


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
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FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

MARCH 1982



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Police Communication
in an Urban County
The State of the Art

U.S. Department of Justice
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The Cover:

Population growth in many areas has necessitated the development of more sophisticated communications systems.

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
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Police Administrators' Attitudes Toward the Definition and Control of Police Deviance

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Only within the last 10 years has the problem of police deviance, especially corruption, been the subject of empirical research. Although the topic has been the subject matter of polemical debate since the establishment of the first paid police forces, empirical research to determine the causes of, attitudes toward, and means to control police deviance is still scarce. Even though there have been some noteworthy exceptions to this statement,¹ the pervasiveness of the phenomenon and the serious nature of the problem have not been matched by social scientific research interest. This is especially true in the area of police administrators' attitudes toward the definition and control of police deviance, especially corruption. Yet, few would deny the importance of the chief's role in preventing, controlling, and eliminating police corruption and other forms of police deviance. Police deviance, particularly in the form of

corruption, is not only contrary to the police mandate and organizationally divisive and disruptive but in many cases it makes the chief and other members of the department subject to criticism, dismissal, and/or prosecution. Although all members of the police command structure are, or should be, accountable for the performance of their men, the ultimate responsibility for corrupt behavior and other forms of police misconduct by any police officer and the integrity of the department rests with the police chief. Those areas in which the chief should be active include establishing an internal affairs unit to eradicate all patterns of misconduct, including corruption; being personally honest and being determined that his men will be honest also; and being willing to pay the price for virtue.² In addition, it is important that the chief take a public stance against corruption as a means of controlling it.³ This includes written

rules and regulations which explicitly define the administrator's position on behaviors which he believes are corrupt. Recognizing the importance of administrative action in the prevention and control of police misconduct, we surveyed police chiefs in one southern State in order to determine their attitudes toward the definition and control of police corruption and other patterns of police deviance. Specifically, the chiefs were asked to define certain patterns of police misconduct as corruption, whether their department had rules and regulations covering these behaviors, and what action, if any, they would take if officers in their departments were discovered engaging in these types of behavior. These are the areas which appear to be most directly under the direction of the chief in his efforts to prevent and control police misconduct.



Dr. Barker

Police Occupational Deviance

The patterns of police behavior to be discussed in this study are examples of a general pattern of deviant behavior (norm- or rule-violating behavior) known as occupational deviance, i.e., deviant behavior (criminal and noncriminal) committed during the course of "normal" work activities. Police occupational deviance refers to all deviant acts, i.e., violations of criminal laws, departmental rules and regulations, and ethical police standards, which occur during the course of occupational activity and are related to employment as a police officer.⁴ These are acts which can be committed only by a police officer or acts which are made possible, facilitated, or directly related to the police occupational role.

Specifically, the patterns of police occupational deviance to be examined are police corruption and police misconduct not directly related to police corruption. (See fig. 1.)

Police Corruption

Technically speaking, police corruption is an example of police misconduct, but we view it as a unique form of police misconduct. Specifically, police corruption is any proscribed act which involves the misuse of the officer's official position for actual or expected material reward or gain.⁵ In other words, corrupt acts contain three elements: (1) They are forbidden, (2) they involve the misuse of the officer's official position, and (3) they involve a material gain no matter how insignificant. There are at least 10 patterns of corrupt behavior which fit this definition.⁶ (See fig. 2.)

Police Misconduct Not Related to Corruption

Police misconduct not related to corruption, hereafter termed "police misconduct," is any pattern of behavior which meets two basic criteria: (1) It is a form of police occupational deviance and (2) the behavior does not involve a material reward or gain. Examples of police misconduct include police perjury, police brutality, sex on duty, sleeping on duty, drinking on duty, and other rule violations not involving a material reward or gain.⁷ The specific patterns of police misconduct to be examined in this study are: (1) Sleeping on duty, (2) hitting handcuffed prisoners, a form of police brutality, (3) having sex on duty, (4) speeding in patrol cars, (5) personal shopping on duty, and (6) drinking on duty.

Figure 1

Deviant Behavior (Norm- or Rule-violating Behavior)	
Occupational Deviance (Deviant Behavior—Criminal and Non-criminal—Committed During the Course of "Normal" Work Activities)	
Police Occupational Deviance	
Corruption (Involves a Material Reward or Gain)	Misconduct (No Material Reward or Gain)
1) Corruption of authority	Police Perjury
2) Kickbacks	Police Brutality
3) Opportunistic Thefts	Sex on Duty
4) Shakedown	Drinking on Duty
5) Protection of Illegal Activities	Sleeping on Duty
6) Traffic Fix	Other Violations not involving material reward or gain
7) Misdemeanor Fix	
8) Felony Fix	
9) Direct Criminal Activities	
10) Internal Payoffs	

Figure 2

PATTERNS OF POLICE CORRUPTION

- 1) **Corruption of Authority**
Officer receives unauthorized free meals, services or discounts, and liquor.
- 2) **Kickbacks**
Officer receives money, goods, or services for referring business to towing companies, ambulances, garages, etc.
- 3) **Opportunistic Thefts**
Opportunistic thefts from arrestees, victims, burglary scenes, and unprotected property.
- 4) **Shakedowns**
Officers take money or other valuables from traffic offenders or criminals caught in the commission of an offense.
- 5) **Protection of Illegal Activities**
Protection money accepted by police officers from vice operators or legitimate businesses operating illegally.
- 6) **Traffic Fix**
"Taking up" or disposing traffic citations for money or other forms of material reward.
- 7) **Misdemeanor Fix**
Quashing of misdemeanor court proceedings for some material reward or gain.
- 8) **Felony Fix**
"Fixing" felony cases for money or other forms of material gain.
- 9) **Direct Criminal Activities**
Officers engage in serious felonies, such as burglary, robbery, and larcenies.
- 10) **Internal Payoffs**
The sale of days off, holidays, work assignments, etc., from one officer to another.

Method

The principal data-gathering instrument for this study was a four-part mail survey questionnaire. The first part of the questionnaire consisted of 10 open-ended questions designed to gather general information about the respondent and his police department. The second section contained 30 questions concerned with the existence of written rules and regulations governing the 16 patterns of police misconduct. The third part of the questionnaire dealt with the subject's opinion as to whether the behaviors actually constituted police corruption. Finally, the last section was used to determine what actions, if any, the respondents would take if officers in their department engaged in the behaviors.

Sample

The population consisted of all police chiefs in a southern State. We compiled a list of 307 police agencies from two sources, *Crime in the United States—1978* and a list entitled "Police Agencies—State of _____—February 1979," which was obtained from a police academy in the State. We decided to survey all departments with five or more sworn police officers. Several methods were used to determine the size of each department in the population. *Crime in the United States—1978* listed the number of officers in 277 of the 307 departments, and a member of the police academy staff was able to supply information on 19 of the missing 30 departments. The remaining 11 departments were con-

Table 1

Response Rate By Size of Department			
Size of Department	No. of Departments	Number	Percentage
5-9 members	76	41	54
10-19 members	58	34	59
20-29 members	25	17	68
30-49 members	14	10	71
50 or more	17	13	76
	190	115	

tacted by phone. The final sampling frame consisted of a total of 190 police agencies having 5 or more sworn police officers—114 departments with 10 or more officers and 76 departments with 5-9 sworn officers.

As a result of the initial mailing and two followup mailings, we received 115 useable questionnaires. This represents an overall response rate of 61 percent. The response rate varied directly with the size of the department from a low of 54 percent for departments with 5-9 members to a high of 76 percent for departments having 50 or more members. (See table 1.)

Rules and Regulations

Each respondent was asked to indicate whether his department had written rules and regulations covering the various patterns of police deviance. Twenty-eight or 24 percent of the chiefs reported that their respective departments had no written rules and regulations. As one would suspect, this was directly related to the size of the department. Forty percent of the smaller departments, under 9 members, had no written rules and regulations, but only 2 of the departments with over 20 members had no written rules and regulations.

Table 2 reports the results on rules and regulations for each of the 16 patterns of police deviance. Over 50 percent of the departments had no rules and regulations specifically dealing with any of the examples given for the first pattern of police corruption—"corruption of authority." Accepting free meals from restaurants was the

one example where there was an almost even split on departments having rules and regulations forbidding this form of behavior—49 percent had rules and regulations covering this activity, 51 percent did not. For the remaining examples of police corruption, there were only three instances where over 50 percent of the departments had no rules and regulations addressing the form of corruption, viz., accepting money from bondsmen (52 percent)—an example of "kickbacks"—and giving and/or taking money for easy work assignments (55 percent) and giving and/or taking money for vacation time (61 percent), both examples of "internal payoffs." In no example did 100 percent of the departments have rules and regulations specifically addressing or mentioning this behavior.

OPINIONS TOWARD POLICE DEVIANCE

Is the Behavior Police Corruption?

In table 3 we are interested in the extent of agreement or disagreement between our definition and the respondents' definition of behaviors which constitute police corruption. As mentioned earlier, we classified the forms of police deviance into two categories: (1) Police corruption—a norm- or rule-violating act which also involves a material reward or gain, and (2) police misconduct—a norm- or rule-violating act which does not involve a material reward or gain. For us, the distinction between the two categories of behavior is the presence or absence of a material reward or gain. We were interested in seeing if the police chiefs also would make this distinction.

The first pattern of corruption to be presented is "corruption of authority." This pattern includes many actions which some find insignificant, and it is the only pattern of corruption which may not involve criminal intent or some misuse of the officer's position at the time of the act. Nevertheless, the officer's integrity and position have been compromised. The officer has received some material reward or gain, and one or both parties to the act may expect some favorable treatment now or in the future. There is always the danger

Table 2

PATTERN OF DEVIANCE	RULES & REGULATIONS (Reported in %)	
	YES	NO
CORRUPTION		
1) Corruption of Authority		
a. Free cup of coffee	35	*66
b. Accepting free meals from restaurants	49	51
c. Using badge for free admission to movie	30	70
d. Accepting Christmas gifts	35	66
2) Kickbacks		
a. Accepting money from bondsmen	48	52
b. Accepting money from lawyers for referral	52	48
c. Accepting money from wrecker drivers for referrals	60	40
3) Opportunistic Thefts		
a. Taking items from a burglary	66	35
b. Taking articles or money from a victim	58	**42
c. Taking home found property	54	46
d. Taking lumber from construction site	54	46
4) Shakedowns		
a. Money from criminals	61	39
5) Protection of Illegal Activities		
a. Accepting money from bootlegger or prostitute	61	39
b. Accepting money from drug pusher	54	46
6) Traffic Fix		
a. Accepting money from traffic offenders	74	27
7) Misdemeanor Fix		
a. Accepting money for dismissing case	68	33
8) Felony Fix		
a. Accepting money for dismissing case	67	33
9) Direct Criminal Activity		
a. Policemen committing burglaries	60	40
10) Internal Payoffs		
a. Giving and/or taking money for easy work assignments	45	55
b. Giving and/or taking money for vacation time	39	61
MISCONDUCT		
1) Sleeping on duty	84	16
2) Hitting a handcuffed prisoner	69	31
3) Sex on duty	66	35
4) Driving over speed limit on routine patrol	71	29
5) Shopping for personal items on duty	39	61
6) Drinking on duty	90	10

N=87

*Some totals may not add to 100 percent because of rounding.

**Indicates a no response.

that an officer engaging in these "petty" forms of corruption may be started on a progression toward more serious ones. Police corruption for many officers often begins with the shared belief among the police peer group that "policemen have a right to a break," and the progression along the continuum of corruption is often so gradual that an officer is deeply involved before he realizes it. As table 3 indicates, this belief may not be shared by the respondents. Seventy-three percent of the respondents disagreed with the statement that accepting free coffee is police corruption. Nevertheless, 35 percent of the departments had rules

and regulations specifically covering this behavior. It may be that the free cup of coffee is a traditional, accepted, and expected pattern of behavior in many of the responding departments. As the authors have heard on many occasions, those establishments that give free coffee are "good to the police" and those that do not are not. The implications of being labeled as "not being good to the police" are obvious. For the remaining examples of corruption of authority—free admission to movies, accepting Christmas gifts, and accepting free meals—the majority of the chiefs are either undecided or disagree with the acts being examples of

police corruption, except that of an officer accepting free meals. In the last example a small majority, 51 percent, agreed that this is police corruption.

The second example of corruption was "kickbacks" and included accepting money from bondsmen, lawyers, or wrecker drivers. In each example, well over 50 percent of the respondents agreed that the behavior was police corruption. Ninety-three percent agreed that accepting money from either a lawyer or wrecker driver for referrals was police corruption, and 60 percent believed that accepting money from bondsmen was an act of corruption.

There was also a general consensus among the respondents that each of the examples of "opportunistic thefts" was police corruption. One hundred percent agreed that taking items from a burglary scene was police corruption, and 99 percent also agreed that taking articles or money from a victim was corruption. Ninety-seven percent agreed that taking lumber from a construction site was police corruption, and 79 percent agreed that taking home found property was also an example of corruption.

For the next six patterns of corruption and their examples, "shakedowns," "protection of illegal activities," "traffic fix," "misdemeanor fix," "felony fix," and "direct criminal activities," there was 100 percent agreement that each of the examples

was an act of police corruption, except for accepting money from a drug pusher—one of the examples under "protection of illegal activities." For some unexplained reason, two respondents (2 percent) disagreed with the statement that such behavior is police corruption.

There was also general agreement that both examples of the last pattern, "internal payoffs," were police corruption. Specifically, 82 percent of the respondents believed that giving and/or taking money for easy work assignments was police corruption, and 81 percent agreed that giving and/or taking money for vacation time was police corruption.

Misconduct

As was stated earlier, the authors

did not define the behavior to be discussed here as acts of corruption because they do not involve any material reward or gain. Again, as with corruption of authority, the respondents did not share our view of the behavior. In four of the six acts of misconduct, over 50 percent of the respondents considered the behavior to be corruption. Specifically, 53 percent believed that sleeping on duty was police corruption, 77 percent believed that hitting a handcuffed prisoner was police corruption, 82 percent believed that sex on duty was corruption, and 82 agreed with the statement that drinking on duty was corruption. The respondents certainly had a more liberal definition of corruption than the authors. We believe that the respondents are responding to how "wrong" or unprofessional they

Table 3

POLICE ADMINISTRATORS' BELIEF THAT BEHAVIOR IS AN EXAMPLE OF POLICE CORRUPTION

PATTERN OF DEVIANCE	BEHAVIOR IS POLICE CORRUPTION (Reported in %)					
	STRONGLY AGREE (5)	AGREE (4)	UND. (3)	DISAGREE (2)	STRONGLY DISAGREE (1)	X SCORE
CORRUPTION						
1) Corruption of Authority						
a. Accepting free coffee	2	7	18	64	10*	2.32
b. Using badge for free admission to movie	13	24	26	35	2	3.12
c. Accepting Christmas gifts	7	14	21	55	3	2.65
d. Accepting free meals	14	37	24	24	1	3.36
2) Kickbacks						
a. Accepting money from bondsmen	30	30	20	20	-	3.89
b. Accepting money from lawyers	42	52	5	-	-	4.33
c. Accepting money from wrecker drivers	53	41	1	-	-	4.4
3) Opportunistic Thefts						
a. Taking items from a burglary	80	21	-	-	-	4.79
b. Taking articles or money from a victim	76	23	1	-	-	4.66
c. Taking home found property	34	45	17	4	-	4.07
d. Taking lumber from construction site	67	30	1	0	2	4.57
4) Shakedowns						
a. Accepting money from criminals	84	16	-	-	-	4.84
5) Protection of Illegal Activities						
a. Accepting money from bootlegger or prostitute	81	19	-	-	-	4.81
b. Accepting money from drug pusher	85	13	-	-	2	4.78

PATTERN OF DEVIANCE	BEHAVIOR IS POLICE CORRUPTION (Reported in %)					
	STRONGLY AGREE (5)	AGREE (4)	UND. (3)	DISAGREE (2)	STRONGLY DISAGREE (1)	X SCORE
6) Traffic Fix						
a. Accepting money from traffic offenders	73	27	-	-	-	4.73
7) Misdemeanor Fix						
a. Accepting money for dismissing case	71	29	-	-	-	4.71
8) Felony Fix						
a. Accepting money for dismissing case	82	18	-	-	-	4.82
9) Direct Criminal Activity						
a. Committing burglary	87	13	-	-	-	4.87
10) Internal Payoffs						
a. Giving and/or taking money for easy work	41	41	10	6	2	4.24
b. Giving and/or taking money for vacation time	33	48	10	6	2	3.99
MISCONDUCT						
1) Sleeping on duty	20	33	15	30	1	3.36
2) Hitting a handcuffed prisoner	50	28	8	12	1	4.05
3) Sex on duty	44	38	10	7	1	4.14
4) Driving over speed limit on routine patrol	7	28	16	44	5	3.0
5) Shopping for personal items on duty	8	20	22	49	2	2.83
6) Drinking on duty	54	29	5	9	4	4.21

N=115

*Some totals may not add to 100% because of rounding.

believe the behavior may be. Consequently, behaviors which violate the respondent's "wrongness" or "unprofessional" standard are equated with corruption. This is basically what one of the authors found in an earlier study.⁹ In that study, members of a 50-man police department were asked to indicate on a scale of 0-9 how "wrong" they perceived various forms of police deviance to be. Sleeping on duty and sex on duty received scores of 8 and police brutality and drinking on duty received scores of 9. These scores were the same as the scores for the majority of the patterns of corruption.

For the remaining patterns of misconduct, the majority of the respondents did not believe the behavior was police corruption. Only 34 percent believed that driving over speed limits while on routine patrol was police corruption, and 28 percent believed that shopping for personal items on duty was an act of corruption.

Reactions to Police Deviance

Table 4 presents a summary of the data dealing with the action the chiefs would take if, and when, instances of police corruption were exposed within their departments. The subjects were presented a fixed choice question dealing with each of the patterns of police deviance. Choices of action were: Take no action, give an oral or written reprimand, suspension, request resignation, press criminal charges, and other. We grouped these actions into four categories ranked by severity of action. The first represents those chiefs who would take no action. The second category, labeled "low," contains those responses of suspension and reprimand. The "medium" category contains those responses resulting in the resignation or dismissal of the officer. Our decision to include the firing of an officer in the "medium" category rather than the "high" category was based on the authors' observations of the effects of a police officer being fired. In numerous "real life" situations observed by the authors, when an officer has been fired from one

"In all but one of the examples, the majority of the chiefs would handle police corruption through in-house or departmental action."

police department, he is often hired by another. This is especially likely if the officer is a certified police officer, i.e., completed his mandated training and receives his certification by the State's Police Officer's Standards and Training Commission. The possibility that the firing of an officer may mean only short term unemployment for the officer does not warrant placing this action in the "high" category. The "high" category was reserved for only those actions resulting in criminal charges against an officer.

A study of table 4 reveals several obvious patterns in the actions that the police chiefs would take in response to the discovery of police corruption in their respective police departments. The most interesting point is that in only one instance did over half of the police chiefs indicate that they would take "high" action. Only for those officers discovered committing burglaries did 75 percent of the respondents indicate that they would press criminal charges. Even more surprising is the fact that 25 percent of the chiefs surveyed would take action of a "low" or "medium" nature against officers committing violations of such magnitude as burglary. For every pattern, except direct criminal activities (committing burglaries), the majority of the police chiefs would take either no action or action of "low" or "medium" severity. In other words, the chiefs would impose departmental sanctions. There are several dangers inherent in this reliance on "in-house" justice for acts of police corruption, especially the more-serious acts. For one, it lessens whatever deterrent effect more severe sanctions might have. In fact, in an earlier study Barker found that there is

an inverse relationship between risk and levels of police corruption. The higher the perceived risk, the lower the level of corruption.¹⁰ There is also always the danger mentioned earlier that an officer can be fired from one department for serious violations of the law and be hired by another department. Lax hiring standards can lead to a few "rotten apples" moving from department to department and continuing their corrupt activities. Furthermore, because police departments operate their own criminal justice system, i.e., receiving, investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating all complaints internally, it is possible for them to operate as a political society unto themselves without control or review by the people. It is also possible that dispensing lenient punishment for serious violations of the law by police officers will provide ammunition to those who argue that the police must be policed by some outside agency because they are unable or unwilling to police themselves.

For those patterns of police deviance defined as police misconduct, the majority of the respondents would take action in the "low" category, i.e., reprimand or suspension. The only instance where the respondents would resort to "high" severity of action is hitting handcuffed prisoners, an example of police brutality. Four percent of the respondents would press criminal charges against the officer. The reactions to police misconduct appear to indicate that even though the majority of the respondents would classify at least four of these acts as police corruption, they place them in a relatively low form of police corruption.

Summary

The purpose of this study was to survey police chiefs in one State and determine their opinions toward the definition and control of two forms of police occupational deviance, viz, police corruption and police misconduct.

Table 4

POLICE CHIEFS' REACTIONS TO POLICE DEVIANCE GROUPED BY SEVERITY OF ACTION (SHOWN IN PERCENTAGES)

PATTERN OF CORRUPTION	NO ACTION	LOW (Suspension & Reprimand)	MEDIUM (Resignation or Firing)	HIGH (Press Crim. Charges)	OTHER
Corruption of Authority					
Free meals	28	68	1		4
Free coffee	77	22			1
Free movie admissions	41	57			3
Christmas gifts	60	33			6
Kickbacks					
Money from bondsmen	24	57	17	1	2
Money from lawyers		45	53	2	
Money from wrecker drivers		47	51		2
Opportunistic Thefts					
Taking items from burglary		2	49	50	
Money or items from victims	1	6	58	31	4
Taking home found property	3	73	19	5	
Taking lumber from construction site		12	44	42	2
Shakedowns					
Money from criminals		3	60	37	
Protection of Illegal Activities					
Money from bootlegger or prostitute		4	67	30	
Money from drug pusher		5	67	29	
Traffic Fix					
Money from traffic offenders		16	68	16	
Misdemeanor Fix					
Money for dismissing case		16	68	16	
Felony Fix					
Money for dismissing case		4	54	43	
Direct Criminal Activity					
Committing burglaries		2	22	75	2
Internal Payoffs					
Giving and/or taking money for easy work assignments		68	30		2
Giving and/or taking money for vacation time	4	73	21		2
Misconduct					
Sleeping on duty		93	7		
Hitting handcuffed prisoners		56	35	4	5
Sex on duty		55	42		3
Driving over speed limit on routine patrol	4	90			6
Personal shopping on duty	28	70			2
Drinking on duty		46	54		

Specifically, we were interested in the existence of written rules and regulations covering the behaviors, whether the chiefs would agree with our manner of categorizing the patterns of deviant conduct, and what action, if any, the chiefs would take if they discovered members of their department engaging in the patterns of corruption or misconduct. We found that a significant number of police agencies had no formal departmental rules and regulations, and of those with rules and regulations, most departments did not specifically mention the patterns of police deviance we outlined. In fairness to the police agencies, we believe that the wording of the question could have functioned to keep the "yes" responses low. Had we substituted the word "cover" for "specifically" in our question, "Departmental written rules and regulations cover this behavior?" instead of "Departmental written rules and regulations specifically address or mention this behavior?" the number of departments responding that they had rules and regulations covering the behavior might have been higher. It is also possible that a rewording of the question may have produced higher responses because the chiefs would have dealt with the patterns of deviance under the vague catch-all regulation found in many departments, i.e., conduct unbecoming a police officer. If this is so, we would have gained no additional knowledge about the disciplinary handling of police corruption and misconduct through a rewording of the question. In any event, this is an empirical question which deserves further research.

The results also indicated a general agreement between the authors and the police chiefs over what behaviors constitute police corruption. The most notable exceptions were the police chiefs' classification of behaviors as corruption which are not generally treated as such by most writers on the subject, viz, sleeping, sex, and drinking on duty and hitting a handcuffed prisoner. There appears to be a general consensus in the literature on the subject that there must be some material gain involved before the act qualifies

"... total reliance on departmental action leads to a small group of deviant actors moving from department to department, and ... contributes to the scandal-reform-scandal syndrome observed in many police organizations."

as police corruption. It appears that this group of respondents is not differentiating between "wrongness" and police corruption. They would define any behavior which they believe "wrong" or unprofessional as corrupt. There is some support for this notion from prior research on the topic. Future studies should attempt to discover exactly a standard or standards police administrators would use to define police corruption.

In our opinion, the most interesting results of our study occur in the manner in which the chiefs would react to police corruption and misconduct. In all but one of the examples, the majority of the chiefs would handle police corruption through in-house or departmental action. The exception was for a police officer committing burglaries, but even here, 25 percent of the chiefs surveyed would handle this criminal act in-house. One can think of several reasons why a chief may opt for departmental action in many cases. In-house disciplinary action is easier to administer and does not require the standard of proof necessary for court proceedings. Departmental action can also function to keep the activities secret or keep the "lid on" a serious problem.

This manner of handling errant and criminal police officers may actually contribute to corruption, because it lessens the deterrent effect of more severe punishment and it contributes to a case-by-case or individual-by-individual approach to corruption control when the problem may be widespread throughout the system or organization. We also believe that total reliance on departmental action for criminal violations leads to a small group of deviant actors moving from department to department, and it also contributes to the scandal-reform-scandal syndrome observed in many police organizations.

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Footnotes

¹See T. Barker, "Peer Group Support for Police Occupational Deviance," *Criminology*, vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 353-366; T. Barker, "Social Definitions of Police Corruption: The Case of South City," *Criminal Justice Review*, vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 101-110; T. Barker, "An Empirical Study of Police Deviance Other Than Corruption," *Journal of Police Science and Administration*, vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 264-272; W. J. Chambliss, *On the Take: From Petty Crooks to Presidents* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1978); J. E. Fishman, *Measuring Police Corruption*, The John Jay Press, Criminal Justice Center Monograph No. 10, New York, 1978; J. C. Meyer, *Complaints of Police Corruption: An Analysis*, The John Jay Press, Criminal Justice Center Monograph No. 9, New York, 1977; A. J. Reiss, *The Police and the Public* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press); J. Rubinstein, *City Police* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973); L. W. Sherman, *Scandal and Reform: Controlling Police Corruption* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1978).

²W. P. McCarthy, *A Police Administrator Looks at Corruption*, The John Jay Press, Criminal Justice Center Monograph No. 5, New York, 1977.

³H. Goldstein, *Police Corruption: A Perspective On Its Nature and Control* (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1975); P. Murphy, "Police Corruption," *Police Chief*, vol. 40, No. 12, pp. 36 et seq; R. Ward, "Police Corruption: An Overview," *Police Journal*, vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 52-54; R. Ward and R. J. McCormack, *An Anti-Corruption Manual For Administrators in Law Enforcement* (New York: The John Jay Press, 1979).

⁴Barker, *Criminology*; Barker, *Journal of Police Science and Administration*.

⁵T. Barker and J. B. Roebuck, *An Empirical Typology of Police Corruption* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1973); Barker, *Criminology*.

⁶Barker, *Criminal Justice Review*.

⁷Barker, *Journal of Police Science and Administration*.

⁸Barker and Roebuck, *supra*.

⁹T. Barker, "Peer Group Support For Occupational Deviance in Police Agencies" (Ph.D. dissertation, Mississippi State University, 1976).

¹⁰Ibid.

END