BACKGROUND PAPER FOR THE
SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDER INITIATIVE
OF THE U.S. OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

BY
PAUL S. ALEXANDER
CHARLES P. SMITH
Teresa L. Rooney

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NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER
AMERICAN JUSTICE INSTITUTE
1007 - 7TH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814
916-444-3096

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PREFACE

As part of the Assessment Center Program of the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, topical centers were established to assess delinquency prevention (University of Washington), the juvenile justice system (American Justice Institute), and alternatives to the juvenile justice system (University of Chicago). In addition, a fourth assessment center was established at the National Council on Crime and Delinquency to integrate the work of the three topical centers.

The present document, "Background Paper for the Serious Offender Initiative of the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention," has been developed by the American Justice Institute. It includes findings on the definition of serious juvenile crime, characteristics of serious juvenile offenders, the response of the juvenile justice system to serious juvenile crime, and a discussion of possible strategies for handling serious juvenile offenders.

Other work of the American Justice Institute as part of the National Juvenile Justice System Assessment Center includes reports on the status offender, child abuse and neglect, classification and disposition of juveniles, serious juvenile offenders, costs of crime, the less-serious juvenile offender, 24-hour intake, job opportunities for delinquents, the characteristics of juvenile offenders, special problems of juveniles, sexual abuse and exploitation of juveniles, and legal advocacy for juveniles.

Charles P. Smith, Director
National Juvenile Justice System Assessment Center
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1. INTRODUCTION

This paper has been prepared to provide background information for use by the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) as part of their Serious Juvenile Offender Initiative. The paper was prepared by the National Juvenile Justice System Assessment Center (NJJASC) based upon their assessment of serious juvenile crime and offenders.

The method used in obtaining information for this paper includes review of the literature, analysis of raw statistics, interviews, and site visits.

The paper first provides a statement of the problem, including limitations in dealing with serious juvenile crime; desired definitions; a description of the extent of serious juvenile offenses; and a description of the characteristics of serious juvenile offenders. The paper then describes and discusses how the juvenile justice system presently handles such offenses and offenders.

In addition, the paper discusses the problems and needs for evaluative research. Finally, the paper provides some strategies for handling serious juvenile crime and offenders, including a rationale, related issues and problems, and specific recommendations.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Several major limitations exist when any attempt is made to do anything about serious juvenile crime. These limitations include:

- disagreement over what is a serious juvenile offense and who is a serious juvenile offender
- lack of current, comprehensive, and readily available information on either serious juvenile offenses or offenders
- disagreement over the objectives and priorities of the juvenile justice system, and
- disagreement or lack of information on what policies or programs should be undertaken even if the definitions were clear, the information available, and the objectives or priorities established.

In this paper, an effort will be made to the extent possible in spite of these limitations to develop a description and strategies for serious juvenile crime and offenders.
It is believed that an adequate quantity of funds and personnel are available through a reallocation of priorities within the juvenile justice system to do something constructive about the problem.

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this paper, the following definitions are used:

1. Juvenile
   A person who is not yet 18, or, for purposes of proceedings and disposition of such a person for an act of juvenile delinquency or a crime committed prior to their eighteenth birthday, a person who is not yet 21. (Based upon United States Code, 1976, Volume IV, Section 5031: Definitions).

2. Offender
   A person who is adjudicated by the adult or juvenile justice system to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency or a crime. (Based upon United States Code, 1976, Volume IV, Section 5031: Definitions).

3. Juvenile Delinquency
   A violation of a law of the United States or its several States committed by a person not yet 18, which would have been a crime if committed by an adult and which is liable to disposition through the juvenile justice system. (Based upon United States Code, 1976, Volume IV, Section 5031: Definitions).

4. Serious Juvenile Offense
   An offense (or one of at least equal severity as measured by the Sellin-Wolfgang Seriousness Scale)* of:
   - homicide or voluntary manslaughter
   - forcible sexual intercourse
   - aggravated assault
   - burglary of an occupied residence
   - larceny-theft of more than $1,000
   - auto theft without recovery of the vehicle
   - arson of an occupied building
   - kidnapping
   - extortion
   - illegal sale of dangerous drugs (26, p. 38).

*For a discussion of the limitations of existing definitions and the desirable use of severity scales in developing definitions of seriousness, the reader is referred to Smith, Alexander, Haistyn, and Roberts, pp. 15-38.

5. Serious Juvenile Offender
   A person who is adjudicated for one or more offenses whose severity is equal to homicide or forcible sexual intercourse as measured by the Sellin-Wolfgang scale or a person whose offense history includes adjudication for five or more serious offenses on the Sellin-Wolfgang scale (26, p. 38).

NUMBER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENSES OR OFFENDERS HANDLED BY THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Effective policy or program development, administration, or evaluation in any social system requires an understanding of the numbers and characteristics of incidents or persons handled by that system, both at a point in time and over a period of time. Precise information of this nature on a national basis is currently unavailable in the juvenile justice system for a variety of reasons. First, the most commonly used source of arrest statistics is the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. From the perspective of the definition of serious juvenile crime used in this paper, however, there is at least one major problem with the use of the UCR data.

The UCR statistics do not distinguish adequately between serious and less-serious offenses. According to UCR, all seven Index offenses are considered as serious. These offenses are:

- murder and nonnegligent manslaughter
- forcible rape
- robbery
- aggravated assault
- burglary
- larceny-theft
- motor vehicle theft (40, p. 169).

The four direct crimes against persons (murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) are generally agreed to be serious and are classified by the UCR as "violent." There is less agreement as to the seriousness of those "property" crimes classified by the UCR as serious offenses. For example, a burglary of an occupied home (with its threat to life) may be more serious than a burglary of an unoccupied storage shed. In addition, much of what is included by the UCR in the larceny-theft classification (which accounted for 53 percent of the 1977 arrests of persons under 18 for all seven Index crimes) would be considered individual incidents of a relatively non-serious nature (i.e., shoplifting,
bicycle theft), although such offenses may be a serious problem due to their aggregate commission throughout a jurisdiction. Further, the UCR data does not easily enable the determination of which and how many larceny-thefts represent serious property loss and which do not (26, pp. 18-17, 74-77).

Second, court processing statistics collected by the National Center for Juvenile Justice (NCJJ), run by the National Council for Juvenile and Family Court Judges, use a slightly different set of definitions for offenses and offenders than the UCR.

Further, the data collected by the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service (NCJISS) on juveniles in custody in jails, detention facilities, correctional institutions, or other facilities, does not distinguish the offense for which a person is incarcerated.

With these limitations in mind, a picture of the extent of serious juvenile offenses and offender disposition during the period 1967-1977 is presented below, based primarily on arrest statistics from UCR and juvenile court statistics from the NCJJ.

The most recent (1977) detailed UCR and NCJJ data available were used for arrest and court processing statistics. Even though preliminary arrest statistics from the UCR for 1978 show an increase in the arrest rates for all ages, it is not believed, as of this date (subject to later detailed analysis), that this should create a substantial difference in the picture for "juvenile" crime. It is hypothesized that most of this increase will be in the adult area. Because the postwar birthrate "bubble" may have moved further forward into adulthood, a more formal treatment of offenses is occurring. Where appropriate, a comparison is made between 1975 and 1977 statistics for arrests and court processing. Because the juvenile population did not change substantially during this time period, frequencies were generally used rather than rates.*

*Between 1975 and 1977, there was a 3 percent decrease in the population of persons ages 7 through 17 and "at risk" for being accused or adjudicated as offenders by the juvenile court (33, pp. 17 and 19).

Offense Types

Arrests

Analysis of UCR 1977 arrest statistics for persons under 18 indicate that:

- Adjusted* arrest rates for Index offenses for persons ages 7 through 17 increased by 43.7 percent from 1967 through 1977 (from 1527.5 in 1967 to 2194.6 in 1977)** (see Table A-1, Appendix A, p. 41).

- 1977 arrests of persons ages 7 through 17 for Index offenses accounted for 37.7 percent of the total number of juvenile arrests. In addition, arrests of persons 7 through 17 for the three Index (or serious) "property" crimes comprised 34.0 percent of the total juvenile arrests, whereas arrests of persons ages 7 through 17 for the four UCR Index (or serious) "violent" crimes account for 3.7 percent of the total arrests (see Table A-1, Appendix A, p. 41).

- In 1977, 1.8 percent (or 44,363) of all juvenile arrests are for robbery and 1.7 percent (or 40,886) are for aggravated assault, for a total of 85,249 arrests for these two serious "violent" crimes (see Table A-1, Appendix A, p. 41).

Juvenile Court Referrals

Analysis of 1977 UCR arrest statistics and 1977 NCJJ juvenile court intake statistics shows that an estimated 42.8 percent decline (from 2,452,318 to 1,401,705) occurred in the number of persons ages 7 through 17 who are referred to juvenile court intake after arrest. In 1975, the decline was 54 percent, from 2,405,247 to 1,106,881 (see Table A-2, Appendix A, p. 43). This decline is accounted for by at least the following factors:

- The court statistics are a national (50-State) estimate based on the NCJJ sample of 22 States for 1977 and 18 States for 1975.
- The court statistics include only persons under 18 originally under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and those persons over 18.

*Adjusted arrest frequencies are used to compensate for variations in agencies (and this population) reporting for each year.
**Preliminary UCR data for 1978 shows a reversal in the general decline in arrests from 1975 to 1977 with the national crime rate for all offenses and all ages rising in 1978 by 2.0 percent. In addition, the preliminary 1978 UCR data shows an increase of 5.0 percent for the four "violent" Index crimes and an increase of 2.0 percent for the three Index "property" crimes (23, p. A-6).
assigned to juvenile court by adult court; not those persons under 18 originally under the jurisdiction of the adult court due to a lower age of jurisdiction in a particular location.

- Some arrest dispositions are made informally by the police and are not referred to court intake.

Further analysis of this data shows that:

- 37.7 percent of the arrests in 1977 for persons 7 through 17 are for an Index offense. The court data shows that approximately the same proportion of persons under 18 are referred to juvenile court intake (43.3 percent) for Index offenses. Almost no change has occurred between 1975 and 1977 (see Table A-2, Appendix A, p. 43).

- For individual Index offenses, a possibly significant higher proportion of persons 7 through 17 who were arrested in 1977 for robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft were referred to juvenile court intake (see Table A-2, Appendix A, p. 43).

- For Non-Index offenses, 1977 shows an increase in both the number of arrests and referrals compared to 1975 (see Table A-2, Appendix A, p. 43).

Characteristics of Those Arrested or Referred to Juvenile Court Intake

**Age**

Analysis of available data on age indicates that:

- 24.0 percent of the total arrests for all ages in 1977 were for juveniles (persons under 18). However, 41.3 percent of the persons for Index crimes in 1977 were of persons under 18 (see Table A-3, Appendix A, p. 45).

- In 1977, persons under 18 comprised a substantially higher proportion of Index (or serious) "property" arrests (46.2 percent) as compared to Index "violent" arrests (21.0 percent). Arrests of persons under 18 in 1977 accounted for 53.0 percent of the motor vehicle thefts, 51.5 percent of the burglaries, 42.9 percent of the larceny-thefts, and 32.0 percent of the robberies (see Table A-3, Appendix A, p. 45).

- Arrests of persons under 18 in 1977 for Index "violent" crimes accounted for only 1 percent of total arrests for all ages (40, p. 180).

- The peak age for arrests in 1977 of persons under 18 for Index offenses was 16. Among the Index offenses, the peak age for arrests of persons under 18 for "property" offenses is 16 and "violent" offenses is 17 (see Table A-3, Appendix A, p. 45).

**Sex**

Analysis of 1975 and 1977 UCR and NCJJ statistics on sex of persons under 18 processed shows that:

- 81.6 percent of the persons under 18 arrested for Index offenses in 1977 were male as compared to 82.4 percent of the Index offense referrals to juvenile court intake (see Table A-5, Appendix A, p. 49).

- Within Index offenses, males were arrested in 1977 for a greater portion of the "violent" offenses (89.7 percent) than for "property" offenses (80.6 percent) (see Table A-5, Appendix A, p. 49).

- Females were arrested in 1977 for 28.3 percent of the larceny-thefts, 14.9 percent of the aggravated assaults, 8.3 percent of the murders, 7.2 percent of the robberies, 9.1 percent of the motor vehicle thefts, 5.9 percent of the burglaries, and 2.5 percent of the forcible rapes (see Table A-5, Appendix A, p. 49).

- Females accounted for a greater proportion of the court referrals in 1977 than 1975 for every offense category (see Table A-5, Appendix A, p. 49).

In a cohort study carried out in Racine, Wisconsin, it was found that "Female delinquency increased from cohort to cohort even more than male delinquency, no matter how frequency or seriousness is measured, although most noticeably in terms of the increasing seriousness of offenses for which younger females have had police contacts" (25, pp. 3-4).
Race

Analysis of 1975 and 1977 UCR and NCJF statistics on race of persons under 18 handled indicated:

- Whites accounted for a larger portion of the court referrals in 1977 than in 1977 for every offense category.
- 68.2 percent of the Index offenses for persons under 18 in 1977 were given a race classification of "white" as compared to 66.0 percent with a race classification of "white" who were referred to juvenile court intake (see Table A-6, Appendix A, p. 51).
- Within Index offenses, "whites" were arrested more frequently (70.4 percent) than "blacks or others" for "property" offenses, and "blacks or others" were arrested more frequently (21.8 percent) for "violent" offenses than "whites" (see Table A-6, Appendix A, p. 51).
- Persons under 18 who were classified as "blacks or others" were arrested in 1977 for 64.0 percent of the robberies, 53.7 percent of the murderers, 55.5 percent of the forcible rapes, 38.0 percent of the aggravated assaults, 31.4 percent of the larceny-thefts, 27.7 percent of the burglaries, and 23.7 percent of the motor vehicle thefts.

In the Racine, Wisconsin cohort study it was found that "minorities make up a disproportionate number of those referred (to the juvenile court) because they have more police contacts, more contacts for more serious categories of behavior, and a disproportionate number are referred beyond what would be expected considering the categories of behavior into which their reasons for police contact fall..." (25, p. 15). At the same time, this study found that "the idea of Blacks and Chicanos as the focal point of the delinquency and crime problem is not only distorted by the failure to consider the spatial distribution of minorities (their ecological status) but it is to a considerable extent a fiction based on confusing contextually-derived behavior and the characteristics of groups" (25, p. 7).

Geographic Distribution

Analysis of 1975 arrest and population data for distribution of Index offenses by geographic region showed:

- A wide range of arrest means incidence rates for combined "violent" Index offenses (from 6.10 to 17.56) and for "property" Index offenses (from 6.10 to 17.56) (26, p. 111).

- A different rank order of regions on the basis of combined Index "violent" offenses or Index "property" offenses (26, p. 111).

Analysis of 1977 UCR arrest data to determine the distribution of juvenile arrests by type of geographic area (e.g., urban, suburban, or rural) shows that:

- 73.8 percent of the arrests for "violent" Index arrests occurred in cities, 25.6 percent in suburbs, and 5.5 percent in rural areas as compared to proportions for arrest for Index "property" arrests of 67.8 percent for cities, 25.5 percent for suburbs, and 4.4 percent for rural areas (26, pp. 188, 197, and 206).

The above mentioned Racine cohort study found that "sheer numbers and high rates of police contacts and the more serious contacts are concentrated in the inner city and its interstitial areas either in terms of place of contact or place of residence of persons with contacts and decrease outward according to the classical pattern" (25, p. 6). This researcher makes the further observation that "the consistency with which the race/ethnicity of persons with contacts parallels the race/ethnic composition of all areas of the community reinforces the position that delinquency and crime are behaviors acquired by people who live in a social milieu conducive to a general pattern of behavior, much of which provides grounds for contacts with the police" (25, p. 7).

Delinquent History

Analysis of 1977 statistics on the delinquent history of persons referred to juvenile court intake shows that:

- From 1975 to 1977, the proportion of court referrals with one or more prior delinquency referrals in previous years increased in all offense categories except forcible rape. During the same time period, the proportion of court referrals with one or more prior delinquency referrals in the present year decreased in every offense category (see Table A-7, Appendix A, p. 53).
- In 1977, 31.5 percent of those referred for Index offenses had one or more prior delinquency referrals in previous years and 22.1 percent had one or more prior delinquency referrals in the present year (see Table A-7, Appendix A, p. 53).
- Within Index offenses, 21.7 percent of referrals for "property" offenses had one or more prior delinquency referrals in the present year as compared to 24.5 percent of the referrals for "violent"
offenses. Among the "violent" offenses, 27.8 percent of those referred for "forcible rape" and 28.5 percent of those referred for "robbery" had one or more prior delinquency referrals in the present year (see Table A-7, Appendix A, p. 58).

Other Personal Characteristics

Attempts have been made to relate "other" personal characteristics such as family background, educational background, employment status, drug use, intelligence, and psychological makeup to juvenile crime. However, inadequate data, conflicting findings, and controversy summarize the information available concerning the relationship of these personal characteristics, other than alcohol, to serious juvenile crime of any type, and no real conclusions can be drawn (26, pp. 227-233).

Context of Serious Juvenile Crime

Group or Gang Involvement

Victimization surveys concerning crimes against persons for the period 1973 through 1977 showed that:

- The number of offenders involved varies substantially by type of crime, e.g., 80 percent of the rapes involved a lone offender compared to 44 percent of the robberies (16, pp. 18-19).
- Offending in groups of two or more occurred in only 34 percent of all offenses as compared to 65 percent for offenses involving a single individual (16, p. 19).
- The percent of offenses involving three or more offenders is highest among juveniles and decreases with age into adulthood with the exception of aggravated assault where the greatest involvement is for young adults (16, pp. 18-21).

Walter Miller compiled estimates of gang member arrests as a percentage of all juvenile arrests in three of the nation's major metropolitan areas: Los Angeles, New York City, and Chicago. In 1973 to 1974, gang member arrests for violence were equivalent to 31.4 percent of all juvenile arrests for violent crimes (17, p. 32). Although some of these gang members are not juveniles, and some of the gang member arrests for "violence" are not included in the four UCR violent crimes, gang and group activity most likely accounts for a substantial portion of violent juvenile crime.

Victim Age

The National Crime Survey for 1977 indicated that over 60 percent of the victims involved in juvenile violent crime were other juveniles (22, p. 42).

Crime on School Grounds

A National Institute of Education report indicated that 280,703 offenses occurred on school grounds during a five-month period in 1973-1974. The same report also indicates that over 40 percent of the robberies and 36 percent of the assaults of urban juveniles occur at school (34, p. 12).

Victim Family Income

The National Crime Survey for 1975 showed that 60 percent of all victims of "violent" crimes were from households with an annual income of less than $10,000 as compared to 40 percent from the same group who were victims of burglaries, 46 percent for larceny, and 42 percent for auto theft (28, p. 29).

Use of Weapons

Victimization surveys concerning crimes against persons for the period 1973 through 1977 showed that:

- Weapons were used by 27 percent of those individuals under 18, as compared to 36 percent for youthful offenders (ages 18 to 20) and 41 percent by adults (16, pp. 21-23).
- There was little variation across age groups in the proportionate use of different types of weapons, except in the case of guns where adults are four times as likely to use such weapons as juveniles (16, pp. 21-23).
- There was no evidence of an increase in weapons use by juveniles over time (16, pp. 21-23).
Substance Abuse

Alcohol use by juveniles has a high correlation with violent crime (depending on the amounts and frequency of use, the personality of the user, the type of alcohol used, and the cultural meaning of drinking). Drug abusers also become involved in crime (e.g., larceny, burglary, robbery), principally for financial gain to support the use of drugs (26, pp. 517-518).

System Handling of Juvenile Offenders

Detention

Analysis of 1977 juvenile court intake statistics as to whether a person was detained shows that:

- In 1977, 22.3 percent of referrals for "property" offenses were detained as compared to 27.4 percent of the referrals for "violent" offenses (see Table A-8, Appendix A, p. 55).
- Within "violent" offenses, 51.0 percent in 1977 and 45.6 percent, respectively, of the referrals to intake for murder and forcible rape were detained as compared to 47.4 percent of the referrals for robbery and 21.6 percent of the referrals for assault (see Table A-8, Appendix A, p. 55).
- Between the years 1975 through 1977, there was a significant decrease (from 37.4 percent to 27.4 percent) for juveniles referred to juvenile court for violent offenses who were detained (see Table A-8, Appendix A, p. 55).

Manner of Handling

1977 juvenile court intake statistics on the manner of handling referrals (with or without petition) shows that:

- 55.4 percent of the 1977 Index offense referrals to juvenile court were handled with a petition (see Table A-9, Appendix A, p. 57).
- Within referrals for Index offenses, 53.9 percent of those referred for a "property" offense were handled with a petition as compared to 61.6 percent of those referred for a "violent" offense (see Table A-9, Appendix A, p. 57).
- Within "violent" offenses, 82.7 percent of the referrals for murder were handled with a petition as compared to 72.0 percent for forcible rape, 79.8 percent for robbery, and 56.2 percent for assault (see Table A-9, Appendix A, p. 57).

In a report assessing case disposition and classification (or labeling) in the juvenile justice system, it was determined that:

- Substantial conflict apparently exists between police and court intake officials over roles, referral criteria, and the seriousness of juvenile incidents (29, p. 42).
- Robbery incidents, abused/victimized children, or dependent/neglected children are apparently perceived by all levels of the juvenile justice system as the most serious incidents (29, pp. 43-44).
- Adequate written policy is apparently not available for case disposition or classification decisions. However, even where written policy is present, it apparently has less influence on actual decisions than might be expected (29, p. 41).
- Referral incident, juvenile's statement, prior police contacts, and juvenile's attitude and demeanor are the four most important factors that juvenile justice system personnel at all levels stress when choosing a case classification and disposition (29, pp. 44-47).
- Inconsistent classification (or labeling) may occur excessively in the juvenile justice system due to inadequate availability and adherence to policy guidelines (29, p. 45).
- Once a classification (or label) is attached to an individual, it apparently rarely changes and it significantly influences the disposition of the individual throughout the juvenile justice system (29, p. 45).

Amount of Time Spent in Court System from Referral to Disposition

1975 and 1977 juvenile court intake statistics for the amount of time that referrals spend in juvenile court system from date of referral to date of disposition indicate that:

- Only 4.7 percent in 1977, compared to 7.5 percent in 1975, for Index offenses spend more than six months in the court system (see Table A-10, Appendix A, p. 59).
- Within referrals for Index offenses, there is an overall decrease from 1975 to 1977 for those referred to juvenile court who spent six months or more in the court system. The breakdown of the Index offenses, from 1975 to 1977 respectively, is 17.4 to 8.2 percent for forcible rape, 14.9 to 8.4 percent for robbery, 12.5 to 12.7 percent for murder, 8.2 to 5.4 percent for motor vehicle theft, 8.2 to 5.6 percent for burglary, and 7.7 to 6.6 percent for assault (see Table A-10, Appendix A, p. 59).
Juvenile court statistics for 1975 show the following for disposition of those referred to juvenile court intake:

- 34.7 percent of referrals for Index "violent" offenses were dismissed, as compared to 40.1 percent of the Index "property" offenses (see Table A-11, Appendix A, p. 61).
- 33.6 percent of referrals for Index "violent" offenses were given formal probation as compared to 33.7 percent of the Index "property" offenses (see Table A-11, Appendix A, p. 61).
- 14.3 percent of referrals for Index "violent" offenses were committed to some form of public or private juvenile institution as compared to 6.0 percent of the Index "property" offenses (see Table A-11, Appendix A, p. 61).

Juvenile court statistics for 1977 show the following for disposition of those referred to juvenile court intake:

- 51.3 percent of referrals for Index "violent" offenses were dismissed, for an increase of 16.6 percent over 1975. 47.7 percent of referrals for Index property referrals were dismissed, for an increase of 7.6 percent over 1975 (see Table A-12, Appendix A, p. 63).
- 26.5 percent of referrals for Index "violent" offenses were given formal probation, a decrease of 7.1 percent from 1975. 31.2 percent of referrals for Index "property" offenses were given formal probation, a decrease of 7.5 percent from 1975 (see Table A-12, Appendix A, p. 65).
- 9 percent of referrals for Index "violent" offenses were committed to some form of public or private juvenile institution, a decrease of 5.3 percent from 1975. 7.5 percent of referrals for Index "property" referrals were committed to juvenile institutions, an increase of 1.5 percent over 1975 (see Table A-12, Appendix A, p. 65).
There are relatively few juveniles involved in violent juvenile offenses in comparison to arrests for all offenses (both juvenile and adult).

The peak ages for arrest for a serious juvenile property offense is 16, and a violent offense is 17.

Most arrests for serious juvenile crime are male, although there is a more significant increase in female arrests during the period 1967 through 1977.

Most arrests for serious juvenile crime are "white," although a disproportionate amount of arrests are for "non-white," particularly for violent offenses.

Most arrests for serious juvenile crime occur in urban areas.

Arrests for various types of serious juvenile crime differ among geographic regions.

There is apparently a high correlation between violent juvenile crime and alcohol abuse.

There is a significant amount of serious juvenile crime committed by gangs.

A substantial amount of serious juvenile crime occurs on school grounds.

Relatively few serious juvenile crimes involve the use of weapons.

The majority of victims of serious juvenile crimes are other juveniles.

The majority of violent juvenile crime victims are from homes with a family income of less than $10,000.

A significant number of persons referred to juvenile court intake for serious juvenile crime have a history of delinquency.

There is inadequate availability or use of policy guidelines for classification and disposition of persons referred to juvenile court intake.

The most important factors in case classification and disposition at all levels of the juvenile justice system apparently are the referral incident, the juvenile's statement, prior police contacts, and the juvenile's attitude and demeanor.

There are substantial conflicts between police and court intake personnel over what constitutes a serious offense and what should be done with a serious offender.

Juvenile justice system personnel at all levels apparently believe that the most serious incidents are robberies, abused/victimized children, and dependent/neglected children.

Inconsistent classification (or labeling) may occur excessively in the juvenile justice system, and this label, which critically influences ultimate disposition, is rarely changed.

Serious offenders take a longer time to process through the juvenile court system from intake to disposition than do non-serious offenders.

Juvenile court intake results in an increased proportion of "non-whites," "males," and 15-year-olds being processed than were arrested.

There is a surprisingly low use of detention or formal processing for persons referred to juvenile intake for violent juvenile crimes.

There are few persons adjudicated for serious juvenile offenses who are put into an institution.

The cost of serious juvenile crime is likely to be at least $11.4 billion per year.

The cost to process an individual serious juvenile offender through the juvenile justice system is likely to be approximately the same as a non-serious offender for the police, higher for the courts, and higher for corrections.

Alternative correctional programs for serious juvenile offenders may or may not cost less than traditional programs.

The knowledge on causes of serious juvenile crime is surprisingly limited.

The statistics on the incidence, processing, and disposition of serious juvenile crime or offenders is inconsistent and incomplete.

III. JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM RESPONSE TO SERIOUS JUVENILE CRIME AND OFFENDERS

Beginning with a brief discussion of prevention oriented programs, and continuing with police, court, and corrections activities, an overview of juvenile justice system response to serious juvenile crime and offenders is necessary for proper perspective. The section will conclude with a review of legislation, showing some trends in legislative response to serious juvenile crime.
Information regarding prevention programs aimed specifically at serious juvenile crime appears to be limited. In a review of youth employment and delinquency prevention, for example, several programs focusing on private sector employment for low-income youth are discussed, including the Corporation for Public/Private Ventures in Philadelphia; the Urban Youth Action Incorporation in Pittsburgh; Project 70001, which provides services to unemployed high school drop-outs in 21 States; and the Fort Worth Labor Participation Project in Fort Worth, which seeks union cooperation in employment for disadvantaged youths (11, pp. 31-41). Unfortunately, none of these programs has been measured for its impact on the reduction of delinquency, much less for impact on serious juvenile crime.

One other approach to prevention, which is more clearly related to serious juvenile crime, is street work with urban juvenile gangs. In the California Youth Authority Gang Violence Reduction Project, an attempt was made to prevent gang fights through the use of indigenous "gang consultants" in Los Angeles. The results were mixed. "After two years of operation...the number of homicides in the project's target area was reduced from eleven during project period one (October 1976 through May 1977) to five during the second (October 1977 through May 1978)." However, although murder and incidents between and within gangs decreased somewhat during the time of the project, "incidents against non-gang members increased by 103 percent, from 109 (first period) to 221 (second period)." The apparent failure of the project to curtail gang-related incidents other than homicide raises the question of whether the gang consultants were able to influence gang activity away from criminal activity, particularly robberies" (2, pp. 2-3).

The response of law enforcement agencies to serious juvenile crime consists of: (1) use of certain types of procedures with serious offenses or individuals more often than with those that are less serious, and (2) targeting, formally or informally, upon youths considered "hardcore," having gang involvement, or youths known as chronic offenders.

An unpublished report on the subject of the serious juvenile offender provides a summary of the typical procedures used in these cases: "After serious juvenile offenders are arrested, they will ordinarily be taken to the police station.... The juvenile may be questioned, searched, fingerprinted, and photographed in these more serious cases. Records will be reviewed to ascertain previous offenses...the juvenile may be placed in a holding cell at the police station for a few hours...the probable outcome will be formal booking and...referral to the juvenile court" (30, pp. 53-54). During this process, the investigating officer may take special care in more serious cases regarding the quality and accuracy of the evidence so that there will be less chance of dismissal due to insufficient evidence.

Targeting on the so-called "hardcore" juvenile offender is a strategy carried out by some police departments. For example, the San Francisco Police Department maintains a "hardcore" file which lists juveniles who have been arrested eight or nine times, three or four of which are felony arrests. "If we pull his card and he is a hardcore, it is a mandatory booking" (22). Whether such police strategies with "hardcore" juvenile offenders are effective or not would be an appropriate subject for evaluation research.

The response of the courts to serious juvenile offenders begins with the question of jurisdiction. In 39 States, including the District of Columbia, the juvenile court has original jurisdiction over youths until they reach the age of 16. In 12 States, the juvenile court has jurisdiction until the age of 17, and in four States until the age of 16 (27, p. 99). For some States, then, the response of the juvenile justice system to juvenile crime--serious or otherwise--is to have the adult criminal court assume jurisdiction as soon as a youth reaches the age of 16 or 17.

Another response to serious juvenile crime is that certain of the more serious offenses are automatically excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. For example, 10 States, including the District of Columbia, provide that specific serious offenses, such as murder, rape, armed robbery, assault, arson, kidnapping, burglary, and/or any offenses punishable by death or by life imprisonment, be automatically excluded from the juvenile court and heard in the adult criminal court (27, p. 117).
In addition, all except three States have provisions for waiver in which the juvenile court, usually after a hearing, may decide to waive its jurisdiction in more serious cases and transfer them to the criminal court. The minimum age at which a youth may be waived to the adult court can be as low as 13 (two States), with 12 States setting the minimum age for waiver at 14, nine States setting the age at 15, and 15 States setting the age at 16. Ten States do not specify any minimum age for waiver (27, p. 129). In 29 States, it is required that there must be a felony charge for waiver; in eight States, specific serious offenses are stipulated; but in 22 States, no specific offenses are required as a basis for waiver (27, p. 133). It is also true that five States currently have mandatory waiver provisions, under which a waiver hearing must be held if the youth is charged with a serious offense listed in the statutes (27, p. 131).

The juvenile court may respond to the serious juvenile offender through policy and practice regarding detention and the filing of petitions. As described earlier in this paper, Table A-8 (Appendix A, p. 55) shows that the percentage of juveniles arrested for violent offenses who are detained after referral to court intake is significantly higher than for other individuals referred to court.

Finally, there are alternative dispositions. As shown earlier in this paper, Table A-11 (Appendix A, p. 61) shows that the more restrictive response to the violent offender is found in the number of commitments to detention institutions, where the rate of commitment for the violent offenders is two to seven times higher than for the average of index offenders.

It can also be seen from Table A-11 (Appendix A, p. 61) that the percentage of violent offenders who are waived to criminal court is significantly higher than for the average of index offenders, although waiver is used for only 5.4 percent of murder cases.

Court handling of the serious juvenile offender is generally characterized, then, by a more severe response, and this can be seen in policies and practices regarding jurisdiction, detention, filing of petitions, waiver, and sentencing.

The response of the corrections segment of the juvenile justice system to serious juvenile offenders is essentially in two modes: public or private correctional institution. The number of youths in these institutions varies greatly from one State to another. As of December 31, 1977, there were 47,430 juveniles in custody in both long-term (37,088) and short-term (10,342) public and private juvenile detention or correctional institutions either awaiting adjudication or committed for a delinquent act. 9,484 of these juveniles were in private institutions and 37,646 were in public institutions (41; 42).

There is a problem in ascertaining, however, how many of these juveniles are serious offenders, because the serious offenders are not separated from the less-serious offenders in most of these institutions, nor does the data collection system identify offense. However, as shown earlier in the court data, a higher percentage of serious offenders receive a commitment to some form of institution than do less-serious offenders.

As Dale Mann found in research on this subject, “While some programs for juvenile offenders include serious offenders and are doing useful work... there are no programs of concentrated assistance specifically for this group” (14, p. 71).

The purpose of these institutions theoretically is twofold: (1) to protect the public, and (2) to rehabilitate the offender. Consistent with the first purpose, most such juvenile institutions use relatively secure custody. Consistent with the second purpose, most such juvenile institutions offer programs of academic and vocational training, counseling and group therapy, and perhaps recreational, religious, and drug rehabilitation programs (30, p. 105).

A major issue is whether it is possible for much real rehabilitation to take place in locked facilities where the “treatment” is not a matter of choice, and where the level of violence and fear may be quite high. Several
writers have suggested that the typical training school may actually be crimeogenic."

In recent years, partly because of skepticism about the ability of the traditional training school to accomplish its goals, there has been a movement in the direction of deinstitutionalization. A major example of this movement was the closing of the training schools of Massachusetts in 1971-1973 and the development of a community-based system for delivering services to delinquent youths. In addition, major impetus for this movement has been the Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, as amended in 1977.

The move toward deinstitutionalization in some States, and especially the concomitant search for community-based approaches, has fostered the development of some new program approaches, some of which serve serious juvenile offenders. A brief discussion of some of these programs follows.

In Massachusetts, following the closing of the training schools, a small number of the most serious offenders were still held in secure facilities with the designation "intensive care." In a recent report on program interventions with serious juvenile offenders, it is noted that, "Programs in the various intensive care centers incorporated education, arts and crafts, vocational training, sports and games, community meetings, 'trust' walks, sex counseling and family counseling...in spite of some good aspects of the program, the problems seemed to outweigh the advantages" (27, pp. 170-171). Since that time, modifications have been made in the Intensive Care Units within the Massachusetts system, and two of the persons deeply involved in the original planning and implementation of these units have written a thought provoking book describing the model for secure treatment units for violent youths which they would like to see carried out when adequate resources become available (44).

UDIS (Unified Delinquency Intervention Services) in Illinois is perhaps a better example of an approach specifically directed at the chronic, serious delinquent who would have otherwise been placed in an institution. The general objective of UDIS is to provide effective alternatives to the Illinois training schools in handling repeat juvenile offenders. More specifically, "A UDIS case typically was 16 years old, having had a first arrest at 12, and an average record of 13 arrests. These included six theft offenses, two with injury or threat of injury, the rest being made up of narcotics and status offenses. This was somewhat less serious than the record of the average DOC [Department of Corrections] commitment" (27, p. 173). The guidelines for UDIS were to use "the least drastic alternative. [K]eeping the youth at home where possible, provision of local rather than remote services...to move the youth out of the juvenile justice system fast, in no more than six months, and...individualized programming.... Continuous monitoring was to be done by a Case Manager, who could make quick changes and adaptations as needed" (27, p. 173). "The case manager brokered services for his cases, located and coordinated services, monitored the case progress and the work of the vendors, and prepared reports for the court. Termination of the case meant failure, to be followed by either commitment to DOC [Department of Corrections] or return to regular probation.... Vendor services available to UDIS Case Managers fell into six general categories: advocacy, counseling, education/vocational, group homes and foster care, rural programs, and intensive care. These were ordered in a rough continuum from the least to the most drastic alternative" (27, pp. 174-175).

The results of evaluation research on UDIS are mixed. Charles Murray and his associates found that "UDIS and DOC [commitments to the Department of Corrections] alike achieved large reductions in the indicators of recidivism used in this study; so large, that this result ranks as the single most significant finding.... Arrests dropped by 67.8 percent, court appearance dropped by 64.4 percent, violence-related offenses dropped by 73.7 percent, and aggregated 'seriousness' costs of the offenses to the community dropped by 65.2 percent" (18, p. 191).

However, some University of Illinois researchers (McIver, Gordon, and Maltz) later carried out a reanalysis of the UDIS data which contradicts the claims of the report by Murray. According to their analysis, the "suppression effect" found by Murray "is completely explained by three tendencies of delinquent populations: regression, maturation, and case mortality...UDIS cases simply recorded an inherent tendency for recidivism to decrease at a

*See, for example: Bartolias, Miller, and Dinitz, Juvenile Victimation; also, Feld, Neutralizing Inmate Violence: Juvenile Offenders in Institutions.

*Information based upon: New York Division for Youth (20).
different point in time...[for] youths to phase out of delinquency as they reach late teen age...[and for] cases to get lost, so that study samples are based on progressively smaller numbers" (27, p. 177). Thus, whether the suppression effect of UDIS processing exists is still under examination.

The UDIS data, however, which Murray and McCluskey analyzed, was the same data. It may be fair to say that whether one accepts the interpretation of one or the other group of researchers, it still seems true that it is possible to handle chronic and quite serious juvenile offenders in community-based programs with about equal effectiveness as in the large secure training schools, and with no increase in danger to the community. The large training schools are expensive to build and maintain (although no more expensive in program cost than UDIS), and the long-term effects of the secure institution may be considerably more negative. Given a choice, the UDIS alternative may be preferable.

Another program approach to the handling of serious juvenile offenders is the Minnesota Serious Juvenile Offender Program, which was begun in late 1977. Before the program was initiated, there were no secure facilities within the Minnesota juvenile correctional institutions. This approach represents a compromise through which a target population of 50 to 60 16- and 17-year-old youths "currently adjudicated for murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, robbery with a prior felony-level offense, or burglary with three priors...serve as experimental subjects, with regularly institutionalized and paroled youths acting as controls" (27, p. 189). The youths move from an initial phase in a secure facility, to a non-secure residential setting, to community supervision. A case management team develops behavior contracts, purchases community services, and maintains liaison with significant persons in the offender's home community. The case management approach begins with institutionalization and continues throughout to avoid discontinuities of treatment (27, pp. 189-190). This appears to be a thoughtful and well-planned approach, but it will be some time before any results from evaluation research will be available.

Project New Pride, in Denver, Colorado, is a program dealing with fairly serious juvenile offenders in a community setting. Project New Pride has been designated an exemplary program by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and is the subject of a large replication effort by OJJDP, and therefore will not be described in much detail in this paper. It is, however, appropriate to mention Project New Pride in a discussion of the handling of serious offenders, because of the target population. "They have a recent arrest record for robbery, assault, or burglary with two prior convictions. Two-thirds of them are school dropouts..." (27, p. 194).

Project New Pride concentrates on education and provides one-to-one tutoring through its alternative school, but it is a multi-faceted program which also provides supportive counseling, job training, and cultural enrichment experiences such as an Outward Bound weekend. They report that 41 percent of their clients returned to public schools, while two-thirds of the youths began jobs and stayed on them from one to three months. Most of the clients were referred from juvenile court, and recidivism rates were about 50 percent contrasted with an expected rate of 79 percent for a comparable group. What is worth note in the context of the present discussion is that Project New Pride demonstrates the feasibility of handling serious juvenile offenders in an intensive, but non-residential program, and at a cost of about $4,000 per client per year, as compared to $12,000 for a year in a Colorado training school (27, pp. 194-195).

These are but a few of the significant responses which might be described, but perhaps enough to indicate a range of approaches in handling the serious juvenile offender in an alternative way to that of the traditional juvenile correctional institution or program.

**LEGISLATION**

Although not a response of the juvenile justice system itself, the response of State legislatures to serious juvenile crime should be mentioned here. There is mixed sentiment and some confusion regarding what the statutes should be. A recent statutes analysis has shown "a definite trend towards punitive procedures for dealing with the serious juvenile offender" in States such as California, Florida, New York, Colorado, Delaware, and Washington, and less punitive and more treatment oriented approaches in such States as Minnesota and Massachusetts (27, pp. 74-75). In California, the juvenile code was amended to create a presumption in favor of waiving juveniles into the adult court for criminal prosecution for specified serious offenses. In Florida, the new provisions call for mandatory waiver in certain cases and the exclusion from the juvenile court in others. In New York
State, a 1978 amendment to the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976 excludes serious cases such as murder and rape from the jurisdiction of the Family Court for youth as young as 13. In the States of Colorado, Delaware, and Washington, new mandatory sentencing statutes call for minimum sentences of confinement for juveniles who are repeat or violent offenders (27, pp. 74-75). The statutes analysis concluded by saying that 'major steps to 'get tougher' on juveniles for serious juvenile offenses have been taken mainly in the more urbanized States. Meanwhile, the vast majority of the States continue to hold to the more traditional juvenile court philosophy of rehabilitation" (27, p. 75).

IV. EVALUATION OF SERIOUS JUVENILE CRIME AND OFFENDER INTERVENTIONS

Evaluations of delinquency prevention and control programs are inadequate. In reviewing the published descriptions of some 6,000 delinquency prevention and treatment programs from 1964 to 1974, Wright and Dixon found only 96 reports which included some form of empirical data on project effects. They concluded that "the evaluation literature is low in both scientific validity and policy utility, and that no delinquency prevention strategies can definitely be recommended" (49, p. 60). These findings are supported by Landman, McFarlane, and Scarpitti, who examined some 1,000 citations of published delinquency studies and were able to find only 25 which contained information on the nature and the results of the program (13, pp. 297-308).

The above findings are consistent with an on-site assessment by Walker, Cardarelli, and Billingsley of 35 delinquency prevention programs (selected out of a possible 1,436) which claimed "formal evaluations. Each of these programs were found to have nonexistent or inadequate evaluation of impact (46, pp. 27-114). In a similar vein, an assessment of program interventions with serious juvenile offenders commented that the quality of evaluations was very uneven, and in some cases nonexistent. "Evaluations tend to be strong on description of ideal elements of programs and may include tabulations of results but usually they contain very little indication of how the program actually developed and how it operated" (27, p. 225).

In this paper, it has already been noted that none of the youth employment programs reviewed by Hawkins, Lishner, and Wall contained any measure of how these programs might impact delinquency (11, pp. 31-41); nor have police programs designed to target on "hardcore" juvenile offenders received the type of evaluation which would be needed in order to ascertain the effectiveness of such an approach. In addition, the continuous case management approach which is described in this paper has been described as an area where better evaluation is needed. "The case management technique is an instance of a potentially effective means for solving a long standing problem of insuring that a youth actually receives services prescribed for him, promised or contracted for in the course of referrals. However, none of the evaluative information, for Massachusetts, Illinois, and Pennsylvania programs included more than general comments on the operation of case management" (27, p. 225). The need for careful evaluation research on intervention strategies is underlined by the conspicuous lack of this kind of information to date.

One other observation on evaluation involves the importance of taking into account political and economic constraints. As Cardarelli and Smith point out, "It is important to keep in mind that the successful implementation of any program of delinquency prevention may be affected by structural factors of a national character over which program directors have little control.... The importance of these wider socio-cultural and environmental factors in both the causation and prevention of delinquency should neither be ignored or treated lightly on one hand, nor should they be used as 'excuses' to avoid the immediate problems associated with their impact. "Program staff not only need to be explicit about their domains of competency, but further, must be realistic about the changes that are feasible within program structure" (3, p. 29).

Having noted weaknesses of evaluation research and mentioned possible constraints, this section will conclude with a note on what evaluation should be.

"An ideal program evaluation would attempt to explain both its successes and failures in terms of implications for program improvement. Measures of cost effectiveness or administrative efficiency, although helpful, are not considered to be sufficient evaluation measures. Similarly, monitoring practices, incorporating numbers of clients served by age, sex, ethnicity, education level, and reporting problems are not, in and of themselves, evaluation. In effect, the evaluation of most programs should be two-fold. The evaluator should first focus upon the changes and processes that develop throughout the history of the project, and whether these changes affect the character
and direction of the intervention strategies. Second, the evaluator would determine the impact of the strategies on the extent or character of delinquency" (5, pp. 20-21).

Because the need for information for advancing the state-of-the-art on intervention with serious juvenile offenders is so crucial, both the quality and the quantity of evaluation research in this area must increase. The recommended strategies in this paper reflect this concern.

V. STRATEGIES FOR HANDLING SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS

The reasons for mounting special efforts in the area of handling the serious juvenile offender will be discussed under three main headings. First, some of the main reasons for focus on serious juvenile offenders will be given. Then, some related issues and problems will be discussed. Finally, specific strategies for handling the serious juvenile offender will be recommended.

REASONS FOR FOCUS ON THE SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDER

Disproportionate Amount of Crime by this Group

Although serious offenders (including those who commit serious offenses or who are chronic offenders) constitute a small part of all juvenile offenders, they are responsible for a disproportionate share of juvenile crime. In the classic research carried out by Wolfgang and his colleagues, it was found that a group of 627 boys in Philadelphia had records of five or more police contacts between their eleventh and eighteenth birthdays. These boys were taken from a cohort of 9,046 youths who were born in Philadelphia and resided there between the ages of 11 and 17. This famous group of 627 boys, approximately 6 percent of the total cohort, was responsible for 52 percent of the total number of offenses, 53 percent of the personal injury offenses, and 71 percent of all the robberies committed by the cohort (31, p. 44).

In another study, Strasburg found that juveniles with five or more arrests "...were responsible for most of the harm done by the group: they were charged with 85 percent of all offenses committed by the sample...including 82 percent of all violent offenses" (31, p. 45). Further, as the Task Force on Crime of the Violence Commission observed in 1969, "When all offenders are compared, the number of hardcore offenders is small relative to the number of one-time offenders, yet the former group has a much higher rate of violence and inflicts considerably more serious injury" (31, pp. 45-46). Finally, Vachss and Bakal observe that, "No more than 6 percent of young people charged with delinquency can be called 'violent,' yet, despite their small percentage, these deeply disturbed young people are responsible for as much as two-thirds of the total of serious offenses committed by persons under the age of seventeen" (44, p. xii).

Importance of Serious Offender Programs to Juvenile Justice Reform

Unless more effective program interventions are developed for the serious juvenile offender, efforts to reform the juvenile justice system as a whole may be undermined. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, as amended (U.S. House of Representatives), placed an emphasis on the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, the separation of juveniles from adults in detention and correctional facilities, and the development of alternatives to incarceration for juvenile offenders. The center of public concern, especially as reflected in the news media, appears to be the serious (and especially the violent) juvenile offender.

Neglecting the serious juvenile offender problem threatens to create a negative public attitude in which harsher measures are demanded for all juvenile offenders. In addition, more effective and appropriate programs for serious offenders would enhance the credibility of the juvenile justice system, not only with the public, but also with juveniles who get into trouble. As it is, noncriminal or petty offenders may in some cases be treated more harshly and locked up for longer periods of time than youths who have committed violent crimes. More attention needs to be given to concerted and effective program intervention with the serious juvenile offender if reform efforts on behalf of status offenders and lesser offenders are also to succeed.

Incapacitation Alone is Insufficient

A strategy frequently proposed for the serious juvenile offender is incapacitation. Writers such as James Q. Wilson have speculated upon the benefits of this strategy and recommended it: "The gains from merely incapacitating convicted criminals may be very large: If much or most serious crime is committed by repeaters, separating repeaters from the rest of society, even
for relatively brief periods of time, may produce major reductions in crime rates" (47, p. 173). Shannon speculates that, "[T]he rate of serious crime would be only one-third of what it is today if every person convicted of a serious offense were imprisoned for 3 years" (31, p. 170).

But is it simple? A trio of researchers in Columbus, Ohio carried out a careful study to determine the effectiveness of a policy of incapacitation. "For incapacitation to be effective," they say, "two conditions must exist. First, the apprehension rate must be greatly increased. Second, a large percentage of crimes must be committed by repeat offenders, much higher than has been found in this study" (45, p. 81). The findings of these writers are that, "Certainly incapacitation of juvenile felony offenders would have prevented some violent crimes. Incapacitation policies applied to juvenile offenders would require a drastic modification of juvenile court legislation and the disposition of juvenile offenders" (45, p. 64). In addition, they found that, "Over two-thirds of the persons in this study were first-time felony offenders. Incapacitation could not have prevented their 1973 crimes."

They go on to conclude that, "It must not be expected that a policy of incapacitation will result in a significant statistical reduction in the rate of violent crime... If the country is serious about the reduction of violent crime, other means for accomplishing this goal will have to be sought" (45, p. 64).

The concept of incapacitation is associated with the notion that a history of juvenile delinquency will result in a career as an adult criminal. The one continues into the other.

Shannon, in the Racine cohort study, wrestled with some of the problems of high continuation probabilities. He found that there is "little evidence of systematic progression in seriousness...that seriousness gradually increases from contact to contact among males, reaches an initial peak, then declines only to rise again among those who continue to have frequent contact with the police, particularly among those from any segment of any cohort with 40 or more contacts. ...the most prevalent pattern is one of discontinuation and declining seriousness. On the other hand, it is obvious that for the few who continue into their late twenties there is an increase and then again a decline. These are the few who become well known to the adult justice system and who create the impression of continuity and increasing seriousness in delinquent and criminal careers, evidence than applied to all who have had contacts with the juvenile and adult justice systems" (25, pp. 8-9).

Shannon also examined 26 attitudinal and demographic variables in a multivariate regression analysis in order to determine which "had the more powerful relationship to juvenile seriousness scores." He found that "age at first police contact turned out to be the most powerful predictor of juvenile seriousness...followed by having friends in trouble with the law" (25, pp. 21-22). After analyzing his data in a number of ways, however, Shannon came up with this conclusion: "...it is one thing to describe delinquency and crime as they are distributed in an urban-industrial community, particularly for more serious types of delinquent and criminal behavior but it is quite another to predict who will have a serious criminal career from their juvenile and young adult experiences with the justice system. Indeed, the greatest error that has been made by sociologists and others with an interest in the relationship of early misbehavior to later misbehavior is the assumption that statistically significant relationships and reasonably high correlations translate into the ability to predict continuity in behavior." (25, pp. 22-26).

It is this issue of prediction, and the difficulty of prediction, which is the crux of the problem with incapacitation. Monahan, in a review of prediction studies, concludes that violence is consistently over-predicted, regardless of the correlates considered or the statistical analysis employed. He finds, in fact, that between 65 percent and 99 percent of those predicted to be dangerous or violent do not go on to commit such an act (4, p. 20).

Similarly, Hungarian and her associates in an Ohio cohort study found that over 80 percent of the cohort members had only one violent arrest (and this was a cohort of youths who had been arrested for violence) (10, p. 54). The fact that so few juveniles continued in violence makes prediction quite difficult.

A policy of incapacitation is, in theory at least, based upon the idea that it is possible to predict, with at least approximate accuracy, which offenders will be dangerous to the community if not locked up: The present state-of-the-art of prediction does not show such an ability.

There is another basic point to make regarding incapacitation: regardless of what crimes may or may not be prevented through the incapacitation
of serious offenders, sooner or later almost all offenders return to the streets. Feld (1977) states the point and its implications clearly: "When a society incarcerates people, whether for benevolent rehabilitation or any other purpose, it assumes responsibility to do so under the least harmful and destructive circumstances, simply because they are human beings. Virtually every incarcerated juvenile will eventually return to the community [emphasis added], and it is imperative for both the community and the individual that the period of separation not be a 'source of harm, injury, or irreconcilable estrangement'" (8, p. 198). 

**ISSUES AND PROBLEMS**

Relative Merits of Institutional Versus Community-Based Programs

Generally, what has been advocated in this paper are community-based programs that are part of a network of services, including some institutional components. The advantage of this approach is that a wider range of services can be provided, there is more flexibility and room for needed experimentation, and, often, more competent staff may be available. However, there is no magic in what is called a community-based service. Some such programs are poorly thought out and poorly implemented.

Similarly, small institutions are not necessarily better than large ones. A small lock-up with poor facilities, inadequate programs, and staff that cannot cope with the clientele, may turn out to be just as brutalizing as a large, traditional training school.

**Staff Requirements in Working with the Serious Juvenile Offender**

There is no question that the demands upon staff in program interventions with serious and violent delinquents are extraordinary. Vachss and Bakal recommend that it is preferable to obtain services through private vendors because they feel this method is more likely to provide high-quality staff. Typically, they say, if the State uses civil service to staff the secure facilities, the result is the "least skilled and least dedicated workers." This is generally because these positions are simply not desirable and may even be seen as punishment (44, p. 81).

Another important staff issue is "burn-out." As Coates, Miller, and Ohlin found, "One of the consequences of the high intensity of youth work is that staff members frequently 'burn-out' after two or three years. Some structural changes could be implemented to at least reduce this effect.... A creative system administrator may be able to adopt a sabbatical strategy... or a rotation of jobs.... Some of the university-based programs [or programs near universities] are able to overcome these burn-out difficulties by relying heavily on undergraduate and graduate students under the supervision of permanent staff." In any case, "Shaving costs at the point of funding contributes to the eventual burn-out of staff and quite possibly the demise of a good program and therefore creates situations that can harm youths rather than help them" (5, pp. 196-197).

Energetic and competent staff are absolutely crucial to the success of program interventions for serious offenders. Whatever it takes to get good staff and keep them should be done.

**Are Intensive Treatment Programs for Serious Offenders Worth the High Costs?**

Treatment programs for the "really tough kids" are not always popular, and any program that has a chance of succeeding is likely to be expensive. This is particularly true for the secure treatment units which, are expensive to build and to operate, Vachss and Bakal speculate on the comparative costs of two different ways of handling the same "violent life-style" delinquent:

1. Juvenile [A] exhibits a chronic, escalating pattern of criminal violence from age twelve to fifteen. He is continually incarcerated in a variety of training schools until, while on parole, he commits a robbery-connected homicide. Waived out of the juvenile justice system, he is convicted as an adult and sentenced to a life term in the state prison. He serves approximately thirteen years on this sentence prior to parole, at a cost to the taxpayers of roughly $15,000 per year. He is released as a confirmed life-style criminal, now armed with far more sophisticated criminal techniques, access to like-minded career criminals on the streets, a certain knowledge that he can 'do time' and survive, an enhanced criminal reputation, and the certainty that he will return to prison.

2. The same juvenile, instead of being waived out of the system at age fifteen, is sent to a Secure Treatment Unit for a term not to exceed five years. The cost will be roughly $60,000 per year, which represents, on a surface analysis, a net loss to society in dollars. However, the expectation that this individual will be released without a commitment to life-style criminality and with serious noncriminal
survival tools at his disposal has a value that we can not accurately express in dollars. If in fact, he does not become an adult criminal repeater, the savings to society are incalculable" (44, pp. 36-37).

As stated earlier in the present paper, estimates have also been made on the direct costs of serious crimes on the victims incurred because of medical costs, loss of income, and loss of property. One such estimate calculates that the direct costs of a homicide would be $178,000; of a robbery resulting in a serious injury, $18,500; of a home burglary, $2,300 (28, p. 77). There are calculated averages and estimates which cannot even touch on the value of a human life to a surviving family member, or the cost in emotional suffering and psychological damage to the victims of a rape or an assault.

Program intervention strategies such as continuous case management and small, closed intensive units may, in the long run, be well worth the investment, both for the future of the troubled juveniles they may reclaim, and for the safety of citizens who are thereby better protected from serious juvenile crimes.

**Strategies Recommendations for Handling the Serious Juvenile Offender**

It is appropriate to preface this section on recommended strategies by quoting some of the findings of Dale Mann and his colleagues regarding what makes for relatively successful program interventions with serious juvenile offenders. "There is nothing which works for everyone and...most things do some good for some individuals...." This, he says, "will startle only true believers (who know that their treatment is The Answer) and total cynics (who reject even successive approximations to better practice)."

As he observes, "Interacting with dangerous juvenile offenders is at least as difficult an area as any other people-changing endeavor" (14, p. 81).

What, then, are the characteristics of the relatively successful programs for serious juvenile offenders? Mann and his colleagues found that client choice, practices that promote learning and the acquisition of new behaviors, the availability of a wide range of program techniques, and the willingness of program staff to take a problem-solving, trial and error attitude toward their work were "features that were associated with success" (14, pp. 75-80). More specifically, "Successful programs were those that maximized...the choices of their clients [emphasis added]. Of course, in the case of the serious offender, the range of choices may be limited...the decision between incarceration and release will be the court's, but once that decision is made the juvenile offender can be afforded several sorts of choices, beginning with whether or not to participate in any treatment program...[and similarly] allowing the client the opportunity to choose which of several treatments to participate in.... The concept underlying client choice is a simple one--voluntary change is more probable, faster, more complete, and more permanent than is coerced change" (14, pp. 75-77).

With regard to conditions that apply for successful learning, "Those situations which elicited the most successful performances on the part of serious juvenile offenders did so, at least in part, because the juveniles could understand what it was that they were supposed to be doing" (14, p. 78). Other factors in facilitating learning of new behaviors included giving the juveniles "reasons to believe in themselves, and in their own efficacy. Tasks structured to be eminently 'do-able' contributed to that.... Emulation is [also] an important learning technique" (14, p. 78). Thus, it is important to have program staff with which the juveniles can identify. "The training situations which were most effective were those which simulated the location where the new behavior was to take place...moving the treatment program to that world, as in the community-based strategies, maximizes the benefits of this feature" (14, p. 78).

Mann lists four reasons emphasizing the availability of a wide range of programs: 1. Different juveniles respond to different treatments, and thus the diversity inherent in any group requires an array of treatments. 2. With a given juvenile, trial and error may be necessary before the child is matched with a technique that does any good. 3. Given the limited utility of all techniques, it is useful to have other methods that may be applied when one begins to fade. 4. A range of treatments is helpful to the staff as well, because (a) it facilitates the eclectic 'borrowing' process that provides them with a repertoire of skill, and (b) it allows them to rotate among methods and thus control some of the personal, psychic demands that are so burdensome in this field" (14, p. 79). Finally, Mann finds that, "The best programs... seemed to be using their failures as a guide to new initiatives and eventual success...they took a frankly problem-solving, trial-and-error attitude..."
[emphasis added] toward their work. Given what is known—and especially what is not known—about intervening with serious juvenile offenders, such an heuristic management strategy is emphatically indicated" (14, p. 80).

With some of these clues to success in mind, and in an attempt to build upon the background material presented earlier in this paper regarding the extent of the problem of serious juvenile crime and the nature of the juvenile justice system response to it, the following strategy recommendations are offered:

1. Target Areas
   • Intervention strategies should focus on the following targets:
     - high-risk potential offenders (e.g., 16- to 17-year-olds, males, "whites" more for property offenses and "non-whites" more for "violent" offenses, gang members, alcohol abusers)
     - severe and high frequency offenses (e.g., robbery, forcible rape, aggravated assault, burglary)
     - high-risk environment (e.g., urban areas, particular regions of the country, school grounds)
     - high-risk victims (e.g., other juveniles, low-income families).

2. Prevention
   • Employment programs working with low-income and high-risk juveniles should be expanded and should incorporate specific evaluation components to determine how such programs can reduce delinquency.
   • Alcohol abuse prevention programs should be expanded and evaluated.
   • More comprehensive research is needed on the causes and preventative techniques for serious juvenile crime.

3. Police
   • Evaluation research should examine a variety of police strategies which seek to identify and refer the "hardcore" offender to the courts.

4. Courts
   • Serious juvenile offenders should be handled primarily in the juvenile justice system with a uniform maximum original jurisdictional age of 18.

5. Correcions
   • Waiver to the criminal court should be used only in the most difficult and serious cases (since there is no assurance that the shortcomings of the juvenile system will be overcome by what may be an equally limited adult system).
   • Efforts should be encouraged to provide for proportionality in sentencing so that more serious offenders receive more restrictive detention and dispositions that non-serious or status offenders.
   • More adequate availability and adherence to written policy guidelines for classification and disposition of serious juveniles is necessary.

6. General
   • Improvement should be made in the collection, analysis, and availability of consistent and comprehensive statistics on serious juvenile crime and offenders throughout the entire juvenile and criminal justice process.
More information is needed on the relative costs of serious juvenile crime as well as the relative cost-benefit for serious juvenile offender strategies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>45,132</td>
<td>64,330</td>
<td>81,544</td>
<td>102,937</td>
<td>129,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>38,562</td>
<td>56,830</td>
<td>74,215</td>
<td>95,627</td>
<td>122,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>35,912</td>
<td>54,987</td>
<td>72,378</td>
<td>93,790</td>
<td>119,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall</td>
<td>32,692</td>
<td>50,445</td>
<td>67,837</td>
<td>89,249</td>
<td>115,643</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
### Table A-2
COMPARISON OF ADJUSTED ARREST FREQUENCIES FOR PERSONS AGES 7 THROUGH 17 WITH
NUMBER OF REFERRALS TO JUVENILE COURT, FOR INDEX AND NON-INDEX OFFENSES (1975 and 1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Adjusted Arrest Frequency</th>
<th>Adjusted Arrest Frequency Of Persons Under 10</th>
<th>Referrals To Juvenile Court</th>
<th>Referrals To Juvenile Court Of Persons Under 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Index</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>947,001</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>450,485</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide and Nonnegligent Manslaughter</td>
<td>59,444</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>53,405</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible Rape</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>51,462</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>27,059</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>41,095</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>22,942</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Property</strong></td>
<td>849,143</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>397,077</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>223,277</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>184,422</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny-Theft</td>
<td>690,044</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>317,654</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>50,002</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>44,725</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-index</strong></td>
<td>1,437,225</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>505,401</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,484,378</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,106,555</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Because of rounding, the percentages may not add to total.

1. Offense frequencies have been adjusted to compensate for variations in the number of agencies reporting arrest data. The following adjustment procedures were used:
   - Adjusted arrest frequency = Arrest frequency x Total Estimated Arrests in U.S. (DOJ) / Total Reported Arrests
   - Offense frequencies are for persons ages 7 through 17 with number of referrals to juvenile court.
   - Offense frequencies include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.
   - Court referrals include all offenses (including surface and littering law violations, and runaways) reported by Uniform Crime Reporting, except the Index offenses.


Table constructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA): American Justice Institute.
## TABLE A-1

### PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS ARRESTED FOR INDEX AND NON-INDEX OFFENSES, BY AGE (1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENSE</th>
<th>10 AND UNDER</th>
<th>11-12</th>
<th>13-14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18 AND OTHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDEX</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent*</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder and Nonnegligent</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide Malslaughter</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible Rape</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property*</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny-Theft</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NON-INDEX</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Violent</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Because of rounding, the percentages may not add to total.

*Total offenses include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.

**Total offenses include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

***Property offenses include burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.


Table constructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Evanston, Ill: American Justice Institute, 1980).
### TABLE A-5

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION FOR ARRESTS OF PERSONS UNDER 18 AND REFERRALS TO JUVENILE COURT FOR INDEX AND NON-INDEX OFFENSES, BY SEX (1975 and 1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>1974 Male</th>
<th>1974 Female</th>
<th>1975 Male</th>
<th>1975 Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony Rape</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny-Steal</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>93.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Murder</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FELONY</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Court referrals include a small number of persons ages 18 and over.

Index offenses include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, felony rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.

Non-index offenses include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, felony rape, robbery, and assault.

Property offenses include burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.

Jurisdiction refers to juvenile offenses.

Non-index offenses include all offenses (including curfew and loitering law violations, and runaway) reported to juvenile courts during the Index offenses.

Non-index offenses include both offenses (including curfew and loitering law violations, and runaway) reported to juvenile courts during the Index offenses.

Court referrals are defined as follows:

1. Jurisdiction: Four major jurisdictions: Juvenile, Family, Municipal, and County.
2. General Jurisdiction: All offenses, both Index and Non-Index.


Table constructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1980).
### Table A-6

#### Percent Distribution for Arrests of Persons Under 18 and Referrals to Juvenile Court for Index and Non-Index Offenses, by Race (1975 and 1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense Description</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrests of Persons under 18</td>
<td>Referrals to Juvenile Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black and Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Because of rounding, the percentages may not add to total.

1. "Arrests" and "arrest rates" were combined to allow comparison between arrests and court statistics.
2. Offenses refer to non-juvenile arrests inclusive of adult arrests, as specified in the index offenses, specific offenses included are very slightly between arrests and court data.
3. Offenses refer to juvenile arrests inclusive of arrest statistics, except the offenses specified in non-index offenses.
4. Estimated from "total" assault category in 1977.


Table constructed by the NATIONAl JOVEnILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1980).
### Table A-7

**Percent Distribution Delinquency History for Referrals to Juvenile Court for Index and Non-Index Offenses (1975 and 1977)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENSE</th>
<th>1975: None</th>
<th>One or More</th>
<th>1977: None</th>
<th>One or More</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INDEX</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible Rapes</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Property</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny-Theft</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NON-INDEX</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny-Theft</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Because of rounding, the percentages may not add to total.

1. Includes small number of persons age 18 and over.
2. Delinquency includes murder, forcible rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.
3. Violent offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, and assault.
4. Assault includes negligent manslaughter and nonnegligent manslaughter.
5. The 1975 "Delinquency" category includes only aggravated assault, while 1977 includes both simple and aggravated assault. Thus, the two years are not directly comparable.
6. Property offenses include burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.
7. Includes purse snatching, shoplifting, and larceny.
8. Non-Index offenses include all offenses (including derelict and littering law violations, and runaway) reported in court statistics, except the Index offenses.
9. Total offenses include Index and Non-Index offenses.

**Sources:**

Table constructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1980).
TABLE A-8

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF REFERENCES TO JUVENILE COURT FOR INDEX AND NON-INDEX OFFENSES, BY "WAS CHILD DETAINED?" (1975 and 1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENSE</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th></th>
<th>1977</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent 1</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder 4</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible Rape</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault 6</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property 7</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny-Theft</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Index 8</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>80.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Because of rounding, the percentages may not add to total.

1Includes small number of persons ages 18 and over.
2Index offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, assault, burglary,
   property-theft, and motor vehicle theft.
3Violent offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, and assault.
4Includes negligent manslaughter.
5Includes negligent and nonnegligent manslaughter.
6The 1975 "assault" category includes only aggravated assault, while 1977
   includes both simple and aggravated assault. Thus the two years are not
   directly comparable.
7Property offenses include burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.
8Non-index offenses include all offenses (including status offenses) reported
   in court statistics, except the Index offenses.
9Total offenses include Index and Non-Index offenses.

Source: Smith, Daniel D.; Finnegan, Terrence; Snyder, Howard; and Corbett, Jacqueline.
"Delinquency 1975: United States Estimates of Cases Processed by Courts with Juvenile
Jurisdiction." (Pittsburgh, PA: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 1979); and Smith,
Daniel D.; Finnegan, Terrence; Snyder, Howard; and Corbett, Jacqueline.
"Delinquency 1977: United States Estimates of Cases Processed by Courts with Juvenile
in press March 1980).

Table 1 constructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento,
CA: American Justice Institute, 1980).
### Table A-9

Percent Distribution of Nationals to Juvenile Court
For Index and Non-Index Offenses by Number of Handing (1975 and 1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENSE</th>
<th>1975 WITH PETITION</th>
<th>1975 WITHOUT PETITION</th>
<th>1977 WITH PETITION</th>
<th>1977 WITHOUT PETITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Index 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible Rape</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property 2</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoplifting 3</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIN. INDEX 4</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL 5</strong></td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Because of rounding, the percentages may not add to total.

1 Includes small number of persons aged 16 and over.
2 Index offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.
3 Violent offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, and assault.
4 Includes burglaries and nonintrusion vandalism.
5 The 1975 "violent" category includes only aggravated assault, while 1977 includes both simple and aggravated assault. Thus the two years are not directly comparable.

Sources:

Table reconstructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1980).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENSE</th>
<th>APPREHEND</th>
<th>JUVENILE COURT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 HOURS</td>
<td>4 HOURS 6 HOURS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infants</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toddlers</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infants</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toddlers</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car-Theft</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House-Theft</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor-Index</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Because of rounding, the percentages may not add to total.

Includes small number of persons age 18 and over.

Includes offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.

Includes offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, and assault.

Includes negligent and manslaughter offenses.

The 1973 "assault" category includes only aggravated assault, while 1977 includes both simple and aggravated assault. That the two years are not directly comparable.

Property offenses include burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.

Includes persons stealing, shoplifting, and larceny.

Non-Index offenses include all offenses (including status offenses) reported in court statistics, except the Index offenses.

Total offenses include Index and Non-Index offenses.


Table constructed by the NATIONAII JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1980).
### Table A-11

**Percent Distribution of Referrals to Juvenile Court Intake for Index and Non-Index Offenses, by Disposition (1975)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REFERRAL</th>
<th>WARRANT</th>
<th>NON-WARRANT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MURDER</td>
<td>NON-MURDER</td>
<td>MURDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEDITION</td>
<td>VIOLENCE</td>
<td>VIOLENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PROPERTY</td>
<td>NON-PROPERTY</td>
<td>PROPERTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THEFT</td>
<td>VEHICULAR</td>
<td>THEFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Because of rounding, the percentages may not add to total.

1. Includes small number of persons age 18 or over.
2. Non-index offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.
3. Warrant offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
4. Total offenses include Index and Non-Index offenses.


Table constructed by the National Juvenile Justice System Assessment Center (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1980).
### Table X-2

**Percent Distribution of Referrals to Juvenile Court for Index and Non-Index Offenses, by Disposition (1977)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENSE</th>
<th>Index 1</th>
<th>Non-Index 1</th>
<th>Index 2</th>
<th>Non-Index 2</th>
<th>Index 3</th>
<th>Non-Index 3</th>
<th>Index 4</th>
<th>Non-Index 4</th>
<th>Index 5</th>
<th>Non-Index 5</th>
<th>Total 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trespass-Theft</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Because of rounding, the percentages may not add to total.

1. Index offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, and larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.
2. Total offenses include all offenses (including status offenses) reported in court statistics, except the index offenses.

**Source:** National Center for Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Court Statistics (1977), Table X-2. (1980).
REFERENCES


