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
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Two Views of **ACQUISITIONS**  
**Criminology and Criminal Justice:  
Definitions, Trends, and the Future**

Papers  
by  
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and  
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## **Preface**

The issues surrounding criminology and criminal justice education have received considerable attention in recent years. The quality of criminology and criminal justice educational efforts, appropriate models for the delivery of these efforts, and the basic purpose of criminology and criminal justice education are subjects of a growing debate. Intertwined with issues such as these is a fundamental concern regarding the appropriate paradigm for the study of crime, societal reactions to crime, and strategies for the prevention and control of crime. Historically, criminology was the academic locus for the study of crime and related phenomena. However, the past decade has witnessed the extraordinary development and growth of criminal justice education. At present, both criminology and criminal justice lay claim to the study of crime and the criminal justice system.

The major goal of the Joint Commission on Criminology and Criminal Justice Education and Standards is to systematically explore the issues surrounding criminology and criminal justice education. Early on, the Joint Commission, which consists of members from the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and the American Society of Criminology, recognized the need to explore the similarities and differences between criminology and criminal justice. The two papers prepared for the Joint Commission by John P. Conrad of the American Justice Institute and Richard A. Myren of American University, represent a preliminary effort at delineating the boundaries of criminology and criminal justice and determining if these boundaries are real or merely a matter of semantics.

The views of the authors are their own and not necessarily those of the Joint Commission. These papers are viewed by the Joint Commission as the beginning rather than the end of debate on this issue. Hopefully they will stimulate a far-reaching dialog that will serve to clarify the nature of educational efforts directed toward understanding crime and improving the criminal justice system.

Vincent J. Webb  
Principal Investigator

## **Criminology and Criminal Justice: Definitions, Trends, and the Future**

### **The First View**

**John P. Conrad**

Few watersheds in the history of any discipline can be so precisely dated as the transformation of criminal justice studies under the powerful influence of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Before 1967, when the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was passed and signed into law, the study of crime took place in the backwaters of social sciences. A few extraordinary talents scattered almost randomly across the country were magnets for young scholars interested in criminology. Most of them relied on local resources or on the interest of a very few foundations for the support of their research. As for the Federal government, the sole source of funds was the center for Crime and Delinquency of the National Institute for Mental Health. With great adroitness, that agency stretched its limited budget to encourage the application of social science to the expanding and ominous blight of crime.

The criminological family was small. The annual gatherings of the American Society of Criminology assembled a few score familiar faces who made up most of the academic community with serious interests in the subject. Most of them were drawn into the work of the three successive commissions created by President Johnson: the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, and the National Commission on Riots and Civil Disorders. In retrospect, opinions differ as to the value of the work done by these commissions, but there can be no doubt of the impetus that they gave to the systematic study of the phenomena of crime. Criminologists at least learned that although they could frame some

momentous questions, they had few answers, and none of them seemed to have the desired effect of abating crime.

From the late fifties, the interest of the Ford Foundation under the leadership of Dyke Brown, David Hunter, Jackson Toby, and Christopher Edley had fostered criminological studies at several universities and had encouraged administrative research in a few state correctional departments. Gradually, as the sixties proceeded, foundation and NIMH resources facilitated the increasingly costly research that criminologists wanted to do. Opportunities for the existing research community were markedly increased, but the population of criminologists was not significantly expanded. If a personal reminiscence can be permitted here, I recall that in 1960, as a penological bureaucrat in search of the latest criminological thought, I could comfortably make the rounds of less than a dozen universities and meet most of the major figures in the field. Ten years later, when I joined the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice with a charge to spread some limited funds where they would do the most good in getting useful research done, I found that I was dealing with the same names and the same reputations; not many additional stars had appeared in our firmament. Within less than a decade, that has changed. Criminologists now have difficulties in keeping up with each other. The body of knowledge has grown so much and the thrusts of our investigations have become so varied that few pretend and none, I think, achieves a comprehensive expertise in our discipline.

But the florescence of criminology is not to be compared with the explosion of criminal justice studies. Before the creation of the Law Enforcement Educational Program under the auspices of the LEAA, almost nothing existed to provide systematic preparation for criminal justice occupations other than the law. If probation and parole officers had any professional training at all, it consisted of what they could adapt from the practice of casework, as taught in correctional curricula in a few schools of social welfare, none of which seemed sure that they really should be involved in the preparation of their students for careers in penology. The administration of police departments, whether done badly or well, was left to those who occupied positions in which they were to administer. The need for more and better professional preparation was a topic for frequent debate at conferences concerned with the administration of justice. Not all of the argument was by any means favorable to the department of specialized curricula at universities. Belief in hard knocks persisted long past the demonstration of the value of academic preparation.

All that has changed, and within the span of hardly more than a decade. Nearly 1,000 colleges across the country are receiving LEEP funds. There are 1,243 schools in the LEEP catalogues, together with some 100 more that offer courses relevant to preparation for various criminal justice careers. It is time to take a compass reading. Teachers, scholars, and practitioners must consider the direction of this momentum, its meaning for the occupations concerned and for the criminal justice system they serve.

## Definitions

Heavy weather can be made in the definition of any scientific discipline, and criminology is no exception. Many writers have striven for a version they could call their own—precise, including only the necessary and sufficient elements, and excluding everything extraneous. A review of these attempts does not lead to any new or interesting illumination of the topic, but it is obvious that if criminology and criminal justice studies are to be distinguished from each other both terms must be clearly defined. I will derive a special distillation of my own from two of the most eminent authorities in the domain of criminology. Sutherland's definition opens the most famous criminological text and serves to mark off the territory:

Criminology is the body of knowledge regarding crime as a social phenomenon. It includes within its scope the processes of making laws, of breaking laws, and of reacting toward the breaking of laws. These processes are three aspects of a somewhat unified sequence of interactions. Certain acts which are regarded as undesirable are defined by the political society as crimes. In spite of this definition, some people persist in the behavior and thus commit crimes; the political society reacts by punishment, treatment, or prevention. This sequence of interactions is the object-matter of criminology.<sup>1</sup>

Acknowledging the authority of Sutherland's definition, Wolfgang and Ferracuti insisted on the epistemological function of criminology, and urged that emphasis be placed on the *scientific* process that criminology must incorporate to produce a body of knowledge. Their refinement assists with distinction that I have to make, and I cite it here.

...(C)riminology means the use of the scientific method in the study and analysis of regularities, uniformities, patterns, and causal relationships concerned with crime, criminals, or criminal behavior.<sup>2</sup>

That definition firmly adds the scientific method to the otherwise more comprehensive and, it seems to me, more dynamic definition laid down by Sutherland. Between these two definitions a resolution is possible, and I will use it for the development of this argument:

Criminology is the application of the scientific method to the explanation of the phenomena generated by the interactions of the processes in law-making, law-breaking, and the reactions of society to these processes.

Two problems confront me here. The first has to do with the scientific method. Volumes have been written to define it and to prescribe its limits. I will content myself with a simple, perhaps over-simplified, definition of my own:

The scientific method consists of the generation of hypotheses for the explanation of perceived phenomena and the search for the most reliable evidence to confirm or falsify these hypotheses.

Each discipline develops procedures of its own for the formulation of hypotheses and for the discovery and testing of evidence. Essential to any *scientific* discipline is a consensus among its practitioners about epistemology. Unless there is agreement that the task in common is the discovery of new knowledge and unless that agreement extends to a shared belief in the methods for increasing knowledge, there is no science. It is well known that the methods of some disciplines are far more complex and technically difficult than the methods of others, but in each science there must be a commitment to the search and generally shared opinion as to the proper methods of conducting it.

The second difficulty concerns the status of criminology as a separate discipline. This problem need not detain us for long. Necessarily criminologists must draw from the accumulated knowledge and methods of all the social sciences and some of the biological sciences. Indeed, it would be hard to find a criminologist who did not consider himself to be primarily a scholar committed to some more basic discipline, commonly, but not always sociology. Most criminologists accept as fellow criminologists persons trained in other disciplines who are applying their methods to the study of the phenomena of crime.

The status of criminology is further complicated by the opinion of some that it is not crime we are studying but deviance. Indeed, there are some who suppose that the term will eventually disappear with obsolescence, merged in the larger task of explaining and understanding all deviant behavior. For the present, criminology is very much alive, a "normal science" in the Kuhnian sense.<sup>3</sup>

Turning now to the *criminal justice sciences*, the criminologist is immediately confronted with a semantic problem. In what sense can a criminal justice *science* exist and not be criminology? Let us hold this question in abeyance for a while; we must consider what these career commitments are that compose the criminal justice sciences.

Here again Wolfgang and Ferracuti are helpful. I quote them at some length because the argument they make is precisely relevant to the issue I am addressing and not to be improved upon:

At present the title of criminologist is indiscriminately used to refer to anyone whose professional activity is focused on criminals. The probation officer, the psychiatrist in a penal institution, the technician in a ballistics section of a police department, the lie-detector analyst, the investigator for the district attorney's office, and even the professor of criminal law have occasionally been referred to as "criminologists." It is our contention that none of these persons by reason only of his activity is a criminologist; and that none of these professional activities constitutes criminology. . .

If any one of these persons in pursuance of his occupational role is principally devoted to the task of scientific study, research, and analysis of the phenomenon of crime, criminal behavior, or treatment of the offender, his role is that of a criminologist. . . .

In most cases the closest they come to being "scientists" is in the application of criminological research findings, but as we have elsewhere indicated, this kind of

application is not criminology. We may refer to them, as Sellin has earlier done, as "technologists" and the work in which they are engaged as "criminotechnology."...<sup>4</sup>

"Criminotechnology" has not caught on, but the point made in the excerpt above covers the activities of those who work in the varied professional pursuits needed by the criminal justice system. I think it is essential to make explicit the point that this argument is not in any sense elitist. A career in criminology is interesting, better paid than it used to be, and different from the careers of a court administrator, a probation officer, a correctional commissioner, or a police chief. To qualify as a criminologist does no more than to make a scholar eligible for work as a university teacher or a specialist in research. Credentials as a criminologist have no relevance for work in any of the professional or technical disciplines of criminal justice. These occupations are also interesting; many of them are better paid than the positions occupied by criminologists, and they are certainly different from a career in teaching and research. A practitioner in one of the criminal justice occupations must have a complex and increasingly elaborate education, only one component of which is the corpus of criminology. He will be a consumer of criminology and will learn some of what he needs to know from criminologists. In a sense, the classic comparison between the hedgehog and the fox is apposite. Like the hedgehog, the criminologist knows one big thing, but the criminal justice specialist is the fox who must know many different things, some big, some little.

It is a misnomer to designate these disciplines as "criminal justice sciences," a misnomer that does no harm so long as we distinguish between these *sciences* and criminology. These professions really are comparable to medicine or engineering; they stand in relation to criminology as medicine does to biology or engineering to the physical sciences. The molecular biologist may make discoveries, but the physician is the professional who puts the knowledge to use. And if the findings of the criminologist are of any service to the world in dealing more effectively with the crime problem, it will be the criminal justice specialist who will design and carry out the programs that put research into action.

The distinction between scientist and practitioner would be unimportant were it not for the question of professional education and the standards to which it should be held. There is one tract for the criminologist, and another—or others—for the practitioner. Although these tracts may intersect—and should—it is important to distinguish between them and to locate their switching points.

### **The Education of a Criminologist**

Most European criminologists have been, and still are, lawyers who have taken an interest in social science or, occasionally, psychiatrists who have taken an interest in criminals. Distinguished sociologists from the time of Durkheim have engaged in criminological studies, but European sociology has not found crime an especially attractive phenomenon for research. Perhaps the sociological style in northern Europe is more congenial to work of a speculative and theoretical character;

perhaps crime does not appear to be a sufficiently important problem for investigation.

There have been important American contributions to criminology from the professions of law and medicine, too; the work of Sheldon Glueck and Paul Tappan, both lawyers, and of Herman Adler and Benjamin Karpman, both psychiatrists, come immediately to mind. But legal training does not readily accommodate to the scientific method, and American psychiatry has not been oriented to research since the wave of psychoanalysis swept across the Atlantic. Since the twenties, criminology has been preempted by sociologists, beginning with the brilliant achievements of the Chicago school. Spurred by the grave crime problems afflicting that city at that particular period, the memorable constellation centered on Park, Burgess, and Thomas, who convincingly demonstrated the value of strict empiricism. The sociological influence has been predominant ever since. The great figures of Sutherland at Indiana and Sellin at Pennsylvania maintained and spread the continuity initiated in Chicago.

The continuity is clear, but the emphases have changed. The Chicago pioneers were taxonomists, preoccupied with the description of the phenomena and problems of classification. Criminology has gone far since that time; it has sought to explain what it used to describe and has aspired to a nomothetic status that it has not yet achieved. But the insistence on the value of faithful attention to the facts and rigorous interpretation of observations has been an unbroken thread since those exciting years in Chicago.

At the same time, concern over methodology has intensified in the parent discipline of sociology. Although there have been important contributions from other social science disciplines, notably psychology and anthropology, the sheer bulk of sociological studies of crime, using the methods of sociological investigation, have created a body of knowledge most easily accessible to students trained in that discipline. To a steadily increasing extent, criminology must require a familiarity with sociological literature and methods. The tendency has been deplored by authorities trained in rival disciplines, as for example, the political scientist James Q. Wilson<sup>5</sup> and by my colleague, Richard Myren, in the paper he has written in tandem with this disquisition. Whether the study of crime would have been better off in the hands of another discipline is beside the point. The body of sociological criminology is too large, too influential, and, I think, too valuable to ignore. The education of the criminologist must include large infusions of sociology now and for the foreseeable future.

If that were all, the discourse could end here. We would be examining the future of a discipline that really amounted to no more than a fiefdom of sociology. But few sociologists informed about crime would dispute the need for a knowledge of abnormal and social psychology, of cultural anthropology, of criminal law, and of the science of government. We are not merely seeking the causes of crime, as some writers mistakenly presume; we have a need to trace the reciprocal effects of crime on the individual and of the criminal individual on the environment around him. The generation of hypotheses about a birth cohort, the statistical study of criminal

recidivism, and the search for improved methods of prediction do not begin to exhaust the issues confronting us in the agenda of criminology. These and similar problems are manageable by methods familiar to the conventional sociologist. Criminologists know that they have to get into the minds of criminals as well as into the neighborhoods in which they are to be found.

It would be a foolish presumption to prescribe the essential curriculum for the complete criminologist of the eighties and nineties. Surely he will need effective access to all the principal social sciences, not for the obviously impossible task of mastering all of them but rather for the purpose of taking what he needs for the particular line of research he will pursue. A large part of the education of a career scholar must be in learning where to find the tools he will need. The paradigms and capabilities of adjacent disciplines are within the grasp of an aspiring scholar, even if he cannot hope to assimilate the full scope of a department of knowledge not his own.

Beyond the grounding in his own discipline—which I think must usually be sociology—and the relevant sectors of other social sciences, the young criminologist must now tackle an increasingly complex curriculum in scientific method and statistical analysis. There are understandable differences of opinion regarding the value of advanced statistical methods in the analysis of data as murky and unreliable as those prevailing in the official crime reports. But there can be little question of improving those reports without reference to the standards required for the application of the more abstruse statistics. The construction of useful mathematical models depends on the existence of data that are suitable for those models. The criminologist of the future cannot escape mathematics; the only question is the definition of a sufficiency.

What is the use of a criminologist? Skeptical outsiders and discouraged insiders may well liken much of the work now going on to the trivialities of Swift's Laputans. The triumphs of every science are built on the shoulders of giants, but those giants are in turn supported by the efforts of countless ordinary mortals, many of whose findings do no more than settle for good the blindness of a blind alley. The work of any scientist consists of hundreds of small failures, sometimes punctuated by a success.

Strictly speaking, the criminologist limits himself to the search for new knowledge about crime. His task is tangled with the effects of social change; the impermanence of his findings assures that he and his students will always have new phenomena to describe and explain. Much of what he learns will be of little interest to the general public or even to the practitioners of criminal justice. His hope is that his confirmed hypothesis, however small in significance, will be useful in a synthesis leading to a principle resounding beyond the boundaries of criminology.

### **Education for Criminal Justice Practice**

For many years my career was that of a practitioner of criminal justice, specializing in the administration of corrections. My colleague, Dean Myren, would have referred to me as a *justician*, had he known me then. I am not comfortable with that

neologism, but I grant its usefulness as a concise generic term for the practitioner in or administrator of criminal justice. I shall appropriate it as a noun in good standing. Whatever I was, I know I did not know enough and the preparation I had as a professional social worker certainly did not meet all the requirements of the work I had to do. It was a reassurance that most of my colleagues were in the same boat; not one of us was really prepared for the tasks confronting us. What we were to learn the hard way was that we were indeed on a frontier. Only after we had explored the prison and the surrounding correctional apparatus of probation and parole could we be sure which existing tools we would be able to use effectively, which tools would have to be discarded, and which we would have to fabricate ourselves. The application of psychoanalytic concepts, for example, so influential twenty years ago, proved to be worse than useless. The predictive methods proffered by sociologists were of very limited value then, and, although better results have been recently claimed by colleagues working with the United States Sentencing Commission and the Michigan Department of Corrections, I remain skeptical of their value for penal administration, while conceding their importance in criminological research. On the other hand, we have learned much of considerable value from the conduct of group counseling and group therapy, and out of the conventional methods imported from psychiatric practice some extremely promising adaptations have been made that lead to improved communications and a milder social interaction in our prisons.

If there had existed a curriculum for the correctional justician thirty years ago, it could not have done us much good, and might well have been to our disadvantage. About all we could have used was a forum for the exchange of experience and the comparison of ideas. The trials and errors of the last thirty years have brought into sight some of the subject matter that should be in the hands of a justician, although I seriously doubt that we are even yet in a position to define the content of a satisfactory curriculum. In what follows, however, I shall sketch the essential elements of such an education. The object is to make clear by example the differences in scope and content of the preparation of a justician with that of a criminologist.

Whether a prison guard, a counselor, or a probation or parole officer, the beginner must know the system in which he works, and this should be taught in the criminal justice curriculum. The history of penology, the boundaries, the past and present expectations of the system all lend themselves to organized instruction at the undergraduate level. This kind of knowledge must also be learned by criminologists, but in much greater depth and elaboration.

A second component of the justician's training is criminology itself. Again, there should be an outline of the essentials of the subject to provide the student with an appreciation of the endogenous and exogenous influences that have to be considered in accounting for the causes of crime. The criminal justice practitioner will need to know this kind of material sufficiently well to understand the people he will be working with, but surely not to the comprehensive extent that the fully prepared criminologist will need. It does not matter much if the justician never

heard of Lombroso or Ferri, or even Bentham or Howard, but the criminologist needs a thorough knowledge of what these and many other scientific ancestors thought and the impact of their thought on the system of justice and the understanding of crime. The jurist must know the current ideas and should know something about the conflict of ideas. Most important, he must be able to put these ideas to practical use.

The same classroom could accommodate beginners in criminology and criminal justice so far. They will both need to acquaint themselves with the principles of criminal law, but neither will have to learn what the lawyer himself must know to advise a client or try a case. After this point, instruction will diverge; the criminologist will turn to the study of the literature, the mastery of methodology, and the conduct of research. The jurist will need to learn counseling in principle and through field work; he must acquire the rudiments of public administration, enough to provide a basis for further learning as he advances in the system; further, he must have a general knowledge of the organization of social services in the community so that as a "people changer" he can make use of the existing resources to assist the offenders whom he must change. These are by no means easy subjects to master; the pity is that so few of us in my generation were even aware of our need for this kind of preparation for our work. Even now, when much of this curriculum is taken for granted in criminal justice education, not many students get all they need.

These are subjects that the criminologist does not need for his purposes. An investigation like that of Kassebaum, Ward, and Wilner<sup>6</sup> will require project directors to familiarize themselves with the principles of counseling so that they can distinguish the prevailing styles, know what is considered good practice, and construct a research design around the principles governing the work of the counselors to be observed. The investigators need not acquire any counseling skills themselves, any more than in trying to understand the role conflicts of the prison guard they should have firsthand experience as a guard.

As correctional justices proceed with their careers, they will need a diversity of special skills, depending on the directions their talents take them. Counselors will need to learn how to train and supervise journeymen counselors; administrators will need to acquire the required management skills in organizational control, systems analysis, and budget planning. Custodial supervisors will have increasingly complex tasks to learn: personnel supervision, administration of discipline, staff training techniques, and classification of prisoners. The list of subject matter to be covered for the various corrections specialities is far from complete. What is to be noted from the samples I have cited is that all of these topics are best learned in the classrooms of a university; they are not suitable for in-service training. Further, the jurist's need for this kind of continuing education is far different from the criminologist's need for ever more intensive exploration of criminal behavior and its interaction with the environment and for increasingly complex research technology to enable him to make better use of the data he collects.

I write as a former practitioner and administrator in the correctional apparatus, and I think I have accurately represented the educational requirements for a

successful career in the vineyard in which I used to work. I got along well enough without much of the formal instruction that I recommend here, but I doubt that I could manage without this kind of foundation if I were starting out now in the late seventies for a career that would take me progressively into the next century.

Correctional personnel are not the only justicians to be prepared in our burgeoning schools of criminal justice. Police officers, court administrators, and members of other professions who are practicing extensively in criminal justice will need some of the same training that is received by correctional practitioners, later going on to specialized instruction indicated by their career requirements.

For all of this curriculum for justicians, the school of criminal justice should be the center in which the essential core instruction takes place, with referrals to other departments of instruction where necessary or desired. All entrants in the criminal justice occupations can well engage in the basic courses, and, of course, there will be advantages in learning together so that there will be a common appreciation of what these occupations share together. Later specializations will lead to separate tracts of study, but everything favors the joint conduct of basic studies.

There remains the question of nomenclature. Some schools of criminal justice, most notably that at the State University of New York at Albany, over which Dean Myren once presided, are primarily schools of criminology with advanced training available for rising officials in criminal justice. Some academic centers of criminology, as for example the Institute at Cambridge once directed by Sir Leon Radzinowicz, provide a considerable amount of training for justicians in addition to studies in criminology. These anomalies, if anomalies they are, need not perplex us. There is no reason why the two tracts of instruction cannot take place under the same roof in a university with the resources to offer them both. The important thing is to assure that criminologists do not mistakenly acquire the notion that they are qualifying themselves to be administrators, and that justicians do not consider themselves to be criminologists on the strength of a course or two in that subject. Most school administrators will find the attempt to duplicate the Albany model far beyond their resources and will prefer to limit themselves to the more modest goal of providing a basic education for justicians.

### **Caveat Scholar, or the Question of Accreditation**

Aided by the Law Enforcement Educational Program (LEEP), thousands of students have chosen to enter criminal justice curricula. The effect has been the proliferation of such curricula at a breathtaking rate. It is not surprising that there should be much concern in many quarters about the quality of instruction dispensed by the hundreds of schools that have sprung into being, in good faith and bad, to prepare justicians for their careers. Responsible college administrators unfamiliar with the needs of the criminal justice system have been uncertain about the minimum requirements for a qualified program. Criminal justice officials have been disturbed by applications received from persons who have completed a substandard education and now have credentials of little worth. Teachers in well qualified

curricula are uneasy about nearby diploma mills whose demands on students are minimal; bad programs tend to depreciate the good.

Federal funds are dispensed by stipends for students undergoing instruction preparatory to entrance into the criminal justice occupations. There is a special responsibility that the taxpayer's dollar should not be frittered away on enterprises that benefit only the entrepreneur, not those he purports to instruct. Where the quality of instruction is below standard, the beginning student is easy picking. Whether the faculty means well or not, the beginner has no way of judging the quality of what he is taught. Too often, there is nobody to advise him except members of the faculty of the school in which he enrolls, who cannot be counted on for disinterested counsel, especially if the standards of instruction are marginal or less.

From the time when Abraham Flexner reformed medical education, accreditation has been the preferred method for maintaining the standards of professional education. Faced with a chaotic situation in training students for the criminal justice occupations, the professions concerned and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration naturally turn to accreditation as a method of weeding out bad programs and assuring that the good ones remain good. This method is uniquely American. From our school-yard days, we learn to look to our peers for judgment, not to a distant authority. We subject ourselves more easily to the authority in which we feel we have a share than to the rule makers in the national capital. Compare this method with standard-setting in Europe, where the appropriate ministry makes decisions about compliance and noncompliance. To resolve our problem, a European ministry of justice would have only to beef up its Inspectorate of Instruction.

We could do that, too. Nothing prevents the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration from establishing an Office of Criminal Justice Instruction Standards, which would make annual determinations of compliance so that the public would know which institutions would be authorized to enroll students receiving federal stipends. The LEAA has chosen to consider an alternative route to accreditation that would engage the participation of those most directly concerned in the making of standards and the determination of compliance. This choice relieves the LEAA of an odious responsibility. It is much more difficult to defend standards made unilaterally by bureaucratic regulation than it is to enforce standards made by a consensus of those who are most directly affected.

But the problems abound in the design of accreditation procedures and in their execution. The first issue to be settled is the limit of the education to be accredited. In the earlier sections of the disquisition, I labored over the distinction to be made between criminologists and justices; I will return to this frontier to delineate one boundary of accreditation.

Criminologists are nurtured in the bosom of social science, usually with an interdisciplinary curriculum, but usually with a home in sociology. The conventional departments of academic instruction are subject to a complicated discipline that assures a minimal level of competence in instruction and encourages faculty

members to strive for an excellence that they do not always achieve. Regional accrediting associations composed of participating universities have adopted well understood and accepted systems for determining university compliance with consensually formulated standards of instruction. Substantial noncompliance with standards will result in loss of accreditation with disastrous consequences for the university. Most universities take internal precautions to prevent such an eventuality. Interdepartmental curriculum review committees carry out periodic studies of each department of instruction, thereby providing the administration with advance notice of problems or assurance that the department under study is in good professional shape. But for universities with graduate instruction, the most significant spur to excellence must be the need to recruit good graduate students, which can only be satisfied by the reputation of those who complete advanced degree programs. The graduate curriculum of university departments that cannot place its successful doctoral candidates in good positions will not survive for long—and should not.

With these powerful controls in force, criminology needs no standard-setting procedure from LEAA. Not many universities are going to provide instruction in criminology as a major subject, and the number of students receiving LEEP stipends will not be great. New procedures from Washington would only burden all concerned with requirements to meet and forms to execute before specified deadlines.

The training of justices is another matter. New schools are created with curricula that are new to many universities. Some schools may be established with the sole purpose of conducting criminal justice instruction, unattached to any institution of higher learning. The number of schools has mushroomed so rapidly as to create anxiety about the extent of the talent available to carry out the instruction. Strong measures are needed to prune back inadequate programs and to strengthen those that are promising, innovative, and responsibly administered. If experience with other professional instruction is our guide, the accreditation process for schools of criminal justice will be a permanent need.

I shall now turn to a definition of the problems that have to be faced in creating a system of accreditation and in maintaining its authority. For any discipline these problems are difficult, but they will be especially vexatious for criminal justice where so much has to be done so rapidly in a field in which expansion has been so prodigious.

### **Ambiguity and Accreditation**

It is natural for a new field of instruction to function in a swamp of ambiguity. The decision has been made that people must be prepared for professional service, but no one is sure which elements of knowledge must be taught if the future jurist is to perform effectively. The functions of the services for which students are to be prepared are in some doubt. Who can be sure in 1979 what probation and parole officers will be doing in 1989 and what they will need to know to do it well? Who can be sure that probation and parole will even exist in their present forms in 1989?

Even the well established professions of medicine, law, and engineering must adapt professional education to needs that were not foreseen a decade ago. The context of practice in each of the traditional professions has changed with scientific advance and social change. For the new disciplines, these difficulties are of a much greater magnitude. In this section I shall define these difficulties and attempt a resolution for each.

**Criteria for Entrance:** There must be a uniform level of required education for admission to professional studies. There has been a strong tendency in most professional disciplines to raise these requirements to the baccalaureate level. That prolongs the route to qualification for practice. In medicine the practitioner will be in his late twenties at the earliest before he is fully qualified for independent practice. Whether the gains from this tortuous journey are worth the cost to the student or to his future patients has never been convincingly demonstrated. Law, engineering, and even social work confront some of the same difficulties; the justification for the preliminary baccalaureate is at least dubious for each.

This issue will have to be settled for criminal justice education. There is no compelling reason to believe that only a person with four years of academic instruction under his belt can manage the materials he must learn. The requirement for more than successful completion of lower division courses in the humanities and the social sciences would be quite sufficient. It will be a refreshing change to institute a program for full professional qualification at the bachelor's degree level and, indeed, the availability of a credential at the end of four years may attract some desirable people who would prefer to get to work without years of enrollment in graduate school.

Although a two-year course of instruction will suffice for entrance level work in criminal justice, a plan for continuing education to meet the needs for professionals with advancing responsibilities should be provided for. The training afforded by some universities with the support of the National Institute of Corrections is an excellent model for further development and eventual standardization.

**The Qualification of Instructors:** Physicians teach medical students. Lawyers teach law students. Who will teach the justices? There is a lack of experienced court administrators, correctional managers, and police officials who are both competent and able to teach others to be competent. Most schools now solve this problem by luring active professionals to their faculties for a course or two taught on a part-time basis. This is a reasonable and often the only feasible solution to the problem, but to assume that even an outstanding practitioner can teach calls for an enormous leap of faith. An accreditation process must take account of this painfully critical situation by requiring that schools allow time for preparation of course material, consultation on subject matter on which the new instructor may not be adequately informed, and tactful supervision to assure that teaching methods are appropriate. Without these precautions, the teaching process becomes anecdotal, unsystematic, and, worst of all, unrelated to the objectives and content of the rest of the curriculum.

**Necessary Facilities:** Standards of space and library holdings are readily adapted from the standards applied in older professional schools and need not detain us here. What is at least as important is access to the realities of the station house, the courtroom, the detention facilities for juveniles, the probation and parole agencies, and the jails and prisons. Without regular and open relations with these examples of the real world in which the postulate jurist will practice, the school will provide a dry and irrelevant kind of instruction. It is not possible to specify field work courses for jurists—except for probation and parole officers—but as a student learns he must be in active contact with the kinds of problems he will have to solve and with the people who are coping with them. Under accreditation, it must be required that the school, its faculties and its students, have unrestricted access to all criminal justice facilities in the vicinity of the school. Where this access is closed off, something is wrong; at the least, the curriculum must be regarded as grossly inadequate. In such a case, accreditation should be denied.

**Criteria for Exit:** What does the jurist need to know and why does he need to know it? This is the most difficult problem of all. Physicians think they know what a student should have learned in medical school in order to practice safely and successfully; a medical school that cannot teach these essentials cannot be accredited. The same is true of law schools and schools of engineering. For the newer professions and for occupations aspiring to professional status, this question implies very serious difficulties. Teachers are uncertain what a good teacher can and should learn at a school of education. Even when they think they know, they find it hard to prove the connection between the knowledge and effective teaching. Social workers and librarians and public administrators all face comparable problems, and so will jurists.

There is no satisfactory solution to this problem except carefully examined experience that has not yet been accumulated. The professional societies should assist the school administrators in devising a generic curriculum on the completion of which a diploma will be awarded. At least, the jurist-to-be can be certain that what he is learning will be knowledge that the professions consider relevant and useful—even if he will encounter many practitioners who do quite well without any organized mastery of the jurist's syllabus.

Whatever body administers accreditation should assume responsibility for a continuing review of the relevance of curriculum content. That kind of review can only be credible if the work of jurists trained in criminal justice schools is systematically studied for effectiveness and competence. The exit criteria should consist of some demonstration of completion of studies considered essential. These criteria should assure a successful entrance into the field, but if they do not, new criteria must be formulated and tested.

**Accreditation Process:** If the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration decides on a process of accreditation administered by a professional society, it will be necessary to establish a commission on accreditation, the membership of which will consist of practitioners and educators who are well established in their fields. This commission should have a small administrative staff with the capability of

disseminating standards, training inspectors, and performing the tasks of certifying or denying approval. Its actions should be promptly reported to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for appropriate procedures on stipends and grants.

The American Bar Association operates an accrediting procedure in which the inspections that are critical to the decisions are carried out by volunteer teams, usually consisting of members of the bar, members of law faculties, and university administrators. The agenda for the inspecting teams are standardized for comparability and fairness. New schools must submit to two inspections within the first two years; established schools are inspected every seven years unless there are indications in annual reports that a special inspection should be made.

This plan works well for the 140 law schools in the country, all of which—with the peculiar exception of the California schools—have been involved for many years in the program. It has many attractive features—voluntariness, economy, extensive use of established members of the bar—which assure acceptance by the law schools and by the public. Modified to deal with the much larger number of schools of criminal justice, the absence of any accreditation process up to the present time, and the serious difficulty of obtaining agreement on entrance and exit criteria, the ABA structure of accreditation should be appropriate for emulation.

**Sanctions and Enforcement:** The older professions relate accreditation to licensure. No one can acquire a medical degree without graduation from an accredited medical school. No one can even sit for examination for a license to practice medicine without a medical degree. The same sanctioning system upholds the accreditation of legal education. No other sanctions are needed.

It will be impossible for many years to restrict criminal justice practice to those who have successfully completed professional education in a school of criminal justice. I am not sure that such a restriction is desirable. It would be a much healthier situation if accredited criminal justice education were seen as substantively so rich that justicians would feel handicapped without it. But whatever maintains the authority of the school, so long as LEEP stipends are related to accreditation, the process will receive compliance on account of the power of the sanction at its disposal, if not for any more substantial consideration.

The integrity of the system is by far the most important criterion for its success. If qualified and sincere people administer it for the purpose of maintaining a valid standard of education and then improving on that standard, the system will be truly respected for what it should be—an apparatus for assuring that young men and women interested in criminal justice careers get the best professional training that can be devised.

## Notes

1. Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, *Principles of Criminology*, 6th ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1960), p. 3.
2. Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, *The Subculture of Violence*. (London: Tavistock Publications, 1967), p. 30.
3. See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 23-24. The notion of "normal science" is essential to Kuhn's famous theory of scientific paradigm change. The assumption is that every science proceeds under a consensually accepted paradigm that governs research and hypothesis generation. So long as the paradigm successfully leads to a satisfactory solution to the puzzles that scientists try to solve, Kuhn thinks of the situation as one of *normal science*. But eventually a paradigm may be exhausted and the science may face a revolutionary change.
4. Wolfgang and Ferracuti, *op. cit.*, supra, n. 2 at p. 29.
5. See James Q. Wilson, *Thinking About Crime*. (New York: Basic Books, 1975), pp. 43-63. I particularly note the curiously naive idea that because most sociologists are liberal, most sociologists believe that everything is possible (p. 63). This opens up the entitlement to liberal credentials for a lot of sentimentalists whose liberalism is hardly in the tradition of Locke, Hume, Bentham, and Mill, to say nothing of the pragmatic liberalism characteristic of American political liberals up to the time of Kennedy and Johnson.
6. Gene Kassebaum, David Ward, and Daniel Wilner, *Prison Treatment and Parole Survival*. (New York: John Wiley, 1971)

## **Criminology and Criminal Justice: Definitions, Trends, and the Future**

### **The Second View**

Richard A. Myren

This paper is not being written in a vacuum. It has been stated quite frankly that:<sup>1</sup>

Although there is some differing opinion among scholars as to what each of these areas (crime, criminology, and criminal justice) includes, it is possible to understand each as an attempt to deal with boundary problems of the discipline. It is also possible to see these choices of titles for one's area of study as political decisions.

Involved are three kinds of politics: academic, criminal justice careerist, and general governmental politics. In real world terms, the stakes in the academic political controversy are without doubt the smallest, but they are definitely substantial in the scale of matters in which academics operate. The issue is control of what has been during the last decade the fastest growing area in the academic world. Table 1 indicates the development in terms of numbers of crime related programs in higher education since 1966:<sup>2</sup>

Table 1

<b>Growth in Number of Crime Related Programs in Higher Education: 1966-80</b>					
<b>Directory</b>	<b>Associate</b>	<b>Baccalaureate</b>	<b>Master's</b>	<b>Doctoral</b>	<b>Institutions</b>
1966-1967	152	39	14	4	184
1968-1969	199	44	13	5	234
1970-1971	257	55	21	7	292
1972-1973	505	211	41	9	515
1975-1976	729	376	121	19	664
1978-1980	1,209	589	198	24	816

This may well be the most rapid growth ever experienced in any substantive academic area in the history of higher education in the United States.

The academic political struggle is over whether crime related programs should remain in sociology, should be separate units denoted as criminology or criminal justice programs (departments, schools, or colleges), should be part of a public affairs program tied tightly to political science and public administration, or should be in some other setting (most frequently a vocational education unit). At stake is control over the faculty and staff, the student seats, and the physical facilities needed to implement the program. Intellectually, the battle is over whether the program should be vocational, professional, or behavioral/humanistic. Also at stake is a considerable amount of academic research and development money that has been available over the last decade and will probably continue to be available for the foreseeable future from both government agencies and private foundations. In at least one small four-year college, a majority of the student body was enrolled in the crime related program.<sup>3</sup> In both material and intellectual terms, the stakes in the academic controversy are high.

For criminal justice careerists, the academic controversy is also important. To the extent that the academic programs are under the control of sociology and psychology professionals, their emphasis will remain on individual persons convicted of crime or declared delinquent. Such programs relate most easily to crime prevention and correctional agencies in criminal and juvenile justice systems. They are not nearly as much at home with police (law enforcement), prosecution, and adjudication agencies and processes as are programs controlled by political science and public administration people. The now old-fashioned police science and correctional (penology) vocational programs also relate well to conventional police and correctional agencies that do not yet appreciate their role as elements of criminal and juvenile justice systems. At stake for the practitioner is grant and contract money for research in and development of the agency, membership in professional and scholarly societies, concern with the problems of the agency in the pages of professional and scholarly journals, and the prestige that comes from close association with academicians and academic programs. Also involved may be a second career in academic teaching or research after retirement from the agency. These are significant interests for at least the leadership groups among justice system careerists.

For general politicians seeking elective and appointive governmental posts, crime has been an issue of great importance in political campaigns for elective officers, ranging all the way from city mayor to president of the United States, and for many appointed officials. Police officers, prosecutors, and even judges, not to mention run-of-the-mill lay politicians, have, with great success, made crime control a central issue in their campaigns for elective office. Appointments as prosecutor, attorney general, and administrator of major justice system agencies have hinged on the view of candidates about crime control. Although it finally seems to be slipping,<sup>4</sup> crime control and safe streets have been the number one public issue for more than a decade. Again, at stake is political patronage, power, and

prestige, as well as control of extremely large budgets. The most recent reports on expenditure and employment data for the criminal justice system in the United States indicate that for 1976 total expenditure for criminal justice purposes was \$19.7 billion, up 14 percent over 1975, and that in October of 1976 there were 1,079,892 criminal justice public employees on a full-time equivalent basis.<sup>5</sup> Those numbers constitute a base for considerable political power.

It would be less than candid for this author not to indicate at least briefly the role that he has played in the controversy over whether crime related programs in higher education should be criminology or criminal justice. From 1952 to 1956, I was an assistant and associate research professor of public law and government at the Institute of Government at the University of North Carolina, specializing in the legal problems of the police officer on the street. During the ten years from 1956 to 1966, I was an assistant and associate professor in what was then the Department of Police Administration and is now the Department of Forensic Sciences at Indiana University, with a specialization that broadened to include the role of police agencies in the criminal justice systems and general government units of which they are an integral part. From 1966 to 1976, I was dean and professor at the School of Criminal Justice of the State University of New York at Albany. In 1976, I moved to the Center for the Administration of Justice, which became the School of Justice of the American University in May of 1978. There is expressed below a point of view, a position to which the author has been moved as the result of twenty-six years of professional experience in academic settings.

### **Definitions**

The academic field of criminal justice was in part a reaction to a particular view of sociological criminology and in part to vocational agency oriented police science and corrections programs. For that reason, it is important to note how at least some of those who were leaders in building the field of criminal justice viewed criminology in the first years of the decade of the sixties. The word criminology means simply the study of crime and, one might presume, anything related to crime. As late as 1976, however, Stephen Schafer stated that:

Criminology, in general terms, is the study of crimes, criminals, and victims. . . . Yet, as criminology is usually understood, its scope does not cover all phases of lawbreaking and all aspects of the crime problem. . . . *Criminal etiology* is one of the two major dynamic parts of criminology. It is the study of the causes or the precipitating or predisposing factors and producing elements of crime. . . . *Penology and correction* is the other dynamic part of criminology. It is the study of the consequences of crime; it analyzes how to change the lawbreaker to be a law-abiding member of society and how to repair the damage or harm caused to the victim of crime.

This is only one definition of sociological criminology, yet it is the one that led to establishment of what was seen as the broader academic field of criminal justice. After a worldwide study of the state of criminology, Sir Leon Radzinowicz wrote in 1961 that:<sup>7</sup>

Too much time is being spent, especially on the continent of Europe, in trying to construct an elaborate and exhaustive definition of criminology, in dividing and subdividing its various departments of interest, and in assigning to each of them a different title, while at the same time insisting that these various pursuits are interconnected and cannot be followed in isolation from each other.

He goes on to list twenty different terms in use as titles for crime related studies, a list that does not contain the phrase "criminal justice." Eventually, he gives what he seems to believe is the commonly accepted definition of criminology:<sup>8</sup>

Criminology, in its narrow sense, is concerned with the study of the phenomenon of crime and of the factors and circumstances—individual and environmental—which may have an influence on, or be associated with, criminal behavior and the state of crime in general.

He then goes on to make it clear that he personally prefers a broader concept:<sup>9</sup>

There remains the vitally important problem of combating crime. The systematic study of all the measures to be taken in the spheres of prevention (direct and indirect), of legislation, of the enforcement of the criminal law, of punishments and other methods of treatment, constitutes an indisputable and integral part of criminology. To rob it of this practical function is to divorce criminology from reality and render it sterile.

Radzinowicz concluded his survey of criminology in the United States with a lament:<sup>10</sup>

Whatever the reasons, it cannot but be regretted that in the very country which leads the way in the development of criminology and where recognition of its importance to the administration of criminal justice is so widespread, its study should be confined almost entirely to the departments of sociology . . .

Four years later, when completing a report commissioned by The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Radzinowicz had become aware of planning by the State of New York for a School of Criminal Justice,<sup>11</sup> which was formally established on March 11, 1965. Planning had begun in 1961. The first discovered use of the title "School of Criminal Justice" was in a memorandum dated March 18, 1963.<sup>12</sup> In his report to the Bar of the City of New York, Radzinowicz recommended the establishment of an institute of criminology and criminal justice in New York City.<sup>13</sup> That institute was never created, at least in part because of the rise of the SUNYA School of Criminal Justice.<sup>14</sup>

With approval of the concept in 1964, formal establishment in 1965, and beginning implementation in 1966, the SUNYA School of Criminal Justice can claim to have been the first major "criminal justice" program. In 1966, City University of New York changed the name of its college of Police Science to the John Jay College of Criminal Justice. American University established its Center

for the Administration of Justice in 1969, and in 1970 the Michigan State University School of Police Administration and Public Safety became the School of Criminal Justice. Many other programs have now followed suit.

To give context to the criminal justice rubric in its academic setting, the following definition was drafted:<sup>15</sup>

Criminal justice studies programs are integrated interdisciplinary sequences of scholarly teaching and research in the behavioral and social sciences (defined to include law and public administration) focused on the social problem of crime.

This definition caught on.<sup>16</sup> It was intended to include everything covered in traditional sociological criminology together with all of the crime related studies that criminology had left out. In effect, it took the expanded version of criminology advocated by Radzinowicz and gave it a new name—criminal justice.

There is always an element of the arbitrary in the organization of a new or newly assembled body of knowledge for purposes of study and teaching.<sup>17</sup> There is no "correct" approach, but some conceptual arrangements seem more successful than others. That sketched below is one of the oldest in criminal justice graduate study, having been used since 1968 at the School of Criminal Justice at the State University of New York at Albany.

In that program, the field is split into five sequences, each of which seems to have identifiable limits despite some inevitable overlap. The five sequences cover the nature of crime as a social problem, the reaction of organized society to that problem, the structure and operation of criminal justice systems as one of the primary control mechanisms used by society, accomplishment of planned change (individual, organizational, and social), and the design of methods used to implement research on the crime problem.

Drawing primarily on the content of psychology and sociology and using a blend of the approaches of those cognate disciplines, the sequence on the nature of crime looks at the phenomenon as one defined by society as being deviant, a departure from the social norm, despite the fact that crime is not always deviant in any scientific sense. It looks at the relationship of crime to other kinds of social deviance and that of deviance generally to conformity. Putting crime into this more general context seems to make it readily understood.

Society's reaction to crime has been both formal and informal. With industrial development and its resulting peculiar brand of impersonal interdependence, the role of formal governmental crime control measures has become increasingly important. These measures are almost always legal. Yet law remains only one of a variety of social control mechanisms. Its prominence does seem, however, to merit focus on legal measures, on their capacities and limitations, in our more general discussion of crime control efforts. For that reason, it is convenient to refer to this sequence as law and social control.

To the detriment of the effort, without a doubt society has placed principal reliance on the criminal law among all possible legal institutions for the control of

socially deviant behavior. That seems to justify special concentration on criminal justice systems in our higher educational efforts. In this discussion, a criminal justice system is defined as comprising those units of government that create and administer the criminal law. Speaking generally, this includes legislatures, planning agencies, the police, prosecutors, courts, and youth. It would also include specialized criminal justice information agencies and units such as the New York State Drug Abuse Control Commission. In studying criminal justice systems as systems, attention is given to the price paid for over reliance on the criminal sanction in dealing with social deviance. Stress is laid on the fact that not everything illegal must be made criminal.

In the hope that someday insights into the crime problem will lead to new ideas about control that merit trial, it is believed that the task of achieving planned change should also be studied by those seeking to become knowledgeable about crime as a social problem. There are a number of facets to that task: theory, strategy, and skills. In addition, one would predict that not only personal and organizational but broader general social change is necessary. Personal change has been the essence of our correctional philosophy; organizational change is necessary if agencies currently conceived solely as separate entities are to be redefined as system elements; and broader general social change is required if society is to develop the capacity to cope with, rather than be defeated by, the crime problem.

Study of each of these four substantive areas reveals a need for more and more reliable information, better ordering of what is known, and better analytical tools for interpretation of available knowledge. This defines a need for research. Perhaps the most difficult part of any research program is a definition of the problem in such a way that research is possible. Next comes design of the particular research approach to be used and then choice of the methods implementing the design. Research design and methodology must be learned both in separate courses concentrating on their content more or less as abstractions and in the context of more general study of the crime problem. New information leading to more meaningful insight is necessary in each of the problem-oriented substantive areas outlined above.

Because it is keyed to society's approach to an eternal although ever changing problem, control of crime, this new academic area has several objectives. Not only do these include a need to study the problem in order to develop new knowledge for knowledge's own sake, but also the need to generate new models for social policy and the structures and operational procedures necessary for implementation of those policies. This blend of the pure and the applied presents a new challenge to higher education in the social and behavioral sciences. At the same time, it presents a unique opportunity to establish a knowledge-generating system in which new models can be tested very quickly in the crucible of application. That testing will inevitably reveal flaws and lead to modification of the models that in turn can then be tried in the real world.

In carrying out this process of development of theory through testing in governmental and other social settings, academicians must recognize and work within the constraints of political systems. Social and behavioral scientists must

strive to be amoral and value-free while generating new knowledge but must then, when testing their models as scientists in a democratic society, take into consideration the morals and values of the system in which that testing is done. The difficulty of playing this role has been well delineated by Kalman H. Silvert in this passage:<sup>18</sup>

To expect . . . macrosocial problems to submit themselves to mere social scientific manipulation, or to think that the policy advice of social scientists is magically efficacious is a denial of the statesmen's art and a burdening of the social scientist with what he is incompetent to handle.

Under the very best of conditions, the social scientist can do the following for governments with his special skills:

- a. He can generate and make available new data.
- b. He can order these data to permit informed guessing about the nature of the lacunae.
- c. He can indicate relevant theoretical patterns for the interpretation of the data.
- d. He can—explaining himself carefully—indicate the probabilities of effectiveness of various elected courses of action.
- e. He can indicate which choices are foreclosed by the adoption of given courses of action.
- f. He can indicate which new choices will be made available by the adoption of given courses of action.

Needless to say, very few if any scholarly documents submitted to any government have satisfied these difficult requirements. The temptation to take the easy path straight from description to prescription is great. But to go past these limits is to assume a vested interest in the ensuing policy itself, thereby rendering the scholar suspect in further objective analysis.

This means that there must always be some distance between academics and practitioners and this distance leads to the almost inevitable dynamic tension between the two groups. The mutual obligation of each is to ensure that this tension is constructive rather than destructive. They must work together closely to achieve that goal. To stress the fact that their roles are different, yet intimately related, we might call the practitioners "justicians" and the academics "justiciologists."<sup>19</sup>

## **Trends**

There seems to be little doubt either that more crime related programs are being developed at educational institutions in the United States every year (see Table 1) or that these tend to be social science/humanistic in their orientation and criminal justice in their label.<sup>20</sup> Although the IACP statistics go back only to 1966, that trend is at least two decades old.

In content, the programs are moving from an agency orientation (usually police or corrections), or from an orientation toward etiology and penology, toward scientific

study of all facets of criminal justice systems. It is broadly recognized that an agency orientation is too narrow. Police and other law enforcement agencies share the police function with prosecution, adjudication (it is in reality courts that enforce the law, that apply sanctions to individual violators), and correctional agencies. The same can be said of the corrections function. In turn, all justices should know something of the etiology of crime just as justiciologists must be concerned with "the vitally important problem of combating crime." Each is a different facet of the same problem that must be conceptually related just as it is functionally related to the others. Criminal justice programs in higher education must retain this broad approach.

This does not mean that particular professors should not become specialists in specific problem areas, but the context of the segment on which their research is focused must be kept in mind. It is also recognized that particular justices will become specialized and work on specific problems in specific agencies for long periods of time. But there too, the context of their work is a vitally important variable not to be lost sight of. Our programs in higher education provide a basis for both. Undergraduate curricula in particular must be general. Specialization is warranted at the graduate level and in the specialized training and self study that every careerist must continue after completion of his formal education to remain abreast of his field. Dedication to a career is also dedication to a lifelong educational effort. The comparatively short period of formal higher education simply lays the base for the lifelong task of continuing self-education.

Sometimes the controversy over whether crime related programs in higher education should be "criminology" or "criminal justice" in orientation becomes an argument about the proper role of practice in the development of theory. Nathan Glazer, professor of education and sociology at Harvard University's Graduate School of Education, considered that issue for the social sciences generally in a recent essay. His concluding paragraphs seem worth setting out in full.<sup>21</sup>

Is the profession being corrupted by disciplinary theory and moving away from its true objectives? Is the discipline being corrupted by practice? I would argue neither of these things. I think a necessary adaptation of the social science disciplines to a changing world is taking place, a world increasingly created by law, regulation, judgment, and large organization, as against the atomic action of individuals and small organizations. On the whole this is a healthy development. There is to my mind an aridity to the endless examination of the writings of the masters. Undoubtedly certain things in the social world are relatively unchanging, and in that there is a necessary balance in how far one carries them, and the enormous effort of young social scientists to "save" and "apply" Marx or some other master, in sociology, political science, and economics, has something farcical about it. This is something from which the professions are more likely to be saved: It is not their style. But then one can make the opposite criticism: The concentration on the world as it is and how to act in it is also narrowing and deadening. The larger perspectives generally provided by the disciplines bring in air and light.

I would argue, finally, that there are reasons beyond the merely practical for the professional perspective to infuse disciplinary study. The disciplines, after all, in some respect must model the real world and must be compared to it. When the internal development of a discipline is too fully based on those issues most centrally identified with it, the discipline has placed at too great a distance its ultimate objects of study: man and society as they actually exist.

Marvin Wolfgang has pointed out that practice can be either scientific or nonscientific:<sup>22</sup>

May we legitimately include "corrections" or "penology" under our meaning of criminology? The answer should probably be negative if by "corrections" is meant the social work activities of probation and parole officers, the organization and administrative functions of the police, or the management of penal institutions. The answer should be affirmative, however, if we mean, as previously indicated, the scientific analysis, measurement, and interpretation of patterns, regularities, causal or associational relationships and probabilities of the same subareas of criminology.

Ideally, the world of practice should be engaged in the testing of scientific theories of crime control and rehabilitative practice in situations in which scientific evaluation of the result is automatic. That evaluation will, in turn, enlighten what future policy should be. Such a procedure would seem to fall within Wolfgang's view of criminology, yet Nathan Glazer reminds us:<sup>23</sup>

As soon as one begins to consider what is good policy, one has already broken out of the shell of a discipline, which looks at one abstract side of any issue, because policy must include everything relevant to something working; not only, for example, the "function" of poverty in a society, but how one reduces it: at that point, economics and political science becomes as relevant as sociology—or more so.

Substitute "crime" for "poverty" and Glazer has in fact described what happened to crime related studies in higher education in the late sixties and early seventies. Those programs have moved and are still moving from narrow disciplinary and nonscientific orientations to a scientific and scholarly integrated interdisciplinary approach. In the final analysis, it doesn't make much difference whether a well-rounded program of this kind is labeled criminal justice or criminology, although use of the latter term does beg confusion with the narrower etiology and penology oriented brand of sociological criminology defined by Schafer and Radzinowicz above. That possible confusion is avoided by using the label criminal justice.

Although the trend toward programs that are criminal justice both in content and in name is strong, the situation will doubtless remain fluid for some time to come. Some of the older vocationally-oriented police science and corrections programs still exist and may well continue to buck the national trend for many years. Sociology departments will continue to be concerned with etiology and penology under the rubric of criminology narrowly defined. Both of these older kinds of

programs will continue to exist side by side with the separately structured and administered criminal justice programs. The issue is not one of quality. Each of these kinds of programs has individual representatives ranging all the way from excellent to very bad. Fortunately, current emphasis nationally is on improvement of quality.<sup>24</sup> Unfortunately, there are times when discussions about the relationships between criminology and criminal justice programs become reminiscent of discussions earlier in other fields.

The bastions of U.S. science and technology—the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering—are snarling at each other these days. . . . At issue between the two groups is the engineers' demand for a bigger voice in the National Research Council, which, since its founding in 1916, has been very much the creature of the National Academy of Sciences. Back in 1964 when the National Academy of Engineering was set up, it, too, was supposed to have the National Research Council as its "operating arm." But the engineers' influence in the council has been blocked. . . . A basic charge that the engineers level against the NAS and the Research Council is that the scientists persist in developing impractical solutions to the problems they investigate. And the scientists, naturally, charge that the engineers are always too ready to grasp at current knowledge for quick answers.<sup>25</sup>

Prevention of this kind of "snarling" might well be one of the principal mandates for the future.

### Future

What the future will bring to criminal justice and criminology programs in higher education is an unknown. Perhaps the most recent attempt to divine the answers using current social science methodology rather than a crystal ball is that of Gordon Misner.<sup>26</sup> The questions of some relevance to this discussion were answered by between 535 and 538 individual members of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. When asked to indicate their disagreement (0) or agreement (10) on a 10 point scale, the following means resulted for the listed statements:

Arts and Sciences will be the most common setting for justice programs in ten years	6.67
Principal orientation will be toward cognate fields or disciplines	6.90
Cognate fields will still be the principal source for new faculty	6.46
Graduate criminal justice programs will be the best source for faculty	7.29
Doctorates will be required for teaching at the community college level	4.50
Doctorates will be required for teaching on the four-year level	8.02

Doctorates will be required for teaching on the graduate level	9.60
Research will be a program commitment on the community college level	3.98
Research will be a program commitment on the four-year level	6.29
Research will be a program commitment on the graduate level	7.68

These results do not seem to indicate that there will be any significant change in current trends over the next decade.

It might well be more interesting to speculate about the new trends that may appear within the next ten years, which might possibly become significant within the next generation. For that purpose, consider the following set of definitions suggested recently by L. Richard Meeth.<sup>27</sup>

In spite of many efforts to define interdisciplinary studies, the answers continue to confuse more often than satisfy. At the risk of adding to the confusion but in the hope of clarifying the debate, we propose here a new set of definitions. . . .

We might think of courses as occupying various levels on an interdisciplinary pyramid. *Cross disciplinary* is the next level after intradisciplinary, which forms the base of the continuum. Cross disciplinary is viewing or observing one discipline from the perspective of another. . . . Cross-disciplinary programs are the easiest to develop because they allow faculty to remain in their own disciplines, while adopting only what is applicable from another.

*Multidisciplinary* goes a level higher. It involves several disciplines focused on one problem or issue—the juxtaposing of disciplines, each of which offers a different perspective on a common question or theme. . . . Multidisciplinary courses require the student to do the integrating, and the best structured of these teach students how, recognizing that integration is a skill to be learned, not a natural ability.

. . . The fundamental difference between multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary, in practice at least, is that interdisciplinary programs attempt to integrate the contributions of several disciplines to a problem, issue, or theme from life. . . .

The highest level of integrated study is transdisciplinary, which is not of the disciplines at all. Transdisciplinary means beyond the disciplines. Whereas interdisciplinary programs start with the discipline, transdisciplinary programs start with the issue or problem and, through the processes of problem solving, bring to bear the knowledge of those disciplines that contributes to a solution or resolution.

Transdisciplinary programs are certainly the most difficult to teach. Professors and students must know not only the techniques of problem solving but also where to search among the disciplines for contributions.

Accepting this set of definitions, one might argue that criminology began as an intradisciplinary area within sociology that quickly became cross-disciplinary and then was moved by leaders such as Radzinowicz and Wolfgang through a multidisciplinary to an interdisciplinary approach. During that development, the name changed to a large extent to criminal justice with the issue or theme from life on which the programs now tend to concentrate being the nature, organization, and operation of our criminal and juvenile justice systems.

If the field is to move in the future to its "highest level" by becoming transdisciplinary, why shouldn't the issue or problem on which it concentrates become simply the concept of justice? Isn't crime only one form of injustice? Why should we fragment the study of justice into civil, criminal, juvenile, and social? Aren't all of these so interrelated and intertwined as to make separation impossible? Juvenile justice has generally been subsumed under criminal; both crime and delinquency have been widely regarded as symptoms of social injustice. It would seem that programs organized as departments, schools, or colleges focusing on the concept of justice and systems for its achievement might well be the future evolutionary stage of our current criminology and criminal justice programs.

During the past decade, it has been recognized that focus on both individual criminals and their careers and on individual criminal justice agencies is too narrow. Programs were expanded to a systems view and approach, concentrating on criminal justice systems as entities responding to the social problem of crime. Hardly had the field made that transition before the realization dawned that individual agencies were a part not only of criminal justice systems but of legal, political, economic, and social systems as well, none of which are congruent. It is not enough to focus on agencies as parts of criminal justice systems; they must be regarded as units in a complex system of systems. One result of this realization is that one of the focuses of our new justice studies programs must be on agencies as they operate as an integral part of a number of systems.

Although the field might well become justice studies taught in departments, schools, and colleges of justice, the process might actually be development in our studies of an acute *Sense of Injustice*.<sup>28</sup> One form that injustice might take is victimization through criminal acts. Crime is a crucial form of injustice. Its definition and control are important social problems. They justify and demand study of criminal justice in a school of justice. But there is also a great deal of civil injustice that merits attention: problems of pollution and economic exploitation not being the least among them. These also demand attention in tomorrow's school of justice. Juvenile justice systems are a blend of civil and criminal, having jurisdiction over behavior that would be criminal if engaged in by an adult, and over some that would not. In addition to forms of injustice that end up in civil, criminal, and juvenile justice systems, there are many other forms of social injustice that do not result in the initiation of formal remedial processes such as those of that triad of systems. Instead, they are handled informally by the culture of the home, the church, the school, the work group, or the social peer group. Such sources of injustice become important to justice studies in a school of justice as a context in

which the more formally recognized kinds of injustice exist. They help set the boundary for central concerns of a school of justice: those kinds of injustice that result in formal processing of those responsible by our civil, criminal, and juvenile justice systems.

One way to make speculation about the nature of a school of justice more concrete is to attempt to differentiate its nature from a school of criminology or criminal justice, a school of social work, a school of law, and a school of government and public administration. Schools of justice will simply be broader than schools of criminology and criminal justice, covering matters that end up in the civil justice system, as well as the criminal and juvenile systems. The civil justice system is defined for this purpose to include not only the traditional civil court structure but the entire administrative agency and court structure as well. Schools of justice will be differentiated from those for social work by the fact that they concentrate on those forms of injustice that result in persons being processed by the civil, criminal, and juvenile court systems. Schools of justice will not be educating persons for the practice of law as do schools of law. Although justice studies will include courses *about* the nature and function of law and legal systems, these courses will not be *in* law. In recognition of the fact that some 85 percent of most law practice deals with business transactions, the curricula of law schools are also heavily weighted toward those matters. The education of law students is much more concerned with what is legal than with what is not. Again, schools of justice will teach students about government and public administration as those arts and sciences are used in justice systems.

One can make a strong argument for adding civil justice to the concerns of our current schools of criminology and criminal justice to complete the curriculum of future transdisciplinary schools of justice. Our federal and (where they exist) state departments of justice are concerned with both civil and criminal justice. It became apparent in administration of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the U.S. Department of Justice that problems of our court system did not separate neatly into the categories of civil and criminal. Research on topics such as use of the criminal sanction in regulation of business and industry also highlights very quickly the inseparable intertwining of civil and criminal. In belated recognition of that fact, the current reauthorization bill for LEAA is called the Justice System Improvement Act of 1978.<sup>29</sup> Perhaps the controversy over whether the field should be criminology or criminal justice will be settled by moving beyond both of them to center on the simple concept of justice.

## Notes

1. Carl B. Klockars, "White Collar Crime," in Edward Sagarin and Fred Mantanino (eds.), *Deviance: Voluntary Actors in a Hostile World*. (New York: General Learning Press, 1977), p. 237.
2. Richard W. Kobetz, *Criminal Justice Education Directory, 1978-80*. (Gaithersburg, Md.: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1978), p. 1.
3. To prevent unnecessary embarrassment, the college will not be named. The author will discuss the matter with anyone having a legitimate interest in documentation.
4. An article in the July 27, 1978 *Washington Post* (p. A 4, c. 6) by George Gallup indicates that by October 1977 crime and lawlessness had already slipped to sixth place in public concern behind the high cost of living and inflation, unemployment, the energy situation, international problems and foreign policy, and race relations. In July 1978, race relations had slipped to seventh place and moral decline and religion had joined dissatisfaction with government in a tie for fourth place with crime and lawlessness.
5. U.S. Department of Justice/U.S. Department of Commerce, *Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System 1976*. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. ix.
6. Stephen Schafer, *Introduction to Criminology*. (Reston, Va.: Reston Publishing Company, Inc., 1976), p. 3.
7. Leon Radzinowicz, *In Search of Criminology*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 167.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
9. *Id.*
10. *Ibid.*, p. 162.
11. Leon Radzinowicz, *The Need for Criminology and a Proposal for an Institute of Criminology*. (London: Heineman, 1965), pp. 3, 4.
12. See Richard A. Myren, *State University of New York at Albany School of Criminal Justice: Establishment, Initial Faculty Planning, Development and Maturation*. (Albany: SUNYA School of Criminal Justice, 1976) (Mimeo, 58 pp.)

13. Radzinowicz is not consistent in his terminology. As indicated in note 10 above, the term Institute of Criminology appears in the title of the report. He first uses the term institute of criminology and criminal justice on page 84. It appears again on page 88. In the actual list of suggestions beginning on page 89, it becomes an Institute of Criminology and the Administration of Criminal Justice, but is referred to later in the list as a Criminological Institute (page 90).

14. *Op. cit. supra*, n. 11 at pp. 14-18.

15. Richard A. Myren, "Criminal Justice Studies and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences." (Presidential Address, Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, March 1973.) As indicated in the address, this definition had actually been coined several years earlier.

16. Gordon E. Misner, "Criminal Justice Education: A National Profile." (Draft, 1978.)

17. The next nine paragraphs first appeared in this form in Richard A. Myren, "Nature of the Criminal Justice Doctorate" (an essay read and discussed at the Conference on Key Issues in Criminal Justice Doctoral Education in Omaha on 21-23 October 1975), p. 207.

18. Kalman H. Silvert, "American Academic Ethics and Social Research Abroad," *American Universities Field Staff Reports Service: West Coast South America Series*. Vol. XII, No. 3, July 1965.

19. Many sources converged during the development of these ideas during the past twelve years. The discussions among colleagues at SUNY Albany, though heated at times, were always enlightening. One of the most influential written arguments was that of Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti in the first two chapters, "The Meaning of Integration" and "Criminology as an Integrating Discipline," in *The Subculture Violence: Toward an Integrated Theory in Criminology*. (London: Social Science Paperbacks, 1967), pp. 1-94. See also Earl J. McGrath, "Interdisciplinary Studies: An Integration of Knowledge and Experience," *Change*, Vol. 10, No. 7, August 1978, pp. 6-9. Anyone can take credit for what he or she sees as good in the concepts discussed in this paper; the author will take the blame for all that is judged bad.

20. See Misner, *op. cit. supra* n. 16 at p. 37; Richard Pearson, *Criminal Justice Education: The End of the Beginning—Summary of Methods and Findings*. (An

exploratory study conducted by a Planning Group at John Jay College of Criminal Justice with counsel and assistance from an Advisory Committee of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, February 1978.) pp. 4-5.

21. Nathan Glazer, "Theory and Practice in the Social Sciences," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. #L July 1978, p. 28.

22. Wolfgang and Ferracuti, *op. cit. supra* n. 19 at p. 25.

23. *Op. cit. supra*, n. 21.

24. See Bassi, L. and Rogers, R. H., "The Road to Accreditation," *Journal of Criminal Justice*. 1976, 4.

25. Research Commentary, "The Battle to Control U.S. Science Policy," *Business Week*, March 18, 1972, p. 39.

26. *Op. cit. supra*, n. 16.

27. L. Richard Meeth, "Interdisciplinary Studies," *Change*. Vol. 10, No. 7, August 1978, p. 10.

28. Edmond N. Cahn, *The Sense of Injustice: An Anthropocentric View of Law*. (New York: New York University Press, 1949.)

29. Message from Jimmy Carter, President of the United States, dated July 10, 1978, sending to the Congress of the United States the Justice System Improvement Act of 1978.

**END**