not be the subject of statistical analysis or evaluation. Project personnel will record the number of times, types and recipients of all information provided to Seattle citizens and report these data in quarterly progress reports. Additionally, project staff will monitor City of Seattle criminal justice public hearings and record the number of attendees. These also will be reported in the project's quarterly progress reports.

Data collection costs for sampling of case reports, data analysis and evaluation personnel will be funded through the Criminal Justice Evaluation Project. Costs of data collection for secondary objectives will be funded from the Citizen Crime Control Project.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
LEAA	\$69,390	\$77,023	\$84,725	\$ 93,198	\$102,517
State	3,855	4,279	4,707	5,178	5,696
City	3,855	4,279	4,707	5,177	5,695
Total	\$77,100	\$85,581	\$94,139	\$103,553	\$113,908

Problem Statement D: Crime victimization surveys need to be institutionalized for program evaluation and planning purposes because crimes reported to the Seattle Police Department do not accurately reflect the true incidence of crime.

Discussion

The percentage of victimization reported varies by crime type and, over time, reporting rates for specific crimes change. Because of this problem, attempts to determine the crime impact of various programs through the use of official statistics may not represent the true change in crime incidence.

Criminologists have suspected for some time that the amount of actual crime in the population is not accurately reflected in the official statistics of law enforcement agencies (A. D. Biderman and A. J. Reiss, Jr., "On Exploring the 'Dark Figure' of Crime," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1967, 374, 1-15). More recently, national victimization surveys conducted by LEAA have shown that depending on the nature of the crime, the percentage of victimizations reported to police departments may vary from 30.0 percent in personal larceny incidents to 93.0 percent in completed auto thefts (Criminal Victimization Surveys in the Nation's Five Largest Cities, LEAA, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1975, Table 6, pp. 61-62). If these non-reporting rates were constant over time, it would be possible to take these into account whenever changes in reported crime were being examined. However, many programs have as an objective of their operation to increase the reporting of a crime to the police, while simultaneously decreasing the true incidence of that crime (for example, Seattle's Community Crime Prevention Program and the Rape Reduction Project).

This represents a problem for conducting a valid evaluation of the effect of such programs if the only source of data for crime incidence is based on official crime statistics. For example, if a program such as the Community Crime Prevention Program is successful in increasing reporting rates of residential burglary by 20 percent while simultaneously decreasing the incidence by 20 percent, the net observable effects upon reports of burglary to the Seattle Police Department may be no observable change.

While this may seem like an academic argument concerning a hypothetical situation not likely to occur, data are available that indicate this, in fact, does occur. Schneider found that while the number of residential burglaries declined from 15.1 per 100 households in 1971-1972 to less than 13.0 per 100 households in 1973-1974, reporting rates to the police increased from 50 percent to 71 percent in the same time period (A. L. Schneider, Crime and Victimization in Portland: Analysis of Trends, 1971-1974, Oregon Research Institute, Eugene, Oregon, 1975). The net effect of the increased reporting rate was to show what appeared to be an alarming 26.5 percent increase in Portland's official police department burglary rate (first six months of 1974 versus 1973) while, in fact, the true incidence was declining.

More recent data (K. E. Mathews, Jr., Ph.D., Third Year Evaluation of the Community Crime Prevention Program from July 1, 1973, to August 31, 1976, Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, October, 1976) indicates that this sort of effect is produced by the Community Crime Prevention Program operation. This effect means that, while burglary victimization decreases in treated areas, there is also an increased reporting rate for those crimes that do occur.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement D

Rejected Strategy

Self-administered Interviews. A frequently used method of obtaining survey information involves providing individuals with questionnaires, requesting them to answer the questions and to return the answers by mail. Typically, these are either distributed by mail or included in printed media (e.g., newspapers or magazines). Such a procedure has the advantage of being less expensive than most other interview techniques. However, such a cost saving is gained at the expense of the accuracy of the information obtained.

Non-response is the most likely reaction, and low response rates are more likely to result in non-representative information being collected by the survey.

Proposed Strategy

In-person and Telephone Interviews. A more costly but more accurate means of conducting surveys is personal interviewing, conducted either in person or by telephone. (In the past, it has been contended that telephone surveys invariably lead to non-representative results. However, the recent report by Tuchfarber and Klecka, Random Digit Dialing, Police Foundation, 1976, compared the sampling adequacy and accuracy of victimization data obtained through both in-person and telephone surveys and found them to be equivalent.) This requires randomly selecting a group of either individuals or residences and contacting them. The interviewer asks a series of prepared questions and records the respondent's answers. This method has the following advantages: first, response rates are usually quite high when confronted with either a telephone or in-person interview; second, the interviewer can explain or clarify any misunderstandings about the questions; third, given a truly random selection procedure, the results will accurately reflect the actual population's victimization rate within a known error rate.

Project: Criminal Victimization Survey

Goal: To determine the extent to which official crime statistics represent actual crime in the City of Seattle and why such discrepancies exist.

Objectives

1. To determine if statistically significant changes in victim crime reporting rates have occurred within the general population of Seattle.
2. To determine what factors significantly influence victims' decisions to report crime incidents to the police.

Methods

The overall aim of this project is to provide current information concerning the extent to which residents of Seattle are victims of crime, and to assess the extent crime victims are reporting these offenses to police agencies. In those cases where a crime has not been reported, the project will identify factors influencing that decision. The project will assist in generating data about the nature of crime which would not otherwise be available without the performance of surveys of the general population of Seattle. Random sampling procedures will be used to select residences which are representative of the general population to determine whether specific crimes of violence or theft have occurred. In addition, data will be collected for those crimes not reported to the police.

It is expected that the data collected in this fashion will provide new information regarding crime and crime victims in Seattle which will supplement data currently available for planning and evaluation uses. Examples of the type of data to be collected include the nature of the relation between the victim and the offender, costs in terms of dollar loss, property damage and physical injury, and why some criminal incidents are not reported to the police.

The types of crimes to be measured in the survey will be those crimes which have the following characteristics. First, they are committed against individuals, residences or commercial establishments. This would exclude crimes against governmental agencies. Second, the crimes would be those which the victim can identify as having occurred. This would exclude consumer crimes and fraud because, in many instances, victims may not be aware or certain that victimization has occurred. Third, victimless crimes such as illegal gambling, drug or alcohol abuse, and prostitution are excluded. The specific crimes to be measured include rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny-theft and auto theft.

Evaluation

Analysis of this project will be a level "E" evaluation--system improvement/process model--and will consist of collection and reporting of data elements identified within the project proposal. More specifically, this will involve the performance of crime victimization surveys, coding and computer analysis of the data obtained. Data collection and processing costs will be funded by the project, while personnel costs relating to the evaluation of the project will be funded by the Criminal Justice Evaluation Project.

Costs

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
LEAA	\$18,949	\$19,986	\$20,890
State	1,052	1,105	1,161
City	1,052	1,105	1,160
Total	\$21,053	\$22,106	\$23,211

<u>Budget Categories</u>		<u>Source of Funds</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
Personal Services	\$ 0	Federal (LEAA)	\$18,948	90%
Supplies	2,100	State Buy-in	1,053	5%
Other Services and Charges	18,953	Local Cash Match	1,052	5%
Capital Outlay	0	State Agency Match	0	0%
Construction				
Total Cost	\$21,053		\$21,053	

Problem Statement E: Detectives in the Investigations Bureau and support staff in Records and Evidence spend too much time manually assembling, transmitting and retrieving data necessary for detectives to carry out investigations.

Discussion

After a crime incident has occurred in the field, an officer may fill out a report relating to the event. These reports are used for followup by detectives, historical information and statistical reporting. The reports contain information about people, property and the incident itself and are forwarded to the precinct of occurrence for approval. At the precinct, the reports are reviewed and forwarded to the Records Section at headquarters for processing and filing.

The Records Section reviews and classifies each report by type of crime. The Report Review Unit prepares copies for distribution to the proper investigative units. The originals of those reports containing property either lost, stolen or recovered are sent to the Data Control Section for entry into state (WACIC) and national (NCIC) computer files.

The Records Section then types index slips on persons involved in the cases. The index references the incident number and describes the relationship of the individual to the case, i.e., suspect, victim, complainant, etc. Each index card is hand filed alphabetically in the master name index file.

The Records Section forwards the original report to the Data Processing Section so that it can be coded for statistical purposes. Selected information is then keypunched and fed into several individual statistical systems. From these data, the police department produces monthly and annual statistics regarding reported crimes and arrests. Researchers, generally from the Law and Justice Planning Office, also use the raw statistical data in performing assorted studies. The Data Processing Section then returns the original report to the Records Section for filing.

Cases are referenced by police officers, detectives or other individuals involved in the case. In order to retrieve the report desired, the person inquiring must either know the document number or have a records clerk search the master name index. From the index card, the incident number can be obtained to retrieve the document.

The net result of this system is that the circulation of information to detectives is delayed from the time it is initially filed with the department. Subsequent retrievals of information necessitate waiting and delays on the part of the detectives and force the police department to maintain a relatively high level of clerical support to undertake a number of functions that could be performed in an automated manner. In addition, without remote entry to information through terminals, detectives are forced to remain concentrated at the downtown precinct. If an automated system could be implemented with remote terminals for entry to information, detectives could be dispersed to precinct stations. Such a dispersment would cut down upon unnecessary travel time between the central precinct and the geographic area of the city where the detectives are assigned.

Crime Reduction Strategies for Problem Statement E

Proposed Strategies: The only reasonable response to this problem in the long run is to develop an automated system to process and retrieve information. The police department has developed a conceptual design and operational plan for the REPORT system to accomplish this objective.

The REPORT system is a records processing system to index, store and retrieve data about individuals, incidents and property related to events that are formally reported to the Seattle Police Department. The application will include case indexing, case management, statistical gathering for Uniform Crime Reporting, property identification leading to recovery and return of stolen property and crime pattern investigation. The system will have interfaces with Seattle Municipal Court's Ordinance Violations Department, King County Subject in Process System and WACIC, NCIC and the Department of Motor Vehicles.

An inquiry into the REPORT system will provide access to all data available in REPORT and the systems identified above. The system will provide information to local law enforcement agencies that possess inquiry capability.

The report generated by the officer in the field would be sent to the Records Section for review and classification as before. Reports would be duplicated and sent to follow-up units. However, the records clerk would enter selected information from individual reports on a video terminal. The information entered would include names of persons involved, property recovered or stolen, bookings, etc. The original report would then be filed in the central records file.

The previous requirement to route the original report around the department for data input would be eliminated. The information required by each unit would now be available at a terminal stationed in that section. Detectives would be able to go to a terminal located in their area and inquire by name, incident number or other identifier and retrieve information related to the person or case. The records clerk would have the same ability to retrieve data and, additionally, would have the ability to update information in the system. Statistics for departmental and UCR reporting would be extracted from the data base on a periodic basis using off-line techniques.

There are several benefits to be derived from the REPORT system:

1. Reduced errors in the case index. Timely entry and accessibility of case data.
2. Immediate entry of stolen identifiable property into the state system (WACIC) and the national system (NCIC).
3. Search capability of the data, by type of offense, by geographic area, by date and time, by modus operandi, by property description and by suspect description.
4. Increased investigative information made available to users.
5. Increased chance of associating stolen property to crime victims, resulting in greater return of stolen property to owners.
6. Reduced clerical time required to collect and retrieve crime-related information.
7. A decrease in the time required by detectives to examine records.
8. Elimination of duplicate efforts by Records Data Control and Data Processing personnel.
9. Reduced lead time required to produce statistical and investigative reports.
10. Production of FBI Uniform Crime Reports on schedule. Improved accuracy of reports. Reduced manpower needed to produce reports.
11. Provision of an analytical tool for the measurement and management control of follow-up investigations.
12. Provision of inventory control and greater accountability of evidence and property processed by the Property Room.
13. Critically needed floor space required for the efficient operation of the Records Section will be made available.
14. Security, privacy and confidentiality safeguards can be implemented by limiting information retrieval to approved terminals. A "need to know" can be established by requiring an audit trail of investigative file numbers in which the information is used.

15. Optimum use of computer resources presently owned by the department.
16. Decentralization of detectives from the Public Safety Building permitted.

Costs

The cost to bring the REPORT system on line in the police department after the design work is completed and approved is estimated to be \$75,000 to \$100,000 over current cost levels. Assembling front-end costs for the REPORT system development and implementation will continue to be a financial problem for the City in the near future. Supplemental funds available to the City will facilitate the implementation of the REPORT system and realization of the subsequent benefits described in the preceding pages. The City will seek discretionary funding to assist in the development and implementation of the REPORT system. In the event that discretionary funding is not available, and in the event any of the projects scheduled for funding with regular Law and Justice support are not implemented, the City could choose to implement this project as a replacement priority.



END