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Third Year Evaluation
of the Illinois
Urban High Crime
Reduction Program

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ACQUISITIONS

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Preface

This report represents the third-year and final product of Abt Associates' evaluation of the Urban High Crime Reduction Program. Our first-year evaluation began in September 1976, more than two years after the first Program grants were awarded. Final grants have now been awarded, with Program activities to continue through 1980. Thus the original three-year time frame envisioned for the Program will have extended to over six years.

In order for the evaluation of the Program to capture planned activities under the final grants, its duration was extended by six months, from 30 September 1979 to 31 March 1980. We have tried to include Program-related events and activities that were current through January 1980.

Our three-and-a-half year involvement in the evaluation of the program has produced several reports, listed in chronological order below:

Richard Ku and Bradford Smith, "First-Year Evaluation of the Illinois Urban High Crime Reduction Program, Interim Report," 31 January 1977.

Richard Ku, "Victimization in Joliet and Peoria: A Baseline Survey," Revised, 22 February 1977.

Richard Ku and Bradford Smith, "First-Year Evaluation of the Illinois Urban High Crime Reduction Program, Final Report," 24 August 1977.

Richard Ku, Bradford Smith, and Deborah Carrow, "Second-Year Evaluation of the Illinois Urban High Crime Reduction Program," 30 September 1978.

Richard Ku, "Victimization in Joliet and Peoria: Two Years Later," 12 April 1979

Although a number of evaluation issues were addressed in these previous reports, the additional time has permitted us to evaluate the Program from a fresh perspective. The present report has therefore been designed as a stand-alone document which incorporates the full range of evaluation issues originally contemplated.

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PART ONE
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

This Part gives an overview of the entire report. Sections 1.1 through 1.3 cover the design of the Program, local planning approaches, and impact on target crime. Readers are encouraged to examine Parts Two through Five, which cover these areas in more detail:

Part One concludes with an assessment of the impact of the Program on the criminal justice system and the community in Section 1.4; a discussion of program costs and benefits can be found in Section 1.5; and conclusions of our evaluation, in Section 1.6.

PART ONE
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

1.1 The Program

The Urban High Crime Reduction Program (the "Program") has been funded since 1974 by the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC). An early description portrayed a program that would make use of scientific methods (notably operations research) to find ways of reducing the occurrence of certain types of crime. The Program was to have a clear-cut impact on these crimes, with specific countermeasures determined and implemented at the local level. While the Program speaks of burglary, homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated assault involving assailants unknown to their victims, only a portion of these crimes were to be selected as "targets." No criteria for the selection of target crime were given. The underlying assumption, however, was that resources could be more effectively allocated if local programs focused on a narrow range of crimes.

Shortly after this description of the Program appeared in the 1973 comprehensive state criminal justice plan for Illinois, there was a change in State administration. Lack of familiarity with the Program on the part of the new administration resulted in a year-long delay before the Program was implemented in mid-1974. The funding agency's planning unit "kept the Program alive," developed a set of Program guidelines, and assumed responsibility for monitoring the Program. The significance of this development lies in increased emphasis on the planning process. The concept of "rational planning" in particular was hypothesized to be an essential ingredient in finding the best combination of actions to reduce target crime incidence.

The Program guidelines described rational planning as an on-going process that would guide the participating cities toward the achievement of their respective crime reduction goals with increasing efficiency and effectiveness. This process was to be cyclical, including not only the formulation and selection of action strategies, but also the development, monitoring, and evaluation of projects through which these strategies could be implemented. The evaluation of these projects would then feed new information into the next cycle.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Program sought to reduce the incidence of target crime in the participating cities, the rational planning process was to be comprehensive, i.e., to take into consideration the three major criminal justice functions of law enforcement, adjudication, and corrections. Since the latter two functions are generally not performed by city agencies, the Program guidelines called for the formation of supervisory bodies (crime reduction councils) consisting of the mayor, city manager, police chief, state's attorney, chief judge of the circuit court, a representative of the state department of corrections, and up to four additional members appointed by the mayor. These local crime reduction councils were to authorize and generally guide the work of a small staff, approve action plans and grant applications developed by this staff, and formulate policies for the local program. Planning grants awarded under the Program were used to support these staff positions.

Although the Program guidelines refer to a single Impact Plan, the cities were given the option to complete plans in law enforcement, adjudication, and corrections phases. Also included was an update phase whose scope included all three functions. Under this phased approach, applications for funds to implement action projects were to be submitted, after each phase of the plan had been endorsed by the local crime reduction council and cognizant ILEC staff. The latter included a review for conceptual compatibility with the State's Comprehensive Plan by the funding agency's Planning and Budgeting Committee, programmatic and fiscal review by staff specialists, and ILEC regional office review for compatibility with regional plans.

To be eligible for the Program, cities had to be outside of Cook County and have a population of at least 10,000. These cities were ranked on the basis of a specified combination of total 1971 index crime, robbery, and burglary known to the police. The five cities ranking worst on this scale were then invited to submit planning grant applications. Four of these cities were:

- East St. Louis, predominately black, economically impoverished, and ranking worst of the eligible cities in crime;
- Peoria, "typical" American city frequently used for product testing and public opinion polling;

- Champaign, home (together with its immediately adjacent city Urbana) of the main campus of the University of Illinois; and
- Joliet, an industrial center 50 miles Southwest of Chicago.

Waukegan was also invited to participate, but city officials found the planning requirements to be too stringent. East St. Louis' participation ended prematurely in mid-1978, after two-and-a-half years, primarily because its crime reduction council never reached operational capacity and was unable to take action to approve the law enforcement plan that was submitted by the staff. The remainder of this part therefore deals only with the other three cities, which will continue to receive Program funds through the latter half of 1980.

The Urban High Crime Reduction Program called for local communities and the criminal justice systems serving them to work together to achieve crime reduction goals. Rather than simply assume that "systems improvements" would eventually bring about such reductions, the Program asked that leaders from both public and private sectors form councils which would meet regularly as part of a planning process for coordinated action. These councils were to choose the specific types of crime on which to target their efforts, and were to decide how best to allocate their resources among alternative actions. "Rational" decisionmaking was to result from the work of a staff which would study the alternatives and make recommendations to its local council. This staff was also to work with those agencies designated to implement projects, to monitor the projects in a systematic fashion and evaluate their effectiveness, and to make recommendations for short-term project modifications and their eventual retention or rejection.

The foregoing summary of the Program design is deceptively simple. This approach had not been tried prior to the federally-funded High Impact Program, which began only two years earlier. Many new concepts were embodied in the planning process and an analytical framework to guide this process. Indeed, even the prospect of criminal justice system administrators exchanging ideas and making joint decisions on a regular basis might have been viewed with some skepticism. The design of the Program was ambitious. As we will see shortly, these ambitions were not entirely fulfilled.

1.2 Evaluation Objectives, Approach and Methodology

Our evaluation began in September 1976, just over two years after the first program grants were awarded and at approximately the same time as the implementation of the Program's first action project. The principle issues for the evaluation dealt with the nature of the broadly-defined planning process undertaken in each city, an emphasis that largely reflected the interests of the funding agency's planning unit. Since the evaluation of action projects was, under the Program's definition of planning process, left to the local crime reduction councils and their staffs, we did not evaluate the action projects per se; rather, our evaluation assessed local evaluation capabilities in this regard as part of the larger planning process.

According to the theory underlying the Program, cities which were able to frame their programs with a rational planning process, other things being equal, should have shown a greater reduction in the occurrence of target crime than cities which were unable to do so. The rational planning process was to provide for the optimal mix of action projects, their faithful execution, and their evaluation, and would contribute to the knowledge base for the next cycle. Comprehensiveness of the Program was to ensure the consideration of all components of the criminal justice system in coordinating the mobilization of resources against target crime.

Our approach to the evaluation was to develop criteria for the assessment of "rationality" of the planning process, analyze target crime trends, and utilize local evaluations of action projects to help interpret statistical connections between rational planning and crime. We also assessed the Program's impact on:

- several facets of the criminal justice system, including the policies and practices of the criminal justice agencies serving the participating cities, their crime control and crime analysis capabilities, and statewide planning standards;
- the participating communities' fear of crime and attitudes toward the local criminal justice system.

Finally, we examined the multi-faceted question of costs and benefits associated with the Program.

With these objectives, our evaluation entailed four primary activities over a three-and-a-half year period:

- examination of local program file materials, such as correspondence, memoranda, crime reduction council meeting minutes, plans and related working documents, press clippings, and so forth;
- interviews with crime reduction council members and program staff, others involved in the local program, and funding agency staff;
- statistical analysis of law enforcement agency data on target crime;
- telephone surveys of the general population, to estimate change in victimization rates, rates of reporting crime to the police, and attitudes toward crime and the criminal justice system.

Altogether, over 500 documents were examined; 100 face-to-face interviews were held; crime statistics covering a seven-year period were analyzed; and two telephone surveys were conducted, each reaching 10,000 Joliet and Peoria households. We also attended ten local crime reduction council meetings and several joint meetings of the local program directors. These data sources provided us with a unique opportunity to become intimately familiar with the local programs and the nature of the planning process undertaken in each city.

1.3 Evaluation of the Local Planning Approaches

The call for rational planning was a response to the belief that the allocation of federal criminal justice funds lacked both focus and basis. The Program was designed to rectify this situation, at least in the participating cities, by requiring that specific types of crime be targeted, and that resource allocation decisions be guided by the analysis of data on target crime occurrence, victim and offender characteristics, and the response of the criminal justice system and the community. Analytic techniques were suggested in the Program guidelines, and the contents of plan documents to be developed for each phase were also outlined. These guidelines, however, did not explain how these elements, taken together, would constitute a rational planning process. The specification of a framework and strategy for rational planning was left to the discretion of the participating cities.

Joliet

The Joliet program adhered closest to the guidelines. Robbery and burglary had been selected as target crimes because of their high frequency

of occurrence and "suppressibility." Plans were completed for all four phases, and five action projects were implemented. The contents of three of the plans generally matched those outlined in the guidelines: overall program design; target crime patterns and trends within the City; resources, operations and existing efforts against target crime; and recommended action proposals, including anticipated impact on target crime occurrence. The staff developed and implemented an offender tracking system from which statistics were derived to show changes in the nature of target crime case dispositions, after arrest, at various points in the (adult) system.

Two action projects were implemented under the law enforcement plan. The Mobile Crime Prevention Unit, to prevent burglary through promotion of techniques for improving residential security, and to deter robbery and burglary through selective enforcement, was funded through a grant to the Joliet Police Departments. The Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program, to provide financial incentives for residential security renovations, was funded through a grant to the Neighborhood Services Division of the Department of Community Development, which planned to coordinate this project with another federally-funded grant providing rebates for general home improvement.

The adjudication plan called for the creation of the Special Prosecution Unit, to provide a deterrent by increasing the threat of full trial in target crime cases and cases involving repeat offenders. This project was implemented under a grant to the Will County State's Attorney's Office.

While not yet implemented when our third-year evaluation began, the corrections plan proposed a Target Crime Restitution project, funded through the Model Ex-Offender Program. This project called for a specialist to assist target crime probationers ordered to make restitution in securing employment or finding public service work, and would monitor compliance with these orders. From this standpoint the Target Crime Restitution project was distinctly different from the law enforcement and adjudication phases in which the data substantiated a need whose fulfillment, it was believed, would be effective in target crime reduction. The analysis for the Target Crime Restitution project was designed to assess the effectiveness of one action strategy (restitution) relative to others (earned dismissal, probation without restitution). This approach captures the spirit of rational planning

as envisioned for the Program in that the data were used to help choose among competing alternatives.

Joliet's plan for the fourth phase centered on a study of the relationship between target crime occurrence and the probability of arrest for target crime. This research found statistically significant relationships suggesting that as the probability of arrest increases, burglary occurrence decreases. Upon examination of a range of possible action projects to increase the risk of arrest for burglary, the staff proposed the Burglary Investigation Project, to enhance investigative capability and provide for the recovery and analysis of physical evidence (primarily fingerprints) at burglary scenes. This project was also funded through a grant to the Joliet Police Department.

The Joliet crime reduction council has been chaired by a member from the private sector. Other council members include the six required members (Mayor, City Manager, Chief of Police, State's Attorney, Supervising Judge of the Circuit Court, and a representative of the State Department of Corrections); three other private sector members appointed by the Mayor; and the Public Defender, who as an individual originally served at the pleasure of the Mayor in his part-time capacity as a private attorney, but whose part-time public position was later given permanent status.

Program grant data for Joliet are summarized in Table 1-1. In the Joliet program, the project directors named in each action grant was the head of the implementing agency. Thus the Chief of Police was named as project director for the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit and the Burglary Investigation Project; the State's Attorney was project director of the Special Prosecution Unit; the Director of the Neighborhood Services Division was project director for the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program; and the Director of the Model Ex-Offender Program, recipient of the Target Crime Restitution grant, was named project director in that grant. The Joliet crime reduction council and its staff primarily served coordinating, monitoring, and evaluation roles once these action grants were awarded, but they had no authority to take corrective action in the event that projects were not implemented as planned, or to require the collection of project data for local evaluation purposes.

TABLE 1-1. Urban High Crime Reduction Program Funding
Joliet: October 1974 - September 1980

Grant Title and Number	Funding Period	Source			Actual Expenditure
		Federal/State	Local	Total	
<u>Program Planning</u>					
1496	21 Oct 74 - 20 Jun 75	\$ 32,225	\$ 7,436 ¹	\$ 39,661	\$ 36,025
1702	21 Jun 75 - 20 Jun 76	59,768	3,145	62,913	60,314
2308	21 Jun 76 - 31 Jan 78 ²	75,050	3,950	79,000	79,430
1984	1 Feb 78 - 15 Sep 78	31,000	1,632	32,632	32,240
3264	16 Sep 78 - 24 Aug 79	50,000	2,632	52,632	52,180
3618	25 Aug 79 - 30 Sep 80	60,000	10,041	70,041	(in progress)
<u>Action Projects</u>					
Mobile Crime Prevention Unit:					
2108	2 Mar 76 - 30 Jun 77 ³	\$126,350	\$ 6,650	\$133,000	\$121,731
Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program:					
2544	1 Feb 77 - 30 Apr 79 ⁴	\$ 21,111	\$ 1,111	\$ 22,222	\$ 6,486
Special Prosecution Unit:					
2573	1 Apr 77 - 31 Mar 78	\$ 74,499	\$ 3,129	\$ 78,420	\$ 77,085
2982	1 Apr 78 - 31 Mar 79	64,924	3,417	68,341	67,994
Target Crime Restitution Project:					
3240	1 Nov 78 - 15 Mar 80	\$ 19,414	\$ 1,022	\$ 20,436	(in progress)
Burglarly Investigation Project:					
3411	1 Apr 79 - 30 Apr 80	\$ 71,446	\$ 3,760	\$ 75,206	(in progress)
3428	1 May 80 - 30 Sep 80	68,396	3,600	71,996	(not yet begun)

1 Includes \$5,949 in-kind match.

2 Incorporates one extension beyond original end date of 20 September 1977.

3 Incorporates one extension beyond original end date of 1 March 1977.

4 Incorporates four extensions beyond original end date of 30 November 1977 and one eight-month suspension (August 1977-April 1978).

Sources: Grant applications, grant award letters, and discussions with local program staff.

Partly as a result of this situation, the Joliet crime reduction council and its staff were able to exercise little control over the implementation of action projects. No records were kept on the activities of the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit, although the Joliet program staff attempted to rectify this situation by proposing operational changes that would permit a limited evaluation and formulating an evaluation plan. Similar problems with record-keeping were encountered by the program staff for the Special Prosecution Unit. In this case, however, the offender tracking system provided data on largely overlapping defendant cohorts from which comparisons could be made with respect to trials, convictions, sentencing and case processing time, before and after the Unit was implemented. Based on these comparisons, the crime reduction council approved a second year of funding for the Unit.

Problems of a different nature befell the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program and the Target Crime Restitution Project. In the former case, the Neighborhood Services Division overestimated the number of homeowners who would apply for crime prevention rebates, while in the latter, referrals from the Will County Probation Department were lacking. In both cases, the Joliet program staff prepared evaluation plans, but for the reasons cited, neither project could be adequately evaluated.

Although the Burglary Investigation Project is not yet fully operational, the Joliet program staff prepared an interim evaluation. The findings indicated that more burglary scenes were being processed for physical evidence and more evidence was being collected. Lacking the automated fingerprint comparison capability, the project did not appear to have increased the number of identifications. However, the investigative component of the project was found to be successful in clearing cases, and the undercover fencing component of the project led to the arrest of several known burglars operating in the Joliet area.

Summarizing, the Joliet program approached its planning, monitoring, and evaluation tasks in strict accordance with the original Program guideline provisions. As will be seen, these guidelines were later revised to reflect the approach of the Peoria program, which was found to more accurately reflect the rational planning process envisioned for all of the participating cities.

Champaign

Champaign officials interpreted the original guidelines quite liberally. Residential burglary was selected as target crime because of its high volume. Plan documents were completed, generally following the topical outlines in the Program guidelines for law enforcement, adjudication, and corrections phases. Offender tracking data were also collected and summarized for inclusion in the plan for the adjudication phase.

Only one action project became fully operational in the Champaign program. The Neighborhood Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Program, to deploy a full service team police unit in a specific residential area of the City, focusing on residential burglary, was funded in part through a grant to the Champaign Police Department. This project first emerged from the law enforcement plan; the corrections plan, which found local correctional services to be more than adequate for those convicted of charges stemming from residential burglary arrests, recommended continuation funding for the project. Short-term continuation funding had already been granted to the project, but funding agency staff declined to provide further long-term support, primarily due to the lack of focus by the team policing unit on residential burglary. This decision was made despite a favorable evaluation of the project that had been conducted under contract with the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois.

The adjudication plan recommended funding of the Designated Prosecutor project, to bolster prosecution resources against residential burglary defendants. This project was funded through a grant to the Champaign County State's Attorney's Office. Designed to handle cases generated by the team policing unit, this project faltered in its early stages, lost credibility with the unit, and never became fully operational.

While not mentioned in one of the program plans, a third project has been funded under the auspices of the Champaign program. This project is designed to improve Management Information and Crime Analysis (MICA) capabilities of the Champaign Police Department through hardware/software additions. Lacking a crime-specific focus, this project appears to bear little relationship to the Program.

Program grants for Champaign are summarized in Table 1-2. The Champaign program was shaped largely by the Chief of Police who, newly arrived at the time, had given improved community relations and more efficient and effective delivery of police services high priority as Department goals. Since these seemed to be reasonable strategies for reducing crime, with a focus on residential burglary, the team policing concept was, from Champaign's perspective, ideally suited for Program funding. A limited team policing experiment had been contemplated by the Police Department six months before the Champaign crime reduction council first met.

The Champaign crime reduction council consisted of the six required members, four members from the private sector, and the Public Defender, added later. The council did not elect a chairman, although the issue was raised on several occasions. Council interest in the program gradually diminished, its last documented meeting having occurred more than two years prior to the scheduled end date of grant support for the Champaign program staff. This was coincident with the City Manager's assumption of responsibility for the program. The staff was absorbed into the Police Department, to evaluate the team policing project and provide general research services to the Department's commanding officers, while the ILEC regional office serving Champaign assisted in developing the grant application for the MICA project. In sum, the Champaign crime reduction council was unable to fulfill its intended roles in the program.

Peoria

The Peoria program was found to be unique in terms of its planning strategy, analytical framework and logic. In Peoria, the Program was viewed as an experiment to test the proposition that rational planning process, aimed at the reduction of specific types of crime and incorporating the full spectrum of criminal and juvenile justice functions, would produce a battery of actions which, if implemented according to plan, would demonstrably reduce the incidence of these crimes. Residential burglary was the chosen target crime, based on public fear of victimization and, owing to its high incidence, detectability of a program effect.

TABLE 1-2. Urban High Crime Reduction Program Funding
Champaign: February 1975 - December 1980

Grant Title and Number	Funding Period	Source			Actual Expenditure
		Federal/State	Local	Total	
<u>Program Planning</u>					
1492	1 Feb 75 - 30 Jun 75 ²	\$ 29,057	\$ 6,705 ¹	\$ 35,762	\$ 35,685
1950	1 Jul 75 - 6 Aug 76 ²	55,319	2,911	58,230 ³	57,843
2324	7 Aug 76 - 28 Jan 78	73,417	3,864	77,281 ³	75,530
2991 ⁴	29 Jan 78 - 31 Mar 79	55,613	2,927	58,540	58,540
3441 ⁴	1 Apr 79 - 31 Dec 80	77,049	8,562	85,611	(in progress)
<u>Action Projects</u>					
Neighborhood Team Policing -					
Burlary Abatement:					
2381	1 Jan 77 - 31 Mar 78	\$145,559	\$ 7,661	\$153,220	\$153,220 ⁵
3299	1 Apr 78 - 31 Jan 79	89,307	4,700	94,007	94,007 ⁵
Designated Burglary Prosecution:					
2945	1 Dec 78 - 30 Sep 79	\$ 24,290	\$ 1,279	\$ 25,569	\$ 25,569 ⁵
MICA:					
3530	1 Oct 79 - 31 Dec 80 ⁶	\$ 79,636	\$ 4,191	\$ 83,827	(in progress)

1 Includes \$5,364 in-kind match.

2 Incorporates two extensions beyond original end date of 20 September 1977.

3 Incorporates one extension beyond original end date of 1 March 1977.

4 Awarded in three parts: the first in the amount of \$35,359 to 31 December 1979; the second for approximately \$38,000 to 30 September 1980; and the third for the balance to 31 December 1980.

5 Upper-bound estimate--does not incorporate small unknown unexpended amounts.

6 Incorporates one extension anticipated beyond original end date of 30 September 1980.

Sources: Grant applications, grant award letters, and discussions with local program staff.

The Peoria program's approach to rational planning embodied two important elements:

- that wherever possible, statements of the effectiveness of certain actions in reducing target crime should be empirically tested; and
- that all empirical studies be done before making resource allocation decisions, so that resources are not depleted by the time the most effective action strategies are identified.

Following this approach, a framework was constructed, outlining possible action strategies that could be adopted to reduce the incidence of target crime. A series of studies was conducted to test the (statistical) strength of relationships between the target crime incidence and system performance with respect to the action strategies available to the adult and juvenile justice systems. For the adult system performance was measured for the strategy objectives pertaining to recidivism, sanctioning severity, case processing speed, and diversion and rehabilitation. For the juvenile system performance was measured in terms of sanctioning severity and recidivism. The studies all utilized a data base constructed and cross-validated manually by the staff. Data sources consisted primarily of burglary incidence reports and case files on virtually every adult and juvenile charged since 1970 for a residential burglary occurring within City limits. Included in these case records were complete known criminal histories, complete system processing (transactional) data for each residential burglary charge, and subsequent charges against the individual named in the record.

The adult studies found that residential burglary incidence displayed the strongest relationship to the system's performance immediately after the offense is committed: the probability of arrest and, given arrest, the speed with which an indictment or information is filed. Although time did not permit an exhaustive analysis of possible action strategies to increase the probability of arrest or increase processing speed from arrest to indictment, over 100 alternatives were identified through various sources and their relative potential for achieving these two objectives was assessed using readily available data. This analysis led to the implementation of:

- the Dedicated Prosecution project, designed to reduce case processing time from arrest to indictment in residential burglary cases, implemented by the Peoria County State's Attorney's Office;

- the Physical Evidence project, to enhance the recovery of latent fingerprints at residential burglary scenes; and
- the Criminal Information Exchange, to improve intra-departmental communication on residential burglary suspects.

The latter two projects were implemented by the Peoria Police Department, to increase the risk of arrest for residential burglary.

Grant data for the Peoria program are shown in Table 1-3. Much to the regret of the Peoria program staff, time did not permit completion of the juvenile plan before the crime reduction council had to make decisions on action projects recommended in the adult plan. This meant that funds had to be committed before the full range of alternatives for reducing residential burglary could be analyzed, contrary to the approach that had been adopted by the council and staff. These decisions relied heavily on the program staff evaluations of the three adult action projects that found:

- dedicated prosecution to significantly increase the arrest-to-indictment speed in residential burglary cases, as anticipated;
- a partially operational physical evidence project to produce more positive suspect identifications, as anticipated;
- the criminal information exchange to be ineffective in the identification and arrest of residential burglary suspects.

The council chose to expend all available funds first to sustain its staff and then to continue funding for the dedicated prosecution and physical evidence projects. Thus while the Peoria program's approach to rational planning was sound, it proved impossible to execute within the Program's time constraints.

Comparative Summary of Planning Approaches

Table 1-4 summarizes Program elements on which the local programs can be compared. Target crime choices span a broad range, from residential burglary in Peoria and Champaign to residential and commercial robbery and burglary. The Program guidelines did not specify target crime selection criteria, although some attention to crime patterns and trends was implicit. All three cities cited incidence as a factor in the selection, although the significance of this factor for Peoria, unlike the other cities, rested in the feasibility of detecting reductions should they occur. Whether the criteria for selecting target crime should have been established locally or,

TABLE 1-3. Urban High Crime Reduction Program Funding
Peoria: March 1974 - September 1980

Grant Title and Number	Funding Period	Source			Actual Expenditure
		Federal/State	Local	Total	
<u>Program Planning</u>					
1161 D (LEAA) ¹	1 Mar 74 - 31 Dec 74	\$ 53,005	\$ 5,301 ²	\$ 58,306	\$ 57,516
1575	1 Jan 75 - 30 Jun 75	105,191	24,275 ³	129,466	103,481
1769	1 Jul 75 - 30 Nov 76 ⁴	157,457	8,300	165,767	161,612
2526	1 Dec 76 - 31 Mar 78 ⁵	151,111	7,953	159,064	159,064
3152	1 Apr 78 - 15 Jan 79	81,000	5,953	85,263	85,263
3358	16 Jan 79 - 30 Nov 79	103,297	5,437	108,734	108,734
3672	1 Dec 79 - 30 Sep 80	41,100	2,163	43,263	(in progress)
<u>Action Projects</u>					
<u>Physical Evidence:</u>					
1161 D (LEAA)	1 May 77 - 31 Oct 77	\$ 51,994	\$ 5,199 ²	\$ 57,958	\$ 56,027
2939	1 Nov 77 - 31 Dec 78	32,836	1,642	34,478	49,938
<u>Criminal Information Exchange</u>					
1161 D (LEAA) ¹	1 May 77 - 31 Oct 77	\$ 33,974	\$ 3,397 ²	\$ 37,371	23,066
2939	1 Dec 77 - 31 Dec 78	54,107	2,705	56,812	28,923
<u>Dedicated Prosecution</u>					
1161 D (LEAA) ¹	1 May 77 - 31 Oct 77	\$ 11,241	\$ 1,124 ²	\$ 12,365	\$ 7,870
2939	1 Nov 77 - 31 Dec 78	23,457	1,173	24,630	24,233

Sources: Program grant applications, award letters, fiscal reports, and discussions with local program staff.

¹ LEAA discretionary funding for Crime Impact Program, used for both planning and acting during periods indicated.

² The 10 percent local match required for the Crime Impact Program grant (\$16,600) was actually expended in full in the planning component of the grant.

³ Includes \$19,420 in-kind match.

⁴ Incorporates two extensions beyond original end date of 30 June 1976.

⁵ Incorporates two extensions beyond original end date of 31 December 1977.

TABLE 1-4. Summary of Selected Program Elements: Champaign, Joliet and Peoria

Program Element	Champaign	Joliet	Peoria
Target Crime	Residential Burglary	Robbery Burglary	Residential Burglary
Present Council Chairman	None	Private sector citizen (optional member)	Superintendent of Police (required member)
Optional Members	-2 private sector citizens	-Public Defender -4 private sector citizens	-Superintendent of Public Schools -Director of Human Resources -County Sheriff -Chairman, County Board -Chairman, Judicial Matters Committee, County Board -2 private sector citizens
Action Projects (in order of implementation)	<u>Enforcement Plan</u> -Neighborhood Team Policing- Burglary Abatement Program <u>Adjudication Plan</u> -Designated Prosecution <u>Corrections Plan</u> -No project recommended <u>Update Plan</u> Management Information and Crime Analysis (MICA)	<u>Enforcement Plan</u> -Mobile Crime Prevention Unit <u>Prevention Plan</u> -Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program <u>Adjudication Plan</u> -Special Prosecution Unit <u>Corrections Plan</u> -Target Crime Restitution <u>Update Plan</u> -Burglary Investigation Project	<u>Adult Plan</u> -Dedicated Prosecution -Physical Evidence -Criminal Information Exchange <u>Juvenile Plan</u> None to date
Project Director/Action Projects	Chief Administrator of the Implementing Agency	Chief Administrator of the Implementing Agency	Executive Director of the Crime Reduction Council
Planning Expenditures ¹	\$313,209	\$330,230	\$719,933
Action Project Expenditures ²	\$356,623	\$440,934	\$190,057
Total Expenditure ¹	\$669,832	\$711,164	\$908,990 ²

¹ Assumes expenditure of budgeted amounts for grants in progress and grants for which actual expenditures could not be determined.

² Includes \$144,479 in LFAA discretionary funds initially awarded for a similar program that was subsequently absorbed by the Urban High Crime Reduction Program.

for all of the cities, by funding agency staff was not addressed in our evaluation.

Differences in the planning approach of the local programs begin to emerge with the next four elements shown in Table 1-4. The fact that Champaign's crime reduction council never elected a chairman characterized that program's lack of focus, while Peoria council membership is indicative of a greater county role in the planning process. Planning phases, shown next, further suggest that the Peoria program differed from the others. The option to plan in law enforcement, adjudication and corrections phases apparently stemmed from the need to expedite implementation of the Program which had lost considerable visibility with the new funding agency administration, as noted earlier. The two cities choosing to exercise this option were automatically constrained with respect to resource allocation since they had to commit funds to action projects proposed for each phase before having the chance to determine whether remaining funds would be sufficient to support equally or more promising action projects in subsequent phases. The fact that Peoria's planning approach sought to delay the commitment of funds to action projects until a wide range of possibilities had been studied distinguished the Peoria program from those of Joliet and Champaign.

Important differences were also found with respect to data analysis strategy. In Peoria, a series of studies was designed to speak exclusively to residential burglary incidence, the studies' central "dependent variable." The studies relied on data that had been collected and cross-validated from source files. These data were used to construct measures of system performance, covering a range of "independent variables" for the studies. This plan sought to examine these relationships from a local empirical perspective. Joliet subsequently adopted a similar statistical methodology in developing plans for the corrections and update phases.

Grant matching funds for the Peoria program were all provided by the city, including the action project implemented by the Peoria County State's Attorney's Office. As a reflection of this, the program director was named as project director on all Program grants to Peoria, with day-to-day supervision provided by the implementing agency. In the other cities, grants covering planning activities and action grants awarded to city agencies were

matched by the city, while action grants awarded to county agencies were matched with county funds. In the other cities, the administrative heads of the implementing agency (e.g., police chief, State's Attorney) was named project director for the project grant. The organizational framework for the Peoria program clearly gave the Peoria crime reduction council a greater locus of control over that program than was possible in the other cities.

The most striking differences between the cities deal with expenditure patterns. The \$908,990 expenditure estimated for the Peoria program derives from both Program grants and an LEAA discretionary grant for a Crime Impact Program. Since these two projects were similar in nature, they were merged at the outset, adding \$166,000 to Peoria's share of Program funding. Only \$144,479 of this amount was spent; subtracting this from \$908,990 leaves \$764,511 as the estimated expenditure for the Peoria program. This still exceeds Joliet's share by 7 percent and Champaign's by 12 percent. Of greater significance is the difference between Peoria's expenditure on planning (79 percent of total expenditures) and expenditures on planning for Joliet (46 percent) and Champaign (47 percent). This provides further indication of the relative importance of the planning function to the Peoria crime reduction council.

The difference between Peoria and the other cities, with respect to planning approach, seems largely attributable to one factor. Since August 1975, when the Peoria Crime Reduction Council first convened, Allen Andrews has been its chairman. Aubrey Moore became its Director shortly thereafter. Both men had served in ILEC staff capacities--Andrews as Executive Director and Moore as his Administrative Assistant--when the Urban High Crime Reduction Program was conceived in 1972, and both were instrumental in the preliminary design of the Program and its fundamental concept of rational planning. To sum up, Peoria was the only city that planned to delay the commitment of funds to action projects until a range of alternatives could be studied, by analyzing the past performance of the adult and juvenile justice systems in responding to the crime of residential burglary. That the Peoria approach to rational planning was adopted in revising the Program guidelines speaks to the exemplary nature of that city's efforts.

1.4 Impact on Target Crime

Two sources of data were utilized in our assessment of the local programs' impact on target crimes. Monthly statistics from the Illinois-Uniform Crime Reporting (I-UCR) system were analyzed for all three cities, to detect significant shifts in target crime trends while action projects were operational. This analysis incorporated seasonal and long-term trends, as well as trends in target crime occurrence in similar cities not participating in the Program. The second source of data, limited to Joliet and Peoria, was a pair of telephone surveys, each reaching about 5000 households in Joliet and 5000 in Peoria, which provided estimates of victimization rates for target crimes during six-month time frames before and after the implementation of action projects in these cities. These surveys also provided estimates of the rate of reporting crime to the police and measured attitudes toward crime and the local criminal justice system.


Figure 1-1 shows annual trends in the known incidence of target crime for the three participating cities and their comparison cities. Inspection of the four graphs suggest similarities in the four pairs of trend lines, with respect to the direction of change from year to year. Statistical techniques were used to provide a conventional means of determining whether there is a shift in the trend when action projects were implemented.

The analysis of trends in known incidence of residential burglary in Champaign and Peoria found no significant shifts when action projects were operational in either city. The Peoria case was largely substantiated by the telephone survey findings: six-month rates of 64 residential burglaries per 1,000 households were estimated from data collected before and after action projects were implemented, and identical estimates of 58 percent for the reporting of this crime to the police were derived for these two periods.

Our analysis also failed to detect a significant shift in the trend for robbery in Joliet, but did find a significant downward shift in the burglary trend for that city. These latter findings were partially borne out by the 15 percent decline in estimated residential burglary victimization, though this change was not statistically significant. The arrest of 97 individuals shortly after Joliet's first action project was implemented, culminating several months' undercover investigation of fencing activities,


FIGURE 1-1. Annual Known Incidence of Target Crime
in Three Illinois Cities: 1972 - 1978

ANNUAL KNOWN INCIDENCE OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY
CHAMPAIGN AND URBANA




— CHAMPAIGN
— URBANA

ANNUAL KNOWN INCIDENCE OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY
PEORIA AND ROCKFORD




— PEORIA
— ROCKFORD

ANNUAL KNOWN INCIDENCE OF ROBBERY
JOLIET AND WAUKEGAN



— JOLIET
— WAUKEGAN

ANNUAL KNOWN INCIDENCE OF BURGLARY
JOLIET AND WAUKEGAN



— JOLIET
— WAUKEGAN

seriously confounded the analysis. While this operation may well have temporarily stemmed burglary activity, it was not part of the Joliet program.

The I-UCR analysis relied on approximations of the period during which the impact of action projects should have been felt. Table 1-5 shows the begin and end dates of action projects implemented in the cities. Since we did not expect our statistical model to detect project-by-project impact, a single date was designated as the date on which action projects as a group were considered "operational." Since July 1977 was reasonable as a median "operational" date for all three cities, it was chosen as the "operational" date in analysis. Thus the statistical analyses were based on five-and-a-half years of "before" trends and one-and-a-half years of "post-implementation" data.

Similarly, the victimization surveys also provided rate estimates for six-month periods before and after action projects were implemented. The first survey covered May-October 1976, while the second survey covered the same period two years later. In view of the projects' start dates in Joliet and Peoria, these are plausible before and after periods. Both methods of analysis are global in that neither relies on the nature of action projects implemented; only the fact of being in or out of operation need be known. Local action project evaluations were unable to provide insight regarding the question of attribution of observed trends to projects' being in operation.

In point of fact, none of the cities has simultaneously had all its action projects fully operational. Peoria's physical evidence project achieved that status only recently, with the completion of fingerprint coding for some 8,000 "known offenders," while projects dealing with juveniles (which will not be Program-funded) have still to be developed. If the dedicated prosecution project is able to sustain a focus on its original objectives after juvenile projects are implemented, the Peoria program may still achieve full operation. Since Joliet and Champaign each have but one action project in progress, their programs will never have been fully operational.

We have examined target crime data from two independent sources, seeking patterns that might reflect local program impact. In only one case did we find a statistically significant shift in target crime levels--namely,

TABLE 1-5. Start and End Dates for Action Projects

<u>Project Title</u>	<u>Start Date</u>	<u>End Date</u>
<u>CHAMPAIGN</u>		
Neighborhood Team Policing/ Burglary Abatement Program	16 May 1977	15 April 1979
Designated Prosecutor	1 December 1977	30 September 1978
MICA	1 October 1979	31 December 1980
<u>JOLIET</u>		
Mobile Crime Prevention Unit	1 September 1976	30 June 1977
Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program	1 February 1977	30 April 1979
Special Prosecution Unit	1 April 1978	31 May 1979
Restitution Specialist	1 December 1978	29 February 1980
Burglary Investigation Project	1 April 1979	30 September 1980
<u>PEORIA</u>		
Physical Evidence Project	1 April 1977	on-going
Criminal Information Exchange	1 September 1977	13 October 1978*
Dedicated Prosecution Project	10 June 1977	on-going

* The Peoria Police Department assumed the cost of continuing operations of this project.

burglary in Joliet, but the extent to which this shift was attributable to Joliet's participation in the Program could not be determined. None of the data examined provided evidence of a dramatic and sustained impact that was envisioned when the Program was first described in the Illinois 1973 Comprehensive Plan. The hypothesis that rational planning is effective in reducing crime can neither be confirmed nor denied on the basis of the analysis.

Perhaps the best explanation of this conclusion is that, despite the significant strides made in the past decade concerning our understanding of crime, the present state-of-the-art in research on crime and criminal justice cannot support the kinds of analysis needed to determine the relationship between crime occurrence and how plans are developed for the system's control of it. A rational planning process for crime reduction that attempts to find optimal mixes of input resources is on its face a logically sound approach. Prematurely high expectations about the extent to which such an approach can be implemented in field settings, should not divert attention from its implicit value. The application of a rational planning process to goals more modest than crime reduction should be pursued, especially given current interest in the productivity of government to provide adequate services given possibly declining resources.

1.5 Impact on the Criminal Justice System and the Community

The Program clearly had a short-term impact on the local criminal justice system serving each of the participating cities. The local crime reduction councils provided a forum in which system officials and private citizens were able to exchange ideas on target crime reduction as well as articulate other problems and needs dealing with crime in their community. In Joliet, crime reduction council meetings provided the first opportunity for public and private sector representatives to engage in this type of interchange on a regular basis. Several members indicated that their attendance at meetings made them more sensitive to the issues faced by others on the council. Similar observations were made by members of Champaign's crime reduction council, despite weaknesses noted with respect to its structure and mission. Members of the Peoria council, many of whom had participated in other federally-funded systemwide programs and local system initiatives,

felt that the work of its staff was unique in demonstrating both the feasibility and value of using research findings to guide resource allocation decisions within the local criminal justice system.

Although the crime reduction councils' efforts were enthusiastically described, observers were somewhat pessimistic over prospects of their continued existence once federal funds are no longer available. The common target crime reduction goal and the local staff component were cited as the "glue" that held these councils together. Without these externally-generated initiatives, it was observed, crime reduction council business would likely be engulfed by the day-to-day demands of the members' primary roles in local (and state) government.

Whether the actions taken to improve cooperation and coordination within the local criminal justice systems serving the participating cities are fully realized over the long term remains an unanswered question. The distinction between cooperation, within the context of crime reduction council meetings or documented agreements, and cooperation in day-to-day practice is a real one, as witnessed for the Target Crime Restitution project in Joliet. In this instance cooperation of the defendant, judge, prosecutor, probation department, and restitution specialist, as well as coordination among them in handling a particular case, was essential to the project's success in achieving its target caseload and disposing of cases satisfactorily. Joliet program staff appeared to take all possible precautions, in the form of correspondence and memoranda of agreement, only to discover that a number of eligible probationers ordered to make restitution had not been referred to the specialist. It is not known whether the outcome of the project would have been different if these individuals had been referred, but this example vividly illustrates the point being made.

Institutionalization of local program staff is another area in which the Program appears to have had an impact. As indicated previously, the Champaign staff was absorbed by the Police Department in mid-1978 and is currently funded out of the City's regular budget. Since that organizational change took place, the staff seems to be providing valuable services to the Department in terms of crime and resource analysis and studies of the geographic and time characteristics of calls for police service.

The Joliet staff will continue to report to the City Manager until its federal funding ends in September 1980. While specific plans for the staff after that point in time have not yet been finalized, a continuing role within City government, possibly within the Police Department, is contemplated. As in Champaign, Joliet's program staff gained considerable expertise in crime analysis and the application of statistical techniques to crime and criminal justice problems, by virtue of the City's participation in the Program. The staff has also become adept in its role of interfacing with the public and is, in many respects, uniquely qualified to speak to system-wide issues in criminal justice matters affecting the City of Joliet.

The situation in Peoria is less clear. As of this writing, the Peoria program is still functioning, although only about half the staff's work derives from Program funding. The other half is about evenly split between evaluation of a grant-funded program for managing criminal investigations implemented by the Peoria Police Department, and the evaluation of selected projects funded by the ILEC regional office serving a tri-county area containing the City of Peoria. The staff's top priority for its Program-funded activities is to complete the juvenile plan, including recommendations for possible no-cost action strategies (e.g., realignment of agency resources, upgrading of records). The services of the Peoria staff have also been solicited by several other criminal justice agencies to conduct a variety of evaluation studies. The Peoria Police Department has absorbed one program staff member to rectify problems in the Department's records system, found when data were collected for the planning studies described earlier.

Long-term benefits of the Program in local crime control may also be forthcoming. The automated fingerprint matching capabilities developed in the Peoria and Joliet programs hold promise for increasing the risk of arrest in cases where latent prints are recoverable from crime scenes. The Peoria County State's Attorney, for example, indicated that the Physical Evidence project has facilitated the prosecution of residential burglary cases, a result that extends beyond the project's original objective of increasing the risk of arrest.

Changes in the policies and priorities of system managers that were prompted by experience with action projects may also benefit the system and the community in the long run. In one such example, the Will County State's Attorney indicated a greater willingness to recommend restitution in probationable cases, partly as a result of his own experience and the interim evaluation findings of the Target Crime Restitution project by the Joliet program staff. In another example, experience with team policing in Champaign may prove to have a long-term influence on the interaction between command staff and patrol officers.

At the very least, additional manpower acquired through Program grants may ultimately enhance the crime control capabilities of all three cities, depending on how this manpower is utilized and how closely its impact is monitored.

Another area in which the Program has had an impact on the criminal justice system deals with law- and policy-making. Three specific examples can be cited, all arising from the Joliet program. Senate Bill 1270 makes it possible for probationers to be regarded as municipal employees, thus permitting such individuals to be covered under municipal workmen's compensation provisions. At the request of the Joliet program director, this legislation was introduced by state legislators representing the City of Joliet, specifically for the purpose of implementing the Target Crime Restitution project without subjecting the City to liability suits in the event that probationers suffered injuries while performing public service work. This hurdle had to be overcome before the Joliet crime reduction council would endorse the project. The Joliet program was also instrumental in the passage of the Parental Responsibility Ordinance, which increases parents' or guardians' liability for delinquent or criminal acts committed by minors under their custody. Finally, in response to a neighborhood group's complaints of prostitution, the Joliet crime reduction council endorsed a Prostitution Policy which seeks to increase the cost and risk of arrest for prostitution through more systematic enforcement measures.

Although largely unanticipated, the Program also had an impact on the criminal justice system at the state level. The influence of the Peoria program on the revision of the Program guidelines (which, in principle, were

statewide in scope) has already been discussed. The studies conducted by the Peoria program staff were also used to exemplify the approach that the ILEC planning unit hoped other regions of the State would adopt. Specifically, the time and deterrence studies undertaken for Peoria's Adult Master Plan were replicated in part in ten other jurisdictions to illustrate system performance measures that could be derived from system transaction data. A similar, but less ambitious, effort was initiated by the ILEC planning unit for the juvenile justice system in which selected jurisdictions were required to collect transaction data on a one-year cohort of juveniles taken into custody by the police. This one-time requirement was designed to promote a greater appreciation for the complexities of the juvenile system relative to that for adults, and to identify local differences in the processing and sanctioning of juveniles. Whether or not these statewide initiatives have long-term consequences, they were clearly a direct result of the ILEC planning unit's experience with the Program. Should any of the jurisdictions that participated in these studies wish to pursue similar or related research in the future, the cost would be reduced by virtue of this earlier documentation of data sources, data collection procedures, and analytic methods.

Opportunities to measure differences in the community's fear of crime and attitudes toward the police as a result of the local programs were provided by the two city-wide telephone surveys we conducted in Joliet and Peoria and by the battery of surveys conducted when the team policing unit in Champaign was evaluated. Our surveys found a significantly lower fear of crime among black residents in both Joliet and Peoria after action projects were implemented than before. In Champaign, fear of crime was also significantly lower in the team policing neighborhood after the project was implemented than before, while no significant difference was found between the two periods in the comparison neighborhoods. Although these differences may not be wholly attributable to the Program, they do suggest that some benefit may have been derived as a result of local action projects. Similar findings emerged with respect to attitudes toward the police. Significantly fewer blacks in all three cities felt that the police should "be more courteous or improve attitudes and community relations" after projects had been implemented than before. Members of the Champaign team policing unit concurred

with these findings based on their street experience in the target neighborhood. Since blacks have historically been more hostile toward the police than whites, and vice versa, these findings suggest that the Program had beneficial community relations consequences.

1.6 Assessing Program Costs and Benefits

In order to assess the relative costs and benefits of the Program, appropriate variables on which to measure costs and benefits would first have to be identified. The total direct cost of the Program (grant awards, matching amounts, other resources providing Program services) is, in principle, straightforward to calculate. Direct benefits, however, are both numerous and varied, and to some extent are dependent on the perceptions of the analyst. Most would agree that the amount by which target crime incidence is reduced should be measured as a benefit. Whether increases in the severity of sanctions constitute a benefit, however, depends on who is being sanctioned for what, and on the observer's view of the appropriateness of the sanction for the crime alleged.

Other questions can also be raised as to Program benefits. Should benefits be assessed from a State perspective, a local perspective, or both? Focusing on crime reduction, for example, both the State and the participating cities would benefit from target crime reduction. Since only half of the eligible target crimes in the State occur outside Cook County, however, the benefit to any one of the participating cities would be relatively greater than that which would accrue to the State as a whole. The measurement of benefits associated with rational planning, at the local or state level, also gives rise to some provocative questions.

The problem of comparing Program costs and benefits could be made somewhat analytically tractable if total Program costs were simply assessed against cost-savings (benefits) realized through target crime reduction. Savings over a given period could be calculated as the product of the number of target crimes averted by the Program and the average dollar loss per target crime. Using this approach, and given the average dollar loss, it would also be possible to estimate the break-even number of target crimes that would have to be averted, before the Program is implemented. For

example, residential burglary losses in Champaign from 1975 to 1978 have averaged about \$308, and \$599,137 was expended under the Champaign program during this period. In order to break even, the Champaign program would have had to reduce the annual incidence of residential burglary by 496. Since this represents about 65 percent of known residential burglaries during this four-year period, it would be difficult to justify Champaign program expenditures on target crime reduction alone.

Another way of examining local program costs and benefits utilizes an input/output approach. Under this approach, target crime incidence would be expressed as a function of criminal (and juvenile) justice resources dedicated to target crime and other pertinent variables (relating, for example, to demographic and economic characteristics of the jurisdiction). In other words, the level of target crime would be mathematically represented as the output of some corresponding level of system resource input. If the parameters of such a mathematical representation could be estimated, the input level where marginal output is minimized could theoretically be determined. This level could then be compared with the actual input of the local program in deciding whether the program is cost-effective.

These rough conceptual sketches of methods for analyzing the relative costs and benefits of the Program have one thing in common: neither the data nor the techniques for a credible analysis could be confidently generated within the scope of our evaluation. The primary cost/benefit decision of whether to institutionalize the program staff has been made in Champaign, and similar decisions are pending in the other cities. We doubt that results derived from the kinds of analyses described in the foregoing paragraphs would have a significant influence on these decisions.

1.7 Conclusions

Our conclusions begin with the theory that the Program was intended to test: that rational planning is essential for the effective allocation of resources to reduce the occurrence of specific types of crime. The three participating cities were to serve as case studies which would speak to this question. Only one of the three engaged in a planning process that satisfied the premise of this theory, but even in that case, time did not permit the

process to be fully executed. Thus we are left with a theory that cannot be tested with the available data, and the validity of the theory remains an open question.

Even if all three (or for that matter, five) cities had engaged in a rational planning process as was intended by the Program, it seems unlikely that the state-of-the-art for measuring crime occurrence and analyzing the relationships between crime, system performance, and other variables that may affect crime occurrence would be adequate for resolving a question of this magnitude.

While the central question for the evaluation has been left unresolved, several other valuable lessons were learned from the Program experience. One deals with the role of the funding agency. The Program clearly needed far more attention than it received. The concepts of rational planning, crime specificity, and comprehensiveness embodied in the Program were generally new to criminal justice practitioners when the Program began in 1975, and unanimous agreement as to their meanings was lacking. Except in Peoria, where the program was managed by two individuals who were largely responsible for designing the Program, technical assistance was badly needed. At a minimum, a set of ground rules more specific than the original guidelines developed for the Program should have been established and clearly articulated to those managing the local programs. This might have circumvented problems such as that encountered in Champaign, where the question was posed whether the team policing unit was "spending" 51 percent of its time or more on residential burglary. This concept may seem perfectly relevant to those who deal with programmatic issues on a daily basis; police departments are simply unaccustomed to viewing their job from a programmatic perspective.

Although the need for greater state-level direction was appreciated by those at the funding agency who were close to the Program, the necessary resource or resources were not available. The planning unit's primary responsibility was to prepare the State's annual comprehensive plan in support of the application for federal block grant funds. Given the dollar amount that relied on the development of an acceptable plan (which included the Program as a small component), there could be no question as to whether the Program or the comprehensive plan would receive priority. Since the

development of the latter virtually required a full-time commitment, the lack of direction given the local programs should not be surprising. The planning director was overly optimistic in thinking it possible not only to combine the Program and the comprehensive plan, but also to use the Program as a vehicle for upgrading the statewide planning process.

Comprehensiveness of the Program was a second source of difficulty for the participating cities, again excepting Peoria. It was difficult to reconcile the fact that local programs were meant to be city programs with the requirement that they be comprehensive in scope. For example, the dilemma of limiting services, provided through a Program grant, to defendants charged with crimes occurring in the city was faced by staff of the Joliet and Champaign projects in developing plans for both the adjudication and corrections phases. This dilemma was resolved by not limiting such services, but by giving priority to those allegedly connected with target crime occurring within the city. Such compromise measures can easily give rise to some degree of funding agency arbitrariness in decisions on the acceptability of particular cases.

The very concept of comprehensiveness, if misunderstood, can undermine any program whose resources are to be allocated in a "rational" manner. It would not be difficult to interpret "comprehensive" to mean that every criminal justice system component would receive some share of a program's funds. Indeed, the option to phase plan development for the Program was tantamount to such an interpretation. Unfortunately, this was precisely the "pie-cutting" phenomenon the Program hoped to obviate.

As we have already indicated, the complexity of the Program seems to have been severely underestimated by its sponsors. The funding agency and the participating cities, without exception, were apparently unprepared for the length of time it took to implement the planning process, rational or not. In Joliet and Champaign, each plan phase took about a year to develop; in Peoria, the adult plan consumed nearly two years' effort while the juvenile plan, whose scope continually grew, is still in progress after three years, though its completion would have been expedited if the staff had not been forced to assume other non-Program duties to sustain itself.

Quite naturally, funding levels diminished for all the cities with the passage of time, and funding uncertainties brought about by periodic threats to the existence of the federal grant programs aggravated the situation. The combination of these two funding issues necessitated interim stop-gap decisions by all the local programs, again undermining the rational planning theme.

Now that federal grants for law enforcement and criminal justice programs appear to be nearing an end, and spending for local government services is continually faced with cutbacks, prospects for capitalizing on the lessons learned from the Program are dim. It is nonetheless our hope that this document can provide some insights to the kinds of problems criminal justice planning and line agencies face in carrying out their mission to control or reduce crime, and will serve as a reference for those who would embark on future efforts that draw on the Program's experience.

PART TWO
IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION OF THE PROGRAM

This Part provides both a context for the Program and a detailed analysis of its major elements. Section 2.1 provides a background discussion on crime reduction as a criminal justice system goal and on the emergence of planning as a vehicle for attaining this goal. The concepts of crime specificity and rational planning are discussed at length in Section 2.2. The products, timetable, and funding initially envisioned for the Program are then described in Section 2.3. Part Two concludes with the revision of the Program guidelines.

PART TWO

IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION OF THE PROGRAM

2.1 Background

The proposition that planning is an essential element for the reduction of crime was first made in the 1967 report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice:¹

"...individual citizens, civic and business organizations, religious institutions, and all levels of government must take responsibility for planning and implementing the changes that must be made in the criminal justice system if crime is to be reduced."

The concept of crime-oriented planning grew out of the belief that the policies and practices of the criminal justice system can influence the occurrence of crime. By keying the planning process to the goal of crime reduction, according to this view, the system could be configured to maximize its crime-reductive potential.

Passage of the Safe Streets Act in 1968 provided the means for at least a partial test of this theory. Planning agencies were established at state, regional, and local levels, and federal funds were made available for the purposes of combatting crime and improving the criminal justice system through cycles of planning and action. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was created to administer this federal assistance program and to play a lead role in guiding states and units of local government toward the effective use of funds toward these goals.

The early years of LEAA saw grants and subgrants (made by state, regional, and local planning agencies) evolve as largely independent of one another, each addressing state problems and needs of the recipients. The process for deciding which grant proposals to fund often involved informal negotiation among members of the planning boards, guided by staff assessments of the proposal contents.² While grant-funding decisions based on this process may have improved the efficiency or effectiveness of recipients' operations, crime levels continued to rise throughout the nation. LEAA responded by funding two major discretionary programs which it was hoped would demonstrate in the first instance, the feasibility of improving system

capabilities for reducing crime, and in the second, the feasibility of achieving specific crime reduction goals.

The Pilot Cities Program

In May 1970, the Pilot Cities Program was announced by the Director of the newly-created National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.³ While the Program's goals and objectives passed through a series of modifications, three goals were eventually adopted in January 1973:⁴

- To demonstrate the ability of an interdisciplinary team with exceptional research and analysis capabilities to work with an operating criminal justice system and within a period of five years to contribute significantly to the improved ability of that system to reduce crime and delinquency and improve the quality of justice.
- To institutionalize the gains made during the Pilot City Program by building into the target area's criminal justice system the research and analysis capability necessary for system-wide, problem-oriented planning and program evaluation.
- To understand more clearly the process by which change takes place in the criminal justice system so that more effective means can be devised for the nationwide dissemination and possible implementation of well-tested innovations.

The first goal hedges on the crime reduction issue by stipulating that the system's ability to reduce crime be enhanced. The second and third goals were of a longer-term nature--to permanently improve research and analysis capabilities in the target city-county areas, and to promote successful innovations through a better understanding of the environment in which change must take place.

The three Pilot City Program goals were to have been achieved through research, demonstration projects, and technical assistance. The Pilot Teams each consisted of four senior-level "associates" with expertise respectively in police, courts, corrections and systems. Approximately \$400,000 was available to each team to cover Team operations and the cost of technical assistance. Moreover, each city was to receive some \$500,000 annually to

implement demonstration projects, although these projects could also be funded from other sources. By the end of 1974, some \$26,025,000 had been expended or committed to the Program, which averaged to \$884,702 per city per year and 98 demonstration projects had been implemented.⁵

A report by the Government Accounting Office, released some four years after the Program began, concluded that the Pilot Cities Program had not been successful and was unlikely to become so.⁶ An independent evaluation of the Program, which was in progress when the GAO report was released, concluded that the potential of the Team concept was demonstrated and that the Program had not yet failed.⁷

The High Impact Anti-Crime Program

While the Pilot Cities' Program was in progress, another major federal initiative against crime, the High Impact Program, was implemented. Announced in January 1972, this program entailed a \$20 million commitment to each of eight cities to reduce burglary and stranger-to-stranger crime by 5 percent in two years and 20 percent in five years.⁸ A Crime Analysis Team, corresponding to the Pilot Teams in that Program, was to have been established in each city to plan, monitor, and evaluate the Impact Program, and to coordinate Program-funded activities undertaken by community, city, county and state agencies.

The High Impact Program funding levels were approximately four times greater than for Pilot Cities. The High Impact Program called for specific reductions in the level of specific types of crime over a pre-established time frame, although the rationale for these parameters was never clearly articulated. The High Impact and Pilot Cities' Programs shared the goal of demonstrating the improvement of criminal justice capabilities through "research and analysis," although Impact was more specific about the manner by which this would be performed. In particular, the concept of a COPIE-cycle (Crime Oriented Planning, Implementation and Evaluation), was a key element of the Impact Program design. As with the Pilot Cities' Program, an independent national-level evaluation of the High Impact Program was conducted.⁹

Origins of the Urban High Crime Reduction Program

Until 1972, the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, like many other state planning agencies, found itself making grant funding decisions for "systems improvement," that were largely independent of one another. As one ILEC observer stated retrospectively in 1976:¹⁰

The [Illinois Law Enforcement] Commission...spent much of its time [prior to 1973] on the review and approval of project applications. Its focus thus tended to be on operations of the individual segments of the system, rather than on the way the system functioned as a whole.

Drawing heavily from the High Impact Program, albeit at a considerably lower level of funding, the Commission in 1972 responded to this problem by approving the State's 1973 Comprehensive Plan, which included a program to be implemented, in selected cities, calling for reductions in the incidence of "stranger-to-stranger" violent crime, robbery and burglary," all believed "amenable to a concerted attack by the criminal justice system and the community."

The Urban High Crime Reduction Program, skeptical about the ability of the piecemeal "systems improvement" approach for reducing crime, offered an approach which sought more immediate tangible reductions in the incidence of these types of crimes. Passages from the 1973 Plan illustrate this point:

- The purpose of this new program is the development and implementation of a plan based on the use of operations research to reduce high crime (p. 240).
- Considering the described needs, ILEC is creating a program in selected cities that will have as its major objective a tangible, measurable reduction in the incidence of target crimes (p. 241).
- Anticipated Results. Inasmuch as this program is a totally new concept and specifically designated as experimental to significantly reduce specific crimes, no statewide specific crime reduction goals are defined at this time. Additionally, no speculation is made on the particular type of intervention programs to be included so as to not influence local selection of the most promising approaches. It is anticipated, however, that this approach will produce a tangible and measurable reduction in the number of target crimes as measured by victimization studies, and thereby provide basis for expansion during the multi-year period (p. 243).

- Objective. This new program is designed to produce measurable, rapid-impact crime-reduction programs in selected high-crime jurisdictions with violent stranger-to-stranger crimes, robberies, and burglaries. Emphasis will be upon programs determined locally with ILEC technical assistance and review (p. 243).

Regarding the fourth point, ILEC staff assistance was to have been provided "in the conceptualization, development and implementation of preventative adjudicatory and rehabilitation systems designed to reduce or hopefully eliminate stranger-to-stranger crimes." As suggested in the third and fourth points, the specific countermeasures were to be locally chosen. This was to be accomplished by crime reduction councils, consisting of key officials and community representatives who would jointly manage the local programs.

According to the 1973 Plan, each council would have as a primary staff source, an operations research specialist who would "utilize the knowledge and expertise of the local criminal justice administrators in the development and implementation of the program and its constituent projects." The techniques of operations research were seen as helping "to identify the characteristics of victims and aggressors in crimes, to analyze the circumstances under which crimes occur, and to analyze the specific elements of each crime. From these analyses [it was anticipated] specific crime intervention techniques or countermeasures [would] be developed." Indeed, when the Urban High Crime was described in the 1973 plan, operations research held promise as an analytic tool in determining optimal patrol deployment strategies, patrol beat configurations and shift scheduling.¹¹ Other work of the operations research/systems analysis genre involved the development of computer simulation models of the criminal justice system.¹²

Only cities outside of Cook County having populations of 25,000 to 1,000,000 were eligible to participate in the Program. These 37 cities were ranked according to their combined ranks on (1) total crime index, (2) index per 100,000, and (3)-(6) known incidence and incidence per 100,000 of robbery and burglary for 1971, the most current year for which these data were available at the time. Table 2-1 shows these data for the five cities exhibiting the worst crime problem according to this scale: East St. Louis, Peoria, Joliet, Waukegan and Champaign. The Plan stipulated that these cities be invited to participate.

TABLE 2-1. Rankings of Five Illinois Cities Using 1971 Incidence and Rate for Total Crime Index, Robbery, and Burglary

City	1970 Population	1971 Index ¹				1971 Robbery				1971 Burglary				Overall Ranking
		No.	Rank	Rate ²	Rank	No.	Rank	Rate ²	Rank	No.	Rank	Rate ²	Rank	
Peoria	127,100	5556	1	4371	4	396	2	312	2	1965	2	1546	5	2
Joliet	80,591	2647	5	3284	9	191	3	237	3	910	7	1129	10	5
East St. Louis	70,100	4550	2	6491	1	431	1	613	1	2008	1	2864	1	1
Waukegan	65,615	2914	4	4441	2	148	5	226	4	827	8	1260	6	4
Champaign	56,700	2318	7	4088	5	121	6	213	5	1099	4	1938	2	3

Source: Request for Proposal to evaluate the Urban High Crime Reduction Program issued 10 February 1976, p.7.

¹In 1971 the crime index was composed on murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and larceny over \$50.

²Rate per 100,000 population.

Other cities were also expected to benefit from the Program by virtue of continuous project evaluation to determine specific intervention techniques that are effective in reducing crime. The 1973 Plan goes on to assert that "The entire thrust of the effort is to conduct an experiment using a variety of crime reduction methodology that will be applicable to other Illinois cities."

Turnover in Commission memberships and staff following the 1972 election, and subsequent structural and programmatic modifications within the agency delayed implementation of the Program until early 1974. During this period, the Program stood almost neglected by a newly staffed agency that was largely unfamiliar with it. Its revival by the planning unit gave the Program a new perspective, which is examined in detail in the next section.

2.2 Goals and Design

More than a year had elapsed since the Program's initial appearance in the 1973 Comprehensive Plan. Given the agency's new emphasis on system-wide, goal-directed planning, the planning unit assumed the lead role in implementing the Program. We begin with a discussion of the goals of the Program. Next we examine the concept of a rational planning process, whose scope includes project planning, development, monitoring, and evaluation. These are treated as the stages of a process, within organizational and analytical frameworks. Our discussion of the Program's design concludes with the products, timetable and funding for the Program.

A literal reading of the goals and objectives of the Program as they appeared in the Program guidelines issued in August 1975 follows:

- To reduce the stranger-to-stranger crimes and burglary in participating cities through rational analysis and systematic goal-oriented planning, program development and implementation, which include:
 - Analyzing present problems, operations and program effectiveness;
 - Establishing progressive law-enforcement and criminal-justice goals and standards that, when applied, should address target-crime problems;
 - Encouraging the systematic development and application of public and private resources to problems of crime prevention and control;

- Completing and implementing a multi-year plan for reduction of target crimes.
- To evaluate the effectiveness of various planning approaches used for each city for replication elsewhere within the state.
- To increase coordination between the police, courts, and correctional officials in policy and operational decision-making at the local level.

Crime reduction retained its status as the primary Program goal, with enhancement of the potential for replicating successful planning approaches and increased coordination in policy and operational decisionmaking at the local level rounding out the list. We will first dispose with issues relating to crime reduction, and then turn our attention to the unmistakable shift in the Program's focus, as indicated by the other two goals.

Burglary and stranger-to-stranger (street) crimes were the targets which were believed "amenable to a concerted attack by the criminal justice system and the community." The extent to this range of crimes would be embraced by the cities implementing the Program was, by omission, to be determined locally. Thus, for example, target crime could be narrowly defined as "convenience store robberies" or broadly defined as all robberies (where the victim and offender are strangers) and all burglaries (involving any type of structure).

There are several ways to characterize the criteria that govern the choice of target crimes:

- (1) crimes which occur with the greatest frequency;
- (2) crimes feared most in the community;
- (3) crimes whose monetary loss to the community is greatest;
- (4) crimes for which reduction is a plausible goal (to a large extent, this criterion was applied in the designation of the range of allowable target crimes);
- (5) crimes whose known incidence is great enough to be able to detect reductions should they occur;
- (6) crimes whose reduction would benefit particular geographic, demographic, or economic sectors of the community.

The relative importance of each of these criteria is clearly a policy choice of the crime reduction council. Given the nature of the last criterion,

these priorities may not always be explicit. If criteria (1), (3), or (5) were adopted, some data would have to be examined in making the choice of target crime. If criterion (2) were adopted, a survey, to determine the most feared within the allowable range, would be needed to render an "objective" choice of target crime. The cost of such a survey would have to be weighed against the possible loss of objectivity introduced by adding the phrase, "as perceived by the crime reduction council."

There are of course other issues relating to crime reduction that were faced by the participating cities in tailoring their local programs to have a "measurable impact:"

- where to try to achieve reductions in target crime (city wide or in selected neighborhoods);
- at which point reduction should be evident and how long it would endure;
- against which baseline(s) measured incidence of target crime would be compared in judging reduction;
- specification of techniques for the measurement of target crime.

Most of these issues are also relevant to our evaluation of the local programs' impact in reducing their respective target crime, and will arise further in other parts of the report.

The enhancement of the replication potential of the Program refers specifically and exclusively to the planning process, which the guidelines described as integral to the achievement of the crime reduction goal. While replication of successful action projects may have been an implicit agency mission, the shift in focus toward the local planning process is evident from the guidelines. Other indications of this shift can be found in the references to standards and goals, a multi-year plan, and the call for increased coordination as an end in itself, in the third Program goal. Even the crime reduction goal stipulates that it is to be achieved through a rational planning process.

The implementation of a rational planning process in each of the participating cities, keyed to the reduction of target crime, had become the primary goal of the Program by mid-1975. This made the central question for

our evaluation whether such a process had been implemented in the cities, and if so, whether the incidence of target crime was reduced as a consequence.

Organizational Framework for a Rational Planning Process

The crime reduction councils were clearly at the center of the local organizational framework. Six Council positions were mandated by the guidelines:

- the mayor;
- the city manager;
- the chief of police;
- the state's attorney for the county in which the participating city is located;
- the chief judge for the circuit in which the participating city is located;
- a representative of the State Department of Corrections.

The guidelines also authorized the mayor to select up to four additional members, with the recommendation that they represent "citizen and minority sectors." Finally, the guidelines suggested that the director of the ILEC regional office serving the participating city sit as an ex-officio member.

As the local policy boards for the Program, the crime reduction councils were charged with the following responsibilities (listed in the order of their appearance in the guidelines):

- (1) oversight and approval of the planning process and timetable;
- (2) approval of the Impact Plan submitted by the staff (program coordination unit);
- (3) suggesting and adopting law enforcement and criminal justice standards;
- (4) review of action project application development, and application approval;
- (5) assist in monitoring and evaluating ongoing projects;
- (6) provision of planning and program development assistance to public and private agencies serving the city's criminal justice clientele;
- (7) promotion of public understanding and involvement in local program development and implementation.

Frequency of meetings and "procedures to be followed in accomplishing major tasks" were left to local discretion, although the guidelines suggested that

each council meet at least monthly. The posting of meeting times and that meetings be open to the public were also guideline requirements.

The composition of the crime reduction councils deserves further comment. Municipal government is represented by the mayor, city manager and chief of police; county government by the state's attorney (an elected official); and state government by the Department of Corrections' representative. The basic geographic unit of the Illinois trial courts is the judicial circuit, of which there are 21. Circuit judges are elected for six-year terms, and the chief judge of a circuit is elected by secret ballot of the other circuit judges. Thus the mandatory membership includes officials representing all geo-political levels within the state. While others representing these agencies were not barred from crime reduction council meetings, only the designated members were permitted to vote on council business.

Omitted from the required membership were probation services (a county or multi-county function in Illinois), the sheriff (a county function), defender services (county-level), and general county government. The purpose of the guidelines' recommendation that the four additional positions be selected from the community-at-large, rather than from these agencies, was twofold. First was the possibility that action projects might be designed to focus on specific neighborhoods, and that citizen input to the design and operation of such projects would be essential to their success. Given the disproportionate share of target crimes in minority neighborhoods, the guideline recommendation explicitly mentioned minority representation on the crime reduction councils. The other reason for the inclusion of citizen members was to give the program greater visibility and public accountability. This was consistent with the emphasis given with the guidelines, for community participation in the local programs.

As staff to the crime reduction councils, program coordination units were, at a minimum, to consist of a program coordinator, a research analyst, and a secretary. While suggesting that the unit be responsible to the mayor or city manager for the "completion of its long-range goals," the guidelines leave the administrative placement of the staff to be determined locally. Ready "access" to all criminal justice agencies serving the city was presumed in the guidelines by virtue of the crime reduction councils' composition.

The guidelines stipulated a number of qualifications that should be possessed by the program coordinators:

- college degree in a field related to criminal justice;
- several years of experience with a criminal justice agency in a planning, data analysis, and program development capacity;
- expertise in research methods, program evaluation methods, and intergovernmental relations.

The cities were also to give preference to candidates with graduate degrees in planning, criminal justice, public administration or sociology, with salaries in the \$18,000-\$20,000 range (1975) suggested.

The option of filling the research analyst position with a member of the police department, assigned full-time, was also given in the guidelines. This option would facilitate access to police department files which, it was believed, would be critical to the planning process. A bachelor's degree in a criminal justice field, a minimum of a year's experience with a criminal justice agency, and experience in data collection and analysis were given as qualifications for this position.

The program coordination units were charged with a number of specific responsibilities, listed below in their given order:

- (1) development of an overall design for the local program, including its planning and evaluation components;
- (2) collection and analysis of data on crime, offenders and the criminal justice system;
- (3) comparison of local system operations against standards established by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (established in 1971) that by 1975 had been published in six volumes;
- (4) preparation of the Impact Plan for target crime reduction;
- (5) expansion of the Impact Plan into a multi-year projection of programs and projects;
- (6) development of action projects for ILEC funding, in cooperation with the appropriate agencies and the crime reduction council;
- (7) development of monitoring and performance report systems;
- (8) assisting ILEC with local and statewide evaluations;
- (9) elicitation of public involvement in the local program through public appearances, news releases, and so forth;

- (10) assisting local criminal justice agencies in planning, budgeting and evaluation for the local program;
- (11) liaison with city, county, and private agencies and with the cognizant regional planning commission.¹³

Staff qualifications emphasized were familiarity with criminal justice practices, data and records systems, and research methods. The Program guidelines make no specific reference to operations research.

Illinois Law Enforcement Commission and its staff constituted a third organizational element of the Program. The Commission's major roles in the Program have been (1) to approve comprehensive state plans for Illinois, subsequent to the 1973 Plan, thereby assuring a Program funding source, and (2) through its Planning and Budgeting Committee, to approve program and project "concepts" (as distinct from grant applications per se). ILEC staff also performs programmatic and fiscal review of all grant applications. The individual who had lead responsibility for the development of the annual comprehensive plan served as monitor for the Program. This entailed monitoring of planning grants (which supported the program coordination units) and coordinating other cognizant staff monitors for action grants (which supported action projects funded under the Program). In contrast to the 1973 Plan, the guidelines offered limited technical assistance from ILEC program staff.¹⁴

Completing the statewide network of criminal justice planning agencies, the Program guidelines called for the director of the ILEC regional office serving the participating cities to sit as ex officio members on the respective crime reduction councils. These offices were also to review and comment on Program grant applications for compatibility with their regional criminal justice plans.¹⁵

Finally, we note that the local mechanism for grant matching funds must also be considered part of the organizational structure of the Program. Since a system-wide action was contemplated for the local programs, city councils and county boards could in theory thwart the implementation of a local program by failing to appropriate matching funds.

The organizational structure envisioned for the local programs was clearly fashioned after that of the Commission itself in important respects:

- a staff component to do planning, develop and administer grants for action projects, and facilitate coordination among line agencies comprising the local criminal justice system;
- a policy or supervisory board to direct and oversee staff operations and to accept or reject staff products and recommendations;
- dual responsibility of the staff components to its supervisory board and the chief executive of the cognizant governmental unit.

Superimposed on the pre-existing machinery for grant management and for local procedures relating to federal grants (or subgrants), the Program's organizational structure becomes quite complex. Figure 2-1 summarizes the participating cities' perspectives, the Program's organizational structure.


Analytical Framework for a Rational Planning Process

Our notion of the analytical framework which was to guide a rational planning process is embodied in the program planning and budgeting (p/p/b) concept that was mandated for federal agencies by President Johnson in 1965. The p/p/b approach to the management of federal programs focuses on output of, rather than input to, government services. Planning and budgeting decisions are correspondingly based on expected levels of output provided by a service, rather than on the level of input required to provide the service. For the Urban High Crime Reduction Program, target crime incidence in the participating cities could thus be viewed as part of the total "output" of the community and the resources of its justice system. While one generally doesn't view the system as "producing" crime, crime reduction can simply be viewed as negative crime production in order to understand the application of p/p/b to the Urban High Crime Reduction Program.

An analytical framework provides for the transformation of alternative input configurations (drawn from community and system resources) into crime incidence output. This structure sets forth possible ways in which the community and the system might reduce the occurrence of target crime. For example, three general strategies for reducing crime can be postulated:

- (a) reduce the risk of victimization for target crime (prevention);

FIGURE 2-1. Organizational Structure of the Urban High Crime Reduction Program



- (b) increase the risk of punishment (deterrence);
- (c) correct the behavior of selected individuals who have previously had contact with the criminal justice system (rehabilitation).


Most other "causes" of crime, such as deprivation of employment and educational opportunities, fragmentation of families, poor housing conditions, mental disorder, and so forth, are only marginally subject to influence by the criminal justice system and have therefore been excluded from our example.

There are a number of possible ways to achieve each of the objectives (a), (b) and (c), which will depend on the choice of target crime. For example, improving the security of residential property would not be a reasonable way to reduce the incidence of convenience store robberies. Nor would increasing the severity of sentencing for check forgers be expected to deter street muggers. Crime-specificity is of less consequence for objective (c), due to our inability to determine the propensity of individuals who have come into contact with the system for committing another crime of any type. While it is ordinarily assumed that those known to have committed a particular type of crime are more likely--if they engage in further illegal activity--to commit the same type of crime, this need not be the case. Thus criteria for the selection of suitable clientele for various correctional treatments could be difficult to establish.

A simple analytical framework for armed street robbery is shown by the schematic in Figure 2-2. The three general strategies noted above are shown in the top boxes in the figure. Under each of these are listed possible ways of achieving these strategy objectives. The items on each such list might constitute action project objectives (e.g., improve physical environment as a way of reducing the risk of victimization). One example of a type of action project is then shown for each such project objective (e.g., street lighting projects to improve the physical environment). Each "path" thus created characterizes the theory by which the incidence of armed street robbery could be expected to decline as a result of action taken by the local criminal justice system.

It should be evident from our armed street robbery example that Program resources would not be able to support action projects of every type.

FIGURE 2-2. Sample Theoretical Structure Underlying Reduction of Armed Street Robbery and Possible Types of Action Projects



The crime reduction councils' major function was to analyze the choices in order to identify actions that have the greatest potential for reducing target crime occurrence and for which adequate resources would be available. The Program guidelines called for this analysis to be "rational," inferring that empirically-based findings play a significant role in the choices. For example, the guidelines referred to the analysis of characteristics, inter-relationships and trends in the following areas:

- crime setting,
- criminal justice system's operations and response to crime,
- victim,
- offender,
- community response.

Statistical analysis, the development of criminal justice system flow-charts, and an analysis of "administrative" elements were mentioned as possible techniques. Moreover, the analysis of choices was to embrace all available resources, whether they be grant funded or existing personnel, equipment or facilities. Thus, action strategies that might call for the integration of Program-funded actions with established operations and policies were also possible.

Other factors which might be considered in the analysis of choice are management and budgetary matters relating to action project alternatives, adaptation of the organizational structure of agencies related to implemented action projects, and the coordination of several alternative actions that could be implemented in parallel or in sequence.

The analysis of choices results in the adoption of a set of action projects which represent a crime reduction council's optimal strategy for achieving its crime reduction goals. In practice, the analysis of choices proved to be the most complex and difficult task faced by the participating cities. As will be seen shortly, this analysis is connected to the monitoring and evaluation of action projects by way of the analytical framework.

The concept of a performance management system for monitoring local programs was introduced to the participating cities through a document prepared by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.¹⁶ Described as "program planning and management technique developed conceptually in 1971 by the federal Office

of Management and Budget, "it is designed to improve managers' ability to monitor actual against planned program accomplishments, and consists of six main ingredients:

- (1) clearly defined objectives;
- (2) a designated manager who can be held responsible for results achieved and has the authority to manage the program in such a way that he can be held so accountable;
- (3) performance measures of progress toward program objectives characterized in terms of achievement targets.
- (4) time-phase plans, within reasonably broad ranges, to meet achievement targets and to utilize program resources;
- (5) Periodic reports comparing planned versus actual results.
- (6) the authority to take timely corrective action when implementation diverges significantly from plan.

A performance management system is a highly structured and formal tool geared to a centrally-managed program. The Program guidelines indicated that a performance management system was to be developed for each local program. Its scope was to be program-wide, inferring that target crime levels and action project accomplishments were to be tracked. Since this was the first program of its kind in Illinois, specific targets would be difficult to justify.

Program evaluation was to be both, the last step of one cycle of the planning process and the first step of the next, thereby providing a feedback mechanism. In contrast to a performance management system, which monitors project achievement and crime levels, program evaluation seeks to determine the extent to which these measures are attributable to the program. The distinction between monitoring the performance of a program or project and evaluating it can be best illustrated by example. Consider a public education campaign which encourages homeowners to install deadbolt locks as a security measure against residential burglary. A performance monitoring system might track the number of burglary-prevention pamphlets distributed, the number of times an anti-burglary lock display will be shown, or to the number of speeches given at community meetings. In order to judge the project's effectiveness, however, one would want to know how many homeowners actually installed anti-burglary locks at the urging of the project.

We noted earlier that the analysis of choices could, through formulation and testing of hypotheses regarding the potential impact on target crime of various system actions, yield quantitative relationships between system actions and target crime levels. Such relationships would provide baselines for making evaluative judgments, in addition to providing the opportunity to gain greater insight into why actual results differ from anticipated ones. Even under these circumstances significantly more effort would have to be expended to make this determination with a satisfactory level of confidence.

In summary, the analytical framework sets forth possible ways in which the community and its criminal justice system could reduce target crime occurrence. A rational planning process then seeks to answer the following questions:

- What configuration of system resources (into action projects) shows optimal potential for reducing target crime incidence? (analysis of choices)
- What assurance is there that projects are being implemented as planned? (performance management system)
- If implemented as planned, did action projects achieve their objectives and ultimately crime reduction goals for the reasons expected? (evaluation)
- How should the theoretical structure be modified based on what has been learned, before the next iteration of the plan is undertaken? (feedback)

The Urban High Crime Reduction Program served as a field experiment for testing the feasibility and evaluating the consequences of this process.

2.3 Products, Timetable, and Funding

Proceeding within the organizational and analytical frameworks described in the previous section, the crime reduction councils and their staff were to produce an Impact Plan for the local program. The Program guidelines permitted the development of these Plans in one to four phases. In the latter case, phases were to be keyed to law enforcement, adjudication, and corrections, with a fourth phase updating these three. Grant applications for action projects could be submitted after the completion of the Impact Plan or any of its phases.

Three years of Program funding were initially contemplated for the Program. The 1973 Plan slated for the Program \$745,000 the first year and \$1,500,000 in two subsequent years, for a total of \$3,745,000 in LEAA funding. Matching state and local funds at 25 percent would yield another \$1,249,000 for a total three-year budget of nearly \$5 million. With five cities participating, each would have had a local program budget of \$1 million. The Program guidelines also stated that each city would receive an equal share of \$745,000 in federal funds, but made no reference to the level of matching funds. Three years at the same, or increased, funding levels were anticipated in the guidelines. By this time, however, only four of the five eligible cities had agreed to participate in the Program, and the match had been reduced to ten percent (half local, half state). Thus, the annual Program budget was \$827,778 which, split four ways yielded \$206,944 per city. This sum would support the program coordination units' planning function as well as each city's action projects. The fraction budgeted for planning was to be locally determined, although staffing requirements for the program coordination units provided a theoretical lower bound of about 30 percent.¹⁷

The manner by which local program funds were to be allocated among a city's action projects was also to have been a matter of local determination. In principal, funding decisions were to have largely been guided by the analysis of choices and project development (components of the analytical framework, outlined in the previous section). To be able to accomplish this under the four-phased option for the Impact Plan, with action projects implemented after the completion of each phase, would have necessitated four passes through the planning process, in which funds available to each phase were determined outside the analytical framework. While this was apparently foreseen, the unexpected length of time required for the program coordination units to collect and analyze data led to the introduction of the phased option, which expedited the implementation of action projects.¹⁸

The program guidelines provided considerable detail on the required contents of each phase of the Impact Plan. One part of Phase One deals with planning, program design and timetable (for the local program). This section was to include discussions on objectives and expected results; underlying

assumptions; criteria for determining which data were to be collected and how they were to be analyzed; the performance management system; the workplan and its constituent tasks. However, the guidelines provided no indication of how these would be brought together to form an analytical framework that would guide the planning process.

The required material relating to target crime is also outlined under Phase One. Listed are crime setting descriptors, characteristics of victims and offenders, target crime characteristics relative to other types of crime, and patterns of known target crime incidence. Background on the history of the city, its demography and economy, and its land use patterns was also required as part of Phase One.

An assessment of the local law enforcement function completes Phase One requirements, with adjudication and corrections covered in Phases Two and Three, respectively. For each of these criminal justice functions, Impact Plans were to describe ongoing operations, workloads and resources, needs and recommended action proposals. Requirements for Phase Three also included statistics on the flow of both adults and juveniles through the local criminal justice system. In addition to updates of these three phases, Phase Four was to include "analyses of the interrelationships between crime prevention, law enforcement, prosecution and defense, court operations, and correctional and social service agencies," and a progress report on the previous year (based on the locally-developed performance management system).

In retrospect, it is unfortunate that most of the elements needed to undertake the planning process appeared in the form of required contents of the cities' Impact Plans. The revised guidelines (15 December 1978), discussed later largely corrected this weakness, which we believe led to questions about why certain types of data were required and gave rise to the view that the Impact Plans might be unnecessarily burdensome.

2.4 Guideline Revision

Revision of the guidelines toward the end of 1978 simultaneously clarified the concept of a rational planning process and provided for expansion and institutionalization of local program functions. The revision process was begun shortly after the submission of our second-year evaluation,

through workshops attended by the Program monitor and the local program coordinators. As the outside evaluator of the Program, we were also asked to participate in the revision process.

A single Program goal, stated verbatim below, incorporated the three goals in the original guidelines:

To reduce target crimes by taking actions (such as the development and implementation of programs, the implementation of policy or procedural changes, reallocation of existing resources) that result in the reduction of target crime(s). This is to be achieved by meeting the following objectives:

- To increase the knowledge and understanding of what actions or programs implemented on a local level can reduce specific crime(s).
- To develop measures and select indicators to evaluate the success of ongoing programs and their effect in reducing specific crime(s), or effecting results (e.g., increased apprehension of target offenders) for which there has been demonstrable empirical evidence for the reduction of target crime(s). These measures should be system-wide.
- To increase the expectation for and use of the above information by local officials and policy makers when allocating resources and evaluating programs in criminal/juvenile justice and law enforcement, and choosing among various program alternatives.
- After the approach is tested using a crime reduction goal, to use the goal-oriented research and evaluation approach described within this guideline to increase the effectiveness of general law enforcement and criminal justice programming and policy-making on the local level.
- To institutionalize this approach to planning and decision-making within local government, if it proves effective.

It was further noted that:

Reduction of crime need not mean from current crime levels but may be viewed as a reduction from what is projected to be a stated time in the future.

An increase in specificity regarding crime reduction criteria, a rational planning process, and its use by local decisionmakers is evident in this revised statement. We can summarize significant guideline revisions in the following points:

- reference to target crimes as one or two specific Part I offenses, as opposed to the full range of stranger-to-stranger crimes and burglary;
- case tracking over an extended period to provide measures of system actions that can be related to target crime levels, a new requirement;
- reasonable expectation that target crime incidence would be reduced as a consequence of implementing action projects, where "reasonable" means empirically demonstrated before the fact, a new requirement;
- the completion of action project evaluation designs, that "fall naturally from the completed analyses which led to the selection of the[se] project[s]," before implementation, a new requirement;
- greater specificity regarding requirements for action project monitoring and possible actions to be taken;
- quarterly reporting to ILEC on studies begun and study findings, a new requirement;
- permission to include community representation on crime reduction councils, in contrast to the original guidelines' recommendation that they be included;
- absence of any references to Program phases;
- absence of any reference to the analyst position being filled by a qualified individual from the police department.

The revised guidelines also added a provision for continued step-down ILEC funding to permit the monitoring and evaluation of action projects to their conclusion (with respect to state funding) and to provide an opportunity in each city to "expand the goal approach to planning to other issue areas."

That the revised guidelines mandated a stronger empirical element in the planning process can be seen in the quarterly reporting requirements on studies undertaken by the program coordination units. The concept of an

analytic framework in which choices are analyzed before resources are allocated, is highlighted by the omission of Program phases and references to expectations for impact on target crime. It is notable, however, that the last point in the goal statement calls for the "institutionalization of this approach to planning and decisionmaking within local government, if it proves effective." We will return to this last question in Part Four.

The guideline revisions were also accompanied by changes in Program funding, which stipulated that \$745,000 be allocated annually. Over the anticipated three years of funding, this amounted to \$2,235,000. An additional \$31,000 was secured for the Program in 1978, making the total \$2,359,000. East St. Louis ended its participation after having expended \$276,462 in planning grants, leaving a total of \$2,082,538 for the remaining three cities, or \$694,179 per city. In order to maintain the program coordination units until action projects in Joliet and Champaign were no longer grant-funded, additional funds were secured bringing these cities' total funding to \$754,183 and \$629,247, respectively. The situation was different for Peoria since that city's action projects are no longer grant-funded, though two were assumed locally. While the current funding scheme for the Peoria crime reduction council will be described at greater length in Section 3.1, we note that a final Program grant of \$41,100 was awarded to the City, bringing its total to \$749,279.¹⁹ All figures differ from those reported in Section 1.3 which refer to estimated expenditures rather than grant award amounts.

Part Two Footnotes

1. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. iv.
2. See for example, Donald G. Alexander, "New Resources for Crime Control: Experience Under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968," The American Criminal Law Review 10 (July, 1971), p. 211.
3. The participating cities were: San Jose, Dayton, Charlotte, Albuquerque, Norfolk, Omaha, Des Moines, and Rochester.
4. LEAA Guideline: Pilot Cities/Counties Program, January 2, 1973, p. 2.
5. Charles A. Murray and Robert E. Krug, The National Evaluation of the Pilot Cities Program: A Team Approach to Improving Local Criminal Justice Systems, prepared by the American Institute for Research for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, November 1975, p. 111.
6. Comptroller General of the United States, The Pilot Cities Program: Phase-Out Needed Due to Limited National Benefits, GAO, 1974.
7. Supra note 5, p. 2.
8. Cities participating in the High Impact Program were: Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland, and St. Louis.
9. Eleanor Chelimsky, "High Impact Anti-Crime Program: National Level Evaluation Final Report," prepared by the MITRE Corporation for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, January 1976.
10. Magnus J. Seng, "ILEC--The Past Four Years," staff paper prepared on behalf of Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, December 3, 1976.
11. See, for example, Richard C. Larson, Urban Police Patrol Analysis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972).
12. For reviews of the use of models in criminal justice research, see Jan Chaiken, et. al., Criminal Justice Models: An Overview, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 1976; and Saul I. Gass, "Models in Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice," in A Guide to Models in Governmental Planning and Operations, Mathematica, Inc., New Jersey, October 1974.
13. Regional planning commissions constituted the fourth, though minor, element of the Program's organizational framework. Established nationally under the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, these commissions were to encourage state and local cooperation in the evaluation,

Part Two Footnotes (continued)

review, and coordination of all federal assistance programs and projects. In conformity with Circular A-95 issued by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, and LEAA guidelines, organizations applying for federal assistance through their (criminal justice) state planning agencies are required to notify the cognizant regional planning commission of their intent.

14. The only reference to "ILEC assistance" that was found in the Program guidelines was to the evaluation of local programs.
15. This was a precondition on most LEAA subgrants awarded to local units of government in the state.
16. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., "Program Planning Techniques," paper prepared for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, October 17, 1972, and accompanying description of the performance management system. We did not determine when these materials were distributed.
17. Assuming a \$20,000 annual salary for the program coordinator, \$15,000 for the research analyst, and \$7,000 for a secretary, and annual expenses of \$20,000 for employees benefits, office rental, equipment, supplies, etc., about 30 percent of a city's annual program budget would have to be dedicated to the operation of a program coordination unit.
18. We learned of this during conversations with Program staff.
19. This figure does not include \$166,000 received by the City under the LEAA discretionary grant for the Crime Impact Program. This is described at greater length in Section 3.1.

PART THREE
DETAILED LOCAL PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS

This Part gives detailed accounts of each of the local programs. The assessment for each city except East St. Louis is divided into five major sections:

- the crime reduction council
- development of the Impact Plan
- other activities of program staff
- action projects
- conclusions

The lack of program documentation for East St. Louis and its premature termination precluded the level of detail that was possible for the other three cities. In recognition of the individual nature of the programs in Champaign, Joliet, and Peoria, we have used the local designations for the crime reduction council and the staff (program coordination units) throughout.

3.1 Peoria

PART THREE

DETAILED LOCAL PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS

3.1 Peoria

We begin our description of the Peoria program with a detailed account of its complex origin. Just prior to the City's participation in the Urban High Crime Reduction Program, application had been made for LEAA discretionary funds for the Crime Impact Program, a small-scale replica of the National High Impact Program, with a total budget of \$166,000. Under a 90-day contract with the City, Aubrey Moore prepared a Master Plan Design for the Crime Impact Program. This document outlined the objectives and anticipated results of the Program; its organizational framework; a program structure; a methodology for the formulation and testing of research hypothesis; and a statistical description of crime occurrence in the City. Aggravated assault, robbery and burglary were designated as target crimes for the Crime Impact Program. After a national recruitment effort, Howard Rickard was hired to direct the Crime Impact Program in July 1974.

Shortly after the Crime Impact Program began, the City successfully applied for ILEC grant funds to implement the Violent Crime Reduction Program. This Program, which eventually operated for three-and-a-half years with a total budget of \$804,644, aimed to reduce the incidence of aggravated assault and robbery, through the implementation of special projects by the City Police Department, the Peoria County State's Attorney's Office, the County's Public Defender Office, and an Emergency Response System which, in conjunction with the Peoria Mental Health Center, was designed to divert individuals involved in potentially violent situations into social services available in the Peoria area.

The Urban High Crime Reduction Program was the third major criminal justice program in which Peoria participated. Aware that the three programs shared a number of common elements, ILEC staff began discussions to coordinate them as early as April 1974. By November of that year, a Master Plan Update had been completed under Mr. Rickard's direction for the Crime Impact Program, and the first application for Urban High Crime Reduction Program funds was submitted to ILEC. This application proposed the transfer of Crime Impact

Program staff (which by this time had grown to three, plus part-time student interns) to the Urban High Crime Reduction Program. The application also proposed that the staff coordinate and evaluate the diverse efforts of the Violent Crime Reduction Program. Awarded for the first six months of 1975, this \$129,466 grant provided the salaries of six full-time staff and a secretary, part-time student interns, a \$50,000 contract to develop computer programs,¹ office space and supplies. Apparently little progress was made under this grant (for example, a crime reduction council was not formed), and the Superintendent of Police, who was designated project director, asked for Mr. Rickard's resignation in July 1975.

Up to this point, \$57,516 had been spent from the \$166,000 Crime Impact Program budget, and \$103,481 had been spent from the first Urban High Crime Reduction Program grant. Between the time of Mr. Rickard's departure in July 1975 and the recruitment of Aubrey Moore in October, the Peoria Crime Reduction Council was formed and convened at two meetings (27 August and 19 September) and the Police Department's Operations Research Specialist, Richard Couron, served as interim program coordinator. Two important points were adopted by the Council during this interim period. The first was the decision to limit the target crime of Peoria's Urban High Crime Reduction Program to burglary, with an emphasis on residential burglary, since the Violent Crime Reduction Program dealt with aggravated assault and robbery. The second was the agreement among Council members that a comprehensive description of persons processed through the adult and juvenile justice systems would be prerequisite to most Council decisions.

From the time Mr. Moore assumed his duties as Executive Director of the Peoria Crime Reduction Council,² the staff has dedicated a majority of its efforts to an analysis of actions the adult and juvenile justice systems might take to reduce the residential burglary occurrence within City limits. As we have already indicated, Peoria chose to develop its Impact Plan in adult and juvenile components rather than in the four phases suggested in the Program guidelines. The Adult Master Plan was completed in May 1977, and three action projects were implemented soon thereafter. All three projects were subsequently institutionalized although grant support for one was prematurely withdrawn as recommended in a staff evaluation. While all of the

studies contemplated for the juvenile plan have been completed, a plan document remains to be produced. Since the studies for the juvenile plan took considerably longer than was anticipated (some three years in progress) no Program funds remain to implement new action projects. Recommendations for action in the juvenile area are therefore likely to be in the form of no-cost modifications in the processing of juveniles who enter the juvenile justice system.

The Peoria Crime Reduction Council currently has a staff of three full-time professionals and a part-time secretary. Since December 1979, the staff has been funded from three sources. The Urban High Crime Reduction Program provides some 47 percent of the budget; the remaining 53 percent is about evenly split between the evaluation of a project being implemented by the Peoria Police Department (Managing Criminal Investigations) and a contract with the Central Illinois Criminal Justice Commission (the ILEC regional office serving Peoria) to evaluate selected projects funded by that body. This funding arrangement will maintain current staff levels through September 1980. Funding of the Peoria program is summarized in Table 3-1.

3.1.1 The Peoria Crime Reduction Council

The Peoria Crime Reduction Council drew its membership from a wide spectrum of city and county functions that deal directly or indirectly with criminal justice matters. While the Council was not officially sanctioned by ordinance or executive order, it has conducted business over the years in a relatively formal manner. Detailed minutes of all its meetings have been prepared from tape recordings made by the staff. The Council has also assumed a posture of low public visibility, although occasional news articles pertaining to meetings have been brought to our attention. This section begins with a description of the composition of the Council and changes that have occurred in its composition since August 1975. A brief analysis of members' attendance at meetings and the nature of business conducted follows. Council members' perceptions of the Peoria program and their role in it are presented in the section's concluding part.

Composition

Recall that six seats on the Council were mandated by the Program guidelines: the mayor, city manager, chief of police, state's attorney,

chief judge, and a representative from the State Department of Corrections. In Peoria, the Mayor deferred his role on the Council to City Councilman Richard Neumiller. Andre Bohannon, Director of Human Resources for the City was also named to the Council, as were two citizen members.

Three County positions (in addition to the Peoria County State's Attorney) were also included on the Council: the Peoria County Sheriff, the Chairman of the County Board, and the Chairman of the Judicial Matters Committee of the County Board. Thus of the Crime Reduction Council's 12 members (excluding the Mayor), six represented the City and four represented the County. The Superintendent of Police was named as Chairman of the Council.

Several of the seats on the Crime Reduction Council have turned over during the past four-and-a-half years. Robert Wright remained City Manager until 1979 when James Daken, the new City Manager, took his place on the Council at its 14 February 1979 meeting. The seat of the chief judge has been occupied by four different individuals. Ivan Yontz was a member during 1975 and 1976, but was replaced by Calvin Stone in 1977. He in turn was replaced as chief judge in 1978 by Edward Haugens, who did not attend a meeting that year. Richard Eagleton has been chief judge since 1979. The seat occupied by the representative of the Department of Corrections has turned over twice. Joe Brown, Superintendent of the Illinois Youth Center, remained in this position until the August 1976 meeting when he was replaced by Henry Templeton. Mr. Templeton remained a Council member through 1977 when he was replaced by Al Buscher, who has represented the Department since that time. Russell Langford, one of the citizen members, attended only two of the first 14 meetings and resigned. He was replaced in May 1977 by Harry Whitaker, Superintendent of Peoria Public Schools. The Sheriff's seat has also been held by three individuals: Bernard Kennedy, until the April 1976 meeting; Fred Oliver until the January 1977 meeting; and George Shadid since then. Finally, members from the County Board have each changed once: Barton Rochman and Ross Cantgebury served on the Council in their respective capacities as Chairman and Chairman of the Judicial Matters Committee, respectively, until 1977. At that time, they were replaced by Ray Neumann and E. Richard Johnson, respectively³.

Meeting Attendance

From its inaugural meeting in August 1975, attended by all members, the Peoria Crime Reduction Council convened 26 times. Four meetings were held in 1975, 1978 and 1979; six were held in 1976; and eight were held in 1977. Table 3-1 shows the attendance record for meetings through October 1979. Overall, meetings were attended by an average of somewhat over seven members (66 percent, excluding the Mayor). The highest average attendance of 8.25 for a calendar year occurred in 1979; the lowest of 6.25 in 1976. The Superintendent of Police had a perfect attendance record; the two citizen members achieved the lowest attendance rate at 30 percent. The seats mandated by the Program guidelines (substituting Councilman Neumiller for Mayor Carver) showed a 74 percent attendance rate. City members were in attendance 67 percent of the time, while the voluntary County positions showed a 58 percent attendance rate. Except for the citizen members, attendance has been impressive, with mandated City and County groups ranking in attendance rate as might be expected.

Meetings were generally planned in accordance with need; no regular schedule was adopted. A mailing, distributed to the members approximately one week before the meeting, contained materials relevant to the agenda. The agenda for a recent meeting is shown in Figure 3-1. Readings of the minutes indicate the discussions were ordinarily led by the Chairman, with most of the discussion by the State's Attorney and the City Councilman. All members appear to have participated in discussions in varying degrees. As executive Director, Mr. Moore's participation at meetings included oral summaries of material in the mailing, clarification of points, and responses to questions. As often as not, the Council would direct the staff to perform short-term research tasks and report on the findings at the next meeting.

Early in the life of the Peoria program, the discussion would occasionally move to issues such as a "target area" or an interesting program that a member had recently heard of; as 1976 came to a close, however, members appeared from the minutes to have focused exclusively on issues falling within the program structure, which is described at greater length below. One such example occurred at the November 5, 1976 meeting we attended during the first year of our evaluation. A presentation was made to the Council on

TABLE J-1
 Attendance at Crime Reduction Council Meetings
 Peoria: August 1975 - December 1979

	1975				1976					1977					1978				1979							
	Aug 27	Sep 21	Nov 5	Dec 16	Jan 6	Feb 17	Apr 28	Jun 16	Aug 18	Nov 5	Jan 19	Mar 3	Mar 30	May 25	Jun 29	Aug 24	Oct 12	Nov 30	Feb 23	June 5	Sep 12	Dec 1	Feb 14	Mar 9	May 29	Oct 30
<u>City Councilman</u> Richard Neumiller	o	A	o	o	o	o	A	o	o	o	A	A	o	o	o	o	o	A	o	o	A	o	o	A	o	o
<u>City Manager</u> Robert Wright James Daken	A	A	o	A	o	A	o	o	o	A	o	o	o	o	o	A	o	A	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
<u>Superintendent of Police</u> Allen Andrews	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
<u>State's Attorney</u> Michael Milm	o	o	o	A	o	o	A	o	o	A	o	o	A	o	o	o	A	o	A	A	o	o	o	o	o	A
<u>Chief Judge</u> Ivan Yontz Calvin Stone Edward Haugens Richard Engleton	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
<u>Department of Corrections</u> Joe Brown Henry Templeton Alfred Buscher	o	o	o	o	o	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
<u>Citizens</u> Russell Langford Dean Taylor (ins. broker)	o	A	o	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
<u>Superintendent of Public Schools</u> Harry Whitaker	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	o	o	o	A	A	A	o	A	A	A	A	A	A
<u>OTHER CITY OFFICIALS</u> Director of Human Resources Andra Bohannon	o	o	A	o	A	o	o	o	o	o	A	o	A	o	A	o	A	o	A	A	o	A	A	o	o	A
<u>OTHER COUNTY OFFICIALS</u> Sheriff Bernard Kennedy Fred Oliver George Shaddid	o	o	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
<u>Chairman, County Board</u> Barton Rodman Ray Neumann E. Richard Johnson	o	o	A	A	A	A	o	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
<u>Chairman, Judicial Matters Committee, County Board</u> Ross Canterbury E. Richard Johnson Ray Neumann	o	A	A	A	o	o	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Key
 o = present or represented
 A = absent
 N = not a Council member

FIGURE 3-1. Agenda for the Peoria Crime Reduction Council Meeting, October 30, 1979

- I. Call to Order
- II. Roll Call
- III. Approval of Minutes
- IV. Director's Report (Oral)
 - A. Planning Process--Status Report
 - B. Future Funding and Work Assignments
- V. Juvenile Data Analysis
 - A. Recidivism Study--Interim Report
- VI. Miscellaneous
- VII. Adjournment

the TASC program,⁴ for which statewide implementation plans were being formulated, and the City of Peoria was offered an opportunity to be a pilot site. Following the presentation, the Council discussed the feasibility of participating, and the staff was directed to prepare a grant application in the event that the decision was made to proceed. The decision was made by the Council not to apply because:

- there was not enough time for adequate fact gathering;
- the local drug facility could not accept new referrals;
- residential burglary defendants, because of the seriousness of this offense, might not qualify for treatment;
- there were complicated confidentiality problems.

While the first of these points may be broadly construed, the Council's demand for "facts" prior to deciding whether to take action is clearly in evidence⁵.

Perceptions of Council Members

Council members were unanimous in their praise of the high level of integrity of the Peoria program. Many, for example, stated that they had served on other commissions, councils, or committees, but that the Crime Reduction Council was unique in its adoption of the program structure and the seriousness with which it viewed its governing and decision-making role within that structure. Other members found the program to provide the City with a unique opportunity to merge rational decision-making and its political context in a productive fashion. Some members believed demonstrable reductions in the level of residential burglary to be the "bottom line" of the program. To others, much would be gained from the program whether or not crime was reduced.

One member expressed disappointment with the lack of citizen participation, which he attributed to the highly professional and technical nature of the enterprise. Others concurred with this point of attribution, adding that short summaries would have been preferred over the often voluminous mailings. In essence, the mailings served as reference material to support the staff's attempt to "walk" the Council through the logic of their planning process.

The Council's interest and patience is evidenced by strong attendance at meetings since the interim evaluations of action projects in mid-1978. The juvenile plan had been in progress for over a year and though nearing

completion, remained by 1980 to be fully documented. Yet the four meetings held in 1979 exhibited the highest average attendance of any year.

It was noted during our interviews that the ability of the Council to work together toward a common goal was enhanced by personal relationships that had been established in the community among key members, prior to their entry into the public sector. Prior contact had also been established at meetings held regularly by former Chief Judge Yontz. Some contact among a few of the members was also made through the Violent Crime Reduction Program which impressed one member significantly less favorably than did the Urban High Crime Reduction Program. Thus while the criminal justice community serving Peoria may have communicated among one another in other forums, the Urban High Crime Reduction Program was, in their experience, unique in its purpose and logic.

3.1.2 Development of the Impact Plan


We stated previously that little progress was made in the Peoria program during Mr. Rickard's tenure as coordinator. The Master Plan Design which had been prepared by Mr. Moore for the Crime Impact Program had been updated, but not implemented. The updated portion included the following components:

- a statistical description of known burglary occurrence in target districts;
- statistics showing arrests and cases entering the courts as fractions of burglary incidence;
- an assessment of the problems associated with the collection of case tracking data, and a summary of data sources;
- summary statistics showing characteristics of persons arrested for burglary and robbery;
- detailed description of City and County criminal justice budgets

Generally, the new material was keyed to the program structure that was included in the Master Plan Design. However, the process by which the program structure would inform the Council's decision-making function in allocating program resources had not been captured in this update.

The program structure set forth in the Master Plan Design underwent some revisions in the early stages of the program after Mr. Moore's arrival

FIGURE 3-2. Peoria Program Structure



in October 1975. Its components, as ultimately adopted by the Crime Reduction Council are shown in Figure 3-2. Designed to guide the development of both the adult and juvenile plans, the program structure depicts three broad strategies for reducing the incidence of residential burglary⁶. Each of these is further divided into topical areas dealing with the issues crime prevention, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and diversion, and the speed with which justice is dispatched. These issues were individually studied to determine the potential of actions that might be taken by the adult and juvenile systems for reducing the incidence of residential burglary.

On the issue of reducing opportunity, it was noted that there was no body of fact on which to base a determination of whether reducing the opportunity to commit residential burglaries in Peoria could reasonably be expected to produce a decline in its known incidence. A chance to test this hypothesis arose when the Crime Prevention Bureau of the Peoria Police Department advised the Council of a project it had planned to conduct premise security surveys, property marking, and other burglary prevention techniques in a designated residential area of the City. The Bureau's plan called for the project to be implemented by Civil Defense police, who would be trained by Bureau personnel, at no cost to the Urban High Crime Reduction Program. While noting that the Council's endorsement of this project would reverse the process for selecting action projects, the Director recommended that it be implemented, subject to the condition that a rigorous evaluation be conducted, using a design developed by the program staff, and that a victimization survey be conducted prior to implementation. It was proposed that the project be implemented during the summer of 1976.

A carefully conceived evaluation design for the crime prevention project was developed by June 1976, but due to lack of manpower, the project was terminated in October. Since only 25 percent of the households in the designated area had been contacted, the project was not evaluated.

Five studies which speak to issues in the program structure were conducted for the Adult Master Plan:

- recidivism,
- deterrence,
- case processing time,

- bail-bond practices,
- diversion and rehabilitation.

An analysis of resources available to the criminal justice system serving the City was also performed by the staff. Each of the studies relied on the adult study population, consisting of data on every adult arrested in connection between January 1, 1971 and June 30, 1976 for a residential burglary known to have occurred in the City.⁷ Detailed information on the case processing events and the time between these events was collected as well on known arrests of these individuals before (as adults or juveniles) and after the "target" arrest (i.e., the one which led to their inclusion in the study population). Information was also collected on the demographic characteristics and on social problems or needs of the study population. Finally, pre-trial jail/bail status of each member of the study population was also recorded. We note in passing that the adult study population has been updated through June 30, 1978 to match the time frame for the juvenile study population (described at greater length later).

The Recidivism Study

The recidivism study was designed to answer questions about changes in the nature and extent of suspected criminal activity after the target arrest. The rates at which various cohorts within the study population were re-arrested within one and two years following the target arrest were analyzed in considerable detail in an effort to identify patterns that might be suggestive of those actions taken by the system, or of group characteristics, which lead to lower than expected recidivism rates.⁸

The study first displayed (adult) system flow charts showing the number of individuals reaching each stage, grouped by the number of prior arrests. Tables showing the number of adults re-arrested for each Part I offense and Part II offenses as a group, as fractions of the number of prior arrests, were also constructed. Examination of a similar table showing the number and type of subsequent arrests disclosed the fact that only 22 of 284 individuals in the study population were re-arrested, within a year of the target arrest, for residential burglary.

While this finding led the Council to exclude reduction of recidivism for adults as an avenue for reducing the incidence of residential burglary, the study continued by testing a number of hypotheses relating prior arrests, subsequent arrests, and actions taken by the system for the target, to detect prominent patterns suggestive of system actions even in the face of the small number of individuals re-arrested for residential burglary. For example, individuals who were and were not re-arrested after the target arrest were compared with respect to:

- number and seriousness of prior arrests;
- whether or not an indictment was filed on the target arrest;
- whether or not a conviction was obtained on the target arrest;
- the type of sentence received on the target arrest.

The study also examined the frequency of re-arrests of those still in process on the target arrest. In all, some 120 hypotheses of this nature were tested using the Chi-square statistic to assess significance. While a number of significant differences were found, no pattern emerged from this more detailed analysis to suggest the imposition of certain sanctions upon certain classes of defendants, as a means of reducing recidivism.

The Deterrence Study

The deterrence study sought to identify relationships between sanctions imposed at various decision points in the system and the known incidence of residential burglary, on the theory that as the severity of sanctions increases, the level of residential burglary should decrease. The analytic strategy can be summarized in the following steps:

- (1) Formulate measures of sanction severity for each division point.
- (2) Derive sanction severity values for cases reaching each decision point in each calendar quarter.
- (3) Estimate the number of residential burglaries committed by adults in each calendar quarter.
- (4) Calculate correlation coefficients for various combinations of values derived in (3) and (4).

Essentially, system actions taken on the study population were partitioned into calendar quarters of their occurrence and correlated with the number of

known residential burglaries estimated to have been committed by adults (the adult estimate). The deterrence study examined this relationship in a multitude of ways, outlined below.

Four variations on this basic theme were undertaken in the deterrence study. The first dealt with the possibility that changes in the adult estimate might lag behind shifts in sanctioning severity, for example, to allow time for policy differences to be perceived by would-be perpetrators of the crime. Thus whether quarterly measures were directly correlated with one another or offset by a quarter provided one source of variation. A second source of variation accounted for simultaneous effects of sanction severity for all points at which sanctions are imposed. In statistical terms, partial correlation coefficients were calculated between the adult estimate and the severity of a given sanction, holding the other sanction levels constant. Before describing the third and fourth sources of variation, we must specify how sanction severity was measured.

Sanction severity was measured in terms of the possible outcomes of each major decision point in the flow of residential burglary cases through Peoria's criminal justice system. Whether or not an arrest is made is the system's first decision point, interpreted broadly. The ratio of (adult) arrests to the adult estimate, (of incidence) viewed as the probability of being arrested for committing a residential burglary, constituted a measure of police efficiency, the first system sanction.

The second system sanction deals with the police disposition of the case--whether arrest charges are filed as residential burglary, lesser felony, or misdemeanor, or dropped. These outcomes were assigned weights of 3, 2, 1 and 0, respectively. The weighted average of cases for which police dispositions were rendered during each quarter can be interpreted as the probability, during that quarter, of receiving the most severe police disposition, a measure of police effectiveness.

The third section pertained to the pre-indictment outcome of cases. At this point, there are also four possible outcomes: an indictment for residential burglary can be secured; an indictment for a lesser felony can be secured; the case can be refiled as a misdemeanor, or the filed charges can be dropped. Again, weights of 3, 2, 1 and 0 were assigned to these outcomes,

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a weighted average of cases for which this decision was made each quarter was calculated, and the result was interpreted as the (conditional) probability, in the quarter, of indictment (given the filing of arrest charges)--the pretrial sanction.

The fourth sanction reflected the establishment of guilt or innocence for indicted cases. Again four outcomes are possible: conviction of residential burglary; conviction of a lesser felony; conviction of a misdemeanor; and acquittal. Using only those cases that were adjudicated each quarter, the same procedure was used to determine the probability, in that quarter, of conviction--the conviction sanction.

The sentencing sanction, fifth in the series, grouped possible sentencing options into five classes: state prison, jail only, jail and probation, probation without incarceration, and fine only. In this instance weights of 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0 were assigned to these outcomes, and the weighted average of cases for which sentence was imposed each quarter was taken as the probability, that quarter, of receiving the most severe sentence.

Our description of these five sanctions was intentionally ambiguous about the unit of count, the third variation on the deterrence study theme. Five ways of counting cases (denoted Parts A through E in the study) were undertaken. In Part A, each residential burglary/defendant combination was counted. Thus if an individual were arrested and charged with two residential burglaries, these two cases would be dealt with separately, and only those cases which remained residential burglary after the imposition of a sanction were included in calculating the next sanction. Thus in Part A the ratio of residential burglaries charged at arrest to the adult estimate provided quarterly measures of police efficiency; the probability that residential burglary charges were filed (by the prosecutor), measures of police effectiveness; the probability that indictments for residential burglary are returned, measures of the pretrial sanction; the probability of conviction for residential burglary, measures of the conviction sanction; and the probability of a prison sentence(s), measures of the sentencing sanction. Part B was defined in the same manner as Part A, with individuals, rather than charges, as the unit of count; one individual counted once for each arrest, regardless of the number of residential burglary charges named in the arrest warrant.

Part C was somewhat more complicated. Police efficiency and police effectiveness were the same as in Part A. Unlike Part A, Part C dealt with all felonies disposed of after the filing of charges by the prosecutor. However, as in Part A, residential burglary charges received greater weight than lesser felony charges. For Part C, residential burglaries charged at arrest, but reduced to lesser felonies before filing by the prosecutor, were included in the calculation of quarterly values for the pretrial sanction. Similarly, quarterly conviction sanctions were derived from all (felony) indictments, whether residential burglary, reduced prior to filing by the prosecutor, or returned as an indictment for a lesser felony. Finally, sentencing sanctions were based on all felony convictions, not only on convictions of residential burglary as in Part A. Part D was identical to Part C, except residential burglary and other felony charges received the same weight.

Police efficiency was measured in Part E as in Parts A, C and D. Remaining quarterly sanctions, however, were greatly simplified, thereby allowing the inclusion of more cases. Police effectiveness outcomes were collapsed into two categories, arrest charges dropped and arrest charges filed (both, by definition of the study population, for residential burglary) and measured each quarter as the probability of charges being filed. Pretrial sanctions were derived as the probability of referral to trial (felony or misdemeanor) for filed charges (felony or misdemeanor) each quarter, while conviction sanctions were calculated as the probability of conviction (felony or misdemeanor), given the filing of any charges. Finally, sentencing alternatives were recombined slightly differently into incarceration only, probation with incarceration, probation without incarceration, and fine only, and sentencing sanctions were calculated as the probability of being incarcerated only for sentences imposed during each quarter.

To summarize: for each Part, the adult estimate was correlated simply with each sanction and multiply with the five sanctions for that Part, both lagged and directly (not lagged). In all, 50 simple correlation coefficients and 50 partial correlation coefficients calculated (5 sections x 5 Parts x 2 methods of time correspondence). Statistically significant simple correlations (at the 5 percent level) of the correct sign (negative) were found for police efficiency for each Part in the lagged case, while partial correlations

were significant for Parts B, C and D, also in the lagged case. None of the other correlations were significant.

The deterrence study served to illustrate the complexity of the measurement process in the analysis of the criminal justice process. System flows in Peoria are much like those of most jurisdictions. However, this is the first study of which we are aware that captures this level of detail on the charge reduction process in sequential measurements over time. We have labored through the details of the study also to illustrate the attention to detail that has typified the work of the program staff. The remaining studies will be described more briefly than this.

The Time Study

The time study employed essentially the same methodology as the deterrence study. Lagged and direct correlations were developed; five different criteria governed the choice of cases to be included in the deviation of quarterly "system speeds;" and five stages (intervals) of case processing were examined. These five stages were defined as:

- date of incident to date of arrest;
- date of arrest to date of indictment or dismissal;
- date of indictment to date of the defendant's plea;
- date of the defendant's plea to date of adjudication;
- date of adjudication to first day of sentence execution.

For a given stage, quarterly average speed (cases per day) was derived using cases which were in that stage for part or all of the quarter. In other words, the total number of cases was divided by the total number of days these cases spent in the stage during the quarter. In determining the total number of cases in a quarter, cases which overlapped other quarters while remaining in the given stage were counted as the fraction of the total time spent in the stage during the quarter of interest.

Part A for a stage included only residential burglary charges that entered the stage, while Part C included only felony charges. Part B used individuals charged with residential burglary instead of residential burglary charges, as in the deterrence study, Part D combined the last two stages, while Part E combined the last three stages, in order to capture possible

cumulative effects. The time study found highly significant simple and partial correlations between the adult estimate and speed in the arrest to indictment stage, for every part, lagged or direct.

The Bail Bond Study

The bail bond study sought to determine pre-trial incapacitative effects on the adult estimate. In Part I of the study, the quarterly probability of failure to secure release was calculated as the fraction failing to secure release during the quarter, of those for whom warrants were signed and served during the quarter and who were incarcerated on the first day of the quarter. According to theories of incapacitation effects on crime, the higher the probability, the lower the incidence of crime. This theory was tested in Part I of the bail bond study by correlating the quarterly probabilities with the quarterly adult estimates, where the adult estimate corresponded directly to the probability of not securing release and was also lagged by a quarter. A statistically significant (negative) correlation was found in the direct case only.

Part II of the bail bond study measured the length of time spent in jail or on the street, during each quarter, by adults charged with residential burglary. Since person-days was the unit of count (for a period as long as residential burglary charges were pending), no distinction was made, for example, between one person spending ten days in jail (or on the street) and ten people each spending one day in jail (or on the street). Simple correlations (lagged and direct) were calculated between the quarterly adult estimate, and person-days in jail and person-days on the street. Partial correlations between the adult estimate and each one of these, holding the other constant. No significant values were found.

The Diversion/Rehabilitation Study

The strategy of the diversion/rehabilitation study was to compare re-arrest rates among these groups of individuals in the study population: those who appeared to have a social problem (e.g., drug abuse) or need (e.g., drug treatment) for whom the system took action to divert; those having a social problem or need for whom no action was taken; and those who did not

appear to have a specific social problem or need. The study population was enhanced by including adults arrested for residential burglary in 1970. Only cases which carried residential burglary charges at filing by the prosecutor, at indictment or at final disposition were included in the analysis. Data sources used to identify the presence of a social problem or need included final disposition orders and transcripts, probation orders, penitentiary letters, and pre-sentence investigation reports.

A number of data collection difficulties were encountered due to missing files, pre-sentence reports and penitentiary letters, and the study detailed the number of such cases by year of disposition. Information concerning dismissals, dismissals as part of a negotiated plea in another case, sentencing for a lesser charge, and sentencing for residential burglary was examined, but few instances of diversion, as defined for the study were found. While cross-tabulations involving whether or not a pre-sentence investigation was conducted and if so, recommendations; sentence type; whether or not a problem was identified; demographic characteristics and prior record of these included in the study, and subsequent arrests at least one year after sentencing, the study concluded that the 24 cases involving diversion were simply insufficient to draw any conclusions.

The Resource Study

As originally conceived, the resource study was a highly ambitious undertaking. The goal of the study was to estimate the local system's expenditures in responding to the crime of residential burglary. If this were achievable, another dimension could be added to the program which would permit analyses of local costs and benefits, the latter in terms of both improved "system performance" and (reduced) target crime levels, again to provide further guidance in the allocation of resources for action projects.

For purposes of the resource study, the following agencies were taken to constitute the system of justice serving the City:

- City of Peoria Police Department;
- Peoria County Sheriff's Office;
- Office of the State's Attorney;
- Office of the Circuit Clerk;

- Department of Court Services (including, among other functions, adult and juvenile probation);
- the 10th judicial circuit (co-terminus with Peoria County).

For each agency, budgets, manpower levels and allocation, and organizational structure were presented. The primary data sources were City and County appropriations ordinances for as many years as these data were available (generally back to 1965). Federal grants and subgrants to these agencies were also included in the analysis.

In practice, estimation of the level of resources dedicated to residential burglary proved unfeasible. The staff did, however, estimate the proportion of circuit court resources dedicated annually to criminal matters, based on the volume of felony case termination and jury trials. Additionally, responding to a request of a Council member, the staff developed estimates of the relative contribution of County revenue sources to the appropriations of County criminal justice agencies. The resource study concluded with a graphical display of the percentage increase since 1970 (through 1976) in the total local criminal justice system budget; this budget in 1967 constant dollars, Part I offenses, and manpower levels. Of particular note was a 17.6 percent average annual increase in the known incidence of Part I crime between 1970 and 1975, compared to average annual increases between 1970 and 1976 of 6.7 percent in the total budget (adjusted for inflation) and a 5 percent in authorized manpower.

The Explanatory Model

The studies described above were synthesized in the formulation of a statistical model for the adult system which expressed the quarterly adult estimate as a function of:

- the probability of not securing release from jail while awaiting further legal action (Part I of the bail bond study) for a quarter;
- the quarterly speed of the system between arrest and indictment;
- The speed of the system between arrest and indictment in the previous quarter;
- police efficiency (sanction severity) in the previous quarter.

Observing that all of the significant findings of the studies dealt with the "front end" of the system, the staff proposed to use this model to predict quarterly levels of residential burglary from hypothetical values of the four explanatory variables. The model also has use in evaluating the program, for example, by comparing observed quarterly target crime levels with predicted values. This, of course, would require that values of the explanatory variables be calculated for the quarter in which predicted values are needed.

The Selection of Adult Action Projects

In January 1977, just prior to completion of the Adult Master Plan in April, the Crime Reduction Council faced an important decision. The Council had decided earlier to hold the balance of funds from the Crime Impact Program--\$108,477--in reserve to fund action projects under the Urban High Crime Reduction Program. Another \$144,991 remained in Urban High Crime Reduction Program funds for Peoria to apply against action projects. However, the Crime Impact Program funds, even with extensions, had to be obligated by November 1, 1977 and actually expended by February 1, 1978. Under these circumstances, the program Director recommended that the Crime Impact funds be used to fund action projects based on the findings of the Adult Master Plan, and that remaining Urban High Crime Reduction funds be held in reserve to implement action projects based on the juvenile plan and possibly to continue funding "adult" action projects.

Recognizing that in principle, this recommendation violated the policy of the Council not to attempt action projects prior to the completion of both Plan components, the Director cited lack of time as the determining factor. Time constraints were also cited as limiting the approach that could be taken to select action projects. Thus the second part of his recommendation was, for the sake of expediency, to "solicit informed opinion and examine those facts which are currently and readily, available." Again, there was simply not enough time to conduct an exhaustive analysis of possible action projects for accomplishing the four strategy objectives identified in the adult studies.

Four types of activity were undertaken by the program staff in order to compile a list of action projects whose primary objectives were to improve police efficiency (or equivalently, increase the risk of arrest):

- All residential burglaries in which an arrest was made between January 1, 1971 and June 30, 1976 were examined in an effort to detect factors to which the arrest was plausibly attributable.
- Personal interviews were conducted with command staff and line officers in the Peoria Police Department to solicit their suggestions.
- Research on action strategies tried elsewhere was assessed by the staff.
- Records of activity kept by specialized units within the Peoria Police Department were reviewed.

Over 125 projects were identified through these activities. The following criteria were then utilized to screen projects for final selection:

- feasibility within the Police Department's existing organizational structure;
- amenability to empirical test through rigorous evaluation;
- adaptability of existing resources to accomplish the same purpose;
- presence of a problem, addressed in common by several action projects on the list (e.g., response time) which, if overcome, would result in the achievement of the objective;
- feasibility of full implementation and evaluation within financial and time constraints;
- existence of a precedent and the utility of information furnished by such a precedent.

Two projects were selected using these procedures and criteria. The Physical Evidence Project, which was partially implemented in April 1977, was designed to increase the risk of arrest through enhanced capabilities for the collection and analysis of physical evidence (primarily latent prints) at residential burglary scenes. The Criminal Information Exchange, which began operations in July 1977 was to serve as a "clearinghouse" for the exchange of information relating to residential burglary among officers, investigators, and tactical unit personnel, and for the analysis of residential burglary patterns in the City.

The Dedicated Prosecution project was formulated in response to the strategy objective of increasing the speed of cases from arrest to disposition. This project, whose objectives and design were established primarily in

discussions held between the State's Attorney and the Program Director, was actually the first action project proposed although it is the second to be implemented, in June 1977. One assistant state's attorney would dedicate his time first to increasing the speed of cases stemming from residential burglaries committed in the City. Recognizing the need to utilize this resource fully in the face of fluctuating caseloads, other duties that might be assigned were listed in order of declining priority--ranging from increasing the speed of target crime cases within the County, but outside the City, to prosecution of City cases of nonresidential burglary.

Development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the action projects will be discussed in Section 3.1.4. We turn next to a description of work to date toward the juvenile plan.

The Juvenile Plan

Work on the juvenile plan began shortly after the Adult Master Plan was completed in May 1977. As noted, development of the juvenile plan has been undertaken within the same program structure which guided the planning process for the adult system. Based on the nature of the juvenile system and the adult findings, however, the staff has concentrated its efforts on two studies: deterrence and recidivism. A time study was also conducted, but according to the Program Director, the data did not lend themselves to a time study because the speed of the juvenile system is largely guided by statute. The speed of juvenile case processing was not adequately controlled to show covariation with the number of residential burglaries estimated to have been committed by juveniles (the juvenile estimate).

The juvenile plan has been in progress for nearly four years. There are three main reasons why it has been this long in preparation. First, and most important, is the volume of the juvenile data. The data base was keyed to every juvenile taken into custody on charges involving residential burglaries occurring in the City. Other units of count used in the various descriptive tales and analyses included custodies, incidents and charges.⁹ Information on all known contacts of each member of the juvenile study population was collected and organized into three time periods:

- prior offenses: before the first residential burglary;

- interim offenses: after the first residential burglary, but before charges are first alleged for that residential burglary upon being taken into custody (first residential burglary custody);
- subsequent offenses: after the first residential burglary custody.

Charges stemming from residential burglary incidents were tracked through the system. Additionally, social histories--guardian case, truancy, and academic performance--were collected for members of the study population, primarily from the records of the Department of Court Services. Finally, data codes to indicate whether a juvenile acted alone; with other juveniles; or with other adults in alleged residential burglary incidents.

The large volume of data collected for the juvenile study population prompted the staff to decide to recode all the data for keypunching, given analytic possibilities and hence the enormous demands that would be placed on hand computations.¹⁰ This decision led to the second source of delay in development of the juvenile plan--a direct result of the data volume and richness.

The third source of delay was imposed by an external restraint. The Council was informed at its 12 October 1977 meeting that for privacy and security reasons the staff had been barred from access to the juvenile records of the Department of Court Services. Chief Judge Haugens required a bond as a prerequisite to issuing a court order permitting the program staff to examine the records. Unable to secure such a bond, this task was not begun until the succeeding Chief Judge waived this requirement when he assumed his duties in January 1978. It should also be noted that adult action project evaluations began at this point in time.¹¹

Extensive descriptive tabulations were prepared using the juvenile data at various stages of their development. Age, sex, and race of individuals in the study population; the census tract of the residential burglary which resulted in the custody; and system actions taken for these offenses were tabulated by year. One notable observation emerged from the description of the location of offenses in relation to the residence of the accused: some 73 percent involved distances of less than half a mile. Other descriptive tables included school performance, substance abuse, and mental health indicators, by race and prior/subsequent arrests patterns. This latter set

of tabulations disclosed dramatic differences between the adult and juvenile populations. The central finding, roughly stated, was that adults appeared not to have been re-arrested frequently for another residential burglary, while subsequent custodies of juveniles occurred primarily for new residential burglary incidents. Specifically, the chance of an adult being re-arrested for residential burglary (given at least one residential burglary arrest) was approximately one in fifteen, while that for juveniles was approximately one in three.

The Juvenile Deterrence Study

Conceptually, the juvenile deterrence study was in part identical to its adult counterpart, described previously. In practice, however, the juvenile deterrence study proved to be more difficult as a result of the complex nature of the juvenile justice system serving Peoria. Five sanction severity measures were specified in the study.

- police disposition--custody outcomes;
- pre-adjudication--outcomes of petition requests;
- adjudication--outcome after the filing of petitions;
- court disposition--dispositions for adjudicated juveniles.

In each case, the number of possible outcomes was greater than for the adult system, and the nature of these outcomes was substantially different.

While these sanction severity measures correspond to the five utilized in the adult study, the juvenile study also measured the certainty of the sanctions, more broadly defined as:

- the probability of being taken into custody;
- the probability of entering the (juvenile) court system, given custody;
- the probability of being declared a ward of the court, given entrance into the court system.

As with the adult study, quarterly values of the juvenile estimate were correlated with quarterly values of the five sanction severity measures and the three measures of the certainty of the imposition of sanctions.¹²

Direct and lagged cases were both included in the analysis. The pretrial correlation between the juvenile estimate and the probability of entering

court (holding the other two certainty measures constant), without lag, was found to be statistically significant.

The Juvenile Recidivism Study

The juvenile recidivism study was described by the Director as the most ambitious undertaking of the staff. The strategy of the study was to analyze recidivism (defined for juveniles as a new custody after the first residential burglary custody) in terms of both system actions taken for the first residential burglary custody and attributes of the recidivist. Such an analysis would seek to inform the decisions of system practitioners for case dispositions to minimize the probability of recidivism for residential burglary. Suppose, for example, that the police were to arrest for residential burglary, a 15 year old male with a record of truancy, poor academic performance, and a first residential burglary arrest at age 13, that did not lead to juvenile court. Using information provided by the recidivism study, the police would be able to determine that disposition (e.g., court petition, station adjustment) which would minimize this juvenile's probability of a subsequent residential burglary arrest.

This example serves to illustrate the level of detail that the current data base can provide. Unless information at this level of detail could be keyed directly into an interactive computer system, a coarser, and perhaps more useful, instrument would be operationally more appropriate. Statistical tests of significance have been completed for virtually all possible relevant correlations between recidivism (variously configured) and combinations of defendant and system variables. The remaining task would appear to involve the reduction and transformation of the data to operationally useful guidelines.

3.1.3 Other Activities of Program Staff

Prior to revision of the Program guidelines in December 1978, staff of the Peoria Crime Reduction Council keyed their activities almost exclusively to the issue of residential burglary reduction. Most of this time the staff were involved with the studies described in the previous section, and with monitoring and evaluation of the adult action projects, described in the next

section. One exception to this highly-focused effort was a staff evaluation of the Violent Crime Reduction Program toward the end of 1977. This task was part of the agreement which provided for coordination of staff responsibilities among the Urban High Crime Reduction Program, the Violent Crime Reduction Program and the Crime Impact Program. Another brief diversion involved the preparation of a grant application for the TASC program, which was never submitted. The staff also provided some technical assistance in the replication of the adult time and deterrence studies in ten other Illinois cities, discussed above in Section 1.4.

The Council first explored other possible areas of staff involvement at its December 1, 1978 meeting, when plans for revised guidelines which would permit the cities to devote time to matters not directly Program-related were announced. This expansion of the scope of local program activities was connected with the eventual need for the staff to become "self-supporting." Among the possible areas mentioned were to supervise and monitor the replication of the Kansas City response time study which was being conducted by the Peoria Police Department; and studies involving delinquency prediction, the Dri-Roads Program--a County operated effort to reduce auto accidents caused by intoxication, and the role of the probation officer. A survey of police officers was also mentioned, although no particular topic was indicated.

By the time of the next meeting in February 1978, the staff had completed a descriptive study of family violence in Peoria, which had been done in anticipation of possible application by the City for LEAA funds in this area.¹³ The study was based on computerized police records for 1977 which provided the name, age, race, sex and address of every individual involved in a crime incident: victim, offender, witnesses, suspects, complainants, etc. Offenses selected for the study included various forms of assault and battery, and offenses against children (e.g., child abuse, sexual assault). Family relationships were tentatively identified on the basis of shared last names or addresses, and the validity of these assumptions was tested against 100 incident reports manually prepared by police officers. According to this check, same name/same address methods overstated the number of actual family relationships by 11 percent. The family violence study estimated the fraction of each type of offense involving family members, the

fraction of households in the city experiencing some form of violence, and the frequency of violent incidents reported by the same family. Statistics on age, race and sex of those involved in each of an incident were also reported, as were summary statistics on prosecution, adjudication and sentencing. A grant application, however, was not prepared.

Three other specific possibilities for additional staff work were raised since the Program guidelines were revised. One pertained to a request by the Peoria County Sheriff, a council member, for an analysis of calls for service (by time and location) and validation/audit checks on entries made to LEADS (Law Enforce Analysis Data System) a national law enforcement information system to assist police operations. The second entailed an evaluation of the Dri-Road Program, operated by the (County) Department of Court Services, whose goal was to reduce accident-related injuries due to drunk driving. The third involved a request for evaluation assistance by the Tri-County Community Anti-Crime Program. In this third case, the council decided to limit its involvement to providing advice and counsel when sought. An estimate of the required level of effort to complete the work requested by the sheriff has been given (10-14 person weeks for 1978 data), while a decision on the Dri-Road evaluation is still pending.¹⁴

Further proposals have been made for work that would sustain a full-time staff beyond September 30, 1980 when the Urban High Crime Reduction Program grant, which as observed, supports half the staff operation, terminates. These included contracting with other local criminal justice agencies to study problems. The Peoria Police Department has taken the initiative in this regard by asking the staff to consider three possible studies.

- design of a quality control system for department records,
- develop a crime analysis handbook for use by department personnel and student interns,
- develop a plan for deciding which data to purge from the department's computerized data bank.

These proposals notwithstanding, the program director indicated that the first priority was to complete the juvenile plan. The completion of the call load analysis for the Sheriff's Office; updated evaluations of the two remaining adult action projects, and a final evaluation of the Peoria program constitute other remaining program commitments.

3.1.4 Action Projects

The three action projects implemented under the Peoria program and their strategy objectives for reducing the incidence of residential burglary are summarized below:

- Dedicated Prosecution--to reduce time from arrest to indictment in residential burglary cases
- Physical Evidence--to increase the risk of arrest for residential burglary
- Criminal Information Exchange (CIE)--to increase the risk of arrest for a residential burglary.

Funding of these three projects was complicated by several factors. Funds were to be drawn from two sources: the Crime Impact Program and the Urban High Crime Reduction Program. Significant time constraints existed for the expenditure of Crime Impact funds. The council had to make a number of decisions regarding the duration that adult action projects could be grant-supported, funds that should be held in reserve to support possible juvenile action projects pending completion of the juvenile plan, and continued support of the program staff.

Administrative considerations for the adult action projects were also noteworthy. Since the Crime Impact Program was funded under a single grant, the three projects were budgeted as action components of one grant application, with the Program Director named as project director.¹⁵ Funds were also drawn for these three projects from a single Urban High Crime Reduction Program grant. The funding period was therefore the same for all three projects: May 1, 1977 through November 30, 1977 from the Crime Impact grant, and December 1, 1977 through December 31, 1978 from the Urban High Crime Reduction grant. However, as indicated previously, the periods of actual operation varied among the projects.

Dedicated Prosecution

The overall strategy objective of this project was to minimize the time from arrest to indictment in adult residential burglary cases. Additionally, the State's Attorney established three other project objectives as benchmarks for monitoring the project:

- to limit to 30 days, time from arrest to entry into the circuit court (an average of 51 days was found for residential burglary cases in the first half of 1976);
- to limit to 60 days, time from entry into the circuit court to disposition (an average of 87 days was found for residential burglary cases in the first half of 1976).
- to institute a policy of declining to enter into plea negotiations within 10 days of the trial date.

The project began on June 10, 1977 and was budgeted through November 30, 1978 at \$36,995. The project essentially supported one full-time assistant state's attorney expending only \$32,103.

A summary of project activities provided to the council at its November 30, 1977 meeting indicated that 31 residential burglary defendants had been processed, and that the average time from arrest to indictment was 10.5 days, significantly less than the 47.7 days in the second half of 1976. Average time from indictment to plea was about the same for the two samples, while that for plea to adjudication was substantially less for project cases, though the difference was not statistically significant. According to the special assistant, plea to adjudication time decreased largely as a result of the strong physical evidence that was brought to bear in these cases. He also noted that about half of his work time was spent on residential burglary cases, with the other half devoted to predominately commercial burglaries.

An interim evaluation report of the project was contained in the June 5, 1978 mailing to the Council, covering the nine months from the project's implementation through March 1978. Cases handled by the project were validated against a number of sources, including police incident reports, records of arrest, records maintained by the Crime Scene Unit, and graphs and charts maintained by the special assistant. A control group of cases involving felony theft, aggravated battery, robbery and auto theft handled as felonies was also selected to provide another frame of reference covering the same time period. Continuances, dismissals, plea negotiations and sentences were also included in the analysis.

The evaluation found a statistically significant decrease in time from arrest to indictment for residential burglaries, when compared to the same time period in the previous year, while no significant difference was

observed for control group offenses when comparing these two periods. Indeed, cases in the control group took less time in the pre-project period than did residential burglaries, while the reverse was true during the project. The report thus attributed the difference to the project. No difference was found when comparing cases with physical evidence to cases without such evidence or in comparisons of the proportion of cases dismissed. The study further found that over 90 percent of the cases met the 30-day arrest-to-circuit court limit (nearly 50 percent traversed this stage in a week or less), while the 60-day circuit court-to-disposition limit was met in only 34 percent of the cases.¹⁶ Finally, it was observed that the policy banning late plea negotiations had not been met, with 15 to 20 such actions having occurred within ten days prior to the trial date. In summary the Dedicated Prosecution project achieved its primary objective of reducing arrest to indictment time in residential burglary cases. As noted previously, the staff plans to update the evaluation at some time prior to September 1980.

Based largely on these interim evaluation findings, the State's Attorney decided to assume the costs of the project and continue its operation when grant funding terminated in December 1978. The project continued to endure as of December 1979, although priorities for case assignment has apparently been relaxed somewhat.

Physical Evidence

The Physical Evidence project was designed to increase the risk of arrest through suspect identifications made as a result of physical evidence-- primarily latent fingerprints found at crime scenes. An analysis of the activities of the Crime Scene Unit of the Peoria Police Department led the Crime Reduction Council staff to believe that the number of identifications made would increase if more residential burglary scenes were processed by officers who were skilled at the recovery of latent prints.¹⁷ One component of the project therefore called for an additional crime scene search officer, bringing the total manpower of the Unit up from five to six. Based on the past performance of the Unit--particularly in 1976, after prints in the active suspect file were geocoded by police district of crime occurrence--the staff estimated that as many as 48 additional identifications could be made as a result of another officer and a fully-equipped laboratory van.

Based on an examination of prior arrests of 284 adults arrested for residential burglary, which found 76 to have been arrested for theft, auto theft or a Part II offense, the staff devised the second component of the Physical Evidence project. Essentially this proposal called for expansion of the geocoded active suspect file from approximately 1000 to some 9000 sets of prints and the coding of these prints for entry into the Police Department's computer. Software would be developed for automated comparisons of latent prints taken from residential burglary scenes with prints in this expanded file. Thus the computer would provide a small number of prints (on the order of perhaps 10 sets, depending on the rarity of print characteristics) for subsequent manual examination, with substantial time savings.

With both components, the project was budgeted for six months operation at \$57,958. Of this amount, about half was to develop the automated fingerprint comparison capability. The Physical Evidence project technically began in April 1977 when the Superintendent of Police issued an order that the Crime Scene Unit be notified of all residential burglaries in the City and that it process as many of these scenes as possible. The additional crime scene search officer assumed his duties on 10 June. By late August, a preliminary design for the software system had been designed and incorporated into a request for proposal to begin the software vendor selection process. As noted previously, unanticipated events delayed full implementation of the automated comparison component until September 1979.

In October 1977, as the six month funding was ending, the Council voted to continue the Physical Evidence project for another 13 months with \$34,478 in Urban High Crime Reduction Program funds, subject to the on-going monitoring and evaluation process. This decision was based partly on interim statistics prepared by the staff which showed statistically significant increases from the previous year in the number and proportion of residential burglary scenes processed and in the number and proportion of processed scenes where latent prints were developed.

An interim evaluation of the project was prepared for the 5 June meeting of the Crime Reduction Council. This report compared activities of the Crime Scene Unit during the first year of the project (beginning with April 1977) to the prior year. Data sources for the evaluation included

monthly forms maintained by the Unit once the project was implemented and the Unit's prior annual activity reports. The data from these sources were verified against police incident reports and the Unit's logbooks. Adults and juveniles identified as residential burglary suspects in each of the two samples were tracked through disposition and sentencing.

The evaluation found that the number of residential burglary scenes processed during the project was more than double that of the prior year. Moreover, a significantly greater number of identifications had been made (61 compared to 42). The proportion of comparisons made of each type (cold search, own initiative, and by request) did not differ significantly between the two years. Finally, the report indicated that the Unit cleared 56 residential burglaries by identification of 32 adults and 25 juveniles during the project year, while only 37 residential burglaries were cleared by identification of 19 adults and 16 juveniles the year before.

The cost of the additional crime scene search officer was assumed by the Police Department after grant funding ended in December. As we noted earlier, the program staff plans to conduct a full evaluation of the Physical Evidence project before September 1980.

Criminal Information Exchange

The Criminal Information Exchange (CIE) was the second project implemented by the Peoria Police Department to increase the risk of arrest for residential burglary. As for the Physical Evidence project, the CIE was also initially budgeted (against Crime Impact funds) for six months, through November 1977, at \$37,371; and was subsequently extended by 13 months with a budget of \$56,812 (against Program funds), pending monitoring and evaluation results.

Organized under the supervision of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the CIE's primary mission was to facilitate the exchange of information, both within the Department and with other law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, relating to residential burglaries in the City and offender characteristics. The project was in part responsive to the problem, experienced by a number of police agencies, of lack of communication between patrol shifts and different divisions within the department. Fashioned after a similar project in Kansas City which also focused on target offenders, the CIE also called

for analyses of trends and patterns of criminal activity, with a focus on residential burglary.

The CIE began operations in the second week of July 1977. Initially staffed by a sergeant, police officer, clerk-typist, and procedures analyst (a consultant), the project experienced a high degree of turnover during its first year of operation. By June 1978, the officer left the department and was replaced; the procedures analyst terminated and was not replaced; and the sergeant was transferred to the detective bureau. Thus by the end of the first year, CIE manpower was halved.

Although the CIE began operations in June, it did not become fully operational until mid-November, the summer and fall months having been spent developing information sources and flow techniques. Trips were made to Kansas City, Miami and Dallas for this latter purpose, and the CIE adapted a poster system and a three-part monthly handout on the basis of techniques learned during these trips. Other methods utilized by the project included:

- the posting of mug shots of parolees released to the Peoria area by the Department of Corrections;
- examination of teletype messages, arrest reports and burglary reports;
- daily trips to a neighboring law enforcement agency to post information;
- attendance at meetings held by regional law enforcement agencies;
- placement of special boxes in which patrol officers deposited information cards;
- development of pin maps and graphical displays of residential and other burglary incidents.

Altogether, the CIE routinely utilized 17 different information sources and was able to solicit information from 134 officers during its first year.

An interim evaluation covering the first year's operation of the CIE was distributed to the Council at its 12 September 1978 meeting. This report analyzed incoming and outgoing information, using records maintained by the CIE, direct observation of roll call activities, a questionnaire administered to all officers; an analysis of arrests that were connected with the project's activities was also conducted. Findings derived from the questionnaire indicated a favorable view toward the CIE on the part of most

officers familiar with it. However, of 1836 information bits received by the CIE, only 2.2 percent pertained specifically to residential burglary, and of the 28 arrests for which the CIE claimed responsibility, the Crime Reduction Council staff was able to confirm the connection, either "direct" or "likely," in only 12 cases, only one of which was for a residential burglary. Based on these findings the staff, while commending the work of the CIE and the data it furnished for the evaluation, was forced to recommend that program support be withdrawn as of 13 October 1978.

Because of its success with respect to other Department needs, the CIE has been maintained under support from the Department's regular budget. It is notable that the withdrawal of program support stemmed solely from its apparent lack of impact on the risk of arrest for residential burglary. As a result of this decision, some \$14,000 was unspent and later reprogrammed to the Physical Evidence project.

3.1.5 Conclusions

While the foregoing description of the Peoria program was given in considerable detail, it fails to do justice to the level of documented detail furnished to both the Council and the evaluator, primarily in the form of studies (planning and evaluation), Council meeting minutes, and memoranda of information and decision needs issued to the Council. We were deeply impressed with the thoroughness and care taken both in implementing the program and documenting its every aspect.

There are two ways of viewing the extended duration of time taken to complete the juvenile plan. From one perspective, already noted, failure to finish the plan forced the Council to decide on the allocation of funds on the basis of partial knowledge--namely the adult system's response to the crime of residential burglary. This was contrary to the policy adopted by the Council, as recommended by its Director, at the outset of his tenure over four years ago. From a more positive perspective, however, the juvenile plan, once completed, will have to formulate recommendations for action that do not involve the expenditure of additional funds.¹⁸ If such recommendations should emerge and be adapted, the feasibility of effecting change toward a highly specific goal, within a local criminal justice system and without external funding, could be demonstrated.

The Peoria program has been an extremely ambitious undertaking which in some measure has been fulfilled. The major outstanding issue faced by the Crime Reduction Council deals with the overall evaluation of the program-- namely its impact on the incidence of residential burglary. Difficulties have been encountered with the explanatory model, partly a result of the exemplary performance of the Dedicated Prosecution project in achieving case processing speeds well beyond the range on which model parameters were estimated. As noted by the Program Director, the validity of predicted incidence of residential burglary based on such speeds would be highly suspect. Modifications to the explanatory model, however, appear unlikely under the Program's auspices.

Section 3.1 Footnotes

1. A sole source contract was awarded to the firm which was at the time engaged in the development of the Computer Aided Dispatch/On Line Information Systems (CADOLIS). Essentially, this contract was to develop, test and implement a series of computer programs which would provide the Urban High Crime Reduction Program with an analytic capability for the CADOLIS data base.
2. Although the Superintendent of Police had been named project director in the first two grants, this role shifted to Mr. Moore shortly after his arrival.
3. Mr. Neumann and Mr. Johnson were elected to one another's position on the County Board in 1979, but both remained on the Crime Reduction Council.
4. TASC derives from Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime, a diversionary program for narcotics abusers who are arrested.
5. Looking at it somewhat more cynically, one might observe that the presence of other high-visibility action grant programs operating in and around the City may have made it easier for the Council to be cautious and deliberate.
6. The 10 percent figure had previously been indicated in the grant application for the Crime Impact Program and was adopted by the Crime Reduction Council as a nominal target.
7. The study population varied slightly from one study to the next due to the presence of an occasional outlier or missing data item for the adult population.
8. Recidivism for the adult population was defined as re-arrest.
9. For the population used in the juvenile deterrence study, there were 470 different individuals, 721 custodies, 582 incidents, and 915 charges (for juveniles, defined as one involvement in one residential burglary alleged by the police).
10. This represented the only direct use of automated data processing equipment for a study by the Peoria program staff.
11. Although system performance data for juveniles for 1971 and 1972 were believed accurate, there was some question as to completeness. Consequently, the time period chosen for the juvenile studies described below was narrowed to January 1, 1973 through June 30, 1978.
12. Unlike the adult study, the juvenile study reports findings only for the case where individuals are the units of count.
13. Since this opportunity arose after the 1 December 1978 meeting and applications were due in March 1979, the Chairman of the Council

Section 3.1 Footnotes (continued)

authorized the staff to proceed with the study without a Council vote. The study was largely funded by the Peoria County Office of Court Services and Probation.

14. We note that recommendations for this evaluation, outlining a design, had already been developed under the auspices of the Illinois Alcoholism and Drug Dependency Association.
15. Day-to-day operations, however, were left to supervisory personnel of the implementing agency.
16. It was noted, however, the extreme values had largely been eliminated for project cases.
17. This conclusion had been reached in a study by the Rand Corporation, entitled The Criminal Investigation Process, Volume III: Observations and Analysis (October 1975), report R-1778-DOJ.
18. It is possible, of course, that new projects may be proposed that would require additional funding which would be sought from sources other than the Urban High Crime Reduction Program.

3.2 Joliet

3.2 Joliet

The Joliet program began in June 1974 with the establishment of the Urban High Crime Reduction Council by city ordinance. Since that time, all four phases of the Impact Plan have been completed, five action projects have been implemented,¹ and the Council has averaged seven meetings per year. By the time grant funding ends in September 1980, some \$330,230 will have been expended for planning and another \$440,934 for action projects.

The Joliet program has seen two directors (Joliet's designation for the program coordinator): Neil Weisman, who began the program but left to manage the Champaign program in August 1976, and Gary Fitzgerald, who started as a student intern in January 1975. Mr. Fitzgerald subsequently served as research analyst and program aide, and was designated Director after Mr. Weisman's departure. Phase One of the program was completed under the direction of Mr. Weisman, while Mr. Fitzgerald has been responsible for the development of the other program phases.

The Council has had two chairmen, both private citizens. The first was Raymond Bolden, who was asked by the Mayor to serve in his place on the Council. With the election of a new mayor in May 1975, Mr. Bolden was forced to resign his membership and the new mayor assumed that guideline-mandated position. J. Michael Collins, a local businessman who had been appointed as an original member, was elected chairman.

Presently, the program coordination unit exists as the Criminal Justice Planning Division under the City Manager's office. In addition to Mr. Fitzgerald, the Division is staffed by a research analyst and a secretary. Staff offices are located at City Hall. While viewing the monitoring and evaluation of the two remaining grant-funded action projects as its primary responsibility, the Division is currently engaged in a variety of activities relating to criminal and juvenile justice as they affect the City of Joliet. It remains uncertain, however, whether its work will continue after September 1980. The future of the Urban High Crime Reduction Council is also uncertain.

3.2.1 The Joliet Urban High Crime Reduction Council

The formation of the Urban High Crime Reduction Council in Joliet was the first opportunity for private citizens and key individuals in the criminal

justice system serving the city to exchange their views on crime and to make joint decisions on the allocation of resources. The Council was established by City ordinance and has through media coverage maintained a high level of public visibility. Over the years, council meetings have been well attended and have seen a variety of discussions relating to the program as well as to other crime-related matters.

Composition

Membership on the Council has undergone some changes over the years. When the Joliet program began, Mayor Berlinsky, at the suggestion of Martin Rudman, then Will County State's Attorney, appointed Raymond Bolden, a private attorney, to sit on the Council in his place as its chairman. The other five positions mandated in the Program guidelines were filled as specified by the City Manager, the Chief of Police, the State's Attorney, the supervising Judge of the Circuit Court of Will County, and the Warden of Stateville Penitentiary (located near Joliet) as the chosen State Department of Corrections representative. The Public Defender, whose services are retained part-time by the county, was also invited to sit on the Council as a citizen member, along with a local businessman, an individual who was active in community affairs, and a private attorney. The Council thus began with eleven members.²

The Joliet Council experienced its first disruption with the election of a new mayor in May 1975. Mayor Keck expressed a strong interest in the City's crime problem and wished to serve in his own behalf on the Council. Mr. Bolden was forced to resign, the new mayor assumed his position, and Michael Collins, the businessman, was elected chairman, and the new Mayor appointed Darryl Holmquist to replace Mr. Bolden. This action was not without consequences. In sympathy with the forced resignation of Mr. Bolden, State's Attorney, Martin Rudman, also resigned his position on the Council, but assured his continued cooperation with its efforts. The State's Attorney position was left unfilled for more than a year, until Edward Petka was elected in November 1976.

In September 1977, Robert Oldland replaced Lynn Neuhart as City Manager and immediately joined the Council. John Bourg was elected Mayor in

1979, assuming his position on the Council at its first meeting thereafter and also re-appointing the citizen members. Other changes also occurred within the ranks of other specified members. The Warden of Stateville left his position in May 1975, and the Director of State Corrections appointed the Warden of the Joliet Correctional Center to this position, also located in Joliet, to this position in July 1977. Finally, one of the citizen members passed away, and the other left the Joliet area (neither case being the chairman). Two new members attended their first meeting respectively in October 1976 and August 1977.

Meeting Attendance

Attendance at Urban High Crime Reduction Council meetings is summarized in Table 3-2. Excluding the first five meetings, which were largely dedicated to the recruitment of a program coordinator, overall attendance at the remaining 37 meetings (October 1974 through December 1979) was 64 percent. Chairmen have been present in all but three meetings (92 percent). As a group, City officials (Mayor, City Manager, Chief of Police) have attended nearly 80 percent of the meetings while county officials have been present 51 percent of the time (68 percent for the State's Attorney and 25 percent for the Public Defender). Following these were the Chief Judge, who attended 43 percent of the meetings and the Department of Corrections representative at 25 percent. Excluding the chairmen, the three current citizen members achieved a 79 percent attendance rate.

Council meetings are formally conducted and are frequently attended by guests and the new media. All Council members and other expected guests receive a proposed meeting agenda and related materials approximately one week before meetings. Following the approval of minutes from the previous meeting, business typically begins with the Director's report, an update on the activities of the staff and the progress of action projects. Discussions regarding materials mailed out prior to the meeting may then be discussed. Issues dealing with administrative matters requiring the Council's attention may also appear in an agenda. Guest speakers who have appeared before the Council include the candidates for State's Attorney in the 1976 election, the Director of the Model Ex-Offender Program and the Restitution Specialist, the

Director of the Community Anti-Crime Program, and other key action project staff. As but one example, we have reproduced in Figure 3-3 the agenda of the December 1979 meeting, the most recent we attended. Based on our limited exposure (four meetings) and our examination of meeting minutes, we would judge the interest level as relatively high, although one source felt that interest in the program had declined since the 1977-1978 period.

Perceptions of Council Members

Most of the Joliet Council members interviewed felt that the program had been successful, though many were also skeptical about the system's ability to "reduce crime." While recognizing that target crime reduction was the primary goal of the program, few viewed this result as a necessary condition for deeming the program a success. All agreed that the forum provided by the Council for system officials to exchange perceptions and otherwise communicate with one another on a regular basis might prove to be the single most significant element of the program.

The Council's role in the selection of action projects was participative, especially in the early stages. A number of possible project areas were discussed at meetings during Phase I of the Joliet program, but the Director noted that projects relating to adjudication and corrections were to be deferred until those phases had been reached in turn. One Council member expressed surprise to learn that the phased approach was optional, while another believed that corrections should have been the first phase attempted. Several members expressed the view that decisions about action projects should largely reflect the expertise of that Council member whose agency would be implementing the project. This apparently did not, however, preclude other members from voicing their expectations. Meeting minutes reflect a number of lively discussions about the feasibility of some action proposals. One notable example was the issue of the City's liability in the event of injuries to individuals making symbolic restitution through public service work.

In summary, the Joliet Urban High Crime Reduction Council has played an active role in the City's implementation of the Program. Most members believed that their participation on the Council was a valuable experience and had high praise for the work of the staff. Members generally believed

FIGURE 3-3. Agenda for the Joliet Urban High Crime Reduction Council Meeting, December 1979

- I. Call to Order
- II. Roll Call
- III. Approval of Minutes of October 25, 1979 Meeting
- IV. Director's Report
 - A. Prostitution Policy Followup
 - B. Progress of Bail Bond Study
 - C. Family Violence Grant Status
 - D. Restitution Project (City Public Service Work Program)
 - E. Burglary Investigation Project
 - F. Target Crime Trend Report
- V. Drug Abuse Prevention Campaign: Update
 - A. Selection of Member to Essay Review Committee
- VI. Repeat Offender Proposal
- VII. YMCA Community Anti-Crime Program: Continuation Proposal
- VIII. Old Business
- IX. New Business
- X. Adjournment

that the influx of federal funds had raised the consciousness of the local criminal justice community and had provided it the opportunity to test innovative approaches to crime reduction that would otherwise not have been possible. While most members saw value in continuing the program as currently configured, few expressed the belief that local resources were sufficient for this to be realized in practice.

3.2.2 Development of the Impact Plan

From the Joliet program's inception in 1974 robbery and burglary have been its target crimes. All forms of these offenses were included: armed and unarmed robbery against individuals and commercial establishments; and both residential and non-residential burglary. That robbery victims are always unknown by their assailants seems to have been an assumption of the program.³


Phase I: Program Structure and Law Enforcement

The Phase I Plan was completed in October 1975, eleven months after Mr. Weisman assumed his duties as program director. This Plan set forth the reduction and control of robbery and burglary in the Joliet urban area as the program's primary goal, with sub-goals of an improved capability for criminal justice planning, increased cooperation and coordination among the primary components of the system, and increased citizen awareness and participation with respect to the City's efforts to control crime. Finally, specific objectives were outlined as:

- analyzing the functions of the system as they pertain to robbery and burglary;
- developing, implementing and evaluating robbery and burglary control program using a systemwide planning approach;
- preparing the requisite Impact Plan.

Excepting the sub-goal involving citizen participation and awareness, these elements directly reflect the goals and objectives given in the Program guidelines.⁴ A program structure, shown in Figure 3-4, was also established, indicating various strategies for the reduction and control of target crimes.

FIGURE 3-4. Joliet Program Structure



The Phase I Plan contained extensive statistical descriptions of robbery and burglary characteristics, compiled manually from Police Department dispatch and offense reports covering the first half of 1974. Included were statistics on:

- the manner by which calls for service were received;
- response time and initial investigation time;
- police disposition;
- age, sex and race of suspects and arrestees;
- victim characteristics (individuals, households, businesses);
- time of occurrence;
- method of entry;
- value of property stolen or destroyed.

A number of these items were also displayed by census tract, with those in the ten tracts experiencing the highest incidence of robbery and burglary examined against a variety of demographic characteristics. The Plan also included detailed descriptions of existing Police Department resources and operations, and an overview of the City (geography, history, government, media, industry, etc.).

The Phase I Plan concluded that the target crimes "demonstrate certain characteristics and predictable tendencies...concentrated in certain areas of the City." Greater focus of police resources, community awareness and action, and an increased capability for knowing where and when resources should be most heavily committed were cited as needs to improve the control of robbery and burglary. A two-pronged project--the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit--was recommended for funding, with a budget of \$133,000. Crime prevention activities, using a recreational vehicle for the display of locks and burglary prevention literature, constituted the first element of the project. Selective enforcement by a team of officers tactically deployed against robbery and burglary, either overtly or covertly, and equipped with an electronic detection device, was proposed as the Unit's other component. The Plan also called for the creation of a Crime Analysis Section within the Police Department's Administrative Services Division that would provide daily, weekly and monthly target crime summaries, to assist the Unit

in the identification of target neighborhoods where the deployment of project resources would be maximally effective. The crime analyst position was to be filled by an individual funded under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, and not by the Urban High Crime Reduction Program.

A second action project, which received no mention in the Phase I Plan, was proposed with a \$46,305 budget, to supplement the crime prevention component of the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit. As described in the grant application, the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program would rebate homeowners in selected neighborhoods the cost of certain physical security measures (solid core doors, deadbolt door locks, window locks, and porch/yard lighting) against robbery or burglary. The neighborhoods in question had already been selected to participate in a federally-funded program that provided rebates to homeowners for improvements that would bring their homes up to housing code standards. While the crime prevention rebate idea has general promotional value, its intent was to reduce the incidence of residential burglary in the target neighborhoods.⁵ The project also sought to reduce residents' fear of crime.

Continuing work relating to Phase I, the Joliet program staff prepared a Plan update and submitted a grant application in March 1978 for \$30,978 to fund a victim-witness aide for 18 months, to be located within the Investigations Division of the Police Department. This recommendation stemmed jointly from a review of the literature and a telephone survey of victims and witnesses of robbery or burglary. The goal of the project was to ensure full cooperation of civilian victims and witnesses who are contacted by the aide if they subsequently were to fulfill another victim or witness role. Due to the low probability of multiple victimizations in robbery or burglary and the small sample for the survey, the Program monitor urged the Council to withdraw its application. A victim-witness aide was subsequently hired, however, in March 1979, using CETA funding.

Phase II: Adjudication

The Phase II Plan was completed in December 1976. Included were a description of the Illinois court system, judicial caseloads and workloads, and descriptions of county functions: the State's Attorney's Office, the

public defender system, the jury system, and probation services. Selected statistics on cases handled by the public defender system that stemmed from 1974 arrests made by the Joliet Police Department, and from police files on juveniles, were also presented in the Plan.

The offender tracking system, begun by the program staff in January 1976, provided a key source of data for Phase II planning. Each month, the names of all adults arrested for homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, and felony drug delivery and possession were provided to the program staff by the Joliet Police Department and the Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad. Arrests for attempts in each of these categories were not included. For each such individual, the following information was collected:

- arrest charge(s),
- prosecuted charge(s),
- prior arrest charge(s), and dispositions,
- age, race, sex and aliases of the defendant,
- bond imposed and whether or not it was made,
- name and type of attorney,
- legal status at time of arrest,
- judicial proceedings on the charge(s) and time between stages
- presiding judge.

Initially the data on each case were recorded as they became known; coded reporting forms were later designed to facilitate the compilation of statistical summaries. These summaries were designed to speak to issues of charge dismissal, plea bargaining and other charge reduction events, case processing delays and backlog, and "repeaters."

Five offender tracking reports have been prepared by the staff, which include arrests spanning the three years beginning in January 1976. Data from two reports, covering the first eleven months, were summarized in the Phase II Plan as an indication of the need to prosecute target offenders more vigorously. The summary statistics, however, were left to speak for themselves as self-evident of this need.

Planning for the adjudication phase of the Joliet program was based largely on the belief that lacking a full-trial capability, the Will County

State's Attorney was not able to achieve a sufficiently strong deterrent against target crime.⁶ Other factors cited in support of an action project to be implemented by the State's Attorney's Office were:

- the inadequacy of robbery and burglary caseloads in the judicial circuit serving the City to justify specialized courts of this nature;
- the belief that the prosecutor's charging decisions were key to the adjudication process and final disposition;
- The belief that by concentrating its resources on repeat offenders, the State's Attorney's Office could bring about disproportionately large reductions in the incidence of target crime.

Proposed for 24 months at a cost of \$137,765, the Special Prosecution Unit emerged as the Phase II action project. This project, seeking to prosecute "target cases" more vigorously than was previously possible, thereby increasing the risk of harsher sanctions against target crime offenders, especially those designated repeaters.

In summary, the Special Prosecution Unit's objectives were (a) to bring about the imposition of stronger sanctions against those convicted of target crimes by (b) increasing the threat of trial through the enhancement of prosecutorial resources, and (c) focusing these resources on repeat offenders.

Phase III: Corrections

Planning for Phase III in the Joliet program took place in two stages. The Phase III Plan itself was completed in August 1977 and covered the following topics:

- state and local corrections for adults and juveniles sentenced from Will County;
- statistics derived from a 1975 survey of the Will County Jail, conducted by the National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture;
- statistics on arrests, sentencing, prior record, and recidivism (defined as rearrest within prescribed periods), compiled for adults in the offender tracking system and prior history of contact with juvenile justice system, and on juvenile recidivism where station adjustment was the police disposition.

The Plan also provided estimates of the proportion of juveniles who were re-arrested as adults and performed a qualitative assessment of juvenile family histories. The staff analyzed these findings in the context of discussions with local correctional officials and reviews of documents describing local correctional programming elsewhere in the country. Four project options were then presented in the Plan:

- a restitution specialist working within the Probation Department or the State's Attorney's Office to monitor conditions of restitution imposed on target offenders;
- parental effectiveness training to assist parents and children in improving communication skills, that would be attended voluntarily by juveniles coming into contact with the system and their parents;
- a volunteer coordinator working within the Probation Department to recruit, train and coordinate community volunteers in the delivery of probation services;
- a job developer, working within the existing Model Ex-Offender Program serving Will County and a neighboring County, to assist probationers in the development of job skills and identify job placement opportunities.

Following submission of the Phase III Plan, program staff conducted further studies of the relationship between recidivism and restitution using the juvenile data.⁷ Using a sample of 60 cases, the Chi-square statistic was used to test the hypothesis that recidivism rates for those required to make restitution were lower than for those not having such a requirement. When the full sample was tested, no statistically significant differences were found. The sample was then stratified by type of juvenile disposition: regular probation (n=25), and the Earned Dismissal Program (n=35) which entailed substantially less supervision. Of the regular probationers, the group required to make restitution had significantly lower recidivism rates (at the ten percent level) than the group that had no restitution condition, while no significant differences were found for the Earned Dismissal Program group. Noting that the number of adults required to make restitution was beginning to increase and applying (with caveats) the findings of the juvenile analysis to the adult population, the staff recommended that the Council approve a Target Crime Restitution Project for Phase III funding.

With a 15-month budget of \$20,436, this project would fund a Restitution Specialist to monitor restitution payments, under orders of Probation, by (adult) robbery and burglary offenders, and would seek job placement opportunities for these individuals. The objectives of this project were to keep the recidivism rate and the restitution failure rate below ten percent, and to effect payments of at least 90 percent of court-ordered amounts.

Phase IV: Update

Completed in January 1979, the Phase IV Plan consisted of three major parts. The first part provided updated information on robbery and burglary patterns in the City and on certain reorganizational elements within the Police Department. Statistical indicators were presented, which showed that citizens were apparently not taking greater precautionary measures to prevent residential burglary, and other community-based anti-crime activities were also noted. The second part of the Plan provided an update on statistics compiled from the program-developed offender tracking system. As will be described more fully in Section 3.2.4, these statistics indicated that felony cases, particularly those involving repeat offenders, were being more aggressively prosecuted in 1977 than in the previous year.

The third part of the Phase IV Plan focused on the staff's Arrest Deterrence Study, fashioned after the deterrence studies conducted by the Peoria program staff. The study strategy was to develop correlation measures between (a) the ratio of arrests to the known incidence of target crime (police efficiency) and (b) the known incidence of target crime. The data which covered five and a half years beginning in January 1973, were stratified by quarter, and both direct and lagged correlations were calculated. Additionally, adults and juveniles were examined together and separately; estimates of the number of target crimes committed by each group in a quarter were made by applying the proportion of each group arrested during the six month interval containing that quarter. Correlations were developed for robbery, burglary, residential burglary, and non-residential burglary. For each of these offense types, five correlation values were computed.

- (1) police efficiency (adult case) vs. known incidence (adult estimate);

- (2) police efficiency (adult case) vs. known incidence (total);
- (3) police efficiency (juvenile case) vs. known incidence (juvenile estimate);
- (4) police efficiency (juvenile case) vs. known incidence (total);
- (5) police efficiency (adult and juveniles) vs. known incidence (total)

In all, 40 correlations were developed (20 each lagged and non-lagged).

Statistically significant negative correlations were found in four of the 30 burglary cases but in none of the robbery cases. Cases (4) and (5) for residential burglary (both lagged); case (1) for non-residential burglary (non-lagged); and case (1) for total burglary (non-lagged) were significant at the five percent level. Based on these findings, the staff recommended that steps be taken to select an action project which would increase the risk of arrest for burglary.

The program staff then proceeded systematically through its project selection process. Possible project areas were first identified through discussions with police officers and management, documented sources, and methods tried elsewhere but not documented. Burglary arrest and incident reports were examined to determine which of five factors was chiefly responsible for the arrest. Citizen-witness calls were by far the most frequent reason cited--44 percent. This was followed by suspect investigation/confession at 22 percent, physical evidence tracing at nine percent, electronic alarm eight percent (but all in the non-residential category), and on-view at 4 percent. The staff then documented its assessment of six project areas:

- public education and neighborhood watch
- expanded use of electronic alarms
- decrease response time
- more patrol officers
- field interview program
- physical evidence training

Elements from three of these areas were joined in the staff's recommendation for a Burglary Investigation Project. Specifically, this project would enhance the physical evidence capability of the department, dedicate an

investigator full-time to burglary, expand the field interview program citywide (street interrogation of suspicious persons), and coordinate public education efforts of other recently-funded community programs. The last two elements involve virtually no cost to the program. With a budget of \$147,202, the objectives of the project were to enhance prospects for identifying suspects and establishing probable cause through physical evidence tracing and through investigation, and to educate the community to call the police immediately upon suspecting a burglary. Unbeknownst to all but those who planned it, an undercover fencing operation to increase the risk of arrest for burglary was also a component of the Burglary Investigation Project. This replicated another such operation in the City eighteen months later.

3.2.3 Other Activities of Program Staff

Complementing its planning, monitoring and evaluation activities were a number of other activities and programs that have been of interest to the Joliet staff. Selected examples are described in the following paragraphs.

Parental Responsibility Ordinance

One outgrowth of research conducted by the staff for the Phase III Plan was a disproportionately large share of juveniles coming into contact with the justice system who were from unstable home situations. In addition to the Plan's reference to Parental Effectiveness Training as a possible Phase III project component, the Joliet Urban High Crime Reduction Council, in March 23, 1977, recommended to the Joliet City Council that it enact an ordinance which would have the effect of increasing the liability of parents and guardians for criminal or quasi-criminal acts committed by minors. In consultation with the City's corporation counsel, the director reviewed ordinances dealing with this subject from several other Illinois communities, including a model ordinance drafted by judges and attorneys in Cook County.

An ordinance was drafted, presented to the CRC and City Council, and was passed by the City Council on April 26, 1977. The ordinance provided for the UHCRC's concern in this matter, which was that parents should be held responsible in some degree, whether in the form of fines, restitutions, or court appearances with their children, for the acts of their children against

persons and property. According to the Police Department's Juvenile Officers, the ordinance has facilitated out-of-court restitution agreements in lieu of other alternatives.

Victim and Witness Issues

The City's interest in victims and witnesses has been significant. We have already mentioned the victim-witness project endorsed by the Council. On June 2, 1977, a panel discussion on the subject of victims and witnesses of crime was sponsored by the Joliet program and organized by the staff. In attendance were representatives of county law enforcement agencies, community service agencies, interested public, and other governmental bodies. Titled, "Community, Government, and the Victims of Crime," the panel featured experts addressing problems that face victims of crime and suggesting ways to alleviate such problems. The discussion drew a total of about 40 participants. More recently, application has been made for a discretionary LEAA grant to fund a Will County Integrated Police/Prosecution Witness Assistance Program.

YMCA Community Anti-Crime Program

The Joliet program director, city grantsman, Director of Neighborhood and Community Services of the YMCA and a coalition of neighborhoods successfully collaborated on an LEAA funded YMCA Community Anti-Crime Grant. The \$176,000 project consists of funding for neighborhood groups to provide support and volunteers to assist the police in combatting crime, especially crime dealing with juveniles and the elderly. The grant was endorsed by the Urban High Crime Reduction Council, the Joliet Chief of Police, and other local officials. Beginning in early 1979, the 18-month project will run until May 30, 1980. Five basic programs offered:

- neighborhood patrols in which volunteer residents patrol areas and contact police at the start of any problem;
- block watches that involve asking the elderly to watch specific areas for problems and contact police;
- education of homeowners about protecting their property against burglary;

- protection of children with playground supervisors; and
- aid to crime victims.

Data supplied by the Criminal Justice Planning Division were consulted in the choice of specific areas where these programs would be targeted. Based on the Division's evaluation of the first 18 months, a continuation grant has been submitted. At one of its meetings, the Urban High Crime Reduction Council explored possibilities for dealing with prostitution with a large contingent from one of the target neighborhoods. A Prostitution Policy Statement was subsequently prepared by the staff, and adopted by the Council, detailing charging and sentencing policies for dealing with prostitution.

Drug Abuse

The Joliet Urban High Crime Reduction Council has over the years maintained a continuing interest in the subject of drug abuse. As already noted, arrests made by the Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad were entered into the Joliet program's offender tracking system. In late 1979, the Criminal Justice Planning Division learned that Joliet had been designated as a Service Center for the statewide Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) program, which sought to identify criminal defendants with drug abuse problems, refer these individuals to treatment, and monitor their progress. The Division subsequently arranged to brief local officials about TASC and has undertaken, in conjunction with the local Drug Coordination and Information Council, a Drug Abuse Prevention Campaign. Viewing drug abuse simultaneously as a problem for parents, police and schools, the campaign's goal is to reduce its incidence among the area's youth. Activities contemplated for the campaign included an essay contest about drug abuse for school children in the Joliet area, the development of brochures and newspaper supplements on the subject, presentations at meetings of community organizations, a high school liaison officer, an evaluation of the local effectiveness of TASC, and coordination with the Community Anti-Crime Program through the development of a drug abuse prevention component.

3.2.4 Action Projects

Five action projects were implemented under Joliet's Urban High Crime Reduction Program: two by the Police Department, one by the Neighborhood

Services Division of the City's Department of Community Development, one by the Will County State's Attorney's Office, and one by the Model Ex-Offender Program, a non-profit social service organization. Figure 3-5 shows the periods of operation of these five projects; also shown are the dates when the undercover anti-fencing operations (JAWS, for Joliet Area Wide Sweep), which will be described later, and the completion date for each phase of the Impact Plan. The development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of these projects are described in the paragraphs below.


Mobile Crime Prevention Unit

While the Phase I Plan was completed in October 1975, the 12-month grant was not awarded until March 1976, and the Unit was not placed into operation until six months later. The initial delay reflected the need to make revisions in the grant application, and to be scheduled on the agenda of ILEC's Planning and Budgeting which, as noted, passed judgment on project "concepts." A grant condition which required the Police Department to develop an adequate affirmative action plan coupled with a reduction in force was largely responsible for the delay between grant award and implementation in September.

A detailed policy and procedures manual was jointly prepared by the program staff and police administrators. The manual first sets forth the Unit's objectives, two each for City-wide and "target area" ceilings on the incidence of robbery and burglary. Noting a 54 percent increase in robbery in 1975 over 1974, the first objective was to halt further growth in 1976.⁸ The second objective called for a 10 percent reduction in robbery in target areas in which the Unit would focus its efforts for three month periods. The more ambitious reduction level reflected percentage increases in the target areas that were somewhat smaller than the citywide figure. A similar rationale was given in stipulating 5 and 15 percent decreases in burglary city-wide and in target areas, respectively. Responsibility for supervision of the Unit and maintenance of records on its activity rested with an experienced sergeant in the Department. The Chief of Police was named project director in the grant.

The manual goes on to describe operating procedures of the selective enforcement and crime prevention teams comprising the Unit. Selective

FIGURE 3-5. Time Span of Action Projects of the Joliet Program



Key	
●	Plan phase completed
▲	Undercover anti-fencing operations

enforcement operations were described as including various overt surveillance techniques, decoy planning and methods, and "specialized patrol." Record-keeping specifications for each type of operation were also described in the manual. Crime prevention activities were described as premise surveys, operation identification, and deployment of the crime prevention van. Daily reports were to be prepared on crime prevention activities. The manual ends with statements of policy toward robbery and burglary surveillance and on-view situations.

In practice, according to information we obtained in interviews, the crime prevention van was never placed into service as part of the project; the silent alarm equipment was infrequently used; and the department found the deployment of the Unit to target areas to be too great a constraint on overall Department operations. An evaluation by the program staff found that records had not been kept as planned, and that the Unit arrested two "repeaters" with one subsequently convicted and sentenced to state prison.⁹ The staff evaluation gave the Department's need to strike a balance between the geographic distribution of calls for service and concentration of resources in target areas as one explanation of why the project was not implemented as planned.¹⁰ The evaluation cited four Unit accomplishments.

- accumulation of "street information" for use by the patrol and investigation divisions;
- improved public attitudes toward the police, through the Unit's crime prevention efforts;
- the arrest of two repeat offenders;
- increased precautions taken against target crimes, by businesses and households.

All but the conclusion were based on anecdotal information.

The situation facing the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit is not unfamiliar. After experiencing numerous delays, and looking ahead to a 10-month horizon for the project, both the program staff and members of the Unit gave record-keeping and project evaluation low priority relative to getting the Unit on the street. Demand for police services throughout the city precluded concentrating the Unit's resources in specific areas. Prior commitment of the vehicle that was to mobilize the lock display forestalled this element of the Unit's crime prevention component, although as we shall see shortly, the

crime prevention van was placed into operation in conjunction with the crime prevention rebate project. In summary, the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit offered the Joliet program little opportunity to learn about its potential for crime reduction on such improvements.

Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program

The Director of the Neighborhood Services Division was thus named project director of the neighborhood crime prevention rebate project in order to coordinate this project with the Division's own general improvement rebate program. As previously noted, these neighborhoods had already been selected to participate in the federally-funded block grant housing program which was being administered by the Neighborhood Services Division of the City Department of Community Development. Coordination was also to take the form of training housing inspectors in premise security techniques by the Police Department's crime prevention officer. Assuming an average rebate of 35 percent from each source, an average cost per home of \$540 and an estimated participation rate of 35 percent (345 homes), a budget of \$46,305 was submitted.

The project's first setback was the decision by ILEC to provide funding that would support only one of the two targeted neighborhoods, with the suggestion that the other be used for comparison purposes. The decision as to which neighborhood to select was left to local officials. The budget was cut to \$22,222, which the Neighborhood Services Division estimated would cover rebates for 125 homeowners. The revised budget was submitted in March 1977, and the crime prevention rebate project was underway by April.

We noted earlier that the crime prevention van that had been scheduled for use by the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit was first placed into service in connection with the rebate project. After approximately two months, use of the van was discontinued due to lack of community interest in viewing the lock display. The premise security surveys planned for the project continued, but few homeowners were persuaded to incur the net cost of physical security improvements, even with the rebate incentive.

The project received its second setback from ILEC when the agency asked the city to suspend project operations in September 1977, the result of

an LEAA ruling that Safe Street funds could not be used to benefit private places "unless a direct and substantial benefit to public enforcement and criminal justice could be demonstrated." The City immediately requested clarification and reconsideration by the Executive Director of ILEC, arguing that the characteristics of benefitting households and the fact that only a portion of the total cost of improvements would be returned caused the rebate project to fall outside the scope of the ruling. The decision was eventually appealed to LEAA, which ruled in the project's favor. In a March 27, 1978 letter, LEAA's General Counsel advised that since the Joliet project began prior to the aforementioned ruling, it was exempt, but that ILEC should no longer award grants for projects of this nature.

Although the project was resumed in April--eight months after it had been suspended--few residents applied for rebates. Project extensions were granted to April 1979, but only 31 residents eventually received rebates averaging \$418.50. Having spent only 29 percent of the project budget, the city returned unspent funds to ILEC for reprogramming.

Observing that the low level of participation did not permit an evaluation of the project in accordance with a plan it had prepared,¹² an April 1979 staff report on the project focused on the reasons for the apparent lack of interest. Suggested were the reluctance of contractors to perform small jobs, such as the installation of solid core doors; the fact that residents had to provide the initial cash outlay, and the non-standard features of the older homes in the target neighborhood that made improvements both expensive and difficult. Also noted was the neighborhood's predominantly Hispanic population which in Joliet has traditionally viewed police-related programs with skepticism (notwithstanding the fact that the crime prevention officer assigned to do premise security surveys for the project was of Hispanic origin). In summary, despite its common sense appeal, the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program was overexpectant and encountered severe implementation problems and drew less interest than was anticipated based on response to the block grant rebates. Fortunately, little cost was incurred for this learning experience.

Special Prosecution Unit

The first year application for the Special Prosecution Unit specified the goals of effecting "high-quality" prosecution of felony defendants, particularly those charged with robbery or burglary and those designated "repeaters," and of increasing capability of the State Attorney's Office to take felony cases to full trial. High quality prosecution would result from:

- specialization in certain types of cases;
- the development of criteria for screening police charges and complaints;
- the establishment of policies governing plea negotiations in target crime cases.

Repeaters were to be identified by means of explicit criteria and were to receive priority attention.

Measurement of the quality of prosecution is by no means straightforward. References to case screening and plea negotiation criteria suggest that greater uniformity or fairness was desired. From the perspective of the Joliet program structure, however, greater severity in charging and sentencing policies come to mind as means of increasing risk to the offender. While the Unit was seen as striving for both of these attributes, the severity issue provided the chief measure of the Unit's success.

The issue of greater trial capability is also somewhat elusive. Success in this regard was not to be measured in terms of the fraction of felony dispositions ending in trial. Rather, the threat of trial in felony cases was to be greater as a result of the Unit. Theoretically, with no workload increase, the threat of trial should increase as a result of greater case preparation time afforded the state through the addition of two assistant state attorneys to replace the experienced assistants assigned to the Unit. This increase in the threat would thus be achieved from the state's greater leverage in the negotiation process. From this standpoint, one would expect to see more guilty pleas entered, but harsher sentences than under former circumstances.

The Special Prosecution Unit was planned to operate for two years, and the project was funded under two twelve-month grants showing budgets of \$74,999 and \$68,340, respectively.¹³ In contrast to the Phase I action

projects, the Unit met with few implementation problems. The Unit began accepting cases in April 1977, some three months after the Phase II Plan was completed.

Actual implementation of the Unit, however, differed substantially from what had been planned. Policies governing the screening of felony cases and plea negotiations were not documented.¹⁴ A scoring system was devised for the designation of "repeaters" but was never used. Documented criteria in all these areas were viewed by the state's attorney as too "inflexible" and thus "unworkable."

Indeed, no record of cases prosecuted by the Unit were kept until December 1977, nine months after the Unit began taking cases. Staff from the then Crescent Regional Criminal Justice Council intervened in November 1977, after having selected the Special Prosecution Unit as a project to be evaluated.¹⁵ Finding no records on the Unit's caseload, the regional evaluators nonetheless released a report of the project in January 1978. Given such limited input, the report's process evaluation was more valuable than its assessment of the Unit's impact.¹⁶

Statistics on cases the Unit disposed of during the 15 months beginning with January 1978 were compiled by the Joliet program staff from case information that eventually recorded by the Unit's secretary. Of the 216 defendants, 33 faced armed robbery charges (15 percent); 7 faced robbery charges (3 percent); 166 faced burglary charges (77 percent); and 10 faced other felony charges (5 percent). Dispositions of armed robbery and burglary cases are summarized in Table 3-3. Of those charged with armed robbery, 67 percent were convicted of some felony. More than half (56 percent) entered into negotiated pleas, while half that number (28 percent) were found guilty at trial. Felony convictions were obtained in 79 percent of the burglary cases; of these, 79 percent were achieved through negotiated pleas, while 7 percent resulted in trial verdicts of guilty. Almost all of those convicted of a felony on armed robbery charges received straight prison sentences (94 percent). In 59 percent of the sentences for burglary, sentences did not involve any form of incarceration. The analysis of the program staff also found median times of 75 days from initial court appearance to guilty pleas and 105 days to the start of a trial in armed robbery and robbery cases

Table 3-3. Summary of Case Penetration Probabilities Achieved
by the Special Crime Prevention Unit (Joliet):
April 1978 - March 1979 (Excluding October)

Case Penetration Probabilities	Armed Robbery	Burglary
Given the decision to charge, the probability of:*	(n=33)	(n=166)
● dismissal	.09	.14
● acquittal in a felony trial	.12	.01
● transfer to misdemeanor court	--	.04
● conviction on misdemeanor in felony trial	.09	.01
● conviction on <u>some</u> felony,	.67	.79
as percentages*	(n=22)	(n=131)
--by blind plea	17%	14%
--by negotiated plea	56	79
--by trial	28	7
● unfit for trial	.03	--
Given conviction, the probability of:*	(n=22)	(n=131)
● time in state institution	.95	.14
● periodic local institution time	--	.29
● probation, no time	.05	.58

*Error in percentages due to rounding

Source. Tabulations prepared by the Criminal Justice Planning Division from records kept by the Will County State's Attorney's Office.

combined. Corresponding times for burglary were 111 days to plea and 150 days to trial.

An evaluation of the Unit's impact on the "severity" of prosecution in robbery and burglary cases would require the development of statistics similar to these from a baseline period before the Unit was created. The construction of any baseline sample from cases disposed of in Will County prior to the Unit would be faced with an important confounding factor. Many of the cases included in the above statistics stemmed from charges on offenses which occurred after February 1, 1978, the effective date of the Class X determinate sentencing law passed in Illinois the previous year. Offering considerably stiffer penalties for most crimes, but particularly armed robbery, this new law would have increased the negotiating leverage for prosecutors under any circumstances.

Under the assumption that explicit case screening guidelines had been developed by the Unit, we had recommended that two case samples be selected from all robbery and burglary arrest charges filed in the county. Using these criteria, cases disposed of prior to and after the implementation of the Unit would have been drawn. The post-implementation sample would have been compared with the actual Unit caseload in determining the extent to which the guidelines were screening the cases they were designed to screen. Moreover, the comparison of statistics from this sample (instead of from the Unit's actual caseload) with statistics derived from the pre-implementation sample would have been statistically unbiased. Since formal screening criteria were not developed by the State's Attorney's Office, this approach proved infeasible. Instead, the Joliet program staff utilized its offender tracking system to derive statistics on trials, convictions, sentencing and case processing time for periods before and after the Unit was implemented. Based on these comparisons, the Council endorsed second-year funding for the project. Although the project was to have continued under local auspices after grant funding ended, workload pressures in the latter half of 1979 caused the Unit to be disbanded; the cost of its staff, however, was assumed by the County. The Joliet program staff plans to provide reports to its Council on prosecutorial success with repeaters and to develop a repeat offenders bulletin containing information on individuals who surpass the

threshold "score," for possible use in suspect development by the Joliet Police Department. No further evaluation of the Unit is contemplated.

Target Crime Restitution Project

The goal of the Target Crime Restitution Project was to reduce recidivism among adults convicted of robbery or burglary (or lesser included offenses) and placed on probation with a condition of restitution. Although only those convicted of target crimes which occurred in Joliet were initially eligible for the project, its scope was later expanded to include all of Will County. Essentially, the project called for a Restitution Specialist to assist target probationers in finding employment or public service work, the former providing a source of legal income for making monetary restitution and the latter constituting symbolic restitution.

Consistent with the court's orders of probation, the specialist prepared written agreements with target probationers, outlining restitution amounts (or length of public service) and payment (or work) schedules. Compliance with this agreement was monitored by the Specialist, and periodic reports were prepared for both system officials and victims.

The specialist was employed by the Model Ex-Offender Program, with the director of that Program designated project director sponsored by the Prison Release Ministry, a non-profit organization providing re-entry assistance to those released from prison. The possibility of placing the Restitution Specialist in the Will County Probation Department was also explored but rejected, largely for reasons of incompatibility with the Department's organizational structure and the large caseload it handles. Moreover, prospects for securing grant match funds from the County Council were remote.¹⁷

Implementation of the Target Crime Restitution Project provided many challenges to the coordinative skills of the Joliet program staff. The State's Attorney's Office, the judiciary, and the Probation Department, were all essential in the client referral process. By recommending probation sentences that include restitution or by offering such sentences as part of a negotiated plea, when appropriate, the State's Attorney's Office is instrumental in the initiation of the process.¹⁸ As the individual responsible

for the signing of probation orders, the sentencing judge is central to the presence or absence of restitution as an official sanction. Finally, the Probation Department was the last link in the referral process. The referral of eligible probationers to the Model Ex-Offender Program relied on their review of probation orders. An agreement between these two organizations was drawn on 31 January 1978, well in advance of the project, stipulating that all unemployed probationers would be referred to the Model Ex-Offender Program for an evaluation of job skills and possible placement, and providing for reports back to criminal justice officials on progress and problems during a one year follow-up.

Policies had to be established to govern the calculation of restitution amounts and payment schedules, and the nature of proceedings in the event of non-compliance. Restitution agreements had to be cognizant of a dual system of restitution payment transfer from the offender to the victim.¹⁹ The question of the scope of public service work (e.g., whether it could be performed for a non-profit public service organization such as the Red Cross) also had to be resolved. This was accomplished through an inquiry from the State's Attorney to the State Attorney General, who indicated that non-profit organizations qualified in this respect. The issue of the City's liability in the event of injury to a probationer performing public service work posed a significant problem in the development of the project. This was resolved by limiting public service slots to those presenting a low risk of injury and by the City's decision to reimburse the medical expenses of a probationer who was injured in such a capacity. According to existing law, probationers could not be hired as City employees; consequently, probationers would not be covered under the City's Workmen's Compensation Plan if they were injured while performing public service work in fulfilling this type of restitution order. Since the Council would not endorse the project unless this liability issue was resolved, program staff sought to amend the law banning probationers from municipal employment. State legislators representing Joliet were contacted by the staff and asked to sponsor a bill. Signed into law in September 1979, Senate Bill 1270 accomplished precisely this task.

Despite the "paper" success of these coordinative efforts, the target crime restitution project fell far short of its anticipated caseload of 75

probationers. As of May 24, 1979, nearly six months after the Restitution Specialist was hired, only five clients had been received. This doubled to 10 by July 17, to 14 by September 12, and to 15 by December 10--the project's first year. As of February 23, 1979, the Specialist's caseload had grown to 23. The volume of referrals to the Target Crime Restitution project was a function of both the size of the eligible pool of offenders and the cooperation of the criminal justice system components noted earlier. Apparently, the shortfall in the caseload of the project was attributable to both sets of factors. The eligible pool was smaller than had been anticipated from past trends, and the Probation Department failed to refer some offenders who were determined by the program staff to have been eligible.

The project was closely monitored by the staff of the Joliet program, and the staff prepared an interim evaluation report in October 1979. This report, among other things, described a pre-project cohort of adult probationers who had been ordered to pay restitution. Individuals sentenced in Will County between September 1977 and November 1978 (the month prior to project implementation) and not known at the time of sample selection to reside outside the County were included. Of these 195 individuals, 41 target crime (or derivative) offenders had restitution in their probation orders (22 percent.)²⁰ Recidivism rates for these offenders calculated for individually varying periods from the date of sentencing to October 1979, were virtually identical for those with restitution orders and those without such orders (56 and 57 percent, respectively.) Thus, if the project were to achieve lower recidivism rates, the explanation could not be found in the restitution concept, but rather in the presence of the Restitution Specialist or some other factor. As of February 29, 1980, only 3 of 23 project clients had been rearrested: one individual three times for burglary, aggravated battery and criminal damage to property, one for theft, and one for a misdemeanor--a rate of 13 percent.²¹ Thirteen of 23 clients were employed as of that date (57 percent), and five had completed their restitution. More than \$11,500 had been ordered in monetary restitution, as had some 1000 hours of public service work. Appropriate agencies were notified in five cases of failure to sign a restitution agreement or failure to complete restitution on schedule.

Finding the project's caseload to be inadequate for a valid comparison with the pre-project group or for a cost-effective operation, the October 1979 evaluation of the project recommended the project be discontinued, and that the Probation Department consider giving higher priority to probationers' restitution orders. In short, the written expressions of support were simply not adequate to sustain the project.

Burglary Investigation Project

Designed to increase the risk of arrest for burglary, the Burglary Investigation Project was planned for implementation during the 18 months starting in April 1979.²² The project consisted of four major components:

- physical evidence collection and analysis;
- investigation dedicated to burglary;
- community education to encourage calls to the police for suspected occurrence of burglary; and,
- an undercover anti-fencing operation.

As noted earlier, the last component had to be kept confidential until the arrests were made on 10 January 1980. This was the second JAWS (Joliet Area Wide Sweep) operation in as many years; both will be described later in this section.

The enhancement of the Police Department's capability in physical evidence collection and analysis was to occur through the work of an evidence officer funded through the grant and eventually through automation of fingerprint comparisons performed by a mini-computer leased with grant funds. Project planners anticipated increases in the number of burglary scenes processed for physical evidence, latent prints recovered, and matches with prints already on file at the Department (suspect identifications).

The physical evidence component was to have been implemented in three stages:

- The first stage actually preceded the award of grant funds, calling for a new policy in which "cold searches" would be conducted for all latent fingerprints recovered from burglary scenes. Under existing policy, latent print comparisons were made only if an investigator requested such comparisons via memorandum. A geocoded "active suspect" print file was developed prior to the implementation of the project to facilitate these cold searches.

- The addition of the evidence officer and the investigator with the grant award would permit the processing of more burglary scenes for latent prints and other physical evidence. Case searches would continue, as would further enhancement of the active suspect file.²³
- In the third stage of the project, prints in the active suspect file would be coded for entry into the mini-computer leased under the grant, the size of this file would be further increased, and automated print comparisons would be made.

An interim evaluation of the project prepared by the Joliet program staff in February 1980, ten months after the project began, found that while the number and proportion of burglary scenes searched and the number of latent prints recovered both increased in 1979 over 1978, the number of suspects identified through physical evidence decreased. Specifically, 50 percent more scenes were processed in 1979 than the 548 in 1978, and 30 percent more prints were recovered in 1979 than the 162 in 1978, but only 5 identifications were made using physical evidence in 1979 compared to 8 such identifications in 1978. While the staff was unable to explain this decline in identifications, the evaluation report noted that the cold search procedures had not been instituted for reasons of attrition and illness in the Evidence Section which offset the presence of an additional evidence officer.²⁴ The report also noted, however, that more print comparisons were made in 1979 than in previous years as a result of additional requests for such comparisons stemming from the work of the project's investigative component.

The physical evidence component of the Burglary Investigation Project still awaits full implementation of the automated comparison capability. As of the end of February 1980, some 4000 prints from the active suspect file had been coded for entry into the mini-computer, but delays in the bidding process to select a hardware vendor and software development had pushed back this automated capability to May 1980.²⁵

The investigation component of the Burglary Investigation Project began in April 1979 as planned. A field interview program (involving street interrogations of suspicious persons) was revived at the same time to provide the investigator with possible additional leads in suspect development.²⁶ The investigator also used a color-coded pin map to locate various types of

burglary targets from which patterns of activity might be detected and traced to a single suspect or group of suspects. In an effort to recover stolen property, pawn shops' transactions were recorded and compared to these shops' weekly reports which were required by City ordinance.²⁷ A final means of enhancing the efforts of the investigator took the form of an administrative order issued by the Police Chief, stipulating that all patrol officers responding to burglary scenes question residents in the immediate vicinity on suspicious activity that might have been observed.

The interim evaluation found that the number of burglaries investigated increased from 511 in 1978 to 621 in 1979. According to the report, this difference, plus 63 other cases in which the investigator participated, accounted for the investigator's total caseload of 173 during the first 10 months of the project. Despite the increase in the number of burglary cases investigated, the overall number of burglaries cleared by arrest declined by 30 percent, from 64 in 1978 to 45 in 1979. The report noted, however, that the clearance (by arrest) rate for the project-funded investigator exceeded that of the other investigators. Four cases, involving the arrest of six juveniles (all subsequently referred to juvenile court) and two adults (subsequently convicted of misdemeanor theft and fined), that were attributed solely to the special investigator.

The interim evaluation report prepared by the Joliet program staff further described two patterns of activity identified through examination of the pin maps and steps undertaken by the program staff to improve citizen reporting of burglary. In this latter regard, the staff found that 39 percent of burglaries cleared by arrest in 1979 relied primarily on citizen contacts. This was slightly below the 44 percent found in the sample of cases examined in designing the project. In summary, the Burglary Investigation Project had yet to demonstrate an impact on increasing the risk of arrests for those committing burglary. Final evaluative judgments must await full implementation of the automated fingerprint matching capability.

Operation JAWS

JAWS II, the undercover anti-fencing operation, utilized \$25,000 in "buy money" that had been secretly incorporated in to the budget for the lease

of the mini-computer which was purchased to automate fingerprint comparisons. Coupled with \$16,000 from the Will County State's Attorney's Office, JAWS II operated over the first 10 months of the Burglary Investigation Project on a budget of \$41,000. Operating expenses (daily agent expenses, materials for the building, video equipment, a van, rent, and utilities) totalled \$28,290 while \$12,749 was spent on actual buys. Nearly half of the items bought were motor vehicles (25 of 55); clothes, TV and stereo equipment, cannabis, weapons, office equipment, and miscellaneous items constituted the remainder. In all, the estimated value of stolen property recovered was \$226,233.

According to the interim evaluation report, JAWS II led to the arrest of 29 individuals involving 90 charges. Nearly 70 percent of those arrested had prior arrests in Joliet; 10 of the 29 arrested had prior arrests for burglary, and 5 had previous burglary convictions. Most of the charges (76) were theft and theft conspiracy. Six charges were for burglary. These arrests cleared 59 offenses, 41 of which occurred in Joliet. Of these, 30 were motor vehicle theft, 12 were theft, eight were burglary, and two were robbery. JAWS II also provided information for the investigation of six other offenses, led to the identification of two fences, a four-state shoplifting ring, a motor vehicle theft ring, and organized gambling operations. The Joliet program staff plans to conduct a special tracking of the arrests made in JAWS II and will seek to measure its impact on burglary levels in the City.

Having no formal relation to the Joliet program but involving several of its Council members, the first JAWS took place in July 1977. Five months in planning, based on evidence garnered from a temporary storefront, JAWS I resulted in 97 arrests and recovery of over \$126,000 in stolen goods. Described by the press as a massive police crackdown on burglars in the Joliet area, JAWS I was a joint effort of the law enforcement agencies throughout the County. The State's Attorney and Joliet Police Chief helped formulate the operation, along with police chiefs from neighboring towns and special federal agents. Supervised by the State's Attorney and the police chiefs, a task force of 40 officers served arrest papers. Four assistant state's attorneys went along as observers; the State's Attorney said this was to view the arrest procedures in anticipation of resistance attempts against police. The State's Attorney planned immediate prosecution of those arrested

in the operation and the Chief Judge declared there would be speedy action on all cases. The program's Special Prosecution Unit led prosecution of all 97 indictments. No tracking data were available on these cases.

At the request of the Mayor, program staff researched court records after the operation to determine what, if any status, the 97 individuals had with the Will County courts at the time Operation JAWS was consummated. Of 52 names immediately available, 35 percent were out on bond, excluding traffic; about six percent were on probation or conditional discharge, and 13.5 percent had other matter pending with the courts. A review of the program's offender tracking system found that a number of those who had been arrested in JAWS had been previously arrested.

Monthly burglary statistics provide one indicator of the short-term impact of JAWS I. In the 12 months following JAWS I (August 1977-July 1978), 1567 reported burglaries were logged for the Joliet Police Department, the lowest figure by over 100 burglaries for this 12-month period since that beginning with August 1973. Known burglary incidence during August 1978 through July 1979 rose again, however, to 1684. These statistics suggest that JAWS I may have had an impact on burglary levels, but one which endured over a period of no more than a year.

3.2.5 Conclusions

For the past six years, the City of Joliet has implemented a broad-ranging program aimed at reductions in the incidence of robbery and burglary within its borders. The Urban High Crime Reduction Council and its staff have proceeded through the four phases of the Program in accordance with the original guidelines, though the road has been a difficult one. For each phase, an Impact Plan document was prepared and approved by the Council, action projects were implemented, and the local program staff has, with varying degrees of success, monitored and valuated these projects. Given limited authority over all facets of the program and its systemwide scope, the coordinative and persuasive skills of the program staff have been put to the test throughout the life of the program. We found this to be Joliet program's greatest strength.

Joliet's adaption in Phase IV of the methodology for selecting action projects used in Peoria reflects the maturation of its planning capabilities. The context of Joliet's Arrest Deterrence Study, however, differed from that of the Peoria studies. In the latter case, the importance of increasing the risk of arrest was judged relative to the relationship between residential burglary and sanctions imposed at later stages in the system, processing speed between stages, jail/bail status of defendants, and recidivism rates (where the subsequent crime is a residential burglary). In Joliet a binary decision based on statistical significance, was made on whether to adopt "increasing the risk of arrest for burglary", as a program objective. Thus, for Peoria the question was how to allocate available resources among possible strategies, while for Joliet the question was whether or not funds should be allocated for a given strategy. Equally important is the presence of resource allocation concerns shown by the logic of Joliet's process for selecting action projects, given its decision to proceed to the objective of increasing the risk of arrest. Its context notwithstanding, the Arrest Deterrence Study was a significant milestone for the Joliet program. The staff demonstrated a capability in statistical methods that was not present prior to Phase III.

The staff has recently undertaken a study of the relationship between bail/bond practices and target crime incidence. Again Peoria's study of this question served as a model. Since there are no more Program funds available, the findings of this study must find use in policy matters or other no-cost experiments.

During Phases I and II, the most prominent weakness of the program dealt with the monitoring of action projects. The absence of documentation on activities of the Mobile Crime Prevention Unit and, in its first year, the Special Prosecution Unit, left significant gaps in the staff's ability to learn much about what these projects could reasonably be expected to accomplish. While statistics on cases handled by the Special Prosecution Unit were developed in its second year, the failure of the Unit to establish criteria which distinguished its caseload from that of other assistant state's attorneys who handled felony cases precluded any meaningful evaluation of impact. Maintenance of records by the agencies implementing action projects improved noticeably in Phases III and IV.

Planned targets for two of the action projects were simply over-optimistic, although failure to achieve them can arguably be attributed to external forces. In the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program, unrealistically high expectations were set for the number of residents who would want to incur any expense to improve the physical security of their homes. Extreme delays in obtaining authorization to proceed, especially given the nature and rationale of the final decision, certainly did not help the situation. Similarly, the expectation that 75 target crime offenders would be referred to the Restitution Specialist proved to be unachievable, in large measure due to the lack of cooperation by the Probation Department. Ironically, the victim witness aide, which was denied Program funding but whose cost was borne locally, was cited in a number of our interviews as one of Joliet's most successful criminal justice innovations.

The Joliet program has always maintained a high level of public visibility through the local news media and its interest in obtaining citizen support for the local criminal justice system. The designation of a citizen member as Chairman of the Urban High Crime Reduction Council attests to this statement. Given the absence of a central authority to manage the overall program and its constituent action projects, this arrangement was probably well-suited to the Joliet program.

Section 3.2 Footnotes

1. The staff also recommended, and the Council endorsed an application to fund a victim-witness aid project. The application was subsequently withdrawn, but the City later funded a victim-witness position at an approximate cost of \$13,000.
2. The position of Public Defender was made permanent on the Council in June 1975.
3. While this may be a safe assumption in most cases, our victimization surveys found 3 of 14 victims in 1976 and 1 of 18 in 1978 who were acquainted with the perpetrator.
4. Unless, of course, this meant participation on the Urban High Crime Reduction Council.
5. As we shall see later, funding was provided for only one neighborhood.
6. Full trial capability reflects the percentage of resources that would be needed if every felony went to trial.
7. The number of adults ordered to pay restitution as part of a probation sentence was too small to permit further analysis.
8. Return A statistics from the I-UCR system showed a 10 percent decline in 1975 robberies over 1974. See Section 9 for a discussion of various sources of crime statistics.
9. A number of other arrests were made by members of the selective enforcement team.
10. A May 1977 memorandum to the Unit supervisor strongly urged the consideration of a test for deterrent effects by restricting the Unit's operation to a single area of the City.
11. This decision stemmed from a case in which LEAA funds were used to purchase private alarm systems for private residences in Tennessee.
12. The plan suggested statistical comparisons between the target neighborhood and a non-participating neighborhood, of successful and unsuccessful forced entry burglaries and no force burglaries, and also the conduct of household surveys in the target neighborhood, before and after full implementation of the project.
13. The first year budget exceeded that of the second year by virtue of the purchase of an IBM Mag Card Typewriter for the Unit.
14. Unwritten office-wide screening was apparently instituted when the new State's Attorney took office, thus pre-empting any screening function the Unit might have undertaken.

Section 3.2 Footnotes (continued)

15. Such regional evaluations were being conducted on a variety of ICEC-funded projects as part of the agency's regional evaluator program.
16. Comparisons of circuit-wide monthly statistics on the adjudication process were made between the six-month period beginning in April 1977 and the same six month period of the prior year. Since the 12th circuit incorporates Will and two other counties, little could be gleaned for robbery or burglary cases, or cases handled by the Unit.
17. The Prison Release Ministry provided matching funds of \$1022.
18. The prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge might agree to the terms of a negotiated plea calling for the inclusion of restitution conditions on probation orders, or a separate hearing could be conducted after trial to determine the nature of a sentence.
19. When the Probation Department conducted a pre-sentence investigation, it also served as transfer agent for restitution payments; otherwise, the Circuit Clerk usually served as the transfer agent. The program staff attempted to centralize the collection of restitution payments with the Circuit Clerk's Office, but this procedure was never adopted.
20. This was up from the 1976 offender tracking system figure of 9 percent, which led the program staff to analyze juvenile data in project application.
21. The average recidivism period for the pre-project group was 6.5 months, compared to 7.5 months for the post-project group.
22. For administrative reasons, the project is actually being funded under two Program grants in the amounts of \$75,206 and \$71,996, the latter grant covering the period from 1 October 1979 through 30 September 1980.
23. In May 1979, the Chief of Police issued an order that all non-attempt burglary scenes be processed for physical evidence.
24. The geocoded active suspect file, however, was developed with assistance from the Joliet program staff.
25. ILEC staff is developing the software, which will also include a police information management capability.
26. The Joliet Police Department had previously conducted field interviews, but these had been discontinued.
27. The program staff analyzed the "hit rate" of this procedure and finding no hits, recommended that the monitoring of pawn shop transactions be discontinued. The City ordinance was subsequently repealed.

3.3 Champaign

3.3 Champaign

The shape of the Champaign program was largely determined at its outset in April 1975, as outlined in the proposal of the University of Illinois Psychology Department to the first program director, Tom Difanis. This proposal, focused on police-community relations and police operations, and was presented in the context of an on-going effort conducted jointly by the Champaign Police Department, the City Department of Community Relations, and the Psychology Department. The proposal largely reflected the interest of a new police administration in the improvement of police-community relations as a strategy to reduce crime, and the analysis of police operations to deploy police resources more effectively against target crime. In April 1976, Mr. Difanis' tenure as program director ended after one year, with a partially-completed Phase I Plan. This document was completed on April 28, 1976 under the direction of Jon Morrison, who had begun as Assistant Planner in March 1976, one month before Mr. Difanis' departure. Two graduate students from the Psychology Department assisted with the development of statistical tables for the Plan.

The resignation of Mr. Morrison in June 1976 brought the first stage of the Champaign program to an end. The Phase I Plan called for crime prevention education and community involvement through the establishment of a small team policing unit that would operate among three areas of the City. Residential burglary had been designated as the target crime.

The second stage of the Champaign program began in August 1976, after two months without a director, when Neil Weisman was recruited from the Joliet program. During this stage, a grant application for the Neighborhood Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Project was developed, expanding the size of the Plan-proposed team from 7 to 13 through internal reassignment of 6 officers, and limiting the team's operation to a single neighborhood: the North End. This neighborhood experienced substantial incidence of residential burglary, and had traditionally been perceived as one for which the delivery of police services was extremely difficult, largely due to poor police-community relations. The team policing unit was placed into operation in May 1977.

A number of other significant milestones were achieved in the second stage of the Champaign program. Phase II and Phase III Plans were completed, the latter in July 1978, almost coincidental with Mr. Weisman's departure. Gary Spear, a new Assistant Planner hired in September 1976, began conducting studies for the Police Department in addition to assisting with the Phase II and III Plans. Efforts were made to align the program with other criminal justice agencies in the County, such as the Urbana and University police and the Sheriff's Office. The East Central Illinois Criminal Justice Commission, ILEC regional office serving Champaign (which has since become a criminal justice coordinating council)¹, began to assume a direct role in the monitoring and evaluation tasks of the program.

The Phase II Plan called for a Designated Prosecutor who would specialize in residential burglary cases, particularly those developed by the team policing unit. The decision by this special prosecutor not to proceed with a case that was subsequently prosecuted to conviction by another assistant state's attorney apparently caused this link to break early in the life of the project, which began in March 1978. No information was available on the caseload or case dispositions of the designated prosecutor.

An analysis of social services for adults and juveniles and an assessment of resources available to the probation department led the program staff to conclude that no viable action project could be developed in local corrections. The Plan thus recommended continuation of the team policing unit. An application to this end was funded to continue team operations from July 1, 1978 through January 1979. The team remained intact without grant support for three more months when it was disbanded due to workload pressures elsewhere in the City.

The third stage of the Champaign program began in August 1978 following Mr. Weisman's departure the previous month. The staff positions occupied by Mr. Spear and Jo Ann Campbell, who performed accounting, secretarial and clerical tasks for the program, were incorporated into the regular City budget plans, although these positions are grant-funded through 1980. The regional office developed a project application for the third action project--a minicomputer system that would assist the staff in the conduct of resource allocation studies (e.g., analysis of calls for service), and possibly the compilation of crime statistics, for the Police Department.

As a supervisory body for the program, the Champaign Urban High Crime Council displayed little desire to influence the direction of the program. It first convened in October 1975, six months after Mr. Difanis began as program director. It repeatedly refused to elect a chairman, deferring this role to the program coordinator. It decided in May 1976, at its sixth meeting, that no quorum need be present to decide issues relating to the program. The council was virtually dissolved when the program entered its third stage, and there is no record of its meeting since July 1978.² This phase-out was in accordance with the City Manager's proposal, outlined at the April 1978 meeting, to transfer the Council's role in the program to the East Central Illinois Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.

In summary, officials in Champaign believed that a local program could be implemented that met the requirements of the Urban High Crime Reduction Program, while at the same time meeting locally perceived needs. Evidently, the City was able to persuade the funding agency that both could be accomplished. It will be reasonably clear from the more in-depth examination of the Champaign program in the following pages that, while most of the Program requirements were met in a literal respect, the program implemented in Champaign bore little resemblance to the design we described in Part Two.

3.3.1 The Champaign Urban High Crime Council

As already noted, the Champaign Urban High Crime Council was not convened until October 1975, six months after Tom Difanis began as program coordinator, and it effectively ceased functioning in July 1978, more than two years before grant funding for the program will end. This section describes the composition of the Council, attendance at Council meetings, perceptions of the program by Council members, and the role in the program of the East Central Illinois Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.

Composition

The Mayor named four citizen members to the Council in addition to six positions mandated in the Program guidelines:

- Shirley Kight, active in juvenile matters and Champaign County PTA Council president;

- Ellen Handler, affiliated at the time with the University of Illinois School of Social Work;
- Don McCabe, a local businessman;
- James Friesner, an employee of State government residing in Champaign.

Mr. Friesner resigned his position in April 1976 because he was leaving the area, and it remained vacant until September 1976 when Henry Slaughter, who was active in a juvenile delinquency prevention program, was named. While the question of Mr. McCabe's poor attendance at meetings was raised by Mr. Weisman in January 1978, no action appears to have been taken, and the remainder of the citizen component of the Council has been left intact.

We stated previously that efforts were made toward the end of 1976 to recruit additional Council members from other criminal justice agencies in the County. While the participation of the Chief of the Urbana and University Police, the Sheriff of Champaign County, and the County Public Defender were all solicited, only the Public Defender joined the Council as a mayoral appointee, at its September 23, 1976 meeting.

A significant change in the State's Attorney's seat on the Council occurred in November 1976. Tom Difanis' decision not to renew his year-long contract to serve as program director in April 1976 was prompted by his impending candidacy for the office of State's Attorney. Having won the November 1976 election, Mr. Difanis replaced James Burgess for the Council position of State's Attorney.

The chief judge's seat also changed once, although this was of little consequence since Birch Morgan, who was initially named to this position, never attended a Council meeting. The second representative of the judiciary was Judge Harold Jensen, who attended his first meeting in October 1976.

Three individuals from the State Department of Corrections filled this seat on the Council. Joseph Cannon's tenure was longest, from the Council's establishment through March 1977. He was replaced by Michael Lane, who was in turn replaced six months later by Alethea Camp. Ms. Camp represented the Department at the remaining meetings.

None of the three mandated Council positions, filled by City officials, changed during the life of the Council. They were William Bland (Mayor), Eugene Miller (City Manager), and William Dye (Chief of Police).

Meeting Attendance

Although the first Council meeting was held in October 1975, no minutes were taken, and consequently no record of attendance was available for this meeting. Beginning with the November 13, 1975 meeting, minutes were available for 20 meetings, through July 25, 1978. As noted previously, minutes of meetings held in January and May 1979 also were not available.

Table 3-4 summarizes Council members' attendance at these 20 meetings. Overall, an average of between 5 and 6 members were in attendance. Over half the meetings (11 of 20) were attended by 5 or fewer members. The Chief of Police and the City Manager had the best attendance records, at 95 percent (19 of 20) and 80 percent (15 of 20), respectively. Representing the County were the State's Attorney (60 percent) and the Public Defender (31 percent), while State representation from the Department of Corrections was found for 65 percent of the meetings. We noted earlier that the first representative for the judiciary attended none of the first nine meetings; his successor, however, attended seven of the remaining eleven meetings (64 percent).

As a citizen appointee, Don McCabe was present at only 3 of the 20 meetings held. Excluding him and the Public Defender, the remaining three mayoral appointees as a group exhibited a 62 percent attendance rate.

Perceptions of Council Members

Council members interviewed during the course of the program raised a number of issues which indicated that the design of the Program had not been adequately conveyed at the outset. Thus, whenever the funding agency intervened with regard to local program activities that were believed to be outside the scope of the Program guidelines, a common response was that the guidelines were too inflexible.

Crime specificity was a key issue throughout the Champaign program. Several members felt that a focusing on a specific type of crime was unworkable in a city the size of Champaign. Others found it inappropriate for a

TABLE 3-4

Attendance at Urban High Crime Council Meetings
Champaign: November 1975 - May 1979

	1975		1976							1977					1978				1979				
	Nov 13	Nov 20	Feb 2	Apr 8	Apr 15	May 26	Sep 1	Sep 23	Oct 28	Dec 3	Mar 3	May 11	Oct 12	Oct 18	Nov 16	Dec 21	Jan 25	Mar 17	Apr 28	Jul 25	Jan 9	May 24	
<u>Mayor</u> William Bland	o	A	o	o	A	A	o	A	A	o	A	A	A	o	o		A	o	o	A			
<u>City Manager</u> Eugene Miller	A	o	A	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	A	o	A	A	o	o	o	o	o			
<u>Chief of Police</u> William Dye	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	A	o	o	o	o	o	o	o			
<u>State's Attorney</u> James Burgess Tom Difanis	o N	o N	o N	A N	A N	A N	o N	o N	N A	N A	N o	N o	N o	N o	N o	N o	N A	N A	N o	N o			
<u>Chief Judge</u> Birch Morgan Harold Jensen	A N	A N	A N	A N	A N	A N	A N	A N	N o	N o	N o	N A	N o	N o	N o	N A	N A	N A	N o	N o			
<u>Department of Corrections</u> Joseph Cannon Michael Lane Alethea Camp	o N N	o N N	o N N	o N N	o N N	o N N	A N N	o N N	A N N	o N N	o N N	N o	N A	N A	N N	N A	N A	N N	N N	N o	N N	N N	
<u>Citizens</u> Shirley Kight (former PTA president) Ellen Handler (U. of Ill.) James Friesner Don McCabe Henry Slaughter Robert Frederick	A o o A N N	o o o o N N	A o o A A N	o o A A A	o A A A A	A N N N N	o N N N N	o N N N N	o A A A A	o N N N N	o A A A A	o N N N N	o A A A A	o A A A A	o N N N N	o A A A A	o N N N N	A A A A A	o N N N N	o A A A A	o N N N N	o A A A A	o N N N N

NO RECORD OF ATTENDANCE OR MINUTES
NO RECORD OF ATTENDANCE OR MINUTES

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Key
o = present or represented
A = absent
N = not a Council member

city of any size, especially with respect to police work. An extreme scenario whereby grant-funded police officers would be barred from making an on-scene arrest for robbery, given the target crime of residential burglary, was cited by one member as a ludicrous example of a strict interpretation of crime specificity. Unfortunately, the requirement that the team police unit spend more than 50 percent of its time and resources on the target crime served to promulgate this view of the concept.

Another apparent misunderstanding dealt with the notion of a target area or areas. The guidelines make no reference to geographic limitations for action projects. At one meeting, however, one of the members expressed resentment over the State's "requiring" that the North End be the target area for the team policing project. This "requirement" might have emerged from a context in which restriction of the team's activity to a single area, rather than the three areas originally contemplated, was discussed.

A number of Council members observed that the members did not act as a cohesive body. Rather, it was believed, decisions were made on the basis of individual initiatives. The presence of an active regional office might well have inhibited the development of the Council as a supervisory body, with overlapping memberships and what seemed to be the same mission--obtain outside funding to meet local criminal justice needs.

The Role of the East Central Illinois Criminal Justice Coordinating Council

The East Central Illinois Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (ECICJCC) played a far more significant role in the Champaign program than did the regional offices serving Peoria and Joliet in their respective programs. Upon reading a newspaper article about the selection of target areas by the Urban High Crime Council--apparently the first ECICJCC staff heard of the Council--a letter was prepared offering assistance from the regional staff and asking that henceforth the regional office be notified of Urban High Crime Council meetings in advance. The regional staff also noted that they might be able to provide useful planning data, and that funds available to the region might be channeled to complement the action projects funded under the Champaign program.

ECICJCC staff were clearly experienced with the LEAA-ILEC grant funding mechanism and with strategies for the preparation of successful grant proposals. Its elevation to coordinating council status in October 1977, making it eligible for additional LEAA funding, attests to this observation. Other evidence of the region's savvy with respect to grant funding was found in comments made at Urban High Crime Council meetings. In one example, the regional representative emphasized the need in Phase II project planning to identify and deal with possible barriers to securing grant matching funds from the County Board. In another, the region observed the "high level of competition and political considerations involved in the LEAA discretionary grant process," in discussing prospects for an application for community anti-crime funds submitted by the Champaign County Crime Prevention Council. The value of the region's experience, it was noted, lay in the fact that, at times, the state was not sufficiently sensitive to local needs.

As 1977 drew to a close, Urban High Crime Council members suggested closer ties with the ECICJCC. The next manifestation of an increased regional office presence in the Champaign program was the development of the continuation grant for the team policing project by regional staff. As noted previously, the City Manager expressed his wish in April 1978 that the Urban High Crime Council be "phased into the overall structure of the [ECICJCC]," which would also be responsible for further grant proposals, with staff resources devoted to monitoring and evaluation of the team policing project and providing services to the Police Department. In keeping with the City Manager's proposal, ECICJCC staff were instrumental in the development of the Management Information and Crime Analysis (MICA) system, the third action project funded under the Champaign program. While one member of the ECICJCC staff continues to work with Mr. Spear on implementation of the MICA system, regional office interest in the Champaign program, it was noted, has declined substantially in the past year.

3.3.2 Development of the Impact Plan

As before, this section outlines the planning rationale underlying the action component of the local program. While the forces that guided the planning process in Champaign have already been discussed, this section

provides additional detail on the Plan documents and various activities performed in connection with Plan development.

Phase I: Overall Program Design and Law Enforcement

The introduction to Section 6 noted that while the team policing concept arose in the Phase I Plan, it was not brought to full maturity until the project application was prepared under Neil Weisman's tenure as program coordinator. The Plan described a 7-man team which would respond primarily to calls for service involving residential burglary or other felonies, rotating periodically among three areas of the City. The team would also elicit cooperation in the reporting of crime in these areas and generally take steps to improve community relations. Further development of this concept ensued in preparing the grant application. The size of the team was to be expanded to 13 members and would provide full police services in one neighborhood. We thus begin with a description of the Phase I Plan, following with a discussion of the factors that re-shaped the project.

The Phase I Plan began with the rationale underlying the Council's choice of residential burglary as the target crime. Five reasons were cited:

- high incidence (1,042 in 1974 and 1,139 in 1975);
- high value of property stolen (\$310,000 in 1974);
- potential danger to community residents;
- the "likelihood of success in reducing the incidence of burglary relative to other types of offenses";
- The high proportion of burglaries committed against private residences relative to businesses (77 percent).

None, however, provided a frame of reference in which to judge terms such as "high" or "likelihood of success," except that provided by individual interpretation of statistics cited. Further rationale was given in terms of reasons why other eligible target crimes were not included.²

The program design outlined a series of interactions among prevention and deterrence, improved system efficiency, and the program, jointly leading toward the reduction of target crime incidence. The goals and objectives cited for the program essentially reflected those stated in the

Program guidelines. The framework of a performance management system, keyed to the program design, was also presented in the Plan.

Descriptive statistics on 285 burglaries occurring in the months of February and August constituted part of the Plan which was prepared by graduate students in the Psychology Department. These were gleaned from offense reports prepared by the Champaign Police Department and covered all forms of burglary, including burglary from auto. Just over 50 percent of the sample were residential burglaries. Statistics were arrayed by type and value of property stolen, number of previous victimizations, time lag in reporting the crime, time and day of occurrence, and use of force. The data were not presented separately for the two months in the sample. The two months in question appear to have been selected as typically high and low volume months.

Other statistics developed by the graduate students pertained to adults charged with residential burglary and booked into the Champaign County Jail during the first eleven months of 1975. Summary statistics on delinquency petitions were supplied directly from the Juvenile Probation Department. The Psychology Department also provided summary statistics derived from arrest reports for both adults and juveniles.

The Plan provided no discussion of statistics until presenting those on the distribution of burglaries occurring in various areas of the city. Known burglary occurrence by type of target and modus operandi were given for the six patrol beats dividing the city, and three beats were selected as "target areas" where program efforts would be concentrated. The Plan also contains a demographic description of the city and its neighborhoods and grant proposals for residential development.

Finally, present law enforcement capabilities were described. Of particular relevance to the Program were several grant-funded activities affecting the Champaign-Urbana metropolitan area. In one, social workers were assigned to the Champaign, Urbana and University police departments to provide crisis intervention services. Another was Project LOCATE, which created a manual data system to upgrade the crime analysis capabilities of these same police departments. A third related project was to provide computer-aided dispatch services to the three departments. Project LOCATE was eventually adopted by the Urban High Crime program staff, and the

metropolitan area computer-aided dispatch system (METCAD) became operational in 1978. The relevance of these efforts will become apparent in our description of the MICA system later in Section 3.3.4.

Phase II: Adjudication

The Phase II Plan of the Champaign program was completed in September 1977, providing thoughtful descriptions of the functions of the adjudication phase: the circuit court, the State's Attorney, for the Public Defender, the presentence investigation conducted by the Probation Department, the Circuit Clerk, and court-related programs. For each function, discussions are provided on personnel, organization, workload, procedures, records, facilities and budgets. Where appropriate, existing policies for burglary cases are described. Needs and problems are explored at the conclusion of each section.

The Plan also described "preliminary" statistics on 122 adults arrested by the Champaign Police Department in 1975 and 1976 for burglary and tracked through disposition. The age, sex, and race of these individuals, residence (by police district), type of attorney, criminal history, type of disposition, and reason for dismissal (25 percent of the cases) were tabulated and depicted in flow diagrams. Analysis of time between hearings and continuances were also given for this sample.

The Phase II Plan ends with the recommended action project-- Designated Burglary Prosecution. As described, the project had three major elements:

- priority prosecution of designated burglaries filed by the Champaign Police Department by an assistant state's attorney designated for all such cases;
- close liaison with the team policing unit of Phase I and screening of all team arrests;
- establishment of an easy access file storage and retrieval system to facilitate the identification of repeat offenders.

With regard to the first point, the Plan called for the development of guidelines to identify repeaters and to govern plea negotiations. The designated prosecutor was to develop specialized skills in handling burglary cases by seeing these cases through disposition. Improved screening methods

were to be developed so that fewer cases would end in dismissal. On the second point, the designated prosecutor would inform team members of evidentiary case law changes and assist them in securing warrants and affidavits. The storage and retrieval system was included due to the inconvenience in obtaining criminal history files which, owing to space shortages, were located in the attic of the courthouse and the basement of the annex building across the street. The Plan recommended that the project be funded for two years.

Phase III: Corrections

The Phase III Plan was completed in July 1978. The Plan described social service agencies serving juveniles and adults in Champaign County, emphasizing their relationship, if any, to the crime of burglary. Based on the analysis of these services, the report recommended that no program funds be expended in this area. An analysis of juvenile offenders and the police was presented next. The Champaign Police Department Juvenile process was described, and statistics on juvenile offenders, case dispositions, and juvenile case investigations were presented. The plan stated that at this time no workable program design in this area could be developed, and again recommended that no funds be expended. Finally, the plan turned to a description and analysis of probation services in Champaign County. Included in this section were budget information, caseload data, a description of new probation programs, statistics on cases processed, a description of the presentence investigation and dispositional report process, and an analysis of the juvenile process in the Champaign County Probation Department. In spite of extremely favorable findings concerning Champaign County Probation Services, the plan recommended that no program funds be provided in this area. This decision was reached because the County had already added three new probation officers through an ILEC grant to improve probation generally, and no evidence could be found that the primary project under consideration-- a priority probation officer handling all burglary cases--would have any positive results. This conclusion was reached through contacts with persons operating similar programs in 10 other areas.

The final conclusion of the Phase III Plan was that no appropriation of funds be made for Phase III action projects and that the monies be reappropriated into Phase I to continue the Team Policing Project. We will see shortly that this did not occur, although Phase III monies were eventually applied to a law enforcement project.

3.3.3 Other Activities of Program Staff

While the staff of the Champaign Urban High Crime Council was not explicitly assigned to the police department until 1979, it had engaged in other non-program activities prior to that time. The activities of the Champaign County Crime Prevention Program and its progress toward obtaining community anti-crime funds from LEAA were closely monitored for well over a year. A police vehicle utilization study was completed by Gary Spear in October 1977. Six months later, a report on calls for service in which statistics were manually compiled was developed at the request of the Chief of Police. In keeping with the close geographic proximity of the Champaign, Urban and University police, a report was also prepared on possible consolidation of certain elements.

Just prior to Mr. Weisman's premature departure from the Champaign program in July 1978, the decision was reached among ILEC, ECICJCC, and the City to hire student interns for assistance in the evaluation of the team policing unit and to split the program staff's time between the program and the Police Department thereafter. Since that time, follow-up studies on calls for service were documented in September, October and December 1979 where the latter was part of a larger study presented to City Council by the Chief of Police.³ While the December report did not contain specific recommendations, it was described as preliminary to requests for possible increases in the authorized strength of the Department.

Other staff work called to our attention included a tactical analysis of a rash of robberies which occurred in a specific area of the City and a similar analysis of Citywide robberies occurring during the third shift in the fourteen months beginning with November 1978. The staff also made a trip to Lawrence, Kansas, to review the organization policies and

activities of that city's department. All police department assignments undertaken by the program staff are supervised by the Chief of Staff Services.

3.3.4 Action Projects

As we have stated before, three action projects have been funded under the Champaign program:

- The team policing project had budgets of \$153,220 and \$94,007 under two Program grants, for a total of \$247,227. The second grant was not in response to the recommendation of the Phase III plan, but rather served to continue the project until sufficient evidence could be collected on the project's impact on residential burglary. The team was supervised by a sergeant, but the Chief of Police was named project director. The team operated from May 1977 through January 1979.
- The designated burglary prosecution project operated for a year, beginning in February 1978, under a \$25,509 budget.
- The MICA project is designed to improve Management Information and Crime Analysis capabilities of the Champaign Police Department through hardware/software additions. With a total budget of 83,827, the project is scheduled for full implementation by 1981. This project was proposed in lieu of pursuing further funding of the team policing project under Phase III.

This section describes the development, implementation and evaluation efforts for these projects.

The Neighborhood Team Policing - Burglary Abatement Project

As we have already indicated, the decision was reached, between completion of the Phase I Plan in April 1976 and submission of the team policing grant application in June 1976, to implement a full service team on a single target area rather than a smaller unit that would rotate among three areas in the City. This decision was influenced in part by an August 30, 1976 technical assistance report prepared by G. Patrick Gallagher and J.P. Morgan⁴, which urged the City to consider "ten or more patrol officers with the burglary abatement group [i.e., the five officers originally proposed], and possibly add a Community Relations person and a Crime Prevention Specialist to form one team for a specific neighborhood."

The team itself was composed of fourteen experienced officers, of whom five were replaced by new recruits funded under the grant; one of the team officers, a sargeant, served as the supervisor of the unit. All other members of the team were volunteers from the regular patrol force. The basic attributes of team policing reflect the old concept of the "cop on the beat." Essentially, team officers are fully responsible for providing all police services to a given geographic area. Organizationally this means decentralization of authority and participation of all team officers in team planning and decision-making. Functionally it means that team officers engage in a full range of police activities, including crime prevention, development of contacts with neighborhood residents, patrol (especially on foot), and general investigation. Increased familiarity with localized crime problems, greater cooperation from the community and an organizational structure which fosters the sharing of information were expected to lead to greater job satisfaction, higher quality arrests, and subsequent crime reduction.

The Champaign team policing unit was selected in early 1977 and received a three-day training seminar in "teaming concepts" at the end of March. The seminar, given by the Public Safety Research Institute (St. Petersburg, Florida), focused primarily on shared management decisions (between the team suervisor and team officers) and on minimizing internal conflict within the police department. Training sessions were held in the neighboring city of Danville, away from the day-to-day business of the Champaign Police Department.⁵

Following a directive issued by the Chief of Police on May 12, 1977, the team policing unit was placed into operation on May 16. This document outlined policies and procedures for the team on issues of dispatching, dress, enforcement priorities, interdepartmental cooperation, promoting greater awareness, and crime prevention. Generally, the team was to:

- have full authority to handle calls to their completion, except in cases requiring follow-up on felonies;
- remain in the team area, except in emergency situations where an officer outside the area needs back-up;

- minimize friction with the community by giving careful consideration to street stops and arrests and by cultivating a friendly rapport with the residents of the neighborhood;
- encourage the citizens in the team area to request premise security surveys and other crime prevention assistance.

The directive noted, however, that in case of conflict, written general orders and directives of the Department would supercede team policies and procedures.

The Champaign team encountered two significant problems when the project was implemented. In one, a vocal minority from the team area attempted to discredit the team at the outset, characterizing it as a tactical force whose intent was to hold down dissenting elements in the target neighborhood. According to the team supervisor, this problem was eventually overcome through team performance and assurances that they were providing a municipal service to residents of the target neighborhood. The second problem dealt with internal aspects of the department--a problem which was anticipated before the team began and, as noted, given special attention during training. This problem was manifested as resentment on the part of non-team officers and command staff who perceived the team as an "elitist" unit, consisting of hand-picked volunteers who had a broader range of authority and greater input to decision-making than did ordinary patrol officers. According to our interviews, this problem was never completely eliminated although its intensity and its ramifications varied over time.

Detailed monthly statistics on team activities and manpower levels were kept by the team supervisor. For each of 34 types of calls for service, the following tabulations were included:

- the number of calls
- the number of files open
- the number of cases cleared
- the number of arrests

Moreover, these figures were provided separately for calls inside and outside the target area. Approximately 25 percent of all calls responded to by team members originated outside the North End. Within the area, burglary calls

consistently ranked among the top five in volume, the others being theft, peace and order, traffic and accidents. The unit averaged slightly over four arrests per month on house burglary calls; not including November 1978 in which 18 such arrests were made, the average declines to slightly under two per month.

Team statistics also included the value of property recovered (on all calls), arrests by sex, and juvenile contacts. Nonproductive manhours (sick, vacation, training, etc.) were tallied, as were overtime and comp time. The number of crime prevention surveys and assists from regular patrol (to locations in the target area) were also given. Finally, these monthly statistical reports included brief descriptions of civic and school appearances made and attendance volumes. The team typically made between 3 and 7 such appearances per months.

A partial evaluation of the team policing project was conducted by Peter Nardulli of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois. This evaluation relied primarily on data collected in two telephone surveys, the first in February 1977, just prior to the implementation of the project, and the second in November 1978, some 20 months later (but while the team was still operational).⁷ Using a reverse telephone directory, samples of 500 households in the target area were drawn for each survey; another 500 living outside the target area were drawn for each survey using the regular telephone directory.

The analysis of survey responses found statistically significant⁸ improvements in scores reflecting target area respondents' satisfaction with police services, measured in terms of speed of response, courtesy, overall rating and comparative rating (with respect to other areas of the City). Moreover, while service scores were significantly lower in the target area than in the comparison areas in the first survey, no differences were found in the second for the overall and comparative ratings. No significant differences in scores were found for the comparison area before and after implementation of the project.

Analysis of survey findings on nine questions pertaining to attitudes toward the police showed significant improvements in the target area for seven of the questions, while no significant differences were found over

time in the comparison area. Again, for two of the questions, attitudes in the target area rose to a level equal to that for the comparison area in the second survey. The evaluation further noted that in the target area, changes were significant for all the questions when the analysis was limited to black respondents.

The evaluation also found that significantly more respondents in the target neighborhood perceived crime as decreasing in the second survey than in the first, although feeling of safety walking alone at night showed no change.

In an attempt to measure changes in the level of cooperation between citizens in the target area and the police, clearance rates, derived from police reports, were also examined in the evaluation. Substantial increases in clearance rates were found for the offenses of building burglary, assault, and vandalism, after implementation of team policing project, while these rates generally declined somewhat in the comparison area.

Finally, the evaluation presented survey data and police statistics on crime rates. Increases were generally registered for the target area using both data sources. For household burglaries, victimization data showed an increase from 77.8 to 87.6 per thousand in the target area, compared to a stable rate of 93 per thousand for the comparison group.⁹ Police statistics showed increases of about 25 percent in both areas (for building burglaries).

In summary, while the Nardulli evaluation found for a number of indicators that the team policing project met with considerable success, burglary rates were not impacted as anticipated. While noting the possibility that crime rates may be affected over a longer term, the report concluded with the observation that the role of the police in crime prevention may simply need to be re-examined.

Designated Burglary Prosecution

Recall that the Phase II action project called for three major elements:

- specialized prosecution of target crime cases;
- liaison with the team policing unit;

- upgrading the capability for identifying repeat offenders.

This third element was to be accomplished by microfilming case records and storage of this information within easy access of the State's Attorney's Office. Upon reviewing the grant application, several ILEC staff jointly recommended that the microfilming component be disallowed. This trimmed the project budget by nearly \$40,000, to \$25,569, which funded one assistant state's attorney and a secretary for 10 months, with supporting equipment. The State's main arguments were that computerized information systems seemed more appropriate, but that neither microfilming nor computer costs could be justified under the Urban High Crime Reduction Program.

The individual selected for the position of designate prosecutor had previously been a Chicago police officer and was thus believed to be well-suited to work with the team policing unit. Although he attended a few team meetings, the special prosecutor lost virtually all his credibility with the team early in the project, by rejecting a serious case which was subsequently prosecuted to conviction by another assistant state's attorney to whom the team later took the case. The Champaign program director urged the State's Attorney to assign another assistant as the designated burglary prosecutor, but to no avail.

No statistics on the designated prosecutor's caseload were available for our review. As the 10-month grant drew to a close, it was evident that the project had not sustained operations in accordance with plans, and in a September 6, 1978 letter to Mr. Spear, the State's Attorney indicated that further grant funds for the project would not be sought.

Management Information and Crime Analysis (MICA) System

The grant application for the MICA system was jointly developed by Mr. Spear representing the Police Department and staff of the East Central Illinois Criminal Justice Coordinating Council. The staff had been relying on the semi-automated, but mostly manual, McBee punch card system for data which could be used to analyze calls for service and the occurrence of major offenses. This system had been adapted from Project LOCATE, which had formally ended in early 1979, and it had to be supplemented with visual examination of police reports in order to prepare the necessary statistics.

The MICA application proposed the purchase of peripheral hardware and software to replace the McBee card system which, while believed to be an improvement over the previous crime analysis capability, was nonetheless cited as expensive, time consuming, and subject to error.

The MICA system calls for two CRT terminals and printers, and an 80 megabyte disc drive to be connected to the METCAD system, a computer-aided dispatching system serving the Champaign, Urbana, and University of Illinois police departments. One of the terminal/printer combinations will be located in the Urban High Crime program office, while the other will be located at the Champaign Police Department. The staff will enter data from offense, follow-up, and arrest reports of the Department to supplement dispatch information already stored in the METCAD system to form the core data set in MICA. This will subsequently be augmented to provide Illinois-Uniform Crime Reporting (I-UCR) data to the State Department of Law Enforcement; a separate file consisting of nicknames, aliases, and known associates; modus operandi and other distinguishing characteristics of known offenders, and (on a temporary basis) information from warning tickets and interrogation reports.

The project's connection to the target crime of residential burglary derives solely from the possibility that MICA might enable the identification of patterns of occurrence that would facilitate suspect development, just as it might with any serious crime. Clearance rates and response time are offered as evaluation criteria, although the application notes the problems associated with the evaluation of the impact on crime of an information system project.

Project planners anticipated installation and testing of the system by February 1980. The transition of data from McBee cards and training of police officers by the program staff were anticipated by mid-1980, and the system was to become fully operational by the end of 1980. Serious delays have been encountered by the project, however. LEAA policy requires LEAA approval of all sole source contracts using block grant funds in excess of \$20,000, down from \$50,000 when the project was originally conceived. Time needed for the staff to issue requests for proposals, review submissions, and negotiate a contract may delay the MICA project by several months. However, a partially operational system may still be feasible by the end of 1980.

3.3.5 Conclusions

The Champaign Urban High Crime program captured the elements of its parent Program only under a very liberal interpretation. While planning was undertaken with respect to the specification of problems and needs, as attested by the Impact Plan (Phases I, II, and III), and resource planning for the police department was also performed by the program staff, no evidence could be found of planning function envisioned in the Program design.

A major problem with the planning process in Champaign was the lack of continuity from statements of problems and needs to recommend courses of action. In all three phases, the latter appears to have preceded the former. Interest in team policing was expressed well in advance of much of the work undertaken for the Phase I Plan. That two specialized prosecutors might be designated to work with the team was noted in the Phase I Plan, and one such prosecutor was, in fact, recommended in the Phase II Plan. While the Phase III Plan contained sound arguments against funding a project in the corrections area, the decision was reached to apply for funds to continue team policing some three months earlier in an April 1978 letter from the City Manager.

The Program provided the City with an opportunity to experiment with team policing, which apparently improved police-community relations in the North End and the willingness of these residents to contact the police. Unfortunately, due to Citywide manpower shortages, the team policing unit had to be discontinued in April 1979. Whether the level of community cooperation achieved by the team can be sustained remains to be seen.

The MICA system promises to deliver a long-awaited capability to the Champaign Police Department--an automated data system that would provide data for both long-range resource planning and short-range tactical planning for patrol and investigative operations. Such a capability, it was hoped, would derive from the work initially contemplated by Psychology Department staff and later from Project LOCATE. Neither of these were able to meet the Department's needs or, for that matter, the needs of the Champaign program.

To date, police officials with whom we spoke seemed pleased with the work of the staff in support of the Department's operation. Despite earlier disappointment with the Psychology Department and Project LOCATE,

regarding the analysis of the Department's resource needs and deployment strategies, officials seem confident that a long-range planning capability has been developed in these areas--one that will be further enhanced after the MICA system becomes fully operational. Indeed, a commitment has been made by incorporating this position into the general city budget.

At first thought, institutional action of the Champaign program may seem ironic. The program was in least conformance with the Program design of the cities examined thus far. Further reflection removes the irony, however. Assumption of control of the program by the City Manager with assistance from the regional office in April 1978 marked the first time the program was given clearcut direction from source of authority. Finding the result beneficial from City's viewpoint, he was able to recommend local assumption of the costs with little difficulty. A number of valuable lessons can be learned from the Champaign experience; these are explored further in Section 11.

Section 3.3 Footnotes

1. Viewed by LEAA as action, as well as planning, agencies, criminal justice coordinating councils were eligible for "Part B" and "Part C" grants. Planning agencies were eligible for only "Part B" monies.
2. This was added at the explicit request of a Council member.
3. Statistics presented in these reports continued to be hand-tallied.
4. The technical assistance was provided under an LEAA grant to provide such services to police departments throughout the country wishing to explore team policing possibilities.
5. We attended these sessions and found them to be informative and well-organized. The trainers seemed to be familiar with the types of conflicts that can occur with the creation of specialized units within a police department. The trainers were aware that the team was to operate in the context of a larger program designed to reduce burglary, but the curriculum did not reflect this fact. Moreover, our discussions with team officers led us to conclude that little was known about the Champaign's Urban High Crime Council. While the team had only recently formed, this indicates that no sense of urgency was felt to brief the team on this aspect of its work.
6. The November 1978 survey was actually the third survey conducted. A second survey was completed in February 1978, one year after the first, but only nine months after the team became operational. Since this interim survey essentially found little change in variables of interest, a third survey was required before ILEC would give consideration to refunding the project.
7. Statistical significance was designated for .01 and .001 chance probability levels.
8. The higher rate of residential burglary victimization in the comparison area is surprising, although the difference vanished when comparisons were restricted to non-students.

3.4 East St. Louis

3.4 East St. Louis

Although East St. Louis ranked as having the worst crime problem of any municipality outside Cook County (according to the criteria outlined in Section 1.3), and the City received three planning grants under the Program, no milestones were achieved in its three years of operation. The first two years of our evaluation covered the activities of the East St. Louis program and provided explanations as to why the City was unable to sustain the program. Due to the unique nature of East St. Louis' participation, this section is not organized in the same fashion as for the other three cities. Instead, we simply provide an overview of the program which incorporates the major reasons why attempts to implement it were never fully realized.

The East St. Louis program began when Stanford Scott was hired as program coordinator in July 1975. His first task was to revise the grant application, made earlier by the City, to comply with ILEC specifications. A Program grant for \$37,920 had been awarded to the City about a year earlier, but the monies were returned since no action was taken due to a change in the City's administration. Since East St. Louis was well behind the other three cities in implementing the Program, another planning grant reflecting a budget of \$157,086¹ was awarded as of August 4, 1975. This grant funded six staff positions from August 4, 1975 to March 12, 1977, with the intent of completing both Phase I and Phase II of the Impact Plan during this period. The Phase I Plan was completed in December 1976, but the staff had not yet begun Phase II. Thus, a second planning grant with a budget of \$94,272 was awarded to cover the cost of the program coordination unit (reduced from six to four people) from March 3, 1977 through July 11, 1978. Since by this time the Phase I Plan had not received approval from the crime reduction council and the Phase II Plan was still incomplete, East St. Louis' participation in the Program formally ended.

In order to understand the nature of the East St. Louis program, one needs first to appreciate conditions in the City. Its appearance alone speaks to the basic problems faced by the City: buildings that have been boarded or burned; abandoned commercial establishments; large groups of young people on the streets at all times of the day. The economic and social fabric of the community is in a highly deteriorated state, indicative of

conditions widely believed to promote crime. According to one source, the survival of the City is almost wholly dependent on federal funds. The fact that local matching funds for Urban High Crime Reduction Program grants were paid from another federal grant clearly attests to this assertion.

Prospects for the successful implementation of a system-wide crime reduction effort were dim as well, given the racial separateness of the City and its surrounding St. Claire County. The City's populace is predominately black; the County's predominately white. Program staff (all black) were denied access to court records in their attempt to develop the Phase II Plan on the argument that they were unable to substantiate the manner in which the data were to be used. At one point in the program, however, a contract with the ILEC regional office serving East St. Louis (the Southwest Illinois Law Enforcement Commission) was contemplated, and regional office staff believed that gaining access to court records would be no problem due to their prior contact with judicial agencies. While the issue of racism (claimed by program staff) may have only been secondary in this case, the denial of access to court records appears to have reflected distrust of City employees on the part of circuit court officials.

The City's prior performance on ILEC grants was apparently also suspect. For example, we learned in interviews that, under a previous administration, City officials had been charged with "improprieties" in fiscal management. The Program grant was apparently the first ILEC grant awarded to the City in a number of years. While East St. Louis' participation in the Program was closely monitored with respect to fiscal matters,² membership on the crime reduction council was severely disrupted in the spring of 1976 when the Chief of Police, State's Attorney and the City's Director of Public Safety were all indicted on criminal charges and asked to resign their positions on the council³. It seems clear that East St. Louis was not immune from problems dealing with charges of political corruption, in addition to its declining economic base and strained social fabric.

Membership of the East St. Louis crime reduction council included the Mayor (its chairman), the Chief of Police, the State's Attorney, the Chief Judge of the 20th circuit, and a Department of Corrections representative. The mayor also appointed his administrative assistant, the director of public

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safety, a banker, a retired police officer, and an attorney to the council. The first meeting was held on October 28, 1975, and by-laws were developed by program staff shortly thereafter. Included in the by-laws were quorum requirements, which required the presence of five members, at least two of whom were not representing City agencies, in order to call a vote. Although minutes were taken at each of the monthly meetings, little could be gleaned from them that seemed relevant to the program. The council continually encountered problems in achieving a quorum, and at times it was not clear who among those in attendance were voting members. In addition to the three designated officials who were forced to resign from the council, at least three of the mayoral appointees also turned over.

The last meeting at which a quorum was achieved occurred in February 1977; the last known council meeting was apparently held in April 1977 although minutes available for our review ended with the March 1977 meeting. The Phase I Plan, completed in draft form in December, was never approved by council vote, and, consequently, applications for Phase I action were not considered.

The program was funded a second year with the hope that the council would approve the Phase I Plan, and that at least one of the three action projects proposed would be funded. Indeed, the program staff did develop two grant applications for Phase I action projects. The first involved the establishment of a Crime Analysis Unit within the East St. Louis Police Department. This was to be staffed by a director, a fiscal control officer, and a secretary. At a cost of nearly \$100,000, a computer system and a first year's service contract were to be purchased under the grant. The Crime Analysis Unit's chief function was to provide data describing the time and location of burglary and robbery (the target crimes) within East St. Louis-- data presumably to be compiled from offense reports by the computer. With the Crime Analysis Unit operating as described, a Special Tactical Unit was proposed in the second grant application. According to this application, the Tactical Unit would patrol only one area--Police District 10--and would concern itself solely with the target crimes of robbery and burglary. The unit was to be staffed by a ten-man squad, aided by a statistician and a film technician. Only the latter two would have been funded under the grant. The

ten police officers were presumably to have been selected from among the existing patrol force, and training was to have been provided at no cost by the Kansas City, Missouri, Department.

In retrospect, it seems fair to say that the Urban High Crime Reduction Program was wholly inappropriate for East St. Louis. While this outcome could have been anticipated, the invitation extended to East St. Louis to participate in the Program was mandated by the sole criterion used in selecting the cities--the magnitude of the crime problem. While the City was, and in all likelihood still is, in desperate need of some form of criminal justice assistance, the Program was simply the wrong vehicle.

Section 3.4 Footnotes

1. Of this total, \$7,855 in local matching funds were drawn from other federal funds to the City.
2. Under both grants, program staff included a full-time fiscal officer.
3. We were unable to determine the outcome of these cases.

PART FOUR
ANALYSIS OF CRIME TRENDS: TECHNICAL DISCUSSION

Crime trends were analyzed for periods before and after the implementation of action projects in the cities. Since we did not attempt to incorporate different implementation dates for projects within a city, since the "median" implementation date for all three cities was June 1, 1977, this date was adopted as the point in time dividing before and after periods.

Target crime trends were analyzed by two methods. Using monthly target crime statistics derived from the Illinois-Uniform Crime Reporting (I-UCR) system, the first method examined city-wide trends for statistically significant declines after the implementation of action projects. This analysis controlled for the long term trend exhibited by each series and for that of a corresponding series in a "similar" city. The second method estimated victimization rates from data collected by telephone from randomly selected households in Joliet and Peoria covering the periods May through October 1976 and May through October 1978. These surveys provided "point estimates" before and after the implementation of action projects and included victimization events neither observed by, nor reported to the police, as well as those that were.

Section 4.1 describes the I-UCR system data that were analyzed, the method of analysis, and the findings. The design, results, and finding of the victimization surveys are described in Section 4.2.

PART FOUR
ANALYSIS OF CRIME TRENDS: TECHNICAL DISCUSSION

4.1 Overview of Offense Data in the Illinois-Uniform Crime Reporting (I-UCR) System

The collection, tabulation and dissemination of crime statistics for the State of Illinois has since 1972 been the responsibility of the Bureau of Identification of the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement. In that year, the Illinois-Uniform Crime Reporting (I-UCR) system was implemented, under which law enforcement agencies throughout the State submit crime data through the Bureau which in turn submits statewide tabulations to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for inclusion in the national UCR program. The Bureau receives data from local law enforcement agencies by a variety of methods, ranging from direct entry via remote terminal, to hand tallies on precoded forms designed specifically for I-UCR reporting. Methods of data submission by the cities participating in the Urban High Crime Reduction Program were described in detail in the first and second year evaluation reports cited in the Preface.

The data used in our analysis were drawn from two I-UCR tabulation sets, both of which are central to the national UCR program. Return A, compiled monthly, contains known incidence statistics for the Part I crimes of homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft.² This was the data source for robbery and burglary--Joliet's target crimes.

Subtotals for robbery and burglary by modus operandi are provided in Return A, but in the case of burglary, subtotals are not given by residential/non-residential categories. These categories are provided in the Supplement to Return A, also compiled monthly. The Supplement therefore provided much of the data used in our analysis of residential burglary trends, the target crime for Champaign and Peoria.

A number of discrepancies were found in the burglary (and robbery) totals given in Return A, the Supplement, and other "property analysis" tabulations furnished us by the Crime Studies Section (within the Bureau of Identification). These discrepancies also were discussed at length in our first and second year evaluation reports, and they forced us to estimate known

incidence for certain months. Finally, because the I-UCR system contained no data on the incidence of residential burglary in Peoria for 1972-1974, we used the monthly residential burglary statistics prepared by the Peoria Police Department and furnished to us through the Crime Reduction Council, for all years.

Tabulations for the participating cities and non-participating "controls" are displayed in Tables 4-1 through 4-8 on the following pages. Tables 4-9 through 4-12 show differences between Return A and Supplement data for (residential and non-residential) burglary in the four cities (Peoria, Rockford, Champaign and Urbana) where residential burglary trends were analyzed. These tables give an indication of the magnitude of possible measurement error in Tables 4-1 through 4-8.

As of February 1980, completed Return A and Supplement data sets were available through 1978. While all three participating cities provided some locally compiled 1979 data, we chose not to include them in our analysis lacking an I-UCR validation source. Thus, the central data base for each city consisted of the monthly known incidence of target crime for the seven year period 1972-1978.

TABLE 4-1. Monthly Known Incidence of Residential Burglary in
Champaign: January 1972 - December 1978

Month	Known Incidence of Residential Burglary						
	1972*	1973*	1974*	1975	1976	1977	1978
January	68	56	50	93	87	48	74
February	52	31	41	67	39	27	60
March	57	29	36	71	43	55	57
April	77	74	46	59	64	36	69
May	80	67	74	84	43	40	39
June	49	57	64	65	53	46	68
July	64	63	69	68	55	79	85
August	69	80	83	83	66	89	94
September	73	60	64	73	49	59	75
October	49	60	77	68	39	86	83
November	60	56	68	56	47	62	70
December	55	44	80	56	69	124	71
Total	753	677	772	843	654	751	845

* Estimates made for January 1972 - May 1974.

Source. I-UCR monthly Return A (1972-1974) and monthly Return A Supplement (1974-1978),
furnished by the Crime Studies Section, Illinois Department of Law Enforcement.

TABLE 4-2. Monthly Known Incidence of Residential Burglary in
Urbana: January 1972 - December 1978

Month	Known Incidence of Residential Burglary						
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
January	15	28	11	21	34	16	22
February	20	16	10	18	15	15	16
March	19	16	19	17	20	18	20
April	10	22	22	15	22	12	23
May	16	11	18	22	19	15	20
June	14	15	26	20	14	16	15
July	12	14	18	19	14	32	17
August	15	15	29	24	17	27	38
September	10	29	22	19	19	24	36
October	10	15	10	21	15	26	39
November	20	29	17	18	17	41	27
December	24	15	15	28	17	22	52
Total	185	225	217	242	223	264	325

Source. I-UCR monthly Return A Supplement, furnished by the Crime Studies Section,
Illinois Department of Law Enforcement.

TABLE 4-3. Monthly Known Incidence of Residential Burglary in Peoria: January 1972 - December 1978

Month	Known Incidence of Residential Burglary						
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
January	102	130	131	270	160	108	114
February	112	120	128	215	132	97	123
March	119	148	167	160	148	105	110
April	135	138	141	214	156	135	109
May	108	130	144	206	121	156	155
June	112	148	150	227	127	160	121
July	157	202	209	240	243	191	179
August	134	171	207	261	200	158	173
September	123	210	148	184	135	179	203
October	137	176	184	212	122	189	183
November	145	176	214	217	162	175	163
December	131	210	250	263	128	121	162
Total	1,515	1,959	2,073	2,669	1,834	1,774	1,795

Source. I-UCR monthly Return A Supplement prepared by the Peoria Police Department and furnished through the Peoria Crime Reduction Council.

TABLE 4-4. Monthly Known Incidence of Residential Burglary in Rockford: January 1972 - December 1978

Month	Known Incidence of Residential Burglary						
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
January	44	101	117	176	157	147	124
February	69	63	104	140	176	102	81
March	55	82	153	168	150	134	118
April	57	143	168	182	186	128	133
May	70	155	348	212	206	131	167
June	64	89	215	247	168	143	178
July	56	118	251	253	257	152	198
August	93	95	248	251	250	169	217
September	80	102	186	190	167	142	191
October	98	78	233	265	294	198	190
November	78	89	208	227	163	126	167
December	73	98	225	212	129	99	126
Total	837	1,213	2,456	2,523	2,303	1,671	1,890

SOURCE: I-UCR Monthly Return A Supplement, furnished by the Crime Studies Section, Illinois Department of Law Enforcement.

TABLE 4-5. Monthly Known Incidence of Robbery in
Joliet: January 1972 - December 1978

Month	Known Incidence of Robbery						
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
January	20	18	27	32	29	16	30
February	10	17	29	24	13	33	27
March	7	18	24	19	13	28	30
April	14	26	15	16	4	16	17
May	14	16	25	13	12	20	23
June	13	26	33	32	14	18	18
July	20	21	11	30	23	20	20
August	10	31	28	30	13	19	24
September	10	26	19	36	33	30	30
October	11	35	31	13	20	23	28
November	15	18	29	13	17	25	30
December	10	21	37	27	18	27	32
Total	154	273	308	277	209	275	309

Source. I-UCR monthly Return A, furnished by the Crime Studies Section, Illinois Department of Law Enforcement (1972-1976), and through the Joliet Criminal Justice Planning Division (1977-1978).

TABLE 4-6. Monthly Incidence of Robbery
Waukegan: January 1972 - December 1978

Month	Known Incidence of Robbery						
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
January	1	13	16	44	10	21	20
February	13	14	16	33	18	22	12
March	11	15	18	38	19	18	10
April	5	8	21	22	22	15	22
May	16	14	25	18	24	11	22
June	14	16	16	20	21	13	24
July	5	21	19	30	21	8	18
August	13	21	33	21	31	18	33
September	22	24	36	25	29	21	13
October	15	42	49	29	37	12	16
November	9	52	31	24	29	19	33
December	28	30	40	30	30	27	19
Total	152	270	320	334	291	205	242

Source. I-UCR monthly Return A, furnished by the Crime Studies Section, Illinois Department of Law Enforcement.

TABLE 4-7. Monthly Known Incidence of Burglary in
Joliet: January 1972 - December 1978

Month	Known Incidence of Burglary						
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
January	55	92	163	110	135	143	82
February	69	90	179	102	101	140	119
March	60	102	212	115	153	197	90
April	73	108	133	122	161	173	106
May	72	134	204	140	149	167	138
June	99	118	251	184	170	124	154
July	130	158	253	171	156	207	159
August	114	133	194	193	144	135	174
September	74	159	125	142	152	169	149
October	73	135	127	129	177	153	187
November	86	151	145	104	121	141	155
December	77	175	145	157	161	121	116
Total	982	1,555	2,131	1,669	1,780	1,870	1,629

Source. I-UCR monthly Return A, furnished by the Crime Studies Section, Illinois Department of Law Enforcement (1972-1978), and through the Joliet Criminal Justice Planning Division (1977-1978).

TABLE 4-8. Monthly Known Incidence of Burglary in
Waukegan: January 1972 - December 1978

Month	Known Incidence of Burglary						
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
January	47	77	96	125	79	96	83
February	56	65	85	98	91	94	73
March	113	72	132	113	134	78	122
April	79	80	100	110	110	55	118
May	68	76	152	102	137	96	42
June	50	90	118	95	128	85	65
July	44	93	116	70	170	90	132
August	95	115	110	93	139	83	123
September	68	88	115	80	104	114	133
October	61	109	125	78	150	108	122
November	73	113	132	121	132	138	137
December	55	125	143	117	145	132	109
Total	809	1,103	1,424	1,202	1,519	1,169	1,259

Source. I-UCR monthly Return A, furnished by the Crime Studies Section, Illinois Department of Law Enforcement.

Table 4-9. Comparison of Monthly Known Incidence of Burglary from Two I-UCR Sources for the City of Champaign: 1972-1978

Year and Source	Known Incidence												Total	Annual Difference	
	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.			
1972															
Return A	83	71	76	93	110	81	88	96	92	67	77	76	1,010	-292	
Supplement	65	46	53	64	73	61	51	63	58	66	59	59	718		
1973															
Return A	76	39	47	93	94	74	89	102	89	98	101	60	962	-272	
Supplement	52	25	32	66	59	49	69	71	73	75	77	42	690		
1974															
Return A	73	54	73	71	101	91	91	109	83	96	90	103	1,035	-91	
Supplement	53	41	52	43	91	91	92	108	83	97	90	103	944		
1975															
Return A	122	82	82	74	105	87	95	97	102	85	89	102	1,122	6	
Supplement	120	82	84	74	107	87	95	97	104	85	89	103	1,128		
1976															
Return A	125	61	68	85	67	74	76	91	69	54	60	81	911	0	
Supplement	124	61	68	85	66	73	77	90	71	54	61	81	911		
1977															
Return A															
Supplement	65	44	69	51	52	77	116	116	77	107	78	149	1,001		
1978															
Return A	97	72	80	90	82	91	123	126	116	113	108	105	1,203	-28	
Supplement	96	72	80	90	80	98	122	125	118	109	89	96	1,175		

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Table 4-10. Comparison of Monthly Known Incidence of Burglary from Two I-UCR Sources for the City of Urbana: 1972-1978

Year and Source	Known Incidence												Total	Annual Difference	
	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.			
1972															
Return A	22	29	29	12	27	18	26	20	31	18	29	34	290		
Supplement	20	28	30	13	23	18	25	19	18	18	27	30	269	-21	
1973															
Return A	34	25	26	38	22	23	19	24	29	22	43	29	334		
Supplement	34	23	26	34	23	21	19	24	33	22	42	31	332	-2	
1974															
Return A	19	19	26	28	26	33	23	34	28	17	18	24	195		
Supplement	19	21	24	27	26	33	24	35	28	17	19	24	297	2	
1975															
Return A	24	23	24	19	24	30	28	21	27	26	21	35	302		
Supplement	24	23	28	22	24	31	30	26	27	27	23	36	321	19	
1976															
Return A	37	22	33	28	26	17	26	21	25	21	26	27	309		
Supplement	38	22	29	29	26	17	27	22	25	21	26	26	308	-1	
1977															
Return A	20	21	21	15	22	26	39	34	28	35	50	30	341		
Supplement	21	21	21	16	22	26	39	34	30	35	52	31	348	7	
1978															
Return A	33	17	25	35	31	25	28	49	54	48	36	60	441		
Supplement	33	22	25	35	31	25	28	48	54	48	36	61	446	5	

Table 4-11. Comparison of Monthly Known Incidence of Burglary from Two T-UCR Sources for the City of Peoria: 1972-1978

Year and Source	Known Incidence												Total	Annual Difference	
	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.			
1972															-519
Return A	154	152	179	189	173	193	246	194	180	187	212	186	2,245		
Supplement	108	121	130	139	121	158	184	172	150	157	150	136	1,726		
1973															-908
Return A	225	215	257	248	236	235	312	293	312	262	256	277	3,125		
Supplement	155	156	203	172	171	184	224	204	218	180	164	186	2,217		
1974															-1,219
Return A	203	199	266	264	241	246	316	333	270	297	303	358	3,296		
Supplement	125	124	161	160	163	195	206	209	153	186	180	215	2,077		
1975															19
Return A	373	311	262	284	314	351	389	402	333	315	319	341	3,994		
Supplement	373	310	265	288	316	351	391	402	338	318	319	341	4,013		
1976															116
Return A	224	190	214	241	196	222	365	299	187	199	206	184	2,727		
Supplement	247	201	229	243	198	228	269	304	208	202	230	184	2,843		
1977															155
Return A	154	174	178	212	241	261	276	250	277	269	243	205	2,740		
Supplement	171	179	190	235	248	338	287	250	277	268	243	209	2,895		
1978															36
Return A	175	186	178	207	270	210	287	292	306	321	242	253	2,927		
Supplement	180	185	178	220	267	215	286	321	302	320	236	253	2,963		

Table 4-12. Comparison of Monthly Known Incidence of Burglary from Two I-UCR Sources for the City of Rockford: 1972-1978

Year and Source	Known Incidence												Total	Annual Difference	
	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.			
1972															-462
Return A	76	114	112	143	141	123	120	202	147	167	144	154	1,643		
Supplement	58	90	89	97	101	100	95	120	99	122	96	114	1,181		
1973															-717
Return A	159	144	180	197	181	170	266	258	231	203	190	210	2,389		
Supplement	136	91	132	199	177	111	158	142	135	128	126	137	1,672		
1974															206
Return A	201	151	228	224	286	264	318	357	286	304	286	308	3,213		
Supplement	207	152	229	234	461	269	320	351	289	309	285	313	3,419		
1975															111
Return A	279	204	238	242	286	350	402	385	258	362	314	326	3,646		
Supplement	277	216	246	240	319	362	403	431	265	361	319	324	3,757		
1976															-135
Return A	225	255	274	262	277	228	321	313	227	365	222	188	3,158		
Supplement	217	250	189	239	266	232	322	313	224	362	244	185	3,023		
1977															-12
Return A	185	148	185	172	174	203	206	223	216	240	196	133	2,281		
Supplement	186	150	182	170	172	202	207	222	190	261	191	136	2,269		
1978															-48
Return A	165	152	155	188	237	248	264	276	262	266	220	211	2,644		
Supplement	158	104	152	186	240	250	261	283	264	267	221	210	2,596		

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4.2 Analysis of I-UCR Data

Our method of analysis involved a formal statistical test of trends in the data that may have reflected local program intervention. This method, which we explored from a non-parametric perspective in the first and second year evaluations,⁴ first "removed" the effects of all known sources of variation from a given monthly trend. This modified series was then "split" into two parts--one corresponding to months in which a program effect was expected, and the other corresponding to non-program months. These two parts, presumably stripped of all but a program/no-program label could then be held to direct comparison.

In application, this method is less direct than the foregoing description might suggest. Known sources of variation in the series were postulated as:

- seasonal fluctuation (where each of the 12 months is a "season");
- long-term trend; and
- city "type"

Seasonal fluctuation was removed by deriving the 12 "typical seasonals" from the data using the ratio-to-moving-average technique, and using these as factors to adjust individual values in the series. Having derived, for example, 0.88 as the typical seasonal for January (for a given target crime series), each January value in the series would be divided by 0.88 to obtain the seasonally adjusted value. In this example only 88 percent of a "deseasonalized" month's target crime would occur in January. Thus, if it weren't for the seasonal characteristics of January, there would be $1/0.88 - 1 = 13.6$ percent more crime in January than was observed in the series.

The designation city type refers to the pairing of each participating city to a similar city that did not participate in the Program. Loosely speaking, removal of this source of variation attempts, in a statistical sense, to remove possible program effects from the participating city. We selected Urbana as Champaign's sister city for obvious reasons. With the main campus of the University of Illinois spanning the two cities and the physical appearance of the two as a single city, one would expect crime trends to be generally quite similar. Waukegan was chosen as Joliet's sister city because the two are similar with respect to known crime volume; they are

both industrial suburbs approximately equidistant from Chicago; and because Waukegan's decision not to participate in the Program provided another interesting source of comparison. Finally, Rockford was chosen as Peoria's sister city because of their similar population and crime volume.

We have already indicated that the seasonal source of variation in each target crime series was removed by transforming the known incidence series into a seasonally adjusted series. The two other sources of variation were removed using regression methods. We first expressed seasonally adjusted values as a function of long-term trend and city type:

$$C(t) = \exp (b_0 + b_1 t + b_2 S(t)) \quad (1)$$

where $C(t)$ = seasonally adjusted target crime incidence in month t for the participating city
 $S(t)$ = seasonally adjusted target crime incidence in month t for the sister city
 b_0, b_1, b_2 = parameters estimated from the data
 \exp = the exponential function

This model postulates an association of proportionate changes between the dependent variable $C(t)$ and the independent variables (t and $S(t)$).

Logarithmic transformations such as this are often used where the theory behind the relationship between dependent and independent variables is weak (i.e., the specific values of the parameters are of relatively little importance), but some relationship between proportions is plausible.

Having represented each pair of monthly series by equation (1), we are now in a position to seek a program intervention effect. This is accomplished by enhancing the models with another term which simply specifies for each month whether the program is operational or not, by adding another variable to the model that can assume but two values (representing these two situations):

$$C(t) = \exp (b_0 + b_1 t + b_2 S(t) + b_3 P(t)) \quad (2)$$

where $P(t)$ is the program variable which assumes the value 0 (not operational) or 1 (operational) in equation (2). Note that when $P(t)=0$, equations (1) and (2) are identical.

Equations (1) and (2) each have associated multiple correlation coefficients, denoted by R^2 , which measure the percentage of variation

in the dependent variable explained by variation in the independent variables. In other words, for a given equation, the statistic R^2 measures how closely a model fits the data. The increase in R^2 , when the program variable $P(t)$ is included in the model, is therefore a measure of the improvement in fit when the model recognizes the program's presence or absence. This increase can be judged for statistical significance using the F-test with 1 and $T-4$ degrees of freedom,⁷ where T is the total number of months. A statistically significant increase in R^2 indicates that addition of the program variable $P(t)$ improves the fit by significantly more than would be expected by chance. Since we have adopted July 1977 as the date separating the periods of operation and dormancy, $P(t) = 0$ when $t = 1, 2, \dots, 66$, and $P(t) = 1$ when $t = 67, 68, \dots, 84$.

In their current form, equations (1) and (2) are non-additive with respect to the unknown parameters b_0, b_1, \dots . Taking natural logarithms of both sides renders both equations additive and in a form where the b 's can be readily estimated using multiple least-squares regression,⁸ the associated R^2 values can be determined and the statistical F test applied to the change in R^2 .

4.3 Findings Using I-UCR Data

Table 4-13 summarizes the results of the regressions and their corresponding statistics. Regression estimates are shown, with and without the program variable $P(t)$, for each target crime type of interest. A negative value of b_3 indicates that the trend shifted downward when the program variable was included, while the reverse is true if b_3 is positive. The right-most column shows the change in the value of R^2 when $P(t)$ is included in the equation.

According to this analysis, inclusion of the program variable yielded a statistically significant increase in R^2 (at the .05 level) in but two cases, one with b_3 positive and the other with b_3 negative. The positive b_3 for Champaign indicates a shift upward in the residential burglary trend coincident with the month in which the program was considered operational. This may be indicative of citywide increased rates of crime reporting in the team policing unit's target area, as suggested by the findings of the surveys

TABLE 4-13. Summary Statistics on the Increase in R^2
When the Program Variable Included in the Model

Regression Case	Estimated Coefficient Value				Increase in R^2
	b_0	b_1	b_2	b_3	
Champaign - Residential Burglary					
with P(t)	3.69	-.23	.18	.35	.076 ¹
without P(t)	3.53	.11	.32		
Peoria - Residential Burglary					
with P(t)	3.85	-.01	.27	-.08	.013
without P(t)	3.65	-.04	.32		
Joliet - Robbery					
with P(t)	2.49	.18	-.06	.58	.002
without P(t)	2.56	.19	-.08		
Joliet - Burglary					
with P(t)	3.64	.23	.15	-.21	.062 ²
without P(t)	3.30	.17	.22		

¹F = 7.22, with 1 and 80 degrees of freedom; significant, but with b_3 having the wrong sign.

²F = 10.23, with 1 and 80 degrees of freedom; significant.

directed by Peter Nardulli (discussed earlier in Section 3.3.4). The b_3 for Joliet corresponds to a downward shift in burglary, corresponding to the month when program operations began. The undercover fencing operation JAWS (described previously in Section 3.2.4), undertaken in July 1977, but independently of the program, unfortunately presents a confounding factor that cannot readily be overcome. The downward shift may reflect the effects of Joliet's action projects, JAWS, other factors coincident in time, or some combination of these.

In order to provide a visual interpretation of trends, Figure 4-1 shows the annual target crime trends in the participating and sister cities which, in all cases, bear considerable similarity. In Peoria and Rockford, all year-to-year changes in known residential burglary incidence occur in the same direction. In the other three cases, changes occur in the same direction two-thirds of the time. That the burglary trends in Joliet and Waukegan are remarkably similar to one another through 1976 suggests that the statistical significance of the shift can be attributed to the opposite directions of these trends in 1976-77 and 1977-78. There appears to be no visual explanation for statistical significance with b_3 positive in the Champaign/Urbana case.


4.4 Survey Design Overview⁹

Recognizing the possibility that crime reporting practices might change substantially over a period encompassing the implementation of action projects, victimization surveys were conducted by telephone in two of the participating cities: Joliet and Peoria.¹⁰ A baseline survey was conducted in October and November 1976, covering victimizations which were reported to have occurred in six-month time frames from May through October 1976. This baseline period just preceded implementation of the Program's first action project--Joliet's Mobile Crime Prevention Unit. A second survey, identical in content to the first, was conducted precisely 25 months later, thus covering victimizations occurring in the six-month time frame from June through November 1978.


Household samples were created for the surveys using random digit dialing. With this technique, randomly selected four-digit codes were

FIGURE 4-1. Annual Known Incidence of Target Crime
in Three Illinois Cities: 1972 - 1978


ANNUAL KNOWN INCIDENCE OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY
CHAMPAIGN AND URBANA




ANNUAL KNOWN INCIDENCE OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY
PEORIA AND ROCKFORD



ANNUAL KNOWN INCIDENCE OF ROBBERY
JOLIET AND MAURICEAN



ANNUAL KNOWN INCIDENCE OF BURGLARY
JOLIET AND MAURICEAN



appended to each of the telephone exchanges serving the two cities in order to create telephone numbers. If a business, government agency, or institution (e.g., school, hospital) were contacted by this method, no interview was conducted. Only persons in households, age 16 or over, were considered eligible respondents. Over 5000 eligible respondents were contacted in each survey, in each of the cities. Overall, an 89 percent completion rate was achieved. Demographic comparisons within the two samples for each city found no significant differences.

Both surveys utilized two questionnaires, to record respondent and victimization data, respectively. The Regular Questionnaire contained items on the age, sex, race of respondents, the age, sex and race of the household head and screening questions to identify possible robbery, assault, burglary and larceny victimizations. If a screening question were answered in the affirmative, the respondent was asked to answer additional questions about the event. These responses were recorded on the Victimization Report--one for each event, and the data provided on this instrument were used to ascertain the type of crime, if any, that occurred.¹¹ Roughly speaking, victimization rates were then estimated as the ratio of "valid" Victimization Reports to Regular Questionnaires.¹² Thus victimization rates could be derived by type of offense for various subpopulations. The Victimization Report also asked whether the event was reported to the police and if not, why. This enabled us to estimate reporting rates for the various crime types and victim subpopulations at points prior to and after the implementation of action projects in the two cities.

Survey respondents actually served a dual role. For the personal crimes of robbery and assault, respondents spoke only for themselves, while for the household crimes of burglary and larceny, respondents answered for the household as the unit of measure. Thus, while some 12 percent of the households in Peoria and 20 percent of those in Joliet were reached in the surveys, the samples constituted somewhat smaller proportions of individuals age 16 and over.

4.5 Summary of Survey Findings

For burglary in Joliet, victimization survey findings partially bear out those derived from statistics on known incidence, though not at a statistically significant level. The estimated residential burglary rate per 1000 households was 15 percent lower in 1978 than 1976, declining from an estimated monthly average of 232 residential burglaries to 203. No change was found in reporting practices for this offense.¹³

For Joliet, victimization survey findings were consistent with the observed 1976/1978 difference in known robberies, although the change derived from the survey was not statistically significant. The survey estimate of 40 per month in 1976 was higher than the 32 per month in 1978, though the difference is not significant.¹⁴ Official statistics show just under 50 percent more robberies in 1978 than in 1976. Differences between these changes cannot be explained in terms of the fraction of robberies reported to the police, which remained at about 70 percent in both years.¹⁵ These findings give no evidence of a program impact on the occurrence of robbery in Joliet.

For Peoria, victimization survey findings are also quite consistent with the official statistics. The surveys estimated 1861 residential burglaries in households for the six-month periods in both 1976 and 1978, with the crime reported 58 percent of the time in both years. Official statistics for this period were 982 in 1976 and 940 in 1978, yielding ratios of known crime to survey estimates of 0.53 and 0.51 respectively. These are somewhat below the 58 percent indicated by the survey, but are well within the error due to differences in measurement methods.

Part 4 Footnotes

1. The "dark figure" of crime--namely that which fails to be included in "official" statistics has been extensively discussed. Surveying Crime, published by the National Academy of Sciences in 1976, is an evaluation of National Crime Surveys funded by LEAA and as such, provides a good introduction to problems in the measurement of crime occurrence. A more recent assessment of these problems can be found in a June 1979 Illinois Statistical Analysis Center report authored by Carolyn Block, entitled "A Look in the Black Box: The Transformation of Robbery Incidents into Official Robbery Statistics."
2. Arson has also recently been designated a Part I crime, but full reporting procedures have not as yet been developed.
3. Of the three local programs only Champaign's identified a (subcity) target area for a project that was highly significant, relative to the overall program--namely the Team Policing project. The Nardulli surveys, described in Section 3.3.4, spoke to the question of this project's impact on crime in the target area and found none of statistical significance. We nonetheless included Champaign in our analysis to test whether the method would detect a citywide impact where none was anticipated.
4. Given the low probability that parametric and non-parametric tests would yield different conclusions and the greater familiarity of most readers with fundamental regression concepts, we chose the conventional method of analysis.
5. Step-by-step computations for this method can be found in Statistics, by Murray R. Spiegel, Schuam Publishing Co. (New York), pp. 285-287.
6. Estimated values of the parameters b_0 , b_1 , and b_2 will change when the program variable is included in the equation.
7. The F-statistic is a ratio of mean squares which, if the null hypothesis is true, has the value one. An excellent description of the application of F in testing the significance of R^2 increments can be found in Jacob Cohen and Patricia Cohen, Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, 1975. The formula for F can be found on p. 135.
8. While non-linear estimation methods would have yielded "better" estimates for the b's for the models represented by equations (1) and (2), the values of b_0 , b_1 , and b_2 , and the magnitude of b_3 (but not the sign) are not directly relevant to the analysis. The statistical significance of the difference in goodness of fit produced by the two sets of b's is at issue.
9. The design, results and findings of the two surveys are described in detail in the two reports cited in the Preface.

Part Four Footnotes (Continued)

10. Champaign and East St. Louis were excluded from consideration due to funding limitations and the nature of their local programs.
11. A third questionnaire was also used in both surveys to elicit attitudinal data from respondents.
12. The data were first weighted, in order to adjust for the number of telephones in the household that might have been dialed.
13. Notably, households headed by blacks did show a statistically significant difference, the 1978 rate estimated at half that for 1976; households head by whites showed virtually no change.
14. Comparisons between police and victimization statistics should only be made heuristically. The reports on the victimization surveys cited in the Preface discuss major differences between the two. We also note that the number and rate of victimizations are statistical estimates and consequently fall within intervals that are determined with known confidence. These confidence intervals, and our method for estimating their endpoints, were also discussed in the reports cited. For robbery, which occurs infrequently, these intervals were quite broad.
15. The difference would more likely reflect a greater number of robberies against non-Joliet residents in 1978, since such individuals would not have been contacted in our survey.

PART FIVE
LOCAL PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION

This Part enumerates all of the documents we examined for our assessment of the Champaign, Joliet, and Peoria programs. This material has been grouped to generally correspond with the sections in Part Three for each city. The types of documents listed include correspondence, memoranda, Impact Plans, working papers, staff reports, grant applications, news clippings and staff resumes.

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: CHAMPAIGN

PROGRAM BACKGROUND

THE URBAN HIGH CRIME COUNCIL

Membership

Meeting Minutes

PROGRAM STAFF ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Law Enforcement Planning

Adjudication Planning

Corrections Planning

Other Activities

ACTION PROJECTS

Neighborhood Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Program

Management Information and Crime Analysis (MICA)

OTHER RELATED PROGRAMS

PROGRAM GRANTS

MISCELLANEOUS

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: CHAMPAIGN

PROGRAM BACKGROUND

31 Jan 1975 Future meeting with ILEC Planning Unit: Suzanne Peck to Steve Harris
22 Sept 1975 Revised timetable for Program Implementation: Tom Difanis to Suzanne Peck
29 Sept 1975 Program Implementation timetable: Tom Difanis to Suzanne Peck
8 Mar 1976 UHC Impact Plan: Tom Difanis to John Lee Johnson
2 April 1976 Program Coordination Unit Recruitment: Eugene Miller to Crime Reduction Council
12 May 1976 Status of UHC Program: John R. Morrison to Suzanne Peck
14 Mar 1978 Program Progress Report for period 1 Sept 1977 to 28 February 1978

THE URBAN HIGH CRIME COUNCIL

Membership

undated "City Plans Crime Council": news article, Champaign News-Gazette
6 Aug 1975 Crime Reduction Council Composition and Responsibilities: Tom Difanis to Mayor Bland
15 Oct 1975 Invitation to 22 October 1975 Council Meeting: Tom Difanis to William Holland
5 Nov 1975 Invitation to 13 November 1975 Council meeting: Tom Difanis to William Holland
7 Nov 1975 Invitation to 13 November 1975 Council meeting: Tom Difanis to Judge Morgan
7 Nov 1975 13 November 1975 Council Meeting: Tom Difanis to Ellen Handler
undated Need for structure and agenda at CRC Meetings: Tom Difanis to James Burgess
16 Jan 1976 ECICJC presence at meetings: Bill Holland to Tom Difanis
14 Apr 1976 Letter of resignation from CRC: James Friesner, Jr., to William Bland
28 Oct 1976 Urban High Crime Council: Eugene Miller to Neil Weisman
15 Oct 1975 News Item in Courier, 6 October 1975: Tom Difanis to Suzanne Peck
7 Apr 1978 Modifications to the Champaign Urban High Crime Program E. Miller to S. Peck
27 Mar 1979 Local Planning Unit: W. Dye to S. Peck-Collier

Meeting Minutes

13 November 1975	23 September 1976	16 November 1977
20 November 1975	28 October 1976	21 December 1977
2 February 1976	3 December 1976	25 January 1978
8 April 1976	3 March 1977	17 March 1978
15 April 1976	11 May 1977	28 April 1978
26 May 1976	12 October 1977	25 July 1978
1 September 1976	18 October 1977	

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: CHAMPAIGN

PROGRAM STAFF ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Law Enforcement Planning

1975 "Full Service Neighborhood Team Policing" (LEAA Publication)
31 Mar 1975 correspondence re: Psychology Department's work with Champaign
Police
from K. Edward Renner to Tom Difanis
undated correspondence re: Overview of Psychology Department's on-going
project
undated from Professors Moore and Renner to Crime Reduction Council
A paper on "The Concept of Neighborhood Team Policing" including
"Background Information" and a "Survey" utilized by Champaign's
Police Department
2 Mar 1976 correspondence re: Request for Ride-Along Program
from Tom Difanis to Chief William Dye
27 Mar 1976 "Difanis: Crime Report Due Next Week" (Champaign News-Gazette)
undated "Urban High Crime Project Progress Report Requested" (Champaign
News-Gazette)
19 May 1976 correspondence re: Action Project grant application
from Jon R. Morrison to Suzanne Peck
undated Sample of Champaign City police data
undated Phase I Plan--Law Enforcement
10 Jun 1976 Grant application for Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Program,
for the period 30 September 1976 to 30 September 1977
10 Jun 1976 Grant application (revised) for Team Policing-Burglary Abatement
Program, for the period 1 January 1977 to 31 March 1978
Jun 1976 "Public Expectations of Police Behavior" a paper by K. Edward
Renner, Theodore Groves, and Thomas Moore, University of Illinois
undated "The Probability Model as Applied to Police Activity" by Kenneth
Kerber, University of Illinois
undated "Police Calls for Service Analysis" by James Munn, University of
Illinois
18 Aug 1976 "Weisman Becomes Crime Director" (Champaign News-Gazette)
27 Aug 1976 "Regional Planning OKs Agency Grant Requests" (Champaign News-
Gazette)
15 Oct 1976 correspondence re: evaluation review of Champaign's Team Policy-
Burglary Abatement Project
from Anne Beard to Application Review Unit via Richard Sullivan
10 Dec 1976 Statement of grant award for Team Policing-Burglary Abatement
Program, for the grant period 1 January 1977 to 31 March 1978
27 Jul 1976 correspondence re: itinerary for technical assistance by Public
Safety Research Institute
from J.P. Morgan, Jr. to Neil Weisman
21 Aug 1976 correspondence re: reports on PSRI
from J.P. Morgan to Frank Jordan
1 Sep 1978 Grant application for Team Policing Burglary Abatement Program,
for the grant period from 1 July 1978 to 31 December 1978
31 Oct 1978 Statement of grant award for Team Policing-Burglary Abatement
Program for grant period from 1 July 1978 to 31 December 1978
5 Jan 1979 Grant application for Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Program,
for grant period from 8 January 1979 to 8 January 1980

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: CHAMPAIGN

PROGRAM STAFF ACCOMPLISHMENTS (Cont.)

Adjudication Planning

5 May 1977 correspondence re: Champaign Urban High Crime Program Burglary Offender Tracking Project, 1975 and 1976 Preliminary Report

6 May 1977 correspondence re: possible Phase II programs to be discussed at 11 May 1977 CRC meeting
from N. Weisman to CRC members

Sep 1977 Phase II Plan-Adjudication

3 Oct 1977. Grant application for Designated Burglary Prosecution Program, for the period 1 December 1977 to 30 September 1978

13 Oct 1977 correspondence re: transmittal of Phase II plan
from N. Weisman to G. Adams

13 Oct 1977 correspondence re: transmittal of Phase II Plan
from N. Weisman to W. Holland

13 Oct 1977 correspondence re: transmittal of Phase II Plan
from N. Weisman to J. Zagel

28 Oct 1977 correspondence re: review of Designated Prosecutor grant application
from N. Weisman to D. Long

28 Oct 1977 correspondence re: review of Designated Prosecutor grant application
from N. Weisman to P. Dollins

28 Oct 1977 correspondence re: review of Designated Prosecutor grant application
from N. Weisman to E. Hedrick

10 Nov 1977 Application review of Designated Burglary Prosecution Program received 28 October 1977 for the grant period 1 December 1977 to 30 September 1978 UHCR grant application for the period 1 January 1978 to 1 January 1979

undated "Lazarro Makes Switch from Lawman to Lawyer" (Champaign Morning Courier)

12 Dec 1977 correspondence re: review of Designated Burglary Prosecution grant application
from A. Beard to S. Lambertson

6 Sep 1978 correspondence re: intention not to seek renewal of Designated Burglary Prosecution Grant
from T. Difanis to G. Spear

Corrections Planning

Apr 1978 correspondence re: possibility of obtaining documents on probation issues and services
from G. Spear to various sources of documentation on probation services

16 Mar 1978 correspondence re: collection of data on parolees in Champaign County
from N. Weisman to P. Mateson

Jul 1978 Phase III Plan--Social Services and Corrections

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: CHAMPAIGN

PROGRAM STAFF ACCOMPLISHMENTS (Cont.)

Other Activities

31 Oct 1977 Police Vehicle Utilization Study (UHCR Program Staff)
31 Oct 1977 correspondence re: transmittal of Police Vehicle Utilization Study
from N. Weisman to F. Dye
8 Jan 1978 correspondence re: time spent on police department matters
from 1 July 1978 through 31 December 1978
undated Preliminary Report--Combined Police services
Feb 1978 "Life Cycle Costing of Patrol Cars for Vermilion County
Sheriff's Department
6 Mar 1978 correspondence re: calls for service analysis
from UHCR staff to F. Dye
6 Apr 1978 correspondence re: briefing on Peoria Police Department
Crime Search Unit
from N. Weisman to P. Gerontes
6 Apr 1978 correspondence re: visit to Peoria's Crime Scene Search Unit
and possibility of such a unit in Champaign
from N. Weisman to F. Dye
13 Aug 1979 correspondence re: motor vehicle thefts and burglaries
from G. Spear to Captain Jones
16 Aug 1979 correspondence re: robberies occurring over the last three to
four weeks
from G. Spear to All Command Staff
Sep 1979 Champaign Police Department Summary Report
Oct 1979 Champaign Police Department Summary Report
30 Nov 1979 correspondence re: Lawrence, Kansas trip
from G. Spear to W. Dye
11 Dec 1979 Champaign Police Department Presentation to the Champaign
City Council
undated Listing of all robberies for the third shift from Champaign
Police Department

ACTION PROJECTS

Neighborhood Team Policing-Burglary Abatement Program

27 Sep 1978 correspondence re: citizen survey
from G. Spear to W. Dye
2 Nov 1978 correspondence re: allocation of time of Team Policing Officers
to target crime
from G. Spear and R. Soucie to S. Peck-Collier
22 Nov 1978 correspondence re: third citizen survey
from G. Spear and R. Soucie to R. Ku
26 Jan 1979 Progress Report for Team Policing Burglary Abatement Program
for the period from 1 July 1978 to 30 November 1978
May 1979 Monthly Reports of Team Policing Unit
to Dec 1978
undated "Team Policing in Champaign" (Peter F. Nardulli, University
of Illinois)

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: CHAMPAIGN

ACTION PROJECTS (Cont.)

undated "Preliminary Findings from Initial Citizen Survey" (Peter F. Nardulli, University of Illinois)
Feb 1977 Champaign Urban High Crime Citizen Survey Instrument
undated "Police Deployment Strategies and the Delivery of Police Services: An Experiment in Team Policing" (Peter F. Nardulli, University of Illinois)
8 Feb 1979 correspondence re: Team Policing Burglary Abatement Program
Apr 1979 "Team Policing and Police Services: An Experiment that Works" (Peter F. Nardulli, Article in IGPA, Newsletter for Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois)
Sep 1979 "Team Policing Services Studied" (National Civic Review)

Management Information and Crime Analysis (MICA)

undated Description of Management Information and Crime Analysis (MICA) System
undated correspondence re: request for concept approval, UHCR Management Information and Crime Analysis System
from A. Tatalovich to Planning and Budget Committee
27 Jun 1979 Grant application for Champaign Management Information and Crime Analysis system, for the period from 1 October 1979 to 30 September 1980

OTHER RELATED PROGRAMS

27 Oct 1977 correspondence re: UHC support for Champaign County Crime Prevention Council
from N. Weisman to O. Fabert
28 Oct 1977 correspondence re: review of Champaign County Crime Prevention discretionary grant application
from N. Weisman to E. Hedrick
28 Oct 1977 correspondence re: review of Champaign County Crime Prevention Council discretionary grant application
from N. Weisman to R.F. Mottley
28 Oct 1977 correspondence re: review of Champaign County Crime Prevention Council discretionary grant application
from N. Weisman to P. Dollins
28 Oct 1977 correspondence re: review of Champaign County Crime Prevention Council discretionary grant application
from N. Weisman to D. Long
28 Oct 1977 correspondence re: review of Champaign County Crime Prevention Council discretionary grant application
from N. Weisman to W. Dye

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: CHAMPAIGN

PROGRAM GRANTS

undated UHCR grant application for the period 1 July 1975--1 July 1976
undated UHCR grant application for the period 1 July 1976--30 August 1977
undated ILEC response to Grant Adjustment Request (in response to requests of 5 March 1976, 8 March 1976)
undated ILEC response to Grant Adjustment Request
undated ILEC response to Grant Adjustment Request (in response to request of 28 May 1976)
13 Sep 1977 correspondence re: activities that could be undertaken with \$31,000 in additional planning funds from N. Weisman to S. Peck
7 Nov 1977 correspondence re: proposal for continuation funding from N. Weisman to CRC members
10 Nov 1977 correspondence re: approval to make application to the ILEC for continuation funding of the UHCR program from N. Weisman to E. Miller
16 Nov 1977 correspondence re: request for continuation funding from E. Miller to ILEC
17 Nov 1977 correspondence re: application for continuation of UHCR program from E. Miller to Mayor and City Council
6 Dec 1977 City Council Bill 77-362 Authorizing City Manager to Execute an Application to Illinois Law Enforcement Commission for the Urban High Crime Impact Project
4 Jan 1977 correspondence re: reallocation of East St. Louis remaining program funds to programs in Champaign, Joliet, and Peoria from R. Soltau to A. Yount

MISCELLANEOUS

Feb 1976 "Champaign County Sixth Judicial Circuit of Illinois, Probation Survey" (R. Barry Bollenson, Coordinator of Probation and Court Sources, Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Justice Programs)
27 Mar 1976 "LOCATE Granted Extra \$45,000" (Champaign News-Gazette)
9 Jun 1976 correspondence re: technical assistance from N. Weisman to W. Dye
28 July 1976 correspondence re: technical assistance from Martie Bibb to James Burgess
Aug 1979 "The Demand for Police Services" final report submitted to ILEC (Peter F. Nardulli, University of Illinois, and Jeffrey M. Stonecast, Syracuse University).
undated resumes for: Marilyn Armbruster, Thomas Difanis, Jon Morrison Gina Shineall, Gary Spear (letter), Neil Weisman

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: JOLIET

PROGRAM BACKGROUND

THE URBAN HIGH CRIME REDUCTION COUNCIL

Membership

Meeting Minutes

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING DIVISION

Statement of Purpose

Law Enforcement

Adjudication Planning

Corrections Planning

Planning Update

Other Activities

Other Staff Reports to the Council

ACTION PROJECTS

Mobile Crime Prevention Unit

Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program

Special Prosecution Unit

Target Crime Restitution Project

Burglary Investigation Project

OTHER RELATED PROGRAMS

Victim-Witness Assistance

Jaws I

YMCA Community Anti-Crime Program

PROGRAM GRANTS

MISCELLANEOUS

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: JOLIET

PROGRAM BACKGROUND

6 May 1974 correspondence re: Information on responsibilities and duties
of Crime Reduction Council members
from B. Wrubel to W. Fehst

6 May 1974 correspondence re: Funding of UHCR Program
from F. Breen to L. Neuhart

15 May 1974 correspondence re: Invitation to attend a pre-council meeting
of Joliet City Council
from L. Neuhart to M. Orenic, M. Rudman, J. Trizna

21 May 1974 correspondence re: Recommendation of Ray Bolden for Crime
Reduction Council Membership
from M. Rudman to Mayor Berlinsky

27 May 1974 correspondence re: Acknowledgement of receipt of letter
recommending Ray Bolden to Crime Reduction
Council
from Mayor Berlinsky to M. Rudman

4 Jun 1974 City Council Proceedings requesting and granting of authori-
zation to apply for UHCR grant

4 Jun 1974 City Ordinance No. 6155 creating the Joliet Crime Reduction
Council

27 Jun 1974 correspondence re: Creation of Crime Reduction Council
from N. Vallera to T. Wilson, A. Williams, L. Neuhart,
M. Rudman, M. Orenic, S. Andreano,
M. Collins, F. Breen

11 Jul 1974 correspondence re: Appointment to Council Chairmanship
from N. Vallera to R. Bolden

11 Jul 1974 correspondence re: Ordinance No. 6155 creating the Joliet
Crime Reduction Council
from N. Vallera to State of Illinois, Department of Corrections

1 Aug 1974 correspondence re: Format for UHCR Program and requirements
for Program Coordinator
from W. Fehst to Council Members

9 Aug 1974 correspondence re: Resumes for Program Coordinator
from W. Fehst to Council Members

13 Aug 1974 City Council proceedings re citizen complaint of crime problem
introduced by Councilman Keck

3 Sep 1974 correspondence re: Withdrawal of application
from P. Gallagher to L. Neuhart

9 Sep 1974 correspondence re: J. Cannon's membership on Council
from W. Fehst to A.R. Sielaff

undated Preliminary Work Plan

undated Performance Management System

THE URBAN HIGH CRIME REDUCTION COUNCIL
Membership

4 Jun 1975 City Ordinance 6311 amending Ordinance 6155 to include Public
Defender as member of Crime Reduction Council

4 Jun 1975 correspondence re: M. Rudman's resignation from Council
from S. Peck to L. Neuhart

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: JOLIET

THE URBAN HIGH CRIME REDUCTION COUNCIL (Cont.)

- 5 Jun 1974 correspondence re: M. Rudman's resignation from Council
from N. Keck to M. Rudman
- 4 Jun 1975 correspondence re: Obtaining cooperation of M. Rudman
from N. Weisman to Council Members
- 11 Jun 1975 correspondence re: Removal of Ray Bolden from Council, and M.
Rudman's resignation
from M. Rudman to N. Keck
- 15 Dec 1976 correspondence re: Willingness of new State's Attorney to
serve as CRC member
from J.M. Collins to S. Peck
- 20 Jun 1977 correspondence re: Appointment of Dennis J. Wolff, Warden of
Joliet Correctional Center, to CRC
from C. Rowe to M. Collins
- 15 May 1979 correspondence re: Continuation of membership on CRC
from J. Bourg to O. Edmon
- 9 Jul 1979 correspondence re: Attendance at meetings
from M. Collins to CRC members

Meeting Minutes

- | | | |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| 15 Aug 1974 | 3 Dec 1975 | 25 Oct 1977 |
| 22 Aug 1974 | 7 Jan 1976 | 2 Feb 1978 |
| 3 Sep 1974 | 11 Feb 1976 | 6 Apr 1978 |
| 29 Oct 1974 | 29 Apr 1976 | 25 May 1978 |
| 5 Dec 1974 | 28 Jul 1976 | 24 Aug 1978 |
| 29 Jan 1975 | 16 Sep 1976 | 26 Oct 1978 |
| 26 Feb 1975 | 26 Oct 1976 | 16 Nov 1978 |
| 26 Mar 1975 | 15 Dec 1976 | 1 Feb 1979 |
| 30 Apr 1975 | 23 Mar 1977 | 29 May 1979 |
| 25 Jun 1975 | 25 May 1977 | 18 Jul 1979 |
| 23 Jul 1975 | 8 Jun 1977 | 13 Sep 1979 |
| 3 Oct 1975 | 25 Aug 1977 | 2 Nov 1979 |

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING DIVISION

Statement of Purpose

- 22 Nov 1977 correspondence re: Role of Criminal Justice Planning Division
from City Manager to Mayor Keck
- undated 1977 Highlights of Criminal Justice Planning Division, City
Manager's Office
- 25 Jan 1979 correspondence re: Institutionalization of local criminal
justice planning
from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members
- undated Statement of Goals for 1978 for the Joliet UHCR Program
- 13 Sep 1979 Goals and Objectives for 1979-1980, Priority Work Areas

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: JOLIET

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING DIVISION (Cont.)

Law Enforcement

3 Oct 1975 correspondence re: Approval of Phase I Impact Plan by Crime
Reduction Council
from J.M. Collins to N. Keck and Council

3 Oct 1975 Phase I: Action Program

20 Oct 1975 correspondence re: Criminal Justice Information Form - System
from L. Neuhart to B. Gerhardt, Chief Breen, N. Weisman

8 Dec 1975 correspondence re: Special arrest and disposition information
from F. Breen to L. Neuhart

16 Dec 1975 correspondence re: Police Department arrest and disposition
information for offender tracking
from N. Weisman to L. Neuhart

Mar 1976 Phase I Impact Plan

Adjudication Planning

Dec 1976 Phase II Impact Plan

8 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Completion of Phase II Plan and submission
of the Phase II action grant application
from S. Peck to M. Collins

Corrections Planning

undated Outline on Joliet Urban High Crime Reduction Program,
Phase III corrections

Aug 1977 Phase III Impact Plan

23 Jan 1978 correspondence re: Phase III programming
from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members

24 Aug 1978 correspondence re: Possible action projects
from A. Hochstetter to J. Kidd

28 Aug 1978 correspondence re: Possible action projects
from A. Hochstetter to J. Kidd

Jan 1978 Evaluation Plan Outline Draft, Phase III Corrections

Planning Update

24 Aug 1978 Phase IV Plan - Arrest Deterrence Study

Oct 1978 Report on Examination of Projects to Increase Risk of Arrest
for Burglary

3 Jan 1979 correspondence re: Field Interview Program
from G. Fitzgerald to Planning Officer

undated Phase IV Plan

8 Jan 1979 correspondence re: Proposal to conduct bail bond study
from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members

12 Apr 1979 correspondence re: Bail Bond Study
from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members

undated Research Design - Bail Bond Study

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: JOLIET

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING DIVISION (Cont.)

Other Activities

- 16 Sep 1979 correspondence re: Drug abuse prevention campaign
from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members
- 18 Sep 1979 correspondence re: Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime
Program
from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members
- 19 Sep 1979 correspondence re: Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime
Program (TASC Program)
from G. Fitzgerald to selected criminal justice officials, 12th
Judicial Circuit
- 27 Sep 1979 correspondence re: Drug Coordination and Information Council
from J. Bourg to A. Marmer
- 11 Oct 1979 correspondence re: Expression of gratitude for organizing
meeting concerning TASC
from M. Heaps to G. Fitzgerald
- 14 Oct 1979 "More Potent Pot Has Health Experts Worried" (Chicago Tribune)
- 24 Nov 1979 "Teens Spend a Lot to Put the 'High' in High School" (Chicago
Tribune)
- 2 Dec 1979 "Dangers found in Marijuana" (Chicago Tribune)
- undated Flyer announcing essay contest on subject "Drugs and Alcohol,
How They Affect Society"
- undated "The Truth About Sniffing" (Drug Coordination and Information
Council)
- 9 Sep 1977 correspondence re: East side revitalization and crime control
suggestions
from G. Fitzgerald to G. Mueller
- 8 Nov 1977 correspondence re: Evaluation of SENO Street Light Program
from G. Fitzgerald to F. Albert, Director of Community Development
- 20 May 1979 "Southside Residents Want Talks with Orenic" (publication unknown)
- 24 Oct 1979 "Grateful to SENO" (publication unknown)
- 13 Dec 1977 correspondence re: Encouraging businessmen to enable employees
to cooperate with law enforcement and
criminal justice agencies
from G. Fitzgerald to R. Colvin, Joliet Region Chamber of Commerce
- 19 Jul 1979 correspondence re: UHCRC prostitution policy
from G. Fitzgerald to J. Gilbert, Community Anti-Crime Program
- 19 Jul 1979 correspondence re: UHCRC prostitution policy
from G. Fitzgerald to E. Petka
- undated correspondence re: Proposed performance measures for team
police
from G. Fitzgerald to F. Breen
- 11 Apr 1978 correspondence re: Report on team policing need and feasi-
bility study
from R. Oldland to Mayor and City Council
- 23 Nov 1977 correspondence re: Data on patrol officer effectiveness
from G. Fitzgerald to F. Breen
- 23 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Parental Responsibility Ordinance
from G. Fitzgerald to R. Feeley, Corporation Council
- 2 May 1979 correspondence re: Attendance at prison grievance review
proceedings
from G. Fitzgerald to City Manager

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING DIVISION (Cont.)Other Staff Reports to the Council

28 Jul 1976 Offender Tracking Six-Month Report
 Jan 1977 Offender-Based Tracking Report

25 Aug 1977 Offender-Based Tracking Report

14 Sep 1977 correspondence re: Offender-based tracking bond figures
 from G. Fitzgerald to E. Petka

Oct 1977 "Offender Tracking System Pinpoints Problems" (International
 City Management Association, Vol. 6, Issue 9)

Mar 1977 Offender-Based Tracking Project, Fourth Report

Apr 1979 Offender-Based Tracking Project, Fifth Report

undated Offender Tracking Form II for Defendant Demographic Data

28 Sep 1977 correspondence re: Robbery and burglary trends
 from G. Fitzgerald to Chief of Police

3 Nov 1977 correspondence re: Target crime trends, October 1976 and
 October 1977
 from G. Fitzgerald to Chief of Police

Jan 1978 Target Crime Report, Fourth Quarter 1977

Jul 1978 Target Crime Trend Reports, First Half of 1978

undated Target Crime Trend Reports, First Nine Months of 1978

1978-1977 Target Crime Trend Reports

undated Target Crime Trend Reports, First Quarter of 1979

20 Dec 1979 Target Crime Trend Reports, Third Quarter of 1979

17 Dec 1975 correspondence re: Status report - UHCR Program
 from N. Weisman to Council members

16 Jan 1976 correspondence re: UHCR Program progress in Joliet
 from D. Fogel to N. Keck

5 Feb 1976 correspondence re: Status Report - 3 February 1976
 from N. Weisman to Council members

22 Apr 1976 correspondence re: UHCR Program status report
 from N. Weisman to Council members

undated correspondence re: Director's Report for Meeting of
 25 October 1977

23 Jan 1978 correspondence re: Project area recommendations for use of
 remaining funds
 from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members

(Fall 1979) correspondence re: Priority #3 repeat offender
 from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members

31 Aug 1976 correspondence re: Topics for 9 September 1976 meeting
 from G. Fitzgerald to UHCR Council members

22 Apr 1976 correspondence re: Topics for April 29 meeting
 from N. Weisman to Council members

15 Feb 1977 correspondence re: Proceedings of 14 February 1977 meeting,
 CRC
 from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members not present at 14 February
 1977 meeting

ACTION PROJECTSMobile Crime Prevention Unit

3 Oct 1975 correspondence re: Need for Mobile Crime Prevention Unit -
Financial Impact Statement
from F. Breen, N. Weisman to L. Neuhart, R. Fraser

undated City Council resolution authorizing Mayor Keck to apply for
Mobile Crime Prevention Grant

24 Oct 1975 Grant application for Mobile Crime Prevention Unit for the
period 1 January 1976 - 1 January 1977

17 Dec 1976 correspondence re: Publicity for Mobile Crime Prevention Unit
from J.M. Collins to W. Blackburn

25 Jan 1977 correspondence re: Request for one month grant extension for
Mobile Crime Prevention Unit
from F. Breen to G. Gersey

7 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Explanation of request for grant adjustment
for Mobile Crime Prevention Unit
from F. Breen to G. Gersey

12 May 1977 correspondence re: Performance of the Selective Enforcement
Unit
from G. Fitzgerald to Sgt. J. Grace, Supervisor of Mobile
Crime Prevention Unit

Nov 1976 Joliet Police Department Monthly Crime Bulletin

Dec 1976 Joliet Police Department Monthly Crime Bulletin

Jan 1977 Joliet Police Department Monthly Crime Bulletin

Feb 1977 Joliet Police Department Monthly Crime Bulletin

Mar 1977 Joliet Police Department Monthly Crime Bulletin

1 Mar 1977 Request for Grant Adjustment, Mobile Crime Prevention Unit

Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program

1 Nov 1976 Grant application for Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate
Program for the period 1 January 1977 to 1 October 1977

5 Jan 1977 correspondence re: Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program
from S. Lambertson to B. Gerhart

24 Jan 1977 correspondence re: Response to questions on grant application
for Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program
from B. Gerhart to S. Lambertson

10 Feb 1977 Statement of Grant Award, Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate
Program, for the period 1 February 1977 to 30 November 1977

11 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Condition of award for the Neighborhood
Crime Prevention Rebate Program
from A. Beard to G. Gersey via J.R. Oksas

11 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Revised budget for Neighborhood Crime
Prevention Rebate Program
from G. Fitzgerald and B. Gerhart to S. Peck and G. Gersey

undated Request for Grant Adjustment for the Neighborhood Crime
Prevention Rebate Program asking for extension from 30 November
1977 to 30 June 1978

13 Jul 1977 correspondence re: Use of Block Grant Funds for Security Systems
Memorandum to SPA Directors

ACTION PROJECTS (Cont.)Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program (Cont.)

15 Sep 1977 correspondence re: Permissability of Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program
from G. Fitzgerald to City Manager

16 Sep 1977 correspondence re: Clarification of use of LEAA funds for Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program
from R. Oldland, City Manager, to J. Zagel, Exec. Dir. of ILEC

26 Sep 1977 correspondence re: Legality of Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program
from J. Zagel to R. Oldland

28 Sep 1977 correspondence re: Legality of Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program
from R. Oldland to J. Zagel

17 Nov 1977 Addendum to Evaluation Plan for Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program

23 Dec 1977 correspondence re: Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program compliance with LEAA guidelines
from J. Zagel to R. Oldland

4 Jan 1978 correspondence re: Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program compliance with LEAA guidelines
from R. Oldland to J. Zagel

30 Mar 1978 correspondence re: Review of Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program compliance with Crime Control Act restriction on Part C funds
from T. Maddox, Assistant Administrator to General Council of LEAA to J. Zagel

5 Apr 1978 correspondence re: ILEC response to Grant Adjustment request for the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program, approving grant extension from 30 November 1977 to 30 June 1978

13 Apr 1978 correspondence re: Re-implementation of Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program
from G. Fitzgerald to Director of Neighborhood Services

Apr 1979 Evaluation Report on the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program

6 Apr 1979 correspondence re: Discontinuance of Neighborhood Crime Prevention Rebate Program after 30 April 1979, end of grant period
from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members

Special Prosecution Unit

24 Nov 1976 "Special Prosecution Unit Funds Sought" (Joliet News-Gazette)

26 Nov 1976 Resolution of County Board approving application for a Special Prosecution Unit

30 Nov 1976 Grant application for Special Prosecution Unit for two-year period beginning 1 February 1977

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: JOLIET

ACTION PROJECTS (Cont.)

Special Prosecution Unit (Cont.)

1 Feb 1977 Phase II proposal Special Prosecution Unit
8 Mar 1977 Statement of Grant Award for Special Prosecution Unit for the
period 1 April 1977 to 31 March 1979
21 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Purchase of a typewriter for the Special
Prosecution Unit
from E. Petka to S. Peck
23 Apr 1977 correspondence re: Proposed evaluation design for the Special
Prosecution Unit
from G. Fitzgerald to A. Beard
30 Apr 1977 "Prosecution Unit Praised" (Joliet Herald-News)
30 Apr 1977 "Two Convicted in \$21,000 Robbery" (Joliet Herald-News)
1 Aug 1977 correspondence re: Nonappearance of defendants at scheduled
court proceedings
from G. Fitzgerald to F. Breen
22 Nov 1977 Grant Application for the Special Prosecution Unit, for the
period 1 April 1978 to 1 April 1979
26 Oct 1977 "Number of Robbers Facing Judge Doubles" (Joliet Herald-News)
Jan 1978 An Evaluation of the Special Prosecution Unit prepared by the
Crescent Regional Criminal Justice Council
30 Jan 1978 correspondence re: Evaluation Review - continuation grant for
the Special Prosecution Unit
from A. Beard to S. Lambertson
17 Feb 1978 correspondence re: Specific responses to items in the evalu-
ation of the Special Prosecution Unit
from G. Fitzgerald to B. Morrell
24 Feb 1978 correspondence re: Response to Mr. Fitzgerald's 17 February
letter
from B. Morrell to G. Fitzgerald
1 Mar 1978 correspondence re: Mr. Fitzgerald's response to the evaluation
of the Special Prosecution Unit
from B. Morrell to A. Beard
16 Mar 1978 correspondence re: Crescent Region evaluation of the Special
Prosecution Unit
from A. Beard to B. Morrell
21 Mar 1978 correspondence re: Data forms for the Special Prosecution
Unit
from B. Morrell to E. Petka
1 May 1978 correspondence re: Approval of data collection forms for the
Special Prosecution Unit
from E. Petka to S. Peck
24 Aug 1978 correspondence re: Submission of plan for continuation of
Special Prosecution Unit through end of FY
1979
from E. Petka to S. Peck-Collier
Jan 1979 Special Prosecution Unit, 1978 Case Dispositions

ACTION PROJECTS (Cont.)Target Crime Restitution Project

1 Jan 1978 "Ex-Offender Programs Mandatory for Jobless on Probation"
(Joliet Herald-News)

31 Jan 1978 An Agreement between the Will County Adult Probation Department
and the Model Ex-Offender Program

15 Mar 1978 correspondence re: Liability to a governmental entity to a
juvenile performing public service work as
a condition of probation
from W. Scott, Attorney General, to T. Difanis, Champaign
County State's Attorney

8 May 1978 correspondence re: Illinois statutes regarding public service
work on probation
from E. Petka to W.J. Scott, Attorney General

25 May 1978 Phase III Proposal

6 Jun 1978 correspondence re: Target Crime Restitution Program
from B. Morrell to G. Fitzgerald

30 Jun 1978 correspondence re: Attorney General's Opinion
from N. Sakellarion to G. Fitzgerald

1 Jul 1979 Grant Application for the Target Crime Restitution Program for
the period 1 October 1978 to 1 January 1980

24 Jul 1978 correspondence re: Evaluation of Target Crime Restitution
Project
from R. Ku to G. Fitzgerald

undated correspondence re: Authorization for administration to
provide public service work jobs to court
probationers
from City Manager to Mayor and City Council

7 Aug 1978 correspondence re: Resolution waiving grant funds for a
target crime restitution program
from R. Oldland to Mayor and City Council

28 Aug 1978 correspondence re: Addition to plea negotiation policy
from G. Fitzgerald to E. Petka

29 Aug 1978 correspondence re: Employment of probationers in public
service work
from R. Lechwar to G. Fitzgerald

30 Aug 1978 correspondence re: Employment of probationers in public
service work
from G. Fitzgerald to R. Lechwar

1 Sep 1978 correspondence re: Evaluation plan for Target Crime Resti-
tution Project
from G. Fitzgerald to R. Ku

16 Oct 1978 correspondence re: Announcement of funding of Target Crime
Restitution Project
from G. Fitzgerald to R. Lechwar

16 Oct 1978 correspondence re: Announcement of funding of Target Crime
Restitution Project
from G. Fitzgerald to R. Lechwar

18 Oct 1978 correspondence re: Evaluation Plan for Target Crime Resti-
tution Project
from B. Haskins to G. Fitzgerald

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ACTION PROJECTS (Cont.)

Target Crime Restitution Project (Cont.)

17 Nov 1978 correspondence re: Role of Restitution Specialist
from G. Fitzgerald to S. Peck-Collier

27 Nov 1978 correspondence re: Meeting to introduce Restitution Specialist
from G. Fitzgerald to M. Orenic

5 Dec 1978 correspondence re: National assessment of adult restitution
projects by University of Minnesota
Community Service Center
from J. Hudson to R. Logue

12 Dec 1978 correspondence re: Restitution and public service
from M. Orenic to all judges in Will County

27 Dec 1978 correspondence re: Role of Restitution Specialist
from M. Rudman to K. Isabelli

28 Dec 1978 correspondence re: Comments on Evaluation of Target Crime
Restitution Project
from M. Myrent to G. Fitzgerald

3 Jan 1979 correspondence re: Evaluation of Target Crime Restitution
Project
from G. Fitzgerald to M. Myrent

8 Jan 1979 correspondence re: Role of Restitution Specialist
From G. Fitzgerald to B. Markese

30 Jan 1979 correspondence re: Preparation of probation orders
from G. Fitzgerald to B. McKea

15 Feb 1979 correspondence re: Proposal for placement of probationers in
public service positions
from M. Hall to N. Sakellarion

21 Feb 1979 correspondence re: Procedures for handling restitution
payments
from M. Hall to M. Costigan

27 Feb 1979 correspondence re: Suggested procedures for handling restitu-
tion payments
from M. Costigan to M. Hall

1 Mar 1979 correspondence re: Uniformity of procedures or handling
restitution payments
from G. Fitzgerald to M. Orenic

26 Mar 1979 correspondence re: Information request for evaluation of
Target Crime Restitution Project
from M. Hall to M. Costigan

9 May 1979 correspondence re: Request for access to information in
probation files
from M. Hall to M. Orenic

24 May 1979 correspondence re: Target Crime Restitution Clients
from M. hall to CRC members

1 Jun 1979 correspondence re: Authorization to release information from
probation files
from M. Orenic to N. Radakovich

12 Jun 1979 correspondence re: Information needed from probation depart-
ment for evaluation of Target Crime
Restitution Project
from M. Hall to N. Radakovich

ACTION PROJECTS (Cont.)Target Crime Restitution Project (Cont.)

9 Jul 1979 correspondence re: Soliciting Support for Senate Bill 1270
from H. Leinenweber, State Representative, to Governor Thompson

13 Jul 1979 correspondence re: Continuance of obligation to pay restitution
if offender subsequently jailed
from G. Fitzgerald to E. Petka

14 Jul 1979 correspondence re: Verification of list of convicted felons
sentenced to probation
from M. Hall to N. Radakovich

26 Jul 1979 correspondence re: Role of Restitution Specialist
from M. Hall to M. Orenic

25 Oct 1979 Target Crime Restitution Project, Interim Evaluation Report

24 Oct 1979 correspondence re: Commentary on Interim Evaluation Report of
Target Crime Restitution Project
from N. Radakovich to M. Hall

8 Nov 1979 correspondence re: Hiring of Restitution Specialist in the
Probation Department
from N. Radakovich to M. Hall

Burglary Investigation Project

26 Sep 1978 correspondence re: Verification of identifiable prints
from G. Fitzgerald to E. Petka

26 Sep 1978 correspondence re: Use of City Hall computer for fingerprint
matching
from G. Fitzgerald to Manager of Data Processing

18 Oct 1978 correspondence re: Recommended approach to increase risk of
arrest
from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members

17 Nov 1978 correspondence re: Resolution approving Phase IV and authori-
zing Mayor to sign grant application for
Burglary Investigation Project
from R. Oldland to Mayor and City Council

29 Nov 1978 correspondence re: Public education on burglary apprehensions
from G. Fitzgerald to Officers Paskvan and Hernandez, Crime
Prevention Unit

29 Nov 1978 correspondence re: Public education on burglary apprehensions
from G. Fitzgerald to R. Williams, Project Director, YMCA
Anti-Crime Program

29 Nov 1978 correspondence re: Education of public in apprehending
burglary suspects
from G. Fitzgerald to R. Williams

12 Dec 1978 Resolution Approving Phase IV Plan and Authorizing Mayor to
Sign Grant Application for Burglary Investigation Project

13 Dec 1978 Grant Application for Burglary Investigation Project for the
period from 1 April 1979 to 1 October 1980

Winter 1978 Article on Burglary Investigation Project (The Joliet Hall-
quarterly)

ACTION PROJECTS (Cont.)Burglary Investigation Project (Cont.)

9 Jan 1979 correspondence re: Conversation on Miscellaneous topics with
commander of investigations
from G. Fitzgerald to file

22 Jan 1979 correspondence re: Directed Deterrent Patrol
from Sgt. W. Fitzgerald to Chief F. Breen

8 Mar 1979 Evaluation Technical Assistance Request Forms requesting
review and commentary on Evaluation Plan of Burglary Investi-
gation Project, submitted to Technical Assistance Resource
Center, University of Wisconsin

10 Apr 1979 correspondence re: Response to comments on evaluation plan
for Burglary Investigation Project
from G. Fitzgerald to J. Greene

12 Apr 1979 correspondence re: Funding of Burglary Investigation Project
from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members

14 May 1979 correspondence re: Comments on Evaluation Design of Burglary
Investigation Project
from R. Ku to G. Fitzgerald

17 May 1979 correspondence re: Response to comments on evaluation design
of Burglary Investigation Project
from G. Fitzgerald to R. Ku

6 Dec 1979 correspondence re: Request ordinance be rescinded
from R. Oldland to Mayor and City Council

10 Jan 1980 JAWS II Operation (Press Release)

10 Jan 1980 "Police Nab 21 in Theft Crackdown" (Joliet Herald-News)

11 Jan 1980 "Cop, 24 Others Indicted in Joliet 'Sting'" (Chicago Tribune)

13 Jan 1980 "Latest 'Sting' Operation has Joliet-Area Criminals Buzzing"
(Joliet Herald-News)

28 Feb 1980 Interim Evaluation Report on the Burglary Investigation
Project

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: JOLIET

OTHER RELATED PROGRAMS

Victim-Witness Assistance

27 Apr 1977 correspondence re: Proposed workshop-seminar on crime victim
and witness assistance.
from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members

6 Jun 1977 correspondence re: News coverage of seminar on UHCR.
from G. Fitzgerald to K. Heyman

3 Jun 1977 "Punch sought for Crime Victims Act." (Joliet Herald News)

14 Jun 1977 correspondence re: Special parking privileges for witnesses in
criminal cases.
from G. Fitzgerald to E. Petka

15 Jun 1977 correspondence re: Hiring of a Victim-Witness Advocate in the
Community Relations Department.
from G. Fitzgerald to A. Lopez, Community Relations Director

Nov 1977 Proposal for a Neighborhood Victim Assistance Project given
to Neighborhood Services Division.

23 Feb 1978 Grant Application for the Victim-Witness Aide Project for the
period 3 July 1978 to 3 January 1980.

Mar 1978 Grant Application for the Victim-Witness Aide Program for the
period 3 July 1978 to 31 December 1979.

17 Mar 1978 correspondence re: Evaluation review of the City of Joliet's
Grant Application for Victim-Witness
Aide Project.
from A. Beard to S. Lambertson via R. Sullivan

22 Mar 1978 correspondence re: Transmitted letter for Grant Application
with note concerning evaluation component
for Victim-Witness Assistance Project.
from M. McDaniel to A. Maddox

19 Apr 1978 correspondence re: Evaluation Component-Joliet Victim-Witness
Assistance Project.
from A. Beard to G. Fitzgerald

26 Apr 1978 correspondence re: Appropriateness of the Victim-Witness Aide
Project as a UHCR funded effort.
from S. Peck to G. Fitzgerald

1 May 1978 correspondence re: Actions taken in response to S. Peck's
letter on Victim-Witness Aide Grant
Application.
from G. Fitzgerald to S. Peck

18 May 1978 correspondence re: Acknowledgement of the withdrawal of the
victim-Witness Aide Grant Application.
from S. Lambertson to N. Keck

Nov 1978 Proposal for a Neighborhood Victim Assistance Project.

17 Dec 1978 "Program to Help Crime Victims Recover Losses."
(Joliet Herald News)

Jul-Aug 1979 "Victim-Witness Assistance." (Joliet Police Department
Bulletin, "Spotlight" feature)

Sep 1979 "Are Judges Responsible for Victims, Too?" (Judicature,
Volume 63, Number 3)

24 Oct 1979 "Guide Leads Victims Witnesses through Maze of Legal System."
(Joliet Herald News)

OTHER RELATED PROGRAMS (Cont.)

Jaws I

22 Jul 1977 "Forty Officers Sweep Area for Suspects." (Joliet Herald News)
1 Aug 1977 correspondence re: "Operation Jaws."
from G. Fitzgerald to N. Keck
undated "Massive Crackdown on Burglars." (Joliet Herald News)

YMCA Community Anti-Crime Program

7 Dec 1977 Grant Application, YMCA Citizen Anti-Crime Program.
undated Brochure for YMCA Community Anti-Crime Program
17 Aug 1978 "Citizen Program against Crime gets Funds." (Joliet Herald-News)
Nov 1978 City Ordinance: Anti-Crime Progress Report of YMCA Community
Anti-Crime Program.
10 May 1979 "YMCA Anti-Crime Program Tries Sports Angle." (Joliet Herald
News)

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: JOLIET

PROGRAM GRANTS

- 1 Jul 1974 UHCR Grant Application for the period from 1 September 1974 to 1 September 1975.
- undated UHCR Grant Application for 12-month period starting 21 June 1975.
- 12 Jun 1975 Revised Statement of Grant Award and Grant Conditions.
- 1 Jul 1975 City Council resolution authorizing Mayor Keck to apply for UHCR grant.
- 5 Feb 1976 correspondence re: ILEC Planning and Budget Committee Meeting. from N. Weisman to Council Members
- 22 Nov 1977 UHCR Grant Application for the period 1 February 1978 to 1 September 1978.
- Spring 1978 correspondence re: Availability of additional \$50,000 for UHCR Planning. from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members
- 15 Jul 1978 UHCR Grant Application for the period of 16 September 1978 to 16 August 1979.
- 3 Apr 1979 correspondence re: Planning Staff continuation. from G. Fitzgerald to CRC members

MISCELLANEOUS

- 3 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Application for criminal justice information for research purposes. from G. Fitzgerald to F. Breen
 - 22 Sep 1977 correspondence re: Access to traffic records and on-line computer criminal records for the courts. from G. Fitzgerald to Chief Judge Orenic
 - 4 Oct 1977 correspondence re: Privacy Regulations. from G. Fitzgerald to Lt. T. Trevison
 - undated City Ordinance: Non-disclosure of Criminal Justice Information Agreement between the Metropolitan area Narcotics Squad and the Joliet Criminal Justice Planning Division.
 - 6 Jun 1978 City Ordinance #6907 regulating secondhand dealers
 - 1978 City of Joliet Police Department Annual Report.
 - undated correspondence re: Survey responses from local attorneys. from G. Fitzgerald to local attorneys
 - undated correspondence re: Survey on case preparation time. from G. Fitzgerald to local attorneys
- Job Descriptions: Program Aide, Criminal Justice Planning, Research/Planning Assistant, Criminal Justice Planning

<u>Staff Resumes:</u>	Gary Fitzgerald	Edwin S. Korupa
	Lynn Gudeman	Neil Weisman
	Henry Pettigrew	Lea Wylder
<u>Personnel Action Forms:</u>	Jerome Celmer	Henry Pettigrew
	Gary Fitzgerald	Daryl Sieger
	Lynn Gudeman	Edwin S. Korupa
	Sherwen Moore	Neil Weisman
	Susan Nordenberg	Lea Wylder

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: PEORIA

PROGRAM BACKGROUND

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Physical Evidence

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OTHER RELATED PROGRAMS

PROGRAM GRANTS

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PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: PEORIA

PROGRAM BACKGROUND

undated Master Plan Design (Crime Impact Program)
24 Nov 1974 Master Plan Design Update (Crime Impact Program)
27 Aug 1975 Overview of Urban High Crime Reduction Program
18 Jan 1977 correspondence re: History of Crime Impact Funds
from A. Moore to CRC members

THE CRIME REDUCTION COUNCIL

Decision Milestones

18 Jan 1977 correspondence re: Allocation of Crime Impact Funds
from A. Moore to CRC members
7 Oct 1977 correspondence re: Continuation of adult action projects
from A. Moore to CRC members
7 Oct 1977 correspondence re: Continuation of planning activities
from A. Moore to CRC members
7 Oct 1977 correspondence re: Grant matters
from A. Moore to CRC members
30 Nov 1977 Crime Reduction Council Resolution re provision of funds to
extend two police action projects through 31 Dec 1978
7 Mar 1979 correspondence re: Allocation of Funds
from A. Moore to CRC members

Meeting Minutes

27 Aug 1975	5 Nov 1976	23 Feb 1978
24 Sep 1975	19 Jan 1977	5 Jun 1978
5 Nov 1975	3 Mar 1977	12 Sep. 1978
16 Dec 1975	30 Mar 1977	1 Dec. 1978
6 Jan 1976	25 May 1977	14 Feb. 1979
17 Feb 1976	29 Jun 1977	9 Mar. 1979
28 Aug 1976	24 Aug 1977	30 Oct. 1979
16 Jan 1976	12 Oct 1977	
18 Aug 1976	30 Nov 1977	

PROGRAM STAFF ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Analyses of Target Crime

22 Oct 1974 memorandum re: pre-Christmas robbery and burglary
from B. Shepley to Superintendent of Police
undated "Report: A Residential Burglary Analysis for 1975"
CRC meeting 24 Sep 1975
undated "Report: A Robbery Analysis for 1975"
CRC meeting 24 Sep 1975

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: PEORIA

PROGRAM STAFF ACCOMPLISHMENTS (Cont.)

undated "Report: Robbery Victimization of Visitors to Peoria"
CRC meeting 5 Nov 1975

undated "Maps: Possible Target Areas"
CRC meeting 16 Dec 1975

undated "Report: Criminal Victimization"
CRC meeting 6 Jan 1976

undated "Report: Residential Burglaries North of the Bluff"
CRC meeting 6 Jan 1976

17 Feb 1976 Descriptive Reports on Residential Burglary in Target Areas
undated "Report: Residential Burglaries in 1975"
CRC meeting 28 Apr 1976

23 Jun 1977 correspondence re: Summary of Victimization Survey
from A. Moore to CRC members

undated City of Peoria 1978 Victimization Study
CRC meeting 29 May 1979

Program Framework

undated "Report: Quantification of Program Goals and Objectives"
CRC meeting 16 Apr 1975

undated "Report: Program Structure"
CRC meeting 16 Dec 1975

undated Performance Management System

undated A. Moore re Program Structure Adult Criminal Justice System
CRC meeting 19 Jan 1977

8 Sep 1978 correspondence re: Explanatory Model
from A. Moore to CRC members

12 Sep 1978 correspondence re: Explanatory Model
from A. Moore to CRC members

Adult Plan

undated "Report: Residential Burglary - Risks of Prosecution and Con-
viction for Adult Offenders in Peoria"
CRC meeting 17 Feb 1976

undated "Report: Recidivism Study"
CRC meeting 28 Apr 1976

undated "Report: Deterrence Study"
CRC meeting 16 Jun 1976

undated "Report: Time Study"
CRC meeting 18 Aug 1976

undated "Report: Bail Bond Study"
CRC meeting 18 Aug 1976

undated "Report: A Criminal Justice System Resource Analysis"
CRC meeting 24 Sep 1975

undated "Draft: Criminal Justice Resource Study"
CRC meeting 5 Nov 1976

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: PEORIA

PROGRAM STAFF ACCOMPLISHMENTS (Cont.)

undated "Report: Diversion/Rehabilitation Study"
CRC meeting 5 Nov 1976
undated Adult Master Plan

Juvenile Plan

1976 "An Analysis of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act" by Frank L. Manella in Youth and the Law, Champaign-Urbana: Police Training Institute, University of Illinois
19 Aug 1977 correspondence re: "An Analysis of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act" by Frank L. Manella in Youth and the Law, Champaign-Urbana: Police Training Institute, University of Illinois
from B. Shepley to CRC members
undated Draft of Peoria Juvenile Justice System
5 Nov 1976 Juvenile Justice Flow Chart
23 May 1977 correspondence re: Data test conducted on juvenile information from B. Shepley to A. Moore
27 Jun 1977 correspondence re: Descriptive Information Regarding Juvenile Study Population
from A. Moore to CRC members
19 Aug 1977 correspondence re: Juvenile Information requested by the Council from B. Shepley to A. Moore
4 Oct 1977 correspondence re: The status of the juvenile data from B. Shepley to A. Moore
30 Nov 1978 correspondence re: Terminology used in juvenile justice system from A. Moore to CRC members
1 Dec 1978 Juvenile Study Population, Descriptive Information
undated Proposed Research Design and Questions for Juvenile Recidivism Study
1 Dec 1978 Outline of Deterrence Study
14 Feb 1979 Juvenile Study Population, Descriptive Information
undated Coding Forms and Instructions for the Juvenile Data
29 May 1979 Executive Summary of Report on Juvenile Deterrence
29 May 1979 Preliminary Report on Juvenile Recidivism
30 Oct 1979 Interim Report on Recidivism Study

Analysis of Data Problems

undated "Report: An Analysis of Data Collection in Regard to Criminal Justice Histories of Burglary and Robbery Offenders"
CRC meeting 24 Sep 1975
undated "Report: Criminal Justice System Data Problems"
CRC meeting 5 Nov 1975
undated Description of Criminal Justice Information System, compiled by program staff

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PROGRAM STAFF ACCOMPLISHMENTS (Cont.)

Other Activities

undated "Report: Domestic Problems and Certain Criminal Activity"
CRC meeting 5 Nov 1975

15 Apr 1976 correspondence re: Proposal for a Crime Prevention Program
from Sgt. D.W. Story to A. Moore

27 Sep 1976 Draft of grant application for TASC program (Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime)

18 Jan 1977 correspondence re: TASC Program (Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime)
from A. Moore to CRC members

22 Dec 1978 correspondence re: Possible CRC Evaluation of "Dri-Roads Program"
from F. Knoll, Director of Court Services and Probation, to A. Moore

8 Jan 1979 "Report on Family Violence"

undated correspondence re: Additional tasks (unrelated to residential burglary)
from A. Moore to CRC members

undated CRC meeting 14 Feb 1979
Report from Illinois Alcoholism and Drug Dependency Association, Special Interest Section for DWI Countermeasures Programs: Recommendations for Impact Evaluation

undated CRC meeting 14 Feb 1979
correspondence re: Assistance from CRC in evaluating the call load of the Sheriff's Department for possible reallocation of district boundaries
from Lt. L. Deyager to G. Shadid

undated CRC meeting 14 Feb 1979
correspondence re: Research assistance request
from G. Shadid, Sheriff, to A. Moore

undated CRC meeting 14 Feb 1979

undated Progress Reports: 1 Jul 1975 to 1 Dec 1975
1 Jan 1976 to 30 Jun 1976
1 Jul 1976 to 30 Sep 1976

ACTION PROJECTS

Adult Projects as a Group

28 Apr 1976 Project Summaries from the Compendium of Selected Criminal Justice Projects, LEAA Publication, 1975

1 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Police tactical operations related to residential burglary
from A. Moore to CRC members

1 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Physical Evidence Project
from A. Moore to CRC members

PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION: PEORIA

ACTION PROJECTS (Cont.)

2 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Summary of police project recommendations
from A. Moore to CRC members

27 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Anti-Fencing Operations
from A. Moore to CRC members

27 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Criminal Information Center
from A. Moore to CRC members

27 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Automated Fingerprint Searching Project
from A. Moore to CRC members

May 1977 Crime Impact Action Projects - Operating Budgets

9 May 1977 correspondence re: Proposed budgets for Peoria Action Projects
from A. Moore to R. Sommerfeld

1 Jul 1977 correspondence re: Proposed evaluation plan for Adult Master
Plan Projects
from A. Moore to S. Hendron

undated Adult Master Plan Projects: Evaluation Plan

16 Dec 1977 Grant application for UHCR Action Projects for the period
1 Dec 1977 to 31 Dec 1978 (revised)

6 Feb 1978 Statement of grant award for Adult Master Plan Action Projects
for the term 1 Dec 1977 to 31 Jan 1979

22 Jan 1979 correspondence re: Monies turned back from Grant #2939
(Criminal Information Exchange)
from S. Peck-Collier to B. Holland

Dedicated Prosecution Project

20 Jan 1977 "Unit Urges Hiring County Prosecutor of Burglars"
Peoria Journal-Star

28 Nov 1977 Dedicated Prosecution Project, Processed Residential Burglary
Defendants, 10 June 1977 to 13 Nov 1977

Jun 1978 Dedicated Prosecution Project, Interim Report

Physical Evidence Project

1 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Physical Evidence Project
form A. Moore to CRC members

28 Nov 1977 Crime Scene Unit Operations, Pre and Post Project Performance
Data

Jun 1978 Physical Evidence Project, Interim Report

undated correspondence re: article, Police magazine
From A. Moore to CRC members
CRC meeting 14 Feb 1979

Jan 1979 "Forensic Sciences, Overburdened, Underutilized"
Police Magazine

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ACTION PROJECTS (Cont.)

Criminal Information Exchange

27 Mar 1977 correspondence re: Criminal Information Center goals and
potential operations
from A. Moore to CRC members

13 Oct 1977 correspondence re: Progress Report, CIE Unit
from Sgt. G. Poynter to Department Superintendent Pisano

undated Interim Report of Evaluation of Criminal Information Exchange
CRC meeting 12 Sep 1978

18 Dec 1978 correspondence re: Return of unexpended funds for discontinued
component
from A. Moore to S. Peck-Collier

22 Jan 1979 correspondence re: Monies turned back from Peoria grant
from S. Peck-Collier to B. Holland

undated correspondence re: Criminal Information Exchange
from A. Moore to CRC members
CRC meeting 12 Sep 1978

undated "Criminal Information Exchange"
Peoria Police Department flyer

undated Draft of CIE Unit Field Interrogation Card Experiment - F.I.
Monitoring Procedure

OTHER RELATED PROGRAMS

undated Grant application for Violent Crime Reduction Program for the
period 15 Oct 1974 to 31 Jul 1975

undated Grant application for Violent Crime Reduction Program for the
period 1 Jul 1975 to 30 Jun 1976

undated Violent Crime Reduction Program Internal Evaluation prepared by
Crime Reduction Council Staff

undated Workload Analysis of the Violent Crime Reduction Program (draft)

PROGRAM GRANTS

undated Grant application for Urban High Crime Reduction Program
(revised) for the period 1 Jan 1975 to 30 Jun 1975

undated Statement of grant award for the term 1 Jan 1975 to 30 Jun 1975

undated Grant application for Urban High Crime Reduction Program
for the period 1 Jul 1975 to 30 Jun 1975

undated Statement of grant award for the term 1 Jul 1975 to 30 Jun 1976

undated Grant application for Urban High Crime Reduction Program
(revised) for the period 1 Dec 1976 to 31 Dec 1977

undated Statement of grant award for the term 1 Dec 1976 to 31 Dec 1977

undated Statement of grant award for the term 1 Apr 1978 to 31 Dec 1978

undated Grant application for Urban High Crime Reduction Program
for the period 16 Nov 1979 to 30 Sep 1980

21 Feb 1978 Final Fiscal Report, LEAA Crime Impact Program

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MISCELLANEOUS

17 Jun 1976 "Serious Crime Rate Drops Here"
Peoria Journal Star

27 Jun 1977 correspondence re: Congratulations on Adult Master Plan
from R. Mills to A. Moore

5 Dec 1978 Revised Urban High Crime Guidelines

12 Feb 1979 correspondence re: Revised Urban High Crime Guidelines
from A. Moore to CRC members

Staff Resumes: Nadine Diller
Aubrey Moore
Bruce Shepley
Craig Smith