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SOME PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME IN  
THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1960:

Executive Summary

by

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The University Center for Social and Urban Research at the University of Pittsburgh has completed a two volume report on the way the citizens of the United States view crime and its related problems, entitled: The Nation Looks at Crime.<sup>1</sup> The report examines national attitudes toward crime itself since 1960, such as the extent to which Americans believe that crime is a pressing social problem, and specific factors that Americans seem to believe cause crime generally. In addition, the report analyzes alternative solutions to the crime problem--solutions in which Americans have expressed some confidence. Finally the report summarizes citizen evaluations of each component of the criminal justice system (police, courts, corrections) as well as of the officials who administer these components, focussing upon the organizational and personnel changes that many Americans seem to wish implemented.

The first volume of the report is subtitled: Crime as a National, Community, and Neighborhood Problem.<sup>2</sup> The second volume is subtitled: Police, Court, and Prison Systems.<sup>3</sup> Each volume is a descriptive study of American public opinion generally, and of agreement or lack of agreement among Americans who share different demographic characteristics. To the extent that is possible, these volumes address changes in American attitudes toward crime and the criminal justice system as the changes have occurred over the course of the past 18 years, as well as differences of opinion that have been expressed by similar and dissimilar groups of citizens living at approximately the same period of time in different regions of the nation or in areas of differential population density.

As one of the important research tools in the hands of the social scientists, surveys are rarely questioned in toto. Not infrequently, of course, those who find particular results displeasing or somehow running quite contrary to their expectations or hopes or both may be inclined to engage in a critique, often a methodological one. Such criticisms then generally tend to question the very meaning, and implications, of sampling itself the underlying theoretical and mathematical models of which have certainly failed to become understood throughout the nation or, for that part, among potential survey results users. Such criticisms, even with some reluctant acceptance of sampling theory (or in the absence of knowledge on the basis of which it devalues it), often address the particular sampling design--the extent to which it includes the "right" kinds of respondents or the degree of its representativeness.

Not infrequently, criticisms are levied against the wording of particular questions or, indeed, against the sequencing of the items in a questionnaire instrument. Nor is it, sometimes, merely

a matter of question "wording." Rather, serious debates range also among social scientists themselves as to the relative worth of more open-ended or in-depth questioning as opposed to the easier-to-administer (and process) more structured approaches. But these are all matters with which books on sampling, on questionnaire construction, and on interviewing deal rather adequately, and little would be added here were we to simply restate what the literature has to offer in these regards. As a research tool, apart from such criticisms as might be heard, survey data allow us to understand the extent to which, on particular issues, the subjects of the study tend to be homogeneous in that they view them essentially alike, and the degree to which they may be heterogeneous. The latter problem, of course, has to do not merely with the determination of the extent to heterogeneity but also its socio-cultural and demographic anchorages: In what ways, indeed, may a particular population be differentiated with respect to the issues under study? Which segments of our society, of a state, of a city or other community, hold what perspective, and "why?"

As a research tool, surveys allow us to interpret the manner in which various attitudinal positions "hang" together or fail to be intercorrelated. Thus a research for systems of attitudes and beliefs, for syndromes, for clusters and configurations of issues both in the aggregate and in the more disaggregated components of our society, the socio-cultural and demographic segments and groups.

Responses to surveys often assess reports of behavior; reports of actions. They do not, of course, measure directly the behavior or action itself. But reports of behavior are a good proxy and, apart from almost unmanageable efforts at actual observing and recording behavior (something rather obviously not doable on a national or even community-wide scale with any degree of accuracy short of mammoth costs--and even then quite problematic), the data amount to about the only body of evidence we (can) have on the actions of larger aggregates or larger entities.

Again, issues of relative homogeneity and heterogeneity with respect to action reports are raised as a central research focus, along, as is the case with "opinion" and "attitude" expressions, issues regarding the socio-cultural and demographic patterning of such heterogeneities as may be disclosed.

In the same manner as concerns opinions and attitudes, the search for action and behavioral configurations is an important one--how, to what extent and among whom various reported ways of behaving interact and relative to what kinds of existential issues and problems.

And finally, of course, the researcher's legitimate concern has to do with the manner in which opinions and attitudes are linked with reported behavior and action, either in the sense of a more direct linkage whereby some attitudes might manifest themselves in behavioral responses or in the sense of an indirect (and often undisclosed or difficult to interpret) chain which binds the "states

of mind" which expressions of opinion, sentiment and attitude seek to assess and the pattern of acting which questions bearing on reports of behavior seek to elicit.

Repeated surveys, using identical, or sufficiently similar questions in similar samples over time, permit us to note the dynamics of issues under study. They make it possible to come to grips with trends along all the lines previously touched upon, and they facilitate an imperfect, even loose but nonetheless extremely important, interpretation of stabilities and changes in the light of events and occurrences which intervene between the respective timings of such repeated surveys. Even better, panels--as surveys repeated with the same respondents and with the same questions--make it possible not only to assess the basic trends and oscillations at the gross level, but also to evaluate "net" changes, that is, the ways in which particular survey subjects or groups of subjects seem to be altering their views or behavior and, indeed, both. Thus a data bank of over-time surveys, each of which deals with similar clusters of problems--crime-related issues in this instance--provides an opportunity to explore these varied dimensions of the search for better knowledge on the part of social scientists. This is so even though the basic samples may differ from survey to survey or from group of surveys to a group of surveys, as long as the sampling design is grounded in the mathematical theory of sampling. This is so even if the specific questions in the respective surveys are not identical, or, occasionally, not even similar. Because while the narrowest mode of interpretation may greatly benefit from such identical or essentially similar approaches to the data acquisition process, the broader meanings--as they bear on the underlying issues as a Gestalt--become interpretable even in the context of diverse ways in which various aspects of the issues are probed into.

We say this to underscore the following point: How particular groups of people answer a specific and very confined question either at one time or even over time becomes somewhat less important than the underlying manner in which our people, and segments and groups of our people, "construct reality" with respect to the major problem on hand.

But apart from all such, and other, research ramifications, and the admittedly vexing methodological and substantive problems of interpretation of both single surveys and, especially, of many surveys over time, there are two questions deserving further, if brief, attention here.

The first question has to do with the possible use, by practitioners, to which survey results can be put. The second question has to do with the possible use-value of a large scale data bank such as we have, on the crime-related problems, created--with its 160 plus surveys over a span of almost twenty years and with the diversity in focus.

Public opinion polls or surveys do not represent the nation's, or a community's, votes. Nor are they referenda which would say a clear, majority-rules, "yeah" or "nay" to a specific policy option raised. The polls are not, nor do they intend to be, a substitute for the voting booth.

This is not because of "sampling" limitations per se. Some polls, such as the Nielson one with regard to television programming, may be more used as actual votes than other polls. Thus some surveys may have a more decisive bearing on the adoption of policies than other surveys. But this is more in the way of the user's choice and preference than it is something that has to do with the properties, or findings, of a survey. Even so, of course, it is not merely Nielson "ratings" which are likely to determine the fate of particular programs. More often than not, many other considerations enter into such decisions and the "polls" are but one (perhaps exceptionally important) input among many others.

Along these lines, it is quite crucial to recognize the second major limitation of surveys--and, indeed, of any other single study no matter what its methodological thrust: It has to do with the fact that no single study, no matter how well designed (or how well financed) does, or even can, address the full spectrum of issues which face an actual decision maker. No single study is, therefore, isomorphic to all the dimensions of a policy problem no matter how well the study gets designed, carried out, interpreted and analyzed.

There are fundamental fiscal considerations which a typical survey cannot adequately handle. They have to do not only with amounts of money (and energy) to be spent in a fundamental sense, but also with the allocation of priorities among competing alternatives (in the sense of opportunities foregone by wholehearted adoption of any given alternative policy) and, indeed, with policies-within-policies which have to do with the alternative sources of revenue or manpower or both whereby whatever option can be actually implemented.

There are broader economic considerations which polls themselves do not, and cannot, address as much as would be required to arrive at unviable decision. They have to do with the ramifications of a policy for such "things" as unemployment levels, productivity, the welfare system, wage and salary policies, profit-related concerns, management-labor relations, price structures and the like.

There are, of course, profound legal issues which are so technically complex that generalized public judgement is not the best guide any more than it can be the best guide to a systems interpretation along fiscal or economic lines--at least, at the level of detail at which an actual policy has to be actually stated and carried out.

There are sensitive political issues which interface with any particular policy thrust. These, too, cannot be simply disregarded nor can they be adequately incorporated into a given inquiry in a manner which would decisively provide evidence of one kind or another.

Many policies, especially in the domain of intervention against crime or crime impact alleviation, raise profound technological questions as well. These also do not lend themselves to easy adjudication by public expressions of views and sentiments no matter how well a survey may be designed even in these terms.

At the same time, the results of surveys help to establish a kind of riverbed of national perspective on this or that issue. They indicate what kinds of approaches might be acceptable and what kinds of policy options might find a degree of resistance, or perhaps cynicism, in our larger body politic. The results show what plagues the nation and what might be the sources of relative satisfaction with the existential conditions of the times. They show patterns of lay reasoning as to causes and effects as well as to the perceived consequences of alternative intervention to reinforce positive effects and circumstances and to alleviate negative ones.

Thus, the results of surveys, at any given time and over time, are one of the important inputs into decision making processes but never the only, or perhaps even the dominant, one.

In a nation based on a representative form of governance, and one in which the delivery of services (including very much those provided by the administration of justice system) hinges very much on the need for such services (since limited human, physical and fiscal resources have to be allocated with some degree of wisdom among many competing needs and possibilities), it is at the peril to our "way of life" that the findings of surveys, within the framework of such limitations as we have already expressed, can be ignored. It is then within this narrower-fiscal, broader-economic, legal and political framework in which the utilizability of surveys must be considered, and even more, their actual use must be seen.

How direct or indirect the usability (in the context of the other economic, political and legal factors) may be depends, of course, on the nature of the survey and of the issues actually raised. Thus there is a somewhat different "utilizability" of results which show the extent to which "crime" is seen as an important national issue, and the findings which indicate whether more police officers on the beat or more street lights in one's neighborhood might be a better way of coping with crime.

In other words, it would be necessary to discuss the detailed pattern of surveys, both at a time and over time, to differentiate variable utilizability of the results. But some general principles can be derived, indeed, and they are the ones which we seek to address herein.

Many findings then have essentially a sensitizing value. They show how a particular problem "rates" on the nation's, or a community's, agenda of issues which require attention both by our elected officials and by the service bureaucracies. The "user" is thus made aware mainly about the relative importance of issues without any specifications whatsoever as to what might, or is, to be done about them.

How else, were it not for surveys, would our responsible officials, both in the elective and the service administration domain know what seems to bother our people? What seems to please them? Protests, demonstrations, letters to officials, media reports and commentaries and all other methods by which such information enters the arena of national or community political discourse are slanted, limited and certainly not in any manner representative of the sense of the body politic. Thus surveys, with all their problems and imperfections, remain the only mechanism, short of the actual voting booth, whereby we can ascertain at any time (rather than only on election and voting days) what seems to be on the mind of our people, this or that constituency.

Thus, in a profound sense, the "monitoring of the pulse of the nation" (or, as the case may be, subparts of it) is the only viable, systematic and scientific mechanism by which representative government can remain representative even if it means, as we have asserted previously, that such results form only a portion of the needed inputs for decision making (or decision not-making).

Often, survey findings reflect direct or indirect assessments of performance of this or that program of this or that agency, of this or that institutional fabric of our society. Such findings, of course, may be inaccurate in terms of some objective performance indices; or they may be accurate to some degree.

The user, under these conditions, may well wish to confront the survey findings with the more objective, or objectifiable, results to see the extent to which the view of the constituents is accurate or invalid.

Public misperceptions then, in a rational world, would induce educational and informational efforts to show why and how particular issues are misperceived.

Accurate perceptions of inadequate performance would, in turn, induce efforts to identify alternative ways of acting which would modify the objective conditions, and perhaps, the perceptions as a consequence of such actual changes in the state of affairs.

For instance, if many people feel (as they do) that police officers do not arrive at the scene of a crime on a timely basis (or fast enough, to put it in other words), the question is indeed one of determining whether the time between a crime report and response to the report is reasonable or "too long" (relative to what it might be given officer deployment, traffic conditions and all). If the complaints seem to have some validity, one subset of actions may be suggested. If the complaints mirror simply the foreshortened time perspective of victims (that is, the victims may feel that the response time is "too long" while it actually is near "optimal" under the circumstances), perhaps a policy of explaining to the victims the process by which the report is received, acted upon, responded to up to the point of reaching the scene of the crime, works.

The former is the policy/action change to deal with a real problem. The latter is an educational strategy to help the public understand what it takes to respond to an incident. The worst policy, of course, is one to ignore the public perception or misperception and simply convince oneself that "we are doing all we can" and fail to react in any manner to the accurate or inaccurate public sentiment.

Often, the survey results point to particular classes of policy interventions. The users also need to take these matters seriously.

For instance, many Americans are convinced that our courts have become simply "too lenient," at least as far as repeated offenders are concerned. This would suggest that the members of the nation's judiciary need to consider whether this, in fact, is the case (as it may well be). If so, then consideration needs to be given to more generalized standards for dealing with repeated offenders (for particular categories of crimes), to reach some professional agreements as to future standards, and to apply such standards.

Or else, of course, there may be great need to educate the public as to the "reasons" for judicial leniency and to the "reasons" how current treatment in the courts accomplishes the best objectives (a) for the offender, (b) for the victim, and (c) for society at large.

Often, survey findings reveal what people say they are doing about a particular problem. In our instance, of course, what they seem to be doing to minimize the danger of becoming victims of a crime.

In this regard, the user is generally faced with a decision to help reinforce the existing behavioral trends or to modify them. The user actions, as far as these matters are concerned, have to do with public education and enlightenment as well. For example, should double locks on all doors or, for that matter, burglar alarms be encouraged? Here, the answer may seem relatively simple: Double-locks and/or burglar alarms (or window bars) cannot do harm relative to crime epidemiology so that the user might be tempted to encourage them regardless. But in a broader societal context in which rather fundamental values are at stake, such values as those which have to do with patterns of mutual trust within our society and those which pertain to the relative costs of such devices (especially if break-ins were to occur anyway), some thought needs to be given to the various trade-offs. In the "trust" dimension, the trade-offs bear on rather basic issues which form the cornerstone of our society. In the "economics" of crime protection dimension, the trade-offs have to do with such simple observations as those which might suggest that the people most likely to be able to afford adequate protection are precisely the people who, in their neighborhoods and

areas, need it the least. For instance, should some patterns of normal social activities be encouraged and reinforced or do they need to be discouraged despite the disbenefits which derive from them? Examples, indeed, abound: Should our people (or particular segments of our society, such as women, or the elderly) be further discouraged from going to some parts of their own city or community? To their park? To walk their dog in the evening? To go for a stroll?

These are difficult questions which no survey can answer. The surveys suggest how many people claim to be doing what and for what reasons (generally, crime-related reasons). But what prudent action needs to be taken is another matter: More police patrols at all times in the vulnerable areas? At the risk, perhaps, of simply shifting the locus of crime from one area to another one simply because with limited resources the manpower deployment implies somewhat degraded services in one area once the services are shifted to another area?

The questions for the decision maker are more numerous and more difficult than are the answers which surveys can ever provide. But the survey findings can help pin-point the key domains (substantive) and areas (geographic) of concern, and thus shed light on the manner in which the decision makers establish their own agendas for action.

Now, it is important to note: All measures of crime protection on the part of our citizens alter our way of life in an unwanted direction. This means that all are sort of "inherently" undesirable, at least as far as the more lasting ethos of our society is concerned. But since some action measures may be required, or at least prudent, the choice of the data user is one among the alternative "evils" and not a choice between an open and trusting society and one that is poised toward expecting the worst from some, no matter how few, of its fellow members.

Apart from its obvious implications as an important, if not essential, data base to understand trends and changing patterns over time for research purposes, a data bank such as the one we have developed on crime-related issues simply reinforces the possibilities, and problems, which the user faces.

Clearly, it indicates the extent to which various problems change in their priorities, if they do, on the nation's or a community's agenda. Thus it suggests the manner in which various problems need to be attended to, and how much attention needs to be paid to them at various points in time. Clearly, it indicates the changing, or stable, perceptions regarding the performance of our various institutions, agencies, and personnel. Thus it also points to the saliency of more specific subsystems to which we need to address more, or less, attention.

Clearly, it indicates the changing, or stable perceptions of desirable policies to deal with this or that problem. Thus an over-time data bank points in the direction of policies which require

further consideration or scrutiny so as to deal with the perceived needs of the nation or of the community.

Clearly, it helps to indicate the changes, or stabilities, in the reports of behavioral responses to the issues which face us. And this, of course, indicates the extent to which our fundamental way of life is changing, or oscillating, or remaining relatively unaltered.

Furthermore, the key time-drift may be toward greater homogeneity in perceptions and actions of our people. This "homogeneity" may be, of course, in a more or less desirable direction.

The key time-drift may also be toward greater heterogeneity along socio-cultural and demographic lines. And such increased heterogeneity would point toward greater potential divisiveness of our society and toward greater potential of internal conflict (though, in no way, necessarily toward greater violent conflict).

Our results, to be highlighted in the following sections of the report, show tendencies toward a more homogenous rather than heterogeneous interpretations by our people of crime-related concerns. Thus we are drifting, in so far as we are, toward a more shared perspective on the importance of crime, its causes, the ways of dealing with it, and the individual and family responses toward crime prevention. This would be a relatively optimistic picture to portray were it not for the fact that the crime problem has been increasing in its severity, in its impact on our people, in the perceptions of its impact, and in responses to ways of dealing with it both at the societal and the household/family level.

Thus, the emerging "homogeneity" of sentiments and action responses is highly problematic from the vantage point of the kinds of standards to which our society aspires to, adheres to, or prefers to identify as the hallmarks of the "American way of life."

## II. ISSUES ADDRESSED

The surveys that have been compared within this Executive Summary have addressed many different problems related to crime in the United States since 1960, by asking respondents various questions. The actual questions cannot be reproduced in this report on account of space. However, some mention needs to be made of the areas which the original questions addressed. As will be done when the findings themselves are presented, the questions are arranged according to the six major areas of concern which this report addresses, namely: Crime as a National, Community, and Neighborhood Problem and the Police, Court, and Prison Systems.

### A. CRIME AS A NATIONAL PROBLEM

Six major issues dominate the investigation of public opinion about crime as a national problem. These issues include:

1. To what extent do Americans see crime as being a national problem?
2. To what extent do Americans demand Federal actions in response to the crime problem?
3. To what extent is the average citizen personally concerned about crime being one of the nation's major problems?
4. To what extent does the average citizen see crime increasing throughout the United States?
5. What factors do Americans consider to be helpful in explaining the causes of crime?
6. How might the nation deal with the crime problem, in the opinion of the person in the street?

### B. CRIME AS A COMMUNITY PROBLEM

Eight major issues dominate the investigation of public attitudes toward crime as a community problem. These issues include:

1. To what extent do Americans see crime as being the single most important problem that a community faces?

2. To what extent do Americans see crime as being one of the several most important problems that a community faces?
3. To what extent does the crime problem require the special attention of local government, community law enforcement officials, and citizens generally?
4. To what extent should funding be earmarked and provided to deal with the problem of crime in the community?
5. To what extent is crime in the community of concern to the individual American citizen and to the family unit?
6. To what extent do citizens see crime as increasing within the American community?
7. What factors do Americans believe contribute most to the epidemiology and etiology of crime and to its increase?
8. What specific steps do Americans perceive as being needed or taken to combat crime at the community level?

#### C. CRIME AS A NEIGHBORHOOD PROBLEM

Ten major issues are central to the study of public opinion about crime as a neighborhood problem. These issues include:

1. To what extent do Americans see crime as being a major problem in the nation's neighborhoods?
2. To what extent is there variability in the way in which inhabitants of different communities view crime in their neighborhoods?
3. To what extent is there variability in the way in which inhabitants of different neighborhoods within the same community view crime in their neighborhoods?
4. How safe do Americans perceive their neighborhood streets to be?
5. What specific crime hazards do citizens believe threaten their neighborhood areas?
6. To what extent has the rate of neighborhood crimes been increasing in the opinion of neighborhood residents?

7. Whom do Americans view as being the main criminal offenders in their neighborhoods?
8. What measures might citizens or their government take to address the problem of crime in the neighborhoods?
9. What measures have individual Americans and their family members taken to deal with the crime risk which they feel lurks in their neighborhood streets?
10. What measures have individual Americans and their family members taken to protect their homes and their families while at home against personal or property crimes?

#### D. THE POLICE SYSTEM

Eleven major issues are of critical importance to the study of what citizens think about the police in the United States. These issues include:

1. How satisfied are Americans with their local police?
2. How much respect do Americans have for their local police?
3. What feelings toward police do Americans see on the part of their neighbors?
4. How willing are Americans to cooperate with the police, and in what ways are they willing most to cooperate?
5. How do Americans evaluate the performance of the police?
6. How do Americans regard and evaluate specific tasks which they view as constituting the function of the police?
7. How rapidly do police officers respond when notified that they are needed?
8. Do Americans believe that police officers are honest?
9. Do Americans believe that police officers are equally fair to all citizens, or, if not, toward what segments of the public are the police perceived as being unfair?

10. To what extent do Americans believe that police officers use unnecessary physical force against citizens, and against which segments of the public is unnecessary force most likely to be directed by the police?
11. Does police authority need to be expanded, curtailed, or redefined, and, if so, in what ways?

#### E. THE COURT SYSTEM

Eleven major issues confront the study of the manner in which citizens view the courts throughout the United States. These issues include:

1. Does the way in which the courts function now encourage or deter the violation of the law?
2. Do Americans believe that accused criminal offenders have to wait too long before coming to trial?
3. Do Americans believe that the sentences which judges impose against convicted criminal offenders are too harsh, too light, or just about right?
4. Do citizens perceive the courts as freeing too many guilty people?
5. Are there any crimes for which capital punishment should be imposed, and, if so, what are these crimes?
6. What actions might be taken in the courts to restore law and order within the United States?
7. Do Americans believe their courts to be unfair, and, if so, against which segments of the population?
8. How much confidence do citizens have in the competence and discretion of their judges?
9. Should more tax dollars be spent to solve the major problems facing the courts?
10. What do Americans consider to be the major problems facing the court system?
11. What might be done to reorganize the courts in order to make them more effective?

#### F. THE PRISON SYSTEM

There are seven critical issues that surround the study into the views of Americans toward their prison system. These issues include:

1. What general impressions do Americans have of the nation's prison system?
2. What general impressions do Americans have of the nation's jail system?
3. How do Americans regard the fairness of the treatment received by persons who have been incarcerated within the nation's prisons?
4. To what extent do Americans respect correctional officers?
5. How much confidence do Americans share in the parole system, and what changes, if any, do citizens feel should be made to improve this system?
6. To what extent do Americans believe that rehabilitation programs inside of prisons are successful in curbing recidivism?
7. To what extent do Americans believe that community-based rehabilitation programs are successful in curbing recidivism?

### III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SURVEY DATA ARCHIVE

Under the original LEAA grant (#76-TA-99-0026) the principle task was the development of a data archive of studies being on the attitudes and opinions of Americans since 1960 with respect to crime and some key (related) issues. Specifically, data sets were considered for inclusion in the archive if any of the following issues were addressed:

- 1) Crime as a national, community, or neighborhood problem.
- 2) Opinions about the police and police protection, the courts and the court system, or the prisons and jails of this country.
- 3) Attributions of the causes of crime.
- 4) Considerations of self-protection measures.
- 5) Recommendations for ways of dealing with crime and criminals.

Obviously this leaves out a large number of substantive areas that are of interest, including issues of juvenile delinquency, gun control, drug abuse and the drug traffic issue, and the like.

As a matter of fiscal prudence, specific studies were then included in the archive on a "cost effective basis." In general, surveys were not included if less than three items in that survey addressed the above issues. However, when the cost of a survey exceeded the ordinary, a minimum of five items was established.

At the close of the original project approximately 140 surveys had been considered for inclusion in the archive. Approximately 70 of these studies were substantively eligible for inclusion and acquired. Although more than 50 research institutes and centers across the country were solicited, the principle sources of data were:

- 1) The Roper Public Opinion Research Center, and
- 2) The University of Michigan's Survey Research Institute and Center for Political Studies, (headquarters for The Inter-University Consortium for Political Research).

Among the acquired surveys was the September 1972 National Crime Survey, and the 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 LEAA National Crime Survey--Cities Attitude Sub-Sample, conducted by the Bureau of the Census.

In order to facilitate analysis of data in the archive with respect to not only when the study was conducted but where it was conducted, the 70 some data sets were partitioned into 147 data sets that are unique with respect to time, space, and unit of analysis. For example, the four (4) City Attitude Sub-Sample data sets were partitioned into 78 data files, each unique with respect to the city of the study, the unit of analysis, and the year the study was conducted.

Under the current grant (#78-NI-AX-0126) the Center for Social and Urban Research undertook the expansion and updating of the archive. As the result of contacting our original sources once again, 17 surveys were added to the archive, for a total of 164 data sets in the archive. Appendix A lists each study with its relevant sampling information.

Each study in the archive has been cataloged with respect to the methodological issues of generalizability, comparability and substantive and demographic items included in the survey. Generalizability deals with the population of generalization, and is assessed in terms of the population frame information, criteria of eligibility for inclusion in the sample, time and geographic space. Comparability is represented in terms of sampling design, unit of analysis and the population of generalization. Further comparability is available with respect to issues addressed, while item comparability is currently not a part of this cataloging. In the "final" iteration of this indexing it has been rendered machine readable to allow greater flexibility and speed in the selection of data sets of specific analytic tasks.

Each substantive item of the archive (some 1200) has also been indexed with respect to issues addressed. This substantive indexing details each item by a variety of crime related issues, including (for example) "politeness," "speed of response," "brutality," "sentencing," "punishment," "crime in relation to other problems," and the like. This indexing system allows the researcher to either select data sets on which to carry out analytic research, on methodological grounds or on substantive grounds.

#### IV. MAJOR FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS

This Executive Summary contains six sets of major findings and primary conclusions. The first three sets are drawn from the first volume of The Nation Looks at Crime, and pertain to public attitudes toward Crime as a National, Community, and Neighborhood Problem. The last three sets are drawn from the second volume of that report, and pertain to public opinions of the Police, Court, and Prison Systems. Each finding is accompanied by at least one primary conclusion which represents an effort by the authors to recite the basic implications of the finding according to their own perspective. Any attempt to address the implications of an empirical body of data amounts to a search for the "meaning behind meaning," which is a risky enterprise. The researcher must stay within the domain of the available information, and, at the same time, go beyond it. Doing so is justified by the fact that data do not speak for themselves. Data must be interpreted and translated into statements that explain their messages. Because researchers have studied primary data, they are in the best position to render second order interpretations and to initiate the ongoing process through which data may be utilized to affect public policy and social action. Interpretations of data cannot but reflect some value judgments on the part of the researcher, however, which in turn must be taken into account by the reader who considers the significance of the objective data together with its subjective interpretation.

##### A. CRIME AS A NATIONAL PROBLEM

A number of findings relate to crime as a national problem. These findings reflect the patterns and trends in public thinking about crime as an issue of national rather than merely of community or neighborhood dimension. Many of these findings are based upon open-ended probes. In such cases, the scatter of responses over a variety of acute national problems such as war and peace, inflation and unemployment, and changing energy resources may obscure the seriousness with which Americans have looked at the rising crime rates. More structured inquiries, when used to follow-up the open-ended probes, provide clear evidence as to how intensely concerned Americans have become about the crime problem.

FINDING 1. Crime is seen by the American Public consistently as being more of a community than a national problem. Senior citizens feel this way more than do younger Americans, non-whites more than whites, and, among blacks, men more than women.

By its very nature, most crime is a localized phenomenon. War, inflation, unemployment, and other national dilemmas seem to evoke concern and even fear among most groups of Americans regardless of who they are or where they live. The same statement is less true of crime. People in the United States seem to be much more concerned about an out-break of crime in their own city, town, or neighborhood than about even more serious criminal behavior in more distant places. One reason why Americans in general may be more worried about crimes that take place nearby than far away is the obvious likelihood that, for example, the criminal who haunts the streets of Baltimore will not directly harm a resident of Denver unless the latter travels to Maryland. Americans seem to perceive crime as being a danger more to individuals who have the misfortune of being victimized personally rather than to the nation's survival. The same Americans appear to witness war, economic depression, or a scarcity of energy resources as being threats to the collective population. Another reason may be that the details of serious crimes are seldom reported on the national news networks to the extent that political and economic turbulence is, but local newspapers and television stations report the particulars of community-based crimes and may even sensationalize them.

Minority and senior citizens may be more alarmed than other Americans are about problems within their own communities, including crime, because they enjoy closer kinship ties to a particular geographic area. They may be less concerned than others about problems that affect more distant areas of the nation because of economic limitations on their ability to travel, less familiarity with the needs of people whom they do not know or identify with, or even on account of their accentuated concern for personal or ethnic struggles that, to them, tend to diminish the significance of other people's battles. Men, and particularly males from minority groups, have had to be preoccupied with obtaining and retaining employment because of the many economic barriers that have confronted them in their quest for a livelihood. Also, men have had to register for the draft, undergo or avoid military training, and in either event sustain personal hardship throughout the history of this nation's military involvements. Hence, men and especially minority men have not had an opportunity to equate crime with warfare and economic uncertainty as being one of the country's critical problems. Yet, a methodological issue may well be involved in the persistent pattern of results as well. When survey researchers ask open-ended questions about the "major problems" of the national body politic, responses tend to be limited to two or three key items. Thus, it is not surprising that at the level of collectivity, the 1960's manifest mainly concerns over the conflict in Viet Nam and unemployment, the early 1970's over unemployment and inflation, and the latter part of the decade finds Americans stressing inflation, energy and unemployment. These issues, as national problems, "victimize" all Americans either directly or indirectly. Crime, as widespread and as frustrating as it may be in its persistence and in its escalation, is simply overshadowed by the national macroissues raised in the context of open-ended questions. That such an interpretation is reasonably justifiable

is seen from those limited studies in which some form of rating scale is provided and "crime" is included among the concerns to be rated. Under such structured questioning, crime does emerge as a major problem indeed, something the format of "national problems" questions tend to mask to some degree.

FINDING 2. Since 1960, concern with crime has been increasing. This increase has been the greatest among senior citizens, non-whites, males, Americans with less formal education, and inhabitants of cities having populations in excess of 250,000.

Concern among Americans about crime as a national problem has increased roughly to the same extent that serious crimes have been reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to have increased. Of course, the reports about increases in crime may well be mainly responsible for the increased sensitivity of the nation to crime as a national problem. Victimization research indicates that reported crimes may account for only about one-third of all offenses to which Americans are exposed, and that victimization rates may have been increasing at a faster pace even than that of reported crimes. Does the rate at which Americans begin to recognize crime as a national problem parallel most closely the reported crime rate or the actual victimization rate? There are not enough victimization studies available for the 1960's to enable this question to be answered at this time.

Concern over crime, in the national context, has increased particularly among the senior citizens, non-whites, and those with less formal education. Thus in the 1970's, the respondents in the numerous surveys have become more homogeneous with respect to their sensitivity to crime and some of the sociocultural and demographic distinctions which mark the data of the 1960's come to be all but obliterated. Indeed, senior citizens have always been more likely victims. Minority and poorer neighborhoods have also borne more of the brunt of crime insults. But actual increases in the numbers of crimes have occurred disproportionately among these groups, also. Thus, we suspect that crime has simply become more visible in these settings and to these groups.

But, speculatively, there may be even more to that--the 1960's began to mark a transitional period in national focus on serious problems of minorities, of the elderly and, indeed, of the poor. Discrimination of all kinds in jobs, housing and housing problems--simple and vexing matters of daily existence--would then lie at the roots of concerns especially among the less privileged Americans. In this context, problems of crime and the like may well seem rather secondary, to these respondents, when compared with the underlying existential dilemmas.

The decade of the 1960's has strongly been transitional in that aspirations at first class citizenship came to be thoroughly legitimized. Major social programs and social policies were adopted, and

efforts at alleviation of the extant inequities were launched systematically. In so far as some perceptions of what plagues the nation then came to be increasingly homogeneous (in this regard, we focus on perceptions of crime as an issue), and increasingly the less privileged came to share the views of the rest of the nation, we might be tempted to argue that this evolving likeness in defining the reality of national problems can itself be construed as a distal measure of the process of integration and reintegration into, and in, our society.

FINDING 3. Between 1960-1975, the need for some governmental actions to curb crime became increasingly recognized. In 1960, only 0.5 percent of the nation favored federal intervention, compared with 17 percent in 1975. Between 1968-1970 alone, the percentage of Americans who favored federal action to help halt crime more than doubled. Throughout the 1960's and in 1970, at least 1.5 times as many Americans who lived in cities of 250,000 and over compared with citizens generally favored action by the federal government against crime.

As the rate of reported serious crimes escalated between 1960-1975, Americans turned increasingly to the federal government for intervention. Such has been the trend historically in America when state and local governments have not succeeded, or have been unable, to solve an urgent problem. A higher percentage of Americans who live in cities of 250,000 and over compared with other Americans favor federal action against crime. Undoubtedly, this is due in part to their closer proximity to serious criminal episodes and especially to dangerous street crimes. Perhaps this is due also to the century-old tradition of using federal tax dollars to counteract inner-city problems--a popular practice among big city political leaders and their associates. The big jump on the bandwagon came by or just before 1970 (comparable data are unavailable for 1969) when the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration began to operationalize federal crime interdiction strategies for use by local law enforcement personnel. Around the same time many more Americans seem to have begun to take seriously the pressing need for federal action to curb crime, and to realize that this necessity was different from and more urgent than other forms of federal assistance which the states and cities seek routinely from Washington.

As late as 1975, however, as much as 80 percent of the nation's citizenry seemed unable on their own initiative and without a reminder to identify crime as a major problem that requires direct action by the United States Government. The precise reasons for this are difficult to come by, but obviously other issues dwarf crime as a concern of most Americans, at least until they are reminded that crime may be a problem.

FINDING 4. At no time since 1960 has crime been identified by most Americans as requiring the highest priority of attention by the federal government. On the other hand, when asked to list the top several of such priorities, about 40 percent of Americans included crime in both 1965 and 1969, although only about half as high a percentage of non-whites agreed. When asked how much attention must be paid to crime as a national problem, however, 80 percent of Americans responded "a great deal of attention," although this feeling was stronger among whites and women than among blacks and men. In 1974, only about six percent of Americans considered crime unimportant as a national problem, but about 12 percent of non-whites felt this way.

There have always been problems that Americans have perceived as outranking crime in terms of danger or urgency. Of course, these greater problems have varied from one moment to another in time, as would be expected. In times of international conflict and tension, the threat of war has surpassed crime. In times of economic uncertainty, both inflation and unemployment have done the same. In 1965, when about 40 percent of Americans ranked crime among the top three national problems, about 45 percent of Americans ranked the need to improve public education as being among the top three national priorities, and over 35 percent felt that trying to conquer "killer diseases" should be ranked in this category.

Of greater significance is the fact that crime remains a problem in the minds of Americans across different economic and political eras. Americans change their perception of the "biggest" problem from time to time, somewhat cavalierly, but crime persists as a major problem that Americans target when it is mentioned, no matter when that happens.

Before 1970, non-white Americans were much less likely than other citizens to rank crime even among the top three priorities for action. Why not? A likely reason was the preoccupation by black Americans in the 1960's towards the civil rights movement and its derivative objectives of reducing minority unemployment and racial discrimination in housing.

Whether or not they would rank crime as being among the nation's top two or three critical problems, most Americans believed by the end of the 1960's that crime required a great deal of attention as a major national problem. Women felt that way in slightly higher proportions (about 10 percentage points) than did men. Whites felt that way in substantially higher proportions (about 20 percentage points) than did non-whites. Differential attitudes based on sex might be explained in a number of ways, such as that men more than women are preoccupied with more basic problems such as earning a living, or that women more than men are afraid that crime will endanger their children. In 1974, an equal proportion of males and females (about 94 percent) agreed that to deal with the crime problem is not unimportant. About twice the proportion of non-whites (about 12 percent) felt that it is unimportant

to combat crime. Why? It would be easy to explain this differential as being a function (or as being even the cause) of a similar differential between the rates at which blacks and whites are arrested and convicted on criminal charges, and at the same time, victimized. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that black criminal offenders were more prevalent than were white offenders in the populations that were sampled for the 1974 University of Michigan (CPS) study from which the data were obtained. On the contrary, there should be a shortage of black compared with white offenders in any representative area of the free world community, because higher proportions of black compared to white offenders are incarcerated in jails and prisons.

Two alternative explanations might be offered. Some non-white respondents who considered crime not to be a problem may have been persons who were abused in the arms of the law or at least close relatives or friends of others who have suffered inequities at the hands of the police. To them, perhaps, it would be better for real criminals to remain at large than for innocent citizens to be harrassed unfairly. Secondly, the rhetoric of "law and order" and "crime in the streets" acquired some doublebarrelled meanings. On the one hand, it was used as an essentially descriptive statement of a problem ("crime in the streets," the need for "law and order"). On the other hand, and perhaps more often, the same rhetoric was used also as still a new terminology of (white) racism and, in fact, by spokesmen whose anti-minority views were not exactly unknown. Thus, it would seem that for many non-white Americans the prevailing rhetoric of the times suggested an anti-black, or, more generally, anti-minority bias to begin with. The finger of "law and order" protagonists seemed too often to be pointed at attempts to bring about some effective end to discrimination (by protests, marches, demonstrations and the like), and the conceptualization of "crime in the streets" appeared too often to be a shorthand for crimes, real or alleged, committed by non-whites.

Hence, we suggest that in a subtle, perhaps unconscious way, the associations which "concern with crime" evoke among the non-whites have, once again, to do with white stereotypes of the nation's racial minorities. If this were so, then the workings of the questions themselves would not have been culture-free, especially in the tense transitional period, since the very meaning of "crime" would relate to very different imageries on the part of the major racial segments of our society. Whatever the answer(s), it is important to stress that as late as 1974 a significantly greater proportion of non-whites disagreed that crime is a major national problem, and this disagreement cannot but affect their attitudes toward the American criminal justice system. But the main line along which we have interpreted the result, as in the above, has not been sufficiently explored. It merits attention.

FINDING 5. Throughout the first half of the 1970's, at least two-thirds of Americans favored an increase in the expenditure of public funds to combat crime,

and this view reflected a strong demographic consensus. About 40 percent of Americans approved further public spending on crime fighting as a national priority in 1975, while being rather evenly divided as to whether this priority spending should be first, second, or third among other priority expenditures. Only about half this proportion of non-whites approved further priority spending to halt crime. Support for priority spending was strongest among Republicans, persons over 50, and those who had completed high school, and was especially strong among persons who had a business or technical education.

There has been a strong national mandate in the 1970's for public and especially federal funds to be spent on anti-crime efforts. When disagreement emerges at all, it is over the trade-off that must take place necessarily between crime fighting and other programs for competitive priority funding. Americans who have amassed substantial property assets seem to be willing to spend more to protect themselves, whether their assets have been acquired because they have lived longer (persons over 50) or because they have earned more money (the more highly educated). Businessmen appear to be willing to spend the most money for anti-crime protection, probably because they feel responsible not only for their own property but for commercial assets as well as their employees' safety. Undoubtedly, one reason why only half the proportion of non-whites compared with whites favor priority funding on crime fighting is that they believe other social problems are of greater immediate concern to themselves and to those others with whom they identify most closely. Programs such as aid to dependent children, publicly-financed housing projects, welfare and many others all compete with anti-crime efforts for priority funding.

FINDING 6. The average American believes that incompetence in its various forms is at the root of criminal behavior. In 1964-1965, Americans believed that parental incompetence in the supervision of children was the principal cause of delinquency, which in turn was the source of most crime. Later, in 1972, many Americans still pointed to failures in the home as producing delinquency and crime, but they added a new dimension by observing dereliction in law making and in law enforcement as together being the most critical causes of crime. In 1972, Americans identified drug abuse as a second major factor that produces crime, replacing racial conflict and other examples of social unrests that Americans cited to explain the origins of crime in the mid-1960's. Much more than non-whites, whites have emphasized the leniency of the legal system as being at the root of crime, while non-whites more than whites have stressed alcohol and drug abuses.

Americans appear to blame themselves or at least their neighbors for the crime problem. They seem to believe without question that crime as a major national problem could be sharply reduced or eliminated if families, schools and especially government officials would do the "right thing." Of course, not everyone agrees upon just what is "the right thing." In the 1960's, Americans lost confidence in the ability of many parents to rear their children properly, and cited the home as being the source of criminal behavior especially among teenagers. In the 1970's, Americans lost confidence in the ability of public officials to define and enforce the law. In the 1960's, Americans sensed the inadequacies of primary organizational units such as the home and often blamed crime on that. In the 1970's, Americans sensed the inadequacies of more complex organizational units such as the legislatures, the police, and the courts, and began to transfer the blame for crime. Clearly, most Americans seem to witness crime as being the product of both individual and organizational change of our times. It is interesting that white Americans seem to be emphasizing the malfunctioning of the legal systems which they control much more than do non-whites whose influence over these systems has been marginal at best. It is equally interesting that black Americans have begun to view personal disorganization such as drug abuse as producing deviant behavior, instead of re-echoing the rhetorical sentiment that legal institutions of the dominant class in society produce criminality among minority group members.

Crime may or may not be the product of such individual or organizational malfunctions. If it is the product of either, than it should be curable or, at least, containable. It might be a part of the human condition, and unalterable. In any event, most Americans believe that crime can be lessened, and are pursuing a relentless search to locate a treatment for the ailment that will work. Their expectations for some relief from this problem are high, and they will be disappointed if relief is not forthcoming.

But, the underlying theme which seems to run through the data has to do with widespread negative evaluations of an increasingly permissive society. In other words, the lay cause-effect linkages tend to suggest a turn to a (morally) more conservative posture toward crime than toward society-at-large through the workings of the families, educational institutions, and institutions of governance seems to have been characterized by.

FINDING 7. A majority of Americans are convinced that better and tougher law enforcement, including stricter actions in the courts against criminal offenders, are necessary steps that must be taken to deal effectively with crime. Improved police manpower and training, together with an expansion of police power, are favored by a majority of citizens, but more so by men than by women. Non-whites favor

improvements in social conditions more than whites do. Although in 1968 non-whites were much more reluctant than whites to give the police more power, by contrast in 1974 non-whites surpassed whites in favoring an augmented police force.

The average American has reached the conclusion that the police are his first line of defense against crime, but that police action must be supported in the courts if it is to be effective. During the course of the early 1970's, blacks joined whites in adopting this point of view, which has turned into a nationwide consensus. Although blacks and white women still seem to be confident that improvements in social conditions would reduce crime if these improvements were to be implemented, white males have lost confidence in this crime-fighting model. The mandate is clear, however. Americans want to hire more policemen, train them better, give them more effective power and, at the same time, hold them accountable for their conduct. Americans want to support their police when the police are discharging their duties, and they expect the courts to do the same.

Why were the blacks more retiscent about efforts to increase police power during the 1960's? Why did they support these efforts strongly beginning in the 1970's? Black resistance to police authority in the 1960's seems linked to the civil rights movement that was in full force throughout the early and mid-1960's. During those years, blacks and even many whites feared the police whom they believed were prone to abusing the power which they had at the time. Police in many communities were perceived as opponents of civil liberties, and especially as opponents of the right of the people to peaceably assemble. Blacks more than whites seem likely to have interpreted police opposition to their civil rights demonstrations as representing racism. Against that perception, clearly the black American could not have been expected to endorse any enhancement of police authority which he felt would be inimical to his own interests.

The dynamics of civil rights movement slowed-down in the years following 1969, and the civil rights demonstrations that had been so prevalent by blacks in the South during the early 1960's and by anti-war demonstrators during the last years of the Johnson Administration subsided. As black Americans returned to and often remained confined within their neighborhoods, they discovered that they were plagued by crimes and needed police to protect them. In the early 1970's, it is not unlikely that the police in many cities failed to deploy sufficient patrol strength in black neighborhoods. At that time, black Americans occupied inadequate housing which was often untenable against intruders, and black neighborhoods were situated along streets with inadequate lighting. These and other factors contributed to making many black Americans the victims of serious crime, which in turn stimulated their outcry for greater police authority to protect them.

It is significant, also, that blacks more than whites favor improvements in social conditions as being necessary to crime reduction. Black Americans believe at once that they are easier victims of crime than are white Americans, primarily due to their inadequate housing and much greater street exposure. Blacks, particularly women and the elderly, walk the streets or use public transportation more so than do more affluent whites. Since a higher percentage of blacks than of whites come into confrontation with the law (regardless of whether or not this is justified or the product of discrimination), the average black American has had greater occasion than the average white American to become familiar with the lifestyles of potential and actual offenders. More so than whites, perhaps, blacks are familiar with accused delinquents and adult offenders as people, and as such, they understand at least in part that socio-economic deprivation predisposes many individuals to crime, or, as a minimum, does not serve as a buffer against those "opportunities" in which criminal acts are more likely.

FINDING 8. Young people are singled-out most often as being primarily responsible for many crimes, especially by older persons who witness delinquency as being more of a threat to the nation than other crimes are.

A good deal, if not most, of the street crimes that take place daily in most cities has been attributed to juveniles or young adults. Arrest data support such perceptions. Whether or not this is true matters not, of course, since newspaper and television depiction of youth as thugs affects public attitudes toward the young. What is more, there is a greater tendency on the part of Americans than, for instance, of Asiatics and Europeans to separate the youth from the elderly. As one example of this, elderly ancestors and collateral relatives reside in the homes of their offspring, nephews and neices much less in this country than abroad. A likely outgrowth of this American living pattern is the polarization of the old and the young--each somewhat less comfortable with the other.

There is another conclusion that may be reached from this finding. Americans, and perhaps older citizens more than younger ones, seem to have become preoccupied by visible crimes and to have ignored or repressed the existence of the more invisible crimes. It may well be that American youth are disproportionately responsible for many visible forms of crime, including the most obvious forms of street crime. The elderly walk the streets more than do middle-aged or young Americans, and so consider themselves to be potential if not actual victims of street crimes more than of other crimes. Americans should face the fact, however, that many serious forms of crime that are committed daily in the United States are not committed by America's youth, and that many other crimes are inspired by older criminals even if actually carried out by younger

ones. The major rackets, high volume narcotics trafficking, and corporate conspiracies to discourage or eliminate competition in violation of the anti-trust statutes, price gouging and the like are a few of a number of very serious criminal conspiracies that cannot be attributed exclusively to the young and that may not be attributable to the young hardly at all.

FINDING 9. "Organized crime" appears to make many Americans uneasy, but more because it is viewed as being detrimental to the collective welfare of Americans than to the personal security of most respondents. Only about 16 percent of respondents in most surveys believed that "organized crime" affected them as individuals.

The term "organized crime" is not a very precise one and has become replete with derogatory ethnic imagery, much of which is misplaced or unjustified at all. For instance, this term has been abused in connection with the Sicilian Mafia, and has become associated with gambling and prostitution "rackets" more so than with other forms of criminal syndicalism. Of course, the term "organized crime" is at least as apt, if not more so, when applied to corporate unfair trade practices, political dirty tricks, international cartels such as those that control the prices of diamonds, uranium and oil, and especially, the world drug trade.

In analyzing this finding, however, it must be assumed that the average American misconstrues the term "organized crime," or otherwise considerably more than sixteen percent of the population would feel that this sort of activity affects them personally! Why do Americans believe that "organized crime" is detrimental to the collective welfare of the citizenry? Among the reasons is the tradition that small businesses are preferable to mammoth ones, an historical tradition that has lingered since colonial times. Another reason may well be that citizens feel that "rackets" are morally pernicious, particularly if they rarely or never participate in these activities.

The more important questions, however, are the dual ones of why 16 percent of the population believes that "organized crime" affects them as individuals, while the other 84 percent do not? Who are the concerned ones? Are they the small entrepreneurs who feel that they must meet periodic extortion demands as protection? Sixteen percent is too high a figure. Are they the "racketeers" themselves, but particularly those who have double-crossed their cohorts? Sixteen percent is too high a figure here, also. Are they the victims or the parents of victims of drug addiction? Sixteen percent is far too low a figure.

It seems more likely that about 16 percent of the American population have become victims of various propaganda campaigns that have been designed to instill among unsavvy people a fear of the wrong dangers. "Racketeers" have long been pegged as being the country's "bad guys," and it appears that about 16 percent of the

citizenry believe that they are threatened by their image of the "underworld," whatever and however accurate their image may be. Although this finding alone may be alarming, its corollary is much more ominous. About 84 percent of the American people do not feel personally threatened at all by "organized crime." Clearly, either they have fallen into the trap of limiting "organized crime" to domestic "rackets," or they are extraordinarily brave. Every American should worry about the personal effect that any one of several international conspiracies will exert on this nation's survival! Since four-fifths do not do so, the obvious inference is that Americans still believe the gasoline retailer on the corner of their block is responsible for the energy crisis, and that "hippies" who grow marijuana in their window boxes are to blame for the narcotics trade.

#### B. CRIME AS A COMMUNITY PROBLEM

Some Americans may consider crime to be a strategic problem facing their community even if they do not believe that crime is a major national concern. To repeat a point already made: This may well stem from the fact that crime is most visible to the people who live in close proximity to the place of its occurrence. It may emanate, also, relate to the fact that most crimes committed in the United States are prosecuted in the state courts and are violations of state laws, so that publicity about crimes is most acute within the state and city or town where they were perpetrated. Only a few of the "spectacular" kinds of crime such as kidnappings and political assassinations receive national attention, although statistics about crime are reported nationally in aggregate form. Unlike the inquiries about crime as a national problem, questions that relate to crime as a community problem are likely to evoke different patterns of responses that, in part, are functions of the particular community in which respondents reside.

FINDING 10. Americans have pointed to crime as being the single most pressing community problem more frequently than they have cited it as being the single most pressing national problem during the same time periods since 1968.

Unlike many national problems such as military defense and economic stability, crime has a limited locus, and its visibility to the public is affected by proximity. This is true, particularly, of street crimes and offenses that jeopardize the security of the dwelling, which have much more of a local focus because rates and *modi operandi* vary from one community to the next. Although there may well be several types of crime, at least, that constitute a major national problem (e.g., conspiracies to restrain the volume and increase the unit price of various fossil fuels), when the average American thinks about "crime" he envisions being beaten or having his belongings stolen from his or damaged. This finding

documents quite well the fact that Americans are more upset by small crimes perpetrated in great frequency and near to home than they are by large capers committed sporadically in far-away places.

FINDING 11. Non-white Americans have felt more strongly than whites about crime as a community problem consistently since 1968, although white Americans have felt somewhat more strongly than non-whites about crime as a national problem.

There is some evidence that, among Americans, non-whites are more concerned than whites about a variety of community problems while whites are more concerned than non-whites about a variety of nationwide issues. This tends to suggest that, in general, non-whites may be most concerned about problems that occur closer to home, and, of course, crime is such a problem. One can only speculate as to why non-whites are more concerned than whites about community problems but less concerned than whites about national issues. Perhaps one reason is that non-whites have not had the same opportunities as whites have had to travel widely, and see themselves as members of a nuclear family unit that has ties almost exclusively to a given geographic area. Another valid reason could be that non-whites have been so concerned, out of necessity, about cleaning-up and securing the area that immediately surrounds their homes that they have not enjoyed enough leisure time to focus upon problems facing other citizens in more distant places. Most ominously of all, perhaps, is the likelihood that non-whites have been victimized personally by serious crimes committed in and around their homes much more so than whites have been, and so the reality of crime as an unpleasant experience rather than merely as a social phenomenon has been impressed upon them.

FINDING 12. In 1968, juvenile delinquency was viewed as being the key community problem more by women, white, and older respondents than by men, non-white and younger respondents. Women and older respondents continued to witness delinquency as being the community's biggest problem more than men or younger respondents did in 1972, but by then whites and non-whites did so about equally. By 1975, older respondents continued to pick delinquency as being the community's most pressing problem more than did younger respondents, but men equaled women at targeting delinquency.

Juvenile delinquency manifests itself as a street crime much more so than many if not most other forms of criminal behavior. The juvenile offender, more so than his adult counterpart, must be content to prey upon victims who reside in the vicinity where he lives or hangs-out, because he enjoys little access to automobiles and even less access to airplane transportation, and because he does not have criminal contacts outside of the city or area of the city in which he has grown-up. For this reason, principally, it seems

reasonable to conclude that the juvenile offender antagonizes and victimizes citizens who spend a good deal of the day and night in a single neighborhood, often alone, and who rely on walking along the streets safely as their sole means of travelling to stores and other commercial outlets. The juvenile offender is in a position to haunt the elderly, and especially women and elderly women, in this way.

It is more difficult to try to explain why non-whites and men came to equal whites and women in targeting delinquency by 1972 and 1975 respectively. The most obvious explanation that may be offered is a two-fold one. During the early 1970's, the accentuated "white flight" out of the inner-cities and, particularly, more elderly non-whites in decaying urban neighborhoods that had become crime-ridden. In the 1960's, delinquents may have preyed upon elderly and female victims who were white more than those who were black, perhaps because whites were perceived then as possessing more property that could be fenced, or perhaps because whites were seen as being less "street-wise" and consequently as easier prey. When the whites left the cities, the non-whites remained to become the exclusive victims of inner-city delinquents. But, as the whites entered suburbia, white delinquents followed with them and began to commit criminal acts against suburbanites. Since suburbanites walk the streets much less frequently than urbanites do and rely on their automobiles much more so, one might suggest that suburban delinquents began to alter their modus operandi by abandoning or diminishing street crime activity in favor of household and vehicular burglaries. If true, this is somewhat explanatory of the increase in men targeting delinquency. The working man is less concerned than the elderly or women are about daytime street crime, since he works during the day, or, if he works at night, he rests during the day. If delinquency shifts from street crime to household and vehicular crime, the male American becomes more directly victimized because the property lost is more a part of him personally. This is true when delinquency affects his automobile more than other property, perhaps.

But, then, there are probably other major forces at work as well. The 1960's and early 1970's were marked, also, by sharp increases in drug abuse, and drug addiction does tend to characterize the young more than other members of our population, especially when it comes to harder drugs. The drug habit, of course, has to be fed. That the pattern of drug abuse tended to spread from inner cities into wealthier suburbia is also not difficult to document. In addition, there is unemployment. Always higher among the young (say 18-25 years of age) than others, it is felt particularly during periods of economic difficulty because the increases in unemployment victimize the young much more severely and much more frequently than they do other employees, if only due to various seniority provisions. At the same time, unemployment rates among the nation's non-whites (especially blacks) tend to be twice as high, and even higher, than those among whites.

Nor would it be unreasonable to argue that more of a "generation gap" evolved during the 1960's and that is a problem which has not disappeared even as late as the late 1970's. To all appearances, it has diminished in significance, however. The problem arose due to inter-generational arguments about "permissiveness" in general and due to the younger generation's resentment, in the 1960's, of the conflict in South East Asia and especially the role they played in it as soldiers. These factors affected the perceptions by adult and elderly Americans of the nation's youth, and created objective conditions under which such propensities toward crime or delinquency as may have existed anyway would tend to manifest themselves more often in actual behavior.

FINDING 13. About 20 percent of the people who resided in at least nine of America's largest cities during 1970 were ready, willing and able on their own initiative to identify crime or a related law enforcement problem as being among the top two or three troubles affecting their communities at the time. In three other large American cities (Albuquerque, Milwaukee, and San Diego) during the same year, however, this was true of only between 10-15 percent.

There is little doubt but that crime is on the minds of many people when they think about their community's problems. Crime generally has not ranked first among those problems. It seems reasonable to speculate that some people cite crime on their own initiative as being among their community's most pressing problems because either they or their relatives or friends have been victimized. Cities such as Albuquerque, Milwaukee and San Diego seem to inspire a smaller proportion of people to cite crime on their own initiative as being a major problem, perhaps because these cities have less of a visible crime problem than do other cities such as Baltimore, Boston, or Kansas City. More likely even than this, however, is the possibility that the media in cities such as Albuquerque, Milwaukee and San Diego have focused attention onto criminal episodes less frequently and/or less intensively than has the media in cities such as Baltimore or Boston. One reason for this may be that crimes themselves are less violent in some cities compared with others, but some cities may suffer more than others do from racial tensions, economic depression, or general population heterogeneity, all of which may inspire citizens to associate crime with general social disruption and to blame ethnic or social groups whom they dislike for particular criminal episodes.

FINDING 14. When structured questions replaced unstructured ones in the same 1970 study of ten large American cities, two-thirds of all respondents acknowledged that drug abuse and drug pushing were serious crime problems in their communities, and 20 percent agreed that speeding and reckless driving were serious crime problems, also. Curiously,

in two of the cities (Albuquerque and San Diego) where citizens complained least on their own initiative about crime being a major community problem, more than three-fourths of the same respondents answered affirmatively to probes about the seriousness of drugs as a community problem. In San Diego, 30 percent of the same respondents answered affirmatively to similar probes about speeding and reckless driving. Equally curiously, in two of the cities (Boston and Kansas City) where citizens complained most on their own initiative about crime being a major community problem, fewer than 60 percent of the same respondents answered affirmatively to the drug probes, and only about 12 percent answered affirmatively to probes about speeding and reckless driving being a major community problem.

Although citizens point to crime on their own initiative as being a community problem at a much smaller rate, at least two out of three Americans who live in major cities appear to agree when asked about whether crime is a major problem within their community. This response confirms the major statistics on crime, which indicate empirically that crime is indeed a major problem, particularly in urban centers.

One vital implication that emerges from this finding is that many citizens may not be cognizant, or may even disagree, about what conduct actually constitutes a crime. Respondents in both Albuquerque and San Diego complained less on their own initiative about crime than did citizens in other cities that were surveyed at about the same time, but these respondents answered affirmatively to probes about drug abuse or reckless driving and speeding at higher rates than did citizens living in other cities. The corollary was true, also. Respondents in Boston and Kansas City who complained most on their own initiatives about crime generally answered affirmatively to probes about drug abuse or reckless driving and speeding at lower rates than did citizens living in other cities. Apparently, when Americans complain or fail to complain about crime on their own initiative as being a major community problem, they are inspired to do so on account of specific types of crime which are on their minds. It is rather obvious that neither drug abuse nor vehicular abuses are among the crimes that inspire citizens to complain most about the crime problem.

FINDING 15. More Americans (14.7 percent) identified crime than anything else as being their community's single most pressing problem in 1975. A slightly lower proportion (10.0 percent) saw unemployment as being their community's biggest problem during that recession year. Americans targeted crime and unemployment more frequently in 1975 than they had done in earlier surveys that had inquired about the biggest community problem.

For a number of years leading up to 1975, more and more Americans seem to have become preoccupied with crime in their communities. It seems significant that Americans identified crime as being the most pressing community problem at higher rates than they identified the economy as being the most pressing community problem during a recession year. This indicates at least that crime is more comprehensible than the economy to the man in the street. Therefore, it implies that the average American expects solutions to the crime problem even ahead of solutions to economic problems. In addition, it is possible that during periods of economic recession, both fear of crime and concern about unemployment rise together as joint symptoms of increasing social unrest. Or, it might be inferred that people think about unemployment more when they are in fact unemployed, and that when idle people become more concerned about the crime problem than they do when they are working.

Of course, the pattern should not be very surprising. Problems in the nation's economy, such as inflation and unemployment are really not seen as being linked by particular system of production of goods and services in any given community. The lay reasoning, as sound as it is, views economic difficulties as having their roots in the larger national system or, possibly, in the workings in the world markets as a whole. Hence, the basic thrust of the data may also be understood to mean that Americans are perceiving key economic problems as being beyond the capability of any community to deal with. For this reason, they wouldn't cite such problems as "community" but as "national" problems. On the other hand, because of its localized manifestations and impacts, crime does lend itself to community intervention, if only in part, and in this sense is thought to be more of a "community" problem.

FINDING 16. In 1970, Americans who lived in ten large cities believed that efforts by local government should be concentrated against burglary and robbery more than against other crimes except drug pushing and drug abuse. Whites favored more police intervention against robbery, while non-whites favored greater police intervention against burglary. The 1974 and 1976 Baltimore and Maryland studies revealed that citizens there wanted local governments to intervene against rape, the sale and use of hard drugs, and murder (including manslaughter) more than other crimes and more than burglary and robbery.

There is an emerging amount of evidence that citizens in urban America have become as much or more concerned about violent crimes and drug abuse as they have been traditionally about burglary and robbery. No real doubt exists as to why Americans feared both burglary and robbery more than many other crimes throughout the 1960's. These crimes struck them in their homes and on the streets, and, in the case of many burglaries, took from them items of personal property that were seldom recovered. Before the 1970's, Americans seem

not to have really believed that drugs and related crimes including murder could hurt them. Murders were perceived by the populace as being either the aftermath of intra-family disputes or inheritance struggles, or the product of bizarre plots to assassinate important people. Rape was often seen as the consequence of "sexual provocation," and anyway, very unusual at that. Drugs were viewed as being the mysterious baubles of strange and remote subcultures. Since the beginning of the 1970's, murders, rapes, and other crimes many of which have been or have been perceived as being drug-related have affected ordinary people while in pursuit of their routine daily activities.

FINDING 17. In 1970, Americans who lived in ten large cities selected better policing (especially at night) and improved street lighting as most important direct measures that might be taken by communities to fight crime. Better policing was preferred to improved lighting by substantial margins (12-30 percentage points) except in San Diego, and there about one-third of the respondents favored each measure. In all ten cities, however, citizens preferred to cutback on lighting rather than policing, if such were necessary financially, by proportionally even wider margins. In some of these cities, non-whites felt that more money should be spent on each of these services than did whites, while in other cities non-whites were more willing to finance improved street lighting, a minority viewpoint.

Citizens are demanding both better policing and better street lighting as their bulwarks in the fight against crime. It is significant that most citizens would improve policing rather than lighting if a choice were necessitated, implying that most Americans still rely on others rather than on themselves to prevent crime. In some cities, non-whites supported the minority viewpoint that better street lighting would be preferable to better policing, denoting their belief that the citizen needs to protect himself from crime rather than to rely on others to do this and that self-defense requires the proper tools such as proper street lighting. Clearly, Americans are not satisfied with the condition of street lighting in their communities, just as they do not believe that police patrols are available in quantities and/or qualities that are necessary.

Whatever else may be said, however, the relative difference between the demand for more and better policing and the desire for better street lighting displays an important logic of its own: More policing, if effective at all, would serve as a deterrent to crime or permit early intervention in those cases when the insult itself cannot be prevented before it happens both during day and night hours. By contrast, "better street lighting," whatever its effectiveness, has implications for crime intervention only during evening and night hours. Thus, better policing is in fact a more generic strategy than is simply better lighting, and even the latter, as an occasionally preferred option, might be most workable only when linked to better policing at the same time.

FINDING 18. Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, both awareness of and concern for crime have been greatest among Americans who live in cities over 250,000 than among other citizens, although awareness of and concern for crime have increased at about the same rate among city dwellers as among Americans generally. Reaction to crime and to measures that may be taken to fight crime have varied according to demographic patterns that have been consistent among respondents living in large cities and elsewhere across the United States, but demographic variations have been more substantial among city dwellers when these variations have existed.

Urban Americans have been both aware of and concerned about crime more so than citizens who resided in areas with lesser population densities, presumably because in the cities crimes have been at once the most rampant and most visible. As expected, awareness of and concern about crime as a problem have increased at about the same rate among citizens living in urban and less populous areas, since crime rates have increased significantly in all areas of the nation since 1960. Age, race, and sex as well as other demographic variables such as education level, income, and general socio-economic status are salient factors that have influenced individual reactions to the crime problem, and this means that no clear consensus exists among average Americans as to what causes crime or what should be done to curtail crime. Demographic variations have been the same, largely, in urban and exurban areas, but when present these variations have been stronger among city dwellers. This is true, at least in part, because conflict and tensions are exacerbated when people live in close confinement. Moreover, city dwellers are more likely than their rural counterparts to identify as part of an ethnic or other demographic group of subculture, and consequently to adopt a "party line" instead of drawing their own conclusions about the etiology of and solutions to the crime problem.

#### C. CRIME AS A NEIGHBORHOOD PROBLEM

Within many communities across the United States, people who reside in some residential areas display attitudes toward crime that differ from those of citizens who live in other areas of the same community. This is to be expected, ordinarily, inasmuch as crime rates vary considerably within different sectors of many cities and towns. Neighborhood feelings about crime and views about strategies to cope with crime yield insight as to the collective thinking of economic, ethnic, and other social groups, because in America neighborhoods tend to reflect ethnic and socio-economic stratification.

FINDING 19. Most of the surveys that have been conducted since 1968 show that fewer than ten percent of Americans generally identify crime on their own initiative as being one of their neighborhood's big

problems. In most of the same surveys, however, almost half (40-50 percent) of respondents agreed when asked if crime is a serious problem within their own neighborhoods. In several of these surveys, respondents who were divorced or separated identified crime as being a neighborhood problem more than did other respondents.

Strong, albeit inconclusive, evidence emerges to suggest that only about one American in ten takes the time to wonder about exactly what problems do confront him in his neighborhood. When induced into doing this by means of being questioned for a survey, another three or four out of ten Americans seem to think about crime at once. To the other half of the nation's citizenry, crime is not perceived as threatening their neighborhoods. Two implications deserve to be underscored. First, three or four out of every ten Americans have to be reminded that the neighborhoods in which they reside are dangerous places to live on account of crime! If this is the case, how can these citizens survive? Surely, the epitome of victim precipitation is reached when people who live in crime-ridden neighborhoods cannot identify crime as being a neighborhood problem unless someone else raises the question. The criminal seldom notifies his victim that the conduct being perpetrated constitutes a crime! Secondly, half of all Americans deny that crime is a problem within their neighborhoods even when asked directly if this is true. Are half of all neighborhoods in the United States virtually free of crime? This seems unlikely. Instead, it seems more likely that as more members of each household work at jobs, there is less interaction between different family units living in the same neighborhood. With less interaction, there is less communication including less exchange of information about the occurrence of crimes being committed. It would seem as if a great many people who live in neighborhoods which in fact do have a crime problem fail to notice the problem merely because they have not been (or are not aware that they have been) victimized themselves. The key issue probably has to do with the fact that significant portions of time (at work, recreational activities, shopping) are generally not spent in one's "neighborhood" so that even the concept of "neighborhood" as a more differentiated meaning and is, generally, of lower saliency in helping to define the variegated loci in which many American families actually function.

FINDING 20. At least 20 percent of the citizens living in ten large American cities during 1970 believed that the neighborhood in which they resided was not a good place to live. Among this group of dissatisfied people, about twice the proportion (20-35 percent) of those living in five cities (Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Denver and Kansas City) compared with those living in three other cities (6-12 percent) blamed neighborhood problems on crime and associated factors such as inadequate street lighting or poor police protection.

Quite clearly, residents of some American cities perceived a crime problem in their neighborhoods more so than do residents of other cities, and seem to be able to document their reasons for this belief. Undoubtedly, both police protection and street lighting, among other salient factors, vary considerably in terms of both quantity and quality from city to city across the nation. This is to be expected, inasmuch as some cities (primarily, those along the Eastern seaboard) are much older than other cities (most of those in the West, and some of those in the Midwest). Some cities have been plagued by major racial or other social unrest, and Denver is one such city. The fact that one in five Americans does not think the neighborhood in which he resides is a good place to live may not be wholly significant, since one out of five persons might be expected to dislike virtually any condition of life for good reason, bad reason, or no reason.

FINDING 21. More than one-third of all Americans who have been surveyed since 1965 feel that neighborhood streets are unsafe at nighttime. This concern peaked in 1974 when, following an increase of several percentage points annually during the 1970's, over 45 percent of Americans felt this way. Consistently, about three times as many women compared with men considered neighborhood streets unsafe at night, and, except in 1972, non-whites have felt this way more than whites by about 15 percentage points. Non-white women have expressed concern over this problem more than others have, and in 1975 over three-fourths of non-white women shared this view. Residents of cities with over 250,000 inhabitants have been more worried (by 5-15 percentage points) than other citizens about inadequate street safety, as have lower income Americans. Disregarding 1965 when age was not a predictor of this perception, age has been an inverse predictor, except that people between 40-59 years of age seem to have felt safer on the streets than those either younger or older.

Streets are considered unsafe at night by people who have to walk along the streets at night, particularly if they have to do so alone. Minority citizens and the elderly enjoy less access to private transportation than do whites, and minority as well as older women rely upon public transportation much more so than do whites and men. Lower income inhabitants, particularly of the cities, rely on public transportation almost exclusively when they can afford it, and must resort to walking when they cannot afford it. One major reason why people who are aged between 40-59 years feel safest on the streets is that they walk the streets very infrequently, and almost never alone. These are the citizens who tend to occupy the more important positions in the community. They drive automobiles, reside in the suburbs, and avoid walking the streets at night much more than other age groups do. They do not have to worry about street safety, because they do not have to rely upon the streets.

FINDING 22. Ten percent or fewer of the Americans who have been surveyed since 1966 feel that neighborhood streets are unsafe during the daytime, although more than one-third of the respondents in some surveys have expressed concern about the safety of parks in their neighborhood during the day, and more than one-third of respondents in several studies have agreed, when probed, that the daytime hazards of robbery and assault, including rape, remain substantial although much less than comparable risks at night. Older citizens, particularly, complain about crime in the streets during the daytime, as do women more than men, the poor more than the affluent, and, often but not always, non-whites to a greater extent than whites.

Fewer Americans feel that streets are unsafe during the day compared with at night because, at least in part, streets are safer during the daylight than after dark, and streets are more crowded by day than by night affording security in numbers. Many elderly have become afraid of using the streets at anytime, as have some minorities and women in other age brackets, because they have been victimized at much higher rates than have other citizens, and because even during the day they frequently must walk alone and feel defenseless. Citizens generally are becoming afraid of using the parks in their neighborhoods even during the day, because incidents of crime have occurred there and have been well-publicized in the news media. Unlike most European communities, American cities often do not assign police patrols or even maintenance crews to parks in sufficient numbers to make them safe. Publicity about instances when no one seems to want to come to the aid of the crime victims even during the course of a robbery or a beating may further beliefs that many streets are unsafe at any time, but this is difficult to ascertain. What does remain important is the degree to which many Americans, especially the elderly and women, have reached the conclusion that they are taking a risk just walking in the streets of their communities, even when many others are around.

FINDING 23. Many Americans fear being victimized by crime in their own homes, and in some cities a woman feels more likely to be raped during the day in her own home than on the street, although this is not so at night. Women between 30-59 years of age seem concerned about rape more than women who are in other age brackets, and women under 20 seem much less concerned about rape. Both men and women between 20-59 years of age seem most concerned about the buglarization of their homes. Non-whites worry about all of these crime problems to a much greater extent than do whites, except in a few cities.

This finding reveals the extent to which Americans are afraid of daytime burglaries. The 30-59 year old women are likely to be concerned more about rape in their homes because they stay home more

than younger women who work. Women in these age brackets may be concerned about rape more than younger or older women because they are most concerned about monogamous sexuality, being in the child-rearing age. Women under 20 years old may be least concerned about rape in the present era because, erroneously, they associate rape with sexual promiscuity toward which some take a cavalier attitude. In this age bracket, also, women are more likely to feel physically able to thwart an attempted rape. It is likely that men and women between 20-59 years of age worry most about burglaries because during these years many of both sexes work and leave their homes unattended during large portions of the daytime.

FINDING 24. Americans tend to believe that their own neighborhoods are at least as safe as, and usually safer than, other parts of the communities where they reside. Specific neighborhood concerns vary within each community. Women more than men tend to be negative in assessing the relative security of their neighborhoods, as do non-whites as much as or more than whites, younger more than older respondents, and the less educated more than the more educated. Surveys that have been conducted since 1965 do not reflect either an increase or a decrease in concern by residents about neighborhood safety at time of interview. At any given time, however, about one-half (between one- and two-thirds) of a neighborhood's residents may be expected to perceive that the neighborhood's crime problem is worse than at any previous time. Men do this more than women, and in the cities non-whites do this more than whites. There is some evidence, also, to suggest that the longer a person lives in a particular neighborhood, the safer he comes to believe that neighborhood to be in relation to the rest of his community.

Most Americans believe that their own neighborhoods are as safe as other neighborhoods in the same community, because they associate safety with value and believe their own neighborhoods are as good as others in which to live. The longer they live in a given neighborhood, the more this feeling becomes reinforced. Of course, some citizens are less happy than are others in their respective neighborhoods. This is true, particularly, of women who stay at home more than men or, if they work, often do so to purchase a more expensive house in a better neighborhood. It is true, also, more of the younger and less affluent citizens who are less established in the neighborhoods where they live for the moment. Many Americans believe that crime is worse now than at earlier times, apparently because they have forgotten about the crime problems of the "good old days." That those days may not have been so good is indicated by the fact that, over at least a ten year period between 1965 and 1975, the rates at which respondents complained about the crime problem during any given current year remained virtually constant.

FINDING 25. Most Americans believe that young people are responsible for perpetrating crimes in the neighborhoods, although the less educated seem to blame teenagers more while the more educated accuse the post-teenage population of young adults. Most of the surveys conducted since 1969 indicate that substantial proportions of both whites and non-whites target blacks as being more likely criminal offenders. Women of both races who are in the younger and the older age brackets seem to be the most suspicious of strangers who are in a different race. About half of both the white and non-white residents of many communities seem to be more afraid of strangers at the door of their homes if the latter are of a different race, but as many as 80 percent of black respondents in some neighborhoods are afraid of any stranger at their doors, regardless of race. Whether neighborhood residents believe that outsiders are more responsible than other residents are for crimes committed in their neighborhoods is an issue that varies considerably from one community to another and demographically within many communities.

There is an abundance of empirical evidence collected by various law enforcement agencies that suggests that young offenders are in fact responsible for a great many of the crimes which are perpetrated in American neighborhoods. Americans may perceive this situation accurately. One reason why the more educated may blame an older youngster while the less educated blame a younger teenager could be that, in the poorer neighborhoods socio-economically, delinquency starts at an earlier age and escalates at a more rapid pace than it does in the more affluent neighborhoods.

There is an abundance of statistical information, some of which is of dubious accuracy, that suggests more street crimes are in fact committed by non-whites than by whites. If this information is accurate, and it could be, then once again Americans may have formed impressions which are basically valid. If this information is inaccurate or exaggerated, as it may well be, then it is likely that many Americans blame non-whites for crimes committed in their neighborhoods because media accounts depict non-whites being arrested more often than whites, a fact that remains all too true throughout much of the United States to this day. Proportionately, fewer whites than non-whites are arrested for street crimes, but these differential rates may be explained in part by the greater reluctance of police to arrest whites compared to non-whites. Whether non-whites should be arrested proportionately more frequently than whites really is of little consequence to public impressions, since the populace is likely to blame crimes on people and groups who are targeted by the police as having committed the crimes, whether or not the official accusations are based on fact.

One reason why younger and older women of both races seem to be afraid of males who are of a different race may be that women in these age brackets are most likely to be single and unescorted by a male when walking along the streets. At least some of these women may fantasize the risk of sexual assault, and associate an imaginary occurrence as being perpetrated by a man with whom voluntary sex is felt to be a taboo. In the United States, interracial sex is among the highest social taboos.

The finding that about half of all Americans of either race are more afraid of a stranger at their door if the stranger is of a different race is a vestige, at least in part, of America's ignominious history of segregated neighborhoods and, consequently, of segregated schools. Blacks and whites are afraid of each other, at least superficially, and this fear is exacerbated when someone of another race threatens even peaceable intrusion into the sanctity of the home. The fact that as many as 80 percent of black Americans are afraid of any stranger who appears at their door signifies the fear in which racial minorities live in some neighborhoods across the nation. This fear has historical origins in hate groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, which have intimidated black Americans for more than a century. This fear has contemporary origins, also, in the fact that many minority neighborhoods are overcrowded and unsafe against many hazards including fire and disease as well as crime. Minority Americans are jumpy, and with some justification for being so.

In some communities but not in others, residents tend to blame strangers for crimes that have been committed in their neighborhoods. To a certain degree, this inconsistent targeting of offenders may reflect guesswork on the part of at least some respondents. However, it must be remembered that some communities are more transient than others are, and that still other communities are more conducive to transient crimes. For instance, neighborhoods that abut interstate highways facilitate intrusion by transient offenders more so than do neighborhoods that are more complicated to enter and leave. So are neighborhoods in communities that are served by efficient rapid transit systems, or that are largely uninhabited by day when households have been vacated by husbands and wives who both work.

FINDING 26. Between one- and two-thirds of all Americans appear to have altered their basic habits to cope with crime. Non-whites, women and older persons admit to these behavioral changes in greater proportions than other citizens do. Many people avoid walks in the park, look over their shoulders while walking along the street, and cross a street to avoid suspicious-looking strangers. Some citizens avoid certain areas of their community completely or at least at night, or prefer to stay home rather than to go out in the evening. A few respondents

(usually ten percent or fewer) admit to carrying a weapon or to acquiring skills in the marital arts, and women especially admit to carrying a chemical repellent.

Although many Americans admit to having made minor alterations in their basic habits to cope with the crime problem, only a small proportion have reacted by arming themselves. A number of citizens respond to their perception that crime affects some areas of a community more than it does other areas by avoiding areas in which they feel crime abounds. Of course, by doing so, they may be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy by causing incidental deterioration of the sectors of the community which they have shunned.

FINDING 27. About one-third of Americans surveyed since 1966 admit to having taken one or more of an array of steps to increase the security of their homes. In most of these surveys, another third of the respondents concurred that they should improve the security of their homes. Specific measures to enhance the safety of dwellings vary considerably, and seem to be a function of income, at least partially, as might be expected. Steps taken include simple and inexpensive precautions such as installing or repairing locks and window bars, as well as more costly investments such as burglar alarms, extra or higher-quality locks, or the acquisition of a watchdog. In some surveys, women and non-whites left some lights on in their homes when away more than men and whites did, but whites and older residents were more likely than other people to use a timer to turn lights on and off automatically during the evening hours when away from home.

Although a significant proportion of Americans seem to have reacted to the crime problem by becoming more security conscious in their homes, at least two-thirds of the population has not done this. Consequently, of course, crime affects residential dwellings rampantly. Do two out of every three Americans already live in buildings that were completely secure even before 1966? This is doubtful, especially since the average American is likely to have moved at least six times since then. Each time a person moves from one house or apartment to another, he can be expected to inherit security deficiencies if only because, unless he changes the existing lock, people who reside in the same abode before him also have keys to his dwelling! This finding exhibits a lack of concern on the part of most Americans about crime prevention, and probably a lack of knowledge about basic crime prevention techniques.

#### D. THE POLICE SYSTEM

Most Americans have exhibited rather strong feelings about the competence and role of police officers serving their community

and neighborhoods. These views range from general feelings toward the police and perceptions of community cooperativeness to more specific ratings of police activities and performance, including police honesty, fairness, brutality and authority. Police officers are the most visible agents of the American criminal justice system, because most citizens see uniformed police on a daily basis. Many Americans have had occasion to benefit individually from an act of assistance by a police officer, and some have been injured by police conduct or misconduct. For these and many other reasons, undoubtedly, Americans seem to have developed attitudes toward police that have become more crystallized than similar attitudes toward other components of the justice system and the personnel who function as officials of those other agencies.

FINDING 28. By far, most Americans have positive feelings toward, respect for, and are satisfied with the services provided by police officers. Most of the citizens who express these opinions personally attribute similar attitudes to the majority of the people who reside in their respective communities and neighborhoods. In the years since 1966, there has been a slight decline in favorableness toward police by citizens generally, but not enough of a decline to signify an important trend. Since 1968, inhabitants of the nations large cities (with populations of 250,000 or more) have been less-favorably disposed toward police consistently than have been other Americans, but the differences are not robust. Whites, women, middle-income earners, older citizens, and Americans with less formal education have reported feelings that are more favorable toward police than have their counterparts.

Most Americans not only support their local police strongly but also seem confident that their neighbors do likewise. This finding tends to show that citizens are quite satisfied with police services generally, and want the police to keep on doing the same good job. The slight decline among most groups of citizens in support for their police since 1966 is insignificant.

Police in the large cities enjoy a little less support from the citizens whom they serve than do police officers elsewhere. But this is explained easily by the fact that non-whites have been much less (about three times less) supportive of their local police than whites have been, and that non-whites constitute a higher proportion of urban compared with suburban or exurban populations. The more important question, however, is why non-whites are less supportive of police than whites are? Undoubtedly, one reason is the negative image of police that has developed among non-whites particularly since the days of the civil rights demonstrations of the early 1960's. Non-whites remember more vividly than do whites the examples of police misconduct and oppression that occurred in various communities even

as late as 1969. Moreover, as late as 1974 most police departments were either all-white or included only "token" non-whites, prior to the time when court-ordered affirmative action plans were operationalized for minority recruitment in police departments.

It is likely that Americans with less formal education have been more supportive than others of their local police because, for one thing, these are the people from whose ranks the police have been traditionally recruited in disproportionate numbers. But also, less formally schooled Americans are active in less rewarding occupations on the one hand, and are more likely to be unemployed on the other hand. They live in less-well-kept, if not outright poor, neighborhoods, often on account of their lack of a formal education. Crime which concerns most citizens is precisely the kind that occurs disproportionately in less advantaged neighborhoods, and the police officer cannot be seen other than as a main buffer against possible victimization. Furthermore, attitudes toward authority on the part of the less formally educated tend to be different from the more educated, and the direction of the difference is one of greater acceptance of authority in the context of a desire for maximum societal order.

In non-white neighborhoods, as we have already pointed out, the essential white police officer is not seen in a similar light, mainly because the police officer's activities of all kinds brings him into more likely confrontations with black residents. White police officers may be somewhat more inclined to respond in an authoritarian manner in non-white compared with white neighborhoods, if only to mask the sense of uneasiness, if not anxiety, that accompanies their deployment into poor black neighborhoods.

Women, too, tend to be consistently more supportive. More than men, they are likely victims of crimes against the person, and the perpetrators are much more often male than female--at least throughout the period which our data addresses. Police officers, themselves have been almost exclusively male throughout the period under discussion, and thus can be easily seen as being the key protectors of the more vulnerable women.

If middle income earners display strongly favorable views toward the police, also, this is not particularly surprising. Whatever the social roots of policemen, their actual occupational status brings them into the "middle income" category themselves. In some subconscious sense, then, they "belong" to similar groupings and live, for the most part, in middle income neighborhoods. But it is also accurate to speculate that the highest form of internalization of some of the central American values occurs in this segment of our society. These values include the key one: "society under the laws," as well as "law and order," and the policeman is the most visible and ubiquitous symbol of the nation's justice system, a daily embodiment of these important values.

FINDING 29. Given the favorable sentiment toward the police which prevails, the recent years (1970's) suggest an increasing polarization of these underlying feelings. In fact, in so far as women and both the lower and middle income earners have become more supportive of the police than others, within these same groups we find, as a minority view, very strong negative sentiments toward the police. The same type of a more polarized perspective marks the feelings of the elderly who both blame the police more for poor community relations and give them more credit for good community relations.

Among Americans, women and the lower income earners appear to have become much more polarized than other citizens in their views toward the police. Some women are highly supportive of the police, while others are equally negative, but more than men, women seem to be willing to express superlative opinions about law enforcement agents. The same is rather true of lower income earners, although many but not all of these people may be non-whites whose hostility toward the police is motivated more by racial than by economic antagonism. High income earners have the most to lose financially when the social order breaks down, and so would be expected to support the police as much as any other group of citizens, or more so. On the other hand, the most highly educated have often been the most critical of the existing social order and, of course, in other countries have functioned as the catalytic agents of revolution. That the American intelligentsia supports the police is a sign of social stability, and also a sign that at least among the whites the police are not perceived as being anathema to democratic institutions in the United States.

The elderly seem to have become polarized in their views of the police role in community relations. Inasmuch as the police cannot be expected realistically to bear complete responsibility for either good or poor community relations, the significance of this finding is that senior citizens seem to look upon their police as possessing extraordinary burdens and powers. If community relations are good, the elderly seem to be contented and to credit the police for their happiness. If community relations are poor, the elderly seem to become excited and to blame the police for their discontent. Perhaps as citizens become isolated through age or otherwise from family and close friends, they turn to the police at least for psychological reinforcement.

The population segments in which the increased polarization of views occurs (with the negative feelings characterized relatively small, but not insignificant, minorities in any event) are also the groups that are most likely to be victimized: women, the elderly, the lower income earners and even those in middle income groups. Thus, it may well be that the more negative assessments relate to more direct experiences with crime and with the patterns of police intervention in face of such victimizations. If this is an accurate interpretation, then it suggests that the actual crime-related contacts with the police force lead to disappointments and frustrations

in some, if not many, instances and that the more generalized favorable assessments, which we consider to have a more symbolic meaning, might yield to feelings of dissatisfaction and, on occasions, to feelings of outright hostility. This would suggest then that the very positive views of the police may have their roots in the perception of the major police functions of which the police officers are visible carriers, whereas actual on-the-job performances may induce more of a sense of dissatisfaction when some of our citizens are faced with actual situation-specific actions on the part of the officers.

FINDING 30. Studies of the early 1970's in a number of large American cities reveal that a significant percentage (40-80 percent) of residents believed that the police do not spend enough time patrolling the city, getting to know juveniles living in the neighborhoods, getting to understand minority residents more, and telling the public about police work. These citizens disagreed sharply both within and across cities as to which allocations of police functions (e.g., foot or motor patrols) need to be improved most and most urgently.

Although Americans seem to be supportive of their police strategically, citizens have expressed much more doubt about police tactics and, particularly, about police deployment tactics. In other words, clearly, Americans believe their police want to do a good job but are unsuccessful in doing the job in important measure because of external constraints. Naturally, the average American is unable to identify which of a number of such constraints, if alleviated, would cause the most improvement in police services. The lay citizen is not an expert in police administration. This finding documents the extent of concern among citizens generally for improving the quality of policing.

The public feeling, rather widespread and important as it is, that the police officers generally do not get to know people in the neighborhoods and especially the young people seems to indicate further the symbolic presence of the police rather than the presence of real human beings. This may be because assignments in street duty keep police officers on the move from neighborhood to neighborhood without acquiring a sufficient familiarity, or even the need to become familiar, with any particular neighborhood. The data do not show whether this is perceived by the Americans as a major factor, or whether there is an indication that police officers do not particularly care to know neighborhood residents.

The emphasis on knowing, or rather on not knowing, young people in the neighborhoods becomes especially salient in light of the fact that so many people attribute high crime rates to juveniles and young adults. Furthermore, the survey results suggest that better knowledge of neighborhood people as persons might serve as a deterrent to crime and might lead to better chances of speedy apprehension of suspects, so that it is seen in part as being an effective intervention strategy.

On more technical matters of policing, the respondents are quite divided and this is not surprising: They are willing to commit themselves to saying that more and better policing is needed, but as many citizens seem to favor foot patrols as favor car patrols, thereby providing little indication in this respect as to lay beliefs about which types of policing strategies work best. If anything, however, there is an implicit (and modest numerical) preference for foot patrols, an observation strengthened by the belief that policemen "ought" to get to know neighborhood people, something much easier done by patrolmen on the sidewalks than by those who have to spend most of their duty time in a vehicle.

FINDING 31. A majority of Americans are willing to assist local police in preventing and fighting crime, but this majority has been stronger among whites than non-whites in some recent surveys. A considerable number of Americans are less than fully "trusting" in their dealings with police officers, and this is more true significantly of non-whites than of whites.

Minority citizens, and particularly racial minorities, seem to lack trust in the police significantly and consistently more than to the whites. Whose fault this has been is perhaps unimportant. The mandate is clear and urgent, however: American police must regain the trust of the entire citizenry. Undoubtedly, non-white Americans have resented the fact that local police have been almost entirely white and male. What is more, non-whites appear to believe that police treat them differently than they treat whites, as suspects, as complainants, and as victims. Having lost this basic trust of the police, minority citizens have become considerably less enthusiastic than whites about assisting their local police. Without citizen cooperation, of course, the task of the police becomes harder, and the discrimination that minorities perceive will become fully realized in practice even if it were not based on fact originally.

Thus, relatively high overall levels of expressed cooperative intentions mask the sharp differences and the attendant problems: The level of cooperation is likely to be much lower in precisely those areas of our communities where such cooperation might do the most good.

FINDING 32. In poorer and in predominantly non-white neighborhoods of large American cities, citizens have come to perceive that many crimes are never reported to the police, and that many criminal offenders known to their victims are never identified for the police.

An attitude has emerged among poor and non-white Americans that the police cannot or will not help them when they need help, and that consequently they are wasting their time and perhaps exacerbating their problems by turning to the police for help. These citizens are unwilling, particularly, to identify known criminal offenders

for the police, apparently fearing reprisal that may be likely when, as they believe, the offender avoids prosecution and returns to the community without punishment. An ominous implication surfaces, also. If poor and minority citizens cannot expect to receive justice at the hands of the law, may they not take the law into their own hands? Relative cynicism about the actual workings of the system can breed only further cynicism and even resentment until the feedback cycle somehow is effectively broken and an environment is created in which a sense of growing confidence can begin to be restored. Whether, as we have mentioned previously, more detailed knowledge of neighborhoods at the human and personal level works partially as such a mechanism cannot be ascertained, but on the surface of the issue it seems to be quite possible.

FINDING 33. In 1970, at least three-fourths of the citizens residing in ten large American cities were satisfied that local police were doing as good a job in their own neighborhoods as elsewhere in their respective cities. In half of those cities at the same time, at least 90 percent of the residents felt this way. In all ten of these cities, however, non-whites expressed much more (usually at least three times as much) dissatisfaction than whites did about the performance of police in their own neighborhoods compared with elsewhere in their respective cities. Still, a majority of even the minority residents of all ten of these cities expressed satisfaction with police performance in their neighborhoods.

It is quite important to note that large majorities of Americans, though with some variation among the cities, have come to the conclusion that police performance in their own residential neighborhoods is not inferior to police services in other parts of their communities. In part, of course, this is a byproduct of the fact that the majority of residents live in acceptable if not well to do neighborhoods where the frustrations, such as they may be, with police performance generally have run very low. But while non-white respondents expressed much more dissatisfaction than whites did in comparing the police performance in their own neighborhoods with other city areas, it remains highly significant that even in such (minority) neighborhoods majorities do not view the police force as neglecting their areas in the pattern and quality of police performance.

On the other hand, almost three times as many non-whites compared with whites are dissatisfied, and this means that in these neighborhoods minorities are convinced that there is some form of discrimination in the delivery of police services to their city areas. This alone might help to explain the lower overall performance ratings which police officers get, and the much more frequent mention of complaints and frustrations, in these city areas. Unfortunately, the data do not reveal the extent to which the neighborhood comparisons of police services have some objective, or even clearly objective, basis or whether the perceptions are part and parcel of a more underlying syndrome of discrimination that is felt in one way or another.

FINDING 34. Studies conducted between 1972-1975 in several large American cities indicate that significant percentages (10-30 percent) of residents there felt that the police in their respective cities should be more prompt, responsive or alert. Although only about one-quarter of the white respondents in most of these cities felt that, when called, police "take quite a while to come," a much greater proportion (over 60 percent in five of these cities) of non-whites felt this way.

Notwithstanding general satisfaction with local police services, citizens in some American cities feel that police are slow to respond to emergency situations, and they feel this is a shortcoming. Non-whites seem to feel that police are lax or slow to respond to emergencies more so than whites do. In any given community, it is likely that twice as many non-whites compared with whites have adopted this view. Whether the view is true, this is but one more manifestation of a growing lack of confidence in police by minority citizens. If police do respond slower in minority neighborhoods compared with elsewhere in the same community, then this is an example of overt racial discrimination that should not be tolerated.

Unfortunately, the surveys do not provide any estimates of the time which is likely to elapse between the police being called in for help and the actual arrival of officers on the scene. If it were collected, such data could then be easily compared with official records and would enable us to understand better whether there exist significant differences of a systematic nature in the relative speed of response. Moreover, such data might illuminate whether police response time itself varies according to such factors as time of day or night, prevailing traffic and climatic conditions, and population densities. Such data might reveal, also, whether the strong need for police help, once it is required, simply makes almost any lapse of time too long from the perspective of those Americans who consider the delays to be excessive and, perhaps, unnecessary.

FINDING 35. Throughout the period since 1966, most Americans have believed consistently that most police officers are honest. In studies conducted between 1966-1975, no more than six percent of Americans generally have expressed a contrary belief. Non-whites, males, and the less-affluent have been more suspicious of police honesty than their counterparts have been, but not significantly so.

Americans seem less concerned about police dishonesty than about police impoliteness, sometimes even brutality and ineffectiveness. This is a little surprising, inasmuch as a number of studies have indicated rather clearly that not negligible proportions of officers within many police departments, particularly urban ones,

may be less than honest to one extent or another. Much of the dishonesty involves police toleration of rackets, however, and may exist without the knowledge of most citizens. This finding is a tribute to the American police. At least, there is not any widespread allegation among Americans that citizens must pay tributes to receive justice. Some citizens believe they can receive justice from the police, while others believe that they cannot, but few seem to believe that a bribe will make the difference.

FINDING 36. In 1970, fewer than ten percent of the residents of four large American cities felt that police treated people less fairly in their neighborhoods than elsewhere in their respective cities, although twice that proportion of citizens felt this way in Baltimore and in Boston. In most of the cities, non-whites felt this way in much (about three times) stronger proportions than did whites, and in three of the cities at least six times as many non-whites compared to whites shared this view. Young people and those with less education or lower incomes tended to complain about unfair police treatment more than did other citizens.

Police fairness is perceived by some citizens to vary from one neighborhood to another, but this perception is much stronger in some cities compared with others. Such a pattern of variation in this regard tends to suggest the police are more fair to citizens living in some neighborhoods and less fair to citizens living in other neighborhoods, but only in some and not all cities of the country. Baltimore and Boston were two cities where this feeling was much more pronounced than in other cities, and both cities have experienced substantial racial tensions in recent years.

FINDING 37. A number of surveys that have been conducted since 1965 reveal that most Americans do not believe that police brutality is a common occurrence. A small minority of citizens (usually, between five and ten percent) believe that police brutality is a common occurrence, particularly toward suspected offenders during or following their arrests. Younger respondents more than older ones, men more than women, the lesser educated and the lower income earners more than their counterparts, are convinced that police officers use excessive force frequently, as are non-whites much more than whites. Among non-whites, however, those with more education seem convinced of this in higher proportions than do those with less education. While consistently most Americans have favored an increase in police authority and power even if this means the use of more violence by police, non-white Americans have been equally divided on the issue of whether to give police more

authority or power, and those who oppose such measures (about half) appear often to be people who complain about police abuses.

The average American, black or white, does not believe that the police abuse their authority by engaging in unwarranted violence. A small minority of citizens disagree, however, and believe that police brutality is commonplace. Does this mean that between five and ten percent of the American population dislike police intrinsically, believe what they see on television without considering its reliability, or are people who instigate physical conflict with the police? It may. On the other hand, it may mean that ten percent of the population live in areas of their communities where police tend to violate the rights of citizens more often and more blatantly than they do in other areas of the community. The young, the less educated, and the low income earners are convinced that police brutality exists much more so than are other citizens. Men are more convinced of this than are women. If strong police action, even over-reactions which may often be categorized as brutality, exist, of course, it is likely to be directed toward the young, poor, under-educated male, and particularly against non-whites. Could concern about police brutality be experiential? We must not fail to heed the cries and complaints of any segment of the community, no matter how small the proportion, because to do so is at our peril.

The most educated people are the ones who are most afraid among non-whites to increase authority. Clearly, educated minority citizens fear police abuses toward themselves and toward their compatriots. That there may be fire amidst the smoke cannot be dismissed in haste. These citizens may be expressing fears which the less educated minority citizens fear expressing.

#### E. THE COURT SYSTEM

Americans are not reluctant to diagnose the symptomatology that confronts the nation's courts, and they are eager to suggest specific changes, however pedestrian, that might be implemented in an effort to reduce the major problems which they perceive to exist. While citizens views of police have been often formed on the basis of experience, or at least greater visibility, for the most part, their understanding of the judicial processes and of the problems that are inherent in the court system are much more likely to have been the products of hearsay, rhetoric or, often, media-produced imagery. Perhaps for this reason, among others, there appears to be less diversity in the viewpoints expressed by Americans toward the court system compared with viewpoints expressed toward the police system. However, the confidence which many Americans profess to have or to lack in the nation's courts seems to be somewhat enigmatic, if not entirely paradoxical. Many citizens express satisfaction with the courts generally and with judicial fairness particularly, but criticize intensely specific trends in judicial behavior such

as sentencing practices. Some citizens express dissatisfaction with the courts generally and with judicial fairness particularly, but praise specific trends in judicial behavior such as sentencing practices.

FINDING 38. Surveys that have been conducted since 1965 reveal consistently that a majority of Americans have lost confidence in the ability of the nation's courts to administer justice successfully. Several of these surveys indicate that Americans believe courts encourage violations of law and order by unreasonably restraining the police and/or by unreasonably refusing to restrain convicted criminal offenders.

Definitely, Americans have lost confidence in the ability of the nation's courts to administer justice. This loss of confidence has been gradual but has gained momentum in recent years. It has been pervasive, extending from the United States Supreme Court down through the state and county courts of general jurisdiction. In a sense, Americans seem to have blamed the courts for law enforcement inadequacies for which the police should at least share the blame.

Citizens seem perturbed that judges have hampered the police by imposing procedural constraints that delay or impede criminal investigations and prosecutions. Although most of these procedural constraints have emanate from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in its efforts to maximize the rights of the accused, there is no doubt but that the average American assesses all courts, high and low, equally and negatively. Perhaps the major reason why Americans have become disenchanted with trial courts is their belief that judges are too lenient with known offenders, permitting dangerous criminals to be released from pre-trial confinement and refusing to impose adequate punishment against most offenders once they are convicted.

Clearly, Americans have a high regard for punishment, and they seem to feel that potential offenders will curtail their criminal activities if they face a greater certainty of severe punishment. Obviously, enhanced punishment would be an easier and more pedestrian solution to the crime problem than alternative solutions such as better crime prevention programs, but the populace looks toward a simple solution.

FINDING 39. Although fewer than one-half of all Americans surveyed in 1963 (48 percent) and 1967 (49 percent) believed that courts were too lenient when sentencing convicted criminal offenders, these proportions escalated to two-thirds (65 percent) in 1973 and to four-fifths (79 percent) in 1975. Between 1965-1975, the proportion of women who favored this view increased to equal that of men, and proportions of both the more educated and the more affluent who supported this position increased to equal proportions of the less educated and less affluent.

Since 1973, and, particularly since 1975, Americans have adopted much harsher views of punishment than they harbored in earlier years. Without any doubt, the average citizen in the United States has become tired of hearing about the crime problem and the threats posed by repeated criminal offenders. Americans want the crime problem reduced, believe that more severe punishment will do the job, and are not bashful about saying so.

A greater consensus has been reached by Americans toward sentencing the criminal offender in the years since 1975, also. While talk about long prison sentences used to be initiated by men and most frequently by undereducated and poor men, since 1975 enough women and affluent men have agreed with these views so that few demographic variations remain as to American views of punishment for crime. Americans from every walk of life have become victimized on the streets and in their homes to the extent that they have become pragmatic and "tough" about dealing with the crime problem.

FINDING 40. In 1967, a majority of white Americans (52 percent) believed that the courts were too lenient when sentencing convicted criminal offenders, but only half that proportion (26 percent) of non-whites agreed. By 1975, about one-half (49.5 percent) of the non-whites had come to support this proposition, and the proportion of whites had increased to two-thirds. During the late 1960's and 1970's, however, only half the proportion of non-whites compared to whites expressed confidence in the nation's courts.

Between 1967-1975, Americans supporting greater punishment of convicted criminal offenders increased by 17 percentage points, from one-half to two-thirds. During this time, white Americans came to issue a national mandate for dealing with the convicted offender much more severely. Non-white Americans were slower to follow this mandate and have never done so yet to the same extent that whites have done, but the increase among the non-whites who have adopted this view has been greater than that of whites, expanding from one-quarter to one-half of the non-white population.

One reason why more whites than non-whites have criticized punishments imposed by American courts is that offenders who have been sentenced by courts recently in most states of the United States have been disproportionately non-white. Still, although whites seem to believe that judges should have dealt more harshly with offenders including non-white offenders, only half the proportion of non-whites compared with whites expressed confidence in the nation's courts. Non-white Americans seem to feel that they have not received justice in the courts. One reason for this is that non-white Americans have become more polarized than whites on the issue of how severely to sentence the convicted criminal offender. Obviously, non-whites who feel the courts

should impose more severe sentences, as about half of them do, may lack confidence in the courts because judges do not impose more severe sentences. This is somewhat unlikely, however, inasmuch as even among whites who feel more strongly on this issue there is a stronger tendency to express confidence in the courts. Some non-whites may not harbor confidence in the courts because they feel the courts impose too severe sentences, perhaps upon non-white offenders especially.

There seems to be another more likely reason why non-whites have not reached the point of expressing much confidence in the nation's courts. To non-white Americans, the courts like the police are white institutions from which they, as non-whites, have been kept aloof. Few courts in the 1960's had black judges even as "tokens," and that is all that black judges became even in the 1970's. Moreover, in the 1960's and 1970's, few blacks occupied positions of authority or responsibility in the judicial process as attorneys for the prosecution or defense.

FINDING 41. In 1968, elderly Americans (those over 65 years old) exceeded young Americans (those under 20 years old) by nine percentage points (68 compared with 59 percent) in believing that courts did not deal harshly enough with criminal offenders, but by 1975 this difference widened to nearly 18 percentage points (87.4 compared with 69.5 percent).

The gap between the elderly and the young widened during the late 1960's and early 1970's as to how severely convicted criminal offenders should be punished. Undoubtedly, one reason why senior citizens came to believe that punishments must be made more severe is that, in their own youth, punishments were more severe and they thought crime was less prevalent. Although punishments have become more humane in the years since the Second World War and younger Americans have grown-up in the new tradition, this certainly does not explain why crime rates have escalated as they have. Better methods of maintaining criminal statistics may explain part of rising crime rates, but many senior citizens do not seem to recognize this. Prevalence of narcotic drugs and other changes in social conditions may explain higher crime rates, and although many senior citizens do recognize this, they seem nevertheless to focus on the punishment issue more so than on other questions related to the crime problem.

FINDING 42. Throughout the late 1960's and 1970's about half of Americans who were surveyed have appeared to be perplexed at the extent to which delays are common as criminal cases are processed in the court system, but this attitude was strongest among respondents who had attended college. Local surveys conducted during this period confirm that at least three-fourths of the citizens who were interviewed favored one or more proposals to reorganize the operational structure of their local

courts, such as the establishment of special administrative procedures for adjudicating traffic offenses, and the creation of separate courts to hear cases that involve disputes within the family unit.

Americans seem to feel that their courts are less than adequate procedurally as well as substantively, but particularly on account of time delays caused by case backlogs. If the alternative to delay reduction in the number of criminal cases to be heard in court, the average citizen is prepared to reorganize the court structure and to alter court jurisdiction so that fewer cases will be heard but so that the cases that are heard will reach a speedy and more predictable disposition.

There is some evidence that significant proportions of the population do not witness traffic and family offenses as being comparable to other criminal cases. Citizens seem willing to have these cases heard before a referee of other non-judicial decision-maker as opposed to a judge, if necessary to reduce case backlog. It is important to stress that some Americans seem to prefer taking traffic and family cases out of the courts even though they do not worry about delays, inasmuch as only about one-half of the population is concerned about court delays but about three-fourths of the population would favor reorganization of the court structure.

One reason why college graduates and others who have attended college seem to be more concerned than other citizens about delays in the courts is that these citizens are most cognizant of the requirements of due process of law, having studied the same in college. Another reason might be that people who have attended college, and especially those who have graduated, have become accustomed to completing their work on schedule, and are annoyed when officials who are being paid by their tax dollars are unable or unwilling to do so, also.

FINDING 43. Many Americans have expressed their willingness consistently to increase the severity of punishments to be imposed upon criminal offenders following conviction, but whites, the elderly, and the affluent have done so more than other citizens have. This viewpoint has been confirmed by several surveys. In 1968, over four-fifths of Americans generally (71 percent of non-whites) felt that capital punishment was appropriate for offenders who had been convicted of murder. In 1973, one-half of those surveyed nationally agreed with the proposition that a drug dealer who would sell heroin to a 12 year old child should be tortured!

Americans believe strongly that punishment will deter crime. That they may be mistaken on this score seems unimportant to them. The average citizen seems to blame the rising crime on a relaxation in the severity of punishments commonly imposed by the courts. One reason why the elderly feel this way more so than younger Americans

may be that, when they were younger, punishments that were imposed more severely than they are now. Of course, years ago, punishments were imposed less equitably than they are now and were, more often, discriminatory toward disadvantaged citizens. White citizens, and particularly affluent whites, stress the need for enhanced punishments, undoubtedly because when they think of someone being punished they think of someone other than themselves. They think of the poor, and they think of non-whites. On the other hand, the poor and non-whites think of themselves, realize that when punished they are not always guilty or as guilty as charged, and therefore they are more reluctant to endorse greater punishments lest greater unfairness result.

There is no doubt that the average American favors capital punishment as an appropriate punishment for persons who have been convicted of murder. Non-whites feel this way almost to the same extent that whites do, a generally strong national sentiment. The strange part of this finding is that, of course, many forms of murder actually cause less harm to society than numerous other crimes. Yet, respondents were much less consistent in favoring capital punishment for any other crime, except treason. A handful of persons have been charged with treason since the Constitution was ratified in 1791!

That Americans seem to focus their attention as well as their wrath on the most visible of crimes is obviated moreover by their willingness toward particularly severe dealing with such offenders as a drug dealer who is shown to have sold heroin to a minor child. Once again, there are many other crimes that cause as much, if not more, harm including more harm to children and to more children (such as, to illustrate, child abuse itself). Americans do seem to be preoccupied with meeting out tough penalties against these offenders while remaining contented to rehabilitate other offenders, or, at least, to be less severe with them in the administration of appropriate penalties.

FINDING 44. The post-Watergate period has been marked by feelings that it would be desirable to make wire-tapping illegal, make it mandatory for accused criminals to answer questions posed during a trial, and to disbar automatically any lawyer who knows about a crime before it is committed but does not report it to the authorities.

In the aftermath of the Watergate saga, quite a few Americans seem to have become convinced that officials of government conspire routinely with criminal offenders, and that by impeding official activities and punishing officials severely when caught in a criminal offense, the country will be better off. The American Bar Association voted at its meeting in the summer of 1979 to make it unethical for a lawyer to know about corporate activities that are illegal without reporting them. For several years, it has been unethical for a lawyer to know that individual clients were planning to commit a crime and not to report them. Still, it is safe to conclude that the average lawyer will not call the police every time his client tells him

about criminal activities in the works. Probably, it would undermine the attorney-client relationship more to enforce these restrictions than it would to overlook them. In other words, the American Bar Association and similar organizations give the people what they seem to want--paper sanctions that can be invoked but that seldom will be invoked against officials.

To make it mandatory for a defendant to answer questions posed to him during a trial, without limitation, would be to abrogate the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The public seems disenchanted with the privilege against self-incrimination, but this is explained largely by reason of the fact that few ordinary citizens are ever charged with having committed a crime, and fewer still ever go on trial. A different attitude could be expected to prevail among persons who have been tried for a crime, and especially among those who have invoked their Constitutional protections. This finding is part of a general trend among many Americans to want to change the Constitution after two hundred years, perhaps to change it only for the sake of change itself.

The inconsistencies are patent in the way Americans are reacting to post-Watergate ideology. They want at once to compel defendants and lawyers alike to "tell the truth" even at the cost of undermining the American system of justice, but they want to restrain officials of government from using wire-tapping. Wire-tapping is a very useful investigatory tool that is invaluable to protecting the nation from foreign and domestic subversions. A reasonable person would hardly be expected to trade away the Fifth Amendment, which protects a few guilty individuals on occasion, in exchange for a prohibition on wire-tapping which enables Federal officials to monitor and curtail serious espionage activities. In favoring this trade, at least implicitly, the average American illuminates his lack of understanding of the complexity of the American criminal justice system.

FINDING 44. In a 1970 survey of ten large American cities, about one-half (56 percent) of the respondents believed that the courts usually treated people fairly. One-sixth (16.8 percent) of the respondents believed that courts are likely to treat everyone unfairly, however. Many Americans expressed the view that the poor are most likely to be discriminated against in the courts, but this view was the strongest among affluent men and the elderly (more than 80 percent of each), the poor themselves (70 percent), and young men (more than 60 percent).

There exists some significant polarization in the way Americans view fairness in the courts. A bare majority feel that the courts generally treat people fairly, but this means essentially that a strong minority of citizens harbor the opposite viewpoint. About one-sixth of the population believes not only that the courts do not always treat people fairly, but that instead courts are likely to treat

everyone unfairly. Indeed, a small but not insignificant proportion of the American population has adopted a rather existential view of the courts, from which they appear to have become quite alienated.

There is a pervasive feeling across the United States that the poor do not receive justice in the courts, and this view is strong among the poor themselves. It is stronger still among the affluent, particularly affluent men, and among the elderly. In our society, the elderly are often among the poor, or at least they see themselves as relatively poor, since their style of living becomes diminished abruptly upon retirement in most cases. Therefore, that the elderly share views of the poor is not surprising. That the affluent do is startling. Why do they?

One reason why the affluent believe that the poor are discriminated against in the courts has to be the fact that nearly everyone cannot help but conclude that obtaining justice in the courts is expensive. It is. Affluent men know that justice is expensive to obtain, because they pay a considerable amount of their own money and business assets to obtain justice for themselves. If they have to spend so much money to obtain justice, then in their minds poorer people who cannot spend as much money must be receiving less justice. Maybe so. Why do affluent women not agree? The likely reason is that affluent women seldom enter the criminal courts, because when they encounter difficulty with the law their husband or someone else bail them out. Moreover, affluent women do not even use the courts for civil litigation to the extent that affluent men do, except to obtain a divorce and property settlement, which customarily is paid for by the husband in cooperation with the wife's lawyer but apart from her presence. Affluent women more than other Americans do not seem to know what the courts are like.

FINDING 45. Many Americans have looked beyond the courts themselves while searching for remedies to cure the problems facing the court system. Some citizens favor a mixture of strategies, such as supporting the local police, providing a better quality of life for the nation's minorities, and a return to the more traditional moral and religious values.

Other findings in this study have documented that many Americans blame the courts for incompetence in other areas of the criminal justice system. At the same time, many Americans seem to look beyond the courts themselves for solutions to problems that face the courts. A number of citizens seem to conclude that economic and racial discrimination are at the roots of many of the problems confronting the courts. This may be true, to an extent, but it does not explain the organizational difficulties facing courts in most jurisdictions. Citizens seem to feel, also, that a return to more traditional moral and religious values would improve the lot of the courts, presumably by reducing the volume of cases entering the courts. This is not true, necessarily, since indeed the least moral and least religious people in the population may well be brought into court less often

than other people. The strangest irony is that Americans seem to feel that the courts have paralyzed the police, but that better policing could cure the courts. In a sense, this is circular reasoning. Implicitly, on the other hand, the mandate from many citizens may be that more lay citizens themselves should become involved in the criminal justice system by supporting the police and the courts more than they have done, both financially and morally. Some of the problems facing the courts require more sophisticated strategies such as automated record keeping, elimination of politics in judicial selection, and better usage of existing courtroom facilities. Most citizens do not identify these or similar remedies as being necessary.

#### F. THE PRISON SYSTEM

The person in the streets of America does not know very much about what life is like behind prison walls, does not seem to want to learn more, and exhibits fear and anger at that possibility. Ordinary citizens display a desire to be compassionate toward criminal offenders, but appear to lose patience when the crime rate continues to escalate. Americans do not balk at the prospect of using retributive punishment when rehabilitative treatment fails, without inquiring in depth as to why treatment strategies may fail or who should share the blame when this occurs. The average American's knowledge about the prison system, of course, like that about the court system but unlike the police system, is based on second-hand information rather than first-hand experience. They are inconsistent in their attitudes toward the prison system just as they are toward the court system, but much more divided in their inconsistencies. There is a tendency on the part of a number of Americans to see the prisoner as a different type of person from themselves, and to become preoccupied with the type and number of crimes which an offender has committed without due concern for why those crimes happened or how to prevent the recurrence of crime through efforts of their own.

FINDING 46. About two-thirds of Americans generally but only one-third of non-white Americans believe an offender who is incarcerated while awaiting trial is likely to receive fair treatment. Citizens seem satisfied with local jails as much or slightly more so than with state prisons.

White Americans seem relatively satisfied that accused criminal offenders who face pretrial incarceration will receive fair treatment, while non-white citizens seem equally convinced that this is not true. One explanation for this dichotomy, obviously, is the fact that far greater proportions of non-whites than whites face pretrial detention when accused of a crime. Non-whites have had many more occasions than whites have had in recent years to experience pretrial detention. Experientially, non-whites are in a better position to evaluate the fairness of pretrial incarceration.

The oddest finding in this study may be the fact that among Americans generally, more are satisfied with local jails than with state prisons. Studies have documented repeatedly in the past decade

that local jail conditions are far worse than conditions in most state prisons. Jails are less healthful places because they are older, smaller, and attended by less competent staff than are prisons. Jails are less safe places because they are less competently supervised than are prisons, and because, unlike prisons that at least pretend to rehabilitate, most jails cannot be labeled anything other than warehouses. Moreover, jails contain a greater heterogeneity of inmates than prisons do, since middle-class defendants who are unsavvy about social practices among the confined are likely to be exploited in jails much more than in prisons. The public is not aware of the considerable actual difference between jails and prisons, or of the tremendous inferiority of jails compared with prisons.

FINDING 47. Americans are about evenly-divided as to whether the prison system is effective in dealing with crime, except that persons who have attended college believe the system is ineffective by a two to one margin.

Americans do not seem to know whether the prison system is effective in reducing crime. How can they be, when expert penologists are uncertain of the answer to this question! Persons who have attended college, particularly in the past decade when criminal justice courses have been offered widely to students, seem convinced, by a two to one margin, that prisons are ineffective. This may reflect the literature that is prominent on many college campuses and that tends to devalue prisons, sometimes unjustly so.

FINDING 48. Surveys have indicated that at least three-fourths of Americans believe the main purpose of imprisonment should be to rehabilitate the offender, but that only between one-third and one-half of the population generally believe rehabilitation programs to be successful. Between 1967-1969, the proportion of the American population who believed in-prison rehabilitation programs to be successful diminished from 47 to 39 percent, and this reduction was strongest among the affluent (those earning over \$25,000) and college graduates, where these proportions decreased by 30 and 25 percentage points respectively. Between 1967-1969, however, the percentage of non-whites who believed in-prison rehabilitation programs to be successful increased by seven percentage points (from 35 to 42 percent).

In this conclusion, another implication of the preceding finding surfaces. Since three-fourths of the population believes that rehabilitation should be the main purpose of imprisonment but less than one-half believe rehabilitation is being accomplished during imprisonment, clearly many Americans express a belief that prisons do not accomplish their intended purpose.

This dichotomy is made even more enigmatic by the fact that between 1967-1969 when the American population generally came to lose faith in rehabilitation programs that were conducted inside the prisons, there was about a 20 percent increase in the number of non-whites who exhibited confidence in these kinds of programs. This was at a time proportionately more non-whites than whites served as inmates in the nation's prisons. Does this mean that significant proportions of minority inmates were pleased enough with the rehabilitation programs they experienced while in prison that they praised these throughout the non-white community? Or, does it mean that non-whites were come to hope against hope that prison rehabilitation programs would be successful, as a psychological defense mechanism used to justify the disproportionate rates at which non-whites were confined in prison?

FINDING 49. Non-white Americans tend to think of prisons as being places where people live behind bars, in small cells, and with tough guards, but white Americans are more likely to associate prisons with the learning of a skill or a trade (a view shared more by the elderly) and psychological counseling (a view shared more by younger respondents).

This finding suggests that among both whites and non-whites, Americans have developed shibboleths surrounding their perceptions of the nature and purpose of imprisonment. In most state prisons, possibly with a few exceptions, inmates do not really live behind bars and guards are not that "tough," to be quite honest. Guards have little control over prisoners in many state prisons, where inmate cliques control order. Although inmates sleep in small cells within most prisons, the average inmate spends most of the day outside of those cells, exercising or working, watching television or engaging in various activities some of which are illegal. Nevertheless, non-whites may apprehend prisons accurately as being bad places in which to live, although not necessarily for the reasons that appear from their descriptions. Most state prisons do not afford the average prisoner an opportunity for either psychological counseling or to learn a trade, and in believing that they do many whites do not understand accurately the meaning of imprisonment. That elderly whites still think a prisoner has a chance to learn a trade is an example of how technology has bypassed the American prison system. Several decades ago, prisoners did enjoy that opportunity, but no longer, since the "trades" which are useful today in the earning of a living are not the ones which the prisons are equipped to teach. The white "free-world" community does not understand this at all. Prisons are operated around service industries such as the production of food, clothing, and institutional equipment. There are few jobs in the outside world for people who possess these skills, and a prison record is sufficient to preclude access to those jobs of this variety that do exist outside of prison. Unlike a few decades ago, prisoners cannot expect to find work outside of confinement in shops that make shoes, file cabinets, beds, or on farms. Today, jobs require more technological skills such as familiarity with computer

hardware and software, and most prisons do not have on hand equipment that would be necessary for learning these skills. The population does not comprehend this limitation on the part of prisons.

Prisons do possess the capability, in theory, of offering psychological counseling to inmates. The primary difficulty is that successful counseling presumes cooperation by the patient, and the prison environment does not foster but instead impedes this cooperation. In addition, many prisons retain part-time psychological staff members who do not have sufficient time to work with more than a few prisoners. Some prisons may well receive adequate psychological counseling while in prisons, but this benefit is not broad-based. The population misapprehends this limitation, also.

FINDING 50. About one-fifth of the American population has become convinced that prisons turn inmates into hardened criminals, although twice this proportion of respondents have expressed that belief in some local surveys. Persons aged 20-50 are more likely than persons in other age brackets to support this view, as are men more than women and whites more than non-whites. Nearly twice as many college graduates compared with high school dropouts seem to have reached this conclusion in several studies.

There is an emerging concern among Americans that prisons may do more harm than good. The more educated citizens share this belief much more so than the less educated, which undoubtedly explains the racial dichotomy. Women share this view much less than do men, perhaps because they are less familiar than men are with prisons generally. The very young and the elderly seem to support this view much less than do persons between the ages of 20 and 50 years old, perhaps because the young do not fully realize the consequences of imprisonment, and the elderly retain attitudes toward life that have become anachronistic.

FINDING 51. Only about one-fifth of the American population (but one-third of the non-white population) felt that parole should be used more frequently in 1967, although then over two-thirds of Americans believed that most offenders were released from prisons before serving their maximum sentences and over one-third felt that most offenders were released before serving half of their sentences. In 1969, about three-fourths of the American population favored denial of parole for second-time offenders.

Americans seem to understand correctly that many prisoners are released from prison prior to having served their maximum sentences. However, most Americans seem to feel that parole is a necessary evil, at best, and that perhaps it should be curtailed. There is a tendency

by Americans not to want to accept failure whether the failure is in international relations, economic growth, or criminal rehabilitation. Perhaps for this reason so many Americans favor denial of parole to second offenders. Citizens do not seem to understand, apparently, that most state prisoners are at least second offenders and that by denying them parole the cost of imprisonment would escalate traumatically!

One major reason why more non-whites compared with whites favor increasing the use of parole is that proportionately more non-whites than whites are imprisoned today, and undoubtedly some are imprisoned unjustly. One way to minimize the effects of imprisonment, and especially the effects of unjust imprisonment, is to shorten the length of incarceration. It is more likely that a citizen will favor the release from prison of someone whom he knows or is related to than of someone whom he is familiar with only on account of having read a name in a newspaper. White Americans seem much more remote from the prison experience than do non-white Americans, and this finding is just another example of this situation, which in itself is alarming.

FINDING 52. Several national and localized surveys have revealed that Americans expect and want parole officers to set and enforce standards for parolees, and to obtain suitable living quarters and employment for them, also. These studies show that citizens recognize a need for improvement in services to parolees, however.

Americans seem to want to hold parole officers responsible for the success or failure of their clients, much in the same way as Americans seem to have blamed the courts for failure of police to eliminate crime. The fact that citizens want to improve services to parolees reinforces this implication. Throughout these surveys, there is an abundance of evidence to suggest that Americans want to spare little money or resources in making available to the criminal offender alternatives to crime, but this attitude is followed by a vengeance that is directed toward the offender who does not avail himself of these opportunities. There is an impression that Americans want to expand community-based services to offenders in order to justify longer and more arduous incarceration as an alternative to unsuccessful community-based programs. Originally, release into the community was envisioned as an alternative to imprisonment. Now, the opposite may be true, in that imprisonment may be viewed as the punishment not so much for having committed a crime, but more for having failed to become rehabilitated in the community.

FINDING 53. In principle, Americans strongly favor establishment of community-based rehabilitation facilities such as halfway houses. Sentiment is much less strong among most Americans for opening such facilities in their own neighborhoods, however, but about twice as many respondents see their neighbors rather than themselves as being primary impediments to this.

This finding is another example of the paradoxical thinking that has surfaced among many Americans in their views of rehabilitation and community-based corrections generally. The average citizen has imagined that his neighbors rather than he himself dislike correctional facilities in the neighborhood. This imaginary barrier is a reinforcement for their own individual distaste for offenders, not so much because offenders have done wrong, but because they have failed to right themselves. This finding, coupled with the preceding one, also indicates a sort of sublimation among Americans that to send offenders to prison without first offering them community-based treatment is unlikely to work, offenders should not be housed in their neighborhoods since if they are, and they go to prison as they surely will, the neighbors rather than amorphous other citizens will have failed along with the offenders! In any event, the main thrust of the finding suggests that Americans say that more community-based centers would be quite desirable, but they ought to be located "somewhere else" in the community, wherever that may be.

FINDING 54. About 43 percent of Americans favored increased spending for the rehabilitation of offenders, according to a national survey conducted during 1967 and a Minnesota poll conducted during 1970. Both surveys indicated that citizens were more reluctant to raise taxes than to increase spending for this purpose and that citizens were much more reluctant to increase Federal compared with state spending.

Another way in which Americans might be somewhat misleading themselves generally as well as in the rehabilitative context is to believe somehow more money can be spent without raising taxes. Citizens are not very eager to pay more dollars into the correctional system. They are willing, however, to allow dollars to be diverted from some other governmental earmark. There is an obvious desire among Americans to retain local autonomy over corrections as well as over other facets of the criminal justice system, and therefore they favor state rather than Federal spending on offender rehabilitation. Another way of interpreting this finding, of course, has to do with the possibility that the respondents believe that such money as is available is not being spent wisely or efficiently. In this vein, citizens may believe that an appropriate reallocation and development of more efficient spending patterns would save enough money to do the job that needs to be done.

FINDING 55. Surveys document repeatedly that Americans feel rehabilitation is possible for about all offenders, even repeat offenders and those who have committed serious crimes, but that most citizens strongly favor long prison sentences for murderers, armed robbers, drug dealers, and even embezzlers. Some surveys have shown that between eight and nine out of ten Americans favors imprisonment at hard labor. Some surveys have shown at least half of

all Americans favor capital punishment for murder and treason, and as many as four-fifths of the population may favor capital punishment as the penalty for murder.

Since most Americans believe that all offenders can be rehabilitated, whether or not this is true, a fear of failure must be among the primary explanations for the view adopted by many Americans that long prison terms and even capital punishment are necessary. Are long prison terms necessary to effectuate rehabilitation? Or, instead, are long prison terms necessary so that popular knowledge of rehabilitation failure will be prolonged? Why should offenders be executed if they can be rehabilitated? This sort of confronts the American with the need to put his life on the line, which many seem unwilling to do. Apparently, many citizens are not as sure as they profess to be that serious and violent offenders can be rehabilitated, and by killing them this risk can remain untested.

The philosophical desirability of rehabilitation and the value-laden belief that man can learn (is teachable and thus rehabilitable)--one of the key beliefs in the structure of the American national character--may well go hand in hand with the conviction that known approaches to rehabilitation do not work and cannot work. Viewed in this light, citizens may believe that viable alternatives to the rehabilitative model have not been offered, so that greater punitiveness in the form of the length of incarceration, tougher parole provisions and the like are kinds of fallback against releasing into society offenders whom the "system" seems unable to integrate into social life "anyway."

This type of an interpretation seems supported particularly by the persistent finding that especially tough sentences are favored for repeated offenders who, by the very nature and existence of their repeated crimes, have proven themselves difficult to rehabilitate or, for that matter, whom the fallible system has been unable to reintegrate into the normal workings of social life. But this, too, is paradoxical in the face of a strong belief that incarceration tends to "harden" the offenders and that it increases, rather than decreases, the likelihood of engaging in a criminal career upon release rather than becoming a valuable member of society.

## V. IMPLICATIONS

Any attempt to address the implications of an empirical body of data amounts to a search for "meaning behind the meaning." A variety of constraints emerge. The researcher must stay within the domain of the available information and, at the same time, go beyond it. The researcher must underscore portions of the data that seem to be the most significant, but without forgetting about or contradicting less significant portions of the same data. The researcher must resist the temptation to treat as being meaningful only such segments of the data as fulfill his own a priori expectations.

Data do not speak for themselves, however. Even in the most restrictive meaning of the term, data must be "interpreted" and translated into clear and concise statements concerning their message(s). The "meaning behind the meaning" then lies in the second order of interpretations, so to speak, in order that the more contextual and more configurational implications can be expressed. The derivation of such interpretative statements remains somewhat idiosyncratic and cannot but reflect some value judgments on the part of the researcher as well as on the part of anyone who reads or uses the research report.

Implications for policy or for action programs are especially difficult to derive from data alone. For instance, what is meant by a finding that "30 percent" of a given population exhibit a certain attitude or trait? May this be understood as meaning that "only 30 percent" as opposed to 70 percent in some other response category exhibit the attitude or trait? Or, should it be interpreted as meaning that "as many as 30 percent," but possibly a higher percentage of people, exhibit the attitude or trait? Or, instead, should it be interpreted as meaning that "not more than 30 percent," but possibly a lower percentage of people, do so? The linguistic habits alone require that some statement be made about "30 percent," and the implication of the statement tends as a rule to underscore either the importance of that percentage or of its complement.

The predilection of our democratic dispositions is to view expressions of feeling, sentiment, attitude, and opinion as a variety of "votes," and we yield to the temptation to view the underlying tenor of empirical data in this way even when the data do not amount to expressions of actual and responsible judgment or decision such as would be the case in an election or other voting and more formal decision making situation. This type of a democratic bias may be unavoidable in our society, and we all may be better off because of it. However, it cannot resolve the subtler questions of principle

because majorities as well as minorities have been known to be wrong! In any event, public opinion data do not represent votes or other decisions. They serve mainly as a sensitizing device. They establish the riverbeds of the flow of sentiment, and in doing so they yield a feeling for the nation's climate of thought, for the pulsations of the national heartbeat, for the economic, moral, and socio-political searching of the population.

Much more is needed in order to resolve matters of public policy, and data from public opinion surveys function only as a first step toward this end. No single survey, no matter how well conceived, can address the variety of complex factors that must be brought to bear upon the types of adjudications out of which new public policy is born or extent policy becomes altered. Yet, each study contributes to a piece of essential information, although the size of the piece of information may be small. Thus, each relevant inquiry has both a "direct meaning" in that it discloses some aspect of the baffling complexity of individual and social life, and a "meaning behind the meaning" of which the study is an indicator, to which any single inquiry may be a clue, and for which it serves as a weathervane or as a barometer.

It is in this spirit that implications are approached in this report. These are among the limitations that are inherent in an assessment of national thinking about crime in the twenty years since 1960. While the findings of this report have been grounded in the data themselves or in the arithmetic manipulations that have been performed on that data, these implications will go somewhat further--beyond the data base itself--and "read into it" the deeper or more underlying concerns of the American people which may be discerned from careful consideration of the available information.

Beginning early in the 1970's, but based at least in part on events that transpired in the 1960's, Americans have altered their lifestyles considerably on account of the crime problem as they see it, and on account of the fear which their perception of the crime problem has provoked. Crime and its apprehension by the population have changed some significant aspects the American way of life from one of relaxation and trust to one of tenseness and doubt. In response to an emerging belief that crime is escalating beyond control, many Americans seem to have reacted by retreating into the enclaves of small groups such as family units or neighborhoods where guarded relaxation and trust still remain. Some Americans have fortified their homes and even armed themselves whenever they leave their homes. A good deal of the American public has thought about who is to blame for crime in general, and in doing so substantial segments of the citizenry have pinpointed the blame for crime, accurately or not, on groups of people who are law-abiding for the most part but from whose ranks a few known criminal offenders have been identified and publicized. Namely, Americans have exhibited a tendency to associate crimes with young people, poor people, and non-whites at rates that far exceed the extent to which these demographic components of society bear criminal responsibility in fact.

The lay theories of many Americans suggest that a decline in the nation's moral standards lies at the roots of escalating crime rates. Increases in the occurrence of crime that have been reported are witnessed by many Americans as representing excessive value relativism and behavioral permissiveness beyond what they consider to be either appropriate or morally right. Two important ramifications may be imputed to these expressions of concern. One has to do with the need for value clarification, reaffirmation or redefinition. The second implication has to do with the need to reassess the relationship between rights and duties, between privileges and obligations. The subsurface ethos of our society reflects a growing desire to establish or to reestablish clear riverbeds of moral conduct as opposed to conduct that is merely compatible with the narrower framework of the legal system or with its still narrower adjudicative interpretations.

The American people pride themselves in having established and maintained a "society under the laws," and justly so. But, this has meant traditionally a social fabric in which patterns of conduct and misconduct are basically predictable and interpretable, not because fleeting whims of men or of the times and fashions of the day play the determining role, but because there exists a deeper framework of moral principles and legal rules. Citizens prefer a system in which both ethical and legal propriety can be evaluated in a lasting rather than in a momentary manner. They look toward the courts to provide guidelines that can withstand the test of time. To their increasing dissatisfaction, however, Americans have begun to view the courts as being institutions which cater to political fantasies of various interest groups, and, consequently, which attenuate and subordinate justice in order to placate different criminal elements.

There is an implied yearning among Americans for resolving the contradiction which they witness as having emerged between using and abusing Constitutional rights and privileges. The citizenry has developed the impression, accurately or not but perhaps more accurately than not, that their collective Constitutional rights have been ignored and left to evaporate as public officials have become concerned only about the Constitutional rights of accused criminal offenders.

Quite a few Americans seem to consider crime to be a byproduct of basic economic and social injustice, notably of racism. Apart from those whose own racism itself enters into their interpretation, many Americans consider significant proportions of crimes that are perpetrated by blacks and Spanish-speaking Americans to be a response to our society's racial and ethnic inequalities. Of course, both national guilt and expiation enter into this sentiment, to some degree at least. Nevertheless, Americans are convinced that governmental measures to deal with crime must address the broader questions of economic and social inequality, and must do so clearly and consistently.

Feelings are mixed among Americans. For some citizens more than for others, society is to be blamed for establishing a pattern of circumstances, relations, and conditions in which the suffering of some creates anger and that anger manifests itself sometimes in

criminal misconduct. For other citizens, the individual is seen as being accountable for his actions, which explains why there is such a clamor for more severe punishment of known criminal offenders. The American people are of two minds, then, and this is not a contradiction at all. We must alleviate economic and social inequalities, patterns of discrimination, and racism on the one hand. On the other hand, we must hold individuals who have been convicted as criminal offenders accountable for their actions. Social inequalities, the data support, cannot be permitted to excuse most criminal offenses, such as the mugging of an elderly woman to obtain a dollar or two, or the selling of addictive narcotics to susceptible children.

Leaders of the minority communities in America must provide the kinds of ideas and role models which will counteract each of two stereotype images: That minorities are all criminals, while of course most are not, and that minorities who do commit crimes may be excused for their misconduct because of their minority status, which of course they should not be. The most important thing to be remembered is that, notwithstanding the fact that historically injustice against minorities has fostered some patterns of crime, nevertheless most crimes that are perpetrated by minority members of society are directed against other minority members themselves. This fact, alone, makes the "racial injustice" interpretation of the origins of crime much weaker than it might be otherwise.

Some Americans blame unemployment for the crime problem. We cannot tell whether people are saying that the unemployed are prone to committing crimes because they are unemployed and therefore idle, or because during periods of unemployment people are confronted with acute economic needs, or because unemployment is accompanied by a severe loss in psychological self-esteem. Younger and non-white Americans are represented disproportionately among the ranks of the unemployed and among known criminal offenders. Many Americans tend to equate these two conditions, accurately or not, and to blame economic recession for creating unemployment as well as unemployment for creating the climate in which crime flourishes. Americans believe, rightly or wrongly, that minimization of unemployment particularly among the nation's youth would serve as an effective deterrent against many forms of crime, particularly property offenses. Whether or not unemployment fosters crime to any significant extent is beside the point in this report. Many Americans feel that there is a clear relationship between the two conditions, and look to government, the nation's business leaders, and the nation's labor unions to do something about unemployment.

A sizeable segment of the American population has become convinced, also, that the nation's crime problem has been exacerbated if not actually caused by the disintegration of the nuclear family unit. Citizens believe that the family unit and parents who should be leading the family unit have failed to inculcate values in the minds of American children, have failed to socialize them into the mainstream of respect for "law and order," and above all have failed to discipline children sufficiently to teach them the difference between right and wrong. Like the family, the American public school

system is witnessed by many citizens as bearing joint responsibility for failing to instill in the nation's youth a sufficient concern for moral values and for "law and order" and for failing to discipline children so as to teach them the difference between right and wrong. A paradox does surface when these criticisms are analyzed in depth, however. Most respondents to the surveys that have been studied have reared children of their own, but they blame families other than their own and school systems other than those which their own children attend for these failures.

Thus, the nation advocates a major assault on crime by dealing with other social problems which they view as being essential. The general moral fiber of the nation itself needs to be strengthened, from parent to teacher to child, and Americans believe that the national morality may be raised if social injustices and official corruption are combated. There is a pervasive belief that young people and minority citizens must be integrated into the larger community, especially into the nation's labor force, and that this will reduce the dimension of the crime problem sharply and abruptly.

Moreover, Americans do not seem to worry about the prospect of spending more money on social programs, anymore than they seem to balk at allocating more money directly to crime prevention strategies such as better and more policing. Citizens seem to be distressed that currently police officers do not show enough respect for the citizens who employ them, and that one reason for this may be the police officers in many communities have not taken the trouble to become familiar with neighborhood residents on a personal basis. There is keen sentiment, particularly, that the police have not endeavored to become familiar enough with the youth who reside in neighborhoods where police are on patrol. Nevertheless, Americans are optimistic about remedial efforts to alter the status quo. They exhibit a surprisingly high degree of confidence in the police in general, and seem to perceive the limited number of shortcomings to be characteristic of insufficient police motivation and training, as well as lack of support for the police in the nation's courts.

Americans seem to perceive prison correctional officers and community-based probation and parole officers as being dedicated professionals, like police officers, whose efforts to reintegrate ex-prisoners into society are stymied factors beyond their own control. Among these obstacles are difficulties involved in securing the re-entry of ex-prisoners into the labor force and into the family units which offenders left as they become incarcerated. Most citizens blame others, rather than themselves, for not accepting released prisoners back into the community, and for resisting efforts to locate community-based facilities such as "half way houses" in their own neighborhoods. To this extent, some hypocrisy is evident among the citizenry.

There appears to exist a considerable amount of dissatisfaction among many Americans toward their courts and toward the judicial process and those who administer it. Americans seem to view judges as being responsible for handcuffing the police and for releasing known

criminal offenders without prior punishment. Clearly, the average citizen has lost some, even a great deal of, confidence in the ability of government to protect him and his family from the depredations of criminal offenders. In view of this loss of confidence, it does not matter really on whose shoulders the citizens places the blame. Instead of continuing to rely upon officials of government to interdict crime, ordinary citizens have begun to take the law into their own hands, at least defensively if not offensively. People have started to barricade their homes, to regulate their personal activities and behaviors especially at night, and to become more guarded during social and recreational activities. The changes in the behavioral patterns of Americans cannot help but weaken the social fabric of the country. There is no doubt at all but that Americans have regressed to social defense patterns that are more typical of an earlier era. They have receded into small units, sometimes but not always into family or constructive family units, and have become suspicious of "outsiders." Indeed, some evidence exists to at least imply that some, perhaps even many, Americans have become so preoccupied with the threat of crime that they have repressed the tendency to identify crime as a major community problem and, instead, they have displaced their aggression toward crime with hostilities toward other members of society who are different from themselves. For instance, the elderly have become increasingly skeptical about the motives of the young, sometimes documenting their apprehension by accusing the young of disproportionate involvement in crime, but sometimes failing conspicuously to specifically cite crime as being at the root of their antagonism. A similar pattern of interpersonal hostility has emerged, particularly in the large cities, by whites toward blacks and even by blacks toward whites, with crime as a source of antagonism, but often an unspoken one.

In a complex society, the search for value anchorages is an endless one. The reconciliation between uses and abuses of rights, between the demand for rights and the acceptance of obligations which flow from those rights, is a tenuous one at best. Although it is difficult to identify a national consensus on the specific interface of law and morality as well as rights and obligations, the search process that is aimed at clarifying these relationships is not impossible.

In effect, the American people have been saying the following: The problem of crime is not simply a problem of particular forms of conduct which have been criminalized, but rather, it is a problem that reaches to the moral backbone of the nation itself. It is not the only problem that reaches to the moral backbone of this nation, however, and citizens realize that crime takes its place along with several problems of equal magnitude, such as the maintenance of peace and economic prosperity, the conservation of energy, the stabilization of inflation, and the maintenance of honesty among government officials. Americans appear to be convinced, however, that no single strategy of crime prevention or interdiction is likely to be effective. Rather, multi-pronged approaches are seen as being needed. These approaches vary considerably across and even within different demographic

segments of the community and different geographic regions of the nation. While some citizens look toward removal of the root causes of crime, others seek acceleration of official law enforcement activities while still others have retreated into their own little worlds and closed-off themselves from "outsiders." The surveys that have been studied do not show the existence of naive optimism. There is some evidence of unwarranted pessimism, but only among limited numbers of the citizenry. The average American seems to regard answers to the crime problem in a way that exhibits something in the nature of a cautious hope, but that is accompanied by a definite zeal to step-up the arduous task at any reasonable expense.

NILECJ SURVEY  
DATA ARCHIVE SAMPLING INFORMATION

APPENDIX A

NILECJ SURVEY  
DATA ARCHIVE SAMPLING INFORMATION

To further standardize the archive and to generate summary materials for the methodological assessment, the University Center for Social and Urban Research (University of Pittsburgh) produced the attached tabulation of major sampling information for each of the surveys in the data bank.

Apart from its tabular form, as presented here, the documentation is computerized and it is retrievable in terms of any study characteristic or combination of characteristics.

1. Each "study name" (generally a name of the organization responsible for the survey) is preceded by a number (1-164). This number is the computer file number of the survey.
2. "File name" reproduces the designation of the survey by the originating organization itself.
3. "Study date" refers to the period of fieldwork. The computerized sampling tables include, however, detailed information about when the fieldwork began as well as when it ended.
4. "Sample size" refers to the actual number of records in the archive and thus to "completed interviews" rather than to the designed sample size.
5. "Time points" information simply identifies whether a particular survey was carried out only on one occasion or on more occasions.
6. Any major criteria defining the study population (from which the sample was drawn) are specified under "Other population criteria."
7. "Sample area" delineates each survey in terms of geographic area coverage. The term "national" refers to the 48 contiguous states. We found two surveys (conducted by U.S. Department of Commerce--Social and Economic Statistics Administration--Bureau of the Census) that have included Alaska and Hawaii as well. No studies include other United States territories and holdings.

8. "Inclusion criteria," further detailed under the columns for "sex," "age" and "race" have to do with definitions of eligibility for the inclusion into the study sample. When "race," for instance, remains unspecified, the survey simply included eligible (age/sex/other criteria) respondents regardless of race.
9. "Unit" designation pertains to still another aspect of the sampling design: whether the sampling frames involved an "individual" as the respondent (with generalizability to individuals) or a respondent representing a "household."
10. The type of sample is identified but more detail is available in the documentation since many of the samples are not precisely definable by the summary "catch phrase" tabulated here. In each instance, however, the key designation reflects the specification of the sample as stated by the responsible organization itself and it does not represent our own decision as to the sampling mode.
11. The last column of the table identifies such stratifiers as the sampling design documentation specifies.

NELEC SURVEY  
DATA ARCHIVE SAMPLING INFORMATION

NILECI SURVEY  
DATA ARCHIVE SAMPLING INFORMATION

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
1 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION - GAIHP	AI6834	August 60	3340	1	None	National	F Youngest S Oldest	M F	18+ 18+	- -	I I	Modified Probability <sup>2</sup>	Size of community Regional, Geographic area, Pairs of location
2 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION - GAIHP	AI669N	March 63	4398	1	None	National	F Youngest S Oldest	M F	18+ 18+	- -	I I	Modified Probability <sup>2</sup>	Size of community Regional, Geographic area, Pairs of location
3 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION - GAIHP	AI709N	April 65	3594	1	None	National	F Youngest S Oldest	M F	18+ 18+	- -	I I	Modified Probability <sup>2</sup>	Size of community Regional, Geographic area, Pairs of location
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION - GAIHP	AI749N	August 67	3528	1	None	National	F Youngest S Oldest	M F	18+ 18+	- -	I I	Modified Probability <sup>2</sup>	Size of community Regional, Geographic area, Pairs of location
5 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION - GAIHP	AI757N	February 68	1500	1	None	National	F Youngest S Oldest	M F	18+ 18+	- -	I I	Modified Probability <sup>2</sup>	Size of community Regional, Geographic area, Pairs of location
6 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION - GAIHP	AI772N	January 69	1264	1	None	National	F Youngest S Oldest	M F	18+ 18+	- -	I I	Modified Probability <sup>2</sup>	Size of community Regional, Geographic area, Pairs of location

Study Name	File No.	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Point	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by
7 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION - CARIP	AI847N	March 72	1516	1	None	National	P. Youngest S. Oldest	M F	18 65		I	Modified Probability	Size of community Regional, Geographic area Pairs of location
8 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION - CARIP	AI861N	December 72	1506	1	None	National	P. Youngest S. Oldest	M F	18 65		I	Modified Probability	Size of community Regional, Geographic area Pairs of location
9 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION - CARIP	AI901	June 72	1560	1	None	National	P. Youngest S. Oldest	M F	18 65		II	Modified Probability	Size of community Regional, Geographic area Pairs of location
10 POTOMAC ASSOCIATES - STATE OF THE NATION - CARIP	AA723	July 72	1670	1	None	National	P. Youngest S. Oldest	M F	18 65		I	Modified Probability	Size of community Regional, Geographic area Pairs of location
11 POTOMAC ASSOCIATES - STATE OF THE NATION - CARIP	AA723	July 72	1614	1	None	National	P. Youngest S. Oldest	M F	18 65		II	Modified Probability	Size of community Regional, Geographic area Pairs of location
12 POTOMAC ASSOCIATES - STATE OF THE NATION - CARIP	CC723	July 72	1528	1	None	National	P. Youngest S. Oldest	M F	18 65		I	Modified Probability	Size of community Regional, Geographic area Pairs of location

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Controls	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by
13 POTOMAC ASSOCIATES - STATE OF THE NATION - GROUP	06774	April 74	650	1	None	National	P-Youngest S-Older	M F	18- 18	W B	I H	Modified Probability	Size of community Regional, Geo- graphic area Pairs of location
14 POTOMAC ASSOCIATES - STATE OF THE NATION - GROUP	06774	April 74	650	1	None	National	P-Youngest S-Older	M F	18- 18	W B	I H	Modified Probability	Size of community Regional, Geo- graphic area Pairs of location
15 POTOMAC ASSOCIATES - STATE OF THE NATION - GROUP	06774	April 74	650	1	None	National	P-Youngest S-Older	M F	18- 18	W B	I H	Modified Probability	Size of community Regional, Geo- graphic area Pairs of location
16 MINNESOTA POLL	MIN284	January 69	645	1	None	Minnesota	None	M F	21	W B	I H	Block Quota	Urban, sex, age rural, town, farm sex, age, socio economic
17 MINNESOTA POLL	MIN297	April 70	600	1	None	Minnesota	None	M F	21	W B	I H	Block Quota	Urban, sex, age rural, town, farm sex, age, socio economic
18 NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER - ROYER INSTITUTE - GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY	00721	February to April 72	1614	1	None	National	None	M F	18	W B	I H	Block Quota	Quotas based on age, sex and employment status within blocks selected probabilistic

Study Name	File No.	Date Year Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by
19 NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER & ROPER INSTITUTE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY	NOV73N	February to April 73	1506	1	None	National	None	M-F	18+		I	Block Quota	Quotas based on age, sex, and employment status within blocks selected probabilistic
20 NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER & ROPER INSTITUTE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY	NOV74N	February to April 74	1485	1	None	National	None	M-F	18+		I	Block Quota	Quotas based on age, sex, and employment status within blocks selected probabilistic
21 NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER & ROPER INSTITUTE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY	NOV74N	February to April 75	1491	1	None	National	None	M-F	18+		I	One half full probability One half block quota	Probability by size geographic region, SES, geographic location within area, race, income by block, sex, age, employment status
22 LOUIS HARRIS POLL	HI682	July 68	1021	1	None	National	None	M-F	18+		I	Multi Stage Cluster	Geographic region Metropolitan Residence

Study Name	File Name	Date Year Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by
24 LOUIS HARRIS CRIME AND CORRECTIONS STUDY ADULTS	II758A	November 67	943	1	None	National	None	M F	21		I	Multi stage cluster randomly designated UR	Geographic region & metropolitan residence
24 LOUIS HARRIS CRIME AND CORRECTIONS STUDY TEENAGERS ONLY	II758T	November 67	198	1	None	National	None	M F	16-20		I	Multi stage cluster randomly designated UR	Geographic region & metropolitan residence
25 LOUIS HARRIS NATIONAL/MALAYSE SURVEY	II813	March 68	1586	1	None	National	None	M F	18		I	Multi stage cluster	Geographic region & metropolitan residence
26 LOUIS HARRIS VIOLENCE SURVEY ADULTS	II887A	October 68	1175	1	None	National	None	M F	19		I	Multi stage cluster	Geographic region & metropolitan residence
27 LOUIS HARRIS VIOLENCE SURVEY TEENAGERS	II887T	October 68	296	1	None	National	None	M F	14-18		I	Multi stage cluster	Geographic region & metropolitan residence
28 LOUIS HARRIS MORALS AND VALUES SURVEY	II950	May 69	1575	1	None	National	None	M F	Adults		I	Multi stage cluster	Geographic region & metropolitan residence

Study Name	File Name	Date Year Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by
29 LOUIS HARRIS POLL	H1970	October 69	1932	1	None	National	None	M F	Adults	-	1	Multi-stage cluster	Geographic region & metropolitan residence
30 HARRIS CRIME SURVEY	H1969	69	1243	1	None	Baltimore 2,070,670	None	M F	Adults	-	1	Multi-stage cluster randomly designated	Geographic region & metropolitan residence
31 HARRIS SURVEY ON WATERGATE	H2374	August 73	1247	1	None	National	None	M F	Adults	-	1	Multi-stage cluster randomly designated	Geographic region & metropolitan residence
32 LOUIS HARRIS POLLS	H2341P	September 73	1936	1	Public	National	None	M F	Adults	-	1	Multi-stage cluster randomly designated	Geographic region & metropolitan residence
33 LOUIS HARRIS POLLS	H2341L	September 73	274	1	Government leaders	National	None	M F	Adults	-	1	Multi-stage cluster randomly designated	Geographic region & metropolitan residence
34 POLICE FOUNDATION STUDY IN KANSAS CITY	K1972	July 72	1200	1	16-24 experiment area	Urban City Missouri	None	M F	16+	-	1	Simple probability	Occupied dwelling units
35 POLICE FOUNDATION STUDY IN OMAHA	OH73	February April 73	1224	1	None	Midwest 22,920	None	M F	16+	-	1	Multi-stage probability	Sector of city, racial, economic differences

Study Name	Title	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Inc.	Unit	Prob.	Stratified by:
36 POLICE FOUNDATION STUDY IN CINCINNATI	CAF 73	February-April 73	1224	1	None	Cincinnati 452-5502	None	M/F	18+		I	Multi-Stage Probability	Sector of city, racial, economic differences
37 POLICE FOUNDATION SURVEY IN SAN DIEGO	SD 73	73	608	1	None	San Diego 683-3332	None	M/F	18+		I	Equal Probability	Clusters of 6 adjacent housing units and selection of respondents within clusters
38 POLICE FOUNDATION SURVEY IN SAN DIEGO	SD 72	72	211	1	None	San Diego 683-3332	None	M/F	18+		I	Equal Probability	Clusters of 6 adjacent housing units and selection of respondents within clusters
39 ST. PETERSBURG CITIZENS SURVEY	SP 72	October 72	209	1	None	City of St. Petersburg 216-0672	None	M/F	18+		I	Random Probability	None
40 ST. PETERSBURG CITIZENS SURVEY	SP 72	October-November 72	211	1	None	City of St. Petersburg 216-0672	None	M/F	18+		I	Random Probability	None
41 URBAN OBSERVATORY PROGRAM, IEM. CITIZEN SURVEY ON CITIZEN ATTITUDES TOWARD LOCAL GOVERNMENT	UOP 70	70	4266	1	Politically defined limits of each central city	10 cities	None	M/F	18+		I	Equal Probability	City

**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 2**

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
42 RACIAL ATTITUDES IN 15 AMERICAN CITIES BY CAMPBELL AND SCHUMAN	WHITEN	January April 68	2584	1	None	15 cities <sup>10</sup>	None	M F	16-69	White	I	Representative Probability <sup>4</sup>	City blocks dwelling units
43 BOSTON AREA STUDY	BAS69	January March 69	723	1	None	Boston 2,753,800 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	Adult <sup>11</sup>	-	H	Area Probability <sup>4</sup>	Geographic area occupied housing
44 BOSTON AREA STUDY	BAS70	January March 70	571	1	None	Boston 2,753,800 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	Adult <sup>11</sup>	-	H	Area Probability <sup>4</sup>	Geographic area, occupied housing
45 RACIAL ATTITUDE IN 15 AMERICAN CITIES BY CAMPBELL AND SCHUMAN	BLACKN	January April 68	2809	1	None	15 U.S. cities <sup>10</sup>	None	M F	16-69	Black	I	Representative Probability	City blocks dwelling units
46 PUBLIC OPINION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA	CAL72	January February 72	937	1	None	California	Adults Teenagers	M F	18+ 14-17	-	I	Representative Probability	Social economic levels ages, race

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
47 PITTSBURGH NEIGHBORHOOD ATLAS, NEIGHBORHOOD SURVEY	CRMPNA <sup>12</sup>	Spring 76	9767	1	Registered Pittsburgh Voter as of November 75	Pittsburgh 520,167 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	18+	-	I	Random	Voting districts
48 THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN LIFE BY CAMPBELL, et.al.	QAL71N	July August 71	2164	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	Multi stage area probability	Geographic regions SMSA, counties
49 JUSTIFYING VIOLENCE: ATTITUDES OF AMERICAN MAN BY BLUMENTHAL, KAHN AND ANDREWS	JV69N	Summer 69	1374	1	None	National	None	M	16-64	-	I	Equal Probability	Small compact geographic areas <sup>13</sup>
50 DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY (UCSUR)	CD4 <sup>14</sup>	February 66	1496	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	Probability	Region of country, Size of city
51 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY	CPS60N	November 60 January 61	1181	1	None	National	None	M F	Adult Voting Age	-	I	Probability	Population density geographic location

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
52 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY	CPS64	November 64 January 65	1571	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	Probability	12 largest cities <sup>15</sup> Proportion to size
53 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY	CPS66N	November 66 January 67	1291	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	Probability	12 largest cities <sup>15</sup> Proportion to size
54 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY	CPS68N	November 68 January 69	1673	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	Probability	12 largest cities <sup>15</sup> Proportion to size
55 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY	CPS70N	November 70 January 71	1694	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	Probability	12 largest cities <sup>15</sup> Proportion to size

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
56 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY	CPS72N	November 72 January 73	2705	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	Probability	12 largest cities <sup>15</sup> Proportion to size
57 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY	CPS74N	November 74 January 75	1575	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	Probability	12 largest cities <sup>15</sup> Proportion to size
58 A STUDY OF FAMILY - SCHOOL RELATIONSHIPS IN DETROIT - DETROIT AREA STUDY	DAS63N	63	1536	1	Mothers of children in grades 5a, 6a, 6b	Detroit area School Dis-tricts	None	F	Adults <sup>17</sup>	Black White	I	Random	Classroom listing, race <sup>18</sup>
59 CITIZENS IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE --DETROIT AREA STUDY	DAS67N	67	780	1	Head or wife of head of primary family <sup>19</sup>	Detroit area <sup>16</sup> 4,199,931 <sup>22</sup>	None	M F	Adults	-	I/W <sup>19</sup>	Area Probability Random	Inner city suburbs <sup>20</sup>
60 BLACK ATTITUDES IN DETROIT --DETROIT AREA STUDY	DAS68N	April to July 68	619	8 of 10 33	None	City of Detroit 1,511,336 <sup>22</sup>	None	M F	69 or less	Black	I	Multi stage Probability	High and Low income Upper and Lower socio-economic, Strata twice as many from high strata as low strata

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
61 WHITE ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS IN URBAN PROBLEMS --DETROIT AREA STUDY	DAS69N	69	640	9 of 10 33	Head or wife of head of primary family <sup>19</sup>	Detroit <sup>16</sup> area, 4,199,931 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	69 or less	White	I/H <sup>19</sup>	Multi stage Probability	Socio-economic patterns
62 SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL CHANGE --DETROIT AREA STUDY	DAS71 <sup>33</sup>	71	1841	10 of 10 33	None	Detroit <sup>16</sup> area, 4,199,931 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	21+	-	I	Multi stage Probability	Race, size <sup>21</sup>
63 DETROIT LONGITUDINAL STUDY WAVE 1	DLSN	August 67 March 68	847	1	Community sample and riot area sample	Detroit <sup>16</sup> area, 4,199,931 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Cluster <sup>34</sup>	Proportionally riot non riot <sup>22</sup>
64 NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY, ATTITUDE SUPPLEMENT	DUALHH	September 72	5900	1	None	National <sup>23</sup>	None	M F	Adult	-	H	Representative Probability	Geographic region population density rate of growth 1960-1970 <sup>24</sup>
65 NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY, ATTITUDE SUPPLEMENT	DUALIN	September 72	9933	1	None	National <sup>23</sup>	None	M F	12+	-	I	Representative Probability	Geographic region population density rate of growth 1960-1970 <sup>24</sup>

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
66 NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER VICTIMS OF CRIMES SCREENER BY PHILLIP ENNIS	ENNIS	Summer 66	3781	1	None	National	None	M F	21+	-	I	Block quota <sup>3</sup>	Geographic area & metropolitan & non metropolitan, median family income, economic characteristic <sup>25</sup>
67 PUBLIC OPINION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN TEXAS	TEX74	January 16 to February 28 73 <sup>26</sup>	749	1	None	Texas	None	M F	Adults	-	I	Probability	None
68 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY - BEDFORD STUYVESANT STUDY ON ADDICTION RESEARCH AND TREATMENT CORPORATION	CUBS	71	612	1 of 2	Community leaders businessmen community residents	Brooklyn 2,602,012 32		M F	Adults	-	I		
69 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH CENTER FOR SOCIAL AND URBAN RESEARCH	SWPA76	October 76	373	1	Positive response to request permission to interview	South-western PA <sup>27</sup>	None	M F	Adults	-	H	Proportional Probability sample	Stage used - enumeration district, block groups

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
70 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HATL72	July to November 72	5803	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Atlanta 497,024 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
71 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PATL72	July to November 72	9267	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Atlanta 497,024 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
72 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HBAL72	July to November 72	5960	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Baltimore 905,759 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
73 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PBAL72	July to November 72	10,376	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Baltimore 905,759 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
74 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HCLE72	July to November 72	6028	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Cleveland 751,046 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
75 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PCLE72	July to November 72	9248	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Cleveland 751,046 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>



Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
79 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PDEN72	July to November 72	9430	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Denver 514,678 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
80 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HNWK72	July to November 72	6037	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Newark 382,377 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
81 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PNWK72	July to November 72	9017	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Newark 382,377 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
82 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HPLD72	July to November 72	5953	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Portland 381,877 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
83 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PPLD72	July to November 72	9571	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Portland 381,877 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
84 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HSTL72	July to November 72	6044	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	St. Louis 622,236 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
85 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PSTL72	July to November 72	8754	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	St. Louis 622,236 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
86 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HCHI73	January to March 73	6098	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Chicago 3,362,825 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
87 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PCHI73	January to March 73	9451	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Chicago 3,362,825 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
88 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HDET73	January to March 73	6081	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Detroit 1,511,336 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
89 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PDET73	January to March 73	9863	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Detroit 1,511,336 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
90 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HLA73	January to March 73	5984	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frame	Los Angeles 2,816,111 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>



Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
94 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HPHL73	January to March 73	6094	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Philadelphia 1,948,609 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
95 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PHL73	January to March 73	10,160	1 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Philadelphia 1,948,609 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
96 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HBOS74	January to March 74	6217	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Boston 641,053 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>







Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
106 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	IMIL74	January to March 74	6077	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Milwaukee 717,124 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
107 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PMIL74	January to March 74	10,627	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Milwaukee 717,124 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
108 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HMIN74	January to March 74	5940	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Minneapolis 434,381 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
109 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PMIN74	January to March 74	9151	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Minneapolis 434,381 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
110 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HNOR74	January to March 74	6075	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	New Orleans 593,471 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
111 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PNOR74	January to March 74	9778	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	New Orleans 593,471 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>





Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
118 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HSFR74	January to March 74	5881	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	San Francisco 715,674 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	II	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
119 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PSFR74	January to March 74	8713	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	San Francisco 715,674 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
120 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HWDC74	January to March 74	5862	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Washington DC 756,510 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
121 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PWDC74	January to March 74	8484	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Washington DC 756,510 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
122 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	KATL75	March to May 75	5858	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Atlanta 497,024 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	II	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
123 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PATL75	March to May 75	8731	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Atlanta 497,024 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>



Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
127 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PCHI75	January to March 75	10,602	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Chicago 3,362,825 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
128 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HCLE75	March to May 75	6315	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Cleveland 751,046 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
129 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PCLE75	March to May 75	9678	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Cleveland 751,046 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
130 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HDAL75	March to May 75	6233	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Dallas 844,189 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
131 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PDAL75	March to May 75	9816	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Dallas 844,189 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
132 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HDEN75	March to May 75	6159	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Denver 514,678 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
133 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PDEN75	March to May 75	9342	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Denver 514,678 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
134 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HDET75	January to March 75	5893	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Detroit 1,511,336 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
135 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PDET75	January to March 75	9369	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Detroit 1,511,336 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>



Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
139 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PNY75	January to March 75	9638	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	New York 7,894,851 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
140 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HNWK75	March to May 75	6187	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Newark 382,377 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
141 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PNWK75	March to May 75	9292	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Newark 382,377 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
142 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PHPL75	January to March 75	6048	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Philadelphia 1,948,609 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	II	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
143 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PPHL75	January to March 75	10,151	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Philadelphia 1,948,609 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
144 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HPLD75	March to May 75	6029	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Portland 381,877 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	II	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria <sup>1</sup>	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
145 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PPLD75	March to May 75	9455	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	Portland 381,877 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
146 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	HSTL75	March to May 75	6410	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	St. Louis 622,236 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	H	Systematically <sup>30</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>
147 LEAA - NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (CITIES ATTITUDE SUBSAMPLE)	PSTL75	March to May 75	9281	2 of 2 <sup>28</sup>	20 percent 1970 census augmented by building permits used as sampling frames	St. Louis 622,236 <sup>32</sup>	None	M F	16+	-	I	Systematically <sup>31</sup>	Occupied housing units and others <sup>29</sup>

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
148 NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER -ROPER INSTITUTE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY	NORC76	February to April '76	1499	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	1/2 Full Probability and 1/2 block quota <sup>4</sup>	Probability by size geographic region, SMSA, geographic location within area, race, income by block sex; age employment status
149 NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER -ROPER INSTITUTE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY	NORC77	February to April 77	1530	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	Full Probability <sup>4</sup>	None
150 NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER -ROPER INSTITUTE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY	NORC78	February to April 78	1532	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	Full Probability <sup>4</sup>	None

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
151 A PROFILE OF CRIME IN GREATER EGYPT CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING REGION	EGYPT	June to August 76	10679	1	None	Southern Illinois - 15 Counties <sup>35</sup>	None	M F	Adults	-	I	Random Digit Dialing Technique	Geographical area, 3 digit telephone exchanges
152 LOUIS HARRIS -- ABC TELEVISION	H2055T	January 75	400	1	None	National	None	M F	16-20	-	I	Block Quota 3	Geographic region size of place
153 LOUIS HARRIS -- ABC TELEVISION	H2055A	January 75	2692	1	None	National	None	M F	21+	-	I	Block Quota 3	Geographic region size of place
154 LOUIS HARRIS STUDY # 7490	H7490	January 75	1543	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	Block Quota 3	Geographic region size of place
155 LOUIS HARRIS STUDY # 7689	H7689	December 76	1459	1	None	National	None	M F	18+	-	I	Block Quota 3	Geographic region size of place
156 PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME BY RESIDENTS OF MICHIGAN WAVE I	MICH1	September to October 72	800	1 to 2	None	Michigan	None	M F	16+	-	I	Probability Proportionate to size	Sample based on 1970 US Census count of occupied dwelling units in Michigan

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criteria	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
157 PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME BY RESIDENTS OF MICHIGAN WAVE II	MIC H2	January 74	900	2 of 2	None	Michigan	None	M F	16+	-	I	Probability Proportionate to size	Sample based on 1970 US Census count of occupied dwelling units in Michigan
158 FAMILY STUDY - 1976 ADULT BY YANKLOVICK, SKELLY & WHITE ROPER # 8084	FAM 76A	1976	1230	1	Interviews conducted only if a child under 13 resided in household	National	None	F	Adults	-	I	Probability	None
159 FAMILY STUDY - 1976 - CHILDREN BY YANKLOVICK, SKELLY & WHITE ROPER #8084	FAM 76C	1976	469	1	Conducted with children of parents, who participate in primary interview	National	None	M F	6-12	-	I	Probability 1/3 Random 36	None
160 FAMILY STUDY - 1976 - HOUSEHOLD BY YANKLOVICK, SKELLY & WHITE ROPER # 8084	FAM 76H37	1976	1230	1	None	National	P - Adults S - Children	M F	Adults 6-12 <sup>37</sup>	-	H	Probability 2/3 Random 38	None

Study Name	File Name	Date Year-Month	Sample Size	Time Points	Other Population Criteria	Sample Area	Primary and Secondary Inclusion Criterial	Sex	Age	Race	Unit	Type	Stratified by:
161 PORTLAND 1974 <sup>39</sup>	ROR T74	1974	4192	1	(39)	Portland SMSA 1,007,130 32	(39)	(39)	(39)	(39)	(39)	(39)	(39)
162 PORTLAND 1977 <sup>39</sup>	POR T77	1977	1216 <sup>40</sup>	1	(39)	Portland 381,877 32	(39)	(39)	(39)	(39)	(39)	(39)	(39)
163 POTOMAC ASSOCIATE STATE OF THE NATION 1976	GAI 976	1976	524	1	None	National	P - Youngest S - Oldest	M F	18+ 18+	- -	I I	Modified Proba-bility <sup>2</sup>	Size of community Regional, Geo-graphic area, Pairs of location
164 POTOMAC ASSOCIATE STATE OF THE NATION 1976	OBI 976	1976	547	1	None	National	P - Youngest S - Oldest	M F	18+ 18+	- -	I I	Modified Proba-bility <sup>2</sup>	Size of community Regional, Geo-graphic area, Pairs of location

FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Primary and secondary inclusion criteria indicate that respondents are selected in two stages. For example, AIPO studies instruct their interviewers to interview youngest male over 18 years of age, but if that person is not available they are to interview oldest female over 18 years of age.

<sup>2</sup>Modified Probability indicates that some minor non-probabilistic augmentation is used in the selection of respondents. This is usually done to insure representation of particularly important subgroups. Primary and Secondary Selection as in above characterizes the sampling procedure as the "modified" type.

<sup>3</sup>Block quota means randomly selected areas at the block level, quotas are used within blocks.

<sup>4</sup>Full, strict, and representative area probability are taken as equivalent.

<sup>5</sup>Multi-Stage Cluster -- selecting geographic areas at the minor civil division level, i.e., cities, towns, townships, with probabilities proportionate to their respective household population size.

<sup>6</sup>15-beat experimental area -- a police foundation defined area which does not encompass all of Kansas City. The actual population involved is being pursued.

<sup>7</sup>Sector of city -- essentially equivalent to a borough.

<sup>8</sup>Equal and Random Probability Samples will be considered equivalent.

<sup>9</sup>Ten cities include: (1) Atlanta, Georgia; (2) Albuquerque, New Mexico; (3) Baltimore, Maryland; (4) Boston, Massachusetts; (5) Denver, Colorado; (6) Kansas City, Kansas; (7) Kansas City, Missouri; (8) Milwaukee, Wisconsin; (9) Nashville, Tennessee; (10) San Diego, California.

<sup>10</sup>Fifteen cities include: (1) Baltimore; (2) Cincinnati; (3) Detroit; (4) Boston; (5) Brooklyn; (6) Chicago; (7) Cleveland; (8) Gary; (9) Newark; (10) Pittsburgh; (11) St. Louis; (12) San Francisco; (13) Washington, D.C.; (14) Milwaukee; (15) Philadelphia.

<sup>11</sup>The following criteria are used to define an adult: (1) adult age 21 years or older; or (2) married regardless of age; or (3) anyone who is not living with parents, or guardians.

<sup>12</sup>Mail Survey.

<sup>13</sup>Small compact geographic areas -- 620 segments defined by the University of Michigan, Survey Research Center.

<sup>14</sup>Fieldwork conducted by National Opinion Research Center (NORC).

<sup>15</sup>The twelve largest cities drawn with certainty; the rest of the country drawn with probability proportionate to size of population. Sample is representative of the entire contiguous U.S. as well as the four (4) major regions of the U.S. -- Northeast, Northcentral, South, West.

<sup>16</sup>Detroit area SMSA includes Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties.

<sup>17</sup>Mothers of school age children (in grades 5a, 6a, 6b).

<sup>18</sup>One-half white, one-half black.

<sup>19</sup>Some items may be considered household items, while others can be considered individual items.

<sup>20</sup>Inner city sampled at twice the number of suburban residents to increase the number of black interviews.

<sup>21</sup>Census Tracts were stratified by racial composition in 1960, proportion to population size in 1960.

<sup>22</sup>Riot areas defined as those areas that apparently had riot related fires. Four (4) such strata were defined non-riot east, non-riot west, riot east, and riot west.

<sup>23</sup>Includes Alaska and Hawaii.

<sup>24</sup>PSU's are grouped into self-representative PSU's which are not stratified and PSU's which are grouped according to similarity in characteristics mentioned in the table.

<sup>25</sup>Block quota means blocks are selected using a standard multi-stage probability. Sampling within the block uses quotas based on age, sex, employment status, size.

<sup>26</sup>Further documentation from the University of California's State Data Program, Texas 74, was actually conducted in the year and month specified on the table. We are not making a change in the file name since that file name exists in copies of the archives of a variety of locations.

<sup>27</sup>Twelve counties: (1) Allegheny; (2) Armstrong; (3) Beaver; (4) Butler; (5) Cambria; (6) Fayette; (7) Greene; (8) Indiana; (9) Lawrence; (10) Somerset; (11) Washington; (12) Westmoreland.

<sup>28</sup>While these studies were conducted in a panel design, no information is available to make matching of cases from Wave 1 to subsequent waves possible.

<sup>29</sup>Stratified by income, owner or renter, family size, further stratified by race of head of household, vacant units, low value, medium value, high value.

30 For all of the household files systematic selection of the 20 percent sample of the 1970 census was used, for further detailed information see Survey Documentation Central Cities Sample, 1975.

31 For all the individual files systematic selection of the 20 percent sample of the 1970 census was used, for further detailed information see Survey Documentation Central Cities Sample, 1975. Enumeration within households.

32 Population figures are according to 1970 Bureau of Census report County and City Data Book, 1972.

33 The Detroit Area studies conducted in the years 1968, 1969, and 1970 are studies of social change focusing on replication of items included in prior Detroit Area studies (i.e., 1953-1959). This replication represents a time series.

34 We assume "cluster" refers to a "multi-stage-cluster" sampling technique.

35 Fifteen counties include: (1) Alexander; (2) Franklin; (3) Gallatin; (4) Hamilton; (5) Hardin; (6) Jackson; (7) Jefferson; (8) Johnson; (9) Massac; (10) Perry; (11) Pope; (12) Pualiski; (13) Saline; (14) Union; (15) Williamson;

36 One third (1/3) random selection of children (6-12 years) in the national sample used in study #158.

37 We define a household record as a record containing a parent and child interview set or a double parent interview set.

38 Two thirds (2/3) random selection of second parent in the national sample used in study #158.

39 Block probability is the random selection of blocks with interviews in every Nth structure, a maximum of 3 structures per block.

40 Completion rate is 60.8 percent.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

PROJECT/REPORT REVIEW FORM

Grant/Contract # 78-NI-AX-0128

Grant/Contract Title Public Opinion and Attitudes Toward Crime and The Criminal Justice System	Grantee/Contractor Name and Address University of Pittsburgh University Center for Social and Urban Research Pittsburgh-Pennsylvania 15260	
Project Director, Address & Phone # Professor Jiri Nehnevajsa University of Pittsburgh University Center for Social and Urban Research Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260	Funding Level This Phase \$74,278	Total Level \$74,278
	Project Period This Phase 10/1/78 - 12/30/79	Total Period 10/1/78 - 2/16/80

Products

Title & Author	Date Submitted
1. Some Perspectives on Crime in the United States Since 1960: Executive Summary- David A. Jones and Jiri Nehnevajsa	Sept. 79
2. A Methodological Exploration of the Crime Opinion Data Archive- Jiri Nehnevajsa and George O. Rogers	Nov. 79
3. _____	_____
4. _____	_____

Project Monitors

1. Sidney Epstein	From 10/1/78	To 2/16/80
2. _____	From _____	To _____
3. _____	From _____	To _____

Outside Reviewers

Name and Title
1. Wesley Skogan, Ph.D. - Professor of Sociology - Northwestern University
2. Peter Rossi - Ph.D. - Professor of Sociology - University of Massachusetts
3. _____

Staff Reviewers

- |                             |          |
|-----------------------------|----------|
| 1. <u>Sidney Epstein</u>    | 3. _____ |
| 2. <u>Charles Kinderman</u> | 4. _____ |

PUBLICATION RECOMMENDATIONS & APPROVAL

Sidney Epstein  
Project Reviewer

9/17/80  
Date

Fred Heenzelmann  
Division Director

9/17/80  
Date

Fred Heenzelmann for  
Office Director W.R. Burkhardt

9/17/80  
Date

I. FINDINGS AND SUBSTANTIVE QUALITY

1. Grant Managers Assessment Report

Provide a narrative assessment not to exceed 200 words describing the following: problem addressed and major objectives, accomplishments, activities undertaken, principal findings and documents produced. This report will be entered into the LEAA Grant Profile File (PROFILE) to be used by criminal justice planners and LEAA management and staff. For further clarification of the requirements, see LEAA Handbook HB Procedures for Administration of Categorical Grants, chapter 6.

This project was intended to give the grantee an opportunity to improve his product produced earlier under O.P.M. funding. It integrated public opinion surveys conducted between 1960 and 1976, on opinions and attitudes about crime and the criminal justice system. At the project's close, the Institute, at O.P.M.'s request, had its products reviewed. The reviewers concluded that the Executive Summary should be published after extensive revision.

A follow on revision project began in 1978 and included new tasks:

1. Include all new surveys of the same kind completed since the first phase.
2. Produce a generalized document on how to use archives of data from collections of surveys which were only partially congruent.
3. Conduct special analyses of the data as requested by the Institute. Because of poor progress made by the grantee during the course of the project, the last requirement was later cancelled.

Two documents were produced, ~~as listed on the first page of this report~~. They are unsatisfactorily written, in structure and language. One is the revised executive summary. The other is the methodology document.

Internal and external reviews resulted in strong recommendations against publishing either document.

2. Detail the major findings and recommendations.

A list of fifty six major findings is attached to this Project Review Form. The confidence which can be placed in these findings is very questionable according to the reviewers of the executive summary.

3. Evaluate the report in terms of the soundness of the methodology, the validity and reliability of the data, the quality of the analysis and the appropriateness of the conclusions and recommendations. How do the results relate to other research results of which we are aware (e.g., do they contradict, modify, reinforce, etc.?).

The methodology was to combine the data of the collected public opinion and attitude surveys and to draw conclusions about their collective import and about changes in attitudes and opinions over time. As the list of fifty six major findings will show, the results relate to very many facets of the criminal justice system and the crime problem and do not always agree with previous findings. However, according to the outside reviewers, we cannot rely on the analyses made and conclusions drawn by this grantee.

- 4. Summarize the outside reviews and address any differences between your assessment and those of the reviewers.

My assessment was that the two reports were badly written and structured but might be of value if rewritten and restructured. Two other reviewers, one outside and one in B.J.S. considered both documents worthless and not worth re-writing. They urged strongly against publication. Another reviewer, one who had reviewed the final report of the original grant, called the methodology volume a useful and excellent document. With respect to the executive summary, he said that the best of his observations in the original review had not been acted upon and that the presentation of data was poor. That is a score of "4" to "0" against the executive summary and "3" to "1" against the methodology document.

- 5. List the members of the Research Utilization Committee.

Fred Heinzelmann  
 Bob Burkhart  
 Sid Epstein  
 Anne Schmidt  
 Paul Cascarano  
 Mike Farrell  
 Jane Middlebrooks  
 Paul Estaver

- 6. Discuss the usefulness of this report in terms of the following issues:

- A. Additional Research

What implications does the report have in terms of future research efforts?

None. It does not seem fruitful to pursue this archiving effort further.

RUC Comments

Concur: ORP/OE WRB OTT

Other:

*John M. Bro*  
*Paul OC*

B. Program Development

What are the implications in terms of LEAA policy and future program development (i.e., technical assistance packages, prescriptive packages, training, further testing, demonstrations?)

None at this time.

RUC Comments

Concur:

ORP/OE

*WRB/OKS*

Other:

OTT

*John H. Sw Paul C.*

C. Utilization/Dissemination

Are there implications for operating agencies? If so, what strategy or strategies should LEAA employ to:

1. make appropriate agencies aware of the implications?
2. assist these agencies in deciding whether to implement the findings?
3. implement the findings?

None. If the reviewers are right in saying that we cannot trust these findings as they are presented, then we had better do nothing about implementation and dissemination. The tapes that are available will be sent to the archives in Michigan.

RUC Comments

Concur:

ORP/OE

*WRB/OKS*

Other:

OTT

*John H. Sw Paul C.*

(Only required for final project closeout)

II. GRANTEE PERFORMANCE

1. Do the products listed on Page 1 meet all of the grant's objectives as presented in the proposal or as officially modified during the course of the grant?

YES \_\_\_\_\_

NO   x  

Please explain any discrepancies. The reports are not well written and the methodology volume does not fulfill the purpose originally intended.

2. Rate the grantee/contractors compliance with the administrative reporting requirements of the grant/contract (submission of fiscal and progress reports, etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_ Excellent, attentive to requirements

\_\_\_\_\_ Adequate performance

  x   Inadequate - frequent difficulties encountered (Explain)

There were frequent delays and failures to submit interim reports. Two time extensions were required.

3. Rate the project director's overall management of the project and the staff independently from the LEAA reporting requirements in #2 above.

\_\_\_\_\_ Excellent

\_\_\_\_\_ Adequate - average number of problems

  x   Inadequate - serious and persistent problems encountered (please explain nature of problems on attached sheet, e.g., lack of coordination, frequent delays, excessive start-up time, lack of cooperation).

We simply did not get the kinds of products we wanted.

4. Is there anything about the performance of the grantee/contractor in accomplishing either the administrative or substantive requirements of the project that should be taken into account by LEAA staff in planning future projects with this grantee/contractor?

It seems likely that the University of Pittsburgh Center for Urban Research cannot be relied upon to deliver timely and adequate products. However, this should not reflect on other parts of the University such as their Criminal Justice Research Center.

III. PRODUCT DISSEMINATION

Grant/Contract # \_\_\_\_\_

1. List all written reports produced by the contractor/grantee intended for dissemination and write in next to each all the letters corresponding to the appropriate dissemination activities using the codes below. Note all that apply.

CODE I	CODE II	CODE III
Availability and Publication of Report by Government	Private Publication by Grantee	Methods of Publicizing Reports and Findings
A. Reading Room	G. Commercial Printing	K. SNI
B. NCJRS Data Base (including Document Loan Program and Microfiche)	H. Publication by Research Firm	L. Flyer
C. Printing of Enough Copies for Direct Mailing to Specific Persons or Groups (no extra copies for sale)	I. Journal Article	M. Personal transmittal letter with direct mail copy
D. Printing of Sufficient Copies for Director Mailing and NCJRS Distribution	J. Article in Magazine or Periodical	N. LEAA Newsletter Article
E. Printing and Sale		O. Propose Press Release to PIO
F. NTIS		P. Press Conference
		Q. Briefing of Director
		R. Institute Seminar
		S. National Conference (NILECJ)
		T. Prescriptive Package
		U. Training Workshop
		V. Program Field Test
		W. Other (Specify)

Proposed Dissemination Activities

Report Title

1.           A          

Some Perspectives on Crime in the United States Since 1960: Executive Summary

2.           A          

A Methodological Exploration of the Crime opinion data archive

3.           W          

The volumes of data and the tapes should be sent to the archives in Michigan.

4.

2. For each report above for which only A (reading room) was recommended, briefly summarize the reasons for that recommendation.

The reason is the same for both documents. They received very negative reviews from the reviewers, who said that they merited no attempt at further revision.

3. For each report above for which C, D, E, K, was recommended, please list mailing categories and number of copies required for each LEAA mailing list. (Instruction 1441.1B, September 1975). If any additional distribution is recommended, indicate number and attach mailing labels.

N/A

4. Are there any articles or privately published reports currently available or soon to be available which were produced under this grant.

No

Yes (if book) Publisher's name:

Address :

Yes (if article) Name of Publication:

Volume # and date of Publication:

5. Is any further editing/revising required for the reports listed on p. 7. (If so, indicate the names(s) of the report and the nature of the editing. Has it been discussed with the grantee? How should the editing best be accomplished?

No. According to the reviewers, these reports should not be published.


SAMPLE MAILING LIST

<u>List Code</u>	<u>Category Code</u>	<u>Sub Category Code</u>	<u>Category &amp; Description</u>	<u># of Addresses</u>
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N/A

Other Distribution:

N/A



**END**