


POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM
BIRMINGHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT



Differential
Police Response
Strategies

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POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM
BIRMINGHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT

Differential Police Response Strategies

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The Police Executive Research Forum is a national membership organization composed of chief executives from municipal, county and state law enforcement agencies. The Forum's goal is to improve the delivery of police services through professionalization of police executives and officers, development of new knowledge through research and experimentation, and open debate on criminal justice issues.

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PREFACE

Understanding the role of police in an urban society requires knowledge about different types of police response to citizen calls for service. Until very recently, studies of the police role, particularly the police patrol function, focused almost exclusively on police response to crime. Questions about the police function generally centered on police effectiveness in dealing with crime and disorder, a matter which, during the Sixties, was studied by police leaders and a number of local and national citizen commissions.

It is clear now that police perform many functions which have little or no relationship to crime control. In fact, the American Bar Association categorized police functions into eleven major areas of responsibility. This broadened context for viewing the police can be readily seen when examining the reasons for which citizens contact the police. The public does not necessarily summon the police, as is often popularly perceived, only because they are being victimized by criminals, but also because they have problems they cannot handle without assistance. That problem may be a "criminal" one, that is, one which involves a violation of the criminal code, but, it may not be concerned with crime. People call the police because they believe their problem requires rapid attention, or sometimes citizens call because they do not know another agency to call. Meeting these needs are important—some agency must perform them—and they must be performed by an agency which is on call 24 hours a day, can respond quickly to enforce its decisions, and if necessary use force.

There is, however, another reality. During the decade of rising demands on police, most departments have also experienced tremendous increases in citizen calls for service. For many years, expanding city budgets made it possible for departments to increase personnel levels, and manage the

workload. But municipal budgets have been strained and police manpower levels are diminishing. State and local expenditures for law enforcement services are expected to increase at an annual rate of 3.3 percent between 1974 and 1980, a decrease from the five percent rate of growth between 1965 and 1970. With inflation, this leaves little opportunity to increase department resources. Police leaders must begin to look for new ways of coping with increased workloads.

One way is to explore alternative methods of responding to citizen calls for service. The underlying rationale is that although citizens have become accustomed to expecting police officers to respond to all their calls, and to do so immediately, it is now impractical and wasteful for police officers to do so. Those departments which adhere to a uniformly rapid response policy are likely to disappoint citizens when they can no longer provide such a response. In fact, in many cases departments are promising to send cars immediately, but are stacking their calls until cars become available. Thus, citizens who are told by the complaint operator, "We'll send a car right away," are being set up for disappointment. In some cities citizens are experiencing extremely long delays between their telephone requests for police service and the arrival of police officers. Most important, some of those calls which are being stacked may require an immediate response which would be possible if the police agency did not require that a police unit be dispatched to every citizen call for service.

There are, obviously, other important justifications besides limited resources and increasing calls for services for developing response alternatives. To the extent that police officers can be relieved of responding to every call, they become available to provide other important services such as meeting with community groups, neighborhood organizations and individual citizens, performing crime directed patrol activities, conducting crime prevention activities for homes and businesses, and following up investigative leads to solve crimes already committed. Patrol officers whose duty hours are completely occupied with responding to a never diminishing stack of calls are not available to provide any of these critical functions. The development of alternative responses to various

types of calls for service increases the likelihood that police officers will be able to provide these and other services.

Rather than placing absolute priority on responding with a uniformed police officer to each and every citizen call for service, it would be more effective to tell citizens that response will be delayed, or that an alternative response method will be used. Further, it may be necessary to decline to respond to some kinds of calls. It may be beneficial and preferable to find alternatives to in-person response by police officers. And it may be useful, given the realities of police work, citizen demands, the wide range of critical services which the police must provide and the realities of municipal finance, to divert some calls to other agencies. It is such alternatives to the immediate uniform dispatch of a sworn police officer to all or practically all citizen calls for service which are the subject of this report.

Responding different ways to different types of citizen calls for service is not a new idea. It is currently being practiced in many police departments for different types of service calls. No department, however, has synthesized the individual schemes into a comprehensive plan as advocated in this report. The National Institute of Justice will be field testing and evaluating this alternative response plan in three police departments during 1981. Their efforts are a logical and necessary next step to test the concepts developed in this report.

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The authors would like to take this opportunity to thank a number of individuals whose assistance on this project was particularly crucial to its success. It is not possible to list all those police officers, civilian police employees and police administrators who contributed their time, experience and critiques to this final project. We would, however, like to extend our particular thanks to the personnel in each of our site cities for their cooperation and help in addressing the diversity of issues involved in this project. The support of former Chief Hugo Masini in Hartford, Superintendent Al Andrews in Peoria, Chief Joseph McNamara in San Jose and Chief Bill Myers, along with former Chief James Parsons, in Birmingham, aided in the successful completion of the project. John Burke in Hartford, Ed Papis in Peoria, and Robert Bradshaw in San Jose, provided many hours of technical assistance to the staff including participating in project meetings in Birmingham. Key support personnel in site cities included Charlie Park and Jimmy Donnelly in Hartford, Sal Pisano, Robert Molleck and John Paulson in Peoria, and Bill Gergurich, Elba Lu, Bob Carlson, Bill Gloege, and Terry Eisenberg in San Jose. Additionally, a number of operational personnel in each of the cities aided the team in the conduct of the study. We are appreciative of the support, counsel, and assistance of each of these individuals. Personnel from each of the site cities also assisted in the model development phase of the project. Their efforts added immeasurably to the study.

A number of consultants provided assistance to the effort. Richard Crow coordinated the community survey. Vergil Williams coordinated the cost analysis component. Bill Formby assisted with the procedural analysis. Each of these individuals also assisted in the model development phase of the project. Bill Bieck, Peter Manning, Thomas Sweeney, and Steve Schack

joined the group during the model development activity. The products of those deliberations made a major impact on this project. Daniel Kullen assisted in the procedural analysis in Peoria. John Zakanycz and Henry Copeland functioned as programming consultants. The efforts of each of these individuals are greatly appreciated.

We would like to extend our thanks to Shirley Melnicoe, project monitor, and David Farmer, both of the National Institute of Justice, for their guidance and support during every phase of this effort. Their continuing advice and counsel significantly improved the organization and quality of this final report.

In addition to the Chiefs of Police of the four site cities, our Advisory Board consisted of Dorothy Bracey, Michael Cahn, Richard Myren, and Victor Strecher. The insight that each of these individuals possessed, along with their desire to expand the knowledge base about policing, was demonstrated by a strong wish to be helpful throughout the project. We are most grateful.

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Finally, we are saddened that Dr. Jane Roberts, a co-author of this report, was tragically killed in November, 1980. This report is dedicated to Jane, whose intelligence and perseverance were an inspiration.

Michael T. Farmer
Raymond O. Sumrall
February, 1981

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1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Issues

Is responding to all citizen calls for service with a patrol unit the most important function of a police department? If police continue to operate as they do now, the answer would appear to be yes.

The patrol division—the nucleus of the police organization—constitutes the largest component of any police department. As such, it commands the greatest amount of resources, number of personnel, and support from other divisions within the agency. When one considers that the major focus of this division is to respond to citizen calls for service and the fact that 40-60 percent of patrol officers' time is spent responding to such calls, it becomes apparent that the way police respond to calls for service significantly affects every facet of their function.

Other facts also corroborate this belief: human and other resources are often allocated according to the workload generated by calls for service; measures of response time to calls for service frequently are used as criteria of efficiency for departments; justifications of budget increases often are based on a department's ability to respond quickly; and sophisticated computerized communication centers and 911 systems (costing millions of dollars) have been installed in many departments to simplify and expedite public access to the police.

This focus on the necessity of responding to all citizen calls for service has affected not only the use of human resources and

structure of police organizations, but also the ethos of patrol officers on the street. As the call for service workload has burgeoned, dispatchers have come to replace sergeants as the real supervisors of patrol officer activities. As a result, many patrol officers have become dissatisfied with their role: many feel they have become little more than report-takers who must respond to a never ending flow of incidents, rather than professionals who have impact on the functions for which they are responsible.

By choice or default, the other functions the police provide, or could provide, are necessarily of secondary concern. Is this a conscious choice police administrators have made based on their understanding of the needs of the public? Should the police be more concerned with responding quickly to a burglary, even if it is discovered several hours or days after its occurrence, than with patrol strategies directed at specific crime problems, increasing criminal investigation capability, or increasing the services provided directly to citizens through crime prevention or community relations programs?

As municipal allocations to police departments have diminished while the number of calls for service has risen, many police administrators have come to realize that, despite efforts to increase productivity through better resource allocation, sophisticated computer planning, and schemes to return more officers to patrol duty, they may simply be unable to continue sending a police car to all citizen calls for service.

In short, if police continue to respond to calls for service as they have in the past—dispatching a patrol unit to each call for service—they will be left with but two alternatives: to drastically reduce, over time, all other functions they currently engage in; and, perhaps, even be unable to answer all citizen calls for service despite attempts to increase productivity.

There is another alternative though. Adequately delivering a full range of police services to the community need not be accomplished at the expense of effective response to citizen calls for service. What is needed is a completely new approach—a system for classifying various types of calls and rationally matching police response alternatives to the particular needs generated by those calls.

Currently, most police agencies do not adequately differentiate among incoming calls. Instead they handle them on a first-come first-serve basis or use, at best, a sketchy differentiations scheme. Although many departments attempt to prioritize calls by urgency, the majority of schemes being used are designed to make only the general distinction between calls that obviously require immediate, mobile response and those for which mobile response can be delayed.

Furthermore, most current call differentiation schemes rely heavily on codes theoretically designed to highlight the legal nature of each call. In reality, these codes, more often than not, are based on local ordinance or state statute categories designed for the purposes of charging and prosecuting offenders. As a result, operators collect only enough information to classify the calls according to the code before referring them to dispatchers. The fact that each code subsumes a variety of possible incidents, each of which may require a different mode of response, points strongly to weaknesses inherent in such a system.

In many jurisdictions, when dispatchers transmit calls to a patrol unit, they may simply inform the officers that, for example, there is a "3010" (mental case) at a particular location; in some departments large numbers of calls are simply lumped together in a "miscellaneous" or "unclassified" category. Such calls do not provide enough information for dispatchers to make a proper decision about the most appropriate response and, therefore, do not offer officers the opportunity to prepare themselves to respond properly when they arrive at the scene.

Methods Used

To address the issues discussed above, this study employed a number of approaches. First, the existing literature was reviewed and synthesized to arrive at an outline of existing police call classification and response practices. This was followed by a survey of over 200 police agencies to determine, in detail, the call for service response practices of those agencies serving jurisdictions of more than 100,000 population. This survey was followed by a more indepth exploration of the response practices of police agencies in four selected cities (Birmingham,

Alabama; Peoria, Illinois; Hartford, Connecticut; and San Jose, California). In two of these cities, Birmingham and San Jose, a sample of citizens was interviewed to determine how receptive they would have been to having their calls handled in a way other than immediately dispatching a police officer.

On the basis of the information gathered through each of these methods, a group of police practitioners and researchers then were asked to devise a new model for police response to citizen calls for service. During a series of meetings such a model was developed and its implications discussed. The chapters which follow will present the proposed model in considerable detail as well as summarize the information gathered and used during its development.

Findings and Recommendations

This study presents a decision model that police officials can use to implement a policy of applying a full range of alternative police responses to diverse citizen calls for service. The model, theoretically derived from previous research findings and existing operational procedures, appears to be both practical and workable. It has, however, not been tested or evaluated operationally. It should not be viewed as a finished product, but rather as a point of departure. Each department interested in differential response should construct its own model, using the recommended model as a framework. Choices made in the model described in this report are suggestive and proffered to encourage discussion. The choices belong to the policymakers of individual police departments. Greater detail, clarification, and refinement of the model will be useful and should reflect the needs of each police department using the model.

The following components comprise the differential response model:

- (1) A set of characteristics to define a type of incident.
- (2) A time factor to identify the relationship between the time the incident occurred and the time the call was received by the police.
- (3) A full range of response strategies.

Each component involves definitional choices and operational decisions. The components, when examined together, identify what type of incident is being reported, when it happened, and what type of response is most appropriate for each type of case. (See Figure 1).

If a department is interested in matching a variety of possible police responses to the specific requirements of each call for service, it must first devise some way of classifying calls based on information critical to subsequent dispatching decisions. In essence, this information should permit the dispatcher to determine the dynamics of the specific incident so that a reasonable police response can be made. Two types of information appear to be critical in making this determination: the nature of the incident (particularly the occurrence of, or potential for, personal injury or property loss), and the time it occurred (in progress, recent, cold). Beyond this basic information, any additional specific information about the problem or incident that the operator can collect increases the likelihood of responding to the call properly. For example, in many police departments an incoming report of a purse being stolen might elicit questions from a police operator on only the caller's location, name, and phone number. Obviously, much more data are needed to determine exactly what is transpiring, or has transpired, at the scene. In addition to the questions listed above, accurate call classification would require the asking of such questions as:

- Has anyone been injured? How severely? Is he or she still at the scene?
- What has been stolen? What is its value?
- Is a suspect still at the scene?
- How long ago did the suspect(s) leave the scene? In what direction did they go? How were they traveling? Can they be described?
- Was a weapon(s) involved? What type?
- Are there witnesses? Where are they located?

Questions such as these make it possible for the operator (or dispatcher) to classify more accurately and assess incoming citizen calls. Using the stolen pocketbook scenario as an

**FIGURE 1:
GENERAL DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE MODEL**
TYPE OF INCIDENT/TIME OF OCCURRENCE

RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES		MAJOR PERSONAL INJURY			MAJOR PROPERTY DAMAGE/LOSS			POTENTIAL PERSONAL INJURY			POTENTIAL PROPERTY DAMAGE/LOSS			MINOR PERSONAL INJURY			MINOR PROPERTY DAMAGE/LOSS			OTHER MINOR CRIME			OTHER MINOR NON-CRIME		
		IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD
SWORN	IMMEDIATE																								
	EXPEDITE																								
	ROUTINE																								
	APPOINTMENT																								
NON-SWORN	IMMEDIATE																								
	EXPEDITE																								
	ROUTINE																								
	APPOINTMENT																								
NON-MOBILE	TELEPHONE																								
	WALK-IN																								
	MAIL-IN																								
	REFERRAL																								
	NO RESPONSE																								

example of larceny, the added information gained by asking more detailed questions would result in better classification of, and response to, a wide variety of possible incidents including the injuring of an elderly woman and the snatching of her purse; the theft of a purse from an unlocked car; the disappearance of a purse from a secretary's desk during lunch hour; the forcible taking of a woman's purse by a group of juveniles who threatened her with a gun and are still in the area; and the loss of a purse from a private home while the owner is away swimming in the neighborhood pool. In each of these cases, although citizens' initial descriptions may sound similar, the required police response may vary greatly.

Existing crime classification schemes, based on legal categories determined by state statute or local ordinance, provide little, if any, information about what actually occurs on the street, the only basis on which a dispatch decision should be made. The incident categories should give some idea of what is really happening, not what fits into a legal category.

In addition to accurately classifying the call, a second piece of information is needed to select a proper response—the time the incident occurred. Although most police operators attempt to gather cursory information on the time of occurrence, the questions asked are often imprecise and the operator too hurried to permit useful classification of the call. In the recommended model, calls would be classified in terms of three time categories. Additional time categories could be created if police managers believed this would make a difference in the type of response.

Finally, the model contains a listing of possible alternative responses available to a police department, (i.e., delayed sworn officer response, telephone reporting, referral). Policymakers involved in implementing this model must decide, in advance, which responses they believe are appropriate for each category of incident in each time category. The complaint operator's task should be to collect information that permits proper classification of the call by incident type and time category. The dispatcher should adhere to the policymaker's choice of police response to that incident.

Previous research has provided considerable insight into the efficacy of traditional police response—a response which

emphasizes the immediate dispatch of sworn police officers to nearly all citizen calls for service. These studies have explored the effect of rapid response on collection of evidence, apprehension of suspects, availability of witnesses, and citizen satisfaction. Studies show that many crime scenes do not yield any collectible evidence or at least that no evidence is collected. Even in those cases where some evidence is collected, it is not always processed or analyzed. In cases such as these, rapid response, in and of itself, cannot be expected to have an impact on gathering evidence.

Present research findings have also indicated that rapid response to calls does not lead to an increased number of apprehensions. The reason that uniform rapid response is not justifiable is because, of all the calls for service police receive, only a small percentage involve actual crime. Of the calls that do involve crimes, police are seldom able to arrest a suspect. Therefore, the idea that all calls for service must be answered immediately by patrol officers, based on the rationale that such response is necessary if police are to apprehend suspects, is unsupported, particularly in cases involving crimes reported long after their occurrence. Common sense dictates that rapid response is very unlikely to lead to the apprehension of offenders. If a burglary happens over a weekend and is reported when discovered on Sunday evening, shaving minutes off the response time will not help catch the burglar.

Similarly, research indicates that many types of calls police receive involve no witnesses. In other cases, no usable type of evidence is available at the scene. Obviously, rapid response cannot be expected to impact on gathering evidence or securing witnesses in these cases.

Most police officials claim that rapid response is a prerequisite to assuring citizen satisfaction. Although research has consistently shown that more than 85 percent of calls received by police are of a noncritical nature, police officials still believe that the public expects quick responses. Many police officials argue that if the police arrive immediately, citizens are reassured by the officers' presence, impressed by the seeming efficiency of the police department, and convinced that if something more serious had happened the police would have been there to help. And yet, recent research findings have made

it clear that citizen satisfaction directly relates to expectations of how rapidly police will respond—expectations often set by the police operator—rather than the actual speed of police response.

In spite of these research findings on the limits of rapid response, in many circumstances, the great majority of police agencies continue to emphasize the immediate dispatch of a sworn police officer to almost all citizen calls for service. The model proposed in this report, if instituted, will enable police to respond to citizen calls for service more efficiently than by sending a patrol unit to every call. Before police administrators generally accept this model, they will have to reject the premise that uniform response to all calls is critical to apprehending offenders, securing crime scenes, completing interviews with witnesses, processing evidence, reducing injury to citizens, and assuring citizen satisfaction. These beliefs have been based more on faith than hard facts.

With the overwhelming dependence on traditional dispatching of sworn officers to most calls, one might assume that few alternative responses have been developed. This, of course, is not the case. Departments throughout the country are using a myriad of alternative responses. These include civilian response, telephone reporting, appointment scheduling, mail-in reporting, referral to other agencies, and no response at all. Surprisingly, 80 percent of the agencies surveyed for this project use some form of alternative response. These are not always a small number of insignificant cases nor are they always the odd practice of one department. The survey results indicate that 64 departments take reports of some larceny calls by telephone; 19 agencies require callers to come to headquarters to report some types of bad check or forgery cases. Yet, none of the departments surveyed appeared to have developed a system for applying the full range of differential responses to the full range of citizen calls for service. For the most part, the use of differential responses has grown haphazardly as a reaction to particular local circumstances.

Before police administrators provide complaint operators and dispatchers with the capability of differentiating calls, and before they adopt an operational plan for a full range of alternative responses, they must be convinced that citizens will

accept such alternatives. The current widespread use of single alternative responses provides some evidence of public acceptance of alternative responses. Certainly, departments would not continue to follow a practice if it engendered strong public resistance. A survey conducted in Birmingham, Alabama, and San Jose, California, as part of this study, indicated that many citizens who had recently called for police assistance would have accepted a variety of possible alternative responses. The results are particularly striking because neither department tried to educate the public about the advantages of such responses.

This acceptance of other than traditional police response indicates, first, that the public understands the differing nature of various incidents and believes that they warrant different police responses; and second, that the public appears more willing to accept alternative police response to calls for service than the police have been willing to admit. The logical conclusions to be drawn from these two facts are that police should experiment with various alternative responses and that public acceptance should be tested. Public education of citizens regarding the reasons and advantages behind a change in the type of police services being provided should minimize resistance. There are, in fact, indicators that the public has a much more sophisticated understanding of the role of the police in handling crime than police believe. This study, in particular, found that citizens would accept many alternative police responses if they knew what to expect.

Future Directions

The fact that many police agencies are now successfully using response alternatives for limited types of calls illustrates the potential for a fully developed system of differential response. Now it is time to begin expanding the list of workable alternative responses, and, more important, it is time to put together alternative responses that have proved effective into an integrated plan for one department. Although one alternative response may constitute an interesting practice, it has little impact on the operation of a department. A coordinated differential response plan can have significant impact and alter dramatically the operation of a police agency.

The model described in this report is an initial step toward the development of a more effective and efficient mechanism for responding to citizen calls for service. However, the extensive use of response alternatives presupposes the importance of the complaint operator's function. The complaint operator is the first contact a citizen has with the police. The treatment citizens receive and the expectations that treatment engenders often determine citizen satisfaction with the service that follows. Moreover, beyond being just an information collector, the complaint operator has a unique opportunity to provide a service to the calling citizen. In some cases, by judiciously obtaining critical information, better informed complaint operators could make better decisions and, thereby, provide a more appropriate and useful response than the traditional dispatching of a patrol unit.

The dispatcher's role is equally critical. Very often dispatcher decisions dictate the type of response a patrol officer makes, because dispatchers communicate their own sense of a call's relative urgency or importance. Indeed, in many departments, dispatchers are responsible for prioritizing incoming calls.

Unfortunately, complaint operators and dispatchers receive inadequate preparation and support in many police agencies. Neither operators nor dispatchers, in the majority of agencies that responded to the operational survey conducted during this project, had received more than rudimentary training in how to elicit the information necessary to make rational response decisions. The lack of training is compounded by a number of other inadequacies. In most police agencies, there is no formal supervision for dispatchers, no standard set of questions for operators to ask in determining the nature of a call, no standard procedure for operators to use in matching available resources with various types of incidents. These inadequacies will have to be rectified before a model can be realistically implemented with any chance for success.

Beyond this, the model must now be tested in the operational environment of one or more police agencies. This test must focus on a number of issues including:

- (1) What questions should be asked of the caller by the

complaint taker to assure that a proper classification of the call is made?

- (2) How cumbersome is the call intake procedure which is necessary to support use of the model?
- (3) What is the best way to convey information gathered from the caller to the patrol officer at the point of dispatch?
- (4) Does the proposed classification scheme work as expected when implemented?
- (5) How do citizens react to having their calls handled in the proposed alternative manner?

It is important to note that there is nothing immutable about the eight incident classifications which are suggested or the range of alternatives enumerated. Any department interested in applying the model should carefully review both, examine the definitions developed, and carefully consider the application of the model to various types of incidents. The purpose of this project has not been to develop a magical solution to the complex problem of matching police resources to citizen demands. Rather, it has focused on the process by which any police agency can develop its own unique solution to the problem of most effectively responding to the full range of citizen calls for service by using the full range of response alternatives at its disposal.

2

STATE-OF-THE-ART: LITERATURE REVIEW AND OPERATIONAL SURVEY

This chapter is divided into two sections: a synopsis of the literature on police handling of calls for service and a summary of the results of a survey of 221 police agencies that asked how those agencies handle calls. Both the literature review and survey were conducted in late 1978. The discussion emphasizes call intake, how operators differentiate among calls, and how the police respond. This chapter also includes a look at the literature on citizen satisfaction with police response.

THE LITERATURE

The recent experience of most police departments—increasing calls for service and decreasing or static personnel levels—presents the problem of discriminating among calls so that each is answered in the most efficient and appropriate way. To make distinctions among calls for service so that the police can respond properly requires a clear set of criteria on which to base the planning for an agency's responses to various types of calls. Previous classification efforts have not been particularly helpful in this regard.

One way to classify calls is by the nature of the complaint. Some early research focused on classifying calls according to whether the complaint was criminal or not. Bercal, who defined criminal calls as those pertaining to Part I or Part II offenses,

said that 16 percent of the calls to the Detroit Police Department were related to crime;¹ Meyer found that 17 percent of the calls to the New York City Police Department related to crimes;² and Reiss found that 16 percent of the calls to the Chicago Police Department were made to report crimes.³

Because the percentage of calls directly related to crimes is small, classifying calls according to a "criminal/non-criminal" standard is imprecise. As Lundman points out, the distinctions between civil and criminal used in these studies are not terribly clear.⁴ Boydston, for example, calls security checks crime-related where Meyer does not.⁵ Moreover, the complaint of a citizen calling for police service and the subsequent finding of the officer who responds are often at variance. Some studies are based on the classification complaint operators make, and others on classifications officers make.

More important, it is not clear that any of these classifications has operational significance. Departments will most likely attach a high degree of importance to crimes in progress, acts of violence past or present and other sorts of serious criminal business. But should a police department give a higher priority to a "cold" burglary report—a clerical function performed by all police departments—than to a family dispute, a lost child, or a drunk lying in the street. The mere classification of "criminal" may not be sufficient grounds for determining the importance of a request for police service or the best mechanism for responding to the call.

More recent research has applied finer distinctions to police calls for service. This effort began with Cumming, *et al.*, who classified a sample of citizens' calls to a police department as calls about things (39 percent) and calls for support (61 percent). Calls for support were divided into personal problems, health service, nuisances, disputes, and so on. Wilson divided calls into information gathering (22.1 percent), service (37.5 percent), order maintenance (30.1 percent), and law enforcement (10.3 percent). Service included accidents, illnesses, animals, drunks, and utility problems.⁶

Reiss divided calls into four categories: requests on criminal matters (58 percent), requests for assistance on non-criminal matters (34 percent), complaints about police services (3 percent), and providing information to police (5 percent).

Webster found that social service and administration compose 57 percent of the calls assigned to patrol officers and occupy 16 percent of officer time.⁷

Rush divided calls into felonies (8 percent), misdemeanors (23 percent), summary offenses (16 percent), traffic offenses (9 percent), juvenile problems (12 percent), suspicious persons or situations (2 percent), noncriminal (10 percent), services (10 percent), and unfounded (10 percent). Lilly classified calls for service as follows: requests for information (59.9 percent), calls about traffic (13 percent), calls about juveniles (5 percent), calls about violence (3 percent), calls about family trouble (3 percent), calls about health services (2 percent), calls about prowlers (2 percent), calls about thefts (2 percent), calls about missing persons (1 percent), and calls about vice (.1 percent).⁸

These systems, although they are more detailed than previous efforts, are attempts to describe what the police do. They are not suitable for categorizing calls for dispatch purposes.

Another type of classification system, one used by many police departments in dispatching, is based on the immediacy of the situation. Departments make judgments about the importance of immediate response, and assign calls on the basis of those judgments. The judgments are based on traditional premises—that quick response to certain calls, like robberies in progress, increases the likelihood of apprehension; that quick response to other calls, like "cold" burglaries, increases the likelihood of finding "clues"; that quick response to calls such as prowlers in the neighborhood increases citizen satisfaction.

But a recent study in the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department suggests that some of these premises may be wrong. Of the 949 calls sampled in Kansas City, only 60 (6.3 percent) were reports of crimes in progress. The study suggested that in 18 percent of all cases, citizen reporting was "quick enough for potential on-scene criminal apprehension." In fact, rapid response led to an arrest in only 3.6 percent of the sample cases (35 of 949 cases).⁹

The problem is that it is very difficult to distinguish between those few cases in which rapid response is likely to make a difference and those cases in which it will not.

Although some minor efforts have been made to classify calls by origin, nature, and immediacy, the work done even on

these few schemes has been insufficient to permit police agencies to match the most appropriate police response with the nature of the request for service. As the American Bar Association put it, "The absence of detailed information at the time a call is received requires" that the initial categorization be in rather general terms. It is that vagueness which leads most departments to respond to almost all calls as quickly as possible, so as to cover themselves in case a quick response was necessary. It is that vagueness which also may lead a police officer "unwittingly to approach the job without proper regard for his own safety and for the needs of his prospective client."¹⁰ It should be recognized, however, that the ability to collect the information necessary to make very fine distinctions may well be limited by the capacity of police operators to conduct lengthy interviews without overloading communications systems. Police managers must carefully examine this constraint to assure that all critical information is collected in the shortest possible time.

Call Intake

The complaint operator, the person who receives the calls made to the police department, is the citizen's most important link to police service. The operator's response—whether cordial, helpful, perceptive, calming—can make a great contribution to helping a citizen before, or even irrespective of, in-person response by a police officer. The complaint operator can obtain information useful to the dispatcher and the responding officer, in some cases making in-person response unnecessary. Typically, complaint receipt is performed mechanically by police officers or civilians (and even this has been a matter of some contention), without training, without clear supervision or quality control. This neglect seems to be a consequence of the strong, and until recently, unchallenged emphasis given to fast response.

If the prevailing attitude is that all calls are equal, that all deserve immediate response, and that immediate response depends on rapid handling of calls by complaint operator and dispatcher, then the complaint operator need do little except obtain an address and the nature of the complaint before transferring a call to the dispatcher. In fact, this has been the underlying assumption of many police departments.

Complaint operators staff a bank of telephones that receive citizens' calls for police service. These operators are the first line of contact between citizens and police, and their function is a critical one: they must elicit enough information to determine how the police should respond to a call. In some instances the minimum information—caller's name and address, nature of complaint, and so on—is enough; in others the operator may make an effort to satisfy the needs of the caller without in-person response by a police officer.

Some departments report that as many as 40 percent of calls can be handled without in-person response.¹¹ Such calls include requests for information, referrals to other agencies, and routine reports. Some departments have begun making efforts to service some kinds of complaints over the telephone, sometimes by the complaint operator and sometimes by referral to a special operator or special unit. Of the 26,417 calls studied by one researcher, 5,717, or 22 percent, were referred. Of those, 60 percent were requests for information, 12 percent were general nonemergency assistance, and the others were traffic problems, public nuisances, and juvenile problems, to name a few of the categories used.¹²

The extent to which complaint operators refer calls (and, indeed, the complaint function itself) is inadequately documented in the literature. Most of the research on police communications has consisted of technical studies of dispatch, installation of 911 systems, or advocacy on their behalf.

Much recent literature which advocates or evaluates computer-aided dispatch and automated vehicle monitoring attempts to find ways of shaving seconds off the complaint operator's call management to reduce police-citizen telephone contact below 90 seconds. As a result, the information gathering function, incident discriminating capability and the service-provision potential of the complaint function has been largely overlooked, despite the importance given to dispatcher decisions, which are based entirely on information obtained by complaint operators.

In many departments dispatchers have primary or supervisory responsibility for ordering calls and, in some cases, delaying response to certain citizen requests for service. Call delay or "stacking" is hardly a new idea. Many police agencies have required that dispatchers delay some calls in order to

satisfy more pressing ones, basing their decisions on what they believe to be the relative importance of calls.

Moreover, dispatchers' decisions have critical effects on patrol officer response. Dispatchers communicate to officers their own sense of whether a call has a significant effect on patrol officer reporting. Pepinsky found that, to a remarkable extent,

patrolmen's decisions as to whether to report offenses were determined by the terms of the calls they had received from the dispatchers. If the dispatcher named no offense in the call or asked the patrolman to check a victimless or attempted offense, the chances were practically nil that the patrolman would report an offense. In the vast majority of cases, in which the dispatcher named an offense in the call, the patrolman reported offenses. All this suggests that the complaint function has been misunderstood in importance and potential.¹³

Differentiation of Call Types

It is clear that a major responsibility of police departments is to handle citizen calls for service; departments, therefore, should be able to either respond immediately to all calls or to choose among calls, responding immediately to some, deferring those that do not require immediate response, providing alternative reporting procedures for others, and referring those that do not require police response at all. The notion that police departments ought to be free to attach priorities to calls has gained currency in recent years, and certainly seems compelled by the realities of call inflation, personnel deflation, and better resource management. Nor is it radical to suggest that police ought to be referring to other agencies calls that do not require response.

Police departments are not out to refuse response to citizens who need or believe they need police service. The police department is the only agency in our society that will respond when a citizen asks for assistance on a problem he or she regards as critical. That service logically resides with police departments because they are mobile and available, and they have the capacity to use force. It ought not be diluted or demeaned; it is a vital service in a complex society. But it is not

true that all calls ought to be treated the same. If a police department accepts a definition of itself as the agency of first response to citizen needs, then attaching priorities to those needs becomes all the more important.

Many administrators have argued that because the police department is a consumer-dictated public service it cannot decide that some services are more important than others. Yet, it is not only possible, but probably essential that police departments make these decisions in order to improve the overall delivery of police service. Gay, *et al.*, suggest that calls initially be divided into three rough categories. Type A calls involve crimes in progress, order maintenance or disturbance calls, or medical emergencies where the presence of an officer is necessary to prevent harm to an individual. Type B calls require a police response, but not an immediate one. These calls might involve significant crimes or attacks in which immediate police response would contribute little, but is necessary to reassure the citizen and obtain information. Type C calls—reports of auto thefts, requests for information, reports of minor incidents—can be handled by telephone. The ability to discriminate among these (or any set of call types) involves devising a system for categorizing incoming calls.

Formal recognition and structuring of operator and dispatcher discretion is not nearly so significant a break with the past as might appear. Since the early 1970s, many police departments have attached priorities to calls, diverting some and delaying others. In 1970, the Dallas Police Department had a call screening desk to which complaint operators referred calls that, in their judgment, might be handled by telephone. In 1974, the Boston Police Department began diverting reports of stolen cars, referring callers to an extension from which reports were taken by telephone. In 1975, the New York City Police Department began establishing ways of handling the growing number of nonemergency calls to its 911 system.¹⁵ In 1976, in connection with its "split force" experiment, the Wilmington, Delaware, Police Department developed three dispatch priorities, formalized response delays, and attempted to measure public response to them. The three priority designations used by Wilmington were basic patrol, basic patrol (critical), and in-progress. In fact, Wilmington dispatchers did not follow this

priority system, but simply made a distinction between critical calls (requiring an immediate response) and routine calls. The Wilmington study found that 86.1 percent of all calls for service were classified as noncritical. Formalizing response delays in Wilmington involved telling citizens when response to their calls would be delayed. Based on a telephone survey of residents calling for routine service, the Wilmington study concluded that "citizen satisfaction is a function of expectation." Citizens are just as happy with a 20-minute response to their calls as with 10-minute response if they get what they expect.¹⁶ Finally, LEAA's Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program, which is designed to enhance the role of the uniformed patrol officer, has included a component focused on the screening of calls. This activity, called teleserve in many jurisdictions, has in some cases involved the implementation of alternative methods of handling incoming citizen calls. This activity is, however, still in its initial development stages.

Types of Police Response

Gay, *et al.*, have indicated that call screening must be based on three basic questions—what happened, when did it happen, who was involved.¹⁷ After obtaining answers to these fundamental questions, however, a department still must determine the most rational response to each call type. In order to do so, it is necessary to ask another set of questions about each call. Is an immediate response necessary? What type of personnel should respond? What type of response is called for? The following sections examine the range of answers to each of these questions. In so doing, it lays the groundwork for a set of responses to various types of citizen calls for service.

Obviously there are some calls to which response must be given immediately. Most analyses of police calls suggest that emergency calls—medical emergencies, crimes in progress, disturbances—account for fewer than 15 percent of all calls. A department must be able to respond rapidly when these calls are received because there is *some likelihood* that response will affect the situation by leading to the arrest of a criminal suspect, by saving a life or reducing injury, or by preventing the escalation of a volatile situation. But rapid response does not ensure such an outcome. Far from it—results of the Kansas

City Response Time Study indicate that in only 3.6 percent of the sample cases was an arrest made because of rapid response.¹⁸ What is important is to be able to define those categories of calls in which rapid response can reasonably be expected to affect the outcome—and those call types are not necessarily the calls now treated as urgent in police agencies.

But what of the remaining 85 percent of the incoming calls, those that do not warrant an emergency mobile response? In order to manage these calls effectively, it is necessary to create some mechanism for determining the nature of the problem.

The implementation of a system of ordering calls enables a police department to stack calls in a logical manner. Most police agencies stack calls only when the workload outstrips personnel resources. But delaying response also can give police agencies the flexibility they need, allowing them to consolidate police officers' time in blocks large enough to be used for other activities (i.e., conducting security surveys, directed patrol). As long as the standard practice of police agencies is to respond to all calls as soon as a unit is available, it will be impossible to develop other strategies for using police personnel.

The second question focuses on who should respond. There are two major issues to be addressed in determining the kind of in-person response to make. The first is how many officers and units should be dispatched, and the second is whether civilians could handle some of the calls. The first issue includes the question of one-officer versus two-officer cars (which is, in many departments, a highly emotional political debate) as well as the number of cars that ought to respond, and whether mobile response is best provided by a generalist patrol officer or special unit.

Another question is whether a police officer or a civilian employee of the police agency should respond. Using nonsworn personnel is becoming more and more acceptable as police budgets become increasingly constrained, although civilians are not always less expensive to employ than police officers. A number of police departments—Worcester, Massachusetts;¹⁹ Scottsdale, Arizona;²⁰ Atlanta, Georgia;²¹ and Dayton, Ohio,²² to name a few—use civilians to answer selected calls for service, generally for calls that do not require law enforcement or expose the civilians to danger.

Helping to meet the call for service demand by relieving officers of less serious calls is an objective common to most police departments that use civilians. Reduction of officer workload was one of the reasons why the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommended using civilian community service officers.²³ Officers whose time is freed by civilians can spend that time on tasks requiring specialized skills; in Worcester, for example, nearly two dozen police were freed for use on special anticrime task forces.

There are other reasons for using civilians: improved police-community relations has been one. The argument is that citizens will be more supportive of the police department if they see it as less militaristic, if their neighbors are employed there, or if they have the opportunity to work closely with sworn officers. Other cities have seen civilian programs as a way of increasing minority employment by creating a new police entry level. Some departments have used civilian programs as a way of involving citizens who have specialized skills unavailable in the police department.

Civilian aides are known by a variety of designations—community service officer, police auxiliary, neighborhood assistance officer, police service aide, cadet, and police assistant. Uniforms and means of patrol vary too. Some departments issue special uniforms to their civilian officers to ensure that they are easily distinguishable from sworn officers, and auxiliary officers patrol in cars other than regular police cars. Civilian employees of some departments use their own cars, with special labels attached; others use specially marked police cars or scooters.

Several options other than mobile response are open to police departments in the way they respond to citizen calls for service. These options include referral to another public or private agency, telephone reporting, mail-in-reporting, and walk-in reporting. Use of these alternatives requires sensitive and knowledgeable handling by complaint operators.

Before police departments establish formal referral mechanisms, they must be aware of the range of agencies available and of their hours, intake standards and procedures, and willingness to accept referrals. In using telephone reporting for

minor crimes, police departments must take into consideration citizens' expectations, as they must in using mail or walk-in reporting procedures. All these methods make a department vulnerable to public feelings of police insensitivity if they are not planned carefully and executed skillfully.

OPERATIONAL SURVEY

As part of this project, the Police Executive Research Forum conducted an operational survey in more than 200 of the nation's largest police departments. The survey was designed to elicit information about dispatching operations, response priorities, and operational policies and practices related to calls for service. The design of the survey instrument was to identify the response activities these jurisdictions now use. The instrument, a copy of which is included in Appendix B, was not designed to generate rigorous statistical data but to explore (1) the nature of existing police response activities; (2) how often police agencies respond to calls with other than sworn patrol personnel; and (3) the role of telephone operators and dispatchers in supporting department responses to calls for service. A particular goal was to identify interesting operational programs, policies, or procedures that could be part of a general model of police response or that would indicate whether there is much to be gained from developing such models. Because of the survey's purpose, analysis of survey data was limited to tabular portrayal of the responses by jurisdiction size (more than 1,000,000; 500,000-1,000,000; 250,000-499,999; 100,000-249,999; and fewer than 100,000) and geographical region (Northeast, North Central, South, and West).

The police chief executive of each city serving a population of more than 100,000 persons (175 jurisdictions), selected city police departments serving populations of fewer than 100,000 but having more than 200 personnel (9 jurisdictions), and selected county police departments, all but two of which serve populations of more than 100,000 (37 jurisdictions) received the survey. Of the 221 surveys mailed, 175 completed questionnaires were returned (79.2 percent of the sample). A list of the responding jurisdictions appears in Appendix B. Five jurisdictions returned the survey after data analysis was completed.

Although survey responses from these departments could not be included in data tabulation, staff reviewed each questionnaire for new ways of responding to calls that could be useful in developing police response models. A more comprehensive description of the survey and its results appears in the Police Executive Research Forum's report, *"Alternative Strategies for Responding to Police Calls for Service, State-of-the-Art: Literature Review and Survey Results."* Copies of the tables developed from the survey data appear in Appendix B.

Call Intake

Survey results indicate that the volume of citizen-initiated calls for service is generally related to the size of the jurisdiction, although cities of the same relative size varied widely in the number of calls for service they received. The spread may reflect the inadequacy of police records on incoming calls as much as actual calls for service. In fact, 26 percent of the responding police departments could provide only estimates of the number of calls received in 1977.

The survey instrument included a number of questions about call intake. Survey results indicated that, in the responding police agencies, operators were predominantly civilian employees (64 percent), with only 10 percent of the agencies using sworn operators exclusively. Interestingly, jurisdictions having populations of more than 1,000,000 reported much more extensive use of sworn operators than jurisdictions of any other size. More than one-fourth (26 percent) of all responding departments reported using some combination of sworn and civilian operators. Dispatchers were more likely to be sworn officers than were operators; however, only 18 percent of the respondents indicated using only sworn dispatchers. Another 49 percent reported using entirely civilian personnel as dispatchers, and one-third of the departments used some combination of civilian and sworn dispatchers.

It was impossible to determine, on the basis of the survey, why there is such variation in the use of sworn and civilian personnel in the intake function. Probably a combination of factors, including tradition, civil service regulations, labor contracts, and the need to provide "inside" jobs for limited duty police officers, explains at least some of the patterns.

The survey included several questions designed to deter-

mine the level of training, supervision and guidance provided to operators and dispatchers. It found that a significant number of police departments permit their dispatchers to function without formal dispatch supervisors. In fact, more than half of the responding police departments serving populations of more than 500,000 said that they had no dispatch supervisors. Departments that did have dispatch supervisors primarily used sworn personnel for this function and a majority of these agencies provided the supervisors with some training.

If a department does not have dispatch supervisors, the way it trains dispatchers and operators becomes critically important. Yet the training of operators and dispatchers is limited. In fact, 31 percent of the responding agencies provided no training for operators. Dispatchers were slightly more likely to receive training, but even so, 25 percent of the respondents reported having no dispatcher training programs.

Departments that did report such training provided only the barest minimum. The median level of basic training provided to operators does not exceed 80 hours in any population category. Likewise, the median number of hours of in-service training for operators does not exceed 40 in any population category. The median number of hours of basic training provided for dispatchers varied from 40 in small jurisdictions to 105 in jurisdictions of more than 1,000,000. In-service training provided to dispatchers approximated that for operators.

The amount of training provided for operators and dispatchers is particularly important in light of the prevalence of civilians in these positions. Although there is now no basis for assuming that civilians are more or less capable of performing the tasks required of operators and dispatchers, it is clear that in most cases they will not bring even a rudimentary knowledge of police procedures to the job. For this reason, basic training is particularly important for departments using civilian personnel in call intake.

This study also examined the guidance operators received on how to handle various kinds of calls for service. The survey asked whether police agencies gave telephone operators a list of types of citizen calls for service that told the operator how to deal with them. Only 35 percent of the respondents reported using such call lists.

Another question asked whether the department gave

operators a standardized set of questions to ask citizens who requested service. Only 41 percent of the respondents reported using such a device.

In summary, although the operator/dispatcher function is pivotal in defining calls for service and providing the information necessary to determine the most effective way to respond, it is apparent that operators and dispatchers function with little supervision, training, or guidance.

Differentiation of Call Types

The structuring of patrol response, as the literature review pointed out, depends on the ability to differentiate among the various types of calls. The survey found that, in fact, many departments made no attempt to differentiate among calls which they defined as requiring a police response. Of the responding police departments, 20 percent reported that they responded to every call for service by sending a uniformed police officer. A careful review of the responses from the remaining 80 percent of the respondents shows that many of these agencies send a sworn officer to all but the most minor calls (i.e., animal calls, uncollected trash).

The survey results indicate that 71 percent of the respondents stacked calls for service. There did not appear to be any relationship between stacking and jurisdiction size, but police agencies in the western United States reported more extensive use of call stacking.

Call stacking occurs regardless of whether a department has a formal system of ordering calls, even in departments that use a "first-come, first-serve" system. Responses to the survey indicated that 15 percent of the respondents stacked calls without using any formal system. Seventy-seven percent reported that they informed citizens whose calls were being stacked but the larger the jurisdiction, the less likelihood there was that the citizens were informed. This may, however, be related to the fact that in smaller agencies the operator and dispatcher are often the same person, permitting the operator to more easily inform the citizen of what is happening to his call. In any case, there was no way to determine whether police department operators actually did inform citizens of delays, or whether this was merely a written procedure.

When a department determines that response can be delayed, one option is to schedule an appointment with the citizen to take a report of the incident. According to the survey, the use of appointment scheduling was less frequent than either telephone reporting or walk-in reporting. Only one-fourth of the respondents used this method.

Type of Police Response

It is clear from the survey results that a wide range of alternatives to uniform and immediate sworn officer response are presently being used by police agencies. Each one of the response alternatives explored during this project was being used by at least some police agencies.

Specifically the results of the survey indicate that, in 30 percent of the responding police departments, special units were the first to answer some calls for service, most commonly traffic accidents and hostage situations.

For certain categories of calls, civilians are the first to respond. Civilians in police departments fall into three general categories: unpaid civilian volunteers; paraprofessionals who receive some limited training and salary; and paid civilians who are extensively trained for their responsibilities. These distinctions are not always clear and, in fact, the survey responses indicated that many jurisdictions had trouble separating various types of civilian employment. This, in fact, may be as much a fault of our survey instrument as a lack of understanding on the part of the respondents.

Although the general classification of tasks handled by civilians is the same in most departments—non-hazardous, routine calls—the exact composition of functions varies considerably among departments. Of the responding departments, 9 percent used civilian volunteers, along with a sworn officer, as part of a patrol team; and 15 percent of the respondents used civilian volunteers for other functions, such as conducting crime prevention surveys, providing chaplain services, and enhancing community relations. Only four departments reported using civilian volunteers to respond to particular citizen calls: two departments used them on abandoned auto calls, one for noise complaints, and one for animal complaints.

Trained civilian employees were slightly less likely to be

used for general patrol than were civilian volunteers. Civilian employees were most likely to be involved in providing social services such as crisis intervention (15 departments) or to handle animal control calls (9 departments).

Of the surveyed departments, 17 percent employed para-professionals, and 14 percent of the respondents reported using paraprofessionals for specific calls, particularly traffic accident calls (six departments).

Of the total number of responding police departments, 61 percent took some incident reports by telephone. Telephone reporting was used most frequently as a response to larceny calls (64 departments), missing persons/runaway calls (48 departments), and vandalism reports (39 departments).

More than half the surveyed departments required citizens to report certain incidents at police headquarters. This method was most likely to be used in cases of traffic accidents (43 departments), some cold robberies (19 departments), bad checks/forgery cases (19 departments), and missing persons/runaways (14 departments).

Figure 2 presents both mobile and nonmobile response strategies by incident type.*

While the numbers in Figure 2 are impressive from the standpoint of the frequency and range of response alternatives used, a department-by-department review of responses to the survey makes it clear that no single responding police agency has considered and implemented a rational plan of matching the full range of response alternatives to various types of citizen calls. The use of response alternatives appears to be a reaction to local police administrator's perceptions of which incident types require rapid response. As this report makes clear, those perceptions are often colored by the biases and unsupported assumptions common to American policing.

Citizen Satisfaction

An important question remains: Whether exercising selectivity in response—deferring, diverting, or finding other

*It should be noted that this table is based on responses to open ended and not forced choice questions. For this reason, the table may not reflect the total range of responses used by individual departments.

FIGURE 2
FREQUENCY OF USE OF ALTERNATIVES, BY SELECTED CALL TYPE

RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES USED	NUMBER OF DEPARTMENTS USING ALTERNATIVES BY CALL TYPE							
	MURDER	ROBBERY	BURGLARY	LARCENY	ASSAULT	AUTO THEFT	SEX OFFENSES (INC. RAPE)	VICE/NARCOTICS
Special Units	2	3	4	1	—	—	2	2
Civilian Volunteers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Trained Civilian Employees	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Paid Para-professionals	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Telephone Reporting	—	7	6	64	5	19	1	—
Walk-in Reporting	—	19	1	8	1	10	2	2
Appointment Scheduling	—	10	1	1	—	—	2	2

FIGURE 2 (Continued)

RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES USED	NUMBER OF DEPARTMENTS USING ALTERNATIVES BY CALL TYPE						
	BUILDING SEARCHES	UNAUTHORIZED USE OF VEHICLE	PROWLERS/ TRESPASS	HARASSMENT/ OBSCENE CALLS	STOLEN BIKES	CRISIS INTER- VENTION/SOCIAL SERVICES	MISSING PERSONS/ RUNAWAY
Special Units	4 (K-9)	—	—	—	1	1	1
Civilian Volunteers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Trained Civilian Employees	—	—	—	—	3	15	2
Paid Para- professionals	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Telephone Reporting	—	—	3	19	24	2	48*
Walk-in Reporting	—	2	—	1	7	—	14
Appointment Scheduling	—	—	—	—	—	1	1

*17 handle runaways by telephone

FIGURE 2 (Continued)

RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES USED	NUMBER OF DEPARTMENTS USING ALTERNATIVES BY CALL TYPE						
	FRAUD/ BUNCO	BLACKMAIL/ EXTORTION	BAD CHECKS/ FORGERY	EMBEZZLEMENT	VANDALISM	HOSTAGE/BARRI- CADED GUNMAN	BOMBS
Special Unit	1	—	3	1	—	7	4
Civilian Volunteers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Trained Civilian Employees	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Paid Para- professional	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Telephone Reporting	2	1	7	—	39	—	—
Walk-in Reporting	5	—	19	4	2	—	—
Appointment Scheduling	2	—	10	1	—	—	—

FIGURE 2 (Continued)

RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES USED	NUMBER OF DEPARTMENTS USING ALTERNATIVES BY CALL TYPE						
	HIT/RUN	LOST/STOLEN TAGS	SCHOOL COMPLAINTS	JUVENILE MATTERS	ILLNESS/INJURY MEDICAL SERVICES	TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORTS	ORDINANCE ENFORCEMENT
Special Units	1	—	2	4	4	14	—
Civilian Volunteers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Trained Civilian Employees	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Paid Para- professionals	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
Telephone Reporting	—	—	—	—	—	10	—
Walk-in Reporting	5	4	—	4	—	43	—
Appointment Scheduling	—	—	—	—	—	4	—

FIGURE 2 (Continued)

RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES USED	NUMBER OF DEPARTMENTS USING ALTERNATIVES BY CALL TYPE						
	PARKGROUND COMPLAINTS	AUTO LOOKOUTS/ ABANDONED AUTOS	NOISE ENFORCEMENT	ANIMAL CONTROL	INTERNAL COMPLAINTS	DELAYED CALLS	INVESTIGATIONS
Special Units	—	5	—	11	1	—	3
Civilian Volunteers	—	2	1	1	—	—	1
Trained Civilian Employees	1	3	2	9	—	1	1
Paid Para- professionals	—	3	1	—	—	—	—
Telephone Reporting	—	1	2	4	—	—	—
Walk-in Reporting	—	—	—	5	10	12	—
Appointment Scheduling	—	—	—	—	3	—	—

methods of handling calls—affects the standing of the police department with its public. Many police executives believe that the public will not accept such strategies. But the modest literature on citizen satisfaction with police services indicates otherwise. Using surveys to obtain citizens' perceptions of the quality of police services was advocated during the 1960s,²⁴ and some police departments experimented with this idea. Dade County attempted to measure changes in citizen satisfaction as a result of beginning a "Safe Streets Unit."²⁵ Baltimore attempted a similar study.²⁶ More recently, some highly refined survey techniques have been developed, including the use of random digit dialing, in an attempt to measure the effects of various police experiments on citizen satisfaction with police services.²⁷

Most citizen surveys have found that citizen satisfaction, although it is affected by police department changes in service, tends to be a function of individual perceptions about the quality of the environment more than of the extent and level of service.²⁸ Citizens seem generally more satisfied with a counseling manner than with more vigorous tactics.²⁹ Hahn found that people's willingness to call the police or cooperate with them was based on their feelings about the fairness and quality of the police.³⁰ In fact, a recent study has raised questions about the use of citizen surveys as an evaluative tool, indicating that, although such surveys are useful in determining whether police service falls within the acceptable range, they have questionable validity as a measure of the effectiveness of particular police activities.³¹

The literature does not answer the question most critical for this study's purposes: How would changes in police response affect citizen satisfaction? Several studies, however, are suggestive. The Police Foundation study in Kansas City, *Police Response Time: Its Determinants and Effects*, found that citizen satisfaction is not a function of speed of response, but of certainty—that citizens are just as likely to be satisfied by a department which promises 35-minute response and fulfills its promise as they are by a department which delivers quicker response. What appears to annoy citizens is a failure to fulfill commitments. These findings are confirmed by the results of the Wilmington Split Force Project, mentioned in an earlier section, and the Kansas City Police Department's own study of

response time. One recent evaluation, which examined citizen satisfaction with the use of telephone report taking, found that 74 percent of the citizens surveyed were satisfied.³²

These studies suggest that citizen satisfaction may not be adversely affected by the use of alternative responses, even when those responses involve referral and delayed response, if the telephone contact with the citizen is conducted with sufficient skill and honesty. The goal of differentiating calls for service is not to limit the service provided, but to match limited resources with citizen needs. When the citizen demands a level of service different from that prescribed by a call response plan, even after an explanation of the department's procedures, it will still be necessary to respond with a uniformed officer.

SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW AND FINDINGS

The literature review and operational survey of police agencies provide considerable insight into police response to calls for service. The complete results of these activities can be found in the Police Executive Research Forum's report, *Alternative Strategies for Responding to Police Calls for Service: State-of-the-Art*. The general findings of the literature review and operational survey can be summarized as follows:

- Existing systems of classifying calls for service are inadequate, focusing primarily on placing calls into pre-determined crime or noncrime codes, rather than basing classification on information critical to determining proper police response.
- Although information gathered during call intake is important in determining proper response, police agencies have failed to pay adequate attention to training, supervision, or guidance of call operators and dispatchers.
- Police departments operate on the premise that immediate response by a sworn officer(s) is the most desirable response to nearly all calls for service.
- Many police agencies still manage service workload on a first-come, first-serve basis or by an informal ordering system.

- Police agencies are now using several strategies including civilian response, telephone reporting of incidents, walk-in reporting of incidents, appointment scheduling, mail-in reporting, referral to other agencies, or not responding at all.
- No agency appears to have examined the full range of possible responses and considered their application to the full range of citizen call types.
- There is some indication that citizens, if informed of police department response procedures, will accept responses other than the immediate appearance of sworn officers.

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3

DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE MODEL

The product of this exploratory research project is a differential response model designed to help police agencies efficiently respond to the vast array of citizen calls for service, making the most effective use of limited police resources while maintaining citizen satisfaction.

The model was developed through a three-stage process. During the first stage a group of Birmingham, Alabama, police officers and consultants tentatively outlined several issues that a differential response model must address, including the quality of intake procedures, mechanisms for referring calls to other community agencies, and the most effective use of civilian personnel. The second stage of the model development process involved convening a group of police officers from Hartford, Connecticut; San Jose, California; and Peoria, Illinois, as well as two officers from the previous Birmingham group. The recommendations coming out of this meeting coincided in many ways with those of the first stage, but they focused more intently on the proper role of the sworn police officer in responding to calls.

The third stage of the model development process involved four experts in the field of policing, project staff, and consultants. This group synthesized the results of the two previous model development stages, the findings of this research effort, and their own knowledge of and experience with police call response procedures.

The result of this process was a general differential response model. The model suggests a structure for organizing

information collection by complaint operators and dispatch decisions by police dispatchers and allows police managers to select and communicate to operators and dispatchers the particular department procedures to be used in responding to the full range of citizen calls for service.

The general differential response model involves three components: a new set of eight call classifications; a determination of the time between occurrence of an incident and its report to the police; and a range of possible police responses. The general model is, in essence, a graphic portrayal of the interaction of these three components. For any citizen call for service, information obtained from the caller is used to classify the incident into one of the eight incident classifications and one of three time of occurrence categories. These two determinations are then used to pinpoint the proper department response to that call from among a range of acceptable police responses.

The project staff developed a specific application of the general model to illustrate how it might work for each of the eight new incident classifications, and tested its practicality by applying it to several specific incident categories most police agencies now use. In each case, the model proved to be capable of organizing police response to deal effectively with the full variety of circumstances falling within the incident category.

The following sections detail the results of this model development effort, including a definition of the model's components; a description of the operation of the general differential response model; an explanation of the model's application to the eight new call classifications; and an examination of the model's relevance to selected incident types now in use.

This model is as yet untested in the working environment of a police agency. It is a product of exploratory research and the practical experience and creative energies of scores of police officers, managers, and researchers. The differential response model must undergo rigorous testing in one or more police agencies before its usefulness is apparent. Once the testing is accomplished, individual police agencies will be able to modify the model to fit their own particular needs.

The components of the differential response model are the type of incident (one of eight major categories), the time of occurrence of the incident, and the range of response strategies. Figure 1 displays the relationship among these components.

TYPE OF INCIDENT

Existing police crime classification systems focus on defining incoming citizen calls in terms of a set of "signal codes" which reflect, to a large degree, legal categories set by state statute or local ordinance. In many cases, these categories provide little, if any, information about what actually occurs in the street, which obviously should be the basis for a dispatch decision. To match police response resources with the response needs of citizens requesting police service, it is necessary to define the purpose of call intake—shifting away from the predisposition to pigeonhole calls by traditional crime-related signal codes. Under such a revised classification system, the role of call intake would be to determine exactly what is happening—not from the standpoint of legal categories, but in order to determine the most appropriate response. For administrative purposes, classification by more traditional categories could be made on the basis of the incident report completed by the responding officer, taken over the phone, or otherwise submitted to the department.

In breaking from the limitations of legal definitions, the practitioners and experts who developed this model considered several factors essential in determining what the police should do to handle an incident appropriately. The factors selected as being important in defining incidents were based on the current thinking of police about what is relevant to understanding the nature of a call. Categorization of calls is currently made informally by both responding officers and administrators. Responding officers use simple categories to compartmentalize calls they are given by the dispatcher, as a way of deciding how to handle the incident and as a guide to how fast they will attempt to get to the scene. Administrators use simple breakdowns in thinking about the types of calls their departments handle and how they can best respond. The factors considered in this model are not the only ones that could be used; they are simply the factors that the model developers considered relevant in determining an appropriate response. Some administrators might consider other factors of an incident more important in determining responses. Such factors as the age of the victim, the geographical location of the incident, or calls from

different types of institutions (e.g., schools, hospitals, banks, etc.), all could be built into the model's categorization of incident types. Other factors that reflect temporary adjustments to address immediate problems might be built in. However, incident types should not become so voluminous that they destroy the operational simplicity of the model. The actual model described herein is less important than the thought process a department should use to develop its own model. Each department must identify the key factors in the nature of an incident that dictate the type of police response required. The model developed in this study illustrates what can be done and provides a basic and workable scheme amenable to immediate adoption.

The first factor identified during the model development as critical to categorizing incidents was whether an incident has already happened or could potentially happen. Knowing whether they are dealing with something that has already happened or something that could happen has significant implications for the type of response police make. In some cases what could happen is more important than what has happened. A call for a prowler, who could be a potential burglar, rapist, or robber, is more important from the standpoint of the requirement for quick response than a burglary that has already been committed. On the other hand, a murder, whenever committed, is more important than a hazardous road condition which presents a potential for personal injury.

A second factor considered in characterizing incidents was whether the incident involved property or persons. Typically, incidents involving injury to persons are more serious than incidents involving damage or loss of property. This categorization reflects the two basic distinctions made by the criminal law and gives the police some idea of the type of event they will be handling.

The final factor considered in defining incident types is whether the call was of a service nature. These calls could involve minor crimes or simply the provision of some form of assistance. These categories generally involve services that police provide but that are not subsumed under the aforementioned categories.

The eight new incident classifications and examples of the types of incidents that might fall into each category are:

Major Personal Injury—Denotes that the victim has been injured in such a manner that medical attention is needed immediately, or that the victim is dead. Examples of calls for service that might be classified in this fashion are aggravated assaults, serious traffic accidents, robberies, homicides, and serious domestic disturbances.

Major Property Damage/Loss—Denotes the theft of items (or damage of items) whose value is over \$500. Some of the calls for service that might fall into this classification include motor vehicle theft, extensive vandalism, burglaries, larcenies, robberies, and traffic accidents.

Potential Personal Injury—Describes incidents where there is a possibility that a citizen will be injured. Incidents that might be classified in this manner include domestic and neighborhood disturbances, disorderly persons, suspicious persons, mental disturbances, hazardous road conditions, and any incident involving an armed suspect at the scene.

Potential Property Damage/Loss—Denotes a possibility that theft of property, or damage to property, will occur. Incidents that might fall into this category include prowler, suspicious person and suspicious vehicle.

Minor Personal Injury—Refers to incidents where the victim has been injured but not the extent that medical attention is warranted. Some incidents that might be included in this category are traffic accidents, simple assaults, fights or brawls, domestic disturbances, and purse snatches.

Minor Property Damage/Loss—Refers to the theft of, or damage to, property whose value is less than \$500. Included in this classification might be the following types of incidents: burglaries, larcenies, traffic accidents, and vandalism.

Other Minor Crime—Refers to incidents of a criminal nature when there are no personal injuries and no property damage or loss. Some incidents that might be classified as such are malicious mischief, neighborhood disturbances, and public drunks.

Other Minor Non-Crime—Includes calls of mainly a service nature where no crime has occurred. Examples of such calls are most animal complaints, non-violent mental disturbances, and citizens' requests for assistance.

The type of incident which fits into each classification is a management decision. The examples provided for each of the classifications reflect the considered judgments of the model developers. For instance, the determination of which kinds of assaults belong in the major personal injury category as opposed to the minor personal injury category was arbitrary. Police administrators must determine the types of incidents which appropriately belong in the potential personal injury and property damage categories based on the practices and experiences of their departments. Forcing these decisions and choices is the ultimate purpose of the model. Administrators interested in developing differential responses to calls must think about what types of responses they believe are appropriate for each type of call for service.

TIME OF OCCURRENCE

To determine the most appropriate response to a citizen call, it is necessary to separate calls into a set of categories reflecting differences in the length of time between the occurrence of the incident being reported and the actual report to the police department. Some incidents are actually occurring at the very time they are being reported to the police. Other calls are received days, sometimes weeks, after the fact. In the first instance, common sense dictates that an immediate police response increases the likelihood of apprehending a criminal offender, locating witnesses, or reducing the degree of injuries to citizens. Yet, as the research literature discussed in Chapter II makes clear, even in these cases the impact of immediate police response may be negligible. Therefore, police agencies examining their call response procedures should carefully examine the nature of calls received while the incident is in progress and determine which cases warrant immediate response. In the case of citizen calls reporting incidents having occurred several days or even weeks in the past, an immediate police response is neither required nor likely to be productive. Again, police officials must examine the nature of these calls and make a rational determination of the proper police response.

For illustrative purposes only, three time categories are presented here: in-progress, proximate, and cold. In-progress incidents are self-explanatory. Proximate incidents are

defined, for purposes of the model, as those that occurred less than one hour before the report. All reports received more than one hour after their occurrence are considered cold. The definitions of proximate and cold obviously are arbitrary. The actual number of time categories and their definitions would have to be determined independently by any police agency implementing these alternative models.

If the three categories used above are adopted, it can be expected that, based on the literature, anywhere from 1 to 20 percent of all citizen calls for service will involve incidents requiring an immediate response. Field work conducted in San Jose (the only site that kept such data) indicated that only 1 percent of their total call volume received a Priority I or in-progress ranking necessitating an immediate response. The remaining incidents can be classified as either proximate or cold. It is impossible to determine, by reviewing either past research or the results of this project, the percentage of non-emergency calls that would fall into any of these categories. There is no indication in the literature or from our field work of the estimated elapsed time between incident occurrence and calls reporting incidents. Although a few departments distinguish among calls requiring mobile response and delayed response, their failure to attach time of occurrence criteria to these classifications makes direct comparisons impossible. One study (Eliot: 1973) conducted in Syracuse (NY) concluded that 70 percent of the calls studied were for incidents that had occurred more than ten minutes earlier. For particular types of incidents, such as auto thefts, the percentage of cold incidents may approach 90 percent.

No matter what set of time categories is selected by an individual department as a basis for differentiating response, police management in that department must examine the types of calls being received in each time category and the alternative methods they could use to respond to each.

RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES

Any police agency has available a wide array of alternative means of responding to citizen calls for service. As Chapter 2 shows, many police agencies are now using several different

methods of response to various type of calls. But use of these response alternatives is limited to a small subset of the departments' workload and their application does not appear to follow any rational plan.

Among the possible police responses to citizen calls are: dispatching sworn personnel, dispatching nonsworn personnel, taking the incident report by telephone, requiring the caller to file a report at a police station (walk-in), requiring the caller to mail a report of the incident (mail-in), referring the caller to another public or private agency, or not responding at all.

In the case of dispatching either sworn or nonsworn personnel, the police department can establish a range of dispatch priority levels which reflect the immediacy of response necessitated by certain calls. For purposes of illustration, four categories were identified in the model development phase of this project:

Immediate Response—immediately dispatch the beat unit, if available; immediately dispatch the nearest available unit if the beat unit is not available; if no unit is immediately available, pull the nearest unit off a low priority call and dispatch.

Expedited Response—dispatch the nearest unit which is not handling a call.

Routine Response—dispatch the beat unit as soon as it is no longer handling a call.

Appointment—schedule an appointment with the caller.

Richard Larson, in *Urban Police Patrol Analysis*, describes a similar set of call priority levels. According to Larson, 5 percent of all calls require a "Priority 1" response, 45 percent require a "Priority 2" response and 50 percent require a "Priority 3" response. Although his definitions for the three priority levels are not strictly comparable to the definitions suggested above, they are closely related. Of particular interest is Larson's use of the concept of "preemptive priorities" which is analogous to that portion of the immediate response definition above which involves pulling the nearest unit off a low priority call and dispatching it when no unit is immediately available.

There is certainly nothing sacrosanct about these priority levels. Each police department implementing a differential response model must develop its own dispatch priority levels and definitions of those levels.

OPERATION OF THE DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE MODEL

In a department using a differential response model such as that proposed here, each incoming call would be placed in one of the eight incident classifications and an estimate made of the approximate time at which the incident occurred. Based on these two determinations, the model would specify the proper police response, as predetermined by the police department's management. The determination of which of the eight incident classifications would be appropriate would be made on the basis of the complainant's responses to a series of specific, standardized questions about the nature of the incident (see Chapter 4). Comparable standard questions would be used to classify the call by one of the three time categories. As Figure 1 on page 6 shows, department management can select a specific set of responses for each incident category/time of occurrence combination. The columns correspond to the eight incident classifications and the three time categories discussed above. The rows correspond to the various differential responses available. For any incident type with any time of occurrence classification, a proper response configuration can be designated simply by marking the appropriate box(es) on the graph.

The model is a decisionmaking tool useful for deciding the appropriate response to the calls that come to the attention of the police. It is not, however, intended to act as an inflexible, automatic decisionmaker in all cases. Nothing can or should replace the good judgment and discretion of operators and dispatchers in ordering a response different than that mandated in the model if the circumstances warrant. The model makes basic choices of appropriate responses for general categories of incidents with common, usual circumstances. There will always be a smaller number of unique cases that demand different responses. The theft of a rare work of art from a museum may be, by the model's definition, just a larceny requiring no

immediate response. Good sense would obviously dictate a different response. A highly emotional caller in a relatively minor incident might well call for a different response from what the incident itself warrants. Finally, if the caller demands a police response, in most instances a car should be sent. Dispatchers and complaint operators should continue to exercise their good judgment and discretion within the framework of the model. Instances where dispatcher decisions are different from the model's prescribed action should be documented with justifications. If enough exceptions are made to the general rule, the definitions or suggested responses may need to be revised. The model should be viewed by dispatchers and complaint operators as a helpful guideline to management's desired response choices and not as a straitjacket.

By employing the eight incident classifications, the time of occurrence labels, and a variety of possible response modes, the differential response model can help in developing response policy by determining the appropriate response alternatives for each major classification. These classifications would be used for dispatching; the responding officer(s) would determine the legal classification (i.e., larceny, burglary) after arrival on the scene. If this model were implemented, the legal classification system would be separate from the dispatch classification, and officers would base their responses on the characteristics of the incident rather than on traditional crime categories.

Figure 3 presents an example, developed by project staff, of how the differential response model might appear after having been completed by the management of a police agency. As mentioned above, each department implementing a differential response model will have to develop a chart similar to Figure 3 which reflects an explicit management determination of the required response to each of the eight incident classification/time of occurrence combinations.

It should be noted that the differential responses of walk-in reporting and mail-in reporting were not selected by the model developers for any of the combinations of incident classification/time of occurrence. This reflects the model developers' judgment that, in most cases, these responses were interchangeable with telephone reporting. The efficacy of mail-in or walk-in reporting over telephone reporting is a management

FIGURE 3:
EXAMPLE OF COMPLETED DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE MODEL
TYPE OF INCIDENT/TIME OF OCCURRENCE

RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES		TYPE OF INCIDENT/TIME OF OCCURRENCE																							
		MAJOR PERSONAL INJURY			MAJOR PROPERTY DAMAGE/LOSS			POTENTIAL PERSONAL INJURY			POTENTIAL PROPERTY DAMAGE/LOSS			MINOR PERSONAL INJURY			MINOR PROPERTY DAMAGE/LOSS			OTHER MINOR CRIME			OTHER MINOR NON-CRIME		
		IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD
SWORN	IMMEDIATE	X	X	X	X			X	X					X			X								
	EXPEDITE								X	X					X					X				X	
	ROUTINE					X	X									X				X					
	APPOINTMENT					X	X									X				X					
NON-SWORN	IMMEDIATE																								
	EXPEDITE	X	X	X																					
	ROUTINE																								
	APPOINTMENT																								
NON-MOBILE	TELEPHONE					X	X				X	X				X	X			X			X	X	
	WALK-IN																								
	MAIL-IN																								
	REFERRAL																						X	X	X
	NO RESPONSE																								

decision which should be based on the assessment of local needs, circumstances, and experiences.

Figures 4 through 11 highlight the eight differential response configurations which correspond to each of the eight incident classifications in Figure 3. Particular note should be given to the footnotes appearing on several of these charts. They are examples of the way in which explicit management decisions can be used to adjust department responses on the basis of particular exigencies of critical importance to that department. For instance, in Figure 5, although the designated response for proximate and cold major property damage/ loss incidents is routine, sworn officer response, the scheduling of an appointment or telephone reporting, certain circumstances

**FIGURE 4:
MODEL OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR
RESPONDING TO MAJOR PERSONAL INJURY**

		TIME OF OCCURRENCE			
		IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	
RESPONSE ALTERNATIVE	SWORN	IMMEDIATE	X	X	X
		EXPEDITE			
		ROUTINE			
		APPOINTMENT			
NON-SWORN	IMMEDIATE				
	EXPEDITE	(1) X	(1) X	(1) X	
	ROUTINE				
	APPOINTMENT				
NON-MOBILE	TELEPHONE				
	WALK-IN				
	MAIL-IN				
	REFERRAL				
	NO RESPONSE				

(1) An ambulance and paramedics would not be dispatched if the victim had already been transported to a hospital.

**FIGURE 5:
MODEL OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR
RESPONDING TO MAJOR PROPERTY DAMAGE/LOSS**

		TIME OF OCCURRENCE			
		IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	
RESPONSE ALTERNATIVE	SWORN	IMMEDIATE	(1) X		
		EXPEDITE			
		ROUTINE		(2) X	(2) X
		APPOINTMENT		(2) X	(2) X
	NON-SWORN	IMMEDIATE			
		EXPEDITE			
		ROUTINE			
		APPOINTMENT			
	NON-MOBILE	TELEPHONE		X	X
		WALK-IN			
		MAIL-IN			
		REFERRAL			
NO RESPONSE					

- (1) These units would not necessarily respond directly to the complainant, but to the area to cover escape routes.
 (2) A beat unit would respond if there were evidentiary concerns, witnesses, *modus operandi*, an identifiable suspect, or if demanded by complainant.

may alter that response, including the presence of evidence or witnesses, a peculiar *modus operandi*, an identifiable suspect or the demand for mobile response by the complainant. These factors only illustrate the types of adjustments to the model a department might wish to make to reflect particular local circumstances and department practices.

Several points should be made about the addition of such factors. First, they should relate to information which can be obtained from the complainant over the telephone or through

**FIGURE 6:
MODEL OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR
RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL PERSONAL INJURY**

		TIME OF OCCURRENCE		
		IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD
RESPONSE ALTERNATIVE	SWORN			
	IMMEDIATE	X	X	
	EXPEDITE			X
	ROUTINE			
	APPOINTMENT			
NON-SWORN	IMMEDIATE			
	EXPEDITE			
	ROUTINE			
	APPOINTMENT			
NON-MOBILE	TELEPHONE			
	WALK-IN			
	MAIL-IN			
	REFERRAL			
	NO RESPONSE			

departmental information readily available to the dispatcher. Second, they should relate to the operating practices of the particular police agency implementing the model. An example should clarify the relationship between ability to collect information and police agency practices. In the example used above and taken from Figure 5, if a department decides that it is impossible to determine, by questioning the complainant, whether evidence is likely to be available at the scene of a major property damage/loss incident, then two response choices exist. The department can either dispatch a unit to each such incident in order to be sure that, in every case which might possibly yield evidence, such evidence is gathered, or, conversely, the department can decide simply to handle all such calls through some form of nonmobile response. In terms of the department's operating practices, a department which has the capability to process and use evidence would certainly place a

higher priority on responding with trained personnel to the scene of a major property damage/loss incident than an agency without such capability. When considering the addition of factors which modify response patterns to reflect local considerations, a police agency must consider both these issues—the ability to obtain the answers to critical questions asked of complainants and the ability to process and use additional information (i.e., physical evidence, witness statements, *modus operandi* descriptions).

Finally, it is important to realize that the addition of each new factor which modifies the straightforward mechanism of the differential response model, complicates the decision-making process at the point of dispatch and increases the likelihood of judgment errors being made. Inclusion of factors to cover local exigencies should be carefully considered by depart-

**FIGURE 7:
MODEL OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR
RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL PROPERTY
DAMAGE/LOSS**

		TIME OF OCCURRENCE		
		IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD
RESPONSE ALTERNATIVE	SWORN			
	IMMEDIATE			
	EXPEDITE	X		
	ROUTINE			
	APPOINTMENT			
NON-SWORN	IMMEDIATE			
	EXPEDITE			
	ROUTINE			
	APPOINTMENT			
NON-MOBILE	TELEPHONE		X	X
	WALK-IN			
	MAIL-IN			
	REFERRAL			
	NO RESPONSE			

**FIGURE 8:
MODEL OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR
RESPONDING TO MINOR PERSONAL INJURY**

		TIME OF OCCURRENCE			
		IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD	
RESPONSE ALTERNATIVE	SWORN	IMMEDIATE	X		
		EXPEDITE		X	
		ROUTINE			X
		APPOINTMENT			X
NON-SWORN	IMMEDIATE				
	EXPEDITE				
	ROUTINE				
	APPOINTMENT				
NON-MOBILE	TELEPHONE				
	WALK-IN				
	MAIL-IN				
	REFERRAL				
	NO RESPONSE				

ment management after the review of all available data on the nature of particular incident types, the range of information presently being provided by complainants in these incidents and the existing and proposed department operating procedures for responding to these types of calls.

In addition to the particular factors a police agency may wish to add to the differential response model to adjust for local exigencies, it may also modify the model by adding tactical considerations to the responses. As an example, in Figure 5, the model developers have identified one such tactical consideration—the point to which responding units are to be dispatched—to the model. Another important tactical consideration is the type and level of back-up assistance to be dispatched for each incident classification/time of occurrence combination. Back-up assistance decisions obviously will vary depending on the department's use and mix of one and two officer units.

When police agencies are developing differential response patterns careful consideration must be given to such tactical choices.

**APPLICATION OF DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE
MODEL TO EXISTING INCIDENT CLASSIFICATION**

A panel of police experts and consultants meeting to work on this project decided to engage in an exercise to see how well the new classification codes would work. The group broke up into subgroups, each assigned a current common call category, such as burglary, larceny, assault, domestic dispute, or traffic accident without injuries. Each group was to think of every

**FIGURE 9:
MODEL OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR
RESPONDING TO MINOR PROPERTY
DAMAGE/LOSS**

		TIME OF OCCURRENCE		
		IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD
RESPONSE ALTERNATIVE	SWORN	IMMEDIATE	(1) X	
		EXPEDITE		
		ROUTINE		
		APPOINTMENT		
NON-SWORN	IMMEDIATE			
	EXPEDITE			
	ROUTINE			
	APPOINTMENT			
NON-MOBILE	TELEPHONE		X	X
	WALK-IN			
	MAIL-IN			
	REFERRAL			
	NO RESPONSE			

(1) These units would not necessarily respond directly to the complaints, but to the vicinity to cover escape routes.

conceivable permutation of its assigned category and to re-classify those permutations using the new classification system.

The purpose of the exercise, as noted, was to see if current legal call classification categories, with the myriad of circumstances they subsume, could be reclassified into the eight new incident categories. Inability to reclassify in this way would mean that the new classifications were unworkable for police response decisions.

The results of this informal test for the types of calls analyzed and for others discussed generally showed that the new classification categories did encompass the broad array of calls that police receive. A significant side effect of the exercise was to demonstrate vividly that current call classifications based on

**FIGURE 10:
MODEL OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR
RESPONDING TO OTHER MINOR CRIMES**

		TIME OF OCCURRENCE		
		IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD
RESPONSE ALTERNATIVE	SWORN	IMMEDIATE		
		EXPEDITE	X	
		ROUTINE		X
		APPOINTMENT		X
NON-SWORN	IMMEDIATE			
	EXPEDITE			
	ROUTINE			
	APPOINTMENT			
NON-MOBILE	TELEPHONE			X
	WALK-IN			
	MAIL-IN			
	REFERRAL			
	NO RESPONSE			

**FIGURE 11:
MODEL OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR
RESPONDING TO OTHER MINOR NON-CRIMES**

		TIME OF OCCURRENCE		
		IN-PROGRESS	PROXIMATE	COLD
RESPONSE ALTERNATIVE	SWORN	IMMEDIATE		
		EXPEDITE	X	
		ROUTINE		
		APPOINTMENT		
NON-SWORN	IMMEDIATE			
	EXPEDITE			
	ROUTINE			
	APPOINTMENT			
NON-MOBILE	TELEPHONE		X	X
	WALK-IN			
	MAIL-IN			
	REFERRAL	(1) X	(1) X	(1) X
	NO RESPONSE			

(1) If a local social agency offers services 24 hours a day, calls such as mental disturbances and animal complaints could be referred to the appropriate agency.

legal distinctions do not generally make the necessary circumstantial distinctions and are, therefore, almost useless for determining appropriate response.

The earlier chapters of this report have outlined a proposed differential response model which, applied to the range of citizen calls for police service, can organize police response more efficiently and effectively. A new set of questions must now be addressed. Just how feasible is the model? In particular, will citizens accept it? Will it actually work? Will it cost more or less than present response methods? What will be the reaction of the rank and file officer to such a system? The following sections provide some very tentative answers to these questions.

Definitive answers depend on careful implementation of the model and analysis of its impact.

COMMUNITY ATTITUDES

Whenever a police agency contemplates a significant change in the way it deals with citizens, the fundamental question is how the public will react. A community attitude survey, therefore, was designed as an integral part of this project. The survey, conducted in Birmingham and San Jose, is unique in seeking citizens' reactions to proposed alternatives for handling calls for service. Although other data were obtained from the respondents—general satisfaction with police services and demographic information—the primary area of interest was their reactions to a range of possible response alternatives.

Project staff interviewed a random sample of citizens who had recently requested police services for burglary (not in progress), larceny, motor vehicle theft, environmental complaints (i.e., noise, animal control), personal assault, and family disturbance incidents. None of the cases was more than three months old at the time of the interview, on the theory that respondents would be able to recall a recent specific incident more easily and clearly. The results of the survey support this theory: only 5.0 percent of those called in Birmingham and 5.8 percent in San Jose, indicated that they could not recall the incident.

The survey consisted of three sections: general satisfaction, attitudes toward differential response, and demographic data. The results indicated that, in both cities, the majority of citizens (77.0 percent in Birmingham and 75.3 percent in San Jose) rated the quality of police services as either good or excellent. In Birmingham, 96.2 percent of the respondents, and in San Jose, 89.7 percent of the respondents believed that the police answered the phone quickly enough when they called for police services; 93.7 percent of the respondents in Birmingham and 88.2 percent of the respondents in San Jose were satisfied with the way the police operator handled their call; and 86.5 percent in Birmingham and 84.0 percent in San Jose were either satisfied or very satisfied with police services after an officer arrived.

Respondents were then asked whether they thought their call could have been handled by an agency other than the police department and, if such an agency were available, whether they would have called it. A majority of respondents in both cities, 53.6 percent in Birmingham and 60.5 percent in San Jose, indicated that they would have used agencies other than the police if those agencies had been available. These results indicate that a majority of citizens would be receptive to the development of nonpolice alternatives for handling their calls.

The respondents were asked how receptive they would have been to a different police response. How would they have reacted if, rather than dispatching a sworn police officer immediately, the police department had taken their report by phone, required them to file the report at the police station, scheduled an appointment, delayed responding for 30 minutes and then sent a specialist, dispatched a civilian employee of the police department, sent a representative of a nonpolice public agency or sent a nonpolice private agency representative?

The most readily acceptable alternative in both cities (75.5 percent of the respondents in Birmingham and 72.8 percent in San Jose) was to have a civilian employee of the police department respond. Two other alternatives were very acceptable to a majority of respondents: having a police specialist respond within 30 minutes (69.6 percent in Birmingham and 62.2 percent in San Jose); and having the police response delayed up to 30 minutes (53.9 percent in Birmingham and 52.2 percent in San Jose).

The type of incident reported appeared to affect the type of response citizens would accept. For those respondents reporting personal assaults, two alternatives were acceptable to a majority: having a civilian employee of the police department respond and allowing a delay with a specialist responding to the call.

Five of the proposed alternatives were acceptable to a majority of the respondents in the motor vehicle theft category: civilian employee response, 30-minute delay with a specialist responding, 30 minute delay, taking the report over the telephone, and appointment scheduling. Citizens apparently do not feel a pressing need for immediate response; hence, a broad array of response alternatives exists.

Five alternatives were acceptable to a majority of respondents in the larceny category: 30 minute delay with a specialist responding, civilian employee response, 30 minute delay, appointment scheduling, and taking the report over the telephone. These findings appear to suggest that larceny cases do not require an immediate response by a uniformed patrol officer.

In the family disturbance call category, the most readily acceptable alternative was to have a civilian employee of the police department respond. Other alternatives acceptable to a majority of respondents were the use of a nonpolice public agency, use of a nonpolice private agency, and a 30-minute delay with a specialist responding.

In the environmental category (see Appendix E for a breakdown of calls included in this category), the following alternatives were acceptable to a majority of the respondents: civilian employee response, 30-minute delay with a specialist responding, 30-minute delay, and use of a nonpolice public agency.

The majority of respondents in the burglary category found the following alternatives acceptable: civilian employee response, 30-minute delay with a specialist responding, and a 30-minute delay.

The least acceptable alternative for respondents in all categories was having the citizen come to police headquarters to give the report. This alternative was acceptable to 33.2 percent of the Birmingham respondents, and 20.7 percent of the respondents in San Jose (Note: San Jose has only one police station; Birmingham has four precinct stations).

For each incident type, there appears to be a specific set of acceptable alternatives. For the personal assault category, which seems to require a more immediate response, the range of acceptable alternatives was limited. For other categories, such as property crimes, where the need for immediate response was not as significant, citizens did not appear to feel as strongly that a uniformed officer needed to respond. Another interesting finding was that in family disturbance cases the acceptability of agencies external to the police department handling the call was quite high. In summary, the findings for

the two cities surveyed strongly indicate that for specific types of cases, specific types of alternatives were acceptable or unacceptable to the public.

Neither race nor ethnicity was influential in determining the degree to which proposed alternatives were acceptable to respondents. Although white respondents, in general, were more likely to accept alternatives, a large number of blacks in both Birmingham and San Jose, and Mexican-Americans in San Jose, found these alternatives acceptable.

There were no particularly startling demographic variations in the results. In San Jose, as compared to Birmingham, individuals interviewed appeared to be more educated; to be more likely to be employed; to have lived in the city for a shorter period of time; and to earn more income. Minimal differences exist between racial or ethnic groups in their overall rating of the quality of police services. Those with the least education and those with the most education tended to rate police services as either good or excellent. In both cities, there was a tendency for the percentage of people viewing police services positively to increase as the age of the respondent increased. In both cities, men had a slight tendency to view the department more positively than did women and were more receptive to alternative response strategies. However, women in both cities were more in favor of alternative responses involving nonpolice public or private agencies.

One of the most surprising aspects of the results found in the community survey was the high level of citizen acceptance of alternatives without any kind of public education program. Obviously, any field test of these alternatives should be preceded by police agency efforts to inform the public of the changes being made and the reasons for them. With such an effort, public acceptance of the alternatives should exceed even those levels of acceptance found in this survey.

The results of the community attitude survey make it clear that police administrators have considerable latitude in experimenting with differential responses to citizen calls for service, at least from the standpoint of potential negative citizen reaction. But police administrators interested in developing differential call response procedures must face several other

issues, including potentially negative police officer reactions to proposed alternatives and the cost of implementing the alternatives.

For a complete breakdown of the community survey results in Birmingham and San Jose, see Appendix F.

POLICE OFFICER REACTION

Changes in call intake procedures can be expected to have substantial repercussions on the organization. They will most likely require assigning more personnel to this function, especially if the response alternatives selected by the department rely heavily on telephone or walk-in reporting. New call intake procedures and policies will need to be drafted and adequate training provided to call operators, dispatchers, and report takers; the level of supervision of intake personnel will need to be increased, at least during the first months following the change; and patrol officers will need to be made familiar with the new dispatching procedures. Most important, decisions will have to be made about how the time freed by reduced call response requirements is to be spent.

Organizational changes of this magnitude are likely to produce some resistance. This resistance can be dissipated only by a careful planning process, active and substantive involvement of representatives of every affected level of the police department, and presentation of available data, research results, and other materials to explain the need for, practicality of and possible impact of implementing alternative response models. Most important, police personnel must understand that the objective of alternative response models is not to reduce personnel levels, but to achieve a more efficient match between personnel resources and demands on the agency.

RESPONSE ALTERNATIVE COST

Finally, a police administrator interested in implementing a differential call response system must ascertain the relative cost of such a system, compared to current practice. Costing out police response is a two-step process. First, in order to estimate the cost of current practice, it is necessary to determine the

total cost of traditional response to any type of call by examining:

(1) The average number of minutes that the police unit assigned primary responsibility spends on one call of a given type.

(2) The average number of minutes that a back-up unit spends assisting the primary unit on one call of a given type.

(3) The cost per minute for the mode of response that the dispatcher normally selects in assigning a primary unit to a particular call type.

(4) The cost per minute for the mode of response that the dispatcher normally selects in assigning a back-up unit to a particular call type.

(5) The number of incidents of a given type handled during a specific time interval.

Obviously, such an approach depends on the availability of adequate data by call type, an accurate measure of the time being spent on calls of various types, accurate estimates of the level of back-up actually being provided in the field, and personnel costs separated by various types of personnel, particularly sworn and civilian. (Each of these areas presented data collection problems during the fieldwork stage that could not be solved within the scope of this effort. For an example of the level of cost data that would have to be developed and the estimates that would have to be made, see Appendix E.)

The second phase of the costing process involves estimating the cost of implementing the alternative mode of response for the specific incident category, using the same approach as the one for estimating the cost of current practice. Because all the alternative models considered during this project involve reducing the number of calls to which sworn officers respond immediately, it is reasonable to expect that the various alternative approaches, in most cases, will be somewhat less expensive than traditional responses. The level of saving, however, must be balanced against the other constraints (citizen attitudes, officer resistance) on implementing the alternative models to determine the efficacy of such a change.

4

FEASIBILITY AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

If, after careful review of the feasibility of differential response models, a police agency decides to implement such procedures, it must resolve several important issues. First is whether the department's current procedures for handling incoming citizen calls for service can provide the level of information necessary for differential response. It was evident throughout this project that current call intake procedures in most departments are inadequate for determining which calls are amenable to handling by alternative response strategies. The complaint and dispatch functions are pivotal in the successful implementation of alternative responses.

The first step in upgrading call intake procedures is to analyze the information currently being recorded by police operators. Department operating procedures and training manuals specifying the information operators are to collect should be compared with the information actually being collected. With these data, a police administrator can decide whether additional information should be collected at call intake to support the use of planned differential responses.

Once all the required information elements have been identified, a set of standardized questions should be developed for complaint operators to assure consistent information collection. If the model proposed in this study were used, the police agency would have to develop a specific set of questions to elicit key information in a number of general areas. For instance, to

determine the proper incident classification category, the agency would have to develop questions about whether the incident has already occurred or had the potential of happening; whether the incident involved the loss of or damage to property or personal injury; whether the call was of a service nature. To determine the time elapsed between the incident's occurrence and the report to the police agency, several questions would have to be developed with which the operator could determine when the offense occurred so that the call could be placed in the immediate, proximate or cold category. Finally, to be able to address particular exigencies and tactical concerns of importance to the department such as those discussed in Chapter 3, specific questions would have to be developed to elicit information from the caller about such things as the availability of evidence, the presence of witnesses, and the use of a particular modus operandi.

This information should allow either the operator or dispatcher to classify the call according to the eight incident categories described in Chapter 3 and determine the proper response to the call. There may be a need, however, to gather additional information particularly critical to a responding police officer. For instance, in classifying a call and determining the best police response, it may be sufficient to know simply that an incident involves a serious injury and has just occurred. From the standpoint of the officer(s) dispatched to the incident, it is also critical to know the nature of the incident (i.e., is it an accident scene, a knifing, a hit and run), information which the dispatcher can provide on the basis of questions asked of the caller. In addition, further information may be provided by the dispatcher from information available and in police department records (i.e., past calls from the location, outstanding warrants). The important point, however, is that the information necessary to classify the incident and to select the most satisfactory department response is very basic and does not relate to the common legal categorization which dominates existing call classification models.*

* In addition to the information elements discussed above, department personnel should obtain the name, address, and telephone number of the caller whenever possible and record the time the complaint was received, the time of dispatch to the scene, the time of officer arrival, and the time at which the call was completed.

Before implementing an alternative response model, police agencies should examine the need to educate the public about what they are doing and why they are doing it. As research has consistently shown, public expectations significantly affect public satisfaction with police services. In addition to preparing the public for introduction of alternative methods of responding to their calls for service, standard explanations to callers of the reasons for particular differential responses must be developed and tested. When response will be delayed, callers should be informed and given a reasonable estimate of when they can expect a police officer to arrive. When a call is referred to another agency, the reason for the referral should be given. Without sensitive handling of callers at this point, differential response models may well face entirely avoidable resistance.

As this study has pointed out, current training and supervisory practices for complaint clerks and dispatchers are inadequate in both amount and content. Training should include a long period of field observation and participation with experienced patrol officers. Supervisors should concentrate on continual on-the-job-training, as well as on ensuring that mistakes are not made.

Finally, every attempt should be made to reduce the number of "unclassified" incidents to which officers must respond. Such dispatches are both dangerous and unnecessary. The combination of conscientious information-gathering at call intake and adequate supervision of the communications functions should significantly reduce this problem.

The call intake function is a critical component in any differential call response system. Yet in many police agencies this function has been seriously neglected. Such a situation is unfortunate when traditional responses are being used; it is even more problematic in a department attempting to match a full range of response alternatives to the vast array of incoming calls.

There is a second major operational implication of implementing a differential response model. If the model works as projected, it will reduce the amount of time patrol officers spend responding to citizen calls for service. It will free officers from the constant dictates of the radio ordering them from one service call to another. It will allow them to make more productive use of the time between calls rather than simply patrolling,

waiting for the inevitable next call for service. The amount of time freed by the use of response alternatives and the degree to which that time can be consolidated into useful blocks are essential elements in restructuring a department's patrol strategy. With blocks of time available (say an hour or more), patrol officers could be returned to the supervision of their sergeants who could plan productive activities. This would serve several purposes. It would involve sergeants in the actual supervision of their officers rather than allowing the dispatcher to serve as the real supervisor and the sergeant as a back-up unit as is currently the case. It would permit the sergeant to direct either crime, community, or service related activities for his or her officers in an effort to address particular community problems. The sergeant's role would become interesting, creative, and important. The officer's job would become interesting, allowing for some planned activities directed toward achieving a goal. If crime directed activities were planned, police officers could devise and implement strategies directed toward a particular crime. This involvement would place many officers in the role they envisioned on joining the department. If officers were to be involved in community related activities, they could spend enough time to establish helpful relationships. Currently, in both these activities, available time is so short and interrupted by the constant demands for answering calls that officers can make no real commitment to them. They know they cannot have the satisfaction of seeing an activity through to its conclusion, so they do not bother initiating the effort. As a result, many officers see themselves not as essential public servants, but rather as report takers.

Freeing officers from the responsibility of answering calls for service should also improve the quality of service delivered on those calls to which an officer is dispatched. Rather than viewing each call as another meaningless report-taking process in an endless run of incidents, the officers would know that each incident to which they were dispatched really required their presence. This knowledge would attune them to the requirements of their task and make them sensitive to the needs of the victim. Removed from the boredom of large numbers of cases, their interest in the incidents they did handle would be increased. Because citizens often criticize police of-

icers for their apparent lack of interest, the use of a differential response model should translate into greater citizen satisfaction. Likewise, without having to worry about clearing themselves from an incident so as to be ready for the next waiting call, officers could spend more time on each to which they are dispatched and provide a better level of service.

Instead of consolidating blocks of time for all police officers, police agencies that implement alternative response procedures could choose to assign all call responses to a group of officers and use the rest of the patrol force for other functions. In fact, the Wilmington Split Force Experiment is an example of such a structure, although it was not a product of a differential response model process like the one being discussed here.

The immediate question facing a police department that implements a differential response model is how to use police officer time productively. Those who are more interested in reducing police budgets than improving police service would argue they could simply reduce the patrol force by a factor equal to the resources saved. This argument presupposes there are no productive ways to use this time. While there are no proved methods of operation that guarantee the achievement of recognized objectives of police work, recent research and experience offer several potentially useful courses of action. Saving resources by handling calls for service more effectively and efficiently should not lead to reducing police resources during the search for better means of achieving other police objectives. Rather, those resources should support testing and trying new methods of operation.

Patrol officers having more free time as the result of the alternative response system could use the time for crime-focused activities (including patrol, investigation, crime prevention, and tactical or undercover activities), community service activities, and administrative activities.

The most obvious use of patrol officers' time is in conducting more random preventive patrol—in most departments the primary activity now being conducted during free periods. Considering much recent research, particularly the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, this may not be a particularly effective use of these new resources. One option would be to use more directed patrol approaches during nonresponse periods,

providing officers with specific instructions about when, and in which well-defined areas, to patrol. Another option would be to place nonresponding patrol units in stationary positions for surveillance of likely crime targets.

Another approach would be to broaden the patrol officer's role in investigating crimes. Recent studies have pointed to the importance of patrol officer activities in the outcome of investigations. This role could be considerably enhanced if, rather than constantly responding to a never-diminishing stack of calls, patrol officers were permitted to focus on preliminary investigations for longer periods of time and, in some cases, to conduct follow-up investigations.

A third possible use of time involves assigning patrol officers to conduct security surveys for businesses and private residences, to develop a working knowledge of the communities in which they patrol, and to speak to school groups and public meetings about crime prevention measures.

It may be effective to assign patrol officers to undercover or plainclothes operations (such as the New York Street Crime Unit) to address particular crime problems.

Police agencies also may choose to allocate all or a portion of freed patrol officer time to community service activities, including working with community and youth groups, following up on the provision of social services to problem families, and providing emergency medical services.

Finally, patrol officer time may be allocated, using blocks of freed time or by reassignment of portions of the patrol force, to a range of administrative assignments, including planning and research, budgeting, and records. It is apparent that implementing response alternatives will require an expanded call intake operation, particularly to support telephone and walk-in reporting procedures. Patrol resources could be reassigned to handle this new function. Significant free time could also be used for inservice training of patrol personnel.

The type and mix of officer activities any department selects is limited only by the imagination of the police managers in that agency and their willingness to experiment with new methods. A number of caveats, however, are appropriate at this point:

- Implementation of the response alternatives recommended here requires considerable planning, including analysis of call workloads, determination of key factors to be used to differentiate calls, examination of existing call intake and dispatch procedures and projection of the cost and impact. A decision to implement these alternatives should not be taken lightly or hastily.
- Implementation of response alternatives can be expected to disrupt department operations to some degree. Administrators should make efforts to provide sufficient lead time, and affected personnel should be involved in defining the various components of the model and trained in using it.
- Once response alternatives are in place, administrators must examine deployment patterns among shifts and within beats. In many police agencies, these beat and shift structures are predicated on a call-for-service workload handled in a traditional manner. If a significant number of calls are no longer handled by mobile, sworn-officer response, these deployment plans are no longer relevant.
- Regardless of management assurances to the contrary, some officers will see the implementation of response alternatives as a mechanism for reducing personnel levels. For this reason, it is important to consider early on the productive use of freed patrol officer time and to develop support for whatever use of that time seems best.

By design, this research project has been exploratory. Although the response models are supported by research and the experience of scores of professionals, their efficacy can be established only by testing them in the real world and measuring their effectiveness and consequences.

Appendix A: Project Staffing

Project Director

Lee Hitchcock

Advisory Board

Al Andrews
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Michael Cahn
Hugo Masini

Joseph McNamara
Bill Myers
Richard Myren
James Parsons

Victor Strecher

Consultants

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Henry Copeland
Richard Crow
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John Burke, Hartford Police Department
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Phillip Camilleri
Sylvia Gonzales
Tony Hughes
Susan McLeod
Patricia Myers
William North

Model Development Panel Members

Task Force #1
(Birmingham Officers)

Officer Gerald Ash
Officer Dan Bianchi
Officer W.A. Cox
Officer Mike Denny
Officer Pat Giambone
Officer John Harold Jones
Officer John Nunlee
Officer Mike Shephard

Task Force #2

Lt. Robert Bradshaw,
San Jose
Officer Mike Denny,
Birmingham
Officer James Donnelly,
Hartford
Sgt. Tim Hogan,
Hartford
Officer Ed Papis,
Peoria
Officer Doug Ward,
Peoria

Task Force #3

William Bieck
Peter Manning
Steve Schack
Thomas Sweeney

Appendix B: Operational Survey Instrument and Tables

POLICE AGENCY SURVEY

1-3 Official Name of Department: _____

4-5 Name of Jurisdiction (City or County, and State): _____

6-7

Give the name, rank, unit and telephone number of the person responsible for the completion of this questionnaire. If more than one person helped to complete this questionnaire then give this information for the person who coordinated the completion.

Name and rank: _____

Unit: _____

Telephone number: AC _____ # _____

Date completed: _____

8 Check this box if you would like to receive the results of this survey:

WHEN COMPLETED MAIL THIS QUESTIONNAIRE AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT MATERIAL TO:

ACTING CHIEF GEORGE WALL
 BIRMINGHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT
 710 NORTH 20th STREET, EIGHTH FLOOR
 BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35203
 ATTN: MS CINDI PARKER

PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE. A BOX MARKED "ESTIMATE" IS PROVIDED NEXT TO THE BOXES THAT REQUIRE NUMERICAL RESPONSE. CHECK THE "ESTIMATE" BOX IF THE NUMERICAL ANSWER IS AN ESTIMATE. IF THE INFORMATION REQUIRED TO ANSWER A QUESTION IS UNAVAILABLE PLEASE ENTER "N/A" IN THE BOX PROVIDED. IF THE QUESTION DOES NOT APPLY TO YOUR DEPARTMENT ENTER "DNA" IN THE ANSWER BOX OR SPACE.

WHILE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE MAY APPEAR TO BE QUITE LENGTHY MANY OF THE QUESTIONS WILL ONLY REQUIRE A YES/NO RESPONSE.

A. JURISDICTION OF DEPARTMENT

1. Number of square miles your department serves:

9-12 Estimate

2. Number of citizens residing within your department's jurisdiction:

13-20 Estimate

B. DEPARTMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS

1. Department's operating budget for fiscal year 1977:

21-29 Estimate

2. City's or county's operating budget for fiscal year 1977:

30-38 Estimate

3. Authorized number of sworn officers for your department:

39-43 Estimate

4. Actual number of sworn officers in your department:

44-48 Estimate

CONTINUED

1 OF 3

5. Number of civilian employees who are:

a. Clerical (Secretarial, filing, typing, etc.):

49-52 Estimate

b. Computer related (Programmer, keypunch):

53-56 Estimate

c. Dispatchers or phone operators:

57-60 Estimate

d. Other:

61-64 Estimate

e. Total number of civilian employees:

65-68 Estimate

6. Total number of citizen initiated calls for service your department received in 1977:

69-76 Estimate

C. DISPATCH OPERATIONS

1. Does your department directly control dispatch operations for police services provided by your department?

YES → GO TO ITEM C2.

77 NO ↓

What agency does control these dispatch operations?

GO TO ITEM C2.

2. Do the dispatch operations for police services also provide dispatch operations for other public or private services?

YES

78 NO → GO TO ITEM C3.

Which of the following services use the same dispatch operations as police services (Check all appropriate boxes):

79 Fire

80 Ambulance

81 Civil Defense

82 Other (Please describe) _____

GO TO ITEM C3.

3. Do the telephone operators who receive citizens' requests for police services also dispatch police officers?

- 83 YES, telephone operators also dispatch police officers.
 NO, telephone operators do not dispatch police officers.

4. Does your department's dispatch operation employ people who decide and tell the dispatchers how citizen calls for service are to be handled?

- 84 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM C5.

a) What is the official title of these people?

b) Are these people:

- 85 Sworn police officers?
86 Civilians?
87 Both sworn police officers and civilians?

c) How many of these people are employed in your agency?

88-90 Estimate

d) Do these people receive special training?

- 91 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM C5.

Please describe: _____

GO TO ITEM C5.

5. Do the telephone operators for your department receive special training to assist them in determining how to handle citizen calls for service?

- 92 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM C6.

a) Number of hours annually of basic training:

93-96 Estimate

b) Number of hours annually of in-service training:

97-100 Estimate

GO TO ITEM C6.

6. Are the telephone operators for your department given a list of the types of citizen calls for service that tells the telephone operators how the calls should be handled?

- 101 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM C7.

Please describe this list or attach a copy: _____

GO TO ITEM C7.

(Use additional sheets if needed)

b) Does your department have any policies on how directly monitored alarm calls should be handled?

- 133 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM D1c.

Please describe these policies or attach copies: _

(Use additional sheets if needed)
GO TO ITEM D1c.

c) Does your department have any programs designed, at least in part, to reduce the number of false alarms for directly monitored calls?

- 134 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM E1.

Please describe these policies or attach documentation:

(Use additional sheets if needed)
GO TO ITEM E1.

E. RESPONSES TO CALLS FOR SERVICE

1. Is it your department's policy to send a police officer to respond to all telephone requests for police service?

- 135 YES → GO TO ITEM E2.
 NO →

a) Please describe generally the types of calls that police officers are not sent to:

(Use additional sheets if needed)

b) Please describe briefly what services (if any) citizens receive if a police officer is not sent to respond to their call for service:

(Use additional sheets if needed)

GO TO ITEM E2.

8. Does your department use civilian volunteers to make initial responses to some types of requests for service?

- 176 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM E9.

Do these civilian volunteers: (Check all appropriate boxes)

Provide general patrol services?

177 Work with sworn officers as a team?

Perform other tasks? (Specify) _____

(Use additional sheets if needed)

GO TO ITEM E9.

9. Does your department use paid paraprofessional police officers to make initial responses to some types of requests for service?

- 178 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM E10.

Do these paraprofessionals: (Check all appropriate boxes)

Provide general patrol services?

179 Work with sworn officers as a team?

Perform other tasks? (Specify) _____

(Use additional sheets if needed)

GO TO ITEM E10.

10. Does your department employ specially trained or educated civilians who respond to requests for service?

- 180 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM E11.

a) Do these civilians: (Check all appropriate boxes)

Provide general patrol services?

181 Work with sworn officers as a team?

Perform other tasks? (Specify) _____

(Use additional sheets if needed)

b) Please describe the training and education of these civilians:

GO TO ITEM E11.

11. Does your department use any special method (eg, special units, specialized training, referral to another agency, etc.) for handling intoxicated individuals?

- 182 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM E12.

Please describe this special method your department uses to handle intoxicated individuals, or attach documentation:

(Use additional sheets if needed)
GO TO ITEM E12.

12. Does your department use any special method (eg, special units, specialized training, referral to another agency, etc.) for handling the mentally disturbed?

- 183 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM E13.

Please describe this special method your department uses to handle the mentally disturbed, or attach documentation:

(Use additional sheets if needed)
GO TO ITEM E13.

13. Does your department use any special method (eg, special units, specialized training, referral to another agency, etc.) for handling family disturbances?

- 184 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM E14.

Please describe this special method your department uses to handle family disturbances, or attach documentation:

(Use additional sheets if needed)
GO TO ITEM E14.

14. Does your department use any special method (eg, special units, specialized training, referral to another agency, etc.) for handling "environmental" calls for service (eg, noisy neighbors, dog bites, neighborhood squabbles, etc.)?

- 185 YES
 NO → GO TO ITEM E15.

Please describe this special method your department uses to handle "environmental" calls for service, or attach documentation:

(Use additional sheets if needed)
GO TO ITEM E15.

Distribution of Respondents, by Region
and Population

Jurisdictions over 1,000,000 population

Northeast

1. Erie County (NY)
2. Nassau County (NY)
3. New York City (NY)
4. Philadelphia (PA)

North Central

5. Chicago (IL)
6. Detroit (MI)
7. Milwaukee County (WI)
8. Wayne County (MI)

South

9. Dallas County (TX)
10. Houston (TX)
11. Harris County (TX)

West

12. Los Angeles County (CA)
13. Los Angeles (CA)
14. Maricopa County (AZ)
15. Orange County (CA)

Jurisdictions between 500,000 & 999,999
population

Northeast

16. Boston (MA)
17. Essex County (NJ)

North Central

18. Cleveland (OH)
19. Columbus (OH)
20. Indianapolis (IN)
21. Kansas City (MO)
22. St. Louis (MO)

South

23. Baltimore (MD)
24. Baltimore County (MD)
25. Dade County (FL)
26. Dallas (TX)
27. District of Columbia (D.C.)
28. Fairfax County (VA)
29. Jacksonville-Duval County (FL)
30. Montgomery County (MD)
31. New Orleans (LA)
32. Prince Georges County (MD)

West

33. Denver (CO)
34. Phoenix (AZ)
35. San Antonio (TX)
36. San Diego (CA)
37. San Francisco (CA)
38. San Jose (CA)
39. Seattle (WA)

Jurisdictions between 250,000 and 499,999
population

Northeast

- 40. Jersey City (NJ)
- 41. Newark (NJ)
- 42. Pittsburgh (PA)
- 43. Rochester (NY)

North Central

- 44. Akron (OH)
- 45. Cincinnati (OH)
- 46. Minneapolis (MN)
- 47. Omaha (NE)
- 48. St. Paul (MN)
- 49. Toledo (OH)
- 50. Wichita (KS)

South

- 51. Atlanta (GA)
- 52. Austin (TX)
- 53. DeKalb County (GA)
- 54. El Paso (TX)
- 55. Charlotte (NC)
- 56. Ft. Worth (TX)
- 57. Jefferson County (KY)
- 58. Louisville (KY)
- 59. Miami (FL)
- 60. Nashville (TN)
- 61. Norfolk (VA)
- 62. Oklahoma City (OK)
- 63. Orange County (FL)
- 64. Tampa (FL)
- 65. Tulsa (OK)
- 66. Virginia Beach (VA)
- 67. Birmingham (AL)

West

- 68. Albuquerque (NM)
- 69. Las Vegas (NV)
- 70. Long Beach (CA)
- 71. Oakland (CA)
- 72. Portland (OR)
- 73. San Diego
County (CA)
- 74. Tucson (AZ)

Jurisdictions between 100,000 and 249,999
population

Northeast

- 75. Albany (NY)
- 76. Elizabeth (NJ)
- 77. Erie (PA)
- 78. Hartford (CT)
- 79. New Haven (CT)
- 80. Patterson (NJ)
- 81. Springfield (MA)
- 82. Stamford (CT)
- 83. Syracuse (NY)
- 84. Waterbury (CT)
- 85. Worcester (MA)
- 86. Yonkers (NY)

North Central

- 87. Ann Arbor (MI)
- 88. Dayton (OH)
- 89. Dearborn (MI)
- 90. Des Moines (IA)
- 91. Duluth (MN)
- 92. Flint (MI)
- 93. Ft. Wayne (IN)
- 94. Gary (IN)
- 95. Grand Rapids (MI)
- 96. Kansas City (KS)
- 97. Lansing (MI)
- 98. Lincoln (NE)
- 99. Madison (WI)
- 100. Peoria (IL)
- 101. Racine (WI)
- 102. Rockford (IL)
- 103. Springfield (MO)
- 104. Topeka (KS)
- 105. Warren (MI)
- 106. Youngstown (OH)
- 107. Hamilton County (OH)
- 108. South Bend (IN)
- 109. Livonia (MI)
- 110. Canton (OH)

Jurisdictions between 100,000 and 249,999
population (continued)

South

- 111. Alexandria (VA)
- 112. Amarillo (TX)
- 113. Arlington County (VA)
- 114. Arlington (TX)
- 115. Beaumont (TX)
- 116. Charleston County (W. VA)
- 117. Chattanooga (TN)
- 118. Columbia (SC)
- 119. Columbus (GA)
- 120. Corpus Christi (TX)
- 121. Ft. Lauderdale (FL)
- 122. Greensboro (NC)
- 123. Hampton (VA)
- 124. Hialeah (FL)
- 125. Irving (TX)
- 126. Jackson (MS)
- 127. Lexington-Fayette County (KY)
- 128. Lubbock (TX)
- 129. Macon (GA)
- 130. Mobile (AL)
- 131. Montgomery (AL)
- 132. Newport News (VA)
- 133. Orlando (FL)
- 134. Portsmouth (VA)
- 135. Raleigh (NC)
- 136. Richmond (VA)
- 137. Roanoke (VA)
- 138. St. Petersburg (FL)
- 139. Savannah (GA)
- 140. Waco (TX)

Jurisdictions between 100,000 and 249,999
population (continued)

West

- 141. Alameda County (CA)
- 142. Anaheim (CA)
- 143. Aurora (CO)
- 144. Berkeley (CA)
- 145. Colorado Springs (CO)
- 146. Eugene (OR)
- 147. Fremont (CA)
- 148. Fresno (CA)
- 149. Garden Grove (CA)
- 150. Glendale (CA)
- 151. Huntington Beach (CA)
- 152. Lakewood (CO)
- 153. Pueblo (CO)
- 154. Riverside (CA)
- 155. Salt Lake City (UT)
- 156. San Bernardino (CA)
- 157. Santa Ana (CA)
- 158. Spokane (WA)
- 159. Stockton (CA)
- 160. Sunnyvale (CA)
- 161. Tacoma (WA)
- 162. Torrance (CA)

Jurisdictions less than 100,000 population

Northeast

- 163. Bayonne (NJ)
- 164. East Orange (NJ)
- 165. New Rochelle (NY)
- 166. Newton (MA)
- 167. White Plains (NY)

North Central

- 168. Pontiac (MI)
- 169. Saginaw (MI)

South

- 170. Mecklenburg County (NC)
- 171. Wilmington (NC)
- 172. Hamilton County (TN)

West

- 173. Compton (CA)
- 174. Inglewood (CA)
- 175. Scottsdale (AZ)

Table 1. Number of Citizen-Initiated Calls, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Number of Calls		
		Low	Average	High
Over 1,000,000	14	21,720	1,337,686	6,500,000
Northeast	4 ^a	25,494	2,625,535	6,500,000
North Central	4 ^b	146,000	1,413,441	2,509,748
South	2	21,720	245,088	468,456
West	4 ^a	70,000	520,381	973,308
500,000-1,000,000	23	156,700	592,931	1,364,467
Northeast	1 ^a	--	100,000	--
North Central	5 ^b	410,519	802,703	1,142,500
South	10 ^a	156,700	591,974	1,364,467
West	7 ^c	309,307	514,881	969,717
250,000-499,999	34	25,751	295,275	1,012,918
Northeast	5 ^a	25,751	217,679	374,756
North Central	7 ^b	128,909	202,038	333,139
South	16 ^d	103,000	359,867	1,012,918
West	6 ^e	153,094	296,972	439,536
100,000-249,999	85	7,500	127,022	880,000
Northeast	11 ^e	55,000	163,294	880,000
North Central	24 ^f	37,071	161,682	846,051
South	30 ^g	7,500	104,256	500,000
West	20 ^h	30,000	99,630	365,000
Less than 100,000	11	13,497	49,727	115,000
Northeast	4 ^a	14,000	45,981	115,000
North Central	2 ^a	50,000	154,474	78,948
South	3 ^a	13,497	39,903	78,000
West	2 ^a	44,411	57,206	70,000

- ^aIncludes 1 department's estimate.
- ^bIncludes 2 departments' estimates.
- ^cIncludes 3 departments' estimates.
- ^dIncludes 6 departments' estimates.
- ^eIncludes 4 departments' estimates.
- ^fIncludes 8 departments' estimates.
- ^gIncludes 14 departments' estimates.
- ^hIncludes 5 departments' estimates.

Table 2. Number of Departments and Percentage That Dispatch Individual Services, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	No Other Dispatch (%)	Additional Dispatch (%)	Additional Service			
				Fire	Amb	CD	Other
Over 1,000,000	14	8 (57%)	6 (43%)	2	3	3	4
Northeast	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)	1	1	1	--
North Central	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)	--	1	--	2 ^a
South	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	1	1	1	1 ^b
West	4	3 (75%)	1 (25%)	--	--	1	1 ^c
500,000-1,000,000	24	15 (63%)	9 (37%)	4	3	5	7
Northeast	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	1	--	--	--
North Central	5	5 (100%)	-- (0%)	--	--	--	--
South	10	5 (50%)	5 (50%)	--	1	3	5 ^d
West	7	4 (57%)	3 (43%)	3	2	2	2
250,000-499,999	34	22 (65%)	12 (35%)	5	7	3	10
Northeast	5	4 (80%)	1 (20%)	1	1	--	1 ^e
North Central	7	3 (43%)	4 (57%)	2	2	2	3 ^g
South	16	10 (63%)	6 (37%)	2	4	1	5 ^h
West	6	5 (83%)	1 (17%)	--	--	--	1 ⁱ
100,000-249,999	87	52 (60%)	35 (40%)	18	20	17	24
Northeast	12	10 (83%)	2 (17%)	--	1	1	1 ^j
North Central	24	9 (28%)	15 (72%)	8	10	7	10 ^k
South	30	19 (63%)	11 (37%)	6	7	5	6 ^l
West	21	14 (67%)	7 (33%)	4	2	4	7 ^m
Less than 100,000	11	4 (36%)	7 (64%)	2	6	4	4
Northeast	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)	--	2	1	1 ⁿ
North Central	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	--	1	1	--
South	3	-- (0%)	3 (100%)	1	2	1	3 ^o
West	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	1	1	1	--
All Responding Depts.	170	101 (59%)	69 (41%)				

^aProvides backup for other emergency services (one department) and serves town police (one department).
^bServes constable, medical examiner, and district attorney's special crime unit.
^cServes marshal, city attorney, and town police.
^dServes animal warden (one department), local police (two departments), and traffic repair calls (two departments).
^eServes traffic repair calls (one department) and alcohol rehabilitation calls (one department), and provides other backup as necessary (one department).
^fServes other city needs after hours (one department).
^gServes animal warden (one department); air pollution, parking, and university calls (one department); and sheriff and marshal (one department).

Table 2 (continued)

^hServes town police (one department), animal warden (two departments), police wrecker (one department), engineer after hours (one department), and other city functions after hours (one department).
ⁱServes school security guards (one department).
^jServes town police (one department).
^kServes animal wardens (four departments); public works department (one department); seven town police forces (one department); city information (one department); freeway patrol (one department); park, public works, and electric company emergencies after hours (one department); traffic engineers, airport security, and parking calls (one department); and park emergencies (one department).
^lServes animal wardens (two departments), traffic repair (two departments), public works departments (two departments), local government (one department), traffic engineers (one department), and emergency calls (one department).
^mServes animal wardens (three departments), district attorney (two departments), sheriff (one department), other city government calls (one department), school patrol (one department), animal wardens after hours (one department), university calls (one department), and traffic repair (one department).
ⁿServes town police (one department).
^oServes town police (one department), animal warden (one department), traffic repair (one department), and other emergencies (one department).

Table 3. Number and Percentage of Departments Where Operators Also Dispatch, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Operator Dispatch	
		Yes (%)	No (%)
Over 1,000,000	14	4 (29%)	10 (71%)
Northeast	4	3 (75%)	1 (25%)
North Central	4	1 (25%)	3 (75%)
South	2	0 (0%)	2 (100%)
West	4	0 (0%)	4 (100%)
500,000-1,000,000	24	3 (12%)	21 (88%)
Northeast	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
North Central	5	1 (20%)	4 (80%)
South	10	0 (0%)	10 (100%)
West	7	1 (14%)	6 (86%)
250,000-499,999	34	6 (18%)	28 (82%)
Northeast	5	0 (0%)	5 (100%)
North Central	7	1 (14%)	6 (86%)
South	16	4 (25%)	12 (75%)
West	6	1 (17%)	5 (83%)
100,000-249,999	83	29 (34%)	57 (66%)
Northeast	12	2 (17%)	10 (83%)
North Central	23	11 (48%)	12 (52%)
South	30	10 (33%)	20 (67%)
West	21	6 (29%)	15 (71%)
Less than 100,000	11	8 (73%)	3 (27%)
Northeast	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
North Central	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
South	3	2 (67%)	1 (33%)
West	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
All Responding Departments	169	50 (30%)	119 (70%)

Table 4. Number and Percentage of Departments Using Sworn or Civilian Operators, or Both, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	Operators						Total No. of Depts.
	Sworn		Civilian		Both		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Over 1,000,000	5	36	6	43	3	21	14
Northeast	1	25	2	50	1	25	4
North Central	1	25	1	25	2	50	4
South	--	--	2	100	--	--	2
West	3	75	1	25	--	--	4
500,000-1,000,000	--	--	12	52	11	48	23
Northeast	--	--	2	100	--	--	2
North Central	--	--	1	20	4	80	5
South	--	--	5	50	5	50	10
West	--	--	4	67	2	33	6
250,000-499,999	3	10	16	53	11	37	30
Northeast	--	--	2	50	2	50	4
North Central	1	20	1	20	3	60	5
South	--	--	9	60	6	40	15
West	2	33	4	67	--	--	6
100,000-249,999	7	9	60	73	15	18	82
Northeast	2	17	8	66	2	17	12
North Central	1	4	18	82	3	14	22
South	1	3	20	69	8	28	29
West	3	16	14	74	2	10	19
Less than 100,000	1	10	8	80	1	10	10
Northeast	1	33	2	67	--	--	3
North Central	--	--	2	100	--	--	2
South	--	--	2	67	1	33	3
West	--	--	2	100	--	--	2
Grand Total	16	10	102	64	41	26	159

Table 5. Number and Percentage of Departments Using Sworn or Civilian Dispatchers, or Both, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	Dispatchers						Total No. of Depts.
	Sworn		Civilian		Both		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Over 1,000,000	6	43	3	21	5	36	14
Northeast	1	25	1	25	2	50	4
North Central	3	75	--	--	1	25	4
South	1	50	--	--	1	50	2
West	1	25	2	50	1	25	4
500,000-1,000,000	3	13	6	25	15	62	24
Northeast	1	50	1	50	--	--	2
North Central	--	--	--	--	5	100	5
South	1	10	3	30	6	60	10
West	1	14	2	29	4	57	7
250,000-499,999	4	13	19	61	8	26	31
Northeast	2	50	--	--	2	50	4
North Central	2	33	3	50	1	17	6
South	--	--	10	67	5	33	15
West	--	--	6	100	--	--	6
100,000-249,999	14	17	45	53	25	30	84
Northeast	6	50	1	8	5	42	12
North Central	6	27	9	41	7	32	22
South	2	7	18	62	9	31	29
West	--	--	17	81	4	19	21
Less than 100,000	2	18	7	64	2	18	11
Northeast	1	25	3	75	--	--	4
North Central	1	50	1	50	--	--	2
South	--	--	1	33	2	67	3
West	--	--	2	100	--	--	2
Grand Total	29	18	80	49	55	33	164

Table 6. Number and Percentage of Departments with Dispatch Supervisors, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Dispatch Supervisors	
		Yes (%)	No (%)
		Over 1,000,000	14
Northeast	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
North Central	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
South	2	-- (0%)	2 (100%)
West	4	3 (75%)	1 (25%)
500,000-1,000,000	24	8 (33%)	16 (67%)
Northeast	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
North Central	5	2 (40%)	3 (60%)
South	10	3 (30%)	7 (70%)
West	7	2 (29%)	5 (72%)
250,000-499,999	34	18 (53%)	16 (47%)
Northeast	5	2 (40%)	3 (60%)
North Central	7	4 (57%)	3 (43%)
South	16	8 (50%)	8 (50%)
West	6	4 (67%)	2 (33%)
100,000-249,999	86	36 (42%)	50 (58%)
Northeast	12	4 (33%)	8 (67%)
North Central	23	8 (35%)	15 (65%)
South	30	16 (53%)	14 (47%)
West	21	8 (38%)	13 (62%)
Less than 100,000	11	2 (18%)	9 (82%)
Northeast	4	-- (0%)	4 (100%)
North Central	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
South	3	1 (33%)	2 (67%)
West	2	-- (0%)	2 (100%)
All Responding Departments	169	71 (42%)	98 (58%)

Table 7. Number of Departments Using Sworn and Civilian Supervisors, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Supervisors		
		Sworn	Civilian	Both
Over 1,000,000	7	7	--	--
Northeast	2	2	--	--
North Central	2	2	--	--
South	0	--	--	--
West	3	3	--	--
500,000-1,000,000	8	2	3	3
Northeast	1	1	--	--
North Central	2	1	--	--
South	3	--	2	1
West	2	--	1	1
250,000-499,999	18	9	2	7
Northeast	2	--	1	1
North Central	4	3	--	1
South	8	4	1	3
West	4	2	--	2
100,000-249,999	35	22	5	8
Northeast	4	2	--	2
North Central	8	6	1	1
South	16	9	2	5
West	7	5	2	--
Less than 100,000	2	1	--	1
Northeast	--	--	--	--
North Central	1	1	--	--
South	1	--	--	1
West	--	--	--	--

Table 8. Number and Percentage of Departments That Provide Training for Dispatch Supervisors, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Supervisor Training Provided	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	7	5 (71%)	2 (29%)
Northeast	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
North Central	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
South	0	--	--
West	3	1 (33%)	2 (67%)
500,000-1,000,000	8	7 (88%)	1 (12%)
Northeast	1	1 (100%)	0 (0%)
North Central	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
South	3	3 (100%)	0 (0%)
West	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
250,000-499,999	17	13 (76%)	4 (24%)
Northeast	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
North Central	4	3 (75%)	1 (25%)
South	8	5 (63%)	3 (37%)
West	3	3 (100%)	0 (0%)
100,000-249,999	35	22 (63%)	13 (37%)
Northeast	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
North Central	7	5 (71%)	2 (29%)
South	16	13 (81%)	3 (19%)
West	8	2 (25%)	6 (75%)
Less than 100,000	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
Northeast	0	--	--
North Central	1	(100%)	0 (0%)
South	1	(100%)	0 (0%)
West	0	--	--
All Responding Departments	69	49 (71%)	20 (29%)

Table 9. Number of Departments That Provide Training for Operators, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Training	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	14	9	5
Northeast	4	4	0
North Central	4	3	1
South	2	1	1
West	4	1	3
500,000-1,000,000	23	20	3
Northeast	2	2	0
North Central	4	3	1
South	10	9	1
West	7	6	1
250,000-499,999	33	24	9
Northeast	4	3	1
North Central	7	6	1
South	16	12	4
West	6	3	3
100,000-249,999	83	54	29
Northeast	11	6	5
North Central	21	13	8
South	30	20	10
West	21	15	6
Less than 100,000	11	6	5
Northeast	4	1	3
North Central	2	1	1
South	3	3	0
West	2	1	1
Grand Total	164	113	51

Table 10. Number of Departments that Provide Training for Dispatchers, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Training	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	14	12	2
Northeast	4	4	0
North Central	4	4	0
South	2	0	2
West	4	4	0
500,000-1,000,000	24	21	3
Northeast	2	2	0
North Central	5	5	0
South	10	8	2
West	7	6	1
250,000-499,999	34	24	10
Northeast	5	3	2
North Central	7	4	3
South	16	11	5
West	6	6	0
100,000-249,999	86	62	24
Northeast	12	8	4
North Central	23	18	5
South	30	20	10
West	21	16	5
Less than 100,000	11	8	3
Northeast	4	2	2
North Central	2	2	0
South	3	3	0
West	2	1	1
Grand Total	169	127	42

Table 11. Number of Hours of Basic and Inservice Training Operators Receive, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	Basic Training				Inservice Training			
	No. of Depts.	Low	Median	High	No. of Depts.	Low	Median	High
Over 1,000,000	9	8	40	200	9	0	40	80
Northeast	4 ^a	40	55	80	4 ^b	0	30	80
North Central	3 ^c	20	70	200	3 ^b	10	50	70
South	1	--	8	--	1 ^c	--	8	--
West	1 ^c	--	32	--	1 ^c	--	40	--
500,000-1,000,000	19	4	80	240	17	0	36	120
Northeast	1 ^c	--	40	--	1 ^c	--	100	--
North Central	3 ^c	40	80	200	3	0	0	40
South	9 ^d	40	80	240	7 ^c	0	36	96
West	6 ^e	4	144	240	6 ^e	0	22	120
250,000-499,999	20	0	80	1,440	15	0	40	1,440
Northeast	3	40	40	80	3 ^c	25	40	168
North Central	5 ^b	40	80	1,440	3 ^a	16	32	40
South	9 ^b	0	40	240	6 ^{c,f}	0	50	1,440
West	3 ^b	160	160	280	3 ^a	10	40	160
100,000-249,999	44	0	40	960	42	0	24	250
Northeast	4 ^c	8	12	80	3 ^a	4	8	40
North Central	10 ^e	0	80	960	11 ^g	0	40	160
South	16 ^e	25	40	260	16 ^h	0	24	160
West	14 ^g	0	40	160	12 ^e	0	19	250
Less than 100,000	5	8	80	240	4	16	32	40
Northeast	1	--	240	--	1 ^c	--	16	--
North Central	1	--	140	--	1	--	40	--
South	3 ^b	8	20	80	2 ^a	24	--	40
West	0	--	--	--	0	--	--	--

^aIncludes two departments' estimates.
^bIncludes three departments' estimates.
^cIncludes one department's estimate.
^dIncludes four departments' estimates.
^eIncludes five departments' estimates.
^fTwo additional departments report that the number varies.
^gIncludes six departments' estimates.
^hIncludes eight departments' estimates.

Table 12. Number of Hours of Basic and Inservice Training Dispatchers Receive, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	Basic Training				Inservice Training			
	No. of Depts.	Low	Median	High	No. of Depts.	Low	Median	High
Over 1,000,000	11	20	105	1,600	10	0	37.5	640
Northeast	4 ^a	40	132.5	350	4 ^a	0	30	80
North Central	3	20	35	1,600	4 ^a	10	27.5	40
South	0	--	--	--	0	--	--	--
West	4 ^b	80	120	960	2 ^a	320	--	640
500,000-1,000,000	19	40	90	960	19	0	40	120
Northeast	1 ^c	--	40	--	2 ^c	0	--	100
North Central	4	40	85	250	5 ^c	0	8	60
South	8 ^b	40	80	720	6 ^c	0	40	96
West	6 ^c	50	184	960	6 ^d	0	52.5	120
250,000-499,999	18	0	80	2,880	19	0	32	1,440
Northeast	2 ^c	80	--	80	3 ^b	20	50	96
North Central	4 ^a	40	80	2,880	3 ^a	20	32	40
South	6 ^{c,e}	0	80	240	7 ^{c,e}	0	20	1,440
West	6 ^f	40	80	320	6 ^e	0	30	48
100,000-249,999	52	0	50	960	50	0	24	1,040
Northeast	6 ^f	8	40	80	5 ^b	0	40	140
North Central	14 ^g	0	50	640	16 ^h	0	24	160
South	17 ^d	20	72	300	16 ^h	0	24	160
West	15 ^h	0	40	960	13 ^f	0	24	1,040
Less than 100,000	7	8	40	240	6	0	32	40
Northeast	2 ^c	40	--	240	2 ^c	0	--	16
North Central	2 ^c	8	--	240	2	--	40	--
South	3 ^b	8	20	80 ^a	2	24	--	40
West	0	--	--	--	0	--	--	--

^aIncludes two departments' estimates.
^bIncludes three departments' estimates.
^cIncludes one department's estimate.
^dIncludes five departments' estimates.
^eOne additional department reports that the number varies.
^fIncludes four departments' estimates.
^gIncludes six departments' estimates.
^hIncludes eight departments' estimates.

Table 13. Number and Percentage of Departments That Provide a Call List to Operators, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Provision of Call List	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	13	6 (46%)	7 (54%)
Northeast	3	2 (67%)	1 (33%)
North Central	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
South	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
West	4	0 (0%)	4 (100%)
500,000-1,000,000	24	14 (58%)	10 (42%)
Northeast	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
North Central	5	3 (60%)	2 (40%)
South	10	6 (60%)	4 (40%)
West	7	4 (57%)	3 (43%)
250,000-499,999	34	10 (29%)	24 (71%)
Northeast	5	1 (20%)	4 (80%)
North Central	7	4 (43%)	3 (57%)
South	16	4 (25%)	12 (75%)
West	6	2 (33%)	4 (67%)
100,000-249,999	85	28 (33%)	57 (67%)
Northeast	12	0 (0%)	12 (100%)
North Central	23	8 (35%)	15 (65%)
South	30	10 (33%)	20 (67%)
West	20	10 (50%)	10 (50%)
Less than 100,000	11	1 (9%)	10 (91%)
Northeast	4	0 (0%)	4 (100%)
North Central	2	0 (0%)	2 (100%)
South	3	0 (0%)	3 (100%)
West	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
All Responding Departments	167	59 (34%)	108 (66%)

Table 14. Number and Percentage of Departments That Provide Standard Questions to Operators, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Provision of Standard Questions	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	14	8 (57%)	6 (43%)
Northeast	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
North Central	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
South	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
West	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
500,000-1,000,000	24	13 (54%)	11 (46%)
Northeast	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
North Central	5	1 (20%)	4 (80%)
South	10	9 (90%)	1 (10%)
West	7	2 (29%)	5 (71%)
250,000-499,999	34	17 (50%)	17 (50%)
Northeast	5	4 (80%)	1 (20%)
North Central	7	4 (57%)	3 (43%)
South	16	7 (44%)	9 (56%)
West	6	2 (33%)	4 (67%)
100,000-249,999	85	27 (32%)	58 (68%)
Northeast	12	3 (25%)	9 (75%)
North Central	23	7 (30%)	16 (70%)
South	30	7 (23%)	23 (77%)
West	20	10 (50%)	10 (50%)
Less than 100,000	11	4 (36%)	7 (64%)
Northeast	4	1 (25%)	3 (75%)
North Central	2	0 (0%)	2 (100%)
South	3	2 (67%)	1 (33%)
West	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
All Responding Departments	168	69 (41%)	99 (59%)

Table 15. Number and Percentage of Departments That Send Police Officers to All Requests for Service, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Departments Sending Police Officers	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	14	2 (14%)	12 (86%)
Northeast	4	1 (25%)	3 (75%)
North Central	4	0 (0%)	4 (100%)
South	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
West	4	0 (0%)	4 (100%)
500,000-1,000,000	24	2 (8%)	22 (92%)
Northeast	2	0 (0%)	2 (100%)
North Central	5	0 (0%)	5 (100%)
South	10	2 (20%)	8 (80%)
West	7	0 (0%)	7 (100%)
250,000-499,999	33	7 (21%)	26 (79%)
Northeast	5	2 (40%)	3 (60%)
North Central	6	2 (33%)	4 (67%)
South	16	3 (19%)	13 (81%)
West	6	0 (0%)	6 (100%)
100,000-249,999	87	20 (23%)	67 (77%)
Northeast	12	4 (33%)	8 (67%)
North Central	24	5 (21%)	19 (79%)
South	30	9 (30%)	21 (70%)
West	21	2 (10%)	21 (90%)
Less than 100,000	11	2 (18%)	9 (82%)
Northeast	4	1 (25%)	3 (75%)
North Central	2	0 (0%)	2 (100%)
South	3	1 (33%)	2 (67%)
West	2	0 (0%)	2 (100%)
All Responding Departments	169	33 (20%)	136 (80%)

Table 16. Number and Percentage of Departments That Rank Calls by Priority, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Rank Calls	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	14	11 (79%)	3 (21%)
Northeast	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
North Central	4	3 (75%)	1 (25%)
South	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
West	4	4 (100%)	0 (0%)
500,000-1,000,000	24	18 (75%)	6 (25%)
Northeast	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
North Central	5	2 (40%)	3 (60%)
South	10	8 (80%)	2 (20%)
West	7	7 (100%)	0 (0%)
250,000-499,999	34	27 (79%)	7 (21%)
Northeast	5	3 (60%)	2 (40%)
North Central	7	7 (100%)	0 (0%)
South	16	11 (69%)	5 (31%)
West	6	6 (100%)	0 (0%)
100,000-249,999	87	58 (67%)	29 (33%)
Northeast	12	7 (58%)	5 (42%)
North Central	24	17 (71%)	7 (29%)
South	30	16 (53%)	14 (47%)
West	21	18 (86%)	3 (14%)
Less than 100,000	11	5 (55%)	6 (45%)
Northeast	4	1 (25%)	3 (75%)
North Central	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
South	3	2 (67%)	1 (33%)
West	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
All Responding Departments	170	119 (70%)	51 (30%)

Table 17. Number and Percentage of Departments That Stack Calls, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Departments Stack Calls	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	14	7 (50%)	7 (50%)
Northeast	4	1 (25%)	3 (75%)
North Central	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
South	2	0 (0%)	2 (100%)
West	4	4 (100%)	0 (0%)
500,000-1,000,000	24	18 (75%)	6 (25%)
Northeast	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
North Central	5	4 (80%)	1 (20%)
South	10	7 (70%)	3 (30%)
West	7	6 (86%)	1 (14%)
250,000-499,999	34	21 (62%)	13 (38%)
Northeast	5	3 (60%)	2 (40%)
North Central	7	4 (57%)	3 (43%)
South	16	9 (56%)	7 (44%)
West	6	5 (83%)	1 (17%)
100,000-249,999	87	67 (77%)	20 (23%)
Northeast	12	8 (67%)	4 (33%)
North Central	24	21 (88%)	3 (12%)
South	30	19 (63%)	11 (37%)
West	21	19 (90%)	2 (10%)
Less than 100,000	11	8 (64%)	3 (36%)
Northeast	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
North Central	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
South	3	2 (67%)	1 (33%)
West	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
All Responding Departments	170	121 (71%)	49 (29%)

Table 18. Number and Percentage of Departments That Alert Citizens to Delays in Answering Calls, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Report Delays	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	7	4 (57%)	3 (43%)
Northeast	1	0 (0%)	1 (100%)
North Central	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
South	0	--	--
West	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
500,000-1,000,000	18	11 (61%)	7 (39%)
Northeast	1	0 (0%)	1 (100%)
North Central	4	3 (75%)	1 (25%)
South	7	3 (43%)	4 (57%)
West	6	5 (83%)	1 (17%)
250,000-499,999	21	17 (81%)	4 (19%)
Northeast	3	2 (67%)	1 (33%)
North Central	4	3 (75%)	1 (25%)
South	9	7 (78%)	2 (22%)
West	5	5 (100%)	0 (0%)
100,000-249,999	67	54 (81%)	13 (19%)
Northeast	8	5 (63%)	3 (37%)
North Central	21	17 (81%)	4 (19%)
South	19	14 (74%)	5 (26%)
West	19	18 (95%)	1 (5%)
Less than 100,000	8	7 (88%)	1 (12%)
Northeast	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
North Central	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
South	2	2 (100%)	0 (0%)
West	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
All Responding Departments	121	93 (77%)	28 (23%)

Table 19. Number and Percentage of Departments That Schedule Appointments, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Appointment Scheduling	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	14	5 (36%)	9 (64%)
Northeast	4	0 (0)	4 (100)
North Central	4	3 (75)	1 (25)
South	2	1 (50)	1 (50)
West	4	1 (25)	3 (75)
500,000-1,000,000	24	7 (29)	17 (71)
Northeast	2	0 (0)	2 (100)
North Central	5	3 (60)	2 (40)
South	10	2 (20)	8 (80)
West	7	2 (29)	5 (71)
250,000-499,999	33	9 (27)	24 (73)
Northeast	5	1 (20)	4 (80)
North Central	6	1 (17)	5 (83)
South	16	3 (19)	13 (81)
West	6	4 (67)	2 (33)
100,000-249,999	86	19 (22)	67 (78)
Northeast	11	2 (18)	9 (82)
North Central	24	4 (17)	20 (83)
South	30	8 (27)	22 (73)
West	21	5 (24)	16 (76)
Less than 100,000	11	2 (18)	9 (82)
Northeast	4	1 (25)	3 (75)
North Central	2	0 (0)	2 (100)
South	3	1 (33)	2 (67)
West	2	0 (0)	2 (100)
All Responding Departments	168	42 (25)	126 (75)

Table 20. Number and Percentage of Departments That Use Special Units to Respond Initially to Calls, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Use Special Units	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	14	4 (29%)	10 (71%)
Northeast	4	1 (25%)	3 (75%)
North Central	4	2 (50%)	2 (50%)
South	2	0 (0%)	2 (100%)
West	4	1 (25%)	3 (75%)
500,000-1,000,000	23	4 (17%)	19 (83%)
Northeast	2	0 (0%)	2 (100%)
North Central	5	3 (60%)	2 (40%)
South	9	0 (0%)	9 (100%)
West	7	1 (14%)	6 (86%)
250,000-499,999	33	11 (33%)	22 (67%)
Northeast	5	1 (20%)	4 (80%)
North Central	6	1 (17%)	5 (83%)
South	16	6 (37%)	10 (63%)
West	6	3 (50%)	3 (50%)
100,000-249,999	87	31 (36%)	56 (64%)
Northeast	12	4 (33%)	8 (67%)
North Central	24	6 (25%)	18 (75%)
South	30	13 (43%)	17 (57%)
West	21	8 (38%)	13 (62%)
Less than 100,000	11	1 (9%)	10 (91%)
Northeast	4	0 (0%)	4 (100%)
North Central	2	0 (0%)	2 (100%)
South	3	0 (0%)	3 (100%)
West	2	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
All Responding Departments	168	51 (30%)	117 (70%)

Table 21. Number and Percentage of Departments in Which Civilian Volunteers Respond, by Activity Category, Population Size, and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Civilian Volunteers				
		Yes	Patrol	Team	Other	None
Over 1,000,000	14	3 (21%)	1 (7%)	1 (7%)	1 (21%)	11 (79%)
Northeast	4	1 (25)	--	--	1 (25)	3 (75)
North Central	4	1 (25)	--	--	1 (25)	3 (75)
South	2	0 (0)	--	--	--	2 (100)
West	4	1 (25)	1 (25)	1 (25)	1 (25)	3 (75)
500,000-1,000,000	24	6 (25)	3 (13)	5 (21)	4 (17)	18 (75)
Northeast	2	0 (0)	--	--	--	2 (100)
North Central	5	2 (40)	1 (20)	2 (40)	1 (20)	3 (60)
South	10	2 (20)	1 (10)	2 (20)	1 (10)	8 (80)
West	7	2 (29)	1 (14)	1 (14)	1 (14)	5 (71)
250,000-499,999	34	10 (29)	4 (12)	6 (18)	7 (21)	24 (71)
Northeast	5	1 (20)	1 (20)	--	--	4 (80)
North Central	7	1 (14)	--	--	1 (14)	6 (86)
South	16	4 (25)	2 (13)	3 (19)	2 (13)	3 (75)
West	6	4 (67)	1 (17)	3 (50)	4 (67)	2 (33)
100,000-249,999	86	15 (17)	6 (7)	11 (13)	13 (15)	71 (83)
Northeast	12	2 (17)	--	--	2 (17)	10 (83)
North Central	23	3 (13)	3 (13)	2 (9)	3 (13)	20 (87)
South	30	6 (20)	3 (10)	5 (17)	4 (13)	24 (80)
West	21	4 (19)	--	4 (19)	4 (19)	17 (81)
Less than 100,000	11	1 (9)	1 (9)	1 (9)	1 (9)	10 (91)
Northeast	4	0 (0)	--	--	--	4 (100)
North Central	2	0 (0)	--	--	--	2 (100)
South	3	0 (0)	--	--	--	3 (100)
West	2	1 (50)	1 (50)	1 (50)	1 (50)	1 (50)
All Responding Depts.	169	35 (21)	15 (9)	18 (11)	26 (15)	134 (79)

Table 22. Number and Percentage of Departments That Use Trained Civilian Employees, by Activity Category, Population Size, and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Trained Civilians				
		Yes	Patrol	Team	Other	None
Over 1,000,000	14	5 (36%)	1 (7%)	2 (14%)	5 (36%)	9 (64%)
Northeast	4	1 (25)	--	1 (25)	1 (25)	3 (75)
North Central	4	2 (50)	--	--	2 (50)	2 (50)
South	2	--	--	--	--	2 (100)
West	4	2 (50)	1 (25)	1 (25)	2 (50)	2 (50)
500,000-1,000,000	24	9 (37)	4 (17)	3 (13)	7 (29)	15 (63)
Northeast	2	1 (50)	--	--	1 (50)	1 (50)
North Central	5	2 (40)	2 (40)	2 (40)	1 (20)	3 (60)
South	10	3 (30)	1 (10)	1 (10)	3 (30)	7 (70)
West	7	3 (43)	1 (14)	--	2 (29)	5 (71)
250,000-499,999	34	14 (41)	1 (3)	3 (9)	14 (41)	20 (59)
Northeast	5	2 (40)	--	1 (20)	2 (40)	3 (60)
North Central	7	2 (29)	--	--	2 (29)	5 (71)
South	16	6 (37)	1 (6)	2 (13)	6 (38)	10 (63)
West	6	4 (67)	--	--	4 (67)	2 (33)
100,000-249,999	86	32 (37)	2 (2)	5 (6)	31 (36)	54 (63)
Northeast	12	2 (17)	--	--	2 (17)	10 (83)
North Central	23	11 (48)	2 (9)	1 (4)	11 (48)	12 (52)
South	30	9 (30)	--	2 (7)	4 (30)	21 (70)
West	21	10 (48)	--	2 (10)	9 (43)	11 (52)
Less than 100,000	11	3 (27)	--	--	3 (27)	8 (73)
Northeast	4	1 (25)	--	--	1 (25)	3 (75)
North Central	2	--	--	--	--	2 (100)
South	3	--	--	--	--	3 (100)
West	2	2 (100)	--	--	2 (100)	0 (0)
All Responding Depts.	169	63 (37)	8 (5)	13 (8)	60 (36)	106 (63)

Table 23. Number and Percentage of Departments in Which Paid Paraprofessionals Respond, by Activity Category, Population Size, and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Paid Paraprofessionals				
		Yes	Patrol	Team	Other	None
Over 1,000,000	14	2 (14%)	1 (7%)	2 (14%)	2 (14%)	12 (86%)
Northeast	4	1 (25)	--	1 (25)	1 (25)	3 (75)
North Central	4	--	--	--	--	4 (100)
South	2	1 (50)	1 (50)	1 (50)	1 (50)	1 (50)
West	4	--	--	--	--	4 (100)
500,000-1,000,000	24	5 (21)	1 (4)	1 (4)	3 (13)	19 (79)
Northeast	2	--	--	--	--	2 (100)
North Central	5	1 (20)	--	--	--	4 (80)
South	10	1 (10)	--	--	1 (10)	9 (90)
West	7	3 (43)	1 (14)	1 (14)	2 (29)	4 (57)
250,000-499,999	32	4 (12)	2 (6)	--	2 (6)	28 (88)
Northeast	4	1 (25)	1 (25)	--	--	3 (75)
North Central	7	1 (14)	--	--	1 (14)	6 (86)
South	15	--	--	--	--	15 (100)
West	6	2 (33)	1 (17)	--	1 (17)	4 (67)
100,000-249,999	85	15 (18)	3 (4)	3 (4)	14 (16)	70 (82)
Northeast	11	--	--	--	--	11 (100)
North Central	23	5 (22)	1 (4)	1 (4)	5 (22)	18 (78)
South	30	4 (13)	1 (3)	--	4 (13)	26 (87)
West	21	6 (29)	1 (5)	2 (10)	5 (24)	15 (71)
Less than 100,000	11	2 (18)	--	--	2 (18)	9 (82)
Northeast	4	--	--	--	--	4 (100)
North Central	2	1 (50)	--	--	1 (50)	1 (50)
South	3	--	--	--	--	3 (100)
West	2	1 (50)	--	--	1 (50)	1 (50)
All Responding Depts.	166	28 (17)	7 (4)	7 (4)	23 (14)	138 (83)

Table 24. Number and Percentage of Departments That Permit Telephone Reporting (no personal police field response required), by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Permit Telephone Reporting	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	14	7 (50%)	7 (50%)
Northeast	4	3 (75)	1 (25)
North Central	4	0 (0)	4 (100)
South	2	1 (50)	1 (50)
West	4	3 (75)	1 (25)
500,000-1,000,000	24	19 (79)	5 (21)
Northeast	2	1 (50)	1 (50)
North Central	5	5 (100)	0 (0)
South	10	7 (70)	3 (30)
West	7	6 (86)	1 (14)
250,000-499,999	34	24 (71)	10 (29)
Northeast	5	1 (20)	4 (80)
North Central	7	5 (71)	2 (29)
South	16	12 (75)	4 (25)
West	6	6 (100)	0 (0)
100,000-249,999	87	50 (57)	37 (43)
Northeast	12	4 (33)	8 (67)
North Central	24	15 (63)	9 (37)
South	30	16 (53)	14 (47)
West	21	15 (71)	6 (29)
Less than 100,000	11	4 (36)	7 (64)
Northeast	4	1 (25)	3 (75)
North Central	2	0 (0)	2 (100)
South	3	2 (67)	1 (33)
West	2	1 (50)	1 (50)
All Responding Departments	170	104 (61)	66 (39)

Table 25. Number and Percentage of Departments That Require Walk-In by Callers to File Some Types of Complaints, by Population Size and Region

Population Size and Region	No. of Depts.	Walk-In Required	
		Yes	No
Over 1,000,000	14	9 (64%)	5 (36%)
Northeast	4	1 (25)	3 (75)
North Central	4	3 (75)	1 (25)
South	2	2 (100)	0 (0)
West	4	3 (75)	1 (25)
500,000-1,000,000	24	13 (54)	11 (46)
Northeast	2	2 (100)	0 (0)
North Central	5	5 (100)	0 (0)
South	10	2 (20)	8 (80)
West	7	4 (57)	3 (43)
250,000-499,999	33	17 (52)	16 (48)
Northeast	5	3 (60)	2 (40)
North Central	6	2 (33)	4 (67)
South	16	7 (44)	9 (56)
West	6	5 (83)	1 (17)
100,000-249,999	87	45 (52)	42 (48)
Northeast	12	6 (50)	6 (50)
North Central	24	19 (79)	5 (21)
South	30	8 (27)	22 (73)
West	21	12 (57)	9 (43)
Less than 100,000	11	7 (64)	4 (36)
Northeast	4	3 (75)	1 (25)
North Central	2	2 (100)	0 (0)
South	3	1 (33)	2 (67)
West	2	1 (50)	1 (50)
All Responding Departments	169	91 (54)	78 (46)

CALLS FOR SERVICE BY POLICE FUNCTION FOR SITE CITIES, 1977

Police Function	Birmingham		Hartford		Peoria		San Jose	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Crime Control	63,668	32.0	61,656	41.9	57,559	34.7	78,178	42.0
Traffic Enforcement	64,108	32.2	32,757	22.3	73,016	44.0	36,839	19.8
Peace Maintenance	23,741	11.9	32,006	21.8	14,099	8.5	51,395	27.6
Social Services	15,253	7.7	19,254	13.1	17,286	10.4	18,831	10.1
Unclassified	<u>32,332</u>	<u>16.2</u>	<u>1,310</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>3,927</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>933</u>	<u>.5</u>
TOTAL	199,102	100.0	146,983	100.0	165,887	100.0	186,176	100.0

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF CALLS FOR SERVICE BY
POLICE FUNCTION FOR BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

Police Function	1976		1977	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Crime Control	56,549	30.9	63,668	32.0
Traffic Enforcement	60,370	33.0	64,108	32.2
Peace Maintenance	20,032	10.9	23,741	11.9
Social Services	14,112	7.7	15,253	7.7
Unclassified	32,118	17.5	32,332	16.2
TOTAL	183,181	100.0	199,102	100.0

SIGNAL CODE COMPONENTS OF MAJOR FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES
FOR BIRMINGHAM

CRIME CONTROL

ALARMS

PROPERTY

Burglary
Larceny
Auto Theft
Worthless Document
Bomb

PERSONAL

Robbery
Purse Snatching
Homicide
Personal Assault
Rape

VICE

Gambling
Liquor Violation
Narcotics
Prostitution

SUSPICIOUS

CIRCUMSTANCES

Prowler
Suspicious Vehicle
Person With A Gun
Suspicious Person

TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT

Abandoned Vehicle
Traffic Accident
Hit and Run
Pedestrian Struck
Driving While Intoxicated
Reckless Driving
Parking Violation
Miscellaneous Traffic Violation
Hazardous Road Condition
Assist Motorist
Routine Traffic Stop
Direct Traffic
Escorts

PEACE MAINTENANCE

CONFRONTATIONS

Disturbance
Affray
Domestic Disturbance
Disorderly Person

NUISANCES

Malicious Mischief

SOCIAL SERVICES

Animal Nuisance
Dangerous Animal
Injured Animal
Pollution Complaint
Deceased Person
Mentally Disturbed Person
Person Down
Missing Person
Drunk
Fire

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF CALLS FOR SERVICE BY
POLICE FUNCTION FOR HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT

Police Function	1976		1977	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Crime Control	55,730	41.5	61,656	42.0
Traffic Enforcement	26,681	19.9	32,757	22.3
Peace Maintenance	33,362	24.8	32,006	21.8
Social Services	17,430	13.0	19,254	13.1
Unclassified	<u>1,147</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>1,310</u>	<u>.9</u>
TOTAL	134,350	100.1	146,983	100.0

SIGNAL CODE COMPONENTS OF MAJOR FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES
FOR HARTFORD

CRIME CONTROL

ALARMS

PROPERTY

Bomb
Looting
Thefts, Shoplifting
Fraud, Flim-Flam
Breaking and Entering
Stolen Vehicle
Property Damage

PERSONAL

Assaults
Sniper
Kidnap/Unlawful Restraint
Purse Snatch
Mugging
Hold-Up
Rape
Homicide

VICE

Narcotics
Liquor
Gambling

135

SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES

Gun
Other Weapon
Suspicious Person
Suspicious Vehicle

TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT

Motor Vehicle Accident
Accident - Other
Standing Violation
Drunk Driving
Evading Responsibility
Other Moving Violation
Assist Motorist
Hazardous Condition
Traffic Control
Escort

PEACE MAINTENANCE

CONFRONTATIONS

Domestic Disturbances
Breach of Peace
Threatening-Harrassment
Large disorderly group

NUISANCES

Juveniles, left
Miscellaneous juvenile
complaint
Indecent exposure
Moral turpitude

SOCIAL SERVICES

Open Hydrant
Animal Complaint
Sick Person
Animal Body
Attempted Suicide
Mental Case
Sudden Death Found
Intoxication
Heat Complaint
Missing Person
Lost or Found Property

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF CALLS FOR SERVICE BY
POLICE FUNCTION FOR PEORIA, ILLINOIS

Police Function	Number	1977 Percent
Crime Control	57,559	34.7
Traffic Enforcement	73,016	44.0
Peace Maintenance	14,099	8.5
Social Services	17,286	10.4
Unclassified	3,927	2.4
TOTAL	165,887	100.0

SIGNAL CODE COMPONENTS OF MAJOR FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES
FOR PEORIA

CRIME CONTROL

ALARMS

PROPERTY

- Shoplifter
- Investigate
- Place Prowled
- Place Kicked In

PERSONAL

- Man Molesting Girl

VICE

SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES

- Suspicious Man
- Man With A Gun
- House Check

TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT

- Violation Stop
- Auto Accident
- Escort
- Wires Down
- Check A Car
- Traffic Control

PEACE MAINTENANCE

CONFRONTATIONS

- Trouble
- Fight
- Man Beating Wife

NUISANCES

- Boys
- Man Exposing Self
- Window Peeper
- School

SOCIAL SERVICES

- Fire
- Drunk
- Want the Police
- See A Man
- Person Down in Street
- Meet a Car
- Lost Child
- Dogs
- See a Woman
- Transporting Intoxicated Person

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF CALLS FOR SERVICE BY
POLICE FUNCTION FOR SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA

Police Function	1977	
	Number	Percent
Crime Control	78,178	42.0
Traffic Enforcement	36,739	19.7
Peace Maintenance	51,395	27.6
Social Services	18,831	10.1
Unclassified	933	.5
TOTAL	186,076	99.9

SIGNAL CODE COMPONENTS OF MAJOR FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES
FOR SAN JOSE

CRIME CONTROL

- ALARMS
- PROPERTY
 - Auto Theft
 - Bomb Threat
 - Burglary
 - Explosion
 - Receiving Stolen Property
 - Theft
 - Arson
- PERSONAL
 - Assaults
 - Homicide
 - Kidnap
 - Rape
 - Robbery
 - Felony Sex Offenses
- VICE
 - Narcotics
 - Illegal Solicitation
 - ABC Violation
- SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
 - Field Stop
 - Check the Area
 - Security Check
 - Suspicious Circumstances/
Prowler
 - Weapons
 - Check the Premises

TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT

- Driving Under the Influence
- Driving Violation
- Parking Violation
- Plane Crash
- Traffic Hazard
- Abandoned Bicycle
- Traffic Control
- Illegal Parking/Impound Vehicle
- Public Safety Assistance
- Abandoned Vehicle
- Traffic Accidents
- Escorts


PEACE MAINTENANCE

- CONFRONTATIONS
 - Disturbing the Peace
 - Disturbing the Peace -
Family
 - Disturbing the Peace -
Fight
- NUISANCES
 - Juvenile Events
 - Bar Check
 - Keep the Peace
 - Indecent Exposure
 - Sex Offenses - Drunk
 - Malicious Mischief
 - Possession of Alcohol
by M...

SOCIAL SERVICES

- Deaths
- Detox
- Drunk in Public
- Mental Cases
- Missing Persons
- Garbage Complaint
- Fire
- Smoke Investigation
- Gas Investigation
- Attempt to Contact
- Attempt to Locate
- Citizen Service
- Courtesy Service
- Found Property
- Flag Down
- Rescue
- Injured Person
- Sick Person
- Resuscitator
- Person Down
- Possible Dead Body
- Meet the Citizen
- Dead Animal
- Stray Horse
- Welfare Check

BIRMINGHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT
SUMMARY RESPONSE MODEL




* THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF INCIDENTS ARE HANDLED BY PHONE UNLESS A POLICE OFFICER'S PRESENCE IS REQUESTED: (1) AUTO ACCESSORY THEFT; (2) THEFTS FROM MOTOR VEHICLES WHERE NO FORCED ENTRY IS INVOLVED; (3) MISSING PERSONS AND RUNAWAYS (UNLESS THE PERSON IS A SMALL CHILD OR MENTALLY IMPAIRED, OR FOUL PLAY IS SUSPECTED) AND (4) MALICIOUS MISCHIEF, EXCEPT VANDALISM.

** BACK-UP AND SUPPORT UNITS INCLUDE PATROL BACK-UP, CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM, COMMUNITY SERVICE OFFICERS, SPECIAL TRAFFIC DIVISION, EVIDENCE TECHNICIANS, K-9 UNITS, AND TACT UNIT.


Appendix D: Procedural Analysis

HARTFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT
SUMMARY RESPONSE MODEL



*BACK-UP AND SUPPORT UNITS INCLUDE PATROL BACK-UP, AMBULANCE, WRECKER, JUVENILE DIVISION, VICE DIVISION, DETECTIVES, FIRE DEPARTMENT, AND EVIDENCE TECHNICIANS.


PEORIA POLICE DEPARTMENT
SUMMARY RESPONSE MODEL



*EITHER THE BEAT UNIT, OR THE REPORT CAR, IS DISPATCHED. THE REPORT CAR IS MANNED BY A ROOKIE, AND IS DISPATCHED TO TAKE REPORTS OF INACTIVE, MINOR INCIDENTS, WHEN THERE IS NO DANGER TO THE OFFICER.

**BACK-UP AND SUPPORT UNITS INCLUDE PATROL BACK-UP, ERS, POLICE WAGON, AMBULANCE, FIRE DEPARTMENT, WRECKER, JUVENILE DIVISION, VICE DIVISION, DETECTIVES, AND THE CRIME LAB.

SAN JOSE POLICE DEPARTMENT
SUMMARY RESPONSE MODEL



COST OF DIRECT LABOR AND FRINGES FOR STAFFING
A PATROL BEAT WITH ONE OFFICER

	Birmingham	Hartford	Peoria	San Jose	Composite
Average patrol officer's salary . . . including cash fringes such as city government contributions to pension plans, payments of life and health insurance, education incentive, seniority pay, workmen's compensation, etc.	\$17,426.00	\$19,845.00	\$21,375.00	\$25,301.00	\$20,987.00
Assignment/Availability ratio in department to convert actual position to abstract patrol officer position filled 365 days per year	1.6	1.76	1.6	1.73	1.67
Average patrol officer's salary multiplied by the assignment/availability ratio to determine salary cost of manning one patrol beat with one officer for 365 days per year	\$27,882.00	\$34,927.00	\$34,200.00	\$43,771.00	\$35,048.00
Labor cost per day for patrol beat manned by one officer	\$ 76.38	\$ 95.69	\$ 93.70	\$ 119.92	\$ 96.02
Labor cost per hour (8 hour day) for patrol beat manned by one officer	\$ 9.55	\$ 11.96	\$ 11.71	\$ 14.99	\$ 12.00
Labor cost per minute for patrol beat manned by one officer	\$.16	\$.20	\$.20	\$.25	\$.20

STAFFING PATTERNS OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS STUDIED

	Birmingham	Hartford	Peoria	San Jose	Composite
1. Total number people assigned to traditionally uniformed operations--sworn and non-sworn--Patrol and Traffic functions	507	363*	155	582*	402
2. Total number people assigned units other than traditionally uniformed operations	347	220	131	483	296
3. Total number personnel of police department--sworn and non-sworn	852	583**	286**	1,065**	696**
4. Percentage of total assigned to traditionally uniformed operations	59.5	62.2	54.1	54.6	57.8

* Both Hartford and San Jose have had budget cuts since we began collecting data and have been losing personnel so that they are operating with fewer personnel as this report is issued.

** This grouping does not distinguish among numbers of personnel providing direct service to the public as opposed to those who perform strictly administrative function to other police officers. It merely distinguishes between the preliminary investigations personnel and those who do follow-up investigations.

INCREMENT OF OVERHEAD SALARY COSTS WITHIN OPERATION
BUREAUS TO COVER COST OF SUPERVISION,
ADMINISTRATION AND NON-SWORN
PERSONNEL

	Birmingham 20.7%*	Hartford 20.7%	Peoria 17.6%	San Jose 23.7%	Composite 20.7%
1. Average patrol officer's salary . . . including cash fringes (annual) multiplied by assignment/availability ratio	\$27,882.00	\$34,927.00	\$34,200.00	\$50,314.00	\$36,626.00
2. Proportion of patrol officer's salary spent to provide supervision, administration, and support by non-sworn personnel salaries (annual)	\$ 5,772.00	\$ 7,230.00	\$ 6,019.00	\$11,924.00	\$ 7,582.00
3. Supervisory/administrative/non-sworn support salary cost on a daily basis	\$ 15.81	\$ 19.81	\$ 16.49	\$ 32.67	\$ 20.77
4. Supervisory/administrative/non-sworn support salary cost on an hourly basis (8 hour day)	\$ 1.98	\$ 2.48	\$ 2.06	\$ 4.08	\$ 2.60
5. Supervisory/administrative/non-sworn salary cost on a per minute basis	\$.033	\$.041	\$.034	\$.068	\$.043
6. Labor cost per minute for patrol beat for one officer	\$.16	\$.20	\$.20	\$.25	\$.20
7. Labor cost per minute for patrol beat for one officer with supervisory/administrative/non-sworn salary cost added	\$.193	\$.241	\$.234	\$.318	\$.243

* The 20.7% figures used for Birmingham and Hartford are averages of the 17.6% used for Peoria and the 23.7% used for San Jose. The Peoria and San Jose budgets distinguish among those salaries paid to patrolmen, supervisory, and non-sworn personnel, while the Birmingham and Hartford budgets do not make such distinctions. Since the proportion of supervisory/administrative/non-sworn personnel do not appear to vary widely, we have used the Peoria - San Jose figures to estimate the Birmingham and Hartford percentages.

OVERHEAD COSTS FROM SUPPORTING UNITS WITHIN POLICE
DEPARTMENTS ALLOCABLE TO SUPPORT OF TRADITIONALLY
UNIFORMED OPERATIONS

	Birmingham	Hartford	Peoria	San Jose	Composite
1. Chief's Office and Staff - including functions of public information; research; administration; inspection; intelligence; legal services; internal affairs; community relations; and psychological services. Total expenditure for function in 1977	\$1,569,972.00	\$ 884,785.00	\$ 628,025.00	\$1,067,000.00	\$1,037,445.00
2. Service Bureaus - including functions of communications; detention; property control; records; personnel; training; evidence collection and preservation; and building maintenance. Total expenditure for function in 1977	\$2,827,692.00	\$ 838,840.00	\$1,379,415.00	\$4,692,473.00	\$2,434,605.00
3. Total expenditures for Chief's Office and Service Bureaus (1 + 2)	\$4,397,664.00	\$1,723,625.00	\$2,007,440.00	\$5,759,473.00	\$3,472,050.00
Percentage of personnel resources assigned to traditionally uniformed operations	59.2%	62.2%	54.1%	54.6%	57.8%
4. Overhead from Chief's Office and Service Bureaus allocable to traditionally uniformed operations	\$2,603,417.00	\$1,072,095.00	\$1,086,025.00	\$3,144,672.00	\$1,976,552.00
5. Total number personnel assigned to traditionally uniformed operations	507	363	155	582	402
6. Allocable overhead divided by number of personnel assigned to traditionally uniformed operations (4+5)	\$ 5,135.00	\$ 2,953.00	\$ 7,007.00	\$ 5,403.00	\$ 4,917.00
7. Allocable overhead cost per day for patrol beat manned by one officer (24 hour day)	\$ 14.07	\$ 8.09	\$ 19.20	\$ 14.80	\$ 13.47

	Birmingham	Hartford	Peoria	San Jose	Composite
8. Allocable overhead cost per hour for patrol beat manned by one officer (line 7*24 hours)	\$.586	\$.337	\$.800	\$.617	\$.585
9. Allocable overhead cost per minute for patrol beat manned by one officer (line 8*60 minutes)	\$.0098	\$.0056	\$.0133	\$.0103	\$.0098
10. Labor cost per minute for patrol beat for one officer with supervisory/administrative/non-sworn personnel salary cost added	\$.193	\$.241	\$.234	\$.318	\$.243
11. Total labor cost per minute for patrol beat for one officer with supervisory/administrative/non-sworn salary (within uniform divisions) and allocable overhead cost per minute for support from other divisions (item 9 plus item 10)	\$.2028	\$.2466	\$.2473	\$.3283	\$.2563

* The rationale for these computations is to divide police functions into those which provide direct services to the public and those which primarily support either direct services or other support units. Thus, all investigative functions (both adult and juvenile) are considered to be direct service to the public and none of the investigative costs are allocated to patrol support. Costs other than patrol and investigation are considered to be support unit costs that should be partially allocated to the patrol function. The support functions are organizationally located in different parts of the police departments studied. To allow comparability, the support functions have been grouped into two broad groups. Since salaries make up the bulk of police department costs, allocation of support costs are made on the basis of the percentage of total police department personnel assigned to traditionally uniformed operations (includes patrol and traffic).

COST OF PERSONAL UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT OF OFFICERS

	Birmingham	Hartford	Peoria	San Jose	Composite
1. Value of annual uniform allowance or actual uniforms furnished patrolmen	\$175.00	\$390.00	\$240.00	\$150.00	\$239.00
2. Equipment furnished each officer (includes items such as leather goods, weapons, badge, handcuffs, ticket book covers, batons, and such items that last more than one year). Annual share of equipment -- presumed to last five years	\$254.00 † 5= \$ 51.00	\$160.00 † 5= \$ 32.00	\$185.00 † 5= \$ 37.00	\$440.00 † 5= \$ 88.00	\$ 52.00
3. Total of uniform and equipment on annual basis	\$226.00	\$422.00	\$277.00	\$238.00	\$291.00
4. Line 3 on daily basis (line 3÷365)	\$.619	\$ 1.156	\$.759	\$.652	\$.797
5. Line 3 on hourly basis (line 4÷24 hrs.)	\$.0258	\$.0482	\$.0316	\$.0272	\$.0332
6. Line 3 on per minute basis (line 5÷60 min.)	\$.0004	\$.0008	\$.0005	\$.0005	\$.0006
7. Total cost per minute	\$.2028	\$.2466	\$.2473	\$.3283	\$.2563
8. Total cost per minute for one officer without transportation	\$.2032	\$.2474	\$.2478	\$.3288	\$.2568

PER MINUTE COST OF DIFFERENT RESPONSE MODES
COMPOSITE POLICE DEPARTMENT

	Primary Unit Cost	Total Cost If One-Officer back- up Patrol car is sent*	Total Cost if Two-Officer back- up unit is sent*
1. One Officer without Transportation	\$.2568	\$.5568	\$.8136
2. One Officer Patrol car	\$.3000	\$.6000	\$.8568
3. Two Officer Patrol car	\$.5568	\$.8568	\$1.1136

* One does not expect that a back-up unit will be tied up for as long as the unit assigned primary responsibility for a service call. This table shows per minute cost and the proper adjustments for the proportionally fewer minutes spent by a back-up unit must be taken into account with applying this data to a typical call.

COST OF PATROL CARS

	Birmingham	Hartford	Peoria	San Jose	Composite
1. Number of new cars usually added to patrol fleet each year	50	20	19	75	41
2. Average cost paid for each new patrol car	\$ 5,389.00	\$ 5,500.00	\$ 5,500.00	\$ 3,700.00	\$ 5,022.25
3. Package added to each patrol car: radio, screens, gun racks, first aid kits, etc. Projected four year life of package results in 25% of package cost added to this annual cost table	\$ 1,062.00	\$ 2,000.00	\$ 1,050.00	\$ 2,331.00	\$ 1,610.00
4. Average cost paid for each new patrol car including 25% of patrol car package.	\$ 6,451.00	\$ 7,500.00	\$ 6,550.00	\$ 6,031.00	\$ 6,633.00
5. Total annual fleet replacement cost (Line 1 times Line 4)	\$322,550.00	\$150,000.00	\$124,450.00	\$452,325.00	\$262,331.25
6. Total annual patrol fleet maintenance costs (Includes gasoline, oil, replacements, and repairs)	\$500,250.00	\$574,186.00	\$159,000.00	\$1,300,000.00	\$633,359.00
7. Total fleet cost (Line 5 plus Line 6)	\$822,800.00	\$724,186.00	\$283,450.00	\$1,752,325.00	\$895,690.25
8. Fleet cost on unit basis (Line 7 divided by line 1)	\$ 16,456.00	\$ 36,309.30	\$ 14,918.42	\$ 23,364.33	\$ 22,737.01
9. Daily unit cost (Line 8 divided by 365)	\$ 45.08	\$ 99.20	\$ 40.87	\$ 64.01	\$ 62.29
10. Hourly unit cost (Line 9 divided by 24 hours)	\$ 1.88	\$ 4.13	\$ 1.70	\$ 2.67	\$ 2.60
11. Per minute unit cost (Line 10 divided by 60 minutes)	\$.0313	\$.0668	\$.0283	\$.0445	\$.0432
12. Cost per minute for patrol officer	\$.2032	\$.2474	\$.2478	\$.3288	\$.2568
13. Cost per minute for one officer in patrol car	\$.2345	\$.3162	\$.2761	\$.3733	\$.3000
14. Cost per minute for two officer patrol car	\$.4377	\$.5636	\$.5239	\$.7021	\$.5568

Appendix F: Community Survey Instrument and Results

ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE PROJECT COMMUNITY SURVEY

I. INTRODUCTION

IF THE FULL NAME OF THE PERSON WHO CALLED FOR POLICE SERVICE IS KNOWN, PROCEED TO THE SECOND PARAGRAPH (MARKED WITH AN *). IF ONLY A LAST NAME OR PHONE NUMBER IS KNOWN, BEGIN WITH THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH.

Good (morning/afternoon/evening). My name is _____ and I am an associate of the (Birmingham/San Jose) Police Department. We are currently contacting citizens who have recently called the police department requesting police services in order to survey their reactions to how the police responded. According to our records, someone at this number (by the name of _____) requested police services on (date) _____ at about (time) _____ concerning a (case category) _____. Can you tell me who that person was?

IF YOU ARE SPEAKING WITH THE PERSON WHO MADE THE CALL FOR POLICE SERVICE, RECORD HIS/HER NAME AND PROCEED TO THE BEGINNING OF THE INTERVIEW (AT THE QUESTION MARKED WITH AN **). OTHERWISE, ASK:

May I please speak with (him/her)?

ONCE YOU HAVE THE PROPER PERSON ON THE PHONE, PROCEED WITH THE FOLLOWING INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH (OMITTING THE FIRST QUESTION, OF COURSE.) IF THAT PERSON IS UNAVAILABLE, ASK WHEN A GOOD TIME TO CALL BACK WOULD BE, AND NOTE THE SUGGESTED CALL-BACK TIME ON THE FILE CARD.

* May I speak with _____?

IF HE/SHE IS NOT AT HOME OR NOT AVAILABLE, TRY TO DETERMINE WHEN WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO TRY TO CONTACT HIM/HER. NOTE THIS TIME ON THE FILE CARD.

Good (morning/afternoon/evening) Mr(s). _____.
My name is _____ and I am an associate of the (Birmingham/San Jose) Police Department. We are currently contacting citizens who have recently called the police department requesting police services in order to survey their reactions to how the police responded. According to our records, you called the police department at (time) _____, on (date) _____, concerning a (case category) _____. Is this correct?

(IF ANSWER IS NO: Can you tell me who requested police services from this phone number at that time? May I speak with (him/her)?
(REPEAT INTRODUCTION TO THAT PERSON)

** (IF ANSWER IS YES) Could I have a few minutes of your time in order to ask a few questions about the incident that prompted you to call the police?

IF THE RESPONDENT SEEMS RELUCTANT, TELL HIM/HER THAT HIS NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER WERE SELECTED AT RANDOM AND THAT ALL ANSWERS WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL. IF HE QUESTIONS THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW, TELL HIM THAT IT WILL ONLY TAKE APPROXIMATELY TEN MINUTES TO COMPLETE. IF HE STATES THAT HE IS VERY BUSY AT THE MOMENT, ARRANGE TO CALL BACK ON A SPECIFIC DAY AND AT A SPECIFIC TIME. IF HE DOUBTS THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE STUDY, ASK HIM TO CALL YOU BACK THROUGH THE POLICE DEPARTMENT SWITCHBOARD AND PROVIDE HIM WITH THAT NUMBER.

NOTE: ALL "I DON'T KNOW" RESPONSES SHOULD BE CODED "9" FOR ALL QUESTIONS.

II. INCIDENT

1. Could you briefly describe the incident?
2. Who was it that needed police assistance? Was it you or someone else?
 1. Respondent
 2. Someone else
3. What was the length of time between the incident's occurrence and your call to the police department?
 1. 5 minutes or less
 2. 5+ - 15 minutes
 3. 15+ - 30 minutes
 4. 30+ - 60 minutes
 5. More than an hour
4. In your opinion, did the police department answer the phone quickly enough?
 1. Yes
 2. No
5. Were you satisfied with the way the operator at the police department handled your call?
 1. Yes
 2. No(IF NO) Would you tell me why you were not satisfied?

6. A. Did the police department respond to your call by sending a patrol car or other departmental representative?
1. Yes

(IF YES) CODE "0" FOR 6C AND PROCEED TO QUESTION 7.

2. No

(IF NO)

B. How did the police department handle your case?

C. How satisfied were you with this method of handling your case?

1. Very satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied

THEN CODE "0's" FOR QUESTIONS 7, 8, 10, 11; ASK QUESTION 9 AND THEN RESUME WITH QUESTION 12.

7. Once you made your call, how long did it take for the police to arrive?
1. 5 minutes or less
2. 5+ - 10 minutes
3. 10+ - 15 minutes
4. 15+ - 30 minutes
5. More than 30 minutes
8. How satisfied were you with the length of time it took for the police to arrive?
1. Very satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Dissatisfied
4. Very Dissatisfied
9. Do you feel that an immediate response to your call was necessary?
1. Yes
(IF YES) Why?
2. No
10. What do you think an acceptable response time would have been?
1. 5 minutes or less
2. 5+ - 10 minutes
3. 10+ - 15 minutes
4. 15+ - 30 minutes
5. More than 30 minutes
11. How satisfied were you with the police services after the police arrived on the scene?
1. Very satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Dissatisfied
4. Very Dissatisfied

12. Have you requested other help from the (Birmingham/San Jose) Police Department during the past year?

1. Yes

(IF YES)

a. How would you compare assistance given during previous contacts with the police with that given in this recent incident? Was the assistance you received this time?

1. Better
2. About the same
3. Worse

2. No

13. In general, what is your feeling about the quality of police service in (Birmingham/San Jose)? Do you feel that the quality of police service is:

1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Marginal
4. Poor
5. Terrible

III. ALTERNATIVES

Next, we have several questions concerning your attitudes toward possible changes in the way the police handle some calls for service. In an effort to provide the citizens of (Birmingham/San Jose) with efficient and effective police services while attempting to conserve tax dollars, there are several alternative ways of responding to calls for service which we would like to explore with you. So now let me ask you a few questions concerning ways in which the police might have responded to the incident which we have just been discussing.

14. (a) First, do you think there should be non-police type agencies to handle your type of case?
1. Yes
(IF YES) What type of agencies should be available?
2. No
(IF NO) Would you please explain why you answered as you did?
- (b) If such non-police type agencies were available, would you use them?
1. Yes
2. No
Would you please explain why you answered as you did?
- (c) If such non-police type agencies were available, do you believe other people in circumstances similar to yours would use them?
1. Yes
2. No
Would you please explain why you answered as you did?

15. If, when calling to request police services, you had been informed that all necessary information for the report could be taken over the phone, thus making a patrol car response unnecessary, would that have been: (READ RESPONSES)
 1. Acceptable
 2. Not very acceptable
 3. Definitely unacceptable
 (If 2 or 3) Why?
16. If, after having taken your report of the incident over the phone, the police operator had asked you to come to police headquarters at your convenience to fill out a more detailed report, instead of sending a patrol car, would that have been: (READ RESPONSES)
 1. Acceptable
 2. Not very acceptable
 3. Definitely unacceptable
 (If 2 or 3) Why?
17. If an appointment had been made to meet with you at your (home/business) at your convenience rather than having the police respond immediately, would that have been: (READ RESPONSES)
 1. Acceptable
 2. Not very acceptable
 3. Definitely unacceptable
 (If 2 or 3) Why?
18. If you had been told by the police operator that the response to your call would be delayed up to 30 minutes, would that have been: (READ RESPONSES)
 1. Acceptable
 2. Not very acceptable
 3. Definitely unacceptable
 (If 2 or 3) Why?
19. If you had been told when you called the response would be delayed up to 30 minutes in order to provide you with a police employee who specializes in handling your type of case, would that have been: (READ RESPONSES)
 1. Acceptable
 2. Not very acceptable
 3. Definitely unacceptable
 (If 2 or 3) Why?

NOTE: IN COVERING QUESTIONS 20, 21, AND 22, USE EXAMPLES APPROPRIATE TO THE TYPE OF CASE.

20. If a civilian employee of the police department (such as a (community service officer/police social worker/evidence technician)), with proper identification, had responded rather than a uniformed officer, would that have been: (READ RESPONSES)
 1. Acceptable
 2. Not very acceptable
 3. Definitely unacceptable
 (If 2 or 3) Why?
21. If a representative of a non-police public agency (such as (welfare department/child or wife abuse centers/ mental health center/fire department/ animal shelter/alcohol and drug abuse center)) had responded instead of the police department, would that have been: (READ RESPONSES)
 1. Acceptable
 2. Not very acceptable
 3. Definitely unacceptable
 (If 2 or 3) Why?
22. If a representative of a private agency (such as (insurance company/private security force/family counseling service/child guidance center)) had responded instead of the police department, would that have been: (READ RESPONSES)
 1. Acceptable
 2. Not very acceptable
 3. Definitely unacceptable
 (If 2 or 3) Why?

IV DEMOGRAPHICS

23. Finally, so that we can group all comments, please tell me into which of the following age groups do you fall:

1. Under 20 years	5. 50-59 years
2. 20-29 years	6. 60-69 years
3. 30-39 years	7. 70 years or older
4. 40-49 years	8. Refused
24. (RECORD RESPONDENT'S SEX)
 1. Male
 2. Female
25. How long have you lived in the city of (Birmingham/San Jose)?

1. One year or less	5. 15+ - 20 years
2. 1+ - 5 years	6. 20+ - 30 years
3. 5+ - 10 years	7. 30+ - 40 years
4. 10+ - 15 years	8. More than 40 years

26. How long have you lived at your present address?
- | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. One year or less | 5. 10+ - 15 years |
| 2. 1+ - 3 years | 6. 15+ - 20 years |
| 3. 3+ - 5 years | 7. 20+ - 30 years |
| 4. 5+ - 10 years | 8. More than 30 years |
27. Do you own the place where you're living now or are you renting?
1. Owns or is buying
 2. Renting
28. What is your race?
- | | |
|---------------------|-----------------|
| 1. White | 4. Puerto Rican |
| 2. Black | 5. Asian |
| 3. Mexican-American | 6. Other |
29. Your marital status:
1. Single (never married)
 2. Married
 3. Divorced
 4. Separated
 5. Widowed
30. What level of education have you completed?
1. Never attended, or kindergarten
 2. Elementary (grades 1-8)
 3. High school (grades 9-12)
 4. Some college course work
 5. College graduate (4 years)
 6. Post-graduate training
31. Which of the following describes you most accurately?
1. Employed
 2. Housewife (not employed outside the home)
 3. Full-time student
 4. Retired
 5. Unemployed
32. Are you the head of this household?
1. Yes
 2. No
- NOTE: IF ANSWER TO QUESTION 32 IS "YES," CODE A "1" FOR QUESTION 33 AS WELL AS FOR 32 AND PROCEED TO QUESTION 34.
33. What is your relationship to the head of this household?
- | | |
|----------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Head of household | 4. Child of head |
| 2. Wife of head | 5. Other relative |
| 3. Husband of head | 6. Non-relative |

34. What is the occupation of the head of this household?

ENCOURAGE THE RESPONDENT TO BE VERY SPECIFIC. ASK FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS AS NEEDED TO PINPOINT OCCUPATION AND LEVEL OF JOB CURRENTLY HELD BY THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD. (WHEN CODING, LEAVE TWO BLANK SPACES FOR THIS QUESTION.)

35. Could you tell me which of the following categories best describes the combined annual income of everyone over 12 in your household who lives with you? By annual income we mean wages and salaries (before taxes), as well as pensions and regular government or public assistance checks. Into which of the following categories would your household's total yearly income fall?
- | | |
|------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Less than \$6,000 | 5. \$15,001 - \$20,000 |
| 2. \$6,001 - \$9,000 | 6. \$20,001 - \$30,000 |
| 3. \$9,001 - \$12,000 | 7. More than \$30,000 |
| 4. \$12,001 - \$15,000 | 8. Refused |
36. That concludes the questions on our survey. Do you have any other comments that you would like to make concerning police response to the incident we have been discussing or police services in general?

Okay, thank you very much for your time and cooperation, Mr(s). _____ . Have a pleasant (day/evening).

Overview of Preliminary Results of San Jose
Community Survey

(1) Quality of Police services in San Jose

	(N=600) All respondents	(N=412) White	(N=39) Black	(N=100) Mexican-American
Excellent or good	75.3%	78.4%	64.1%	71.0%
Marginal	15.2%	12.9%	20.5%	18.0%
Poor or terrible	7.5%	6.3%	15.4%	9.0%

(2) Satisfied with police services after police arrived on the scene:

	(N=561) All respondents	(N=384) White	(N=35) Black	(N=96) Mexican-American
Satisfied or very satisfied	84.0%	84.6%	80.0%	86.5%
Dissatisfied or very dissatisfied	13.7%	12.8%	20.0%	11.5%

(3) Police answered phone quickly enough: 89.7% yes

(4) Satisfied with way police operator handled their call: 88.2% yes

(5) Satisfied with amount of time taken for police to arrive on the scene: 83.0% satisfied

(6) Did you feel an immediate response to your call was necessary: 57.2% yes

(7) Would you have used non-police agencies if available: 60.5% yes

ALTERNATIVES
(% acceptable overall)

- Civilian employee of police department responding, 72.8%
- Response delayed 30 minutes with a specialist responding, 62.2%
- Response delayed up to 30 minutes, 52.2%
- Response by representative of non-police public agency, 42.7%
- Response by representative of private agency, 41.2%
- Police making appointment to meet citizen, 38.5%
- Police taking report over the phone, 29.3%
- Citizen coming to police headquarters to fill out report, 20.7%

(1) Quality of Police services in Birmingham

	All respondents (N=600)	Whites (N=298)	Blacks (N=298)
Excellent or good	75.9%	78.5%	75.2%
Marginal	15.9%	16.1%	15.8%
Poor or terrible	6.0%	4.3%	7.7%

(2) Satisfied with police services after police arrived on the scene:

	All respondents (N=539)	Whites (N=259)	Blacks (N=277)
Satisfied or very satisfied	88.4%	88.4%	84.9%
Dissatisfied or very dissatisfied	11.1%	9.3%	12.6%

(3) Police answered phone quickly enough: 96.2% yes

(4) Satisfied with way police operator handled their call: 93.7% satisfied

(5) Satisfied with amount of time taken for police to arrive on the scene: 83.8% satisfied

(6) Did you feel an immediate response to your call was necessary: 60.8% yes

(7) Would you have used non-police agencies if available: 55.6% yes

ALTERNATIVES
(% acceptable overall)

- Civilian employee of police department responding, 75.5%
- Response delayed up to 30 minutes with a specialist responding, 69.6%
- Response delayed up to 30 minutes, 53.9%
- Police making appointment to meet citizen, 47.9%
- Response by representative of non-police public agency, 43.4%
- Police taking report over the phone, 41.4%
- Response by representative of private agency, 40.9%
- Citizen coming to police headquarters to fill out report, 33.2%

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE ACCEPTABILITY
FOR BURGLARY

Alternative	Birmingham % Acceptable	San Jose % Acceptable	Mean Acceptability
Take report over phone	26.0	24.0	25.0
Come to headquarters	27.0	18.0	22.5
Appointment	39.0	39.0	39.0
30 minute delay	56.0	66.0	61.0
30 minute delay with specialist	73.0	73.0	73.0
Civilian employee of police department	76.0	77.0	76.5
Non-police public agency	24.0	32.0	28.0
Private agency	29.0	47.0	38.0

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE ACCEPTABILITY
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL

Alternative	Birmingham % Acceptable	San Jose % Acceptable	Mean Acceptability
Take report over phone	34.0	27.3	30.7
Come to headquarters	29.0	21.2	25.1
Appointment	38.0	60.0	49.0
30 minute delay	59.0	45.5	52.3
30 minute delay with specialist	71.0	57.6	64.3
Civilian employee of police department	74.0	63.6	68.8
Non-police public agency	64.0	39.4	51.7
Private agency	49.0	42.4	45.7

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE ACCEPTABILITY
FOR FAMILY DISTURBANCE

Alternative	Birmingham % Acceptable	San Jose % Acceptable	Mean Acceptability
Take report over phone	33.0	9.0	21.0
Come to headquarters	31.0	6.0	18.5
Appointment	46.0	14.0	30.0
30 minute delay	36.0	31.0	33.5
30 minute delay with specialist	56.0	44.0	50.0
Civilian employee of police department	78.0	65.0	71.5
Non-police public agency	53.0	51.0	52.0
Private agency	62.0	46.0	54.0

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE ACCEPTABILITY
FOR LARCENY

Alternative	Birmingham % Acceptable	San Jose % Acceptable	Mean Acceptability
Take report over phone	62.0	41.0	51.5
Come to headquarters	40.0	22.0	31.0
Appointment	67.0	47.0	57.0
30 minute delay	66.0	67.0	66.5
30 minute delay with specialist	80.0	74.0	77.0
Civilian employee of police department	74.0	77.0	75.5
Non-police public agency	36.0	42.0	39.0
Private agency	33.0	33.0	33.0

CONTINUED

2 OF 3

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE ACCEPTABILITY
FOR PERSONAL ASSAULT

Alternative	Birmingham % Acceptable	San Jose % Acceptable	Mean Acceptability
Take report over phone	27.3	20.8	24.1
Come to headquarters	28.3	22.8	25.6
Appointment	46.5	29.7	38.1
30 minute delay	42.4	37.6	40.0
30 minute delay with specialist	62.6	50.5	56.6
Civilian employee of police department	66.7	70.3	68.5
Non-police public agency	44.4	45.5	45.0
Private agency	42.4	40.6	41.5

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE ACCEPTABILITY
FOR VEHICLE THEFT

Alternative	Birmingham % Acceptable	San Jose % Acceptable	Mean Acceptability
Take report over phone	66.0	54.0	60.0
Come to headquarters	44.0	34.0	39.0
Appointment	51.0	60.0	55.5
30 minute delay	64.0	66.0	65.0
30 minute delay with specialist	75.0	74.0	74.5
Civilian employee of police department	84.0	84.0	84.0
Non-police public agency	39.0	46.0	42.5
Private agency	30.0	38.0	34.0

ANALYSIS OF 30 MINUTE DELAY ACCEPTABILITY BY RACE
FOR SAN JOSE

Category	White			Black			Mexican-American			Total		
	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able
Burglary	74	52	70	5	3	60	12	7	57	91	62	68
Larceny	75	52	69	4	3	75	13	8	62	92	63	68
Vehicle Theft	58	39	67	6	3	50	26	18	69	90	60	67
Environmental	76	39	51	5	2	40	13	2	15	94	43	46
Personal Assault	72	30	42	9	2	22	13	4	31	94	36	38
Family Disturbance	57	22	39	10	2	20	23	7	30	90	31	34

ANALYSIS OF 30 MINUTE DELAY ACCEPTABILITY BY RACE
FOR BIRMINGHAM

Category	White			Black			Total		
	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able
Burglary	50	35	70	50	21	42	100	56	56
Larceny	57	43	75	43	23	53	100	66	66
Vehicle Theft	68	46	68	29	17	59	97	63	65
Environmental	72	41	57	28	18	64	100	59	59
Personal Assault	28	15	54	71	27	38	99	42	42
Family Disturbance	23	11	48	77	25	32	100	36	36

ANALYSIS OF 30 MINUTE DELAY WITH SPECIALIST
ACCEPTABILITY BY RACE FOR SAN JOSE

Category	<u>White</u>			<u>Black</u>			<u>Mexican-American</u>			<u>Total</u>		
	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able
Burglary	74	58	78	5	4	80	12	7	58	91	69	76
Larceny	75	57	76	4	4	100	13	8	62	92	69	75
Vehicle Theft	57	46	79	6	4	67	26	16	62	89	66	74
Environmental	76	46	61	5	2	40	13	6	46	94	54	57
Personal Assault	72	37	51	9	4	48	13	7	54	94	48	51
Family Disturbance	57	28	49	10	4	40	23	10	43	90	42	47

ANALYSIS OF 30 MINUTE DELAY WITH SPECIALIST
ACCEPTABILITY BY RACE FOR BIRMINGHAM

Category	White			Black			Total		
	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able
Burglary	50	43	86	50	30	60	100	73	73
Larceny	57	47	82	43	33	77	100	80	80
Vehicle Theft	68	52	76	29	22	76	97	74	76
Environmental	72	49	68	28	22	79	100	71	71
Personal Assault	28	21	75	71	41	58	99	62	62
Family Disturbance	23	14	61	77	42	55	100	56	56

ANALYSIS OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE OF POLICE DEPARTMENT
ACCEPTABILITY BY RACE FOR SAN JOSE

Category	<u>White</u>			<u>Black</u>			<u>Mexican-American</u>			<u>Total</u>		
	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able
Burglary	74	61	82	5	3	60	12	7	58	91	71	78
Larceny	75	60	80	4	3	75	13	9	69	92	81	88
Vehicle Theft	58	52	90	6	5	83	26	19	73	90	76	84
Environmental	76	48	63	5	3	60	13	8	62	94	59	63
Personal Assault	72	49	68	9	6	66	13	11	85	94	66	70
Family Disturbance	57	39	68	10	7	70	23	15	65	90	61	68

ANALYSIS OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE OF POLICE DEPARTMENT
ACCEPTABILITY BY RACE FOR BIRMINGHAM

Category	White			Black			Total		
	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able	N	Number Accept- able	Percent Accept- able
Burglary	50	44	88	50	32	64	100	76	76
Larceny	57	48	84	43	26	60	100	74	74
Vehicle Theft	68	59	87	29	23	79	97	82	84
Environmental	72	57	79	28	17	61	100	74	74
Personal Assault	28	22	79	71	44	62	99	66	66
Family Disturbance	23	17	74	77	61	79	100	78	78

Question 15: If, when calling to request police services, you had been informed that all necessary information for the report could be taken over the phone, thus making a patrol car response unnecessary, would that have been:

- (1) Acceptable
- (2) Not Very Acceptable
- (3) Definitely Unacceptable

Response Category	Burg-lary	Lar-ceny	Vehi-cle Theft	Environ-mental	Person-al Assault	Domestic Disturb-ance	TOTAL	
							N	Z
Expect police to come out - called, so need help	15	8	6	14	21	23	87	24.9
Emergency help needed: immediate serious matter	10	4	4	1	31	21	71	20.3
Police needed for investigation, fingerprints to collect clues	28	5	11	8	2	4	58	16.6
Rather police came out and handle case	4	11	2	26	6	7	56	16.0
Need face to face or person to person contact	6	4	6	11	5	6	38	10.9
Feel more secure, if police come out	4	0	2	0	2	6	14	4.0
Pay taxes, should have police come out as part of services	3	3	1	2	2	0	11	3.1
Need police for investigation for insurance purposes	3	2	1	0	0	0	6	1.7
Police are not taking crime seriously if report taken over phone	2	0	0	1	1	0	4	1.1

ANALYSIS OF OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS
FROM THE
BIRMINGHAM COMMUNITY SURVEY

I don't know	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	.3
No response	0	0	1	2	0	1	4	1.1
TOTAL	75	38	34	65	70	68	350	100.0
All Responses								
# Acceptable	25	62	66	34	28	32	247	41.2
# Not Very Acceptable	40	22	24	45	44	33	208	34.7
# Definitely Unacceptable	35	16	10	20	26	35	142	23.7
# I Don't Know	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	.3

QUESTION 16: If, after having taken your report of the incident over the phone, the police operator had asked you to come to police headquarters at your convenience to fill out a more detailed report, instead of sending a patrol car, would that have been: (acceptable, not very acceptable, or definitely unacceptable)?

Response Category	Bur- glary	Lar- ceny	Vehicle Theft	Environ- mental	Peri- onal Assault	Domestic Disturbance	N	Total %
Expect police to come out - called, so need help	10	6	4	11	21	14	66	16.7
Rather police came out and handle case	18	7	4	19	9	8	65	16.4
Too inconvenient for citizen to go to police station	9	9	16	18	6	5	63	15.9
Pay taxes, should have police come out as part of services	6	6	9	4	4	6	35	8.8
Emergency help needed: immediate serious matter	3	6	4	2	10	7	32	8.1
Police needed for in- vestigation, finger- prints, to collect clues	11	4	6	4	4	1	30	7.6
Can't leave because of work; need police on scene	7	12	7	0	3	1	30	7.6

ANALYSIS OF QUESTION 16 CONTINUED

Response Category	Bur- glary	Lar- ceny	Vehicle Theft	Environ- mental	Personal Assault	Domestic Disturbance	N	Total %
Problems because of lack of transportation	3	5	5	2	5	7	27	6.8
Need police to prevent personal injury	0	0	0	0	3	9	12	3.0
Need face-to-face or person-to-person contact	3	0	0	2	2	3	10	2.5
Inconvenience due to health or age	1	1	0	3	1	4	10	2.5
Can't get to police station because of problems at home	0	2	0	1	1	2	6	1.5
Need police for invest- igation for insurance purposes	1	2	0	0	0	0	3	.8
I don't know	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	.3
No response	1	0	2	3	0	0	6	1.5
TOTAL	73	60	57	69	70	67	396	100.0
ALL RESPONSES								
Number Acceptable	27	40	43	30	29	32	201	33.6
Number Not Very Acceptable	43	36	38	42	45	36	240	40.1
Number Definitely Unacceptable	30	24	19	27	25	31	156	26.0
Number I Don't Know	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	.3

QUESTION 17: If an appointment had been made to meet with you at your (home/business) at your convenience rather than having the police respond immediately, would that have been: (acceptable, not very acceptable, or definitely unacceptable)?

Response Category	Bur- glary	Lar- ceny	Vehicle Theft	Environ- mental	Personal Assault	Domestic Disturbance	Total N	%
Emergency Situation (Sub-Totals)	5	8	3	1	21	20	58	19.3
Crime in progress at time of call	4	4	3	0	0	0	11	3.7
Subject in custody	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	1.0
Criminal currently fleeing scene	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	.7
Violent argument/fight going on	0	0	0	1	4	14	19	6.3
Out-of-control person	0	0	0	0	4	5	9	3.0
Person bleeding/injured	0	0	0	0	6	0	6	2.0
To prevent personal injury	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	1.0
To apprehend suspect on scene	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	1.0
Violent group of people	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	.3
Person bothering complainant	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	.3
Feels immediate response required	19	9	31	16	8	22	105	34.9

ANALYSIS OF QUESTION 17 CONTINUED

Response Category	Bur- glary	Lar- ceny	Vehicle Theft	Environ- mental	Personal Assault	Domestic Disturbance	N	Total %
Rather police came then to handle call	31	13	11	38	22	7	122	40.5
Appointment would be inconvenient	2	1	2	2	1	3	11	3.7
Feels making appointment unnecessary	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	.7
Would rather go to police headquarters	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	.3
No response	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	.7
TOTAL	60	32	48	57	52	52	301	100.0
ALL RESPONSES								
Number Acceptable	38	67	51	39	46	46	287	48.0
Number Not Very Acceptable	33	19	28	18	23	25	166	27.8
Number Definitely Unacceptable	27	13	20	14	29	27	135	22.6
I don't know	1	1	1	4	1	2	10	1.7

QUESTION 18: If you had been told by the police operator that the response to your call would be delayed up to 30 minutes, would that have been: (acceptable, not very acceptable, or definitely unacceptable)?

Response Category	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft	Environmental	Personal Assault	Domestic Disturbance	Total N	Total %
Emergency Situation (Sub-Totals)	9	10	6	14	33	16	88	32.0
Crime taking place	6	4	4	2	9	12	37	13.5
Subject in custody	0	2	0	0	1	0	3	1.1
Criminal fleeing scene	3	4	2	0	2	0	11	4.0
Threats made	0	0	0	0	5	2	7	2.4
Physical injury involved	0	0	0	2	16	2	20	7.3
Potentially dangerous problem	0	0	0	10	0	0	10	3.6
Feels immediate response required	16	10	15	11	15	43	110	40.0
Rather police come then to handle call	17	4	11	3	6	3	44	16.0
Inconvenient	0	6	1	5	1	1	14	5.1
Depends on type of call	1	3	0	5	1	1	11	4.0
Feels timely delay unnecessary	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	.4

QUESTION 19: If you had been told when you called the response would be delayed up to 30 minutes in order to provide you with a police employee who specializes in handling your type of case, would that have been: (acceptable, not very acceptable, or definitely unacceptable)?

Response Category	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft	Environmental	Personal Assault	Domestic Disturbance	Total N	Total %
Emergency Situation	4	0	2	1	4	3	14	8.0
Crime taking place	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	.6
Subject in custody	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1.1
Criminal fleeing scene	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1.7
Threats made	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	.6
Physical injury involved	2	0	0	0	2	3	7	4.0
Potentially dangerous problem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Feels immediate response required	14	13	17	16	22	23	105	59.7
Rather police came then to handle call	7	6	6	7	7	14	47	26.7
Inconvenient	0	1	0	0	0	2	3	1.7
Depends on type of call	0	0	0	3	3	0	6	3.4
Feels time delay unnecessary	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	.6

ANALYSIS OF QUESTION 19 CONTINUED

Response Category	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft	Environmental	Personal Assault	Domestic Disturbance	Total N	%
I don't know	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
No response	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	26	20	25	27	36	42	176	100.0
ALL RESPONSES								
Number Acceptable	73	80	75	71	63	57	419	70.1
Number Not Very Acceptable	13	12	15	15	20	25	100	16.7
Number Definitely Unacceptable	13	8	10	12	16	17	76	12.7
I Don't Know	0	0	0	2	1	0	3	.5

QUESTION 20: If a civilian employee of the police department such as a (Community Service Officer/Police Social Worker/Evidence Technician), with proper identification, has responded rather than a uniformed officer, would that have been: (acceptable, not very acceptable, or definitely unacceptable)?

Response Category	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft	Environmental	Personal Assault	Domestic Disturbance	Total N	Total %
Acceptable (1)	75	74	84	73	66	77	449	75.1
Not Very Acceptable (2)	15	19	10	16	21	12	93	15.6
Definitely Not Acceptable (3)	9	7	6	9	9	7	47	7.9
Don't Know (9)	0	0	0	2	3	4	9	1.5
WHY NOT? (Question 2 or 3)								
Immediate threatening or dangerous situation	2	5	0	0	3	1	11	7.9
Need show of uniform for others in situation	1	3	1	5	5	5	20	14.3
Do not feel comfortable with other agencies (cost, expected speed of agencies, time of the complaint, training or safety)	5	3	4	2	0	0	14	10.0
Do not trust individuals with an I.D. only. Want a person in uniform.	9	7	2	10	10	4	42	30.0
Only police have (or should have) authority.	1	1	1	6	3	2	14	10.0

ANALYSIS OF QUESTION 20 CONTINUED

Response Category	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft	Environmental	Personal Assault	Domestic Disturbance	Total N	%
Do not want added burden on taxes paid for police services.	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	.7
Need investigative services (include insurance).	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	1.4
Just want police.	5	5	4	1	4	5	24	17.1
Dependent on situation	0	0	1	0	2	0	3	2.1
No response	0	1	2	0	2	2	7	5.0
Don't know why	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	.7
Miscellaneous reasons	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	.7
TOTAL	24	26	16	25	30	19	140	100.0

QUESTION 21: If a representative of a non-police public agency (such as welfare department/child or wife abuse centers/mental health center/fire department/animal shelter/alcohol and drug abuse center) had responded instead of the police department, would that have been: (acceptable, not very acceptable or definitely unacceptable)?

Response Category	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft	Environmental	Personal Assault	Domestic Disturbance	Total N	%
Acceptable (1)	24	35	39	63	45	53	259	43.3
Not Very Acceptable (2)	40	48	38	23	30	30	209	34.9
Definitely Not Acceptable (3)	32	16	20	11	22	16	117	19.6
Don't Know (9)	3	1	3	3	2	1	13	2.2

WHY NOT? (Question 2 or 3)

Immediate threatening or dangerous situation	2	1	1	0	0	2	7	2.1
Need show of uniform for others in situation	0	8	0	1	12	4	25	7.7
Do not feel comfortable with other agencies (cost, expected speed of agencies, time of the complaint, training, or safety)	12	13	8	7	6	5	51	15.6
Do not trust individuals with an I.D. only. Want a person in uniform.	15	1	9	4	6	10	45	13.8
Only police have (or should have) authority.	10	2	8	13	4	5	42	12.9

ANALYSIS OF QUESTION 21 CONTINUED

Response Category	Burglary	Larceny	Vehicle Theft	Environmental	Personal Assault	Domestic Disturbance	Total N	Total Z
Do not want added burden on taxes paid for police service.	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	.7
Need investigative services (include insurance)	3	4	5	0	0	0	12	3.7
Just want police	22	28	20	5	15	15	105	32.2
Dependent on situation	2	3	0	0	5	1	11	3.4
No response	2	2	4	2	1	0	11	3.4
Don't know why	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Miscellaneous reasons	2	1	2	0	0	4	9	2.8
TOTAL	72	64	58	34	52	46	326	100.0

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