

The committee is also very interested in gaining insight into the training and research projects administered through Federal Agencies, and their effectiveness. Our central purpose, of course, is to make certain that whatever resources are needed will be made available to assure that acts of terrorism do not disrupt the orderly functions of the Government and our democratic institutions.

It is in this vein that we have invited today's witness, Dr. Bertram S. Brown, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health. As I pointed out at the beginning, he is eminently qualified to testify on terrorism as he has developed much expertise in the field from studies and research on the problem.

In addition, he is conversant with existing programs and procedures that are carried out through the National Institute of Mental Health in connection with terrorism.

Dr. Brown, it is a pleasure to welcome you as a witness. Do you have a prepared statement?

Dr. BROWN. I do, Mr. Chairman. Then I would welcome any questions or comments from you or other members.

Chairman ICHORD. Very good. Proceed.

STATEMENT OF BERTRAM S. BROWN, M.D.

Dr. BROWN. As a psychiatrist and Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee during these important hearings on the problem of terrorism as related to the national security.

The original mission of the National Institute of Mental Health had to do with national security in connection with neuropsychiatric difficulties, our most significant health problem in World War II. Immediately after the war, the National Mental Health Act was passed, and the NIMH was created by President Truman in 1946.

This mission has recently been reaffirmed by the Congress in Public Law 93-282 of May 1974, to "develop and conduct comprehensive health, education, research, and planning programs for the prevention and treatment of mental illness and for the rehabilitation of the mentally ill."

This mission in turn requires an active concern on the part of the Institute with mental health problems reflected in various types of antisocial behaviors. Violent behaviors, certainly including terrorism, are of particular concern to NIMH because such behaviors are harmful and disturbing to society, and frequently involve the commission of serious criminal acts.

Scientific research on problems of violent behavior has thus far included a number of studies aimed at developing improved knowledge of these behaviors. Studies, for example, have focused on the neurophysiology of violent behavior, or how the brain actually works, the possible role of certain chromosome abnormalities in behavioral deviations, and the possible interactive relationships between prenatal brain damage and later antisocial behavior (in plain English, the difficulties which may arise between pregnancy and childbirth and how they relate to later behavioral troubles).

Research also is attempting to develop improved means of differentiating persons with aggressive life styles from persons who manifest episodic aggressivity stemming from certain psychiatric characteristics, such as epileptoid and hysteroid factors. Studies have been made on violence within families, on the extent to which the social behavior of children is affected by exposure to television violence, and on community reactions and responses to civil disturbances.

We know, of course, that society's need for much better ways of coping with violent behaviors cannot always wait for the results of further research, so NIMH has been active in the development and testing of new intervention strategies.

In one such study, police officers themselves conducted research on ways to avoid unnecessary violence in their daily encounters with citizens, and they devised remedial programs for implementation by the police department. Another study has been examining the social-psychological effects of rape on female victims and the subsequent impact of the criminal justice processing of rape cases on the mental health of the victims.

NIMH, to date, has not been very much involved in studies of terrorism per se, with one exception.

Chairman ICHORD. At that point, Doctor, this term terrorism is pretty broad. How are you using the term, terrorism? What is your definition?

Dr. BROWN. The definition of terrorism I am using has some range, in our attempt to be responsive to the committee's concerns. I consider terrorism as ranging from individual acts which inflict damage, violence, death, and terror, to the violent actions of organized groups attempting to achieve political or social motives. We know that the assassin destroys men who—in his belief—are corrupting a system, while the terrorist attempts to destroy a system as such. For the terrorist, the guilt or innocence of the victim is irrelevant. He often deliberately kills people innocent of any wrong, knowing that terror spreads more rapidly and paralyzingly when men are murdered indiscriminately. The terrorist conceives that he is speaking to generations yet unborn.

A credo of terrorism is that the more flagrantly a particular murder offends normal sensibilities the more it excites the admiration of some. A leader of the Weatherman terrorist movement was quoted as describing the Tate-La Bianca mass murders as follows:

"Dig it. First they killed the pigs, then they ate dinner in the same room with them, then they even shoved a fork into the victim's stomach! Wild!"

The first Russian terrorist of the 19th century, Nachaeyeff, wrote: "The terrorist despises all dogmas and all sciences, leaving them for future generations. He knows only one science * * * the science of destruction."

Jerry Rubin, when leader of the American Yippies, had the theory: "When in doubt, burn."

The theory of modern revolutionary terrorism was developed by Nachaeyeff in the 19th century in the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) movement. The movement failed, apparently because its leaders confused strategic and tactical principles.

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The terrorist attempts to maximize uncertainty and create extraordinary apprehensions. Terror springs less from those dangers which can be anticipated and thus prepared for, and more from those which are so uncertain that our imagination makes them far worse than they actually are.

In recent years, the terrorists have made the phrase "guerrilla warfare" well known. However, in the true sense of the word, the terrorist is not a guerrilla. The aim of the guerrilla is to dispense the State's conventional forces so that he may defeat them piecemeal. Because the guerrilla directs his military energy against armed men, the guerrilla has won a begrudging partial recognition, in domestic and international law, as a soldier and is entitled to the privileges and immunities of that status when captured. In contrast, the terrorist is not a soldier and prefers to avoid military targets. Recently, for example, Arab terrorists lying in ambush let several clearly marked Israeli military vehicles pass to destroy a bus loaded with schoolchildren. Even when the terrorist does attack soldiers he goes out of his way to kill in the most bizarre fashion, mutilating prisoners or employing them as hostages (one reason courts treat terrorists as criminals).

Our law primarily deals with actions; and from the perspective of the law a terrorist is only one who violates particular conventions regulating civil or military intercourse. What one must bear in mind, is that the true terrorist consciously employs terror, believing that the end desired cannot be produced in any other way. He is demonstrating that there are no immunities, no restraints. Therefore, a terrorist campaign involves the prolonged systematic use of terror to secure a political objective.

The strategy of the revolutionary terrorist is to attack the masses, the very people he wants to liberate, but in a way that makes it appear the Government is the enemy. The classical revolutionary views society as deeply divided usually along class and racial lines with some overt hostility present, and an unequal distribution of wealth. Without this condition he will not attempt insurrection. Basically, the terrorist sees society as pervasively corrupt where the citizen's attitude to citizens is ambivalent about their commitment to society. They view the common man as basically dissatisfied with his life, but unwilling or fearful of expressing his discontent because he desires peace and security more. But—in the terrorist view—these people are extremely vulnerable and will be easily intimidated by bold men, those who want revolution now.

The basic goal of the terrorists was to kill key officials or innocent people and then panic the Government into adopting a policy of indiscriminate repression which would then radicalize the population against the Government.

Historically, most terrorist organizations have failed because they were unable to develop a coherent and effective organization as well as lucid tactics. They fail to recognize that it takes time and continuous effort to develop whatever latent hostilities a people possess.

Generally, modern terrorists have learned from the mistakes of the old terrorists, that the basic tactic in the initial stages of an insurrection is to build their own strength first.

The basic tactics of the terrorist may be summarized as follows:

- a. Mount spectacular attacks against prominent persons, in order to attract the very young who thirst for notoriety.
- b. Attack defenseless targets, in defiance of convention, to spread fear, and to insure their own tenuous survival.
- c. Avoid battle, but destroy the system by maddening and frightening its defenders so they will wear themselves out in vain efforts to find an enemy who is everywhere in general but nowhere in particular.

Despite numerous attempts, no system has been overturned by terror alone.

A well planned terrorist campaign to provoke revolution develops in three stages: (1) Organization prepares; (2) organization initiates attacks to secure momentum and encourage latent hostilities; and (3) it takes the struggle out of the Government's hands and crushes liberal or moderating elements, hoping to secure a political solution which all can accept.

The terrorist is always attacking, always escalating the character of his violence, but to succeed he must learn to escalate within prescribed bounds. Each new tactic capable of raising the level of outrage and revulsion must be seen as a natural response to "the provocations of officials." At the very least, tactics must be justified on grounds that the previous and more restrained effort has not produced the desired effect.

The problem of justifying the tactics is always a critical one as previously mentioned. Only a few may become terrorists fully cognizant of the implications of their decisions. Most drift into terrorism, prisoners of their own logic, adopting more extreme measures as each preceding one proves inadequate. If elections fail, they turn to demonstrations, then dynamiting, kidnaping, and finally murder.

However, when the "necessity" of murder is accepted, it is difficult to deny the need to distinguish between offending officials, innocent bystanders, and sympathizers.

The terrorist usually does not reveal in the beginning how far he is willing to go, for fear of alienating potential sympathizers.

In the first phase, tiny loose cells are formed, with a terrorist unit having 3 or 4 bases; for each person engaged in acts of terror, 7 to 10 must perform supportive functions.

Terrorists almost always depend on surprise. Therefore, they employ innocuously appearing people, often women.

Terrorists nearly always fight a "poor men's war." Equipment is inexpensive and light and they try for constant motion.

In the second stage, the terrorists must make themselves known to the general public. Initially they must have a few victories in order to recruit members. So initially they attack the most defenseless targets, ones which have no military or political value whatsoever—they plant firebombs in office buildings, post offices, libraries, banks. These acts are often seen as infantile vandalism, criminal madness or political lunacy. The longer the major portion of the public regards these as infantile, the more time the terrorists have to solidify their organization.

Chairman ICHORD. Then you are not confining it to acts which have a political or ideological motivation?

Dr. BROWN. I am not, because we have not yet been able to focus down on any one underlying meaning of the word terrorism. I think that dialog is very important, in that very often discussions are based on one premise of the definition, for example, organized acts for political coercion or change, whereas in fact the behavior we may be dealing with at that specific time involves an overtly psychotic loner who has no relationship other than to his own past troubles.

Or vice versa. In short, a similar argument might be made for the other side of the spectrum, when we have a person carrying out a thoughtful calculated act against some part of society and it is presumed he is severely mentally ill, whereas upon examining him you might find a rather well put together individual.

Delineating more carefully this interplay between the individual motivation and the ascriptive nature of the act itself would indeed be a worthy contribution to these hearings.

The one study of terrorism in which NIMH is involved is a research project in which the investigator is making an analysis of assassination and terrorism in selected Western and non-Western societies.

Before considering specific forms future NIMH involvement might take, it is important to set forth a number of considerations in our thinking through which NIMH might best respond to the committee's desire to determine what federally initiated efforts might be useful in bringing the problem of terrorism under more effective control.

The first consideration has to do with the extent to which persons who engage in terrorism in the United States are viewed as persons suffering from some form of mental illness, or as persons who have deliberately resorted to terrorism to gain attention, create widespread social unease, and weaken and destroy the American system of government.

It would appear that the latter view is the one more appropriate for most cases in which terrorism actually has occurred. Most terrorists in this country have exhibited purposefulness, choice, and commitment in a very different manner from that of persons who are suffering from some kind of mental illness.

It seems important, therefore, that no activities be undertaken which might obscure the real nature of the terrorism problem in this country.

Another consideration is that the mission of NIMH is essentially therapeutic, in contrast with the law enforcement and defense missions vested in other agencies of the Government. Because of its therapeutic mission, NIMH does not have access to or a need for the intelligence data which other Government agencies collect on terrorist groups and activities in this country. Any NIMH involvement with the terrorist problem would accordingly be in a support role to other Government agencies, which have primary responsibilities in the area of law enforcement and national security.

A third consideration is the extent to which NIMH activity in relationship to terrorism would be consistent with NIMH's mission to develop and conduct programs for the prevention and treatment of mental illness and for rehabilitation of the mentally ill. As I have indicated, it does not appear to us that most terrorism in this country has been the work of persons suffering from mental illness.

On the other side of the coin, we recognize—as you have seen earlier in my prepared statement—that in some cases it is the objective and ambition of terrorists to engender, by their actions, widespread fears and tensions which might be highly detrimental to the public's mental health and conducive to mental illness. The measuring of the success of terrorist acts in creating anxiety and tensions is another part of the situation which has not really been looked at comprehensively through studies.

The social and mental health impact of terrorist activities, therefore, is a problem of concern to NIMH, and one on which more research and study might be needed depending upon whether or not adequate research methodologies can be developed.

In view of these considerations, it appears that the following are likely to be the ways in which NIMH could most appropriately contribute to the study of terrorism in this country.

NIMH can support studies in the area of basic research which can contribute to improved understanding of the phenomenon of terror and the processes involved. In addition, studies can be made—on a survey or other basis—of the social impacts of particular manifestations of terrorism in this country. For example, much of the avowedly political terrorism in this country has tended to be short-lived, whereas some types of criminal terrorism have had more long lasting and pervasive social effects.

NIMH could contribute qualified experts from the various disciplines who would be available to study the phenomena of terrorism through its various training projects—particularly those concerned with training behavioral and social science researchers and evaluation personnel.

Insofar as counterterrorist programs and operations are concerned, it is doubtful that the NIMH role should be more than one of providing consultation and technical assistance when requested. This is not an area in which NIMH has any special expertise except that derived from studies of violent behaviors generally.

In addition, as I have suggested, this is an area in which any attempts at therapeutic intervention may well be misplaced and inappropriate as long as most terrorism in this country continues to be the work of persons who operate from political motives.

That concludes my formal statement. I have just one brief additional remark. I want to compliment you on your staff who provided me this morning with a set of very thoughtful questions that my staff members said would make the outline for a very excellent Ph. D. dissertation.

Chairman ICHORD. Thank you very much, Dr. Brown. Would you tell us something about your consultative roles to other Government agencies?

Dr. BROWN. I have served both as a formal and informal consultant as issues of psychiatry and other behavioral sciences came up. Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I entered the Public Health Service in 1960 and had an unusual experience when I worked for President Kennedy's Committee on Mental Retardation which brought me into places where psychiatry interacts with problems of our society on a national and international basis.

In 1966 I served as an informal consultant for many different challenging problems. For example, in my role as Deputy and later as



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