VOLUME III
CRIME AND URBAN COMMUNITY:
TOWARDS A THEORY OF NEIGHBORHOOD SECURITY

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REACTIONS TO CRIME PROJECT
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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART I:</th>
<th>THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Fear of Crime and the Idea of Social Control</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Adapting the Social Control Perspective to the Study of Fear of Crime</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: A Short History of the Decline of the Social Control Perspective and the Emergence of the Victimization Perspective</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Preserving Community and Policy Development in the Victimization and Social Control Perspectives</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART II:</th>
<th>USING THE SOCIAL CONTROL PERSPECTIVE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: The Social Control Perspective: An Empirical Application</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: Social Disorganization and Neighborhood Change</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7: Sources of Social Control</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8: Crime, Fear and Community Context</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART III:</th>
<th>POLICY IMPLICATIONS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 9: Policy Development and the Two Perspectives</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REFERENCES | 139   |
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1:</td>
<td>A Comparison of Perspectives.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2:</td>
<td>Fear of Crime in the Social Control Perspective</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3:</td>
<td>Fear of Crime</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4:</td>
<td>Perceptions of Neighborhood Change.</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5:</td>
<td>Population Stability.</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6:</td>
<td>Crime Rates, Crime Concerns, and Fear.</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7:</td>
<td>Concern about incivility.</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8:</td>
<td>Crime and Social Disorganization Concerns and Fear.</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9:</td>
<td>Fear by Level of Social Integration</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10:</td>
<td>Levels of Social Integration.</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11:</td>
<td>Population Instability and Social Integration</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12:</td>
<td>Percent Involved in Community Affairs</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1:</td>
<td>Demographic Characteristics of Neighborhoods</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2:</td>
<td>Distribution of Respondents According to Degree of Social Integration</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3:</td>
<td>Perceived Organizational Effectiveness</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4:</td>
<td>Social Disorganization Indicators and Neighborhood Resources: The High Fear Neighborhoods</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5:</td>
<td>Social Disorganization Indicators and Neighborhood Resources: The Low Fear Neighborhoods</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART I

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
INTRODUCTION

Fear of crime is a major social problem in urban America. Surveys tell us that close to 50% of the adult urban population is afraid to be out at night in their own neighborhood. The media informs us through dramatic stories that fear has crippled individuals and limited their freedom to lead normal, productive lives. Government agencies at the federal, state and local levels have implemented programs to reduce the fear of crime among selected populations. Some commentators have gone so far as to label the fear of crime one of the principal causes of the decline of city life. Yet our knowledge of that fear, and the conceptual framework through which we view it as a problem, have not, for the most part, been scrutinized very closely.

This essay attempts to explain the distribution of fear of crime in American cities and in doing so hopes to improve upon the theoretical framework which has guided the scholarly discussion of the fear of crime to date.

We approach the study of fear of crime from what we call the social control perspective. This perspective is adapted from the "Chicago School" of Sociology's orientation to the study of the city and urban community life. We will argue that the level of fear in a community is a consequence of the level of social disorganization perceived by its residents. If an urban community has the capacity, through its local institutions (families, churches,
voluntary associations, etc.), to combat the growth of the signs of disorganization than fear levels will be modified. If local institutions cannot exert social control and regulate these signs of disorganization then fear will be increased.

Our analysis of ten neighborhoods in Chicago, San Francisco and Philadelphia, suggests that fear levels are higher, not merely as a function of rising crime rates, but more as a result of the declining capacity of local institutions to control the social disorganization residents perceive around them.

We were drawn to this older tradition in the study of crime and its impact because of the unanswered questions raised by the contemporary, more conventional, approach to the study of fear of crime. The recent literature on fear of crime has been dominated by what we call the victimization perspective. This perspective, often implicit in the major studies, treats fear as a response to victimization. It assumes that an individual's report of being fearful is a direct consequence of experiencing crime as a victim. We will argue on both theoretical and empirical grounds that this approach is too narrow and, by focusing on psychological responses to victimization, fails to take account of the political and social structures which play an important role in shaping the fears of citizens. The central issue is not that individualistic psychological perspectives are without utility, but that when they are used in a vacuum they result in a partial (some would say ideological) understanding of the issue.

The social control perspective treats fear as a consequence of the incapacity of local institutions to exert social control. It analyzes changes in the community as the precipitant of a fearful citizenry. The victimization experiences of residents must be placed in a community context in order to understand the impact of those experiences on fear. Victimization will only increase fear when local institutions have lost the capacity to exert social control and maintain the integrity of the local moral order.

In the chapters to follow we will describe the social control perspective and the victimization perspective and analyze their theoretical assumptions and intellectual traditions. Chapter One describes the development of the social control perspective as it emerged as a general theoretical orientation at the University of Chicago's Department of Sociology in the second quarter of the twentieth century. Particular attention is paid to the importance of urbanization and its impact on community life as the central issue of the emerging discipline of Sociology. In Chapter Two the social control perspective is applied to the study of fear of crime. Building primarily on the work of Gerald Suttles (a contemporary scholar in the "Chicago School" tradition), the concepts of "invasion," "signs of disorganization" and "provincialism" are introduced to explain how and why fear surfaces in urban communities. Chapter Three charts the intellectual decline of the social control perspective and the transition to motivational theories of crime and delinquency. We then discuss how this shift in emphasis affected the social policy initiative of the 1960's, and led to the formulation of the victimization perspective by the end of that decade. The theoretical construction of the new perspective is discussed in terms of the work of Biderman, Ennis and Reiss. We describe the underlying assumptions which they employed and relate these assumptions to the changes in criminological theory which had taken place within the generation preceding their efforts.

In Chapter Four the discussion moves to the idea of community. Both perspectives treat the preservation of community as an important objective. We discuss the different approaches to that objective which are implicit in
the construction of the two perspectives. We show how community, or the lack of it, is treated as a consequence of fear within the victimization perspective and how community is treated as a contextual variable within the social control perspective. We then discuss the implications of these differing approaches for our understanding of the relationship between fear of crime and community solidarity.

In Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight, we operationalize the theoretical discussion in an empirical analysis of fear of crime in ten urban communities in Chicago, San Francisco and Philadelphia. Our purpose is to explore the potential of the social control perspective in accounting for the anomalies left unresolved by the research conducted within the victimization framework. The analysis is secondary, that is, we were using survey instruments and fieldwork data which were not designed to test the efficacy of either perspective, but which can be applied to a discussion of their relative merits. Consequently this empirical analysis should be viewed as illustrative and informative rather than definitive.

Chapter Five describes the ten communities demographically. The key concepts are operationalized and the indicators identified. In Chapter Six we describe the social disorganization indicators in ten communities and in Chapter Seven we turn to the sources of social control. In Chapter Eight we consider the relationship of crime, fear and community context and conclude in Chapter Nine by exploring the policy implications of the analysis of fear of crime within the social control framework.
distribution of fear among demographic groups. Analysis of these data was limited to inter-city comparisons and reporting variations in fear levels by demographic sub-population within large national samples. Analysts of the victimization surveys discovered, just as their predecessors had earlier, that fear of crime was often prevalent among precisely the groups (i.e., the elderly) which were least victimized (Skogan, 1976). While young black males consistently reported the most victimizations and the least amount of fear, fear was highest among older females (both black and white) who reported the fewest victimizations of any demographic group. Scholars have attempted to explain this apparent paradox by employing more and more sophisticated analytic techniques to the questions of both the amount of crime in the environment and the dimensions of fear reported by respondents. Through the refinement of measurement techniques and more sophisticated analytic procedures some progress was made in explaining the apparent discrepancy between the amount of crime to which people were exposed and the level of fear they reported (Hindelang, Gottfriedson and Garofalo, 1978).

The work of Biderman, Reiss and Ennis set the tone for the scholarship on fear of crime in the 1970's. Most of the research on fear of crime which followed this early work found no consistent relationship between fear of crime and the victimization experiences of the respondent (McIntyre, 1967; Boggs, 1971; Conklin, 1971; Fowler and Mangione, 1974; and Hindelang, 1974). There were also a few studies which did report a positive relationship between victimization and fear (Feyemberg and Hindelang, 1974; and Kleiman and David, 1973). In reviewing this literature it becomes apparent that the implicit hypothesis that victimizations predict fear is not substantiated. Some scholars have begun to question whether this perspective is the most appropriate framework for approaching the issue of fear of crime. Most recently Garofalo and Laub (1979), after reviewing the literature, make this point forcefully.

All of the factors discussed above—the ambiguous relationship between victimization and the fear of crime, the indications that crime is not generally perceived as an immediate threat, and the mixing of fear of crime with fear of strangers—point to the conclusion that what has been measured in research as the "fear of crime" is not simply fear of crime (Victimology, p. 246).

Biderman himself hinted at a potentially more useful perspective over a decade ago.

We have found that attitudes of citizens regarding crime are less affected by their past victimization than by their ideas about what is going on in their community—fears about a weakening of social controls on which they feel their safety and the broader fabric of social life is ultimately dependent (1967:160).

Hunter was led to a similar conclusion in a more recent discussion.

"Fear in the urban environment is above all a fear of social disorder that may come to threaten the individual. I suggest that this fear results more from experiencing incivility than from direct experience with crime itself (1978:9)."

The notion that fear may be more directly related to the issue of social control and the local social or moral order offers the possibility of an alternative conceptual framework. The idea of social control has a long tradition of theoretical development in sociology and the use of that tradition to study fear of crime may not only explain more about that problem, but also shed some light on the role of victimization in the fear production process.
After developing the concepts of social control and fear of crime in some detail, we will analyze the victimization perspective and show why the empirical findings in this perspective have been so limited. The problems may be less a function of methodology and more an issue of theoretical orientation.

Janowitz (1978) has recently discussed the history of the idea of social control in sociological theory. He argues that the concept originally was defined as "a perspective which focuses on the capacity of a social organization to regulate itself" (p. 29). The social control perspective became a central theoretical concept for the American discipline of sociology in the 1920's. Park and Burgess' (1925) assertion that "all social problems turn out to be problems of social control," takes on new meaning in the light of Janowitz's discussion.

The social control perspective developed theoretically through the study of city life begun in the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago. The perspective was part of a reaction to the evolutionary theories of Spencer and Comte which emphasized the historical development of society from lower forms of savagery to the present heights of civilization. Evolutionary thinking was viewed as inherently conservative, anti-empirical and generally incapable of explaining the poverty, vice and human misery so prevalent in American cities at the turn of the century. While Toennies and Durkheim extended the evolutionary tradition into the twentieth century, a group of scholars at the University of Chicago drew upon the metaphors of natural history and biology to counter the pessimistic theorizing of European scholars. Reformist in temperament, these men were developing tools to study the fast growing metropolis which was shooting up around them, and the changes which were taking place in local urban communities. Led by Parks, Burgess and McKenzie, whose The City was published in 1925, the scholars formulated an approach to the study of society which for the next twenty-five years dominated the new academic discipline of sociology.

The "Chicago School" as they came to be known, borrowed from the evolutionary thinkers a concern about social change and the nature of community. They sought to examine the changes which were taking place in the structure of the local communities, and how these communities were accommodating themselves to the pressures of city life.

Park, Burgess, Wirth and others focused on understanding the effect urbanization (as a particular variant of social change) was having on city dwellers, particularly the newly arrived poor European immigrants. From that theorizing emerged the notion that crime was the "natural" result of the process at work in cities and that urban communities faced serious problems in maintaining social control in the face of these processes. The conceptual link between social change and social control was the concept of social disorganization. For social change in the city affected local communities in a variety of ways, disrupting social control and introducing forms of deviance (including crime and delinquency) as a consequence of that disruption. Carey (1975) gives us a good working definition of social disorganization.

A socially disorganized community is one unable to realize its values. The consequences of disorganization (delinquency, dependency, desertion, truancy, high rates of mental illness, etc.) are considered undesirable by most of the citizens who live in the disorganized community—they would do something about them if they could. The characteristic response to the question, "disorganized from whose viewpoint?" was "disorganized from the viewpoint of the people who live there" (p. 107).
Social control is "the means of doing something about them" and as such plays a pivotal role in how the major social forces of city life affect the social organization of local communities.

Members of the Department of Sociology differed in how they operationalized the concept of social disorganization. Thomas and Znaniecki (1939) were among the first to discuss how communities and families became disorganized under the pressure of urban city life. Park, too, had an approach to social disorganization, specifying a process of organization and reorganization, as the capacity to regulate social life reemerged. There were a number of scholars working with the idea of disorganization (Landesco, 1929; Shaw and McKay, 1942; etc.) who treated the disorganization as an "objective" judgement about the state of the community. As Carey (1975) points out in his discussion of the "social disorganization paradigm," there were a variety of approaches to defining and measuring the concept, but they all hinged on analysis of how city life disrupted the local social order. Contrasting city life to folk ways, Wirth (1938), for example, argued that density, heterogeneity, increased mobility, insecurity, and instability, lead to the establishment of formal controls to mitigate the personal disorganization in the city.

The close living together and working together of individuals who have no sentimental and emotional ties fosters a spirit of competition, aggrandizement, and mutual exploitation. To counteract irresponsibility and potential disorder, formal control tends to be resorted to (1938:15).

Given this general set of factors, the social and cultural institutions at the local or neighborhood level are not capable of performing their socialization and social control functions, and criminal activity follows. The family, church, friends and neighbors cannot counter the dysfunctional influences of the city which lead to social disorganization and criminal activity in the urban community.

It is probably the breaking down of local attachments and the weakening of restraints and inhibitions of the primary group, under the influence of the urban environment, which are largely responsible for the increase of vice and crime in great cities (Park, 1970:25).

Primary face to face relations, which had been the basis of social control in less complicated societies, are inadequate control mechanisms in the context of the urbanization process (Smith, 1979). This is especially true for second generation immigrants (those born in the United States) who felt less tied to the traditions of the old country (Wirth, 1933) and are pulled towards the deviant values of the metropolis.

Crime within this theoretical orientation is the direct result of the pressures of city life. Rather than being an aberration due to individual character disorder, it is the anticipated consequence of the effects of disorganization on local community. A theory of the city "explains" criminality. For as city life disorganizes local communities, crime increases. The Chicago scholars are clear as to how to solve the crime problem, for that solution draws upon their general theory of urbanization, social control, and social disorganization.

The distinctive features of the urban mode of life are often seen sociologically as consisting of the substitution of secondary for primary contacts, the weakening of bonds of kinship and the declining social significance of the family, the disappearance of the neighborhood and the undermining of the traditional basis of social solidarity (Wirth, 1938:21).

Against this setting, the individual is forced into "voluntary associations" to achieve his ends.
Being reduced to a stage of virtual impotence as an individual the urbanite is bound to exert himself by joining with others of similar interest into organized groups to obtain his ends. This results in the enormous multiplication of voluntary organizations directed toward as great a variety of objectives as there are human needs and interests (Wirth, 1938:22).

Crime could only be reduced if local communities could reassert the primacy of their values over the insidious influences of city life. The voluntary association is particularly well suited to the exercise of social control for it allows the community to assert its values.

Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay adapted the social control perspective to the particular problem of crime and community. The Chicago Area Projects which were started in 1934 built on precisely the same theoretical construct we have been describing, only in this case the scholars left the classroom and applied that construct in the neighborhoods of Chicago through a series of interventions. This practical application was informed by a series of books on delinquency which were published in the same period (e.g., Shaw and McKay, 1942; Shaw et al., 1929).

The project "attempts to deal with crime as a natural phenomenon," and focuses on local community as the place to take action.

The essential logic of the Area Project becomes, then, one of discovering the pertinent social processes and significant cultural organization of the community as expressed in the institutions of local residents themselves, and through these, introducing values consistent with the standards of conventional society (Burgess, Lohman and Shaw, 1937:23).

The prevention of crime is a matter of working through and with local people and institutions to strengthen the community's capacity to enforce "values consistent with the standards of conventional society."

If juvenile delinquency in the deteriorated areas is a function of the social life characteristics of these situations, it seems that a feasible approach to the changes in the attitudes, sentiments, codes, and moral standards of the neighborhood as a whole (Burgess, Lohman and Shaw, 1937:22).

Through the Chicago Area Project the forces of urbanization can be mitigated. "Society has here an opportunity to discover and encourage forces which will make the local community, insofar as is possible, independently effective in dealing with its own problems" (Burgess, Lohman and Shaw, 1937:23). As Kobrin (1959) pointed out, from this perspective it is city life, not individual pathologies which generate crime. And if crime and its consequences are to be alleviated, social control, meaning the ability of the local group to control its members, has to be reinstated.

Thus, the theory on which the Area Project program is based is that, taken in its most general aspect, delinquency as a problem in the modern metropolis is principally a product of the breakdown of the machinery of spontaneous social control (Kobrin, 1959:22).

The Chicago Area Project attempted to enlist indigenous leadership working through local institutions in the fight against crime. This emphasis on voluntary participation at the neighborhood level was central, given a definition of crime as the process of value erosion. Only by combatting social disorganization (as indicated by delinquency and crime rates) could local communities become more decent places to live.

Crime could be prevented if the community changed itself. The forces of urbanization could be mitigated by local action. This link between crime prevention and community was forged conceptually over forty years ago. It was based on a theory of social disorganization.
in which the city's influence was negative; weakening social control and leaving the individual adrift. Crime was one of many negative outcomes of this process and it followed from the theory that preventing crime was a function of strengthening the local community in its attempt to assert social control. The emphasis on voluntary associations and local citizen action followed from an analysis of social bonds which emphasized the importance of primary social relations over the secondary relations manufactured in the metropolis. Crime could be curbed only if social institutions rather than criminal justice institutions (courts, probation, police, etc.) were strengthened. To prevent crime the impact of city life has to be mitigated by the strengthening of socializing and controlling institutions in the community.

This formulation of the problem has structured the discussion of crime and community for the last fifty years. If crime is by definition the result of the introduction of deviant values, then appropriate values must be taught and reinforced by local institutions if crime is to be reduced.

To summarize, the social control perspective explains the distribution of crime and delinquency (as well as other forms of deviance) in terms of the effects of city life on the local urban community's capacity to regulate itself. Since this capacity varies in different communities depending in part upon the external forces (demographic, urban and economic) impinging on the community and in part on the strength and viability of those local institutions which exert social control, the study of crime and delinquency is often comparative, assessing the levels of crime and delinquency in different communities in one metropolitan area. It was hypothesized that social change led to social disorganization in communities which could not exert social control. Shaw and McKay (1942) described the higher rates of delinquency they found in the communities most affected by the growth of the city, and true to the logical assumptions of the social control perspective they prescribed strong doses of local social control as the antidote to that delinquency problem.

There are three general theoretical implications of this perspective which are important to bear in mind as the perspective is applied to the study of fear of crime. First, the perspective focuses on differences between communities rather than individuals in the occurrence of criminal and delinquent behavior. The major orientation in the study of causes of crime throughout this century has been towards explaining why the individual commits deviant acts. Emphasis has been on articulating the personal motivations and influences which lead the individual to criminal activity. From phrenology through psychoanalysis, criminologists have attempted to explain the occurrence of deviance by the interaction of personal attributes and the individual's socialization experiences. As Kornhauser (1978) points out in her discussion of theories of delinquency, an over-reliance on personal socialization and sub-cultural influences has limited the explanatory power of most delinquency studies.

The social control perspective emphasizes institutional and contextual variables in explaining differences in community characteristics. This will be particularly important as the perspective is applied to the fear of crime, for the study of fear has mostly focused
on the demographic patterns of individual variations in fear rather than the structural issue of its distribution among local communities.

Second, the social control perspective emphasizes social change as a catalyst for the emergence of social problems. Thus, the investigation must relate the structural transformation of the city to the distribution of crime and delinquency. The differential distribution of resources contributes to that transformation. Shifts in population, density, business growth or decline all affect the development of social problems. The impact of these forces is felt in varying degrees by communities with varying racial and income compositions as well as the more subtle influences of institutional strength and indigenous leadership.

Finally, the criteria for assessing the extent of the social problem are comparative. The seriousness of a social problem is a function of the local community's capacity to cope with the relative, effects of social disorganization. Understanding the relative seriousness of a problem means comparing the impact of social disorganization on differing communities. Standards for description as well as treatment are derived empirically from the differing levels of deviance and not from an arbitrary judgment based on some ideal notion of health or normality imputed to individuals. These three features of the social control perspective should be remembered as the discussion now turns to applying the perspective to the study of fear of crime.

CHAPTER TWO
ADAPTING THE SOCIAL CONTROL PERSPECTIVE TO THE STUDY OF FEAR OF CRIME

Fear of crime is a problem in communities which do not have the capacity to regulate themselves. Communities which can exert social control through local institutions will have less fear than communities which cannot. For fear is the consequence of changes in the social organization of the community. As these changes are perceived by local residents they become fearful. Fear can be modified by the exertion of social control. There are many indicators of social disorganization for residents. Where these signs of disorganization go unchecked by local institutions fear increases. Where the signs of disorganization are checked by local action fear is reduced. Fearful communities are communities which cannot defend the local "moral order" in the face of social changes in the area. An example of social disorganization should help clarify the point.

Snodgrass (1976) and Holtch (1979) allude to the importance of business growth in the social control perspective. The expansion of business creates crime by disrupting the lives of city dwellers. Under the pressure of the disintegrative forces which act when business and industry invade a community, the community thus invaded ceases to function effectively as a means of social control. Traditional norms and standards of the conventional community weaken and disappear. Resistance on the part of the community to delinquent and criminal behavior is low, and such behavior is tolerated and may even become accepted and approved (Shaw, et al., 1929:24).

This notion of "invasion" offers an interesting, if undeveloped, insight into the process which makes crime a problem for a neighborhood.
First, this invasion implies the introduction of exogeneous influences into the life of the community. Shaw hypothesized that business and industry expanded into residential areas, weakening traditional norms. Land which was originally used and controlled by residents was now controlled by businesses, and that transfer of land destroyed in some unspecified ways the operative social controls. This hypothesis was developed in the 1920's in Chicago when the central business and commercial district was expanding. The influence of Burgess' concentric zone theory is evident in Shaw's approach (Burgess, Lohmen and Shaw, 1937). The intrusion of business into residential areas caused significant upheaval.

Suttles (1968) has drawn upon and expanded that notion of invasion in his contemporary work on the moral order of urban communities. He sees diverse ethnic groups rather than businesses as the invaders and argues that moral order is dependent upon the capacity of each host community to modify if not control access to the area which it inhabits.

This shift from business expansion to population movements reflects the decaying nature of the American metropolis in general and Chicago in particular. Contemporary cities in the industrialized Northeast have seen a steady erosion of their commercial base since World War II. The massive migration of blacks to the northern cities has replaced business expansion as the social force which most directly changes the shape and composition of urban communities. Suttles reflects this change in his emphasis on ethnic conflict and accommodation. He elaborates on the methods which residents use to assert social control (e.g., ordered segmentation).

Each ethnic section of the Addams area differs from the others in the extent to which it possesses a standardized routine for managing safe social relations. There is, however, a general agreement upon the social categories beyond which associations are not pursued. The boundaries of the neighborhood itself form the outermost perimeter for restricting social relations. Almost all the residents caution their wives, daughters, children, and siblings against crossing Roosevelt, Halsted, Congress, and Ashland. Within each neighborhood, each ethnic section is an additional boundary which sharply restricts movement (1968:225).

Suttles argues that fear and isolation are minimized to the extent that "standardized routines for managing safe social relations" exist. A fearful neighborhood, then, is one in which the signs of disorganization (e.g., invasion) give rise to the sense that community standards are no longer enforced or conformed to. It follows that the fear level in a neighborhood can be reduced by attempts to control these signs of disorganization. Where efforts are underway to reverse this trend towards disorganization fear is often reduced. Communities which have few signs of disorganization will have very little fear. Abandoned buildings, vandalism (disregard for property), kids hanging around and perceived drug use (inappropriate personal conduct) all signal the moral decline of the area. Where attempts are made to combat these problems through collective action, fear levels are lowered. By exerting control over land use and access to the area fear is lessened.

Suttles (1968) has termed this capacity "provincialism." In areas where ethnic groups have the power, both privately through home and business ownership, and publicly through locally based community
organizations, to manage access into their areas and the activities in these areas, fear may be reduced even if the signs of disorganization are evident. The reason for this is that the disorganization is not conceived of as a consequence of invasion. The disorganization is perceived as an internal problem which can be managed through channels available to the neighborhood residents.

The ability of local institutions to resist the disorganization process is a function of their capacity to assert the legitimacy of local standards and to affect those activities inside the neighborhood which are contributing to the disorganization process (Suttles, 1968). When a community cannot assert its values, its residents become fearful. The social and political organization of the local community is the first line of defense against the encroachment of the "urban environment" (Bernard, 1973), since the assertion of those values means the power to, if not dictate, at least influence, the decision making process in the public and private sectors which affect community life. Thus in the modern metropolis the political organization of the local community is equally as important as the social organization. In a great many instances that political organization may serve as the means for expressing the social organization.

Fear of crime from the social control perspective is a reaction to the decline of an area. The signs of the decline are captured in the general physical and moral disruption of community life. Those who are fearful may in fact see their risk of victimization increasing but they see this as a consequence of the moral decay of their community brought about by the invasion of forces which disrupt the social order.

To sum up, the social control perspective offers the following explanation of the fear of crime. Crime for residents of urban neighborhoods is a problem of the undermining of the conventional moral order. Concern about crime, for the most part, focuses on the activities of "invaders" or adolescents in the neighborhood as potential offenders. Residents are concerned that the neighborhood is losing its capacity to control its young as well as the other forces which undermine the social value system. Residents evaluate the extent of that deterioration through a variety of public indicators including the deterioration of property (abandoned buildings and vandalism) and the inappropriate behavior of adolescents (hanging out and drug use). Fear of crime is directly related to the signs of disorganization perceived by neighborhood residents in that locality. As these signs become more prevalent, fear becomes more prevalent. There are two factors which mediate this relationship between fear and signs of disorganization. They are the social integration of the neighborhood and what, following Suttles, we call the provincialism of the area. The former factor is a social dimension and the latter is political. In neighborhoods where there is high social integration, signs of disorganization do not usually induce high levels of fear. Communities which are integrated while reporting that their risk is increased by these signs of disorganization, are not as fearful as less integrated neighborhoods. The reason for this is that risk can be managed through knowledge of the area. Knowledge of the boundaries between ethnic groups in conflict, as well as

*This notion of invaders parallels the "fear of strangers" concept in the victimization perspective.
knowledge of individuals and areas which are dangerous, allows the integrated citizen to move through the environment carefully avoiding the dangerous areas. Consequently, because he knows the people and areas he should stay away from, his assessment of risk is relatively high, reflecting that assessment, but his fear is not proportionally as high because he knows how to avoid the danger.

Provincialism also has a modifying effect on fear in areas with many signs of disorganization. Provincialism is a political factor in that the community's capacity to regulate the movement of populations and land usage and to interact with those agencies which impinge upon and affect the community (e.g., municipal building departments) empowers residents to assert control. The capacity to regulate and provide linkage is especially effective in reducing fear when that capacity is utilized to reduce the signs of disorganization (e.g., have abandoned buildings removed). Taub, et al. (1978) point out the importance of these linkages in the evolution of community organizations and emphasize the role of "external agents" in that evolution. While we are in agreement that community organizations are more an expression of local political development than a consequence of social integration, the ability to cement those linkages is far more important for fear reduction in the community than the fact that those linkages might have been externally induced.

*Levi and Lipsky (1972) discuss this same capacity but from a sociology of protest orientation.

CHAPTER THREE

The social control perspective has not been without its critics and critiques. Indeed the emergence of the victimization perspective is directly tied to the general shift in emphasis away from the social control perspective after World War II. In this chapter we will review that shift in criminological theory and relate it to the major social policies initiative of the early 1960's. We will then describe the emergence of the victimization perspective as part of this general shift of emphasis in a period of a rapidly rising national crime rate.

By the 1950's the social control perspective had been generally discredited (Carey, 1975). Methodological difficulties (Guterman, 1959) along with a critique of the perspective as inherently middle-class and conservative (Mills, 1943) led to the general disenchantment.

The critique of the perspective began by the early 1940's. In 1939 two works had appeared which offered alternative theoretical explanations for the emergence of crime and delinquency. Edwin H. Sutherland published the third edition of his Principles of Criminology in 1939. In that edition he outlined his theory of "differential association" which described crime as a function of value conflicts between groups.

Educated at the University of Chicago, Sutherland depicted criminal activity as the result of the socialisation to values by one group which clashed with the values of a more powerful group in the society. "The conflict of cultures is the fundamental principle in the explanation of
crime" (1939:52). The values of one's intimates dictated the extent to
which one respected the laws. Adherence to the law was learned from
one's primary relation and if one's primary group felt no bond to the
statutes then the individual could not. Rather than crime being a
violation of commonly held values it was the adherence to values, just
not the ones expressed in the criminal code.

Robert Merton, building on the Durkheimian tradition, published
his "Social Structure and Anomie" in 1938. In that piece Merton
develops a general theory of crime and delinquency. Merton assumes a
general agreement upon values among all members of the society and sug-
gests that deviance follows from the differential distribution of
legitimate means to achieve those values. For example, all young men
agree that being rich is important but the poor lack means (e.g.,
education, employment opportunities, etc.) for obtaining the end.
Consequently illegitimate means (e.g., criminal activity) are used to
achieve the commonly agreed upon ends.

Both Sutherland and Merton develop theories of socialization in
contradiction to the social control perspective. Where the control
theorists emphasize how city life distorts and dilutes the values of
the local community, Sutherland and Merton emphasize the learned
nature of criminal activity. For Merton and Sutherland crime is a
consequence of learning all too well the lesson one's community is
trying to teach, while Shaw and McKay, among others, see the community's
incapacity to socialize as the catalyst for crime. Kornhauser (1978)
distinguishes Merton's "Strain Theory" from Sutherland's "Cultural
Deviance" approach on a variety of dimensions. However, for our
purposes it is their common reliance on personal motivations and
socialization in their theorizing which is most important.

Both Merton and Sutherland explain crime and delinquency in terms
of the factors which motivate individuals to commit deviant acts and
both perceive the local sub-culture as the transmitting agent for the
particular form those motivations take. These approaches are explana-
tions of personal behavior based on cultural influences. Both men were
more concerned with the "interactive process" (Matza, 1969) in their
communities than with community differences in levels of social
disorganization and social control.

Merton and Sutherland take the analysis of the relationship
between crime and community in two very different directions. The
latter draws the scholars' attention towards the interaction between
peers in the community, while the former focuses on the differential
opportunities available to adolescents in the community. In neither
case are the particularly urban dimensions of the early Chicago thinkers
retained. Finestone (1976) points out "the fundamental concept for the
analysis of the delinquency problem has become social status rather
than social change" (p. 167). The changes brought about by city life
in particular were no longer part of the analytic framework: rather,
scholars in the 1950's focused on the interplay of values and peer
pressure to explain delinquent behavior (e.g., Cohen, 1955).

There was another critique of the social control perspective which
began in 1943. In that year C. Wright Mills and William F. Whyte
challenged the concept of social disorganization. Whyte suggests
that concern about disorganization had led sociologists to focus on
a narrow range of aspects in lower class life.

For too long sociologists have concentrated their attention upon individuals and families that have been unable to make a successful adjustment to the demands of their society. We now need studies of the way in which individuals and groups have merged to reorganize their social relations and adjust conflicts (Whyte, 1963:34).

Building on his own work in Street Corner Society (1943), Whyte emphasizes the newly created social bonds in immigrant communities. If social disorganization involves a 'decrease of the influence of existing social rules,' and the rules referred to are those of the peasant society from which the immigrants came, then the slum is certainly disorganized. However, that is only a part of the picture. It is fruitless to study the area simply in terms of the breakdown of old groupings and old standards; new groupings and new standards have arisen (LThyte, 1943:38).

Rather than focusing on the destructive forces in the community, emphasis was placed on the institutions and habits which forged the moral order. Reacting to the explicit bias in the social disorganization perspective of emphasizing the deviant and pathological, Gans (1962) and Janowitz (1967), among others, focused on the regulation of daily life by conventional, although non-middle class, standards and rules.

Mills (1943) challenged the criteria social scientists were using in assessing these communities as disorganized. In his review of social problem text books, he observed a bias which stemmed from the white, rural, Protestant and nativist backgrounds of the scholars. That background colored their understanding of urban, immigrant life. Social disorganization was nothing more than the deviation from norms these men held to be correct and that judgement had been couched in scientific terminology. Both Whyte and Mills demonstrated that what the social control perspective described as deficiencies in community life were nothing more than differences in social organization.

The critique of social disorganization and the development of alternative theories of crime and delinquency reduced the social control perspective to an obsolete approach to the study of social problems. By the mid-1950's studies of crime and delinquency focused either on sub-culture or strain theories of motivation.

One of the most influential studies of that period was Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) Delinquency and Opportunity. A direct descendant of the Mertonian approach, that book was used to orient the planning of programs for delinquency prevention at the Ford Foundation and the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (Marris and Rein, 1967).

The authors argue that because adolescents in poor areas did not have access to the means (opportunities) to achieve their goals (status, money, recognition), they resorted to illicit activities to achieve those goals. Class differences are depicted as differences in relative access to common goals. The task for those who would prevent delinquency is to improve the legitimate access for those potential delinquents. This can be accomplished by improving the bureaucracies which served the poor.

The processes of assimilation were breaking down, and could only be repaired by an enlargement of opportunities. But this emancipation would only come about as the enabling institutions of assimilation—the schools, the welfare agencies, the vocational services—recognized their failure, and became more imaginative, coherent, and responsive (Marris and Rein, 1967:53).
The very institutions which the Chicago scholars had dismissed twenty years earlier as inadequate to the tasks of improving city life were given the "opportunity" of reforming themselves.

In the Chicago tradition, the city has a negative influence on community life. The problem of crime was a consequence of the social disorganization which ensued. In this newer formulation crime could be prevented if service agencies performed their functions better. Bureaucratic ineptness was the critical factor rather than urbanization.

This switch from an urban analysis to a service analysis means bureaucracies have to be changed, rather than the social and economic forces shaping the city. Foremost in this shift is a radically different notion of city life from the Chicago tradition. In the 1960's perspective the city was seen as an essentially neutral or benign background within which prevention strategies were developed.

As a whole, the strategy of the projects seemed to assume...that urban society is essentially a benevolent anarchy. Highly competitive, the city is yet open to all ambitious enough to pit themselves in the struggle. Its harshness is mitigated by social welfare, which should not merely confront the failures, but encourage them back into the race. And its justice is protected by an educational system which should ensure to every child an equal state. The will to compete is primary, and social agencies are to be judged, above all by their ability to foster and sustain it. If their middle-class prejudices make them at times insensitive, this is only an aspect of a more fundamental tendency towards bureaucratic introversion. Thus liberal reform, like the radical right, seems to be appealing to a tradition of individualism which bureaucracy has corrupted (Marris and Rein, 1967:52).

The delinquency prevention projects at the Ford Foundation and President's Committee saw general bureaucratic reform as their goal. The programs naively called for comprehensive planning and bureaucratic cooperation in a world without conflicting groups or interests. It seems as if the problems of the bureaucracy would be overcome by adding a new bureaucracy.

Taken together, the conceptions of a poverty cycle and of bureaucratic introversion explained the breakdown of assimilation to the opportunity structure without presupposing any fundamental conflict of interest. On both sides, the breakdown was seen in terms of irrational self-frustration. If this interpretation was right the projects could appeal to all parties to support a non-partisan program of reform (Marris and Rein, 1967:54), bureaucracies could reform themselves with the proper infusion of self-awareness and the experimental mentality. Crime could be prevented and community life improved by improving bureaucratic performance.

Shaw and McKay would reject this 1960's assimilationist reformism as part of the very urbanization process which was weakening social control in the communities. Assimilation is part of the process which leads to crime, not part of the prevention process. Improving assimilation, especially through bureaucratic intervention, may exacerbate the problem it is intended to solve.

It is assumed that the reason for rapid increase in crime in our large cities is due to the fact that the foreign element in our population has not succeeded in assimilating American culture and does not conform to the American mores. This would be interesting, if true, but the facts seem to suggest that perhaps the truth must be sought in the opposite direction (Park, 1925:27).

The irony of the evolution of the crime and community tradition should now be apparent. At precisely the point at which "community" programs became a central component of domestic policy, the theoretical orientation which demanded an understanding of how community factors "created" criminals had been replaced by an emphasis on bureaucratic
ineptness. At the point at which community activists were supplied with the resources to attack social problems, they were stripped of a conceptual framework which potentially made sense of the urban processes which affected those problems. While the rhetoric of these programs demanded change, the analysis of social problems which informed that rhetoric was inherently conservative. Or as Finestone (1976) put it in his discussion of delinquency research, "the conceptual primacy of the local community was replaced by that of social class" (p. 93).

The 1960's social planners had also discovered the path from local community to social class. But a class or an opportunity structure analysis, without a concrete understanding of how those opportunities are shaped by the structure of the metropolis, is forced into what Zimmerman (1972) calls a strategy for "bureaucratic democratization" (p. 6). For instead of reforming the local community the emphasis is on reforming the bureaucracies which service those communities. The dynamic link between crime and community which had been developed over fifty years ago through the social control perspective had been distorted into a discussion of poverty and bureaucracy in which the bureaucracy rather than the community was supposed to change.

By the mid-1960's, bureaucracy and poverty had replaced crime and community as the central reform issues. The expanded definition of the social problem coupled with the infusion of federal funds recast the issue of crime and community. The major loss in this transformation was a theory of urbanization which reflected the changing realities of American metropolitan life, and indicated how these changes affected the communities' capacity to exert social control.

While the study of crime and delinquency evolved into a critique of bureaucracy, the study of local community continued, but there was a strategic shift in emphasis. Led by William Whyte and his Street Corner Society (1943), there was a renewed interest in the aspects of lower class life which cemented social bonds.

The studies still emphasized social control, but now it was in terms of how it operated rather than in terms of its malfunction. Given this bifurcation between studies of crime and community, and the practical and conceptual dead end the community action programs had run into by the late 1960's, it is no wonder that the victimization perspective developed so readily.

The victimization perspective shifted the emphasis in crime and delinquency studies from the offender to the victim. With the official crime rates soaring by the late 1960's and the ghetto riots turning policy makers and the public against the infusion of federal funds into the black community, "innovative" concepts about preventing and controlling crime were receiving serious attention. Wilson captured and articulated the spirit of this conservative shift in interest.

Predatory crime does not merely victimise individuals, it impedes and, in the extreme case, even prevents the formation and maintenance of community. By disrupting the delicate nexus of ties, formal and informal, by which we are linked with our neighbors, crime atomizes society and makes of its members mere individual calculators estimating their own advantage, especially their own chances for survival amidst their fellows (Wilson, 1975:21).

The "cost of crime" issue (Miller, 1973) was seen less in terms of what offenders might lose and more in terms of the impact crime was...
having on victims. Crime was destroying community.

What these concerns have in common, and thus what constitutes the 'urban problem' for a large percentage (perhaps a majority) of urban citizens, is a sense of the failure of community (Hiller, 1973:24).

I will discuss the importance of the idea of community in both perspectives in the next chapter. It suffices at this point to begin to understand how the victimization perspective emerged out of the conceptual void left by the strain and cultural deviance theories of the preceding twenty years.

Biderman (1967), Reiss (1967), and Ennis (1967) all administered surveys funded by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice to randomly selected populations. While the surveys varied in their foci, all attempted to measure the amount of fear reported by respondents. Fear, while measured differently in each survey, was implicitly defined as anticipating the occurrence of a crime event. Where anticipation was high, fear by definition was high. An increase in crime was assumed to generate an increase in fear.

All three researchers took as their task documenting the level of fear among respondents, assuming that fear was related to the amount of crime to which respondents were exposed. Indeed, given the measures employed by the scholars, it would have been impossible to dissociate fear of crime from the anticipated crime events. For example, Biderman measured "Fear of Personal Attack" by one item:

Would you say there has been an increase in violent crimes here in Washington? I mean attacks on people—like shootings, stabblings and rapes? Would you say that there's now very much more of this sort of thing, just a little bit more, not much difference, or that there is no more than five years ago? (1967:132; see also Appendix D, p. 11).

To report an increase in violent crime events is to score high on fear of crime (or in this case, attack). Reiss, while avoiding a direct discussion of fear subsumed the topic in a more general discussion of "citizen perceptions about crime in their areas." Here again anticipation of the crime event was synonymous with fear.

When you think about your chances of getting robbed, threatened, beaten up, or anything of that sort, would you say your neighborhood is (compared to other neighborhoods in town): very safe, above average, less safe, or one of the worst? (Reiss, 1967:33-34).

Have you changed your habits because of fear of crime? (stay off streets, use taxis or cars, avoid being out, don't talk to strangers.) (1967:102-110)

These early studies highlighted two ways victimization would increase fear. The "individual fear profile approach" focuses on the correlates of fear among demographically defined groups. Emphasis here is less on the criminogenic aspects of the environment and how it is assessed and more on the demographic characteristics associated with victimization and fear of crime. This approach relies on large national samples and is generally descriptive.

The "neighborhood assessment" approach focused on the amount of crime the respondent expected the local neighborhood to produce. Both Ennis (1967) and Biderman (1967) develop measures of fear which were premised on the imputed relationship between a dangerous neighborhood and individual fear. Biderman called this measure an "Index of Anxiety" and it was composed of the following items:

1) What was it about the neighborhood that was most important?

(If this was asked only of those residents who indicated the neighborhood was more important than the house in selecting their present residence) - Safety or moral reasons vs. convenience, etc.
2) When you think about the chances of getting beaten up would you say this neighborhood is very safe, about average, less safe than most, one of the worst?

3) Is there so much trouble that you would move if you could?

(Again, a screen question asked only of those who did not say their neighborhood was very safe.)

4) Are most of your neighbors quiet or are there some who create disturbances? (All quiet, few disturbances, many disturbances.)

5) Do you think that crime has been getting better or worse here in Washington during the past year? (Better, worse, same) (Biderman et al., 1967:121).

Ennis (1967) distinguished between "Fear of Crime" and "Perception of Risk." He measured "fear" by the following items:

1) How safe do you feel walking alone in your neighborhood during the day?
2) How safe do you feel walking alone in your neighborhood after dark?
3) How often do you walk in your neighborhood after dark?
4) Have you wanted to go somewhere recently but stayed home because it was unsafe?
5) How concerned are you about having your house broken into? (Ennis, 1967:72-75).

Risk was measured by two items:

1) How likely is it a person walking around here at night might be held up or attacked—very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely?
2) Compared to other parts of the city, is a home or apartment around here much less likely to be broken into—somewhat less likely, somewhat more likely, or much more likely to be broken into? (Ennis, 1967:75-76).

Ennis distinguishes between "feeling unsafe" (the report of fear) and the assessment of the possibility that a crime will occur (risk). But his fear measure seems as much an assessment of the neighborhood as it is a report on the respondent's sense of dis-ease.

As Baumer (1977) has pointed out, there is little published information on how these early measures were developed, but for our purposes it is their content rather than their methodological limitations which is of interest. For these early scholars developed the research vocabulary for the study of fear of crime in the decade which followed.

The importance of this early work, for our purposes, can be found in the assumed association between fear (as a reported internal state of the individual) and the number of victimizations the respondent anticipates. Fear is assumed to be a consequence of the potential for victimization and the research issue is how that fear is distributed within a given population. The neighborhood is seen as a setting within which that victimization takes place. If the respondent scores high as an anticipator of victimization he is defined as fearful. A neighborhood is fear inducing to the extent that it provides a context for criminal activity.

The victimization perspective (as we shall call that contemporary approach) postulates "crime" as an event experienced by the individual as either a direct or indirect victim. Fear, from this perspective, is a consequence, a response in time, of having had contact with crime events. If direct victimization fails to account for particularly high levels of fear, then indirect contact usually through the media or personal communication is postulated as the mechanism through which the experience of crime affects the individual. Fear then becomes an indicator of the effect of victimization on the individual. Fear is seen
as a direct consequence of crime exposure. There is a direct linearity to this scenario which is assumed and rarely tested.

The victimization perspective shares several features with the strain and sub-cultural theories of crime and delinquency which displaced the social control perspective. The victimization perspective is an implicit theory of motivation. Fear is explained in terms of the stimuli (victimizations) which trigger the fear in the individual. Just as Sutherland and Merton (and those who followed in their footsteps) sought to explain the motivations of offenders in terms of the values of the groups to which they belonged, so the victimization scholars seek to explain fear of crime in terms of how victimization experiences generate fear in individuals. Victimizations lead to fear just as naturally as working class cultures lead to delinquency.

Ennis, Biderman and Reiss, while focusing on very different issues, all found that fear was not related to the level of victimization experienced by the individual or anticipated in the surrounding area in a direct, straightforward way. While the amount of crime in an area generally predicted the amount of fear among those area residents, there were enough inconsistencies in this finding to raise the issue of what other factors besides the level of victimization affected the level of fear among respondents.

In dealing with these anomalies, some scholars postulated the existence of various social psychological mechanisms to rationalize their findings. For example, Stinchcombe (1977) introduces the concept of "vulnerability" to help explain fear among women and the elderly.

The most commonly relied upon mechanism is the idea of fear of strangers. Faced with the disjunction between levels of fear and levels of victimization, several scholars introduce the "stranger" as that which explains the fear. As stated by Ennis (1967):

"It is not the seriousness of the crime, but rather the unpredictability and the sense of invasion by unknown strangers that engenders mistrust and hostility" (p. 80).

McIntyre (1967) echoes the same thinking in her analysis of avoidance behaviors. "The precautions which people take to protect themselves indicate that underlying fear of crime is a profound fear of strangers" (p. 40). Biderman (1967) sees the relationship as being even more direct, "fear of crime is the fear of strangers," and Skogan (1976) interprets the relationship between robbery victimization and fear as a consequence of the fear of strangers. But the fear of strangers is only introduced ex post facto to interpret results and explain findings. While Skogan may be correct in attributing the relationship between robbery and fear to an intervening fear of strangers, that suggestion is pure conjecture.

The fear of stranger explanation posits the existence of an intervening type of fear which has not been measured. Consequently, this attribution process is not opened to empirical testing and has no better standing than victimization itself as an explanatory factor (Blake and Davis, 1964; 460).

There has been some progress made within the victimization perspective by refining measurement techniques and analysis procedures in particular. Pursemberg (1972), Fowler and Mangione (1974), Skogan (1976) and Hindelang, Garofalo and Gottfriedson (1978) have all refined the conceptualization of fear in the victimization framework. Distinctions
between fear, concern, worry and risk have helped distinguish the various attitudinal dimensions captured in the idea of fear, and these clarifications have improved the explanatory power of more recent studies.

Also refining the various types of victimization (personal/property, single/multiple, direct/indirect, etc.) used as the independent variable has led to improved results. In this vein, some scholars have attempted to develop more refined measures of the amount of crime to which respondents are exposed. Balkin (1979), for example, argued "that fear of crime is a rational response to the actual incidence of crime, and that where discrepancies appear it is because of faulty objective measures of crime incorrectly calibrating the real risk of crime." (p. 343)

Skogan (1977), Garofalo (1977) and Hindelang et al. (1978) have all made valuable contributions to our understanding of fear of crime from the victimization perspective. Indeed, the last decade has seen much progress since the early formulations of Biderman (1967), Reiss (1967) and Ennis (1967). Many of the difficulties of the early work may be overcome by this second generation of scholars who have expanded the perspective rather than rejecting it. We simply offer a different road for the reader to take. It may lead nowhere or, more likely, to a junction between the perspectives in the future. But we hope to convince the reader that the anomalies and inconsistencies which have surfaced in the findings on fear of crime throughout this decade of research are more the result of asking the wrong questions than failing to get the right answers because of methodological shortcomings.
decline of the community.

Little of the material we have examined suggests that Durkheim was correct in arguing that crime brings people together and strengthens social bonds. Instead, crime produces insecurity, distrust, and a negative view of the community. Although we lack conclusive evidence, crime also seems to reduce social interaction as fear and suspicion drive people apart. This produces a disorganized community that is unable to exercise informal social control over deviant behavior (Conklin, 1975:99).

This scenario is predicated on the notion that people react to crime in individualized ways. Rather than collectively sanctioning the criminal behavior as Durkheim would anticipate, citizens, because of fear, attempt to protect themselves individually (e.g., buying guns and locks, not going out, etc.), thus breaking down community cohesion. Conklin’s discussion of community hinges on the distinction he makes between individual and collective responses to crime and these responses in turn gather their importance from Conklin’s use of the victimization perspective. For the logic of responding individually hinges on the salience of the victimization experience. Individual responses are assumed to be the normal response to the fear, or experience, of victimization. Since this relationship is assumed, the conclusion that individual responses have negative consequences follows from the primacy of the victimization experience. Interestingly enough, this line of reasoning makes the response to victimization rather than the victimization itself, the central phenomenon. When a community can respond collectively, crime integrates; when those responses are individualized, crime disintegrates community ties (Lewis, 1979).

The victimization perspective defines crime as an event that is experienced individually by a citizen. Conklin implicitly uses this definition in his application of Durkheim’s work on deviance and argues that "crime" (victimization experiences) does not usually bring people together in a community. However, collective responses, that is, those responses which unite people in an attempt to do something about crime are by definition community building activities, for they bring people together to resist victimization. Given the reliance on victimization as the motivating factor for initiating responses, we have no sense of the process which would make collective responses an appropriate reaction.

The victimization perspective draws us toward the characteristics of the particular victimizations (crime waves, dramatic incidents, etc.) in explaining when and where collective responses occur. There is no acknowledged mechanism through which these events could make for collective action. We are told that collective responses build a sense of community, but we are not aware of under what circumstances that will happen. If crime destroys the individual’s sense of community by undermining each individual’s imputed sense of trust and cohesiveness, how are collective responses possible in a crime-ridden community?

While Conklin does not address this issue of process, he does describe the kinds of collective responses which emerge.

Crime weakens the fabric of social life by increasing fear, suspicion, and distrust. It also reduces public support for the law, in terms of unwillingness to report crime and criticism of the police. However, under certain conditions people will engage in collective action to fight crime. They may work for a political candidate who promises to restore law and order. They may call meetings of community residents to plan an attack on crime. Sometimes they may even band together in a civilian police patrol to carry out the functions that the police are not effectively performing for them. Since people who perceive high crime rates often hold the police responsible for crime prevention, we would expect such patrols to emerge where people feel very threatened by crime,
believe that the police cannot protect them, and think from past experience with community groups that the people themselves can solve the problem (Conklin, 1975:185).

The collective response in the victimization perspective is an attempt to exert social control. It is response to crime, but its emergence and the shape it may assume in varying circumstances is left unspecified. Since crime and fear atomize communities it is not at all clear when we should expect to see it develop, and why it emerges in some contexts and not in others. Equally troubling is the issue of sponsorship. Neither Conklin nor any of the other scholars working in this area (WashniB, 1976; Schneider and Schneider, 1977) discuss in any detail which groups or individuals, under what circumstances, are more or less likely to organize these collective responses. While we know something about who will participate in these activities once they are operational, very little has been suggested about which groups or individuals will emerge, either successfully or unsuccessfully, to lead these collective responses.

Within the social control perspective, Louis Wirth (1933) defines community as "group life when viewed from the standpoint of symbiosis":

A territorial base, distribution in space of men, institutions, and activities, close living together on the basis of kinship and organic interdependence, and a common life based upon the mutual correspondence of interest tend to characterize a community (Wirth, 1933:166).

As we have discussed previously, if the community's capacity to regulate itself is undermined by social disorganization, crime and the fear of crime increase. The key problem as Janowitz (1978) points out is "whether the processes of social control are able to maintain the social order while transformation and social change take place" (p. 30).

Thus the collective response is less of a mystery within the social control perspective. All urban communities exert social control through local institutions. The need to regulate behavior by socializing residents to local values and controlling those who violate those values is an integral part of community life.

The problem in realistic terms is one of achieving a new organization of life in these local deteriorated communities. As an objective, society can aim toward the development of a new and local spirit of collective welfare, expressed in an interest in child welfare, social and physical improvement of the district (Burgess, Lohman and Shaw, 1937:23).

That "new and local spirit of collective welfare" must be instilled in those institutions which can directly affect the values of local residents.

Since for most group purposes it is impossible in the city to appeal individually to the large number of discrete and differentiated individuals, and since it is only through the organizations to which men belong that their interests and resources can be enlisted for a collective cause, it may be inferred that social control in the city should typically proceed through formally organized groups (Wirth, 1938:23).

Fear can be reduced if this new spirit can be infused into "formally organized groups." Finally, the leadership of these groups should logically come from the local citizenry.

In recognizing the existent cultural organization one can identify intelligence and ingenuity in the local population which can be enlisted for this purpose. This natural leadership which is the product of a distinctive social life can be strategically utilized in giving direction of a constructive kind to the cultural and recreational life of the community. Young men and women from the local community are in a position to express more exactly the needs and moods of the people (Burgess, Lohman and Shaw, 1937:23).
Social control, if it is not to become simple coercion, must be exerted through locally led community-based organizations. The secondary institutions of the state are not equipped to prevent either crime or fear. The prevention of crime was conceived as a task that would only be achieved outside of the formal agencies established to prevent crime. The placement of the prevention mechanism within community institutions led to a reformist politics premised on the inability of the criminal justice system to achieve its ends. If conventional value consensus is the key to reducing crime, then bureaucracies are by definition incapable of inculcating those values, because values are best transmitted by individuals with whom one has primary relations.

What we do observe— is that control that was formerly based on mores was replaced by control based on positive law. This change runs parallel to the movement by which secondary relationships have taken the place of primary relationships in the association of individuals in the city environment (Burgess, Lohman and Shaw, 1937:30).

The Chicago scholars and reformers also made several assumptions about the nature of the community they were reforming. Of critical importance among these was the assumption that the community was made up of potential offenders. Their approach to crime prevention was premised on reducing crime by preventing people from becoming criminals rather than preventing people from becoming victims. The assumption embedded in this approach was that if you do something about local social control you will have an impact on crime. That criminal activity was the consequence of the way the community was organized was an assumption which derived directly from a theory of urbanization. Tannenbaum (1938) makes the point forcefully:

"The criminal is not a symptom merely, he is a product, he is of the very bone and fiber of the community itself... The distinction between the criminal and the community drawn in sharp contrast—a distinction between good and evil—is a false distinction and obscures the issue (Tannenbaum, 1938:25).

The result was a strategy for crime prevention which postulated that to build a community was to deter crime.

The preservation of a viable, secure, urban community is the concern of scholars working within both perspectives. The capacity of those community residents to exert social control is linked to the reduction of fear in both perspectives, but the victimization perspective describes the weakening of community solidarity as a consequence of crime and fear, while the social control perspective treats community as a context within which fear and crime emerge given a lack of social control.

The social control perspective offers an alternative explanation for the emergence of individual responses. Rather than adding to the isolation of individuals and the decline of community solidarity, individual responses may have a far more complex relationship to fear and community.

Individual responses have been separated into avoidance and mobilization behaviors (Furstenberg, 1972). By avoidance, Furstenberg means "strategies to isolate...oneself from exposure to victimization," (e.g., staying off the streets at night, locking doors, ignoring strangers, etc.). Mobilization techniques in contrast involved the protection of one's property and/or self through the purchase of a product (e.g., burglar alarms, window bars, flow lights, guns, etc.). In making this distinction Furstenberg noted that Biderman had found that citizens who "avoided" didn't necessarily "mobilize," and vice-versa,
thus suggesting the independence of these dimensions. In addition while those who avoid are more afraid than those who do not, mobilization and fear are not correlated positively (Furstenberg, 1972).

Applying Suttles' (1968) work within the social control perspective, we can offer another interpretation of avoidance behaviors. Avoidance behaviors can be seen as part of a broader social process by which people in slum areas (often high crime areas) define and constitute the "moral order." Given a situation of mutual distrust and suspicion, ghetto residents create a relatively secure, stable environment by restricting their movements and relationships in space. "Public morality" is constituted through the delination of safe areas and persons.

...A positive role for conflict cannot be appreciated unless it is placed in a developmental sequence. At the outset, parents, and children in the Addams area do not prescribe a definite set of persons with whom the family are to associate. Instead, they voice a variety of proscriptions: 'Don't go out of the neighborhood;' 'Don't you get off the block;' 'Stay by the house, like I told you' (Suttles, 1968:228).

These "avoidance behaviors" then are the building blocks for the "ordered segmentation" which creates a sense of order and safety in slum areas.

From this perspective avoidance behaviors function as the building blocks of community, rather than community disintegrating activities. They have both the symbolic and practical value of delimiting and thereby manufacturing a liveable moral order. Avoidance behavior then is a common social practice, not explicitly as a reaction to victimization, but possibly more as an ordering phenomenon. This alternative explanation places avoidance behaviors in a general theory of ordering the environment rather than solely as a response to the perceived risk of victimization. Avoidance behaviors supply the building blocks for a liveable moral order, and this creates trust rather than distrust.

It does not follow from this discussion that all avoidance behaviors build community. Indeed, in areas where residents assume a safe rather than a dangerous environment, e.g., suburbs, avoidance behaviors may have the negative impact Conklin and Furstenberg suggest. The same activity can mean different things in different settings. But in urban areas it may be more useful to think of individual responses as a common ordering activity rather than a response to victimization.

Finally, the Suttles approach may provide an insight into the limited utilization of mobilization techniques. Furstenberg found that regardless of the fear level people did little to protect their homes. The finding was "puzzling" to him. But if avoidance behaviors are better understood as part of a construction of a moral order, rather than a reaction to crime, the discrepancy between the frequency with which avoidance and mobilization behaviors are employed is less startling. Mobilization behaviors may be explained more by social class (having the income to spend on protective devices) than by the anticipation of victimization or fear, and consequently their employment should not be considered a direct reaction to crime.

Both perspectives do assume that communities which exert social control have less of a crime and fear problem than communities which do not. There is some evidence (Maccoby et al., 1958; Clinard and Abbott, 1976) that communities which have the capacity to exert informal social control have less of a crime problem than areas which do not have that capacity. However, the relationship between informal social control and collective responses is based more on theoretical considerations than empirical findings. In both perspectives the collective response is an intentional intervention to construct "formally" informal social controls.
Both Furstenberg (1972) and DuBow and Podolefsky (1979) have done empirical studies on citizen participation in collective responses and both report that concern about crime is not associated positively with participation in collective responses to crime. Indeed, participators in collective responses do not differ significantly on a variety of crime-related attitudinal measures from their nonparticipating neighbors. Podolefsky et al. (1979) in a separate study also demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of collective responses were oriented towards neighborhood improvement and programs for adolescents.

Theorists from both perspectives are pessimistic about the emergence and longevity of such efforts (Wirth, 1933; Conklin, 1975), although that gloom is based on very different kinds of analysis. Collective responses are the chief means of modifying the effects of crime on a community but these responses are difficult to sustain. The victimization perspective posits the isolation of citizens because of crime as the reason for this difficulty, while the social disorganization perspective identifies the general pressures of city life as working against their emergence. In both cases, collective responses helped to maintain local community as crime eroded community life, but the task is by no means automatic. The victimization perspective offers no sociological or psychological mechanism to explain the emergence of collective responses. The social control perspective posits the mechanism (local institutions preserving conventional standards) but remains skeptical of the success of the response given the pressures facing these disorganized communities (Wirth, 1933; Taub et al., 1978).
CHAPTER FIVE

THE SOCIAL CONTROL PERSPECTIVE: AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION

We have traced the historical and analytic development of two perspectives which guide research into crime in general and fear of crime in particular. The social control perspective emphasizes the impact of city life on the capacity of urban communities to regulate themselves. The victimization perspective focuses on individual motivation. The former directs our attention to variables generally not considered by those who utilize the latter in the analysis of fear of crime. It points to differences between communities rather than individuals; it extends the range of fear engendering conditions; and it assumes the relevance of both the perceived causes of these conditions and the sources of social control enabling residents to cope with them.

To demonstrate how their central concepts are defined and linked we have contrasted the two perspectives along four dimensions: crime, fear, responses and community. Figure I schematizes our previous discussion. The social control perspective broadens the conception of crime to include both the conventional behaviors defined as illegal by most criminal codes and a range of conditions and behaviors signalling to neighborhood residents the decline of the local moral order. All of these are defined as "crimes" because they indicate that conventional values are not guiding behavior.

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Fear, the self-report by citizens that they are afraid, is generated not only by victimization experiences but also by increases in any number of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victimization Perspective</th>
<th>Social Disorganization Perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crime</strong></td>
<td>Crime is a perceived process of the decline of the local, moral order. This perception is shared by communities. The potential offender is the key actor in the decline of the moral order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fear</strong></td>
<td>Fear is a communal response to the decline in the moral order. That response is contingent upon the signs of disorganization perceived in the environment. Communities are generally fearful to the extent that these signs increase unchecked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responses</strong></td>
<td>Local institutions not individuals respond to crime. Responses aim to strengthen the socialization and social control capacities of those institutions. Provincialism is the capacity to modify the behavior of potential offenders through the control of land and its utilization. The effect of crime is limited in provincial communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community</strong></td>
<td>Community is disintegrated by crime. Community solidarity is a consequence of overcoming the effects of fear. It is difficult to accomplish in areas with high fear levels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Figure 1, a comparison of perspectives is presented. The Victimization Perspective views crime as an event defined by criminal statutes as illegal, experienced by the individual. The potential victim is the key actor, and higher victimization is the manifestation of crime. Fear is a consequence for the individual of experiencing crime or the anticipation of victimization based on the assessment of local conditions. Citizens respond individually or collectively, isolating and crime producing. The effect of crime is limited in communities. Community is disintegrated by crime. Community solidarity is a consequence of overcoming the effects of fear. It is difficult to accomplish in areas with high fear levels.

On the other hand, the Social Disorganization Perspective views crime as a perceived process of the decline of the local, moral order. Fear is a communal response to the decline in the moral order, contingent upon the signs of disorganization perceived in the environment. Communities are generally fearful to the extent that these signs increase unchecked. Local institutions not individuals respond to crime, aiming to strengthen the socialization and social control capacities of those institutions. Provincialism is the capacity to modify the behavior of potential offenders through the control of land and its utilization. The effect of crime is limited in provincial communities. Community is the context in which crime affects the moral order. Community is a set of institutional relationships through which solidarity is maintained.

Indicators of social disorganization in the community. When one investigates fear of crime within the social control framework, the local community becomes the unit of analysis; the signs of social disorganization in the community, the independent variables and fear, the dependent variable. This approach captures the contextual imprint of local conditions on reported fear levels that is lost when the research focus is confined to demographically defined subgroups. In this section we explore the utility of the social control perspective by examining ten communities in which the residents exhibit varying levels of fear. The following hypothesis provides the framework for our analysis.

Fear is a consequence of the failure of local institutions to exert social control and is more likely to be found in neighborhoods where residents see an increase of disorder in their communities and where they lack the resources that might contain the problems thus engendered. We have noted, in our previous discussion that signs of social disorganization will engender less fear in communities with high levels of social integration and provincialism. Social integration will strengthen a community's capacity to regulate the behavior of local residents and provincialism (in Suttles terminology) enhances the capacity of local residents to control the use of the land within their community boundaries. The latter is dependent on community linkages to the private and public institutions whose decisions determine the shape of neighborhood development and change.

Our investigation constitutes a comparative case study. And although the number of cases precludes generalization, we hope that the insights provided by our efforts will form the basis for more systematic research endeavors. Our analysis will concentrate on social change, social disorder and social control. In considering social change we will try to assess the extent and direction of change (better or worse) and the time frame...
within which it occurs. And we will look at the factors associated with that change. These include changes in the behavior of groups indigenous to the area, the intrusion of new groups or business into the area or the implementation of new policies by private and public agencies affecting neighborhood development.

These changes frequently lead to a variety of conditions and behaviors viewed by local residents as threatening to the integrity of their community. Among those most frequently identified are the physical deterioration of the area and an increase in criminal and/or other behaviors that a majority of the residents find unacceptable and threatening. The neighborhood response to these conditions is shaped by the resources which allow them to exert social control. Some of these are locally based and derived; others are dependent on the support provided by agencies external to the community.

In operationalizing these concepts, we will use perceptual rather than objectively measurable indicators. We do this, not only because of the difficulty involved in devising adequate objective measures, but mainly because the attitudes we are studying are based on perceptions rather than on some commonly accepted definition of the situation in each of these areas. Furthermore, we want to avoid the possibility of imposing our own definitions on respondents who might not share them. In operationalizing our concepts and in selecting our indicators we have tried to approximate as closely as possible the circumstances in which the residents in the neighborhoods conduct their daily affairs. The expected relationships are depicted in Figure 2.

---

**FIGURE 2**

FEAR OF CRIME IN THE SOCIAL CONTROL PERSPECTIVE

Social Disorganization —> Lack of Control —> Fear

Provincialism, Social Integration

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Insert Figure 2 here
The Data

Data was collected as part of the general data gathering activity of the Reactions to Crime Project at the Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University. The project was funded by the National Institute of Justice to undertake a long-term, multi-methodological research endeavor. As part of that project, data was collected in ten communities in three cities: Chicago, Philadelphia and San Francisco. Data collection techniques included a random-digit dialing telephone survey, fifteen months of fieldwork in each community and the use of archival data, e.g., crime data, census data, etc. The use of a multi-method strategy offers a unique opportunity in social science research for both the breadth of information (from surveys) and the depth of understanding (from fieldwork) not often afforded researchers.

The dependent variable in the social control perspective is fear of crime. Our measure of fear is derived from one item on the telephone survey:

How safe do you feel, or would you feel, being out alone in your neighborhood at night—very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?

This item is a slight modification of the item most generally used in previous surveys to measure fear of crime (Cook and Cook, 1975). You will notice from Figure 3 that the ten communities in our sample range from a high of 54 percent to a low of 24 percent of the residents reporting fear, with a cluster of communities around the 30 percent mark. Our city samples also cluster at the 30 percent level. It will be our task in the remainder of this report to explain this variation within the social control perspective.

FIGURE 3

Fear of Crime* (Percent feel unsafe in neighborhood at night)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>WICKER PARK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>WOODLAWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>VISITATION VALLEY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>MISSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>WEST PHILADELPHIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>LOGAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>SOUTH PHILADELPHIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Missing values have been excluded from analysis.

[Insert Figure 3 here]
The Neighborhoods

In delimiting the neighborhoods for this study we were guided by Hunter and Suttles' definition of community: "that piece of urban geography for which residents have a collective awareness which may be manifest minimally in symbolically shared names and boundaries" (Hunter, 1974). Boundaries for our study sites thus were determined on the basis of the perceptions of area residents interviewed during the fieldwork phase of the project and were not drawn to match any convenient pre-existing geographical subunits. The neighborhoods were neither randomly selected nor meant to be representative of the cities in which they were located. Rather they were chosen on the basis of their characteristic socio-economic class, racial status, crime rate and on the apparent level of organizational activity.

The ten communities—four in Chicago and three each in San Francisco and Philadelphia—represent the range of those typically found in large urban areas. Their demographic composition is presented in Table 1.

Four of the neighborhoods are predominantly white. Two—Lincoln Park in Chicago and Sunset in San Francisco—are middle class and relatively affluent. Sixty percent of the residents in both neighborhoods have completed schooling beyond high school. The other two—Back of the Yards in Chicago and South Philadelphia—are predominantly working class with lower levels of income and education. Both have within them small separated enclaves of black residents.

Four of the neighborhoods are racially and ethnically heterogeneous. Of these, Visitacion Valley in San Francisco is the more affluent with a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1</th>
<th>DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lincoln Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Employed</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Unemployed</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ over $20,000</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ under $10,000</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean # Children</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-40</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-60</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61+</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Spanish</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Own Homes</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 Population</td>
<td>21,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 Population</td>
<td>20,773</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
middle and working class population whose income approximates those in Lincoln Park and Sunset, but whose educational levels are lower. Its minority population consists of Blacks (29%) Hispanics (11%) and a smaller number of Filipinos and Samoans. Although some blacks are segregated in the public housing projects, the rest of the neighborhood is ethnically and racially integrated.

The other integrated areas are more economically deprived. Wicker Park in Chicago, Logan in Philadelphia, and Mission in San Francisco are lower and working class areas with over 30% of their residents earning less than $10,000, and between 14-16% unemployed. Activists in both Wicker Park and Mission note that the census figures underrepresent the percentage of Hispanics which they claim comprise 30% of the population in both neighborhoods. Other minorities include blacks (15% in Wicker Park and 9% in Mission) and, in Mission, a number of Filipinos, American Indians and Samoans.

Woodlawn in Chicago and West Philadelphia are predominantly black low income neighborhoods. Approximately 17% of the residents in both sites are unemployed and approximately 30% have completed schooling beyond high school.

The four predominantly white areas as well as the two integrated San Francisco neighborhoods are for the most part clean and physically well maintained. Between 40-60% of the residents in most of these sites own their homes. The two exceptions are Lincoln Park and Mission where the high percentage of renters reflects the preponderance of younger residents without children.

The two black and two of the four integrated areas are less well maintained. There one finds conditions typically associated with urban decay—littered streets and vacant lots, dilapidated and abandoned housing and deteriorating commercial areas. Although these conditions are evident in all four neighborhoods, they appear to be more prevalent in Wicker Park and Woodlawn. The two Philadelphia areas (West Philadelphia and Logan) are atypical of low income areas in their large percentage of homeowners (60%). Wicker Park and Woodlawn are more typical with 33% of the residents in the former and 17% in the latter owning their homes.

Social Disorganization Indicators

We developed a number of different indicators of social disorganization using the telephone survey and the field notes. For analytical purposes we divide those indicators into signs of victimization and signs of incivility. Since some of the indicators are drawn from the survey and others from a content analysis of the field notes, they range from very quantitative to qualitative in nature. The indicators are:

1. Reported crime rates for each neighborhood (victimization)
2. Concern about crime as a neighborhood problem (victimization)
3. Concern about various signs of "incivility" as a neighborhood problem (incivility)
4. Knowing a local victim—vicarious victimization (victimization)
5. Perceptions on the part of the neighborhood activists that the neighborhood is being inadequately served by city machinery (incivility)
6. Presence and degree of ethnic conflict (incivility)
7. Introduction of undesirable businesses in commercial areas in the neighborhood (incivility).
Indicators (5) through (8) are drawn from the content analysis of the field notes and are essentially impressions of recurring themes heard from neighborhood residents and key persons in various neighborhood groups. The following sections discuss the exact manner in which the indicators were operationalized.

Concern About Victimization

The survey respondents were asked whether four types of crime were neighborhood problems. The exact wording of the questions were:

- **Burglary**: What about burglary for the neighborhood in general. Is breaking into people's homes or sneaking in to steal something a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem for people in your neighborhood?
- **Robbery**: How about people being robbed or having their purses or wallets taken in the street. Would you say that this is a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem in your neighborhood?
- **Assault**: Besides robbery, how about people being attacked or beaten up in your neighborhood by strangers. Is this a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem in your neighborhood?
- **Rape**: In your neighborhood, would you say sexual assaults are a big problem, somewhat of a problem, or almost no problem at all?

The response scale for these items ranged from 1 (almost no problem) to 3 (big problem).

Crime Awareness

As another indicator of the degree to which residents perceive social disorder, we asked whether or not they knew someone in their neighborhood who was a victim of a particular crime. Specifically we asked:

- Do you personally know of anyone, other than yourself whose home or apartment has been broken into in the past year or so?
- (if yes) Did any of these break-ins happen in your present neighborhood?

The questions were appropriately reworded so that we asked the question for assault, robbery and rape as well as burglary.

Concern About Neighborhood Signs of Incivility

In order to assess the levels of concern that residents felt about various signs of neighborhood disorganization, the following questions were asked of the respondents in the sample:

- **Groups of teenagers hanging out on the streets.** Is this a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem in your neighborhood?
- **Buildings or storefronts sitting abandoned or burned out.** Is this a big problem, some problem or almost no problem in your neighborhood?
- **People using illegal drugs in the neighborhood.** Is this a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem?
- **Vandalism, like kids breaking windows or writing on walls or things like that.** How much of a problem is this?

These particular indicators were developed in conjunction with the fieldwork. When fieldworkers asked neighborhood residents what the nature of the local crime problem was, residents typically included descriptions of teenage loitering or drug activity as neighborhood ills. Inclusion of these items in the survey permitted us to systematically assess the extent to which the neighborhoods vary with respect to residents' perception of noncriminal social disorder.

Aggregate Profiles

Aggregate profiles of the measures of crime and incivility concerns and crime awareness were constructed. The rationale for developing the aggregate concern about and awareness of crime scales were as follows. From the social control perspective, any individual victimization problem—unless it
represents a sudden "crime wave"—is not as important as the aggregate victimization problem across all serious crime categories. Thus, the internal consistency of all four concerns about crime was checked through factor analysis (all four items loaded on a single unidimensional factor accounting for 51 percent of the variance) and by calculation of Cronbach's alpha coefficient on the pooled city-wide samples. All four items were moderately correlated with the sum of the other three and together formed a scale with an alpha coefficient of .674. The position of a neighborhood on the concern about victimization scale was determined by the percentage of responses that were "Big Problems" for the four crimes.

The awareness of crime variable represents aggregation of four counter-variables representing whether a respondent knew a local victim of each type of crime. Each of the counter variables for robbery, attack and rape could range in value from "0" to "3", depending on how many local victims a respondent knew for each crime. Because the knowledge of burglary victims was asked about in a different way, the counter variable for burglary could assume either a "0" or "1". The awareness of crime variable was then computed by counting how many of these crime-specific counter variables had nonzero values.

It was hypothesized that all four signs of incivility (loitering youth, drugs, vandalism, and abandoned buildings) would define a construct representing the extent to which there was a perceived problem with social disorganization in the neighborhood. Accordingly, a factor analysis of the four indicators was performed on the pooled city-wide samples. All the items were unidimensional and significantly intercorrelated. The internal consistency of these items was further checked by calculations of Cronbach's alpha coefficient. The four items formed a scale with an alpha of .755. The position of a neighborhood on the concern about the social order scale was determined by the percentage of responses that were "Big Problems" for any of the four questionnaire items.

Summary

The quantitative indicators from the survey were coupled with the more qualitative nonrandom assessments from the field notes to present a portrait of the extent to which social disorganization is perceived by the neighborhood residents. The set of indicators are not merely a grab bag assortment of items that we happen to have at hand for an analysis of neighborhoods, but rather stem directly from our consideration of the research implications of the social control perspective.

We wanted indicators which would permit us to make inferences drawing upon three types of knowledge in our sample neighborhoods: the attitudes of residents, their experience, and some indicator of the physical reality in the neighborhood. The eight indicators described above can be classified as follows:

Residents' Attitudes

- Concern about crime victimizations as a neighborhood problem.
  This permits us to assess the extent of residents' concern about specific crimes without necessarily including a personal dimension (i.e., "a big problem for me"). It can be assumed that this reflects the integration of information and attitudes from neighbors and from local media coverage.

- Concern about various signs of incivility as neighborhood problem.
  The four indicators here (teenagers, overt drug use, abandoned buildings and vandalism) sprang from an inversion of our data collection goals. Rather than asking residents whether crime was a neighborhood problem, our fieldworkers asked the residents what were the neighborhood problems. Inclusion of these items in the questionnaire permitted us to measure the concern about these problems as well as the concerns about victimization. The social disorganization perspective implies that victimization is only one of a number of signs residents encounter in their neighborhoods.
The presence or arrival of undesirable businesses.

Whether or not a business is seen as undesirable is a subjective assessment. But, businesses so categorized are unwanted typically because of the type of clientele that they are perceived to attract, regardless of whether or not they actually do. The presence or arrival of such businesses may symbolize the lack of control residents potentially have over their environments.

Inadequately served by city services.

This indicator permits us to assess how important and how locally powerful their community is with respect to their demands for municipal attention; another aspect of their local controlling ability.

Residents' Experience

• Vicarious victimization (knowing a local victim).

By now it is a truism that fear of crime corresponds tangentially to reported crime. Within the disorganization perspective, the important variable of interest is the amount of experience a person has with victimization, direct and indirect. Reported crime is a poor measure of that experience because: (1) few people are aware of reported crime statistics; (2) it is unclear how the magnitude of a reported crime statistic (e.g., a burglary rate of 35 per 1000) effects any person's attitude; and (3) crime statistics are typically not made known at a neighborhood level. A better measure of a person's experience with victimization is whether or not a person knows a local victim of a crime.

Physical/Social Reality

• Description of neighborhood physical decay.

This indicator permits us to assess the extent to which a neighborhood's residents have control of their community's land and its uses. It will be seen in the following section that in some areas, the presence or absence of physical decay is directly related to the municipal political power that a community can marshal.

Presence and degree of ethnic conflict.

Ethnic conflict is another indicator of the degree of control that residents have over their neighborhood. Apart from racism, this indicator also can be used to infer the degree of competition residents experience in their neighborhood for community resources, and the type of dispute settlement that the areas' residents engage in to solve difficulties.

With all indicators described above, of course, there exist varying degrees of subjectivity. While the questions on the survey directly ask for a subjective assessment, the other indicators involve an opinion on the part of our fieldworkers or on our part in interpreting the field notes. Nevertheless, we feel that the social control perspective demands a careful scrutiny of all the available sources of data; it requires a multi-method, multi-indicator approach. In this way, we develop a broader base to theorize from, and at the same time allow the richness of the experiences and attitudes of the residents to present themselves.
CHAPTER SIX
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE

Most urban neighborhoods experience some change most of the time. New groups of people move in, while others leave. Old housing stock deteriorates. New housing is constructed. Commercial areas decline or change in character. New ones may be introduced. Others may disappear entirely. Recreation facilities, social services, and other amenities may expand, decline or be removed entirely.

In some areas these changes are minor, often barely noticeable. In others they extend over longer time periods so that the immediate impact is not readily apparent. And in others change is both rapid and dramatic. For the most part, these transformations reflect the larger movements of population and business that have affected major urban centers through the years. Most frequently this involves the exodus of the more affluent white population and the entry of lower income minorities. Recently however, in some neighborhoods this process has been reversed as more affluent professionals move into areas populated mainly by low income minorities.

Although all of the neighborhoods in this study have experienced some change, we found considerable variation in the direction, the magnitude and the time frame within which it occurred. Our survey provides two indicators of neighborhood change. The first taps the residents' perception of the extent and direction of change, and the second measures residential stability by determining the percentage of long time and short term residents in the area.

Figure 4 presents the percentage of residents in each neighborhood who see their neighborhood changing for better or worse, or remaining the same.

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Insert Figure 4 here

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By these measures, Sunset, Back of the Yards and South Philadelphia are the most stable and Logan, Wicker Park, Woodlawn and Lincoln Park are the least stable. A substantial proportion of those noting change in Wicker Park and Logan perceive neighborhood decline, whereas over half the Lincoln Park residents noted neighborhood improvement. In Woodlawn equal proportions of the residents saw their neighborhood moving in opposite directions. Most of the residents perceiving change are pessimistic about the future of their neighborhoods. Only in Lincoln Park and Mission does the percentage of residents noting improvement exceed those who saw decline.

Figure 5 provides a measure of population stability. Although the neighborhood rankings are not identical to those in Figure 4, the same neighborhoods lie on the high and low ends of both the no-change and long-term residents measures. This suggests that for many urban residents neighborhood change is closely related to population movement.

Sunset’s image as a stable neighborhood reflected in these two measures, however, is modified by its position on the short term resident chart. There we see that although one fourth of them have lived in the neighborhood twenty years or more, over forty percent have lived in the area five years or less, and of these, twenty percent have lived there only one year or less. Sunset is populated by a sizeable proportion of older people who have raised their families and plan to remain in the area. The more recent arrivals are predominantly orientals who have purchased homes.

In two of the neighborhoods at the low end of our stability measure, recent racial and ethnic population movement is seen as the dominant factor...
in neighborhood change. Both Wicker Park and Logan experienced substantial racial transition in the 1960's and 1970's significantly altering both the ethnic and age distribution of neighborhood residents. In both areas the remaining whites tended to be elderly whereas the minorities coming in were younger families with children. In both neighborhoods residents also associated the population change with neighborhood deterioration. Two explanations were offered. The new ethnic groups were perceived as not sharing the maintenance interests and commitments of the older residents. An elderly Polish woman in Wicker Park noted:

This neighborhood used to be nice, but now it is bad. The sidewalks are terrible and there is garbage all over. The cause for all this, she claimed are "the Puerto Ricans who don't keep things clean." A similar explanation was offered in Logan:

We didn't have any problems here until the blacks started to come...There wasn't any graffiti or roaches, or rats... They brought them all with them. They don't know how to take care of anything.

More sophisticated explanations were offered by community organization activists in both neighborhoods who blamed the physical deterioration on the decline in city services and the redlining practices of the financial institutions which frequently occur in neighborhoods undergoing racial transition. Whatever the cause, residents in both these neighborhoods noted extensive racial and ethnic population movement accompanied by physical deterioration.

However, for residents in Wicker Park, physical improvement also engendered concerns. Housing rehabilitation, while improving the physical condition of the neighborhood, was pricing its current residents out of the area. Thus many organization leaders noted that "redevelopment has become a problem worse than what it is trying to solve." Indeed in Wicker Park, many organization leaders saw the deterioration of the neighborhood as part of a covert plan by the city administration to drive out the current residents and make way for a higher income population group that can afford to support the newly rehabilitated housing.

Wicker Park residents are afraid that their neighborhood will become another Lincoln Park. There the changes, as we have seen, led to neighborhood improvement. But it was improvement undertaken at the expense of the low income minority residents who were driven out of the area by urban renewal programs in the 1960's. The current inhabitants have benefited from the physical improvement of the neighborhood and the population transformation which drove minority low income residents out and brought in the more well-to-do white professionals who currently reside there. Thus many attribute neighborhood improvement, as did this long time resident, to the fact that "the less responsible people have moved out and the more responsible people have moved in."

Woodlawn has experienced no racial transition in recent years. But it has suffered a thirty percent population decrease in the past ten years which residents say was caused primarily by serious gang violence and extensive arson fires. These are also associated with the departure of most of the commercial enterprises providing an economic base for the area. Because these problems were most severe in the early 1970's, many residents now see their neighborhood getting better. Those who claim the area is getting worse note the population decline, the physical deterioration caused by arson and housing abandonments and the commercial deterioration.

Changes in Mission, as indicated by Figure 1, were differentially perceived. The population movement there appears to be part of the same
"Gentrification" process that has occurred in Lincoln Park and is feared in Wicker Park. Housing renovation and area redevelopment is seen by the white residents as an indication of neighborhood improvement and stability, whereas the minorities, who cannot afford the rents and rising property values, see it as an effort to remove them and change the character of the neighborhood. "It's like they don't want us around." There have also been some changes in the commercial areas of Mission which suffered from the construction of the mass transit system in the area, the loss of some of same major employers and reputable businesses, and the intrusion of less reputable pawn shops and pornographic stores.

In addition to the population changes previously noted, Sunset residents also pointed to new ethnic diversity in their commercial areas and some loss of the smaller neighborhood operations to larger more commercial enterprises.

The other four neighborhoods in this study experienced less extensive changes. In many instances as in the racial transition which transformed both Woodlawn and West Philadelphia, the changes occurred less recently and apparently also less rapidly. South Philadelphia appears to be the most stable area in this study. A little less than half the population has lived there twenty years or more. Even young people, who generally move out of city neighborhoods, tend to remain. One respondent claimed that only two people out of his high school class have left the area.

Neighborhood change of any kind creates disruption in an area that does some damage to the existing social order—the generally accepted patterns of behavior and relationships which shape the expectations of the local residents. These changes are reflected in what we have called signs of social disorganization—situations which indicate to residents that their neighborhood is changing in unwelcome ways. Most of these situations, crime increase, abandoned housings, etc., are clearly associated with neighborhood decay. In some instances, however, physical improvements which drive up real estate and rental prices will destroy the social order of the low income groups who will eventually be driven out. This is masked in areas like Lincoln Park where the renovation is essentially completed and the population transfer has taken place, but it is clearly evident in Wicker Park and Mission where the low income groups feel equally threatened by neighborhood improvements.

We examine next the social disorganization indicators in the ten neighborhoods. Included will be clearly threatening situations such as victimization events, others that are tangentially related to crime and serve as reminders to neighborhood residents that their neighborhood is unsafe, and still others which suggest to residents that their neighborhood is changing in ways that are inimical to their well being.

Social Disorganization in the Neighborhoods

The Criminal Environment

Perceived increases in crime is one of the clearest indicators of social disorder in an area and one of the most potent stimulants of fear. The strong relationships between victimization experiences and even knowing about a local crime victim and fear has been well documented (Skogan, 1980). However, measuring the impact of crime on behavior and attitudes poses several problems. Crime rates and victimization surveys tell us about the prevalence of crime in an area, but do not indicate its salience to the inhabitants. Measures of awareness and concern, on the other hand, tell us little about the reality on which these attitudes are based. Recognizing that all of our measures are somewhat imperfect we combine them to provide an assessment of the criminal environment in each of the neighborhoods. We use the reported crime rate to provide some assessment of the extent of crime.
in these areas; a measure of awareness—knowing a local victim—to determine
the extent to which the existence of criminal events is transmitted to
neighborhood residents, and a measure of concern—whether or not crime is
considered a big problem in the neighborhood—to indicate the ways in which
residents interpret the information they have received.

Figure 6 represents the crime rate for each of the ten neighborhoods,

-74-

the percentage of residents in each who consider crime to be a big problem
and the percentage of the residents who are afraid to walk in their neighbor-
hood at night. The crime rate and concern measures represent profiles for
four crimes combined—burglary, assault, robbery and rape. Because the
rankings on the crime rate measures are somewhat skewed by intercity vari-
ations in reporting procedures, we have included the mean crime rate for
each of the cities. Four of the neighborhoods—Woodlawn, Wicker Park,
Lincoln Park and Visitation Valley are fifteen or more units above their
city's mean. Four,—Mission, Back of the Yards, West Philadelphia and Logan—
are within three units of their city's mean. And two—South Philadelphia
and Sunset—fall well below.

A comparison of the rankings of the neighborhoods on the crime rate
and concern chart indicates some anomalies. Wicker Park, which ranks fourth
on the crime rate chart, nevertheless, ranks first on our measure of concern.
Lincoln Park, on the other hand moves from third on the crime rate chart to
fourth on the concern measure. And Sunset and South Philadelphia with the
lowest crime rates exhibit more concern than the two other Philadelphia neigh-
borhoods where the crime rate is higher. The fear measure, produces even
more striking differences. Wicker Park, consistent with its position on the
concern chart, remains on top. But Lincoln Park, moves way down into a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Rate per thousand</th>
<th>Crime Rates, Crime Concerns and Fear</th>
<th>Fear</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>I know a local victim</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Visitacion Valley 61.31</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Woodlawn 59.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Mission 56.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Wicker Park 45.0</td>
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<td>San Francisco 45.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Lincoln Park 51.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Back of Yards 65.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Mission 56.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Logan 59.7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Logan 14.50</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>So. Philadelphia 7.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 6**
cluster of neighborhoods with considerable less crime and concern.

Concern about crime may vary because of differences in crime rate or because of differences in neighborhood communication patterns transmitting information about crime. This is evident in Figure 6 which shows Back of the Yards with a lower crime rate exhibiting higher levels of awareness than a number of neighborhoods with more crime but less population stability. The fact that the percentage of residents knowing local victims exceeds those expressing concern about crime indicates that knowledge is not automatically translated into concern. And the fact that the percentage expressing fear exceeds those expressing concern suggests that crime alone cannot account for the fear in most neighborhoods.

Furthermore, Wicker Park’s position on the fear measure indicates that there may well be fear engendering conditions there that are not at work in the other high crime neighborhoods. And Lincoln Park’s position in a cluster of neighborhoods with considerably lower crime rates suggests that one might find there conditions that foster feelings of security counteracting those inducing fear. We look next at the other fear-engendering conditions in the neighborhoods.

Incivility

Four incivility indicators were tapped in the telephone survey. Two of these—illegal use of drugs and vandalism—are illegal behaviors tangentially associated with more serious crimes. The other two—teenagers hanging around and abandoned buildings—serve as cues indicating to neighborhood residents that the area is changing in unwelcome ways. Teenagers hanging around constitute a particular threat in transitional areas where age and ethnic differences combine to create neighborhood tension.

---

FIGURE 7

CONCERN ABOUT INCIVILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teens</th>
<th>Abandoned Buildings</th>
<th>Illegal Drugs</th>
<th>Vandalism</th>
</tr>
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<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>WOODLAWN 35.7</td>
<td>WICKER PARK 44.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>S. PHILA. 27.9</td>
<td>WICKER PARK 29.6</td>
<td>MISSION 27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WOODLAWN 27.2</td>
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<td>BACK OF THE YARDS 25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>LOGAN 23.1</td>
<td>BACK OF THE YARDS 25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
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<td>LINCOLN PARK 26.4</td>
<td>MISSION 22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>W. PHILA. 16.9</td>
<td>W. PHILA. 16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOGAN 15.8</td>
<td>LOGAN 15.8</td>
<td>BACK OF THE YARDS 15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>SUNSET 10.6</td>
<td>MISSION 8.3</td>
<td>SUNSET 9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>LINCOLN PARK 6.6</td>
<td>WOODLAWN 9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VISITACION VALLEY 21.3</td>
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<td>W. PHILA. 20.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WOODLAWN 24.7</td>
<td>WOODLAWN 24.7</td>
<td>WOODLAWN 24.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

--- Insert Figure 7 here ---
Figure 7 presents the percentage of residents in the ten neighborhoods exhibiting concern about each of these problems. There we note that Wicker Park consistently falls at the top of each chart and Sunset is equally consistent in its position at the bottom. South Philadelphia, Back of the Yards and Mission join the residents of the high crime areas in concern about teens and teen related activity. In South Philadelphia and Mission the major problem is drug use. In Back of the Yards, it is vandalism. Maintenance problems reflected in the abandoned buildings chart appear to be most serious in Woodlawn and Wicker Park, but present minimal concerns to the residents in the San Francisco neighborhoods and in Lincoln Park.

The conditions generating these concerns as well as those untapped in our survey are more fully described by our field data. Residents’ descriptions of neighborhood conditions in Wicker Park make its position at the top of the social disorganization concern measures readily understandable. Abandoned, boarded up buildings, a large number of vacant lots, and litter on both lots and streets are frequently found in most parts of the neighborhood. Much of the housing is badly maintained by the absentee landlords who control a good portion of the rental property in the area. Neighborhood bars attract an unsavory clientele which spills out into the streets and, although there are islands of well kept homes where the older white Polish families reside and where young professionals are renovating old “mansions”, the major sections of the neighborhood are generally viewed as deteriorating and dangerous.

Concerns about teens and drugs reflect the area’s gang problem. Although several sites in this study have experienced such difficulties in the past, Wicker Park is the only neighborhood currently confronting serious disruptions by youth gangs. Violence is frequent in the schools. A fight between a Latino and a black elementary school girl, and an assault by a Black student on a white elementary school principal are among incidents reported in the field data reflecting the tension and hostility confronted by young people on a daily basis. One young girl graphically described her environment: “It feels just terrible to walk alone here around four o’clock in the afternoon.”

Crime, as we have noted, is a serious problem for residents in Wicker Park. But our survey questions did not tap the most frightening crime of all. Suspected arson fires were frequent occurrences in the area and played a critical role in generating unease among neighborhood residents. A sit-in was staged in the mayor’s office after a particularly devastating fire killed seven people and graphically illustrated the danger involved when Anglo firemen are unable to communicate with Latino victims. A city arson task force was subsequently created, but it served more as a symbolic response and offered little help to residents who felt compelled to take turns staying up at night to watch for arsonists.

Other problems discussed by residents indicated a number of additional social disorganization indicators undetected in our survey. The ethnic mix in Wicker Park appears to generate a fairly high level of ethnic conflict. Negative stereotypes are pervasive. The elderly white population is particularly hostile to the Puerto Ricans who are perceived to be dirty, irresponsible transients with no interests or commitment to the community. White parents are resentful over the special attention given Latinos in the school bilingual program and insist that Spanish speaking residents are unwilling to participate in school affairs. Latino parents, on the other hand, feel excluded from events where no Spanish translations are provided. The conflict is further aggravated by the age gap between the white elderly residents and the younger Latinos and Blacks.
Intra-minority conflict is also evident. Puerto Ricans feel that they are the most disadvantaged and badly served group in the neighborhood. Minority programs, they argue, are geared to the needs of the black population. Mexicans are also seen as more advantaged. In fact, intra-Latino conflict is almost as common as inter-racial conflict. Puerto Ricans resent the Mexicans and neither group is very fond of the Cubans who are more socioeconomically advantaged.

Residents in Wicker Park confront many barriers as they try to deal with the physical deterioration of the neighborhood. They report difficulty in forcing the many absentee landlords to properly maintain their buildings. They claim that they are unable to ascertain the ownership of the abandoned dillapidated buildings and vacant lots in their area. And they report that they are unable to obtain mortgage money to improve their homes.

The difficulties confronted by Woodlawn residents are in many ways similar to those in Wicker Park. Physical maintenance problems are severe. The majority of the buildings in the area are multiple-unit apartment buildings, usually run down and deteriorated in appearance. Many of them are owned by absentee landlords who find it economically unfeasible to maintain them adequately. Often tenants are unable to ascertain their landlord's identity and thus cannot confront the person or persons responsible for the conditions in which they live.

Many of the more threatening situations currently endemic in Wicker Park are part of Woodlawn's history. In the early 1970's gang violence was a serious problem and arson had reached epidemic proportions. However, gangs have become less evident and arson is no longer a problem because, as one fire captain put it, "there's nothing left to burn."

Woodlawn has lost most of the establishments which supported its economic life. The commercial areas are dotted with vacant lots, boarded up stores and taverns. The stores that remain are protected by heavy iron gates. Most of the residents interviewed indicated that the stores in the area offer inferior goods for prices that are higher than those in other parts of the city. The dearth of business in the area is reflected in its unemployment rate which is especially high for youths between sixteen and nineteen years of age (fifty percent).

Not surprisingly, anti-social activities most frequently engaged in by teens such as drug use, drug selling, and vandalism are major concerns. Most of the crime in the area is attributed to the heavy drug use and frequent addiction found among the residents.

One finds in Woodlawn many of the negative perceptions of the police and political establishment exhibited by the activists in Wicker Park, but there is a qualitative difference. While the majority of the respondents reflect a weariness about the police, a feeling that in general they are ineffective and in fact cannot do much about many of the problems with which the residents must cope, the intense hostility one finds in Wicker Park is not present. There is less discussion in Woodlawn about police harassment and brutality and more talk about the constraints policemen face in their effort to control crime in the neighborhood.

Woodlawn activists also find reason to complain about the quality of services the city provides for them. The education offered in the public schools has been defined as largely irrelevant to the needs of the youth of the community. In addition, control of the community is seen as problematic. One finds in Woodlawn some of the concern about the establishment and its plan for the area that is so prevalent in
Wicker Park. Much of the hostility is directed at the University of Chicago, which some feel will determine the future of the area. There are the same difficulties in identifying owners of abandoned buildings and vacant lots and the same suspicions about the interests of the owners. As one respondent put it, "the real criminals are the real estate interests."

Although the field data suggests that Wicker Park and Woodlawn are similar in social disorganization indicators characterizing the neighborhoods, there are interesting differences in levels of concern expressed by the residents. Whereas Wicker Park ranks first in concern about teenagers and vandalism, Woodlawn ranks fourth, with approximately half the percentage of residents in Woodlawn as in Wicker Park expressing such concern. And although Woodlawn ranks second to Wicker Park in the percentage of residents expressing concern about drugs and abandoned buildings, there is a difference of eleven percentage points between the two neighborhoods on the first issue and approximately four percentage points on the second.

These differences in concern levels might be due to the racial homogeneity in Woodlawn. There is evidence (Stinchcombe, 1978) that proximity to racially diverse groups increases levels of fear. It is possible that levels of concern about the basically similar conditions are higher in Wicker Park because they are associated with the intrusion of ethnically diverse groups into the area.

Another factor might be the area’s perceived position in the cycle of neighborhood change. We have seen that a large percentage of the residents in Wicker Park perceive their neighborhood as getting worse, whereas equal proportions of Woodlawn residents cite improvement and decline. The condition of the neighborhoods is basically the same, but many Woodlawn residents have seen worse and interpret the resolution of some problems as a sign that the neighborhood is improving. Most residents in Wicker Park, however, see unabated decline.

Although South Philadelphia differs from Wicker Park and Woodlawn along most dimensions, its residents share with those of the other two neighborhoods the highest drug concern levels. Field interviews reflect perceptions of widespread use and devastating consequences for the area. The concerns expressed are multi-faceted. There is first the physical problem of pervasive drug addiction. One respondent described a three block area housing twenty-five hard core heroin addicts. Secondly, there is the danger posed by pushers in the neighborhood who sell drugs to young children who are not yet addicted. And finally, there are all the drug related crime problems. The president of one neighborhood group created specifically to deal with problems generated by drug use noted that in his area a hundred people a week are robbed or mugged. Although the figures might be exaggerated the connection is clear. Drug addicts are perceived as needing money to support their habit and willing to do whatever is necessary to get it. Several parents report being robbed, and in some instances, beaten up by their own drug-addicted children.

The field notes indicate that there is more tolerance in South Philadelphia for teenagers hanging around than one finds in most neighborhoods. Thus the fact that South Philadelphia ranks third on the
survey measure of concern about teenagers suggests that this issue for South Philadelphians is confounded by their concerns about drugs.

The field note descriptions of the other two Philadelphia neighborhoods, West Philadelphia and Logan, are similar in many ways to those of Woodlawn and Wicker Park. The residents in both complain about abandoned housing, vacant lots and deteriorating commercial districts. Like Woodlawn, both neighborhoods experienced disruptive gang violence in the early seventies which has since abated. The residents in Logan, like those in Wicker Park, experience racial conflict. And residents in both neighborhoods perceive a non-responsive city bureaucracy. Complaints about inadequate city services, police harassment and discrimination in the schools are pervasive. However, although the problem descriptions are similar, the levels of concern exhibited in Philadelphia neighborhoods are considerably below those of the two Chicago neighborhoods. This may be because the problems in the former are in fact less severe, because they are compounded by lower levels of crime, or because Philadelphia residents have available superior problem solving resources.

Sunset stands out as an area with minimal concerns about the surveyed indicators of social disorganization. However, two situations perceived as a threat to neighborhood integrity were identified in the field data. The first is a change in the commercial areas which consist primarily of small owner operated stores, but which have recently experienced the intrusion of large banks and fast food carry-outs. These establishments, although not threatening per se, are seen as unwelcome signs of neighborhood change. One local businessman explained that the problem is posed not so much by the new businesses coming in, but rather by the loss of the small neighborhood enterprise. "We lose our identity when we lose our small merchants."

The second and more pressing concern is the perception of the area's deprived position as a recipient of city service. Although it is a relatively affluent area, residents complain about inadequate police protection, inadequate bus services, inadequate recreation facilities, and inadequate allocation of community development funds. Most respondents felt that they were not getting a fair return for their tax dollar.

According to Sunset activists, although voting turnout is high, relations with the Board of Supervisors, San Francisco's elected legislature, is poor. "We can't get to them," noted one neighborhood activist. The Sunset is a forgotten community. We don't get an equitable proportion of resources. We elect the Supervisors, decide every ballot, then they forget us.

Crime, Social Disorganization and Fear

In Figure 8 we compare measures of aggregated concerns about crime and incivility indicators with the percentage of residents exhibiting fear in the ten neighborhoods. We note first that, with the exception of Lincoln Park, Visitacion Valley and Sunset, residents concerned about social disorganization indicators exceed those concerned about crime. Secondly, we see that in each neighborhood the percentage of residents reporting fear exceed both those exhibiting crime and the other social disorganization concerns.
In all of these neighborhoods, a relatively small percentage of the residents actually suffer victimization experiences. Others are indirectly affected by their knowledge of those experiences acquired either through informal communications networks or through the media. In addition, as we have seen, there are a number of other situations generally interpreted by area residents as an indication that their communities are changing in ways that might threaten their well-being. We have noted four of these in our survey and four others in our field data. Racial conflict, deterioration in commercial areas or changes in the character of business establishments, neighborhood improvements threatening to drive out low income residents and perceived inadequacies of city services are all viewed as disruptive to the social order in the neighborhood.

The fact that fear levels exceed those measuring both crime awareness and crime concern might be due in most neighborhoods to the compounding effect of the other social disorganization concerns. Thus perceptions or increases in crime are continually reinforced by other visible reminders that the community is changing in threatening ways.

This explanation is not as convincing in Lincoln Park, Visitacion Valley and Sunset where social disorganization indicators are less visible and extensive. Although residents in Visitacion Valley and to a lesser extent, those in Lincoln Park, confront more pervasive crime, they do not face the constant visible reminders of neighborhood decay found in many of the other areas. Residents in Sunset, on the other
hand, report neither serious crime nor social disorganization concerns. One must ask then, why do fear levels in Visitacion Valley approximate those in Woodlawn and Wicker Park where high crime combines with pervasive indicators of physical and social deterioration to create most seriously troubled neighborhoods. And why, given the demographic similarities between the two neighborhoods, are fear levels in Sunset equal to those in Lincoln Park where crime is so much more pervasive?

Indeed the cluster of neighborhoods around the thirty percent mark on the fear measure raise some intriguing questions. These areas differ on a number of demographic dimensions generally associated with variations in fear. White affluent neighborhoods like Lincoln Park and Sunset are generally expected to generate lower fear levels than low income black or transitional areas like West Philadelphia and Logan. The more pervasive crime in Lincoln Park might explain its position in that cluster. And, given the positive relation of age and fear, the elderly population in Sunset might explain the similarity in fear levels of Sunset and Lincoln Park. But this cannot explain Sunset’s similarity with West Philadelphia where there is an equally large elderly population which is both black and low income and faces more serious problems. Given what we know about the relationship of fear, victimization experiences, and demographic characteristics, we would expect to find more fear in Lincoln Park, Logan and West Philadelphia than in Sunset.

It is difficult to explain Sunset’s position in this cluster by asking what makes people afraid, for what are generally viewed as fear inducing conditions appear to be sparse indeed. If we turn the question around, however, and ask what makes people feel secure, other considerations come to the fore. This turns our attention to resources which enhance the capacities of neighborhood residents to cope with the problems they confront. These, we argue, make it possible to exert some social control and thus foster among neighborhood residents a sense of security mediating threatening changes and the anxiety that such changes induce. Since most urban communities experience social change as a constant, the issue of fear is affected by the community’s capacity to regulate that change with its individual and political resources. Neighborhoods with such resources, we argue are able to cope with extensive difficulties, whereas those without them might find even minimal changes frightening. We apply this premise next in our examination of the social control resources in the ten sites.
CHAPTER SEVEN
SOURCES OF SOCIAL CONTROL

Those who exercise social control in a community influence both the behavior of local residents and the decisions of external actors that shape the quality of neighborhood life. The latter include city agencies allocating municipal services and financial institutions, realtors and others who play a role in determining the direction of neighborhood change. The ability to exert such control rests to some extent on the attributes of community residents and to some on the nature of their interactions in formal and informal settings.

Individual attributes include both the strengths associated with high levels of income and education and those derived from extra-community associations with institutional and political actors controlling the resources required for maintaining neighborhoods and solving local problems. Informal interactions affect a community's capacity to influence individual behavior. Neighborhoods with high levels of social integration are more capable of exercising such control. Formal interaction in organized groups can strengthen a neighborhood's ability to influence both external actors and local residents.

In assessing the social control resources of the 10 neighborhoods we will consider: 1) the demographic characteristics of local residents; 2) the perceived ability of local activists to generate response from bureaucratic and political agencies; 3) neighborhood support systems provided by high levels of informal integration; 4) and the perceived effectiveness of local groups in involving neighborhood residents and in solving local problems.

Our assessment of the organizational and political strength of each community is based on the unstructured interviews conducted by our field workers with a wide range of activists in each of the neighborhoods. Our assessment of social integration is based on two measures derived from the survey data. The first is a measure of formal integration reflected in the percentage of respondents reporting involvement in community affairs. The second is a measure of the informal interaction of community residents with each other.

The development of this measure was performed as follows. Initially, factor analyses were performed on the pooled city-wide samples of the three cities that make up the telephone survey of the reactions to crime project (Lavrakas, Baumer, Skogan, 1978). The following variables were used because it was thought that they might form a social integration construct:

- Difficulty of identifying a stranger in the neighborhood
- Whether or not the respondent felt a part of the neighborhood
- The number of children the respondent knew in the neighborhood

Reliability analysis of this scale revealed a moderately high Cronbach's alpha of .585.

In order to make this scale more amenable to the purposes of descriptive analyses to be reported here, the social integration scale was collapsed to 3 categories using cut points that resulted in an approximately normal distribution of values (i.e., about 50 percent of the cases falling into the middle category, and about 25 percent each into the low or the high categories). Thus the scale was recoded to indicate levels of integration that could be termed qualitatively as "low", "moderate", and "high".
Table 2 presents the resulting distribution of respondents categorized according to "low", "moderate", and "high" levels of social integration. Figure 9 shows the fear levels in each neighborhood as a function of the level of social integration. With the exception of Sunset, social integration is associated with lower fear levels in all neighborhoods and appears to serve as a support system granting a measure of security to community residents.

Although we examine all of the sources of social control separately, we realize that frequently the possession of some facilitates the acquisition of others. For example, higher status individuals are more efficacious and exhibit greater ability to control the environment in which they live (Verba and Nie, 1974). However, these characteristics also induce higher levels of organizational participation. On the other hand, we have evidence that there are situations which can induce low status groups to organize effectively and this in some instances enables them to develop closer ties with the political establishment. Although formal integration via involvement in community organizations is more frequently associated with higher socio-economic status, informal social integration often varies inversely with it. We expect then, as we examine our study sites to find variations not only in the extensiveness of the resources available, but also in the ways in which social disorganization indicators and different resources are combined in specific neighborhood settings.
FIGURE 9
FEAR BY LEVEL OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Low Involvement ▲
High Involvement △
Social Integration

Our informal social integration construct was used to categorize neighborhood residents as high, moderate or low integrates. Figure 10 presents the distribution of residents with high and low scores in the ten neighborhoods. Neighborhoods where 50% of the residents scored high on the integration measure are classified as high; those with less than one fourth scoring high are low, and those in between are classified as moderate. By these measures we have one highly integrated area—South Philadelphia; four moderates—West Philadelphia, Logan, Back of the Yards and Woodlawn, and five neighborhoods characterized by low levels of integration—Wicker Park, Visitacion Valley, Sunset, Lincoln Park and Mission. With the exception of Visitacion Valley, all of the “low integration” neighborhoods exhibit high levels of population instability. In each instance 40% or more of the residents have lived in their neighborhoods five years or less.

The case of Logan, however, suggests that population instability in and of itself need not necessarily produce low levels of social integration. In Figure 11 a comparison of population instability and social integration reveals that although Logan ranks second only to Mission in the percentage (55.3) of residents who have lived in the neighborhood five years or less, it is a moderately integrated neighborhood with close to forty percent of its residents classified as high integrates. An explanation for this can be found in
FIGURE 10

LEVELS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Social Integration</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Lincoln Park</th>
<th>Sunset</th>
<th>Woodlawn</th>
<th>Visitacion Valley</th>
<th>Wicker Park</th>
<th>Woodlawn</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Back of the Yards</th>
<th>South Philadelphia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Integration</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Integration</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 11

POPULATION STABILITY AND LEVELS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Living in Neighborhood Five Years or Less</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>High Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln Park</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunset</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodlawn</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitacion Valley</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wicker Park</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodlawn</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Philadelphia</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitacion Valley</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Philadelphia</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-97-
Figure 12 which ranks the neighborhoods by percentage of resident involvement in community affairs. There we find Logan at the top.

High social integration suggests that residents feel a part of the neighborhood and have a wide range of acquaintances there. This could well result from informal neighboring activities which tend to increase with long term residence in an area. But it can also be induced by participation in formally organized community organizations.

In either case such integration seems to provide a support system for neighborhood residents who feel more comfortable in a community where they know people to whom they can turn for help when needed. South Philadelphia provides ample illustration of the informal support provided in a stable neighborhood where long term residency is the norm and cooperative neighboring the expected mode of behavior. "Here in South Philadelphia we take care of our own....we are like a family, not neighbors. If something happens to me, the people who did it would have to fight the whole street." These strong community ties also induce an unusual level of attentiveness which was illustrated for our field worker when she was questioned by two neighborhood men who had been observing her activities. This incident confirmed her feeling "that everyone is being watched in these narrow streets in South Philadelphia."

Formal organizations are not as important to socially integrated residents. But in areas where informal networks do not develop naturally, similar supports can be provided by small scale community organizations. This is illustrated in the integration that appears to be fostered by such groups in Logan and in

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FIGURE 12

PERCENT INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logan</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Philadelphia</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodlawn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitacion Valley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Philadelphia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back of the Yards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunset, Mission</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wicker Park</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln Park</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln Park</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunset, Mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visitacion Valley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>South Philadelphia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back of the Yards</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunset, Mission</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wicker Park</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln Park</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the following statement of a West Philadelphia block club member.

On my block I'm known and I know everybody. I can feel safe walking on my block at twelve o'clock at night...I'm afraid on the bus, but when I reach my neighborhood I'm not afraid because the people I know around here, know me...

This sense of belonging may explain in part the findings reported in Schneider and Schneider (1977), Lavrakas (1978), and Kiddar, Cohn, & Harvey (1978) that citizens involved in community organizations are less likely to be fearful than those who are not. Figure 12 indicates that between 20 and 27% of the residents in seven of the neighborhoods are likely to derive the benefits associated with community involvement. In Sunset, Mission and Wicker Park, however, such involvement and the related advantages are minimal.

Association with community groups appears to have some impact on the sense of security of those who belong. Such groups, if effective, however also, serve as a resource for the neighborhood at large. When a community organization has a reputation for getting things done and when concrete examples of organizational effectiveness are visible in the neighborhood, the group may well impart to all the residents the feeling that there is in fact some mechanism available for controlling what happens in the area. In such areas, even nonmembers with problems, tend to turn to the community organization for help.

Organizational Strength

Table 3 indicates the variations in the perceptions of organizational strength. These classifications reflect our interpretations of the assessments

| High       | Moderate                      | Low
|------------|--------------------------------|-----
| Back of Yards | West Philadelphia             | Sunset |
| Lincoln Park   | South Philadelphia            | Mission |
| Logan        |                                | Wicker Park |
| Woodlawn     |                                |       |
| Visitacion Valley |                              |       |

Insert Table 3 here
made by a wide range of local activists in each area. The organizations classified as high are perceived as viable by activists either because they attract an active working membership or because they have adequate funds and staff to support their activities. They also serve as effective umbrella groups coordinating the activities of a number of disparate organizations in the area. Such groups were found in Back of the Yards, Lincoln Park, Logan, Woodlawn and Visitacion Valley. Organizations classified as moderate attract an active membership, have at least adequate financial resources, but are not able to effectively coordinate the activities of other groups in the area. Such groups exist in West and South Philadelphia.

Within the West Philadelphia borders are five local civic associations, a multitude of block clubs and three umbrella groups all attempting unsuccessfully to units in an effort to more effectively achieve their common goals. However, the competition among these groups for scarce city funds and the apparent jealousy among the leaders have prevented the formation of a working coalition. In South Philadelphia there are a large number of groups activated only sporadically as crises emerge in the community. Efforts to coordinate activities have also failed here in part because the informal support system provided by the high level of social integration in the neighborhood makes a more formalized network less necessary.

Activists in Sunset, Mission and Wicker Park implicitly ranked the effectiveness of their organizations as poor. Sunset residents defy the accepted political science wisdom that associates high socio-economic status with high levels of participation. Unlike the residents in the other high income neighborhood in this study, they have not translated their educational and economic advantage into organizational effectiveness. Although there are in Sunset a number of organizations attempting to address community problems, levels of involvement are low and funding and staff support is minimal. Sunset activists consider this to be a major problem and a cause of their neighborhood's neglect by the city's political and bureaucratic establishment.

Everything is isolated in the Sunset. There's no Sunset community. The result is no pressure group.

In Mission, involvement is also low in the large number of groups addressing the problems identified by residents. These groups are fragmented and often work at cross purposes. This is due in part to the diverse interests of the heterogeneous population. Thus one group's solution is likely to become another group's problem. The young white professionals are more likely to push for neighborhood redevelopment which creates serious difficulties for the minorities who cannot afford the subsequent rental and real estate increases. Minorities on the other hand are more concerned with the deep-seated economic and cultural adjustment problems. Whites are more likely to be associated with neighborhood improvement and block clubs which address issues that are more readily resolved, whereas minorities depend more on the work of the social service agencies which provide temporary relief from distress caused by external forces they are powerless to control.

In assessing organizational effectiveness, middle class professionals in Mission saw some reason for optimism. Their success in redevelopment and housing rehabilitation efforts suggested that intensive organizational activities got results. This was particularly true because forces external to the area were working for goals consistent with their needs and interests. The minorities in Mission fared less well. Their organizational contact was primarily with service agencies which centered on a client-professional rather than a self-help relationship. Their problems also were less amenable to
quick solutions and were in fact aggravated by the redevelopment projects
designed to deal with the difficulties confronting the middle class residents
of Mission.

Wicker Park ranks at the bottom of all the sites in the percentage of
residents involved in community organizations (see Figure 12). As in Mission,
the neighborhood groups are dominated by whites. Although several of them
address issues of interest to the minority residents and although they tend
to support the minorities in their concern about redevelopment and "gentri­
fication," they have not been successful in recruiting a significant number
of members from the Latino community. The Alinsky umbrella group in the area
has hired white organizers who claim little success in energizing local
residents. "People have to be encouraged to take action. They won't work
for themselves."

The effectively organized neighborhoods represent a range of socio­
economic and ethnic profiles which are reflected in the circumstances prompting
the formation of their dominant umbrella organizations and in the issues
currently addressed. Racial and ethnically heterogeneous, predominantly
white, predominantly black neighborhoods, and the major income groups are in
this grouping.

Four out of the five groups in these areas were created with the help
of a community organizer. The Back of the Yards Council and the Woodlawn
Organization (TWO) were organized under the tutelage of Saul Alinsky. The
first of these is the oldest and most powerful group identified in this
study. Created in 1930 to help solve the social and economic problems of
the packinghouse workers who live in the area, the Council today is committed
to maintaining the physical environment of the neighborhood and serving
its predominantly white working class clientele. Supported by substantial
funding, a long term committed membership, and the prestige and political
connections of its executive director, it coordinates the activities of
all of the institutions in the neighborhood.

The Woodlawn Organization (TWO), founded in 1960 to oppose the
expansion of the University of Chicago’s South Campus, dominates the
organizational life of its neighborhood. Most of the organizations and
block clubs in the area are affiliated with TWO which currently is committed
to "restructuring Woodlawn physically, economically and socially." Like the
Back of the Yard’s Council, TWO has become a neighborhood institution.
Supported by a staff of about 200 and financed by a number of major foundations,
it offers a variety of social support services for welfare recipients,
senior citizens and the unemployed. Its major focus currently is on economic
development in the area. And although both staff and community residents
claim that this emphasis is taking attention away from the severe social
problems still plaguing the community, the results are clearly visible to
all who view its housing developments, supermarket and movie theater. Some
residents feel that the organization has moved away from its grassroots base.
But its position in the community and its achievements provide clear evidence
that local residents can exert some control in dealing with local problems.

The All People’s Coalition in Visitacion Valley is a more recently or­
organized group which still utilizes the Alinsky type confrontation tactics
no longer needed by the two older organizations. Although it does not
have the strength of the older groups it is credited with bringing a major
crime prevention program into the community and has generally built a reputa­
tion as the place to go when things need to get done. The director of a
neighborhood service center described the APC’s position as a linkage
mechanism. "If we have mice on the playground or leaks in the plumbing,
we call them (APC) and they get on the city's case to get over and fix it. It's pretty good."

Logan's rich organizational life is reflected in its position as first among all sites in the percentage of residents involved in community affairs (27%). Organizational life there is dominated by the racially integrated Ad Hoc Committee for Logan which was formed specifically to deal with the myriad of problems created by the racial and economic changes in the area. Under its umbrella are found approximately sixty block clubs and a number of area religious and service organizations. Its three major committees—housing, youth and safety, address in some way all the major problems in the neighborhood. Concrete evidence of this group's success is seen in the improved lighting and tree pruning services in the area.

The heart of the Committee's activity however consists in block club organizing. As one leader put it, "it became apparent to us in a large community like Logan, that unless a small unit by unit method of organization was used, any attempt at organizing would be futile." The block clubs enable the Ad Hoc Committee to address both the physical and social deterioration of the area. They form the mechanism by which membership is recruited and thus provide the power base needed for the pressure tactics applied to the city bureaucracy and other relevant institutions. They also work to bring together a seriously divided community. Organization members claim that racial integration has proceeded more smoothly in Logan than in other Philadelphia communities precisely because the block clubs have managed to open up communications between previously hostile groups. The social integration which was so severely disrupted by the rapid population and economic changes in this formerly homogeneous neighborhood appears to be reemerging, at least among the members of the Ad Hoc Committee, as a function of their joint efforts in community problem solving. "Through fighting and victories, a sense of pride has been developed and there is a real sense of togetherness among the people."

Unlike the groups in the other four sites, the Lincoln Park Conservation Association (LPCA), an umbrella organization coordinating the activities of several smaller neighborhood groups in the area, is committed to maintaining the benefits that have already been derived. Formed in the 1950's when the city's urban renewal program began the process that was to transform the community from a deteriorating neighborhood to one of the most exclusive areas in the city, the LPCA was intent on participating in the urban renewal decisions. Its members were the beneficiaries of these decisions and for the most part lacked the concern about minority displacement evident in Wicker Park and Mission. LPCA concentrates on neighborhood beautification, crime prevention and other activities designed to "defend" its area from external influences which might create additional problems for the residents. Thus efforts were made to keep out of the area a game room which would attract "outside" teenagers and a supermarket which would bring in a clientele from a nearby low income housing project.

The residents in the communities served by these five groups differ in the kinds and severity of the problems they confront and in the quality and number of other resources available to them. But they all share access to a community institution that has produced visible signs of effectiveness and that is viewed by members and nonmembers alike as the place to go when help is needed. As such these groups serve not only as local problem solving agencies, but also as symbolic evidence that some degree of local control is possible.
Relations With City Bureaucrats

Many of the tasks undertaken by these groups require the cooperation of city service agency bureaucrats. The variations in the character of the relationship with these officials described by the activists in these neighborhoods suggest that effective organizations do not necessarily produce cooperative relations with city bureaucrats, local police and elected officials. Leaders in only three of the neighborhoods reported positive relations. In four others they described an adversary relationship which could produce response when appropriate tactics were employed. An in three communities, the politically alienated leadership perceived hostile unresponsive officials who could not be influenced.

The political support provided by the residents of South Philadelphia and Back of the Yards to the dominant party organizations in Philadelphia and Chicago respectively, ensured, in their view, positive responses from the service bureaucracies to their demands. Residents in both neighborhoods were satisfied both with the level of police protection and with the allocation of other city services in their neighborhoods. An early battle with Chicago's Democratic organizations ended with a victory for the Back of the Yards Council which produced a cooperative relationship between the two that endures to this day. Council program implementation has been facilitated by easy access to information about the ownership of homes and real estate in the area, the cooperation of the fire department in an effort to reduce electrical fires in the area and the cooperation of the local police who refer young people picked up on misdemeanor charges to the Back of the Yards Council's youth guidance project. The effectiveness of the Council's control over neighborhood environment was illustrated in a recent study of Chicago code violations which found not only that its area ranked first in the number of violations reported, but also that this constituted twice as many as were reported by the area ranked second (Jones, 1979). Although residents in Lincoln Park do not support the dominant political organization, their political sophistication and that of the Independent Alderman whom they elect as well as the status and effectiveness of the neighborhood groups has engendered a working relationship with city agencies that assures adequate support for the neighborhood.

Residents in Logan, Visitation Valley, West Philadelphia and Woodlawn who claim no ties to the political establishment define city service agencies as adversaries who must be forced to do their jobs. These relationships as well as the tactics required to produce response to neighborhood demands were most clearly spelled out by Logan residents. Unable to rely on the traditional ties with the local elected officials who serve as intermediaries between their constituents and the service bureaucracy that serves them, they developed an alternative neighborhood power base.

We're saying power comes from our neighbors, our friends, from people getting together...We are here to say that the heart and soul of Logan is not in the pocket of self-seeking politicians...or in the hands of bankers...or the realtors. Power is in our blocks, homes, churches.

This power base engenders a relationship with the political establishment that is both qualitatively and quantitatively different from that prevailing in areas that are well connected politically. Neighborhood organizations have to fight for the services that one phone call from a powerful committeeman in Philadelphia or the director of the Back of the Yards Council can provide. In describing the battle to get the trees in Logan pruned one respondent stated:
through a constant harrangue, petitioning the people at the part office, we had to circumvent the political hierarchy to finally get this done. Now very few streets have not been tackled. But it's an ongoing war that we have and will continue to wage.

Thus the political process rather than being a smooth transmission of requests to elected officials which elicit response, is seen as an ongoing battle. Those who are elected or appointed to serve, are seen as the adversaries rather than the servants of the people.

This feeling was shared in the other neighborhoods. In West Philadelphia the city was described as uncaring and disinterested in the community. "The city doesn't care too much about the inner city people." A city council member urged the local organization to unite so they could extract concessions from the city. In Visitacion Valley, where the APC organized a mass confrontation with the Board of Supervisors to elicit its neighborhood's participation in a pilot crime prevention program, one respondent echoed the views expressed in Logan. "The only power you have is the power of the people." And "we've got to push, push, push, to get things done."

And in Woodlawn the same tactics were invoked. Although TWO does not have the power of the Back of the Yards Council, it can produce a crowd to bring pressure on the Board of Education, to protect court delays and to push for the prosecution of neighborhood drug dealers.

Although activists in these neighborhoods felt that they were engaged in an ongoing battle with city bureaucracies, they did claim some victories. And these engendered a sense of confidence that, difficult as the task may be, there are tactics that can elicit bureaucratic response and that will enable local residents to influence the developments in their neighborhoods.

This feeling was not shared by activists in Sunset and Wicker Park and by the leaders of minority organizations in Mission. Lacking both political power and organizational strength, they spoke of their inability to elicit the kind of services that might make a visible impact in their neighborhoods.

In Mission and Wicker Park residents who feared that they would be displaced by the redevelopment planned for their areas, noted that the only improvements in their neighborhoods were made at the expense of those who currently live there and for the benefit of those who will ultimately move in. As one Mission resident put it: "People who are planning to revamp the shopping area are flippan and cavalier about the people who live there." In Wicker Park, activists accuse city officials and local realtors of complicity in the arson epidemic which is viewed as part of a larger effort to clear the area for eventual "gentrification."

Residents in all three neighborhoods complain about inadequate police services. In Wicker Park and Mission police harassment of residents is an equally serious concern. One Wicker Park resident expressed the feeling common in both areas: "Police will hassle you, but will not deal with our problems." In all three communities activists note that they are ignored and manipulated. In Mission, a local merchant explaining the deterioration of the local business district stated, "City Hall does not want to do anything and that's all that matters." And in Sunset there is a feeling that the neighborhood is victimized by its low crime rate. "We have less crime, but also less of everything else, less police, less government participation..."

All of these problems are aggravated by the sense that this insensitivity is deliberate. A young white project resident in Mission argued that the problems afflicting poor areas are the direct result of official policies because "the man want's it that way. He doesn't put any money into the poor areas, so we fight it out and rip each other off." A white middle class block club member shares this cynicism:
I think there are unseen things that are pulling our strings. There are power structures in this country that want to see personal integrity go down the drain.

And in Wicker Park residents perceive the entire political system as corrupt and believe that the city officials are interested in the real estate but not the people who live in the area. Neighborhood leaders working to improve their community lack the resources available in other areas. They cannot, like the leaders in Back of the Yards, ascertain the ownership of homes and real estate in the area and thus cannot pressure owners to improve dilapidated buildings and neglected vacant lots. They are unable to obtain mortgage money to improve their own homes, and like the activists in the other two neighborhoods, they share the frustration of a Sunset leader who noted, "If this community could get it together, I know it would be a powerful force."

The residents in Sunset are more economically and educationally advantaged than those in Wicker Park and Mission. They do not confront the serious social or physical maintenance problems prevalent in the other two neighborhoods. Their crime rates are considerably lower. But they do share with the residents of Mission an exceedingly high population turnover. Thirty-three percent of the residents in Mission and 20% of those in Sunset have lived in the area one year or less. That may help explain why, along with the residents in the other two sites, they have been unable to develop either the organizational strength or alternative tactics that make it possible to elicit the city services their neighborhoods require. Thus although the residents in these communities combat problems which differ qualitatively and quantitatively, they share a sense of powerlessness and helplessness as they try to cope with their concerns.

In the preceding chapters we have discussed the problems that tend to foster feelings of insecurity among neighborhood residents and the resources facilitating their resolution. We noted differences in the quantity and quality of indicators of social disorder, of available resources, and of the ways they are combined in specific neighborhood settings. These combinations, we argue, constitute the community context in which fear is generated and must be taken into account if the distribution of fear among the neighborhoods is to be understood.

Neighborhood residents use both their individual resources and those of local organizations and leaders in an effort to modify situations that they perceive to be threatening to the moral order of their communities. The perceived severity of the threats as well as the adequacy of their resources determine the effectiveness with which residents can cope, and this in turn will be reflected in their discernment of safety in the neighborhood. No single pattern appears to be related to specific fear levels. But by looking at the neighborhoods with similar levels of fear, we can clarify further those forces which engender fear and those which appear to generate a sense of security.

The "high fear" neighborhoods differ in visible signs of social disorganization, in concerns expressed by neighborhood residents, and in available resources. Signs of physical deterioration are found throughout Wicker Park and Woodlawn, but are less evident in Visitacion Valley. Racial tension and conflict pose serious problems for residents in Wicker Park and Visitacion Valley, but not for those in predominantly black Woodlawn.
Teens, drugs and vandalism concern more residents in Wicker Park than in any of the other sites. Woodlawn comes close to Wicker Park in concern about drugs, but moves down to slightly above the median on the teens and vandalism concerns. A considerably smaller percentage of Visitacion Valley residents report that these situations pose problems in their community.

Significant differences in available resources are also evident. Residents in Wicker Park and Woodlawn lack the support provided by high levels of income and education. The population in Visitacion Valley has slightly superior educational and significantly better economic resources. Particularly important in this regard is its higher percentage of homeowners who, at a minimum, have some control over their immediate environment that is unavailable to those who rent.

All three neighborhoods exhibit a similar moderate ranking on our informal social integration measure, but they differ significantly on the level of involvement in community affairs and the effectiveness of the organizations in their neighborhoods. Wicker Park residents report the lowest level of involvement among all ten sites. Woodlawn and Visitacion Valley rank third and fourth respectively. Although all three neighborhoods have Alinsky style organizations operating within them, Wicker Park's has been the least effective in generating response and involving community residents. The organizations in Woodlawn and Visitacion Valley have both achieved a fair measure of visible success. The most active organizations in the latter two neighborhoods adopt a self-help model which encourage active participation in community problem solving. In Wicker Park, however, relationships with service agencies rather than grass roots organizations are more prevalent. And there the client-professional relationship tends to reinforce dependency feelings in area residents.

These neighborhoods are similar, however, in the perception of their residents about the severity of crime problems in the area and the failure of the city's service bureaucracies to meet area needs. The crime rates in all three neighborhoods are well above their cities' means. And the people who live in them express the highest level of awareness and concern about the most fear provoking crimes, robbery and assault.

In Table 4 we present a simplified illustration of the context of the

*The following procedures were used to determine the ranking of the variables in table. For the social disorganization indicators an additive scale was formed by assigning one point to each neighborhood for the indicators discussed in the field notes, and one point to each neighborhood where thirty percent or more of the residents expressed concern about teenagers, drugs, vandalism and twenty or more percent expressed concern about abandoned buildings. The scores ranged from 0-7. A score of 5-7 was high, 2-3, moderate and 0-1 low. The rankings for victimization awareness, concern, community involvement and social integration was determined by the inspection of the position of each neighborhood on the charts comparing the sites on each of these variables. The ranking on income, education, home ownership and reported crime rates were determined by each neighborhood's relation to its city's mean. Those well above the mean were ranked high, those approximating the mean were moderate and those below the mean were low.
TABLE 4
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION INDICATORS AND NEIGHBORHOOD RESOURCES:
The "High Fear" Neighborhoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROBLEMS</th>
<th>RESOURCES</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incivility Concerns</td>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>Crime Rate</td>
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<td>Victimization and Awareness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victimization Concern</td>
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<tr>
<td>Home Ownership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Involvement</td>
<td>High</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Incivility</th>
<th>Crime Rate</th>
<th>Victimization and Awareness</th>
<th>Victimization Concern</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Home Ownership</th>
<th>Social Integration</th>
<th>Community Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WICKER PARK</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOODLAWN</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VISITACION VALLEY</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
express few concerns about the major issues generally confronting residents in high crime areas. Woodlawn and Wicker Park, on the other hand reflect the urban crisis in its most extreme form. Visitacion Valley residents also have better resources than those in the other two neighborhoods. Inhabitants of Woodlawn also have some advantages. They do not have to deal with racial conflict and they do have the support provided by a well established community organization. Furthermore, as we noted earlier, a little over one third of the residents perceive improvement in their neighborhood.

The residents in all three communities confront high levels of victimization relative to the other neighborhoods in this study and share related concerns about crime. We have argued, however, that because crime directly affects a relatively small segment of the population in even high crime areas, fear is frequently provoked by other signs of disorder that remind local residents of the threats surrounding them. Those are clearly evident in Woodlawn and Wicker Park, but less so in Visitacion Valley.

If there are in Visitacion Valley fewer reminders of the threats posed by potential criminal activity, why do we find a fear level there approximating that in the other two neighborhood? Two explanations come to mind.

It is possible that there is a threshold (see Conklin, 1975) beyond which the number of victimizations in an area overwhelms all the forces that might otherwise enhance perceptions of neighborhood security. Or we might find in Visitacion Valley, other cues which substitute for the social disorder indicators we have identified as signalling the threats posed by crime in the area.

A majority of the residents in the area have installed iron gates as target hardening devices. And although these are not as immediately threatening as illegal drug use or abandoned buildings, they do suggest that there is cause for concern. An extensive crime prevention (SAFE) program undertaken...
during our data collection period also offered continual reminders of area crimes. Residents were given neighborhood specific crime statistics; they were told about a variety of protective strategies; they saw movies depicting criminals in action; and they shared local victimization stories. In addition, they were reminded about the limited protection afforded by police.

Kidder, Cohn and Harvey (1979) found that people who engage in victimization prevention report more fear and less control over crime than those who work with community organizations to prevent crime. Our speculation that fear in Visitacion Valley might be heightened by the SAFE program is consistent with that finding. In any case, we have found that the prevalence of victimizations in the area appears to be the major factor associated with fear in those sites where approximately half of the residents report that they are afraid to go out on the street in their neighborhood at night.

The percentage of residents reporting that they feel unsafe clusters within three percentage points in five of our "low fear" neighborhoods. The sixth—South Philadelphia—exhibits the lowest fear level and is removed from the cluster by five percentage points.

Table 5 presents the social disorganization-resource combinations in the "low fear" neighborhoods. Although none exhibit severe problems, a variety of social disorganization concerns are found in the two Philadelphia neighborhoods and in Back of the Yards. Crime concerns are more prevalent in Lincoln Park where burglary is a pervasive problem. Only in Sunset and South Philadelphia does one find minimal concerns about both crime and social disorganization indicators.
TABLE 5
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION INDICATORS AND NEIGHBORHOOD RESOURCES:
The "Low Fear Neighborhoods"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Disorganization Indicators</th>
<th>Resources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incivility</td>
<td>Crime Rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST PHILADELPHIA</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGAN</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUNSET</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOY</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINCOLN PARK</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH PHILADELPHIA</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
South Philadelphia falls at the bottom of the fear measure. But residents in Sunset exhibit fear levels approximating those in Lincoln Park where crime is much more pervasive and in the other three neighborhoods where both crime and social disorder stimulate some measure of concern. The problems confronting Sunset residents do not appear to explain this phenomenon. But an examination of the right-hand side of the table suggests that fear in Sunset might be accounted for not by the prevalent problems, but rather by its paucity of community problem-solving resources.

Sunset residents have more than adequate personal resources. They share the relatively high income and educational level of the inhabitants of Lincoln Park and the extensiveness of home ownership found in the Philadelphia neighborhoods. But they lack the support of both the informal social integration and the organizational effectiveness of groups that can generate high levels of participation in community affairs. Thus residents in Sunset have failed to translate their personal resources into those that might enhance the community's capacity to generate a response to local demands and to exert a measure of social control. This failure might in part be explained by the recent entry into the neighborhood of large numbers of Orientals who, because of language and cultural barriers, engage neither in formal group nor in informal neighboring activities.

Sunset residents face far fewer problems than those in the other sites, yet they perceive changes threatening to the cohesion of the community they know and value. And although these changes appear to be relatively minor compared to those confronting residents elsewhere, the reactions in Sunset may well be aggravated by the perceived helplessness of community residents who try to deal with them. Although residents in the other neighborhoods face more serious problems, they all appear to have some kind of community support system available. Residents in Lincoln Park have both the individual and community level resources which appear to more effectively enable them to cope. There are in the neighborhood, active organizations with reasonably good relations with the bureaucratic establishment. And although levels of community involvement are not as high as in the two Philadelphia neighborhoods, the political sophistication of area residents and their extra-community ties strengthen their capacity to generate responses to their needs.

Back of the Yards residents do not have the socioeconomic resources of the Lincoln Park residents, but they do have the support of a really potent community organization. Again levels of involvement are not as high as in the Philadelphia neighborhoods. However, the strength of the organization lies not so much in the current size of its membership but rather in its status and that of the executive director and in his ties with the Democratic Organization and the city bureaucracy. In South Philadelphia there are close connections with the political establishment, but more important is the high level of social integration which generates the feeling that "we can take care of our own."

The two other Philadelphia neighborhoods present an alternative model for community problem solving. Lacking both the economic strengths of Lincoln Park residents and the political power of those in the Back of the Yards and in South Philadelphia, they compensate with extensive organizational involvement as they attempt to address community needs.

Neighborhood activists see their relationship with city government as "an ongoing war that we have and will continue to wage." Although this re-
relationship does not produce the responses available to people who already have political or organizational power, it does work to some extent and, when the situation is not too extreme, appears to develop in the residents a sense that they can exert some control over events in their neighborhood. Organizations in both Logan and West Philadelphia also focus on organizing at the block club level which creates both a power base and a neighborhood level support system.

Whatever the source, all five neighborhoods exhibit a local support system that gives residents a feeling that they can exert some control over the environment in which they live. Some of this support, such as social integration, levels of community involvement, home ownership and other demographically associated strengths of area residents, are locally based and locally derived. But since most serious neighborhood problems are externally induced, their resolution requires external support.

Although the degree to which urban resources are differentially distributed is a matter of some debate (Lineberry, 1977; Benne, 1979; Jones, 1979), our field notes indicate that many urban residents perceive a maldistribution and feel that a neighborhood level power base is required to secure adequate services from city bureaucracies.

The efforts of neighborhood groups to secure such benefits is an example of interest group politics at the local level. The strategies used to get bureaucratic response varies according to the political and organizational strength of the residents. And the effectiveness of their efforts, the generally recognized presence in an area of an organization known to be able to elicit bureaucratic response, might well generate among neighborhood residents a sense that they have the capacity to exert some measure of social control.

Feelings of security are psychological responses to objective conditions and thus are generated as much by individual interpretations as well as the conditions themselves. The case of Sunset suggests that neighborhood residents confronting relatively few problems may become fearful if they feel that they cannot deal with whatever changes take place. There appears to be little crime in Sunset and certainly a relatively small percentage of residents are concerned. However, the crime rate in San Francisco is the highest for all three cities in this study. Sunset residents, according to our survey are most likely to read and recall crime stories in the newspapers. And they believe, however low their rates, that crime is increasing in the area. When these perceptions are coupled with the feeling that neighborhood residents are not capable of generating an adequate response to their demands, fear levels in Sunset become more understandable. They are equal to those in the areas where the problems are more severe because of the perceived helplessness of the residents who feel that they cannot adequately respond to any difficulties they confront.

Skogan (1980) has argued that black and low income populations are more fearful because they are "socially" vulnerable. This social vulnerability reflects the fact that those on the low end of the socioeconomic status scale are frequently unable to generate the resources which make up a secure environment. We argue that communities can also be viewed as vulnerable if the activists have experienced repeated failure in their efforts to secure response from city bureaucratic and political agencies. Cohen (1979) has classified neighborhoods according to the political capacities generated by community groups. By his standards, the three low income neighborhoods in Philadelphia are more politically advantaged than Sunset which is viewed by its activists as politically deprived, and thus vulnerable. Our analysis of Sunset is
particularly instructive because it is a deviant case which defies our ex-
expectations about the relationship of socioeconomic status and political
power. It is cases such as this, however, (Huitt, 1961) that clarify forces
which might otherwise be submerged in the expected associations of status
and power.

What have we learned here about the relationship of fear and neigh-
borhood context? Our analysis of the high fear neighborhoods seems to suggest
that there is a threshold beyond which a high incidence of crime in a neigh-
borhood generates a high level of fear. Differences in community resources
appear to have little impact when crime rates and concerns are high. In
neighborhoods with a moderate or low level of crime, however, community
resources may make a difference. This is particularly true of community
organizations which generate an active commitment to the area. This study
suggests that where local residents lack political power, effective organi-
zations can compensate. And it suggests that where neighborhood residents
perceived that they are receiving inadequate support from city bureaucracies
and are unable to generate community involvement and organizational strength,
political alienation and a sense of helplessness is more likely to be generated.
Whether such neighborhoods face extremely severe problems such as those in
Wicker Park, moderately severe problems such as those in Mission, or minor
problems such as those in Sunset, the message to the residents is clear.
They do not have the capacity to control the changes that are threatening the
quality of life in their neighborhoods. This perceived lack of control appears
to engender as much fear as the threatening situations themselves.

This finding should not be minimized by its relevance primarily to our
low fear neighborhoods. For the fact that a little more than one quarter of
the residents in these sites exhibit fear suggests that this constitutes

a problem demanding serious attention. Indeed, it is more likely that fear
reduction policies would be more effective in such neighborhoods than in
those like Wicker Park and Woodlawn where the severe social problems them-
selves, rather than the fear they generate, should be directly addressed.
PART III

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
CHAPTER NINE

POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND THE TWO PERSPECTIVES

We have shown that the social control perspective, by expanding the focus of the research, draws attention to conditions overlooked by those considering fear of crime within the framework of the victimization perspective. The difference between these two approaches, however, is of more than academic interest. For as Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) argue, in a general discussion of implementation, all policies are premised on theoretical assumptions.

Policy implies theories. Whether stated explicitly or not, policies point to a chain of causation between mutual conditions and future consequences. If x, then y (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: XV).

Bardach (1977) in this same vein suggests that policies may not achieve their objectives regardless of how well they are implemented, if their underlying conceptualization is faulty.

Any policy or program implies an economic, and probably also a sociological, theory about the way the world works. If this theory is fundamentally incorrect, the policy will probably fail no matter how well it is implemented (Bardach, 1977: 251).

Not only has the victimization perspective dominated fear of crime scholarship for the past decade, it also provides the framework for current policy development on that issue. We conclude this essay by reviewing the policy implications of the victimization perspective and exploring those associated with the social control approach.

There is a strong tendency in social problems research in general to look for the explanation for the emergence and distribution of the problem in the character and condition of those individuals most directly affected by the
problem (Rein, 1973; Gusfield, 1975). Drunk drivers cause automobile accidents and poor people cause their own poverty. Less attention is given to the situational or contextual factors which are involved. This "blaming the victim" orientation has several general consequences. First, political responsibility (Gusfield, 1975) for solving the problem rests with government action either to educate or deter the victim. Next, treatment and sanctioning industries spring up to help in that process. Generally it is the victim who must change if the problem is to be solved (Rein, 1973). The victimization perspective on fear of crime shares many of the characteristics of this individualistic approach to social problems.

Fear within the victimization perspective, is seen as a problem of socialization, a learned response to a situation. What is problematic within the perspective is to identify the sources of fear in society, and to develop a hypothetical process by which that source is internalized. This is why so much attention is given to the types of victimizations associated with fear (What motivates the fearful?) and to constitutive psychological formation (How does that source generate the fear?)

Thus policies based on the victimization perspective concentrate on reducing the opportunity for the victimization to occur. The most frequently pursued community crime prevention policies emphasize the manipulation of two of the three factors necessary for a predatory victimization to occur—the victim, the offender and a place for them to interact. If following Glaser (1971) one defines predatory victimization as illegal acts in which "someone definitely and intentionally takes or damages the person or property of another," then community crime prevention strategies aim at reducing the number of such victimizations by manipulating the potential victim and the potential place where that interaction takes place. Criminal
activity can be deterred by changing the opportunity structure for victimization rather than by directly attempting to change the offender. Since fear is hypothesized to be a consequence of victimization, then it too would be reduced as victimizations are reduced.

The victimization perspective shifts attention from the criminal to the event (victimization). Community crime prevention strategies focus on changing the behavior of potential victims and the physical environment in which the crimes are committed in an attempt to change the behavior of the criminal. Potential victims are "educated" to their potential risks and to the precautions they might take in order to avoid being victimized. Environmental design strategies attempt to change the behavior of criminals and victims by altering the physical surroundings in which they interact.

While there have been projects which focus on either manipulating the behavior of potential victims or on environmental design, there has been a tendency recently to see these activities as mutually reinforcing and thus synthetic strategies which combine both are presently considered optimum. The recently completed Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program (1979) provides a rationale for this synthesis.

1. The crime rate in a residential neighborhood is a product of the linkage between offender motivation and the opportunities provided by the residents, users, and environmental features of that neighborhood.

2. The crime rate for a specific offense can be reduced by lessening the opportunities for that crime to occur.

3. Opportunities can be reduced by:
   a. Altering the physical aspects of buildings and streets to increase surveillance capabilities and lessen target/victim vulnerability, to increase the neighborhood's attractiveness to residents, and to decrease its fear-producing features;
   b. Increasing citizen concerns about and involvement in crime prevention and the neighborhood in general; and
   c. Utilizing the police to support the above.

4. Opportunity-reducing activities will lead not only to a reduction in the crime rate but also to a reduction in fear of crime. The reduced crime and fear will mutually reinforce each other, leading to still further reductions in both (Fowler et al., 1979:2).

Fear of crime will decrease as victimizations decrease. Victimizations will decrease as reductions are made in the opportunities afforded to criminals by police, citizens and environments to commit crimes.

Fear reduction policy is a function of victimization reduction and that follows from modifications (both physical and interactional) in community life.

The Community Anti-Crime Program (CACP) offers a slightly different approach to utilizing the victimization perspective in a fear reduction strategy. Introduced in the summer of 1977, the CACP was authorized to spend thirty million dollars in direct grants to community organizations:

To assist community organizations, neighborhood groups and individual citizens in becoming actively involved in activities designed to prevent crime, reduce the fear of crime and improve the administration of justice (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:58).

The program's guidelines also describe the problems that the grants are meant to alleviate:

The increasing social isolation of neighborhood residents, resulting from a fear of crime, which has destroyed the feelings of community necessary for social control (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:58).

And the program guidelines are equally clear about what types of activities the program is meant to foster:
The mobilization of community and neighborhood residents into effective self-help organizations to conduct anti-crime programs within their communities and neighborhoods. To encourage neighborhood anti-crime efforts that promote a greater sense of community and foster social controls over crime occurrence (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:58-1).

The program guidelines go even further in outlining the type of efforts which will be funded. Priority will be given to programs and activities that are public minded in the sense that they are designed to promote a social or collective response to crime and the fear of crime at the neighborhood level in contrast to "private minded" efforts that deal only with the actions of citizens as individuals or those that result from the provision of services that in themselves do not contribute to the organization of the neighborhood (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:58-3).

The legacy of the victimization perspective is apparent in the design of this program. Victimization experiences are assumed to create fear. Fear in turn generates isolation, because citizens react individually to the threat. Crime consequently disintegrates community. "Crime occurrences" and fear can be reduced if the citizens react collectively to that threat. The CACP guidelines are quite explicit about the program's goal:

To encourage neighborhood anti-crime efforts that promote a greater sense of community and foster social controls over crime occurrence (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:58-1).

Crime events are seen as promoting the decline of community, and collective action to prevent these events is seen as the solution to the fear problem. This perspective is shared by both Charles Silberman and James Q. Wilson (1975) in their widely read discussion of fear of crime. Silberman's discussion treats fear as a universal response to the universal threat of victimization. Since we all share the potential for victimization we all are prone to the same psychological reaction. Fear is the same for all people. Differences in context are submerged into general psychological determinants.

Ultimately, the whole fabric of urban life is based on trust; trust that others will act predictably, in accordance with generally accepted rules of behavior, and that they will not take advantage of that trust (Silberman, 1978:12).

Following Conklin, Silberman argues for the primacy of victimization in undermining that order.

Crime does more than expose the weakness in social relationships; it undermines the social order itself, by destroying the assumption on which it is based. (Silberman, 1978:12).

Wilson (1975), is also locked into the primacy of victimization in his discussion of fear. But again the differential distribution of the capacity to maintain community is linked more to the crime rate and the migration of local leadership to the suburbs.

Wilson suggests that as the leaders of local urban communities became more affluent and moved to better areas, the neighborhood's capacity to exert social control diminished and crime increased. Crime then was a consequence of the decline of the moral order.

Many of those who once headed the block clubs, ran the PTAs, complained of poor garbage collection, manned the neighborhood political apparatus, and kept the streets under some degree of surveillance had moved out. They left a void, sometimes literally a physical one. The growing number of abandoned buildings in the central parts of New York and other cities is grim evidence of the reduction in population densities and the increased purchasing power of former slum-dwellers.

With the more affluent having departed and the community-maintenance functions they once served now undermined, the rates of predatory crime in inner-city areas rose (Wilson, 1975:38).

While Wilson hypothesizes that a community's loss of leadership leads
to a loss of control which creates the conditions for more crime, he also argues that local control must be exerted over a wide range of issues. Urban citizens, he suggests are concerned about the decline of the moral order.

What these concerns have in common, and thus what constitutes the "urban problem" for a large percentage (perhaps a majority) of urban citizens, is a sense of the failure of community. When I speak of the concern for "community," I refer to a desire for the observance of standards of right and proper conduct in the public places in which one lives and moves, those standards to be consistent with—and supportive of—the values and life styles of the particular individual. Around one's home, the places where one shops, and the corridors through which one walks there is for each of us a public space wherein our sense of security, self-esteem, and propriety is either reassured or jeopardized by the people and events we encounter (Wilson, 1975:24).

Modifying these social conditions is difficult for Wilson because the leaders are gone and because crime has isolated citizens. Silberman recognizes the importance of local social control in reducing fear but that fear reduction comes as a consequence of reducing crime.

Thus the development of more effective social controls in poor communities can provide a far larger payoff in reduced crime and improved order than can the development of more effective methods of policing, more efficient courts, or improved correctional programs (Silberman, 1978:429).

Echoing the founders of the social control perspective, Silberman goes on to call for local initiative in developing that social control,

If a community development program is to have any chance of success, those in charge must understand that the controls that lead to reduced crime cannot be imposed from the outside; they must emerge from changes in the community itself, and in the people who compose it. Hence the emphasis must be on enabling poor people to take charge of their own lives—on helping them gain a sense of competence and worth, a sense of being somebody who matters (Silberman, 1978:430).

For Wilson, fear is a consequence of the lack of social control.
of a crisis of victimization is unwarranted unless it is understood to mean a fear of victimization (Cook and Cook, 1975:644).

In all these cases, the conceptual link between fear of crime and social order is called for, but not established. Ellis (1971) and Wrong (1961) suggest that since value consensus is assumed in motivational theories of the social order, these theories cannot account for the emergence of that order when consensus has broken down. Once fear of crime erodes the sense of community an individual has developed, the victimization perspective does not provide a method for reestablishing that community. Since one has learned to be afraid, there is no mechanism specified for learning to feel secure. Thus collective action is called for but no scheme is developed to demonstrate sociologically or politically how and why that action should occur. The victimization perspective shares with Parsonian consensus theory an inability to explain social order when and where that order is not already operational. Once the individual is motivated to be afraid the perspective cannot explain the reemergence of the social order that fear destroys. Either the impetus for fear (victimizations) must be removed or the victimized individual must process victimization information differently. It is the fearful individual who must change if fear is to be overcome.

We see the social control perspective as a corrective to this situation. For this perspective emphasizes the political over the psychological and the community context over individual variations. The introduction of community context as a factor in the production of fear removes the burden from the individual victims and offers a number of policy options.

Lasswell (1936) distinguishes between elites and masses on the basis of the acquisition of scarce values in society--elites have more of them.

Included among these values is security as well as wealth, status and power. Residents in fearful communities have less security and in many instances less of the other values as well. However, as we have seen, there are situations (e.g., Visitacion Valley, Back of the Yards and Sunset) where these values do not cluster.

A fear reduction policy, like a poverty reduction strategy, attempts to redistribute a value, in this case security. As such, it is consistent with other redistributive policies pursued by the government. However, unlike some of them, (e.g. income) redistributing security requires the reallocation of variable resources geared to the needs of particular communities. Environmentalists often refer to appropriate technology when adopting specific energy producing strategies in particular environments; wind mills in one area, solar cells in others. The analogy seems fitting when it comes to fear of crime. Some communities need assistance in maintaining successful efforts; others need to develop their level of provincialism; and others should be left alone. Appropriate fear reduction strategies need not be the same in all places but should rather be responsive to the particular set of circumstances operating in each locality.

Strategies to reduce the number of abandoned buildings can be administered by government agencies while the street behavior of adolescents probably cannot be controlled by policing procedures. Developing local leadership, strengthening indigenous organization and building linkages to government agencies impinging on the community should all be encouraged on the basis of our study. This should be done in the context of local definitions of problems and the unique and often complex combinations of factors affecting the production of fear.
This type of redistribution policy negates the "neutrality of context" assumptions of those like Silberman. Whereas he speaks of a generalized "fabric of urban life," we argue that the fabric of urban life varies considerably from community to community. That fabric is "man-made," resulting from the distribution of values including security. Silberman may be correct that "people need to be able to make sense out of their environment" (p. 14), but that "need" is more or less easily met depending upon the political development of the community. Social control is a function of resources and that makes the local social order a concrete political reality, which shapes how much trust the individual can have.

It may be true that "our sense of self is bound up with our ability to control the personal space in which we live" (Silberman, 1978:12). But that ability to control is not purely a psychological mechanism. It is a political capacity which communities develop in varying degrees depending upon their resources.

These political capacities, however, also influence the shape and focus of reallocation formulas. Thus the most fearful communities often do not have the resources to compete successfully for the policy benefits. Consequently those who are most in need of better security are least capable of availing themselves of positive government intervention.

For this reason the social control perspective draws upon the ability of local community institutions to maintain social control. We have seen how powerful community groups can lessen fear levels (Back of the Yards), and how the lack of political and social development can increase fear (e.g., Wicker Park and Sunset).

Just as with the Community Action Programs, our approach to fear reduction emphasizes the importance of local groups of citizens acting collectively. Fear reduction, from this perspective, results from the political mobilization of local citizens. Formulating the problem this way circumvents the entire criminal justice system in favor of those geographically based, for the most part, citizen oriented, voluntary associations. This strategy alone has substantial impact on the distribution of resources (Levi and Lipset, 1972). Citizen groups enter the policy arena, not as advisors in an ancillary position to the professionals but as the formulators and implementors of policy. The authority to administer public programs may be passed to local groups (Bell and Held, 1968). Greenstone and Peterson (1976:16) highlight the importance of this point in their discussion of OEO.

The content of the community action controversy involved a critical issue of political authority: namely, which interests should participate in and be deferred to in the course of framing public policy.

We argue the importance of this approach on the basis of the analysis we have done of ten separate communities. Communities have the potential for reducing fear when local organizations are active in controlling the signs of disorganization. Fear reduction is not simply a matter for the professional. It has, we argue, an added political dimension, since it is necessary to mobilize community groups and local leaders who can articulate groups' interests and implement programs themselves (Greenstone and Peterson, 1976). The significance of this authority shift, from professionals to citizens is substantial, for fear reduction, according to the social control perspective, calls for assisting communities in their efforts to reduce signs of disorganization rather than attempting to reduce victimization through the traditional criminal justice methods (see Washin, 1976). This important shift in emphasis places community organizations in a central position, for it serves as both the sociological unit of analysis and the political
agent of change. Knowledge of the community and legitimacy within it becomes essential to achieving fear reduction. A perspective which places both the problem and the solution in a community context gives meaning to the emphasis on local leaders and dilutes local officials' claim to a professional monopoly on the knowledge necessary to reduce fear.

Finally, by defining community as a moral order rather than politically (e.g., racial antagonisms or class differentials), the perspective defuses criticisms of a policy which emphasize radical ideas (Marris and Rein, 1967). By depicting the crime and fear problems as essentially matters of better socialization and informal social control, concern over the policy creating political turmoil is not introduced, as it was with OEO.

A fear reduction strategy which emphasizes community cohesion, local political development and a general revitalization of the neighborhood should of course be wary of the excesses and mistakes of OEO. One of that programs major design errors was to treat the urban context as a neutral environment in which poverty-reduction strategies are implemented.

If there is one implication which follows from our analysis, it is that there is nothing neutral about the urban context. Patterns of migration, local political development, the distribution of urban services, and the impact of victimization all affect communities differentially. An intelligent fear prevention program must be cognizant of the differential pressures of urban life on the generation of fear at the community level.

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