


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A Study to Improve Evaluative Information Utilization at LEAA

Volume II

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A STUDY TO IMPROVE EVALUATIVE
INFORMATION UTILIZATION AT LEAA

Volume II

Edited by Charlene Potter
Research Triangle Institute

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ACQUISITIONS

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I. INTRODUCTION

This volume contains the Evaluation Findings Summary completed for each of 33 documents selected for case study under Task 2 of Contract J-LEAA-005-7, entitled Evaluation Utilization Study. With the exception of the discussion of actual utilization contained in Section F of each evaluation findings summary, these summaries were prepared prior to our interviews with LEAA staff. RTI reviewers completed the summaries according to the guidelines included as attachment A to this volume. For convenience, the summaries are presented by functional area.

In order to remain consistent with our case study approach and to meet the needs of evaluation policy planners, we have presented our findings regarding actual utilization separately for each document reviewed. However, this approach may lead to faulty assumptions and conclusions unless viewed from a broader perspective. On the basis of content analysis of various documents and memoranda and consideration of interviewers' reports, we have found that a given document, taken alone, may be considered practically worthless. The same report, considered in relation to documents addressing the same substantive issues, may appear as a prime example of effective utilization. This situation was most prevalent in the enforcement and adjudication areas where, in the words of one respondent: "Several separate studies often build upon one another, and a group of related studies may hold more utilization potential than any single study."

We contend that a staff member faced with a particular decision will digest every available piece of information pertaining to the issue under consideration. It is unrealistic to assume that the body of knowledge acquired can be retrospectively separated into the original components.

Several methods were available for reporting actual utilization in the evaluation findings summaries. In Volume I of this report, evaluation utilization has been conceptualized in terms of "utility classes;" however, we have noted that an individual evaluation may hold

significance in regard to multiple classes of use. Furthermore, much valuable qualitative information obtained through unstructured interviews is irretrievable using the utility class method of reporting. Therefore, in each evaluation findings summary, actual utilization of evaluation study products is presented in "bullet" form. These brief statements are designed to retain a maximum of the original interviewees' comments, without transgressing our commitment of confidentiality. This reporting procedure offers the advantage of allowing further analysis of varying conceptions of utilization of a particular document within different offices and divisions of LEAA.

Although evaluation findings summaries were not completed for each of the 45 documents originally selected for case study, RTI interviews with LEAA staff were based on the total list. Therefore, we have included information concerning utilization of additional studies.

Because many of the evaluation studies reviewed were from the National Evaluation Program, Phase I, one final introductory comment is needed. An NEP Phase I evaluation study produces a series of detailed reports. Only the Phase I Executive Summary was reviewed by RTI prior to interviews with potential users. It is possible that much more valuable evaluative information is present in volumes other than the summary. However, only the summaries were discussed in the interviews and none of those interviewed about Phase I NEP studies call our attention to the greater utility of the other volumes.

II. PREVENTION

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Citizen Patrol Projects

A. Descriptive Abstract

This study identified over 200 resident patrols in 16 urban areas. Such patrols involve situations in which residents themselves patrol or hire guards to patrol a residential area, maintaining some surveillance routine to the exclusion of their occupational activities. Some patrols cover neighborhood sections, with members driving cars and maintaining contact through citizen band radios. Other patrols cover specific buildings or projects, with members stationed at a building entrance and monitoring passage by strangers into and out of the building.

The field interviews and review of existing literature on patrols revealed that patrol activities are difficult to document and have not undergone formal evaluation. Nevertheless, the preliminary evidence suggested that resident patrols can serve as a potentially effective deterrent to residential crime, require small amounts of money to be operated, and generally enjoy good support from local police as well as other residents. Almost all of the resident patrols were oriented toward reducing residential crime rather than, as in the past, toward dealing with civil disorders. Although patrol members occasionally took to harassing residents and other dysfunctional behavior (especially in periods of boredom), little evidence was found that contemporary patrols engage in much vigilante-like behavior.

The study concludes by recommending further research, both evaluative and nonevaluative, regarding the patrols. For example, the legal status of patrol members and their legal liabilities for causing harm or inconvenience to other citizens are unknown. The study reaches no firm conclusion with respect to recommending LEAA or other federal support for patrols (which were generally not currently supported by public funds), but if such support is initiated, the study suggests several ways in which the support might be efficiently provided.
(Authors' Abstract)

B. Methodology

The study utilized a literature review, fieldwork and interviews. The literature review is not included in the text; a bibliography is. Four months of fieldwork were undertaken in 16 sites on 226 patrols. A patrol profile was gathered on 109 of the patrols (these were done by phone or in person with some responsible member of the group). The interviews were organized around "key words" (not included), protocols

are not included, nor is the number of interviewers or fieldworkers involved, how long they stayed, how many people were actually interviewed (they state that "400 persons were contacted" but do not explain what this means in informational terms). Sites were selected from among the group of cities that were in either the fifteen largest cities, LEAA impact cities or cities in which victimization surveys have been conducted. Once in the cities, an ingenious method was used to identify and contact patrol groups (basically a kind of referral network was used). The extant studies (from which they draw no conclusion or inferences), 109 profiles and 32 narratives on patrol projects that they apparently studied in depth, were used to form a typology of four kinds of patrols (building, neighborhood, social service and community protection patrols. Some quantitative (mostly demographic) data are presented, but primarily it is qualitative, and is termed an "exploratory study."

C. Findings and Conclusions

On the basis of identifying 226 patrols in these urban areas, they estimate that there could be as many as 8-900 in urban areas over 250,000. Patrols last, on the average, 4-5 1/2 years, more than half cease to operate within four years, and less than 15 percent survive for more than 10. Patrols can be found in all income levels in both white and racially-mixed neighborhood patrols and the rest were evenly divided between building and service patrols. Some variation was found by geographic region. Paid groups were smaller (under 20), while volunteer groups ranged from under 25 to over 75 members. Only six groups had financial support from LEAA, but most patrols are carried out without any direct support from public sources.

Contemporary patrols vary widely in cost, but most are operated on a small budget and on a volunteer basis. The major expenditures are related not to weapons, but to citizen-band radios and other communications equipment, uniforms, gasoline and maintenance for patrol cars, and the administrative costs of maintaining records and files. Most of the patrols, other than those organized by public housing authorities, receive no public financial support (page 29). They suggest that building patrols are effective, but present no data to support this; neighborhood patrols are controversial, and they did not feel they had adequate data to evaluate the effect of community protection or social service patrols. They argue that public housing patrols differ in that perpetrators may be among the residents, and the patrols do not serve exclusively to control access to outside "intruders." These patrols may ease police community relations by mediating encounters between the police and community members. They also conclude that several implementation factors influence a patrol's ability to operate and to achieve its goals: personnel, organizational affiliation and degree of bureaucratization. Those with neighborhood affiliations and more bureaucratized groups were more effective in their judgement.

D. Program/Policy Implications

The authors urge further evaluation research on community patrols, and suggest several possible approaches. The authors do not state whether government support should be given (they do not wish to make such a recommendation on the basis of this study), but suggest some of the conditions under which governmental support would be most effective (pp. 32-34) e.g., should be funded through tenants' association, training should be funded, should aid the development of rational bureaucratic procedures. No recommendations concerning crime or crime prevention are made.

E. Critique of Quality, Usability, and Utility

Since there is an executive summary, it is difficult to say whether the findings reported here are adequately supported by data. It is unlikely that many of the claims made are supported, since they state them very tentatively, especially those they call "patrol outcomes" (see C, above). It is not possible to present data on whether the patrols reduce crime, increase citizen security, or improve police-citizen relations, since these are areas where no "hard" data have been gathered, or where the questions asked are essentially value judgements. They are appropriately cautious about the findings, and term the study a "case study" and an "exploratory study." It is not clear that this is an evaluation study. It has not evaluated an LEAA function; it has only described these patrols. Thus, their recommendations on future evaluation research do not seem to follow. It is not clear what would be evaluated by future research on these community patrols. Their effect on crime, or crime prevention, is hardly touched on here, and since they have no base line data on crime prior to the patrols, nor at present, it is unlikely they could make any inferences about this question.

2. The deficiencies of the research are implied, rather than obvious. I suspect (a) that the fieldwork was not systematic (one does not know how many people were at each site for how long, what they were doing with whom, and to what end), (b) that the interviews were very uneven, (c) that they had difficulty in finding groups, and (d) that their partial reports (109 of 226 interviews) with 400 people are signs of a less than successful project. These are speculations, but the authors do not very well explain the anomalies. Their partial success in the field was not discussed.

3. The study lacks any conceptual or theoretic basis, or a frame of reference. There is no indication why one should study these patrols, for what reasons they bear on crime, crime control or prevention, how they related to social organization, social change, police actions, community dynamics, etc. No connections are drawn between this work

and the literature on vigilantism, collective behavior and rebellion, etc., e.g., the work of Hobbsbawn, Gurr, Turner and Killian, etc. For example, the obvious functional consequences and differences implied in patrols composed of hired guards vs. those composed of volunteers were not brought out or indeed discussed at all. No theoretic questions are asked, no hypotheses advanced, and purely descriptive data are included. On the other hand, they are very modest in describing the study, make no recommendations, and say little of any importance about issues of crime.

4. (see 3, above).

5 and 6. I do not see this report as having much overall use in LEAA policy or planning. However, numbers 11 (planning future research and evaluation), 13 (future evaluation measures) and 14 (methodology needs identified) may be appropriate. The strongest case is made here for the need for more refined fieldwork in gathering information on these sorts of groups, for developing better measures of their functioning and impact, and seeing if in fact they do increase citizen security, reduce crime, increase citizen solidarity and morale and the like.

F. Utilization

Although direct utilization (or lack of utilization) could not be ascertained from our interviews, RTI interviewers received indication that findings from this Phase I NEP should serve as general state-of-the-art information for action program staff concerned with the enforcement area. According to LEAA staff, past evaluation studies in the prevention area have not been a significant factor in the development of programs in community crime prevention.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Operation Identification Projects: Assessment of Effectiveness NEP Phase I Summary Report

A. Descriptive Abstract

This report presents a summary of a judgmental and empirical assessment of Operation Identification (O-I). The assessment is based upon both the past findings of other evaluators and project performance data collected during this study. Contained in this report are selected portions of a larger report, which examines in detail both the effectiveness and the validity of the basic O-I project activities, the underlying assumptions linking those activities, and the intermediate and ultimate objectives of the O-I concept. Readers desiring more detail may refer to the main report, "Phase I Evaluation of Operation Identification, Assessment of Effectiveness".

This report is divided into three sections. The first section defines the kinds of property-marking programs assessed, describes a simple O-I project model used to organize the assessment results, and identifies the information sources used. The second section summarizes the major assessment findings and presents an overview assessment of Operation Identification in terms of the costs and resources expended for O-I projects and the overall benefits of the concept to the community. The final section presents an assessment of the future of O-I programs.

B. Methodology

1. Review of general knowledge and past findings from background material, past research, historical development, expert opinion about the role and usefulness of O-I as a burglary prevention concept, and past findings of other researchers about the implementation and evaluation of specific O-I projects.
2. Telephone survey of 99 ongoing O-I projects. Two groups of projects were surveyed, namely:
 - a. stratified sample of 78 representative projects selected on the basis of geographic location, population, and degree of urbanization of the target area, and
 - b. 21 special projects, each selected because of an unusual project feature.
3. On-site visits to 18 of the O-I projects contacted in the telephone survey to validate the results of the telephone survey, obtain more precise information about the operation of particular O-I projects, and more accurately identify the similarities of and the differences between O-I projects.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. O-I projects have been unable to recruit more than a minimal number of participants in their target areas.
2. The recruitment cost per participant for an O-I project is quite high (median project cost of \$4 per household) not counting donated promotional resources and manpower.
3. O-I participants have significantly lower burglary rates after joining as compared to before joining.
4. Cities with O-I projects have not experienced reductions in city-wide burglary rates.
5. No evidence exists to indicate that O-I produces any increase in either the apprehension or conviction of burglars.
6. The presence of O-I markings does not significantly reduce the opportunities to dispose of stolen property.
7. There is no indication that O-I markings appreciably increase either the recovery or return of stolen property.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. In the absence of large amounts of funding and participation incentives, the outlook for future O-I recruitment is not very good.
2. So long as the possibility of burglary displacement exists, either to other targets or to other types of crime, the future assessment of O-I as a burglary deterrent will remain very much in doubt.
3. Without improvement in (a) police property systems, and (b) means of owner identification, there is little reason to be hopeful that any property recovery benefits will be realized from O-I in the near future.
4. The most positive use of O-I to date has been to "sell" crime prevention to the public; O-I has value in promoting police-community relations (PCR).
5. If the burglary deterrence and property recovery goals of O-I are ever achieved, the public information and PCR value of O-I are extra benefits that will serve to further enhance the project. If, on the other hand, O-I does not achieve its two primary objectives, then the public education and PCR benefits, although useful, may not justify its cost to the community when outside funding support ceases.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

This report is brief, clearly written, and well organized. It identifies the key issues and assesses what is currently known about them. Sources of the information on which it is based are identified; there is a bibliography of 48 items. It has utility and relevance for anyone interested in the experience accumulated regarding O-I. It reviews the evidence supporting the findings and provides plausible explanations for the observed failures or successes.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization

This report should be utilized by decision-makers concerned with the future of O-I, its continuation or otherwise, modifications which might be feasible, and the assessment of its benefits in relation to its costs. It should also be utilized by those who may be considering the implementation of an O-I program. The report should also have exemplary value for those who have an interest in program evaluation and assessment, and in the summary presentation of evaluation results.

Actual Utilization

Operation ID evaluation results have not been utilized because the data collected was not sufficient to verify program success. Potential users of the study made an assumption of failure of the program concept. This type of reaction exemplifies a problem characteristic of all Phase I NEP's: the studies were intended as data gathering devices, not as the basis for definitive evaluation judgments. Potential users, primarily the enforcement area action staff, note that definitive conclusions are needed. Furthermore, action priorities have centered on other issues.

NILECJ

- The study represents a misapplication of NEP. Study findings have not contributed to further research and evaluation.

OCJP:

- Evaluations generally are utilized only as support for someone's "pet project." Evaluation findings which prove unfavorable to a popular program are often ignored. One staff person referred to Operation ID as a "negative results study" which had no deleterious effects on the high priority program evaluated.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Citizen Crime Reporting Projects
NEP Phase I Summary Report

A. Descriptive Abstract

This report summarizes the current state of knowledge about projects that encourage citizens to report suspicious/criminal activities to law enforcement agencies. It represents the results of an eight month research study conducted for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) as part of its National Evaluation Program (NEP). Contained in this summary report of Citizen Crime Reporting Projects (CCRPs) are: (a) a description of project types; (b) a framework presenting the place CCRPs occupy in the criminal justice system; (c) an assessment of the current state of knowledge regarding the effort and impact of CCRPs; and (d) judgmental recommendations for future CCRP efforts.

From a theoretical perspective CCRPs have an important role in the criminal justice system since most activities in this system can be traced back to citizen reports. It is also clear that many communities are investing much effort in CCRP activities. Of greater importance is the fact that citizens are responding to these efforts by attending meetings, using special telephone numbers to report crimes and opening their homes to their neighbors. Since CCRPs are community oriented, they potentially can impact on such problems as poor police-community relations, lack of community cohesiveness, and reduce unrealistic fear of crime. CCRPs offer one of the few opportunities to do something positive about crime. Unfortunately, the lack of well designed CCRP evaluation studies does not allow us to draw any firm conclusions regarding the effectiveness of CCRPs.

Given the general lack of good quantifiable data, the judgment of project operators and experts in the area of crime prevention take special importance. The majority feel that their activities are increasing the number of crimes reported. Experts were almost unanimously positive in their evaluation of CCRPs.

B. Methodology

1. Potentially relevant CCRPs were identified, resulting in 130 projects qualified for the survey. Of these, 100 project sites were selected to receive the CCRP project questionnaire. Questionnaires were returned by 78 sites.
2. The twenty-three page questionnaire consisted of 62 multistage questions. Information was collected about projects in the

following eight questionnaire categories: organization; budget and background; staff efforts; assistance; program goals; detailed program activities; crime statistics; citizen and community information; and evaluation.

3. Twenty-nine experts on citizen involvement in crime prevention and CCRPs were interviewed by telephone.
4. Twenty site visits to CCRPs were made, in which more than 75 persons were interviewed.
5. Questionnaire responses were coded and prepared for computer analysis.
6. A file was established for each project, including all relevant records and information.
7. An advisory committee of eight persons was selected from among the experts and project directors previously contacted in telephone interviews or site visits. The committee members attended a conference in Chicago to review and respond to the initial findings of the NEP study.
8. The content of the conference discussions and conclusions, like the site visit field research, contributed to the assessment of CCRPs detailed in this report.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. Nearly all CCRPs specified a definable target area, in terms of geographical unit or number of persons. However, not enough systematic planning prior to the commencement of CCRPs has taken place concerning:
 - a. how large a target area should be designated, given the resources and the nature of the CCRP; and
 - b. how many citizens within the target area would be contacted and be expected to participate in CCRP activities.

This general lack of systematic planning in designating a target area makes it difficult for most CCRPs to validly interpret any observed changes in impact measures.

2. CCRPs do not, in general, keep uniform information on the demographic characteristics (e.g., sex, age, race, etc.) of their target area citizens and actual participants. Without such basic descriptive information, any CCRP claim of impact on participant's reporting behavior will remain subject to criticism of "selection confounds". That is, the impact could be due merely to the participation of certain kinds of citizens. The lack of these data also leaves CCRPs defenseless to the possible criticism that they may be servicing only middle-class individuals and avoiding areas where implementation may be more difficult.

3. Most CCRPs use a combination of the following techniques to make citizens aware of their project:

- a. use of media;
- b. distribution of literature and stickers;
- c. distribution of novelty items; and
- d. personal contact.

Few CCRPs attempted to document the number or proportion of their target area citizens who are aware of the CCRP's existence, although it seems that citizens are generally aware of CCRPs where efforts have been made to publicize their existence.

4. All CCRPs employ techniques which attempt to commit citizens to participate in surveillance and/or crime reporting. These techniques fall into the following three categories:

- a. attempts to increase the benefits associated with crime reporting (e.g., providing rewards);
- b. attempts to decrease the costs associated with crime reporting (e.g., providing anonymity); and
- c. attempts to encourage behaviors which are consistent with crime reporting (e.g., becoming a member of a CCRP).

5. CCRPs do not know the number or proportion of their target population that is actually committed to crime reporting.

6. Fifty-seven percent of the CCRPs used explicit educational activities, while the others provided some educational information, at least implicitly. However, there is a lack of attempts to measure the immediate effectiveness of the educational activities.

7. No CCRP has data that should be interpreted as showing that its participants have increased their:

- a. surveillance;
- b. quantity of reporting; or
- c. quality of reporting.

8. Despite the absence of good quantifiable data it should be noted that many CCRP operators and experts in the field of crime prevention feel that CCRPs do make an impact on both the quality and quantity of reporting. These findings, while open to alternative explanations, should not be overlooked. Given the methodological difficulty in establishing a clear interpretation of actual reporting behavior, subjective opinion, theoretical perspectives and effort expended by CCRPs assume a greater importance in evaluating CCRPs.

9. Well-implemented Radio Watch projects will significantly increase participant surveillance, increase the quantity of reports, and improve the quality of reports.

10. There are insufficient data to enable any conclusions to be drawn regarding the effectiveness of Whistlestop.
11. Special Telephone Line projects will not significantly increase the quantity of reports, as they tend to rely heavily on media.
12. Group Presentations may be effective in altering awareness, knowledge, attitudes and in generating requests for other services, but not in changing reporting behavior.
13. No data are available on which to base conclusions regarding Membership Projects.
14. Home Presentation Projects will have a significant positive impact on crime reporting behavior.
15. The following seven possible side effects of CCRPs were identified:
 - a. change in police-community relations;
 - b. change in participants' fear of crime;
 - c. overload on police facilities;
 - d. increased community cohesiveness;
 - e. increased criminalization of certain types of behavior;
 - f. increased unrealistic suspicion; and
 - g. increased vigilantism.

In general, there is little evidence on which to base firm conclusions regarding these possible effects.

16. Other unresolved issues include the following:
 - a. crime reduction;
 - b. effects of LEAA grants;
 - c. cost estimates;
 - d. generalizability across communities;
 - e. longevity of impact; and
 - f. the role of behavioral science research.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. On the basis of their findings and associated reasoning, the authors recommend that CCRPs continue to receive LEAA support. They are especially optimistic about the potential of Home Presentation and Radio Watch Projects.
2. Support of CCRPs should be contingent upon adequate planning and evaluation.
3. Project planners and operators should give special attention to the following questions:

- a. What qualifications should project personnel have?
 - b. What specific target area will be served by the CCRP?
 - c. Is there a control area or group available for comparison purposes?
 - d. What available techniques are best suited to create awareness of and a positive attitude toward the CCRP among target citizens?
 - e. What available methods are best suited to commit CCRP participants to reporting suspicious/criminal incidents?
 - f. How will commitment to crime reporting be maintained?
 - g. What should citizens learn from CCRP educational activities?
 - h. What positive and negative side-effects may the CCRP create?
4. Planners and operators of CCRPs should be provided with easily assimilated information concerning relevant behavioral science research findings, or individuals with a background in the behavioral sciences should be included in the planning and implementing of a CCRP.
 5. CCRPs should continue to gather data concerning their efforts.
 6. The continued use of reported crime statistics as the major measure of effectiveness of CCRPs is not recommended.
 7. An evaluation plan should be developed at the same time a CCRP is being planned. Such a plan should ideally include measures of the following:
 - a. descriptive information (e.g., age, race, sex) of target area citizens, actual participants, and control area citizens;
 - b. effort measures (e.g., the number of public service announcements scheduled, the number of group presentations given, the number of educational films shown);
 - c. short term impact measures (e.g., the number of citizens made aware by public service announcements, the number of membership cards signed, the knowledge gained by participants from educational activities);
 - d. long-term impact measures (e.g., the number of in-progress calls, the number of calls about suspicious persons/vehicles, ratings from dispatchers and investigators regarding the quality of reports); and
 - e. potential side effects: i) police-community relations (e.g., survey information); ii) fear/concern of crime (e.g., survey information); iii) overload of police facilities (e.g., response time); and iv) community cohesiveness (e.g., survey information).

However, most CCRP operators have neither the need nor the resources to implement all of these measures. Operators should decide which project activities are worth evaluating and then select those recommendations which best fit their evaluation needs and resources.

8. CCRPs, by themselves, should not be held accountable for demonstrating a reduction in crime.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

This report is a well-organized presentation of the key issues pertaining to CCRPs and an assessment of what is known about them to the extent that available evidence permits. It has utility and relevance for those who are planning, operating, or attempting to evaluate a CCRP. More detail on many points can no doubt be found in the sources which are identified in the report.

F. Utilization

This report should be utilized by planners and operators of CCRPs, by those concerned with the evaluation of CCRPs, and by decisionmakers in LEAA concerned with the funding of future CCRP efforts. It has clear messages for all of these persons.

Although this study provided data and statistics designed to serve as useful background information, no dramatic instances of utilization were noted. Findings of the report did furnish questions for future research and evaluation.

Citizens' Crime Reporting Projects has had no impact on new action programs. The relatively new action office has adopted priorities for which the older NEP findings are not relevant.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Crime Prevention Security Surveys NEP Phase I Summary Report

A. Descriptive Abstract

This report presents a summary of an empirical and judgmental assessment of a crime prevention technique known as the security survey. The assessment is based primarily on data and other information collected during the study. Although efforts were made to draw from the work of past research, it was found that a dearth of knowledge exists on this subject. More detail is presented in the final report: "Phase I Assessment of Security Survey/Community Crime Prevention Programs".

This report is divided into two sections. The first section defines the security survey technique and its principal components and summarizes the key steps taken in the study. The second section reviews the major findings and conclusions.

B. Methodology

1. Development through secondary research of a detailed report outlining the issues and substance of expert views and opinions regarding the security survey.
2. Telephone survey of 100 security survey agencies.
3. Mail survey of all agencies known to conduct physical security inspections that were not included in the telephone sample.
4. Computer analysis of the information gathered through the telephone and mail surveys.
5. Twenty site visits to substantiate data gathered via telephone and mail as well as to obtain more detailed historical, organizational, programmatic and evaluative information concerning specific projects.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. The following four factors play a role in the initiation of security survey programs:
 - a. high burglary rates,
 - b. desire for improved police-community relations,
 - c. formal crime-prevention training, and
 - d. availability of outside financial support.

2. The key factor behind the continuation of crime prevention/survey programs is support from top management.
3. A high level of public support is an important factor in program continuation.
4. The survey program helps to enhance police-community relations.
5. Although the data documents that the security survey is an important component of crime prevention programs:
 - a. in most cases it is not a primary function of these units,
 - b. it is unlikely that the security survey will become the primary function of crime prevention units so long as current personnel patterns and program implementation strategies persist, and
 - c. the data suggests that crime prevention units are not staffed at a level which will permit them to produce a meaningful impact jurisdictionwide.
6. The use of trained volunteers to conduct surveys is less expensive than the use of salaried personnel, but the potential problems are significant in terms of the varying and unknown backgrounds of non-law enforcement personnel.
7. It is more cost-effective to use one person to conduct surveys than to use two persons.
8. Trained surveyors perform more thorough and effective surveys.
9. The intensive use of target areas is not employed by most agencies because of their jurisdictionwide responsibility and the potential charge of "unequal protection".
10. Personnel in most agencies do not understand the use of the target/control area, or quasi-experimental design process, which has the potential to assist in program evaluation.
11. No evidence was found that supports the contention that security codes are effective crime deterrents, but it is widely believed that the security code has the potential to substantially augment the intended accomplishments of the security survey.
12. Agency personnel are generally not equipped to use goals and objectives as effective management or evaluation tools.
13. Documentation provided by the majority of agencies responding to the survey focused mainly on inventorying program activity as opposed to evaluating the achievement of goals and objectives through the application of methodologically sound research designs.

14. The data with regard to the degree to which crime prevention personnel "feel" that security survey goals and objectives are met must be considered as inconclusive.
15. Information and data provided by a vast majority of agencies contacted during the survey offered no meaningful knowledge concerning the impact of the security survey program; only five agencies were found that use burglary rate data to assess program impact.
16. Eighty-six percent of those responding to the general survey maintain information on survey findings and recommendations; the vast majority of these agencies use the information primarily for record purposes.
17. Agencies that concentrate on prior victims generally conduct more surveys than those that concentrate on potential victims.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. If further research is conducted, it may be valuable to determine if organizational location of survey units is a factor in actual program success or impact.
2. Future research may also wish to reassess whether program age, size, or funding sources are significant factors relative to program implementation.
3. If additional research is to be conducted, those agencies that participate as "models" should be thoroughly briefed on and use the target area process.
4. If further research on the survey program is conducted, an effort documenting the impact of security codes is essential.
5. It may be hypothesized that without the expanded use of codes and incentives, the full potential of the security survey technique will never be realized.
6. If goals and objectives are to be used effectively as management tools, the following three steps must be taken:
 - a. A "model" set of assumptions must be developed from which reasonable goals and objectives can be derived.
 - b. These models should be made available to all agencies which have developed or are considering security survey programs.
 - c. Crime prevention security survey training should include specific segments dealing with the planning, implementation, and evaluation of such programs.

7. It may be more useful to assess burglary rates among premises surveyed vis-a-vis those not inspected in a jurisdiction, or among an experimental and a control area, if a quasi-experimental approach is used.
8. A common definition of compliance must be established, at a minimum, within individual agencies if the resulting data are to be of any value as an effectiveness indicator.
9. If additional research is undertaken on the impact of the survey process, the reasons why individuals request surveys and also their level of awareness based on various advertising techniques should be assessed.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

Throughout this report, there are statements to the effect that insufficient data exist to enable a proper evaluation to be made. While the report attempts to cover the key issues and assess what is known about them, the lack of data and documentation severely hampers the accomplishment of this task. Some of the findings and conclusions seem rather obvious as stated (see, for example, 6, 7, and 8 under Findings and Conclusions). If the statements are based on purely subjective judgment, they contribute little that a reasonable person would not guess to be true. Yet they pertain to matters amenable to objective evaluation if a scientific approach is taken. The report has utility and relevance for those who are planning evaluations of programs of this type, in particular because it highlights the need for good data if proper evaluation is to be accomplished.

On the basis of RTI interviews with LEAA staff, we have no clear

F. Utilization

This report should be utilized by those who are planning the evaluation of programs of this kind, since it serves to indicate the information and planning needed for such evaluations. It should also be utilized by decisionmakers concerned with the future of these programs, despite the fact that it is less than complete on many points of interest to decisionmakers.

On the basis of RTI interviews with LEAA staff, we have no clear indication that the report was utilized; however, references were made to the use of these findings for determining research and evaluation strategy and needs for future research.

Evaluation Findings Summary

Community Crime Prevention, Seattle, Washington

An Exemplary Project
by

Abt Associates, Inc.

September, 1977

A. Descriptive Abstract

The Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program is one of 23 programs which have earned the National Institute (NILECJ) "exemplary" label. Projects are nominated through the LEAA Regional offices and the State Planning Agencies and are examined by an independent evaluator to verify their

- overall effectiveness in reducing crime or improving criminal justice
- adaptability to other jurisdictions
- objective evidence of achievement
- demonstrated cost-effectiveness

In Seattle, the LEAA-funded Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP) developed by Seattle's Law and Justice Planning Office has tapped an essential resource for controlling burglary - citizens themselves. The program marshals citizen action in both burglary prevention measures and improved reporting of actual crimes. By encouraging citizens to join cooperative efforts in their own behalf, CCPP has helped to measurably reduce burglaries and served also to diminish the fear and "fortress mentality" that can come from feelings of isolation and helplessness.

Elements of the CCPP program are

1. Residential security inspection services
2. Assistance in marking personal property
3. Organization of "block watches" to supplement police prevention patrol
4. Preparation of informative materials

Coordination with and support from the Seattle Police Department is a vital factor in CCPP's success.

The Seattle program is unique in the degree of rigor with which its accomplishments have been evaluated through studies initiated by the city's Law and Justice Planning Office.

This study describes the program, assess its effectiveness by using data from the evaluations which have been performed, and offers guidelines for replicating the program elsewhere. Appendices to the report contain CCPP job descriptions, a sample home security checklist, CCPP training program guidelines, a victimization survey instrument, and other sample documents clarifying operational aspects of the program.

B. Methodology

This descriptive study basically constitutes a careful review of available documentation from Seattle's Law and Justice Planning Office (LJPO) including crime (victimization) survey data, program evaluations, and other records. A brief literature review is included in support of the hypothesis that "potential victims are in the best position to diminish criminal opportunity, recognize stealth, and minimize their own vulnerability." The report contains no discussion of methodology.

C. Findings and Conclusions

In October 1976, the city of Seattle's Law and Justice Planning Office (LJPO) determined that

1. In over one-third of Seattle's reported burglaries thieves entered through unlocked doors and windows
2. Most victims had not identified lost property in any way to discourage fencing or assist recovery
3. Most burglaries occurred during working hours when they could be witnessed by citizens
4. Traditional police patrols cannot saturate neighborhoods in a meaningful preventative way.

Their findings led to the establishment of the CCPP program. The program as implemented was found to be efficient, easily taught, flexible, free of institutional (legal, political, and civic) obstacles, and free of the necessity for large citizen investments of time or money.

LJPO surveys identified the following CCPP impacts:

1. An indicated 48-61 percent reduction in burglary victimization among participants.

2. No evidence of displacement of burglaries to other areas.
3. Reporting rates in target areas up from one-half to three-quarters of actual burglaries committed.
4. A 27 percent increase in burglary-in-progress calls as a proportion of all burglary calls from target areas.
5. A 40 percent involvement of households in target areas.
6. Forty percent of households acting on recommendations of home service technicians.

The key in CCPP operations is neighborhood saturation through mailings, home visits, and invitations to Block Watch meetings by professional CCPP staff bearing the approval and support of both city government and police.

The study identifies certain demographic factors relevant to replicability of the CCPP program.

1. The thief deterred by CCPP is usually an amateur who capitalizes on rather than creates criminal opportunity.
2. A program of this type is most effective with single family or duplex houses in relatively compact neighborhoods and where residential turnover is not high.
3. Neighborhood homogeneity and the absence of competitive or overlapping programs aids success.
4. High income or rural neighborhoods are less appropriate for CCPP type programs.

Cost-benefit analyses indicate that the Seattle CCPP program reached 2,700 homes in its first year at an average cost of \$48 per home reached and \$92 per home joining Block Watches. Second year comparable costs were \$12 and \$44. Third year costs rose to \$18 and \$55 but included about 15 percent of total effort devoted to program maintenance and follow-up consultation services.

Benefits in terms of real marginal cost savings were judged as difficult to quantify. An aggregate reduction in crime means some real savings. There are also non-monetary savings in distress, time lost, and other social costs of crime.

D. Program/Policy Implications

This report is intended primarily as a guide to assist other communities in adapting the Seattle approach to their own needs. Thus it focuses on an explanation of the development, operations, and results of CCPP. There is an implied clear recommendation that the program be replicated elsewhere, a possibility supported by the universality of the problem and basic simplicity of the CCPP response.

The impetus for initiating a CCPP can come from anywhere in the community-citizens groups or a government agency. But the program should itself be an independent operation and avoid political alignments.

Evidence suggests that the civilian nature of the program increases the likelihood of citizen participation and compliance. But high priority must be given to enlisting the assistance and support of local law enforcement agencies.

Specific program evaluation guidelines are suggested including, for victimization surveys:

1. Select test tracts not extreme in prior crime rates
2. Collect pre- and post-program data for residences both receiving services and not receiving services in program areas.
3. Use control census tracts to assess potential crime displacement and spontaneous variations in crime rates
4. Use independent researchers where possible
5. Use quality control checks by follow-up sample phone checks
6. Utilize random telephone survey methodology for reasons of lower cost and apparent equal reliability vis-a-vis personal interviews (a sampling methodology and projected costs of a professional survey are detailed in a report appendix)

Regarding evaluation of crime reporting it is noted that analysis depends largely on pre-existent police system to record citizen crime reports. A key element is burglary-in-progress calls due to the importance of such calls for apprehension.

Evaluation of program operations requires detailed records of project performance and service delivery.

E. Critique of Study Quality, Usability, and Utility

This report provides a clear, readable, and persuasive argument for the value of a CCPP-type crime prevention program. Its main potential utility is as an informational and marketing tool for the replicability of such programs. It does not represent a comprehensive, independent evaluation of the Seattle program, depending as it does on past reports and evaluations conducted by or mandated by the Seattle LJPO itself. But as a descriptive and explanatory document it is well designed and executed for general distribution and use.

F. Utilization

Within the action program office, the Seattle Exemplary Project Study was utilized in the design and delivery of procedural aspects of community programs -- particularly with regard to Block Watches.

Community and Citizen Mobilization Programs
Conducted by the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency and the AFL-CIO Community Services Committee

by

The SERD/Human Development Institute
August, 1975

A. Descriptive Abstract

In 1974, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) received a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to develop, in cooperation with the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), a program to recruit union and community leaders to participate in training programs aimed at increasing understanding of criminal justice problems and to motivate participants to take action in bringing about changes.

The rationale behind the program was the judgment that the NCCD, a nationally recognized crime and delinquency organization and the AFL-CIO, with its vast membership, presented a unique combination to organize citizen education programs which eventually could lead to action programs to improve the operation of criminal justice agencies.

SERD/HDI was awarded a contract in January 1975 to conduct a six-month assessment of this project. In early 1975, the NCCD-AFL-CIO project was in its second year of operation and had training programs underway in five cities.

Methods and techniques in conducting this study included site visits to training programs and in-depth interviews with staff organizing and conducting the programs and individuals used as speakers and resource persons. SERD/HDI staff monitors attended training and Action Committee sessions and collected detailed notes on what occurred. Trainees enrolled in the four intensively studied programs completed questionnaires at the first and last sessions. Mail surveys were conducted of participants in the 1974 cycle programs. The other four 1975 cycle programs reported attendance data by mail to SERD/HDI and participants completed questionnaires at the first training session.

General conclusions: In 1975, more than 300 persons enrolled in training programs in the four cities that received intensive analysis. From 36 percent to 100 percent of participants in the various programs were union representatives; the remainder were from other organizations and the community at large. Union representatives tended to be local union officers and members. Community representatives tended to be teachers, social workers, housewives, college students, and members of religious orders. Generally, the programs enrolled few persons

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who might be considered "opinion leaders" in their communities. The training programs were up to eight weeks long offered once weekly in two-hour sessions. Attendance and participation were spasmodic-- few participants attended all or most of the sessions. However; participants who attended regularly came away with new ideas and conceptions of needs and problems in the criminal justice field. The programs in the 1975 cycle, started in February and March, were completed in late Spring 1975 and, in Summer 1975 were in the process of developing Action Committees. In two cities, committees were well underway, but in the other two, the nature of the committees which would evolve was not known, and persons coordinating the Action Committees were experiencing difficulties getting organized.

A variety of recommendations are presented including different training program approaches, administrative and management needs, monitoring and assessment tools, and program planning needs more effectively achieve its, to date, largely elusive goals.

B. Methodology

These approaches, methods, and techniques were used in this study:

1. SERD/HDI staff completed site visits during the training process to each of the four programs studied intensively in this project. During these visits, staff interviewed the training program Coordinators and others involved in the training and observed the training sessions.
2. Program monitors were hired locally in the four cities intensively studied to attend all training sessions and Action Committee planning sessions and meetings. Monitors performed exactly that function--they observed the training sessions, took detailed notes and collected materials, including attendance data. Because the notice announcing the session was received by the SERD/HDI monitor after the session was over, only one session (the July 30 San Diego Action Committee meeting) was missed.
3. SERD/HDI study staff maintained telephone contacts with Labor Participation staff, program Coordinators, and SERD/HDI Monitors during the training programs.
4. Telephone interviews were conducted with 25 resource persons who participated in training sessions.
5. All training program Coordinators and Labor Participation Department staff were interviewed.

6. In each of the intensively studied cities, a confidential survey was completed at the first and last training sessions. Participants were asked to complete essentially the same questionnaire on both occasions. The purpose of the survey was to collect background data on participants (age, race, sex, union affiliation, etc.), experiences with crime, and attitudes toward and expectations of the training program. Questionnaires were sealed in envelopes and returned to SERD/HDI for analysis.
7. The same questionnaire was used in a survey of four additional cities where training programs were started in 1975. However, in these cases the survey was completed only at the first session. In these four programs, Coordinators were asked to forward training program attendance data to SERD/HDI.
8. A library research survey was conducted of community action and adult education programs to identify studies relevant to this project.
9. This study also included a process analysis of two programs where training was completed in 1974--Atlanta and Cleveland. Two site visits were completed in each city at which time information and data were collected and key persons associated with the programs were interviewed. In addition, the same survey noted above was conducted in these cities via the postal service.

C. Findings and Conclusions

A review of the data presented in this report indicates that the program has largely failed to meet its original objectives, namely.

1. To identify needs and goals in selected cities as appropriate for citizen action.
2. To educate local citizens and structure powerful citizens action committees capable of effecting change.
3. To change attitudes and policies related to criminal justice operations and goals as held by lay citizen decisionmakers.
4. To contribute specific active and programmatic support to local criminal justice systems by tapping rehabilitation services in the private sector.

The project as operating at the time of the study was not an integrated whole. There existed conflicts over responsibilities, goals, purposes, and use of resources. With rare exception, NCCD staff played a minor role in the programs studied.

A reviewer of the evaluation study quoted in the study itself concluded that:

1. Training programs (at least of the scope of those in this project) do not change attitudes about law enforcement and criminal justice.
2. Informational programs do not result in significant action to improve law enforcement and criminal justice.
3. Programs involving unpaid volunteers tend to exhibit higher turnover rates. Successful programs must counterbalance this tendency.
4. Achievement of a "multiplier" effect (wider dissemination of training results) is doubtful in programs to inform unpaid citizen volunteers.

The study's own conclusions included the following:

1. The eight programs started in 1975 enrolled over 700 participants in six to eight-week training programs.
2. Survey data and in-depth interviews indicated the programs had a marked impact on those who attended regularly, but many did not.
3. The training programs enrolled about 60 percent of participants with union affiliations--few of whom were key leaders.
4. The programs have developed, have identified, and are working with small core groups of persons committed to bring about change in the criminal justice system.
5. More attention needs to be directed toward advance planning, the establishment of goals and priorities, and the development of training programs based on the goals identified. The lack of intensive planning was beyond staff control because LEAA required that programs establish tentative target dates within 60 days of an effective grant.

6. Action is occurring at two levels. First, Community Services Representatives in several cities are getting things accomplished on an individual basis without working through the Action Committees. Second, Action Committees are in the process of organization and, hopefully, will become the focal points for action.
7. The program is staffed by four highly committed, experienced trade unionists.
8. The utilization of other NCCD staff (especially experts in the criminal justice field, research persons, etc.), SPA and regional criminal justice planning groups, as well as local professional groups, such as the Bar Association, etc., needs to be strengthened and improved.
9. The development of action programs is a most difficult process which has not really even been evaluated.
10. There are a number of specific ways in which the education and action programs can be strengthened and improved.

D. Program/Policy Implications

The most general recommendation is that these programs should be continued and strengthened in terms of management, involvement of other NCCD staff and professional groups within the cities in which the programs occur, and by experimenting with different approaches in training and action. Specifically:

1. The selection and planning phase within a city is now a short-term process of the local labor movement. This should be expanded to a fairly long-term process whereby an estimate is made of the potential commitment of the local labor body to the program, the extent to which non-union groups can be involved, and the identification of possible programs and priorities for programs in a particular city.
2. Once the planning stage is completed, a range of program formats have been identified by SERD/HDI which education programs can adopt, rather than confining themselves to one approach as is presently the case.
3. The training program should make use of a variety of techniques and approaches in the general field of adult education and adult learning including measures to improve participation patterns.
4. There needs to be closer monitoring of training and action programs, including but not limited to, the collection of detailed information and data, the establishment of measurable goals and priorities by education programs and action programs and the measurement of the extent to which these goals and priorities are achieved.

5. Local action programs need technical assistance beyond that which the Labor Participation Department staff can now supply. Technical assistance is crucial in such areas as how to conduct self-studies of selected aspects of the criminal justice system, provision of survey research services, organizing action programs, identifying priorities, writing proposals, etc.
6. Wider use should be made of the entire range of NCCD staff and services, especially in the identification of program goals and priorities and the provision of technical assistance.

E. Critique of Quality, Usability and Utility

The study is based primarily on a large mass of results of personal observation. Actual data collection is limited and incomplete; its analysis is erratic. The report is ponderously written and poorly organized. The several varieties of abstracts and summaries provided are particularly poorly prepared and are not representative of either the content or the implications of the material in the body of the report. Thus, for a reader to benefit from the significant insights scattered throughout the study, he must wade through the whole report, a dismal project. Such potential utility as exists is thus largely lost.

The report is aware of and reports certain major methodological limitations in its approach though it does not consider possible alternatives. But, more significantly, it simply fails to come to grips with its own findings either in how it reports them or how it interprets them into recommendations, especially regarding program continuation. Certain specific suggestions for program improvement, if dug out of the long report, may have more utility if continuation is assumed.

F. Utilization

The study provided a wealth of excellent data, although the report conclusions were not consistent with the data collected. The report conclusions were utilized to justify program continuation decision; however, some felt that on the basis of the data, the program should not have been considered for additional funding.

Evaluation Findings Summary

Milwaukee County Project Turnaround

by

Evaluation/Policy Research Associates, Ltd. and

Price Waterhouse and Co.

November 1976

A. Descriptive Abstract

Milwaukee County's Project Turnaround is a pilot program attached to the District Attorney's office responding to the need to make citizen participation in the criminal justice system safer, more convenient, and more effective. Its key feature is the incorporation of several different approaches to alleviating problems experienced by crime victims and witnesses. This study reviews each of five action units of the program interns of goal achievement, cost of replication, cost-benefit analysis, and impact assessment. Two support units -- information systems and administration -- are also reviewed. Finally, the total project is analyzed in terms of cost of replication, cost-benefit factors, and degree of citizen involvement.

The five action units include:

1. Citizen Contact and Support Unit: Personally serves witnesses and victims by informing them of their rights and duties, counseling them when they are distressed, and assisting with matters such as appearance scheduling, transportation, child care, witness fees, etc.
2. Citizen Victim Complaint Unit: Provides opportunity for ordinary citizens to stop in without an appointment and without accompanying police officer and make a complaint to an Assistant DA in a receptive environment and with minimal waiting time.
3. Sensitive Crimes Unit: Provides specialized assistance and individualized attention to victims of sensitive crime and provides specialized prosecution services in such cases.
4. Advocacy Unit: Seeks to help witnesses and jurors by analyzing the system as a whole and recommending broad changes in laws and rules. Assists in coordination of pertinent activities of criminal justice system.

5. Witness Emergency Unit: Provides services to witnesses who have been threatened, harrassed, or otherwise intimidated as a result of reporting crimes or testifying in court.

The study concludes that Project Turnaround has been a remarkable success and justifies this conclusion with a very rigorous cost-benefit analysis. On the assumption that the program and its component units can be a model for others, extensive analysis is devoted to issues of replicability including detailed cost estimates.

B. Methodology

The evaluation study is based on a detailed review of program records and documents supplemented by extensive user surveys performed on a sampling basis. Methodologies were specifically designed to quantify benefits for cost-benefit calculations. The assumptions underlying these calculations are spelled out but, in general, the report does not discuss its methodology in any detail.

The data is presented and segregated in ways to permit maximum replicability of the program whether in part or in whole. The purpose of the analysis is not to present a recommended budget for similar programs but to provide a financial starting-point for replication decisions.

Underlying the cost-benefit analysis is the assumption that time savings for citizens, increased productivity in government, and reduction of employee absenteeism in the business sector can all be quantified by the imputation of financial values to the realized time savings.

C. Findings and Conclusions

Study findings are organized by program unit.

1. Citizen Contact and Support Unit: High user satisfaction was noted, especially for services received directly from the staff rather than by referral. Quantifiable savings were 20 percent of ongoing costs but many additional benefits were noted which cannot be quantified.
2. Citizen Victim Complaint Unit: Has successfully decreased waiting time for citizen complainants. Citizen perception of services is positive but the rating is declining. Savings associated with reduced waiting times exceed unit operating costs.
3. Sensitive Crimes Unit: Majority of clients report extreme satisfaction with services. A high percentage of victims are willing to testify and cooperate with criminal justice proceedings. An improvement in the prosecution process is noted: cases are handled more quickly and there is a positive effect on guilty verdicts. Cost savings are realized from a reduction in the number of court adjournments.

4. Advocacy Unit: In practice, the main thrust of unit activity has been on coordination efforts. Substantial net economic benefits are noted.
5. Witness Emergency Unit: User satisfaction with emergency and followup services is high. Generally successful outcomes noted in cases involving victim/witness intimidation where unit services have been offered (65 percent conviction rate). A lack of baseline data prevents determination of net benefit value.

The support units also receive a favorable evaluation. The information Systems Unit has successfully elicited a substantial amount of user involvement during definition of systems requirements and continued cooperation with user departments is excellent. The administration and planning unit has been notably successful in creating improved awareness, participation, and support for citizen victim witness service needs among local government officials and within the community.

In its cost of replication analysis, the report indicates another community could expect to spend approximately \$306,000 to initiate a comprehensive program like Project Turnaround and carry it through the start-up phase. Ongoing operational costs would reach \$1.34 million per year.

The cost-benefit analysis concludes that quantifiable benefits would exceed the cost of first year services by a factor of 1.5. It is also judged that 44 percent of the benefits potentially achievable by elimination of unnecessary trips and waiting have been realized. These achievements are viewed as threshold level only; further benefits are anticipated.

The study further commends Project Turnaround for its extensive and effective efforts to promote improved community support, awareness, cooperation, and participation in improving the criminal justice system.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. Citizen Contact and Support Unit: Recommend development of procedure to identify and mention witness appearances in court and an examination of present activities to establish clearer priorities among them.
2. Citizen Victim Complaint Unit: The clear-cut cost benefits of the activity justify continuing priority given to the citizen complainant and the establishment of systems by which situations not necessarily amenable to criminal charge can be dealt with within the criminal justice system.
3. Sensitive Crimes Unit: Recommend unit be returned to 2-person operation and that guidelines be established to reduce case load to most serious types of sensitive crime cases.

4. Advocacy Unit: Progress and impact to date justify continuance both for assistance provided to victims, witnesses, police officers, attorneys, and the judiciary but also to keep the DA's office on the "cutting edge" of innovation.
5. Witness Emergency Unit: There is need to coordinate unit guidelines for types of clients considered for service with other Project Turnaround units and other elements of the criminal justice system in the interests of balancing demands on respective units and avoiding too thin spread of manpower resources.
6. Information Systems Unit: Although an impact evaluation of this unit was beyond scope of study, it is noted that there are many potential additional benefits from the information system which require sufficient continued funding to allow the unit to continue intact through additional systems development.
7. Administration and Planning Unit: Control and coordination of unit service activities and outreach efforts could be improved through more frequent unit coordination meetings and by establishing strengthened control procedures.

E. Critique of Quality, Usability, and Utility

In a highly favorable review of the study by the LEAA's Program Development and Evaluation staff, it was noted that:

1. The findings should be of great interest to local officials and citizens concerned about problems faced by victims and witnesses of crime.
2. The study's analytical methodology is a significant contribution to the state-of-the-art of criminal justice impact and benefit evaluation. A clear and well-conceived evaluation design is evident.
3. The evaluation's separate focus on individual project components serves flexible and locally-tailored replication.
4. The report demonstrates that social programs can be subjected to rigorous cost-benefit analysis.
5. The report should serve as a useful model for criminal justice evaluators and as a valuable source of case material for training in criminal justice and other social program evaluation.

The PDE staff recommended wide distribution of the report, and, by implication, urged its replication where appropriate.

This study is well written, clearly organized, and carefully researched. The research design gives particular support to possibilities for replication of elements of Project Turnaround.

It would have assisted a study of the report in its entirety to have been provided a contextual overview of Project Turnaround covering the nature and magnitude of the problems it addressed, the approaches taken, and the general objectives. An organizational chart depicting individual units and their interrelationship would provide a context in which the reader could place the discussion of individual project units.

F. Utilization

Several interviewees expressed the opinion that Milwaukee County Turnaround was the best research project ever funded by LEAA. The evaluation report was widely distributed within the agency; however, no specific information regarding its utilization was obtained through our interviews.

III. ENFORCEMENT

Evaluation Findings Summary

Crime Analysis in Support of Patrol

A. Descriptive Abstract

A comprehensive survey of 23 departments using interviews, observations and documents, was conducted in 1975 to determine the state of the art of Crime Analysis in support of Traditional Preventive Patrol, Team Policing and Specialized Patrol. The survey showed that generally police intuitively believe in the value of Crime Analysis; however, there is little systematic proof or knowledge of its actual operational value. Crime Analysis has not been examined on its own merits, independent of the programs it supports, because analysis is an integral part of the total allocation and deployment decision-making processes and it does not lend itself well to classical evaluative measurement apart from these programs. These programs themselves are not evaluated, nor is crime control data generally used as a basis for decisions on allocation or deployment.

Several findings stand out:

1. Allocation decisions are made infrequently and equalized workloads are the most commonly used tools.
2. The more formal the analysis program and separated from the users of the output information the less likely the information will be used, regardless of the background of the analysts. The inverse is also true.
3. Police, at all levels, are suspicious of sophisticated analysis and do not believe it contributes significantly to meeting the on-going problems of allocation and deployment of patrol resources.

(modified authors' abstract)

B. Methodology

The methods employed included a systematic literature review, site visits to 23 police departments, and the development of flow charts and models of ideal program-evaluation processes for crime analysis units. The literature review covered the development of the concept of crime analysis in support of patrol in regard to allocation of resources (strategic use) as well as deployment of resources (tactical) for three types of patrol: traditional, specialized and team policing. Site visits (the number of persons involved, the length of time on site, the numbers of persons talked to or interviewed are not included)

included observations, survey interviews and the gathering of key documents for the development of flow charts for each of the 23 sites. Seven issue areas were covered in the review of the literature and in the interviews: (1) Decision Context; (2) Resources and Organization; (3) Data Collection and Files; (4) Analysis; (5) Problem Solution; (6) Program Specification; and (7) Dissemination of Crime Analysis Information. Also presented were flow charts for the decision-context in the use of crime information; analysis processes; a generalized model of the assumptions under which crime analysis in support of patrol operates and a chart of the overall logic of crime analysis in support of patrol goals, objectives, assumptions and measurements. These charts set the logic of the study and the site-specific systems while the text deals with the actual processes discovered on site. The analysis is thus a combination of flow-charting, problem identification, and qualitative assessment-comparison of the actual processes against the ideal models provided by their flow charts and the overall logic of the ideal crime analysis.

C. Findings and Conclusions

The principle findings of the study are the qualitative analyses that they provide while discussing the various flow charts and idealized pictures of crime analysis activity within the 23 sites. Some generalizations about all sites are made on the basis of their observations, the documents gathered, and the actual operation of each system. These are presented qualitatively, and the study is defined as a descriptive one (although they strongly suggest that the findings are generalizable to all police departments).

Three kinds of general points are made repeatedly and well. First, although there has been a great deal written about simulation models, computerized dispatch, allocation and deployment models, these have been rarely used in any police department in the United States, they were used in two, and now have been abandoned. Second, even where there are computerized dispatch and allocation systems, such as in Los Angeles, they are used only descriptively, and the information is used on an ad hoc basis to shape decisions. A model, such as their own on integrated programmatic approach which includes a statement of goals, objectives, assessments, evaluations, measures, is not used in any department. This suggests that the systems used are used on ad hoc basis, not linked to goals, objectives, or programs, are not assessed as to use, not reevaluated systematically, nor integrated in any important way with any on-going police patrol function. Third, the value of crime analysis is assumed; but there is little assessment of it, or its impact on deployment or allocation. Analysis personnel are left on their own to devise a program, and only in a few departments is there any feedback or assessment of the program. This feedback is subjective, dependent on personal relationships, and ertswile.

They conclude, "Overall, little conclusive evidence was found to substantiate the intuitively evident value of crime analysis or in what way it should be structured to be cost-effective." (page 18.) At all levels, crime analysis is judged "at the gut level" (page 82), and they conclude that although there is a belief expressed in the literature of the utility of sophisticated mathematical techniques of modeling, crime prediction, workload adjustment or hazard formulae, "The situation in the field does not support this contention." (page 82.) These techniques are not properly used.

D. Program-Policy Implications

There is an implication, not stated, that crime analysis in support of patrol is a useful and potentially effective means of guiding patrol decisions at both a strategic and tactical level. It would appear that given their flow charts, the authors believe that if an integrated program were set up which contained goals, objectives, measurements, assessments and negative and positive feedback, that it would "work." They show no data, nor could any of the 23 departments studied, to verify or validate this feeling or claim.

They believe that the more sophisticated the techniques (e.g., computerized mathematically based), the less departments understand and are willing to use the system. The gut level is the primary level at which the system is used and evaluated; Chiefs and other command people make decisions to alter the pattern of deployment or allocation when they perceive a problem without reference to the data other than at the superficial level of say, concern for "a rise in crime in X area over the last year." Formal analysis and reports on crime are not used, and are in fact rejected at the operational level. The operational level, in general, is not required to use the information and the evidence even when it is read at role call or given to them (see also findings stated in the abstract above).

Although the authors do not state as much, I think there are strong policy implications present in these findings, and it is implicit in their commitment to the idea and favorable treatment of it in general terms, in spite of its "failure" to be implemented in the field.

E. Critique of the Quality, Usability and Utility of the Report

1. The detailed evidence they provide for each of the types of patrol in the text, the flow charts showing an absence of use of the information even when assembled, the site-specific flow charts and figures, and the inferences they draw, are convincing. The conclusions do follow well from the data presented, although it is more an overall "picture" or a pattern of non-use than a detailed picture of the

actual use at whatever level. They do not make specific recommendations, other than urging that their overall program of evaluation of crime analysis data use should be adopted in any future research effort.

They do not propose specific research, suggest what should be done, or how it should be done.

2. The report is a modest yet powerful one that makes careful use of the data gathered, generalizes only from the departments seen, but has very strong validity and reliability in my view: (a) The findings are very consistent with other research on the use of computerized dispatch and other technological innovations, i.e., they are rejected at the operational level and are largely failures in fact although they continue to be advocated by various police administrators and operations researchers. (b) There is a strong coherence in this data; the flow charts, the descriptive material and the assessments are consistent across the sites. (c) The findings are very consistent with other writings describing the actual practice of policing, e.g., the work of Wilson, Rubinstein, Van Maanen, Manning, Williams, Redlinger and Manning. That is, they note the rejection of formal knowledge, of written documents, of technology as a means of controlling lower segments, and the case-by-case "clinical" nature of police work.

3. It is difficult to fault the findings, given their face validity, but the methods are not well explained or detailed; there is the limitation of the sample (23), and the absence of a rationale for choosing those departments (see below). The conclusions strike me as both valid and reliable (see 2 above).

4. There are several problems in the presentation. The survey interviews are not excerpted for quotes or qualitative data, nor is the interview protocol included. We are not told who was interviewed, how many interviews were gathered at each site, by whom, how the persons interviewed were chosen, nor how the interviews were used or analyzed. They do not quote from interviewees, nor compare sites using them (site-specific flow charts are used for this). They do not quote from or compare the utilities or uses of the crime analysis personnel's views with those of others in the department. There are not quantitative data presented on the distribution of, for example, attitude toward the system, or uses of it, etc. The general attitude outside the unit (and maybe within) is presented as being cautious or negative in practice, and accepting at the verbal or public level. One does not know why these 23 units were chosen. They do not note that they gathered documents, nor of what kind, although they must have done so in order to create the site-specific flow charts presented in the report.

Their use of abbreviations, often the ones used on a site (PATRIC), were difficult to follow; all such computer acronyms should be purged from reports because they are idiosyncratic in meaning and impossible to fully understand unless one has the program.

Figures IV 1-4 are omitted from the list of charts and figures on page vii.

5 and 6. The authors do not specify how they think this study should be used and to what ends by LEAA or police departments. In my judgement, it is very important, very insightful and revealing, and should be given the widest possible public and LEAA dissemination with respect to number 7 (modification of program), 9 (monitoring and directing programs), 11 (planning future research and evaluation) as well as 20 (public information). My reasons for making this strong argument for the report are that so much misleading nonsense has been written by people like Chaiken (Rand), Larson (PSE-MIT), O.W. Wilson and other police administrators that claims the operational utility of these devices with no mention of whether they are actually in use, and whether the officers and departments will accept their use. It is my view that more information about the essentially "gut-level" nature of police planning and operations must be made public, and the technological fantasies of various engineering firms and research groups be put in perspective of the actualities of policing.

This report indicates to me as a researcher that technological funding without evaluation should not be given in any LEAA grant. Secondly, I think that research is needed on how to integrate such information as crime-relevant data into police patrol, and this should be linked to close evaluation of whatever is attempted using the Reinier model. The fallacy of rhetoric without results should be made public. Further, these findings suggest to me the need for more field type methodologies which will address the on-going applications and use of technologies on the site.

This is an important piece of research, in part because it is modest and careful, and in part because it is a devastating critique of the police, and of the gap between rhetoric and practice.

F. Utilization

The comments which follow were paraphrased from staff members' accounts of actual utilization of the document under consideration.

OPM:

- . The study findings were useful in developing questions for ICAP program evaluation (University City Science Center impact evaluation).

NILECJ:

- . The study findings were utilized in a general manner as background material.
- . The Crime Analysis study was not particularly useful in regard to future research and evaluation; therefore, utilization of study findings was expected to be quite limited. The study was poorly designed and the questions addressed were unimportant.

OCJP:

- . This document was utilized in a broad sense in the development of "Action Program Model Packages;" however, NEP's never literally impact on action programs.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Response Time Analysis

A. Descriptive Abstract

Rapid police response has long been an accepted procedure in law enforcement. The need to reduce response time has served as justification for bolstering officer strength and for large expenditures on equipment. While it is not unreasonable to assume that rapid police response will produce more arrests, more witnesses, fewer serious citizen injuries, and more satisfied citizens, little empirical data exists which can support that assumption.

The Response Time Analysis study was designed to provide a comprehensive assessment of issues and assumptions regarding the value of police response to a variety of crime and noncrime, emergency and non-emergency, incidents. Specifically, two objectives were established for study:

1. Analysis of the relationships of response time to the outcomes of on-scene criminal apprehension, witness availability, citizen satisfaction, and the frequency of citizen injuries in connection with crime and noncrime incidents.
2. Identification of problems and patterns in reporting crime or requesting police assistance.

These reports (Volumes I and II and the Executive Summary) address issues pertaining to Part I crimes, which include homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. Homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault are classified as violent Part I crimes, while burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft are classified as nonviolent Part I crimes. The data were collected between March 1975 and January 1976, primarily from 56 beat-watches composing the upper 27th percentile of beat-watches in frequency of robbery and aggravated assaults based upon 1974 Kansas City, Mo., crime statistics. There were 949 eligible Part I crimes in the data base. Volume I provides a review of pertinent literature and an overview of the study's methodology, data collection procedures, and quality control systems. Volume II presents a description of analysis techniques and a discussion of findings. A concise description of objectives and methodology, analysis and findings, and conclusions and implications is given in the Executive Summary.

B. Methodology

Data for analysis were collected by civilian observers, communication tape analysts, and telephone and personal interviewers. Observers

accompanied officers in the field to collect data on travel times and on-scene activities, while tape analysts collected dispatch time data by timing telephone and radio exchanges recorded on Communications Unit tapes. The interviewers questioned victims of crimes and citizens who reported crime and noncrime incidents or requested police service.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. Reporting time was longer than either the time taken to dispatch a call or the time taken to travel to a call and nearly as long as the combined time taken to dispatch and travel to a call.
2. Response time was found to be unrelated to the probability of making an arrest or locating a witness for the large proportion of Part I crimes that were discovered after the crime had occurred.
3. For those crimes involving a victim or a witness, reporting time was the strongest determinant of arrest and witness availability. Travel time generally had a limited effect on these outcomes, though for some types of crime the influence was strong.
4. Citizen satisfaction was more closely related to citizens' expectations and perceptions about response time than to actual response time.
5. Voluntary actions by citizens explained more delay in reporting than did problems experienced by citizens in contacting the police.
6. The following eight patterns in reporting were identified as being related to the reporting interval:
 - a. Delay due to talking to another person,
 - b. Delay due to investigating the incident scene,
 - c. Delay due to telephoning another person or receiving a call,
 - d. Delay due to waiting or observing the situation,
 - e. Delay due to being unsure about police assistance,
 - f. Delay due to chasing the suspect,
 - g. Delay due to apathy, and
 - h. Delay due to contacting security.
7. The following five problems were identified as unavoidable hindrances related to delays in reporting:

- a. Delay due to public communication problems,
- b. Delay due to not being informed or being misinformed about the incident,
- c. Delay due to fear or emotional shock,
- d. Delay due to police communications problems, and
- e. Delay due to injury.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. Because of the time citizens take to report crimes, the application of technological innovations and human resources to reduce police response time will have negligible impact on crime outcomes.
2. Procedures developed to discriminate accurately between emergency and nonemergency calls will achieve more productive outcomes if coordinated with patrol resource allocation.
3. Because direct and rapid police response by nondispatched officers to robbery incidents or to the immediate vicinity surrounding robbery scenes is not effective in achieving response-related arrests, alternative response strategies for robberies should be developed, tested, and evaluated.
4. Long range research efforts must address reasons explaining voluntary actions by citizens which account for reporting delays and alternative methods of developing more effective reporting procedures.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

The three parts of this report (Volume I, Volume II, and the Executive Summary) constitute a thorough and detailed description of the Response Time Analysis study and its findings, conclusions and implications. As stated in the preface of the Executive Summary, the effort was devoted to generating rather than testing hypotheses. An effort was made to report all deficiencies and deviations from the original design. Those instances in which it was discovered after the fact that an alternative procedure might have produced a more desirable result have been documented. There is a commendable feature, of special utility to those who may be interested in conducting similar studies, as well as to those who wish to have a full understanding of the findings of this study.

This report has relevance to decisions regarding the improvement of the efficiency of police activities. It makes very clear the finding that increases in manpower and improvements in technical equipment are of less importance than improvements in citizen cooperation.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

This report should be utilized by those concerned with the improvement of policies enabling the police to serve the public more effectively. In particular, the finding that the bolstering of manpower and equipment to increase on-scene arrests and witness availability will produce negligible impact until citizen reporting times improve significantly should be noted. This casts doubt on the assumed importance of rapid response, and suggests the need for research to test the potential effectiveness of public education programs aimed at reducing citizen delays in the reporting of crimes. It also suggests the need for alternative reporting methods to reduce the time required to report a crime. Also indicated is the need for findings ways of establishing better rapport between police agencies and citizens regarding their mutual responsibilities, and the need to realistically assess citizens' aspirations and expectations in relation to agency resources. The report should be utilized by persons concerned with any of these matters.

Actual Utilization

OPM:

- . Useful in developing questions for ICAP program evaluation (University City Science Center impact evaluation under OPE).

NILECJ:

- . According to one member of the Institute staff, Response Time Analysis (and several other studies such as Managing Criminal Investigations and The Wilmington Split-Force Experiment) has been useful in terms of changing the manner in which the entire field services delivery system is structured in policing.
- . In regard to annual program continuation decisions, recommendations from Response Time Analysis were reviewed and utilized in the selection of research topics for funding.
- . The "Citizen Report Section" of the Response Time Study was instrumental in the development of testing and demonstration strategy. The study was utilized in regard to prioritizing and deciding whether or not to conduct field testing.
- . The document was utilized in the development of a program model which was subsequently field tested as "Managing Patrol Operations."
- . Response Time Analysis and Managing Criminal Investigations were noted as having the most significant impact on Executive Training Workshops in the Enforcement area.

OCJP:

- . Response Time Analysis, Managing Patrol Operations, and The Wilmington Split-Force Experiment have been utilized directly in demonstration programs.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Specialized Patrol Projects: National Evaluation Program Phase I Report

A. Descriptive Abstract

(LEAA Grant Nos. 75-NI-99-0067 and 75-NI-99-0067-S-1 awarded to the Institute for Human Resources Research, Bethesda, Maryland. Report completed January 1977.)

This report summarizes four separate reports bearing major title of (Phase I National Evaluation of Selected Patrol Strategies: Specialized Patrol Operations under the National Evaluation Program). The report on specialized patrols is based on a review of relevant literature; a field survey designed to collect information from about 400 law enforcement agencies; and judgemental and empirical assessment of a sample of projects selected as being representative of the state-of-the-art on civilian dress, uniform tactical, and mechanical device specialized patrol tactics. Specialized patrol is used in three-quarters of the police departments serving cities of 50,000 or more persons and by a small percentage of departmental units in smaller cities.

Tactics fall into three categories of patrol, based on assumptions regarding the impact of low versus high police visibility.

1. Low visibility assumes that invisible police presence, achieved through civilian dress and/or mechanical device tactics, will increase arrest and, therefore, reduce crime.
2. High visibility patrols assume that increased uniform police presence, achieved through a uniformed tactic, will deter crime and also increase the likelihood of arrest.
3. High/low visibility patrols combine high and low visibility strategies and utilize uniformed tactical and civilian dress and/or mechanical device tactics. These patrols are expected to deter crime and increase arrests.

Objectives common to the three categories are to increase convictions, clearances, and citizen support and involvement and to maintain citizen safety and respect.

Short term evaluations based on inadequate study designs have left basic assumptions untested and have yielded noncomparable results claimed from a diverse variety of measures. However, gross ratings on success and failure related to performance and effectiveness yielded a set of tentative conclusions: (1) high visibility patrols are more successful at deterrence than at apprehension, (2) high/low visibility patrols are slightly more successful at apprehension than deterrence, and (3) although no conclusive statement can be made about the low visibility family, due to inadequate information, existing data suggest the projects in the family were slightly more successful in

detering crime than in increasing arrests.

The report concludes that standard procedures need to be devised and used for assessing information at the local and national levels in order to determine whether specialized patrol is more cost-effective than traditional patrol and which specialized tactic is most effective for combatting a given type of crime.

B. Methodology

1. A literature review was conducted to determine the types and usage of specialized patrols and the advantages and disadvantages of specialization. (The report contained conclusions and recommendations based upon the literature review alone.)
2. Mail and telephone interviews were conducted to identify 22 cities (a purposeful sample) which used specialized patrols, from which 21 were selected for indepth study and analysis.
3. An analytic model was developed to assess the 21 projects. Generally, this was a systems model focusing upon input, through put, and output.
4. The evaluative information (evaluations, crime figures and other raw data, and expert opinion) were rated according to their reliability, and the projects were assessed according to their success or failure with respect to the amount of change affected by the patrol, the performance or effectiveness of activities, and the overall rating.
5. Based upon the analysis a soft set of recommendations was developed.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. Little or no formal evaluation has been conducted in the area.
2. High visibility patrols are more successful at deterrence than apprehension.
3. High/low visibility patrols are slightly more successful at apprehension than deterrence.
4. Existing data suggest that low visibility projects were slightly more successful in detering crime than in increasing arrests.
5. All three types had common characteristics including using the best men in the department, providing specialized training, relying heavily on crime analysis for planning, internal monitoring

and evaluation of the projects, a span of control of 10 or less men, and relying on crime and location oriented operational modes.

6. Low visibility patrols characteristics: achieved about half of their objectives, were generally successful, were as expensive, and were favorably perceived by their community. The successes were due to good planning and cooperation, building strong cases, use of exceptional personnel, significant financial support, extensive training and good use of equipment. Failures were due to low productivity.
7. High visibility patrols: were more extensively evaluated, affected positive change, obtained less than half of their objectives, and qualified successes. The reasons for the successes were generally the same as those for low visibility projects.
8. Combined high/low visibility patrols: most were evaluated, 60 percent of the objectives were obtained, affected positive change, and were flexible operations. The successes were due to the same reasons as the other project types and failures were due to the use of costly equipment and volunteer overtime personnel.

D. Project Policy Implications

The framework for the specialized patrol projects can be described as pertaining to large cities and the common settings described above. The type of patrol depends upon the assumptions one accepts concerning the efficacy of visible or invisible police presence. The assessment of the projects and the report demonstrate a lack of information concerning the validity of the assumptions and the overall effectiveness of the projects. It points out the need for considerable additional research in the area and more formalized evaluation of the patrol projects. Further research is recommended on patrol methods, process measures, and outputs or impacts of the patrol activities. As products 5 and 6 of their study, the authors developed designs for local, multiple project and field experimental evaluations of specialized patrol.

E. Critique of Quality, Usability, and Utility

Due to time and budget limitations, the study focused upon previously conducted evaluations and expert opinions related to a number of specialized patrol projects. The final report is a document produced for evaluators rather than for practitioners. Quickly recognizing the lack of quantitative data about the specialized patrol projects, the authors attempted to quantify for comparison many different aspects of the specialized patrol projects. This confused me about what they were actually saying, i.e., were the projects good or bad, did they accomplish or not accomplish the objectives they were

intended to set up, etc. The report clearly is a prelude to the Phase II study. In that sense it satisfies the study objectives. Potential users of this document primarily would be persons involved in research planning and project evaluation at LEAA. This report would be of little value to police chiefs in determining whether or not to establish a specialized patrol project.

F. Utilization

Actual utilization of study findings is represented in the following:

OPM:

- Useful in developing questions for ICAP program evaluation (University City Science Center impact evaluation under OPE).

NILECJ:

- The results from Specialized Patrol were combined with those from Traditional Preventive Patrol and synthesized in a prescriptive package for dissemination and marketing.
- The study dealt, in part, with the use of SWAT teams. Since this type of allocation and deployment of personnel has become decreasingly popular, the NEP has never been directly utilized in the field.
- Specialized Patrol Projects has played a part in determining future research and evaluation needs. The findings have contributed to the state-of-the-art and enhanced examinations of various other aspects of police patrol.
- Specialized Patrol Projects NEP was concerned with a program development issue and probably was effectively utilized in that sense. However, the study findings were not particularly meaningful with regard to research and evaluation strategy and needs.
- The study offered no utility for the practitioner.
- Although this study and the other patrol NEP's were not useful for action program staff from the point of view of program design, the prescriptive package developed from these NEP's was valuable in regard to design and marketing.
- The patrol studies were utilized in the development of program models, testing, demonstration and marketing, and in regard to planning further evaluations in a topic area.

OCJP:

- The study has been utilized as background information in the development of "Action Program Model Packages" for ICAP.
- Specialized Patrol Projects was utilized in the design of the Patrol Emphasis Program, however, this study was somewhat less useful than Traditional Preventive Patrol.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Traditional Preventive Patrol NEP Phase I Summary Report

A. Descriptive Abstract

This report is a judgmental assessment of current knowledge about the conduct of traditional preventive patrol. It presents a summary of the findings of a comprehensive review, the details of which are found in three volumes identified in the preface. The inquiry was confined to the operational activities of uniformed officers assigned to general patrol. An attempt was made to separate opinion from fact, the central objective being to identify and evaluate empirically-based findings regarding the relationship between patrol effectiveness and the variety of factors over which police officials have control.

The approach is goal-oriented, and the five principal and most commonly accepted goals of patrol are identified as:

1. Deterrence,
2. Apprehension,
3. Provision of non-crime related services,
4. Provision of a sense of community security and satisfaction with the police, and
5. Recovery of stolen goods.

Each goal is examined in terms of the hypotheses and assumptions which link specific patrol activities, tactics, and strategies to goal attainment. Attention is devoted to determining the validity of these hypotheses and assumptions and to the type and quality of the measures of effectiveness which are used to gauge the contribution of various patrol practices to the over-all aims of patrol. The quality of these measures determines, to a large degree, the reliability and validity of available knowledge about preventive patrol.

Following the examination of goals, the report turns to consideration of the inputs and processes which comprise preventive patrol: characteristics of patrol personnel, modes of transportation, deployment practices, supervision, and in-service task assignments. It is through the manipulation of these factors that a department seeks to realize the desired levels of: patrol visibility, predictability of officer movement, response time, preventive patrol activity, service provision, officer/community compatibility, officer knowledge about the community, and officer misconduct and corruption. These intermediate strategic and tactical objectives of preventive patrol serve as the arbiters of patrol effectiveness. They provide the linkage between the inputs and processes of patrol and the attainment of the goals of patrol. Thus, patrol administrators, on the basis of explicit and implicit assumptions, manipulate the resources (inputs) at their disposal through the processes of deployment, supervision, and task assignment in order to reach the desired levels of attainment for the eight intermediate goals. It is through the achievement of these objectives that the patrol division seeks to realize the five basic goals of patrol.

This report focuses on the goals, objectives and activities of patrol on a disaggregated basis. The division of content into discrete areas facilitates analysis and presentation and reflects the fact that patrol represents an amalgam of many quite disparate activities. It should not, however, be allowed to obscure the complex interrelationships between these activities, each one of which may be analyzed separately but truly understood only in its relationship to the entire patrol system.

The report concludes with some prescriptive statements which are based on this assessment of the current state of knowledge about patrol. The final chapter discusses aspects of patrol which are most in need of further study and offers some suggestions and lessons concerning the execution of research on patrol. It points out important areas of ignorance in the present "state of the art," in which careful examination would have a significant impact on the practice of patrol while providing a firm grounding for the development of further knowledge about patrol.

The report contains a number of exhibits. Some of them present an assessment of techniques used for measuring goal attainment. Others display assumptions regarding the relationship between the goals of patrol and the contribution of various aspects of patrol to the achievement of its goals. The exhibits displaying assumptions are analytical constructs which present points of view rather than facts or knowledge. They are heuristic devices which are intended to facilitate systematic and critical thinking about patrol. As such, they seek to highlight significant and often controversial questions rather than resolve issues. Knowledge about the merits and implications of these assumptions is summarized in the text of this report and presented in greater detail in the volumes identified in the preface.

B. Methodology

The information and conclusions presented in this report were developed from an extensive review of available literature on patrol practices and from project reports setting forth the findings of research and program activities supported primarily by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and, to a lesser degree, by the Police Foundation. Information was also developed through direct contact with all LEAA regional offices, discussions with State Planning Agency representatives, and a survey of some 300 police and sheriffs' departments throughout the country. Finally, site visits were made to 26 police and sheriffs' departments for the purpose of reviewing on-going programs which had come to the attention of the project staff and were believed either to be particularly representative of traditional patrol practices or to constitute significant or provocative innovations in patrol. Extensive telephone conversations were also held with representatives of many departments.

C.1 Findings and Conclusions on Goal Attainment

1. The goal of deterrence is of primary importance to patrol activities, but little is known about the relationship between patrol strategies and deterrence as at present there are no satisfactory cost-effective measures for evaluating the effects of patrol on deterrence. Departments throughout the country are expressing increasing concern about this problem. Unfortunately, however, further analysis will continue to be based on second-order, surrogate indicators since non-events cannot be directly measured.
2. While apprehension of criminal offenders is a primary goal of patrol operations, little is known about the relationship between patrol strategies and apprehension, and no entirely satisfactory measures exist for evaluating the effect of patrol tactics on the rate of apprehension.
3. Measures of the effectiveness of patrol in providing non-crime related services are:
 - a. activity counts showing the number of non-crime related services provided, often as a percentage of the number of requests received;
 - b. changes in the number and content of citizen complaints concerning the failure to provide such services satisfactorily if at all; and
 - c. information from survey data concerning the general quality of service provision and the satisfaction of the recipient with the performance of the police officer.

It is felt that the highest reliability and validity is achieved with community attitude surveys in association with data on the percent of calls for service to which the police responded.
4. While measures of community attitudes exist, they have not been adequately used to test the impact of tactical changes on levels of citizen satisfaction and felt security. As a result, most of the reported relationships are based on uncertain assumptions. Attitudinal survey data, when obtained appropriately, can provide a reliable and valid measure of the number of people who feel secure within the community.
5. Measurement of effectiveness in recovery of stolen goods is based on:
 - a. the value of goods recovered;
 - b. the value of goods recovered as a percentage of the value of goods reported stolen; and
 - c. the speed with which recovered goods are returned to their owners.

The first two indicators are direct measures. However, since neither is related to the total amount of stolen goods, but at best only to the reported amount, an increase in the value or quantity of recovered goods may indicate either increased patrol effectiveness or possibly decreased effectiveness if

the value or quantity of property stolen has also increased. The prompt return of recovered property is an important goal, but is not ordinarily the responsibility of patrol officers.

6. Preventive patrol is only one of the many factors which can affect the realization of the five primary goals. This makes it difficult to relate the contribution of specific patrol activities and practices directly to the attainment of goals. Consequently, patrol administration typically concentrates on achieving the desired levels of the following eight strategic and tactical objectives:
 - a. patrol visibility;
 - b. predictability of patrol unit movement;
 - c. response time;
 - d. level of preventive patrol activity;
 - e. level of service provision;
 - f. officer compatibility with their assigned beats;
 - g. officer knowledge of the community; and
 - h. officer misconduct and corruption.

Unlike the goals of patrol, it is believed that these intermediate objectives can be directly realized through the manipulation of departmental resources. Each objective is linked by a set of explicit and/or implicit assumptions to the attainment of one or more of the five basic goals. They serve as mediators between patrol activities and goal attainment.

C.2 Findings and Conclusions on Operational Issues

1. It seems clear that from a "technological" point of view, sufficient knowledge and equipment exist to permit the fine manipulation of deployment so as to reflect to a very high degree the assumptions, desires and concerns of the patrol command. The state of the art is highly advanced, and the actual deployment of officers can be made to reflect the desired configuration through both motivation and supervision. There remains, however, one significant and, at the moment, unresolved problem: there has been very little research on the impact of alternative deployment patterns upon changes in the overall effectiveness of the patrol division. As a result, while we know a great deal about the techniques of deployment, we know very little about its ultimate effect upon anything other than the ability to respond to calls for service.
2. It is commonly recognized that supervision of a patrol force is an inherently difficult task. Patrol divisions differ from most other formal organizations in that there is a great deal of individual discretion at the lowest levels of the organizational hierarchy. This presents a fairly unique supervisory situation which, while widely recognized, has been the subject of very little careful research. As a result, present knowledge about the relationship of supervisory practices to patrol effectiveness is extremely incomplete.

3. The present state of knowledge about patrol officer corruption is not sufficiently detailed and reliable to permit any very definite conclusions concerning the relative merits of various approaches to dealing with the problem. The John Jay School of Criminal Justice is currently conducting a NILECJ/LEAA-funded study of police corruption which promises to fill some of the gaps in current knowledge. Certainly, little can be accomplished in the absence of better and more detailed knowledge.
4. The effectiveness of various in-service task assignments for patrol officers is an issue of growing concern. Present knowledge about the relative merits of different in-service task activities is slight, and this would seem to be an extremely important topic for further investigation.
5. There has not been a systematic study of the relative performance of white and non-white patrol officers. However, fragmentary evidence does exist which suggests that, on the whole, officers patrolling in minority areas perform similar tasks in a similar manner regardless of race.
6. From an operational point of view, the most important concerns regarding women on patrol appear to be: (a) the ability of women to perform adequately on patrol; (b) the advantages and disadvantages of using women on patrol; and (c) the possible effects of large numbers of female officers on the nature of police operations. To date, program evaluations of women on patrol have been conducted in three departments: New York City; St. Louis County, Missouri; and Washington, D.C. The sample sizes in New York and St. Louis (14 and 16 respectively) are too small for their findings to be regarded as anything more than suggestive. However, the Washington, D. C. study represents an ambitious, elaborate, and influential effort to evaluate experimentally the use of women on patrol. It concluded that:
 - a. It is appropriate to assign women to patrol on the same basis as men,
 - b. Employing women on patrol has numerous advantages, and
 - c. The use of a substantial number of women on patrol may reduce the likelihood of violent encounters between the police and the public.But there are serious flaws in the design and execution of the study which undermine the validity of its findings. This is not an argument against using women on patrol, but rather an indication of the need for better studies of this issue.
7. The available information on the effects of education on the conduct of police patrol is incomplete. It is difficult to generalize about the influence of education because educated officers may differ from their peers in many ways which are potentially related to performance, and different types of education may have differential impacts on patrol abilities.

At present, there is little available evidence to support the assumptions which relate higher levels of education among officers to improved individual performance and patrol effectiveness.

8. Experience with non-sworn personnel on patrol has generally been positive, but there is very little definite information about their effectiveness or the ways in which they can most profitably be used. This issue is being addressed in an LEAA-funded study in Fremont, California, which will hopefully make a major contribution to the meager state of current knowledge.
9. In assessing the relative merits of alternative modes of transportation, patrol administrators are concerned with the impact of the vehicle upon the ability of the department to realize the goals and objectives of patrol, and the operating characteristics of the vehicle in terms of officer safety, officer morale, vehicle availability, and economy of operation. With respect to these factors, particular modes can be viewed as being arranged along continuums of various dimensions. However, there is little well-documented guidance to assist departments in selecting the most appropriate configuration of vehicles given their perceived needs. As a result, departments have often tended to adopt new and different modes of transport in the absence of careful evaluation regarding their relative economy, safety, and effectiveness. Widely publicized endorsements often serve as the primary justification for the utilization of particular vehicles.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. To be of value, research on patrol must be relevant to the needs of policy makers. This does not mean that applied research should be conducted to the exclusion of basic research questions. The police community generally recognizes that to produce meaningful and programmatically useful results, applied research must be based on a sound foundation. But it does mean that all research should be ultimately justifiable in terms of its relevance to departmental concerns.
2. Research projects should be designed to reflect the operating realities and constraints of police work. Departments are more receptive to the adaptation of policies and procedures for research purposes than has been commonly believed. However, it is still incumbent on researchers to carefully assess and report the impact of these often unforeseen constraints on the reliability and validity of their findings.
3. It is of utmost importance that research and evaluation components be built into programs from the outset and that sufficient lead time be provided for the accumulation of the baseline

data required for the conduct of a valid and reliable study. All too often, research designs have been developed on an ad hoc, after-the-fact basis. This deficiency has been responsible for many of the problems in much of the research carried out to date. The timely development of adequate evaluation designs may necessitate increased availability of funds for planning grants.

4. The prospects for the successful completion of a research project are greatly enhanced when all the departmental personnel who will be involved are carefully briefed and provided with an opportunity to express their concerns and offer their advice. It is also useful to maintain a detailed chronicle of all project activities. This not only facilitates the reconstruction of the project for analytical purposes, but it also contributes to the transferability of successful programs and useful findings to other departments. Finally, care should be taken to report results promptly and accurately. Modest and accurate presentation with a minimum of fanfare enhances the acceptance of research conclusions. The premature release of incomplete findings can touch off unproductive debates which may diminish the acceptability and utility of the final results.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

This report is a summary of the several other reports which are mentioned in it. Consequently, very little of the content can be skipped over lightly by those who have a genuine interest in preventive patrol. It focuses on issues and questions which have been featured prominently in the relevant literature and/or appear to be of particular concern to law enforcement agencies. The detail and complexity of the subject are competently presented through the numerous exhibits which supplement the text. It has relevance to the every-day decisionmaking in police departments as well as to the planning of research on preventive patrol.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

This report should be of assistance to police departments interested in improving their patrol operations, particularly because it focuses on issues which are under the administrative control of such departments. It should be of value to those who are planning research programs in the subject area of preventive patrol, as well as to decisionmakers responsible for funding such research. It indicates the questions which are as yet unanswered, and points out some of the pitfalls in the attempts that have been made to answer those questions.

Actual Utilization:

OPM:

- . Useful in developing questions for ICAP program evaluation (University City Science Center impact evaluation).

NILECJ:

- . Findings from the Traditional Preventive Patrol NEP Phase I and Specialized Patrol were combined and utilized in a prescriptive package dealing with patrol strategies, which served as the basis for developing a training package entitled Managing Patrol Operations.
- . The document on traditional patrol has been used extensively "in-house" and was quickly picked up by the Wilmington, Delaware project dealing with split-force patrol.
- . The Managing Criminal Investigations project followed from the Traditional Patrol NEP.
- . Within the Institute, effective utilization has been impeded by lack of understanding of evaluation findings among managerial staff.
- . This document has been utilized in the development of program models, testing, demonstration and marketing, and in regard to planning further evaluations in a topic area.
- . Recommendations from Traditional Preventive Patrol were utilized in order to provide justification for program continuation (consideration of a particular topic area for future research).

OCJP:

- . The document served as one of many "background pieces" in the development of "Action Program Model Packages" for ICAP.
- . The findings of the Traditional Preventive Patrol NEP were noted as reinforcement to results obtained from previous evaluations conducted in the patrol area.
- . The study findings served to reinforce the design of the Patrol Emphasis Program.
- . Managing Patrol Operations (which was largely based on Traditional Preventive Patrol and Specialized Patrol) was not utilized by the action program, because these prescriptive packages deal with agencies on a test basis.

IV. ADJUDICATION

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Court Information Systems: NEP Phase I Report

A. Descriptive Abstract

This report presents a judgemental assessment of court information systems and the development projects which produced them. Sponsored by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and conducted by the MITRE Corporation Program, this NEP Phase I assessment reports on the existing state of knowledge based on a literature search, discussions with practitioners, an extensive nationwide telephone survey, and 13 indepth field site visits.

The site visits revealed that little formal transfer of knowledge among jurisdictions concerning information systems was occurring because little authoritative information is available. Courts are being influenced in system development decisions by conferences, peer groups, vendors, and other government agencies. The study discovered no formal quantitative evaluations of courts systems being conducted, although system development project costs ranged from less than \$.5 million to over \$4 million. Annual system operating expenditures require from \$100,000 to over \$1 million.

This summary report incorporates the findings and conclusions of four reports: a discussion of significant court information systems issues, descriptions and flow diagrams of current system operations, a description of the development of the assessment framework, and a judgemental assessment utilizing the framework and the critical court information system issues. Eighteen primary issues related to court information systems are discussed, followed by a related judgemental assessment based on the results from the on-site field visits.

B. Methodology

1. A search of the literature and related reports produced an initial list of 111 jurisdictions with operational information systems.
2. The list was reduced to approximately 40 systems by selecting only systems that; (a) were currently operational, (b) support trial court operations, and (c) support both operational and management functions.
3. Based on source of funds, the population served, length of time operational, and other factors, 13 systems were selected for site visits.

4. Data were gathered during site visits to document (a) the process by which the court information system was conceived, designed, and implemented, (b) the actual flow of information through the system, (c) the impact of the system on the court, users, and the justice system, and (d) the potential for developing evaluation standards for measuring the effectiveness and impact of such systems.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. Requirements Analysis is either completely ignored or performed in a perfunctory manner.
2. Courts lack technically trained personnel to accomplish system design and must rely on outsiders to design and implement the system.
3. There has not been a general recognition of the need for a long term funding commitment for the system following initial development (initial development costs range from .5 to 1.0 million dollars).
4. Minimal use has been made of court management and case flow management, because no individual was charged with specific responsibility and case flow management was not recognized as a separate distinct court function.
5. There has been little transfer of systems due to lack of information about available systems, the not-invented-here syndrome, and dissatisfactions of the originating jurisdiction with the system.
6. Consultants have been used in the design stages with modest success.
7. Few courts have established separate project organizations to develop and implement systems.
8. The users of the system and the judges and court administrators have had mixed responsibilities and degrees of participation in the development and design of a system.
9. There is a general lack of interest by the judiciary and some clerks of court in this court information system and its operation.
10. Courts have generally used the existing government computing systems which consist of a large computer with associated data display terminals, printers and communications devices.
11. Documentation of computer programs is inadequate.

12. The systems have not limited or restricted traditional court activities and organization.
13. The courts have for the most part maintained the same quality of justice without regard to the court information system and its potential for assisting in improved judicial administration.
14. There have been no real evaluations of any court information system projects which utilize quantitative assessments of performance.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. System development should be conducted in limited discrete steps rather than in a giant leap and within the boundaries established by the real world constraints which are found in the court environment.
2. The funding source must be aware of the project and its goal and of the long-term commitment required to insure successful implementation and operation. Court information effectiveness is not independent of the commitment to utilize the system's outputs or management, by both judges and court administrators. Therefore, greater attention must be placed on the total management process. In transfer systems among jurisdictions, there is a natural tendency to emphasize the computer in such contemplated transfers rather than the information needs of the implementing court. Better documentation of the system characteristics would be advantageous to those contemplating transfer.
3. The systems approach is neglected in the overall design and development of information systems.
4. Since court information projects usually involve substantial amounts of resources and produce significant changes in the operating procedures of a number of key criminal justice agencies, evaluations should be conducted before additional commitments of scarce funding are allocated to system development.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

This report presents an abundance of information and a framework of a judgemental assessment. The summary document is supported by several other volumes which are not fully identified. While the findings and conclusions are based primarily on the observations of 13 court systems, it is clear that the earlier literature review and discussions with

other persons are significantly influencing the results. It is not clear which are the sources for the specific findings.

A table or matrix identifying specific system features or characteristics with the court systems observed would have been helpful for understanding the overall status of development, and to understand more clearly which systems were being described. In summary, none of the 13 systems observed is identified as particularly good or bad in the framework of the evaluation.

The report takes a very strong systems approach to the issue of designing, developing, and implementing a court information system. The organizational issues are strongly emphasized and should offer forewarnings to those administrators contemplating the addition of a system. The reader will have to go elsewhere to identify which system would be most desirable to be modeled.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

The report should be utilized by funding sources prior to funding a new court information systems project to insure that the framework for the project is satisfactory. Since the study demonstrates lack of evaluation it should be utilized by those responsible for evaluation activities. The documentation underlined in the summary report should be useful in highlighting exemplary projects and identifying shortcomings of others. It should be useful to program development personnel in consideration of court management programs. It should be useful for planning, training or technical assistance to courts personnel in the areas of project planning, systems operation, and organization. Most importantly, the report should have utility to courts administrators throughout the U.S. who may be contemplating a courts information system. It will highlight for them the complexities of designing and managing a system and the reality of potential shortcomings of any information system.

Actual Utilization:

- . The NEP Phase I Assessment of Court Information Systems noted a serious information gap between systems design and management personnel. Several NILECJ staff had recommended that a Special Conference be held to assist decision makers in the courts, LEAA, and the SPA's in planning, implementing, and expanding these systems. However this topic was not selected for such a conference.
- . Although various staff members felt that the study's conclusions supported changes in training and planning, the appropriate staff demonstrated no interest in follow-up to the grantee's recommendations.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

An Evaluation of the Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS) as Operated by the Superior Court Division of the United States Attorney's Office of the District of Columbia

A. Descriptive Abstract

The Prosecutor's Management Information System (PROMIS) provides information to Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSA's) on all pending felony and serious misdemeanor cases prosecuted by the United States Attorney's Office (Superior Court Division) for the District of Columbia. Comprehensive information on pending cases is readily available to AUSA's from eight PROMIS computer terminals located in various offices within the Superior Court Division. Selected PROMIS information is available to the Washington, D. C. Metropolitan Police Department through computer terminals located at police precincts throughout the city. Additional PROMIS information is available to AUSA's in the form of printed reports generated from the active cases portion of the PROMIS data base.

This evaluation, completed in December 1975, had the following three major objectives:

1. To determine whether the system was providing a needed information service,
2. If so, to determine how efficiently the system was meeting this information need, and
3. To make recommendations for improving the PROMIS information service if deficiencies were discovered in the current operation.

The report describes the operational history of the system, the method used to evaluate it, associated costs and benefits, findings related to the observed level of service, and recommendations for correcting problems associated with PROMIS operations. Supporting and related data are presented in appendices.

B. Methodology

1. A careful study of PROMIS system documentation.
2. Development of PROMIS user questionnaires designed to elicit information about the utilization of specific PROMIS reports, the degree of dependence on the system by the users, and the users' evaluation of the quality of the PROMIS information service.
3. Development of questionnaires for PROMIS support employees containing questions dealing with job training, job knowledge, availability of written data maintenance procedures, and a question dealing with the procedures used to check the accuracy of PROMIS data.

4. Interviews with 50 of the 75 AUSA's employed in the Superior Court Division, using the user questionnaire.
5. Interviews with 40 employees having responsibilities relating to PROMIS support, using the support personnel questionnaire.
6. Observation of the PROMIS data preparation and input procedures in order to determine their efficiency.
7. Testing of the accuracy of data entered into PROMIS through repeated sampling at key points in the data entry process.
8. Identification of PROMIS costs and assignment of them to one of the following three categories:
 - a. Developmental costs,
 - b. Recurring operational costs, and
 - c. Recurring indirect costs.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. PROMIS provides an important and necessary information service to the Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office.
2. PROMIS is an easily accessible source of comprehensive data collected for all cases prosecuted by the Superior Court Division. It minimizes the clerical functions of the AUSA's, allowing more time for their prosecutorial tasks, and aids in case preparation, plea bargaining, recommending bond, etc., by providing background information on defendants.
3. PROMIS serves as a valuable managerial tool by furnishing the means to monitor case progress through the judicial system.
4. The following deficiencies prevent the full information support capability of the system from being utilized, and should be corrected as quickly as possible:
 - a. Lack of a system manager,
 - b. Dependence on contractor,
 - c. Lack of formal training programs,
 - d. Lack of PROMIS system security,
 - e. Use of noisy office areas for on-line data input,
 - f. Reassignment of PROMIS personnel without proper training,
 - g. Inaccuracy of PROMIS information,
 - h. Violation of the Privacy Act of 1974, and
 - i. Collection of case weighting data.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. The Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO) should continue to maintain and operate the PROMIS

system as a primary source of case status information and management support data.

2. The USAO should promptly carry out its plan to select and hire a PROMIS system manager.
3. The USAO should continue its present activities related to the completion and implementation of a procedures manual governing the current operation of PROMIS in the Superior Court Division.
4. The present effort to correct errors in the PROMIS data base should be continued with the allocation of as much manpower to this activity as is possible.
5. Arrangements should be made so the data base updating via terminals within Superior Court Division offices can be performed in quiet areas, at scheduled times, without interruptions.
6. The PROMIS support staff performing data preparation, input, correction, update, quality control, etc., should be trained thoroughly in any new PROMIS-related responsibility prior to being assigned the new responsibility.
7. Formal training courses should be developed and scheduled periodically for all AUSA's and paralegals, to familiarize them with the full spectrum of available PROMIS information.
8. The USAO should assume full management responsibility for PROMIS, and dependence on INSLAW for general assistance in PROMIS operation, maintenance, and troubleshooting be brought to an end.
9. The USAO should continue work now in progress to develop programming to produce the computerized audit trail necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974.
10. The USAO should immediately request assistance from the Office of Management and Finance of the Department of Justice in the planning and implementation of a complete security system for PROMIS.
11. The Crime Analysis Worksheets, used by AUSA's to collect data for every case during the case screening process, should be prepared by a paralegal using the source documents prepared at the initial case papering stage, after the documents are returned from the key-to-tape process.
12. Representatives of the USAO should meet with officials of LEAA to obtain information about the future use of the PROMIS case weighting data. If LEAA plans to utilize the data for continued research purposes, then it would be appropriate for LEAA to provide funds for collecting and maintaining the data in PROMIS. If LEAA does not expect to use the information,

then the USAO could discontinue the collection and maintenance procedures associated with it, and reduce PROMIS costs.

13. The USAO should review the distribution and usage of the PROMIS printed reports, with the objective of expanding distribution to offices where such report information would be useful, and discontinuing distribution where reports now distributed are not used. In cases where reports are of no value to any USAO office, the PROMIS computer programs which produce such reports should be evaluated for possible removal from the system to reduce PROMIS costs.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

This report is a straightforward presentation of the results of an evaluation which was, apparently, done with thoroughness. All relevant aspects of the evaluation are clearly described. Findings and recommendations are cogently presented. The report has utility and relevance for anyone interested in the implementation/operation of a prosecutor's management information system.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

This report should be utilized by the USAO of the Superior Court Division in D.C. with specific consideration being given to the implementation of the recommendations. It should also be utilized by USAO's in other jurisdictions who may be considering setting up such an information system. It should be utilized by decisionmakers in LEAA who control funds for the support of such systems.

Actual Utilization:

- . Actual utilization of these evaluation results occurs on the state level, primarily through the guidelines book. However, LEAA staff have no way of assessing the extent and impact of such utilization.
- . Policy oriented recommendations from the report were probably utilized by the SPA's.
- . The regional offices were never required to incorporate the recommendations from this study into the comprehensive plans of the states.
- . The PROMIS system findings and recommendations were utilized in a demonstration of the program in the State of Kansas.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Neighborhood Justice Centers
An Analysis of Potential Models

A. Descriptive Abstract

Neighborhood Justice Centers, as defined by the American Bar Association Report of the Pound Conference Follow-up Task Force, are "facilities...designed to make available a variety of methods of processing disputes, including arbitration, mediation, referral to small claims courts as well as referral to courts of general jurisdiction." The purpose of this report is to review selected dispute processing projects which are currently in operation, and provide recommendations for Neighborhood Justice Center models which are appropriate for experimental implementation.

A number of projects have been developed in recent years which are similar in many respects to the broad definition of Neighborhood Justice Centers. These projects provide a forum for the resolution of minor disputes, as an alternative to arrest or formal court action. In addition to arbitration, mediation, and referral to the courts, the projects often employ social work staff, make referrals to social service agencies, and conduct fact-finding and related functions. Virtually all of these projects are of very recent origin. The Columbus Night Prosecutor Program, the forebear of many of the current projects, was established in 1971. Similarly, the pioneering work of the American Arbitration Association and the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution in applying labor-management conflict resolution techniques to citizen dispute resolution is a recent innovation.

A sample of dispute processing projects was selected which spanned the range of resolution techniques, referral sources, organizational affiliations, and mediation staff characteristics. These projects were studied in detail to provide a basis for making recommendations regarding Neighborhood Justice Center models. Project selection was based on a review of the characteristics of a variety of projects across the country and discussions with leaders in the field of dispute resolution regarding the range of projects which might represent the currently available models.

The six projects selected for intensive review were:

- A. The Boston Urban Court Project;
- B. The Columbus Night Prosecutor Program;
- C. The Miami Citizen Dispute Settlement Program;
- D. The New York Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution Dispute Center;
- E. The Rochester American Arbitration Association Community Dispute Services Project;

F. The San Francisco Community Board Program.

Chapter 1 of the report provides an overview of available dispute processing mechanisms, and highlights major recommendations for the improvement of American dispute processing.

Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the major issues which need to be considered in developing a Neighborhood Justice Center. Twelve major aspects of the structure and functioning of these Centers are reviewed. The advantages and disadvantages of different program components are discussed. The aim of Chapter 2 is to identify the major dimensions on which Neighborhood Justice Centers may differ, to provide concrete examples, where possible, of projects incorporating the specific features under discussion, and to analyze the implications of implementing specific project components or arrays of components. Chapter 3 contains detailed reports on the history, organization, and functioning of the six projects which were studied.

B. Methodology

All of the projects were visited during May of 1977 except for the San Francisco project which was still in the development phase and had not begun to process cases. Prior to project site visits, descriptive materials regarding the projects were requested from the project directors. Materials received included grant proposals, annual and quarterly reports, evaluative studies, media accounts of the projects' achievements, and concept papers. A project survey instrument was developed which included questions regarding the nature and size of the community; project start-up including questions on initial development, grant processing, and early implementation; case criteria; referral sources; resolution techniques; hearing staff qualifications; follow-up procedures; project organization; staff training; costs; evaluation; and general recommendations of the project regarding models for Neighborhood Justice Centers. A copy of the survey instrument is presented in Appendix A of the report.

During the site visits, efforts were made to observe the various components of the project in operation. In many cases representatives of the projects' referral sources were interviewed, visits were made to the local courts, prosecutors' offices, etc., to observe intake and screening practices, and, where permissible, mediation hearings were observed. Project directors and relevant staff members were interviewed at each project, and past project directors were contacted if they had recently been replaced by the current project director. In the case of the San Francisco project, the project director was interviewed during a site visit to the East Coast, and project materials were reviewed.

Each project director was provided with the opportunity to review and comment on a draft of the description of his program to insure accuracy and comprehensiveness. Information on additional projects was gathered through telephone conversations with project staff and a review of relevant literature dealing with dispute-processing mechanisms.

C. Findings and Conclusions

C.1 The Range of Mechanisms Potentially Useful to Dispute Centers

Neighborhood Justice Centers can employ any of the following non-adjudicatory third party dispute resolution techniques: (1) conciliation, (2) mediation, (3) arbitration, (4) fact-finding, and (5) the informal court oriented processing listed in the report under "administrative procedures" in which compromises are encouraged in light of impending adversary proceedings. It has been recommended that the whole panoply of dispute processing mechanisms be housed together and that screening staff allocate incoming disputants to specific processes or sequences of processes (e.g., mediation followed by arbitration if necessary). This recommendation seems sound. Clearly, this type of thorough restructuring of the way in which we process disputes cannot be accomplished overnight. The Department of Justice's pilot projects, incorporating mediation and arbitration for the processing of disputes, will provide a valuable first step toward the development of a comprehensive and highly integrated dispute processing mechanism suitable to the widely varying types of disputes which occur in society.

C.2 Educating Disputants in the Use of Unilateral and Dyadic Approaches

Although the unilateral and dyadic approaches to dispute processing cited in the report are under the control of the individual disputants rather than third party forums, Neighborhood Justice Centers can provide a valuable service in teaching disputants how to use these informal techniques for dispute processing. Many disputes could be successfully resolved without the need for third party intervention if disputants first attempted to use constructive unilateral and dyadic approaches such as careful consideration of whether the dispute is justified, attempts at negotiation, etc. Mediation sessions at the Neighborhood Justice Center can provide disputants with valuable experience in negotiating differences to arrive at a compromise. Neighborhood Justice Center staff should receive training in methods of educating disputants to resolve disputes independently. Hopefully, the Centers could serve both to resolve immediate conflicts and also teach citizens how to avoid the need for official third party intervention in the resolution of future conflicts.

C.3 Potential Pitfalls in the Development of Neighborhood Justice Centers

The combined forces supporting Neighborhood Justice Centers have enabled the concept to achieve a promising beginning at both the federal and local levels. Even with broad-based support and apparently sound concepts, however, the move to develop Neighborhood Justice Centers is not assured of success. Other promising reforms have failed to achieve their goals due to an array of problems common to many social reform projects. Neighborhood Justice Centers are not likely to be immune from these same problems. Program developers should carefully consider the various factors which have limited the success of some previous social projects in order to avoid repeating earlier mistakes and to increase the chances of widespread implementation of

the Neighborhood Justice Center concept. Problems which deserve particular attention include: (1) overpromising potential achievements, (2) lack of attention to mechanisms for on-going local funding, (3) excessive bureaucratization, and (4) transformation of original goals.

D. Program/Policy Implications

D.1 Data Relating to Project Development

The systematic collection of data on the development of new Neighborhood Justice Centers would be useful to aid potential replicators in understanding the types of obstacles likely to hinder project development and ways to overcome these obstacles. The data would also provide insights into how public agencies and community members interact in project development and might provide guidance for strategies for community involvement in other jurisdictions.

D.2 Data Relating to Project Processes

Every project should collect on-going data on project caseflow, case characteristics, personnel allocation, etc. to enable the project to monitor its achievements and problems.

D.3 Data Relating to Project Impact

In addition to data on project caseflow activities, information would also be valuable regarding the project's impact upon clients, the local criminal justice system and social service agencies. Data on client impact can be obtained in part through the follow-up phone contacts with disputants. Clients can be asked questions regarding their satisfaction with the dispute's resolution, their contacts with social service agencies, the courts, etc.

Measuring project impact on the criminal justice system would require determination of the likelihood that project cases would be prosecuted through the various stages of the criminal justice system. This type of prediction is, of course, extremely difficult.

D.4 Central Research Questions Requiring Attention

Some of the interesting research questions which are closely tied to Neighborhood Justice Center operation and might fruitfully be explored in comparative evaluation research and "state-of-the-art" assessments include the following:

1. the influence of public versus private sponsorship upon perceptions of neutrality of the dispute processing project, degree of stigmatization of clients, and differential willingness of community members to participate in project development and functioning.

2. the influence of case criteria policies upon the public's perception of the Center, particularly in regard to the processing of non-mediational cases, such as bad check cases, which often involve an institutional complainant and an individual respondent.
3. mechanisms for structuring incentives to encourage police officers to make referrals to the Neighborhood Justice Center, such as the provision of the equivalent of "collar credit" for Center referrals.
4. the causes of case attrition from initial referral to appearance at hearings focusing upon the possible disenchantment of citizens with institutional solutions to their problems.
5. the impact of pre-hearing cooling off periods upon case attrition, and possible causes for this attrition.
6. the influence of the use of public agency stationery and threats of prosecution upon the rates of appearance of respondents.
7. the degree to which strong threats of possible criminal court action result in disputants perceiving their mediated case resolutions to be as enforceable as arbitrated resolutions with civil remedies.
8. the relative merits of conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and combinations of these techniques in resolving disputes.
9. the relative merits of different hearing procedures such as the use of written versus oral resolutions, single versus multiple mediators, long versus short hearings, etc. upon dispute resolution.
10. the possibility of using a two-stage process of mediation and arbitration, when necessary, with different hearing officers in the two stages to avoid constraints occurring when an officer must serve as both a mediator and an arbitrator.
11. the relative merits of variations in types of mediation staff including trained citizens, law students, lawyers, and professional mediators in resolving cases brought before the Neighborhood Justice Center. In addition, data on citizen perceptions of the adequacy of each type of mediator would be valuable.

Larger scale, more basic research questions which might be usefully explored with substantial research programs include:

1. the current availability of dispute resolution mechanisms in communities, and differences in their availability as a function of community size, demographic characteristics, etc.

2. an analysis of trends in the development of non-adjudicatory remedies to problems and the apparent causes for these trends.
3. the appropriate role of lawyers in the resolution of disputes in present day America, particularly given the current reward structure existing in the legal profession favoring large scale litigation. As part of this study, possibilities should be explored for modifications in the training of lawyers and para-legal staff to accommodate the recent move in the United States away from reliance on adjudicatory forums.
4. additional cross-cultural research on the varieties of dispute processing mechanisms of the type being conducted by Johnson, Felstiner, et al.
5. variations in individual definitions of "communities" and the degree to which individuals are interested in having their problems solved within the context of these "perceived communities".
6. the causes for individual differences in readiness to complain about problems and the sociological and psychological consequences of dispute avoidance.
7. institutional and organizational barriers to the development of alternative dispute processing mechanisms, the reasons for these barriers, and possible resolutions of the problem.
8. differences in the public's perception of the civil and criminal justice systems and the impact of these perceptions upon readiness to employ specific forms of alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution.

D.5 Major Dimensions Characterizing Neighborhood Justice Centers

An attempt to recommend a single unitary model for Neighborhood Justice Centers would be inappropriate due to dissimilarities in the needs and characteristics of host jurisdictions, and the widely differing visions of the purposes Neighborhood Justice Centers should serve. However, it is possible to identify twelve major dimensions which should be carefully considered in making conscious choices regarding program structure and operation. In some areas, available findings may suggest the choice of a specific option, while in many others, the trade-offs between advantages and disadvantages will be difficult to calculate. The twelve dimensions are:

1. the nature of the community served
2. the type of sponsoring agency
3. project office location
4. project case criteria
5. referral sources
6. intake procedures
7. resolution techniques

8. project staff
9. hearing staff training
10. case follow-up procedures
11. project costs
12. evaluation

E. Critique of Quality, Usability, and Utility

This report will be of interest and value to anyone concerned with the development of innovative programs in the criminal justice field. The relevant fundamentals are clearly presented in Chapter 1. The major options are discussed in Chapter 2. Six case studies pertaining to selected dispute-processing projects are presented in Chapter 3. The latter are organized in a uniform way, which is very helpful in making comparisons easily and quickly.

This document should be of assistance to communities in making informed choices in planning and implementing a Neighborhood Justice Center to meet local needs. As the authors have clearly indicated, there is no general model which will apply to all jurisdictions. Instead, the listed major dimensions must be considered in the context of the needs and characteristics of the jurisdiction in which the Center is to operate.

F. Utilization

Although actual impact was difficult to assess, the report offered limited opportunity for utilization. The document is of interest only with respect to possible program models.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Career Criminal Programs

A. Descriptive Abstract

Career Criminal Programs were developed because there is evidence that a disproportionate volume of crime is committed by a relatively small percentage of all offenders, and because there is evidence that the normal criminal justice system routine cannot or does not devote sufficient attention to the prosecution of these offenders. Career Criminal Programs attempt to correct this problem by increasing justice system resources so that special prosecution efforts can increase the severity of sanctions that are applied to those defined as career offenders. Program goals are to incarcerate more offenders with serious criminal histories for longer periods of time. The prosecution goal is targeted vertical handling of cases. Vertical prosecution involves the assignment of a single experienced prosecutor to the cases of career offenders, and the expectation that this same prosecutor will handle the case all the way through the adjudication process. Ultimately, Career Criminal Programs are expected to reduce the crime rate through more efficient incapacitation of those offenders who commit much of the serious crime.

Several documents deal with the national evaluation of this program. The two most important ones are The National Level Evaluation of the Career Criminal Program: Concept and Plan and Criminal Prosecution in Four Jurisdictions: Departures from Routine Processing in the Career Criminal Program. The first presents the evaluation plan for the national-level evaluation of the Career Criminal Program. The second reports interim summary descriptive findings for the Career Criminal Programs in four jurisdictions. Five other documents are also important. One of these describes the site selection process that resulted in the selection of the Career Criminal Programs in Columbus, Kalamazoo, New Orleans and San Diego for evaluation. An additional volume describes the program for each of the chosen sites.

The overall evaluation plan will have three foci: (1) Program Activities, (2) Criminal Justice System Performance, and (3) Crime Levels. The evaluation reports issued thus far deal mainly with a description of program activities (#1). There is some presentation of criminal justice system performance data (#2) but these data are not systematically analyzed with regard to isolating program effects and estimating crime rate impact (#3). Later reports are to deal with these issues. Preliminary findings do suggest that career criminal programs may result in higher conviction and incarceration rates for career criminals than for non-career criminals but these findings must be viewed as tentative.

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B. Methodology

The methodology used or proposed for the evaluation of the national Career Criminal Program is described in The National Level Evaluation of the Career Criminal Program: Concept and Plan. The methodology used for the work completed thus far involves a description of the criminal justice structure, process in four jurisdictions and the implementation of career criminal programs in these same jurisdictions. The methodology proposed to isolate program effects and to estimate the impact of programs on crime rates is more complex. The major component of this methodology is a model developed by Shinnar to estimate the impact of criminal justice system performance on crime rates. The model is based on the formula λqJS , where λ is a crime rate estimate, q is an estimate of the probability of conviction given arrest, J is an estimate of the probability of incarceration and S is the amount of time incarcerated. The effective crime reduction impact of the criminal justice system is stated as:

$$\text{Effective reduction} = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + \lambda qJS}$$

In simple terms the model proposed will estimate the difference between the expected crime rate, in the absence of a career criminal program, and the actual crime rate with a career criminal program operating.

C. Findings and Conclusions

The authors describe in detail the adjudicative structure and processes in Columbus, Kalamazoo, New Orleans and San Diego. The career criminal programs are also described for each of these cities. There are differences between the cities on all these dimensions. Adjudicative structure and process and career criminal programs differ from city to city.

Initial findings suggest that career criminal programs may result in higher conviction rates and higher incarceration rates. Findings are tentative:

The critical comparison - between the outcomes which would have occurred had no program been initiated - has not been examined. The limited data at hand are not sufficient to address the question of program impact. (Criminal Prosecution in Four Jurisdictions: Departures from Routine Processing in the Career Criminal Program, p. 156).

The evaluation program is not yet completed. Later reports should provide more conclusive information about program impact.

D. Program/Policy Implications

Program-policy implications drawn from findings to date are limited because program effects are not yet specifiable.

The authors do note the implications of some of the structure - process characteristics of the four jurisdictions on the adjudicative outcomes. For example, the structure of the prosecutor's office and court can determine the form of vertical prosecution that is possible. In a court with a complex, specialized process (San Diego) it is all but impossible to have a single prosecutor handle a case from beginning to end. The structure of adjudicative operations in New Orleans allows for more prosecutor case continuity.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

The reports produced thus far from the national level evaluation of the Career Criminal Program are generally of high quality. If the promises of the grantee to deliver further reports that address program effects and crime rate impacts more rigorously and comprehensively are fulfilled, the evaluation program will be important and will make a significant contribution to policymaking, program planning, and evaluation methodology. The evaluation design is a careful and appropriate one and has the potential to result in significant, policy-relevant findings.

It is apparent from the data in the reports already published that there is the potential to be more precise about the presence or absence of program effects. Present data also have the potential to yield findings that would assist in the improvement of present career criminal programs and/or in the creation of programs in new jurisdictions. The question of the magnitude of program impact on crime rates will be a more difficult effect to measure, but this aspect of the evaluation needs to be pursued to its end.

There is an ongoing career criminal-habitual offender program being conducted by the Rand Corporation under the sponsorship of the Center for the Study of Crime Correlates and Criminal Behavior in the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. This is a research effort that examines some of the issues and assumptions on which the "action" or programmatic effort is based. An example of such an issue or question is: "What are the rates at which different offender types commit offenses?" It is and will continue to be important that internal LEAA procedures assure communication between the research and program efforts. There is some indication that this has happened - The Mitre report quotes a Rand report at one point and both reports use the Shinnar model. The utility and benefits of the two efforts will be enhanced if some communication and coordination occurs between them.

In summary, a very good descriptive evaluation of the national level Career Criminal Program has been done in these reports. The

important findings and implications remain to be reported.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

These reports should be utilized by those who are monitoring the progress of these programs, either formally or informally. While conclusive information on program impact will not be available until later, there are lessons to be learned from the progress reported thus far. The reports should also be utilized by those who are interested in evaluation methodology, and in the planning and management of the evaluation of programs such as these.

Actual Utilization:

OPM:

- . The findings of these studies led to recommendations for a combined evaluation of the implementation of ICAP and the police component of career criminal (process evaluation), and that the impact evaluation of these two components should be combined.
- . The report led to the recommendation that TA contractors receive and use implementation and performance monitoring/evaluation data, and then pass this data and their analyses to the impact evaluation contractor.

NILECJ:

- . Career Criminal^{1/} findings and recommendations were discussed with the LEAA Study Group to illustrate successes of some LEAA efforts. The study group was composed of LEAA and DOJ senior staff, and was organized by Attorney General Griffin Bell to aid the preparation of legislation for reorganizing LEAA.
- . The Career Criminal Rand study offered potential utility for program modification; however, OCJP has not paid any attention to the study findings.
- . Due to the ongoing evaluation of career criminal, no current utilization of career criminal study findings could be cited. The action program staff persons are interested in waiting for the results of the latest impact evaluation.

^{1/} Specific documents were not identified.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Summary of Pre-Trial Screening Evaluation Phase I

A. Descriptive Abstract

This is a report of a Phase I investigation of case screening, based on observations of screening programs and conversations with prosecutors and their assistants in 18 cities. Thirteen observations and conclusions are stated and the rationale for each is discussed. The basis for establishing an evaluation design is presented. Pre-trial screening in perspective is discussed under the headings:

1. Opportunity for review,
2. Perception of charging responsibility,
3. Prosecution policy,
4. Legally-sufficient policy,
5. System efficiency policy,
6. Defendant rehabilitation policy, and
7. Trial sufficiency policy.

The discussion shows how each of the types of prosecutorial policy cited above tends to lead toward different types of charging decisions and how each has different effects on other dispositions. While other policies could probably be isolated, the examples discussed in the report are considered sufficient to show the importance of considering the broader ramifications of pre-trial screening. The simplistic view of pre-trial screening as merely an alternative form of disposition, one for weeding out poorly made or legally insufficient cases, results in a tendency to evaluate pre-trial screening solely in terms of system efficiency. In the author's view, the major weakness of current discussions of screening programs and their value is that the discussions focus on the operation of pre-trial screening programs per se and do not consider the role of pre-trial screening as a means for implementing policy or the effects of pre-trial screening on other elements in the criminal justice system.

Goals and predicted outcomes are shown for each of the four policies 4 through 7 in the above list. The resulting typology permits the examination of prosecutorial performance within a rational and logical system.

Strategies to implement policy are discussed under the headings:

1. Plea negotiation,
2. Discovery, and
3. Diversion.

The strategies likely to be employed by an office to implement its policy are summarized.

Resource allocation concepts are discussed, focusing on only those areas which are under the prosecutor's control: charging, case assign-

ment and trial preparation, and sentence recommendation. The importance of external factors is recognized. Variations in the three areas under the prosecutor's control are summarized in relation to the four policy models 4 through 7 in the above list.

It is concluded that, at the present time, evaluation of pre-trial screening programs is conducted mostly in terms of the economies to the criminal justice system. If, however, this was the only way that the evaluation was to be conducted, there would be little need to raise the evaluation effort above the individual project level. The aggregation of the total savings of all projects to a national level would have little meaning, much less any significant impact on policy except to provide another measurement area for the proponents of productivity theory.

The results of this Phase I investigation and the development of the typology of charging policies has, however, drastically changed the above, and present a clear and mandatory case for a national assessment. If the various policies can be isolated, and their effects on the criminal justice system and society measured, then the implications for evaluation are obvious. Since the policies present different strategies, staffing patterns, and dispositions, they become the valuable tools for planning and budgeting. Not only can the impact of policy be measured, but one should be able to predict expected outcomes. The impact of these policies are not just on the criminal justice system but on the community as well. For the first time it appears that a rationale exists for assessing such screening programs.

B. Methodology

1. On-site observations at 18 prosecutor's offices purposively selected to provide exposure to as broad a range of operations as possible.
2. Examination of relevant literature.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. The policy of the chief prosecutor plays a key role both in describing pre-trial screening programs and in understanding their impact.
2. The policy of the prosecutor toward charging and expected dispositions is rarely articulated, constrained by the external environment, often based on tradition, and varies widely among jurisdictions.
3. The transmittal of policy to assistants generally is by verbal communication, usually through staff meetings. When written

communication is used, the most prevalent means is by memo, the least by policy manuals.

4. Factors other than state constitution and legislation appear to have greater impact on pre-trial screening programs and procedures.
5. Variations in prosecutors' perceptions of their role affect the development and purpose of pre-trial screening programs.
6. As an office grows in size, the type of organization used may support or hinder a pre-trial screening program.
7. The primary purpose of pre-trial screening is to ensure uniform and consistent charging decisions. Yet, too often, the authority to make decisions is delegated, without accountability, and with few controls. As a result, evaluation of charging decisions is hampered.
8. The existing literature on pre-trial screening provides excellent analyses of the dimensions of the prosecutor's discretionary authority. This knowledge should be used as a foundation to develop new material analyzing the discretionary power in an operational perspective and in terms of system impact.
9. The Phase I evaluation could not have been conducted without on-site visits.
10. At the present time, prosecutorial policy can be identified only by on-site visits. However, empirical techniques are available to measure policy preferences but need further testing, refinement, and validation.
11. Adequate evaluation of pre-trial screening requires empirically based description and analysis of the prosecutorial process and its impact on the justice system in addition to measures of efficiency and economy.
12. Evaluation of pre-trial screening requires the presence of objective observers fully aware of the elements which determine the ways prosecutors will choose to process cases.
13. The data presently collected by prosecutors with regard to workload and disposition of defendants do not satisfy pre-trial screening program evaluation needs.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. The impact of pre-trial screening policy should be measured in terms of impact on other criminal justice agencies, particularly corrections. Depending on the charging policy, the

future quantity and characteristics of the correctional population can be anticipated. Where treatment programs are used, prosecutorial policy may well indicate the needs and requirements of such activity. Thus the impact of policy on dispositions can be turned into a highly effective planning and management tool.

2. A foundation can be laid which will examine the effect of prosecutorial policy on not just the criminal justice system but society as well. With policy appearing to show such a direct impact on dispositions, and with the statistical tools available, the impact as an attempted plan for the solution of societal problems confronted by the criminal justice system can be tested.
3. On a higher conceptual level, a base line can now be established which permits a broader examination of discretion, its limits, scope and impact. The basic issue of prosecutorial discretion, particularly as it related to screening and plea bargaining, can be examined with an eye to the ever-present potential for abuse. This examination can have far-ranging implications on our justice system.
4. The tasks necessary for a national evaluation may be divided into the following four sections:
 - a. Preparation of the standard set of cases to measure the prosecutor's priorities for prosecution, to measure the congruence between the prosecutor's policy and the charging assistants, as well as the uniformity among the assistants, to establish a standard base for comparative analysis among prosecutors' offices, and to provide the data necessary to develop uniform indicators and weights for objectively ranking new cases in terms of urgency for prosecution;
 - b. Implementation of local office evaluations which are flexible enough to permit varying types of evaluations based on whether the pre-trial screening program is new and therefore requires economies measures, or an existing program which requires measurements of effectiveness based upon the program's ability to carry out the policy of the prosecutor;
 - c. Research and analysis for exploration of the data collected from the flow of cases in a wide range of prosecutors' offices to further refine the typology, empirically establish the patterns of dispositional outcomes associated with the various policies, and explore the consequences of different policies for the operation of the prosecutor's office and the other elements of the criminal justice system surrounding it; and

- d. Dissemination of findings to expand the available knowledge in the area by explaining the processes which occur in the prosecutors' pre-trial screening programs in terms of policy types and by exploring the effects of policy types on the prosecution process.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

This is a scholarly presentation of the results of a Phase I evaluation of pre-trial screening. Its utility will be primarily for those with prior knowledge of the subject matter, e.g., District Attorneys. For the more general reader, a concise description such as an executive summary would have been helpful. That summary could have included a statement of the general purpose of pre-trial screening, followed by a listing of the specific objectives that are implied by that purpose. The reader would then be in a better position to decide for himself whether, for example, the report is complete in its coverage of the relevant categories of prosecutor priorities. The categories in the report seem to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, but the reader is left to guess what elements may be missing.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

The report should be utilized by anyone who has responsibility for the setting up and implementation of pre-trial screening policy. It should be utilized by those concerned with the evaluation of pre-trial screening, with particular use to be made of the section on evaluation requirements. It should be utilized by those in LEAA or elsewhere who may be concerned with national evaluation of pre-trial screening.

Actual Utilization:

The Pre-trial Screening Evaluation NEP served as the basis for issues and strategies addressed by current research. The NEP findings led to a grant to look at policies and implications in regard to screening.

Results from this latter study may result in utilization within ODTD.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Citizen Dispute Settlement The Night Prosecutor Program of Columbus, Ohio An Exemplary Project

A. Descriptive Abstract

In its simplest form, a Citizen Dispute Settlement (CDS) Program offers an alternative "hearing process," outside of the normal court hearing procedures, for disputing parties to reconcile their differences with the aim of producing a lasting solution. The purpose of this informal hearing process is not to determine right or wrong and to impose sanctions of the law. Rather, the fundamental goal of a CDS Program is to assist the complainant and the "defendant," or respondent, in reaching a mutually satisfactory settlement which can be implemented, whether that settlement is restitution or a promise to discontinue the problem behavior.

The goals of the CDS Program in Columbus, Ohio, inaugurated in November, 1971 are:

1. To rapidly and fairly dispense justice to citizens of Columbus who become involved in minor criminal conduct,
2. To ease the burden on the criminal justice system by reducing the number of criminal cases which have caused a backlog in the courts,
3. To ease community and interpersonal tensions by helping the parties involved arrive at an equitable solution to their problems without resorting to a criminal remedy,
4. To provide working people with a public agency forum during hours which will not interfere with their employment,
5. To remove the stigma of having an arrest record resulting from a minor interpersonal dispute, and
6. To prepare a case summary for use by the Prosecuting Attorney, if the Night Prosecutor cannot resolve the problem.

This document is a manual which provides a detailed description of the Columbus program for use by jurisdictions interested in replication. Goals and results are described in Chapter 1. Program management, services, evaluation and costs are discussed in Chapters 2 through 4. Replication potential and crucial program variables are described in Chapter 5. Operating procedures are described in Chapters 6 and 7. Specimens and descriptions of relevant documents are given in an appendix.

B. Methodology

No statement is made regarding the methodology used in preparing this document.

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C. Findings and Conclusions

1. During the first ten operating months (November, 1971 through August, 1972), approximately 1,000 hearings were held and all but 20 disputes were resolved without resorting to formal criminal procedures.
2. During the period of September 1, 1972 through September 1, 1973, hearings were scheduled for a total of 3,626 cases, representing about 8% of all 1972 criminal cases.
3. Of the total hearings scheduled, 2,285 (63%) were actually conducted. The remaining complainants (37%) failed to show up for their scheduled hearing and presumably took no further formal action on the dispute. Only 84 criminal affidavits were filed, representing 3.6% of cases heard, or 2% of all cases scheduled. The average cost of diverting each case was approximately \$20.00. This compares favorably to the estimated \$100.00 per case involved in normal criminal processing.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. The major point of the CDS concept is that many interpersonal problems, which are the basis of a significant number of minor criminal violations, can be dealt with in a more efficient, appropriate and satisfactory manner outside of the traditional criminal justice system.
2. A smoothly functioning and effective CDS program provides valuable assistance to the criminal justice system, as well as to the disputants. From the perspective of the criminal justice system, the CDS model offers: a reduction of court caseload; low costs; a very simple administrative process; and worthwhile, as well as easily attainable, goals. From the point of view of the disputants, the model offers empathetic assistance from the criminal justice system, and an alternative, informal forum for settling differences in an objective setting.
3. The program's flexibility, its simple concept and procedures, make it an ideal candidate for replication. A CDS program, based on the Columbus Project, could be easily adapted to fit the needs and capabilities of many different settings. The potential for expansion depends on the needs of a community and on the effectiveness of the program in dealing with specific problems. In addition to the cases handled by the Columbus Project, the concept might be applied to other problem behaviors including selected juvenile complaints, alcohol violations, and minor drug related offenses. With appropriate linkages to community social service agencies, the program may be equipped to deal with a range of personal problems which the courts cannot address.

4. A replication of this program would not require that the project director have direct ties with the police or courts. However, because these relationships are ultimately crucial to program success, the planning process must include a procedure for involving both the police and the courts in a policy-making capacity. Moreover, the stronger the relationship of the project director to the prosecutor's office -- optimally, the director would be a member of that office's staff -- the greater the chance of securing support from policy-makers at all levels. In the replication effort, the most effective leadership should come from the prosecutor's office itself, and should then branch out to include police and court representatives.
5. There seems to be little question that the citizen dispute settlement concept cannot be effectively replicated unless the program is located in a setting that maintains an aura of judicial authority. Therefore, any location other than the prosecutor's office (optimal), the central police station or a police precinct building, or a courtroom building, would not be appropriate. Although the program lacks much of the actual authority of these judicial components, its effectiveness rests in the fact that it gains support from these settings and suggests implicitly to the program participants that legal mechanisms are operating during the hearing as they would in any other "courtroom" setting. In the final analysis, it is this implicit assumption that gives the program the "authority" it needs to impress upon participants the advantages of settling the dispute during the hearing.
6. Staff recruitment and training are a crucial part of the CDS program model, since the success of the program hinges on the effectiveness of its staff. A formal recruitment and screening process is the first prerequisite to a quality staff. The hiring process should, however, be supported by continuing assessment and staff development efforts. For staff with no previous legal training, seminars should be held to explore many of the legal issues which emerge during hearings.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

This manual is a thorough and complete description of an exemplary project. It has utility and relevance for anyone considering the implementation of a CDS program, as well as for those who may be involved with the operation of programs of this type. It has relevance also to those in LEAA concerned with funding decisions pertaining to CDS programs.

F. Utilization

This manual should be studied by anyone contemplating the inauguration of a CDS program. It should be of use to those who are operating an ongoing program of this type. It should also be read by persons in LEAA who are concerned with funding decisions relevant to CDS programs.

Actual utilization could not be determined. With the exception of several staff persons concerned with model programs, our interviews indicated no familiarity with this report.

Additional Indications of Evaluation Utilization
in the Adjudication Area

During the course of our interviews within various offices and divisions of LEAA concerned with the substantive area of adjudication, the most enthusiastic responses regarding utilization were elicited with respect to The Court Management Project Series, completed by American University. This series of studies was done for NILECJ and resulted in four separate volumes: Financial Management, Personnel Management, Records Management, and Case Flow Management.

Direct utilization of the first document was unspecified. The Case Flow report was produced and withdrawn for re-working by a different contractor. Case Flow Management was to be utilized as the Workshop series in adjudication; however, bail-bond will be used instead.

The remaining two volumes are considered by many to be the most extensively utilized studies ever conducted in LEAA. Both have been developed into more practical manuals for use in program development and management by action office staff. The Personnel Management study was directly utilized in the development of Personnel Administration in the Courts. Records Management was translated into an applied approach in Computer Use in the Courts. The latter document, by Larry Polansky of American University, dealt with planning, procurement, and implementation. The document is considered as the best resource for courts information systems developed for court administrators.

V. CORRECTIONS

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime

A. Descriptive Abstract

This report provides an evaluative framework and state of knowledge assessment for the Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) program. TASC identifies drug abusers who come into contact with the criminal justice system, refers them to treatment programs and monitors their progress during treatment. As of October 1975, the Federal government had provided \$21.8 million to support thirty-six TASC projects.

This assessment was conducted by The Lazar Institute as part of the National Evaluation Program sponsored by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Past studies and original data analysis are summarized for project operations, outcomes and external factors affecting them. Major findings include:

- . Currently active TASC clients experienced an eight percent rearrest rate during program participation. Data on client outcomes after leaving the program are not available.
- . Approximately 55 percent of TASC's clients are receiving treatment for the first time.
- . Although TASC projects may reduce the processing burdens of the criminal justice system and improve the system's interface with treatment programs, little analysis of such impacts has been conducted.
- . The six projects which completed the maximum Federal funding period of approximately two years were institutionalized, by obtaining State or local funding.
- . The most serious gap in present knowledge is the lack of followup analysis of the outcomes of former TASC clients, as compared with outcomes of an otherwise similar group which did not enter TASC.

B. Methodology

In order to assess present knowledge concerning TASC, three major data collection activities were undertaken:

- . a review of existing literature and work in progress;
- . telephone interviews with the 22 TASC projects which were operational as of February 1975; and
- . site visits to ten projects.

Most of the existing studies of TASC have analyzed project operations in a single place. These studies vary widely in coverage: some assess overall project operations, others focus on client flow and a few address cost-effectiveness concerns. The studies also vary widely in terms of methodological soundness and other indicators of quality. To the extent possible, this report assesses and comments upon the validity of the findings reported in past studies. To supplement available written materials, the telephone interviews and site visits provided considerable information on the actual operations of projects. In addition to TASC staff, representatives of the criminal justice and treatment systems were interviewed to obtain their perspective about TASC's operations and impact. This assessment presents the findings of these various data collection activities and identifies major gaps in existing knowledge.

C. Findings and Conclusions

Selected findings from analyses of project operations include:

- . The use of mass urinalysis testing of all arrestees is not an essential technique for identifying potential clients. Interviewing arrestees selectively or relying on referrals from judges, probation officers, defense attorneys and others appears to be as effective and may be less costly.
- . Little is known about the extent to which TASC identifies all potential clients and offers them the opportunity to participate.
- . There is some evidence that TASC's formalized mechanism for referral to treatment is more effective than informal referral procedures.
- . TASC's monitoring of clients, and prompt reporting of violations, appears to improve client performance.
- . Criminal justice system representatives often report that TASC's monitoring of clients is one of the most important features of the program and greatly enhances its credibility.
- . Although TASC projects sometimes provide services directly to clients, in addition to referring them to local treatment programs, little is known about the relative effectiveness of service delivery by TASC as compared with other organizations. Nor has the importance of routine or intermittent TASC contact with clients been assessed.
- . Although a number of evaluation studies have been conducted of individual TASC projects, these analyses are of limited use in assessing the overall TASC program. There is usually little comparability across studies. The type of evaluation may vary from project to project, the definitions used for the same types of evaluation may differ, similar basic data may be collected, but categorized in ways precluding cross-project analysis.

In addition to analysis of individual project functions, the flows of clients through these activities has been considered. There are three conceptually distinct types of client flows at TASC projects:

- . pretrial intervention, in which a client is identified before trial, normal judicial processes occur and information on progress in treatment is provided to the court for use in the sentencing decision;
- . diversion, which in some jurisdictions provides that the case will not come to trial if treatment progress is satisfactory; and
- . posttrial processing, in which a client is identified and referred to treatment after the case has been adjudicated.

Selected findings from analyses of client flows include:

- . Individual projects often collect a substantial amount of information on client flows and losses. However, these data are not always systematically analyzed to identify the processing stages where losses most often occur or to consider the possible reasons for such losses.
- . Little is known about outcome differences for pretrial, diversion and posttrial clients, although diversion clients appear to have the strongest incentives to succeed (since charges would be dropped) and posttrial clients have more definite incentives than pretrial participants (since court outcomes are known).
- . There is also little knowledge concerning the continuity of pre- and post-trial processing (i.e., whether pretrial TASC clients are probated to TASC post-trial, rather than receiving a sentence which disregards earlier TASC participation).

Costs of TASC's interventions have also been considered. The cost per client served at sixteen projects ranged from \$214 to \$2055 and averaged \$932. However, such a calculation is of limited value, since the same budget level may support vastly different sets of services (in some cases including treatment) at different projects. More appropriate comparisons would consider the unit costs of providing similar services at different projects, but such analyses have not been done.

External Factors. A variety of external factors may affect TASC's operations. These include:

- . the size of the universe of potential clients, which depends both on the number of criminally involved drug abusers in the area and on TASC's eligibility criteria;

- characteristics of potential clients, which may affect the likelihood of rehabilitation;
- the nature of the criminal justice and treatment systems, particularly the attitudes of persons within them toward the TASC innovation; and
- such other local factors as the nature of the drug and crime problems and the prevailing economic conditions.

In general, most information concerning the impact of external factors on TASC's operations is impressionistic. Although individual TASC projects often identify such factors, assess the limitations they impose and try to change factors which impede operations, there has been little systematic analysis or documentation of this process. Indeed, such analysis would probably be difficult to conduct, since these factors not only vary widely among communities but also may vary considerably over time within the same community.

Major Gaps in Knowledge. The major gaps in existing TASC knowledge, in order of importance, are:

- the lack of data on client outcomes after completion of the TASC program, especially as compared with otherwise similar groups of non-participants;
- the absence of standardized information on project operations, which could be used for cross-project comparisons of such items as the number of persons processed through various TASC stages and the associated costs of that processing; and
- the lack of analysis of the institutionalization process by which projects obtain State and local funding to replace the initial Federal support.

If these gaps were filled, more appropriate judgments could be made about the value of the benefits accruing from the allocation of funds to the TASC program. Although TASC's short-term effects include an eight percent rearrest rate while clients participate in the program, the inducement of a large number of people (about 55 percent of all TASC clients) to enter treatment for the first time and impressionistic information that TASC's activities have improved the interface between the criminal justice and treatment systems, such findings cannot substitute for analysis of a program's long-range impact. The lack of client outcome analysis in particular precludes defensible statements regarding TASC's long-range impact on drug-related crime or the associated processing burdens of the criminal justice system.

D. Program/Policy Implications

While the author does not specifically identify program/policy implications, the following points have definite implications of this kind.

TASC's various interventions have raised a number of legal issues. These concern:

- . identification of drug abusers, particularly whether TASC's screening interviews and urinalysis tests were conducted under truly voluntary conditions;
- . selection and admission of drug-dependent arrestees into TASC, including whether eligibility criteria violate equal protection rights, whether treatment participation can be a condition of pretrial release and whether participants in diversion programs can be required to plead guilty as a condition of program admission;
- . determination of points at which TASC clients are entitled to counsel, specifically, whether counsel should be present during screening interviews or when the option of diversion is presented; and
- . termination of TASC clients, particularly specification of legally permissible grounds for termination, use of proper procedures and determination of legally permissible results of termination.

Although these issues have been widely discussed, they have not been subjected to the court tests required to resolve them.

Although there is some evidence that criminal justice system pressure may improve client performance, and additional evidence that treatment for drug abuse may be associated with reduced criminality, these studies cannot be relied upon to assess TASC's impact. Defensible statements regarding TASC's effect on client outcomes can only be made by conducting follow-up analysis of former clients after the period of TASC participation ends and comparing their outcomes with those of an otherwise similar group which did not enter TASC. Since such analysis has not been conducted, no conclusive statements regarding TASC's impact can be made.

In the assessment of either immediate or ultimate impacts, it is important to consider the varying effects of a given outcome on different parts of the criminal justice system. For example, if a TASC client who would otherwise have been incarcerated is probated and succeeds in treatment, there will be a reduced burden on corrections facilities but an increased burden on the probation department. If the client fails, there may be an increased burden on the police department, if additional crimes are committed before the person is apprehended. Although it is important to consider the probable effects of TASC's interventions on the various parts of the criminal justice system, such analysis has not been conducted.

A second type of environmental impact is whether the TASC project becomes institutionalized, that is, whether local and/or State funding replaces the initial Federal funding. As of November 1975, nine TASC projects had either completed their maximum period of Federal funding (two grant years) or been terminated before completion of that period. Three projects had ceased operations: Wilmington, New York City and St. Louis. These projects were unable to obtain sufficient clients to warrant continuation of TASC activities and were terminated before completion of the Federal funding period.

The six projects which had completed their maximum period of Federal funding were institutionalized through State or local funding. Austin, Marin County and Philadelphia received continuation funding from LEAA bloc grants administered through State planning agencies. Cleveland received formula grant funds from the Ohio single state agency for drug abuse prevention. The Alameda County and Dayton projects were incorporated into broader pretrial services programs.

Aside from reporting projects' success or failure in achieving State and local funding, little else can be said about the institutionalization process. No analyses have considered whether institutionalization reflects the locally perceived value of the projects or merely the local financial situation. Nor have any analyses assessed the operations of TASC projects before and after institutionalization. In addition, there has been no systematic analysis of the process by which projects become, or seek to become, institutionalized.

A third type of environmental impact concerns TASC's use as a model for similar programs. Analogous programs in the same community could serve alcoholics, persons with mental health problems, or similar groups of arrestees. Indeed, during Lazar's site visits, several TASC communities reported that the TASC approach was being considered for use with other groups. In addition, TASC could serve as a model for similar programs in nearby communities. However, the extent to which TASC may have served as such a model has not been documented.

A fourth possible environmental impact consists of attitudinal or behavioral changes induced in the criminal justice or treatment systems which affect the ways those systems process criminally involved drug abusers. Although this topic has not been closely studied, a variety of comments obtained during Lazar's site visits indicated that members of the criminal justice system had developed a higher opinion of treatment as an alternative to routine criminal processing of addict-defendants. In addition, some criminal justice system members observed that TASC's monitoring of treatment progress had made treatment programs more accountable concerning accurate and prompt reporting of such information.

On the treatment side, some programs reported that TASC had freed them from the need to develop a detailed understanding of the operations of the criminal justice system. Programs could, instead, call upon TASC for advice in criminal justice system matters concerning clients.

CONTINUED

1 OF 3

E. Critique of Quality, Usability, and Utility

1. Do the conclusions and recommendations follow logically from the detailed evidence and the synthesized findings?

Yes.. The point of the project was to review the existing literature and the work in progress on TASC. This was done well and the conclusions and recommendations (largely the section entitled, Major Gaps in Knowledge) logically follow.

2. Are there deficiencies that might invalidate the findings (in whole or in part)?

Any deficiencies lie with the project reports and data reviewed for this project. Their quality was not always evaluated. To the extent that prior work can be trusted, the findings and conclusions may be trusted. On the whole trend data tend to substantiate the findings of the report.

3. What qualifications do you as a reviewer place on the findings, conclusions, or recommendations?

None really. The report identifies problem areas of the TASC program and calls for further research to resolve these problem issues. It does this very well.

4. What characteristics of the document add to or detract from its usability to readers?

None. It is well written and properly repetitive. The TASC client flow charts are particularly good. The charts are accompanied by a clear discussion of client flow problems.

5. Are there findings in the report that are relevant to the LEAA policy and planning systems that are not highlighted in the report's conclusions and recommendations?

The utility classes that apply to this report are:

- Setting program priorities
- Program development
- Program continuation decision
- Modification of program
- Monitoring and directing programs
- Planning future research and evaluation

The findings of the report are not specifically connected to the above utility classes. If this is desirable for such a report, it is suggested that a chart of utility classes be presented to the report writers with a specific request to make the connection between findings and application.

6. What is your overall judgment about the utility of this evaluation study document for the LEAA policy and planning system or for other uses?

It is an excellent document for LEAA policy and planning in that it identifies clearly the difficulties in evaluating the TASC programs and points to the major gaps in knowledge about the TASC programs. This document serves as a nice blueprint for further evaluation research of TASC programs.

F. Utilization

NILECJ:

- . Findings and recommendations were discussed among the LEAA study group in preparing legislation for reorganization of LEAA. TASC was depicted as characteristic of successful LEAA efforts.
- . The evaluation of the TASC program was intended to provide information on some mounting questions concerning the utility of the program. This information was needed in order to justify continuation of funding for the action program; therefore, action program staff were highly involved in all phases of the evaluation.
- . The Phase I evaluation of TASC was effectively utilized in setting parameters and in selecting designs and measures for the Phase II evaluation.
- . TASC Phase I was utilized as an examination of the feasibility of a full scale field level evaluation.
- . Institutionalization of the TASC program or components of the program once discretionary funding ended was a utilization purpose intended for the results of Phase I and Phase II. The evaluation findings were utilized by national staff in marketing the program on the state and local levels.
- . TASC Phase I had no utility for policy planning and no legislative implications.

OCJP:

- . The evaluation findings were utilized as public relations material - to let "the public" (especially legislators) know about the program and its successes.
- . The Phase I report was utilized in the modification of program delivery and operations and in program management activities.

Evaluation Summary

The Transition from Prison to Employment:

An Assessment of Community-Based Assistance Programs

by

Lazar Institute for
National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice (NILECJ)
(a National Evaluation Program Phase I Report)

July 1978

A. Descriptive Abstract

This report assesses the present state of knowledge regarding community-based programs which provide employment services to prison releases. More than 250 such programs exist, offering a wide range of services including counseling, work orientation training, job development, job placement, and follow-up assistance after placement. These services are provided because the acquisition of employment is often considered essential for a releasee's successful adjustment to a crime-free life in the community.

Like other NILECJ Phase I studies, this assessment is not meant to be a definitive evaluation, rather it analyzes what we presently know about community-based assistance programs providing employment services to prison releases and what is still uncertain or unknown. The study is intended as a basis for planning further evaluation and research.

The study utilizes an extensive literature search, a mail/telephone survey of existing employment services programs, and site visits to selected programs. Programs are assessed under categories including methods of client identification, the goals services, and resources of actual programs, client outcomes, and significant external factors.

The basic finding of the study is that despite widespread interest in these programs and substantial public funding of their activities, there has been relatively little systematic analysis of program impact. Most existing studies are descriptive rather than evaluative and focus on one program rather than cross-program comparisons. There is also a lack of data on the outcomes of program participants as compared with individuals who did not receive program services.

The report recommends further analysis to provide essential information concerning program impact, to improve present delivery of services to prison releases, and to test the efficacy of new approaches for assisting individuals in making the transition from prison to employment.

B. Methodology

The report is by and large a qualitative assessment of the state of knowledge regarding community based assistance programs under an analytical framework for study which divides the subject into four components: methods of client identification; the resources, goals, and services of existing programs; client outcomes; and external factors affecting the universe of possible clients and the environment in which services are offered. (For a full breakdown of this analytical framework see the appendix to this summary).

Each factor from the framework is reviewed in terms of the current state of knowledge and where further information would be desirable. The sources of data are the views of program staff, criminal justice system representatives, employers, researchers, and other knowledgeable individuals. Their views were surveyed by means of:

1. A review of existing literature and work-in-progress including several program assessments.
2. A mail/telephone survey of over 250 employment services programs.
3. Site visits to 15 programs focusing on client flow, services provided, and relationships among involved persons and agencies.

C. Findings and Conclusions

A large variety of assistance is offered by employment services programs albeit in a wide range of combinations and styles. These services include needs assessment, counseling, training, support services, job development, job placement, and follow-up assistance. But little is known about the types of services which seem most effective or about the best ways to provide any given service.

The study offers limited statistical and anecdotal assessment of these various programs and draws the following broad conclusions:

- Many programs have analyzed whether clients obtain jobs, and most have reported that the majority of clients are successfully placed.
- Available analyses usually indicate that program clients experience lower rates of recidivism than do comparison groups, although outcomes are far from consistent from one project to the next, and few programs have been evaluated adequately.
- Most outcome studies use quite limited impact measures, such as placement and rearrest rates, and do not consider such factors as job stability, job quality or the severity of crimes committed.

- Few studies compare the outcomes of program clients with those of similar groups of non-clients; consequently, the extent to which successful client outcomes should be attributed to the programs' interventions or to other causes cannot be determined nor specifically compared with program costs.

D. Program/Policy Implications

The study recommends the following actions:

1. Conduct a follow-up analysis of client outcomes as compared with the outcomes of an appropriate group of non-clients. Such an analysis should consider outcomes over a period of several years for programs emphasizing different types of services and aiding clients with various characteristics.
2. Prepare a "handbook" providing step-by-step instructions on ways to conduct evaluations at different levels of complexity to assist employment services programs to better utilize time and resources often devoted to data collection alone.
3. Analyze ways to improve linkages between the Department of Labor and LEAA at the Federal, State, and local levels to improve funding continuity and avoid research overlap.
4. Disseminate relevant materials developed at individual programs to other programs which could use such material.
5. Assess ways to improve linkages between the staffs of corrections facilities and employment services programs.
6. Expand the employment services currently available to women releases to involve greater cognizance of the special needs of women job-seekers.
7. Explore ways to establish job creation programs for prison releases including demonstrations where appropriate.

E. Critique of Quality, Usability, and Utility


In accordance with its Phase I mandate, this study assembles a great deal of information which is used to identify key issues and assess what is known about them. The information is not used to evaluate the programs under study nor, except in the broadest terms, to point the way to their improvement. The report is sprinkled with suggestions for more intensive evaluation but the issue of methodology for further research is not seriously addressed. Thus, although some basis for planning future assessments is provided, there is little that would not be rather self-evident to a criminal justice professional without benefit of this study.

The report is internally consistent and clearly presented. It will serve as an interesting overview of an important issue and a somewhat persuasive argument for more research. Of itself, however, it will add little to the state of knowledge and is inadequately specific as to the most important areas and methodologies for further work.

F. Utilization

The results of this NEP Phase I report were utilized within NILECJ since NEP's generally are aimed at deriving the proper questions for further research. The study findings were not translatable into action programs.

—Analytical Framework for Assessing Employment Services Programs



EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Montgomery County Work Release/Pre-Release Program An Exemplary Project

A. Descriptive Abstract

Most criminal justice experts today agree that work release/pre-release is an essential element of the correctional system, providing a "middle ground" between security institutions and probation or parole. What is noteworthy about the Montgomery County (Maryland) Work Release/Pre-Release Program is the array of services it offers its clients, the carefully structured design of the program, and the conscientious application of its rules and standards. The Pre-Release Center (PRC) enjoys a low walk-off rate (less than five percent) and a low recidivism rate among its clients who are released successfully (22.2 percent re-arrested, 11.6 percent convicted).

The development of the PRC is traced in Chapter 2. Legislative issues, staffing patterns, and procedural changes are all discussed as factors in the PRC's history. Chapter 3 gives a detailed description of the Pre-Release Program itself, covering selection of Program participants, details of the various treatment strategies and control features, work and community release, counseling, the Social Awareness Program, the contractual agreement and phased furlough/release plan, and disciplinary measures. Chapter 4 is devoted to start-up considerations, procedural issues, and costs.

The results of an evaluation of the Pre-Release Program are presented in Chapter 5. The residents are described and program data illustrate the extent of the Pre-Release Program's goal achievement. Chapter 5 also suggests several methods for evaluating the "success" of a pre-release program. The discussion is organized around three types of program goals: process, outcome, and administrative. Examples from PRC's experience illustrate the need for ongoing evaluation.

Relevant documents are reproduced in appendices.

B. Methodology

The authors make no statement about the methodology used in developing this report. The reviewer guesses that they reviewed all relevant documentation and interviewed appropriate persons, included PRC staff and residents.

C. Findings and Conclusions

The following facets of Montgomery County's Work Release/Pre-Release Program are considered to be amenable to replication in other communities:

1. Central county location, access to parking,
2. Suitable environment for residents,
3. Physical adjacency and availability of program components,
4. Cultivated community support,
5. Legislative and political support,
6. Appropriate staff training program,
7. Manual of standard operating procedures,
8. Residents' awareness of their obligations and privileges,
9. Close supervision of residents, and
10. Specialization of staff responsibilities.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. To be successful, a pre-release program should have the following specific objectives:
 - a) to provide employment to residents,
 - b) to release residents with suitable housing and cash savings,
 - c) to protect the community by monitoring and controlling residents' behavior, and
 - d) to reduce resident recidivism.
2. Extensive monitoring of PRC activities as well as detailed record keeping and data collection are essential for assessing the success of participants in meeting program goals.
3. A follow-up assessment of residents' employment, cash savings and post-release housing can provide meaningful information regarding the appropriateness of certain job placements, the effectiveness of PRC job training efforts, and whether varying amounts of cash were sufficient upon release. Follow-up at one month, six months, one year and two years may be most appropriate. Besides reflecting on the effectiveness of the program's job placements, these data viewed together with personal histories may be useful in determining when various types of releasees may need additional post-release support regarding employment, housing or available cash. A method of predicting when such help might be needed and the ability to provide that help might have significant effects on keeping these individuals out of further trouble with the law.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

This manual is a very thorough description of a program which is, apparently, very effective. Between the main text and the appendices, it contains everything that a reader could expect to find in such a description.

It is clear from the description that the success of the program was due in large part to the following factors:

1. team approach to management,
2. carefully spelled out procedural guidelines,
3. ongoing program assessments, and
4. staff willingness to respond to possibilities for improvement.

F. Utilization

This manual should be read by administrators of correctional programs and by those concerned with program development in the field of corrections/rehabilitation. It provides convincing evidence of the value of a pre-release program and detailed information on setting up and managing such a program. Managers of existing pre-release programs will find it useful for comparison purposes. Funding sources should find the manual useful in judging the merits of proposed pre-release programs. The manual should also be useful to those concerned with the planning and conducting of program evaluations, as it clearly indicates the important role which evaluation can play in the management of pre-release programs.

Each interviewee within the Corrections area acknowledged familiarity with this program; however, the question of utilization was never answered satisfactorily. Most staff persons indicated that this document was utilized in a general manner (if at all), with regard to program design and models.

One staff person indicated that the report has had significant impact on training through the HOST program. The program has been adopted for test in three sites.

Additional Indications of Evaluation Utilization
in the Corrections Area

The following evaluation products were effectively utilized within OCJP, although the utility class and mode of use remain unspecified:

1. Sentencing and Community Alternatives
2. Women Offenders
3. Treatment of Sex Offenders
4. Community Service Restitution

Additional studies having a significant impact on program design, program models, and program management:

1. Parole Decisionmaking
2. Determinate Sentencing
3. Cost Analysis of Correctional Standards Series - (Institutional-based Programs and Parole, Alternatives to Arrest, and Pretrial Diversion)

The evaluation products which follow were utilized for specific purposes:

The Evaluation of Intensive Special Probation Projects NEP Phase I was combined with similar research and translated into three program models, each concerning a different type of probation. These models were field tested and disseminated to action program staff as "validated program designs."

Restitutive Justice, a feasibility study of restitution, suggested an experimental action program. The program was implemented and is presently undergoing a second phase of evaluation.

Alternatives to Jail, a product of the Institute's Corrections Division, was concerned with pre- and post- adjudication. The study purpose was to select examples of successful programs around the country. This evaluation project led to funding by the adjudication division of an action program known as "Overcrowding in Jails."

VI. JUVENILE JUSTICE
EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

The Theory and Practice of Delinquency Prevention
in the United States: Review, Synthesis and Assessment

A. Descriptive Abstract

This report assembles what is known about delinquency prevention nationally. It is divided into two sections. Section I presents a critical and expository analysis of literature and research in the field. Section II reports the results of a field assessment of 31 delinquency prevention programs.

Delinquency theories are divided into the following three categories:

1. The individual is the focal point. Included within this perspective are the wide range of psychological and psychoanalytic theories that have attempted to chart motivational, emotional, and attitudinal complexes (intrapsychic variables) behind deviant behavior.
2. Social institutions are the focal point. These are primarily sociological theories that concentrate on the properties of the cultural and/or social systems. Emphasis is on the manner in which these systems generate tendencies or motives within the individual to either conform to or deviate from the norms or standards of conduct established by the moral demand system to which the individual has been exposed.
3. Social interaction is the focal point. The major focus is on the definitional processes and the individual deviant, i.e., labelling.

Each theory suggests a different strategy for handling the problem. Where the individual is viewed as the focal point, diagnosis and treatment are based on personality theories with emphasis on increased self-understanding so that the individual can function in a prosocial manner in the home, the school, work, and/or the community. Where institutions are seen as the focal point, emphasis is on societal and institutional reform and/or change so that families can raise children who function in a prosocial manner in society. When social interaction is the focal point, emphasis is on increasing society's flexibility and tolerance toward juvenile misconduct, while decreasing the negative stigmatization associated with the official labelling of such behavior.

Section II presents a synthesis and assessment of current theories, practices, and evaluation procedures being used at the sites which were visited. This research uncovered programmatic weaknesses in client identification, linkage problems in intervention strategies, formal requirements that inhibited delivery of services, and the limited domain of many practitioners to effect change.

B. Methodology

1. Literature review.
2. Site visits to several statewide and national juvenile delinquency prevention program administrative offices.
3. Site visits to 31 currently active delinquency prevention programs selected from a listing of 120 such programs. Selections were based on data collected by telephone. Sites selected for visitation were representative of the following criteria: one of six "cluster" types, geographic dispersion, locus of intervention, predominant mode of intervention, client or target group characteristics, funding source, maturity, staff size, an estimate of cooperativeness, and evaluation. Evaluation was a heavily weighted criterion. If evaluation of the program, either internally or externally, existed, it was more likely to be chosen. Two people, a consultant and a JDP/NEP staff member comprised the site review team. Guided by a site review manual based upon the taxonomic framework of program elements, site reviewers wrote independent reports describing the program elements of context, identification, intervention, and evaluation and assessed the linkages that existed between them.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. Although frequently expressed by practitioners as major delinquency causation factors, social interactional processes and social institutional variables are rarely addressed or focused on by delinquency prevention programs.
2. Programs based on the initial prevention of delinquent acts suffer from the inability to identify potential clients.
3. Client "skimming" practices (selecting those most likely to succeed) preclude the delivery of prevention services to many of the most troubled youths.
4. Parental consent statutes impede the delivery of prevention services to clients who might otherwise participate voluntarily.
5. Within programs, differential rates of intervention duration and intensity based upon client characteristics/needs are generally non-existent.
6. External program linkages with other community agencies and/or prevention services are marked by suspicion, mistrust, inter-agency strife, and lack of cooperation in referral and feedback processes.

7. From the perspective of program administrators, federal "seed money" grants may be more detrimental than beneficial.
8. Program survival promotes manipulation of grant proposals, programs, and evaluation results.
9. Generally speaking, prevention programs are ill conceived, poorly structured, and suffering from a lack of conceptual, definitional and operational clarity in virtually all major aspects.
10. A high rate of turnover exists among workers in the programs studied.

D. Program/Policy Implications

When the federal seed money runs out, funding has to be obtained from another source. This is the reason for selecting only those clients who have a good chance of being "rehabilitated", and for manipulating the evaluation results. Despite the fact that evaluation was a major criterion in site selection, valid evaluations were non-existent.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

This report is well written and logically organized, accomplishing the goals set forward by the funding agency. However, it is deficient in the following respects:

1. Since the judgements are entirely subjective, it would be difficult to replicate this study. Evaluation was a main criterion for choosing sites, but after selection, it was found that evaluation, internally or externally, really did not exist.
2. In Section I, delinquency prevention theories are divided into three groups. In Section II, delinquency prevention programs are divided into six groups. It seems that most of the actual programs treated the individual as the focal point. This was mentioned in the report, but should have been enlarged upon.
3. More information on the sites that were studied would be helpful to serious students of juvenile delinquency. A short critique on each one, including number of personnel, number of clients served, and mode of treatment or orientation would have given the reader a better understanding of what was studied.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

This report serves as an information base for policymakers concerned with juvenile delinquency, providing them with an overview of what has been done, including the deficiencies which need to be overcome in the future. It should also be utilized by those doing research on delinquency, building on the base which is provided.

Actual Utilization:

This report was of some utility, as the following staff comments illustrate:

- . The Ohio State study on prevention was not particularly helpful because it found few promising approaches to the problem.
- . The framework for evaluation utilized in the Ohio State study has been instrumental in the selection of designs and measures for other evaluations, such as the current national evaluation of delinquency programs.
- . This report (and other early studies) is utilized in NIJJDP Assessment Centers as a knowledge base. Further utilization is expected through the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse, where information from the assessment centers will be disseminated. Within this clearinghouse will be a Training Institute with programs directed to state and local practitioners.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Secure Detention of Juveniles and Alternatives to Its Use NEP Phase I Summary Report

A. Descriptive Abstract

The purpose of the study was to provide information on the use of alternatives to secure detention which could assist those individuals and organizations seeking to implement certain provisions of the 1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (Public Law 93-415). That Act sets forth as two of its major goals the reduction in the use of secure detention (incarceration) and the provision of alternatives to detention for youths involved in the juvenile justice process. It further requires--for states seeking funds authorized by the Act--the elimination (within two years following submission of a state plan) of the use of detention for juveniles charged with offenses that would not be criminal if committed by an adult. Because of these provisions, the study proceeded on the assumption that one must understand the use of secure detention in a jurisdiction in order to comprehend the use of alternatives. This, in turn, requires knowledge about the juvenile justice processes that are the context for the use of both secure detention and alternatives. These assumptions led to an analysis of the significant aspects of the nation's experience with detention and alternatives to date which, when joined with the provisions of the Act, can help shape realistic plans and strategies for implementation and evaluation of federal policy in this area in the future.

The study shows that thoughtful communities can and have developed viable alternatives to detention for children in trouble--alternatives that are more humane than secure detention and present minimal risk to the community. The study's four program formats (residential and non-residential) were roughly equal in their ability to keep both alleged delinquents and status offenders trouble-free and available to the court. The failure rate ranged from 2.4 to 12.18 percent across the fourteen programs visited.

The study focuses on how youth are selected for admission to secure detention or placement in an alternative program in the context of decisions throughout the juvenile justice system process. It describes the four types of programs: public nonresidential programs based on the Home Detention Model; Attention Homes; programs for runaways; and foster home programs under private auspices.

B. Methodology

1. Review of the literature published since 1967 on the use of secure detention and of alternatives.

2. Compilation of a list of existing alternative programs in the United States.
3. Visits to 14 juvenile court jurisdictions with alternative programs. The selection of the fourteen research sites was purposeful, not random. The researchers tried to select programs in large, middle, and small size cities; programs designed for status offenders, or alleged delinquents or both; and programs designed as both residential and nonresidential in nature. In addition, the selection of sites attempted to achieve good geographical spread. However, the most important criterion in the selection process seemed to be the anticipated learning value of a program rather than its representativeness.

While the authors are very brief in their description of data collection they do indicate that site visits were two to three days at each of the fourteen sites and that during this time court and "other officials" were interviewed and "statistical data" assembled. The authors do not elaborate on who the "other officials" were nor do they say what "statistical data" were collected, although it is assumed from the report that they included data on program failures (i.e., those that ran away or committed an offense while in the program). Data was not always available on failure rate.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. Findings

- a. Findings from literature review of empirical studies indicated:
 - (1) County jails are still used for detention.
 - (2) Use of secure detention for dependent and neglected children is on decline.
 - (3) Many jurisdictions still exceed the NCCD recommended maximum rate of 10% of all juveniles apprehended.
 - (4) Status offenders tend to be detained at a higher rate than youths apprehended for adult-type criminal offenses.
 - (5) Minority youths tend to be detained at a higher rate and for longer periods than others.
 - (6) Extra-legal factors are more strongly associated with the decision to detain than legal factors.
- b. Literature indicated development of the following in some jurisdictions:
 - (1) Improved intake procedures including written criteria, recording of reason for detention decision, and review of detention decision.

- (2) Nonresidential alternatives to detention.
 - (3) Residential alternatives to detention which serves as a substitute residence for the youth awaiting court hearing.
- c. Literature also suggested that alternative programs could have unintended consequences:
- (1) Alternatives might be used for youths who would simply have been sent home previously.
 - (2) Youths placed in some alternatives appear to wait longer for adjudication than those placed in secure detention.
- d. Visits to 14 jurisdictions were the basis of the following findings:
- (1) In 4 jurisdictions admission to detention was automatic, i.e., a request resulted in admission.
 - (2) In 10 other jurisdictions court (in detention) personnel made the initial intake decision.
 - (3) In most jurisdictions hearings (review of detention) produced decisions that often resulted in youths being removed from detention.
 - (4) Four general types of programs were found in the 14 sites:
 - (a) Home Detention Programs (7): (nonresidential program) each youth is left in his own home awaiting adjudication, but he is assigned to a paraprofessional who has a normal caseload of 5 youths to supervise.
 - (b) Attention Homes (3): (residential home-like environment)
 - (c) Runaway Program (2): one program of this type serves local runaway youths in a residential setting, while the other program is for transient youths from other jurisdictions and its purpose is to return youth to families.
 - (d) Private Residential Foster Home Programs: two programs of this type were visited. One uses a proctor concept in which each client referred is given a proctor who had no other clients. The other program consists of an Intensive Detention Program with a four-bed receiving unit, 2 five-bed group homes, and two foster homes and a Detained Youth Advocate Program with 17 two-bed Foster Homes.
 - (5) For the 12 programs for which failure rates were available, the proportion of participants either running away or allegedly committing new offenses

ranged from 2.4 to 12.8 percent. If those placed in secure detention (possible in Home Detention Programs only) by case workers are counted as failures then failures ranged from 29.2 to 10.6

2. Conclusions

- a. Home Detention Programs appear to work well for the middle range of serious delinquents who are often detained securely. Status offenders are often difficult to deal with in this type of situation unless substitute living arrangements are made available.
- b. Problems in Home Detention Programs seem to be related to misuse and maladministration rather than to a problem of the program; for example, delays in adjudication caused by crowded court dockets or use of home detention to "test out" how youths might respond on probation may increase failure rate.
- c. Similar programs can produce different results when carried out by different organizations in different jurisdictions with perhaps different kinds of juveniles.
- d. Programs used as alternatives to secure detention can be used for many youths who would otherwise be placed in secure detention and with a relatively small risk of failure.
- e. Type of program does not appear as critical as how it is used by the jurisdiction.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. "Criteria for selecting juveniles for secure detention, for alternative programs and for release on the recognizance of a parent or guardian while awaiting court adjudication should be in writing" (36).
2. "The decision as to whether youths are to be placed in secure detention or an alternative programs should be guided, so far as possible, by written agreements between the responsible administrative officials. These agreements should specify the criteria governing selection of youths for the programs" (37).
3. "The decision to use alternative programs should be made at initial intake where the options of refusing to accept the referral, release on the recognizance of a parent or guardian to await adjudication and use of secure detention are also available" (37).
4. "An information system should be created" (38) that permits crosstabulation of important variables.

5. "Courts should adjudicate case of youths waiting in alternative programs in the same period of time applicable to those in secure detention" (38).

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

1. In general, the conclusions follow logically from the findings. However, the recommendations seem to go far beyond the data. In one case, the recommendation is for keeping better data which speaks to the inadequacy of the available data and thereby the weakness of the "findings". The other recommendations seem to be derived from the authors' sense of appropriate conduct rather than staying within the data.
2. The findings derived from the literature are based on a wide number of studies whose validity in many cases is questionable. Therefore, this aspect of the report is no more nor no less valid than those of the individual studies. The report does not provide sufficient detail to question these specifically, nor to get a sense of the strength of the data. The findings from the literature review are more ambiguous than the authors suggest. Therefore, I suggest that this part of the report should note more qualifications regarding past studies than the authors do. In other words, they seem to oversimplify this part of the study.
3. Failure on the authors' part to critically review the literature does not give the reader the necessary sense of the quality and extent of these studies.
4. The study itself provides an informative view of what a wide number of jurisdictions are doing to deal creatively with detention problems. Moreover, the recommendations provide some good suggestions that should be carefully considered as to their implications and how they might be made policy.

F. Utilization

The findings and recommendations should be of immediate practical benefit to juvenile courts and juvenile justice planners who are considering the introduction of alternatives to secure detention.

The NEP's done in the area of Juvenile Prevention and Detention had as their objective general state-of-the-art assessments. This report has been utilized to develop definitional clarity in Juvenile Justice issues, to assist JJDP legislation, and to help OJJDP identify promising program approaches.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Cost and Service Impacts of Deinstitutionalization of
Status Offenders in Ten States:
"Responses to Angry Youth"

A. Descriptive Abstract

This report contains the results of an evaluation of the impact of deinstitutionalization of status offenders (juveniles who are charged with or who have committed offenses that would not be criminal if committed by an adult). The study grows out of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 which requires that States receiving funding under this Act should no longer hold status offenders in detention and correctional facilities. The 1977 Amendments to the Act extended the deadline for compliance from an original two years from the submission of their plans for participation to three years. Moreover, the 1977 Amendment permitted continued participation if it is determined that "substantial compliance" (meaning 75 percentum deinstitutionalization) has been achieved within three years.

This evaluation selected for case study ten States who were participating in the Act for assessment of where they stood in the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. Of the ten States, some had deinstitutionalization programs pre-dating the Act, others generated their programs after the Act. The ten States were treated as case studies with the purpose of seeing: (1) to what degree had they complied with the Act; (2) to what degree principal actors in the system perceive that "full compliance" is appropriate; (3) what types of alternatives are being generated for pre-trial detention and post-adjudication incarceration; (4) the degree to which programs for status offenders should be specific for status offenders, or whether there is enough overlap of problems of status offenders with those of other troubled youth to not require separate programs; (5) where there are service gaps for status offenders; (6) the quality of service rendered; (7) the relative cost of alternatives for status offenders; (8) what governmental agencies should do specifically for status offenders; (9) who should have jurisdiction over status offenders; and (10) how states see JJDP criteria for defining detention and correctional facilities.

The study concludes that neither OJJDP nor HEW need to consider the development of new programs specifically directed toward status offenders. However, the study does suggest that while there is no need for the infusion of Federal monies there should be continued availability of the Juvenile Justice and Crime Control funds devoted to youth services, whatever organizational changes take place at the Federal level. Perhaps the major recommendation of the study is that OJJDP should consider allowing some flexibility in the application of its guidelines defining detention and correctional facilities. Such flexibility would encourage wider participation and encourage participation by a greater number of States.

B. Methodology

The methodology for the evaluation was a case study approach to describing various approaches to deinstitutionalization. In order to do this the evaluators selected ten States representing a "mix of size, approaches to youth service delivery, geography, and approaches to deinstitutionalization". (p.vi). In each State key people were interviewed, legislation was reviewed, currently available data was reviewed for 1974 and 1977 to test for the changes in handling of status offenders, assessment of services available to status offenders (apparently through interviews), and a cost analysis was performed.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. Findings

a. Hard Data:

- (1) Confinement of status offenders shows a marked reduction in detention and confinement from 1974 to 1977.
- (2) Status offenders are still being kept in confinement both pre- and post-adjudication, but pre-adjudication is the most frequent form of confinement.
- (3) Cost Analysis: Impact of development of alternatives to detentions.
 - (a) In three States there has been little or no effect on expenditures.
 - (b) In three States cost saving has been realized.
 - (c) In one State no information was available.
 - (d) In three States incremental costs are being incurred to achieve deinstitutionalization.

b. Qualitative Data:

- (1) Strategies to promote deinstitutionalization
 - (a) Eight of the ten States have defined status offenders differently.
 - [1] Three States have merged status offenders with dependency.
 - [2] Eight States have separated status offenders from delinquency.
 - [3] One State removed status offenders from court's original jurisdiction.
 - (b) All ten States have restricted placement of status offenders.
 - [1] Six have prohibited use of jails and lockups.

- [2] Four have prohibited use of detention facilities.
- [2] Ten have prohibited use of adult correctional facilities.
- [4] Eight have prohibited use of juvenile correctional facilities.
- [5] One has provided financial disincentives.

(c) Ten States developed alternatives.

- [1] Ten States provide financial incentives.
- [2] Ten States provide community-based alternatives.
- [3] Ten States provide community-based non-residential alternatives

- (2) Interview data and reviewing legislation found that many do not favor complete deinstitutionalization of status offenders.
- (3) Interviews found that it is perceived that a small group of offenders have "problems" more severe than most other troubled youth.
- (4) Interviews with juvenile court judges (except for two States) revealed a perception that jurisdiction over status offenders should be retained by the juvenile court. Other officials tended to favor ultimate elimination.

2. Conclusions

- a. The quality and quantity of services are lessened by the fragmentation of services.
- b. Context in which deinstitutionalization is attempted will have impact on whether cost savings or costs will be incurred.
 - (1) Some institutional costs are fixed and are not reduced by reducing size of population.
 - (2) Cost savings may accrue at one level and new service demands (and costs) may appear to another level.
- c. Some status offenders are at least as well off left alone, with no public intervention.
- d. The most significant service need is some alternative to detention.
- e. There are virtually no status offender-specific needs.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. Neither OJJDP nor HEW need consider any major new programs directed specifically toward status offenders. Services are presently available or are being developed adequate to the demands created for them by deinstitutionalization. New programs targeted on status offenders as a special population would primarily serve to exacerbate the current fragmentation which characterizes youth services systems in all States.
2. While there are individual instances where additional funding is needed, there is no systematic pattern that suggests that major infusions of Federal dollars would fill major service gaps for status offenders. The primary Federal attention to funding should be to assure the continued availability of the Juvenile Justice and Crime Control funds devoted to youth services, whatever (Federal level) organizational changes may occur. Additionally, continued availability of runaway house funds and a stress on the legitimacy of status offenders as clients for Title XX programs, foster care, and mental health programs, would be useful.
3. OJJDP should consider allowing negotiation regarding the application of its guidelines defining detention and correctional facilities in those unusual instances where States can show substantial conformance, but are still technically at variance. While definitions are clearly necessary, some flexibility would acknowledge the ambiguities and special cases which demonstrably exist in the States. Such openness to flexibility would encourage wider participation and increase the chances of effecting change in a greater number of States.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

1. In general the conclusions of the study follow from the data. However, the data are highly suspect for two reasons:
 - a. The hard data utilized to test for changes in numbers of status offenders in the system are highly suspect. The collection of such data is normally for purposes other than those desired in this study. Moreover, each agency that collects the data see such data as being of little importance. Consequently, the data reflecting changes from 1974 to 1977 are of questionable validity.
 - b. The cost-benefit analysis is based on data never clearly defined.
 - c. The interviews were with people who were being scrutinized as to their compliance with the JJDPA and who would seem to be put in a defensive position. Responses to an interview in such a context seem highly suspect.

2. The reviewer feels that the document has the following deficiencies:
 - a. Inadequate detail as to the types of people interviewed, how many were interviewed, and their role in the juvenile justice system.
 - b. The information from the interviews is never detailed as to types of questions asked (structured vs. unstructured interview).
 - c. In general, the manner of selecting the sites and data collection are only superficially described so that the reader is uncertain as to how it was all done. It certainly could not be replicated from the information given.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

Overall, the study would seem to be saying basically that there has been only partial fulfillment of the deinstitutionalization goal of the JJDP 1974 and that state officials believe that full accommodation would be inappropriate because status offender needs are the same as the needs for non-status offenders, and in some cases worse. This is not a shocking finding, but it may suggest a re-evaluation of the JJDP and either a retreating from earlier stands or evaluation concerning how to bring about full deinstitutionalization of status offenders. This would seem of some utility to LEAA's policy and planning system.

Actual Utilization:

The Arthur D. Little study was intended as a state-of-the-art review for use in the field; however, the study has been utilized in several additional ways:

- . The report's policy recommendations to OJJDP were worked through the system, but no clear or direct utilization pattern could be discerned.
- . The study functioned as an informal input into decisions regarding guidelines for the treatment of status offenders and influenced increased flexibility in these guidelines.
- . In addition to the Arthur D. Little study, a national evaluation contract was given to the University of Southern California for development of the DSO program. This research has also influenced guidelines. The full two-stage study (when completed) will be used:

- (1) to indicate the strengths and weaknesses in ways programs have been implemented to assist future efforts and replications;
- (2) to identify substantial program issues;
- (3) to provide useful information for transfer to states; and
- (4) to provide a basis for further evaluations.

VII. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM SUPPORT

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Surveying Crime

A. Descriptive Abstract

A major statistical series, The National Crime Surveys (NCS), was instituted by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in July 1972 to develop new information on the incidence of crime and its impact on society. The new series was to provide information on the victims of crime, and on crimes not reported to the police and to give uniform measures for the types of crime selected.

A national sample survey included personal interviews at 6-month intervals in approximately 60,000 households and 39,000 business establishments. Initial plans also called for sample surveys designed to provide data for individual cities. Such surveys have been conducted in 26 cities; in 13 of them a second survey has been taken to provide a measure of changes over time. The Bureau of the Census, on behalf of LEAA, is responsible for the collection and tabulation of the survey data.

Shortly after the surveys were underway, LEAA asked the Committee on National Statistics of the National Academy of Sciences--National Research Council to evaluate the surveys. The Committee selected a panel representing a variety of disciplines and recruited a staff to carry out the investigations necessary to perform the work envisaged. The study covered the period January 1974 to June 1976. Throughout the time of the study, the staff and the panel had the full cooperation of the staffs of the Bureau of the Census and LEAA.

The report is presented under the following chapter headings:

Description and Comment on Survey Design
Review of LEAA-Sponsored Pretest and Pilot Studies
The Need for Managerial and Technical Coordination
Methodological Research
Assessment of NCS Collection Instruments and Procedures
NCS Findings: Analysis, Publication, and Dissemination
Assessment of Objectives of the National Crime Surveys
Utility of the National Crime Surveys

B. Methodology

The panel (see Abstract) studied published reports, interviewed LEAA and Census staffs (as necessary), and reviewed internal documentation (when available). The report represents a summary of the consensus views reached in panel discussions, the review of interim reports, and the review of early drafts of the final report.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. The design of the NCS generally is consistent with the objective of producing data on trends and patterns of victimization for certain categories of crime. Some reservations about specific design components of the surveys are expressed.

2. Conceptual, procedural, and managerial problems limit the potential of the NCS, but the panel considers that given sufficient support, the problems ought to be amenable to substantial resolution in the long run.

3. A major shift of resources to analytic and methodological research is essential in order for the NCS to yield data useful for policy formulation. This shift should be accompanied by the development of administrative mechanisms to enhance this large and complex series' capacity for self-correction.

4. The primary uses envisioned originally for the NCS were of a social and policy indicator nature. The panel agrees that a subsequent objective of producing operating intelligence for jurisdictions is inconsistent with the original purposes of the NCS and with the design informed by those purposes, except insofar as operating intelligence is a by-product of understanding broad trends and patterns of victimization.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. A substantially greater proportion of LEAA resources should be allocated to delineation of product objectives, to managerial coordination, to data analysis and dissemination, and to a continuing program of methodological research and evaluation.

2. The staff providing managerial and analytic support for the NCS should be expanded to include the full-time efforts of at least 30 to 40 professional employees. Without this expansion, the NCS cannot be developed to achieve its potential for practical utility.

3. A coordinator at the Bureau of the Census should be appointed whose responsibilities would crosscut the various Census operations that support the NCS.

4. The staff that performs NCS analysis and report-writing functions, whether LEAA employees or otherwise, should have an active role in the management of the NCS. Specifically, the analytic staff should participate in the development of objectives for substantive reports and publication schedules. Once analytic plans are formulated, the analytic staff should have autonomy in specifying tabulations to be used in support of the analysis, and it should have direct access to complete NCS data files and to data processing resources. It should be the analytic staff's responsibility to formulate statistical or other criteria used in hypothesis testing. Finally, a feedback mechanism should

be instituted through which the staff can influence decisions on the content of survey instruments, on field and code procedures, and on analytic and methodological research to be undertaken.

5. Resources now used for the nationwide household survey and for the independent city-level household surveys should be consolidated and used for carrying out an integrated national program. The integrated effort could produce not only nationwide and regional data, but, on the same timetable, estimates for separately identifiable Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's) and for at least the five largest central cities within them. For some purposes, it would be practicable and perhaps useful to combine data for two or more years and to show separate tabulations for a large number of cities and metropolitan areas.

6. A review and restatement of the objectives of the commercial surveys should be conducted and data collection should be suspended, except in support of experimental and exploratory review of these objectives.

7. Five percent of the NCS sample in the future should be available to interview in order to explore different forms and ordering of questions, and for pretesting possible new questions. Chapter 6 is devoted to discussion of alternate measures of victim events, to the scope of victim events surveyed, and to the need for independent variables. Measures of the concepts of vulnerability and opportunity for victimization are recommended additions to the interview schedule.

8. Routine NCS tabulations should include results on the risk of victimization, where the unit of analysis is the surveyed individual, and that analysis of risk should be a significant part of NCS publications on a recurring basis. If the NCS data are coded and tabulated so as to yield a cumulative count of personal and household victim experiences of all surveyed respondents, analyses of multiple victimization, including events now excluded as "series" incidents, could and should be routine components of official publications.

9. A major methodological effort on optimum field and survey design for the NCS should be undertaken. Toward this goal, high priority should be given to research on the best combination of reference period, frequency of interview at an address, length of retention in the sample, and bounding rules. Part of the recommended research in this area should be a new reverse record check study in order to assess: (a) differential degrees of reporting for different types of victimizations and different classes of respondents, (b) problems of telescoping and decay; and (c) biases in the misreporting of facts.

10. Local interest in victimization patterns should be addressed through LEAA-Census joint development of a manual of procedures for conducting local area victimization surveys. The federal government should produce reports on the NCS that contain detailed analyses of patterns and trends of victimization so as to allow law enforcement personnel, the public, and policymakers to draw inferences that might be applicable

to the issues with which they are concerned. Informing the public and their policymakers of the distribution and modifiability of risk should be the primary objective of the NCS.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

A panel of experts with an academic/research orientation has reviewed a complex and elaborate data-collection system designed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Predictably, they have focused on methodological issues related to the reliability and validity of the data for research purposes, and on improvements which could be made in that context. The findings, conclusions, and recommendations, some of which have a rather sophisticated basis, are described in a way which can be appreciated by non-experts. Chapter 9 in the report is a thoughtful and informed discussion of the utility of NCS data, which merits careful reading by the planners of NCS.

For those who are interested in data of immediate practical utility to operating agencies in the criminal justice/crime prevention fields, the report will be less satisfying. It might have posed alternative courses of action and discussed their pro's, con's, and requirements. If this approach had been taken, methodological problems might have been judged to be less serious and a quite different set of recommendations probably would have emerged.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

This report will have its greatest utility for those within LEAA who are directly responsible for the planning and management of the NCS, and for those who set program priorities involving NCS. It has utility for survey methodologists, particularly for those concerned with designing victimization surveys, such as the Safe Schools Study. Planners of research involving NCS data may also find the report useful.

Actual Utilization:

- Utilization of the National Academy's study was impeded by lack of interaction between the contractor and the unit under study. Several interviewers noted that the investigators ignored the dynamic nature of the NCS program, resulting in several irrelevant and unrealistic recommendations.
- A joint Census-LEAA Committee was established to review the report, extract recommendations, and monitor follow-up "item-by-Item." Resulting actions included: a study of a 6- versus a 12-month reference period, a telephone versus personal interview experiment, revisions of the questionnaire, the Leesburg Conference, naming of a coordinator in the Bureau of the Census, clearer identification and publicity of the objectives of NCS, and use in setting priorities and making sequencing and level-of-effort decisions.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Analysis of the Utility and Benefits of the National Crime Survey (NCS)

A. Descriptive Abstract

This study was completed at the request of the Statistics Division, NCJISS to assist with both immediate and long-range decisions concerning the LEAA-sponsored National Crime Survey (NCS), a continuing national survey of a rotating panel of 60,000 households interviewed semi-annually by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The objective was to determine the present and potential utility and benefits of the NCS and its potential for contributing to public and private criminal justice decision-making. The study was planned to assist NCJISS in the development of priorities for programs of research and statistical services in view of both the needs of the Division's clients and the constraints of its sponsoring agency, LEAA. A previous NCS review in 1976 by the National Academy of Sciences focused on survey methodology but did not rigorously solicit or analyze information on the needs of specific user groups.

Interviews were conducted personally or by telephone with 160 representatives of various victimization information user groups under a stated "benefit analysis" approach. Evidence of NCS use was classified by year of use, organizational role of user, NCS product used, level of analytical depth of use, and purpose of use. These data, supplemented by an extensive literature review, were analyzed using a "growth curve" model to describe the pattern of past and current uses and to predict the potential for future use.

Knowledgeable users and NCS supporters were found in Congressional subcommittees, Federal executive offices, national associations, research and service firms, state legislative and planning offices, and local criminal justice and academic institutions. Evidence suggested that there will be continued growth in NCS utilization by most of these groups and that the potential benefits of the NCS program to public and private criminal justice decisions are substantial enough to recommend continuation of NCS and to support improvement in both survey methodology and the system of knowledge dissemination.

Overall priorities recommended for attention in follow-up action are, in order of importance: improved efficiency, reliability, and validity; greater product simplicity; more relevant variables; more politically relevant samples (for state/local jurisdictions); and more timely products.

The report includes a history of NCS development; review of study methodology; the presentation of evidence organized by user category with analysis, interpretation, and forecast of potential use; and summary recommendations and conclusions.

B. Methodology

A hypothesis of continued rapid growth in NCS use was tested for each of several user communities representing decisionmakers as well as experienced analytical users. Evidence was obtained by unstructured personal interviews and telephone conversations. Interviewees were selected by screening calls, referral, attendance lists from relevant workshops, and citation in the literature.

The approach to data handling is described as deriving from a "benefit analysis" concept, defined as the effort to critically estimate the value of an activity and to show explicitly the social and economic consequences of alternative courses of action. Interpretation of the data utilizes a "growth curve" model which assumes that new technologies start slowly, reach a period of accelerated utilization, move into a less rapid growth period, and finally mature into a relatively steady state. An example of a growth curve is given in the attached appendix.

Since all uses and users are not of equal importance in setting NCS priorities, actual and potential uses are examined by user category and evidence of utilization is further classified by year of use, the organizational role of the user, the NCS product used, the level of analytical depth of use, and the purpose of the usage. In particular, the use pattern of data affects the benefits received so the study classifies usage by the activity of the user from data to decision (routine to highly original use). Levels of use ratings are detailed in the attached appendix.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. Use of NCS has grown gradually, which is considered normal for a large and complex data series.
2. There is evidence that the growth in the use of NCS is accelerating; it is projected that this acceleration will continue for a number of years if appropriate modifications are made to NCS production and distribution methods.
3. The most frequent substantive use of the data has been by the academic community performing scientific rather than policy research.
4. There is sufficient evidence of past and potential use of the NCS in policy research to conclude that this use will also grow in the near future.
5. The NCS aggregate data have been used as a social indicator of crime by many who have received the NCJISS documents. This use has been shallow to date because the interpretations by the Census do not project trends or postulate causes and the data are highly aggregated.

6. A national household survey such as the NCS has little use as a tool for detailed planning and evaluation. Census restrictions on the disaggregation of NCS data limit their use by local planners.
7. Although victimization data may be potentially useful as performance measures in evaluating local programs, the NCS does not collect data at the appropriate time or level of detail for such use.
8. It is the general impression of some potential NCS users and many of the strong supporters of official police statistics that the present NCS methodology produces unacceptable estimates. The National Academy of Sciences' review and other criticisms of NCS methodology have caused some concern about the validity of the survey.
9. Knowledgeable users fully expect that there will be methodological changes throughout the history of the NCS, as there are in all national series. They support such improvements.
10. A few users with urban constituents would prefer to have NCS data collection concentrated in one or a few large urban areas.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. The findings of this study provide strong support for the continuation of NCS, but not necessarily the full survey now in operation.
2. There is a need to clarify the objectives of NCS, particularly with respect to priorities among potential user groups.
3. Priorities for improvement of NCS are summarized as:
 - a. improved efficiency, reliability and validity,
 - b. greater product simplicity,
 - c. more relevant variables,
 - d. more politically relevant products, and
 - e. more timely products.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

This report provides an effective analytical review of NCS usage by user category. Although based on the subjective judgements of respondents and the subjective analysis of interviewers and authors, the findings, as stated, are highly relevant to future policy direction and priority-setting in LEAA. The report does not attempt to pre-judge those priorities but only to suggest certain implications of the find-

ings for possible future NCS policies. The findings clearly support the study conclusion favoring NCS continuation and, in conjunction with the National Academy study, point the way to benefits that potentially will be obtained through enlightened scientific and policy research as well as better informed legislative and executive decisionmaking and resource allocation.

The study is clearly intended to be an analysis of NCR utility and benefits and to complement the more survey-design-oriented National Academy Study. In this context the focus on a user survey is appropriate and valid. The evidence is presented with sufficient detail so that it can be used to assist both in the establishing of NCS priorities and in the subsequent program modifications needed to serve those priorities. The data are clearly organized for efficient utilization by readers with specific or general concerns.

There is a certain methodological inconsistency between the early emphasis on "benefit analysis" and the later statement that, "the benefits of the NCS program are not addressed specifically in this study" (p. 5-17). That is, in fact, true. No attempt is made to actually do a benefit analysis; the focus is entirely on utility. Since utility is a necessary condition for the realization of benefits, the actual study focus is entirely appropriate. To evaluate benefits would require analyzing usage factors outside NCJISS control. But the introductory focus on benefit analysis and even the use of the word "benefits" in the report title is misleading.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

This report should be utilized by those who make policy decisions regarding NCS, its planning and management. It should be utilized by those in a position to influence priority-setting in meeting the needs of the various users of NCS. It could also be of value to those concerned with the production and dissemination of NCS data, as well as with dissemination of information regarding the availability of NCS data. Since the focus is on users of NCS data, the report should be of interest to those involved in NCS who have interaction with users of NCS output.

Actual Utilization:

- . The study had a significant impact on the statistics branch of NCJISS, resulting in program modification and changes in program management. Effects of this report are still evident in regard to statistics policy level deliberations. For example, the NCJISS Review Board recently approved a new study on city level victimization surveys.
- . The study is too recent to specifically judge utilization; however, the setting into which the report has been placed is certainly conducive for "constructive ad-hocism."

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

An Evaluation of the Accomplishments and Impact of the Programs of LEAA in the Areas of Information Systems Development and Statistical Services (NCJISS)

A. Descriptive Abstract

The objectives of this study are:

1. To assess the producer-consumer relationship between NCJISS and receivers/users of NCJISS-produced statistics,
2. To assess LEAA support for criminal justice information systems development in terms of accomplishments and impact.

The report is organized around a brief historical background and discussion of the reasons for the study, a description of the study and its methodology, and a presentation of the collected data with analysis and the drawing of conclusions leading to specific recommendations.

The study is based primarily on a structured interview methodology in which "key persons" in state and local user agencies, LEAA staff, and certain non-LEAA agencies were asked questions designed to identify information and statistics needs, evaluate existing information systems development, and evaluate statistical systems and programs, especially in terms of utility.

The study found that LEAA funding has had a positive impact on the development of state and local information systems but that a lack of supporting inputs such as technical assistance has resulted in little impact on system quality or user satisfaction. NCJISS statistics, it was found, are limited in utility because they are not addressed to specific needs and lack useful analysis. Documents utilizing these statistics were found to be of generally mediocre quality.

The report recommends greater NCJISS-user interaction in the areas of analysis, evaluation, and to promote cross fertilization of ideas. Statistical services should be improved through better formats, increased clarity, and focused analytical studies which are user-oriented.

These recommendations basically call for NCJISS to do a better and broader job of what it is already doing and mainly require an increased and more effective allocation of NCJISS resources to the tasks at hand. No major structural or policy changes are called for.

B. Methodology

The following steps were carried out in performing this study:

1. Convened three broadly representative groups, each representing three states, to discuss relevant issues and furnish information to be used in developing detailed interview guidelines.
2. Surveyed SPAs and local grantee CJ units in nine representative states (different from those above) through interviews and document review.
3. Analyzed the resulting data to assess LEAA capability and effectiveness in serving users and their utilization capability. Certain general hypotheses growing out of contract statements were selected and tested.
4. Conducted a telephone survey of users of NCJISS published documents and Law Enforcement Education Program participants (too late for comprehensive analysis prior to preparation of final report).

C. Findings and Conclusions

This report contains a large number of findings and conclusions; they are summarized in the attached appendix.

With respect to the impact of LEAA input on state and local information system development, the primary conclusion is that LEAA funds have had a decided effect on the rate of development of such systems but no effect on system quality or the degree of user satisfaction. There has been little LEAA input beyond funding; technical assistance is normally obtained from data processing vendors or consultants. In terms of utilization of NCJISS-produced statistics it was concluded that usage was limited by the feeling that the statistics were not developed with sufficient attention to the needs of state and local agencies or in formats readily applicable to planning at that level. The products serve mainly as general reference material and there is a lack of producer-consumer interaction to mutually enhance product value and usability.

The review of state/local documents using NCJISS data led to the conclusion that they were of generally mediocre quality. The limited telephone survey was inconclusive but did not contradict other findings.

D. Program/Policy Implications

Report recommendations are summarized in the attached appendix in association with the related findings.

Regarding information systems, these recommendations deal mainly with suggestions for more technical assistance, cross fertilization of ideas, evaluation capability, user participation in system development, and simplification/clarification of relevant LEAA guidelines and system classifications.

With reference to statistical services, somewhat more specific recommendations are made, categorized by classes of users. These deal mainly with improving the clarity and format of statistics presentation, developing resources to issue analytical studies focused on particular users' needs and interests, and increasing interaction with users through technical assistance and other support services.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

Contractual and time constraints limited the thoroughness of both the data collection and its analysis. The interview sample, while broad, depended in large part on who was available and may or may not be representative. The organization and use of the large mass of "soft" data assembled was necessarily somewhat subjective.

Where a rather scientific methodology was used - to interpret the ratings of three "judges" in the document review - it was probably disproportionate to the somewhat arbitrary sample of 47 documents selected from 100 made available.

The hurried telephone survey resulted in a very thin sample. Additionally, the preselected response categories led to a large number of respondents answering "other." The results must thus be seen as indicative only and not definitive.

Despite the methodological limitations, however, the results of the process are sufficiently valid for uses made of them in the report. The recommendations are ultimately presented in terms of rather general improvements with little indication of how they might be carried out. It may thus be difficult for NCJISS to respond quickly or to focus on the most essential concerns.

Related to this is the reality that the contract is with LEAA's Office of Planning and Management rather than NCJISS itself. This may have precluded interaction with NCJISS as part of the methodology, a dynamic which would have enhanced their sense of being participants as opposed to objectives of a critique with probable benefit to their readiness to utilize the findings.

The report is clearly presented, highly readable, and the internal logic is consistent. That is, findings and conclusions flow clearly from the narrative and statistical presentations, and the recommendations have a solid base in the findings. The structure of the report in which findings and recommendations are summarized by system or data user-class facilitates some focusing on concerns relevant to particular report readers. That advantage is largely overridden, however, by the reality that the report and recommendations are addressed to LEAA and not the users themselves. For the LEAA's benefit, some integration of the many findings and recommendations into a limited number of specific management suggestions would have been useful. For example, recommendations using action words such as "improve," "increase," "develop," and "promote" might better specify from where to where LEAA should and realistically can move on these issues and how.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

There is little in the report claiming to predict the utilization of the findings and recommendations, assess their potential impact, or point the way toward their effective usage. As noted above, there is insufficient specificity to offer maximum guidance for adapting the NCJISS program to meet the identified needs of present and potential consumers. And by virtue of the data derived from state and local level interviews being subsumed into summary conclusions, some of the value of those findings for addressing actual local needs may be lost as well.

The utility of the study is affected in an indeterminate way by a significant structural reality. The report is addressed to the LEAA and therefore utilizes an underlying assumption that there is an active federal role to be played in influencing information systems design and statistics utilization. However, as the report notes, the role assigned to LEAA under the Safe Streets Act is quite limited, representing, for example, only 10-15 percent of state/local funds spent for criminal justice information systems. The study might well have taken this reality more seriously in both its methodology and in the way it structured its conclusions and recommendations. Otherwise, there is risk that the LEAA, in acting upon the report recommendations, will be pushing on a string.

Most of the recommendations call for NCJISS to do more things or to do what it does with additional inputs. It seems likely that NCJISS may have been aware of many of these needs and opportunities prior to the report but lacked the necessary resources. This again points to the utility of greater prioritization of suggestions or some attention to how existing resources might be reallocated to address these concerns in the actual environment in which this must take place.

Actual Utilization:

- . Those people within the agency concerned with legislative response and the reorganization act utilized findings from this report as background material for Congressional testimony. The study findings served as a basis for requesting a study of utilization of the National Crime Panel.
- . RTI's study of NCJISS exemplified the use of procedures and practices hindering effective utilization. For instance, a study designed by an office with limited understanding of the unit under scrutiny is likely to address the wrong issues. Furthermore, an evaluation imposed from outside the unit under investigation tends to be perceived as a threat, thus setting an atmosphere which is unfavorable for acceptance and constructive follow-up.
- . NCJISS felt that the study's quality was low and utilization impossible.

APPENDIX

A SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this project, which was conducted jointly by the Research Triangle Institute and Midwest Research Institute, was to evaluate the effectiveness of the work the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) has undertaken during the past six years in the two areas: the development of criminal justice information systems and the production and dissemination of crime and criminal justice statistics. The objectives were to provide assessments of (1) the producer-consumer relationships between the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service (NCJISS) and the receivers and users of NCJISS-produced statistics and (2) LEAA support for criminal justice information system development. The conclusions and recommendations are summarized first for the information systems and next for the use of statistics.

II. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Evaluation of 76 criminal justice information systems (chapter 4) showed that most of them are promoting rapid retrieval of more accurate information, and thus are greatly assisting criminal justice agencies in the performance of their functions.

LEAA funds have made decided differences in the rates of development of information systems. Many would not have been developed if LEAA funds had not been available. The timing of these funds was often more important than the amount; for example, a \$20,000 contribution to a \$200,000 locally funded system may have kept the development alive. The presence or absence of LEAA development funds did not appear to have influenced either the sophistication or the level of user satisfaction. Information systems appear to be most advanced in the law enforcement area; more of LEAA development funds have been expended in the law enforcement area than in courts or corrections areas. Rather than funds, the factors which appeared to most influence user satisfaction were the degrees of user participation in the design and user familiarity with the system.

LEAA technical assistance has been limited largely to sponsoring seminars, publishing informative materials, and providing funds for visits to other systems. Technical and technology transfer assistance have been provided most often by in-house data processing personnel, computer industry vendors, management consulting firms, aerospace industries, and academic institutions. Systems operators would have used LEAA technical assistance if it had been available when they were designing their systems.

Consumers of LEAA development support would like to have more and better information about other systems which are operating successfully, technical

assistance in measuring system efficiency, clearer and firmer guidelines and regulations, and less administrative delay.

Based on the above conclusions, the following recommendations are made:

- Provide and disseminate timely and accurate information on successfully operating criminal justice information systems and on software packages appropriate for use by criminal justice system agencies.
- Sponsor more seminars for promoting the "cross-fertilization" of data processing and law enforcement ideas.
- Enhance the technical assistance capabilities of State Planning Agencies.
- Develop an information system evaluation methodology.
- Promote a high level of user participation in the development and use of information systems.
- Clarify and expedite the dissemination of LEAA regulations and guidelines.
- Review the grant evaluation and award processes.
- Promote the development of classifications, definitions, and a standard terminology for criminal justice information systems.

The recommendations are amplified in chapter 4.

III. USE OF NCJISS STATISTICS

Evaluation of the use on NCJISS-produced documents and data services were based on personal interviews in state and local agencies, at LEAA headquarters and in non-LEAA federal agencies in Washington. Also, telephone interviews were held with general subscribers to NCJISS-produced documents; and documents produced in the field were evaluated. Documents and services which the NCJISS Statistics Division provides have generally met the federal needs which they were originally designed to meet. When the NCJISS data series were initiated in 1972, they provided benchmark data for several subjects on which no others were available at the national level. Thus, those interviewed in Washington found the series to be invaluable. However, the documents and data series have not kept pace with the changing needs at the federal level. The documents are being used frequently in educational institutions, particularly those participating in LEAA's Law Enforcement Education Program.

There is no evidence that any of the NCJISS documents and data series were designed specifically to meet the needs of state and local agencies. Generally they meet few of these needs. If NCJISS is to meet the needs, the data series must give more complete coverage to state and local areas, the

documents must permit realistic comparisons within and between states, and the states must have help in upgrading their capabilities to perform analyses using the data.

A. Non-LEAA Federal Agencies

The following conclusions were drawn from the findings in interviews with 14 non-LEAA agencies in the District of Columbia. The NCJISS-produced documents and data series are more strongly supported in this set of interviews than in the others. Most of the persons interviewed expressed needs for series relevant to their specific functions. Most do make use of the documents or the data series. The documents seldom are used as primary data sources for research and analysis; they are used most often as general reference sources. Only the victimization data are used for research and analysis, but the users have access to the raw data.

Based on these conclusions, the following recommendations are made:

- Improve document use by providing brief summary documents pointing out the important findings, trend changes, or key statistics to the high level administrators who should know about them.
- Improve statistical series use by providing the Statistics Division with adequate staffing to produce and disseminate special reports at the requests of federal (or other) users.
- Increase user interaction between NCJISS and federal agency researchers and analysts.

B. LEAA Headquarters

The following conclusions were drawn from the findings in interviews with 18 persons in LEAA Headquarters in the District of Columbia. The NCJISS documents are used within these offices. The frequency of use ranges from daily to one-time-only depending on the document and the needs of the office.

The victimization series is considered to be "a gold mine"; however, its present documentation needs to be improved and the NCJISS Statistics Division should increase its capability to perform special analyses with these data. The routine tabulations should be more in line with LEAA programs. The victimization survey is needed and the collection procedures are sound. The major complaints are that no analysis is made of the data to draw out implications for research and program planning and that tables in the documents do not show classifications of interest to most receivers of the documents.

The expenditure and employment data are used occasionally in all other LEAA offices and frequently in the Office of Regional Operations. Needed are timely, up-to-date data and regional breakdowns.

Criminal justice agency listings are used infrequently by the LEAA offices, except the Office of Regional Operations. They are most useful as sources of the approximate numbers of agencies in a region or state. Corrections documents, except for Children in Custody, were most useful for benchmark data when the series were first produced. Data showing trends and significant changes that are relevant to planning the corrections programs would be useful. Tabulations of the characteristics of women in prisons were specifically requested. The one court document on the list is used infrequently as a general reference. The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) from the FBI are used widely in these offices.

The conclusions led to the four recommendations for improving the producer-consumer relationships and the Division's statistical capabilities and services.

- Increase liaison with LEAA research and program offices to enhance the relevance to and use of documents by the offices.
- Increase the analytical staff resources, and the number and quality of analytical studies in support of LEAA policy and program designs.
- Continue to make all data from the statistical series easily available for special analyses, to publicize the availability of procedures for performing special studies, and to provide analytical services to LEAA and non-LEAA offices that have no analytical capability available to them.
- Review its procedures for producing documents--in the expenditures and employment series and the criminal justice agency series in particular--to insure that the documents are as current and timely as good management will permit.

C. State and Local Agencies

These conclusions were drawn from interviews with over 100 planners, researchers, and system operators in state and local agencies. The NCJISS documents and data series were usually received, scanned once, and placed on a shelf for possible later reference but were not widely used by state and local agencies. Planners in state agencies most often use or attempt to use them to compare their states with others of a similar demographic mix. When they are unable to compare, they consider the data incomplete or the methods of tabulation inappropriate for their needs. Researchers and analysts need victimization data on their states, their local areas, or their regions to use with FBI crime statistics.

From the conclusions evolved three recommendations to help NCJISS improve its services to state and local agencies.

- Develop a program to assist state and local agencies in data analyses to fulfill the immediate need for straightforward examples of practical criminal justice analyses.

- Develop a larger, analytically trained staff and/or obtain consultant assistance to draw from the data series inferences relevant to state and local criminal justice planning and analysis.
- Replace the more bulky documents in some series with summary analyses.
- Make criminal justice data in the repository readily accessible to researchers and analysts in states with advanced analytical capabilities.

Recommendations in this section are amplified in chapter 5.

D. Statistical Documents

From the 18 states, 100 documents were received for review and 47 were judged relevant to the evaluation of the impacts of LEAA-produced statistics on the state-produced statistical documents. Conclusions based on the evaluations are presented here.

- With few exceptions, the judged quality of the documents was not high.
- The quality of documents referencing LEAA/UCR documents was higher than it was for documents not referencing LEAA/UCR documents.
- The quality of documents referencing LEAA/UCR documents increases as the number of LEAA/UCR documents referenced increases.
- For all documents reviewed, references to only LEAA documents (UCR excluded) occurred 19 percent of the time.
- For all documents reviewed, some LEAA/UCR statistics were used in 38 percent of the documents.
- Documents referencing LEAA/UCR sources and using LEAA/UCR statistics were judged to be of somewhat lower quality than documents referencing LEAA/UCR sources but not using LEAA/UCR statistics.
- Documents funded by LEAA were judged to be of higher quality than documents not funded by LEAA.

No recommendations were derived from this evaluation of state-produced documents.

E. Survey Subscribers and LEEP Institutions

The random samples of 300 subscribers to NCJISS publications and 50 persons in institutions participating in LEAA's Law Enforcement Education

Program (LEEP) were interviewed in the telephone survey. The subscribers use the documents more than the personnel in state and local agencies do. Most of the LEEP participants were users. Uses for both groups were primarily general reference, research, and classroom instruction.

Recommendations based on both groups of respondents were consistent with those of local and state agency personnel. The main two were:

- Include more narrative explanations of analyses, and
- Include more interpretation of data.

Details are in section E of chapter 5.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

A Review and Assessment of Telecommunications Planning in the 50 State Planning Agencies

A. Descriptive Abstract

[LEAA Grant No. 74-SS-99-3310 to Association Public Safety Communications Officers, Incorporation (APCO) for \$592,994 on May 6, 1974; subsequent contract to Applied Research Division of Booz Allen and Hamilton, Incorporated.]

APSO held regional meetings and then conducted a national survey of 7,686 telecommunications grants in order to assess the present status of telecommunications planning by the SPA's and to develop guidelines for the assistance of those at the municipal, county and state level involved in the development of telecommunications planning. This report in three volumes presents a review and assessment of telecommunications planning in the 50 state planning agencies, including a national profile and summary and detailed summaries of the planning organizations, relationships, and activities in each of the 50 states. Volume III presents planning guidelines as an attempt to bridge the gap that exists between the grant applicant at the local level and the grant approval authority at the SPA level. It is an attempt to provide an orderly process by which local level personnel can develop useful, technologically feasible, and cost effective telecommunications programs and the development of a plan which will be approved by the SPA.

Evaluation of the survey data shows that (1) many of the state comprehensive law enforcement plans are not sufficiently comprehensive nor adequately detailed in the area of telecommunications; (2) SPA's vary in the quantity and the quality of telecommunications staffing available for the planning and management of telecommunications grants; and (3) lack of telecommunications detail in many of the plans can make it impossible to adequately determine whether grant applications for telecommunications projects meet the objectives of the plan.

B. Methodology

1. Four regional meetings were held for representatives of LEAA, the SPA's, state divisions of communications, and APCO to discuss the project and plans of the survey.
2. Contractor teams visited each of the SPA's of the 50 states and visited the following cities: the District of Columbia, New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. They also inspected 7,868 telecommunications grants.
3. Conducted an analysis to show the scope, content, objectives, and methodology of the plans and to describe the impact of the grant programs since 1971.

4. From the data and the experiences, a set of planning guidelines was developed.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. Many of the state comprehensive law enforcement plans are not sufficiently comprehensive nor adequately detailed in the area of telecommunications. Many or all possess the following characteristics: lack the basis for full utilization of existing resources, lack priorities for allocation of funds, lack provisions for interstate or intrastate coordination of frequencies, lack operational descriptions such as assignment of responsibilities and designation of tasks, lack sufficient detail.
2. SPA's vary in the quantity and quality of telecommunications staffing available for planning and management of telecommunications grants. This handicaps SPA's in providing detailed analysis and makes difficult the development of technically adequate plans.
3. Since plans lack detail, one can't tell whether the grant applications are consistent with the plan objectives.

D. Program/Policy Implications

LEAA should establish the following requirements or policies: (a) each comprehensive plan should contain a comprehensive telecommunications section, (b) support the use of the APCO planning guidelines, (c) encourage the development of criteria for staffing telecommunications, (d) develop and promulgate recommended minimum standards for grant application, (e) development of priority lists for grant applications, (f) telecommunications seminars at the working level, (g) a procurement handbook for agencies expending LEAA funds, (h) a review and implementation procedure for state and local frequency plans, (i) an office of telecommunications planning/coordination, (j) minimum standards for training of dispatchers, technicians, (k) utilization of existing DOC resources for planning, (l) standard policy with respect to the kinds of agencies eligible for LEAA grants.

E. Critique of Quality, Usability, and Utility

The report presents an encyclopedia of the resources, organization, and planning processes for telecommunications in each of the states. While it presents an indepth profile of the existing systems, it constitutes an evaluation in only the loosest sense of the word. Based on the state-of-the-art described, the authors present recommendations that a national policy encouraging a comprehensive approach to planning for communications, guidelines for comprehensive plans, and guidance concerning staffing should be developed. The prescribed guidelines constitute Volume III of the report.

The format of the report summary yielded duplication in statements about project methodology and concerning study conclusions and recommendations.

The primary utility of the study product is the inventory compiled and the guideline document produced. The utility to LEAA lies in the policy implications listed in section D of the study report.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

According to the few staff people who expressed familiarity with the study, the assessment of telecommunications planning consisted of a review of the various systems. The study was not considered as an evaluation; therefore, it was not utilized as such within LEAA.

Actual Utilization:

- . When the study was initiated, 10 out of 50 states had adequate technical staff for telecommunications. As of 15 months ago, however, at least 40 states had adequate technical people on their staffs.
- . The report has served to add to the knowledge base regarding telecommunications. Some familiarity with the report was expressed by the police area staff.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Costs and Benefits of the Comprehensive Data System Program

A. Descriptive Abstract

The objective of this study was an assessment of the costs and benefits of the Comprehensive Data System (CDS) with emphasis on the interstate exchange of criminal histories through the Computerized Criminal History (CCH) program.

The report is organized around a brief historical overview of the CDS program; a discussion of the methodology and assumptions related to CDS cost estimation; a detailed presentation of projected CCH development and operational costs including description of an automated cost model for studying the effectiveness of alternate CCH policies; a review of CDS statistical component* cost estimates; and a presentation of CDS and component benefits. The findings are then used to define several policy issues impacting future cost trends of the CDS system.

Project methodology involved field study visits to selected state and local criminal justice agencies. Additionally, studies were made of all CDS grants which had been approved as of September, 1974 to investigate factors relating to costs and procedures. Based on the data, a model was developed and certain fundamental procedural assumptions adopted as the basis for projecting CDS program costs 10 years into the future. Benefit analysis was more subjective and less quantifiable.

The study found that annual CDS costs would rise from \$30 million in 1975 to \$54 million in 1984 (constant dollars). These costs are broken down by component and related to basic procedural assumptions. Benefits are then described for each component in terms of the amount, speed, and utility of data processing output from the CDS system for different segments of the criminal justice system.

No comprehensive attempt was made to judge the cost effectiveness of CDS or its components beyond noting that costs are higher than originally projected. The findings are used instead to identify several policy issues impacting cost projections where the study team felt there was potential for large cost reductions with minor benefit loss. These are mainly procedural in nature. In some cases, policy alternatives are suggested. No recommendations are made beyond the implication that these policy issues should be given consideration by the appropriate policymakers within LEAA.

* CDS components include:

OBTS/CCH:	Offender Based Transaction Statistics/Computerized Criminal Histories
UCR:	Uniform Crime Reporting
SAC:	Statistical Analysis Center
MAS:	Management and Administration Statistics
TA/CDS:	Technical Assistance

B. Methodology

The study was conducted in 12 months, seven of which were used for field study. Visits were made to criminal justice agencies in 11 states, 3 regions, 5 municipalities, and the FBI. In addition, a study was made of all CDS grants approved as of 1974 to investigate costs and procedures relating to basic operations such as data collection, storage and transmission of criminal histories, information systems, and the criminal identification process.

Basic assumptions were made as a basis for cost estimation. These included the expectation that all states would implement all five CDS components. Costs of political and jurisdictional obstacles to implementation were excluded. A 10 year timeframe was selected to allow for expected completion of systems and two years of operational and maintenance experience.

Costs of OBTS/CCH, the major CDS component, were projected based on field visit data on system design, past and anticipated expenditures, telecommunications and computing requirements and personnel needs. Operating costs estimates involved construction of a model depicting state and federal processing operations.* Unit costs for each task were used to convert processing volumes into CCH operating cost estimates by year. The model allows for rerun of data under a variety of implementation assumptions, a capacity relevant to the study's citation of alternative cost-saving policies.

Development costs for OBTS/CCH were extrapolated from the experiential 11 state data base. Certain assumptions about the nature and pace of system development of necessity underlie these estimates.

Costs of other CDS components (SAC, UCR, MAS, and TA/CDS) were projected from the survey of existing grants and consultations with the FBI concerning UCR. From this LEAA funding policy was inferred and extrapolated to the remaining states.

The methodology of benefit analysis was less rigorous than the cost estimates. The artificial assignment of dollar values to benefits not measured in dollars was rejected as unrealistic in the absence of competitive markets for CDS products. Except for an analysis comparing CCH information retrieval capability with existing time constraints and a detailed estimate of future decision volumes, no quantitative assessments are used in the benefit presentation.

C. Findings and Conclusions

Between 1975 and 1984, annual CDS costs will rise from \$30 million to \$54 million in constant dollars. Of the 1984 total, 70 percent will


* For an overview of the cost model from report, see Appendix A.

be OBTS/CCH costs. The total investment in CDS development and operations in the 10 year 1975-1984 period will be in excess of \$450 million in constant 1975 dollars.

As of June 1975, 30 states are participating in CDS. Some others have developed CCH and UCR capability with funds from other sources. As remaining states develop CDS capacity, development costs will decline in the 1980's, but total annual CDS expenditures will level at about \$55 million in constant dollars, not decline, due to rising personnel costs.

Graphic presentation of the major report findings and estimates regarding CDS costs is attached as Appendix B. It should be emphasized that the validity of these projections is dependent on a large number of procedural and policy assumptions which, of necessity, must underly the extrapolations and which are carefully spelled out in the report.

Regarding benefits, the study notes that many are measurable in units other than dollars or by subjective judgements. Primary quantitative attention is given to the role of CCH in criminal justice decision-making. By 1984, CCH could potentially improve the quality of 12 of 19 million decisions annually, especially among those which must be made within a matter of hours. For the 10 year period, CCH information will support the quality of 73 of 165 million decisions or 44 percent. The following report graphic displays this development.



Decisions Supported by CCH by Year

The report lists a large number of additional CDS benefits in qualitative terms organized by CDS component. The methodological basis for identifying this broad range of benefits is not spelled out. Cited benefits, by component category, include:

- CCH - Information to service Federal agency decisions
- Criminal data to support community protection
- Data to serve protection of individual rights
- Potential cost displacement of manual procedures
- Implementation of standards in criminal justice system
- Support of criminal justice improvements recommended by the National Advisory Commission

- OBTS - Support for development and evaluation of legislative initiatives
- Coordinating and evaluating special investigatory prosecuting efforts
- Planning and managing probation, parole, corrections
- Allocating funds among correctional, courts, and prosecution activities
- Anticipating prosecuting and judicial work loads
- Standardizing state level data elements
- Planning police manpower usage
- Answering status and schedule inquiries for litigants and witnesses

- UCR - Improved data to determine local crime severity
- Specific crime and offender data for planning
- Geographic and demographic distribution of offenses to aid establishment of priorities
- Improvements in local recordkeeping

- SAC - Data and analysis for inclusion in state comprehensive plans
- Management and administration statistics reporting
- Reports of compliance with security and privacy regulations

MAS and TA/CDS - "Expenditures on these components (so far) cannot be described as financing progress toward any single national objective."

D. Program/Policy Implications

The cost elements in this study are significantly higher than those originally projected for CDS. Federal funding intended for system

development is being used for initial operations and costs that states are unwilling or unable to assume. Many states do not yet perceive CDS programs to be permanent and viable so use federal funds as much as possible and withhold full commitment of state personnel and resources. In the opinion of the project team, the survival of CDS will require either an increase in Federal funding to more than double the present level over 10 years or a revision of several cost-impacting CDS policies to reduce funding needs. The study cites 12 policies and practices as candidates for change because they offer potential for significant cost reduction with minor losses in CDS benefits. In effect, these policies raise expenditures above levels necessary to achieve CDS goals.

These policies are summarized on the two following pages with suggested policy alternatives. In only a few cases is the cost effect quantified and the study makes no attempt to aggregate possible total cost savings.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

The study report is sufficiently clear, concise, and well organized that the user can comprehend the study product efficiently and without difficulty.

The study is aware of its own methodological limitations and thus has internal validity and consistency but these limitations put significant bounds on the utility of the final product. By using a quantitative approach to cost estimation and a qualitative approach to benefit assessment it is not possible to evaluate the cost effectiveness of CDS or its components, but only to cite certain areas of potential cost savings. Nor is the issue of efficiency seriously addressed except in terms of policy trade-offs which still assume virtually complete program continuation. The hard but basic question of whether the system is worth what it costs is never asked nor are criteria suggested against which such a judgement could be made by the reader for himself. For example, the assumption that the quick availability of CCH information has a direct relationship to the quality of criminal justice decisions is neither tested nor put in a context of other factors affecting decision quality which may be more important and more efficiently controlled.

The genesis of this study was a GAO observation that cost estimates are needed before sponsoring Federal agencies or Congress can decide on proceeding with CDS programs and so it can be further determined whether states can finance their own system continuation after federally-funded initial development. As previously suggested, there is some doubt this purpose has been fully realized. Regarding the issue of state continuation, study cost data will be useful but will require significant further analysis to break costs into source components - Federal, Block Grant, and local. The study does not directly address the issue of state capabilities except indirectly by noting the need for an enlarged Federal commitment.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

Regarding Federal-level decisions on program continuation, the study provides useful grist for certain policy and execution decisions but begs the question of overall program merit. Most of the cited benefits do not depend on CDS as presently configured and are stated too broadly to reach meaningful conclusions regarding CDS cost-effectiveness. In sum, while the outputs of this study may be seen as of high quality and significant utility, that utility is strictly bounded within limits that may be smaller than intended by its initiators within LEAA.

It is understood that this report contributed to the program decision not to fund any further conversion of old fixes into the new system. This was based on the cost of putting historical data into the CDS system. This matter is dealt with in policy issues 2 and 5 excerpted from the study and cited above. But its particular importance as an issue is not necessarily evident from the study. That importance arises from the utilization history.

Actual Utilization:

- . The Inslaw study of CDS aided in certain cost-limiting procedural decisions in the program, primarily the end of the practice of reconstructing prior criminal histories.
- . The study played a major role in planning and budgeting decisions.
- . Although useful, the study was not strictly an evaluation.


NOTE: This Evaluation Summary is based only on Volume I of the study report and does not reflect additional data that may be in Volume II but not referenced in the Volume I summary.

PRESENT POLICIES OR EXPECTATIONS	POLICY ALTERNATIVES	COST EFFECT OF POLICY CHANGE
<p>1. Participation of all states is anticipated for the COS program. However, some states are not ready for participation, and current funding policies may not support participation of all states within the next ten years.</p>	<p>(a) Delay participation of technically less advanced states. Process data from these states at Federal level. (b) Encourage participation of less advanced states by providing technical assistance and modifying funding policy.</p>	<p>Cost study assumes all states participate; cost model available to estimate effect of alternative policies.</p>
<p>2. Manual criminal history systems will duplicate CCH operations for ten years or more.</p>	<p>(a) Refine CCH system design and provide technical assistance to reduce need for duplicate operations. (b) Modify funding policy to reduce financial support for duplicate operations.</p>	<p>Maximum 10-year state-level cost reduction estimated at \$64 million.</p>
<p>3. Computers dedicated for CCH are required to be under the management control of a criminal justice agency.</p>	<p>Consider alternative methods of security assurance.</p>	<p>Effect on cost not analyzed.</p>
<p>4. Lack of cooperation between law enforcement and judiciary in some states limits disposition reporting to OBTS/CCH.</p>	<p>Consider funding policies which would encourage cooperation in those states, e.g., use of SJIS as a disposition source.</p>	<p>Cost model available to study effect but additional data needed.</p>
<p>5. Delayed fingerprint identification response encourages multiple submissions and added processing.</p>	<p>High technology, rapid response identification systems would enhance CCH benefits. Encourage a uniform, single fingerprint submission policy and technical assistance by the FBI to the states.</p>	<p>Maximum 10-year savings estimated at \$100 million for "single print" policy. No analysis made of other options.</p>
<p>6. Manual histories are converted for subjects rearrested after CCH start-up (reentrant conversion policy).</p>	<p>Automate only those subjects whose first arrest occurs after CCH start-up (first-offender automation policy).</p>	<p>10-year savings estimated at \$47 million.</p>
<p>7. Multistate offender criminal histories reside in the central NCIC/CCH data base.</p>	<p>Maintain an index to both single and multistate offenders, with records in state data bases.</p>	<p>No analysis made; data and cost model available.</p>
<p>8. Disposition reporting requirements are not being enforced.</p>	<p>(a) Require full disposition reporting in NCIC/CCH format. (b) Require full reporting of dispositions linked to arrest charges.</p>	<p>No analysis made; full reporting assumed in cost study.</p>
<p>9. OBTS/CCH source document data are collected at state level.</p>	<p>Collect OBTS/CCH dispositions through interface with other automated systems.</p>	<p>No analysis made but duplicate entry clearly expensive.</p>

PRESENT POLICIES OR EXPECTATIONS	POLICY ALTERNATIVES	COST EFFECT OF POLICY CHANGE
10. Statistical components are being funded prior to development of a national system design.	Develop specific guidelines for implementing statistical components. Consider diverting MAS and TA/CDS funds to other components until their roles are defined.	Maximum 10-year savings estimated at \$25 million
11. Management control of the criminal history exchange program is fragmented.	1971 OMB recommendation for coordination of interstate criminal history exchange program at a higher level.	Cost effect not estimated.
12. Local police departments will maintain records which duplicate state repositories of fingerprints and criminal histories. This duplication is caused by the need for rapid positive identification, a need which is not satisfied by present CCH design.	Design and install a system for facsimile transmission of fingerprints to state and national identification bureaus. This could lead to the elimination of local record maintenance of NCIC criterion offenses.	Cost effect not estimated. Savings thought to be very significant.


APPENDIX A

Overview of Cost Model



APPENDIX B

CDS and Component Cost Projections



CDS COMPONENT	CDS COST BY YEAR - CONSTANT (1975) \$ MILLIONS										Total Ten-Year Cost
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	
CCH	20.2	22.8	21.7	25.0	26.4	28.2	28.7	29.6	30.4	31.2	261.2
OOTS	2.4	2.6	4.0	5.5	5.5	6.2	6.9	6.7	6.4	6.5	52.7
UCR	4.3	4.9	5.6	6.2	6.8	7.6	8.3	8.1	8.1	8.1	68.0
OTHER:											
SAC	2.2	2.7	3.2	3.7	4.2	4.7	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.2	41.5
MAS	.3	.5	.8	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	12.0
TA/CDS	.4	.6	.8	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	13.0
Total CDS Program (Constant Dollars)	27.8	31.3	36.0	42.5	45.4	49.8	52.5	53.0	53.6	54.4	461.5

CDS COMPONENT	CDS COST BY YEAR - CURRENT \$ MILLIONS										Total Ten-Year Cost
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	
CCH	20.2	25.3	25.8	31.7	35.2	33.2	41.4	44.4	47.5	50.6	351.3
OOTS	2.4	2.9	4.7	7.0	7.3	8.7	10.0	10.1	10.0	10.5	73.6
UCR	1.3	5.5	6.6	7.9	9.1	10.6	11.9	12.1	12.7	13.2	93.8
OTHER:											
SAC	2.2	3.0	3.8	4.7	5.6	6.5	7.5	7.8	8.1	8.4	57.7
MAS	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.6	2.0	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	16.9
TA/CDS	0.4	0.7	1.0	1.4	1.8	2.2	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	18.4
Total CDS Program (Current Dollars)	29.8	39.0	42.9	53.9	60.5	69.1	75.8	79.6	83.7	88.3	621.7

EVALUATION SUMMARY

The National Evaluation of the Pilot Cities Program

by

The American Institutes for Research (AIR)

November, 1975

A. Introduction

In May 1970, the LEAA awarded the first grant for what was to become known as the Pilot Cities Program, a plan by which a small team of interdisciplinary experts was to be established in each of eight cities to stimulate change, provide technical assistance, and conduct research on promising ideas and technologies in law enforcement and criminal justice. By June 1972, grants had been awarded to the eight pilot city/county pairs.

The teams established by this plan were to operate as independent units which could work with all aspects of the law enforcement/criminal justice system across agency and jurisdictional boundaries.

Additionally, the program provided non-competitive "Pilot 0" funds through which agencies in the selected city/county units could pursue demonstration projects developed out of the work of the team.

The National Evaluation studied the Pilot Teams' effort in terms of two measures of impact: capacity building in local law enforcement/criminal justice systems and contributions to national criminal justice theory and practice.

Data was gathered in 1974 and 1975 from 388 interviews with past and present team members, related agency and political officials, and other local and national criminal justice personnel who had interfaced with the program. Additionally, all available archival materials relating to the program were reviewed.

Coincident with the presentation of the draft report of this study in mid-1975, the Pilot Cities Program was phased out, largely in response to a critical 1974 GAO analysis of program benefits.

The National Evaluation report agreed, in part, concluding that the program was plagued throughout its existence by shifts in emphasis, changes in priority, and conflicting interpretations of its objectives. Numerous implementation failures were noted, attributed generally to deficiencies in LEAA and NILECJ management. Regarding basic program objectives, particular lack of success was noted in the area of innovative contributions to criminal justice theory.

Nonetheless, in the area of improving local criminal justice systems, the study found that the central concept of the Pilot Cities Program and also

its basic process sequence were sound and that identifiable and beneficial improvements occurred in the ways local agencies performed their functions.

On this basis the study recommends future LEAA support of city/county teams modeled on the Pilot Team approach and suggests particular operational guidelines derived from study findings to maximize the potential benefits of this approach.

B. Methodology

In assessing the impact of the Pilot Teams, the study analyzed the data in terms of the two fundamental objectives of the program:

1. To build the capabilities of local law enforcement/criminal justice systems
 - a. impact on local agency operations
 - b. impact on local research, planning, and evaluation capabilities
 - c. impact on interagency communication and coordination.
2. To contribute to national criminal justice theory and practice
 - a. development of innovations in law enforcement/criminal justice practice
 - b. contribution to criminal justice theoretical state-of-the-art
 - c. development of demonstration projects with widespread utility elsewhere.

Archival, interview, and questionnaire data were obtained from past and present team members, officials of local criminal justice agencies in pilot cities, representatives of LEAA Washington and regional offices, city and county police officials, and representatives of State Planning Agencies and Regional Planning Units which interfaced with pilot programs.

The mass of qualitative data was quantified, when appropriate, by simple rating schemes. The main units of analysis were activities, not the teams, since team performance was not uniform between different activities or over time.

C. Findings and Conclusions

Although structural and operating procedures for the Pilot Teams were reasonably clear from the outset, what they were to accomplish was less so. The program ran through several sets of objectives, none of which ever reflected a genuine consensus. Implementation was made difficult by a series of management-related failures including:

- program goals were not spelled out at the beginning,
- site selection criteria were poorly defined and overly restrictive,

- pilot team staffing fell short of intended expertise and experience,
- only two of eight selected grantee organizations had significant institutional experience in criminal justice research,
- only half of the teams maintained even minimal continuity,
- regional LEAA offices received no clear guidance on the limits of their responsibilities for Pilot Teams.

An analysis of the 120 pilot research activities, 98 demonstration projects, and 105 technical assistance activities carried out under the program showed that people, skills, and hardware were added to local criminal justice agencies that increased their research, planning and evaluation capabilities and linked separate segments of local criminal justice systems through continuing relationships that did not exist prior to the Pilot Teams' efforts. Teams affected the course of system development as well as its rate through accomplishments that could not have been made by the agencies themselves.

But the effect of the program on national criminal justice theory and practice was found to be negligible. Demonstration projects generally were not innovative nor readily replicable in other cities.

An essential finding was that innovation and improvement are not the mutually reinforcing objectives they were assumed to be. Innovation is often unnecessary for improvement since what is known about law enforcement and criminal justice far outstrips what is generally practiced. The Pilot Team approach is quite efficient for introducing cost-efficient improvements involving small increments of technology and expertise but not for stimulating advances in the state-of-the-art. The early program emphasis on innovation was in the end, a mistake that severely eroded potential impact and led to failures that were interpreted wrongly as proof that the concept was at fault. In fact, the pilot cities history is one of a good concept that was poorly translated into an actual program and was therefore not properly tested. To the extent the concept was genuinely implemented and tested, its soundness was supported.

D. Policy Implications/Recommendations

As a retrospective analysis of a program that was, in fact, phased out prior to completion of the AIR evaluation report, the primary products of the study are the findings and conclusions summarized above. A limited number of these conclusions are translated into direct policy recommendations, namely:

1. The LEAA should define a few central unresolved issues in law enforcement/criminal justice practice and provide the funds and expertise to mount specifically designed demonstrations and authoritative evaluations of them. The LEAA should exercise direct control over the design and implementation of these projects and fully compensate local agencies for any costs of their involvement. The grant application mechanisms is inappropriate for identifying and sponsoring worthwhile innovations since local improvisation should be held to a minimum.

2. With regard to evaluations of most LEAA-funded projects, the LEAA should develop an inhouse evaluation process using routinely gathered data.
3. LEAA should establish as policy that support of city/county teams modeled on the Pilot Team approach is an appropriate use of discretionary funds. These teams should be staffed by genuine criminal justice experts conversant with social science research techniques. Their work should support on-going local planning and focus on "improvement" rather than "innovation." Demonstration funding should not be a priority.
4. The city/county teams need maximum independence from the LEAA.

E. Critique of Quality, Useability, and Utility

This essentially qualitative study was well researched and clearly presented with enough detail to allow the reader to draw particular conclusions for him/herself or to analyze the backing for the 41 conclusions drawn by the authors.

Methodology and survey design are described only briefly. Although the report indicates questionnaires were used as a source of data (apparently for rating Pilot Team "process variables"), nowhere is the procedure described or instrument displayed. Certain other instruments are provided in the appendixes but it is not possible from the information given to always determine just how they were used. The way in which the data are described and used, however, lends credibility to the manner of its collection.

The report is well organized and highly readable with clear and consistent graphics. The conclusions are well justified and presented in broad enough terms to be of value even though the program in question no longer exists. It represents a superior example of how to learn from mistakes and, if taken seriously, will help in avoiding them in the future.

F. Utilization

- . Evaluation results from the Pilot Cities study figured prominently in the design of the High Crime Area Program, which was funded by Congress but not authorized.
- . In cities with crime analysis capabilities, some elements of the Pilot Cities Program have survived.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Safe Streets Reconsidered: The Block Grant Experience 1968-1975 The Intergovernmental Grant System: An Assessment and Proposed Policies

A. Descriptive Abstract

This report on the Safe Streets program by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) is divided into four major sections. The first contains background chapters describing the legislative and administrative history of the program and analyzing planning and funding activities at the state, regional and local levels. The second discusses issues and perspectives concerning the Safe Streets program and the block grant instrument, and offers recommendations for improving the act and its administration. The third presents a comparative analysis of ten case studies of Safe Streets experience and individual state reports. The final section contains the questionnaires used in ACIR's 1975 Safe Streets survey and response rate tables.

B. Methodology

The study is basically an issue-oriented historical review based on questionnaires and case studies with grant application and GMIS data used for analysis of resource allocation. In measuring the state-of-the-art of Safe Streets planning, implementation, evaluation, etc., no comparison with other agencies or any stated standards was attempted.

Case studies attempted to survey a broadly representative sample of states and utilized interviews, files, manuals, minutes, plans, financial records, audit reports, etc. Interviews focused around a broad series of identified issues. Conclusions are thus largely subjective and study findings and recommendations necessarily presented in light of the reality of growing reported crime rates. No attempt was made to quantify the effect of the Block Grant mechanism on crime as such, but rather on the operational effectiveness of the criminal justice system as viewed by its participants. Limited use is made of analytical secondary source material, mainly journal articles.

C. Findings and Conclusions

These are summarized at the ends of certain chapters and in a final "future directions" section (see pages 188-193 in the report). Most are subjective and are generally attributed to trends in the history of LEAA such as lack of continuity in leadership and a legislative history of shifting objectives. Many of the findings relate to planning deficiencies, especially the lack of both standards and evaluation mechanisms, and to the lack of effective coordination between SPAs and state criminal justice systems.

D. Program/Policy Implications

The great number of findings scattered throughout the report are distilled into eight broad recommendations (see pages 193-203 in the report) dealing with decategorization, limitations on funds used for personnel, LEAA oversight, state planning, the role of state governors, the role of state legislatures, the role of courts, and the participation of local officials in RPU's. Except for the LEAA oversight recommendation, legislation at the federal or state level is required to address the ACIR suggestions. Thus, only the LEAA oversight recommendation is directed to the LEAA and can be satisfied by management action alone. In connection with this recommendation, certain standards and criteria relating to SPA planning and fiscal administration are suggested.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

Findings are based on the distillation of issue-oriented opinions and required subjective judgements and, to some extent, taking sides. Given the paucity and inconclusiveness of statistics on the relationship between Safe Streets and crime, even the basic study judgement favoring program continuation cannot be said to be rigorously tested. It reflects only the near unanimous opinion of persons queried (most of whom have a stake in the program) and the evaluation of ACIR based on overall subjective input.

Study recommendations follow logically from findings given the overall judgement favoring program continuation. Most call for rather broad legislative or structural actions by Congress and State legislatures and, to a lesser degree, LEAA and SPAs. No mechanism for moving these bodies to decision and action is discussed.

As part of an overall broad study of the block grant mechanism by ACIR, this study provides useful insights and supporting comment. It is also a valuable source for any group thoughtfully considering legislative changes in the Safe Streets Program. Although case studies dealt in detail with certain state programs and arrived at state-specific conclusions, no recommendations were addressed to this level beyond general legislative suggestions. Depending on how individual states utilize the case study data and findings, some potential value may be lost.

The main value of the ACIR study is as a case study in the effectiveness of the block grant instrument as a mechanism to achieve national purposes while maximizing state and local discretion. Conceptual-operational dichotomies in block grant history and the compromises and trade-offs necessary for the survival of the instrument are highlighted.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

With its emphasis on legislative remedies, this report should be utilized by policymakers who have a role in influencing legislation. It should also be utilized by program implementers involved with State and comprehensive plan reviews and State comprehensive plan implementation, as well as by the Assistant Administrator and Deputy Assistant Administrator of OCJP. The report has called attention to problems at least some of which are at least in part amenable to solutions found through administrative mechanisms and program management.

Actual Utilization:

- . The ACIR report was utilized by a small group of people within the agency who were concerned with legislative response and the reorganization act.
- . These results served as a basis for defending the Block Grant Program at a time when Congress was considering replacing it with a Special Revenue Sharing program.
- . The study was instrumental in regard to program decision-making, because it was the first policy study to be regarded as an evaluation.
- . The findings were "so nebulous as to be virtually useless."
- . The ACIR report and the Brookings Study dealt with the same issues; therefore, the reports were utilized by the same people. The Brookings Institute conducted an evaluation comparing the Block Grant program to Revenue Sharing. The report was extensively utilized in Congressional testimony concerning the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and research into criminal justice.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

High Impact Anti-Crime Program
National Level Evaluation

A. Descriptive Abstract

Under the sponsorship of the LEAA's National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, MITRE conducted a several-year examination of the High-Impact Anti-Crime Program, which began in eight U.S. cities in January of 1972 and ended in September of 1976. The eight cities were Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland and St. Louis. This program was a broad-aim, free-form social action effort, designed to reduce crime and to improve criminal justice capabilities through the demonstration of an iterative process of comprehensive crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation (the COPIE-cycle). Other objectives of the program included the improvement of agency coordination and of community involvement in the criminal justice planning process, as well as the development of new knowledge about crime, about anti-crime effectiveness, and about the process of innovation within the criminal justice system. The program introduced the concept of a Crime Analysis Team (composed of functional experts and researchers) which would work in each city to produce a master plan, supervise and perform COPIEcycle, and act as liaison in the effort to coordinate criminal justice agencies.

The MITRE evaluation identifies what tended to promote good planning, implementation and evaluation, and what did not; what moved agencies toward coordination and what did not; what stimulated innovation and institutionalization and what did not; and what new knowledge was gained from the program and what failed to be gained (and why). In particular, the evaluation establishes what happened in the development of each city's program, speaks to the feasibility and usefulness of the two program innovations (the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team) and examines anti-crime efforts at the project level. (The evaluation does not, however, address program-wide outcomes; this was done by means of a set of victimization surveys that were to be performed in 1972, 1975 and 1978.)

Volume I of the final report summarizes the findings and recommendations of the MITRE evaluation. Volume II synthesizes the analyses and findings of the MITRE reports which served as the basis for the evaluation, generates its own information, and attempts to draw the conclusions of the overall evaluation effort for a general audience.

B. Methodology

This assessment was synthesized from a series of MITRE reports. A set of eight histories narrated in detail program development and agency/community interactions in each of the Impact cities. The COPIE-cycle was examined in four reports which separately addressed crime-oriented planning, implementation, evaluation planning and evaluation reporting across the eight cities.

Another volume explored the processes of innovation and institutionalization in the program. Various other reports studied two anti-crime strategies commonly employed in the Impact program: intensive supervision to reduce recidivism among probationers and parolees, and increases in overt police patrol to reduce crime levels. Finally, a set of papers analyzed specific questions such as the transferability of Impact projects, the implementation difficulties of drug program and data system efforts, the caseload and trial delay problems of Impact city felony courts, and the post-treatment reintegration of juveniles into the school system.

C. Findings and Conclusions

Findings and conclusions occupy 41 pages (pages 17 through 57) in Volume I, to which the reader desiring more detail or elaboration should refer. The following are presented on pages 56 and 57 as overall program conclusions.

1. The program innovations of the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team were shown to be feasible and allowed major improvement in system capability.

2. Anti-crime effectiveness was demonstrated at the project level, via evaluation findings, for 35 Impact projects representing the expenditure of about \$35 million in federal funds. (Other project-level success cannot be ruled out however, since there may be achievements which have not yet been-- or could not be--documented.)

3. An examination of crime changes in the eight cities showed that in Dallas and Denver--which had the highest proportions of federal funds spent effectively--the increases in system capability were correlated with improvements in crime rates which were not the result of long-term trends, and which were not seen in non-Impact "sister" cities.

4. Eight U.S. cities now possess, in varying degrees, the system capability to rationally plan, implement and evaluate their anti-crime programs.

5. New Federalism worked well in eliciting local priorities and in resolving the effectiveness/efficiency conflict in some areas (i.e., community involvement, juvenile and system capability projects were not de-emphasized because of the strength of local priorities). On the other hand, New Federalism acted as a depressant to agency coordination, an inhibitor of implementation concentration and speed, an obstacle to data collection, evaluation planning and reporting and a constraint to knowledge payoffs and to innovation.

6. The question of "advantage" or "disadvantage" among Impact cities did not appear to be a crucial discriminator, except for innovation and evaluation. Crime-oriented planning was performed as well by Newark as by Portland, St. Louis was a faster implementer than Denver, and agency coordination depended more on the organizational locus and power of the CAT vis-a-vis the city/state relationship, than it did on any resource capabilities of the cities.

7. In general, contrary to early expectations (and contrary to the typical revenue-sharing experience), Impact cities used federal monies as they were intended to be used: for worthwhile anti-crime efforts which could not otherwise have been funded.

8. A disappointment of the program was the inability to implement effective drug programs (with the single exception of Baltimore's Intensive Supervision of Narcotics Offenders).

9. High points of the program were:

- a. the quality of the Denver Crime Analysis Team, which should serve as a model for future applications of this concept;
- b. the excellence of Portland's evaluations; and
- c. the improvements in juvenile recidivism observed among many Impact projects.

10. Evaluation planning emerged as a "fulcrum" element, crucial for the success of anti-crime interventions both at the project and at the national levels.

11. Innovation appeared to bring benefits related intrinsically to the quality of freshness and newness. Innovative projects in Impact tended to undergo more careful development, received more media and public attention, were more likely to be effective and more likely to be institutionalized than other projects. Further, the difficulties of opposing innovation (and progress) made it a useful technique in some cases for reducing institutional barriers.

D. Program/Policy Implications

D.1 Recommendations Relative to the On-Going Program

D.1.1 Capturing the knowledge

a. When this report was prepared, Impact was still on-going in six of the eight cities (Atlanta, Denver, Portland, Dallas, Baltimore, and Newark). The first three of these cities produced the best evaluation reports of the program, and both Dallas and Baltimore made great progress in this area. It was recommended that LEAA endeavor to capture the information relating to the success of these final projects and to the quality of their evaluations.

b. The verdict on project and Crime Analysis Team institutionalization was still out when this report was written and follow-up was therefore necessary.

c. Victimization survey analysis needed to be performed and no Crime Analysis Teams would be available for that effort; yet it was highly important to capture this information and to contrast it with the UCR data examined in this report, to see whether the inferences derived are reinforced. It was recommended that LEAA have this analysis performed.

d. A new crime-level analysis (such as the one performed for burglary in this evaluation) should be executed a year later so as to determine whether the correlation between improved system capability and city crime changes reported for Dallas and Denver is also observed over the longer term for the slower implementers (Atlanta, Baltimore, and Portland), and to see, as well, whether the Denver and Dallas results continue over a longer time period.

e. For those recidivism-focused projects which were well evaluated, it was considered important to follow up and to analyze data on recidivism reduction, so as to reinforce or modify current findings.

D.1.2 Disseminating the knowledge

a. The dissemination task had not really begun when this report was prepared. Although the MITRE instrument for reviewing evaluation plans had been widely disseminated, serious efforts needed to be made to ensure diffusion of the lessons learned in evaluation reporting, in implementation, in the iterative aspects of the crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation process.

b. It was recommended that wide diffusion be made of the best evaluation plans and reports originated in the Impact cities over the course of the program. Some of these efforts were very good (especially in Portland, Denver and Atlanta) and are worthy of widespread dissemination.

c. It was recommended that documents be made accessible to researchers which display in convenient form the baseline information generated by the program. This information should be accessible both in synthesis and in the form of primary documentation.

D.2 Recommendations for Future Urban Anti-Crime Programs

D.2.1 Program goals

a. Programs should not posit quantified city-wide crime reductions unless planners have evolved evaluation strategies allowing the development of plausible expectations about the effects of different kinds of anti-crime projects upon city-wide crime rates. These goals, when they have not been rationally determined, tend to raise public expectations and are more than likely to be unattainable, since there is no basis for their postulation.

b. Projects, on the other hand, should feature quantified objectives, based on experience, where possible, and in any case, to be updated by the collection of project evaluation data which thus serve as a baseline both for evaluating achievement and for re-assessing project objectives. Further, this reinforces the iterative quality needed in planning, implementation and evaluation.

D.2.2 The COPIE-cycle

a. The COPIE-cycle, having proved effective for the development of system capability, should be adopted as a tool for rational planning and evaluation, with some modifications.

b. Given that many program problems developed because the cities could make a choice between good crime-oriented planning and rapid implementation (sacrificing either one or the other), this choice should be ruled out in future programs. Adequate time should be allowed for Crime Analysis Team start-up and master plan development (perhaps the 16 months required by Denver would be a good amount of time to schedule).

c. Implementation should not proceed before completion of the crime-oriented planning and evaluation planning phases.

d. The quality of crime data collected and of the analysis performed in cities should be monitored, and the monitoring itself randomly checked by LEAA.

e. The data problem in the courts area was a serious impediment to evaluative research at all levels in the Impact program. LEAA should develop new guidelines for court data submission in the context of a future Impact-type program.

f. New as well as classical techniques for analyzing data, and for developing evaluation baselines should be routinely disseminated and on-going technical assistance furnished to host agencies where needed.

g. Materials to be disseminated to the cities should be ready before the start of the program (in Impact, only crime-oriented planning materials were adequately disseminated).

h. LEAA should take steps to ensure that project implementation is more carefully monitored and to investigate, on a random basis, the quality of the monitoring function.

i. There is a need to examine, very closely, in each city, the reasons for chronic delays between grant submission and the beginning of service delivery.

j. A city's program should not be too heavily oriented toward projects whose scope and funding are too small to allow them to make an impact.

k. On the other hand, excessively large-sized projects are also a problem because they are hard to administer, they risk failure with big sums of money, and they may have great difficulty in achieving institutionalization at the end of the program.

l. Unless a project has been crime-orientedly planned, LEAA should not permit the re-funding with LEAA funds of projects already funded

under other auspices because this seriously inhibits the COPIE-cycle. In effect, the arduous process of crime-oriented planning appears almost academic if the projects to be funded have already been selected.

m. LEAA should not mandate that all projects in a free-form program like Impact be evaluated. Some evaluations are likely to have much more important payoffs than others; some are not worth doing within a short time-frame; some are simply infeasible in a given context.

n. Evaluation planners should divide projects on some reasonable basis (such as crime problem priority or feasibility or public concern) into two groups, those which should receive only monitoring, and those for which a full-fledged evaluation permitting attribution to the project is worthwhile.

o. Evaluation planners in each city should group similar projects (such as those focusing on juvenile recidivism, for example) and plan their evaluations jointly, so that one set of baseline data can serve for all projects. Such a grouping (organized in Denver during Impact) would maximize the creation of new data sources and foster the development of a serious research function and focus.

p. The time-frame allowed for evaluation was typically too short, in Impact, except perhaps for area-specific crime-reduction projects. A future urban anti-crime program should provide for more evaluation follow-up to allow for the development of more meaningful information in the area of recidivism reduction (especially since implementation delays further restricted time left for evaluation in Impact).

q. It is not enough to allocate no-match funds to evaluation in a general way. LEAA will need, in a future program similar to Impact, to consider the question of evaluation management so as to achieve a maximum production of needed plans and reports. There needs to be, simultaneously, enough flexibility to cut off problematic evaluation, but also enough rigor to stimulate the flow of documents. In any case, a final period, after the end of implementation, should be specifically earmarked for the analysis of collected data and for the writing of final reports.

r. Many of the problems besetting Impact evaluations should have been remedied through (1) better project implementation, (2) a resolute setting of evaluation milestones and projects by LEAA Central, supported by the regional office, (3) technical assistance, (4) better dissemination of evaluation materials and (5) mechanisms for communication, among the eight cities, of problems encountered and problem-solving techniques and strategies generated.

s. Technical assistance in evaluation should stress the importance of defining and specifying project activity objectives very clearly.

D.2.3 The Crime Analysis Team

a. The Crime Analysis Team proved to be an effective mechanism in the cities where it was able to exercise its major functions, where it was organizationally located in the mayor's office (or with a city agency) and where it was not cut off from operating by other agencies. To insure greater effectiveness of the Crime Analysis Team, LEAA should stress the importance of an organizational locus in the mayor's office and should require cooperation with the Team by agencies receiving LEAA funds.

b. The question of the evaluation responsibility is a delicate one, but it seems that some sacrifice of excellence is not an exorbitant price to pay for a developed in-house city evaluation capability and for a better chance at achieving long-term agency coordination. Evaluation should remain a function of the Crime Analysis Team.

c. Team transience was a problem in Impact, both in terms of staffing and in terms of the accumulation of enough power for the Team to be effective. Perhaps the Team should be funded on a more permanent basis, as it was in Dallas, to ensure power with other agencies and the retention of expert staff.

d. Crime Analysis Teams should be required to hire at least one professional evaluator at program start-up, so as to ensure (1) the coordination of crime-oriented planning (and especially project selection) with evaluation planning, (2) timely evaluation planning and reporting, (3) the collection of baseline data, and (4) the feedback of early evaluation findings into on-going planning for new projects.

e. Crime Analysis Teams should include some members of local criminal justice agencies; this would ensure better agency coordination and also a greater likelihood of the propagation of planning and evaluation techniques.

f. The Denver Crime Analysis Team furnishes a model for future programs. All in all, Denver's was the most effective Team performance from the viewpoints of planning and evaluation, successful implementation, agency coordination, community involvement, innovation and institutionalization. A study of the Team's strategies and efforts, successes and failures should provide an important basis for future endeavors in this area (see MITRE's history of the Impact program in Denver, MTR-6838).

D.2.4 National-level planning, evaluation and administration

a. Although program planning did take place at the national level in Impact, there was not enough time to follow thoroughly, nor to perform the crucial task of evaluation planning. Future programs should make this area an important priority.

b. A national implementation monitoring system needs to be installed to provide national planners and evaluators with an instrument for:

- i. examining initial implementation results and making adjustments in planning and evaluation objectives;
- ii. linking program activities to program effects; and
- iii. establishing an iterative and dynamic planning, implementation and evaluation process at the national level rather than the current static one of discrete, successive phases.

c. Implicit in such an iterative COPIE-cycle at the national level is the need for national evaluators to be able to channel information directly to a national group, such as the original LEAA Policy Board, with power to effect needed implementation changes. The demise of the LEAA Policy Board was a serious loss to Impact in June of 1973. Future programs should ensure the continued existence of such a body throughout the life of the program, with full powers to require the phase-out or modification of obviously unsuccessful projects.

d. National evaluation planning should provide for the availability of technical assistance in evaluation not only to project evaluators, but also to various managers and to operational people needing to deal with the various phases of evaluation and with the interpretation of evaluative findings.

e. Planners should build into a future program real mechanisms for lateral coordination across federal agencies. These mechanisms need to be developed at the working, planning and evaluation levels; otherwise they will remain only well-meaning utterances of top-level interest that will bog down almost immediately (as in Impact) before any real coordination can take place.

f. There are real dangers for the marshalling of new knowledge about crime and about anti-crime effectiveness if Congress allows new agencies to proliferate, given the existing problems of coordination among all agencies, and among federal agencies in particular. Steps should be taken immediately to ensure coordination between any newly created agencies (such as the National Center for the Prevention and Control of Rape, located within HEW) and LEAA. The current effort to control the drug problem clearly demonstrates the present inability of large bureaucracies to coordinate; it would be highly unfortunate if these failures should begin to spread to other criminal justice areas as well.

g. Program evaluation for future programs should strive to avoid at least some of the knowledge pitfalls encountered in Impact. A basic difficulty here is the action/research conflict: action programs are funded and operated to provide services, not to test hypotheses. Research must operate in a fashion which does not interfere with the delivery of services.

h. New Federalism should be somewhat modified in future programs. LEAA should continue its recent felicitous changes in policy which have included a stronger leadership role, an upsurge of nationally-sponsored

demonstration programs, a more powerful research and evaluation focus, and a tendency to begin attaching at least a few strings to its grants.

i. Turnover of high-level program personnel was a serious problem in Impact. Although turnover itself cannot be helped, program administrative structures should be so strengthened that the locus of power remains firmly at the federal level over the duration of any future federal/state/city program.

j. Not much has been learned about how citizens feel with respect to criminal justice programs. Since community attitudes are highly important for the effectiveness of criminal justice programs, it is recommended that a future national program include systematic before/after surveys of target area communities for all projects involving community/criminal justice system interaction.

D.2.5 Policy formation at the national-level]

a. In demonstrating the COPIE-cycle, LEAA asked the Impact cities to go to the sources of their crime problems, substantiate them, prioritize them, address them, and evaluate them. The kinds of benefits which accrued to those cities that did so make it seem that LEAA might fruitfully initiate a similar process at the national level. LEAA should establish, at least for its discretionary fund program, an iterative process of national planning, research, implementation and evaluation which allows a coherent delineation of what needs to be done and formulates reasonable criteria for assessing achievements.

b. Such a process should include:

- i. an on-going planning, evaluation and priority-setting function which generates policy goals and receives inputs from all LEAA programs;
- ii. a structured research function (addressing determined policy goal priorities) which includes: basic theoretical research on priority crime problems; system research (i.e., applied efforts to improve criminal justice capabilities); and carefully designed experiments to establish a more solid basis for policy;
- iii. a demonstration function (such as the one which presently exists) to test new ideas which have successfully passed the research and development stage;
- iv. a crisis-management function which features large-scale urban action programs in the public interest utilizing currently acquired anti-crime knowledge to improve system capability, to reduce crime and public insecurity, and to provide insights into the value and relevance of program and policy goals in the real world; and finally,
- v. a cost/benefit and policy analysis function.

c. The planning and evaluation capability is needed at the national level to ensure that programs undertaken are in the service of policy goals and that the likely results of such programs will bring knowledge about the progress made in reaching those goals and about the relevance of the goals themselves. Research, demonstration and crisis-management program results should feed back into the planning process where evaluation findings should be related to policy via analysis, and where the various options possible in the pursuit of the same goal should be subjected to cost/benefit study. The policy and cost/benefit analysis functions would thus be the final steps in the on-going revision and updating of policy goals and priorities. In this way, research findings like those of the Pilot City program, or Impact, and knowledge assessments like those of the National Evaluation Program, would have a more prolonged and meaningful impact on the formation of policy and on the delineation of new assumptions, new goals and new actions to achieve those goals.

D.2.6 Priority areas for criminal justice research emerging from the Impact program experience

a. The rehabilitation of offenders

The LEAA should undertake to fund research on the effectiveness of rehabilitative interventions on a priority basis. There are two major reasons why this should be done.

- i. It is the lack of such research which led to the recent finding that the evaluative results of most rehabilitative interventions are indicative neither of success nor of failure but are simply uninterpretable; and
- ii. The alternative to such research (and to a program developing and increasing the effectiveness of current rehabilitative interventions) is not incarceration (which the public is unwilling to subsidize) but a worsening of prison conditions such that incarceration will constitute cruel and unusual punishment (as it has already been ruled in the prisons of Alabama); the wholesale freeing of offenders will then appear preferable to imprisoning them in such places, and it is this which is liable to be the real alternative to rehabilitation.

b. Research on quantitative methods for estimating crime levels

One of the more significant methodological issues in the area of criminal justice research and evaluation involves the development of quantitative methods for demonstrating the impact of anti-crime programs on crime levels. LEAA should undertake a serious critique and test of available quantitative models, their relative utility and specific limitations.

E. Critique of Quality, Usability, and Utility

This report by the MITRE Corporation synthesizes the findings, conclusions, and recommendations in some 33 reports, all by the MITRE Corporation. Without reviewing the 33 reports individually, one has no basis for judging (1) the extent to which this report faithfully represents the findings in the source documents, or (2) the quality of the work reflected in the source documents. Assuming adequacy in these two respects, the report serves an important purpose in bringing together the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the many reports on various aspects of a complex program. One reflection of the magnitude of the task is the space required to cite the recommendations in a summarized form (Section D, above).

The report is well organized and clearly presented, a credit to the author whose task was indeed formidable. A particularly useful feature is the presence along with many of the recommendations of a cogent statement of the underlying rationale. These statements tend to be readily understood and believable in their own right, thus obviating a need by the reader to refer to a source document for elaboration.

MITRE's evaluation of the Impact program focused on processes rather than on outcomes. This was because of the conflicts and constraints of the program, which are described briefly in Section I of the Executive Summary. The value of the report resides in its identification of the key factors which promoted or inhibited the success of the program. At least as many lessons were learned from problems experienced as from achievements. Whether or not the Impact program was judged to be a success, this report was successful in drawing together the lessons to be learned.

Were the recommendations relevant to the implementation of the then on-going program (Section D.1, above)? If so, did they result in changes in the estimates of the program's achievements?

The report will have utility for those who may be concerned with the planning and/or management of future urban anti-crime programs. Findings and recommendations will have utility in relation to the following processes: setting of program goals, national-level policy planning, setting priorities in criminal justice research, program management, program monitoring, and evaluation planning.

F. Utilization

OPM:

- . Congress has utilized LEAA evaluations in order to make decisions regarding future funding of programs. For example, the High Impact evaluation figured prominently in the legislative decision to stop the High Crime Program.
- . The study findings were utilized in the development of LEAA policy to proceed with implementation of a High Crime area program.
- . "Impact Cities" had a significant impact on program management decisions.

NILECJ:

- . The report was instrumental in regard to policy planning within the agency. On the basis of these findings, LEAA administrators decided to develop the High Crime Area Program.
- . The results from this study were extensively utilized in the design of the High Crime Area test program.
- . Some elements of the High Crime Area Program remain in those test cities with a crime analysis capability.
- . Another study of the Impact Cities is to be conducted by Northwestern to evaluate their use of LEAA funds. This evaluation will utilize the results of the Chelmsky study and the evaluation of the Pilot Cities Program in addition to analyses of local data.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Developing Useful Evaluation Capability: Lessons From The Model Evaluation Program

A. Descriptive Abstract

This report presents the findings from an assessment of 12 attempts to develop and demonstrate model evaluation systems in the criminal justice area. Some were successful; others were not, and four were still under way when the report was prepared. These efforts were funded through grants from The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) in its Model Evaluation Program (MEP). The grantees, selected through competitive bidding, were seven State Planning Agencies (SPAs) and five Regional Planning Units (RPU's).

The grantees had considerable freedom in developing their proposals for systems to generate information on the results, costs and effectiveness of criminal justice projects, programs and activities. The broad objectives of the MEP were (a) to encourage state and local agencies to generate and use evaluation information, (b) to test in what ways the effective use of evaluation information can help state and local agencies achieve their objectives, and (c) to test the hypothesis that if the evaluation units were successful in (a) and/or (b), they would be institutionalized by the planning agencies.

The Urban Institute was selected to document the activities of the individual MEP grantees and to synthesize the experience and results of all of the grantees. This report presents that synthesis, based primarily on the experience of the eight sites that had completed their grant activities by January 1978, but reflecting the experience of all 12 sites.

Findings are presented in the form of six lessons on the utility of evaluation systems (what they can and cannot do), five lessons on implementation (what evaluation systems can and cannot be set up), and eight problems which evaluation managers must be prepared to solve. These are listed under C, below.

It is concluded that decision makers have to want the evaluation results, and be willing to invest time and resources in obtaining information if evaluation is to have utility.

B. Methodology

1. Interviews with relevant local officials, managers, program specialists, and evaluators.
2. Reviews of site materials.
3. Synthesis of results of the above.

C. Findings and Conclusions

Utility of Evaluation Systems

1. Evaluation systems cannot be expected to have a measurable impact on the performance of SPAs and RPUs, since these agencies do not have realistic and verifiable objectives regarding their primary mission.
2. In half the cases studied, the evaluation systems provided information that will be used by either planning agencies or criminal justice agencies.
3. Evaluation systems are not likely to be useful to the planning agency staff unless the agency is being directed toward some mission-related objective.
4. Evaluation systems have an excellent chance of providing useful information to state and local criminal justice agencies if they choose to serve that audience.
5. An evaluation system can increase its chances of producing useful information by serving users and information needs that already exist, and by allowing users to own the study.
6. Planning agency evaluation systems carrying out intensive evaluations to test program concepts will not be successful.

Implementation of Evaluation Systems

1. If funds are earmarked for evaluation, planning agencies are almost certain to set up an internal evaluation system that produces, or helps produce, information.
2. Development of an evaluation capability does not assure institutionalization of the capability.
3. Planning agencies appear to be unsuccessful in establishing evaluation systems in local criminal justice agencies.
4. Given the opportunity, planning agencies will set up evaluation systems which differ from each other in product, cost, and operations.
5. The only characteristic of an evaluation system associated with utility was the degree of involvement of the user in the evaluation activity.

Sources of Operational Problems

1. Delays and disruptions due to staff turnover.
2. Delays due to civil service rules.
3. Reluctance of projects to report data.
4. Lack of necessary data in project files.
5. Problems with computer processing.
6. Problems in contracting out evaluations.

7. Unclear or shifting information requirements.
8. Diversion of evaluation unit staff to other planning agency functions.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. Criminal Justice Agencies in General

For successful and useful evaluation, the following ingredients are necessary:

1. Careful up-front planning, covering all foreseeable contingencies.
2. Knowledgeable and aggressive management dedicated to the success of the program.
3. Commitment of adequate resources and management authority to retain that commitment.
4. Involvement of the user of the information.
5. Appropriate communication and decision mechanisms linking all elements of the program.

2. LEAA Policy and Program System

Nothing stated in report.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

Subjectivity and personal opinion play an important role in a study of this kind, with the vested interests of the interviewees tending to color their responses. The authors have counteracted this to the extent possible. For example, they required that perceptions of usefulness be supported by instances of actual use. The quality of the document, in conveying the information the authors had to communicate, is excellent.

The utility of this report resides primarily in the fact that it documents and illustrates the types of problems which can arise. Without this documentation, the findings and conclusions might seem obvious or platitudinous. They are things which good managers should know to begin with. But the fact that the problems did arise is convincing evidence of the need for the elements cited in D, above. The findings of this report have relevance and value to anyone planning an evaluation program.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

This evaluation study should have utility for research program modification and continuation decisions of the Office of Program Evaluation, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. It may also have utility for policy planning in the Office of Planning and Management, LEAA, as the issue of responding to the Congressional mandate to evaluate LEAA programs is discussed.

Actual Utilization:

- . The study will result in changes in marketing strategy although the specific nature of such modifications are, as yet, undetermined. From this study it was learned that the evaluation program is rendered extinct when Federal money is not available.
- . This study convinced an entire office that utilization is enhanced when the demands of evaluators are coordinated with the information needs of decisionmakers for whom the evaluation would prove relevant. Direct utilization of the Model Evaluation Program Study is evidenced by the formation within OPE of a mechanism called the "decisionmaker group." This group is comprised of people who are likely to be users of the evaluation information, and it functions as a mechanism to increase the utility of evaluation by determining: (a) the specific decisions which need to be made in the future, and (b) the kinds of information that the evaluation could collect that would help the people make the necessary decisions.

EVALUATION FINDINGS SUMMARY

Understanding Crime
An Evaluation of the National Institute
of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

A. Descriptive Abstract

The Committee on Research on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the National Academy of Sciences conducted an 18-month review of the research program of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The review included a systematic examination of the Institute's projects, products, and processes.

It is concluded that the Institute has not been the catalyst or sponsor of a first-rate and significant research program commensurate with either its task or resources. It has clearly had some successes with individual projects and has begun to develop some basic and vital data and a research community, both of which had previously been inadequate for society's needs, but structural and political constraints have all too often deflected the Institute from its true mission--to develop valid knowledge about crime problems. Furthermore, it is concluded that, given those same restraints and extrapolating its marginal improvements over the years, the Institute in its present form is not likely to become a significant and quality-oriented research agency. There is a need for a program of research on crime problems that is national in scope and therefore for a national institute of law enforcement and criminal justice supported by the federal government. Both structural and conceptual reordering of the Institute itself and of its research agenda is recommended.

The first section of the report describes historical factors that have influenced the Institute's development and the LEAA structure within which it operates; the second section reports the Research Committee's evaluation of the federal role in crime research and of the program developed and funded by the Institute; the third section details the Committee's conclusions and recommendations. The report includes case studies, appendixes with supporting materials, and biographical sketches of Committee members and staff.

B. Methodology

The Committee studied a stratified sample of projects supported by the Institute, with members participating in the actual reading of the files. They heard presentations by major contractors. They conducted interviews with current and former staff members of the Institute, principal investigators of Institute projects, and other experts on criminal justice. Their report is a distillation of the information thus obtained.

C. Findings and Conclusions

1. The quality of Institute-funded research is not high, and much of it has been mediocre.
2. Little of the material disseminated by the Institute is used in planning or program development by either SPA staff or practitioners; usefulness of the material is problematic to assess.
3. The Institute is not committed to a research program aimed at building a coherent body of knowledge and focusing that knowledge on solving problems.
4. Shortcomings in the Institute's research administration include a weak advisory system, ineffective review procedures, misguided research strategy, and vulnerability to pressures detrimental to the development of a research program.
5. The Institute has been asked to carry too large a share of the burden of making LEAA effective and accountable; it has been unable to resist pressures that are inappropriate to a research role.

D. Program/Policy Implications

1. The role of the Institute should be to develop valid, generalizable knowledge about crime, criminal behaviors, and the effectiveness of crime control methods and policies. As a national research institute, it should develop the resources necessary to undertake research that is not feasible or appropriate at the state or local level.
2. To protect the integrity of its research program, the Institute should be reconstituted as an independent research agency within the Department of Justice.
3. A Criminal Justice Research Advisory Board should be established by statute with members including an appropriate mix of scientists and practitioners.
4. The Institute should be organized around substantive program areas.
5. The Institute should take steps to ensure quality in its research.
6. Activities involving direct service to components of LEAA or practitioners should not be the responsibility of the Institute.

7. The Institute's program should be judged by the value of its contributions to our knowledge about crime and criminal justice rather than by operational measures such as crime and recidivism rates.

E. Critique of Product Quality, Utility, and Relevance

Among the 15 members of the Committee, there are 12 academicians, one retired Director of Police, one big-city mayor, and a chemical physicist high in the technical management of one of the country's largest corporations. They have done a fine job of presenting the academician's point of view on the subject as they chose to define it, namely, the research program of the Institute, the purpose of research being defined (see ABSTRACT) as "to develop valid knowledge about crime problems." They did not choose to address alternative approaches which might have embraced the operational aspects (support and service to an action program), of the Institute's mandate in association with the research aspects.

F. Utilization

Potential Utilization:

This report should be utilized by those responsible for policy development within LEAA and by those in a position to achieve autonomy for the Institute's research program. It should be utilized by those in program planning who define and delineate the substantive areas and set priorities within those areas. It should be utilized by those responsible for the procurement, administration, and monitoring of research. In summary, this report has utility for anyone concerned with any aspect of the Institute's research program, because it does a thorough job of covering all of those aspects.

Actual Utilization:

- . The study findings were utilized by policymakers within LEAA who were concerned with legislative response and the reorganization act. The report was utilized in the LEAA Study Group and in testimony before Congress.
- . Fourteen out of the nineteen recommendations of the National Academy evaluation of NILECJ have been utilized (although the manner of utilization was not specified). The remaining five recommendations require changes in the law and are incorporated in the new legislation.
- . Recommendations from this evaluation appeared in the DOJ Study Group report written by Diegleman and later in the Kennedy/Carter legislation.

One interviewee referred us to the LEAA Response to Testimony of the National Academy of Sciences^{1/} for a detailed discussion of utilization.

^{1/} See appendix C of Federal Role in Criminal Justice and Crime Research.

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ATTACHMENT A

Instructions for Completing Evaluation Findings Summaries
for the Evaluation Utilization Study

Instructions for Completing Evaluation Findings Summaries
for the Evaluation Utilization Study

I. INTRODUCTION

These instructions are to explain the terms that are to be used in the preparation of evaluation findings summaries and to provide a format for these summaries. The preparation of evaluation findings summaries is required as the first step in Task 2, Evaluation Utilization Study, under the RTI master contract with LEAA for consulting services (RTI Project 23U-1412-2). These summaries are to be completed and submitted to the Government Technical Representative (GTR), Dr. Ralph Swisher, for review before they are finalized. The summaries are to be used by RTI analysts who will follow the paths of the selected evaluations study documents through the policy and program development activities of LEAA. It is desirable that the summaries be capable of being used by LEAA's Office of Planning and Management (OPM) as models for summarizing evaluation study findings in the future.

The emphasis of the summaries is to be upon the findings of the evaluation study. As you know, LEAA's reference service provides study abstracts that contain little information about results and conclusions. The evaluation study documents assigned to you should state what the study was trying to learn and what it was able to learn. (If the document is not clear on what the study is trying to find, the RTI Washington office can find the grant or contract for you at CJRS or LEAA and extract its statement of purpose and objectives.) The specific findings are most important, but information is also needed so that a judgement can be made as to the reliability and validity of these findings. Also, information is needed to estimate the potential utility of the document in the LEAA policy and program development process.

In the following section the interpretation of the terms used in the LEAA task request for this study of LEAA's Evaluating Utilization System will be presented. You will then be given guidelines for completing the required sections of an "Evaluation Findings Summary."

II. GENERAL DEFINITIONS

A. Evaluative Terms

You will be given one or more documents that are considered the product of an LEAA evaluation study. The documents may be clearly indicated as "An Evaluation of the ..." or they may be the documentation of a research study that provided the evaluative information used by a decisionmaker in his own evaluative actions. Webster defines "evaluate" as: (1) to determine and fix the value and (2) to examine and judge. An evaluation design will try to do more of the former; the usual policy research study is constrained to do more of the latter. Be aware that some studies will be called "evaluations" by LEAA even though they contain neither determinations of value nor judgements of worth.

The documents supplied to you are reports of studies selected by the GTR for our use as case studies. His experience has indicated that case studies of the utilization of these documents will disclose information needed to improve the utilization of evaluative information within LEAA.

B. Utilization Terms

"Utilization" will also be defined specifically for this study. The word means "use," but common usage has caused "utilization" to signify a special class of use in which social purpose is involved-- particularly when the word is employed by the federal government. The term may have acquired this meaning to be in agreement with the economist's use of the word "utility" to contrast with "usability" in utility theory. When an evaluation study document is used by you as a reviewer in this study, you will be reading it to see what it contains. If you find that it is easy to read, that the study approach is logically described, and that its findings are not ambiguous, you may rate it as highly useable. You will be asked to make such judgements about the documents assigned to you.

You will also be asked to rate the utility of the document for LEAA policy and program development activities. Utility classes will be defined under system terms below. You need not worry too much at this point about anticipating utilization within LEAA. Our interviews within

LEAA will trace the path of the documents through the so-called evaluation utilization system until such a process can be synthesized, analyzed, and examined for potential improvements.

C. Systems Terms

As the terminology introduced above may have suggested, the LEAA evaluation utilization systems is not a separate set of activities operating apart from the overall LEAA planning process. The planning process within which evaluation study utilization can be anticipated may be described as a system in any number of ways, just as the term "system" has many definitions. For this study, a system is: a set of related things functioning together with purpose and under control. We seldom are paid to do a systems analysis on a system without purpose, and any system with purpose has some type of control. Identifying the control component and the scope of its control is the best first step in defining the boundaries of the purposeful systems of interest to us.

Exhibit 1 is a functional flow block diagram of the LEAA system for policy and program development under the control of the Administration. It shows the major inputs to be funds (appropriations), reports (from contractors and grantees), and data (survey and monitoring results) that enter through the functional components. The other inputs are Congressional mandates and budget authorizations that enter through the control component. These inputs are transformed into grants, contracts, and publications by the LEAA system. The largest share of the appropriations goes directly to the grant management and support subsystem for formula distribution to the States. The action program development component receives most of the discretionary funds, and it plans action programs for the state and local level to implement. The action program development function is performed in many of the organizational units of LEAA. The Research component and the Statistics component are separately identified in the diagram for the convenience of this study. The function performed by these components is largely program planning. All of these components operate under the Administration's control. This control is exercised through policy instructions, verbal directions, and review and approval of program documents. The outputs of LEAA system are grants and contracts for research, surveys, action programs, or utilization in States according

CONTINUED

2 OF 3

to formulas developed by the Congress. Publications are also major outputs of the system (Guidelines, Printed Reports, Training Materials, etc.).

The evaluative information developed by LEAA contracts and grants may be utilized in one or all of these components of the LEAA system, but an evaluation study is usually designed to suit the immediate needs of only one of these components. Exhibit 2 is an illustration of how evaluative information may have utility in different ways to different components of the LEAA system. The utility classes in the table are examples of possible utilization proposed by the GTR in the statement of work for this evaluation utilization study. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, and you may propose other classes or other terms if these do not express the utility concept you wish to convey. (However, if your term means anything other than the common usage as defined in a Webster's Dictionary, I will need your definition.) The X's in the table indicate that the component of the LEAA system in the column is most likely to take advantage of results relevant to the utility class in the row. The table may serve as a checklist for you as you decide how to judge the potential utility of the findings in the evaluation study document you are reviewing.

Specific LEAA organizational units are not identified for each component in exhibits 1 and 2, because exhibit 1 is not an organization chart. It is a flow chart of major policy and program development activities. The staff and management at LEAA may change their roles hourly as they move from one activity to another. The roles or functions in the rows of exhibit 2 are more important than an organizational title in analyzing the system. An individual may utilize an evaluation study document when evaluating policy for the Administrator and when planning for research, statistics, or action programs. Also, the document may be used for developing knowledge about the subject even though specific utilization is not pending. It will not be possible for you to identify all of the titles or the individuals that should be interviewed in order to trace utilization of your assigned case study. However, your identification of the roles or functions of logical users and probable organizational locations of these roles will help our further planning. It will

also be helpful if you will identify specific LEAA organizational units that you expect to utilize the findings. If you need them, LEAA organizational details can be supplied by the project leader.

III. PREPARATION OF SUMMARIES

A. Introduction

An evaluation finding summary comprises a one page control form prepared for you (illustrated as exhibit 3) and a three to five page summary with contents outlined in exhibit 4. Sections A to D are to be relatively free of your opinions, interpretations, or judgements. In section E, you are specifically asked to make judgements about the methodology, the product's usability, and the utility of the findings for the LEAA policy and program development system.

B. Discussion of Sections A through D of Exhibit 4

A descriptive abstract is called for in section A. Exhibit 5 is an abstract of a recently completed RTI study that provided evaluative information to both the Administration (policy level) and Statistics (program level) in the LEAA system. It illustrates the type of abstract desired from you. It explains the study's purpose (what we were trying to find out) and the subject of the study (National Crime Survey). It then explains what RTI did to collect evidence (methodology or approach) and the findings that were synthesized from analyses of the evidence. The conclusion is a value judgement by the authors of the study. In your descriptive abstract, these same elements should be included. Do not go into detail on any element that is called for in greater detail in later sections. You may use the author's abstract if it covers all that should be in the abstract.

The methodology description in section B should be brief. Your judgement about quality or appropriateness of the methodology goes in section E. As the outline says, use layman's terms to describe the meaning of any jargon used.

Section C on findings and conclusions should be in two parts. Findings are the distilled evidence from the study after analysis and synthesis. Conclusions introduce the judgement or interpretation of the study investigators. If the later do not follow logically from the former, discuss this later in section E. Since the findings are of special interest to this study, take special care to express them clearly, simply, and faithful to the report's contents. Add an appendix if the

findings are such that only great detail can do them justice, but try to avoid such detail.

The policy and program implications are usually found in the conclusions and recommendations. In section D, stick to the implications called out in the report. If the author identifies specific organizational units at LEAA for which his implications are relevant, list them in this section. If organizations outside LEAA are the targets of the recommendations, give their names or descriptions.

C. Critique of the Evaluation Study Document

In the previous sections, you will have summarized the pertinent information from the evaluation study document. In this section you are invited to give your own opinion about the methodology, the document, and the utility of the findings. You are also asked to extract any implications for the LEAA policy and program development system that may not have been made explicit by the report's authors. Please address the following questions:

1. Quality of Study


- a. Do the conclusions and recommendations follow logically from the detailed evidence and the synthesized findings?
- b. Are there deficiencies that might invalidate the findings (in whole or in part)?
- c. What qualifications do you as the reviewer place on the findings, conclusions, or recommendations?

2. Usability of Document

- a. What characteristics of the document add to or detract from its usability to readers?

3. Utility for LEAA System

- a. Are there findings in the report that are relevant to the LEAA policy and planning system that are not highlighted in the reports conclusions and recommendations (see exhibit 3 for possible utility classes)?
- b. What is your overall judgement about the utility of this evaluation study document for the LEAA policy and planning system or for other uses?



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


Exhibit 1. LEAA Policy and Program Development System

Exhibit 2. Example Utility Classes and Components Most Likely to Utilize

Utility Classes	Component Expected to Utilize Findings				
	LEAA Control	Research	Statistics	Action Planning	Program Management
1. Policy Planning	X ^{1/}
2. Setting Program Priorities	X
3. Agency Budgeting	X
4. Program Development	.	X	X	X	.
5. Model Program Documentation	.	.	.	X	.
6. Program Continuation Decision	.	X	X	X	.
7. Modification of Program (Concepts, Delivery, Operations)	.	X	X	X	.
8. Setting Criteria for Participation (Eligibility and Selection)	.	.	.	X	X
9. Monitoring and Directing Programs	X
10. Market Strategies or Level of Effort Selection	.	.	.	X	.
11. Planning Future Res. and Eval.	.	X	X	.	.
12. Selecting Future Eval. Designs	.	X	.	.	.
13. Standard Future Eval. Measures	.	X	.	.	.
14. Methodology Needs Identified	.	X	X	.	.
15. Methodological Innovations Tested	.	X	X	.	.
16. Planning Training or TA	.	.	.	X	.
17. Findings in TA Documents	X
18. Findings in Training Courses	X
19. Legislative or Executive Reports	X
20. Public Information	X

^{1/}X's indicate that the particular type of utility in the row is most likely to apply to the column(s) in which the X appears.

Exhibit 3

Case Study Control and Bibliographical Information Form

Functional Area: _____

Program Area: _____

Case Study: _____

Grant No.: _____

Performing Organization & Year: _____

Reference: _____

Principal Investigator: _____

Evaluation Government
Project Monitor: _____

Program Government
Project Monitor: _____

Other LEAA Contacts: _____

Comments: _____

RTI Reviewer: _____ Subcontractor: _____

Date Document was Given to Reviewer: _____

Date Evaluation was Returned: _____

Exhibit 4. Evaluation Findings Summary

OUTLINE

A. DESCRIPTIVE ABSTRACT

Describe the study concisely but sufficiently to tell the reader what the authors did. Do not include details that are called for in B, C, and D below.

B. METHODOLOGY

How did the authors perform the study? Describe in layman's terms--if the jargon of a specific field is appropriate, use it--but also say what it means. Be as brief as possible.

C. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Report faithfully, concisely, and clearly what the authors found out, and what they concluded.

D. PROGRAM/POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Should be limited to the author's opinions.

E. CRITIQUE OF QUALITY, USABILITY, AND UTILITY

Unlike parts A thru D above, this part can reflect the reviewer's opinions--it should do so when the reviewer has a relevant criticism to make. Consider the following questions in preparing this section.

1. Do the conclusions and recommendations follow logically from the detailed evidence and the synthesized findings?
2. Are there deficiencies that might invalidate the findings (in whole or in part)?
3. What qualifications do you as the reviewer place on the findings, conclusions, or recommendations?
4. What characteristics of the document add to or detract from its usability to readers?
5. Are there findings in the report that are relevant to the LEAA policy and planning systems that are not highlighted in the report's conclusions and recommendations (see exhibit 3 for possible utility classes)?
6. What is your overall judgement about the utility of this evaluation study document for the LEAA policy and planning system or for other uses?

RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE

Final Report Brief

RTI/1412/01-01F

November 1978

ANALYSIS OF THE UTILITY AND BENEFITS OF THE
NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (NCS)

This report contains the results of a study to determine the present and potential utility and benefits of surveys of the victims of crime in the United States. The study is especially concerned with the National Crime Survey and its potential for contributing to public and private criminal justice decisionmaking.

The National Crime Survey (NCS) is supported by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and is the largest program of the Statistics Division of LEAA's National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service (NCJISS). There have been victim surveys in 26 cities under the NCS, but current activity is limited to a continuing national survey of a rotating panel of 60,000 households, interviewed semi-annually by representatives of the United States Bureau of the Census.

More than 250 documents were reviewed to find evidence of the nature and extent of NCS use in scientific and policy research. The gradual development of the system to produce and distribute NCS information was reviewed. RTI analysts then completed 160 in-depth interviews with past and potential users of victimization information from the NCS. The evidence obtained was used to describe the extent of NCS use in the past and predict its future utility.

Although the NCS program was initiated in 1970, very little NCS information was available to users until about 1975. The evidence gathered by RTI shows that there were substantial increases in both frequency of use and analytical depth of uses each year after 1975. Knowledgeable users and NCS supporters were found in Congressional subcommittees, Federal executive offices, national associations, research and service firms, state legislative and planning offices, local criminal justice and academic institution.. The evidence suggests that there will be continued growth in NCS utilization by most of these user groups.

The study concludes that the potential benefits of the program to public and private decisions are substantial and recommends that the program be continued. However, numerous methodological improvements are recommended. Following the completion of this study, the LEAA Administration decided to continue the NCS and the Statistics Division initiated steps to complete the needed methodological improvements.

Prepared for:	Department of Justice	P.S. McFullan
	Law Enforcement Assistance Administration	J.J. Collins, Jr.
	Office of Planning and Management	R. Gandossy
		J.G. Lenski

Descriptors: National Crime Survey
Statistics Utilization

END