

**UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION (INTERPOL)**

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**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP,  
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS**

**FIRST SESSION**

ON

**H.R. 4641**

**INCREASING U.S. DUES TO INTERPOL**

**MARCH 30, 1977**

**Serial No. 32**



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
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(II)

OCT 30 1978

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UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION (INTERPOL)

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 1977

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP,  
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in room 2137 Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Joshua Eilberg [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Eilberg, Holtzman, Hall, Harris, Evans, Fish, and Sawyer.

Also present: Garner J. Cline and Arthur P. Endres, Jr., counsel; Peter Regis, legislative assistant; and Alexander B. Cook, associate counsel.

Mr. EILBERG. The meeting will come to order.

Today's hearing has been called to consider H.R. 4641, a bill designed to remove the limitation of dues for U.S. membership in the International Criminal Police Organization, commonly known as Interpol.

This bill was introduced by the chairman of the committee, Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. at the request of the administration. According to the executive communication accompanying this legislation "It would be preferable to establish continued control of this expenditure through the annual budget process rather than by the inclusion of a statutory ceiling as a part of permanent law."

The executive communication also states that "Statutory ceilings in the basic statute have proved too inflexible in the past," and that "The appropriations process assures that Treasury participation in Interpol is justified."

[A copy of H.R. 4641 follows:]

95TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 4641

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 8, 1977

Mr. RODINO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

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## A BILL

To remove the limitation on dues for United States membership in the International Criminal Police Organization, and for other purposes.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*  
3       That the Act of June 10, 1938, as amended (22 U.S.C.  
4       263a), is further amended by deleting the last sentence.

5       SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to  
6       pay to the International Criminal Police Organization the  
7       unpaid balance of the dues for the calendar years 1975 and  
8       1976. There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as  
9       may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.

Mr. EILBERG. In the past, this committee, and particularly this subcommittee, has been reluctant to remove the statutory ceiling because of our desire to periodically review the value of U.S. participation in Interpol, and we are hopeful that today's hearings will bring us up to date on the results of our membership in this organization.

Some of my colleagues and also private organizations have questioned the background and history of Interpol as well as the propriety and necessity of continued U.S. membership in this organization. Others, including GAO, have criticized the operational aspects of our National Central Bureau which I understand has recently been transferred back to the Justice Department. It is our intention to explore many of these issues with our witnesses today, and we now welcome Mr. Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General Office of Management and Finance.

[The prepared statement of Glen E. Pommerening, follows:]

STATEMENT OF GLEN E. POMMERENING, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

#### INTERPOL FUNCTIONS

##### *Introduction*

I am Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, U.S. Department of Justice. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the operation of the Interpol function by the Justice Department and our membership in the worldwide International Criminal Police Organization, which is better known by its cable address: Interpol.

##### *History*

The concept of achieving cooperation among police agencies in different countries became a reality with the creation of the International Criminal Police Organization in 1923. Initially conceived as a means for a small number of European countries to facilitate police matters, the Interpol mechanism has grown to a worldwide consortium of 125 countries, with headquarters in Paris, France.

In 1938, at the request of J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Congress approved legislative authority (22 U.S.C. § 263a) permitting the Attorney General to accept membership in Interpol on behalf of the United States. He initially designated the FBI to perform this role. Shortly thereafter, Interpol operations ceased to function because of the outbreak of World War II.

In 1946, Interpol was re-constituted purposely to provide for elected directors and to establish safeguards to prevent abuses of its powers by either member or non-member countries.

The United States resumed participation in 1947 but withdrew in 1950 following several incidents that were viewed by the FBI as violations of the Interpol constitution. The Treasury Department, however, anxious to preserve contacts in support of its narcotics enforcement role, continued to maintain an informal liaison with Interpol. As a result, the Attorney General designated the Treasury Department as the United States representative to Interpol. In 1968, however, responsibility for narcotics enforcement shifted to the Justice Department. In 1973, Reorganization Plan 2 increased the scope of activities for narcotics within the Justice Department. Since more than 50 percent of the United States activity in Interpol has a direct and significant impact on the Justice Department, a decision was made to return the Interpol function to this Department. Consequently, the Attorney General withdrew the Treasury Department designation on June 24, 1976. A "Memorandum of Understanding . . ." was executed between Justice and Treasury Department officials on January 18, 1977, and the operational center known as the United States National Central Bureau was physically moved to the Justice Department on March 17, 1977.

##### *The National Central Bureau*

In each member country, a point of contact and coordination are established for the Interpol function. Generally, the national police in the capital city of

each country undertake this activity. The designated entity is known as the National Central Bureau. Although staffing patterns and size vary, each member country operates its own National Central Bureau consistent with its own national laws and policies but within the framework of the Interpol constitution. In the United States, authority for the Interpol function rests, by law, with the Attorney General.

To insure a wide degree of Federal agency participation, the United States National Central Bureau is staffed, in addition to a permanent Justice Department cadre, by personnel detailed from the Secret Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Customs Service. Plans have been made to augment this configuration soon with personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

#### *The General Secretariat*

It is appropriate now to discuss the "General Secretariat" and explain how it relates to Interpol and the United States.

The 125 countries that participate in the Interpol network, through their respective National Central Bureaus, support a permanent administrative and technical organ through which the organization operates. This consists of a headquarters staff, a large communications facility, a secretary general, and a number of peripheral activities attendant to the world-wide coordination of Interpol activities. Presently, the headquarters is located in St. Cloud, a suburb of Paris, France.

Financial support for the headquarters or General Secretariat as it is formally named is transmitted in the form of membership dues which are based upon a number of factors. For example, the budget of the General Secretariat is constituted in Swiss francs—a currency noted for its minimal fluctuations. Dues for membership which vary each year depending upon the total amount of the budget are assessed on a proportionate basis. Thus the United States pays about 5.2 percent of the overall General Secretariat budget which currently is 10,300,000 Swiss francs. The United States owes \$214,000 for current dues and approximately \$38,000 for previous years. The current statutory ceiling of \$120,000 needs to be raised in order to accommodate current dues, previously unpaid dues, and any dues increases in the future.

#### *Mission and goals*

The Interpol function in the United States as well as in other participating countries is carried out to facilitate police matters that cut across international jurisdictions. In the United States, the National Central Bureau responds to requests from foreign police agencies for information regarding persons, vehicles, and goods that bear on criminal matters within those respective foreign jurisdictions. Conversely, the U.S. National Central Bureau assists police in Federal, State, and local jurisdictions that have law enforcement requirements in foreign countries. Basically, this function exists as a catalyst to provide efficient police communications between the United States and other member countries and the General Secretariat headquarters. Careful monitoring, coordination, and followup by National Central Bureau staff insure prompt and thorough service. Unless Federal jurisdiction is involved, assistance of the U.S. National Central Bureau is basically the only method by which State and local officials can secure aid from foreign police.

#### *Justice Department plan for operation*

In view of its recent resumption of the Interpol function, the Justice Department has developed a plan to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. National Central Bureau. This plan resulted from an analysis of reports of previous congressional hearings, the recently completed report of the General Accounting Office, and articles developed by the public media.

This plan is highlighted as follows:

- Task I—Reestablish Interpol Washington in the Justice Department.
- Task II—Survey existing Interpol Operations.
- Task III—Survey potential operation.
- Task IV—Develop expanded domestic programs.
- Task V—Increase U.S. role in General Secretariat.
- Task VI—Improve and strengthen administration and operation of National Central Bureau.

In addition, the Justice Department has instituted plans to cover the following areas:

*Policy advisory group.*—To insure the coordination of all Federal agencies that participate in the operation of the Interpol National Central Bureau in the United States, a Policy Advisory Group is being established to help guide the Attorney General with major policy matters.

*U.S. Visibility in Interpol.*—The role of the Justice Department in operating the Interpol function in the United States will be highlighted to enhance visibility and national prestige. Moreover, the Interpol network can be employed as a forum to help resolve international strategy for dealing with major crime and terrorist activity common to all member countries.

*Career staff.*—An Interpol career staff is being organized to insure that continued management is always maintained even though many staff positions are filled by specialists detailed from the ranks of participating Federal agencies.

*Safeguards and rights protection.*—Major operating policies and standard operating procedures will be developed to ensure that proper safeguards are employed with respect to efficient operation, security and maintenance of records, the Privacy Act, and the Freedom of Information Act.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman, and I shall be pleased to provide any additional information that you require or answer any questions that you may have. Thank you.

**TESTIMONY OF GLEN E. POMMERENING, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ACCOMPANIED BY ANDREW TARTAGLINO, DIRECTOR OF THE INTERPOL LIAISON STAFF, AND BRONSON CLAYTON, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND FINANCE**

Mr. POMMERENING. I am Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, U.S. Department of Justice. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the operation of the Interpol function by the Justice Department and our membership in the worldwide International Criminal Police Organization—

Mr. EILBERG. Will you be kind enough to identify the persons accompanying you?

Mr. POMMERENING. At my right is Mr. Andrew Tartaglino, director of the Interpol liaison staff. To my left is Ms. Bronson Clayton, a member of my staff.

Mr. EILBERG. Proceed.

Mr. POMMERENING. The concept of achieving cooperation among police agencies in different countries became a reality with the creation of the International Criminal Police Organization in 1923. Initially conceived as a means for a small number of European countries to facilitate police matters, the Interpol mechanism has grown to a worldwide consortium of 125 countries, with headquarters in Paris, France.

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The United States resumed participation in 1947 but withdrew in 1950 following several incidents that were viewed by the FBI as violations of the Interpol constitution. The Treasury Department, however, anxious to preserve contacts in support of its international narcotics enforcement role, continued to maintain an informal liaison with Interpol. In 1968, however, responsibility for narcotics enforcement shifted to the Justice Department. In 1973, reorganization plan 2 increased the scope of activities for narcotics enforcement within the Justice Department. Since more than 50 percent of the U.S. activity in Interpol has a direct and significant impact on the Justice Department, a decision was made by the Attorney General to return the Interpol function to this Department. Consequently, the Attorney General withdrew an earlier designation to the Treasury Department on June 24, 1976. Subsequently, a "memorandum of understanding" was executed between the Justice and Treasury Department officials on January 18, 1977, and the operational center known as the U.S. National Central Bureau was physically moved to the Justice Department on March 17, 1977.

In each member country, a point of contact and coordination is established for the Interpol function. Generally, the national police in the capital city of each country undertake this activity. This designated entity is known as the national central bureau. Although staffing patterns and size vary, each member country operates its own national central bureau consistent with its national laws and policies but within the framework of the Interpol constitution. In the United States, authority for the Interpol function rests, by law, with the Attorney General.

To insure a wide degree of Federal agency participation, the U.S. National Central Bureau is staffed, in addition to a permanent Justice Department cadre, by personnel detailed from the Secret Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Customs Service. Plans have been made to augment this configuration soon with personnel from the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

I think it is appropriate now to discuss the "General Secretariat" and explain how it relates to Interpol and the United States.

The 125 countries that participate in the Interpol network, through their respective national central bureaus, support a permanent administrative and technical organization through which the Interpol operates. This consists of a headquarters staff, a large communications facility, a secretary general, and a number of peripheral activities attendant to the worldwide coordination of Interpol activities. Presently, the headquarters is located in St. Cloud, a suburb of Paris, France.

Financial support for the headquarters or General Secretariat as it is formally named is transmitted in the form of membership dues which are based upon a number of factors. For example, the budget of the General Secretariat is constituted in Swiss francs—a currency generally noted for its minimal fluctuation. Dues for membership which vary each year depending upon the total amount of the budget are assessed on a proportionate basis. Thus the United States pays about 5.2 percent of the overall General Secretariat budget which currently is 10,300,000 Swiss francs. The United States owes \$214,000

for current dues and approximately \$38,000 for dues from prior years. The current statutory ceiling of \$120,000 needs to be raised in order to accommodate current dues, previously unpaid dues, and any dues increases in the future.

The Interpol function in the United States as well as in other participating countries is carried out to facilitate police matters that cut across international jurisdictions. In the United States, the National Central Bureau responds to requests from foreign police agencies for information regarding persons, vehicles, and goods that bear on criminal matters within those respective jurisdictions. Conversely, the U.S. National Central Bureau assists police in Federal, State, and local jurisdictions that have law enforcement requirements in foreign countries. Basically, this function exists as a catalyst to provide efficient police communications between the United States and other member countries and the General Secretariat headquarters. Careful monitoring, coordination, and followup by National Central Bureau staff insure prompt and thorough service. Unless Federal jurisdiction is involved, assistance of the U.S. National Central Bureau is basically the only method by which State and local officials can secure aid from foreign police.

In view of its recent resumption of the Interpol function, the Justice Department has developed a plan to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. National Central Bureau. This plan resulted from an analysis of reports of previous congressional hearings, the recently completed report of the General Accounting Office, and articles developed by the public media.

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In addition, the Justice Department has instituted plans to cover the following areas:

**Policy Advisory Group:** To insure the coordination of all Federal agencies that participate in the operation of the Interpol National Central Bureau in the United States, a policy advisory group is being established to help guide the Attorney General with major policy matters. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that the way this group is established it will be chaired by the Deputy Attorney General. As you are probably aware, the new deputy has been identified. He has had his hearings and his confirmation has been recommended by a Senate committee. We would anticipate that action will be taken today or tomorrow.

Mr. EILBERG. That is Mayor Flaherty.

Mr. POMMERENING. Yes.

**U.S. visibility in Interpol:** The role of the Justice Department in operating the Interpol function in the United States will be highlighted to enhance visibility and our national prestige. Moreover, the Interpol network can be employed as a forum to help resolve

international strategy for dealing with major crime and terrorist activity common to all member countries.

Career staff: An Interpol career staff is being organized to insure that continued management is always maintained even though many staff positions are filled by specialists detailed from the ranks of the participating Federal agencies.

Again, deviating from the statement, Mr. Chairman, I might foresee policy in this department that would accommodate temporarily, assignment of State and local police officials with the National Central Bureau to enhance their awareness of the resources.

Safeguards and rights protection: Major operating policies and standard operating procedures will be developed to insure that proper safeguards are employed with respect to efficient operation, security and maintenance of records, the Privacy Act, and the Freedom of Information Act.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman, and I shall be pleased to provide any additional information that you require or answer any questions that you may have. Thank you.

I might add that these materials have been discussed with Mayor Flaherty, and he has expressed his regrets that he cannot appropriately be here today.

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you, Mr. Pommerening.

I have some questions. We will rotate among the members of the subcommittee for any questions they may have.

Do you have any idea how many requests are made to law enforcement agencies of one country to their counterparts in another country without using the channels of Interpol?

Mr. POMMERENING. I will defer that question to Mr. Tartaglino.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I think that information is available. We would have to ask each of the Federal establishments that have representation abroad to see if they can handle that. There are four or five: The Drug Enforcement Administrations, DEA, the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Treasury Department, Customs, and the Internal Revenue Service.

But the answer is: We do not have that information readily available.

Mr. EILBERG. You will supply us with that?

Mr. POMMERENING. We will supply the situation and to the extent we can accumulate empirical data we will submit it.

Mr. EILBERG. Particularly, do Federal law enforcement officials stationed abroad—particularly DEA agents—ever use the services of Interpol, or do they communicate directly with their agency in the United States?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. They do both. Principally, they deal with the agency in the United States through the Interpol channel, but there are situations that come up where they deal with Interpol. There are countries that prefer international cooperation directly with the Drug Enforcement Administration and others prefer to deal with or through their Interpol bureau.

Mr. EILBERG. How often do foreign law enforcement agencies in running down background information on U.S. citizens who may have violated their laws go to: (1) Legal attachés (FBI agents) in

our Embassies, (2) other embassy officials such as consular officers, or (3) Interpol?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. We would have to check with the FBI to see if the information is available. And we will, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Would you try to do that.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. When did Interpol become involved in exchanging information regarding terrorists—previously Interpol maintained that terrorism, like Nazi war crimes, was political in nature and not within its mandate? Was this decision made officially and publicly? If not, why?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I am not personally familiar with when they actually started taking part, but I think it was in the last 2 or 3 years. I would say that a ball park guess would be about 1972—that they may have started dealing in what they referred to as crimes of violence, as opposed to criminal terrorist activity.

Mr. EILBERG. By whom was that decision made?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I think it was made—here again, I would have to check the record—I am newly arrived in this area—I think the decision was made by the executive committee, which is a committee of 20 individuals with representation worldwide. They are law enforcement officials from many countries detected to this governing group.

Mr. EILBERG. I hold in my hand a book entitled, "Entebbe Rescue" written by Ben-Porat Haber and a gentleman named Zeev Schiff, published by the Dell Publishing Co. of New York City and originally published in Tel Aviv.

This book describes, Israel's rescue mission, which is so well known. On page 56, this statement appears:

Israel asked Interpol to help, and forwarded secret information to their Paris headquarters, only to discover that the Arabs had gotten hold of it and they in turn had passed it on to the terrorist organizations.

Is this true?

Mr. POMMERENING. Mr. Chairman, I don't—we can't make any report.

Mr. EILBERG. Could it possibly be true? Is it possible for it to be true?

Mr. POMMERENING. Anything is possible. I just, you know, can't spread light on that—haven't read the book.

Mr. EILBERG. On page 345, in the same publication, the statement appears.

Experience has shown that Interpol, the International Organization of Police Forces, is not the tool for the job. Quite apart from its commitment to noninvolvement in politics, information transmitted through Interpol in the past has leaked to Arab countries, who have gladly handed it on to the terror groups.

Is this true?

Mr. POMMERENING. I don't know.

Mr. EILBERG. You don't know whether it could be true or not, I take it.

Mr. POMMERENING. Presumably, it could be, but I don't know.

Mr. EILBERG. Would you look into it.

Mr. POMMERENING. Yes.

[The following information was submitted:]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION INTERPOL,  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

April 19, 1977.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Subcommittee for Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
House Committee on the Judiciary,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. EILBERG: Reference is made to our conversation of April 4 and my letter of April 5, 1977.

During the hearing on March 30, 1977, reference was made to the book "Entebbe Rescue" and in particular, pages 56 and 34j concerning Israel providing secret information to the Interpol General Secretariat in Paris and this information was in turn passed to the terrorist organizations.

I am attaching a copy of a message from Interpol Jerusalem which is the Israel National Police, which clearly reflects that the statements made in the book "Entebbe Rescue" are a complete fabrication.

Although I will include this in my responses for the record, I thought this important enough to give to you individually.

Sincerely,

LOUIS B. SIMS, *Chief.*

Enclosure.

(Radiogram)

April 8, 1977.

From: Interpol Jerusalem NR 367 W 47 8/0910 Gmt.  
To: Interpol Washington.  
INT/28.

Concerning your telegram LBS of April 5, 1977. We inform you that neither Israel police nor any other organization has transmitted any secret information to General Secretariat. Therefore, no information could have been transmitted to the terrorists organizations through Arab countries. We have no objection to be cited. Thank you.

INTERPOL JERUSALEM.

Mr. EILBERG. Did you want to add something?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Mr. Chairman, the Operation Chief of Interpol is a Treasury Department representative, and he may have some data.

I would like to mention that we are not avoiding that issue. He is not here today. He left last week for a conference.

As far as the information—I have not heard that in various conferences that I have gone to or in my conversations with him—that there is no substance to that.

Mr. EILBERG. What is the name of this man?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Mr. Louis Sims. He has had the operational leadership of the Interpol Central National Bureau for about the last 3 years.

[Chairman Eilberg sent the following letter to Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel concerning the Entebbe raid and received the following response.]

SEPTEMBER 30, 1977.

His Excellency SIMCHA DINITZ,  
Embassy of Israel,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: My Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law has legislation pending before it regarding U.S. participation in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

My colleagues and I are desirous of obtaining all information possible on this organization before processing the legislation.

To this end, we would like to enlist your cooperation in verifying an allegation which appeared on pages 56 and 34j of the book Entebbe Rescue by Ben-Porat, Haber, and Schiff wherein it is stated that Israel had provided secret information to the Interpol General Secretariat in Paris which had leaked it to Arab countries who had in turn passed it on to terrorist organizations. These statements

have been characterized by the U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol as complete fabrications.

Ladislav Farago in his book *Aftermath* states on page 287 "the borderline between 'common-law crimes' and 'matters of a political character' has never been clearly drawn for Interpol as far as Nazis were concerned. This leaves a gaping loophole in Interpol, which is ingeniously exploited by the fugitive Nazis themselves".

We would be grateful if your government could review these charges made by the authors of these books and advise us as to the reaction of the competent officials in Israel to these remarks and their evaluation of Interpol activities based on their experience with the organization.

With kind personal regards.

Sincerely,

JOSHUA EILBERG, *Chairman.*

ISRAEL POLICE,  
Jerusalem, January 8, 1978.

Mr. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,*  
*U.S. House of Representatives,*  
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SIR: Your letter addressed to Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of September 30, 1977 has been forwarded to us.

Regarding the allegation which appeared on pages 56 and 345 of the book *Entebbe Rescue* we would like to quote part of our reply sent to Interpol Washington concerning the same matter: "Neither the Israel Police nor any other organization have transmitted any secret information to the General Secretariat of the I.C.P.O.—therefore, no information could have been transmitted to the terrorist organization through Arab countries."

Concerning the statements made in Ladislav Farago's book *Aftermath* (on page 287), the charges made by the author have not arisen in the last few years. We would therefore like to review the correspondence and interview people who were actively involved during the years that this problem may have existed.

Sincerely yours,

R. MINKOVSKY,  
*Deputy Commander,*  
*Head of Criminal Investigation Division.*

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Fish?

Mr. FISH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, at the outset I would like to welcome our colleague, Mr. Harold Sawyer from Michigan, who comes to this committee with great strengths: Former prosecuting attorney in Kent County, Mich. He was counsel to the one man grand jury investigation and a special prosecuting assistant attorney general.

Mr. Sawyer's memberships and honorary invitational positions he has held have earned him great respect within the State of Michigan and I could go on for several pages.

I think we have a great resource here, given his background and training and we are delighted that he has joined us.

Mr. EILBERG. We are also glad to have him. He has participated in a couple of our meetings already. And we have evidence of the valuable contributions he is able to make in this subcommittee.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I am scheduled in a very few minutes to follow the chairman of our committee to testify before Mr. Danielson's subcommittee.

I would like to ask a few questions at this point—and hopefully, because we have a great many important questions, they are going to be followed up. If it comes around to a second turn and my questions

haven't been completely asked, I will ask permission for counsel to complete them.

Mr. ELLBERG. That will be satisfactory.

Mr. FISH. I want to compliment you for initiating this inquiry into Interpol as an organization, and its relationship to the National Central Bureau of the United States.

What concerns me, Mr. Pommerening, is—I am sure you are familiar with the GAO report—it indicates that there is no absolute control of the distribution of information (page 36). And on page 10, it goes on to explore legislation to protect the confidentiality of our citizens, such as the Privacy Act.

I think the issue before us is how to keep the exchange of information under control. I wonder if you could describe for the committee how information is exchanged among the member countries of Interpol and to what limit, if any, member countries have accessibility to FBI records and other investigative records of the United States.

Mr. POMMERENING. I will ask Mr. Tartaglino to comment on that briefly. But before I do that, Mr. Fish, I want to suggest that you have pinpointed a subject which has been of continuing concern to the Department of Justice.

As I said in my opening statement, by statute the Attorney General has the responsibility in this area.

For some 18 years he had delegated or designated the responsibility to another departmental agency though the statute still reposes responsibility in him.

We have been concerned about some of the very questions which you are now raising and we are happy that they are being raised. And it is precisely for this reason that an official as high as the Deputy Attorney General of the United States is going to chair the policy group which will thoroughly look at the issues raised under the GAO report and establish procedures and policies which will assure that the rights of American citizens are protected, at least to the same extent that they are protected within these United States.

Mr. FISH. I am very glad to hear, Mr. Pommerening, that the Attorney General is acutely aware of this problem. It is not a new matter. My concern goes back a number of years, and I hope we will get a chance to have the Deputy Attorney General before us, Mr. Chairman.

And I hope that you understand that this committee, this inquiry is, in its expression of concern—these questions are directed to the same need for a good hard look at this evidence.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. First of all, one of the first things that we will do in the Justice Department—and we have steps in motion—is to have a training program—and I am not suggesting that the individuals who are involved are not experienced. They are all professionals, and they are all familiar with the rights of privacy. But we have steps in motion to have a training program to make them even more acutely aware.

When information is exchanged and comes through the Interpol mechanism, it goes through two review processes. For instance, if it is information from a State or local jurisdiction, we have to know why the particular country wants the information; and we have to be satisfied that there is a need for it.

Then, on the other hand, as far as security, we have installed adequate physical means to insure that when the information is given to the Department of Justice it is safeguarded. So our processing procedures have been greatly reorganized.

On the other end of the spectrum, I have had—in the latter 1960's, I was Chief of the National Central Bureau for 2 years. I don't know of an instance where information leaked out. I know of more instances in these United States where information has leaked out.

So, in that 2-year period—and I have had additional years abroad working with law enforcement—I have never seen a problem.

That is not to suggest that there has not been a problem, but certainly somewhere along the line of our mechanisms in the United States I think it would come to our attention.

Now, if we do have information brought to our attention, we bring it up before the executive committee and the country that is a member risks being expelled.

Mr. FISH. There is no limit to your knowledge of why a country wants information to bear on access to the FBI record and other investigative records of U.S. citizens?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. They have to let us know why they want it and what use they will put it to.

Mr. FISH. This means countries like Algeria, Chile, Ethiopia, Romania, to name a few, would have access to records pertaining to American citizens?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. So you will not be misled, it depends on the type of information.

As far as reports—investigative reports of various agencies—we do not as a rule pass them. We cull what we think is the minimum of information. And here again, there has to be a very good reason provided. They are all member countries.

Mr. FISH. They would be under the same criteria which you gave us as the only criteria: which is, a legitimate reason for the request?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes. And they would have to satisfy us. And it depends on the type of information they want.

Mr. ELLBERG. Can you expand on that a little further. What are you going to release and what are you permitted to withhold?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Well, I will give you a hypothetical situation: The LaGuardia bombing incident was a highly emotionally charged crime and one that is still to be resolved. I would say that if we put out a 125-point bulletin around the world in a matter of minutes, to try to get a modus operandi or a reading, and based on the evidence that was gathered right there, that we might ask one of those countries—if we had information for people going there—to help us locate individuals who might have performed that violent act.

On the other hand, they might come back and say they have leads on that particular person and want further identification on him. That is what we would be responsible for.

If one of those countries gave a background on one of their own nationals and he was wanted in their country for homicide or for a criminal activity, I think we would be responsive to it. The type of information might be: "We have located him." "He is here in this country."

And there are other safeguards and processes. We just don't turn people over. We might say, "He is located in our country, and you would have to go through extradition proceedings," et cetera. But as far as the investigative process, we may locate him and tell them we have located him.

It is usually not the policy to say, "He is at such-and-such an address." But the type of information that might be given is that one of their nationals is suspected of committing a criminal act and I am excluding anything political. We would try to insure that the individual was not a political refugee of some kind.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I have prepared and submitted this request to you, prior to this. And this is just requiring answers now.

The last collective figures I have seen in the budget membership of Interpol appeared in the 91st Congress, first session, in a Senate hearing for the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

I would appreciate if you would update for this committee complete financial disclosure of contributions by the United States received, and how spent. [Information appears in App. I, at p. 44.]

Second, submit for the record all associates of Interpol, their individual background with particular emphasis on the political.

[Information appears in app. 1, p. 70.]

Mr. POMMERENING. Are you referring to the National Central Bureau in the United States?

Mr. FISH. I am referring to Interpol, membership of Interpol, employees and associates of Interpol.

Can you comply with that request?

Mr. POMMERENING. Well, yes; I can if I understand it and its limitations. There are 125 National Central Bureaus in 125 countries and a General Secretariat in Paris. Now, we obviously can give the information that we have on the National Central Bureau in the United States.

We can give you information on the budget of the international organization. I am not sure that we can give you information on all the French citizens who are employees of the General Secretariat, and I am sure that we would have a very difficult time getting the employees of 124 National Central Bureaus in the countries outside of the United States.

Mr. FISH. We don't know who we are dealing with in these other countries?

Mr. POMMERENING. By name, I am not sure we do.

Mr. FISH. Would you try for this committee to comply with these requests that I have handed—as specifically as you possibly can.

Mr. POMMERENING. Yes, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. We would be interested in knowing whether Interpol is financed only by government contributions, or whether there is any source of funds from private interests. Would you know the answer to that?

Mr. POMMERENING. It is my belief that it is government contributions. I will verify that to make sure I am giving an accurate response.

[Information appears in app. 1, p. 70.]

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Hall?

Mr. HALL. \$214,000 that the United States owes at this time, does that go back to 1950 when we withdrew from this organization?

Mr. POMMERENING. No; the delinquencies that are presently on the books are the small amount from 1975, the small amount from 1976, and the current 1977 figure.

Mr. HALL. What is the budget of Interpol at this time?

Mr. POMMERENING. Ten million three hundred thousand Swiss francs I don't have the rate of conversion to Swiss francs here. But our portion of it is \$214,000; and that is 5 percent, generally, of the budget. So, I would assume by interpolating that the budget is a little in excess \$4 million for the General Secretariat.

Mr. HALL. According to the information that I have here, former Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, withdrew from Interpol in 1950 because, in his view, the results obtained through membership did not justify the financial outlay involved.

Can you, or any of you, advise this committee whether the situation that was true in 1950 still holds true, and why, in your judgment our participation in Interpol now is justified?

Mr. POMMERENING. Mr. Hoover's position in 1950 was reflected by the Attorney General's delegation of the responsibility to the Secretary of the Treasury in 1958. At that time the Department of Justice had very little involvement in international police matters because the narcotics responsibility was in the Treasury Department.

The current judgment of the Department of Justice is that now we do have the narcotics responsibility that the participation is worthy.

Mr. HALL. Well, is that based upon your own investigation or based upon an objective finding?

Mr. POMMERENING. It is based upon conclusions reached internally in the organizations that are participating in the law enforcement activities of the Department.

Mr. HALL. What does the United States—let's assume we didn't have participation in Interpol of any kind—what would we not receive from any country who is a member, or who might not be a member, that we would receive if we were members?

Mr. POMMERENING. The Interpol organization now is a method of communication with the 124-member countries. If we were not a member of Interpol, we would have to establish different and separate communications methods and separate people to contact in those countries in which we do not presently have legal attachés or other representation.

Mr. HALL. Well, could not the people that are now connected with Interpol work out their own contact with the contacts of other countries?

And my second part of the question is, don't nearly all of these Interpol people—representatives—work out of the foreign embassies of the United States into other countries?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Is the question, sir, do the Interpol representatives work out of foreign embassies?

Mr. HALL. Yes, sir, our embassies in foreign countries?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I don't know of any instance where we have anyone working for Interpol who works out of an embassy.

We have Federal representation abroad in the form of FBI, DEA, and the Immigration Service. They work with Interpol, but they are not part of Interpol. They cooperate, and they have an exchange of data.

I don't know of any case where we have an Interpol Bureau in a foreign embassy.

To go back to your original question—a very good question—with rising crime and foreign governments to help, this is the only mechanism that we have to enable us in 10 or 15 minutes to communicate with 20 to 25 countries. It is all organized, all set up. If we didn't have it, I think the consequences in some situations could be very, very detrimental to what we are trying to do. I know of no other way to do it.

I can send 125 telegrams, I suppose, if I wanted to get an all points bulletin out around the world. But there is no structure to do it, other than the Interpol mechanism. And to set up another unit that would do the same thing as that which has already been set up, really doesn't make very much sense to me.

Mr. HALL. Can you give any instances in the past where there have been any results that have come back to you from your notification of these other 120 different areas—that has been of any assistance in gaining subsequent convictions of any individuals.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I think, the annual report—

Mr. HALL. I am not asking you to give information that you are not—

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Let me go back to insure I am not getting into anything under current litigation: Interpol played a very significant part in the area of the prosecution and conviction of one Foreign Minister and two Ambassadors who were responsible for supplying in excess of a ton of heroin into the United States. I would hate to tell you how many heroin deaths we can attribute to that. That is one particular case.

Interpol played a very significant part and plays a very significant part in the suppression of the heroin traffic.

Mr. POMMERENING. There are only two representatives abroad in the Secret Service, but we have input from communication with 125 countries and the intelligence regarding the particular crime, whether it be customs or whether it be homicide or brutal murders of children by sex fiends, et cetera. That is the type of information available. To take this tool away, which is the only tool that we can communicate with means that we are communicating with only one country at a time. Sometimes we don't know the answers. Just as we put out all points bulletins in this country, we do the same thing in the international field. And in the LaGuardia bombing incident, very productive information came back that was of great significance to the police.

Mr. HALL. Going on to one other subject, we have read and heard lately about some of the Nazi war criminals that are living in this country and possibly in the western hemisphere, and in the South American countries. Is that something that Interpol would become involved in—in trying to locate those people?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I have read the articles that I guess we have all read, and I just can't address them. If there were substance to them and if there were a trial, I would say we should be involved in it. If it were here in the United States I would certainly make the referral to the Immigration Service or to local and State enforcement.

So, I am speaking for myself now as far as other countries, I just can't speak, and I cannot speak to that novel.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Hall, we wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury, William Simon, on January 20, 1976, on this point. We received an acknowledgement on January 23, and a reply in a second letter dated February 25, 1976. And I would like to place these letters on the record at this point.

JANUARY 20, 1976.

Hon. WILLIAM E. SIMON,  
Secretary of the Treasury,  
Department of the Treasury,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SIMON: This is to request the urgent assistance of the Department of Treasury with regard to the investigation of alleged Nazi war criminals residing in the United States which is currently being conducted by the Departments of State and Justice.

As you may know, my Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law has closely followed this investigation for the past two years in order to insure that every possible lead is explored in an effort to determine whether these individuals should be denaturalized or deported.

It has been suggested that the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the various National Central Bureaus may possess evidence or information which would assist in this investigation.

It is also my understanding that Interpol has been unwilling to provide such assistance because the issue was deemed to be "political" in nature and therefore not within the mandate of Interpol.

I would therefore request that our United States representatives to Interpol raise this issue and seek the assistance of Interpol at the earliest opportunity.

I would certainly appreciate a prompt response to this request.

Sincerely,

JOSHUA EILBERG, *Chairman.*

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,  
Washington, D.C., January 23, 1976.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On behalf of Secretary Simon, I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of January 20, requesting INTERPOL assistance in the investigation of alleged Nazi war criminals residing in the U.S., which is being conducted by the State and Justice Departments.

You will have a further response as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN H. HARPER,  
*Legislative Affairs.*

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,  
Washington, February 25, 1976.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of January 20, 1976 in which you requested the assistance of the International Criminal Police Organization—INTERPOL—in investigating the residence of alleged Nazi war criminals in the United States. You suggested that INTERPOL's General Secretariat and National Central Bureaus may be in possession of evidence or information which might bear on investigations currently being conducted by the Departments of State and Justice.

Mr. James Greene, Assistant Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, has provided this United States National Central Bureau with a list of persons under investigation in this matter. This list has been checked against the files at both the United States National Central Bureau and the

INTERPOL General Secretariat in Saint Cloud, France. The names of none of these persons appear in either file.

With respect to matters "Political" in nature, INTERPOL's mandate is clearly reflected in the Organization's Constitution. Article Three states: "It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character." Accordingly, INTERPOL's general policy is to avoid any involvement in these four areas lest hostilities arise between member nations which would impede international police cooperation and thereby limit or completely block the Organization's effectiveness. However, if an individual or organization whose nature or activities fall within one of these four prohibited areas violates a criminal statute of a member nation, INTERPOL will assist in the investigation of specific violations.

We hope we have been of assistance in this matter. We shall continue to work closely with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to assist them in cases involving violations of U.S. immigration laws.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM E. SIMON.

We were informed that Interpol was unwilling to provide assistance because of the political nature of the inquiry. We then asked that our U.S. representatives at Interpol raise this issue and seek the assistance of Interpol at the earliest opportunity.

Secretary Simon replied that the names on the list of suspected Nazi war criminals in the United States were checked against the files of Interpol, but nothing was found. The letter then goes on to discuss Interpol policy on political matters. It is fairly clear from the reading of this letter that this subject was regarded as political and therefore violative of the constitution of Interpol.

Do you have any comments on that?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. My comment would be that if I had received that letter that a criminal violation was committed I would pursue it here in the United States.

Mr. EILBERG. Are you in a position and since you are in Justice, I suggest that you should be in a position to raise this issue and seek the assistance of Interpol in connection with Nazi war criminals in the United States?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I am not familiar with the letter you are reading from. I have a comment on that: If these are criminals in the United States and the request comes in from someone who is interested in it, I would pursue it.

Mr. Chairman, this is a matter that at the last terrorist activity meeting in Paris was discussed. We all decided that, regardless of the levels—the judicial and the different branches—this presents no difficulty to the policeman. If there is a bombing, we proceed as policemen to try to resolve it. If, along with the process, there are other factors that enter into it, we have done our job. And I am going to work as a policeman.

Mr. EILBERG. Are you stating flatly that such cooperation was not violative of the Interpol constitution and we can freely obtain any information that is available, from or through Interpol?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I don't know how responsive they would be. I was talking the other way around.

Mr. EILBERG. I was not talking about the bombing of LaGuardia, I was talking about Nazi war criminals.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I am sorry. If the incoming request describes a criminal act, I would be responsive to that, and outside of that I can only do what other countries would do.

Mr. EILBERG. I would like to know whether the subject of alleged Nazi war criminals living in the United States is a subject that you would seek information on through Interpol; and whether or not there was any barrier in the constitution or regulations of Interpol that would specifically bar any such information being supplied?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. My answer to your question is: Yes, I would seek information. And my interpretation of the constitution is—that it would not be in violation.

Mr. EILBERG. What assistance could be rendered by the various national central bureaus in assistance in investigating Nazis currently residing in the United States? What kind of help do you think can be obtained?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. In the United States?

Mr. EILBERG. Yes.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. As you know, Interpol could pass this on to the appropriate law enforcement organization that would have jurisdiction. We would pass this on to the Immigration Service and they would conduct the search. And I think that from the present reports that I have read, they have ongoing investigations today.

Mr. EILBERG. We have been dealing with INS specifically in this area. I am just renewing my request of you at this time.

We want to talk about getting help from Interpol abroad, not from Interpol in the United States. We have tried many ways to find witnesses in the United States, and I am not perfectly sure that we can expect to develop very much more locally at this point. But I do believe that there are witnesses in Israel, behind the Iron Curtain, and there may very well be information in other countries.

And I might add that I have read a book by Mr. Farrago, in which he deals extensively with Nazi war criminals in South America and he refers repeatedly to information that has come to him from Interpol. Now we want access to that information, particularly with regard to Nazis living in the United States.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I react positively that I would handle it. I would examine the substance of the request—and if it's a criminal matter I would proceed to make every effort I can to get it out.

Mr. HALL. Suppose you get a request for information concerning an alleged violation, who makes the initial decision as to whether or not it is a political matter or a criminal matter?

Mr. POMMERENING. Mr. Hall, you are now referring to a request received in the National Central Bureau for a piece of information?

Mr. HALL. Correct.

Mr. POMMERENING. The head of the National Central Bureau, under whatever policies have been determined by his supervisors, makes the determination. However, he must make two determinations: Is it a valid request? Is it information which is appropriately releasable under the laws and policies of the United States? If the answers to both of those questions are affirmative, at that point the request for information would be disseminated to any law enforcement agency in the United States which might have that information in its possession.

Mr. HALL. Who makes that decision?

Mr. POMMERENING. The operating head of the National Central Bureau.

Mr. HALL. Who is that?

Mr. POMMERENING. That is Mr. Louis Sims who has been the head for the past 3 years I believe.

Mr. HALL. Well now, does he make that decision himself, has he a committee that works with him, or is he the final arbitrator of that matter?

Mr. POMMERENING. I am not aware that in the past operations there has been any sort of committee meeting on each request for information.

Mr. HALL. I gather from looking at and reading hurriedly these pamphlets that were given to me yesterday that Interpol has been operated as a rather loose jointed operation with reference to contacts that you have in other countries, and that sort of thing?

Mr. POMMERENING. I wouldn't describe it with the term "loose". It is a very formal organization with very defined membership criteria and has an operational base in France.

Mr. HALL. I note that in appendix III of the GAO report—that is, this book that we have—[indicating], it gives the summary of some 19 cases processed by the U.S. Bureau.

Without going into those specific cases, it appears that most of these cases could just as easily be handled by the U.S. consul or routinely by the Embassy or consular liaison with the local police. I am sure that you have reviewed these case studies, and are they indicative of the majority of the cases handled by the U.S. Bureau, and do you have any examples of cases of more than routine importance handled by the U.S. Bureau in the past year?

Mr. POMMERENING. Mr. Hall, we have been in the position to over-view the operation of the National Central Bureau for 13 days. March 17 was the date that it came over to the Department of Justice.

We are aware of the report, and the questions which are raised in the GAO report give us the same concerns that they give you. They are the policy and operational matters to which the Deputy Attorney General and his advisers will be addressing themselves.

Mr. HALL. Is there any established number of people from the United States that work for Interpol in not only the United States, but in the 120 foreign countries that are involved in Interpol?

Mr. POMMERENING. There are no Federal employees who work for Interpol out of the United States, save one, who is now in Paris detailed to complete the narcotics section of the General Secretariat—and that is of recent date—since the first of the year. Prior to that, there have been no Federal employees involved in Interpol matters outside of the United States.

Mr. HALL. I thought they were drawn from the FBI and Narcotics Section?

The POMMERENING. That is correct. And they are the people who staffed the National Central Bureau which until March 17 was located in the Treasury Department and since March 17 has been located in the Justice Department.

Mr. HALL. Did I understand you to say we have only one person overseas working for the Federal Government in Interpol?

Mr. POMMERENING. That's right, one person.

Mr. HALL. Just one person is all we have?

Mr. POMMERENING. Overseas, yes.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. He works in the headquarters of Interpol in Paris in the drug section, and extracts information dealing with the international drug traffic that may be between two countries that in his judgment may one day affect the United States. He puts that information into a report and funnels it to those countries that are concerned with it.

Mr. HALL. Is that the only number of people that we have—is that the greatest number of people we have ever had, so far as you know, working in Interpol in a foreign country?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes, sir. In 1973 he was assigned there, and that is the only member of the United States attached to the Interpol General Secretariat—or the only United States national member of our enforcement community who was stationed abroad for Interpol.

Mr. HALL. Is there some reason why there are not more than one working in narcotics? Are there other areas of Interpol, other than narcotics where people of the United States should be working?

Mr. POMMERENING. That is the question which has been raised with us and that is one of the questions that we propose to address at our advisory board as to whether the American—U.S. representation and participation in the headquarters operation should not be increased. And as I told you, this assignment has been since the first of the year. Mr. Tartaglino is much more knowledgeable and just corrected me and said this person has been detailed since 1973.

Mr. EILBERG. Before I call on Mr. Sawyer—another very serious bit of information, if it's true, has come to us very recently in preparation for this hearing, namely, that during the Nixon administration that Mr. Gordon Liddy is said to have used information that was available through Interpol in connection with obtaining political contributions from foreign corporations. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. POMMERENING. I do not.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Tartaglino?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I do not, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. Do you have any idea as to whether the Interpol office in the Treasury was even abused or misused for political purposes during those administrations?

Mr. POMMERENING. If it were, I am not aware of it. There would be no way that I would be aware of it.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Tartaglino?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Mr. Chairman, I have no information on that.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. I had only one occasion to deal through Interpol and it always has been a kind of a shadowy operation. I don't have a good understanding of it.

First of all, is it part of any other organization, such as the U.N., or is it just a totally independent group?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. In that sense it is totally independent. However, it has a representative who serves as an observer on various committees. But it is independent in that sense.

Mr. SAWYER. And this organization—does it have a head, a single executive chief, in the world?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. It has a Secretary General who is a career police officer in the French Government, who is a senior police officer. And

it breaks out into divisions which are traditional police operations: narcotics, administrative, and smaller divisions for various types crimes.

Mr. SAWYER. Now, in each of the participating countries, the Interpol bureau or office there is staffed strictly by nationals, is this correct?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. The General Secretariat is staffed by nationals from around the world, yes, sir.

Mr. SAWYER. I wasn't talking about that. I was talking about the bureaus, or whatever they have, in each of these 120 countries. Are they each staffed by their own nationals?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes, sir.

Mr. SAWYER. And the coordinating office in effect then is the Secretary in the house, is this correct?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. That is correct.

Mr. SAWYER. And is that staffed by French nationals?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Not entirely. It is staffed by nationals from many countries.

Mr. SAWYER. What about—do you know about what proportion of the staffing is—

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I would say 25 percent are French nationals but not on the policy level.

Mr. SAWYER. And is it true that each of the bureaus are, as you call it—the National Central Bureau you call it?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes, sir.

Mr. SAWYER. Its payroll is carried by departments other than things like the appropriation for Interpol, I assume?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. It is. It is a very unusual situation. In most countries it is an arm of the national police. Otherwise it is a staff office, and the requirements or requests are levied on the police service.

Mr. SAWYER. So I presume that if we have FBI agents, for example, assigned to our National Central Bureau that they are carried on the payroll of the FBI, is that correct?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. That is correct.

Mr. SAWYER. And that the whole appropriation we are talking about here is strictly the appropriations that maintain the National Secretariat and its expenses?

Mr. POMMERENING. That is correct. The authorization bill is to permit the payment of the annual dues which in turn are used to support the operation in Paris.

Mr. SAWYER. And are any Eastern Bloc countries included in these 120 nations?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I think there are two: Yugoslavia and, I believe, Rumania. I would have to qualify the second one. That is available, and we can supply that.

Mr. EILBERG. Would you be good enough to provide for the record a list of the countries that are in Interpol?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 72.]

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, on page 48 of the Senate hearings it indicates the two countries, Rumania and Yugoslavia, are presently 2 of the 120 member countries in Interpol.

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you. Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. SAWYER. Approximately how many agents—if that is what you would call that category of personnel—do we have operating or assigned to the National Central Bureau?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. We have and I will define them. We have a customs agent—

Mr. SAWYER. How many agents?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Five. Seven law enforcement professionals, five of which are agents for five different agencies plus two other law enforcement professionals and I think five or six support. So the total figure is about 14 or 15 people.

Mr. SAWYER. Do they do any field work, or are they largely a mission of calling like FBI or department of police or—in other words, do they do any field investigation themselves?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. No, sir, they do not.

It is a massive communication system, a Telex operation, teletype, telephone.

If it is easier to call the Michigan State Police, they call and obtain the information and ask if it is all right to disseminate the data. It goes out with a copy to the originator, to show the data that was disseminated.

Mr. SAWYER. As far as you know, is that a similar pattern to the way the Bureaus in the other countries who are participating, operate?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. It is a similar pattern, but this is a staff function usually in a national headquarters operation. They use their communication facility by going out to their provinces or major cities and getting the data and sending it out. It is more easily centralized in foreign governments because it is usually in one police service. But in our case, we very briefly go to the local or State police.

Mr. SAWYER. And you feel that this kind of—just information gathering—couldn't be done out of a consulate or embassy in many foreign countries, or just by their contacting some local police forces and just asking them to get the information?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I didn't mean to say that it can't be done. That is another operation. I think this is a much better way because you have professional law enforcement officers who are involved in the whole operation. You would have to have the assignment of a professional law enforcement officer, I suppose, to do that.

Mr. SAWYER. Do we have any—or does the international organization have any criteria or control over the qualifications or type personnel that are in these various bureaus in various countries?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. No. I can just say from personal knowledge and experience that they have been individuals from the police services of those countries. What established standards they meet, and so forth, I can't tell you.

When you get into the Third World countries, they probably have support types. They are all police officers or members of the police services in any event.

Mr. SAWYER. Does the Secretary General have any executive authority or control over any of the bureaus operating in any of the 120 countries?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. No, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. I didn't hear the answer.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. The answer was, "No".

Mr. SAWYER. Would it then be fair to say that it is really an organization made up of 120 different and independent bureaus that are just, in effect, coordinated by the Secretary General organization in France?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. 125 countries, yes, sir.

When there is communication between Mexico and the United States, this is done directly with no coordination by the General Secretariat.

Mr. SAWYER. And I presume that might be true with any number of other countries.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes; the General Secretariat only comes into play if you want 125 bulletins or an international all points alert.

Mr. SAWYER. What does the Secretary General do then, other than act as a fan-out for 125 telegrams?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Well, they have—first of all they have a large ident section that he supervises.

His principal function, I suppose, is policy direction and planning of all the bureaus; and some 12 or 15 conferences a year. These are specialized conferences, are held, usually in the General Secretariat where member countries are invited to participate, depending on their need. And he participates or chairs all of those and does all of the staff work in preparations for the conferences.

Mr. SAWYER. For the conferences?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes. And these conferences are exchanges of data or needs, and the suppression of particular types of drug traffic or other crime on an international basis.

Mr. SAWYER. Could we get some idea, approximately, if you know—how many people are employees of the General Secretariat in Paris—just approximately?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I don't know sir, but I will take a guess.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, I mean, would it be—

Mr. TARTAGLINO. 200.

Mr. SAWYER. 200.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. 200 would be somewhere in the ball park. I would guess it would be 200.

Mr. SAWYER. But again, that whole operation, including the Secretary General—there is no executive authority over really any of the 125 different bureaus.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. No, sir.

Mr. SAWYER. Nor are there standards for their personnel or their security criteria, or anything of that type?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. No, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. In the hearings before the Senate subcommittee the question as to the number of employees come up and my recollection is that there were about 120.

Now, Senator Montoya asked for a list of names of those employees and the reply given was that they would not supply the information. Senator Montoya wanted a list and the description of the duties of all of those personnel. Do you know any reason why that information should not be provided to this subcommittee?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I was not familiar with that request.

Mr. EILBERG. Would you make the request and attempt to supply us with that information—that is, the names.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I will make the effort, Mr. Chairman.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 71.]

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you, Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. SAWYER. I just wonder, if in conclusion, would it be possible for you to provide—I realize you wouldn't go around carrying this in your head—but could you provide a yearly breakdown—not categorize—but yearly number of requests that both were incoming from other countries to our Nation Central Bureau and the number of inquiries that we made to others for—say, the last 15 years. By year. Would that be possible?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I know it is possible in recent years. Yes, sir. For instance, we have been members since 1958, I believe, so I think it is available for that period of time.

Mr. SAWYER. Say from 1958 to date—just by year: The number of outgoing and the number of incoming requests.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes; I believe that is available. That would be in the Treasury Department, and we will make an effort to get it.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 77.]

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. That's all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Getting back to the possible misused of Interpol, what I am trying to determine is whether Interpol—more specifically, our Interpol Office in Treasury was ever abused or misused for political purposes during the administrations prior to this one—the last two administrations. Nixon—and you said you don't know anything about that.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Mr. Chairman, I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. EILBERG. Now, Mr. Pommerening, since he is your expert, and you do not know the answers to the question either, how do we get an internal investigation underway, or how can we go about trying to get your cooperation to find the answers to those questions? Because I have heard these rumors as they have filtered through.

Mr. POMMERENING. If you would make available to me or Mr. Tartaglino the substance of the allegations or their general nature, we would take them to the Deputy Attorney General and ask his assistance.

Mr. EILBERG. Well, I will write a letter, specifically in further detail—since I do not wish to go into further detail—based upon the information I have, which is not substantiated, but we would like an exploration of the subject matter.

Mr. POMMERENING. To my judgment, on receipt of your request, it would be handled in the following fashion: When we receive a letter from you, we will send it to the Office of Professional Responsibility, which is an organization internally in the Department of Justice specifically charged with assuring that there are no violations of professional standards of integrity.

I would assume that we will then be in contact with the Treasury Department for information on those matters which are out of the scope of our present knowledge and would indicate some further review is necessary.

Mr. EILBERG. Pursuing that a little further, what association, if any,

did the following individuals have to Interpol, the U.S. National Central Bureau; and what positions or relationships did they have with the Treasury Department—Egil Krogh, Gordon Liddy, Edward L. Morgan, and J. C. H. Bryant, Jr.? Do you know anything about that?

Mr. POMMERENING. The only one that I know of is Mr. Morgan who, I believe, was, when he was the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. representative for Interpol. I believe that the National Central Bureau at that time operated under his jurisdiction and responsibility.

Mr. EILBERG. Would you seek to get that?

Mr. POMMERENING. Yes.

Mr. EILBERG. Do you wish to respond further, Mr. Tartaglino?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I was just going to confirm that that is the only one I can respond to that was an operating head while he was Assistant Secretary.

Mr. EILBERG. If they were related to Interpol or to our NCB, what was their capacity, function, and duties, and what access did they have to the Treasury's communication system, the FBI's National Criminal Information Center, or any other Federal or State criminal office in the United States?

Mr. POMMERENING. We will attempt to ascertain that information for you.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 78.]

Mr. EILBERG. What types of information do we provide to foreign governments when a request is made for all relevant criminal and background information relating to a particular U.S. citizen? And please try to be specific.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. We would give—if no objections were made and if the reason were valid, we would give the whereabouts of a U.S. citizen; we would give a past criminal record, if he had a past record. We would be responsive to the general whereabouts and identity.

Mr. EILBERG. Well, in the Senate hearings previously referred to, the impression given to me was that criminal arrests or convictions data is about the only data provided. Now, is that correct or incorrect, or what additional data is provided?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I would say the location data of the U.S. nationals is provided, if they wanted to know. If a man had committed a crime in a foreign country, we would state whether he could be located. I would say that we might respond that he is here and proceed through different channels and appropriate procedures—if there were an extradition—

Mr. EILBERG. Is there any way that our National Central Bureau can verify whether a request is made for a legitimate law enforcement purpose?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. We accept what they send out in a request; they usually define the reason. Usually, the requests that came in during my tenure did not include why they wanted it. We would ask them, and it would have to be legitimate. But we do not make any effort to go back to verify it. We accept the liaison.

Mr. EILBERG. A suggestion made in the Senate hearings again; it was suggested that some of the requests to the NCB may have been

laundered, so to speak—that is, come from some Communist or other country and transmitted by a Western country that we are accustomed to dealing with and have some confidence in—when the request comes in to the United States. Do you know of any such practice?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I can only say that it has not been my experience that any have been detected as being in that form or that we have uncovered any in that area.

Mr. EILBERG. In supplying information requested, do we provide only criminal history, or do we also provide other information relating to the character and background of an individual?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I would say, no. Here again, it has been 6 or 7 years since I have been in the operational portion—but I would say that we would not.

Mr. EILBERG. Do we provide information on all convictions for misdemeanors and felonies?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. For felonies I would have to respond yes. Here again I am responding for another person, Mr. Sims. Again we would give you data for felonies. I am uncertain whether he would give it for misdemeanors. I would have to say I don't know. But we will provide that to the committee.

Mr. EILBERG. I am afraid there are too many areas that your answers are, "I don't know," and you are not sure. When is Mr. Sims coming back?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. He will be back next Monday.

Mr. EILBERG. Would you be good enough to submit the draft of the hearing to him so that we can have from him the answers to all the questions that we have raised, particularly in light of your being uncertain.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Well, I regret, sir, that I do not have the answers. Yes, we will do that.

[Mr. Sims' answers appear in app. 1 at p. 39.]

Mr. EILBERG. Do you provide information, when it is solicited on simply arrests, arrests only, where there has been no further report regarding the conviction?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. There have been occasions in the past when just arrest information. But I believe that there has been a change of policy in the past few years.

Mr. EILBERG. Change in what way?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. It is not provided and today just conviction information is disseminated.

Mr. EILBERG. Do you provide information on all outstanding warrants that may have been issued for an individual?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I would say if the information was asked for; we would reply. We would respond on it, yes. If that specific information was asked for, I think we would provide it if we are talking about criminal matters.

Mr. EILBERG. Doesn't that raise some real questions in your mind as to whether it is right to transfer that information along?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Well, here again, we are depending on the type of warrant.

Mr. EILBERG. Is there any way that the National Central Bureau of Interpol headquarters can verify whether a request is made for a legitimate law enforcement purpose?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Here again, we accept at face value the request that comes in, whether it comes in by Telex or whether it comes in by letter. Except for the reason cited in prior testimony, we are responsive.

Mr. HALL. You said you accept at face value anything that you get from one of these member countries by letter or Telex.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. If they set out in a letter that it is for a valid investigative or criminal purpose, we accept that, just as we do here in the United States.

Mr. HALL. If you make a request to Interpol for information on a person living in Rome, and you think it is a legitimate request that they should supply information to you—at the other end of the line, the receiving line, they come back and say, “That is not a legitimate request.” Does the United States have any method of appeal from that person who made that answer to you?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I would say no. The answer is “No,” there is no appeal.

But in some cases in the past—in one particular case, the Secretary General brought the two countries together and tried to bring it to a resolution. It was a question on whether something was in the political—it did not concern the United States, it was two other countries. One country took the position that it was more political than criminal and it was resolved that way, through the Secretary General.

Mr. HALL. He is the final arbiter?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. He is—I would say in our case, if we did not want to disseminate the data there is no way the foreign country or Secretary General could force us to. There is no way they could make us give the data.

Mr. EILBERG. How many requests were made by the U.S. National Central Bureau and of these requests how many were initiated by Federal law enforcement agencies and by local law enforcement agencies?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. We will provide that for you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have that.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 82.]

Mr. EILBERG. It is clear that State and local law enforcement agencies have not utilized the services of Interpol to any great extent in our opinion. What has the Justice Department done to increase the awareness of State and local law enforcement agencies as to the functions of Interpol? What is the percentage of U.S. requests referred to foreign governments which were initiated by State and local law enforcement agencies? And how responsive have State and local law enforcement agencies been in answering foreign requests referred to them by Interpol?

Mr. POMMERENING. This is one of the areas which I referred to in my principal testimony, and it is one of the questions that will be on the first agenda for the policy board meeting.

As to the figures—as to the amount of incoming and outgoing communications, we will supply that.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 82.]

And I might add that to the extent that your questions here have been directed to the operational procedures of the National Central Bureau as it has been carried out in the past—I understand your concern that our answers are not responsive. They are not responsive

because we just don't know; we haven't been running the National Central Bureau.

But as I indicated earlier, I think that your questions are very orderly and very precise, and are capable of very definitive answers, which you will receive as soon as we have the wherewithal to determine them.

Mr. EILBERG. That is a good statement, and you say in this context that you have only had 13 days for cooperation, but isn't it true that Justice acquired jurisdiction over Interpol from the Treasury as of last June? What has Justice been doing since last June?

Mr. POMMERENING. That is correct. We have been trying to implement withdrawal of the designation from Treasury, and that implementation was not made possible until there was an agreement between the then Deputy Attorney General and the then Under Secretary of the Treasury on January 1.

Mr. EILBERG. To what extent has the interagency rivalry between Treasury and Justice—or more particularly, between Customs and DEA—played a part in Justice renewing its interest in Interpol?

Mr. POMMERENING. I don't believe it is playing any role in it. I am not sure that that rivalry still exists.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I presume that what you would furnish to a foreign government or Interpol would be standard rap sheets that are available to the FBI. Am I correct?

Mr. POMMERENING. Well, under the operations in the Department of Justice, obviously no information would be disseminated which would exceed what we can disseminate within these United States.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, within the United States I am sure you are familiar with the rap sheets that are put out by the Department, and they include all the history, they include all arrests and the lack of convictions, the arrests and dismissals, nolle prosequis and everything.

As a matter of fact, it takes a little practice to be able to interpret them because they have so many entries on them that many of them are overlapping, and you have got to kind of sift out and figure out whether you are referring to the same thing.

Mr. POMMERENING. Well, we do not distribute the rap sheet, per se. If there is a request for information, we will extract the information from the rap sheet and distribute the extractions.

Mr. SAWYER. And yet that is available to every constable or deputy sheriff in the United States who wants it: That rap sheet that has everything on it. It's obviously not secure information or restricted in any way, except that you have to be some kind of a law enforcement officer to be able to get it. And they just presume that the reason you asked for it is legitimate. When anyone is arrested and charged, one of the first procedures is to get the rap sheet. So why would they be more meticulous in the dissemination of that information when they make it available to probably hundreds of thousands of law officials in the country?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. That is a requirement of the FBI that we not disseminate that material.

Mr. SAWYER. Pertaining to only dissemination outside the country?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. No; that we extract the data that is asked for. We do not disseminate the rap sheets. The FBI may give us data, or give us the rap sheet, but we extract the pertinent conviction data. I think largely a lot of it is because of the language barrier. And as you pointed out it may be very difficult to make an interpretation—where we may not have that difficulty.

Mr. SAWYER. It is not real easy for local law enforcement agencies to unravel, which is because they have multiple entries.

The other—of course, the lien network have all felony warrants outstanding in the United States—and that is available again to any deputy sheriff who can get that in 1 minute on his police car radio. And that is radio disseminated on unsecure channels. So I presume that any foreign government that wanted to know what felony warrants he has outstanding for any individual, we would supply that, too, wouldn't we?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Depending on what type of warrant.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, a felony warrant. Only felony warrants go on lien, as you probably are aware.

Now, on an extradition—let's assume that somebody committed a murder, let's say in England, and they had reason to believe that that person was in the United States. How would our Interpol office—if they wanted confirmation in checking on this—what would you do; how do you go about finding out if that individual is here and locating him where he is?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. U.S. national or foreign national?

Mr. SAWYER. Well, regardless. Would it make a difference which he was?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. The investigation procedure is different. If the suspect who committed the homicide in England is a foreign national—an Italian—we would follow a different course of action than for a U.S. national.

Mr. SAWYER. Let's assume it was an American natural citizen, what would you do—and you get a call from the, what is the equivalent of the National Bureau in London—and I presume you would be the one they would contact; that is the way the contact would come. Would that be the way it normally would come?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes; yes, sir. They could give the identifying data that they had to the legal attaché.

Mr. SAWYER. Scotland Yard wouldn't just call the FBI?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. They could. There is a legal attaché in London, and they could follow both courses of action. Sometimes in police cooperation cases, they go to the legal attaché and ask him to do it. There is no set rule.

Mr. SAWYER. For example again, in a Scotland Yard situation and they have a homicide in England and they have reason to believe or suspect that it was an American citizen and that he has returned to the United States—now, why wouldn't they normally—and Scotland Yard is in constant communication with the FBI, and as a matter of fact with numbers of local police agencies; they are very cooperative and if there is an occasion to do it they deal pretty much direct—why wouldn't they deal with the FBI rather than go through Interpol?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. They are more likely in that particular case to go to the FBI. Just like in the drug matter they are more likely to go to the drug enforcement agency.

Interpol serves a useful purpose where we do not have U.S. representation abroad. It is not to be misunderstood or misinterpreted as the liaison for all matters dealing with local crime or Federal crime. It serves a useful purpose when there are no other means, and that is its real importance.

Mr. SAWYER. Would it then be fair to say that probably it is really assigned to more underdeveloped or smaller countries?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Well, it is used in countries where we do not have U.S. Federal representation, as well.

Mr. SAWYER. Well if, for example, let's assume now that it came through, instead of Scotland Yard—I don't care what country is involved—contacted Interpol and again related a homicide, or a suspicion of an American citizen. Now what would you then do?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. We would try and locate him if he was a suspect. We would ascertain through routine investigative procedures his whereabouts.

Mr. SAWYER. When you say you would try to locate him—how?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. It depends on the data that is provided. But if we were able to, if the data suggested he may be in the State of Michigan—we would go to the Detroit Police, or we would go to the State police. We would ask them whether they could locate him, and we would give them the reason why. And if they located him, then we would get back to Scotland Yard or London and tell them he has been located and ask if they desired to proceed further with the extradition process to go through the Embassy or diplomatic channels.

Mr. SAWYER. The foreign extradition is handled through the State Department, so Interpol wouldn't have directly to do with that?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. No, sir.

Mr. SAWYER. In other words, you would not undertake the obtaining or issuance of a warrant or anything of that—

Mr. TARTAGLINO. All we do is the first step, in saying he has been located but we don't perform any arrest process or anything else, other than to say, "We located him."

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you.

Mr. EILBERG. Getting back to alleged Nazi war crimes for the moment. Has the United States or our National Bureau ever requested Interpol for assistance in investigating Nazis either by introducing resolutions at assembly meetings or meetings of the executive committee or by any other method?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I don't know, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Will you find out the answer to that question.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 84.]

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Pommerening, I wonder if you could undertake to find out whether we could really do this at the next general meeting of Interpol. We are very interested in that subject.

Mr. POMMERENING. Certainly.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 84.]

Mr. EILBERG. Coming to another subject, would you explain in detail the meaning of the "third agency rule" and how it operates with regard to Interpol?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. The third agency rule is a regulation within the Federal establishment indicating we will not provide a document to anyone that was originated by another agency. So if Interpol comes upon information from one jurisdiction in the United States and it is asked for by a third person—well, we refer them to the originator, or we go through the process and get the permission of the originator before we pass it out.

Mr. EILBERG. When the NCIC is tapped by our National Central Bureau for information, can the Department of Justice determine whether the source of the request is a foreign government or a domestic law enforcement agency?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I don't know, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. Is the information made available, dependant upon whether the source is foreign or domestic?

Mr. POMMERENING. I don't know, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Will you try to find that out?

Mr. POMMERENING. Yes.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 84.]

Mr. EILBERG. When a request is made by a foreign government, what supporting information must accompany the request?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. The foreign government in the communication must provide the reason they want the data.

Mr. EILBERG. Do they require names, dates, places, descriptions of criminal activity revealed by an investigation, copy of any warrants that may have been issued, et cetera?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. This may be included in their request. They may give a great deal of the past history on why they want certain data. In some cases they set out the justification and in other cases when they do not, we go back and ask for further data.

Mr. EILBERG. The GAO report noted that in "49 percent of the cases the requestors had provided insufficient data." In fact, in some cases no reason was given at all for requests by foreign governments for biographical information and criminal histories of U.S. citizens. This is certainly disturbing and would you please comment on this GAO finding.

Mr. POMMERENING. Mr. Chairman, I can't comment on that finding because I don't know the facts.

Mr. EILBERG. Would you attempt to find out and submit an answer.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 84.]

Mr. Cook, do you have some questions?

Mr. Cook. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Another area of which the GAO report was somewhat critical dealt with the U.S. receipt of information once we forwarded the information to a foreign government and that was that we failed to receive any information on the final disposition of the matter that was being investigated. Do you know whether we do, on a routine basis, receive information from any foreign government which has requested data from us?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Again, sir, the GAO report was an analysis of an operation in another department, and I am not familiar with the facts. It would be unfair if I tried to address myself to it.

Mr. Cook. OK. I just repeat: Can we get a report on that?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 85.]

Mr. COOK. And a question regarding the—that relates, I think, to the other issue—the war crimes—would you submit for the record some examples of interpretation of article III of the constitution as to when did Interpol become involved in exchanging information regarding terrorists—previously Interpol maintained that terrorism, like Nazi war crimes was political in nature and not within its mandate?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I will obtain that information and submit it. I know what your question is, but I don't know whether there have been any instances in the U.S. National Central Bureau where we had seen that—and I can't expand further on that section of the constitution.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 88.]

Mr. COOK. Could you verify whether Interpol has ever issued regulations—

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Well, are you talking about Interpol or are you talking about regulations issued by the General Secretariat?

Mr. COOK. Both would be helpful. Thank you.

Mr. EILBERG. Allegations have been made that Interpol personnel have misused official reports to engage in blackmail. Have you ever heard such allegations?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I think I read a newspaper article on it, where it was alleged, but I have not heard of any allegation from any specific party, no, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. Do you have any reason to believe that there is any substance to these allegations?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I have no knowledge that there is any substance to the allegations.

Mr. EILBERG. Can you check further within your organization and see if there is any more information available?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes, sir.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 89.]

Mr. EILBERG. For some time this subcommittee has been concerned with the activities of U.S. consular officers abroad. We find in the GAO report that the State Department on occasion is not advised by the U.S. National Central Bureau that Americans have been arrested abroad. Has anything been done to correct this problem?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Here again I would have to confer with Mr. Sims on his return to see what has been done.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 89.]

Mr. EILBERG. Can you tell us from your experience whether or not the nature and amount of supporting documentation differ depending on the foreign government which has requested the information?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I could go back to my own experience and say yes it has differed. Some countries provide more documentation than others.

Mr. EILBERG. Can you identify them or describe the differences?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. No, sir, I think it is just a question of style by some governments. Some have more resources at their disposition.

There are countries that make some requests, of just two or three lines, and there are others that provide very voluminous investigative reports and give you a sense of exactly what the request is and what they are doing.

Mr. EILBERG. Are there any operating instructions or guidelines given to the employees of the U.S. National Central Bureau with

regard to the manner in which requests by certain foreign governments should be handled?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I don't know what their policy has been in the past, sir. I think our own regulations and laws, with periodic briefings, guide them as it may apply to foreign governments.

Mr. EILBERG. Will you try to get a better answer to that, please.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 90.]

Mr. EILBERG. Who are the members of the present Executive Committee?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. The U.S. representation to it is the Director of the U.S. Secret Service, Mr. Stuart Knight. I will get the names of the additional 20 members, and I will provide that.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 90.]

Mr. EILBERG. When is the next general assembly of Interpol to be held?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. The next general assembly is scheduled to be held the early part of December in Stockholm.

Mr. EILBERG. Are the assembly documents and agendas prepared prior to meetings?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Agenda for the general assemblies and at most of the other conferences—in some cases there are no prior documents. But the answer is "Yes," in most cases.

Mr. EILBERG. What is the distribution that is made of these documents within the U.S. Government?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. They are provided to the delegates who attend and all the delegates, as far as I know, retain them for their own files.

I don't know of any outside distribution—any distribution outside Interpol.

Mr. EILBERG. Is it customary for the United States to prepare position papers on agenda items?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes; it is.

Mr. EILBERG. How is this coordinated within the executive branch?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. The operating agency that has jurisdiction over a particular agenda item will prepare a position paper that is disseminated and coordinated to the proper place, agency or department.

That is accomplished in two manners. I think it is sent out in booklet form prior to the meeting, and then just prior to the general assembly a general discussion is held with representation from all the agencies.

Mr. EILBERG. Is the proposed budget submitted to the governments sufficiently in advance to permit analysis by the governments prior to the meetings?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I would say yes, it is.

Mr. EILBERG. Has the U.S. delegation ever interceded in the executive committee or general assembly with regard to specific items of the budget?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I can't respond to that, Mr. Chairman, but I will get the information and provide it for you.

Mr. EILBERG. And I would like to know what particular budget items have occupied U.S. interest in the past?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I will do likewise, Mr. Chairman.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 90.]

Mr. EILBERG. In your opinion is the manner in which Interpol presently is organized effective and efficient?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I believe that it is as to what its present functions are, that is, its communications network between 125 countries. I think it is very effective.

Mr. EILBERG. Do you have any suggestions for improving the operation and administration of Interpol?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I think that there is always room for improvement, and I think there is room for improvement in the U.S. National Bureau.

As far as the General Secretariat, I have some ideas on what their operations could be.

Mr. EILBERG. I wonder if you could give us a summary of synopsis of the activities of Interpol in the last calendar year of 1976, if that is convenient to you.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. That is available, Mr. Chairman.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 90.]

Mr. EILBERG. The Interpol constitution has not been expressly approved by either the executive branch or the Congress. Interpol apparently considers that the United States has approved its constitution because it has not received a nonacceptance declaration by the United States.

Are there any reasons why the executive branch has not formally approved the Interpol constitution or requested Congress to do so?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I am not aware of any, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Will you get the answer to that?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes.

Mr. EILBERG. And does it maintain this attitude to preserve the flexibility of joining or not joining Interpol in its operations?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I will also get the answer to that.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 91.]

Mr. EILBERG. Does the United States really have any voice in Interpol policies?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. I think that through the executive committee we do. We have one voice in the vice president who is a U.S. representative. He has the opportunity to bring issues before the executive group.

Mr. EILBERG. Has the United States ever introduced resolutions which would directly affect the Interpol operations?

Mr. TARTAGLINO. Yes, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. I wonder if you would provide to the subcommittee some evidence of it—some evidence indicating the United States really has a voice in Interpol policy, and also suggest or give to us some of the resolutions indicating some of the activity on the part of the United States.

Mr. TARTAGLINO. We will do that.

[Information appears in app. 1 at p. 92.]

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. I note, Mr. Pommerening, in your statement on the program of analysis or development that you are undertaking—item No. 4, is to develop and expand domestic programs. Can you give me some idea of what you mean by that?

Mr. POMMERENING. Yes; the concept to be suggested to the policy group is that a more active effort be undertaken to acquaint State and local law enforcement organizations of the availability of the Interpol communications network and the assistance that it could be to them in carrying out their State and local law enforcement responsibilities.

Mr. SAWYER. It does not contemplate an expansion of your activity domestically as a police agency?

Mr. POMMERENING. Absolutely not.

As a matter of fact, Interpol has no responsibility as a police agency. It is a support operation and primarily a communications network.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, it is called the International Police Agency—I mean, that is the name of it?

Mr. POMMERENING. Yes; and it is in support of the activities of police organizations.

Mr. SAWYER. The International Criminal Police Organization—so I presume it is labeled correctly in its title.

Mr. POMMERENING. The title, Mr. Sawyer, was developed some years ago. And I think I indicated earlier that the situation in the United States is much different from that in most foreign countries, which have a central police organization which we do not.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, in any event I was a little concerned by that No. 4—and it is not susceptible or intended to be susceptible to the interpretation that it will expand domestic programs. Domestic programs are not or were not contemplated to be expanded under Interpol; that that is not an interpretation, is what you meant. Is that accurate?

Mr. POMMERENING. That is correct.

I hate to use the term “educational.”

Mr. SAWYER. Well, most people do, but—thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Pommerening, I think if you were sitting where we were this morning, at this stage in this particular hearing I think you would be asking these questions. I am not going to ask them of you, but just to give you some indication of my state of mind, which is rather depressed at the moment in terms of what Interpol is all about: I asked what are the principal advantages gained by the United States in belonging to Interpol? Do you think that U.S. participation in Interpol is vital to the existence of the organization, and would our law enforcement capabilities be seriously disrupted if we did not belong to it, and if so, in what areas?

And there are such enormous gaps in the answers provided that I wonder about whether we will be able to move affirmatively on the bill that you gentlemen are advocating. Do you wish to respond?

Mr. POMMERENING. Well, you asked those questions, and I thought you asked that we respond to them.

The Department, when it made the decision to assume the responsibility that had been given to the Attorney General by the statute, felt that on the basis of the experience of our law enforcement organizations, this was a worthy undertaking and that the participation and membership was of value to the United States in carrying out its law enforcement missions.


Mr. EILBERG. That is a conclusion and really doesn't help us very much as lawyers, Mr. Pommerening.

Are there any other questions?

Gentlemen, we thank you very much for appearing here this morning. I regret that we have had to be pointed in our remarks. And with that, we hope we will get some direct written responses that will be helpful to this subcommittee.

Mr. POMMERENING. Very well.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]



## APPENDIXES

### APPENDIX 1

Due to the absence of Mr. Louis B. Sims, Chief of the United States National Central Bureau, at the hearing before the subcommittee on March 30, 1977, the Chairman requested that Mr. Sims submit answers to the questions directed at the Department of Justice witnesses.

Mr. Sims' responses are included in this appendix.

THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,  
Washington, D.C., May 16, 1977.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I refer to the hearing before your Committee on March 30, 1977 concerning H.R. 4641, a bill designed to authorize the payment of INTERPOL dues in arrears for 1975 and 1976, which occurred as a result of the ceiling of \$120,000 and to keep the United States dues current on an annual basis.

Mr. Glen Pommerening and Mr. Andrew Tartaglino, who appeared before your Committee on March 30, 1977, were from the Office of Management and Finance, and therefore were not the appropriate persons to respond to your questions on operational and other aspects of the United States National Central Bureau, INTERPOL.

During the hearing, you requested that all the questions be answered by Mr. Louis B. Sims, U.S. Secret Service, who has been Chief of the United States National Central Bureau since September 1974. I am enclosing herewith responses by Mr. Sims.

Should you need any further information or have any additional questions, Mr. Sims and I stand ready to assist.

Sincerely,

PETER F. FLAHERTY.

Enclosure:

#### INTERPOL—UNITED STATES NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAU

The United States National Central Bureau (U.S. NCB) INTERPOL, is staffed by active Federal agents (OSC Series 1811) from the law enforcement agencies in the Departments of Justice and Treasury, namely the U.S. Secret Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. The staff also includes certain administrative personnel from these agencies plus the Departments of Justice and Treasury. Within the near future the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration & Naturalization Service will assign one agent and one clerical employee from each agency.

To insure continuity in management, while the Chief of the U.S. NCB is from a law enforcement agency in Treasury for a two year period, the Deputy Chief will be from a law enforcement agency in the Department of Justice. Upon the Chief returning to his agency after two years, it is planned that the Deputy Chief will become Chief, making his entire assignment approximately four years in duration. This staffing will not only insure continuity in management and staffing, but will insure staffing by career law enforcement agents (Series 1811 criminal investigators).

The privacy of the individual and all necessary security safeguards are uppermost in our operation and are continually reviewed to insure compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974, the Freedom of Information Act, the Federal Statutes and the effective and efficient function of the U.S. NCB to assist law enforcement in the suppression of crime.

To further specify the involvement of both the Departments of Justice and Treasury, the Memorandum of Understanding executed on January 18, 1977 follows:

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERTAINING TO U.S. REPRESENTATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION (INTERPOL) AND MATTERS RELATED THERETO

The following understanding has been reached by Acting Secretary George H. Dixon, Department of the Treasury, and Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Department of Justice, concerning U.S. representation to INTERPOL, 22 USC 263a, and matters related thereto.

1. The positions of U.S. representative to INTERPOL and the alternate U.S. representative to INTERPOL shall be occupied for two-year rotating terms by the designees of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury. Beginning February 1, 1977 and continuing to January 31, 1979, the designee of the Attorney General shall serve as U.S. representative to INTERPOL, and the designee of the Secretary of the Treasury shall serve as alternate.

2. Beginning February 1, 1977, the position of Chief, United States National Central Bureau of INTERPOL (USNCB), will be occupied for two-year rotating terms by professional law enforcement employees of the Department of Justice and the Department of the Treasury. Beginning February 1, 1977, a professional law enforcement employee of the Department of the Treasury shall serve as Chief USNCB, and a professional law enforcement employee from the Department of Justice shall serve as the Deputy Chief, USNCB.

3. There will be only one operational INTERPOL office within the Departments of Justice and Treasury, namely, the INTERPOL United States National Central Bureau.

4. Each Treasury investigative agency and each Justice investigative agency will assign professional law enforcement personnel to work at the USNCB under the supervision of the Chief and Deputy Chief of the USNCB. Professional, clerical and administrative staff will also be provided to the USNCB by the Departments of Treasury and Justice.

5. Beginning February 1, 1977, the administrative costs of operating the USNCB, other than the costs of detailed employees and their travel, will be assumed by the Department of Justice. Suitable arrangements regarding appropriations for annual INTERPOL dues will be developed jointly.

6. A policy advisory group will be established which will include the alternate U.S. Representative and the head, or designated senior representative, of each participating law enforcement agency. The U.S. Representative will chair the group and will conduct periodic policy meetings for the purpose of developing INTERPOL programs and policies.

7. Forthwith, the operation and location of the National Central Bureau (NCB) will be moved from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice. The Department of Treasury will render the necessary assistance to facilitate smooth transfer of the NCB to Justice as expeditiously as possible.

8. The Attorney General will modify his designation letter of June 24, 1976, copy attached, and all Department of Justice Orders consistent with the provisions of this agreement.

[Questions to witnesses during hearing and Mr. Sims' prepared responses.]

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. Do you have any idea how many requests are made to law enforcement agencies of one country to their counterparts in another country without using the channels of INTERPOL?*

Mr. SIMS. A survey of the Federal law enforcement agencies in April 1977 revealed the following:

Agency	Requests sent/received non-Interpol channels	
	Fiscal year 1975	Fiscal year 1976
Immigration and Naturalization Service.....	(1)	-----
U.S. Customs Service.....	(1)	-----
Drug Enforcement Administration.....	(1)	-----
U.S. Secret Service:		
Paris office.....	2 500	2 600
Honolulu office.....	9	19
San Juan office.....	35	25
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms <sup>3</sup> .....	None	-----
Internal Revenue Service.....	None	-----
Postal Inspection Service.....	None	-----
Federal Bureau of Investigation: <sup>4</sup>		
January.....	1, 222	1, 648
February.....	1, 173	1, 570
March.....	1, 190	1, 625
April.....	1, 197	1, 646
May.....	1, 213	1, 676
June.....	1, 366	1, 583
July.....	1, 622	1, 616
August.....	1, 816	1, 538
September.....	1, 735	1, 429
October.....	1, 615	1, 632
November.....	1, 742	1, 569
December.....	1, 758	1, 567

<sup>1</sup> No Statistics.

<sup>2</sup> Of this number, 10 percent were made direct to foreign police, the other 90 percent were made through Interpol communication channels to foreign police.

<sup>3</sup> No overseas requests by other than Interpol channels except those handled direct at Canadian and Mexican borders.

<sup>4</sup> Statistics reflect number of pending cases at beginning of each month. Since a case may extend for 1 or several months, these statistics do not reflect the number of cases or requests handled in any given month or year.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. When did INTERPOL become involved in exchanging information regarding terrorists—previously INTERPOL maintained that terrorism, like Nazi war crimes, was “political” in nature and not within its mandate? Was this decision made officially and publicly? If not, why? By whom was the decision made?*

Mr. SIMS. INTERPOL engaged officially in this cooperation in application of the following listed General Assembly resolutions. These decisions were made officially and publicly via the General Assembly.

Year and General Assembly :

1967: Kyoto.....	Hijacking of Aircraft.
1970: Brussels.....	Unlawful Acts Against Civil Aviation.
1972: Frankfurt.....	Hostages and Blackmail.
1973: Vienna.....	Hostages and Unlawful Acts of International Concern.
1974: Cannes.....	Safeguarding of International Civil Aviation.

[Copies of the above cited resolutions follow:]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION, INTERPOL, 36th GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION, KYOTO, SEPTEMBER 27-OCTOBER 4, 1967

#### RESOLUTION

##### *Hijacking of aircraft*

At the request of the representatives of Chile, Colombia, Nigeria, Venezuela and Zambia, and

Having noted the points made by the representatives of the Association of Airline Security Officers;

The I.C.P.O.—Interpol General Assembly, meeting in Kyoto at its XXXVth session from 27th September to 4th October 1967:

Asks the General Secretariat to study, in the context of the research already done on this subject by the International Civil Aviation Organization (I.C.A.O.), the problems of aircraft hijacking and forced landings by means of unlawful threats in order to determine the measures that should be taken by police forces to prevent this form of crime.

#### RESOLUTION

##### *Unlawful acts against international civil aviation*

The General Assembly of I.C.P.O.-INTERPOL, meeting in Brussels from 5-10th October 1970 at its 39th session,

In view of the fact that:

1. Unlawful seizures of aircraft and other acts of violence directed against international civil aviation—against its installations and/or services—seriously compromise the safety vital for it to function efficiently, endanger the lives of passengers and crews and constitute a threat to aircraft;

2. Such unlawful acts are increasing on an alarming scale;

3. At its 17th session (Montreal—June 1970), the I.C.A.O. (International Civil Aviation Organisation) Assembly adopted Resolution No. A. 17-14, inviting the I.C.P.O.-INTERPOL to co-operate with it as far as possible in the search for a solution to the problem of unlawful interference in international civil aviation;

Bearing in mind report No. 6 on "Hijacking of Aircraft" submitted by the General Secretariat at its 35th General Assembly session in Mexico City in 1969;

Having taken note of the proposals made by the General Secretariat in its report on "The protection of international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference" submitted in 1970 to the 17th I.C.A.O. Assembly session and published by that Organisation under reference A.17.WP/12;

Considering that international police co-operation should as far as possible combine its efforts with those which have been and are being made in this field by the United Nations and by other international organisations, notably by the I.C.A.O. and I.A.T.A. (International Air Transport Association), to prevent and reduce these unlawful activities and to restore the safety of international air transport;

Draws the attention of affiliated countries to the conventions and resolutions adopted by the I.C.A.O. to strengthen international co-operation in the field concerned and to prevent and reduce such acts, and urges affiliated countries which have not yet done so to accept the relevant multilateral conventions of I.C.A.O. and to adopt the principles and measures recommended in such conventions and resolutions;

Decides that the machinery and services set in place by the I.C.P.O.-INTERPOL should be used within the limits of the Constitution (namely Articles 2 and 3) of the Organization against persons suspected of acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft or other unlawful acts committed against international civil aviation.

Asks the General Secretariat:

1. To continue to co-operate with the I.C.A.O. and I.A.T.A. on this subject;

2. To draw up an annual list of the legal provisions and security measures taken in affiliated countries;

(a) To ensure or increase the safety of installations and services at airports and that of aircraft on the ground and in the air;

(b) To provide penalties and ensure prosecution and, where appropriate, extradition of persons presumed to be guilty of unlawful seizure of aircraft or of other unlawful acts committed against international civil aviation.

#### RESOLUTION

##### *Hostages and blackmail*

Considering that certain aspects of modern international criminality, such as the holding of hostages, with the intention of perpetrating blackmail or other forms of extortion, have developed to the extent of constituting a severe menace to the life and safety of persons as well as the security of property;

The I.C.P.O.-INTERPOL General Assembly, meeting in Frankfurt from 19th to 26th September 1972, at its 41st session,

Recommends that member countries take appropriate measures in order to prevent or suppress these forms of criminality, and co-operate among themselves utilising existing machinery and services of Interpol, within the limits of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of the Organization (1).

*Article 2.*—The aims of the International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL are:

(a) To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights";

(b) To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes.

*Article 3.*—It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.

#### RESOLUTION

##### *Unlawful acts of international concern*

Mindful of the continued occurrence of unlawful acts such as taking hostages, interference with international civil aviation, and murders;

Concerned that the notorious nature of such acts has the effect of creating disregard for the law throughout the world to the great detriment of the objectives of Interpol and the member states with the consequent burdens and dangers to police professionals throughout the world, and

Remembering that Interpol itself may not become involved in activities of a political, military, religious or racial character, which is but a reflection of the principle of objective professionalism in the effective conduct of law enforcement activities;

The I.C.P.O.-INTERPOL General Assembly, meeting in Vienna from 2nd to 9th October 1973 at its 42nd session:

Urges firm and resolute opposition to interference with due enforcement of the law and observance of international obligations.

#### RESOLUTION

##### *Safeguarding of international civil aviation*

Bearing in mind Article 3 of the I.C.P.O.-Interpol Constitution,

Recognising that acts of unlawful interference continue to pose a serious threat to the safety of international civil aviation,

Recognising also that there are still trends towards international crimes of violence throughout the world and that civil air transportation is a vulnerable target, as evidenced by recent events,

The I.C.P.O.-Interpol General Assembly, meeting in Cannes from 19th to 25th September 1974 at its 43rd session:

Urges that all I.C.P.O.-Interpol member countries take early action to implement the provisions contained in the security specifications adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for the safeguarding of international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.

*Question from Mr. Bilberg. I hold in my hand a book entitled "Entebbe Rescue," written by Ben P. Herber and another gentleman named Schiff Herber, published by the Dell Publishing Company of New York City and originally published in Tel Aviv.*

*This book describes, of course, Israel's rescue mission, which is so well known. On page 56, this statement appears: "Israel asked INTERPOL to help and forward the information to their Paris headquarters, only to discover the Arabs had gotten hold of it and they in turn passed it on to other terrorist organizations". Is this true? On page 345, the same publication, there appears this statement: "Experience has shown that INTERPOL, the International Organization of Police Forces, is not the tool for the job. But apart from its commitment to non-involvement in politics, information transmitted to INTERPOL in the past has leaked to Arab countries who allegedly have handed it on to the terrorists." Is this true?*

Mr. SIMS. In a message of April 8, 1977, the Federal Police of Israel advised that concerning the book *Entebbe Rescue*:

"We inform you that neither Israel Police, nor any other organization has transmitted any secret information to INTERPOL General Secretariat. Therefore, no information could have been transmitted to terrorist organizations."

*Question from Mr. Fish. I am sure you are familiar with the GAO report—it indicates that there is no absolute control of the distribution of information, page 36. And page 10, it goes on to explore screening in this country to protect the confidentiality of our citizens, such as, the Privacy Act.*

*I think the issue before us is how to keep it under control. I wonder if you could describe for the committee how information is exchanged among the member countries of INTERPOL and to what limit, if any, member countries have accessibility to FBI records and other investigative records of the United States.*

Mr. SIMS. The GAO Report on INTERPOL of December 27, 1976, to which you refer, reflects the following:

"There was no evidence in the files made available to us (all files were made available) that personal or political information about Americans was being disseminated abroad by the U.S. Bureau. Information sent abroad was largely related to suspected criminal activity."

The Departments of Justice and Treasury, as well as the personnel in the U.S. NCB, have stringent policies and procedures to insure the privacy of the individual while still effectively carrying out the function of assisting law enforcement both in the United States and abroad in the suppression of crime.

In disseminating information to police abroad, the decision to respond to a request from police abroad rests with the agency in the United States that originates the information. The request from the foreign police in accordance with INTERPOL procedures must set forth the type criminal investigation and sufficient data therewith for the U.S. NCB and the agency receiving the request to make the determination that it is a specific criminal investigation and within the U.S. Statutes and/or State statutes pertaining to that particular agency and the Privacy Act of 1974. If the agency originating the information cannot conduct the investigation or provide the information requested and do so within our laws, the foreign police are advised of this and no information is disseminated. If the agency originating the information provides a response, the information to be furnished to foreign police is again screened at the U.S. NCB in accordance with the Privacy Act and other pertinent statutes and policies. The Agency originating the information having control over its dissemination is referred to as the "Third Agency Rule." The U.S. NCB applies the "Third Agency Rule" with regard to municipal, county, state and Federal agencies.

No foreign police have access to U.S. NCB records, FBI records, National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) records, Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) records or any other records through INTERPOL.

The policies and procedures of the U.S. NCB set forth the above described safeguards for protecting the rights and privacy of the individual.

The information provided does not at anytime include information of a personal, political, racial or religious nature and is limited to information of the following types, depending on the specific offense: data of subject of the investigation (date and place of birth, passport data and photograph and fingerprints in some instances); criminal arrest history and information relating to the specific type of offense, statements from victims, witnesses, co-defendants.

All information sent to foreign police is stamped by the U.S. NCB as follows:

"THIS MATERIAL IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED outside your organization except to Official Law Enforcement and/or Criminal Justice Agencies without the expressed permission of Interpol Washington."

In 1974 the United States introduced a resolution at the General Assembly entitled "Privacy of Information." The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly and the text appears in this testimony.

*Question from Mr. Fish. The last collective figures I have seen in the budget membership of INTERPOL appeared in the 91st Congress, 1st Session in a Senate hearing for the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.*

*I would appreciate if you would update for this committee complete financial disclosure of contributions by the United States received, and how spent.*

[Mr. Sims submitted the following in response:]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION, INTERPOL, 44TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION, BUENOS AIRES, OCTOBER 9-15, 1975

Subject: Financial Report—Ordinary Budget.

The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in accordance with Article 34 of the Financial Regulations. It is presented in three parts, as follows:

Part A: The report on the financial administration of the General Secretariat for the year 1974, including:

A table entitled "Income and Expenditure Accounts: Position at 31st December 1974" (Appendix 1);

A table entitled "Contributions in Arrears" (Appendix 2); and  
The Auditors' Report (Appendix 3).

Part B: An interim report on the 1975 Financial Year.

Part C: The Draft Budget for 1976 (Appendix 4).

*Part A: Report on the 1974 Financial Year*

In accounting matters, 1974 was a normal year for the Organization, inasmuch as accounting procedures and the value of the budget unit remained the same as in 1973.

The income and expenditure account at 31st December 1974 is to be found in Appendix 1 hereto. The following comments would seem helpful.

*Balance in Hand at January 1, 1974.*—The figures are the same as those reported under the heading "Balance in Hand at 31st December 1973" in Appendix 1 to the report submitted to last year's General Assembly.

*Income.*—The draft budget for 1974 estimated that the year's income would be 4,954,250 Swiss francs, whereas actual income for 1974 amounted to 6,023,210 francs. The difference can be explained by several factors.

First, although the regular membership contributions for 1974 did not reach the amount expected (4,680,250 Swiss francs), payments of contributions in arrears (totalling 1,018,835 Swiss francs) were added to the contributions we received for 1974, and income for this chapter of the Budget was therefore slightly more than 800,000 Swiss francs higher than anticipated.

Secondly, when the 1974 Budget was adopted, the European countries had not yet taken the decision to intensify the fight against illicit drug trafficking and therefore had not yet established the amounts of the special financial contributions they would make to the Organization for that purpose. In the event, those contributions amounted to 205,605 Swiss francs, to which has been added the sum of 4,900 Swiss francs in arrears from SEPAT Plan contributions.

Thirdly, while subscriptions to the *International Criminal Police Review* did not bring in the full 20,000 Swiss francs anticipated, sales of other publications, and especially of the audio-visual teaching material on drug law enforcement, brought in more than 81,425.33 Swiss francs; only 5,000 Swiss francs had been anticipated for this source of income. This is in fact a reimbursement of funds spent in preparing the publications, as will be seen in the "Expenditure" account.

The royalties paid to the Organization by Systemen Keesing on sales of the review *Counterfeits and Forgeries* amounted to 172,176 Swiss francs, as opposed to the 125,000 francs previously anticipated, indicating that the publication has been more successful than we had expected.

Earnings from the Organization's investments were substantially lower than expected, and one of our holdings reached maturity and was cashed in.

Earned bank interest amounted to slightly more than expected.

On the other hand, even taking into consideration that some of the 1974 income from property was not paid until early 1975, the total amount received was lower than previously anticipated, because of temporary arrangements with some tenants and because of over-optimistic expectations.

The 1974 Budget anticipated that the Organization would receive various tax refunds from the French Government, as stipulated in the Headquarters Agreement. Unfortunately, because of government tax office delays, no reimbursement had been made by December 31, 1974; the sum was received early in 1975 and consequently it will be accounted for in the 1975 Financial Report.

*Remarks.*—The progress made by certain member countries in trying to bring their contributions up to date has unfortunately been offset by other member countries' delays in paying their contributions; nonetheless, thanks to the special contributions (for drug-related activities) and, to a lesser degree, the appreciable receipts from other sources, total income exceeded the sum anticipated.

*Expenditure.*—As a preliminary to the comments on expenditure for 1974, it should be noted that the General Assembly modified the figures for three items on the draft budget submitted to it, after which the allocation for salaries of employees under direct contract was 1,960,000 Swiss francs, the allocation for insurance and pension contributions was 480,000 Swiss francs, and the allocation for experts' fees was 50,000 Swiss francs.

In addition to those modifications, other changes were approved by the Executive Committee, at its April 1974 and September 1974 meetings, as indi-

cated by the notes at the bottom of the table. In so doing, the Executive Committee was acting in conformity with Article 55 of the General Regulations.

The revised total allocations for each chapter were not completely spent; only the allocations for certain items within chapters were completely used up.

Accordingly, the following detailed comments on certain items may be of interest:

*Telecommunications equipment:* The allocated sum of 300,000 Swiss francs was exceeded by 8,135 Swiss francs. This does not seem excessive considering that the Central Station in Paris had to purchase new and expensive equipment in 1974 for setting up a teletype network.

*Furniture:* The amount by which the allocation for this item was exceeded is proportionally greater; the sum of 52,253 Swiss francs was spent, while the allocation was only 40,000 Swiss francs. The unanticipated expenditure was needed to outfit offices for Liaison Offices, in connection with a program that was officially adopted a full year after the 1974 Draft Budget was drawn up.

*Improvements to premises:* The additional funds approved by the Executive Committee for outfitting the Headquarters Annex at 22 rue Armengaud and for installing an electronic burglar alarm system proved to be quite ample, even in the light of the fact that some of the expenditures have not been included in the chart because they were made in 1975.

*Tax costs:* French administrative delays in collecting taxes explain why there is a disparity between the amounts actually paid and the estimated amounts payable. However, it should be noted that the taxes for transferring ownership of the property at 13 rue Armengaud amounted to nearly the sum previously anticipated.

*Operation, Supplies and External Services:* Expenditure on each of the items listed in this chapter was lower than the sum allocated except under "Miscellaneous equipment", where the allocation (1,000 Swiss francs) was exceeded by 349 Swiss francs, to purchase equipment for the new transmitting station at St-Martin d'Abbat.

*Transport and Travel Expenses:* For all the items listed, actual expenditure was much lower than anticipated, but it should be borne in mind that the General Assembly met in France in 1974, and not in the very distant country whose invitation had been accepted by the General Assembly at its previous session.

*Surveys and Technical Assistance:* The printers of the English-language edition of the *International Criminal Police Review* usually submit their bills to us rather late, which explains why the allocation is higher than the actual amount spent for this item in 1974; a sum of about 34,000 Swiss francs for this item must be carried over to the Budget for 1975.

The allocations for all the other items in this chapter were sufficient. It should merely be borne in mind that expenditure on preparation of the audio-visual material on drug law enforcement was covered by income (q.v.).

*Management costs:* The only comment necessary concerns "Advertisements, exhibitions, medals", the last item in this chapter, for which the expenditure was more than twice the amount allocated (1,000 Swiss francs); it resulted from previously-incurred bills connected with the Organization's 50th Anniversary activities.

*The Euro-Drug Plan in 1974.*—As promised, the General Secretariat can now present a financial report on the project undertaken to intensify the fight against illicit drug trafficking.

While it is a matter of course for us to keep separate account of the special contributors paid by the European member countries for this project, distinct not feasible to indicate, for each expenditure item on the overall budget adopted from their regular annual contributions for membership in INTERPOL, it is by the General Assembly, the exact proportion spent in support of the Euro-Drug Plan alone. The Liaison Officers' salaries and travel expenses, for example, are not listed apart from general budget entries for the salaries and travel expenses, for example, are not listed apart from general budget entries for the salaries and travel expenses of other General Secretariat staff members. Such is also the case with expenditure on office supplies, secretarial assistance, utilities, etc.

*Income.*—As reported in the table at Appendix 1, in 1974 the General Secretariat received some SEPAAT Plan contributions that had been owing for previous years; however, the important budget item for our purposes here is the one entitled "Special Contributions for the Euro-Drug Plan". By the close of Financial Year 1974, twelve (12) European countries<sup>1</sup> had paid their contributions for this item. A total of 210,505 Swiss francs was received in 1974.

Three of the five Liaison Officers joined the staff and started to draw their salaries only late in 1974. The expenditure for Liaison Officer salaries amounted to approximately 32,000 Swiss francs in 1974; this figure also includes special allowances and employer's contributions to insurance and pension plans. Travel and maintenance expenses amounted to approximately 34,000 Swiss francs, including both official missions and expenses incurred to enable the Liaison Officers, in some cases unaccompanied and in some cases accompanied by their immediate families, to come to the General Secretariat. The total expenditure for these two items, therefore, was approximately 66,000 Swiss francs.

The arrival of the Liaison Officers meant that more office space had to be made available, and consequently the Headquarters Annex had to be outfitted and occupied. Thus a good proportion of the special contributions received for the Euro-Drug Plan has been spent.

\* \* \* \* \*

At the close of the year, the balance in hand was high enough to make it feasible to transfer 85,000 Swiss francs to the Extraordinary Budget, which is the subject to a separate report. Even after transfer of that sum, the position was still satisfactory and it was possible to add a sum exceeding 1,300,000 Swiss francs to the Safety and Reserve Fund.

It should be noted that this relative financial ease was due in part to the strength of the Swiss franc, which is the Organization's official monetary unit for accounting purposes.

*Part B: Interim Report on the 1975 Financial Year*

At the time this report is being prepared (June 1975), only the following observations can be made:

*Income.*—The regular annual membership contributions are being paid at the usual rate. Fifty (50) countries have paid their membership contributions on the basis to the value of the budget unit approved by the General Assembly in Cannes in 1974. Nonetheless, exchange rate fluctuations sometimes cause considerable differences between the exact amount payable and the amounts actually received; usually this situation results in a loss suffered by the Organization.

At 1st July 1975, the following sums had also been received:

1. 136,000 U.S. dollars, a grant from the United States authorities for intensifying the fight against illicit drug trafficking over the coming three years; one third of this sum will accordingly be reported as income on each draft budget for the coming three years.
2. 2,910 Swiss francs, Ireland's contribution to the Euro-Drug Plan for 1974.
3. 246,620 Swiss francs, contributions to the Euro-Drug Plan for 1975 from Austria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom.

Income from the other sources is being received normally.

*Expenditure.*—Disbursements are being made as previously anticipated and hopefully they will not exceed the sums approved by the General Assembly, unless unexpected circumstances (such as sudden currency devaluations) arise. Still, there are certain unforeseeable factors, such as salaries, which necessarily follow in the wake of cost of living changes in France, and such as new telecommunications equipment purchase prices and installation costs.

In accordance with Article 12 of the Financial Regulations, the Secretary General has informed the Executive Committee that some of the expenditure allocations may be exceeded, as indicated in the following table.

<sup>1</sup> Cyprus, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Monaco, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.

Item	Budget allocation	Balance re-remaining at Jan. 5, 1977	Additional allocation requested	Remarks
Technical office equipment.	\$44,800	5,300	\$35,000	The initial allocation was too low. Major unforeseen purchases (2 varitype machines) had to be made. Additional office equipment will be required.
Furniture.....	44,800	34,000	15,000	It is not certain that the requested additional allocation will be spent.
Other technical equipment.	11,200	11,200	30,000	The initial allocation was too low. Current plans call for purchasing a papershredding machine.
Miscellaneous publications..	50,400	48,900	150,000	Several drugs publications are to be re-edited; the United Nations will pay the largest part of the expenses.
Experts' fees.....	67,200	35,000	30,000	The interpreters are often paid from these funds rather than from the funds allocated for salaries.

### *Part C: The Draft Budget for 1976*

The Draft Budget for 1976 has been drawn up along the lines of the Budget for 1975, taking into consideration how the Organization's activities should progress and how the economic situation will evolve. The following comments would therefore be in order.

*Income.*—Income from regular annual membership contributions should be approximately the same as in 1975, since the value of the budget unit has not changed. All we can hope for are substantial payments to settle any membership contributions still in arrears. The total anticipated income from this source is listed as 400,000 Swiss francs on the Draft Budget. Also under "Income", the Draft Budget includes an amount equal to one-third of the United States grant, which was awarded in full in 1975 to cover a three-year period (cf. Part B, above).

The other sources of income need no special comments, but it should be borne in mind that the figures are only estimates and not definite amounts, particularly where figures are given for special contributions to the EURO-DRUG Plan and for tax refunds, both items depending very closely on the administrative procedures in the various countries concerned.

Under "Income" we have also listed a deficit of 303,500 Swiss francs; this is to indicate that, if the estimates for expenditure and income prove to be accurate, it will be necessary to draw upon the Safety Reserve Fund to supplement the income and cover the expenditure.

*Expenditure.*—For 1976 it is anticipated that total expenditure will increase by about 11% over 1975's figure. To arrive at this low estimate, only absolutely essential expenditure has been taken into consideration, and projects likely to entail excessively heavy costs have been trimmed as much as possible.

For each budget item for which it seemed feasible, the 1975 Budget figure has been repeated on the Draft Budget for 1976 and sometimes, when the figures for 1975 appear to be more than sufficient, a lower figure has been allocated for 1976.

However, the sub-total for the chapter entitled "Salaries, Social Insurance, etc." reflects an increase considerably greater than the overall average percentage increase; the new figure represents over 16% more than the figure for 1975, for two main reasons. First, in light of the Organization's increased and expanded activities, it is highly unlikely that the staff strength will be reduced and much more likely, in fact, that additional staff members will be employed. Secondly, expenditure on salaries and the various related allowances must necessarily follow changes in the cost of living index.

In Chapter VI, "Studies and Technical Assistance" a new entry has been made: "Regional Conferences". Because the "regional conference" system is developing, it seems advisable to keep account of how much such conferences are costing the Organization. The funds for this new entry have been drawn from various other items on the budget, such as "General Assembly", "Transportation and Travel Expenses", and "Experts' fees".

The result is that total expenditure forecasts exceed total income, but everything possible will be done to avoid using the Safety and Reserve Fund. A balanced budget will of course be much easier to achieve if the member countries pay their various financial contributions promptly and if member countries with contributions in arrears do all in their power to bring their INTERPOL accounts.

up to date. Nonetheless, it seems quite clear that the increase in the General Secretariats activities, if it is to continue as expected, will necessitate readjusting the value of the budget unit for 1977. The problem will have to be dealt with by the General Assembly at its session in 1976.

*Income account in Swiss francs at Dec. 31, 1974*

I. Balance in hand on 1st Jan. 1974:	
(a) Balance in Geneva bank account.....	2, 217, 653. 85
(b) Balance in Paris bank and post office accounts.....	38, 808. 46
(c) Balance in Paris (cash in hand in French frs).....	16, 653. 41
(d) Balance in Paris (foreign currency).....	457. 62
	55, 919. 49
	2, 273, 573. 34
II. Income during 1974:	
(a) Regular annual membership contributions for 1974 (4,680,250) <sup>1</sup> .....	4, 470, 260. 57
(b) Regular annual membership contributions for previous years.....	1, 018, 835. 84
(c) Special contributions for the SEPAT plan.....	4, 900. 00
(d) Special contributions for the Euro-Drug plan.....	205, 605. 79
(e) Subscriptions to the I.C.P.R. (20,000) <sup>1</sup> .....	18, 897. 62
(f) Publications (5,000) <sup>1</sup> .....	22, 464. 39
(g) Audiovisual teaching material.....	58, 960. 94
(h) Royalties from Systemen Keesing (on counterfeits and forgeries) (125,000) <sup>1</sup> .....	172, 176. 50
(i) Earnings from investments (12,000) <sup>1</sup> .....	10, 885. 45
(j) Sale or redemption of investment securities.....	5, 525. 65
(k) Bank interest (15,000) <sup>1</sup> .....	16, 568. 45
(l) Income from property (17,000) <sup>1</sup> .....	8, 579. 39
(m) Other income.....	9, 549. 53
	6, 023, 210. 12

<sup>1</sup> Previously estimated sums for 1974 (\$8,296,783.46) :

- (1) Including 50,000 Swiss francs allocated by the Executive Committee for a collating machine.
- (2) Including 330,000 Swiss francs allocated by the Executive Committee for outfitting the headquarters annex at 22 rue Armengaud.
- (3) Including 105,000 Swiss francs allocated by the Executive Committee to this entire chapter, to cover the liaison officers' salaries.
- (4) Allocated by the Executive Committee to cover taxes whose refund was anticipated.
- (5) Including 20,000 Swiss francs allocated by the Executive Committee.

APPENDIX 1

EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT IN SWISS FRANCS AT DEC. 31, 1974

	Sum allocated	Total expenditure
ASSETS SUBJECT TO DEPRECIATION		
Vehicles.....	17, 000	
Telecommunications equipment.....	300, 000	308, 135. 87
Printing and photographic equipment.....	90, 000	66, 208. 72
Technical office equipment.....	10, 000	1, 031. 21
Furniture.....	40, 000	52, 253. 98
Improvements to premises.....	415, 000	282, 731. 42
Subtotal.....	872, 000	710, 361. 20
OPERATING COSTS		
ii. Salaries, social insurance, etc.:		
Salaries of employees under direct contract.....	2, 025, 000	1, 681, 230. 04
Allowances to seconded police officers and civil servants.....	470, 000	392, 025. 58
Other allowances.....	20, 000	13, 993. 08
Insurance and pension contributions.....	608, 000	501, 750. 07
Subtotal.....	3, 123, 000	2, 588, 998. 77

## APPENDIX 1

## EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT IN SWISS FRANCS AT DEC. 31, 1974

	Sum allocated	Total expenditure
<b>II. Tax costs</b> .....	14,000	3,649.16
Property transfer taxes.....	30,000	29,153.42
Subtotal.....	44,000	32,802.58
<b>III. Operation, supplies, and external services:</b>		
Hire of equipment.....	70,000	33,824.44
Maintenance of premises (land and buildings).....	75,000	58,519.97
Maintenance of equipment, furniture, vehicles, maintenance supplies.....	15,000	12,087.44
Telecommunications maintenance.....	50,000	26,787.32
Office cleaning.....	78,000	77,830.19
Translations.....	12,000	145.77
Miscellaneous equipment (purchase of).....	1,000	1,349.96
Heat and power (electricity, gas, heating, fuel, oil, petrol).....	130,000	94,054.63
Technical reference material (library).....	4,000	3,134.50
Experts' fees.....	85,000	66,674.64
Insurance.....	16,000	5,281.98
Subtotal.....	536,000	379,690.84
<b>IV. Transport and travel expenses:</b>		
Paris/St. Cloud transport allowances.....	12,000	7,803.06
Travel expenses and living allowances (official missions).....	130,000	84,958.50
Freight and document transport costs.....	10,000	8,508.70
Subtotal.....	152,000	101,270.26
<b>V. Surveys and technical assistance:</b>		
International Criminal Police Review.....	140,000	81,677.24
Technical co-operation and symposia.....	90,000	40,264.77
Audiovisual teaching material.....	60,000	52,332.75
Miscellaneous publications.....	45,000	3,089.14
Subtotal.....	335,000	177,363.90
<b>VI. Management costs:</b>		
Official hospitality and entertainment.....	12,000	9,126.19
Office supplies.....	70,000	70,499.08
Photographic and printing workshop.....	70,000	56,330.19
General reference material.....	1,000	1,429.26
Postal, telephone and telegram charges.....	128,000	104,938.66
Subscriptions and other payments.....	1,000	716.37
Executive committee.....	55,000	34,763.13
General Assembly.....	150,000	129,602.62
Advertisements, exhibitions, medals.....	1,000	2,151.26
Subtotal.....	493,000	409,556.76
<b>VII. Financial costs and loans:</b>		
CDC loan.....	232,000	199,144.05
Bank charges.....	6,000	5,426.70
Total.....	5,793,000	4,604,615.06
Transfer to extraordinary budget.....		85,000.00
Total.....		4,689,615.06
Loss due to modified exchange rates.....		7,562.80
Total.....		4,697,177.86
Balance in hand on Dec. 31, 1974:		
In Geneva bank account.....	3,544,769.00	
In Paris (bank and post office accounts).....	31,221.01	
In Paris (cash in hand in French francs).....	20,932.33	
In Paris (foreign currency).....	2,683.26	
Subtotal.....	3,599,605.60	3,599,605.60
Grand total.....		8,296,783.46

Note: Conversion of French francs to Swiss francs according to the following formula: 1 Swiss franc equals 1.6053 French francs.

## CONTRIBUTIONS IN ARREARS (AT JULY 1, 1975)

Country	For 1974	For 1973	For previous year	Total
Bolivia	14,550.00	14,550.00	47,728.90	76,828.90
Burundi	4,850.00	952.00		5,802.00
Chad	4,850.00	4,850.00		9,700.00
Chile		5,433.00	11,834.00	17,267.00
Colombia	9,602.10	30,925.65	29,952.40	70,380.15
Congo	4,850.00	1,185.30		6,035.30
Costa Rica		3,379.07		3,379.07
Dahomey	14,550.00	4,193.00		18,743.00
Dominican Republic	4,850.00	4,850.00	13,230.00	22,930.00
Ecuador	1,188.25	9,957.44	15,591.68	26,737.37
El Salvador	24,250.00	24,250.00	93,450.00	141,950.00
Ethiopia	220.47			220.47
Gabon	511.65	490.60		1,002.25
Guatemala	2,144.00	1,029.80		3,173.80
Guinea	24,250.00	22,543.00		46,793.00
Guyana	2,807.00			2,807.00
Haiti	14,550.00	3,684.80	768.35	19,003.15
Indonesia	16,500.00	90.87		16,590.87
Iran	3,200.00	800.00		4,000.00
Iraq		453.84		453.84
Italy	46,657.00			46,657.00
Ivory Coast	2,467.27			2,467.27
Khmer Republic	4,850.00			4,850.00
Korea	1,161.35			1,161.35
Laos	4,471.88			4,471.88
Liberia		1,540.14		1,540.14
Mauritania	4,138.41			4,138.41
Mexico	1,296.00			1,296.00
Morocco	2,588.47			2,588.47
Nicaragua	14,550.00	14,550.00	2,863.00	31,963.00
Pakistan	38,800.00	10,800.00	28,000.00	77,600.00
Panama	2,509.00	2,420.00	445.00	5,474.00
Philippines	148.00			148.00
Sierra Leone	2,074.55			2,074.55
Sri Lanka	1,850.00	1,350.50		6,200.50
Togo	901.85			901.85
Trinidad and Tobago	124.06			124.06
Tunisia	225.72			225.72
Uganda	14,550.00			14,550.00
United States	13,640.00			13,640.00
Uruguay	14,550.00			14,550.00
Venezuela	1,719.00			1,719.00
Total	324,096.03	164,279.01	243,863.33	732,238.37

## AUDITORS' REPORT

On 21st and 22nd May 1975, in application of the Financial Regulations, the following persons met at the Organization's Headquarters at 26 rue Armengaud, Saint-Cloud:

Mr. Michel Popieul, a qualified accountant and one of the auditors registered at the Paris Court of Appeal, representing the accounting firm referred to in the Financial Regulations.

Mr. Harry Thomsen, Auditor (substitute; Mr. Jeschke was unable to attend), Mr. Emile Benhamou, Auditor.

They proceeded to check the accounting records for 1974. Whenever they felt it necessary, they checked the transfer card against the corresponding receipts, vouchers, etc.

The Auditors noted with satisfaction that several member countries with contributions in arrears had made a serious effort to settle the sums outstanding. They hope that the effort will be maintained and that the remaining countries with contributions in arrears will soon follow suit. If appears remain unpaid, it will be difficult to manage the Organization's finances satisfactorily. They suggest that the Executive Committee contact the authorities of the countries concerned. It does not seem fair that countries in arrears with their contributions should continue to benefit from services financed by the other member countries.

The Auditors also noted the good-will shown by the European countries with regard to the financing of the EURO-DRUG Plan but note that a number of them have not actually paid the suggested contributions. As an indication, nearly 60 percent of the contributions were unpaid at 31st December 1974.

The Organization's income from shares and bank deposits was reviewed. In view of developments in the world capital market, the Auditors feel that it would be hazardous to recommence investing in securities.

They noted the low rate of interest paid on bank deposits (0.5 percent before tax), due to the fact that the Organization was currently unable to use the funds held in Swiss francs for medium-term or long-term investment.

A number of questions on financial management were put to the Secretary General and the answers were considered satisfactory.

The Auditors note that the accounts are in order and propose that the General Assembly approve them.

## APPENDIX IV

## DRAFT BUDGET FOR 1976

## INCOME [In Swiss francs]

Regular annual membership contributions, 5,900 Swiss francs times 965 budget units.....	5,693,500
Contributions in arrears.....	400,000
Special U.S. grant (1/4).....	114,000
Contributions to "Euro-Drug" Plan.....	440,000
International criminal police review.....	20,000
Publications.....	10,000
Royalties from Systeman Keesing (on counterfeitis and forgeries).....	150,000
Bank interest.....	25,000
Interest from investments.....	10,000
Tax refunds.....	130,000
Income from property.....	40,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>7,032,500</b>
Anticipated deficit.....	303,500
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>7,336,000</b>

## EXPENDITURE

[In Swiss francs]

	Allocations for 1975	Draft budget for 1976
<b>ASSETS SUBJECT TO DEPRECIATION</b>		
Vehicles.....	19,040	20,000
Telecommunications equipment.....	336,000	300,000
Technical equipment.....	56,000	75,000
Furniture.....	44,800	50,000
Improvements to premises.....	95,200	95,000
Subtotal.....	551,040	540,000
<b>OPERATING COSTS</b>		
<b>I. Salaries, social insurance, etc.:</b>		
Salaries of employees under direct contract.....	2,710,600	3,156,000
Allowances to seconded police officers and civil servants.....	582,000	615,000
Other allowances.....	23,200	24,000
Insurance and pension contributions.....	814,080	1,010,000
Subtotal.....	4,129,880	4,805,000
<b>II. Tax costs.....</b>		
	15,680	16,000
<b>III. Operation, supplies, and external services:</b>		
Hire of equipment.....	78,400	55,000
Maintenance of premises (land and buildings).....	84,000	90,000
Maintenance of equipment, furniture and vehicles, maintenance supplies.....	16,800	17,000
Telecommunications maintenance.....	56,000	50,000
Office cleaning.....	87,360	106,000
Translation and interpretation.....	13,440	60,000
Miscellaneous equipment purchases.....	1,120	2,000
Energy (electricity, gas, heating, fuel oil, gasoline).....	145,600	140,000
Technical reference material (library).....	4,480	5,000
Experts' fees.....	67,200	20,000
Insurance.....	17,920	10,000
Subtotal.....	572,320	555,000
<b>VI. Transport and travel expenses:</b>		
Paris—Saint-Cloud transport allowances.....	13,440	10,000
Travel, maintenance, and accommodation expenses (official missions).....	211,600	220,000
Freight and document transport costs.....	11,200	10,000
Subtotal.....	236,240	240,000
<b>V. Surveys and technical assistance:</b>		
International criminal police review.....	156,800	156,000
Technical assistance and symposia.....	100,000	70,000
Miscellaneous publications and audiovisual material.....	61,600	70,000
Subtotal.....	319,200	296,000
<b>VI. Miscellaneous management costs:</b>		
Announcements, exhibitions, medals.....	1,120	3,000
Official hospitality and entertainment.....	13,440	14,000
Office supplies.....	84,000	82,000
Photographic and printing facilities.....	78,400	75,000
General reference materials.....	1,120	2,000
Postal, telephone, and telegram charges.....	143,360	140,000
Subscriptions and donations.....	1,120	1,000
Executive committee.....	61,600	60,000
General assembly.....	168,000	160,000
Regional conferences <sup>1</sup> .....		75,000
Subtotal.....	552,160	612,000
<b>VII. Financial costs and loans:</b>		
CDC loan.....	232,000	175,000
Bank charges.....	6,000	7,000
Mortgage payment on former Langlade property.....		81,000
Total.....	6,614,520	7,336,000

<sup>1</sup> New entry.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION, INTERPOL,  
44TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION, BUENOS AIRES,  
October 9-15, 1975.

Subject: Extraordinary Budget: I.C.P.O.-INTERPOL Telecommunication Centre  
at Saint-Martin D'Abbat.  
1974/1985 Balance Sheets.  
Closure of Account. Overall Balance Sheet.

In 1970; In application of a resolution adopted at the 38th General Assembly session (Mexico City), the I.C.P.O.-Interpol acquired property (43 hectares, or about 106 acres) to which to transfer the Central Radio Station then located at Lagny-Pomponne.

This property, at Saint-Martin d'Abbat, Loiret, about 120 kilometres south of Paris, includes a farm leased to a farmer and a large house that has been remodeled into apartments for the technicians working at the new telecommunications centre.

The General Assembly, meeting in Brussels at its 39th session, adopted a resolution stating that "an Extraordinary Budget shall be opened in order to carry out the work made necessary by the transfer of the I.C.P.O.-Interpol Radio Station to the site owned by the Organization at Saint-Martin-d'Abbat (France)".

The work that urgently needed to be done at the property was undertaken as soon as the site was acquired, and construction of the new telecommunications centre was begun in 1971. The work proceeded in stages, as planned, in 1972, 1973, 1974 and the first quarter of 1975; simultaneously, work was done on renovating the living quarters, improving the farm buildings, installing equipment and modernising the telecommunications material and installations.

On 28th May 1975, the new I.C.P.O.-Interpol Telecommunications Centre at Saint-Martin-d'Abbat was officially opened by President W. L. Higgitt and all the members of the Executive Committee.

The project of establishing the new I.C.P.O.-interpol Telecommunications Centre, to replace the previous facilities, has now been completed and consequently it is now possible to submit an overall balance sheet for the project.

I. THE EXTRAORDINARY BUDGET : BALANCE SHEETS OF 1974 AND 1975

In application of Article 17 of the Financial Regulations, two balance sheets are submitted, one for 1974 (Appendix 1), the other for 1st January-31st July 1975 (Appendix 2). The figures given are in French francs.

At 31st July 1975, all the construction and renovation work had been completed. From that date onwards, the only work to be done will be maintenance and outfitting, which will be covered by the Ordinary Budget.

II. OVERALL BALANCE SHEET

What are all the financial implications of the Telecommunications Centre project?

These are summarised in an overall balance sheet (Appendix 3); the figures given are in French francs, the currency used for all related financial operations. The balance sheet shows that:

1. Closure of the account leaves a surplus of 31,596.75 French francs, which can be returned to the Ordinary Budget.

2. The total cost of the project has been 2,423,994.99 French francs, which includes the following major items of expenditure:

Technical buildings: Construction and fitting out.....	381, 656
Technical installations: Telecommunications material, equipment, aerials and pylons, electricity supply and telephone connections....	1, 085, 610
Main buildings: Renovation, maintenance, furniture and equipment....	627, 490
Access roads and landscape development.....	116, 141
Farm buildings: Fitting out and maintenance.....	76, 282
Transfer of installations from Lagny-Pomponne.....	52, 551
Architect's fees.....	81, 897

## 3. This expenditure was financed as follows:

Transfer of the surplus from the extraordinary budget for construction of the headquarters building-----	182,366.39
Transfers from the ordinary budget-----	2,145,306.80
Bank account interest-----	127,081.55
Refund on invoice-----	837.00
<b>Total</b> -----	<b>2,455,591.74</b>

The resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 39th session, which indicated that the Extraordinary Budget should be financed primarily by regular transfers from the Ordinary Budget, has been faithfully followed.

It should be noted that the sum of about 75,000 French francs, representing part of the amount paid by the Organization in taxes, has been refunded to us by the French Ministry of Finance, in accordance with provisions in the Headquarters Agreement between the I.C.P.O.-INTERPOL and the French Government. This sum has been accounted for in the Ordinary Budget.

[Attachment]

## APPENDIX 1

*Extraordinary Budget, 1974*

[In French francs]

*Income:*

Balance in hand on Jan. 1, 1974-----	341,602.46
Transfer from ordinary budget-----	137,096.80
Interest for 1974-----	17,958.94
<b>Total</b> -----	<b>496,658.20</b>

*Expenditure:*

Architect's fees-----	15,672.56
<i>Main building and outbuildings:</i>	
Fitting out-----	69,662.63
Maintenance-----	65,990.89
Furniture-----	19,178.80
Equipment-----	1,437.48
<i>Farm buildings:</i>	
Fitting out-----	} 4,401.97
Maintenance-----	
Technical buildings: Fitting out-----	870.24
<i>Technical installations:</i>	
Purchases-----	27,000.19
Fitting out-----	50,101.96
Maintenance-----	2,439.24
<i>Landscape development: Improvement and maintenance</i> -----	17,846.25
Station transfer costs-----	8,520.00
	<b>283,122.26</b>
Balance in hand at Dec. 31, 1974-----	<b>496,658.20</b>

[Attachment]

## APPENDIX 2

*1975 Extraordinary Budget Telecommunications Centre at Saint-Martin-D'Abbat  
(Jan. 1-July 31, 1975)—Closure of the Account*

Income (in French francs):	
Balance in hand on Jan. 1, 1975-----	213, 535. 94
Interest for 1975-----	6, 531. 50
Total -----	<u>220, 067. 44</u>
Expenditure (in French francs):	
Architect's fees-----	19, 562. 51
Main building and out-buildings:	
Fitting out, maintenance-----	38, 145. 65
Furniture and equipment-----	11, 208. 05
Farm buildings: Fitting out, maintenance-----	9, 103. 00
Technical buildings: Construction, fitting out-----	21, 445. 37
Electricity/telephone connections-----	1, 284. 19
Access roads and landscape development-----	43, 690. 26
Transfer of installations from Lagny-Pomponne-----	29, 577. 60
Miscellaneous -----	14, 453. 61
Total -----	188, 470. 69
Balance in hand on July 31, 1975-----	31, 596. 75
Total -----	<u>220, 067. 44</u>

[Attachment]

## APPENDIX 3

*Constructing and outfitting the Telecommunications Centre at Saint-Martin-  
d'Abbat*

## INCOME (IN FRENCH FRANCS)

I. 1970—Transfer of the surplus from the Extraordinary Budget for Construction of the headquarters building (closure of that account decided by the 39th General Assembly session, Brussels, October 1970)-----	182, 366. 39
II. Transfers from the ordinary budget:	
1971-----	1, 070, 146. 10
1972-----	534, 542. 20
1973-----	403, 521. 70
1974-----	137, 096. 80
Total -----	<u>2, 145, 306. 80</u>
III. Bank account interest:	
1971-----	2, 525. 00
1972-----	32, 792. 79
1973-----	67, 273. 32
1974-----	17, 953. 94
1975-----	6, 541. 50
Total -----	<u>127, 081. 55</u>
IV. Miscellaneous (refund on invoice): 1973-----	837. 00
Total-----	<u>2, 455, 591. 74</u>

## EXPENDITURE (in French francs)

I. Purchase of property, solicitor's fees.....	2, 363. 35
II. Constructing and fitting out the technical buildings.....	381, 656. 77
III. Purchases of telecommunications equipment and material:	
Material and equipment.....	343, 949. 68
Omnidirectional aerial:	
Basic purchase.....	340, 900. 00
Related costs (sales taxes, customs duty, delivery charges, etc.).....	71, 741. 64
Total .....	412, 641. 64
Pylons and electricity poles:	
Basic purchase.....	249, 223. 39
Installations costs.....	16, 892. 56
Delivery charges.....	12, 277. 07
Total .....	278, 393. 02
IV. Electricity/telephone connections.....	50, 627. 67
V. Main building:	
Renovation, fitting out, etc.....	589, 364. 71
Furniture and equipment.....	38, 125. 38
Total .....	627, 490. 09
VI. Maintenance and fitting out of farm buildings.....	76, 282. 29
VII. Access roads and landscape development.....	116, 141. 40
VIII. Architect's fees.....	81, 897. 87
IX. Transfer of installations from Lagny-Pomponne and miscellaneous expenses.....	52, 551. 21
Total expenditure.....	2, 423, 994. 99
Balance in hand on July 31, 1975.....	31, 596. 75
Total .....	2, 455, 591. 74

## INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION, INTERPOL, 44TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION, BUENOS AIRES, OCTOBER 9-15, 1975

Subject: Balance Sheet at December 31, 1974.

The balance sheet at 31st December 1974 has been drawn up by the Société Fiduciaire d'Expertises Comptables, the specialist firm appointed to check the Organization's accounts in application of Articles 35 and 36 of the Financial Regulations.

Whereas the report on the 1974 financial year gives an account of income and expenditure during that year, the "balance sheet" shows the Organization's overall financial situation at a fixed date—in this case, 31st December 1974—taking into account all the Organization's assets and liabilities.

This balance sheet is given below.

The following explanatory notes should help clarify the various figures given.

In converting French francs to Swiss francs, we have used the average exchange rate for 1974, or 1.6053 French francs for one Swiss franc. (The average exchange rate for 1973 was 1.4201 French francs for one Swiss franc.)

## EXPLANATORY NOTES

*Assets (left-hand side)**I. Fixed assets*

(a) These figures represent the *purchase prices* paid for land and any buildings which were or still are standing on it.

(b) and (c) The figures given in Column 1 represent the total cost or purchase prices. Depreciation (Column 2) has been calculated at the rate of 5 percent per year for premises, plant, etc. and at rates varying from 10 to 12.5 percent per year for equipment.

(d) These deposits are for gas and electricity.

*II. Accounts receivable*

(a) The figure in Column 2 represents contributions we do not expect to recover.  
(b) This sum includes, for example, anticipated tax refunds and the royalties due from Systemen Keesing for 1974.

*III. Current assets*

(a) The three figures represent respectively: *Column 1*: the purchase price. *Column 2*: depreciation according to quotations on 31/12/1974. *Column 3*: the market value on 31/12/1974.

(b) and (c) See the reports on the 1974 Financial Year and the Extraordinary Budget at 31/12/1974.

"*Reminder*" This figure represents the interest payable on the loan from the "Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations" for construction of the Headquarters building.

*Liabilities (right-hand side)**I. Long-term liabilities*

No comment required.

*II. Current liabilities*

(a) This figure represents only repayment of the principal.

(b) This figure represents expenditure to which we are committed—i.e. orders placed in 1974 which will have to be paid for in 1975.

(c) This figure represents primarily insurance and pension contributions for the last quarter of 1974, which were in fact paid in 1975.

*III. Surplus*

(a) This represents the Organization's "holdings"—or net worth—at 31/12/1973, when all financial obligations have been met.

(b) The value of the property in Swiss francs has been adjusted to reflect the change in the comparative values of the Swiss and French francs between the years in which the property was purchased and the year 1974.

At 31st December 1974, the surplus was 9,884,653.58 Swiss francs.

## INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION—INTERPOL—BALANCE SHEET ON DEC. 31, 1974

[In Swiss francs]

	Assets		
	Original value	Depreciation	Remainder
I. Fixed assets			6,961,040.35
(a) Land and original buildings on site	2,183,472.29		2,183,472.29
(b) Construction of headquarters building, plant and equipment	4,788,127.88	1,597,277.07	3,190,850.81
(c) Office equipment and supplies	2,251,887.11	668,371.76	1,583,515.35
Subtotal	9,223,487.28	2,265,648.83	6,957,838.45
(d) Deposits and prepayments			3,201.90
II. Accounts receivable			970,451.45
(a) Contributions outstanding on Dec. 31, 1974	1,334,798.93	726,325.07	608,473.86
(b) Other sums to be received	361,977.59		36,977.59
III. Current assets			3,882,964.94
(a) Investment in bonds	227,656.60	77,316.60	150,340.00
(b) Bank and post office accounts	3,709,009.35		3,709,009.35
(c) Cash	23,615.59		23,615.59
Grand total			11,814,456.74
Reminder: Interest payable on CDC loan			6484,200.68
I. Long-term liabilities			1,715,745.94
(a) CDC loan (1976-84 inclusive) (principal only)			1,435,424.51
(b) Installments on Langlade property			280,321.43
II. Current liabilities			214,057.21
(a) Annual 1974 installment toward repayment of CDC loan			122,417.54
(b) Outstanding working expenses			46,517.60
(c) Other sums to be paid			23,024.70
(d) Contributions paid in advance			22,097.37
III. Surplus			9,884,653.59
(a) Excess of assets over liabilities at Dec. 31, 1973			9,023,516.53
(b) To be deducted: adjustments due to differences in exchange rates (value of property in France)			615,672.87
Subtotal			8,407,843.66
(c) Excess of income over expenditure for 1974			1,476,809.93
Grand total			11,814,456.74
Reminder: Interest payable on CDC loan (1975-84)			484,200.68

## INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION, INTERPOL, 45TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION, ACCRA, OCTOBER 14-20, 1976

Subject: Report on the 1975 Financial Year.

1. The 1975 budget was adopted by the General Assembly at its 43rd session in Cannes. Acting in accordance with Article 55 of the General Regulations, the

Executive Committee modified the sums allocated under 7 headings at its meeting in Buenos Aires. In two of these cases, however (furniture and miscellaneous publications), the additional sums allocated were not used. In examining the implementation of the 1975 budget, the draft published in Cannes should consequently be amended as follows:

Headings	Sums originally allocated	Final allocations
Technical office equipment.....	44,800	79,800
Other technical equipment.....	11,200	41,200
Experts' fees.....	67,200	97,200
Office cleaning.....	87,360	107,360
Postal, telephone and telegram charges.....	143,360	153,360

The table as given at Appendix 1 incorporates these modifications. The following comments would seem to be in order:

#### *Income*

2. The General Assembly in Cannes fixed the value of the budget unit at 5,900 Swiss francs. On the whole, member countries paid their contributions at this new rate but the amount actually received (4,986,392 Sw. fr.) was rather less than the amount expected (5,693,500 Sw. fr.) because certain countries were late in settling their contributions. Approximately ten of these countries paid their contributions after 1st January 1976.

3. A number of other countries paid their contributions for previous years during the course of 1975 so that the income forecast proved to be fairly accurate in the end. Appendix 2 gives a table of the amounts still due from various member countries at 1st July 1976.

4. The table at Appendix 1 includes details of the amounts received from the United States and the European countries in respect of the exceptional contributions for intensifying the fight against illicit drug traffic.

5. The exceptional contributions received from Spain and Japan—to offset the salaries paid to officers from these two countries by the General Secretariat—are also shown.

6. Lastly one of the Arab countries, anticipating the decision taken at Buenos Aires on the adoption of Arabic as a working language, paid an additional 23,600 francs over and above its regular contribution.

7. The sum received from the French Government in respect of refunded tax on purchases made by the General Secretariat was slightly higher (272,712 francs 90 centimes) than the estimated figure (180,000 francs). This is basically due to the fact that the refund covers not only purchases made during 1974 but also those made during the second half of 1973 and the first half of 1975.

8. The amount received in respect of subscriptions to the I.C.P.R. was very nearly exactly what had been forecast. The royalties from Systemen Keesing (Review Counterfeits and Forgeries) were slightly lower than they had been during the previous year but were still in excess of the forecast figure. The amounts received under the other, smaller income headings all exceeded the cautious forecasts.

9. Finally, it will be noted that the Extraordinary Budget for fitting out the St. Martin d'Abbat radio station was closed during 1975 and the balance of 17,494 Sw. fr. has been entered alongside the other items of income. This of course is no more than an accounting operation as the funds were already at the Organisation's disposal.

10. In conclusion, total income during 1975 exceeded the forecast figure.

#### *Expenditure*

11. Except under the heading detailed below, expenditure under the various budget items was lower than the sums allocated by the General Assembly.

#### *Assets subject to depreciation*

##### *Technical office equipment*

12. A special effort was made during 1975 to mechanise some of the operations carried out at the General Secretariat. In fact, it appeared to be more advanta-

geous to purchase machines or modify existing equipment than to take on additional staff.

*Operation, supplies and external services: Technical reference material—Library*

13. It has been more or less a tradition to allocate an extremely small sum for these purposes and this year the allocation proved inadequate as several of the General Secretariat departments had to renew their technical reference documents (dictionaries, special works of reference, etc.)

*Surveys and technical assistance—Technical co-operation and symposia*

14. The sum allocated was exceeded by about 10% because a number of awards made in 1974 were not in fact paid until 1975. It should be noted that, during the past year, 41 officers from 33 countries benefited from awards which allowed them to increase their knowledge in and skills fields of direct interest in the Organisation, either at the headquarters or in Nairobi.

*Management costs—Postal, telephone and telegram charges*

15. The almost continual increase in postal charges (stamps, telephone, telex, etc.), coupled with the modern tendency towards greater use of rapid but costly telecommunications channels, accounts for the overspending under this heading (164,209 francs 89 centimes, instead of the 153,360 francs allocated).

16. On the whole however, and even allowing for exchange losses, expenditure was 1,087,265 Sw. fr. less than the figure forecast and 1,590,932 Sw. fr. less than the income received. The level of the Safety and Reserve Fund is therefore somewhat higher but it is still below that stipulated in subparagraph 4 of Article 31 of the Financial Regulations (18 months, operating costs).

The relatively comfortable financial situation is the result of careful management coupled with fluctuations in the foreign exchange rates whose trends in years to come cannot be predicted. Furthermore, it is fortunate that the balance in hand at 1st January 1976 was relatively high as there will be no increase in contributions during 1976 although there is every reason to think that costs will increase as will the work load borne by the General Secretariat.

17. The Auditors' Report is attached at Appendix 3.

[Attachment]

APPENDIX I—INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNTS: POSITION AT DEC. 31, 1975

[Income account in Swiss francs]	
Balance in hand on Jan. 1, 1975:	
(a) Balance in Geneva (2 bank accounts).....	3,544,769 00
(b) Balance in Paris bank and post office accounts.....	31,221.01
(c) Balance in Paris (cash in hand in French francs).....	20,932.33
(d) Balance in Paris (foreign currency).....	2,693.26
Total.....	<u>3,599,605.60</u>
Income during 1975:	
(a) Advances on 1976 contributions.....	195,926.76
(b) Regular annual membership contributions for 1975.....	4,974,857.31
(c) Regular annual membership contributions for previous years.....	402,353.47
(d) Special contribution from USA.....	345,970.00
(e) Special contributions for the EURO-DRUG Plan, 1975.....	483,400.00
(f) Special contributions for the EURO-DRUG Plan, 1974.....	89,240.00
(g) Special contribution from Spain.....	10,908.43
(h) Special contribution from Japan.....	69,208.22
(i) Special contributions from the Arab countries.....	23,600.00
(j) Reimbursement of VAT: 2d half 1973, plus 1974, plus 1st half 1975, and a property tax (1973, 1974).....	272,712.90
(k) Subscriptions to the ICPR.....	22,045.43
(l) Publications.....	4,414.66
(m) Audiovisual teaching material.....	13,900.54
(n) Royalties from Systemen Keesing (on counterfeits and forgeries).....	163,996.90
(o) Earnings from investments.....	9,991.20
(p) Sale or redemption of investment securities.....	7,733.00
(q) Bank interest.....	72,788.86
(r) Income from property (rent).....	38,949.00
(s) Other income (payment for photocopies, etc.).....	31,293.13
(t) Transfer from extraordinary budget.....	17,494.40
Total.....	<u>7,258,834.21</u>
Grand total.....	<u>10,858,459.81</u>

Note: Rate of exchange: 1.6501.

20-400-78-5

## [Expenditure account in Swiss francs]

	Sum allocated	Total expenditure
<b>Assets subject to depreciation:</b>		
Vehicles	19,040	
Telecommunications equipment	336,000	276,506.69
Printing and photographic equipment	79,800	107,585.81
Technical office equipment	41,200	24,976.67
Furniture	44,800	23,967.70
Improvements to premises	95,200	63,506.65
<b>Total</b>	<b>616,040</b>	<b>496,543.52</b>
<b>Salaries, social insurance, etc.:</b>		
Salaries of employees under direct contract	2,710,600	2,328,384.95
Allowances to seconded police officers and civil servants	582,000	550,402.92
Other allowances	23,200	16,144.40
Insurance and pension contributions	814,080	682,206.27
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,129,880</b>	<b>3,577,138.54</b>
<b>Tax costs</b>		
	15,680	3,511.91
<b>Operation, supplies, and external services:</b>		
Hire of equipment	78,400	64,401.08
Maintenance of premises (land and buildings)	84,000	75,163.49
Maintenance of equipment, furniture, vehicles, maintenance supplies	16,800	14,002.57
Telecommunications equipment	56,000	39,161.47
Office cleaning	107,360	104,217.28
Translations	13,440	3,736.94
Miscellaneous equipment (purchase of)	1,120	3,408.80
Heat and power (electricity, gas, heating, fuel, oil, petrol)	145,600	96,732.62
Technical references material (library)	4,480	5,826.32
Experts' fees	97,200	73,428.35
Insurance	17,920	6,112.92
<b>Total</b>	<b>622,320</b>	<b>486,191.84</b>
<b>Transport and travel expenses:</b>		
Paris/St. Cloud transport allowances	13,440	7,039.57
Travel expenses and living allowances (official missions)	211,600	146,544.85
Freight and document transport costs	11,200	2,982.06
<b>Total</b>	<b>236,240</b>	<b>156,566.48</b>
<b>Surveys and technical assistance:</b>		
International criminal police review	156,800	144,963.15
Technical co-operational and symposia	100,800	111,198.10
Audio-visual teaching material	11,200	1,665.49
Miscellaneous publications	50,400	18,678.23
<b>Total</b>	<b>319,200</b>	<b>276,504.97</b>
<b>Management costs:</b>		
Official hospitality and entertainment	13,440	11,343.31
Office supplies	84,000	82,274.71
Photographic and printing workshop	78,400	76,738.18
General reference material	1,120	2,013.95
Postal, telephone and telegram charges	153,360	164,209.89
Subscriptions and other payments	1,120	272.23
Executive committee	61,600	46,881.42
General Assembly	168,000	60,437.17
Advertisements, exhibitions, medals	1,120	654.74
<b>Total</b>	<b>562,160</b>	<b>444,825.60</b>
<b>Financial costs and loans:</b>		
CDC loan	232,000	198,080.15
Bank charges	6,000	8,343.45
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,739,520</b>	<b>5,648,606.46</b>
Loss due to modified exchange rates		10,295.68
		<b>5,658,902.14</b>
<b>Balance in hand on Dec. 31, 1975:</b>		
In Geneva bank account	4,497,565.00	
In Paris (bank and post office accounts)	680,626.70	
In Paris (cash in hand in French francs)	20,625.68	
In Paris (foreign currency)	720.29	
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,199,537.67</b>	
<b>Grand total</b>		<b>10,858,439.81</b>

## [Attachment]

## APPENDIX II—CONTRIBUTIONS IN ARREARS (AT JULY 1, 1976)

Country	For 1975	For 1974	For 1973	For previous year	Total
Bolivia	17,700.00	14,550.00	14,550.00	47,728.90	94,528.90
Brazil	16,800.00				16,800.00
Burundi	2,679.00				2,679.00
Cameroon	2,286.50				2,286.50
Central African Republic	1,994.00				1,994.00
Chad	5,990.00	4,850.00	4,850.00		15,600.00
Chile	17,700.00		5,433.00	11,834.00	34,967.00
Colombia	76,700.00	9,602.10	30,925.65	29,952.40	147,180.15
Congo Brazzaville	5,900.00	4,850.00	1,185.30		11,935.30
Costa Rica	380.60	2,264.52			2,645.12
Dahomey	17,700.00	14,550.00	4,193.00		36,443.00
Dominican Republic	5,900.00	4,850.00	4,850.00	13,230.00	28,830.00
Egypt	118,000.00				118,000.00
Ecuador		1,188.25	9,957.44	14,392.82	25,538.51
Gabon	111.75	511.65	490.60		1,114.00
Guinea	29,500.00	24,250.00	22,543.00		76,293.00
Guyana	4,443.10				4,443.10
Haiti	17,700.00	14,550.00	3,684.80	10,725.75	46,660.55
Iran	5,200.00	3,200.00	800.00		9,200.00
Iraq		453.84			453.84
Ireland	17,700.00				17,700.00
Italy	86,794.00				86,794.00
Ivory Coast	29,500.00	2,467.27			31,967.27
Khmer Republic	5,900.00	4,850.00			10,750.00
Laos	5,900.00	4,471.88			10,371.88
Lebanon	29,500.00				29,500.00
Liberia	2,600.00	1,540.14			4,140.14
Morocco		2,588.47			2,588.47
Mauritius	929.95				929.95
Mauritania	10,357.43	4,138.41			14,495.84
Mexico	6,005.00	1,236.00			7,241.00
Nicaragua	17,700.00	14,550.00	14,550.00	2,863.00	49,663.00
Pakistan	29,500.00	10,800.00	38,800.00		79,100.00
Panama	3,745.00	2,609.00	2,420.00	445.00	9,219.00
El Salvador	17,700.00	24,250.00	24,250.00	93,450.00	159,650.00
Senegal	5,982.29				5,982.29
Sierra Leone	17,700.00	2,074.55			19,774.55
Suriname	17,700.00				17,700.00
Togo	5,900.00	901.85			6,801.85
Tunisia	1,933.10				1,933.10
Uganda	17,700.00	14,550.00			32,250.00
United States	46,986.00				46,986.00
Upper Volta				2,782.00	2,782.00
Uruguay		14,550.00			14,550.00
Total	722,327.72	205,307.93	183,482.79	227,403.87	1,338,522.31

## [Attachment]

## APPENDIX III

## AUDITORS REPORT

In application of Article 35 of the Financial Regulations, the following persons met at the Organization's Headquarters in Saint-Cloud on 31st May and 1st June 1976:

Mr. Michel Popieul, a qualified accountant and one of the Auditors registered at the Paris Court of Appeal, representing the accounting firm referred to in the Financial Regulations.

Mr. Harry Thomsen, Auditor (Denmark).

Mr. Emile Benhamou, Auditor (France).

They proceeded to check the accounting records for 1975. Whenever they felt it necessary, they checked the transfer card against the corresponding receipts, vouchers, etc.

The Auditors noted that although the situation regarding the recovery of regular contributions had improved in 1974, the records for 1975 showed that the situation had deteriorated considerably, with the result that overall amount owed by certain countries had increased by two-thirds (1,697,000 Swiss francs in 1975 compared with 1,048,000 Swiss francs in 1974).

Regarding contributions to the Euro-Drug Plan, a total of 497,610 Swiss francs had been requested in respect of contributions for 1974; of this 201,760 Swiss francs (approximately 40 percent) had not been paid at 31st December 1975. However, the situation regarding the 1975 contributions was much more favorable: of the total of 605,340 Swiss francs due for 1975, 111,900 Swiss francs were still outstanding at 31st December 1975.

The Auditors also noted that there had been an improvement in the balance in hand but this was not yet sufficient to meet 18 months' operating costs, as mentioned in Article 31 of the Financial Regulations. This improvement appears to be due to prudent management, favorable fluctuations in the exchange rate and a considerable contribution in the form of staff seconded to the Organization by certain member countries.

A number of questions on the financial management of the Organization were put to the Secretary General and the answers given were considered satisfactory. The Auditors note that the accounts are in order, and propose that the General Assembly approve them.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION, INTERPOL,  
45TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION, ACCRA,  
October 14-20, 1976.

Subject: Balance sheet at December 31, 1975.

The balance sheet at 31st December 1975 has been drawn up by the Société Fiduciaire d'Expertises Comptables, the specialist firm appointed to check the Organization's accounts in application of Articles 35 and 36 of the Financial Regulations.

Whereas the report on the 1975 financial year gives an account of income and expenditure during that year, the "balance sheet" shows the Organization's overall financial situation at a fixed date—in this case, 31st December 1975—taking into account all the Organization's assets and liabilities.

This balance sheet is given below.

The following explanatory notes should help clarify the various figures given.

In converting French francs to Swiss francs, we have used the average exchange rate for 1975, or 1.6501 French francs to one Swiss franc. (The average exchange rate for 1974 was 1.6053 French francs for one Swiss franc.)

#### EXPLANATORY NOTES

##### Assets (left-hand side)

###### I. Fixed assets

(a) These figures represent the *purchase prices* paid for land and any buildings which were or still are standing on it.

(b) and (c). The figures given in Column 1 represent the total cost or purchase prices. Depreciation (Column 2) has been calculated at the rate of 5% per year for premises, plant, etc. and at rates varying from 10% to 12.5% per year for equipment.

(d) These deposits are for gas and electricity.

###### II. Accounts receivable

(a) The figure in Column 2 represents contributions we do not expect to recover.

(b) This sum includes, for example, anticipated tax refunds and the royalties due from Systemen Keesing for 1975.

###### III. Current assets

(a) The three figures represent respectively: *Column 1*: the purchase price. *Column 2*: depreciation according to quotations on 31/12/1975. *Column 3*: the market value on 31/12/1975.

(b) and (c) See the report on the 1975 Financial Year at 31/12/1975.

"Reminder" This figure represents the interest payable on the loan from the "Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations" for construction of the Headquarters building.

##### Liabilities (righthand side)

###### I. Long-term liabilities

No comment required.

###### II. Current liabilities

(a) This figure represents only repayment of the principal.

(b) This figure represents expenditure to which we are committed—i.e. orders placed in 1975 which will have to be paid for in 1976.

(c) This figure represents primarily insurance and pension contributions for the last quarter of 1975, which were in fact paid in 1976.

### III. Surplus

(a) This represents the Organization's "holdings"—or net worth—at 31/12/1974, when all financial obligations have been met.

(b) The value of the property in Swiss francs has been adjusted to reflect the change in the comparative values of the Swiss and French francs between the years in which the property was purchased and the year 1975.

At 31st December 1975, the surplus was 13,470,573.68 Swiss francs.

#### INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION—INTERPOL—BALANCE SHEET ON DEC. 31, 1974

[In Swiss francs]

	Assets		
	Original value	Depreciation	Remainder
	Liabilities		
I. Fixed assets			6,941,133.21
(a) Land and original buildings on site	2,124,196.26		2,124,191.26
(b) Construction of headquarters building, plant and equipment	4,733,809.28	1,816,632.24	2,197,177.04
(c) Office equipment and supplies	2,705,177.18	808,527.23	1,896,649.95
Subtotal	9,563,177.72	2,625,159.47	6,938,018.25
(d) Deposits and prepayments			3,114.96
II. Accounts receivable			1,203,421.80
(a) Contributions outstanding on Dec. 31, 1975	2,011,383.88	1,042,135.21	969,248.67
(b) Other sums to be received	234,173.13		234,173.13
III. Current assets			5,326,018.67
(a) Investment in bonds	214,491.13	88,010.13	126,411.00
(b) Bank and post office accounts	5,178,191.70		5,178,191.70
(c) Cash			21,345.97
Grand total			13,470,573.68
Remainder: Interest payable on CDC loan			391,488.46
I. Long-term liabilities			1,489,27.53
(a) CDC loan (1977-84 inclusive) (principal only)			1,271,106.53
(b) Installments on Langlade property			218,168.60
II. Current liabilities			404,182.92
(a) Annual 1978 instalment towards repayment of CDC loan and Langlade			179,888.853
(b) Outstanding working expenses			24,182.68
(c) Other sums to be paid			4,184.95
(d) Contributions paid in advance			195,926.76
III. Surplus			11,577,115.63
(a) Excess of assets over liabilities at Dec. 31, 1974			9,884,653.59
(b) To be deducted: adjustments due to differences in exchange rates (value of property in France)			148,535.13
(c) Excess in income over expenditure for 1975			9,736,118.46
Grand total			13,470,753.68
Remainder: Interest payable on CDC loan (1976-84)			391,488.46

#### INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION, INTERPOL, 45TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION, ACCRA, OCTOBER 14-20, 1976

Subject: Draft budget for the period 1977-79 inclusive.

Article 7 of the Financial Regulations states that: "During each three-year period, the value of the budget unit should not, as far as possible, be altered".

The 1977-1979 draft budget has been drawn up with this principle in mind.

## 1. EXPENDITURE

This draft budget takes into account the following main points:

(1) *Avoidance of a deficit*: The 1976 budget may show a slight deficit (x). The appropriate adjustments will therefore have to be made to ensure that in future there is no possibility of a deficit, however small.

(2) *Inflation*: General economic instability throughout the world makes it essential to allow for certain inflationary trends which have been prevalent nearly everywhere in recent years. In France, the country in which the Organization has its headquarters, the official rates of inflation have been: 12.3 percent in 1973; 14.1 percent in 1974; and 9.6 percent in 1975.

It is of course practically impossible to make forecasts in this area, but an average increase of 30 percent spread over three years (1977-1979) would probably only cover depreciation due to inflation.

(3) *Staff salaries*: The rate of annual salary increases is higher than the average rate of inflation for the following reasons:

(a) The salaries paid by the Organization must keep in line with salary increases in the country in which the Organization has its headquarters. These increases are higher than the rate of inflation.

(b) The salaries paid to staff by the Organization obviously increase with length of service at the General Secretariat. Because of the age of the staff, the "average" salary has not yet reached the highest point of its development and will therefore continue to rise.

(c) Salaries were in fact very low and we are gradually making the necessary adjustments so that we can recruit and keep qualified staff at the General Secretariat. As an indication, in January 1976, the average net salary<sup>1</sup> of staff paid entirely out of the international budget was 3,138 French francs a month.

(d) The social security contributions paid by the employer increase regularly and are compulsory. In January 1973 they represented 27.7 percent of salaries, in January 1976, 31.3 percent.

(e) Several officers originally seconded to the General Secretariat by their countries also have to be paid by the Organization, either because they have retired from government service in their own countries and stay on at the General Secretariat for a period, or because their governments can no longer continue to pay their salaries. This does, of course, make the Organization that much more independent.

The table in Appendix 1 gives staff forecasts for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979.

(4) *Increased work-load*: Finally, we must take account of a greater work-load resulting from increased co-operation and all that this implies. For example, the number of messages (both received and transmitted) handled by the General Secretariat's Central Radio Station rose from 109,616 in 1973 to 162,685 in 1975.

Increased staff numbers have obviously resulted in an increase in management tasks and the General Secretariat does not now have enough administrative staff to cope with this. Extra staff are needed in certain departments (secretariat, personnel, etc.).

Consequently, allowance must be made annually for a slight increase in staff numbers in various Secretariat departments.

(5) *Expenditure in 1975*: When estimating expenditure for the period 1977-79, we have taken account of the 1976 budget allocations and actual expenditure for 1975. This has made it easier to adjust the forecasts under several headings.

The Organization's total expenditure over the next few years is expected to be as follows:

1976: Allocations—7,443,000 Swiss francs.

1977: Estimated expenditure—10,059,000 Swiss francs.

1978: Estimated expenditure—10,842,000 Swiss francs.

1979: Estimated expenditure—11,864,000 Swiss francs.

The average budget for the period 1977-79 inclusive can therefore be estimated at 10,850,000 Swiss francs. In comparison with the 1976 allocations, the percentage increases—except those relating to staff—are low.

These figures represent only the absolute minimum expenditure required if the Organization is to continue at its present rate of activity.

<sup>1</sup> Salary actually paid, after deduction of the employee's social security and other contributions, but before deduction of income tax, which is paid personally by each employee.

The break-down of expenditure under the various headings is given in Appendix 2.

## II. INCOME

Miscellaneous income will be approximately 550,000 Swiss francs per year (cf. Appendix 2).

The sum of 10,300,000 Swiss francs (10,850,000-550,000) will therefore have to be found through the payment of countries' contributions.

### A. Ordinary contributions

As the range of budget units stands now, 1,010 budget units should theoretically be paid into the Organization's budget each year if each member country pays its contribution punctually. However, only 925 budget units at most are paid, since there are unfortunate but inevitable cases of nonpayment.<sup>1</sup>

Following the adoption, in 1975, of Arabic as one of the Secretariat's official working languages, the Arab countries decided to pay a larger number of budget units to the Budget. In all, this should bring in 65 extra units annually.

In practice, then, a total of 990 budget units should be received as ordinary contributions (925 + 65) under the present arrangement.

### B/Special contributions to the Euro-Drug Plan

To finance the Euro-Drug Plan, the European countries have agreed to pay special contributions representing 20% of their ordinary contributions to the Organization's budget. These special contributions cover all the expenditures involved in the Plan<sup>2</sup>.

In terms of budget units, these special contributions represent 83 budget units (after making allowances for certain cases of non-payment).

Consequently, when forecasting income for 1977, we can count on the payment of a total of 1,073 budget units (990 ordinary + 83 Euro-Drug).

### C/Calculating the budget unit

The value of the budget unit could be calculated purely and simply by dividing the estimated total expenditure by the number of budget units indicated above.

However, the Executive Committee unanimously considered it would be preferable to make certain adjustments in order to increase the number of budget units paid each year as ordinary contributions. The Committee therefore proposed that:

(a) A new group, in which countries could pay 80 budget units, should be added to the contribution scale. Those countries currently paying 60 units will thus be able to increase their financial support if they so desire.

(b) Countries in the group currently paying 28 units should be asked to contribute 30 units. This would bring in 8 additional units. Those countries at present unable to meet this increase could temporarily continue to pay 28 units.

(c) A number of countries should be asked to make a voluntary increase in their contributions (negotiations along these lines are being conducted).

In this way, we could probably obtain a total of 86 additional units annually in ordinary contributions.

We could therefore count on the payment of:

7,076 units from ordinary contributions (990 + 86),

83 budget units from the special Euro-Drug contributions,

giving a grand total of 1,159 budget units. The budget unit could therefore be fixed at: 10,300,000 by 1159 equals 8,886,97 i.e. 8,900 Sw. fr.

If the Resolution below is adopted by the General Assembly, the model annual budget for 1977-1979, given in the present report would be treated as the budget for 1977.

<sup>1</sup> In 1975, 816 budget units were paid for 1975 contributions and 81 units for contributions in arrears.

<sup>2</sup> 1975 contributions to the Euro-Drug Plan: 493,400 Sw. fr. Euro-Drug Plan expenditure for 1975:

Staff	263,500
Travel and missions	42,000
Estimated overheads	150,000
Total	455,500

## CONCLUSIONS

The Executive Committee is unanimous in recommending that the General Assembly adopt the following Draft Resolution.

## DRAFT RESOLUTION: FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

In view of Article 7 of the Financial Regulations,  
 In view of the Report "Draft Budget for the period 1977-1979 inclusive" submitted by the Executive Committee,  
 In view of Resolution No. 1 on financial contributions adopted by the General Assembly at its 35th session (1969),  
 The I.C.P.O.—INTERPOL General Assembly, meeting in Accra from 14th to 20th October 1976 at its 45th session,

*Decides*

1. That for the purpose of calculating annual financial contributions, countries shall join one of the following groups and pay the number of budget units (per country) indicated:

Group 1.....	80 units	Group 7.....	13 units
Group 2.....	60 units	Group 8.....	8 units
Group 3.....	40 units	Group 9.....	5 units
Group 4.....	35 units	Group 10.....	3 units
Group 5.....	30 units	Group 11.....	2 units
Group 6.....	20 units	Group 12.....	1 unit

2. That from 1st January 1977, the value of the budget unit shall be fixed at 8,900 Swiss francs.

*Important Note:* Countries will continue to pay the same number of budget units that they paid in 1976, unless they themselves decide to increase that number. Otherwise the only change will be in the title of the group to which they belong.

## GENERAL SECRETARIAT STAFF—FORECASTS FOR THE PERIOD 1977-79

Year	Staff paid entirely by the organization				Number of seconded staff at Jan. 1	Total number of staff at Dec. 31
	In service at Jan. 1	Salaries to be taken over by the organization during the year	Staff to be recruited during year			
1976.....	108	6	7	52	167	
1977.....	121	2	9	46	178	
1978.....	132	1	5	46	184	
1979.....	138	—	5	46	189	

## INCOME

	Swiss francs
Regular annual membership contributions (1,076×8,900).....	9,576,400
Special contributions for the Euro-drug plan (83×8,900).....	738,700
Miscellaneous income:	
Special U.S. grant (14) <sup>1</sup> .....	110,000
Salaries refunded by certain countries (Japan, Spain).....	75,000
International Criminal Police Review.....	20,000
Publications.....	10,000
Royalties from Systemen Keesing (on counterfeits and forgeries).....	150,000
Bank interest.....	25,000
Interest from investments.....	10,000
Tax refunds.....	120,000
Income from property.....	30,000
Total.....	550,000
Total.....	10,865,100

<sup>1</sup> This has already been paid.

## DRAFT BUDGET, 1977-79—EXPENDITURE

(In Swiss francs)

	Expenditure 1975	Allocations for 1976	Draft budget, 1977-79	Variation (percent) of 1976 allocation
<b>ASSETS SUBJECT TO DEPRECIATION</b>				
Vehicles .....		20,000	20,000	
Telecommunications equipment .....	276,506.69	300,000	300,000	
Technical equipment .....	107,585.81	125,000	135,000	+1.69
Furniture .....	48,944.37	50,000	45,000	
Improvements to premises .....	63,506.65	95,000	100,000	
Subtotal .....	496,543.52	590,000	600,000	
<b>OPERATING COSTS</b>				
Salaries, social insurance, etc.:				
Salaries of employees under direct contract .....	2,328,384.95	3,156,000	5,382,000	
Allowances to seconded police officers and civil servants .....	550,402.92	615,000	725,000	
Other allowances .....	16,144.40	24,000	30,000	+66.90
Insurance and pension contributions .....	682,206.27	1,010,000	1,883,000	
Subtotal .....	3,557,138.54	4,805,000	8,020,000	
Tax costs .....	3,511.91	16,000	12,000	-25
Operation, supplies, and external services:				
Hire of equipment .....	64,401.08	80,000	90,000	
Maintenance of premises (land and buildings) .....	75,163.49	90,000	95,000	
Maintenance of equipment, furniture and vehicles, maintenance supplies .....	14,002.57	17,000	20,000	
Telecommunications maintenance .....	39,161.47	50,000	60,000	
Office cleaning .....	104,217.28	106,000	130,000	+13.05
Translation and interpretation .....	3,736.94	60,000	70,000	
Miscellaneous equipment purchases .....	3,408.80	4,000	4,000	
Energy (electricity, gas, heating, fuel oil, gasoline) .....	98,732.62	140,000	140,000	
Technical reference material (library) .....	5,826.32	5,000	7,000	
Experts' fees .....	73,428.35	20,000	30,000	
Insurance .....	6,112.92	10,000	12,000	
Subtotal .....	486,191.84	582,000	658,000	
Transport and travel expenses:				
Paris—Saint-Cloud transport allowances .....	7,039.57	10,000	10,000	
Travel, maintenance and accommodation expenses (official missions) .....	146,544.85	220,000	225,000	
Freight and document transport costs .....	2,982.06	10,000	5,000	
Subtotal .....	156,566.48	240,000	240,000	
Surveys and technical assistance:				
International criminal police review .....	144,963.15	156,000	165,000	
Technical assistance and symposia .....	111,198.10	70,000	75,000	+4.72
Miscellaneous publications and audiovisual material .....	20,342.72	70,000	70,000	
Subtotal .....	276,504.97	296,000	310,000	
Miscellaneous management costs:				
Announcements, exhibitions, medals .....	654.74	3,000	3,000	
Official hospitality and entertainment .....	11,343.31	14,000	16,000	
Office supplies .....	82,274.72	82,000	100,000	
Photographic and printing facilities .....	76,738.18	75,000	100,000	
General reference materials .....	2,013.95	2,000	3,000	+15.57
Postal, telephone and telegram charges .....	164,209.29	170,000	210,000	
Subscriptions and donations .....	272.23	1,000	1,000	
Executive committee .....	46,881.42	60,000	60,000	
General assembly .....	60,437.17	160,000	170,000	
Regional conferences .....		75,000	80,000	
Subtotal .....	444,825.60	642,000	743,000	
Financial costs and loans:				
CCC loan .....	198,080.15	205,000	200,000	
Bank charges .....	8,343.45	7,000	9,000	-1.83
Mortgage payment on former Langlade property .....		60,000	58,000	
Subtotal .....	206,423.60	272,000	267,000	
Total .....	5,648,606.46	7,443,000	10,850,000	+45.75
Equity and reserve fund .....			15,100	
Total .....			10,865,100	

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. We would be interested in knowing whether INTERPOL is financed only by government contributions, or whether there is any source of funds from private interests. Would you know the answer to that?*

Mr. SRMS. I refer to the INTERPOL Budget for 1976, which is included in the record of this hearing. The major INTERPOL funds (70 to 80 percent) are derived from dues. Other sources of income are:

Certain member countries make special contributions for Narcotic Liaison Officers.

Subscriptions to the *International Police Review*, (INTERPOL's monthly publication).

Publications.

Royalties.

Audio-visual teaching material.

Earnings from investments.

Bank interest.

Income from Property Rentals.

Other income, reimbursements and transfers.

No contributions are received from private citizens or firms.

*Question from Mr. Fish. Submit for the record all associates of INTERPOL, their individual background with particular emphasis on the political.*

*I am referring to INTERPOL, membership of INTERPOL, employees and associates of INTERPOL.*

Mr. SRMS. The three top officials at the General Secretariat are Mr. Jean Nepote, Secretary General; Mr. Andre Bossard, Assistant to the Secretary General and Head of Administrative Division; Mr. Raymond Kendall, Head of Police Divisions. Mr. Nepote and Mr. Bossard are from France and members of the National Surete. Mr. Kendall is from the United Kingdom and is a member of Scotland Yard.

Secretary General Nepote presented to the Executive Committee the request for a listing of the names, etc., of all employees of the General Secretariat. The following letter from Secretary General Nepote dated May 18, 1977 sets forth the decisions of the Executive Committee and includes a breakdown of personnel at the General Secretariat.

[Attachment]

ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE POLICE CRIMINELLE,  
France, May 18, 1977.

To: Interpol Washington.

Subject: Listing of Employees at the Interpol General Secretariat.

In your telegram n°LBS/W/200 of 22/4/1977, you asked me for a listing of employees at the General Secretariat, the countries they represent, and any other pertinent information. As an interim reply to that request, I informed you that the matter would be presented to the Executive Committee for discussion and decision at its 56th meeting (3rd to 6th May 1977).

The Executive Committee did in fact consider the request at that meeting. The discussion at that time led to adoption of a policy statement which effectively makes it impossible for me to supply you with the requested listing. A copy of the relevant text is enclosed herewith.

On numerous occasions, various INTERPOL Member Countries' officials have made fact-finding visits to the General Secretariat and have left satisfied with the information and explanations which they obtained. If members of the U.S. Congress would like to avail themselves of such an opportunity to visit this headquarters, I can assure you that they will be cordially received here.

J. NEPOTE,  
Secretary General.

Enclosure.

## TEXT

On the subject of the request from the U.S. Congress for a list of the names of all employees at the General Secretariat, the Executive Committee considered that, in order to protect the privacy of the General Secretariat staff members, the Secretary General should not supply a list of their names.

## GENERAL SECRETARIAT PERSONNEL STRENGTH (BY CATEGORY)

Category	May 15, 1976	Apr. 1 1977
Employees under direct contract <sup>1</sup> -----	107	106
Seconded French Government employees:		
Police officers-----	34	32
Administration staff-----	5	5
Detached French Government employees-----	2	3
Seconded non-French police officers <sup>2</sup> -----	11	11
Detached non-French police officers <sup>3</sup> -----	11	11
Totals-----	170	168

<sup>1</sup> Including: 1 American, 1 Argentinian, 1 Austrian, 6 Britons, 2 Cambodians, 3 Germans, 1 Indonesian, 1 Iraqi, 2 Portuguese, 1 Spaniard, 1 Sri Lankan, and 1 Tunisian.

<sup>2</sup> Including: 1 American, 1 Australian, 3 Britons, 1 Canadian, 1 German, 2 Italians, 1 Norwegian, and 1 Swede.

<sup>3</sup> Including: 1 Austrian, 1 Finn, 1 German, 1 Indonesian, 1 Japanese, 1 Pakistani, 2 Spaniards, 1 Swede, 1 Turk, and 1 Venezuelan.

## Personnel distribution

Secretary General-----	1
Police Coordination Division-----	72
Supervisory staff-----	4
Criminal records and fingerprints sections-----	28
Subdivision I (General crime):	
Theft and trafficking (Groupe C)-----	6
Offenses against persons and crimes of aggravated violence (Groupe D)-----	5
Subdivision II (Economic and financial crimes):	
Fraud (Group E)-----	6
Currency counterfeiting (Group F)-----	7
Subdivision III (Drugs)-----	16
Research and Studies Division-----	8
Supervisory staff-----	2
International criminal police review-----	2
Supervisory staff-----	1
Administrative Division-----	85
Supervisory staff-----	4
Telecommunications-----	31
Secretariat and clerical staff-----	6
Finance and accounting office-----	3
Personnel-----	1
Translation service-----	11
Typing service-----	8
Photographic laboratory and printing workshop-----	6
Security, distribution and transport-----	6
Maintenance and refectory staff-----	9
Total January 4, 1977-----	168

I have no knowledge, nor have I seen any evidence of any political employees or activity within the Interpol General Secretariat or National Central Bureaus of member countries.

A list of Interpol member countries, the staffing of National Central Bureaus and a list of the United States National Central Bureau staff follows:

## INTERPOL MEMBER COUNTRIES

Algeria	Egypt	Mali
Argentina*	El Salvador	Malta
Australia	Ethiopia	Mauritania
Austria	Fiji	Mauritius
Bahamas	Finland	Mexico
Bahrain	Netherlands Antilles	Monaco
Belgium*	New Zealand	Nauru
Bermuda	Nicaragua	Nepal
Bolivia	Niger	Netherlands
Brazil	Nigeria	Senegal
Brunei	Norway	Sierra Leone
Burma	Oman	Singapore
Burundi	Pakistan	Somalia
Cameroon	Panama	Spain
Canada	Peru	Sri Lanka
Central African Rep.	Philippines	Sudan
France	Portugal	Surinam
Gebon	Qatar	Swaziland
Germany, Fed. Rep. of*	Romania	Sweden*
Ghana	Rwanda	Switzerland
Gibraltar (Terr. of)	Saudi Arabia	Syria
Greece	Iraq	Tanzania
Guatemala	Ireland	Thailand
Guinea	Israel	Togo
Guyana	Italy*	Trinidad and Tobago
Haiti	Ivory Coast	Tunisia*
Honduras	Jamaica	Turkey
Iceland	Japan	Uganda
India	Jordan	United Arab Emirates
Indonesia*	Kenya*	United Kingdom
Iran	Korea, Rep. of	United States*
Chad	Kuwait	Upper Volta
Chile	Laos	Uruguay
China, Rep. of	Lebanon	Venezuela
Colombia	Lesotho	Yugoslavia
Congo	Liberia	Zaire
Costa Rica	Libya	Zambia
Cyprus	Liechtenstein	Arab Rep. of Yemen
Dahomey	Luxembourg	Bangladesh
Denmark	Madagascar	New Guinea
Dominican Rep.	Malawi	
Ecuador	Malaysia	

\*Member of Executive Committee.

## NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAUS

Each member country has an Office within their official police staffed by their police officials which they refer to as their National Central Bureau. The U.S. NCB is located in the Department of Justice under the supervision of the Deputy Attorney General, the United States Representative to Interpol, and the alternative U.S. Representative to Interpol, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement. The U.S. NCB is staffed by active Federal agents of the law enforcement agencies in the Departments of Justice and Treasury. Personnel presently assigned to the U.S. NCB are as follows.

<i>Name and agency</i>	<i>Position</i>
Louis B. Sims, U.S. Secret Service.....	Chief.
James O. Holmes, U.S. Customs Service.....	Deputy Chief.
Harold Leap, Drug Enforcement Administration.....	DEA Representative
Dale Chorpensing, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.....	ATF Representative.
Janice Stromsem, U.S. Customs Service.....	Translator.
Carolyn Bowden, Drug Enforcement Administration.....	Secretary.
Valerie Stanley, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.....	Clerk/stenographer.
Daniel Bonasera, Office of the Secretary, Department of Treasury.....	Do.
Patricia Henry, U.S. Secret Service.....	Do.
Beatrice Owens, U.S. Customs Service.....	Secretary.
Allyn Hoover, Office of the Secretary, Department of Treasury.....	Do.

*Question from Mr. Hall. Can you give any instances in the past where there have been any actual results that have come from your notification of these other one hundred twenty different areas—that have resulted in concrete evidence coming back, to convince the subcommittee—subsequent convictions.*

Mr. SIMS. In Fiscal Year 1976, the U.S. NCB assisted law enforcement units in the United States with 1,338 investigative requests to 109 foreign NCB's. In addition, assistance was provided by the U.S. NCB to both domestic and foreign law enforcement offices in cases which involved 1,105 arrests. In those cases where judicial action had been completed by the end of the fiscal year, 452 convictions and 72 acquittals, dismissals or not guilty verdicts were reported.

*Question from Mr. Hall. Going on to one other subject dealing with this: Of course we have read and heard lately about the remnants of the Nazi War criminals that are living in this country and possibly in the western hemisphere, the South American countries. Is that something that Interpol would become involved—in trying to locate those people?*

Mr. SIMS. Interpol would only assist in coordinating and communicating requests from the police/law enforcement of one country to the police/law enforcement of another country where an offense against the criminal statutes existed. Interpol would not be the appropriate channel for requesting assistance in matters of a political, racial, religious or military nature. Neither the Interpol General Secretariat, the Executive Committee nor the General Assembly can compel the police/law enforcement agencies of any country to assist in any type of investigation. The receiving country must make this decision within their own laws.

To be more responsive to your question we would have to know specifics, offenses in each case so a determination could be made.

*Question from Mr. Ellberg. We said that Interpol has been unwilling to provide assistance because of the political nature of the inquiry. And we asked that our United States representatives at Interpol raise this issue and seek the assistance of Interpol at the earliest opportunity.*

Secretary Simon replies with the communication that the names on the list submitted were checked against the files of Interpol, but nothing was found, but the letter then goes on to discuss matters political and it is fairly clear from the reading of this letter that this subject was regarded as political and therefore violative of the constitution of Interpol. Do you have any comments on that?

Mr. SIMS. Only to further state that if the matter is an offense against the criminal statutes, Interpol could assist in coordinating and communicating requests from the police of one country to the police of another. Also, that the country receiving the request must make the decision as to their laws as to what action, if any, they will take.

To be more responsive to your question the specifics and offense would have to be known.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. I would like to know whether the subject of alleged Nazi war criminals living in the United States is a subject that you would seek information on; whether or not there was any barrier in the constitution of regulations of Interpol that would have specific—would bar any such information being supplied.*

Mr. SIMS. If these persons have committed offenses against the criminal statutes, we would assist law enforcement authorities in the United States with requests to foreign police. These requests would follow the normal Interpol procedures of advising the foreign police of the type/specifics of the offense against the criminal statutes. I cannot at this time provide you with a more definitive answer since each case would no doubt have its own set of circumstances, offenses, etc. and therefore, a generalization cannot be made.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. What assistance could be rendered by the various National Central Bureaus in assistance in investigating Nazis currently residing in the United States? What kind of help do you think can be obtained?*

Mr. SIMS. This would depend on the circumstances of each individual case and whether or not an offense has been committed against the criminal statutes. If so, the request would be forwarded from the law enforcement agency in the United States to the appropriate foreign police, advising the foreign police as to the type case and specific offense against the criminal statutes. The deciding factor would be the foreign police and what action they could take under their own laws, with regard to the specific offense.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. We have been dealing specifically in this area, but have not had a opportunity to check the names of the people—I am just renewing my request of you at this time.*

*We want to talk about getting help from Interpol abroad, not from Interpol in the United States. We have tried many ways to find witnesses in the United States.*

Mr. SIMS. When you speak of Interpol abroad, the Interpol National Central Bureau in each country is actually the police of that country. Each National Central Bureau is an office within their police, staffed by their police. Therefore, if the request is referred to the U.S. NCB by a law enforcement agency in the United States, setting forth the type case and the specific offense against the criminal statutes, this request would be communicated to the foreign police. The foreign police then make the determination, based upon the criminal offense and circumstances, as to what action they can take within their own laws.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. And I might add that I have read a book by Mr. Farrago, in which he deals extensively with Nazi war criminals in South America and he refers repeatedly to information that has come to him from Interpol. Now we want access to that information, particularly with regard to Nazis living in the United States.*

Mr. SIMS. On April 27, 1977, the Secretary General of Interpol advised that he has no knowledge of this matter, or Mr. Farrago, nor do the records of the Secretariat have any reference to him at anytime.

*Question from Mr. Hall. I note that in Appendix III of the GAO report that it gives the summary of some 19 cases processed by the United States Bureau.*

*Without going into those specific cases, it appears that most of these cases could just as easily be handled by the United State Consul or routinely by the Embassy or Consular liaison with the local police. I am sure that you have reviewed these case studies, and are they indicative of the majority of the cases handled by the U.S. Bureau, and do you have any example of cases of more than routine importance handled by the United States Bureau in the past year?*

Mr. SIMS. I believe the following information taken directly from the U.S. NCB Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1976 will give you a good indication of the variety and magnitude of cases handled.

"I. Specific investigative requests from one Interpol member country to another result in the solution of numerous crimes.

"A request by a country in the South Pacific enabled an agent of a U.S. Federal law enforcement agency to uncover evidence of the exporting of luxury sports cars to defraud the lending institutions which held liens on them.

"Agents of U.S. Federal investigative agency interviewed a subject based on a request by a West European NCB, and obtained a confession of mutiny and quadruple murder aboard a South American ship. The killer was extradited to South America for trial.

"II. Often the arrest of an international criminal in one country leads to the solution of crimes in other countries.

"When the police of a European country arrested one of their citizens for robbery and taking hostages, he admitted to a string of bank robberies in the United States. This was furnished to a U.S. Federal investigative agency. A trace of a firearm found in the subject's possession abroad, showed that he had bought the gun in the same state where the bank robberies were committed.

"A man arrested in South America confessed to a murder in a large United States city and the foreign police also recovered the pistol used in the crimes.

"A local police department asked for a check in Europe on a man suspected of defrauding a Rabbi. There was no record under the subject's name, but foreign police supplied a photograph of a man who had used a similar 'modus operandi'. The Rabbi identified the photograph and an international wanted notice was issued for the swindler.

"A rapist was about to be released in the United States because none of his numerous victims would testify to the crimes he committed upon them. Through ICPO a witness was found in another country who agreed to testify. The suspect was held for trial.

"A request to foreign police regarding a subject suspected of having stolen a gun in the United States revealed the suspect had declared the stolen weapon to officials when he arrived in a European city. The information was passed to the subject's embassy by a U.S. Federal investigative agency, since his country is not a member of Interpol, for follow-up action in his country.

"A U.S. Federal investigative agency requested assistance regarding a man found to possess passports from various countries in different names. The man was identified as a fugitive with several convictions in Europe, and the passports were found to have been stolen. He was deported from the United States, convicted and imprisoned in Europe.

"III. In many instances, the inquiries requested through Interpol channels either clears the suspect or determines he has no prior criminal history.

"An investigation by a State Police department of a man suspected of murder proved that the subject was in this country, applying for a job, on the date the murder was committed in Europe.

"IV. Interpol members are notified when one of their citizens is arrested or the subject of a criminal investigation by the police of other member countries. The country making the notification furnishes details of the offense, to determine if the person is presently engaged in similar criminal activity, is wanted for criminal offenses or previously convicted of criminal offenses.

"The U.S. NCB, through inquiries in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), and the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) and the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS), determines the location of fugitives and other persons wanted by law enforcement agencies in the United States at the local, state and federal levels.

"The subject of an inquiry from South America was checked through TECS and found to be wanted by a U.S. Federal investigative agency in connection with the terrorist bombings of a police station and an airport. He was deported to the United States for trial.

"A man wanted in the United States for perjury was arrested in a country in the South Pacific. Several guns found in his possession were traced. The man was charged with a bank robbery and murder, committed in the foreign country with these weapons.

"A man convicted for a \$50,000 extortion in the United States was identified as being wanted for a similar crime committed in his native country. After completing his sentence here, he will be deported to face trial there.

"By coordinating information supplied by a U.S. Federal investigative agency, a major drug trafficker, wanted in the United States, was arrested as he attempted to enter a European country on a flight from a country in the eastern Mediterranean. He was extradited to the United States for trial.

"Other examples of the types of fugitives located and apprehended abroad include subjects wanted in the United States for: (a) Grand larceny (b) A half million dollar fraud (c) 63 counts of mail fraud (d) Illegal sale of machine guns (e) A \$2,000,000 fraud (\$207,995 was found beneath the fireplace in his European apartment) (f) Robbery (g) Murder (h) Other criminal violations.

"V. Persons encountered by police in this country are often found to be wanted abroad.

"(a) A person arrested by police in the United States was wanted for extortion in Europe.

"(b) Two men encountered by U.S. Federal investigative agents working undercover were wanted in Europe for murder.

"(c) A man arrested by local police was wanted for highway robbery in South America.

"VI. TECS entries of foreign fugitives and stolen property available to the Federal investigative agencies at all border crossing points around the United States, bring about numerous arrests and recoveries of stolen property.

"(a) Agents intercepted several thousand dollars worth of technical equipment stolen from a country in the South Pacific.

"(b) An individual entering the United States was found to have \$21,000 in undeclared currency.

"VII. Routine background checks turn up valuable information in many cases.

"A sheriff in the United States made an inquiry concerning a man who claimed to be employed by a foreign revenue service. The individual was found to be an imposter with a record for fraud.

"An applicant for a police agency in the United States was found to have convictions for theft, auto theft and other crimes in Europe. He had indicated no arrests on his application.

"VIII. Interpol assists police in the identification of unknown bodies and in the tracing of missing persons where foul play is suspected.

"The police of one European country noticed that the description of a missing United States citizen matched the description of an unidentified body found bound in a river in another European country. Through fingerprints, the body was identified as that of a missing United States citizen. A murder investigation is now underway.

"A missing American was found alive and safe in a prison abroad, serving time for trafficking in heroin.

"The usefulness and effectiveness of the United States participation in Interpol is limited only by the degree of its utilization by law enforcement agencies in the United States. As Interpol facilities and capabilities become better known to the American police agencies at all levels, the effectiveness of the fight against crime increases."

*Question from Mr. Hall. Is there any established number of people from the United States that work for Interpol in not only the United States, but in the one hundred and twenty foreign countries that are involved in Interpol?*

Mr. SIMS. No United States law enforcement personnel are employed in Interpol National Central Bureaus abroad. Two U.S. law enforcement personnel are employed at the Interpol General Secretariat. One DEA Agent works in the Drug Sub-division and one Customs Agent works in the International Fraud Sub-division. The DEA Agent has been assigned since February 1974 and the Customs Agent temporarily assigned since February 15, 1977.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. Before I call on Mr. Sawyer—another very serious bit of information, if it's true, has come to us very recently in preparation for this hearing, namely, that during the Nixon Administration that Mr. Gordon Liddy is said to have used information that was available through Interpol in connection with obtaining contributions from foreign corporations. Do you know anything about that?*

Mr. SIMS. The Chief of the U.S. NCB from June 1969 to September 1974, which is the period to which you refer, was Kenneth S. Giannoules, U.S. Secret Service. Mr. Giannoules has stated that Mr. Gordon Liddy was not in any way involved with Interpol and did not have access to any Interpol documents or communication facilities.

Should you at anytime desire to question Mr. Giannoules or Mr. Sims further on this issue, both will be happy to assist in any way possible.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. Do you have any idea as to whether an Interpol office in the Treasury was ever abused or misused for political purposes during those administrations?*

Mr. SIMS. I again refer to Mr. Giannoules' testimony on February 24, 1976 before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations. [See p. 89 this appen-

dix.] Also, I can state without any reservation that during my tenure as Chief, U.S. NCB, since September 1974, I have seen no attempt, nor any misuse, of Interpol for political or any other purposes.

*Question from Mr. Sawyer. Approximately how many agents—if that is what you would call that category of personnel—do we have operating or assigned to the National Central Bureau.*

Mr. SIMS. There are four active Federal agents: Chief, Louis B. Sims, U.S. Secret Service; Deputy Chief, James Holmes, U.S. Customs Service; DEA Representative, Harold Leap; and ATF Representative, Dale Chorpenning.

The Department of Justice plans to assign one Federal Bureau of Investigation agent and one Immigration and Naturalization Service agent to the U.S. NCB in the near future.

*Question from Mr. Sawyer. And you feel that this kind of—just information gathering—couldn't be done out of a Consulate or Embassy in many foreign countries, or just by their contacting some local police forces and just asking them to get the information?*

Mr. SIMS. Perhaps it could be done. However, I would question its effectiveness, timeliness, desirability, uniformity, privacy safeguards and costs, all of which are most important to this function.

An alternative to handling these matters through Interpol would be to station law enforcement personnel from the various agencies at each U.S. Embassy in 125 countries. The cost would be exorbitant and an office in the U.S. would be required to coordinate all requests to and from police agencies. Also, some means of communication would be required with the police both within the United States and abroad. State Department Communications would only communicate with U.S. Embassies abroad.

*Question from Mr. Sawyer. What does the Secretary General do other than act at a fan-out for one hundred and twenty-five telegrams?*

Mr. SIMS. The Secretary General is responsible for the day to day operation of the General Secretariat, which includes the supervision of three police subdivisions, responsible for the coordination and communication of numerous investigative requests between member countries.

The Secretary General is also responsible for planning, preparing for and carrying out symposiums almost monthly, concerning all types of criminal activity and the General Assembly which occurs annually.

*Question from Mr. Sawyer. Could we get some idea, approximately, if you know—how many people are employees of the General Secretariat in Paris—just approximately?*

Mr. SIMS. One hundred and sixty-eight persons.

*Question from Mr. Sawyer. Are there standards for personnel at NCB's and General Secretariat, or their security criteria, or anything of that type?*

Mr. SIMS. The National Central Bureaus are offices within the official police of each member country, staffed by their police officials. Therefore, the same criteria exist for officials assigned to Interpol as they do for law enforcement officials.

The General Secretariat conducts record checks on non-police personnel recruited and employed by the General Secretariat. The active police officials and those recently retired from active duty as police are vouched for by their police agency. Therefore, no record checks are conducted. No one employed at the General Secretariat has a criminal history. Every non-police employee is required to sign a declaration that he, or she, will maintain professional secrecy concerning all matters that come to their knowledge in their daily work.

The Secretary General has the ultimate responsibility for hiring General Secretariat employees.

*Question from Mr. Sawyer. Could you provide a yearly breakdown—not categorize—but a yearly number of requests that both were incoming from other countries to our National Central Bureau and the number of inquiries that we made to others since 1958.*

Mr. SIMS. The earliest statistics available are for the last half of Fiscal Year 1960. The statistics for Fiscal Year 1969 through 1976 are as follows:

Fiscal year	Individual inquiries sent to foreign police	Individual requests received from foreign police
1969 (½ yr.)-----	1, 621	481
1970 -----	5, 257	982
1971 -----	6, 544	1, 317
1972 -----	10, 063	1, 621
1973 -----	15, 211	2, 820
1974 -----	14, 588	2, 290
	Cases sent to foreign police <sup>1</sup>	Cases received from foreign police <sup>1</sup>
1975 -----	641	2, 406
1976 -----	1, 338	2, 653

<sup>1</sup> 1 case may have 1 or several individual inquiries, where in the years 1969-74 each inquiry is reflected.

Other case statistics for Fiscal Year 1975 and Fiscal Year 1976 which were not included in the above statistics are as follows:

	Noncriminal police support <sup>1</sup>	Criminal all points bulletins	Criminal wanted circular
1975 -----	93	297	900
1976 -----	109	336	400

<sup>1</sup> Technical assistance/information in areas of equipment, personnel management, drug and explosive detection, etc.

*Question from Mr. Lilberg. Pursuing that a little further, what association, if any, did the following individuals have to Interpol, the United States National Central Bureau—E. Krogh, Gordon Liddy, Edward L. Morgan and J. C. H. Bryant, Jr. Do you know anything about that?*

Mr. Sims. Mr. Egil Krogh of the White House staff, only had contact with Interpol through his responsibility for the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotic Control (CCINC) His only contact through CCINC was in the area of attempting to have Interpol become more involved in the gathering and exchange of information in narcotic cases. The program was not implemented and at no time did Mr. Krogh have access to any Interpol records or communication facilities.

Mr. Edward Morgan was an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Enforcement, Operations and Tariff Affairs). In this position he attended the 1973 General Assembly in Vienna, Austria. Although one of his functions was to supervise the U.S. NCB, he had no access to any Interpol records or communication facilities.

Mr. Gordon Liddy had no connection to Interpol, nor any access to Interpol records or communication facilities.

J. C. H. Bryant was a Confidential Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs and Operations). The following testimony was given by Mr. Kenneth Giannoules during testimony before the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee on Appropriations on February 24, 1976.

[The following excerpt was submitted by Mr. Sims]

#### UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL

Senator MONTOYA. During your service at the National Central Bureau, were any persons assigned to you whose law enforcement background was not what you would have regarded as particularly strong or suited for this kind of work?

Mr. GIANNOULES. Yes, sir.

Senator MONTOYA. Will you name those individuals and state why you did not consider them to fall within this category?

Mr. GIANNOULES. The one and only was a man by the name of J. C. Herbert Bryant, Jr. I did not feel he met the qualifications for staffing in the National Central Bureau since he was not a qualified active Federal law enforcement

agent to which I had previously indicated in my policy recommendations to the previous Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

Senator MONTTOYA. After he was brought on board, did you feel he was not qualified?

Mr. GIANNOULES. He was not qualified to perform the full tasks of an agent in the National Central Bureau.

Senator MONTTOYA. Who hired Mr. Bryant?

Mr. GIANNOULES. At that time Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, Operations and Tariff Affairs, Mr. Edward Morgan.

Senator MONTTOYA. Did J. C. Herbert Bryant have any Civil Service classification, or was he hired by request?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir. Maybe I can answer that. We have a little information sheet on Mr. Bryant, knowing that you were going to ask about it, Mr. Chairman. He was assigned to Interpol February 20, 1973. He terminated January 4, 1974.

His title was Confidential Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Tariff Affairs, and Operations, although he was apparently working in Interpol. Grade GS-14. Experience: U.S. Navy, 1958 to 1962. Department of the Interior, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Interior for Enforcement Activities, April 1971 to January 20, 1973. White House, July 1970 to April 1971. August 1969 to July 1970, President of the Salem Yacht Sales. Maybe I should introduce this and let it stand in the record.

Senator MONTTOYA. Fine.

[The information follows:]

Assigned to Interpol: February 20, 1973.

Resigned: January 4, 1974.

Title: Confidential Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Enforcement, Tariff and Trade Affairs and Operations).

Grade: GS 301-14-1—\$24,247 per annum.

Experience:

1. U.S. Navy—November 18, 1958 to August 24, 1962.
2. Dept. of Interior—April 19, 1971 to January 20, 1973 GS-13—Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Interior for Enforcement Activities.
3. White House—July 1970—April 1971, Staff Assistant to Ron Zeigler—Salary \$1 per year.
4. August 1969—July 1970—President, Salem Yacht Sales, Inc., Miami, Florida—\$29,000 annually.
5. May 1967—August 1969—Austin Ford Inc., Miami, Florida.

Senator MONTTOYA. Did you receive any communication from the White House that he should go on board?

Mr. GIANNOULES. No, sir, I did not.

Senator MONTTOYA. It was really handled through Secretary Morgan.

Mr. GIANNOULES. Yes, sir.

Senator MONTTOYA. Was he discharged from this position?

Mr. GIANNOULES. It is my understanding he resigned in January 1974.

Senator MONTTOYA. What were his duties with Interpol during the time he was with you?

Mr. GIANNOULES. Since he was not what I considered a qualified Federal agent or an active Federal special agent within an agency, I did not feel he had the qualifications to perform the routine daily criminal liaison activities.

He therefore handled the nonenforcement type work, the public service type work that the office gets involved in, such as notification of the next of kin of American citizens who have died abroad. This is a service Interpol performs on occasion, as well as notification concerning U.S. citizens' property which is lost or stolen abroad. Also, an inquiry from a U.S. enforcement agency or even perhaps from the Congress regarding missing constituents overseas. He handled those types of requests.

I might add, Senator, that all items that he did handle were under my control, under my very strict control of my Assistant's supervision in my absence.

Senator MONTTOYA. That was pretty good pay for somebody who was doing that kind of work, \$24,247.

Were any other individuals in this category?

Mr. GIANNOULES. No, sir.

Senator MONTTOYA. He was the only one.

Mr. GIANNOULES. Yes, sir.

*Question from Mr. Bilberg. What types of information do we provide to foreign governments when a request is made for all relevant criminal and background information relating to a particular United States citizen? And please try to be specific.*

Mr. SIMS. First, the request from the foreign police must set forth the type of investigation so that it can be determined what is involved, i.e. type of criminal activity, arrest charges, investigation, etc. The foreign police are making the same type request that our law enforcement agencies make abroad, can the individual concerned be positively identified through fingerprints, identifying data (date and place of birth, physical description, parents names if known) photograph, passport data; does the individual have a history of criminal activity (arrests, convictions) in this country similar to those he is either engaged in, or suspected of being engaged in abroad and, if so, to what extent (court records, investigative reports where pertinent). The request may also involve interviews of associates, other suspects, witnesses, etc. in the case. Release of this information under the "Third Agency Rule" is the prerogative of the agency originating the information.

The U.S. NCB then provides a second screening to determine that the information to be furnished is in accordance with the Privacy Act, is pertinent to the investigation and does not include personal, political or racial type data.

The policies and procedures of the U.S. NCB set forth the above described safeguards for protecting the rights and privacy of the individual.

The information provided does not at any time include information of a personal, political, racial or religious nature and is limited to information of the following types, depending on the specific offense: data of subject of the investigation (date and place of birth, passport data and photograph and fingerprints in some instances); criminal arrest history and information relating to the specific type of offense; statements from victims, witnesses, co-defendants.

All information sent to foreign police is stamped by the U.S. NCB as follows:

"This material is not to be disseminated outside your organization except to Official Law Enforcement and/or Criminal Justice Agencies without the expressed permission of Interpol Washington."

In 1974 the United States introduced a resolution at the General Assembly, "Privacy of Information". The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly entitled, "Privacy of Information". The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly and the text is as follows:

"Noting the concern of many countries with the privacy of the individual with regard to criminal justice information, and

"Noting, in addition, that the development of international crime requires an exchange of information on an international basis,

"The I.C.P.O.-Interpol General Assembly, meeting in Cannes from 19th to 25th September 1974 at its 43rd session,

"Urges that in exchanging information the I.C.P.O.-Interpol NCBs and the General Secretariat take into account the privacy of the individual and strictly confine the availability of the information to official law enforcement and criminal justice agencies."

*Question from Mr. Bilberg. Is there any way that our National Central Bureau can verify whether a request is made for a legitimate law enforcement purpose?*

Mr. SIMS. The procedures of Interpol as set forth in a resolution introduced by the United States and adopted at the General Assembly in 1975, i.e. each request must include the type of investigation and enough detail for the receiving country to determine that it is a specific criminal investigation. The resolution, adopted in 1975 follows:

"Having noted the question on policy on investigations raised by the United States delegation,

"Considering that effective international police co-operation through I.C.P.O.-Interpol depends on the rapid exchange of information between countries,

"Stressing the fact that rapid exchange of information depends upon the degree of detail contained in a request submitted by one NOB to another during the course of an investigation, since much detail is of great assistance to all police services when making the enquiries requested; and assists in preventing any additional communications solely for the purpose of requesting details as to the type of investigations, etc..

"The I.C.P.O.-Interpol General Assembly, meeting in Buenos Aires from 9th to 15th October 1975 at its 44th session,

"Found it necessary that National Central Bureaus, requesting information—investigation—arrest, etc.—from either another NCB or the General Secretariat should:

"1. State clearly the reason for the request, indicating as far as possible the type of investigation involved, details of offense (dates of offense, charges, arrests, convictions, sentences, etc.)

"2. Give the fullest possible details when requesting information about persons, to assist in establishing their identities (date and place of birth, parents' names, nationality, passport number with date and place of issue, place of residence, fingerprints, etc.) as well as any other information likely to be of assistance to answering NCB.

"The NCB or General Secretariat receiving a request for information—investigation—arrest, etc., MUST answer as soon as possible or state reason for delay or inability to provide the information requested. Failure by NCB to respond in a timely manner tends to destroy the effectiveness of the I.C.P.O.-Interpol."

The U.S. NCB follows up with the foreign police to determine the judicial action taken.

*Question from Mr. Ellberg. A suggestion made in the Senate hearings again: Congress suggested that some of these requests may have been laundered, so to speak, that is, come from some Communist or other country and transmitted by a western country that we are accustomed to dealing with and have some confidence in, when the request comes in to the United States. Do you know of any such practice?*

Mr. SIMS. The Senate Hearings as I recall them, did not suggest that requests may have been "laundered", i.e. come from a non-member country through a member country. The Senate just asked if this is possible and are there any known instances of it happening.

Our response to the Senate Sub-Committee on Appropriations in 1975-76 and to this Committee is that it is possible. We have no knowledge of any attempts to do so. Regardless of where the request comes from, it receives the same screening upon receipt and upon a response being provided. Perhaps I should explain the type of request and information we are talking about. The request must concern a specific criminal matter and any information provided would be criminal history, convictions, identifying data, results of interviews with witnesses, associates, etc. concerning the specific investigation.

We would also request results of judicial action in the specific matter. It has been our experience that if you are dealing with a criminal and/or a criminal offense (Murder, fraud, drugs, robbery, rape, firearms offenses, counterfeiting, thefts, etc.) and working with the police of Romania and Yugoslavia, two Soviet bloc countries that are members of Interpol, that your objective is the same, to solve a crime and apprehend the criminal. When United States citizens are victimized, be it your family, mine or someone else's and the criminal can be apprehended, it seems rather insignificant that it may be a Soviet bloc country. The screening procedure at the U.S. NCB includes a constant alertness for laundering or any type of request that may infringe on the rights and privacy of our citizens.

*Question from Mr. Ellberg. Do we provide information on all convictions for misdemeanors and felonies?*

Mr. SIMS. First, the same screening process goes on as just described. The arrest history and/or convictions may involve both felonies and misdemeanors. If the person has one arrest for public drunkenness, fighting or some similar type misdemeanor, information would not be provided; however, if the individual had repeated arrests for these types of offenses, this criminal history would be provided. It should be noted that since about 1974, the FBI has not recorded "minor offenses" on the arrest record. This problem always exists in obtaining dispositions where the arrest(s) appear on the FBI record, but some dispositions are not reflected to indicate if the individual was convicted, found not guilty, deported, etc. Although efforts have been made by the FBI to obtain this information from law enforcement agencies in this country and efforts are made by the U.S. NCB to obtain these where they are not reflected on the FBI arrest record, this is not always possible. Prior to any arrest record being provided to foreign police, if the disposition is not reflected with regard to any specific arrest, the notation "Not known if convicted" is included.

*Question from Mr. Ellberg. Do you provide information on all outstanding warrants that may have been issued for an individual.*

Mr. SIMS. After the request from the foreign police received the screening as previously described, if the subject is wanted in this country, the foreign police

would be advised. The suspect's location and status (arrested, convicted, etc.) would be determined from the foreign police and this information would be provided to the police in the country who have the "wanted" for this person. It will also be determined from the police agency in the United States if they plan to pursue provisional arrest and extradition of the wanted person. If so, the U.S. NCB assists them in contacting the appropriate office in the Department of State and/or the Government Regulations and Labor Section in the Department of Justice. Depending on the determination reached by the Department of State concerning provisional arrest and extradition, the foreign police are advised as to whether or not a request will be made by the Department of State.

*Question from Mr. Hall. Is there anyone that can overrule. Suppose you make a request to Interpol for information on a person living in Rome, and you think that it is a legitimate request that they should supply information to you—at the other end of the line, the receiving line, they come back and say, "That is not a legitimate request." Does the United States have any method of appeal from that person who made that answer to you?*

Mr. SIMS. First, the Interpol General Secretariat has no authority to direct or tell any country to respond to a request. Each country acts within its own laws and makes their own determination.

In the example of a request to Rome, no one could overrule, it is a decision for authorities in Rome. In most instances of this type, the foreign police need more information relating to the specific criminal offense involved. There are few examples of where the request involves a specific criminal investigation and adequate information is provided when the foreign police are not responsive.

*Question from Mr. Bilberg. How many requests were made by the United States National Central Bureau and of these requests how many are initiated by Federal law enforcement Agencies and by local law enforcement agencies?*

Mr. SIMS. During Fiscal Year 1975, the U.S. NCB made requests to foreign police in 641 cases, (each case may involve one or several individual requests abroad). Of the 641 cases, 236 were requested by local, county and state authorities and 394 by Federal agencies.

During Fiscal Year 1976, the U.S. NCB made requests to foreign police in 1338 cases, 372 of which were from local, county and state authorities and 580 from Federal agencies.

Local, county and state law enforcement are most cooperative to requests from foreign police, as it is a two way street. They are receiving information from the foreign police that a person from their community or area of jurisdiction is involved in crime abroad.

*Question from Mr. Sawyer. I presume that what you would furnish to a foreign government or Interpol would be standard rap sheets that are available to the FBI. Am I correct?*

Mr. SIMS. As described in some detail in a prior question, the criminal arrest record, FBI rap sheet or whatever term is used to refer to it, is forwarded to foreign police as set forth in a prior response to dissemination of information abroad. It should also be noted that all information forwarded to foreign police is stamped by the U.S. NCB as follows:

"This material is not to be disseminated outside your organization except to Official Law Enforcement and/or Criminal Justice Agencies without the expressed permission of Interpol Washington."

*Question from Mr. Sawyer. Let's assume that somebody committed a murder, let's say in England, and they had reason to believe that the person was in the United States. How would our Interpol office—if they wanted confirmation in checking on this—what would you do; how do you go about finding out if that individual is here and locating him where he is?*

Mr. SIMS. If the authorities from the United Kingdom provided identifying data and a possible location, the matter would be sent to the local, county or state authorities in that area to determine subject's location and verify his identity. If no location was given, INS, FBI, Customs and other agencies, if pertinent to the situation, would be informed of the request from abroad and requested to advise if they know of this suspect or his location and arrest history. If a United States citizen, the U.S. Passport Office would be queried to determine if the subject has been issued a passport, to check his identity and also address for location purposes. In many instances, this identity check determines that the name of the person who the foreign police want is a name assumed by the person who committed the act. The person whose name has been used, in many instances, lost their passport, wallet or had them stolen. This information is then provided to the foreign police after appropriate screening.

*Question from Mr. Sawyer. Why wouldn't Scotland Yard, who is in constant contact with the FBI, and as a matter of fact, with a number of police agencies, deal direct with the FBI rather than go through Interpol.*

Mr. SIMS. In some instances they no doubt do use the FBI, particularly if the offense is within the jurisdiction of the FBI. If the offense, such as a "homicide," is not within the FBI jurisdiction, or any other Federal agency, the FBI representative, DEA representative, Customs representative or any other Federal law enforcement agency representatives may assist the foreign police in the interest of liaison and police cooperation. In this instance, where it is not in their jurisdiction, Scotland Yard must send, or give it to the U.S. Agency representative at the American Embassy. The Representative then transmits the request to his headquarters in Washington by Embassy Channels or letter. The headquarters in Washington then transmits the request to their office in the geographical area of interest. If it is meant for local police, it is then communicated or carried to the police.

If a request of this nature from Scotland Yard is sent through Interpol channels, it can be sent from Scotland Yard via Interpol radio telecommunications directly to the U.S. NCB and from the U.S. NCB by message directly to the police agency/department concerned.

The most important aspect of this question is that Interpol has 125 member countries and communications and coordination established to communicate with the police of these countries. The following list will reflect the forty-four countries where at least one U.S. Federal law enforcement representative is located. The FBI is located in 14 countries, INS 9, Customs 9, Secret Service 1, DEA 40 and IRS 14.

Country	FBI	DEA	CUS	INS	IRS	U.S.S.S.
Afghanistan		X				
Argentina	X	X				
Australia					X	
Austria		X		X		
Belgium		X				
Bolivia		X				
Brazil	X	X			X	
Canada	X	X	X	X	X	
Chile		X				
Colombia		X				
Costa Rica		X				
Denmark		X				
Ecuador		X				
England	X	X	X		X	
France	X	X	X		X	X
Germany	X	X	X	X	X	
Greece		X		X		
Guatemala		X				
Hong Kong	X	X	X	X		
India		X				
Indonesia		X				
Iran		X				
Italy	X	X	X	X	X	
Jamaica		X				
Japan	X	X	X	X	X	
Korea		X				
Malaysia		X				
Mexico	X	X	X	X	X	
Morocco		X				
Netherlands		X				
Pakistan		X				
Panama		X				
Paraguay		X				
Peru		X				
Philippin s	X	X		X	X	
Singapore		X				
South Africa					X	
Spain	X	X				
Switzerland	X	X				
Thailand		X				
Taiwan			X			
Turkey		X				
Uguyay		X			X	
Venezuela	X	X			X	

As the above chart reflects, except for the DEA Representatives who are located in 40 foreign countries to handle drug matters, other Federal agencies have representatives located in 14 or less countries.

*Question from Mr. Sawyer. Would it be fair to say that Interpol is really used by the underdeveloped or smaller countries.*

Mr. SIMS. No, that is not an accurate statement. Interpol is used extensively by the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Federal German Republic, Austria, Canada, Israel and many others.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. Getting back to "alleged Nazi War Crimes" for the moment. Has the United States or our National Central Bureau ever requested Interpol for assistance in investigating Nazis either by introducing resolutions at assembly meetings or meetings of the Executive Committee or by any other method?*

Mr. SIMS. I find no record of the United States having introduced any resolutions concerning investigation of Nazi War Crimes nor any other war crimes.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. I wonder if you could undertake to find out whether we could really do this at the next meeting. We are very interested in that subject.*

Mr. SIMS. At your request, the United States brought this matter up for discussion by the Interpol Executive Committee which met May 3-6, 1977.

The Executive Committee has learned from authorities in Israel that the Israeli Supreme Court, as a result of requests from United States citizens, recently considered assistance provided by Interpol in the area of Nazi criminals. The Court found that they are satisfied with Interpol and the assistance provided by Interpol in these matters.

The Executive Committee confirmed that Interpol will not become involved in matters that are political. They also confirmed the present Interpol policy, that if the person being sought is the subject of a criminal investigation concerning an offense against the criminal statutes, the Interpol member country receiving the request will assist in accordance with that country's laws. Irregardless of any action taken on the part of the General Assembly, Executive Committee or General Secretariat, the decision of assistance and cooperation in any and all cases rests with the country receiving the request. For these reasons each request must be considered separately and not necessarily by Interpol but the police authorities receiving the request.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. When the NCIC is tapped by our National Central Bureau for information, can the Department of Justice determine whether the source of the request is a foreign government or a domestic law enforcement agency? Is the information made available, depending on whether the source was foreign or domestic?*

Mr. SIMS. All requests from the U.S. NCB are concerned with a request from foreign police and the FBI is aware of this. The U.S. NCB does not make NCIC inquiries for agencies in the United States on all written requests to the FBI, this NCB specifies that it is for foreign police.

I think it is important to define the type information in NCIC; warrants outstanding for criminal offense, arrest and conviction history and stolen property, including securities, automobiles, boats, etc.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. The GAO report noted that "49% of the cases the requestors had provided insufficient data. In fact, in some cases no reason was given at all for requests by foreign governments for biographical information and criminal histories of United States citizens. This is certainly disturbing and would you please comment on this GAO finding."*

Mr. SIMS. The GAO report refers to 49% of the 110 cases they reviewed. The U.S. NCB handles in excess of 4000 each year. The report further states that in eight instances the U.S. NCB furnished information to foreign police agencies where the foreign police agency failed to provide adequate documentation to support its request and suggests that this occurred in a number of cases.

The following descriptions of the cases to which GAO refers will clearly indicate that the GAO report lacked completeness and thus was misleading with regard to this issue.

"In three of these cases, no information was supplied to the foreign police agency; in three other cases, only official police arrest records were provided (each of the three subjects had one or more prior convictions); in one case, only the data necessary to verify the identity of a person was furnished; and

in another case, the inquiry was initiated by police authorities in this country. In certain instances in order to expedite investigations, the U.S. NCB did request information from domestic agencies before it received sufficient supporting data from the foreign police agency, but in each case additional information, adequate to justify the inquiry, was received by the U.S. NCB before the requested data was released to the foreign police.

"In some instances record checks were made, the foreign police agency was promptly advised that a suspect or a person under arrest had no prior criminal record, and his physical description was provided. This procedure is desirable because providing foreign police with such data permits positive identification of a suspect and prevents impostors from using stolen documents to pose as a legitimate U.S. citizen and possibly creating a police record in the name of an innocent American. Since the GAO report does not describe the limited extent of the 'biographical data' furnished in such cases, it permits the implication that the reports include a large volume of personal information. Actually, the reports include no more than the suspect's date and place of birth, parents' names, occupation, passport number with date of issue, and photograph."

*Question from Mr. Cook. Another area of which the GAO report was somewhat critical dealt with the United States receipt of information once we forwarded the information to a foreign government and that was that we failed to receive any information on the final disposition of the matter that was being investigated. Do you know whether we do, on a routine basis, receive information from any foreign government which has requested data from us?*

Mr. SIMS. The GAO report suggests that the U.S. NCB has been negligent in its efforts to follow up reports of foreign arrests to determine whether the subjects have been convicted. Yet the report also states that the U.S. NCB has followed up with requests for this information and has a procedure to pursue these requests at 90 or 180 day intervals until the disposition information is obtained.

The policy of the U.S. NCB is that the files remain open until the outcome is known. The final disposition of a case frequently cannot be determined until judicial action is completed.

I believe at this point it would be beneficial to include the official response of February 11, 1977 to the GAO Report on Interpol.

#### ATTACHMENT

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,  
Washington, D.C., February 11, 1977.

Hon. JACK BROOKS,  
Chairman, Government Operations Committee,  
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is the Treasury Department's response, as required, by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, to the General Accounting Office's report entitled, "United States Participation in Interpol, the International Criminal Police Organization", ID-76-77.

We were pleased to note the report acknowledges that the Treasury office which handles Interpol matters, the U.S. National Central Bureau (U.S. NCB), has not been disseminating information on the personal habits and political activities of U.S. citizens, and that GAO investigators did not find any instances where information supplied by the U.S. NCB was improperly used by foreign entities.

In spite of some of its favorable findings, however, the report, including the digest, seems to create an erroneous impression that there has been less than adequate supervision and control of the dissemination of information on American citizens and permanent resident aliens. The facts do not support such a conclusion. The U.S. NCB, always alert to possibilities for perfecting its operation has, over a period of time, initiated improvements in its procedures for disseminating information. As a matter of fact, most of the actions recommended in the GAO report had been undertaken by the U.S. NCB prior to the GAO inquiry.

In order to fulfill the purpose of U.S. participation in Interpol, the U.S. NCB has had to face the sensitive task of responding to numerous requests from police agencies in other countries. The U.S. NCB has a standard procedure for screening such requests. That procedure requires a requesting foreign police agency to provide detailed and specific information before any data is released. This requirement gives the U.S. NCB the opportunity to insure that the informa-

tion requested is *relevant* to the investigation being conducted abroad and is provided in compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and other U.S. statutes governing Federal investigative agencies. It would be impracticable to draw up written procedures to cover every possible contingency and to provide detailed guidance for deciding what information is relevant in each case. To issue precise guidelines, purporting to cover every situation that might arise, would be self-deluding and serve no useful purpose.

While the report comments on the funding and other costs associated with the United States' participation in Interpol, it fails to point out the valuable benefits that the U.S. derives from that participation. For example, in Fiscal Year 1976, the U.S. NCB assisted law enforcement units in the United States with 1,338 investigative requests to 109 foreign NCB's. In addition, assistance was provided by the U.S. NCB to both domestic and foreign law enforcement offices in cases which involved 1,705 arrests. In those cases where judicial action had been completed by the end of the fiscal year, 452 convictions and 72 acquittals, dismissals or not guilty verdicts were reported.

For your further information we are enclosing comments concerning certain specific instances in which we feel the report is misleading and inaccurate.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES J. FEATHERSTONE,  
*Deputy Assistant Secretary, (Enforcement).*

[The above letter and the following comments were also sent to the Honorable Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman of the Government Operations Committee, U.S. Senate.]

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY COMMENTS

1. The report states that in 8 instances the U.S. National Central Bureau furnished information to foreign police agencies where the foreign police agency failed to provide adequate documentation to support its request and suggests that this occurred in a number of cases. (*See*: pp. ii, 14, 17-18).

##### *Comment*

In three of these cases, no information was supplied to the foreign police agency; in three other cases, only official police arrest records were provided (each of the three subjects had one or more prior convictions); in one case, only the data necessary to verify the identity of a person was furnished; and in another case, the inquiry was initiated by police authorities in this country. In certain instances in order to expedite investigations, the U.S. NCB did request information from domestic agencies before it received sufficient supporting data from the foreign police agency, but in each case additional information, adequate to justify the inquiry, was received by the U.S. NCB before the requested data was released to the foreign police.

In some instances record checks were made, the foreign police agency was promptly advised that a suspect or a person under arrest had no prior criminal record, and his physical description was provided. This procedure is desirable because providing foreign police with such data permits positive identification of a suspect and prevents impostors from using stolen documents to pose as a legitimate U.S. citizen and possibly creating a police record in the name of an innocent American. Since the GAO report does not describe the limited extent of the "biographical data" furnished in such cases, it permits the implication that the reports include a large volume of personal information. Actually, the reports include no more than the suspect's date and place of birth, parents' names, occupation, passport number with date of issue, and photograph.

2. The GAO report erroneously creates the impression that the U.S. NCB operates with inadequate guidelines.

##### *Comment*

The U.S. NCB is staffed by professional Federal law enforcement officers and operates under the various legal restrictions and regulatory guidelines which apply to all Federal agencies, including the Privacy Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and the third-agency rule.

The third-agency rule recognizes that only the agency (local, county, state or Federal) that originates an investigative report can authorize its dissemination to a third-agency.

In addition, Interpol activities are guided and regulated by the Interpol Privacy of Information Resolution adopted by the Interpol General Assembly at its 43rd Session (September 19-25, 1974). That resolution urges Interpol NCBs and the General Secretariat to take into account the privacy of the individual and strictly confine the availability of information to official law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. Furthermore, Article III of the Interpol Constitution states: "It is strictly forbidden for the Organization (Interpol) to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious, or racial character."

3. The GAO report states, on page 2, that the U.S. NCB, "has access to certain Federal and local government records".

*Comment*

This is inaccurate and incomplete. The U.S. NCB has no special access to such records. In response to a specific request for information relating to a properly identified subject that states the type investigation being conducted by the foreign police, a Federal, State or local law enforcement agency may, at its discretion, furnish the U.S. NCB with information pertaining to that subject. The nature and extent of the information furnished is determined by the collecting agency, based upon the law and regulations governing its actions and the facts of the specific investigation. Personnel assigned to the U.S. NCB are given access, on a case by case basis, to certain limited records of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Passport Office in order to locate or to verify the identity of persons arrested or under investigation abroad. The U.S. NCB has made no request for access to classified records at the U.S. Passport Office, nor is this information needed or desired.

Any information obtained from domestic agencies is screened by the professional Federal law enforcement agents at the U.S. NCB to insure that its release is in accordance with applicable guidelines and U.S. laws before it is forwarded to the foreign requesting agency.

Data available to the U.S. NCB through NCIC pertains only to persons for whom warrants have been issued. It consists of an individual's name, description, and the details of the arrest warrant. This information is available to all police agencies in the United States.

4. The GAO report recommends that the U.S. NCB "explore the need for better defined policy guidelines and operating procedures for the interaction of various overseas U.S. law enforcement agencies with the U.S. Bureau, foreign police and foreign national central bureaus." (See: pp. iv and 40).

*Comment*

This recommendation ignores the fact that overseas officers of U.S. law enforcement agencies act entirely independently of the U.S. NCB, and there is little, or no interaction between them and the U.S. NCB. The U.S. NCB has no authority whatsoever over U.S. law enforcement agency representatives abroad.

5. Throughout the GAO report the term "investigation" is frequently used in describing action taken in certain cases when a "record check" was all that occurred.

*Comment*

These terms mean quite different things, and the failure to differentiate between them is misleading. A "record check" is a simple inspection of existing files of one or more law enforcement agencies to determine whether or not the subject has previously come to the attention of, and is of record with, that agency or agencies. An "investigation" is an inquiry by law enforcement officers to gather information not previously known. The investigation may involve interviews with various individuals (suspects, arrestees, witnesses, etc.), location of suspects or wanted persons, or other legitimate investigative activities.

This misuse of terms has created an erroneous impression that U.S. NCB over reacted to a number of foreign requests and transmitted an excessive amount of information to foreign police when, in fact, only a record check was involved.

6. The GAO report states that foreign police agencies prefer to deal with U.S. agency representatives abroad rather than through Interpol channels (pages iii and 35).

*Comment*

The GAO report concedes that its investigators did not review U.S. agency files in each country and that "comparable statistical data" was unavailable.

The GAO representatives visited ten European, South American and Asian countries. They interviewed 14 foreign police/Interpol officials, 2 other foreign officials, and 47 U.S. agency representatives and State Department officials.

Obviously, the group interviewed cannot be considered a scientific sample or even a representative sample of law enforcement officials knowledgeable concerning Interpol. Over 75% of those interviewed had had little or no direct contact with Interpol, particularly with the U.S. NCB; and some may even regard Interpol as competition.

In November 1976, the U.S. NCB queried the national police of various countries, including those visited by the GAO investigators, regarding the number of investigative requests submitted through Interpol or U.S. agency representatives. The questions asked were:

(1) Please provide your best information concerning the number or volume of criminal investigative requests from your NCB or police to U.S. and the period of time they cover:

- (a) through Interpol channels.
- (b) through U.S. agency channels.

(2) What are your reasons for using one channel compared to the other?

(3) Do your answers reflect the views of:

- (a) NCB Chief
- (b) National Police
- (c) Other (Please list).

Seven countries responded with statistics based on survey periods ranging from one month to three years. The total figures showed 1,541 requests passed through Interpol compared with 814 requests sent to U.S. agency representatives abroad.

Where details were furnished, the foreign police agencies said that requests transmitted to or from U.S. agency representatives concerned immediate operational matters within the special jurisdiction of the U.S. agency concerned (DBA for drugs) or, in the case of the FBI, political matters outside the scope of the Interpol charter. One European country replied that, except for a very few exceptional cases initiated by U.S. agency representatives, all criminal matters are handled via Interpol. Three countries replied that all cases are handled through Interpol. Five countries replied that they had no records which would shed light on this question. These responses strongly suggest that the opinions expressed in the GAO report have not been properly substantiated and do not correspond with the facts.

The survey conducted by the U.S. NCB is available for inspection.

7. The GAO report suggests that the U.S. NCB has been negligent in its efforts to follow up reports of foreign arrests to determine whether the subjects have been convicted. Yet the report also states that the U.S. NCB has followed up with requests for this information and has a procedure to pursue these requests at 90 or 180 day intervals until the disposition information is obtained.

#### *Comment*

The final disposition of a case frequently cannot be determined until judicial action is completed. Files at the U.S. NCB remain open until the outcome is known.

*Question from Mr. Cook. Regarding the War Crimes, would you submit for the record some examples of interpretation of Article III of the constitution as to when did Interpol become involved in exchanging information regarding terrorists—previously Interpol maintained that terrorism, like Nazi War Crimes was "political" in nature and not within its mandate?*

Mr. SIMS. On April 28, 1977, the Interpol General Secretariat advised:

(1) Interpol has been cooperating on hijackings and bombings since 1966.

(2) Interpol engaged in this cooperation in application of General Assembly Resolutions, see Resolutions Kyoto 1967 Brussels 1970, Frankfurt 1972, Vienna 1973 and Cannes 1974 on Civil aviation security, also Frankfurt 1972 resolution on hostages and blackmail, Vienna 1973 on hostages and unlawful acts of international concern, and the paragraph of the above mentioned Cannes 1974 resolution concerning international crimes of violence. These resolutions have been made a part of this record.

To address your question concerning interpretation of the Interpol Constitution, if the request from police of one country to the police of another country through Interpol channels involves offenses against the criminal statutes, then it is considered a criminal matter and Interpol will assist in communicating and coordinating this request. The decision as to what action, if any, is to be taken

by the police receiving the request, rests solely with the agency receiving the request.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. Allegations have been made that Interpol personnel have misused official reports to engage in blackmail. Have you ever heard such allegations? Do you have any reason to believe that there is any substance to these allegations?*

Mr. SIMS. On February 24, 1976, Mr. Kenneth Giannoules, Chief of the United States National Central Bureau, Interpol, from June 1969 to September 1974, testified before the United States Senate Sub-Committee on Appropriations. The exact transcript of Mr. Giannoules testimony follows:

[The following was submitted by Mr. Sims.]

#### USES OF INTERPOL FACILITIES

Senator MONTOKA. Can you cite any instances of political misuse or abuse of Interpol, as was the case where the CIA, FBI or IRS were involved during the Nixon Administration?

Mr. GIANNOULES. No, sir. In my 5 years at the Bureau, I saw no such instances and no attempts to use the National Central Bureau for those purposes.

Senator MONTOKA. What about requests from within the Administration for information on individuals and the request to be made by Interpol Washington?

Mr. GIANNOULES. I did not receive any.

Senator MONTOKA. Did you know of any that were requested of other individuals working under your supervision?

Mr. GIANNOULES. If there has been, I would have seen them.

Senator MONTOKA. When it was under your supervision, did Interpol ever violate the privacy of Americans by sending to other countries information on them which had no bearing on police matters?

Mr. GIANNOULES. No, sir. I don't believe it did because of the rules of Interpol, both the charter of the organization and the constitution of the organization and the rules that I myself had established in the NCB, that all requests must be from a law enforcement agency or related to a criminal investigation.

Senator MONTOKA. Did you concern yourself with the possibility that the request may have been transmitted from a law enforcement agency through Interpol in that foreign country to Interpol in this country and answered, and that the request was going to serve the needs of an individual who might have requested it who was not within the circle of eligibility.

Mr. GIANNOULES. Senator, that possibility certainly exists then, as it exists now. The guidelines on that, to try to circumvent something like that, was strict compliance as far as requiring the other National Central Bureaus to give the full background of what the criminal investigation was all about, satisfying myself that it was a bona fide criminal investigation.

As far as something like that possibly happening, it could. However, in my staff's continuously looking at each and every individual request, I don't think it happened.

Senator MONTOKA. Do you feel that that could be a possibility and you wouldn't know it even if you tried to catch it?

Mr. GIANNOULES. I think by my own training and background as a Secret Service agent for 17 years, and as Mr. Sims said, certainly that is one reason why when I took over the NCB in 1969, I did insist that they have experience as a Federal agent.

Senator MONTOKA. But the possibility does exist that that could happen?

Mr. GIANNOULES. Yes.

Senator MONTOKA. You don't know that it has happened, if it has?

Mr. GIANNOULES. To my knowledge, it has not.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. For some time this subcommittee has been concerned with the activities of United States Consular Officers abroad. We find in the GAO report that the State Department on occasion is not advised by the United States National Central Bureau that Americans have been arrested abroad. Has anything been done to correct this problem?*

Mr. SIMS. The U.S. NOB has discussed this matter with the Consular Section, Department of State, setting forth that we will provide them the names, identity, place of arrest and charge concerning U.S. citizens arrested abroad and we would ask in return that the Consular Section advise this Office of information received as to the results of judicial action against U.S. citizens abroad. The

Consular Section has not agreed to this assistance to each other. The U.S. NCB will continue to pursue the matter.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. Can you tell us from your experience whether or not the nature and amount of supporting documentation differ depending on the foreign government which has requested the information?*

Mr. SIMS. The same requirements and documentation exists regardless of the country making the request.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. Are there any operating instructions or guidelines given to the employees of the United States National Central Bureau with regard to the manner in which requests by certain foreign governments should be handled?*

Mr. SIMS. The same guidelines pertain to any and all requests.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. Who are the members of the present Executive Committee?*

Mr. SIMS. President, M. C. G. Persson (Sweden). Vice-Presidents, M. T. Berrejeb (Tunisia); W. Budidarmo (Indonesia); J. De Gryse (Belgium); H. S. Knight (U.S.A.). Delegates to the Executive Committee, E. Ako (Ghana); G. Arosemena (Panama); J. R. Bugarin (Philippines); Y. M. Gharaibeh (Jordan); W. Heini (Fed. German Republic); H. A. Rojas (Argentina); M. Wan-yaku (Zaire); J. S. Wilson (United Kingdom).

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. Are the assembly documents and agendas prepared prior to meetings?*

Mr. SIMS. Yes.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. What is the distribution that is made of these documents within the United States Government?*

Mr. SIMS. The General Secretariat forwards these documents to each NCB. The U.S. NCB provides these documents to the Departments of Treasury and Justice and to the agencies sending representatives to the General Assembly.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. Is it customary for the United States to prepare position papers on agenda items? How is this coordinated within the Executive Branch?*

Mr. SIMS. The U.S. NCB provides the draft agenda to each agency and asks them to prepare position papers on the agenda items within their jurisdiction, as they deem necessary. It is the responsibility of the agency preparing the paper to clear it through the Department of State and any other pertinent channels. These agencies are so advised of this responsibility.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. Is the proposed budget submitted to the governments sufficiently in advance to permit analysis by the governments prior to the meetings? Has the United States delegation ever interceded in the Executive Committee or General Assembly with regard to specific items of the budget?*

Mr. SIMS. Upon receipt, the "Report of the Financial Year", Balance Sheet as of December 31st of the preceding year and the draft budget for the forthcoming year(s) are provided not only to the Departments of Justice and Treasury and the agencies participating in the General Assembly, but through 1976 the Treasury Budget Office was asked to review the documents as to general acceptability of accounting and auditing procedures of the documents from a budget/financial standpoint.

The United States as a member of the Executive Committee has input concerning any or all items of specific interest in the budget. The following budget matters have been of particular interest to the United States in recent years and input as deemed necessary has been made by the United States.

1. Dues in arrears.
2. Annual Dues.
3. Narcotic Liaison Officer Program.
4. Scheduling/frequency/location of conferences.
5. Maintenance and Improvement of plant and communication facilities at General Secretariat.
6. Staffing and Salaries of persons at General Secretariat.
7. Services provided by General Secretariat.

*Question from Mr. Eilberg. I wonder if you could give us a summary or synopsis of the activities of Interpol in the last calendar year of 1976, if that is convenient to you.*

Mr. SIMS. Interpol's calendar for calendar years 1975-76 was as follows:

Jan. 13-14, 1975	Meeting to discuss operating rules for the use of radio teleprinters on the Interpol radio network.	St. Cloud	For heads of radio stations equipped with radioteleprinters or expecting to obtain such equipment shortly.
Jan. 15-17, 1975	European conference for heads of national drugs services.	do	
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 1975	2d meeting of the FIR Working Party.	do	
Feb. 3, 4, 5, 1975	Symposium on cases involving hostage.	do	
February 1975	Interpol conference for Caribbean countries.	Not yet decided	
April 1975	Asian Regional Conference	Manila	
Sept. 16-19, 1975	Forensic science symposium	St. Cloud	
Oct. 5, 7, 8, 1975	5th American Regional Conference.	Buenos Aires	
Oct. 9-15, 1975	General Assembly	do	
Nov. 4-6, 1975	Symposium on crime in sea and river port areas.	St. Cloud	

Place	Dates	Subject
General Secretariat	Nov. 17-28, 1975	Training course on counterfeit currency in Spanish.
Do	Dec. 1-10, 1975	Training seminar for NCB office in English.
Do	Feb. 2 and 3, 1976	European conference for heads of national drugs services.
Do	Feb. 4-6, 1976	European Regional Conference.
Do	Feb. 24-26, 1976	Symposium on violent crimes committed by armed gangs.
Do	Mar. 1-11, 1976	Training seminar for NCB office in French and Spanish.
Do	Mar. 15-19, 1976	4 yearly Interpol Telecommunications Conference.
Nairobi	May 25-28, 1976	African Regional Conference.
General Secretariat	May 10 and 11, 1976	Symposium on crime prediction methods and research.
Do	Sept. 14-17, 1976	Symposium for heads of police colleges.
Do	Nov. 3-5, 1976	Symposium on new ways of identifying persons and finding evidence.
Accra, Ghana	Oct. 14-20, 1976	45th General Assembly session.

On January 15-16, 1976, the General Secretariat co-sponsored an International Seminar for Youth Magistrates and Police Officers Dealing with Juveniles and in 1975 and 1976 held Working Group Meetings concerning a study as to the desirability, feasibility and need for the computerization of General Secretariat. The United States is a member of this working group.

The above activities are in addition to the General Secretariat's primary function of coordinating and communicating criminal investigative requests between the police of the member countries.

*Question from Mr. Bilberg. The Interpol constitution has not been expressly approved by either the Executive Branch or the Congress. Interpol apparently considers that the United States has approved its constitution because it has not received a non-acceptance declaration by the United States.*

*Are there any reasons why the Executive Branch has not formally approved the Interpol constitution or requested Congress to do so?*

*And does it maintain this attitude to preserve the flexibility of joining or not joining Interpol in its operations?*

Mr. SANS. To my knowledge there is no reason why the Interpol Constitution has not been expressly approved by the Executive Branch or the Congress. Since the Interpol Constitution does not conflict with U.S. laws, there has apparently been no requirement to have the constitution formally approved. This is particularly true since the Interpol Constitution does not, nor cannot, require the United States, or any member country to provide information to the General Secretariat or foreign police, nor to conduct any investigation. The Interpol Constitution therefore serves as a general guideline and only compels the General Secretariat, the General Assembly and certain other conferences or symposiums to act in accordance with it.

During each symposium, conference and General Assembly where a resolution, or recommendation is being drafted, I and/or another member of the U.S. Delegation makes substantial input.



**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 3**

*Question from Mr. Ellberg. Does the United States really have any voice in Interpol policies? Has the United States ever introduced resolutions which would directly affect the Interpol operations? I wonder if you would provide to the Subcommittee some evidence of it—some evidence indicating the United States really has a voice in Interpol policy, and also suggest or give to us some of the resolutions indicating some of the activity on the part of the United States.*

Mr. SIMS. The United States, through the Executive Committee and the day to day activities of the U.S. NCB has voice in Interpol policy on any given issue. Some examples of this, just to name a few, are resolutions passed in 1975 "Privacy of Information"; 1976 "Policy to be followed concerning requests for Information"; 1976 "International Frauds and Commercial Crimes"; all resolutions on illicit narcotics; 1975 "Illicit traffic in Stolen Motor Vehicles"; all resolutions on counterfeit currency, and a recommendation in 1977 "Day to Day Cooperation in the Americas".

*Question from Mr. Ellberg. I asked what are the principal advantages gained by the United States in belonging to Interpol? Do you think that United States participation in Interpol is vital to the existence of the organization, and would our law enforcement capabilities be seriously disrupted if we did not belong to it, and if so, in what areas?*

Mr. SIMS. The United States finds many advantages in being a member of Interpol. First and foremost is that the U.S. NCB provides the means for law enforcement agencies at all levels of government in the United States to pursue a criminal investigation abroad, i.e. police to police. Without Interpol, Federal agencies, local and state agencies without representatives in the appropriate countries must rely on nonpolice channels or attempt direct communication. With the exception of DEA, who has their Agents in 40 countries, all other agencies have few criminal investigators abroad, i.e. FBI in 14 countries, INS in 9 countries, IRS in 14 countries. Customs in 3 countries and Secret Service in one country. Some of the problems with direct communication are recognition, language, timeliness, no uniform handling and screening of requests and responses. As a member of Interpol, the United States plays an important role in international police cooperation with the objective being the suppression of crime.

The United States participation is important to both the United States and Interpol; however, Interpol will continue to grow in membership and flourish with or without the United States.

To further expand specifically on a sampling of the benefits the United States receives, a portion of the U.S. NCB Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1976 follows:

For the purpose of setting forth the value of the United States participation in Interpol and the assistance provided to law enforcement in the United States, portions of the U.S. National Central Bureau's Annual Report for 1976 follows:

#### U.S. NCB ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

Effective January 1, 1975, investigative requests, all points bulletins and wanted circulars received by the U.S. NCB were entered into the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS). Those pertaining to stolen property, all points bulletins, wanted circulars and certain other criminal cases have been made directly accessible to Treasury law enforcement agencies, through TECS, while the remaining (approximately 80 percent) TECS entries made by this NCB, are directly accessible only to this NCB. No foreign policy/Interpol Bureaus have access to TECS, or any records in the U.S. NCB.

Benefits derived from TECS include more uniform indexing, retrievability of statistics and data, a suspense system for pending cases and for purging of files when no longer required, prompt entry of all points bulletins and wanted circulars, continual updating of information entered, as well as location of criminals wanted by law enforcement in the United States. Through TECS, the National Law Enforcement Teletype System was utilized to communicate with local and/or state law enforcement agencies/departments and to place nationwide lookouts. During the period from July 1, 1975 to June 30, 1976, a total of 3663 cases were entered into the TECS system, with 8603 individual entries.

In Fiscal Year 1976, the U.S. NCB received 2653 investigative matters from 109 other Interpol Bureaus and 961 investigative matters from U.S. law enforcement agencies/departments asking for investigations. During this same period of time, the U.S. NCB sent 1838 investigative requests to 109 foreign NCBs and 5214 investigative requests to U.S. law enforcement agencies/departments and certain financial and/or other commercial institutions. The U.S. NCB assisted 95 foreign and U.S. police agencies in obtaining various types of information con-

cerning police operations, organization procedures, equipment, special categories of criminal enforcement.

During Fiscal Year 1976, out of the total 8603 individual entries into TECS, 1705 had been arrested as of June 30, 1976. Of the 1705 arrests where judicial action had been completed, 452 convictions and 72 acquittals, dismissals or not guilty verdicts, have resulted. In a large percentage of the 1705 arrests, judicial action has not yet been completed and/or this NCB has not been advised of the final disposition. Out of the 8603 individual entries, 2134, or approximately 22 percent, related to U.S. citizens.

During Fiscal Year 1976, statistics were also kept on the types of cases handled by the U.S. NCB. Of the cases entered into TECS, the percentages for types of cases were as follows:

	<i>Percent</i>
Counterfeiting .....	3.64
Drugs (Smuggling, trafficking, etc.) .....	27.14
Theft (Art works, vehicles, valuables, etc.) .....	14.11
Firearms and explosives .....	5.36
Violent crimes (Murder, rape, assault, etc.) .....	7.42
Missing persons .....	3.41
Frauds .....	13.08
Vehicle trace (Abandoned vehicles, etc.) .....	3.89
Residence visas, employment checks (law enforcement applicants, etc.) permits (firearms, alcohol, etc.) .....	11.39
Other offenses (illegal traffick in currency, alien offenses, surveys, etc.) .....	10.52

In Fiscal Year 1976, the Interpol international radio network was increased to include 64 of the member countries. Through the use of radio, telex and cable, the U.S. NCB communicated with Interpol NCBs of member countries and the Interpol General Secretariat as follows:

Radio:

Sent .....	4,551
Received .....	5,463

Telex:

Sent .....	197
Received .....	233

Cable:

Sent .....	247
Received .....	30

The radio traffic increased 7.7 percent over Fiscal Year 1975, and the telex increased 5.2 percent over Fiscal Year 1975.

## APPENDIX 2

### SUBCOMMITTEE SURVEY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

The material presented in this appendix reflects a subcommittee survey made of various Federal and local law enforcement agencies which could be presumed to have knowledge and/or contact with Interpol.

The survey is broken down into three categories: Federal agencies, police chiefs, and sheriffs.

#### A. U.S. FEDERAL AGENCIES

The following letter and attached questionnaire were sent to:

- The Department of State.
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- The Department of the Army.
- The Department of the Air Force.
- The Drug Enforcement Administration.
- The Immigration and Naturalization Service.
- The Department of Agriculture.
- The Department of Commerce.
- The Central Intelligence Agency.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.  
 The Customs Service.  
 The Internal Revenue Service.  
 The Defense Investigative Service.  
 The Secret Service.  
 The Naval Investigative Service.

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
 Washington, D.C., August 16, 1977.

Name and address.

DEAR \_\_\_\_\_: The Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law has under consideration legislation which will continue United States membership and increase annual contributions to the International Criminal Police Organization, commonly known as Interpol.

It is the wish of the Subcommittee to assess the usefulness of this organization and its effectiveness as it pertains to the operations of various United States government agencies. The Subcommittee seeks your help in making an evaluation of Interpol.

I would be grateful if you could supply my Subcommittee with detailed replies to the attached questionnaire as promptly as possible. I know your cooperation will be most helpful in our deliberations.

Please accept my thanks for your assistance.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely,

JOSHUA EILBERG, *Chairman.*

Enclosure.

#### QUESTIONS ON INTERPOL FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES

1. Is your agency familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? Its Constitution? Do you regard it as a valid international organization? On what basis? Is the Constitution sufficiently restrictive to prevent or eliminate any abuse of its powers? If it is a valid intergovernment organization, do you not believe that the headquarters should be in a neutral country such as Switzerland?

2. How many requests has your agency processed through Interpol channels in 1976 and 1977? Please furnish breakdown of type of information you requested?

3. How many investigations or file checks has your agency processed in that period upon the request of Interpol? Please furnish breakdown of types of cases referred to you for response? Did you screen the information before releasing it to the U.S. National Central Bureau? What information was screened out?

4. In this period, how many requests for information or investigation have you processed directly with personnel of your agency stationed abroad? Please furnish a breakdown of the type cases referred directly. Why did you not use Interpol channels in these cases?

5. What tangible results were obtained by your agency as a result of Interpol cooperation? Do you know of any major crimes that were solved or major criminals apprehended in your sphere of responsibility as a result of Interpol cooperation? Please describe.

6. Does your agency receive requests from state, county or city police officers for information from a foreign country? Do you process these directly with agency representatives abroad? Do you refer these requests to Interpol through the U.S. National Central Bureau? Do you consider Interpol's assistance in this regard as essential to local police enforcement activities?

7. Has your agency contributed to Interpol General Assemblies by sending delegates or representatives? When? Who? Has your agency had any in-put in Assembly agenda? Does your agency provide position papers to the U.S. delegates on matters affecting your agency? Has any representative of your agency ever sponsored a resolution brought forward at a General Assembly? Please be specific in your replies to the above questions, citing dates, locations and proposals.

8. What guidelines exist which govern your cooperation with Interpol? How do you protect a person's individual rights in your replies to inquiries?

9. What is your evaluation of the total contribution Interpol has made toward the suppression of crime and the enforcement of criminal laws on an international scale?

10. What advantages or disadvantages do you perceive for the United States by its membership in Interpol? Do you think that it is worth an annual member-

ship dues of \$214,000 per year plus the cost of maintaining equipment and federal agency personnel—totalling \$1 million?

11. Interpol has refused to release the names, nationalities and salaries of persons employed by the General Secretariat. Do you believe this information should be available to the Congress? Should not a directory be compiled with the names of all NCB chiefs as well as their affiliation with their respective law enforcement agency?

12. Do you perceive any objection to exchanging information on suspected criminals with totalitarian type governments? Do you perceive a risk in these governments using Interpol channels for political purposes, i.e. eliminating persons whose ideas might be judged contrary to the views of the government?

13. Have you ever used Interpol to send out an international all points bulletin? How many NCB's were contacted as a result of your request? Were any positive results achieved as a result of this international wanted notification?

14. Do you have any tangible evidence of the existence of Interpol agents who are not connected with a National Central Bureau? Has there been any evidence that Interpol engages in criminal-type investigations apart from making normal information requests from law enforcement agencies? Have you any information that Interpol personnel are engaged in criminal or espionage activities?

15. Do you perceive any advantage by having the United States participate in a worldwide communications network in the event of a national emergency?

16. Do you believe it is feasible to require Interpol to accept the jurisdiction of U.S. Federal Courts in all civil claims against it for acts or omissions involving U.S. citizens or residents?

A summary of the replies from the Federal agencies follows, as well as the actual responses as they were submitted to the subcommittee.

#### STAFF SUMMARY—USE OF INTERPOL BY FEDERAL AGENCIES

Questionnaires on Interpol were sent to 15 Federal agencies. All have replied.

Three agencies, the Naval Investigative Service, the Defense Investigative Service and the Central Intelligence Agency said they could not answer the questionnaire for specific reasons:

1. The Naval Investigative Service said that contact between it and Interpol is minimal, and "it is therefore impractical to key this response to the questionnaire furnished."

2. The Defense Investigative Service stated that its primary mission is "conducting of personnel security investigations for DoD." It said it has not processed any request through Interpol and has not received any requests from them.

3. The Central Intelligence Agency declined to answer the questionnaire because it said the "activities and missions of Interpol, as a criminal organization, are outside the areas of statutory responsibility of the CIA."

The Department of Commerce said that its familiarity with Interpol "is generally limited to recent media coverage."

A summary of responses from the remaining eleven agencies follows:

*Question 1.* Is your agency familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? Its Constitution? Do you regard it as a valid international organization? On what basis? Is the Constitution sufficiently restrictive to prevent or eliminate any abuse of its powers? If it is a valid intergovernment organization, do you not believe that the headquarters should be in a neutral country such as Switzerland?

Each of the eleven agencies stated that they were familiar with Interpol and its Constitution and regarded it as a valid international organization. The basis for validity according to the State Department is recognition by Congress, 22 Stat 921, and Interpol's history. The F.B.I. cited Title 22, U.S. Code Section 263a (supp. V 1975), originally passed in 1938 which authorizes the Attorney General to accept membership in Interpol. The Department of Agriculture cited Interpol's membership and the spirit of international cooperation demonstrated by member countries as the basis for its validity. The other agencies gave no basis for Interpol's validity.

Ten agencies stated that Interpol's constitution would prevent abuses. The State Department stated that the Constitution of Interpol will not prevent or eliminate abuse if member countries desire to abuse it, and that no constitution could preclude abuse.

A.F.O.S.I. said it would have no objection to moving Interpol Headquarters to Switzerland. The State Department had no position on this. The other agencies were satisfied with the location.

*Question 2.* How many requests has your agency processed through Interpol channels in 1976 and 1977? Please furnish breakdown of type of information you requested?

Federal agencies reported processing approximately 1,245 requests through Interpol in the 1976-1977 time frame in addition to the requests which were processed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. ATF stated that requests for 1976 and 1977 were not kept as separate statistics, and were therefore not retrievable. It noted, however, that it had made numerous requests in the past, and that the volume of requests via Interpol is increasing dramatically "as field agents are becoming more aware of the potential of the Interpol network to contact law enforcement agencies in 125 countries."

Types of information requested include:

1. criminal record checks on foreign-born persons applying for alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives business licenses.
2. drug related requests.
3. criminal antecedents.
4. fugitive searches.
5. subscriber information for telephone and vehicle registrations.
6. conspiracy investigations.
7. background checks on subject using forged USDA certificates of wholesomeness for meat being shipped from London to Rotterdam.
8. information pertaining to an investigation of an American cattle company which was allegedly smuggling beefalo semen from Brazil.
9. stolen vehicles, vehicle licenses and driver license checks.
10. stolen art and artifacts.
11. currency violations.
12. prohibited exportations and importations (endangered species, arms, ammunition, and narcotics.)
13. full identification of types of counterfeit, origin of counterfeit, details of arrests and/or seizures.
14. locations of individuals.

*Question 3.* How many investigations or file checks has your agency processed in that period upon the request of Interpol? Please furnish breakdown of types of cases referred to you for response? Did you screen the information before releasing it to the U.S. National Central Bureau? What information was screened out?

Eight Federal agencies report having received approximately 3,048 requests from Interpol during 1976-1977. The majority of those requests were handled by the Drug Enforcement Administration (1354) and the U.S. Customs Service (1066). According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the number of requests it received is not retrievable from its recordkeeping system.

In addition to the above requests, the State Department stated that the passport office serviced 1,346 requests usually for review of passport files in connection with lost passports or criminal matters. The material was not screened. There were less than ten requests to the State Department's office of security. These requests usually dealt with visa issuance.

The FBI does not keep a breakdown of requests from Interpol. The FBI stated that the requests received are routinely screened to insure that they meet legal criteria for release to law enforcement agencies.

Eight agencies report that all of the material which was supplied to Interpol was screened in accordance with the Privacy Act.

The types of information dispensed included:

1. pre employment records check.
2. criminal investigations.
3. drug related investigations.
4. criminal history.
5. assault, battery.
6. forgery, smuggling.
7. robbery.
8. homicide.
9. missing persons inquiries.
10. illegal use of firearms.

11. tracing firearms.
12. sex offenses and desertion.

*Question 4.* In this period, how many requests for information or investigation have you processed directly with personnel of your agency stationed abroad? Please furnish a breakdown of the type cases referred directly. Why did you not use Interpol channels in these cases?

The Department of the Army, Criminal Investigations Command (CID), and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations replied that they use their own personnel stationed abroad in their investigations. Although no specific number was cited, AFOSI said "thousands" of such investigations had been conducted. The Drug Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Customs Service and the Secret Service also stated that they use their own personnel stationed abroad in certain investigations, but that they could not retrieve from their records the number of cases, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has no personnel stationed in foreign countries.

The FBI states that during a typical month the legal attaches handled 2,667 investigative matters. Eighty percent were criminal or employee applicant matters including name checks. 1,241 matters had been received from foreign police and liaison contacts or other U.S. Government agencies. The FBI claims that there is no substitute for personal liaison.

The State Department was not able to give the number of requests. It estimates the number to be many thousand each year. These include name checks with host country police services, particularly our host country nationals applying for employment at embassies. The State Department also investigates employee misconduct. Interpol is not used because usually the investigations do not involve violations of criminal laws, and the State Department has representation in most countries of the world. The Department states that consultations with foreign police can be done more effectively and efficiently by having designated embassy personnel assigned as liaison with national police, than by using Interpol.

*Question 5.* What tangible results were obtained by your agency as a result of Interpol cooperation? Do you know of any major crimes that were solved or major criminals apprehended in your sphere of responsibility as a result of Interpol cooperation? Please describe.

Seven agencies reported excellent results in cases due to Interpol cooperation. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms claimed that information they received from Interpol channels had been highly satisfactory. One case they reported involved an international gun smuggling operation which was broken by ATF in the Charleston, West Virginia area. In that case a Japanese national with the assistance and complicity of U.S. nationals purchased handguns and then concealed them in hollowed out automobile transmissions being shipped to Japan. The case resulted in the conviction in this country of three defendants. The case is still open in Japan.

The U.S. NCB assisted ATF by relaying information to Japanese authorities and coordinating the visits of Japanese police to Charleston to interview the suspect and witnesses. The U.S. NCB received a letter of commendation from the director of the Japanese National Police Agency for participation in the case.

The Drug Enforcement Administration reported that the most tangible result it obtained through cooperation with Interpol is the apprehension of DEA fugitives and the assimilation of documentary evidence for conspiracy investigations, especially in countries where DEA has no representation.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service stated that through Interpol, member countries have notified the INS of many aliens who are wanted for serious crimes abroad. In many instances INS said it has been notified through Interpol of aliens in the United States with serious criminal records in foreign countries who had gained entry into this country by concealing their criminal backgrounds.

The Department of Agriculture praised Interpol cooperation in giving a "clean bill of health" to a "legitimate business interested in obtaining a loan from the Farmers Home Administration," and the speedy dispatch of information from Interpol in connection with the semen smuggling investigation conducted by the Department.

The United States Customs Service reported that it had been most successful in its use of Interpol in the recovery of stolen vehicles imported into the United States.

The Secret Service claimed that Interpol is most effective and has assisted them in major counterfeiting cases and in certain other cases to identify authors of threatening letters or remarks to certain Secret Service protectees.

The FBI was not able to state whether cooperation with Interpol as such had helped solve major crimes.

The State Department was not able to point to any major results. There were six passport frauds which Interpol brought to the Department's attention, and the Interpol Committee on International Aviation Security provided a useful forum to ICAO and IATA.

Types of information sought by personnel of U.S. federal agencies in these cases includes: fraud, counterintelligence matters, narcotics information, information needed in criminal and deportation proceedings, commodity oriented inquiries--relating to value, classification and dumping, technical "customs" inquiries, identification and investigation of counterfeit U.S. currency, and questions relating to tax laws of the United States.

*Question 6.* Does your agency receive requests from state, county or city police officers for information from a foreign country? Do you process these directly with agency representatives abroad? Do you refer these requests to Interpol through the U.S. National Central Bureau? Do you consider Interpol's assistance in this regard as essential to local police enforcement activities?

Four Federal agencies said they receive requests from state, county or city police officers requesting information from a foreign country which they process through Interpol. The Air Force and USACIDC also said they receive requests from local police enforcement agencies, but that they usually concern service connected problems and are processed by AFOSI or USACIDC personnel stationed abroad.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the U.S. Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Secret Service all receive requests which are processed through Interpol, although DEA said such requests are infrequent. ATF, Customs and the Secret Service claim that Interpol is "most essential" to local police. ATF called attention to the fact that many "State and local agencies are not aware of Interpol's capabilities and inquire of the ATF agents for advice on information from foreign countries. This assistance to State and local officers builds better working relationships between Federal and local agencies and is an important factor in building good will and effective relations."

The Customs Service claimed the alternative "in using Interpol would be either a total lack of international police cooperation or a difficult and cumbersome attempt by the thousands of police agencies in the U.S. to develop their liaison with the thousands of police agencies in the 125 member countries."

The State Department stated that the Office of Security occasionally receives requests from state and local police departments. These requests are processed through the embassies.

The FBI receives requests in cases where criminals may have crossed international boundaries. The FBI frequently has jurisdiction in such cases and they are handled through the legal attaches. When the request is not within FBI jurisdiction, the FBI relays it directly to FBI contacts abroad, or refers the case to Interpol. No record is kept of how many cases are referred to Interpol.

*Question 7.* Has your agency contributed to Interpol General Assemblies by sending delegates or representatives? When? Who? Has your agency ever had any in-put in Assembly agenda? Does your agency provide position papers to the U.S. delegates on matters affecting your agency? Has any representative of your agency ever sponsored a resolution brought forward at a General Assembly? Please be specific in your replies to the above questions, citing dates, locations and proposals.

Nine Federal Agencies report sending representatives to Interpol General Assemblies, conferences and symposia. Those agencies include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Customs Service, the Secret Service, the Department of Agriculture, Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the State Department. All of the above agencies, with the exception of IRS report having submitted position papers and/or resolutions or recommended agenda items. Mr. Green from the Immigration and Naturalization Service reported that suggestions for the agenda are routinely requested from the Service and position papers are routinely submitted on items of interest on the agenda. The nine agencies listed delegates to the assemblies, and the ATF, Customs Bureau, Secret Service, the FBI, and the State Department listed observers and titles of their position papers submitted at the various assemblies.

*Question 8.* What guidelines exist which govern your cooperation with Interpol? How do you protect a person's individual rights in your replies to inquiries?

Nine of the agencies cooperating with Interpol report that guidelines do exist for such cooperation. They state that they are governed by applicable statutes and regulations regarding the release of information, and that individual rights are protected by strict adherence to the 1974 Privacy Act. USACIDC said that they are governed by Army regulations as well as the Privacy Act.

The State Department said they have no formal guidelines other than the Privacy Act.

The FBI stated that Interpol's access is only to the NCIC concerning criminal requests from foreign police agencies. The FBI stated that it closely scrutinizes the legitimacy of requests to perform inquiries, and always complies with Federal law.

*Question 9.* What is your evaluation of the total contribution Interpol has made toward the suppression of crime and the enforcement of criminal laws on an international scale?

Eight agencies attributed "substantial contribution to the suppression of international crime" to Interpol. The statement made by the Secret Service appears to sum up the statements of AFOSI, DEA, INS, USACIDC, ATF, Customs Service, and the FBI:

"Interpol has made and continues daily to make substantial contribution in the suppression of crime and enforcement of criminal laws. We know that Interpol does not initiate or conduct investigations but assists police/law enforcement in the coordination and communication of criminal investigative requests. Therefore, Interpol can only be as effective as the police/law enforcement of the member countries."

Seven Federal agencies which declined to answer question 9 claimed that their contact with Interpol was not sufficient to permit them to make a valid evaluation. Those agencies were the Naval Investigative Service, the CIA, DIS and IRS, as well as the departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and State.

*Question 10.* What advantages or disadvantages do you perceive for the United States by its membership in Interpol? Do you think that it is worth an annual membership dues of \$214,000 per year plus the cost of maintaining equipment and federal agency personnel—totalling \$1 million?

According to the 10 agencies responding, there is "every advantage" to be had in Interpol membership. All expressed the belief that it is "well worth the cost." The answer given by the U.S. Customs Service contains the various thoughts expressed by the other agencies:

"The United States has a decided advantage in being a member of Interpol. As stated earlier, it is one of the three or four heaviest users of Interpol facilities. Its membership is invaluable to the suppression of crime since the need for international police cooperation has increased progressively in recent years. All law enforcement agencies, whether city, county, state or federal, can benefit from the use of Interpol. The cost is borne by the Federal Government, however, the benefits are received by all agencies utilizing Interpol. The cost is more than justified."

*Question 11.* Interpol has refused to release the names, nationalities and salaries of persons employed by the General Secretariat. Do you believe this information should be available to the Congress? Should not a directory be compiled with the names of all NCB chiefs as well as their affiliation with their respective law enforcement agency?

Seven Federal agencies addressed this question, and the answers differed, some significantly.

ATF said the "staff of the General Secretariat should have the same rights and privileges as provided by the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974. Names, nationalities, and salaries of Interpol staff members has no relationship on the effectiveness of the organization \* \* \*"

The Department of Agriculture expressed the belief that the "names, nationalities and salaries of persons employed by the General Secretariat should be furnished the Congress. It is our understanding that a Directory containing the names of NCB chiefs and their respective law enforcement agencies exists. \* \* \*"

DEA claimed that Interpol "has not refused to list the names, nationalities and police affiliations of persons employed by the General Secretariat. In fact, this data is already contained in the Congressional Record. \* \* \* It should be emphasized that if any member country wishes to know the identity of the NCB Chief in another country, the information is readily available."

INS reports that in order to "protect the privacy of persons employed by the General Secretariat, Interpol has declined to publish this information. The

United States National Central Bureau advises that this information can be made available to Congressional Committees at their request. \* \* \*

USACIDC stated that "Interpol publishes for member countries a directory which lists all National Central Bureaus \* \* \* the present directory, without listing personal names, seems sufficient for the purpose for which it was intended."

The U.S. Customs Service declared that the "Secretary General has made it known that the United States Congress would be welcome to review the names, nationalities, and salaries of personnel employed by the General Secretariat at its Paris headquarters. The Interpol Executive Committee, of which the United States is a member, concluded that to provide a list would not be within the best interest of the individual's privacy. \* \* \*"

The Secret Service and FBI gave the same general answer as the Customs Service. The State Department had no position.

*Question 12.* Do you perceive any objection to exchanging information on suspected criminals with totalitarian type governments? Do you perceive a risk in these governments using Interpol channels for political purposes, i.e. eliminating persons whose ideas might be judged contrary to the views of the government?

None of the agencies posed an objection to exchanging information on suspected criminals with totalitarian type governments. Most, in fact, pointed out that the information must involve a criminal investigation, and is carefully screened. They reportedly have received no requests which could be interpreted as being other than criminal. According to the agencies, "all member countries realize that the Interpol Constitution forbids involvement in political, religious, racial, or military matters. If a criminal offense by a person or organization is committed in these areas, Interpol will assist on the basis of the criminal acts."

*Question 13.* Have you ever used Interpol to send out an international all points bulletin? How many NCB's were contacted as a result of your requests? Were any positive results achieved as a result of this international wanted notification?

Five agencies, ATF, DEA, Customs Service, Secret Service and the FBI have used Interpol to send out international all points bulletins. According to the reply from Customs, Interpol has the world divided into zones and such bulletins can be speedily circulated to any one zone, any combination of zones, or world wide. Positive results achieved as a result of this notification are reportedly in the areas of apprehension of fugitives, recovering stolen yachts, the location, apprehension and ultimate return of important DEA fugitives to U.S. jurisdiction. The FBI reported no significant results.

*Question 14.* Do you have any tangible evidence of the existence of Interpol agents who are not connected with a National Central Bureau? Has there been any evidence that Interpol engages in criminal-type investigations apart from making normal information requests from law enforcement agencies? Have you any information that Interpol personnel are engaged in criminal or espionage activities?

According to the Federal agencies response, there are no Interpol agents. The Secret Service pointed out that each "member country maintains a National Central Bureau for Interpol which is an office within their official police, staffed by that country's police." Therefore, they state, "Their personnel assigned to the National Central Bureau in each country are not Interpol agents, but are official police of that country."

*Question 15.* Do you perceive any advantage by having the U.S. participate in a world-wide communications network in the event of a national emergency?

The Customs Service noted that "Interpol Washington did assist on one occasion in the Guatemala earthquake and on numerous occasions has arranged for shipments of baby food and difficult-to-obtain medicines in emergency cases."

*Question 16.* Do you believe it is feasible to require Interpol to accept the jurisdiction of U.S. Federal Courts in all civil claims against it for acts or omissions involving U.S. citizens or residents?

With one exception, eight agencies responding to the questionnaire pointed out that the National Central Bureau in each member country works within the framework of its own national laws. INS noted that the "International Organization could not accept the jurisdiction of U.S. courts without setting a precedent that would lead to accepting the jurisdiction of courts in all 125

member countries." The FBI took no position but deferred to the Justice Department. The State Department felt that the question was ambiguous. The Department questioned the meaning of the word "accept" in the inquiry.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, D.C., November 29, 1977.

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington,  
D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: You will find enclosed our responses to the questions posed by your letter of August 16 concerning the International Criminal Police Organization, commonly known as Interpol. Essentially, while the Department is certainly aware of the operations of Interpol and recognizes it as a valid international organization, it has few dealings in the operational sense with Interpol and, apart from the Passport Office, services relatively few requests from Interpol. Indeed, our Office of Security, to which your letter was addressed, probably has less contact with Interpol than other areas of the Department.

I trust the enclosed information will be of assistance to your committee.

Sincerely,

DOUGLAS J. BENNET, JR.,  
Assistant Secretary  
for Congressional Relations.

Enclosure.

#### QUESTIONS ON INTERPOL FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES

1. Is your agency familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)?

The Department is familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization.

b. Its Constitution?

The Department is familiar with Interpol's Constitution as amended in 1964.

c. Do you regard it as a valid international organization? On what basis?

We regard Interpol as a valid international organization on the basis of its Constitution, the history of its existence and recognition of its legitimacy by Congress, i.e., 72 Stat. 921.

d. Is the Constitution sufficiently restrictive to prevent or eliminate any abuse of its powers?

The Constitution of Interpol will not prevent or eliminate abuse of information if member countries desire to abuse such information. With a membership of over 100 participating countries, which have agreed to share information concerning international criminals, there is no realistic way in which a Constitution could be written to preclude abuse.

e. If it is a valid intergovernment organization, do you not believe that the headquarters should be in a neutral country such as Switzerland?

The Department has no position on that question. The mere fact that Interpol is an inter-governmental organization does not mean that it should necessarily be located in a neutral country.

2. How many requests has your agency processed through Interpol channels in 1976 and 1977? Please furnish breakdown of type of information you requested?

The Department of State has processed no requests through Interpol.

3. How many investigations or file checks has your agency processed in that period upon the request of Interpol? Please furnish breakdown of types of cases referred to you for response? Did you screen the information before releasing it to the U.S. National Central Bureau? What information was screened out?

We were unable to obtain complete statistics in response to this question. The number of requests from Interpol to the Office of Security is so minimal that we have no statistical accountability for that category of request. Within the past two years the Office of Security received probably less than ten requests for investigative assistance or name checks. Most of these requests to the Office of Security concerned inquiries about visa issuances to foreign nationals. The Office of Security was requested to conduct one interview of an employee to corroborate testimony obtained in the course of a criminal investigation conducted by another country. The information was furnished the Interpol representative in the Treasury Department for transmittal to the requesting country.

The information furnished in no way violated the rights of privacy of the American employee.

The Passport Office serviced 1346 requests from Interpol in 1976 and 1977. Almost all of these requests were for reviews of passport files, generally in connection with lost passports overseas or criminal matters overseas. The material was generally not screened and no information was screened out.

Occasionally, in extradition cases, a foreign government will alert Interpol that a fugitive is being sought. If the fugitive is located in the United States and this becomes a matter of record with Interpol, sometimes the foreign police agency will request via Interpol, that he be arrested for extradition. Occasionally our law enforcement officials, ignorant of the provisions of extradition treaties, have complied. This complicates extradition, as treaties provide that requests for extradition have to be made through the diplomatic channel. The instances where arrests on the basis of an Interpol request occur are rare, perhaps 1 or 2 a year, and we have no way, from our extradition records, of coming up with exact statistics for 1976 and 1977.

4. In this period, how many requests for information or investigation have you processed directly with personnel of your agency stationed abroad? Please furnish a breakdown of the type cases referred directly. Why did you not use Interpol channels in these cases?

It is not clear whether this question refers only to criminal investigations or to all types of inquiries. The Office of Security of the Department of State has investigative responsibility for the State Department in matters of personnel security. As such, it conducts routine background investigations of our employees and any special investigations required as a result of alleged criminal activity or non-criminal misconduct. In addition, it conducts routine and non-routine personnel investigations concerning U.S. Government employees of other agencies attached to our diplomatic missions overseas. A further investigative effort involves prospective local national employees of our Embassies.

Our investigation statistics do not distinguish between overseas investigative leads and domestic inquiries. Many of our overseas investigative actions involve name checks with host country police services, particularly on host country nationals applying for employment at embassies. The number of such requests for name traces or investigative assistance from foreign police forces is unknown, but probably amounts to many thousand each year. Interpol is not used because: (1) these investigations do not normally involve violation of criminal laws; and (2) because we have diplomatic representation in most countries of the world. When we need to consult with the host country police concerning investigative matters, we can do so more effectively and efficiently by means of designated Embassy personnel having liaison with the national police.

The Passport Office has referred approximately 100 investigations overseas. Generally the cases were referred for information or for investigation of fraud. Interpol was not used because Passport fraud and Visa fraud are within the jurisdiction of the Department of State and consular personnel or Regional Security Officers handle such cases.

5. What tangible results were obtained by your agency as a result of Interpol cooperation? Do you know of any major crimes that were solved or major criminal apprehended in your sphere or responsibility as a result of Interpol cooperation? Please describe.

Because the Department generally uses its own resources, we have little operational interplay with Interpol. Interpol has brought to the attention of the Passport Office approximately six cases a year of passport fraud of which the Passport Office was unaware. The passport fraud cases were investigated and handled by the Department once they were brought to its attention by Interpol. No other major crimes were solved or major criminal apprehended in our sphere of responsibility as a result of Interpol cooperation. Since the Department of State is not a law enforcement organization, obviously we are not involved in the day-to-day search and apprehension of international criminals.

Interpol activity in the area of counter terrorism is primarily information-sharing in nature and supportive of the need to achieve broad awareness (1) of the threat posed by terrorism; (2) of the groups and individuals involved; and (3) of measure to cope with the threat. The Interpol Committee on International Aviation Security, has provided a useful supplemental forum to ICAO and IATA for cooperative action by participating governments. We are unable to point to any major terrorist crimes solved directly as a result of Interpol cooperation.

6.a. Does your agency receive requests from state, county or city police officers for information from a foreign country?

The Office of Security occasionally receives requests from state, county or city police departments for information from a foreign country. The Passport Office does not.

b. Do you process these directly with agency representatives abroad?

These requests are processed through our embassies in the appropriate countries. Representatives from the embassies contact the host country government agencies having jurisdiction over the matter of interest to the American requestor.

c. Do you refer these requests to Interpol through the U.S. National Central Bureau?

No.

d. Do you consider Interpol's assistance in this regard as essential to local police enforcement activities?

We feel that Interpol probably provides its greatest service to the state, county and local police departments. The paucity of requests to the Department from local law enforcement jurisdictions suggest that they deal primarily with Interpol, an arrangement which seems to work well and is endorsed by the Department.

7. Has your agency contributed to Interpol General Assemblies by sending delegates or representatives? When? Who? Has your agency ever had any input in Assembly agenda? Does your agency provide position papers to the U.S. delegates on matters affecting your agency? Has any representative of your agency ever sponsored a resolution brought forward at a General Assembly? Please be specific in your replies to the above questions, citing dates, locations and proposals.

Robert A. Fearey, Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism, attended an Interpol Symposium on Violent Crimes Committed by Organized Groups on February 24-26, 1976, at St. Cloud, France. Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker presented a paper, "Prevention Through a Coordinated Police and Government Response," to the Interpol Symposium on Cases Involving Hostages at St. Cloud, France, February 3-5, 1975. Participation in these two symposia was by invitation. The Department does not contribute to Interpol General Assembly agenda. No representative of our agency has ever sponsored a resolution brought forward at a General Assembly.

8. What guidelines exist which govern your cooperation with Interpol? How do you protect a person's individual rights in your replies to inquiries?

The Department has no formal guidelines governing our cooperation with Interpol. Information is released to the Department of the Treasury under the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974.

9. What is our evaluation of the total contribution Interpol has made toward the suppression of crime and the enforcement of criminal laws on an international scale?

The Department is not in a position to make such an evaluation.

10. What advantages or disadvantages do you perceive for the U.S. by its membership in Interpol? Do you think that it is worth an annual membership dues of \$214,000 per year plus the cost of maintaining equipment and federal agency personnel—totalling \$1 million?

We feel that continuing membership in Interpol is advantageous to the U.S. Government. On a local government level it provides an operational link with sister law enforcement agencies around the world. The Department of State's contact with Interpol has been useful, although extremely limited, in past years and will probably continue to be so in years to come. Interpol was not set up to duplicate diplomatic channels of communications and indeed if it were to do so, it would become redundant.

In the field of counter-terrorism the Department would probably realize its greatest benefit from continued Interpol membership. Although we depend primarily on those U.S. agencies specifically charged with intelligence collection and dissemination on terrorist groups and individuals, the Department has been a consistent advocate of this sharing of intelligence information on as wide an international basis as possible to aid national authorities in responding to the threat posed by terrorist lawlessness. It is our belief that Interpol serves a useful role in the context of sharing such information internationally. An annual budget of \$1 million to continue membership in such an organization seems a very small price to pay.

11. Interpol has refused to release the names, nationalities and salaries of persons employed by the General Secretariat. Do you believe this information should be available to the Congress? Should not a directory be compiled with the names of all NCB chiefs as well as their affiliation with their respective law enforcement agency?

The Department has no position on this question.

12.a. Do you perceive any objection to exchanging information on suspected criminals with totalitarian-type governments?

We perceive no objection to the exchange of information on suspected criminals with totalitarian-type governments. The object of exchanging information on criminals, suspected criminals or terrorists is to protect our own national interests. In that context the country-source of the information or the recipient of such information concerning criminals has no relevancy.

b. Do you perceive a risk in these governments using Interpol channels for political purposes, i.e., eliminating persons whose ideas might be judged contrary to the views of the government?

There is always a risk that other governments may use Interpol channels for political purposes. By requiring justification for the service of investigative requests, we can reduce that risk somewhat. When one weighs the overall program goals against the risks involved, the possibility of other governments using Interpol channels for political purposes becomes an "acceptable risk"—one which can never be totally eliminated.

13. Have you ever used Interpol to send out an international all points bulletin? How many NCB's were contacted as a result of your request. Were any positive results achieved as a result of this international wanted notification?

No.

14. Do you have any tangible evidence of the existence of Interpol agents who are not connected with a National Central Bureau? Has there been any evidence that Interpol engages in criminal-type investigations apart from making normal information requests from law enforcement agencies? Have you any information that Interpol personnel are engaged in criminal or espionage activities?

No.

15. Do you perceive any advantage by having the U.S. participate in a worldwide communications network in the event of a national emergency?

There are advantages to a worldwide communications network in the event of national emergency. This is particularly true for countries that do not have a sophisticated communications capability. In the case of the United States, it is felt that existing State Department communications and the military communication systems are probably sufficient for our needs. It is our understanding that at the present time the INTERPOL National Central Bureau, through the U.S. Department of the Treasury, uses the Department of State's communications circuits so we are already assisting in providing this "worldwide communications network."

16. Do you believe it is feasible to require INTERPOL to accept the jurisdiction of U.S. Federal Courts in all civil claims against it for acts or omissions involving U.S. citizens or residents?

This question is difficult to answer the way it is posed, for any complaint brought before a Federal District Court must allege a basis of jurisdiction to bring the suit in that court. Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts rests on statute in Title 28, United States Code. If there is no statutory basis for a plaintiff to allege jurisdiction over INTERPOL, there is no way INTERPOL can "accept" the jurisdiction of the courts.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
Washington, D.C., November 21, 1977.

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of August 16, 1977 addressed to Clarence M. Kelley concerning Interpol.

I am attaching a memorandum prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for your information.

Sincerely,

PATRICIA M. WALD,  
*Assistant Attorney General.*

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  
*Washington, D.C., October 27, 1977.*

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION  
(INTERPOL) RAISED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND  
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

The following are responses to 16 questions received by letter dated August 16, 1977, to Director Clarence M. Kelley from Congressman Joshua Eilberg, chairman of captioned subcommittee:

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been familiar with Interpol for many years. FBI representatives have attended Interpol regional meetings and General Assemblies (GA) as observers. The FBI is familiar with Interpol's constitution and regards Interpol as a valid international organization recognized as such by Title 22, U.S. Code, Section 263a (Supp V 1975), originally passed in 1938 which authorizes the Attorney General to accept and maintain membership therein. More than 125 countries currently are members.

In 1976, the General Accounting Office inquired regarding U.S. participation in Interpol and found that while the United Nations, the General Secretariat of Interpol, and the U.S. Treasury Department all refer to Interpol as an inter-governmental group, others consider it private or nongovernmental. Interpol's constitution, Article 4, states "any country may delegate as a Member to the Organization, any official police body whose function comes within the framework of activities of the Organization."

Interpol's constitution states its goal as the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes through cooperation within the limits of the laws of different countries in the spirit of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Interpol is "strictly forbidden" to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character. These precepts provide firm bases to prevent abuse or for a member agency to use as grounds for denial of cooperation in circumstances that might appear questionable.

The location of Interpol's headquarters in the Paris suburbs poses no problem and we are unaware of any compelling reason to move it elsewhere at this time.

2. According to records of the Washington National Central Bureau (WNCB) in 1976 the FBI referred 27 matters to Interpol and received 1,297. In 1977 through August, 12 cases had been referred by the FBI which received 626 in return. While cases received by the FBI are recorded by type rather than by originator, it can be safely said that the majority of matters received from Interpol were name check requests made on behalf of foreign police agencies concerning persons involved in criminal investigations. Most other incoming items were notices of major thefts or crimes including data on wanted persons or stolen items. The majority of matters referred by the FBI to Interpol dealt with wanted alerts on fugitives with a history of international travel.

3. As noted above, no exact breakdown of requests for investigations or name checks received from Interpol is kept. Name check requests are frequently screened by the WNCB and directed to the FBI on a form indicating the request arises from an official criminal investigation. Information sent in reply to the WNCB is routinely screened to ensure it meets legal criteria for release to other law enforcement agencies. We have experienced no difficulty in handling these requests through our normal procedures.

4. Figures on cases being handled by FBI Legal Attaches are maintained to indicate the pending work level at the end of each month. The pending figures include cases that were received the month before as well as those that may have been pending for more than one month at the time the count was made. They do, however, provide a useful average of the workload during the period in question. Selecting June, 1977, as a typical month, our Legal Attaches were handling 2,667 investigative matters as of June 30, 1977. Nearly 80 percent were criminal or applicant matters including name checks. The remainder dealt with other investigations within the FBI's exclusive jurisdiction. Of the pending matters 1,241 had been received abroad from foreign police and liaison contacts or other U.S. Government agencies. This number is indicative of the positive results of our vigorous foreign liaison program. The FBI believes that in carrying out its mission, which continually involves cases with foreign ramifications, there is no substitute for effective personal liaison as proved by the accomplishments of our Legal Attaches.

5. It is difficult for the FBI to state whether cooperation by Interpol, as such, has helped solve major crimes within FBI jurisdiction. A small number of FBI Special Agents are posted abroad in selected U.S. Embassies as Legal Attaches. They cover the major non-communist nations of Europe, East Asia, North and South America. Their local police contacts, who have cooperated in cases successfully concluded, are also frequently the Interpol representatives in their countries. Our experience indicates, however, that having our own personnel abroad maintaining close personal contacts within foreign police agencies in all the countries they cover immeasurably expedites the handling of our requests.

6. The FBI normally receives requests requiring inquiry abroad from state and local law enforcement authorities in cases where individuals of criminal interest are believed to have gone from the United States to other countries to avoid prosecution or to engage in illegal activities. In the vast majority of these cases, provisions of the Fugitive Felon Act or statutes dealing with interstate/international crimes places them within the FBI's investigative jurisdiction and we handle through our Legal Attaches. Where the case does not fall within FBI jurisdiction we have, as a matter of cooperation, either relayed the information or request directly to our contacts abroad suggesting they follow up through their own channels or have referred the cases to the WNCB. This is done on a case by case basis, no overall record is kept.

7. FBI representatives have attended Interpol GAs as observers since the 30th GA in 1961. Until 1974 the Legal Attache responsible for the area where the GA was held was designated to attend. In 1974, the Associate Director of the FBI attended the 43rd GA in France together with the Legal Attache, Paris. The 44th GA was attended by the Deputy Associate Director, the Chief of the Liaison Section, FBI Headquarters, and the Legal Attache, Buenos Aires. The Chief of the Liaison Section attended the 45th GA in 1976.

Director Clarence M. Kelley and the Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, together with the Legal Attaches from London and Paris, were present at the 46th GA, just concluded. At this GA the FBI contributed papers on "International Fraud in Commercial Crimes," "International Traffic in Copyright Sound Recordings and Motion Pictures," and "International Traffic in Stolen Property including Valuables and Motor Vehicles."

As observers our participation has been limited to presenting papers or joining in discussions at GAs or various symposia. The FBI is called upon to submit specialized papers and at present has been invited to present a research paper on the computerized reading and classification of fingerprints, a field in which the FBI is the acknowledged leader, to the "Symposium on Use of Electronic Data Processing by the Police" to be held in France in December, 1977. In addition, the FBI has been requested to research and present its findings on "The Application of Radioimmunoassay to the Determination of Sex from Blood Stains" at the 4th Interpol Forensic Science Symposium at St. Cloud, France in September, 1978.

8. Interpol does not have direct access to FBI files. The WNCB can make inquiry of our National Crime Information Center (NCIC) concerning matters of legitimate criminal interest to foreign police agencies. The NCIC maintains only documented information relating solely to fugitives, missing persons, stolen property, and criminal history information on individuals who have been charged and fingerprinted for a serious offense.

In cases where Interpol requests the FBI to conduct inquiries in the United States for a foreign law enforcement agency, its requests are closely weighed to ensure they are within the logical interests and concerns of the requesting agency. It should be noted that all information provided by the FBI to foreign law enforcement organizations through Interpol channels is in strict compliance with applicable Federal law.

9. As the FBI is not the U.S. representative to Interpol we see only that portion of Interpol's activities that applies directly to us. Therefore, it would be presumptuous for the FBI to try to evaluate the total contribution Interpol makes to the suppression of international crime. Interpol is basically a clearing house of information which is acted upon by literally hundreds of agencies and our experience is that in this jet age the international nature of crime increases daily. Interpol excels in setting out alerts on stolen artwork, securities, etc., and details of crimes believed perpetrated by individuals traveling between nations. In addition, with the multiplication of fraudulent schemes such as advance fee swindles using fictitious or shady financial institutions and false addresses abroad, having a method for requesting police inquiry in other countries is

utterly necessary. To the extent Interpol provides the channel for accomplishing positive results, it makes a definite impact on international crime.

10. For the United States not to be a Member of Interpol would for many agencies, especially state and local police, substantially delay contacts with authorities abroad. Unfamiliarity with the police structure in, for example, Singapore or Mexico could result in the Pennsylvania State Police sending futile requests for assistance to those countries. Police organization abroad is frequently very different from ours. The United States reportedly has over 30,000 police departments; Australia has only nine. The latter find this incomprehensible. With white collar crimes, alone, estimated to be costing the American tax payer \$40 billion a year, the amount spent for Interpol dues and to staff the WNCB seems to be a small but wise investment.

11. Interpol Members are nations. The representatives of these nations vary greatly. For example, the Deputy Attorney General is our representative. There is an Interpol directory of National Central Bureaus identifying the bureau in each country. Interpol's reported reluctance to publicize data on employees of the General Secretariat in France may well spring from privacy concerns which have been evidenced by the General Secretariat as recently as July, 1977.

12. Dangers of exchanging information with totalitarian governments are naturally a matter of concern. For this reason, the basis for the request for information must clearly show that it is in connection with an official criminal inquiry before cooperation is extended. However, in the case of the search for a common murderer, robber or thief or an effort to recover stolen treasures the type of government in power in the country where the crime occurred may not be pertinent. The FBI is alert to the possibility of abuse. In 1950, former Director J. Edgar Hoover resigned his position as Vice President of Interpol and the United States withdrew temporarily from Interpol. The break was precipitated by FBI concern that an East European communist country was using Interpol to trace refugees. Participation was not fully renewed until 1958. The FBI, since that time, is unaware of any such abuse of Interpol.

13. We have requested the WNCB on a number of occasions to alert all National Central Bureaus concerning particularly wanted fugitives believed to have fled abroad. No significant results have been received.

14. Personnel of the FBI who have been closely associated with Interpol activities cannot recall any reports of the existence of Interpol Agents not connected with a National Central Bureau. Visiting foreign police officers, some 300 of whom come to FBI Headquarters annually, often are members of the agency having Interpol representation in their countries but we have had no complaint of any of them conducting unauthorized investigations of any nature under the cover of Interpol during their visits to the United States.

15. U.S. participation in a worldwide communications network in the event of international emergency would certainly appear to be useful, although the nature of the emergency would clearly influence the usefulness of the network.

16. It is more properly within the province of the U.S. Department of Justice to comment upon the jurisdiction of U.S. District Courts over civil claims against Interpol filed by U.S. citizens or residents.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,  
U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND,  
Falls Church, Va., October 28, 1977.

CICG-FLO

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. EILBERG: Inclosed are answers to the questions you posed concerning the US Army Criminal Investigation Command's (USACIDC) relationship and knowledge of Interpol.

While this command's dealings with Interpol are not as extensive or as involved as those of many of the other Federal law enforcement agencies, the USACIDC does communicate, on a routine basis, with Interpol, Washington National Central Bureau.

Sincerely,

GUY M. HUSKERSON, Jr.,  
Colonel, MPC, Deputy Commander.

Inclosure.

## QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

*Question 1.* The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) is familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), its mission, functions, organizations and the National Central Bureau operating within Washington, D.C. Interpol is a required international organization in that it functions to assist police law enforcement organizations within the 125 member countries by coordinating requests for assistance and communications of criminal investigative matters among member nations. One of Interpol's most important functions is the coordination it seeks among international police in the suppression of crime. The Interpol constitution specifies that each of the member countries will act within the confines of its own laws and that the national law of each country will prevail. The general secretariat of Interpol, acting as the governing body, has no authority or power to require investigations by member nations. There have been no instances which have occurred to our knowledge which would indicate a requirement to have the headquarters of Interpol move from France to Switzerland.

*Question 2.* During Calendar Year 1976, Headquarters, USACIDC submitted four separate inquiries to Interpol for investigative or information purposes. A breakdown of these cases includes tracing of firearms, stolen U.S. Army CID badge and credentials, validation of CID interview and request for personal identification data. Thus far no request/inquiries have been submitted by USACIDC to Interpol for Calendar Year 1977.

*Question 3.* During Calendar Year 1976, Interpol Washington submitted 16 separate inquiries to Headquarters, USACIDC for investigative or informative purposes. Through Calendar Year 1977 to date, Interpol Washington has submitted 34 separate inquiries to Headquarters, USACIDC. These requests from Interpol were concerned with criminal history checks, drug violations (sale and possession), assault and battery, forgery, smuggling, robbery, homicide, missing person inquiries, illegal use of firearms, tracing of firearms, sex offenses and desertion. In response to specific requests, information was reviewed and selectively provided to answer questions relating to criminal law enforcement matters.

*Question 4.* Headquarters, USACIDC communicates daily with CID elements stationed overseas in matters relating to the investigation of crimes committed by U.S. servicemen stationed in foreign countries. The fact that the U.S. Army has elements stationed worldwide requires that USACIDC also operate on an international basis by investigating crime within the Army worldwide. Our investigations overseas are conducted because there are U.S. forces present in foreign countries. Elements of USACIDC stationed overseas are used to conduct investigations rather than utilizing Interpol channels.

*Question 5.* There are instances where information is required from within a nation where neither U.S. forces nor a CID element are stationed. In such instances we have used the Interpol communications network in order to obtain investigative information essential during the conduct of criminal investigations within the Army. There are also enforcement agencies located within countries affiliated with Interpol who deal directly through Interpol rather than communicating with USACIDC elements or other military law enforcement agencies. This Headquarters presently has no documented evidence that Interpol cooperation has ever resulted in the resolution of any major crime within our jurisdiction, or in the apprehension of Army major criminals sought by USACIDC.

*Question 6.* The USACIDC does occasionally receive requests for assistance from state, county or local police agencies. However, these requests for assistance usually involve a U.S. soldier stationed with a U.S. Army element in an overseas area. Because a U.S. service member is involved, these requests for assistance are processed through USACIDC channels abroad. The USACIDC does not refer these requests to Interpol where there must be a U.S. Armed forces connection associated with the request from state, county or local police agencies for the Army to become involved in the first place.

*Question 7.* The USACIDC has not contributed to the Interpol General Assembly proceedings. The USACIDC has not provided any position paper to the U.S. delegates to Interpol on matters which may affect the U.S. Army. Matters pertaining to such proceedings are more appropriately addressed by other U.S. Federal law enforcement agencies rather than by USACIDC, which functions as only an element of the United States Army law enforcement community.

*Question 8.* The USACIDC, in dealing with Interpol, is governed by U.S. Army regulations concerning both USACIDC cooperation with external agencies and the protection of individual rights. The USACIDC cooperates with Interpol within

the guidelines of Army regulations as well as the Privacy Act of 1974 and other appropriate laws and regulations which protect the rights of individuals.

*Question 9.* The Interpol has been successful through assistance in the suppression of crime primarily by achieving international cooperation. The Interpol does not initiate or conduct investigations. Rather, Interpol cooperates with other police and law enforcement agencies by coordination and communication of criminal investigative requests for assistance. One of Interpol's main contributions is its rapid transmission by radio of investigative requests for assistance between Interpol offices among member nations. These requests for assistance are relayed from the Interpol offices to the appropriate investigative agency within their respective countries.

*Question 10.* The USACIDC, because of its investigative mission and functions, does not use the facilities of Interpol as much as other US Federal law enforcement agencies. However, all US law enforcement agencies, to include city, state, local and Federal, can receive benefits from the use of Interpol. While the cost for US membership in Interpol is borne by the Federal government, the benefit in suppression of crime is received by all law enforcement agencies within the United States which utilize Interpol.

*Question 11.* The Interpol publishes for member countries a directory which lists all National Central Bureaus. The directory issued by Interpol lists, in addition to the name of the National Central Bureau, its head by title, mailing address, telephone, Telex, cable address, language spoken and hours of operation. Since Interpol communicates between member nations rather than individuals, the present directory, without listing personal names, seems sufficient for the purpose for which it was intended.

*Question 12.* Information exchanged through Interpol channels with foreign police could involve, at times, the exchange of information on suspects and criminals within totalitarian governments. Information exchanges between member nations are screened to insure that they involve only criminal investigative matters. The USACIDC has received no request which could be interpreted as being for any reason other than a criminal investigation. The Interpol constitution forbids involvement by member nations in political, religious, racial or purely military related matters. All exchanges of information between member nations must be closely screened to protect the privacy and rights of the individuals concerned.

*Question 13.* The USACIDC has not used Interpol to send out international all points bulletins. However, USACIDC is aware that Interpol has the world divided into zones and such bulletins can be circulated in a rapid manner to any one of these zones on a worldwide basis. Our liaison with other Federal agencies has indicated that such all points bulletins have been used successfully in apprehending fugitive and recovering stolen property.

*Question 14.* The USACIDC has no evidence or information that there are Interpol agents not connected with the National Central Bureaus. Each member nation maintains a National Central Bureau for Interpol. The Interpol office within the member nation is staffed by that country's police. As such, the personnel assigned to the National Central Bureau within the member nation are not agents of Interpol but are official police of that country. Each National Central Bureau receives requests for assistance relating to criminal investigative matters and refers such requests to an appropriate investigative agency within the country. We have no information that would indicate that the system is operated in another manner in other member countries or that Interpol is engaged in other than criminal investigative matters.

*Question 15.* In the event of a national emergency, such as a national disaster, Interpol could serve a useful purpose because of its worldwide communication network. We are aware of one instance where Interpol Washington was called upon to assist during an earthquake in Central America.

*Question 16.* The National Central Bureau in each member country works within the framework of its own national laws. The U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol comes within the jurisdiction of all United States laws. As such, any claims or suits against Interpol Washington would be filed within the U.S. court system. The same would apparently be true of other Interpol offices worldwide in that claims or suits against member Interpol offices would be filed in their respective countries under their own appropriate national law. It would seem inappropriate for U.S. courts to resolve a claim between a U.S. citizen and a foreign Interpol office unless the alleged act or omission underlying the claim is international in nature and has some jurisdictional nexus with the

United States. A claim that is local in nature should be resolved under local law just like other claims between a U.S. citizen abroad and the police of a foreign country, particularly since U.S. courts are not well equipped to resolve issues of foreign law. Consistent with this view, disputes between a foreign national in the United States and the U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol would be resolved in U.S. courts rather than in the courts of a foreign country.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,  
Washington, D.C., September 19, 1977.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The following responses from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations are submitted in answer to your questionnaire. Each answer corresponds to the numbered questions that you submitted.

1. Although the AFOSI is familiar with the basic organization, mission, and function of Interpol, its knowledge beyond this superficial point is limited. AFOSI regards it as a valid international organization and, as such, has no objection to its location for the headquarters in Switzerland, but AFOSI is not familiar with its Constitution or restrictions thereto.

2. The AFOSI is a centrally-directed world-wide organization with a presence throughout the United States, Europe, and Asia, and with a mission wherever there is an Air Force presence. Because of this world-wide capability, the AFOSI does not have a need for Interpol channels, since any requirement for information is communicated directly to the resident AFOSI representative in any particular area. Thus, AFOSI has not processed any requests through Interpol channels during the period 1976-77.

3. In 1976, the AFOSI received five requests through official Interpol channels, four in the area of criminal investigations and one relating to a preemployment records check. Thus far in 1977, it has received eight requests from Interpol, all of which related to criminal investigations. The information released was reviewed prior to its release to insure full compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974, but it did not require additional screening as in nearly all cases it pertained to records checks only.

4. During this period of time, thousands of requests for information or investigation have been processed directly with personnel of AFOSI stationed abroad. Virtually all requests originating these cases or requiring the information abroad were processed within AFOSI or other counterpart DOD agencies. These cases related to a wide and varying range of criminal, fraud, and counterintelligence matters of concern to the USAF, and Interpol channels were not used as the investigation into these matters is the primary mission of the AFOSI.

5. Since Interpol channels were not used, no tangible results were obtained by AFOSI as a result of Interpol cooperation. AFOSI is aware of no major crimes solved or major criminals apprehended within our mission as a result of Interpol cooperation.

6. The AFOSI does receive requests from time to time from a state or local agency for information from a foreign country. Such requests, if they do not violate the Posse Comitatus Act, and where there is a legitimate Air Force interest, are processed directly with our own representatives abroad and thus Interpol channels are not used by the AFOSI in such cases.

7. The AFOSI has never contributed to an Interpol General Assembly either by attendance or through an input, position paper, or resolution.

8. The AFOSI has very clear and stringent internal policies with regard to the release of any information within its files. Thus, only that information which under these policies could otherwise be approved for release to any proper police or security agency may be released to Interpol. In addition, all requests for the release of information from any agency are considered in the light of the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974, and releases are made only as authorized by that law. Requests for investigative assistance would normally be honored if the request from Interpol was within the mission and capability of the AFOSI.

9. Through its presence at various locations throughout the world, the AFOSI is aware of the substantial contribution made by Interpol to the suppression of crime on an international scale, though this contribution does not relate directly to the scope of AFOSI responsibilities. Interpol "wanted posters",

for instance, are widely publicized in many foreign countries where AFOSI has representatives. Future contributions will depend upon the cooperation among the individual members of Interpol.

10. The AFOSI believes that the cost for the U.S. to maintain membership is worth the advantages gained through continued ties with Interpol. Membership may further well be worthwhile to insure a type of worldwide communications network in the event of an international police emergency.

11. This agency is not in a position to address the question of Interpol providing employee information to Congress. A directory of all NCB chiefs would be useful in facilitating the international flow of information.

12. The exchanging of any police or security information with totalitarian type governments must be approached cautiously and on a case-by-case basis because of the constant danger of unfavorable political implications. Interpol channels certainly could be misused for political purposes, though in some cases, those governments which might be judged to be totalitarian have the most efficient internal police organizations and could be valuable contributors of information.

13. The AFOSI has never used Interpol to send out an international all points bulletin, since few AFOSI cases pertain to fugitive cases and because AFOSI or USAF channels could more conveniently be used.

14. The AFOSI has no information relating to any of the three questions posed regarding the placement of Interpol agents or the purview of its investigative activities.

15. U.S. participation in a worldwide communications network would be advantageous not only in the event of a national emergency, but also to provide a means of rapid communication between member countries in the event of major criminal cases or investigations with international considerations.

16. Because Interpol is an international organization and acts involving U.S. citizens could occur in foreign jurisdictions, it would not be reasonable to attempt to subject Interpol to U.S. civil court jurisdiction. However, Interpol should accept civil responsibility for its acts within the United States and its territories.

Thank you for your continued interest in Air Force matters.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. STIRK, Colonel, USAF,  
Chief, Congressional Legislation Division,  
Office of Legislative Liaison.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,  
Washington, D.C., September 20, 1977.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN EILBERG: Reference is made to your inquiry concerning the continuation of United States membership in and an increase of the annual contributions to the International Criminal Police Organization, known as Interpol.

Attached is my reply to your questionnaire which I hope you will find useful in your assessment of this organization and its effectiveness. I feel that without the use of Interpol and its channels of communication and international cooperation valuable information and major enforcement activities will be lost. As stated in my reply to your questions, major narcotics fugitives have been located, apprehended and returned to the United States for prosecution. In some instances this was only possible through the use of Interpol channels.

Please let me know if I can be of any further help to you and your Committee in this decision.

Sincerely,

PETER B. BENSINGER, Administrator.

Attachment.

#### QUESTIONS ON INTERPOL FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES

*Question 1.* Is your agency familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? Its Constitution? Do you regard it as a valid international organization? On what basis? Is the Constitution sufficiently restrictive to prevent or eliminate any abuse of its powers? If it is a valid inter-

government organization, do you not believe that the headquarters should be in a neutral country such as Switzerland?

Answer. DEA and its predecessor agencies have worked closely with ICPO-Interpol and we firmly support Interpol as a universally accepted international organization with a vital coordinating function in criminal matters. Interpol representatives are carefully selected and are often senior level, respected enforcement officers. Interpol employs security safeguards in its filing and reporting system considered acceptable for its purposes. It should be recognized that Interpol officers have no more information than is already available to the contributing/recipient countries themselves. Security of the system is much less a factor than is the possibility of personal compromise.

Interpol headquarters should remain in France, as opposed to moving to Switzerland. France is well respected in the international law enforcement community. It is stable, quite centrally located with excellent communications facilities and a language commonly used abroad. Interpol officers, facilities, equipment are presently functioning in Paris and considered very good. Economically, it would be impractical to relocate the General Secretariat from Paris, particularly with its current tight budget. Police matters particularly with regard to narcotics have traditionally maintained themselves as "apolitical" No advantage would be gained and, in fact, it would not be feasible to move to Switzerland. It is uncertain that the Swiss Government would be receptive to such a move, in large part because of their neutrality policies.

Question 2. How many requests has your agency processed through Interpol channels in 1976 and 1977? Please furnish a breakdown of type of information you requested.

Answer:

Calendar year	DEA initiated cases
1975 -----	82
1976 -----	190
1977 to date -----	76

All requests are drug related. Statistics relative to the type of information are not available. However, most of the requests are relative to criminal antecedents, fugitive searches, subscriber information for telephone and vehicle registrations and conspiracy investigations.

Question 3. How many investigations or file checks has your agency processed in that period upon the request of Interpol? Please furnish a breakdown of types of cases referred to you for response. Did you screen the information before releasing it to the U.S. National Central Bureau? What information was screened out?

Answer:

Calendar year	Interpol initiated cases
1975 -----	304
1976 -----	615
1977 to date -----	435

The statistics represent cases. Each case may contain one or more individual requests. All requests are drug related. All information is screened in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and other laws and regulations as applicable to each individual request.

Question 4. In this period, how many requests for information or investigation have you processed directly with personnel of your agency stationed abroad? Please furnish a breakdown of the type cases referred directly. Why did you not use Interpol channels in these cases?

Answer. It has been the practice for most leads developed in the U.S. by DEA to be passed directly to DEA offices abroad for follow-up action. Such leads otherwise would be furnished to the NCB Washington, eventually to the NCB of the action country and finally filtered down to our very own counterparts for a response. The response would be transmitted back via that same process.

Narcotics information is quite often perishable, if not timely pursued. Since DEA has excellent communications facilities, it is more practical in most cases, to transmit the information directly. This practice also gives DEA the opportunity to enhance rapport with host country officials and provides DEA with some measure of input or control over how and when the information is developed abroad. Direct communications are also quite frequent abroad where a DEA

foreign office is requested by host government officials to transmit a message to another foreign country. In some instances of requests for provisional arrests, DEA will use Interpol channels, since it is the official channel recognized and accepted by Interpol member nations who are authorized by law to act on Interpol requests. In these instances, Interpol reaction is often much more timely than via U.S. State Department/Foreign Office channels.

*Question 5.* What tangible results were obtained by your agency as a result of Interpol cooperation? Do you know of any major crimes that were solved or major criminals apprehended in your sphere of responsibility as a result of Interpol cooperation? Please describe.

Answer. The most tangible results obtained by DEA is the apprehension of DEA fugitives and the assimilation of documentary evidence for conspiracy investigations, especially in countries where DEA has no representation. Several extremely important DEA fugitives have been apprehended abroad through the timely assistance of Interpol.

*Question 6.* Does your agency receive requests from state, county or city police officers for information from a foreign country? Do you process these directly with agency representatives abroad? Do you refer these requests to Interpol through the U.S. National Central Bureau? Do you consider Interpol's assistance in this regard as essential to local police enforcement efforts?

Answer. Yes. Such requests are infrequent but they generally would be processed directly with agency representatives abroad. Occasionally, however, they would be referred to the US National Central Bureau of Interpol. Interpol assistance in some matters is more essential than in others, e.g., the country involved and the nature of the request.

*Question 7.* Has your agency contributed to Interpol General Assemblies by sending delegates or representatives? When? Who? Has your agency ever had any in-put in Assembly agenda? Does your agency provide position papers to the U.S. delegates on matters affecting your agency? Has any representative of your agency ever sponsored a resolution brought forward at a General Assembly? Please be specific in your replies to the above questions, citing dates, locations and proposals.

Answer. Since 1951, DEA has had representatives at all General Assemblies. Mr. John T. Cusack, Chief, International Policy & Support Division, has attended the General Assemblies for the past five years. The representative for DEA has recommended agenda items and has presented position papers on illicit drug traffic and has made these papers available to all U.S. delegates prior to each General Assembly. On four occasions our delegate was elected Chairman of the "Committee on the Illicit Drug Traffic". As Chairman of this Committee DEA and its predecessor agencies have sponsored resolutions. An example of this is as follows:

At the 44th General Assembly held at Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 9-15, 1976, the "Committee on the Illicit Drug Traffic", chaired by Mr. John T. Cusack of DEA, presented a resolution concerned with the seriousness of the worldwide problem posed by the illicit traffic and abuse of narcotic and psychotropic substances.

*Question 8.* What guidelines exist which govern your cooperation with Interpol? How do you protect a person's individual rights in your replies to inquiries?

Answer. Internal policy guidelines determine DEA's cooperation with Interpol. Requests for information most often involve criminal background checks which are routine to all law enforcement as are replies thereto. Unusual requests would be screened and authenticated. In every case, replies are made in accordance with the Privacy Act and related internal policies and regulations.

*Question 9.* What is your evaluation of the total contribution Interpol has made toward the suppression of crime and the enforcement of criminal laws on an international scale?

Answer. Interpol has contributed to a very measurable extent in international narcotics control, primarily in three basic ways. The apprehension and extradition of important narcotic fugitives is often facilitated, and at times even made possible through Interpol. Interpol serves as a central coordinating body providing the facility of criminal information and other resources of some 126 member countries and their law enforcement organizations. Interpol has served a vital role in more recent years in stimulating more effective narcotics enforcement on regional and worldwide basis principally through the various conferences and meetings it periodically sponsors. Most importantly, Interpol enables member countries, including the U.S., to have access to criminal information and enforcement resources in countries where the USG has little or no independent capability.

*Question 10.* What advantages or disadvantages do you perceive for the U.S. by its membership in Interpol? Do you think that it is worth an annual membership dues of \$214,000 per year plus the cost of maintaining equipment and federal agency personnel—totalling \$1 million?

Answer. U.S. membership in Interpol is definitely of considerable advantage to DEA because Interpol is a unique organization—the sole international body which can assist its 126 member countries in the coordination and communication of requests for criminal investigation. The global nature of the international narcotics traffic and the fact that illicit narcotics originate outside the U.S. renders it particularly worthy of Interpol interest and activity and Interpol lines of communication are often the sole means of effectively transmitting important investigative requests and drug intelligence. In view of this, the total cost of membership is justified.

*Question 11.* Interpol has refused to release the names, nationalities and salaries of persons employed by the General Secretariat. Do you believe this information should be available to the Congress? Should not a directory be compiled with the names of all NCB chiefs as well as their affiliation with their respective law enforcement agency?

Answer. Interpol has not refused to list the names, nationalities and police affiliations of persons employed by the General Secretariat. In fact, this data is already contained in the Congressional Record. The names of NCB Chiefs are omitted from the NCB directories in order to maintain cooperation on a country-to-country rather than person-to-person basis. It should be emphasized that if any member country wishes to know the identity of the NCB Chief in another country, the information is readily available.

*Question 12.* Do you perceive any objection to exchanging information on suspected criminals with totalitarian type governments? Do you perceive a risk in these governments using Interpol channels for political purposes, i.e., eliminating persons whose ideas might be judged contrary to the views of the government?

Answer. Membership in Interpol does not provide another forum in which to judge the political systems of other member countries. Article 3 of the Interpol Constitution strictly forbids the undertaking of activities of a political nature. Moreover, cooperation with any member country, totalitarian or otherwise, is voluntary and cannot be forced.

*Question 13.* Have you ever used Interpol to send out an international all points bulletin? How many NCB's were contacted as a result of your request? Were any positive results achieved as a result of this international wanted notification?

Answer. Yes. Circulation is routinely made to all NCBs and in several instances positive action resulted in the location, apprehension and ultimate return of important DEA fugitives to U.S. jurisdiction.

*Question 14.* Do you have any tangible evidence of the existence of Interpol agents who are not connected with a National Central Bureau? Has there been any evidence that Interpol engages in criminal-type investigations apart from making normal information requests from law enforcement agencies? Have you any information that Interpol personnel are engaged in criminal or espionage activities?

Answer. No, we have no tangible evidence of the existence of Interpol agents who are not connected with a National Central Bureau. Yes, in Bolivia and Ecuador, Interpol agents are operational and engaged in narcotics investigations on their own initiative. Yes, not espionage, but there have been allegations of corruption in narcotics cases.

*Question 15.* Do you perceive any advantage by having the U.S. participate in a worldwide communications network in the event of a national emergency?

Answer. A possible advantage could occur under such circumstances but it would appear a secondary concern and of limited value.

*Question 16.* Do you believe it is feasible to require Interpol to accept the jurisdiction of U.S. Federal Courts in all civil claims against it for acts or omissions involving U.S. citizens or residents?

Answer. The U.S. NCB comes within the jurisdiction of all U.S. laws. The international organization could not accept the jurisdiction of U.S. Courts anymore than it could accept the jurisdiction of the courts of all 126 member countries. Any grievances by U.S. citizens would be filed in the United States if it were against the U.S. NCB. If against the NCB of another member country (the police of that country), it would be filed in that country. The same would be true if that country's citizens desired to file a civil action against a U.S. agency.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER,  
Washington, D.C., September 30, 1977.

CO 708.785.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. EILBERG: This is in response to your letter of August 16, 1977, which transmitted a questionnaire from your Subcommittee regarding the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

Attached hereto are responses to your questions. The responses are numbered to correspond to the questionnaire.

If I can be of further assistance, do not hesitate to call upon me.

Sincerely,

LEONEL J. CASTILLO, *Commissioner*.

Attachment.

1. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), its constitution and functions. Liaison is maintained with the United States National Central Bureau at the Central Office level. Interpol is a valid International Organization that assists in the coordination and communication of criminal investigative requests between its 125 member countries. Interpol has no power in itself, but operates through its constitution with the General Assembly being the governing body. The Interpol General Secretariat has no authority to require investigation or other action by any member country. The Interpol constitution recognizes that each member country will act only according to its own statutes. The Interpol constitution is sufficiently restrictive to prevent any abuse of its powers. This Service has no knowledge of any occurrence which would cause consideration to be given to moving Interpol to another country.

2. This agency processed 42 requests through Interpol channels during 1976 and the first 6 months of 1977. Most of these requests were made to attempt to identify persons in the United States through foreign police records. Some requests were for the purpose of determining previous criminal activity and whether or not individuals were fugitives from justice.

3. During 1976 and the first 6 months of 1977, 369 informational referrals or requests for information were forwarded to this Service by Interpol at the request of foreign law enforcement agencies. No statistics as to the types of referrals are available. However, the bulk of these were with regard to persons who are fugitives or have criminal records who are known or believed to be in the United States. All information provided to Interpol to be transmitted to foreign law enforcement agencies is screened in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and other laws and regulations as applicable to each individual matter.

4. This Service has no record of the number of requests for information or investigation furnished directly to our personnel abroad. Cases referred directly usually require investigation or obtaining foreign records. In order to be acceptable as evidence in criminal or deportation proceedings, foreign records must be authenticated by American Consular Officers. Interpol naturally cannot furnish this service.

5. Through Interpol, member countries have notified this Service of many aliens who are wanted for serious crimes abroad. In many instances, this Service has been notified, through Interpol of aliens in the United States with serious criminal records in foreign countries who had gained entry into this country by concealing their criminal backgrounds. Many times this Service has been able to institute deportation proceedings or notify the proper authorities so that extradition proceedings could be initiated.

6. This agency does not accept requests from state, county or city police officers for information from foreign countries. This Service has no information as to whether or not Interpol's assistance is essential to local police enforcement activities.

7. The Service has been represented at Interpol General Assembly sessions for many years. James F. Greene, Deputy Commissioner, was in attendance in 1972 at Frankfurt, Germany; in 1973 at Vienna, Austria; in 1974 at Cannes, France and 1975 at Buenos Aires, Argentina. Henry B. Falcher, District Director at Rome

represented the Service in 1976 at Accra, Ghana. Suggestions for agenda items are routinely requested from the Service and position papers are routinely submitted on items of interest on the agenda. Mr. Greene sponsored a resolution before the General Assembly at Vienna in 1973, with regard to the need for a study regarding the increased use of counterfeit and altered passports and other identity documents by international criminals and traffickers in narcotics.

8. Service cooperation with Interpol is governed by all applicable statutes and regulations regarding the release of information. The Privacy Act of 1974 is strictly adhered to in protecting individual rights.

9. Interpol does an excellent job of assisting law enforcement organizations in the coordination and communication of criminal investigative requests. However, it does not initiate or conduct investigations so its effectiveness is dependent on the cooperation and effectiveness of the law enforcement organizations of the member countries.

10. Maintaining lines of communication and cooperation with law enforcement agencies in other countries through membership in Interpol would appear to be a distinct advantage to the law enforcement effort.

11. To protect the privacy of persons employed by the General Secretariat, Interpol has declined to publish this information. The United States National Central Bureau advises that this information can be made available to Congressional Committees at their request. Interpol provides member countries with a directory of all National Central Bureaus listing their affiliation with the national police or other law enforcement agencies. The names of Chiefs of National Central Bureaus are available to member countries on request.

12. Information exchanged with foreign law enforcement organizations through Interpol involve criminal investigations. All exchanges must be carefully screened to protect the rights and privacy of the individual while protecting the rights of everyone through enforcement of criminal statutes and the apprehension of offenders.

13. The Service has never used Interpol to place International All Points Bulletins.

14. This Service has no evidence as to the existence of any Interpol Agents. Each member country maintains a National Central Bureau which is staffed by its own law enforcement personnel. The United States has but one Interpol office, located in the Department of Justice, which is staffed by personnel from various federal law enforcement agencies.

15. Interpol communications might be of assistance in case of an emergency such as a natural disaster. It should be remembered that the Interpol constitution forbids involvement in military or political activities.

16. All National Central Bureaus are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in their individual countries. Suits may be filed in any country where a violation has occurred. The International Organization could not accept the jurisdiction of U.S. courts without setting a precedent which would lead to accepting the jurisdiction of courts in all 125 member countries.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION,  
Washington, D.C., August 30, 1977.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,*  
*U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Attached is our reply to your Subcommittee's questionnaire pertaining to the Interpol. Our reply is numbered in the order of the questions in the questionnaire.

Sincerely,

JOHN V. GRAZIANO, *Director.*

Attachment.

1. Our agency is familiar with Interpol and its Constitution. We feel the Constitution is sufficiently restrictive to prevent abuses of power only as they pertain to the United States. We cannot furnish possible examples of abuse of powers in other countries.

We regard Interpol as a valid international organization based on its membership and the spirit of international cooperation demonstrated by our colleagues in other countries.

We do not feel the location of Interpol Headquarters in Paris has had a detrimental effect on Interpol's mission.

2. We have processed four requests through Interpol in 1976 and through the present.

Our first request was for background checks of subjects living in London who were connected with a firm that was shipping meat to Rotterdam. The meat was then shipped into West Germany which had an embargo against U.S. meats. The meat was accompanied by forged USDA certificates of wholesomeness.

The second request processed through Interpol was for a background check of a parent firm in Switzerland whose American Subsidiary was requesting a sizable Business and Industry loan from the Farmers Home Administration. The American subsidiary wanted the loan to build a plant in Puerto Rico to manufacture small aircraft. The Farmers Home Administration was concerned that its design would readily lend itself for use by terrorists or guerrillas.

The third request processed through Interpol was for information from the Brazilian National Police on Brazilian laboratories extracting, processing and selling Brahman semen. This request was based on information developed during an investigation into Brazilian semen being smuggled into the United States through Mexico.

Our fourth request processed through Interpol was the result of information furnished by the Brazilian National Central Bureau. This fourth request was for information on subjects of an investigation being conducted by the Brazilians into the smuggling of beefalo semen by an American cattle company.

3. Interpol has not requested information from the Office of Investigation.

4. None.

5. One tangible result of Interpol cooperation has been the clean bill of health given legitimate business interested in obtaining a loan from the Farmers Home Administration.

A second tangible result has been the speedy receipt of information in connection with our semen smuggling investigation.

6. Not applicable to our agency.

7. I attended the International Symposium on Crime in Port and Dock Areas which met in Paris November 4 through November 6, 1975. Our agency's position on the subject was presented by memorandum dated October 29, 1975.

Robert F. Smith, Deputy Assistant Director, Security and Special Investigations attended the Interpol meeting held in Accra, Ghana, October 12 through October 22, 1976. Mr. Smith participated in the Symposium on Endangered Species. He and three other delegates prepared a resolution on the protection of endangered species which was adopted by the attending delegates.

Nicolas J. Panos, Group Leader, Foreign Investigations, Security and Special Investigations, attended the VI American Regional Conference held in Montevideo, Uruguay, in March 1977. Mr. Panos personally discussed exotic bird smuggling and semen smuggling with the delegate from Brazil. He also discussed the problem of USDA donated commodity shortages with the Haitian delegate.

8. The guidelines governing cooperation with Interpol as well as protecting an individual's rights are outlined in the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act.

9. We are not able to respond to this question.

10. We support the United States membership in Interpol and cannot furnish an example of a disadvantage to membership. We feel the cost of membership is well worth the money.

11. We feel the names, nationalities and salaries of persons employed by the General Secretariat should be furnished the Congress. It is our understanding that a Directory containing the names of NOB Chiefs and their respective law enforcement agencies exists. The information contained therein is available to member agencies.

12. We have no objection to exchanging information on suspected criminals with totalitarian type governments nor do we perceive a risk in these governments using Interpol channels for political purposes.

13. No.

14. No to each of these interrogations.

15. Yes.

16. Yes.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,  
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION,  
Washington, D.C., September 8, 1977.

Mr. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington,  
D.C.*

DEAR CHAIRMAN EILBERG: Thank you for including the Department of Commerce among those agencies from which you seek assistance in making an evaluation of the International Criminal Policy Organization (Interpol).

I regret my somewhat tardy response to your letter of August 16, 1977, but it was necessary to poll the other enforcement and investigative organizations of the Department before replying to the 16 questions you posed.

As you will see from our comments and answers to your questions, the Department has not utilized Interpol, nor has it had even limited interface.

For the sake of brevity, our enclosed answers will correspond to the numerical sequence of your questions.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM H. RANDOLPH,  
*Director, Investigations and Security.*

Enclosure.

ANSWERS TO THE COMMITTEE'S QUESTIONS ON INTERPOL FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

1. The Department's familiarity with Interpol is generally limited to recent media coverage. Thus we are not qualified to reply to the rest of question 1 and respectfully defer to those agencies that are more active in international enforcement activities.

2. None.

3. None.

4. The Department of Commerce has processed a number of requests for information or investigation in connection with implementation of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended. The majority of such inquiries are made to the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Customs Service, whose technical expertise in this area is precisely tailored to our needs. Thus, the use of Interpol would not be warranted.

5. Our reply to question 4 necessarily dictates a negative answer.

6. No.

7. No.

8. Again, negative in light of our reply to previous questions.

9.-12. With respect to questions 9, 10, 11 and 12, the Department defers to those agencies that are more active in international enforcement activities.

13. The Department of Commerce has never used Interpol to send out any international all points bulletins.

14. No.

15. Please see response to questions 9 through 12.

16. In matters such as these the Department of Commerce defers to the Department of Justice.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,  
Washington, D.C., September 29, 1977.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: I regret the delay in my reply to your letter of 16 August 1977 which enclosed questions from the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law about the International Police Organization (Interpol).

The activities and missions of Interpol, as a criminal police organization, are outside the areas of statutory responsibility of the CIA. CIA does not maintain any contact with Interpol as an organization. From time to time, CIA officials may be in touch abroad with foreign officials who may be in contact with Interpol on behalf of their own governments, but our contacts with them are

not concerned with Interpol. Therefore, the CIA has no information on which to base a response to your questions.

As you might expect, there are occasions when information comes unsought to the CIA that has some bearing on criminal activity. When this happens, the information is forwarded promptly to the FBI or the Department of Justice for appropriate disposition.

With all good wishes.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,  
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS,  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,  
Washington, D.C., September 12, 1977.

HON. JOSHUA ELLBERG,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your inquiry of August 16, 1977, asking for our evaluation of Interpol.

As the attached answers to the questions indicate, the Bureau believes Interpol to be an effective and useful law enforcement system.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN G. KROGMAN, *Acting Director.*

Enclosure.

QUESTIONS ON INTERPOL FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES

1. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) is familiar with and cooperates fully with Interpol, its functions, purpose, and organization. Guidelines for Interpol assistance requests from ATF personnel are outlined in an ATF Manual Order that also includes the Interpol Constitutional prohibition against involvement in racial, religious, military, or political matters. ATF regards Interpol as a valuable tool for assistance in obtaining accurate and rapid responses from foreign countries to our requests for information on legitimate criminal investigative functions. Moreover, Interpol is basically the only tool that we have to reach foreign law enforcement authorities for fast investigative response. ATF believes the Interpol Constitution is sufficiently restrictive to prevent abuse of its powers. In the Report of the Comptroller General of the United States dated December 27, 1976, entitled "U.S. Participation in Interpol, The International Criminal Police Organization," it is stated in part that U.S. officials believe that the U.S. National Central Bureau (NCB) operates within the general framework of the Interpol Constitution and that the Constitution does not conflict with U.S. laws, i.e., Report of Comptroller General.

The Headquarters of Interpol has functioned efficiently and in a nonpolitical method for many years in St. Cloud, France. To move the Headquarters to a neutral country such as Switzerland would not, in our estimation, produce a higher level of performance nor guarantee a higher degree of nonpolitical or neutral involvement than already exists.

2. How many requests ATF has processed via Interpol channels in 1976 and 1977 are not kept in our records keeping systems as separate statistics. ATF has made numerous requests in the past for Interpol assistance in tracing firearms and suspected arms traffickers under investigation for criminal offenses in this country. The volume of requests via Interpol is increasing dramatically as field agents are becoming more aware of the potential of the Interpol network to contact law enforcement agencies in 125 countries.

To comply with U.S. laws, the ATF Regulatory Division also utilizes Interpol facilities to make criminal record checks on foreign-born persons applying for alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives business licenses. Each of the ATF Regulatory Regions maintains its own records and the records keeping is not programmed to retrieve this type of statistic. To provide this statistic would require a hand search of the files and expend thousands of man-hours. Since ATF does not maintain an overseas staff, we rely heavily on the U.S. NCB to handle all requests to foreign countries for criminal investigative information.

3. Again, this type of statistic is not retrievable from our system of records keeping. Since ATF is the U.S. agency responsible for enforcing Federal firearms and explosives laws, we receive numerous requests from all over the world to

trace weapons used in crimes, and these requests are channeled via Interpol. Information sent to Interpol is screened to ensure compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974. No information is released on the personal or political activities of U.S. citizens.

4. ATF does not have any personnel stationed in foreign countries.

5. Results obtained by ATF from Interpol channels have been highly satisfactory. One of many cases involved an international gun smuggling operation broken by ATF in the Charleston, West Virginia, area. A Japanese National, with the assistance and complicity of U.S. Nationals, was purchasing handguns, then concealing the handguns in hollowed out automobile transmissions and shipping the transmissions to Japan. This case resulted in three defendants being convicted in this country. The Japanese authorities still are conducting investigations in their country on this matter. The U.S. NCB assisted ATF by relaying information to Japanese authorities and coordinating the visit of Japanese police to Charleston to interview the suspect and witnesses. The U.S. NCB received a letter of commendation from the Director of the Japanese National Police Agency for participation in this case.

6. Since ATF maintains an active field force of special agents who are in daily contact with State and local law enforcement agencies, many requests are channeled via ATF agents to Interpol to assist the local agencies criminal investigations requiring foreign information. Many State and local agencies are not aware of Interpol's capabilities and inquire of the ATF agents for advice on information capability from foreign countries. This assistance to State and local officers builds better working relationships between Federal and local agencies and is an important factor in building goodwill and effective public relations.

7. ATF has sent delegates for many years to the Interpol General Assemblies. For example, at the 1974 Assembly held at Cannes, France, September 19-25, Mr. Rex D. Davis, Director of ATF, attended as delegate and Mr. John Corbin, then Assistant Director, Criminal Enforcement, attended as an observer. At this Assembly, Director Davis submitted a position paper recommending stronger international firearms control laws, and that the General Secretariat publish periodic summaries of small firearms laws.

At the 1975 Assembly held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in October, Director Davis attended as delegate and Mr. Miles Keathley, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Enforcement, and Mr. George A. Hopgood, Special Agent, Miami Post of Duty, attended as observers. At the Americas Regional Conference held March 28 to April 1, 1977, at Montevideo, Uruguay, Mr. Marvin O. Shaw, Assistant Director, Criminal Enforcement, attended as delegate.

8. ATF maintains a Headquarters Office of Criminal Enforcement Liaison that receives field requests for Interpol assistance. The requests are screened to comply with the Privacy Act of 1974. ATF also maintains one special agent on the Interpol staff that again reviews the requests prior to their transmission to the overseas Interpol NCB. Any nonrelevant information is removed, for example Social Security numbers are not furnished to foreign Interpol NCB's. In addition, the "third agency rule" is adhered to to protect the rights of individuals.

9. ATF believes Interpol is a valuable and effective method for law enforcement agencies to utilize in their fight to suppress crime.

10. We can think of no disadvantages of U.S. membership in Interpol. Our evaluation is that the U.S. NCB is staffed by a well trained, professional cadre. U.S. membership in Interpol is highly respected internationally and in this country by professional law enforcement agencies. In our estimation, the approximate cost of U.S. membership of one million dollars is a small amount to pay in relationship to the benefits received in the effort to combat crime and terrorism.

11. The staff of the General Secretariat should have the same rights and privileges as provided by the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974. Names, nationalities, and salaries of Interpol staff members has no relationship on the effectiveness of the organization in combating international crimes. The Interpol concept is to foster cooperation between law enforcement agencies of the member countries and not between individuals.

12. We have no objection to the exchange of information relating to criminal offenses with any country as long as the enumerated offense is also a violation of U.S. law and does not conflict with the U.S. Constitution and the Interpol Constitution that prohibits association in political, racial, religious, or military matters. A U.S. citizen that is the victim of a crime of violence, such as an armed robbery, committed against him in Yugoslavia or the Dominican Republic should have the same privilege of a fair and intensive effort to capture the perpetrator

as the victim of the same crime in England. We see no risk in this country's membership in Interpol as long as these basic tenets are followed:

13. ATF has used the international All Points Bulletin on numerous occasions. In one instance, the modus operandi of a suspect who had possession of over 100 firearms and who is currently under investigation for arms trafficking was sent to all member countries. The investigation still is pending.

14. ATF has no knowledge of the existence of Interpol personnel who are not connected to a NCB. We have no evidence that Interpol personnel are engaged in criminal or espionage activities. The staff of each country's NCB is comprised of trained police personnel with clerical support.

15. The Interpol worldwide communications network could possibly be an advantage for the rapid transmission of radio messages in case of a national emergency.

16. The U.S. NCB is operated under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Justice and is governed by all U.S. laws, the same as any other Federal agency. The international organization could not accept jurisdiction of U.S. courts any more than it could from any of the other member countries. Civil claims against Interpol would have to be filed in the courts of the country involved in the dispute.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,  
U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE,  
Washington, D.C., September 9, 1977.

Refer to INV 22 I:S:F.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of August 16, 1977. I shall be happy to comment on INTERPOL (International Criminal Police Organization) and our participation in that Organization.

As to the current legislation now under consideration for authorizing continued United States membership and the increase of our annual contributions to INTERPOL, I would urge that it be approved as soon as practicable. The United States is one of the three or four countries benefiting most from use of INTERPOL services. It is a worthy organization and one which United States enforcement agencies, whatever level, can and should utilize.

I have enclosed our responses to the sixteen questions set forth in your questionnaire. If I can be of further assistance to you in any way, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT E. CHASEN,  
Commissioner of Customs.

Enclosure.

#### QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

1. The Customs Service is familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), its mission and organizational structure of the Secretariat General. We have utilized its communications facilities and benefited from participation in Interpol General Assemblies, various regional conferences and symposia. We have on hand, and are acquainted with, the Interpol Constitution.

Interpol is a valid organization recognized and accepted internationally and plays an important part in assisting police/law enforcement throughout the 125 member countries. This is accomplished by coordination and the use of rapid communications involving criminal investigations abroad. Its role is primarily in the suppression of crime. The Interpol Constitution recognized that each member country will act within its own laws and the national law of each country will prevail. The General Secretariat issues helpful bulletins and guidelines, coordinating where necessary; it has no authority to demand or require investigations or other action by any member country. The Constitution is adequate. We know of no reason to have the General Secretariat located in a country other than France. We would have no objection if it were located in a neutral country such as Switzerland.

2. During calendar year 1975, Interpol Washington submitted 150 separate inquiries to U.S. Customs either for investigation or information purposes; U.S. Customs referred 69 inquiries to Interpol for investigative purposes. During calendar year 1976, these figures were increased to 509 and 104 respectively.

During 1977 to date, Interpol has referred 407 inquiries to Customs and Customs has referred 51 inquiries to Interpol. These have not been broken down as to category, but are concerned with stolen vehicles, vehicle license and drivers license checks, criminal checks, currency violations, stolen art and artifacts, prohibited exportations and importations (endangered species, arms and ammunition, narcotics), and other criminal matters.

3. The U.S. Customs Service has processed various investigations for Interpol insofar as they are within the area of responsibility of our Service. We have no breakdown of types of cases referred to us for response. All information is screened in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, "Third Agency Rule", and other laws and regulations as they apply in each individual case.

4. The U.S. Customs Service maintains ten foreign offices throughout the world to service our total needs in the international arena. In performing our statutory mission, we conduct formal inquiries into 32 different categories of activity which range from commodity oriented inquiries regarding value, classification, dumping, etc., to the full range of criminal investigative needs. Whenever our Service requires any type of foreign inquiry, we always direct our initial request to the responsible Customs foreign office. As a result, we do not maintain a breakdown of inquiries sent direct to our foreign offices rather than Interpol. However, if the inquiry is not of a "technical" Customs nature; is not a "security" matter; is of a general enforcement nature; and our foreign offices may not be able to timely respond, we then consider directing the matter to Interpol for inquiry.

5. Our Customs offices abroad are spread thinly, which presents an economic problem. We have used Interpol to advantage in areas not easily covered by Customs; we have been able to communicate with law enforcement agencies in certain countries through Interpol facilities which would not be possible otherwise. Some enforcement agencies in member countries prefer to deal solely through Interpol rather than directly with a United States Federal or other enforcement agency.

We have been most successful in our use of Interpol in the recovery of stolen vehicles imported into the United States. An example of this is the recent seizure of five vehicles from information provided by Interpol on two of these vehicles.

6. The U.S. Customs Service receives many requests from state, county or city police offices for information from foreign countries since they realize we have offices abroad. We evaluate the requests and submit them either to our Customs Representative abroad or to Interpol for referral abroad. This has been of immeasurable importance to our Service in promoting liaison and co-operation on the part of these various agencies with Customs. Interpol's assistance is definitely essential to local police enforcement activities. The alternative in using Interpol would be either a total lack of international police cooperation or a difficult and cumbersome attempt by the thousands of police agencies in the U.S. to develop and maintain their own liaison with the thousands of police agencies in the 125 member countries. Police officials, since they are not cognizant of the identities and official status of most of the police agencies in other countries and continents, would be reluctant to comply with the requests or respond to communications from individuals or agencies purporting to be police officials.

7. The U.S. Customs Service has sent delegates and observers to all General Assemblies, Regional Conferences and Symposia. We have submitted position papers whenever possible. Shown below are the more recent General Assemblies, our delegates and position papers:

*13d General Assembly in Cannes, France (Sept. 19-25, 1974)*

Delegates: Commissioner Vernon D. Acree; Assistant Commissioner (Investigations) George C. Corcoran, Jr.

Observers: Customs Attache, Mario Cozzi, Rome; Customs Attache, Wilbur Underwood, London; Customs Attache, Viktor Jacobson, Bonn; Customs Attache, Andrew Agathangelou, Paris.

*14th General Assembly in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Oct. 9-15, 1975)*

Delegate: Assistant Commissioner (Investigations) George C. Corcoran, Jr.  
Observers: Director, General Investigations Division, John H. Dennis; Customs Attache, Raul Gerhart, Mexico City.

Position Papers Submitted:

1. Couriers and New Methods Used by Narcotics Traffickers.
2. Vessel Violation Profile System (VVPS).

3. Use of Aircraft.
4. International Fraud and Commercial Crime.
5. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.

*45th General Assembly in Accra, Ghana (Oct. 14-20, 1976)*

Delegate: Assistant Commissioner (Investigations) George C. Corcoran, Jr.  
Observer: Director, General Investigations Division, John H. Dennis.

Position Papers Submitted:

1. International Commercial Fraud.
  2. The Overall Drug Trafficking Situations.
  3. New Crime Prevention Methods—Aircraft Hijacking.
  4. Illicit Traffic in Wild Animals.
  5. Crime in Port and Dock Areas.
8. The U.S. Customs Service cooperates with Interpol by working within the framework of the Privacy Act of 1974, the "Third Agency Rule", applicable Federal Statutes and other laws and regulations necessary to protect the rights of the individual and to carry out U.S. Customs responsibilities.
9. Interpol has been successful in the suppression of crime by international cooperation. Especially important is the rapid transmission by radio and other means, of investigative requests between Interpol offices, who relay the requests to the appropriate investigative agencies in their respective countries. Such referrals are to agencies which have the capability and responsibility for these investigations.
10. The United States has a decided advantage in being a member of Interpol. As stated earlier, it is one of the three or four heaviest users of Interpol facilities. Its membership is invaluable to the suppression of crime since the need for international police cooperation has increased progressively in recent years. All law enforcement agencies, whether city, county, state or federal, can benefit from the use of Interpol. The cost is borne by the Federal Government, however, the benefits are received by all agencies utilizing Interpol. The cost is more than justified.
11. The Secretary General has made it known that the United States Congress would be welcome to review the names, nationalities, and salaries of personnel employed by the General Secretariat at its Paris Headquarters. The Interpol Executive Committee, of which the United States is a member, concluded that to provide a list would not be within the best interest of the individuals' privacy. Interpol does issue a directory which lists all National Central Bureaus, their heads by title, their mailing addresses, telephone, telex and cable addresses, language spoken, and hours of operation, all of which remain constant. Since we communicate between countries rather than individuals, the directory does not list personal names. This suffices for our purposes.
12. We have no objection in exchanging information on suspected criminals with totalitarian governments. Since this information must involve a criminal investigation and is carefully screened, we have received no requests which could be interpreted as being other than criminal. All member countries realize that the Interpol Constitution forbids involvement in political, religious, racial, or military matters. However, if a criminal offense by a person or organization is committed in these areas, Interpol will assist on the basis of the criminal acts.
13. The U.S. Customs Service has used Interpol for all points bulletins on occasion. Interpol has the world divided into zones and bulletins can be speedily circulated to any one zone, any combination of zones, or world-wide. We have been successful in apprehending fugitives and recovering stolen yachts using this system.
14. We have no information that there are Interpol agents, as such. Each National Central Bureau is normally located in the capital of a country, and in the Headquarters of that country's National Police. Each National Central Bureau receives criminal investigation requests and refers them to the appropriate investigative agencies. We have no information that this is otherwise in any member country or that there are so-called Interpol "agents" engaged in criminal or espionage activities. We do not think this is so.
15. In the event of a national emergency, Interpol could participate in a world-wide communication network if it were not in violation of the Interpol Constitution and the human element were involved. Interpol Washington did assist on one occasion in the Guatemala earthquake and on numerous occasions has arranged for shipments of baby food and difficult-to-obtain medicines in emergency cases.

16. As stated earlier, the National Central Bureau in each member country works within the framework of its own national laws. The National Central Bureau in Washington is subject to U.S. laws and decisions of the U.S. Courts. Any claims or suits against Interpol Washington would be filed in the United States. Any claims or suits against other Interpol offices or the Secretariat General would be filed in their respective countries under the laws of those countries.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,  
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,  
Washington, D.C., October 17, 1977.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in reply to your letter of August 16, 1977, which was referred to this office for response. We appreciate the opportunity to assist your Committees' deliberations on the International Criminal Police Organization, commonly known as Interpol.

Enclosed are our answers to the questions you proposed. It should be noted that many of the questions do not pertain to our use of Interpol. We cannot give them information because of our disclosure regulations; and thus, we are not concerned with their safeguarding information from us. Also, it should be noted that Interpol does not generally assist in the investigation of fiscal crimes such as tax evasion.

If we can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely yours,

DOUAUL T. MARTIN,  
(For S. B. Wolfe,  
*Assistant Commissioner (Compliance)*).

Enclosures.

*Question 1.* Is your agency familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? Its Constitution? Do you regard it as a valid international organization? On what basis? Is the Constitution sufficiently restrictive to prevent or eliminate any abuse of its powers? If it is a valid inter-government organization, do you not believe that the headquarters should be in a neutral country such as Switzerland?

Answer. The Internal Revenue Service is familiar with Interpol. We have reviewed its constitution and believe it to be sufficiently restrictive for any dealings we have with it. We have had no experience to make us feel that the potential exists for it to abuse its powers.

We regard Interpol as a valid international organization because it provides the mechanics for communication between national law enforcement organizations.

Our limited experience with Interpol does not indicate any problem with its headquarters being located in France.

*Question 2.* How many requests has your agency processed through Interpol channels in 1976 and 1977? Please furnish breakdown of type of information you requested?

Answer. Although we do not keep records of this, we have identified twelve such requests during the last two years. In all instances we were either seeking to locate an individual's current location or to determine if an individual had a record of criminal activity in a foreign country.

*Question 3.* How many investigations or file checks has your agency processed in that period upon the request of Interpol? Please furnish breakdown of types of cases referred to you for response? Did you screen the information before releasing it to the U.S. National Central Bureau? What information was screened out?

Answer. The Internal Revenue Service has received inquiries concerning tax information from various countries through Interpol. Because of our disclosure regulations, we have been unable to furnish the information requested by these foreign countries.

*Question 4.* In this period, how many requests for information or investigation have you processed directly with personnel of your agency stationed abroad? Please furnish a breakdown of the type cases referred directly. Why did you not use Interpol channels in these cases?

Answer. The exact number of requests are unknown. A reasonable estimate would be 300 annually. All of these inquiries would involve the tax laws of the United States.

Interpol was not used because there is an international reluctance to become involved in fiscal crimes and because our own personnel are highly trained to secure the type of information needed for the case in question.

Also, it should be recognized that Interpol does not have personnel assigned to foreign countries. Rather, they provide the mechanics for communicating and requesting information from police organizations that are fellow members.

*Question 5.* What tangible results were obtained by your agency as a result of Interpol cooperation? Do you know of any major crimes that were solved or major criminals apprehended in your sphere of responsibility as a result of Interpol cooperation? Please describe.

Answer. Measurement of tangible results is very difficult in this area. First, the knowledge that a quick means of international communication between law enforcement is, in itself, a deterrent to international flight. However, we do not know of any major crime that was solved as a result of Interpol cooperation.

*Question 6.* Does your agency receive requests from state, county or city police officers for information from a foreign country? Do you process these directly with agency representatives abroad? Do you refer these requests to Interpol through the U.S. National Central Bureau? Do you consider Interpol's assistance in this regard as essential to local police enforcement activities?

Answer. We know of no such requests.

*Question 7.* Has your agency contributed to Interpol General Assemblies by sending delegates or representatives? When? Who? Has your agency ever had any input in Assembly agenda? Does your agency provide position papers to the U.S. delegates on matters affecting your agency? Has any representative of your agency ever sponsored a resolution brought forward at a General Assembly? Please be specific in your replies to the above questions, citing dates, locations and proposals.

Answer. Mr. William S. McCarter, the Revenue Service Representative from Rome, Italy, attended the Interpol General Assembly meeting in Ghana, October 14-20, 1976. He attended as a member of the delegation from the Treasury Department. While there, he participated in the presentation of a Treasury Department position paper concerning economic crime. However, the Internal Revenue Service did not present any position papers on its own nor has it sponsored a resolution. It should be noted that the Internal Revenue Service is not a member of Interpol and our participation is limited to being members of delegations representing the Treasury Department.

*Question 8.* What guidelines exist which govern your cooperation with Interpol? How do you protect a person's individual rights in your replies to inquiries?

Answer. We have not published any guidelines for cooperation with Interpol. As previously noted, our disclosure regulations prevent us from furnishing information to Interpol.

*Question 9.* What is your evaluation of the total contribution Interpol has made toward the suppression of crime and the enforcement of criminal laws on an international scale?

Answer. Because of our limited participation, we are not in a position to accurately evaluate this. We do feel that the existence of such a communication network is, in itself, a deterrent to international crime.

*Question 10.* What advantages or disadvantages do you perceive for the U.S. by its membership in Interpol? Do you think that it is worth an annual membership dues of \$214,000 per year plus the cost of maintaining equipment and federal agency personnel—totalling \$1 million?

Answer. Again, we are not in a position to evaluate this because of our very limited participation.

*Question 11.* Interpol has refused to release the names, nationalities and salaries of persons employed by the General Secretariat. Do you believe this information should be available to the Congress? Should not a directory be compiled with the names of all NCB chiefs as well as their affiliation with their respective law enforcement agency?

Answer. We are not sufficiently familiar with this to answer the question. We can see the personal dangers involved in publishing an agent's name if he is involved in sensitive work. Further, we believe that the release of names of law enforcement personnel may be an infringement on the individual's privacy rights.

*Question 12.* Do you perceive any objection to exchanging information on suspected criminals with totalitarian type governments? Do you perceive a risk in these governments using Interpol channels for political purposes, i.e., eliminating persons whose ideas might be judged contrary to the views of the government?

Answer. Again the Internal Revenue Service is prohibited from exchanging information due to our disclosure regulations. Based on Interpol's constitution, we feel that a totalitarian type of government would find it difficult if not impossible to get other governments involved in political matters.

*Question 13.* Have you ever used Interpol to send out an international all points bulletin? How many NCB's were contacted as a result of your request? Were any positive results achieved as a result of this international wanted notification?

Answer. No.

*Question 14.* Do you have any tangible evidence of the existence of Interpol agents who are not connected with a National Central Bureau? Has there been any evidence that Interpol engages in criminal-type investigations apart from making normal information requests from law enforcement agencies? Have you any information that Interpol personnel are engaged in criminal or espionage activities?

Answer. No to all questions.

*Question 15.* Do you perceive any advantage by having the U.S. participate in a worldwide communications network in the event of a national emergency?

Answer. Not from the standpoint of Internal Revenue Laws.

*Question 16.* Do you believe it is feasible to require Interpol to accept the jurisdiction of U.S. Federal Courts in all civil claims against it for acts or omissions involving U.S. citizens or residents?

Answer. Our experience with Interpol is not sufficient for us to feel qualified to answer this question.

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DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE,  
Washington, D.C., August 22, 1977.

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of August 16, 1977, concerning United States membership in the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).

The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) is a Component of the Department of Defense (DOD) and has as its primary mission the conducting of personnel security investigations for DOD. DIS has not processed any requests through Interpol and has not received any requests from them.

DIS has no personnel stationed outside of the United States or Puerto Rico, and does not furnish information to foreign governments or police departments.

DIS has never sent a delegate or representative to an Interpol General Assembly. Since we have no contact with Interpol, it is not possible to evaluate the benefits which the United States can obtain through membership with the organization.

I hope that these answers may be of some benefit to your Subcommittee and I regret that I cannot be of greater help to you.

Sincerely

BERNARD J. O'DONNELL, *Director.*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,  
U.S. SECRET SERVICE,  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,  
Washington, D.C., September 9, 1977.

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of August 16, 1977. I welcome this opportunity to comment on the International Criminal Police Organization and the United States participation.

We are aware of the pending request for amendment to the current legislation authorizing payment of the U.S. dues to Interpol. We believe that the United States participation in Interpol is most worthwhile and we recommend the pro-

posed legislation be acted upon as soon as possible. The annual publication by Interpol listing those countries in arrears in their annual dues does not give the U.S. the desired image since the U.S. is currently in arrears \$131,000 (1975, \$18,000; 1976, \$20,000; 1977, \$93,000), yet we are one of the most active countries in the use of Interpol facilities.

I have attached our responses to your questionnaire. Should you require additional information, please let us know.

Sincerely,

LILBURN E. BOGGS,  
*Deputy Director.*

QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

1. The United States Secret Service is familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization—Interpol—its purpose, organizational structure, communications and coordination functions, activity of the United States National Central Bureau, Interpol and Interpol General Assemblies, conferences, symposia and the Interpol Constitution.

Interpol is a valid organization that has the function of assisting police/law enforcement of the 125 member countries in the coordination and communication of criminal investigative requests abroad. Interpol has an important role in international police cooperation in the suppression of crime. The Interpol Constitution clearly recognizes that each member country will act only within its own laws. Therefore, the national laws of each country prevail. The Interpol General Secretariat has no authority or power to require investigation or other action by any member country. The Interpol Constitution is considered to be adequate. Nothing has occurred to our knowledge with regard to Interpol and its location in France to consider moving Interpol to another country.

2. During 1976, the U.S. Interpol Office made 147 referrals to the U.S. Secret Service and in 1977 to date have made 99 referrals. Most of these concerned counterfeit U.S. currency. In some of the cases and in several other instances (statistics not available) we asked the U.S. Interpol Office to obtain additional information from foreign police on these matters. Information requested usually involved full identification of types of counterfeit, origin of counterfeit, details of arrests and/or seizures.

3. The U.S. Secret Service has not conducted any investigations or file checks for Interpol; however, we have conducted investigations and file checks for certain foreign police who have made their request through Interpol. Statistics are not available as to the number.

Most cases involved counterfeit U.S. currency. The information was screened by us before forwarding to the U.S. Interpol Office. All information is screened in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and other laws and regulations as applicable to each individual matter.

4. In 1976, our representatives in Paris, France made 600 referrals to foreign police, our Honolulu office made 19 referrals and our office in San Juan made 25 referrals to foreign police agencies. Approximately ten percent of the 600 referrals made by our representatives in Paris were made directly to foreign police agencies and ninety percent were made through Interpol communications channels. As is indicated, Interpol channels were used in a large percentage of the cases. In other instances the Secret Service representatives handled them directly with foreign police in view of the degree of expertise required in the identification and investigation of counterfeit U.S. currency.

5. Interpol's function is the communication and coordination of criminal investigative requests between police/law enforcement agencies of the member countries. Interpol is most effective and has assisted us in major counterfeiting cases and in certain other cases to identify authors of threatening letters or remarks to certain Secret Service protectees.

6. When we receive requests from local, county or state police concerning a request to foreign police, if the request does not concern the jurisdiction of the Secret Service, the request is sent to the U.S. Interpol Office for handling and the requester is so advised. Interpol is most essential to local, county, state and federal police/law enforcement. Agencies having representatives abroad have them in only a few countries except possibly the Drug Enforcement Administration. Interpol has 125 member countries and thus coordination and communication with the police of these countries is essential.

7. The Secret Service has contributed to Interpol General Assemblies, conferences and symposia by sending delegates, by recommending agenda items and

by sponsoring and/or assisting in the drafting of resolutions. An example of this for the period 1974-77 is as follows:

*1974 General Assembly in Cannes, France*

The Secret Service delegate was Director Knight. Mr. Louis B. Sims was also a delegate in his capacity as Chief of the United States National Central Bureau, Interpol. Also attending were Assistant Director Burrill Peterson; Deputy Assistant Director James Burke; Special Agent in Charge John Holtzhauer, Counterfeit Division, Special Agent in Charge Frank Leyva, American Embassy, Paris; and Mr. Kenneth Giannoules, outgoing Chief of the United States National Central Bureau.

The Secret Service suggested that international currency counterfeiting be included on the agenda. Secret Service delegates took an active part in the discussion on this subject and the Interpol General Secretariat's report on currency counterfeiting. The Secret Service delegates did not prepare any papers for distribution at the assembly, but prepared briefing papers for their own delegates. Mr. Sims and Mr. Kenneth Giannoules drew up and introduced a draft resolution "Privacy of Information" (Exhibit I).

*Interpol Executive Committee*

Director H. S. Knight was elected by the 1974 General Assembly to the Executive Committee representing North America. He participated in an Executive Committee meeting following his election.

*1975 General Assembly in Buenos Aires, Argentina*

The Secret Service delegate was Mr. Eugene Dagg, American Embassy, Paris. Mr. Louis B. Sims was a delegate in his capacity as Chief of the United States National Central Bureau, Interpol. The only other Secret Service representative attending was Mr. Victor Gonzalez, Special Agent in Charge, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

The Secret Service asked that currency counterfeiting be included on the agenda and thus took an active part in the discussions and presentations. The Secret Service took an active part in drafting the resolution "Prevention of Currency Counterfeiting" (Exhibit II). Mr. Sims introduced a resolution "Policy to be Followed Concerning Requests for Information—Investigation—Arrest, etc. From NCB or General Secretariat" (Exhibit III).

*Interpol Executive Committee*

Director Knight, member of the Executive Committee representing North America, participated in Executive Committee meetings during June 1975.

*1976 General Assembly in Accra, Ghana*

The Secret Service delegates were Director H. S. Knight and Assistant Director Thomas J. Kelley. Other Secret Service representatives were Mr. Eugene Dagg, American Embassy, Paris, and Mr. Joseph LeDenmat, American Embassy, Paris. Mr. Louis B. Sims was a delegate in his capacity as Chief, United States National Central Bureau, Interpol.

The Secret Service delegates took an active part in discussions and presentations on the agenda item "V.I.P. Protection". Mr. Louis B. Sims took an active part in the discussion and presentations on agenda items "Exchange of Information between National Central Bureaus: the effect of National Regulations designed to protect Privacy" and "Day to Day Cooperation". The Secret Service delegates also took an active part in the discussions during the American Continental Meeting, i.e., communications and cooperation.

*Interpol Executive Committee*

Director Knight, member of the Interpol Executive Committee, participated in the Executive Committee meeting held just prior to and during the period of the General Assembly. Director Knight was elected Vice President (representing North and South America) during the General Assembly.

S. The Secret Service cooperates with Interpol using Federal Statutes, Privacy Act of 1974, Third Agency Rule and other appropriate laws and regulations to protect the rights of individuals and to carry out Secret Service statute responsibilities.

9. Interpol has made and continues daily to make a substantial contribution in the suppression of crime and enforcement of criminal laws. We know that Interpol does not initiate or conduct investigations but assists police/law enforcement in the coordination and communication of criminal investigative requests. Therefore, Interpol can only be as effective as the police/law enforcement of the member countries.

10. The U.S. is definitely at an advantage in international police cooperation and suppression of crime in that the United States is a member of Interpol. The United States membership in Interpol is invaluable to law enforcement in international police cooperation and the suppression of crime.

11. It is our understanding that Interpol has not refused to advise the United States Congress of the names, nationalities and salaries of persons employed by the General Secretariat, but stated that the United States Congress, or their staff, would be welcome to review these lists at the General Secretariat and, if desired, talk with the staff. For reasons of privacy of the individual, the Interpol Executive Committee, of which the United States is a member, concluded that to provide a list would not be within the best interest of the individual's privacy. We are aware that Interpol presently publishes for all member countries a directory of NCB's, their affiliations with the national police and/or other official police agency. Interpol stresses cooperation between police of the member countries and not between individuals of the member countries. A directory of NCB Chiefs would tend to move away from this concept and it is doubtful that it would serve any useful purpose. If any member country needs to know the NCB Chief of other countries, all one must do is ask.

12. Information exchanged through Interpol with foreign police, including those of alleged totalitarian-type governments, involve criminal investigations. If there was no exchange, nor police cooperation with the police of these countries, the criminal who victimizes the citizens of the United States and other countries could go to these countries and the police/law enforcement in the United States, or other victimized country, could not proceed with efforts to locate the offender. All exchanges both within the United States and without, must be closely screened to protect the privacy of the individual while protecting the citizenry by enforcement of the laws and apprehension of offenders. We know of no instances where Interpol has been used for political purposes. Interpol and all member countries are very much aware of the sensitivity in the areas of political, religious, racial and military matters. We understand that these are prohibited areas in the Interpol Constitution.

13. The Secret Service has used Interpol to send out all points bulletins ranging from contacting the police of only a few member countries to contacting the police of all 125 member countries. Positive results have been received as a result of these notices in that Interpol is basically the most direct and quickest way to alert the police of the member countries (an exception to this may be where the agency has a representative physically located in that country).

14. There are no Interpol Agents. Each member country maintains a National Central Bureau for Interpol which is an office within their official police, staffed by that country's police. Therefore, the personnel assigned to the National Central Bureau in each country are not Interpol Agents but are official police of that country. The United States has only one Interpol Office staffed by 13 persons four of which are Special Agents (criminal investigators) from the U.S. Secret Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. There are no Interpol General Secretariat personnel in the United States. The 13 personnel in the United States NCB are the only Interpol personnel in the United States.

15. In the event of a national emergency such as a national disaster, etc., Interpol may serve a useful purpose. There is no reason to believe it would be a detriment in that situation.

16. The United States National Central Bureau, Interpol, Department of Justice, comes within the jurisdiction of all United States laws. Neither the General Secretariat, nor any other member, could accept the jurisdiction of United States courts anymore than the United States could accept the jurisdiction of their courts. Any alleged grievances or complaints by United States citizens would be filed in the United States if it were against the United States National Central Bureau. If against the National Central Bureau of another member country (the police of that country) it would be filed in that country. The same would be true if that country's citizens desired to file a civil suit against a United States agency.

## EXHIBIT I

## RESOLUTION—PRIVACY OF INFORMATION

Noting the concern of many countries with the privacy of the individual with regard to criminal justice information, and

Noting, in addition, that the development of international crime requires an exchange of information on an international basis,

The ICPO-Interpol General Assembly, meeting in Cannes from September 19th to 25th, 1974 at its 43rd session.

Urges that in exchanging information the ICPO-Interpol NCBs and the General Secretariat take into account the privacy of the individual and strictly confine the availability of the information to official law enforcement and criminal justice agencies.

## EXHIBIT II

## INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION (INTERPOL) 44TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION

(Buenos Aires, Oct. 9-15, 1975)

## RESOLUTION: PREVENTION OF CURRENCY COUNTERFEITING

Having noted the manufacturing and marketing of colour photocopying machines that make it possible to obtain very exact copies of documents,

Considering the possibility of fraudulent use of such machines to reproduce paper currency, cheques, and other securities for fraudulent purposes,

Aware of the fact that the above problem can only be solved by the adoption of security measures based on technical studies and by contacts between responsible authorities and the manufacturers of such machines.

The ICPO-Interpol General Assembly, meeting in Buenos Aires from October 9th to 15th, 1975 at its 44th session.

Calls attention to the problem arising in the prevention of counterfeiting from the existence of photocopying machines that produce exact colour copies of documents,

Requests the Secretary General to continue the study of this question and take all the steps possible to assist member countries in the prevention of the use of such machines for counterfeiting purposes.

Adopted unanimously by the 75 delegations voting.

## EXHIBIT III

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION (INTERPOL)  
44TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION

(Buenos Aires, Oct. 9-15, 1975)

RESOLUTION: POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED CONCERNING REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION,  
INVESTIGATION, ARREST, ETC. FROM NCB OR GENERAL SECRETARIAT

Having noted the question on policy on investigations raised by the United States delegation,

Considering that effective international police co-operation through ICPO-Interpol depends on the rapid exchange of information between countries,

Stressing the fact that rapid exchange of information depends upon the degree of detail contained in a request submitted by one NCB to another during the course of an investigation, since much detail is of great assistance to all police services when making the enquires requested; and assists in preventing any additional communications solely for the purpose of requesting details as to the type of investigations, etc.

The ICPO-Interpol General Assembly, meeting in Buenos Aires from 9th to 15th October 1975 at its 44th session,

Found it necessary that National Central Bureaus, requesting information, investigation, arrest, etc. from either another NCB or the General Secretariat should:

1. State clearly the reason for the request, indicating as far as possible the type of investigation involved, details of offense (dates of offense, charges, arrests, convictions, sentences, etc.)

2. Give the fullest possible details when requesting information about persons, to assist in establishing their identities (date and place of birth, parents' names, nationality, passport number with date and place of issue, place of residence, fingerprints, etc.) as well as any other information likely to be of assistance to answering NCB.

The NCB or General Secretariat receiving a request for information, investigation, arrest, etc. must answer as soon as possible or state reason for delay or inability to provide the information requested. Failure by NCB to respond in a timely manner tends to destroy the effectiveness of the ICPO-Interpol.

Adopted unanimously by the 74 delegations voting.

NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE,  
*Alexandria, Va., August 29, 1977.*

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law Subcommittee, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Your letter of August 16, 1977, to the Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Navy, has been referred to this Service for response inasmuch as the Naval Investigative Service is the activity charged with maintaining liaison on criminal matters with organizations such as Interpol.

The contact between this Service and Interpol is minimal and it is therefore impractical to key this response to the questionnaire furnished. Additionally, it would not be appropriate for this Service to respond to questions numbered 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16 and, if not already accomplished, you may want to direct these questions to the Department of Defense.

This Service does not process requests through Interpol channels. The Naval Investigative Service has an investigative capability wherever there is a U.S. Naval presence. Any additional assistance required would be requested of another U.S. agency or directly from the host country police agency. This Service does receive, on an average, five or six requests per year from Interpol agencies and these requests are usually received via the U.S. National Central Bureau. Typically, this request will originate with a foreign police agency and the information desired relates to the disposition by U.S. authorities of an alleged criminal offense committed in that country by a person in the naval service. This Service does not maintain any separate file holdings concerning these requests and the only way to identify them would be through the files of the U.S. National Central Bureau.

Inasmuch as the contact between this Service and Interpol is truly minimal, and no personal contact is involved except as to the U.S. National Central Bureau, I am unable to be more definitive concerning your questions. I trust, however, that the above response will identify to you the extent of our contact and serve the purpose of your inquiry.

Sincerely,

A. B. CARUSO,  
*Acting Director, Naval Investigative Service.*

#### B. QUESTIONS ON INTERPOL FOR CHIEFS OF POLICE

A letter from Chairman Eilberg and questionnaire concerning Interpol were forwarded to some 47 police chiefs throughout the country. Replies were received from 26 chiefs from the following localities:

- Police Department, Los Angeles, California.
- Bureau of Police, Wilmington, Delaware.
- Police Department, City and County of Honolulu, Honolulu, Hawaii.
- Department of Safety, City and County of Denver, Colorado.
- Macon Police Department, City of Macon, Georgia.
- Department of Police, City of Springfield, Illinois.
- Department of Police, City of Kansas City, Kansas.
- Department of Public Safety, Lexington Fayette Urban County Government, Kentucky.
- Department of Police, City of Detroit, Michigan.
- Minneapolis Police Department, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
- Police Department, City of Biloxi, Biloxi, Mississippi.

Metropolitan Police Department, City of St. Louis, Missouri.  
 Police Department, City of Helena, Montana.  
 Police Department, City of Manchester, New Hampshire.  
 Police Department, Albuquerque, New Mexico.  
 Police Department, City of Rochester, New York.  
 Police Department, City of Raleigh, North Carolina.  
 Police Department Bismarck, North Dakota.  
 Department of Public Safety, City of Zanesville, Ohio.  
 Police Department, City of Salem, Oregon.  
 Bureau of Police, Reading, Pennsylvania.  
 Providence Police Department, Providence, Rhode Island.  
 Dallas Police Department, Dallas, Texas.  
 Ogden City Police Department, Ogden, Utah.  
 Police Department, City of Tacoma, Washington.  
 Department of Police, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
 Washington, D.C., August 9, 1977.

DEAR ———: For a number of years the United States has been a member of the International Criminal Police Organization, known as Interpol.

Recently my Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law has been asked to consider certain legislation which would increase our yearly contributions to the organization, as well as maintain our active membership.

My colleagues and I have already gathered considerable data through hearings, investigations and unsolicited reports. However, it was felt that a proper final evaluation of the effectiveness and usefulness of the organization could only be made after receiving the views of the potential beneficiaries of United States membership.

I would be grateful to you if you could supply my Subcommittee with detailed replies to the attached questionnaire as promptly as possible. I am sure that your cooperation will greatly assist us in our decision.

Please accept my thanks for your assistance.

Sincerely,

JOSHUA EILBERG, *Chairman.*

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION (INTERPOL)

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol?
2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested.
3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? What types of information have you been requested to supply?
4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation?
5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? If the U.S. were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations?
6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol?
7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol?
8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris?
9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you?

## STAFF SUMMARY OF USE OF INTERPOL BY POLICE CHIEFS

A general summary of replies from the chiefs of police, as well as the replies themselves follow.

Police chiefs in approximately 47 cities were sent questionnaires prepared by the Subcommittee on Immigration Citizenship and International Law. Twenty-six replied.

The police chief in Wilmington, Delaware, Harry F. Manelski, appeared to be most familiar with Interpol, its function and possibilities for police work. There appears to be a working relationship between the Wilmington P.D. and Interpol. It was the only police department which said they had instituted special procedures to handle incoming and outgoing Interpol requests. Chief Manelski stated that all Interpol activity in Wilmington is assigned to Det. Lt. John Doherty, "who was familiar with the organization prior to his joining the Bureau of Police."

Wilmington's is the only police department which said they had made investigations (three of them) as a direct result of Interpol information. It resulted in one arrest. Chief Manelski said he believes that Interpol cooperation is essential to the operation of the Wilmington P.D.

According to Chief Manelski, Wilmington receives Interpol's publications. Their help, he said, in discerning the type of information Interpol supplies to responding agencies.

Nineteen of the twenty-six police chiefs indicated a familiarity with Interpol, its functions and purposes. Five of them urged the subcommittee to support Interpol and its request for an appropriations increase (Wilmington, Minneapolis, Rochester, Bismarck, Dallas). Six police chiefs said that they were not familiar with Interpol (Biloxi, Manchester, Raleigh, Zanesville, Reading, and Providence).

Five replies to question 2 concerning the use of Interpol, and the type of information sought indicated some use of Interpol. Police chiefs in Wilmington, Detroit, Minneapolis, Salem, and Dallas stated that they had received help from Interpol on approximately 21 occasions in the 1976-1977 time frame. The types of information requested included tracing fugitive, large scale fraud cases, especially involving stock fraud operating out of this country but using U.S. corporations as cover, notification of next of kin of death in family, request for background information on individuals or organizations suspected of international criminal fraud operations, confirmation on subject wanted in West Germany for misappropriation of funds.

Question 3 was answered in the affirmative by police chiefs in 10 cities (Los Angeles, Albuquerque, Denver, Wilmington, Honolulu, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Helena, Rochester and Dallas). They stated that the U.S. National Central Bureau had requested information from them to be supplied to another Interpol office. The Interpol requests have been specific, according to the replies. They stated that they were told where their information was destined and the purpose of the request. A composite of the types of information requested by Interpol includes the following areas of investigation:

- (a) confirm the identity and addresses of subjects;
- (b) investigations into mail fraud;
- (c) theft;
- (d) robbery-homicide;
- (e) administrative vice;
- (f) organized crime intelligence;
- (g) fugitives;
- (h) burglary-auto theft, bunco-forgery;
- (i) missing persons;
- (j) background information on individuals and/or organizations suspected of international criminal fraud operations;
- (k) information on registered owner of vehicle;
- (l) dental records for identification of a fire victim in Canada;
- (m) residency, employment and local criminal record data.

Answers to questions 4 through 9 are shown on the chart which follows. Questions which were either not answered, or answered in the negative are shown with a 0.

## ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 4-9

Cities which replied to survey	4	5	6	7	8	9
Los Angeles, Calif.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wilmington, Del.....	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	0	(?)
Honolulu, Hawaii.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denver, Colo.....	(?)	(?)	0	0	0	0
Macon, Ga.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Springfield, Ill.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lexington, Ky.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Detroit, Mich.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Minneapolis, Minn.....	0	Yes	0	0	0	(?)
Biloxi, Miss.....	0	0	0	0	0	(?)
St. Louis, Mo.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Helena, Mont.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Manchester, N.H.....	0	0	0	0	0	(?)
Albuquerque, N. Mex.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rochester, N.Y.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Raleigh, N.C.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bismarck, N. Dak.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zanesville, Ohio.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Salem, Oreg.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reading, Pa.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Providence, R.I.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dallas, Tex.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ogden, Utah.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tacoma, Wash.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
Milwaukee, Wis.....	0	0	0	0	0	0

<sup>1</sup> Suggestions follow below.

<sup>2</sup> No figures available.

<sup>3</sup> (a) Yes; (b) no.

## SUGGESTIONS

The following suggestions were made in response to question 9:

Wilmington, Delaware: 1. Institution of a rapid communication system to tie Interpol with U.S. police agencies and foreign agencies. For example, a direct teletype communication system or possibly a computerized system similar to N.C.I.C. We would not be in favor of Interpol having direct access to N.C.I.C.

2. We have consistently held the opinion that the U.S. National Central Bureau is in sorrowfully short supply of personnel and equipment that would enhance the operational effectiveness of that organization.

Minneapolis, Minnesota: Recommends that the U.S. Interpol representatives hold seminars for the heads of investigative units of law enforcement agencies throughout the country so that we can better understand all the resources available in Interpol and so that we can better understand the part we play when we do assist them.

Biloxi, Mississippi: Educate all departments as to Interpol's purpose and the benefits which can be derived from joining same.

Manchester, New Hampshire: We would like more information on the operations of Interpol in order to make their services available to us.

## THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES FROM THE POLICE CHIEFS FOLLOW

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
Los Angeles, Calif., September 16, 1977.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN EILBERG: The Los Angeles Police Department is pleased to provide the following information in response to your inquiry of August 9, 1977.

A survey has been conducted in your behalf of those Departmental entities which, by nature of their specialized functions, are more subject than others to receive requests from INTERPOL or, in turn, to contact that organization for information.

The divisional entities are Robbery-Homicide, Administrative Vice, Administrative Narcotics, Scientific Investigation, Organized Crime Intelligence, Public Disorder Intelligence, Burglary-Auto Theft, Bunco-Forgery, Labor and Juvenile.

The Asian Task Force, Fugitive Section and Missing Persons Section also were surveyed.

The findings indicate that the aforementioned divisions, task force, and sections received between 55 and 72 INTERPOL requests over the past 12-month period. The largest number were addressed to Missing Persons Section (15-20); Robbery-Homicide Division (10-15); Bunco-Forgery (12-15). The latter division twice sought information from INTERPOL and the Asian Task Force on two or three occasions.

This is the 12-month breakdown :

Entity	Requests received
Robbery-homicide -----	10-15
Administrative vice -----	2-3
Administrative narcotics -----	0
Scientific investigation -----	0
Organized crime intelligence -----	4
Public disorder intelligence -----	0
Fugitive -----	6-8
Burglary-auto theft -----	1-2
Bunco-forgery -----	15-20
Labor -----	0
Juvenile -----	0
Asian task force -----	5
Missing persons -----	15-20

We regret we are unable to reply in specific terms to each of your nine questions in that this Department does not maintain a central clearing facility for Interpol communications which rarely have been more than minimal.

Be assured that your interest in writing to the Los Angeles Police Department is sincerely appreciated.

Very truly yours,

EDWARD M. DAVIS,  
Chief of Police.

CITY OF WILMINGTON,  
BUREAU OF POLICE,  
August 23, 1977.

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. EILBERG: I am happy to respond to your survey, reference: "Our Experience with the International Criminal Police Organization known as Interpol".

Our answers shall correspond to the question number of your survey. Those questions which require more than one answer, each area will be covered in a separate paragraph.

1. The Bureau of Police is very familiar with the operation of Interpol and have maintained a fairly continuous relationship with them.

It is our understanding that Interpol is primarily an information dissemination organization. Interpol is extremely beneficial in following leads outside the continental United States in the investigation of criminal activity.

2. The Bureau of Police used Interpol as follows: 1976, 5 times; 1977, 3 times (to date).

Our requests are processed by a letter directed to the U.S. National Central Bureau in Washington, D.C.

All information that was requested and received from Interpol was extremely useful to our investigators.

Answers are generally valuable in assisting with our investigations but at times the responses are slow.

Information sought from Interpol has, in our experience, centered around two types of investigations: (a) Tracing of fugitives, (b) Large scale fraud cases, especially involving stock fraud, operating out of this country but using U.S. Corporations as cover.

3. We have received requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau on various occasions.

The requests are very specific to the nature of the investigation and the agency requesting the information.

The country/agency requesting information is carefully considered when reply is made. Those older more established European agencies (E.G. Scotland Yard) require less screening than those countries whose governments are far less stable.

The information usually deals with person or persons under investigation for activities which would constitute a crime in the United States. No "intelligence" information reference non-criminal activity has been, is, or will be given by the Wilmington Bureau of Police.

4. We have made three investigations as direct result of Interpol information with one arrest from same.

5. We do feel the availability of Interpol cooperation is important and essential to our operation.

If the United States were to drop from Interpol we would suffer serious inconvenience in our investigation of crime, especially the while collar crimes of stock fraud and other international schemes involving Delaware corporations. We would be unable to easily obtain information on criminals and criminal activity operating out of foreign countries in the United States. We would not know who to contact in a foreign country where we are not familiar with the various jurisdictional policies, regulations and the numerous governmental agencies involved.

6. The Wilmington Bureau of Police assigns all Interpol activity to Det. Lt. John Doherty, who was familiar with the organization prior to his joining the Bureau of Police.

7. Yes, especially in that publications help discern the type information Interpol supplies to responding agencies.

We have not had any of our officers attend any seminars, meetings, or assemblies organized by Interpol. This response must be qualified in that we have met with Interpol at our request in order to formulate inter-operational procedures.

8. No. To our knowledge member agencies carry out all investigations within their respective jurisdictions.

9. The major problem that the Bureau of Police has experienced with the Interpol operation is that of very slow response time.

We would therefore suggest the following :

1. Institution of a rapid communication system to tie Interpol with U.S. police agencies and foreign agencies. For example, a direct teletype communication system or possibly a computerized system similar to N.C.I.C. We would not be in favor of Interpol having direct access to N.C.I.C.

2. We have consistently held the opinion that the U.S. National Central Bureau is in sorrowfully short supply of personnel and equipment that would enhance the operational effectiveness of that organization.

We would strongly endorse the increased appropriation into Interpol, especially in light of the high mobility and sophistication of the modern international criminal. Our seemingly losing battle against the international drug trade would be a strong indicator of the sophistication and methods of the international criminal.

I hope that we have been helpful and if we can be of any further assistance, please feel free to contact us.

Yours truly,

HARRY F. MANELSKI,  
*Chief of Police.*

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,  
POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
*Honolulu, Hawaii, August 24, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA BILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SIR: This is in regard to your letter of August 9, 1977, requesting our assistance in replying to your Subcommittee's questionnaire relative to the subject. Our response, listed in the sequence of the questionnaire, is as follows:

1. Yes, we are familiar with Interpol, however, we are not familiar with its entire scope of functions. It is our understanding that Interpol is an international criminal police organization which fosters cooperation and coordination of criminal investigations among its participating members.

2. None. However, in February 1977, we did submit a copy of our investigational report covering the activities of persons who may be involved in duplicat-

ing valuable art objects for international distribution. This report was provided for any action that was deemed appropriate and necessary.

3. From 1976 to August 24, 1977, we received twelve requests for information or follow-up investigations from the U.S.N.C.B. to be supplied to other Interpol offices. The requests were specific so that we knew their purpose and to whom we supplied the information.

We do screen the material before transmitting it to the U.S.N.C.B. In most cases where the investigation is lengthy, a complete copy of our investigative report is forwarded. When a request is specific and the reply is brief, the information is usually provided in a letter.

We have responded to requests for the following types of information:

(a) Confirm information of names, addresses, driver's license, etc. (four requests);

(b) Inquiry into the availability of witnesses for trial in London (one request);

(c) Investigations into mail fraud (one request); theft from luggage (one request); subjects under investigation (four requests); and theft from vehicle (one request).

4. None.

5. No.

6. No.

7. We have not received any Interpol publications and have not participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by this concern.

8. We do not have any knowledge nor do we believe that there are any Interpol agents carrying out investigations in Honolulu.

9. We have had very few requests for information and investigation and have not had any need for its assistance. Consequently, we have not encountered any problems and cannot provide any recommendations for improvement at this time.

It is hoped that the information we have provided will be beneficial to your Subcommittee in considering certain legislation which would increase contributions to the organization as well as maintain active membership.

Very truly yours,

FRANCIS KEALA,  
*Chief of Police.*

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,  
DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY,  
POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
*Denver, Colo., September 2, 1977.*

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN EILBERG: Your letter of inquiry to Chief Dill re Interpol has been referred to me for reply. I apologize for the delay in response.

The following answers are listed in seriatim, corresponding with your questions.

1. I am familiar with Interpol. Its function, in my opinion, is to assist member countries in criminal history checks, the location of suspects, fugitives, and witnesses, the tracing of weapons and motor vehicles, and the conducting of criminal investigations leading to arrest and extradition.

2. Our contacts with Interpol in the last two (2) years have been negligible and were processed through the Dept. of Justice in Washington, D.C. The information received was beneficial and involved both criminal investigation and requests for general information.

3. We have received requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office. The requests have been specific in that we do know to whom we are supplying information and the purpose of the request. We always screen material which we send out.

4. We have no figures available as to investigations, apprehensions or arrests made as a result of Interpol cooperation.

5. To the extent that Interpol is one of a number of agencies which we utilize upon occasion, its unavailability would affect our operation. It would be more a matter of inconvenience than essential loss.

6. We have no special unit nor do we have special procedures to handle incoming and out-going requests to Interpol.

7. I consider what Interpol publication which I have seen to be of limited value. I have never participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol.

8. I know of no Interpol agents who are carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris.

9. Our very limited and successful dealings with Interpol afford me no reason to recommend ideas for improvement of the service.

I hope that the foregoing will prove to be of some assistance to you.

Sincerely,

Capt. THOMAS LAHEY,  
Commander, Intelligence Bureau.

MACON POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
Macon, Ga., August 23, 1977.

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN EILBERG: Thank you for your letter of 9 August, 1977 requesting information on the International Criminal Police Organization commonly known as Interpol.

In attempting to answer the nine (9) questions on the attached questionnaire, I find that I must answer all but Question No. 1 in the negative. I am, of course, familiar with the Interpol organization and realize that their basic function is cooperation and coordination with police agencies throughout the free World. I have never had the occasion to utilize any of Interpol's services and doubt very much if I will have the occasion in the future, for I am of the opinion that they work more directly with our federal agencies than with local municipal police agencies.

I apologize for the delay in answering this letter, but I had to check with my deputies to ensure that we had not received inquiries or information from Interpol.

If I can be of further assistance, please feel free to write me direct.

Sincerely yours,

TRAVIS L. LYNCH,  
Chief of Police.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
Washington, D.C., August 9, 1977.

MR. WILLIAM ASCHER,  
Chief, Springfield Police Department,  
Springfield, Ill.

DEAR CHIEF ASCHER: For a number of years the United States has been a member of the International Criminal Police Organization, known as Interpol.

Recently my Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law has been asked to consider certain legislation which would increase our yearly contributions to the organization, as well as maintain our active membership.

My colleagues and I have already gathered considerable data through hearings, investigations and unsolicited reports. However, it was felt that a proper final evaluation of the effectiveness and usefulness of the organization could only be made after receiving the views of the potential beneficiaries of United States membership.

I would be grateful to you if you could supply my Subcommittee with detailed replies to the attached questionnaire as promptly as possible. I am sure that your cooperation will greatly assist us in our decision.

Please accept my thanks for your assistance.

Sincerely,

JOSHUA EILBERG, Chairman.

Chief Usher's responses follow each question.

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol? Yes.

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the infor-

mation is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested. None.

3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? What types of information have you been requested to supply? No.

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation? None.

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? If the U.S. were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations? No.

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol? No.

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol? No.

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris? No.

9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you? None.

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DEPARTMENT OF POLICE,  
Kansas City, Kans., August 17, 1977.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Your questionnaire has been forwarded to this unit for response.

After interviewing the senior investigators and commanders in this police department in reference to your questions, we have adopted the following general response.

Although everyone is aware of Interpol and their basic function, this police department has never had any contact with Interpol. Since no one on the department has ever had contact, we feel it would be inappropriate for us to comment on the efficacy of Interpol at this time.

We regret that we are unable to be of more assistance to you.

Sincerely,

JAMES L. BISHOP,  
*Planning Assistant, Research and Development.*

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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,  
DIVISION OF POLICE,  
Lexington, Ky., August 19, 1977.

Mr. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. EILBERG: This letter is in response to your questionnaire dated August 10, 1977, concerning the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).

1. Yes, we are somewhat familiar with Interpol; however, our familiarity is from news sources, police magazines, bulletins, etc. Since we do not have a direct relationship with Interpol, we could only surmise the actual function of the organization.

2. To our knowledge, we have not used Interpol in the years of 1976 and 1977.

3. We have not received requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office.

4. To our knowledge, we have made no arrests, investigations, or apprehensions as a result of Interpol cooperation.

5. Since we have not had any direct contact or interaction with Interpol, we could not say that cooperation with the organization is essential to our operation.

If the U.S. were to drop out of Interpol, it would not cause a great deal of inconvenience or be a detriment to our operation.

6. Answered above.

7. We have received no Interpol publications; and, to our knowledge, we have not participated in any Interpol seminars, meetings or assemblies.

8. No, to our knowledge, there are no Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris.

9. Since we do not rely on the service of Interpol, we would be unable to make any recommendations concerning the past or future functions of the organization.

Sincerely,

NOLEN W. FREEMAN,  
*Chief of Police.*

MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
*Minneapolis, Minn., September 1, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington,  
D.C.*

\* DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This letter is in response to your questionnaire and letter of August 10, 1977. I will answer your questions using the numbers as given on your questionnaire.

1. We are familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization known as Interpol. It is our opinion that Interpol is a police service which would coordinate International investigations and assist various agencies throughout the World in contacting the proper law enforcement agency in any given problem.

We also feel that Interpol, through all of its sources, would be able to keep track of criminal figures and contraband movements throughout the world and furnish that information as would legitimately be needed by any law enforcement agency.

2. I do not have the exact number of times we have been in contact with Interpol in 1976 and in 1977 but would doubt that we have been in contact a dozen times. We normally handle requests from Interpol or its associated agencies to a standard assignment with our personnel after evaluating the request to make certain that the request falls within the laws of the State of Minnesota and the City of Minneapolis.

Generally speaking we have received requests from Interpol for assistance and this has been given. The time or two we asked Interpol for information that information did prove beneficial to our investigation. As in every investigation the value of the information will vary greatly. In one investigation the information was of great value and in the second investigation the information had a zero value.

3. Two or three times we have received request from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office. The purpose of the request had been clear but on occasion we were not certain to which Interpol office the information was going. I would suggest that the ultimate recipient of the information be made clear so that we could better appreciate to whom we are giving the information and its ultimate use. We do of course screen all information before it is transmitted to the U.S.N.C.B. and then rely on them to use that information they receive for further transmission.

4. We have never started any investigations or made arrests or apprehensions based purely on Interpol cooperation. I would guess that if the proper information came to our attention we would do so but to this date the Interpol assistance has been merely another phase of the overall investigations of any given case.

5. Even though we have had very few occasions to utilize the Interpol system in our cases I do feel that law enforcement throughout the nation does need the availability of Interpol, its sources and its contacts. Regardless of how big or small an investigation is it can only be completed through the cooperation of all law enforcement agencies concerned. It bothers me deeply that your Committee would even consider dropping out of Interpol. If you are merely bowing to outside pressure you are cowards and if you are bowing to economic pressure you are fiscally irresponsible.

6. Under normal operations the Division of our Department needing Interpol's assistance would contact them directly. By this I mean that if be Narcotics Division, Burglary Division and such needed the assistance of Interpol they would contact this agency themselves.

Any requests coming to our Department are normally forwarded to either our Special Operations Division or our Intelligence Unit. In either case no special procedures have been established for a contact with Interpol.

7. We have never had the occasion to participate in any of the seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol but would welcome the chance to do so. Further, we have not been the recipients of too many Interpol publications but have found those we have received to be of value and interest.

8. I have no knowledge of any Interpol agents carrying out any investigations in our area.

9. I would recommend that the U.S. Interpol representatives hold seminars for the heads of the investigative units of law enforcement agencies throughout the Country so that we can better understand all the resources available in Interpol and so that we can better understand the part we play when we do assist them.

If I may sum up my feelings in regard to this questionnaire and with regards to Interpol I would like to point out that as a mid-country agency we do not have all that much contact with Interpol. I do feel strongly that law enforcement not only in our area but throughout the Country needs all the resources possible and all the cooperation we can foster in order to combat that highly mobile group known as the criminal element. Law enforcement must have the cooperation of agencies throughout the Country and World just to hold the lines against the criminals.

With regards to the questionnaire I must state that it was not entirely applicable to our Department and our relation with Interpol. Hopefully our answers have been of some value to you.

Sincerely,

CARL E. JOHNSON,  
*Chief of Police.*

DEPARTMENT OF POLICE,  
PUBLIC INFORMATION UNIT,  
*Detroit, Mich.*

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol? Yes.

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested?

Three times: 1976, Notification of next of kin of death; 1977, Verification for London P.D. that family was living in Detroit; Inquiry from London P.D. as to warrant for subject in custody their jurisdiction. No extradition.

3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? What types of information have you been requested to supply? None.

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation? None.

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? If the U.S. were to drop out of Interpol would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations? None.

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol? No.

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol? No.

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris? No.

9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you? None.

POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
Bilowi, Miss.

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol?

1 (a) No.

1 (b) Analization of intelligence.

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested.

To my knowledge this department has never used Interpol.

3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? What types of information have you been requested to supply?

To my knowledge this department has never used Interpol.

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation?

To my knowledge this department has never used Interpol.

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? If the U.S. were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations?

No.

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol?

No.

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol?

No.

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris?

Not to my knowledge.

9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you?

Educate all departments as to Interpol's purpose and the benefits which can be derived from joining same.

EDWARD RYAN,  
Chief, Bilowi Police Department.

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
St. Louis, Mo., August 29, 1977.

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Chairman, Committee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, U.S.  
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN EILBERG: We have for a number of years been familiar with the International Police Organization, known as Interpol, as a functioning Police agency, providing investigative assistance to other law enforcement agencies on an international scale. We have not, in recent memory, made requests for assistance via Interpol, however, we have conducted several brief investigations at the request of that agency, which involved foreign nationals residing in St. Louis. This information generally concerned employment residency or local criminal record data. We have not received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office. Replies to such requests, in accordance with our standard operating procedures, would be screened prior to transmittal to Interpol.

Because of the infrequency of requests by Interpol to this Department, we have no special procedures for handling requests to or from that agency, nor can we make any specific recommendations for improvement of Interpol service. With the institution of this Department's intelligence operations at Lambert-St. Louis International Airport and possible investigation involving inter-

national air travelers, the increased use of the services provided by Interpol may become necessary.

Sincerely,

Col. EUGENE J. CAMP,  
Chief of Police.

POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
Helena, Mont.

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol? To apprehend international criminals.

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested. Never.

3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? What types of information have you been requested to supply? Wanted information on registered owner of vehicle.

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation? None.

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? No. If the U.S. were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations? No.

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol? No.

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol? Have never had any publications.

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris? No.

9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you?

POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
Manchester, N.H.

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol? Unfamiliar.

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested. Have not used Interpol.

3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? What types of information have you been requested to supply? No.

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation? None.

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? If the U.S. were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations? No.

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol? No.

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol? No.

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris? No.

9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol coopera-

tion and service to you? We would like more information on the operations of Interpol in order to make their services available to us.

THOMAS KING, *Chief of Police.*

POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
*Albuquerque, N. Mex.*

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol? Central clearing or referral center.

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested. None.

3. (1) Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? (2) Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? (3) What types of information have you been requested to supply? (1) yes. (2) yes. (3) Background on individual.

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation? None.

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? If the U.S. were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations? No.

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol? No.

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol? No.

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris? No.

9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you?

BOB V. STOVER,  
*Chief of Police.*

POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
*Rochester, N.Y., August 23, 1977.*

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. EILBERG: Your August 10th communication regarding Interpol was referred to our Criminal Investigation Division for reply. The comments of Major Fantigrossi are attached for your information. In addition to the major's comments, there have been requests from Interpol for assistance that have been referred by many to other departments within the Rochester Police Department or to other jurisdictions regarding requests from foreign police agencies. To my knowledge the Rochester Police Department has never made a request to Interpol.

I am unaware of the cost of operation of Interpol, but I am certain that its assistance to American citizens in foreign countries would be extremely valuable.

Very truly yours,

THOMAS F. HASTINGS,  
*Chief of Police.*

Enclosure.

[Inter-Departmental Correspondence]

ROCHESTER, N.Y., August 19, 1977.

From: Maj. Anthony Fantigrossi, Commanding, CID.

To: Police Chief Thomas Hastings, RPD.

Subject: Interpol.

In regard to the questions that were asked on Interpol by the Committee on the Judiciary, in Washington, D.C., I have attempted to prepare the answers to the best of my knowledge:

1. It has been my opinion that Interpol's function is the exchange of information from one member country to another on criminal investigations.

2. We have never made any requests to Interpol in the years 1976-77. In my years in the Criminal Investigation Section, I do not remember of any investigation that was conducted where we requested information from Interpol.

3. We have received two requests for information in the year 1977, from Interpol. One request involved establishing the residency of an individual in the City of Rochester. The second request was in regard to obtaining dental records from a local dentist of a fire victim to be used for identification purposes of the victim in Ottawa, Canada.

4. There is no record of any arrests or apprehensions or investigations that were made by this department, known to me, as a result of Interpol cooperation.

5. There may come a time when we may need the services of Interpol, but based on the previous years, I doubt very much if Interpol is essential to our operation. If the U.S. were to drop out of Interpol, it would not cause us inconvenience, nor would it be a detriment to our operation.

6. We do not have a special unit and we have not instituted special procedures because of the requests being so minimal; and, if requests are made, they are handled by the Central Investigation Division.

7. I am not familiar with any Interpol publications, and I have never seen one, and was never aware of any seminars, meetings or assemblies that were organized by Interpol.

8. I have never met an Interpol Agent and have no knowledge of one working locally from headquarters in Paris or anywhere else.

9. Because of the few contacts we have had with Interpol, I find myself unable to make any recommendations for improvement of cooperation and services.

Respectfully submitted.

ANTHONY L. FANTIGROSSI,  
*Chief of Detectives.*

RALEIGH, N.C., August 19, 1977.

Mr. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. EILBERG: This Department has never had an occasion to call on Interpol for assistance. Therefore, we are not in a position to evaluate the effectiveness and usefulness of the organization.

Sincerely,

ROBERT E. GOODWIN,  
*Chief of Police.*

POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
*Bismarck, N. Dak., August 26, 1977.*

Mr. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. EILBERG: In response to your letter of August 10, 1977, I should state initially that we have no records indicating any mutual contact with Interpol or agencies acting for Interpol. However, I will attempt to answer the questions you included with your questionnaire.

1. We are familiar with Interpol and understand the purpose is to insure the optimum conditions for cooperation between criminal police authorities on an international basis. We also understand that intelligence data gathering and narcotic law enforcement and criminal apprehension are some of the major responsibilities of Interpol.

2. A search of our records indicate no contact with Interpol.

3. We have not received requests for information from Interpol.

4. No arrests or apprehensions have been made in this city as a result of Interpol cooperation.

5. At present, no need has arisen for the services of Interpol. We would, however, hesitate to state that the United States should drop out of Interpol based on this fact. It would seem that it is an asset to law enforcement agencies to be able to rely on an organization with established guidelines and abilities on an international scale.

6. No special unit is designed to handle Interpol requests. Obviously, our department is not of sufficient size to do so.

7. We receive no Interpol publications, nor have any meetings, seminars, etc.

8. We have no knowledge of Interpol agents carrying out investigations under the control of Interpol headquarters in Paris.

9. Because of lack of contact with Interpol we hesitate to offer any recommendations for improvement of the Interpol organization.

Thank you for including us in your survey and I hope I have been of some assistance.

Sincerely,

VERN L. FOLLEY, *Chief of Police.*

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,  
DIVISION OF POLICE,  
*Zanesville, Ohio.*

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol?

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested.

3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? What types of information have you been requested to supply?

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation?

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? If the U. S. were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations?

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol?

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol?

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris?

9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you?

DEAR SIR: Attached are my answers to your questions. The numbered answers correspond with your numbered questions.

EARL D. MOORE.

1. I am not truly familiar enough with the function of Interpol to answer the question.

2. Never used Interpol.

3. No requests received from U.S.N.C.B.

4. None whatsoever.

5. A. Not at this time. B. No inconvenience.

6. None.

7. A. I do not recall reading any Interpol publication. B. I have never participated.

8. I have no knowledge of any Interpol investigations.

9. I am not familiar enough to make any recommendations.

POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
*Salem, Oreg., August 24, 1977.*

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN EILBERG: Sorry for the delay in responding to your request for information regarding our use of Interpol. I have responded to your questions by item.

1. Yes. Primarily a records compilation agency. Does provide a direct link with foreign police agencies.

2. Once, 1977. Direct call to Interpol, Washington, D.C. Yes, beneficial. In this instance needed confirmation subject wanted in West Germany for misappropriation of funds.

3. No. Therefore cannot respond to remainder of question.

4. None. Another agency conducted investigation.

5. First question, not essential. Cannot provide an informed answer. Would speculate it would be of some inconvenience, particularly to larger agencies.

6. No.

7. Some. No.

8. No.

9. None.

Sincerely,

ROY E. HOLLADY,  
*Chief of Police.*

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS,  
BUREAU OF POLICE,  
*Reading, Pa., September 7, 1977.*

Mr. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. EILBERG: I am in receipt of your letter, dated August 10, 1977, concerning the International Criminal Police Organization, known as Interpol.

At the present time, the City of Reading, Bureau of Police has no need for the services which are offered by Interpol. If the services, from the international law enforcement agencies are ever needed by this Department, we channel our requests through the Offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, either through the Allentown Offices or their Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

If your offices should need any additional information concerning law enforcement efforts by our Department and any other agency on mutual matters in this field, please contact my office as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

BERNARD J. DOBINSKY,  
*Chief of Police.*

PROVIDENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
*Providence, R.I., August 29, 1977.*

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN EILBERG: I have reviewed your letter and questionnaire on the operations of Interpol, particularly as they effect this Department, and I do not feel that I have sufficient familiarity with the organization to respond effectively.

The contacts and/or relationships that I have had with Interpol are not such that I would be able to form an opinion that would be of value to the Committee.

I regret that I could not be of further assistance to you.

Sincerely,

Col. ROBERT E. RICCI,  
*Chief of Police.*

DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
*Dallas Tex., September 8, 1977.*

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This will acknowledge your letter of August 10, 1977, relative to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).

I would like to endorse your support of continuing United States support of this organization. While the geographic location of Dallas tends to isolate us from some of the problems of port of entry cities, I feel that we can expect

more international criminal activity during the next decade due to our size, the new regional airport, and our central location between the east and west coasts.

Due to the comparatively low volume of our interaction with Interpol we cannot respond to your questionnaire as it is structured. We normally receive six to eight inquiries a year from their office, and we normally make one to two inquiries of their office a year. Generally both their inquiries and our inquiries concern requests for background information and individuals and/or organizations suspected of international criminal fraud operations. The Intelligence Division of our police department normally receives or requests such criminal activity information, but we do not have any special procedures for this activity.

In closing, we have none of their publications nor have any of our personnel participated in any seminars, meetings, etc., sponsored by this organization.

Sincerely,

D. A. BYRD, *Chief of Police.*

OGDEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
*Ogden, Utah, August 16, 1977.*

JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. EILBERG: Thank you for your inquiry concerning the association between the Ogden Police Department and Interpol. I am sorry that I am unable to give you vast amounts of information, and perhaps what I can give is of no use to you. Listed below are my reactions to your questions, in numerical order:

1. Yes; I am familiar with Interpol. I understand Interpol assists local state and federal law enforcement agencies who have investigations in foreign nations that are Interpol members.

2. My department has not used the services of Interpol during 1976 or, to date, in 1977.

3. I have not received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office.

4. No arrests have been made for or by us as a result of Interpol cooperation.

5. The availability of Interpol cooperation is not essential to my operation.

6. We do not have a special unit for handling Interpol requests.

7. I have not received nor seen Interpol publications, therefore, I cannot give a true assesment of their value.

8. I am personally unaware of any investigations being conducted in my area which are under control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris.

9. I make no recommendations to improve service to my organization. There is an office available to me through the Treasury Department office in Salt Lake City, and I realize I can obtain the needed help.

Sincerely,

JOE H. RITCHIE, *Chief of Police.*

CITY OF TACOMA POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
*Tacoma, Wash., September 8, 1977.*

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.*  
(Attention: Joshua Eilberg, Chairman).

DEAR SIRs: You recently directed an inquiry to our department in regard to Interpol. Our response is as follows:

1. In my opinion Interpol is an International Police organization whose purpose is to coordinate police activities directed toward those criminals who do not limit their activities to one country.

2. We did not use Interpol in 1976, nor to date in 1977.

3. We have never received any requests for information from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information for an Interpol office.

4. This department has made no arrests involving Interpol cooperation.

5. The availability of Interpol is not essential to the operation of this department. The membership of the United States in Interpol is of no consequence to this department at this time.

6. Any information requests made by Interpol would have to come through the F.B.I. Washington State law does not allow us to furnish information to agencies not members of the Criminal Justice System.

7. We have not received any publications from Interpol, nor have we participated in any functions sponsored by Interpol.

8. I have no knowledge concerning the activities of any Interpol agents.

9. I have no general recommendations concerning Interpol at this time.

Yours truly,

W. W. PERRETT, *Chief of Police.*

CITY OF MILWAUKEE  
POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
Milwaukee, Wis., August 22, 1977.

Mr. JOSHUA EILBERG, *Chairman,*  
*Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. EILBERG: In response to your letter of August 10, 1977, and questionnaire concerning the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), please be advised we have had no direct relationship with Interpol.

Yours very sincerely,

HAROLD A. BREIER, *Chief of Police.*

#### C. SHERIFFS

To the following letter and questionnaire sent to 27 Sheriff Departments in the United States, replies were received from the following 18 departments:

Boulder County, Colo.

Dade County, Fla.

Cook County, Ill.

Marion County, Ind.

Iowa County, Iowa

County of Saginaw, Mich.

Ramsey County, Minn.

Westchester County, N.Y.

Robeson County, N.C.

Franklin County, Ohio

Oklahoma County, Okla.

Multnomah County, Oreg.

Pennington County, S. Dak.

Salt Lake County, Utah.

King County, Wash.

Dave County, Wis.

County of Alameda, Calif.

Maricopa County, Ariz.

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Washington, D.C., August 12, 1977.

Sheriff \_\_\_\_\_

DEAR CHIEF OR SHERIFF: For a number of years the United States has been a member of the International Criminal Police Organization, known as Interpol.

Recently my Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law has been asked to consider certain legislation which would increase our yearly contributions to the organization, as well as maintain our active membership.

My colleagues and I have already gathered considerable data through hearings, investigations and unsolicited reports. However, it was felt that a proper final evaluation of the effectiveness and usefulness of the organization could only be made after receiving the views of the potential beneficiaries of United States membership.

I would be grateful to you if you could supply by Subcommittee with detailed replies to the attached questionnaire as promptly as possible. I am sure that your cooperation will greatly assist us in our decision.

Please accept my thanks for your assistance.

Sincerely,

JOSHUA EILBERG, *Chairman.*

#### INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION (INTERPOL)

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol?

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investi-

gation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested.

3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? What types of information have you been requested to supply?

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation?

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? If the U.S. were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations?

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol?

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol?

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris?

9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you?

A general summary of the replies received from the Sheriffs, as well as the replies themselves follow:

#### STAFF SURVEY OF THE USE OF INTERPOL BY SHERIFFS

Questionnaires concerning the effectiveness and usefulness of Interpol were mailed to sheriffs in 27 counties throughout the country. Eighteen replies were received. Fourteen sheriffs claim to be familiar with Interpol. Sheriffs in Cook County, Ill., Ramsey County, Minn., Multnomah County, Oreg., and Dane County, Wis., said they had no knowledge of the organization.

There were four affirmative replies to question 2 concerning the use of Interpol by the sheriffs. Dade County, Fla., and Westchester, N.Y. each estimated using Interpol on about 6 occasions. Saginaw, Mich. used it on one occasion, and Boulder, Colo. claimed to have used the organization but did not state how often it was called upon for information.

According to sheriffs in Saginaw and Westchester, the information they received from Interpol was important. Saginaw made one investigation as a result of Interpol cooperation. Sheriffs in Boulder, Marengo, Saginaw, Westchester and Salt Lake Counties said they considered Interpol important, though not essential to their work.

Replies to questions 1 through 9 are charted below.

#### QUESTIONS

Sheriffs of the following counties replied	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Maricopa County, Ariz.....	Yes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1 R
Alameda County, Calif.....	Yes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Boulder County, Colo.....	Yes	Yes	0	0	Yes	0	0	0	R
Dade County, Fla.....	Yes	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cook County, Chicago, Ill.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marion County, Ind.....	Yes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marengo County, Iowa.....	Yes	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Saginaw County, Mich.....	Yes	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
Ramsey County, St. Paul, Minn.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Westchester County, N.Y.....	Yes	6	0	0	Yes	0	0	0	0
Robeson County, N.C.....	Yes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Franklin County, Ohio.....	Yes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oklahoma County, Okla.....	Yes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Multnomah County, Oreg.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pennington County, S. Dak.....	Yes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Salt Lake County, Utah.....	Yes	0	0	0	Yes	0	0	0	R
King County, Wash.....	Yes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dane County, Wis.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

<sup>1</sup> See letters submitted by the sheriffs.

The individual replies from the sheriffs follow :

BOULDER COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,  
BOULDER COUNTY JUSTICE CENTER,  
Boulder, Colo., August 17, 1977.

Mr. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR Mr. EILBERG: Thank you for your interest in our input regarding the proposed legislation affecting the United States' membership in INTERPOL. I hope the enclosed comments will be of assistance.

Sincerely,

ALAN STAEHLE,  
*Captain of Detectives.*

1. Limited familiarity. Interpol is an international records system relating to criminal activity.
2. Limited use, requests mailed to Interpol. They did not have the information we hoped they might (but requests were long shots). Requested record or identity information on suspects thought to have potential criminal involvement overseas. We have entered location requests on specific fugitives.
3. Never.
4. None.
5. Interpol might be the only source of information on certain significant criminals. Due to our limited use, dropping out would in effect have little impact. However, potentially, the loss could be significant and would eliminate a possible source of information.
6. No.
7. No.
8. No.
9. Make its services and capabilities better known to law enforcement.

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLA.,  
PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT,  
Miami, Fla., August 24, 1977.

Mr. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR Mr. EILBERG: Thank you for your letter dated August 12, 1977, reference Interpol.

The Public Safety Department has dealt with Interpol no more than six times in the last two years. To our knowledge, the organization has not harmed these investigations; however, the information received was not vital to the cases.

Were Interpol to be banned in the State of Florida, it would not cause problems for the Public Safety Department. We would contact a known law enforcement agency directly instead of using Interpol as an intermediary. This method is usually used now as direct liaison has proven more reliable and efficient.

Please be assured of our cooperation in all matters of mutual interest.

Sincerely,

E. WILSON PURDY, *Director.*

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Washington, D.C., August 12, 1977.

Sheriff RICHARD J. ELROD,  
*Chicago Civic Center,  
Chicago, Ill.*

DEAR SHERIFF ELROD: For a number of years the United States has been a member of the International Criminal Police Organization, known as Interpol.

Recently my Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law has been asked to consider certain legislation which would increase our yearly contributions to the organization, as well as maintain our active membership.

My colleagues and I have already gathered considerable data through hearings,

investigations and unsolicited reports. However, it was felt that a proper final evaluation of the effectiveness and usefulness of the organization could only be made after receiving the views of the potential beneficiaries of United States membership.

I would be grateful to you if you could supply my Subcommittee with detailed replies to the attached questionnaire as promptly as possible. I am sure that your cooperation will greatly assist us in our decision.

Please accept my thanks for your assistance.

Sincerely,

JOSHUA EILBERG, *Chairman.*

[Sheriff Elrod's answers follow]

1. Unknown.
2. None.
3. None.
4. None.
5. No.
6. No.
7. No.
8. No.
9. Unknown.

OFFICE OF MARION COUNTY SHERIFF,  
*Indianapolis, Ind., August 23, 1977.*

JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*U.S. House of Representatives,*  
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE EILBERG: In reference your questionnaire on Interpol, the following answers are submitted for your subcommittee:

1. Our Department is familiar with Interpol. Our impression is, to assist all law enforcement agencies of the free world in cases where jurisdiction problems exist between countries.

2. I know of no cases where Interpol have been used by this Department. I know of no cases where any information was requested from Interpol.

3. I know of no case where we have supplied information to Interpol. We have supplied much information over the years to many federal agencies, not knowing who, other than the agency requesting, where the information is going. Not many, if any, of the federal law enforcement agencies supply information upon request.

4. I know of no investigations, arrests or apprehensions as a result of Interpol cooperation.

5. I do not consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to the operation of our Department. It would not cause this Department any inconvenience if the U.S. would drop out of Interpol.

6. This Department does not have any special unit or special procedures to handle in-coming or out-going requests to or from Interpol.

7. I do not think we have received any publications from Interpol. I don't think that anyone from this Department has ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol.

8. This Department knows nothing about any Interpol agents or investigations that agents may be conducting.

9. I have no recommendations to improve Interpol cooperation or service. Due to the inland geographical position of Indianapolis, Indiana, we have not had the opportunity to use any services of Interpol.

Lt. LARRY K. BULLINGTON,  
*Personnel Officer,*  
(For Donald E. Gilman, Sheriff Marion County).

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
*Washington, August 12, 1977.*

Sheriff WILLIAM J. SPURRIER,  
*Marengo, Iowa.*

DEAR SHERIFF SPURRIER: For a number of years the United States has been a member of the International Criminal Police Organization, known as INTERPOL.

Recently my Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law has been asked to consider certain legislation which would increase our yearly contributions to the organization, as well as maintain our active membership.

My colleagues and I have already gathered considerable data through hearings, investigations and unsolicited reports. However, it was felt that a proper final evaluation of the effectiveness and usefulness of the organization could only be made after receiving the views of the potential beneficiaries of United States membership.

I would be grateful to you if you could supply my Subcommittee with detailed replies to the attached questionnaire as promptly as possible. I am sure that your cooperation will greatly assist us in our decision.

Please accept my thanks for your assistance.

Sincerely,

JOSHUA EILBERG, *Chairman.*

[Sheriff Spurrier's answers follow]

1. Yes. I understand INTERPOL to mean an organization that will assist with crimes on a national or world wide basis.

2. None.

3. No.

4. None.

5. I believe that the United States should remain active in INTERPOL, and I would not hesitate to use their facilities if the need arises.

6. Do you have a special unit? No. Have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol? Yes.

7. No.

8. No.

9. None.

OFFICE OF THE COUNTY SHERIFF,  
*Saginaw, Mich., August 17, 1977.*

Chairman JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Committee on the Judiciary,*  
*U.S. House of Representatives,*  
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. EILBERG: This department hasn't had much contact with Interpol, but with the minimal contact that we did have here are the answers.

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? Yes.

In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol? My opinion of Interpol is that it is an International Crime Organization working within the member countries.

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? Once. How did you process the requests? By calling directly to the Interpol office in Washington, D.C. Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Yes.

Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimal value? Due to the fact that I only had one (1) occasion to use Interpol I would have to say that the information was of great value.

Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested. After locating suspect, requested finger prints, hair samples, and sperm samples of suspect; all of which were furnished to this department.

3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? No.

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation? One (1) investigation.

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? On the one (1) occasion that Interpol was used it was essential to my investigation.

If the U.S. were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations? Due to the fact that Interpol was used by myself on only one (1) occasion I wouldn't feel qualified to answer this part of the question.

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol? We have no special unit assigned to this task. If we should receive any request from Interpol it would be handled by the Captain of the Investigation Division.

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have not received any. Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol? No.

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris? On the one (1) occasion that I requested assistance from Interpol all our requests went through Paris.

9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you? Due to the minimal use this department has had of Interpol I don't feel qualified to make comment on this question. In the contact that I did have with Interpol I found them to be friendly and very cooperative.

If I may be of further assistance to you in any way, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

EDWARD CHMIELEWSKI,  
*Undersheriff, Saginaw County.*

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
*Washington, D.C., August 12, 1977.*

Sheriff KERMIT HEDMAN,  
*St. Paul, Minn.*

DEAR SHERIFF HEDMAN: For a number of years the United States has been a member of the International Criminal Police Organization, known as Interpol.

Recently my Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law has been asked to consider certain legislation which would increase our yearly contributions to the organization, as well as maintain our active membership.

My colleagues and I have already gathered considerable data through hearings, investigations and unsolicited reports. However, it was felt that a proper final evaluation of the effectiveness and usefulness of the organization could only be made after receiving the views of the potential beneficiaries of United States membership.

I would be grateful to you if you could supply my Subcommittee with detailed replies to the attached questionnaire as promptly as possible. I am sure that your cooperation will greatly assist us in our decision.

Please accept my thanks for your assistance.

Sincerely,

JOSHUA EILBERG, *Chairman.*

[Sheriff Hedman's answers follow]

1. No.
2. None.
3. None.
4. None.
5. None.
6. No.
7. Do not receive any publication.
8. No.
9. None.

SHERIFF'S OFFICE, WESTCHESTER COUNTY,  
*White Plains, N.Y., August 26, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SIR: Reference is made to your letter of August 12th with enclosed questionnaire regarding the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). Attached are the answers to the questions.

I trust that this information will be of assistance to your committee.

Very truly yours,

THOMAS J. DELANEY,  
*Sheriff, Westchester County.*

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol?

This department is somewhat familiar with the functions of the International Criminal Police Organization. At present, one of my officers is receiving assistance from that agency. Its function, to the best of my knowledge, is to act in the capacity of a liaison between local United States Police Agencies and Police Agencies in participating countries.

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested.

This department's use of Interpol has been limited during the 1976-1977 period. To give an exact number of requests made to Interpol would be difficult. However, during this period, I doubt that more than six requests for one bit of specific data have been made. There is one exception and this is the investigation presently being conducted. The limited requests were answered quickly and satisfactorily. During the course of the present investigation, my officers have requested that several, in depth, inquiries be made in both England and Spain. These requests, due to the scope of the investigation and the several local foreign Police Agencies that would have had to be contacted for information, would have made information gathering nearly impossible.

It is not generally true that my department's requests are of minimal value. Although this office has not requested the services of Interpol very often, when a request is made, the information is important.

3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? What types of information have you been requested to supply?

This department has not received any such requests.

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol Cooperation?

As mentioned previously, the information requested of Interpol has been for a specific piece of evidence. Singularly, it would not enable my staff to effect the arrest, but it has been an integral part of the investigation.

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? If the U.S. were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operation?

Is this question, "essential to your operation" is too general a phrase. Interpol is important and allows local law enforcement to cut through the timely process of establishing a liaison between members of my staff and their counterparts in foreign countries. As previously stated, when information is requested, it is important that the reply be received as quickly and accurately as possible. Interpol has fulfilled this need. Yes, if Interpol were abolished it would hurt the efforts of law enforcement.

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol?

No.

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meeting or assemblies organized by Interpol?

Not at the present time.

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris?

No.

9. What general recommendation can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you?

None at this time.

ROBESON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,  
Lumberton, N.C., August 24, 1977.

JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. EILBERG: In response to your inquiry of August 12, 1977, I am familiar with International Criminal Police Organization. I have not called on Interpol nor have they ever called on me for assistance in any case. I have not furnished the U.S. National Central Bureau any information at any time.

I have not participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol. About two years ago the Chief of Interpol was on the program at the National Sheriffs' Association training session. His talk was very informative and was well accepted by the association. I do not have any recommendation

for the improvement of Interpol services; but if I need them I would write directly to Louis B. Sims, Chief, Interpol, National Central Bureau, Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C. 20220, and I am sure that I would receive all of the cooperation that Interpol could offer.

Sincerely yours,

MALCOLM G. McLEOD, *Sheriff.*

FRANKLIN COUNTY COURTHOUSE,  
Columbus, Ohio, August 19, 1977.

*Committee on the Judiciary,  
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.  
(Attention Joshua Eilberg, Chairman).*

DEAR SIR: This Department has never had the need to use Interpol, but it has my full support. I feel that Interpol is a very worthwhile organization.

Sincerely,

HARRY J. BERKEMER, *Sheriff of Franklin County.*

OFFICE OF SHERIFF, OKLAHOMA COUNTY,  
Oklahoma City, Okla., August 23, 1977.

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SIR: This is in reply to your letter of August 12, 1977 and the questionnaire on Interpol. The following information is all we can provide:

Question 1—Yes. Created to help with international thieves.

Questions 2 thru 9—We have never used Interpol, have never needed it and know nothing but hearsay of its operation and the good it provides. We understand it is a fine organization of sharp agents and that it is needed in Coastal cities.

We regret we cannot furnish answers to the questions which might be of assistance to your committee.

Sincerely,

GENE WELLS, *Sheriff.*

MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREG.,  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC SAFETY,  
Portland, Oreg., August 22, 1977.

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, U.S. House  
of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CHAIRMAN EILBERG: In response to your inquiry of 12 August 1977 regarding the International Criminal Police Organization, known as Interpol, this Division does not have contact with this organization. Our records show that the Division has not utilized, or cooperated directly, with Interpol in recent times.

I hope this information will be of assistance.

Sincerely,

Sheriff EDGAR L. MARTIN,  
*Director of Public Safety.*

PENNINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,  
Rapid City, S. Dak., August 18, 1977.

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Committee on the Judiciary,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SIR: Enclosed please find completed questionnaire on the International Criminal Police Organization.

If we can be of further assistance, please let us know.

Sincerely,

MEL LARSON, *Sheriff.*  
DON HOLLOWAY, *Chief Deputy Sheriff.*

## INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION (INTERPOL)

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol? Yes.

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested. Never.

3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? What types of information have you been requested to supply? No.

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation? None.

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? If the United States were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations? No.

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol? No.

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol? No.

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris? No.

9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you? None.

SHERIFF'S OFFICE SALT LAKE COUNTY,  
Salt Lake City, Utah, August 18, 1977.

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. EILBERG: Enclosed is the completed questionnaire which you requested regarding Interpol. Even though we have not used the services of Interpol recently we recognize that the work performed by this agency is of great value. I hope that this information will be of benefit to your committee.

Sincerely,

DELMAR L. LARSON, Sheriff.

## INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION (INTERPOL)

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol?

Yes, we are familiar with Interpol. To the best of our knowledge the function of Interpol, is an international exchange of information relative to criminal factions and organizations that operate on a multi-national level. It is also useful in tracking and apprehending fugitives from justice that have fled from one country to another.

Further exchanges of information relative to situations and circumstances that tend to cross various borders is also of valuable assistance to police in the country concerned.

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested.

We have not requested or used the services of Interpol in 1976 or 1977.

3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? What types of information have you been requested to supply? No.

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation? None.

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? If the United States were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations?

No, but it is convenient when the need does arise. Without the use of Interpol you would have to deal specifically with each country concerned and the quality of information received would directly depend upon your relationship with that country. It is felt that through the use of Interpol the information could be of great quality.

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol? No.

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol? In that we have never received any Interpol publications, nor have we participated in any seminars, meetings, or assemblies organized by Interpol.

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris? No.

9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you? Make the fact that the services of Interpol are available more broadly known to local agencies. Also those local agencies should be informed as to the procedure and methods necessary to utilize when attempting to use the services of Interpol. Finally a listing of areas where Interpol would be of value would also aid in an understanding and increase in use of their services.

KING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,  
*Seattle, Wash., August 17, 1977.*

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington,  
D.C.*

Your August 12, 1977 letter requested that I complete a brief questionnaire relative to this Department's contacts with the International Criminal Police Organization, known as Interpol.

Enclosed is the requested information.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

LAWRENCE G. WALDT, *Sheriff-Director.*

Enclosure.

1. Are you familiar with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)? In your opinion, what is the function of Interpol?

I have a limited familiarity with Interpol. My understanding of Interpol is that it is a criminal intelligence organization that has liaison with certain law enforcement agencies and investigating agencies and provides them with information on crimes and criminals, usually of international interest because of their movement and modus operandi.

2. How many times have you used Interpol in 1976 and 1977? How did you process the requests? Was the information you received beneficial to your investigation? Is this generally true or are there occasions when the information is of minimum value? Please furnish a description of the types of information you requested.

Have never had direct contact with Interpol. If information was received that Interpol had developed and transmitted, it would have come through a third party.

3. Have you received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information to be supplied to another Interpol office? Is the request specific so that you know to whom you are supplying the information and the purpose of the request? Do you screen the material before you transmit it to the U.S.N.C.B. or do you depend on them to transmit what they feel is appropriate? What types of information have you been requested to supply?

Do not recall ever having received any requests.

4. How many investigations, arrests or apprehensions have you made as a result of Interpol cooperation?

None known.

5. Do you consider the availability of Interpol cooperation as essential to your operation? If the United States were to drop out of Interpol, would it cause you a great deal of inconvenience or would it be a detriment to your operations?

Because this Department has no direct contact with Interpol, it is impossible to answer this question. It is possible that information received from federal investigating agencies may have their origin from Interpol.

6. Do you have a special unit or have you instituted special procedures to handle in-coming and out-going requests to Interpol?

No direct contact with Interpol.

7. Do you consider Interpol publications of value? Have you ever participated in any seminars, meetings or assemblies organized by Interpol?

Do not receive publications from Interpol. Have never participated in seminars or meetings with Interpol.

8. To your knowledge, are there any Interpol agents carrying out investigations which are directly under the control of the Interpol headquarters in Paris?

None known.

9. What general recommendations can you make to improve Interpol cooperation and service to you?

Because of the lack of direct contact with Interpol, I am not qualified to make any recommendations.

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DANE COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT,  
Madison, Wis., August 25, 1977.

Mr. JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. EILBERG: As you can see, we have no official knowledge of any organization known as Interpol.

I would like to point out that our agency is the second largest in the State of Wisconsin (population 320,000). We do constantly work with all federal agencies.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM H. FERRIS, Jr., Sheriff.

1. No.
2. No.
3. No.
4. None.
5. No.
6. No.
7. No.
8. No.
9. None. No services rendered.

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COUNTY OF ALAMEDA,  
Oakland, Calif., August 24, 1977.

Re your Questionnaire on Interpol.

JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

1. Yes; I am familiar with Interpol. Their function is to develop information and assist in criminal investigations that transcend international borders.

2. I have not used Interpol during 1976 and 1977.

3. I have not received any requests from the U.S. National Central Bureau for information.

4. I have not conducted investigations nor made arrests as a result of Interpol cooperation.

5. The availability of Interpol is not essential to our operation.

6. I do not have special procedures for handling in-coming or out-going requests to Interpol.

7. I do not receive Interpol publications and have not participated in Interpol sponsored seminars.

8. I do not have knowledge of any current Interpol investigations.

9. It would be desirable for my office to be advised of current investigations conducted by Interpol within my area of responsibility.

T. L. HOUGHINS, Sheriff.

OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, MARICOPA COUNTY,  
Phoenix, Ariz., August 29, 1977.

Re questionnaire on Interpol.

Representative JOSHUA EILBERG,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: In response to your questionnaire in detail as requested, we should like to offer the following:

1. By hearsay only. It is our understanding that Interpol is primarily a cooperative Police Intelligence network relating to crime and criminals who move internationally.

2. No requests were made.

3. No requests have been received.

4. None.

5. At this point no.

6. No.

7. We have never received any publications relating to Interpol.

8. Unknown.

9. Unknown, if any.

It would probably be to our advantage to receive information relating to the various duties and services offered by Interpol. We could probably make a more intelligent estimate of the value of this organization with that information at hand.

Sincerely,

Capt. T. H. MELCHER,  
Division Commander, Support Services Division.

### APPENDIX 3

The U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report ID-76-77 on December 27, 1976, entitled, "U.S. Participation in Interpol, the International Criminal Police Organization."

According to GAO, this report describes Interpol operations in the United States, analyzes the kinds of criminal information being disseminated, and makes recommendations aimed at improving U.S. participation.

To complete the record the report is reprinted in its entirety.

To complete the record the reports is reprinted in its entirety. [The response of the Treasury Department to the report appears at p. 85.]

#### REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

#### U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INTERPOL, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION

##### Department of the Treasury

This report describes INTERPOL operations in the United States, analyzes the kinds of criminal information being disseminated, and makes recommendations aimed at improving United States participation.

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
Washington, D.C.

B-161370.

Hon. JOSEPH M. MONTOYA,  
U.S. Senate

Hon. JOHN E. MOSS,  
House of Representatives

This report is in response to your February 5, 1976, request for a study of U.S. involvement with Interpol, the International Criminal Police Organization. We directed our review to answering the 26 questions you raised regarding U.S. participation in Interpol. As requested by your office, formal agency comments were not obtained for this report, but we did discuss the questions with cognizant agency officials and considered their views in preparing the report.

ELMER B. STAATS,  
Comptroller General of the United States.

### *Digest*

The International Criminal Police Organization's (Interpol's) popular image is that of a worldwide police force whose agents travel the world pursuing international criminals. Actually, Interpol has no police force of its own. It provides the coordination and communication channels that the police of its 125 member nations use to make requested criminal investigations.

To facilitate this communication, each member country operates a national central bureau. The U.S. National Central Bureau is part of the Department of the Treasury, under the supervision of the U.S. Treasury representative to Interpol.

From January 1975 to April 1976, the U.S. Bureau received about 5,700 requests for information. GAO randomly sampled 110 of these to discern the type, use, and disposition of information being developed.

#### *Nature and type of requests*

Eighty-three percent of the requests were from national central bureaus in 33 countries; the rest were from U.S. sources, primarily U.S. law enforcement agencies.

Sixty percent of the requests, most of them from other bureaus, concerned U.S. citizens and 40 percent concerned foreign nationals and permanent resident aliens.

Requests were usually made after a suspected crime had been committed or an individual arrested. However, most requests involved individuals with no prior criminal records.

#### *A basic problem*

Requestors often did not furnish adequate documentation to support the requests. For example, some requests did not

- Explain why the request was made;
- Identify the type of activity being investigated;
- Indicate whether the individual had been arrested or was being investigated; and/or
- Provide fingerprints, even when a subject had been arrested.

#### *Processing the requests*

The U.S. Bureau asks the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other Federal and local law enforcement agencies for assistance in processing the requests of other Interpol bureaus.

These law enforcement agencies decide whether the request requires action and, if so, what information will be furnished. The U.S. Bureau screens the information before forwarding it to another national central bureau.

#### *Information sent abroad*

Of the 110 requests examined, 92 were from other Interpol bureaus. The U.S. Bureau determined that 14 required no response.

FBI and other records listing charges, arrests, and other information were furnished for 17 others. Data on the disposition of many listed charges was not available—a condition which concerns the U.S. Bureau but is difficult to resolve.

In response to other requests, the U.S. Bureau said the subjects had no criminal records and/or furnished information ranging from biographical data to criminal data resulting from investigations.

Information on the personal habits and political activities of Americans was not being disseminated.

For the most part, after information was sent abroad, the U.S. Bureau was not advised of the outcome of the cases.

#### *Other matters*

Interpol's General Secretariat, in St. Cloud, France, administers a large criminal investigations record bank to which its 125 member countries have access.

The information provided by the U.S. Bureau is only available to foreign countries through police channels by Interpol directives. Although there is no practical way to assure compliance, the U.S. Bureau is not aware of any abuses.

U.S. Government law enforcement agencies operating abroad, such as the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration, have direct working relationships with foreign police who are, in some cases, also Interpol officials. No clear guidelines define U.S. Government agency working relationships with foreign police and Interpol. However, foreign police seem to prefer overseas U.S. Government agency channels rather than Interpol channels in dealing with U.S. criminal matters.

Treasury officials responsible for Interpol activities felt that the U.S. Bureau's procedures for processing requests for information were effective. GAO recognizes these procedures but believes the U.S. Bureau has not been effectively following them because almost half of the sample cases GAO reviewed involved inadequate documentation. GAO believes the U.S. Bureau prematurely proceeded with various record checks and investigations.

#### *Recommendations*

The U.S. Bureau should :

- Improve the screening of, and insist on adequate documentation for, requests for information.
- Encourage other bureaus to report the disposition of cases.
- Screen replies to be sent abroad to make sure they are relevant and appropriate.

Although GAO did not find any instances of improper use of information by other agencies, the U.S. Bureau may wish to explore the need for better guidelines to govern the interactions of overseas U.S. law enforcement agencies with the U.S. Bureau, foreign police, and foreign central bureaus.

#### CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION

In May 1975, a Senate Committee on Appropriations subcommittee<sup>1</sup> held extensive oversight hearings on U.S. participation in the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). These hearings, followed up in February 1976 by hearings before the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, focused on safeguarding information about U.S. citizens made available to Interpol member countries. Several congressmen asked us in February 1976 to respond to 26 questions about Interpol, including costs of and authority for U.S. participation and safeguards on the use and dissemination of information on U.S. citizens.

#### *Background*

The Office of the Attorney General in the Department of Justice is the designated office of responsibility for Interpol in the United States. Congress initially authorized U.S. participation in 1938, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), under authority delegated by the Attorney General, represented the United States. In 1950, the flight of political refugees from Eastern Europe and the use of Interpol by a Communist member country to track them down was one of several reasons prompting the United States to withdraw from Interpol and the FBI director to resign his position as vice president of Interpol.<sup>2</sup> U.S. Treasury Department officials advised us that Treasury law enforcement agencies did not concur in the FBI's withdrawal because they needed international police cooperation through Interpol to carry out their investigative responsibilities.

From 1951 to 1958, the Treasury Department informally represented the United States, and in 1958, the Attorney General designated Treasury as the official U.S. liaison with Interpol.

On June 24, 1976, the Attorney General initiated action to withdraw the Treasury's authority and reinstate the Justice Department as official U.S. liaison. Treasury appealed to the President to overrule the Attorney General's order. Treasury officials advised us that the President decided not to make an immediate decision on this matter. Thus, for the present, the Department of the Treasury retains responsibility for Interpol.<sup>3</sup>

The United States, like the other 124 members of Interpol, maintains a National Central Bureau which has access to certain Federal and local government records.

<sup>1</sup> Subcommittee on Treasury, U.S. Postal Service and General Government.

<sup>2</sup> According to the FBI, the former FBI director also gave as reasons for his resignation that the time and money spent by the United States were not commensurate with the benefits and that he disagreed with the General Secretariat's hiring of two U.S. technical consultants without prior consultation with the U.S. Interpol representative.

<sup>3</sup> This report comments on Interpol activities as they were being carried out by Treasury at the time of our study.

As the communications link between U.S. law enforcement agencies and Interpol member countries, the Bureau arranges for the exchange of information between U.S. and foreign police authorities regarding specific criminal investigative requirements.

The total cost of U.S. participation in Interpol is not readily available. Direct U.S. costs of Interpol membership (salary and other operating costs of the Bureau plus membership dues) for fiscal year 1976 were estimated at \$434,000. This amount does not include costs for numerous investigations, data searches, and information provided by Federal and State agencies to the U.S. National Central Bureau nor the costs of other Government officials' attendance at Interpol conventions, meetings, and seminars.

#### CHAPTER 2—INTERPOL OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Interpol has no police force of its own and relies on communications among member countries to combat international crime, mainly by encouraging cooperation and contact among law enforcement groups. It consists of a General Assembly, an Executive Committee, and a General Secretariat which operates from Interpol headquarters in St. Cloud, just outside of Paris, and 125 National Central Bureaus located in each member country. The chart on the next page shows the Interpol network.

The Interpol constitution requires each member to designate a police body as a focal point for Interpol operations and to serve as a liaison between the bureaus of other countries and appropriate departments within the member country. The national central bureaus are not subject to direct control by Interpol, and in most countries they are part of their country's national police system. For example, the bureau of the United Kingdom is part of Scotland Yard and the Bundeskriminalamt, the German Federal Bureau of Criminal Police, is designated as the bureau in Germany. The U.S. National General Bureau is an office within the Treasury Department and operates under the Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement in the same manner as the U.S. Secret Service.

#### *Legal status*

The U.S. law directly relating to Interpol (22 U.S.C. 263a (Supp. V, 1975)) authorizes the Attorney General to accept and maintain membership in Interpol on behalf of the United States. This law was originally passed in 1938 and has been amended several times to provide for increased membership dues. Under the current version of the law:

"The Attorney General is authorized to accept and maintain, on behalf of the United States, membership in the International Criminal Police Organization, and to designate any departments and agencies which may participate in the United States representation with that organization. Each participating department and agency is authorized to pay its prorata share, as determined by the Attorney General, of the expenses of such membership. The total dues to be paid for the membership of the United States shall not exceed \$120,000 per annum."

This authority, in our view, permits the Attorney General or other participating Federal agencies to establish a U.S. National Central Bureau; allot it space in Federal buildings; and provide personnel, equipment, services, and other items reasonably required for its operations. U.S. Bureau activities are carried out by U.S. Government employees assigned to the Bureau.

We believe that this authority also allows the Bureau to coordinate and communicate criminal investigative requests with any U.S. law enforcement agency and with foreign police. The scope and extent of U.S. participation in Interpol is, subject to general statutory limitations on Federal activities, within the discretion of the participating agencies.

We are not aware of any other legislation which concerns U.S. participation in Interpol. U.S. membership is not the result of an international treaty or agreement and Interpol does not have expressed international status in the United States. U.N. recognition of Interpol is discussed on page 25.

#### *Limited U.S. approval of Interpol constitution*

The present Interpol constitution was adopted by the Interpol General Assembly at its 25th session in Vienna, Austria, in June 1956. Interpol's method of ratifying the constitution did not require formal approval by member countries, i.e., all countries represented were deemed to be Interpol members unless they subsequently declared through appropriate governmental authority that they

could not accept the constitution. The United States submitted no non-acceptance declarations so Interpol considered this as approval of the constitution.

There was no official U.S. representative to Interpol at the time of the 1956 General Assembly meeting because the United States was not a formal member. The U.S. delegation at the meeting included officials of the Treasury Department and the predecessor of the Agency for International Development. Department of Defense officials attended as observers. The Interpol constitution has not been expressly approved by the executive branch or the Congress. Treasury officials noted, however, that the U.S. Bureau operates within the Interpol constitution's general guidelines and that the constitution does not conflict with U.S. laws and does not require criminal information to be provided abroad or investigations to be conducted in the United States.

#### *U.S. National Central Bureau*

As part of the Treasury Department, the U.S. Bureau receives policy guidance from and reports to the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs. (See organization chart on p. 7.)

Treasury officials advised us that the U.S. Bureau received the same monitoring and congressional oversight as other law enforcement agencies within Treasury. They noted that no Federal advisory board currently monitors activities of INTERPOL or the majority of other Federal law enforcement agencies.

Treasury has made no formal management studies or audits of U.S. Bureau activities to assess the pros and cons of Interpol membership. However, officials believe the Bureau's annual reports, case files, and positions in national and international law enforcement demonstrate its value.

The operating costs of the U.S. Bureau are fragmented among several Federal agencies. Treasury's Office of the Secretary pays the Bureau's travel and communications costs and salaries for two Bureau staff members: the Department of Justice pays the salaries for three staff members, the Secret Service for two, the Customs Service for three, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for two. Collectively, those payments totaled about \$314,000 in fiscal year 1976.

The 1976 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee hearings on Interpol noted that a former White House aide who did not have a professional law enforcement background was assigned to the Bureau from February 1973 until he resigned in January 1974. The former Chief of the Bureau said that in view of the aide's qualifications, he was assigned nonenforcement public service type work during his tenure. (The former Chief added that this was the only nonqualified person employed at the Bureau.)

All current professional staff members are experienced law enforcement agents.

#### *Access to U.S. data systems*

The U.S. Bureau has a computer terminal connected to Treasury's Enforcement Communications System (TECS). Treasury's computer system contains criminal enforcement data which is used by the U.S. Customs Service; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Internal Revenue Service; and the U.S. Bureau. Treasury officials told us that the Internal Revenue Service limits its input to the computer system to identifying data on wanted persons. The system, in turn, connects to the FBI's National Crime Information Center. Information available in this Center is restricted to documented public record information on stolen property, wanted persons, and individuals arrested for serious crimes. The Center is not linked into the FBI's internal investigative or intelligence files.

For each request for information received, the U.S. Bureau prepares a case file and enters it into the computer network. Most cases receive a T-1 designation, which means that the information is for U.S. Bureau use only. When the request involves a wanted person, the case receives a T-5 designation. This information normally is used by U.S. Customs and Immigration and Naturalization Service officials at U.S. borders to prevent criminals wanted abroad from entering the United States. The T-5 information is also available to other U.S. law enforcement agencies that have access to Treasury's computer.

Requests are turned over to one of the four Bureau agents for required action. The agents review the requests to make sure that the reasons for the investigations or information are clearly stated; i.e., criminal matters that involve law enforcement and fall within U.S. laws.

Requests from foreign bureaus are generally sent to Federal law enforcement agencies and local police, as appropriate, for record checks or investigations. The agencies are given the details of requests, and they decide whether to provide the

information and assistance requested. In this way, the U.S. Bureau says that it acts as a conduit for information and has no real capacity for initiating or conducting investigations.

For passport information, however, the U.S. Bureau staff visits the State Department Passport Office and requests permission under Privacy Act procedures to review files concerning a specific criminal investigation. The type of criminal inquiry as well as the requesting country must be stated on the written request. The U.S. Bureau has access to files containing (1) reports on U.S. citizens' arrests and detentions that have been sent to the State Department's Bureau of Consular and Security Affairs from U.S. Missions abroad and (2) classified and unclassified reports on U.S. citizens which were received from other Government agencies. Passports are a key means of tracing the international travel of criminals, and the U.S. Bureau uses passport files to extract biographical data for responding to foreign requests. During fiscal year 1976, the Bureau reviewed about 600 passport files. Yet, this substantial activity was only about 2 percent of the total access granted to U.S. agencies by the Passport Office. Federal agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Investigative Service, and the FBI, all used the files extensively and were among some 35 agencies which reviewed more than 30,000 files during 1976.

Information from law enforcement agencies, local police, and the Passport Office is reviewed by Bureau agents to see that it is responsive to the request and is in accordance with U.S. laws. All replies are reviewed and approved by the Bureau chief or his designee before being mailed, cabled, or radioed to the requestor.

Requests for specific criminal investigations from U.S. requestors are sent to foreign Interpol bureaus for necessary investigation and information. All requests forwarded are approved by the Bureau chief or his designee before release. Foreign replies follow the same channel back through the U.S. Bureau to the requestor.

We asked U.S. Bureau officials what plans, if any, they had for increasing data exchanges between the United States and Interpol. The U.S. Bureau Chief told us that there were no plans to increase such data exchanges. He stated that information requests would continue to be handled on a case-by-case basis and information would be furnished only in those cases where the requestor demonstrates specific need.

#### *Exemption from Privacy Act*

The U.S. Bureau's system of records are subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579),<sup>4</sup> and the Treasury Department published the required notice describing the existence and character of the Interpol system.<sup>5</sup> Record systems maintained for law enforcement purposes may be exempted from many Privacy Act requirements and Treasury has chosen to exempt the Interpol records,<sup>6</sup> as have other Federal law enforcement agencies.

In claiming these exemptions for the U.S. Bureau, Treasury explained that the disclosure to an individual of investigatory materials would hamper law enforcement by prematurely disclosing knowledge of illegal activities and the bases for possible enforcement actions. Disclosure to an individual could hinder future enforcement efforts if the record contained investigative technique and procedures.

In July 1976, a bill (H.R. 14780) was introduced in the House of Representatives which would allow U.S. membership only if Interpol agreed to comply with U.S. Code provisions for protecting individual privacy from misuse of Government records. Under the proposed bill, if the organization discloses the record of an American or resident alien to a foreign civil or criminal law enforcement entity, the disclosure would have to be reported to the U.S. Bureau. Also, if an American or resident alien wanted to review a record maintained on him, the organization would have to provide the record to the U.S. Bureau.

Treasury officials questioned the merits and workability of the proposed bill. They believed it to be unrealistic and unnecessary.

<sup>4</sup> Provides safeguards for individuals against invasion of personal privacy by imposing requirements on Federal agency collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information.

<sup>5</sup> See 40 Fed. Reg., 37661 (Aug. 26, 1975); adopted 40 Fed. Reg. 45084 (Oct. 2, 1975).

<sup>6</sup> See 40 Fed. Reg. 37612 (Aug. 22, 1975).

The information gathered by the U.S. Bureau for dissemination abroad concerns U.S. citizens or aliens under arrest or investigation abroad. This information comes from other U.S. agencies, and these agencies authorize its disclosure. There is no absolute control over the distribution of information disseminated abroad, through Interpol or U.S. law enforcement agency channels. It can be made available to the Interpol General Secretariat or to the bureaus of the 124 other member countries.<sup>7</sup> Treasury officials stated that the usual practice of Interpol bureaus, however, is to request the information from the country of origin. Also, an Interpol resolution passed in 1974 restricts the information to law enforcement or criminal justice channels only.

#### *Role in extradition procedures*

The United States has extradition treaties with many countries providing for the return of individuals accused of certain crimes for the purpose of judicial proceedings. Extradition is handled at the diplomatic level, with formally prescribed documents and procedures. To avoid the flight of suspected persons, some treaties provide for provisional arrest, through which an individual may be detained by notifying the arresting country that extradition will be finalized later. Under these circumstances, wanted persons can be held for various periods of time depending on existing treaties or the arresting countries' laws.

Interpol has a two-fold role in extradition matters. In some cases, Interpol channels can be used to request foreign police to make a provisional arrest. A message from the U.S. Central Bureau to the French Central Bureau, for example, could be an acceptable basis for the provisional arrest of a person wanted in the United States. Interpol also circulates arrest requests. Upon receipt of certain information from the requesting bureau, the General Secretariat sends out a "red-index wanted notice" to all member bureaus. When a police department locates the wanted person, it complies with the provisions of the Interpol notice; i.e., arrest the subject, report location, keep watch on movements, etc. In any event, the receiving country acts in accordance with its own laws and treaties.

The U.S. National Central Bureau, like other bureaus, initiates red-index wanted notices by informing the General Secretariat of the Judicial authority for making the request and giving details on the case and an assurance that extradition will be requested if the suspect is located. In June 1976, about 15 such notices were circulating internationally at the request of the U.S. Bureau. Until July 1975, these notices read, "If found anywhere in the world, please detain (arrest) and inform," then the wording was changed to "If found, do not arrest but inform . . ." because of an incident in which a person was arrested but not extradited.

Formal extradition requests are processed through the State Department, which advises State and local governments about provisions of the applicable treaty and steps to take in making formal requests. The State Department's Assistant Legal Advisor for Management is responsible for translating extradition papers and ensuring that they are in order for both U.S. and foreign-initiated requests.

The State Department does not want State or locally initiated provisional arrest or preventive detention requests made through Interpol unless it has ensured the offense is covered by a current extradition treaty. It prefers that requests be made through diplomatic rather than police channels and currently has an informal working arrangement with the U.S. Bureau to do this before requesting detention of a suspect. In the past, however, this understanding has not always been followed and persons have been detained for suspected criminal activity not covered by current extradition treaties. Treasury officials stated that no extradition problems have arisen since informal Interpol, State, and Justice guidelines were put into effect in June 1975.

The Justice Department's Criminal Division directs and advises U.S. Attorneys on Federal cases warranting extradition proceedings. Justice also does not want persons detained on the basis of Interpol directives. It retains the exclusive prerogative (through its Criminal Division) of initiating requests, through

<sup>7</sup> Includes two Communist countries, Rumania and Yugoslavia, and two countries, Iraq and Uganda, with which the United States has no diplomatic relations.

State Department channels, for foreign authorities to detain suspects based on U.S. Federal warrants. The Justice official responsible for this activity told us that, contrary to desired procedures, U.S. agency representatives overseas have in the past requested foreign authorities to detain suspects but that this is no longer a problem.

#### CHAPTER 3—REVIEW OF U.S. BUREAU CASE FILES

We made a random sample of the cases handled by the U.S. National Central Bureau to determine the type of information being disseminated. On January 1, 1975, the Bureau began to file cases numerically and by April 1976 had established about 5,700 case files. These cases contained requests for information from foreign Interpol bureaus, U.S. law enforcement agencies, and private sources. We examined a total of 110 cases—every 50th case on hand.

Requests made to the U.S. Bureau generally did not involve established international criminals or large crime syndicates. Most cases involved individuals with no prior criminal record who were arrested or being investigated for a wide variety of offenses (summarized on p. 14). The U.S. Bureau usually was asked to provide information after a crime had been committed or an individual arrested. The number and significance of cases handled by the U.S. Bureau appeared to be limited by the tendency of foreign police officials to work directly with U.S. law enforcement officials overseas. For example, most narcotics cases, the largest category of requests handled by the U.S. Bureau,<sup>8</sup> involved young Americans or U.S. servicemen arrested overseas with small quantities of drugs, such as marijuana.

Treasury officials stated that cases handled by the U.S. Bureau are significant, although limited in certain areas where foreign police deal directly with the overseas representatives of U.S. agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

There was no evidence in the files made available to us that personal or political information about Americans was being disseminated abroad by the U.S. Bureau. Information sent abroad was related largely to suspected criminal activity.

#### *Origin and subject of requests*

Of the cases in our sample, 83 percent (92 cases) came from foreign Interpol bureaus in 33 countries. Six countries—West Germany, Italy, Argentina, France, Great Britain and Spain—accounted for more than half of these requests. The remainder came from such U.S. sources as the DEA; Postal Service; Internal Revenue Service; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; local police; and private firms;<sup>9</sup> Appendix II lists foreign requests processed by the U.S. Bureau during fiscal years 1975 and 1976.

About 60 percent of the requests, most of them from foreign bureaus, concerned foreign nationals and permanent resident aliens.

The cases involved the following types of criminal activity.

	Number of cases	Percent
Narcotics.....	28	26
Theft.....	10	9
Wanted persons.....	9	8
Fraud.....	9	8
Type of crime not specified by requestor.....	8	7
Background investigations.....	8	7
Immigration matters.....	6	6
Other <sup>1</sup> .....	32	29
Total.....	110	100

<sup>1</sup> 13 categories, 5 cases or less in each category.

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Bureau officials stated that their fiscal year 1976 criminal statistics indicate that drugs and drug-related cases made up about 34 percent of the caseload, while frauds and thefts constituted approximately 29 percent.

<sup>9</sup> The U.S. Bureau advised that their fiscal year 1976 statistics show that about 70 percent of the requests came from foreign INTERPOL bureaus and about 30 percent from U.S. agencies.

The U.S. Bureau asked the following organizations for assistance in processing the 92 requests from foreign INTERPOL bureaus.

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Number of cases<sup>1</sup></i>
Federal Bureau of Investigation.....	52
Drug Enforcement Administration.....	28
Customs Service.....	23
Immigration and Naturalization Service.....	19
Passport Office.....	17
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.....	3
Postal Service.....	2
Local police.....	18

<sup>1</sup> Cases do not total 92 because the Bureau contacted more than one agency on many cases.

Normally, each agency is asked for a particular type of information.

—The FBI was asked to check its criminal identification records to determine whether an individual had committed any crimes. It was not asked to perform any investigation but, in some cases, supplied information directly to foreign police about the subjects of current FBI investigations.

—The Immigration and Naturalization Service frequently was asked whether an individual had entered or left the United States.

—The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms was asked several times to determine the previous owners of guns.

—DEA and the Customs Service were informed of INTERPOL requests involving narcotics. DEA was asked to check its records to see if an individual had a history of involvement with drugs. On a few occasions, it was also asked for investigative reports relating to narcotics arrests in the United States. The Customs Service was informed of narcotics cases to help it screen travelers at U.S. ports of entry. Most of the information requested from the Customs Service, however, related to merchandise entering or leaving the United States.

—The Passport Office was asked whether an individual had a passport and for biographical data from the subject's passport application.

—The two requests to the Postal Service involved the investigation of a firm allegedly mailing pornographic material overseas and a case of suspected mail fraud.

—Local police were asked for various types of assistance, such as the locations of individuals, surveillance, whether arrests had been made, and investigation of a suspected murder.

We did not attempt to determine the extent to which other agencies created their own records in the cases examined. It is clear, however, that the information provided by the U.S. Bureau led the agencies to establish or add to their own records. For example, the FBI routinely adds to or establishes criminal records on the basis of fingerprints provided by the U.S. Bureau and the Customs Service enters such data into the Treasury Enforcement Communications System computer and uses it to screen travelers returning from overseas.

#### *Information sent abroad*

The U.S. Bureau gave foreign Interpol bureaus the following kinds of responses to their 92 requests.<sup>10</sup>

—For 42 requests, information was furnished ranging from background data (dates of birth, current addresses, and results of interviews) to criminal data resulting from law-enforcement investigations. Some cases involved collecting readily available data, such as the current address of an American being investigated abroad for cashing a worthless check. Other cases involved the compilation of data by local police and Federal law enforcement agencies through various types of investigations.

—For about 40 cases, the Bureau advised that the subjects had no criminal records. In some instances, biographical information or photographs obtained from other Federal agencies was furnished at the same time.

—For 117 cases, FBI and other criminal history records were furnished concerning arrests for both felonies and misdemeanors. No disposition data was available for many of the charges listed.

<sup>10</sup> The requests total more than 92 because more than one kind of information was included in some of the responses.

—For 14 cases, no response was made, either because the case did not require a response or because it was resolved before the Bureau processed the request.

The remainder of the cases, about 3 percent, were pending at the time of our review and no data had been furnished.

#### *Problems in processing requests*

The U.S. Bureau's basic problem in processing requests was that the requestors were not furnishing adequate documentation to support their requests. The Bureau recognized the problem and has made efforts to improve request documentation.

An Interpol resolution and U.S. Bureau procedures require requestors to fully explain and support their requests. In 49 percent of the cases in our sample, however, requestors had provided insufficient data. In most instances, the Bureau did not request additional supporting data before asking other agencies to make record checks or investigations. The requestors did not (1) explain why the request was made, (2) identify the type of criminal activity being investigated, (3) precisely describe the charges, (4) furnish evidence to support allegations that individuals had criminal backgrounds, (5) indicate whether an individual had been arrested or was being investigated, and (6) provide fingerprints, even though a subject had been arrested. The following examples illustrate one or more of these problems.

1. A cablegram from a Middle East central bureau advised that an American had committed "an offense against legislation in trade." It gave the subject's date and place of birth and asked for all available information. The U.S. Bureau learned from the FBI that the subject had no criminal record, but it obtained a photo and biographical data from the Passport Office and sent this information to the requestor.

No reason was given for the request; specific information was not requested; the charge was vaguely described; it was not clear whether the subject was under arrest or being investigated; and, if the subject was arrested, fingerprints and/or a photograph were not provided. The requestor also did not say how urgently the information was needed. In this case, it took about 60 days for the Bureau to obtain the information it furnished.

2. A South Pacific central bureau advised that a 24-year-old American was "possibly involved in a narcotics charge" and that the subject's father was reportedly president of a fraternal organization located in a northeastern city. It asked for any data on the subject. The U.S. Bureau was informed by the FBI that the subject had no criminal record. It obtained a report from a DEA office which stated the individual had no known connection with narcotics. DEA also advised that nobody with the subject's name had been president of the fraternal organization for the past 4 years, that State Police records showed the subject had six motor vehicle violations for which the fines had been paid, and that the subject's drivers license had been suspended. This information was conveyed to the foreign bureau.

The charge was vaguely described, the foreign bureau did not indicate what stage its investigation had recalled, what specific information it needed, or whether the subject was still being detained in its country.

#### *Bureau efforts to improve request documentation*

In response to the initiative of the U.S. delegation, the October 1975 Interpol General Assembly Delegation unanimously accepted a resolution calling for better request documentation. Treasury officials felt that the U.S. Bureau had implemented this resolution with effective operating procedures. They also felt that, in most cases, they did not release criminal information to requestors who did not adequately support their requests. Although the U.S. Bureau has adopted guidelines for screening requests, almost half of the sample cases we reviewed involved inadequate documentation and we believe the U.S. Bureau prematurely proceeded with the various record checks and investigations. Thus, our study shows that additional efforts have to be made to improve documentation practices.

#### *Records established*

A serious ramification of the inadequate documentation of requests is the chain reaction which takes place, including the creation of criminal information records at various agencies contacted, such as the FBI. For example, when an Interpol request in our sample included fingerprints, an FBI criminal record was established or added to. In almost half the cases for which FBI records were estab-

lished, the crimes were only vaguely described. The following charges, quoted directly from cases, are the only data on the nature of the offense supplied by the foreign bureau: "theft," "possession of narcotics," "drug users," "intentionally causing bodily injury thru negligence by car," "assault on representatives of authorities." In several other cases, the type of narcotic drug was identified but not the quantity. The vagueness of these descriptions makes it difficult to judge the seriousness of the offenses.

Treasury officials told us that information received by the U.S. Bureau is provided in its original form to U.S. agencies and that police officials who have access to this information are experienced in law enforcement and can no doubt evaluate it properly. They also said that it is each agency's prerogative to determine, based upon the information, whether or not the material will be retained and a file set up.

The Chief of the U.S. Bureau and other U.S. law enforcement officials believe that offenses committed overseas by Americans should be reported to and recorded by the FBI. Since FBI criminal records are furnished upon request to U.S. law enforcement authorities, it is equally important that these records be complete.

#### *Sending criminal history information abroad*

It is customary in the United States for criminal justice agencies to exchange criminal history information obtained from various Federal, State, and local agency files. Criminal history information is data developed on an individual between arrest and final release from custody, and it could include name; dates of arrests; nature and disposition of charges; and the name of each arresting agency, court, or correctional institution. When transmitted from one agency to another, this information is generally recorded on a "rap sheet." The rap sheet is requested by submitting a fingerprint card on the individual in question, usually at the time of arrest.

Basic questions stemming from U.S. participation in Interpol is how much and what kind of information the U.S. Bureau should furnish to foreign requestors. Policy direction on this question is essential because, generally, the foreign bureaus ask for all relevant information on subjects under investigation or arrest. Also, the information released will be used in an unknown environment, i.e., under differing national customs, standards of conduct, peculiarities in law, and due process of law, and by governments ranging from liberal democracies to totalitarian regimes.

The U.S. Bureau indicates that its procedures provide for a double screening of information. The U.S. agencies providing the information initially decide whether the request is of a nature and type to require any action and, if so, what information to provide. U.S. Bureau agents then screen the information again to determine that the information for dissemination abroad is appropriate, considering the request.

#### *Furnishing criminal records*

Our sample study showed that the Bureau furnished criminal records for 17 of the 92 foreign requests. Actions taken by the Bureau in furnishing these records and questions raised in doing so are discussed below.

According to the Chief of the U.S. Bureau, criminal history records on Americans would not be sent overseas if the individuals had been acquitted or the offenses were misdemeanors, such as drunk driving. However, such entries would not be purged from records which also listed felonies. Records which contained misdemeanors would be forwarded only if the charges showed definite patterns.

Criminal records obtained from the FBI, DEA, and others and furnished to foreign Interpol bureaus did not always indicate whether the subjects were convicted or found innocent. Only 5 of the 17 sample cases for which criminal records were sent abroad contained the dispositions for all the charges listed. When furnishing a criminal record without the disposition, the U.S. Bureau states that it is not known whether the subject was convicted. The U.S. Bureau chief stressed the difficulty of obtaining disposition data from U.S. law enforcement agencies. This is a recognized inherent weakness in such records. We believe the value of furnishing criminal records without final dispositions is questionable because it is not clear how useful this information can be or how it will be used overseas. The potential problem of losing control over the use of information was noted in a recent GAO report on FBI domestic intelligence activities.<sup>11</sup> We reported that

<sup>11</sup> "FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations—Their Purpose and Scope: Issues That Need To Be Resolved," GGD-76-50, Feb. 24, 1976.

the FBI should be cautious in distributing information developed during preliminary inquiries because once information is disseminated the FBI loses control over how it is used or interpreted and how long it is retained. We believe information dissemination problems are further magnified when criminal information without disposition is distributed abroad.

#### *Relevancy of responses*

The Bureau indicated that information obtained from other agencies is screened to insure that it is relevant to the original request. However, no written procedures provide guidance as to what constitutes relevant information. In 69 of 80 applicable cases we examined, the data provided appeared relevant. For the other 11 cases, however, data furnished did not appear to be relevant to the suspected criminal activity. For example, in 7 cases the Bureau was asked to investigate U.S. citizens arrested or being investigated on narcotics charges. The investigations disclosed that the Americans had no known connection with narcotics. However, information forwarded by the U.S. Bureau included such data as drivers' license numbers, places of employment, addresses, and birth dates.

Treasury officials stated that it would be impractical to draw up written procedures to cover every possible contingency and to provide detailed guidance for deciding what information is relevant for each case. They emphasized that the U.S. Bureau screens out irrelevant information daily and does not provide information unless it falls within the request and has been released by the originating agency. Treasury also explained that the U.S. Bureau's practice of furnishing identifying data is appropriate for helping the requestors resolve their investigations. It stated that identifying data concerning an individual is necessary for making a positive identification and that, in many instances, this information proves to the foreign police that the subject of the request is an imposter and protects the person whose name or identification is being used.

#### *Disposition of cases*

In the 1975 Interpol hearings, the Senate Subcommittee Chairman asked whether the U.S. National Central Bureau required foreign requestors to report on what happens to individuals for whom it has furnished information. This reflected concern about whether foreign governments are legitimately asking for information. The Chairman was assured that the bureau did require disposition information and that it was located in each individual case file.

We analyzed 44 foreign request cases involving American citizens who were investigated or had been arrested to see whether disposition information had been furnished. The Bureau has been advised of the outcome of 16 cases and did not know the disposition of 28 cases. Of the latter, 16 cases were unanswered for more than 180 days and 10 cases for more than 90 days. Thus, our study showed that the Bureau was having problems in getting timely outcome information. Without this feedback, the Bureau does not know whether its information-gathering activities are meaningful and effective.

Appendix III includes cases for which disposition information was not made available to the U.S. Bureau.

The Bureau was trying to overcome this problem through a 180-day followup procedure whereby foreign bureaus were asked to report on what happened in the cases for which information was supplied from U.S. law enforcement sources.

We believe it is important to obtain disposition information because, in some cases, it was not clear why the individuals were under criminal investigation or arrest. This makes the propriety of sending information abroad under these circumstances questionable.

Treasury officials pointed out that foreign and U.S. courts often do not dispose of cases for periods ranging up to a year or more. The same problem (on a larger scale) exists in the United States, as evidenced in FBI attempts to obtain dispositions of arrests in this country. They said that improvement is strived for in both areas and that the U.S. Bureau still makes every effort to obtain the disposition information in all cases involving arrests or investigations of U.S. citizens abroad.

#### *State Department disposition data*

The State Department, through its U.S. Embassy officers, has a system for reporting on the status of Americans arrested abroad. State officials told us their objective is to offer appropriate assistance to detained or arrested U.S. citizens. We reviewed State Department records for 18 cases in which Americans had been

arrested abroad and foreign bureaus had not furnished disposition information to the U.S. National Central Bureau. State had information on 9 of the cases—the disposition was recorded for 7 (i.e., the subject had been fined, deported, etc.), disposition was not known for 1, and 1 case was pending. State had no information on the other 9 cases—3 involved U.S. military personnel, 1 involved a subject born and living in a foreign country, and 5 involved situations apparently not reported on by State overseas officials.

The U.S. Bureau does not have access to disposition data collected through State Department channels. State feels that this data is collected for the purpose of assisting Americans and not for law enforcement purposes. We believe, however, that it would be helpful if State under Privacy Act guidelines, was able to inform the U.S. Bureau when an American was convicted or acquitted of a crime committed overseas. This could be beneficial because U.S. Bureau records—and possibly records created by such agencies as the FBI—are now incomplete.

U.S. Bureau access to State Department data on arrested Americans might also be used to obtain facts which frequently are not supplied by foreign Interpol bureaus. In general, State Department data on charges against Americans and the circumstances surrounding some cases appeared to be more complete. In one case in which the U.S. Bureau sent a foreign bureau an American's FBI record indicating a previous conviction for possession of marijuana, the State Department had submitted a formal diplomatic note to the country complaining that the American had been mistreated during interrogation. Additional facts such as these could help the U.S. Bureau to decide how to handle foreign bureau requests.

It could also be helpful for the State Department to have access to the U.S. Bureau's information on Americans arrested abroad. As previously noted, State was not aware, in some cases, that Americans had been arrested abroad.

Treasury officials advised us that the U.S. Bureau wants State Department data on U.S. citizens arrested abroad, so as to have the best possible information on which to base decisions concerning responses to the requestors. They also said that the Bureau would be pleased to provide State with information concerning U.S. citizens arrested abroad. To that end, the Bureau is initiating a meeting with the State Department to further explore this exchange.

#### CHAPTER 4—INTERPOL INTERNATIONAL NETWORK

Member countries agree to abide by the general tenets of the Interpol constitution, and combine as a General Assembly and an Executive Committee to formulate policy and procedural guidelines. Most Interpol funds come from membership dues.

A General Secretariat maintains Interpol's permanent offices. It operates a comprehensive criminal information file and a worldwide communications network to assist member countries in coordinating their efforts on criminal matters.

Although the United States is not a party to any international agreements or treaties defining Interpol's international status, various terms have been used to describe Interpol's status. The United Nations, the General Secretariat, and U.S. Treasury officials refer to it as intergovernmental; others call it a private or nongovernmental organization, and many perceive it as an organization in the mold of a United Nations. Interpol's status is important to its ability to elicit cooperation among its members, compliance with its rules and regulations, and recognition.

At one time, Interpol was considered a nongovernmental organization and held consultative status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council. In June 1971, this Council entered into a special arrangement with Interpol providing for exchanges of information, consultations, technical cooperation, representation by observers at organization meetings, and written statements and exchange of agenda items for matters of mutual interest. This cooperative arrangement was based on the rights and privileges normally granted to nongovernmental organizations and took into account the special arrangements existing between the Council and intergovernmental organizations.<sup>32</sup>

Treasury officials emphasized that Interpol is intergovernmental because each Interpol bureau is an official office within its country's government, which appropriates funds for it; the laws governing the operation of each bureau are the laws

<sup>32</sup> For further information, refer to the following documents of the U.N. Economic and Social Council; E/4799 (Mar. 14, 1970); E/4945 (Feb. 18, 1971); E/RES/1579 (L) (June 3, 1971); E/INF/149 (July 14, 1975).

of its country; and the Interpol officers and Executive Committee members are elected by government officials from all the countries.

Interpol's international status, however, is not directly relevant to its operations in the United States. Operations supporting its international objectives are carried out by the Treasury Department, which is subject to the force of U.S. law.

#### *Objectives*

Interpol's objectives, as described in article 2 of its constitution, are to (1) ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and (2) establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of crime.

Its activities are limited by article 3, which states that: "It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political character."

Thus, some investigations are considered to be outside of INTERPOL's established mandate.

#### *Governing bodies*

The General Assembly, composed of delegates appointed by member nations, and the Executive Committee, composed of the president, three vice presidents, and nine delegates from different countries, determine overall Interpol policy. A General Secretariat is responsible for applying the decisions of these governing bodies.

The General Assembly meets once a year to discuss and act on matters of mutual concern. The October 1976 agenda, for example, included three countries' applications for membership; the annual budget; a progress report; elections; and discussion of problems, such as international fraud, currency counterfeiting, and drugs. Regional conferences and seminars on criminal matters are held throughout the year.

Matters requiring detailed study are handled by the Executive Committee. In 1976, the Committee consisted of four officers and of delegates from Niger, Indonesia, Lebanon, Italy, West Germany, the United States, Kenya, Sweden, and Argentina.

#### *The General Secretariat*

The General Secretariat, headed by a Secretary General elected by the General Assembly, maintains a central file of criminals and cases, operates a worldwide communications system, publishes the "International Criminal Police Review," and conducts research studies of criminal activities. As of May 1975, it had 155 employees, including law officers assigned from 20 member countries, one from the United States.

*Central file.*—The central file enables the Secretariat to monitor the activities of international criminals, respond to requests for information, initiate wanted notices, and provide basic data for such special research studies as trends in types of criminal activity.

Each national central bureau is asked, but not obligated, to send copies of all correspondence to the Secretariat and to the bureau concerned. For example, Germany might inform France that an American citizen residing in France has been arrested for drug trafficking and ask for any information available on the individual; a copy of the correspondence should be sent to the General Secretariat and to the U.S. Bureau. It is acknowledged, however, that relevant information is not always provided to the General Secretariat or to other bureaus. Nevertheless, the Secretariat receives daily information through letters, telegrams, investigation reports, fingerprints, photographs, conviction sheets, and wanted notices.

The central files consist mainly of index cards, reference folders, and individual and case files. They duplicate to a limited degree the individual files maintained by the various national central bureaus.

Index cards are established by name and by special information categories. Name cards list offenders accomplices, victims, reporters of crimes or important witnesses, dates and places of birth, given names, aliases, and the like. Special information cards supplement the name cards with additional data, such as the type, date, and place of the offense; type and registration of car used; and passport numbers.

Documents received by the Secretariat are put in reference folders until the information is considered of sufficient importance or magnitude to justify opening a specific individual or case file.

Files on individuals contain their aliases, arrest records, foreign travels, wanted notices, etc. Files on specific cases contain all available information on complex cases involving several people, stolen art objects, and unidentified dead bodies.

A monthly Secretariat statistical report shows that at May 1, 1976, the following records were maintained.

Index cards:	
Alphabetical -----	944, 000
Phonetical -----	944, 000
Special -----	609, 000
Subtotal -----	2, 491, 000
Reference folders -----	287, 000
Files:	
Individual -----	23, 000
Case -----	3, 500
Art objects -----	2, 200
Dead bodies -----	300
Subtotal -----	29, 000
Total -----	2, 807, 000

Generally, only the General Secretariat and national central bureaus have access to the files in support of their criminal investigations. However, DEA has an agent working full-time at the Secretariat and other U.S. agencies in Paris, such as the Secret Service and the FBI (legal attache), use information from the files for criminal investigations.

The 1975 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee hearings on Interpol explored the question of whether the U.S. Bureau was provided with copies of all information in the General Secretariat files that involved U.S. citizens. The Secretary General was questioned about this in a cable and he responded that it is Interpol custom to keep national bureaus informed of cases involving their countrymen. He noted, however, that the Secretariat files could contain some exceptional cases involving document exchanges between national bureaus for which the U.S. Bureau did not have copies. He offered to introduce a systematic check of all correspondence exchanged by national bureaus to ensure that the U.S. Bureau would receive documents affecting U.S. citizens. He added, however, that he wanted official confirmation from the U.S. Bureau that such a measure was necessary before such action would be taken.

Treasury officials advised us that a verbal request was made to the Secretary General immediately following his offer (in May 1975) to accomplish such screening. This was followed up by a written request in January 1976. However, the U.S. Government has not made a one-time request for full access to all information available at Interpol headquarters on U.S. citizens.

*Communications system.*—The major national central bureaus and the Paris headquarters are linked by a worldwide radio network with regional relay stations. This slow and outmoded communications system continues in operation because it is relatively inexpensive, although some smaller, less wealthy member countries have been unable to acquire necessary radio equipment. Requests for record and identity checks, criminal records, (number and types of arrests/convictions) criminal investigations, whereabouts of family members, and identification of deceased persons are made from one bureau to another and to Interpol headquarters in St. Cloud, where the central files are maintained. Priority messages are sent by commercial telex, low priority messages by mail. In some locations, such as Paris, U.S. Department of State communication lines are used to transmit messages from U.S. agencies to Interpol headquarters. A code-word system helps to protect the confidentiality of messages and decreases the cost by using five letter code words in place of complete phrases. Each country has a decoding book in its own language, so the code-word system also helps in translations.

### Funding

Interpol derives its funds mainly from membership dues. Its 1975 income totaled \$2,903,500, approximately \$2,229,300, or about 77 percent, derived from dues.<sup>13</sup> The remaining income sources were:

Special contributions for drug prevention and other purposes-----	\$412,100
Audio-visual teaching material-----	5,600
Subscriptions to the International Police Review-----	8,800
Publications-----	1,800
Royalties-----	65,600
Earnings from investments-----	4,000
Sale or redemption of investment securities-----	3,100
Bank interest-----	29,100
Income from property rentals-----	15,500
Other income, reimbursements, and transfers-----	128,600
<b>Total (including \$2,229,300 from dues)-----</b>	<b>2,903,500</b>

Annual dues are set and approved by the votes of member countries at the General Assembly. The amount of dues paid recognizes the size and state of development of a country as well as its use of Interpol. The United States, Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom are assessed the highest, with each contributing 60 budget units, or about 6 percent of the total assessment. In 1975, a budget unit was valued at about \$2,300, which made the United States and the other four countries shares about \$140,000 each.

The United States has been in arrears in dues payments because the current congressional appropriation ceiling limits payments to not more than \$120,000 a year. This amount has not been enough to cover increased dues assessments and the declining value of the U.S. dollar in relation to the Swiss franc. Treasury officials told us that they introduced legislation in early 1976 to raise the ceiling and resolve the dues-arrears. The proposal was not acted upon and will be re-introduced in the 95th Congress. As of September 1976, the United States still owes \$18,800 for 1975 membership dues and \$20,000 for 1976.

Although Interpol's policy is to receive no private contributions, an item in its February 1970 International Criminal Police Review stated that:

"Two exceptional contributions had been paid during 1968, one by Venezuela, the other by Switzerland; also, another contribution had been paid by Brazil in 1969. More than 20 contributions of this kind had already been received."

Secretariat officials explained that contributions from these countries were simply part of the extraordinary building budget established to construct the headquarters building. They further explained that these contributions were from governments of the countries, not from individuals.

A board of auditors, which includes a professional auditor, certifies the General Secretariat's annual report of income and expenses. The report is made available to all members. Interpol's ordinary and extraordinary (special) budgets and financial situation statement is examined by the U.S. Treasury Department, which found the financial reports of calendar year 1974 satisfactory. This was the most recent report filed by Interpol at the time of our study.

### U.S. Grant to Interpol

In December 1974, the United States disbursed \$135,000 to Interpol from Agency for International Development (AID) funds. This disbursement constituted a one-time grant to extend a European plan to gather intelligence on narcotics activities to South America and Southeast Asia. The money was to be used to recruit two liaison officers, one in each region, for the purpose of promoting the exchange of international narcotics control intelligence.

The grant stemmed from a 1972 proposal to establish a special Narcotics Intelligence Group at Interpol headquarters. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials told us that the CIA and Treasury Department jointly developed the proposal at the request of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. As documented in a previous GAO report,<sup>14</sup> the CIA in 1969 had been requested directly by the Executive Office of the President to use its foreign intel-

<sup>13</sup> Dues are assessed and financial records maintained in Swiss francs. For reporting purposes, we converted Swiss francs to U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of about 40 cents per franc.

<sup>14</sup> Problems in Slowing the Flow of Cocaine and Heroin From and Through South America, GGD-75-80, May 30, 1975. Sections of the report are classified Confidential.

ligence resources to support the U.S. international narcotics control program. With the formation of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control in 1971, the CIA was assigned responsibility for collecting and analyzing international narcotics intelligence by clandestine means. In this role, it chaired the Cabinet Committee's Intelligence Subcommittee, which considered the proposal and ultimately recommended its approval. The proposal was approved by the Cabinet Committee. The Bureau of Customs was asked to support the proposal since it was related to the role of gathering narcotics intelligence. Customs was authorized to appoint the then-president of Interpol as a consultant for the program, and he made several trips to various countries to get the project started. According to a Treasury official, these trips were financed by the Bureau of Customs. The project as initially proposed envisioned higher dollar amounts than the final \$135,000 grant. It was designed to create an international squad of police officers to be drawn from 10 to 15 countries, such as Germany, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Hong Kong, who would collect and solicit information from their countries on drug traffic.

In May 1972 and thereafter, Interpol officials indicated their interest in pursuing this effort to increase surveillance over drug activities. Subsequent modifications to the U.S. plan eventually decreased the cost to \$135,000. The proposal evolved into a plan aimed at gathering and disseminating information on narcotics trafficking in South America and Southeast Asia among drug enforcement and Interpol bureau officials.

The desire to support such an effort posed a problem for the executive branch as to how the funds might be made available to Interpol. Memorandums during 1972-74 indicated concern over the proper means of making funds available. Treasury's Office of Management and Budget maintained that Treasury had no authority to make any payments in excess of the then \$80,000 annual membership dues. A June 1973 memorandum stated that AID had suggested that Treasury act as implementing agency for AID as a means of funneling the funds.

In June 1973, Treasury's Office of General Counsel concurred that the proposal should be financed from funds earmarked in AID's budget for international narcotics programs. The Counsel also concurred that AID should transfer the necessary funds to Treasury during the fiscal year so that Treasury, as the U.S. representative to Interpol, could make the contribution. This possible arrangement was later discarded, and in December 1974, after funds were appropriated by the Congress, a check was issued to INTERPOL's account by the AID Comptroller's office in the amount of \$135,000 from foreign assistance funds. The U.S. contribution, according to the U.S. Central Bureau's 1975 report, is used to support INTERPOL liaison officers for drug enforcement, one assigned to Southeast Asia and one to Latin America. The same program is carried on in Europe and is funded by European countries.

Treasury, AID, and Interpol officials told us that this was the only case in which U.S. funds were provided to INTERPOL outside of the normal annual contributions.

#### CHAPTER 5—NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAUS

Police activities in the countries we visited (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, India, Japan, Thailand, Peru, Brazil, and Venezuela)<sup>15</sup> were centralized under their ministries of justice or interior. One office within these ministries usually handled all international activities and part of that office was designated as the national central bureau. The bureaus were headed by designated chiefs who were professional law officers.

The staff size of the Interpol offices we visited varied—from a few persons in India to about 50 in Germany. We were told that the offices, exclusive of clerical personnel, are staffed by professional law officers. Staff members appeared to be trained, qualified officers, and many of them have police academy training and diverse police experience. The General Secretariat has no voice in the way bureaus are staffed as this decision is reserved to each member country.

#### *Central bureau coordination*

The essence of Interpol membership is cooperation in international criminal police activities. A high degree of cooperation probably exists among the central bureaus, particularly in Europe. For example, Italy, Germany, and France apparently are in constant contact on criminal matters.

<sup>15</sup> These 10 countries and the General Secretariat accounted for 47 percent of the total foreign requests processed by the U.S. Bureau during fiscal years 1975 and 1976.

Foreign bureau requests to the U.S. Bureau may originate with individuals, other government organizations, local police units, or the national police. The foreign bureau screens the requests and decides whether to make formal requests for information, what information to request, and from whom. Thus, central bureaus are the focal points incountry for transmitting and receiving requested information. Typically, requests to the U.S. Bureau are for such information as criminal records, fingerprints, and photographs. Although direct requests from U.S. police departments (i.e. not through the U.S. Bureau) are generally answered by foreign bureaus, there is little direct exchange of data between U.S. police departments and foreign bureaus. Requests for information are generally made through the U.S. Bureau or through U.S. agencies in Washington.

Interpol is well known in international law enforcement circles and the national central bureaus are on a high organizational plane in most countries. Yet, our overseas work indicated that foreign police and national central bureaus make extensive use of non-Interpol channels in dealing with U.S. matters. Our overseas discussions indicated that foreign police prefer the communication channels of overseas U.S. agencies to satisfy criminal information needs. The Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, Customs, and, to a lesser extent, such agencies, as the Secret Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service, have offices in major cities of the world. The tendency of foreign police and central bureaus is to try to obtain information through these agencies because they are considered faster, more flexible than Interpol in terms of the types of cases they handle, and more effective, at least in connection with providing information relevant to immediate investigatory matters.

Interpol channels, on the other hand, are used when U.S. agency contacts are not available or when a worldwide canvass is necessary to locate a suspect or to determine whether arrest records exist in several countries.

Treasury officials disagreed with our comments on the presence of other U.S. agencies abroad, stating that, with the possible exception of DEA, U.S. agencies do not have representatives in most major cities of the world and agency representatives often cover several countries and even entire continents.

We believe our contacts with U.S. overseas agency officials and other readily available staffing information evidences the extensive overseas representation of U.S. officials.

We did not review U.S. agency files in each country, so we could not measure the degree of similarity between information exchanged through Interpol channels and through U.S. agency channels. Comparable statistical data was also unavailable but, based on the best estimates of U.S. agency representatives we interviewed, the majority of foreign requests being made to the United States come through overseas offices of U.S. agencies. For example, information compiled at our request in the three South American countries we visited indicated that less than 25 percent of the foreign requests for information came through Interpol channels.

Treasury officials stated their belief that foreign police use U.S. agency overseas channels only for matters which fall within the investigative jurisdiction of these agencies and use Interpol channels for other information needs. They also stated that there are no statistics or records to specifically substantiate how foreign police route their investigative requests.

#### *Information provided on U.S. citizens*

Information provided to recipient countries by the U.S. Bureau is for use in connection with specific criminal investigations. Foreign bureau officials claimed that the information was restricted to police channels, but there is no practical way to insure this is the only use made of the information. In some countries, the alliance of foreign police systems with the intelligence branches certainly does not preclude the sharing of such information.

Treasury officials stated that information handled through Interpol is restricted to police and criminal justice channels by an Interpol privacy resolution. Also, the U.S. Bureau red stamps all outgoing documents with the statement that the material furnished is not to be disseminated outside the receiving organization except to official law enforcement and justice agencies without the expressed permission of the U.S. Bureau. The officials also agreed that there is no practical way to insure the use made of the information but emphasized that no examples have been found of abuses. They said that each country is aware that unauthorized information disclosures would result in the U.S. Bureau not giving further information. Treasury noted that, because of the alliance of foreign police systems with their intelligence branches, there is always the potential for information to be accessible to them; however, the U.S. Bureau has found no examples of this.

The FBI and DEA also have close direct working relationships, sometimes under formal agreements, with police officials abroad. In some cases, these police officials are also Interpol officials. Many times, information is shared routinely. For example, the FBI specifically earmarks information on U.S. citizens for dissemination to foreign police officials and provides them with requested criminal records and record checks. Also, Article 3 of DEA's protocol with the French police encourages cooperation, stating that:

"Within the framework of their respective laws, the two services will exchange, at the earliest possible time any information relative to their respective fields, particularly concerning investigations, arrests, seizures and illicit movements of drugs or suspects."

The DEA, in recognition of the requirements of the Privacy Act, maintains a file of accountability showing information disclosed on U.S. citizens and to whom. Its Paris office file, for example, shows that information on U.S. citizens has been given to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, United Kingdom Customs Service, and Interpol office in Oslo, Norway, among others.

We asked U.S. agencies whether instructions had been issued to guide working relationships with foreign police officials and contacts with Interpol. The FBI has not issued such instructions and DEA has only general guidelines for operations in foreign countries. This suggests that relationships are handled according to individual situations.

DEA officials felt that their general guidelines provided effective guidance to overseas DEA agents who have to make judgments on how to proceed in specific cases. They emphasized that, generally, DEA agents work on important narcotics cases and refer routine drug matters to Interpol for processing.

#### *Usefulness of information provided by U.S. Bureau*

Officials abroad thought the information provided by the U.S. Bureau was useful and some characterized it as slow but adequate. As stated earlier, many Interpol requests are routine and informational and appears to be used for developing more comprehensive data. For example, French authorities told us that inquiries are routinely made to the country of each foreigner arrested in France to learn whether the person is wanted.

Treasury officials took the position that inquiries not only inform the home country of the criminal activity of its citizens but often resolve unsolved cases in the home country and that it is important for citizens to know that they cannot commit criminal offenses without those offenses being recorded in their home country.

### CHAPTER 6—CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### *Conclusions*

At various times, the United States has been a full-time member and an informal member of Interpol. It is currently a full-time member and is emphasizing greater use of Interpol facilities among U.S. agencies and local police organizations.

The U.S. National Central Bureau subscribes generally to the objectives, rules, and regulations of Interpol and has been a party to and initiated Interpol resolutions which have become operating guidelines for members. The Bureau has (1) access on a case-by-case basis to the files of Federal and local government agencies, (2) space in a Federal building, (3) professional and clerical staff, and (4) telecommunication privileges.

In the case files we examined, we found no disclosure of an individual's personal habits or political activities. We did find, however, a need to require better documentation in support of requests for information. We recognize that the U.S. Bureau faces the difficult task of responding to numerous requests from foreign police—individuals with different traditions, standards, and procedures. We also recognize the inherent difficulties in 125 countries agreeing to and performing under a common code of conduct. Nonetheless, a concerted effort must be made to clearly substantiate reporting of alleged criminal offenses and provide a sound basis for investigating such matters. The U.S. Bureau should be the model for other countries to follow in this regard.

The Department of the Treasury has been the designated representative to Interpol and the focal point for U.S. Government contact. Yet, the FBI, DEA,

and other U.S. agencies exchange information directly with Interpol offices in many countries. Indeed, the information channels of these agencies from their overseas offices to Washington headquarters were the preferred route for the foreign police units and Interpol offices we surveyed. These contacts take place with only general and informal agency guidance.

#### *Recommendations*

We recommend that the U.S. Bureau:

Improve the screening of information by requiring specific information before proceeding with criminal record checks or other criminal investigations.

For individuals charged with crimes, the Bureau should require (1) specific statements of the criminal act or acts, including the dates and places, and (2) data necessary to establish their identity, such as fingerprint records, photographs, descriptions, distinguishing physical marks, and appropriate biographical data.

For individuals convicted of crimes, requestors should be required to furnish specific information on the convictions and sentences passed.

Encourage foreign bureaus to report on case dispositions. Outcome data would give the U.S. Bureau a valuable insight into whether requests from foreign governments are legitimate and whether they are serving useful law enforcement purposes.

Carefully screen all replies, particularly those to be sent abroad, to ensure that the information is relevant to the charges or investigations being made.

Although we did not find any instances where information was improperly used by foreign entities, the U.S. Bureau may want to explore the need for better defined policy guidelines and operating procedures for the interaction of various overseas U.S. law enforcement agencies with the U.S. Bureau, foreign police, and foreign national central bureaus.

#### CHAPTER 7—SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our work was directed primarily toward answering the 26 questions raised by the congressmen. We did not evaluate the economy or efficiency of U.S. participation in Interpol.

Principal audit work was performed at the U.S. National Central Bureau in Washington, D.C., where we talked with officials, reviewed policies and operating procedures, and examined 110 case files for the nature of requests made to the Bureau; actions taken to respond to requests; and type of information disclosed, particularly to foreign sources.

Coordination of information between the U.S. Bureau and various government and local police agencies was discussed with representatives in Washington of the State and Justice Departments, Customs Service, FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Secret Service, Central Intelligence Agency, Internal Revenue Service, and Drug Enforcement Administration.

Our work overseas, in May and June 1976, examined (1) the relationships between the Interpol General Secretariat in St. Cloud, France, and member national central bureaus, (2) how the bureaus were organized and staffed, and (3) how they requested law enforcement information from the United States. We also talked with representatives of U.S. agencies overseas to determine how they related to local bureaus and to the U.S. Bureau. Countries and agencies we visited are listed below.

#### SCOPE OF OVERSEAS FIELDWORK

<i>Offices visited</i>	<i>Persons interviewed</i>
<b>Europe:</b>	
<b>Interpol:</b>	
Headquarters, St. Cloud, France----	Secretary General and members of his staff
<b>National Central Bureaus:</b>	
Wiesbaden, Germany-----	Bureau chief
Paris, France-----	Assistant to bureau chief
Madrid, Spain-----	Bureau chief
Rome, Italy-----	Bureau chief

## SCOPE OF OVERSEAS FIELDWORK—continued

<i>Offices visited</i>	<i>Persons interviewed</i>
U.S. representatives:	
U.S. Embassies:	
Bonn, Germany-----	FBI Legal Attache
Paris, France-----	FBI Legal Attache, DEA Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Secret Service Special Agent in Charge, and Customs Special Agent in Charge
Madrid, Spain-----	FBI Legal Attache and DEA Special Agent in Charge
Rome, Italy-----	FBI Legal Attache, DEA Special Agent in Charge, and Immigration and Naturalization Service Special Agent in Charge
U.S. Consulate, Frankfurt, Ger- many.	DEA Special Agent in Charge, Senior Customs Representative
Asia:	
National Central Bureaus:	
Tokyo, Japan-----	Deputy bureau chief
Bangkok, Thailand-----	Bureau chief and Interpol Regional Narcotics Liaison Officer
New Delhi, India-----	Bureau chief
U.S. representatives:	
U.S. Embassies:	
Tokyo, Japan-----	FBI Assistant Legal Attache, DEA Special Agent in Charge, Customs Attache, Assistant Security Officer, and Consul General
U.S. Embassies:	
Bangkok, Thailand-----	DEA Special Agent in Charge, and his assistant and Regional Security Officer
New Delhi, India-----	DEA Special Agent in Charge, Re- gional Security Officer, and U.S. Consular Officer
Foreign government:	
Government of India, Revenue In- telligence, New Delhi.	Deputy Director and his assistant
South America:	
National Central Bureaus:	
Caracas, Venezuela-----	Bureau chief
Lima, Peru-----	Bureau chief
Brasilia, Brazil-----	Bureau chief
U.S. representatives:	
U.S. Embassies:	
Caracas, Venezuela-----	Charge d'Affairs, FBI Legal Attache, DEA Regional Director, DEA Dis- trict Agent, Regional Security Of- ficer, Deputy Consul General, and U.S. Consular Officers
Lima, Peru-----	U.S. Ambassador, DEA Special Agent in Charge, Regional Security Of- ficer, and U.S. Consular Officers
Brasilia, Brazil-----	U.S. Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, FBI Legal Attache, DEA Special Agent in Charge, Regional Security Officer, Defense Attache Officers, Political Officer, and U.S. Consular Officer
U.S. Consulate, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.	Chief of U.S. Consular Section and DEA District Agent

APPENDIX I

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Washington, D.C., February 5, 1976.

B-161870

ELM: B. STAATS,  
Comptroller General, General Accounting Office,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. COMPTROLLER GENERAL: The United States is a member of Interpol, ostensibly an International Criminal Police Organization through which police forces in 120 countries may exchange data on criminal suspects. Members transfer information by access to each other's law enforcement files. In the U.S., this can include the FBI's massive National Crime Information Center. Interpol's National Central Bureau here, operating from Treasury Department facilities, seems to operate under no guidelines limiting what data on Americans can be disseminated abroad. Americans working for Interpol are Federal employees on loan from the Secret Service, Customs, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Interpol is a private organization, and we have been unable to establish that it has ever been established by any international charter or treaty. Its constitution and bylaws, binding on its U.S. office, have never, to our knowledge, been submitted to or approved by the U.S. Congress. Yet it seems to be enjoying all the privileges of a U.S. Federal agency.

Interpol is not, to our knowledge, a part of the United Nations, and has never been granted any status by the General Assembly of that body. Therefore, because of America's financial contributions, use of the U.S. law enforcement personnel and facilities as well as crucial privacy and data access questions, we request that the GAO probe our involvement with Interpol, seeking specific answers to the following questions:

(1) Exactly how much information does Interpol receive from the U.S. and precisely what is its nature? (See p. 16.)

(2) Does Interpol have access to the FBI's NCIC system of the U.S. criminal information files, through Treasury's TECS system or any other ADP or manual system, including NLETS? (See p. 6.)

(3) Do Federal law enforcement agencies collect criminal data from state and local authorities at Interpol request, and third party it abroad through Interpol? (See p. 15.)

(4) What plans, if any, are being made to increase such data exchanges between the U.S. and Interpol? (See p. 9.)

(5) Can Interpol place its own data on individuals into NCIC or other U.S. law enforcement agency files? (See p. 16.)

(6) Does Interpol's office here, the National Central Bureau, possess or operate under any guidelines limiting what information on Americans may be disseminated to other nations? (See p. 20.)

(7) Is data from American law enforcement agency files, once transmitted to Interpol, accessible to all 120 Interpol members, including several Communist nations and certain countries with whom we have no formal diplomatic relations (See p. 10.)

(8) A number of American's, employees of various Federal law enforcement arms, staff the Interpol bureau at Treasury. Who do they report to and seek final approval of policies from? (See p. 6.)

(9) Does Interpol have any legal right or permission to initiate investigations or data exchanges with U.S. law enforcement entities or state or local levels? If so, please elaborate. (See p. 5.)

(10) What kinds of data bank and/or dossiers are being maintained in Paris on Americans and what does the U.S. government know about their contents or how they are utilized and the data disseminated? (See p. 27.)

(11) Does the U.S. Government have full access to all such information in Paris at one time upon request? (See p. 28.)

(12) Has our government ever made such a request? (See p. 29.)

(13) Is the American government helping to underwrite a growing international data bank it cannot monitor? (See p. 28.)

(14) Interpol acknowledges in its internal publication that "exceptional contributions" have been made to it by unnamed persons in Switzerland, Venezuela and Brazil. Who are these individuals, and does the U.S. have access to information on them? (See p. 31.)

(15) Have non-professionals lacking law enforcement experience ever been placed in Interpol's Washington office because of a politically-oriented referral? (See p. 6.)

(16) Is there any dissemination by Interpol of personal and political information about American citizens neither accused nor suspected of criminal activity? (See p. 13.)

(17) Interpol maintains files not only on known criminals but also on individuals "under suspicion", as well as data on complainants, victims and witnesses involved in criminal cases. Who has access to this data and to whom is it disseminated? (See p. 28.)

(18) Are there any guidelines, either from Interpol's international headquarters or originating in Washington, governing exchange of unverified accusations, raw intelligence data and other information potentially damaging to innocent U.S. citizens? (See p. 20.)

(19) Should Interpol be housed at the Treasury Department as if it were a Federal agency? (See p. 5.)

(20) Does the U.S. receive any accounting from Interpol's Paris headquarters on how our financial contributions are being spent? (See p. 31.)

(21) Interpol requested and received a \$135,000 grant from the State Department in September, 1974. Sheldon Vance of the State Department approved that request, yet the funds in question were administered by the Agency for International Development. Why was this request made? Who made it? What similar requests have been made and what was the disposition of the request? Why did AID administer it rather than the Treasury Department? (See p. 31.)

(22) How deeply is Interpol involved in diplomatic functions, such as extradition requests? What is its relationship with our State Department regarding such requests? (See p. 11.)

(23) Where is the scope of Interpol's authority to operate as described within the U.S. spelled out by statute? (See p. 3.)

(24) Is Interpol carrying out police, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement and other functions without effective American oversight? (See p. 6.)

(25) Does Interpol have access to the State Department's passport files? (See p. 8.)

(26) Does Interpol have a U.S. Federal advisory board? (See p. 6.)

Your prompt response to this inquiry is urgently requested.

Sincerely,

JOHN E. MOSS.  
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA.

GAO note.—Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of this report containing the answers to questions raised.

## APPENDIX II

## FOREIGN REQUESTS PROCESSED BY THE U.S. BUREAU, FISCAL YEARS 1975 AND 1976

Requesting country	Number of requests		
	1975	1976	Total <sup>1</sup>
Algeria	4		4
Arab Republic of Egypt	5	4	9
Argentina	87	43	130
Australia	84	78	162
Austria	40	36	76
The Bahamas		1	1
Belgium	44	57	101
Bermuda		1	1
Bolivia	1	1	2
Brazil	32	24	56
Canada	53	57	110
Central African Republic	3		3
Chile	18	8	26
Colombia	27	28	55
Costa Rica	6	2	8
Cyprus	6		6
Denmark	33	40	73
Dominican Republic	2	8	10
Ecuador	3	9	12
Ethiopia	2		2
Fiji Islands	4		4
Finland	15	8	23
France	85	95	180
Gabun	1		1
Germany	396	319	715
Ghana	9	4	13
Gibraltar		3	3
Greece	54	67	121
Guatemala	16	10	26
Guyana	1	1	2
Honduras	1	3	4
Hong Kong	13	14	27
India	36	38	74
Indonesia		4	4
Iran	11	12	23
Iraq	1	1	2
Ireland	2	2	4
Israel	9	13	22
Italy	201	223	424
Jamaica	9	1	10
Japan	60	18	78
Jordan	2	3	5
Kenya	2	1	3
Korea	1		1
Kuwait	1	2	3
Laos	1		1
Lebanon	22	8	30
Liberia	17	9	26
Libya	1	5	6
Luxembourg	5	7	12
Malta		2	2
Mexico	12	4	16
Monaco	2	3	5
Morocco	47	23	70
Nepal	8		8
The Netherlands	39	50	89
Netherland Antilles	26	17	43
New Zealand	25	21	46
Nigeria	19	14	33
Norway	12	18	30
Pakistan	4	5	9
Panama	6	4	10
Paraguay	7	3	10
Peru	66	43	109
Philippines	2	4	6
Portugal	4	14	18
Romania	4	2	6
Saudi Arabia	1		1
Senegal	1		1
Sierra Leone	1	1	2
Singapore		11	11
Somalia		1	1
Spain	171	101	272
Sri Lanka	3	9	12
Sweden	50	27	77
Switzerland	49	67	116

<sup>1</sup> Does not include Interpol's wanted circulars, all-points bulletins, requests for information on police-support functions, or requests forwarded by the U.S. Bureau to foreign police.

## APPENDIX II—Continued

## FOREIGN REQUESTS PROCESSED BY THE U.S. BUREAU, FISCAL YEARS 1975 AND 1976—Continued

Requesting country	Number of requests		Total
	1975	1976	
Syria.....	3	3	6
Thailand.....	35	23	58
Trinidad and Tobago.....	6	1	7
Turkey.....	12	5	17
Uganda.....	1	-----	1
The United Kingdom.....	226	189	415
Uruguay.....	25	13	38
Venezuela.....	19	17	36
Yugoslavia.....	20	18	38
Zaire Republic.....	2	-----	2
Interpol General Secretariat.....	41	27	68
Total.....	2,379	2,008	4,387

## APPENDIX II

## CASE STUDY SUMMARIES

Summarized below are selected cases from our random sample of 110 cases from files of the U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol. These cases describe some of the kinds of information requests the U.S. Bureau processes.

1. A South American Bureau asked for a U.S. citizen's criminal record and any other available information but did not specify the reason for its investigation. The U.S. Bureau obtained biographical data from Passport Office files and learned from the FBI that the subject had no criminal record. This data was furnished to the foreign bureau.

2. West European Bureau asked the U.S. Bureau for details on the birth and parentage of the owners of a U.S. firm that allegedly sent pornographic material to that country. The request was referred to the U.S. Postal Service. Investigative data prepared by the Postal Service was forwarded through the U.S. Bureau. This information, which included physical descriptions and identifying data on the firm's owners, indicated that the firm sold material which could possibly be considered pornographic. The firm was being investigated by the Postal Service, which asked for but did not receive details of the investigation being conducted overseas. About 2 years after the initial inquiry, the West European Bureau reported that the U.S. owners had been given a suspended 6-month jail term and a fine for mailing obscene material. The Postal Service asked the U.S. Bureau to determine whether the owners had actually been on trial overseas.

3. On behalf of one of its country's public prosecutors, a West European Bureau asked for details on a U.S. citizen's birth and parentage. The foreign bureau did not indicate what crime had been committed and supplied only the person's name, age, and address. The U.S. Bureau attempted to clarify the subject's address since there was no such city, but the foreign bureau never replied. No information was furnished to the foreign bureau.

4. A South American Bureau asked the U.S. Bureau to keep a discreet watch on a South American citizen who had a "suspended conviction" for drug trafficking, i.e., a conviction followed by a suspended sentence. The subject apparently intended to reside in the United States. The U.S. Bureau notified the Customs Service, DEA, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Immigration told the U.S. Bureau that the subject had been granted permanent residency and that his residency application indicated no previous arrests or convictions. Immigration indicated that it would take no further action in the case until obtained certified copies of the violated statute, the arrest, and the conviction, which could be used to revoke the permanent residency. The U.S. Bureau was not asked to obtain this data and had no information on the disposition of this case.

5. On behalf of its local police, a West European Bureau asked for the true identity of a U.S. citizen who had paid his hotel bill with a worthless check. The foreign bureau could not supply the subject's passport number or date and place of birth but did provide the identification numbers found on the check. The U.S. Bureau was unable to obtain any response to several inquiries made of the New York Bank on which the check was drawn. About 2 years after the original re-

quest, the foreign bureau sent a photocopy of the check. Another inquiry at the bank revealed that the subject had opened an account using a false name and background data. The U.S. Bureau sent this information to the foreign bureau.

6. A South Pacific Bureau informed the U.S. Bureau that charges against a U.S. citizen arrested for possession of cannabis had been dismissed. The foreign bureau stated also that, based on pornographic material found in the subject's luggage, the subject might be a homosexual. No fingerprints or other data was furnished. The U.S. Bureau sent this information to Customs since this was a potential violation of U.S. Customs laws. They also contacted DEA, requested an FBI record check, and biographical data from the Passport Office. The foreign bureau was informed that the subject had no known criminal convictions and was given biographical data and a photograph.

7. A South American Bureau asked for all relevant data to complete its information on one of its nationals who was fingerprinted by the FBI in 1946. The subject's date and place of birth and parents' names were provided. Both the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service told the U.S. Bureau that they had no record of the subject. The U.S. Bureau passed this information on to the foreign bureau and also indicated that, if the subject's FBI identification number were forwarded, a further check of FBI records could be made.

8. A South American Bureau investigating one of its citizens for alleged trafficking in currency gave his date and place of birth and asked the U.S. Bureau to determine how much currency the suspect had in his possession, its origin, his activities, and any criminal record. No evidence or additional explanation of the charge was provided. The foreign bureau also furnished the flight number of the aircraft it thought the subject took to the United States. The U.S. Bureau sent the request to the Immigration and Naturalization Service to alert it to a possible illegal alien in the U.S. The Bureau was told by Immigration that it had no record of the subject's entry. The FBI indicated that the subject had no criminal record. A Customs Service investigation disclosed that the subject had leased an apartment at a certain address until 1977 and was living there with his wife and grandson. These facts, together with the negative results of the FBI check, were sent to the foreign bureau.

9. A West European Bureau advised the U.S. Bureau that a foreign national arrested for trafficking in narcotics had a notebook containing the names of three U.S. citizens and asked for all available information of this matter. DEA was asked to investigate, and it reported that the names were checked through DEA files with negative results. The U.S. Bureau sent a copy of the DEA report to the foreign bureau.

10. A local U.S. police department asked the U.S. Bureau to make a background check for a foreign national who had applied for a job as a "junket arranger" for a major U.S. hotel. It asked for any available intelligence or derogatory information about the individual. The U.S. Bureau advised the applicable foreign bureau that the individual had applied for a sensitive position in the United States and asked for a background investigation. The foreign bureau replied that the individual had no criminal record in that country, and this information was sent to the local U.S. police department.

11. A West European Bureau asked for all available data on an American serviceman convicted and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment for "violation of legislation concerning, drugs." The charge, date of conviction, sentence and subjects date and year of birth were provided by the foreign bureau. The U.S. Bureau notified Customs and DEA and asked the foreign bureau for the subject's military identification or social security number. After the receipt of this data, an FBI criminal record check was conducted. The foreign bureau subsequently was notified that the subject had no previous arrests.

12. A South American Bureau asked the U.S. Bureau to take any action it saw fit regarding one of its nationals, a convicted criminal, who intended to go to the United States. The subject had been tried for "trafficking in women." The subject's date and place of birth and passport number were provided. The U.S. Bureau notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Subsequently, Immigration told the U.S. Bureau it had no record of the subject's entry into this country. The foreign bureau was informed that the subject had no criminal record with Immigration.

13. A West European Bureau asked for the U.S. address of one of its citizens and two small children for its "Family" department of the prosecutor's office. They wanted to know the whereabouts of this citizen. The U.S. Bureau asked a

local U.S. police department to investigate. On the basis of a telephone call from the local police department, the U.S. Bureau informed the foreign bureau of the subject's present address and employment, said the children were attending school and had obtained proper authority to leave that country for the United States, and that its diplomatic officials were already aware of this information.

14. A South American Bureau informed the U.S. Bureau that a citizen of its country, a known pickpocket, appeared to have left for the United States. The subject's date and place of birth were provided. The U.S. Bureau was informed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that it had no record of the subject entering or leaving the country. This fact was passed on to the foreign bureau. The U.S. Bureau entered the subject's name in the Treasury Enforcement Communications System computer. If the known criminal is detected by Immigration, it will have this information for its use in determining what action to take. If a Customs agent at a U.S. port of entry checks the subject's name through the computer, he will be notified that the subject's itinerary and address in this country should be provided to the U.S. Bureau but that the subject should not be arrested.

15. A local U.S. police department was investigating a 70 year old American who was an admitted associate of one or more organized crime figures. He approached certain banks about depositing a large sum of money which he claimed he would receive from foreign sources. An Internal Revenue Service agent had the U.S. Bureau query several foreign bureaus to check the "subscribers and givers" of telephone numbers used by the subject. Some of the phone numbers were traced and others could not be. Subsequently, the U.S. Bureau received a copy of a local police investigative report which included police interviews with the subject and his family and indications of mafia contacts dating back over many years. This information was sent to the foreign bureau. The local police were still investigating the case.

16. A West European Bureau advised the U.S. Bureau that a U.S. citizen was guilty of illicit driving and wanted to know if the individual had a U.S. drivers license. It furnished the subject's passport number and named the State where the individual's parents resided. A State police investigation disclosed that a driver's license had not been issued to the subject nor was he wanted for any crime. This information was given to the foreign bureau. The case file did not disclose the disposition of this matter.

17. A West European Bureau asked if a U.S. citizen, wanted in its country for stealing the wallet of an elderly woman, has a criminal record. The subject's date and place of birth were provided. A check with the FBI indicated that the subject had been charged with "neg and refusing to atd. school." The charge was placed against the subject when he was 16 years old and the record showed no disposition for the case. The U.S. Bureau told the foreign bureau that the subject had no criminal record.

18. On October 20, 1975, a North African Bureau asked for the true identity and criminal record of an American arrested for "intentionally causing bodily injury and disturbing the public." The subject's date and place of birth, fingerprints, and photograph were provided. An FBI criminal check disclosed that the subject had a computerized criminal history which listed such offenses as possession of marijuana, rape, and sleeping in public. The disposition was given for only 1 of 11 offenses—acquittal on a charge of grand larceny. On January 3, 1976, this record was furnished to the foreign bureau because the record was considered appropriate for consideration of officers who suspected the subject of committing a violent crime. As of May 1976, the U.S. Bureau had not been told whether the American had been convicted or acquitted.

State Department records indicated that the subject had been sentenced to a month in jail and fined \$20 shortly after being arrested for assault and battery on a North African national. On August 30, 1975—1½ months before the North African Bureau made its request—the American was deported.

19. On August 4, 1975, a West European Bureau asked for all available data on three young Americans arrested at an airport several months earlier for possessing 24 pounds of hashish. Photos and fingerprints were provided. The U.S. Bureau notified Customs and DEA and requested an FBI record check. The European Bureau was told the Americans had no prior arrests. As of June 1976, the U.S. Bureau still had not been informed of the disposition of the charges.

State Department files indicated that on September 11, 1975, the Americans were given suspended prison sentences.

## APPENDIX IV

PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERPOL ACTIVITIES<sup>1</sup>

	Tenure of office	
	From—	To—
Department of Justice:		
Attorney General:		
Edward H. Levi.....	February 1975.....	Present.
William B. Saxbe.....	January 1974.....	February 1975.
Robert H. Bork, Sr. (acting).....	October 1973.....	January 1974.
Elliot L. Richardson.....	May 1973.....	October 1973.
Richard G. Kleindienst.....	June 1972.....	May 1973.
Richard G. Kleindienst (acting).....	March 1972.....	June 1972.
John N. Mitchell.....	January 1969.....	March 1972.
Department of the Treasury:		
Secretary of the Treasury:		
William E. Simon.....	May 1974.....	Present.
George P. Shultz.....	June 1972.....	May 1974.
John B. Connally.....	February 1971.....	June 1972.
David M. Kennedy.....	January 1969.....	February 1971.
Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs:		
Jerry Thomas.....	October 1976.....	Present.
David R. Macdonald.....	May 1973.....	September 1976.
Edward L. Morgan.....	February 1972.....	February 1973.
Eugene T. Rossides.....	January 1969.....	January 1972.
Chief, U.S. National Central Bureau:		
Louis B. Sims.....	September 1974.....	Present.
Kenneth S. Giannoulos.....	March 1969.....	September 1974.

<sup>1</sup> At various times U.S. officials have been elected to the Interpol Executive Committee. Also, in November 1976, the Director of the U.S. Secret Service was elected a vice president of Interpol.

## APPENDIX 4


## U.S. INTERPOL ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1976

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION, U.S. NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAU,  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FISCAL YEAR, 1976

This report reflects the activities and progress of the International Criminal Police Organization—Interpol, and in particular, that of the United States National Central Bureau (U.S. NCB) for the Fiscal Year which ended on June 30, 1976.

By statute (22 U.S.C. 263a), the United States participates in the International Criminal Police Organization—Interpol—whose General Secretariat is located in Saint Cloud (Paris), France and whose membership included 122 countries. The President of Interpol is Mr. William L. Higgitt, former Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The Secretary General, Mr. Jean Nepote, is a former Commissaire Divisionnaire of the French Surete Nationale. Director H. S. Knight of the U.S. Secret Service has represented America on the Interpol Executive Committee since his election by the General Assembly in September of 1974. The Executive Committee meets in the Fall just prior to the General Assembly, and again in the Spring, which this year was from June 14–17, 1976.

In 1958, Public Law 85-768 was passed amending 22 U.S.C. 263a which authorized the Attorney General to designate the Department of the Treasury as the official liaison with Interpol. Assistant Secretary David R. Macdonald, Department of the Treasury, is the current U.S. Representative to Interpol. During Fiscal Year 1976, twelve full-time positions were assigned to the U.S. participation in Interpol. One of these positions is presently located in the General Secretariat of Interpol in France, and the remaining eleven are located in the U.S. NCB in Washington, D.C. These positions are funded as follows: three by the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice; two by the U.S. Secret Service, three by the U.S. Customs Service, two by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, two by the Office of the Secretary, Department of the Treasury.



**CONTINUED**

**2 OF 3**

In September of 1974, the Interpol 43rd General Assembly voted an increase in the Interpol annual dues from 4850 Swiss francs per budget unit to 5900 Swiss francs per budget unit. The United States, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France each pay 60 budget units, or the equivalent of 354,600 Swiss francs (\$141,600). Other member countries pay correspondingly less, depending mainly on the development of the country and their utilization of Interpol.

In addition to the increased budget unit, currency fluctuations have increased the dollar equivalent of the budget units as expressed in Swiss francs. For this reason, annual dues have ranged from \$117,420 in October of 1974 to \$147,000 in February of 1975, and during fiscal year 1976 were valued at approximately \$140,000. The current U.S. dues represent 6 percent of the overall Interpol budget of \$2,367,808 Swiss francs.

Public Law 93-468, approved on October 24, 1974, increased the limit on Interpol dues from \$80,000 to \$120,000. However, since Public Law 93-468 is already inadequate due to the fluctuation of value between the U.S. dollar and the Swiss franc, legislation has been proposed to authorize payment of the Interpol dues as approved by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees annually.

Interpol's function is to provide the necessary coordination and communications for law enforcement agencies (local, state or Federal) having a foreign investigative requirement abroad. The communications handled by Interpol range from requests for criminal history record checks to requests for full investigations. Interpol in the U.S. conducts no investigations. The activities of the U.S. National Central Bureau are directed toward:

1. Arranging for prompt assistance by foreign police to law enforcement agencies in the United States (local, state and Federal) in their investigative requirements.
2. Arranging for prompt assistance to a foreign investigative request in the United States provided it concerns a criminal investigation and is in accord with United States law.
3. Increasing state and local law enforcement's awareness of the assistance available through Interpol in the event they have foreign investigative requirements.
4. Coordinating U.S. law enforcement agencies' input and/or participation in Interpol international conferences on specific types of crimes as well as overall international police cooperation.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has granted the U.S. NCB, Department of the Treasury, access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). This access is granted pursuant to the guidelines established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the protection of individual's rights and covers only those records containing information on the following:

1. Stolen Securities.
2. Stolen Motor Vehicles.
3. Wanted Persons (Warrants Outstanding).<sup>1</sup>
4. Stolen, Missing or Recovered Guns.
5. Stolen Boats.
6. Stolen License Plates.
7. Computerized Criminal Histories.<sup>1</sup>

#### U.S. NCB ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

Effective January 1, 1975, investigative requests, all points bulletins and wanted circulars received by the U.S. NCB were entered into the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS). Those pertaining to stolen property, all points bulletins, wanted circulars and certain other criminal cases have been made directly accessible to Treasury law enforcement agencies, through TECS, while the remaining (approximately 80 percent) TECS entries made by this NCB, are directly accessible only to this NCB. No foreign police/Interpol Bureaus have access to TECS, or any records in the U.S. NCB.

Benefits derived from TECS include more uniform indexing, retrievability of statistics and data, a suspense system for pending cases and for purging of files when no longer required, prompt entry of all points bulletins and wanted circulars, continual updating of information entered, as well as location of criminals wanted by law enforcement in the United States. Through TECS, the National Law Enforcement Teletype System was utilized to communicate with local and/or state law enforcement agencies/departments and to place nationwide lookouts.

<sup>1</sup> Individuals indexed in NCIC are only those persons for whom arrest warrants are outstanding or persons who have had substantial involvement, supported by fingerprint records, with the criminal police system.

During the period from July 1, 1975 to June 30, 1976, a total of 3663 cases were entered into the TECS system, with 8603 individual entries.

In fiscal year 1976, the U.S. NCB received 2653 investigative matters from 109 other Interpol Bureaus and 961 investigative matters from U.S. law enforcement agencies/departments asking for investigations. During this same period of time, the U.S. NCB sent 1338 investigative requests of 109 foreign NCBs and 5214 investigative requests to U.S. law enforcement agencies/departments and certain financial and/or other commercial institutions. The U.S. NCB assisted 95 foreign and U.S. police agencies in obtaining various types of information concerning police operations, organization procedures, equipment, special categories of criminal enforcement.

During fiscal year 1976, out of the total 8,603 individuals entries into TECS, 1705 had been arrested as of June 30, 1976. Of the 1,705 arrests where judicial action had been completed, 452 convictions and 72 acquittals, dismissals or not guilty verdicts, have resulted. In a large percentage of the 1705 arrests, judicial action has not yet been completed and/or this NCB has not been advised of the final disposition. Out of the 8,603 individual entries, 2,134, or approximately 22 percent, related to U.S. citizens.

During fiscal year 1976, statistics were also kept on the types of cases handled by the U.S. NCB. Of the cases entered into TECS, the percentages for types of cases were as follows:

	<i>Percent</i>
Counterfeiting .....	3. 64
Drugs (smuggling, trafficking, et cetera) .....	27. 14
Theft (art works, vehicles, valuables, et cetera) .....	14. 11
Firearms and explosives.....	5. 86
Violent crimes (murder, rape, assault, et cetera) .....	7. 42
Missing persons.....	3. 41
Frauds .....	13. 08
Vehicle trace (abandoned vehicles, et cetera) .....	3. 89
Residence visas, employment checks (law enforcement applicants, et cetera) permits (firearms, alcohol, et cetera).....	11. 89
Other offenses (illegal traffick in currency, alien offenses, surveys, et cetera) .....	10. 52

In fiscal year 1976, the Interpol international radio network was increased to include 64 of the member countries. Through the use of radio, telex and cable, the U.S. NCB communicated with Interpol NCBs of member countries and the Interpol General Secretariat as follows:

Sent:	
Radio .....	4, 551
Telex .....	197
Cable .....	247
Received:	
Radio .....	5, 463
Telex .....	233
Cable .....	30

The radio traffic increased 7.7 percent over fiscal year 1975, and the telex increased 5.2 percent over fiscal year 1975. Due to more NOBs joining the radio or telex networks, the expensive cable traffic decreased by about 10 percent.

#### GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SYMPOSIUMS

The 44th Interpol General Assembly, held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in October of 1975, was attended by the leading police officials of member countries. The U.S. Delegation to the Assembly took on an active role in formulating substantive resolutions in the following areas:

- A. International Frauds and Commercial Crimes.
- B. Identification File on Typewriter Marks.
- C. Bilateral Police Agreements.
- D. Policy to be Followed Concerning Requests for Information—Investigation—Arrest, Etc. from NCB or General Secretariat.
- E. Traffic in Stolen or Misappropriated Motor Vehicles.
- F. Taking of Hostages.
- G. Use of Arabic Language during General Assembly.
- H. Illicit Drug Trafficking.

## I. Prevention of Currency Counterfeiting.

## J. Recruitment of Police Officers for Juvenile Delinquency Work.

Interpol Symposia held during the year in which the United States actively participated included:

<i>Symposium</i>	<i>Date</i>
A. Forensic science.....	September 1975.
B. American regional conference.....	October 1975.
C. Crime in sea and river ports.....	November 1975.
D. Training for NCB personnel.....	December 1975.
E. Juvenile delinquency.....	January 1976.
F. Violent crimes by organized groups.....	February 1976.
G. European conference for heads of drug services.....	Do.
H. European regional conference.....	Do.
I. Telecommunications conference.....	March 1976.
J. Crime prediction method and research.....	May 1976.
K. Interpol computer workshop.....	Do.
L. Executive committee conference.....	June 1976.

## U.S. INTERPOL NCB

Throughout the year, the U.S. NCB personnel addressed various enforcement bodies on Interpol and the function of Interpol in the United States. Those addressed included: Foreign Service Institute; Associated Public Safety Communications Officers, Inc.; International Association of Chiefs of Police; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism; Interagency Committee on Transportation Security; U.S. Attorney's Conference; U.S. Marshalls' Conference; Department of Agriculture; United States Secret Service Agents School; Customs Service Orientation Class; Federal Criminal Investigator's Association and Drug Enforcement Administration's Overseas Orientation Program.

The Chief of the U.S. NCB is a member of the International Advisory Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police; the Federal Advisory Committee on False Identification; and the Interagency Committee on Auto Theft Prevention.

In February of 1976, Senator Joseph Montoya, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, held a hearing covering Interpol appropriations. During the hearing, issues on privacy and U.S. participation in Interpol were thoroughly reviewed.

On behalf of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Enforcement, Operations and Tariff Affairs), the U.S. NCB wishes to acknowledge the support and the cooperation of all Federal law enforcement agencies, the Departments of Justice, State and Transportation, the outstanding assistance of local, county and state police/law enforcement agencies/departments. This NCB would further like to acknowledge the support of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs' Association and the National Criminal Investigators' Association in the interest of international police cooperation.

## SYNOPSIS OF FOREIGN AND U.S. INVESTIGATIVE REQUESTS

I. Specific investigative requests from one Interpol member country to another result in the solution of numerous crimes.

A request by a country in the South Pacific enabled an agent of a U.S. Federal law enforcement agency to uncover evidence of the exporting of luxury sports cars to defraud the lending institutions which held loans on them.

Agents of U.S. Federal investigative agency interviewed a subject based on a request by a West European NCB, and obtained a confession of mutiny and quadruple murder aboard a South American ship. The killer was extradited to South America for trial.

II. Often the arrest of an international criminal in one country leads to the solution of crimes in other countries.

When the police of a European country arrested one of their citizens for robbery and taking hostages, he admitted to a string of bank robberies in the United States. This was furnished to a U.S. Federal investigative agency. A trace of a firearm found in the subject's possession abroad, showed that he had bought the gun in the same state where the bank robberies were committed.

A man arrested in South America confessed to a murder in a large United States city and the foreign police also recovered the pistol used in the crimes.

A local police department asked for a check in Europe on a man suspected of defrauding a Rabbi. There was no record under the subject's name, but foreign police supplied a photograph of a man who had used a similar "modus operandi." The Rabbi identified the photograph and an international wanted notice was issued for the swindler.

A rapist was about to be released in the United States because none of his numerous victims would testify to the crimes he committed upon them. Through ICPO a witness was found in another country who agreed to testify. The suspect was held for trial.

A request to foreign police regarding a subject suspected of having stolen a gun in the United States revealed the suspect had declared the stolen weapon to officials when he arrived in a European city. The information was passed to the subject's embassy by a U.S. Federal investigative agency, since his country is not a member of Interpol, for follow-up action in his country.

A U.S. Federal investigative agency requested assistance regarding a man found to possess passports from various countries in different names. The man was identified as a fugitive with several convictions in Europe, and the passports were found to have been stolen. He was deported from the United States, convicted and imprisoned in Europe.

III. In many instances, the inquiries requested through Interpol channels either clears the suspect or determines he has no prior criminal history.

An investigation by a State Police department of a man suspected of murder proved that the subject was in this country, applying for a job, on the date the murder was committed in Europe.

IV. Interpol members are notified when one of their citizens is arrested or the subject of a criminal investigation by the police of other member countries. The country making the notification furnishes details of the offense, to determine if the person is presently engaged in similar criminal activity, is wanted for criminal offenses or previously convicted of criminal offenses.

The U.S. NCB, through inquiries in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS), determines the location of fugitives and other persons wanted by law enforcement agencies in the United States at the local, state and federal levels.

The subject of an inquiry from South America was checked through TECS and found to be wanted by a U.S. Federal investigative agency in connection with the terrorist bombings of a police station and an airport. He was deported to the United States for trial.

A man wanted in the United States for perjury was arrested in a country in the South Pacific. Several guns found in his possession were traced. The man was charged with a bank robbery and murder, committed in the foreign country with these weapons.

A man convicted for a \$50,000 extortion in the United States was identified as being wanted for a similar crime committed in his native country. After completing his sentence here, he will be deported to face trial there.

By coordinating information supplied by a U.S. Federal investigative agency, a major drug trafficker, wanted in the United States, was arrested as he attempted to enter a European country on a flight from a country in the eastern Mediterranean. He was extradited to the United States for trial.

Other examples of the types of fugitives located and apprehended abroad include subjects wanted in the United States for: a) Grand larceny b) A half million dollar fraud c) 63 counts of mail fraud d) Illegal sale of machine guns e) A \$2,000,000 fraud (\$207,995 was found beneath the fireplace in his European apartment) f) Robbery g) Murder h) Other criminal violations.

V. Persons encountered by police in this country are often found to be wanted abroad.

(a) A person arrested by police in the United States was wanted for extortion in Europe.

(b) Two men encountered by U.S. Federal investigative agents working undercover were wanted in Europe for murder.

(c) A man arrested by local police was wanted for highway robbery in South America.

VI. TECS entries of foreign fugitives and stolen property available to the Federal investigative agencies at all border crossing points around the United States, bring about numerous arrests and recoveries of stolen property.

(a) Agents intercepted several thousand dollars worth of technical equipment stolen from a country in the South Pacific.

(b) An individual entering the United States was found to have \$21,000 in undeclared currency.

VII. Routine background checks turn up valuable information in many cases.

A sheriff in the United States made an inquiry concerning a man who claimed to be employed by a foreign revenue service. The individual was found to be an imposter with a record for fraud.

An applicant for a police agency in the United States was found to have convictions for theft, auto theft and other crimes in Europe. He had indicated no arrests on his application.

VIII. Interpol assists police in the identification of unknown bodies and in the tracing of missing persons where foul play is suspected.

The police of one European country noticed that the description of a missing United States citizen matched the description of an unidentified body found bound in a river in another European country. Through fingerprints, the body was identified as that of a missing United States citizen. A murder investigation is now underway.

A missing American was found alive and safe in a prison abroad, serving time for trafficking in heroin.

The usefulness and effectiveness of the United States participation in Interpol is limited only by the degree of its utilization by law enforcement agencies in the United States. As Interpol facilities and capabilities become better known to the American police agencies at all levels, the effectiveness of the fight against crime increases.

## APPENDIX 5

### INFORMATION RELEASED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ON SOME OF ITS EARLY ACTIVITIES IN AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERPOL

This information was previously released to a private agency under the Freedom of Information Act.

JULY 18, 1950.

Memorandum to: Mr. D. M. Ladd.

From: A. H. Belmont.

Subject: The International Criminal Police Commission.

#### PURPOSE

To recommend the discontinuance of the Bureau's membership in the International Criminal Police Commission in accordance with the Executives Conference memorandum of June 21, 1950.

#### BACKGROUND

It will be recalled that the matter of the Bureau's membership in the ICPC was brought to a head by the cablegram received from legal Attache West on June 19, 1950, stating that the ICPC intended to name Lieutenant Colonel Goddard, a ballistics expert, and Dr. James Manning, New York Police Department physicist, as honorary technical counselors of the Commission, and by Mr. West's subsequent cablegram, dated June 22, 1950, advising that he was recommending that the Bureau cease active membership in the ICPC. At that time Mr. West advised that a letter with details would follow.

The Executives Conference recommended that no action be taken pending the receipt of Mr. West's communication, but that unless he was able to advance some profound argument and reasons not yet considered for continuing membership in the ICPC, such membership should be terminated, the Director should resign his position as Vice President, and the Bureau should advise the State Department that it is not believed that there should be any further participation in the Commission by an agency of the United States Government. The Executives Conference memorandum bears the Director's notation "I concur. H."

## FACTS

Mr. West's letter with the details regarding the ICPC has now been received. He has advanced no new reasons not previously known to the Bureau for continuing membership. Mr. West recommended that the Bureau withdraw its membership in the ICPC, but continue to cooperate on the same basis as the Secret Service and other similar groups.

Enclosures.

In his letter he also pointed out the following facts in connection with our membership:

*1. Bureau's payments*

Mr. West advised that although we are paying \$3000 per annum membership dues, Louis Ducloux, the Secretary General of the ICPC, contends that we are not paying our full quota. Ducloux apparently believes that the United States should pay approximately \$6500 annually on the thesis that the rules of the ICPC stipulate that countries having more than 50,000,000 inhabitants will pay 5 Swiss francs for every 25,000 inhabitants, and since the 1940 census placed the population of the United States at 131,669,275, this would amount to approximately \$6500.

In this connection it is to be noted that in 1946 when the Bureau again affiliated with the ICPC, President F. E. Louwage wrote to the Director under date of July 9, 1946, stating that he was quite aware that the Bureau would find the present prescribed membership rate too high for a State of considerable population and that "the financial contribution of States of high population, for instance USA and U.S.S.R., is rather symbolic and that the amount may be left to the discretion of their governments". President Louwage therefore personally suggested that if our contribution equals that of a state with a population, for instance, of 60,000,000 inhabitants, the Secretary General would be only too glad to receive it. He added, "But I must add immediately that the financial contribution is of minor interest to us: the major fact is your active cooperation to our Commission". (94-1-2061-246)

On the basis of President Louwage's statement, therefore, Ducloux's objection that we should pay more than the \$3000 subscribed annually since 1947 is groundless.

*2. June 1950 General Assembly of the ICPC*

None of the Iron Curtain members of the ICPC attended the June conference held at The Hague, but Yugoslavia sent delegates.

The question of protocol arose when the ICPC listed the American delegates including Messrs. Baughman and Spaman of the U.S. Secret Service with West's name at the bottom, in spite of the fact that West, as the Bureau's representative, was the official delegate. When West protested, he was advised that the list was drawn up alphabetically. Inasmuch, however, as the names of other delegates were not listed "alphabetically" under their countries, Mr. Nepote, Assistant Secretary General, agreed to correct the final record.

Mr. U. E. Baughman, Chief of the United States Secret Service, personally attended the preceding conference on counterfeiting at The Hague and remained for two days at the regular ICPC conference. According to West, Baughman attracted considerable attention and the ICPC officials and delegates seemed delighted to have such an important personality among them. He was elected vice president of the Conference on Counterfeiting and president of that conference's Sub-Committee on Entrapment.

*3. Difficulties with H. Soderman of Sweden*

It will be recalled that Mr. Soderman visited the Bureau last December, when he was interviewed by Assistant Director H. H. Clegg. At that time Soderman raised the question about the Bureau's payments to the ICPC and also indicated that he believed that Mr. Anslinger of the Narcotics Bureau apparently does not believe the ICPC to be very effective in the narcotics field. At that time Soderman was in the United States in connection with the book which he was publishing.

West now advises that he first met Soderman on April 5, 1950, at an informal luncheon given by Ducloux and Nepote. At that time Soderman was directly or inferentially critical of the Bureau. He challenged the Bureau's personnel

policy, referring specifically to the "Beaux Arts affair", and he slyly observed that the Director expected his agents to be paragons of virtue or downright "goody-goodies". He implied that the FBI is a political police and hinted that there was rivalry between the Bureau and the New York Police Department.

West advises that he endeavored to correct Soderman's erroneous impressions concerning the Bureau's service, but it became apparent to West that Soderman is "irrevocably committed to the support of the New York Police Department".

In this connection, it is pointed out that Soderman received considerable assistance from that department in the preparation of his book and it is possible that through his connections with the police department of New York he may have developed false ideas concerning the Bureau. Following this incident, however, West's relations with Soderman have been cold.

#### A. REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM ICIP

Mr. West has advanced the following reasons for withdrawing from the ICPC: The ICPC is supported largely by the French Government through financial contributions, the donation of office space and equipment, and no less than twenty permanent full-time employees of the Surete Nationale are assigned to the ICPC, the Commission remains under the domination of the French Government.

##### 1. *Appointment of Goddard and Manning as "honorary technical counselors" of the Commission*

The appointment of these individuals as counselors to the Commission was apparently at the instigation of Soderman, who is a member of the Commission's Executive Committee. On June 19, during a session of the Assembly, Soderman approached West and brusquely informed him that it was the intention of the Commission to name Lieutenant Colonel Goddard, a ballistics expert with the Army in Japan, and Dr. James Manning, a physicist in the New York Police Department, as honorary technical counselors. Soderman requested West to cable the Director, advising him of the Commission's contemplated action. West told Soderman that if the Commission intended to do this, the Bureau would not stop it and he questioned the need for sending a cable merely to present the Bureau with an accomplished fact. Soderman insisted, however, that the cable be sent so that the Director would be advised of the Commission's intention prior to its formal action on Wednesday, June 21. He asked that if the Director had any objection to the Commission's proposed action, that he (Soderman) be advised prior to Wednesday. West told Soderman that he would send a cable but that the matter was being brought to the attention of the Bureau entirely too late for appropriate consideration.

West claims that Soderman's action in advancing the candidacies of Goddard and Manning at the very last minute after the conference had already begun is a violation of the statutes of the ICPC. Article three of the statutes provides for the selection of "extraordinary members" who must always be approved by their respective governments. The article states that persons who have rendered actual service to the Commission or who, because of their technical or scientific knowledge or because of their office are most capable of giving further impetus to the activities of the Commission, may be offered as candidates for the title of "extraordinary members." Such candidates, however, must be announced two months before the Assembly meeting and must, besides, be approved previously by the Government concerned.

The minutes for the Assembly session for June 21 under a sub-section "Appointment of Technical Advisors of the Scientific Police" indicate that President Louwage proposed that Professor Sannie of France and Professor Grassberger of Austria be made technical advisors since they have already been of service to the ICPC. He also proposed that two members from the United States be added to the list of technical advisors of the ICPC—"Lieutenant Colonel C. Goddard, one of the technical creators of expert appraisalment of firearms, and Dr. J. Manning, Technical Head of the Police Laboratory of New York, renowned above all (sic) for the application of the methods of modern physics to the Scientific Police." No indication was given that the two Americans had assisted the ICPC previously. West believes, however, that the naming of Goddard and Manning was solely Soderman's idea and that it possibly stemmed from a personal obligation which Soderman may feel towards these men for assisting him in the revision of his book "Modern Criminal Investigation."

In connection with West's claim that the appointment of the two Americans did not conform to the provisions of the ICPC Constitution, it is to be noted that the provisions cited apply to "extraordinary members" while the Americans in question were appointed as "technical advisors." From the information available at the Bureau, it is not possible to say whether or not the provisions for the appointment of "extraordinary members" are also supposed to apply to "technical advisors." The Constitution itself contains no provision for "technical advisors" but some such advisors were previously appointed by the Commission at the Assembly in Berne, Switzerland last year.

Regardless of whether or not technical advisors are appointed under the provision to appoint extraordinary members, it is self-evident that clearance should be obtained from the agency representing the country involved before such appointments are made. Failure to make inquiry of the Bureau concerning this prior to the actual opening of the conference was obviously a breach of good faith on the part of Soderman. In this connection, it is interesting to note that earlier this month President Louwage wrote to the Director concerning an individual in Belgium who, according to Belgian newspapers, claimed to be an "expert graduate" of the International Association for Identification and "President for Belgium", and who was calling for experts in identification to attend the International Association for Identification Congress to be held in Ottawa, Canada on July 24 this year. President Louwage advised that the individual in question was not considered as an expert by Belgian officials and that he "does not know the abc of identification". President Louwage requested that the officials of the International Association for Identification be advised of this individual's status as an "expert".

This incident is an indication of Louwage's realization that foreign agencies may well not be aware of the technical qualifications of so-called "experts". It is of interest in view of the derogatory information set forth in Mr. Clegg's memorandum to Mr. Tolson dated June 20, 1950, regarding Goddard.

### *2. Use of ICPC by Czechoslovakia for political purposes*

It will be recalled that at the ICPC Assembly in Prague in 1948, the Constitution of the ICPC was amended to specifically limit the Commission's activity to matters of a criminal nature, prohibiting matters of a political, religious or racial nature.

In spite of that fact, the Bureau recently received ten "red flag" wanted notices from the ICPC relative to men who had fled from Czechoslovakia aboard Czechoslovakian airplanes on March 24, 1950, arriving in American-occupied Germany. As you are aware, this case received considerable publicity when the individuals involved took over control of the commercial aircraft in which they were flying and escaped from Czechoslovakia to the western zone of Germany. The planes were later returned to the Czech Government. Mr. West advises that the Czech protests were met by the United States State Department with the contention that these individuals were political refugees and not subject to extradition.

At the request of the Czech Police, however, the ICPC issued wanted notices regarding these individuals, citing laws which were allegedly violated and stating that warrants for arrest had been issued "for having acted or not having acted in particularly dangerous circumstances and for having abducted persons and impeded the liberty of individuals". The "red flag" notices showed that extradition would be requested by the Czech Government if the subjects were located.

Mr. West has discussed the issuance of these wanted notices with Mr. Nepote of the ICPC which were in obvious violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the ICPC Constitution. According to West, both Ducloux and Nepote agreed to comply with the Czech request to issue these wanted notices and they stated that they feared some criticism would be leveled at the Commission by the Czechs at the June annual conference if they did not comply.

It appears that by giving in to the Czechs in this instance, the ICPC has opened the door for further utilization of the organization by the satellite members for political purposes, which is entirely contrary to the purpose and spirit of the organization.

### *3. Ambitious officials*

Mr. West has advised that in his opinion the ICPC is staffed principally by officials interested in furthering their own ambitions. He has described Presi-

dent Louwage as a sincere, high type, career law enforcement officer who is pro-American to a certain extent but who will resist any more to weaken his hold on the Commission.

#### 4. *Relative unimportance of the ICPC*

West has advised that the ICPC appears to be struggling to justify its existence. It claims 37 member states but only 27 sent delegates to the conference. No Latin American country was represented. The last annual report of the Secretary General states that the ICPC had "intervened in 950 individual cases, made 207 international circularizations, indexed the names of 92 notorious international criminals of which "about 20 individuals were arrested owing to ICPC interventions and 7 others have been identified through the fingerprint files." In the drug category, 52 cases of drug traffic were reported and descriptions of 26 habitual offenders were circulated.

West has advised that the ICPC officials want to have all the correspondence between member agencies cleared through the ICPC. The Bureau has, of course, never followed this procedure inasmuch as it is deemed unnecessary and the Bureau has always preferred to contact the interested police agency directly when requesting information from abroad. According to information received from West, Ducloux seems to be dissatisfied with this procedure followed by the Bureau although it is noted that he has never raised an official objection.

### B. DISADVANTAGES TO RELINQUISHMENT OF MEMBERSHIP

#### 1. *Future police relations*

Mr. West has advised that if the Bureau terminates its active membership in the ICPC, he sees no reason why we cannot continue liaison with the organization and member countries on the same basis as Secret Service and other "observer" groups. According to West, in this way we will enjoy the fruits of membership without financial obligations or the hazards of entangling commitments.

In view of the close tie-up between the French police and the ICPC as well as the fact that the termination of the Bureau's membership will be a severe blow to the ICPC, it is believed that we will probably incur some animosity among the French police and ICPC officials. It is believed, however, that with tactful handling Mr. West can out this animosity down to a minimum.

Because of this situation it is believed that in advising the ICPC of the termination of our membership, sufficient reasons and facts should be set forth in order that Soderman or any other persons opposed to the Bureau cannot misinterpret reasons for the Bureau's resignation.

#### 2. *Membership by other U.S. Agency*

When we cease active membership in the ICPC, the possibility exists that they may endeavor to obtain some other American agency as a member. From the information already available, it does not appear that the Narcotics Bureau would be particularly interested in this organization and Mr. West has advised that Guy Spaman, U.S. Secret Service representative in Paris, does not value the organization highly and West does not believe that he would recommend that the Secret Service take up the relationship which the FBI has seen fit to drop. Baughman, however, may hold different views and it might be noted that his trip to Europe for the express purpose of attending the ICPC conference may have significance. Any interest which the Secret Service might have in joining the organization, however, will probably be governed to some extent by the letter which the Bureau will have to direct to the State Department concerning our reasons for ceasing membership in the organization.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. The Bureau terminate its membership in the ICPC as of December 31, 1950, when the current paid-up year expires, and direct a letter to President Louwage, with a copy of Ducloux, advising them of this fact. It is further recommended that in this same letter Louwage and Ducloux be advised that the Director is resigning his position as Vice President and member of the editing committee of the "International Criminal Police Review" as well as resigning the post as liaison between the ICPC and the United Nations in New York.

2. The Bureau continue to make name checks and conduct investigations within our jurisdiction for the ICPC as we have done in the past and as we do for any other law enforcement agency. These requests are few in number and relate strictly to police matters. With reference to those cases which may be referred to us which are not within our jurisdiction, it is recommended that we refer them to the local police with the suggestion that they may wish to communicate directly.

3. A letter be directed to the State Department advising them of the termination of the Bureau's membership in the ICPC and the reasons therefor.

4. Mr. West be instructed to advise Ducloux, through liaison, that after December 31 it would be best for the ICPC to forward subscription copies of the "International Criminal Police Review" directly to the exchange subscribers in the United States, rather than transmitting them to the Bureau for retransmittal as has been done in the past. At that time Mr. West will also advise Mr. Ducloux that it will no longer be necessary to send the Bureau the 150 copies of the "International Criminal Police Review" which the Bureau has been receiving as the member for the United States and forwarding to various American law enforcement agencies on the mailing list. In view of President Louwage's position in the Belgian police and his apparently pro-American attitude, it is further recommended that Mr. West be instructed to see Louwage at some convenient time and tactfully explain the Bureau's position to him.

5. Advise ASAC Whelan in New York that the Bureau is terminating its membership in the ICPC effective December 31, and that he should advise the United Nations that he is no longer acting in a liaison capacity for the ICPC.

#### ACTION

Attached are the following proposed letters incorporating the above recommendations, which will be forwarded if approved:

1. Letter to Louwage with cc to Ducloux, advising of the pending termination of the Bureau's membership and the Director's resignation from his positions in the ICPC.

2. Letter to the State Department advising that the Bureau is terminating its membership in the ICPC and the reasons therefor.

3. Letter to Legal Attache West instructing him regarding the transmittal of "International Criminal Police Review" copies after December 31 and the Bureau's relations with the ICPC and Louwage.

4. Letter to ASAC Whelan instructing him to advise the United Nations of the immediate cessation of his liaison activities for the ICPC.

If the above letters are transmitted, it is suggested that this memorandum be referred to the Administrative Division so that appropriate action can be taken to delete the \$3,000 membership phraseology in future appropriations.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
July 21, 1950.

To: Communications division: Transmit the following message to:  
LEGAL ATTACHE, AMERICAN EMBASSY,  
Paris, France.

ICPC. Reurlet July five last. Air mail letter has been sent to President F. E. Louwage and copy to Ducloux advising Bureau terminating membership ICPC effective December thirty-one, nineteen fifty at expiration of paid-up membership inasmuch as results obtained by Bureau from membership do not justify financial outlay; ICPC does not need Bureau's membership since contacts in United States well-established and on sufficiently close basis that Commission has not found it necessary to consult the Bureau regarding participation of other U.S. agencies and citizens in Commission's activities sufficiently in advance to afford real opportunity for Bureau to furnish opinions; issuance of wanted circulars last June for individuals wanted by another government on obviously political charges believed to open door to use of Commission for purposes other than those provided for in statutes. I have also resigned as Vice-President of Commission and member Editing Committee of ICPR as well as liaison between ICPC and United Nations. Copy of letter being forwarded you by diplomatic pouch. Above for your information in event Ducloux contacts you prior to receipt of pouch.

NOVEMBER 29, 1951.

Memorandum to: Mr. D. M. Ladd.  
 From: A. H. Belmont.  
 Subject: International Criminal Police Commission (I.C.P.C.).

## PURPOSE

To advise that an official of the U.S. Bureau of Customs is giving consideration to the possibility of his agency becoming a member of the ICPC. It is being recommended that the Bureau of Customs be informed regarding the Bureau's reasons for leaving the ICPC, and it will be ascertained if that agency definitely plans to join the captioned organization.

## BACKGROUND

The Legal Attache at Paris, by letter dated November 15, 1951, advised that he had met Mr. David B. Strubinger, Assistant Commissioner of Customs, Bureau of Customs, U.S. Treasury Department, Washington, D.C., who was in Europe on an inspection trip.

During the course of his conversation with the Legal Attache, Strubinger stated that he was also considering the possibility of his Bureau becoming a member of the ICPC. He requested information of the Legal Attache relative to the experiences of the FBI with the ICPC, and as to the reasons why, the Bureau had withdrawn from the organization. The Legal Attache advised him that it had been the experience of the Bureau that the results obtained from the membership had not justified the financial outlay involved.

Strubinger stated that he had not yet contacted the ICPC but he definitely planned to do so. He commented that he had heard that the ICPC distributes lists of international smugglers. He had also heard that whenever contraband was found on an airplane moving in international commerce the ICPC recorded the identities of the plane and of all the crew members. He was of the opinion that information of this type would be of value to the Bureau of Customs. He indicated that he had not yet decided as to what final action he would recommend upon his return to Washington relative to membership in the ICPC, but he appeared to be somewhat partial to a trial membership for a year.

## COMMENTS

Although the Legal Attache pointed out that the benefits derived from the Bureau's membership in the ICPC were not commensurate with the expenses involved, it is nevertheless believed advisable that the Bureau of Customs be made cognizant of the Bureau's experience with the ICPC which involved the request of that organization by the Czech Government to place wanted notices concerning ten individuals who had escaped from Czechoslovakia. You will recall that these persons reportedly had fled from Czechoslovakia on board aircraft which were commandeered and landed in the western zone of Germany. The ICPC issued ten circular wanted notices indicating that the persons involved were being sought by the Czech Government for "having acted or not having acted in particularly dangerous circumstances, and for having abducted persons and impeded the liberty of individuals." It was felt that the circularization of these wanted notices was an abuse of the functions of the ICPC because it opened the door to possible further use of that organization by Russian satellite members for political ends.

As you know, the Bureau avoided the issuance of public statements with respect to the reasons for the withdrawal from the ICPC which became effective December 31, 1950. After the June 27, 1951, issue of the "Pathfinder" news magazine misrepresented the Bureau's reasons for leaving the ICPC, a letter dated July 6, 1951, was directed to Mr. Wheeler McMillen, the Editor in Chief of the aforementioned publication. In this letter it was explained that there were a number of factors compelling the Bureau to withdraw from the ICPC which could be summed up in the conclusion that the benefits derived had not been commensurate with the time and expense involved. It was also explained in this letter that one of the important considerations made by the Bureau in connection with its separation from the ICPC had to do with a request of that organization for the placing of wanted notices on the ten individuals who had escaped from Czechoslovakia. In the same letter to Mr. McMillen it was stated that circularization of those wanted notices was considered to be an abuse of the functions of the ICPC.

On July 9, 1951, the Honorable Homer D. Angell of Oregon included in his remarks before the House of Representatives which appeared in the July 9, 1951, issue of the Congressional Record, a letter received by him from the Director dated July 6, 1951, and the Director's letter dated July 6, 1951, sent to Mr. McMillen of the "Pathfinder" magazine. The aforementioned communications clarified the Bureau's position relative to its leaving the ICPC. The referred information which appeared in the Congressional Record was furnished to all Legal Attaches by letter dated July 18, 1951, for their information and future guidance.

Although the Bureau of Customs may decide not to join the ICPC after receiving the above information, there is the possibility that the agency may not attach serious significance to the Bureau's experience with the captioned organization. If such is the case, it is believed that the Attorney General and the State Department should be advised if the Bureau of Customs definitely plans to join the ICPC. In view of the Bureau's experience it is very probable that the Attorney General and the State Department would desire to take steps to prevent the Bureau of Customs from becoming a member of the captioned organization. In this regard, it is to be noted that the State Department was informed in detail by letter dated July 18, 1950, directed to Mr. Jack D. Neal concerning the Bureau's reasons for leaving the ICPC.

Inasmuch as Strubinger may have been expressing only his personal views to the Legal Attaché at Paris, and since the official attitude of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs in this matter is not known, it is believed advisable to withhold informing the Attorney General and the State Department until it is ascertained if the Bureau of Customs definitely plans to join the ICPC.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That through liaison channels the Bureau of Customs be informed regarding the Bureau's reasons for leaving the ICPC. In this connection the liaison agent can utilize the attached remarks of Congressman Homer D. Angell which appeared in the Congressional Record on July 9, 1951. The liaison agent can predicate his interview on Strubinger's conversation with the Legal Attache in Paris.

After furnishing the above information to the Bureau of Customs, it should be ascertained if that agency definitely plans to join the ICPC and if so, the matter should then be referred to the Foreign Liaison Desk in order that it can be presented to the Attorney General and the State Department bearing in mind that they may find it appropriate to prevent the Bureau of Customs from joining the ICPC.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  
Washington, D.C., December 10, 1951.

Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, Mr. Nichols, and Mr. Clegg.

Mr. John S. Graham, Assistant Secretary in Charge of Customs, Tax Advisory Staff, and Division of Savings Bonds of the Treasury Department, called me with reference to Interpol, the International Criminal Police Chiefs. Mr. Graham was desirous of discussing this matter with me on an informal basis, and he indicated there has been quite an upsurge in diamond smuggling and that the Bureau had sent them some very helpful information. He stated they were now interested in trying to establish a closer working relationship in Paris with Interpol and we had pointed out to them the statutory language is that we used to represent the United States Government but had found it expedient to withdraw. Mr. Graham stated they were not interested in representing the U.S. Government but were interested in a closer working relationship because of the smuggling angle. I told Mr. Graham that we had had a very sorry experience with this organization and that this was a matter entirely for his own judgment. I said I personally felt the organization was a most unstable one and during our years of membership we had not found it productive in anyway but, to the contrary, were being used in many ways which I felt could be embarrassing to our Government if we continued in it.

Mr. Graham stated if it would be convenient with me, he would like to come over and tell me the plan they would like to operate under so that the Bureau would know what they were doing. I told Mr. Graham I would be very glad to

talk to him, but as far as I am concerned I was not in a position to either object to what he proposed to do or to approve it because it is something entirely within the Treasury Department's jurisdiction, and was entirely up to them and I could give them no advice on it. I stated I felt the organization was thoroughly unreliable and from the FBI point of view, we would never be a party to joining it again by reason of our experiences with it. Mr. Graham stated they were developing a good deal of information on smuggling by aircraft, a favorite means of smuggling for diamond smugglers, and they thought they could get some information from Interpol which would be particularly beneficial. I stated so far as the Bureau was concerned whatever they wanted to do would be entirely their responsibility, that we would not be interested in it in any way, shape or form except that we did feel that we were under obligation to advise the Customs as to what our experience was so they would know what they were going into. Mr. Graham said they were not at all interested in representing the U.S. Government since he could see from what I had said that there were some overtones that were \* \* \*. I pointed out to Mr. Graham the fact that the Iron Curtain countries were members and certain phases of Interpol in regard to subversive activities and added that it could have been very embarrassing if this Bureau acted as the representative for the U.S. Government as a member of this type of organization. Mr. Graham stressed the fact that where they are dealing with the criminal element smuggling diamonds and narcotics around the world, any information which pinpoints how the traffic is moving is valuable to them. I stated that, of course, was a matter entirely within their jurisdiction and I would not presume to give any advice or counsel on that as I didn't feel it was any of my business.

Mr. Graham stated he just wanted to assure me they were not trying to move into any field over there. I told Mr. Graham I felt they should know the kind of group they were going into but as to their intruding into any so-called jurisdiction of ours, that it had never entered my mind because I preferred and have continued, since we left that group, to deal directly with the individual countries and we have been able therefore to carry on our same responsibilities and get the same information by dealing with the official authorities of the individual countries.

Mr. Graham stated that under their proposed plan, they would have a Customs man in Paris who would represent the Secret Service and Narcotics Bureau and anything that came up in the criminal smuggling field. He stated that if this did come to pass, they would be glad to do anything they could and he assumed it would be agreeable with me for their man to talk to our man in Paris so that they could get mutual support and aid. I stated our Legal Attache in Paris is limited entirely to liaison on matters of criminal violations within our jurisdiction; that we didn't go into narcotics or customs or anything of that sort. I stated we confined ourselves solely with matters like subversive activities or fugitives from justice, white slavery, motor vehicle theft cases and the like. I stated we had had a man at the Embassy in Paris for quite some years now and he is under very strict orders not to go into any of these other aspects or to accept any information concerning such matters but to refer the French authorities to the appropriate officer of the Embassy there, and in the event Treasury has a man there, that would be the procedure we would follow. Mr. Graham thanked me for this information.

Very truly yours,

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, *Director.*

U.S. INTERPOL BROCHURE

# INTERPOL

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION




DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

# INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION



## WHAT IS INTERPOL

The International Criminal Police Organization, better known by its radio designation - Interpol

- More than 125 countries are members.
- General Secretariat is at 26 rue Armengaud, St. Cloud (Paris), France.
- Annual General Assembly is hosted by a member country each year. This is attended by the top police/enforcement officials of member countries.
- Symposiums occur almost monthly in various countries, attacking particular crime(s) by given geographic area, or worldwide.
- **NO INTERNATIONAL LAW** as each country maintains its own sovereignty and operates within its country's laws only.
- Constitution of Interpol forbids involvement in political, religious, racial or military matters. If criminal offense involves person/organization of this type, Interpol will assist on basis of the criminal act.
- Communications Facilities - the National Central Bureaus of the member countries have machinery set up to communicate with member countries via Radio, Cable and Telex.
- The National Central Bureau in most countries is an office within their National Police. In the United States, it is an office under the control and direction of the Departments of Justice and Treasury, staffed by personnel from federal law enforcement agencies within Justice and Treasury (Drug Enforcement Administration, Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and Immigration and Naturalization Service).

UNITED STATES NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAU  
 PROVIDES ASSISTANCE  
 TO LOCAL ~ STATE ~ FEDERAL  
 LAW ENFORCEMENT



Drug Enforcement Administration  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation  
 Immigration & Naturalization Service

U.S. Secret Service  
 U.S. Customs Service  
 Bureau of  
 Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms



**HOW CAN  
 INTERPOL ASSIST  
 LAW ENFORCEMENT  
 (LOCAL, STATE, FEDERAL)**

The U.S. National Central Bureau can assist when you have a requirement for a criminal investigation in any of the Interpol member countries. The investigations may be of the following types:

- Criminal History check
- License plate/drivers license check
- Full investigation leading to arrest and extradition
- Locate suspects/fugitives/witnesses
- APB's to any or all member countries
- International Wanted Circular
- Trace weapons/motor vehicles abroad
- Other types of criminal investigations

**HOW DOES LAW  
 ENFORCEMENT IN U.S.  
 UTILIZE INTERPOL**

Your request may be made to the U.S. National Central Bureau either **DIRECTLY** or **THROUGH YOUR HEAD-QUARTERS** via:

NLETS	DCINTEROO
Letter	Interpol Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone	(202) 739-2867
Facsimile	(202) 739-3188
TWX	710 822-1907

***ALL REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE MUST INCLUDE TYPE OFFENSE AND CERTAIN OTHER INFORMATION TO REFLECT IT IS SPECIFIC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION.***


Algeria  
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 Cameroon (United Republic)  
 Canada  
 Central African Republic  
 Chad  
 Chile  
 China (Republic of)  
 Columbia  
 Congo (Brazzaville)  
 Costa Rica  
 Cyprus  
 Dahomey  
 Denmark  
 Dominican Republic  
 Ecuador  
 El Salvador  
 United Kingdom  
 Ethiopia  
 Fiji  
 Finland  
 France  
 Gabon  
 Federal German Republic  
 Ghana  
 Gibraltar (Territory of)  
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 Guatemala  
 Guinea  
 Guyana  
 Haiti  
 Honduras  
 Hong Kong  
 Iceland  
 India  
 Indonesia  
 Iran  
 Irak  
 Ireland (Republic of)



Israel  
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 Jamaica  
 Japan  
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Liberia  
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 Mexico

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 Morocco  
 Nauru  
 Nepal  
 Netherlands  
 Netherlands Antilles  
 New Guinea  
 New Zealand  
 Nicaragua  
 Niger (Republic of)  
 Nigeria  
 North Borneo (Malaysia)  
 Norway  
 Oman  
 Pakistan  
 Panama  
 Paraguay  
 Peru  
 Philippines  
 Portugal  
 Rumania  
 Qatar  
 Rwanda  
 Sarawak (Malaysia)  
 Saudi Arabia  
 Senegal  
 Sierra Leone  
 Singapore  
 Somalia  
 Spain  
 Sri Lanka  
 Sudan  
 Surinam  
 Swaziland  
 Sweden  
 Switzerland  
 Syria  
 Tanzania  
 Thailand  
 Togo  
 Trinidad and Tobago  
 Tunisia  
 Turkey  
 Uganda  
 United Arab Emirates  
 United States of America  
 Upper Volta  
 Uruguay  
 Venezuela  
 Yugoslavia  
 Zaire  
 Zambia



**END**