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Final Report on

DIMENSIONS OF VICTIMIZATION  
IN THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISTIC ACTS

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## F O R E W O R D

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This volume constitutes the final report on the international seminar held in Evian, France from June 3 - 5, 1977 on dimensions of victimization in the context of terroristic acts. It is a companion volume to the report on research strategies for the study of international political terrorism. Both volumes are aimed at promoting more extensive and relevant research in the field of terrorism and the accumulation and transfer of knowledge from a wide range of fields and professions to this area of increasing concern. The papers and analyses in this volume deal with a specific issue, that of terrorist victimization, in the broader context of the interface between research and policy, between the academic and the practitioner, between theory and practice. As such, it is addressed to both researchers and administrators and provides insights both into the question of conducting research in the terrorist context and the question of adapting research strategies to the needs of prevention and control programmes. It also provides insights into the general problem of terrorist victimization and the specific subtopic of the prolonged hostage siege. The role of psychiatry in prevention and control of hostage sieges is given special attention.

The many levels and perspectives represented in this volume highlight the importance of interdisciplinary, comparative research and the crucial significance of combining theory and practice by promoting cross-fertilization between those with operational responsibilities and those with academic or research interests.

Denis SZABO

Director  
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THE VICTIM OF TERRORISM - PSYCHIATRIC CONSIDERATIONS

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by

Frank OCHBERG

The following pages introduce the fourth international seminar on terrorism sponsored by the Centre International de Criminologie Comparée. Previous conferences have considered the history of terrorism as a political device, its use by government and by dissident groups, definitions, theories of etiology, responses by police and military, and the impact on the operations of the criminal justice system. During the last several years when these academic discussions were occurring there were also legislative hearings on terrorism, State Department conferences, FBI symposia, and various inter-governmental attempts to illuminate the phenomenon. Our charge in the current seminar is to examine the role of the victim of political terrorists. While broad enough to fill volumes, this charge is quite narrow when compared to the vast scope of subject matter encompassed in the definition of "terrorism." The reason for narrowing our boundary is obvious: a broad but necessarily superficial consideration of terrorism has occurred with sufficient regularity in the past three years to give persons of different disciplines, different roles, and different nationalities a common set of concepts and reference points. Every successful restatement of these common concepts has led to a recommendation to focus attention on one or more areas which has been relatively underexplored. Focusing permits deeper exploration and such deep digging may unearth new nuggets of value to all of us. The reason to concentrate on psychiatric aspects of the victim's experience may not be so clear. Victimization is nothing new. Coping with the stress of captivity has been studied in considerable detail during and after World War II. But to our knowledge there has never been an attempt to assemble world experts on stress, on coping, and on captivity in order to explore the phenomenon of victimization by political terrorists, and to do this exploration in the company of those charged with combating terrorism. Since the victim of terrorism is often a symbol of the government under siege, and since hostages released by terrorists have an immense audience provided by the media in the aftermath of a dramatic incident, these victims have an impact on public opinion and public sentiment which may be profound. A public which overreacts in outrage against the victims' helplessness may precipitate

harsh, simplistic counter-terrorist measures. A public which joins the victim in identifying with the terrorist-aggressor may undermine the morale and confidence of police. A public perplexed and alienated by the entire process may interfere with the bond of trust between government and governed which is necessary for the survival of democratic institutions. But, on the other hand, a public that is reasonably well aware of the repertoire of human responses which are effectively used by men and women under stress—even under the stress of terroristic threat and captivity—such a public will be able to participate in rational decision-making about national policy on terrorism.

There is another obvious reason to consider the victims of terrorism. They suffer. And their suffering may be misunderstood, or neglected when the tumult and drama of the notorious event has subsided. There are medically sound approaches to the diagnosis and treatment of such suffering which can and should be brought to bear on these cases. Since terrorists' victims are often the unwitting and unwilling proxies for assault on the state itself, the state might well concern itself with reparation, provision of free care, support to family members, and vigilant attention to the possibility of delayed psychiatric disability. Israel does this. Holland does not, but is vigorously debating the issue. The U.S.A. has not yet broached the subject formally, but undoubtedly will. In fact, the deliberations of the conferees at this seminar may well advance the search for an appropriate role for government with respect to these victims.

The clinical method of inquiry often begins with a close look at a single illustrative case, and we shall do so here. Although there are unfortunately many to choose from, none could be better than the experience of Mr. Gerard Vaders, a mature, sensitive, newspaper editor who was held for 13 days on that ill-fated train from Groningen, in December 1975. The point in presenting Mr. Vaders' story is to raise general issues about the hostage situation, about the role of the victim, about stress, coping, and psychological effects. It is not my intention to diagnose or psychoanalyze Mr. Vaders' behavior. I am grateful to him for the time he took to tell me his story, and for the courage he showed in taking the notes which permitted a detailed published account of this bizarre experience.

### The Moluccan Train

The basic facts of the siege are well known. At 10:00 AM on December 2 the train from Groningen to Amsterdam was boarded and stopped by seven masked gunmen on a flat, dreary piece of land near

Beilen. The engineer was shot and during the ensuing period of negotiation under duress two hostages were executed. One terrorist and a hostage were injured when an automatic rifle discharged accidentally. The assaulting group were of the Free South Moluccan Youth Movement, and their cause was the separation and independence of their homeland from Indonesian rule. Their demands included release of political prisoners from Dutch and Indonesian jails, publicity of their cause, policy changes in Holland regarding Moluccan independence, and safe passage out of the country. They held 72 hostages at the outset, but allowed the number to dwindle to 23. Their weapons included pistols, automatic rifles, and sham explosives which were taped menacingly to all exit doors. One year later the Moluccan terrorists were in prison beginning 17-year sentences, and Mr. Vaders was back in his bustling newsroom, telling me the story he would rather forget.

"How do I feel now? It is complicated. I know I need to get back to this life, and to leave that other. But there are many who are still sitting on that train, waiting. Waiting for Godot .

"From the beginning it was different for me. I recognized the situation. The moment the Moluccans came in I felt back in the war. I was thinking, 'Keep you head cool. Face the crisis.' I knew there would soon be choices. Times to take risks. For instance, it was risky to sit there taking notes. That destroys your anonymity. I made the choice and took notes."

At this point I asked if the feelings at the beginning of the siege were like any others.

"There was an early experience. I must have been 17. I was sleeping in the room with my brother and all of a sudden the SS were standing there with machine pistols. They were on a reprisal raid because the resistance had murdered a Dutch collaborator. We were sent to a concentration camp in Holland. Every morning we had hours of 'appel'—lining up in freezing weather. But I was young looking and had fair hair. I came to the attention of the SS officer in charge. He asked my age and I lied, 'Sixteen.' I remember him saying, 'My God, are we fighting children?' I was released the next day.

"There was also a time of similar feeling during the Ardennes offensive, when I came under fire... And in 1948 in Indonesia two hand grenades were thrown at me and I saw them at my feet. Neither one exploded."

We returned to the train: "...they threw the door open. There were two or three of them wearing black woolen balaclavas. I knew they were South Moluccans. The others thought P.L.O., but on their rifle butts you could see the colors. I recognized it from Indonesia.

"Although the memories are vivid, it wasn't so much a memory as a realization that I would have to mobilize reflexes like in the war.

"I still have guilt over the war. I did nothing bad, but not enough good. Not enough for the Jews. My sister did more and was in Dachau. Then I chose not to take too many risks.

"But on the train I did risk. I decided to write and to do it openly.

"For the first ten minutes I felt cool. Cooler than usual. I was even looking for humor in the situation. December 5th is our Santaklaus holiday when we give poems as presents. I was thinking how I wouldn't have to write poems this year.

"The others on the train were either sitting still or following orders. The Moluccans had us tape paper over the windows and many were doing that. One man seemed a little too aggressive. That was Mr. DeGroot.

"I was taping windows, too. I asked them if anyone was hurt. They said the driver wanted to be a hero and was shot. I asked if an ambulance should be called. They said, 'No. He's dead.' But he wasn't dead yet, as we later found out. I sat down and took notes.

"They saw me writing and didn't say anything, but tied me up with my hands behind my back and they tied me by the arms to the doorway so that I was like a curtain. I faced away from the passengers and toward the pool of blood from the driver. People could walk past me, under my arms. I knew they were planning to execute hostages...

"For a second I thought Mr. DeGroot was the Minister for Underdeveloped Countries who had come to negotiate our release. But that was a mirage.

"Then I thought that they executed DeGroot. We all did. One Moluccan was weeping and quoting the bible and saying, 'There is a time to kill...I do not hate you but I have to do it.' Actually, Mr. DeGroot escaped, but we never learned this until much later. At that time I was talking to them as much as possible.

"One terrorist told me he couldn't hate the Dutch, that he was married to a Dutch girl. (That was a lie.) They must have wanted us to like them.

"On the first day while I was hanging there they killed a soldier. (The first terrorist demand said hostages would be shot every thirty minutes until their request for a bus, a plane, and political recognition was granted.) I could see one of them shooting and hear a howl like a dog.

"They let me down in the afternoon. Prins, (a fellow hostage who had convinced everyone he was a doctor) massaged my arms for an hour. This was my first contact with another hostage during the ordeal. I tried to keep up the contact.

"The first night I began shivering. They had used my coat to mop up the blood of the driver. Then one of the passengers finally gave me another coat. Afterwards I learned that it was the coat of the dead soldier.

"The next morning I was full of fear. Sweating. Cramps in the stomach. Fighting away panic.

"Now I took notes by stealth.

"On the second night they tied me again to be a living shield and left me in that position for seven hours. The one who was most psychopathic kept telling me, 'Your time has come. Say your prayers.' They had selected me for the third execution.

"I had different impulses. One was to reason with them. But I suppressed that. I thought that would strengthen their resolve. The second impulse was to flee. I would have had to untie both hands, feet and the door. I had one hand slightly free, but I would not have had time to do the rest.

"I was preparing for execution. Making up a balance. My life philosophy is that there is some plus and some minus and everyone ends up close to zero. Some say that is pessimistic. I think it is realistic. I was fifty years old. It had not been a bad life. I'm not happy with my life, but satisfied. I had everything that makes life human.

"But you weren't executed," I said. "How did you feel?"

"You won't believe this. Disappointed."

"I had the impulse to say, 'Let that man go and let me go in his place,' but the words stuck..."

"I felt...I feel guilty." (He had a sad look then.)

"In the morning, when I knew I was going to be executed I asked to talk to Prins, to give him a message for my family. I wanted to explain my family situation. My foster child - her parents had been killed - she did not get along too well with my wife, and I had at that time a crisis in my marriage just behind me. I hoped my wife would get a new purpose in her life by concentrating on that child. There were other things, too. Somewhere I had the feeling that I had failed as a human being. I explained all this and the terrorists insisted on listening. Dr. Mulders and Dr. Bastiaans think that saved my life." (I do also. He was no faceless symbol any more. He certainly was no hero. All his human flaws were exposed and the Moluccans could not execute him.)

"After that they didn't isolate me any more. They said, 'We have others to kill.' I was sitting next to this woman and across from a young man named Bierling (a 33 year old father of two). They came and pointed to Bierling and led him away and shot him."

That must have been the point of maximum horror for Mr. Vaders. Considering his feelings of guilt and shame from previous "survivals", this one must have been excruciating.

"The days went by and we somehow knew there would be no more executions. Only Eli, the psychopathic one, wanted a fourth killing, but the others talked him out of it. I was worried when Paul left. He was sensitive and intelligent and he seemed to balance out Eli. But Paul was wounded when a gun went off and had to go to the hospital.

"There was a growing sense that the authorities were mishandling the situation. They sent us food, but no utensils. The mayor of Beilen made a stupid announcement.

"And you had to fight a certain feeling of compassion for the Moluccans. I know this is not natural, but in some way they come over human. They gave us cigarettes and blankets. But we also realized that they were killers. You try to suppress that in your consciousness. And I knew I was suppressing that. I also knew that they were victims, too. In the long run they would be as much victims as we. Even more. You saw their morale crumbling. You experienced the disintegration of their personalities. The growing of despair. Things dripping through their fingers. You couldn't help but feel a certain pity. For people at the beginning with egos like gods - impregnable, invincible - they end up small, desperate, feeling all that was in vain."

I asked about after-effects and learned that Mr. Vaders lost a great deal of weight and had a long illness which went undiagnosed from the summer of 1976 until a gallstone operation in November brought relief. His relationship with his wife improved dramatically. There was much discussion, reconciliation, and a decision to spend far more time together.

He wrote some stories which were critical of the government and these aroused a great many threatening calls and letters. The government claimed he was sick, several colleagues spread rumors that he made a deal with the Moluccans to spare his life in return for a favorable press, and a police dossier emerged claiming that he had Communist connections. He drank more and smoked more, then cut it all out precipitously.

His daughter had a great deal of difficulty watching all the aggression leveled at him, dropped out of school, and needed some psychological support.

He had no dreams and no fantasies that he can remember during the siege, but beginning one week after release he had nightmares for one week in which he was threatened by guns. These have not recurred.

His negative feelings about the way the government handled the case have abated, and he is willing to help develop future policy. (He sits on a national committee for this purpose.) But he notes that the Ministry of Justice is very sensitive to criticism. "They think they do their best and that we should just express gratitude."

### Significant Points in the Case

Gerard Vaders is a human being, alive today because he overcame the natural inhibitions which shroud intimate life details, and he displayed his true self to committed executioners. Ironically, this display of humanness could only occur after Mr. Vaders reconciled himself to death. Of course there can be no certainty in conjecture about precise reasons for the Moluccans' change of heart, nor can we know definitively why they chose him for execution in the first instance. As a note taker and newsman (he told the Moluccans that much but never admitted editing the largest paper in north Holland), he stood out from the crowd. As a living curtain, suspended between compartments of the train, he was the nearest thing to an inanimate object. Disposing of curtains is easier than disposing of persons.

Mr. Vaders told me that he insisted on telling Mr. Prins all the details which should be conveyed to his wife and family, and he gave a great deal of background so that Mr. Prins could understand the message. The Moluccans tried to hurry this process at first, but Mr. Vaders was quite resolute and managed to overcome their objections. This is reminiscent of Judge DiGennaro, who was kidnapped by Italian terrorists, and told me, "I gave up all hope of life and I was free to be brave." Bravery did not mean attempting escape (he was bound and blindfolded throughout) but rather telling the captors exactly what was on his mind. Vaders showed a certain blend of courage and resignation which may have reminded the Moluccans of themselves.

His initial response to danger was classical. There was a period of arousal in which he felt cool, assessed the threat, and made physical and mental preparations. He was not particularly aware of bodily needs, visceral changes, or the falling temperature in the train during this beginning phase. However, he did suffer a collapse of sorts after the first night ended. There are rhythms in stress responses. Mr. Vaders may have entered what Hans Selye calls the "stage of exhaustion" (see below). Several other hostages in different settings have reported striking changes in their ability to function smoothly after dawn of the second day, or after the first period of sleep. The phenomenon is recognized; the mechanisms are not fully understood.

Mr. Vaders' response to danger was also idiosyncratic. Stress researchers have emphasized that both physiological and psychological patterns show striking individual differences, related to life history rather than the form or intensity of the threatening stressor. The other victims on the train were showing varied patterns of activity, emotion and interaction throughout the siege.

To cope with captivity and the threat of death, Mr. Vaders employed several familiar devices. Researchers in this field, such as Drs. David Hamburg and Richard Lazarus, call these "coping mechanisms." First, Mr. Vaders assumed a familiar role. He became a journalist. In this role he could concentrate his attention, conserve his energy, and feel a certain amount of professional self-esteem. Preserving self-esteem is often more important to the individual than preserving life - a striking finding in the examination of these hostage incidents. Furthermore, Mr. Vaders gathered information throughout his ordeal. Good copers do this. Others may constrict their view of events in order to ward off threatening perceptions. Although denial of overwhelmingly negative input may be necessary to preserve the ego, one's ability to scan the environment, to perceive quickly and accurately, to gain further knowledge from a peer group in a similar plight, are all critical mechanisms for coping with stress. Mr. Vaders employed these mechanisms. Moreover, Mr. Vaders affiliated with his fellow captives. The ability to form and preserve affective bonds is necessary for normal human development, is adaptive in negotiating the usual life crises, and is critical in extreme situations such as captivity. Dr. Leo Eitinger and others who have studied concentration camp survivors have documented and developed this point.

Mr. Vaders had a mild case of "Stockholm syndrome." Named for the dramatic and unexpected realignment of affections in the Sveriges Kreditbank robbery, this syndrome consists of a positive bond between hostage and captor, and feelings of distrust or hostility on the part of the victim toward the authorities. In Mr. Vaders' case the negative display toward government was more intense than the affection for the Moluccans. Both feelings began in the early days of the siege, crested in the immediate aftermath, and diminished over time. Some positive feeling toward the kindlier of the captors remains; negative feelings toward the government officials have abated. This is by now a recognized feature of hostage situations. It does not occur in every instance, but is frequent enough to be considered by police in the management of protracted negotiations.

Finally, Mr. Vaders suffered a series of physical and emotional after-effects which are characteristic of such situations. His weight fell markedly, not only during the period of captivity and restricted intake, but afterwards. His protracted abdominal distress may or may not have been due to gall bladder disease. Gastrointestinal dysfunction after prolonged stress is not uncommon. A variety of mechanisms and target organs may be involved. Changes in eating, drinking, and smoking habits bridge the processes of physical and emotional re-equilibration. For instance emotion affects appetite, appetite affects nutrition, nutrition affects physical health, which in turn affects appetite and emotion.

Mr. Vaders did rather well psychologically, and as noted, his marriage emerged stronger than before the event. In several other cases victims have described feelings of "rebirth" and returned to family and friends with new resolve to place relationships on firmer ground. The fact that Mr. Vaders' daughter had difficult days, is, sadly, a common occurrence. Loved ones do suffer by extension of the trauma into their lives, and they may not be protected by the mobilization of support which occurs within and around the victim. Mr. Vaders' nervous system was activated, his coping skills were employed, his friends were rallied. This is not unlike the patient at death's door with a serious illness who ends up comforting his distraught relatives.

Having identified these factors in Mr. Vaders' situation, let us turn to a consideration of the general areas which have been raised. These are stress, coping, the Stockholm syndrome, and the delayed effects of captivity. These subjects will merely be introduced in this paper, but will be expanded by Drs. Roth, Tinklenberg, and Eitinger, and discussed in depth at the seminar in June.

#### Stress:

The father of modern stress research is Hans Selye, who began major publications in the 1950s and remains active today. Selye and his followers use the term, stress, to include all those responses common to organisms which are provoked from a state of equilibrium into disequilibrium. Stress is not the provocation, but rather the condition of the organism in response to provocation. There are many "stressors" or provocations, such as cold, disease, or threat of death. As an aside, it is interesting to note that policemen in counter-terrorist situations are often immune to threats of physical harm, but extremely stressed by fear of failure. The whole world is watching. In particular, their peers and senior officers are watching. They have been trained and conditioned to remain poised in the face of considerable danger, and this they do magnificently. But their training does not extend to insulation against the judgment of fellow officers.

There is a definite rhythm and tempo to the human organism's stress response. Although this varies from person to person, Selye has defined a general pattern and labeled it G.A.S. - General Adaptation Syndrome. Stage I is Alarm. At first the body's resistance is lowered (shock phase) and then resistance is raised as physiological defenses are mobilized (countershock phase). Stage II is Resistance, during which maximum adaptation occurs. The pounding heart and nervous excitability of the alarm stage will have diminished, but the adrenal

glands are enlarged and the body is prepared to function with major organ systems at peak output. Should the state of stress persist until reserves are depleted, a final state of Exhaustion will be entered.

More recent research has attempted to tease out specific circuits for aspects of stress responses. At one time it was generally believed that body and mind were aroused together from a state of tranquility to one of readiness for action in the face of stressful stimulation. But as more sophisticated psychological and physiological measures were made, it became clear that dissociation of arousal occurs. To put it rather simply, the thinking circuits may be on high output while the autonomic (automatic fight-flight) circuits are on low, or vice versa. Obviously, understanding these mechanisms has relevance to siege management. The authorities may feel that their attempts to manipulate food, water, light and heat, or even to administer sedatives, will bring hostage-holders to the stage of physiological exhaustion. But in fact, they may be diminishing the capacity for rational thought by reducing Central Nervous System arousal, while disinhibiting the visceral and autonomic systems. The result is a finely tuned animal, unfettered by reason, dangerously coiled and ready to spring.


Dr. Benjamin Weybrew, of the U.S. Navy Medical Department has attempted to explain relationships among psychological and physiological factors in stress states. His diagram, displayed on the following page, is included here simply to illustrate the complex array of human components which must be considered in any detailed explanation of stress. Individuals vary with respect to each of these components, and also with respect to the way these components impact on physical and emotional systems within the person. Weybrew draws our attention to predispositional factors which determine an individual's pattern for responding to various stressors. These patterns are shaped by previous external events (primary stressors) and are stimulated by current provocation (secondary stressors). The outcome of all of these processes will either be a compensatory adjustment to stress, or decompensation.

At a Canadian symposium on psychological stress, over a decade ago, the co-chairmen summed up the voluminous studies in the field with a series of eight general observations that hold true today. Mortimer Appley and Richard Trumbull wrote:

"1. Stress is probably best conceived as a state of the total organism under extenuating circumstances rather than as an event in the environment.

"2. A great variety of different environmental conditions are capable of producing a stress state.

Schema of variable interactions affecting adjustment to stress -Weybrew



"3. Different individuals respond to the same conditions in different ways. Some enter rapidly into a stress state, others show increased alertness and apparently improved performance, and still others appear to be 'immune' to the stress-producing qualities of the environmental conditions.

"4. The same individual may enter into a stress state in response to one presumably stressful condition and not to another.

"5. Consistent intra-individual but varied inter-individual psychobiological response patterns occur in stress situations. The notion of a common stress reaction needs to be reassessed.

"6. The behaviors resulting from operations intended to induce stress may be the same or different, depending on the context of the situation of its induction.

"7. The intensity and the extent of the stress state, and the associated behaviors, may not be readily predicted from a knowledge of the stimulus conditions alone, but require an analysis of underlying motivational patterns and of the context in which the stressor is applied.

"8. Temporal factors may determine the significance of a given stressor and thus the intensity and extent of the stress state and the optimum measure of effect."

#### Coping with Stress:

In general, psychiatry deals with failure: failure to develop normally, failure to think rationally, failure to tolerate life crises. But it is at least as important that both psychiatrists and non-psychiatrists deal with the opposite of failure. Humans have various methods and styles of succeeding as well as failing. These coping devices, when they are successful, result in four positive achievements. First, whatever task or crisis or stressor is currently being faced is met and brought to resolution. Secondly, anxiety is kept within tolerable limits. Thirdly, self-esteem is maintained. And finally, relationships with others are preserved. Dr. David Hamburg developed this formulation after studying people facing wide varieties of stressful situations: parents of leukemic children at the National Institutes of Health, high school students gearing up for the transition to college, disfigured and dying patients in the Army Burns Center, doctors sweating out qualifying exams. Although intelligence certainly helps an individual cope with crisis, and neurotic traits often interfere, coping is quite distinct from brainpower and sanity. Among persons of average and low intelligence there are those who cope well and those who cope poorly. The

same may be said for neurotic and even psychotic individuals. Some cope better than others. What then are the methods employed by "good copers?" As noted in Mr. Vaders' instance, the ability to assume a familiar role in a novel situation, to lead from strength, as it were, is one device. Copers also will frequently rehearse a new role, or fantasy the role, trying it on for size, if actual rehearsal is impossible. For instance, most of the high school students who made a good adjustment to college away from home had visited on their own, had imagined awkward or demanding situations before they actually encountered them, and in general prepared themselves for a role apart from their parents and their familiar friends. The USIA has a training program for embassy staff which promotes rehearsal for the role of political hostage. More than simply taking security precautions, such rehearsal involves actively imagining seizure and captivity, in order to familiarize oneself with one's own range of emotional reactions.

Copers learn from peers. In negotiating the usual life crises, such as moving away from parents, marriage, loss of loved ones, retirement and physical decline, they will assimilate almost intuitively the successful strategies of age-mates and of those slightly older. This does not mean that the coper is merely imitative. A fair amount of creativity, and even risk-taking behavior characterizes their style. But they do learn well from others.

Learning occurs in other modes: attention to the environment, to books, and to internal cues. Occasionally one can be overwhelmed by negative, albeit accurate, input. This was often the case with burned patients and the parents of children with leukemia. Those who endured such devastating stress with the more favorable outcomes seemed to make good use of denial. That is, they unconsciously refused to perceive and comprehend the total situation at first. Then, as they built up sufficient psychological reserve to stand the full impact of their tragedy, they assimilated more and more until the whole truth was laid bare.

Good copers manage to hear constructive criticism, but not to allow a negative appraisal to damage their self-esteem. They devalue the impact of failure. Should a promotion not come through, they would be likely to think, "I'll get it next time," or "The boss didn't see me at my best," or "I really wasn't too interested in that job anyway." They might decide improvement was warranted in certain areas, but they would not think, "I'm no damn good." There is a continuing process of adjusting expectation to reality. Mr. Vaders did that as he philosophized about the balance sheet of life.

Obviously, those of us concerned with victims of hostage-taking terrorists will want to learn more about successful coping devices in this particular circumstance. There is evidence from other cases of victimization that the greatest area of vulnerability is one's self-esteem. Feelings of humiliation, debasement, depression and alienation are found when one does not cope successfully. Perhaps all of us in our own fields can contribute to successful victim coping. Israel lionizes its war heroes and considers victims of terrorism to be soldiers of the state. New Scotland Yard includes ex-hostages in the training seminars for police negotiators. This contributes to the victims' sense of worth, even though the motive is not one of therapy for the hostage. And the Netherlands has several victims on the national terrorist crisis committee. Moreover, the Dutch have task forces to study the effects of victimization and to offer clinical assistance.

Many victims cope remarkably well. As government officials realize this, and make better use of the experience and skills of ex-hostages, relationships between victims and the authorities should improve. As noted above, these relationships are often strained, particularly when hostages cope by identifying with their captors, rather than their would-be liberators.

#### The Stockholm Syndrome:

We defined the Stockholm Syndrome above as that unholy alliance between terrorist and captive, involving fear, distrust or anger toward the authorities on the outside. Many of us have been asking ourselves who is prone to this syndrome? When does it form? How long does it last? And why does it occur? Persons of all ages and both sexes have described surprisingly positive feelings towards their captors. Men in their fifties such as Dr. Herrema and Sr. DiGennaro use paternal phrases when comparing their emotions to the warmth they feel for their own children. One of the hostages from London's Spaghetti House siege told me he would like to give Frank Davis (the gang leader) a pack of his favorite cigarettes, then shake a finger at him and say, "You know, Frank, you did a bad thing." It was a parental wish, full of kindness and concern.

The original Stockholm victim was a young woman who apparently had intimate relations with the robber, Olsson, in the vault, and lasting affection for him afterwards. Similar affections with or without sexual relationships have been described in kidnappings and sieges. The data available to us will not support conclusions about particular personality types who identify with captors.

Sir Geoffrey Jackson, England's former Ambassador to Uruguay, exemplifies one type who does avoid the Stockholm syndrome by identifying with government throughout captivity, and maintaining as much distance and dignity as circumstances permit. His account of 244 days in a Tupamaro prison is now a classic—"Surviving the Long Night."

The positive bonds do not form immediately, but seem well established by the third day. In half a dozen recent interviews with ex-hostages I had difficulty establishing the onset of the syndrome because time sense was such a blur. No victim described the course of growing affection in detail. Once aware of the feeling, it was there, more or less, for the duration of contact. Fond memories remain as long as two years, which is as long as any of my interviewees have been free after captivity.

Various theories have been proposed to explain the phenomenon. A colleague at Tavistock wonders if we aren't seeing the pseudo-intimacy of any marathon group experience. It is common in group psychotherapy, encounter groups, and "sensitivity training" to have sudden, superficial feelings of closeness which occasionally result in long term relationships. That small group phenomenon might be a contributing factor, but wouldn't account for the strength of feeling between captive and captor, as opposed to other possible dyads. The term "identification with the aggressor" is often used. This of course refers to the psychoanalytic concept of identification with a punitive parent-figure and incorporation of his aggressive qualities. But these victims do not necessarily incorporate the terrorists' violence. There have not been recent examples, to my knowledge, of torturing fellow captives in the manner of SS guards, as occurred in Nazi camps when prisoners did take on the character of their wardens. It seems rather that hostages successfully deny the danger engineered by the terrorists. Having separated this from awareness, they are overwhelmingly grateful to the terrorist for giving them life. They focus on the captor's kindnesses, and not his acts of brutality. Intellectual appreciation of the terrorists' cause may be related to this irrational affection, but the relationship is not complete. That is, one can love a captor and not his cause, and vice versa.

Factors which seem to promote the Stockholm syndrome are the intensity of the experience, the duration (but after three or four days, duration has little meaning), the dependence of the hostage on the captor for survival, and the psychological distance of the hostage from government. Ambassador Jackson had little distance, Mr. Vaders had more, and Kristin in the Kreditbank was quite distant.

When the Stockholm syndrome is blatant, it has considerable significance to all concerned. Police negotiators cannot confide in the hostages if an assault is planned and a warning could be delivered in advance. The prosecution has lost its star witness. The terrorist cause may be promoted. And trust between government and the public at large is strained if not undermined. But, on the other hand, life is spared. The positive bond protects both hostage and hostage-taker. And insofar as life is spared, all parties come out ahead.

#### Delayed Effects:

There are four clusters of negative psychiatric sequelae which have been described by these victims, and which correlate with similar post-traumatic reactions. First are the anxiety responses. These tend to be seen soon after the event, although they may be triggered by anniversaries and incidents which stir memories long afterward. Nightmares, nightsweats, startle reactions to loud noises, inability to concentrate, and other symptoms of uncontrolled anxiety are not uncommon. As mentioned above, this degree of emotionality may lead to unfortunate self-medication, drug abuse, alcoholism, and dietary changes detrimental to health. Symptomatic treatment is indicated, and is important. In addition, the clinician should consider earlier traumata which may have been awakened by the latest episode. Dr. Jan Bastiaans has noted this in his treatment of concentration camp survivors, and now again in victims of terrorist sieges.

Physical and psychophysiological complaints form the next cluster. Exactly how physical ailment is connected to psychological stress is still debated. It should be remembered that there is a great deal of physical stress in the captivity situation as well. There may be head injury, dehydration, contaminated food, frostbite, and a host of other stressors. Thorough medical examination and re-examination is indicated.

Depression has been described although not labeled as such by several interviewees. In the concentration camp literature, anhedonia is often mentioned, a pervading joylessness which lasts decades and seems impervious to therapy, to reunion with loved ones, and to successes in any sphere of life. I have not seen this extreme form, even in relatives of victims who were killed, but others may have. There is a hint that depression deepens as the memories and positive feelings associated with the dramatic event fade. This is a loss like any other, and reactive depressions often follow losses, particularly when one has felt ambivalent about the person or object which is lost,

and normal grief is inhibited.

Finally, there is a paranoid pattern, in which negative feelings are projected and victims feel watched, threatened and persecuted. There may be a grain of truth in these feelings. The ex-hostage is suddenly a public figure, and his story is known by strangers. If he speaks ill of his captor, he may fear reprisal on very rational grounds. But for some victims, and family members as well, the fear is out of proportion to reality and takes on the characteristics of a delusion—a fixed, false belief.

There are two schools of thought about prevention of negative consequences in all of these cases. One is to let the victim forget, to be as unobtrusive as possible, to keep medical intervention to a minimum and avoid any suggestion that psychiatric care could be beneficial, unless it is specifically requested by the victim or the family. There is a lot to be said for this position. Few countries have the resources to treat victims adequately, so vigorous case-finding may raise expectations for therapies which are unavailable. Many victims cope perfectly well without professional help, seek only the support of family and friends, and do not want the additional burden of a medical or psychiatric label interfering with their attempts to readjust to work and home.

Obviously, the other viewpoint holds that victims of intense and protracted sieges are at high risk for further pain and problems, that the government owes them at least an opportunity for diagnosis and care, and that good care can be found, and should be found. Not only is it medically proper and humane to proffer this care, but it is politically prudent. They have suffered as symbols of the state; they can heal at state expenses and, one hopes, contribute symbolically and substantively to the lawful improvement of the society which the terrorist was unlawfully assaulting.


#### The Spectacular Context:

From a medical point of view the victims of modern terrorism are not very different from other victims of trauma and threat. Medical expertise in this field derives from the general studies of stress and coping, which have been briefly mentioned here, from the more specific studies of wartime stress, concentration camps, and POWs (for an excellent recent review see Julius Segal, et al, "Universal consequences of captivity: stress reactions among divergent populations of prisoners

of war and their families." *Int. Soc. Sci. J.*, 1976), and from the merging field of victimology. This latter field concerns itself with all victims and amalgamates the insights of doctors, lawyers, police, academicians, and persons who have been victimized. Emilio Viano edits an international journal, scarcely one year old, which is devoted to victimology.

Any one of these fields of study—stress, coping, captivity, victimology—is a springboard for analyzing the particular plight of the victim of terrorism. But in certain respects, the current wave of terrorism is unique, and the victim must be considered in the context which is specific to this new wave. The epitome of terrorist techniques is the planned siege. Hostages are held in a public place and threatened with execution. Demands are made of government, either for payment, publicity, passage, prisoner release, or policy change. The press is always part of the picture, broadcasting events to the public at large, and showing every decision-maker struggling with impossible choices. Those terrorist groups which have as a long range objective the destabilization of a society and the fall of the regime in power are pleased when the public watches its governing officials squirm. Some revolutionary theorists hold that the authorities will eventually crack under the strain of humiliating harassment, will turn repressive to an intolerable degree, and will fall in a popular revolt (e.g., Marighella). Others feel that publicity will arouse world sympathy and their ultimate goals will be realized through political and diplomatic channels. When the stakes are this high, involving the stability of governments and the relationships among nations, it is tragically easy to forget about the victim in the siege room. The chart below illustrates some of the factors and forces which interrelate in the terrorist siege, and which form the context for viewing each victim:

The three circles in the diagram represent three distinct arenas of action. On the left is the actual incident. Here the terrorist holds and threatens the victim. However, the victim is seldom the real target of the terrorist. Targets are outside of the siege room, often in the political arena. Through demands made of government officials (sometimes publicized and sometimes not) and through the extensive media coverage which brings the events of the incident before the public at large, the stage is set for political drama. As the public perceive the unfolding action, they will increase or decrease confidence in government. And this confidence, or trust, between government and governed is a two-way street. Leaders can mistrust or trust the populace just as a population can have more or less faith in its leadership. Western democracies are founded on this corridor of trust. This is not the place to explore the history and psychodynamics of such trust, but we should remind ourselves that trust is a basic component of human behavior, forged in infancy at a primitive, unconscious level, but reinforced in



*THE HOSTAGE INCIDENT FLOW CHART*

adulthood by the realistic fulfillment of expectations. Trust in the political arena like trust among family members will depend in part upon emotional factors, and in part upon objective assessment of behavior.

Obviously the media play a major role in shaping public opinion which in turn affects government options. The government, well aware of public opinion, translates politics into incident management through the formulation of policy and the delegation of decision-making authority within the bureaucracy. These functions are pictured at the right of the chart. Governments vary considerably with respect to negotiation policy, use of assault teams, and crisis management in general. Prior experience with terrorist incidents invariably affects a nation's choice of policy, strategy, and tactics. Certainly the effectiveness with which police implement tactics, be they negotiation or assault, will have profound impact on outcome, opinion, trust, and future policy. Hence the three arenas of action depicted in the diagram are interrelated. And the link of greatest significance within this chain of events is that vulnerable bond of trust between government and governed.

While the chart was drawn with the hostage incident in mind, it could logically extend to any case in which public sentiment is stirred by a politically motivated crime against innocents. The hostage case pits the government against the terrorist in a battle of wits while known lives hang in the balance. Threats to unleash diabolical weapons affect potential victims, but still place the government in jeopardy, making decisions under duress. Bombings and assassinations affect innocent victims, polarise public opinion, and force consideration of potentially unpopular measures, but they do not bring government directly into the incident with options to capitulate, negotiate or assault as in the overt siege.

Although the events described here are quite complex, they evoke primitive emotions and cries for simplistic solutions. It is unfortunate that the channel of communication from victim to public is open for so brief a time, and in the presence of competing concern about police tactics, negotiations with terrorists, and all the other elements on the diagram. The stress which these victims endure, the coping mechanisms they display, the human interaction they achieve in the face of death should give an anxious public the patience to consider policy carefully and dispassionately. Just as terrorists find it easier to vent their rage at victims who are mere symbols (a curtain rather than a man) the public may treat victims of sieges, and the whole spectacle, as characters in a novel who elicit passion rather than thought. Any

effort to reduce sensationalism and to promote a detailed exchange of information between victims and those who are capable of caring about victims should help society as a whole cope with terrorist threat.

Summary:

Terrorism is a special crime: deadly, difficult, and staged for a world audience. Motives and patterns vary through time, and there are many variations of terrorism occurring at this moment. We have focussed on one pattern: the siege-with-hostages, and on one element within that pattern: the victim. That victim feels stress, copes with stress, and endures a host of physical and psychological maladies. Our understanding of his experience is based on several scientific disciplines and several recent fields of study. The disciplines include, among others, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, criminology, and law. The fields of inquiry include stress, coping, captivity, and victimology. None of these disciplines and none of these related research areas is sufficient to embrace the topic under consideration. For the hostage-victim must be seen in the singular, dramatic context which characterizes modern terrorism. This involves a free press, trust between government and governed, world interdependence, sophisticated technology, vulnerable targets, and passionate, sometimes primitive, people.

The exploration of a new field, and this is in many respects a new field, requires considerable patience and understanding. There are no true experts, but there are many whose expertise in closely related areas will advance our knowledge and improve our capacity to act. Those who have the responsibility to develop government policy or to implement authorized strategy are, of necessity, developing their own expertise. Obviously, each of us brings a different viewpoint, a different idiom, a different set of experiences to the topic. Hopefully we will hear each other and learn with each other. The victim of terrorism represents our own vulnerability in this modern age. As he copes, we cope. And as we reconcile our differences and pool our abilities, we survive.

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SESSION ON STRESS

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PSYCHOMATIC IMPLICATIONS OF  
CONFINEMENT BY TERRORISTS  
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by

Walton T. ROTH

After a terrorist attack or siege has ended, the authorities and survivors survey what damage has been done. Physicians describe the physical damage done to the victims' bodies in terms of the body tissue damage caused by guns and other instruments of violence. Psychiatrists try to assess the damage done to the victims' psyche by the terrifying events that have taken place. It is possible that something will be missed, however, in the ordinary physical and psychological evaluation. The victim has been exposed to a situation in which many subtle physical changes take place in the body as a response to the stressor in that situation. These changes may be only temporary, but as I shall argue, such changes may leave a permanent mark on the body that affects future health. Furthermore, the stress response of the body is not limited in time to reactions during attack or captivity. Changes in one's life produced by either pleasant or unpleasant events can have implications for future health. The extremely unpleasant situation of being the victim of terrorism has an impact that reaches far beyond the time of capture, an impact that may result in further stress reactions.

### The Physiology of Stress

Bodily response to threatening situations occurs in three basic response systems: the skeletal muscular system, the autonomic nervous system and the endocrine system. We are all familiar with the fight or flight responses that are enabled by the postural and locomotive functions of the skeletal muscular system. Somewhat less obvious are the numerous adjustments of the autonomic nervous system that also support the fight or flight response. The autonomic nervous system regulates physiological systems that are usually beyond voluntary control such as the constriction and dilation of blood vessels. Recent research has

shown that some voluntary control of such functions can be learned by biofeedback, but at best, the control is far less than that over skeletal muscles. Autonomic regulation is accomplished by adjustments in the balance of the two principal divisions of the autonomic nervous system: the sympathetic and the parasympathetic. The two branches are distinct anatomically and when they are stimulated they usually have opposing effects on the end organs they control. The sympathetic nervous system is, at least initially, activated during stress. Some of the effects of such activation are listed in Table I. The heart beats faster and more strongly, blood is diverted from the skin to the muscles, the airways to the lungs open more widely, and digestive activities are suspended. The evolutionary significance of such changes is clear: they prepare the organism for immediate physical effort to meet the challenge of the stressor. The parasympathetic nervous system on the other hand may be either inhibited or activated during stress. However, it is sometimes difficult to know if an observed change is produced principally by sympathetic or parasympathetic effects. For example, the pupil of the eye dilates under stress, a change that could be obtained by stimulating the sympathetic system or by inhibiting the parasympathetic system. Both of these systems have a baseline rate of activation and it is essentially a change in the balance between these rates that produces effects on many of the end organs. Although this balance usually shifts to the sympathetic side under stress, there are some exceptions. The syndrome of vaso-vagal fainting represents an increase in parasympathetic activation in which heart rate slows and blood pressure falls, producing syncope. Another example of parasympathetic activation under stress is seen when subjects react with an increase in motility and tone of the gastrointestinal tract, resulting in diarrhea.

Many autonomic nervous system changes can be perceived directly by the person undergoing stress and may increase his feeling of being afraid. Endocrine responses to stress are even more widespread than autonomic responses but cannot be perceived by the subject in the same way. Table 2 lists some of the hormones and other chemical substances that have been assayed by stress researchers and found to change during or after stress. These chemical changes are interrelated in very complex ways. The anterior pituitary secretes stimulating hormones that affect other organs such as the adrenal cortex and thyroid. The hormones released by the adrenal cortex have effects on most body systems that result in wide-spread changes in body chemistry. Feedback systems exist that counteract the swings in hormone levels produced by stress. As in the case of the autonomic nervous system, stress affects an endocrinal system which is already operating at some baseline level.

The overall integration of the muscular, autonomic, and endocrine response systems is accomplished by the brain. The hypothalamus and limbic systems of the brain control the specific patterns of autonomic

and endocrine response. The cortex, though more remote from the neural pathways that control the stress response, often initiates the entire sequence by perceiving the threatening situation. The cortex is unnecessary if the stressor is pain or some other physical stimulus such as heat or cold. However, immediate physical discomfort does not always constitute the prime source of stress for people involved in terrorist action.

Selye in his description of the General Activation Syndrome emphasizes that there is a temporal sequence of events that occurs in prolonged and severe stress. His description of stress stages is based on the response of the adrenal cortex of rats exposed to severe stressors. Stage I is divided into the shock phase in which the adrenal cortex is normal in size but is being stimulated by ACTH from the pituitary and the counter-shock phase in which the adrenal cortex has enlarged. In Stage II, the stage of resistance, the adrenal cortex has returned to normal size but is still secreting more steroids than before. In a sense this is an adjustment to chronic stress. Stage III, or the stage of exhaustion, only comes about when the stressor is intense and prolonged. During this stage the adrenal cortex enlarges again but is unable to provide sufficient steroid hormones and becomes depleted. At this point the organism becomes very vulnerable to infection and other diseases. It is unlikely that an exhaustion of corticosteroids would occur in a human in a captivity situation lasting a few days or even a few weeks, but Selye's scheme does serve to emphasize that the immediate stress reaction may be quite different from the prolonged stress reaction. Furthermore, substances that were repressed during stress may rebound to higher than normal values when the stressor is removed. As is noted in Table 2, that is the case for serum pepsinogen.

#### Activation and Performance

The ability of the person to think and to act is modified during stress. Psychophysicologists studying the effect of stressful situations on performance have conceptualized the complex of physiological changes we have outlined as being indices of psychological activation or arousal. Psychological activation is low when a subject is relaxed and drowsy and high in states of emotional excitement. One generalization that has emerged from experiments relating activation level and performance is that the relationship between these two variables has the shape of an inverted U. Performance is optimal on a wide variety of tasks at intermediate levels of activation. Too much or too little activation produces a decrement in performance. Furthermore, the optimum arousal

level for simple tasks is higher than for complex tasks. To perform a simple and possibly boring task requires a degree of alertness that would interfere with the performance of difficult tasks for which a more relaxed mental state is necessary. Examples of the kinds of tasks that show this effect are tasks of motor coordination, of perceptual discrimination, and vigilance. Ways in which activation level has been manipulated experimentally include administration or threat of electric shocks, presentation of continuous loud noise, and sleep deprivation.

One of the ways in which activation affects performance is to change one's state of attention. At high levels of attention, attention can be too sharply focussed on a few relevant parts of the stimulus field and other relevant stimuli can be missed. For example, stimuli presented near the center of the visual field could be detected whereas other signal stimuli in the periphery may be missed. For some tasks this narrow selectivity of attention is an advantage. In the Stroop test, subjects must report the color of words printed on cards as quickly as possible after presentation of each successive card. The difficulty of the task stems from the fact that the words are color names and when a subject sees the word "red" printed in blue ink, he may say "red" instead of "blue" or may take longer to respond with the correct answer. There is evidence that under conditions of high activation, subjects do better at this task because their attention is riveted to the color of the word and there is less tendency to read the word. In general, however, such abnormal focussing of attention is detrimental to performance.

Different types of personalities react differently to stress. Some people are more prone to high activation in emotional situations or are slower to return to a relaxed state after becoming excited. These people perform complex tasks poorly under stress. According to the findings of Eysenck and his coworkers people with introverted personalities are chronically more highly activated than people with extroverted personalities. As a result introverts may perform better on simple boring tasks than extroverts because the activation level of the extroverts is suboptimal. Under stress however, the extrovert may do better than the introvert, because the activation of the introvert is too high while the activation of the extrovert moves into the optimal range.

One is faced with a number of problems when one tries to apply these insights to the problems of terrorism. For example, is it best to exert emotional pressure on the terrorist or deprive him of sleep before negotiating with him or before trying to capture him by force? A laboratory vigilance task which requires a subject to wait for a long time for a visual display to change is very similar to the continuous vigilance required of the terrorist who is watching for

threatening moves from his captives or from the outside authorities. However, its applicability to the terrorist-hostage situation is limited by the fact that attention can be allotted in various ways according to the plans of the subject. One interpretation of the narrowing of attention in high activation is that the subject attempts to resist the distraction of arousing stimuli. Noise, shocks, and other emotionally arousing events not only increase physiological activation but also distract attention and this may explain some of the performance deficit at high arousal levels. However, to a certain extent the allotment of attention (a concept very closely related to the allotment of effort) is dependent on plans and needs of the organism. The sleep-deprived subject can succeed in restoring normal performance and adequate activation by exerting compensatory effort. However, motivation to perform well and feedback about performance are crucial to sustaining and modulating the compensatory effort required. Most studies of the relation of arousal to automobile accidents are unable to show that fatigue, boredom, and other activation-lowering factors increase the probability of accidents, as long as the driver is still awake. The driver may exert less effort and drive less carefully, but seldom so carelessly as to cause an accident. It is only when the driver actually falls asleep at the wheel, that fatigue and boredom take their toll.

#### Stress, Disease and Death

There is evidence of varying quality that stressors and the emotions resulting from them can result in disease and death. The effects of the stressor may be immediate or delayed. At one end of the time scale are reports of death occurring within minutes or hours of experiencing an emotion-arousing situation. Usually the victim has a history of cardiovascular disease or is of an age where cardiovascular disease is likely. However, Herbert and Mead have collected accounts of deaths following closely after stress situations in young and presumably healthy people. Some of these accounts come from anthropologists and missionaries, who tell about members of primitive tribes dying of unexplained causes within a few days of eating a tabu food by mistake or after learning that witchcraft was being practiced against them. For example, in Australia a man's enemy would point a bone at him, and if the effects of this pointing were not counteracted by appropriate magic, the victim would fall sick and die within a few days. In these situations the beliefs of the society reinforce the beliefs of the individual that he will die, and in the case of breaking tabus, that he should die. The behavior of the dying person in these societies is not one of fear and agitation but more of hopeless acceptance of death.

There are also anecdotal reports about people in Western societies who have died because they were firmly convinced that death would come. For example:

"An assistant was hated by the students of a college. They condemned him in a joking manner to death, carrying out the ceremony in a serious manner. The assistant was held with his head on the chopping block, eyes bandaged, while one student made the noise of a swinging axe, another dropped a warm, wet cloth on his neck. The assistant died instantly."

The same authors cited other examples of the lethal effects of panic. In a bomb shelter in London in 1943 a bomb went off nearby and the electric power failed leaving 600 people underground in the dark. Supposedly 200 of these people died of panic before an exit route was reestablished. A lethal anxiety state was described in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 where people under the stress of circumstances developed a state of anxiety, perplexity, and helplessness. A week later a fever supervened and over 95% of the 100 died within a few days. Although a physician reported normal cerebrospinal fluid findings in these patients, one might wonder if the victims were suffering from some sort of undiagnosed encephalitis.

Studies that look at the effect of stressors on health over a time span of a few months emphasize that stressors eliciting fear and anxiety are not the only type of stressors that affect health. Rahe in a series of studies employed a questionnaire that is designed to measure life change. Items include both unpleasant changes such as the death of a family member or being fired from work and pleasant changes such as a vacation or a job promotion. Both types of changes result in more sickness in the near future. In one study American seamen filled out the questionnaire before going on a cruise. They were divided into high- and low-risk groups on the basis of total life change registered on the questionnaire. In the first month at sea the high-risk group had 90% more sickness than the low-risk group. This difference declined over the ensuing 6 months, but even after six months the high-risk group had more illness than the low-risk group.

Some authors have felt that certain psychological responses to stress predispose to sickness or death on this time span of a few months. Engle found that often a person died when he was in a situation characterized by intense emotion, a fear of loss of control over the precipitating situation, and feelings of hopelessness. The person had often given up psychologically shortly before his death. Greene and his coworkers studied sudden death in patients, 77% of whom had a history of coronary heart disease. Typically the patients had

been depressed from one to three months, had become involved in an arousing situation at home or work, and had been returning to their baseline state of depression when death occurred.

Anticipating a significant event in one's life may decrease the probability of death. Phillips and Feldman discovered that the death rate decreased in the 6 months before birthdays, especially one month before birthdays, and is increased after birthdays, reaching a peak in the first three months following the birthdays. This variation is greatest for those who are distinguished, for whom the ceremonial occasion of a birthday would elicit the greatest social response.

Long-term follow-ups of people exposed to stressful situations such as prison camp incarceration often suggest that such situations have far-reaching consequences for the survivor's state of health. Survivors of prison camp incarceration have higher mortality and morbidity rates than age and sex-matched comparison groups for many years after liberation. Eitinger and Strom found that the excess in mortality was greatest among the prisoners who had been exposed to the worst conditions, and that the higher mortality persisted at least 15 years after release. More than the expected number died of tuberculosis and other infectious diseases and by accidents, lung cancer, and coronary artery disease. In some samples liver disease secondary to alcoholism is very much increased in ex-prisoners. The increase in accident rate was especially striking among Korean War prisoners during their first year of release. Eitinger and Strom also investigated the incident of disease based on registered diagnoses when survivors came into contact with the national health system. Ex-prisoners had much higher incidences of tuberculosis, neurosis and nervousness, alcohol and drug abuse, gastric and duodenal ulcers, and complaints of back pain. The incidence of cardiovascular disease was not significantly higher.

Among survivors of prison camps it is difficult to separate the effects of stress from other more specific disease factors such as starvation, infection, and physical trauma from hard labor and torture. Of course separation is only partially possible even in theory, since stress probably decreases the resistance to infectious disease. In any case the situation of these prisoners differed considerably from the situation of the prisoners of terrorists, who are seldom held as long or under such severe conditions. It is possible that the starvation in the prison camps actually reduced the subsequent incidence of coronary heart disease in some groups. Also the figures about mortality and morbidity of prison camp survivors could be misleading because the captives may have been healthier than average at the time of capture (such would be expected for soldiers) and the ones that survived may have been the healthiest members of this group.

## Stress Responses and Disease Mechanisms

Although the examples named in the last section are evidence that stress influences health, they fail to tie together the physiological stress response and disease in any specific way. The physiological stress reactions are examples of what Cannon has called "the wisdom of the body" since they have the purpose of preparing the organism for increased muscular effort. Through the process of evolution, those physiological changes that enhanced an animal's ability to fight or flee were favored. For this reason, the stress response involves similar changes to those that actually take place during physical activity. This complicates the use of physiological indicators to measure emotion in real situations. I can illustrate this point from one of our own experiments. We were interested in verifying the relationship between increased heart rate and emotional stress during every-day activities. Subjects in our experiment wore a light tape-recorder that recorded their electrocardiograms during a 24-hour period. During this period subjects kept a diary of activities and rated the emotional arousal associated with each activity. Figure 1 shows physical responses of a subject recorded in this way. The figure shows the mean heart rate per minute (bpm) at certain periods during the day, and the output of an activity sensor for the same periods. Note the tremendous variation in heart rate that is associated with different activity levels. When the subject was sitting his heart rate was between 80 and 90 bpm and while he was hurrying from place to place it was from 100 to 120 bpm. During sleep the heart rate reached a low of 50 bpm. Such variations are typical. Note that at 3:50 pm there is an increase of heart rate to 105 bpm without any accompanying increase in activity. At that point in time, the subject, who was a psychiatrist-in-training was conducting a group therapy session in which he began to get angry at what one of the patients was doing. This anger, which from an evolutionary standpoint began to prepare the psychiatrist to punch the patient in the nose, illustrates two points. First, the amount of increase in a physiological variable due to emotion may be very small compared to the variations that take place during mild physical effort. Second, it illustrates how in modern civilization a physiologically adaptive response is no longer useful. Nowadays emotional arousal rarely is followed by immediate fighting or fleeing.

A central paradox in psychosomatic theory is that the psychological stress response is an adaptive mechanism that helps the body avoid breakdowns in function, while at the same time it is postulated that the stress response itself can lead to breakdowns and disease. How can mechanisms that have evolved to protect the body become mechanisms of destruction? One possibility is that extreme emotions can elicit extreme physiological responses that are no longer adaptive and are

even incompatible with life. This might apply to the cases of death occurring within minutes or hours of the stressful event.

Cannon thought that in cases of voodoo death, extreme activation of the sympathetic nervous system could be the cause of death. The symptoms of such an activation might be elevated heart rate, sweating, enlarged pupils, and fever. On the other hand the experiments of Richter point towards parasympathetic activation. Wild Norway rats that are forced to swim in a tank die quickly, especially if their whiskers are clipped off before putting them in the tank. Whiskers provide useful orienting information to these rats. The rats did not die from drowning but from heart rate slowing and cardiac arrest, which points to massive vagal stimulation. A milder form of this phenomenon is seen in vasovagal fainting attacks in humans exposed to a stress such as blood drawing. Heart rate and blood pressure drop. The relationship of the autonomic nervous system to different kinds of emotion is complex in that emotional arousal stimulates both sympathetic and parasympathetic pathways. However, anxiety is usually more associated with sympathetic discharge, and depression and giving-up with parasympathetic discharge. Thus, in autonomic terms, extremes of either emotion might have cardiovascular effects that could prove lethal. Usually they would not be so because of the numerous regulatory mechanisms the body has to prevent excessive swings in physiological functions; but people with pre-existing heart disease might be unable to accomplish this regulation. This heart disease need not be known to the patient or his physician. Certainly the presence of pathological changes in cardiac and vascular function in older men in Western societies is the rule rather than the exception.

Another possibility is that continued activation of a physiological mechanism useful in acute stress situations leads to pathological changes. For example, the increase in blood pressure that occurs in acute stress is too small to be harmful and has the evolutionary purpose of preparing the person for physical action, but if the stress continues at a low level for a longer period of time, the mechanism that regulates blood pressure can be altered so that blood pressure is maintained at a higher level even when the stressor is removed. It is as if the setting of a thermostat has been turned up. The net result is a decreased life expectancy due to the complications of hypertension. Early man who relied on hunting for his existence was better served by these mechanisms. In the first place, early man was more likely to benefit from reacting to stress with physical activity: fight or flight. In the second place he seldom lived to an age where the complications of elevated blood pressure would be noticed.

There are other components of the stress response which, if prolonged, lead to other diseases of end organs. Alexander emphasized

certain diseases as being stress related: bronchial asthma, essential hypertension, ulcerative colitis, certain types of dermatitis, rheumatoid arthritis, thyrotoxicosis, and peptic ulcer disease. Certain general symptoms such as headaches, menstrual disturbances, eating disorders, and sleeping disorders are also often affected by stress. For the so-called psychosomatic diseases the quantitative relationship between psychological factors is much less clear-cut than, say, the relationship between infecting agent and infectious disease. Stress can have either an etiological or a modulating influence on psychosomatic diseases, depending on the individual and the intensity of the stress response.

### Variations in Stress Responses

Not everyone reacts the same way to a stressful situation. What is stressful to one person may not be stressful to another. The stress response itself does not have an identical physiological form in everyone. These types of variability may explain why some people develop stress-related diseases and others do not. At this point it will be useful to consider some of the sources of variability in more detail.

First some kinds of stressors produce specific kinds of physiological response. Some of this differentiation is simply due to the fact that the autonomic nervous system has specific regulatory tasks that are not related to stress in itself. For example extreme cold and extreme heat may both be stressful, but the autonomic changes that cause conservation of heat such as peripheral vasoconstriction, shivering, and suppression of sweating, are the opposite of those that produce dissipation of heat. Another type of differentiation lies more on a psychological plane. This type of stimulus-response specificity is based on experiments pioneered by Lacey which indicate that if the stressor is the type that requires attention to the external environment the heart rate decreases, while if the stressor requires attention to internal processes, the heart rate increases. An example of a situation requiring attention to the environment is a vigilance task and an example of a situation in which attention is directed inwards is doing mental arithmetic in the presence of outside distraction. What is interesting about these two types of situation is that, although heart rate behaves differently in the two cases, skin conductance rises in both. In other words, increased heart rate does not always accompany increased skin conductance and psychological stress.

Second, there is a great deal of difference between people in their particular patterns of response to stress. However, the same person will often react consistently to different stressors or show response specificity or stereotypy. Some people are heart rate reactors, while others are blood pressure or muscle reactors. This labelling refers to the variable that shows the most change, and does not mean that most people react exclusively in one way. Instead, quantitative differences in reactivity in various systems results. It is generally assumed that these idiosyncratic differences in patterns of reactivity are based on genetic anatomical differences, though it is possible that some types of physiological patterning might be the results of learned patterns.

Third, there may be some emotional specificity in the reactions to stressors in that reactions may be different if fear or anger or other emotions are experienced. Under some circumstances anger may produce a rise in diastolic blood pressure while anxiety or fear produces a fall. In general, the cardiovascular response to anger-provoking stimuli is similar to the effects of nor-epinephrine while the response to anxiety-provoking stimuli is similar to epinephrine effects. The emotion associated with depression and giving-up may lead to more parasympathetic arousal than anxiety. It is likely that the effects of the specific emotion are much smaller than the effects of emotional arousal in general. In fact, emotional arousal and physiological changes occur to pleasant events as well as to unpleasant ones. Also some psychological states that are not usually thought of as emotional states are associated with physiological activation. When subjects are actively involved in social interaction, activation is higher than when they are not so involved. The subject might describe himself as "involved" or "participating" rather than using a word such as "anxious" or "excited". The same kind of activation may accompany the feeling of being hurried.

A fourth type of specificity is personality specificity. Dunbar found in the late 1930's that people with different diseases had different personalities. For example, men with coronary heart disease seemed to be hard-driving achievement-oriented people. Her work was criticized later for its shortcomings such as difficulties in getting a random sample of patients, but in recent years some of her ideas have been vindicated in better designed studies. Friedman and Rosenman have described a coronary-prone behavior pattern they call the type A personality. People with this pattern are competitive, very aware of the pressure of time, very deeply involved in their work, and have difficulty relaxing. They do not complain of anxiety and cannot be labelled neurotic. They are active doers and not people who brood over problems. In a prospective study of 3,400 men free of coronary heart disease, the presence of the type A pattern led to a much greater risk of heart attack or other symptoms of coronary heart disease in the 39 to 49 year old group. From the standpoint of physiology we might expect these

people to be constantly manifesting stress-related changes even though they are generally happy with their lives and find the stress exciting and pleasing, if they notice it at all. Rosenman and Friedman have shown that this personality pattern goes together with elevated cholesterol, triglycerides, and decreased blood clotting time during work activities, all physiological changes that can plausibly lead to coronary heart disease.

A fifth type of specificity of physiological stress reaction that had preoccupied psychiatrists in the 50's and 60's was conflict specificity, an idea developed by the psychoanalyst Franz Alexander. He associated different psychosomatic disease with different intrapsychic conflicts that might be manifested in different personalities. For example, his investigations of patients with peptic ulcer disease convinced him that these patients had dependency conflicts that could either lead to a dependent personality or a very independent personality whose independence is a denial of dependence. Such a personality develops in people who have had dependent relationships on their mothers. This often took the form, when the person was an infant or child, of being fed to alleviate frustration. Alexander pictured peptic ulcer disease as a kind of physiological regression. The frustrated adult acts as a child waiting to be fed by secreting acid and digestive enzymes that can eat holes in the stomach if no food is actually present. For non-psychoanalysts it is easier to see the mechanism as a Pavlovian conditioned reflex, in which stress situations serve as a conditioned stimulus for gastric secretion.

A good example of the interaction of various kinds of specificity to produce actual disease is the experiment of Weiner and his coworkers. These investigators screened 2,073 inductees into the American army to find those with serum pepsinogen levels in the upper 15% and the lower 9%. These 120 people were given a battery of psychological tests and an upper GI series. These subjects received a second GI series between the 8th and 16th week of basic training. It turned out that 3 men had healed ulcers and one man an active ulcer on the first examination, and 5 more developed active ulcers by the time of the second examination. It was found that both the level of serum pepsinogen and psychological test results predicted who would get ulcers but that these two predictors were not independent. All of the 9 people who got ulcers were in the high serum pepsinogen group. Also 7 of the 9 were among 10 men selected by the experimentors on the basis of psychological testing to be those most likely to develop peptic ulcer because of psychological conflicts. These men were selected before either the men or the experimentors knew they had ulcers. These results show that physiological differences and psychological differences are both important in determining the development of peptic ulcer disease and that physical and psychological predisposing factors may be correlated. In terms of

the previous discussion this is an example of response specificity and conflict specificity interacting to produce ulcers.

### Psychological Defenses and Physiological Response

Although we have categorized some of the sources of variability in physiological response to stressors, the psychological aspects of this categorization are a bit superficial. Personality and conflicts cannot be easily put into distinct compartments. Personality tests can be misleading. For example, numerous studies have shown that a person's self rating of anxiety in a personality test bears little relationship to the physiological reactivity shown in an anxiety-provoking situation in the laboratory. One of the many reasons for this is that physiological changes are more closely related to the emotional state during physiological recording than to a general personality trait of anxiety-proneness. Specific aspects of a situation may be more important in determining the emotional reaction than the fact that such situations are stressful to a hypothetical average person.

For a situation to be stressful, the individual must evaluate it as threatening; and that evaluation depends on the subject's past experiences, attitudes and psychological defenses. The function of defenses is to make a situation that is perceived as threatening at some level, more benign through intra-psychic mechanisms. The physiological impact of psychological defense is illustrated in some of the studies of Lazarus. He presented subjects with films of aboriginal puberty rites involving mutilation of the penis. The films had various sound tracks. If the sound track promoted denial that there was any pain or discomfort involved, or intellectualization by presenting a theoretical sociological explanation of what was going on, a viewer's heart rate and skin conductance response was less than when no sound track was used.

One of the persistent ideas in psychosomatic medicine is that defenses that lead to repression of emotion result in greater physiological expression. This is tied together with some of the early ideas of Freud that postulated that emotional stimuli produced an increase in psychic energy that had to be discharged by emotional expression or it would become dammed up and find outlets in somatic symptoms. Originally the somatic symptoms were considered to be symbolic expressions of the conflict that were functional rather than organic: that is, there was no organic physical pathology underlying the disability or

complaint. Later there was a tendency to believe that dammed up emotional energy could also be discharged in activity of the autonomic nervous system or other physiological systems. These ideas are not confined to psychoanalytically-oriented psychiatrists. In California at least, there is a fairly wide-spread belief among the lay public that failure to express feelings can lead to psychosomatic illness. In some ways the research findings of Lazarus and others contradict this belief in that defenses that prevent emotional expression also result in less somatic disturbance, at least in the physiological systems tested. Other experiments suggest that emotionally-expressive people show more autonomic lability than less expressive people.

Epstein and Fenz have done an interesting series of experiments that show the relationship of performance, defense and physiological response in a stressful situation that is less artificial and more intense than many laboratory stress situations. These investigators have studied sport parachute jumpers, making measurements of psychological and physiological response before going up in the airplane, during the flight up to the moment of jumping, and after landing. Experienced parachutists are different from novices in the timing of their physiological and psychological fear responses. Earlier in the jump sequence, for example immediately after getting in the airplane, experts and novices were equally fearful and equally physiologically activated. However, as the moment of the jump approached, experts showed a decrease of physiological and psychological fear response, while novices showed an increase right up to the last moment. In some way, experienced parachutists can turn off their fear response as the moment of the jump approaches. If each of the two groups is further divided into two on the basis of performance ratings, the good performers at each level of experience have a decrease in physiological activation in the last parts of the jump sequence. Among experts, the mean heart rate at the time of jump for the poor performers was 120 and for the good performers was 85. These findings confirm the inverted U relationship between arousal and performance by showing that very high arousal levels are associated with disruption of performance.

In these studies the defense of denial was found more frequently in the novice group. For example one novice jumper said, "I was not afraid at all until I looked down and saw my knees trembling. Then I realized how scared I really was." Thematic apperception test cards of parachuting scenes were presented to novice and expert jumpers in order to learn more about their mechanisms of defense. In the stories of novices the hero was usually either completely calm or intensely fearful. The heroes in the stories told by experienced jumpers concentrated their thoughts on the task of jumping and seemed to be oriented towards taking in sensory information relevant to the task. Although they did not insert denials of fear in their stories, they generally

avoided expression of emotion. We can infer from these results that the novice group was unsuccessfully attempting to control their fear by denial, while the experienced group, who had less fear to control because they were more familiar with the task, could control what fear remained by avoiding thinking about their feelings. Both physiological and psychological reactions depend on the efficiency of the defense and the strength of the emotion being defended against.

Under periods of intense emotion another defense mechanism comes into play in certain individuals. It is the experience of depersonalization or derealization. Depersonalization is the feeling that the self or mind is outside the body, and derealization the feeling that although the mind is within the body, the outside world is unreal or remote. These two experiences are not completely distinct and represent only some of the possible experiences of splitting between parts of the mind, body, and external world. Arthur Koestler describes one of these experiences in his book The Invisible Writing. He had been captured and imprisoned during the Spanish Civil war. He writes:

"On the day when Sir Peter and I were arrested, there had been three occasions when I believed my execution was imminent...On all three occasions I had benefited from the well-known phenomenon of split consciousness, a dreamlike, dazed self-estrangement, which separated the conscious self from the acting self—the former becoming a detached observer, the latter an automaton, while the air hums in one's ears as in the hollow of a seashell."

This experience does not always lead to an alleviation of anxiety but can be accompanied by continued psychic distress as in the anxiety-depersonalization syndrome described by Martin Roth. What is especially interesting about this experience is that physiologically there seems to be a kind of truth in the feeling that the relationship between mind and body has changed. Lader has reported a case of an anxious woman who intermittently experienced intense panic and depersonalization. When the patient experienced depersonalization the skin conductance indicators of anxiety indicated decreased activation. This mechanism was a kind of safety-valve that prevents the organisms from being overwhelmed by panic and prevents physiologic systems to go too far from equilibrium.

## Conclusions

The description of the experience of being captured by terrorists can leave no doubt that for most people it is the kind of situation that will elicit a physiological stress response. The evidence we have presented suggests that if such response is intense enough or prolonged enough it will have important consequences. Although the length of the stress situation of captivity by terrorists may only last a few hours or days, the threat of this situation is much greater than most events in ordinary life and is certainly much greater than any threat that has been administered in the laboratory in research studies. Being captured by terrorists is not on the Rahe list of "significant life events" because of the low frequency of this event in the population, but it certainly represents a very significant event.

Changes in one's pattern of life have been reported following captivity: the stress of the event reaches far beyond the actual period of captivity. Such changes are known to have health implications either through the mechanisms of the primary physiological stress response or through secondary mechanisms, such as increased use of alcohol and other drugs, accident-proneness, and other covert or overt suicidal behaviors.

The extent of the health disability of the victims of terrorism needs to be specifically investigated. It is impossible to draw quantitative conclusions on the basis of research done on stressors of different magnitude or duration. Two features that future research on psychosomatic implications of captivity must have are implied by our discussion. First, because there is so much variability between individuals in their response to stress it will be necessary to examine a fairly large number of cases to draw any definite conclusions. These cases should be examined for a variety of physical illness and not be limited to the few traditionally psychosomatic ones. Thorough physical examinations will be necessary to distinguish between complaints of sickness and actual demonstrable physical sickness. Second, a control group is essential to provide a baseline rate for illness so that valid inferences can be made. This control group should be as similar in age, sex distribution, and social background to the group exposed to the terrorists as feasible.

The nature of modern terrorist tactics, particularly hijacking, meet many of the requirements of empirical research. Many of the complicating factors that have plagued psychosomatic investigations

of prisoner of war survivors are absent. First, comparable control groups are readily available. Since the victims have only a symbolic significance it makes little difference to the terrorists which airplane is hijacked. A second airplane that was not hijacked can be our comparison group. Second, air travellers tend to be more representative of the general population than prisoners of war for example who come from a population of physically healthy young men. Thus, the results of investigation of victims of hijacking may be more generalizable to the general population. Third, the stressors in captivity situations are largely psychological. Physical hardship or torture are the exception. It has been difficult to separate the long-term effects of psychological and physiological trauma in the case of prisoners of war and concentration camp victims, who have been malnourished, mishandled, and exposed to infections. Fourth, the psychological stress is well-defined in nature and in timing. Prisoners of war and concentration camp victims underwent profoundly stressful situations even before capture. Soldiers had been in combat and the Jews had seen the gradual destruction of their world. The victim of terrorism is caught by surprise and the onset of the stressor can be timed to the minute. Although reactions to the event of being captured will vary from person to person, the stressor at least is externally similar for everyone, so that investigations of different coping mechanisms are simplified.

Research on the issue of psychosomatic implications of terrorism is essential to resolve the extent of damage to the victim. We cannot be satisfied with mere speculation, however plausible it may be. As far as I know, there is no hard evidence that short-term stressors have the consequences I have argued that they could. The body has remarkable homeostatic mechanisms and recuperative powers, and there is no reason to add unfounded hypochondriacal worries to the others the victim has. In order to satisfy you, me, and policy-makers involved in this issue a well-controlled medical and psychological investigation of these victims needs to be undertaken.

Figure 1. Heart rate in beats per minute (bpm) and physical activity level (arbitrary units) for a male psychiatric resident over a 24-hour period. The graphs connect data points representing 6-minute running averages. The kinds of activity and subjective anxiety-tension levels on a 0 to 10 scale are indicated on the top of the figure. Record ends at 10.40 a.m.




TABLE I

AUTONOMIC NERVOUS SYSTEM RESPONSES TO STRESSORS

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<u>Organ</u>	<u>Response</u>
Eye	Dilation of pupil
Heart	Increase in pacemaker rate Increase in conducting velocity of excitation Increase in strength of contraction
Arterioles	Dilation of coronary arterioles Constriction of peripheral arterioles
Lungs	Relaxation of bronchiolar muscles
Stomach and intestines	Decrease in motility Decrease in tone
Skin	Sweat secretion Piloerection
Adrenal medulla	Secretion of epinephrine Secretion of norepinephrine
Genitalia, male	Inhibition of erection Facilitation of ejaculation

TABLE II  
 ENDOCRINE AND OTHER CHEMICAL RESPONSES TO STRESSORS  
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<u>Substance</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Change of serum level</u>	
		<u>Immediate</u>	<u>Post-stress</u>
ACTH	Anterior pituitary	Up	-
TSH	Anterior pituitary	Up	-
GH	Anterior pituitary	Up	Up
ADH	Posterior pituitary	Up	-
Glucocorticoids	Adrenal cortex	Up	-
Mineralocorticoids	Adrenal cortex	Up	-
Epinephrine	Adrenal medulla	Up	-
Norepinephrine	Adrenal medulla	Up	Up
Thyroid hormones	Thyroid	Up	Up
Insulin	Pancreas	-	Up
Androgens	Testicles	Down	-
Estrogens	Ovaries	Down	-
Pepsinogen	Stomach	Down	Up
Free fatty acids	Adipose tissue	Up	-
Lipoproteins	Liver	Up	-
Coagulation factors V & VIII	Liver	Down	Up
Fibrinogen	Liver	Down	Up
Uric acid		Up	-
Iron		Down	-

COMMENTS

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by

Stanley MILGRAM

The great value of Dr. Roth's paper is that he presented us with a summary of what is known about the physiological consequences of stress. In my discussion I would like to relate the issues of stress more specifically to the hostage situation.

First, we must note that stress is not simply an incidental feature of the terrorist act. After all, the very word "terrorism" takes its name from the stressful, aversive emotion which the acts produce. Unlike a bank robbery, in which stress is an unintentional feature, terrorists seek to create stress:

in the hostages  
in the larger public  
in the authorities.

Indeed, it is the intolerable nature of this stress that the terrorists hope to use as the critical psychological lever to insure decision-making in their favor. The main aim is to produce stress in the authorities. Indeed, sometimes the terrorists will try to comfort the hostages, partly for its PR or proganda value. Often they will speak to the hostages with the dulcet tones that psychopaths use, even when they have covert and destructive intentions.

A question therefore arises: does the stress of the hostages derive from the hostage situation per se or from the specific way in which the hostages are treated. For example, the Dutch school children, in the May 1977 incident, reported that the "men were nice to them, even playing games with them", while there was an element of sadism in the way the Hanafi moslems treated their victims at Bnai Brith, frequently threatening to behead them.

An important question we must answer is: what is the magnitude of the stress experienced by the hostages, and how does it compare to the experience of stress in other life circumstances? Is it greater than that of a student preparing for a medical school examination? Of a marriage or divorce? What role ought the issue of stress play in the total situation?

It would be most interesting to compare the stress reactions of those who are hostages to terrorists and those who are prisoners of authority. On balance, it appears that terrorists have been less brutal than those repressive regimes that utilize torture on their prisoners, as has been well documented in the case of Chile, Brazil and other countries. Is our repugnance of terrorism rooted mainly in the lack of their legitimacy—rather than the specific inhumanity of their acts? I am not prepared to give an affirmative answer to this question, but merely raise it for general consideration.

Dr. Roth has summarized what we know about the physiology of stress. Next we must ask what forms of therapy or prophylaxis are possible?

a) Prophylaxis seems impractical because of the infrequent nature of the hostage experience. Only one person in several million will undergo the hostage experience. One can, however, focus on specific categories of individuals who have a much higher risk potential, such as prison guards, and diplomats in sensitive political posts.

b) As to the ongoing hostage experience, emotional first aid is limited by lack of access to the victim. But some symbolic messages that communicate concern for the victim by his government are sometimes possible and may provide a source of emotional support even while the victim is under the control of the terrorist. For example, sending food and blankets to the hostages indicates a continuing concern for them and may undercut feelings of abandonment.

If anxiety is responsible for significant trauma, would it not be possible to treat the food sent in to the hostages with a mild sedative, such as Valium. And insofar as one the victim's concerns is the financial consequences to his family, of his own death (note the thriving insurance business at airports) would he not be in some degree comforted if the government adopted a policy of automatic compensation to the families of those killed or injured as hostages.

c) To some extent, the way each terrorist incident is handled, insofar as this is publicized, is probably the only basis the hostage has for predicting the way in which the authorities will handle his situation. Such methods, therefore, ought to be undertaken not only for the resolution

of the immediate problem, but for the model they provide all future hostages.

Another important aspect of stress concerns the manner in which it affects decision making. Here we may benefit from the recent work of Janis and Mann (1977) who have studied the consequences of the effects of stress on decision-making, and the manner in which it may produce a number of decisional styles.

When we talk about the effects of stress we need to look not only at the physiological aspects, but the degree to which it alters the hostage's attitudes toward society and authority. Do ex-hostages experience a persistent sense of vulnerability? Do they have less trust in the protective potential of authority. How does it affect their relationships generally? This question is important because, like kidnapping, hostage-taking deals at root with the manipulation of relationships. The terrorists use the government's relationship to the victims, and seek to manipulate it as the kidnapper uses a parent's relationship to the seized child.

We need to ask how those relationships are affected by the experience. Probably, some of the data we have on kidnapping is of relevance here, and in a limited sense, terrorism may be thought of as kidnapping projected onto the political plane. The difference of course is that the terrorist often sees himself acting out of a higher morality, while the kidnapper cannot so easily justify his act by a higher principle. Yet, at a certain level, a similar dynamic is operative, specifically in the way that positive human relationships are ruthlessly manipulated to attain a goal.

The question of stress cannot be separated from the notion of coping mechanisms available to the victim. The most general question is 1) What can or should the victim say or do to secure what ends?

We may ask further 2) Should victims have any responsibility to liberate themselves? We know the police advise against this, but we know the police generally discourage the citizen from acting directly against criminals. 3) Even if a more active victim role created short term dangers, would it not in the long run discourage the seizure of hostages, since terrorists count on the passivity of their hostages? I raise this merely as a question, rather than as the espousal of a policy.

In discussing stress, we need to consider the issue of differentiation among hostages. We need to consider differential effects

dependent upon:

a) the age and developmental level on the hostage. How do children, those in the prime of life, and old people respond to the experience?

b) whether the hostage is alone or with others, and whether he has had a pre-existing relationship with his fellow hostages or whether, as in an airline seizure, the passengers need not have a prior solidarity?

c) whether the hostage has with him other members of his family which he feels responsibility to protect. Personally I would find it far easier to be a hostage alone, than in a situation in which members of my family were present and I were unable to protect them.

d) a critical variable is the duration of captivity. Dr. Roth has pointed out that the duration of the stress period has an important effect on the extent of resulting damage.

If we are to take seriously the information that Dr. Roth has provided us on the damaging effects of stress, then we must consider the possibility that the kind of protracted negotiation, such as the first Dutch train incident, which lasted two weeks or so, may have many hidden costs on the victims, costs that must be fed into the equation of what strategy is best adapted to a hostage situation. If it is the case that lethal anxiety may develop in some persons, and that long term damage may be produced by the stress of captivity, then we may have to give greater emphasis to the speedy liberation of hostages.

Finally, we need to identify the various sources of stress within the hostage situation, in order to guide post-incident therapy. Such sources probably include 1) the threat to the victim's life inherent in the hostage situation, 2) the consequences of perceived helplessness in this situation: (Martin Seligman of the University of Pennsylvania points out that the inability to take an instrumental act to remove aversive stimulation may lead to depression, and furthermore, it may impair one's future capacity to deal with aversive situations in the future), 3) guilt over inaction, which may be self-labeled as cowardice, 4) guilt over one's own less than exemplary behavior in the hostage situation, and other issues involving diminished self-esteem 5) a continuing sense of vulnerability may also require therapeutic attention.

SESSION ON CAPTIVITY

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60020

THE STRESS OF CAPTIVITY

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by

Leo EITINGER

## GENERAL OUTLINE

### Deprivation of freedom

- Degree
- Other material conditions
- Predictability of fate
- Relations toward family and world

### Causes of deprivation of freedom

From the point of view of the captive:

- "Self inflicted"
- Accepted
- Identification
- Completely meaningless

From the point of view of the incarcerator:

- Atonement
- Reeducation
- Protection of society
- Crushing the resistance
- Using working power
- Anihilation

### Coping mechanisms

Fast coping in acute situations

- Life saving compliance

Coping over time (value problems)

- Primitive coping
  - Denial
  - Creating of illusions
  - Adaptation "for any price"
  - Identification with the aggressor

More sophisticated coping

- "Something to live for"
- Linkage with valued groups
- Maintenance of self-esteem
- Group attachment

Necessary coping

- "Closing off" or
- Psychic anaesthesia

### Results on victim—on victim's surrounding

Immediate

Late

The word captivity has many different meanings, and even if we look only at the very practical ones, it covers a wide range from the open prisons in let us say Sweden, where the inmates are daily going—even driving in their private cars—to their work and returning "home", that is to say to prison in the evening. On the other hand there is the captivity of a hostage as described dramatically in Dr. Guy Richmond's (14) memoirs: "An officer was held hostage by determined men who had a grievance relating to their treatment by the courts. They were appealing their conviction and wanted publicity. They seized an officer and held him in the barber's chair with a razor at his throat. It was impossible to rescue him in spite of officers posted with rifles at strategic points. To shoot would have been to shoot the officer. I mobilized all available medical services and requested our consulting surgeon to stand by with a reserve of blood plasma. If they cut the hostage's throat, there might still be a chance of saving his life. The historic culmination was a special edition of The Sun within an hour or two of the interview with the men concerned. They held the officer until they had seen the newspaper report of their grievances. On his release he was in shock and exhausted."

Between these two extremes one can place the whole range of captivity stress-situations and reactions. In the following I shall try to discuss the different aspects in the various forms of captivity according to an arbitrary systematization as shown in the general outline. But as always in psychiatry and life, the personalities concerned will react in somewhat different ways, both psychologically and physically as discussed by Dr. Roth, although there are certain limitations.

The core of any form of captivity is the deprivation of freedom to move freely "around in the world". Psychiatric patients, their problems and their deprivation of freedom will not be discussed here. The most extreme restraint, which is often applied against hostages (as

described in my introduction) can produce anxiety that can reach a state of panic with blocked possibilities to move. These situations are well known from many animal experiments. In addition hostages often perceive accurately that they are in danger of losing their lives. The tragic history of many hostages captured by either ordinary criminals or political terrorists, whom the far too benevolent mass-media tend to call guerrillas or freedom fighters, proves that the assessment of the situation as life threatening can be more than correct.

Confinement in small rooms was practised systematically by the Nazis in their refinement of torture methods in the form of the so-called "Stehbunker". These were cubicles so small that it was impossible to lie down or even to sit down properly. In order to make the situation even more intolerable the height of the bunker was limited to a degree that standing in a crouched position was the only possibility. Another Nazi-torture only slightly less disagreeable, was being forced to stand between two rows of electrically charged barbed wire. The duration of such a stay was at least 24 hours usually before an interrogation, the aim being of course to reduce one's mental power of resistance. I remember very well that the temptation to lean against the barbed wire and to end in a very simple way the torture of restraint, of sleep, food and water deprivation on a hot summer day, could become overwhelming. A very strong wish to survive was necessary to resist this temptation to take the "easy way out".

Solitary confinement with a more or less pronounced sensory deprivation may be considered the next lower degree of the deprivation of freedom. From the experiments of Hebb and Heron and many others (for details see Zubeck (19)), we know the results of extreme sensory deprivation. It is also rather well documented that these studies have been used as the basis for extreme torture in different forms and modifications, practiced even by very "civilized" nations. Needless to say that these additions to isolation represent a very substantial degree of worsening of the captivity stress situations.

Just to mention the further steps: solitary confinement with or without the possibility of working, so-called normal prisons and then camps where one usually had relatively ample possibilities to move around, to meet people and speak to them.

There is one other type of prison where the prisoners are held behind bars under continual observation, which ought to be mentioned. To stay on display for 24 hours a day, to have not the slightest trace of privacy at any time, to stay behind bars, literally like animals in the zoo, is without doubt a deep insult to human dignity and a serious blow to one's self-esteem.

In her personal and outstanding report on individual and group responses to confinement in a skyjacked plane, Sylvia Jacobson (7) observes a scene that is worthwhile quoting: "By afternoon, armed men of various North African armies began to pass through the plane in a steady stream, staring curiously at its interior and its occupants. This aroused feelings of revulsion, degradation, dehumanization, and vague threat. Distinctly we felt impotent, confined, constricted, and like animals in a zoo. Even the adolescents resented the feeling of being 'on display'. Divisiveness was subdued. Despite differences of nationality, religion, race, sorrows, needs, values, resentments, and fears, there was a unity in a showing of proud indifference, aloofness, and disdain to the inquisitive stares." It is, however, questionable how long this attitude of proud indifference and aloofness can be kept. Most naturally it will give way to an attitude of contempt towards the whole world including oneself.

The next aspect of deprivation is in our outline called "other material conditions" during captivity. There is an interesting description in the literature of a captive who was rather restricted in his movements but otherwise lived under relatively good material conditions. I am referring to Isser Harel's (4) book on Eichmann. After having been caught he was kept with one leg chained to a bed. He had to wear dark spectacles, and his opportunities to talk to others were rather restricted. On the other hand he was under constant medical supervision, special food rich in vitamins was prepared for him, and he had regular exercise in order to keep him fit and healthy for the transport from Argentina to Israel and the trial there. Any kind of abuse was strictly forbidden. His very cooperative and appreciative attitude can to a certain degree be taken as proof that even a relatively extreme degree of restriction of freedom can be tolerated with few negative reactions, provided that the other material and psychological conditions are acceptable or at least not too stressful.

On the other hand we know from the concentration camps that the freedom of movement in the often large camps, the possibility to visit each other in the different blocks or barracks was of no avail for the greatest part of the inmates, because they were far too tired after 12 hours of hard labour and many additional hours of standing at attention in the endless roll calls and far too hungry to move around more than absolutely necessary.

One of our most basic needs is the feeling of security, and here a certain amount of predictability of one's future is necessary. In this respect the "normal" criminal prisoners are actually those who are best off. They have their sentence and they can calculate precisely the day they will be released. On the other hand hostages are on the

other extreme of the spectrum. This applies perhaps mostly to hostages of terrorists when the terrorists are members of different more or less obscure "liberation movements". Nobody actually knows what they will demand and if it will be possible to appease them at all.

High-jacked victims, who do not even know where they are going to land, experience this feeling of insecurity in the most painful way. Also on this point Sylvia Jacobson has an important little observation of her own. In her plane there were 14 college students, and in their first attempt of coping they started scanning the seatpocket maps and speculating among themselves in an attempt to predict their destination.

Martin Symonds (18) shows that there is a special psychological relation between the kidnapper and his victim. In the crimes of kidnapping and hostage-taking, the criminal must have contact not only with the victim, but with others as well. The capture and custody of the victim is used as a lever to force the family or the police to fulfill the criminal's goal. A paradox ensues. Dr. Ochberg has called this phenomenon the "Stockholm syndrome". The criminal is experienced by the victim as his protector, and it is the family and the police who, by their behaviour or refusal to accede to the criminal demands, endanger the victim's life. Under such conditions where the anxiety or terror is overwhelming the victim easily distorts reality. Then the victim will actively view the family and the police as the enemy. It is also understandable that the victims of politically-motivated skyjacking are more concerned about their lives and fate than about general political principles.

Prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment or to death with suspended death sentences are a special group. Panton (12) who has investigated 34 male prison inmates sentenced to be executed and a representative prison population sample of more than 2500, found signs associated with the situational stress of being on Death Row. This is not specially unexpected to see. In the Nazi concentration camps the non-Jewish prisoners used to say that their stay in the camps was a race between their ability to survive and the duration of the War. The Jewish prisoners, however, knew that they were sentenced to death like all other Jews who were deported to the camps, and that their remaining alive was only a means of using their working capacity to the last possible moment. They experienced every day of life as both a new threat and a new gift.

The next factor which may be considered of importance as possible stress during captivity, is the relations towards one's family. These can be rather complex. On the one side there is the "normal"

criminal who has brought "shame on his family", whom the family despises but nevertheless visits in prison and supports. On the other hand we have all those who are cut off from any connection with the outside, of whose fate the family does not know anything and who want to get in some sort of contact with their nearest and dearest. Again the most common problem nowadays are the victims in a skyjacked plane who know that their families are waiting at the airport. What will they think? How will they react"? What will the airline company, the radio or the news tell them? Let me quote again a few sentences from Sylvia Jacobson:

"Around what would ordinarily have been the time of landing at Kennedy Airport, self-orientation and self-concern shifted to expressions of alarm for expectantly waiting families. How shocked they would be on learning that this plane would not land. Seatmates and passengers within whispering reach of one another, allied themselves, exchanging names and addresses, making promises that survivors would somehow notify the next of kin of those who might not make it."

This brings us to another aspect: the possible causes of deprivation of freedom. We can look at these causes from two different angles: from the point of view of the incarcerator and from the point of view of the captive. The "normal" criminal is held in captivity for very complex reasons. There is the problem of "atonement" for the crime and the "justified punishment". Officially, however, one speaks rather about the re-education of the criminal, and in cases where re-education is not considered feasible anymore, of prevention of crime or of protection of the society against the incorrigible criminal. In theory, though not always in practice, the criminal is thus a person whom one tries to change, in short a "person of importance".

In dictatorial states it is on the other hand of importance to crush political resistance because dissenters cannot be tolerated. Interrogations and torture are the usual means, while later incarceration in camps are only supportive measures for the physical and moral destruction of the enemy of the "people", the "regime" or whatever one prefers to call the monolithic state.

In kidnapping, the kidnapper seizes one valuable in order to exchange it for another one. The kidnapped person has his individual importance in this exchange value, but at the same time he is considered only as an object. This is still more obvious in persons who are kidnapped as hostages or highjacked. They are not individualities anymore, but only symbols taken by chance without consideration to their personality, or their individual value. Prisoners of war, on the other hand, are taken in order to reduce the fighting potential of the enemy; they have no individual value, but they count as masses. Large forced labour camps have more or less the same objective. The captives there are no personalities, no individuals, only "labour resource" to be used at the incarcerators' own discretion.

The extreme form was the combined concentration and extermination camp. Here the victims were virtually without any worth whatsoever. They arrived in huge transports of several thousands, and only very few were brought to the camps where the last remnants of their working capacity were used. After that they went the same way as all the others who had been deported to the camps—into the gas-chambers and crematories. They were humiliated and debased to the utmost degree. Their individuality was of course of no importance. They were numbers only, and this was stressed by tattooing numbers on their arms. Their working capacity was a "quantité négligable", and even the ashes of their burnt corpses were used as fertilizer only.

Also from the point of view of the captive, the traditional prisoner, the criminal, is in the relatively most favourable situation. We cannot discuss here the philosophical questions of predestination and free will. Disregarding all these problems one can in a way state that the criminal is master of his own destiny, that his loss of freedom can be considered as self-inflicted. Prisoners of war are on the other hand without any possibility of influencing their fate, but on the whole they will accept it as a part of the game, even if the game by itself is considered meaningless. Needless to say one's total attitude to the loss of freedom will be influenced by the way one experiences its causal agent. This was especially obvious at the concentration camps during World War II. Among the millions arrested there were political and religious groups who of course did not consent to the reason of their arrest. Unlike prisoners of war, they did not accept the right of the Nazis to put them in camps, but once arrested they identified themselves with the cause they were imprisoned for, thus gaining a certain degree of self-respect and coping capability. To become the object of completely meaningless events is on the other hand detrimental not only to one's dignity, but also to one's ability to deal with the on-going situations in a rational way. This was rather obvious in the camp inmates who could not identify themselves in any way with the other prisoners.

Still more clearly this situation emerges in cases of victims of mugging or rape, problems that have been dealt with on a professional level only in recent years as far as the victim is considered. The immediate initial anxiety reactions to sudden unexpected attack of violence have been discussed by Dr. Roth. After the first shock reaction, a sort of coping behaviour starts. This will be dealt with in detail by Dr. Tinklenberg, here. I'll come only with a few personal remarks and experiences (2). I think it is important to differentiate between fast coping in acute situations and coping over time. Coping in acute and seriously life threatening situations will usually mean to survive the danger of the moment. Victims of highjacking confronted with an overwhelming force of armed terrorists will naturally enough comply in order to avoid heightened nervousness and panic, and enhanced danger of

shooting, of being killed. There are several accounts of skyjacking where victims who seemed somewhat stubborn or who expressed their feelings or opinions in a way which was considered provocative by the terrorists, were shot dead immediately. As earlier mentioned the terrorists do not consider the victims as individual human beings, they are only objects for them, means by which they want to achieve their goals. Any sign of human individuality in the beginning of an "action" disturbs this picture, and can lead to "short circuit reactions". There are however, certain limits for complying too, and in cases where terrorists would demand that a hostage perform criminal acts or other activities that would reduce the self-esteem of the victim to an intolerable degree, it might happen that some victims will prefer death to extreme debasement. Usually however, this question does not arise before some time has elapsed after the hyper-acute phases.

The victims of kidnapping or skyjacking must change and find new adaptation mechanisms quickly in order to cope with the current situation constantly in flux. The situation will usually be complicated by the heterogeneity of the captives and their lack of inner cohesiveness. The forming of subgroups, sometimes even hostile towards each other, is quite usual.

Under longlasting situations of captivity, quite different coping goals and mechanisms come into functioning. We know that there are many different value systems which all are of salient importance for a specific individual and his psychological homeostasis. I would suggest that we consider as successful coping an adaptation that—provided basic minimal survival possibilities are present—tends not only to foster physical survival, but to maintain mental health during the captivity and in the years after the liberation. In this way we are trying to avoid the value problem, accepting that "each individual may be saved on his own premises."

In normal prisons the ordinarily most used and probably for the local situation, most effective coping mechanism, is identification with the subculture of criminality and of anti-establishment attitudes. The criminal prisoner expects to meet those values and they are in accordance with his own. In addition to that he can seemingly comply to a certain degree with the incarcerator, which will be rewarded by all sorts of privileges.

In the camps, however, the situation was a quite different one. The set of values prevailing there, and that of most of the inmates, were radically different. People who tried the more primitive coping mechanisms as denial, creation of illusions, had very few chances to

survive. People who tried to adapt and to do anything in order to survive, both lost their self-esteem, and at the same time their interpersonal relationships with the other inmates were disturbed, often with a rather fatal result. The very few camp inmates who had survived in spite of using this coping mechanism, and whom I have interviewed, showed deep pathological changes of their personality.

The group of people who were able to mobilize the most adequate coping mechanism were according to my experience those who, for one reason or another, could retain their personality and system of values more or less intact even under conditions of nearly complete social anomie. Those who were most fortunate in this respect were the persons who, thanks to their profession, could both show and practice interest in others, who could retain their norms and values inside the camp at the same level as outside the camp. The few fortunate ones were some doctors, nurses, even social workers and priests as described by Kral (8) in Theresienstadt (Terezin). All of those were more preoccupied with the problems of their fellow prisoners than with their own, came through their trials in better mental condition than the average inmate of the camp. Only a tiny minority, however, had this good fortune. The greater part had to find other ways of coping. These are perhaps illustrated in the best way looking at those who were not able to do so.

Prisoners who were completely isolated from their family, bereaved of all contact with groups to whom they were related before the war, people who very quickly abandoned themselves and their innermost values, people who were completely overwhelmed by the notion that they had nobody and nothing to struggle or to live for, who felt completely passive and had lost their ability to retain some sort of mental activity were those who most easily succumbed. The symptoms of the feelings of hopelessness and giving-up could be seen by experienced observers rather early.

On the other hand, my interviews have shown that the maintenance of self-esteem, a sense of human dignity, a sense of group belonging, and a feeling of being useful to others, all seemed to contribute significantly to survival in both physical and psychological terms.

When comparing the groups of survivors who mobilized coping mechanisms like these with those who ascribed their survival to mere luck or chance, it appears, on a statistically significant level, that the former have fewer and less severe psychiatric complications than the latter. In other words, coping mechanisms which enhanced the individual's contact with a group, coping which was based on intact and

positive value systems, on retaining self-respect as a human being in the best and truest sense of the word, coping where attachment to others was of central concern, proved not only to be of importance in relation to the capacity of immediate survival, but also a way of survival without too many psychological disturbances and with one's personality intact —when experiences like those in the concentration camps allow it at all.

Here it is perhaps worthwhile mentioning a little study by Henderson (5) from Tasmania. The seven survivors of a shipwreck involving ten men, were interviewed within a few days of rescue. They had been floating in a rubber raft for 9 days and had thereafter been on an isolated rocky beach for 4 days. Three of the men walked through dense brush to obtain help. Rescue came on the thirteenth day. The purpose of the authors' examination was to identify those behaviours which the survivors reported as helping them to cope during their ordeal. The most prominent of these was attachment ideation, the drive to survive, prayer and hope. By attachment ideation is meant preoccupation with principal attachment figures such as wives, mothers, near peers, girl friends etc. Comparing the incomparable we find nevertheless some of the same coping mechanisms here as in the camps.

In order not to be accused of non-realistic idealization it is necessary to admit that everybody had to go through some sort of psychic "closing off" as Lifton (9) calls it, or psychic anaesthesia as it had been called in the postwar literature. Lifton's book also mentions another type of psychic reaction. The changed outlook in which one began to accept death as a matter of course. One ceased to respect its awfulness when corpses were everywhere, something that was the same in Hiroshima and in Auschwitz. This changed outlook did not only apply to death, but also to a certain degree to the sufferings of the other inmates.

It seems that reactions during unexpected captivity are the same as during disasters. These problems are dealt with in an extensive literature, which time does not allow to quote here. We can only mention that man-made disaster is more difficult to bear and to accept than a natural catastrophe and its results.

I am now approaching the last part of my presentation: the (late) results of the stress of captivity. From our experiences with chronic psychiatric patients we know that longlasting institutionalization with impaired human relationships can deteriorate not only the patients' psychological functioning, but his biological functioning as well. It is therefore reasonable to assume that criminals who have been held behind bars, whose self-esteem and self-respect has been reduced and abused, will suffer under this condition, even after their release from jail. The longlasting effects of this humiliation have not been investigated properly, but it is reasonable to assume that these people hardly will find any reason to accept the social

values of our society and to act according to them. They are bound to feel excluded from the society, and feel free to take action against it.

On the other hand, the literature as regards the captivity in POW-camps and concentration camps and its late results, is rather comprehensive. It would go far beyond this presentation trying to list all the details. Suffice it to say that in spite of the diversity of the populations investigated, of the differences in cultural backgrounds and theoretical orientations of the investigators, certain consistent patterns of chronic changes emerge.

In very detailed studies with meticulous scrutinizing of all anamnestic data and comparing these with the symptoms found in each single case, it is of course possible to find relationships between special forms of traumatization and their pathological results. Strøm (17) and our team could for instance show that anxiety reactions even 20 years after the War were more common among those arrested before the age of 25, and among those who had suffered from mental illness prior to their arrest. Higher incidence of anxiety was also found among those who had suffered repeated head injuries and a loss of weight of over 30% and especially among those who reacted with mental disturbances during their imprisonment.

Others have been concerned with the late results of malnutrition and starvation in relation to infectious diseases etc. Time does not allow even to quote all the studies. The most persuasive evidence of the impact of longlasting and stressful captivity, is the higher mortality among the survivors. This was found for ex-POWs from Japan, Korea, in both USA and Canada, and for ex-POWs from Russia in West Germany. For concentration camp survivors in Norway, Eitinger and Strøm (3) could show an excess of death among the ex-prisoners during all the years after liberation. Knowing the precise number and age of the ex-prisoners, the expected number of deaths between 1945 and 1965 was 608, while the observed number was 719, which gives a ratio of 1.18 for all prisoners. For prisoners who were under the most difficult situations the ratio was 1.5, which is much higher than for the other prisoners.

In the fifties and sixties when the first more extensive results of investigations on concentration camp survivors started to appear, there was a certain discrepancy between the Scandinavian and American results. The former stressed more the somatic and neurological findings, while the latter were more concerned with the psychodynamics of the traumatization and its psychological results. This now seems a rather futile discussion. Knowing on the one hand the extreme physical

hardships of forced labour, starvation and the other massive somatic traumatizations, and on the other hand the terror, persecution, defamation, family dissolution, isolation and the whole psychological stress which was imposed, but knowing also that these psychophysical stresses and traumatizations occurred simultaneously and were directed against the same individuals, it is nearly meaningless to attempt to distinguish the relative importance of a single factor on the late reactions. To see only the one or the other side of the complex picture demonstrates only the onesidedness of the observer, and not of the pathology. Studies that have shown that the ex-prisoners' general morbidity is higher than that of controls, can most easily be explained by the fact that the excessive stress lowered the ex-prisoners' resistance to infections and lessened their ability to adjust to environmental changes. The effects of captivity are so deep that the vulnerability of the victims remains increased, and full recovery does not appear to be possible.

Nevertheless I would like to mention the newly published German study of Höpker (6) who has investigated nearly 3000 post mortem protocols, 1098 of them of former German POW's, the others of matched controls. The study is done very thoroughly and the conclusions drawn with great caution. One very clear finding is that of more internal hydrocephalus and degenerative changes in the brain tissue among the POW's. Clinically this means changes that can be compared with deteriorations one sees in senility with diminished efficiency. The patient tires more readily, has less initiative, and is duller in comprehension. Tasks which he formerly accomplished readily, become increasingly difficult, and finally pass completely beyond his power. Failures of memory, first of all especially for names, are very common. Restlessness and irritability can complicate the picture. The final condition is one of more or less complete mental reduction.

We know relatively little about the long-term impact of short-term unexpected captivity. Symonds suggests that the general reactions of victims of crime are similar to the psychological response of an individual who has experienced sudden and unexpected loss. When shock and denial have failed as adaptive reactions, the victim becomes frightened, and the trauma-related anxiety syndrome can persist through several years. Anxiety during the day and anxiety dreams at night, repetitive thoughts, heightened irritability, and sometimes even fright with clinging behaviour are symptoms that have been described in victims of crime and of catastrophes. The common denominator is probably the loss of trust in one's integrity, in the society's ability to protect one, or in the stability of one's milieu.

Investigations of the later years have brought ample evidence that the problem of the concentration camp survivors probably will

not die together with them. Barocas (1) has suggested that children of concentration camp survivors may become the transference recipients of parental unconscious and unexpressed rage. This would explain explosive and aggressive behaviour of children as described by Niederland (11). The severe depressive reactions as observed in children of survivors by Rakoff et al (13) may reflect intense parental restraints, culminating in an internalization of the anger. The process by which the concentration camp syndrome may be transmitted to the children seems thus to be very complex indeed according to Barocas. Russel (15) treated 36 families of survivors, and found that they presented even more than expected all sorts of dysfunctional communication patterns. Their family life is an isolated life, with no real world. Furthermore survivors' guilt was found in almost all adults of the sample. On the whole, the picture given by the Canadian investigators is a rather gloomy one.

The effects of the POW's experience on the prisoner's family has until very recently been largely overlooked as a subject of study, writes Julius Segal. McCubbin et al (10) highlighted adjustment problems which were found among the families of American men returning from captivity in Vietnam, and confirmed that family reunions among POW's are indeed stressful. The effect on children of the absent and returning POW-father has only recently begun to be studied, but from parallel situations rather disturbing results are well known.

John Sigal (16) reviewed in 1976 the effects of paternal exposure to prolonged stress on the mental health of the spouse and children. He quotes an unpublished dissertation by Karr, who found that children of both (or one) parents who were concentration camp survivors, have a.o. symptoms, significant difficulties in impulse control and a tendency to anxiety and depression. These findings were more or less the same as those Dr. Sigal and his group had encountered earlier in children of concentration camp survivors. A comparison of concentration camp survivors with Canadian POWs who had been in Japanese camps for 44 months, showed practically no differences in the late results. The extreme stress these two groups had been exposed to was sufficient to erase cultural and ethnic differences, and to result in a final common path of symptomatology. The effect on the offspring seems however, to be somewhat different. The observations are only preliminary and tentative, and the sampling not complete; nevertheless it is of interest to note that it is only the oldest female child who seems to be affected.

It is far too early to state anything about possible long-range results in victims of crimes, skyjacking and so on. Even less can be said with certainty about the possible effects on the second generation. There is, however, enough knowledge concerning other serious psychic traumatizations and their long-term effects on the individual concerned

and on his surroundings, that we have every reason to take also these traumatizations seriously as regards their possible after-effects on the victim's children and immediate environment. And to take every possible measure to prevent both these traumas and their deleterious results.

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The Comments for this session  
were not available at publication  
time.

**SESSION ON COPING BEHAVIOUR**

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60021

ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR OF VICTIMS OF TERRORISM

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by

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This paper presents adaptive behaviors victims use in coping with the severe stress of terrorism. The discussion has been extended to include examples from similarly threatening situations requiring many of the same coping mechanisms. Several examples of defense and coping mechanisms are drawn from information on the severely stressful experiences of prisoners of war and concentration camp survivors.

This paper should serve several purposes. First, this discussion should serve to support the growing conviction that specific steps must be taken to assess the unusual plight of the victim of terrorism. Second, this presentation will assist in developing theories and techniques of successful adaptive behaviors capable of reducing anxiety and maximizing the probability of survival. Third, those charged with the responsibility for the containment and depotentiation of the terrorist incident, as well as the protection of the victim, can benefit from a deeper understanding of the psychological mechanisms at work in the victim as well as the terrorist, both of whom are likely to exhibit certain predictable behaviors under the strain of the terrorist situation.

## INTRODUCTION

A definition of terms is needed since there is considerable semantic overlap in the use of such terms as adaptation, defense, and coping. Following the lead of Robert White's systemization, adaptation is the superordinate category under which are subsumed the terms defense mechanisms and coping (1974).

Adaptation includes all the responses and strategies a victim may assume in order to reduce stress and/or maximize the probability of survival. Narrowly defined for this discussion, defense mechanisms are the essentially unconscious psychological adjustments the individual makes to a present danger and the attendant anxiety and are largely influenced by the personality pattern of the individual. Coping refers to adaptation under relatively difficult conditions and is concerned with ongoing active adaptive processes that meet task requirements. Coping involves innovative rather than routine behaviors and is distinguished from defense in that it is not restricted to unconscious mechanisms, but instead involves conscious, deliberate behaviors of the individual.

The systematic study of terrorism and victimology is relatively new, but much of the victim's responses come from the repertoire of behavior that is common to all adaptive behavior. Thus, the observations gained from the disciplines of the behavioral sciences and psychiatry can usefully be applied to this phenomenon.

For purposes of exposition we will discuss in order, under the general concept of adaptation, first, defense mechanisms and then coping strategies. It should be noted, however, that these mechanisms do not operate singly or necessarily in any particular order but rather operate simultaneously as a cluster. The repertoire of adaptive mechanisms is extensive and varies among individuals. Strategies change over time and with the circumstances; mechanisms overlap and may even be contradictory. For instance, the victim may at the same time deny the reality of the experience and hope that things will come out all right.

### Basic Considerations

The problem of predicting successful adaptive behavior in a situation of terrorism is complicated by several factors which alter the characteristics of the situation and influence the outcome.

### 1. Duration of the threat

The range of responses available to an individual confronted with severe anxiety is determined to some extent by the duration of the stress. Victims of prolonged captivity will adopt over time different adaptive behaviors and at different rates of progression than victims who are confronted by a terrifying but relatively brief threat. Indeed, unless adaptive behavior is adjusted to the temporal duration of the threat, the individual will not be able to withstand the physical and emotional stress. Initially, stress usually induces sustained and directed activity, increased vigilance and greater alertness to outside events as the body prepares for strenuous activity. However, as described by Seyle and others, the individual cannot maintain this response over a prolonged period of time (1956). As the threat continues, these responses become increasingly difficult to maintain. Unless other adaptive behaviors are assumed, with further threat, thought and judgment deteriorate, somatic disturbances appear, action becomes erratic and impulsive and finally panic sets in; the individual loses discrimination and becomes emotionally and behaviorally labile. Obviously a panic reaction is not useful for survival since there follows the collapse of mechanisms that serve survival—body control, attention, and alertness to reality testing (White, 1956). Consequently, the victim of a brief terrorist encounter may be well served by the initial, brief, hyperalert state that includes physical inhibition; but the victim of a prolonged threat must institute other adaptive behaviors appropriate to the temporal demands of the situation.

### 2. Prior life experience and personality factors.

Victims of terrorism vary in their life experiences and behavioral response repertoire. Some individuals such as military personnel, may have had prior training which may enable them to mobilize a wider range of conscious adaptive behaviors in addition to unconscious defense mechanisms. Presumably they might have adaptive advantages in a terrorist situation in comparison to, for example, a housewife. In addition, personality type is an important factor determining coping behaviors. Studies of POW and concentration camp survivors have shown that under identical circumstances certain personality types cope more successfully than others. As an example, Ford and Spaulding (1973) evaluated psychiatrically the 82 surviving crew members of the USS Pueblo who were captured and imprisoned in North Korea for 11 months in 1968. Those men who adapted poorly to the prolonged stress were frequently diagnosed as being passive-dependent, while those men who coped with the stress well most often had personality diagnoses of "healthy" or schizoid. Thus, the adaptive behaviors available to different individuals will differ

depending upon previous experience and personality factors.

### 3. The Terrorists' Set

The outcome for the victim is largely dependent upon the terrorist's particular set, that is, his motives, goal, and the actions he is willing to take. Motives may range broadly from simple monetary gain to obtaining publicity for a specific political cause; the tactics employed to gain these ends may vary from holding hostages to bombing threats. Since the victim seldom knows at the outset of a terrorist incident what the motives, expectations, and tactics of the terrorists may be, adaptive behaviors can only be instituted as new information about the reality of the situation becomes available. In the most pessimistic of cases, the terrorist may intend from the outset to kill the victim. An example would be the case of the Israeli athletes assassinated in Munich in 1972, where the assassination of the victims was the immediate objective and the redirection of national policies was the ultimate objective. It must be accepted that there are situations, dependent upon the set of the terrorists, in which the only adaptive behavior available to the victim is a primitive physical struggle for survival. In these situations, no matter what defense mechanisms or coping strategies the individual employs, his chances of survival are minimal. Fortunately, a review of the details of terrorist incidents in recent years indicates that, in the majority of cases, the motives and tactics of terrorists are not simply to kill the victim; but are more complex, and thus amenable to psychological manipulation. Thus, the personalities and life experiences of the terrorists, their motives, tactics, and objectives will determine which adaptive behaviors on the part of the victim offer the greatest possibility of survival.

The mechanisms outlined below are only some of the various adaptive behaviors available to the individual. They have been selected for exposition because they seem to be most salient in terrorist situations.

#### Psychological Defense Mechanisms

When an individual is immediately confronted with a severe threat he frequently employs an initial psychological defense of denial or a counterphobic mechanism.

Denial. Denial is when an individual refutes partially or totally, the reality of an experience, the affect associated with it, or the memory of it. This common defense mechanism serves the individual by reducing the shock of the experience to a manageable level of stress and inhibiting precipitous action, or excessive reflexive heroism. However, denial can be employed only so long as it can co-exist with reality testing (Freud). As the stressful situation continues and progressively more information (reality) impinges on the individual, refutation of the experience becomes increasingly difficult. Thus, denial is a time-limited defense which ceases to serve the individual well when employed for prolonged periods. Anxiety levels actually rise during sustained denial of perceived reality. Optimally, denial defense is gradually lessened as the reality of the situation is assimilated in psychologically acceptable degrees and other adaptive behaviors become operative. An example is the report of an American woman who was among 149 passengers and nine crew members who were skyjacked to the Jordanian desert and held captive for seven days by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. She vividly describes the initial response of several passengers as stunned refusal to believe that a skyjacking was actually taking place (Jacobson).

So, the victim may at first respond with "I don't believe this," or "this can't be happening." These statements are psychologically true; the individual unconsciously refuses to comprehend the situation. Denial permits the lapse of time and protects the individual from physical collapse. Panic reactions are prevented or made less likely. The temporizing effects of denial provide the victim with an opportunity to gradually assess the situation and perhaps formulate coping strategies. Thus, this unconsciously self-constructed buffer mechanism serves the psychological balance of the individual and permits the gradual, less destructive assimilation of a dangerously threatening reality.

Counter-phobic Mechanism. This mechanism refers to the reduction of stress and anxiety by excessive and sometimes precipitous responses that are the opposite of the individual's basic inclinations. A simple example is the case of the man with a fear of heights who becomes a mountain climber. This unconscious defense may serve the individual well in stress situations other than violence or terrorism. For instance, a person who is confronted with a snarling dog may make friends with the dog, instead of attempting to strike the dog or run away as his instincts would suggest. However, in the circumstances we are dealing with here, this unconscious mechanism is more to be guarded against than used. Acted-out counter-phobic behavior in these situations, sometimes termed "macho" or "heroism", often increases the probability of injury or death for the victim. We can cite several examples of these negative outcomes from our investigations

at the California prison system, where for several years we have been studying adolescent assailants and their victims. Our data clearly indicate that counter-phobic responses in a situation of potential violence are frequently futile and dangerous. A common example is the case of the robbery victim who, while the assailant had a gun pointed at him, moved to reach under the counter for a gun. The assailant immediately shot and killed him. Other victims have defiantly dared the assailant to shoot, or have threatened to kill the assailant although unarmed and knowing the assailant had a loaded gun.

Taking an example from a recent terrorist incident in the United States, we can cite the fatal outcome of the Hanafi takeover of three sites in Washington, D.C. for two days in March of this year. Heavily armed men invaded the District Building, which serves as City Hall for Washington, the headquarters of B'nai B'rith, and the Islamic Center. Only one person was killed during the Hanafi siege. As the terrorists were taking control of the building, this individual emerged into the corridor and saw the terrorists armed with rifles and machetes. Unarmed himself, and in this totally overwhelming situation, he verbally assaulted the terrorists, belligerently calling out, "Hey man, you're going to hurt someone with those." The terrorists immediately shot and killed him (New York Times, March 10, 1977). Many examples can be cited, but the point is that, for the survival of the victim of terrorism, the counter-phobic mechanism is an immediate response that he should be aware of and control.

Other defense mechanisms that are apparent in highly stressful situations include the following:

Intellectualization refers to a psychological mechanism that reduces stress by taking the threatening situation into the sphere of the intellect, divesting it of affective and personal meanings, and working on it as cognitive problems i.e., metaphysics, religion, political theory, or mathematics. Mr. Vaders, in the Netherlands incident cited by Dr. Ochberg, employed this defense mechanism when he began taking detailed notes and imposed his professional role as a journalist on an emotionally terrifying series of events. Again an example can be taken from the Pueblo incident. One crew member spent a considerable portion of his time in captivity mentally designing and building a complex computer, while another, a chef, mentally planned the preparation of elaborate meals (Spaulding and Ford; Bucher).

Creative Elaboration. This refers to a psychological process wherein specific situations are elaborated and disguised in dreams, stories, imagery and fantasies. In terrorist situations, the victim represents

himself in a different relationship with his captor. One member of the Pueblo crew reported extensively using this defense mechanism. He fantasized in detail about United States troops mounting a massive retaliatory raid upon the North Koreans, including exploding minefields and burning cities (Bucher; Ford and Spaulding).

Humor. Humor, the ability to joke within the context of a stressful situation, can have the adaptive function of reducing anxiety. An example is so-called "gallows" humor. Aboard the skyjacked airplane that was held in the Jordanian desert, some of the people had been in Nazi concentration camps, and, of course, most people had not been. The veterans of Buchenwald joshed the complaints of the others, saying that compared with what they had lived through there, the plane was a "Hilton Hotel" (Jacobson).

Reaction Formation and Identification with the Aggressor. Reaction formation is the adaptive process whereby attitudes and behaviors are adopted that are opposites of impulses the individual harbors either consciously or unconsciously, e.g., fear of the terrorist is transformed into approval or admiration. Closely related, and sometimes observed in the victims of terrorists, is the defense mechanism of identification with the aggressor. The victim unconsciously incorporates the characteristics of the feared person and becomes psychologically allied with him. When the victim transforms himself from the person threatened into the person who makes the threat, anxiety is reduced (Freud). This transformation is more commonly found in hysterical personalities and younger, less stable people than in mature individuals. Obvious examples of this process can be drawn from Nazi concentration camp experiences where some inmates mimicked their captors to the point of wearing swastikas and walking with a goose step.

Reaction formation and identification with the aggressor may have been salient in the highly publicized case of Patricia Hearst and the Symbionese Liberation Army. In brief, Miss Hearst, then 18, was abducted from her Berkeley apartment in February 1974 by a gang of terrorists who called themselves the Symbionese Liberation Army. She was held hostage and subjected to severe stress for a prolonged period of time. Miss Hearst subsequently appeared to join her captors and aggressively participated in some of their violent activities. For example, although before her abduction, she had limited, if any, experience with firearms, three months after her capture, she provided covering fire when her companions, William and Emily Harris, were challenged by a storekeeper for shoplifting. The court's decision in the Hearst case reflected the psychological complexity of these events, both assigning culpability with a guilty verdict, and yet adding extenuating circumstances in handing down conviction with probation.

In varying degrees, the same psychological mechanisms were apparent during the Hanafi siege in Washington, D.C. Ms. Betty Neal, the woman who acted as the Hanafi leader's secretary and assisted him in his negotiations, stated at the end of the siege that she had become more frightened of the police than of her Hanafi captors (New York Times, March 12, 1977). Many of her co-captives expressed sympathy and concern for the terrorists while others maintained the attitude throughout that the Hanafi were murderers and deserving of contempt (Washington Post, March 12, 1977; New York Times, March 13, 1977). An important question here is to what extent did the woman who assisted the Hanafi leader lessen the probability of morbidity and aid in the resolution of the conflict? We will argue later that her forming of positive bonds with the leader was a useful coping behavior for her.

Shifting allegiances between victims and their captors is a factor which must be taken into account when dealing with terrorism. Victims should be regarded as neutral or even negative towards the authorities. Episodes have occurred where the victims warned their captors of impending rescue attempts. There is no way to know whether the victims have become sympathetic to their captors or not, so their positive participation should be minimized in the strategy calculation of the authorities.

The adaptive behaviors, reaction formation and identification with the aggressor, raise a number of legal, psychiatric, and public policy questions. What limits, if any, does society apply to victim coping behavior? Who is to determine the degree of transformation or whether it is real or feigned? And of particular importance to this conference, what can authorities expect of terrorist hostages in terms of co-operation?

### Coping Strategies

Although there is considerable overlap between defense mechanisms and coping strategies, the term coping generally refers to more conscious, deliberate methods of reducing stress while attempting to meet task requirements or achieve specific goals. Coping generally denotes relatively difficult situations and involves creative, not routine, actions and reflective, not reflexive, behavior (White, 1974; Hamburg, Coelho & Adams, 1974). There is a wide variety of coping mechanisms, but in this paper we will present only those that are most salient for victims of terrorism.

Relinquish Control. Denial and counter-phobic mechanisms have been described above as defense mechanisms initially used by many people in extremely frightening situations. Denial is generally limited to the beginning stages of the unexpected threat and usually dissipates as the individual gradually assimilates the reality of the experience. Our studies in the California prison system on victim and assailant interactions especially in violent situations indicate that continued denial is often associated with injury or death. In other words, a refusal to relinquish control to the assailant who is clearly in the dominant position increases the danger to the victim.

The coping strategy that seems most useful in the initial stages of a terrorist episode is for the victim to consciously accept that he is a captive and must at least temporarily relinquish control to his captor. When propitious, the victim should tacitly or explicitly acknowledge that he accepts their dominant position. Relinquishing control in this fashion serves two purposes: 1) it emphasizes the reality of the situation for both the terrorist and the victim; and 2) it reduces the possibility of precipitous violent action on the part of the terrorist. In interviews with California kidnapers where victims were killed, a recurrent theme was "he didn't know who was the boss" or often irrational comments, such as "he would have hurt me if I had let him." As the affect of the assailant, especially in the initial phases of aggressive interactions, is anxiety or even fear, overreaction to any non-submissive behavior of the victim is especially probable.

Thus, the most prudent initial strategy for the victim is to leave resistance and intervention to professionals trained in appropriate tactics and use of force. Even in the event of a mounted assault upon the terrorists, victims should not interfere, but should seek cover and maintain a submissive posture as much as possible.

Maintain Control of Emotions. In order to relinquish control the victim must be aware of his own emotional responses to the situation. In addition to fear, victims of terrorism commonly experience rage, frustration, and humiliation. However, as it is usually counter-productive to act on these powerful feelings, it is important that the victim be attuned to his internal state and maintain control over his emotions and actions.

As discussed previously, unconscious defense mechanisms will often inhibit initial action; the next adaptive step is often to consciously remain inactive, submissively silent, and focussed on whatever self-relaxation is possible so that behavior can be adjusted to the situation. Some victims have found it useful to concentrate on that

which is immediately evident in the environment, and not let their imagination wander through all the possible negative outcomes. Others, who were unable to maintain their focus on the immediate circumstances, have directed their thoughts toward a neutral subject or on a comforting, sustaining subject such as music or a personal faith. As mentioned above, assuming a familiar role and undertaking tasks over which one has a sense of mastery is useful in reducing and maintaining self-control. Recent examples include Ms. Neal, an office worker on the staff of B'nai B'rith, who acted as secretary to the Hanafi leader; and Mr. Vaders, a professional journalist, who began taking notes on the events in the Moluccan terrorist attack.

In many stressful situations there is a warning period during which the individual can rehearse his role and formulate appropriate coping behaviors. However, in most instances, the victims of terrorism have no prior warning or training. In response to this need, the U.S.I.A. has prudently developed a training program for embassy staff who are at high risk of victimization. This program involves actively rehearsing the captive situation so that the potential victim can become aware of his emotions under threat and learn to deal with them.

We feel it is important for the victim to realize that calm inaction in the face of severe threat is in fact "doing something". Especially in Western societies, where active control of one's destiny is highly valued, such passivity is difficult for some individuals. Awareness that inactivity is often the strategy most likely to enhance ultimate survival helps the victim to maintain self-esteem, a crucial component in reducing the immediate stress and facilitating successful adjustment after the terrorist episode.

Following the initial strategies of consciously relinquishing control of the situation to the terrorists and of maintaining passive self-control, the victim can begin to use adaptive maneuvers that are appropriate for prolonged episodes of terrorism. Common examples include: 1) gathering information; 2) establishing positive bonds with the terrorists; 3) establishing affiliations with other victims; 4) focussing on survival for some purpose; and 5) maintaining the will to live.

Gathering Information. Gathering information about the environment, the physical layout, the circumstances of fellow victims, and most importantly about the "set" of the terrorists has adaptive value and can significantly reduce stress. For example, in all three sites of the Hanafi siege in Washington, D.C., there was markedly more gentle treatment of women hostages than of the men (New York Times, March 12, 1977).

These differences in treatment of hostages are thought to stem from the religious beliefs of the Hanafi. This information alleviated somewhat the anxiety of some of the captives (especially the women) as it suggested that execution was not the paramount intent of the terrorists. In the Pueblo incident cited earlier, a member of the crew reported that he had been certain that the North Koreans would eventually release them because he observed that although the guards beat them severely, they were careful to avoid visible disfigurement (Ford and Spaulding).

Victims of terrorism should remain aware that, as with the dissipation of initial denial, there is an optimal rate at which information is assimilated. Either too much or too little input of information is often associated with increased stress. Thus, the individual should optimally adjust accordingly his surveillance of the transpiring events, his interactions with the terrorists, and so forth.

Establish Positive Bonds With The Terrorists. Establishing communication between the terrorist and the victim is a controversial issue. The U.S. Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism recommends that victims attempt to establish dialogue with the terrorists, taking care to express serious, noncontentious interest in their personal and political beliefs; attempt to persuade them to alternatives; avoid giving information; and seek to elicit information that would be helpful in apprehending the terrorists (1977). In contrast, Dr. Calvin Frederick of N.I.M.H., who has worked extensively with hostage survivors, recommends that the victim not attempt to establish any contact with the captor, unless and until the captor initiates the communication (Washington Post, March 12, 1977). This coping strategy seems most reasonable to us: the victim should not initiate interactions with the captors but should be prepared to take full advantage of whatever opportunity the terrorists offer for contact. The important goal of this contact is to induce in the terrorists positive affective bonds. The victim should vigilantly seek such a possibility and respond quickly and sincerely, since greater human awareness of each other generally reduces the possibility of violence. A recent example is the experience of Ms. Betty Neal, who acted as secretary to the Hanafi leader and assisted him in his negotiations by handling the phone communications. She later reported that the leader gave her advice on where to hide and how to protect her life should violence erupt, a far cry from threats to cut off the heads of other captives (New York Times, March 12, 1977).

Of importance is that even in episodes of terrorism, positive affective bonds between captor and victims are usually enhanced with the passage of time. This psychological process is reflected in most terrorist situations where brutality and violence of the terrorists has decreased during the episode. Mr. Darrell Trent, a U.S. expert on

terrorism, has collected evidence which indicates that if the victims have not been harmed in the first three days, their chances of survival unharmed progressively increase. (Trent).

Establish group affiliation with other victims. The establishment of interactions with at least a few other victims has repeatedly been shown to be a valuable coping strategy. The feeling of common adversity, "all being in the same boat" has been convincingly documented as a psychological process that reduces stress. This tactic was absolutely essential among concentration camp survivors; even a single friend meant the difference between going on and giving up (Dimsdale). The U.S. Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism recommends that victims take every opportunity to discuss and evaluate their situation with an emphasis on what they can do to help each other (1977). Group interaction also provides an environment for leadership to arise which can both benefit morale and ameliorate some of the conditions of captivity. The benefit of this strategy was seen among the members of the Pueblo crew who were billeted together several to a room. Spontaneous leaders arose who were very helpful in reducing the guilt experienced by many men after their forced confessions (Spaulding and Ford). Jacobson reported in her account of skyjacking to the Jordanian desert that, after all the men had been removed from the plane, the women who remained established a solidarity and a self-policing, self-assisting group system (1973).

Focus on survival for some purpose. This coping strategy may take a wide variety of forms. Some concentration camp survivors have reported that they were determined to survive because they felt desperately needed by other members of their families (Dimsdale). This strategy may take the form of faith in something that transcends the human condition. The transcendental view has been found to have great positive value for anxiety reduction and survival, whether it be commitment to a religious faith, devotion to a cause or art form, or the positive value of carrying on certain interests to which one is deeply attached. Religious faith was reported as useful by many of the captives at the Islamic Center site of the Hanafi siege where several individuals read the Koran during the terror (Washington Post, March 11, 1977). A deep and abiding faith in mankind or one's colleagues may serve as a positive focus. The Pueblo crew members who fared relatively well during captivity reported that they knew they would not be abandoned (Ford and Spaulding). Among concentration camp survivors many sustained themselves by the firm conviction that the bulk of humanity would not tolerate such atrocities (Dimsdale).

The will to live. Although related to the strategy of survival for a purpose, the will to live refers to a more primitive commitment to life itself, with or without special purpose. It may consciously take the form of a deep and total decision to live no matter what, on any

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terms, to choose life for its own sake. Survivors of long term imprisonment have reported making the decision to live at some point during the early months of captivity and credit this with their survival (Segal, Hunter and Segal). Among concentration camp inmates the will to live often became the entire motivation of the individual, over-whelming all others; while the opposite, "give-up-itis" was one of the major causes of non-deliberate death (Dimsdale). Another example of the force of this psychological mechanism is in the report of Commander Bucher of the Pueblo. He reported that at one specific time, repeated beatings, exhaustion and pain had brought him to the contemplation of suicide. But instead, as the next beating approached he stood up, drawing upon "prayer and a fundamental will to live and prevail over these beasts" (1970).

Of course, most terrorism is more time-limited than prisoner of war or concentration camp captivity, but this fundamental decision to survive can serve as the focal point around which the individual can organize other coping strategies.

#### Summary

The adaptive behaviors we have presented have been repeatedly demonstrated by victims of terrorism and have been used in various life-threatening situations to reduce anxiety and enhance the probability of a positive outcome. In addition, the coping mechanisms conform to Hamburg's comprehensive analysis of the positive goals of adaptive behavior, (1969). First, whatever stress is currently being faced is met and brought to the best possible resolution; second, anxiety is kept within tolerable limits; third, self-esteem is maintained; and fourth, relationships with significant others are made or preserved.

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**COMMENTS**

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by

**John GUNN**

I discuss Dr. Tinklenberg's paper with considerable diffidence. That is not only because of the high quality of Dr. Tinklenberg's contribution but also because I have a very real sense of my own lack of expertise in the subject matter of this fascinating conference. Just to introduce myself, I am in fact a jobbing forensic psychiatrist, by which I mean someone who researches into, teaches about, and practices with mentally abnormal offenders in the U.K. Mercifully the British experience of hostages and sieges has been small and I have been involved with none of them. Furthermore I have never treated or met any of the hostage-takers.

Dr. Tinklenberg has given us a very reasoned and logically consistent account of the issues involved in coping when under the stress of a siege. The first question his remarks raise in my mind is does he believe that there are specific behaviours and coping mechanisms for the siege state which are different from those encountered in other very stressful circumstances? I ask this question because if it can be demonstrated that the hostage has unique problems then we have a very special difficulty, because data is difficult to come by given the publicity surrounding most sieges and their infrequency.

Next I felt that during the course of his presentation Dr. Tinklenberg was indicating not so much the uniqueness of the siege phenomenon but rather the singularity of each victim's case. Each victim, and for that matter each terrorist, brings to a siege his own previous experience, his own psychology, and his own physiology. Now this point may seem a simple one but it is important because 2 major consequences flow from it. Firstly generalizations from any particular siege are inadmissible. Secondly our descriptive analysis of coping behaviour will have to rely on clinical and interactive methods. Such methods are good at helping us to make sense of what is happening to a particular group of individuals, but they give us very limited predictive powers. Any interactive analysis will have to take into account

innumerable factors, such as age, health, previous experience, religion, weather conditions; some of these factors such as previously established relationships between the victims, any battle for power which exists between the terrorists, and so on, will, as Dr. Tinklenberg indicated, develop and change their significance with the passage of time.

The third question raised in my mind by Dr. Tinklenberg's paper concerns the much discussed relationships that develop between captors and captives during a seige. The question I ask myself is are these warm feelings we have been hearing about normal or abnormal? My view is that they are normal and to be expected. Man is a group animal and he tries, both consciously and unconsciously, to align himself with any group in which he happens to find himself. Any group with which we have daily contact puts pressures on us to conform to the group norms and ideals. Assuming that in a seige the terrorists and the hostage communicate, think of the intensity of interaction that must develop. All the people in the seige very rapidly develop common over-riding needs: food, water, clothes, lavatories. Furthermore, all these commodities have to be supplied by another group, the police, or "authorities" in some guise, and the supply may not be readily forthcoming just when the group in the seige feels its need most intensely.

One possible way of checking whether the positive feelings that develop between the terrorist and hostage are normal or abnormal is to check whether the psychiatrically normal are more or less likely to identify with the aggressors. Another would be to see if identification during the seige made any difference to later breakdown rates after the seige had ended.

My fourth question is, how many victims fail to cope? Dr. Tinklenberg gave a list of healthy defence mechanisms but what about less healthy ones. I am thinking particularly of projection which could no doubt lead on to paranoia and of turning against the self which might induce suicidal ideas, guilt feelings and shame. No doubt we are back to the the fundamental issue of not having much data to go on but I wonder if there is any evidence at all about these possible reactions. For example do we know how many people break down psychiatrically after a seige? Do we know how many commit suicide during a seige, either by their own hand, or by provoking the terrorists to kill them?

The next issue raised by Dr. Tinklenberg's paper relates to his list of coping strategies, namely relinquishing control, keeping control of our emotions, gathering as much information as possible, establishing positive bonds with the terrorists, establishing group affiliation with the other victims, and focussing on survival. On the

face of it they seem to make an admirable field guide or survival kit for the potential hostage. However, on reflection I have some reservations. Sieges are random and there is no way in which we could prepare every member of large populations for this kind of experience. No doubt people in occupations, such as the diplomatic service or prison officers, who might be expected to be more than usually vulnerable, could with advantage be given some prior information, but I suspect that future sieges, like previous ones, will take everyone completely by surprise and an entirely uninitiated Mr. and Mrs. Brown will unfortunately have to cope with horrors they have never dreamed of. I also suspect that as information about coping mechanisms becomes more freely available we will then be faced with the consequences of feedback from the expert terrorists who study their subject. For example, they may take training to avoid group alliances developing, they may kill one or two hostages on the 5th day or later just to alarm the authorities. In other words, I'm not particularly optimistic about our ability to improve on the coping mechanisms we already develop in the course of an ordinary life. Perhaps most of all I am sceptical about the offering of advice about coping mechanisms when I am not sure that we know which will be the best. We have to remember the uniqueness of each siege and I think we have to question each idea very closely, even though it may seem at first to be sound common sense. For example, keeping control of our emotions. The hotel management here in Evian believe in this; they urge that in case of fire "gardez votre sang-froid, ne criez pas 'au feu'", and yet I wonder if the opposite kind of advice would not have saved a few lives in the terrible fire in Texas recently when people ignored the initial fire warnings. Similarly in assuming his familiar role of journalist in the first Dutch train siege Mr. Vaders made himself more visible and that may have been a factor in determining that he was to be killed.

Now I would like to make some general points which are not directly related to Dr. Tinklenberg's paper but which are stimulated by it. In discussing these points I am afraid I will wander into the territory of stress which I believe overlaps the topic of coping.

Returning to the issue I raised earlier about the specificity of the siege I believe we may be helped in our understanding of coping in the siege by reference to the psychological effects of disasters of all kinds. In this conference we have already heard of the work conducted by Dr. Eitinger into concentration camp victims. I would like to draw your attention to Martha Wolfenstein's description of the so-called 'disaster syndrome'.<sup>1</sup> She postulates two extreme reactions to severe stress; emotional withdrawal or panic. She collected observations made by people who were present in Japan when the atomic bombs were dropped and described how people under overwhelming stress became very unemotional. Her suggestion is that once a victim

has been forced to take in more stress than he or she can assimilate there is a compensatory resistance and they therefore appear insensitive and unaware of their surroundings. They can, in these circumstances, even be unaware of their own wounds. In her book she also comments on how frequently panic is encountered as a reaction to disaster. Her postulate is that panic will occur most commonly when escape routes are partially or totally blocked at the same time that safety seems close at hand and she suggests that being trapped arouses intense terror which in its turn impairs judgment, and she quotes examples of seamen on burning ships that have sometimes jumped into water covered with flaming oil so burning themselves to death. These theories seem to me to have some relevance to our topic today and it would be interesting to know whether hostages feel overwhelmed, or whether they feel trapped and whether there are reported observations of either emotional unreactivity or of panic.

I wonder too if there is data indicating the frequency of somatic symptoms in victims. My interest in this stems from the fact that during the second World War two major surveys of psychiatric health of the British population were carried out but no increase in psychiatric neurasis was noted,<sup>2,3</sup> whereas a survey of physical symptomatology<sup>4</sup> showed a considerable increase in peptic ulceration in London during the bombing. A year or two ago there was a disaster by fire on the Isle of Man when holidaymakers were trapped in a burning perspex cage. Quite a number of patients had to be admitted to hospital, not because of physical trauma but because of emotional stress mainly showing itself as persistent vomiting and incontinence of urine.<sup>5</sup> This phenomenon was brought back to my mind recently when I learned that the children in the latest Dutch seige developed abdominal symptoms.

Next I wondered if hysterical illnesses or even simulated illness could be employed as coping mechanisms. Dr. Peter Scott's contribution to an earlier phase of our discussion suggested that an hysterical illness might be advantageous in some sieges and we should remember that "shell shock", a common neurotic disorder in the first World War, saved the life of many a British soldier. However the terminology changed to "lack of moral fibre" in the second World War and was deemed an offence; it hardly occurred. As for simulated illness, that would be very tricky but I am reminded of a story told me by my chief, Professor Gibbens who was taken prisoner of war by the German Army in the second World War. Inevitably he became the medical officer to the prisoners. At the end of the war when the whole camp was being marched into the interior of Germany as the allies advanced, he taught his fellow prisoners to fake a raised temperature, neck stiffness, and restricted straight leg raising. He then reported to the German Command that he suspected an outbreak of infectious meningitis. Prudently the Germans abandoned their prisoners to the advancing allies. Such skillful

simulation would of course be difficult for ordinary hostages as they wouldn't know the correct pathological features; furthermore the timing of such a ruse is critical.

I also want to raise here a fundamental anxiety I have about our discussion. In his paper Dr. Tinklenberg was very properly addressing us as a behavioural scientist. Behavioural scientists come from many backgrounds and the beauty of such a conference as this for those of us who enjoy multi-disciplinary work, is that the more rigid closed-shop aspects of our usual professional life can be dispensed with. However, since a psychiatrist presented this paper and another psychiatrist has been invited to discuss it, I think I am bound to ask precisely what role psychiatrists should have in relation to seige victims. Many of the mechanisms we have been discussing are normal ones, many of the victims do not suffer psychiatric illness before, during or after the seige. The question we have to ask ourselves is what special skills in this work does the psychiatrist have that others do not have and what useful medical intervention can a psychiatrist make? My own view is that psychiatry should be prepared to help seige victims on an emergency basis if necessary, and I believe that psychiatry should more readily extend its hand to victims of all sorts. However we must be specially aware of 3 important points. Psychiatric resources are in short supply in most countries; we must ensure that their skills are used sparingly to good effect. If too much is claimed for psychiatry then those exaggerated claims bring the subject into disrepute. Thirdly, psychiatry can bring its own special form of stigmatisation and may, in this way, add to a victim's burden.

Lastly Dr. Tinklenberg's paper raised in my mind, as you will have gathered by now, a whole series of research questions and I hope our discussions will help to propose methods whereby we can collect data about coping mechanisms. I did wonder, briefly, if simulated seiges could be useful in providing data but I have decided that if the simulation is known to the participants, as for example in a training exercise, then the results would not really be valid, and if the simulation was not known it would be unethical. I suspect therefore that experiments on coping mechanisms are out but I would be glad to hear what others think, particularly Dr. Milgram. This leaves me with 2 techniques, the retrospective case study, the kind of work being carried out by Frank Ochberg, and Brian Jenkins, and lastly the examination of coping mechanisms under other forms of stress, for example, short-term imprisonment, during natural disasters, during rape and kidnap. I particularly hope that others will be able to extend this list of research techniques.

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**ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO TERRORIST VICTIMIZATION:  
A CASE STUDY OF THE HANAFI HOSTAGE TAKINGS**

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by

**Benjamin DEAN**

On Wednesday, March 9, 1977, twelve Hanafi Muslims mounted a terrorist assault against three separate buildings in Washington, D.C. At one of those sites, the B'nai B'rith building; seven Hanafis held more than one hundred staff hostage for thirty-nine hours. During the period, a cadre of B'nai B'rith staff, who had not been captured, worked tirelessly to aid families and friends of the hostages. The purpose of this paper is to summarize the nature of their work during the crisis.

#### THE SIEGE

On Wednesday, March 9, 1977, Hamas Abdul Khaalis led a precision terrorist assault against three buildings in Washington, D.C. Before the crisis had ended, 134 hostages had been taken, one man had been shot dead, and nineteen others had been shot, stabbed, or beaten.

The incident began at 11:00 a.m. when Khaalis and seven young Hanafi followers struck the first target, the B'nai B'rith building. An hour and a half later, at 12:30 p.m., three Hanafis took the Islamic Center located several miles up Massachusetts Avenue in Northwest Washington where they held eleven hostages in an office on the south side of the Center. Then, two hours later at 2:30 p.m., two Hanafis took the District Building. They shot and killed a black radio news reporter, Maurice Williams, hit City Councilman Marion Barry in the chest with a ricochet bullet, and held eight hostages on the fifth floor.

Then followed 39 hours of threats, demands, and negotiations that eventually involved the ambassadors of three Islamic nations.<sup>1</sup> Finally, in the early morning hours of Friday, March 13, Khaalis agreed to surrender all hostages. As part of the agreement, he and three Hanafi followers were released on their own recognizance without bond. Before his victims had been processed and released, Khaalis was safely home.

The three sites shown in Figure 1 illustrate an historical aspect of the incident. This was the first example of terrorists simultaneously striking multiple targets. This has, of course, just been repeated in the Netherlands. I will leave it to Chief Cullinane to discuss the strategic problems a multiple strike poses to police.

A second interesting aspect of the case involves the nature of one of the three targets. The B'nai B'rith building, International Headquarters for the largest Jewish service organization in America, houses a staff of 250. B'nai B'rith was the first American example of an organization being struck by hostage-taking terrorists.<sup>2</sup> The victims of most mass hostage-takings are strangers joined by chance, for example, the coincidence of boarding the same flight. In contrast, B'nai B'rith staff were members of an organization sharing a common purpose and characterized by informal ties that in many cases extended beyond working hours. In addition, they were held hostage at a site to which they would have to return when the crisis ended. For many this would become a difficult task.

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<sup>1</sup> For an excellent account of the takeovers, see Newsweek, March 21, 1977, pp. 16-25. For first-person accounts by hostages, see "39 Hours: The seige remembered," and "Reflections on Terror: Thoughts on being held hostage," in The National Jewish Monthly, Volume 91, Number 9, May, 1977.

<sup>2</sup> This was not the first example of an organization being targeted for a mass hostage-taking, of course. Other examples include the Japanese Red Army capture of 52 people in August, 1975, which included the staff from the U.S. and Swedish consulates in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and Carlos' capture of staff and ministers at the OPEC conference in December, 1975 in Vienna.




Figure 1  
THREE SITES STRUCK BY HANAFI TERRORISTS

#### THE B'NAI B'RITH RESPONSE

On the day the seige began, Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel, was in town. While the Hanafis were securing control of the B'nai B'rith building, Dr. Daniel Thurz, the Executive Director, was at the Shoreham Hotel awaiting the arrival of the Prime Minister for a luncheon in his honor. Shortly after noon he received a telephone call from one of his staff. He was told that there was trouble at the building. He should return as soon as possible. Before he could hang up, a secret service man was at his side. "We know what is happening but don't know who is responsible," he said. "Do us a favor and leave without telling anyone about it," (Thurz, 1977) As he took the long taxi ride to the B'nai B'rith building, he speculated that, "It must be the PLO."\* It made sense. Rabin was in town; the PLO had struck B'nai B'rith.

\* Palestine Liberation Organization

He arrived to find the building blocked off by police barricades. As he arrived at the B'nai B'rith lobby, he surveyed a scene of milling, busy police and shattered glass. Wesley Hymes, a B'nai B'rith offset print operator, was being carried, bleeding heavily, out of the building on a stretcher. It was clear that the situation was dangerous.

As is customary in barricade-and-hostage situations, Thurz and his staff were briefed by the police (virtually nothing was known) and then immediately began supplying the police with practical information on floor plans of the building, estimates of the number of staff and visitors inside, and keys to offices.

After this initial information was supplied, it became frustratingly clear to B'nai B'rith staff that there was nothing they could do to speed the release of the victims. The terrorists' demands seemed to have nothing to do with them.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the staff busied themselves with those items about which they could exercise some control: providing food and medicine for the hostages. They systematically contacted family members suggesting that they bring medication needed by hostages down to a Red Cross command post. By the morning of the second day, when the Hanafis finally agreed that food could be sent up to the hostages, B'nai B'rith staff were ready to set food (coffee and donuts) and medication on the elevator that would ferry supplies up to the captives and captors on the eight floor.

It is important to note the unsurprising point that neither Thurz nor his staff had given thought to, much less developed, a plan to deal with the eventuality of a terrorist strike. Nevertheless, they began at once to respond in a constructive, proactive manner. I will outline two strategies they employed during the crisis to deal with the terrorists' secondary victims, the families and friends of the hostages.

First, they intuitively realized that the terrorists' victims extended beyond the immediate hostages. The wives, husbands, other family members, and friends of the hostages were victims as well. Almost by accident, B'nai B'rith staff established a personalized telephone support system to take incoming calls from anguished family members

<sup>3</sup> Although the terrorists' demands varied during the seige, the major ones involved three issues: (1) that the movie, Mohammed, Messenger of God, not be shown in the United States, (2) that the five men convicted of the 1973 murders of Khaalis' children be brought to B'nai B'rith for retributive execution, and (3) that the \$750 incurred by Khaalis as legal fees during the trial of the five men be reimbursed to him.

scattered throughout the nation.

Within a few hours of the takeover, some relatives had discovered the location of the police command post in the Grammercy Inn adjacent to B'nai B'rith. By chance Charles Fishman, B'Nai B'rith Director of Youth Services, overheard police taking calls from distressed relatives calling to see if their loved one were among the victims. He felt that police handling the calls were noncommittal and impersonal (and understandably so--the priority for police was not dealing with relatives but rescuing victims).<sup>4</sup> As a result, he volunteered to take all calls from families and friends himself. He manned the telephone throughout the afternoon of the first day and through the night. Working with policemen who coached him on the information that should not be released to relatives,<sup>5</sup> Fishman intuitively developed a three-part plan to guide his conversations with family members. First, establish rapport. He would indicate to callers that he was "one of them." He, too, was concerned. In many cases, he could emphasize that he knew the victim in question personally. Second, tell them the truth. Third, within the context of the truth, be as encouraging as possible. (For example, "Yes, she is still among the hostages on the eighth floor. But please understand, there has been no violence since the very beginning. They are being given food and medicine. The police are playing for time, and with each passing hour the situation seems to be improving.")

During the night, the Associated Press circulated the Grammercy Inn telephone number to television stations throughout the country. As a result, the number of incoming phone calls quickly increased. By Thursday morning, the Grammercy Inn offered B'nai B'rith a dozen rooms for use as a temporary headquarters. Fishman set up a phone bank in these rooms manned by staff and volunteers. He taped written outlines above each phone outlining his three-part guide for communicating with family members and detailing those areas that should not be discussed.

<sup>4</sup> Fishman and Thurz were extremely impressed with the police handling of the incident. B'nai B'rith staff generally indicated that the work and concern of police were outstanding and that their respect for them increased throughout the seige.

<sup>5</sup> The police were aware that the media throughout the country tend to call family members to ask their reactions to the crisis. They assumed that any information given to family members might be released to the media and could easily find its way to radio stations in Washington and on to the terrorists themselves. Thus, they made sure that Fishman was aware of possibly detrimental information that should not be released, e.g. that SWAT teams were moving through the lower floors of the building releasing barricaded employees whom the terrorists had overlooked.

The use of the phone bank was enormous. Fishman estimates they received calls from 500 different parties. Many of these parties called repeatedly; some as often as hourly. Calls from the press were channeled to a single volunteer who referred them to a police spokesperson.<sup>6</sup> Volunteers kept written records of the name and phone numbers of each party calling in. These records were to be used in contacting family members as soon as the incident was resolved.

At the same time, two blocks away at the Foundary United Methodist Church, other B'nai B'rith staff worked with the Red Cross to implement a second strategy for working with those families living in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. As in all hostage situations, most family members wanted to be as near their loved one as possible. In the basement of the Foundary Methodist Church, B'nai B'rith and Red Cross staff maintained a center at which family members could gather to share their vigil. Red Cross workers distributed food, coffee, and tea while B'nai B'rith staff worked to establish a supportive atmosphere. There was much hand-holding and mutual support, much work with family members one-to-one, and on-going briefings on developments at B'nai B'rith.

Dr. Thurz, the Executive Director, made regular visits to the center. Although he seldom brought new information to the families, his presence there was important. His visits communicated to them that they were important and that they were being kept as fully abreast of news as was possible. Each of his visits was greeted by warm applause.

After the incident was over, the response both of families who had stayed at the church and of the hundreds of individuals who had called the Grammercy for information and reassurance was extremely positive. Intuitively and without preparation B'nai B'rith staff had provided important support for family members and friends during the crisis.

In the early morning hours of Friday, March 13, the hostages were finally released. They went first to the Foundary Methodist Church for tearful, joyous reunion with family and friends. They then were processed through a local hospital before being released and sent to their homes. Volunteers and staff members manning the phone banks continued working through the night calling family members throughout the country to inform them that their loved ones had, in fact, been safely released.

<sup>6</sup> The policeman designated to work with the media at B'nai B'rith had the marvelously ironic name of Joe Gentile.

## THE AFTERMATH

In the aftermath of the incident, much work and rehabilitation remained for B'nai B'rith staff. The police returned the building to them on Sunday. They found it to be in shambles. The damage was estimated to be in the tens of thousands of dollars. And the work of returning to "normal" for the former hostages had only just begun.

Much of my work in this incident has involved personal interviews with B'nai B'rith staff. Since the crisis ended, they have continued to deal with the challenge of bringing their organization back to normal in a truly creative manner. However, for the purpose of this report, much of my information about the post-incident period must remain confidential.

One problem from this period can be discussed, however. The Hanafi hostage-takings generated intense international press coverage. The event was a cover story for both Newsweek and Time magazines and was headline news throughout the world. As a result, it became an extremely attractive event to study or to write about. B'nai B'rith staff found themselves besieged by researchers wanting to research every possible relevant aspect of the incident. In addition, journalists and writers bombarded staff with requests for articles, television specials, and books. Finally, therapists from throughout the Washington, D.C. area volunteered with great eagerness to "help" the victims adjust in the aftermath. One staffer was moved to term the phenomenon, "professional voyeurism." Such an onslaught of professionals will probably follow any event that receives publicity of this magnitude. However, it may be possible to help staff cope with this problem by, at the least, alerting them to it in advance.

## CONCLUSION

In summary, this paper has outlined some of the high points of the Hanafi hostage-takings and summarized the response of B'nai B'rith staff during the incident. The work of the B'nai B'rith staff, particularly in setting up the phone banks and working with the in-town families at the church, was highly effective. And, more important, it was done without warning or preparation. It serves as an example of the types of strategies that can be used to reduce the psychological impact of

such events on future hostages and their families. Although no formal evaluation has documented the success of these staff efforts, informal word-of-mouth reports indicate they were quite effective.

It is possible that with planning and careful thought, an entire array of strategies could be developed that could focus on the psychological dimension of terrorist damage. It may be that we should begin to think in terms of a psychological equivalent to the work of Marty Silverstein (Silverstein, 1977). We should begin to consider what can be done in operational terms to address the problems of reducing the psychological damage inflicted by terrorists.

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**SESSION ON LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

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60022

VICTIM INTERESTS IN ANTI-TERRORIST  
LEGAL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY

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by

Peter JASZI

The coming of centralization in Anglo-American criminal law displaced the victim of crime from his formerly critical position as the instigator in the punishment of offenders. And the continuing modernization of that body of law has completed this work of displacement: even the surviving institution of "private prosecution" is now rapidly subsiding into vestigial status in both the United States and Great Britain. More generally, similar trends can be detected in the historical development of most bodies of modern national criminal law and procedure. As the desirability and the legitimacy of a state monopoly over the apprehension and penalization of criminals have become more widely recognized, there has occurred a parallel conceptual shift in the general understanding of the character of crime—away from the view that it consists merely of doing prohibited harm to individuals, and towards a view which stresses its significance as a violation of offenders' duties to the collective and of their obligations to contribute to social peace. In this latter view, the fact of individual victimization, however crucial it may be to the legal and sociological definitions of particular criminal acts, is a subordinate consideration where the design of official responses to those acts is concerned. The increasing importance of inchoate crimes and "victimless" crimes in the scheme of modern criminal codes is one outcome of this trend in thinking. Another is the relegation of the victim to the position of the "complaining witness" in modern schemes of criminal procedure.

In large part, the policy thrust of the new study of "victimology," as it pertains to the design and administration of legal systems, is toward the amelioration of what are perceived as deleterious secondary effects of the displacement of the victim in criminal justice, rather than toward the restoration of the victim to a truly central position in the overall pattern of criminal justice. Thus, for example, it has been urged that—without returning to a system of private punishment or personalized retribution—legislators, police agency officials, prosecutors and judicial officers can and should:

- (1) Demonstrate heightened sensitivity to the physical, emotional and economic hardships experienced by crime victims, especially in connection with the design of methods of criminal investigation and adjudication;
- (2) Modify existing criminal law penalty structures to provide some measure of personalized relief (as through offender "restitution") to victims, and to reflect harm done to victims in the assessment of punishment;
- (3) Create programs to deliver "victim aid" (including counselling and practical coping assistance) within the general framework of the criminal justice system; and
- (4) Develop and fund "victim compensation" schemes designed to offset victims' offense-related losses through payments of public funds derived from fines in criminal cases, general tax levies, or both.

Several factors can be identified as contributing to the appeal of such proposals. Prominent among them is the recent exposure of the disparity between officially recorded and "self-reported" crime rates—a disparity which has been widely attributed to the existence of disincentives to voluntary victim involvement in the processes of criminal justice. Although the nature of the relationship remains largely unknown, a fundamental proposition seems inescapable: victims of crime are more likely to contribute, in some degree, to the apprehension and conviction of offenders when the costs to them of so doing are reduced.

Also contributing to the force of victim-centered proposals for criminal justice reform is recent documentation of the psychologically and economically traumatic effects of victimization by particular kinds and classes of offenders, and particularly those studies of victim experience which document the negative impacts which encounters with legal systems and law enforcement personnel generate for victims. This documentation has been gathered largely with respect to particular crimes of individual interpersonal violence—most notably rape—but conclusions drawn from it have been generalized extensively by persons concerned with issues of criminal justice reform.

How applicable is the general policy thrust of victim-centered reform efforts to the official handling of offenses involving terroristic crime—whether of the "true" (i.e. "political") type or

the "quasi-terroristic" variety (e.g., hostage-taking without political or ideological motivation)? What important and legitimate social and law enforcement interests, apart from the promotion of victim interests, may be disserved by adapting official handling of terroristic crime so as to accomodate victim interests more completely? And to what extent is a restructuring of police, prosecution and adjudication practices to reflect concern for the direct victims of terrorism likely to result in a diminution of the effectiveness of efforts to protect the larger community of persons indirectly victimized by terroristic crime? It is to these questions—and allied issues—that the discussion which follows is addressed.

Throughout this discussion, an expansive definition of the "criminal law process" will be employed. It is a definition embracing events from the drafting of substantive legislation, through the police response to notification of potential future acts of terroristic crime (whether by way of intelligence, reported threats, or otherwise), to the point of sentencing in judicial proceedings against the perpetrators of terroristic crimes. Moreover, the criminal process, as here defined, includes any attempt to legislate or otherwise to impose mandatory standards of conduct for persons (other than perpetrators) who are involved in terroristic crimes.

The choice of an expansive definition is important because only in a comprehensive view of the criminal process, which emphasized the roles of unofficial and official participants alike, does the full extent of the potential tension between victim-centered approaches to terroristic crime and other modes of response become apparent. A few illustrations may serve to demonstrate this point, and to emphasize the kinds of issues with which this discussion is concerned:

- (1) When a government (or a police agency, or a business firm) adopts, publicizes and adheres to a policy of "no negotiations" with (or "no concessions" to) hostage-holding terrorists, it is—in effect—acknowledging a determination that one or more of a range of interests other than the promotion of victim survival is relatively more crucial. These interests may include the inculcation of public confidence in government and the deterrence of future terroristic crime. But however these interests are identified, it appears that an unqualified commitment to the goal of victim survival is fundamentally inconsistent with a general policy setting limits on the permissible scope of negotiations or concessions.

- (2) Where legislation is enacted to create barriers to the private payment of ransom for the release of persons made the victims of terroristic abduction, the clear tension between promoting the immediate interests of direct victims and promoting the welfare of the general class of indirect victims and potential victims has again been resolved in favor of the latter. To the kidnap victim it is small consolation that a bar against ransom payments which has failed to deter his abduction may, in the long run, contribute to a reduction in the incidence of ransom kidnappings.

In one of these examples, the policy decision at issue concerns standards for official response to terroristic crime; in the other, standards for non-official response are at issue. But according to the definition here employed, both are decisions affecting the "criminal law process". In presenting these relatively dramatic and clear-cut instances of tension between a commonly followed (or widely advocated) principle of anti-terroristic law enforcement and a truly victim-centered approach, the purpose is not to suggest that any principle is necessarily invalid by reason of its implicit assumptions with respect to victim interests. Rather, it is to illustrate the degree to which unanalyzed popular and professional reactions to various actual or proposed principles of anti-terroristic law enforcement may be understood as reactions to the degree to which those principles recognize (or reject) the interests of victims as a prime policy concern. Although the examples just posed illustrate the potential for tension between furthering victim interests and promoting other goals with special poignancy, the same dilemma arises at many other points along the continuum of the criminal law process.

The potential for tension just noted is fully apparent only when the phrase "victims of terrorism" is given a precise and narrow meaning. In the broadest sense, all members of any society affected by terroristic crimes are the intended or unintended victims of those crimes to the extent that their subjective sense of well-being is disturbed by them. And, again in a broad view, governments and other impersonal entities can also be understood as "victims" of terrorism. If the definition is thus expanded, the sorts of policy conflicts with which this discussion is concerned tend to blur; if everyone or everything is a "victim," it is hardly sensible to speak of how particular policy choices balance "victim interests" against other interests. In attempting to draw attention to actual and incipient dilemmas in anti-terroristic law enforcement and legal policy-making, therefore, this discussion concentrates on that class of individual victims who are personally affected by acts of terroristic crime because of an exercise in target selection on the part of the perpetrators of those crimes—those victims, in other words, who are more directly affected than are mere

members of the general society. This emphasis does not, however, restrict the class of victims whose interests are to be considered to those who are the immediate physical victims of terroristic violence. It permits (and indeed requires) a consideration of the position of the family members of persons who are the victims of terroristic attacks, and who will be affected in ways which, although profound, are nevertheless attenuated.

Moreover, it should be emphasized that the issues examined here are most apparent when the short-term—or incident-centered—view of an incident of terroristic crime is taken. In the longer-term perspective, those law enforcement practices and legal rules which disserve the interests of particular individual victims may be argued, more or less persuasively, to advance the interests of the class of potential individual victims as a whole. Thus, for example, a "no negotiations" policy or an "anti-ransom" law may, through its general deterrent effect, influence the future course of hostage-taking or kidnapping. How much weight should be given to this possibility will depend, of course, on how great the true deterrent impact of such policies is considered to be—a question which will be addressed in more detail below. Here, it is enough to note that when a short-term view is taken, and the special concerns of the victim of a terroristic crime in progress are considered, future-looking arguments necessarily will appear excessively abstract and speculative. And it is in terms of the interests of the concrete class of actual victims, rather than those of the larger but less easily defined class of potential victims, that this discussion attempts to interpret the policy choices underlying anti-terroristic law enforcement.

To begin, it is important to note that the general provisions of substantive law which define and set basic penalties for terroristic crime are reflective of victim interests in that the conduct they proscribe necessarily involves interaction between offenders and other persons. In this limited sense, any statute which prohibits, for example, murder or kidnapping is an instance of victim-centered legislation. However, when new legislative actions are taken (or proposed) to deal specifically with the phenomenon of terroristic crime, or to provide enhanced penalties for persons engaging in it, the new definitions which such laws incorporate typically display no more victim-orientation than do the definitions they supplant or augment. Instead, such efforts to redraft criminal codes to take account of terrorism typically concentrate on factors of offender motivation or criminal technique—factors of far greater significance to the official community or the general population than to persons actually victimized in incidents of terrorism. Thus, for example, the substantive law distinction between a terroristic bombing and a non-terroristic bombing (where such a distinction is recognized) might turn on such issues as the political affiliations or intentions of the perpetrators, the form of organization of the perpetrator group, or even the kinds of explosives employed; it will typically

not depend on the number and character of injuries inflicted, the nature of the target (except in the case of government instrumentalities), or other like incident characteristics.

Arguably, the insensitivity to victim concerns of new statutory provisions directed specifically at terrorism is inevitable—the selection of targets for terroristic attack may be as generally fortuitous as the attacker's calculation of means is painstaking, and any attempt to regulate the former through criminal codes may therefore be an exercise in futility. Any lawmaker attempting to tailor a code provision to take special account of terrorism must grapple with the view that, according to prevailing theories of terrorist activity, the very apparent illogic or "randomness" of victim or target selection will be perceived by the terrorist as a factor enhancing the impact of the act. And, on another plane of argument, strong arguments can be marshalled against making ultimate criminal responsibility turn on questions of who was harmed, or even what harms were done, as distinct from the character of the act which gave rise to those harms; although substantive criminal law makes gross discriminations between, for example, classes of larceny ("petty" and "grand"), it takes no cognizance of finer shadings of degree or—more significantly—of the relative hardship inflicted by theft losses on victims of varying wealth or means. So, it might be said, efforts to legislate clearly against terrorism will founder if they attempt too much in the way of definitional sensitivity, and will be perceived as unfair if they condemn any attack on a person more seriously than any other roughly equivalent offense. But however problematic efforts to do so might prove, it is important to note that—at the outset of the criminal law process—efforts to legislate against terrorism do not take the interests of individual victims into significant account.

At those stages of the criminal law process where anti-terroristic law enforcement is primarily the concern of police agencies, other peculiarities reflecting the difficulty of giving appropriate weight to victim interests are apparent. Some, like the emphasis placed by certain departments on rapid apprehension—through use of force, if necessary—even where tactical operations will put victims' lives at risk, are the outcomes of internal police agency policy-making processes which may be less than optimal in their evaluation of competing sets of interests. To note this is not to call into direct question the propriety of such an emphasis merely on the ground that it is responsive to the institutional concerns of police agencies; arguments in favor of a strong apprehension emphasis can also be developed on the basis of deterrence and of the need to reassure the public-at-large. It is to suggest, however, that police agencies should recognize and be prepared to state explicitly the assumptions which underly their policy-making, rather than avoiding or disguising those assumptions. Arguments

in favor of general rapid apprehension policies (as distinct from decisions to move for rapid resolution of particular incidents) cannot be successfully founded on concern for victims, no matter how genuinely felt or loudly professed—to assert that early police intervention generally favors victim survival in hostage cases, for example, is to ignore the tendency of the available data. If police tactics in anti-terroristic law enforcement are to emphasize the conventional goals of law enforcement in non-terroristic contexts, it will be well to recognize that this may be feasible only at the cost of sacrificing important victim interests.

On occasion, the public and private sectors are required to cooperate in making a policy decision which will affect the weight given to victim interests in anti-terroristic law enforcement. Thus, for example, local police and business may need to work together to determine how recurrent bomb threats against business premises will be handled. In a very real sense, a decision to do anything less than evacuate and search fully in response to every threat received discounts the interests of individual victims (or potential victims)—those employees and others who would suffer physical harm in the event of an actual attack—in some degree. But countervailing interests—including the important ones of maintaining public calm, and of avoiding the serious interference with normal commercial operations which may be among the important goals of the terroristic threat-maker—also require weighing. Again, no general rules for striking proper balances can be prescribed. But it can be recommended that the pretense that solutions actually arrived at always give full scope to victim interests should be abandoned in favor of a more realistic recognition of the character of the interest balancing actually involved in policy making.

Other difficult issues may arise in the immediate aftermath of incidents. Law enforcement personnel have an obvious interest in conducting complete interview with victims of terroristic crimes—be they bombings, hostage-taking incidents, or other varieties—as soon as possible after the event. On the ability to conduct such interviews may turn not only the success of apprehension and prosecution efforts in the case at hand, but also that of efforts to learn from that case in order to prevent future terroristic acts (or to improve official responses to them). The victim, on the other hand, may wish not to be interviewed; regarding the just-completed experience, the victim may wish to treat it—for all its public character—as an essentially private matter, or wish simply to avoid a painful re-evocation of an initially traumatic episode. The dilemma—which translates in practical terms into a question about how hard police investigators should press unwilling interview subjects—cannot be resolved by resort to the observation that post-incident interviewing has a generally positive effect on those victims who undergo it. Clearly, much can and should

be done to assure that police and police-affiliated interviewers perform their tasks with greater sensitivity to the victim's position and to the victim's distress. But even extensive improvement in police practice in this respect will not eliminate the issue. Inevitably, the content of an investigative interview will differ markedly from that of an interview having a therapeutic purpose. And even discount the difference, a question which cannot be begged remains: how far should the victim's personal preference as to how and with whom the experience is discussed be disregarded or overridden?

Related issues arise in connection with planning for trial by law enforcement and prosecution personnel. For them, a crucial practical doubt will often be how far to go in persuading or pressuring the individual victims of terroristic crime into cooperating actively in the formulation of a prosecution case, or into assisting in the presentation of that case through testifying at trial. Oftentimes, victim cooperation of these kinds will be difficult to obtain because of victims' fears—rational and irrational—of retaliation, or because of victims' desires to suppress their recollection of an incident and "put it behind" them. In some limited degree, assurances of aid and protection from authorities may be available to counter these sources of victim reluctance. Ultimately, however, the choice faced by authorities will often resolve itself into one between honoring the preferences of individual victims or attempting to override those preferences in service of what is perceived to be a larger objective.

A similar dilemma arises in forcible rape prosecutions, where it has been noted by those working to give new emphasis to victim interests in that area of the administration of criminal justice. Although the laws of many American jurisdictions have recently been redrawn to make the ordeal of the rape-victim-as-witness less intolerable, by limiting prosecution inquiry into moral character and previous sexual activity, the step into the witness box remains one which many rape victims are reluctant to take. As a general matter, continuing public education as to the importance of citizen cooperation with the mechanisms of criminal justice may gradually alleviate this problem, but this is of no significance for any particular prosecution. And in jurisdictions where official sensitivity to the victim's interests is most apparent the tendency is toward abandoning prosecution (or negotiating a plea of guilty to a reduced charge) rather than attempting to influence the rape victim to testify despite strong disinclination. Unfortunately, the differing calculus of public interest factors in rape and terrorism prosecution make this humane resolution less clearly appropriate to cases arising out of terroristic crime. Where offenses occur relatively infrequently and attract considerable publicity, and where they can be (or are intended to be) interpreted as challenges to general order as well as invasions of individual interests, the necessity to proceed to a trial which will vindicate the authority of the state may sometimes require

that the victim be compelled to testify.

This is not to say that many practical accommodations cannot be made to lessen the objective and subjective hardship which participation in a prosecution may entail for a victim. The manner of questioning can be—insófar as the presentation of the state's case is concerned—adapted to take account of a victim-witness' sensibilities. And the scheduling of trial appearances can be arrived at with the convenience of the victim-witness in mind. Where, as is frequently the case, an incident of terroristic crime gives rise to a complicated or protracted trial, the consultation of a victim-witness' convenience in scheduling testimony can be particularly important. Finally, however, these steps are nothing more than measures—albeit necessary ones—to limit the extent to which coercing or compelling unwilling victims to participate in a prosecution makes serious inroads on victim interests in the service of the public purposes of anti-terroristic law enforcement.

A last example of the tension between accommodating victim interests and serving other ends of anti-terroristic law enforcement is revealed by a consideration of the victim's position vis-a-vis the state when both the incident and any criminal proceedings against its perpetrators are concluded. Remaining to be resolved is the question of what duties, if any, should exist with respect to "making whole" the victim who has incurred personal losses through the fact of terroristic crime. Obviously, there is a range of services which the state can and should undertake to provide; these are the potentially valuable practical helping services (including counselling and therapy for victims and their families) which in no way conflict with official aims of anti-terroristic law enforcement. Only official commitment and adequate funding are required to make programs to assist victims of terrorism in resuming their pre-incident community roles a reality. And, it would seem, the state can go further still; on the model (or through the mechanism) of existing programs for the provision of financial compensation to the victims of conventional, non-terroristic crimes of violence, it is possible to create a system of awards of public monies to those whose health, property or livelihood has been damaged or destroyed by terrorists, as well as to the survivors of those who lose their lives at terrorist hands. Moreover, it is legally and administratively possible to assure that—upon proof of damages actually suffered—such payments would be available to victims and their survivors as a matter of right.

Should the legislative or executive action necessary to create a fund for reparations to victims and a mechanism for processing claims against it be taken? Or, to put the question differently, should

states undertake to distribute the economic risks of terroristic victimization by "insuring" their citizens against those risks? The answer is, in fact, far from clear—although it would be unequivocally affirmative if only the interests of the individual victims of terroristic crime were to be taken into account. In an objective view, every instance of terroristic victimization represents a failure on the part of the state to protect citizens (and other victims) adequately against a special danger of modern, collective social organization. Thus, fundamental notions of equity would be served by a compensation scheme. Moreover, the availability of compensation might serve—in some degree—to modify public fears concerning victimization, and thus to deprive campaigns of terror of some of their socially disruptive impact.

The cost at which these good ends could be obtained should not, however, be overlooked. If the objective of many political terrorists and terroristic organizations is to strike at the state through attacks on symbolic or randomly selected targets, the government which undertakes to make up the losses of individual victims from general revenues is, in effect, making a partial concession to those terrorists. When the costs of terroristic victimization are borne publicly rather than privately, terroristic organizations may actually find this an incentive to accelerate or upgrade their activities. Such an incentive effect would be attributable not only to the perceived possibility that heightened terroristic activity might lead to a measure of financial embarrassment for the government which undertakes to insure against it. It would also be a function of the symbolic importance of state compensations to victims, which could be understood as representing an official policy of placing all potential victims under a form of official protection. Where compensation was available, terrorists and potential terrorists might reason, the popular revulsion against attacks which victimize "innocent" persons might actually be less intense than where no compensation was provided.

No example throws the tension between serving victim interests and fulfilling other objectives of law and law enforcement into sharper relief than that just discussed. Considerations of simple humanity, together with a variety of more pragmatic policy arguments, would all appear to be on the side of state-created compensation programs. But how such an accommodation of victim interests would affect the crucial long-term interest in discouraging the growth of terrorism and depriving its practitioners of their pretensions to legitimacy and their claims on public sympathy remains a crucial question for the policy-maker.

The examples noted above indicate that difficult choices will face policy-makers as they attempt to arrive at coherent plans for giving appropriate emphasis to the interests of victims in the

design and administration of the criminal law process. Before turning to the question of how those choices are to be made, however, it is necessary to ask whether governing principles of substantive law constrain the policy-maker's power of choice in any significant degree. Otherwise phrased, the question is whether, independent of general considerations of equity and policy effectiveness, there exist legal obligations to victims (and potential victims) of terrorism which governments can ignore only at the risk of subjecting themselves to civil liability?

With respect to terrorist attacks on a country's own nationals, the important restrictions imposed on policy-making by substantive law would appear to be few in number. Where principles of domestic law impose on the state or its agents' liability for acts which, although undertaken in the cause of law enforcement, nevertheless contravene general legal or constitutional standards of conduct, a successful legal action for damages flowing from certain kinds of over-zealous acts is a possibility. Thus, for example, where the unnecessary or ill-considered use of force by police attempting to apprehend hostage-holding terrorists is at issue, hostages actually harmed as a direct result of such official conduct may be in a position to compel the individual officers involved—or their agencies—to respond in damages. In one recent American case, a federal appellate court relied on this principle to establish the potential liability of federal law enforcement officers for injuries caused to passengers in an attempt to end a "sky-jacking" incident by firing on the landing gear of the aircraft involved; the court decision emphasized that the unreasonableness of this procedure was demonstrated by the fact that it was prohibited by the internal regulations of the officers' own agency. (See Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1975).)

Nevertheless, the limitations on the significance of this principle as a practical constraint in law enforcement policy-making are great. First, it is likely to be applied, in litigation, to only the grossest cases of official misfeasance; such occasional damage suits do not provide a mechanism for general, continuing judicial supervision of the treatment of victims in the course of anti-terroristic law enforcement operations. Second—and more important—the usefulness of the principle appears to be limited to cases where victims are harmed as a direct consequence of positive official action. It is not suggested that from it any general legal duty to act in the best interests of victims—whether by providing preventive services, or by apprehending or punishing terrorists after the fact of victimization—can be extrapolated. Insofar as affirmative official duties to the victims of terrorism are concerned, the commands of domestic substantive law are few.

Where the victim of a terroristic crime is an alien, the duties of the host country on whose soil that offense occurs—and its liability for failures to fulfill those duties—are determined by international law. And although the question of the extent of those duties is a troubled one, it can be said that international law does impose on sovereign states an obligation to exercise "due diligence" in protecting foreign nationals from harm at the hands of terrorists, and a correlate obligation to make reasonable efforts to apprehend, try and punish the perpetrators of terroristic crimes against aliens. What constitutes "due diligence" will vary according to the degree of foreknowledge possessed by the host country (where the issue is the duty of prevention), the political and logistical capacity of the host country to move against the terrorist or terroristic organization in question, the nature of the penalty structures established by the domestic laws of the host country, and the like. (See generally, R.B. Lillich and J.M. Paxman, "State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terroristic Activities, 26 American University Law Review 217 (1977).)

Although the principle of international law just noted is limited in its importance by the difficulty of enforcing claims for compensation in the international legal system, and by the low likelihood of informal cooperation between less than friendly nations to provide for compensation outside those institutions, it has real potential importance where terroristic crimes against diplomatic representatives of friendly nations and acts against executives of foreign companies who are citizens of friendly nations are concerned. And unlike the relevant principles of domestic law discussed above, the international law rule of "due diligence" is one which does command observance of affirmative duties owed by law enforcement personnel (and other officials) to the actual and potential victims of terrorism. Finally, however, the rule's impact on policy formation is likely to be circumscribed by the very nature of the "due diligence" standard itself; as it has been interpreted, it does no more than set a floor for acceptable official conduct, and does not generate an articulated body of principles to regulate such conduct. As a practical matter, the minimal demands of the "due diligence" rule are likely to be met, in the vast majority of cases, by any government which takes a serious interest in preventing or punishing acts of terrorism; those demands may still be useful, however, in attempts to enforce responsibility for victims on states which abet or tolerate terroristic offenses against aliens within their territory. The "due diligence" standard, then, is unlikely to aid any nation greatly in making for itself the sorts of policy choices with which this discussion is concerned.

With so few significant positive commands of substantive law to guide it, the work of accomodating victim interests in anti-terroristic law enforcement policy formation is relegated almost entirely

to legislative and administrative discretion. And, like so many of the tasks involved in adapting conventional criminal law and process approaches to the special challenges of terroristic crime, this work can barely be said to be underway. Perhaps the most important development which could occur immediately would be a general recognition by policy-makers that the victims of terrorism do have special claims on their interest and attention, and that the interests of those victims should be taken into account in any planning exercise.

Beyond this elementary stage, however, the policy-maker's task is a hard and complicated one. If only victim interests were at stake, the list of innovations and adaptations which could be designed to serve those interests would be long but relatively easy to compile. The arguments for these steps—in terms of humane considerations, and in terms of the need to counter the corrosive effects of terroristic crime—are persuasive in themselves. But, as has already been noted, there do exist other countervailing considerations, and points at which the state's interest in combatting terrorism will seem potentially inimical to the recognition of victim interests. If the definition of the victim class is expanded, these same conflicts can be alternatively described as tensions arising from competition for recognition among the different sub-classes of victims—the immediate victim versus the potential future victim, the direct victim versus the indirect victim, etc. But however described, these conflicts generate difficult choices for policy-makers.

Only more information on the importance of the considerations which appear to militate against the full recognition of victim interests in the anti-terroristic criminal law process is likely to promote the making of rational policy choices. It is convenient, for example, to argue that deviation from "hard line" policies in favor of those better adapted to preserve the individual victims of terrorists from immediate harm may undercut the "general deterrent" impact of anti-terroristic law enforcement practices generally. But the elementary state of our knowledge as to what in fact motivates terroristic acts, and how the potential perpetrators of those acts respond to perceived likelihoods of apprehension and punishment, makes it difficult to proceed beyond speculation in such an argument. If, for example, it should be demonstrated that as many terrorists are stimulated by risk as are discouraged by it, one otherwise potent reason for not treating with terrorists—and thus, inevitably, exposing individual victims to enhanced dangers—would be invalidated. At present, however, such a demonstration has not been made. And without better information, the tendency to avoid policy choices which, despite their short-term attractiveness, may subject whole societies to long-term risks of unacceptable magnitude is a natural one.

Among the other topics on which even a little additional knowledge would go far to inform the judgment of the policy-maker seeking to accommodate victim interests in the criminal law process are the dynamics of terroristic target selection, the nature of captor/hostage interactions, the post-incident reactions of victims, and the deterrent impacts of particular punishment structures. Obviously, the list is not exhaustive—the ability to make sound policy choices affecting victims is generally limited by the state of our systematic understanding of the phenomena of terrorism and terroristic victimization.

Our lack of knowledge should not, however, be permitted to impede all movement toward practical recognition of victim interests. Many simple and non-controversial (if not far-reaching) steps—such as the development of systems to make the experience of the victim who participates in an investigation or prosecution as comfortable as possible—can and should be taken now. The general inertia of legal systems which have concentrated, in recent times, on vindicating law and legal authority—often to the extent of refusing to recognize the individual victim's place as an important participant in the transactions of justice as well as the transaction of crime—should not be allowed to delay the taking of these measures.

Even more fundamentally, mere uncertainty should not delay indefinitely the taking of major steps to make the criminal law process more sensitive to the interests of the victims of terrorism. It may soon develop that some of the information which could, in the ideal, be valuable as a basis for policy-making with respect to victims of terrorism is not only unknown but, at least for the foreseeable future, unknowable. If so, the obvious humane and pragmatic arguments in favor of overcoming inertia and adapting the process of criminal justice to the needs of individual victims should take on a new weight and importance. Their very concreteness should count heavily when they are evaluated against counter-arguments of a more abstract or remote character. Finally, it may develop that the only adequate laboratory for assessing the hypothesis that giving greater scope to victim interests will increase the general social exposure to terroristic crime to unacceptable levels may be the society itself—and the only valid test of that hypothesis may be the practical experiment of making major reforms which favor the victim.

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TERRORISM AND VICTIMS: REACTIONS TO JASZI'S PAPER

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by

Louk HULSMAN

I am in agreement along major lines with the observations in Jaszi's paper which point toward more concern for the victim. I differ in two perspectives from what he suggests. I shall explore these in the following two sections.

### Part 1. The Definition of Criminal Justice System (CJS)

A first difference—not so very important except that it must be made in order for my intervention to be comparable to his paper—has its basis in the definition of the CJS. I use a different definition for this system than he.

#### 1.1. The concept of CJS

Which part of reality do we envisage when we talk about 'criminal justice systems'? Certain legal rules? A certain number of state agencies and their activities? A set of ideas and feelings: an ideology?

I take a broad view. For me the concept implies:

- criminal law as a body of texts, doctrines and ideas;
- the existence and functioning of a certain number of state organizations in their mutual relationship (police, probation, boards of child protection, courts, corrections, ministry of justice, parliament) in so far as they legitimate their activities with a reference to criminal law. We can make, within those organizations, a distinction between: (1) organizations which are mainly dealing with individual cases defined as criminality (the police, the public prosecution, the judge, corrections) and (2) organizations dealing mainly with the production of legislative texts and with the administration of the earlier meant organizations.

It is important to keep in mind that the large majority of the organizations mentioned above belongs only partly to the CJS.

Most of them have an important 'life' and develop very important activities outside the CJS. A very important part of the activities of the police has nothing to do with the CJS. The police direct traffic, advise on licenses and occasionally help old ladies to cross the street. Police activities belong only to the criminal justice system in so far as they are legitimated by a reference to criminal law or in so far as this activity leads to the production of documents which are sent with such a reference to other organizations which belong to the CJS. We could add comparable examples for the other organizations earlier mentioned.

- the last dimension of criminal justice systems is a more psychological one. It is a special link between the CJS activities of the above-mentioned organizations and the mass media, and the dramatic productions which are based on this special link. To this dimension belong also the ideas and feelings within the population with respect to crime, criminality, delinquency, and the relationship between the population and, on the one hand, the dramatic production based on this theme and, on the other hand, the organizations mentioned above.

Figure 1 can give us an idea about the relationship of the dimensions earlier mentioned.

## 1.2. The concepts of criminality and delinquency

The confusion which prevails often in discussions about these topics is for a large part caused by the ambiguous way in which the concepts of crime, criminal and delinquency are used. In criminological and social science literature the concept of crime is often used to indicate behaviour of an undesirable nature (from a more general or a more specific perspective) independently of the question of how far that behaviour falls within the formal competence of the CJS. Within that framework the concept is sometimes limited to behaviour which is seriously undesirable and sometimes not. In the same literature the concept is also used to indicate the behaviour falling within the formal competence of the CJS. The indiscriminate use of that terminology in a completely different sense makes a useful discussion about questions on criminalization and decriminalization very difficult. Such a conceptualization would only be workable (1) if all the behaviour within the formal competence of the CJS would be automatically (seriously) undesirable and (2) if all the (seriously) undesirable behaviour was or had to be within the formal




Figure 1: The figure shows us that the direct contacts between the population (public) and the CJS are extremely restricted. The population communicates with the CJS mainly through the filter of dramatic productions, based on a 'criminal theme'.

competence of the CJS. Now both hypotheses are in a factual and in a normative sense false. One of the factors which can provoke a process of decriminalization is the conviction that a certain behaviour is not undesirable and many forms of undesirable behaviour remain - also in cases in which State organs deal directly with them - outside the realm of the CJS. It is also untrue that the formal competence of the CJS is a reliable indicator of the degree of undesirability in which that behaviour is held by State organs.

When we are talking about delinquency we should be very well aware of the way in which we use the concept. When we are using the concept in a way in which it covers behaviour that falls within the formal competence of the CJS that concept does not imply a judgment about the (un)desirability of that behaviour. The whole field of criminalization and of the criteria which should be used to criminalize and to decriminalize is particularly underdeveloped. This underdevelopment is often not taken sufficiently into account. The fact that normatively undesirability is a necessary condition for criminalization does not imply that this is also in fact the case.

### 1.3. Different ways of participation in the CJS

People in industrialised countries participate in different ways in a CJS. For some this participation is a part of their direct experience. The participation takes place in their 'literal' day-to-day activities. The most extensive experience of this kind is concentrated mainly in the group of registered offenders and their immediate environment. Officials belonging to the different organizations which 'carry' the CJS have a comparable type of direct experience of the reality of the system. Their direct experience is however - contrary to that of the offender - generally restricted to a certain small compartment of the CJS. Policemen have no direct experience of corrections. The correctional official has no direct experience of police and court activities.

Most people in our society participate most often in the CJS in a way which we can compare best with the way we participate in a dramatic production. This is even true for those people for whom the activities of the CJS are sometimes (when they are accused or official) a 'literal' activity and a direct experience. Dramatic productions play an important part in the life of people in our society. Desires and needs we cannot satisfy in our literal everyday activities, can be pursued in a vicarious participation in a dramatic production.

Many of the dramatized worlds which are available for vicarious participation have a clear and simple internal structure which is known to the potential participants. The clear, unambiguous and relatively simple structure of the dramatized world is often for the potential participants one of its great attractions. It permits the participant to get away from the ambiguities and complexities of real life. It makes him feel secure again.

The dramatized world of CJS themes belongs to this simple and unambiguous type. The structure of this world is basically Manichean. There is a clear distinction between good and evil, angels and devils. The degree of 'evil' can be measured on an unidimensional scale (the seriousness-scale) and can be expressed in the amount of 'punishment'. This world is mainly structured by a transformation of elements of the 'literal' world of another time (the Middle ages) and relies heavily on myths which were in that time part of the indirect experience of most people living in Europe. This situation is not immediately visible because some words belonging to the Middle age reality have been replaced by others belonging to our own time. So, the word 'God' is replaced by the word 'society'. These changes in words did not generally change the structure of the drama. A strong indication that the reality of the CJS is for most participants a dramatic and not a literal one is found in the very unusual time dimensions which are applied in this criminal justice world. Those time dimensions are generally completely out of touch with the normal time experience in daily life in our society.

Ways of vicarious participation generally give no indication of the way people would react in literal everyday situations nor with respect to what people would think desirable in those situations. Someone who in dramatic reality is asking for heavy punishment can be mild and lenient in real-life situations. He is perhaps even more inclined to do so because he has had a chance to act out his other feelings in vicarious participation.

My conclusion is that public reactions on delinquent behaviour and publicly expressed desires with respect to the CJS do not give any indication whatsoever about the meaning and importance of events—so defined—for the direct participants nor about the reactions to such an event in which the direct participants are willing to take part.

Those public reactions can naturally nevertheless be an obstacle to certain ways of dealing with events in so far as public agencies are dealing with or feel obliged to deal with certain events on the basis of those public reactions. In the dramatized production based on that event, insofar as this is the case, the complete or partial

abolition of the definition of delinquency may be a necessary condition to permit new approaches to certain events to develop more in the interest and according to the wishes of the direct participants.

The public interest in dramatic CJS productions and the intensity of the participation therein show a cyclic movement and are comparable to the developments we see in 'fashion'. These cyclic movements are an important aspect in the public perception of crime and are thus one of the main factors in the development of 'trends' of delinquency. 'Trends of delinquency' are always trends in the public perception of delinquency.

#### 1.4 The lack of control

Many look upon CJS as rational systems, created and designed by men and under his control. In a working paper of the secretariate of the U.N. in preparation of the 5th U.N. congress on the prevention of crime, held in Geneva in 1975, this supposition was challenged in the following way:

"One of the problems is that it is taken for granted that such a complex structure (the criminal justice system) indeed works as a system, that the several sub-systems share a set of common goals, that they relate to each other in a consistent manner and that the inter-relationships constitute the particular structure of the system, enabling it to function as a whole with a certain degree of continuity and within certain limitations.

However, in countries where researchers and policy-makers have undertaken a critical examination of the structure of their criminal justice systems, they have found that there are few common aims, that there is considerable diffusion of duties and responsibilities and little or no co-ordination between the subsystems, and that there are often differing views regarding the role of each part of the system. In short, they have found a serious lack of cohesion within the systems. Yet, when people talk about the criminal justice system as a whole they implicitly and explicitly assume that the system functions well and is effectively controlled. They also assume that it is a system oriented towards goals that are designed to meet the needs of the community."

The possibility of controlling a system depends first of all on the degree of feedback available. Control implies: knowing where one wishes to go and where one is going and adapting either the

objective or the means in the light of this information, Feedback can be 'natural', 'organic' or 'systematized', 'artificial'. Natural feedback exists automatically between those who have frequent and face to face contact with each other, All informal control is exercised on the basis of natural feedback. In a system of systematised feedback, the data which are believed to be good indicators of the relevant effects of an activity are systematically collected and transmitted to the decisional process.

A necessary condition for systematised feedback is the existence of a conceptual framework permitting a degree of operationalization towards the external effects of an activity; otherwise it is impossible to determine which data are indicators of the relevant effects.

Even if this condition is satisfied—which is not generally the case in legal systems—the control of a system cannot be based principally on systematized feedback if complex activities are involved in which a multitude of qualitative effects (which are difficult to quantify) are considered relevant, as is always the case in a legal system in which the complex dimension of 'justice' plays a part. In such cases the existence of effective natural feedback is a necessary condition for the control of a system.

Systematised feedback is low in the CJS. In some parts of the system, isolated and rudimentary elements of systematised feedback (e.g. research on the relative effectiveness of certain penal sanctions in the framework of special prevention) are appearing. However, these do not yet enable the penal system (CJS) to be controlled, for several reasons:

- the conceptualization which is at the basis of the present decision-making process does not yet allow for these feedback data to be used in that process;
- the feedback data are generally such that one can only compare certain penal options among themselves, while no comparison can be made between penal options and extra-penal options; one remains closed within the system;
- the feedback data are related almost exclusively to certain effects considered as 'benefits' in the official view (e.g. the rate of recidivism). On the other hand, such data are almost never available on those aspects which are of primary interest to the direct 'consumers' of the system, particularly the victims and the accused.

The degree of 'controllability' of legal systems then depends mainly on natural feedback mechanisms. How certain is this type of feedback in the system under examination? There is a greater guarantee that natural feedback will influence the control of a system if those who have an interest in the external products of the system can influence its functioning.

The influence of the parties external to the system is fairly extensive in the civil system and very limited in the CJS. The administrative system comes between the two. From the point of view of 'controllability' by the external parties involved, the civil system is best placed. The CJS is the most likely to function on the basis of the interests of the organizations which are its components. It is the least controlled.

This risk is the greater since a detailed analysis of the decisional processes in the three systems shows that the process of successive decisions in the CJS and the distribution of these decisions among different services with relatively little contact between them is much longer and more complicated in the CJS than in the other systems.

## 1.5 Other characteristics of the CJS

### a. The CJS is focused on the behaviour of guilty 'authors'

Many 'events' can be seen—and are seen by the directly involved—as complicated interactions in a pre-existing relationship with a past and a future. Due to the orientation of the CJSs towards rules rather than consequences, these systems, as they are at present structured, do not take this aspect into account sufficiently.

It may be of interest to cite the following observations on this point made in a study for the Law Reform Commission of Canada (Studies on diversion, Canada 1975).

"A criminal event arising out of a pre-existing relationship is just the last link in a varied chain of events. The parties relate to each other on many levels: they might be husband and wife, or businessman and client, or merely neighbours, but they interact socially on a continuing basis. When the relationship creates a conflict

that leads to criminal action, this relationship is affected. What the parties want is a solution that will harmonize their difficulties, not necessarily a judgment that will crystallize their discord."

When the criminal justice system is invoked, "the dispute and the relationship (thus) change form: the invoker becomes 'the victim', even though he might have contributed substantially to the event precipitating the crisis; the other party becomes 'the offender' and is immediately placed in a negative role where both the 'victim' and the State join forces against him. The event itself may have been just one incident in the overall context of the relationship. Yet it is singled out and regarded as an isolated act. The machinery of criminal justice focuses on it, out of context, and provides solutions that might fit the isolated event but do not either take into account or accommodate the surrounding network of dependencies and interaction".

- b. The specific output of the criminal justice system (punishment and suffering) and unequal distribution of this output.

There is no need to dwell in this context on the specific output of the CJS: punishment and suffering. Everyone will agree that the 'artificial' creation of such an output has to be diminished to the utmost. Another important aspect in this context is the unequal distribution of this suffering. All those who are professionally acquainted with the working of criminal justice systems know from their personal experience that the present functioning of the CJS shows considerable differentiations which reflect social inequalities. The empirical research done in this field confirms that experience.

## 1.6 Conclusions

The definition of situations, behaviours or persons as 'delinquent' always creates a danger that a situation or a problem is dealt with outside the context of the direct participants. Thus there is always the risk that the normal social fabric able to deal with that problem is invalidated.

Situations which are defined as delinquent have only one thing in common: there is a risk of intervention of the criminal justice system either in its adult or in its juvenile form. In other respects these situations have no common denominator. They have no common meaning for the direct participants, they have no common genesis and there is nothing common in the possibilities to deal with them.

Under these circumstances, there is no reason whatsoever to make one system officially responsible in this respect. It should become an important policy aim to abolish this way of defining events. As long as this definition has not yet been abolished, we should be aware that trends in delinquency criminality are in a large degree created by cyclic movements in the public participation in CJS themes.

## PART 2. The CJS and a Victim Approach

2.1. The second difference regarding Jaszi's paper is much more important in the context of this seminar. I think that it is in fact impossible, while maintaining the CJS, to have a victim-oriented approach. When one wants to pay attention to victims, then one must change the structure for handling problems and the changing of this structure implies a change both in the basic concepts from which one works and in the organization wherein the problems are dealt with. It is clear from Part I that an abolition of the CJS is not an abolition of the police or judges, but a change in the relation between such services, and with it, of course, a change also in the orientation of their activities. Another example will clarify this. If in the juridical context of justice, one would orient the handling of a case toward a victim, in doing so, just that characteristic which defines the criminal justice approach is left behind and, in reality, we would find ourselves in a civil process. Thereby, in this phase of processing a case, it is exactly the criminal justice element as a distinct way of approach which would have disappeared.

2.2. (1) Political terrorism, (2) the CJS and (3) military solutions have as their basis a common way of thinking. They are identical formulas for the solution of problems. In these three institutions one wishes to achieve a specific objective by means of violence or threat of violence. This threat and this use of violence are focused not only on those whose decisions one wants to influence directly but also on other persons. Thus, one uses violence and threat of violence against certain people in order to influence the decisions of other people. This is, of course, especially clear for political terrorism and for the military approach. At first sight, this seems perhaps somewhat less obvious for the CJS, but if one considers, on the one hand, the meaning of the claim of general prevention and, on the other hand, the knowledge that every punishment always affects the wife, family and friends of the punished as well, then it becomes clear that, within the CJS, this basically applies in the same way as in the two other systems mentioned.

During the conference, this close connection between political terrorism and the CJS became very clear in the information which we received concerning the Patricia Hearst case. The mechanisms of "loyalty influencing" of the SLA and that of the CJS appeared fundamentally very much the same and ultimately had the same effect.

Often, the three above-mentioned systems resemble each other also in this way, that one tries to change certain matters outside of the intermediary institutions wherein, in fact, decision are taken. Military systems, political terrorism and the CJS operate within a model wherein one thinks mainly in terms of macro-institutions (the State) on the one side and individuals on the other, and wherein process of change are not seen in the first place as being addressed to intermediate institutions.

The CJS and the military system are fundamentally much more dangerous than the system of political terrorism, on the one hand because we are here dealing with much more important systems and, on the other hand, because violence is legitimized within the military and CJ systems, while this is far less the case within the terrorist system. The most interesting aspect of the subject of political terrorism, is precisely that it provides an opportunity to gain a better insight into the true nature of the military and CJSs. The rightful rejection of political terrorism as a mechanism of problem-solving has from such an understanding the consequence that one must also work towards the abolition of CJ and military problem-solving.

2.3. Between the CJS and the system of political terrorism, there is also this resemblance, that there is a question of a cycle of isolation. "Terrorists" become politically isolated or at least they feel politically isolated. They isolate their hostage and ultimately, when the hostage-taking is over, become isolated once again in prison.

In the terroristic context, there is to a certain degree a "remedy" to this situation: the Stockholm syndrome or, in fact, the common sense syndrome. When they are together, the "captors" and captives break through their mutual isolation it is exactly this mechanism which is used to achieve a "happy ending." It is typical that, in the CJS, such a "remedy" is absent.

2.4. It is noteworthy that, during the conference, people continually took primarily the view that the "state" (a set of large-scale, bureaucratized organizations) is always in the right. In a realistic approach to the terrorism problem, one must give a great deal of thought to the imperfect functioning of these large-scale organizations. Because, generally, therein lie the conditions which precipitate political terrorism. How much our conceptions of reality become disturbed through the identification of most participants with the state, is apparent from the fact that in their conceptualizing one has, on the whole, no chance to include in their considerations the dangers of wars (for example of the First World War) and of events like genocide or events such as those related to Watergate.

They keep looking at the state as an organization which, taken as a whole, is in the service of the citizens and which is more less controlled from the basis of society. This way of looking seems to me, in the light of our present politicological knowledge, to be completely unjustified. What we need to have is a much more "neutral" approach to supervision of the state organization, such as, among other things, included in the paper of Davis Bobrow (see volume on research strategies). The functioning of different parts of the state apparatus can often be much better understood as the uncontrolled serving of specific internal interests by large-scale organizations rather than as the controlled serving of external interests.

2.5. When we speak of "legal policy implications of dimensions of victimization" than it is of course difficult, from this perspective, to generalize. It seems reasonable to make a distinction between short-term legal implications and longer-term implications. Moreover, in a consideration of these implications, one must always start from the existing situation and this existing situation is not the same in all countries. Furthermore, the implications depend in part on the context of terrorism with which one is confronted. The short-term legal implications of a situation like that in Northern Ireland will be very different from those of the United States. Thus the legal implications will, as we also saw at other times during this conference, have to be related to typologies of terrorism and typologies of reactions thereto.

Another observation which I wish to make in this context is that I very much agree with Jaszi that, in order to derive, in a responsible way, conclusions about legal policy implications, it is extremely important that one takes into account especially the tangible, concrete things which one can oversee.

2.6. On the somewhat longer-term, I reject a criminal justice approach to terrorist activities for the following reasons:

- the CJS is uncontrolled;
- it shares a violent paradigm with the system which it combats;
- it is directed toward individuals and an effective approach to phenomenon such as terrorism must direct itself exactly, on the one hand, toward intermediate institutions and, on the other—in part via intermediate institutions—toward large-scale organizations;
- it shares with the terroristic system the paradigm of isolation;
- the CJS is a highly dramatizing system and thereby exaggerates to a significant degree the negative aspects which terrorism can have in daily life. Moreover, it adds further to the provoking of terrorism to the degree that this dramatization is precisely one of the objectives of the terrorists.

2.7. When one rejects the criminal justice approach to terroristic activities what other ways of solving the problem remain available? We must hereby make a distinction between the more general combatting of terrorism and the "incident specific" approach.

For what concerns the more general aspects it is again necessary to make a distinction between situations wherein political terrorism is a part of the broader war or pre-war situation and situations wherein that is not the case. I leave outside consideration those cases where we are dealing with a war or quasi-war situation.

At the more general level it is, in the first place, important to work toward a general cultural climate wherein violence is not seen as an acceptable solution to problems. In the first place, such a climate is facilitated by seeing to it that those sectors of society on which one can exercise a certain influence, reject this kind of problem-solving. (including the government itself).

A second, more specific preventive, is to see to it that groups which, are dissatisfied to a serious degree with their situation have at their disposal sufficient non-violent means of expression. One of the reasons for terroristic activities is that some groups have insufficient access to the mass media and to political channels of expression. Right here, of course, lies the opportunity for such groups to exercise a real influence on the political process and to actually change specific aspects in the situation of their group. Sometimes this can involve demands for active policies; in other cases it is above all a demand that certain types of policies be stopped. In this whole field, it can be very important to increase the opportunities for groups of people to begin a new in another context. It is just such stalemated

situations which often demand a new start. This is valid as much between individuals as between groups of individuals.

A further important preventive point is a lessening of the vulnerability of society to terroristic acts through the spreading of dangerous objects and through a lessening of the degree of dangerousness of objects. An important argument for an economic approach such as is suggested in Schumacher's "Small is beautiful" lies also in the fact that one thereby diminishes the substantial degree.

Another dimension of a preventive nature lies in the lessening of the consequences of terroristic acts and here we come to the area of "disaster facilities" about which Silverstein has spoken (see Silverstein's paper in the volume on research strategies). Such disaster facilities should by the way, deal not only with medical aspects, but also with psychological ones.

2.8. Regarding the incident specific approach, once the CJS has fallen by the wayside, the following approach could be considered:

- the first phase of the solution concerns crisis intervention. This crisis intervention should in principle have the same character as it has acquired in practice at the moment. An important argument for my whole approach is just that the usual criminal justice approach to the resolution of the terroristic situation seems on the whole not to work. The current crisis intervention methods have the character of "negotiating" and they must also retain this. It is particularly striking, in the current situation, that after the negotiating situation which is used to resolve the crisis, the problem is again handed over to the CJS, where negotiated solutions of the type implied here are, in principle, not possible. Under certain circumstances, it is conceivable that crisis intervention be followed for a short term by a period of deprivation of liberty which can be seen as comparable to a sort of POW situation. It is very important to keep this period as short as possible. I am thinking here rather of weeks and months than of years.
- A second aspect of the incident specific approach should be the minimizing and, as much as possible, the restoration of the damage which is suffered. Under certain circumstances, one should be able to demand of the captors their participation in the restoration of the damage. Even if this participation in the indemnification would have primarily a symbolic character. And this participation should be enforceable.

- A further aspect of this approach should be the collection of information about the incident. At present, this information gathering is usually oriented toward the ensuing criminal process. It is therefore directed toward identifying individual authors who can be sentenced. The information gathering which I suggest must have another character. It must determine why the hostage-taking occurred in the first place and the blocked channels of communication which led to the action being taken. Further, it should provide insights into the grievances which the terrorists have. And further it must be directed toward information which will make it possible to "cope" with further terroristic acts and to limiting the damage deriving therefrom.
- Ultimately, the incident specific approach must provide the opportunity to negate any specific unlawful advantages which the terrorists have won by their action. So one must have opportunities, for example, to demand at a later date the return of significant sums of money paid in relation to the terroristic action.

2.9. I have argued here to arrive on the somewhat longer term at a de-criminalizing of terroristic acts. This stands of course in a wider perspective of abolition of CJSs as they now exist. It is clear to me—already from the practice of the current approach to terrorist events—that the criminal justice reaction is not an adequate answer to the problem. How can we now, however, arrive at a gradual abolition of that criminal justice answer in this field? A general recipe cannot, it seems to me, be given here. This depends very heavily on the particular rational situation. One of the strategies for change which hereby should be able to be used is a stronger orientation to the needs of the victims. Linking up with this could be a striving for a little "civilizing" of the reaction in a juridical context and an avoidance of or strong lessening of sanctions involving deprivation of liberty.

2.10. An immediate advantage of a direct implementation of a strong de-escalation of criminal justice sanctions is that the "way back" for terrorists thereby becomes easier.

CLOSING SESSION: Special Topics

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VICTIM COMPENSATION OR INDEMNIFICATION

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by

Lennart GEIJER

We have discussed the problem of indemnification or compensation to the victim of terrorist acts.

1. As a starting point, one must mention that these victims have the same rights as other victims of violent acts to demand compensation of the offender;

2. But the offender usually cannot pay compensation;

3. The situation in terrorist acts is different from other acts of violence. We have discussed if they can be compared to victims in a war-situation or victims of natural disasters. But we have found it is not necessary to make such comparisons;

4. The victims in terroristic acts often have feelings that the authorities neglect their situation. And in fact they are—as Dr. Ochberg says in his report—the unwitting and unwilling proxies for the assault on the State itself. That seems to be a good argument for a compensation scheme;

5. We have discussed if a compensation scheme might encourage the terrorists. We think it will not. In our opinion, the possibility of compensation to the victims is irrelevant for individual who are committing violent acts.

6. Another point is if the State can give compensation to victims of terroristic acts without giving compensation to victims of other violent acts. This problem must be studied further;

7. What kinds of damages should be compensated? We do not wish to go into details. Medical care, loss of salary, support to the families and, in some cases, compensation for mental suffering;

8. Should the maximum of compensation be limited? In Sweden for example it is normally maximised at 12,000 dollars—in other countries not so much;

9. We have observed that in some countries there already are compensation schemes, for example, in the United Kingdom, Norway, Holland, Israel and Sweden. It is desirable to collect information these and other countries.

#### CONCLUSION

It is desirable to promote compensation schemes. That could, perhaps, reduce the feelings amongst the victims that they are ill-treated by the authorities.

WHEN TO ATTACK



by

Conrad HASSEL

The question proposed above is often decided in the realm of political or policy expediency. One can conceive of a situations, for example, the holding hostage of high officials of a foreign government, where the decision-making power as to the attack phase would not be in the hands of the field commander. The decision as to the attack phase would then devolve upon the highest echelons of government. The decision as to the attack could in such a case be based on the political realities with which the involved nations must deal. There may also be a standing national policy that terrorists will not be tolerated and no negotiations would be allowed under such a policy. The only option of a field commander under these circumstances is the timing of the attack rather than a decision as to whether or not to attack.

Under ideal circumstances, when the decision to attack is within the competence of the field commander, that decision must always be based on maximum preservation of life. Perhaps the decision of the attack is the most critical and soul searching exercise for the commander in any police situation.

There are three obvious options which can be considered as to the timing of an assault in a hostage situations.

1. Attack Before the Deadline

- A. This has the advantage of optimum surprise.
- B. This has a disadvantage in that the hostage-taker probably will allow the deadline to pass without taking action against the hostages.

2. Attack at the Deadline

- A. This has the disadvantages of B above and it is also when the hostage-taker would be most alert for such an attack.

3. Attack after first fatality.

- A. This has the advantage of possibility saving lives prior to the cold-blooded killing of further hostages.
- B. There are cases on record where, even though one hostage was killed, further deadlines were ignored by hostage-takers and the remaining hostages were eventually released unharmed.

Prior to making a tactical decision as to assault, the following ingredients must clearly be taken into account by the decision maker.

1. Intelligence

- A. The physical plans where hostages are being held
- B. Background and psychological profiles on hostage-takers
- C. Background and psychological profile on hostages
- D. Weapons and or other devices in the hands of hostage-takers

2. Policy

- A. Community perception of police action
- B. Protection of community in places other than where the immediate incident is occurring
- C. Media relations
- D. Credibility of law enforcement for future incidents
- E. Legal liability problems

As can be seen from the above brief and incomplete survey of the question of "when to attack", it becomes obvious that the situation is not one which lends itself to mathematical precision. It is therefore the considered opinion of the group that there can be no absolute correct answer to this question. When leaving aside questions of national and international politics, which might ultimately bear on the freedom of the field commander, it is felt by this group that the guiding principle for the field commander must always be the preservation of life. Perhaps then the most important ingredient in the question of when to attack is the intelligence, compassion, education, and training—in other words the professional ability—of the field commander.

60024

RESEARCH ON VICTIMIZATION

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by

Stanley MILGRAM

The committee developed numerous specific research ideas on victimization, but had inadequate time to develop a full set of priorities regarding them. But let me start with a few general, and logically prior considerations.

First, we feel it is important to view terrorist victimization in the broader context of other types of victimization. Are the effects more or less damaging than say, rape, wife beating, road accident, etc? We recommend, as an early research priority, the development of a scale of victimization, which will allow us to place hostage victimization on a continuum with other forms. How do hostage victims rate their experience, on a negative/positive continuum, relative to other victims. The scale may need to be multi-dimensional. One purpose in developing this scale is to keep the present issue in balance, in relation.

Secondly, the forms of terrorist victimization vary widely. Some possess a face to face component (such as an airline hijacking) while others, such as a letter bomb, do not. Some incidents are of long duration, while others are relatively brief episodes. Finally, some activities involving hostages are political, others psychotic, and still others may be undertaken for purely financial ends. We feel that an adequate typology of terrorist victimization must provide the framework for any specific research. Techniques appropriate to one type need not be effective for any other type.

We may divide the research on victimization into three phases: pre-incident, during incident, and post-incident questions. Furthermore, we find it necessary to make a distinction between those who actually undergo the hostage experience (primary victims) and those who have a special concern for them, such as family members whom we shall call secondary victims. We do not foreclose the possibility that, in

certain incidents, the families of hostages may undergo a more stressful experience than the hostages themselves, though this is a question that must be resolved through research.

In the pre-incident research: we believe it important to assess the attitudes which persons have toward terrorist incidents, that is, a survey of the public perception of terrorism. What is the public afraid of? What actual dangers does it ignore? This type of survey is an extension of more general crime-survey currently in progress. The survey will give us a picture of the degree of salience such activities have for the general public, the intensity of attitudes, and will also allow us to locate those segments of the population that are most affected by the existence of terrorism. We would want to know, also, what steps or adjustments people have actually made in the face of the terrorist threat: do they, for example avoid certain airlines or parts of the world, etc.

Another aspect of the pre-incident phase concerns research into the best educational and informal approach to prepare persons for possible terrorist incidents. Can a form of prophylaxis be developed so that people can a) avoid terrorist situations and b) once involved in such an incident, respond most adaptively.

In all of this, we are aware of potentially important cultural differences that must be thoroughly investigated before workable procedures developed in one culture be uncritically exported. Thus an additional major theme is that of cross-cultural studies of victimization.

A general formulation was what existing research paradigms in victimology could be applied to this domain. The notion of victim proneness has been developed in connection with a number of crimes, as well as the idea of criminal-victim patterns. The question arises whether certain personal and social demographic features will allow us to develop an index of proneness to terrorist acts, and thus allow us to focus our prophylactic measures to such individuals or groups.

Turning now to victimization within the actual terrorist situation, a number of research problems warrant investigation:

We need to make a study of victim-terrorist interactions, to study which modes of behavior are most adaptive for the victim, and which have less fortunate consequences. It is possible that there is a range of outcomes which may in part be victim determined, and mediated

through his or her interactions with the terrorist.

The nature and extent of stress during the victim's captivity has received a great deal of attention at this symposium. We need to understand not only the intensity of stress, but where, in the specific sequence of events it is likely to peak.

A major set of research questions take the following form: What are the variables within the hostage situation that increase or diminish the occurrence of stress? We believe that a mediating variable concerns the victim's perception of helplessness. It can be seen that a great many specific details can be treated under these general questions. For example, we suspect that the locus of a terrorist incident, and the perceived closeness of supportive authority, all bear on the victims perception of helplessness and stress.

In discussing stress, we need to consider the issue of differentiation among hostages. We need to consider differential effects on:

a) the age and developmental level of the hostage. How do children, those in the prime life, and old people respond to the experience?

b) whether the hostage is alone or with others, and whether he has had a pre-existing relationship with his fellow hostages, or whether as in an airline seizure the passengers need not have a prior acquaintance.

c) whether the hostage has with him other members of his family for whom he feels a responsibility to protect.

d) a critical variable is the duration of captivity and its consequences for stress and adaptation.

e) finally, we need to know what specific social, racial or other personal variables affect the victim's reaction within specific types of hostage situations. In a PLO hijacking of a commercial airliner, can we assume that Jewish passengers are likely to experience more stress than their non-Jewish passengers, indeed is the presence of a potential scapegoat likely to reduce the general level of stress for others.

We believe it is very important to study the situation, not only from an objective perspective, but from the point of view of the victim himself. What does the victim regard as the worst aspect of the situation? What does the victim wish he could have done better, or should have done better? We believe it appropriate to treat the victim not only as objects of study, but believe his perspective—his wants, needs, defences—is uniquely valuable in our research, and in ensuing policy. We must always ask: What does the victim want.

Another major focus is: what variables alter the victim's perception of the terrorist, and vice versa. We include within this question the reported attachments that develop between victim and terrorist, but feel the shorthand designation is somewhat overused and imprecise. There is a range of attitudes among victims, and we need to look more closely at the variables, both situational and characterological that lead to or inhibit such attachments.

In the post-incident phase, the research concentrates on the question: What are the immediate and delayed effects of the incident, from a psychosomatic and emotional standpoint, as well as in terms of the alterations in attitude which it produces. We accept the possibility that there will exist both negative and positive changes, and they need to be documented. We need to conduct research on the most effective forms of therapy—if any—and we stress the possible need for therapy among secondary victims as well as the primary victims.

A matrix of benefits and losses should be developed: the range of people who are helped and harmed. Research on victimization should lead to prevention.

#### METHODS

Survey research  
 Clinical assessment  
 Simulation - film  
 Data bank  
 Research on general issues - e.g., depersonalization  
 The terrorists as a source of information  
 What can victims teach each other? What would they have done better?

THE ROLE OF THE PSYCHIATRIST

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by

Peter SCOTT

The psychiatrist's role depends on his skill, training and experience as a professional, on his non-professional qualities of personality leadership, social or executive capacities, or on a combination of these. In these respects, apart from the difference of the specific body of knowledge, he is no different from other professions or disciplines.

The psychiatrist's particular qualifications to play a role in hostage situations include—:

- 1) His knowledge as a physician which enables him to give guidance on the needs, endurance and health of all the parties involved (terrorists, victims, and the persons containing and negotiating with them).
- 2) His traditional role as a helping rather than a destructive person.
- 3) The trust which the public place in doctors as a disciplined service with a strong ethical tradition.
- 4) His knowledge of psychiatry, in recognizing mental disorder, his knowledge of mental processes and their changes under varying conditions of stress, and how to change or alleviate such reactions. He is also, in common with the police, (and especially if he is a forensic psychiatrist) experienced in facing and interviewing dangerous and deviant persons of all sorts.

Great emphasis was placed on his possible use, if he accepts a prominent role in national crises of this nature, as a convenient screen for governmental policies of perhaps a coercive or totalitarian nature, thus endangering the ethical standards of his profession. To guard against this he should be able to refer to and be guided by an ethical committee within his profession.

There is no prohibition against a psychiatrist using his skills in social rather than psychiatric problems, but he must be aware when he has crossed the line and be prepared to acknowledge it to others.

The expectations of his role will vary greatly as perceived by different practitioners and different authorities. Basically the aims of preserving life and alleviating suffering must stand firm. The public's expectations may well be unrealistic demands magically to brush the problem away, and every opportunity should be taken to declare the usefulness and the limitations of psychiatry. The risks for psychiatrists adopting an unrealistic, 'oracular' position is much reduced by the essentially practical situation of a siege, and by the immediate and manifest consequences of decisions.

The very great variation in the nature of hostage-takings and the constant tendency for these situations to evolve into new forms, absolutely prevents any generalizations as to the ideal practice or person to deal with such situations. For example, in choice of negotiator, the hoaxer needs a good poker-player, the lone skyjacker a mother figure, the paranoid patient a psychiatrist or mental nurse, the inadequate person in a family crisis a social worker or comforter, and the terrorist a strong diplomat. Always, however, these will be initial problems of diagnosis and often intercurrent queries on physical or mental problems. No one psychiatrist, nor any other form of advisor, could be ideally suited to all situations, so that it is important that the available experts are assessed and their availability at a moment's notice known.

The role of the psychiatrist can be considered under the headings before, during and after the incident.

Before the incident comprises a great deal of mutual education, preparation, training, definition of tasks and contingency planning. The psychiatrist should submit to selection for suitability, and help in the selection of other personnel.

The educational task should extend to "sensitizing the public", as Peter Jaszi said this morning, and of widening their understanding of the problems involved, even how to respond as a victim.

Prophylaxis can certainly be attempted in prisons, secure hospitals, and other institutions by reducing the frustrations as far as possible and by establishing good channels of communication. Nearly all violence signals its eruption if it is known what to look for.

Prophylaxis may be extended also to some minority groups and disadvantaged persons in the community.

During the incident, at least the psychiatrist must be present to advise on the mental and physical state of all parties as required. At most, and if he (and no one more suitable) has the necessary powers, he may assume wider functions, preferably in accordance with preconceived plans. Usually it will be the police who take charge and in these circumstances the operational plan should include a panel of behavioural experts including a psychiatrist, psychologist, sociologist and perhaps a legal advisor, representative of the culture involved and a trade-union representative. These experts would have to be kept informed of the progress of the incident through 'intelligence', visual (closed circuit television) and auditory equipment. They could then be momentarily called upon by the command for opinions, and could volunteer observations within their special competence.

After the incident the psychiatrist should assist in recording, assessing and drawing conclusions from what happened. He should treat symptoms when asked to do so, and should inform the general practitioners of hostages to enquire after their health and that of their families, bearing in mind delayed effects.

The psychiatrist might also initiate or cooperate with follow-up and other research projects.

60023

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

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by

Ronald D. CRELINSTEN

This volume addresses the problem of terrorist victimization within a specific context. That context is the interface between academic research on the one hand and prevention and control on the other. The broad question is what can existing knowledge and research strategies offer to policy- and decision-makers responsible for the prevention and control of terrorism. While the companion volume on research strategies for the study of international political terrorism examined a wide range of issues and problems, this volume picks on one aspect, that of dimensions of victimization, for in-depth study. As such, it functions as a kind of test case for the general issues raised in the first volume.

The preceding papers and comments in this volume have looked at different aspects of the overall problem of terrorist victimization. Ochberg's paper, using the case study approach, sets the stage for the more detailed papers which follow. He also sets the problem of victimization into the broader contexts of policy, operations and politics itself - the relationship between governor and governed. The following three papers and their commentaries (one of which was not available at the time of publication) share a common orientation, i.e. psychiatric. This highlights the interdependency between research topic and research methodology. One of the subsidiary goals of the current endeavour is to look at how a specific discipline, its body of knowledge and its methodological expertise, can be applied to specific problems in the field of prevention and control of terrorism. The role of psychiatry was chosen for this purpose.

The paper by Dean, on the Hanafi incident in Washington, looks at a dimension of victimization not directly addressed in the other papers, that of the indirect victim, while the papers by Jaszi and Hulsman look at the broader policy implications of a victim-oriented approach to prevention and control.

Looking at the relationships between papers and topics, it is evident that several things are going on at once. First, the area of victimization has been chosen as a test case for the question of how research can be applied to the prevention and control field. Second, the discipline of psychiatry has been chosen as a representative of the research community. And there is a third level of focus, stated explicitly in Ochberg's paper. Among all the possible types of victimization, the prolonged hostage siege has been chosen for in-depth analysis. Thus, the papers on stress and coping behaviour address themselves primarily to this terrorist context, while the paper on captivity represents a related context presented for comparative purposes. The Moluccan case cited by Ochberg and the Hanafi case described by Dean are both hostage sieges as well.

In the analysis which follows, an attempt will be made to integrate these different levels of focus and to highlight the ways in which they inter-relate. The analysis will attempt to critically evaluate whether the specific foci chosen have succeeded in exposing fruitful issues or whether they have tended to highlight potential pitfalls or dead ends. Rather than repeat details which have already been raised in the preceding papers, especially the four papers evolving from small group discussions (a fifth, on victim treatment, was not available at publication time), the analysis will follow its own course, drawing on these details as they relate to specific points raised.

#### Dimensions of Victimization: Problems of Definition.

Victimization in the context of terroristic acts has some special characteristics which lead to definitional ambiguities unless they are explicitly recognized. A classic terrorist tactic makes use of threats against one set of victims to extort something from another set of victims. The threat and the demand are directed toward different parties. This dual aspect of terrorist victimization has led to various terminologies, such as active and passive victims, direct and indirect victims or primary and secondary victims. Elsewhere,\* I have argued that primary and secondary victims are the most appropriate terms, applied to the object of the demand and the threat respectively. These terms explicitly recognize the objective of the terrorist strategy, whereby the immediate or "direct" victim, e.g. a hostage, is but a means to an end. He is a pawn in a larger game involving the terrorist and the party to whom the demand is addressed.

Another special feature of the terrorist context is that the specific terrorist act is often designed to have public impact. It

\* R.D. Crelinsten and D. Szabo. Hostage-taking (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, in preparation).

is not simply a private act directed at specific parties, but often tends to develop into a piece of theatre played out on a world stage. The "terror" derives its power from its effect on public attitudes and expectations and one of the main elements of the terrorist strategy, specifically in the political arena, is to influence the relationship between the public and the government—the governed and the governor. Because of the nature of many terrorist campaigns, those not immediately involved in the actual conflict become drawn in and the impact of any one event or campaign spreads far beyond the principals concerned in the case.

Related to this broader impact of terroristic acts is the role of the mass media. Because of the theatrical aspects of terrorism, specific acts lend themselves to sensational reporting. The terrorist is aware of this and tends to play to his audience. Notes warning of impending strikes or claiming responsibility for specific acts are sent to newspapers or radio stations. Reporters are invited to sites of sieges. Manifestos are published or broadcast. Thus, the mass media industry, and specifically the personnel—the reporters, the broadcasters, the commentators, the editorialists—become involved in the terrorist incident. By exerting pressure on authorities to act, by exposing elements of prevention and control strategy, by giving a voice to terrorists, by interviewing victims and their families, they play an active role in the whole terrorist scenario. Whether intentionally or not, the media tend to exacerbate the terror aspects of specific incidents or campaigns and to place additional pressure on the principals involved, e.g. the relatives of the direct (secondary) victims or the authorities responsible for managing the incident or the primary victims who must decide whether to meet the demands or risk the carrying out of the threat.

One final dimension of victimization concerns the terrorist himself and why he adopts the terrorist strategy in the first place. In one sense, he is the victim of his own actions, for if he is unsuccessful he will die or end up in prison. In another sense, he is the victim of other factors which can range from the particular associations he has had which led him to join a terrorist organization to the broader sociopolitical factors relating to the particular political goal of the terrorist campaign. To the degree that the terrorist strategy is a desperate attempt to gain social or political recognition where all other means have failed, the terrorist is a victim of a society which ignores or suppresses those who claim a voice in the political process.

Given these special features of the terrorist context, who is to be defined as a victim and what implications will this

definition have for prevention and control or for the psychiatric perspective on stress reactions, defense mechanisms and coping behaviours? Let us look very briefly at the different parties that can conceivably be involved in terrorist acts and identify which can be perceived as victims and what particular stress may be placed on them in this context.

a. The Direct, but Secondary Victim. The hostage, the one who opens the letter bomb or is blown up in a car, the tourist machine-gunned in an airport terminal, the plane or train passenger who is hijacked, the kidnapped diplomat or businessman, etc.—these are the means to the end, the pawns in the terrorist game. They are usually "innocents" or uninvolved parties and their victimization is sudden and unexpected. As such, pre-incident stress is usually not a factor, unless the potential victim is a prime target due to his position. The German businessman, Hans Martin Schleyer, and Sir Geoffrey Jackson, former British ambassador to Uruguay, both knew they were targets before they were kidnapped. Stress during an incident is only relevant in the case of a siege or a kidnapping or following the announcement of a threat for mass destruction or a bombing in a public place. Often pre-bomb warnings are just long enough to allow quick evacuation or come too late. Obviously, post-incident effects as far as the direct victim is concerned are only relevant when the victim survives. It would seem that, apart from those who know or suspect that they are targets, the unexpected and sudden character of most terroristic acts means that post-incident effects are the most important factors which apply to all types of incidents. The hostage situation is unique in view of the prolonged isolation or the captivity factor. In this case, coping with physical and mental stress during captivity becomes an issue, as does the relationship with the captor.

b. The Primary Victim, to whom the demand is made. While not directly subject to physical threat, this party is responsible for the fate of the secondary victim, at least in cases of hostage-taking or threats of public violence or mass destruction. In a simple kidnapping, say for financial gain, a quick payoff could resolve the incident quite quickly. However, in the terrorist context, the issue is more complex. Questions of policy enter into consideration as do questions such as deterrence of future incidents. The decision-making process can be exceedingly complex as many conflicting pressures are placed on the decision-maker. The stress which can develop has the potential for distorting decision-making ability. For this reason, contingency planning, gaming and pre-determined policy are key elements in effective crisis management. Those who are in positions which make them likely targets of terrorist demands are increasingly concerned with ways to diminish the impact of terrorist crises on the decision-making process.

It is often the case that a demand is directed not to an individual but to an organization, such as a multi-national corporation or a government. In this case, the decision-making process becomes much more complex and one can speak of stress on the organizational system itself. The individuals within the system will experience stress to the degree that their responsibilities are being challenged and their decisions are based on conflicting pressures and considerations. As in all hierarchical organizations, the higher up one goes, the greater the authority and power and one might expect that effective coping mechanisms will be that much more available to the individual. It is the individual who has responsibilities but no authority or power who is most likely to experience severe stress.

c. The Indirect Victim: relatives and friends. Family, friends and close associates of direct victims may undergo even greater stress during or after an incident than the direct victim himself, by virtue of the fact that the latter's coping mechanisms have been fully activated to deal with the situation while the former feels totally helpless and useless. We have seen in some of the preceding papers how this dimension of victimization has been receiving greater attention in prevention and control circles.

d. The Indirect Victim: the General Public. Those not involved in an incident either directly or by virtue of knowing someone who is involved may still feel touched by a particular incident. The psychology of terror and the fear of indiscriminate or random violence are key factors here. Though we cannot label it terrorism, since the acts committed had no purpose and the terror was probably created by the media, the recent murders by the "Son of Sam" in the New York suburbs affected many people whose chance of being victimized was nil. Whether people actually avoid visiting Israel or walking in certain areas of Belfast or accepting certain diplomatic missions or business posts or speaking out publicly on various issues out of fear of being targeted by terrorists is not easily measured or verified. However, it is a fact that most ordinary citizens will accept severe curtailment of civil liberties in the name of security. This is the ironic lesson which has been repeatedly demonstrated in country after country faced with serious terrorist campaigns. This fact alone is sufficient evidence that the general public is victimized in some way by terroristic acts.

e. Tertiary Victims. These are people who suffer financial or property damage due to specific terroristic acts. They range from airline companies to banks to shop-owners whose stores are destroyed by bomb blasts. Though life and limb are never at stake, the loss can be considerable. Little or no consideration has been given to this dimension of terrorist victimization either in the research field or the prevention and control field.

Having surveyed those parties who can be considered in some way to be victimized in the terrorist context, it remains to mention three other parties who are inevitably involved in terrorist crises, but whose victimization is less immediate or even debatable in view of his reasons for becoming involved.

a. The terrorist himself. As mentioned before, the terrorist too can be perceived as a victim. However, no traditional prevention and control programmes adopt this view and, as Hulsman points out, the operations of criminal justice tend to make this perspective untenable. If, however, one views the terrorist strategy as a last resort to achieve political recognition, then the traditional disposition of convicted terrorists, i.e. imprisonment, can be viewed as a kind of victimization. Like the victim of terrorism, the terrorist feels distant from the State and experiences a "devitalization". From the psychiatric point of view, however, the ideological commitment of the terrorist and the willingness to take responsibility for his actions are much more conducive to good coping and minimization of mental stress or feelings of helplessness compared with the direct victim who is taken by surprise and is asking himself "why me?"

b. Law enforcement and other operations personnel. While certainly exposed to physical danger, such individuals tend to view their involvement and the risks they take as being part of their job. Furthermore, special legal and financial provisions, such as mandatory life imprisonment or capital punishment and widow's pensions, act as psychological counter-balances to the high risks they take in the line of duty. It is interesting that comparable provisions, such as indemnification schemes or widow's compensation, were suggested for hostages or other victims of terrorism. These were seen as possible ways of reducing stress of the hostage during his captivity as well as the more obvious post-incident benefits. As far as stress experienced by operations personnel during an incident, it was suggested that performance in front of one's peers constitutes a greater source of anxiety than does fear of injury or death.

As mentioned when discussing the primary victim, hierarchical organizations, when involved in crises, place certain burdens on individual personnel over and above the specific impact of the crisis. This is also true of law enforcement and any other personnel involved in managing the crisis at the operational level. This could include negotiators, consultants, air traffic controllers, psychiatrists, police commanders, etc. All such individuals may at some point in the crisis have to make key recommendations to the ultimate decision-maker or may even feel tempted to act outside of the existing chain of command. The stress and coping mechanisms related to these factors are particularly important elements in the total picture of crisis management.

c. The Mass Media. Reporters have been known to suffer injury or death while covering a particular story. This is particularly true of the war correspondent, but it could apply to the terrorist context as well. In general, the reporter has recourse to similar rationalizations as the operations personnel, to diminish the stress he experiences in doing his job. Media personnel can experience stress situations comparable to that of the primary victim however. He is often subject to conflicting pressures similar to those confronting the primary decision-maker. Getting a good story or protecting information critical for control efforts, respecting the privacy of victims or getting personal accounts, obstructing control efforts or getting pictures and/or interviews, dramatizing the account and risking playing into the hands of the terrorist or toning down the report in the interests of de-dramatization --these are some of the conflicts faced by the conscientious and responsible reporter or correspondent. Whether or not the stress or demands for coping are as considerable as for other parties remains an unknown since no research has been done on the matter.

Having looked at the more global picture regarding dimensions of victimization in the context of terroristic acts, it becomes clear that not all dimensions have received equal attention either by researchers or policy-makers. This is also true of the preceding papers and the conference in general. One reason is of course the emphasis on the hostage siege, but there are other reasons. In fact, these same reasons explain in part why the prolonged hostage siege received special attention in the first place. As discussed in the volume on research strategies, the definition and delimitation of a particular problem often reflects the goals of the researcher or policy-maker and the conceptual models he uses to describe the phenomenon of terrorism. One reason that the hostage seige was chosen for particular study was that it is the easiest to deal with. For one thing, prevention and control are the most sophisticated in this area and have met with a great deal of success. This fact alone makes it very easy to view the hostage siege as the prototypic challenge for prevention and control. While it is understandable to focus on a well-developed area for in-depth analysis, there is the danger that, in doing so, the broader dimensions will be overlooked and the resulting implications for prevention and control will be narrow. This is related to the models we adopt to explain the phenomena we study. While they can be useful, they can also blind us to other possibilities. In the area of siege management itself, this has happened as a result of the great successes obtained by a negotiations strategy. Because of this, the negotiations model tended to be indiscriminately applied to all situations. However, other models exist, including early assault and the long wait (no negotiations or assault). The fact that Holland, a country often identified with the wait-it-out model, resorted to assault in the June, 1977 Moluccan incident, highlights the fact that no one model can be applied in all situations. Flexibility and willingness to study alternatives are probably the most important factors in effective prevention and control.

Similarly, the hostage siege is but one tactic in the terrorist arsenal. To base all models of prevention and control on the management of prolonged sieges would be to lose sight of many other dimensions which are highly pertinent to the terrorist context. While Ochberg considers the siege as the epitome of the terrorist tactic, it is really a comparatively recent development. Bombing and assassination are much more typical, while the individual kidnapping is the more popular hostage tactic. All these tactics present much greater challenges to prevention and control at least in terms of the effects of terror, simply because the perpetrators are invisible and unknown—at least until they claim responsibility. In the case of the siege, the terrorists are at the mercy of the authorities and the incident is essentially a complex power struggle. Perhaps this explains the potency of the drama. The final assault on the Dutch train held by South Moluccans in June of 1977 took place in the early hours of a Saturday morning. A videotape of the assault was repeatedly broadcast throughout Saturday afternoon and evening prime-time television. For many viewers, it constituted top-notch entertainment. Random bombings and assassinations, on the other hand, are less exciting and interesting and more terrifying. The outcome of a siege more often than not culminates in the apprehension of the terrorists. In other terrorist acts, this is not so. The perpetrator is free to strike again. It is this element of impotence and groping in the dark which lies at the root of the terror strategy. And while the thought of being taken hostage or skyjacked can be terrifying, the very success of prevention and control efforts is a counter to feelings of total vulnerability. There is no such feeling of decreased vulnerability in the case of random bombing, assassination and kidnapping. The atmosphere in the Federal Republic of Germany following the recent wave of assassinations and kidnappings of businessmen attests to this fact.

Having seen how the dimensions of victimization in the context of terroristic acts are much more complex than implied by a narrow focus on the hostage siege, let us look at some of the other reasons that the hostage siege has been chosen for special study.

Because of its localization in one spot which can be cordoned off and "controlled" directly, data collection is easier than say for a kidnapping or a bomb campaign, specific variables can be identified more easily, and the direct victims are easily accessible during formalized post-incident debriefing. Also, the numbers of hostages allow more variables to be studied as the data pool is greater. The effects of terror in the general population and its impact on public trust and confidence in the authorities is much more elusive and difficult to study. For all these reasons, the prolonged hostage siege provides the best opportunity for studying the relationships between victim needs and behaviour and control strategies, as well as the possible long-term effects of victimization. Furthermore, the captivity

aspect offers unique problems not relevant to other modes of terrorist victimization, specifically hostage-captor relationships and their effect on hostage attitudes toward authorities. These problems are especially relevant to the psychiatric perspective. Finally, other contexts involving captivity, in which much research has been done, are available for comparative analysis. Let us now look at the main points which emerged from this focus on prolonged 'hostage sieges'.

### Dimensions of Victimization in the Context of Hostage Sieges

The catalogue of victim types outlined above can be found in most hostage situations involving a prolonged siege. The very nature of a siege, unfolding over time as it does, presents some unique opportunities for studying the dimensions of victimization, the interactions among victim-types and the relationship between policy and public/victim attitudes toward authority. During the presentations and discussions at the conference, several specific variables were mentioned which could have direct implications for prevention and control. In addition comparisons were made with other contexts involving captivity and with other kinds of victimization. A brief outline of some of these variables and contexts will be given here to indicate possible directions for research (see also Milgram's paper) as well as highlighting important considerations for prevention and control.

#### a. Important Variables

Age — it was noted that POWs tend to be young and in their prime, while hostages tend to range across all age groups. The different vulnerabilities to stress, the variability in coping mechanisms and the attitudes of the captor toward captives of different ages are some of the more pertinent factors here. It is interesting to note that the schoolchildren taken hostage in Bovensmilde, Holland in June, 1977 all became sick. Roth has pointed out that one result of prolonged stress is a decreased resistance to infection. It is quite likely that children are more susceptible to this effect than are adults and the Dutch incident is consistent with this.

Sex — women's liberation notwithstanding, males and females could differ in the way they cope with stress and may feel different kinds of pressures during a hostage siege. Also, captors may treat captives

differently according to sex, as was the case in the Hanafi incident in Washington.

Alone or in a group - the presence of other hostages can significantly alter the perceptions and attitudes of someone in a captive situation. Group dynamics may have an impact on hostage coping behaviour. Some of the possibilities include passive resistance, mutual support, passive obedience or assault. In some cases, as in the case of say a diplomat held hostage with his family, the presence of other hostages may prevent the diplomat from taking action he might otherwise have taken if alone. Feelings of helplessness may be greater because of the presence of loved ones.

Hostage relationships - in a skyjacking, the passengers on the plane are all strangers, while in an embassy, for example, the employees all know each other. In the B'nai B'rith building, taken over by the Hanafi Muslims, many of the hostages knew each other as well. The effect of this on the experience of stress and the extent of coping is an important area for research.

Relationship to terrorist cause - this is a loose category covering many different kinds of variables which could make the hostage feel more or less conspicuous, increasing or decreasing his sense of danger, his feelings of stress, or his expectations of violence. An individual who feels totally removed from the particular issue may experience less stress or perhaps a "why me" type of attitude. A Jew may feel more conspicuous if the terrorists are Palestinians, while a radical leftist may feel less stress if held hostage by leftist extremists. Then again, an individual who does not agree with the terrorist cause but, by virtue of his social class, race or background, may be expected to identify with the cause, might experience stress due to this particular conflict. One realm in which such factors could perhaps be of particular relevance is the choice of hostages for execution. Do such factors play a role or is the choice determined by other factors, such as hostage behaviour or some particular whim of the captor?

Homogeneity and Size of Group - is a random collection of hostages of different ages, nationalities, states of health, etc., as perhaps typified by a skyjacking case, different from a more homogeneous group, as typified by POWs? Are contacts between hostages and mutual support facilitated in the latter case? Is stress any less? As for group size, is there a critical limit which determines whether an assault is more or less likely? Or does large group size make it more likely that an individual will hide in the anonymity of the group?

Treatment by Captors - some captors are more abusive than others, some ignore their hostages and try to minimize contact, others are friendly, others execute or threaten to execute them one at a time, some allow food and clothing to be delivered, while others do not.

What are the effects of different treatment on stress levels and coping strategies?

These are some of the key variables identified during discussion. They highlight how important it is to understand the relationship between stress and coping behaviour in as many different contexts as possible. To date, some of the most spectacular hostage sieges have provided opportunities to assess the impact of certain of these variables, as indicated in the examples cited. The more data is collected, the more likely it is to gain insights into the operations of these variables. The ironic thing is that the lessons learned can be useful to the terrorist as well as the policy-maker. After Bovensmilde, it is quite probable that terrorists will not seize a large group of children again. In this particular case, it is highly unlikely that any objections will be raised.

b. Different Contexts of Captivity or Terror

In the course of discussion during the conference, different contexts were mentioned either in which captivity occurred or in which terror was a significant factor. These contexts were considered for comparative purposes in the hope that lessons learned in these areas could be applicable to the specific context of hostage sieges and the wider context of terroristic acts in general. Those contexts in which captivity was a key element were: hostage sieges, kidnappings and sky-jackings; imprisonment in the context of criminal justice; prisoner of war camps; and concentration camps. Generalizations were difficult to achieve because of the different functions of each context. In the hostage situations we have already seen that the hostage is a symbol and a means to an end. What about other contexts?

In the prison situation, the individual is there by virtue of having committed a particular act and he knows that he will eventually be released, unless the term is life. In any case, torture and forced labour are no longer elements of prison life at least in liberal democracies. The imprisoned political offender does exhibit specific characteristics which distinguish him from other prisoners. This in turn results in differential treatment by prison personnel and other judicial officials. The political prisoner is usually unwilling to co-operate. He feels no guilt and is more intelligent than the average prisoner. The relationship between this constellation of characteristics and the coping mechanisms he adopts in adapting to prison life could have direct relevance to other captivity contexts. Because of these special characteristics, the political prisoner is more suspect of subversive activity in the eyes of prison guards. Furthermore, the exercise of

judiciary discretion regarding the conditions of imprisonment is less than in the cases of other prisoners. Finally the police are more involved with political prisoners than they are with "ordinary" prisoners. A study of the effects of this differential treatment on the political prisoner's experiences of stress would be interesting, particular as it relates to his attitudes toward authority.

In the POW camp, there is a knowledge that release is contingent on the end of hostilities. The homogeneity of the captive population and the context of war provide a high degree of solidarity and mutual support. Torture and forced labour and interrogations exert extreme stress on individual captives and long-term effects have been demonstrated in survivors of POW camps. Furthermore, these effects have been passed on to the next generation, showing up in the children of POW camp survivors.

The concentration camp context is the most difficult to generalize. Here the reason for internment was extermination. There was no hope of release or escape, except through death. The treatment of the inmates emphasized depersonalization, humiliation and dehumanization. Under such extreme conditions, those few who survived demonstrated specific coping mechanisms which were outlined in previous papers. The main elements were a maintenance of self-esteem and a caring for others. In other words, the processes of depersonalization which were an integral part of camp life were countered by personal attitudes and behaviour. Another factor distinguishing this context from the others is that the stress experienced during captivity did not begin at the time of imprisonment. It preceded incarceration and was an element of everyday life in society at large. The camp experience was merely the end of the road. Research on survivors has shown that severe long-term effects do exist and these too are passed on to the children. These effects are more severe in those individuals who view their survival as a matter of luck as opposed to those who view their survival as the result of effective coping. Thus, one clear lesson of this most extreme context is that survival and long-term adjustment are functions of an individual's ability to maintain feelings of self-worth and human integrity in the face of a dehumanizing process. In the sense that a hostage is a mere object, used by the terrorist to achieve goals completely unrelated to the hostage's *raison d'être*, this coping strategy which emerges from the concentration camp context appears to be most applicable.

Contexts which do not necessarily include captivity, but were thought to offer some comparable elements to the hostage siege context and the wider context of terror include: natural disasters, rape, social violence, totalitarian regimes and major surgery. The surgery context was specifically raised during a discussion of identification with the captor. It was pointed out that the patient undergoing major

surgery is essentially in a captive situation and is at the mercy of the surgeon. One coping mechanism is to identify very strongly with the surgeon. The example highlights how very different contexts can cross-impact on one another and how an inter-disciplinary, comparative approach can reveal useful information in unexpected areas.

The natural disaster context, like the terrorist context carries with it the element of surprise and the randomness of victimization. The "why me" attitude and processes of denial described in some of the preceding papers is applicable here too. An important commonality concerns public perceptions of governmental responsibility for minimizing social impact and limiting damage. The relationship between victim coping and victim expectations of government intervention are relevant here.

The rape context was raised in discussing long-term effects of incident-related stress, as well as the effects on health of victim expectations and perceptions of justice. The health of rape victims has been shown to improve dramatically upon news of a conviction. Stress decreased, nightmares were less frequent and a gain in weight occurred. Comparably, concentration camp survivors have exhibited increased health problems when they hear that a war criminal has been released or acquitted.

The social violence context was not mentioned very much, yet much research has been done, for example on public perceptions to violent crime, and it would seem that the area is a potentially fruitful one for comparative research. The terrorizing of communities or specific age or ethnic groups by violent gangs or vigilante groups is one broad area which comes to mind. Perhaps this dimension of victimization was not emphasized specifically because of the focus on prolonged sieges. However, its relevance to an understanding of the effects of terror, coping mechanisms in the context of selective or random violence and public attitudes toward authority during terror campaigns is very clear. A comparison between the terror produced by planned terrorist campaigns and that engendered by lone murderers such as Jack the Ripper or Son of Sam would also be useful for understanding the psychology of terror and the relationship between the context in which the terror arises and the public expectations of prevention and control capabilities and government or law enforcement responsibilities. Why do vigilante groups which "take the law into their own hands" develop in some situations, while demands for official intervention proliferate in others, while in still others, everyone cowers at home in front of their televisions? And why do some people feel the terror and others not? Why some in one situation and others in another? Such questions are obviously difficult to research and have less immediate application to existing prevention and control techniques. Yet the pre-incident studies listed by Milgram's group on victimization research would provide, in the long run, much valuable

information for future prevention and control efforts.

The totalitarian context and the dynamics of terror in societies ruled by dictatorships or experiencing issue-specific social or political hate campaigns or reigns of terror, was a perspective which received very little attention during the seminar. This was again due to an implicit orientation of the seminar, concerned as it was with the exercise of terroristic acts by small groups against legitimate governments. "Legitimate government" is defined as liberal, democratic governments of the Western European and North American variety, and military dictatorships and regimes were implicitly excluded from consideration. It so happens, however, that several modern nations have, in the past three or four decades, passed in and out of dictatorships or democracies—nations such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Chile, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. Changes of this sort provide excellent opportunities for studying how people cope with the lifting or re-imposition of a reign of terror. What effects are there on education of new generations, on attitudes of older generations to the new government, on attitudes between generations? What are the psychiatric implications for an individual who has been in hiding for thirty years, when the conditions which compelled him to hide disappear? Are there long-term effects? Are coping mechanisms which were adaptive during the period of hiding and which are irrelevant now going to disappear? Will they interfere with the new mode of life? Will trust in the authority be possible?

Even in a liberal democracy which has never experienced a totalitarian regime, such as the United States, political terror campaigns can come and go. During the McCarthy era in the 1950's, some people committed suicide. Others did not. What made the difference? Some refused to co-operate with the government, others collaborated. What were the effects of different stress levels and coping mechanisms on the relation of trust between governed and governor? Are there long-term effects?

What implications do these wider contexts have for prevention and control? Their greatest impact is not so much incident-specific, but is applicable to the wider and ultimately more fundamental aspects described by Ochberg in his diagram (see p. 32). Especially in view of the implicit focus on liberal democracies, prevention and control does not merely embrace policy and operations; it includes the broader area of politics and the exercise of authority and power in a social context. The dimensions of victimization extend to this level and the implications for prevention and control, as well as the challenge to researchers, is enormous.

## Implications for Prevention and Control

Now that we have explored some of the dimensions of victimization in the terrorist and other contexts, it remains to highlight specific findings and observations which have direct relevance for some aspect of prevention and control. The discussion will be divided into three parts—before, during and after an incident.

### a. Before an Incident

Before any specific incident occurs, there exists only potential victims or victims of past incidents. In view of the findings on the relationship between coping behaviour and long-term effects of captivity, it would appear that a major priority at this stage would be to train those who are high-risk targets for terrorist attacks in the best coping strategies to adopt for different threat situations. Both psychiatrists and former victims could play an important part in this process.

Another important factor at this stage is the effect of stress on various sorts of individuals by virtue of their roles or functions or perceived danger. The terrorist strategy makes great use of threat and no incidents are necessary to provoke fear and concern if the terrorist group has enough credibility. In fact, even if those responsible for prevention and control have assessed the threat and found it unconvincing, the general public or those who feel they are potential targets may not be in the position to judge rationally and may succumb to irrational fear. How do the authorities who possess the knowledge assure those who do not that there is no real danger, without either compromising their intelligence operations or appearing insensitive to the fears of those who are genuinely concerned? A government can sometimes be forced into hasty action by an aroused public just as a public which does not recognize the danger can interpret any government action which is taken as unwarranted or dangerous in itself. Only an authority which is open to the needs of its public and which is constantly in touch with the many perceptions and moods of its constituents can hope to maintain public trust during a terrorist crisis. For this reason, a policy which takes cognizance of the public climate and the differing perspectives and needs of the various elements of society is essential if pre-incident prevention and control are to effectively counter the special pressures which the terrorist threat imposes on society.

It should be realized that the very division of this discussion into pre-incident, during the incident and post-incident phases reflects an incident-oriented approach to prevention and control. A more broadly-oriented approach would look beyond the specific incident to the more global problems of the sociopolitical process and the development and maintenance of trust between the official authorities and all segments of society. From this perspective, what we are now calling the pre-incident phase becomes the major focus of attention and the management of specific incidents and their aftermaths becomes one small element of the total picture. As indicated in the volume on research strategies for the study of international political terrorism, this broader perspective on prevention and control would have to consider areas not previously considered relevant. This could include the effect of education on public attitudes toward and perceptions of the history of their own nation and other nations, an analysis of the influence of our ways of thinking on how we perceive social and political issues, and the efficacy of non-violent methods and approaches for achieving social and political change. Clearly, such problems cannot be tackled within the time span familiar to prevention and control. This broad, multi-disciplinary approach can only be a long-term process.

b. During the incident

The only type of incident which lasts any significant amount of time is the hostage situation, be it a siege, a skyjacking or a kidnapping. Bombings and assassinations are necessarily very short-lived incidents. The time element becomes a significant factor only when several of such attacks are spread out over time, as in a bombing campaign. Some kinds of technological terrorism could last awhile, such as power blackouts or release of biological agents and the triggering of a local epidemic. Such scenarios are yet to be played out, but the possibility has been considered in prevention and control circles.

With regard to the public impact of any incident or campaign and its effect on public attitudes and confidence in the official authorities, a key element in countering the effects of terror and diminishing general and non-specific perceptions of victimization is public visibility. The authorities should demonstrate that they have taken charge of the situation and are dealing with it efficiently. Effective crisis management must always take public perceptions and attitudes and possible reactions into account. The rapid delivery of emergency medical care and the ready availability of psychiatric consultants during a prolonged siege or perhaps even during an extended bomb campaign are other specifically victim-oriented aspects of control operations during an incident. While directly relevant to those victims immediately involved in the incident, the use of these victim-oriented

services also serves to demonstrate to the general public that victims are being attended to and that the authorities care. Thus, it serves to maintain the bond of trust between authority and public.

With regard to siege management, many specific implications derive from psychiatric perspectives on stress, coping and captivity. An analysis of the stress response as it changes over time reveals characteristic variations in arousal and alertness. Peaks and troughs occur at characteristic time intervals. The implications for control efforts relate to the question of when to implement specific decisions, such as launching an assault or presenting key negotiations. The exact timing of the particular tactic could be determined by the level of arousal of the captor. Furthermore, studies could be done on whether these levels can be influenced by easily implemented procedures such as via the food or the use of various distractions.

A knowledge of the possible effects of prolonged stress as opposed to those of short-term stress may have implications for determining the relative merits of early assault and protracted negotiations or waiting until the terrorists surrender. According to Dr. Bastiaans, IRA suspects subjected to "in-depth interrogation" for seven days exhibited after-effects "more or less" the same as those exhibited by concentration camp survivors who experienced years of isolation. While the phrases in quotations would require considerably more precision, the possibility of serious long-term effects of prolonged stress over a period of days or weeks as a hostage does have clear implications for control policy. The fact that statistics presented by Jenkins show that most hostages die during assault shows that the answer is not simple even if research does show that serious long-term effects result from prolonged hostage sieges.

Another important area which has implications for siege management is hostage behaviour and coping mechanisms. In light of the evidence on captivity, survival and long-term effects indicating that successful coping increases survival chances and decreases detrimental after-effects, there may be a direct conflict between current control policy attitudes toward hostage behaviour and the needs of the hostage. The current dogma in siege management is that the hostage remain passive and leave everything to the law enforcement agencies. What are the effects of this passivity on stress levels, on self-esteem and on effective coping? In group situations, how does this affect relationships among the hostages? Will a hostage who puts up a fight be immediately supported or abandoned to his fate and resented for risking everyone's lives? Will guilt develop after the incident over the lack of any effort to resolve the situation oneself? Dr. Scott cites the case of the hysterical hostage in the Spaghetti House case who was the first hostage

to escape. Are the after-effects more or less severe for such a hostage as compared to one who stayed calm and passive and remained a hostage for the duration of the siege? What of the individuals taken hostage in the West German embassy in Stockholm in 1975, who refrained from using their weapons to attempt escape in conformance to pre-set policy and who were ultimately killed? This whole set of questions on hostage behaviour and the relationships between effective coping, levels of stress and after-effects presents one of the greatest challenges to policy-makers and siege managers.

Another area of key importance is hostage-captor relations. Citing the Croatian skyjacking case, Strentz indicated that it was not length of time in contact with the captors which determined whether a positive bond would develop, but rather the quality of that contact. The Hanafi case would be a good test case for this hypothesis, considering the differential treatment of male and female hostages. A very important aspect of the "Stockholm Syndrome" for prevention and control is that not only does a positive bond develop between captive and captor, but the captive develops a negative or hostile attitude toward the authorities. It is interesting to speculate if the two hostages killed during the assault on the Dutch train in June of 1977 failed to lie down as commanded through loudhailers by the storming troops, because they distrusted the command or followed a contradictory command from the terrorists to stay standing. While this is pure speculation, it is meant to highlight a very real implication for those in charge of terminating the incident.

Siege management does not only involve those victims inside the siege room; it must also deal with those outside, e.g., the indirect victims. Dean's account of the Hanafi case highlights some of the operational problems which can be encountered during major incidents and how they may be successfully dealt with. The Dutch crisis organization is designed to handle the needs of family and friends of the hostages and makes use of former victims and psychiatrists for this purposes. The immediate effect of such a policy is to decrease the stress experienced by these indirect victims and, in meeting their needs in a pre-determined manner, to avoid their otherwise inevitable interference in other aspects of incident management. The longer-term result is that the bond of trust between authority and public is strengthened and public perceptions of official coping and caring are improved.

Another important issue and one which tends to be ignored when one is focusing exclusively on the more obvious victims, i.e. the hostage and his family, is the effect of stress on decision-making. Just as stress factors and coping mechanisms related to the captor and the hostage can have an important bearing on siege management policy and operations, so these same factors as they relate to the decision-maker

can have important implications. As mentioned before, in surveying victim types, the operations personnel do not tend to view themselves as victims and, in a large organization such as government, the primary victim may not be any one individual. It is well-known that high pressure jobs involving major decision-making responsibilities can produce a variety of health problems, such as ulcers. Whether or not the stress involved in crisis management can cause any long-term effects has not been researched. It would be interesting to compare the stress levels and after-effects of the hostage, the terrorist and the decision-maker to compare the results and see if their differing roles, responsibilities and self-perceptions relate in any way to differing effects of stress or differing coping mechanisms.

In the context of terroristic acts, incident management is bound to have to consider relations with the press and mass media. The press can have three detrimental effects on siege management. They can interfere with ongoing operations, for example, by tying up telephone links to the siege room for interviews with the terrorists; they can exacerbate the pressure on the responsible authorities and contribute to impaired decision-making; and they can harass relatives of victims by pressing for interviews. All these possible effects can be avoided by pre-set policy on granting interviews, providing regular news releases and providing press facilities near the siege site. The press constitutes a vital link between the authorities and the public-at-large. As during the 1977 South Moluccan siege, daily news releases containing bits of information on details not crucial to developing strategy and tactics can sate the public appetite for information as well as conveying an image of official responsibility and effective crisis management. Public trust and confidence are maintained and the sensationalism which thrives in an information vacuum can be avoided or minimized.

One final implication for siege management which derives from the current discussion, particularly in view of the emphasis on the role of psychiatric research, is relations with researchers during an incident. One excellent source of critical data is, of course, the ongoing siege. Policy-makers might begin to consider ways in which independent researchers could be allowed to act as observers during an incident, so that important data could be collected to test some of the hypotheses raised during this conference. The challenge would be to integrate such researchers into the crisis management team such that he can be effective without hindering the siege management itself.

Having looked at some of the key issues pertaining to siege management, it remains to emphasize that many of these issues pertain to kidnapping where the site of the hostage is unknown. In the case of incidents such as bombing or attempted assassination, the only

issues which really apply are those involving indirect victims or the relationship between authority and the general public.

c. After the incident

As far as the direct victim of terroristic acts is concerned, several important issues arise. First, there is the issue of victim treatment. Should it be compulsory or not? Dr. Bastiaans pointed out that a kind of double isolation occurs for the hostage—first at the hands of the terrorist and then at the hands of the psychiatrists and social workers. Many victims just want to go home and forget the whole thing. The consensus was that treatment should not be obligatory. This leaves the question of how to implement treatment as an open question. What facilities should be made available? Should continued contact with the victim be encouraged and, if so, how frequently and how long? What if the victim requests immediate treatment? What form should it take? Which kinds of disturbance should be recognized and treated? Should old problems which were triggered by the event be treated or only new problems which were clearly directly caused by the event? The implications for more victim-oriented prevention and control are clear. An originally high-minded and humanitarian policy such as victim treatment can ultimately become bureaucratized to the point where it adds to the burden already suffered by the supposed beneficiary.

Related to this is the question of indemnification. Some felt that this was the best policy, rather than the development of an elaborate policy of victim treatment comparable perhaps to the present offender-treatment model in criminal justice which is currently the brunt of so much criticism. Any policy of indemnification would of course have to determine criteria for eligibility, amounts, sources of funds, etc. While it was generally agreed that all victims of terrorism should be eligible, no recognition of differing victim types was made. It is assumed that direct victims who suffered serious physical or mental disability would be the victims under consideration. Automatic compensation for relatives of victims who died was also considered.

A major consideration was the possibility of serious after-effects. The implications of this for siege management have already been discussed. Related to this, however, is the issue of "de-briefing" or post-incident interviews and examinations. While this is often an integral part of the criminal justice process or evaluating the control programme itself, the risk of prolonging the stress of the victim and increasing the chances of long-term effects may be an important factor militating against this procedure. On the other hand,

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the chance to talk about the experience may have a beneficial "ventilating" effect. Individuals vary and this should be recognized by policy-makers. A victim-oriented approach demands a flexible policy which is sensitive to the needs of different individuals. Some of the possible after-effects mentioned were a continued sense of vulnerability and a perseveration of the "Stockholm Syndrome". The latter has particular implications for future co-operation of the victim with the authorities. Furthermore, a persisting mistrust of the authorities could increase the probability of continued stress experienced after the incident. This appears to have been the case with Gerard Vaders, whose criticism of the authorities after the incident elicited public hostility and accusations that he had collaborated with the Moluccans to save his life. It is interesting that, according to Ochberg, when the second Moluccan incident occurred 18 months later, all persisting signs of positive feeling toward their Moluccan captors on the part of the hostages of the first incident disappeared. This indicates that the effect is reversible. Whether or not other effects are remains to be seen. A comparable example concerns the victim's expectations of justice and its effect on his health. As mentioned before, rape victims' health improves when a conviction occurs, while concentration camp survivors exhibit more problems when a war criminal is acquitted or released. Thus, long-term effects can occur and are susceptible to change when conditions pertaining to the original incident change.

The implications of these findings on long-term effects and their relation to later developments arising out of the original incident have direct implications for the involvement of the victim in the criminal justice process and in prevention and control programmes. A victim may not be willing to testify in court or, if he does, he may not be able to give testimony useful to the prosecution. In fact, Jenkins points out that, in kidnapping cases, defense attorneys use the identification of the hostage with the captor either to prove that the hostage collaborated with the captor or to reduce the kidnapping charge to extortion. The effects of testifying in court on post-incident health and re-adaptation have not been studied but, in view of some of the findings discussed in other contexts, it would appear to be of some importance. Similarly, the involvement of victims in prevention and control programmes, as in The Netherlands, could be subject to similar considerations.

In sum, when considering the implications of some of the psychiatric findings concerning victims for prevention and control, a lot of questions arise and not many answers follow. The main element running through the many implications discussed above is that maintenance of public trust and confidence in the government's good faith and ability to cope is a key factor in effective prevention and control. A concern for the victims of terrorism which is expressed in actual policy, e.g. indemnification or involvement of victims in siege management, as opposed to empty statements of official concern, can do much to counter the public impact of terroristic acts and campaigns. This in turn has a direct effect on public co-operation with the authorities as well as

public sympathies for the terrorist and the problem of "fellow travelers" or terrorist supporters.

One final point concerns the fact, illustrated by Jaszi, that a victim-oriented approach can conflict with other policy considerations which are important in the context of criminal justice. This highlights Hulsman's contention that alternative models to criminal justice may be more conducive to a victim-oriented prevention and control policy. When one focuses on the victims of terroristic acts and realizes that dimensions of victimization extend far beyond the immediate target to include the terrorist himself, the official authority and the public-at-large, one realizes that prevention and control efforts must look beyond specific incidents and the narrow goals of an offender-oriented criminal justice system. It was noted in the volume on research strategies for the study of international political terrorism that current prevention and control efforts tend to be incident-oriented and short-sighted. This orientation has also been reflected in the focus of the current volume on hostage sieges. However, an analysis of other contexts and the implications of some psychiatric research findings on the relations between stress, coping and captivity for prevention and control efforts has shown that this narrow focus does not begin to address the myriad of questions relating to the psychology of terror and the dimensions of victimization in the context of terroristic acts. In this light, it is interesting to note the somewhat limited role for psychiatry in prevention and control, which emerged from the conference. This is probably more a result of the commensurately limited focus on siege management and possible after-effects rather than a reflection of the relevance of psychiatric knowledge and research to the broad area of terrorist victimization.

The tone of this analysis has tended at times to be critical, particularly when noting the effects of focusing on siege management on prevention and control models. The resulting model of prevention and control becomes incident-specific and short-term. This criticism is not meant to negate the important role which research findings on stress, coping and captivity can play in developing better incident management which is fully cognizant of and responsive to victim needs and expectations. It is, in part, the responsibility of prevention and control programmes to be incident-oriented. However, the increasing use of terrorist tactics in the political context necessitates a widening of the traditional perspective. This explains the greater emphasis on crisis management and international co-operation found, for instance, in the companion volume on research strategies. The problem is broader now. But this also necessitates new models, new perspectives, new alternatives. The very practical orientation of prevention and control, subjected as it is to the acid test of real life applicability, tends to facilitate the maintenance and perseveration of a short-term, incident-centred approach even in the face of changing trends. This is probably to be

expected, simply because of the nature of prevention and control itself.

It is up to research to help prevention and control to adapt to changing conditions. Comparative studies which look at different national experiences, different contexts, different fields and different conceptual models, can provide clues to new alternatives for prevention and control. Of course, the ultimate test is in applying research findings to policy and operations. And it is here that the interface between research and policy is so vital. A continuing dialogue between the two is the only way to ensure that prevention and control reflect the real needs of a healthy, democratic society.

PROGRAMME  
and  
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

P R O G R A M M E

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JUNE 3, 1977

Opening Session

9:00 - 9:30	Welcome & Opening Remarks - D. Szabo - P. Lejins - R. Crelinsten
9:30 - 10:30	Keynote Presentation - F. Ochberg
10:30 - 10:45	Break

Session on Stress

Chairman: M. Silverstein

10:45 - 11:30	Core Presentation - W. Roth
11:30 - 11:45	Discussant - S. Milgram
11:45 - 12:45	General Discussion
12:45 - 14:30	Lunch

Session on Captivity

Chairman: W. Rasch

14:30 - 15:15	Core Presentation - L. Eitinger
15:15 - 15:30	Discussant - J. Bastiaans
15:30 - 16:30	General Discussion

JUNE 4, 1977

Session on Coping Behaviour

Chairman: B. Jenkins

9:00 - 9:45	Core Presentation - J. Tinklenberg
9:45 - 10:00	Discussant - J. Gunn
10:00 - 11:00	General Discussion

Session on

Survival Identification Syndrome

Chairman: A. Miller

11:15 - 12:15	Core Presentation - C. Hassel - T. Strentz
12:15 - 12:45	General Discussion
12:45 - 14:30	Lunch
14:30 - 17:30	<u>Panel: Stress during and after the Siege</u> Chairman: M. Codd  Panelists: B. Dean M. Cullinane F. Bolz

JUNE 5, 1977

Session on

Legal and Policy Implications

Chairman: Y. Dror

9:00 - 9:45	Core Presentation - P. Jaszi
9:45 - 10:15	Discussant - L. Hulsmann

10:15 - 10:30	Break
10:30 - 12:30	Small Groups
12:30 - 14:30	Lunch
14:30 - 16:00	Small Groups
16:00	<u>Closing Session</u>
	Co-chairmen: F. Ochberg
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