In our day modern society has become more vulnerable to the danger of terrorism than ever before. Due to the exponential growth of modern society in specialization, differentiation and size, the dependences on and sensitivity of highly placed individuals, crucial institutions and industries, communication centers, etc., has tremendously increased, thus making those individuals and industries attractive and often easily accessible targets for terrorist attack. Rapid advances in technology, psychology, and mass communication have made explosive, highly dangerous weapons generally available; brainwashing and other covert, or subtle coercive influence techniques can now be used effectively and productively, and it was “discovered” recently that violent acts can serve as mass entertainment. These factors have multiplied the chances and dangers of terrorism.

The Chairman of this Committee has correctly predicted the rise (and the import) of terrorism years ago, and called for legislative and administrative measures to combat this mounting social danger. Admittedly most terrorism is criminal, but represents a criminal activity of a special sort falling for special and innovative counter-measures that are not confined to conventional law enforcement approaches. Terrorism having yielded maximal results in public attention and effective promotion of terrorist causes on comparatively minor investments of money and life, has proved itself a veritable growth industry, which can be expected to further expand and proliferate, possibly in a mushroom-like fashion.

Terrorists deliberately creating extreme fear and in its wake, indignation or helplessness and even paralysis, forcibly draw attention to themselves and the causes they presumably represent, and in whose name violence is perpetrated. Terrorism mainly serves to signal, to alarm, to frighten and prove the powerlessness of power, to advertise and to propagandize. Victims chosen at random, or for their publicity value, are used and abused residuelessly to produce the desired effects of intimidation on the objects of terrorism (not to be confused with the victims), which are a small (family) or a huge (nation) community or even the whole world, by extortion, blackmail and spectacular cruelty.

The terrorist personality profile roughly falls within three main categories:

1. Criminal; motivation mainly or exclusively personal gain.
2. Mentally deranged; motivation personal, idiopathic conflicts, dramatic self-display and self-cure, delusions or hallucinations, often incomprehensible to observers.
3. Political; motivation directed toward a realistic or imagined strategic goal, directly or indirectly, nationally or internationally, serving either a clear, but often also a vague political, pseudo-political or pseudo-religious ideology. These three categories, criminal, deranged, political, often overlap, frequently it is difficult to distinguish in a given instance (for instance, Symbionese Army) which of these motivations are present or predominating. Yet it appears clear that for effective counter-measures, the distinction between these categories must not be blurred; what is effective in one category, is totally ineffective for another (for instance, the expected deterrence of death penalty, or the lure of money, to favorably influence the political or mentally deranged offender).

Violent conflict situation attempts become all the more likely the more the participants are in a conflict on either side are or become fanatically indoctrinated, imbued with feelings of righteousness and convinced of the sacredness of their cause. The evident connection between violence and its justification (in the minds of the perpetrators) deserves particularly careful study; the “national” terrorists who use more “strategic” than “symptomatic” violence, may be objectively sincere, intelligent, unselfishly motivated, incorruptible, well trained and well

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organized, which makes them no less but more dangerous. Modern political terrorism represents an explosive threat in its inherent multiplicity and disregard of innocents, because the terrorists also consider their own lives as expendable.

At the present stage of the development of terrorism, very often terrorist acts represent episodes of a series and are followed, copycat, or imitation crimes. Some forms of terrorism (e.g., in countries with a large number of tiecutters, kidnapping, etc.) occur in waves, follow definite patterns, influenced by mass media, and spread by criminal organizations.

After the stimulating "sensational" entertainment effect has worn off, righteous indignation sets in on the part of the people of terrorism (community), the multiplicity of rational or irrational ideas or "political" or "social" indications. But, according to the principle of entertainment, righteous indignation is a substitute for genuine understanding on which effective countermeasures can be based.

Terrorism is not a phase, it has to be seen against the background of various social conditions (or, rather, the images and emotions connected to these conditions or their images). Terrorism thrives on feelings of remediable injustice; neither actual deprivation nor oppression as such are root causes of terrorism, but rather a fear of well-founded, accurate, and clearcut injustices against the people, in the belief that such injustice can be remedied by social action (and is not considered natural), inevitable, fast, etc.) are basic reasons for terrorism.

In fact it can be argued that the full weight of counter-measures against terrorism is only justified only if conditions of governmental terror are not tolerated (like in some countries that permit or encourage oppression, deny due process of law, condone torture, etc.). Terrorists are characteristically recruited from the ranks of the disaffected and alienated; the origin of terrorism is in direct relationship to conditions that do not permit meaningful social change, except by violence. Due to modern communication, terrorism is an international problem; terrorist techniques are easily exported and quickly imitated all over the world. Empirical research has shown beyond any reasonable doubt that imitation and repetition of terrorist acts occur more readily when the spectral violence is used, regardless of whether violence is intended by the law breakers or by the law enforcers.

The following steps are suggested for more effective counter-measures to terrorism, as well as for new preventive and protective insights to be gained:

I. Research and remedial social (legislative, administrative, technical, law enforcement, etc.) measures should be initiated immediately and simultaneously with mutual reference to each other. The formulation of research should take into account that terrorism is a fluid and static, but rather a fact, the so-called fluidity and-changing of terrorism, no one can exactly predict, not only the social and political changes that happen within terrorism, but also the reflection of effective or ineffective counter-measures. Therefore, the systematic combination of research and action, of the theoretical and practical considerations of teaching, training, instruction and field work, experience and participation is mandatory to meet terrorist threats and to optimally anticipate and prevent terrorist dangers. The international, national, and international measures (interpol-like international agency for exchange of information and mutual assistance, help in preparation and advice for conclusion of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements) should be visualized from the very start.

II. Due to the varied and varying, multifaceted and changing manifestations of terrorism that are often different motivated (criminal, mentally derivanged, political), no single legislative formula will "explain" or "solve" terrorism. Different terrorist offenses; yet terrorist activities follow essentially the same few models. Hence, general principles and guidelines of counter-strategies can be developed. Therefore:

A. Avoiding terrorist task forces, consisting of highly trained, professionalized experts from various fields (police, military, etc.) should be organized and permitted to participate in action right away. These teams should be oriented on a local level under the umbrella of a permanent organization; their function should be to watch the development of terrorist activities to be sought by the decision makers (fully elected or appointed officials) in an obligatory fashion; just as there should be an obligation to inform the public about the details of relevant events. In special cases these task forces could be used for actual participation in negotiations, bargaining, etc.

B. The organization of action teams or task forces should have computerized data banks and similar resources at their disposal, which quickly inform about success or failure of previous similar events and the countermeasures taken.

The data collecting center, or centers could be empowered to conduct ongoing research into:

(a) The personality profiles and personality development of various types of terrorists and of participants (e.g., mentally derivanged, political).

(b) Victimology. The identification of victims to be chosen as victims, behavior of victims, for instance in terms of indignation, reactions of bystanders, or hidden and of "interests washing" and other forms of coercion creating conversion or increased resistance.

(c) Behavior of terror objects, i.e., families, communities, nations, etc. Studies in social psychology of behavior under stress (man on the list of potential terrorists, woman on the list of potential terrorists), combined with studies of thought and action, effect of higher possibilities, particularly death penalty specifically in regard to terrorism; the trial of the terrorist only increases stimulation of security, rather than security.

(d) Special attention to psychology of law enforcement officers and their sensitivity life courses, for instance, resolving emergent or actual conflict by quick confrontation, rather than by negotiation.

3. Confrontation of various negotiation techniques and strategies in terms of effectiveness and morality:

(a) When variants are less suited to bring about certain stated or agreed upon ends. Who should negotiate, whom and how, up to what limit, etc.

(b) Providing empirical research data for the decision about ultimate ends; for instance, preservation of individual life (considered highest hierarchical aim in peacetime democratic society) vs. prestige or propaganda gains, or gains in status or territory, (considered high goal by authoritarian societies or in times of war).

III. Due to the undeniable fact that the mass media perform willingly or unwillingly the propaganda job for terrorisms by providing national or international audiences with sensational mass entertainment and special emphasis on First Amendment protection and other media protection, especially on organized and compulsory control schemes, avoiding枯燥 censorship can be suggested by allowing the media to present terrorism and terrorism-controlling and exciting events, to minimize the multiplying contagion effect, leading to incitement and escalation of terrorist destruction, including anything demanded by the people, should be avoided; media experts and special emphasis placed on experimental attempts to extrapolate the media effects. Such measures can be used in the following:

IV. Modern terrorism is a criminal activity of a novel and special sort, therefore novel methods for its control, regulation and elimination must be developed, which should include the following:

1. Training of law enforcement officers in the various fields of the experts and vice versa training of experts in strategy and tactics of law enforcement, with particular attention to communicability of their joint activities to the public.

2. Research into methods to legislate and administrative bodies regarding availability and manufacture of hand firearms and explosives, as well as other measures, and into terrorist activities against terrorism. Hence even the legal beginnings of such terrorist measures prolonged over a long period of the individual freedom, etc.) must be spotted and avoided by weighing the inherent potential of all measures against their costs in liberty and freedom (see, for instance, search and seizure, free movement, etc.).

Insofar as terrorism must be seen in the general context of its origin and justification for the terrorists and actual or potential objects, novel action research methods can be used to single out and point to particularly sensitive areas nationally and internationally, in which the feeling of responsibilityFlash an answer. It is in the nature of a problem without 31-597-74-p. 1 —— 5
waiting for the terrorists to do so by their spectacularly violent actions. The task forces on terrorism could be social action initiators and fulfill a preventive function (for instance, the explosiveness of the situation in Palestinian refugee camp could have been and was forecast. Officially tolerated police torture of the political prisoners by totalitarian and South American countries poses a high terrorist potential, or the situation in some ghettos and certain jail cells as breeding ground for terrorism, can easily be spotted). Legitimate moral authority can be conferred on strong, firm and decisive countermeasures against terrorism only by the very same authority, that does not just demand demand loyalty and obedience to law, but endeavors to bring about conditions which justly and legitimatly can command loyalty and obedience to law. The strategy of our future to which a free democratic nation is irrevocably committed, demands the development and availability of free and institutionalized alternatives to violence for peaceful and reasonable evolution. To this high purpose, all research and action endeavors should be dedicated.

Dr. Hacker, I want to congratulate whoever was responsible for drafting the set of questions because it shows some expertise and knowledge on the subject and for a moment it made me feel it was not necessary for me to testify because you had this information already.

I think, due to the tremendous technological developments and the accomplishments in perfecting weaponry and such, that the differentiation of modern society, there is no doubt about it that modern society has become more vulnerable for this type of focused attack which now goes on under the name of terrorism and has become more vulnerable for both the criminal and political motivated attack.

I would like to make a statement on that, first of all. Even granting that most or all political acts of violence directed against an established government like the United States of America, it should be considered criminal and it is criminal. It is a special type of criminality that I believe cannot be handled with the conventional police methods.

In other words, terrorism is a crime, but a special sort of crime that demands certain special measures and certain special information to meet it successfully. I am glad the chairman spoke about the suggestion of action teams. All over the country each local police force or law enforcement agency that has the responsibility of solving a case that happens in its jurisdiction, should be privileged to have the advice of such teams either on the spot or by telephone or whatever, which have been properly trained. It should be obligatory that whoever makes the decision about these matters has to consult with that team. It does not necessarily have to take the advice of that team — that would be too much of an interference in the structure—but every police chief or whoever makes that type of decision should be obligated to consult with a team of that sort.

Great care should be taken in selecting and training the team members so that it would be a functioning body, having all the material at its disposal. It could be computerized, right now, in order to determine the strategy of the matter and to be able to meet each individual case or incident at the moment.

Again, I want to say something as a matter of principle. I believe it is wrong to think we know nothing about terrorism. It is equally wrong to think we know all about it. There is no simple recipe. Now the motivations for terrorism are different. The first thing we have to do is take account of the differentiations. I would distinguish between the criminal, the lunatic, and the political. To be sure, they are very frequently intermingled with each other. Maybe later I could give a few ideas on how one could handle that problem. But very clearly, the countermeasures of a society must take into account whether these acts are done by "crazies," inveterate criminals, or politically inspired people. This differentiation just implies that there are different types of attack, not the one type of action only, if at the moment one ought to be done about a deed according to the suspected motivations of the perpetrator.

I agree with the chairman that at least in the very near future the method of using blackmail and extortion will become more popular because of the contagiousness of these methods, particularly when propagated by the mass media.

That is another area of very serious consideration, being fully aware of the first amendment protections and other necessary safeguards of freedom. But I believe nowadays one cannot afford to overlook the unhappy fact that willingly or unwillingly the mass media do the business of terrorism. They perform the dirty business of terrorism as its propaganda arm by spreading and dramatizing and making more spectacular acts of terrorism, thereby providing terrorist inducements.

In other words, my general idea is, although we cannot hope to devise a blueprint or even two or three blueprints, we can establish general guidelines that may be quite valid and will not miraculously handle every case to everybody's satisfaction, but will improve our batting average very significantly.

I would not be a scientist if I would not advocate a great deal more research. But I feel it should be very strictly focused, should not be a fishing expedition type of research, to just haphazardly go ahead and see what you can pick up. We already know a few areas, for instance, mass media, differentiation of various profiles; also by improvement of negotiation methods, by carefully going over past negotiations, that could improve society's reactions against what promises to be a dire thread, not only to the unfortunate victim but to the whole structure of society. Unfortunately, for better or worse, terrorism has been a very popular growth industry because there was relatively little at stake and spectacular things are accomplished.

The last thing I would like to say is what the representatives of law and order have to guard against is not to answer terrorism with terror. We have to be careful not to go overboard in our enthusiasm of fighting terrorism and not get into the area of terror.

I would feel the strongest and most focused activities are indicated right now. As everybody can see, terrorism is increasing and spreading like the cholera. The time to do something about it is right now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Icsman. Thank you very much. We will proceed under the 5-minute rule. I will recognize the members for questioning. At this time, I will first be myself of that.

It has been pointed out that probably the only nation in the world which has any set policy toward dealing with terrorism has been the nation of Israel. They work on the principle that terrorism feeds upon publicity and successes.
END