Civil Service Systems:
# Their Impact on Police Administration

U.S. Department of Justice
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

Civil Service Systems:
Their Impact on Police Administration

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXHIBITS

Tables

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

ABSTRACT

"Civil Service Systems: Their Impact on Police Administration" is a wide-ranging study of various aspects of the police personnel field in American urban police departments. The research was supported by a grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (Grant Number 76-NI-99-0140). In its entirety, the project was conducted over approximately a two-year period beginning in November, 1976.

Data for the study were collected in each of 42 randomly-selected large American cities, ranging in population size between 50,000 and 750,000. In each study site, current civil service laws and police union contracts were collected, interviews were conducted with the municipal officials and organization spokespersons most knowledgeable about police personnel matters, and police departments provided information on programs and policies in a police departmental questionnaire. Supplemental data was provided by the Police Foundation, the National Planning Association, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

One of the study's major conclusions is that popular debate and discussion notwithstanding, there is no one "civil service system" which governs police personnel affairs in urban America. Civil service commissions differ from city to city in the roles they play in police personnel administration and, as a result, in the impacts they have on local officials, on police departmental programs and practices, and on the general quality of local law enforcement. Some commissions--especially those which play regulatory roles in the local police personnel system--pose significant constraints on the abilities of local officials to promote innovative police programs and to deliver high quality police services. Others--especially those which engage in the formulation of police personnel policy--tend to promote departmental innovation and more efficient and effective criminal apprehension results in local police work.

Within the overall context posed by this finding, the study also examines a number of specific questions, among them the statutory supports for local civil service commissions and the impacts of community politics and of police unionism on local police personnel administration. The specific findings generated combine with the overall context of role- and impact-specificity to suggest that proposals for civil service reforms in the urban police context should be tailored to local circumstances and to meaningful variations in civil service roles.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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  Service   Service   Service

x

The continuing clamor among police administrators and others for civil service reform dates back almost as far as when police departments were first "harnessed with" or "protected by" some form of civil service apparatus and policies. Obviously, the verb used to describe this application depends on which side of the fence from which one views this--as an overlay of fine principles or inhibiting prohibitions (or both). Since this study began, the "Proposition 13" episode has entered the American scene and gives strong evidence of crystallizing broad public opinion against wasteful public spending. This frame of the public's mind, which is likely to strengthen and persist as long as inflation and taxation are abrasive, also provides a sharply critical setting in which established and long-standing practices and governmental arrangements will be judged. Indeed, the school of "public policy" thinkers has anticipated this turn of events with their perspective that administrative programs and policies which do not generate improved levels of delivered services are unproductive activities--regardless of professional clamor for their adoption or expansion.

A. Project Objectives, Tasks, and Methods

Despite the clamor for civil service reform, particularly strident from police administrators and scholars, there have been relatively few empirical studies of the positive and negative effects of civil service upon urban police systems. In recognition of this fact, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration offered a research grant to Public Administration Service in the fall of 1976 to study this problem. The project supported by that grant was entitled "Civil Service Systems: Their Impact on Police Administration." The explicit objective and concern of this project has been to begin to fill this void and to replace, but not necessarily refute, episodic experiences and criticisms and the folklore which inevitably evolves around old institutions. To do so, the substantive portion of the project, and of the final report documenting its methods and findings, proceeds along the following lines:

1. An analysis of the basic laws and legislative frame-works which have established and influenced the operation of urban police systems (Chapter III).

2. An analysis of the actual policy and administration of police personnel systems; or who does what to whom (Chapter IV).

3. An analysis of the impacts of city politics on police personnel systems and the political setting for change (Chapter V).

4. An analysis of the characteristics of police unionism and its impacts on police personnel systems (Chapter VI).

5. An analysis of the impacts of civil service on police personnel programs and practices and of police responses to administrative issues (Chapter VII).

6. An analysis of the effects of civil service on the quality (effectiveness and efficiency) of police performance (Chapter VIII).

1. Project Tasks. Before beginning the foregoing analyses, a systematic literature search was undertaken to assess the state of the art and to build upon the experience and relevant findings of other earlier studies. The results of that search (presented in Chapter I of the final report) yielded a historical perspective on civil service, from the period of its institution in the late 1800's through the present day. Clearly the perspectives on civil service of practitioners and scholars alike have changed with the passage of time. Concern for political protection of public employees--the original impetus behind the civil service movement-- has gradually changed to concern over the equity and responsiveness of civil service systems, and the efficiency and effectiveness of government employees. This concern is not limited solely to police agencies, but the literature review does document the many criticisms of civil service offered over the years in the law enforcement context.

The second task was to determine the sources of factual data and information upon which to base the analyses described above. It was decided to make use of 51 medium- and large-sized cities as sample points for the data collection efforts. That collection of cities was chosen because it consisted of a random sample of the urban places (of population size equal to or greater than 50,000) in which Americans were most likely to reside. In addition, researchers at the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) of the University of Chicago had been collecting data on these cities for many years and cooperation with them was established in the earliest stages of the project. Forty-two of the 51 cities actually participated in the study. Those cities were:

Akron, Ohio	Memphis, Tennessee
Albany, New York	Minneapolis, Minnesota
Amarillo, Texas	Newark, New Jersey
Atlanta, Georgia	Palo Alto, California
Berkeley, California	Pasadena, California
Birmingham, Alabama	Phoenix, Arizona
Bloomington, Minnesota	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Boston, Massachusetts	St. Louis, Missouri
Buffalo, New York	St. Paul, Minnesota
Cambridge, Massachusetts	Salt Lake City, Utah
Charlotte, North Carolina	San Francisco, California
Clifton, New Jersey	San Jose, California
Duluth, Minnesota	Santa Monica, California
Euclid, Ohio	Schenectady, New York
Fort Worth, Texas	Seattle, Washington
Fullerton, California	South Bend, Indiana
Hammond, Indiana	Tampa, Florida
Irvington, New Jersey	Tyler, Texas
Jacksonville, Florida	Waco, Texas
Long Beach, California	Warren, Michigan
Manchester, New Hampshire	Waterbury, Connecticut

2. Project Methods. The literature review and analysis of secondary data (of other studies) brought to light two major conditions which influenced the development of this study, namely, the near ubiquity of some form of civil service system in American municipalities and the extremely wide variations in certain features of these systems. It became apparent that an adequate study would have to extend its scope, topically and procedurally, rather broadly to cover the topic in a thorough and worthwhile manner.

Actual field work and data collection were undertaken between April and September of 1977. All interviews were conducted by members of the professional staff of Public Administration Service as were all documents analyzed. The data collection activities included the five categories listed below:

a. Documentation constituting the legal framework for local police personnel operations.

b. Documentation containing the results of negotiations with police officer unions or associations.

c. A standard questionnaire on police policies and procedures.

d. Structured interviews on policy-making and local police issues were conducted with:

(1) The mayor or city manager.

(2) The chief of police or police administrator.

(3) The city personnel director.

(4) The chairperson or executive secretary of the civil service body.

(5) The personnel officer of the police department.

(6) The head of the local police union or similar organization.

e. Annual reports of the police department.

Data from one or more of the above categories were gathered in 42 (82.4 percent) of the 51 cities in the initial sample. This included personal interviews (item d, above) with 197 officials, a range of participation ranging from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 6 persons in any given city.

The methods of data analysis utilized throughout this project involved a mix of qualitative and quantitative styles. The techniques of cross tabulation, correlation, and multiple regression were applied to that portion of the data which was quantifiable. Substantive evaluations, reflecting professional experience and personal values, were added to the statistical measures when necessary to answer such judgmental questions as: Is the policy in question a success or failure, costly or inexpensive, good or bad?

B. Summary of Key Project Findings

1. **The Legislative Process and the Law.** Although there is still a civil service "core" evident in laws underlying civil service systems, there is a clear trend towards displacement of its original legal mandates. Legislative history as a block-on-block process tends to overlay the old laws with new ones to meet contemporary concerns, each with new programs and new monitoring or enforcement mechanisms and organisms. Municipal, managerial, and police administration professionalism have operated in a modest way to supplant certain civil service functions. Further inroads into civil service traditional spheres are also traceable to the emergence of police unionism and anti-discrimination legislation, particularly as enforced by intermittent and indeterminate judicial interpretations and mandates. The law cannot be considered as an exclusive nor all-embracing instrument for civil service reform.

2. **The Contemporary Nature of Civil Service.** The myth that there is a "typical" civil service system should be put to rest; there is no such thing. On the American scene of local government, diversity is the rule and was traced to the following:

   a. The one-to-one relation between the systems and their laws must be and are adapted to specific local concerns.

   b. The civil service arrangements and dynamics are a dynamic and changing field of interplay between many local actors and authorities.

   c. The levels of authority held by local officials over police personnel affairs are conditioned by the aggregates of the changing balances between supportive and competitive political influences which are brought to bear upon them.

   d. Although the effects of police unionism on civil service performance were found to be indirect, the future of police unions and their eventual impacts remains very much an open question.

3. **The Roles Played by Civil Service Commissions.** Within the contemporary diversity in actual civil service practices, there are five roles which are discernible; and one, some, or all of them are exercised by established civil service authorities:

   a. formulator of local police personnel policy;

   b. adjudicator of employees' appeals to personnel decisions;

   c. administrator of routine personnel operations;

   d. advisor to the city administration on personnel affairs;

   e. regulator of the personnel policies and practices of other city agencies.

From the perspective of the urban officials responsible for local law enforcement, the most important role of contemporary civil service bodies is the adjudicative one. It was perceived to be performed by civil service commissions almost twice as frequently as the regulatory role, and more than twice as frequently as the remaining ones. In addition, it was discovered that the more formal decision-making authority enjoyed by a local commission in police personnel matters, the more it will tend to involve itself in each and all of the foregoing roles. The central tendency among the 42 cities analyzed is "all or none"; civil service commissions tend to score either high or low on roles exercised.

    4. <u>Major Participants in the Civil Service Field of Action and the Interplay of Authority over Personnel Affairs</u>. The checks and balances provided in early civil service legislation is no longer a simple dichotomy but a subtle and supple changing set of shifting alliances and competitive balances. Although this general scene evidences a capacity to change and adjust, uncertainty is created by the comparative vigor and strength of the several participants in these networks. In this setting, accountability is often difficult to trace, let alone fix.

    a.   <u>The Police Chief Executive</u>. Although the most influential authority over personnel affairs, he shares that authority with a close competitor: the urban chief executive. To a lesser extent he also shares authority with the civil service commission, the city personnel director, the city council, and the city attorney (in that order). The police chief executive must exercise this authority through a network in which he is variously: (1) the primary decision-maker, (2) a joint decision-maker, (3) a negotiator, or (4) an advisor, depending on the component of the personnel program being examined. During the last five years there has been the movement of personnel functions both towards and away from him and his department. It is not easy to determine where the buck stops.

        In this competition with the local civil service commission, two tendencies are evident: (1) to the extent that the police chief executive exercises a high level of authority, there is less performance by the civil service body of the regulatory role, it is deprived of administrative tasks, and it is relegated to the role of adjudicator; and (2) to the extent that the commission enjoys authority at the expense of the police executive, it expands its overall role in police personnel affairs.

    b.   <u>The Mayor</u>. More authoritative mayors are highly compatible with administrating civil service commissions. At the same time such authority bears a negative correlation with that of the personnel director: the stronger the mayor, the weaker the personnel director, as well as the converse.

    c.   <u>The City Manager</u>. The more authority exercised by the City Manager, the more likely is the role of the civil service commission to be restricted to the adjudicative function. The city manager's authority complements that of the personnel director.

d.   The Personnel Director.   The impacts of this official on the
local civil service commission depend much on the local
governmental context.   In manager cities, the personnel
director takes on the task of professional personnel ad-
ministrator and relegates the commission to an adjudicative
role.   In mayor cities, administration becomes the preroga-
tive of the commission and not of the personnel director.

5.   Civil Service System Impacts on Police Personnel Practices and
Programs.   The following table summarizes the impact of each of the five
civil service roles on selected police personnel practices.

On balance, the general tendencies evident from the data indicate:

The policy-formulating role of civil service commissions serves
as a positive force on certain important aspects of police work.
Conversely, the regulatory role would appear to have an inhibiting
effect on several aspects of police administration.

6.   Civil Service System Impacts on Police Performance.   Impacts of
civil service systems on efficiency and effectiveness in criminal apprehen-
sion emerge as indirect effects which are likely to be more closely attri-
butable to the pattern of police programs which are in existence in a
given department.   In relation to the various civil service roles these in-
direct effects are as follows:

a.   regulatory commissions indirectly constrain police effec-
tiveness and efficiency by inhibiting the inclusion of
females and minorities in sworn positions;

b.   policy-formulating commissions indirectly promote police
effectiveness and efficiency by promoting civilianiza-
tion, grant-seeking, and adoption of innovations; and

c.   adjudicative commissions are mixed in their impact, fos-
tering more efficiency and effectiveness by promoting
adoption of innovations and wider use of performance ap-
praisals but constraining it by promoting the use of more
extensive sets of selection devices in their search for
police recruits.

7.   Implications for Civil Service Reform.   In summation, there is
a range or spectrum of desirable to undesirable impacts on police personnel
policies, programs, and performance among the following roles:

a.   Policy-Formulation Role.   This role of exercising or parti-
cipating in the formulation of personnel policies provides
the most consistent evidence of desirable impacts on po-
lice personnel programs and practices and, indirectly, on
the quality of police performance.

b.   Administrative and Advisory Roles.   These roles are rela-
tively neutral in terms of impacts on police personnel
matters.   This is quite evident with respect to the ad-
visory role in that even if a commission's advice is fol-
lowed, the decision (if made) and the action (if taken) is
by or under the auspices of another office or officer.   The
administrative role as a "housekeeping" function should not

IMPACT OF CIVIL SERVICE ROLES
ON SELECTED POLICE PERSONNEL PRACTICES

Practices	Civil Service Roles				
	Advisory	Administrative	Regulatory	Adjudicative	Policy Formulating
Associated with:					
More civilian paraprofessionals					Positive
Higher proportions of civilian police employees			Negative		
Higher proportions of female, minority officers			Negative		
More attempted field innovations				Positive	Positive
More grants received					Positive
More special pay programs		Negative	Negative		
More educational incentive programs		Negative	Negative		Negative
Wider opportunity structures	Negative	Negative		Negative	Negative
More extensive recruiting					Positive
More leniency on recruits' prior criminal records					Positive
Less extensive sets of selection standards			Positive		
Less extensive sets of selection devices				Negative	

Practices	Civil Service Roles				
	Advisory	Adminis-trative	Regula-tory	Adjudi-cative	Policy Formula-ting
Wider use of performance appraisals				Positive	
More functionally elaborate police organizations			Negative		
More compact sworn officer appeals systems	Negative		Negative		

xviii

be a significant influence if it is located in an appropriate or convenient functional location. An interesting exception is the presence of an authoritative mayor, a circumstance which favors a strengthened administrating commission and a weakened personnel director.

c. **Adjudicative Role.** This appellate role provides both positive and negative impacts on police personnel functions. In many cases, this is a vestigial refuge of civil service commissions which have relinquished functions to police or professional urban administrators: the more vigorous such officers are, the more are commissions restricted to this role.

d. **Regulatory Role.** This role of monitor, reviewer, and regulator of decisions or actions taken by others has inhibiting and negative effects on many police personnel policies, programs, and practices.

Clearly, the major thrusts of any civil service reform efforts should be to foster the shifting of roles _to_ that of policy-formulation and _from_ that of regulation.

C. Relation to Other Research in the Field

In a 1974 review of the status of research in the field of police personnel administration, Professor Nesta M. Gallas makes the following point:

> "Observations (of other commentators) about the
> lack of research relevant to personnel adminis-
> tration are still pertinent and applicable to
> the police field. The lack of research and the
> near absence of any integration of research ef-
> forts and findings have widened rather than
> narrowed gaps in knowledge pertinent to police
> personnel systems."

Professor Gallas goes on to note the most literature in the field is either purely descriptive or argumentative and polemical. The work that is relevant to the field tends to be psychometrically oriented and centers about the problem of police officer selection and recruitment.

To the extent that Professor Gallas' criticisms are well-founded this project stands apart from the dominant research trend in the field. It is not psychometric in orientation; while it discusses police selection and recruitment, it does not focus solely on those topics. Because much of the literature on civil service is a series of arguments and counter-arguments for reform--few of which are based on systematic observations across numerous law enforcement agencies--this project was designed as an empirical, comparative effort. It was intended as a vehicle by which the strengths and the weaknesses of those arguments can be tested in the actual working situations of police departments and civil service commissions.

This study does owe much to the larger social science literature, for many of the elements of its design and operationalization come from studies of organizational dynamics, community power structures, and inter-organizational relationships. As a result, many of its findings do speak to issues current in the social sciences, as well as to those presently under debate in the police administration field. It is hoped that the relation of this study will relate to the larger field of police adminis-tration research not through a one-to-one correspondence with past efforts but rather by spawning new efforts, suggestions for which are mentioned below.

D. Summary of Recommendations

1. Civil Service Reform. Any approach to civil service reform must take into account several circumstances: (a) the competitive, shift-ing, and diverse local settings in which most civil service commissions operate; (b) their status in any particular jurisdiction as either entre-preneurial or relatively passive; (c) the hierarchy of good, mixed, neutral, and negative impacts that certain of their roles have on police personnel programs and services; and (d) the undesirability of a body which does almost all or, conversely, almost none of the personnel functions. This combination of circumstances suggests several necessary components for efforts to reform civil service and its impacts on urban police:

    a. A broad, generalized program which is aimed at all or most urban civil service systems, involving uniform incentives and strategies, will meet with only partial success and indeed may disturb arrange-ments in certain localities which are operating satis-factorily.

    b. Similarly, the progressive elimination of civil serv-ice commissions and the assumption of their vestigial functions by other offices or officers is in most jurisdictions an organic change requiring broad poli-tical support. This is not to say that a premium should be placed on the retention of civil service commissions; rather, it is meant to suggest that except where civil service commissions are established by state laws, basic changes involving their elimination or major reformation tend to enter the domain of local political interests and not uncommonly require local electoral support.

    c. As mentioned earlier, certain civil service roles impact directly on police practices and programs, some positively and some negatively. These impacts, in turn, redound into the sphere of police effectiveness and efficiency in many distinct and identifiable ways, as noted above.

The foregoing point clearly to the soundness of exercising a degree of discretion in efforts to foster civil service reform. Certainly, it is desirable to lead commissions toward the policy-formulating role, and incentives for this purpose should indirectly impact on better police effectiveness and efficiency. At the other extreme, disincentives should be utilized with respect to commissions exercising the regulatory role, or alternatively incentives to relinquish or sharply reduce its exercise.

As mentioned earlier, the administrative role tends to follow the exercise of other roles. Any reform of this role should involve consideration of the style and arrangements for administrative management in a given jurisdiction. With respect to reform, any incentives or resources made available should be carefully directed at the modernization and rationalization of this function within the specific local setting.

The advisory role is a passive one in terms of impact, but a civil service commission limited to this role continues to provide a sounding board for community attitudes and opinions about local public service. In addition, a reform movement away from the active exercise of roles of authority to an advisory status for the commission is likely to be construed as less drastic than total elimination of the civil service tradition and, in some situations, may be fostered as a face-saving strategy.

In summation, reform efforts from whatever source they originate—local, state, or Federal—should be selective in providing incentives, disincentives, or benign neglect. Assuming the adequacy of the administrative machinery of the particular jurisdiction, movement of a passive or inactive commission to an advisory role would not be undesirable. The incentives regarding changes in exercising the administrative role should be related to concurrent administrative analysis and the sound integration or coordination of this role with the administrative machinery and resources of the particular jurisdiction. Clearly, however, the major thrusts of reform efforts should be to foster the shifting of roles to that of policy-formulation and from that of regulation.

2. Future Research Efforts. Most general topics for research can be studied in a variety of ways. In fact, it seems that the broader the topic, the larger the number of defensible research designs that may be applied to it. The impact of civil service systems on police administration is one example of a very broad topic. Thus, there are other research designs which might be fruitfully applied to it to supplement and expand the findings and analyses discussed above.

One alternative design is replication at a different level of analysis. At base, this study has been one of cities and their police agencies. The choice of the city level of analysis is appropriate in its own right. Nevertheless, it does not yield full and total coverage of that topic. County sheriff's departments, state bureaus of investigation or law enforcement, and federal police agencies are in many cases covered by civil service systems. Whether civil service bodies play the same roles at those other levels of government and whether they exert the same impacts as they do in city police agencies is an open question, to be answered by further research.

By the same token, this study might be replicated in the same cities at a future date. The point of this exercise would be to capture changes in the findings from this effort as they occur over time. The ideology behind and the operational impacts of civil service systems have clearly changed over the century since passage of the Pendleton Act. The general environment of urban law enforcement has changed equally, but over a much shorter span of time. The findings reported in the pages above need to be monitored during those changes.

Within the context posed by the specific findings of this study, there are many suggestions to be made with regard to new, nonreplicative research efforts. One of those might concentrate on specification of the impacts noted in the pages above. For example, the link between affirmative action results and police performance results seems clear from the preceding analyses, but the precise causal linkage between the two deserves serious examination. Without further research, the alternative causal hypotheses which can be constructed around relationships like these cannot be evaluated and realistic planning for the law enforcement function in America's cities cannot be undertaken without such specification.

Another important topic for future study, albeit a very difficult one to operationalize for empirical research, is the utility and the feasibility of the "tailored" reforms and incentives suggested above. Put simply, the question is just what incentives will work to change civil service systems in America's cities? Proposing general changes is easy; sponsoring and monitoring actual experiments in change for the large-scale feasibility in far more difficult, but exceedingly important for future research.

Finally, one other topic suggests itself. This study has been aimed at police departments and their performance in the various contexts of civil service systems. The topic is an important but a limited one. As mentioned earlier, the idea of civil service has diffused throughout the country to the point that most public workers in most agencies in most jurisdictions are under some sort of civil service umbrella. Do civil service boards undertake the same roles and functions for nonpolice agencies? Do they exert the same impacts? Will the incentives for change operate similarly for nonpolice civil service functions, or are there other alternatives? Future research projects which examine the nonpolice public sector and compare it to the police-related findings of this report must be mounted to answer these questions.

Chapter I

CIVIL SERVICE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

I. CIVIL SERVICE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Throughout the presidential campaign of 1976, the then-candidate Jimmy Carter termed governmental reorganization one of the key priorities for a future Carter administration. Waste, inefficiency, and the general confusion presumed to characterize the functioning of large bureaucracies could best be eliminated by revamping the Executive establishment to make it "as good and as decent as the American people."

In February of 1978, President Carter revealed the outlines of his proposed plans for governmental reorganization and increased governmental effectiveness, to be achieved through the implementation of a series of reforms of the Federal civil service system. Whether President Carter's ideas will ultimately be implemented in whole, in part, or not at all, is a concern for the futurist, and not the historian. However, one can view those proposals in a historical perspective, as the latest chapter in a history of public personnel reform as old as the country itself. For nearly a century and a half, cries for the elimination of the "spoils system" and for improvement in the performance, the efficiency, the responsiveness, and the accountability of governmental agencies and personnel have been the watchword for politicians, reformers, and scholars alike.

The general consensus of historians is that the first annual message of President Andrew Jackson to the Congress, submitted in December, 1829, marked a basic turning point in the philosophical rationale for recruitment and selection of personnel for positions in government service.[1] Prior to Jackson's accession to the presidency, American government was a "government by gentleman,"[2] peopled by administrators of then upper-class backgrounds and, according to the historical consensus, operated quite freely of corruption or malfeasance. Never totally devoid of political or "spoils" concerns, the civil service was nonetheless filled by personnel deemed by the authorities to be competent for the tasks of governance and public administration.

Jackson's message of 1829 contained the famous passage which caused him to be subsequently labelled the man who began the "period of unmitigated spoils."[3] In that speech, he said:

> The duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance: and I cannot but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience.[4]

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[1] The consensus can be quite clearly demonstrated by comparing the narratives contained in Mosher, Frederick C., Democracy and the Public Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); Shafritz, Jay M., Public Personnel Management: The Heritage of Civil Service Reform (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975); and Stahl, O. Glenn, Public Personnel Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

[2] Mosher, ibid., pp. 54-55.

[3] Stahl, ibid., pg. 31.

[4] Van Riper, Paul P., History of the United States Civil Service (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson & Co., 1958), pg. 38.

Jackson's major concern was that administrative positions in government not become the birthrights or sinecures of an established American aristocracy. His recognition of the need for "men of intelligence" in governmental service belies the notion that claiming the spoils of electoral victory was his major motivation. In fact, if Jackson's administration is judged in the light of his own appointive practices, he emerges as no less oriented toward merit than his presidential predecessors. The historical evidence shows that while he did favor "self-made men" for governmental positions more than did earlier presidents, the overwhelming majority of Jackson's appointees came from the top-ranking occupational strata of American society.[5] The image of Jackson as "spoilsman" is a gross inaccuracy; as some scholars have suggested, President Thomas Jefferson deserves at least equal consideration for that dubious distinction.[6]

Nevertheless, the "spoils" system grew in the post-Jacksonian period, until it "reached its zenith under Lincoln"[7] in 1864. Some historians, in point of fact, have suggested that a major contributing factor to the North's victory in the Civil War was Lincoln's highly partisan but extremely effective utilization of partisan patronage for filling governmental posts.[8] Be that as it may, calls for "civil service reform" only began to arise in the post-Civil War era.

During this period, American society underwent a major structural transformation. The completion of the trans-continental railroad in 1867 linked diffuse regions into one national unit. The rise of the large business corporation and the general process of industrialization brought such concepts as operating efficiency and managerial effectiveness to the forefront of administrative thinking. Furthermore, the combination brought by the post-war death of idealism and the approach of the nation's centennial anniversary gave rise to a group of political philosophers whose criticisms of the failure to operationally achieve the democratic ideal began to appear more and more frequently in the nation's political discourse.[9]

One of those most responsive to the need for increased efficiency in the public service was Congressman Thomas A. Jenckes of Rhode Island. Jenckes had travelled extensively through Europe, studying the quality of public personnel administration. He had returned to the United States suitably impressed by his European experiences and chagrined at the comparative failure of the United States to match them.

Throughout the late 1860's, Congressman Jenckes introduced and reintroduced into Congress a series of bills to create a merit system in federal employment through the institution of competitive examinations

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[5] Aronson, Sidney H., _Status and Kinship in the Higher Civil Service_ (Cambridge: Howard University Press, 1964).

[6] Vaughn, Robert, _Principles of Civil Service Law_ (New York: Matthew Bender, 1977), pp. 1-4.

[7] Shafritz, _op. cit._, pg. 15.

[8] Van Riper, _op. cit._, pg. 43.

[9] See Garraty, John A., _The New Commonwealth 1877-1890_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1968) for an extended discussion.

for job applicants. Jenckes' initial legislative proposals, which embodied the notion that merit selection would improve the efficiency of governmental operations, were largely ignored by an American public preoccupied with the escalating drama of the Andrew Johnson impeachment trial. However, by 1870, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois was able to introduce and see passed a rider to an appropriations bill stating:

> That the President of the United States be, and he is
> hereby, authorized to prescribe such rules and regula-
> tions for the admission of persons into the civil service
> of the United States as will best promote the efficiency
> thereof, and ascertain the fitness of each candidate . . .
> and for this purpose the President is authorized to employ
> suitable persons to conduct said inquiries to prescribe
> their duties, and to establish regulations for the conduct
> of persons who may receive appointments in the civil
> service.[10]

On the day following its passage, President Ulysses S. Grant appointed the first U. S. Civil Service Commission.

The Commission was not to be a long-lived body. As Congress became more aware of the Commission's negative impact on patronage, it became correspondingly less willing to support the activities of its creation. Ultimately, funds for the Commission's operations were simply not appropriated, and Grant formally abolished that body in 1875.

The irony of the fact that the first serious steps toward civil service reform were taken during the generally corrupt Grant administration has not been lost upon scholars. Equally noteworthy are the legacies of the Grant Commission to modern civil service practices, including institution of the "rule of three" as a personnel selection device, restriction of lateral entry to the entrance level positions, and prohibitions of extending the offering of promotional examinations to anyone not already employed in the promoting agency.[11]

The civil service ideal did not die with the Commission; the efforts of the "genteel reformers" would not let it. Men such as Henry Adams, Charles Elliot Norton, Frederick Law Olmstead, and Jacob D. Cox continued to dramatize the discrepancy between high political ideals and the rampant corruption of political practice. Their writings exerted an increasing influence on businessmen, bankers, professionals, and other members of the middle-class. Combined with their own moral education in the values of thrift and sobriety, important elements of the American middle-class turned to new organizational forms to further promote the merit idea.[12]

Chief among these was the New York Civil Service Reform Association, founded in 1877. Initially the vehicle of the "genteel reformers," the Association was reorganized in 1880 to be more responsive to the concerns of a wide spectrum of civil service activists. As the movement spread and other similar organizations (59 by 1884) were formed, the political "clout" behind the civil service ideal grew apace.

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[10] Van Riper, loc. cit.

[11] Vaughn, op. cit.

[12] Vaughn, op. cit., pp. 1-4 - 1-18.

The bill-drafting skills of the New York group were united with the political influence of Senator George H. Pendleton of Ohio in 1881, in the form of the "Pendleton Bill" which was introduced into Congress. When newly elected President (and strident civil service reform advocate) James A. Garfield was assassinated in 1881 by a frustrated seeker of a patronage post, an outraged nation elected a "civil service" Congress which passed the bill into law in 1883.

The Pendleton Act, formally titled "An Act to Improve the Civil Service of the United States," has been recognized as another landmark in the history of public personnel administration. It provided formal, legislative sanction for many of the procedures first utilized by President Grant's administration and added some of its own. It created the bi-partisan, three-member U. S. Civil Service Commission, required competitive entry-level and promotional examinations and probationary periods for new personnel, and authorized the Commission as the investigator for enforcement adequacy. The law also vested in the President the power to extend civil service coverage to various groups of Federal employees by executive order. That power was more than adequately exercised; in the first 35 years after the passage of the law, civil service expanded its coverage from the initial 10 percent of the Federal work force to 70 percent.[13]

The civil service movement in states and localities across the nation received major impetus from the passage of the Pendleton Act. The legislatures in the states of New York and Massachusetts passed, in 1883 and 1884, respectively, their own civil service mandates, and by the turn of the century, Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana, Louisiana, and Connecticut had followed suit. The Populist and Progressive eras which followed passage of the Pendleton Act also gave rise to more serious efforts toward reform at the municipal level, many of which centered around or were at least relevant to the institution of local civil service systems.[14]

The Civil Service Commission created by the Pendleton Act was subject to the administrative discretion of the President of the United States, but its counterparts which sprang up in various states and municipalities more often than not were established as bodies truly independent of the local chief executive. That this should have been so is not surprising in light of the intellectual history of the era. Only four years after the passage of the Pendleton Act, Woodrow Wilson published a seminal essay on "The Study of Administration."[15] The central tenet for that essay was his clear and distinct statement of the separation which he felt must be established between politics and administration. The next 50 years of intellectual development in the discipline were little more than an extension of this line of reasoning.[16] In light of

[13] Shafritz, op. cit., pp. 23-26.

[14] See Vaughn, op. cit., pp. 1-24 - 1-27. For interesting case studies of municipal reforms, see Miller, Zane L., Boss Cox's Cincinnati: Urban Politics in the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); Holli, Melvin G., Reform in Detroit: Hazen S. Pingree and Urban Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[15] Wilson, Woodrow W., "The Study of Administration," Political Science Quarterly, June, 1887, pp. 197-222.

[16] Golembiewski, Robert T., Public Administration as a Developing Discipline, I: Perspectives on Past and Present (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1977).

the fact that opinion-leaders around the country were quick to adopt the central thoughts proposed by then-Professor Wilson, it comes as no surprise that independent civil service commissions became the rule rather than the exception. The central "positive" goal of civil service was (as it remains) the recruitment of capable personnel to governmental service, but the central "negative" goal was avoidance if not elimination of political influence over governmental employees.

As the years passed, the political protection provided by civil service systems became stronger and the dangers of political interference receded. As this happened, and as the guiding disciplinary models for public administration changed to embrace the "public policy" focus,[17] the perspectives of commentators changed. Concern for political protection gradually changed to concern over the equity and responsiveness of civil service systems, and the efficiency and effectiveness of government employees. The concern of President Franklin D. Roosevelt that by the late 1930's the civil service seemed "an arsenal of obfuscation"[18] was perhaps the earliest expression of this concern.

In the late 1960's, a study of the effect of civil service on public employment in New York City was conducted, the conclusions of which rather well express the variety of contemporary concerns with civil service. Among those conclusions:

- . . . Credentialism runs rampant, and (job prerequisites are sometimes introduced with no discernible value except bureaucratic convenience in the subsequent selection process . . . .

- The (recruiting) process has been so ineffective that out of exasperation competing recruiting organization was set up . . . not for . . . patronage, but for recruiting the type of professional and technical personnel without which modern government cannot really function.

- Yet not a single case could be found where the validity of a written test . . . was ever proven.

- . . . the current legally mandated selection procedures . . . discriminates against those applicants who are most qualified according to its own standards.

- With regard to promotions, the civil service can be described more accurately as a seniority system than as a merit system . . . an employee's chance of promotion bears no relation to his performance on the job.

- . . . the civil service system is already enmeshed in all of the strains of racial and ethnic politics.

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[17] Ibid., pp. 24-28.
[18] Vaughn, op. cit., pp. 1-34.

- Given the nature of the promotion procedures, there are relatively few ways in which an agency head, manager, or supervisor can motivate, reward or penalize his workers . . . the administrative procedures involved, the time lags, the large amount of managerial effort needed "to make a case" all force the manager to fight with the problem rather than to solve it.

And, as if those were not enough,

- . . . union power has produced a second personnel system overlapping and at times conflicting with and negating the civil service system.[19]

No one would deny that New York City is a special case; the actual problems noted above are not uniformly found in every civil service system. The point is that they do exist in many locales and that they pose a new set of problems in the management of public employees and the accomplishment of the public's purposes.

A. Civil Service and the Police

As civil service systems were increasingly created in cities and states in the late nineteenth century, they were mandated to include more and more groups of public employees. Among these were state and local police officers. Thus, it should come as no real surprise to discover the existence of more than a half century of concern over police civil service systems, as expressed by police authorities.

One of the first to recognize the inherent weaknesses of police civil service systems was Raymond Fosdick, who studied the problems of American police systems in several large cities over half a century ago. Fosdick did not hesitate to denounce the adverse effects of civil service upon the problems of recruitment, selection, promotion, and discipline in police departments.

> In its application to a police department, civil service has serious limitations. In the endeavor to guard against abuse of authority, it frequently is carried to such extremes that rigidity takes the place of flexibility in administration, and initiative in effecting essential changes in personnel is crippled and destroyed. Too often . . . civil service is a bulwark for neglect and incompetence, and one of the prime causes of departmental disorganization. Too often does the attempt to protect the force against the capricious play of politics compromise the principle of responsible leadership, so that in trying to nullify the effects of incompetence and favoritism, we nullify capacity and intelligence too.[20]

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[19] Savas, E. S. and Ginsburg, Sigmund G., "The Civil Service--A Meritless System?" The Public Interest, Number 32, Summer, 1973, pp. 70-85.

[20] Fosdick, Raymond B., American Police Systems (New York: The Century Company, 1920), pg. 284.

Studies of police operations in several large American cities conducted in the early decades of the twentieth century added to the growing controversy surrounding civil service. Leonard V. Harrison, in a study of the Boston Police Department, concluded that the civil service commission serving that department had at least partially outlined its usefulness and that the conditions which had once necessitated civil service control of police selection and promotion no longer existed. Harrison recommended that much of the civil service commission's authority be transferred to the police executive, thus relegating the civil service commission to the status of a Board of Review. Harrison also suggested that the real opportunity for improving police personnel practices rested not with the civil service system but with the advancement of a spirit of professionalism among police administrators.[21]

In 1929, a comprehensive study of the Chicago Police Department—the first of its kind in the city—was conducted. In its final report, the Citizen's Police Committee issued a sweeping indictment of the weaknesses that prevailed in the civil service system at that time.[22] Among other findings, the Committee declared that:

- Buying and selling promotions and appointments was a widespread practice, despite the existence of civil service.

- The purpose of civil service had been consistently circumvented and compromised by a series of actions, such as:

  The appointment of weak men to the civil service commission; the removal of commissioners who displayed an independent attitude; specially designed examinations for the benefit of favorites; the failure to advertise examinations; unjust removals; the reinstatement of employees who had been removed by a previous civil service commission; the frequent use of sixty day appointments; and various other methods. . . .[23]

- The system of promotion in the Chicago Police Department did little to ensure the elevation of qualified employees, but rested largely upon seniority and veterans' preference.

- The civil service served to impede rather than promote the application of professional principles of police personnel administration.

- The existence of a civil service commission did little, if anything, to guard against political influence in the internal affairs of the police department.

[21] Harrison, Leonard V., "Police Administration in Boston: Harvard Law School Survey of the Boston Police Department," Vol. III (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), pg. 30.

[22] The Citizens' Police Committee, Chicago Police Problems (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931).

[23] Ibid., pg. 49.

The hopes expressed in 1895 that the passage of the
civil service law meant the end of the old order were
far from being realized. The habit of filling city
offices with partisans, with the understanding that
they would work for the machine, was too deeply rooted
in the political ideas of the time to be abandoned merely
because there was a law against it.[24]

A few years later, August Vollmer, another eminent scholar and
police administrator, similarly condemned the defects of civil service in
police departments. While admitting somewhat reluctantly that civil ser-
vice might be necessary to eliminate some forms of corruption from the
internal affairs of police departments, Vollmer found little difference
in the evils of political parties or politics between civil service and
noncivil service police agencies.[25] Vollmer was also quite critical of
the extent to which civil service commissions impeded a police administra-
tor's ability to eliminate undesirable employees from the police
organization.

It should be possible for the civil service commission
and the police chief to cooperate in a mutually satis-
factory procedure for the elimination of undesirables.
When some men discover that their leader is without
power to remove them, they take advantage of his lack
of authority and do as little as possible.[26]

Bruce Smith, in his classic work on the problems of American law
enforcement, also found reason to criticize civil service. Smith suggested
that a wholesale reform was needed in civil service principles.

Based upon the past record of civil service control--
the political pandering, the personal corruption, and
the bureaucratic rigidity so commonly noted among its
characteristics--there is little in the prospect to
lend hope for better things in municipal police
administration.[27]

Smith also suggested that one possible solution to the problems associated
with civil service in police organizations was the emerging development of
a core of police administrators whose personal competence and dedication
to professional principles of management would eliminate the need for re-
liance upon an independent civil service commission to oversee police
personnel practices.[28]

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Vollmer, August, The Police and Modern Society (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1936), pg. 226.

[26] Ibid., pg. 229.

[27] Smith, Bruce, Police Systems in the United States, 2d. Rev. Ed.
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), pp. 127-128.

[28] Ibid.

In other settings civil service has played an important role in insulating police personnel from unnecessary political pressures and in clearing the way for open, competitive procedures and techniques in the selection and promotion of police personnel. Few would question the concepts originally underlying civil service: fairness and equity in all aspects of public employment and the elimination of political influences. But many authorities, in supporting the basic philosophy of civil service, now question whether the conditions which at one time necessitated rigid protections embodied in civil service laws still exist.

The American Bar Association, in recommending standards for urban police forces, suggested that many aspects of contemporary civil service law are no longer appropriate to meet the problems of the police in contemporary society.

> With the passage of time, many of these safeguards
> have become obsolete or have come to be administered
> in a way that has lost sight of their original pur-
> pose and that fail to recognize the current problems
> of police agencies.[29]

The American Bar Association report further recommended that police administrators be given greater authority over the management of human resources in the police agency and that civil service commissions should facilitate, rather than impede, the task of the police executive.[30]

In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, in its report on the police, also recommended that a greater spirit of cooperation and coordination be developed between police agencies, and noted that: "Central personnel agencies and civil service commissions alone are not capable of selecting, advancing, and promoting personnel within the police service."[31] The Commission also observed that the emergence of professionalism among police administrators has ". . . diminished the threat of the spoils system and other corrupt practices . . . ."[32]

B. An Approach to Research Issues

In one sense, the narrative to this point has mirrored quite well the field of inquiry it was designed to introduce. The scholarly literature is rich and varied in the amount of historical analysis devoted to civil service at the national level and in reference to the general concerns of public administration. While no less varied, the literature is correspondingly weak when the focus is narrowed to civil service and municipal policing. Although written in quite a different context, the words of two urban analysts are quite applicable to the police-civil service scene:

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[29] American Bar Association, Standards Relating to the Urban Police Function (New York: American Bar Association, 1972), pg. 223.

[30] Ibid., pp. 221-223.

[31] National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pg. 438.

[32] Ibid.

A reader new to the analysis of police services will
be surprised at the definiteness of recommendations
with virtually no evidence supporting them. The
recommendations are much more the product of a "way
of thinking" about the problem . . . than an empirical
analysis of problems and alternative solutions.[33]

The commentaries proffered by observers of civil service systems
in police work in the United States form a more than sufficient basis upon
which to construct hypotheses for empirical research. In recognition of
this fact, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration offered a research grant
to Public Administration Service in the fall of 1976 to study this problem.
The project supported by that grant was entitled "Civil Service Systems:
Their Impact on Police Administration."

The approach taken to the project by PAS was one informed by general
systems theory. As implied in the project title, it was presumed that civil
service systems and police administration policies and programs played a
measurable and predictive role vis-a-vis each other, that variations in
the former could be systematically tied to variations in the latter.
However, PAS soon expanded that notion into a more general hypothetical
model of the fairly standard input-throughput-output variety. The model
generally presumed that a variety of background or environmental factors
(the input component) led to the construction of particular police person-
nel systems (the throughput component), the operations of which would lead
to particular police policy or program results (the output sector).

Background, Environmental Factors (Input)	→	Police Personnel Systems (Throughput)	→	Police Policy, Program Results (Output)

The logic underlying such an approach is relatively clear-cut, and
potentially quite useful from a practical standpoint. For example, finding
that civil service systems did in some ways impact upon police administra-
tion or operations might naturally lead to a call for change in those
systems. But if such systems were themselves the products of a series of
other factors, then those calls for change might require far more elaborate
and extensive implementation strategies than are immediately apparent.

Providing general definitions of the input sector was a relatively
straightforward process. The commentaries in the relevant literature sug-
gested three major causal factors: (a) the political operating environ-
ments for civil service systems by law, (b) the constraints and freedoms
instituted in civil service systems by law, and (c) the growing impact of
public employee (especially police) unionism. Specifying a series of
variables to measure these basic concepts or factors would provide suffi-
cient material to cover the input sector quite adequately.

The major conceptual difficulties the project faced were those
attendant upon trying to define the throughput sector, the police personnel
systems. Despite the simplicity of the project's formal title, "civil

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[33] Bish, Robert L. and Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Govern-
ment: Metropolitan Reform Reconsidered (Washington, D.C.: American Enter-
prise Institute for Public Police Research, 1973).

service systems" present the analyst with a host of definitional problems. These range from the philosophical through the operational realms of police personnel work, but they exist nonetheless.

The very concept of "merit" provides the researcher with almost no guidance in the area of empirical inquiry. "Merit" is a very general concept; almost no consensus exists in the relevant literature around specific definitions. A cursory glance at those writings suggests that the debate over merit is similar in character to that which centers about other general concepts like justice or equality. Some judge a personnel system "meritorious" if the means it employs in dealing with personnel are job-specific, job-related, and impartial. Others arrive at their judgments after examining ends; for them, a system can be labelled "merit" if it results in finding a high quality workforce, a racially and sexually balanced group of personnel, effective and efficient performance, any combination of those, or any of a host of other desired results. The debate will probably not diminish in intensity in the near future, as perhaps, it should not. But, for the purposes of the civil service research project, the concept of "merit" was deemed too general and all-embracing to serve as a foundation for empirical work.

Given that decision, the problem is unfortunately no closer to resolution. Most local jurisdictions do have a formal merit board, civil service commission, or similar group playing some role in local police personnel affairs. However, those bodies vary along a large number of characteristics, among them:

- formal organizational features (such as group size and composition, members' tenure of office, sources of appointment, and access to staff and budgetary resources);

- authority possessed and exercised (its source, its generality or specificity, and the instances of and reasons for its exercise);

- administrative responsibility possessed and exercised; and

- overall type and character of the role it plays in the local police personnel system.

Such wide variation, as actually documented in portions of other research projects,[34] made it quite clear that any simple, unidimentional definitions of "civil service systems" would be inappropriate to the actual situation, if not actually misleading.

In light of the fact that the existing research supplies no clear and acceptable definition of "civil service systems," it was decided that those systems would be defined inductively. That is, rather than impose

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[34] See Boesel, Andrew W., "Local Personnel Management: Organizational Problems and Operating Practices," in Municipal Year Book 1974 (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, 1974); also Eisenburg, Terry, et al., Police Personnel Practices in State and Local Governments (Washington, D.C.: International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Police Foundation, 1973).

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a predetermined specification of the concept, data would be collected on all of the features listed above. "Definitions" of civil service systems could then be constructed from the most meaningful concurrent variations in those different features.

Defining the output sector of the tentative model was an equally wide-ranging but much simpler task. The literature containing the comments most critical of the impacts of civil service systems on police personnel policy, police administration, and police operations can be divided--in accordance with the impacts discussed--into three logical categories: impacts on personnel practices, impacts on police administrative issues, and impacts on police performance.

The first of these, the personnel practices category, is the most wide-ranging. Civil service systems have been accused, by their various critics, of impacting negatively upon selection, recruitment, training, compensation, promotion, assignment, discipline, and separation policies in police departments. In terms of the civil service research project, the research hypotheses to be tested are whether the various features of civil service systems (as outlined above) relate positively, negatively, or not at all to the actual practices of police agencies in the areas listed. Judgments of the "meritorious" character of those impacts can then be imposed on the data by the analyst, in the light of current standards of professionalism in police personnel work.

The second category--impacts on police administrative issues--is related to, but distinct from, the first. Over the past few years, various observers of the police scene in America have levelled criticisms toward what they see as a lack of achievement in four major areas: building a police force representative of the community it serves through affirmative action, promoting the greater efficiency of policing by employing civilians in police work, promoting the professionalism of sworn police officers through the institution of formal career development programs and, in general, maintaining the continuing search for responsible styles of policing through continued experiments with suggested operational innovations. These criticisms can be recast into empirically testable hypotheses, similar to those suggested above. That is, through analyses of data on police activities and results in each of those four categories, the impacts of the various civil service system features can be calculated and assessed.

Of course, the third general category raises the most basic question of all. One can argue, in accord with the "public policy" intellectual perspective on public administration,[35] that administrative programs or policies which do not generate improved levels of delivered services are unproductive activities--regardless of professional clamor for their adoption. The research hypothesis implicit in such arguments can be framed in terms of the search for direct or indirect impacts of the civil service system features on the effectiveness and the efficiency of police performance.

Figure 1 depicts, in the form of a diagram, the hypotheses to be explored by the civil service research project. The arrows in that figure are not meant to be exhaustive of all possible impacts. In fact, their existence and magnitude (and those for any others not specifically included)

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[35] An excellent summary statement of this perspective is available in Ostrom, Vincent, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1973).

Figure 1

CIVIL SERVICE PROJECT: GENERAL CONCEPTUAL MODEL

are empirical questions, the answers to which are most appropriately left to the analyses of actual data. The figure is rather intended to present the general logic underlying the entire inquiry, and to suggest the outline of the narrative to follow.

The second chapter of this report will describe the general methodologies employed during the course of the research project. Detailed descriptions are provided of the data collection tasks and instruments utilized, of the rationale behind the selection of research sites, of the data collected and the variables defined, and of the effects of nonparticipation on the quality of subsequent analyses. Chapter II is, in summary, devoted to the techniques of inquiry.

As suggested in the narrative above, the history of civil service reform is one usually characterized by discrete events which have come to serve as benchmarks—such as Jackson's Annual Address of 1829 or the Pendleton Act of 1883. Because many of these reform efforts were instituted through the passage of laws, Chapter III constitutes a detailed description of the legal framework behind contemporary municipal police personnel systems.

Chapter IV moves beyond the legal framework to a description of what actually exists. It documents in great detail both the form and the substance of contemporary police personnel systems from a behaviorial standpoint. That is, it is centered around the discovery of what sorts of actors compose police personnel systems, what authorities and responsibilities they exercise, and what general roles they play. In summary, Chapter IV concentrates on who does what, and to whom.

Chapter V and VI are more analytic efforts, designed to test and assess the various hypotheses mentioned above. They take the features of police personnel systems as dependent variables and attempt to assess the impacts of characteristics of the policing environment (more specifically, of local political configurations, of legal constraints, and of police unionism) on those features. Chapter VII adds to the analysis by then turning to the impacts of both the environmental factors and the police personnel systems on local police personnel practices and on police responses to the administrative issues.

In Chapter VIII, the issue of quality of police performance is the main focus. Measures of the efficiency and the effectiveness of the police in their roles as agents of law enforcement are discussed, defined, and calculated. Then, those measures are added to the model which is reassessed to determine the impacts of the causally prior variables on the performance measures.

The concluding chapter provides two major bodies of information. First, it recapitulates and summarizes the findings of the study most pertinent to both scholars and practitioners. Secondly, the chapter attempts to suggest the most fruitful directions for subsequent research into that necessarily complex area, the local police personnel system.

Chapter II
STUDY METHODOLOGY

II. STUDY METHODOLOGY

The Civil Service Research Project formally commenced on November 8, 1976. It began, as do most research endeavors, with a review of the pertinent literature on the study topic. Among the sources of literature examined were collections at the following locations:

American Justice Institute, National Project to Develop Police Program Performance Measures, Sacramento, California

Charles E. Merriam Center of Public Administration, Chicago, Illinois

Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana

International Association of Chiefs of Police

International City Managers' Association (Urban Data Systems)

International Personnel Management Association

National Civil Service League

National Criminal Justice Reference Service

National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

National League of Cities/U. S. Conference of Mayors

National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago

National Planning Association (National Manpower Survey)

Police Foundation

United States Civil Service Commission, Bureau of Inter-governmental Personnel Programs

United States Civil Service Commission, Library

Furthermore, three of those sources (the National Planning Association, the International City Managers' Association, and the Police Foundation) graciously offered PAS the use of data relevant to the topic which they had primarily collected in surveys of their own. Secondary analysis of this material proved most helpful in sharpening the focus of the project and in resolving early study design issues. Furthermore, these sources provided many question formats which were duplicated in the PAS collection instruments.

The literature review and the secondary data analyses quite quickly brought to light two major conditions which proved important to the development of this particular project. The first of these was the near ubiquity of some form of civil service system in American municipalities. In four different surveys conducted between 1970 and 1976, no fewer than 45 percent of the responding municipal governments reported the existence of civil

service commissions in their cities. In a study more closely focused on police personnel matters, 84 percent of the responding municipal police departments indicated that at least some of their sworn officers were "under" a civil service/merit system."[36] Civil service systems for city police are, quite clearly, the rule rather than the exception.

That same study of police personnel affairs also suggested, however, that municipal civil service systems vary quite widely on some highly significant dimensions. The dimensions singled out for closest scrutiny revolved around who had police personnel policy-making responsibility and who had, for a series of personnel functions, administrative responsibility. Variations within the "civil service" respondent agencies were clear and significant.

Given both the prevalence of some form of civil service in American policing, and the extremely wide variations in certain features of these forms, the decision was made to utilize some form of random sampling procedure to select study sites. It was felt that a more stratified, classically experimental procedure would have carried with it two major disadvantages:

- potential data showed every possibility of containing more within-strata than between-strata variation, thus confusing the meaning of any findings generated, and

- impacts due to the lack of any form of "civil service" system would be relevant only to a very small minority of municipal jurisdictions.

These considerations made it clear that a random selection procedure for study sites, and a definition of civil service systems tapping much more than their mere presence or absence, were both incumbent upon the project.

Thus, in the initial proposal and during the planning stages of the Civil Service Research Project, Public Administration Service targeted a random selection of 51 medium- and large-sized cities to serve as sample points for its data collection efforts.[37] That collection of cities was chosen precisely because it constituted a random sample of the urban places (of population size equal to or greater than 50,000) in which Americans were most likely to reside. Complementing this reason was the fact that researchers at the University of Chicago had been collecting data on these cities for many years, and that contact and cooperation with them was established in the earliest stages of project conceptualization. Thus, using the NORC sample promised a quantum of efficiency in data collection and thus an advantage over drawing a sample de novo.

The results of the literature review also made it quite clear that an adequate study would have to extend its scope rather broadly to cover the topic in a thorough and worthwhile manner. Chapter I has already outlined the conceptual basis for the data collection efforts; suffice it to say here that it was decided to seek data on the legal backgrounds of the civil service systems encountered, on the characteristics of the study sites and of their local political structures, on the nature of local police unionism, on the structures of the local police personnel systems, and on police policies, programs, and performance levels.

[36] Eisenberg, Terry, et al., Police Personnel Practices in State and Local Governments (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1973).
[37] See next page.

The decision to study city police departments and to exclude county, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies was also taken quite deliberately. One of the major goals of the project was generalization of the findings based on an adequate base of comparable cases. While county, state, and Federal level civil service systems are clearly topics worth studying, the law enforcement agencies at each of those levels of government perform very different functions in very different environments. In the interests of research generalization and interagency comparison, the study was limited to cities, their police departments, and their civil service systems.

A. Data Collection Methods

Because the range of matters to be addressed by the project was quite wide, it was determined that a variety of data collection techniques should be utilized to generate relevant research materials. More specifically, five data collection activities were planned for each of the selected cities:

1. documentation constituting the legal framework for the local police personnel operation which might prove relevant to the topic were collected for subsequent content analyses;

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Those cities are the constituent members of the Permanent Community Sample of the National Opinion Research Center of Chicago, Illinois. For more details on them and how they were selected, see Rossi, Peter H. and Crain, Robert L., "The NORC Permanent Community Sample," in _Public Opinion Quarterly_, 32, Summer, 1968. The particular 51 cities are:

Akron, Ohio	Memphis, Tennessee
Albany, New York	Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Amarillo, Texas	Minneapolis, Minnesota
Atlanta, Georgia	Newark, New Jersey
Berkeley, California	Palo Alto, California
Birmingham, Alabama	Pasadena, California
Bloomington, Minnesota	Phoenix, Arizona
Boston, Massachusetts	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Buffalo, New York	St. Louis, Missouri
Cambridge, Massachusetts	St. Paul, Minnesota
Charlotte, North Carolina	St. Petersburg, Florida
Clifton, New Jersey	Salt Lake City, Utah
Duluth, Minnesota	San Francisco, California
Euclid, Ohio	Santa Ana, California
Fort Worth, Texas	San Jose, California
Fullerton, California	Santa Monica, California
Gary, Indiana	Schenectady, New York
Hamilton, Ohio	Seattle, Washington
Hammond, Indiana	South Bend, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana	Tampa, Florida
Irvington, New Jersey	Tyler, Texas
Jacksonville, Florida	Utica, New York
Long Beach, California	Waco, Texas
Malden, Massachusetts	Warren, Michigan
Manchester, New Hampshire	Waterbury, Connecticut
	Waukegan, Illinois

2. documentation containing the results of formal or informal negotiations with police officer unions or associations were also collected for subsequent content analyses;

3. a standardized questionnaire on police policies and procedures was delivered to the local police department in each participating city, to be completed by that person or those persons most knowledgeable about its contents;

4. structured personal interviews on police policy-making and local police issues were conducted with as many of the following as would make themselves available to the field staff:

   • the mayor or city manager

   • the chief of police

   • the city personnel director

   • the chairman, chairwoman, or executive secretary of the civil service board or commission

   • the director of the office of personnel of the local police department

   • the head of the local police union or similar organization

   Of course, whenever such an official designated a surrogate or spokesman, the person so designated became the subject of the interview; and

5. the annual reports compiled by the police departments in the jurisdictions to be studied were collected as possible sources of data on police operations unavailable in any of the other sources.

For Steps 1 through 4, formal collection instruments were developed. Checklists of relevant items to be extracted from the legal materials and from the bargaining materials in the context of content analyses were constructed by PAS staff members. These checklists are reprinted below as Appendices I (the legal documents) and II (the bargaining documents). Survey instruments for Steps 3 and 4 were also developed internally, and were subjected to a three-stage review and refinement procedure, wherein:

1. refinements were made following the criticisms offered in an internal review by PAS staff members experienced in either police or personnel administration, or both;

2. additional refinements were made following the
   criticisms offered by a panel of external readers;[38] and

3. final refinements were made following field testing
   in four study sites.

The finalized survey instruments used in the project are reprinted
in Appendices III (the departmental questionnaire) and IV (the personal
interview schedule).

During the early spring of 1977, it was decided to utilize experi-
enced PAS staff members to conduct the field work and data collection
tasks. Toward the end of preparing them for that task, a day-and-a-half
training and orientation session was held which consisted of three primary
components. The first component was a "Project Introduction" which in-
cluded an overview of the development of the project, a brief history of
civil service reform, and a discussion into the nature of contemporary
civil service problems and issues. This part of the training program also
included a discussion and definition of the intended roles and responsi-
bilities of each project participant.

The second component of the orientation session examined the re-
search design and the survey instruments and included an item-by-item re-
view of the survey questionnaires.

The final portion of the training session dealt with selected pro-
cedural and administrative matters considered important to the project's
smooth operation. Topics included cost considerations, document distri-
bution, surrogate interviews, and the disposition of data collection
problems.

The decision to employ regular PAS staff members to collect the
data in the on-site visits was taken quite deliberately. In the early
stages of the project, it was anticipated that staff members' extensive
experience in public administration would be of positive benefit in at
least two regards:

1. they could quite easily and quickly resolve ambiguities
   in survey questions in a manner so as to generate clear
   and reliable responses; and

2. they could make independent observations of the local
   scene while they were on site and could record these
   in a series of field reports--this could add a quali-
   tative background feature to the statistical findings
   of the study.

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[38]Those external reviewers were: Terry N. Clark, Associate Profes-
sor of Sociology at the University of Chicago; Michael P. Gardner, Director
of Personnel for the Boston Police Department; Thomas F. Hastings, Chief
of Police, Rochester, New York; and Charles Brown, Staff Associate for the
Police Executive Research Forum.

In retrospect, it is clear that this strategy was sound. Because of the quantity of data sought and the primacy given to its collection, the qualitative observations and comments varied widely due to the press of time and availability of essential local actors. On balance, the contextual detail provided by the PAS regular staff strengthened the quality of the survey results.

Actual field work and data collection were undertaken between April and September of 1977. As mentioned above, all interviews were conducted by members of the PAS staff, who also analyzed all documents. The information which could be quantified was transferred to punched cards for analysis at the Computation Center of the University of Chicago. However, all original documents and sources were retained to enable the performance of qualitative analyses, whenever such were appropriate and essential.

The most successful method used to enlist city participation was a letter of introduction followed by personal telephone contacts. The letter of introduction was ordinarily addressed to the mayor or city manager and explained the purpose and scope of the project (a copy of the letter is attached as Appendix V). The letter also explained that for its participation each city would receive a comparative profile of its personnel practices. This incentive proved to be attractive to many of the cities. About five days after mailing the introductory letters each city was contacted by telephone to schedule the actual staff members' visits.

B. City Participation and Response Bias

Data from one or more of the collection activities were gathered in 42 (82.4 percent) of the 51 cities in the initial sample. This participation level exceeding 80 percent is a quite acceptable result for such a research endeavor. More specifically, the results of the various activities were as follows:

- civil service or personnel-related laws (whether at state, county, or local levels) which were relevant to police personnel were collected in 36 of the 42 cities;

- documents embodying police labor-management agreements (contracts, memoranda of understanding, etc.) were collected in 31 of the 42 sample cities;

- completed police departmental questionnaires were returned by 41 of the 42 cities;

- 197 personal interviews were conducted with local police system actors with a minimum of three and a maximum of six persons in any given city, distributed as follows:

- Urban Chief Executives   36
- Chiefs of Police   42
- City Personnel Directors   30
- Civil Service Spokespersons   28
- Police Personnel Officers   14
- Police Association/Union Leaders   42
- Others   5

197, and

police department annual reports were provided by agencies in 29 of the participating cities.

Because the data for the civil service research project were collected on a city basis and because the city (or the city police department) serves as the unit of analysis in subsequent chapters, it seems most pertinent to examine in some detail the effects of nonresponse or nonparticipation on the quality of the data base. More specifically, the question to be addressed is whether nonparticipating cities differ in some systematic ways from the participants so as to cast serious doubt on the generalizability of any findings to come.

Data for each of the 51 cities in the sample were collected in order to test for the effects of nonresponse and its associated biases. Nine variables, generally demographic or socio-economic in nature but quite plausibly linked to police performance, were selected for these tests. Those variables were:

- Estimated Population Size in 1973

- Type of City Government

- Percent Change in Population, 1970-1973

- Percent Nonwhite, 1970

- Percent Under Age 18, 1970

- City Revenues (From Own Sources)

- Number of City Employees

- Per Capita Income

- Percent at or Below the Poverty Level

The actual data items for these entries were extracted from the 1976 and 1977 Municipal Year Books of the International City Management Association. However, it should be noted that most of the data encountered in those books are extracted from the biennial census or from its update studies.

The statistic used to perform tests for nonresponse bias is called chi-squared (X^2). Essentially, this statistic calculates whether the internal distribution of cases in a contingency table is significantly different from that which one might encounter purely by chance. More specifically, chi-square calculates the differences between the actual and the

expected distributions and then tests how likely that difference is to be encountered. If that likelihood is extremely low, the finding is said to be statistically significant.

By statistical and scientific convention, "extremely low" is defined mathematically as a probability equal to or less than 5 chances in 100 ($p \leq .05$, in technical terminology).

	City Size, 1973	Partici-pated	Declined
x^2 = 1.959 with 2 degrees of freedom; $p \leq .40$ (not significant)	250,000 +	20	2
	100,000 to 250,000	9	3
	50,000 to 100,000	13	4
	Government Type		
x^2 = .429 with 2 degrees of freedom; $p \leq .90$ (not significant)	Mayor-Council	24	6
	Council-Manager	17	3
	Commission	1	0
	Percent Change in Population, 1970-1973		
x^2 = .03 with 2 degrees of freedom; $p \leq .95$ (not significant)	- 2%	22	5
	- 2 to 2	10	2
	2 +	10	2
	Percent Nonwhite, 1970		
x^2 = 3.569 with 2 degrees of freedom; $p \leq .20$ (not significant)	0 - 6%	15	2
	77 - 20	14	6
	21 +	13	1
	Percent Under Age 18, 1970		
x^2 = .826 with 1 degree of freedom; $p \leq .50$ (not significant)	32%	21	3
	32%+	21	6
	City Revenues from own Sources (millions of dollars)		
x^2 = 2.310 with 1 degree of freedom; $p \leq .15$ (not significant)	$35	21	7
	$35 +	21	2

22

		Partici- pated	Declined
$x^2 = 2.053$ with 1 degree of freedom; $p \le .20$ (not significant)	**Number of City Employees** 0 – 2,000 2,000 +	17 25	6 3
$x^2 = 3.141$ with 1 degree of freedom; $p \le .075$ (not significant)	**Per Capita Income** Over \$4,000 Under \$4,000	23 19	2 7
$x^2 = 2.070$ with 2 degrees of freedom; $p \le .45$ (not significant)	**Percent at or Below Poverty Level** 13 + 9 – 12 0 – 8	8 14 20	0 4 5

The findings from those individual tests can be summarized rather
succinctly at this point: on none of the test variables was the distribu-
tion significantly different from what might have been expected purely by
chance. That is, the results of the various tests, taken individually or
together, indicate that no significant biases are injected into the data--
and no significant obstacles to accurate generalization interposed--by the
failure of 9 of the original 51 cities to participate in the Public Adminis·
tration Service research project on civil service systems.

The methods of data analysis utilized throughout the civil service
research project constituted a deliberate and self-conscious mix of quali-
tative and quantitative styles. The very nature of a study of policy or
program impact, such as this one, demands such a combination, for it pre-
supposes two related but distinct analytic activities. On the one hand,
the analyst must follow the prescriptions of Bish and Ostrom: evidence
must be gathered and weighed to discover what has happened, to whom, under
what circumstances and with what results. To answer such questions with
any precision, one must necessarily deal in statistical terms. Thus the
result of the application of the techniques of cross tabulation, correla-
tion, and multiple regression to the information gathered plays a key role
in the chapters which follow.

On the other hand, the policy analyst cannot afford to lose sight
of the "bottom line" of his or her work. The ultimate question to which
most policy studies are at least implicitly addressed is normative in
character: is the policy in question a success or a failure, costly or
inexpensive, good or bad? To answer such questions is to go beyond the
realm of statistics and into that of professional experience and personal
values. It requires one to inject substantive evaluations into statistical
measures. The subsequent narrative includes these as well.

In quite another context, Coulson has stated:

"The use of applied mathematics in its relation to
a physical problem involves three steps:

    i.   a dive from the world of reality into the
       world of mathematics;

    ii. a swim in the world of mathematics;

    iii. a climb from the world of mathematics back
       into the world of reality, carrying the pre-
       diction in our teeth."[39]

In much the same vein, the report which follows probes the worlds of statis-
tics and public administration in its search for the impact of civil service
systems on urban police administration.

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[39]Coulson, C. A., The Spirit of Applied Mathematics (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1953).

Chapter III

THE LAWS AND URBAN POLICE PERSONNEL SYSTEMS

III. THE LAWS AND URBAN POLICE PERSONNEL SYSTEMS

This chapter examines the legal framework behind contemporary municipal police personnel systems. Although in their origins, many local laws governing merit systems tended to be influenced directly or indirectly by the Federal model so that certain common features can be perceived among them, the analysis of laws undertaken in this study revealed a wide diversity in many important provisions. This diversity is further compounded by the complexity in many settings of the nature and structure of the legal framework per se. For example, local civil service laws may operate within a broader framework of legal requirements which often emanate from higher levels of government and are embodied in such diverse documents as constitutions, charters, statutes, ordinances, and administrative rules and regulations having the force of law. The task of a clear identification or isolation of those "civil service" aspects of the legal framework is also becoming more difficult by the emergence of a body of parallel laws regarding collective bargaining, equal employment opportunity, and laws which establish special disability and retirement systems and training networks for police officers. These laws variously conflict or compete with, complement, or otherwise impinge upon certain characteristics of municipal police personnel systems.

During the course of this study, PAS was able to collect and analyze the basic civil service (personnel) laws from 36 out of the 42 cities that participated in the project. In many cases, more than one type of document (e.g., state law, city charter, or ordinance) was relevant to a given municipality; in such cases, data were extracted from that document which superseded the others in legal standing. In most cases, the laws analyzed were identified by local authorities as the ones which provided the basic legal foundation for personnel administration in their particular jurisdictions.

The analysis of these basic civil service laws which follows is not intended to be an exhaustive examination into all of the laws impacting municipal police personnel administration. Rather, it is an attempt to identify specific aspects of the basic civil service laws which influence or determine municipal police personnel administration standards and structures. Specifically, the basic civil service laws were analyzed to find answers to the following types of questions.

- Do the laws mandate personnel administration based on merit principles?

- To what extent do merit-based laws cover police personnel?

- What is the nature of the organizational arrangements mandated or permitted by law?

- What group or persons are given legal responsibility for setting personnel policy and operating the personnel system?

Answers to these questions should clarify the extent to which civil service laws influence or govern the behavior and activities of officials responsible for making personnel decisions affecting municipal police administration. They should also indicate the amount of authority legally possessed by different officials and should indicate the nature and scope of legal forces operating on municipal police personnel systems. In short, the analysis of the legal basis should provide the initial basis for evaluating the relationship between civil service personnel systems and police administration.

A. Civil Service Reform

The State of New York passed the first state civil service law in 1883. At the local government level, the first municipality to adopt a civil service law was Albany, New York, in 1884. By the early 20th century civil service systems based on the merit principle were established in many state and local governments.[40] Since then, they have grown in numbers at a very rapid pace, so that by the contemporary era they have become almost ubiquitous.

As stated in Chapter I, merit-based personnel systems were a product of a reform movement aimed at eliminating governmental corruption and promoting economy and efficiency in government.[41] Thus, early civil service laws contained provisions guarding against political corruption and emphasized employment practices (i.e., open, competitive examinations) aimed at securing a competent public work force. The original models provided watch-dog roles at both the front and back doors of public employment and an active monitor's role with regard to a wide spectrum of conditions of service.

Although the principle of nonpolitical, merit based employment has remained essentially intact over time, the concept of what constitutes a modern merit system has changed. For example, the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 established the merit approach as public policy and embodied the following six broad merit principles as the foundation for personnel administration.[42]

1. Recruiting, selecting, and advancing employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge, and skills, including open consideration of qualified applicants for initial appointment.

2. Providing equitable and adequate compensation.

3. Training employees, as needed, to assure high-quality performance.

4. Retaining employees on the basis of the adequacy of their performance, correcting inadequate performance, and separating employees whose inadequate performance cannot be corrected.

[40] For a history of civil service reform in state and local government, see Kaplan, H. Elliot, The Law of Civil Service (Albany, N.Y.: Matthew Bender & Company, 1958), pp. 22-29. Also, U.S. Civil Service Commission, Biography of an Ideal (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1973).

[41] Vaughn, Robert, Principles of Civil Service Law (New York: Matthew Bender & Company, 1976, pp. 1-33.

[42] Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970. Public Law 91-648, 91st Congress, S.11, January 5, 1971.

5. Assuring fair treatment of applicants and employees in all aspects of personnel administration without regard to political affiliation, race, color, national origin, sex, or religious creed and with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights as citizens.

6. Assuring that employees are protected against coercion from partisan political purposes and are prohibited from using their official authority for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election or a nomination for office.

Although the above provisions can be interpreted in different ways, many of today's observers believe that modern merit systems should be concerned not only with traditional employment practices but with the entire range of personnel management from equal employment opportunity, to career development and training, to collective bargaining.[43] The question then posed is to what extent are today's urban police departments governed by civil service laws and how well do these laws meet modern merit standards?

B. Types of Systems and Their Coverage

There is no doubt that the majority of today's civil service laws emphasize merit based personnel systems, at least in the traditional sense. In the majority of cases PAS analyzed, the merit principle was mandated by general provision of law to be the focus of local personnel structures. For example, specific legal provisions mandating or permitting merit-based personnel systems were contained in 80.5 percent of the laws analyzed. Further, such merit provisions were usually accompanied by some type of statement protecting employees from partisan political coercion. Such statements were found in slightly over 63 percent of the laws analyzed.

Even if some laws did not contain a direct statement mandating a merit personnel system, the vast majority of the laws were clear in their mandate for merit based hiring practices. Over 94 percent of the laws contained provisions for job specifications or position descriptions, open job and test examination announcements, and standardized certification procedures for hiring.

Generally, these merit oriented personnel laws apply to all jurisdiction employees including police personnel. This situation occurred in 86.1 percent of the cases studied, indicating that the police are generally being governed by the same personnel laws as other municipal employees. More specifically, 36.1 percent of the cities studied had personnel laws which mandated civil service coverage of all sworn personnel and an additional 50 percent had laws which covered most of the sworn ranks. (It is fair to assume that the vast majority of sworn personnel in the group of cities affording only partial coverage fall under merit-oriented personnel systems because the positions which are most often exempt from coverage are typically those of the chief of police, and, in some cases, the chief's immediate support and command staff.) This finding of the extension of coverage to sworn personnel by general civil service laws governing wider employee populations becomes particularly important to anyone attempting to reform or adjust police personnel structures in isolation from other local government agencies.

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[43]For a more detailed discussion into the elements of modern day merit systems, see U.S. Civil Service Commission, Guide to a More Effective Public Service . . . The Legal Framework (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1975).

To determine the substance of these civil service laws in relation to traditional merit concepts and the extent to which they contained more contemporary components of merit based personnel systems, each of the 36 laws were analyzed. Table 1 lists 16 provisions that were specifically examined, and although they are not all-encompassing, these provisions present a representative picture of personnel functions that have stood over time, as well as those which are extended toward elements of contemporary focus.

As can be seen from Table 1, the civil service laws analyzed are clear in their mandate to establish personnel systems that require public employees to be recruited, selected, and promoted on the basis of merit and competition; and that provide mechanisms and mandates for protection against partisan politics and arbitrary separation. Variations from these core provisions deal with pay schedules, fringe benefits, personnel investigations, and performance evaluation.

Equally important, however, is the finding that some of the elements considered essential to modern personnel management are not addressed in the majority of civil service laws. For instance, provisions for training and career development and labor relations appeared in less than one-third of the laws analyzed. Similarly, provisions calling for affirmative action or equal employment are clearly mandated in only about one-fifth of the laws studied.

These latter activities are more likely to be governed by a separate body of law. For example, at the Federal level the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964, extended civil rights coverage to state and local governments.

In addition, the majority of states have fair employment practice laws which prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religious creed.[44] Many states and cities have established fair employment practices commissions or human rights commissions which serve as enforcement agencies for these statutes. Similarly, the majority of states have laws setting forth collective bargaining rights and processes for public sector employees in general, and police personnel in particular. In addition, many states have established employer-employee relations commissions or similar agencies to oversee collective bargaining laws. A preponderance of states have legislated training and selection standards for police officers, and many states have established police officer standards and training commissions and provided them with certification and compliance enforcement powers.

The above examples illustrate the legal complexity which surrounds urban police personnel administration. It is well documented that the practical application of these separately based laws often lead to conflict. There is no doubt, for example, that the standards of selection established by agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have had substantial impact on civil service practices; this is particularly the case with respect to the use of written examinations, considered by some to be one of the keystones of public personnel systems.

The nature and effects of job qualifications are another area where conflict abounds. Job requirements for military service, seniority and work experience, physical and strength standards, education, and the absence of criminal history records continue to be subjects of controversy

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[44] Vaughn, op. cit.

Table 1
ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SERVICE LAWS
SELECTED PROVISIONS LISTED IN ORDER OF FREQUENCY MANDATED

	Stance in Law							
	Mandated		Permitted		Not Addressed		Not Clear	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Provision for certification procedures	33	(91.7)	3	(8.3)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)
Provision for promotional process	33	(91.7)	3	(8.3)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)
Provision for job/examination announcement	32	(88.9)	3	(8.3)	1	(2.8)	0	(0.0)
Provision for job specifications or position descriptions	31	(86.1)	3	(8.3)	2	(5.6)	0	(0.0)
Provision for rules and regulations	31	(86.1)	4	(11.1)	0	(0.0)	1	(2.8)
Provision for layoffs	31	(86.1)	1	(2.8)	4	(11.1)	0	(0.0)
Provision for grievance and appeals	23	(63.9)	0	(0.0)	13	(36.1)	0	(0.0)
Provision for protection against partisan political purposes	21	(58.3)	2	(5.6)	12	(33.3)	1	(2.8)
Provision for selection standards	21	(58.3)	10	(27.8)	5	(13.9)	0	(0.0)
Provision for pay schedules	20	(55.6)	0	(0.0)	15	(41.7)	1	(2.8)
Provision for performance evaluation	20	(55.6)	2	(5.6)	14	(38.9)	0	(0.0)

29

Table 1 (continued)

	Stance in Law							
	Mandated		Permitted		Not Addressed		Not Clear	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Provision for internal personnel investigations	17	(47.2)	12	(33.3)	7	(19.4)	1	(0.0)
Provision for training or career development	11	(30.6)	1	(2.8)	23	(63.9)	1	(2.8
Provision for labor-management relations	10	(27.8)	2	(5.6)	23	(63.9	1	(2.8)
Provision for equal employment or affirmative action	8	(22.2)	5	(13.9)	22	(61.1)	1	(2.8)
Provision for fringe benefit plan	4	(11.1)	2	(5.6)	29	(80.6)	1	(2.8)

among such groups as labor unions, women and minorities, veterans' organizations, as well as traditional civil service advocates. Each of these diverse groups turns to the law to support their viewpoints.

There can be little question that municipal police personnel systems must be operated within a legal framework which is extremely complex, potentially controversial, and which many times defies resolution through administrative channels available to local officials. Increasingly this has led to relying on the courts for determination, resulting in yet another enlarging body of law--judicial case law.

C. The Legal Basis for Organizational Arrangements

The organizational arrangements for municipal personnel systems have been the subject of continuing debate, much of it centering upon the structure and amount of independence of the personnel authorities. Legal provisions can dictate or significantly affect the way personnel systems are organized and controlled. Some of these include the method of appointment of those persons responsible for personnel operations, the presence or absence of a board or commission and the degree of its independence, the amount of political insulation provided to persons responsible for personnel operations, and the amount of specific power granted to personnel authorities. The following discussion considers the legal basis for these and other organizational factors.

1. The Preponderance of Civil Service Commissions. The laws clearly favor organizational configurations which include some type of civil service commission or analogous personnel board. Over 80 percent of the laws analyzed provided for the establishment of some type or form of personnel commission. While some nine of these organizations operate at the state or county levels, the great majority are established as city level agencies. Furthermore, the law establishes a consistency of operation; the level of government (state, county, or local) at which personnel policy-making authority is vested also tends to be the one at which administrative responsibility for personnel operations rests.[45] Only a few of the laws analyzed called for an executive-centered personnel approach that placed responsibility for personnel operations entirely under the city's chief executive officer.

The laws frequently speak to the composition and terms of civil service boards in several ways. For example, the majority of the laws examined set forth the size of the commission and a sizable minority require board members to be residents of the jurisdictions they serve. The laws often set forth requirements which affect the relationships between the board and the city's chief executive. For instance, the majority of the laws prescribe that board members are to serve fixed and overlapping terms of office. This provision is intended to reduce the likelihood that a chief executive might dominate the board during the executive's term of office. Similarly, a sizable majority of the laws set forth a non- or bipartisanship requirement for board composition.

The laws clearly favor appointment as the method of selection of board members: 29 laws call for appointment of board members; only one law mandated election of board members. Six laws set forth other selection

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[45]The correlation between policy-making level and administrative level is quite strong and statistically significant, at $r = .743$.

practices. In the 29 cases where members are appointed, their source of appointment is generally the chief executive, usually the mayor or city manager. This method is favored in 15 out of the 29 cases calling for appointment of commission members. The power of the chief executive to appoint commission members is often restricted, however. As mentioned earlier, the most common restrictions tend to be appointment of members to fixed or overlapping terms, the non- or bi-partisan requirements of board members, and appointment by the chief executive subject to confirmation by the city council. In some instances, commission members are appointed directly by the city council: a procedure found in about 20 percent of the laws examined. A slightly higher percentage of the laws set forth a variety of other appointment practices.

In summary, our analysis clearly indicates that, more often than not, the organizational arrangements for municipal personnel systems includes the formation of a local board or commission. Although the membership to local civil service commissions are often established through appointment by the local chief executive, he is not usually granted unlimited powers of appointment. It must be remembered, however, that within these general characterizations many variations exist.

- The City of Pasadena, California, for example, has no legal prescription for a board and none exists.

- At the other extreme, the Jacksonville, Florida, personnel system operates within an organizational framework that includes an independent and popularly elected civil service board.

- The City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is mandated by state law to establish a civil service commission to oversee personnel operations within the City. The Pennsylvania statute also grants the City's mayor wide latitude in appointing commission members.

- Members to the Jefferson County Personnel Board (Birmingham, Alabama) are appointed to their positions by a Citizens' Supervisory Commission. Membership on the Citizens' Supervisory Commission is prescribed in positional terms by state law and includes, among others, private citizens, public officials, representatives of the business community, as well as union and government employee representatives.

Regardless of the variations and extremes which are legally prescribed, most civil service arrangements incorporate a system of organizational and legal checks and balances that are intended to neutralize political activity and that tend to limit or dilute the authority of chief executive officers in personnel management matters.

   2. Personnel Directors. The laws definitely favor the appointment of a personnel director, sometimes referred to as Secretary or Executive

Secretary to the civil service commission, to administer personnel operations. The appointment of a personnel director was legally mandated or permitted in over 90 percent of the cases examined. About 54 percent of the laws vested the civil service commission with the power to appoint the personnel director; a much smaller percentage of cases gave the chief executive this appointive power.

Only a small number of laws spelled out education or experience qualifications that are to be used by commission members to make their selection of a personnel director. For the most part, the laws were also silent on subjects such as the personnel director's term of office or the specific procedures governing the selection of this officer.

More often than not, the personnel director's administrative relationships with the civil service commission or chief executive are prescribed by law. Nearly 69 percent of laws stated the personnel director was to report to the civil service commission, while only about 28 percent provided that the personnel director report to the chief executive.

Of course, there are a large number of factors which affect the role of the personnel director. The powers and authority granted to or assumed by the personnel director, previous experience and professional competence, and indeed, the individual's personality are just a few of the less tangible factors affecting the role of personnel director and the degree of independence actually exercised. Nevertheless, there can be little question that the legally prescribed methods of appointment and the personnel director's legally defined reporting relationships are weighted in favor of granting the personnel director a considerable degree of independence from the city's chief executive officer.

D. Policy Determination and Administrative Responsibilities

This segment of the legal analysis sought to determine which government officers are legally assigned responsibility for setting personnel policy and administering day-to-day personnel operations. In order to answer this question, the laws of 36 cities were examined to determine who was assigned legal responsibility for setting policy and administering 15 important personnel functions. Table 2 depicts the policy-making and administrative decision-making patterns as prescribed by law for each of these personnel functions.

The first column of the table lists the personnel functions; each is considered an essential component of modern merit-based personnel systems. The second column indicates, in terms of percentages, the number of times a particular function was mandated or permitted by civil service laws.

At this point it seems worth repeating two earlier findings. First, as the data in column two illustrate, there is a heavy legal emphasis on traditional personnel activities, particularly those related to the hiring process. Second, the civil laws are largely silent on several essential personnel functions. Included in this latter group are fringe benefits, labor management relations, employee ethics and conduct, training and career development, and equal opportunity provisions.

The third column of the table names the actor or actors identified most frequently in the laws as having policy-making authority for specific personnel functions. The final column lists the actors accorded legal

33

Table 2
PERSONNEL POLICY-MAKING AND
ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY PATTERNS

Personnel Function	Percent of Cases Addressed by Law	Actors Most Frequently Assigned Policy-Making Authority	Actors Most Frequently Assigned Administrative Responsibility
Certification Process	100	Civil service board	Personnel director
Promotional Process	100	Civil service board	Personnel director
Job/Examination Announcements	97.2	Civil service board	Personnel director
Rules and Regulations	97.2	Civil service board	Personnel director
Job Specifications/Position Descriptions	94.4	Civil service board	Personnel director
Selection Standards	88.9	Civil service board	Personnel director
Work Force Reduction Process	80.6	Civil service board	Personnel director/ department head
Appeal Process	63.9	Civil service board	Personnel director/ supervisor
Performance Evaluation	61.1	Civil service board	Personnel director/ supervisor
Pay Schedule	55.6	Legislative body	Personnel directtor
Employee Ethics and Conduct	38.9	Not specified	Not specified
Equal Employment/ Affirmative Action	36.1	Not specified	Not specified

Table 2 (continued)

Personnel Function	Percent of Cases Addressed by Law	Actors Most Frequently Assigned Policy-Making Authority	Actors Most Frequently Assigned Administrative Responsibility
Training or Career Development	33.3	Not specified	Not specified
Labor-Management Relations	33.3	Not specified	Not specified
Fringe Benefits	16.7	Not specified	Not specified

35

responsibility for administering these essential personnel functions on a day-to-day basis.

As the table indicates, the civil service board and the personnel director are generally prescribed by the laws as the primary actors in formulating and administering important components of municipal personnel programs. The laws generally prescribe a division of work wherein the civil service board sets policy and the personnel director is legally responsible for the day-to-day administration of the personnel activities listed.

These are, of course, the central tendencies in the data; variations across the study sites do exist. Nevertheless, those variations are patterned in such a way as to suggest that the function of the law in police personnel matters is still the traditional one of protecting public employees from local chief executives presumed to be politically powerful. For, in those cities where the law vests policy formulation for more of the police personnel functions in the civil service commission, it is also the case that the prerogatives of the urban chief executive (to appoint and to be responsible for personnel directors, to appoint civil service commissioners) are more limited. Conversely, the more discretion enjoyed by the urban executive, the fewer the functional areas where policy is the prerogative of the commission.[46] Given the findings depicted in Table 2, it is clear that the law exists (at least implicity) to provide "checks and balances" in the local police personnel system.

E. Summary

The analysis of basic civil service laws governing personnel management in 36 urban areas indicates that the usual legal foundation for today's municipal personnel systems is some form of civil service law which generally covers all municipal employees, including the vast majority of sworn police personnel. For the most part, these laws contain general provisions calling for the establishment of personnel systems based on merit and the vast majority of these laws contain provisions establishing merit based employment standards and selection methods that are to be free of partisan political considerations.

Over 80 percent of the laws analyzed provided for the establishment of some type of local personnel commission or civil service board. Generally, members of these boards are appointed by the local chief executive officer, but wide variations exist in the appointment practices, terms and selection methods, and other characteristics affecting the relationships between the civil service board and the city's chief executive officer. Regardless of the specific organizational variations which are legally prescribed, most civil service arrangements incorporate a system of administrative and legal checks and balances that are intended to neutralize partisan political activity and, whether intended or not, that inhibit or dilute the authority of local government administrators.

Over 90 percent of the laws examined allowed for the appointment of a personnel director to administer day-to-day personnel operations. More often than not the laws say the personnel director should be appointed by and report to the civil service board.

Many of today's basic civil service laws are silent on critical areas of modern personnel administration. Particularly notable are the

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[46]The correlation describing this finding was r = -.464.

areas of affirmative action for equal employment opportunity, collective bargaining, and training and career development. In most instances, these areas are covered by separate laws which often may be in conflict with basic civil service law, especially when consideration is given to their practical application.

Often municipal police personnel systems are characterized as monolithic structures dominated by semi-autonomous and independently established civil service commissions. Indeed, our analysis of the laws lends some validity to this general characterization. It was found, for example, that most urban police departments must deal with some type of civil service commission or personnel board in the formulation and administration of their personnel practices. Further, many of these boards and commissions are assigned policy-making authority in regard to personnel matters. In addition, these boards are often permitted by law to appoint a personnel director who oversees daily personnel operations.

On the other hand, the analysis of the laws indicates there are substantive factors at work within civil service systems which seem to refute the monolithic characterization often given to civil service structures. For example, considerable variation was found in the ways civil service organizations are established, the way board members are selected, and other characteristics and powers which affect the relationships between local civil service bodies and local government administrators.

Even more significant was the finding that major components of local personnel systems are not covered by one basic civil service law but, instead, are covered by different laws. Many of these other laws emanate from the state and Federal government levels, and are enforced by state and Federal agencies. In these circumstances, local civil service organizations, as well as municipal police agencies, must operate in an increasingly complex legal setting that assigns parallel or concurrent powers to numerous Federal, state, and local agencies. Whether this leads to a progressive displacement or erosion of traditional civil service safeguards by other modern alternatives of regulation and monitorship or whether some workable accommodation with partially competing, partially conflicting, and partially complementing bodies of law is possible is a fundamental issue which emerges.

Diagram A seeks to portray in historical perspective the main legislative influences and trends which have affected local civil service functions and urban police administration. The time scale should be interpreted as a generalized framework in that within the wide spectrum of American cities it is quite possible to find a decade or more of difference among them in regard to the dates of civil service adoption and its impact on the local personnel program.

As shown in the diagram, the early historical period experienced the progressive growth of civil service primarily at the expense of urban political leaders and executives. The intermediate period, between 1930 and 1950, experienced two significant developments: (a) municipal reform frequently involving the introduction of professional municipal management and the gradual emergence of professional police administrators and (b) certain limited interventions by states in providing supplementary services (pension and disability systems) or through regulatory powers. This period experienced a modest shifting of certain personnel functions back to urban executives or professional administrators.

Diagram A

PORTRAYAL OF MAIN STREAMS OF HISTORICAL INFLUENCES
IN LEGISLATION AFFECTING LOCAL POLICE PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

38

PRE - 1900

1900 - 1930

1930 - 1950

1950 - 1980

Antidiscrimination
Legislation
and
Judicial Mandates

Civil Service

State
Interventions

Professional Urban
and
Police Administrators

Civil Service

Unionism and Judicial
Interpretations

Total Spectrum of Local Personnel Functions

Since 1950, the incursions of the professional executive to displace the civil service in the performance of certain personnel functions have continued at a slow but significant rate, certainly, more so than the interventions of state authorities and progress. Perhaps of equal importance during the last three decades has been the emergence of police unionism and of antidiscrimination legislation. These too have made inroads into the sphere of personnel functions formerly carried out almost exclusively by civil service bodies. Indeed, judicial interpretations of collective bargaining agreements and judicial antidiscrimination mandates (both portrayed as saw-toothed edges) have and do provide additional intermittent and indeterminate forays into the civil service arena.

As the centennial for the development and use of American civil service systems approaches, the trends of these competing forces may erode the civil service component completely or, with the passage of time, they may lose their contemporary force and allow the civil service component to operate in some condition short of total displacement. Alternatively, they may together find a workable equilibrium not only in meeting the diverse social and economic interests and goals confronting American cities but in adapting to new competing and complementing forces which are only now being generated. This study will shed light on these questions.

Chapter IV

CIVIL SERVICE IN POLICE WORK
ACTUAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION OF POLICE PERSONNEL SYSTEMS

IV. CIVIL SERVICE IN POLICE WORK
ACTUAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION OF POLICE PERSONNEL SYSTEMS

This chapter moves beyond the legal frameworks behind contemporary police personnel systems to a description of what was found to actually exist both in the form and substance of these systems. The near ubiquity of some type of civil service apparatus affecting municipal police services inevitably brings with it the great diversities among American communities in size, geography, political values and historic traditions, economic d social components, and short- and long-term concerns and objectives of dif- ferent communities in responding to contemporary problems and trends.

In this milieu, the term "civil service system" is in fact a loose semantical umbrella covering a wide variety of organic forms and relation- ships. Although these variants may look to a common historical ancestry or origin, they represent evolved branches which can differ widely both from their original forms and among themselves as well.

This chapter then will be centered around the discovery of what sort of actors or participants are present in police personnel systems, how they are chosen, what authorities and responsibilities they exercise, and what roles they play. In short, it concentrates on who does what and to whom an emphasis which should facilitate an understanding by police practitioners and administrators of where they stand among these slowly evolving stresses, strains, and fibers of civil service systems.

A. Near Ubiquity of Civil Service Coverage

Four independent surveys[47] conducted during the period 1971-1976 revealed that no fewer than two-thirds of American municipalities have civil service commissions or an analogous "merit-oriented" body. The 42 cities participating in the current study (from the NORC group of cities) reflected this same circumstance in that all but six of these cities had civil service commissions or an analogous body which monitored or administered segments of the personnel program. Among these cities, civil service coverage of municipal law enforcement employees is the rule rather than the exception. As shown in Table 3, a vast majority of both sworn and civilian personnel are covered by civil service systems. Usually it is the same personnel sys- tem rather than a separate and distinct merit system established for law enforcement personnel only. This coverage is in consonance with the legal frameworks for civil service systems as reported in the prior chapter.

The predominant method of selection of members to these civil serv- ice bodies is by appointment, either by an urban chief executive or a city council. The predominant method of selection of a commission chairman is internal election by the commissioners. The table below presents the data:

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[47]Further detail can be found in: Boesel, Andrew, "Civil Service Commissions in City and County Government" (in Urban Data Service, June, 1973); Personnel Program Inventory of the International Personnel Management Association, Summer, 1976; and IPMA Special Report on Civil Service Commis- sions, 1976.

Table 3

COVERAGE OF CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS

Coverage	Sworn Officers		Civilian Personnel	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
All Ranks/Positions	18	43.9	22	53.7
Some Ranks/Positions	17	41.5	12	29.3
None	6	14.6	7	17.1
Is the system the same one covering all local employees?[a]				
Yes	26	76.5	30	90.9
No	8	23.5	3	9.1

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[a]One of the civil service systems did not report its coverage.

42

| | Member Selection | | Chair Selection | |
--------------------------------------	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Appointment by Urban Chief Executive	17	53.1	3	10.0
Appointment by Council	8	25.0	0	0.0
Internal Election	0	0.0	23	73.3
Other	7	21.9	4	16.7

The foregoing practices are also in consonance with the legal requirements as set forth in Chapter III.

From the personal interviews conducted in each of the cities studied by PAS, a number of points of consensus emerge on matters of police personnel administration. Among them:

- Civil service commissions have a mean size (across 35 cases) of 3.571 members. Approximately two-thirds of all of the cities' commissions fall in the size range of one to five members.

- The average term length for civil service commissioners is 4.55 years, across 29 cases. (Two cities, which are excluded from these statistics, report terms of "varying lengths.") Two-thirds of the cities commissioners' term lengths fall in the range from 2 to 12 years.

- Twenty-seven cities report that professional staffs are assigned to the commissions, with an average staff size of 26.4 persons. Similarly, the average civil service commission budget (in 24 reporting cities) reaches approximately $683,000.

- The overwhelming majority of commissions (86.7 percent) apparently do not assign particular members to police matters.

1. Personnel Directors. Just as most cities possess civil service commissions of some type, so too do most (73.5 percent) create the position and utilize the services of a full-time personnel director. The overwhelming majority of the personnel directors are selected by an urban chief executive (mayor or manager) 73.7 percent), with a minority (18.4 percent) of others selected by the local commission. (The remainder employed a variety of novel appointment practices.) In addition, the vast majority (77.8 percent) of the responding 36 cities make their directors responsible to the local chief executive, with a minority (16.7 percent) responsible to their civil service commission.

As noted earlier in Chapter III, slightly more than one-half of the civil service laws vested the civil service body with the power to appoint the personnel director, and almost 70 percent of these laws stated that the personnel director was to report to that body. In practice, however, this prerogative and relationship seem to have been shifted in many places to the urban chief executive. It is conjectural as to whether this discrepancy is due to a progressive strengthening of the administrative staffs of urban executives, the abdication or passivity of the civil service authorities, or some combination of both. At any rate, the personnel directors in these situations tend to operate between two

authorities and may be in a set of circumstances wherein their roles are shifting from that of executive secretary to the civil service body to a closer relationship with the urban chief executive.

B. Personnel Functions and Their Performance

The PAS survey sought to obtain a current picture of what specific personnel functions were carried out affecting police department administration and to identify by whom these functions were performed. Through the design of this analysis, it was also possible to identify significant changes in the loci of responsibility among the local actors during the last half decade.

In each city in which the civil service project's data-gathering activities were conducted, the personal interviews included questions designed to elicit from the respondents their perceptions as to which actors in their respective cities carried the major responsibility for executing each of a series of personnel functions in the police department. While almost all of the respondents provided those perceptions, only those of police chief executives are employed in the narrative below. There are three reasons for the adoption of this procedure:

1. Police chief executives were the respondents contacted and interviewed on this question with the greatest associated completion rate (95.2 percent).[48]

2. It was assumed that the responses of police chief executives would be most closely comparable to the data collected in 1972 by Eisenberg, et al.,[49] on many of the same questions, facilitating comparisons over time.

3. Of all the actors contacted in each city, it was assumed that the police chief would be most knowledgeable about the disposition of the personnel functions affecting his department.

The survey respondents in the civil service project were each presented with a list of 29 personnel administrative functions and were then asked to indicate, with regard to the local police department:

1. whether the function was performed in that city, and

2. (if it was) by whom.

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[48]In the two cities in which the police chief executives declined to answer these questions, the responses of the police personnel officers were substituted in their place.

[49]Eisenberg, Terry, et al., Police Personnel Practices in State and Local Governments (Washington, D.C.: International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Police Foundation, 1973).

Table 4 summarizes the responses with regard to actual performance and compares the data to that compiled by Eisenberg approximately five years earlier.

In tables based on distributions like those above, differences between the two samples of a magnitude of approximately 10 percent are required before they achieve statistical significance. With that in mind, it would appear that relatively few items attain such a status.[50]

In applying the foregoing test, the following personnel functions have changed significantly during this period: (a) the development of pay schedules; (b) deciding appeals to written test scores; (c) conducting psychological or psychiatric appraisals; (d) conducting polygraph examinations; (e) conducting physical agility tests; and (f) engaging in collective bargaining. Perhaps the most surprising entry in the table is the 90.2 percent of the departments which report that they do engage in collective bargaining with local employee unions or associations. This item presents the single largest difference between the two samples; its magnitude indicates (when taken with other findings throughout the survey) a very real change over time in the growth of police unionism.

1. Who Does What? For each of the above-listed functions performed by or for the responding police departments, the question of which actor carried major administrative responsibility was also asked. Respondents could select any or all of the following actors:

> Office of the Chief of Police
> Internal Police Personnel Office
> Office of the Mayor/City Manager
> Civil Service Commission/Personnel Board
> City Personnel Office
> Other

Table 5 summarizes the data generated for these questions from the responses of the police chief executive in each department. The column headed "Percent of Choices" indicates the frequency with which the modal actor or combination of actors was mentioned as carrying out the prescribed personnel function. The following three columns indicate percentages of participation by actors internal or external to the police departments or in some combination of joint internal and external participation.

This table demonstrates the great diversity among civil service programs in the patterns of distributing the performance of personnel functions. Indeed, it appears that each jurisdiction is required to make its own accommodations in working out a division of work among actors within the police departments, within and between the civil service authorities, and other participants. But as an expression of the mode or central tendencies in the practices of the participating cities, the picture given does not provide a very neat or logical division of work, especially so from the viewpoint of a responsible departmental administrator. As shown in the table, the following central tendencies emerge, listed in order of degree of diminishing involvement in the conduct of personnel functions by the police chief or his departmental personnel officer:

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[50]It is somewhat difficult at this point to interpret those differences which do emerge, since two possibilities (real change over time and the focus on big-city departments characteristic of the PAS survey) can coexist to "muddy the waters." Since the former will be examined in more detail a bit later, the latter will--for now--be adopted as the interpretation for the differences.

Table 4

LOCAL PERFORMANCE OF POLICE PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS

Personnel Functions	Percent Reporting Local Performance of Functions	
	PAS 1977	IACP 1972
Establish entrance qualification standards	97.6	100
Prepare examination announcements	97.6	97
Construct written examinations	95.1	90
Purchase selection tests	92.7	83
Determine job-relatedness of tests and other selection procedures	92.7	91[a]
Conduct job or task analysis	92.7	91[a]
Prepare job specifications or position descriptions	92.7	97
Develop pay schedules	100.0	90[a]
Conduct recruitment programs	100.0	91[a]
Screen applicants for eligibility prior to written tests	90.2	91
Determine minimum acceptable test scores	95.1	98
Decide appeals to written test scores	97.6	87
Determine candidate eligibility after written tests	95.1	99
Conduct:		
• Psychological or psychiatric appraisals	80.5	57
• Oral interviews	95.1	98
• Background investigations	97.6	100
• Polygraph examinations	61.0	39
• Physical agility tests	90.2	75[a]
Evaluate background investigations	97.6	99
Certify eligible candidates for appointment	97.6	97
Develop performance appraisal mechanisms	97.6	b
Develop promotion standards	100.0	99
Certify eligible candidates for promotion	100.0	b
Plan and conduct in-service training programs	95.1	99
Establish discipline procedures	97.6	b

46

Table 4 (continued)

Personnel Functions	Percent Reporting Local Performance of Functions	
	PAS 1977	IACP 1972
Operate an employee grievance and appeals system	97.6	96[a]
Engage in collective bargaining with employee unions or associations	90.2	61
Administer an employee pension and benefit system	95.1	b
Conduct exit interviews and evaluations with departing employees	97.6	b

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[a]On these items, the IACP data reported are those of municipal respondents only (N=375). On all others, the data are from all respondents (N=493).

[b]No directly comparable item on the IACP survey.

47

Table 5

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS

Personnel Functions	Modal Actor/Combination	Percent of Choices	Percent of Choices That Show Performance By: Internal	Joint	External
Establish entrance qualification standards	Civil Service Commission	32.5	5.0	45.0	50.0
Prepare examination announcements	Civil Service Commission	42.5	7.5	17.5	75.0
Construct written examinations	Civil Service Commission	42.1	5.3	34.2	60.5
Purchase selection tests	Civil Service/City Pers. Office.	38.2	8.8	8.8	82.4
Determine job-relatedness of tests and other selection procedures	Civil Service Commission	32.4	10.8	24.3	64.9
Conduct job or task analysis	City Personnel Office	25.7	20.0	28.6	51.4
Prepare job specifications or position descriptions	Civil Service Commission	15.8	21.1	42.1	36.8
Develop pay schedules	Office of the Mayor/Manager	23.1	2.6	15.3	82.1
Conduct recruitment programs	Police Pers. Office/City Pers. Office	12.5	15.0	60.0	25.0
Screen applicants for eligibility prior to written tests	Civil Service Commission	30.6	16.7	30.5	52.8
Determine minimum acceptable test scores	Civil Service Commission	48.7	7.7	7.7	84.6
Decide appeals to written test scores	Civil Service Commission	56.8	2.7	16.2	81.1
Determine candidate eligibility after written tests	Civil Service Commission	31.4	11.4	28.6	60.0
Conduct:					
● Psychological or psychiatric appraisals	Police Personnel Office	36.7	46.7	13.3	40.0
● Oral interviews	Police Personnel Office	21.1	42.2	42.0	15.8
● Background investigations	Police Personnel Office	57.5	67.5	30.0	2.5
● Polygraph examinations	Police Personnel Office	63.6	90.9	4.6	4.5
● Physical agility tests	Police Pers. Office/Civil Serv. Comm.	27.8	36.1	19.5	44.4
Evaluate background investigations	Police Personnel Office	27.5	62.5	27.5	10.0
Certify eligible candidates for appointment	Civil Service Commission	45.0	10.0	7.5	82.5
Develop performance appraisal mechanisms	Police Chief/Police Personnel Office	15.0	37.5	47.5	15.0
Develop promotion standards	Civil Service Commission	30.0	15.0	50.0	35.0
Certify eligible candidates for promotion	Civil Service Commission	47.5	7.5	17.5	75.0
Plan and conduct in-service training programs	Police Personnel Office	35.9	76.9	15.4	7.7
Establish discipline procedures	Police Chief	31.7	52.4	37.8	9.8
Operate an employee grievance and appeals system	Police Chief	26.3	31.6	42.1	26.3
Engage in collective bargaining with employee unions or associations	City Personnel Office	25.0	12.5	43.7	43.8
Administer an employee pension and benefit system	City Personnel Office	40.5	2.7	5.4	91.9
Conduct exit interviews and evaluations with departing employees	Police Personnel Office	38.5	69.2	13.0	17.8

<u>Primarily Police Actors</u> (Police Chief and/or Police Personnel Office)

Background investigations
Polygraph examinations
Evaluate background investigations
Plan and conduct in-service training programs
Establish discipline procedures
Conduct exit interviews and evaluations with
   departing employees

<u>Joint Endeavors</u> (Usually with City Personnel Officers)

Conduct recruitment programs
Develop promotion standards

<u>Primarily by External Actors</u> (Civil Service Commission, Office of Mayor or Manager, and City Personnel Officer)

Prepare examination announcements
Conduct written examinations
Purchase selection tests
Determine job-relatedness of tests and other selection procedures
Conduct job or task analysis
Develop pay schedules
Screen applicants for eligibility prior to written tests
Determine minimum acceptable test scores
Decide appeals to written test scores
Determine candidate eligibility after written tests
Physical agility tests
Certify eligible candidates for appointment
Certify eligible candidates for promotion
Administer an employee pension and benefit system

<u>Indeterminate Pattern of Actors</u>

Establish entrance qualification standards
Prepare job specifications or position descriptions
Psychological or psychiatric appraisals
Oral interviews
Develop performance appraisal mechanisms
Operate an employee grievance and appeals system
Engage in collective bargaining with employee unions or
   associations

   Although the foregoing indicates that police departments have retained some important and sensitive selection functions (background investigations and their evaluation, polygraph examinations), if one looks at the these patterns of functional participation in terms of a flow of personnel processes, as shown in Table 6, that is from pre-entry, entry, in-service, and separation, one sees that the departmental actors enter these processes intermittently and in various roles ranging from responsible decision-maker, to joint decision-maker, to negotiator, and finally to an ad hoc or advisory role as dictated by such arrangements as may be made locally for certain functions. Indeed, to the extent that such variations exist, it is not conducive to unified leadership by the police executive, does

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1 OF 3

Table 6

DISPOSITION AMONG ACTORS OF PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS

Actors	Pre-Entry	Entry and Selection	In-Service	Separation
I. Internal Police Department		• Background investigations • Polygraph examinations • Evaluate background investigations	• Plan and conduct in-service training programs • Establish discipline procedures	• Conduct exit interviews and evaluations with departing employees
II. Joint Actor (Usually with City Personnel Officer)	• Conduct recruitment programs		• Develop promotion standards	
III. External Actors (Civil Service Commission, Office of Mayor or Manager, or City Personnel Officer)	• Prepare examination announcements	• Construct written examinations • Purchase selection tests • Determine job-relatedness of tests and other selection procedures • Screen applicants for eligibility prior to written tests • Determine minimum acceptable test scores • Decide appeals to written test scores • Determine candidate eligibility after written tests • Physical agility tests • Certify eligible candidates for appointment	• Conduct job or task analysis • Develop pay schedules • Certify eligible candidates for promotion	• Administer an employee pension and benefit system
IV. Indeterminate External Actors		• Establish entrance qualification standards • Phychological or psychiatric appraisals • Oral interviews	• Prepare job specifications or position descriptions • Develop performance appraisal mechanisms • Engage in collective bargaining with employee unions or associations	• Operate an employee grievance and appeals systems

not provide a logical and systematic sphere of work for the civil service authority, and defeats efforts to determine or fix accountability for the personnel program.

2. Changes in Responsibility for Personnel Functions. The foregoing patterns of divided responsibility are further complicated by the fact that they reflect these practices at a given time which in turn are the results of movements in the locus of administrative responsibility for various police functions during the past five years. The analysis of these changes was possible for a subset of cities because:

a. many of the functions asked in the PAS study were identical to those included in the 1972 Eisenberg effort, and

b. thirty-one of the same cities were studied by both projects.

To attempt to analyze administrative change over time, the responses from the police chiefs on administrative responsibility were recoded to indicate whether a particular function was performed by an actor "internal" to the police department, or "external" to it, or by a combination of both. Then, for each of 24 common functions, performance responses from the Eisenberg survey were compared to those from the PAS survey.

Of the 24 functions examined, the locus of administrative responsibility is essentially the same during the last five years for the following:[51]

● Prepare Examination Announcements

● Conduct Psychiatric or Psychological Appraisals

● Certify Eligible Candidates for Appointment

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[51]For each of the foregoing seven functions which are listed below, the measure of association employed (Kendall's Tau b) is statistically significant. For all of the others, there is no relationship over time.

Inter-Temporal Correlations for the Locus of
Administrative Responsibility

Function	Tau b	Significance
● Prepare Examination Announcements	.325	.0325
● Conduct Psychiatric or Psychological Appraisals	.438	.0123
● Certify Eligible Candidates for Appointment	.379	.0157
● Conduct Physical Agility Tests	.355	.0205
● Conduct Background Investigations	.558	.0011
● Evaluate Background Investigations	.424	.0094
● Bargain Collectively	.330	.0479

- Conduct Physical Agility Tests

- Conduct Background Investigations

- Bargain Collectively

The problem of measuring the changes which occurred in those functions where the locus of administrative responsibility was unpredictable is a complex task. One needs to account for both the amount and the directions of change. Table 7 attempts to do both. It depicts, first of all, the proportion of cities in which any change occurred between 1972 and 1977. Then, for the changers, it depicts the proportions which changed either toward internal performance or toward external performance.[52]

Although no clear pattern of the redistribution of functions is present, there is a discernible internal trend for some very vital selection functions supported by an enlarging departmental role in job analysis and in the job-relatedness of selection instruments and procedures. In addition, the development of performance appraisal mechanisms and of grievance and appeals systems also indicates a movement to closer departmental cognizance or control.

In contrast, most of the functions dealing with the establishment, application, and interpretation of recruitment standards, the conduct of recruitment programs and of in-service training indicate a movement away from exclusive or joint departmental participation or control.

It is, of course, only conjectural as to whether these same functions will sustain the same direction and strength of change into the future. Suffice it to say that despite the disarray of patterns of functional responsibility cited earlier, there is evidence of a capacity to change and adjust. Unfortunately, there is no evidence in these changes of a trend toward a more systematic division of work among the participants and to the extent that the changes toward external performance involve more and indeterminate actors, accountability and responsibility become more elusive and dispersed.

Certainly, other levels of government, state and Federal, which are in some way concerned with local police administration should recognize both the diversity and changing patterns of urban personnel administration in devising methods and resources intended to assist them.

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[52]The terms are defined as follows:

Toward Internal = changes from completely external to joint
or from completely external to completely internal
or from joint to completely internal.
Toward External = changes from completely internal to joint
or from completely internal to completely external
or from joint to completely external.

Table 7

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS IN RELATION TO URBAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS

	Proportion of Cities Changing	Proportion of Changers Who Moved	
Functions Moving Toward Internal Performance		Toward Internal	Toward External
Conduct oral interviews	65.5	63.2	36.8
Operate an employee grievance and appeals system	64.0	62.5	37.5
Prepare job specifications or position descriptions	56.7	52.9	47.1
Conduct job or task analysis	46.4	53.8	46.2
Determine job-relatedness of tests and other selection procedures	46.4	61.5	38.5
Develop performance appraisal mechanisms	41.9	53.8	46.2
Conduct polygraph examinations	37.5	100.0	0.0
Purchase selection tests	30.8	62.5	37.5
Functions Moving Toward External Performance			
Develop pay schedules	75.0	22.2	77.8
Screen applicants for eligibility prior to written tests	60.7	47.1	52.9
Conduct recruitment programs	58.1	33.3	66.7
Determine candidate eligibility after written tests	53.8	14.3	85.7
Establish entrance qualification standards	46.7	35.7	64.3
Determine minimum acceptable test scores	36.7	27.3	72.7
Construct written examinations	31.0	33.3	66.7
Appeals to written test scores	25.0	42.9	57.1
Conduct in-service training programs	25.0	42.9	57.1

53

C. The Roles of Civil Service Systems

The analysis described above documents quite well one of the central dilemmas encountered during the course of the civil service research project: defining with any precision the nature of a civil service system. In light of the great diversity of structures, actors, and interrelationships encountered in the cities in which field work was conducted, that task is a very difficult one to accomplish. In fact, given the great variation characteristics of the field of police personnel administration, it is imperative that one adopt a more contextual framework from which to resolve the problem; that is, to define the local civil service system by the types of things that it does, and then to examine both the causal determinants of those types as well as the impacts which they exert on the style and the quality of local police personnel administrative activity. In short, it is proposed here to define a local civil service system by the roles it plays in the city government of which it is a part.

Role is, of course, a social construct; the role of a participant or actor in any social system is defined as much by the perceptions of others in that system as it is by the actor's actions. In the present context, the role of a civil service commission is determined only in part by the activities it does (or does not) carry out. It is also determined by the perceptions, expectations, and reactions of others in the local police personnel field to these activities; the ways in which they adjust their behaviors to accommodate to or to conflict with the activities of the civil service body further delimit the commission's roles. The role of a local civil service commission in the field of police personnel administration is thus a more general and, perhaps, abstract concept with which to deal than is a list of functions which it does (or does not) perform. Nevertheless, in the light of the wide variations attendant upon the construction of such lists, role may be the only vehicle which facilitates across-city comparisons and through which more general and generalized understanding of the impacts of civil service may be reached.

In each of the cities which participated in the civil service research project, every respondent who was interviewed was asked to indicate whether the local civil service commission or personnel board played any, all, or none of the following roles:

- Acts as an advisor to the city administration on personnel matters.

- Administers routine personnel functions.

- Acts as a regulatory body over local personnel officials.

- Adjudicates employees' appeals to personnel decisions.

- Formulates personnel policies.

Each of the survey respondents occupied a different position in the police personnel system, and as a result, each brings quite different perspectives to bear on his or her perception of the local civil service commission. Thus, it seems fair to infer that the "real" role of the local merit board is, in fact, a combination of all of these perspectives.

Each city was given a role score for each of the five items included in the interview. That score was computed as the simple proportion of all actors interviewed who indicated that the local commission played each of the roles listed above.[53] Computed scores can thus vary between .000 (no one indicating the commission as playing a given role) and 1.000 (everyone indicating that it plays that role).

The table below depicts the average civil service role score on each of the items examined across the entire sample of 42 cities. The data make quite clear the relative importance of the adjudicative function vis-a-vis all of the others; its average across all of the study sites is almost twice the magnitude of the next closest item, the regulatory function. Granting wide variations in the scores for each of the roles, it is nevertheless the case that the role of the local civil service commission is perceived by those in the best position to know as being predominantly one of adjudication.

Roles Cited for the Civil Service Commission
by Local Respondents

Role	Mean Proportion of Mentions
Adjudicative	.571
Regulatory	.343
Policy-Formulation	.269
Administrative	.186
Advisory	.173

Of course, the other roles cited are not unimportant and they should not be discarded from further analysis, simply because their overall mean scores are relatively low. Mean scores, by their very nature, mask intercity variations; these can be recovered by examining the patterning of the roles vis-a-vis each other. Figure 2 attempts to do precisely that, by depicting the simple correlations between each of the five roles and every other. For ease of interpretation, it should be noted that only those coefficients which achieved conventionally defined statistical significance[54] are included in the figure.

While much could be made of the different individual inter-role relationships, two interpretive points should be noted from a more general perspective. The first is a straightforward inference from the fact that the signs of all of the coefficients in the diagram are positive. None of the roles examined in the survey questions are incompatible with each other. In fact, the figure suggests quite the opposite; performance of one role quite often leads to performance of another. From the standpoint of organizational theory, this finding is not surprising in that it demonstrates that civil service commissions are typical of other organizations in that they attempt to expand their importance in their operating environments by

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[53] In cases where no such commission existed in a city, or where such a body existed but was identified by the respondents as being essentially dormant, the scores were automatically set to 0.00.

[54] $p \leq .05$

Figure 2

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ROLE INTERRELATIONSHIPS[a]

Regulation

.431   .517   .478

Adjudication   .610   Policy Formulation   .626   Administration

.384   .262

Advice

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
[a] Neither the arrow nor the coefficients entered in the figure are intended, nor should they be construed, to represent causal impacts or path coefficients. The numbers are simple bi-variate correlations; the format of the figure is adopted solely as an interpretive convenience.

assuming increased role responsibilities which require increased organizational resources for their performance.[55]

The second noteworthy point concern the structure of role interrelationships. As is clear from the preceding figure, the roles of adjudication and administration are uncorrelated; they are independent of each other. This is so despite the fact that they share correlations of almost identical magnitude with the roles of regulation and policy-formulation. A plausible inference from these findings would be that two overarching roles are played by local civil service commissions in the police personnel field: the roles of personnel administration and appeals adjudication. That is not to say that the commissions do not play the others. Rather, the data suggest that the roles of regulation, policy formulation, and advice-giving are played in a style or a context that will be compatible with the adjudicative or the administrative roles.

Confirmation for this inference is provided by the results of further statistical analytic procedures. The five civil service role scores for each of the 42 cities were subjected to factor analysis,[56] a statistical routine the general purpose of which is the reduction of a large number of variables to a smaller group of underlying dimensions (or factors) which can best summarize all of the original variables examined. In this instance, the procedure yielded two statistically significant factors. These were labelled the "administrative" and the "adjudicative" roles, in recognition of their strong contributions to the factor analytic solution. However, these labels should not be allowed to mask the fact that the other roles made their own contributions to the solution (as depicted in footnote 56). Perhaps the two labels are best conceptualized as the basic role-orientations from within which local civil service commissions carry out a number of more specific activities.

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[55]For further examples of this process in other contexts, see Selznick, Philip, TVA and the Grass Roots (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); Thompson, James D., Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), or Wildavsky, Aaron, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).

[56] The procedure used is known, in technical terms, as principal components factor analysis. The factor analytic procedure employed here uses an oblique method of factor rotation in its computational procedure, rather than an orthogonal one. Thus, scores on one factor may be correlated with those on another. This procedure was specifically adopted because it better mirrors reality than does the orthogonal alternative.

The statistical results of the procedure, from which the substantive conclusions about roles were drawn, were:

Role	Communality	Loadings	
		Factor I	Factor II
Advisory	.162	.022	.392
Administrative	.836	.971	.150
Regulatory	.388	.437	.291
Adjudicative	.914	.075	.987
Policy-Formulation	.696	.560	.418

The factor analytic procedures also calculated factor scores on each of the factors for each city studied. These scores are plotted on Figure 3. The factor scores are correlated ($r = .481$). This implies that the central tendency across the 42 cities studied is "all or none"; boards tend to score high (or low) on both role dimensions simultaneously. The relationship is far from perfect, as the number of cities in the upper-left quadrant of the figure (which exercise the adjudicative role alone) would suggest. Nevertheless, the correlation is statistically significant and thus reflective of a general tendency in the entire population from which the example was drawn.

The figure provides substantive meaning to the "skeleton" provided by the correlation coefficient. Visual inspection demonstrates that there is something of a tendency for the study sites to line up along the diagonal from lower-left to upper-right. In substantive terms, this tendency can be interpreted as an activity continuum, the polar positions of which are no activity on either role (e.g., St. Louis or South Bend, the lower-left corner) ranging up to high levels of activity on both (e.g., Minneapolis or Akron in the upper-right corner). However, it should again be noted that this tendency is not perfect; cases such as Bloomington or Albany exemplify the exceptions to the general rule, of which there are a significant number.

At this point, there are relatively few interpretive principles which can be superimposed on the figure to shed further light on the distribution of the cases. City size bears no relationship to the role scores; large and small cities alike spread themselves quite widely throughout the role space. The same is generally true of type of city government; mayor-council and council-manager cities are, again, spread relatively equally throughout the figure.

A minor degree of regionalism is contained in the role space and should thus be noted. Figure 4 reproduces the original distributions of the study sites along the two civil service role dimensions. Superimposed upon it are the clusters formed by the southern and southwestern cases (upper grouping) and the New York and New England cases (lower grouping). The adjudicative dimension appears to differentiate these two groupings of cities; in the south and southwest, that role is a significant one, whereas in the northeast it is not. Beyond this, however, it would appear that basic urban demographic or distributional characteristics are of little use in providing further understanding from the table.

Implicit in the failure of urban demographic characteristics to explain very much about local civil service body role performance is the likelihood that those roles are the functions or results of other aspects of the local police personnel system. To add substance to this notion, it is only necessary to expand the perspective to include the other actors in the system. If each of them—the mayor, the police chief, the city council, and the other participants—is conceptualized as an actor in the local police personnel system's environment, behaving, in accordance with our earlier organizational perspective, so as to maximize his or her authority and discretion, then the research question can be rephrased as: are such activities compatible with the performance of certain roles by the local civil service commission? To construct an answer to this question, however, one must also address a logically prior query: is the perspective based on interorganizational competition a fair one to use in studying the local police personnel system?

Figure 3
CIVIL SERVICE ROLE DIMENSIONS
OF PARTICIPATING CITIES

Figure 4

*REGIONAL VARIATIONS
IN CIVIL SERVICE ROLE DIMENSIONS*

Adjudicative + Factor

Administrative + Factor

+1.0

-1.0

+1.0

-1.0

Birmingham   Minneapolis

Akron

San Jose   Seattle

St. Paul

Bloomington   Charlotte

Amarillo   Long Beach

Tyler, Waco   Salt Lake

Ft. Worth

Atlanta

Phoenix

Jacksonville   Tampa

Warren
San Francisco

Memphis

Irvington

Newark   Duluth

Boston

Pittsburgh

Euclid

Berkeley

Waterbury
Clifton

Cambridge

Schenectady   Albany
Buffalo

South Bend, Santa Monica,
St. Louis, Hammond, Palo Alto,
Fullerton, Manchester, Pasadena

The second of these questions is best addressed through an examination of both the distribution and the structuring of authority in decision-making in the local police personnel system. To thoroughly examine both of these topics, each interview subject was asked to indicate the relative amount of authority (much, some, or none) in police personnel decision-making exercised in his or her city by each of the following actors:

The Mayor
The City Manager
The City Council/Board of Aldermen
The Civil Service Commission/Personnel Board, or Similar
The Public Safety Director
The Chief of Police
The City's Director of Personnel
The City Attorney/Corporation Counsel

To anyone familiar with local governmental structure, the list as presented is somewhat problematic. In some cities the mayor is not only the chief political but also the chief administrative officer; in others, the latter function is assumed by a city manager. Similarly, in some cities the chief of police is the actor primarily responsible for local law enforcement while in others that role is accorded to a public safety director. Table 8 depicts the average authority score given an actor across the 42 cities studied. Some account is taken of the structural divergence mentioned above by means of the creation of the urban and the police executive labels, which attempts to capture the higher authority level of the chief urban executive officer (mayor or manager) and the chief executive officer of the police department (police chief or public safety director).

While the individual scores are interesting in their own right, they do not yet answer the question posed earlier regarding interorganizational competition. For this, an examination of their patterning vis-a-vis each other is necessary. However, rather than be completely inductive in this examination, an expected structure can be posited in light of the above narrative. That is, one might reasonably expect the six actors listed in Table 8 to be linked in an authority structure similar to the following:

In that positions of personnel director and police chief executive are usually filled by mayoral or managerial appointment, one could very plausibly hypothesize that those actors would be linked to the urban executive and to each other through the process of delegation of authority in a rational urban administrative structure. These, in turn, should be

Table 8

LEVELS OF POLICE PERSONNEL DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY
(On a Scale of 1.0 to 4.0)

<u>Urban Chief Executive</u>	3.485
Mayor	3.48[a]
Manager	3.48[b]
<u>Police Chief Executive</u>	3.834
Chief	3.97[c]
Public Safety Director	3.33[d]
<u>City Council</u>	2.4_9
<u>Civil Service Board</u>	2.870
<u>City Personnel Director</u>	2.544
<u>City Attorney</u>	2.369

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[a] Computed across the 21 cities in which no city manager exists.

[b] Computed across the 21 cities in which a city manager does exist.

[c] Computed across the 33 cities where no public safety director exists.

[d] Com_,ted across the 33 cities where no public safety director does exist.

62

independent of the city council in accordance with the formal separation of executive and legislative functions which characterizes most city governments. The typical role of the city attorney is as legal counsel to the city council and legal advisor to the executive and other city agencies. The civil service board should stand apart, in light of the "checks and balances" originally built into the system by law (and discussed earlier in more detail).

The actual results of the data analysis do not present such a clear-cut picture. Those results are depicted in Figure 5. While the authority relationships between the city attorney and the civil service board and the city council were as predicted, the other relationships were significantly different. For example, although the personnel director and the police executive complement each other in terms of authority, the former is not linked to the civil service board and the police executive appears to compete with it. Linkage to the urban executive is variable and is determined by whether this executive is a mayor or a manager. The correlation of personnel director authority and city manager authority is actually a statistically significant .440; that between mayoral authority and personnel director authority is -.263, also statistically significant.

It would thus appear from these data that "system" is not a particularly appropriate designation for the local police personnel area. "Field" might be a better label, if delimited so as to connote an environment populated by a number of actors, each of whom competes with, complements, or stands apart from selected others in that environment with respect to decision-making authority in local police personnel affairs. The way is now clear to address the question of impact. More specifically, the way stands open for an examination of the relationships between the authority levels enjoyed by the different actors in the local police personnel field and the roles performed by the local civil service commission in that same field. Table 9 presents the correlation coefficients which describe those relationships.

It is clear from the table that there is no simple, catch-all phrase or sentence capable of adequately summarizing the field dynamics which promote or inhibit civil service role performance. From the variations in decision-making authority levels encountered earlier, this is not surprising; indeed, it stands as confirmation of the severity of the problem of trying to come to general and generalizable conclusions in the context of 42 widely different operating field or environments. Nevertheless, four dynamics are worth noting, in that they do shed further light on the determinants of the roles of local civil service boards.

The first of these is quite a straightforward inference from the correlations: the more decision-making authority enjoyed by the local commission, the more it will attempt to involve itself in each and all of the roles examined in this study. The analogy to a business concern in a free-market competitive economic environment is not inappropriate: continued growth and future success require entrepreneurial expansion throughout the present operating environment.

The second notable dynamic lies in the fact that high levels of authority vested in police executives lead to less performance by civil service commissions of the regulatory role. In light of the police

Figure 5

THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY IN POLICE PERSONNEL SYSTEMS[a]

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
[a] Again, coefficients and relationships are those demonstrated by correlational analysis, and not by path analysis.

Table 9

**CORRELATION OF AUTHORITY LEVELS OF URBAN ACTORS
IN RELATION TO CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ROLES**

	Individual Civil Services Roles					General Role Calculations	
	Advises	Administers	Regulates	Adjudicates	Formulates Policy	Adminis-trative	Adjudi-cative
Urban Executive Authority	–	–	.258	–	–	–	–
(Mayoral Authority)	–	.358	–	–	.294	.371	–
(Managerial Authority)	–	-.300	–	–	–	-.288	–
Police Executive Authority[a]	(-)	(-)	-.311	(+)	(-)	(-)	(+)
City Council Authority	–	–	–	.312	.351	–	.320
Civil Service Commission Authority	.396	.428	.675	.542	.556	.550	.595
Personnel Director Authority	–	–	–	.267	–	–	–

[a] The positive and negative signs are indicated for those correlations which did not achieve statistical significance.

executive/civil service process of competition for authority described earlier, this correlation is not surprising either: to the victors in the authority competition go the spoils of freedom for role performance. This interpretation receives tentative support from the other role correlates of police executive authority. Those are not listed in the table because they failed to achieve conventional statistical significance; thus, any interpretations based on them can only be made quite tentatively. Nevertheless, the signs of the correlations between police executive authority and both the individual adjudicative role of the civil service body and its generalized adjudicative orientation were both positive; all the other coefficients in that row were negative, as shown in Table 9. To the extent that the civil service commission enjoys authority at the expense of the police executive, it expands its police personnel role. To the extent that the converse is true, the commission is deprived of the administrative task and relegated to the role of adjudicator.

The same conclusion also holds when the focus is changed from the police executive to the city manager and his personnel director. The more authority they enjoy, the more (again) is the civil service commission largely restricted to the adjudicative function.

The fourth interpretive dynamic is contained in the fact that mayoral authority and managerial authority impact so differently on civil service role performance. From the table it is clear that authoritative mayors and active administrating commissions are quite compatible, in strong contrast to the situation with authoritative managers. Perhaps the explanation for this lies in the contrast itself. Mayors are, after all, elected officials who can be held accountable by their constituents for the results of their administrative policies and programs. Managers are no less accountable, but to a city council rather than to an electorate. In that arrangement, they hold a positional advantage over their mayoral counterparts; they are one step removed, and thus one layer insulated, from popular dissatisfactions with their administrative practices. It is not implausible to infer that mayors seek similar protection in a radically different way: by letting another actor, made distinct from the mayor through a legal series of checks and balances, bear the brunt of the administrative tasks in the police personnel field.[57]

D. Summary

Within the near ubiquity of urban civil service commissions, with jurisdictions extending in most cases to sworn police personnel as well as to other municipal staff, two characteristics are striking: the capacity to change and diversity. Except for certain interventions by state services or regulation affecting urban police administration, the total spectrum of locally performed personnel functions has during the last half decade remained relatively unchanged. But within this bundle of functions, which are largely derived from the original concepts of the Pendleton Act and from municipal reforms of the last half century, the local personnel setting is now occupied by both original and new actors which from city to city behave differently with respect to one another and perform or share personnel functions in different ways.

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[57] In game-theoretic terms, the mayor would be following a good minimax strategy: minimizing his electoral losses due to the exigencies of the police personnel administrative tasks by separating himself from the very performance of that task.

Although an analysis of the relative levels of police personnel policy-making authority points to the police chief executive as the most influential, he shares this authority with a close competitor: the urban chief executive and, to a lesser extent, with the civil service commission, the city personnel director, the city council, and attorney (in that order). Indeed, even though the police chief executive may tend to enjoy the most authority, it is not usually clear-cut in that he must exercise it through a network in which he is variously: (1) the primary decision-maker, (2) a joint decision-maker; (3) a negotiator; or (4) an advisor, depending on the particular component of the personnel program. Moreover, this network is not necessarily stable as shown by trends of the last five years indicating that from the perspective of the police chief there is the movement of certain personnel functions both towards and away from him and his department.

The foregoing complexities pointed to the advisability of focusing the analysis on the roles played by civil service commissions and how they affected the foregoing network of relationships. The most important role of civil service commissions was found to be one of adjudication which was perceived to be almost twice as frequent as the regulatory role and more than twice as important as the roles of policy-formulation, administration, and advisory. The foregoing roles formed two overarching (generalized) ones: adjudicative and administrative which had almost identical positive correlations with the roles of regulation and policy formulation. Thus, the performance of one of the roles tends to lead to the performance of another. In fact, this tendency was also revealed by a factor analysis of the adjudicative and administrative roles, indicating that the central tendency among the 42 cities is "all or none": civil service commissions tend to score high (or low) on both roles simultaneously.

The analysis of the authority structure and relationships of the different participants in local police personnel and the roles played by civil service commissions in that same area indicate that local police personnel affairs operate in an area which can be characterized more as a "field" rather than a "system" in that it is a setting populated by a number of actors, each of whom competes with, complements, or stands apart from others with respect to decision-making. Some of the determinants evident in this "field" are as follows from the perspective of key actors or participants:

> The Civil Service Commission. The more decision-making authority enjoyed by the local commission, the more it will attempt to involve itself in each and all of the roles examined in this study.

> The Police Chief Executive. The police chief executive appears to compete with the local civil service commission, as follows:

> 1. To the extent that high levels of authority are vested in police executives, there is less performance by the civil service commission of the regulatory role; it is deprived of the administrative task, and it is relegated to the role of adjudicator.

> 2. To the extent that the civil service commission enjoys authority at the expense of the police executive, it expands its police personnel role.

On the other hand, the personnel director and police chief complement each other in terms of authority; that is, the strengthening of one will tend to strengthen the authority of the other, and the converse.

The Mayor. More authoritative mayors are compatible with active administrating civil service commissions and at the same time such authority bears a negative correlation with that of the personnel director. In the latter case, the stronger the mayor, the weaker the personnel director, as well as the converse.

The City Manager. As with an authoritative police chief, the more authority exercised by the city manager, the more likely is the role of the civil service commission to be restricted to the adjudicative function. The city manager's authority complements that of the personnel director, as in the case of the police chief's authority level.

The Personnel Director. The analysis indicated no stable nor significant relationship to the local civil service body which may imply either an administrative subordination of the personnel director to the civil service commission or, as is evident from the analysis, a complementary authority relationship with the city manager and/or police chief. As indicated above, the personnel director's authority bears a negative correlation with that of an authoritative mayor.

As can be seen from the foregoing, the checks and balances originally provided by the authors of early civil service legislation do not represent a simple dichotomy but have become considerably more subtle and supple, forming a changing setting of shifting alliances and competitive balances. Indeed, there is hope for the future which can be based on the evident capacity to change and adjust, but there is a degree of uncertainty depending upon the comparative vigor and strength of the several members or actors in these networks.

Chapter V

THE IMPACTS OF CITY POLITICS

V. THE IMPACTS OF CITY POLITICS

In any research endeavor, the analyst must attempt to avoid two major pitfalls: excessive ambition and debilitating myopia. In slightly less pretentious terms, one seeks to define one's field of inquiry broadly enough to allow for examination of the major topics relevant to that field, but narrowly enough so as to avoid floundering about in a sea of data. Many an otherwise well-designed project has fallen prey to one or the other of these problems.

A good deal of effort has been expended in the preceding pages in an effort to better understand the structure and the dynamics of local police personnel systems. There can be no doubt that this effort is important and directly relevant to the general topic to which the project has been addressed. Nevertheless, it would be myopic in the sense mentioned above if the research efforts did not go further. The literature on police personnel administration in American cities is replete with suggestions that two factors in the general environment of urban policing impact quite significantly on many of the systems characteristics examined earlier. One of those allegedly crucial factors is a relatively new one: the growing power and influence of police officer unions. The other, hardly new but presumed by the commentators to be no less important, is the influence of politics as exercised by the various actors who compose the local political structure.

It would be foolhardy to pretend that the efforts of the PAS civil service research project were able to capture the nature of both of these forces in their entirety. In the same vein, it would be a serious error to omit them from the study. Thus, while primary importance was accorded by PAS to the collection of materials on police personnel system characteristics and on police administrative and operational practices, an effort was also made to collect information that would tap some of the central aspects of local politics and police unionism.

Thus, the purpose of this chapter and of the next is to expand the context in which the findings and conclusions mentioned earlier are understood. In the pages which follow, evidence is marshaled on the nature of the distribution of political influence in the 42-city sample. Influence in a variety of issue arenas is compared to influence in the police personnel arena, in order to place the latter in the appropriate context. Then, the distribution of political influence on police personnel affairs is juxtaposed with the authority levels and the civil service roles which were analyzed in some detail earlier in the search for significant community political impacts on the actors and the relationships which characterize the local police personnel field.

In Chapter VI, the general format and purpose are the same. However, in that chapter the focus is shifted to the topical area of urban police unionism.

A. Community Political Interests and Police Personnel Administration

The "genteel reformers" of the late 1800's brought to the civil service movement of that era two models of the local political process:

one reflecting the way they perceived the actual situation, the other the way it would function vis-a-vis a reformed civil service system of government administration. In the former, the "interests"--urban bosses, political parties,and "robber barons"--were presumed to possess disproportionate political resources and to exercise them so as to control government employees, services, and programs and to thwart the true will of the people. In the latter, the civil service commission would handle the tasks of public personnel administration insulated from the political pressures of the interests and in consonance with the popular will.

It is an open question whether the will of the interests was so diametrically opposed to that of the people or, for that matter, whether an analyst could at that time (or even now) have meaningfully determined this question. In any event, many commentators--but by no means all[58]--would concur in the judgment that civil service commissions have largely accomplished the reformers' goal: they have insulated the task of personnel administration from the vagaries of the local political structure.

That judgment is, again, one of those matters decided largely on the basis of the commentator's individual experience and without the benefit of comparative evidence. The same could be said for most of those who disagree. For that reason alone, further examination is entirely appropriate.

However, the question of political influences on local police personnel administration has grown much more complex than that posed by the original civil service reformers. It has already been demonstrated that the law establishes some form of civil service system for police employees in the vast majority of cities, and that the system is usually embodied in the activities of a formally constituted civil service commission or board. While the law defines the commission and its activities even further, it has also already been demonstrated that that body must adapt itself and its activities to the operational situation. It must compete with other actors for the authority to perform roles relevant to the task of police personnel administration. In that context, it must also find its niche among actors in the local community who enjoy varying degrees of political influence. For some, civil service commission performance of one or more of the roles examined earlier is consonant with their interests and goals, for others it is not. Thus, in the context of the 1970's, the question most appropriately posed is whether and to what extent civil service role performance and police personnel administration are affected and directed by the distribution of political influence in the local community.[59]

The measurement of political influence is neither a simple nor a straightforward task; in fact, there is very little approaching consensus among scholars or practitioners on the best measuring methods to use or indicators to compute. A voluminous body of social scientific literature has arisen around this point. Some of the contributors urge a reputational approach, in which persons reputed to be influential are taken by

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[58]An interview conducted by New England magazine with Robert di Grazia upon his departure from the Boston Police Department is one good example.

[59]Leonard Ruchelman provides three case studies of the general interaction between community leaders and police officials in his Police Politics: A Comparative Study of Three Cities (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974).

the researcher to actually compose the local "power elite." Others would urge a positional approach, concentrating their energies on a study of those who occupy actually or potentially powerful formal corporate or organizational positions. Yet others recognize that influence and those who possess it change from issue to issue; they propose an issue specific methodology.[60] While each of these methods has some academic and practical value, one facing an actual research problem is usually constrained by the forces of time and finance to select one or the other of the alternative methods. The particular procedure adopted for the civil service project was relatively closest to the "issue specific" methodology, with significant "positional" aspects.

The specifics of the actual procedure were as follows. During the personal interviews conducted with prominent local actors in each of the study locations, five questions were asked of each respondent in order to determine influence levels of local individuals or groups. Each respondent was first requested to indicate the relative influence (very much, some, or none) exercised over local police personnel decisions by each of the following community actors:

1. The City Council
2. The Mayor
3. The Democratic Party
4. The Republican Party
5. Church Leaders
6. Chamber of Commerce
7. Newspapers
8. Bar Associations
9. Labor Unions
10. Ethnic Groups
11. Neighborhood Groups
12. Heads of Local Government Agencies
13. City and County Employees
14. Industrial Leaders
15. Retail Merchants
16. Bankers and Executives of other Finance Institutions
17. Other Businessmen

This procedure was repeated four other times in the interviews, using the same response categories and the same list of actors, but varying the issue arena introduced by the interviewer among the following four topical areas:

● winning a school board election

● winning a mayoral election

● starting an air pollution control program

● passing a community development block grant proposal

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[60]For a more detailed discussion of these methods and their advantages and disadvantages, see either Polsby, Nelson A., Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963) or Clark, Terry N., Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses (San Francisco: Intext-Chandler, 1968).

Because the number of interview respondents differed from city to city, the responses to the questions mentioned above were standardized by employing mean scores rather than simple sums. That is, scores were assigned to each possible influence ranking (very much = 3, some = 2, none = 1); the influence score for each actor and each issue type was then computed as the average influence score for that actor on that issue, across all respondents in the city.

Because the politics/policing nexus has been such a topic for study and speculation and simultaneously a "cause" for social action, it seems useful to address a preliminary question: does an actor's influence in general city politics correlate with his or her influence in local police personnel matters? The answer is an emphatic yes. Data to support that contention are presented in Table 10. In that table, the numerical entries are the correlation coefficients between the relevant actors' influence levels in the various issues listed and their influence levels in police personnel affairs. In general, the lesson of the table is that political influence "carries over" from almost any arena of city political life to the police personnel arena, for almost any local actor. These results are strongest and most consistent for the police personnel/mayoral and school combinations and for the pairing of police personnel influence and the summed influence score over the four nonpolice issue arenas. Both of these findings, but especially the former, demonstrate two general results well worth detailing quite specifically. The first of these is, as mentioned above, that the police personnel area is not a separate or unique arena for the exercise of political influence. The second is that police politics is generally closest in nature to the most partisan of all of those arenas examined in the survey. Air pollution control programming and community development planning and policy-making are often quite specialized, issue-oriented matters; each of them demands of their participants a certain technical expertise in the subject matter and a special commitment to the general area. On the contrary, electoral politics tends to be conducted in a more partisan context than any of the others, to activate a wider variety of participants who are motivated by a wider variety of goals, and to be as much a symbolic as a practical political conflict. The data from the table of correlations demonstrate that the politics of the police personnel arena are closer in nature to the traditional form and substance of urban politics, as represented by the electoral contests, than they are to the newer, issue-oriented types of political controversy.

There is one other inference to be made from the correlations listed in the table. The correlations between general political influence (as measured in the last column of the table) and police personnel influence are particularly strong (.500 or greater) for five local actors: the Democratic Party, the mayor, local government agency heads, newspapers, and church leaders. In much of the traditional political science literature, where the motivations of political activists have been the focus, actors such as the first three have been painted as generally practical in style and "localist" in orientation; the latter two have been deemed more idealistic and issue-oriented in style and more "cosmopolitan" in orientation.[61] Most of the other actors in the list would fall somewhere between these two extremes. In addition, it should be noted that these five particular actors tend to find their possibilities for political action heavily dependent on the local scene, as opposed to either businessmen or labor spokesmen

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[61] See Freeman, Linton C., Patterns of Local Community Leadership (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), or Banfield, Edward C. and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963).

Table 10

CORRELATIONS: POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN POLICE PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION IN RELATION TO OTHER ISSUE ARENAS

Actor	Issue Arena				
	School Board Politics	Mayoral Politics	Air Pollution Control Politics	Community Development Politics	Sum of All Four
The City Council	....	....	....	....	....
The Mayor	.509	.367	.350	.504	.527
The Democratic Party	.571	.672	.429	.595	.682
The Republican Party	.277	.354	.452	.461	.395
Church Leaders	.545	.475	.425	.486	.588
Chamber of Commerce	.441	....	.547	.593	.418
Newspapers	.422	.460	.565	.435	.578
Bar Association	.364	....	....	....	....
Labor Unions	....	....	....	....	....
Ethnic Groups	.497	.485	....	.372	.483
Neighborhood Groups	....	.321	....	.478	.376
Heads of Local Government Agencies	.532	.527	....	.347	.568
City and County Employees	....	....	....	....	....
Industrial Leaders	.415	.543	.372	.436	.571
Retail Merchants	....	.360	....	.373	.320
Bankers and Executives of Other Financial Institutions	.408	.411	.277	.329	.401
Other Businessmen	....	....	.385	.423	.339

.... indicates that a coefficient did not achieve statistical significance.

who are, as often as not, drawn beyond the locality and into the national economic and political arenas. The data thus demonstrate that local police personnel affairs tend to be the focus of those actors tied most intimately to the local scene; the findings suggest further that local practical actors and local idealists alike are seen as enjoying an important "carryover" of influence from the general polity to the police arena.

Correlation analysis, by its very nature, answers research questions in relative terms. It does not directly address absolute magnitudes in the variables it examines. Thus, it cannot directly reveal who has how much influence in the politics of police personnel. To examine this question a bit more closely, Table 11 is provided. It depicts the mean influence score of each political actor in the arena of police personnel issues, calculated across all 42 study sites. The entries are arranged in descending order of influence magnitude, and demonstrate that a relatively low and broad influence hierarchy best characterizes the structure of local political influence in the police personnel arena. As shown in the pyramid of comparative political influence (Figure 6), at the pinnacle of that hierarchy (which, itself, is a pinnacle of only modest substantive influence) stand the mayor and the city council. Immediately below them come representatives of a wide variety of local interests: the media, ethnic and neighborhood groups, labor, and business. A champion of democratic theory would undoubtedly be pleased at these findings, in that they provide an almost textbook case of the theoretical democratic structure: elected officials in the most authoritative positions, followed rather closely by an unbiased agglomeration of any and all interest groups.

1. Relative Political Impacts. It is somewhat cumbersome to retain 17 independent variables as measures of the local political situation; thus, recourse was had once again to the method of factor analysis in an attempt to reduce the 17 to a smaller and more convenient group of technically appropriate and substantively adequate measures. The results of that application of factor analysis[62] were that, in general, four clusters of political influentials could be identified as active in the local politics of policing:

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[62]Again, the method used was principal components factor analysis with oblique rotation. The statistical results of that procedure were:

	Factor Loadings				
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Communality
The city council	0.35258	0.07817	0.00525	-0.11068	0.15617
Mayor	0.34704	0.27649	0.27727	0.17608	0.43717
Democratic Party	0.01751	0.10027	0.85367	0.37323	0.88081
Republican Party	0.00438	-0.03195	0.72330	-0.19141	0.56738
Church leaders	0.54504	0.06935	0.20711	0.40962	0.62611
Chamber of Commerce	0.68752	0.11316	-0.13660	0.33256	0.61598
Newspapers	0.54583	0.23342	-0.00079	-0.30262	0.50736
Bar associations	0.29423	0.21113	0.13993	-0.40844	0.39507
Labor unions	-0.22182	0.35402	0.15015	-0.45134	0.40139
Ethnic groups	-0.05629	0.72310	0.07645	0.00640	0.52214
Neighborhood groups	0.33536	0.69412	-0.18152	0.03477	0.67635
Government agency heads	0.51537	0.19593	0.11248	0.16303	0.44589
City and county employees	0.04340	-0.05810	-0.05077	-0.42063	0.17382

Table 11

MEAN INFLUENCE SCORES IN THE POLITICS OF
POLICE PERSONNEL MATTERS

Actor	Score[a]
Mayor	2.381
City Council	2.118
Newspapers	1.746
Ethnic Groups	1.730
Neighborhood Groups	1.688
Labor Unions	1.679
Retail Merchants	1.600
Heads of Government Agencies	1.539
Church Leaders	1.475
City and County Employees	1.473
Chamber of Commerce	1.463
Other Businessmen	1.456
Industrial Leaders	1.439
Bankers and Heads of Financial Institutions	1.415
Bar Associations	1.310
Democratic Party	1.301
Republic Party	1.153

[a]Scale values range from 1.00 to 3.00 N = 42.

Figure 6

PYRAMID OF COMPARATIVE POLITICAL INFLUENCE
IN POLICE PERSONNEL MATTERS

Maximum

Scale

3

2

1

Democratic Party

Bankers and Financial Heads

Other Businessmen

City and County Employees

Heads of Government Agencies

Labor Unions

Ethnic Groups

City Council

Mayor

Newspapers

Neighborhood Groups

Retail Merchants

Church Leaders

Chamber of Commerce

Industrial Leaders

Bar Associations

Republican Party

- a cluster which linked the mayor, the city council, the church leaders, the newspapers, the chamber of commerce, the heads of the local government agencies, and the various business actors;

- a cluster which linked neighborhood groups and ethnic groups;

- a cluster which linked the Democratic and Republican Parties; and

- a cluster which linked bar associations, labor unions, and city and county employees.

The first of those was labelled the "power elite," in that it linked many of the actors to whom Mills[63] awarded that title in his own studies of the distribution of influence and authority; in contrast, the second factor was labelled the "grass roots." The third is clearly a "political party" dimension. The fourth has been titled an "organized labor" cluster; while the presence of the bar associations among that grouping is not particularly appropriate to that designation, the label does seem to be the best overall description of that factor.

The major question to be addressed is the impact of political influence among local community actors on the police personnel administration field. The table of simple correlation coefficients (Table 12) provides material relevant to that assessment.

Three patterns of impact of political influence on personnel actors' authority levels are depicted in the table. The first of these is the general congruence discovered between mayoral authority in police personnel decision-making and the levels of political influence enjoyed by the local power elite, the "grass roots" neighborhood and ethnic groups, and the political parties. Of course, it is an open question as to why these correlations are positive. Some would probably claim that mayors can be influenced more easily than the other actors studied; others would posit that mayors better represent their policy preferences than managers or personnel directors. In all likelihood, a mix of both is present in each of the cities studied. In any event, it is clear that mayoral authority (and, presumably, the decisions and policies which emanate from it) in the area of police personnel decision-making has strong roots in the local community influence structure.

[62](continued from page 72)

	Factor Loadings				
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Communality
Industrial leaders	0.65921	-0.29647	0.46567	-0.02553	0.79129
Retail merchants	0.81476	0.00663	-0.05295	0.04498	0.64790
Bankers and financiers	0.65087	-0.08765	0.31694	-0.17231	0.64598
Other businessmen	0.96601	-0.10038	-0.00496	-0.09196	0.88270

[63]Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). At a more local level of analysis, but using similar ideas, see Hunter, Floyd, Community Power Structure (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

Table 12

POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON POLICE PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

	Influences Enjoyed By			
	Power Elite	Grass Roots	Political Parties	Organized Labor
Personnel Field Authority Levels				
Urban Executive	.....	.....	.....	.....
(Mayor)	.362	.365	.502	.....
(Manager)	-.403	-.326	-.531	.....
Police Executive	-.283	.....	-.385	.....
City Council	.....	.....	.....	.....
Civil Service Commission	.....	.....	.....	.....
Personnel Director	-.470	.....	-.378	.395
Civil Service Roles				
Advisory	.....	.....	.....	.....
Administrative	.....	.277	.....	.....
Regulatory	.....	.....	.....	.....
Adjudicative	.....	.....	.....	.278
Policy-Formulative	.....	.336	.....	.....
Adjudicative Orientation	.....	.....	.....	.273
Administrative Orientation	.....	.300	.....	.....

The converse of this argument constitutes the second notable impact pattern. With regard to police executives, city managers, and personnel directors, it is clear from the table that the competitive model of the local police personnel field can quite appropriately be extended to include local political actors as well. The negative correlations in the relevant cells demonstrate that, for the most part, the political influentials in the local community are unwilling to invest their influence in managers, police chiefs, or personnel directors. Policy options or proposed programs which also functioned to increase the authority of any of those officials would run counter to the interests of large segments of the local political structure. Such proposed programs could only be successfully instituted in localities where those segments of the local political structures were largely lacking in political influence in police personnel matters.

There is one exception to this general statement, implied in the positive correlation between the influence of organized labor and the decision-making authority of the city's personnel director. This coefficient indicates a preference for dealing with a generalist personnel director on the part of organized labor; specifically, dealing with a given official on a direct and regular basis in a relationship in which jointly acceptable compromises can be effected rather than encountering antagonistic confrontations.

While community political influences are unrelated to the level of decision-making authority enjoyed by the civil service commission, they do exert two impacts on the roles played by those commissions. In simple terms, more influential "grass roots" groups promote an administrative role for the commission; a more influential organized labor promotes an adjudicative role. While the influence levels of the power elite and the political parties are not directly related to the civil service roles, it would be an error to suggest that they have no impacts. Theirs are the indirect influences, filtered through their support for or their competition with the various governmental officials who possess formal decision-making authority in the police personnel sphere.

B. Summary Findings and the Political Setting for Change

The analysis and findings presented in this chapter show that police personnel administration is affected by the distribution of political influence in the local community.

Although the amount of political influence varies among individual community actors, it is clear that whatever political clout these individuals and groups hold in a particular community, it carries over to the police personnel administration arena. Further, the general tendency across the 42 cities studied is for this carryover factor between political influence and police personnel administration to be the strongest in the most partisan arenas of traditional urban politics, as represented by the correlations for elections as depicted in Table 10.

As in the case of all statistical comparisons of the kind presented in this chapter, the findings represent the general patterns and central tendencies of the data collected. Thus, the amount and incidence of political influence on police personnel administration can vary from city to city. Nevertheless, this does not diminish the importance of the finding that the issue of police personnel administration is not insulated from local political pressures.

In addition, the data presented in the last part of this chapter indicate that the political influence enjoyed by different groups and individuals in the local community are definitely related to the levels of authority held by some of those local government officials responsible for administering police personnel affairs. Although some of these community political influences are supportive in nature, others portray a more competitive decision-making environment.

When taken together, these findings are important to those considering the reform of local personnel administration. An illustration of how the dynamics of local politics could impact the prospects for change is in order.

In 1970, the National Civil Service League called for a sweeping reform in the then current state of civil service and public personnel administration.[64] The League advocated the abolition of independent civil service commissions and their replacement with citizen advisory commissions on personnel matters. Central to the League's reform model was the vesting of public personnel managers and top government officials with the authority to conduct complete personnel programs. The League's proposals were, and continue to be, provocative and controversial.

The League and, for the most part, supporter of the League's model personnel structure are quick to point out that their reform proposals are not meant to be imposed without recognizing the uniqueness of local circumstances. The findings presented in this chapter highlight the significance of that caveat. This is not in any way to imply a judgment, pro or con, as to the merits of these ideas; rather, the proposals themselves constitute a convenient point of focus in relation to the analyses detailed above.

There are, of course, two implicit questions which any reformer must address: should change be effected, and can change be effected? The former will, for now, be deferred; it is a question which can only be answered in the light of evidence that it will bring better personnel administration and higher quality government services and programs; and the marshaling of such evidence is the task of subsequent chapters. The latter question, however, is a political one; it is a matter of discussing whose ox will be gored by change and how likely it is that the goring will be attainable.

In the context of the design of the research conducted, there are two logical implications of the League's proposals: elimination of the authority enjoyed by civil service commissions in police personnel decision-making, and elimination of the relative degrees to which the commission plays any of the roles described earlier. The question to be addressed, then, is who will support such changes and who (aside from civil service commissions) will oppose them?

The analyses outlined earlier suggest that support for such changes can reasonably be expected from personnel directors, city managers, and police executives. The personnel directors are, after all, professional

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[64]*A Model Public Personnel Administration Law*, National Civil Service League, Washington, D.C., 1970.

administrators; they would clearly favor a system which provided them more latitude and more authority to be administrators. The same is true of city managers, and of police executives. Among the latter, of course, lies the additional desire to eliminate the regulatory role which civil service commissions also, on occasion, perform.

The findings also suggest that there would be little likelihood of gaining mayoral support for such a change. The central dynamic here is a matter of political economy. That is, the benefits to be gained from increased authority and administrative responsibility are accompanied by costs--electoral costs in the form of lost votes if the mayor cannot administratively please his employee-constituents. Strong mayors who opt to minimize their costs by relegating the administrative task to someone else are not likely to support a movement to reverse that decision.

Of course, where mayors are relatively weak and symbolic creatures (as they are in many council-manager contexts), the objection is not too difficult to overcome. Where they are figures of real authority, however, their preferences are likely to be supported by several major political influence groups in the larger community environment. In such contexts, reform on a scale of that proposed by the National Civil Service League seems a difficult quest, and indeed, this and other attempted reforms must deal with the unique skein of political influences and interests present in each American jurisdiction.

Chapter VI

POLICE UNIONS IN POLICE PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

VI. POLICE UNIONS IN POLICE PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

Most students of police unionism trace the heritage of that movement back to the Boston police strike of 1919. As is well known by now, that traumatic event was the first of what has come to be a series of police officer job actions staged in protest of salaries, benefits, working conditions, and a host of other matters of concern. The Boston strike ended in defeat for the police officers; in fact, one of its major results was to propel the man who ended it, Massachusetts Governor Calvin Coolidge, into national prominence and, eventually, the White House. Few contemporary police officer job actions are so weighty in immediate significance. Nevertheless, their apparent growth in number and importance has been sufficient to generate a great deal of concern among observers of the police scene over their impacts on the quality of local police administration.

The question is most clearly posed in the title of an article by Charles Feigenbaum, "Civil Service and Collective Bargaining: Conflict or Compatability?"[65] Unfortunately, answers posed in the literature have not approached the same clarity. For some, collective bargaining and the merit system are in irreconcilable conflict; victory for one can only be achieved at the expense of the other, in the zero-sum format of classical game theory.[66] This conclusion has led to quite diverse recommendations for action--ranging from elimination of civil service to strict limitations on police unionism. Other commentators take the position that peaceful coexistence between civil service and police unions is not only possible but absolutely necessary to accurately represent the legitimate but differing interests of police officers and to continue to provide them protection from political encroachment.

Juris and Feuille have expanded upon this coexistence theme in a comparative analysis of police unionism. Their study suggests that police unions derive a positive benefit from civil service systems, not in the nature of better representation or protection but rather through the generation of multi-lateralism in the collective bargaining sphere. Civil service systems with the authority to make binding decisions (or to overturn those of others) provide police unions with an additional means of leverage over the system. To get what they want, they can choose to employ any (or all) of the bargaining table, the ballot box, the judicial system, or the civil service commission.[67]

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[65]*Public Personnel Management*, May-June, 1974, pp. 244-252.

[66]Morse, Muriel, "Are We Bargaining Away the Merit System?" *Public Personnel Review*, October, 1963, pp. 239-243; Wurf, Jerry, "Symposium on Merit Principle Today," *Public Administration Review*, Sept.-Oct., 1974, pp. 425-452; Maddox, Charles W., *Collective Bargaining in Law Enforcement* (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1975).

[67]Juris, H. A. and P. Feuille, *Police Unionism: Power and Impact in Public Sector Bargaining* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1973). Additional case studies on different police union tactics and on the types of unions that use them are available in Halpern, Stephen C., *Police Association and Department Leaders* (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1974).

It is clear that consensus has not yet been reached by the commentators on the roles of police unions vis-a-vis civil service systems; it is equally clear from the literature that the topic is in serious need of more empirical study and fewer allegations and counter-allegations. Toward that end, part of the civil service research project was devoted to an assessment of the impacts of police unions on the local police personnel field and on local civil service commission roles with regard to police personnel administration. In this instance, as it was with the analysis of city politics, it would be presumptuous to claim that the narrative which follows covers the topic of police unionism in the breadth and depth which it deserves. Nevertheless, the topic was deemed too important to ignore; some assessment--albeit a limited one--is preferable to none.

Two separate data collection vehicles were utilized in an attempt to discover the impact of police unionism on civil service and police personnel administration. In one of these, the prominent local officials who were personally interviewed were asked a series of questions designed to assess the history and present scope of local police efforts at collective bargaining. In another, the most recent labor contracts or memoranda of understanding, binding cities and their police officers, were collected and subjected to a detailed and lengthy content analysis procedure. These content analyses were designed to yield further data on the present status of police collective bargaining in the cities studied.[68]

A.   The Form and the Substance of Police Union Activities

The use of clear and precise terminology is imperative in any research effort if its findings are to be widely understood and its significance duly appreciated. Unfortunately, the terminology employed in the study of police unionism varies from study to study. The problem begins with the very basic task of identification of the study subjects; while it may sound a bit preposterous, it is nevertheless true that one is often unclear if the group he or she is studying truly constitutes a "union." In most cities, police officer job actions are organized and conducted by officers' clubs, by benevolent associations, or by lodges of fraternal organizations, such as the F.O.P. or the I.C.P.A. which, in the eyes of the law, may or may not constitute a union.

Similar definitional problems plague concepts such as militancy and job action. In the narrative which follows, the problem of defining a union is sidestepped; the units of analysis are the police officer associations which represent those in the basic departmental rank for sworn personnel, regardless of their legal status as unions. Job actions are any activities undertaken by those groups in and for public view; thus, while job actions may range from the holding of press conferences to formal strikes, they exclude private lobbying sessions or discussions.

How much union activity is there in contemporary American city police forces? Using the number of job actions carried out by police unions undoubtedly understates the case, but it can serve as an indicator of the phenomenon. In that light, the answer must be stated as only a very moderate amount. The respondents to the survey indicate that, in

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[68]The content analysis document is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix II.

the 42 cities studied, 19 (45.2 percent) have had at least one job action
in the past five years; 10 (23.8 percent) have had at least two; and only
4 (9.5 percent) have had at least three. The average number of job ac-
tions per city over the past five years is less than one, .786, to be
precise. Even if the sample is limited to only those municipalities
which have witnessed police union activities, the average rises but to
1.74 actions over the five-year span. Based on such figures, one would
be hard pressed to build a case for a wave of police unionism militancy
sweeping the country.

While the formal police strike is usually the job action most
closely attended by the media, it is not the tactic most frequently em-
ployed by police unions. That distinction must go to the "sick-out."
Almost one-third of all police job actions recorded by the research project
were of this type as the table below demonstrates; the nearest alternatives
occurred with barely half the frequency of voluntary absences or "sick-
outs."

	Number of Actions	Percent
Speed-up	2	6.1
Slow-down	6	18.2
Picketing	6	18.2
Sick-out	10	30.3
Leafleting	1	3.0
Strike	5	15.3
Public statements or threats to take action	3	9.1
	33	100.1

The types of actions employed do show something of a progression:
where a variety of introductory tactics are used, the second action cen-
ters heavily on the "sick-out," as is demonstrated in the table below.
This is a highly symbolic tactic, as are picketing and the issuance of
threats; and these are often intended by their organizers more as demon-
strations of solidarity and strength than as tactics deliberately engineered
so as to lead both parties to the bargaining table.

	First Action	Second Action	Third Action
Speed-up	2	0	0
Slow-down	5	0	1
Picketing	5	1	0
Sick-out	3	6	1
Leafleting	0	0	1
Strike	4	1	0
Threats	0	2	1

Although a variety of intermediate possibilities exist, the results
of police union job actions can generally be placed in one of two catego-
ries: the opening of negotiations or the failure to do so. While the
number of cases available for analysis is rather small, the recorded job
actions do suggest that bringing labor and management to the bargaining
table in the police context is not the ultimate product of a rising

crescendo of union activity. The reverse appears to be a more accurate description: first actions have a two-to-one chance of ending in some type of negotiated settlement, while second actions have a four-to-one chance of defeat.

Not surprisingly, different job actions tend to achieve success to very different degrees. Sick-outs and formal strikes would appear to be the least efficacious of the tactics available to police unions. Even the mildest of job actions--picketing and issuing threats--tend to bring about negotiations proportionately more often than they meet their demise. The reverse is the case for strikes and sick-outs.

	Overall	First Result	Second Result	Third Result
Union Defeat (by disciplinary action, injunction, or exhaustion)	16	6	8	2
Negotiation	17	13	2	2

		Result	
		Negotiation	Union Defeat
	Speed-Up	2	0
	Slow-Down	3	0
	Picketing	4	2
Job Action	Sick-Out	3	7
	Leafleting	1	0
	Strike	2	3
	Threats	2	1

Turning from matters of form and dynamics to matters of substance with regard to police unionism leads to a very definitive picture of the major concerns and accomplishments of those organizations. Of course, the specific substantive areas which have been the subject of union activity have varied a good deal. However, as Table 13 demonstrates, a central theme does emerge: police unions, like their counterparts in other private or public settings, are most specifically concerned over the most concrete of member benefits. In the personal interviews, each respondent was presented with a list of topics, and asked to indicate whether the local police union had: (1) formally bargained, (2) informally discussed, or (3) done nothing in the listed areas. In light of the findings in the table below, a very appropriate conclusion would be that police unions are not the extremist nor unique element so often portrayed in the literature or the media. Their most salient concerns are salaries, fringe benefits, and shift and hour schedules; in practice, police unions are as much "business unions" as any long-time component of the AFL-CIO. Furthermore, police unions are perceived by the survey respondents to be most effective in these same areas, and only marginally so in any of the others.

One of the major criticisms levelled against the general concept of collective bargaining in the police context revolves around that often

Table 13

POLICE UNION ACTIVITY[a]

	Percent			
	Union Formally Bargained	Union Informally Debated	Union Did Nothing	Mean Effectiveness Rating[b]
Salary Scales	67.5	15.7	16.7	4.21
Fringe Benefits	66.0	17.3	16.7	4.23
Job Classifications	14.7	33.5	51.8	3.09
Selection Standards	3.7	35.6	60.7	2.74
Promotion Standards	9.9	37.7	52.3	3.06
Training Program Contents	4.2	34.6	61.3	3.04
One-Man Car Assignments	17.3	25.1	57.6	3.29
Divisional, Beat Assignments	8.4	20.4	71.2	3.15
Shift, Hours Schedules	31.9	22.5	45.5	3.68
Affirmative Action Programs	3.7	27.2	69.1	2.74
Civilian Review Policies	5.2	24.1	70.6	3.45
Selection of Police Chief Executives	1.0	20.9	78.0	2.24

[a]Entries in cells are percentages of all survey respondents.
[b]1.00 = Very Ineffective; 5.00 = Very Effective

87

loosely defined set of activities which are considered managerial prerogatives. For approximately one-third of the cities studied, police union activities have proven something of a concern in the area of these prerogatives. When asked if any managerial rights have been lost to police unions or organizations, the general consensus in 13 cities was that they had, and in 23 others that they had not. (In six other cities, the question went unanswered or the answer was indeterminate.) The distribution of "rights lost" was as follows:

Scheduling, Assignment Prerogatives	6
One-Man Car Assignments	1
Job Descriptions	2
"Past Practices"	2
Decision-Making Authority Lost to Arbitration	1
Unknown	1

Clearly, it is in matters of assignment that most concern over such managerial rights is expressed.

However, if proneness toward such losses is to be identified, the data suggest that it should be pointed at urban chief executives acting alone and unaided. The basic distribution of final decision-makers for sworn police union bargaining problems, when cross-tabulated against whether any managerial rights have been lost to the bargaining process, is as follows:

	Managerial Rights Lost	
Final Decision-Makers	Yes	No
Urban Chief Executive	4	3
City Council	4	9
Chief Executive plus Council	4	7
Other	1	4

$x^2 = 4.856703$ $p \leq .20$
$df = 3$

While the results are not strong enough to attain statistical significance, they do suggest a trend toward the loss of managerial rights in police bargaining situations where the final decisions are left solely to urban chief executives, the most politically vulnerable of any of those groups.

B. Police Union Contracts

Of course, the products of police union activity are such that they can become enshrined in formally binding labor-management agreements. The clauses of such contracts offer a second perspective on the topic of police officer unionism and police personnel administration. Use of the word "contract" in this context is, perhaps, a bit deceiving, for the titles of the documents analyzed were distributed as follows:

	Frequency	Percent
Labor Agreements (contracts)	16	51.6
Memoranda of Agreement	3	9.7
Memoranda of Understanding	7	22.6
City Ordinances	1	3.2
Other	4	13.0
	31	100.0

Of these 31 documents, 24 cover sworn personnel only, 1 covers civilian personnel only, 4 cover both, and 2 are indeterminate.

The contract provisions make quite clear the fact that salaries are of primary importance to the parties to the agreement. In 29 (93.5 percent) of the documents, salary levels are specified in the contract itself.

Superior/subordinate salary ratios are expressed in the documents themselves in only one of the 16 cases where they are mentioned; in the other 15, they are silent. Differentials do exist in 15 cases, distributed as follows:

Basis for Differential	Frequency	Percent
Rank	1	6.7
Assignment	10	66.7
Rank and Assignment	2	13.3
Unclear	2	13.3
	15	100.0

In six contracts, the payday or pay period is expressly noted. Only one contract specifies police salaries as a ratio of fire salaries.

Special pay practices are mentioned in many of the contracts, as the following summary table makes clear:

Pay Provision	Frequency	Percent of Total Contracts Studied
Longevity Pay	17	54.8
Educational Incentive Pay	10	32.3
Educational Assistance of Some Type	11	35.5
Both Educational and Longevity Pay	4	12.9

Various fringe benefit clauses or provisions appear in most of the contracts analyzed, although the specifics on many vary quite widely. Vacation and sick allowances are fairly standard contract inclusions, as are holidy provisions and health insurance provisions; each appears in nearly 80 percent of all contracts examined. Life insurance is provided in about half of the contracts; dental insurance in one quarter.

Overtime provisions vary much more widely, as the table below demonstrates:

Overtime Provisions	Frequency	Percent of Total Contracts Studied
Paid Only	12	38.7
Compensatory Time Only	1	3.2
Employee Choice	9	29.0
Paid at Time-and-a-Half	17	54.8
Compensatory Time Granted at Time-and-a-Half	11	35.5

Uniform or clothing policies are included in most contracts in one form or another, as detailed below:

Provision	Frequency	Percent of Total Contracts Studied
Uniform Allowance	23	74.2
Plainclothes Allowance	19	61.3
Uniforms	4	12.9
Uniform Allowance Same for all Ranks	21	67.7
Plainclothes Allowance Same as for Uniforms	12	38.7

Policies covering leaves of absence are much more diverse.

	Frequency	Percent of Total Contracts Studied
Bereavement/Funeral	20	64.5
Jury (with pay)	3	9.7
National Guard/Reserve (with pay)	9	29.0
Personal (with pay)	9	29.0
Pregnancy (without pay)	7	22.6
Other (without pay)	15	48.4

Grievance provisions are also quite crucial aspects of the contracts analyzed. Among the grievable issues, the most common appear as follows:

	Frequency	Percent of Total Contracts Studied
Terms of Agreement	23	74.2
Rules and Regulations	8	25.8
Changes in Past Practice	1	3.2
Conditions of Employment	5	16.1
Disciplinary Actions	1	3.2

The grievance procedures are further specified in the table below:

			Who Hears Grievances			
	Supervisor	Division Head	Deputy Chief	Chief	Mayor/ Manager	Other
Step 1	20	3	0	0	0	3
Step 2	1	8	2	7	1	7
Step 3	0	4	0	7	6	9
Step 4	0	1	0	4	1	20
Step 5	0	0	1	0	2	9
Step 6	0	0	0	1	2	4

Contract provisions regarding the types of reprimand allowed to punish an officer are distributed as follows:

	Contract	
	Permits	Prohibits
Oral Reprimand	6	0
Written Reprimand	6	0
Suspension	6	0
Demotion	5	0
Discharge	6	0
Transfer	2	4
Fines	2	0
Loss of Days Off	4	1
Other	5	0

Of the 31 contracts analyzed, 28 of those documents provide a grievance procedure specification, the "final step" in which is specified as follows:

	Frequency	Percent
Binding Arbitration	18	64.3
Advisory Arbitration	2	7.1
Mayor/Manager Review	3	10.7
Other	5	17.9

In 23 of the contracts, the association is allowed to send a representative to assist in the proceedings, and in 15 of those cases the representatives receive paid leave for time so spent.

In the vast majority of contracts, a number of topics are largely left unaddressed, or are mentioned so idiosyncratically that little can be said about them that is generalizable. Among those topics are job classifications, lateral entry, training programs, one-man versus two-man car assignments, divisional and beat assignments, promotional procedures, lay-off procedures, affirmative action programs, and civilian review procedures. Shift and rotation procedures are often mentioned but are generally maintained as the prerogatives of police management.

Manager's prerogatives and officers' rights are addressed in some union contracys or memoranda. The rights usually reserved to management, and the frequency of those reservations, are as follows:

	Frequency	Percent of Total Contracts Studied
To manage and direct work force.	9	29.0
To discontinue or transfer services and functions,	7	22.6
To subcontract for services and functions.	2	6.5
To select, assign, schedule, promote, and transfer employees.	13	42.0
To establish and revise job descriptions and classifications.	17	54.8
To lay off, demote, and terminate employees for lack of funds or work.	7	22.6
To discipline employees for just cause.	12	38.7
To determine methods and procedures.	8	25.8
To exercise all management rights not specifically abridged or modified by contract.	14	45.2
To vary and alter past practices.	2	6.5
To establish rules and regulations.	7	22.6

On the other hand, the rights reserved to police officers and the frequency of reservation are:

		Number Containing[69] This or a Similar Clause	Percent of Total Contracts Studied
1.	Interrogation of a member of the force shall be at a reasonable hour, preferably when the member is on duty. If any time is lost, the member of the force shall be compensated.	6	19.4
2.	Interrogations shall take place at a location designated by the chief of police and the mayor, usually at police headquarters or the location where the incident allegedly occurred.	6	19.4
3.	The member of the force shall be informed of the nature of the investigation and name of the complainant before any interrogation commences. If the member is being interrogated as a witness only, he should be so informed at the initial contact.	6	19.4
4.	The questioning shall be reasonable in length, and reasonable respites shall be allowed.	6	19.4
5.	The member shall not be subject to offensive language, nor threatened with transfer, dismissal, or other punishment. No promise of reward shall be made as an inducement to answering questions.	6	19.4
6.	The complete interrogation of the member of the force shall be recorded. There will be no "off-the-record" questions. All recesses called during the questioning shall be recorded.	4	12.9
7.	If a member of the force is under arrest or is likely to be, he shall be given his rights pursuant to the current decisions of the United States Supreme Court.	5	16.1
8.	In all cases, and at every stage of the proceedings, a member may consult with counsel and/or his association representative before being questioned concerning a violation of the rules and regulations.	7	22.6

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[69]Some states, such as California, have enacted officers' rights legislation. The foregoing tabulation is based on actual contract content and is not related to such statutes.

Finally, in the area of "past practices" clauses, almost one-half of the contracts (14: 45 percent) contain specific clauses. Ten of those 14 specifically continue all past practices; 4 do not. Exactly one-half of that group (7 of the 14) allow for modifications through the "meet and confer" vehicle.

C. The Impacts of Police Unionism

To address the question of the effects of unionism on the local police personnel system, four variables measuring the scope and impact of local police union activity were created from some of the material presented above. Those variables, and the methods by which they were created, are as follows:

- the number of police union job actions which have occurred in the study sites over the past five years;

- an index of union activity: the responses of police chiefs to each of the union activity topics presented in the personal interviews were weighted (two points where a union bargained in an area, one where it discussed the topic informally, and zero where it did nothing) and the weighted scores were added over all topics;

- an index of officer rights' bias: an additive index formed by summing the number of clauses of the police officer bill of rights found in the local union contract or agreement memorandum; and

- an index of management prerogatives bias: an additive index formed by summing the number of management prerogatives found in the local union contract.

Moderate to high levels of intercorrelation link those four variables to each other, as the table below demonstrates. This is especially true with regard to the two variables derived from the contract materials; as officers' unions pursue and attain more "rights" clauses, managers do the same for "prerogatives" clauses. Neither side is apt to witness a clear-cut victory enshrined in the formal contract; rather, this correlation implies that police unions and management negotiate contracts which embody more or less articulated and formalized definitions of appropriate and inappropriate management-labor interactions. In terms of contract provisions specifying such rights and prerogatives, a given study site is not a "labor" or a "management" city; it is more a "formal" or an "informal" city in police union matters.

	Activity Index	Number of Job Actions	Rights Perspective	Prerogatives Perspective
Activity Index	1.0	.315	.278	.452
Number of Job Actions	--	1.0	--	.279
Rights Perspective	--	--	1.0	.610
Prerogatives Perspective	--	--	--	1.0

What has been the impact of police unionism on the local police personnel field? In general, it has been quite minimal. The table below, sparse as it may be, depicts the only statistically significant correlations to emerge from the analyses; it omits the seven variables measuring either specific civil service roles or generalized role orientations because not one of the unionism variables correlated with any of the civil service role measures.

	"Rights" Perspective	"Prerogatives" Perspective	Number of Job Actions	Index of Union Activity
Urban Executive Authority	--	--	--	--
(mayor)	--	--	--	--
(manager)	--	--	--	--
Police Executive Authority	-.374	-.324	--	--
Civil Service Commission Authority	--	--	--	--
Personnel Director Authority	--	--	-.248	--

The table does lend some support to the idea noted above that the rights and prerogatives clauses serve as indicators of the formality of the system; higher numbers of both correspond to decreased personnel decision-making authority of the police chief executive, a finding which makes sense only in the context of greater formalization. On the other hand, the variable measuring number of job actions carried out by police officer unions can serve, on its face value, as a measure of militancy; as such, more police union militancy is related to a decrease in the decision-making authority of the personnel director in police personnel affairs.

It was demonstrated earlier (in Chapter IV) that more authoritative police chief executives tend to restrain civil service commissions from playing regulatory roles; similarly, more authoritative personnel directors promote the playing of an adjudicative role by civil service commissions, primarily by leaving them little else to do. To the extent that police unionism affects the authority these officials can exercise, it indirectly impacts on civil service commissions. However, on balance, it must be concluded that the direct impacts of police unionism on local civil service commissions and their activities are, at best, minimal.

D. Summary

Whenever an urban police officers' union goes on strike, the incident usually becomes a major media event. The problem with that development is that publicity and personality often combine in ways that make it difficult to maintain an overall perspective on the general police unionism phenomenon. Unfortunately, the literature on police unions is--with a few notable exceptions--either too particularistic in scope or too normative in content to provide much guidance in this area. In many respects, this chapter constitutes research de novo.

It would be an error to minimize the extensiveness of the police union phenomenon. In every city studied by the civil service project, some group--be it a formally recognized union or a more informal voluntary association--could be identified as claiming to represent the interests of police officers before police and city managements. In fact, in one of the study sites, the local chapter of the Fraternal Order of Police staged its first organized job action on the very day that data collection began in that community.

Nevertheless, it would be an error of equal magnitude to overestimate the militancy or to misconstrue the general goals of those police unions. Job actions carried out in and for public view by police officer organizations are relatively rare events; across the 42 cities studied, the average number of such actions staged in any given city over the past five years is approximately one. Furthermore, those actions vary widely in form (from formal strikes to informal leafleting), in duration and in results. While police unionism may be quite widespread, militant police unionism is not.

Further support for this proposition comes from the analysis of both the personal interview responses on local police unionism and the contents of the formal documents (contracts, memoranda, and so forth) binding police management and unions. The police unions emerge from both of those exercises as, in general, business unions. They tend to be most active in the areas of wages, fringe benefits, and time scheduling; they are perceived by local police personnel actors as being most effective in those same areas; and the contracts tend to treat those areas in most detail.

From the analyses of the contracts, one additional finding of some importance emerges. The contracts do not appear to enshrine within their clauses any clear-cut victory for one side or the other. What they do appear to do is to measure the formalization of police management-labor relations. The study sites are not so much "labor" or "management" towns as they are more or less formal in labor-management interaction.

The impacts of police unionism on civil service roles are not direct, cause-and-effect results; in fact, no direct correlates of civil service role performance and unionism emerged from the analysis. That is not to say, however, that there were no impacts whatsoever. Two patterns of indirect effect were evident in the data:

More Formality in Police Labor-Management Relations	is related to	Less Decision-Making Authority for the Police Executive in Police Personnel Matters	is related to	More of a Regulatory Role for the Civil Service Commission
⟵⟶			⟵⟶	
More Police Union Militancy	is associated with	Less Decision-Making Authority for the City Personnel Director in Police Personnel Matters	is associated with	Less of an Adjudicative Role for the Civil Service Commission
⟵⟶			⟵⟶	

Thus, the regulatory and the adjudicative roles can feel--albeit somewhat indirectly--the weight of the local police union.

Chapter VII

CIVIL SERVICE AND POLICE PERSONNEL PROGRAMS

VII. CIVIL SERVICE AND POLICE PERSONNEL PROGRAMS

The narrative and analysis developed to this point have made quite clear the wide variations in police personnel systems in American munkcip- alities. It would hardly be implausible to suggest the same with egard to police programs and services. That is, it would be perfectly nsonant with the materials presented above to suggest that a wide variety f forces or variables are causally related to the actual administrative policies and programs of police departments and to the quality of police services delivered to local communities. Just as many factors contribute to struc- ture, so ought they to contribute to function or program.

Nevertheless, some critics have suggested that the characteristics of civil service systems are the central, if not the crucial, elements in the system and that they impact negatively on the outcomes or performance of that system. Those criticisms have been reviewed at some length in earlier chapters and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that, from the critics' perspective, civil service systems are alleged to have contributed to excessive rigidity in police administration, to the extent that police departments are unable to adopt "progressive" personnel prac- tices, to initiate innovative police programs, or to respond to changing community needs. Such critics usually assume that innovation, progres- siveness, and responsiveness in police departments lead to a higher quality of local police service; thus, by extension, civil service sys- tems are alleged depressants of high quality policing.

One of the major goals of the civil service research project was to subject as many as possible of these hypotheses to empirical testing, and thus to validate and support or to demolish them with scientific backing for that stance. The goal, in short, was to move beyond the realm of charge and countercharge to that of analysis and proof. Toward that end, a major portion of the project was dedicated to the collection of a substantial body of data on what actually exists by way of personnel pro- grams and policies in American municipal police departments. From this material over 50 variables were created to measure some aspect or charac- teristic of either police personnel programs and procedures or of police operating practices. By means of a variety of statistical procedures, these variables were juxtaposed with and tested against the civil service roles described earlier.

Technical limitations on statistical procedures due to the size of the sample generally preclude the construction and verification of sophisticated multivariate models of the police personnel field and its impact on actual policies and programs. Those limitations, however, do not preclude a focus on the effects of civil service characteristics on the program and policy outputs and to that end this chapter is devoted. For efficiency of exposition, the programmatic variables are grouped into general categories (e.g., innovation-related variables, affirmative- action-related variables, etc.); then, for each of those categories, com- putation procedures for individual variables are discussed and assess- ments of the impacts of civil service commission authority levels and role characteristics are made.

A. Civil Service Impacts on Police Personnel Programs and Practices

1. **Recruitment and Selection Programs.** Five variables were created to measure some of the highlights of extant police practices in these important functional areas. Four of those variables dealt with selection and one with recruitment.

To measure recruitment practices, each department indicated whether it used any of nine different recruiting vehicles in its search for potential recruits. Then, the total number of vehicles used was summed for each agency, to yield a measure of recruitment extensiveness. The vehicles, and summary statistics for the extensiveness measure, are listed in Table 14.

Two variables were created to measure the leniency of departments on prior arrest and conviction records possessed by police applicants: one for adult criminal records leniency and one for juvenile criminal records leniency. These variables were created by summing the number of "acceptable" clauses of each type; the clauses and the summed results are also depicted in Table 15.

Finally, the participating departments were asked to indicate how many operative selection devices (e.g., polygraph examinations, written tests, etc.) and standards (e.g., age limitations, height requirements, etc.) they used to screen applicants. Again, the relevant variables for the analysis were the summed scores for each.

	Average
Number of Standards Used	9.53 (of possible 12)
Number of Devices Used	5.76 (of possible 7)

The aspects of the recruitment and selection processes measured by these variables are related to the roles in police personnel administration played by local civil service commissions in the following ways:

a. The more a commission plays a policy formulating role, then:

   (1) the more extensive the number of recruitment procedures used ($r = .277$);

   (2) the more lenient is the selection process with regard to juvenile records ($r = .281$); and

   (3) the more lenient is the selection process with regard to adult records ($r = .286$).

b. The more a commission plays a regulatory role over other local officials' personnel-related activities, then the less extensive the set of selection standards used by the local police department ($r = -.341$).

Table 14

POLICE PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT MEASURES

Practices	Users	
	Number	Percent
Want ads in local newspapers	27	69.2
Radio, T.V. spot announcements	25	64.1
Special posters in public places (e.g., city hall, buses, etc.)	28	71.8
Requesting referrals from schools and other educational organizations	28	71.8
Requesting referrals from community organizations	23	59.0
Requesting referrals from police employees	21	53.8
Visiting college campuses	22	56.4
Using continuous examination announcements	15	38.5
Special outreach programs for minorities	28	71.8

Extensiveness (Number of Programs Used)   Average = 5.56

Table 15

ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS AND APPLICANTS

	Departments in Which Record is Acceptable	
	Number	Percent
Adult		
Moving Traffic Conviction	41	100.0
Misdemeanor Arrest, No Conviction	39	95.1
Felony Arrest, No Conviction	33	80.5
Misdemeanor Conviction	29	70.7
Felony Conviction	2	4.9

Leniency Average = 3.51

	Number	Percent
Juvenile		
Moving Traffic Conviction	40	100.0
Misdemeanor Arrest, No Conviction	39	97.5
Felony Arrest, No Conviction	30	75.0
Misdemeanor Conviction	28	70.0
Felony Conviction	10	25.0

Leniency Average = 3.68

c. The more a commission plays an adjudicative role,
   the more extensive the set of selection devices used
   by the local police department (r = .311).

These findings can be summarized in two general statements. On the one hand, where local civil service commissions are involved in actually establishing the policies and procedures which underlay the recruitment and selection processes, then the more widely will the net be cast in pursuit of police recruits. On the other hand, where commissions are limited to more regulatory and adjudicative stances, their impact is toward a less extensive set of qualification standards and toward reliance on more selection devices to select police applicants.

2. Compensation and Benefit Packages. Five variables were created to measure various aspects of the participating departments' compensation and benefits policies. Two of those five were, quite simply, the basic and the maximum attainable annual salary levels for those at the rank of sworn police officer, average values for which were $12,405 (basic) and $15,245 (maximum). The third pay-related variable was the total number of the following special pay programs which each of the participating departments have for their sworn officers.

Special Pay Provisions		
	Number of Departments Having:	Percent
Educational Incentive Pay	26	63.4
Special Assignment Pay	24	58.5
Special Performance Pay	7	17.1

The final two variables created were those measuring the extensiveness of disability benefits paid by a participating department to sworn and to civilian personnel. The variables were the simple sums of all applicable provisions among those listed in the table below.

Disability Benefits

	Yes	
	Number	Percent
For Sworn Officers		
Pays a disability premium	20	50.0
Pays salary for a period of time	34	85.0
Pays for physical rehabilitation	25	62.5
Provides occupational counseling	14	35.0
Provides psychological counseling	18	45.0
Helps find new job in department	14	35.0
Helps find new job outside of department	5	12.5

Total Average = 3.25 Benefits

103

Disability Benefits (continued)

	Yes	
	Number	Percent
For Civilian Personnel		
Pays a disability premium	19	47.5
Pays salary for a period of time	26	65.0
Pays for physical rehabilitation	18	45.0
Provides occupational counseling	11	27.5
Provides psychological counseling	12	30.0
Helps find new job in department	10	25.0
Helps find new job outside of department	4	10.0

Total Average = 2.50 Benefits

No significant correlations between compensation levels for sworn police officers or disability benefit generosity for sworn officers on the one hand and the degree of performance of any of the five civil service roles by commissions were forthcoming from the analysis. More generous disability programs for civilian police employees are associated with civil service advisory roles; the more the commission serves in that capacity, the more generous the program (r = .286). However, the strongest civil service impacts come in the area of special pay programs: the more the commission plays administrative and regulatory roles in the local police personnel field, the fewer special pay programs of the type examined will be instituted for sworn police officers (r's = -.451, -.276, respectively). Clearly, more "administrative" civil service commissions lead to more restricted pay programs in the municipal police service.

3. Citizen Complaints, Appeals, and Avenues of Redress of Grievances. Six variables were created to measure various aspects of the citizen complaint resolution process. Two measured rate of complaint filing and substantiation, two measured the formality of departmental appeals processes, and two others the extensiveness of opportunities for redress facing a police employee (either sworn or civilian).

In the departmental questionnaire, each participating police agency was asked to indicate the number of complaints against sworn police officers lodged by the general public over the past year, the number of those which were substantiated, and the number of substantiated complaints which resulted in the suspension or the dismissal of the affected officer. The citizen complaint substantiation rate was computed as the ratio of substantiated complaints to all complaints: the citizen complaint discipline rate as the ratio of complaints resulting in suspention or dismissal to the number of complaints substantiated.

From the departmental responses, it is the case that roughly 20 percent (19.3) of all citizen-based complaints against police officers are substantiated; of those, about 30 percent (31.6) result in a notable disciplinary response from the agency. In overall terms, the substantiation rate appears relatively low; as the standard deviation (14.1) indicates, most departments substantiate between 5 and 33 percent of all citizen-originated complaints. It is impossible to determine from these data whether citizens file large numbers of frivolous complaints or whether

police agencies protect their employees by failing to substantiate real police-community problems. Undoubtedly both play some role.

The variance on the disciplinary rate (standard deviation = 44.6), on the other hand, is quite high. While some departments never discipline, others do so in three-fourths of the cases where complaints are substantiated. This indicates an incredibly wide variety of actual performance patterns; some departments appear to totally disregard the complaints of the citizenry, while others are almost totally responsive.

Wherever the explanation behind the variations in these measures lies, it is not to be found in variations in civil service role characteristics. No direct impacts on either the substantiation or the disciplinary proportions were discovered in the analyses.

The appeals formality measures were additive scales. For sworn and for civilian personnel, the number of appeals provisions which were operative in each responding police department and listed below (see Table 16) were summed, and the results served as the measures used in the analyses.

The extent to which a local civil service commission plays an adjudicative role does correlate with the formality of the appeals process for civilian police employees: the more the former, the more of the latter (r = .311). However, neither that nor any other commission role is correlated with appeals formality for sworn officers.

Finally, in each department, note was made of all of the possible sources of appeal from a personnel decision which are available to an officer or to a civilian police employee. The particular listings are outlined in Table 17; again, the variables used in statistical analyses were the total number of appeals sources available to an aggrieved party.

Civil service role performance does have some impact on the extensiveness of appeals procedures, but that impact varies between the type of police employee to whom the procedures apply. For sworn officers, it is the case that the more the commission plays advisory or regulatory roles, the more extensive the appeals process (r's = .312, .304, respectively); for civilian employees, the more the commission plays an adjudicative role, the more extensive (r = .329) the appeals procedure. For both types of police department employees, the often-heard criticism would appear to hold true: civil service systems can prolong and lengthen the process of decision-making in disciplinary actions.

4. Civilianization. Civilianization has been a topic of great concern to police administrators and researchers alike for a number of years. Most observers who consider themselves "progressive" have strongly supported the movement to bring civilians further into police work than they traditionally have been. The arguments which the proponents marshal to support their preference usually revolve around the higher levels of organizational and operational effectiveness presumed to accompany higher levels of civilianization. More specifically, it is presumed that:

a. bringing civilians into police administrative and management positions will make police agencies more responsive to modern management techniques and will thus improve the organizational capacities of those agencies; and

105

Table 16

APPEAL PROVISIONS

Appeals: Sworn Officers

	Yes	
	Number	Percent
Department has formal appeals procedures	34	82.9
Employee has right to appeal and hearing	39	95.1
Employee has right to have a representative at hearing	40	97.6

Average = 2.78

Appeals: Civilian Employees

Department has formal appeals procedures	32	78.0
Employee has right to appeal and hearing	33	80.5
Employee has right to have a representative at hearing	33	82.5

Average = 2.53

Table 17

AVAILABLE AVENUES OF APPEAL

	Number of Agencies	Percent of Total
Sworn Officers' Appeals are Made to: (Check all that apply)		
Civilian Review Board	1	2.5
Departmental Review Board	14	35.0
City/County Manager	5	12.5
Civil Service Commission	26	65.0
Board of Police Commissioners	3	7.5
Central Personnel Agency	1	2.5
Mayor	4	10.0
Chief of Police	17	42.5
Other (please specify)	17	42.5
	Average = 2.16	
Civilian Employees' Appeals are Made to: (Check all that apply)		
Civilian Review	2	5.0
Departmental Review Board	5	12.5
City/County Manager	6	15.0
Civil Service Commission	20	50.0
Board of Police Commissioners	1	2.5
Central Personnel Agency	4	10.0
Mayor	2	5.0
Chief of Police	16	40.0
Other (please specify)	10	25.0
	Average = 1.59	

b. bringing civilians into paraprofessional-police
    assignments will free the sworn police officers to
    concentrate more time and energy on traditional
    crime prevention and law enforcement activities.

The immediate question for analysis is not whether civilianization
actually promotes higher levels of effectiveness or efficiency in police
agencies, but rather whether characteristics of the local civil service
commission impact significantly on the ability of a department to civilian-
ize. To answer this question, three measures of civilianization were com-
puted. The first is simply the total number of civilian paraprofes nals
employed by the responding police departments, the average of which   oss
all study sites comes to 37.2 paraprofessionals. The second measure w
the simple percentage of the total manpower available to the departments
that is civilian, the overall average on which measure amounted to 23.4
percent. The third measure was another summed score. Departments that
responded to the questionnaire were asked to indicate, for a number of po-
lice personnel functional areas or units, which were managed by civilians.
Table 18 lists the individual results by functional area and the summary
statistics for the total score.

The number of management functions directed by civilians in the
responding police agencies was unrelated to the different civil service
commission role measures, but such was not the case with the other two
civilianization variables. Where civil service boards play stronger
regulatory roles, the proportion of police manpower that is civilian is
lower ($r = -.492$); however, where commissions play more of a policy-making
role, the number of civilian paraprofessionals in the local policy agency
is higher ($r = .319$).

5. Affirmative Action. As noted earlier, some of the most heated
debate on the impact of civil service in policing has come in the area of
affirmative action. The critics have charged that civil service systems
establish recruitment and selection procedures or rules which are too
constraining to allow police departments to make selection practices re-
sponsive to the local community or to recruit innovatively or nontradi-
tionally where that might be necessary to encourage minorities and females
to apply for the job. Others claim that peer group pressures and biases
against police service by women and certain ethnic groups erodes the effi-
cacy of the most active and positive recruitment measures. Unfortunately,
the debate has all too often turned on opinion unsubstantiated by evidence.
Thus, the question to be addressed is what impact (if any) civil service
has on a police agency's affirmative action posture.

Affirmative action was measured in proportional terms; that is, a
police agency's affirmative action posture was empirically defined as the
percentage of the sworn officer complement (or of particular ranks in that
complement) that was composed of minority personnel. The same proportional
definitions were applied to the percentages that were female. The table
below displays the summary statistics for these variables.

108

Table 18

SWORN/CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT BY FUNCTIONAL AREAS

	Sworn Director		Civilian Director		No Response		Not Performed	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Personnel	26	83.9	5	16.1	4	--	7	--
Purchasing	19	76.0	6	24.0	4	--	13	--
Records	34	89.5	4	10.5	4	--	0	--
Dispatch	33	94.3	2	5.7	4	--	3	--
Budget	23	71.9	9	28.1	7	--	3	--
Training	34	94.4	2	5.6	6	--	0	--
Planning	28	84.8	5	15.2	6	--	3	--
Maintenance	15	78.9	4	21.1	3	--	20	--
EDP	9	60.0	6	40.0	3	--	24	--
Legal	5	45.5	6	54.5	5	--	26	--
Public Relations	18	81.8	4	18.2	5	--	15	--
Community Relations	31	91.2	3	8.8	4	--	4	--

Percentages of the Sworn Complements

	Minority		Female	
	Mean Percentage	Standard Deviation	Mean Percentage	Standard Deviation
Overall	7.71	7.31	2.39	2.06
Police Officers	8.95	7.87	3.02	2.97
Detectives	5.34	10.27	1.07	2.14
Sergeants	4.83	7.80	--a	--
Lieutenants	3.22	5.63	--	--

aProportions were 0.0 or so close to it that the variable could not be used for data analysis.

Civil service commissions do impact upon the affirmative action postures of urban police departments to the extent that those commissions play regulatory roles in the police personnel field. As the table below demonstrates, that impact is negative; the more significant the extent to which a commission plays a regulatory role, the smaller the female proportion of all sworn personnel and the smaller the minority proportion of all sworn personnel, of lieutenants, of sergeants, and of police officers.

Correlations Between Performance of Regulatory Role by Civil Service Body and:

Proportion of all sworn personnel that are females	-.325
Proportion of all sworn personnel that are minorities	-.334
Proportion of lieutenants that are minorities	-.473
Proportion of sergeants that are minorities	-.359
Proportion of police officers that are minorities	-.354

No other role performance measures of civil service commissions correlated with the affirmative action variables as significantly as did the regulatory role. These findings would support the contentions of critics of civil service in that the effect of a commission with a strong regulatory role in the area of affirmative action is to depress the proportions of minorities and females who find their ways into sworn positions on urban police forces. This circumstance reflects a pervasive influence of the "regulator" to inhibit or constrain other actors in the police personnel field from taking actions which may necessarily be new or non-traditional to obtain minority and female representation. These actors would harbor hesitancy about or distaste for a possible review or reversal by the "watch dogs," psychologically, leading to administrative inertia to maintain the status quo.

6. Innovative Capacity. Three variables were employed to measure both the organizational capacity for innovation and the actual record of innovations characteristic of the participating police departments. Innovative capacity was measured by the department's ability to capture state and Federal grants; both the actual number of grants received over the past five years and the total dollar value of those grants were retained

for analysis. The third measure was the total number of the innovations listed below which a participating department claimed to have tried.

Adoptions of Innovations

	Number Responding "Yes"	Percent "Yes"
Lateral Entry	2	4.9
Career Development Programs	12	28.6
Team Policing	22	52.4
Police Legal Advisors	21	50.0
4-40 Scheduling	19	45.2
Family Intervention Specialists	18	42.9

Average Number of Innovations Tried = 2.20

Where civil service commissions play stronger policy-formulating roles in police personnel affairs, both the number of innovations tried and the number of grants received tend to be higher (r's = .345, .284, respectively). Strong adjudicative roles for the commission lead to the same result with regard to innovations (r = .341). Thus, the evidence available disconfirms the hypothesis that civil service commissions stultify police departmental innovation; in fact, quite the contrary emerges from these correlations.

7. __Career Development and Enrichment__. Much has been written of the need to develop a conscious spirit of careerism among police officers in the United States, and many programs and policies to satisfy that need have been suggested by observers of the police scene. However, instituting such programs usually requires a degree of experimentation, which their critics say civil service systems discourage. Thus, the question for examination is, do civil service systems impact on the conditions in or the practices of municipal police departments with regard to career development and enrichment.

Nine dependent variables were employed to serve as measures of the degree to which the participating departments are promotive of career development for their personnel. Three of those deal with actual career development programs; four others with departmental conditions conducive to the promotion of careerism; and two others are probably best considered correlates or indicators of careerism.

a. __Career-Related Programs__. Three variables measured various types or aspects of active career development programming in the study sites. The first was, quite simply, the average number of hours per year spent by sworn police officers in in-service training activities (average = 55.90 hours). The second variable was the total number of the career development programs listed below instituted by each of the participating departments.

Career Development Mechanisms

	Yes	
	Number	Percent
Formalized job rotation designed to broaden an employee's experience	15	37.5
Personnel exchange programs with other police departments or agencies	6	15.0
Special assignments into jobs or positions that have career value	20	50.0
Provisions for leaves of absence that allow employees to pursue education or temporary employment experience in other agencies	21	52.5

Average Number of Programs per Agency = 1.55

The third measure was based on the educational incentive plans listed in Table 19. Each department was awarded 2 points for every educational policy it was presently operating, 1 for policies once adopted but later terminated, and 0 for policies never adopted. The summed score of each department across all of those programs was the actual variable used in the analyses.

Civil service role performance levels correlate significantly with neither in-service training hours nor numbers of career development programs adopted; such is not the case, however, with regard to educational incentive programming. Lower scores on the educational incentive scale are the case where local civil service commissions play stronger administrative ($r = -.429$), regulatory ($r = -.304$), and especially policy-formulating roles ($r = -.554$). It was quite clear that civil service bodies play serious constraining roles on the adoption and retention by urban police departments of educational incentive program.

b. Career-Related Conditions. Above and beyond immediate programs designed to foster career development, police departments are subject to a variety of conditions which are indirectly relevant to that same area. It is quite plausible to expect that departments with diverse operational responsibilities, with more elaborate functional structures, and with more promotional possibilities would foster more career opportunities for their sworn officer cadres. Thus, the question becomes one of the impact of local civil service systems on these career-related departmental conditions.

Four variables were used in the attempt to answer that question. The first was a measure of functional extensiveness, computed by summing the total number of functions of those listed below, performed by the participating departments.

Table 19

EDUCATIONAL INCENTIVE PLANS

	Adopted and Being Used		Adopted, Later Terminated		Never Adopted	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Adjusting schedules to facilitate class attendance	26	63.4	4	9.8	11	26.8
Allowing time off to attend class	9	22.5	4	10.0	27	67.5
Departmental subsidies for books and tuition	17	42.5	3	7.5	20	50.0
Increased pay based upon accumulated college credits or academic degree(s)	24	60.0	1	2.5	15	37.5
Using academic education as part of the basis for promotions	11	28.2	0	0.0	28	71.8

Overall average score = 4.47 plans

Functional Extensiveness

Function	Number of Departments Performing	Percent of All Departments Responding
Training	41	100.0
Planning	37	92.5
Maintenance	20	50.0
Electronic Data Processing	17	41.5
Legal Advice	14	35.0
Public Relations	25	62.5
Community Relations	37	90.2
Personnel	34	82.9
Purchasing	27	67.5
Records	41	100.0
Dispatch	38	92.7
Budgeting	36	92.3

Average Number of Functions
Performed per Department = 8.98

The second was a measure of span of control, calculated as the ratio in each participating department of the number of sworn police officers per each front-line supervisor (corporals and sergeants). The third variable created was termed the "opportunity structure" in the department, defined as the ratio of all sworn positions above the basic police officer rank to all sworn officer positions, and it describes the relative upward mobility potential for each sworn officer. The fourth variable created was termed the diversity structure ratio. It measures the lateral mobility potential of an officer in each department by comparing the number of nonpatrol positions in the department to the number of patrol positions. (The table below depicts the average proportions of the sworn force in each of a series of assignments.)

Average Percentages of Sworn Force in Divisions

	Percent
Administration (staff and general management)	5.9
Traffic	6.0
Juvenile	3.9
Street Patrol	66.0
Other Patrol	2.4
Criminal Investigation	14.8
Community Relations	1.1

None of the civil service role performance measures correlated significantly with either the span of control or the diversity structure variables. Regulatory civil service roles and organizational extensiveness are correlated; the more significant the former, the less the latter ($r = -.292$). By far, however, the strongest impacts of civil service make themselves felt on the opportunity structure. All five role performance measures correlate negatively with the opportunity structure, and four of

those attain statistical significance. That is, the opportunity structure of the local police department will be narrower according to how strongly the local civil service commission plays an advisory (r = -.377), an administrative (r = -.425), an adjudicative (r = -.313), or a policy-formulating role (r = -.320) in the local police personnel administrative field.

Despite the strength of those statistics, the substantive meaning which should be attached to them is not unambiguous. Wider opportunity structures, which imply more promotional opportunities for a police officer and thus may be quite desirable from a career development perspective, also imply relatively "rank heavy" departments which may be quite undesirable from an administrative or fiscal standpoint. Depending on the perspective adopted, the interpretation of these correlations can very legitimately be either substantively positive or negative.

c. __Career-Related Indicators.__ Data were also collected which facilitated the calculation of net attrition rates of both sworn and civilian employees in each of the participating agencies for the year prior to administration of the questionnaire. These variables seem best treated as indicators of the lack of career-perspectives, since higher attrition rates mean police employees are not remaining in the responding agencies for periods of time sufficient to construct meaningful career paths. However, little more need be said about these, since neither correlated significantly with any of the civil service role performance measures.

8. __Performance Appraisal.__ Finally, one variable was created to measure the extent to which the participating police departments employed formal performance appraisal systems in assessing their sworn police personnel. More specifically, each department was given one point if it used such appraisals for each of its recruits, its police officers, and its ranking officers. That measure was correlated with civil service performance of an adjudicative role (r = .337); the more such a role is played, the more widely performance appraisals are used in the responding agencies.

B. Summary

In the preceding pages, primary attention has been focused upon the impacts of civil service commission activities on individual police personnel practices and programs. Many of those individual program effects are interesting in their own right; each of them speaks to a matter of legitimate concern for police scholars and practitioners. However, recognizing that the whole is often more than the sum of its parts, it remains necessary to attempt to come to a more general assessment of the impacts of civil service boards on police personnel operations.

Table 20 provides material relevant to that task, in that it recaps the notable correlates[70] of civil service performance of various roles in the police personnel field.

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[70]The entries in the table are stated in relatively stark "yes-no" terms to highlight the correlates of role performance. Entries of "yes" mean that strong performance of a given role is positively correlated with the program variable as printed in the column. Entries of "no" imply negative correlations; strong role performance is associated with the reverse of the printed program measure. Empty cells designate a lack of statistically significant correlations.

CONTINUED

2 OF 3

Table 20

CIVIL SERVICE ROLES IN RELATION TO SELECTED POLICE PERSONNEL PRACTICES

Practices	Advisory	Administrative	Regulatory	Adjudicative	Policy Formulating
Associated With:					
More civilian paraprofessional					Yes
Higher proportions of civilian police employees			No		
Higher proportions of female or minority officers			No		
More attempted field innovations				Yes	Yes
More grants received					Yes
More special pay programs		No	No		
More educational incentive programs		No	No		No
Wider opportunity structures	No	No		No	No
More extensive recruiting					Yes
More leniency on recruits' prior criminal records					Yes
Less extensive sets of selection standards			Yes		
Less extensive sets of selection devices				No	
Wider use of performance appraisals				Yes	
More functionally elaborate police organizations			No		
More compact sworn officer appeals systems	No		No		

116

As the table demonstrates, civil service commissions whose roles are primarily advisory have almost no impact on actual police personnel practices. Perhaps the lack of impact is inherent in the very role itself; the police personnel field is a complicated one which includes many authoritative or otherwise influential individuals and groups. In such a context, an advisor who does not possess the authority to implement his or her suggestions can probably not very realistically hope to see many of them become reality.

A commission whose forte is the administration of routine personnel operations has, with one notable exception, a similar lack of impact. The exception, however, is an important one. In the area of career development planning and programming, administrative commissions are obstacles to be overcome rather than allies to be joined. This may be attributable to their citywide responsibility and authority.

Regulatory commissions share with their administrative counterparts the negative impact on the police career development area. They further compound that, however, by adding negative impacts on the civilianization and the affirmative action program areas. If there is any type of civil service commission which exemplifies the problems cited by the critics, it is this one.

Adjudicative commissions are mixed in their impacts. To their credit, they promote field innovations and the use of formal performance appraisals. However, like their counterparts, they are inhibiting when it comes to building wide opportunity structures.

Policy-formulating commissions fare no better in the career development area, but are otherwise quite positive in their effects on "progressive" police personnel operations. They promote civilianization and innovation, and are generally associated with more wide-ranging, less restrictive recruitment and selection procedures. Again (excepting the career area) where civil service commissions can actually set personnel policies, they opt for those that commentators have generally labelled as progressive.

There is no simple, catch-all phrase that can adequately summarize the effects of civil service commissions on police personnel programs and operating practices. The narrative and analysis presented in this chapter show that the effects on police activities of civil service commissions may be positive, negative, or nonexistent. In a very real sense, they are in an intricate network of impacts which reflect on interplay between given types of civil service roles and specific issues. They are no all of uniform force nor incidence. Within this context there are these general tendencies evident from the data:

> On balance, the policy-formulating role of civil service commissions serves as a positive force on certain important aspects of police work. Conversely, the regulatory role would appear to have an inhibiting effect on several aspects of police administration.

Thus, the critics of civil service are both right and wrong. There is evidence that their criticisms are well made when applied to regulatory commissions. There is, however, contrary evidence to the application of these criticisms to policy-formulating commissions.

There is one area where the criticisms may be justified, namely, the largely negative impact of civil service commissions on police career development programs. From the findings presented earlier, such a general criticism is substantiated with varying degrees of strength in each of the civil service role contexts examined.

In many ways, the issue of career development goes beyond the confines of the city police department. From a practical standpoint, a civil service commission operating a citywide personnel system must consider whether the adoption of such programs as educational and pay incentives should be limited to a department or extended to all city employees. Balancing considerations of equity in extending or limiting these incentives and of financial impact are likely to be concurrent deterrents.

Chapter VIII

CIVIL SERVICE AND THE QUALITY OF POLICE PERFORMANCE

VIII.   CIVIL SERVICE AND THE QUALITY OF POLICE PERFORMANCE

The bulk of the criticisms of civil service in the police personnel context have generally been levelled at its alleged depressant effect on the quality of personnel administration. For that reason, much effort has been expended by the civil service research project in a search for empirical verification or disconfirmation of civil service impacts on police personnel practices and programs. There is an inherent validity to this search; many of the programs examined in earlier pages are interesting and important in their own right and thus fully deserving of sustained attention and analysis.

Nevertheless, one can push analysis of those practices one further logical step. In an era of governmental retrenchment and revenue limitation, the inherent merits of administrative innovations or field experiments are not always sufficient as justifications for the effort and expense necessary to bring them about. One can very appropriately ask whether those programs contribute to a better quality of delivered services and seek their justification on such grounds. In the context of this project, the question can be rephrased as: do civil service systems contribute to high quality police service, either directly through their own activities or indirectly through their impacts on quality-related field experiments or personnel practices?

Operationalizing the notion of "quality" is no simple task; there is a good deal of disagreement in the literature about the optimal theoretical concepts, measures, and methodologies best brought to bear on the task. However, most researchers would probably agree that the ideas of efficiency and effectiveness are, at the very least, relevant to the topic of quality. In fact, most policing programs and practices are implemented with the goal of improving departmental performance on one or the other (or both) of these indicators.

The literature[71] provides clear and appropriate definitions for both of these concepts, as follows:

Effectiveness = Output per Unit of Input, or

$$\frac{Output}{Input}$$

Efficiency = Output per Unit or Input per Organizational Operating Unit, or

$$\frac{\frac{Output}{Input}}{Organizational\ Operating\ Unit}$$

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[71]For a detailed explanation of the definitions, see Skogan, Wesley G., "Efficiency and Effectiveness in Big City Police Departments," Public Administration Review, No. 3, May/June, 1976). For a more conceptual approach to the problem of measuring the quality of police service, see Ostrom, Elinor, "On the Meaning and Measurement of Output and Efficiency in the Provision of Police Services," Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 1, Summer, 1973).

In less formal terms, effectiveness is defined as "getting the job done"; efficiency as getting it done with less expenditure of effort.

Selecting data for the inputs and outputs is the major methodological dilemma in any analysis of police service quality. It is quite clear that municipal police departments perform a variety of roles; they attempt to prevent crime; when that fails, they are expected to apprehend the criminals; and, on top of that, they are summoned to provide a host of social services, many of which are only very tenuously related to crime prevention and law enforcement. In other words, outputs abound, and they are triggered by an equally wide variety of inputs.

While it is quite obvious that municipal police departments do far more than simply apprehend criminals, it is nevertheless true that this function is one of their basic reasons for existence. Thus, it is not unfair to assess efficiency and effectiveness in terms of crimes solved and/or criminals apprehended; how well other services are provided by the police matters relatively little if they cannot perform this basic task. For purposes of analysis, input is defined as number of crimes known to the police,[72] output as number of arrests made, and organizational operating units as the personnel who staff those departments.

Simple algebraic transformations of the above conceptual definitions yield the following two equations:

Output = (Input) Effectiveness
Output = (Input) (Organizational Operating Unit) Efficiency

In this form, the equations are amenable to the application of linear regression statistical techniques to estimate mathematical values for effectiveness and efficiency, which are the remaining unknown factors. The results of this procedure will then yield the complete equations for lines which best fit the distribution of the available data. The distance of the actual units of analysis from their positions as predicted by these equations (the regression residuals) can then be used as actual measures of effectiveness and efficiency for each of the departments participating in the study. In this project, the regressions were calculated for each of the seven Part I crime types (and arrests) as well as for the total Part I crimes (and arrests), using data collected for 1976.

Which personnel programs and practices are associated with higher levels of police effectiveness and efficiency? All of the practices measures collected during the course of the project were correlated with the measures of effectiveness and efficiency, in the search for an answer to that query. Table 21 presents the program correlates that achieved statistical significance.

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[72] Using reported crime rates as measures of input is a fair procedure, in that police departments cannot very well be expected to respond to events of which they have no knowledge. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that reported crime rates are reasonably good indicators of actual levels of victimization. See Decker, Scott H., "Official Crime Rates and Victim Surveys: An Empirical Comparison," Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 5, Number 1, Spring, 1977.

Table 82
CORRELATES OF POLICE EFFECTIVENESS

	Effectiveness in Apprehensions							
	Homicide	Rape	Robbery	Assault	Burglary	Larceny	Auto Theft	All Part I Crimes
Proportion Female of All Sworn Personnel	....	....	.392	....	....	....	.531	....
Proportion Female of All Police Officers	....	....	.405	....	....	....	.506	....
Proportion Female of All Detectives	....	.307	.363	.316	.358	....	.478	.355
Proportion Minority of All Sworn Personnel	....	.377	.379	.264	....	....	.488	.322
Proportion Minority of All Police Officers	....	.260	.293	....	....	....	.372	.298
Proportion Minority of All Detectives	.340	.473	.416	.278	....	.252	.415	....
Proportion Minority of All Sergeants	....	.416	.537	.269	.388	....	.773	.292
Proportion Minority of All Lieutenants	....	.314	....	....	....	....	.397	....
Dollar Amounts of Federal and State Grants Received	.382	.432	....	....	....	....	....	.307
Number of Civilian Paraprofessionals	-.657	....	....	....	....	....	.312	....
Diversity Structure	....	....	....	....	....	-.309	....	-.273
Minimum Police Officer Salary	-.311	-.391	....	....	-.391	-.270	....	....
Maximum Police Officer Salary	....	-.396	....	....	-.349	....	....	....
More Extensive Selection Devices	....	-.290	....	-.283	....	....	....	....

121

Clearest and most significant of any of the relationships between police effectiveness and personnel program matters are the findings relevant to affirmative action. Apprehension effectiveness for almost any type of major crime is higher in the police department that includes larger proportions of females and minorities among its various ranks and positions. This is especially the case with regard to detectives and (among minorities) sergeants. While the detailed dynamics behind these coefficients cannot be specified from the available data, it is nevertheless the case that opening police ranks to minorities and women has a very desirable effect on the quality of local police performance.

The same general conclusion can be inferred with regard to grant receipts. The effects are not as general or wide-ranging as they were for the affirmative action area, but then again many of the Federal and state law enforcement grants have been more or less tailored to specific program activities. In any event, apprehension effectiveness is higher where police departments have garnered more Federal and state financial support.

The correlations on civilian paraprofessionals present, on surface inspection, something of a paradox; larger numbers of them are simultaneously related to more auto theft effectiveness and less homicide effectiveness. These findings, however, are not very mysterious if one views them in the light of reasonable expectations. The correlations suggest that civilians cannot substitute for sworn officers in the field of homicide investigation and apprehension, where experience plays a crucial role in what often becomes a very tense situation. On the other hand, when so many auto thefts are committed annually, departments can achieve "economies of scale" by turning to paraprofessionals for support.

Where they are relevant at all, wider departmental diversity structures and higher police officer salaries carry negative connotations for police departmental effectiveness. Of course, these findings should not be read to indicate that police departments that impoverish their officers and put them all on patrol will be the most effective; there are obvious limitations to such a policy prescription. Rather, the correlations suggest the appropriateness of a threshold analysis. Any organization--police departments included--needs to provide for the performance of support and auxiliary functions. By the same token, any employee--police officers included--needs to earn enough of a salary to supply himself and his dependents with their material needs. What the correlations in the above table suggest is that moving far beyond these threshold levels is not accompanied by similar increases in organizational effectiveness; in fact, it demonstrates quite the reverse. Wider diversity structures and higher police officer salaries may be intrinsically justifiable, or they may promote other program or policy goals, but moving beyond those thresholds will not promote police departmental effectiveness in the criminal apprehension area.

It is a bit more difficult to explain the negative correlation between the number of recruit selection devices employed by a department and police apprehension effectiveness. The independent variable may be serving as a measure of the bureaucratic elaboration so widely castigated by the critics of civil service; in that instance, their criticisms should be accorded a more serious hearing, for elaboration in selection appears counterproductive with regard to performance quality.

Table 22 depicts the results for a similar correlational analysis, with levels of police efficiency serving as the dependent variables. The

Table 22

CORRELATES OF POLICE EFFICIENCY

	Efficiency in Apprehensions							
	Homicide	Rape	Robbery	Assault	Burglary	Larceny	Auto Theft	All Part I Crimes
Proportion Female of All Sworn Personnel	....	....	.423	....	....	....	.526	....
Proportion Female of All Police Officers	....	....	.420	....	....	....	.508	....
Proportion Female of All Detectives	.259	.373	.346	.428	.368	.341	.446	.268
Proportion Minority of All Sworn Personnel	.514	.546	.502	....	.322	....	.486	....
Proportion Minority of All Police Officers	.370	.365	.412	....	....	....	.364	....
Proportion Minority of All Detectives	.182	.497	.517	....	....	....	.424	....
Proportion Minority of All Sergeants	.315	.463	.575	.308	.454	....	.752	.278
Proportion Minority of All Lieutenants	....	.307	....	....	....	....	.349	....
Dollar Amounts of Federal and State Grants Received	.501	.520	.390	....	....	....	....	....
Innovations Tried	.297	....	.338	....	.263	....	.359	.371
Extensiveness of Use of Formal Performance Appraisals	....	....	....	.301	....	.383	....	.346
Number of Civilian Paraprofessionals	-.318	-.314	....	....	....	....	.271	....
Police Officer Minimum Salary	-.293	-.380	....	....	-.421	....	....	-.273
Police Officer Maximum Salary	....	-.306	....	....	-.307	....	....	....

123

The results with regard to affirmative action postures, grant receipts, the employment of civilian paraprofessionals, and police officer salary levels are so similar to those found in the effectiveness table that they need not be discussed again.

Two new variables do make an appearance in this table: the extensiveness of the use of formal performance appraisal mechanisms and the use of field innovations and experiments. Both relate to various efficiency variables, and both relate positively; the more of either of innovations or appraisals, the higher the efficiency scores. The finding on innovations is supportive of the earlier finding on the amount of grants received; innovation is worth it, at least in terms of efficiency. So is wide use of the performance appraisal mechanism; results-oriented evaluations of as many sworn employees as possible go hand in hand with more efficient departmental performance in selected areas of criminal apprehension.

A. Effects of the Civil Service System

Do the powers or the activities of civil service commissions relate in any systematic way to police departmental effectiveness or efficiency? The answer would appear to be "no" on the one hand and "yes" on the other, as Table 23 demonstrates.

It is difficult to infer anything of a general nature with regard to the effects of civil service on police effectiveness. The signs of the correlations shown in that section of the table are consistent in neither location nor direction. That is not to say that there are no effects; rather, it seems most fair to suggest that effects are highly specific to particular departmental activities and particular civil service characteristics, and that they form no overall pattern.

However, such is clearly not the case with regard to police departmental efficiency. The degree to which a civil service commission carries out an advisory, a regulatory, or an administrative role is statistically unrelated to any measure of efficiency examined in the table. The policy-formulating role fares little better. Where relationships are significant they are positive; the more the role is played, the more efficient the department, especially in terms of overall apprehension performance. However, those relationships are relatively few and far between and do not appear to permit strong generalization.

The adjudicative role quite obviously stands out from the various correlations depicted in the table; the stronger the degree to which it is performed by the civil service commission, the more efficient the police department in virtually every apprehension category. However, despite the clarity and consistency of that column of correlations, one should not leap to a conclusion from them alone. Other factors may be intervening between civil service roles and performance output measured to account for those positive relationships.

For example, in Chapter VII it was demonstrated that adjudicative civil service roles are positively related both to the wider adoption of field innovations and to the wider use of performance appraisals. Since both of those measures correlate positively with overall police departmental efficiency, it would not be implausible to suggest that the adjudication/efficiency relationship is the simple result of this program impact. That suggestion is supported by data analysis; correlations between the adjudicative role and overall efficiency remain positive after

124

Table 23

CORRELATIONS: CIVIL SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

	Civil Service Commission Formal Decision-Making Authority	Civil Service Variables						Generalized Role Orientations	
		Individual Role Performance							
		Advisory	Adminis- trative	Regulatory	Adjudi- cative	Policy Formulating		Adminis- trative	Adjudi- cative
Effectiveness									
Homicide	....	....	....	....	....	-.343		....	....
Assault	....	-.246	-.349	....	....	....		-.331	....
Larceny	.271	....	....	....	.293	....		....	.273
Overall	....	....	....	....	....	.263		....	....
Efficiency									
Homicide	....	....	....	....	.328	....		....	.321
Robbery	....	....	....	....	.323	....		....	.316
Assault	....	....	....	....	.344	.257		....	.329
Larceny	....	....	....	....	.342	....		....	.334
Auto Theft	....	....	....	....	.260	....		....	....
Overall	.271	....	....	....	.366	.383		....	.375

innovation attempts and appraisal effectiveness are controlled (r's = .284, .282, respectively), but not at a level sufficient to attain conventional statistical significance. Thus, the impacts of the adjudicative role are more accurately considered indirect relationships; strong adjudicative commissions promote certa'. program outputs, which lead to particular performance results.

One need not limit discussion of indirect impacts solely to the adjudicative role; others are components of similar processes as well. Table 24 duplicates the civil service - police program findings presented earlier; superimposed are indications of which of those programs and practices relate in turn to the quality of local police performance in the area of apprehension. That is, the boxed entries in the table indicate that the personnel practice as listed in the margin of the table are related to higher levels of police effectiveness or efficiency or both.

The table does not change the essential nature of any of the findings with regard to civil service roles that were presented in Chapter VII. It does, however, provide further emphasis to many of them, in that it links programs to performance. For example, the regulatory role has already been shown to constrain the ability of police departments to attract increasing proportions of female and minority officers; that problem is further compounded by the fact that more females and/or minority sworn police relate to more departmental effectiveness and efficiency. Similarly, the fact that policy-formulating commissions promote more field innovations is a finding made even more important by the fact that more innovations are related (positively) to more departmental efficiency.

Again, one need not minimize the effects of civil service roles on particular police personnel practices simply because the latter have no relationship to the quality of police performance. Many programs and practices are inherently important and should be treated as such. Rather what the table above suggests is that regulatory commissions earn double indictments and policy-formulating commissions double praise through their impacts on performance-related personnel programs.

B. Summary

Civil service system impacts on efficiency and effectiveness in criminal apprehension are, on balance, few and far between. Where they do emerge from the analyses, they emerge as indirect effects. More specifically,

- regulatory commissions indirectly constrain police effectiveness and efficiency by inhibiting the inclusion of females and minorities in sworn positions;

- policy-formulating commissions indirectly promote police effectiveness and efficiency by promoting civilianization, grant-seeking, and adoption of innovations; and

- adjudicative commissions are mixed in their impacts, promoting more efficiency and effectiveness by promoting adoption of innovations and wider use of performance appraisals but constraining it by promoting the use of more extensive sets of selection devices in their search for police recruits.

126

Table 24

CIVIL SERVICE ROLES, SELECTED POLICE PERSONNEL PRACTICES, AND
LEVELS OF POLICE PERFORMANCE

Practices		Civil Service Roles			
	Advisory	Adminis-trative	Regulatory	Adjudi-cative	Policy Formulating
Associated With:					
More civilian paraprofessionals					(Yes)a/
Higher proportions of civilian public employees			No		
Higher proportions of female, minority officers			No		
More attempted field innovations				Yes	Yes
More grants received					Yes
More special pay programs		No	No		
More educational incentive programs		No	No		No
Wider opportunity structures	No	No		No	No
More extensive recruiting					Yes
More leniency on recruits' prior criminal records					Yes
Less extensive sets of selection standards			Yes		
Less extensive sets of selection devices				No	
Wider use of performance appraisals				Yes	
More functionally elaborate police organizations					
More compact sworn officer appeals systems	No		No		

a/ It will be recalled from earlier that the impact of civilianization on the quality of police performance varied, depending on which apprehension category was under investigation.

127

Such patterns of effects suggest that contemporary civil service reformers are mistaken to expect quantum leaps in police departmental performance resulting from systems changes. Rather, system change will impact upon programs, which will in turn affect performance quality by local police departments in the area of criminal apprehension.

Chapter IX

MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

IX. MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

It is not at all difficult, when confronting a study of the scope of this one, to become engrossed in the development of one of its many component topics. To do so is by no means improper; each has a theoretical and a practical importance independent of the others. Nevertheless, the overall context must not be completely lost in the process. Individual topics and findings are small elements of larger, more complex social realities. Thus, it is time to face the task of weaving together civil service laws, urban police personnel actors, and police departmental programs to form a more generalized view of the overall system.

A.   The Legislative Process and the Law

The legislative process and the laws and statutes which emanate from it have not demonstrated any significant flexibility in expanding or modifying the legal framework of civil service systems to accommodate emerging political and social forces. Although there is still a civil service "core" evident in the laws underlying existing systems, the legislative trend has clearly been toward a displacement of the original legal basis of civil service systems. The legislative process seems predicated on the assumption that older civil service laws should be retained in the event of a resurfacing of the forces they originally sought to correct. But the contemporary concerns--be they police unionism, equal employment opportunity and affirmative action, training and career development, or any of a host of others--are addressed by new legislation, new programs, and new monitoring or enforcement mechanisms and organisms. There is little evidence that these trends will change or diminish in the future. Indeed, they probably cannot change, since civil service law is the result of this block on block political process. While the law cannot be ignored, neither can it be made the exclusive, all-embracing instrument for civil service reform.

B.   No Typical Civil Service System

The very phrase "civil service law" implies a common body of principles which provides the framework for a common body of personnel practices in every location in which it is applicable. While there may be a common core of civil service legal provisions, there is no such commonality around the actual chores and duties of civil service commissions. To put it bluntly, there is no such thing as a "typical" civil service system; the myth of its existence well deserves to be put to rest. Civil service commissions come in all sizes, shapes, and varieties; some cover virtually every step in the process of police personnel administration, while others are quite dormant. Some are sources of much controversy and consternation; others are quite meek and accommodating.

There are probably three major reasons behind this wide diversity. The first is that civil service systems--like any other social systems-- cannot exist for any long period of time in one-to-one correspondence with the laws that created them. The laws can articulate quite well a set of principles and ideals; the systems must work with human beings in all their eccentricities. In many instances, what is in the civil service law is not what an observer sees practiced in a functioning police personnel system.

That is not to say that anyone is intentionally violating the law. Rather,
it means that civil service systems must always emerge as adaptations of
the law to specific local concerns.

Further complication is added by the fact that civil service com-
missions are generally not the only local actors who wield decision-making
authority over police personnel affairs. They must find their niche in
relation to personnel directors, mayors, police chiefs, city managers, and
a score of other local actors, all of whom are to some extent responsible
for the conduct of local police personnel affairs. In fact, in any given
jurisdiction, the civil service arrangements and dynamics are less of an
intentionally created "system" and more of a "field" or an adaptational
result of a complex interplay between local authorities.

A final reason for the diversity of actual civil service systems
undoubtedly lies in the complexity of the larger urban systems in which they
are embedded. Two major aspects of that complexity can be discovered in the
local political culture and in the growing impact of police officer unions.
The former aggregates the interests of a wide variety of local business
leaders, political parties, neighborhood and ethnic groups, and a host of
others and communicates those interests to formal decision-makers from
whom some response is expected, if not actually demanded. The latter--
unionism--is a relatively new force on the scene, which to date has strongly
resembled in style and activity the development of its counterparts in the
private sector of the economy. Nevertheless, the future of police unions
and of their impacts on civil service systems remains very much an open
question.

C. Roles of Civil Service Commissions

The diversity in actual practices notwithstanding, one can glean a
deeper understanding of the dynamics of civil service systems in local po-
lice personnel affairs by turning to the more generalized concept of role.
Five roles for civil service commissions were identified and examined in
the study:

- formulator of local police personnel policy;

- adjudicator of employees' appeals of personnel decisions;

- administrator of routine personnel operations;

- advisor to the city administration on personnel affairs;
  and

- regulator of the personnel policies and practices of other
  city agencies.

While the adjudicative role is the one most often and most consistently
attributed to the civil service commission by knowledgeable local infor-
mants, a more crucial finding emerges from the analysis of commission roles.
Civil service commissions emerge from the data as systems entrepreneurs:
the more formal decision-making authority enjoyed by the commission, the
more it plays all five of those roles.

130

1. **Hierarchy of Roles in Relation to Impacts.** Had these roles no relationships to the programs and practices of local police departments, they would be little more than a research curiosity. However, such is not the case. In fact, as measured by desirable impacts on police personnel policies, programs, and performance, there is a discernible hierarchy of roles played by civil service commissions or personnel boards. These are as follows:

    a. **Policy-Formulation Role.** This role of exercising or participating in the formulation of personnel policies provides the most consistent evidence of desirable impacts on police personnel programs and practices and, indirectly, on the quality of police performance.

    b. **Adjudicative Role.** This appellate role provides both positive and negative impacts on police personnel functions. In a sense, this is a vestigial refuge of civil service commissions which have relinquished functions to police or professional urban administrators: the more vigorous or authoritative such officers are, the more are commissions restricted to this role.

    c. **Administrative and Advisory Roles.** These roles are relatively neutral in terms of impacts on police personnel matters. This is quite evident with respect to the advisory role in that even if a commission's advice is followed, the decision (if made) and the action (if taken) is by or under the auspices of another office or officer. The administrative role, as an administrative "housekeeping" function, tends to be located in an appropriate or convenient functional location. An interesting exception to this is the presence of an authoritative mayor, a circumstance which tends to favor administrating commissions and weakened personnel directors.

    d. **Regulatory Role.** This role of monitor, reviewer, and regulator of decisions and actions taken by others has inhibiting and negative effects on many police personnel policies, programs, and practices.

The importance of impacts such as these stems from two sources. On the one hand, performance of a given role by a civil service commission may retard or inhibit initiation of a program necessary, worthwhile, or otherwise beneficial in its own right. At the same time, however, that program may hold implications for the quality of local police services. In that case, it must be said that the civil service commission has impacts on performance as well. The clearest example of this situation can be seen in the negative effect exerted by the regulatory role on a police department's affirmative action posture, a finding sufficiently weighty to merit some changes or reforms on its own. It should be noted in addition, however, that affirmative action postures are positively related to police effectiveness and police efficiency; in being so, they inject a powerful results-oriented motivation for change into the process of local police reform.

D. An Approach to Civil Service Reform

Any approach to civil service reform must take into account several circumstances: (1) the competitive, shifting, and diverse local settings in which most civil service commissions operate; (2) their tendency to be either entrepreneurial or expansive with respect to performing personnel functions or to enter a stage of desuetude or passivity; (3) the hierarchy of good, mixed, neutral, and negative impacts that certain of their roles have on police personnel programs and services; and (4) assuming the presence of an established civil service commission or personnel board, the undesirability of a body which does almost all or, conversely, almost none of the personnel functions. This combination of circumstances suggests several necessary components for efforts to change or reform civil service and its impacts on urban police:

1. A broad generalized program which is aimed at all or most urban civil service systems, involving uniform incentives and strategies, will meet with only partial success and indeed may disturb arrangements in certain localities which are operating satisfactorily.

2. Similarly, a program aimed at the progressive elimination of civil service commissions and the assumption of their vestigial functions by other offices or officers is in most jurisdictions an organic change requiring broad political support. This is not to say that a premium should be placed on the retention of civil service commissions; rather, it is meant to suggest that except where civil service commissions are established by state laws, basic changes involving their elimination or major reformation tend to enter the domain of local political interests and not uncommonly require local electoral support.

3. As mentioned earlier, certain civil service roles impact directly on police practices and programs; some positively and some negatively. The accompanying table illustrates these positive and negative impacts of each of the civil service roles on selected personnel practices of local police departments. These impacts, in turn, redound into the sphere of police effectiveness and efficiency in the following ways:

    a. Regulatory commissions, by inhibiting the inclusion of females and minorities in sworn positions, indirectly constrain police effectiveness and efficiency.

    b. Policy-formulating commissions, by promoting civilianization, grant-seeking, and adoption of innovations, indirectly promote police effectiveness and efficiency.

    c. Adjudicative commissions are mixed in their impacts; by encouraging adoption of innovations and the wider use of performance appraisals, they promote police effectiveness and efficiency; by promoting the use of more extensive sets of selection devices in their search for police recruits, they constrain police effectiveness and efficiency.

132

Table 25

IMPACT OF CIVIL SERVICE ROLES
ON SELECTED POLICE PERSONNEL PRACTICES

Practices	Civil Service Roles				
	Advisory	Adminis-trative	Regula-tory	Adjudi-cative	Policy Formula-ting
Associated with:					
More civilian paraprofessional					Positive
Higher proportions of civilian police employees			Negative		
Higher proportions of female, minority officers			Negative		
More attempted field innovations				Positive	Positive
More grants received					Positive
More special pay programs		Negative	Negative		
More educational incentive programs		Negative	Negative		Negative
Wider opportunity structures	Negative	Negative		Negative	Negative
More extensive recruiting					Positive
More leniency on recruits' prior criminal records					Positive
Less extensive sets of selection standards			Positive		

Table 25 (continued)

Practices	Civil Service Roles				
	Advisory	Administrative	Regulatory	Adjudicative	Policy Formulating
Less extensive sets of selection devices				Negative	
Wider use of performance appraisals				Positive	
More functionally elaborate police organizations			Negative		
More compact sworn officer appeals systems	Negative		Negative		

134

1. A Reform Strategy. The foregoing point clearly to the soundness of exercising a degree of discretion in efforts to foster civil service reform. Certainly, it is desirable to lead commissions toward the policy-formulating role, and incentives for this purpose should indirectly impact on better police effectiveness and efficiency.

The reform posture regarding the adjudicative role should be quite selective. In certain local settings, the movement of a commission towards this role is often a symptom of a strengthened urban or police executive. If the adjudicative role is exercised judiciously, it does have program impacts which are positive and salutary. On the other hand, it might tend to foster a defensive attitude or extreme caution among other actors in the local personnel arena. In that instance, it would clearly be counterproductive to encourage the perpetuation of the adjudicative role.

At the other extreme, disincentives should be utilized with respect to commissions exercising the regulatory role, or alternatively incentives to relinquish or sharply reduce its exercise. At the other extreme, disincentives should be utilized in order to encourage commissions to relinquish or sharply reduce their exercise of the regulatory role.

As mentioned earlier in the report, the administrative role tends to follow the exercise of other roles. Any reform of this role should involve consideration of the style and arrangements for administrative management in a given jurisdiction. Certainly such elements as records management, data processing resources, budgeting practices, and the flow of personnel transactions and information should be included in any efforts to shift or revise the exercise of this role. With respect to reform, any incentives or resources made available should be carefully directed at the modernization and rationalization of this function within the specific local setting.

The advisory role is a passive one in terms of impact, but a civil service commission or personnel board limited to this role continues to provide a sounding board for community attitudes and opinions about local public service and its personnel practices and policies. In addition, a reform movement away from the active exercise of roles of authority and decision-making to an advisory status for the commission is likely to be construed as less drastic than total elimination of the civil service tradition and, in some situations, may be fostered as a face-saving strategy.

In summation, reform efforts from whatever source they originate-- local, state, or Federal--should be selective in providing incentives, disincentives, or benign neglect. Assuming the adequacy of the administrative machinery of the particular jurisdiction, movement of a passive or inactive commission to an advisory role would not be undesirable. The incentives regarding changes in exercising the administrative role should be related to concurrent administrative analysis and the sound integration or coordination of this role with the administrative machinery and resources of the particular jurisdiction. Clearly, however, the major thrusts of reform efforts should be to foster the shifting of roles to that of policy-formulation and from that of regulation.

E. Directions for Future Research

Most general topics for research can be defined and studied in a variety of ways. In fact, it is fair to say that the broader the topic, the larger the number of defensible research designs and styles that may be applied to it. The impact of civil service systems on police administration is one example of a very broad topic. Thus, there are other research designs which might be fruitfully applied to it to supplement and expand the findings and analyses discussed above.

One alternative design that comes immediately to mind is replication at a different level of analysis. At base, this study has been one of cities and their police agencies. The choice of the city level of analysis is appropriate in its own right; after all, most Americans--among them, most police officers--live and work in cities. To study urban police administration and urban civil service systems is thus to study the mainstream of the topic. Nevertheless, it does not yield full and total coverage of that topic. County sheriff's departments, state bureaus of investigation or law enforcement, and federal police agencies are in many cases covered by civil service systems. Whether civil service bodies play the same roles at those other levels of government and whether they exert the same impacts as they do in city police agencies is an open question. It can be answered only by further research.

By the same token, this study itself might be replicated in the same cities at a future date, say three to five years hence. The point of this exercise would be to capture changes in the findings from this effort as they occur over time. The first chapter of this report noted that the ideology behind and the operational impacts of civil service systems have clearly changed over the century since passage of the Pendleton Act. The general environment of urban law enforcement has changed equally, but over a much shorter span of time. The findings reported in the pages above need to be monitored during those changes, for proposals for reform based on an outdated social situation are of no value to anyone, anywhere.

Within the context posed by the specific findings of this study, there are many suggestions to be made with regard to new, nonreplicative research efforts. One of those might concentrate on specification of the impacts noted in the pages above. For example, the link between affirmative action results and police performance results seems clear from the preceding analyses, but the precise causal linkage between the two deserves serious examination. On the one hand, it is possible that minority and women police officers, as relatively new additions to their respective police forces, feel "Hawthorne" effects which impel them to work harder and produce more results than their nonminority male counterparts. It is equally possible, however, that minority and female officers bring new communication networks with the local community into their police departments which result in improved quality of services delivered by the entire department. Without further research, alternative causal hypotheses like these and the many others suggested by this study cannot be evaluated. By extension, realistic planning for the law enforcement function in America's cities cannot be undertaken without such specification.

Another important topic for future study, albeit a very difficult one to operationalize for empirical research, is the utility and the feasibility of the "tailored" reforms and incentives suggested in the preceding

pages. Put simply, the question is just what incentives will work to change civil service systems in America's cities? Presuming for the sake of argument that everyone in a local system must gain something in order to support changes in that system, it becomes crucial to identify the types and the quantities of gains which must be generated and distributed through such reforms. Proposing general changes is easy; sponsoring and monitoring actual experiments in change for the large-scale feasibility is far more difficult, but exceedingly important for future research.

Finally, one other topic suggests itself for continued empirical effort. This study has been aimed at police departments and their performance in the various contexts of civil service systems. The topic is an important but a limited one, for police departments are not the only agencies to be covered by civil service systems. As mentioned at the outset of this effort, the idea of civil service has diffused throughout the country to the point that most public workers in most agencies in most jurisdictions are under some sort of civil service umbrella. Do civil service boards undertake the same roles and functions for nonpolice agencies? Do they exert the same impacts? Do those roles and impacts vary with the level of government served? Will the incentives for change operate similarly for nonpolice civil service functions, or are there other alternatives? Future research projects which examine the nonpolice public sector and compare it to the police-related findings of this report must be mounted to answer these questions.

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Appendix I

**POLICE PERSONNEL SYSTEMS - LEGAL FRAMEWORK
CONTENT ANALYSIS CHECKLISTS**

LEGAL ANALYSIS DOCUMENT #1
PROVISIONS OF LAW AFFECTING
PERSONNEL STRUCTURE

Name of Jurisdiction: _____

Statutory or other Legal Reference - Circle appropriate code(s).

01 State Constitution

02 State Law

03 State Rules and Regulations

04 City Charter

05 City Ordinance

06 Local Personnel Rules and Regulations

(NOTE: Personnel Rules and Regulations should <u>not</u> be included in the analysis of legal structure unless the enabling legislation states that the rules and regulations are to "have the force of law" or similar reference.)

Reference Document Code	Legal Basis - Personnel Structure
	1. Type of System
_____	1. Law — mandates — — permits — merit principle. — does not address —
_____	2. Does the law contain a statement protecting employees from partisan political coercion? Yes _____ No _____
_____	3. According to law policy-making authority rests at: (check more than one if appropriate) _____ State Level _____ County Level _____ City Level Describe: _____ _____ _____

Legal Basis - Personnel Structure

4. According to law, administration of routine personnel operations is at: (check more than one if appropriate)

_____ State Level

_____ County Level

_____ City Level

Describe: _____

_____

_____

B. Coverage of System

            - all ranks -

1. According to law - some ranks of sworn personnel
            - no ranks -
are under the personnel/merit system.

Describe: (List all exempt ranks) _____

_____

_____

2. Is it the same personnel/merit system as for most other employees in the jurisdiction?
            Yes_____   No_____

If no, explain: _____

_____

_____

            - all positions -

3. According to law - some positions of nonsworn -
            - no positions -
personnel are under the personnel/merit system.

Describe: _____

_____

_____

Legal Basis - Personnel Structure

4. Is it the same personnel/merit system as for most other public employees in the jurisdiction? Yes _____   No _____

    If no, explain: _____

    _____

    _____

C. Organization and Finance

1. Law establishes:

    _____ State Commission or Board

    _____ County Commission or Board

    _____ City Commission or Board

    _____ State executive personnel system

    _____ County executive personnel system

    _____ City executive personnel system

    _____ Other

    Explain: _____

    _____

    _____

2. If Commission or Board is called for, law sets forth: (check appropriate statement(s))

    _____ size of Commission or Board

    _____ term of office for members

    _____ residency qualifications

    _____ nonpartisan or bipartisan requirement

    _____ Commission or Board members appointed

    _____ Commission or Board members elected

3. If appointed, Commission or Board members are appointed by:

_____ Local chief executive

_____ City Council

_____ Other

Explain: _____

_____

_____

- mandates -
4. Law - permits -
- does not address - appointment of local
personnel director or similar official.

5. According to law, the local personnel director is appointed by:

_____ Commission or Board

_____ State chief executive officer

_____ Local chief executive

_____ City Council

_____ Other

Explain: _____

_____

_____

6. Law provides for personnel director's:
(check appropriate statement(s))

_____ term of office

_____ residency qualifications

_____ professional experience qualifications

_____ educational qualification

_____ method of selection

Reference Document
Code

Legal Basis - Personnel Structure

7. According to law, personnel director reports to:

   _____ Chief executive officer

   _____ Commission or Board

   _____ Other

   Explain: _____

   _____

   _____

8. Law contains provisions for financing Commission or Board operations.

   Yes _____   No _____

Name of Jurisdiction _____

Reference Document
Code

		Law Mandates	Law Permits	Law Does Not Address
	A. General Provisions – Check the appropriate column for each personnel practice provisions.			
_____	1. Provision for job specifications or position descriptions			
_____	2. Provision for pay schedules			
_____	3. Provision for fringe benefit plan			
_____	4. Provision for job/examination announcement			
_____	5. Provision for certification procedures			
_____	6. Provision for promotional process			
_____	7. Provision for workforce reduction			
_____	8. Provision for Performance Evaluation			
_____	9. Provision for Grievance and Appeals			
_____	10. Provision for Labor-Management Relations			
_____	11. Provision for employee ethics and conduct			
_____	12. Provision for employee political activity			
_____	13. Provision for Training or Career Development			
_____	14. Provision for Equal Employment or Affirmative Action			
_____	15. Provision for Selection Standards			
_____	16. Provision for Rules and Regulations			
_____	17. Other _____			
_____	18. Other _____			

I-6

Reference Document
　　　Code

B. Detail Provisions - Selection, Certification

1. Law sets forth following selection standards and devices:

Requirements

_____ Age

_____ Weight

_____ Height

_____ Minimum Education

_____ Vision (color)

_____ Vision (acuity)

_____ Voter Registration

_____ U. S. Citizenship

_____ Drivers' License

_____ Residency

_____ Pre-Employment:　Local
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　State

_____ Post-Employment:　Local
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 State

_____ Other (please list):

_____

_____

_____

Devices

_____ Medical Examination

_____ Physical Agility

_____ Written Test
　　(Name and Publisher) _____

_____

Reference Document
     Code

_____   Polygraph Examination

_____   Psychological, Psychiatric Interview

_____   Oral Interview

_____   Background Investigation

_____   Other (please list):

_____

_____

_____

_____ 2. Law establishes preference for veterans

       _____ Absolute (i.e., placed at top of eligi-
                bility list)

       _____ Some (i.e., points added)

       _____ No preference

_____ 3. Law establishes preference for special skills

       _____ Absolute preference

       _____ Some preference

       _____ No preference

Describe: _____

_____

_____

_____ 4. Law establishes educational preference

          Yes _____   No _____

If yes, describe: _____

_____

_____

Reference Document
        Code

_____

5. Law sets forth certification procedures

        Yes _____   No _____   If yes:

_____   Rule of one

_____   Rule of two

_____   Rule of three

_____   Other

Describe: _____

_____

_____

C   Detail Provisions - Promotions

_____

1. Law requires following factors to be considered
    for promotion:

_____   Veteran's preference

_____   Seniority within rank

_____   Service requirement (experience) within
            department

_____   Education

_____   Training

_____   Other

Describe: _____

_____

_____

D. Detail Provisions - Grievance and Appeals

_____

1. Law sets forth specific steps to be followed by
    employees and supervisors to resolve differences.

        Yes _____ .   No _____

_____

2. Law sets forth appeal rights for actions which ad-
    versely affect employee's livelihood or career
    prospects.   Yes _____   No _____

Reference Document
      Code

_____

3. If question #2 is yes, employee rights set forth in law include: (check appropriate statement(s).

   _____ Advance notice of action to be taken

   _____ Right to reply

   _____ Right to hearing by impartial body

   _____ Other

Describe: _____

_____

_____

_____

4. According to law, if an employee is discharged and appeals the action, he or she may be reinstated by:

   _____ Personnel Commission or Board

   _____ Chief Executive Oi ice

   _____ City Council

   _____ Other

Explain: _____

_____

_____

LEGAL ANALYSIS DOCUMENT #3
LEGAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO
RESPONSIBILITY FOR FORMULATING
AND CARRYING OUT PERSONNEL PRACTICES

The attached card is intended to determine what person or body is responsible for formulating personnel policy and what body or person is responsible for implementing the policy according to law.

The following definitions and actor codes are used:

Policy Determination - Actor having final legal responsibility for formulating policy and determining policy is being carried out in prescribed manner; oversight responsibility.

Administrative Responsibility - Actor having responsibility for performing routine operations associated with functions.

Actor Codes

01 - Personnel Board or Commission

02 - Mayor or City Manager

03 - Personnel Director or similar official

04 - Police Department

05 - Police Department Board or Commission

06 - Other: To be specified on form

07 - Actor not specified in law

LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY ANALYSIS DOCUMENT #3

Name of Jurisdiction _____

Reference Document Code	Personnel Function	Policy Determination	Administrative Responsibility	Comments
_____	1. Job Specification/ Position Descriptions			
_____	2. Pay Schedules			
_____	3. Fringe Benefits			
_____	4. Job/Examination Announcements			
_____	5. Certification Process			
_____	6. Promotional Process			
_____	7. Work Force Reduction Process			
_____	8. Performance Evaluation			
_____	9. Appeal Process			
_____	10. Labor-Management Relations			
_____	11. Ethics and Conduct			
_____	12. Training or Career Development			
_____	13. Equal Employment/ Affirmative Action			
_____	14. Rules and Regulations			
_____	15. Selection Standards			
_____	16. Other: _____			
_____	17. Other: _____			

Appendix II

POLICE BARGAINING CONTRACTS
CONTENT ANALYSIS CHECKLISTS

CONTRACT ANALYSIS

Note: Where a contract specifically incorporates past practices or previous agreements for an item, the contract is considered to cover that area.

If neither yes or no is checked, contract is silent.

City: _____

Association: _____

Dates of Contract: _____

Date Signed: _____

Contract Covers

_____ Sworn   _____ Non-sworn

    _____ Police Officer   _____ Dispatch

    _____ Sergeant   _____ Crossing Guards and
                                    Supervisors

    _____ Lieutenant   _____ All in department

    _____ Captain   _____ Citywide

    Other: Other:

    _____   _____

    _____   _____

    _____   _____

                    _____

_____ Both Sworn and Non-sworn
(check appropriate boxes above)

"Contract" embodied in:

    a. Agreement/Labor Agreement _____
    b. Memo of Agreement _____
    c. Memo of Understanding _____
    d. Ordinance _____
    e. Other _____

                                Yes   No

Contract Covers Modifications to Existing Practices/Benefits _____ _____
only.

Areas of Collective Bargaining

1. Salary

<div style="text-align: right">Yes   No</div>

   a. Contract Specifies Salary Levels   ____ ____

   b. Superior Officers' Salary Expressed
       as a Differential from Police Officers'   ____ ____

   c. Contract Specifies Pay Day and/or
       Pay Period   ____ ____

   d. Pay Differentials Exist for

Title	Amount
Detectives/Invest.	____

   Other:

_____	____
_____	____
_____	____

   More than 5 ____ (N.B. List Highest)

   Differential Represents

Rank	____
Assignment	____
Unclear	____
Silent	____
Both	____

   e. Contract Specifies Pay Relationship with
       Firefighters   ____ ____

   f. Contract Provides for Longevity Pay   ____ ____

   g. Contract Provides for Educational
       Incentives   ____ ____

h. Contract Provides for Assistance in
Educational Program   ____ ____

     Tuition   ____

     Books   ____

     Schedules   ____

     Other:

     _____

     _____

     _____

i. Employee can Receive Both Educational
Incentive and Longevity Pay   ____ ____

j. Longevity Pay Exceeds Educational
Incentive for A.A. at ____ years for
B.A. at ____ years   ____ ____

2. Fringe Benefits

a. Contract Specifies Vacation and Sick Leave
Allowances   ____ ____

b. Contract Includes Provision for Holidays
and/or Holidays Pay   ____ ____

c. Overtime

    (1) Paid-Only   ____ ____

    (2) Comp Time Granted-Only   ____ ____

    (3) Employee Choice   ____ ____

    (4) Paid at Time and One-Half   ____ ____

    (5) Comp Time at Time and One-Half   ____ ____

d. Health Insurance: City Pays Part or Full Cost   ____ ____

e. Life Insurance: City Pays Part or Full Cost   ____ ____

f. Dental Insurance:

    (1) City Pays Part or Full Cost   ____ ____

    (2) City Makes Available; Employee Pays
Full Cost   ____ ____

g. City provides uniform allowance   _____ _____

    (1) Same for all ranks   _____ _____

              Specify Amount _____

    If not, specify by rank

    Police Officer   _____

    Sergeant   _____

    Lieutenant   _____

    Captain   _____

    Other: _____

    _____

h. City provides all uniforms and equipment   _____ _____

i. City provides plain clothes allowance
same as uniform allowance   _____ _____

    If not, amount: _____

j. Contract provides bereavement/funeral
leave   _____ _____

k. Contract provides other leaves with pay   _____ _____

    Specify: Jury duty   _____ _____

          Guard/reserve service and training   _____ _____

          Personal Leave   _____ _____

          Other: _____

    _____

l. Contract provides for pregnancy leave without
pay   _____ _____

m. Contract provides for other leaves without pay   _____ _____

    Specify: _____

    _____

n. Contract establishes city pension plan   ____ ____

o. Contract requires city to provide physical
    examinations   ____ ____

3. Job Classifications and Descriptions

a. Contract specifies duties of job classes   ____ ____

b. Contract requires association approval of
    changes in duties   ____ ____

c. Contract requires consultation with associa-
    tion on changes in duties or classifications ____ ____

4. Selection Standards

a. Contract covers selection standards   ____ ____

    Specify: _____

    _____

    _____

b. Contract requires association input into
    selection standards   ____ ____

c. Contract requires association approval of
    selection standards   ____ ____

5. Promotions

a. Contract addresses promotion procedures
    or aspects thereof   ____ ____

b. Contract requires association input into
    modifications of promotion procedures   ____ ____

c. Contract requires association approval of
    modifications of promotion procedures   ____ ____

d. Contract requires promotions be in accordance
    with:

    _____   Seniority

    _____   Skill

    _____   Ability

e. Contract prohibits lateral entry _____ _____

6. Out of Title Pay

   a. Contract provides for out of title pay _____ _____

   b. Contract requires out of title appointments be made from promotion list _____ _____

   c. Contract requires that out of title appointments be made in accordance with:

   Seniority _____

   Qualification and ability _____

   Other: _____

   _____

   _____

7. Layoffs

   a. Contract specifies procedure for layoffs and re-hires _____ _____

   b. Major factor is seniority _____ _____

8. Training

   a. Contract addresses recruit training _____ _____

   b. In-service training _____ _____

   Specify: _____

   _____

   _____

   c. Contract requires city to pay for attendance at required training or to schedule during regular working hours _____ _____

9. One-Man Cars

   a. Contract requires all two-man cars _____ _____

   b. Contract otherwise addresses subject; How: _____

   _____

   _____

c. Contract silent   _____   _____

d. Contract has clause dealing generally with
the safety of officers   _____   _____

10. Contract specifies how division/beat assignments
are made   _____   _____

Criteria:

      _____   Seniority

      _____   Skills

      _____   Ability

           Other: _____

_____

_____

11. Shifts and Hours

a. Contract specifies shifts schedule   _____   _____

b. Contract provides for emergency shifts   _____   _____

c. Contract requires consultation with association
on nonemergency shift changes   _____   _____

d. Contract requires approval of such changes   _____   _____

e. Contract provides for full rotation of shifts   _____   _____

f. Contract provides for partial rotation:
which: _____   _____   _____

_____

g. Contract specifies frequency of rotation   _____   _____

h. Contract requires shift assignment be made
by seniority   _____   _____

12. **Affirmative Action**

a. Contract has nondiscrimination clause   _____   _____

b. Contract provides for affirmative action
program   _____   _____

Specify: _____

_____

_____

c. Contract uses terminology referring to both
genders   _____   _____

13. **Civilian Review**

a. Contract provides for civilian review process _____   _____

b. Contract prohibits civilian review   _____   _____

c. Contract otherwise addresses issue   _____   _____

Specify: _____

_____

_____

14. **Citizen Complaint and Internal Investigations**

a. Contract specifies process for citizen complaints _____   _____

b. Contract specifies "Bill of Rights" for officers   _____   _____

c. Within a "Bill of Rights" or otherwise, contract
contains provision similar to:

(1) The interrogation of a member of the force   _____   _____
shall be at a reasonable hour, preferably
when the member of the force is on duty,
unless the exigencies of the investigation
dictate otherwise, in which event reassign-
ment of the member of the force should be
employed. If any time is lost, the member
of the force shall be compensated.

(2) The interrogations shall take place at a
     location designated by the Chief of Police
     and the Mayor. Usually it will be at Police
     Headquarters or the location where the inci-
     dent allegedly occurred.

(3) The member of the force shall be informed of
     the nature of the investigation before any
     interrogation commences, including the name
     of the complainant. Sufficient information
     to reasonably apprise the member of the alle-
     gations should be provided. If it is known
     that the member of the force is being inter-
     rogated as a witness only, he should be so
     informed at the initial contact.

(4) The questioning shall be reasonable in
     length. Reasonable respites shall be al-
     lowed. Time shall also be provided for
     personal necessities, meals, telephone
     calls, and rest periods as are reasonably
     necessary.

(5) The member of the force shall not be sub-
     ject to any offensive language, nor shall he
     be threatened with transfer, dismissal, or
     other disciplinary punishment. No promise
     of reward shall be made as an inducement
     to answering questions.

(6) The complete interrogation of the member
     of the force shall be recorded mechanically
     or by a department stenographer. There will
     be no "off-the-record" questions. All re-
     cesses called during the questioning shall
     be recorded.

(7) If a member of the force is under arrest or
     is likely to be, that is, if he is a suspect
     or the target of a criminal investigation, he
     shall be given his rights pursuant to the
     current decisions of the United States Sup-
     reme Court.

(8) In all cases, and at every stage of the pro-
     ceedings, in the interest of maintaining the
     usual high morale of the force, if he so re-
     quests, to consult with counsel and/or his
     association representative before being
     questioned concerning a violation of the Rules
     and Regulations during the interrogation of a
     member of the force.

    d. Contract limits or prohibits use of polygraph
        examinations in internal investigations   ____   ____

13. Grievance Procedure

    a. Contract provides a grievance procedure   ____   ____

    b. Final step is:

            Court   ____

            Binding arbitration   ____

            Advisory arbitration   ____

            Mayor/manager review   ____

            Council review   ____

            Other:_____

                    _____

                    _____

    c. Contract allows for association representative
        to assist in grievances   ____   ____

        (1) Representatives receive leave with pay   ____   ____

    d. Grievance heard by:

Step	Immed. Supv.	Div. Head	Dept. Chief	Chief	Mgr./ Mayor	Other
1	____	____	____	____	____	____
2	____	____	____	____	____	____
3	____	____	____	____	____	____
4	____	____	____	____	____	____
5	____	____	____	____	____	____
6	____	____	____	____	____	____

                                                    Yes   No

15. e. Grievable issues include:

         (1) Terms of Agreement   _____

         (2) Rules and Regulations or
              their Application   _____

         (3) Changes in Past Practices   _____

         (4) Conditions of Employment   _____

         (5) Disciplinary Actions   _____

         Other: _____

         _____

         _____

     f. Contract Specifically Addresses
         Disciplinary Actions   _____   _____

         (1) Disciplinary actions may be appealed
              through grievance procedure   _____   _____

         (2) Alternative disciplinary procedures
              are provided; describe: _____   _____

              _____

              _____

              _____

         (3) Employee has choice between procedures _____   _____

              (a) Choice of one alternate precludes
                   appeal to another procedure   _____   _____

              (b) Choice must be exercised prior to a
                     specific point
                   which: _____   _____   _____

                   _____

(4) Alternative procedures are available,
by contract, for specific issues which: _____   _____
Suspension/Discharge _____
Other Disciplinary Actions:

_____

_____

Otherwise limited; describe:

_____

_____

_____

g. Contract Limits Disciplinary Actions   _____   _____

Contract permits only or prohibit

	Permits Only	Prohibits
Oral reprimand	_____	_____
Written reprimand	_____	_____
Suspension	_____	_____
Demotion	_____	_____
Discharge	_____	_____
Transfer of Assignments	_____	_____
Fines	_____	_____
Loss of Days off	_____	_____

Other: _____

_____

_____

16. Management Rights

    a. Contract has management rights clause   _____   _____

         Provisions include rights:

         (1)   to manage and direct workforce   _____   _____

         (2)   to discontinue transfer services and
              functions   _____   _____

         (3)   to sub-contract for services and functions   _____   _____

         (4)   to select, assign, schedule, promote, and
              transfer employees   _____   _____

         (5)   to establish and revise job descriptions
              and classifications   _____   _____

         (6)   to lay off, demote, terminate employees for
              lack of funds or work   _____   _____

         (7)   to discipline employees for just cause   _____   _____

         (8)   to determine methods and procedures   _____   _____

         (9)   to exercise all management rights not
              specifically abridged or modified by
              contract   _____   _____

       (10)   to vary and alter past practices   _____   _____

       (11)   to establish rules and regulations   _____   _____

         Other: _____

         _____

         _____

    b. Contract has a clause continuing all past
        practices not specifically modified   _____   _____

    c. Past practices may be modified by meet and
        confer process or mutual agreement   _____   _____

d. Past practices clause limited   _____   _____

    Specify how: _____

    _____

    _____

    _____

e. Contract requires discussion with Association   _____   _____
    prior to changes in rules and regulations

f. Contract requires Association approval for   _____   _____
    changes in rules and regulations

17. Association activity

  a. Contract provides for time with pay for
      Association activity   _____   _____

      which: _____

      _____

      _____

  b. Contract provides for dues checkoff   _____   _____

  c. Contract provides for service fee for:
      All covered employees   _____   _____

      Nonmembers   _____   _____

  d. Contract provides for the dissemination of   _____   _____
      information to the Association

  e. Contract requires labor management meetings   _____   _____

     (1) Specified frequency   _____

        Specify _____

     (2) As needed   _____

     (3) As required   _____

f. Contract restricts subjects for discussion
    at labor management meeting   _____   _____

    How: _____

    _____

    _____

18. Re-Opener

a. Contract provides for re-opening   _____   _____

    Negotiations:
    On which subjects:

    _____

    _____

    _____

    _____

19. Miscellaneous

    Any other provisions of note:

    _____

    _____

    _____

    _____

Appendix III

POLICE DEPARTMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Date _____

City _____

Person Completing Questionnaire _____

Name of Department _____

Address _____

Telephone _____

I. Civil Service - Merit System

1. Are sworn personnel in your police department under a civil service/ merit system? (Please check only one.)

___ Yes--All Ranks   ___ Yes--Some Ranks   ___ No

Which ranks are exempt?

Describe the type of system used for sworn employees:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(Go to Question 2)

Is this the same civil service/merit system as for most other public employees in your jurisdiction? (Check one)

___ Yes   ___ No

2. Are non-sworn personnel in your police department under a civil service/merit system? (Please check only one.)

___ Yes--All Positions   ___ Yes--Some Positions   ___ No

Which positions are exempt?

Describe the type of system used for non-sworn employees:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(Go to Question 3)

Is this the same civil service/merit system as for most other public employees in your jurisdiction? (Check one)

___ Yes   ___ No

II. Organization, Manpower, and Compensation

3. How many employees were working in your police department as of 1/1/77? (Please give the exact number for each category.)

	Total Employees		Sworn Employees	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Full time	___	___	___	___
Part time	___	___	___	___
Provisional or temporary	___	___	___	___

4. Please fill in the table below with the exact number of persons for each category. If your department has other ranks than those listed, please include them.

| | Manpower: Sworn (As of 1/1/77) | | |
	Total	Female	Minority (Black, Spanish)
Chief	_____	_____	_____
Assistant Deputy Chief	_____	_____	_____
Inspector	_____	_____	_____
Major	_____	_____	_____
Captain	_____	_____	_____
Lieutenant	_____	_____	_____
Detective	_____	_____	_____
Sergeant	_____	_____	_____
Corporal	_____	_____	_____
Police Officer	_____	_____	_____
Other (please list):	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

5. During 1976, how many of your personnel?

	Sworn	Nonsworn
Joined the department?	_____	_____
Left the department?	_____	_____

6. What are the minimum and maximum attainable salaries for:

	Minimum	Maximum
Police Chief	_____	_____
Detective	_____	_____
Police Officer	_____	_____

7. If your department has any of the following special pay provisions for its sworn or civilian personnel, please check the appropriate space. Then, please briefly describe those provisions in the appropriate space.

	Sworn	Nonsworn
● Educational Incentive Pay (Description: _____)	_____	_____
● Specialized Pay for Particular Assignments (Description: _____)	_____	_____
● Specialized Pay for Superior Performance (Description: _____)	_____	_____

8. Does your police department have a formal classification plan, including individual position descriptions and class specifications for:

	Yes	No
Sworn personnel?	___	___
Nonsworn personnel?	___	___

(If it has a plan for sworn personnel) Does that plan include job titles other than military rank titles (e.g., ballistician, radio dispatcher, etc.)? Please explain.

_____

_____

9. Some departments have adopted manpower policies which call for the use of paraprofessionals in line and critical support functions. If your police department uses civilian paraprofessionals in any of the following positions, please fill in the appropriate number of persons.

	Male	Female
Police Cadets	___	___
Community Service Aides	___	___
Traffic Enforcement Officers	___	___
Crime Scene Analysts/Evidence Technicians	___	___
Criminalistics/Lab Technicians	___	___
Crime Analysts	___	___
Other (please list):	___	___
_____	___	___

10. For each function performed within your department, please complete the table below:

	Check if Performed	No. of Persons Employed in Function		Status of Individual in Charge (Check One)	
		Sworn	Nonsworn	Sworn	Nonsworn
Personnel	___	___	___	___	___
Purchasing	___	___	___	___	___
Records	___	___	___	___	___
Comm./Dispatch	___	___	___	___	___
Budget	___	___	___	___	___
Training	___	___	___	___	___
Planning/Rsch.	___	___	___	___	___
Equip. Maint.	___	___	___	___	___
Data Processing	___	___	___	___	___
Legal Counsel	___	___	___	___	___
Public Relations	___	___	___	___	___
Community Rels.	___	___	___	___	___
Other (please list):	___	___	___	___	___
_____	___	___	___	___	___

III-4

11. How many sworn police personnel are assigned to each of the following:

Administration (staff and general management) _____
Traffic _____
Juvenile _____
Street Patrol _____
Other Patrol _____
Criminal Investigation _____
Community Relations _____
Other (please list): _____

_____ _____

12. During 1976, what was the average number of man-days lost per month by sworn personnel due to:

_____ Sick leave?   _____ Injured leave?

III. Grant Application and Approvals

13. Has your department applied for any grants for police programs and/or equipment from state or Federal sources over the past 5 years? (If you have, please fill in the table below):

Subject for Which Applied	Total No. of Grants Applied For	Total $ Amount Applied For	Total # Grants Received	Total $ Amount Received
Technology				
Computer	_____	_____	_____	_____
Communications	_____	_____	_____	_____
Field Equipment	_____	_____	_____	_____
Personnel				
Selection Programs	_____	_____	_____	_____
Training Programs	_____	_____	_____	_____
Recruitment Programs	_____	_____	_____	_____
Promotion Programs	_____	_____	_____	_____
Special				
Youth Programs	_____	_____	_____	_____
Legal Advisor Programs	_____	_____	_____	_____
Field Innovation Programs	_____	_____	_____	_____
Other (please specify)				
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

IV. Recruitment of Entry Level

14. For each recruitment practice listed, please indicate whether the police department uses it, and rank its effectiveness.

Practices	Check Those Used	Effectiveness (Check one for each technique used)				
		Very	Some-what	Don't Know	Not Very	Not At All
Want ads in local newspapers	—	—	—	—	—	—
Radio, TV spot announcements	—	—	—	—	—	—
Special posters in public places (e.g., city hall, busses, etc.)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Requesting referrals from schools and other educational organizations	—	—	—	—	—	—
Requesting referrals from community organizations	—	—	—	—	—	—
Requesting referrals from police employees	—	—	—	—	—	—
Visiting college campuses	—	—	—	—	—	—
Using continuous exam announcements	—	—	—	—	—	—
Special outreach programs for minorities	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other (please list)	—	—	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—	—	—

15. Does the police department designate a particular individual to manage and direct its recruitment efforts? (check one)

    __ No (Go to Question 16)
    __ Yes ─────────────┐
                        ▼

    What is the rank or title of that person? _____

    What criteria or qualifications must a person meet to be designated in charge of the department's recruitment efforts?
    _____

16. Does the department have an affirmative action plan for the recruitment and hiring of minority personnel? (Check one)

    __ No (Go to Question 17)
    __ Yes ─────────────┐
                        ▼

    What are the formal and informal goals of that plan? _____
    _____

    What problems (if any) has the department encountered in trying to meet those goals? _____
    _____

17. Is the department presently under a court order or compliance agreement with regard to minority recruitment and hiring? (Check one)

___ No (Go to Question 18)
___ Yes

What are the terms of that order? _____

_____

V. Selection, Training, and Probation

18. Below are printed a variety of selection requirements and devices often employed by police departments. Please indicate all of those used by your department in the selection of entry level and sworn personnel. Where relevent, please specify your department's standards; where not, simply check the devices or requirements used.

Personnel		Requirements
Male	Female	
_____	_____	Age (minimum-maximum)
_____	_____	Weight (minimum-maximum)
_____	_____	Height (minimum-maximum)
_____	_____	Minimum Education
_____	_____	Vision (color)
_____	_____	Vision (acuity)
_____	_____	Voter Registration
_____	_____	U.S. Citizenship
_____	_____	Drivers' License
_____	_____	Number of Months Residency
		Pre-Employment:
_____	_____	Local
		State
		Post-Employment:
_____	_____	Local
		State
		Other (please list)
_____	_____	_____

Personnel		Devices
Male	Female	
_____	_____	Medical Examination
_____	_____	Physical Agility
_____	_____	Written Test
		(Name and Publisher) _____
_____	_____	Polygraph Examination
_____	_____	Psychological, Psychiatric Interview
_____	_____	Oral Interview
_____	_____	Background Investigation

III-7

19. Please check the one most accurate statement describing your selection policies for sworn personnel with regard to:

Veteran's preference:

     ___ Absolute (i.e., placed at top of eligibility list)

     ___ Some (i.e., points added)

     ___ No preference

Special skills (i.e., bilingualism, computer experience, etc.):

     ___ Absolute preference

     ___ Some preference

     ___ No preference

20. Please indicate which of the <u>arrest and conviction</u> conditions listed below for adults and juveniles are acceptable for applicants to sworn police positions. (Check all that apply.)

	As a Adult	As a Juvenile
Moving traffic violations conviction	___	___
Arrested for misdemeanor, not convicted	___	___
Arrested for felony, not convicted	___	___
Convicted for a misdemeanor	___	___
Convicted for a felony	___	___

21. Which of the following statements best describes your jurisdiction's method for making selections to entry positions from among qualified candidates for sworn police personnel? (Check one only.)

     ___ The highest ranking applicant who is available for appointment must be selected.

     ___ Any applicant who is ranked among the top three of those available for appointment may be selected (i.e., rule of three).

     ___ Any applicant who is ranked among the top five of those available may be selected (i.e., rule of five).

     ___ Any applicant in the highest category of a category rating system (e.g., best qualified, qualified, etc.) may be selected.

     ___ Other (please describe). _____

22. What weight, if any, are each of the following factors given in ranking qualified candidates for entrance eligibility to sworn positions?

___ Written tests
___ Oral interview/exam
___ Veteran's preference (number of points or percentage: _____

    Disabled   _____
    Nondisabled _____

___ Date of application
___ Other (please specify) _____

23. Is successful completion of recruit training required prior to assignment to your police department as a sworn police officer?

___ Yes   ___ No

How many hours of training does the average recruit receive? ____
Who (what group, institution) operates the program? _____

24. Is successful completion of a probationary period required:

	Yes	No
Prior to assignment as a sworn officer?	___	___
After assignment as a sworn officer?	___	___

How long is the probationary period for recruit or new police officers?

___ No probationary period
___ 6 months
___ 12 months
___ 18 months
___ Other (please specify) _____

VI. In-Service Training and Education

25. If your department has in-service training for any of the following groups of personnel, please check the appropriate blank and fill in the average number of training hours a person in each group receives per year.

		Department Has Training	Average Hours/Year
Police officers		—	—
Supervisory Personnel			
	Sworn	—	—
	Nonsworn	—	—
Management Personnel			
	Sworn	—	—
	Nonsworn	—	—

26. Which, if any, of the following policies with regard to educational attainment has your department ever adopted? (Check one for each policy.)

	Adopted and Being Used Now	Adopted But Later Terminated	Never Adopted By the Department
Adjusting schedules to facilitate class attendance	—	—	—
Allowing time off to attend class	—	—	—
Departmental subsidies for books and tuition	—	—	—
Increased pay based upon accumulated college credits or academic degree(s)	—	—	—
Using academic education as part of the basis for promotions	—	—	—

27. Does your department make use of any of the following "career development mechanisms"? (Please check.)

Yes No

___ ___ Formalized job rotation designed to broaden an employee's experience

___ ___ Personnel exchange programs with other police departments or agencies

___ ___ Special assignments into jobs or positions that have career value

___ ___ Provisions for leaves of absence that allow employees to pursue education or temporary employment experience in other agencies

28. Please complete the following "educational profile" for the sworn personnel in your department.

Rank	Number of Sworn Personnel Who:				
	Have High School Diploma or Less	Have 1, 2 yrs. of College	Are College Graduates	Have M.A.'s	Have Ph.D's or Professional Degrees*
Chief					
Asst./Deputy Chief	—	—	—	—	—
Inspector	—	—	—	—	—
Major	—	—	— —	—	—
Captain	—	—	—	—	—
Lieutenant	—	—	—	—	—
Detective	—	—	—	—	—
Sergeant	—	—	—	—	—
Corporal	—	—	—	—	—
Police Officer	—	—	—	—	—
Other Ranks (please list)	—	—	—	—	—

* (E.g., M.D., LLD.)

VII. Promotion and Appraisal

29. Is there a formal performance appraisal program for police personnel? (Check one in each column.)

	Nonsworn Personnel	Recruits	Police Officers	Ranking Officers
Yes	—	—	—	—
No	—	—	—	—

30. How often is the employee's performance reviewed? (Check all that apply.)

	Nonsworn Personnel	Recruits	Police Officers	Ranking Officers
Every 6 months	—	—	—	—
Annually	—	—	—	—
Every 2 years	—	—	—	—
Other (Please specify.)	—	—	—	—

31. Who conducts the performance appraisals? (Check all that apply.)

	Nonsworn Personnel	Recruits	Police Officers	Ranking Officers
Immediate supervisor	—	—	—	—
Next highest supervisor	—	—	—	—
Fellow employees	—	—	—	—
Supervisory panel	—	—	—	—
Other (Please specify.)	—	—	—	—

32. Performance appraisals are generally more important for some purposes than for others. Please circle the appropriate ranking of the importance of performance appraisals in your department for each of the listed purposes.

	Sworn Personnel Importance			
	Very	Some	Little	None
Salary increase	4	3	2	1
Promotion	4	3	2	1
Discipline	4	3	2	1
Assignment/Transfer	4	3	2	1
Dismissal	4	3	2	1
Counseling	4	3	2	1
Training	4	3	2	1
Other (Please specify.)				
_____	4	3	2	1

	Nonsworn Personnel			
Salary increase	4	3	2	1
Promotion	4	3	2	1
Discipline	4	3	2	1
Assignment/Transfer	4	3	2	1
Dismissal	4	3	2	1
Counseling	4	3	2	1
Training	4	3	2	1
Other (Please specify.)				
_____	4	3	2	1

33. Which of these statements best describes your department's promotion program as it relates to sworn police personnel? (Check only one.)

___ There is a standard promotion program applied uniformly throughout the department

___ Each unit within the department has its own promotion program

___ The promotion program varies in accordance with rank

___ There are no established promotion programs; each action is handled on the merits of the individual case

___ Other (Please describe.) _____

_____

_____

34. Which of the following factors are normally included in your promotion (qualification and fitness) standards for police personnel? (Please check the appropriate column for each factor as it is used.)

	Sworn		
	To Meet Eligibility Requirements	To Receive Extra Points	Used For Ranking Purposes
Supervisory evaluation of performance in present position	—	—	—
Veteran's preference	—	—	—
Seniority within a given rank	—	—	—
Written examination	—	—	—
Oral examination	—	—	—
Service requirements (experience) in your department	—	—	—
Awards or commendations	—	—	—
Evaluation by fellow employees	—	—	—
Education (college credits, associate degree, or higher)	—	—	—
Supervisory evaluation of promotion potential	—	—	—
In-service training	—	—	—
Assessment center evaluation	—	—	—
Other (Please specify.)	—	—	—

| | Nonsworn | | |
	To Meet Eligibility Requirements	To Receive Extra Points	Used For Ranking Purposes
Supervisory evaluation of performance in present position	—	—	—
Veteran's preference	—	—	—
Seniority within a given rank	—	—	—
Written examination	—	—	—
Oral examination	—	—	—
Service requirements (experience) in your department	—	—	—
Awards or commendations	—	—	—
Evaluation by fellow employees	—	—	—
Education (college credits, associate degree, or higher)	—	—	—
Supervisory evaluation of promotion potential	—	—	—
In-service training	—	—	—
Other (Please specify.)			
_____	—	—	—

35. Which of the following statements best describe your jurisdiction's method for making promotions from among qualified candidates for police personnel? (Check one only.)

	Sworn	Nonsworn
The highest ranking applicant who is available for appointment must be promoted.	—	—
Any applicant who is ranked among the top three of those available for appointment may be promoted (i.e., rule of three).	—	—
Any applicant in the highest category of a category rating system (e.g., best qualified, qualified, etc.) may be promoted.	—	—
Other (Please describe.) _____		
_____	—	—

36. Is there a minimum amount of time which must be spent in a rank prior to promotion to the next?

___ Yes   ___ No   How much? _____

37. If your department employs a promotion list, how long is it used? (Check only one.)

___ No promotion list is used
___ Until all employees on the list have been promoted
___ Three months
___ Six months
___ One year
___ Two years
___ Other (Please specify.) _____

_____

38. "Tenure" refers to the permanent status granted to a promoted employee upon successful completion of a specified probationary period. Does your police department have a system of tenure in employment for promoted sworn police personnel? (Check one.)

___ Yes————┐   ___ No (Go to Question 39)
             ↓

If "yes," how soon after promotion are sworn police personnel granted employment tenure? (Check only one.)

___ Immediately after appointment to the rank
___ After serving a satisfactory probationary period of 6 months
___ After serving a satisfactory probationary period of 12 months
___ After serving a satisfactory probationary period of 18 months
___ Other (Please specify.) _____

39. Does your police department have a system of tenure in rank for promoted sworn personnel?

___ Yes————┐   ___ No (Go to Question 40)
             ↓

If "yes," how soon after promotion are sworn police personnel granted tenure in rank? (Check only one.)

___ Immediately after appointment to the rank
___ After serving a satisfactory probationary period of 6 months
___ After serving a satisfactory probationary period of 12 months
___ After serving a satisfactory probationary period of 18 months
___ Other (Please specify.) _____

VIII. Discipline and Appeals

40. Please fill out the following table on complaints filed by citizens against police personnel.

	Sworn	Nonsworn
Over the past 12 months:		
Total number of complaints filed	___	___
Number of complaints substantiated	___	___
Number of substantiated complaints resulting in:		
Employee reprimand	___	___
Employee suspension	___	___
Employee termination	___	___

Please fill out the following table on complaints filed by police personnel against police personnel.

	Sworn	Nonsworn
Over the past 12 months		
Total number of complaints filed	___	___
Number of complaints substantiated	___	___
Number of substantiated complaints resulting in:		
Employee reprimand	___	___
Employee suspension	___	___
Employee termination	___	___

41. Could you describe the general procedure used by your department to handle complaints against:

Sworn Personnel	Nonsworn Personnel
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

42. Please check the items below that apply to your department with regard to appeals of personnel decisions by:

	Employees	
	Sworn	Nonsworn
Department has formal appeals procedures	—	—
Employee has right to appeal and hearing	—	—
Employee has right to have a representative at hearing	—	—
Appeals are made to: (Check all that apply.)		
Civilian Review Board	—	—
Departmental Review Board	—	—
City/County Manager	—	—
Civil Service Commission	—	—
Board of Police Commissioners	—	—
Central Personnel Agency	—	—
Mayor	—	—
Chief of Police	—	—
Other (Please specify.)	—	—
_____	—	—
Final decision made by: (Please specify.)	—	—

IX. Disability and Retirement

43. Could you briefly describe (e.g., minimum years to retirement, benefit amounts, transferability of pension plan, etc.) your retirement program for sworn personnel? _____

_____

_____

nonsworn personnel? _____

_____

_____

44. What percentage of their salaries do sworn personnel retiring from your department receive after:

a. 20 years of service? _____
b. 30 years of service? _____
c. 40 years of service? _____

45. Please check all of the procedures listed below that your department follows in the event that a disability is incurred by a:

	Employee	
	Sworn	Nonsworn
Pays a disability premium	—	—
Pays salary (amount: $_____) for a period of time (how long? _____)	—	—
Pays for physical rehabilitation	—	—
Provides occupational counseling	—	—
Provides psychological counseling	—	—
Helps find new job in department	—	—
Helps find new job outside of department	—	—

III-17

Appendix IV

THE PERSONAL INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Date of Interview _____

Interviewer _____

City _____

Respondent: (Name and Title) _____

_____

Telephone _____

1. The administration of law enforcement agencies with regard to personnel matters varies widely across American cities. Let's start by looking at some of the actors involved in police personnel administration here in (city).

   HAND RESPONDENT CARD 1.

   On Card 1 is a list of person or groups who sometimes have decision-making authority over police-personnel affairs. For each of those, please circle the appropriate score.

   AS RESPONDENT NEARS END OF LIST: Are there other persons or groups we inadvertently omitted? Please write them in and give them a score.

   TAKE BACK CARD 1.

2. IF RESPONDENT INDICATES A COMMISSION/PERSONNEL BOARD IS PRESENT AND HAS AUTHORITY, ASK THE FOLLOWING. IF NOT, GO ON TO QUESTION 3.

   Which of the following statements best describes the role played by the civil service commission/personnel board in police personnel matters?

   a. __ acts as an advisor to the city administration.
   b. __ administers routine personnel operations.
   c. __ acts as regulatory body over actual administrators.
   d. __ hears appeals from police employees.
   e. __ formulates personnel policies.

3. IF RESPONDENT INDICATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OR PERSONNEL BOARD HAS AUTHORITY, ASK THE FOLLOWING. IF NOT, GO TO QUESTION 4.

   (Ask only once in city, of Commission President or City Personnel Director.)

   How many members does the commission have? _____
   How long are their terms in office? _____
   Does the commission have supporting staff? _____
   About how large is that staff? _____
   How large is its budget? _____
   By whom are commissioners chosen? _____
   According to what criteria? _____

   IF NOT ALREADY ANSWERED: Does one need any special qualifications to become a commissioner? What? _____
   How is the commission's president or chairman selected? _____

   Does the commission have any of its people assigned specifically to police personnel matters? _____ How many? _____

4. IF CITY'S PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT HAS AUTHORITY, OR IF FULL-TIME PERSONNEL DIRECTOR HAS AUTHORITY, ASK THE FOLLOWING. IF NOT, GO TO QUESTION 5.

   (Ask only once in city, of Personnel Director or Mayor.)

How is a person chosen to be (city's) personnel director? _____

IF NOT ANSWERED ABOVE: Does one need any special qualifications to
become the personnel director? _____ What? _____
In matters of police personnel administration, to whom is the director
responsible? _____
How large is the city's personnel office professional staff? _____
Are any of the professional staff assigned specifically to police
personnel matters? _____ How many? _____
How large is the department's budget? _____

5. IF AN INTERNAL POLICE DEPARTMENTAL OFFICE OF PERSONNEL HAS AUTHORITY,
   ASK THE FOLLOWING. IF NOT, GO TO QUESTION 6.

   (Ask only once in City, of Police Personnel Director or Police Chief.)

   Is there a particular individual assigned to direct personnel matters
   within the police department? _____
   A police officer or a civilian? _____
   How is that individual selected? _____

   IF NOT ANSWERED ABOVE: Does one need any special qualifications to be
   selected? _____ What? _____
   How large is the police department personnel office budget? _____
   What is the size of its staff? Sworn _____ Nonsworn _____

6. IF A BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS HAS AUTHORITY, ASK THE FOLLOWING.
   IF NOT, GO TO QUESTION 7.

   (Ask only once in city, of Police Personnel Director or Chief of Police.)

   How many members of the board are there? _____
   How long are their terms of office? _____
   How are members selected? _____
   IF NOT ANSWERED ABOVE: Does one need any special qualifications to
   become a member of the board? _____
   How is the board chairman selected? _____

7. Do any state or county officials or groups possess decision-making
   authority in matters of police personnel administration in (city)?
   Which officials, and in what areas do they possess such authority?

_____ Actor _____	_____ Area of Authority _____

8. Of all the actors who exercise authority over police personnel matters
   in (city), which would you say has the greatest amount of such
   authority? _____
   Second greatest amount? _____
   Third greatest? _____

9. Sometimes actors have no decision-making authority but are nonetheless influential in police personnel matters. That is, their opinions are given substantial weight by the decision-makers. Please indicate on Card 2 HAND RESPONDENT CARD 2 which actors, if any, would fit that description here in (city).

AS RESPONDENT NEARS THE END

Please write in any actors we may have omitted.

TAKE BACK CARD 2.

10. Does the (city) police department presently have any unions or associations that represent:

a. Sworn Personnel _____   b. Civilians _____

IF THE ANSWER TO THE ABOVE FOR EITHER WAS NO, ASK THE FOLLOWING. IF NOT, GO TO TOP OF NEXT PAGE.

What do you think has kept (sworn, civilian) employees from forming a union?
Sworn: _____   Civilian: _____

Do you sense any movement in that direction for the future? What?
Sworn: _____   Civilian: _____

NOTE: IF THERE ARE NEITHER SWORN NOR CIVILIAN UNIONS, GO ON TO QUESTION 11. IF THERE ARE ONE OR THE OTHER OR BOTH, ASK THE FOLLOWING FOR THE APPROPRIATE GROUPS. FILL IN THE TABLE BELOW WITH THE RESPONSES.

Sworn	Civilian
Which organization is that?	Which organization is that?
Which ranks are represented?	Which positions are represented?
About how many members does it have?	About how many members does it have?
Does (organization) have exclusive bargaining rights for its members?	Does (organization) have exclusive bargaining rights for its members?
How long has it enjoyed that status?	How long has it enjoyed that status?

Organization	Sworn (✓ if it is)	Ranks and Positions Represented	Number of Members	Exclusive Rights? (✓)	For How Long?
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

Who makes the final decision on what to grant or not grant in collective bargaining:

a. with "sworn" unions?   b. with "civilian" unions?

_____   _____

What is the procedure used for breaking an impasse with:

a. "sworn" unions?   b. "civilian" unions?

_____   _____

CONTINUED

13 OF 3

In the past 5 years, have any of the unions we have been discussing staged a strike or some other type of job action?

IF NO: Have any managerial rights been lost to unions through collective bargaining? Which rights, and to which unions?

_____

IF YES, ASK THE FOLLOWING AND FILL IN THE TABLE.

What was that action? Over what?
Which union staged it?
When did it happen?
How long did it last?
How was it resolved, and by whom?

Action	Union	When	Duration	Resolution

ASK THE FOLLOWING FOR SWORN PERSONNEL ONLY

HAND CARD 3

On this card are listed policies which are often subject to collective bargaining negotiations. Please indicate those over which collective bargaining has occurred in (city) with your "sworn" employee union, and please indicate how effective the police organization was in influencing each policy.

TAKE BACK CARD 3.

11. I'd like to turn now to a few questions on more specific matters of police department functioning and administration HAND CARD 4. This is a list of some of the functions which police administrators often perform. For each, please indicate which actor, if any, performs them for (city's) police department.

TAKE BACK CARD 4.

12. Does the (city) police department have a program of lateral entry for any sworn ranks above police officer and below chief?

IF YES:

How long has that program been in effect? _____
Who proposed it? _____
Who made the final decision to adopt it? _____
Did anyone oppose it? _____
Who? _____
How long did the issue take to be resolved from proposal to final decision? _____

IF NO:

Which of the following best describes the reason your department does not allow lateral entry? (Check all that apply.)

___ Legal restrictions forbid.
___ Bad past experience with it.
___ Lack of qualified personnel.
___ No need for such personnel.
___ Pension system discourages it.
___ Other (please list).

NOTE: If respondent indicates "past experience," ⟵. If not, go to Question 14.

IV-5

13. Assignments are often determined by a number of different groups or persons in police departments. For each of the following types of assignments, please state the person or document that determines how they are made.

	Police Chief.	Unit Com- mander	Immediate Supervisor	Union Contract	Assignment Selection Committee	Other (Please Specify)
Patrol - watch	—	—	—	—	—	—
Patrol - beat	—	—	—	—	—	—
Invesgigation - watch	—	—	—	—	—	—
Investigation - Specialty (e.g., homicide, robbery	—	—	—	—	—	—
First line super- vision (sergeants)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Middle management (lieutenant through captain)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Executive Officers	—	—	—	—	—	—

Assignments are often made on the basis of a number of different factors. Please rank each of the following factors according to the amount of weight (1=most weight, 2=next most, 7=least) it is given in generally determining assignments in your departments.

___ Personal hardship   ___ Special skills
___ Seniority   ___ Performance ratings
___ Disciplinary reasons   ___ Other (please list)
___ Career development

_____

14. Some departments have faced very real problems in attracting women or minority recruits to the force. Has the (city) police department had problems in finding such recruits? _____ Can you describe that problem in any detail? _____

IF NO:

What recruiting device or procedure has been most ef- fective in recruiting women and minorities to the force?

_____

When did it first start being used? _____

Who proposed it? _____
Who opposed it? _____

IF YES:

Has the department considered taking any steps to eliminate tha: problem?

_____

What? _____
What would be most effective?

_____

What would it take to implement that?

_____

IF NO:

Who made the final decision to imple-
ment that procedure? _____
How long did it take to resolve the
issue? _____
Are those programs still in use?

_____
IF NOT Why not? _____

IF YES:

Is implementation a realistic
possibility for the future?

_____
_____

15. Some police departments have tried to experiment with their tradi-
     tional programs and structures in such areas as assignment and work-
     week patterns. Has your department ever done so through such
     programs as:

     (Check if they have.)

     a. ___   team policing
     b. ___   police legal advisors
     c. ___   4-day, 40-hour scheduling
     d. ___   the training and use of family crisis intervention specialists

     FOR THE FIRST ONE MENTIONED

     IF YES:

     Who proposed that program?

     _____
     Did anyone oppose it? _____
     Who? _____
     Who made the final decision to
     implement it? _____
     How long did it take to resolve
     the issue? _____

     IF NO:

     Why do you think they haven't
     been tried? _____

     _____

16. A few police departments have attempted to promote "career" or
     "professional" development among their officers, through such means as
     restructuring their rank systems or the creation of alternative career
     paths.

     Has the (city) police department ever tried such experiments? _____
     What were those? _____
     When were they tried? _____

     IF YES:

     Who proposed it? _____
     Did anyone oppose it? Who? _____
     Who made the decision to
     implement? _____
     How long overall did it take to
     resolve the issue? _____
     IF APPROPRIATE: Why was it
     discontinued? _____

     _____

     IF NO:

     Why do you think (city) has not
     tried such programs? _____

     _____

17. Suppose that the chief of police in (city) were to resign from his office tomorrow. Could you describe the process the city would use to find a replacement? _____

What are the qualifications for a police chief here? _____

Do you think it would be better to select the best person available anywhere, even though he or she might come from another city and be unfamiliar with local problems, or the best person from this department? _____

Is there anyone in (city) whose support for or opposition to a particular candidate would be almost impossible to overcome? _____

Who? _____

Who would make the final decision on accepting a particular candidate? _____

18. Are there any major changes you would like to see in police administration or in the police department in (city)? _____

What are those? _____

Why are they necessary? _____

If you were to propose such, whose support would be crucial to getting them implemented? _____

Who would you expect to oppose such? _____

19. Now, I would like to get some of your opinions about a variety of general aspects of police administration in (city). HAND CARD 5. For each of the printed statements, please check the response that most closely approximates your own opinion.

TAKE BACK CARD 5.

20. Finally, we'd like to get your assessment of what city politics in general are like here.

On each of these cards is printed an issue, and a list of persons who might be active in it. Please check the appropriate spaces for each of the actors.

HAND CARDS 6, 7, 8, 9.

Card 1

Actor	Has Much Authority in Police Personnel Decision-Making	Has Some Authority in Police Personnel Decision-Making	Has No Authority in Police Personnel Decision-Making	Does Not Exist Here
			S t a t u s	
a. The Mayor	4	3	2	1
b. The City Manager	4	3	2	1
c. The City Council/Board of Aldermen	4	3	2	1
d. The Civil Service Commission/ Merit Board, or Similar	4	3	2	1
e. The Public Safety Director	4	3	2	1
f. The Chief of Police	4	3	2	1
g. The Board of Police Commissioners	4	3	2	1
h. The City's Director of Personnel	4	3	2	1
i. The City's Department of Personnel	4	3	2	1
j. The Police Department's Internal Department of Personnel	4	3	2	1
k. The City Attorney/ Corporation Counsel	4	3	2	1
l. Other (please list)				
_____	4	3	2	1
_____	4	3	2	1
_____	4	3	2	1

Actor	Very Influential	Somewhat Influential	Not Influential
a. The City Council	—	—	—
b. The Mayor	—	—	—
c. The Democratic Party	—	—	—
d. The Republican Party	—	—	—
e. Church Leaders	—	—	—
f. Chamber of Commerce	—	—	—
g. Newspapers	—	—	—
h. Bar Association	—	—	—
i. Labor Unions	—	—	—
j. Ethnic Groups	—	—	—
k. Neighborhood Groups	—	—	—
l. Heads of Local Government Agencies	—	—	—
m. City and County Employees	—	—	—
n. Industrial Leaders	—	—	—
o. Retail Merchants	—	—	—
p. Bankers and Executives of Other Financial Institutions	—	—	—
q. Other Businessmen	—	—	—
r. Other (please list)			
_____	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—

Card 3

	Union Has:		Union Was:				
	Formally Bargained Over	Not Formally Bargained, But Was Active in Debate Over	Very Effective	Effective	Don't Know	Ineffective	Very Ineffective
Salary Scales	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Fringe Benefits	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Job Classifications	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Selection Standards	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Promotion Standards	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Training Program Contents	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
One-Man Car Assignments	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Divisional, Beat Assignments	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Shift, Hour Schedules	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Affirmative Action Programs	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian Review Policies	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Selection of Police Chief Executives	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others (please list)							
_____	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

IV-11

Card 4

	Function Not Performed Here	Office of the Chief of Police	Internal Police Personnel Office	Office of the Mayor/City Manager	Civil Service Commission/ Personnel Board	City Personnel Office	Other (Specify)
Establish entrance qualification standards							
Prepare examination announcements							
Construct written examinations							
Purchase selection tests							
Determine job-relatedness of tests and other selection procedures							
Conduct job or task analysis							
Prepare job specifications or position descriptions							
Develop pay schedules							
Conduct recruitment programs							
Screen applicants for eligibility prior to written tests							
Determine minimum acceptable test scores							
Decide appeals to written test scores							
Determine candidate eligibility after written tests							
Conduct:							
● Psychological or psychiatric appraisals							
● Oral interviews							
● Background investigations							
● Polygraph examinations							
● Physical agility tests							
Evaluate background investigations							
Certify eligible candidates for appointment							
Develop performance appraisal mechanisms							
Develop promotion standards							
Certify eligible candidates for promotion							
Plan and conduct in-service training programs							
Establish discipline procedures							
Operate an employee grievance and appeals systems							
Engage in collective bargaining with employee unions or associations							
Administer an employee pension and benefit system							
Conduct exit interviews and evaluations with departing employees							

IV-12

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The police department here is operated in strict accordance with "merit" principles					
Lateral entry is/would be a good program for our police department					
The police union/association here has been gaining strength over the past five years					
The personnel rules and regulations here are so rigid and binding that they keep responsible police officials from trying new experiments with the police department					
Our police officers can be "professionals" and "union men" at the same time; the two are generally compatible					
Higher educational standards for our police will lead to to better police service					
City politics and political considerations almost never intrude into the administration of the police department					
Our police department should assign civilians to any of its positions which do not require the exercise of authority or the application of specialized police skills					
The police department often receives requests for special services and consideration from city political figures					
The standards on police proposed by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals are just too idealistic to be actually implemented here					
The standards on police proposed by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals are just too expensive to be actually implemented here					
The police chief here can usually get the police union/association to go along with him on things he wants to do in the department					
The single most important factor in police assignments here is city politics and political considerations					
The single most important factor in police promotions here is seniority					
Too many of the police chief's managerial rights have been taken away by the local police unions					
Too many of the police chief's managerial rights have been taken away by other local civilian authorities					
The single most important factor in police assignments here is seniority					
The selection standards for local police are too narrow and binding					

(over)

Card 5 (continued)	Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
It takes too long to "go through channels" in the local personnel system to effectively discipline a police officer					
Getting good minority recruits is a serious problem for our police department					
Personal contact, friendship, and trust among the police officers are more important for an effective police department than most administrative experiments (like team policing, 4-day - 40-hour scheduling, etc.) suggested in recent years.					

Card 6

Issue: Whose support would be essential for winning a school board election?

Actor	Essential	Very Important But Not Essential	Moderately Important	Not Important at All
a. The City Council	___	___	___	___
b. The Mayor	___	___	___	___
c. The Democratic Party	___	___	___	___
d. The Republican Party	___	___	___	___
e. Church Leaders	___	___	___	___
f. Chamber of Commerce	___	___	___	___
g. Newspapers	___	___	___	___
h. Bar Associations	___	___	___	___
i. Labor Unions	___	___	___	___
j. Ethnic Groups	___	___	___	___
k. Neighborhood Groups	___	___	___	___
l. Heads of Local Government Agencies	___	___	___	___
m. City and County Employees	___	___	___	___
n. Industrial Leaders	___	___	___	___
o. Retail Merchants	___	___	___	___
p. Bankers and Executives of Other Financial Institutions	___	___	___	___
q. Other Businessmen	___	___	___	___
r. Other (please list)				
_____	___	___	___	___
_____	___	___	___	___

Card 7

Issue: Whose support wou'd be essential for winning a mayoral election?

Actor	Essential	Very Important, But Not Essential	Moderately Important	Not Important at All
a. The City Council	—	—	—	—
b. The Mayor	—	—	—	—
c. The Democratic Party	—	—	—	—
d. The Republican Party	—	—	—	—
e. Church Leaders	—	—	—	—
f. Chamber of Commerce	—	—	—	—
g. Newspapers	—	—	—	—
h. Bar Associations	—	—	—	—
i. Labor Unions	—	—	—	—
j. Ethnic Groups	—	—	—	—
k. Neighborhood Groups	—	—	—	—
l. Heads of Local Government Agencies	—	—	—	—
m. City and County Employees	—	—	—	—
n. Industrial Leaders	—	—	—	—
o. Retail Merchants	—	—	—	—
p. Bankers and Executives of Other Financial Institutions	—	—	—	—
q. Other Businessmen	—	—	—	—
r. Other (please list)				
_____	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—

Card 8

Issue: Whose support would be essential for starting an air pollution control program?

Actor	Essential	Very Important, But Not Essential	Moderately Important	Not Important at All
a. The City Council	—	—	—	—
b. The Mayor	—	—	—	—
c. The Democratic Party	—	—	—	—
d. The Republican Party	—	—	—	—
e. Church Leaders	—	—	—	—
f. Chamber of Commerce	—	—	—	—
g. Newspapers	—	—	—	—
h. Bar Associations	—	—	—	—
i. Labor Unions	—	—	—	—
j. Ethnic Groups	—	—	—	—
k. Neighborhood Groups	—	—	—	—
l. Heads of Local Government Agencies	—	—	—	—
m. City and County Employees	—	—	—	—
n. Industrial Leaders	—	—	—	—
o. Retail Merchants	—	—	—	—
p. Bankers and Executives of Other Financial Institutions	—	—	—	—
q. Other Businessmen	—	—	—	—
r. Other (please list)				
_____	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—

Card 9

Issue: Whose support would be essential for passing a community development block grant proposal?

Actor	Essential	Very Important, But Not Essential	Moderately Important	Not Important at All
a. The City Council	—	—	—	—
b. The Mayor	—	—	—	—
c. The Democratic Party	—	—	—	—
d. The Republican Party	—	—	—	—
e. Church Leaders	—	—	—	—
f. Chamber of Commerce	—	—	—	—
g. Newspapers	—	—	—	—
h. Bar Associations	—	—	—	—
i. Labor Unions	—	—	—	—
j. Ethnic Groups	—	—	—	—
k. Neighborhood Groups	—	—	—	—
l. Heads of Local Government Agencies	—	—	—	—
m. City and County Employees	—	—	—	—
n. Industrial Leaders	—	—	—	—
o. Retail Merchants	—	—	—	—
p. Bankers and Executives of Other Financial Institutions	—	—	—	—
q. Other Businessmen	—	—	—	—
. Other (please list)				
_____	—	—	—	—
_____	—	—	—	—

Appendix V
LETTER TO URBAN EXECUTIVE

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERVICE

1776 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NORTHWEST • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
DIAL AREA CODE 202—833-2505   CABLE ADDRESS: PASWA

Dear

    The purpose of this letter is to introduce you to a nationwide study of police civil service systems being conducted by Public Administration Service. PAS is a non-profit public interest organization that performs a wide variety of consulting and research work for public service institutions (see attached brochure).

    During the past decade, there has been considerable discussion surrounding the issue of "civil service" and the impact civil service has on local officials and their ability to properly manage police personnel resources. As you well know, the questions which surround this issue are numerous and complex.

    Our aim is to analyze a variety of municipal civil service and personnel decision-making systems in order to determine what impact (both positive and negative) these structures have on the ability of local officials to manage their police resources. To accomplish this task, we intend to analyze the police personnel systems in over 50 cities (see attached list) across the country. The cities that are being invited to participate in the study represent a random sample of U.S. cities with a population greater than 50,000.

    In return for participating in the survey, each city will receive a Personnel Practices Profile which provides an analysis of its own personnel practices and procedures in comparison with those of other U.S. cities. This diagnostic document will be of value to city officials and police managers in assessing the adequacy of their personnel structure and operations as they relate to other comparable U.S. cities.

    In order to receive this document, each police department will be asked to complete a questionnaire about important aspects of its police personnel practices. Ordinarily, this questionnaire will be completed by the person most knowledgeable of the city's police department personnel practices and procedures. In addition, we would like to hold an interview with the city officials responsible for the formulation and administration of the city's personnel system. Depending upon the city's government structure, these officials might include: the mayor or city manager, the police chief, the director of civil service and personnel director, and the president of the police employee's union.

    An experienced PAS staff will conduct the interviews and will be available to assist in the completion of the questionnaire. Naturally, information gathered from the questionnaire and during the interviews will be treated in the strictest confidence.

Because we feel this project will lead to improvements in the way municipalities structure their personnel programs and manage their police personnel resources, we hope that you will decide to participate. A member of our staff will be in touch with you to answer any questions you may have and to explain the details of the project.

Theodore Sitkoff
Executive Director

END