


National Criminal Justice Reference Service

ncjrs

This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on this frame may be used to evaluate the document quality.



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official position or policies of the U. S. Department of Justice.

National Institute of Justice
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20531

3/9/83

THE DETECTIVE

MEI

THE JOURNAL OF ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

SUMMER 1978



U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice.

Permission to reproduce this copyrighted material has been granted by
The Detective/Public Domain

to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).

Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permission of the copyright owner.



**HOSTAGE
NEGOTIATIONS**
see page 5

THE USACIDC STAFF

COMMANDING GENERAL
Maj. Gen. Paul M. Timmerberg

DEPUTY COMMANDER
Col. H. Boyd Long, Jr.

CHIEF OF STAFF
Col. Richard A. Rein

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Donald E. Devaney

OPERATIONS
Col. Rodger L. Hoff

INVESTIGATIVE CONCEPTS/DOCTRINE
Col. Thomas M. Jones

LOGISTICS
Col. Paul B. Gale

INSPECTOR GENERAL
Col. Edwin R. Levine

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Col. John G. Blanche III

PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION
Lt. Col. Herbert Deiss

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
Lt. Col. David W. Gledhill

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
Lt. Col. John F. Lymburner

PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Lt. Col. John E. Taylor

CRIME RECORDS
Robert A. Brisentine, Jr.

SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF
Lt. Col. Peter B. Torres

REGION COMMANDERS

FIRST REGION
Col. Eugene R. Cromartie

SECOND REGION
Col. Charles F. Kraak

THIRD REGION
Col. Thomas A. Mac Donnell

SIXTH REGION
Col. Carl J. Allen

SEVENTH REGION
Col. Robert J. Leakey

WASHINGTON DISTRICT
Col. Richard A. Fitzgerald

CRIME LAB COMMANDERS

CONUS
Lt. Col. Kenneth C. Zahn

EUROPE
Lt. Col. Johnny M. Humphrey

PACIFIC
Lt. Col. Kenneth I. Kawano

The Detective magazine is published quarterly by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC).

The Detective publishes articles providing factual information and guidance to USACIDC special agents and staff members, as well as to other members of the military and civilian law enforcement community, on criminal investigative and law enforcement equipment, doctrines, training, and techniques.

Although some articles in the Detective may discuss controversial subjects or contain the opinions of individual authors, these opinions do not necessarily agree with those of the USACIDC commanding general or the Department of the Army.

The Detective solicits articles of law enforcement interest from all its readers, which may be sent directly to the Editor at USACIDC Headquarters, 5611 Columbia Pike, Falls Church, VA 22041.

Unless otherwise noted, material in The Detective is not copyrighted and may be reproduced without prior approval, provided a credit line is given to the author and to "The Detective, a publication of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command."

Distribution of The Detective is made by the USACIDC pinpoint distribution system.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL: **RICHARD A. REIN**
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

JOHN E. TAYLOR
Lieutenant Colonel, GS
Chief of Public Affairs



CID Pamphlet 360-1
Summer 1978 Volume 6 Number 4

NCJRS

JUN 16 1978

ACQUISITION

the Detective

the journal of Army Criminal Investigation

4

Commander's Notes

Maj. Gen. Paul M. Timmerberg comments on terrorism.

5

The Special Agent's Role in Hostage Negotiation

Special Agent Anthony Ward discusses tactical procedures for hostage negotiations.

11

A Problem of Definition—Guerilla, Terrorist, Political, Transnational

Special Agent Gregory Petrakis examines growing terrorist movements.

19

Use of Dogs as an Aid in Investigations

Maj. Steven Phillips explores the legal aspects of using dogs in investigations.

22

Training With Scotland Yard—a Unique Experience

Two agents tell about their experiences at Scotland Yard.

27

Operation Safeguard

Special Agent Terence Pray outlines his plan to combat barracks larceny.

31


Photographing Fingerprints on Glass

Special Agent Robert Sanders describes methods to photograph latent prints on glass.

34

First Region Smells a RAT!!


Sfc. Roger Wilkinson tells about the success of RATs in First Region.



page 5



page 19



page 34

CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Lt. Col. John E. Taylor

DEPUTY CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Capt. Terry A. McCann

EDITOR
Alice J. Russell

ASSISTANT EDITOR
Sp5 Malcolm D. Smith

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS
Eve H. Malakoff
James S. Salmon

PRODUCTION
Evelyn Kinnett

GRAPHICS
Sp5 Ronald D. Altizer
Sp5 Dennis A. Mullan
Sp5 Gary D. Perkinson

About the issue :


The Detective's feature article explores special agents' role in hostage negotiations. Problems posed by the increased use of terrorism by political and criminal groups in the world today also affect Army

investigators. Terrorism is a form of crime that can be prevented with organized and well informed law forces. As technology advances, so do modern terrorist tactics. It is therefore necessary for law enforcement officials to keep informed of the latest developments on the international terrorist scene.

83398

The Special Agents' Role in Hostage Negotiation

By Anthony Ward
Special Agent, HQ USACIDC



The USACIDC special agent normally has well defined guidelines in which to conduct investigations. In a hostage negotiation situation, however, this is not the case. That leaves us with the question: What is the guideline, or USACIDC's position in this area?

USACIDC's position, at this time, is that the post commander of an installation is the responsible individual and overall commander for hostage situations that occur on his installation. He may choose the most qualified person from all manpower resources in his area of responsibility to act as negotiator. This person could be a USACIDC special agent. When identified as a negotiator, the USACIDC special agent will be under the control of the post commander who will assume responsibility for the agent's actions. To most special agents this is contrary to what they believe in--USACIDC central control with no outside influence by superiors in the Army. Clarification of this policy is necessary to put aside all doubts of its validity.

The post commander of an installation is responsible for all actions and incidents affecting or occurring on his installation. He is the only officer who has the authority to make decisions that can affect the welfare of the installation, troop personnel, dependents, visitors, and most important, law enforcement actions.

The USACIDC office commanders, operations officers, and special agents do not have this authority. They must remember that one of their missions on the installation is to support the installation commander. The first point that should be clarified is no one should be delegated to be the negotiator. The person chosen as a negotiator should be a volunteer, one who is physically fit, mentally stable, and able to perform in stress situations. These three requirements are essential. We could not afford, for instance, to have the negotiator die of a heart attack, try to be a superman, or provoke an argument with the captors when he is engaged in negotiations. The negotiator must always display level-headed calmness when performing.

While the negotiations are being conducted, other available special agents should assist the negotiations by collecting possible criminal information on the captors, by providing guidance to the commander and his staff, and by starting investigations of the crimes already committed. We must remember that hostage taking is kidnapping and kidnapping is a felony.

It is appropriate at this point to discuss hostage negotiations. What to do, when to do it, and last but not least, what not to do.

The first priority in any hostage situation is preservation of life--the hostage's, the public's, the law enforcement and support personnel's, and also the subjects' lives. Our main objective will be to recover the hostages unharmed, apprehend the captors, and recover and protect property.

The next area to consider is the decision to negotiate. This is the responsibility of the post commander. He has basically four alternatives: to negotiate, refuse to negotiate, isolate and demand surrender, or assault. These are better described as

"TACTICS." TACTICS planning is probably the most important area of consideration. TACTICS are divided into four areas.

- Out and out assault--An assault on the area where the hostages are held by a well-equipped and trained force.

- Sniper team targets--This is where selective marksmen are placed in position and fire on order at targets of opportunity.

- Use of chemical agents--Before using these we must know the medical condition of the hostages, the type of delivery system of the chemical agents, and the protective equipment in the captors' possession.

- Contain situation and negotiate--Contain the captors and hostages in the smallest area possible and set up negotiations.

Of these four TACTICS, the most successful has been the last; contain situation and negotiate. The one exception to this is in cases of prisoner takeovers in confinement facilities. In such cases, in the initial hours, an out and out assault and show of force is

usually recommended. This will prevent the prisoners from establishing leadership and strength.

As no two hostage situations are alike, there is no standardized format for negotiations. Each situation is treated individually. The following guidelines, however, have been developed by the New York City Police Department as a result of their experiences.*

Members of the hostage negotiation team should appear mature so that they will be perceived by the captors as persons of authority.

A negotiator should not be portrayed to the captor as an ultimate decision maker. This will permit the negotiator to defer decisions and maintain rapport with the captor when demands are delayed or refused because he, the negotiator, is not the person denying the captor's request.

The negotiator should be aware that the captor will normally fit one of the following psychological profiles for a criminal, psychotic, or terrorist:

*Tactical Manual for Hostage Situations, Police Department, City of New York.



- The professional criminal is usually the easiest type of captor to deal with. This person is usually a relatively rational thinker who, after assessing the situation and weighing the odds, comes to terms with the police and refrains from unnecessary violence or useless killing.

- The psychotic individual, on the other hand, presents different and more complex problems. He tends to be irrational and therefore less predictable. His actions, the words he uses, and the demands he makes are often valuable clues to his mental condition. The psychotic harbors great inner frustration and conflict. He may even feel a degree of pleasure from his precarious predicament as he now finds himself important and the center of attraction, a position which may be unique in his life. Time works for the negotiator in this instance, because the psychotic is emotionally tense and expends a great deal of physical and psychic energy, which eventually wears him down.

- The terrorist creates an even more difficult hostage situation. Many rationalize their behavior by claiming to be revolutionaries seeking social justice; and ready to die for their cause. In these situations, this resolve may deteriorate with the passage of time, thus allowing mistakes to be made.

In any case, if a captor kills a hostage during negotiations, immediate action should be considered by the commander to save the lives of the remaining hostages, because once a captor kills one hostage, he is likely to kill more.


Practically all captors' demands are negotiable but two:

- Supplying weapons. If the captor is bluffing using an unloaded or bogus weapon, giving him a real weapon would truly create a danger.


- No additional hostages should be given or exchanged. This does not preclude, however, a situation where we provide a service for which he has negotiated, such as an unarmed driver for the escape vehicle who, in effect, would become another hostage.

Every decision that is made should be predicated on the philosophy that human lives -- the hostage's, the police personnel's, and the captor's -- are sacred, and protecting those lives constitutes the first priority in devising any strategy.

The following checklist on conducting negotiations is provided for general information on what to do, when to do it, and how to do it. This list was made by the New York City Police Department and modified to fit military installations and problems:




- Respond to hostage incident with available manpower and material. Keep the situation confined and contained, and the area cleared of other persons who might become involved.
- Summon assistance and establish a location for the command post. It should be located close to the situation; however, it should not be within sight or hearing of the hostage area.
- Clear the entire line of fire around and outside the captors' area of control.
- Establish who is in charge of the incident; this is the post commander or his designee who will make the final decision on all courses of action.
- Cordon the area with necessary vehicles and personnel. Consolidate the incident.
- Surround the area with tactical unit personnel armed with suitable weapons and equipment, and if possible, replace the initial support personnel on the scene with these persons.
- Summon medical and facility engineer support personnel with appropriate equipment and vehicles. Have them provide floor plans for the building or area the captors and hostages are in. Become familiar with the floor plans, entrances and exits, fixtures in the area, and places of concealment.
- Interview persons who have knowledge of the incident. Try to establish the number and identity of



captors and weapons; number and identity of victims; personal, criminal, and medical histories of subjects and victims. Remember, intelligence of the incident is the most important area of consideration to establish who you are up against.

- Bring to the scene, but keep out of sight, the spouse, parents, and siblings of the captors, to gain further insight into their behavior and reasoning process.
- Have professional practitioners who may have dealt with the captors brought to the command post or made available for consultation (for example, psychologists, clergymen, lawyers, and probation/parole officers).
- Deploy community relations personnel to deal with community groups and individuals.
- A representative of the installation public affairs office should be on hand to handle inquiries from the news media.
- Insure that the lighting of the scene is adequate for your needs.
- Have support personnel available who can create on-the-spot costumes for masquerading.
- Bring in support personnel familiar with electrical and mechanical devices to deal with the situation. If necessary, have these persons cut off all electrical and plumbing facilities to the area where the captors and hostages are confined. Making the captor uncomfortable could aid in wearing him down.
- Establish communication with the captor as soon as possible by closed-line telephone or provide him with a walkie-talkie. Have all other communications shut off to prevent unauthorized persons from talking with the captors.
- Attempt to obtain multiviews of the hostage's and captor's location, behavior, and movements. Create contrivances, such as mirrors on rods, or bore holes to make it possible to view as much of the activity as possible. Use video tape equipment, if available, to screen the area and record all that goes on. It will also be useful for later critiques.
- Set up, if possible, a listening system into the captor's area of control.
- Decide who will communicate and negotiate with the captor and make certain that the captor knows who these persons are. Be certain the negotiator is prepared, mentally and physically, to negotiate. Request permission of the captor to talk with him. Have him guarantee the negotiator's safety before meeting with him. Wear distinctive clothing so that he will recognize you. **USE ONLY ONE NEGOTIATOR AT A TIME.**
- Insure that audio communication with the captor will be maintained. If necessary, use a bullhorn.



- Record all communications with the captor. This will help to analyze his condition and will be necessary for after-action critiques.
- Make no demands, other than to agree to trade the release of the hostages for the captor's safety in surrender.
- Accept no deadlines from the captor.
- Obtain anything within reason the captor requests, except ammunition, weapons, and additional hostages.
- Establish the liaison necessary to provide food and beverages to the captor and hostages.
- Establish a way to make food and beverages available to the captors.
- Make certain that nourishment provided is ample and attractive, reflecting a concern for the captors' physical condition.
- Do not introduce drugs into food or beverages. This action could result in harm to a hostage and ruin your negotiations.
- Avoid providing alcohol to the captor. A limited amount of beer may be included with the food supply to introduce a social element.
- Do not permit anyone to enter the captor's area of control. Exceptions might include a doctor who volunteers to treat injured or stricken parties. Insure the doctor's safety before letting him enter the area. Try and secure his return after he completes his mission.
- Determine if the hostages are bound or able to move about.
- Ask to see the hostages so that you can assess their well-being and movement potential.
- Do not show over-concern for the welfare of the hostages.
- Determine from intelligence information if any hostages are military or law enforcement personnel to anticipate if they might take independent action.
- Be prepared to move in if the captor begins to seriously harm the hostages. Weigh the decision of this action against the likelihood that the captors will

kill the hostages.

- Shoot only if you are convinced that the captors are prepared to kill the hostage without regard for their own lives.

- If shooting is ordered, have an assault team prepared to enter as soon as the first shot is fired. Make sure that prior shooting signals are established. Rather than using plain talk, use the signals RED (do not shoot), GREEN (shoot), AMBER (only shoot at designated targets of opportunity that are positive kills). "Don't shoot" could come out "Shoot" from a radio that has not been keyed long enough. One further consideration before shooting is that the captor might have changed clothing with a hostage - Be 100 percent sure of who will be fired at.

- Use smoke and/or gas rather than bullets if you are convinced that the captor has run out of ammunition.

- Continuously assess the captor's rationality and willingness and ability to negotiate.

- Note the following indicators of the captor's willingness and ability to negotiate: his continued participation in the negotiating process, his lessening of demands, the uneventful passage of deadlines set by him, and considerate treatment of the hostages.

- Keep the captor talking with you as long as possible and continue to gather and analyze intelligence of the incident.

- Recognize that as long as the captor is talking, the opportunity remains for a successful negotiation.

- Phase in replacements for on-duty personnel gradually. Always try and keep these persons out of sight of the captors.



- Move in on the captor if he has become irrational and destructive. Recognize that this move is a showdown action.
- Continue to do everything possible to consume time, in the expectation that the captor will be worn down or led into a miscalculation that will facilitate his capture.
- Settle with the captor on his negotiable demands, if possible, to convince him to yield the hostage for his own safety in surrender.
- Indicate that you will agree to reasonable demands concerning his surrender and his incarceration. Inform him that you personally will escort him to the confinement area. And do so.
- Agree, as a further attempt to reach optimum settlement, that you will seek to get concurrence from any individual he designates to ride to the confinement area with him and you.
- Agree to arrange a meeting with media personnel if the captor insists on it after his surrender.
- Introduce the idea of meeting with the media to the captor if you feel it will get him to surrender.
- If you have determined that the captor will not yield and will harm or kill the hostage, agree to his demand for an escape vehicle and a procedure for leaving the scene in return for the release of the hostage.
- If the negotiation moves to this position, agree to provide the escape vehicle and a procedure for leaving the scene without his agreement to release the hostage. In this situation the likelihood is very great that additional opportunities will present themselves to recover the hostages alive.
- Equip the escape vehicle with electronic tracking devices and mark the rooftop.
- Do not agree to the release of any individuals from your custody whose freedom the captor seeks, nor agree to transmit any demand for the release of individuals in custody elsewhere.
- If the captor insists upon leaving the country, consult with appropriate Federal authorities as the jurisdiction of the incident may change.
- If the negotiation moves to this level and the captor is permitted to leave the country, secure the release of the hostage as a condition for his departure.
- If the captor is authorized to leave the country and you must permit him to take the hostage with him the likelihood is overwhelming that the government of any nation to which the captor flees will release the hostage.
- Recognize, if the captor is permitted to escape, that although the Army acquiesced in the captor's exit, it has not agreed to it. Also realize that lives have been saved and there will be another chance to capture the individual in the future.



In closing, I would like to remind the reader that negotiators do not make promises that have not been approved by the commander or promises that cannot be fulfilled. All decisions are made by the commander; law enforcement personnel only make recommendations to him.

Time should be taken to gather intelligence on the captors and hostages. Support personnel, except the negotiator, should be changed as often as possible to relieve nervous tension.

A negotiator should never exchange a hostage or weapon. Something should always be demanded in exchange for something given. A guarantee of safety should always be asked for before face-to-face talks.

And finally, remember that we can always escalate from negotiations to assault if necessary; however, it is very difficult to go from an unsuccessful assault to negotiations.

Special Agent Anthony Ward works in the Crimes Against Persons Branch, General Crimes Division, Operations Directorate, at USACIDC Headquarters. He has participated in several studies conducted on terrorism and hostage negotiations with Department of Defense and Federal investigative agencies in the Washington, D.C., area.

END