


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U. S. Department of Justice
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration



Prevention and Control of Urban Disorders:

Issues for the 1980s

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PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF URBAN DISORDERS:
ISSUES FOR THE 1980'S

A Monograph for Law Enforcement Executives

Prepared by

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August, 1980

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INTRODUCTION

This monograph is a review and discussion of selected issues partially derived from an analysis of the police response to the Dade County disorder of May 1980. An overview of events which led up to the disorder is given, followed by a summary chronology of the nine day disorder itself. Selected issues and problems are then identified based on an assessment of the preparation, planning, mobilization, and tactical response to the disorder conducted by the Dade County Department of Public Safety (DPS) and the Miami Police Department (MPD), a review of the current literature on the prevention and control of disorders, and comments or observations by police executives and others. These have been used to support our analysis. There is a very clear and limited purpose to this monograph--to inform other police executives about issues and problems associated with the prevention and control of disorder that may be useful to them in preparing for the treatment of potential disorders in their jurisdictions.

In two separate site visits to Dade County in June and July 1980, we asked senior police executives, mid-level supervisors, and line officers similar questions: What type of disorder prevention and control plans were in existence and use in the department? What system existed for collecting, collating, assessing and reporting information about early warnings of tension or possible disorder? Did the actual management of the police response to the disorder follow the disorder control plan? What were the principal problems or issues noted in the planning and management of the police response? What recommendations could be offered to police executives, staff, supervisors, and line officers in other jurisdictions? Answers to these questions were noted; comparisons were made with written after-action reports; meetings were held with groups of officers; and discussions were held with other police executives--outside Dade County--in order to clarify our perceptions about emerging issues and their applicability to other jurisdictions.

Sections of the monograph concentrate on a description and analysis of what we believe are critical issues associated with the prevention and control of disorders. These issues are relevant to every community and its police, since they were important factors in the police response to the Dade County disorder

and a review of disorder studies indicates that they have been important issues for some time.

Officials of both departments were open and candid in discussing their perceptions of the lessons other police agencies can learn from Dade County. Volumes of internal police reports, newspaper accounts, and related documents were reviewed as an integral part of this work. The authors also reviewed the comments and recommendations of several other reports about disorders published in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Numbered citations at the end of various paragraphs in this study refer to pertinent statements from other studies and are intended to clarify and expand on the issues and lessons presented in this monograph. An appendix contains an After Action Report prepared by the Dade County Department of Public Safety.

Law enforcement officials in Dade County and Miami were generous with their time and assistance in aiding us in our site visits and in reviewing different drafts of this monograph. We are particularly grateful to Director Bobby Jones, Commander Harry Bollinger, and Captain Bera Pitts of the Dade County Department of Public Safety, and to Chief Kenneth Harms and Assistant Chief Michael Cosgrove of the Miami Police Department. Others who assisted us by their critical comments and review were Chief Thomas Hastings of the Rochester, New York Police Department, Dr. Lee Brown, Commissioner of Public Safety, Atlanta, Georgia, Dr. Reginald Wells, Professor of Social Welfare, State University of New York, Stony Brook, and Mr. Fred Newton, Colorado Springs, Colorado Police Department.

We are also grateful to our colleagues of the Police Technical Assistance Project staff, Mr. Steve Gaffigan, Ms. Marcia Trick, and Ms. Tefera Dark, who, together and individually, typed, proof-read, and assisted in editing this monograph under extremely tight schedules. Whatever the shortcomings of this monograph may be, they are, of course, the responsibility of the authors alone.

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OVERVIEW OF DADE COUNTY

Dade County

Dade County is an area of 2,300 square miles and is populated by almost 1.7 million people, with most of the population located in the eastern portion of the county. According to a 1975 census study, the ethnic characteristics of the population are: 53% white, 32% hispanic, and 14% black. Significant increases in the hispanic population are anticipated in the 1980 census; slight decreases in the black and white populations are also projected. In March and April of this year alone, it is estimated that over 50,000 Cuban refugees settled in the Dade County area and within the past two years, as many as 50,000 Haitians settled in both Broward and Dade Counties.

The Dade County economy suffered severely during the recession of 1974 and has not yet recovered. Minority unemployment is high, as are levels of welfare expenditures, unemployment compensation funds, food stamp costs and other social support services. The economy has been affected by the recession, high energy costs, inflation, high interest rates, and an extraordinary demand for housing coupled with a low level of available housing stock. Efforts at major tax reductions by popular referenda similar to Proposition 13 were narrowly defeated last year. The referenda would have required deep and immediate reductions of the county operating budget. A similar tax reduction referendum is scheduled to be voted on later this year.

The metropolitan form of government is unique to Dade County in the State of Florida. The County is governed by Commissioners, elected at-large, who appoint a County Executive, who, in turn, appoints and directs the heads of various county departments. Departments serve the needs of all of the unincorporated areas of the county and also provide selected general services to 27 independent incorporated cities and towns within the county. Services to incorporated cities and towns are supported by county taxes paid by citizens of the cities and towns.

Dade County has grown rapidly in the past few years. Attendant with this growth have been all the ills associated with a heavily and densely populated, spread-out, hard-to-manage, urban and suburban environment. The area is not typical of Florida; it is an international port with a multilingual and an international flavor in certain areas. It has shifted rapidly from a tourist center to a business, transportation, finance, and service economy. Immigration from the Carribean and Latin America has been extensive. The area is also a focal point for major drug traffic and more than 500 homicides have been committed within the past year with more than 60% of such crimes being directly associated with drugs. The high population density, the extreme competition for jobs between whites, latins, and blacks, extremely old and poor housing conditions--particularly in the housing projects in which many blacks live--create an astonishing contrast to the significant wealth and economic growth of other parts of the area. As one observer noted, this contrast creates the image of people living and moving in such a compressed area that a critical mass has formed--just waiting for an event to trigger an explosion.

There is widespread agreement among public officials that pressures resulting from large population increases in an economy unable to support increasing numbers of unskilled workers produced a setting of severe community social stress.

The Dade County Department of Public Safety (DPS)

The principal law enforcement agency of the county is the Department of Public Safety (DPS), which is directly responsible for the delivery of full-service policing to approximately 1,800 square miles. DPS manages all local court services and provides some limited police services to most of the incorporated cities. However, each city or town also has its own independent police department, with the City of Miami Police Department being the largest, second only to the DPS in number of personnel. DPS is not responsible for fire protection or corrections--each of these having been assigned to new departments in the county government since the early '70's.

The Department of Public Safety is organized according to divisions and bureaus. There are six districts or stations throughout its police service area (Figure 1). The headquarters building is located in the city of Miami; a regional communications system, housed in an outlying facility, provides communications for county police, fire, and emergency units. It is estimated that for the year 1980, DPS will respond to slightly more than 500,000 calls for service.

The FY 80 budget is approximately \$65 million; there are about 2,100 employees of whom 1,505 are sworn officers. There are approximately 1,700 authorized budgeted sworn positions. As of April 30, 1980, there were 699 uniform personnel assigned to the Patrol Bureau in the Police Division and 315 non-uniform (Detectives) assigned to the Investigation Bureau. The ethnic ratio of the department is approximately 25% minority and 75% white.

From 1967 to the mid-1970's, the DPS underwent a period of vigorous growth in its attempt to match the rapidly escalating demands for service and the population increases in the area. In recent years, the DPS has suffered a substantial decline in sworn personnel, with an attrition rate of 13% from October 1979 through May 1980. Since 1975, however, the Department indicates that the calls for service rate has increased by 22%. Part I crimes have increased by 26%, and the population of the unincorporated areas of Dade County have increased by 15%. Hiring freezes coupled with minimal wage increases have limited the department's ability to hire new personnel.

The Miami Police Department

The Miami Police Department services the incorporated city of Miami, a jurisdiction of 34.3 square land miles and 19.5 square miles of waterfront, with a population of 380,000 people. The department is organized into two major divisions, Administration and Operations, each under the command of a Deputy Chief. Within the Operations Division are both the patrol and criminal investigations sections.

The fiscal year 1980 budget for the department is \$31,502,574. There are presently 938 employees in the department, of whom 654 are sworn officers. For

FIGURE 1

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
POLICE DIVISION ASSIGNMENTS

April, 1980

<u>Station Number</u>	<u>Population Estimate</u>	<u>Police Personnel</u>	<u>Square Miles</u>	<u>P.O. Sq. Mile</u>
1 - Northwest	122,300	Unif. 91 Total 138	252	.36
2 - Central	88,600	Unif. 97 Total 155	14	6.93 11.07
3 - Midwest	58,690	Unif. 97 Total 112	268	.25 .42
4 - South	122,170	Unif. 90 Total 136	936	.10 .15
5 - Southwest	208,770	Unif. 119 Total 175	339	.35 .52
6 - Northeast	107,440	Unif. 74 Total 116	22	3.36 5.27
TOTAL	707,500	Unif. 537 Total 832	1,831	.29 .45

several years, the department has decreased in strength, because positions were eliminated or frozen as officers resigned or retired. Recently, the department was authorized to hire an additional 100 officers and 50 civilians.

There are presently 319 sworn personnel assigned to the patrol function and 77 sworn personnel assigned to the detective function.

Since 1975, the population of the city has been slowly decreasing primarily among the minority white population. At present, the ethnic mix of the city is 53% hispanic, 23% white, and 22% black. The police department is presently about 22% hispanic, 64% white, and 14% black.

OVERVIEW OF THE DISORDER

Pre-Disorder Events

The Dade County disorder began on Saturday, May 17, 1980. On May 6, 1980, the Dade County Community Relations Board offered its regular mid-year assessment of community tensions:

From every angle, every perspective, the community relations board perceives that Dade County is in a state of crisis...In our law enforcement agencies, there is police brutality, including murder; there are allegations of police corruption involving alliances with drug dealers and the theft of confiscated money...In our school system, there are charges of official corruption at the highest level...In our neighborhoods there are drug-related, gangland-style killings, joblessness, inflation and juvenile delinquency...Fear and anger are prominent among our citizens... Many of them feel they can no longer trust their police, their neighbors, their government officials, nor even the news media... The potential for open conflict in Dade County is a clear and present danger.

This statement partially summarized a series of incidents involving both the police and the criminal justice system, which appear to have contributed to a breakdown of confidence between the citizens, the government, the police, and the criminal justice system. Five major cases covering a period of over seventeen months have been consistently cited as factors which were the major contributors to the disorder. In retrospect, however, some public officials and most of the police believe that the extensive reporting and editorializing about these events by the media--particularly the print media--also contributed to the increase of tension in Dade County prior to the outbreak of disorder. One high level police official noted in an assessment of the disorder, "...a review of the role of the media, especially the print media, clearly demonstrates their contribution to the breakdown of order in the community. Each of the cases was made sensational when the facts were not. Media overkill was the rule, not the exception." The print media has consistently denied these charges and, in several editorial commentaries, have noted that they only reported and did not create these conflict situations involving the police and the community.

The Officer Jones Case

In January 1979, a 37 year old white Florida Highway Patrol officer was accused of taking an 11 year old black female into his patrol car and sexually molesting her. Both an internal investigation and a State's Attorney investigation supported the charge. The officer did not contest the charge and in a pre-trial agreement between the State's Attorney and the defendant, a negotiated plea was developed; the defendant was released on probation, was permitted to resign, and was ordered by the court to receive psychiatric assistance.

Print and media coverage on this incident was extensive. Editorial criticisms of the negotiated plea were frequent; the presiding judge, later, criticized the manner in which the plea was developed. A special investigation of the State's Attorney's role in this incident was conducted by the State, but the results had not yet been announced when the disorder occurred.

The LaFleur Case

In February 1979, narcotics officers of the Dade County Department of Public Safety conducted a search, with a warrant, of the home of Mr. Nathaniel LaFleur, a Dade County black school teacher. A uniformed officer showed the warrant at the door of Mr. LaFleur's home. Mr. LaFleur slammed the door closed on the officers and retreated to a bedroom, where he proceeded to call 911 and ask for police assistance; officers broke into the house, and entered the bedroom; LaFleur was observed reaching under a mattress, where a pistol was later found; a struggle took place and the officers subdued LaFleur; he was seriously injured in the process; within less than a minute, 911 personnel returned LaFleur's call to verify it (a common department practice), and one of the raiding officers notified them that the situation was under control. The officers conducted an extensive search of the home; Mr. LaFleur's son arrived during the search, objected, and was subsequently arrested. Shortly thereafter officers discovered that the search warrant address was different than the address of the LaFleur residence.

Press and media coverage of the incident was immediate and extensive. Internal investigations by the Department of Public Safety revealed that the

officers acted improperly and they were placed on disciplinary leave; a subsequent State's Attorney investigation--including the convening of a Grand Jury investigation--resulted in no criminal indictments. Mr. LaFleur subsequently sued the county for \$3 million and the civil case is still pending in the courts.

During the lengthy investigation process, various citizen groups as well as print and media editorials called for an open review of the investigation files, establishment of new policies and procedures on the use of force by the police, and establishment of a civilian or local government police review board.

Between February and May 1979, the LaFleur case was the dominant issue in the Dade County area. The then Director of the Department of Public Safety adopted a policy of not releasing raw files and of not agreeing to the call for new policies or civilian police review boards.

The Superintendent Jones Case

During the period following the LaFleur case, the State's Attorney and the Department of Public Safety conducted an investigation of Dr. Johnny Jones, the black superintendent of the Dade County school system. The investigation had resulted from information obtained from an internal school system audit. Dr. Jones was accused of using several thousand dollars in school funds to buy gold plated fixtures for a vacation home he was building. Additionally, he was accused of participating in a contractor-kickback scheme. Upon completion of the investigation, the results were turned over to a Grand Jury. The Grand Jury was to be short-lived. Because media coverage of the accusations and their investigations had been extensive, and because the School Board refused to act until after the completion of the investigation, a rare Saturday meeting of the Grand Jury was held. An indictment was obtained and Dr. Jones' attorney was notified that a warrant had been issued for his arrest. On Sunday, the School Board met in a special session and dismissed Dr. Jones. The trial was broadcast live each day by the local public television station. Dr. Jones was convicted on April 30, 1980 and was awaiting sentencing when the disorder broke out.

Dr. Jones had been the first appointed black superintendent of the Dade County school system and was considered, by both blacks and whites, to be a

popular and charismatic leader in the community. Prior to the disorder, many commentators noted the sharp contrast between the investigation and televised trial of this public official and other criminal cases involving public employees. Some cited this contrast--in spite of the overwhelming evidence against Dr. Jones--as an indication of a perceived dual standard of justice in Dade County.

The Heath Case

In September 1979, an off-duty Hialeah police officer working as a security guard shot and killed Mr. Randy Heath, a 22 year old black male. The officer said he had surprised Mr. Heath during a break-in; later the officer said his gun had gone off accidentally. Mr. Heath's sister, who witnessed the incident, stated that her brother had been shot while urinating against a wall of the building. The State's Attorney's Office conducted an extensive and intensive investigation and a Grand Jury was convened to hear the evidence. In late April 1980, the Grand Jury ruled that the killing was a negligent but not criminal act. Media coverage of the case was widespread. Commentators noted, again, the discrepancy between the outcome of this case and that of the similar police use of force cases.

The McDuffie Case

On December 17, 1979, Mr. Arthur McDuffie, a 33 year old black male, was riding a motorcycle at approximately 1:35 a.m. and passed through a red light in Dade County. A unit of the Dade County Department of Public Safety gave chase and was joined by other units of both the DPS and the City of Miami Police Department. Mr. McDuffie ran at least 25 stop lights at speeds of up to 100 m.p.h., said the Department of Public Safety report. He was apprehended by more than ten Dade County and Miami police at an intersection where Mr. McDuffie had finally stopped. According to the initial police report prepared by on-scene Department of Public Safety officers, Mr. McDuffie had crashed, hit his head, then resisted arrest so violently that police had had to use force to subdue him. Mr. McDuffie was unconscious and was subsequently transported to a hospital; he remained in a coma for approximately four days and died from massive head injuries on December 21, 1979. Shortly thereafter, the County Medical Examiner reported that Mr. McDuffie's injuries could not be solely the result of a motorcycle accident.

Based on further information supplied by officers who had been at the scene, the Department of Public Safety's Internal Affairs Unit and the Homicide Unit began an investigation of this incident. Preliminary results of this investigation were transmitted to the State's Attorney's Office and a more elaborate joint investigation was initiated. On December 26, 1979, the Department of Public Safety announced that four of its officers were relieved from duty and that further investigations were being conducted. On December 28, 1979, five DPS officers--the original four relieved from duty plus one additional officer--were indicted by the State's Attorney and charged with manslaughter, manslaughter by unnecessary killing, and tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. These five officers were subsequently dismissed from the Department of Public Safety. Four other DPS officers were relieved from duty pending further administrative or criminal action.

During the succeeding three months prior to the trial, the McDuffie case received massive daily media coverage. Reprints of verbatim transcripts of interviews between charged officers and Department of Public Safety homicide detectives, reprints of polygraph reports, medical examiner reports and of other official documentation were published, side by side, with analysis and editorializing about the incident and the adequacy of the police and State's Attorney's investigations. Issues regarding police use of force, police-community relations and police practices in Dade County since early January 1979 were reviewed and commentaries published. Almost 200 separate articles, reports, and commentaries were published in the local daily press alone.

Because of extensive pre-trial publicity and increased community feelings about this case, defense attorneys for the indicted officers requested and were granted a change of venue, and the trial was transferred to Tampa, Florida. The trial began on March 31, 1980; charges were dismissed for one officer early in the trial because of inadequate evidence; in the middle of the trial, a City of Miami police officer, previously not known to have been at the scene, voluntarily reported to the State's Attorney that he had been present and participated in the violence against McDuffie.

Principal prosecution witnesses were other on-scene officers from the DPS who had been promised immunity in return for their testimony. The trial lasted

six weeks. Some news accounts suggested, during the middle of the trial proceedings, that the prosecution case was becoming weaker due to doubts raised by the defense about the actual role of the defendants in the McDuffie incidents, as well as questions about the credibility of prosecution witnesses.

On May 17, 1980 at approximately 2:40 p.m., a six-man, all white jury, after deliberating for two hours and forty minutes, acquitted the four officers of all charges.

Outbreak of Disorder

News of the McDuffie verdict was broadcast at approximately 3:00 p.m. on Saturday, May 17, 1980, and spread quickly throughout the entire county. Police personnel were deployed in Dade County in normal complements and assignments for a Saturday afternoon. In the city of Miami, the department had placed extra personnel on duty and had held over one shift at the request of the on-duty Operations Captain.

Shortly after the first news announcement, two black-oriented radio stations changed their programming format from music to interviews and commentaries about the McDuffie verdict. Several announcements were also made about a peaceful demonstration scheduled to take place later in the day at the Dade County Justice Building in downtown Miami. Residents of the county were urged to attend.

At about 3:00 p.m., several miles north of the Justice Building, at Africa Park, a Community Anti-Crime rally sponsored jointly by the Dade County Department of Public Safety and the Miami Police Department was ending. About 80 Liberty City residents--mostly residents of the sprawling, deteriorating public housing complex which bisects much of the area served by both the County and City police departments--had earlier participated in discussions with the Director of the DPS and the Miami Police Chief and their staffs.

Shortly after 4:00 p.m., what was later described as "random, scattered violence" began to occur in different areas of Dade County and Miami. Most of the initial reports originated from the area adjacent to Africa Park; more than 300 area residents, predominantly young men, had now clustered on the streets and were throwing rocks and bottles at cars traveling through the area.

A small field command post was established nearby in a fire station by a field supervisor of the Miami Police Department. No major call-up or mobilization of police forces was initiated by either department at this time. It was to this command post that reports were first made about severe acts of violence to motorists passing through the major highways of this section of Dade County. Reports about white motorists being stopped or assaulted or of cars being hit by rocks and bottles began to increase; a walk-in report to the Miami field command post indicated that several whites had been taken from stopped autos and severely beaten and possibly killed. Verification of this latter incident and subsequent recovery of several bodies did not occur until later in the early evening, because of initial confusion about the exact intersections of the incident, the fact that there were more than one such incident, the increasing numbers of people on the streets formed into roving gangs, and the escalating level of violent acts, including arson, shooting of small arms, and looting.

By 6:30 p.m., according to dispatch tapes, reports were being received and broadcast to units of both the DPS and the MPD every few minutes about various types of assault, mobs, rock throwing, and some limited amount of arson throughout ever-widening areas. It seems that several zones of rioting began to develop simultaneously throughout widely separated areas in the earliest hours of the disorder.

By 7:30 p.m., the assembly at the Justice Building was estimated at 4,000-5,000 people. Concern was expressed by commanders of both the Department of Public Safety and the Miami Police Department about continued reports of escalating disorders. Briefings were conducted for on-going police shifts and riot equipment was distributed.

By 8:30 p.m., the crowd at the Justice Building had become disorderly; arson of cars and break-in and arson at the State Building were reported; shots at buildings were reported and verified by the Miami police; parts of the crowd surged into the Department of Public Safety headquarters and attempted to break in to areas of the building beyond the lobby; windows and doors were shattered. Both the Dade County and Miami departments initiated their emergency mobilization plans and formal command posts were established in each agency. The Dade County command post was fixed at the Central District station--approximately 10 miles

from downtown Miami--bordering on the Liberty City area and the Miami Police Department established its post at their headquarters building in Miami.

By 9:00 p.m., disorder was reported throughout a 20-square mile area; the crowd at the Justice Complex was out of control; police automobiles parked at the complex were reported to be on fire. The Department of Public Safety requested assistance from the Miami Police Department to secure the area around the DPS Headquarters. A contingent of over 70 police officers, led by the MPD, were grouped and began to undertake a show of force to secure the area. There was sniping as these police units moved in. By 9:30 p.m., the crowd was dispersed and no arrests or serious injuries were sustained. A cadre of officers was left to patrol the complex and the remainder of the force, approximately 40 officers, were sent to a Zayre's department store several blocks away, where massive looting had been reported. Officers arrived on scene; the crowd began to disperse, and 50-60 looters' cars were abandoned in the parking lot. Arrests were made of some looters; no major injuries were sustained by either the police or citizens in this incident. By this time, a significant number of reports were being received of looting, arson, assaults, and widespread disorder throughout a 20-30 square mile area of Dade County and Miami.

At 9:32 p.m., after consultation with the Florida Governor, the Director of the Dade County Department of Public Safety initiated Phase IV of their emergency mobilization plan, in which the manpower and resources of the entire department were mobilized and other neighboring law enforcement agencies were requested to provide assistance. By 9:52 p.m., a liaison officer from the National Guard was on route to consult with the Dade County Director regarding the activation of Phase V of the emergency plan. This phase stipulated that the National Guard units would be called in and deployed under the direction of the Dade County Department of Public Safety Director and would function according to missions assigned to the National Guard commanders by the DPS Director. The operations of the DPS and other departments were conducted according to Phase V requirements from approximately 11:00 p.m. Saturday, May 17, until the lifting of the emergency plan at 7:00 a.m., Monday, May 26, 1980.

During the 9 days, there were 18 riot-related deaths; 7 non-riot-related homicides; 49 unattended deaths; 8 suicides; over 1,300 riot-related arrests for

assorted felonies and misdemeanors and between \$100 and \$125 million estimated property damages and other costs attributed to the disorder. The disorder began quickly, was widespread, and was marked in its early hours by acts of personal violence to victims who had unknowingly entered the areas of the disorder very early in the evening of Saturday, May 17, 1980. Though contained over a wide-spread area by actions principally of the DPS, the Miami Police Department, and the National Guard, the disorder was never fully controlled. During the disorder's early phases, from Saturday evening until Thursday morning, reports of various types of assaults, arson, mob lootings, etc. were received within an area of approximately 40 square miles--from the northeast part of Dade County to the most southern part. The disorder was most intense in an area of approximately 14 square miles, largely within the jurisdiction served by the Central District #2 of the DPS, and parts of the city of Miami.

In the early stages of the disorder, the DPS Director was placed in full command of all local and state resources by the Governor of the State of Florida. Attached as an Appendix is a reprint of significant portions of the After-Action Report prepared by the Department of Public Safety, which contains a more detailed chronology of the disorder.

Summary Characteristics of the Disorder

- Between the first news report of the decision of the McDuffie jury on the afternoon of May 17, and the time the first confirmed pattern of disorder activities were logged, there was, in the judgment of some officials, time to prepare and mobilize for a "worst case" scenario. Commanders, however, indicated they just did not believe there would be the kind of widespread disorder that actually occurred.

- Various disorders began in different and widespread zones within a short, initial time span.

- The series of disorders spread throughout a wide area, ranging from a core of approximately 14 square miles, to a curfew area of 30 square miles, to a perimeter area of between 45 and 50 square miles.

- In retrospect, it is clear that by 9:30 p.m. on Saturday, May 17, a series of multiple disorder zones existed which were characterized by assaults, murders, lootings, fire-bombings, snipings, arson, theft and larceny; mobs of various ages and sexes, ranging from small groups of a dozen to several hundred, had taken control of the streets to the extent that effective police action was judged to be relatively impossible by many officials.

- By 9:35 p.m., the resources of both police departments had been or were in the process of being notified to mobilize and report to duty. It is not clear whether these forces could have engaged in a coordinated, proactive response aimed at controlling the disorder, had they been mobilized earlier. It is clear that by 7:00 a.m. Sunday, May 18, the combined shift forces available for use to the Dade County Department of Public Safety Command Post numbered between 700 and 800 law enforcement officers and National Guard. The Miami Police Department had deployed over 300 persons in the city of Miami.

- The tactic used at the beginning of the disorder, and during most of its first hours, was one of containment characterized by establishing perimeters around the disorder areas, keeping people out and in, fixed posts and barricades, periodic excursions into the disorder areas to answer the most extreme emergency calls--when possible in the judgment of supervisors--and periodic moving of the perimeter further back from the core areas of the disorder as it spread behind police lines. Once assigned, National Guard acted as supplementary forces to the Department of Public Safety in manning these fixed posts and perimeters. National Guard were not permitted to assist Dade County firefighting teams with protective support. Fires were permitted to burn in Dade County because of the refusal of firefighters to enter into disorder areas without the protection of either law enforcement officials or National Guard. The Miami firefighters were supported and assisted by MPD officers.

- It is believed by some officials that the disorder dissipated and ended because participants gave up due to tiredness, because there was nothing more to loot or burn, or because of strict curfew enforcement.

- Damage due to the disorder was widespread; estimates made shortly after the disorder by the Dade County Manager's office were as follows:

- Loss of life due to riot-related deaths was 18;
- Assaults numbered over 300;
- Numerous arrests for felonies and misdemeanors amount to over 1,400;
- 16 homes destroyed;
- 71 businesses destroyed, ranging from a multi-million dollar tire manufacturing and distribution firm to small businesses;
- 36 minority-owned businesses destroyed or severely damaged;
- 238 businesses damaged;
- Estimates of loss of employment for up to 3,000 people with a corresponding economic impact loss of approximately \$10 million;
- Estimated cost: \$100 - 140 million.

Problems Cited by Police Supervisors

In their review of police operations, commanders in both the DPS and the Miami Police Department cited problems associated with the mobilization and operations of the police response. The most commonly cited problems were:

- Lack of personnel on duty at the time of the first reports of the disorder;
- The Emergency Mobilization Plan in DPS had not been updated to reflect reorganizations in the agency;
- Previous morale and labor relations problems which crystallized during the disorder (e.g., on Thursday, May 22, a police walk-out by uniformed members of several departments was a distinct possibility);
- Lack of clear policies regarding acceptable levels of enforcement of existing laws during the disorder;
- Confusion about the acceptable levels of use of both lethal and non-lethal force;
- Poor communications between the command posts, both within and between departments;
- Shortage of equipment, such as hand-held radios, gas masks, rescue vans;
- Lack of police services in non-riot areas during the riots;

- Lack of communication about the mission of the National Guard and the loss of time in determining under what circumstances the Guard could be used;
- Absence of rumor control: There were three types of rumors--rumors among the police assigned to perimeter posts, among the citizens outside the riot area, and within the riot areas;
- Inability of police to enter riot zones because of actual and rumored sniper fire;
- Lack of intelligence gathering mechanisms or information systems which could have alerted police to the potential for disorder;
- Lack of training of command personnel concerning how to make field decisions consistent with agency policy;
- Lack of specific tactical plans to control crowds, to make mass arrests, to secure specific targets, and to maintain security of critical facilities;
- Lack of understanding of proper tactics to initiate and sustain a targeted show of force in various riot zones in order to obtain immediate police control;
- Comments by field commanders that the police were not prepared to quickly mount an effort which, in the words of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, would enable them to accomplish the following: "If an incident develops, and a crowd begins to threaten lawlessness and acts of violence, the police must act promptly and with a sufficient display of force to make clear their intent and capacity to suppress disorder and to ensure the public safety";
- Lack of prior comprehensive planning and coordination with outside assistance agencies;
- Mutual Aid Pacts did not function well;
- Use of outside agencies to conduct riot duty while local officers were kept on duty in non-riot zones.

In our review of these problems, we have identified several issues that directly affect a police department's ability to understand the environment in which it must operate, to plan for the prevention and control of disorder, and to effectively respond when it occurs. The remaining chapters of this monograph identify these issues, analyze the reasons for their importance, and suggest several lessons that may be useful for other police executives.

A SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES

From our review of the Dade County disorder and other studies, we have identified seven topical areas for analysis and discussion.

The Changing Social Environment

The urban environment in which local police agencies must operate today is far different than that of ten or fifteen years ago. Inflationary pressures, public and internal agency concern with police practices, demands for greater productivity from the police, increases in police unionization, increased concern about the use of force, and the relatively long absence of urban unrest are factors which today directly affect police preparation for handling urban disorder. Many local government and police administrators have had no direct experience in managing responses to large scale urban disorder, with the result that an experiential base for planning, decision-making and action is often lacking. The effect of these factors is that a jurisdiction's ability to prevent or control escalating disorder is often limited. These factors create different or more severe problems for the police than were present during earlier disorders in the 1960's.

Assessing the Potential for Disorder

Disorder planning requires that the police adequately assess the state of community tensions in a manner that will permit the use of meaningful prevention as well as control activities. Disorder assessment is not widely viewed as a part of the disorder planning process. Police departments need to learn how to carefully analyze neighborhood tensions. However, assessing the potential for disorder is not a one-time activity; it requires the establishment of new police functions which will involve police personnel at all levels of the organization, officers with special competencies and relationships, as well as neighborhood-based organizations. Although there appear to be few concrete guidelines to aid police administrators in developing such capabilities, the focus of administrative attention on establishing this capability is critical to the prevention of disorder.

Responding to Disorder Potential

Police actions must be taken to prevent the outbreak of violence when a department becomes aware that a high potential for disorder exists. Selecting effective responses to escalating community tensions is difficult and complex. Some consider it impossible and unsuitable for the police. But, there is increasing agreement that the very survival of police administrators may depend on the degree to which they and their departments attempt to de-escalate violence-prone conflict. There are a range of traditional and non-traditional police responses which may effectively limit conflict. It is better to understand the options and do something than to do nothing and let conflict run its own course. It is also clear, that traditional police-community relations activities, as they are usually conducted, may have little impact on resolving community tensions that could eventually lead to a major disorder.

Planning for Disorder Control

The basis of the police planning activity for disorder control has been variously described as the disorder control plan, riot plan, or emergency mobilization plan. The experiences in Dade County have raised several important questions about the adequacy of the traditional approach to disorder control planning. Because there is always a gap between the written plan and what actually occurs in the field during a crisis situation, there are many important considerations for police administrators to keep in mind as they review their disorder planning process. This process will provide an opportunity for police agencies to implement many of the lessons learned in the Dade County disorder. Present lack of experience with disorder control can best be remedied through extensive planning, training, and practice in the type of decision-making and action required to control a disorder.

Dealing with Initial Disorder Activities

The initial police response to a major or escalating disorder is the most important action police agencies take. Critical issues include dealing with organizational inertia, availability of personnel, mobilization, deployment, tactics, the provision of strong command presence throughout wide-based field

activities, and prior understanding and agreements about what actions are to be taken in order to limit or control the spread of a disorder.

Advance discussions, prior to a disorder, about important police-government policy issues need to be developed and agreed to so that a definitive plan of action concerning acceptable tactics and strategies can be carried out. A number of important policy issues have been identified and can serve as valuable guides for police and government administrators.

Management of the Ongoing Disorder

The review of the Dade County and Miami disorder indicates that the problems of managing an extended disorder are quite different from the problems associated with the initial stages of a disorder. Personnel become available at later stages that were unavailable during the early stages. Issues arise that are not present during the rapid activity of the initial response, such as personnel boredom with fixed-place assignments, employee fear and tension, and the need to deal with sporadic, but widespread, ongoing patterns of violence, looting, arson, and attacks on police.

Policy Issues

Several important policy issues arise during and after the management of an urban disorder which will affect the police organization. When a disorder occurs, there is often national media attention on the community, its government, and its police agency. Special interest groups, public and private, local and national, will focus their attention and advice on the manner in which the police organization and the government handle the disorder. Debates about the causes of the disorder, the adequacy or appropriateness of the police response and the search for solutions to intractable social problems will converge. A police administrator must be prepared to deal with these new, and often competing, pressures. A significant amount of organizational stress often results from the period of extended disorder control activity. Departmental disciplinary systems become taxed, morale is affected, and a period of organizational and individual self-criticism often follows.

Meaning for Police Executives

Each of these issues have been identified by police executives in Dade County and elsewhere as demanding discussion and review by both police executives and other local governmental officials. Each issue is separately treated in the succeeding sections of this study; where appropriate, references supporting the issues are extracted from other reports or studies about disorder prevention and control and are cited in the reference section and, finally, some questions or suggestions are listed, within the context of each issue, as lessons from the field, for use by the police executive in assessing a department's capability to plan for and act during a disorder period.

We have followed two major themes in our discussion of each issue: (a) traditional doctrine about disorder control has overshadowed the necessity for continual thinking about and planning for an organized police role in disorder prevention in the 1980's; (b) training of senior police executives, mid-managers, and line officers in the procedures and techniques for the design and use of disorder prevention strategies and actions is as important as training in the use of military tactics and skills in controlling a disorder.

The issues chosen for analysis are logically connected. A review of several factors currently affecting the urban environment, which differentiate it from that described a decade ago in disorder studies, provides a framework within which we then discuss several interrelated and interdependent issues regarding the police role in the prevention of tension and the planning for and control of major disorders. These prevention and control issues are treated in a specific, logical order so that they can be used as a scenario or checklist for the police executive to review the manner in which a police organization is prepared to assess and plan for the prevention and control of potential or real disorders. Reduced to their simplest form, these issues can be phrased as questions:

- What can the police do in order to identify and assess indications of potential disorder or tensions?
- What can the police and others do now to respond creatively to potential tensions in order to prevent or limit the escalation of tension into a disorder?

- What can the police and others do now to plan for and coordinate an effective response to a major disorder?
- What can the police and others do now to prepare for effective, early, mobilization responses to a major disorder?
- What can the police and others do now to prepare for the continued management of a long-term major disorder?
- What can the police and others do now to address and modify policies and practices which will affect police preparation for the assessment, planning, organizing and managing of a response to potential or actual disorders?

THE CHANGING SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

There is clear evidence that substantial changes in society and in policing are having a direct impact on the ability of police organizations to prevent, plan for and respond to disorders.¹ Many of these changes are in the form of critical fiscal problems that have called into question the ability of government agencies to maintain or expand services and thereby sustain the consensus that government works to the advantage of all in an equitable, stable and efficient manner. Other social problems have been identified that have not received the attention they warrant, given the fact that these problems carry with them the potential for becoming major social crises. Each of these problems creates a context for the 1980's that is significantly different from that of the 1960's or early 1970's--a context which requires a different treatment of the prevention and control of disorders than have been prescribed by earlier disorder studies.

The Changing Economy

Throughout the middle and late 1970's, economic growth rates declined from the levels attained during the 1950's and 1960's. As Levine notes:

These declining growth rates have forced...governments to confront some politically sensitive tradeoffs...largely ignored during periods of rapid growth...These tradeoffs include (1) the choice between inflation or unsatisfied public demands for goods and services; (2) the choice between providing services through tax-supported bureaucracies or through market arrangements; (3) the choice between attempting to provide equal health, housing, and educational opportunities to all citizens or (in effect) rationing opportunities to those who can afford to pay for them; and (4) the choice between spending for national defense or spending to alleviate the hardship of the poor, the sick, and the underprivileged....

Many urban areas continue to experience severe hardships as a result of lessened economic growth, high unemployment and underemployment, two recessions, and the continual impact of rising inflation. These pressures have brought about cut-backs in local government budgets, as well as reductions in Federally financed manpower development and social service programs.

At the neighborhood level, one obvious result has been an ever increasing rise in youth unemployment--particularly among minorities--coupled with limited access to a shrinking job market for underskilled or entry level workers. In many neighborhoods, an environment of hopelessness pervades, characterized by every increasing numbers of dependent, idle, unemployed young men and women. A routine confrontation between such residents and the police which, in past years might have gone unnoticed, can now lead to prolonged conflict between the police and neighborhoods.²

Police budgets have been affected by local economic pressures. Police agency personnel have been reduced as municipal and county budgets have been restricted. In both Miami and Dade County, for example, while total expenditures for police continued to rise, the number of personnel supported by those expenditures gradually declined. The result is fewer personnel resources available to police administrators to deal with what are often increasing problems. In city after city, administrators have reported that their resources are spread thin and that reported crime and citizen calls for police service have been increasing.

Climate of Race Relations

The late 1970's have seen important changes in the climate of race relations in the United States, changes which also affect the potential for disorder in large urban communities.³ School desegregation, changing housing patterns, and public housing desegregation have frequently generated localized racial tensions. While violence has been present, such violence has generally been sporadic and isolated as opposed to the widespread violence associated with the urban disorders of the 1960's.

Such developments have changed the focus of the police away from large-scale group action toward the smaller, more directed, police actions aimed at dealing with what are believed to be isolated incidents. Major disorder control plans have gathered dust while police have been training and developing community relations team, hostage negotiators, crime prevention teams, and neighborhood team policing units.

Secondly, there has been substantial progress, from the viewpoint of the police administrator, in opening up agencies to employment by minorities. From the charges of discrimination and lack of access for minority groups prevalent in the 1960's, today, many police agencies perceive that they have substantial minority representation, have adopted progressive policies on use of force and firearms, and have developed valuable police community relations programs. Yet, in most communities today, minority employment in police departments is far below the racial composition of the community and many of the policies governing police practices remain inadequate or are not rigorously enforced.⁴

There is still a widespread belief within many segments of the community that police operations are discriminatory and that many minorities do not have access to fair treatment from the criminal justice system.^{5,6} In the Dade County disorder and elsewhere, the outbreak of violence occurred after decisions within the criminal justice system. It appears that in this instance, the community gave the system a chance to resolve important justice issues but when the justice system was perceived to have failed, community reaction was severe.

Institutional Change

Substantial institutional changes in policing during the past 15 years have had a direct impact on police ability to deal with disorders. One of the most important changes is in the actors themselves. There are few decision-makers or leaders in either the community, the government, or the police, who exercised significant roles in the urban disorders of the 1960's. There is a little or no experience base from which to make judgments about potential disorders. Some neighborhood and community leaders are from a new generation, testing their strength, with limited backgrounds in the social action movements of a decade ago. Local political leaders of today were not involved in the political process in a meaningful way during the 1960's. Within police organizations, many current administrators were patrol officers or sergeants 15 years ago and have a limited perspective and experience concerning the prevention, planning, and control of complex disorders.

Partnerships and relationships between leaders and organizations of leaders of the past, in many cases, no longer exist. New relationships which have been

formed have not been tested in the complex environment of escalating urban tensions and disorders. The result is a group of participants--including the police, local government officials and local community organizations--who are often unsure of their roles and uncertain as to the most appropriate approach or strategy in dealing with community conflict.

Combined with these changes have been major realignments within police organizations, as resources have become increasingly scarce. The ability of many police organizations to field large numbers of personnel has been limited by reductions in personnel levels. Changes in police work schedules (such as the 4/10 plan or the 4/2 schedule) have further limited available police resources for any given time of day. Specialized tactical units, once relied upon to respond initially to disorders, in many cases no longer exist. Some of these units were disbanded because they were perceived as being either overly aggressive or too costly to maintain.

A third change affecting the ability of police organizations to respond to urban disorder has been the increase in unionization within the police service. Collective bargaining and unionization have had a variety of impacts on the handling of urban disorder, e.g. the increasing cost of policing in terms of mandatory overtime, the politicization of personnel reflected in the willingness of police personnel to speak out and articulate their personal viewpoints, and the increasing difficulty of providing leadership and discipline, since personnel may threaten to walk off the job if an administrative action is taken with which they do not agree. Many police administrators find that the threats of collective police job actions place as many demands on them as do the problems of controlling disorder in the streets, even though such job actions are considered reckless by large segments of the population living in a disorder area. During the Dade County disorder, for example, police officers of several jurisdictions came close to walking off the job in disagreement with comments made by elected officials and others regarding amnesty for arrested looters and the disciplining of police officers charged with vandalizing looters' cars.

False Expectations

The absence of major urban disorders during the past few years has created the expectation that jurisdictions were beyond the stage of urban disorder--that urban riots were a thing of the past.⁷ These expectations were reinforced as individual local crises occurred without widespread disorder.

So prevalent were these feelings that in Dade County, after the McDuffie verdict was announced, there was a widespread belief among police officials that the potential for violence was fairly low. The community was perceived as being basically nonviolent.

The attitude that "we're home free" should be considered by police executives as misleading. Given the state of the economy, high levels of unemployment among inner city residents, and media attention to what are seen as police abuses, the potential for disorder is probably as great as ever. Social conflict which could escalate into disorder is present in many communities.

Problems Receiving Little Attention

Coupled with these observable problems are a number of emerging social problems which a 1977 National Science Foundation study characterized as having the potential for becoming critical social crises if not adequately addressed. Each of these emerging problems is linked with one another; each also relates to the manner in which police departments must rethink their policies and procedures regarding the prevention and control of disorder.

- The power to create large, complex organizations and systems does not automatically confer the power to effectively control such systems. There is growing evidence that small, comprehensible systems have been aggregated into supersystems that are very difficult to manage, least of all in a democratic and participatory fashion. Most urban police departments have been faced with the realization--and dilemma--that there are limits to the management of their agencies. Complex organizations, like police departments and other urban government bureaucracies, tend toward conditions of low performance, as they become more incomprehensible and less amenable to control. Systems become increasingly vulnerable to disruption at key points--e.g., the behavior of line officers in moments of stress, the use of deadly

force--and ever higher levels of self-discipline on the part of individuals are demanded by the nature of the complexity of the organization. The very real problem for police executives and others is how, in a complex, large, impersonal supersystem, can the department create and maintain ways to require self-discipline of officers?

- As the scope and concentration of human activities have increased, our societal institutions--including law enforcement agencies--have become more tightly interconnected. Increasingly, police service calls are being seen as patterns of problems, rather than as discrete incidents. Many of the underlying conditions sustaining these problems require treatment by other institutions. The dilemma is that previously developed institutional boundaries of public and private organizations have compartmentalized aspects of these problems. Attempts to create inter-agency agreements and collaborative solutions have been frustrated, and the resulting conflict between agencies calls into question the entire institutional fabric of a society. Such questioning may generate demands for violent actions aimed at the destruction of such institutions.
- The media has assumed a larger role as the principal processor of information, with a profound impact on the manner in which a relatively passive audience interprets reality. An increasing proportion of peoples' experiences are lived vicariously through the media. Consequently, their perceptions of social reality may be distorted; their judgment may be more susceptible to intentional or unintentional manipulation; they may tend to withdraw from direct political and social participation because they perceive that social problems, as grasped through the media, admit of few solutions. Within the past five years, there have been significant increases in the amount of media reporting and analysis of criminal justice activities. Concurrently, police executives have become increasingly concerned about the manner and impact of such reporting and analysis. Clashes between these two institutions have become more predominant.
- Legal liability has been redefined, with significant impact on the manner in which public organizations and their employees behave. Increasing complexity, interdependence, and scale of action in society have increased the potential liability for decisions of individuals and organizations, while permitting lines of responsibility to blur. Civil litigation against police organizations and individual employees has dramatically increased. Such efforts bypass organizational responsibility and reinforce loss of trust in public institutions and professions. As a consequence, professional risk-taking has become more hazardous.
- The deterioration of older parts of some cities and counties and the decline of neighborhood economies have created pockets of trapped urban populations not unlike those of Appalachia. The situation of these depressed and despairing agglomerations, especially among already impoverished minority groups, portends widespread and persistent violence and lawlessness. Such areas are considered the nesting places of society's problems--problems that the police alone are expected to control. Quasi-guerilla warfare, violent crimes committed

against older residents, and assaults against police and public service facilities have already, in some instances, reached intolerable levels.

- Fiscal stress and the use of new technologies have had unanticipated effects on the nature of U.S. law enforcement activities. Cutbacks in budgets and increasing demands for services have stimulated efforts to augment each police officer's capabilities. The pressures, economical and managerial, that necessitate increasing the area of officer coverage, speed of response, types of calls, and level of force used, have increased the social distance between the officer and the citizens he/she serves. Alienation of police officers from many segments of society is such that police forces are regarded in some places as occupying armies. Similarly, this sense of alienation has aggravated the job-related stress and dissatisfaction of officers. The net effect is that the distance between officers and citizens increases, officers become more politicized and radicalized, and citizen demands for more control over police organizations increase.

The changing economy, alterations in the climate of race relations, changes in the institution of policing, the relative absence of major disorders, and a set of interdependent and unaddressed problems, have created a social context today which makes the task of preventing and controlling disorder more difficult and complex than was suggested by previous conventional reports. Disorder plans of the 1960's may not be suitable for the 1980's. Police administrators and local government leaders cannot assume that policies, procedures, agreements, relationships, and plans developed in the past will hold up under current or future conditions.

Finally, in these hard times of fiscal stress and a changing social environment, police administrators must continue to support the important values of justice and fair treatment. In this period of cutbacks, it is often police improvement programs, whose aim is to improve the administration of justice and the operations of departments, that are the first to be eliminated. It is difficult, if not impossible, for police administrators to concentrate on much more than trying to meet increased service demands with declining personnel and financial resources. However, it is an agency's perceived commitment to justice which is the most important element in the area of police-community-citizen relationships. Administrators must continue to direct their organizations toward internal improvements, commitment to neighborhood responsiveness, and fair and equal treatment of all they serve.

ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL FOR DISORDER

Disorders rarely just happen.⁸ The disorder in Dade County was not due to an isolated incident; the tensions preceding the disorder had been building over a long period of time. Police commanders in both Miami and Dade County acknowledged that they did not fully appreciate the potential for disorder when the verdict in the McDuffie case was announced. Some command officers were concerned about the outcome of the trial, but few expected the type of widespread disorder that occurred shortly after the verdict was announced. Yet, in retrospect, many of these same commanders felt that they should have been more sensitive to the potential for a disorder.

The process of assessing potential disorders is difficult, and there are few tested guidelines to follow. While police community relations officials in both police departments believe that they had an understanding of the potential for disorder, they also admitted that it was difficult to translate those concerns into specific, workable disorder prevention strategies or programs. Indeed, it seems to many police administrators that the sudden escalation of disorder is beyond the capability of the police to predict and therefore prevent. Moreover, once a major disorder begins, concern about controlling and containing the disorder becomes paramount.

At the same time, however, it is clear that in both Miami and Dade County there were a number of officers and specialists who were aware of the escalating tension in the various communities and neighborhoods. It appears, though, that senior executives had assigned no one person or unit with regular responsibility to assess what one officer termed the "state of community mental health".

FACTORS IN ASSESSING DISORDER POTENTIAL

There are no clear-cut guidelines by which a police agency can assess the state of tension in a community.⁹ But a sense is beginning to emerge that there are certain indicators of unrest that can be identified and used. A number of cities have, informally, selected several types of indicators to assess and analyze potential tension with what they believe is some degree of success. Some of these indicators are:

- Disturbance calls involving conflicts between groups
- Incidents in which the responding police officer finds him/herself the target of abuse over what is considered routine police action
- Incidents of stoning of police or fire vehicles responding to calls for service
- Assaults between groups
- Assaults against police
- Citizen complaints of excessive force by police officers
- Changes in media coverage of police events or incidents
- Lack of citizen willingness to assist police in routine matters

Numerous other factors could be added by a city as it begins to review the conflict situations within its jurisdiction. Existence of any of these situations, on a regular basis, may indicate a level of tension which should be of concern to the police administrator. A single such incident may escalate into major violence or stimulate conditions that can lead to violence. These incidents should be analyzed by type of incident, time of day, place, and officer involved.

The assessment and analysis of incidents that potentially can lead to disorder are not different, methodologically, from the types of analysis already being performed by police agencies through their crime analysis units. In fact, the example of crime analysis is a useful one and can be adapted for disorder analysis. Moreover, just as the products of crime analysis are used to create innovative crime prevention or control activities by the police, so too the products of disorder analysis may be used to design and carry out policies, procedures, strategies, and tactics which may lessen the escalation of patterns of conflict.

A major difference between crime and disorder analysis products is in their use. Crime analysis reports are used internally by police commanders in order to structure a directed police response to an emerging crime pattern or trend; sometimes, such reports are also used externally in that crime prevention units will alert various neighborhood organizations or businesses about certain crime trends.

By contrast, the products and reports of disorder analysis must be distributed widely by the police, in order to alert their own personnel and others about the emergence of patterns of disorder. Neighborhood organizations, community and citizen based organizations, other departments of local government, city and county governing bodies, the news media, local community leaders--in short, the entire network of local organizations and individuals who, by their position or interest, have a stake in the community--must be made aware of these trends. Nothing prevents the police executive from conducting private and public briefings or conferences with these organizations and individuals about such patterns. Nothing forbids the sharing of this information. In fact, such a role has always been part of the peace-keeping mission of the police, the only agency in the community with the ability to provide this information.

If the police, as they often admit, cannot solve disorder-producing problems alone, then sharing police information with others is a critical first step they can take in order to stimulate widespread community involvement in seeking creative solutions to emerging patterns of disorder.

Most neighborhoods and communities do not want to be considered as pockets of violence where disorder can occur at the slightest provocation. The police do not want to be seen as an army that must mount periodic excursions into such areas to restore order.

Collaboration on common problems requires a prior understanding of the nature of the problem. Collaboration must be based on informed judgments--judgments which can proceed from assessments of the potential for disorder.

Finally, in some instances, rising community tension may be the direct result of inappropriate police policies or procedures. Police administrators who consider their policies or procedures as inviolate will run the substantial risk of alienating large segments of the community. The police need such support in order to carry out the police function in a democracy.

When a police department discovers that an employee has made a mistake or has acted inappropriately or illegally, the department must acknowledge what has occurred and seek to correct the problem. The worst thing is to stonewall, cover-up, or to state as justifiable facts what are, in reality, errors or mistakes.

Even when a department runs the risk of possible civil litigation because of employee misconduct, it is better that the department admit its mistake and take corrective action; the ultimate cost of inaction would be much greater in terms of loss of departmental integrity, erosion of public trust and confidence, and generating a belief among employees that they will not be held accountable for their improper actions.

In assessing disorder potential, it is important that potentially disruptive conflicts not be confused with activities which are a normal part of urban life.^{10,11} Police agencies need to be careful not to become so rigorous in assessing conflict that they spend time surveilling groups engaged in protest which is constitutionally protected and non-disruptive. Disorder assessment of the type described here is not to be considered as part of the legitimate intelligence gathering operations of the police.

Lessons From The Field

A review of the Dade County disorder and the experiences of a number of other cities suggests several important questions for police agencies to consider. Answers to these questions may assist departments in increasing their awareness of community tensions and provide sufficiently early warning about escalating tensions.

- What formal mechanism does the department have for the collection, assessment, and use of information about levels of tension in the community?

The responsibility for collection, collation, and analysis of information of this type should rest with a single individual or unit, from data provided by field units and reports. This individual or unit should have direct access to the policy-making officials of the organization.

- What are the tension indicators which can be regularly assessed and serve as a basis for developing a picture of the neighborhood tension level?

Some police executives have developed an informal set of indicators of potentially volatile situations. Rarely have these indicators been institutionalized so that they can be regularly collected and serve as an "early warning system" for the police agency and others. Without a defined set of indicators, similar to those discussed earlier, the department will have to rest on police intuition, which will increase the likelihood of overlooking important developments. There is always the danger that important indicators will become so much a part of the regular environment that the police agency will develop a false sense of security. In Miami and Dade County, rock throwing at police response units is, in some areas, so common that it is often considered a routine occurrence.

- How are levels of tension in the community analyzed, reviewed, and discussed by the organization's policy-makers?

High levels of tension and police-community conflict must not be accepted as a normal part of the daily working environment of the police officer. Although individual incidents of disagreement between the police and citizens may occur, given the nature of certain types of legitimate police action, when a police agency believes that group conflict between themselves and others is a normal part of their working environment, then the agency is isolated from sections of the community and the groundwork is laid for a major conflict. It is important that administrators not ignore these conflicts. Their existence must be discussed at the highest levels of the police organization. We have found numerous cities, for example, where housing projects exist in which police officers are reluctant to respond to calls for service because of the danger of assault. Such situations cannot be permitted to exist; if they do exist, they serve as the center of disorder activities once an escalating disorder begins. It is clear that resolving such situations requires more than police action.

- Are there sections of the city in which police responses to calls for service are not possible due to the potential for assault and injury of police officers?

These situations, of course, are the most extreme indicators that neighborhood tension is high enough to develop into a disorder. When they exist, a department must quickly consider the development of plans and coordinated efforts to respond to such tensions and disorder potential.

RESPONDING TO THE POTENTIAL FOR DISORDER

There are five common situations which often increase community tensions and become focal points for public concern.¹²

- Overly aggressive police enforcement activities;
- Aggressive actions against the police when they are dealing with routine incidents;
- News media attention focused on claimed inequalities within the criminal justice system;
- The neighborhood conflict existing over a long period of time;
- Racial attacks on minorities (or attacks by minorities on others) over neighborhood access or housing issues.

The agency disorder assessment capability can identify and analyze the existence of any of these situations.¹³ The challenge for the police administrator is to develop a strategy for police and community responses which will either correct system failures or defuse community tension.¹⁴

There are several response typologies to these situations. One of the most common is doing nothing, often to the extent of not admitting that a serious situation exists. Even when an administrator admits that these situations merit police attention, it is common for a police organization merely to monitor on-going developments, due to the often mistaken belief that there is little a police agency can do to head off potential violence until it actually breaks out.

Doing nothing may result in nothing happening. But it also may permit a tense situation to develop into one with high potential for disorder and violence.

Police administrators need to respond to every instance of rising community tension, whether it be taking action against police misconduct, establishing outreach efforts to networks of individuals and organizations for assistance in collaborative actions, increasing visible police patrol, or implementing "walk and talk" programs.

A second common response to a developing conflict situation, especially when the police agency is the object of some of the community's attention, is the defensive use by the police of self-serving justifications. Avoiding such a rigid stance is difficult, since charges against the police may often be emotional, partially or totally inaccurate, or filled with inconsistencies. The administrator often finds himself in a dilemma; internal personnel or union pressures to take a firm stance in support of the department are juxtaposed with external pressures from the neighborhood and government to be open.

Inflexible responses should be avoided. If not, they may escalate the level of conflict and result in a change in the police administration. The administrator must recognize that although there is usually some degree of error on both sides of the conflict, an absolutist, "win-lose" or "we-they" situation usually guarantees greater conflict. Many police administrators have taken an initial position of outright rejection of charges made against the police organization only later to be confronted with evidence of some type of police error.

A third response by the police to escalating community conflict is to increase visible police patrol. Whether the conflict involves the police or some other aspect of community life, many administrators believe that police visibility is the best method for controlling or even preventing the escalation of a conflict into a disorder. In several cities, the results appear to support this concept. However, without a disorder assessment capability in the agency, it is often difficult for the police administrator to know if any one situation is potentially more explosive than other situations. Furthermore, budgetary pressures may make it difficult for a police agency to continue to provide saturated coverage over a long period. The need to target resources effectively underscores the necessity of conducting assessments of potential disorder situations.

There is, of course, a risk inherent in the police use of visible saturation in a developing conflict. Police presence in a disorderly neighborhood may trigger a wider disorder. In response to this possibility, some administrators appear to have adopted the stance of doing nothing extra during a period of high tension to avoid provoking additional conflict.

It appears from a review of incidents of violence that such a tactic, unless part of a well-developed creative strategy of building community responsibility for order maintenance activities, is not successful and will permit lawless elements in the community to continue violent activities once the police withdraw.

Creative intervention into community conflict differs greatly from the police community relations programs of the 1960's. Creative intervention seeks to affect deteriorating social relationships within a neighborhood and between the neighborhood and police. The traditional approaches of newsletters, public meetings to discuss crime rates, tours, and social events for neighborhood kids may improve the police image among some residents, but they do little to lessen tensions within many communities. Even the use of neighborhood advisory boards may become a police public relations gimmick, unless the advice from such groups become part of the police policy-setting mechanism and has an impact on police tactical and resource allocation decisions.

Creative strategy development involves a commitment by the police administrator to share power with the community for order maintenance and prioritization of police activities. Without that willingness to share power, police will find that communities will continue to force the police to assume total responsibility for dealing with all of the neighborhood's problems. The division between police and community will widen as the more stable members of a neighborhood will remain detached observers of the escalating state of community tension.

Earlier, we noted some of the possible uses of disorder assessment reports, particularly in educating others about potential disorder trends. These "others" are often part of a large network of talent found in community-based agencies or organizations--each of which has a major stake in the orderly development of the neighborhoods they serve. Many such agencies are known to the police, if for no

other reason than that calls for police services are often referred to such agencies. It is this network that should be convened by the police executive, commanders, and line officers to obtain some insight and consensus on practical strategies to lessen the possibility of further tension or disorder. Members of this network may be highly skilled professionals, such as psychiatrists and psychologists serving in community mental health centers; others may be youth counselors and outreach workers who are part of the staff of a variety of public or private youth-serving agencies; some may be part of a wider network of Community Action Agencies that sponsor a host of small neighborhood-based centers; some may be small, relatively obscure, self-help organizations serving only a few streets in heavily populated areas. Through some form of communication, these organizations are in touch with one another; collectively, as a network, they form an incredibly active resource. For too long, this resource has remained aloof from the police and vice versa. Rather than waiting for these individuals and agencies to act after a disorder, it seems more useful to engage them in community problem-solving and conflict intervention before a disorder.

Conflict intervention is a developing field and there are few prescriptions available to guide the police administrator. Several principles, however, appear to be worthy of consideration. The first is to utilize police tactics which are not confrontational in dealing with police problems in areas with a high degree of disorder potential. The second is to encourage the use of neighborhood groups to assist in order maintenance activities. A third is to encourage and reward efforts by line officers and others to make individual contact with as many residents of a troubled area as possible. Indeed, one of the most important resources available to the police department is the line officer, who is often overlooked by senior police executives as a knowledgeable source of information and insight about the handling of potential disorder situations in his or her beat or area. Aside from neighborhood residents, such officers have as much at stake in the maintenance of order in their areas as anyone else. Only recently have there been efforts to develop ways in which the beat officer can report recommendations for lessening tension-producing situations. Current examples of such efforts are the Community Oriented/Directed Patrol Programs in the Sacramento and San Diego, California Police Departments and the Neighborhood Oriented Policing Project, a cooperative effort between the Boston-Fenway Program and the Boston Police Department.

Lessons From The Field

There are a number of questions for the police administrator to consider in responding to community tension.

- Is the department avoiding the use of confrontational tactics in congested neighborhoods during a time of considerable neighborhood tension?

When neighborhood tensions are extreme, a single police action can trigger an explosive outburst. Police tactics which have a potential for confrontation are the most likely to spark that explosion. Neighborhood residents rarely understand the events leading up to a confrontation; they are influenced by crowd psychology and the events which occur before their eyes. An aggressive police action in front of a crowd of onlookers may well provoke additional conflict. Specialized police undercover units which seek to stop a string of robberies, for example, could easily provoke additional conflict by chasing after an escaping suspect and firing shots in front of a tense group of residents. When such tactics are used during periods of neighborhood conflict, it is as if the police agency is asking for a confrontation.¹⁶

When there are a number of police problems requiring attention in neighborhoods having a high level of tension, the police agency needs to identify alternative actions to solve the problem without provoking further tension. The police agency cannot consider business as usual; the dynamics of community tension make the environment unusual.

- What mechanism does the police agency have for using neighborhood and other governmental resources to devise and implement alternative policing strategies?

One of the best means for the police to avoid becoming a target of neighborhood conflict is for the police agency to utilize neighborhood based organizations in dealing with difficult problems.¹⁷ For example if there is a string of robberies outside a housing project, the police agency can attempt to develop community

support and concern focused on the problem prior to undertaking a police enforcement strategy. Media can be notified of the problem. Community meetings, door to door visits and meetings with neighborhood leaders are all strategies that administrators have found useful toward building community awareness of a problem and supporting community willingness to work jointly toward elimination of the problem.

Creative strategy development is difficult for many police administrators to understand, since unconventional approaches are used. Creative strategies include communicating to residents, understanding their point of view, engaging in activities difficult for the majority of a neighborhood to reject, making the unexpected the norm of action, and signifying a commitment to fair but firm action. The administrator needs to ask the question: What strategy will accomplish the police objective, be acceptable to the majority of residents in the neighborhood, and eliminate the possibility that those engaged in disruptive behavior can use police actions as a basis for building anti-police support?

The key lesson from experience in the field is that doing nothing is usually the worst course of action, since it can let things get out of hand. However, whatever creative strategy is undertaken, the police agency also needs to prepare for the eventual worst case: that the strategies fail and tension breaks out into a major disorder. In this sense, use of creative strategies does not preclude the organization from preparing itself by planning for disorder control.

PLANNING FOR DISORDER CONTROL¹⁸

After the disturbances of the 1960's, many police agencies discovered they had inadequate disorder control plans.¹⁹ To correct this deficiency, a great deal of effort was put into developing disorder plans. Most major police agencies now have such plans.²⁰

In reviewing the effectiveness of the disorder plans in both Miami and Dade County, police administrators suggested a number of problems. Some of the problems related to the length of time that had passed since the plans had first been developed; others noted the sharp contrast between the written plan and what had actually occurred. In both Dade County and Miami, many administrators viewed the disorder control plans as having been prepared to deal only with an expected emergency, the hurricane, or with a planned event, a political convention.

Most emergency mobilization plans appear to be directed toward mobilizing police personnel based on the assumed severity of a disorder.²¹ The plan is written in phases which describe a situation, and then lists personnel levels needed for each phase. These two items, assumed phases and needed personnel, are then linked into a plan for mobilization. The disorder plan is often a well-developed logical sequence of expected phases: who does what, where resources can be drawn from, and who has what responsibility.

There are several problems with the effectiveness of such phased plans, problems which commanders in both Dade County and Miami identified only after they had used their plans. The most important of these problems are as follows:

- Actual mobilization in response to a major disorder is not a compartmentalized, well-organized process.²²

Police agencies are human organizations. There is a wide gap between the written concept of action and the decisions made by police commanders in times of stress. Few disorder plans appear to have considered the chaos of hundreds of police officers arriving at a central location, being formed into squads and

given assignments--all occurring against a background of confused decision-making at the highest levels of the police organization and amid conflicting and numerous reports from the field. Disorder plans which make assumptions about policy decisions, which prescribe tactics, but which do not anticipate rapidly changing conditions and confused decisions will be only marginally useful to the police administrator.

Mobilization is a large and complex process.²³ The mobilization system needs clearly defined, realistic objectives, an effective management system, adequate manpower and an adequate logistics system. Reviewing selected mobilization plans from several police agencies revealed that plans were often a hodge-podge of old and unconnected standing orders, emergency orders, policies, regulations, and procedures. Each covered only one part of the process; not all parts were addressed, and the relationships between the parts were often inappropriate or contradictory. Because mobilization demands enormous speed and coordination, because it engages hundreds of people through a decentralized system, because such personnel must move quickly into a highly centralized command area, and because the process differs markedly from every-day decision-making -- a detailed, lucid, and frequently tested mobilization plan that considers a variety of variables is imperative.

- There is a need for a community debate on police disorder control strategies in order to achieve a level of consensus on acceptable police actions.

There is a need for administrators to discuss with others the options for dealing with a major disorder, to focus on suitable strategies and tactics, and to consider what the impact of each will be. Political leaders and government administrators with broader concerns and constituencies than the police manager must be part of such a discussion. This will require a debate over issues of disorder control strategy before a disorder. Such a debate will be time consuming but it will assist the police agency in its efforts to develop acceptable plans and actions in the future.

There is no need for such a debate to wait until a disorder begins. Police administrators can initiate discussions with other governmental leaders about

response strategies long before a major disorder occurs. Even if a disorder does not occur, the police administrator and city or county administrator will have a better perspective on the political concerns that will inevitably arise in a major disorder. Likewise, the political leadership may begin to focus more carefully on disorder-producing problems.

The lesson is clear. If discussions are not held prior to a disorder, they will inevitably take place once the disorder begins. At that time, confusion on policy could severely limit the police response. Issues to be discussed include the use of force, policy on arrests, objectives of the police action, the role of elected officials during a disorder, legal requirements for declaring a riot and for declaring curfews, and other policy issues requiring prior agreement. Such discussions should be held periodically between police and government.

- There is a need for police organizations to separate personnel mobilization issues from disorder control strategies.

The mobilization plan should be oriented toward obtaining, as quickly as possible, as many police personnel as can be gathered into an area. How those personnel are to act should be the focus of a separate manual on strategy and tactics. When personnel mobilization issues are mixed with control strategies in a disorder plan, there is a tendency for one or the other to predominate. Every police department needs a plan for mobilization of personnel. Likewise, each agency should have a policy manual which outlines and describes disorder control strategies.

- There should be a direct linkage between the implementation of mobilization and the occurrence of daily policing crises.

Disorders are not random occurrences. They usually result from some pre-existing tensions or police actions in a neighborhood. Each police action has the potential to escalate into a disorder. It is important that each occurrence be linked to the department's disorder assessment capability, and that the disorder control plan consider each of these occurrences as a possible initial step in the implementation of the plan. In most instances, there will be no disorder. But,

if there is no linkage between simple daily crises and the mobilization of personnel to an escalating disorder, there will be considerable delay in the police response and a small disturbance will, suddenly, turn into a widespread disorder.

The plan which begins with the small disorder as the basis of all responses will also serve to reinforce understanding among lower ranking police officers that every situation is potentially explosive. This type of disorder plan effectively solves the problem of the unwillingness of lower ranking officers to suggest or initiate a mobilization plan without the authorization of higher ranking commanders. When the process of mobilization is regularly perceived as beginning with the minor incident, the initiation of a mobilization is automatic and within the scope of lower-level personnel.

In several recent disorders, there appeared to be an unwillingness by commanders to admit that the disorder could not be controlled with existing deployed resources. Given the fiscal restraints within the government, this is a justifiable conclusion. But the reason for hesitancy in admitting the possibility of controlling a small disorder with existing shift personnel is more likely due to uncertainty about the organization's policy for mobilizing and controlling disorders. It appears that, except at the highest levels of the police organization, there is an unwillingness to initiate a build-up of police forces. But such a build-up, at an early stage, can determine whether an escalating disorder is brought under control quickly or whether it will continue.

It is important that disorder plans be written in a clear, jargon-free language which approximates the operational style of the police organization. If a department is oriented toward a military style of operations, a military type of plan (with Annexes, Op-Ords, etc.) may be appropriate. But if a police organization has routinely operated in a different style, this should be taken into account in the writing of the plan. Police planners and administrators should recognize that, during a time of crisis, there is little time to read. Plans which are overly wordy and unclear will be ignored and will contribute to the inevitable confusion.

Disorder plans must be kept current.²⁴ After the Dade County disorder, a number of police agencies reviewed their disorder control plans and found them

greatly out of date. Organizations are constantly changing; units are created or abolished; command personnel change assignments; facilities change location; and equipment is stored differently. A disorder plan must be continually updated to reflect these changes, or there will be a gap between the plan and the organization's actual operation.

Finally, it is important that the disorder control plan provide for assignments of non-patrol personnel as well. Without specific assignments, specialists such as detectives, will arrive at the police facility, grab an automobile, and go their own way with their own priorities. Except for specialties directly related to disorder control activities (such as homicide and internal investigations), specialists should be assigned to the patrol personnel pool, provided with a uniform, such as a jumpsuit, and used in the field as patrol officers under the operational command of the appropriate patrol supervisor. Far too many personnel are lost in the mobilization when specialists determine their own assignments.

Policy And Planning Issues

There are a number of policy issues which need to be addressed as a part of any disorder control plan: the use of the National Guard²⁵ and other outside resources; communicating plans to department personnel; training of personnel, and testing of plans.

When the National Guard was requested in the Dade County disorder, there was a substantial delay in response until the Florida Governor had developed policies as to how the Guard should be used. Such decision-making delays are avoidable. Though no governor wants to commit National Guard troops to a situation in which they are unnecessary or poorly trained, there is no reason why every major city police administrator cannot now initiate discussions with National Guard officials as to the specific and mutually agreeable role of the National Guard in an urban disorder. Such discussions, with representatives of the governor's office present, can resolve major problems prior to the start of a disorder. Many current governors have had no experience in responding to a request for assistance in dealing with a major disorder; initiating discussions, now, can eliminate destructive delays in the future, when time will be of critical importance.

Similarly, it is important that mutual aid pacts be reviewed, rewritten, and formalized to plan for the use and control of outside agencies. The disorder control plan must provide for a location to which responding agencies can report to receive their assignments. The departments requesting assistance must designate a specific role for these agencies and must provide local supervision and direction of their efforts.

Policies must also be established concerning the use of other outside resources in a disorder. What role will citizens be permitted to play? Who will serve as the contact for area residents or outsiders who want to assist in "cooling things down". What limits should be placed on the news media? What actions should be taken by other local government agencies?

Lessons From The Field

In reviewing the experiences in Dade County and in other disturbances across the country, several critical issues emerged.

- Does the disorder plan reflect the fact that most disorders escalate from a minor incident?

Instituting police actions to prevent a small disturbance from escalating into a major disorder must start at the lowest levels of the organization. The disorder plan must deal not only with those incidents which have gotten out of hand; it must address the daily incidents which, though normally nonexplosive, may have the potential for rapid escalation.

- Does the department recognize that the lack of violence following a tense situation does not always mean there is no potential for further disorder?

Police administrators have tended to believe that when a difficult and potentially explosive situation is over, the problem has been resolved. The potential for violence can build over time, be contained, and then be precipitated by another incident. Violence is not static but dynamic and may come in waves.

- Does the disorder plan reflect two separate needs: (1) mobilization of resources and (2) strategies or police tactics to respond to a range of types of disorder problems

We have previously reviewed the reasons for this distinction. Each administrator should note whether such a distinction is made in the disorder control plan.

- Is there an agreement among the police, government and political leadership (at the local and state levels) on acceptable strategies to deal with major disorders?

Failure to develop agreements on policy issues will result in serious time lapses between the outbreak of a disorder, the decision to commit personnel, and the decisions concerning the tactics personnel are to use in controlling the disorder. Such delays are disruptive and often demoralize those officers who view delay as a sign of weakness or political meddling in the department's mission to maintain peace, eliminate disorder, and enforce existing laws and ordinances.

- Are there written plans which list various tactics to be used in the control of disorders, and are personnel trained in the use of such tactics?

It is clear that police officers need training in the use of various tactics to assist them in controlling major disorders. The origins of many of these tactics can be found in military doctrine and practice. They include formations and movements which demonstrate a visible, disciplined show of force; specific squad formations directed at dispersing groups; crowd control techniques; tactics associated with mass arrests; the securing of various types of buildings; perimeter patrol placements (both moving and fixed); and the use of non-lethal force, such as chemical agents.

It is equally clear that there are serious problems associated with current disorder control training. Such training is not presently part of the normal routine formation and development of police officers. In some departments, less than five hours of such training is given to new officers in the police academy, with even less provided through in-service training. Cutbacks in both Federal

and state budgets have eliminated many of the locations, military and non-military, where officers can be trained in disorder control tactics. In many departments, there are fewer officers with military experience and training, thus limiting the personnel available to design local department curricula.

The effective use of disorder control tactics requires regular drill and practice, is time-consuming and is costly.²⁶ It is important to note that such training involves practices which differ markedly from normal police work. Most of the daily work of a patrol officer consists of providing individualized, unsupervised, requested services; less time is spent on crime control activities. But little, if any, time is spent training units as part of a military squad preparing for battle. Individual officers will experience great stress in being trained in tactics that are radically different from the orientation and practice of their work. Not all officers will be comfortable with the constant threat in a riot of being seriously injured or seriously injuring others; fear, anxiety, anger, resentment, and other legitimate emotions will surface and limit the effectiveness of their training. Officers who are members of minority groups may find themselves in extremely stressful circumstances, due to their possible social and family involvement with the neighborhood. Commanders may make inappropriate decisions and commit officers to courses of action that foolishly endanger themselves, their personnel, and others.

Some observers, in noting these problems, have proposed that only selected groups of officers be trained for crowd control, so that they, as specialized cadres, can respond to small-scale disturbances.²⁷ Though this suggestion is useful, it overlooks the distinct possibility that often there are many, widespread, and sporadic disturbances in the early phases of a disorder. Small cadres would be unable to respond to all of these; other police personnel must be able to act. Others have suggested that a larger number of officers be specially trained, and then kept on routine assignments. When there is a major disorder, the agency will have a pool of trained officers from which to draw, assigning the officers as temporary squad leaders or supervisors. This suggestion has some merit, but it is critical that such temporary leaders be identified, mobilized, briefed, and deployed rapidly in the earliest stage of a major disorder. Their usefulness will be limited if untrained but ranking supervisors take charge of such squads.

The most difficult dilemma centers on the basic role conflict police officers will inevitably experience in a disorder.²⁸ Police officers are not military personnel, sworn and trained to defend their country against its enemies.²⁹ They are citizens of a community who have chosen to serve that community. In conversations with officers who have been deployed in major disorders, this role conflict was presented as one of the most difficult personal issues confronted by officers.³⁰ It is clear to them that little attention has been given to this issue, either in training or in discussions with police executives and others.³¹

DEALING WITH INITIAL DISORDER ACTIVITIES

Once an outbreak of disorder has occurred, the police organization is faced with the problem of mobilizing resources and implementing acceptable strategies to control the disorder. From a review of the actions in a number of recent disorders, four key elements stand out as being important to the impact of the initial police response.

- Dealing with organizational inertia;
- Dealing concurrently with the present and the next possible future steps;
- Selection of reasonable objectives for police action consistent with prior policies;
- Provision of strong leadership and supervision within the police organization.

Large police organizations have an inertia and ritual all their own, usually derived from the maintenance of a routine service on a daily basis. Response to an escalating disorder requires a major and abrupt change in the organization's level of activity. Decisions need to be made quickly. Tight control must be quickly established over organizational units.

We have mentioned some of the factors affecting organizational inertia in a disorder control environment: the unwillingness of lower-level supervisors to acknowledge escalation potential; the problem of notifying managers and policy makers at an early stage; the calling-up of needed numbers of personnel; the use of different types of communications, the redeployment of on-duty personnel, etc. Disorganization is common during the early mobilization period. In Dade County, many commanders noted the frustration and confusion that occurred when hundreds of police officers suddenly appeared at the mobilization location. The key question for administrators is: How can we plan to reduce this disorganization while moving rapidly to build up a capability to respond to an escalating disorder?

One result of this sense of disorganization is the tendency to focus only on the present: How many of what are needed where now? But there is always a chance that the escalation of the disorder will continue, and there is a need to have someone focusing on not only the present but on what the next requirements may be. For example, in the mobilization of the total personnel of the police force, someone should have the responsibility for preparing to call up these personnel; once personnel are being called in, that person should move on to preparing for the next step, which may require calling in outside resources. There are always two distinct operational tasks: one deals with the present need and the second--independent of the first--focuses on the next need.

In responding to disorders, it is important--as learned clearly in the Dade County disorder--to select reasonable objectives for action. Since there are always limited personnel available at the early stages of a disorder, the responding police force cannot be everywhere at once. They cannot respond to all calls for assistance. The department needs to select a limited set of objectives obtainable within its existing resources; if the objectives selected are beyond the organization's capability, there will be failure and little will be accomplished. The question to be asked by the commander is: What should we do first and have we sufficient personnel to achieve it? Consideration must be given to quickly halting an agency's normal response to calls for service and using on-duty personnel to stop the escalation of a disorder.

It is also important that objectives selected are consistent with local government and department policies. Once again, the importance of discussion with the political and governmental leadership prior to a disorder cannot be overstressed. Issues concerning the use of force, arrest policies, and curfews should be decided beforehand. Strategies which follow these policies should also reflect available resources.

It is critical that leadership and supervision be provided throughout the organization for the duration of the disorder. The management of disorders is a complex, emotional undertaking, placing great stress on the police organization. The potential for confrontation is so great that maximum command supervision must be provided to field personnel so that these forces do not make difficult

decisions without guidance and assistance. In Miami, for example, the department adopted a policy of assigning a supervisor to every three to six officers to ensure that no independent actions be undertaken.

Leadership is equally important. Leadership begins with the willingness of the chief administrator to be on the scene during all stages of the disorder.³³ The chief of police cannot relegate himself to remaining in an office with only occasional tours of the city.³⁴ He/she must regularly mix with operational personnel, reinforcing the agency's commitment to careful, sensitive responses to difficult situations. An equally important part of leadership is the willingness of the police administrator to inform personnel, often, about the organization's objectives and expectations, as well as the reasons for decisions that have been made. Without such leadership and communication there is a possibility of inappropriate police action which may further the disorder.

As part of the leadership and supervision function, it is important that the department know where and to what extent all resources are committed. Experience shows that such information is difficult to process from a field command post, since such command centers rarely have sufficient monitoring and documentation capabilities.³⁵ All information should be fed to one central monitoring location. Higher-level personnel need to be assigned to command centers of other agencies to provide access to other agency's information. In Miami, the city found that a high ranking officer was necessary at the county command post to ensure that the city had access to accurate information on county and National Guard deployment.

Finally, it is important that the department continually reinforce policies and regulations, especially those dealing with use of force, arrest, and use of firearms. Without continual reinforcement, the potential for inappropriate action is increased. With such guidance however, field officers will understand that command is carefully monitoring their activities.

When departments move to exercise leadership during a disorder, the importance of a unified command cannot be overstressed.³⁶ There needs to be agreement among command as to what the policies are, how they will be interpreted, and how they will be enforced. This may require regular briefings of the command staff

by the chief of police, since a unified command is based on equal access to information.³⁷ In the same sense, the department command staff should be seen by officers in the field, especially in highly volatile areas of the community. Lacking such a command presence, officers will feel abandoned, and their frustration and anxiety may cause officers to engage in inappropriate behavior or over-react to a stress-filled situation.

Lessons From the Field

The analysis of police activities in recent disorders, coupled with commanders' critiques of their own activities, suggest several important questions to be addressed by the police administrators in assessing an agency's preparation for urban disorders. The most important of these are as follows:

- Has the police agency clearly described the decision-making authority of lower-level managers and supervisors during the initial stages of an escalating disorder?

We have seen that the uncertainty and/or lack of authority of low level supervisors and managers to initiate disorder control efforts often cause a serious delay in the mobilization of sufficient personnel to prevent further escalation. Agencies can best deal with this problem through the use of carefully written policy statements concerning decision-making authority, discussions with managers and supervisors, and the training of supervisors in the exercise of the control plan. Some agencies have found it useful to practice the decisionmaking process through simulated exercises.

- Has the department considered the potential for mass confusion during a rapid mobilization of personnel, and developed mechanisms to reduce the potential for confusion?

Police managers would be well advised to ask themselves: What would happen if 80% of our personnel were called to work at the same time under disorder conditions? What would be the centers of confusion? Where would people be reporting? These are important questions; indeed, some of the agencies dealing with aspects

of the disorder in Miami/Dade County found personnel had reported to locations different from where officers normally kept their equipment, necessitating additional transportation to the normal places of assignment to obtain uniforms, riot equipment, and materiel.

Another important question concerns the mechanism to check in and assign responding officers. Does the police agency have a system for documenting the arrival of officers by name and assignment? Is there a mechanism to advise the central command center of the exact assignment of officers sent into the field? Some agencies are now developing preprinted lists of personnel to be filled in during an emergency mobilization as a means for providing such documentation. Without such a system, the agency may discover that it doesn't know how many officers have reported and where they are working.

- Has the department provided for a command officer responsible for considering "next possible futures?"

Once the police agency has committed itself to any type of mobilization, a senior officer should be assigned solely to the task of anticipating the next resources which will be required. Since there is always a delay from the time an agency decides it desires a given resource, and the actual availability of the resource, planning of "next moves" is important.

- Has the department discussed with field commanders reasonable objectives for initial police actions in the earliest stages of an escalating disorder?

There are a number of competing demands made on an agency during the early periods of a disorder. Reports of violence and looting often come from many varying locations in the community. Yet, responding to every one of these incidents is difficult without using up all of the available personnel. Sufficient personnel are rarely available to completely cordon off a trouble area while simultaneously responding to calls.

Field commanders need to be cognizant of these competing demands and not attempt everything at once, for experience indicates that such an attempt will

dilute personnel so rapidly that the command will lose control of police activities.³⁹ The experience in Miami/Dade County suggests several sequential steps in stopping a developing disorder.⁴⁰

1. Limiting the area of the disorder by establishing a perimeter around the area. Since the nature of disorders is somewhat changing, and there is substantial risk to outsiders (civilians caught unaware in a riot area), it is imperative that major routes into the area be cordoned off as soon as possible.
2. Responding to reports of personal violence before responding to reports of property crimes. Though it appears that some incidents of personal violence may not be reported to the police for some time, when such reports occur, immediate response is necessary.
3. Securing places that have been hit by violence against property. The experience in Miami/Dade County indicates that intervention in situations of looting is not sufficient to stop the activity, since when the police leave, places are often looted again. Police commanders therefore need to consider how to provide security at these locations after the initial police interventions, since such police security will dilute the pool of available personnel. Police officers should not just move from incident to incident, since once they are gone the problem will simply recur.
4. Providing a highly visible police presence. It is possible, at the early stages of a disorder, that a highly visible police presence can prevent further escalation of disorder. Once relative calm has been established, the highly visible police presence can prevent rekindled violence. But during the stage of rapid escalation, the previous steps listed above appear to be as important as simply providing visible police presence.

In each of the above strategies, it is important that the police agency undertake an effort with sufficient personnel. When a decision is made not to undertake such an effort, it is important that personnel of the agency be told the

reason for inaction, so they will not perceive the decision as a sign of weakness or unwillingness to act.

- Does the command staff of the police agency understand disorder control policies and the importance of providing a highly visible command presence?

The most important initial step in developing a command presence is the prior training of top management in terms of the agency's perspective on urban disorders, the policies of the agency, and the strategies expected to be utilized should a disorder break out. When a disorder occurs, however, it is the chief of police who must ensure that command staff are kept fully briefed on developments and policies and that they are assigned to field duty supportive of patrol personnel. The chief of police must maintain a highly visible field presence.

Disorder control activities place extraordinary pressures on a police organization. They require strong leadership at the highest levels and they require a commitment by top executives that they will return to duty, even if on a vacation or on a day off. Nothing is more demoralizing to a department than a chief executive or command officer who is not present during the difficult and complex police management of an ongoing disorder.

MANAGEMENT OF THE ON-GOING DISORDER

Once the initial disorder control activities have been carried out and it appears that a disorder may last for several days, a new set of management issues arise which are somewhat different from those associated with the early phases of an escalating disorder.

One major issue is the use of newly available personnel.⁴¹ Previous requests for assistance from other departments, state police or highway patrol and the National Guard usually result in new personnel arriving on the scene some time after the start of the disorder.⁴² The police agency needs to consider carefully how they can best be used.⁴³ Each use contemplated must be under the supervision and direction of the requesting department.

There is substantial agreement by commanders in the Dade County disorder that when outsiders eventually become available, they should be used for one of two activities: to provide police service outside the disturbance area and to secure areas brought under the control by the local police within the disorder area. Use of outside resources for police service delivery in areas of the community other than the riot zone is suggested because of the absence of knowledge and sensitivity by outside personnel to local concerns and issues. The local police will have to work in the area after the disturbance is over, and will need to rebuild confidence with the community. Local commanders believe that they are better equipped to undertake police action in the highly-charged emotional atmosphere of the disorder or riot area.

Use of outside resources to secure property already under control will permit the local police force to continue deployment of its own personnel to new trouble areas. Outside resources can maintain fixed posts in front of damaged property under the control of local police supervisors. The key issue, however, is not so much the specific use of outside resources as it is the necessity of advance planning to determine what that use will be. Advance discussions with government officials from other jurisdictions and the state is a part of the disorder planning process. Questions about the use of the National Guard (to be resolved at the state level),⁴⁴ the use of the state police or highway patrol⁴⁵

(also a state-level decision) and the use of other cities' or counties' personnel must not be decided during the disorder. If decisions are not made before the outbreak of a disorder, limitations will be placed on personnel usage which may severely reduce the effectiveness of disorder control. Problems associated with logistics, equipment, radio communications, command and supervision must also be resolved prior to a disorder.

The agency must consider how to plan for a sustained police presence. It will be difficult for any police agency to maintain a sustained presence without the assistance of outside resources. As discussed in previous sections of this study, policies for use of personnel need to be established during the disorder planning stage, at the local, county, and state level.

The police agency should also consider the use of civilian assistance in maintaining security over longer-term periods of the disorder. Since it will eventually be necessary for the community to support peace-keeping efforts without police action, the gradual transfer of responsibilities to neighborhood civilians can be an important approach. The experience in Dade County suggests that area residents reach a level of intolerance with disorder after their lives are severely disrupted. The police agency is wise to consider ways of bringing this concern of residents into the process of maintenance of order in the disorder area.

When a disorder control effort must extend over a long period of time, several personnel issues arise which need to be addressed by the police administrator. Personnel on fixed-post duty for long shifts tend to become bored. Boredom can lead to activities which then become the object of public disapproval. Police officer frustration will occur. As the object of hyperactive field requirements and the recipient of verbal and physical abuse, the officer may feel frustrated at what appears to be the lack of "punishment" for criminal acts. If these frustrations are not addressed, they may result in threats of job actions or even in officers trying to "take the law into their own hands." It is during these periods that executive leadership is especially important, so officers do not feel abandoned.

When a disorder has been reduced to sporadic violence and disruption over a long period there is a tendency for police command officers to accept that violence as unavoidable. This is a dangerous tendency, for it escalates the level of normal neighborhood tension to a new height. Police administrators who have not accepted the inevitability of prolonged violence, and have undertaken preventive actions to reduce lingering tensions, have found that the end result of a disorder is often renewed agreement from neighborhood residents to work jointly with police to reduce future outbreaks of violence.

Dealing with disorders is a hyperactive, tension-producing and emotional task. Normal, routine police service delivery is a far different affair, and the transition from one state to the other is not always easy. It can be expected that old relationships between police and neighborhood will have been shaken, new relationships may have formed, and there will be a tendency for some officers to transfer disorder control perspectives back into the provision of daily police service. There will be a need for greater supervision during the period after a disorder, and managers must continue to be available, with a high level of command presence, as a means for dealing with the potential for rekindling sparks that could cause a second disorder.

In this sense, it is especially important that the police agency avoid taking actions which will lead to confrontations with neighborhood residents for some time after a disorder has ended. Indeed, police officials would be wise to always avoid the use of such tactics, so long as creative strategies can be found to resolve problems in another, equally effective, manner. Following the "winding-down" of a disorder control effort, it cannot be "business as usual" within the police agency; extra sensitivity is required in selecting tactics and strategies for dealing with what were probably once considered routine actions of the police force.

Lessons From the Field

Several major policy questions have arisen in many of the recent disorders for which there are no clear-cut answers but which require discussion by the police administrator, the command staff and local government officials prior to a disorder.

- Should there be enforcement policies in disorder periods that are different than those followed by the police in non-disorder periods?

In the Dade County disorder, there was substantial discussion about how several policies and procedures should have been different during the disorder than prior to it. For example, the Miami Police Department instituted a revised use of force policy in the middle of the disorder that formally tightened departmental restrictions on the use of firearms.

There is some feeling that disorder conditions may require adjustments in policy, especially in the areas of use of deadly force, general use of force, and arrest. There appears to be some accuracy to the perception that during a disorder, legitimate police actions and policies which are normally acceptable may be unacceptable and may require extra supervision and control.

An extensive amount of time was spent during the Dade County disorders in debating the legal requirements and language of state statutes or local ordinances regarding:

- The exact nature of police powers in a riot, disorder, or a civil disturbance;
- The legal steps and procedures to be followed in declaring a curfew;
- The legalities of local use and control over state forces, such as the National Guard, or the state police;
- The legal and logistical steps to be followed in conducting searches, mass arrests, bookings, fingerprinting, gathering witness statements, and evidence collection during a riot, disorder, or civil disturbance;
- The legal confusion about standards on the use of deadly force based on existing state statutes, as opposed to local agency policies which may be more restrictive than state statutes.

The police must act to control a disorder and establish peace and order. They must do so legally. In many existing state statutes and local ordinances, there are confusing and contradictory guidelines that will inhibit the police from acting in an effective and equitable manner.

Answers to specific questions are not always clear in existing state law. For instance, what constitutes the legal definition of a riot, as distinguished from a disorder? Is there is a distinction? The question is more than a semantic exercise. Some state statutes grant extensive police powers to a local department or government under the heading of a riot. For example, refusing to obey an order from a police officer, in a riot, in some states is defined as a felony; refusal to assist an officer, in a riot, when lack of assistance results in serious injury or death to others, is defined as a major felony.

Police administrators, local and state government legislators, and others must review and alter, if need be, existing laws and policies governing police actions in a riot, civil disturbance, or disorder. The police department cannot be left alone to bear the burden of interpreting such laws during a disorder.

CONCLUSION

Recent disorders in Dade County and elsewhere have been in many instances the result of a build-up of narrowly defined but widely shared grievances against the police or criminal justice system. Although deep-seated anger, frustration and disappointment with the role of the police and the criminal justice system in Dade County were not the sole causes of the disorder, few would disagree with the judgment that actions or inactions by the police contributed to and aggravated the potential for violent outbreak.

However, several of the areas of Dade County in which rioting occurred were neighborhoods which, for over a decade, had been known by both the police and the local governments to be centers of violence and disorder. An environment of extreme human and social stress, coupled with periodic neighborhood violence, had been allowed to grow with no serious long-term efforts to address chronic problems. This combination of social stress and a breakdown of confidence in the administration of justice provides the classic ingredient for disorder; all that is required is one incident to act as the fuse or flashpoint.

It is clear that the police and criminal justice system cannot directly resolve the intractable problems of poverty, poor housing, unemployment, lack of education, and other types of social pathologies that still affect many neighborhoods in the cities and counties of this country. Yet, the police and the criminal justice system are more aware of the daily nature of life in such areas than are other departments or levels of government. It is the police who must respond, on an hourly basis, to these areas. It is the police who seek to maintain some semblance of order, to provide some redress of grievances when neighbor is pitted against neighbor, to offer emergency service when no other agency is available, and to protect life and secure property when the norm in many of these areas is to settle grievances through violence. It is the police who must act in a just manner in order to deter acts of lawlessness or disorder. It is the police who, alone, are delegated to perform these acts on behalf of the government and its citizens.

It has now become commonplace to state that the police can no longer act alone in preventing disorder. The prevention and control of disorder must become a collaborative effort between government, citizens, and the police. However, the police must assume major responsibility for maintaining a sensitive, skilled, and intelligent posture during times of potential and real urban unrest. Regardless of actions taken by other public or private institutions, the police themselves can serve as the principal catalyst for performing constructive roles in maintaining community peace or they can be the catalyst for provoking increased community tensions. The choices are clear.

The lessons learned from Dade County have been acquired at great cost and they will, no doubt, have to be learned again and again. In applying these lessons, police departments will need to assume a different type of leadership in the 1980's. They will need to be less reticent in sharing with others their knowledge of neighborhood conditions which contribute to violence and disorder. When tensions are due to police failures, publicly acknowledged corrective action must be taken in order to maintain the credibility of the department.

Short-term and long-term strategies can be developed by the police in conjunction with others in government and neighborhoods. This process will be difficult and complex, and will admit of no easy, quick-fix solutions; trial and error, frustration, doubts and questions will generally mark such collaboration. Collaboration and joint problem-solving between the police and local neighborhoods, supported by local government policies and programs, will, however, contribute to lessening tensions. They will not, of course, solve the deeply rooted social and economic problems of many of the residents of these areas, but such joint efforts will be the beginning steps necessary to the building of confidence between the police and such neighborhoods.

Efforts by police executives will require a review of their own agencies' policies and procedures. The following questions summarize the most important issues for consideration:

- What are the tension indicators which can be regularly assessed and serve as a basis for developing a picture of neighborhood tension levels?

- What formal mechanism does the department have for the collection, assessment and use of information about the levels of tension in the community?
- How are levels of tension in the community analyzed, reviewed, and discussed by the organization's policy-makers?
- Are there sections of the city or county in which police response to calls for service is not possible, due to the potential for assault and injury of police officers?
- Is the department avoiding the use of confrontational tactics in congested neighborhoods during a time of considerable neighborhood tension?
- What mechanism does the police agency have for using neighborhood and governmental resources to devise and implement alternative police strategies for order maintenance?
- Does the disorder plan reflect the fact that most disorders escalate from a minor incident?
- Does the department recognize that the lack of violence following a tense situation does not always mean there is no potential for further disorder?
- Does the disorder plan reflect two separate needs: (1) mobilization of resources and (2) strategies or tactics to respond to a range of disorder problems?
- Is there agreement between the police and political leadership (at the local and state levels) on acceptable strategies to deal with major disorders?
- Are there written plans listing various tactics to be used in the control of disorders and are personnel trained in the use of such tactics?

- Has the police agency clearly described the decision-making authority of lower level managers and supervisors during the initial stages of an escalating disorder?
- Has the department considered the potential for mass confusion during a rapid mobilization of personnel and developed mechanisms to reduce the potential for confusion?
- Has the department discussed with field commanders reasonable objectives for initial police actions in the earliest stages of an escalating disorder?
- Does the command staff of the police agency understand disorder control policies and the importance of providing a highly visible command presence?
- Should there be enforcement policies in disorder periods that are different than those followed by the police in non-disorder periods?

It is clear that the next decade of policing in this country will be characterized by efforts to accomplish and maintain civil order and consensus. The role of the police organization in attempting to keep the peace and maintain order will become more difficult and complex. This monograph is a modest attempt at providing to police executives some insights into several issues that many departments will be facing. It is our hope that such beginning efforts will provide some assistance to our colleagues.

REFERENCES

Throughout this monograph, we have cited various references to selected statements made by several national commissions that have analyzed and reported on civil disorders. These statements are intended to clarify or act as contrasts to our own judgments in this study. The citations have been taken from the following national reports:

- Report of the National Commission on Civil Disorders, E.P. Dutton & Co., NY, 1968. This report was commonly referred to as the Kerner Commission Report and is cited in our references below as Kerner.
- The Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence: To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility, Praeger Publishers, NY, 1970. This report is cited in our references below as Violence.
- Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D.C., 1976. This report is cited in our references below as NACCJSG.

The numbered citations listed below refer to reference numbers listed in the main text of our study. Page number references in each citation are listed as well.

1. Assessment of Future National and International Problem Areas: National Science Foundation Report, Center for the Study of Social Policy, Stanford Research Institute Project 4676, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., February 1977.

Managing Fiscal Stress: The Crisis in the Public Sector, Charles H. Levine, Chatham House Publisher, Inc., Chatham, New Jersey, 1980.

Policing a Free Society, Herman Goldstein, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977.

2. THE GENESIS OF GROUP VIOLENCE

Man's progress has reached a stage in which several forces combine to create critical stresses in our social and political structure. First, technological advances and population growth have wrought profound and complex changes in our physical environment and our ability to control it so as to meet basic human needs. Second, an extended period of considerable progress in raising standards of living and education for all and in providing greater social justice for disadvantaged groups - however unevenly - has created rising expectations of still further progress and demands that it be brought about. Third, our political and social institutions and the programs they manage are not changing rapidly enough to keep up with the speed of change in environment they are intended to control. Although we now have the technological and economic capability of releasing all our citizens from poverty and social deprivation, we have not been willing or able to fashion the changes in our political institutions and public programs that will bring to the disadvantaged the liberation that is almost within their grasp. This combination of forces creates demands for change that are not being met and leads to protests that sometimes result in group violence. (Kerner, p. 83)

3. THE HISTORICITY OF GROUP VIOLENCE

America has always been a nation of rapid social change. We have proclaimed ourselves a modern promised land, and have brought millions of restless immigrants to our shores to partake its fulfillment. Persistent demands by these groups - by the western farmers of the revolutionary period, later by the Irish, the Italians and the Slaves, and more recently by Puerto Rican, Mexican, and Negro Americans - and resistance to these demands by other groups, have accounted for most of the offensive and defensive group violence that marks our history. (Violence, p. 62)

4. LITTLE CHANGE ESTABLISHED IN THE AFTERMATH

A study of the aftermath of disorder leads to disturbing conclusions. We find that, despite the institution of some post-riot programs:

- o Little basic change in the conditions underlying the outbreak of disorder has taken place. Actions to ameliorate Negro grievances have been limited and sporadic; with but few exceptions, they have not significantly reduced tensions.

- o In several cities, the principal official response has been to train and equip the police with more sophisticated weapons.
- o In several cities, increasing polarization is evident, with continuing breakdown of interracial communication, and growth of white segregationist or black separatist groups. (Kerner, p. 8)

5. THE POLICEMAN BEARS THE BRUNT OF COMMUNITY HOSTILITY TO THE WHOLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The policeman in the ghetto is a symbol not only of law but of the entire system of law enforcement and criminal justice.

As such, he becomes the tangible target for grievances against shortcomings throughout that system: against assembly-line justice in teeming lower courts; against wide disparities in sentences; against antiquated corrections facilities; against the basic inequities imposed by the system on the poor - to whom, for example, the option of bail means only jail. (Kerner, p. 299)

6. UNDERLYING ISSUES CONTRIBUTING TO SOCIALLY DISTURBED ATMOSPHERE

Although specific grievances varied from city to city, at least 12 deeply held grievances can be identified and ranked into three levels of relative intensity:

1st Level

1. Police practices
2. Unemployment and underemployment
3. Inadequate housing

2nd Level

4. Inadequate education
5. Poor recreation facilities and programs
6. Ineffectiveness of the political structure and grievance mechanisms

3rd Level

7. Disrespectful white attitudes
8. Discriminatory administration of justice
9. Inadequacy of federal programs
10. Inadequacy of municipal services
11. Discriminatory consumer and credit practices
12. Inadequate welfare programs. (Kerner, p. 7-8)

7. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF UNREST HAVE WORSENEDED SINCE THE 1960's

We cannot afford to ignore the underlying causes of civil disorders during this period of relative calm. The urban crisis is far from being resolved; in many ways, the state of the great cities is more desperate than it was during the most serious riots of the 1960's. An unstable economic situation has forced substantial curtailment of public services in many cities and caused a general deterioration in the quality of life for the poorer classes. Crimes of violence, damaging to both criminal and victim, continue

at an unacceptably high level. Unemployment has risen markedly, and job opportunities for the disadvantaged have dwindled. These facts may well have contributed to the present quiescence. But this is a false calm, and we must see in the current social situation an accumulation of trouble for the future. (NACCJSG, p. 2)

8. THE INCREASINGLY DISTURBED SOCIAL ATMOSPHERE LEADING TO RIOT

In the 24 disorders in 23 cities which we surveyed, disorder did not erupt as a result of a single "triggering" or "precipitating" incident. Instead, it was generated out of an increasingly disturbed social atmosphere, in which typically a series of tension-heightening incidents over a period of weeks or months became linked in the minds of many in the Negro community with a reservoir of underlying grievances. At some point in the mounting tension, a further incident - in itself often routine or trivial - became the breaking point and the tension spilled over into violence. (Kerner, p. 6)

THE UNDERLYING GENESIS OF DISORDER: BLACK GRIEVANCE WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Virtually every major episode of urban violence in the summer of 1967 was foreshadowed by an accumulation of unresolved grievances by ghetto residents against local authorities (often, but not always, the police). So high was the resulting underlying tension, that routine and random events, tolerated or ignored under most circumstances...became the triggers of sudden violence.

Coinciding with this high level of dissatisfaction, confidence in the willingness and ability of local government to respond to Negro grievances was low. Evidence presented to this Commission, establishes that a substantial number of Negroes were disturbed and angry about local governments' failures to solve their problems. (Kerner, p. 284)

9. THE BENEFITS OF AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM FOR DISORDER

No refined system for predicting the incidence of mass disorder exists; even if it did, its practical usefulness in law enforcement decisionmaking - which must be conducted on the basis of limited data - would be questionable. At the same time, experienced police officers are able to point out likely trouble spots and high-risk periods. Devising an early warning system for disorders involves no more than systematizing the making and sharing of such essentially intuitive judgments and, in the process, developing an improved assessment of their accuracy. The early warning system proposed here is method of polling what officers in all ranks of a department already know about the causes and prevention of disorders in their jurisdiction and of attempting to assure that the value of that knowledge will not be lost to the department as a whole. The importance of such a system is that it gives a department at least some basis for consistent efforts to prevent disorder through adapting police response action to community conditions. (NACCJSG, p. 163)

10. GROUP VIOLENCE CONCEPTUALIZED

We tend to think of group violence as a major aberration in a democratic society, as a sickness that comes only in extraordinary times. A deeper reading of the past belies this notion. In man's political history, group violence has accompanied periods of serious social stress from Homer to this morning's newspaper. Group violence runs through the American experience, as it always has, in varying degrees and manifestations, for every society. Violence has been used by groups seeking power, by groups holding onto power, and by groups in the process of losing power. Violence has been pursued in the defense of order by the satisfied, in the name of justice by the oppressed, and in fear of displacement by the threatened. (Violence, p. 57)

11. SUMMARIZING THE DECADE OF THE 1960S

Violence in the United States has risen to alarmingly high levels. Whether one considers assassination, group violence, or individual acts of violence, the decade of the 1960s was considerably more violent than the several decades preceding it and ranks among the most violent in our history. The United States is the clear leader among modern, stable democratic nations in its rates of homicide, assault, rape, and robbery, and it is at least among the highest in the incidence of group violence and assassination. (Violence, p. XV)

12. SIMILAR CHARACTERISTICS OF VIOLENCE ESCALATION

In the 24 disorders in 23 cities which we surveyed: The final incident before the outbreak of disorder, and the initial violence itself, generally took place in the evening or at night at a place in which it was normal for many people to be on the streets.

Violence usually occurred almost immediately following the occurrence of the final precipitating incidents, and then escalated rapidly. With but few exceptions, violence subsided during the day, and flared rapidly again at night. The night-day cycles continued through the early period of the major disorders.

Disorder generally began with rock and bottle throwing and window breaking. Once store windows were broken, looting usually followed. (Kerner, p. 6)

13. RELATION BETWEEN PRIOR AND FINAL PRECIPITATING INCIDENTS

Finally, we have noted a marked relationship between prior and final incidents within each city. In most of the cities surveyed, the final incident was of the same type as one or more of the prior incidents. For example, police actions were identified as both the final incident and one or more prior incidents preceding seven (of 24) disturbances. Rallies or meetings to protest police actions involved in a prior incident were identified as the final incident preceding three additional disturbances. The cumulative reinforcement of grievances and heightening of tensions found in all instances were particularly evident in these cases. (Kerner, p. 122)

14. PREVENTIVE STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY LOCAL OFFICIALS:

To maintain control of incidents which could lead to disorders, the Commission recommends that local officials:

- o Assign seasoned, well-trained policemen and supervisory officers to patrol ghetto areas, and to respond to disturbances;
- o Develop plans which will quickly muster maximum police manpower and highly qualified senior commanders at the outbreak of disorders;
- o Provide special training in the prevention of disorders, and prepare police for riot control and for operation in units, with adequate command and control and field communication for proper discipline and effectiveness;
- o Develop guidelines governing the use of control equipment and provide alternatives to the use of lethal weapons...;
- o Establish an intelligence system to provide police and other public officials with reliable information that may help to prevent the outbreak of a disorder and to institute effective control measures when a riot erupts;
- o Develop continuing contacts with ghetto residents to make use of the forces for order which exist within the community;
- o Establish machinery for neutralizing rumors, and enabling Negro leaders and residents to obtain the facts. Create special rumor details to collect, evaluate, and dispel rumors that may lead to a civil disorder. (Kerner, p. 18)

15. THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT/COMMUNITY OPERATION

Civil authorities must seek actively to harness the community in the fight against disorder, terrorism, and political violence. The authorities should strive for greater community involvement in activities designed to improve the quality of life, to increase the understanding and respect for law, and to promote social harmony. To this end, publicly funded joint community/government action groups should be established in advance of unrest, and these should work energetically to discover any serious problems inherent in the community and to take all practical steps toward their solution. It is essential that such groups undertake a meaningful exercise; they should be given the opportunity of implementing in collaboration with civil authority their own recommendations. The community should be encouraged, through these mechanisms, to take a greater interest and responsibility in its own governance and to realize its potentialities for affecting change through peaceful means. (NACCJSG, p. 73)

16. ADVANCE CLEARANCE OF CONTROVERSIAL AND POTENTIALLY PROVACATIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Retrospective inquiries in the wake of major urban riots have often identified the trigger for the explosion of disorder as a particular police-citizen law enforcement transaction - sometimes proper and unavoidable, sometimes legitimate but ill judged on the part of police, and sometimes questionable or even improper. The risk of this sort of triggering cannot be altogether eliminated; nor is it certain that, if it were avoidable, disorders would not crystallize around other classes of events. Nevertheless, police responsibility for the prevention of disorder embraces a responsibility to avoid presenting real or perceived provocations to citizens in predictably volatile situations. To prevent the triggering of disorder, an anti-disorder plan should provide a system of advance clearance for potentially inflammatory law enforcement operations and should specify clearly what sorts of operations should receive advance clearance. (NACCJSG, p. 163)

17. THE IMPACT OF NO INTERNAL COMMUNICATION WITH THE COMMUNITY ON GOVERNMENT PLANNING

The lack of communication and the absence of regular contacts with ghetto residents prevent city leaders from learning about problems and grievances as they develop. As a result, tensions which could have been dissipated if responded to promptly, mount unnecessarily and the potential for explosion grows inevitably. Once trouble erupts, public officials are frequently unable to fashion an effective response; they lack adequate information about the nature of the trouble and its causes and they lack rapport with local leaders who might be able to influence the community. (Kerner, p. 285)

18. PLANNING OBJECTIVES FOR THE "POST-OPERATIONAL REVIEW" PHASE OF OPERATIONS

One important planning objective under this heading... (is to provide in an anti-disorder plan) for post-operational reviews of the adequacy of the plan itself as a practical guide to action. Additional objectives include: (1) the development of other methods for evaluating police experience in anti-disorder operations; (2) the establishment of channels for communicating these experiences outside the police agency; and (3) the establishment of policy for dealing with the community in the wake of anti-disorder operations. (NACCJSG, p. 135)

PLANNING OBJECTIVES FOR THE "TACTICAL RESPONSE" PHASE OF OPERATIONS

A multitude of planning objectives are included under this general heading. All can be broadly categorized, however, as either (1) organizational objectives, (2) policy objectives, or (3) technical objectives. Organizational objectives are those that concern the planning of the division of responsibility for tactical response (cf. "Mobilization Phase" objectives). Policy objectives are those that involve advance determinations of the general guiding principles that will apply to tactical responses. (NACCJSG, p. 135)

PLANNING OBJECTIVES FOR THE "MOBILIZATION" PHASE OF DISORDER OPERATIONS

Under this heading, planning objectives include determining (1) what departmental personnel should be summoned to the scenes of disorders of differing sizes and severities, (2) what command structure should apply in anti-disorder tactical operations, and (3) when and how outside assistance will be requested and employed. (NACCJSG, p. 135)

PLANNING OBJECTIVES FOR THE "DETECTION" PHASE

Under this operational heading, planning objectives include the development of methods to (1) assure the prompt reporting by individual officers of information indicating a practical likelihood of mass disorder; (2) provide for the prompt and systematic analysis of all information received, from any source, bearing on short-term potentials for disorder; and (3) guarantee the prompt reporting of disorders actually in progress. (NACCJSG, p. 135)

THE INGREDIENTS OF THE "PREVENTION" PHASE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING

The planning objectives for this stage of anti-disorder operations include the development of systems to (1) forestall the development of planned legal mass protests into disorder, (2) assure that police law enforcement operations do not tend unnecessarily to trigger disorders, and (3) provide an adequate information base for determining when and where spontaneous disorders are most likely to occur. (NACCJSG, p. 135)

THE FIVE PHASES WHICH CONTINGENCY PLANS MUST ADDRESS

Every comprehensive contingency plan for police handling of threatened and actual disorders must make clear rules for five stages or phases of operations: prevention, detection, mobilization, tactical response, and post-operational review. (NACCJSG, p. 135)

THE GOAL OF ANTI-DISORDER OPERATIONS AND PLANNING

The goal of anti-disorder operations is the restoration of order with minimum harm to nonparticipants and their property, to law enforcement officers, and to participants in this form of extraordinary violence. (NACCJSG, p. 135)

ESTABLISHING THEMATIC PRIORITIES TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING OF POLICE

The key to the type and level of the basic police response projected under the plan for a particular disorder should be the severity of the disorder in risk to life and property rather than its etiology or the motivation of the participants. Adherence to this approach will promote even-handedness in police response and will serve the correlative value of enhancing police impartiality on political issues and non-law-enforcement-related citizen grievances. (NACCJSG, p. 134)

THE RANGE OF MASS DISORDERS WHICH PLANNING MUST ANTICIPATE

Mass disorders may be characterized by spontaneous, unorganized, or disorganized patterns of individual criminal activity (such as random looting and arson); by a mix of activities combining planned illegal acts and their secondary spread effects (such as general looting incited by leaders drawing riot participants from the general population); or by apparently leaderless individual activities following a general, but widely understood, prearranged criminal plan (such as mass traffic obstruction). The political content of mass disorders, spontaneous and organized, varies widely, with some incidents involving only the unfocused violent expression of discontent (as expressed, for example, through generalized property destruction) and others involving relatively articulate symbolic statements of particular grievances (as expressed, for example, through disorderly protests against national foreign policy or through selective destruction of absentee-owned businesses in minority population centers). (NACCJSG, p. 134)

THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY GROUPS IN PRE-CRISIS CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Where many elements of a comprehensive anti-disorder plan are concerned, police can benefit significantly from public input. In particular, views from outside the police agency and from outside government should be sought about those parts of the plan that deal with general assumptions underlying operations and with police cooperation with non-law-enforcement agencies and private groups or persons in times of emergency....And if a plan calls for reliance on nonpolice groups or private community leaders to supply information, to quiet rumors, to troubleshoot, or to coordinate services to victims in disorder situations, it is essential that police relationships with these groups should be set and hardened during the planning process. (NACCJSG, p. 133)

CONTINGENCY PLANS, TO BE USEFUL, MUST BE PRACTICAL AND FITTED TO REALITY

Police agencies must plan in order to be able to perform simultaneously the mixed and even apparently contradictory disorder-related functions of safeguarding public order and preserving individual liberties.

PLANNING CAN PREPARE LINE OFFICERS FOR THE UNFAMILIAR TASKS OF DISORDERS AND CONTRIBUTE TO CONTROLLED INDIVIDUAL POLICE REACTIONS

The responsibility to plan for anti-disorder operations arises out of the special place of such operations in the range of police functions. Because disorders are by definition general threats to social stability, because anti-disorder operations involved the deployment of large numbers of officers in confrontation with assemblies of citizens, and because the primary focus of such operations is necessarily on the control of the incident itself rather than on the conduct of individuals, risks of unintentional but serious overreaction and overreaching in police-citizen transactions are particularly great. These risks are aggravated by the relative unfamiliarity of command-level and line officers with the tasks they must perform in disorder situations and by the tendency of line officers to react quickly and individualistically to violence when systematic discipline is not imposed upon them. (NACCJSG, p. 132)

WHY CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS JUSTIFIED: BOTTOM LINE IS OBLIGATION

All factors that appear to militate against detailed contingency planning for disorders, however, are outweighed by countervailing considerations. Every major retrospective review of police performance in civil disorders and riots has underlined the human and fiscal costs of inadequate planning. Every department or agency with a working planning capability can testify to real savings - incidents averted or contained, lives and property preserved, and even efficiencies achieved in the conduct of anti-disorder operations. The final and most weighty consideration, however, is the existence of a police responsibility to plan, independent of economic constraints and efficiency values. (NACCJSG, p. 132)

NEGATIVE FEATURE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING: WHY THERE IS RELUCTANCE

Each individual disorder has so many features peculiar to itself that the temptation to regard each incident as unique is strong. Negative experiences with the often literally useless products of inadequate planning processes tend to reinforce the view that planning itself is an ineffective tool. And adequate planning for disorders is expensive and time consuming. Moreover, because many real and potential disorders are linked to legitimate citizen protest and dissent, visible planning for the prevention and control of disorders may create political or public relations liabilities. Given the serious resource constraints under which even the best funded police agencies operate, the inevitable tendencies are to forego or postpone detailed contingency planning for disorders, to plan in sketchy or over-general terms, and to allow plans, once arrived at, to become stale and outdated with time. (NACCJSG, p. 132-133)

MINIMUM ELEMENTS OF A CONTINGENCY DISORDER PLAN:

- A. Methods of gathering and analyzing press reports, officer observations, and intelligence data for early warnings of times and places at which the risk of mass disorders is particularly acute;
- B. Methods of assessing hostility to police in advance of routine operations to prevent the development of mass disorder as a reaction to law enforcement actions in potentially volatile situation;
- C. Methods of preventing the development of mass disorder evolving out of planned nonviolent demonstrations;
- D. Methods of identifying and counteracting persons and groups intending to incite riots or violent demonstrations;
- E. Principles governing the creation and location of emergency field command posts from which police anti-disorder operations can be directed;
- F. Special command structures or authority relationships within the police agency in disorder emergencies;
- G. Authority relationships between the police agency and other law enforcement and non-law-enforcement agencies in disorder emergencies;

H. Roles of specialized units within the agency in disorder-control activities;

I. Rules on the use of lethal and nonlethal force to be followed in operations during disorders;

J. Techniques for checking private reprisals against participants in disorders and for limiting individual intervention by off-duty officers or police personnel from other jurisdictions;

K. Special rules governing the exercise of discretionary police powers of arrest and post-arrest release in disorder emergencies;

L. Sources of legal advice and counsel to departmental authorities during anti-disorder operations;

M. Methods of effecting valid arrests in volume, with provisions for prisoner transport and housing, subsequent identification of arrestees, and preservation of evidence;

N. Methods of preventing or checking the geographic spread or localized intensification of limited disorders already in progress;

O. Identification of departmental officials responsible for discussions or negotiations with disorder participants and nondisorderly community leaders and groups, along with principles governing the scope of such discussions or negotiations; and

P. Principles governing agency relations with print and electronic news media representatives during the current course of disorders. (NACCJSG, p. 130-131)

THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR DISORDERS

Every law enforcement agency that may be involved in preventing or reacting to disorders - regardless of its size and regardless of its day-to-day, nonemergency responsibilities - should adopt a contingency plan for disorder-related emergencies. The plan may be internally generated, devised in cooperation with other police agencies, or adapted from plans already in use elsewhere. (NACCJSG, p. 130)

19. LOGISTICAL PLANNING: LEAD TIME REQUIRES PRIOR PREPARATION

Commission studies disclosed serious deficiencies in police plans for logistical support. Many police departments simply assume that supplies and equipment are on hand and in the amounts required. The moment of need is too late to find out whether they are. (Kerner, p. 489)

20. WHO SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN PLANNING

The government agencies and private groups to be covered by the planning include: police departments (including police community relations units), fire departments, ambulance services, detention facilities, courts, legal

aid services, probation and parole services, city or county human relations commissions, public and private transportation systems, public and private utilities, public health departments, hospitals, sanitation departments, telephone companies, news media, municipal works, civil defense agencies, private guard services, youth service groups, service agencies, churches, social workers, community action agencies, poverty program workers, and others. (Kerner, p. 510)

21. HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL PLANNING FOR DISORDER

The necessary planning (for civil disorder) is both 'vertical' and 'horizontal' in nature. Horizontal planning involves coordination among government agencies and private groups within a city or community (intracity planning); among neighboring jurisdictions, including cities and counties (intercity planning); and among states (interstate planning). Vertical planning involves coordination at the state-local and federal-state levels. The primary responsibility for coordinated planning rests with state and local government. (Kerner, p. 509)

22. PRINCIPAL DEFECTS OF ESTABLISHED MOBILIZATION PLANS

A study conducted for the Commission by the International Association of Chiefs of Police of 30 major police departments found that all had some form of written mobilization plan. The quality of the plan varied greatly. Principal defects were: inadequate attention to implementing the plan; inadequate relief of reserve force after the plan has been activated; inadequate predesignated assembly areas or command posts in the various areas of the cities where trouble might be expected; inadequate logistical support of police and other law enforcement officers engaged in control activities; inadequate flexibility in planning to cope with disorders of varying natures and magnitudes; and unnecessarily complicated planning that deviated excessively from normal operations. (Kerner, p. 486)

23. THE PROBLEMS OF THE EMERGENCY CALL UP: LOGISTICAL DELAYS OF CALLING UP MEN

One police commissioner testifying before the Kerner Commission discussed difficulties in mobilizing additional men quickly:

"It cannot be emphasized too strongly that mobilization is inherently a time consuming operation, no matter how efficient. After a man is notified, he must dress and travel to his reporting point. Once he has checked in and has been equipped, he must be turned around and transported to a command post or an assembly point. There he must be briefed on the situation that exists, the location of the riot area, his duties, and other details he requires to make him effective once he is deployed. He must then be actually committed to the area of involvement. The time lapse in this entire procedure ranges from 1½ to 2 hours." (Kerner, p. 485)

24. NEED FOR MOBILIZATION PLANNING: HAVING ADEQUATE MANPOWER AVAILABLE

To find and mobilize enough policemen to handle a riot emergency is difficult, even in large cities. In one major city with a population of more than 1 million, an area of 140 square miles, and a police force of nearly 5,000 men, 192 patrolmen were on duty when a major civil disorder erupted. Of these, only 44 were in the riot area. (Kerner, p. 485)

25. THE NEED TO TEST PLANS AND PERIODICALLY UPDATE THEM

All plans should be tested in training exercises. At a minimum, exercises should include checks of the command structure and communications. Finally, provision should be made to update the plans periodically in order to take into account changed conditions, or to incorporate new control equipment and techniques into the procedures. (Kerner, p. 512)

26. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING THE POLICE GENERALIST FOR DISORDER DUTY

Basic police training units, whether offered to newly recruited officers or as inservice training, should stress skills and information required by nonspecialized personnel to participate effectively in departmental efforts against extraordinary violence. Curriculum units that should be offered are:

- a. Communication skills;
- b. Community relations;
- c. Departmental plans for emergency situations;
- d. Specialized departmental units and services;
- e. Civil disorder duty;
- f. Crisis information training.

(NACCJSG, p. 124)

27. POLICE SPECIALIZATION FOR DISORDER OPERATIONS

A variety of police specialities in dealing with disorders...can be readily identified. They include two that can be adequately developed only by the establishment of relatively large specialized units - special operations (or special weapons and tactics) and riot control - and a number of others that can be supplied by relatively small units - bomb detection and disposal, security liaison, negotiation, intelligence, and threat analysis. (NACCJSG, p. 149)

28. WHAT THE RIOT CONTROL OFFICER DOES DURING DISORDER: OPERATIONAL AND SUPERVISORY ROLES

In emergencies and nonroutine situations involving disorderly assemblies, the role of riot-control units is a complex one. During relatively small incidents, their members should be the only officers in direct contact with disorderly groups and should be charged with establishing barriers and lines, attempting to disperse crowds, or effecting arrests of crowd members. In larger mass disorders, or as the size of a disorder grows, specialists must delegate more and more of their less sensitive duties to non-specialist officers working under the directions of riot-control unit members. Thus,

the role of the riot-control unit may be partially practical and operational and partially supervisory. (NACCJSG, p. 153)

29. EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCE

Civil authorities should develop a clear, publicly declared policy on the calling out and employment of military forces in the event of an emergency situation involving civil disorder...The powers to call for such assistance should not be invoked unless it is clear that ordinary law enforcement personnel will be unable to cope with the situation developing and that there is a substantial likelihood of a serious breakdown of authority. Military forces ought not to be called simply in order to bring greater pressure to bear, by reason of their discretionary powers, on those who are resistant to the civil authority. Wherever possible, other means of supplementing the powers of the civil authority should be sought and utilized for this purpose. (NACCJSG, p. 56)

30. GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICE ROLE IN CIVIL DISORDERS

Although responsibilities for dealing with extraordinary incidents of actual or threatened violence are or should be widely distributed, many planning, prevention, response, control and follow-up functions will inevitably rest with State and local law enforcement agencies. Whether civil disorders, violent demonstrations, terrorism, or quasi-terrorism be involved, local police will ordinarily be the first to appreciate the existence of potential dangers, to be notified of concrete threats, and to intervene in actual incidents. Moreover, because police exercise special control over access to information and to incident scenes, their policies and action will largely determine the roles non-police agencies, groups, and individuals play in planning and operations against incidents of extraordinary violence. (NACCJSG, p. 123)

31. RIOT CONTROL REQUIRES ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGES FROM NORMAL TO MILITARY MODEL

Adding to the difficulty (of mobilizing manpower) is the fact that the standard training for police operations is basically different from that required for riot control. Traditional police training seeks to develop officers who can work independently and with little direct supervision. But the control of civil disturbances requires quite different performance-large numbers of disciplined personnel, comparable to soldiers in a military unit, organized and trained to work as members of a team under a highly unified command control system. No matter how well-trained and skilled a police officer may be, he will be relatively ineffectual to deal with civil disturbance so long as he functions as an individual. Thus, a major civil disturbance requires a police department to convert itself, suddenly, into a different organization with new operational procedures. (Kerner, p. 485)

32. THE LIMITS OF POLICE CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH NEW VIOLENCE: THE NEED FOR NEW UNIFIED STRATEGIES

The limits of what local police can do to cope with extraordinary violence must be reappraised; expectations of police capacity are often unrealistically high. If incidents of extraordinary violence and concern with it are on the increase, new multidisciplinary modes of coping with it and plans providing for non-police participation must be devised. Nevertheless, as multidisciplinary approaches are still largely theoretical and interagency or intergroup coordination is only intermittently effective, police responsibility for dealing with extraordinary violence remains paramount. (NACCJSG, p. 123)

33. POLICE CHIEF EXECUTIVE ON THE SCENE: AUTHORITY IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE

When the police chief executive (or another headquarters official superior in rank to the emergency field commander) chooses to be present at an incident scene, that official should make clear, upon arrival, the capacity in which he or she is present. If this is as an observer or adviser, the emergency commander should be so informed; if it is to assume operational command, this too should be explained. And when the police chief executive departs an incident scene after having assumed command, the transfer of command authority back to the emergency field commander (or to another official) should be explicitly noted. (NACCJSG, p. 159)

34. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND THE EMERGENCY COMMAND STRUCTURE

The role of the emergency commander does not imply policymaking responsibilities; rather, it is this official's responsibility to translate existing departmental policy - as expressed in planning documents - into practices. It is in the nature of extraordinary violence, however, that even the most scrupulous planning process cannot anticipate every policy issue that will arise in emergency operations in order to impose his or her own policy positions or those of higher civil authorities on the conduct of operations. Thus, the police chief executive must be prepared to intervene in emergency operations in order to impose his or her own policy positions or those of higher civil authorities on the conduct of operations. (NACCJSG, p. 159)

35. THE DESIGNATION OF CENTRAL NON-EMERGENCY AUTHORITY BY ROLE RATHER THAN PERSONALITY TO PERMIT CONTINUITY OVER TIME

Given the relatively high rates of promotion and turnover that apply to the command level of larger police agencies, choosing a non-emergency coordinator on the basis of special personal characteristics, rather than on the basis of fit between the task of coordination and the other tasks that are already part of the position he or she occupies, is to risk trading off high efficiency in the short run against failure of continuity over time. Equally important is the necessity of avoiding even the appearance of ad hoc style in making this delegation of authority if the non-emergency coordinator's role is to be performed effectively, it must be accepted as a legitimate continuing function by those specialized unit members and commanders who are required to work under the coordinator. (NACCJSG, p. 158)

36. THE ADVANTAGES OF A UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE

The clarity with which command responsibility is specified in advance and the degree to which the principle of unified command is followed in practice will determine the speed, quality, and effectiveness of response in emergencies involving mass disorders...The extent of a department's capability to centralize command responsibility in emergencies will depend, in turn, on the degree to which the department has given continuing centralized attention to the potential for extraordinary violence and to specific issues of departmental preparedness during non-emergency periods. (NACCJSG, p. 175)

37. THE IMPACT OF COMMAND STRUCTURE ON INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMUNICATION FLOW

An important goal of centralizing command responsibility for non-emergency police functions related to extraordinary violence is the improvement of intradepartmental coordination. An intelligence unit may, for example, be fully capable of concluding that an upcoming demonstration has potential to become a mass disorder; a riot-control unit may be fully capable of reviewing its personnel rosters and equipment inventories to determine its readiness to respond if required. But a center of command authority for both units is required if the two are to function in coordination and if the conclusions of one are to influence the preparations of the other. Critical to the effective performance of non-emergency functions, then, is a bureaucratic structure that can serve as an efficient medium for an intradepartmental exchange of information. (NACCJSG, p. 157)

38. THE IMPACT OF COMMAND ON CONTROLLED POLICE RESPONSES CONSONANT WITH BIG PICTURE POLICY

The critical goal in centralizing command responsibility for emergency police field operations involving extraordinary violence is control. Emergency decisionmaking involves a series of choices, some relatively easy and some extremely difficult, among different courses of actions. Often, sets of choices...may appear only on serious examination to be interrelated. And far too often the temptation to choose a course of action because of a desire for the results that would flow from success without adequate consideration of the consequences of a failure is great.. Finally, because one natural response to violence is the use of force, the minute-to-minute tactical choices that response to extraordinary violence demands may have the most serious of negative consequences even if the tactic chosen should succeed. Thus, there is little place in such field operations for decision-making on the initiative of individual line officers or unit commanders; control requires centralization. (NACCJSG, p. 156)

39. THE IMPACT OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY ON POLICE RESPONSE

The clarity with which command responsibility is specified in advance and the degree to which the principle of unified command is followed in practice will determine the speed, quality, and effectiveness of police response in emergencies involving mass disorders... The extent of a department's capability to centralize command responsibility in emergencies will depend, in turn, on the degree to which the department has given continuing centralized attention to the potential for extraordinary violence and to

specific issues of departmental preparedness during non-emergency periods. (NACCJSG, p. 157)

40. THE OBJECTIVES OF A TACTICAL RESPONSE TO DISORDER

When an illegal mass disorder with one or more points of geographical focus presents itself, the objectives of a tactical response are clear:

- a. Protecting persons - including non-participants and participants alike - and property at risk;
- b. Dispersing disorderly or threatening crowds in order to eliminate the immediate risks of continued escalation and further violence; and
- c. Arresting individual law violators with a view to their subsequent prosecution and penalization. (NACCJSG, p. 165)

41. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: WHO RUNS THE SHOW?

The situation in which a panel of representatives of separate law enforcement and non-law enforcement agencies is the smallest practical command unit that can direct emergency operations in an incident of extraordinary violence should be avoided. When it exists, control over the actions of participating law enforcement personnel will generally be weakened, and the important value of speed in decisionmaking will often be sacrificed to the necessity of obtaining consensus. It is a function of comprehensive, multi-agency planning to avoid such situations, by specifying through advance agreement which agency will have practical responsibility for the management of incidents that are technically under multi-agency jurisdiction.... In such cases, the planning process should include the advance designation of one of the agencies with coordinate responsibility as the agency that will take overall charge of operations in the event of such incidents. (NACCJSG, p. 160)

42. ANTICIPATING NATIONAL GUARD REQUESTS: LEAD TIME REQUIRES PLANNING

Outside forces will need a relatively long lead time before response. A survey of National Guard capabilities, for example, shows that an average of four to six hours is required from the time of notification to the time of arrival of an effective complement of men.

Local authorities must not wait until the critical moment to alert a neighboring jurisdiction, the state police, or the National Guard. Outside control forces will then be unable to mobilize and respond on time. All agencies that may be asked to control a civil disturbance must be alerted at an early stage and kept informed. (Kerner, p. 488-489)

43. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

If called upon to act in a situation involving disorder...each agency should be aware of its response capabilities and the need to adapt these to an overall policy laid down by the supreme executive authority. The actual planning process should begin at the agency level, subject to general policy directives, rather than being imposed on the agencies from above.

Detailed contingency planning should be undertaken by the agencies directly engaged in responding to disorder, acts of terrorism, and other extraordinary acts of violence. This preference poses the need for the development of an overall, harmonious policy, laying down broad guidelines, for example, on interagency cooperation; chains of command; response priorities; use of force; negotiations; and other general, logistical matters. (NACCJSG, p. 47)

THE ADVANTAGES OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACTS BETWEEN POLICE AGENCIES

Mutual assistance pacts have these advantages over obtaining help from the state: help may arrive much more rapidly; repeated use of state police or National Guard forces may reduce or eliminate their 'psychological' value; police officers from nearby communities may be more effective because they are familiar with local geographic and sociological patterns; agreements may lead to increased cooperation and coordination of activities in other fields; and the additional funds, personnel, and equipment for riot control can be utilized by local police departments in both emergency and ordinary operations, rather than diverting these resources to state forces established solely or primarily for the control of disorder. (Kerner, p. 514)

DISADVANTAGES OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACTS

There are also certain disadvantages in mutual assistance agreements; riot control requires unit operations much like those used by the military, not the individual approach characteristic of normal police work; police-community relations may be so bad in an area that only outsiders, not neighbors, can cool the situation, units may have an important psychological effect on rioters and may be more effective because of their training; police departments in adjoining communities may differ widely in quality of personnel, and the lower quality departments tend to dilute the effectiveness of the better ones; in times of emergency, a police department in a neighboring city not experiencing a disorder may be reluctant to release its forces because of the possibility that trouble may spread. (Kerner, p. 514)

44. THE INAPPROPRIATE WEAPONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

The Guard is armed and equipped by federal funds in order to fulfill its federal role as a combat force. Experiences of this last summer (1967) reveal that much of this equipment is inappropriate for dealing with civil disorders in American cities. The Guard and other military units lack an adequate 'middle ground' between a display of force and the use of lethal or indiscriminate force. (Kerner, p. 502)

THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF BLACKS IN THE GUARD

Evidence from Detroit indicates that active Army troops were more effective than National Guard units in controlling the disorder. According to many observers, the higher percentage of Negroes in the active Army was a significant contributing factor. (Kerner, p. 499)

45. NEGATIVE EVALUATION OF STATE POLICE CAPABILITY TO ASSIST LOCAL RIOT DOL.

"... (D) despite real variations, most state police forces lack the necessary manpower, experience, and training to assist local police effectively in controlling civil disorders. In the great majority of states, only the National Guard can furnish effective assistance." (Kerner, p. 497)

APPENDIX

On June 27, 1980, the Dade County Department of Public Safety completed its After Action Report on the Civil Disturbance Emergency Mobilization. The Report is an overview of significant events, listed in chronological order, of the Dade County Disorder from the period of its reported inception, May 17, 1980 until the lifting of the Emergency Mobilization on May 26, 1980.

The Report contains 23 appendices which document various statements made in the Report. Due to space limitations in our study, these appendices and footnote references have been eliminated in the reprint of the Report which is contained in the remainder of this section. Portions of this Report are reprinted below with the permission of the Dade County Department of Public Safety; further information may be obtained from the author of the Report, Captain Bera Pitts, Central Region Commander, Dade County Department of Public Safety.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: May 1980

Consistent with available manpower on Saturday May 17, 1980 beginning at 2:00 p.m., Central District uniformed supervisory personnel deployed seven patrol units to the high crime core area. All other units were assigned to mandatory functions such as the Seaport, Key Biscayne and the Public Safety Department Headquarters Building.

Subsequent to the deployment of the 2:00 p.m. Squad, the officers attended roll call activities and discussed routine operational matters. At this point nothing out of the ordinary was noted or reported. It was common knowledge however, that the McDuffie trial had gone to the jury and it was generally conceded that some, if not all, of the accused officers would be found guilty. No concern had surfaced in the Department or in the Central District as to what the public outcry would be if the officers were acquitted.

Associated Press (AP) issued the following news statement at 2:42 p.m. to all South Florida media:

"Tampa, Fla. AP Four white expolicemen were acquitted Saturday on charges that they beat to death a black Miami insurance man, then tried to make his death look like an accident.

"An all-white male jury deliberated two hours and 40 minutes before announcing its verdict."

At approximately 3:00 p.m. several local news stations released the contents of the bulletin to the general public in the form of a brief statement. At 3:29 p.m., United Press International (UPI) issued the following complete statement:

"Tampa, Fla. (UPI) - Six white jurors took only two hours and 40 minutes - minus a lunch break - Saturday to find four white former Dade County police officers innocent of all charges in the alleged beating death of a black insurance executive.

"Defendant Alex Marrero who faced the most serious charge (second degree murder), broke into tears when the verdict was read. He sobbed loudly, leaning against the courtroom wall, for minutes.

"So did Eula Bella McDuffie, mother of Arthur McDuffie, 33 who died four days after the alleged beatings.

"My son, my son she moaned. They're guilty, they're guilty... there's a God up there that will take of this." She was led sobbing from the courtroom, a few steps behind McDuffie's weeping former wife, Frederica, who had planned to remarry her exhusband February 7th.

"McDuffie died four days and 11 hours (4 days, 11 hours) after suffering massive head injuries at the end of a high-speed motorcycle chase through Dade County December 17th. He never regained consciousness.

"Police first reported that he was injured in a motorcycle accident. The Medical Examiner later said the injuries were made by heavy flashlights and night sticks of police who chased him. Five officers were charged. One Ed DelToro, charged with being an accessory after the fact was freed on a directed verdict of acquittal midway through the sevenweek trial.

"The trial was moved to Tampa because of intense publicity in Miami and high emotions aroused by the incident in the black community... objected to having the trial here, saying it could stir up equal problems. The courthouse was virtually surrounded by police and Hillsborough County Sheriff's cars Saturday.

"The jury sat passively during the 13 minutes it took to read their verdicts on the multiple counts against each defendant. But though Dade County Circuit Judge Lenore Nesbitt admonished the courtroom that she would tolerate no loud reactions, weeping and screams broke out.

"Defendant Michael Watts heard his verdict first, sitting at the Defense Table with his chin on his hand. He showed no emotion as he was pronounced innocent of two counts of Manslaughter and one of Aggravated Battery.

"Then he closed his eyes, smiled slightly, turned and shook hands with his attorney, Phil Carlton.

"Marrero, charged with Second Degree Murder, on one count of Manslaughter and one count of Tampering with the Evidence, broke into tears after his last verdict was read. He sat sobbing loudly.

"Ira Diggs sat with his head bowed as he heard innocent verdicts on all five counts against him--two Manslaughter charges, one of Aggravated Battery and one of Tampering with Evidence, one of being an Accessory after the Fact. The he grasped hands with Marrero.

"By the time the verdicts for Herbert Evans Jr. were read, the decision was obvious. Evans, who faced the least serious charges of the four, Tampering and being an Accessory after the Fact, showed little reaction.

"He said later that he was in "a total emotional state" during the reading of the verdicts."

The contents of this statement were transmitted by several local radio and television stations at this time.

Upon reporting for duty at 4:00 P.M., all Area II police personnel were aware of the acquittal and discussed it freely at roll call. No action was initiated on a District level to develop contingency plans in the event of a reactionary disorder. Each officer was given his field assignment and released to duty.

Between the 4:00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M. roll calls the afternoon Platoon Commander, became increasingly uneasy and apprehensive based on the types of calls being dispatched to his field units. At approximately 4:30 P.M. Lieutenant McGee met with Director Jones at Station # 2 and discussed operational matters. No decipherable trend could be identified at the time of this meeting. Captain Plager (onduty Operations Captain) contacted Lieutenant McGee in this time period and made arrangements for the Northwest District's Special Response Team to be deployed as backup units for the Central District if the environmental conditions dictated.

Area III officers reported for duty at 6:00 P.M. and were briefed by onduty supervisors to the effect that the general core area clientele were inflamed and violent over the McDuffie trial. Several dangerous situations involving rocks and bottles being thrown had been reported. All on-going officers were instructed to utilize riot equipment during this tour of duty.

At 6:05 P.M., Lieutenant R. Elliott, Detective Bureau Shift Commander, contacted Captain Plager concerning a planned rally by blacks at the Justice Building at 8:00 P.M. to protest the McDuffie trial. The potential outcome of this rally was discussed and concluded to be a dangerous situation. Captain Plager advised the City of Miami Police Department of the rally. The City dispatched fifteen officers to the Justice Building complex for security. Captain Plager also notified Frank Morrow, Dade County General Services Administrator, who advised he would increase security at the Justice Building.

As the evening hours progressed it became increasingly apparent to the Department's management that stress within the black communities throughout Dade County was at an extremely volatile level. Chief Bowling responded to Station # 2 at 7:00 P.M. and initiated liaison with the City of Miami Police Department.

At 7:34 P.M. the Public Safety Department established a Command Post at Station #2 for the purpose of coordinating all police activities. At this time the situation in the Central core area had become extremely grave. Large groups of blacks were on the street throwing rocks and bottles at whites. Traffic had to be diverted from the area of N.W. 22 Avenue and 62nd Street.

The situation at the Justice Building was stable at 8:00 P.M. Traffic flow in and about the complex however, was impassable due to heavy congestion.

At 8:11 P.M. the first riot related casualties were reported to the Command Post by the Miami Police Department. Two whites were shot at N.W. 12th Avenue and 65th Street.

Violent crowd conditions in the core area of Central degenerated into widespread riotous conduct. By 8:27 P.M. Chief Bowlin activated Operational Phase I of the Mobilization and Emergency Operations Plan. Field units were reporting gunfire from snipers.

Officer B. Lewis requested emergency backup units to the Public Safety Department Headquarters Building at 8:32 P.M. to repel a large group of blacks that were attempting to break through the entrance doors. The City of Miami was advised and responded along with units from the Midwest District. Lieutenant Elliot requested assistance from the Jail and directed all on-duty Detectives to secure the building.

The overall conditions at 8:45 P.M. throughout certain sections of Dade County had degenerated to the point that the initiative had passed from police control to that of the uncontrollable lawless element. This prompted Chief Bowlin to upgrade the Mobilization Plan to Phase III.

The City of Miami advised that a large crowd of blacks were breaking into the Justice Building at 9:04 P.M. Several vehicles in the area were on fire and the situation was out of control. The State Building was under attack and attempts were being made to burn both structures. Lieutenant Elliot advised that some control had been regained in front of the Public Safety Department Headquarters Building but all other areas were beyond control.

County Manager Merrett Stierheim arrived at the Command Post at 9:29 P.M. and established contact with the Governor concerning the National Guard.

Director Jones arrived at the Command Post at 9:22 P.M. and activated Phase IV of the Mobilization Plan. The situation at this time was completely out of control with field units reporting heavy gunfire and several areas being inaccessible due to hostile crowds. All main avenues into the Riot area were blocked and traffic diverted. The conditions at the Justice Building complex were severe and out of control. The State Building was reported on fire at this time. Director Jones contacted the Governor at 9:44 P.M. and requested National Guard assistance.

Consistent with the foregoing events uniformed elements from Hialeah, Miami Shores and El Portal Police Departments were deployed to divert traffic from the riot area in Central District. All available Public Safety Department field units from other districts were assigned duty at the Justice Building complex or to the Central District perimeter.

Information was received by the Command Post at 9:25 P.M. that National Guard liaison personnel had been dispatched. They arrived in the riot area at 10:57 P.M. and started contingency planning for Guard deployment.

Between 10:00 P.M. and midnight, the general policing function taken by the Department was one of containment and restriction of traffic movement. Manpower was slowly building from 13 units at 6:00 P.M. to an estimated 60-70 by midnight. The degree of violence experienced by field units was such that calls for service had to go unanswered. Three bodies were found mutilated and calls for police services received by the Communications Bureau were numbering into the hundreds. The streets in some areas were littered with burned vehicles and looted materials. Building arson was common with the Fire units unable to respond.

By 12:27 A.M. Sunday May 18, 1980 (2 and a half hours after requested), National Guard elements began taking positions on the perimeter. At this time all field activities were conducted under combat conditions with two additional deaths reported.

At 3:30 A.M. other parts of Dade County were experiencing heavy property damage from arson and looters. The Northwest District reported a number of structural fires and assaults. Also to a lesser degree, the same was occurring in the South District.

At 5:08 A.M. the National Guard was continuing to take positions on the perimeter. Other state enforcement personnel were being deployed as they arrived in the area.

Between 6:00 A.M. and 7:00 A.M. the Command Post did a superficial assessment of the death and destruction that had occurred in the first twelve hours of the county-wide disorder. There had been nine major fires with dozens of smaller blazes. Many vehicles had been burned, including two belonging to the City of Miami. Heavy damage was done to the Justice Building, State Building and to the Public Safety Department. The situation at these three locations had been brought under control at this time. Looting was widespread and still increasing. Ten deaths had been reported at this time; three in the City of Miami and the remaining seven in the unincorporated area of Dade County. A total of 126 arrests were made, most of which were for looting. Property damage was already estimated to be in the millions of dollars.

Alpha Shift relieved on-duty Command personnel at 7:00 A.M. Sunday May 18, 1980. Mobilization of manpower was continuing at an acceptable rate with assignment being made to the perimeter, which consisted of N.W. 41 Street on the South, I-95 on the East, N.W. 37 Avenue on the West and N.W. 103 Street on the North. Some confusion existed as to the processing of arrested persons, food and the deployment of out-of-county police officers. These problems were resolved during the A.M. hours.

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Disorder related activity during this twelve hour period consisted of random business fires which escalated during the day. The number of fires exceeded fifty. Looting incidents increased significantly and went unabated because officers were unable to respond. Most reported assaults involved attacks on whites by blacks. One death was reported with forty persons arrested.

A command decision was made to impose a curfew and restrict the sale of weapons, alcohol and gasoline by proclamation of the Director.

The Governor was asked by telephone to provide additional National Guard personnel and for approval to deploy such personnel with fire fighting apparatus in order to bring fires under control. Fire fighters were not responding to fires because of the safety factor.

There were several discussions throughout the day by telephone with the Governor and his staff (Gary Smith, Commissioner Jim York and others) reference the situation and need for Guard personnel to escort fire fighting equipment. Also, the Governor was asked for authority to move the Guard off the perimeter of the restricted area and into the restricted area at critical intersections and for security assignments at specific locations. The situation was still critical with many fires, sporadic sniper fire and looting by large crowds.

The Governor was briefed late in the evening. He advised that earlier requests would be granted but National Guard personnel would not be used on fire trucks for fire escort because he did not want Guard confrontations with subjects which might escalate the situation. Also all Guard assignments were to be with law enforcement personnel. There were to be no individual Guard assignments without police present.

Throughout the day briefings were held with the County Manager and his staff who remained at the Command Post throughout all critical periods. In addition, the Florida Highway Patrol, Marine Patrol and Fish and Game Commission representatives arrived and began deployment of additional uniformed personnel. Briefings were held with the Miami Police Department representatives.

Telephone conferences were held with Sheriff Butterworth of Broward County. He was working with police officials in Broward County in an effort to provide 200 law enforcement officers as soon as possible. This assistance was discussed with the Governor during the day. These personnel were to arrive in the morning of May 19, 1980. Major Ken Collins of the Broward Sheriff's Office was assigned to coordinate.

During the day there were discussions with Chief Judge Cowart and Judge Jorgenson along with Assistant Director, Patrick C. Gallagher, Corrections and Rehabilitation Department, regarding the detention of juveniles and processing arrests. Also discussed was the security for the Justice Building.

As the time approached 7:00 P.M., total personnel strength was at the following levels:

Dade County: 155

National Guard: 305

State Agencies: 127

Broward County: 68

Bravo Shift reported to duty at 7:00 P.M. and deployed 750 officers as follows:

Florida Highway Patrol, Florida Marine
Patrol and Florida Fresh Water
Fish and Game Commission: 140

Florida National Guard: 327

Broward Sheriff's Office: 60

Public Safety Department: 160

Municipalities: 63

A curfew was imposed between 8:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. to restrict the movement of people in the disorder areas. The curfew was enforced with the arrests of 371 persons by all agencies. Gunfire and snipers were reported throughout the shift. Arson continued to occur with twelve major fires. Four deaths were reported along with many assaults. Activity slowed around 3:00 A.M. Monday, May 19, 1980 and a survey of the disorder areas indicated the curfew was allowing the police to regain control.

Alpha Shift, May 19, 1980, 7:00 A.M. - 7:00 P.M.

All oncoming Command Post personnel were briefed concerning the past twelve hours. As of this time the perimeter extended along N.W. 103 Street on the North, N.W. 7th Avenue on the East, N.W. 36th Street on the South and N.W. 37th Avenue on the West. Manpower deployed during this shift was as follows:

Dade County Public Safety Department: 155

National Guard: 305

State Agencies: 127

Broward County: 68

Administratively, the personnel assignment process became stable with fewer problems being encountered. Interaction between agencies was progressing well. All areas of the county were under police control with the situation becoming stabilized. Throughout the day looting continued to persist with more than 30 separate incidents reported. A total of 55 persons were arrested with the majority of cases involving theft and burglary. More than 17 separate incidents

of fire, predominantly of businesses and vehicles, were reported. Fire Rescue continued to respond only when accompanied by escorts.

At 12:30 P.M. a crowd of approximately 800 persons gathered at N.W. 62nd Street and 10th Avenue and planned to march to the Caleb Center, 5400 N.W. 22nd Avenue, then to the Justice Building. The crowd was diverted to Manor Park, 1300 N.W. 50th Street, where Andrew Young was expected to address it. At 2:30 P.M., when Mr. Young failed to appear, the crowd dispersed without incident.

Departmental management throughout the day interacted with various governmental agencies. Commissioner York, Mr. Gary Smith, and other representatives of the Governor arrived the previous evening or early that morning and conferred with the Director, County Manager, and his staff. During the day discussions were held regarding deployment of National Guard personnel. Mr. Smith expressed concern about the use of National Guard personnel and felt that the Governor would want to know specific uses to which the Guard was being put.

A full meeting was called at 2:30 P.M. to discuss Guard assignments. Public Safety Department Command Staff, Commanders of state law enforcement agencies, Miami Police Department representatives, General Beem and his staff, the Governor's representatives, and others were present. The National Guard was asked for an exact count of the deployable manpower by 5:00 P.M. The Command Staff of the Public Safety Department and Miami Police Department representatives were asked for a recapitulation of specific assignments to which the National Guard would be deployed, also by 5:00 P.M.

During the meeting the deployment of Florida Highway Patrol, Marine Patrol and Fish and Game personnel was clearly spelled out to everyone's satisfaction.

At 5:00 P.M. the same group met again. At this time information was received from General Beem and his staff that by the following day (May 20, 1980) there would be approximately 3,000 National Guard personnel in the area. Of this, 1,500 would be deployable on 12 hour shifts. There was a semantic problem regarding how many troops could actually be placed on the street because National Guard figures included support personnel (cooks, drivers, maintenance people and other specialized assignments). During this meeting the Public Safety Department indicated a need for 1,000 troops on 12 hour shifts and Miami Police Department asked for 500. General Beem advised us that that he had three Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), and three helicopters available at Opa Locka for deployment as needed. It was requested that this equipment remain in reserve and not be brought into the restricted area unless specifically requested.

Bravo Shift, May 19, 1980, 7:00 P.M. - May 20, 1980, 7:00 A.M.

The overall situation allowed active patrol of the riot area which was inclusive of N.W. 95th Street to N.W. 46th Street and N.W. 17th Avenue to N.W. 27th Avenue, with all intersections covered and checkpoints manned on the perimeter.

Total number of personnel deployed during this Bravo Shift were:

Florida Highway Patrol, Florida Marine
Patrol and Florida Fresh Water Fish
and Game Commission: 197

Florida National Guard: 149

Broward Sheriff's Office: 62

Public Safety Department: 250

Overnight nine fires were reported and twelve incidents involving gunfire were noted. At the conclusion of this twelve hour period it was reported that sixteen deaths resulted from the countywide disorder.

Alpha Shift, May 20, 1980, 7:00 A.M. - 7:00 P.M.

The affected area of the Emergency Mobilization was comprised of N.W. 103rd Street (North), N.W. 7th Avenue (East), State Road #112 (South), and N.W. 37th Avenue (West). Active patrol existed along with National Guard posts within the affected area.

Personnel were deployed in the following numbers:

Public Safety Department: 171

Florida Highway Patrol: 81

Florida Marine Patrol: 16

Florida Fresh Water Fish
and Game Commission: 30

National Guard: 432

All perimeter checkpoints were opened to normal traffic. The riot area was in a state of calm. All Broward County and Municipal police officers were released and the curfew changed to 10:00 P.M. - 6:00 A.M. Criminal activity was restricted to minor looting and a few assaults with 14 arrests being made. There were 1,015 minor fires reported but most proved unfounded. The National Guard was deployed to protect Ranco Oil, J&J Texaco and McKessen Liquors at 6:00 P.M. Approximately 3,900 National Guard personnel were mobilized in the area and briefings continued with all agencies.

The Mayor, County Manager and members of the County Commission (Shack, Oliver, Ruvin and Phillips) toured the area and received a briefing at the Command Post. Congressman Fascell and Lehman toured the area and received a briefing from the staff.

The County Commission ratified Sheriff Jones' proclamation and extended the curfew and restrictions to 12:00 Noon, Friday May 23, 1980 unless modified by the Sheriff. Curfew times were changed to 10:00 P.M. - 6:00 A.M. instead of 8:00 P.M. - 6:00 A.M.

During the day, bus and waste services to the area were restored. Repairs and maintenance to public utilities were facilitated. Attorney General Civiletti conferred by telephone with Sheriff Jones.

Bravo Shift, May 20, 1980, 7:00 P.M. - May 21, 1980, 7:00 A.M.

The affected area of the Emergency Mobilization was comprised of N.W. 103rd Street (North), N.W. 7th Avenue (East), State Road #112 (South), and N.W. 37th Avenue (West). Active patrol existed along with National Guard Posts within the affected area.

Deployment of personnel was as follows:

Public Safety Department: 202
Florida Highway Patrol: 45
Florida Marine Patrol: 24
Florida Fresh Water Fish
and Game Commission: 30
National Guard: 546

The amount of violence and property damage continued at a low level. One civilian car was burned and gunfire was reported throughout the shift. Eighteen persons were arrested for curfew violations.

Alpha Shift, May 21, 1980, 7:00 A.M. - 7:00 P.M.

All perimeter locations were removed at 12:40 P.M. and units returned to patrol activities.

The Governor's Executive Order 8047 granting board powers to Sheriff Jones was received.

After full consultation with the staff, law enforcement agencies and National Guard personnel, the Sheriff decided to lift the curfew and restrictions and to release some National Guard personnel. All Guard personnel were to be relieved of perimeter, intersection and fire security assignments but were to retain strategic posts at depots. A substantial number of Guard personnel (500-1,000) were to remain available in the area on standby for thirty minute call out potential.

The Fish and Game Commission officers were relieved and released. Florida Highway Patrol and Marine Patrol personnel remained on duty in patrol and standby status. Agreement was received from Major Hicks and Captain Carmody, Florida Highway Patrol, to retain State Troopers through Monday, May 26, 1980 at 7:00 P.M.

The decision was made to keep the Police Division on Alpha/Bravo shifts throughout the County until 7:00 P.M., May 26, 1980. Other divisions were to return to normal assignments except as designated by division chiefs. The

Director's Office units were to remain on Alpha/Bravo shifts until further notice.

At 2:00 P.M., Director Jones and Chief Harms held a press conference regarding lifting of the curfew and restrictions. The situation in the community remained stable. During the period that restrictions were in effect, great pressure was exerted by restaurants and hotels to lift restrictions on the sale of alcohol in areas not within the curfew boundaries. These were rejected for obvious reasons.

Liaison was maintained with the School Board and Superintendent on a day-to-day basis. The recommendation of law enforcement agencies during this shift was to reopen schools. Mr. Grassie, City Manager; the County Manager; some City Commissioners and the School Superintendent asked for National Guard personnel presence at the schools. This was rejected by the Sheriff, National Guard and law enforcement officials, who instead pledged prompt response to any school before problems developed. Mr. J. Wheeler, Chief of Security for the school system, agreed to supply a list of schools where problems might develop.

Judge Coward called and said he was tolling the speedy trial rule for the duration of the emergency. He requested a copy of any statement, order or notice declaring that the emergency had ended. He was told this request would be honored and was thanked for all the cooperation received from the judicial system.

The decision was made at the Command Post to reduce Command Officer presence to a Major and District Commander on each Shift. The Director, Assistant Directors and Chiefs were to remain on standby alert.

Schools were opened to students and no unusual problems occurred throughout the day.

Personnel deployed during the shift consisted of:

Public Safety Department: 161
Florida Highway Patrol: 112
Florida Marine Patrol: 32
Broward Sheriff Deputies (Relieved): 0
National Guard (Relieved): 432
National Guard (Still Posted): 45

The total number of persons arrested during this twelve hour period was 14.

Bravo Shift, May 21, 1980, 7:00 P.M. - May 22, 1980, 7:00 A.M.

All acts of civil disorder continued to decrease. Units of the Florida Highway Patrol and the National Guard remained in the patrol to augment Public Safety Department Units.

The National Guard complement was reduced to 16 Guardsmen posted at 4 locations in the affected area. A manpower reserve of 2,900 Guardsmen remained available with approximately 1,450 available for assignment within two hours of callout.

Southern Bell was advised of Black Panther members planning to take over three locations on Thursday May 22, 1980. The locations were identified as:

- A. N.W. 167 Street & 20 Avenue
- B. N.W. 183 Street & 27 Avenue
- C. 215 North Miami Avenue

Communications contacted the Central District Command Post at 12:15 A.M. advising they had received information from Mr. Wes of WCKT, Channel 7 indicating that a confidential informant had advised him of a planned "hit" on the families of former P.S.D. Officers Marrero and Meier in Miami Springs. Miami Springs reported that the families had already been placed under protective surveillance.

At 1:20 A.M. the Central District Command Post received a report that a P.S.D. vehicle had been struck by gunfire at N.W. 163 Street & 32nd Avenue. No officers were reported injured, but the incident was followed by the gathering of a large crowd.

The total number of persons arrested by all police agencies to date, related to the disorder, was placed at 1,335. Any arrest activities that were occurring at this time were of a routine nature involving looting and minor assaults.

Alpha Shift, May 22, 1980, 7:00 A.M. - 7:00 P.M.

The affected area remained stable for this twelve hour period with only minor incidents of violence and looting reported. Actions by all governmental agencies began to focus on returning the area to normal. A total of 282 personnel were deployed. Ten persons were arrested on minor charges.

A general concern as to the Department's response when dealing with riotous conditions surfaced in the Officers' rank. This concern was prompted by a news article in which the County Manager was supportive of the issue of amnesty for all riot related arrests.

Chief Bowlin restated the Department's position in accordance with Section 1.555 of the Department Manual. The County Manager issued a teletype to all Public Safety Department employees qualifying his remarks on amnesty. This action had little effect on the officers who were reflecting a strong sense of alienation. This problem was further compounded by the actions of the City of Miami Police Department when five of their officers were relieved of duty pending the outcome of a vandalism investigation.

As this shift progressed it appeared that the police community was becoming extremely enflamed and polarized over these issues and a threat of a police walkout began to circulate.

At 3:30 P.M. the Governor's representative contacted the Staff Command personnel to make arrangements for the Governor to tour the riot area at 5:30 P.M. this date. After security planning was complete, the Governor did tour the area and then arrived at the Command Post at 6:55 P.M. where he met with State and local officials and was briefed on all aspects of the riot situation. The Governor was to attend a local black civic meeting but changed his plans upon advice of management personnel.

Employee morale was low, reflecting a strong sense of boredom with the patrol function and manifested heated discontent with the Department Administration. Reports were received that the City of Miami police officers and possibly some Public Safety officers might be contemplating a work stoppage as a result of the amnesty question and the pending action against the city Officers.

Reports were received that ex-officer M. Watts, a defendant in that McDuffie case, had attempted suicide. He was out of danger at this time.

Alpha Shift, May 23, 1980, 7:00 A.M. - 7:00 P.M.

The situation in the mobilization area remained stable this twelve hour period. There existed, however, a strong possibility of a police walkout. Major Gunn of the City of Miami Police Department was contacted for a status report on his officers. He reflected grave concern and requested to know how many police personnel the Public Safety Department could supply in the event the city officers walked out. Contingency plans were developed to deploy the Florida Highway Patrol and the National Guard to the city upon request. This action was prompted by the possibility that many Public Safety Department officers would also walk out in support of the city officers.

Action was initiated by the Public Safety Department managers to keep abreast of the labor situation and to respond to the issues involved. Chief Bowlin, in an attempt to relieve the situation, met with a number of field units and discussed the significance of the walkout.

Reports were received that a police demonstration was planned in front of the Miami Police Department at 1:00 P.M. At issue were the suspended city officers and action to recall the Mayor for a statement he made about the Police. Reports were received by the city that snipers would be at the demonstration. They requested security assistance from the Command Post. The Florida Highway Patrol responded at noon with an eighteen man Special Response Team.

Due to the grave circumstance that a police walkout would present to the County, all standby units were brought to full alert. Command personnel from the National Guard and the Florida Highway Patrol returned to the Command Post to await the outcome of the demonstration. To further intensify this problem the city was receiving intelligence information that a black insurrection would occur in the event of a walkout.

At 2:00 P.M., a meeting was convened in which representatives from all public agencies involved in the disorder attended. Major Gunn discussed the results of the 1:00 P.M. demonstration. The city made concessions to the officers which appeared to defuse the walkout question. Concern was raised as to a possible black backlash. Information was presented that a large scale insurrection would break out throughout Dade County after dark. Of further

concern was the three day Memorial weekend at hand. This fact forced a decision to maintain mobilization status until Tuesday May 27, 1980 at 7:00 A.M.

At approximately 4:00 P.M., Director Jones, reacting to employee unrest, met with a number of officers to discuss their concerns. The results of this meeting were reported to the County Manager at 5:30 P.M.

Bravo Shift, May 23, 1980, 7:00 P.M. - May 24, 1980 7:00 A.M.

A state of relative quiet with few arrests existed during this twelve hour shift.

Unconfirmed intelligence continued to reach the Central District Command Post, providing some basis for speculation that the disturbance was not terminated. These reports included the alleged making of fire bombs in the Larchmont Gardens area, the local selling of gas in containers and the possible theft of dynamite from the Hialeah area. Despite these unverified reports, actual incidents were minimal and law enforcement authorities were continuing active patrol throughout the area.

Alpha Shift, May 26, 1980, 7:00 A.M. - 7:00 P.M.

During the ninth day of Emergency Mobilization Operations, Central and Midwest Units continued to provide patrol coverage within the District.

Activity within the district continued to be minimal with no significant incidents to report. Arrangements had been made to supplement Central District Uniformed Patrol when Command Post operations ceased at 7:00 A.M., May 27, 1980.

All National Guard Posts had been eliminated and the remaining one company of Guardsmen, then on standby, was scheduled to clear at 7:00 A.M., May 27, 1980. Normal activity for the Public Safety Department was to resume with the termination of the Command Post.

Chief Bowlin approved the immediate transfer of two sergeants and twenty-one officers from Central and South Safe Streets units to Central District, effective 7:00 A.M., May 27, 1980. He also approved the reassignment of three Central Vice/Narcotics/Intelligence personnel.

Bravo Shift, May 26, 1980, 7:00 P.M. - May 26, 1980, 10:00 P.M.

The Command Post was secured at 10:00 P.M. with field units assuming normal operations. Phase III of the Emergency Mobilization Operation was terminated without incident. Central District manpower had been increased by twenty officers and two sergeants effective May 27, 1980, resulting in all two man patrol to address any further recurrences of civil violence.

THE POLICE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT

The Police Technical Assistance Project (PTAP) is supported by the Enforcement Division of the Office of Criminal Justice Programs, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice. Its purposes are:

- To provide assistance to selected law enforcement agencies which are experimenting with various techniques to improve the management and operations of the patrol and investigative functions of their departments
- To provide assistance to a newly established Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies so that the standards of accreditation which are to be developed and used by the Commission take into account findings derived from the improvement efforts of these experimenting agencies and departments
- To enhance the techniques for improving the management and operations in these experimenting law enforcement agencies
- To assist in the orderly transfer of new findings to other law enforcement agencies.

These purposes are to be accomplished by a series of interrelated tasks which include assessment of the current state-of-the-art of law enforcement improvement programs, an analysis of the results and accomplishments documented by this assessment, publications of results and findings in a variety of ways, assistance to the network of experimenting agencies, assistance and information for the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, and transfer of new information to other law enforcement agencies through various types of technology transfer mechanisms. For further information about PTAP, contact:

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