
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National Institute of Justice United States Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20531

MINNESOTA COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS ACT EVALUATION



PLANNING BOARD

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TECHNICAL REPORT:

SOCIAL JUSTICE

January, 1981

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TECHNICAL REPORT:

SOCIAL JUSTICE

January, 1981

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FIGURE 1: A Method 1 Under CC

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
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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to provide a thorough explanation of the evaluation of the impact of the Community Corrections Act (CCA) on Social Justice. The report is a supplement to the <u>Minnesota Community Corrections Act Evaluation</u>: <u>General Report</u>. The evaluation of Social Justice relies on findings from the evaluations of appropriateness of sanctions and public protection. The technical reports on each of those evaluations should be consulted for an explanation of sanction and public protection findings.

The conceptual overview for the evaluation (see <u>Research Design</u>) identifies objectives, goals and outcomes of the CCA. The objectives follow directly from provisions in the Act and are conceptualized as contributing to three goals. The balance between goals results in two outcomes — Efficiency and Social Justice. The balance between the goals of public protection and appropriateness of sanctions constitutes Social Justice. Although the CCA policy is intended to bring benefits to both the public and to offenders, a tension exists between the two goals. For example, the public could perhaps best be protected by incarcerating all offenders. However, there is a sense that justice is not served when offenders are given too severe sanctions while the public experiences very little risk. Similarly, there is a sense that justice is not served when offenders receive minimal sanctions while the public is at great risk. The evaluation of Social Justice investigates this delicate balance between concerns for offenders and concerns for public safety. Considering the CCA's effects on public protection and appropriateness of sanctions, does the balance between these two goals produce a higher or lower level of Social Justice?

Social Justice is evaluated primarily with data on adult offenders. Although the public protection and appropriate sanction evaluations do provide data on juvenile offenders, shortcomings in those data suggest they would provide a very imperfect indication of Social Justice. Juvenile data are not used to provide precise estimates of Social Justice, but they are inspected to suggest whether reliance on adult findings misrepresents the impact of the CCA.

II. DEFINITION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

Because Social Justice carries a variety of connotations and suggests different normative outcomes to different people, it is important to clarify how the term is being used in this evaluation. In reviewing philosophical traditions of social justice, it became apparent that the term is used here in a somewhat untraditional and more complicated way. Social Justice is usually considered a distributive principle. That is:

... each individual has exactly those benefits and burdens which are due to him by virtue of his personal characteristics and circumstances (Miller, 1976, p. 20).

At its simplest, "to each his due".

According to this standard definition of justice, the goals of both public protection and appropriate offender sanctions represent forms of justice. If one agrees that the public in general does not deserve offender threats, then the higher the levels of public protection, the more just is the situation for the public. Ideally sanctions should prevent further offenses through rehabilitation, deterrence or incapcitation. When an offender is prevented from committing a new offense a just outcome exists for the public; when an offender commits a new offense an unjust outcome exists for the public. Similarly, the more that offenders receive the sanctions that they deserve, the more just is the situation for offenders.

Social Justice, as it is being used in this evaluation, represents the relationship between justice for the public and justice for the offender. Social Justice is not a distribution of a particular benefit or burden throughout society, but instead it is a balance of two states of justice; one for the public and one for the offender. This conceptualization is not meant to imply a balance between two distinct social groups. Rather what is appropriate for offenders as well as what is fair for the public are both social values. The concern with appropriateness of sanctions is a social concern with doing "right" things for offenders, not a set of values articulated by offenders themselves. The balance between public and offender interests, then, is in reality a balance between two social values.

It is possible that justice for one group is in conflict with justice for the other. For example, reducing offender threats could conceivably be in conflict with increasing appropriateness of offender sanctions. How can one determine, then, whether Social Justice has increased when one group benefits and the other is burdened? There are a number of possible outcomes, but it is not immediately clear which constitute an increase in Social Justice. If there is an increase in both public protection and appropriateness of offender sanctions, then the outcome clearly is more just. Similarly, if both goals decrease, the outcome clearly is less just. The problem arises when one goal increases and the other declines. The position adopted here is that Social Justice is said to increase so long as justice in the <u>aggregate</u> increases; that is so long as the total number of deserved situations increases. Thus, if offender sanctions are a great deal more appropriate at a slight loss of public protection, Social Justice increases. On the other hand, if sanctions become only slightly more appropriate but the public is put at great risk, Social Justice decreases.

Social Justice is conceptualized typically as a distributive principle. This view of Social Justice as an aggregative principle as well (i.e. the total amount of deserved situations, not only their distribution) makes this a somewhat different conceptualization yet one that appears appropriate for this evaluation in which two states of justice must be balanced. Social Justice is said to increase if the total amount of justice (i.e., deserved situations) experienced by the public and offenders increases. This situation could exist if justice for one group declines, so long as justice for the other group increases to a greater extent.

III. METHODOLOGY

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A. A Method for Comparing Actual and Predicted Levels of Social Justice

In measuring Social Justice, like efficiency, the concern is to assess whether the CCA provides a better situation than would exist without the CCA; that is, a comparison of actual and predicted levels of Social Justice. The measurement of efficiency which is explained in a separate technical report involves a straightforward ratio of costs per public protection. Any ratio producing more protection per dollar spent indicates a more efficient system. Social Justice, however, does not lend itself to such straightforward measurement.

The evaluations of public protection and appropriate offender sanctions provide estimates of successes (public protection) and appropriate offender sanctions with CCA participation. It is also possible to predict successes and appropriate offender

sanctions had areas not participated in the CCA. Indicators of public protection and appropriate sanctions are explained thoroughly in the reports for those two evaluations. The problem in this section is to devise a method that can use these actual and predicted estimates to assess whether Social Justice has increased with CCA participation.

Two options clearly are inadequate. First, a ratio of appropriate sanctions per offender success does not provide an indicator of justice. The first example in Table 1 provides data that if treated in a parallel manner to efficiency would indicate justice. With the CCA the hypothetical data indicate that public protection is increasing (denominator) while appropriate offender sanctions decrease (numerator). According to the definitions of Social Justice discussed above, these data do not indicate a more just condition. The public is better off than without the CCA (100 more successes) but offenders are worse off (200 fewer appropriate sanctions). The distribution of benefits is even more unequal and the total amount of benefits decreases (the public gains 100; offenders lose 200; net loss of 100). A ratio parallel to an efficiency ratio obviously does not provide a measure of Social Justice.

A second alternative considered is to use a ratio but to use as a standard of Social Justice a ratio of one. A ratio of one indicates that both groups are benefiting equally, while ratios farther from one indicate one group is benefiting at the expense of the other. But the second example in Table 1 illustrates that this method also is inadequate to measure Social Justice. While the hypothetical data with the CCA provide a ratio of one, one group is losing while the other remains the same. Thus, the total benefits are reduced although benefits are more equitably distributed. This method gets at the distributive dimension of social justice but it misses the aggregative dimension (i.e., the total level of justice).


What is required is a method that can provide a measure of both the distributive and aggregative dimensions of Social Justice. Such a method is depicted in Figure 1. Public protection is the vertical axis while offender sanctions is the horizontal axis. This example assumes there are 500 offenders in the post-CCA population. Complete justice for the public occurs with 500 successes. Complete justice for offenders occurs with 500 appropriate sanctions. The problem is to develop a measure of whether the situation with the CCA provides more Social Justice.

The first step in Figure 1 is to plot the predicted values of successes and sanctions without the CCA (point X). One then draws a line through this point that intersects each axis at a 45° angle. Along this line one unit of success is equivalent to one unit of appropriate sanctions. Some persons might disagree with this value position that an offender is equal to an individual in the public. However, the most neutral position available to the researcher is to assume all are equal. If persons could articulate the relative weight of each group (e.g., an individual in the public is worth twice as much as an offender), a line could be drawn at a different angle to reflect these different weights. From this diagonal line one draws two additional lines at 45° angles. One then has six sections in which the actual CCA values can fall when plotted. The main diagonal line separates just and unjust outcomes. This diagonal line indicates the aggregate dimensions of social justice. If the actual CCA value falls anywhere above the line, in the aggregate the total amount of justice has increased. If the actual CCA value falls anywhere below this line, in the aggregate the total amount of justice is less than without the CCA.

The distributive dimension of Social Justice is indicated by the lines that separate three types of justice and three types of injustice. These sections, in other words,

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Pr	edicted Ratio	Actual Ratio		NUMBER OF SUCCESSES
	thout CCA	with CCA		(Public Protection)
Example 1: # Appropriate Sanctions	<u>300</u> 400 (3/4)	100		
Successes	400 (3/4)	<u>100</u> 500 (1/5)		
Example 2: # Appropriate Sanctions	400	400		
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X = Hypothetical estimate of predicted number of appropriate offender sanctions and predicted number of successes without the CCA.

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A through F = Hypothetical estimates of actual number of appropriate offender sanctions and actual number of successes with the CCA. б

indicate which group is benefiting or being burdened with the CCA. Consider first the possibilities of justice, those points falling above the diagonal line. If the actual CCA values fall in the center section (e.g., point A), both groups are experiencing more justice with CCA participation. This section, therefore, has been labelled absolute justice since everyone benefits. If actual CCA values fall in the upper section of justice (e.g., point B), the public is benefiting at the expense of the offenders. One can see that at any point in this section the public is gaining to a greater extent than offenders are losing. There is justice because there is more total justice, but it is a relative justice because one group benefits while another is burdened. The lower section of justice (e.g., point C) represents the opposite case in which offenders are gaining a great deal while the public is losing to a lesser degree.

The types of injustice can be handled in exactly the same way. If the actual CCA values fall in the center section below the diagonal line (e.g., point D), there is absolute injustice because both groups are worse off than they would be without the CCA. If the values fall in the upper portion below the diagonal line (e.g., point E), there is relative injustice. The public has gained a little but offenders lose to a greater extent so that in the aggregate there is less justice. Finally, if actual CCA values fall in the lower portion below the diagonal line (e.g., point F), there is rulative injustice. Offenders are receiving somewhat more appropriate sanctions, but because there are many more failures among offenders, in the aggregate there is less justice.

This method of plotting Social Justice has several advantages. First, it provides a visual presentation of actual and predicted levels of justice so that findings can be easily reported and understood. Second, it provides a convenient way to illustrate the two dimensions of Social Justice. By creating the six sectors of justice and injustice, both the level of justice is depicted (aggregate dimension) as well as the group(s) that is benefiting (distributive dimension). This latter characteristic is particularly useful because it permits the reader to make a personal determination of whether the outcome is more or less just. While a certain definition of Social Justice has been imposed and a measure devised according to that definition, the manner in which the outcome is reported enables persons with a different sense of social justice to assess whether outcomes meet this sense of justice. For example, someone might disagree that point C in Figure 1 in fact represents justice. According to the above definition it does, but to someone else it might not (e.g., someone who greatly values individuals in the public over offenders). The presentation of the findings in this way enables readers with different values to interpret findings according to those values.

B. A Problem of Different Population Sizes

The application of the method described above requires a choice of what values to plot - numbers or percentages. The choice makes no difference when populations for the public protection and sanction evaluations are the same. However, the target population for each goal has been defined differently, meaning that the population numbers plotted on each axis differ.

The relevant population for evaluating appropriateness of sanctions is all community and state cases. The relevant population for the public protection evaluation, on the other hand, is all community and less serious state cases. The argument is that the CCA has a responsibility to encourage the incarceration of offenders who ought to be imprisoned, but the CCA is not responsible for the criminal behaviors of these offenders following their incarceration. Thus, serious state cases are included in the sanction evaluation but not in the public protection evaluation. The population for the sanction evaluation is in all cases larger.

The effect of different population sizes is that when one plots numbers of appropriate sanctions and numbers of successes, sanction results have a greater effect on Social Justice conclusions. Consider the following example. The actual post-CCA percentage of cases with appropriate sanctions is eighty percent and the percentage of successful cases is seventy-five percent. The predicted percentage of cases with appropriate sanctions in the absence of the CCA is seventy-five percent (i.e. sanctions are improved by five percent with the CCA) while the predicted percentage of successes in the absence of the CCA is eighty percent (i.e. public protection declines by five percent with the CCA). If one plots actual and predicted percentages, the decline in public protection is exactly offset by the increase in appropriateness of sanctions (five percent), producing a conclusion of no change in Social Justice (the "actual" point falls on the diagonal line in Figure 1).

When one applies these percentages to the post-CCA populations to obtain numbers and when the sanction population is larger, the change in number of sanctions is larger than the change in number of successes. That is, the increase in number of appropriate sanctions outweighs the decline in number of successes, producing a conclusion of an increase in Social Justice for the benefit of offenders. When one plots numbers, sanction results contribute more to Social Justice conclusions than do public protection results. When one plots percentages, results from the two evaluations contribute equally.

The decision is that the unequal contribution of the two goals in fact represents most accurately the implicit operation of the policy. If the CCA has the potential of affecting more cases in one goal than another, then that effect should be considered. Numbers, therefore, rather than percentages are estimated for the Social Justice plots. This decision recognizes that the CCA has the potential of affecting more sanctions than offender successes. Said differently, it recognizes that the target population for the sanction evaluation is larger than the target population for public protection. While this decision has the potential to affect Social Justice conclusions, in no case do results differ using the alternative decision.

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The evaluation of public protection uses offender successes as an indicator of public safety. The more that offenders are prevented from committing new offenses (felonies), the more the public is protected. The target population for the goal of public protection is all cases sentenced to the community and all less serious cases committed to prison. Estimates of actual and predicted successes are based on this post-CCA target population. The population and sample data are available only through 1978 because the public protection evaluation requires a follow-up period for coding new offenses. Estimates of successes, therefore, are not made for Rock-Nobles whose entry is 1/1/79. Estimates also are not made for Washington because its CCA entry of 7/1/78 provides only six months of post-CCA cases.

The public protection evaluation relies on comparisons of success rates (i.e. proportion of offenders not committing new felonies) before and after CCA entry among samples of offenders in each CCA area. The public protection evaluation distinguishes success rates in the short term, the long term and overall. The overall success rates are used for estimating successes in the early and middle participants. Because of their recent entry only short-term success rates can be used for Region 6 West, Blue Earth and Hennepin.

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C. Estimating Actual and Predicted Numbers of Successes

The estimate of the actual number of successes is derived by multiplying the sample post-CCA success rate by the post-CCA target population. The method for predicting number of successes had an area not entered the CCA depends upon the research design used in evaluating public protection. The designs are explained thoroughly in the report on public protection. For some areas the design is a pretest-posttest design without control groups. The middle participants (Red Lake-Polk-Norman, Todd-Wadena, Arrowhead Regional Corrections and Anoka) have no comparison counties. The comparisons originally planned for Region 6 West and Blue Earth were ruled out as invalid. For areas 'ith no comparison data, predictions are based solely on the pre-CCA success rates. When there is no significant change in success rates after CCA entry, the predicted number of successes is considered to be the same as the actual. When there is a significant change in success rates after CCA entry, the predicted number of successes equals the pre-CCA sample success rate multiplied by the post-CCA target population.

The public protection evaluations of Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted, Crow Wing-Morrison, Ramsey and Hennepin utilize comparison county data. When comparison data are available the predicted number of successes is based on the pre-CCA success rate, adjusted for changes occurring in the comparison counties. Should the success rate change not be significantly different from the change found in the comparison counties, the predicted number of successes is considered to be the same as the actual number with the CCA. However, when the success rate change is significantly different from the change occurring in the comparison counties, the pre-CCA success rate is adjusted by the average percentage change found in the comparison counties. For example, if the average percentage change in an area's comparison counties is +05% the CCA area's pre-CCA success rate is increased by 05%. This adjusted rate multiplied by the post-CCA target population constitutes the predicted number of successes had a county not participated in the CCA.

D. Estimating Actual and Predicted Numbers of Appropriate Sanctions

The evaluation of appropriateness of sanctions uses the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines grid as the criterion for determining the appropriateness of offenders' sanctions (commitment vs. non-commitment). The target population for this goal is all offenders sentenced for felony offenses. The estimates of actual and predicted numbers of appropriate sanctions are based on this target population. Population and sample data are available only through 1978 because of the follow-up requirement for coding sanction changes.

The sanction evaluation compares the proportions of offenders with appropriate sanctions before and after CCA entry in samples of offenders in each CCA area. The evaluation provides data on appropriateness at the time of sentencing and two years after sentencing. The latter measure takes into account the effects of sanction changes. Data on appropriateness two years after sentencing are used for the early and middle participants. Thus, the estimates of Social Justice for these areas are based on data covering the long term for both sanctions and successes. Because of their recent entry, data on appropriateness at the time of sentencing must be used for Region 6 West, Blue Earth and Hennepin. These sanction data are comparable to the short-term success data used for these three recent participants.

Procedures for estimating the actual and predicted numbers of appropriate sanctions are identical to those explained in the section above on successes. The estimated actual number of appropriate sanctions while participating in the CCA equals the post-CCA sample proportion appropriate multiplied by the post-CCA target population. When no significant change in appropriateness after CCA entry is identified, the predicted number of appropriate sanctions had a county not participated is considered to be the same as the actual. When a significant change is identified, the predicted number of appropriate sanctions equals the post-CCA target population multiplied by the pre-CCA sample proportion appropriate. For CCA areas with comparison data, the pre-CCA sample proportion is adjusted by the average percentage change occurring in the comparison counties.

E. Inspecting Juvenile Data

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Although Social Justice analyses are not conducted with the juvenile data, it is important to assess whether the adult findings are representative. If there is evidence, for example, that Social Justice regarding adult offenders declines but Social Justice regarding juvenile offenders perhaps increases (or vice versa) it is not legitimate to report only one set of results. Researchers want to be confident that not evaluating social justice for juveniles does not illegitimately hide either positive or negative findings.

Juvenile commitment rates are negative indicators of appropriateness of juvenile sanctions. Juvenile arrest rates are negative indicators of public protection. Generally, juvenile commitments decline with CCA participation (appropriateness of sanctions improves) but arrest rates tend to increase (public protection declines). Researchers have not emphasized either the positive juvenile sanction results or the negative juvenile public protection results because neither evaluation is as sound as the corresponding adult evaluations. Both juvenile studies have the following limitations:

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The inferences from the juvenile data are more problematic than those for adults. There is a clearly defined and enumerated adult target population of the CCA. From this adult target population representative samples are drawn from which inferences can be made to the target population. Extensive data are collected on sanctions and follow-up criminal behaviors. Inferences can be made from the adult sample results on sanctions and public protection to the target population. Because of careful sampling there is a small but known element of error that can be considered in this inference. The juvenile situation is far less satisfactory. The target population is not clearly defined. It is believed to be larger than the adult target population but certainly not as large as the total population-at-risk. Because there is not a clearly defined and enumerated target population, it is not possible to draw samples of juveniles. As a result the data that are used are county-level aggregate commitment rates and arrest rates based on the total population-at-risk. The inference is from the total populationat-risk to an ambiguous target population. The degree to which commitments and arrests are accounted for by the target population and whether this population and the population-at-risk overlap and whether this degree is changing over-time are unknown. The extent of error is unknown and cannot be considered in interpreting results. Thus inferences to juveniles in the target population from aggregate data based on the population-atrisk may contain errors.

Both commitment and arrest data provide imperfect indicators of the concepts being evaluated. For adults the sample data indicate what type of offender receives what type of sanction and indicate which offenders are reconvicted for new felonies. For juveniles, however, it is not known if a felony arrest represents the commission of a felony; it is not known if a

decrease in commitments represents the same amount of increase in the use of more appropriate community sanctions.

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3. Each evaluation has available only one data set. Moreover, both the commitment and arrest data are subject to error. While reporting problems decrease the reliability of arrest data, the commitment data in the early 1970's are affected by problems in data entry. The inclusion of all non-CCA areas in both evaluations should help to control the effects of the data errors, but any error systematically affecting CCA or non-CCA counties remains uncontrolled. In contrast intercoder reliability tests were conducted to assure the accuracy of the adult sample data. Additional data were also available to provide corroborating evidence for the adult analyses.

Because of these problems the evaluations of juvenile sanctions and public protection probably provide less precise indications of the changes in the two goals that have resulted from CCA participation than is true for the adult evaluation. On the other hand, failure to analyze the juvenile data leaves the study open to the criticism of illegitimately failing to report positive or negative findings. The changes in commitments and arrests are therefore inspected to determine the net change in the two goals. Each reader can interpret those data as he sees fit.

Commitment and arrest rates are both based on the juvenile population-at-risk. The mean number of commitments (per thousand population) for the post-CCA years provides an estimate of the actual number of (in)appropriate sanctions. The mean number of arrests (per thousand population) for the post-CCA years provides an estimate of the actual number of arrests with CCA participation. The mean pre-CCA commitment and arrest rates, adjusted by the percentage change found in the non-CCA counties, provides a predicted number of inappropriate sanctions and arrests had an area not entered the CCA. The actual minus the predicted number of commitments indicates the change in appropriateness of sanctions that can be attributed to the CCA. The actual minus the predicted number of arrests indicates the change in Public Protection that can be attributed to the CCA. The two change scores are comparable because they are based on the same population-at-risk figures. Thus, the two change scores can be compared to determine the net contribution of the CCA. For example, if there is one more appropriate sanction for every one thousand juveniles but one more arrest, there is no net increase or decrease, resulting in a maintenance of Social Justice.

IV. RESULTS

Data on actual and predicted successes for the ten CCA areas are reported in Table 2. Data on actual and predicted appropriate sanctions are reported in Table 3. For nine of the ten CCA areas included in the Social Justice evaluation, the actual and predicted numbers of successes and appropriate sanctions are the same. There is, therefore, no change in Social Justice and thus no need to create a Social Justice figure.

The data in Table 3 indicate that the Red Lake-Polk-Norman change in appropriateness of sanctions provides a basis for a change in Social Justice. Because only one goal is changing the direction of change for Social Justice and the group benefiting or losing is fairly obvious. However, a Social Justice figure is drawn to illustrate the change in outcome.





TABLE 2: Actual Number of Successes with CCA Participation and Predicted Number of Successes without CCA Participation

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CCA Area	<u>Overall S</u> Pre-CCA ^D	<u>Post-CCA</u>	Post-CCA Target <u>Population</u> a	Actual Number of Successes with CCA Participation	Predict Success <u>CCA Par</u>
Dodge-Fillmore-					
Olmsted	n.s.	82.0	297	244	
Crow Wing-Morrison	n.s.	88.2	291	257	
Ramsey	n.s.	84.3	2,020	1,703	
Red Lake-Polk-Norman	n.s.	86.7	137	119	
Todd-Wadena	n.s.	98.0	53	52	
Arrowhead Regional					
Corrections	n.s.	87.2	587	512	
Anoka	n.s.	83.0	319	265	
Sho	<u>rt-term Su</u>	<u>ccess Rate^a</u>			
Region 6 West	n.s.	97.7	27	26	
Blue Earth	n.s.	93.5	50	47	
Hennepin	n.s.	93.6	1,224	1,146	

- a. The overall success rate is based on samples of offenders sentenced to April 1, 1978. The corresponding target population consists of offenders sentenced to April 1, 1978. The short-term success rate is based on samples of offenders sentenced through December 31, 1978. The corresponding target population consists of offenders sentenced through December 31, 1978.
- b. If the pre-CCA and post-CCA rates are not significantly different or not significantly different from comparison county changes, "n.s." is recorded in the pre-CCA column.



Percentage of Cases with Appropriate Sanctions Two Years after Sentencing^a Post-CCA Actual Number of Target Appropriate Sanctions CCA Area Pre-CCAb Post-CCA Population^a with CCA Participation Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted n.s. 85.3 381 325 Crow Wing-Morrison n.s. 81.7 360 294 Ramsey n.s. 85.4 2,892 2,470 Red Lake-Polk-Norman 63.5 96.1 208 200 Todd-Wadena 90.5 n.s. 66 60 Arrowhead Regional Corrections n.s. 84.5 957 809 Anoka n.s. 76.1 523 398 Percentages of Cases with Appropriate Sanctions at Time of Sentencing^a Region 6 West n.s. 85.8 29 25 Blue Earth n.s. 83.3 52 43 Hennepin n.s. 78.3 1,357 1,063

a. The sample percentage and target population for two years after sentencing includes to April 1, 1978. The sample percentage and target population at time of sentencing sentenced through December 31, 1978.

b. If the pre-CCA and post-CCA percentages are not significantly different or not signi from comparison county changes, "n.s." is recorded in the pre-CCA column.

TABLE 3: Actual Number of Appropriate Sanctions with CCA Participation and Predicted Number of Appropriate Sanctions without CCA Participation



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


Figure 2 compares the actual and predicted levels of Social Justice for Red Lake-Polk-Norman. The increase in appropriateness of offender sanctions with the maintenance of public protection produces a net increase in Social Justice. For Red Lake-Polk-Norman offenders benefit while the public experiences no change with CCA participation.

Table 4 provides the actual and predicted number of commitments and arrests for juvenile offenders. These data are not reported to provide precise estimates of levels of Social Justice. Instead, they are reported to suggest whether reporting adult findings only might misrepresent the impact of the CCA on Social Justice.


The juvenile data indicate that the increases in arrest rates tend to be greater than the decreases in commitment rates. The net balance in ten areas is in a negative direction. For nine of eleven areas the increases in arrest rates more than offset the decreases in commitments. In one area (Blue Earth) an increase in commitment rates is greater than the arrest rate decrease. In only one area (Hennepin) is the net effect positive: the arrest rate decline is greater than the commitment rate increase. Thus researchers do not believe the inability to analyze social justice for juveniles results in a failure to report positive findings. On the other hand, because it is believed that the juvenile data are not adequate to analyze the concept of social justice and because the extent of error is probably greater for juvenile arrest data, it is not believed that negative results are inappropriately minimized.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Table 5 provides a summary of the findings on Social Justice based on adult offender data. For nine of the ten CCA areas analyzed, Social Justice is maintained. This maintenance is based on the maintenance of both public protection and appropriateness of offender sanctions. That is, in no case is maintenance the result of one group's gain offsetting the other group's loss. Social Justice increases in Red Lake-Polk-Norman, with an increase in appropriateness of offender sanctions.

Inspection of the juvenile data indicates that the increases in arrest rates are greater than the decreases in commitment rates. Because the arrest data probably are less reliable than the commitment data, researchers are not in a positition to conclude that the greater declines in public protection produce a decline in social justice. The limited data available do suggest, however, that the inability to analyze social justice for juveniles does not prevent the reporting of a positive CCA impact.

Evidence indicates that the Community Corrections Act has little impact on public protection or on appropriateness of offender sanctions. It is to be expected, then, that the statewide conclusion is that <u>Social Justice is maintained but not improved with the</u> Community Corrections Act.



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
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Predicted Level of Social Justice had Red Lake-Polk-Norman not participated in the CCA.

Actual Level of Social Justice with CCA participation.



TABLE 4: <u>The Net Effect</u>			le Commitment		<u> </u>						
	Number of Sanctions per 1,000 Prodicted	(Commitme Juveniles	ents) <u>s_at-</u> Risk	Number of per 1,000 Juveniles	at-Risk		Difference +	Net Impact on Social	and the second	•	
Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted	Predicted 1.00	_	Difference	Predicted	a <u>Actual</u>	Difference	Difference	Justice			
Crow Wing-Morrison	2.03	.17	+ .83	18.7	22.4	- 3.70	- 2.87	DECREASE			7
Red Lake-Polk-Norman	1.01	.77	+1.26	22.2	24.9	- 2.70	- 1.44	DECREASE			
Todd-Wadena		.41	+.60	б.О	7.3	- 1.30	70	DECREASE			
Arrowhead Regional	.31	.27	+ .04	1.9	6.9	- 5.00	- 4.96	DECREASE	- ere alla dege de		
Corrections	1.78	1.04	+.74	24.0					فيسالهم فالتعار		
Anoka	.66	.17	+ .49	24.8	28.0	- 3.20	- 2.46	DECREASE		-	
Region 6 West	1.20	.40	+ .49	26.8	28.5	- 1.70	- 1.21	DECREASE	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e		
Blue Earth	1.12	1.71		5.8	6.7	90	10	DECREASE			
Washington	1.50	.29	59	27.4	27.0	+ .40	19	DECREASE			
Ramsey	1.34	.74	+1.21	15.1	20.1	- 5.00	- 3.79	DECREASE G			•
Hennepin	.87		+ .60	32.0	39.0	- 7.00	- 6.40	DECREASE			
	.07	1.37	50	58.3	45.0	+13.30	+12.80	INCREASE	j j	4 .	
a. The predicted a change (pre to Hennepin. The The large chang by reporting pr	predicted ra ges in arrest	in non-CC ates for F rates fo	CA counties. Ramsey are bas or both Ramsey	The non-CCA sed on Henner and Henner	data exc	lude Ramsey a	and				

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TABLE 5: Summary of Socia' Justice Conclusions

CCA Area	Public Protection	÷	Appropriateness of Sanctions	-	Social Justice
Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted	Maintain	+	Maintain	=	MAINTAIN
Crow Wing-Morrison	Maintain	+	Maintain	=	MAINTAIN
Ramsey	Maintain	. /-	Maintain	=	MAINTAIN
Red Lake-Polk-Norman	Maintain	+	Increase	=	INCREASE
Todd-Wadena	Main tain	+	Maintain	=	MAINTAIN
Arrowhead Regional Corrections	Maintain	÷	Maintain	=	MAINTAIN
Anoka	Maintain	+	Maintain	=	MAINTAIN
Region 6 West	Maintain	+	Maintain	=	MAINTAIN
Blue Earth	Maintain	÷	Maintain	=	MAINTAIN
Hennepin	Maintain	+	Maintain	=	MAINTAIN

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Miller, D. (1976) Social Justice Oxford: Clarendon Press

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