

READINGS IN POLICY ANALYSIS

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ACQUISITIONS

READINGS IN POLICY ANALYSIS

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PROJECT SYNOPSIS

The Training in Economics and Policy Analysis project commenced in January, 1977, extended over fourteen months, and was organized around two basic assumptions: (1) many corrections agencies possess the resources necessary to conduct policy analysis, but the potential has not been exploited; (2) correctional executives feel a need to be proactive (rather than reactive) to issues facing them.

The overall program goal was to develop a policy analysis capability in corrections agencies, supported by long-run goals:

1. To increase the frequency of interaction between managers and analysts in the policy analysis process;
2. To increase the use of policy analytic studies in correctional agency decision-making;
3. To increase the amount of resources allocated to policy analysis by corrections agencies.

The short-run goals, attainable within the project period were:

- create a laboratory (workshop) setting to approximate the actual policy analysis process
- clarify organizational roles for managers and analysts in policy analysis
- refine the concept of research management
- provide exposure to relevant disciplines of policy analysis
- involve participants not part of residential workshops in their agency's policy analysis effort
- assist agencies in completing a policy analysis project

To accomplish these goals, the project was divided into three phases:

Residential Training--Three regional workshops, each involving approximately twenty managers and analysts, trained participants in issue definition, economic analysis skills and research planning. Emphasis was placed on interaction between agencies as well as between managers and analysts. Each agency departed with a researchable issue to which they would apply policy analysis during the subsequent months.

On-Site Technical Assistance and Training--Participating agencies were visited by project staff who provided general guidance and more specific assistance where necessary. Mini-workshops in policy analysis were conducted for other agency personnel in order to involve as many agency staff as possible in the process.

Advanced Seminar--Project participants came to a single, week-long workshop devoted to evaluating research products and implementation planning. Completed policy studies were evaluated according to technical correctness and political opposition. A set of strategies were developed for implementing recommendations.

Thirty-one corrections agencies were represented during this project; 64 persons were trained at the regional workshops; 45 at the advanced seminar. An additional 350 persons were trained during the technical assistance phase. The project produced two major documents--A Model for Policy Analysis Training and Readings in Policy Analysis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project was made possible, in every way, by the participation and cooperation of managers and analysts from thirty-one correctional agencies. To say the project and the products developed therein would have been impossible without their help is particularly an understatement in this case. In addition to attending arduous, week-long workshops, participants kept detailed time records for the \$ 136,000.00 of in-kind match, coordinated on-site visits and generally devoted a sizeable proportion of their resources to policy analysis. Their written evaluations and otherwise candid and cooperative attitudes made it possible to revise, eliminate and add training materials as well as refine the training process itself. Interpersonally, they were also outstanding and made the overall experience highly enjoyable, informative and productive.

Special thanks go to Sally F. Familton, a long time associate of the Correctional Economics Center. Invaluable throughout the project, she developed much of the regional workshop training materials, working extensively on issue paper content and format, case studies, and the policy analysis process. Her aptitude as trainer proved itself at all the workshops.

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INTRODUCTION

Background

Far-reaching changes in corrections over the last five years have challenged many of the assumptions which have heretofore guided administrators in the field. Judicial decisions have forced revision of long established administrative procedures; legislators and elected executives have demanded greater accountability for performance through changes in budget procedures, program evaluation requirements, and productivity standards; and, the debate over the relative effectiveness of corrections programs among administrators, elected officials, and outside observers has undermined attempts to develop coherent policies. These events have placed corrections administrators in a difficult position. On the one hand they are asked to justify the agency's activities and programs in clear, carefully documented terms. At the same time, they must make decisions on future courses of action for which there is no precedent in their personal experience.

Other changes in recent years make this an opportune time to introduce policy analysis into corrections agencies. Increasingly these agencies have attracted individuals from a wide variety of educational backgrounds who are sympathetic to systematic analysis of problems, instead of relying totally upon experience as a basis for decisions. In addition, the growth of sophisticated information systems in corrections and other criminal justice agencies provides the empirical foundation for on-going policy analysis within the agency if it is tapped effectively.

Policy Analysis Defined

Policy analysis is the systematic, explicit examination of alternative ways to accomplish public agency objectives. It is designed to inform managers' decisions by identifying possible courses of action, gathering objective evidence, and estimating the relative effectiveness of alternatives. As such, it is as much an approach to problem solving as it is a discrete set of activities.

Like program monitoring, information systems design, and performance measurement it places heavy emphasis upon developing objective indices of agency activities wherever possible. It shares with planning an orientation toward future events rather than a description of the past.

Although economics and statistics are an essential part of its intellectual tradition, it also draws heavily on other disciplines for its analytical framework--political science, social psychology, public administration, sociology and industrial engineering, to name a few. It is, perhaps, better described as an approach to policy making than as a discrete set of activities; an approach which focuses on integrating the political subjectivity which accompanies public choices with the benefits of more reliable information which comes from objective analysis.

The systematic explicit nature of policy analysis is sometimes antithetical to the political context within which public sector decisions are made. The public administrator's need to build coalitions and gain consensus may require ambiguous objectives, tentative results or appeals to personal values; whereas, the scientific method underlying analysis must begin by identifying measurable results, anticipating consequences and remaining objective. Because it operates at the point where these two approaches meet, policy analysis has certain elements that distinguish it from related analytical efforts such as monitoring, impact evaluation and process evaluation.

Policy analysis arises out of a manager's need to make a decision regarding some issue confronting the organization; therefore, the analysis focuses on some action, rather than solely on the acquisition of knowledge. By assuming that there are choices (or alternative ways of reaching objectives), the content of a policy study is concerned with future courses of action and not the monitoring of past decisions or performance. (However, a key step in the process is deriving mutually agreed to performance criteria against which feasible alternatives will be measured.) The problem-orientation of policy analysis, also, places a more stringent time constraint on producing recommendations than typically found in traditional impact or process evaluations. Consequently, greater reliance is placed on secondary data sources and (sometimes) qualitative information. The fourth distinguishing characteristic results from the public sector environment in which such analyses are conducted. Public decisions are seldom unilateral and may impact on other decision makers, a variety of clientele, agencies, interest groups, laws and regulations. This complexity usually requires drawing on different theories and methods from law, economics, political science, management, sociology, etc.

The critical juncture in the policy analysis process is the link between the means for acquiring objective information, on the one hand, and the choices which must be made by policy makers on the other. Yehezkel Dror has described the problem as follows: "The major problem at which policy science is directed is how to improve the design and operations of policy-making systems. A major component of this problem is how to increase the role of policy-issue knowledge in policy making on concrete issues."^{1/}

Policy analysis assumes that decision-making and analytical efforts must be part of the same process rather than discrete activities.

To accomplish this objective two perspectives must be represented in the process. One perspective is represented by the decision maker, who brings to the process a sensitivity to the political, administrative, and operational implications of a problem which must be recognized if the analytical outcome is to be relevant to the decisions which must be made. Public policy is a product of competing values and interests as well as an understanding of "what works." An analytical effort can clarify what choices are available and, given a set of objectives, identify the likely effect of different courses of action. But, in order to be useful, it must focus on those alternatives which are compatible with the political and administrative context within which the decision must be made.

The second perspective is represented by the analyst. He brings to the process an awareness of the criteria for defining an issue in terms which are amenable to analysis, and the technical skills necessary to marshal the evidence around alternative courses of action. Perhaps most important, the analyst brings to the process an understanding of the limits of policy analysis. Not all problems are appropriate for analysis. In many instances the issue is one of competing values rather than the appropriate means for reaching a set of objectives; the solution, therefore, lies in the political or administrative arena rather than through the analytical process. In other instances the knowledge base is so limited that an analytical effort will add very little to the lessons learned from experience.

Policy Analysis Process

The policy analysis process involves a series of steps. It begins with an issue or problem facing the decision maker. The origins of the issue may include a crisis facing the agency, a personal concern of a manager or analyst, a demand for action from outside the agency, or any combination of these. This initial problem must be clarified and redefined so that it is amenable to analysis through discussions between the decision maker and the analyst. The definition process depends on the recognition of different areas of concern represented by managers and analysts. These areas include the audience or actors to whom the issue is important; the relevant goals and objectives of the agency (which ostensibly are maximized through the policy analysis effort); the methodologies which can be used to effectively research the issue; and, an initial statement of potential study outcomes, or alternatives. It is at this point, before the study process is underway that manager and analyst jointly agree on whether the issue is amenable to analysis and whether objective information will be of use in the decision-making process. The research endeavor follows issues thus defined and may range in sophistication from a search of secondary sources to mathematical model building. Regardless of the analytical scheme employed, the outcome

Although the steps are presented sequentially, the process will be iterative in nature rather than proceeding in order; that is, a discovery at one stage is likely to call for a revision of an earlier definition. For example, as evidence is collected the original concept of the issue may need to be reexamined because some of the assumptions underlying it have been proven wrong.

Although their roles will vary from one stage of the process to the next, both the manager and analyst must play a major part throughout. The manager is likely to be the primary source of the issue to be addressed but the analyst must be brought in to assess the feasibility of subjecting the problem to analysis. By the same token, during the research phase of the process the analyst will be the primary actor; but the manager must keep abreast of interim results to assess their implications for the original definition of the issue and to assist in meeting resource needs as they arise.

Throughout this discussion the emphasis has been upon the policy analysis process rather than specific analytical techniques. The reason for this emphasis is that the research and technical skills required are those shared by analysts in general--rules of evidence, problems of measurement, statistical manipulations and alternative analytical frameworks. Economics has been a dominant force in the development of policy analysis over the last ten years. But it has, by no means, been the exclusive framework. Allen Schick writes: "In application, economics and statistics are the main tools of policy analysis. The former brings a uniform system of valuation to public policy; the latter offers a metadisciplinary language. Yet neither can serve as the integrating orientation for policy analysis."^{2/} The reason for this lack of methodological focus lies in the nature of policy analysis. The technical skills take on meaning only when combined with an understanding of the implications of the policy decision which must be made. It is the decision which gives purpose to the research, not the reverse.


The policy analysis process is not complete until implementation has taken place. Implementation is the transformation of or incorporation of the results of a policy study into actual operations. Objective analysis can be used to further implementation by providing the manager with the information necessary to manage the risk associated with each alternative course of action. There are three sources of risk which must be addressed: technological reliability, political consensus, and resource availability. Technological risk refers to the dependability of the causal assumption(s) underlying the proposed program changes. Political consensus describes the potential conflict which may arise (both from within the agency and from other critical actors) if the program is adopted. The third component in the analysis is the assessment of the budgetary, information, and personnel requirements for carrying out the change. Once the sources of risk are identified, strategies can be devised to reduce the probability of failure. Strategies may include such things as further research to increase the technological reliability, bargaining and negotiation to overcome resistance to change, and reassignment of personnel to meet the needs of the new program. The analytical process involved in implementation

has many of the same attributes as the issue definition and research phases of policy analysis: it involves integrating objective information with action requirements, requires the involvement of both manager and analyst for its success, and is iterative in nature.

The actual documents reflecting the idealized process appear in Figure 2. The Issue Paper, perhaps the most important of the documents, is used to provide an initial definition of the problem to be investigated and is developed jointly by the manager and analyst. The Workplan is a research management tool, designed to facilitate converting the Issue Paper into operational terms. The last three documents shift attention to the outcomes of the analytical process. An Executive Summary forces analysts to present their findings in a succinct fashion by identifying the alternative courses of action which are possible and evaluating the potential problems for each. The Risk Assessment Grid is a technique for assessing the risks involved in attempting to implement each of the alternatives identified in the Executive Summary. Like the Workplan, the Implementation Document is designed to assist with managing the problems of carrying out a course of action. An important component of this process is the development of strategies for dealing with the risks identified on the Risk Assessment Grid.

FIGURE 2

MAJOR DOCUMENTS OF THE POLICY ANALYSIS PROCESS



APPLYING POLICY ANALYSIS IN CORRECTIONS

Project Description

The description of policy analysis in the foregoing section is an attempt to take account of the problems of thinking analytically about issues in a public setting. The concepts and process were applied in a one year project incorporating training, technical assistance and research components. Thirty-one state and local agencies were represented in one of three regional workshops that presented relevant concepts and resulted in a research design to study an issue confronting the organization. While doing the analysis, agencies were visited by project staff who provided any technical assistance needed and conducted seminars on principles of policy analysis. An advanced seminar combining 25 of the original agencies evaluated research reports and initiated an implementation planning process. As with any application of theory, participant characteristics and actual process steps departed from the ideal.

There were many agencies which took part in the program that had to truncate their research efforts, shift their attention from the original issue to another, more pressing problem, or abandon the analytical effort altogether. To provide the reader with a broader framework to interpret the experiences reported in the case studies, the experiences of all the participants in the project are summarized. The conclusions are based on a survey of the participants in the advanced workshop, supplemented by anecdotal evidence where appropriate. It illustrates the variety of obstacles which may arise in the course of an analytical effort and some strategies which may be employed to overcome the problems, as well as the potential benefits if a project is successful.

Participant Characteristics

Agency teams came to the initial workshops from diverse age groups, educational and professional backgrounds. The 54 initial participants for whom data were available ranged in age from 23-58; although, the greatest number were in their 30's and early 40's. Eleven women comprised 17 percent of those attending and served both in analytical and managerial positions. Fifty-two participants averaged over 6 years of professional experience in corrections and criminal justice. About one-third were relatively new to the field (two years or less experience). Approximately

65 percent held an advanced degree. Given this individual diversity, the workshop was structured to encourage peer self-help and to create a common frame of reference for conducting policy research.

TABLE 1
 INITIAL WORKSHOPS
 PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS

Age		Education	
Under 26	1	BA/BS	19
26 - 30	12	MA/MS	21
31 - 35	13	MSW	5
36 - 40	12	MPA	6
41 - 45	8	PhD/JD	3
46 - 50	6		
Over 50	3		

Originally designed for top level managers (agency heads or their assistants) and staff members working solely in analytical capacities, the workshops included professionals with more diverse roles than these simple titles reveal. The note to Table 2 indicates the range of organizational responsibilities represented. The proportion represented by staff or research analysts increased substantially in the advanced workshop, reflecting the overall fluidity in team memberships and formal relations.

TABLE 2
ORGANIZATIONAL POSITIONS OF PARTICIPANTS

	Initial Workshops		Advanced Workshop	
	#	%	#	%
Executives ^{a/}	20	36	11	24
Program Managers ^{b/}	8	14	7	16
Research Managers ^{c/}	12	21	7	16
Staff/Research Analysts ^{d/}	<u>16</u>	29	<u>20</u>	44
	56		45	

NOTE: ^{a/} Includes Chief Administrator, Assistant Commissioner, State Senator, Director and Assistant Director of agencies and agency divisions

^{b/} Includes Field Services Supervisor, Superintendent, Administrative Officer, Support Service Director

^{c/} Includes Planning Director, Information Systems Director, Chief of Evaluation, Director of Research and Development

^{d/} Includes Senior Planner, Senior Analyst, Administrative Analyst, Statistical Analyst

Agency Team Relationships

The client is assigned a central role in the policy analysis literature. It was for this reason and the action-orientation of the training/technical assistance program that teams comprised of a manager and analyst were encouraged. Selection decisions, also, preferred superior-subordinate or supervisory relations. It was felt that this latter criterion would ensure a pre-existing working relationship, some level of mutual trust and the authority to commit resources for the field work project. These factors were considered essential to openly and explicitly naming key actors

associated with a policy issue, the iterative nature of the process, and the time constraints under which a study would be done. Excluding the three agencies where only one employee attended, over 60 percent of the participants met the superior-subordinate criterion. Those classified as "peer" included cases where agencies changed teams following selection but prior to initial training (5), or the analytical staff regularly undertook studies for specific managers (4). Two interagency teams were included because the analysts were from executive staff offices that had oversight responsibility for agency budget activities.

All but one agency team left the workshops with a research design to address an issue of importance in their agency. Five months later a survey was taken of the participants in the advanced workshop to identify changes team relationships, determine the status of their project, and describe some of the problems encountered in carrying them out. Seven agency teams did not take part in the advanced workshop and, therefore, were not available to complete the questionnaire. (They have been included in the analysis which follows through anecdotal evidence).

Table 3 compares formal team relationships of participants in both workshops. However, this only reflects the net effect of a variety of membership and relationship changes. Seventeen agency teams in the advanced workshop were altered in some way. Eight changed only persons on their teams; five changed only relationships, including dropping a participant; and four changed both.

TABLE 3

FORMAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AGENCY TEAM MEMBERS

	Initial Workshops		Advanced Workshop	
	#	%	#	%
Supervisory	17	54.8	12	48.0
Peer	9	29.0	7	28.0
Interagency	2	6.5	1	4.0
Single Participant	3	9.7	5	20.0
TOTAL	31	100.0	25	100.0

Table 4 shows the direction of nine changes in relationships. The twelve membership changes resulted in 14 new participants, 6 of whom had been included in the on-site seminar during the technical assistance visits. The four changes in both membership and relations involved two from supervisory to peer and two in the opposite direction.

TABLE 4

STATUS OF CASES WITH A RELATIONSHIP CHANGE BETWEEN WORKSHOPS

Initial Relationship	Initial Total	Changed To:				Total Changes	Drops
		Supervisory	Peer	Interagency	Single Participant		
Supervisory	17	NA	3	-0-	2	5	2
Peer	9	2	NA	-0-	1	3	2
Interagency	2	-0-	-0-	NA	1	1	-0-
Single Participant	3	-0-	-0-	-0-	NA	-0-	2
TOTAL	31	2	3	-0-	4	9	6

The Policy Analysis Process

A critical part of the policy analysis process is the careful definition of the issue to be investigated. During the initial workshop considerable time was spent by each agency team in determining the parameters of their problem, converting it to a researchable question, creating an appropriate research design, and developing a workplan for collecting the necessary data and performing the analysis.

To define the issue, agency teams were required to assess the importance of the problem for their agency; identify the potential audience for the study, including those who might be affected negatively; determine the goals of the agency furthered by the analysis; specify the methodology required for the research; and suggest possible outcomes of the inquiry, including specific hypotheses to be tested.

This definition of the issue differs significantly from the content of a traditional research design. Instead of focusing on developing the theoretical foundation for the inquiry and identifying the empirical evidence to test the preliminary hypotheses, policy analysis demands that equal attention be given to the political context of the research endeavor. As a result, the final product of the issue definition is something which can be used for a variety of purposes as well as serving as an outline of the analytical effort.

This multiplicity of purposes is reflected in the responses of the participants to a question regarding how they used the issue paper developed at the workshop. Their answers are summarized in Table 5. Several items on the list are uses normally associated with a research design--e.g., planning the tasks for conducting the research, reducing analytical problems, and identifying data sources. Others, however, reflect the policy orientation of the research--e.g., setting priorities among agency problems, clarifying the audience for the project and using it as the basis for a decision in the agency. The decision orientation of policy analysis requires that these considerations be an integral part of the definition of the issue. This is not to suggest that political implications can color the outcome of the analysis; the analytical effort must, after all, remain objective for the product to be useful. Rather, it indicates that the agency context is a critical factor in determining the parameters of the research.

TABLE 5

USE OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Set priorities among agency problems	2	11
Plan the tasks for conducting the research	14	74
Reduce analytical problems	6	32
Monitor the progress of the research	10	53
Locate resources	5	26
Identify data sources	6	32
Clarify the audience for the project	7	37
Reduce the political problems	1	5
As a decision document	3	16
Number = 19*		

*The question focused on the issue paper developed at the original workshop. However, three agencies changed their issue so dramatically that the original research design was irrelevant.

The research design is only the first step in conducting policy analysis. It is expected that the definition of the issue will be an on-going process as new problems are uncovered in the course of the research effort. To test whether the iterative process in fact took place, participants were asked to identify how their projects had changed during the inquiry. The results are contained in Table 6. All the teams reported some revisions in their

project during the course of the analysis. In some cases the changes were relatively minor--extending the completion deadline; additional information collected; and increasing the number of people involved. But most teams reported important shifts in their policy analysis. Seven had to redefine the objectives of their study. Eight used the project to uncover additional problems which needed to be addressed. And four abandoned their original issue altogether in favor of an alternative project.

TABLE 6

CHANGES MADE IN THE ORIGINAL ISSUE DEFINITION

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Research scope expanded	2	9
Research scope narrowed	7	32
Original issue abandoned	4	18
Objectives of the study redefined	7	32
Research postponed	3	14
Completion deadline extended	10	45
Data collection truncated	3	14
Additional information gathered	4	18
Form of analysis redefined	5	23
Number of people involved increased	10	45
New issues uncovered that needed study	8	36
Number = 22		

These results are an additional demonstration of the multiple purposes served by policy analysis in an agency. In the process of defining an issue for analysis, decision makers may find that their original concept of the problem is inappropriate, or the problem itself is not as critical as first thought. Alternatively, the policy analysis process may become a search endeavor, uncovering new issues which demand the attention of decision makers. Or, the yield may be a redefinition of the objectives of the study or the agency as additional information on means is generated by the research. Finally, the study may simply address the original issue. All of these purposes were served for one or more of the agency teams.

The Problem of Doing Policy Analysis

Conducting research in an operating agency is not an easy task. In addition to the problems of missing data, limited resources, and inadequate theory

which are part of any analytical effort, researchers in a public setting must deal with a constantly shifting political environment which can impact on their work. The difficulty of doing policy analysis is reflected in the experiences of the participants in the workshops. Of the thirty-one agency teams which took part in the original workshops, fourteen had completed their projects five months later, nine were still in the middle of their research, and eight had abandoned the effort altogether.

There are very few factors which distinguish the 23 successful agencies from the eight unsuccessful. Some of the more obvious explanations do not apply, namely, the kind of project undertaken and the character of the agency. The eight projects which were not completed had the same range of complexity of the issue and sophistication of the research techniques involved as those that were completed. The successful projects included such things as a search for alternative means for providing juvenile shelter care, a detailed assessment of court administrative procedures, and an evaluation of factors affecting institutional length of stay of juvenile offenders. The unsuccessful projects had a similar range in complexity including a search for an alternative cost accounting system and an assessment of the intake procedures for a small jail.

The agencies which succeeded varied widely in size and experience with research endeavors. In several instances there was a separate planning or research unit in the agency which had conducted a series of evaluations, plans and budget analyses over the years. In other instances there was no such tradition and the project was carried out by individuals who also had administrative responsibilities. Similarly, the agencies which did not complete a project included two with strong research programs; three with no such tradition but were large enough to support a separate staff for budget analysis; and two which were small, local agencies.

Although on the experiences of eight agency teams that dropped out of the program, we could not collect systematic evidence, we can suggest some possible explanations for their failure based on impressions gained during working with the agencies. As will be demonstrated more fully, many participants felt the pressure of competing demands on their time while trying to conduct policy analysis. In three of the eight agencies this pressure was sufficient to force them to abandon their projects and turn their attention to administrative matters. In two additional instances a lack of trust between the key individuals involved in the process led to the projects' demise. A third factor which interfered with carrying out the policy analysis effort was the loss of key personnel either through transfer to another unit or resignation.

Although it is tempting to credit these factors as the determinants of success or failure, it should be mentioned that all these same events

occurred in agencies which were successful in using the policy analysis process as well. The range of problems encountered by these agency teams is summarized in Table 7. The competing demands for attention was something most people face as evidenced by the large number of responses to this item (77%). Budget preparation, preparing planning documents, and other regular administrative duties all had to be accommodated by members of the agency teams while carrying out their policy analysis project. Although occurring less often, several of those who successfully completed their study had to contend with a crisis in the agency (27% of the teams cited this as a problem). In one case a project was completed despite a series of difficulties which forced the manager member of the team to resign from the agency.

TABLE 7
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH POLICY RESEARCH

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Competing demands for attention	17	77
Lack of understanding of policy analysis among agency leadership	2	9
Major changes in the audience for the report	2	
Data unavailable	7	32
Less personnel for project than anticipated	2	9
Change in key research personnel	3	14
Crisis in the agency shifted priorities of management	6	27
Demands from outside the agency forced change in project	5	23
Results of the analysis shifted definition of the problem	5	23
	Number = 22	

There were other negative circumstances which impinged on the analytical effort among the successful agencies. Two teams cited a lack of understanding of policy analysis among the agency leadership as a problem; and five had to contend with political pressures from outside the agency.

The other problems cited by the successful agency teams are the kind of difficulties any research effort is likely to encounter—missing data, fewer resources than anticipated, changes in the definition of the problem,

and preliminary results forced them to redefine the original issue. The important point in this summary is that none of these problems prevented the team from carrying out a policy analysis effort. As obstacles arose they were overcome in these agencies.

We have no definitive explanation for the different experiences of those teams which were successful and those which were not. One important element appears to be the commitment of the individuals involved in the policy analysis process. If the conditions are supportive of an analytical effort, for example, those important in the administrative hierarchy give a high priority either to the analytical endeavor or to the issue involved-- anyone can successfully complete a project as the incentives are great for those involved in research to see the project through to its resolution. When the setting is hostile, however, either because of changing events or the antagonism of other people in the agency, success is dependent upon the personal commitment of the individuals carrying out the policy analysis. This is not a very comforting conclusion for those interested in introducing policy analysis into an agency whose leadership is indifferent or even hostile to such an approach. But it does suggest that it is not necessary to wait for some ideal set of circumstances to emerge before attempting an analytical effort.

The case studies in Part II demonstrate that it is possible to approach problems systematically despite the pressures of time, conflicting political demands, administrative responsibilities, and limited experience with research methods. They also suggest, however, that this is not an easy task. Problems arise in the course of any project which demand ad hoc strategies for their solution if the policy analysis effort is to be successful.

Summary of Case Studies

Combining the methodological diversity of policy research with the complexity of correctional processes offers a formidable challenge to the practicing analyst. Economics was the dominant method in public policy analysis for many years. Welfare economics and its applied form--cost-benefit analysis-- enjoyed a monopoly during the time when government practiced a "hands off" philosophy and public activities were largely limited to national defense, natural resource management and international trade. However, growing sophistication in other social sciences, at the time government's purview was expanding, enabled the policy analyst to more comprehensively and more accurately examine alternative ways of accomplishing ever more complex

1/

Yehezkal Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (Chandler Publishing Company, 1968), p. 8.

2/

Allen Schick, "Beyond Analysis", Public Administration Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1977), p. 261.

public goals.

Corrections (and, consequently, the application of any policy analysis) differs from other government endeavors. The dispersion of responsibility between levels and branches of government greatly complicates the formation, implementation and analysis of policy. A violator may be arrested by the county sheriff, placed on probation by a state judge, supervised by a local department, revoked to a prison, released to a state parole agent, rearrested by a city policeman.... This diversity creates a set of political, legal, organizational and economic issues that almost defy explanation. Yet, the systematic, explicit and objective nature of policy analysis must confront these realities and produce information that, hopefully, will improve the quality of public sector decisions.

The case studies included in this volume reflect the diversity of policy analysis methods applied to diffuse correctional responsibilities. They have been grouped into three categories--Resource Utilization, Correctional Organization and Interagency Relations--but this obscures the multi-dimensional nature of each study and the commonalities that a close reading reveals. Three are primarily economic, but even these vary in their approach from traditional cost-effectiveness to an approximation of the Delphi technique. Three studies clearly focus on organizational issues--service distribution within a metropolitan area, sharing of state-local responsibilities, and the job structure internal to an agency. Another is concerned with controlling discretion in large scale organizations but shares with two more an analysis of interactions between executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. Data collection techniques range from participant observation and mail survey questionnaires to structured interviews and case file extraction. Data analysis includes multiple regression as well as verbal description. The products were sometimes a better articulation of the problem and sometimes implementation of a chosen solution.

Resource Utilization

Cost-effectiveness analysis relates program costs to some unit of output. If economic values can be placed on these outputs, cost-benefit analysis is possible. "The Residential Corrections Facility at Fort Des Moines" used client samples from three correctional alternatives matched on the basis of a risk-seriousness scale. An economic measure of recidivism--follow up criminal justice system costs--compared the results of probation, prison and jail with the Fort Des Moines community facility. The study was a more traditional research effort, since its origins were not in response to a specific issue. Nevertheless, given the general policy debate in Iowa at the time whether to build new prisons or expand community programs, the results are directly relevant to those decisions.

"District Court Study" by the Denver Anti-Crime Council is a comprehensive analysis of the factors affecting efficient utilization of court resources. Based on apparent problems identified independently by judges, case file data, direct observation and structured interviews were used to isolate the reasons for court delay and underutilized facilities. While tentative solutions are suggested, the findings were used primarily to stimulate formulation of alternatives by District Court judges. A key step in subsequent planning will be to assess whether study data objectively support perceived problems.

The impetus behind "A Strategy for Resource Allocation" clearly arose from a "felt need" within the San Diego Probation Department: Budget reductions. Much of the analytical work was devoted to developing common goals and measurable objectives so the effect of budget changes on five service areas comprised of 63 programs could be assessed. Determining what could be provided under various budget scenarios was done by service area managers. The results were compiled to estimate the marginal effects on attaining departmental objectives.

Correctional Organization

The research reported in "Transferring Parole Services to the Local Level" was prompted by Hennepin County's decision to participate in a subsidy program requiring local assumption of certain State responsibilities. The issue was how to financially and organizationally realign programs. An ad hoc committee of State and County personnel was formed to define issues and collect data. Direct observation and structured interviews were used to estimate workloads of and to objectively describe tasks performed locally by State parole officers. These data were cross checked by comparing agents' jobs and perceptions to those in an adjoining county which had three years' experience with the subsidy program. The project incorporated all steps of the policy analysis process from issue definition through implementation. An interesting by-product of the approach was improved understanding between State and County staff which will facilitate the transfer of personnel and programs.

The problems of innovation, even on a pilot basis, are highlighted in "The Multijurisdictional Caseload and Resources Management Team". Ventura County, California attempted to cooperatively integrate state and local level field services and restructure caseworkers' jobs into community resource managers. Structured interviews, case file data and client surveys provided data for identifying problems and evaluating alternative approaches prior to full scale implementation. The outcomes reinforce the need to identify critical actors, define key issues, and examine alternatives prior to even a pilot project. Nevertheless, the agency was

able to "buy information" through a demonstration without incurring the level or risk associated with comprehensive policy change at one time.

Cramped office facilities, poor public transportation and general population shifts forced the Adult Probation Department in Phoenix into reexamining its centralized structure. "Decentralization of Adult Probation Services" primarily addresses where area offices should be located, not the desirability of decentralization. Recommendations are based on the geographic dispersion of crime prone age groups, families below poverty levels, AFDC recipients, and projected general population growth. The study, also, was able to better define administrative, communicative and organizational issues accompanying decentralization.

Interagency Relations

Centralized authority, management-by-objectives, organizational development and training are some of the methods for controlling individual discretion in large scale organizations. "Classification and Sentencing Guidelines for Juveniles" describes how objective data were used to develop a classification system for governing length of stay decisions. The Washington Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation started out to address the organizational problem of discretion. However, a law requiring sentencing guidelines, passed while the initial study was underway, made the data collected for this purpose relevant to judicial decision-making as well.

A more direct application of policy analysis to the relation between legislative and executive branches is seen in the next case study, "The Nebraska Correctional Improvement Program". In this case, the approach was used principally to examine alternative ways of performing the legislative oversight function. As one might expect, the relevant actors were numerous and varied. Yet, by focusing on issue clarification and mutually agreeing on what was needed, the legislature, executive and citizen groups were able to plan a seven-part program for improving Nebraska's correctional system. The growing numbers and sophistication of legislative staff only underscores the need for public administrators to systematically anticipate emerging issues and respond, in part, with objective analysis.

A proposed law requiring deinstitutionalization of status offenders prompted the Probation Department in DuPage County, Illinois to examine impact prior to enactment and to identify placement alternatives. "Shelter Care Project" aptly demonstrates that one outcome of policy analysis may be to show that perceived effects may not be real ones. Originally thought to affect 25-30 clients monthly, the new law actually impacted only 8-10, once "shelter care" was defined and objective data collected from case files. The analytical task then became to generate descriptions of alternative shelter care and financing arrangements. Budgetary and political constraints precluded immediate implementation, but planning is now underway for this step of policy analysis.

RESOURCE UTILIZATION

12793

THE RESIDENTIAL CORRECTIONS FACILITY AT
FORT DES MOINES: A COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

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Study Purpose

This study was undertaken to compare three correctional alternatives: jail, prison, probation; with a fourth: community residential corrections. The focus of the comparison was on program costs and later criminal justice system costs (rearrest, etc.), particularly with regard to the role of community residential corrections. Later system costs, or follow-up costs, were used to measure recidivism as a program outcome.

The scope of the study was limited to Fort Des Moines, a community residential facility in Polk County, Iowa, county probationers (Fifth Judicial District), the Polk County Jail and the Men's Reformatory at Anamosa. The question addressed by this study is: Is residential corrections a cost-effective alternative to other correctional programs?

The Fort Des Moines Residential Corrections facility is a minimum security alternative to both jail and prison. Since its opening in mid-1971, it has been the prototype of residential corrections facilities in the state of Iowa. This study is an evaluation not of programmatic effectiveness, which has been reported upon elsewhere (see Venezia and Steggerda, 1973),* but rather this is an exploration of the program's cost-effectiveness, which has never been examined in detail.

The role of the facility is to provide a minimum level of security and supervision for men who have been sentenced or are awaiting sentencing in Polk County. They are permitted to work during the day, returning to the facility for counselling, recreational activities, and sleep after work (or school) is over. Presented in this paper in lieu of a program description is a profile of clients who have historically been admitted to Fort Des Moines.

Admissions were grouped into three categories for simplicity. The first category is the one to which the alternative is incarceration in the Polk County Jail. Individuals in this category were either sentenced to jail

*Venezia, Peter S. and Steggerda, Roger. Residential Corrections: Alternatives to Incarceration. Davis, California: National Council on Crime and Delinquency, July, 1973.

and ordered to serve their sentence at Fort Des Moines, or were sentenced directly to residential corrections. Included in this category were two volunteers who were accepted to the program for correctional counselling and supervision. This category is labelled "Jail".

The second category includes those who were sentenced to Fort Des Moines either as a condition of receiving probation, or as a revocation of probation. For these individuals the alternative was likely to be either probation or prison. This category is labelled "Probation". The third and final admissions category is for clients who were allowed to be in Fort Des Moines either prior to trial or prior to sentencing. This category is labelled "Pretrial". These data are displayed in Table 1.

Table 1

A Sample of Admissions to Fort Des Moines, by Type

	<u>July '71 & January '72</u>	<u>July '72 & January '73</u>	<u>July '73 & January '74</u>
Jail	30%	65%	32%
Probation	47%	26%	37%
Pretrial	23%	9%	31%
(N)	(30)	(23)	(19)
	<u>July '74 & January '75</u>	<u>July '75 & January '76</u>	<u>July '76 & January '77</u>
Jail	29%	33%	15%
Probation	53%	57%	70%
Pretrial	18%	10%	15%
(N)	(38)	(21)	(20)
	<u>Total</u>		
Jail	34%		
Probation	48%		
Pretrial	18%		
(N)	(151)		

Table 1 suggests some conclusions about admissions to Fort Des Moines over the years since it opened. More than doubling in the second year, the percentage of admissions in the jail category declined back to about the 30% level, then halved again in the most recent year. By contrast, the probation admissions dropped sharply in the second year, only to rise steadily in each succeeding year, finally reaching 70% of admissions in the

last period studied. The pretrial admissions have fluctuated without any apparent pattern. Based on this information, we can conclude that there has been a marked increase in probation admissions at the expense of those in the jail category.

The types of release are also classified into three categories. The first was comprised of escape, return to jail, or other transfers, which included transfers to the Men's Reformatory, "Hope Haven", Hope House, the Iowa Security Medical Facility, the Mental Health Institute at Clarinda, the Iowa State Penitentiary, extradition, and Broadlawns Polk County Hospital (for psychiatric evaluation). All of the discharges in this category were considered "unfavorable"; that is, the client was discharged because he was unsuitable to the program or vice-versa. The bulk of the cases in this category were returns to jail; therefore, the category label in Table 2 is "Return to Jail".

The second type of release was to the Department of Correctional Services' probation program. The overwhelming majority of clients with this type of release were admitted as a condition of probation or probation revocation. Occasionally, however, someone on a jail sentence or straight sentence will have the balance of his sentence suspended and be placed on probation.

The final type of release is "Discharge", by which a client is released without being sent to any other program. Most of the discharges were in the jail or pretrial admission categories.

Table 2

A Sample of Releases from Fort Des Moines,
by Type and Original Admission Date

	<u>July '71 & January '72</u>	<u>July '72 & January '73</u>	<u>July '73 & January '74</u>
Return to Jail	47%	26%	32%
Probation	43%	13%	47%
Discharge	10%	61%	21%
(N)	(30)	(23)	(19)
	<u>July '74 & January '75</u>	<u>July '75 & January '76</u>	<u>July '76 & January '77</u>
Return to Jail	37%	29%	25%
Probation	34%	52%	55%
Discharge	29%	19%	20%
(N)	(38)	(21)	(20)
	<u>Total</u>		
Return to Jail	34%		
Probation	40%		
Discharge	26%		
(N)	(151)		

No trend in types of release is evident, although the pattern does stabilize in the last two years with probation discharges being twice the size of either of the other two types. The increase in discharges to probation in the last two years has been accompanied by a decline both in returns to jail and straight discharges. This appears to match with the admission data, which indicate that most clients, at least in recent years, are admitted as a condition of probation or upon probation revocation.

In conclusion, it appears that Fort Des Moines has been used increasingly to house probationers, especially in the last two to three years. Whether these men would have gone to probation or prison is an open question, although it appears likely that a majority of them would have been on probation. This conclusion is supported by the large number in this sample who entered on probation, as well as by the large number who left on probation. Depending upon the relative effectiveness of probation, prison and Fort Des Moines, this could have important resource allocation implications.

General Data, 1974-1976

In addition to the information reported above, and still as an introduction to Fort Des Moines, the Bureau of Correctional Evaluation (BCE) has data available on 521 individuals admitted to Fort Des Moines in 1974, 1975 and 1976. These data will serve as a profile of the clients admitted to Fort Des Moines during this period.

Table 3 below shows a distribution of the types of crimes for which men were admitted to Fort Des Moines from 1974 to 1976.

Table 3

Most Serious Admission Offense

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Simple Misdemeanor	26	5.0%
Indictable Misdemeanor	98	18.8%
Felony	387	74.3%
Other or none	<u>10</u>	<u>1.9%</u>
Total	521	100.0%

The mean age of clients at the time of admission to Fort Des Moines was just over 24 years. However, over half of the clients were 21 years old or younger. Of the 521 clients admitted during this period, 164 (31%) were either 18 or 19 years of age.

Sixty-seven percent of the clients were unemployed at the time of admission, 30% were already employed full time, and 3% were employed part-time. Finding employment or schooling for the unemployed clients was a major effort of the residential facility's staff.

Finally, 82% of the clients admitted between January 1, 1974 and December 31, 1976 successfully completed the program with no rearrests or technical violations; 14% were arrested for misdemeanor offenses or were revoked for technical violations of the house rules. Almost 5% of those discharged were arrested for committing a felony while in the program. These figures do not include rearrests or commitments after leaving the program. Rearrests, as well as unfavorable commitments, are the subject of the cost-effectiveness analysis to follow.

Table 4

New Charges Associated With Termination

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
None	426	81.8%
Misdemeanor or technical	71	13.6%
Felony	23	4.4%
Felony against persons	<u>1</u>	<u>0.2%</u>
Total	521	100.0%

Study Process

The hypothesis of this research project is that the residential corrections facility at Fort Des Moines is a cost-effective alternative to other corrections programs to which men are sentenced from the District Court in Polk County.

The logical alternatives to Fort Des Moines are probation, jail and prison, as these are the programs to which offenders can be sentenced if they are not sentenced to residential corrections. This analysis selected a sample of clients from each of these four programs. The group of clients selected from Fort Des Moines are called the experimental sample. The experimental sample is systematically compared with the three groups of samples from probation, jail and prison. These other three samples are called the control samples.

Since the clients in all of these samples have committed a variety of crimes and have diverse social and criminal backgrounds, some method had to be devised to compensate for differences between individuals. For this purpose, we utilized the "risk-seriousness scale", a prediction tool similar to the Base Expectancy Score now in use in three of Iowa's eight judicial districts.

The risk-seriousness scale includes factors known to be correlated with recidivism in combination with the seriousness of the crime committed.

Included in the risk component are the following variables: occupational level, educational level, age at first arrest, number of prior arrests, prior adult commitments (to probation, jail, or prison), prior juvenile commitments (to the Training School for Boys), history of using an alias, history of drug or alcohol abuse, and the type of crime for which the client was ultimately sentenced. These variables are weighed and each client is assigned a number on a scale from 0-20 that allows us to gauge before the fact the likelihood that he will fail in a corrections program.

A list of all clients who entered Fort Des Moines, the Polk County Jail, Polk County probation and the Iowa State Men's Reformatory at Anamosa during the first six months of 1974 was obtained from the Bureau of Correctional Evaluation (BCE) computer file. Ten clients were selected randomly from each of the control samples. Only those clients for whom risk-seriousness information is on file were chosen, because each of them was then matched by risk-seriousness with a client from Fort Des Moines. These sixty individuals comprised the total sample. The thirty from Fort Des Moines were categorized according to which control sample they were matched. Thus, the three experimental samples were matched with the three control samples according to the risk-seriousness scale.

Analysis of cost-effectiveness data can be done in two ways. In the first way, the total direct and indirect costs of each client's stay in Fort Des Moines, plus a one- to three-year follow-up period, are directly compared with the total program and follow-up costs of the matched control client in the alternative program. This allows us to measure the effects of both risk and cost in explaining the magnitude of follow-up costs of each sample. Then we will be able to compare the costs of Fort Des Moines with those of probation, jail and prison.

Several aspects of this approach are evident at the start. First of all, recidivism (rearrest, trial and conviction) costs are going to be very important. If a man is rearrested, convicted and sent to prison immediately after he leaves Fort Des Moines, then his total cost will increase significantly. For this individual, residential treatment was not a cost-effective alternative. His costs will be higher than those of a similar person sent directly to prison, which will reflect the inappropriateness of Fort Des Moines as a correctional setting for him. The same type of situation occurs in the case of someone sent to probation and then revoked and sent to residential corrections. The costs would have been lower if he initially had been placed at Fort Des Moines.

The second way to measure cost-effectiveness is to take a more treatment-oriented approach. The question addressed by this approach is: In which program does a change in program expenditures have the greatest impact on follow-up costs? According to this approach, it doesn't matter if a particular

program is more expensive, as long as the greater expense results in a lesser cost.

The first way of measuring effectiveness is more budget-oriented; it points out the programs in which high costs in the present do not result in lower costs in the future. As such, it is similar to a cost-benefit approach. The second way examines costs according to dollar-for-dollar effects, which is more truly an effectiveness approach. The multiple regressions used to arrive at these two measures of effectiveness are described in the statistics section of this report. Either or both approaches are acceptable, according to the reader's preference.

Data Collection

The data collection effort followed six different paths. The direction of each of these paths was determined by each of the four programs being compared, by the clients' follow-up contacts with the criminal justice system, and by the availability of and ease of access to referral programs' cost information.

Data on the clients who were in Fort Des Moines were first obtained by examining in detail the entire file of each client at the Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services. Various sorts of information were gleaned from these files. The most important information in the end proved to be sentence, offense, furloughs, rearrests and returns to jail, outside referrals, rent payments, restitution payments, court cost payments, release date, and receiving program. Some of the rent, restitution and court costs payment cards remained at Fort Des Moines itself and were examined on site. Average daily budgetary cost figures for the residential facility came from the relevant Monthly Reports of the Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services (DCS). A wealth of information on clients' employment history is available at Fort Des Moines. Necessity dictated that only a small portion of it could be used, but the staff there were most gracious to provide it.

Probation files are kept in the same place at DCS. This was convenient, since the same information was collected from them. Once again the Monthly Reports were indispensable.

Data on the Anamosa sample were collected from the Parole Board files at the Lucas State Office Building. Dates of admission, transfer, and release were the most useful items collected at the Parole Board. Transfers among institutions were considered part of one program until release. While files at the institution itself are more complete, the relative proximity of the Lucas Building made data collection there more time-efficient.

Information on cost per client per day for Anamosa, the other state institutions, and parole are available in convenient form in the Department of Social Services' Annual Report for the years 1974, 1975 and 1976. For 1977, the Iowa Comptroller's office has the institutions' financial status reports. Figures on the average daily population are available at the Division of Adult Corrections.

Lengths of stay in the Polk County Jail were collected from a card file in the jail itself. Interestingly, no budget for the jail itself exists prior to fiscal year 1978. Therefore, the 1978 budgetary figures were collected from the Polk County Budget Department and deflated to the appropriate year. The U. S. Commerce Department's government spending deflator was used for this purpose. Average daily population figures were obtained from the Sheriff's Department.

Follow-up criminal justice system costs presented a real challenge in data collection and estimation. Information on subsequent criminal justice contacts were obtained from: (1) client's files at DCS; (2) Bureau of Criminal Investigation rap sheets, (3) the intake and release card file at DCS, (4) Parole Board records, (5) the aforementioned card file at the Polk County Jail, and (6) the Clerk of District Court's office (criminal division) at the Polk County Courthouse. On the basis of this information, data were collected on subsequent criminal justice system costs.

There are two main categories of follow-up costs: (1) rearrest, trial and sentencing costs; and (2) subsequent corrections and quasi-corrections costs, whether as a result of rearrest or merely as a result of referral.

The cost of one rearrest was estimated with the help of John Jones, director of the Des Moines Police Department's Research and Development Section. Mr. Jones reported that the average trip time for a patrolman is 28 minutes, and that the average patrolman's salary works out to \$6.71 an hour. This makes an average trip cost \$3.13. (Trips are all calls from time of dispatch to time of return, including arrests, traffic accidents, illegally parked cars, and so on.) Using \$3.13 as the cost of one arrest no doubt is an understatement. However, an attempt to include all patrol and investigation costs as overhead (or indirect) costs yields a figure of hundreds of dollars per arrest, a figure that is unreasonably high. Considering all the varied services the police department performs, it seems best to understate rather than overstate the cost of one arrest.

Pretrial condition costs fall into the first category if they are borne by the criminal justice system. These figures are available from the County Budget Department if the rearrestee was held in jail, or from the Department of Correctional Services if he was released to the pretrial project. Since the cost of bail is paid by the defendant, it was not included.

Follow-up court costs were collected with the assistance of the Polk County Clerk of District Court's staff. This information is available in the criminal docket books. Often the cost figure is not actually recorded, but can be estimated according to a formula provided by the clerk's staff. The figures used here are probably underestimates rather than overestimates, since the idiosyncracies of each case are apt to increase costs. Such idiosyncracies are unknown by the researcher, but are known by or available to the Clerk of Court.

Finally, sentencing program costs that result from rearrest were estimated just as were program costs described earlier. This brings us to the second category of follow-up costs: those that do not result from a rearrest.

Included in this second category are referrals, such as to ADASI for alcohol or drug abuse treatment; and normal follow-up programs, such as probation following a stay in Fort Des Moines and parole following a stay in prison. Some might question the appropriateness of charging the costs of probation and parole to Fort Des Moines and Anamosa (respectively) in this manner. In response to that it should be said that the effectiveness of residential or institutional treatment is extenuated if a client needs further deinstitutionalization in a probation or parole program. In other words, if residential corrections or the prison experience were completely effective in the ideal sense, probation or parole would not be necessary. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, probation and parole were included in the follow-up cost figures as part of the effectiveness measure.

The last stage of the data collection effort was to estimate the cost of some of the referrals made by programs like residential corrections and probation. These are external costs defined earlier. In the overall economic perspective, they are attributable to the program from which the client was referred.

The data collection effort, the most time-consuming part of a study of this nature, should be considered a success. A large volume of information was gathered, and the quality of the data is relatively good. On the whole, the information sources were quite cooperative. This helped make the data analysis meaningful.

The Outcomes

1. One-year follow-up results

One measure used in this report to calculate program effectiveness is criminal justice system costs after a client leaves the program to which he was assigned. This measure is called the follow-up cost and, as discussed above, can be considered a measure of recidivism.

After a search of the relevant criminal justice records, one-year follow-up costs were computed for all six samples. Two-year follow-up costs were computed for only four of the samples, since the length of time spent in Anamosa precluded using a follow-up period of more than one year for the Anamosa and Fort Des Moines-Anamosa samples. Since the control period began as recently as 1974, only the jail and Fort Des Moines-jail comparison samples could be "followed" for three years.

Table 5 displays the program costs and follow-up costs for one year according to the methodology and data collection described earlier. It is apparent that, for this sample at least, the Men's Reformatory at Anamosa is not cost-effective in economic terms when compared to the Fort Des Moines program. The Anamosa clients not only had higher program costs, but their follow-up costs were also higher than those of Fort Des Moines. This makes the total costs (program plus follow-up) after one year higher still. This conclusion is supported by the tests of statistical significance described below.

Table 5

Mean One-Year Cost Data

	<u>Program Cost</u>	<u>Follow-up Cost</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
Anamosa (N=6)	\$10,828.51	\$3,254.24	\$14,082.74
Ft. Des Moines-Anamosa (N=6)	2,176.59	1,343.33	3,519.87
Jail (N=10)	442.49	1,382.15	1,824.64
Ft. Des Moines-Jail (N=10)	707.12	1,313.82	2,020.94
Probation (N=10)	602.92	651.06	1,253.98
Ft. Des Moines-Probation (N=10)	2,495.65	603.77	3,099.42

The Polk County Jail, which has lower program costs than Fort Des Moines for similar clients, shows follow-up costs for this sample that are only slightly higher. Sixty-three cents worth of jail incarceration yields the same follow-up costs as one dollar's worth of supervision at Fort Des Moines. The actual difference is too small to be statistically significant, but the difference changes after three years. Thus, Fort Des Moines is neither more nor less cost-effective than the Polk County Jail.

The probation and probation-Fort Des Moines groups are similar in two very important respects: after one year the two samples have incurred

roughly the same amounts of follow-up costs; and, in order to achieve this result, substantially less was spent on the probation clients than on a comparable group of men at Fort Des Moines. Therefore, the total costs of the comparable Fort Des Moines group remained significantly higher than the probation group after one year. We can conclude that, in the short run, Fort Des Moines is not a cost-effective alternative when compared to probation.

To summarize one-year findings we find that Fort Des Moines is more cost-effective than the Anamosa Men's Reformatory, less cost-effective than probation in the Fifth Judicial District, and is neither more nor less cost-effective than the Polk County Jail. The results of statistical tests of these conclusions are reported in a later section.

2. Two-year follow-up results

Two-year follow-up costs could be computed only for the jail and Fort Des Moines-jail and probation and Fort Des Moines-probation comparison samples. These data are presented in Table 6.

In comparing Table 6 with Table 5, we see that the jailed clients incurred follow-up costs at a much faster rate than the Fort Des Moines clients. In fact, the total cost figure for the jail surpassed that of the Fort Des Moines comparison sample by a fairly wide margin. If this trend continues for three years, then we might be able to conclude that Fort Des Moines is, in the long run, more cost-effective than the Polk County Jail.

The difference in total cost for the probation sample and its comparison sample at Fort Des Moines widened even further after two years. However, this was due to two cases that incurred dramatically higher costs. The trend for the other eight cases was actually the reverse: the difference narrowed as probationers incurred more follow-up costs than the residential clients. Therefore, the probation-Fort Des Moines comparison is inconclusive, a recurring problem with very small samples. Further research is necessary to determine the effectiveness of Fort Des Moines compared to probation.

Table 6

Mean Two-Year Cost Data

	<u>Program Cost</u>	<u>Follow-up Cost</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
Jail	\$ 442.49	\$2,823.94	\$3,266.43
Ft. Des Moines-Jail	707.12	1,412.35	2,119.47
Probation	602.92	1,646.34	2,249.26
Ft. Des Moines-Probation	2,495.65	2,790.97	5,286.15

To summarize our findings after the two-year follow-up period, we find that there appears to be a trend toward Fort Des Moines being more cost-effective than the Polk County Jail, although the three-year data will be necessary to support this conclusion. In the probation comparison, problems in sample size prevent us from drawing a conclusion at this point. Lacking third year cost data on the probationers, we may have to conclude that, between probation and Fort Des Moines, there is no long-term difference of which we can be confident.

3. Three-year follow-up results

Jail and residential corrections are the only programs under study here that typically last less than a year. Therefore, it was possible to collect data on three-year follow-up costs only for the jail sample and its comparison sample at Fort Des Moines.

Table 7

Mean Three-Year Cost Data

	<u>Program Cost</u>	<u>Follow-up Cost</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
Jail	\$442.49	\$5,440.57	\$5,883.06
Ft. Des Moines-Jail	707.12	1,728.14	2,435.27

These data are interesting because the trend established in the second year continued: the follow-up costs of the jailed individuals increased at a much faster rate than those of the similar individuals admitted to Fort Des Moines. Even if the increased difference is not found to be statistically significant (see below) the fact that such an obvious trend exists should suggest that, in the long run, Fort Des Moines is more cost-effective than the Polk County Jail.

One possible problem with the third year data should be mentioned: the three-year follow-up costs are more inaccurate than the one-year and two-year costs because some of the figures are quite recent. This not only introduces the problem of using budget estimates rather than actual expenditures, but also the possibility that some costs may not have been reported to my sources, such as the Bureau of Criminal Investigation or the Clerk of District Court's office.

Statistical and Economic Interpretations

The most useful economic and statistical tool in this type of analysis is multiple regression. This tool tests the degree to which different

programs affect the total cost of the corrections experience for a group of clients when other variables are controlled. Because some statisticians argue that regression should not be used on matched data, all regression results are confirmed, where possible, by a t-test specifically designed for matched pairs of cases. (See Blalock, p. 181.)*

Regression analysis can also be used to test the hypothesis that an increase in program expenditures should result in a decrease in follow-up criminal justice system costs and, conversely, that a decrease in program expenditures should result in an increase in follow-up criminal justice system costs. This approach assumes that corrections programs can be said to be productive in an economic sense; that is, that an increased investment yields an increased return. Unfortunately, the use of regression in this manner cannot be confirmed by a t-test; therefore, any conclusions will be suggestive rather than definitive.

Using the approach mentioned in the first paragraph on this page, we can test the significance of the program in determining total cost (when risk-seriousness is controlled) by hypothesizing the relationship expressed by the equation below:

$$\text{Total cost} = a + b(\text{Risk}) + c(\text{Program})$$

The significance of different programs is found by estimating mathematical coefficients and testing them for deviations from chance values.

In the above equation, a, b, and c are the coefficients to be determined by computation. "Risk" is the risk-seriousness scale that has a value from 0 to 20 depending on the individual client. "Program" has a value of 0 if the client was in Fort Des Moines and 1 if he was in another program. "Total cost" is defined exactly as in the methodology above. Each equation and each variable were tested using a F-statistic to see if enough variation in the dependent variable (Total Cost) was explained by variation in the independent variables (Risk and Program).

Prison

The estimation of this equation for the Anamosa cases and its match sample at Fort Des Moines (a total on only twelve valid cases) yielded the following results:

$$\text{Total cost} = \$7,769.66 + \$10,506.21 (\text{Anamosa}) - \$339.98(\text{Risk})$$

The meaning of this particular equation is that putting someone in the Men's Reformatory instead of Fort Des Moines costs an additional \$10,000 from the

*Blalock, Hubert M. Jr. Social Statistics. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960.

the time of the client's admission until one year after his release. This equation and the important variable (Anamosa) are significant at the .05 level. In other words, there is a 95% probability that Fort Des Moines is more cost-effective than Anamosa. This conclusion is also supported by a t-test for matched pairs.

Although it is clear that residential corrections in Polk County is more cost-effective than prison in total cost terms, there is the possibility that a dollar spent on corrections at Anamosa is actually more effective in preventing follow-up costs than a dollar spent at Fort Des Moines. In other words, it is possible that the prison may be more productive than residential corrections, even if it is more costly. To test this hypothesis, the following equation was estimated:

$$\text{Follow-up cost} = a + b(\text{Program cost}) + c(\text{Program})$$

Estimating this equation for the Anamosa and Fort Des Moines-Anamosa data reveals no significant results. Thus, since treatment of the Anamosa group was not effective on a productivity basis, the relative effectiveness with the comparable Fort Des Moines sample must be based on total cost alone. From this one could recommend that if cost is to be the deciding factor between sending someone to Anamosa or sending him to Fort Des Moines, then he should definitely be sent to Fort Des Moines.

Probation

Applying this method to the probation and Fort Des Moines-probation samples yields similar results with the opposite implication. The total cost regression for these samples after a one-year follow-up period looks like this:

$$\text{Total cost} = \$0.38 - \$1,845.55(\text{Probation}) + \$356.22(\text{Risk})$$

These results signify that there is a 95% likelihood that it will cost about \$1,800 less, on the average, to send a client to probation rather than Fort Des Moines.

Using the second regression technique, it was not possible to achieve results significant enough to estimate relative productivity. Once again, the determination of effectiveness must be made in terms of relative total costs alone. The conclusion is that probation is significantly more cost-effective than Fort Des Moines, according to our definition. This is supported by the t-test for match pairs.

However, after a two-year follow-up period, this conclusion is nullified. The F-statistic and the t-statistic both drop below the .10 significance level for the program variable. After this length of time, a client's total cost in these two samples is significantly explained by risk, but not program. We can conclude that, in the longer term (that is, two years after termination), probation is neither more nor less effective than Fort Des Moines. With the long run outcome in mind, the decision on whether to send someone to probation or Fort Des Moines must be made on criteria other than cost.

Jail

Applying these tests to the jail and Fort Des Moines-jail samples shows the strength of the dichotomous methodology introduced in this section. The F-statistic for the coefficient of the program variable in the total cost equation rises over time from .02 to .58 to 2.14, but remains well below the .10 F-statistic significance level of 3.26. The total costs of the jail experience to the criminal justice system are higher than those of Fort Des Moines, but not significantly higher.

When the program cost levels of the two programs are held constant, only then does the Polk County Jail become significantly and substantially more cost-effective than residential corrections at Fort Des Moines. Here is the equation from which this conclusion is drawn:

$$\text{Follow-up cost} = \$-927.06 + 3.75(\text{Program cost}) + \$4,706.11(\text{Program})$$

For clients in the jail program, which takes on a value of one, the coefficient of the program variable becomes a constant term and is added to the other constant (the first term to the right of the equals sign). For Fort Des Moines clients, the value of the program variable is zero (the base value) and this term drops out altogether. The result is two equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Follow-up cost} &= \$3,779.05 + 3.75(\text{Program cost}) \\ &\quad \text{for the jail, and} \\ \text{Follow-up cost} &= \$-927.06 + 3.75(\text{Program cost}) \\ &\quad \text{for Fort Des Moines.} \end{aligned}$$

From this we can conclude that Fort Des Moines is significantly more productive than the Polk County Jail for similar clients three years after discharge. From this particular sample (which admittedly was not a perfect match) we have found that, with the level of the original program cost controlled, the follow-up cost of a jailee tended to be \$4,700 higher than the cost incurred by a residential client after three years. This conclusion may cause some controversy because it is not generally accepted to use regression on matched samples. Further research on this subject verifying this conclusion would certainly be welcome.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In brief, the conclusion of this analysis is: in the short term (one year after release) the Fort Des Moines Residential Facility is more cost-effective than the Men's Reformatory at Anamosa, is less cost-effective than probation in Polk County, and is neither more nor less cost-effective than the Polk County Jail. After two years, the difference in effectiveness between probation and residential corrections vanishes; and, in the long run (with some reservations), Fort Des Moines finally becomes more effective than the Polk County Jail.

The implications of this are important in an economic sense, but limited in another sense. Very often a program is appropriate for a particular client regardless of the cost. For example, the sentencing of a career forcible felon to prison may be less problematic than for other offenders. For other types of offenders, the decision may hang in the balance. In these cases, cost becomes an important criterion. The client who hangs in the balance between Anamosa and Fort Des Moines should be sent to Fort Des Moines. Between jail and Fort Des Moines, the balance also tips in favor of the residential program. In the short run, probation is the more effective, although over time the differences cancel out.

Lending weight to the idea that cost is only one of many variables to consider is the fact that an individual's risk and seriousness profile tended to be a better predictor of follow-up cost than program cost. In a world where budget constraints are very real, though, efficient allocation of those resources that are available is an important issue. The finding that 40% of Fort Des Moines clients end up as probationers is reassuring if those clients would otherwise have been at Anamosa. It is a distressing waste of resources if those clients would have been on probation anyway if residential corrections had not been an alternative.

Based on these conclusions, the recommendation of this report is that two courses of further action be taken: first of all, that this report be replicated state-wide; and finally, that the residential corrections facility at Fort Des Moines be used more extensively as an alternative to the Men's Reformatory and the Polk County Jail, than as an alternative to probation.

An important assumption in the Advisory Commission on Corrections Relief Report (dated March, 1977) related to their projections regarding the size of future prison populations in Iowa. Their conclusion that prison populations will decline is partially based on an assumption that the increasing utilization of community residential facilities will reduce prison populations if these facilities follow a trend such as assumed for Fort Des Moines. The Advisory Commission projections assumed either 60% or 70% of the residents in these facilities would have been sentenced to Anamosa or Fort Madison.

On the contrary, the present study, based on samples of Fort Des Moines residents from July, 1971, to January, 1977, suggests that only 35% of the residents would have been sentenced to Anamosa or Fort Madison. The impact of residential facilities on the future prison population in Iowa may be even less than this figure when it is realized that judges in other judicial districts may be more conservative than those in Des Moines and the Fifth Judicial District, and consequently, would be less likely to sentence offenders to community residential facilities who would ordinarily be sentenced to prison.

1

This figure is an estimate, and although the data indicate a lower proportion than assumed by the Advisory Commission, the actual proportion is subject to the influence of several variables. Not all of those in jail would be in prison, and some probationers would be revoked.

55836

DISTRICT COURT STUDY

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Origin of the Issue

A long standing interest in the issue of District Court resource utilization has existed among those involved in the criminal adjudication process. Examples of apparent inefficiency, wasted time and resources, can be cited by the court administration, judges themselves, their support staff (clerks, recorders, bailiffs), district attorneys, public and private defenders, police and civilian witnesses, jury chief and jury panels. Suggestions for improvement are often hesitantly given because of uncertainty regarding the workability of the suggestion. The court process is a complicated one involving many procedures and many actors. Even those most intimately involved readily admit that they do not fully comprehend the scope and intricacy of the problems. Reference to other jurisdictions for data on efficient caseload management is to little or no avail. Few, if any, jurisdictions have studied or analyzed their procedures and administrative practices comprehensively.

The interest in analyzing caseload management and court resource allocation was heightened recently by two impending events. The State Legislature had expressed a willingness to deal with court backlog by adding another judiciary position, but it was not clear this would solve the problem. The current system can be described as follows: There are six full time criminal court judges; and two "relief" judges who normally hear civil matters, but are available to handle criminal matters on an "overflow" basis. One of the six judges has principal responsibility for "major" trials, and hence routine matters are not assigned to him. All but a few felony cases are filed in Denver County Court. As they are filed in County Court they are automatically assigned to the five judges on a rotating basis. Thus, each judge ideally is set to handle every fifth filing and the workload should be distributed among them. Also, the District Attorney's Office was planning to reduce the percentage of cases plea bargained in District Court and this policy might increase the number of cases going to trial.

The general issue is one of operational efficiency and resource allocation, so the study attempted to identify the existing problems in the current workload management system. The six judges were interviewed and expressed at least one of the workload management problems listed below:

1. Certain events which are scheduled to occur in open court are very time consuming--Some of these events might best be eliminated completely, or handled in a less time consuming manner, either in writing or perhaps in chambers. Examples of events which may be requiring extended use of court time are motions to reconsider sentence, bond reduction hearings, grand jury indictments, and hearings on pre-trial motions.
2. There is little or no certainty that an event which is set to occur on a given date at a given time will actually occur--There is most uncertainty regarding likelihood to proceed to trial. The current method of dealing with this uncertainty is to schedule several trials for one day on the assumption that at least one will go to trial and the others will reach a disposition with a last minute guilty plea. Only one of these possible outcomes is efficient. If all the cases reach disposition without trial, time and resources available to accommodate a trial go unused for the rest of the day. If more than one case is ready for trial, all but one must be continued, transferred, or placed in a trailing status, thus causing inconvenience to lawyers, the defendant and witnesses.
3. The courtroom facilities are not being used in the most economical manner--One cause for this is the vacancy rate already discussed. Another is the infrequent transferring of events from an overloaded court to an idle one. Also in question was whether or not the larger courtrooms are the ones which consistently need to accommodate the most people (i.e., defendants, jurors, witnesses, spectators).
4. Frequently, the personnel servicing the court cause delays--These delays can be either due to lack of punctuality or preparation, or insufficient staff available in the various departments. Although there are no data to support it, there is an assumption that delays are sometimes caused to meet self-serving ends.
5. Certain policies, procedures or administrative practices cause delays--A large number of perfunctory routine matters may not need to be handled by the judge or may be eliminated entirely. Also in this category is the perceived problem of varying amount of backlog in the individual divisions. Finally, because a large number of preemptory challenges are allowed, jury selection is very time consuming.

Analyzing Court Utilization

In March, 1977, an en banc meeting of Criminal Division judges asked the staff of the Denver Anti-Crime Council to initiate a court research effort as a basis for determining what policies and procedures, if any, could be modified to improve court utilization, decrease trial scheduling conflicts and reduce case backlog. Member of the Denver Anti-Crime Council, encouraged staff involvement in such an analysis.

The Denver Anti-Crime Council has frequently served in a technical assistance role to criminal justice agencies in Denver. Some form of research or policy analysis has been involved in most of these technical assistance activities. An example of prior policy research is a study of calls for police services which was conducted in conjunction with the Denver Police Department to analyse the dispatching system. Another example is a study conducted with the District Attorney's Office to analyse the effect of mandatory sentencing legislation.

As a preliminary activity, the DACC staff conducted personal interviews with each of the judges of the Criminal Division to obtain each judge's perception of the problems that are most detrimental to efficient court functioning. Staff interviews also solicited possible solutions from the judges interviewed. The purpose of the interviews was to acquaint each of the Criminal Division judges with the prospects of the Anti-Crime Council's study and at the same time provide members of the DACC staff an opportunity to become more fully cognizant of both the problems of the court as well as the constraints under which the judges must operate.

Subsequently, the Anti-Crime Council staff designed a general study with two purposes:

1. To collect "qualitative" and "quantitative" data about various factors that appear directly related to the occurrence of court events, time spans between events, and court schedules in order to be able to provide a summary description of the courts' current operation, as well as identify data-support problems.
2. To infer from the data collected and analyzed, the nature of the probable impact on future court operations as policies and procedures were changed, such as proposed in the "overflow" court proposal or the effects of an additional courtroom.

Studies of organizations as complex as the Criminal Division of the District Court require multiple data sources to provide a comprehensive analysis of the system. For this reason, and the need for reliability checking, the court study was subdivided into several major data collection phases. The three major phases of the data collection effort are described as follows:

Phase I--Observation of all court proceedings in each of the six Criminal Division courtrooms for a period of three weeks, with data collected, including time spans, for each court event occurring (morning boards, trials and special events).

Phase II--The review of all Criminal Court minutes for an eight week time period which included collection of data about all court proceedings by type, and date for the next scheduled events.

Phase III--A longitudinal study of 1,538 criminal cases filed from January 1 to June 19, 1975, using case files as a data source to record all events specific to each case, including data and type of event.

In addition, there were separate supplemental data collection efforts of a lesser magnitude. The Phase I effort described above was enhanced with detailed data collection of certain trial events. To provide limited comparative analysis of facility utilization by the Criminal and Civil Divisions, random time measures of court use were conducted four times a day over a one week period for all courtrooms in both Divisions.

Although this study relies heavily upon the collection of objective data, the need to interview judges to collect expert opinion data about court operations and issues were recognized and conducted. These interviews provided direction in defining issues to be addressed as part of the study.

An estimated 35 person weeks of data collection effort were required. The use of multiple data sources and data collection methods--observation of court events, interviews with judges, review of court minutes, review of case files and court use measurements--provided a comprehensive and reliable basis for analysis.

The Outcomes

The first category of perceived problems was the extent to which certain events occupied excessive open court time. Judges identified four specific events conducted in open court sessions which might be analyzed. The first is "sentence reconsideration". After a prison commitment is made it is possible for the defendant to return to the court and ask that the sentence be reconsidered. Data from the court study reveal that 10 sentence reviews occur each week. They average 10 to 15 minutes each and account for 1.6% of the total court time. Elimination from court docket would save 1.5 to 2.5 hours per week or about 20 minutes per judge each week. Three alternatives which are being considered are: (1) eliminate

all reviews of reformatory sentences since all reformatory commitments are reviewed automatically by the parole board after 7 months; (2) consider written sentence review motions in chambers without the presence of counsel or defendant; and (3) review sentences only in exceptional cases.

The second time consuming event, bond reduction hearings, is requested in District Court even though a County Court judge may have already heard a bond reduction motion for the same case. The study found that 7 bond reduction hearings occur each week. They average 7.2 minutes each for a total of 50 to 60 minutes a week for all courts. Two alternatives being considered for reducing time spent for bond reduction hearings are: (1) limit bond reduction to strictly a County Court function and eliminate these hearings completely at the District Court level; and (2) consider only written motions for bond reduction in chambers.

Grand Jury Indictments are time consuming and use scarce court space. Study results reveal that Grand Jury Indictments take an average of 4 to 8 days a month for both the County and State Grand Juries. Courtroom use is primarily involved. Actual trials of Grand Jury Indictments, though infrequent, take twice as much trial time. One alternative other than continuing the existing method of assigning indictments as any other filings is to establish a special court using a retired or parttime judge to hear trials or indictments.

Hearings on motions were also identified as accounting for much of court session time. From the study we learned that the Criminal Division spend 9.2 hours per week on motions or hearings on motions, which is 8% of the total courts session time weekly. While this may not be an inordinate proportion of the time, it is worthwhile considering some alternatives to the existing system of hearing motions as a regular part of each day's Morning Board. One possibility is to schedule motions for only one day a week. A further specification on this alternative is to not only limit motions to a specific day, but also to a specific time of day, for example at 7:30 a.m. Another alternative is to establish a motions court.

The second major problem category was the uncertainty that scheduled events would actually occur and occur on time. Most uncertainty was related to trials. Of 229 cases scheduled for trial, only 17 actually proceeded, for a ratio of 1 out of 14. Of those cases which did not go to trial when scheduled, the following disposition occurred:

TABLE 1

Disposition of Non-Trial Cases

32.7%	Plea or Requested Deferred Sentence
32.3%	Trial Reset or Continued for Resetting
5.2%	Case Dismissed
3.9%	Alias Capias Issued
9.1%	Motions Presented
4.3%	Case Transferred
2.1%	Continued due to Attorney Conflicts
2.6%	Trailing Case
7.8%	Other

To summarize these dispositions, almost half of the scheduled trials (47%) were replaced by another event (plea, dismissal, motion). The second major reason for failure to go to trial was that the case was continued or transferred (41%), probably because several trials were scheduled for the same time. One possible solution is to set an event formally identified as "status or plea negotiations". In addition dockets should be structured using the best possible estimate of trial possibility. The latter solution would require a specific methodology for estimating trial possibility, and a means for communicating the information to parties involved.

Uncertainty regarding non-trial matters, frequently cause "passes" rather than continuances. If a case is not ready it is passed over and recalled later in the day. The study determined that about 1 out of 5 events must be delayed at least once. More specifically, of the 1,195 judicial events observed, the court temporarily passed 248 (21%) at least once, 55 (5%) twice, 21 (2%) three times, and 11 (1%) four times. In addition to these temporary delays, 35% (420) events had to be continued to another day. Two alternatives have been offered as solutions: (1) identify events and call them on the Morning Board based on the probabilities that the case can be disposed; and (2) have attorneys identify events on the Board they wish to delay for negotiations prior to the initiation of court session.

One reason cited for the unnecessary delays both with trial and non-trial matters is communication problems between the officers of the court and the court support personnel. It was discovered that one court which takes active measures to ensure effective communication between various participants in the courtroom demonstrated average event times that were from 39% to 58% lower than the average times for all other courts on 9 out of 11 of the most frequently occurring court events. This finding suggests the viability of holding frequent (perhaps monthly) meetings of all court officers and service personnel to review daily dockets for the coming month.

The third problem related to efficiency of courtroom utilization. This problem has two parts. Courtrooms are frequently vacant during regular court hours, and the policy of transferring events from an over-scheduled courtroom to an empty courtroom does not work effectively. Regarding the vacancy rate, it was found that Criminal Division courtrooms are used approximately 52.5% of the available time. The range was from 35% in the afternoon to 70% in the morning. This does not appear to be an inappropriate vacancy rate. As for the transferring of cases only 2% of the observed events were transferred from one courtroom to another. About 50% of those transferred cases were continued by the court to which they were transferred. Solutions to improve transferability include both hiring a parttime judge to be used for transfer cases, and establishing a functional procedure for transferring cases and balancing daily dockets.

In the fourth category, it appeared that, delays and scheduling problems were caused by court personnel. According to some judges court personnel do not treat the schedule seriously. Scheduled court starting time is 8:30 a.m. Study findings indicate that the usual starting time is 8:45 a.m. It was also determined that 11% of the recesses were caused by parties being late and accounted for 33 minutes of recess per day. Adherence to a strict code of punctuality would considerably reduce delays. In addition, an emphasis on prior preparation for proceedings would also eliminate considerable delay. It was determined that the following court officers accounted for delays in the following proportions.

TABLE 2

Court Personnel and Court Delay

Sheriff not arriving with prisoners	1.0%
Defendant not present	11.6%
Defense Attorney not present	8.7%
Prosecutor not present	1.0%
Witness not present	2.3%
Other reasons	75.4%

Solutions include increasing the court complement of district attorneys, public defenders and sheriff deputies; changing the present scheduling to ensure adequate case coverage; and assigning a case coordinator the duty of ensuring that all necessary personnel are available when the case is called.

Lack of preparation on the part of the court, defense, or prosecution was cited as causing delays or continuances when necessary reports, documents and motions are not submitted to the court on time. The percentage of

delays attributable to each was found to be as follows:

TABLE 3

Document Availability and Court Delay

	<u>Passes</u>	<u>Continuances</u>
Court	11.2	11.1%
Defense	30.8	15.8%
Prosecution	11.2	2.3%
Probation	2.0	2.6%

Assuming current staffing does not allow adequate preparation time, the solution is to increase the professional and/or clerical staff in each court-related agency. Another alternative is to improve the communication system by establishing an early notification system by which court clerks would remove cases from the docket if they are not prepared.

Another sub-issue is that insanity pleas generate delays often because doctor's reports are not available in a timely fashion. During the average month there are 9.3 competency hearing events scheduled which average approximately 30 minutes and require an average of approximately one-half hour per judge per month. Of the events scheduled for review of doctor's reports, 64% are continued. A solution is to develop a contract procedure with the City of Denver Department of Health and Hospitals for quicker turn around on psychological evaluations.

Pro forma submissions of multiple motions by defense counsel, also, was identified as a problem. During trial proceedings 78% of all motions are introduced by the defense counsel. Only 16% of defense motions are granted. Motions by defense counsel account for 4% of all court time and account for 9% of all events. Because due process necessitates professional freedom, no simple solution to this issue appears to be available.

Finally, the last category of problems relates to existing policies and procedures. For example, an inordinate amount of time is used in voir dire because of the large number of preemptory challenges that are allowed. It was found that jury selection averages 6 hours with an average of 34 jurors interviewed at approximately 10.5 minutes each. There are 15.3 preemptory challenges and 5.3 challenges for cause. All figures increase for capital cases. Two solutions are suggested. The first is to limit the number of preemptory challenges in non-capital cases to four per counsel. Second, the judge could take a more active role in voir dire, either by asking most of the standard questions of the entire jury pool, limiting the number of questions an attorney would ask prospective jurors, or setting a limit on the time for juror questioning allowed to each counsel.

Resolution of this problem may require legislative change.

Another policy matter is that the present case assignment procedure although initially equitable, does not account for caseload differences and backlog overtime. The data suggest this may be true because the extremes in scheduled court days for the Criminal Division judges range from 40 days to 180 days. For this problem, two solutions were suggested: (1) Establish a standard for case schedule backlog and assign cases based on an even distribution of court days backlogged for all courts. This would require an equal distribution of daily board events between the courts; and (2) establish an arraignment (plea/setting) judge whose caseload would be only plea and setting and sentencing on pleas. All other judges would be trial judges.

The District Court Study involved the analysis of a complex system and multiple issues, thus increasing the time required to complete the analysis but providing a potentially more useful product. At this point in time, the alternatives mentioned above have not been evaluated nor have specific alternatives been recommended. The solutions came from a variety of sources. Some were suggested by one or more of the six judges during the preliminary interviews without benefit of the data. Alternative solutions were offered by DACC staff after the data analysis was completed. It is expected that as the issues are discussed with the judiciary, other solutions will surface and be considered for implementation. One of the steps in the implementation phase will be to assess whether the study data objectively support the problems as perceived.

The research results are being reviewed with the judges and implications are being discussed in the broad sense, although a specific implementation strategy has not been formalized. Late in October, 1977, a draft executive summary was prepared and a meeting was held which included the court clerk, the state court administrator, and one criminal court judge who is also on the Denver Anti-Crime Council. They were briefed on the findings, asked to review the draft and make comments. A second meeting was called with the same participants to discuss the original document in more depth. From these discussions a Preliminary Briefing Paper was prepared to present to all the judges on the criminal bench in mid-December. The paper will be presented at an en banc meeting, and future discussions are expected to follow this preliminary briefing.

A series of monthly meetings have been scheduled to further familiarize the judges with specific findings and alternative recommendations for change including advantages and disadvantages of each alternative.

Conclusions

At this point there appears to be a high probability of implementing some of the recommendations of the study. This impression is based upon a seemingly strong commitment on the part of the judges to improve court management and positive feedback from earlier meetings to brief the judges on findings of the study. It may require an additional year to phase in implementation of any significant procedural or policy change given both the complexity of the court system and number of agencies affected by even minor changes. However, the study was timely, involved several data sources and relevant issues. Consequently, it should in the end analysis prove to be a catalyst for change in court operation.

55835

A STRATEGY FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION

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Problem Background

The San Diego County Probation Department is the second largest Probation Department in the State of California providing probation investigation, supervision and institutional services for both juveniles and adults. The average annual budget for the Department has been in excess of \$25 million for the last three fiscal years. Within these appropriations, the Chief Probation Officer has the task of providing services as mandated by law and as requested by the Superior and Municipal Courts and as required by the San Diego Community at large.

Due to the increasing costs of government and the concern of the taxpayer in the areas of "the growing bureaucracy", local elected officials have adopted the position that governmental spending must be reduced. This posture has resulted in a reduction of appropriations to the Probation Department averaging somewhat less than \$1 million per year during fiscal year's 1974/75 through 1976/77.

While the Probation Department has experienced significant reductions, other criminal justice agencies have experienced increases. In order to understand why the Probation Department, a criminal justice agency, has experienced these reductions, one must understand the dynamics involved. Within the State of California the Probation Officer is the only county criminal justice official that is appointed. All other criminal justice officials, i.e., the Sheriff, the District Attorney, and the Superior and Municipal Court Judges hold elected offices. While the California Penal Code allows for appointment of the Chief Probation Officer by the Superior Court, which is the case for most Chief Probation Officers throughout the State, in San Diego the appointment of the Chief Probation Officer is made by the County Board of Supervisors with the concurrence of the majority of the Superior Court Judges. This creates a situation where law mandates, the judiciary requires and the community and special interest groups demand certain types and levels of services while the County Board of Supervisors and its more recent elected members, have pushed to reduce direct county costs.

Within the County of San Diego, expenditures for criminal justice activities, excluding municipal law enforcement, exceeds \$70,000,000 per fiscal year,

90% of which is financed by county property owners. With property tax revenues accounting for \$111,000,000 of the total \$450,000,000 County budget, where better to identify budgetary cuts than within criminal justice activities and where better to direct such cuts than to a department administered by an appointed official. It is within this environment that the Chief Probation Officer must provide services to the courts and to the community within the budgetary constraints as identified by the Board of Supervisors. This situation more often than not places the Chief Probation Officer and the Department within the center of a "force field" of competing and contradictory interests.

Faced with the reality of ever decreasing fiscal appropriations, the Department requested participation in the Policy and Economic Analysis Project in hopes of designing a method by which reductions could be anticipated without unduly disrupting mandated and needed program levels. Programs and related service levels would have to be provided at an adequate level within the constraints as established by the Board of Supervisors through the County's Chief Administrative Office.

Conducting Policy Analysis in Corrections Agencies

The utilization of policy analysis, though not that specifically presented by the Policy and Economic Analysis Project has been used routinely by the Probation Department. The Probation Officer is directed by both the courts and the County Board of Supervisors to provide policy recommendations on the basic activities of the Department and the resolution of issues as they arise. In addition, staff assigned to the office of the Chief Probation Officer provide reports to a multitude of special interest groups, advisory boards, commissions, and committees who act in an advisory capacity to County policy makers.

Though policy analysis was not unique to the San Diego County Probation Department, it was felt that assistance was required to design a rational and yet politically realistic method of allocating departmental resources. While the Department does not possess a large research and evaluation staff (one Research Analyst and three Program Evaluators), it has been the Department's experience that through the utilization of existing resources the Department has been able to adequately conduct reports of this type.

Since this project required the gathering of program descriptions, the Chief Probation Officer assigned his Assistant to coordinate the gathering of needed information as developed by Directors of the five major service areas; i.e., Juvenile Services, Adult Services, Adult Institutional Services, Juvenile Institutional Services, and Administrative Services.

The first step in the project was to identify and describe all non-mandated programs. (This was changed after the initial workshop since it was decided that while certain services are mandated by law, service levels were not mandated and, as such, could be reduced with the concurrence of the courts and the Board of Supervisors.) Once it was decided that all programs, including both mandated and non-mandated, were to be identified, Service Directors were directed to provide the following information: Program descriptions, whether mandated or non-mandated, number of professional and supportive staff and annual budget. This was completed and resulted in the identification of 63 distinct programs within the five major service areas,

Upon completion of the program descriptions, it was decided to redefine and clarify the Department's mission statement so that the elimination or reduction of any one of these 63 programs could be measured against the potential impact on the Department's basic mission. Toward this end, a position paper was developed and presented to the Presiding Superior Court Judge and his Executive Committee. The Superior Court concurred with the position paper and the mission statement contained within. This mission statement has been included within the Department's 1977/78 program budget request which will be reviewed by the Board of Supervisors during April, 1978. The position paper addressed several areas of concern and took as its focus the Probation Department's goal to provide adequate client services. The economic reality of budget constraints was seen only as one impediment; another was the necessity of defining a mutually acceptable set of probation service goals. Absent clear statements of philosophy, roles and service components, reallocation is impossible. To the degree that legislators and citizens desire movement of correctional activities away from rehabilitation and toward community protection, this will affect the level and kind of services provided.

Presented for consideration in light of the foregoing was a mission statement for the San Diego County Probation Department:

The basic mission of the San Diego County Probation Department is to protect the community by stabilizing the behavior of both the adult and juvenile offender, to provide services to the courts, as both mandated by law and as requested, and to prevent further penetration of pre-delinquent youth into the juvenile justice system.

Once all programs were identified, it was necessary to design a method by which these programs could be placed in priority order. Since this involved prioritizing 63 programs, it was decided that the Director of each of the five service areas would prioritize his programs and submit this listing to the office of the Chief Probation Office which would compile an overall listing of program priorities.

Upon concurrence of the Superior Court, Service Directors were directed by the Chief Probation Officer to design quantifiable objectives that would measure the Department's movement through this overall goal. These objectives have been developed and are included within the 1978-79 program budget request.

In order to arrive at some sense of priority, three scenarios were developed specific to each of the Department's five service areas. Basically these scenarios took the FY 1977-78 appropriations and staff years and reduced these figures 6%, 9%, and 12% respectively, and requested that each Service Director assess impact on service levels and objectives. By reducing or eliminating programs within a service area, based upon a reduction in overall resources, we were able to get a sense of program priorities in relation to the overall mission of the Department. This was accomplished at a net reduction of \$500,000 (3.25%) in direct county costs proposed within our 1978-79 budget request while maintaining adequate service levels throughout the Department.

Problems of Implementation

As a process for the rational allocation of resources, we found that the strategy that was used assisted us in the preparation of the Department's 1978-79 budget request. For the first time the Department identified and quantified its 63 specific program activities, assigned cost figures to each, and was able to place them in priority of importance. The end product has been accepted by the courts, the Human Resources Administrator, and will soon be reviewed by the County's Chief Administrative Officers and the County Board of Supervisors. If government's ability to acquire and expend property tax revenue remains as currently exists, we are certain that our ability to provide critical and requested services will not be seriously affected.

As pointed out again and again by Correctional Economics Center staff, any correctional entity operates within a political environment and, as such, should be prepared to respond to changes in program emphasis or direction. As the department/agency must respond to political pressures, so must the various reports, evaluations, documents, etc., produced by the Department to reflect the most current political realities. This is the case with the proposed "Jarvis/Gann Initiative" which if passed will limit the ability of local units of government to acquire revenues from property taxes.

As our scenarios were designed for the 1978-79 Budget, the maximum loss in revenue was 12% of current appropriations (\$2,662,458), 123 staff years, and eleven specific programs. If the Jarvis/Gann Initiative is passed, the Department's appropriation will be reduced by 29% (\$6,390,000 in revenue, 225 staff years, and 21 specific programs including 6 of the 7 existing adult institutions and the 4 juvenile treatment facilities.

Basically the passage of this Initiative will leave the Department only with those activities mandated by law. The project was not a total loss since we were able to prioritize all 63 programs, but we did not realize that we would potentially have to eliminate as many programs as the passage of this Initiative will require.

The Utility of Policy Analysis for Corrections

From our perspective, for any correctional agency to survive, and hopefully implement effective programs, the agency's administrator must utilize some form of policy analysis. While all agency administrators realize, or should realize, that they operate in a political environment, policy analysis does lend some rationality to the process and identify ways of proceeding within the political "force field". While policy analysis cannot identify all variables, it does assist in limiting the number of variables so that efforts can be directed toward those which appear to be the most critical.

CORRECTIONAL ORGANIZATION

55837 TRANSFERRING PAROLE SERVICES TO THE LOCAL LEVEL

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Origin of the Issue

Hennepin County (Minneapolis), Minnesota, decided in early 1977 to participate in the State's Community Corrections Act. This Act (CCA) authorizes, for participating counties, a subsidy for the county's assumption of responsibility for certain State correctional services, including parole, probation and related State services (except State correctional institutions). Additional money in the subsidy is used to pay for per diem charges of adults and juveniles committed to the State and for the development of added community-based corrections programs so that an increased number of offenders will be handled on a local basis.

Although a participating county in the CCA must assume the State parole/probation function, the county has freedom to choose how that service will be provided: by use of existing county staff; by use of newly hired "outside" staff; by contract with or incorporation of State parole agents; or by some combination. The planning problem posed was to develop recommendations for the method by which this function should be assumed by the County, with alternatives, and within constraints of current costs, future budgetary encumbrances and maintenance of level/quality of service.

Because assumption of this function was mandated as part of CCA participation, the problem was immediate and would not disappear by itself. A decision had to be made by the County Board and Corrections Advisory Board with or without study. Sufficient informational and staff resources existed to analyze the alternative methods for assumption.

The central issue for study was how to realign the programs within the legal mandate. Sub-problems included lack of detailed information about the State service, required descriptive and an identification of the administrative, organizational and budgetary implications of the change. The present size of State field staff is 54 personnel with a total annual budget of over \$1.1 million. This budget would represent between 1/4 to 1/5 of the total eligible subsidy available for the County. Also, the State staff salaries are about 15-20% lower than comparable position

County salaries, creating both an immediate and longer-term budgetary concern. Similarly, the size of the State parole caseload (about 1900 adult and juvenile cases) requires sufficiently trained personnel from some source to handle while maintaining both legal requirements and professional standards of service. A study of this problem was seen essential in order to minimize expenses and meet optimum service standards (for both client and community). The decision makers (County Board) are responsible to the electorate for both fiscal responsibility and public protection.

Relevant actors included County planning department staff, County Court Services staff, State field services staff, State planning staff and Corrections Advisory Board. Obviously the planning staffs from County and State had prime responsibility for insuring development of sound information for decision makers. Field staff from both HCCS and DOC each had demonstrated concerns with the pending CCA over new roles and functions, organizational and spatial realignments and personnel issues (compensation, seniority rights, etc.).

The County Welfare Board provides funding for numerous placement needs of adult and juvenile correctional clientele and may or may not benefit from receipt of any corrections subsidy monies.

Basically there are three levels of decision-making for this problem-- (a) Corrections Advisory Board, required under the CCA, yet not in existence at the time of the study, but which was required to review the recommendations after the study was completed; (b) the County Board of Commissioners, having legal responsibility for all programs under the CCA and for all budgetary decisions involved; and (c) State Commissioner of Corrections, whose office must approve the overall County plan, including State field services, before subsidy monies would be authorized. The County Board is the prime decision-making body.

The client population may also be affected by the selected solution to the problem. If the CCA achieves its intended goal of committing fewer people to State institutions, more of the client population will be locally handled. Some present programs offered to parolees by the State may be altered or dropped when the County assumes program responsibility.

Certain goals were identified in the study process to guide the selection of alternative recommendations for method of parole services assumption. These included the following:

1. Maintain highest flexibility for decision-making.
2. Reduction (minimization) of costs to Hennepin County.
3. Maintenance of quality, professional service.

4. Establishment of clear administrative lines of management.
5. Development of optimum personnel practices equity.
6. Achievement of optimum working relationships between County and State staff.

These goals were seen to be those of highest significance to the decision makers (County Board) and planning staff.

Planning Service Delivery

The overall responsibility for planning Hennepin County's entrance into the CCA rested with the County Office of Planning and Development. Because the Court Services Department represents about 60% of the funds expended on corrections by the County, it was deemed advisable to develop a joint planning team, comprised of personnel from both County planning staff and Court Services. This team jointly participated in generating the recommended material for the first year's CCA plan. Segments of the plan naturally fell to either County planning staff (e.g., budget matters, organizational structure, etc.) or to Court Services (e.g., assessment of State parole services, monitoring of contracts for alternative sentencing residences, etc.). Thus, the study described here was appropriately within the expertise of Court Services.

Hennepin County Court Services (HCCS) is a County-funded, but Court bench administered, multi-service probation and institutional organization. The Department has a total of 350 employees and an annual budget of \$8.5 million. Investigative and probation supervision services are provided for the Juvenile, District and Municipal Courts; evaluative and counseling services for Domestic Relations Court; a secure detention facility and a cottage-based residential treatment program for juveniles are provided under Court jurisdiction. In addition, there are the following staff support services: budget manager; clinical services (psychological/psychiatric evaluation and treatment); volunteer services (involving nearly 400 active, trained volunteers); staff training services; statistics and research. Court services has developed a data information and evaluative system for the use of division managers in daily operations and for program assessment and/or development. Much of this work is done by the professional research and planning staff, but usually with considerable involvement of line personnel. In this instance, one planner was responsible for the study, relying upon a large number of line staff to collect data.

In order to develop recommendations for County Board action, an initial decision had to be made whether to base the recommendations on budgetary issues alone or to include program service issues. The latter was selected and, in order to avoid proceeding on assumptions, it was decided to conduct

a descriptive study of State field services. Although the functions of County probation and State parole are parallel, it was deemed important to highlight the similarities and differences and to obtain an accurate picture of how the State services were actually constituted. The following objectives were outlined on June 1, 1977:

- a. Develop a definitive description of State parole (field) services for juveniles and adults in Hennepin County and quantify the parole activities/tasks by need, volume and cost, by August 1, 1977.
- b. Outline the essential legal requirements and policy expectations placed on State field services staff by statute, Minnesota Corrections (Parole) Board and the Department of Corrections, by August 1, 1977.
- c. Develop recommendations from the collected data for submission to the Corrections Advisory Board and County Board of Commissioners, by August 15, 1977, to encompass the following two areas:
 - (1) Extent of needed staffing for State field services, number and costs, for calendar 1978;
 - (2) Recommended method(s) by which the State services function should be provided within the County as of January 1, 1978.
- d. Develop an experimental model for delivering parole services at significantly reduced costs, for demonstration use in calendar 1978, by August 15, 1977.

The first three objectives were met by September 1, 1977. The fourth objective was deleted for reasons given later.

In order to identify state services (item "a" above), the most time-consuming of the objectives, it was decided by Court Services to form an ad hoc committee on parole (state services), comprised of supervisors and probation officers from the County. This committee would be representative of District and Juvenile Court probation staffs and, therefore, could tap additional personnel from those divisions for assistance.

Prior agreement had already been obtained from the administrator of State field services to conduct such a study. That administrator also has added responsibilities for helping to implement the CCA in other counties in the metro region.

The purpose of the ad hoc committee was as follows:

1. To assist HCCS/County planning staff by obtaining current information on the function and activities of State field services provided in Hennepin County.
2. To consider how the assumption of the State field services function by Hennepin County will impact both the delivery of that service and the respective staffs of both State and County.
3. To provide a channel for communication between the planning staff and the service personnel in both the County and State who will be affected by the CCA.

The ad hoc committee was not given the task of developing the recommendations (item "c" above), but to gather the data upon which the recommendations would be based. It also provided a forum for identifying issues and concerns about the CCA held by line staff and to involve extended numbers of County staff in a direct interaction with their counterparts in the State, with whom there had been little prior interaction.

The format for the study (item "a" above) as developed follows:

- a. One person from County staff would be assigned to one person from the State to spend one day in observation of State agents' work (descriptive, not evaluative).
- b. On a separate day, the County officer would conduct a formal, structured interview with the same State agent to detail the way in which the job was performed every day.
- c. A detailed outline of the State agent's functions (adult and juvenile) was developed, with identified tasks to carry out these functions. The outline was developed by the Court Services planner, who headed the ad hoc committee, and the State staff administrator.
- d. Also developed was a list of roles appropriate to the State agent's job, which each agent was asked to rank in order of importance, using two different contexts: how the roles exist in the job currently being done and how these roles would be ranked under "ideal" conditions (where the agent could do what he/she thought was the best service, but with the existing caseload).
- e. Each County interviewer would then write up the observation notes and the structured interview results, following special outline of function forms, and turn these in to the staff planner, along with the results of the role ranking. (The outline of functions was developed on two sets of forms: one for observational notes, the other to record the number of times per month the State agent performed each task or function and the total amount of time spent.)

- f. The staff planner then aggregated all the quantifiable data and developed a descriptive narrative of the interviewers' writeup. These were then rough-typed and discussed with each of the interviewing staff group (adult and juvenile) for clarifications and corrections. Then a revised draft was developed for individual review by each interviewing staff person and by State field services supervisory staff. A final narrative was then developed incorporating feedback from both County and State staff.

Throughout the study, care was taken to emphasize that the study would not be evaluative, only descriptive. Also, every effort was made to insure confidentiality of an individual agent's responses. Only aggregated data was circulated for general review.

The process for selecting the State staff to participate ranged from general objective representation to negotiation. It was not possible to insure a stratified sample of agents and no attempt was made to get a cross-section of "good" and "less-good" agents, for both practical and political reasons.

State staff in Hennepin County who were interviewed included three supervisors (2 adult and 1 juvenile) and twelve agents (8 adult and 4 juvenile). The 8 adult agents represented 30% of the adult line workers; the 4 juvenile agents represented 50% of the juvenile line workers. A higher percentage of juvenile staff was interviewed due to their fewer numbers overall. In addition, five agents in Ramsey County (3 adult, 2 juvenile) were interviewed. As an adjacent county to Hennepin and serving the same type of metropolitan clientele, Ramsey County offered the opportunity for comparative descriptions; also Ramsey County entered the CCA about 3 years before and the staff there had a perspective on that experience. The Hennepin County interviewers were of the same classification (either supervisor or probation officer/agent) as the State or Ramsey County staff, with one exception (one H.C. supervisor interviewed a Ramsey County agent). A total of twenty staff (State and Ramsey) were interviewed by nineteen HCCS staff. In addition, a number of other administrative, supervisory and planning personnel from the County and State were involved in the study process for purposes of orientation, comments and review of the results.

Generally the study progressed as outlined, although time frames had to be extended a few weeks to accommodate staff schedules. Perhaps the biggest area of concern existed in the subjective nature of the study. the study was designed to be descriptive only and, therefore, hopefully, objective. Individual perceptions and interpretations tended in part to undercut the objectivity. This was especially apparent in two areas: on the interpretations given by the interviewers to descriptive data from

State staff, and on the State staff projection of time allocations for specific functions. There was not sufficient time to attempt a controlled time study, but it is doubtful if any more useful data could be obtained by that method than the approach used.

Another, and not unrelated, factor which emerged during (and before) the study was the awareness of a good deal of professional "distance" between County and State staff. County staff tended to approach the task from the standpoint that the County level of probation service was more professional or more sophisticated than that which State services offer to parolees. Although purely descriptive information was accurately reported, where there were interpretations of a given function the perspective indicated above, when present, tended to be an influence on the data. In other cases, this did not occur. Similarly, there was a recognized degree of anxiety by State staff regarding the uncertainty of being absorbed within the County organization. Also, there was present a concern that the study process would be a way for the County to determine how to eliminate any number of State positions. In spite of these factors, the study results were surprisingly consistent and were verified as generally quite accurate later through information received from State administrative and supervisory personnel, with only one or two exceptions (which were interpretative).

Toward the end of the study it became evident that the County, for budgetary and flexibility-of-choice reasons, had informally decided on the method of providing the State field service function in 1978: i.e., by contracting with the State for the services currently provided and at the present State salary levels. Although this tended to obviate the need for the study, two considerations prevailed: (a) eventually the County would need to have the data, as the State indicated it would honor an agreement to contract for only one year, and thereafter the County would have to provide the service directly by some method; and (b) that at least one of the alternatives to incorporate a portion of State staff would be less costly than would a contract at existing salary levels.

An added, positive factor emerged from the study: an increased understanding, by the County and State staff involved in the study of the similarity of each other's roles. Also, through the use of the County staff on the ad hoc committee, in interviews and in group discussions, the awareness of the staff of the implications of the CCA became clear. The staff thus had an opportunity to wrestle with some of the issues arising with community corrections and to reduce some of their own anxieties.

The Outcomes

Three of the four objectives established for the study were completed. The first objective--develop a definitive description of State parole services--

was accomplished by Court Services staff as indicated above. The second-- outline the essential legal requirements and policy expectations placed on State field services staff by statute--was completed by the staff planner and incorporated in the writeup along with the material from the first objective. The third objective--recommendations for decision-- was also completed and the results are outlined below. The only objective which was not fulfilled by this project was the development of an experimental model for delivering parole services. As indicated earlier, this objective was deleted from the project primarily because the evidence showed that the County was moving toward an "as is" contract with the State. Without direct management responsibility, it was seen that pursuit of this objective would be premature, at best, and resented or resisted without a full involvement of State staff.

Three alternative courses of action were identified by the project. Each is summarized below.

Option I: Contract--County contracts with State for a total of 49 positions to perform required field services, under management by the State. Reducing the following positions from present State budget (of 54 positions): 1 field unit supervisor, 1 Senior Agent and 3 paraprofessionals. Retains 36 adult agents and 8 juvenile agent positions and increases the supervisory ratio close to HCCS ratio. Retains the special juvenile programs of special education and prostitution and the self-concept improvement program (adults). Eliminates the Intensive Street Supervision Program (ISSP) for juveniles. Present State budget/or salary and fringe costs is \$1,053,897; Option I cost is \$967,827.00.

Option II: Contract Plus--County contracts with the State for 30 staff positions and incorporates 15 additional positions as county employees (Total: 45 positions). Juvenile staff is reduced from a total of 11 positions to a total of 7 (reducing juvenile agents from 8 to 4 positions); juvenile staff (11) incorporated as county employees and integrated into county juvenile probation; total juvenile caseload becomes county responsibility. One adult unit of 8 positions incorporated as county employees to engage in demonstration of additional models of service delivery; adult unit administered by HCCS. All other 30 positions (adult) managed by State. Option II salary and fringe costs is \$906,163.

Option III: Incorporate--County incorporates 44 state staff positions as county employees: 7 juvenile positions integrated with county juvenile probation as in Option II; 37 adult positions incorporated as separate department for first year, moving toward future integration with county adult staff. Option III salary and fringe costs is \$947,144.

In addition, a careful assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of each option was prepared given particular attention to flexibility of implementation, cost, and staffing requirements. This was included as part of the summary document.

Option I (contracting with the State for parole services) was adopted, as anticipated, by the County for reasons identified earlier. However, this option is limited to one year so the other two options are still viable and, conceivably, both could be implemented in progressive succession. At the conclusion of the study, we favored Option II (Contract Plus) as it was potentially achievable, moved the County further along in its agreed upon commitment to Community Corrections than did Option I, and helped reserve a sizable portion of the staff complement from an immediate decision to incorporate by the County. Option III was seen as a later evolution.

Two rather immutable factors determined that only Option I would be adopted for 1978: (1) time was running out too rapidly to be able to negotiate an equitable personnel solution involving County and State staff, which was necessary for both Options II and III; (2) a majority of the County Board had informally taken the position that incorporating any State staff by January 1, 1978, was not in the County's interest for retaining a maximum degree of flexibility on the method of assuming field services responsibility.

Problems of Implementation

The basic issue on implementation of the contract option was to negotiate the terms of the contract within a fixed dollar amount already budgeted by the County for this purpose. The requirement of the law that the County must assume the parole function (in order to be eligible for the subsidy) and the fact that the County Board unanimously voted for the contract option and had the authority to effectively implement that approach, gave encouragement to the relevant actors to expeditiously implement the decision.

The study results were used to establish a recommended level of State personnel upon which an initial budget amount was based. In the negotiating, however, it became obvious that the costing-out of that level had not included all the personnel benefits known to the State. This resulted in a contract total as originally set by the County (\$1,136,196) with an option to increase up to an additional maximum of \$50,000 by mutual consent.

The terms of the contract are as follows:

1. State to provide full management and administration of the field services staff.

2. Because field services would eventually come under County management, the State agrees to consult with the County on any intended personnel changes or any substantive programmatic changes.
3. The State will provide for the County, on a quarterly basis, reports of budget expenditures, staff complement, caseload statistics, etc. for monitoring purposes.
4. The State will include County personnel in regular administrative and supervisory meetings to assist in monitoring and to aid in planning for County involvement following the contract.
5. The County and State agree that, with mutual consent, one of the other options that would include some or all the State staff being incorporated as County employees may be considered for implementation before expiration of the contract.

Problems to be faced during the contract period deal with implementation of other options at the conclusion of the contract. These are: (a) finalizing the size determination and job classification of parole staff; (b) developing an agreed upon method of incorporation of State staff as County employees (i.e., whether to integrate into the same functions or retain separate functions); (c) determining the extent of special programs, current and proposed, based on need, identified role responsibility and costs; (d) outlining the administrative and authority relationship of former State agents administered by County Court Services (under contract from the County Board), but with continued responsibility to the releasing authority of the State Parole Board and for implementing operating procedures set up by the State Department of Corrections; (e) development of staff training content and method of delivery in reference to a State training unit; (f) develop method of integrating a management information system for parole staff with existing County system; (g) obtain State staff commitment to use of trained volunteers and integrate with existing Court Services Volunteer program; (h) negotiate an equitable (to both State and County staff) personnel salary/benefits/seniority agreement prior to incorporation.

Some methods to be employed to assist in the achievement of these objectives include regular attendance by planning staff at State supervisory meetings, use of HCCS administrative team, and development of a joint HCCS/DOC staff committee to discuss problems of incorporation.

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THE MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CASELOAD AND COMMUNITY RESOURCES MANAGEMENT TEAM

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Origin of the Issue

With the passing of the Safe Streets Act in 1968, establishment of LEAA, and the development of State and Regional Criminal Justice Planning Boards to guide the distribution of federal funds, came an increased emphasis on cooperation among the various components in the Criminal Justice System.

Early efforts by the Ventura County Regional Planning Board centered in the area of corrections, with concern expressed regarding the need to develop improved diagnostic services for both pre-trial or pre-sentence, and for sentenced offenders.

In 1971 a growing concern emerged regarding the duplication of services and the lack of communication and/or coordination between the various jurisdictions and the Federal Bureau of Prisons announced its intentions to build a youth prison in Ventura County. At the same time the Bureau wanted to build, the County had an over-crowded and outdated county jail and the California Department of Corrections had unused facilities.

In the next few years, top level representatives from the federal, state and local correctional agencies met and worked together in an effort to develop a mutual planning effort and to advocate multijurisdictional services. The Sheriff's Department prepared and submitted grant proposals to begin a "Unified Department of Rehabilitation," emphasizing community based corrections, whose cornerstone was to be a Work Furlough Program. The long range goal was to be delivery of correctional services with state and federal agencies exercising contractual arrangements with the county for trading various services.

Concurrent with this effort to expand correctional services and further develop community correctional programs on a multijurisdictional basis, was a growing concern as to which agency should ultimately be responsible for corrections in Ventura County. Traditionally, any pre- or post-sentence services affecting incarceration were the responsibility of the Sheriff.

Because of this concern and a growing commitment by many county officials that responsibility should be with someone other than the Sheriff, the Probation Department was encouraged to redesign and submit the grant proposal for the "Unified Department of Rehabilitation."

This proposal, funded under the revised name of the Unified Corrections Project, was to receive LEAA funding for four years—two from the California Office of Criminal Justice Planning and two as an LEAA Discretionary Project and demonstration of standards and goals.

Two broad goals were established for the project in the first year's grant application:

1. A significant prevention of crime in Ventura County through a reduction of recidivism among those offenders who pass through the county jail facilities or correctional programs; and
2. The development and implementation of a comprehensive corrections program at the county level that would bring together the resources of public and private agencies now serving offenders in a unified correctional effort.

Inclusive in these broad goals were the following specific objectives that address long-standing needs and concerns in Ventura County:

- A. The direct participation of public and private agencies at the City, County, State and Federal levels involved in the correctional process, in a coordinated effort of reintegration of offenders into the community.
- B. Development of a pool of existing and potential community resources, public and private, to be utilized in satisfying the needs of the correctional programming and diversion efforts of all Criminal Justice Agencies working in Ventura County with both juveniles and adults.
- C. Development of an effective mechanism for rational delivery of such resources to the client population that eliminates, to the degree possible, costly duplication of efforts, and extends assistance to the offender groups not now being served.
- D. Expansion of a variety of sentencing options available to the Ventura County Criminal Courts, including both institutional programs and community release alternatives.
- E. Development of an effective diagnostic process and classification system for application in both pre-sentence program planning and post sentence intervention.

- F. Mobilization of community support and involvement in a correctional process based at the local level and focused upon facilitating successful reintegration of offenders into community life.

Project Description

The program which is evaluated in this document represents the cumulative efforts of several years of activity by Project staff.

The Multijurisdictional Caseload-Community Resource Management Team Experimental Unit was to demonstrate an approach to field services through development of a multijurisdictional staff that would work a multi-jurisdictional caseload utilizing the team approach. They would also advocate resource brokerage as a technique, as opposed to the traditional client-caseworker role.

This documentation covers the Unit's development from its inception in November, 1976 to September 1, 1977. During this time, the multijurisdictional aspect of the unit was eventually phased out and the event and circumstances leading to this are explored. Client and staff activity data were collected for a sample group, with the study period running from January 1, 1977 to June 30, 1977. Cases studied include only those under the jurisdiction of the Corrections Services Agency, despite the fact that the clients and staff from the California Department of Corrections and the California Youth Authority were present in the unit until April 1, 1977. A sample comparison group from the Corrections Services Agency's traditional group was also utilized.

This project was carried out in Ventura County which is located in coastal southern California, approximately 70 miles from downtown Los Angeles. The County itself has approximately 450,000 residents. The project received a great deal of enthusiasm and commitment from the highest administrative posts at the federal, state and local levels. At the time it was implemented in late 1976, both the state agencies (California Youth Authority and California Department of Corrections) had new directors and thus new priorities and new problems to contend with, which had some effect upon the commitment to this particular project. There were major problems in making major policy decisions which involved so many levels of state and local correctional programs.

Since this was an experimental project, it was suggested that we should serve a client population of 400 adults located in the Oxnard-Camarillo areas of Ventura County. The Unit was staffed with a team leader (Senior Deputy Probation Officer), one parole agent each from the California Department of Corrections and the California Youth Authority and two deputy probation officers from the Ventura County Corrections Agency. Each of these workers would bring their existing caseloads into the project and would begin to

develop the new approach in working with their clients. Other deputy probation officers within the Corrections Services Agency and parole agents within the state agencies were interested in this project because of the possible implications for service delivery.

This project was carried out under the general administrative direction of the Corrections Services Agency, which has the following agency goals:

1. Decision-Making: Corrections has the responsibility to provide protection to the community through an ever increasing ability to differentiate accordingly between offenders who are acceptable for reintegration within the community and those who should be confined.
2. Resocialization: Corrections has the responsibility, within its resource limitations, to take whatever steps are necessary to create conditions that will result in the modification or containment of offender behavior within legal limits. A broad effort towards reorienting the offender to more responsible behavior is the goal.
3. Punishment and Deterrence: Corrections must recognize that considerable community desire for retribution and punishment exists, and that there is a wide-spread belief that swift and sure punishment does, in fact, deter. This thesis has never had a real test, and testing is unlikely as long as most crimes go unsolved. Working within these limitations, the goal should be to arrange definite consequences for law violations which are implemented within the shortest time-span possible.
4. Victim Compensation: Corrections has the responsibility to be sensitive to the needs of victims and insure that they are provided with compensatory action for physical, monetary, or emotional damage or loss. Whenever possible, the offender is to provide or pay for the damage done.
5. Client Protection: Corrections has the responsibility to: Insure that client's constitutional, statutory and administrative rights are respected; to make available the opportunity for reintegration into the community; and to eliminate any physical or emotional abuse or inhumane treatment from the process. These elements must be provided without regard to a person's sex, age, race, creed, disability, nationality or economic status.
6. Public Education: The Corrections Services Agency must be sensitive to the needs of the community, keeping the taxpaying public informed on all aspects of the Correctional System, its problems, successes, and failure, and must provide an avenue of involvement in the process. Public understanding of the community's role and responsibilities in corrections must be a goal.

Because of the potential national and state-wide impact the multijurisdictional program could hold, and the strong interest by the Corrections Services Agency in testing the resource brokerage concept, it was arranged by the Research and Planning Units of the Unified Corrections Project to conduct an in-house formative evaluation. One staff member from this project was assigned to work on this project, as well as on one additional project funded through LEAA to the Unified Corrections Project of the Corrections Services Agency. The Agency has had continual problems of trying to fund a research component within the agency and has relied totally upon the Unified Corrections Project for research and planning. In order to meet the evaluation objectives, four methods and types of data collection were utilized: (1) use of reports, documents and other written material that provided information on the program development; (2) the collection of case activity data directly from the client's files; (3) the use of client and staff surveys to supplement recorded activity data and to provide some quantitative feed-back; and (4) the use of case studies taken directly from the files and supplemented by research staff.

The present evaluation centers primarily on the Community Resource Management Team process, dealing with the multijurisdictional aspect only when it relates to program development. Original plans called for a cost analysis of the program, which was a major issue in the multijurisdictional concept. However, this part of the program was deleted and will be addressed later in this paper. Early in the gathering of data, it became evident to the researcher that the data to adequately analyze the cost of resource brokerage were not available. Since the direct operational cost of the CRMT and traditional units to the Agency are relatively the same under the original approach, the cost analysis effort was abandoned.

Final evaluation objectives included the following: (1) to document and describe the CRMT process as implemented by the Unified Corrections Project of the Corrections Services Agency; (2) to document and compare the level of service delivery by the CRMT and a comparison group utilizing traditional approaches; (3) to document and compare some initial indicators of service effectiveness by the CRMT and traditional approaches.

Project Phases

The Community Resources Management Team, as implemented in Ventura County, has passed through four major organizational and operational stages.

Stage I: November and December of 1976 represented a time of training and process development. During that time, the Tri-Agency staff (CSA, CDC and CYA) were located together, along with their caseloads, awaiting

the time when they were to be blended into a team with a pool caseload. Contacts had been made and a contract developed with a consultant to provide training in the development and implementation of the Community Resources Management Team. These preliminary sessions dealt with the whole concept of resource brokerage, what was needed in the community and how a team might go about marshaling resources to meet a client's needs. One of the tasks was the completion of a needs assessment on all clients assigned to the caseload. Each client's status in 13 areas was assessed according to their level of need for service. The exercise not only oriented staff to a diagnostic approach critical to the resource brokerage process, but also provided a beginning profile of the entire caseload that would be served as a basis of organizational and procedural development.

Off-site training sessions took place where all officers assigned to the program were joined by other supervisors, managerial staff from each agency, and their secretaries. The training concentrated on team building, orientation and commitment to resource brokerage, client advocacy, and developed into a preliminary design for unit process. Each staff member was given primary responsibility for the development of resources within their areas of assignment, to be carried out in liaison with other members of the team. An issue arose regarding the level of commitment to the project from the various agencies and managers, and to their willingness to advocate the changes that would be required if the multijurisdictional caseload were to become a viable reality. The middle managers agreed to commit staff to the project through December, 1977, to allow for a full year of activity. There was a consensus that the Agency managers would support and give permission for procedural changes that did not have policy implications. However, it was also recognized that major changes would need to be dealt with on a step-by-step basis, approaching Policy Boards as the need for modification became apparent and only when the position or recommended process was fully developed.

The Team left that week of training with enthusiasm, and readiness to be team members, brokers of resources, and advocates for clients and the system change and modification that would be required for success.

During the second week of December, 1976, the Staff were feeling the frustration of overwork and the emotional distress of trying to implement new methods and procedures while still handling all their old responsibilities. Court and board reports were numerous and mandated. Staff were spending the majority of their time in the office dictating and were hindered in setting the sub-system processes needed to implement the new approach. Also, the necessity for the person representing

each Agency to do his or her own reports compounded the problems. Because of state procedural requirements, only the Corrections Services Agency staff were able to begin seeing clients from other agencies to any degree, since there were pooled caseloads. All staff were putting in overtime without compensation. Pressure from overwork was also reflected in the Team's resistance to the evaluation plan and efforts to establish some method of data collection. Yet despite the earlier commitments to the resource brokerage concept, some staff were already expressing concern over the impersonal aspect of resource brokerage and were experiencing discomfort with the pressure to move away from the one-to-one client caseworker relationship.

Stage II: Stage II (January to April 1, 1977) was the most critical time for the Multijurisdictional Unit. While activities centered around further development of the CRMT process, major problems were developing with the Multijurisdictional System that were beyond the staff's control. Administrators from all three agencies were faced with decisions that would drastically alter the organization of the unit. During the month of January, the record keeping and tracking system were fully established and all clients on the caseload were tied into the new system. Because of time problems, it was decided that clients would no longer attend staff meetings.

Because of the continuing problems, arrangements were made to have a meeting during the third week of January, where all local supervisors from each of the agencies would be present. Each staff member prepared a list of alternatives to be explored by the group for barriers that concerned their agency. These issues were discussed but no action was taken until after the first week of February in order that each supervisor could return to their agency and explore some of the ideas presented with other management personnel. By this time, all the staff members were feeling the pressure of continuing the many procedural requirements required by the State and were not finding any relief to develop the new system. It was at this point that the consultant made a very critical and careful analysis of the program and felt that major changes had to occur or the program could not continue under a system that required adherence to former procedures and at the same time was attempting to develop a new system of case delivery. The Corrections Services Agency met with the coordinator of the project and discussed this report. The Director made a commitment to continue testing the resource brokerage team concept even if the state agencies withheld personnel from the program.

Throughout February, a reply was not received from the state agencies as to their ability to alter procedures. Members of the Team asked for a decision from administrators to either: (1) Relieve the Team

of violations reports, thus simplifying unit functions and allowing more rapid development of resource brokerage, or (2) allow the Team to continue doing all legally mandated functions typically assigned to Field Supervision Units, but have the three agencies or departments supply uniform report formats, procedures and a cross transfer for parole-probation officer's authority over multijurisdictional clients. A target date of April 1 was set, with the understanding that this was the maximum amount of time the Team felt that it could carry on until major changes could be implemented.

A series of meetings and consultations were held between staff and management of the three agencies, and the CSA director submitted a proposal for reorganization of the Multijurisdictional Caseload. Essentially, the proposal involved the removal of the state cases from the pool caseload and the assignment of two or three more CSA caseload and probation officers to the unit. The CSA personnel would continue to supervise their own cases in the traditional manner; however, still housed at the office with the CSA Unit.

Neither CDC nor CYA were able to facilitate the changes needed to save the Multijurisdictional System. For CDC the break was a clean one, with only a request that they be kept informed of the Unit's progress with CRMT.

The Youth Authority was more hesitant, however, as the regional administrator had been a fervent supporter of "Unified Corrections" and had expressed strong objection to letting the concept die. Staff and clients were withdrawn only with the hope that another effort, under better circumstances, might be attempted. By April 1, all state personnel and their cases were set to return to their original offices.

Stage III: Although April began with some hope that some state involvement would continue, by the second week, all state cases and staff were out of the office. Meetings with CSA management resulted in the decision that one additional DPO would be added to the caseload and that all cases in the Oxnard offices classified as regular cases would be assigned to this Unit. With the addition of the new officer and cases, the workload increased. The caseload count went from approximately 230 at the end of April, to 304 at the end of May. Staff developed the 90-day case progress report cycle on all service cases and a 180-day review cycle on monitoring cases was established. During June, a case staffing format was committed to writing. Sub-system assignments were reorganized to reflect workload fluctuations.

It was realized that by the end of December, 1977, the funding for this project would discontinue and a decision was made by CSA to transfer into the Agency the CRMT Unit so that it might continue to experiment with the brokerage concept.

Stage IV - Final Design: As of September 5, less than one year from the initiation of the multijurisdictional caseload, the CRMT Unit achieved what it hoped to be a stable design with most of the "bugs" worked out. As of this time, the Unit was staffed with one senior deputy probation officer, four deputy probation officers, one community worker, and two part-time Criminal Justice interns. There are five sub-system assignments. Mental and Substance Abuse each have approximately 70 clients assigned. Monitoring has 110, Employment 40, and Social Services, 40. The officers assigned to the latter two functions also handle intake because of their lower caseload. This arrangement continues to be flexible, depending on staff and workload fluctuations. When the Unified Corrections Project ends in November, the Unit will be under the direct supervision of the Field Services Division manager.

As can be seen by the previous information, it was extremely difficult for the researcher on this project to carry out assigned responsibilities. Because of the problems very early in the project, there was constant shifting of clientele and thus reexamination of the researcher's role and the documentation that would be necessary.

The Outcomes

In terms of reliability and validity of the data, it is of utmost importance that readers of this report be aware of and accept its weaknesses and limitations. There are several significant factors that emphasize the need to consider this as only an initial and inconclusive look at the CRMT process.

First, the necessity to complete the evaluation by the end of the grant period forced research staff to use activity data for a time when the CRMT process was not only not fully developed, but was undergoing constant change. The study period of January through June in no way provides a valid assessment of the casework approach. Rules and procedures were new to both staff and clients and resource development was still in the beginning stages.

Second, again the time constraints forced the use of a cross-sectional sample rather than a longitudinal one. This made comparisons inconsistent and uneven. Further, the short study period prevented any real examination of results.

Third, the comparison groups were just that. The client sample profile shows some of the discrepancies. Emphasis should be on the difference in process and methods between the two groups, not on relative effectiveness.

Fourth, the small returns on the client survey make its validity questionable. Although those from the CRMT clients may be reasonably representative, certainly there are too few from the others to make any fair assumptions.

C nclusions

Despite these limitations, it does appear that there are some preliminary conclusions that can be drawn regarding the multijurisdictional effort, and trends have developed that give some interesting insights into the CRMT and traditional processes.

The conclusion of the researchers, based on study findings, is that the multijurisdictional approach to field services as implemented by the Unified Corrections Project is not a workable model. Further, that if the program is to succeed, major administrative and legal changes will have to precede any successful effort.

- A. The three systems cannot be combined into one. A fourth system must be developed which incorporates the needs of the other three, with one set of procedures, to all staff.
- B. There must be clarification as to agency loyalty and responsibility when a multiagency staff is utilized. Staff cannot serve two masters.
- C. If the approach is to be revised even under another model, there must be a reassessment of needs and a recommitment to the project by each agency. Further, that commitment should come from the highest level of staff, as well as the Policy Boards that govern agency activities.
- D. There must be some agreement among the agencies involved as to the eventual objectives of a multijurisdictional unit - whether it is to be gradual assumption by one agency of field services for all, or solely to demonstrate cooperation among the agencies.

The early evidence found in this report confirms that staff using the CRMT approach do identify more client needs, encourage clients to be aware of these needs, utilize more resources and, in general have a more productive approach to field services than do the traditional units. At the same time, the regular supervision units emphasize more direct services and individual contacts, while the subsidy unit emphasized the law enforcement-surveillance aspects of the job.

Outcome data were too weak to conclude anything about effectiveness of the approach at this point.

It is felt that the CRMT Unit has demonstrated its viability even for such early data. The unit should be continued for further study now that the process and procedures are fully implemented and all efforts should be made to conduct an effective analysis. In the meantime, CSA should seriously consider an adaptation of some of the CRMT procedures into the traditional

units to improve recording and diagnostic processes in these units. Research staff found that CRMT's files were more consistent, accurate, and reflective of case activity.

Policy Alternatives

The Management and Research Team assessed in this project developed two policy options for the Multijurisdictional Unit and five for the CRMT Unit. For the multijurisdictional effort, the first alternative was to discontinue this approach and make no attempt to revise coordinated field supervision efforts between state and local agencies. The major advantage to discontinuing this multijurisdictional effort lies in the easing of tension and frustration on the part of all staff members associated with the implementation process. The major disadvantages to this approach relate to the continuing need to assess effective approaches for correctional clientele. For some people, such a withdrawal may be interpreted as a defeat for the whole concept and this could be a disadvantage to supporters. For this reason, this alternative is rejected. The second alternative seems feasible and that is to meet with influential representatives of appropriate agencies to review past experience and reexamine the need and feasibility of continued multijurisdictional efforts in the probation-parole fields. Advantages may be to establish greater communication with the agencies in question and to reexamine top administrative support to continued efforts to look at this approach.

The first alternative to CRMT was to discontinue the CRMT Unit and return program staff to the regular field operations. To accomplish this would mean having four deputy probation officers and one senior deputy probation officer and approximately 400 probationers returned to a regular supervision unit. The advantages to this action would include a more consistent approach to probation supervision by having all Field Services Units operate on the same philosophy and methodology for delivery of probation supervision services. The disadvantages would include the discontinuation of experimentation and delivery of services to probationers and the opportunity to thoroughly test the efficacy of resource brokerage. It would also be disadvantageous to end the experiment before an adequate period of time has elapsed. This could not only be a disservice to the concept, but to the staff who participated in the program. For these reasons, this alternative was rejected.

The second alternative is more feasible, and that is to continue the CRMT Unit with the present staffing level, with a three-month management review and evaluation. This approach would allow the gathering of additional data to more critically look at the whole CRMT process, thus allowing management more data to make decisions in the future. It is also feasible because it was a commitment to continue using existing resources to accomplish the task. At the end of the three-month period, a decision could be made to abandon the project or to continue the analytical effort. Certainly the executive staff would be involved in any final review or decision process.

The third alternative is to continue the CRMT Unit with present staffing levels, with appropriate research staff to continue the evaluation and make recommendations to management. This alternative was rejected because at the present time the Agency does not have other research staff to accomplish this option. It is doubtful that the Board of Supervisors would reconsider a budget allocation to staff this project in mid-year. However, with alternative two, it might be possible in this budget year to have enough data available to request the Board of Supervisors to include a research staff within the Agency budget.

Alternative four is to transfer certain elements of CRMT to Field Services. These elements would be the needs assessment methodology, the team approach, systematic approach to the use of community resources and adoption of recording and reporting procedures. This is a very favorable alternative in that it is foreseen that attempting to adopt any of the major elements of CRMT on a large scale would be risky and would meet with some staff resistance. However, if implemented incrementally with appropriate consultation and training, it is felt that this is very feasible. The biggest disadvantage would be a change in the present procedures and the accompanying resistance to change. The major advantage relates to quicker delivery of probation services, accountability, standardization and increased involvement by communities in the corrections process.

Alternative five, to expand the CRMT model to all Probation Field Units, would be difficult to accomplish. The study of the CRMT model has produced very limited data that would support the total implementation of this model into all Field Units. There would be staff resistance to attempting to establish this program on a county-wide basis. It would present a serious threat to traditional casework models. In addition, there might be a great deal of opposition generated by employee and professional groups who would support the employee's resistance to the implementation of such a program. It is unknown at the present time whether this new method would really be cost effective and provide better services in field operations. There has been a lack of management time to analyze the implications implementing the CRMT model on a county-wide basis.

The Problems of Implementation

There are a number of decisions that can be reached. The data available in the evaluation report negates serious consideration of either alternative one (discontinue the project) or alternative five (extend the approach to all Field Units). While there is insufficient evidence to justify total commitment to either resource brokerage or the team approach, there is certainly sufficient positive information to warrant further experimentation and study.

The present lack of research staff and lack of sufficient data to justify a request in the near future, make alternative three impractical despite the need. Alternative two, which would have field service personnel continue in a three-month management analysis, is feasible providing that there is commitment and reallocation of existing resources to accomplish the task. At the end of the three months, a decision could be made to abandon the project, or to continue it for further analytical efforts.

Alternative four, in which certain selected components would be adapted to the traditional units, is most feasible if implementation is in stages. Staff resistance can be lessened if transfer of the more effective elements of CRMT is gradual and evaluated at each step. The recording and reporting system would be the easiest to implement and would address an existing problem area. It is critical to have all management staff involved in the review process. At this point, the director of the agency and the executive staff have met to discuss the CRMT Unit. A decision has been reached to continue the CRMT Unit after the grant funds run out on December 31, 1977. The project is being transferred to the Field Division and it is expected that administrative help will be available to continue the data collection. In addition, the administrative staff is exploring the possibility of incorporating some of the CRMT components into regular field operations.

DECENTRALIZATION OF ADULT PROBATION SERVICES
IN MARICOPA COUNTY

55839

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Origin of the Issue

The Maricopa County Adult Probation Department was established by the Criminal Division of the Maricopa County Superior Court on December 6, 1971. During the first year of its operation, the Department had a total of 1,937 individuals on probation under its supervision. During 1972, the staff of Adult Probation Officers grew from 21 to 43 with 22 officers at year's end responsible for the supervision of almost 2,000 probationers. During that year, the investigating officers wrote a total of 2,502 presentence reports.

Today, in 1977, the same facilities now house 68 Adult Probation Officers, with a total number of 122 employees. The total number of persons on probation during 1976 has also significantly increased to 3,809, representing an increase of almost 97% since 1972. Also, during the year 3,543 presentence reports were written by the investigating officers, an increase of 42% in the four-year period. As of July 1977, the total number of cases under supervision was 4,316.

This growth, as indicated by the increased numbers of both probationers and probation department staff, has had a significant impact on the physical facilities and the provision of services. The increasing numbers of probationers and need for staff is outlined in the Department's Five-Year Plan.

Throughout this century, the decennial rate of population growth for Maricopa County has been significantly higher than the United States as a whole. Compared to the 2.67 times increase of the United States from 1900 to 1970, Maricopa County increased 47.34 times. Since 1940, the rate of

County population growth has steadily accelerated. This historical growth pattern clearly indicates that Maricopa County will continue to realize substantial population increase in the years ahead.

In summary, the problem is one of being able to continue our level and quality of services and meet the goals and objectives of the Adult Probation Department; i.e., protection of the community and rehabilitation of the offender, despite the increasing caseload sizes and concomitant additions of staff. Already, space limitations preclude privacy and diminish effectiveness of communication between staff and clients. Also, ever increasing distances between the downtown office and growing probationer populations in developing outlying areas are limiting client accessibility. These combined effects already may be beginning to impede accomplishment of the goals of rehabilitation and protection of the community.

The goal of this study is to prepare a preliminary report on decentralization which will: Assess alternative areas for location of community-based satellite offices in Maricopa County; identify and describe key issues inherent with decentralization; and make recommendations based on the findings.

Decentralization is defined as the dispersion or distribution of functions and powers from a central authority to regional and local authorities. More specifically, for purposes of discussion and as used throughout the study, decentralization refers to an organizational structure where one or more service units meets all of the following criteria:

1. Responsible for providing a basic probation service, e.g., case supervision.
2. Geographically proximate to client population--the service unit occupies permanent office space within a prescribed geographical area.
3. Self-contained--the service unit has the staff, facilities and equipment necessary to operate on a relatively independent basis.

Analyzing the Implications of Decentralized Administration

To investigate the topic of decentralization, a small staff committee was appointed. The committee continued its regular assignments while devoting time to this research. The resultant product and conclusions derived from the inquiry are presented as a sampling of a multitude of considerations involved in the complex topic of decentralization. The results are a product of various limitations in the areas of information accessibility, time restrictions, scheduling difficulties and participant expertise. Further, the results are inextricably tied to variables which are uncontrollable, and changes over time may significantly impact on the conclusions.

From the onset of the investigation, it was absolutely necessary to limit the scope of the project. Critical decisions were made predicated on limiting

the study to topics determined most germane to significant issues. Initially, committee members recognized that there are few standards to guide decision-making with reference to decentralization. Therefore, from an investigative standpoint, it was necessary to adopt a few basic assumptions on which to build a foundation for meaningful inquiry. As an operational imperative and specifically for the preparation of this report only, committee members accepted decentralization as an inevitability. The acceptance of that assumption allowed the focus of the investigation to shift from a discussion based largely on philosophical ambiguities to the concrete realities of a move toward decentralization.

The key issues related to decentralization were identified in this study by the following methods: Verbal analysis; a review and examination of secondary sources; and use of a questionnaire developed by the committee to solicit input from all staff within the Adult Probation Department. Several outside agencies were contacted and information on decentralization was requested.

In order to obtain input from staff regarding decentralization, a questionnaire was devised, using primarily open-ended questions to gain as much information as possible. The questionnaire was distributed to all probation officers and their supervisors, as well as all clerical personnel. A memo was circulated to all staff informing them of the study and requesting their input. Results of the questionnaire were then compiled.

Maricopa County was divided into six areas for purposes of assessing alternative sites for satellite offices. The boundaries of these areas were determined after a careful examination of past and currently existing field caseload boundaries. An attempt was made to follow the natural boundaries between cities and towns where they exist, as is done with the field caseloads. Area 1 is the Northwest section of the County; Area 2 represents the North Central section; Area 3 the Northeast section, bordered by the Salt River on the south; Area 4 represents the Southeast section of the County; Area 5 the South Central, including the inner city area; and Area 6 is inclusive of the Southwest section of the County.

After the establishment of boundary lines, the task was to place the caseloads of the assigned officers into the six appropriate field areas.

Point-in-time measurements of the various officer's caseloads for each area were taken, using June 30 and December 31 as the points. Point in time was used versus intervals to control for new caseloads or dissolved caseloads within the interval periods. Each area was subdivided into years with the two measurement points for each year depicted by officer. A percentage comparison was then done between the total numbers of probationers from June to December for years 1974, 1975, 1976 and June of 1977. A percentage

comparison was then done between the caseload total of June 1974 and the caseload balance of June 1977.

Since a contrast between the selected areas and the In-County probation population was desired, point measurements of the In-County caseload were also done in the same manner as the area summaries. The In-County caseload used for this project did not include the Department's active warrants, Report Only Caseload (ROC), Out-of-State Caseload (OOS), or the Out-of-County caseload (OOC), since these caseloads are not designated or restricted to certain areas within the County. But, for comparison purposes only, percentage changes were calculated for the total population which included the warrants, Report Only Caseload, Out-of-State Caseload, and Out-of-County Caseload, and for the combined In-County plus Report Only Caseloads. From June of 1974 to June 1977, the total probation population increased by 1,394 persons, or 47.7%. The In-County plus the Report Only caseloads jumped from 2,325 to 3,405 for a difference of 1,080 persons, or 46.5%. (In June of 1974, the Report Only Caseload had not been formed. The caseload came into being in November of that year, with 19 cases its first month.)

In addition to examining probationer population and movements, it was necessary to study characteristics of the general population in Maricopa County, as well as characteristics of selected sub-populations.

The criminal justice system in particular responds to population growth because it is totally a people-serving system. The growth of the community directly increases the potential for contacts between citizens and representatives of the justice system. There is a definite association between the level of need and the size of the population. However, population alone did not seem adequate for determining the allocation of services, so high risk groups were isolated within the overall population.

Age is recognized as a characteristic with significant impact on crime and, thus, on the level of activity of the entire criminal justice system. Although persons of nearly every age group are involved in criminal activity, the component of the population between 18 and 24 years of age is recognized as a high risk group. The chart on Page 5 indicates the age distribution of probationers in Maricopa County, and graphically shows that over 60% of the probationer population in the County is in the 18-24 bracket.

With the above in mind, alternative geographical areas were assessed by examining:

- Total persons below poverty level (1970 census)
- Aid to families with dependent children (AFDC)
- Family rates (June 1971 and August 1976)
- Projected County population distribution (August 1977)

FIGURE 1
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF PROBATIONERS AS OF 6-30-77




TABLE 1

AGE	PROBATIONER NUMBERS	% OF TOTAL PROBATIONERS	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
17 & Under	11	.2	.2
18-21	1,687	39.9	40.1
22-24	856	20.3	60.4
25-27	556	13.2	73.6
28-35	649	15.4	89.0
36-40	189	4.4	93.4
41-45	113	2.6	96.0
46 & Over	173	4.0	100.0
TOTALS	4,234	100.0	

As indicated in the cumulative percent column above, 89.0% of the total probation population (as of 6-30-77) were 35 years or under in age.

- Percentages of age groups in households (October 1976)
- Population by age and sex (1975)
- Annual percentage growth in population (1970 and 1975 census)
- Population projections for 1976-1982 (1970 and 1975 census)

To process charts and maps for the age distribution of household members, the Probation Department's caseload areas were superimposed onto a map of Maricopa County containing consumer survey districts. These districts were identified and grouped within the six defined areas.

The questions and key issues identified by the analysis are listed below:

FIGURE 2

ISSUES IDENTIFIED

<u>Questions Considered</u>	<u>Key Issues Identified</u>
Why	Quality of Service
Where	Accessibility to Public Transportation
When	Existing Space Limitations
Who	Staffing and Reorganization
How	Policies and Procedures

Obviously, the questions and related issues are not mutually exclusive and the results are based on a review of secondary sources, verbal analysis and an open-ended questionnaire.

Most staff who returned the questionnaire were supportive of decentralization. (Approximately 45% of the staff returned the questionnaire.) The majority of probation officers were not in favor of locating near law enforcement agencies, but slightly over one half of the probation officers were in favor of locating near social service agencies.

The population below poverty level in 1970 was 113,469 or 11.9% of the total Maricopa County population (see Appendix Tables). There were more persons below poverty level in Area 1 than in Areas 4 or 6. Areas 1 and 4 each had 18% of the persons below poverty level. (The description of demographic variables concentrates on Areas 1, 4 and 6, because Area 5 is now served by the Central Office.)

Considering that some census figures were extremely high, the average number of AFDC families per thousand of total population was highest in Area 6, followed by Areas 4 and 1 respectively. Although the total number of AFDC families increased between 1971 and 1976, the largest percentage of growth was in Areas 1 and 4, with 68% each. Nevertheless, Area 5 had the largest absolute number of AFDC families.

The increase in urban and rural population of Maricopa County between 1975-1985 is projected at 29.3% and 84.3% from 1975 to 2000. Among three target areas, Area 4 indicates the highest number and percentage of the total county population (of the three) through the year 1985. Area 6 indicates the highest percentage of increase from 1975 to 2000.

Area 4 shows the highest percentage of people within the 18-24 year-old age group, followed by Areas 6 and 1 respectively. Area 4 also shows the highest percentage of annual growth (9.50%) between 1970 and 1975, followed by Area 1 (6.19%). Area 6 has the least percentage of annual growth (0.69%).

Population projections for 1976 to 1982, based on 1970 and 1975 annual rates of growth, estimate increased populations for Area 1 as 93,852 people (96.4%), Area 4 with 160,044 people (66.1%) and Area 6 with 961 people (0.2%). Even though Area 4 has more people, Area 1 is growing at a faster rate. Representatives of the Maricopa County Health Department, Demographics section, as well as the Arizona State Department of Economic Security, predict that population expansion will initially reach maximum capacity in Area 4, followed by Area 1, and finally Area 6.

Excluding Area 5 (182,000 people), Area 4 (74,415) represents three times as many people between the ages of 15 and 29 as Area 1 (24,697); Area 6 only has 3,669 people within this age group.^{1/} The state of Arizona and Maricopa County have 49.2 and 48.9 percent male population respectively; the 15 to 29 year-old group encompasses 50.9 percent males.

Outcomes

In reviewing the results of our probationer and general population studies, comparisons can be made between the six defined areas. It is easily seen that based on population and movement, Areas 1 and 4 are comparable. From 1974 to 1977, the population of probationers in Area 1 increased 33.4%, and in Area 4 the population of probationers increased 41.0%. In actual numbers, the increases were 123 and 112, respectively. Area 5, representing

^{1/}

Population Estimates of Arizona as of July 1, 1976, Department of Economic Security (DES) report #9 (DES 1305 8-77).

the greater part of the Phoenix city limits, had the next highest growth, up 26.2%, with the greatest increase in actual numbers. Since the central office appears suitably located and adequately serves this area of the central city, only Areas 1 and 4 need be discussed and compared here. Areas 2 and 6 showed very slight growth in probationer populations and Area 3 actually showed a small decline.

General population growth in the county from 1970 to 1975 paralleled probationer growth, with Areas 1 and 4 showing greatest percentages of annual growth, 6.19% and 9.0%, respectively. The only other area coming close was Area 2 with 4.9% annual growth. Projecting to 1985, again Areas 1 and 4 show greatest total population growth, 48% and 77%, respectively. The only area close is Area 2 with 37% projected growth. However, projecting to the year 2000, the growth change in Area 6 is the most dramatic, up 330.5%, compared to 260.5% for Area 4, and 198% for Area 1. The next closest is Area 2 again, up 50.9%. An actual population projection comparison in the year 2000 between those three areas reveals Area 1 with 240,800, Area 4 with 545,000, and Area 6 with 74,100 projected population. In 1975, Area 6 had only 18,228.

Since the Adult Probation Department lacks a statistical data base that is capable of providing specific information regarding characteristics of probationers within the defined geographical areas, no additional concrete comparisons of areas can be made. Attempts to determine what portion of client population in each of the six areas is dependent on the Department of Economic Security assistance programs was also not possible. The only comparisons possible were poverty populations and age of populations between the geographical areas, and these are presented for the reader's consideration, without attempting untenable generalizations. Areas 1 and 4 have the largest percentage of the poverty population, outside of Area 5; each has just over 18% of the persons below poverty level. The next closest was Area 6 with 7%. Area 4 also had the greatest number of people in the 18-24 age bracket, 33%, compared to 31% for Area 6, and 26% for Area 1.

As results of the probationer population and general population studies indicate, population growth and movement are in both the Northwest Area 1, including Glendale, and the Southeast Area 4, including Tempe and Mesa. Both areas appear to be good alternative areas for the first community-based satellite office(s). A community-based office in Area 1 at this time would serve 491 male probationers, if services are limited to the residents of Area 1. Similarly, a community-based office in Area 4, as of June 30, 1977, would serve a total of 385 male probationers. These figures do not include female probationers; however, the number of women in the two areas would also appear to be fairly equal, with approximately 75 to 100 in each of the respective areas. A community-based office in Area 4 could

also serve probationers in Area 3, or a combined total of 469 male probationers.

At this time, there does not appear to be any significant differences in the two areas in terms of the key issues described within this report; adjustments that would need to be made with decentralization in one area would be required in the other. Two alternatives appear to be: (a) narrow the choice to one and establish a "pilot" office within the area; or, (b) establish two satellite offices simultaneously based in both areas.

Based on the committee's findings, it is recommended, at this time, that the Maricopa County Adult Probation Department immediately consider setting a goal to initiate decentralization of Probation Field Services. With a commitment to this goal, it is then recommended that the Probation Department:

- Establish the first community-based area offices simultaneously as pilot projects in Areas 1 and 4;
- Review the Department of Economic Security's implementation plan for area offices, examine its selected sites, and explore the feasibility of co-location;
- Conduct cost comparisons for selected alternative sites within Areas 1 and 4;
- Perform an on-site examination of operating decentralized probation offices;
- Prepare an implementation plan for decentralization;
- Pursue tentative funding approval for decentralization.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1

PERSONS BELOW POVERTY LEVEL BY AREA, 1970

<u>AREA</u>	<u>POVERTY POPULATION</u>	<u>PERCENT OF TOTAL PERSONS BELOW POVERTY LEVEL</u>	<u>PERCENT BELOW POVERTY LEVEL FROM TOTAL COUNTY POPULATION</u>
1	20,864	18.3	2.1
2	6,394	5.6	0.6
3	4,545	4.0	0.4
4	20,636	18.1	2.1
5	53,007	46.7	5.5
6	8,023	7.0	0.8

TABLE 2

AFDC RECIPIENTS PER THOUSAND FAMILIES BY AREA,
1971 AND 1976

<u>AREA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>		<u>MEAN AFDC FAMILIES PER THOUSAND POPULATION</u>		<u>PERCENT CHANGE</u>
	<u>1971</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1976</u>	
1	573.2	964.7	10.4	17.5	68.0
2	241.0	173.6	8.3	6.0	- 39.0
3	49.9	243.8	2.6	12.8	392.0
4	562.2	964.4	12.2	20.5	68.0
5	5385.0	5769.8	72.8	78.0	7.1
6	259.6	386.8	26.0	38.7	49.0

TABLE 3
PROJECTED URBAN/RURAL POPULATION BY AREA
(REVISED AUGUST, 1977)

<u>AREA</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>PERCENT TOTAL COUNTY</u>		<u>PERCENT TOTAL COUNTY</u>		<u>PERCENT TOTAL COUNTY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE INCREASE</u>	
		<u>1985</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>1975-1985</u>	<u>1975-2000</u>			
1	95,034	7.6	132,300	8.3	240,800	0.5	48.0	198.0
2	11,532	0.9	15,800	1.0	17,400	0.8	37.0	50.9
3	78,560	6.3	92,700	5.8	106,400	4.6	18.0	35.4
4	240,825	19.3	380,700	23.6	545,700	23.7	76.7	260.5
5	698,224	56.0	802,200	49.8	1,042,100	45.4	14.9	49.3
6	18,228	1.5	28,200	1.8	74,100	4.0	41.3	330.5
TOTAL	1,246,500		1,612,000		2,297,000		29.3	84.3

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF AGE GROUPS BY AREA

<u>AREA</u>	<u>AVERAGE PERCENT 18-24</u>	<u>AVERAGE PERCENT 25-29</u>
1	26.0	22.0
2	28.0	14.7
3	18.5	11.0
4	33.0	22.0
5	32.2	20.3
6	31.0	26.0

TABLE 5

COUNTY POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY AREA

<u>AREA</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>PERCENT OF ANNUAL GROWTH 1970 - 1975</u>
1	51,289	87,295	6.19
2	7,155	9,121	4.975
3	67,823	78,065	2.857
4	142,660	218,222	9.504
5	582,500	669,005	2.808
6	12,647	12,584	0.648

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

TABLE 6

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTY POPULATION BY AREA
(BASED ON 1970-1975 ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH)

<u>AREA</u>	<u>AGE GROUP</u>	<u>BOTH SEXES</u>	<u>MALE</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>FEMALE</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
1	15-19	8,800	4,483	50.9	4,317	49.1
	20-24	7,856	3,902	49.7	3,954	51.3
	25-29	<u>8,041</u>	<u>4,105</u>	<u>51.1</u>	<u>3,936</u>	<u>48.9</u>
		<u>24,697</u>	<u>12,490</u>	<u>50.6</u>	<u>12,207</u>	<u>49.4</u>
2	15-19	1,089	577	53.0	512	47.0
	20-24	388	216	55.7	172	44.3
	25-29	<u>238</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>136</u>	<u>57.1</u>
		<u>1,715</u>	<u>895</u>	<u>52.2</u>	<u>820</u>	<u>47.8</u>
3	15-19	8,434	4,338	51.4	4,096	48.6
	20-24	5,405	2,791	51.6	2,614	48.4
	25-29	<u>4,787</u>	<u>2,291</u>	<u>47.9</u>	<u>2,496</u>	<u>52.1</u>
		<u>18,626</u>	<u>9,420</u>	<u>50.6</u>	<u>9,206</u>	<u>49.4</u>
4	15-19	24,373	12,034	49.4	12,339	50.6
	20-24	28,030	14,380	51.3	13,650	48.7
	25-29	<u>22,012</u>	<u>11,339</u>	<u>51.5</u>	<u>10,673</u>	<u>48.5</u>
		<u>74,415</u>	<u>37,753</u>	<u>50.7</u>	<u>36,662</u>	<u>49.3</u>
5	15-19	63,966	32,988	51.6	30,978	48.4
	20-24	58,938	28,483	48.3	30,455	51.7
	25-29	<u>59,096</u>	<u>29,526</u>	<u>50.0</u>	<u>29,570</u>	<u>50.0</u>
		<u>182,000</u>	<u>90,997</u>	<u>50.0</u>	<u>91,003</u>	<u>50.0</u>
6	15-19	1,489	774	52.0	715	48.0
	20-24	1,223	620	50.7	603	49.3
	25-29	<u>957</u>	<u>487</u>	<u>50.9</u>	<u>470</u>	<u>49.1</u>
		<u>3,669</u>	<u>1,881</u>	<u>51.3</u>	<u>1,788</u>	<u>48.7</u>

TABLE 7

POPULATION PROJECTIONS OF INCORPORATED AREAS
(BASED ON 1970-1975 ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH)

<u>AREA</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
1	97,404	108,786	121,594	136,025	152,283	170,605	191,256
2	9,574	10,051	10,551	11,076	11,627	12,206	12,813
3	80,292	82,582	84,938	87,361	89,854	92,417	95,053
4	241,982	263,212	286,375	311,624	339,173	369,232	402,026
5	687,790	707,103	726,958	774,370	768,356	789,932	812,112
6	17,775	17,924	18,084	18,252	18,430	18,617	18,736

INTERAGENCY RELATIONS

55840

CLASSIFICATION AND SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR JUVENILES

Warren Netherland
Department of Social and Health Services
Community Services Division
Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation
State of Washington

Origin of the Issue

Early in 1976, the Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation began to review its programs, clients, and the systems used to integrate these two into an effective treatment agency. Through this analysis, a number of problems were noted:

1. Inadequate and inaccurate information available about clients;
2. Lack of system integration and coordination;
3. Lack of consistency in programs and release practices;
4. Programs not specifically linked to special needs of youth;
5. Lack of emphasis on need for protection of the community;
6. Inadequate linkage in the movement of youth from the community, institutions, and back to the community.

After considering these problems, BJR administrators felt that steps should be taken to standardize the critical agency decisions affecting youth. The focus of this effort quickly centered on development of an objective length-of-stay policy based primarily on offense behavior. Since all juvenile sentences were indeterminate, the decision to release a youth was the responsibility of the Bureau and especially subject to abuse. This emphasis was prompted, in part, by an assessment of what was felt to be the origins of the problems within BJR, and, in part, by events occurring outside the agency.

The origin of these problems appeared to stem from inadequate administration control and a pattern of delegating decision-making authority to lower organizational levels. There was an overall lack of attention in the agency to managerial concerns. The general shift of emphasis to community programs, rather than institutions, reinforced the control problems. Further compounding these administrative dynamics was the agency's emphasis on "treatment", rather than protection of society or even on youths' delinquent behavior. Most programs within the Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation

were based on a medical model, and most superintendents were social workers.

These problems, particularly the lack of consistency in release policies, had generated a relatively high degree of concern outside the Department. Several legislators had expressed concern with the operations of the agency. It had become a priority issue with certain judges in the State. And prosecutors, court directors, police officers and others in the criminal justice field were openly and verbally critical of the Bureau's practices.

During this same period of time, and arising out of many of the same causes, new legislation was proposed, passed and planned for implementation. This legislation--the Juvenile Justice Act--directed the Department much more toward a determinate sentencing pattern but gave the responsibility for developing this sentencing structure to the Department.

From these events emerged two, overlapping, efforts by BJR. The first was the development of a factual-based classification system for youths which could be used as the foundation for a standardized length-of-stay policy. Before this policy was fully implemented, however, work began on devising a sentencing structure which would conform with the requirements of the Juvenile Justice Act. Although a distinct effort, the development of the sentencing structure built on the experience with the length-of-stay policy.

Developing a Standardized Classification System

In order to resolve the above problems, it was felt that a classification system could be developed that met several specific criteria:

1. It must generate decision relevant information without redundancy.
2. It must provide accurate information.
3. It must provide data that are as factual as possible and reduce individual opinion and judgment.
4. It must accurately reflect the community's perception regarding the seriousness of various delinquent behaviors.
5. It must provide information which indicates program needs for groups of youth.
6. It must identify specific problem groups for which new programs will need to be developed.
7. It must maintain the capability of diversion at the point of entry.
8. It must establish initial placement with the level of security needed.

Staff for carrying out this effort were drawn from two sources. A number of BJR personnel were detached from their normal duties and given responsibility for this project. They provided a detailed knowledge of the current operations

of the Bureau as well as a sensitivity to the objectives established for the fully developed system. As part of the Department of Social and Health Services the Bureau was also able to draw on the resources of the Department's Division of Research.* These two sets of personnel were combined into a single task force for the purpose of developing the classification system.

The task force began by reviewing the literature concerning classification and contacting other states and local jurisdictions within the State of Washington to see what existed as operational classification systems. Following this they monitored closely the decision-making process within the Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation to see what material was used in making placement and program decisions. After this initial review, it was decided to divide the classification system into three segments.

PHASE I - Offense Information--The primary responsibility to develop Phase I would rest with BJR staff. This phase would use past delinquent history of an individual youth as a primary data base. These data would be arranged in a hierarchical scale reflecting the public's perception of the seriousness of delinquent behavior. The scale would take into account committing offenses, the pattern of behavior, and when that behavior occurred.

PHASE II - Individual Information--The primary responsibility to develop this phase was given to the research staff. Appropriate information would be collected to respond to individual needs. This would include information necessary to make placement and program decisions. The data would include placement and treatment information, descriptive behavioral information, and personal background material. This phase is not discussed in this report.

PHASE III - Program Information--The primary responsibility for this task would rest with the Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation staff. This would consist of a critical review of the existing program components and the need for each. These programs would be related to basic population data (i.e., age, sex, educational levels, etc.) and program changes would be made based on the review. This task is still underway and will not be included in this report.

The task force working on the offense-based classification system found a number of initial problems. No classification system in other states or jurisdictions in the State of Washington were found useful. There was inadequate information about the youth currently being served within the Bureau. The task force began by categorizing all offenses according to the severity of their community impact. This served as the foundation for the classification system.

Current information systems, however, did not provide information needed to operationalize this typology. Consequently, a data system was developed

and information was collected on the total institutional population on a given date. Since that date, this data has been collected on all youth entering BJR. Additionally, for comparative purposes, a random sample of three previous years of admissions was selected and data collected on those groups.

While these baseline data were being collected, the task force developed a classification system that incorporated seriousness of the committing offense, the overall delinquent history and when delinquent behavior occurred. The historical population information was used to test the proposed classification system. The initial design resulted in too many groups and some that were extremely small representing less than one percent of the Bureau's population. Consequently, the categories were reorganized to conform with the pattern of commitments. To assess the expected impact of the classification system an effort was made to project future BJR populations using the historical data that was gathered. The results were used to make further adjustments in the formulae.

Once the system was put together, a rather extensive orientation and information plan was developed. Meetings were held with every court director in the State of Washington and institutional and parole staff to receive suggestions for revision and to make key persons aware of some major policy changes. Following these meetings, the classification system was implemented. It was first applied to all youth being received into the system. After two to three months all youth currently in institutions were classified as well. Finally, using the classification system a general length-of-stay policy was established for the BJR which was implemented for both institutions and parole.

Juvenile Justice Act Sentencing Standards

As the BJR began implementing the classification system, it also began working on the sentencing standards required under the new Juvenile Justice Act. It was felt that implementation of the classification system would make the transition to the sentencing structure a much easier, less traumatic experience. Another task force was created and given responsibility for this effort. This task force involved not only Bureau staff, but law enforcement, prosecutors, defense council, court directors, community agency representatives, institutional staff, parole staff, and other key individuals in the juvenile justice system. A number of models were considered including the classification system which had just been developed. Since the sentencing requirements under the new law were fairly rigid, a more comprehensive system was needed that set standards for the institutional and parole segments of the juvenile justice system as well as for community supervision, detention, and fines. Preliminary decisions were made concerning

a fairly complex point system. A random sample of referrals to juvenile courts in the 39 counties in Washington State was collected and technical consultants used to develop a simulation model. The model tested the impact of new sentencing structure on community agencies, diversion units and the institution and parole systems.

Following these initial simulations some minor modifications were made in order not to overload any segment of the system. Once the sentencing structure was developed, a very intensive information program was developed. The sentencing structures were discussed with a number of key legislators; copies were sent to all judges, court directors, community agencies, law enforcement, etc. Formal presentations were made to certain legislative committees, court directors, association meetings, law enforcement meetings, all institution staff, parole staff, and other segments of the juvenile justice system affected by the new standards. At the present time additional simulations are being done to describe in more precise terms the exact population composition which will be entering each point of the system. This will take into account a number of the unknowns and make a simulation based on various percentages where there are options available.

At the same time that these tasks were taking place, proposed amendments were being drafted to alter the new Juvenile Justice Act to minimize some of the problems which appeared obvious in the existing law.

The Outcomes

Two very specific products emerged from the dual effort which have had an immediate impact on agency operations: a formal length-of-stay policy based on the classification system and a set of explicit sentencing standards governing all intake and release decisions. Several less tangible, but no less important, outcomes of the process were the development of a data base on clients and agency operations which can be used for making further decisions; an interest in BJR for further evaluation of its programs; and an information and support network among the numerous segments of the juvenile justice system. Each of these outcomes will be discussed in detail.

The foundation of the length-of-stay policy was the offense classification system developed by the initial task force. All offenses were divided into six categories according to the severity of their impact on the community. At one end of the continuum were those offenses with severe impact against people, e.g., assault, murder, rape. At the other end were those with minimum effect on people and property, e.g., public indecency,

vehicle prowling, glue sniffing. Each offense committed by a youth was assigned a weight according to the category in which it fell, qualified by the number of months since the act was committed. This permitted the delinquent history of the individual to be taken into account while giving priority to the most recent offense in making the final decision.

The resultant score was then transferred to a matrix which established the expected minimum, maximum and average length of stay in an institution by the individual.

This classification formula was supported by a detailed set of instructions regarding what offenses would be considered (only those allegations found correct by a court, on-site hearing, an institution's Review Board, or the Parole Administrative Review); when the scheme should be applied; and what procedures were to be followed if the guidelines were exceeded. Since all juvenile sentences in Washington were indeterminate prior to passage of the Juvenile Justice Act, these standards were applied through administrative directive to the institutional and parole release process. In addition, specific criteria were established governing transfers and leaves for offenders based on the same classification procedure and institutional behavior.

The specific requirements contained in the Juvenile Justice Act required a revision of the classification scheme developed by the Bureau. The Act specified that only three factors were to be included in establishing sentencing standards--age, criminal history, and current offense. In addition, the Bill required that the minimum for any term of confinement over one year be no less than 80% of the maximum; minimum for terms between 90 days and 1 year no less than 75% of the maximum; and minimum for terms of 90 days no less than 50% of the maximum.

To incorporate the Bill's provisions into the Bureau's classification scheme, the number of offense categories was expanded to nine arranged along a continuum of degree of danger to people and property. A youth's age and current offense established a base point number which is multiplied by points received for criminal history. The resulting points establish what the standard disposition will be for that particular youth given his age, current offense and criminal history. Since, at this writing, the law had yet to take effect the impact of these standards has yet to be determined. But it is anticipated that it will continue the process begun under the Bureau's classification scheme.

Although these formal products of the analytical efforts have had a major impact on BJR operations, equally important are the less tangible outcomes. For the first time the Bureau had detailed information on the pattern of disposition of youthful offenders by agency. This has made possible the development of more coherent procedures for assigning offenders to the

appropriate institutional setting and reducing many of the abuses which were the basis for earlier criticisms of the agency. In addition, the data have been used to develop a more elaborate effort to assess the impact of the Juvenile Justice Act, and evaluate the effectiveness of Bureau programs.

A major outcome of the process has been the creation of an information network among the variety of actors involved in the juvenile justice system-- judges, court administrators, law enforcement personnel, prosecutors, and state officials. One state official deeply involved in the process estimated he had contact with over 1,000 individuals at the state and local level in the course of explaining first the BJR classification scheme and then the Juvenile Justice Act sentencing standards. One immediate effect of this network is that almost every segment of the juvenile justice system took part in the development of the proposed effort to evaluate the impact of the Juvenile Justice Act and the effectiveness of juvenile programs. Prosecutors, court directors, judges, institutions and community agencies have all participated in developing the concept paper for this project. On a more long term basis, they have also agreed to attempt to develop a common data collection system.

One effect of the project was to increase the Bureau's ability to address major issues in a systematic fashion. In the past, the Bureau has undertaken policy analysis or issue analysis projects. Typically, these were more restricted to individual program elements rather than a project as encompassing as the classification sentencing project. At no time in the past has the Bureau undertaken a project which had such widespread impact and implications. This project not only affects all of the Bureau's programs but also other parts of the Juvenile Justice System. Because of the magnitude of this project, much more time and effort went into the planning, organizing, and marketing of the results, particularly the marketing aspect. Typically, projects in the past only affected a small segment of the internal organization, and it did not require any real dialogue with those outside of the Bureau. This project required a great deal of dialogue with legislators, judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, court directors, law enforcement, community agencies, the general public, and our own bureau staff. Also, because of the significant shift in the basic approach in dealing with youth in our institutional programs, a much more thorough monitoring and evaluation component is being devised.

* The Department of Social and Health Services is a large umbrella agency created in 1970. Prior to that time the Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation was part of the Department of Institutions. In 1970 Senate Bill 52 was passed, which combined five existing agencies—the Department of Institutions, Department of Public Assistance, Department of Health, Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, and the Veterans' Rehabilitation Council into one superagency. This agency comprises approximately 13,000 employees.

Since 1970 the Department has undergone a number of organizations and reorganizations. At the present time the Department has five support divisions and four program divisions. The Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation falls under the Community Services Division, which is by far the largest division in the Department. This division includes the Bureau of Social Services which contains child welfare, income maintenance, and other typical public assistance roles; the Bureau of Mental Health contains mental hospitals, community programs, etc.; the Bureau of Developmental Disabilities contains the institutions for the retarded, blind, deaf, community group homes and aftercare services; the Bureau of Juvenile Rehabilitation has seven institutions, parole, groups homes, probation subsidy, and special projects. Approximately 8,000 of the 13,000 employees fall under the Community Service Division with the Bureau having approximately 1,000 of these employees.

55841

THE NEBRASKA CORRECTIONAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM:
POLICY ANALYSIS IN A LEGISLATURE

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Origin of the Issue

This report describes the development and implementation of the Correctional Improvement Program. This program is a joint Legislative-Executive effort in seeking improvement in specific program areas of the state's correctional system. The concept for the project began with a member of the Appropriations Committee, and was approved by the Appropriations Committee, the Legislature and the Governor; it is now operational. We did not attend the Correctional Economics and Policy Analysis Workshop until after the Correctional Improvement Program had been developed and adopted by the Legislature and the Governor. Therefore, what we learned at the workshop was used in the implementation phase of this project, rather than the developmental phase. This paper will describe both phases of the project and how policy analysis was used either formally or informally at various stages of the project.

Introduction and Background

A legislative body has four primary functions: enacting laws appropriating funds; approving appointments; and legislative oversight. The first three of these functions are easily defined, described, and performed. The passing of laws is the most visible legislative activity, and all legislative bodies seem to spend a great deal of time introducing and enacting new laws to meet new or recurring problems. All governmental agencies receive the funds to operate from their respective legislatures. Again, the appropriation of funds is a traditional and visible legislative activity. Customarily, the chief executive officer of a political entity makes numerous appointments to boards, agencies, and commissions, and the respective legislative body reviews these appointments for confirmation.

The fourth function, providing legislative oversight and monitoring of governmental activities, is not as easily defined. It is a less traditional,

less well defined, and a more subjective function of a legislature. As a result, it is possibly the most difficult function to perform. At least this is the case for the Nebraska Legislature's efforts at oversight and monitoring of the operations and activities of the state's correctional system.

Prison reform and the improvement of the state's correctional institutions and programs have been a major policy concern for the Nebraska Legislature for at least the last five years. In 1973, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed Legislative Bill 563 which created a separate agency known as the Department of Correctional Services. This was the first major correctional reform effort in the 1970's.

The second major legislative effort occurred in 1975, when the Legislature enacted Legislative Bill 417 which reorganized the administrative structure of the Department into four separate divisions: the Juvenile Services Division; the Adult Services Division; the Community-Centered Services Division; and the Administrative Services Division. LB 417 (1975) also authorized the construction of two medium-minimum security facilities, one in Lincoln, Nebraska, with 250 beds and one in Omaha, Nebraska with 200 beds. Other legislative efforts included the commissioning of two separate master plans, increased funding for correctional programming, and legislation.

With these efforts and others, improvements in certain aspects of correctional programming were made; however, there remained within the Legislature a general feeling of dissatisfaction that the gains and improvements were not all that they could have been. So while continuing their improvement efforts, legislators sought better ways or mechanisms to bring about these improvements.

During this same period there were other efforts at improving the legislative monitoring and oversight process. A major effort at improving the oversight process was begun in 1974 and is described in the following excerpt from an article by the former Chairman of the Appropriations Committee and others.

During 1974, the Legislative Appropriations Committee of Nebraska's Unicameral Legislature implemented a model for expressing intent and facilitating oversight which differs from these traditional concepts. The budget process provides the skeleton for the model. Nebraska uses a basic performance budget process. To this is added, in the appropriations bill a clear, detailed statement of intent. Oversight is facilitated by the submission of a series of reports on the status of elements prescribed by the executive agencies. In addition, the legislative staff monitors and evaluates executive action and reports to the Appropriations Committee.

The purpose of this system is to provide the Legislature with a tool to express intent and to provide means of oversight and evaluation to ensure that intent is being met. As a side benefit, it also assists legislators in thinking about the present status of state programs and whether legislative goals are being achieved.

This model was primarily used in budgeting for a University of Nebraska program known as the Areas of Excellence. In the Areas of Excellence Model, special funding was directed toward designated programs.

Five steps were taken in the development of each of the University's Areas of Excellence. These steps are:

1. Each department of designated program internally conducted a complete self-evaluation and review and then defined its goals.
2. In determining these goals, each department developed a multi-year plan of action.
3. After the goals and multi-year plan were fully developed, resource and budgetary needs were identified.
4. Expectations, standards, and objectives were developed and adopted.
5. Measurements were designed by which programs and development could be compared with the adopted goals.

In addition to the self evaluation, an outside visitation team, made up of professionals from the industry, professional peers from other institutions, students, Legislators, gubernatorial representatives, and members of the public met periodically to evaluate the development of a particular Area of Excellence. An annual report of findings was submitted to the University Board of Regents, the Legislature, the Governor, and the general public.

As Legislators were seeking alternatives to continue the progress in correctional improvements, it occurred to them that the Areas of Excellence concept might provide the vehicle to meet these goals. Thus, the Correctional Improvement Program is an adaption of the Areas of Excellence concept.

Statement of the Problem

As described above, the problem which led to the development and enactment of the Correctional Improvement Program can be stated as follows: The

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Marvel, Richard D., Parsons, Robert J., Sanderson, Winn, and Wright, N. Dale, "Legislative Intent and Oversight: Nebraska's Experience in Higher Education," State Government, Winter, 1976.

problem is the development and implementation of a legislative monitoring and oversight process which will encourage the Department of Correctional Services to make improvements in correctional planning and programming which are consistent with legislative policies and priorities.

Parties Involved and Impacted

The Department of Correctional Services is responsible for and provides services to approximately 1,700 adult and 500 juvenile offenders. The agency consists of five institutions, a central administrative office, parole administration, and the agency has approximately 860 employees. The Correctional Improvement Program directly or indirectly affects the entire department, and all employees and clients. Within the Department, the most involved participants were the Director, the Assistant Director, three members of the Planning and Research Staff, two other staff persons assigned to work with the Evaluation Teams, and thirteen institutional and programmatic persons directly involved in the implementation of the Correctional Improvement Program.

One of the purposes of the Correctional Improvement Program was to further develop legislative and executive cooperation and consensus on correctional policy and operations. To achieve this objective, the program involved the Governor and two gubernatorial aides; two members of the Governor's Budget Office can also be considered important participants.

In summary, 83 relevant and critical participants have been identified for the Correctional Improvement Program. This total includes: the Governor; 23 State Senators; 4 legislative staff; 7 employees of state agencies other than the Department of Correctional Services; the Director of the Department of Correctional Services; 19 other employees of the Department of Correctional Services; and 28 private citizens.

Goals and Objectives

It is acknowledged that the Correctional Improvement Program began at legislative initiative; however, within a Legislature of 49 members, it is difficult to be specific about individual or collective legislative goals and objectives. It is equally difficult to define specifically the goals and objectives of the seven Correctional Improvement Program Evaluation Teams or the Department of Correctional Services.

Perhaps the clearest identification of major goals and objectives for the Correctional Improvement Program is in the statement of the problem which identifies two goals or objectives: (1) development and implementation of

an improved legislative monitoring and oversight process; and (2) improvement of the Department of Correctional Services correctional planning and programming consistent with established legislative policies and priorities.

Four additional benefits which may be expected to result from the Correctional Improvement Program are: (1) improved legislative and executive consensus and cooperation on correctional policies and programs; (2) improved relations between the Legislature and the Department of Correctional Services; (3) improved programming for offenders placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correctional Services; and (4) increased understanding of the state's correctional programs by private citizens.

Conducting Policy Analysis

It was due to the development and implementation of the Correctional Improvement Program that a member of the Nebraska State Legislature and a staff member of the Legislative Fiscal Office sought to participate in the workshops offered by the Correctional Economics Center on Policy Correctional Economics and Policy Analysis.

The Correctional Improvement Program was developed during the 1977 Legislative Session. After attending one of the University of Nebraska's Exit Report presentations in February, 1977, a member of the Appropriations Committee attempted to design and develop a program which would improve programmatic operations of the Department of Correctional Services and simultaneously improve the legislative oversight of these programs.

As developed, the Correctional Improvement Program designates seven areas for improvement: inmate labor; leisure time activities; comprehensive health care; community centered programs; chemical dependency programs; staff training; and program planning. There is mixed funding for the program in that the majority of the funding came from reallocating existing resources with additional funds being added to provide more comprehensive funding for the programs. The program, as developed, is a three year, phased-in program, similar to the Areas of Excellence. The first part of the program is a requirement that the Department of Correctional Services conduct a self-evaluation of the existing program and develop three year plans for improving the programs.

A second aspect of the program calls for the creation of a separate evaluation team for each of the program areas. Each team consists of two Legislators; two Gubernatorial appointments; and three private citizens.

The Correctional Improvement Program concept was presented to the full Appropriations Committee in March, 1977. The concept was adopted by the Legislature on June 1, 1977; on June 27, the Nebraska representatives attended the Correctional Economics workshop.

Ad tion of the Correctional Improvement Program

The Appropriations Committee unanimously endorsed the concept and included slightly more than \$1,000,000 for the Correctional Improvement Program in the recommended appropriations for the Department of Correctional Services. The appropriations bills and companion legislative intent bills included specific amounts for each of the seven designated areas and a clear, detailed statement of intent for the Correctional Improvement Program. Although the 1977 appropriations bills were amended, no changes to the Correctional Improvement Program were offered by individual Legislators. After full discussion, the appropriations bill and companion legislative intent bills were passed and forwarded to the Governor for his consideration.

In reviewing appropriations bills, the Governor is empowered to veto the entire bill or to make line-item reductions or vetoes. The Governor did not line-item the overall appropriations for the Correctional Improvement Program contained in the appropriations bill. The Governor signed the companion legislative intent bill but eliminated the designation of funds for the Correctional Improvement Program without reducing the total amount of funds appropriated to that program. In the letter detailing his specific objections, the Governor wrote:

The Department, in conjunction with the program evaluation teams should have an opportunity to evaluate all of the programs specified in LB 539 and allocate resources according to these evaluations. Earmarking is premature, inappropriate, and will place a straight jacket on effective administration.

On the final legislative day, June 1, 1977, the Governor's line-item veto of this legislative intent bill was overridden.

The Correctional Improvement Program became effective on July 1, 1977, the beginning of the new fiscal year; however, planning for the implementation of the program began before that. Legislative staff responsibility for the Correctional Improvement Program was assigned to the Legislative Fiscal Office, and \$25,000 was appropriated to that office to meet the legislative responsibilities of the project.

Conducting Policy Analysis

Policy analysis has been defined as a systematic examination of alternative ways of accomplishing public agency objectives. In modifying the Areas of Excellence budgeting concept and developing the Correctional Improvement Program, alternative ways of accomplishing objectives were examined, although perhaps not too systematically.

The characteristics of policy analysis are that it is: (1) decision focused; (2) proactive, anticipatory or future oriented; (3) action oriented; (4) multi-disciplinary; and (5) time limited.

The development and subsequent adoption of the Correctional Improvement Program could be described in these terms. The decision to adopt or reject the Correctional Improvement Program and provide funding was presented to the Appropriations Committee; to the Legislature; and to the Governor. The Correctional Improvement Program is future oriented in that it is a phased-in three year program with modifications being made during the implementation phases. The Correctional Improvement Program is action oriented in that it calls for and anticipates improvement in correctional programming during the next three years. A multi-disciplinary approach is necessary during the developmental and the implementation phases of the Correctional Improvement Program in the seven designation areas of: inmate labor; inmate recreation and leisure time activities; comprehensive health care; community based program; chemical dependency programs; staff training; and program planning. The evaluation team members are from a variety of disciplines and professions due to the multi-disciplinary nature of the program.

The development and adoption phases of the Correctional Improvement Program were particularly time limited because the concept was conceived in February, 1977, and final adoption occurred June 1, 1977.

Initial Implementation

Initial implementation of the Correctional Improvement Program consisted of five tasks: (1) the appointment of members of the seven evaluation teams; (2) developing the tasks and responsibilities of the evaluation teams; (3) orienting the members of the evaluation teams; (4) assessing the progress of the Department of Correctional Services in implementing the Correctional Improvement Program; and (5) assessing the progress of the evaluation teams in monitoring and evaluating the work of the Department of Correctional Services.

Each of these tasks necessitated, either formally or informally, some or all of the steps required for the development of a policy analysis issue paper: (1) statement of the problems; (2) parties impacted; (3) goals and objectives of the program or the activity; (4) specification/description of methodological framework for analysis; and (5) alternatives. In completing the tasks outlined in the preceding paragraph, the policy analysis used in developing the initial implementation phases of the Correctional Improvement Program was done informally and somewhat unscientifically. However, this process was still useful in that the informal process resulted in the development of alternatives which might otherwise have been overlooked.

Using Policy Analysis During the Implementation Phase of a Program

The Department of Correctional Services has three major responsibilities during the first year of operation of the Correctional Improvement Program. They are:

1. To conduct a self-evaluation of each of the seven designated program areas and present the self-evaluation reports to the respective evaluation team;
2. To develop a three year improvement plan with specific, measurable goals for each of the seven designated program areas; and
3. To implement, after review and comment by the respective evaluation team, each multi-year program plan in accordance with the funding available.

The responsibilities and roles of the seven evaluation teams were not as easily and clearly developed and defined, and are best summarized in a paragraph taken from the orientation materials provided to evaluation team members:

Each Correctional Improvement Program Evaluation Team will seek to identify the ideal and the operationally feasible correctional program for the designated areas and then seek to determine whether the multi-year plan developed by the Department of Correctional Services meets the ideal and can aid in achieving improvement in the designated program areas.

The Correctional Improvement Program began July 1, 1977; since that time the following have occurred:

1. The appointments to the Correctional Improvement Program Evaluation Teams were made by August 1, 1977.
2. Orientation materials were provided to each evaluation team member by August 20, 1977.
3. The organizational meeting of the Correctional Improvement Program Evaluation Teams was held on August 30, 1977; there was a joint morning session for all evaluation team members with the seven teams meeting individually during the afternoon session.
4. Between September 1 and November 15 each evaluation team met at least three times, toured various facilities and became familiar with the program and operations of the Department of Correctional Services.

5. The Department of Correctional Services made self-evaluations of each of the seven designated programmatic areas during the months of September, October, and November, 1977. The Manual of Standards For Adult Institutions, published by the American Correctional Association, was used as the source document of criteria for these self-evaluations, when applicable. All self-evaluation reports were submitted to the respective Evaluation Teams on or about December 1, 1977.
6. The three-year improvement plans were submitted to the respective Evaluation Teams by January 1, 1978, were subsequently reviewed, and alternative recommendations developed by the Evaluation Teams.
7. The First Year Composite Report of the Correctional Improvement Program was submitted to the Legislature and the Governor on January 27, 1978. In addition, on January 27, 1978, the Appropriations Committee conducted a full day of hearings to receive and discuss the reports on the Correctional Improvement Program. Each Evaluation Team Chairman made an oral report on the three-year plan and the Team's recommendations and comments. The Director of Correctional Services followed each Evaluation Team Chairman and offered his comments on the respective three-year plan and the Team's recommendations.
8. As of March 1, 1978, the Appropriations Committee has incorporated the recommendations of the Evaluation Teams in the proposed FY 1978-79 budget for the Department of Correctional Services.

The Problems of Implementation

The first six months of the Correctional Improvement Program were not without problems. Some of these problems were anticipated, some were not. Some of the problems of implementation were: (1) initiating the program; (2) maintaining executive and agency cooperation; and (3) maintaining evaluation team interest.

In dealing with these problems the components of policy analysis were used. Some examples of how these tools were used follows.

1. Initiating the Program

Prior to the appointment of members of the seven evaluation teams, the legislative staff assigned to the Correctional Improvement Program met numerous times to develop the implementation alternatives and to recommend an implementation strategy. These meetings could probably be best described as free-think sessions. However, the use of policy analysis and other fairly structured techniques did occur.

During one of the early meetings, the staff attempted to anticipate major pitfalls and to list all of the goals and objectives of the Correctional Improvement Program from a number of perspectives including that of the legislative branch; the executive branch; the Department of Correctional Services; the client offenders; the evaluation teams; and the public at large. Policy analysis was then used in an informal manner to state the potential problems and to identify the most realistic and attainable objectives.

2. Maintaining Executive and Agency Cooperation

One of the purposes and goals of the Correctional Improvement Program was to improve the coordination and cooperation between and among the major and critical participants; the legislature, the executive and the agency. There have been problems in this area, but most of them have been minimized. One of the alternatives developed through an informal policy analysis process to deal with these problems of cooperation and coordination is called "linkage" or the linking together of participants. Used in this manner the word linkage is often associated with the foreign policy practices of Henry Kissinger. In this instance, linkage means maintaining frequent and open communications between the critical participants, either directly or indirectly. This linkage process was both formal and informal. Informally the legislative staff attempted to meet and talk with the various participants as often as possible. Formal meetings were held at least monthly between legislative, executive and agency representatives; the seven Legislators who chaired the evaluation teams met periodically to assess the progress of the program.

3. Maintaining Evaluation Team Interest

A strategy or methodology associated with policy analysis is known as risk identification and assessment. The utilization of this technique greatly aided in dealing with this problem. During the early planning and development stages of implementation, legislative staff members attempted to identify everything that might go wrong during the implementation phase. The list of risks exceeded fifty items; means of avoiding or reducing these possible risks or problems were then identified and used during the implementation phase.

Through the risk identification and assessment process, two aspects of the problem of maintaining evaluation team interest were identified. The first aspect is Evaluation Team apathy; again, the linkage process was used to maintain evaluation team interest. Also, careful scheduling of evaluation team meetings with specific and planned agendas helped minimize the problem. Only one of the 49 members of the Evaluation Teams missed more than two meetings; this may be an indication that the strategies were reasonably successful.

The second aspect of the problem was identified as the possibility of having an over ambitious Evaluation Team which might exceed its role.

Prior to the Evaluation Teams becoming operational, there were no specific plans to deal with this anticipated problem; fortunately, the problem did not materialize. The use of this process points up another aspect of policy analysis which was useful to the project; repeating the process of stating problems, identifying parties impacted, identifying goals and objectives; performing analysis and identifying alternatives. Various steps of policy analysis were used continually during the first six months of operation; usually they were in an informal manner. However, even informally, these tools provided insight into ways various problems could be avoided or minimized.

Results

Thus far there are three tangible and visible results from the first six months of operations for the Correctional Improvement Program. During these six months, the Department of Correctional Services has conducted self-evaluations for each of the seven designated program areas; it has prepared a three-year improvement plan for each of these areas; and, each of the Evaluation Teams has prepared a first year report and submitted it to the Legislature and the Governor.

The above are the visible results of the Correctional Improvement Program. It is difficult at this time, to determine how much progress has been made in achieving the major goals and objectives of the Correctional Improvement Program. The goals and objectives reflected in the statement of the problem contained in the first section of this report are: (1) the development and implementation of a legislative monitoring and oversight process; and (2) the encouragement of the Department of Correctional Services to make improvements in correctional planning and programming which are consistent with legislative policies and priorities. What has been done thus far in the Correctional Improvement Program is to initiate the processes and vehicles by which these goals can be achieved. At a later date, as the Correctional Improvement Program progresses through the three year operational period, it will be easier to determine and measure the degree to which the program fulfills its stated goals and objectives.

Summary: The Utility of Policy Analysis in a Legislative Setting

The work involved in both the developmental and implementation phases of the Correctional Improvement Program included all of the five characteristics of policy analysis. Both phases, development and implementation, of the Correctional Improvement Program were particularly decision focused, particularly at the developmental phase. First the Appropriations Committee had to determine whether the concept and funding would be authorized, and then this decision was considered by the full Legislature and the Governor.

As the Correctional Improvement Program will be operational for at least three years, it is proactive or future oriented, and policy analysis has been used in both the development and implementation phases of this proactive project. Likewise, the Correctional Improvement Program is action oriented, and the use of policy analysis has been beneficial because it is action oriented.

Because of the varied nature of the seven designated program areas of the Correctional Improvement Program and the varied backgrounds and interests of the 83 relevant and critical actors it is equally clear that the Correctional Improvement Program is quite multi-disciplinary as are the tools and techniques used in developing and implementing the program.

The fifth characteristic of policy analysis is being time-limited. Of the five characteristics, this one appears to be the most relevant and critical, both to the Correctional Improvement Program and to much of the work of a Legislature. The concept of a correctional improvement program was first expressed in February, 1977; presented to the Appropriations Committee in March, 1967; presented to the full Legislature in April, 1977; and presented to the Governor in May, 1977. That seems quite time-limited, and the background work associated with each of these steps was completed within short periods of time. Because policy analysis recognizes the requirements of time limitations, it is a useful tool for the legislative staff, and was useful in the development and initial implementation phases of the Correctional Improvement Program.

It should be acknowledged that the use of policy analysis in the developmental and implementation phases of the Correctional Improvement Program was often done informally and less systematically and scientifically than might normally be desired or expected.

During one of the policy analysis workshops, there was some question whether a project begun and completed in a 24-hour period would constitute policy analysis. More specifically, the question was whether the tools of policy analysis could be appropriately used in such a short time frame. It was argued by some that the research requirements of policy analysis could not be met if the policy analysis were completed in such a short period.

The goals of most legislative research and policy analysis is to present the best information possible, in the time available. This was one of the requirements in the development and implementation of the Correctional Improvement Program. We contend that such efforts as the Correctional Improvement Program and many other legislative projects can and should include policy analysis in formal or informal forms and that such abbreviated forms are necessary and appropriate. The critical requirement in any application of policy analysis, particularly in any abbreviated form, is that the analyst must explain to the decision maker that this is the best

information available in the time allowed. As long as the analyst clearly identifies any limitations and inadequacies of the data and the research method used (including policy analysis) the information can be useful, reliable, and timely, whether the project is completed in 24 hours or 24 days (or years!).

It is contended that if policy analysis is to be useful to decision makers, particularly those operating in a legislative area, it must necessarily be quite time-limited. And it is argued that the Correctional Improvement Program is a successful and appropriate use of policy analysis in just such a time limited atmosphere.

SHELTER CARE PROJECT

55834

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Origin of the Issue

The DuPage County Probation Department administers a Youth Home, which is a high-security detention center for juveniles. However, Chapter 37, Section 703-4, of the Illinois Revised Statutes limits use of such a high-security center to those juveniles who are a threat to themselves or to others, or those likely to flee the jurisdiction of the Court. Illinois Public Law 80-536, signed September 8, 1977 (and anticipated at the time this project was begun), as well as national trends, question the detention of status offenders or Minors in Need of Supervision (MINS). In addition, Sunny Ridge, a shelter care group home used by the County for care of MINS, closed for lack of funding. These mandates to deinstitutionalize status offenders plus the closing of the shelter care facility created a new problem for the County. However, the size of the population affected was unknown and there was no way to immediately address the impact on service.

After careful examination of case files, it was found that eight to ten juveniles per month are detained in the Youth Home who do not, by the above description, belong there. With the population of the County growing by ten percent annually, it was reasonable to expect the MINS population to grow as well. This spurred the movement for the Department to seek an alternative solution to detention for MINS population.

The DuPage County Probation Department is a unit of the County, operating within the 18th Judicial District, a single County Circuit Court. The Department provides all Court services to the Judiciary. Intake Division is responsible for adult presentence investigations, juvenile conferences and dispositional reports, custody investigations, and adoption consents. In addition, the Adult Division handles all offenders over 17; Juvenile all offenders under 17, Juvenile Diversion, and the Youth Home. The Department operates within a Management Team Concept, with representation from all Divisions of the Team. Because no staff is available for research projects, special task forces are assigned to handle specific problems. Usually, these task forces operate under constraints, with definition of a problem undetermined and little direction available.

In December, 1976, a Task Force was formed by the Management Team to tackle the problem of Shelter Care for MINS offenders. The group consisted of a

representative from Diversion, the Youth Home, Intake (juvenile conference officer), Juvenile, and Adult, and was chaired by the Coordinator of Volunteer and Community Services. They were all service oriented and steeped in philosophical discoveries--a noble pursuit, but one which stood in the way of quick decision-making. In May, 1977, the Chief Probation Officer replaced the Adult Division representative on the committee with someone who had had training in policy analysis in the hope that this would speed up the process. The group was most receptive to the idea of focusing in on the problem and, perhaps, speeding up the decision-making process.

The Analytical Process

The group had set as their first task development of an agreed upon definition of "shelter care". A report on this portion of the project was due to the management team by April, 1977. At the end of May, when policy analysis was introduced to the group, this first task was "near completion and almost ready for a report".

Including a policy analyst and excluding the Adult Division representative altered the task force to some extent. Using policy analysis as a basis, the group quickly decided the definition of shelter care was "non-secure preadjudicatory placement for those juveniles who are neither a threat to themselves or to others or likely to flee the jurisdiction of the Court". By defining the problem clearly, the focus of the committee was channeled toward gathering statistical information to determine an accurate "need" figure. Considerable energy was spent reviewing department statistics before this figure was established. It was discovered that there was much duplication, and that the same juveniles were counted in several different ways as the case flowed through the Department. This discovery was of considerable benefit in enabling the committee members to see where energy needed to be spent in developing an accurate method for gathering case information.

Once need was defined and the case files reviewed, it was found that there were eight to ten juveniles per month eligible for shelter care, rather than twenty to thirty as originally estimated. With the realization that the need was not as great as had been anticipated, attention was focused on determining viable alternatives for handling the smaller number of clients.

The next step in the process was to enumerate the elements of an "ideal" shelter care program. Realities would be faced later. Once this ideal was established, discussion began on some of the alternatives for meeting this ideal, keeping in mind that the size of the population served would have considerable effect on whether or not an alternative was truly viable. Most alternatives carried with it a price tag, and so the politics of the

situation could not be ignored. This part of the analysis was extremely difficult--the team had a hard time separating cost from program desirability.

It was established that the Shelter Care program must be a 24-hour crisis intervention program and a preliminary assessment of case care need made at the time of intervention. Facilities, process (personnel) and procedures were elements of this phase of operation. It was also felt that a minimal number of emergency foster homes would be needed, and a contracted group home or other shelter care facility might be required if the juvenile could not be returned to his own home or to the home of a friend or relative.

A central screening area where case assessment would be made could, most logically and economically, be placed at the Youth Home. Two interveners, one at the central screening area and one available to travel, would be needed. In addition, training would be required for staff, old and new; foster parents; facility staff; the coordinator who followed through on cases; and the referral sources (police, schools, etc.). A great deal of flexibility would be written into the program to allow for differences in case needs and the time needed for disposition and/or treatment where necessary.

With desired components of a program settled on, priorities were established; that is, a determination was made that saleability was as important as idealism. The search began for alternatives.

The Outcomes

The first of the alternatives identified was the Sunny Ridge plan. At first glance, this seemed to be the easiest program to implement. Closer scrutiny, however, proved this conclusion wrong. Sunny Ridge is a private placement center within the County. It was the agency most often used for Probation Department placements until two years ago, when it closed because of financial difficulties. It had recently reopened under new management, and contracted with the Division of Children and Family Services, a state agency charged with care of dependent and neglect cases only. The new Sunny Ridge program was not geared to the juvenile the DuPage Probation Department would be placing. In conversations with the administrator of the Center, he indicated a desire to develop a program tailored to the Department's requirements. However, problems arose over the cost of implementing such a program. The minimal contract maintenance cost would far exceed the entire Care budget, whether or not placements were being made. Although this program could possibly incorporate many of the elements of the ideal program, the expense could not be justified. Other potential problems existed. Sunny Ridge's convenient location and ease of placement lent itself to a potential for overuse. With an easy out, individual

situations might not be as critically considered. In addition, the committee feared that an outside agency might not be as cooperative in linking and coordinating with Department staff and programs as would an arm of the Department. Their suggested program indicated a duplication of programming for the client.

Another alternative explored was the development of a program whereby comprehensively trained and supported foster homes would be available on a 24-hour basis to satisfy identified shelter care needs. An emergency foster home program could be designed specifically to meet the existing shelter care need and could be a less expensive method than private shelter care agency placements. Historically, foster placements have been less expensive than contracts with private shelter care facilities. The design, implementation and on-going operation solely within the Probation Department would allow for expansion and/or redesign of program elements as changes in need occur. Additional considerations were the start-up time for such a program. Potential problems included recruitment, training and support of foster homes; the difficulty in designing and maintaining adequate foster parent support systems; the lack of a well-defined Department commitment to community involvement; and the potential for lessening of continuity in casework services provided juvenile probationers. Implementation costs and additional staff costs were also taken into consideration.

The third alternative explored was contracting with the Illinois Status Offender Service (ISOS) to handle all juvenile cases requiring shelter care. ISOS is a federally funded grant project focusing on the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. The ISOS project is administered by the State of Illinois Department of Children and Family Services. ISOS provides shelter placement, institutional, or foster homes to minors residing in their own homes. In cases handled by ISOS, a volunteer advocate is used to assist in providing these support services to the family on a 24-hour basis. The services of ISOS are made available to referred minors for a stipulated 14-day period only. After the 14 days, if no Court disposition has been made, the juvenile is returned to the Probation Department for further placement.

Further formalized involvement with ISOS would require the least amount of monetary expenditure and staff time. The ISOS program is already operational and, therefore, would not require time for design and implementation of a new program. However, the many disadvantages of further involvement with ISOS far outweighed the advantages. ISOS services a case no longer than 14 days. Cases in the Juvenile Justice system usually require some form of service for a longer period of time and, therefore, case continuity is lost. ISOS also lacks adequate personnel resources to service clients from DuPage County. A primary service lacking is a diagnostic process and a system providing feedback of necessary information to the Probation Department.

The fact that ISOS is a federally funded grant project gives no guarantee of future funding for the project. And an overwhelming negative factor is the confusion and lack of coordination of a state-administered program operating within a County or specific Court jurisdiction.

A fourth alternative explored was petitioning the Crescent Region of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission for monies available to develop shelter care programs. Such an approach would facilitate the development of a program by eliminating start-up costs and provide better training opportunities and supplementary staff positions without cost to the County. Further exploration revealed that the County is too large, by population and geographic boundaries, to qualify for program monies in accordance with Federal guidelines for the specific purpose of developing shelter care programs. The Department did, however, apply for a portion of block monies given to the DuPage Law Enforcement Commission. The application has been made part of the Commission's Master Plan, but no funding will be available until 1979.

The final alternative explored by the Task Force, and the one selected as the most viable, was the development of a Homebound-Detention Program. This concept has met with documented success rates in other counties and commanded serious attention. The committee felt that by tailoring such a program to meet the needs of DuPage County, the positive aspects of all the alternatives studied could be incorporated at far less cost. In addition, an in-house program has an added success element of Department staff commitment.

The program could be housed at the intake center of the Youth Home. Better identification of client problems at the time of crisis would help identify programs best to fit needs of the client. It was felt that such a program would minimize shelter care placements and costs. Continuity of the case through the Department would be maximized.

By working with families through crisis intervention, there would be greater opportunity for reconciling differences, thus maintaining family relationships. In addition, it was felt that there is much value to returning kids to the community and to their homes to the extent possible.

The only dollar item involved with implementation of this program was the cost of an additional staff position at the Youth Home. The committee felt that this minimal expense would make this program the most saleable of all alternatives. The Department's Management Team accepted the findings of the Task Force and agreed that implementation of the program should be pursued with the County Board by requesting a new position for this purpose at the Youth Home in the 1978 Youth Home Budget.

Problems of Implementation

The County Board of Supervisors has long been critical of the daily cost at the Youth Home. In addition, population at the Youth Home had dropped drastically for several months preceding the budget hearings, an unexplainable phenomenon. The cost of running the Youth Home, however, remained nearly the same. The County Board contended that they could not justify additional staff under present conditions, and the request was denied.

An appeal was made to the Judiciary Committee on Juvenile Problems in the hope that their support for the concept would sway the County Board. However, the Judicial Committee felt there was no need to push for implementation and that a decision could wait a little longer.

The Shelter Care Task Force remains committed to development of a Homebound Detention Program. It has been agreed that a goal for 1978 will be to research alternatives for implementation of this program. Procedures will be designed and a job description for a Program coordinator developed. Using policy analysis, a new task force will tackle this problem.

Although the use of policy analysis did not ease implementation of the program, it was of great benefit to the Department. It eased the task of defining the problem, and the process of researching alternatives was shortened considerably. The spillover effects of this method of task accomplishment (e.g., the duplication of case information gathering) is of invaluable benefit for further sophistication of programs. Those on the task force were impressed with the speed in which a decision was reached and are eager to begin the new task of implementation, using the processes of policy analysis as their guide to problem solving.

END