

75-NI-01-0001
FINAL REPORT

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TEAM POLICING IN THE
HARTFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT

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February 1978

PREFACE

This report constitutes a final evaluation of the Hartford Police Department's efforts to fulfill the obligation of a federal grant to introduce full-service, neighborhood team policing (FSNTP) in three Districts. The evaluation, which covered the period from June 1976 through January 1978, consisted of two parts: (1) through December 1976, assessment of departmental activities associated with the federal team policing grant and submission of recommendations; and (2) through January 1978, assessment of departmental accomplishments and direct involvement of the evaluation team in organizational development and training activities associated with the team policing grant.

The reader will discern a bias toward a consideration of management issues, because the authors contend that the Department used the federal grant as a primary instrument in its management of decreasing resources to improve a wide range of services, particularly those provided by the Field Services Bureau. The report can thus be viewed, in large measure, as an evaluation of departmental management practices.

The approach of the evaluators was to recognize and be sensitive to the ideas and views of the officers whose work behaviors were to be affected by adoption of a team policing model as one of the Department's major management policies. As a consequence, the evaluators were able to discern a general commitment, with noticeable exceptions, to the structural and operational changes portended by the model's adoption.

Prompted by their experience with private and public organizations,

the authors concluded that many of the issues and problems that are discussed in this report are not unique to the Hartford Police Department; rather, they are common to all complex organizations. At the same time, the authors are cognizant of the special conditions under which the Department must continue to function. In general, the considerable individual and collective talents displayed by the Department's members contribute to an optimistic view that the issues and problems discussed will not be insurmountable obstacles to improved management practices and, consequently, to improved policing services to the Hartford community.

The key to abbreviations frequently used in this report is:

FSB: Field Services Bureau

FSNTP: Full service, neighborhood team policing

ISB: Investigative Services Bureau

OD: Organizational development

THE HARTFORD MODEL

The policy of the Hartford Police Department never included an intention to devolve all policing functions to neighborhood-based districts. The team policing grant itself limited departmental experimentation to two Districts and part of a third. The grant's objectives were in fact limited to improved police services, decreased crime and citizen fear, and a change to a preventative policing mode. Through the end of 1976, at the end of the first phase of the evaluation, the Department had not met the objectives of the federal grant. By the end of 1977, the Department had surpassed the terms of the grant, and all district-based operations were closer to the full-service, neighborhood team policing (FSNTP) conceptual model. The major effect of the team policing grant was to provide a conceptual model as a guide to organizational change. Although the FSNTP model was never intended to be adopted, certain characteristics of that model were adapted to Hartford's special conditions. What ensued was a variant that was named the Hartford team policing model, or simply, the Hartford model.

A bubbling cauldron of change, as was the Department during the evaluation period, does not make identification of specific ingredients or causal factors easy. Some organizational or operation changes attributable to the team policing grant were the results of conscious planning, which permitted observation of cause-effect relationships. However, in the opinion of the evaluators, neither the nature nor the substance of the Hartford team policing model was, in retrospect, wholly planned.

"Team policing was just allowed to happen." This statement by a senior Department official epitomizes the manner in which the team policing

concept was introduced to the Hartford Police Department. A brief directive (HPD Directive Number 21-75 "Full Service Team Policing Program") enunciated the policy, but operational details were not spelled out. The deliberate vagueness stemmed from a belief that an imposition of a preconceived definition of the concept would have engendered resentment. Department policy makers were aware of the failures encountered by other police departments in their attempts to change operational modes using the team policing model as a vehicle for change. Also, the Department was at the time beset by aggravated labor-management relations and by budget cuts; obviously not a suitable environment in which to achieve change using a conceptual model alien to established attitudes prevailing within the Department.

The first attempt to explore how the FSNTP model might pertain to the Department was a series of organization development seminars conducted during the first six months of 1976. According to some members of the Department who were in attendance, the seminars generated more than normal frustrations by seeming to promise more changes than actually occurred. In contrast, there are those who point to the subsequent creation of the Department's Organizational Development Board as a real improvement and to changes attributed to seminar discussions. However, as to whether those initial OD efforts contributed to an operational definition of team policing for Hartford or to any significant organizational changes, they must be judged negligible. In terms of their influence, the 1976 seminars could be said to have had no effect on subsequent major changes within the Department.

Late in 1976, the ill-fated Alpha One project began under the sponsorship of the newly-appointed Team Police Coordinator. The project consisted of a flurry of memoranda, photocopied articles, and one well-attended meeting.

Alpha One succeeded only insofar as it brought together a cross-section of Field Services Bureau personnel to hear the Chief spell out a set of expectations, including the need for a working definition of a policing model that the Department could adopt. The process of deriving the working definition was to be participatory, not mandatory.

As the evaluators have observed in other complex organizations, many organizational changes are concomitant with personnel actions. Departure of the Team Policing Coordinator early in 1977 led to a shift of his function to the FSB Commander's staff, which then reconvened the former Alpha One group as a Hartford Team Policing Model Definition Task Force. The Task Force included the Assistant Chief, who also serves as Chief of Operation; a representative from the Department's planning unit; and an ISB representative. The explorations of the Task Force ranged over many issues, including communications flows and investigative case management procedures, but the central question was always the emergent role of the uniformed street officer. Gradually, a consensus emerged that an enlarged role, one which included investigative functions, would yield both greater individual officer job satisfaction and greater district operations productivity.

Another factor that added to the momentum of the Task Force's work was that each of the five FSB Districts had implemented, to varying degrees, a team mode of operations. At least one of the District Commanders who served on the Task Force has accumulated evidence of the effective results ensuing from having a district-based investigative team work with the District's patrol teams. The impetus for devolving part of the investigative function from ISB to the Districts produced the suggestion that some members of the Crimes Against Property Unit be assigned to districts. This suggestion did not receive unanimous support, and the Task Force recessed for the summer.

For all intents and purposes, the Hartford team policing model had been defined but not adopted by mid-1977. The heart of departmental operations, the Field Services Bureau, would consist of the five Districts created in 1975. Districts would be organized by teams, which in turn would be manned by multi-service street officers. As far as resources permitted, Districts would stress community interaction and crime prevention. Although there remained questions about effectiveness of the functional transfer, the youth services function had been placed in the Districts. The critical question of how much of the investigative function was to be performed at the district level still had to be resolved. The Department was committed to retention of the Investigative Services Bureau, yet the die appeared cast that some devolution of the investigative function was inevitable.

One solution to the quandary over the investigative function seemed to lie in the investigative case management project that the Department was about to embark on. However, the results of that project would be too far in the future to be of value. Another solution was the expanded use of Investigative Trainee Program under which district-assigned officers could be assigned to investigative units for training and then be rotated back to their districts upon completion of the training. Both alternatives implied an increase in the investigative function at the district level.

When the Task Force reconvened in October, it had a dramatic increase in the number of ISB representatives. In addition, the new ISB Commander, one of the earliest supporters of the team policing concept within the Department, was a participant. Discussion again focused on job satisfaction, rewards systems, productivity in the face of diminishing departmental resources, communications problems, and the investigative function. The Task Force's work culminated in

a two-day conference at Northampton, Massachusetts at the end of October 1977. Recommendations of the conference were: (1) to increase the investigative capacity within Districts and (2) to improve departmental communications in ways to enhance decentralized decision making.

Departmental staff development activities supported by the team policing grant also provided a means by which some of the issues associated with a team policing concept could be discussed and analyzed openly. For example, in a series of training sessions for FSB lieutenants and sergeants, the issue of decentralization and its meaning for those ranks were explored in depth. The lieutenants and sergeants as a group expressed a sense of frustration over the apparent expectation, expressed many times by the Chief, that decision making be decentralized and the belief that supervisors and team leaders, even District Commanders, could not make a decision without looking over one's shoulder to see who was going "to pull the rug out from under him."

In the words of one of the evaluators, "Decentralization does not mean 'giving away the organization.'" The FSNTF concept is dependent upon such factors as effective vertical and lateral communications, trust, confidence, and clarity of goals and objectives. The evaluators perceived a gap in the trust-confidence chain between the highest and lowest echelons of the Department, a gap that was, and is, attributable to differing perspectives and interpretations. This problem has been addressed in large measure within the Field Services Bureau, but as in other organizations, the problem is persistent and recurring. Since recognition of the problem, as well as open discussion of it, is one of the best avenues to corrective action, the Field Services Bureau may be close to a partial resolution. If so, decentralization of decision making may occur as the team policing concept intended.

II

PLANNING AND GRANTS

An evaluation of The Hartford team policing model cannot ignore other grant-supported activities. For example, if the Department's efforts to improve its community services are channeled through citizens' groups within each District, would this not afford a means of stressing crime prevention and reduction of citizen fear? And would improved data collection and reporting systems help improve policing services, which in turn could possibly provide more effective law enforcement and correlative decreases in crime rates? Because departmental decision makers apparently believe that both questions must be answered affirmatively, at least two other projects must be brought within the scope of the evaluation (but not themselves evaluated). Both projects were still underway in the Department as of January 1978.

Crime Prevention Study

In 1977, the Department received an allocation from the City's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds for the creation of a crime prevention and public safety program. This program was conceived as a natural adjunct to the team policing project. Departmental planners, particularly those on the FSB staff, intended to develop a workable and substantive neighborhood approach, which meant working through Districts. As the Hartford team policing model's realization progressed, each District sought to establish and staff a neighborhood police office. The Crime Prevention Study is utilizing these offices or centers by creating crime prevention centers in each, for the purpose of assisting residents in the development of tactics for the prevention of certain types of crimes. With the exception of District II (at the close of the evaluation period), all districts have citizen public safety committees whose primary responsibilities

are to identify neighborhood problems, develop strategies to deal with the problems, and create public safety plans for neighborhoods within each patrol district.

Street Crime Assessment Study

At approximately the same time that the Department began to work on a team policing model, it contracted for consultants to work on a street crime assessment study. Among the anticipated results of the study were (or are):

- (1) A software system will be developed for the maximum utilization of data collection by field personnel.
- (2) A comprehensive workload study of patrol operations.
- (3) A crime analysis management information system (MIS) will be applied to patrol deployment problems. This will allow for an informational potential to be directly applied to the problems of uniform patrol.
- (4) The MIS will encompass substantial input of non-case data, the analysis of which will effect patrol distribution.
- (5) Specific problems which the members of the patrol force commonly encounter will be highlighted, considered for improvement, and to the maximum extent possible by improved.
- (6) Management Services Bureau conferences:
 - (a) Operational objectives of patrol personnel,
 - (b) Priorities for patrol activities,
 - (c) Improved patrol allocation system, and
 - (d) Equalization of workload among patrol personnel.

The intended results of these studies will have a bearing on

the Hartford team policing model. If the projects are successful, then the Hartford model will be drawn closer to the FSNTF model. By October 1977, the Department has achieved a high degree of grant integration. All three projects were being coordinated through the FSB staff operation, which obviously accounted for the integration. And because of the use made of the staff by the FSB Commander, project results can now be translated into Bureau operations as soon as feasible.

The translation of plans into operations includes a relatively sophisticated staff development process, particularly the training provided by the Hartford Police Academy staff. As projects yield results, these are incorporated into training programs for FSB personnel who would be affected by the anticipated changes implied by those results. The process is best characterized as a close, fruitful relationship among staff, managers, and trainers. This observation must be limited to the realm of the Field Services Bureau, since there is no evidence that it as yet can be applied to the whole Department.

III

PROJECT PURPOSE

How much change within an organization--its structure, policies, programs--can be attributed to one person's role or to the inexorable and persistent influence of time and events is an open, perhaps unanswerable question. However, changes were preordained for the Hartford Police Department by the appointment of Hugo Masini as Chief of Police in April 1974. Chief Masini's selection represented a break with the tradition of promoting a person to Chief from among the Department's ranks. Furthermore, Chief Masini's management philosophy, enunciated from the outset, augured changes in the Department's traditional, quasi-military, highly centralized mode of operation. One could conjecture indefinitely about what means might have been used in place of the federal team policing grant as the catalyst for desired change, but the fact is that the grant was under negotiation within a year after Chief Masini's arrival in Hartford.

The use of a grant of additional resources from an external source does not guarantee automatic organizational responses in line with the grant's objectives. The history of the team policing grant in Hartford provides evidence that diversion of manpower from normal assignments for grant management purposes engenders costs that are not recoverable from grant resources. Externally funded grants can also be dysfunctional in the sense that existing routines and established priorities are disrupted or displaced. The team policing grant appeared to give purpose to such dysfunction. Management responsibilities are increased, because grant-supported projects increase the number of functions to be coordinated and management decisions are required if project results are to replace, supplement, or be merged with existing functions.

No evidence is available to support the suggestion that Chief Masini was involved in the day-to-day, tactical oversight of the Department's team policing developments. Interviews with him revealed that he had some reservations about the applicability of the team policing concept, although he favored the change in emphasis away from the more rigid command structure tradition of the Department. He was adamant that the amount of reorganization was not to be extensive.

One of his strategies, though never enunciated in any detail, was to use grants to attack what he and his close advisers deemed critical problem areas within the Department. One consequence of this strategy was the proliferation of projects undertaken simultaneously within the Department without apparent top-level concern for project overlap. Project coordination was minimal, or at least was indiscernible, for the first eighteen months after the federal team policing grant's inception. The evaluators drew the inference that the absence of tightly-knit coordination was purposive. An element of organizational instability allowed Chief Masini to make administrative changes with greater flexibility and ease than he could have had more rigid, centralized organizational patterns remained in place.

Another consequence of the Masini strategy is that causes of desired or undesired results of project efforts are difficult to pinpoint. One is led to deduce a rippling characteristic of change, where one operational change will cause other operational changes among the Department's complex functional interrelationships. For this reason, any attempt to measure changes in departmental service capacity by correlating crime statistics with team policing efforts is of questionable validity and worth. Incomplete and unreliable data plus changes in data base categories made statistically valid, year-to-year, district-to-district comparisons impossible during the evaluation period.

Furthermore, the distinction between experimental and control Districts was lost when two of the control Districts moved to carry out some of the team policing grants objectives.

On-site observations and interviews proved to be useful and informative tools for evaluating the effects of the team policing grant. The assessment that follows must be viewed within the context that the persons who are the Department have, for the most, set high, professional standards for themselves. The evaluation team was able to conclude in working with a cross-section of the Field Services Bureau that performance base standards are presently higher on a qualitative scale than they were at the outset of the evaluation.

This report emphasizes accomplishments of the Field Services Bureau, since the team policing grant's objectives were keyed to changes within that unit. The central role played in all departmental functions by the Bureau implies that activities of other units must adjust to the pace and nature of FSB changes. In this respect, the team policing grant has had a department-wide impact.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

In retrospect, the team policing concept has been offered as a unified solution to a number of the pressing problems existent in the police delivery system. At the outset of the grant period, team policing reflected a then-new management philosophy for the typical policing system, a philosophy built around two salient attributes or characteristics. The first was decentralization in which decisions would be made at the lowest organizational level that is practical and adequate. The second was to provide each policing group with a stable, constant geographical area for which it bore policing authority and responsibility "around-the-clock."

This report is concerned with change within the Hartford Police Department. Change is difficult to measure, because it is difficult to define; yet, simple observation of human activities yields evidence that what we sense as change has occurred. Measurement is possible if the environment in which change is taking place is conducive to control and accurate recording of pertinent events or phenomena. Similarly, objective standards by which change is measured must be based upon objective criteria that are universally applicable in place and time. Short of this, we must introduce subjective elements into our methodology.

Accomplishments of the Hartford Police Department can be measured against the attributes of the full-service, neighborhood team policing model, which were translated into the following objectives of the federal team policing grant:

I. Improve Policy Community Relations.

The burgeoning of activities associated with this objective include participation of District personnel in community meetings, District police

advisory committees, public safety committees, neighborhood watch programs, Operation Identification, and auxiliary and explorer programs. With the exception of District V, none of these activities was in place within Districts at the advent of the team policing grant.

A conscious effort to improve the Department's relationships with citizens demonstrates how grants can be used in conjunction with one another. Establishment of neighborhood service centers began under the aegis of the federal team policing grant, but major impetus for broadening the scope of community-based activities should come from the Community Development Block Grant project.

II. Increase Officers' Job Satisfaction.

Job satisfaction is a deep and individual question. Very high expectations were developed by individual officers upon introduction of the team policing concept; this in itself has led to some increased satisfaction after some initial setbacks and frustrations. Nevertheless, the evaluators believe that more "institutionalizing" of the concepts must take place before the psychic reward of feeling satisfied is manifest in individual job performance and measurable through use of formal job performance evaluation techniques.

Furthermore, this objective can be affected either positively or negatively by such variables as the outcome of labor-management negotiations. These variables notwithstanding, the stability of assignment with Districts has engendered a "pride in beat" that can be interpreted as a form of job satisfaction. Of even greater import for the future is the rotation of officers between the Field Services and Investigative Services Bureaus. The enlarged scope of district-based policing operations is already viewed as a form of job enrichment by officers who have participated in the program.

III. Increase Productivity.

There is evidence that the improved availability of data from the Data Analysis Unit (DAU) and a report from one of the evaluators have had a beneficial effect on the allocation of resources and, therefore, on productivity. Several workshops on resource allocation have made district personnel more sensitive to the need for flexibility of response and to be more aware of the many alternatives that may be possible in the decision-making process. The gaps that do exist in the crime-related information flow are presumably addressed by another grant-supported project. Since current and new data, intelligence, and strategies lie at the heart of police activities, consistent departmental effort should be expended, especially the consideration of introducing and maintaining a user concept for decision makers whose needs are constantly changing.

The most obvious index of increased productivity, although only a rough index, is that aggregate results of policing activities in Hartford appear to have remained relatively constant while the uniformed manpower level has decreased twenty percent during the evaluation period. (Note: Although the number of major crimes in Hartford has increased during the past year, the total number of incidents reported has remained relatively the same.) Prior changes in data reporting categories, slippage in report submissions, and the absence of established productivity indices prevent refinement of this observation. Nevertheless, evidence which is available suggests a significant increase in individual productivity, especially within the Field Services Bureau.

IV. Increase Flow of Crime-Related Information to Police.

Objectives III and IV are in many ways related. Data related to productivity will be closely associated with numbers and types of crimes and

and the time for resolution. The flow of intelligence information from and to Districts has been improved, crime analysis activities by Districts Commanders and their staffs have been upgraded, and the Data Analysis Unit now supplies, upon District request, statistical data for operations planning and resource allocations.

As in Objective I, this category demonstrates the need for careful integration of grant projects. The street crime assessment, management information system, and investigative case management projects represent crucial subsystems of a potentially unified system of police management. At the Department shifts to a more decentralized posture, its dependence upon reliable data becomes even more critical as decision making becomes more widely distributed. Maintenance of control over the organization requires that higher levels of management have access to an uninterrupted and rapid flow of accurate, timely data.

V. Increase Quality and Quantity of Investigations, Increase the Number of Criminals Apprehended and Prosecuted.

This fundamental objective of a police department was central to the organizational development effort associated with arriving at a working definition of a Hartford team policing model. The rotation of persons on temporary assignments between the Field Services and Investigative Services Bureaus has not only shifted some of the investigatory function to Districts, but has also increased the magnitude and quality of that function. The investigative case management project can be expected to round out this objective, although it is evident that many of the project's future operational requirements are already in place as a result of the Department's accomplishments under the federal team policing grant.

VI. Improve Police Service.

Does a definition of what constitutes police service rest with a professional law enforcement agency or is the definition a product of community expectations? In many respects, this objective is a composite of all the other objectives combined. For example, if the sole criterion for measuring improved service were the response time to calls for service, then the Department's record in meeting this objective would not be a good one. However, when the significant manpower and equipment cuts which have beset the Department are measured against the improvements in departmental activities cited elsewhere, a net improvement in services becomes apparent.

The evaluators perceive two needs with respect to the police service objective. First, a reliable instrument, capable of measuring quality of police service, must be devised. Second, a sharper definitional delineation must be made between police service and community service. For example, after 4:00 PM and before 9:00 AM Monday through Thursday and on week ends, the Hartford Police Department supplies a range of services normally provided by other City agencies. Any measuring instrument must accommodate for the fact that elements of data systems must differentiate among the kinds of services actually provided.

VII. Improve Crime Prevention and Control.

In the case of the Hartford Police Department, crime prevention is an operational policy and a District strategy. For example, the integration of the team policing and CDBG grants has established the means by which neighborhood residents working through public safety committees can assist District Commanders develop crime prevention strategies and tactics. Residents actually participate in crime prevention activities as auxiliaries or as members of neighborhood watch groups.

At the command level, the improved data flow now permits District Commanders to analyze crime statistics as a prelude to developing, maintaining, and modifying crime prevention strategies and operations. However, the evaluators perceived that the Department is confronted with a dilemma: one of the aims of a crime prevention strategy is presumably to decrease demand on departmental resources, yet the significant decrease in manpower has impeded District efforts to move toward greater crime prevention efforts.

VIII. More Effective Law Enforcement.

How can one determine if law enforcement is more effective? Did the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 control crime or make streets safe? Semantics problems aside, the possible permutations of the complex set of factors that influence law enforcement raise doubts about the validity of a so-called scientific measurement of this dimension. Instead, "effective law enforcement" is a term which can be heuristically defined and measured through interaction of the police and citizens. Participants in the organization development and training sessions during 1977 were clearly aware that a consensus had to be reached between the police professionals and the residents of Districts to meet on this objective. There also was an awareness that any consensus reached between the two parties would be subject to change as circumstances altered.

IX. Decrease Crime Rates.

This is a very complex question arising from social and economic factors and the deployment of decreasing, available resources and the effectiveness with which those resources are employed. Further, it is quite possible to reduce crime in one area, only to have it move to more susceptible areas. Since a common data base will have to be maintained over a period of time before measurement and evaluation is possible, the data-related projects

now underway within the Department will have to be completed before this objective can be assessed accurately.

X. Decrease Citizen Fear.

District centers have done much to allay unfounded fears and to establish a more effective presence in the community. Community discussions seemed to have focused departmental resources more closely to changing community needs. The community seems to understand more clearly the resource limitations under which the Department is operating. Much progress has been made here, especially if one uses the standard that officers now feel that they enjoy a restored respect for their presence in the community.

XI. Improve Community Services.

One of the difficulties encountered in attempting to assess this objective is the absence of a clear and fixed definition of terms. A marked but uneven progress is evident in the Department's involvement in community affairs within Districts, but a question remains concerning the extent and composition of that involvement. In some respects, police departments are faced with the same problems as the public schools, which are now expected by communities to provide more than just educational services. How many services beyond the law enforcement and crime prevention functions can police departments be expected to provide? In the opinion of the evaluators, the answer to this question will not be forthcoming until the Department institutes a more formal, centralized planning function.

Summary of the Status of the HPD Team Policing Model

Basic elements of the Hartford team policing model are now in place within the Field Services Bureau. The Districts have done a substantial part of what

they can accomplish by themselves, and they are now at the stage of evolution where their activities must be directed and coordinated with the movements of other units of the Department. The Department, in turn, is confronted with continued change, some of its own initiative and some in response to external pressures such as budgetary restrictions and community expectations. The rippling or spillover effect of systemic change means the impetus of improved FSB operations will induce responsive changes in other departmental operations, usually in the form of upsetting established routines. In using the team policing concept as an instrument to affect managerial and policing services changes, the Department has often benefited from timely, fortuitous personnel shifts. But have those changes that have so far been put into effect been institutionalized? In other words, the test of the Department's progress is whether those elements of a working team policing model now in place have been ingrained sufficiently in day-to-day, normal FSB operations to continue should key individuals leave the Department.

The Department, in the evaluators' collective opinion, went beyond the stipulations of the federal team policing grant when it developed its hybrid version of the textbook model of full service, neighborhood team policing. The time has come where this concept must be defined in HPD terms. The results of the organizational development efforts must be codified and spelled out in policy operational terms. Once this is done, the Hartford team policing model can be used as a conceptual and operational base upon which to build an even more effective policing organization.



END