


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BOSTON PUBLIC HOUSING  
SECURITY PROGRAM--AN  
ASSESSMENT/EVALUATION

February, 1977

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
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BOSTON PUBLIC HOUSING SECURITY PROGRAM --  
AN ASSESSMENT/EVALUATION

Prepared for Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice  
by  
Boston Urban Observatory/University of Massachusetts  
at Boston  
under  
Contract # 74DF-01-0017

February, 1977

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

The Boston Public Housing Security Program was launched in the fall of 1974. Design of the demonstration was based on the hypothesis that security -- both actual and perceived -- depends upon favorable factors in both the physical and the social environments. Key to an effective program would therefore be an approach which, working at the level of the housing development, aimed simultaneously at improving the physical structures that provide protection from criminal activities, and developing social structures that foster a unity of purpose and encourage cooperative efforts for mutual protection.

The program emerged from a complex and lengthy planning process that involved agencies at the federal, state, municipal and community levels. Important among the protagonists were representatives of the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ) and the Boston Housing Authority (BHA). They worked in tandem to secure a grant of \$500,000 from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the U. S. Department of Justice for support of a social action or "software" component that would match a grant of \$500,000 from the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for the "hardware" component of the program comprising among other things, the installation of security doors.

Program Components

The housing developments considered as environments for testing the program strategy were to meet the following criteria: (1) crime was determined and perceived to be a serious problem; (2) the fear of crime was to be intense, especially because of the interface of a large elderly population with young families; (3) there was to be a reasonable chance of reducing crime. Applying these guidelines, four housing developments were selected at which organized tenant groups had earlier expressed an interest in becoming involved in new security techniques advocated by the Boston Housing Authority's Central Security Office (CSO).

In addition, community organizations had to be found that would not only assume responsibility for project planning and implementation, but that also had demonstrated experience in financial management and the capacity to provide front-end financing for project expenses within the context of a cost-reimbursement system.

Among Boston's public housing developments, Columbia Point was a likely choice. It is Boston's largest public housing development, completed in 1954 with an original maximum of 1504 dwelling units, although only 870 were occupied as dwellings in the fall of 1974. It was also the development with the highest rate of reported crime, recorded

in 1972 as two and one half times the crime level of the city as a whole.\* Located on a remote peninsula relatively isolated from other residential areas of the city, it was populated predominantly by blacks, a fluctuating group of Hispanics (many of whom were squatters) and a dwindling number of elderly, white households who feared not only high crime rates, but the threat of displacement resulting from extensive renovations being planned under HUD's Target Projects Program.

Goals formulation and program development for security at Columbia Point grew out of cooperative LEAA/community/University of Massachusetts at Boston efforts (mainly staff of the Boston Urban Observatory) over a 16-month period beginning in January 1974. The first 11 months of planning operations were devoted to organizing a community security planning structure and process, framing a comprehensive security plan, and initiating selective security operational activities. During the following five months the Boston Urban Observatory provided technical assistance to the Columbia Point Community Development Council (CPCDC) and to its Security Task Force, which had been constituted as a committee of the

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\* Boston Public Housing Security Program, Program Application submitted by the Mayor's Safe Streets Act Advisory Committee to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice, May 20, 1974 (pages unnumbered).

CPCDC. The CPCDC is the governing board for the Area Planning Action Council (APAC), itself a community affiliate of Action for Boston Community Development, Inc. (ABCD), the City's official anti-poverty agency.

The Mission Hill and Mission Hill Extension housing developments also suffered from reported crime rates significantly higher than those of the city at large. Built in 1940 with 1023 units, by 1974 Mission Hill Main had fewer than 800 occupied units and provided shelter predominantly for Hispanic and black residents. Mission Hill Extension had been completed in 1952 with 588 units; its resident population was overwhelmingly black. Both developments were characterized by a large proportion of female-headed households and minors, the absence of a strong sense of community, and a high degree of vandalism.

Efforts by staff of the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice to launch a youth employment program that would have involved Mission Hill youth in making security-related repairs failed because of a lack of cooperation by the BHA maintenance workers' union. The result was a last-minute search for a local community agency to plan and carry out an alternative project addressed to both Mission Hill Main and Extension. It ended with the selection of Roxbury Children's Service, Inc., an agency founded in 1968 to provide social services to children and families of Roxbury.

The third choice of a participating development in the Boston Public Housing Security Program was Commonwealth or Fidelis Way. This site was selected because, despite recent increases in crime, the chances for improving security appeared favorable. Constructed after the second World War with 648 units, the development was undergoing major demographic changes with a long-established but upwardly mobile white population being replaced largely by black and Hispanic residents. The high rate of turnover was resulting in a breakdown of the development's sense of community, the periodic outbreak of racial tensions, and fear among the sizeable white elderly population.

The Commonwealth housing development had been served for several years by the Allston-Brighton Area Planning Council (APAC), another ABCD community affiliate, which met the MOCJ's requirements of fiscal agent. Although Commonwealth was a state-subsidized development and thus not eligible for renovation funds through HUD's matching "hardware" grant, it was chosen with the hope that funds available for security doors and mailboxes would be subsequently identified and secured.

The comprehensive demonstration security program that emerged thus consisted of three completely separate software proposals, reflecting the intrinsically perceived problems of each of the four housing developments. In addition, a

Volunteer Resident Patrol Project was incorporated in the overall demonstration, a project that would provide a common operational thread at the participating housing developments and a building resident organization coordinated with the security hardware operation.

According to final negotiated plans, HUD was to allocate its grant share in the following ways: \$350,000 for the installation of steel security doors, mailboxes and foxlock plates, the renovation of hallways, and miscellaneous equipment/furniture for the Voluntary Resident Patrols in the three federally-subsidized developments; and \$150,000 to underwrite the expanded operations of the Boston Housing Authority's Central Security Office, which was to manage and supervise implementation of the Volunteer Resident Patrol Project.

The LEAA grant would cover \$17,850 in wages of four part-time Resident Patrol Supervisors, one for each housing development, over a two-year period. It would also support a software program at Commonwealth for two years at an estimated cost of \$120,000, and at Mission Hill for 12 months at \$130,000. For Columbia Point the grant would include \$120,000 over a 14-month period, these funds to be supplemented by HUD's Target Project Program (TPP) and 15 allocated job slots under the federally-assisted Public Employment Program (PEP), for a total estimated cost of \$340,648.

Program Goals and Evaluation Methodology

The workplan prepared by the Mayor's Office of Criminal

Justice for the Boston Public Housing Security Program identified four overall program goals: (1) to increase tenant involvement in crime control; (2) to increase resources for crime control available to public housing residents; (3) to increase security, perceived as well as actual; and (4) to demonstrate the effectiveness of a combination of community action, police patrolling and security hardware in reducing crime.\*

This evaluation has combined three approaches to measuring program and project impact by analyzing their effort, effectiveness and process. The evaluation of effort looks at the volume and quality of operations, comparing actual to planned levels of activity. The evaluation of effectiveness examines what was accomplished in relation to the statement of program goals and project objectives. Process evaluation aims at understanding how and why the overall program and individual projects work or do not work.

Sources of program and project documentation available to the evaluation team included operating data maintained by the individual projects; quarterly reports submitted to the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice by project directors; Chapter VIII (Security and Police Protection) of the report of the Master in the case of Perez v. Boston Housing Authority, ca. 09096, with supporting documents; crime statistics released by the Boston Police Department and tabulated by

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\* Ibid.

the Boston Housing Authority's Central Security Office; and the pre-program victimization survey data gathered by a private consulting firm. These data bases were supplemented by information drawn from on-site observation and interviews with key persons from the following groups: project governing boards; project staffs; fiscal agents; Boston Housing Authority personnel, including Central Security Office staff and housing development managers; public housing Tenant Task Force leaders; Boston Police Department personnel, including Police District Commanders, Community Relations Officers and Team Police leaders; and representatives of public and private agencies serving the housing developments.

The evaluation was constrained by a serious lack of hard data. The limitations of reported police statistics and of the victimization survey are discussed in Chapter VI. In addition, in some security projects, especially that at Mission Hill, there has been essentially no record keeping; at Commonwealth the record keeping has been less than comprehensive and systematic. Direct observation was impossible in the case of the project at Mission Hill, which terminated before the beginning of this evaluation. Moreover, the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project was functioning to any significant extent in only one of the four developments (Commonwealth) during the course of the evaluation. Interviewing, especially in reference to projects at the Mission

Hill developments, revealed discrepancies between the recall of various participants concerning past events, and reports written in the past.

Finally, certain trends and events occurred during the process of the security demonstration program that affected the impact of the several projects. The most significant of these intervening variables were BHA decisions regarding maintenance and renovation in individual developments, resident turnover patterns and rates, and changes by the Police Department as to coverage of public housing developments. These will be discussed in the last chapter of the report.

The balance of this report is divided into five chapters. Chapters II through V deal respectively with the Columbia Point Community Security Project, the Commonwealth Community Security Project, the Mission Hill Safety and Security Intervention Project, and the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project. In these chapters the impact of the projects are described both in terms of effort and effectiveness. Columbia Point is treated in greater detail than the other demonstration projects for several reasons: its records are most complete, the components related to security are both more ambitious and more controversial, and the possibility of BHA extension of the demonstration period has always appeared more likely.

Chapter VI addresses the demonstration program as a whole, and is essentially an evaluation from the perspective of process.

## CHAPTER II

### COLUMBIA POINT COMMUNITY SECURITY PROJECT

#### Project Goals and Strategies

Goals for this security project adhered closely to two conclusions drawn from analyses of reported crime, victimization and offender data: Most of the serious reported crimes committed at the Columbia Point housing development consisted of robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft, marking crimes against property as the dominant pattern of illegal behavior; and most of the offenders involved in such crimes against property were male residents between the ages of 14 and 21.

Thus, the stated principal goals of the Columbia Point security project were both the reduction of crime against property and the reduction in the number of youthful offenders, while an implied goal was the reduction of the fear so prevalent in the lives of Columbia Point residents.\*

The comprehensive security plan sought to achieve the above goals through four major components:

1. A self-help, community-based, security-oriented organization of residents, sponsored by and accountable to the Columbia Point Community Development Council (the governing body of the onsite Area Planning Action Council), to carry out components of the security plan, to coordinate follow-up security planning efforts and to continue cultivation

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\* Workplan for Columbia Point Security Program submitted to the Mayor's Safe Streets Act Advisory Committee by the Columbia Point Security Task Force, pp. 6-7.

of mutual assistance and resident involvement in crime prevention and community education activities.

2. A community services component, consisting of an unarmed security patrol unit, to augment protective services provided by the Police Department by observing, reporting and following up incidents affecting persons and property, and by performing emergency services and special services related to the security function.

3. A youth advocacy services component, to fill the unmet needs of older youth -- mainly those who were out of school and unemployed or otherwise delinquency prone -- in regard to educational opportunities, training and employment choices, and criminal justice alternatives.

4. A low-frequency, development-based radio station, to enhance resident and agency communications within the housing development and to meet various needs of the community security project for transmitting reliable, timely information to residents.

A somewhat complicated but definitive funding arrangement, summarized in the table below, was negotiated to finance the four components of the community security plan. A contract between the Boston Housing Authority and the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice authorized a U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) grant of \$120,000 to support two strategies in the plan during the period of May 1, 1975 to June 30, 1976 -- the community organization component and the

community services or patrol component. This contract was subsequently amended to extend the period of performance to November 30, 1976 and to increase the total LEAA grant to \$153,720.55. The Boston Housing Authority demonstrated its own commitment to improving security at Columbia Point by folding the entire security plan into its application to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for large-scale renovation of this development under the so-called Target Projects Program (TPP), thereby guaranteeing the remaining financial requirements for the security plan. Although responsible City officials, with the Mayor's written approval, had agreed to set aside 15 slots for the Boston Housing Authority under Boston's Public Employment Program to staff the security patrol, the Authority never received its allocation.\* Once TPP funds were assured from HUD, however, these positions were added to BHA's TPP grant payroll. The entire project cost was picked up by the BHA after its November 30 termination, and although the first phase of the HUD grant for TPP terminates on March 31, 1977, BHA officials are optimistic about a grant extension that could include funds for continued financing of the community security project.

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\* This commitment was affirmed in a letter of January 15, 1975 from the Mayor of Boston to the Assistant Secretary for Housing Management (HUD) as part of the application from the BHA to participate in HUD's Target Projects Program. The Public Employment Program originated under Title II of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, and is financed with funds from the U. S. Department of Labor.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Columbia Point Security Project Funding Sources</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>LEAA Grant (Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice)</u>	<u>TPP Grant (Boston Housing Authority)</u>	
Security Task Force Staff	\$ 49,160	-	\$ 49,160
Community Security Services Unit	70,840	\$157,360 <sup>a</sup>	228,200
Radio Station	-	12,000 <sup>b</sup>	12,000
Youth Advocacy Services	-	51,288	51,288
Totals	\$120,000 <sup>c</sup>	\$220,648	\$340,648

a. Includes estimated salary equivalents of \$102,00 and estimated fringe benefit equivalents of \$15,300.

b. Excludes \$10,000 available from LEAA security planning grant to U/Mass.-Boston for radio station equipment in 1974.

c. Excludes \$33,720.55 in additional LEAA funds through a contract amendment authorized by vote of the BHA on August 25, 1976, that also extended the grant period through November 30, 1976.

Project Implementation

As the security project moved from its planning phase to its operational period, there were important shifts in patterns of institutional accountability. Once the Boston Urban Observatory had completed all technical assistance assignments on behalf of the Security Task Force (by the end of April 1975), the Boston Housing Authority succeeded the University of Massachusetts at Boston as LEAA grantee and assumed the role of fiscal agent for implementation of the security project. Under the plan a reconstituted Security

Task Force was to supervise and monitor the security project. Membership was to be restricted to resident and community-based agency representatives appointed by the Columbia Point Community Development Council (CPCDC), with ex-officio membership for public and private law enforcement agencies operating on the Columbia Point peninsula: the Boston Police Department, BHA Central Security Office and University of Massachusetts-Boston Security Department.

The BHA thus kept the project sponsorship intact, despite the fact that all sources of financing for the security project were now under its own control as grantee for both LEAA and HUD funds. However, the Authority did strengthen its participation in project implementation by the assignment of its TPP liaison officer to attend meetings of the Security Task Force, and the retaining of the Director of BHA's Central Security Office as an active ex-officio member of the Security Task Force. The latter had helped shepherd the security project through its tortuous planning process, and was one of its outspoken advocates.

During the 19 months in which the security project at Columbia Point operated as an LEAA demonstration (May 1975 to November 1976), the first six months or so are best described as a transitional stage, with most efforts during this period directed toward establishing credibility for its reconstituted community security organization, and making the security project operational and visible as soon as possible to

compensate for the relatively long planning period. Decisions made during the transitional stage contain seeds that shaped the forces and explain the difficulties that emerged once the project was fully operational.

Community Security Organization

An important strategy of the Columbia Point security project was its so-called community organization component consisting of the reconstituted Security Task Force and a paid support staff of three Community Liaisons working under the Project Director. It was hoped that the Security Task Force, representative of the residential community and of on-site agencies serving the community, could provide the required leadership and monitoring essential for implementing the security project, for continuing security planning and for related community organization and education. There was also an implied hope that Task Force efforts would help in combatting resident apathy, counteract the accelerated trend of resident outmigration and improve relationships between the community and the criminal justice system.

According to the workplan the support staff or community organization unit was to assist the Security Task Force in carrying out the following activities: (1) servicing and recruiting staff for this unit and supervisory staff for other components of the security project; (2) supervision and coordination of operational planning for all project

components; (3) design and implementation of security education and informational services; (4) providing continuing liaison with Police District 11 and with BHA's Central Security Office; (5) providing continuing liaison with the Columbia Point Community Development Council through its Administrative and Program Planning Committees; (6) providing technical assistance and staff services to the Security Task Force -- planning and conducting Task Force meetings, contract monitoring, planning and program development, proposal preparation, fund-raising; (7) budget expenditure control; (8) progress report preparation; (9) direction of fund-raising for radio station development (Phase II).\*

Logistical problems of one kind or another taxed the capacities of the re-constituted Security Task Force and of its top-level staff throughout the pre-operational period. Delays were encountered in the delivery of requisitioned office furniture and equipment. Not only was the initial project office found to be vulnerable to breaking and entering, requiring the installation of steel window grills, but the chronic failure of the heating system and flooding caused by broken pipes forced a move to another headquarters office. The two vehicles for the security project were ordered in August 1975, but did not become available until seven months later. The project's radio communications equipment did not arrive until November 1975.

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\* Ibid, p. 12-13.

when finally delivered, looked so much like those worn by the Police Department's Tactical Patrol Force that they generated threats from certain segments of the Columbia Point community.

Critical as the above logistical issues may have been to smooth launching and effective operation, most of the problems faced by the security project throughout the demonstration period may be traced to staffing policies that were molded during the early months of the demonstration project.

A major set-back to progress of the security project during the transitional period came with the termination of the Project Director by the Security Task Force after only four months of service. Conflicting reasons were cited for his dismissal in September 1975. It is most likely that his efforts to broaden and revise the scope of the project from security-related services to activities more heavily directed toward social change and action were not only perceived as threats to prevailing community leadership at the housing development, but as designed confrontations with neighboring communities. There was also a concern among Task Force members that diversion from the project's goals and program components might jeopardize its continued funding.

The firing of the Project Director may have been related to the assumption by the chairman of the Security Task Force of the position of CPCDC chairman. While this tour de force

eased the transition for the security project by facilitating the somewhat complicated community accountability mechanism, it also eliminated the advantage of the CPCDC's serving as an independent check on its own Security Task Force, as envisaged in the security project workplan.

What proved to be particularly injurious were the Task Force revisions of the original experience requirements in the job description for Community Service Worker. The Task Force added the phrase "but not required" to qualification guidelines that would have given preference to past experience, training and high school education, reflecting a community concern that residents would otherwise not qualify. This decision had the effect of downgrading already modest standards. Moreover, in too many cases, often because of pressures from certain persons on the Task Force on behalf of individual applicants, inadequate attention was given to prior police records and later on, to demonstrated patterns of irresponsibility and poor work habits.

The seeds of chronic staff turnover were sown during these first few months of operation. Some well qualified recruited staff, delayed by cumbersome BHA payroll procedures, lost interest by the time their hiring became effective. Others were hired who proved to be completely unreliable and had to be eventually suspended and/or terminated. Most of the terminations (10 for cause from April-September), did not occur, however, until 1976, when the project was in full

operation and staff discipline was being considerably tightened up. The cumulative effect of these hiring patterns and of the subsequent high level of staff turnover (resignations of competent persons for better jobs or educational opportunities, and forced resignations of incompetent persons) was distrust on the part of residents and police officers serving the Columbia Point development as to the seriousness of the community security project. Such distrust lingered throughout the life of the demonstration period.

By the time the project was in full operation the Security Task Force was at a low point of enthusiasm and participation. Both external and internal forces contributed to weakening the initial zeal and relatively active involvement of the final planning period, March - May, 1975.\*

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\*For example, whereas the Security Task Force convened seven times between March 19, 1975 (its first organizational meeting as a reconstituted body) and May 2, 1975, the frequency of meetings (originally designated as once a month) declined between the latter date and November 1975, during which period only four meetings were held). Moreover, attendance at such meetings was often below the quorum level. By the end of October 1975, the chairman and vice-chairman of the Security Task Force saw the need for re-invigorating the energies of the Security Task Force because of the failure of many Task Force members to attend scheduled meetings. An October 28th letter from the vice-chairman to all members reminded them of the striking contrast between active board participation during the early spring months of project planning and the declining participation rates during the fall months. The letter requested members to submit memoranda of their intent to continue membership or to resign. Since a complete record of Task Force meeting minutes is not available, there is no way to tell which scheduled meetings were actually held with proper quorums and who attended such meetings. Available data indicates that during late 1975 meetings were scheduled for October 1 and 22, November 5 and 19, and

Concern about Task Force lethargy emerged again late in 1976 and steps were taken to strengthen the board. Several vacancies on the Task Force were filled in November with long-time residents. Plans were also being laid for filling the remaining vacancies before the year was out, and to add as an ex-officio member of the Task Force the BHA staff relocation officer in the Target Projects Program at Columbia Point. The latter move was designed to improve liaison between the BHA and the security project, particularly on impending nuisance tenant evictions, and to compensate for the infrequent and irregular attendance at Task Force meetings of the BHA's Director of the Central Security Office. While the latter did not frequent Security Task Force meetings, he has nevertheless played an important day-to-day advisory role for the project directorship, thereby somewhat offsetting the temporary inactivity of the Task Force. The reactivated Task Force has found itself somewhat at odds with some guidelines suggested by the CSO Director, especially those regarding the degree to which Community Service Workers should stick out

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(footnote con't)

December 10 and 17. There is no evidence that these meetings were held. The records do show that Task Force meetings occurred on January 21 and February 25, 1976. Subsequent meetings were to take place monthly from April through June, 1976, but if the meetings were held, minutes or notes were not taken. In fact, there is no record of a Security Task Force meeting between February 25, 1976 and November 9, 1976.

their own necks in reporting on drug traffic.

Throughout the duration of the demonstration, the Community Liaisons have provided a variety of linkages between the security project and residents of the housing development, and between the security project and community agencies. They attend regularly scheduled and ad hoc meetings of community agencies. (Regular weekly meetings are held by the Columbia Point Health Association and the Columbia Point Alcohol Program.) They have played key roles in special security education and informational efforts -- along with the Community Service Workers, making 600 direct contacts during the transition period to orient residents to project goals and proposed activities; preparing and disseminating two security project newsletters (in June 1976 and December 1976); and preparing and distributing leaflets to residents informing them of the security project and its availability as a source of help on housing emergency and security problems. The Community Liaisons have participated in informal discussions with residents about the security patrol and about the team effort of the Boston Police Department, explaining the advantages of these security services. On request they schedule escort services through use of the project's vehicles, as well as emergency transportation to rapid transit stations and hospitals. They also assist the Community Service Workers in writing up reports about incidents and offenders and correlate crime statistics gathered by the security

project with official crime data from the Police Department. One of the Community Liaisons has dealt in a specialized way with tenants in the cluster of high-rise, elderly resident buildings, arranging for security services coordinated with the delivery of their hot lunches and the operation of a mobile food market. One of the more recent responsibilities of the Community Liaisons has been working with BHA staff on gathering documentation required for proceedings by the BHA with selective evictions of nuisance tenants. Liaison between the security project and the commanding officers of District 11 and the new team police unit has been handled more appropriately by the Security Task Force itself and top-level project staff -- the Project Director and the Supervisor of the security patrol -- rather than by a Community Liaison, as originally intended in the workplan.

At the close of the demonstration period only two of the three Community Liaison positions were filled -- the Spanish-speaking bilingual Community Liaison had resigned in September 1976 to return to Puerto Rico and his vacancy has not been filled. The two current Liaisons (one male and one female) are long-standing residents of the Columbia Point housing development.

#### Community Patrol

Most of the detailed workplan for the Columbia Point security project pertained to its strategic centerpiece, the

Community Security Services Unit. Originally conceived as an unarmed, resident patrol to augment protective services provided by the Police Department, but without powers of arrest, this unit was to carry out a variety of surveillance and related security activities within those sections of Columbia Point under BHA jurisdiction. Under policy and procedural guidelines to be developed by the Project Director and the unit Supervisor in collaboration with the BHA's Central Security Office, the patrol was to be responsible for (1) the observation and patrolling of designated structures, activities and areas; (2) reporting to appropriate law enforcement agencies incidents requiring their intervention, investigation and/or follow-up; (3) responding to resident emergency needs; (4) performing special security-related functions -- escort services, emergency medical services, finding lost children, etc.; (5) coordinating and facilitating communications among intra-area security services on the Columbia Point peninsula; (6) developing constructive relationships with youth; and (7) providing stand-by traffic control assistance to the Police Department as requested and needed.

The workplan proposed the following general guidelines for implementing operations of the Community Security Services Unit: (1) a 15-person patrol; (2) a supervisory and support staff consisting of a supervisor, operations manager, three field supervisors and two dispatchers;

(3) an intensive one-month basic training period followed up by a 3-month period of on-the-job training; (4) 7-day week coverage on two shifts, with staff deployed as determined by need and experience; (5) two patrol cars to back up walking and/or stationary beats, to facilitate patrol supervision and to accommodate escort services, emergencies, etc.

During the period of transition from July through September of 1975, the limited number of employed Community Service Workers, (the full complement of 15 patrol members plus supervisory staff were not available until November 1975), carried out experimental patrol routines without uniforms, communications equipment or patrol vehicles during a single shift from noon to 8:00 p.m. To enhance their community education efforts and to expand the visibility of their activities throughout the housing development, members of the patrol began to provide escort services to vendors making deliveries to residents (food, furniture, cleaning, etc.), and took the initiative in securing an on-site office to facilitate the delivery of food stamp services.

During November and December 1975, the Security Services Unit staff conducted a comprehensive survey of all buildings at the housing development, checking doors leading to roofs, entrances and vacant apartments used as hangouts. The overall purpose of the survey was to detect security and/or safety hazards, to identify drop-off points for stolen goods

and to gather intelligence concerning types and locations of vandalism and patterns of illegal activities.

With few important exceptions, the Community Security Services Unit has operated within the intent and guidelines of the original workplan since November 1975, by which time the Unit was in full uniform and operating with radio equipment. During a few weeks in November 1975, an alternating three-shift, three-team deployment model was tried, with each team working three early shifts, rotated to three late shifts, followed by three days off. Since mid-November the patrol has been on a 6-day, (Monday-Saturday) 16 hours per day arrangement with two shifts -- one shift on duty from 1:00 to 9:00 P.M.; the other from 9:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M. This concentration of patrol activity coincides with the peak periods of reported crimes and incidents. Community Service Workers are assigned to one of the two shifts and there is no rotation. A skeleton patrol force is maintained during the relatively quiet Sunday. The unit Supervisor assumes responsibility for the first shift; the Operations Manager provides supervision on the late shift.

While not specified in plan guidelines, the regular patrol effort has always been a horizontal or street patrol. During normal procedure patrol activity consists of walking beats and the stationing of Workers at certain hazardous locations during periods when incidents are likely to occur -- the senior citizens center, day care center,

health center during closing hours, and elderly buildings during the operation of a hot lunch service between 11:00 A.M. and noon. First shift patrol members also provide escort services to vendors, contractual personnel (exterminators, overtime carpenters, etc.), employees of community agencies and BHA employees. The volume of escort services declined from an average of five per day in 1975 to two per day during late 1976. On the late night shift a motor patrol covers designated points every half hour and responds to calls. During the 5:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. period, patrol activity is not scheduled since few incidents take place, and someone is always available in the security project office to answer the telephone and handle emergency requests.

Temporary shifts in patrol schedules and deployment have been made from time to time in response to emergencies and special needs, such as a rash of break and entries and vandalism of community agency facilities. For example, after the murder of an exterminator in November 1975, employees at Columbia Point demanded greater protection going to and from work. To deal with this heightened climate of fear, the Community Service Workers were switched to two shifts, beginning at 8:00 A.M. and ending at midnight. Deployment also changed in response to an April 1976 intrusion into the housing development of vehicles carrying young outsiders, and the resultant confrontations with residents, rock-throwing and related incidents. The security patrol doubled

its night-hours shift, maintaining a skeleton force during the day, and worked in collaboration with the Youth Advocates to break up assemblies of older youth groups and to ease tensions by counselling and street work. Expecting an unprecedented increase in incidents stimulated by the aggravations of excessive temperatures and humidity and the limitation of constructive outlets for youth, the security managers revised the patrol patterns and schedules for the 1976 summer season. Instead of the usual rotation arrangement of three groups of Service Workers, patrols were concentrated during the 4:00 P.M. - 3:00 A.M. period to provide greater visibility during the hours in which difficulties were most anticipated, and patrol routes were revised to give Workers smaller and more manageable sectors for operation and surveillance. These temporary changes proved effective against intrusions from outside the housing development and for coping with internal situations.

The communications system of the security project consists of a two-way radio linked to five walkie-talkie units carried by Community Service Workers on patrol. Two Dispatchers operate the system from the headquarters office of the security project during the morning hours and through the first shift that ends at 9:00 P.M. On the late shift and on weekends, a Community Service Worker is assigned to the dispatcher function. When a call comes in from a resident, the Dispatcher records the name and telephone number of the

caller and transmits this information to the Service Worker nearest to the address. The latter is required to check the matter out and to call back the Dispatcher with the facts concerning the incident, indicating whether police assistance is required. The Dispatcher, in turn, calls the police. The response time in this procedure ranges from three to six minutes. According to one Dispatcher, police response time has been reduced from about 20 to 25 minutes to an average of 10 to 15 minutes since the Team Police has been at Columbia Point.

The Security Services Unit did not receive its basic training program until the end of May 1976, whereas the original plan was to conduct this training soon after appointment and orientation. The basic training program was a 12-hour sequence conducted over a three-day period at the Boston Police Academy. Twenty-four staff members participated at a total cost of about \$1600. The courses included basic law, observing and reporting, crime classification, surveillance methods, report writing, techniques for securing areas where crimes are committed, self-defense (including the use of batons), forms of weaponry, narcotics, team policing, and the role of security staff in a public housing community with a discussion between Team Police and security project personnel. Staff of the Bromley Heath security project also participated in this training program and the two groups were

able to share common interests and experiences.

While participants concluded that the Police Academy training was useful, its impact on the Unit's overall skill level was dissipated by the high rate of staff attrition. Of the 24 staff persons in the security project who were exposed to the basic training (four refused to attend and were terminated), as of the end of November 1976 only 13 were still working in the Columbia Point security project, only six of whom were directly involved in patrol activities.

While awaiting the formal basic training program, senior staff members of the security project arranged for other types of training activities, both through the enlistment of outside resources and through the use of in-house staff. These included training in self-defense techniques conducted by a Columbia Point resident who was a certified Ju-Jitsu instructor; human relations training by a University of Massachusetts faculty member in such areas as general counseling, conflict resolution, observation skills, drug counseling, and rape prevention; and on-the-job training by top level security project staff in problem-solving and communications techniques for supervisory personnel.

Most of the Community Service Workers and Dispatchers who have worked with the Unit since its inception have been residents of the housing development. By the end of the

demonstration period there were only three Spanish-speaking staff members (compared to nine workers at one point in time)--- one Field Supervisor and two Service Workers. This parallels a decline in the total number and proportion of Spanish-speaking heads of household at Columbia Point from 276 and 29 percent to 88 and 16 percent of the occupied household units. The three females in the original group of Community Service Workers had been eliminated by November 1976 through terminations and resignations. Plans were being made to appoint two female Community Service Workers during December 1976.

#### Youth Advocacy Services

The youth advocacy component of the security project emerged from an analysis that concluded that (1) more than half of all arrests for serious crimes committed at Columbia Point involved persons below the age of 21, most of them male; (2) low educational achievement, high unemployment and low income were among the important causes of youth offender behavior; and (3) youth who were between 17 and 21 years of age, out of school and out of work, were grossly under-served.

The underlying concept of the youth advocacy strategy was that a special group of outreach workers would intervene on behalf of youth with their parents, youth-serving institutions and other agencies influencing the lives of hard-to-reach, delinquency-prone youth. Originally, this four-member

staff was supposed to supplement youth-serving staff of the APAC, but the emergence of internal difficulties within the APAC, (exacerbated by the resignation of its executive director and a major shift in the control of the CPCDC), led to the decision to retain the youth advocacy services component as part of the security project.

By January 1976, the youth advocacy component was delivering the range of services outlined in the workplan, and its staff has continued within the demonstration period to comply with the spirit and intent of the workplan despite a number of difficulties: (1) the adverse impact on its credibility caused by the resignation of the Coordinator for being involved with drugs (he had a significant prison record and had been on parole when hired); this incident became worse when the Coordinator physically attacked the vice-chairman of the Security Task Force; (2) the relative inexperience of individual staff members; (3) the inability to recruit a Spanish-speaking Youth Advocate; and (4) staff turnover and shortages, especially during the fall months of 1976.

Since the staff has been at full strength, each Advocate has been assigned to one of three specialized areas of service--education, employment and criminal justice. Advocates make contacts with youth, handle the referral of youth from law enforcement authorities and social service agencies, and seek out opportunities and resources needed by youth and their families, both within and outside the confines

of Columbia Point.

Among the significant referrals handled by the youth advocacy staff have been young persons picked up for trespass on the adjoining University of Massachusetts campus. Under established procedure, young trespassers who are Columbia Point residents are warned and referred to the youth advocacy component. Experience indicates that there are few repeaters of trespassing following such referral. If the incident involves a crime, the offender is turned over to police authorities. A major focus of recent activity has been working with youth, parents and staff of the Boston School Department to generate and process core (diagnostic) evaluation of potential special education (Chapter 766) students. Youth who are suspended from school or are adjudged to be truant are automatically referred for core evaluation. Advocates have estimated that 10 to 15 percent of youth at Columbia Point would be eligible for Chapter 766.

Although Youth Advocates accompany and assist youth in court proceedings, including fighting or truancy problems arising from the school desegregation process, the security project has not yet succeeded in getting courts to recognize the youth advocacy services component as a legitimate follow-up resource. The Youth Advocate working in this criminal justice activity has concentrated on developing constructive working relationships with the probation offices and juvenile courts, and in securing legal assistance for clients from

Greater Boston Legal Services, Inc.

Alerting youth to job and training opportunities has been carried out mainly through a monthly newsletter, produced cooperatively with other Columbia Point youth service and social service agencies, that lists available jobs, training programs and other information useful to job seekers. The Youth Advocate assigned to employment assists in the placement of youth in after-school employment, in such training offerings as the Opportunities Industrialization Center, and in summer jobs, especially those through the Neighborhood Youth Corps.

A special project planned and carried out by the Youth Advocates during the summer of 1976 was the so-called Youth Patrol -- the use of 22 school-attending trainees aged 14 through 19, enrolled and paid through the Neighborhood Youth Corps, in the following roles: to assure that available recreation areas and facilities were accessible to and secure for users; to inform youth of services and resources; to assist in Summerthing activities conducted by the City of Boston; and to accompany regular Community Service Workers and fill vacancies due to vacations or disciplinary action. Members of the Youth Patrol received training in self-defense, various aspects of patrol operations and procedures, youth service referral, and juvenile arrest and court procedures. They also sponsored car washes to raise funds for social events.

During the period between January and April, 1976, the Youth Advocates were serving an average of only about 25 clients per month, most of them with employment assistance and counseling. With the growing concern that not enough contacts were being made, the Coordinator of Youth Advocacy Services established, in late April 1976, a standard of 15 new youth clients per month, and specific activities were designed to stimulate client contact generation: cooking class, weekly movies, basketball clinic, college orientation, newsletter, bicycle club, sailing program, etc.

Experience to date with youth offender behavior and youth advocacy efforts indicates that employment is the critical factor in coping with youth crime at Columbia Point. Most of the employment requests come from in-school youth seeking after-school jobs in the non-summer months. Of the 270 in-school Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) slots available, Columbia Point's allocation was only 14 during the 1975-76 school year. The universe of need probably runs to several hundred. Job applications from out-of-school youth tend to be on the low side -- 15 to 20 per month, probably because of the realization by these youth that job and training opportunities for their group are so limited. Columbia Point did get a fair share of available NYC summer job slots -- some 320 in the summer of 1976 -- but even this quota fell short by 50 to 100, based on the total number of applications.

As the staff capacity of the Area Planning Action Council at Columbia Point was being restored during 1976, especially in its youth development and neighborhood employment components, the Youth Advocates were interfacing their activities more closely with those of the APAC staff, as well as with the Youth Center of the Federated Dorchester Neighborhood Houses, Inc. Coordinated efforts of community-based agencies have been aimed at securing full utilization and programming of the on-site City-operated recreation center (now open only for informal basketball), and reorganizing the center's sponsorship; planning and conducting trips for youth outside Columbia Point; and making referrals to job and training opportunities, especially to the summer Neighborhood Youth Corps program run by the APAC in 1976 when it serviced 320 youth under 11 supervisors. One of the outcomes of closer collaboration of the youth advocacy services of the security project with the Youth Center has been a temporary arrangement whereby Youth Advocates have voluntarily served as supervisor-counselors at the center four evenings a week to compensate for a staff shortage. Concern over agency jurisdiction at Columbia Point has subsided as youth-serving staff have improved their linkages and cooperative efforts, understanding that each agency's survival may well depend on the effectiveness of the integration of agency activities.

### Radio Station

The one component of the security project at Columbia Point not in operation as of the end of the original demonstration period is the community-based, closed-circuit AM radio station. Reasons for the delay include difficulties in recruiting a radio station consultant, changes in system design recommended by a second consultant, contractual renovation of apartments immediately above security project offices for a radio station facility, and cumbersome procedures for the ordering and delivery of radio station hardware and software. After a false start with one radio station manager, another was hired as of May 1976 as a 20-hour per week consultant.

In reviewing the guidelines for a radio station contained in the original Columbia Point security plan, the consultant concluded that a conventional system was more appropriate since it could use the existing power lines to transmit their signals. Moreover, he disagreed with the assumption that coupling the transmitters into the 12 distribution points would not allow the radio signal to reach the buildings, pointing out that many radio stations in the Boston area, including the one at Bromley Heath, used the method of coupling into the point that linked a number of buildings together. He also emphasized that the interim need at Columbia Point was for a technical manager, rather than a

general manager, capable of supervising the following steps:

- (1) installation and wiring of control room facilities;
- (2) installation of the transmitters in the buildings; and (3) purchase of needed telephone lines to feed audio to the transmitters.

The consultant delineated the following roles and assignments for himself as technical consultant in carrying out the above steps: (1) conducting tests to determine the proper number, location and power requirements of transmitters; (2) interfacing equipment in the control room with the studio facilities; (3) determining and arranging for the procurement of necessary hardware and software for the radio station; and (4) providing technical advice to BHA physical plant authorities on the construction and modification of the proposed facility and the installation of additional electric wiring. He estimated that it would take about two person-months to complete his consultant work relating to the installation of the station, but that this estimate depended on the time frame for delivery of the equipment and related services. He also calculated that the radio station installation itself would cost about \$14,000, as compared with the original estimate of \$29,000.

Because of the delays in preparation of the station facility and delivery of equipment (the transmitters, transmitter cabinets and microphones did not arrive until late November 1976), the radio station (WCPR) is not likely

to be operative until February 1977. It is expected to operate initially only during the evening hours from 5:00 P.M. to midnight. Once the station is in full operation with an adequate number of volunteers, programming will extend from 9:00 A.M. to midnight.

Meanwhile, the consultant has been making preliminary programming and operational plans. Basic to these efforts was to be a community impact survey to help determine resident expectations from and programming interests in the radio station. The overall response was highly disappointing, as only 24 residents completed and returned the questionnaire.\*

Nevertheless, the radio station consultant anticipates that the facility will be a strong motivating force for resident youth, both in operational and programming opportunities. His plans include the training of the Youth Advocates of the security project as radio station trainers, eventually becoming completely responsible for the facility and its operation, leaving the principal programming role to the radio station manager. Moreover, he would like to arrange

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\* Seventy-five percent of the respondents were women, and the average age was about 37. (Only two were of Hispanic origin.) They were long time residents of Columbia Point, having lived there for an average of nine years. The questionnaire elicited information concerning current radio listening habits, preferences in timing and programming for WCPR, and the roles which respondents might want to play in operating the station.

for hook-ups and exchange programs with the radio stations at the Bromley Heath housing development and at the University of Massachusetts/Boston campus.

Project Impact

Although there were some minor deviations from the original program design, and security activities varied in priority and intensity in response to changing conditions, the intervention of unanticipated forces, and deliberate policy choices by the Task Force and/or security project management, there was remarkably close adherence to the intent and substance of the workplan during the November 1975 through November 1976 period of full operation. The relative inactivity of the Security Task Force during much of 1976, however, was an important exception to this rule. Among the outside factors explaining this erosion of enthusiasm and participation were difficulties within the CPCDC, the parent organization of the Security Task Force, as well as within the APAC staff (including the struggle for power within the CPCDC board structure, the turnover in the position of APAC executive director, and attrition in APAC staff); and continuing tenant outmigration, including move-outs of a dwindling pool of community leaders and of residents with many years of tenure at Columbia Point. Added to these external factors were internal forces within the security project itself: controversy within the Security Task Force

over efforts of the first Project Director to redirect project goals and strategies; termination of the first Project Director early in September 1975; and an unusual rate of staff terminations and resignations, including some of the best people who ever worked for the project. From July through December, 1975, there were six terminations for cause and six resignations, most of the latter for better job or educational opportunities.

Primary emphasis of Task Force deliberations has been on personnel policies, especially staff attrition, disciplinary actions, periodic staff shortages, and complaints about staff productivity and visibility. That the Security Task Force as a whole and individual Task Force members have played inordinate roles in personnel management, thereby weakening the management prerogatives of the Project Director and other supervisory staff, has emerged as a thorny issue. (In several cases the Task Force overturned management decisions to fire or suspend staff members.) Closely related to this concern over undue Task Force intrusion in personnel questions has been the concern that this Task Force priority has diverted the attention of its membership from the consideration of security policy and performance monitoring responsibilities. The fact that one of the reasons for termination of the first Project Director was his attempt to redirect project goals and strategies illustrates Task Force/staff

sensitivity to implementation of the project in strict accordance with workplan guidelines. This does not mean that confusion over goals and staff roles did not re-emerge from time to time. In fact throughout the demonstration period, the Task Force and security project management had to deal with staff misconceptions over not only behavioral standards, but also roles that interfered with effective operation of project components. Thus not only were staff terminations caused by individual cases of nonfeasance, misfeasance and malfeasance (unauthorized, chronic absenteeism, leaving duty posts without permission, insubordination, dealing in or using drugs, passing of bad checks, purchasing alcoholic beverages in "after-hours joints") and resignations caused by the tightening up of discipline as a result of growing complaints about patrol visibility, but certain resignations were also generated by the refusal or inability of some staff members to shift role attitudes from that of "community organizer", which seemed to be a misinterpretation of the job definition of Community Service Worker, to that of security worker.

Representatives from the Police Department and from the University of Massachusetts/Boston Campus Police have been ex-officio members of the Task Force since its reconstitution. During the course of the demonstration, security project managers have made several efforts to improve

communication and coordination with such complementary security services. These efforts have included meetings with the Captain of District 11 and his command staff to make them aware of the security project and its problems, to alert them to inadequate police response to reported incidents, and to work out more effective cooperative arrangements. The murder of an exterminator at Columbia Point in November 1975 generated a strongly-worded letter from the Security Task Force to the Boston Police Commissioner and was undoubtedly one of many factors in the subsequent decision of the Police Department to reorganize the special Public Housing Police Unit and to establish Team Police in several high-crime housing developments, including Columbia Point.

Security at Columbia Point has been significantly strengthened by the presence of the Team Police unit that got underway in March 1976, even though the Security Task Force was not made fully aware of the team police plan in advance of its establishment. This shift away from the relatively ineffective Police Public Housing Unit to the Team Police approach at Columbia Point and several other public housing developments had also not been anticipated in planning the components of the community security project: The operational elements of the Team Police unit at Columbia Point are similar to those characteristic of models undertaken in other cities: (1) a police patrol with geographic

stability through the permanent assignment of a group of police officers to a small neighborhood; (2) maximum interaction among members of the police team, including close and regular internal communication among all officers assigned to the neighborhood; and (3) maximum interaction among members of the Team and neighborhood residents to facilitate the flow and exchange of information, to assist in the identification of neighborhood problems and to emphasize the cooperative nature of the peacekeeping function. Activation of the Team Police has doubled the number of police officers previously patrolling Columbia Point to 12 police officers, under a supervising Sergeant, divided between two shifts during the period from 8:00 A.M. to 1:00 A.M. and operating from a patrol car. It has improved police response time to reported incidents, raised the quality of investigative activities in reported serious crimes (the Team Police follow up every felony), and increased the rate of crimes cleared by arrest. The Team Police operates from Columbia Point through an on-site office which has an unmanned telephone and provides a facility for compiling reports.

It is believed that as Columbia Point residents have become increasingly aware of the security project and the Team Police, the reporting of crimes and related incidents to both of these groups has increased. This upward trend has occurred despite the prevalent strong community norms

of tolerating certain kinds of illegal behavior, and traditional reluctance to report illegal acts for fear of retaliation. In fact, crimes reported to the security project may not be reported to the police when the victim can be satisfied in having stolen goods returned through "street justice". The increase in reported crimes has been accompanied by a similar rise in calls for service -- sickness assistance, housing emergencies, domestic problems, etc.

Although the continuous presence, visibility, performance and community orientation of the Team Police have generated a greater respect in residents for police service and a gradual improvement in community relations, the established tradition of mistrust and alienation among the minority poor in public housing developments continue to affect police-community relations. It was not surprising, therefore, to learn that the security project receives calls from some residents about robbery, breaking and entering, and other serious crimes against property prior to resident notification of the police. Moreover, the effectiveness of the Team Police is impaired by fluctuations in its own manpower and by the attrition of black officers in the unit. By the early fall of 1976, Team Police strength was down to seven officers; of the three black officers with which the Team Police began operations, only one remained as of the end of November 1976.

Except for the continuing participation of the supervising Sergeant of the Team Police in the security project through his role on the Security Task Force, there are relatively few direct contacts between Team Police members and Community Service Workers or their immediate supervisors. Team Police do not consider security project staff a reliable source of intelligence on serious incidents, especially drugs, a major cause of violent crimes. Thus, although more intensive surveillance by the Team Police has been accompanied by raids from time to time on suspected drug dealers (a new experience at Columbia Point which has reinforced positive resident attitudes toward police action), these raids have proved to be unproductive and a source of frustration for the Police Department. This frustration, in turn, has cultivated the suspicion that security project staff know when drug drops are to be made at Columbia Point and that security staff ought to provide the Team Police with such intelligence. Complicating this issue, however, is the policy, adopted by the Security Task Force in December 1975, that security staff should avoid involvement in drug traffic control because of the threats on the lives of staff members as a result of past experience. Security project managers, encouraged by the Director of the Central Security Office, have insisted that police authorities are privy to more useful intelligence

about narcotics activity at the housing development than the security staff is, and that this serious area of law enforcement is more properly the province of the Police Department.

The police understand the difficulties of Community Service Workers in facing up to relatives, friends and neighbors whom they must report to the police authorities, and the disadvantages of Service Workers in deterring violators carrying dangerous weapons. A major reason for police distrust, however, is their knowledge that many Community Service Workers have police records, and they seem to have limited confidence in rehabilitated inmates staying out of trouble, or in former drug users having "kicked the habit". Conversely, security project staff point to instances of insensitivity of Team Police to roles of Service Workers in certain critical situations. - Whatever the perspective, there seems to be consensus that security at Columbia Point would benefit from greater cooperation and coordination of the Team Police and the security project.

The security project at Columbia Point has achieved both community recognition and the acknowledgement of law enforcement agencies that it is a legitimate crime prevention institution. However, it still has some way to go before reaching full potential as an effective community watch, as a trusted and compatible adjunct to the Team Police and as a

reliable resource of intervention on behalf of delinquent and hard-to-reach youth. Even the most severe critics of security project policies and performance concede the significance of project components for the feeling of well-being among residents, while also citing past and current weaknesses of project staff and activities. Such critics applaud the continuing sensitivity of the Security Task Force to negative feedback, especially to expressions of mistrust and skepticism about operational effectiveness raised by individual Task Force members themselves, impacted BHA staff, and representatives of security project funding sources. They also are heartened by the Task Force's demonstrated capacity for self-examination and renewal and for dealing decisively with serious lapses of staff performance and embarrassing deterioration of important institutional relationships. There is greater awareness within the Task Force, as reflected in the attitudes of the changing membership, of the interrelationship among resident confidence, police trust, institutional cooperation, performance, coherent Task Force policies, strong management and dependable, trained personnel.

Except for the radio station, due to become operational in February 1977, each component of the security project was in place and functioning at the close of the demonstration period. Extension of the project after the end of November 1976 has been accomplished by agreement of the Boston Housing

Authority to pick up the total cost as part of the HUD-assisted Target Projects Program, which had been supplying the majority of program costs during the demonstration period.

There have been advantages and disadvantages for security project implementation in the emerging trend whereby the BHA is being thrust more deeply into community security involvement at Columbia Point. Until now the Authority, mindful of policies and regulations of federal and state funding agencies which suggest that, except for emergencies, security is a municipal function, has resisted assuming any significant budgetary commitment for security services. The new BHA role in security at Columbia Point could thus be considered a positive development with far-reaching implications for improved tenant services.

BHA sponsorship of security project operations has not always been appreciated, however. Offsetting disadvantages were deeply felt by the security project as it first moved into operation. Implementation had to abide by BHA payroll and procurement policies and procedures, long-standing bureaucratic arrangements that proved frustrating to an impatient, ambitious security project staff.

As a result of the BHA extension, the Security Task Force has been strengthening its own role and performance

by filling vacancies with trustworthy community resident representatives and by closer institutional ties with TPP management and BHA management. Task Force leadership has evaluated the quality of the security project management and supervision with a view to adopting and enforcing new standards of performance and inspiring greater confidence of police authorities in the project's security operations. There is growing evidence that the Task Force is ready to confront the difficult issues facing the project at the end of the demonstration: (1) eliminating the remaining, non-productive "bad apples" from the security project staff; (2) insisting on greater objectivity by patrol staff in observing and reporting illegal behavior; (3) cooperating with BHA management in eliminating the dwindling but hard-core group of resident offenders who must be dealt with through nuisance eviction proceedings, in order to reverse the long-prevailing climate of fear among residents; (4) improving communications with and reporting to Team Police at all levels, particularly at the street level; and (5) establishing standards to guide the performance of the under-utilized but potentially important youth advocacy services component.

## CHAPTER III

### COMMONWEALTH COMMUNITY SECURITY PROJECT(CCSP)

#### Project Goals and Strategies

The project plan presented by the Allston-Brighton Area Planning Action Council(APAC) defined the Commonwealth Community Security Project as a "security related social service program" with the purpose of working "to reduce the fear and tension that leads to crime, and work toward an atmosphere of healthy growth among the Tenants of Fidelis Way."

More specifically, the goals of the CCSP are to reduce the number of crimes (both reported and not reported) in the development to lessen the fear of crime in the minds of tenants and to lessen opportunities to commit crimes and to mobilize other resources and other agencies in the greater community and the City of Boston to work with the CCSP to deal with Commonwealth security problems.

The plan recommended implementation of four strategies to fulfill objectives geared toward various subgroups of the resident population. A community security and education component aimed at building a sense of concern about crime in the community as a whole as well as in individuals, to generate greater mutual and self-protection. A second strategy oriented toward the Spanish-speaking residents of the project was designed to accelerate their integration within the life of the community by improving their access to both security

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\* Commonwealth Community Security Program(Project Application Number 74-DF-01-0017)submitted by the Mayor's Safe Streets Act Advisory Committee to the Committee on Criminal Justice, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, p.12.

and social services. An educational/vocational component was intended to be an alternative to criminal activities, especially among youth and young adults, through educational and vocational counselling and referral activities, and tutoring. Finally, an escort service component was to provide paid escorts for the elderly, a highly victimized group, while offering employment opportunities to youth, the most likely offender group.

Funding for the project was to be \$60,000 per year for two years, beginning in November 1974. Amendments to the performance period have extended the project through July 1977.

#### Project Implementation

During the fall of 1974, a monitoring committee composed of residents of Commonwealth as well as representatives of community agencies was formed to serve the project in an advisory capacity. Although still incomplete, the group organized a personnel subcommittee, the first task of which was to approve the choice of a Project Director. A young man was hired who had lived at Commonwealth through 1964, had completed a criminal justice undergraduate program, and had some social work experience. By the end of 1974 all project staff positions were filled, with selections by and large following the priority, set by the monitoring committee, of employing housing development residents for positions of

the Community Organizer, Elderly Coordinator, Neighborhood Worker(Spanish-speaking), Educational/Vocational Counselor and Administrative Secretary.

A project office was established in the basement of a development building, sharing space with the Tenant Task Force as well as with an Alcoholics Anonymous worker and a part-time referral worker, whose activities were supported by the APAC. The office had been the site of an information and referral service operated by the APAC until the summer of 1973, at which time the APAC faced a funding cutback by ABCD from the U. S. Office of Equal Opportunity.\*

At the outset of the project all dwelling units were leafletted, and two mass meetings were held to orient residents to the project. Neither of these drew more than 35 to 40 persons, the low attendance being attributed to indifference. Building notices concerning project activities often disappeared soon after posting. The Community Organizer worked jointly with the Tenant Patrol Supervisor (supervised by BHA's Central Security Office) in visiting each household, and simultaneously explaining the CCSP and organizing tenants around the promised security doors. The elderly were invited to special coffee hours, and the Elderly Coordinator made an effort to acquaint elderly residents with the escort service component in particular, as well as some area-wide services

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\* These funds were partially restored during the following fall.

available to the elderly. The Spanish-speaking Neighborhood Worker began by translating notices about the security project into Spanish. Although her direct service offerings were not readily accepted, before long she was being called at all hours of the day and night to assist in communications with public agencies, especially the State Welfare Department.

Simultaneously, the Project Director and Educational/Vocational Counselor, as well as the Community Organizer, made contacts with several local and citywide agencies.\* These contacts have served the purpose of information sharing, and have led to referrals of residents for direct social services, skill training, employment placement and summer camp enrollment.\*\*

During the course of the project a significant evolution has occurred in project components, with the result that by

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\* These included the District 14 police station, Neighborhood Employment Center, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, the Youth Activities Commission, the Brighton Court, Allston-Brighton Little City Hall, Boston University Work-Study Program, Boston University Tutoring Program, Boston College Day Camp, Jackson-Mann Community School, the Baldwin School, the BHA Elderly Task Force, St. Gabriel's Monastery, Temple Kadimah, the Council of Elders, Commission on Affairs of the Elderly, Area II Homecare, the Visiting Nurse Association, the State Office for Children, Boston Family Services, the Welfare Department.

\*\* During two summers over 270 referrals were made to summer camps located outside of Commonwealth, although fewer children probably attended the camps. Over 125 referrals were made for temporary or full-time job training or placements, although it is uncertain how many placements resulted.

the end of its second year, the shape of the CCSP is considerably different from the model originally proposed.

The part-time position of Spanish-speaking Neighborhood Worker was vacated after the first six weeks because the incumbent felt that constant calls and visits interfered unduly with her personal life. The vacancy has never been filled.

The Elderly Coordinator, also working part time, attempted to organize an escort program during the first eight months of the project. Many members of the elderly community showed an initial interest. Some requests came in, mostly for trips outside of the immediate area. Escort service was provided mostly by the Coordinator himself, and often by other members of the CCSP staff who would drive the elderly in personal cars, often to doctors' appointments, or walk them between the project and a neighboring elderly development, the local church, or the local synagogue. No youth were ever hired for the escort component although the plan called for 10. During the first summer (1975), however, some youth, in slots financed by the Neighborhood Youth Corps and mostly from outside of the development, helped out, especially on trips to the local supermarket in a weekly bus service provided by the supermarket for Commonwealth elderly residents. While no records were kept, the Elderly Coordinator estimated that in total, some 25 to 30 persons used the

escort service once or twice; some 6 or 7 others used it more often. Interest by the elderly in this activity seemed to peter out in the fall of 1975.

In addition to referring project residents to employment, educational and rehabilitational opportunities, working with the district court on cases involving resident youth, and encouraging the attendance of summer camps and sports programs, the Educational/Vocational Counselor has spent a good portion of his time coordinating an Afternoon Center and helping to run a day camp in the development during the summer of 1976. The Elderly Coordinator has collaborated in both of these endeavors.

The summer camp was organized in cooperation with the Boston Parks and Recreation Department. CCSP staff recruited and supervised three college work-study students, as well as 10 teenagers employed through the Neighborhood Youth Corps, most of whom were from outside of the development. Between 30 and 60 children were served daily with free lunches (provided through arrangements with the Boys! Club) as well as with recreational activities.

The project opened an Afternoon Center in the beginning of 1976 and operated it until May. Work benches were constructed by the Elderly Coordinator, who also supplied model building equipment. An interracial core group of about 20 children between the ages of 6 and 12 attended daily after

school hours, having heard about this activity through word of mouth. Some supplies were contributed by CCSP staff members. The APAC supplemented these to some extent, and subsidized the participation in the program of two work-study students from Boston College. Some 10 volunteers from Boston University's occupational therapy program (Sargent College of Allied Health Professions) also were involved. While the principal goal of the center was to encourage the children to interact in a positive manner, aggressive behavior was a continuing problem. Staff realization that a lack of basic reading and math skills among the children may have been a factor in the behavioral pattern led to a restructuring of the program. By the time the Afternoon Center re-opened in October 1976, it had been incorporated into a paired schools program -- a collaborative effort between Boston University and School District I, subsidized by the State Department of Education. The program includes the employment of a Commonwealth resident as coordinator between Commonwealth and the schools attended by housing development children, as well as the volunteered services of Boston University students as tutors for children who are referred by the schools or who attend voluntarily. The center is located in a building basement and open from 3 to 5 P.M., three days a week. Four or five volunteers come to the Center each day, supervised by a work-study student; 20 to 30 children attend, usually

bringing along homework assignments.

The Community Organization and Education Coordinator has spent a considerable portion of her time helping the Resident Patrol Supervisor organize individual buildings, both when the Volunteer Resident Patrol Project was first funded (simultaneously with the CCSP at the beginning of 1975), and a year and a half later when the installation of the security doors actually began.

She also helped re-open the Teen Center in June 1975, generating a grant from the State Department of Mental Health for a part-time worker and a commitment from the BHA to refurbish the space. When funding for this worker's salary ran out, the Project Director was encouraged by the APAC to hire someone to run it. After an unfortunate experience with this especially employed Teen Center worker, the Elderly Coordinator took over this responsibility. The users of the Teen Center have shifted from almost totally white, to almost totally black youth. The center is supposed to be open from 6:30 to 10:00 P.M., five nights a week. However, spot checks made in October 1976 indicated that it was actually open less frequently. According to the Elderly Coordinator, on occasion, he has shut the kids out rather than put up with rowdy behavior. The center has been equipped with a small snack bar, a television set, cards, a chess game, a ping pong table, and a pool set, although some of these are in bad repair. Informal activities rather than formal programming

characterize center operations. Little visible outreach work is evident.

Perhaps the most important role of the Community Organization and Education Coordinator was to be the instruction of residents to protect themselves. She has publicized procedures in the IDENT-I-GUARD Program, engraving the possessions of about 100 households with Social Security numbers, and has responded to inquiries of five residents concerning the advertised Federally-supported crime insurance.

During the course of the project the CCSP staff, along with Tenant Task Force members, have met with police personnel, including the captains of the Public Housing Unit and District 14, frequently pressuring them for improved service. In the spring of 1976, when the irregular patrolling of the Public Housing Police officially ended, they encouraged the District 14 command to carry out their plan for a three evening (8 pm to 2 am) a week paired foot patrol, a voluntary assignment. The interest of the area's State Representative encouraged the group to meet with the Police Commissioner during the summer of 1976 to request a police team. The result was that the overtime patrol was expanded to seven evenings a week and a sergeant from the Bureau of Field Services was assigned for several months beginning in September to study the situation and make recommendations to the Commissioner. During the fall of 1976, the Sergeant recommended against a police team, but service was increased to include a paired

10 am to 6 pm walking patrol.

The involvement of the State Representative and the police Sergeant sparked the interest of project residents (two mass meetings attracted between 60 and 70 residents each) and of building captains, who have been brought together in several group meetings. It has also stimulated the convening in special meetings of representatives of agencies serving the development (the police, APAC, local church, local synagogue, Little City Hall, community school, Youth Activities Commission, BHA management, etc.) and it has revived the interest of the CCSP staff, whose morale had been adversely affected by continuing conflicts with the APAC, culminating in the firing of the Project Director in October 1976.

Problems between the APAC and Commonwealth housing development residents apparently predate the establishment of the Commonwealth Community Security Project. Among the sensitive issues were the relative allocation of available APAC resources to the housing development, housing development representation on the APAC Board of Directors' Program Committee and establishment of the Daycare Center at Commonwealth.

Even during the planning of the CCSP proposal, a conflict arose regarding the source of ultimate power over project implementation. The APAC Director signaled himself as the center of responsibility in his capacity as Director of the Fiscal

Agent, while residents pressed for a Monitoring Committee. The Monitoring Committee was to consist of 14 members: nine voting members including Task Force members, residents from specified categories, the APAC Director, and a representative from the BHA manager's office; and five advisory members from specified organizations.

According to the final project proposal the Monitoring Committee was to have responsibility only for the hiring of staff, and "to evaluate the work, provide feedback, and make suggestions to improve the effectiveness of specific programs, staff, and overall operations."\* Nevertheless, although the CCSP Project Director was chosen by the APAC Director, he was approved by the Monitoring Committee on the basis of the Committee's strong warning that he was answerable to it. CCSP staff tended to believe that their primary loyalties were to the Monitoring Committee. One of the results of increasing tensions between the APAC Director and active residents of the Fidelis Way development was the decision of the APAC Director to dissolve, in the summer of 1975, the Monitoring Committee, the meetings of which he had not attended for the previous six months. He defends his actions by pointing out that, by the end of the first year, all Monitoring Committee resident members had moved away from the housing development, leaving the CCSP staff in effect accountable to nobody. During the remainder of the project, however, this

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\*Ibid, p. 16.

leadership void for the security project was not filled. Not until the end of 1975 was an APAC staff person assigned to observe security project activities and prepare a proposal for refunding. By that time the energy level among project staff was at its lowest level; the CCSP Director was put on probation.

The dramatic turnover in resident membership on the Monitoring Committee reflected the large-scale turnover of residents in the development as a whole. Outmigration had left the Tenant Task Force reduced from seven to two members at the end of 1975. The gap in leadership has been partially filled by CCSP staff, who have been called upon to represent residents in maintenance complaints. CCSP staff also have met with staff of the Boston Housing Court's Master's Office investigating conditions at Commonwealth and have helped to monitor the BHA's compliance with court orders. Ironically, the staff has also assisted many longtime residents seeking transfers out of Commonwealth with applications.

#### Project Impact

Staff members and observers of the Commonwealth Community Security Project concur that the project title is a misnomer. Not only do they believe that it was misleading to project the image of a group that could deliver on stated goals of the security project, but the APAC Director himself thinks that publicity concerning the security project may have worsened the traditionally negative image of the Commonwealth housing

development in the surrounding community. The APAC's project proposal did identify the plan as a "security-related social service program." The emphasis, however, has been primarily on social services.

Some activities have been directly oriented toward improving security at Commonwealth. IDENT-I-GUARD efforts increase personal awareness about crime, and may help to reduce tensions in the users, although there is no proof that such a system actually deters crime. The concept of self and mutual protection is also being promoted through the coordination of CCSP staff with the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project. Unfortunately available community resources such as workshops and films on home security systems, self-defense and first aid have not been mobilized to any appreciable extent. Neither has there been any significant outreach to new tenants. By the spring of 1976, after a period of sustained resident turnover, a large proportion of the resident population probably knew nothing about the project or its goals, having come to Commonwealth after the orientation-information period was over. The Community Organizer Coordinator did help to mobilize some outside resources on behalf of the Teen Center. However, the Teen Center, which was in operation prior to the beginning of the CCSP, now depends upon resources internal to the security project itself. While interest in the Teen Center by residents is said to have been strong at one time,

this interest has waned. Neither outreach nor special activities currently exist to attract significant numbers of youth.

The escort service, a truly new endeavor for Commonwealth, was never attempted as planned. Some have claimed that sufficient demand did not emerge. Others say that competing services were being developed at that time, i.e., the Home-care Corporation, a mobile market, the supermarket weekly bus and a van operating from the Jackson-Mann Community School. Still others indicate that a walking escort service was unnecessary since most elderly felt comfortable enough on the streets until about 4 P.M., especially in the company of a friend. The Coordinator himself feels that as a young, black male, he was not the best choice for an outreach worker in a largely female, white, aged community. However, others have disagreed and hold that a special project van would have attracted users for outside trips, and that a more prolonged, intensive educational process might well have encouraged the elderly to use young escorts for local trips. In any case, the APAC Director made it clear that the agency would be unable to front-end the salaries of young workers for an escort component, or in any other youth employment program that might be substituted in fulfillment of the objective of providing constructive alternatives for project youth. Efforts related to setting up an escort program must have been dampened by this knowledge.

Failure to implement the Spanish-speaking component has been rationalized by the APAC Director along three lines: the Project Director did not support any one candidate strongly enough; the Fiscal Agent did not have the funds, considering inordinate delays in reimbursements from the City, to pay for this position; the need for a Spanish-speaking worker had not been clearly demonstrated.

Project staff disagree with this assessment of need, basing their position not only on the heavily subscribed services during the short tenure of the Spanish worker, but also on their own and the building captains' problems in communicating with Hispanic heads of household. The problem is reflected as well at the management level where, it is conceded, the language barrier may well intensify maintenance problems.

The relative importance of this component has increased during the course of the project, as the Hispanic population has gradually increased from nine percent of all households in October 1974, to 12 percent in September 1976. A good portion of these households are headed by rather shy, young women who, if they speak English, do so with embarrassment. In recent mass meetings, out of 60 to 70 residents in attendance, no more than a handful have been Hispanic, and these have tended to stand together by the door and leave early. The possibilities of working with this group is well demonstrated.

by a nonHispanic, Spanish-speaking nun who has recently begun to organize many of these families around the issues of nutrition and Catholic education.

The Educational/Vocational component of the project has been perhaps the most active, as it has involved not only the Educational/Vocational Guidance Counselor, but also the Project Director, Community Organization and Education Coordinator and, at times, the Elderly Coordinator. While their efforts have been serious, it is not clear that these workers have the experience or training to provide direct counseling services. There has also been some concern about the ability of these workers as members of a dwindling white ethnic group to adapt to the needs of the newer incoming ethnic groups, including black and Hispanic families. The Educational/Vocational component does not represent a new service of the APAC at Fidelis Way; it is a replacement of referral and of afternoon-center and summer camp coordination services that existed previous to the funding of the CCSP.

In summary, the APAC had committed itself to a four-part project, the front-end funding for which was obviously beyond its capacity to provide.\* Despite the security-related

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\* The LEAA Program Coordinator now believes that the APAC has the capacity to front-end less than \$4000 per month. The fulfillment of the whole plan would have required front-end financing of \$5000 per month.

nature of the components as planned, the tasks of the CCSP staff have evolved to the point that they closely resemble the social services previously provided by the APAC at the housing development. In its policy of favoring development residents the APAC assembled, early in the life of the project, a conscientious but relatively inexperienced staff. The APAC failed to provide training as proposed in its plan and the staff was unprepared to accommodate its strategies to the rapidly changing project population which requires a more assertive outreach approach.

In the area of security the CCSP has provided valuable back-up services for some positive forces external to the project itself, services that the Tenant Task Force might have been able to provide had the high rate of turnover not sapped its strength during a good portion of the project. Thus project staff have provided information for and support to the Court-Appointed Master's Office, pressured the Police Department for increased services, and served as an organizing resource to a state representative trying to improve security at the development, as well as to the special police assignment that together they were instrumental in attracting.

Finally, unlike the Mission Hill and Columbia Point security projects, the CCSP has represented a real and valuable intermeshing with the security door program through mutual

support provided by CCSP staff and the Resident Patrol Supervisors. While this situation has improved the visibility of the CCSP and has ultimately helped it to rally the support of a core group of interested residents, it has not always been beneficial to the CCSP's image. By associating itself with the long-delayed hardware improvements (only begun to be installed almost a year and a half after the beginning of its operation and concluded almost two years afterwards) the CCSP, during a long period, was made to appear as a project which could not deliver. The final installation of the doors and the activation of the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project (see Chapter V) has therefore provided somewhat of a facelift for the Commonwealth Community Security Project.

## CHAPTER IV

### MISSION HILL SAFETY AND SECURITY INTERVENTION PROJECT (MHSSIP)

#### Project Goals and Strategies

The underlying goal of the project proposed by the Roxbury Children's Services (RCS) can best be summarized in an excerpt from that agency's project proposal: "to demonstrate the impact and effectiveness of a preventative and correctional approach in solving problems that relate to security and safety as they exist in the Mission Hill Housing Projects".\* Nevertheless, as operational experience demonstrated, the interests of the sponsoring agency clearly extended beyond narrowly defined concern for safety and security. RCS' further explanation for its participation was "to reinforce the desire in tenants and create a valid rationale for motivation with the objective of improving the quality of life and potential for upward mobility in an area that is seriously deteriorated."\*\* As this evaluation will demonstrate, although the goal of improving security and safety provided the framework for the design of project strategies, the hidden agenda of improving the potential for upward mobility, a goal related to RCS' sense of community mission, seems to have prevailed during project implementation.

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\* The RCS Mission Hill Safety and Security Intervention Project (Project Application) submitted by Roxbury Children's Service, Inc. to the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice, p.8.

\*\* Ibid., p.6.

The specific project objectives articulated by RCS were ambitious: (1) to involve tenants in the documentation of security and safety problems; (2) to develop a plan for improvement of safety and security; (3) to identify conditions and behaviors that contribute to unsafe situations; (4) to offer training and education to residents relating to creating a safe environment, behaving in a safe way, and responding to danger; (5) to provide back-up to the Tenant Task Force; (6) to extend employment and skill training in leadership, communication, and interpersonal relations to a number of adult and youth residents; (7) to make supportive services available to tenants; and (8) to provide 24-hour emergency coverage and services.\*

To achieve this catalogue of purposes, RCS proposed two basic project components. One priority was an on-site training strategy, including "in-service" training to 12 resident youth who would help develop and implement the rest of the Safety and Security Intervention Project; training for volunteer building captains participating in the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project designed by BHA's Central Security Office; and a safety training component oriented toward project residents, grouped according to age.

A second priority was a battery of direct services to be provided by telephone through the Roxbury Children's Services central office. These would include daytime counseling and 24-hour emergency service regarding personal as well as

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\* Ibid., pp. 8-9.

security problems through the conventional telephone system, and the establishment of a special direct telephone communications line from each building at Mission Hill Main and Extension to the RCS central office, thereby constituting a security alert network.

The budget for this project during the first year of operation was to be \$130,000, a sum which did not include the installation cost of the special phone system. RCS was to pursue other funding sources to finance that component.

#### Project Implementation

The Mission Hill Safety and Security Intervention Project was in operation from June 1975 through August 1976. Since all activities of the project were terminated two months before the beginning of this evaluation, it was impossible to observe the project in action. The evaluators were therefore forced to depend entirely upon the quarterly reports submitted by the Project Director to the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice, supplemented by interviews with four of the five professional adult staff members, by a group discussion with four of the twelve youth trainees who agreed to come together for a meeting, and by interviews with various key individuals at the housing developments who had presumably come in contact with the project. Most evident during this fact-finding process was the lack of consensus among project participants concerning not only the goals and

objectives of the project and the relative value of its results, but concerning the very activities that had transpired during the course of the fourteen months.

The MHSSIP began in June 1976 with the hiring of a Project Director and a Youth Supervisor. The top-level position was initially filled by the then director of the RSC's satellite office at Mission Hill; later, by a minister with community organizing experience. A young, bilingual man was recruited for the position of Youth Supervisor. When hired, he had been collaborating with the Executive Director of RCS in developing grant proposals aimed at initiating RCS's interest in experimentation with video technology, mainly in his capacity with the Boston Video Access Center, a small group of persons interested in video programming.

By the end of July, 15 youth were recruited from Mission Hill Main and Extension. These were almost equally distributed among four categories: black male and female, and Spanish surnamed male and female. A few youth had just finished high school, at least one was about to enter college and a few others were looking for full-time work. The youth were to be paid \$2.10 per hour for full-time employment during the two summers and half-time employment during the school year. A Training Coordinator -- a bilingual male with experience in encounter group work -- was appointed in August 1975. Until the video equipment to document housing problems

became available at the end of the summer, the youths' time was left unplanned and largely filled through outdoor recreation. There were some abortive efforts by the Training Coordinator to introduce leadership training and community organization techniques.

During the fall of 1975 several project members (adult and youth) joined other neighborhood groups in working for the peaceful implementation of court-ordered school desegregation, mainly by being present at the potentially tense moments when neighborhood children boarded and debarked from buses. Participation in this unanticipated peace-keeping mission was considered to be a justified diversion from other planned project activities.

In addition, the Youth Trainers spent approximately six weeks of the fall season preparing an office for use of the project in one of the buildings at Mission Hill Extension. RCS had originally hoped that the Boston Housing Authority would fix up these apartments. When it was clear that the labor of cleaning, plastering and painting would have to be the group's own, the resentfulness of the project's adult staff was communicated to the youth. In March 1976 somebody broke into the office, covering it with paint and thinner. The office was burned out at the end of the project. Both incidents were interpreted as unmotivated vandalism by outside parties.

In November 1975 a young black man with some previous group work experience for a neighborhood settlement house was hired in the position of Telephone Counselor. The Telephone Counselor assumed virtual administrative control of the project in the absence of an active director, generating some bitterness from the Youth Trainers and several adult staff members.

By the end of 1975 one of the fifteen Youth Trainers had returned with his family down south, and another to Puerto Rico. Two had dropped out, according to some in the youth group, because greater accountability had been demanded of them. Two, who had graduated from high school and were unemployed, had been put on the payroll full-time. (One left the program in December.) A video consultant was brought in for a few days when the equipment arrived during the summer of 1975, and worked two days a-week from March through May of 1976. He worked full time from June through August 1976 as Youth Coordinator following the termination of the Youth Supervisor and Training Coordinator in May 1976. A family caseworker was assigned sometimes part and sometimes full time from Roxbury Children's Services, and while her work was aimed at the community, she sometimes provided assistance to project staff.

The youth participated in several activities after the Telephone Counselor took charge of the project. They

provided back-up support to the Tenant Task Force leader of Mission Hill Extension by leafletting tenants for a couple of mass meetings and helping to organize a demonstration in the office of the housing development manager. They learned to operate video equipment and recorded poor housing conditions as well as the destruction of abandoned cars which they showed to the Team Police in an attempt to encourage quicker police response. They practiced interviewing techniques through a poll of tenant opinions concerning deteriorating conditions. Two issues of a limited bilingual newsletter were produced and distributed to project residents. Newsletter focus was on articles introducing project residents to locally available social services. Some project staff cooperated with the Mission Hill developments' team policing unit established in April of 1976 during a potentially explosive racial incident. Finally, some excursions for the Youth Trainers were organized, including one to New York City and another to Martha's Vineyard. They were designed to expose low-income youth to the world outside of the development.

#### Project Impact

None of the adult staff members interviewed considers the MHSSIP a security-related program, except insofar as the youth learned to link certain unsafe behaviors with their consequences. Thus they observed and analyzed the consequences of the delay in police action on abandoned cars, and of the

inadequate securing of their own office. By and large the project's goal was viewed not in its orientation toward security problems within the housing developments, but toward improving the upward mobility of the particular youth participants. No attempt was made to train or even establish contact with or help recruit building captains, nor to seek resources required for the installation of an emergency communications network.

Visibility of the project remained relatively low during most of its life. Visibility appears to have increased somewhat toward the end of the project with the distribution of the newsletter, although this informational medium did not emphasize the image of a security-related community organization and process.

A number of factors explains the relatively low morale of adult staff and youth enrollees throughout the demonstration period: (1) continuing tension between the Project Director and on-site staff; and (2) the reluctance of the Project Director to authorize expenditures other than for salaries and wages and the purchase of video equipment, a policy that excluded expenditures for maintenance and transportation of equipment, seriously curtailing video taping operations. The Project Director's attitude reflected long delays in reimbursement of funds front-ended by RCS. Most significant perhaps, the staff conflicts represented a negative influence,

frustrating the need of the youth participants for positive adult role models.

Throughout the project relations between black and Spanish-speaking participants, both adult and youth, were strained. While only one Spanish-speaking Youth Trainer was not bilingual, a communications problem was perceived by black Youth Trainers who felt excluded when Spanish was spoken by the others. Two adult staff members accept this situation as an inevitable clash of two cultures with different life styles and tastes. However, by the end of the project these differences were apparently beginning to be resolved.

Although videotaping, interviewing and writing interested some youth and enhanced their observational and analytical capacities, it is not clear that the energy input was very high for the majority of the youth. However, one staff member believes that the youth did learn how to project a more positive self-image when dealing with others, and they doubtlessly benefited from the reinforcement of paid employment. In fact, the project's most significant visibility may have been among the friends of the Youth Trainers, who would have liked to have been similarly employed.

It is impossible to indicate with any certainty whether this project will in any way increase the long-term upward mobility of its youth, the hidden agenda of project staff.

One adult staff member believes that of the four Youth Trainers who entered the project with police records, recidivism occurred with only one of these during the course of the project. While no causal relationship can be attributed, the need cannot be underestimated for youth employment/work experience programs that provide constructive alternatives to fill the free time of low income youth, leading to the acquisition of skills, income and self-esteem.

CHAPTER V.  
VOLUNTARY RESIDENT PATROL PROJECT

Project Goals and Strategies

The primary goal of the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project was "to give the tenants themselves an interest and an ability to deal with safety problems within their building."<sup>\*</sup>

This was to be achieved through the implementation of two interdependent strategies, one relating to hardware improvements and the other utilizing a software or organizational approach. The installation of lockable steel security doors at all entrances -- front, rear/basement, and roof -- would be financed in the three federally-subsidized developments through the special grant pledged by HUD to match LEAA funds. Included in this allocation would be funds for certain physical improvements to follow the installation of doors, aimed at increasing both security and tenant morale. Thus HUD's share of the project included \$241,554 for new security doors, and \$36,076 for the replacement of hall glass, \$30,870 to replace mailboxes, \$14,000 for the installation of foxlock plates, \$7,500 for hall paint and other improvements, and \$20,000 for such patrol equipment as uniforms, flashlights and telephones.

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<sup>\*</sup> Resident Patrol Supervisors Project Application (Proj. No. 74 DF 01 .0017) Committee on Criminal Justice, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, p.2.

The organization of tenants at each development was to be the responsibility of a Resident Patrol Supervisor. This development resident would be funded for approximately one-third time by LEAA, and supervised through the Boston Housing Authority's Central Security Office (CSO), to be subsidized for the purpose of this project by HUD's special matching grant. An allocation of \$17,850 was originally programmed by LEAA for Resident Patrol Supervisors during a two-year period.

The level of focus for the organizing of residents was to be the building,\* at which level the Resident Patrol Supervisor would introduce and rally support for the concept of security doors, organize the election of a building captain, and encourage the joint determination of the hours during which the doors would be locked as well as the hours and strategies of the Resident Patrol. The role of the captain would be the organization and supervision of a patrol responsible for controlling the entry of persons without keys, and in the absence of such an effort, the assumption or delegation of responsibility for the locking of doors at hours agreed upon by building residents. The resident patrol ideally would be supplied by development management with a first-floor apartment as one became vacant, as well as with supplies for cleaning and decorating hallways. The Resident

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\* For the purpose of this report, the word "building" will refer to address. Many developments have large buildings with several addresses, each with its own entranceways and staircase or elevator, and separated from other addresses in the same building by fire walls.

Patrol Supervisor would also be responsible for organizing and training building captains as a group, providing input to the CSO and development management concerning security-related problems, and cooperating with LEAA-funded security projects operating at the developments in areas of mutual interest.

The Central Security Office committed itself to the recruitment of Resident Patrol Supervisors and to conducting a six-week training period combining on-the-job training with classroom lectures and discussions. It was also to maintain close contact with Supervisors, receiving daily incident reports and weekly progress reports, and holding monthly meetings.

The project was one which the Director of the Central Security Office had long advocated. During the fall of 1973 he had accompanied a group of Boston public housing residents to New York City to observe a voluntary resident patrol at work at the Queens Bridge Housing Project. Following that trip he helped participants to organize several pilot patrols. One was in a 7-story building at Columbia Point. The hallways were cleaned and painted by tenants. A tenant patrol was formed which maintained an office in a first-floor apartment and the door was locked 24 hours a day. In another building, a three-story structure at Commonwealth, tenants simply decided to keep the door locked in the evenings.

#### Project Implementation

Four Resident Patrol Supervisors were hired, two in October

of 1974 and two in February of 1975. The Supervisors from Mission Hill Main and Mission Hill Extension were the Chairpersons of the Tenant Task Forces at these developments and among the most active development residents; they maintained their positions as Resident Patrol Supervisors during the entire course of the project. The Supervisor at the Commonwealth development was also an active Task Force member; she moved away at the end of 1975, and her position was filled by a resident whose interest in the development also led him to seek out a position on the Tenant Task Force. At Columbia Point, the original Resident Patrol Supervisor was found not to be a resident at all, but a squatter. He was followed by a succession of three other Supervisors until the summer of 1976, when activities virtually ended.

Training began in February, with the first of three or four meetings. During these sessions Supervisors were informed of the goals, functions and limitations of the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project and its interface with other BHA functions. They were instructed in procedures for organizing building-wide meetings of residents, and development-wide meetings of building captains, and in the art of report writing. During these meetings, the Supervisors were encouraged to share their own experienced problems and solutions.

Simultaneously, a CSO staff member accompanied each Supervisor during his or her initial building meetings. A slide show introduced residents to New York City's success

story. The slides portrayed hallways beautifully decorated with fresh paint, wallpaper, carpeting and flower arrangements, achieved through the labor and financial contributions of residents. Resident patrol members were seen uniformed in smocks, sitting by a table at the building entrance.

The plan of the CSO was that a building would not receive new doors until all of its tenants had signed a statement of interest. While it is not clear that this was achieved, the installation of doors began at Columbia Point and Mission Hill Extension at the end of 1974, and was concluded in June of 1975. Keys were distributed to tenants at all but two buildings located at Mission Hill Extension, the keys for which still have not been produced. The final cost was about \$600 per door, compared to \$381 originally estimated by HUD. Planned internal improvements -- the installation of windows, light fixtures, or mailboxes, etc.\* -- did not follow.

Work at Mission Hill Main began in the fall of 1975. There the strategy was primarily one of renovation of existing entrances, entailing the removal of the glass block windows surrounding the door frames and their replacement with cement. The work was done so inadequately that in many entrances holes separate the door frames from thin bearing walls. In addition,

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\* Columbia Point will receive these hallway improvements during the course of its renovation program; some modernization funds have been allocated for the installation of mailboxes at Mission Hill Extension.

many doors do not fit the door frames. In some cases the door closers are located on the outside rather than the inside of the door, and doors open inwardly rather than outwardly. Renovation was never concluded and as a result, no keys were ever distributed to residents despite the recurrent complaint by the Resident Patrol Supervisor that the contractor had left many doors locked from without. Payment of the contractor was halted, and the matter is only being investigated now, one year later.

When it became clear early in the life of the program that HUD's matching grant would not be forthcoming, the BHA received HUD authorization to use its available modernization funds. This meant that the three federal developments received new doors only when each Tenant Task Force allocated part of its own discretionary modernization funds for such purposes.

Because Commonwealth as a state-subsidized development was not included in the original allocation by HUD, funds for the installation of doors were allocated by the Tenant Task Force from the very beginning from state modernization loans earmarked for the development. During February 1975 a survey of doors was made, and specifications for installation were prepared. Door installation did not begin, however, until more than one year later. During the installation process it became obvious that the survey of doors had omitted

the basement entranceways of the six-story buildings. Rectification of this error extended the installation process into the summer of 1976 and again into the fall as the disappearance of the new padlocks placed on basement doors necessitated replacements. Cleaning of hallways by a maintenance crew began in the fall, and then, only by court order.\* New mailboxes will soon follow, also paid for with modernization funds allocated by the Tenant Task Force.

The basic facts concerning the implementation of the software portion of the program have been difficult to ascertain, especially since there is little agreement among reports made by the Resident Patrol Supervisors, the Central Security Office, development managers and residents.

At Columbia Point the Central Security Office reports that all residents in the development's 72 buildings at one time expressed approval for the installation of security doors. Nevertheless, at the height of activity - the spring of 1975 - no more than 25 buildings were listed as having captains. The project manager claims that with the exception of eight elderly high-rise buildings which have always been kept locked,

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\* The cleaning of hallways has been considered a tenant rather than maintenance function. The delegation of that responsibility by means of dates specified in each lease, in the absence of enforcement, has resulted in most hallways not having been scrubbed for years. The BHA has been under court order since the beginning of 1976 to clean building hallways at Commonwealth.

there was never a serious effort to lock these doors, many of which have since been vandalized. The only resident patrol that has been known to operate is in the building originally chosen as the project pilot.

Reports from Resident Patrol Supervisors at Columbia Point to the CSO were filled with pleas for basic improvements without which the apathy and defeatism of residents would prevail. The high rate of resident move-outs, the insecurity about BHA's plans for the development, and the presence of squatters were all seen as serious obstacles to the operation of the project.\* Apparently no attempt was ever made to relate the Volunteer Resident Patrol Project to the Columbia Point Community Security Project.

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\*The following are typical reports from three different Resident Patrol Supervisors:

During the month of July I spent majority of my time trying to explain to the building captains why nothing is happening with the program, this was very hard for me because I don't know what's going on. I have made several suggestions and recommendations on ways that the program could be strengthened, but I have heard nothing in response to them. Therefore, because of the negativeness that I receive from the building captains I feel that I must resign.[sic] (July 31, 1975)

I visited..... We had a meeting. I brought them up to date about the resident patrol and that I was supervisor of the building captains. I told them how the patrol was to function. They then told me that their building captain had moved. Miss....also told me that someone tried to break in her apt. They put tape over the peep holes on her floor so no one could see who it was. I then inspected the hallways and the new front and back doors are off, and the windows are broken. The mail boxes are vandalised. After this I visited.....I tried to explain the patrol to them, but they weren't interested as they are going to move. Their building capt. has already moved. There only about 5 families left in the 6 story

Mission Hill Extension also reached its peak of organization during the spring of 1975 when 17 of a total of 29 buildings had captains. Several tenants have denied, however, that buildings were ever kept locked. Nevertheless, the Supervisor and development manager insist that at one point in time the residents of several three-story buildings were maintaining their buildings locked at consensually determined hours; that several seven-story buildings maintained active patrols which used vacant first floor apartments during the daytime and evening hours, regulating the entry of those without keys; and that some tenants cooperated in cleaning up their hallways.

If this were the case at Mission Hill Extension, the pattern probably lasted less than a year. At present residents of only one or two buildings are cooperating in maintaining the doors locked. In fact, only 11 buildings are lockable,

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cont'd from p.8

building. The reason for the determination to move is because they were robbed last year in the morning between 9 and 10:00 and no one saw anything,[sic] (December 29, 1975)

I also have been trying to reorganize the buildings as far as having a new building captain elected. And the serious problems that I've been facing in the neighborhood like what's going to be done to the buildings. It's like I myself is trying to deal with it, and I'm not receiving any help from anyone.[sic] (Spring, 1976)

considering the condition of their two street-level doors.\*

The reports of the Resident Patrol Supervisor at Mission Hill Extension were filled with frustrations in handling the contradictions which arose during the course of the project. While residents of earlier organized buildings were impatiently demanding their doors before the delicately constructed organizations dissolved, in buildings with doors already installed, some residents were keeping them open with anything from cans to ice cream sticks. While in some buildings residents were demanding copies of the keys which were lost by the workmen during the installation process, making the securing of the new doors impossible, in other buildings residents were passing out keys to squatters. In some buildings residents resisted the idea of security doors, even making threats when approached on the subject; in other, organized buildings, residents and captains were paralyzed by the fear of reprisal from restricting the entry of outsiders, possibly involved in the use or sale of drugs, robbery, etc. There was clearly an absence of substantive help or guidance

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\*The Team Police assigned to the development know of only one building which is maintained locked. A building by building survey performed around noon on December 20, 1976, a weekday, showed that building and one other as locked. The number of lockable buildings may well be an overestimate, since the functioning of the unsurveyed roof and cellar doors is crucial to the ability to secure a building. In all, 32 of 58 ground level doorways were unlockable due to vandalism or rough treatment of inadequately installed doors. Included were five entrances from which the doors had been totally removed, and about three cases of door frames which have separated from supporting walls.

for the Resident Patrol Supervisor for resolving these problems.\*

The programmed intermeshing of the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project here and in Mission Hill Main with the Mission Hill Safety and Security Intervention Project failed to occur.

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\*The following is a selection from reports made by the Resident Patrol Supervisor to the CSO:

Some bldg. now are complaining that they had their bldgs all set to go on the Resident patrol and didn't get thier door and, are not ready to cooperate until they get them. [sic] (October 20, 1974).


So far this month I have been looking into some bldgs. that don't have any doors and no one to form a patrol..one woman tried to form one and was threaten..[sic] (January 18, 1975).

..my problem is that I don't have any one to report to or to follow up on any...misunderstanding that may arise...for out program to work.....these promise that have been made to tenants has to be kept you can't run a program on...promises or lies...[sic] (January 26, 1975)

The bldg. with doors are not being lock because the doors are not put up as good as it should be in checking the door I find that some are off the hinglts some won't shut...The tenants are also complaining about the doors are being lock and, they don't have keys.....some buildings have front doors and no back. But, are still being hamper with because tenants don't understand why they should have one door and not the other. And I don't have the answers [sic] (February 1975)

This week was worst yet. we have people passing keys to squatters and, they are moving in by the truck loads..[sic] (February 15, 1976)

As supervisor in this development I have come to the point of calling all bldg. capt. to come to Columbia Point to tell of all the complaints they are having from the tenants such as dope, robbery, brocken doors that they see outsiders are doing and are afraid to come forward and name names. Their life have been in danger because of the different insult have been put upon them from these people. And still nothing can be done to help them. I can't even help them because I have no one who can handle the trouble.[sic] (undated)



**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 2**

The period of greatest activity in the organizing of residents at Mission Hill Main also took place during the spring of 1975, at which time only 20 buildings out of a total of 137 had captains. The reports of the Resident Patrol Supervisor at Mission Hill Main varied between enthusiasm about the concept, and the reality of tenant resistance to organization, the inferior work of installation, the never-ending search for the keys, and the resulting destruction of the doors.\* The absence of keys was a particular problem for doors which were left locked by the workers who installed them. The Resident Patrol Supervisor apparently never understood the locking system, nor the accessibility of the simple wrench which releases the lock from the inside. Thus if these doors were even to be closed, first-story residents would have to respond to every arrival, resident or visitor. The alternatives were propping the doors open, or breaking the locks.

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\* The following are examples of reports made by the Resident Patrol Supervisor to the CSO:

...the tenants of ... apt..slam the door in my face...the tenants of ...would not open the door. Apt...does not want to sign either...[sic](March 10, 1975)

...The peoples protest continues to be the same in relation to the locks. They complaint that the locks are loose and can brake easily, even though the second week of this month, various doors were installed with heavy locks which are very difficult to brake. But still the problem that they are kept open, for the simple reason that the tenants do not own their own key. [sic] (March 31, 1976)

While the Resident Patrol Supervisor at Commonwealth was very active at the inception of the project, skepticism was high among residents about the sincerity of the BHA in fulfilling its promises. The Supervisor enlisted some help from residents who notified her of security problems, but the residents' general apathy appeared vindicated as the delay in the installation of doors continued. Serious organizing efforts on the building level were therefore postponed until the doors were installed, a process which ended almost two years after organizing activities had begun.

By December 1976, as many as 33 of 35 buildings at Commonwealth had building captains. Low turnouts at building meetings had led to the recruitment of a captain in each building, who was then introduced to residents as a fait accompli. More than half of these captains attended development-wide captains' meetings in November and December. In most buildings doors are locked from 10 P.M. to 7 A.M., and in a few, captains are experimenting with locking them after the morning arrival of the postman. Probably half of all buildings are actually locked on a given night.\*

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\* A survey conducted by a member of the evaluation team at midnight on December 8, 1976, an extremely cold weekday evening, found 17 of 35 buildings with at least one street-level door unlocked. Two of these had doors which were broken in such a way as to be ununlockable. A few "locked" doors were actually slightly ajar, possibly because of faulty closers.

Although building patrols have never been considered at Commonwealth and it is not clear that the majority of tenants are interested in the program, the building captains have been encouraged by group meetings to "hold the fort" themselves. They are a mixture of residents, young and old, black and white, oldtimer and newcomer, most of whom feel a stake in the development. They have requested monthly meetings and have sought out additional responsibilities, such as the delivery of flyers and the enforcement of rules, including not only those which are listed in leases, but also norms of behavior which they would compose, have ratified by general election, and which possibly could be upheld in eviction proceedings of problem tenants. The majority of building captains are women, many of whom, despite an interest in greater responsibility, are afraid to pressure problem tenants. In several cases the Resident Patrol Supervisor, aided by the Community Organization and Education Coordinator of the Commonwealth Community Security Project, has provided back-up services to building captains by convening building meetings, meeting with individual residents, or relaying information or grievances to the development manager.

In fact, Commonwealth is the only one of the four developments in the demonstration program in which there has been a real intermeshing of the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project with the community organization/social action project . The

relationship has been beneficial to both. The captains have been reinforced by the recent interest shown by the State Representative and the Police Department (see Chapter III), and both the morale and the impact of CCSP staff has been strengthened by the recent appearance of this active group of residents, however thinly spread throughout the development.

#### Project Impact

The Voluntary Resident Patrol Project aimed at increasing the control that residents have over their own environments. Unfortunately, more than anything, it emphasized how little control concerned residents really can assert because that control actually lies in the hands of the BHA and HUD, and in the hands of a small group of predators composed both of those who reside in and those who simply use the developments.

It is clear from the foregoing description of implementation that the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project was a misnomer. There has been only one successful resident patrol, at Columbia Point, upon which the Central Security Office has focussed a great deal of attention. At Mission Hill Extension a small handful of buildings maintained patrols over a period of several months. At Mission Hill Main and Commonwealth, the idea was never considered.

The project might have been reduced to one in which captains, elected by tenants, would take or delegate responsibility for the locking of doors at hours agreed upon by all building

residents. Nevertheless, although contradictory reports cloud the actual sequence of events, it appears that even this degree of participation by residents was rare. There were doubtlessly many enthusiastic residents at all developments, enough to encourage their elected representatives to give security doors priority over other needed improvements in the allocation of modernization funds. However, too many others proved too skeptical of BHA promises, too distrustful of neighbors, too apathetic or simply too preoccupied with their own problems to participate. Many residents felt that security services were the responsibility of the Police Department and the BHA, and that tenants should not work without compensation. In some cases participation was withheld by persons in disagreement with the concept of locked doors, either because of the difficulty thus imposed to the easy entry of young children and guests, or of cohorts in such illicit activities as prostitution and drug sales.

Captains, recruited by the Resident Patrol Supervisors, were often the most concerned residents. In some cases attempts by captains to actively enforce building rules were met with hostility from other tenants.

In one sense the apathy or impatience of many tenants was vindicated. Waiting periods for the installation of doors, extending from months to two years, neutralized much of the tenant organization that had been achieved. The installation of many doors was poor, and usually went uncorrected. The

absence of keys for all new doorways at Mission Hill Main, and for several buildings at Mission Hill Extension and Columbia Point was met with the reluctance of all parties -- the development manager, the Central Security Office, the Central Maintenance Office, and the contractors -- to assume responsibility for producing them.

In addition, not only did the promised hallway improvements fail to follow the installation of doors, but neither did maintenance practices change in ways that might have been supportive of the security project. Even where security doors were perfectly installed, they often safeguarded hallways that were dark because of the absence of light fixtures, cold because of the poor condition of radiators, and filthy because of years and sometimes decades of neglect. At Mission Hill Main and Extension, the gaping holes that have replaced windows in vacant first-floor apartments mock any attempt to lock street doors. At Columbia Point, on the other hand, BHA's program of relocation and renovation of some buildings, and mothballing of others, aggravated prevailing uncertainty about continued tenure of residents in their apartments, thus affecting their interest in participating in building organizations.

The disillusionment of the Resident Patrol Supervisors was therefore predictable, although it might have been avoided by timing their employment with the actual installation of the doors, as originally proposed. The disillusionment of the

Central Security Office staff was also predictable, especially since it had committed itself to supervise a project over which in actuality it had no direct control.

Nevertheless, the CSO may have raised unreasonable hopes with its slide show of New York's model development, considering the track record of the BHA in delivering on improvements and maintenance. It underestimated the difficulties of organizing a highly mobile, disillusioned, low-income population. It placed Resident Patrol Supervisors in the field with virtually no real training in organizing, and provided them with little support for the contradictions implied in their roles.

CHAPTER VI.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary of Findings by Project

This chapter will summarize the findings of the previous chapters and focus on the goals and impact of the Boston Public Housing Security Program as a whole. It will end with some conclusions drawn from the several demonstrations.

The Columbia Point Community Security Project was implemented almost completely according to plans, the major exception being the radio station, which is due to become operational in February 1977. The project's beginnings were hardly auspicious. Logistical problems resulting in delays in placing hired staff on the payroll and receiving equipment crucial to operations were exacerbated by the termination of the Project Director, whose efforts to broaden project scope to social organization were perceived as threats to entrenched community leaders. The Security Task Force's own operations were threatened by a power struggle within its parent organization, the Columbia Point Community Development Council, as well as through the exercise of undue influence by Task Force members in the hiring of staff. A downgrading of original personnel requirements permitted more Columbia Point residents to qualify for appointment, but also increased the security project's vulnerability to persons with poor work habits, resulting in a large number of terminations and compromising

the security project's image in the community.

Nevertheless, even the most severe critics of the security project concede its importance for the residents' feeling of well-being, and are heartened by the Task Force's demonstrated capacity for self-examination and renewal.

After more than one year's operational experience (most components were operating by November 1975) and with the BHA funding extension totally underwritten by the federal Target Projects Program providing the security project a new lease on life, the Task Force has been reevaluating security project management and supervision with a view to adopting and enforcing higher standards of performance. In the process the security project is finally beginning to achieve recognition by both the community and law enforcement agencies as a legitimate crime prevention institution with considerable potential for becoming a trustworthy and effective community watch, providing security services that complement operations of the team police, and serving as a constructive source of intervention on behalf of delinquent and delinquent-prone youth.

The thrust of the Commonwealth Community Security Project was to focus on social rather than security services. In so doing, the project gradually came to resemble the collection of services available to development residents prior to its inception: education and employment referral, after-school tutoring center, evening teen center, summer lunch and

recreational programs. The one new social service component outlined in its plan -- a Spanish-speaking neighborhood worker -- was not seriously implemented, nor was the plan's most innovative security-oriented component, linking youth employment to an elderly escort service. The lack of commitment to all components of the project plan by the fiscal agent resulted from that agency's financial inability to front-end the cost of the entire program, as well as historic conflicts between the agency's director and active housing development residents.

While accepting a policy of favoring development residents for staff positions, the fiscal agent did not provide training as it had promised to do in its project plan. It thus assembled, early in the life of the project, a relatively inexperienced staff, unprepared to service a changing population requiring an assertive outreach approach. This staff nevertheless did constitute a stable and generally conscientious core of tenant advocates during a period in which population turnover sapped the strength of the Tenant Task Force and maintenance problems accelerated. It thus represented tenants before the BHA in maintenance concerns and before the Police Department in lobbying for better coverage, and helped to provide backup services for the Court-Appointed Master's

Office, the activities of a concerned state representative and a special assignment from the Police Commissioner's Office. It also provided important support for the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project.

The Mission Hill Safety and Security Project consisted of ambitious program elements, most of which were never implemented. There was no consensus among staff concerning security-related objectives, and project implementation was directed somewhat narrowly at improving the upward mobility of a small group of housing development youth. There was no serious effort to comply with project component guidelines dealing with the training of building captains, the establishment of a security communications network, and safety education for development residents.

Even within its more narrow definition as a youth employment endeavor the project proved to be weak. Although activities of videotaping, interviewing and writing interested a few youth, and one staff member believes that such participants learned to project a more positive self-image when dealing with others, too much time was left unprogrammed. In place of planned sensitivity training, project participants were demoralized by conflicts among adult staff members and tended to separate themselves in sometimes hostile racial groupings.

Roxbury Children's Services' difficulties in implementing its plan illustrates the dilemma that an agency with a

traditional casework approach may experience in shifting its orientation to the very distinct requirements of a community organization approach.

The Voluntary Resident Patrol Project was, on balance, more instrumental in reinforcing the disillusionment and skepticism of residents in the four housing developments than it was in increasing their control over their own security. Long delays between the original tenant organization activity and the installation of the doors -- ranging from several months at Columbia Point and Mission Hill Extension to almost two years at Commonwealth -- negated much of the effectiveness of the project's community organization component. Many doors were poorly installed; at Mission Hill Main the workmanship was so bad that the contract was suspended. Keys were never distributed at Mission Hill Main, nor at several buildings in other developments, despite frustrated pleas by Resident Patrol Supervisors. Nor did hallway improvements follow the installation of security doors, as planned. Meanwhile overall maintenance at the developments continued to decline.

A "voluntary resident patrol" exists at present in only one building at Columbia Point -- that which has consistently been promoted as a model by the Central Security Office. Such patrols were said to have existed at one time in a few buildings at Mission Hill Extension. Even the recruitment of building captains to take on or delegate responsibility for the locking of doors was not very successful. Only a fraction of all

buildings at the four developments were covered at one time or another by building captains. At present a large proportion of the doors at all developments except Commonwealth are non-functional due to faulty installation and/or subsequent vandalism, and only a small number of buildings in these developments are regularly kept locked. At Commonwealth the securing of buildings has recently been completed and the organization of building residents has resumed; the success of this project has yet to be demonstrated, however.

Despite agreements between the regional offices of HUD and LEAA, HUD's matching grant to the BHA never materialized. The BHA only half-heartedly followed through on its commitments, using funds allocated by the Tenant Task Force of each development from its own modernization allotment. The internal organizational pattern of the BHA prevented the Central Security Office from exercising control over the installation of the doors or related maintenance problems, the ultimate responsibility for which has been denied by all actors. The Resident Patrol Supervisors were thus left in the untenable position of trying to win cooperation from already skeptical neighboring residents with promises that were impossible to keep.

#### Overall Program Impact

The impact of the Boston Public Housing Security Program as a whole should also be considered within the perspective of its own program goals. First of these goals was to increase

tenant involvement in crime control. The impact on this goal was mixed.

At Columbia Point, the degree of resident involvement, as measured by the relative viability of the representative community security organization, has ebbed and flowed. That tenant involvement is a priority concern, however, is evident in efforts of Security Task Force leadership to strengthen its own ranks and to respond to tenant feedback concerning needed improvements in security project operations and effectiveness. It should also be noted that employment opportunities in the several components of the security project have made it possible to increase tenant participation in crime control in a more tangible and direct way. Two out of every three staff positions in the security project are filled by development residents. However, the only residents who are taking advantage of the security doors, besides one model patrol building, are the elderly, who rarely appear from behind the locked doors of their buildings.

The Mission Hill Safety and Security Intervention Project failed to follow through on an ambitious plan to involve residents in crime control. The Resident Patrol Supervisor was not very successful in organizing residents at Mission Hill Main, and while some patrols existed at Mission Hill Extension, they were short-lived.

The Commonwealth Community Security Project, as previously described, retrenched into a traditional configuration of social

services, providing little outreach to the influx of new tenants. Nevertheless, a combination of factors -- installation of the security doors, the court-ordered hallway clean-ups, the involvement of a state representative, and the assignment of a police sergeant to study security problems -- has recently raised the interests of many residents, especially a core group of some 30 who have volunteered to be building captains. These hopeful signs are so recent, however, that it is difficult to predict how long this resurgence of participation will last.

While the failure of the security program to increase substantially the level of tenant involvement in crime control stems in part from problems encountered in the conceptualization and implementation of its components, the very choice of housing developments limited its opportunities for success. A 1975 attempt to rate family public housing developments in Boston by "revealed preference" or demand, for example, ranked Columbia Point next to last among 23 such developments, Mission Hill Extension 19, and Mission Hill Main 17. Commonwealth did somewhat better with a ranking of 11.\*

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\* Roland Burke, William Farley, Priscilla Fritz State of the Development Report, 1975 Planning and Development Department, Boston Housing Authority, p. 61. Revealed preference for a housing development is based upon the number of years a family on the waiting list would have to wait for a unit, assuming the continuation of the current rate of turnover.

The poor images and reputations of these developments, especially the first three, are based upon physical as well as social factors. These developments have been allowed to deteriorate in many cases to uninhabitable conditions, as dramatized by findings in the case of Armando Perez, et als. v. Boston Housing Authority.\* In fact, the impossibility of complying with court orders for upgrading Boston's public housing as a whole has forced a Court-Appointed Master's Office to concentrate its efforts on those developments with the gravest physical problems, a small group of housing developments that includes Mission Hill Main and Columbia Point. Commonwealth has also been included because of the recent acceleration in deterioration. In addition, a 1975 BHA ranking of family developments by social "problem scores" identified Mission Hill Main in second place, Mission Hill Extension in third, and Columbia Point tied for fourth. While Commonwealth ranked 10th, it tied with one other development for the greatest decline in ranking since 1969 at which time it

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\*This case was a class action brought before Boston's Housing Court in February 1975, accusing the Boston Housing Authority of failing to maintain its housing in accordance with the State Sanitary Code. The Authority has been under court order since March 1975 to correct nonconforming conditions.

ranked 19.\*

Finally, during the course of the security demonstration program, resident turnover at these developments has been particularly high. Mission Hill Main ranked as the public housing development with the highest proportional turnover during the year beginning July 1, 1974, with 30 percent of all households moving out.\*\* During the following year, 23 percent left.\*\*\* At Columbia Point, which ranked second in turnover, 27 percent left during the year beginning July 1, 1974, a rate which was sustained during the following year. Commonwealth's rate of outmigration was lower, but still dramatic -- 18 percent of the population between 1974 and 1975, and 20 percent between 1975 and 1976. Here, turnover was accentuated by racial change, and the development's racial profile shifted from 19 percent black and 9 percent Hispanic in October 1974 when the program began, to 29 percent black

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\* Ibid., pp. 70-71. The problem score is based upon rankings of six variables: percent of families with no workers; percent of families in residence for less than five years; turnover rate; percent of households in rent arrears for over 30 days; percent of single-parent families; number of minors per non-elderly adult male. See p. 18.

\*\* Ibid., p.62. These include residents who have transferred to other developments. Percentages are based upon the number of units occupied at the beginning of the year, and may be slightly exaggerated due to multiple turnovers of some units during the year in consideration.

\*\*\* Moveouts and transfers during the year beginning July 1, 1975 are based upon a compilation of Daily Statements of Operations, recorded by development managers.

and 12 percent Hispanic two years later.\* Mission Hill Extension's turnover rate was somewhat lower -- 16 percent of the development's households turning over during the first year and 11 percent during the second.

It is clear from the above rankings that this experiment in security programming, with the exception of Commonwealth, focused on developments which are popularly considered among the most difficult and least attractive. The greater configuration of social problems suggest that the energies of residents at these developments would be more devoted to basic concerns of "coping" than in other developments. Experiences with the Housing Authority at its most neglected developments would reinforce skepticism about promises of improvements. A high rate of turnover not only tends to cream off the most upwardly mobile and active residents, but also creates a "community" of strangers lacking a sense of a common purpose and, especially in the case when one ethnic group is replaced by another, fearful of one another. A combination of all of these factors would make it difficult to elicit and maintain resident involvement in community security projects even under the best of circumstances.

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\* This change would have been more dramatic had the Housing Authority not established a racial quota to maintain a mix despite a reduced white demand for units at Commonwealth. The goal has been a racial mix reflecting the mix of Boston's population eligible for public housing.

Columbia Point presented special problems for community security organization in that the uncertainties surrounding the future status of current residents in the BHA's renovation plans, which include the upgrading of some buildings and the mothballing or destruction of others, led many to feel particularly impermanent. Indeed, due to an order of the Boston Housing Court, most of the households which moved out during the past two years have not been replaced. The number of households billed for rents at Columbia Point has fallen from 870 in October 1974 to 540 in November 1976, and with almost two-thirds of the development vacated, it has begun to resemble a ghost town.\*

During the course of the security demonstration program, many residents realized that concerted community action to promote mutual security was limited as long as they had no control over choosing their neighbors. In recognition of its emerging role as a provider of housing of last resort, the BHA has been forced to relax tenant selection standards to the degree that considerate residents may find themselves living at the mercy of a few troublemakers.\*\* While refusing

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\* Boston Housing Authority Data Processing Department. There were originally 1504 units constructed. As of July 1975, 1359 units theoretically were available for housing, that is, not used by some agency or lost in breakthroughs.

\*\* Prospective tenants are assigned to housing developments by the BHA Tenant Selection Department. A development manager can only reject a household if sufficient reason is proven.

to testify in favor of nuisance evictions for fear of retaliation, tenants have no other means to pressure others to cooperate.\* Problems from within considerably weakened the potential impact of the security program. The protective function of the doors, for instance, could be temporarily subverted by one popsicle stick inserted in a lock or a beer can in a door closer. It could be permanently destroyed (considering the status of the doors among other maintenance priorities) by a strong jam. Some tenants asked for the right to meet prospective tenants and explain building rules before the signing of leases, but this idea was never pursued.

A second goal of the overall security program was to increase resources for crime control. If crime control is strictly defined as protective services, then two potentially important local delivery systems are the Boston Police Department and the Boston Housing Authority itself. Late in 1975, the Police Commissioner came to the conclusion that the Police Department's Public Housing Police Unit was not being effective. It was terminated in the early spring of 1976, and police teams established in their place at Columbia Point

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\* Plantedosi, et als. v. BHA, a class action brought in early 1974, enjoined the BHA for one year from evictions on any grounds other than the nonpayment of rent, because of the lack of proper procedures for nuisance eviction. Although the injunction has been lifted, there appears to be greater reluctance to follow this route.

and Mission Hill, providing 16-hour coverage from on-site offices. It is possible that the presence of the Security Program as a manifestation of resident concern about security acted as a catalyst in generating the above change. Certainly in the cases of Commonwealth and Columbia Point the project governing boards and staffs served as channels and sounding boards for complaints about poor police protection, bringing them to the attention of district commanding officers as well as the Police Commissioner.

In terms of Housing Authority resources, the BHA has been continuing the Columbia Point Community Security Project by allocating discretionary TPP funds for at least the four-month period (December 1976 - March 1977) following the termination of the LEAA grant, and is giving serious consideration to support for an additional year afterwards through extension of the TPP grant. However, resources for security services in BHA's regular operating budget are meager -- less than two percent of the total. Discussions at the state level may alleviate this situation in the case of state-aided developments. In a recent draft of its Tenant Services Policy Statement,<sup>\*</sup> the State Department of Community Affairs suggests

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<sup>\*</sup>"Draft Tenant Services Policy Statement", William B. Flynn, Executive Office of Communities and Development, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, October 1, 1976, p. 4.

that local housing authorities such as the BHA might in the future be able to receive state operating subsidies to support resident services encouraging improved tenant-authority relations, the enforcement of rules and regulations, tenant orientation, and participation in security-related prevention and control activities, etc. The increased understanding among BHA decision-makers and funding agencies of the relationship between security and maintenance as demonstrated by the security project experiments may well encourage the BHA to take advantage of such opportunities in state-owned developments, as well as allocate federal subsidies in ways which integrate security with management functions. Finally, the BHA is presently seeking federal Community Development Block Grant funds for the purchase and installation of security doors at additional housing developments. While these funds might have been pursued independently of the demonstration program, the hope is that the BHA will have learned some lessons from these experiments concerning their use.

If "crime control" is more broadly defined as those activities that provide constructive alternatives to potential delinquents through job and educational referral, tutoring, youth activities or employment programs, there have been to date no additional resources elicited for these housing developments to continue the activities carried out with LEAA funds.

The third goal of the Boston Public Housing Security Program was to increase security, perceived as well as actual. In this respect, the evaluation suffers from a serious lack of hard data. The determination of an improvement in actual security is problematic. The crime statistics of the Boston Police Department, like crime statistics everywhere, reflect one subset of actual crime: that which is reported. They are therefore subject to two, often dependent, variables: the rate of actual crime and the rate of reporting. Thus, on the one hand, one might interpret an increase in reported crime statistics at any one housing development during the course of this program as a negative sign, alleging that crime has increased, despite concentrated efforts to discourage it. On the other hand, one might read it as a positive sign, claiming that residents are more willing to report crime because of less fear of reprisal or more confidence that reporting will stimulate corrective action.

One solution to the limitations of crime statistics is theoretically the victimization survey, by which a sample of persons report the crimes for which they were victims during a specified time period. Such a survey was administered by a private consultant at the participating developments during the beginning of this program.\* The survey also included

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\* William Brill Associates, Inc., *Victimization, Fear of Crime and Altered Behavior: A Profile of Four Public Housing Projects in Boston*, prepared for the Boston Mayor's Committee on Criminal Justice and the Boston Housing Authority, 1975.

questions regarding fear of crime that might have shed light on the program's impact on perceived crime. However, the survey was considered to have been inconsistently conducted and too costly to merit its repetition at the conclusion of the program.

Finally, even if trends in both actual and perceived crime could be supported statistically, no causal relationship would be demonstrated between security program strategies and changes in criminal activities, especially in light of such variables intervening in the process as changes in practices and strategies by the Boston Housing Authority and the Boston Police Department.

These caveats aside, a brief attempt, however risky, will be made to look at the change in crime at the four developments.

At Commonwealth, CCSP staff all expressed considerable concern about what they saw as an increase in crime during the course of the project, dramatized by the rise in bag-snatching from elderly women. This upward trend may have been curbed in the late fall of 1976 by the expanded police patrol which, according to the especially assigned Police Sergeant has identified the few resident youth who are the chief troublemakers. This is borne out by official statistics that show a dramatic proportional increase in reported

Part I crimes\* between the first six months of 1975 when they averaged 6.5 per month, to the first six months of 1976, when they averaged 11.7 per month. (This increase contrasts with the area immediately surrounding the development where reported crimes fell slightly.\*\* ) These jumped to 16 per month during the summer months of July and August, but dropped to nine in October, despite the likelihood that the greater visibility of the police was encouraging more reporting.\*\*\* While only 8.6 percent of Part I crimes were cleared in the first half of 1976, 33.3 percent were cleared in October 1976. Certainly, it would be risky to attribute this improvement in security directly to the LEAA-funded program.

The impact of both the Mission Hill Safety and Security Intervention Project and the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project

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\* Incident Reports, Data Processing, Boston Police Department. Part I crimes include criminal homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and auto theft.

\*\* In police reporting areas 784 and 785, directly abutting the development north of Commonwealth and on both sides of Washington Street, reported crime fell six percent during this same period.

\*\*\* One CCSP staffer and former resident at Commonwealth suggested that the present population has no more offenders than the previous. Formerly, development youth were known by their neighbors, but could easily prey on the surrounding community. However, the increasing numbers of black youths are too conspicuous in the white community surrounding the development, but can victimize their neighbors in a socially disintegrated development where people either do not recognize or are afraid of each other.

at Mission Hill Main and Extension have been so minimal that the changes in Part I reported crimes between the first six months of 1975 and 1976, indicating a 20 percent increase at Mission Hill Main and 29 percent decrease at Mission Hill Extension, cannot be explained within the context of this evaluation. Interestingly, there was a decrease of 27 percent in the area immediately abutting the developments.\*

At Columbia Point the prevailing opinion is that there has been a significant reduction in the number of youthful troublemakers, but moveouts rather than project impact is cited as the principal cause. While there has been a decrease in reported Part I crimes from 27.7 to 23 per month between the first six months of 1975 and 1976, this actually represents an increase in crime rates considering the high proportion of moveouts during this period. Moreover, it is unclear whether an increase in the rate of reporting to police authorities occurred during this period. While the presence of the Team Police and of the security project might have stimulated such reporting, an informal norm among project personnel to work outside of the formal justice system by encouraging the return of property stolen from one resident by another, would have decreased reporting, although not necessarily the actual number of crimes committed.

Reported Part I crimes decreased even more substantially in parts of the Columbia Point Peninsula other than the housing

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\* Reporting areas 589, 590, 600, 601, 602, southeast of Huntington Avenue and northeast of Tremont Street.

development -- from 9.5 to 5.2 per month.\* It is unclear what changes in the activities of other security systems, such as the the campus police of the University of Massachusetts, may have occurred to affect crime and reporting. Crimes in the area of eastern Dorchester adjacent to the peninsula experienced a six percent increase in reported Part I crimes, not large enough to suggest the displacement of criminal activities formerly aimed at the Columbia Point housing development.\*\*

Within the development, the reporting of break and entries increased from 8.3 to 9.5 per month, while such street crime as robbery and larceny (including purse-snatching) decreased from 12.2 to 5.2 per month. Auto theft, however, increased slightly from 3.5 to 4.2 per month.

Security project progress at Columbia Point has been most evident in reductions in vandalism in unoccupied apartments and buildings being renovated; fewer cases of molesting of parents picking up children at the day care center; less harassment of elderly residents; and fewer abandoned, stolen cars being stripped and/or burned (they are now removed more expeditiously).

The final goal of the Boston Public Housing Security Program was to demonstrate the effectiveness of a combination

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\* Reporting area 256, east of Morrissey Boulevard, excluding the Columbia Point Development.

\*\* Reporting areas 189, 190, 235, 245, 246, 249, 250, and 253, abutting the Southeast Expressway on both sides, from Old Harbor Village to Savin Hill.

of community action, police patrolling and security hardware in reducing crime. Unfortunately, all three approaches to reducing crime have been activated simultaneously only at Commonwealth, and there only in the past few months. The verdict on achievement of this goal, therefore, is not yet in.\*

As already pointed out, several factors external to the program itself have increased the possibility of future progress at Commonwealth. One is the independent interest of the area's State Representative, who had been alarmed by the deterioration of commercial areas abutting the development and concerned about future safety problems in a nearby elderly development presently under construction. His encouragement and aid to security project staff and the Tenant Task Force in petitioning the Police Commissioner resulted in the special assignment of a sergeant from the Bureau of Field Services in September 1976 to study the need for police services. In addition, the special status of Commonwealth as a development under court order and the advocacy of the Court-Appointed Master's Office have given Commonwealth an unanticipated advantage in terms of the continued maintenance of the newly installed security doors as well as clean-ups by maintenance

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\* During the writing of this report, a citywide cutback in police overtime assignments has been effected, with the apparent result of eliminating Commonwealth's expanded patrol service.

staff of building hallways. The effect of these external actors has been to increase the morale at Commonwealth and the feeling of efficacy among the building captains who have been recruited from 32 of 35 buildings. The Resident Patrol Supervisor admits that even this degree of organization is fragile. Since many captains receive little support from other residents in their buildings, they need continuous outside encouragement and help in solving problems. How long this will continue considering termination of pay for the Resident Patrol Supervisor and the imminent termination of the Commonwealth Community Security Project is questionable, unless some of these services can be incorporated into the management/tenant services function.

There was one important variable which intervened during the course of the study to divert the energies of security project staffs: the heightened racial tensions accompanying the implementation of court-ordered school busing, especially Phase II which began in the fall of 1975. Thus the staffs found themselves mediating during the outbreak of hostilities between black development residents and white outsiders at both Columbia Point and Mission Hill, and among neighbors at Commonwealth.

### Conclusions

While the results of these demonstration projects have not been overwhelmingly positive, they nevertheless provide

demonstrated experience important for the design of future strategies, both experimental and more permanent.

The first lesson is the inseparability of security and maintenance. In fact, security problems may be caused by laxness in maintenance services as, for example, when broken windows of vacant, first floor apartments are not secured. There is an obvious contradiction when a steel security door is kept locked in a building in which gaping holes lie at an arm's length from any intruder. This contradiction may be real, or only psychological, if the vacant apartment's door is welded closed from the inside. However, the psychological factor cannot be overstated. The Housing Authority's difficulties in providing an acceptable quality of maintenance services contributes to a lack of respect in residents not only toward the property of the Housing Authority, but toward themselves. The former feeling may lead to vandalism; the latter, to defeatism.

It also appears to be poor judgement to allocate \$600 for the purchase and installation of security doors and give low priority to their maintenance. The marginal increase in difficulty of breaking an expensive over a cheap security door may not be worth the marginal increase in cost, especially when the difficulty and cost of repairing the door is also much greater.

A second conclusion, closely related to the first, is the

inseparability of security and management. The inability of both the managers and residents to apply more stringent tenant selection criteria and the difficulty of strongly sanctioning problem tenants undermines any efforts on the part of the mass of residents to protect themselves from the few troublemakers. While the extreme course of placing tenant selection in the hands of tenants might not only be illegal, but also undesirable, building residents might be encouraged to establish reasonable norms of behavior (e.g. hours for the locking of security doors). Development managers might discuss such norms with prospective tenants so that those unwilling to conform to such norms might be self-eliminated and directed to other buildings or developments.

In addition, while tenants may be interested in their own security, it is neither realistic nor fair to advocate a system of locked doors without buzzers or other intercommunication devices which demands the sustained investment of time of a well-organized, uncompensated patrol system. This would be difficult to organize among middle-income households; among those burdened with poverty and its attendant problems, the difficulty is greater.


Moving from the level of the development to that of the Authority, the separation maintained between security and other management functions is both clear and problematic. The Authority's Central Security Office is headed by a person who

is technically an employee of the Boston Police Department as well as the Boston Housing Authority. It functions in an autonomous manner which not only means that it lacks the authority to control implementation of its programs when they involve coordination with other departments (maintenance, contracting, etc.,) but also lacks sufficient accountability and supervision within the Authority itself.

One way to bring together services related to security and those related to maintenance and management is in the role of a resident custodian/security worker. There is evidence that BHA staff planners are now giving this idea some consideration. The investment of a free apartment and stipend might not only upgrade maintenance and security services for residents, but could conceivably save the BHA money in the costs of vandalism.


All demonstration projects suffered from the lack of well qualified personnel. This stemmed in part from the low salaries offered and in part from deliberate attempts to employ housing development residents. The aims of optimum project performance and promotion of resident employment are sometimes contradictory, but can be enhanced simultaneously by well planned and timely training. Such training was programmed but not satisfactorily implemented in this demonstration program.

Finally, these demonstrations serve as a lesson for the



design of future experiments for what they say about the problems of project sponsorship and accountability. While it is difficult to judge institutional motives, it is nevertheless important to ascertain the degree to which a sponsor sincerely shares the goals of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and is committed to the program designed rather than the dictates of some hidden agenda. The sponsor must be prepared to provide front-end funding based upon a cost-reimbursable system, with full understanding of the long delays which are probable, and the Mayor's Office must be frank in its assessment of this problem.

The Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice expended a great deal of effort in seeking out eligible community groups to assume sponsorship of program components. Nevertheless, the only planned components of the Boston Public Housing Security Program that were fully implemented -- the Columbia Point Community Security Project and (at least theoretically) the Voluntary Resident Patrol Project -- were those in which funding was channelled through the Boston Housing Authority. This agency managed, with varying degrees of difficulty, to withstand delays in reimbursement. This observation should not serve to eliminate community organizations from sponsorship, but to highlight the need for a change in funding procedures.



**END**