


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FORWORD

The NOBLE/Riviera Beach experience represents a LEAA/OCACP attempt to field test Community Crime Prevention and Community Anti-Crime techniques developed in larger and medium sized cities in a small city, operationally defined as a city of 150,000 or fewer inhabitants. Realizing that crime and citizen fear of crime was leading to the atomization of communities in small cities in much the same way it was in larger communities, LEAA/OCACP funded a NOBLE proposal submitted as response to a RFP soliciting the development of a Community Anti-Crime and Comprehensive Crime Prevention in a small city. Riviera Beach, Florida meeting the demographic requirements of the RFP, was chosen by NOBLE to host the CAP wherein concentrated, concerted on-going technical assistance (TA) would be given by NOBLE.

Several specific objectives were identified and the attainment of these constituted the essence of the project. Among these were: (1) to achieve greater involvement and cooperation between CAP's and the criminal justice system. (2) To initiate a citizen based model for preventing crime utilizing police and citizens. (3) Improve relations between law enforcement agencies and minority communities.

To achieve these goals, NOBLE set about several specific tasks.

- (1) To develop and implement specific community activities as community Anti-Crime and Crime Prevention Operations in Riviera Beach, Florida.
- (2) Set up mechanisms for providing technical assistance to CAP's in small cities throughout the nation upon request.
- (3) Concentrated on placing priority emphasis on identifying and making readily available a pool of consultants with experience and expertise in dealing with police/community relations in small cities and minority cities, community organizing, Community Anti-Crime Program Planning and development and community-based non-profit corporation management.
- (4) Host workshop wherein representatives from CAP's in small "Observing" cities could review the work of the NOBLE/Riviera Beach Project in progress.
- (5) Compile progress reports documenting problems encountered, solutions proposed and implemented and conspicuous project successes and failures as well as modifications in structures and functions resulting from lessons of trial and error during project operations.
- (6) Present to LEAA/OCACP as a deliverable a compilation of validated principles for conducting CAP's in small cities as transfer technology elements.

NOBLE was seen as the ideal organization to do this as it contained the most impressive assemblage of high ranking black police officers to be found anywhere. Having always subscribed to the view that no police department, however dedicated, competent, compassionate, can impact significantly of crime and citizen fear of crime without the support of the community. NOBLE undertook to make Riviera Beach a demonstration city for field testing Crime Prevention extrapolations developed in large and medium size cities and to empirically assess the efficacy of these extrapolations for Community Anti-Crime and Crime Prevention Projects in small cities.

COMPREHENSIVE CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS
AND COMMUNITY ANTI-CRIME PROGRAMS: A CASE
FOR SMALL CITIES PROJECTS

Numerous studies on the correlates of criminality show that crime varies according to demographic characteristics of communities. Regional differences, for example, are found in the fact that New England states have relatively low rates in all offenses; southern states have the highest rates for homicide and assault; except for homicide and assault, Pacific Coast states have the highest rates for all offenses against persons and property. Large cities ordinarily have higher rates than small cities and urban rates exceed rural rates.

It is generally known that in launching its three major Crime Prevention Programs, the Comprehensive Crime Prevention Program (CCPP), the Community Anti-Crime Program (CAP), and the new LEAA/Action Urban Crime Prevention Program, OCAP/LEAA concentrated most of its efforts of large and medium sized cities. Sixteen urban centers, Atlanta, Georgia, Fort Worth, Texas, Jackson, Mississippi, Kansas City, Missouri, Knoxville, Tennessee, Los Angeles, California, Miami, Florida, Minneapolis, Minnesota, New Haven, Connecticut, Newark, New Jersey, Oakland, California, Portland, Oregon, Salt Lake, Utah, Seattle, Washington, Springfield, Massachusetts and the Iowa Crime Prevention Coalition, were chosen for the sites of these Community Anti-Crime and Crime Prevention Experiments. The general purposes of these anti-crime and crime prevention by LEAA/OCAP were to develop broad-based neighborhood coalitions to support a broad range of crime prevention efforts that would address the diverse needs of those communities and set up models for successfully integrating business, industry, citizen/civic, association and neighborhood organizations with criminal justice systems and other non-criminal justice governmental organizations in a coordinated effort to impact on crime and citizen fear of crime.

These social experiments yielded some practices that could be replicated and easily and readily extrapolated to CAP's in smaller city and rural/urban areas. These practices were largely inappropriate for small cities for the following reasons:

1. In large urban centers, CAP programs tended to be organized around extant self-help neighborhood organizations structured around ethnic ecological arrangements, i.e., Little Italies, Greektowns, Polish Neighborhoods, etc.
2. In many instances, the mayor's office took the initiative for choosing umbrella organizations for spearheading the proposal writing and other responses to the RFP from LEAA/OCAP and political realities rather than program needs dictated the political jurisdiction's response to the RFP.
3. Generally, there will be one, and only one, CAP in a small city (operationally defined as a city of less than 150,000 residents) and all population elements in this body politic must rally under the banner.
4. The body of expertise in the persons of numerous professionals, i.e., city managers, urban planners, manpower specialists, marketing segmenting specialists, engineers, programmers, environmental design expertise, etc. is not usually extant in small communities.
5. Smaller cities were at a competitive disadvantage in that professional personnel was not always available for conducting such activities as needs assessment --- community profiles and the identification of resources nor can it carry out sophisticated crime analyses, citizen surveys or victimization surveys.
6. Having been generally exposed to a relatively low level of crime until recent decades, residents at small cities generally exhibited little sophistication in dealing with the elaborate and changing operandi of habitual criminals. This meant not only that there

was a need for public awareness programs to awaken, arouse and sensitize these small city communities, but for also providing essential public information and education services.

7. Crime rates vary according to the social and cultural characteristics of constituent neighborhoods, i.e., highest rates are found in deteriorated areas near the center of large cities where there is extreme poverty and unemployment and where because of constant change of residence and the presence of diverse racial and ethnic groups, residents have few community ties and where social discontinuities between youths and their elders are most noticeable. Small cities may not be as demonstrably exhibitiv of these social phenomena.
8. The extremes of poverty and super wealth juxtaposed in close physical proximity is seldom as flagrantly in smaller cities as it is in large urban centers, despite the obvious existence of pockets of rural and small city poverty.
9. The high incidence of crime among marginal members of communities who exhibit high mobility, experience high role strain and occupy discrepant social roles usually exist in more profusion in larger cities. The most serious crime problems may take on new dimensions in smaller cities characterized more intimate, face-to-face patterns of human relations and human interactions, consanguine relations and where the ties of both formal and informal networks may be stronger.
10. Successful programs for impacting on crime and citizen fear of crime may not already be in place in small cities. Hence, the technology for planning, implementing and operating these programs successfully, efficiently and meaningfully often has to be built step-by-step with few milestones or markers to guide these efforts.
11. Attempts to make CAP's in small cities adapt to models designed for and geared to large cities have proved to be largely ineffectual, given the differences of demographics, life styles, ecological processes, labor, industry and commerce.

12. Patterns of human relations have not usually been subjected to the degrees of institutionalization and depersonalization that they have in large urban centers. Hence, personal leadership styles, charasmatics and other ideographies may be more important in areas wherein, because of the relative smallness, human hands on contact is more prized.

WHY THIS GUIDE?

This guide is designed to provide community Anti-Crime and Comprehensive Prevention Programs and LEAA/Action projects in small cities (cities having populations of less than 150,000 residents) with a manual for planning, implementing, conducting and evaluating community anti-crime and crime prevention programs. It is also designed to provide LEAA/OCAP with a source book for providing and contracting for technical assistance (TA) to these CAP's in carrying out these activities.

This guide represents a compilation of the practices and activities born of trial and error in conduct of a program funded by LEAA/OCAP in a small southern city, Riviera Beach, Florida. This CAP in Riviera Beach, Florida was technically assisted by the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), an organization made up of some of the most experienced, credentialized and socially sensitive law enforcement professionals to be found anywhere. It was an effort to field test a body of expertise in the conduct of CAP's in small cities which NOBLE was uniquely qualified to render. The members of NOBLE and the professional staff of the NOBLE-Riviera Beach CAP being community oriented and cognizant of and committed to the premise that no police or law enforcement agency, however honest, committed, conscientious and efficient, can completely protect the citizenry from crime and the pervasive and socially stultifying effects of the fear of crime on the quality of life throughout America. The members of NOBLE, acutely attuned to the fact that crime is driving people from our streets, forcing them to barricade themselves in their homes and flee from close association and intercourse with fellow citizens themselves and, hence, was not something that could, or should for that matter, ever be delegated to a police agency.

As a result, the NOBLE executive staff and leadership discerned that there was not only a raison d'etre for CAP's in small cities, but also a role and a mission. This role and mission NOBLE saw as one of working

closely, cooperatively and symbiotically with the law police in anti-crime and crime prevention activities. This NOBLE saw as the very essence for successful CAP's, particularly those in minority communities.

Having both experience and expertise in facilitating police/community relations in minority communities wherein relations between the local police and minority citizens have traditionally left much to be desired, uniquely equipped NOBLE to provide technical assistance (hereinafter called TA) to CAP's in small cities in planning, implementing and conducting the operations of these CAP's with police endorsement and support.

Aware of the fact that often CAP's in small cities often do not have the technical expertise extant in civic associations and neighborhood self-help groups or other neighborhood organizations for planning, implementing and conducting many of the activities attenuating these processes, NOBLE used Riviera Beach as a natural laboratory for field testing, validating and replication of the technology of the small city CAP process.

This manual affords LEAA/OCAP with a document with the efficacy to give guidance and instruction to CAP's Planning Community Anti-Crime and Crime prevention projects in small cities. It serves to decrease the reliance of these CAP's in small cities on extrapolations from large city CAP's which may have limited applicability and usefulness to them. Given the rapidly rising rates of crime in these small cities, this document is potentially an invaluable aid in the crime prevention process at the community level.

THE STRUCTURE OF THIS DOCUMENT

As previously indicated, the purpose of this document is to, through the use of lessons born of trial and error in the Riviera Beach experience, construct a guide to be used by CAP's in smaller cities for planning, implementing and conducting the operations of community anti-crime and crime prevention programs. In concert with this role and mission, it is designed to effect a compilation of field tested extrapolations from this Riviera Beach experiment into a single document the elements of which are deemed to have more than local applicability and generalizability. The widest feasible dissemination of this document is also anticipated.

From this document, the reader is expected to gain guidance and instruction in the initial steps in planning CAP's, the subsequent steps in implementing CAP's and the final steps involving in conducting the operations of the CAP's and the progress and final evaluations of them. In one respect this document is designed to constitute a how-to-do-it booklet: how to get started, how to choose a planning board, how to get planning assistance, how to obtain funding, steps to be taken immediately after being funded, etc. Specifically, it is designed to be a how-to-get-to-point A from-point B booklet. It is both desired and anticipated that this booklet will be helpful to CAP's in small cities in setting up and conducting community crime prevention programs.

Why Riviera Beach?

Riviera Beach, Florida was chosen as the site wherein NOBLE hoped to develop and refine the technology needed in the planning, implementation and conducting the operations of CAP's over several competing cities.

The City and particularly the police Chief made the following arguments for housing the CAP there: First, Riviera Beach, with its roughly 30,000 residents, 65 percent of whom were of minority descent, met the demographic requirements for the experiment. Second, Riviera Beach was a town largely devoid of the factionalism endemic in the generic, normative old style eastern seaboard cities. Hence, a CAP in Riviera Beach would in fact be the CAP for Riviera Beach; in essence, it would be the only game in town. Third, Riviera Beach was in the process of becoming a model of shared power in the New South where the races were developing models of propinquity and reciprocity characterized by mutual respect.

The police force of Riviera Beach, headed by a Black Chief, is 30 percent black and 70 percent white. The 165-man force, became very supportive of the project. A police officer who had formerly been the president of the police union, FOP, was chosen as Crime Prevention Officer and worked closely with the resident Riviera Beach staff.

The crime picture of Riviera Beach was more typical of that of smaller cities and towns. These crime rates are generally growing demonstrably and the police have relatively few new techniques in the repertoire of choices in their arsenals for combatting this new phenomenon. It suffered from a

new relative acceptance of drugs and a changing social and economic scene. Life in Riviera Beach was changing as it was throughout America. Television and Madison Avenue Advertising were bringing alternative life styles to the consciousnesses of young people in Riviera Beach as they are elsewhere. The same gulfs existed between the young and the old. Assuredly, all the ingredients necessary for instructing the nation about the social lags which impact on the incidence of crime existed in rich profusion in Riviera Beach.

Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Riviera Beach, like most of the state of Florida was experiencing a third world invasion of the poor and the dispossessed of the earth from Jamaica, Cuba, Haiti, other places in South, Central America, and points in the Carribean. The true impacts of thrusting these hungry hordes of laborers working for subsistence wages on the economy of what once was a sleepy southern town will not be known for decades.

In essence, there is much that can be learned from the NOBLE/Riviera Beach Experiment. There are many practices and principles attenuating the planning, implementation and conduct of this experiment that must be captured as technology transfer elements. There are many guideposts for other CAP's that will subsequently be setting up such programs. These elements have generalizability and applicability far beyond the border of Riviera Beach.

CRIME PREVENTION IS . . .

The Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs (OCACP) in the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), is currently sponsoring three major crime prevention programs, the Comprehensive Crime Prevention Program (CCPP), the Community Anti-Crime Program (CAP), and the LEAA/Action Urban Crime Prevention Program. All of these crime prevention and crime control programs were designed to assist community groups and neighborhood self help groups to plan, implement and conduct broad-based community programs. Sixteen political subsidies participated in the national demonstration program field test the effect of establishing well-planned, comprehensive approaches.

Hence, community crime prevention, as it is viewed by LEAA/OCACP, refers to the multivariate types of activities undertaken by a community to impact on the incidence of crime and the citizen fear of crime. This definition connotes the development of a centralized mechanism for the planning, coordination and the implementation of public and private crime prevention services throughout the community. Envisioned in a formal community crime prevention organization. This organization is to be civilian headed and citizen directed, yet working hand-in-hand in close cooperation and toward common goals with the local enforcement agency.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEAA/OCACP

The philosophy of LEAA/OCACP is derived from a realization that crime prevention is not the sole responsibility of law enforcement and requires the active participation, collaboration and mobilization of the entire community. Through Comprehensive Crime Prevention Programs, LEAA/OCACP seeks to initiate an innovative effort to forge a meaningful bond between citizens and local government, business, and law enforcement in a united and concerted effort to prevent crime. A fundamental assumption underlying this philosophy is that the individual citizen not only has a responsibility in crime prevention, but that he also is a repository of ideas and meaningful suggestions concerning how crime prevention is most likely to be achieved. This concept of shared responsibility incorporates the idea of the individual citizen as an equal partner with formal law enforcement and agencies in the prevention of crime.

Hence, the essence of the LEAA/OCACP philosophy entails a concept of shared and mutual interests between citizens of the body politic and those agencies delegated the principal responsibility for crime control in crime prevention. It envisions citizens and public and private interests working cooperatively and symbiotically toward the general goals of crime prevention, the reduction of crime and citizen fear of crime.

RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA: A CASE HISTORY OF A SMALL CITY'S MODEL FOR A COMMUNITY ANTI-CRIME AND CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM

History

Riviera Beach, Florida, located in North-Central Palm Beach County, was first incorporated as a town in 1922, and later as a city in 1959. During the Post World War I period, its population never exceeded 800. The city, which relied on commercial fishing for its economic vitality during this period, was settled by fishermen out of the islands of Bimini and the Bahamas and is still referred to as a "Conchs" town by many of the locals. The "Conchs" provided a landscape of drying nets, small boatyards and wooden fishermen's shanties.

This town, retaining some of its yesteryear character, still contains areas that are still reminiscent of these serene days, but it is today a bustling and booming city. Its population in 1979 stood at approximately 30,000, having grown from 21,465 in 1970. Prior to 1950, the permanent population of Riviera Beach had never risen over its then 4,061 residents. By 1960, the city had more than doubled its population; it celebrated its initial year as a city with a population of approximately 12,000 residents. The port of Palm Beach, which was developed along with other industries at that time, was the most active of all the ports in the state, primarily through its trade with Cuba. When these trade relations with Cuba were broken, in the early sixties, Riviera Beach continued to grow by diversifying its economic base. This diversification led to IBM and Pratt Whitney Aircraft becoming the major employers of the area.

Land Use and Terrain Features

Palm Beach County wherein Riviera Beach is located in an area of great size, 2230 square miles. It offers a diverse market place as well as an unusually supportive business environment and has a variety of distinct economic and social regions. Palm Beach County's eastern border consists of 47 miles of unspoiled beaches. The coastal region contains Palm Beach itself and is separated from the rest of the county by the Intra Coastal Waterway which links the county to Maine on the north and the keys on the south. West of the Waterway is the strip of land that supports most of the industrial and residential development of the county; this area includes the communities of West Palm Beach, Riviera Beach, Lake Worth, Boynton Beach and Boca Raton. It is estimated that due to county-wide planning, this area, given the rapidly increasing Florida population, can support and accommodate an estimated 1,172,000 by the year 1900 without experiencing the congestion characteristic of other urbanized areas. However, in order to keep growth and services in balance, the projected population density was recently cut by 300,000. The current Palm Beach County population is 557,629.

Two conservation areas and the area around and including Lake Okeechohee in the western section of the county, provide small game hunting and fishing. Lake Okeechohee is the second largest fresh-water lake in the nation. Perhaps the most important, but least recognized, of the county's economic activities take place in the county's remaining 1016 square miles. Agricultural products, i.e., sugar, vegetables, beets, dairy products, horses and ornamental plants are produced here to the tune of one-half billion dollars.

Riviera Beach is the only segment in the West Palm Beach urban area which has within its midst a planned and functioning industrial park with direct connections to water and ground transportation facilities. There are approximately 1400 acres of zoned industrial land in the city of Riviera Beach -- approximately 30 percent of this is developed. The major industrial areas of the city are: (1) Port of Palm Beach, 147 acres (rail served), (2) Lewis Terminals, 578 acres (rail served), (3) Central Industrial Park, 192 acres (4) Interstate Industrial Park, 151 acres, (5) Westroads and Port West Industrial, 167 acres and Banker Life Tract, 151 acres.

Industrial Park development was envisioned over a decade ago. Lewis Terminal's approximately 400 acres also represents another option for providing the city with rail served industrial land. The park is bolstered by two railroads, the Florida East Coast and the Seaboard with 13,000 feet of trackage connecting the Port of Palm Beach and the major markets in the area. These industrial areas are served by four major highways, Florida Turnpike, Interstate 1-95, Congress Avenue (future) and U.S. Highway 1 and AIA Florida Turnpike which is a toll road with two entrances having exit points approximately 10 miles from the industrial area, Interstate I-95, a toll free, limited access highway with an entrance and exit on Blue Heron approximately 2 - 6 minutes from industrial areas. Congress Avenue is a major north - south thoroughfare for Palm Beach County. There are plans to construct a portion of this highway in Riviera Beach in the immediate future. United States Highway #1 and AIA is an easterly north to south roads link. The scenic route along the beach and resort areas of Singer Island is AIA. State Road 710 provides direct linkages to the Glades agricultural areas west of the city. These highway and roads traffic the major population areas west of the

city of Riviera Beach.

Riviera Beach itself is located in the north central portion of Palm Beach County along the celebrated Florida Gold Coast; the Gulfstream is closer to Riviera Beach than to any other point on the continent. Hence, Riviera Beach is rapidly developing as the hub for the distribution of goods to southeast Florida and is attractively situated to facilitate the shipping of goods throughout the world. Its advantaged location is one of Riviera Beach's most positive features: it is approximately 60 miles from the metropolitan Miami area; it is 50 miles due east of the Bahama Islands; it is in close physical proximity to all the major southeastern Florida attractions whether the financial institutions of Miami or the shops along Worth Avenue.

Other Transportation Systems

Palm Beach International Airport is about nine(9) miles from the city of Riviera Beach by the way of 1 - 95. Major airlines of Delta, Eastern, United Nation and Air Florida serve here. The airport handles air express air freight and mail cargo through these facilities. The port of Palm Beach, located within the city's boundaries, provides direct access to the Inter-coastal Waterway and Atlantic Shipping Lanes via the Palm Beach Inlet. This port handles petroleum, cement, furfural, molasses and general cargo.

Industry and Employment

The following industries have become a part of Riviera Beach's Industrial Expansion Program: (1) Canada Dry Bottling Company, (2) Palm Beach Bottling Work, Inc., (3) Florida Diesel and Marine Service, Inc., (4) Perry Oceanographics, Inc., (5) Florida Georgia Tractor Company, (6) Orourcat Foods, Company, a division of Arnold Bakeries, (7) RAF Company (Electronics), (8) Kerton, Inc., (9) Solitron Devices, (10) Milton Ray Company Laboratory Control Division (Chromatography), (11) Raintree (Sprinkler Manufacture), (12) AFL Industires (Pollution Control Devices), (13) Emergency Vehicle Manufacture, Inc.

The firms are located in Palm Beach County and serve and employ Riviera Beach residents: (1) IBM, (2) United Technology, Pratt and Whitney Aircraft, (3) RCA, (4) Gulf and Western Food Products Company, (5) Quaker Oats, (6) Rybovich and Sons Boat Works, (7) Northern Telecom, (8) NCI, Inc.

The occupation distribution of Riviera Beach yielded the following profile:

Occupation	Percent of Total
Professional-Technical	12.1
Managerial-Administrative	7.0
Sales	6.3
Clerical	11.1
Craftspeople	11.2
Operatives	13.9
Transportation Operatives	4.4
Laborers	9.5
Farm Workers	1.3
Service Workers	14.4
Private Household Workers	8.8

Source: 1970 U.S. Census

In 1970, 20.5 percent of the persons in Riviera Beach were employed in manufacturing as compared to 14.1 percent for the state of Florida. Other Riviera Beach/State of Florida comparisons are as follows are to be found in real estate, insurance and finance: these showed 13.9 percent for Riviera Beach as compared to 6.0 percent for the state of Florida.

Unemployment in Palm Beach County was placed at approximately 6 percent. No separate statistics for unemployment in Riviera Beach were available. According to Mr. Wilbert McTier, Director of the Florida State Employment Service,

unemployment rates for Blacks of Riviera Beach is approximately twice that of Whites, about 12 percent (see interview of McTier by Dr. Fitzgerald, May 28, 1981). Mr. McTier also stated that the unemployment rates of minority youth in Riviera Beach approximates national level, between 35 and 40 percent. The adult unemployment rate, Mr. McTier related, fell to 4 percent during the height of the tourist season. That is to say, during the months between January and April. The tourist industry, aerospace, electronics business and marketing when allied with agriculture, gives Palm Beach County a rosy employment picture.

This pollyanish employment picture notwithstanding, serious dislocations are currently emanating from the fact that there is no matchup between the skills Riviera Beach Blacks now have and the skills which the high technology industries currently need. The largess of the gentrification movement in Palm Beach County appears to be deleteriously affecting Riviera Beach Blacks (see the Interview of Mrs. Morrow, May 29, 1981, by Dr. Fitzgerald) Competition with undocumented aliens, e.g., Jamaicans, Trinidadians and other West Indians, to say nothing of Cubans and Haitians, particularly in the highly seasonal tourist industry is not perceived by Young Blacks in Riviera Beach as a viable employment alternative. There are, according to Mr. McTier, approximately 7,000 newly arrived Cubans and Haitians now in Palm Beach County. The former coming as a direct result of Castro's 1980 diaspora and the latter arriving daily in makeshift seacraft of all kinds. The Haitians, Mr. McTier explained, are perhaps the most docile workers in the world, working for subsistence wages under agricultural or other conditions.

The Relationship of the Employment Picture to the Crime Problem

The normative economic picture all too characteristic of the older cities on the Eastern Seaboard ill fits the employment/unemployment picture portrayed by Riviera Beach. Here

one finds an element of the population with high percentages of its member unemployed who conceivably could find work, albeit in agricultural pursuits. One also finds large numbers of Blacks employed in the highly seasonal industry which affords full employment for approximately only four months per year. Nevertheless, unemployment insurance often yields the Blacks more income than some of these agriculturally oriented jobs. Moreover, many of these young unemployed Blacks come from established families who have roots in Riviera Beach. Such youths do not readily compete with undocumented West Indian (Jamaican, Trinidadian, etc.) aliens for low paying jobs. The presence of subsistence level Haitians and Cubans have made this bad competitive situation virtually intolerable.

At least from the perceptual - phenomenal field of many of these young Blacks, it simply does not even pay them to become involved in these cut throat competitions. Usually the economic base already established by their parents (the first or second Riviera Beach generations) allow them to keep body and soul together, if not much more.

Not having the skills needed for working in the high technology jobs that afford a degree of permanency and an entry to the good, good life and not having a desperation level that mandates competition with undocumented aliens and Haitians and Cubans, these young Blacks are outside of the mainstream of Palm Beach life. Too many of them sink into alcohol and drug use and abuse born of boredom, idleness and feelings of essential inferiority and incompetence. The logical progression or regression to crime happens all too often.

There also appears to be an unparalleled and unprecedented volume of drugs coming into the county and the city largely from Dade County and Miami, having originally been imported from South and Central America and the Carribean. This heavy drug and alcohol use appears to be influenced by the catalytic impact idleness, envy, anomie and general goallessness.

THE NOBLE ANALYSIS

The NOBLE Staff obtained the services of Dr. Leroy Fitzgerald to conduct an impact analysis of the NOBLE/Riviera Beach CAP project in order to determine its avowed goals. To pursue this goal, Dr. Leroy Fitzgerald spent an anthropologically oriented week in Riviera Beach during the week of May 21-25, 1981. Here he attempted to gain a perspective of life, labor and crime in Riviera Beach by interviewing the key actors in the planning, implementing, conducting the operations and monitoring of the CAP project. In essence, he attempted to conduct evaluative research of both process and products (impacts) types. Consequently, he was concerned with both the outcomes of the project and the structures and functions that were deemed to be responsible for the successes and non-successes of the project. That is to say, the extent to which goals and objectives were attained and the reasons for attainment or non-attainment.

The purposes of this evaluative research were:

Process Evaluation

The purposes of process evaluation are:

1. to discover whether and how well objectives are being fulfilled.
2. to determine the reasons for specific successes and failures.
3. to uncover the principles underlying a successful program.
4. to direct the course of experiments with techniques for increasing effectiveness.
5. to lay the basis for further research for the relative success of alternative techniques.

The emphasis of the process evaluation were be to answer the following questions:

1. What kind of change is desired?
2. By what means is change brought about?
3. What is the evidence that changes observed are due to the means employed?
4. What is the meaning of the changes found?
5. Were there unexpected consequences?

The steps in the evaluation process will be the following:

1. Identification of the goals to be evaluated.
2. Analysis of the problems with which the activity must cope.
3. Description and Standardization of the activity.
4. Measurement of the degree of change that took place.
5. Determination of whether the observed change is due to the activity or to some other cause.
6. Validation of some indication of the durability of the effects.

The main purpose of the process evaluation component of the total project evaluation is to determine the validity of structures and functions of the project for attaining its avowed objectives. The initial task involved in this, the ensuring that these objectives were behaviorally stated and measurable. The second task involved the specifying to data sources and primary program measures.

Data sources were seen as project documents, e.g., scope of work statements, Technical Assistance Coordinator (TAC) to Program Manager (PM) correspondences, CAC Board Minutes, communications between staff members, requests for technical assistance, responses to requests for TA services, turn around time, agenda of professional staff meeting, training formats, attendees critiques and evaluations of workshops and crime prevention institutes.

Other documents established for perusal were: (1) Work Plans and Work Papers of Consultants, (2) Resumes of Minority City (MC) and CAC Board members, (3) Resumes of community groups of MC, CAC's who received TA services from NOBLE, Police Departments who received TA throughout the nation and attendees of NOBLE Workshops and Crime Prevention Institutes. Important program measures were be changes or perceived changes since the onset of the project in terms of the incidence of crime and the fear of crime.

Among the principal players and key actors interviewed by Dr. Fitzgerald while in Riviera Beach were: (1) The Executive Director and his staff, (2) The Police Chief of Riviera Beach, (3) The City Manager of Riviera Beach, (4) The principal of the LEA, (5) The Riviera Beach Director of Housing and Community Development, (6) Several CAP Board Members, (7) The Riviera Beach Crime Prevention Officer, (8) The Briefing and Statistical Officer of the Riviera Beach Police Department, (9) The Director of the Riviera Beach Poverty Outreach Program and (10) Lay citizens and business leaders.

The interviewing was generally non-structured and open ended, designed to access impressionistic information concerning how they became involved with the project, the nature of their involvement, their perceptions of the problems, benefits and accomplishments of the project and the major impacts of the project. Digests of these interviews were incorporated as parts of the evaluation report of the project.

Another indirect evaluation of the project's impact was conducted by surveying the perceptions and major learnings of the attendees of the Anti-Crime Institutes held in Baltimore during the week of July 13-18, 1981. These attendees, representatives of CAP and CCP projects through the nation, were flown into Baltimore to observe the work of the NOBLE/Riviera Beach CAP in Progress and to be instructed in how they could use the Riviera Beach experience in the planning, implementation and conduct of operations in their own Community Anti-Crime Programs.

Participants represented the following cities: (1) Boise, Idaho, (2) Lake Wales, Florida, (3) Guadalupe, Arizona, (4) Greenville, South Carolina, (5) Uniontown, Alabama, (6) Opa Locka, Florida, (7) Niagra Falls, New York, and (8) Orange, New Jersey.

The participants were tested on the major learnings they were expected to acquire as a result of their participation in the training institute. A tabulation of the composite scores of this group of trainee-attendees revealed a mean score of 88. This can be interpreted to mean that the average attendee retained a high degree of the content taught during the sessions. A copy of the test of content is enclosed in the appendices.

These attendees were also asked to evaluate all aspects of NOBLE's hosting and planning of the conference. Eighty-six percent of the responses were found to be favorable. It can be inferred from the high degree of favorable response concerning the extent to which NOBLE was able to meet the informational and

technical assistance needs of these attendee/respondents that the lessons learned in the conduct of the Riviera Beach CAP were meaningful and useful. Having used these findings as a springboard to attempt to find out what kinds of questions are upper-most on the minds of members from these diverse grassroots self-help groups and the crime prevention officers who also attended the institute in Baltimore, NOBLE felt that it had a handle on the kinds of information and technical assistance these CAP's and police officers needed.

Reflecting that many of these questions related to the kinds of questions that had emanated from the start-up experiences of Riviera Beach and early days trial and error when the game plan had to be made up as they went along, NOBLE extracted practices and principles found to have utilitarian implications for dealing with problems encountered at each juncture of project work from planning and policy derivation to final evaluation, hereinafter called, "elements."

These elements NOBLE has incorporated into a single compilation and envisions that this document will prove to be useful to CAP's in small cities where attempts are being made to plan and implement CAP's. Among the topics included in this Guide are: (1) "Community Anti-Crime and Crime Prevention Programs: The Decision to Organize," (2) "Deciding What Community Groups to Involve: What the Riviera Beach Experience Tells Us About Building CAP Coalitions in Small Cities," (3) "What the NOBLE/Riviera Beach Experience Tells About Early Start Up Problems with Public Officials," (4) "Police/Community Relations in Small Cities," (5) "Involving Local Government Officials in CAP's in Small Cities: Lessons of the NOBLE/Riviera Beach Experience," (6) "Managing CAP's in Small Cities: What Can Be Learned from the NOBLE/Riviera Beach Experience," and (7) "The Evaluation of CAP's in Small Cities."

A. COMMUNITY ANTI-CRIME AND CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS: THE DECISION TO ORGANIZE

The ability of the people in a community to organize themselves in an attempt to impact on the problem(s) of crime is a critical element in crime prevention and anti-crime programs. At the onset, the crime problem may be global, ill defined and non-specific. This decision to organize may emanate from a perceived or felt need of residents in a community to do something about crime. However, if the goals for organizing remain vague, general and nebulous, the crime prevention and anti-crime activities of these community residents are foredoomed to fail. The critical initial task of any group attempting to organize is to ensure that it organizes around a specific crime problem(s).

Easier said than done. What remains unanswered by most texts and monographs on the subject is how does one get from point A to point B. How does one determine what the critical crime problems are? What resources exist in the community for helping citizens who would impact on these problems to define them? Do community groups more often than not contain members with the expertise for doing this? If this expertise is not extant in the community, how can it be tapped. What barriers and/or obstacles must be overcome in order to horn in on these extant resources?

The moment of truth comes for members of many community groups arises when they realize that they actually do not know what the most crucial community crime problems are: they have some subjective, impressionistic and idiosyncratic views of what these problems are. These views are often as diverse, diffused and varied as the members comprising the group themselves. Often the expressions of these concepts of what these problems are couched in generalities, i.e., "need for jobs," blighted houses" or "eye sores," "drug and alcohol problems," etc.

What members of planning CAC's who mouth these shibboleths appear to be saying is that the mounting of a concerted, concentrated attack on community crime must await an addressing of these societal ills. What they are often inadvertently communicating to their audiences is that because

one cannot do everything, one should do nothing. Often people in the community who are action oriented lose interest when this is done. Hence, the essential ingredient in the decision to organize is to organize around a central crime problem.

How are "grass roots" groups to determine what crime problem(s) to organize around? Often they cannot do this without the help of others. How are these others to be identified? Sometimes officials in the police department responsible for the collection of crime statistics can and will help. So will members of city planning departments. One source of help in perusing data needed for conducting a needs assessment for assessing and defining a community's crime problem, developing its community profile and identifying its community resources are local educators and academicians. Often they can put these "grass roots" community groups with professionals who will examine land use patterns, Economic Development Plans (EDP's), HUD Housing and Community Development Block Grant Applications, CETA SMSA Prime Sponsor Applications and other documents giving the demographic attributes of the community such as digests current U.S. Census data.

Once these data have been collected and perused, a clearer picture of what the most pressing community crime problems are should emerge. Even then a group decision concerning this must be made. It is important to reiterate that this must be a group decision - a decision reached in the give and take of the group process. Police department advisors and technical assistance providers can help. They can point out problems, identify obstacles and cite options and alternatives. Nevertheless, a group's crime problem must in the end be its crime problem. It cannot be imposed from without. It cannot be the mayor's "pet project." Nor can it be a "spinning wheels" project suggested by the police to keep CAC busibodies busy. It must be a project that the members of the community perceive as being important, meaningful and compelling. Hence, here are some important do's and dont's of orthogenesis planning inherent in the decision to organize.

DO's

1. Seek to involve early on a cross section of different community groups even if the idea to organize originates with a small

central core group, e.g., PTA's, civic associations, sororities or fraternities, businessmen groups, etc.

2. Seek to make an intelligent and empirically oriented assessment of what the major community crime problems are and use extant data sources for doing this.
3. Enlist the support and assistance of the local police department and other planners in making the needs assessment to determine the crime problem on which you primarily want to focus.
4. Seek the advice and technical assistance of the local police in defining the parameters, implications and ramifications of the crime problem which you have chosen to attempt to impact upon.
5. Determine what expertise and experiences are extant in the planning or steering group, but do not hesitate to go outside of that group for resources that are needed. Perhaps it is better to condition and sensitize the members of your group to the continuous and on-going inclusion of new members. It is important that they not perceive themselves as a closed, elitist crowd.
6. Seek the membership of persons who have community creditability, roots and stature, however, make this membership as inclusive as possible. Do not confine it to professionals, home owners, voters, etc.
7. Choose a crime problem which can, given available resources and expertise, reasonable expect to impact. This may or may not be the most serious crime problem in the community.
8. Trust the people. Community people who daily confront crime in its most dire circumstances are a repository of ideas and creative solutions for its deterrence and amelioration. Incorporate these ideas into the CAC plan.
9. Clearly and concisely prepare a Plan of Action; what is needed to plan and focus on, objectives, resources and funding needed, possible funding sources, linkages and liasons needed, personnel and human resources needed, milestones, product and process evaluation, etc.

DEFINITIONS AND AMPLIFICATIONS

1. Cross sectional representation, for purpose of this treatise, means representation from groups such as these youth - senior citizens, labor, business educators, human services workers, housing workers, indigenous paraprofessionals, etc.
2. Operationally, an "intelligent and empirically oriented assessment" refers to a needs assessment consisting of the following:
(1) crime analysis, (2) citizen survey, (3) community profile and (4) community resources.
3. Enlisting police support entails two aspects: one, informational - the police need to be apprised of the intention to set up a CAC: you need their endorsement, sanction and support; two, technical assistance. You need early on support in conducting crime analysis. You also need help in setting up perpetrator profiles and other scientific techniques for identifying and documenting crime patterns and modus operandi. Remember, at each juncture of your program, police support will be critical and crucial. This cannot be over-emphasized. A cultivation of these relations from the onset will pay dividends over the long haul.
4. Seeking the advice and counsel of the local police before launching new initiatives also pays large dividends. Often crime prevention and community relations units often have at their disposal the means for massive logistical support, e.g., crime prevention vans, displays, films, etc., these can often be used to augment your efforts. Police technical assistance (TA) should be on-going and continuous.
5. You should utilize the talents and expertise of the members of your group. However, you should never hesitate to go outside of this group for expertise that you need. A comprehensive CAC should endeavor to be an open crowd - it should seek the involvement of as many community members as possible. There will often be exclusionary and elitist proclivities in most groups. No such groups can be comprehensive enough to be effective without broadly based.
6. The perceptions of members of your community toward the individual members on the steering committee or planning board will color and shape their attitudes toward the CAC itself. Hence, men and women of perceived leadership qualities and community standing should be chosen for advisory board and planning committee. This should not be construed to mean that you should exclude the "wee people." Remember, they know the community; often they are the only sources of light and power in the community.

7. A CAC is not a smorgasboard: you cannot be all things to all people. Selectivity is the key thing here. Choose to become involved in those activities that portend to maximize and optimize your chances for performing excellently well.
8. A CAC at the grass roots level should provide a forum and an avenue unleashing the latent talents of lay citizens and harnessing these in the fight against crime. Use the talents that you find in your community.
9. If you do not know where you are going any road will get you there. Develop behavioral objectives which lend themselves to empirical verification and quantification, evaluate, revise and re-evaluate. Succinctly, know where you want to go, how you will get there, where you now are in point and time and what exactly is needed to move you from where you are to where you want to go.
10. Seek the advice of local, state and federal agencies involved in conducting crime prevention and community anti-crime programs during the early planning stages of your CAC project. At the federal level this would mean OCACP or LEAA. The state coordinating agency acting as a conduit for federal funds from LEAA in the U.S. Department of Justice may be called by several different names, depending on the state in whom one finds himself. The same thing could be said about the local counterpart agency.
11. Whether you are seeking funding sources, technical assistance, logistical support or whatever, it would probably be in your best interest to touch bases with LEAA or its state and local governmental conduits. They can point you to sources that can help you to get started. It appears that successes in this business have cumulative effects. Success favors subsequent successes. The snow balling effects early successes reinforce the importance of getting off on the right foot. One of the best ways to get your project off to a good start is to seek consultation with these agencies prior to getting started.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SMALL CITY CAC's

1. It is perhaps more crucial for a minority group seeking to set up a CAC to seek cross sectional representation than the normative group seeking to accomplish this purpose, particularly in an economically disadvantaged area. In order for a minority CAC to experience essential success in economically disadvantaged environs, it must engage the loyalty and cooperation of large segments of a population not generally known for its historical cooperation with the police and one wherein there are certain demographic and situational circumstances similarities between the crime victims and the crime perpetrator. Here Blacks and the economically disadvantaged members of the community often feel that they have no control over their lives.

These persons must be given an opportunity to engage in dialogue with persons representing business, the professions and other avenues of life on a plane of parity and shared responsibility. Only then will they discern that their stake in helping to prevent crime is personal and individual.
2. Conducting a needs assessment is crucial to appropriate preliminary planning for minority CAC's as for other groups. Usually being closer to the crime scene and more often victimized by crime than mainstream groups, minorities are often prone to operate on the premise that "everyone knows what the problem is." However, "street smarts" makes the letting of the processes involved in needs assessment to be served no less important.
3. The long history of distrust for the police in many of the minority communities in the nation and its appurtenances police brutality and excessive deadly force, have left a legacy of poor relations and general bad feelings. No CAP which does not seek to mend and heal these relations and dispel this mistrust can expect to succeed. This is best done by working together on goals over which you can coalesce. The local police should be used in conducting the needs assessment, particularly the crime analysis component.
4. The minority CAC is more likely than not to be a novice at the crime prevention business. The police are professionals scientifically trained to fight crime. Their resources should be used whenever possible. Remember the aim is not to re-invent the wheel.
5. Minority CAC's may often lack the depth and breadth of expertise and technical skills found in more mainstream oriented CAC's. Hence, they may not contain all the technical, management and professional skill within the organizing nucleus group to operate a CAC. Herein, lies the importance, and even the cruciality, of seeking technical assistance early on. The members of the organizing group must be sensitized to the importance of this.
6. Creditability with the indigenous community is the sine qua non of minority CAC's in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. Steering committee or organizing board members who have stature, roots and respectability are your best advertisement.

7. An element of self hate generally pervades most minority communities in a subtle, hard to defuse, way. The material cultural superiority of the majority community impels this. Often members of minority communities associate technical competence and "can do" with white institutions. Therefore, it is important to demonstrate at the onset that minority programs can run well and can experience successes. Therefore, it is very important that the CAC choose crime problems that these communities feel are the most crucial ones, but also that they choose problems on which they can impact. Remember, nothing succeeds like success and nothing fails like failure.
8. Often members of minority communities devise and operate some of the most elaborate systems of societal arrangements to protect the lives and property in their communities and for governing interpersonal relations. Tap this expertise; use these experiences; harness and channel these latent powers.
9. Remember that stratification and social and economic segregation of Blacks and other minorities into urban ghettos effects and sustains a number of totally irrational systems. This predisposes mind sets that do not always associate a set of behavioral responses with a set of expectancies and outcomes. Disarray, disorder, lack of rhyme or reason and magical and whimsical thought is often characteristic of thought patterns among lower socioeconomic groups. Hence, the plan of action must not only be rational and empirically oriented, it must also be systematic, segmental and indicative of objectives, enabling objectives, prerequisite activities and behaviors and milestones. The goals must be carefully graded: it is important to convey an image of order and progress.

The establishment and maintaining of linkages and liasons with extant agencies is an organized and systematic part of project work at each juncture of this work. Monitoring and maintaining these linkages and liasons are as important as setting them up initially, if not more so.

10. Minority CAC's, more often than other CAC's, must look for sources of funding and support, not having the economic and human resources of more mainstream communities. Hence, early contact with agencies whose primary missions involve criminal justice planning and/or funding crime prevention and anti-crime programs should be made. It is always best to bounce your ideas off of these agencies at the state, local and federal levels. The technical assistance offerings of the agencies should be fully utilized.

B. THE ROLE OF NOBLE IN ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY FOR PLANNING, IMPLEMENTING AND CONDUCTING THE OPERATIONS OF CAP'S IN SMALL CITIES

The National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE) responded to a RFP from LEAA/OCACP to plan, implement and technically assist an experimental prototype of a Community Anti-Crime Program in a small city for the purpose of identifying, documenting and refining elements and principles found to be successful in these processes to be extrapolated to similar and subsequent programs throughout the United States. The role of NOBLE as envisioned by the preparers of the proposal in response to the RFP as one of a third party technical assistance provider giving concentrated and on-going TA to a resident, on-site CAP in Riviera Beach. NOBLE viewed its charge as a responsibility to give TA and training to the CAP in the site city at each juncture of the project, from planning and policy derivation to final and summative evaluation and report writing.

The NOBLE Community Anti-Crime and Comprehensive Crime Prevention Technical Assistance Project was designed to make available to CAP Programs throughout the nation, technical expertise in the areas of: (1) Program Planning and Program Implementation, (2) Organizational Management, (3) Financial Management, particularly administrative, organizational and financial management of non-profit organizations and (4) Police/Community Relations. In concert with this charge, NOBLE is attempting to attain the following objectives and to:

1. Achieve greater involvement and cooperation between CAP's and Criminal Justice Agencies.
2. Develop techniques for making police personnel and institutions in the Criminal Justice System sensitive to the problems of Black officers and the Black community.
3. Establish strategies for dealing with racism in the Criminal Justice System.
4. Implement a model Crime Prevention Program in a small, predominately Black city.
5. Deliver responsive technical assistance to communities and police departments implementing anti-crime programs across the country.

6. Conduct one, two-day workshop in order that interested and involved persons from "Observing Cities" can review project work in progress.
7. Instruct persons at the Crime Prevention Institute in improving police/community relations.
8. Initiate a citizen based model for preventing crime utilizing police and citizens.
9. Improve race relations between law enforcement agencies and minority communities.

To pursue these objectives, NOBLE has established several specific tasks involved in the development of a model CAP project with intensified and concentrated, on-going technical assistance. To disseminate, amplify and demonstrate the features and elements of this model having more than local (minority site city) applicability, NOBLE arranged to offer technical assistance in terms of essentially the same types of programmatic thrusts to approximately thirty-five CAP's throughout the nation. NOBLE attempted to arrange for the additional dissemination and demonstration of lessons learned during this experiment through the use of workshops, designed to attract approximately thirty-five attendees, four representatives from each of five observing cities and ten representatives from Riviera Beach, Florida, the host city. Also in attendance would be the Program Manager, Technical assistance Coordinator and three Project Advisory Board members. NOBLE members are also expected to attend and lend their expertise.

The specific tasks relating to the operationalizing of the NOBLE CAP Technical Assistance Project were to:

1. Establish a 15 to 20 member Community Anti-Crime Council (CAC) in Riviera Beach, Florida using selection criteria drawn up by the Program Manager (PM) and the Technical Assistance Coordinator (TAC).
2. Choose a Project Coordinator (PC) using criteria drawn up by the PM and TAC.
3. Develop and implement specific community activities for Anti-Crime and Crime Prevention Operations in the Minority City (MC), Riviera Beach, Florida.


4. Set up mechanisms for providing technical assistance upon request to CAP's and police departments dealing with minority CAP's throughout the nation by identifying and making readily available a pool of consultants with experience and expertise in dealing with police/community relations in minority areas and community organizing, community anti-crime program development and community based non-profit organization management.
5. Host workshops wherein members of CAP's and other interested involved persons from several "Observing Cities" whose demographic features approximate and resemble those of the MC can review the project work in progress.

C. CAUSAL MODELS (OUTCOMES)

As a direct result of lessons learned, strategies tested and technology developed, NOBLE effected a compilation of do's and don't and considerations for planners of CAP's in small cities. This compilation explains the basic differences between small cities and medium sized cities vis a vis Community Crime Prevention considerations, ramifications and implications. Covered in this manual are topics relating to how to get started, pre-planning considerations, proposal writing, conducting needs analysis, selecting a crime problem upon which to attempt to impact, managing fiscal/financial aspects of the project and technical assistance.

NOBLE feels that this excursion into hitherto uncharted territory has yield a set of validated principles with utilitarian implications for other small cities in the process of planning and implementing CAP's in small cities. NOBLE further believes that these findings have generalizabilities and applicabilities far beyond the borders of Riviera Beach and should be helpful to many small cities planning such programs.

MODEL: TENANT SECURITY AND COMMUNITY CRIME WATCH PROGRAM WITH SENIOR CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS OF HIGH CRIME AREAS



(33)

B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CAP'S IN SMALL CITIES

The needs assessment document, particularly the identification of community resources component, should be used as direct basis for establishing the organizational structure of the CAP. This process should afford the CAP organizers the opportunity to identify ongoing crime prevention and anti-crime activities and the principal players involved in these processes. The immediate task is to attempt to coordinate these diverse efforts and different personalities into a cohesive action group.

The problem of course is how to do this. Some of these groups will have close knit memberships and will have "track records" and agendas of their own. They may tend to regard your projected CAP as the new boy on the block. Dialogue must be initiated with the officers and members of these CAC in order to apprise them of the mutual benefits to be derived from affiliation with the planned CAP. The general aim is to set up coalitions which can be placed under the umbrella of the CAP. What you want to emerge is a comprehensive organization capable of mounting a concerted attack on crime or a specific crime area.

There is no easy way of doing this. At best, this requires some rather delicate negotiations. Some of these organizations very parochially perceive their activities and spheres of operations. Rarely do they see the "big picture." Getting them to coalesce is no simple intellectual exercise. There are emotional involvements and identifications to deal with. These must not be seen as barriers to progress, but as obstacles to be overcome.

Using a carefully organized and reasoned presentation of the pro's and con's of organizing into a broadly based comprehensive CAC is perhaps the most expeditious means toward that end. Citizens who are serious about impacting on crime can usually be won over to cooperating. The possibility of acquiring funding or program support as a consequence of pooling efforts also serves as a catalyst to organize.

In minority communities, the incentive of a potential grant award often helps to get grass roots groups together. The resources of economically disadvantaged minority communities being what they are, it is often not realistic to attempt to launch a comprehensive CAC effort without the expectations of program support of some kind. Nevertheless, this should not be the

sole coalescing point; some means must be found for the continuation of the program after the transpiration of the grant period.

The key ingredient, however, that its organizational structure must provide for participation in the program by a broad range of community resources, e.g., police, lay citizens, business, industry, local and state government, civic associations, etc. From these groups, a network of citizens willing to serve on a steering committee or task force should be formed into a temporary organizational structure commissioned to set policy for the CAC.

SELECTING COMMUNITY COMMITTEE OR ADVISORY BOARD MEMBERS

Advisory board members are to be selected for the personal and individual strengths that they bring to the policy planning process. One source of these strengths will obviously be the positions which they hold in the professional, business, government, industry, civic association, youth group, senior citizen associations to which they belong and represent. The strength identification process for seeking indigenous representatives from minority areas is essentially the same among low income groups. There are persons in the environs who are perceived by the members of these neighborhoods to be leaders. Such persons are readily identifiable despite the relative dearth of institutions and opportunities for leadership training and experience. The non-participatory caste of the community should not obscure this fact.

Among some of the traditional sources of CAC leadership at all echelons have been the following institutions and agencies: (1) churches and religious institutions, (2) civic associations and community and self-help groups, (3) educators and school principals, (4) women's clubs and groups, (5) youth groups, (6) senior citizen and aging groups, (7) businessmen groups, (8) labor unions, (9) fraternities and sororities, etc. The representatives should be augmented by local government agency heads or their designees, i.e., health and human resources, housing and community development, school system administration and police.

THE MANAGEMENT TEAM

Beneath the structure of the policy making community policy making board there should be a board concerned with day-to-day operations. Roughly the same mix of principal players should activate this board, although in some instances they may be of a lower echelon hierarchy. However, the key watchword here is availability of the members of this operational board for meetings, planning and conduct of the CAC's business. As mentioned earlier, they may be assistants of designees of agency heads with the authority to speak and act for their superiors.

The prime responsibility of this group is to plan and monitor the operations of the CAC. It is suggested that they do this through the appointing of an executive director with sufficiently wide decision power to ensure a free flow of project work.

FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND FOUNDATION FUNDING

If the CAC Planning Board elects to approach outside agencies for funds to implement a community anti-crime program, it should do so only after a thorough discussion and understanding of certain groups of facts. Among these are the following:

1. Most LEAA/OCACP grants are one-time occurrences--some thoughts concerning private and public sources of continued and/or additional funding should be explored.
2. Successful proposal writing is an inexact science--some contingency plans should be formulated in the event you are, despite your best efforts or through no fault of your own, unsuccessful.
3. The obtaining of an LEAA OCACP grant should not become the all and end all the community self help effort--don't oversell; don't get hopes up too high. Your chances of success are at best marginal.
4. Be prepared for the possibility of non-success--know exactly what you will do if you do not get an LEAA/OCACP grant. It should not be the end of the world where your neighborhood self-help planning group is concerned.
5. Seek state, local government and federal funds as well as funds from the private sector. Try not to put all eggs in one basket. Attempt to market your proposal in as many segments as possible.
6. Begin your quest for funds with an eye toward continuity of the program and a plan for seeking funds for the continuation of the programs after the initial grant award shall have expired.

WRITING THE PROPOSAL

1. Hold meetings on all aspects of the RFP or grant announcement-- it is important that as many members of your CAC Planning Board as possible understand as many of the aspects of these documents as is possible. Few members will probably be able to understand all aspects.
2. Form special committees for the purpose of discussing various aspects of the RFP and or the grant announcement - concentrate your efforts zeroing in on those aspects of the proposal considered to be most critical to the roles that the different players are expected to ultimately play in the conduct of the program. However, do not encourage members to overspecialize to the extent that this deleteriously impacts on the probability that they will understand the global implications of the project.
3. Remember that CAC members do not have to be technical experts to understand many aspects of the proposal preparation process - focus on the strengths of CAC members, not their perceived deficits; utilize these strengths to the greatest extent possible.
4. Peruse your community for sources of help and technical assistance - By this time you should have a working knowledge of the extant resources in your community, having done the community survey as a part of the Needs Assessment process. Identify educators, college professors, professional planners and paid consultants who can assist you in the proposal preparation process. Determine what kinds of services and resources they may be equipped and willing to offer free of charge and/or for fees.
5. Establish dialogue with the political powers that - pick their pockets; access their state and local contacts who are specialists in the criminal justice field. Find out what expertise they tap when they want to get factual information for position papers, expert testimony and legislative committee work. Remember - this guy has access to some of the best information lobbyists and special interests and advocacy groups can supply.
6. Have your state and local officials to obtain appointments for your group with local and state criminal justice planners --- let him run interference for you; do not spin your wheels trying to find your way through a maze of agencies and bureaucracies. Most likely they depend on his vote for their budget and continued existence. Let him do it.
7. What is true of your state and local elected officials is usually enlarged larger than life with your congressional representative - his staff should be knowledgeable about federal, state and local sources of technical expertise - remember that staff members of congressmen are usually knowledgeable or have colleagues on the staffs of other congressmen who are knowledgeable concerning the intricacies of the application process. Insist that they put

you in touch with OCAP/LEAA personnel whose job it is to assist you with this application process.

8. Obtain technical assistance offered by OCAP/LEAA through either its professional staff or through some of its third part provider.
9. Using the technical assistance resources available to you, write a technically sound proposal - give appropriate attention to mechanics, appurtenances, assurances, technical quality, etc.
10. Obtain letters of support from public and private agencies whose assistance, acceptance and tolerance you require - ensure that these are meaningful commitments, not perfunctory accommodations.
11. Observe all agency deadlines, a-95 clearance deadlines and sign offs - ensure that your proposal at least gets into the hopper by not having it rejected because you failed to include some required document or signature.
12. Market the proposal with as many agencies and organizations as is feasible. Ensure that you contact private corporations and foundations for support.
13. Obtain directories of philanthropic organizations and corporations which fund self-help neighborhood groups such as yours. These can usually be obtained from local libraries. Ensure that your solicitations get the widest dissemination possible. Also, make sure that this constitutes a versatile dissemination. Do not rely on the largess of the federal government.

YOU ARE SUCCESSFUL IN WINNING A GRANT AWARD

1. Spend as little time as possible rejoicing; you have work to do - a year is shorter than you think; you have much to do. It always takes longer.
2. Make sure that you send copies of your grant award to the appropriate persons, i.e., mayors, state and local elected officials, persons who have assisted in the proposal preparation process, persons who have endorsed your proposal or given letters of support, etc.
3. Hold meeting with your program monitor on exactly what the levels of funding are, the statement of work, the deliverables, the progress reports, program changes and general considered.
4. Hold meetings with your Planning Board in order to make important decisions, e.g., to incorporate or not to incorporate, by-laws, committee structures - both standing and special. policies governing procurement of professional staff, housing of the project, logistical support for the project, disbursement of funds, purchase of equipment, etc.
5. If your organization is like most organizations, do you need a person to be responsible for the day - to day operations of the project. Call him what you will - executive director, program manager, etc.: If your Board is peopled by persons who are busy and involved in many organizations, would it not be best to have them involved in the CAP in capacities of setting policy, project monitoring, facilitating or oversight, rather than in day-to-day operations.
6. You have position descriptions to write: What kinds of staff members do you need? What kinds of qualifications should they have? Is the executive officer to have a free hand in choosing his staff? What limitations does the Board wish to impose on this power? Is the power to be, in fact, absolute? What kinds of professional qualifications attenuate these positions? Do these persons serve at the pleasure of the executive director? What kinds of job rights do they have? These are only some of the types of questions you will have to address and resolve in launching your project. The successful addressing of these will help to get your project off the ground smoothly. Try as you may, it will be difficult to get your group to think seriously and to plan systematically about their prior to notification of a funding or grant award.

Remember the acquisition of a grant or funding award brings out the best and the worst in people. It can be likened to a prize of a kill. Hunters and would-be hunters will scam; they will crawl out of the wood-

work. You will wonder where they were when you needed them. The initial days following the grant award will be crucial ones. How you handle directions and initiatives will set the course for your project. Plan and plan well. This planning will pay large dividends. Often the battle is either won or lost during these early onset hours.

THE RIVIERA BEACH CASE STUDY: A PROTOTYPE FOR COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN SMALL CITIES

Riviera Beach, Florida is a small seemingly idyllic small southern city located in West Palm Beach County in Florida. It has a population of approximately 30,000 inhabitants, of whom approximately 65 percent are black. Although Riviera Beach is a part of the booming Palm Beach area of Florida, it is significantly more economically disadvantaged than most parts of this county except the Belle Grove Glades where an established and wealthy Agrarian population of large plantation owners manage sugar cane estates worked by migrant workers, e.g., Jamaicans, Bahamians and other West Indians and new arrived Cuban victims of Castro's most recent diaspora and Haitian boat people.

Specifically Riviera Beach proper has more than twice the rather modest 7 percent unemployment enjoyed by Palm Beach County. Its economy is also closely tied to the highly seasonal tourist industry that is in full bloom only during the months between January and April, at which time the overall unemployment rate for Palm Beach County falls to 4 percent. All total, 14 percent of the employed persons in Riviera Beach work in this highly seasonal industry. When this incidence is coupled with the number of persons employed as household workers (8.8), this accounts for almost one-fourth of the workers in Riviera Beach. These persons are working for, at best, a finite time of only four months, the duration of the tourist season. As many of these household workers are caretakers of houses and summer homes of wealthy Singer Islanders. It is easy to see why these two industries are inextricably bound together.

Palm Beach County, Florida, wherein Riviera Beach is located, is currently undergoing a gentrification movement that is probably unparalleled for the area and perhaps unprecedented in the United States except perhaps in Washington, D.C. The presence of high technology industries, e.g., IBM, Pratt Whitney Air Craft, Florida Diesel and Marine Services, RAF Electronics, Solitron Devices, Perry Oceanographics, Milton Ray Company Laboratory Control Division, AFL Industries, etc. has led to the importation of college-trained and technologically oriented young, beautiful white people rather than an enhancement of employment opportunities for young blacks native to the area. These young, middle class gentrified whites are putting strains on rental value and land use patterns to the continued disadvantage of Blacks with roots and community ties in Riviera Beach.

These young Blacks are rapidly becoming outcasts in their father's houses and pariahs in the land of their birth. The largess of the All American City has passed them by. They often do not have the scientific and technical skills needed to work in the aforementioned industries which appear to be currently importing an inordinately large amount of its labor and personnel.

At the same time, these young Blacks are second and third generation Riviera Beach residents whose parents are in many instances property owners. Such young people do not readily enter into dog-eat-dog job competition with Jamaicans, Bahamians, and other West Indians, to say nothing of destitute Cubans and Haitians for low paying jobs, or even for that matter, with young American blacks from rural areas immediately adjacent to Riviera Beach.

As a result, what emanates is a poverty in the midst of plenty syndrome. Young blacks who commit crimes are tantalized and teased by the good life in this gentrified city. They are also afflicted by idleness, anomie and an estrangement that emanates from being on the outside of it all. The logical progression from idleness-to-drugs and alcohol-to-crime is a story which repeats itself over and over in the lives of young people in Riviera Beach. These young people, poor, sullen and embittered, are for all practical purposes unemployable in the Riviera Beach/Palm Beach County market as it is presently constituted.

There are also pockets of real poverty in Riviera Beach. People who live in cars and double up in the face of accelerating and soaring rent and utilities costs who face at best an unpredictable future. There is also the presence of one of the most complexly organized and sophisticated drug traffic apparatuses in the world. Voluminous amounts of drugs pour into Riviera Beach from Dade County and Miami Beach by way of the Caribbean and South and Central America.

There is also the presence of hungry hordes of Cubans, Haitians and other West Indian and Latinos whose true impact on the economy will not be known for decades. These occurrences are of relatively recent origin and their impacts could not have been foreseen at the onset of project implementation. These act as intervening variables between project operations and desired outcomes, namely the reduction of crime and citizen fear of crime.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NOBLE/RIVIERA BEACH EXPERIMENT

The City of Riviera Beach, selected as the site of the NOBLE small cities project where principles of Community Crime Prevention were to be tested was chosen because of its demographic characteristics. It was, however, a city undergoing rapid, radical change. It was an emerging entity: it was rapidly becoming a paradigm of the "New South" - a showplace of shared political power and parity. At the time of the implementation of the CAP, Riviera Beach was governed by a white mayor and four white city councilmen, all of whom represented councilmanic zones and parochially defined their responsibilities. This led to fragmentation, low level statesmanship and too much power in the hands of the council chairman who originally opposed the implementation of the CAP. During the first four months of project operation these figures had reversed themselves: there was now a black mayor and four black city councilmen. There was also a black City Manager, Chief of Police, City Clerk, Building Official, Director of Housing and Community Development and Director of Recreation. Inner City blacks from Riviera Beach were working cooperatively and symbiotically with affluent Singer Islanders on the common goal of crime prevention.

Good police/community relations between the CAP and the local police had been established largely through the efforts of Chief "Boone" Darden, Sergeant Westlake, the Crime Prevention Officer, Captain Ralph Lentini and Mr. Jim Wortham, the CAP Executive Director and his staff. In place was a Crime Prevention Officers Association, A Ride Along Program, A Stop and Talk Program. The former program allowed city to ride along for an hour to observe the problems the average police officer encountered in the field during his normal tour of duty. The Stop and Talk Program required each on-duty officer to stop and converse with a citizen in order to familiarize himself with the citizen's perspective and to turn in the name to his supervisor of the citizen with whom he conversed.

The Riviera Beach Department of Housing and Community Development, which gave the CAP office space and xeroxing and duplicating and other logistical support such as consumable supplies, utilities, etc., reported that burglaries in public housing went down so demonstrably that they were able to dismiss one half of their security staff. The print and television media engaged in a public awareness program designed to make the residents of Riviera Beach

more security conscious. Fund raising initiatives and foundation support initiatives are currently underway to ensure the continuation of this CAP project.

While the NOBLE/Riviera Beach project may not have fully attained the desired outcomes of reducing crime or citizen fear of crime there have been significant impacts. Among these are: (1) Model police/community relations, (2) Superior modes of local government/CAP cooperation, (3) Outstanding community awareness programs, (4) Model bi-racial cooperation in CAP conduct and operations and (5) Institutional change by having a small city to incorporate elements of the CAP.

NATURE OF THE CRIME PROBLEM

The NOBLE/Riviera Beach project focuses its primary emphasis on Breaking and Entering (B & E) as the crime upon which they wished to impact. This was highly appropriate as Index Crimes in this small city are negligible in comparison with the total incidence of crime. Only one murder was committed in Riviera Beach in 1980-81. This occurred when a woman screamed on Singer Island when surprised by a burglar. Her screams brought her husband who was fatally shot by the burglar. Rapes and armed robberies were also infrequent occurrences.

The public's response to the CAP in light of current crime waves has been good. These Riviera Beach residents exhibited a degree of control over their lives and are not panicking under this onslaught.

WHAT THE NOBLE/RIVIERA BEACH EXPERIENCE TELLS ABOUT EARLY START-UP
PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC OFFICES

The NOBLE/Riviera Beach project experienced a three month delay in getting off the ground. This mandated that an additional three-month extension be requested from LEAA/OCAP in order that the work of this project might culminate in a timely fashion. Despite the best efforts of the NOBLE staff, the project could not get started on the date scheduled by LEAA/OCAP. Several factors led to this undesired state of affairs:

1. The Riviera Beach City Council, then composed of one Black and four Whites, originally opposed the idea of what they then perceived to be a minority CAP.
2. Riviera Beach City Councilmen represent zones and then tended to be somewhat parochial about affairs having perceived no direct benefit to the zones they individually represent. Mr. William Wilkins, the Riviera Beach City Manager, indicated that politicians often oppose the presence of large amounts of funds in their districts over which they have no control.
3. The City Manager also indicated that the "zone" system (wherein councilmen represent individual zones of the city) gave the council chairman who originally opposed the idea of the NOBLE/Riviera Beach CAP unusual powers. He gave Dr. Andrea Sullivan, the NOBLE PM credit for winning over the chairman to the idea of supporting, or at least not opposing the project.
4. Blacks literally swept the entrenched white power structure from power in the next election, the election of April 7, 1981, electing four Blacks and one White to the Council, reversing the racial make up of the council.

SO WHAT?

1. Political reality is that local politics do affect the conduct of CAP's. No CAP can remain totally indifferent to politics in the local communities. Taking sides is often more up front and ever fratricidal in small communities. Nevertheless, CAP's must be apolitical, but not impolitical. They must endeavor not to take sides in factional fights. They must umbrella many diverse groups coalescing over common problems, crime(s). They must often include members of opposing camps. Often the only thing CAP members agree on is the CAP itself.
2. Local and state and federal politicians must be advised on plans to plan, implement and conduct the operations of CAP's in their districts. Good, bad or indifferent, they are your representatives as they should be of all the people in the districts. They should be used for what they can contribute to the success of your program. They will often want to get all the political mileage they can get out of supporting or opposing your CAP. There is often little you can, despite your best efforts and purest thoughts, do to prevent this. This is the nature of the political process. You must, however, be non-partisan and even handed in your approach to them.

DO's and DON'Ts

1. Always invite public officials to your public meetings, forums, symposia and seminars. But, invite them to serve your functions and your agenda, not their own. The two things may not always be the same and very often are not.
2. Try to invite members of all parties or factions. This may not always be possible, because elected officials may disproportionately represent a single party in your community. Nevertheless, try! try! try hard. Give it your best shot. If you recognize them publicly at your public meetings, try to recognize all of them; salve egos: give exposure if you must, but do it even handedly. Treat them all the same way, badly.
3. Develop in your Planning or Executive Board a manual entitled, "The Care and Feeding of Local Politicians," making required reading for all staff and board members.

WHERE DID RIVIERA BEACH GO WRONG?

1. They didn't; they trod an unbeaten path; they went where no one had gone before and where there wasn't any light.
2. They couldn't have known what was over the next hill; no one had ever gone there in smaller cities. But you can.
3. In retrospect, wouldn't it have been good if:
 - a) They could have hit the ground running.
 - b) They could have gotten the support of the political powers that early on.
 - c) The support of all the public officials had been there.
 - d) The professional expertise to run a CAP had been extant in Riviera Beach - Often it isn't in smaller cities.
 - e) The roles of NOBLE and the Planning Board and the Executive Director had been clearly specified and delimited.
 - f) Policies governing the actions of these three principals had been in place.
 - g) What is now known about the running of CAP's in small cities that is now known was known.
 - h) There had been a Guide Book to give instruction and guidance to NOBLE, Riviera Beach, and LEAA/OCACP in planning, implementing and conducting the operations of CAP's in smaller cities.

ON THE ACQUISITION OF PROFESSIONAL AND SUB-PROFESSIONAL AND
CLERICAL STAFF: WHAT THE NOBLE RIVIERA BEACH EXPERIENCE
TELLS US

Smaller cities are more likely than their larger counterparts not to have all of the local talent in terms of experience and expertise available to them for planning, implementing and conducting the operations of CAP's. First, this is relatively new business; no one has yet created the mold; there are few guidelines to tell us what kind of animal a director of a CAP in a smaller city should be nor what the other animals in this zoo should be. The position description has not been written; this individual must be many things to many people. He is the coach, the leading cheerleader and the water boy all rolled in one. Yet, he cannot be a one-man show. He works with people; he makes other people work with other people and he works while other people sleep.

Second, most of the people who would make good CAP directors are already employed. The type of individual who can put in place a functional CAP and have it operational in a year and in the position to actualize its objectives is usually in demand elsewhere. Often he must be enticed to leave one position to accept this relatively thankless job of long hours and generally poor working conditions and attempt to make something where hitherto little or nothing existed. This individual must be a self starter and go getter and a fireball. Such individuals unfortunately are in short supply. The chances that he will be readily available in your city are not good.

Third, short term grants often have special problems getting good people. There is no essential job security. People often become skittish as the grant winds toward a close. People often jump ship in the middle of the voyage for greener or more permanent pastures. These considerations notwithstanding, there is no substitute for good employees. No CAP program can be a winner without these. Obtaining and keeping good people is a must.

NOBLE/RIVIERA BEACH STAFF

The record shows that NOBLE/Riviera Beach CAP attracted quality people from jump street. It does not mean, however, that all were equally qualified. This project did not attract all super stars, but by and large the overall quality of the staff was excellent. Deputy Commissioner Bishop L. Robinson, the NOBLE Project Officer, who is one of the young, black, rising stars in the law enforcement profession represents the new breed and is a breed apart. He gave quality time to this project despite the many duties attenuating his two hats - President of NOBLE and high ranking police official. Dr. Andrea Sullivan, the program manager, was the holder of the doctoral degree in criminology from the University of Pennsylvania. She was a student of Dr. Marvin Wolfgang. Marvin Wolfgang is a real biggie in the field of criminology and criminal justice. She has served as consultant on several LEAA/OCAP projects. Its manual on technical assistance is a prime example of the quality of this contribution. She was succeeded in this position by Mrs. Alice Barnett Sheen, a competent and experienced criminal justice planner. Alice has a long and admirable track record of creditable accomplishments in the field. The Program Analyst, Dr. Leroy Fitzgerald, a competent and regionally recognized researcher, has conducted and published the results of numerous large scale studies.

There is also ample evidence to support the contention that every attempt was made to obtain quality on site staff in Riviera Beach also. At the onset of the project, Chief "Boone" Darden engaged the services of a consultant, Mr. Al Turnquist, who had had previous involvement with Opelika, Alabama CAP. Mr. Sam Berry, the first Riviera Beach Executive Director, was a law student, hence, credential wise he was qualified to serve as the Administrator of the Project. Jim Wortham was a once in a lifetime find.

DO'S AND DON'TS

1. Remember, good workers are hard to come by. Yet, no CAP can operate without them. The administrative positions require leadership, faith, passion, idealism and good horse sense. Look high and low for such an individual.
2. Have your Planning Board to write a position description delineating and specifying the duties and responsibilities of this position.
3. Set up an interview and selection panel and people it with your most objective members. Decide on the ranking factors hierchically arraying your the "musts," minimal and the wish lists you have for this position. Admonish your selection panel to get the best person available in an above board way. Remember, the process is almost as important as the product.
4. You may not get what you like, but it is vital that you like what you get. Once a professional administrator, executive director, call him what you will; it will be necessary for all members of the Board to work cooperatively with him. You must stand with or fall with this Joshua, called of God and man to lead the headless host. Do not sandbag him before he gets started.
5. Give your top administration the opportunity to fail or succeed. Don't do it for him. Let his mistakes and his blunders be his mistakes and his blunders. He should have a lot to say about who is going to work with him and for him. You can't overdirect and still expect him to give point and direction.
6. Let your leader do something even if it's wrong. There is so much to do and so little time. Let him/her be about the business of getting on with it. Do not second guess him/her or make action impossible.

BIRTH PAINS: WHAT CAN THE NOBLE/RIVIERA BEACH EXPERIENCE TELL US ABOUT GETTING THE CAP OFF THE GROUND

Relations Between the Planning Board and the Executive Director

Written policies should define and describe the relations between the Executive Director and the Planning and/or the Executive Boards. These policies should spell out the size and length on the leash on which this Board wishes to hold him. Common wisdom holds this Talmuddic Sea, however, comprehensively written does not cover all questions for all times. It is difficult to anticipate every problem centering around these relations that will ultimately come up. Hence, it is perhaps better to settle for broad principles governing them.

Board/Executive Director Problems in Riviera Beach

Almost to a man/woman, the members of the Riviera Beach Board felt that the fact that Mr. Sam Berry, the first Executive Director of the Riviera Beach project, tended to go off on tangents by himself without involving the Board, deleteriously impacted on the project's progress. They were also quick to add that Mr. Jim Wortham, his successor as Executive Director enhanced the progress and creditability of the Board by involving its staff at each juncture. Also, it was felt that the NOBLE staff in Washington-Baltimore did not always give the on site Riviera Beach staff as much autonomy as they would have desired.

Hence, the role of the relations between Board and employed staff has critical and crucial implications for project success. The tug and pull of the relations generally constitute the tensions in project operations.

DO'S AND DON'TS

1. Do write comprehensive policies concerning Board/Executive Director relations.
2. Don't try to etch everything in stone. Keep these policies flexible, fluid and pragmatic.
3. Negotiate honest differences of opinions between the Board and the Executive Director. Try not to deliver ultimatums or non-negotiable demands.
4. Your Executive Director is like your physicians in that if you want all to be well with you and yours, you must either trust him or get another one.
5. Give him a general free rein with subordinate staff members.
6. Generally afford him the opportunity to convey good and bad news to the staff.
7. Let this leader lead. Only one person can ultimately be charged with the ultimate success or failure of the project and that is the individual in charge.

LEAA/OCACP OBJECTIVES

The LEAA Guideline Manual issued September 30, 1979 entitled, "Guide For Discretionary Grant Programs," sets forth the general program object of the Community Anti-Crime Program and describes other LEAA activities related to this program, including technical assistance, training, testing, as these focus on crime prevention. Among these general and subsidiary program objectives are:

Program Objective. To assist community organizations, neighborhood groups and individual citizens to become actively involved in activities designed to prevent crime, reduce the fear of crime, and contribute to neighborhood revitalization.

- (1) To establish NEW community and neighborhood based anti-crime organizations and groups which can mobilize neighborhood residents to conduct crime prevention activities.
- (2) To strengthen and/or expand existing community and neighborhood based anti-crime organizations and assist existing organizations involved in community improvement efforts to develop anti-crime programs.
- (3) To develop improved understanding and cooperation of crime prevention activities among criminal justice officials and neighborhood residents.
- (4) To integrate neighborhood anti-crime efforts with appropriate community development activities.

This program, like many other LEAA Programs of the late 1970's, reflect the implementation of the Action Development Process in LEAA. The Action Development Process is an effort to improve the value and effectiveness of LEAA Action Programs by systematically building on knowledge about concepts, approaches and techniques which are successful in controlling crime and improving criminal justice, carefully testing program concepts. It also involves marketing these concepts through the use of training and technical assistance. This technical assistance was to be provided both through the in-house resources of LEAA/OCAP and third party technical assistance providers.

The Community Anti-Crime Program was designed to address the following:

- (a) Increasing social isolation of neighborhood residents resulting from a fear of crime has destroyed the feeling of community necessary for social order.
- (b) The lack of institutional vehicles for organizing community residents into groups which can conduct effective anti-crime programs.
- (c) Increased victimization of the elderly, a problem which is particularly amenable to community and neighborhood based solutions.
- (d) Lack of effective communication and cooperation among neighborhood residents and criminal justice officials.
- (e) Lack of coordination among community development efforts and anti-crime programs.

It was also designed to achieve the following results:

- (a) The mobilization of community and neighborhood residents into effective self-help organizations which can develop and conduct anti-crime programs within their communities and neighborhoods.
- (b) Neighborhood anti-crime efforts that promote a greater sense of community and foster social controls over crime occurrence.
- (c) Improved cooperation among community and neighborhood residents and criminal justice agencies concerning the crime problems of communities and neighborhoods.
- (d) Increased awareness and involvement of criminal justice agencies in resident-sponsored neighborhood crime prevention activities and increased opportunities for citizen input into the criminal justice system.
- (e) The broad scale transfer of information about successful community and neighborhood-based anti-crime programs to other groups throughout the nation.
- (f) A reduction in the fear of crime among community and neighborhood residents.
- (g) A reduction in the victimization of community and neighborhood residents.

This program was designed to test the following hypotheses:

- (a) The provision of financial and technical assistance to community and neighborhood groups will encourage and enable them to mobilize and involve residents in effective anti-crime programs which will prevent crime, reduce the fear of crime and improve cooperation among residents and criminal justice officials.
- (b) Crime and the fear of crime can be reduced at the community level through increased coordination of anti-crime programming with other neighborhood revitalization efforts, e.g., social services and physical rehabilitation measures.
- (c) Innovation born from necessity will provide new approaches to the reduction of crime.

The following assumptions on the part of LEAA/OCAP were found to underlie the Community Anti-Crime Program:

Two essential program strategies were designed by LEAA/OCAP; these were:

- (1) The Coalition Model and (2) The Grass-Roots Model:

The program strategy is designed to ensure that funds get to the grass-roots, neighborhood level. It will accommodate newly forming community and neighborhood-level anti-crime groups and encourage existing groups involved in other community improvement efforts to expand their activities to include crime prevention activities. This emphasis at the neighborhood level will be accomplished through two funding models:

- (a) The Coalition Model.

- 1 One project type under this approach would consist of an existing community organization (for purposes of this program, community is assumed to be larger than neighborhood) serving as a catalyst to involve smaller, less formal neighborhood groups (block clubs, etc.) in a comprehensive community anti-crime program. The larger, more established organization serves as the coordinator of these grass-roots efforts development, integrating their funding needs into the project proposal, and assisting the smaller groups in project implementation. This approach including several jurisdictions. The larger organization is the grant applicant and is responsible for program and financial accountability. These applications should include copies of agreements which have been entered into with participating groups.

- 2 A variation of the above model could consist of a coalition of small neighborhood groups which band together to form a new incorporated non-profit community organization. It should be noted that the length of incorporation will not be the sole criterion for determining an applicant's potential to conduct a successful program.

- (b) The Grass-Roots Model

Many community neighborhood groups are, themselves, genuine grass-roots organization consisting of neighborhood residents with elected congresses, etc. Established organizations of this type are eligible to apply as individual applicants, though they may choose to coalesce with other similar organization or to associate with a larger organization.

Whereas the strategies of the program were designed to support community and neighborhood-based projects promoting collective responses to crime at the community level, no funding was allowed for actions of citizens as individuals which did not contribute to the organization of neighborhoods and communities. For example, activities designed to increase individual security, e.g., purchasing and installing locks and/or alarm systems on individual residences or solely to provide services to juveniles, rape victims or victims of family violence, constituted ineligible elements for LEAA/OCAP funding and the auspices of the Act.

Innovative crime prevention projects of two types were provided for programs addressing factors having casual relationships to crime and programs emphasizing the reduction opportunities. Among the former were:

- 1 Youth crisis centers
- 2 Projects to strengthen the family to discourage delinquency and criminality
- 3 Community based programs for delinquents and offenders in need of services
- 4 Community-based victim assistance programs
- 5 Volunteer-based recreational programs, e.g., night-time supervision of available facilities.
- 6 Neighborhood mediation centers
- 7 Linkages to the police and courts with respect to alternative sanctions (community service orders, for example)
- 8 Programs that provide community-based support for ex-offenders.

Among the latter types of activities were:

- 1 Block watch programs
- 2 Tenant security programs
- 3 Escort services for the elderly
- 4 Child protective services
- 5 Residential security education

Other general considerations of vital concern to neighborhood groups seeking to set up CAP's in small cities were:

- (c) Programs consisting of a particularly innovative approach to a single crime problem which is particularly severe in the applicant's neighborhood. APPLICANTS MUST DEMONSTRATE why this single problem approach is justified and the project must contribute to the organization of neighborhood residents.
- (d) As a general rule, LEAA will not fund applications of type (a) or (b) which are limited to a single crime prevention activity through the Community Anti-Crime Program. The Community Anti-Crime Program is not solely a target-hardening program (for example marking valuables) or a recreation program for juveniles. However, if activities like these are integrated into a multi-service model which includes several activities, they are permissible. Particular emphasis should be given to programs which are causally related to the prevention of crime and which stand some likelihood of being institutionalized in the community. Further, such activities must be conducted primarily by community residents, not by formal agencies.
- (e) Projects must consist of a planned approach with evidence of substantial input from neighborhood residents in the identification of crime problems and assessment of needs.
- (f) Project must have an action orientation, involving volunteers in anti-crime projects. The conduct of meeting, training, and conferences alone will not be considered sufficient.
- (g) Projects must consist of activities that can reasonably be assessed as having the potential for crime prevention. Applicants must describe how their activities will impact on the crime problems in their communities.
- (h) Project activities must be cost-effective, i.e., staffing patterns and cost must be a reasonable investment compared with the expected results of the project.
- (i) Projects must consist of an integrated group of activities which complement and reinforce each other.

Applicant CAP's seeking to implement coalition model type programs were required to include descriptions of the neighborhood groups participating in the coalition as well as the amount of fund needed by these participation groups and the types of activities they planned to implement. The applicants were required to document the steps they had taken to seek out and encourage these groups to participate. In essence, they were required to provide "seed money" to these groups as part of their outreach efforts.

Grass roots community/neighborhood groups were required to demonstrate that they actually resided in the community and that their membership consisted of indigenous neighborhood residents. Community profiles including, but not limited to, crime rates, general economic and demographic features, percentages of economically disadvantaged and elderly citizens, etc., were required to be drawn up.

Descriptions of anti-crime programs operating in the applicant community were required under both models. Also required were statements on how the proposed program related to these extant local programs and how it related to other federal, state and local community anti-crime or civic improvement activities. Applicants were also required to include statements on how the projects were to be evaluated.

The NOBLE/Riviera Beach project was eclectic in that it incorporated elements of both models. This type of eclectic program design was deemed by NOBLE to be more efficacious for CAP's in small cities. This approach allows the CAP to incorporate basic elements from each approach.

DECIDING WHAT COMMUNITY GROUPS TO INVOLVE: WHAT THE NOBLE/RIVIERA BEACH EXPERIENCE TELLS US ABOUT BUILDING CAP COALITIONS IN SMALL CITIES.

As there will usually be one, and only one, CAP in most small cities, it is important that cross sectional representation among competing groups be obtained. As a result, the decision of which groups to involve and which groups to exclude becomes perhaps the most important decision to be made by the planning board of the CAP. Normatively and generically, affiliation and involvement should be open to all extant organizations in the city whose roles and missions are exhibitivie of congruence with the role and mission of the planned and projected CAP.

When this is done, a CAP attracts under its banner a wide variety of different groups and interests, many of which have different agenda-sometimes hidden agenda. Incorporation within the CAP usually brings together, or at least coalescing, community groups whose past patterns have often been representative and characteristic of antipathies, antagonisms and adversary relationships. The trick is to get the dissonant groups to work cooperatively toward a common goal - community crime prevention.

While all of the groups can participate, not everyone can participate in the decision-making process: the alternate is some form of representative participation. Representative participation is a compromise between perfect democracy and the need to transact business and to get something in a body which may become so large as to become unwieldy.

The task is to effect the structures through which truly representative views can be aired. The CAP Planning Board cannot nevertheless be allowed to degenerate into ventilation forums or debating societies. Nothing is so counterproductive in the planning and implementation process as inaction and indecision. Participants lose interest with endless debate.

It is difficult to identify and make overtures to all the extant groups in the community, but it is also important to try to do so. Being given the opportunity to be involved, irrespectively as to whether or not the group elects to become involved, is often enough to neutralize some groups whose opposition could impede and imperil project progress. While it is obviously desirous to engage the cooperation and participation of these community groups, certainly it can be gotten that these groups at least will not actively oppose the CAP.

In order to make the coalition work, it may be necessary to give up some control, effect compromises and make concessions. This weakens the political strengths of all involved groups but yet enhances the chances of project success.

In order to get all of the chords of dissonance working harmoniously as a symphony, there must be put in place mechanisms conflict resolution, barganing and compromising and negotiation.

DO'S AND DON'TS

1. Attempt to negotiate rules governing the involvement of community organizations in the CAP coalition.
2. Attempt to identify all extant community groups and solicit their involvement.
3. Set up mechanisms for conflict resolution.
4. Do this through bargaining, compromising and negotiating.

DON'TS

1. Do not engage in elitisms in selecting community organizations for involvement in the coalition.
2. Do not allow perfect participatory democracy to needlessly delay CAP progress.
3. Attempt to obtain true representativeness even if perfect participatory democracy is not attainable.

POLICE/COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN SMALL CITIES

The NOBLE/Riviera Beach experience contains elements which help to explain how the essence of how police/community relations in small cities differs from that in larger and medium sized cities. This experience contains allusions to the roles of police officers as civic leaders, community workers and even local "folk heroes." It becomes immediately apparent at the cursory observation level that the rigid, fixed and etched in stone lines between the police and the citizens characteristic of large cities simply do not exist in small cities. The police are seen as neighbors, church fellows and business, social and political associates as well as protectors of life and property in cities.

Authorities on the Criminal Justice System in America allude to the ambivalent state of police/community relations in larger cities of this country. On the one hand, most agree that it is imperative that good police/community relations exist if the police are to get community support in their initiatives and offensives against crime. Nevertheless, the policeman's perception of the other people who work on social problems in his neighborhood is generally varied.

According to W. Eugene Groves, in an article entitled, "Police in the Ghetto," Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder, there are systemic gaps in the perceptions of the usefulness or helpfulness of community groups to them in the discharge of their duties and the conduct of police work. Policemen often complain of the lack of community support in their campaigns against crime. Community residents, on the other hand, want police to do something about crime, but do not agree that they should be given a carte blanche to engage in inconsiderate, annoying or brutal behavior or the imposition of alien and unjustified standards of conduct upon powerless people.

The policeman's primary task is the immediate enforcement of rules of law and order and, hence, he often establishes a criminal-non criminal dichotomy in his relations and encounters with citizens. These criminal-non criminal dichotomies, according to McNamara, interfere with his ability to handle a variety of situations and different types of people in a sensitive manner. This ability requires an understanding of the community in which he works. Community residents are likely to perceive a relatively low level of this kind of understanding on the part of most policemen.

According to Groves, while at least 30 percent of policemen indicated that they attended community meetings occasionally, only seven (7) percent indicated that they attended them frequently. Like most lower-middle class occupational groups, policemen are not frequent participants in community groups or organized activities outside their jobs. Groves found that 16 percent did not belong to any organization and 56 percent belonged to only one. The shift work nature of their employment also deleteriously affected the civic participation of policemen.

Furthermore, while research reveals that many policemen are dissatisfied with the external rewards of their job, about half-way satisfied with their working conditions, they are, nevertheless, very happy with the colleagues with whom they work. This in-group solidarity, while important to morale, esprit des corps and camaraderie within the department, tends to move them even further away psychologically from the unsupportive and even threatening world where they work. This isolation usually exacerbates the latent hostility between the residents and the "enforcers."

Compounding and intensifying these police/community relations is the culture of this, paramilitary, closed society itself. This police/establishment "inside" behavior itself yields a world view that is behavior typical for this class. The policemen on the beat generally concludes that the only persons who really understand him and his work are other policemen. This isolationism is manifested in many ways: a new police officers usually loses his non-police friends during his first year on the force. Not only does the police officer work solely or primarily with other police officers, he also tends to socialize only with them too.

The institutional caste of these paramilitary proclivities, never so pronounced and blatant in small and medium sized cities as in larger cities, is nevertheless characteristic of all police departments. Hence, good police/community relations, although an imperative goal of most police departments, must be worked at. Open communication between CAP's and their police emanating from points of common interest and symbiotic initiatives must be cultivated during the early stages of the project's life cycle. Procedurally, this often entails overcoming decades of indifference, mistrust and even hostility. Mere lip service or commitment

to the concept of good police/community relations will not suffice. Involvement, cooperation and pursuit of common goals over planes of parity and mutual respect must become guideposts for these relations.

There are, to be sure, some rather standardized features in terms of initiatives and operations of all CAP's irrespectively of size or demographic feature. Firstly, there are the crime analysis elements, i.e., time or occurrences, modus operandi, suspect information, victimization surveys, etc. which must be conducted in cooperation with the local police before decisions concerning what crime problems the CAP elects to impact on can be made. Secondly, police input into police decisions regarding the conduct of the CAP as well as strategies and techniques related to project operations should be overtly solicited. Problems related to turf and territoriality should be worked out in such a way that project operations do not jeopardize on-going police initiatives and investigation. Finally, ways of sharing information and collaborating on joint efforts of mutual importance must be worked out.

Mechanism and formal as well as informal structures for interacting with officers delegated the primary responsibility for crime prevention education and activities within the police department must be worked. A working knowledge of the crime prevention officers plans and initiatives being needed in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and overlap, the CAP Executive Director or Chief Administrative Officer should maintain regular dialogue with his police officer. From this crime prevention officer he should also be able to learn what kinds of logistical support he can reasonably expect to be forthcoming from the local police in setting up crime fairs, vans, displays as well as public meetings. Joint appearances of the CAP Executive Officer and the Crime Prevention Officer at many of the community education public meetings are clearly requisite as each of these officials should complement the other's work.

Whereas police/community relations work generally requires at least a rudimentary knowledge of the innerworkings of police departments themselves and a knowledge of sensitive areas within these departments, it constitutes an area of CAP programming which usually should not be attempted without the added dimension of technical assistance. This TA, like other forms of TA, is of course available from LEAA/OCACP as well as a number of third party providers. Newly formed CAP's in small cities, as in other cities, should engage this TA at their earliest opportunity. It should be used in an on-going manner in these delicate areas.

Given the current status of police/community relations and the relative importance ascribed to both crime prevention and commonly relations must plan for change. That is to say, they must develop new repertoires of skills and competences as well as the technology needed to make the development of these as integral to police work as the officer on patrol's regular routine as the normative police roles traditionally defined by both the police and the general public as "crime-fighting" or hard core "law enforcement." The reality of the situation is that presently experts estimate that approximately 80 per cent of the officer's time is spend in the areas of social regulation, order maintenance, and service to the community. Only two out of ten of the seven million calls made by New York City Police in 1973 involved actual or threatened crime or violence. Authorities generally concede that role ambiguity on the part of police by both the public and the policy has serious ramifications for both the police and the public.

One of the roles of CAP's in small cities to convince top echelon officers in local police departments that it is in their best interest to plan and implement programs designed to improve community relations.

As improving these relations rests on implementing programs to deal with resistance to change, a firm commitment to the integration of ventures in regards to training and constructive organizational objectives is required, rather than the delegation of this responsibility to a specialized person or group. Programs similarly delegated tend to fragmented, uncoordinated and doomed to failure at inception.

Support is required at the policy making level; institutional support is required; role definition and priority specification are also required. No police department, however honest, committed, and dedicated can make meaningful inroads against crime independently of community support. This must be communicated to the common structure of the local police department at the onset.

Specifically, middle management resistance must be overcome. Patrol supervisor support must be engaged. The relevance and importance of police/community relations must be covered in accountability terms. Field supervisory personnel at all levels must be involved in planning as well as implementation for only they can anticipate the problems that are likely to arise in actual operations. Effective training is also clearly mandated for both police officers and CAP personnel.

Outside of capitalizing on natural bonds of neighborliness and face-to-face contacts more likely to exist in small cities than in larger or medium sized cities, CAP's in smaller cities have few other established and tested assets in initiating and maintaining good police/community relations. Obviously, this is decidedly an area wherein technical assistance is needed.

DO's and DON'Ts

1. Encourage policy board member and CAP staff members to put aside traditional suspicions and mistrusts of local police officer in an effort to initiate a new era of understanding, mutual respect and symbiotic cooperation between the CAP and its affiliated neighborhood self-help and civic improvement groups and the local police.
2. Initiate dialogue with the higher echelon staff of the local police during the planning stages of the CAP.
3. Seek technical assistance from the local police in the planning and conduct of the crime analysis component.
4. Apprise the local police regularly of your impending crime initiatives and seek their advice, logistical support and sanction for these activities.
5. Engage technical assistance (TA) for implementing policy and setting up the structures and functions pertaining to police/community relations and the conduct of operations relating to them.
6. Keep open the channels of communication between the CAP and the local police.
7. Integrate as many activities with those of the police as may be technically feasible.

DON'TS

1. Do not attempt to incorporate or absorb legitimate police functions.
2. Do not work at cross purposes with your local police.
3. Do not polarize relations between your local police and other community groups.
4. Do not focus on issues that are negative and divisive or polarizing. Attempt to move your CAP to new dimensions of cooperativeness and mutual understanding.
5. Do not confuse, misunderstand or misinterpret to other community groups, your role as a CAP.

INVOLVING LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN CAP'S IN SMALL CITIES:
LESSONS OF NOBLE/RIVIERA BEACH

Grassroots groups in small cities usually have problems in obtaining support and participation from local government agencies and officials other than police officials. In most instances, the problems relating to obtaining this kind of support is usually dependent upon the type of organization initiating and sponsoring the program. Important also are the roles, missions, community standings and reputations of the various organizations which umbrella under the banner of the coalition.

Grassroots groups also usually lack established contacts with public officials in most agencies. They must, as a result, often start from scratch in developing these contacts. Time obviously is not on their side when they have single year funding. A necessary first step is gathering information of how the local government actually works and who has authority and responsibility for making various kinds of decisions as a number of different officials involved in policy making and providing services needed by community based CAP's in small cities. However, the principal players in small cities are usually a highly visible group and, consequently, readily identifiable.

Among the agencies which should be involved are the following:

- ...Elected officials, such as the Mayor, City Council, County Board of Supervisors, City/County District Attorney.
- ...Schools - the Principals, School Board, PTA
- ...City Planning Department
- ...Probation Department and/or Court Service
- ...Safety Commission
- ...Housing and Community Development
- ...Welfare Department
 - . Housing and Building Inspector
 - . Family Services
 - . Zoning and Liscencing Commissions
 - . Fire Department
 - . Economic Development
 - . Manpower Development

In order to gain access to these department heads, a somewhat difficult process, and to convince them of the significance of the project, it is necessary to build community support and legitimacy. Often "marching" on the mayor's office is not as effective as working with and through elected officials.

These elected officials usually offer their support more readily when invited to community meetings or public forums, particularly if these forums include representation from large numbers of active community residents and organizations.

DO'S AND DON'TS

1. Be sensitive to the limitations of the authority of public agencies.
2. Be aware of the competing demands on the resources and time of bureaucrats and elected officials.
3. Understand that they will logically be more interested in programs that are complementary to existing programs. They have ascended to their present positions through the status quo.
4. Be careful to explain to them how the programs are non-duplicative and how they do not infringe on their turf and territoriality.

DON'TS

1. Do not make threats or give ultimatums.
2. Do not equate caution with evasiveness or procrastination; politicians and bureaucrats often delay committing themselves until consensus building has taken place.
3. Don't assume that all bureaucrats have the freedom to act: often this is orchestrated from the mayor's office.

MANAGING CAP'S IN SMALL CITIES: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED
FROM THE NOBLE/RIVIERA BEACH EXPERIENCE

Community boards cannot manage day-to-day fiscal affairs of CAP's any more than they can manage day-to-day operations of these CAP's. This is a professional responsibility; professional expertise is needed for discharging this responsibility. The chief administrative officer of the CAP, the Executive Director, must be a capable fiscal manager. He must have a working technical knowledge of budget derivation and budget execution. Primary responsibility for the budget must be his and his alone. He must be given sign off responsibility for expenditures and disbursements.

As he is expected to be something more than a glorified clerk, and, as his primary responsibilities are operational responsibilities relating to crime prevention, more often than not he requires technical assistance in carrying out his fiscal/financial responsibilities. He must, first of all, understand and rigorously follow the live items of the budget. He must be more than just conversant with the LEAA/OCACP guidelines governing the execution and preparation of budgets. His first line of defense in these endeavors is the LEAA staff itself. Usually there are protracted budgetary negotiations before budget approval is obtained. Furthermore, LEAA Manuals contain very specific guidelines on all aspects of the budget processes. Program Managers from LEAA/OCACP are usually willing to be helpful in dispatching fiscal agents to assist. The goal is to ensure that all grants are in auditable condition at all times.

Decisions whether or not to engage CPA's or auditing firms to assist in this process has to be a personal one but is usually not a necessary one. With adequate technical assistance from LEAA and/or one of its third party providers, most CAP's should be able to do a creditable job of accounting for federal funds granted by LEAA.

Decisions as to whether to form non-profit corporations should be undertaken with both technical and qualified legal consultants. The old axiom that a man who tries to be his only lawyer not only has a fool for a client, but also a fool for a lawyer is very applicable when it comes to forming non-profit organizations for the management of CAP's. There are IRS considerations, i.e., non-profit corporation numbers, etc. These matters attenuate highly technical and complex considerations. Legal and technical assistances are obviously warranted.

More mundane kinds of fiscal operations such as time sheets, travel vouchers, fees for consultants, etc. entail the keeping of copious and technically correct records. Purchase order, receipts for deliveries, rental receipts and equipment rental vouchers should be kept in such a way that they can be easily audited. Employees should be required to sign for payroll checks. Prevailing prices should be paid for consumable supplies.

As a result, the answer to sound fiscal management in most CAP's in small cities is TA and more TA. One can use the local fiscal powers that be, that is those extant in his CAP. Local government officials and functionaries who have experiences with managing federal funds as local political subdivision conduits should be tapped and enlisted into the fiscal management effort. Use all resources at your disposal. Do not try to go it alone.

DO'S AND DON'TS

1. Ensure that as much mileage is gotten out of early budget negotiations and discussions as is possible. Involve your best fiscal minds in these processes. Discuss them in Planning Board Meetings.
2. Peruse LEAA Manuals on budgetary requirements; understand salient features; study fine print; raise questions with LEAA officials; ensure that you thoroughly understand LEAA/OCACP budgetary and fiscal requirements.
3. Error on the side of caution in obtaining technical assistance. It is usually not possible to get too much.

DON'TS

1. Do not try to go it alone.
2. Do not over-professionalize or over-specialize fiscal/financial matters; usually most intelligent and educated persons can understand them. Do not make this an elitism function.
3. Do not let fiscal/financial matters, particularly budgetary matters get out of hand. If you make a mess out it do not try to reconcile your own mess. Use the TA sources available to you.

THE EVALUATION OF CAP'S IN SMALL CITIES

All LEAA/OCAP Community Anti-Crime and Comprehensive Crime Prevention Programs have rather stringent reporting and evaluation requirements which must be adhered to and complied with. While these impose very specific record keeping and data collection requirements on grantee organizations, they were put in place to afford these CAP's the opportunity to empirically assess and monitor the processes and products emanating from activities undertaken as part of their Statements of Work. Hence, the program monitors of LEAA/OCAP have prepared self-assessment and program monitoring instruments to be used in the evaluation/assessment process. These instruments are to be used by the policy-making boards and the project staff members in planning evaluation and progress reports.

There are, however, established, validated and replicated ways capturing the data needed for these evaluation/assessment processes. On the first hand, CAP staff and board members must be sensitized to the importance of this process, that is to say, toward treating it as an integral part of project work rather than as an add on. They must clearly understand the LEAA/OCAP mandates concerning this evaluation.

First, LEAA/OCAP envisions and independent national evaluation of these CAP and CCP projects through the use of an independent contractor, to be chosen by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. This contractor and LEAA will select projects for inclusion in this national level evaluation and grantees may be required to modify their proposed evaluation. Second, there are self assessment, monitoring and evaluation requirements which attenuate these grants. Third, there are hypotheses to be tested which center around the impacts of these projects on the incidence of crime, reduction of citizen fear of crime and functions of the Criminal Justice System. In short, each of these funded CAP's in small cities should test these reduction of crime/reduction of citizen fear of crime hypotheses.

In order to do this, project staff members need to implement an early identification and documentation system for capturing and using data sources. A very elementary way of doing this is by establishing and maintaining copious records of all board minutes, deliberations and correspondences and daily

logs of all staff and policy-making board activities. These should constitute the primary data sources for measuring project progress.

Other important data sources are attendance records of public forums, symposia and seminars. Audience generation techniques should, also, be identified and documented. Audience responses should be surveyey. Audience participation should be subjected to interaction analyses processes and all public impact.

The Research Analyst or Program Evaluator should be engaged at the onset of the project rather than in the terminal stages. Usually, he alone knows what is needed by the way of program measures and data sources to empirically establish the efficacy of the project for meeting the goals and objectives which the project was designed to address.

The identification of unforeseen occurrences and transpirations - intervening variables - which frustrate or inhibit in the attainment of project goals should also be identified and documented and, if possible, quantified. Their impacts and influences on progression toward project goals should be assessed. Strategies for either overcoming them or reducing their retarding impacts on project progress should be studied and strategies that are effective in minimizing their overall impacts should be captured as technology impact elements.

Small cities, often not having the sophisticated data management and assessment mechanisms, usually do not have at their disposal, the capabilities found in larger and medium sized cities in terms of statistical data processing. As a result, computerized operations for data management, storage, retrieval and treatment is less likely to be available. Consequently, CAP's in these small cities must set up data management operations in concert with their own assessment and evaluation needs. Usually this is an area in which technical assistance is required. Nevertheless, the hardware needed is usually minimal.

The essence of evaluation is the comparison of both outcome - what happened that would not have happened in the absence of the project - and relative effectiveness - what strategies within programs work best? The primary purpose of evaluation is to provide objective information to program managers, Planning Board members and other policy makers on the costs and effects of community anti-crime and crime prevention programs, thereby assisting in the effective management and the efficient allocation of limited resources.

Evaluation Defined

The Urban Institute, in a manual entitled, Federal Evaluation Policy: Analyzing the Effects of Public Programs, defines evaluation in terms of the avowed purposes set up for engaging in this activity:

Evaluation (1) assesses the effectiveness of an on-going program in achieving its objectives, (2) relies on principles of research design to distinguish a program's effects from those of other forces working in a situation, and (3) aims at program improvement through a modification of current operations.

Functionally, evaluation is more concerned with matters of program or project effectiveness than with program or project efficiency; it is goal-oriented, focusing more on output than input. It also differs from both "program

and "policy analysis" as these usually compare existing programs with alternative or hypothetical programs. Its function is to provide feedback concerning the results of decisions and links program operations to planning and programming. It also provides information for the incremental upgrading of project strategies and operations.

Types of Evaluations

There are four basic types of evaluations - (1) program/project impact, (2) program strategy evaluation, (3) project evaluation and (4) project rating. Program/project evaluation is the assessment of the overall effectiveness of a program/project in meeting its objectives. Program strategy evaluation is the assessment of the relative, marginal or complementary effectiveness of different techniques used in the conduct of the project's Statement of Work. Project evaluation refers to a measurement of output variables in attempt to compare project results with performance objectives or baseline conditions, omitting the use of comparison groups. Project rating is the assessing of the relative effectiveness of different local projects in achieving program objectives.

In addition to these four kinds of evaluations, there are two alternatives to the evaluation of on-going programs, these are field experiments and experimental demonstrations. The latter operates with a careful specification of treatment groups and control groups, control over input and process variables and careful measurement of input, process and output

variables. The former operates without control groups, but with control over input and process variables and careful measurement of input, process and output variables.

While these differences are more than mere semantic differences, the task is not to become overawed or bogged down by these technicalities. The CAP's in small cities usually do not have on the staff full-time employees with the research/evaluation competence. As a result, they should avail themselves to TA that is being made available by LEAA/OCACP early in the project period.

Also, staff and Planning Board members of these CAP's should be cognizant of the fact that research/evaluation is usually a professional responsibility. Consequently, a Research Analyst or Program Evaluator should be engaged to perform these tasks; usually the TA providers authorized by LEAA/OCACP will assist you in the selection of this person if you request assistance.

Evaluation - Related Activities

Monitoring, reporting systems and cost analysis are also three evaluation-related activities; these are differentiated from evaluation in that they focus on program inputs. Monitoring refers to the assessment of managerial and operational efficiency of programs and projects. The general objective of monitoring is to allow funding agencies, in this case LEAA/OCACP, to see impressionistically how projects are going. Reporting systems usually supply data on services provided, populations served and costs of services. Cost analysis is a management tool which allows for comparative analysis of dividends from different project components, strategies and operations.

Do's and Don'ts of Evaluation

1. Carefully prepare an evaluation plan which will allow you to gauge the efficacy and efficiency of the structures and functions of the CAP project for meeting the goals and objectives established.
2. Make evaluation an integral and on-going part of the project; do not relegate evaluation to some tangential or inconsequential or subsidiary role.
3. Determine during the planning stages of the project what your probable data needs will be in conducting an empirical assessment of the CAP's worth and impact.
4. Sensitize all staff and board members to the importance of accountability and stewardship. Make them thoroughly cognizant and appreciative of the fact that evaluation should be constant and on-going and that best use of evaluation results in the area of program strengthening, modification and revision.
5. Develop and refine instruments for capturing the data need for assessing and evaluating the structures and function of the CAP Project. Seek technical assistance from LEAA/OCAP or one of the third party TA providers commissioned by LEAA/OCAP.
6. Evaluate all of the activities of the CAP, i.e. public forums, training sessions, demonstrations, displays, etc. Conduct these evaluations from the context of the perceived usefulness of the recipient/audience whenever possible. It is easy to be carried away by one's own planning presentation and production of materials. Very often one is too close to the operation to objectively gauge its impact.
7. Use research and evaluation results in compilations such as progress and interim reports, program monitor's reports and other independent evaluations to improve and restructure the CAP Project.
8. Bring on board or contract with your program Evaluator or Research Analyst during the early stages of the project in order that he/she may input the data needs of the project during the data needs of the project during its inception. Use his expertise to help you construct, field test and validate instruments such as pre-post-tests, surveys, questionnaires, schedules, etc.
9. Be concerned with using only the analytic operations which help you to conduct a true evaluation of the CAP project. Make this evaluation as empirically oriented as possible. Wherever feasible, quantify and operationalize variables and constructs.

DON'TS

1. Do not refuse to share data concerning your project with Program Monitors and Program Evaluators.
2. Do not make evaluation an end in itself or a substitute for project operations; put it in its proper perspective - an integral and systematic part of the project's Statement of Work.
3. Do not choose elaborate, complex and esoteric research designs for reasons of trying to impress or misrepresent. As a rule, choose the simplest research and evaluation designs and tools.

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