


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9/20/83

Commercial Security Field Test - Denver, Colorado

Denver Anti-Crime Council
City and County of Denver, Colorado

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U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

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ABSTRACT

The Commercial Security Field Test was part of a national research effort funded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. The Test evaluated the effectiveness of a crime prevention survey program among small businesses. The project was characterized by the joint participation of businessmen and police in the development and implementation of strategies to encourage merchant compliance with survey recommendations. The Denver project was limited to a two year research effort involving 715 businesses. Program methodology included identification of commercial areas within Denver consisting of twenty or more small businesses surrounded by residential neighborhoods, and having recognizable geographical identities. Detailed crime and business data were collected in each area. The areas were tentatively pair-matched based on collected data, and each pair was randomly separated into a test and a control component. Comprehensive crime prevention surveys, and survey compliance activities, were undertaken at each business in the test components. Project staff also participated in the formation of business associations in each test area. Commercial areas having the highest rate of compliance with survey recommendations, had the lowest incidence of victimization. The project concluded that the methodology represented a useful and cost-effective approach to commercial crime prevention.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Commercial Security Field Test involved 25 months of intensive effort in the organization and implementation of a major research program. The project addressed the problems of identifying specifically defined commercial areas; measuring and quantifying criminal, physical, and social characteristics of these areas; scheduling and carrying out nearly 500 comprehensive security surveys and vulnerability assessments in participating businesses; collecting, collating, and analyzing volumes of data; and working in the unfamiliar milieus of community development and client advocacy. The objective of this activity was to determine if a cooperative effort between police and merchants could reduce selected commercial crimes in targeted locations and enhance police-business relationships. The fact that the program successfully demonstrated that the methodology employed in the field test could achieve these results, was the culmination of many outstanding individual efforts. The following people and agencies deserve specific recognition for their contributions to the project's success.

Chief Arthur G. Dill of the Denver Police Department consistently supported the project through allocation of department resources, by donating his time to Chair the project's Police Advisory Board, and by his personal involvement and interest in project operations.

Charles D. Weller, Executive Director of the Denver Anti-Crime Council, John Carr, staff Criminal Justice Systems Specialist, and Patricia Feese, staff Accountant, provided guidance and technical assistance to the project staff throughout the span of the program. Former DACC employees, C. Robb Fuller, Jr., and William K. Lester, Jr., were instrumental in developing the original project design and in the management of the project's early phases.

Mrs. Marie A. Blair, and Denver Police Detectives Manuel Alvarez and John Costigan, III, all members of the project staff, gave many hours of uncompensated extra effort to the program to meet deadlines and to ensure that the high levels of quality control dictated by the research design were maintained.

On the National level, N.I.J. Program Manager, Fred Becker, University Research Corporation Consultant Joe Bunce, and Michael Cahn of Public Systems Evaluation, Inc., were always available for consulting, trouble shooting, and resolving evaluation and program management issues.

Officers Larry Rhodes and Steve McAndrews of the Long Beach, California Police Department, and Lt. Paul Herman and Detective Gary Poeling of the St. Louis, Missouri Police Department willingly shared experiences and

problem solving techniques in their respective program components, which greatly enhanced our ability to meet similar challenges.

A special note of appreciation is expressed on behalf of the Project Advisory Board Chairman, David A. Jensen, of Honeywell, Inc., and the Members of his Board: Larry Baker, Bill Luft, Ralph McMichael, and Larry Merkl; who gave freely of their valuable time and business experience to guide and enhance the project's activities.

Last but certainly not least, Mrs. Carolyn Smith, DACC Executive Secretary, coordinated the typing, manuscript review, and editing of the project's final report with her usual dispatch and efficiency.

FOREWARD

The decade of the nineteen seventies produced an intensive flurry of federally funded criminal justice and crime control demonstration programs. Despite the abundance of critics of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the National Institute of Justice, the fact is that such efforts have led to numerous innovations which have been institutionalized in criminal justice agencies across the United States. Similarly, the research community has profited immensely from the wealthy harvest of new knowledge, more accurate and complete crime data, and the dispelling of several myths which the criminal justice community has harbored for years.

The Commercial Security Field Test was one such demonstration/research effort that appears to offer a similar dual impact on law enforcement procedures, as well as college and university research programs. The report that follows still awaits the objective findings of an independent Evaluation Firm which has lived with the project, at arms-length, since its inception. However, it is readily apparent to local officials in Denver that the field test of the business/police partnership is a most lucrative marriage and has the potential of several spin-off benefits which impact crime at the local level, both in crime prevention and crime control.

This report is intended to assist the chief law enforcement policy makers, strategic middle management decision makers, and tactical level crime prevention personnel. It suggests that the Police Department must assume a position of aggressive leadership to capture the loyalty and faith of small business owners and then encourage them to collectively unite in local neighborhoods for the specific purpose of combating small business crime. The achievement of this mission takes repeated personal contacts with crime prevention personnel.

The Commercial Security Field Test project provides Denver an excellent opportunity to demonstrate that civilian (non-sworn) crime prevention specialists can effectively work with sworn police officers, as principle agents of the police department, and earn the unlimited confidence of small business proprietors. Civilian personnel, technically trained and professionally certified as crime prevention specialists are not necessarily more economical, but they are free of many of the 24 hour a day responsibilities of sworn law enforcement officers. They are more economical in the long range in relation to retirement costs and other fringe benefits. Their personal career aspirations are more likely to be totally targeted toward crime prevention, rather than perceiving a crime prevention assignment as one of many temporary assignments in a 25 year police career. Interestingly, this was not one of the propositions to be tested in the original design of this research validation project.

Secondly, participation in a research project involving three urban areas of the U.S. offered the local crime prevention team a competitively rewarding experience. Each city approached the project objectives a little differently, yet each city will no doubt be proud of their accomplishments individually and totally when the final results are released. Additionally, the project experience offered an opportunity for Anti-Crime Council members to focus special attention on small business property crimes at a time when most public attention, nationally and locally, was riveted on "crimes of violence."

Finally, the research generally suggests that commercial security crime prevention must be defined in detail, supported by analysis of accurate historical data, be followed by specifically targeted corrective action, business by business and owner by owner, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness. No longer can we afford generic, random, generalized public education crime prevention programs as the only weapon to be proactive about crime prevention. In this vein of thought, the Commercial Security Field Test project is akin to the Kansas City "Preventive Patrol" research findings, which suggested patrol officers randomly and aimlessly driving about the City have very little effect on crime. This project may well be the van-guard of future research that suggests crime prevention resources must be just as focused, just as grounded in historical data, and just as thoughtfully planned as the allocation of police patrol resources. If the facts end up supporting such speculative statements, which there is initial evidence to believe, there are many, many, law enforcement crime prevention units in the United States on the brink of the shock of their lives. If and when the shock impacts major city police administrators someday in the future, Denver will be even more grateful for having had the opportunity to make a significant pioneering contribution to the broad field of crime prevention knowledge.

Charles D. Weller
Executive Director
Denver Anti-Crime Council

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SUMMARY

The small, independent, retail businessman is a vanishing species in this country. High interest rates, competition from volume chain and discount stores, the growth of suburban shopping malls, and changing urban demographic and traffic patterns have combined to erode his market and economic base. The small retailer doesn't deal in the volume that the larger chain stores do, and thus offsets his lack of volume by higher pricing structures. These stores in turn, hope to attract clientele not because their prices are lower, but because they feel they can provide more services, and most importantly, because their location provides a convenience factor which the large chain, discount, or department stores cannot provide. Because smaller retail operations deal in a smaller, more high priced inventory, any loss of inventory affects them more significantly than their larger competitors. Chain stores which operate on a smaller mark-up with a much larger inventory of goods, can afford to absorb shrinkage volumes, which in effect, wipe out the smaller business. Another major problem associated with small businesses is that any number of new retail operations will start up which are grossly under-capitalized. This means that until the business establishes a clientele, it will go through a period where the cash flow is negative and there are not sufficient cash reserves to offset losses during the first few months or even years of operation. When a business finds itself in such a precarious position to start with, losses which have not been anticipated, such as crime losses, can constitute the fatal blow. In addition, a majority of smaller retail businesses are either not insured against crime losses, or are significantly under-insured for the types of risks they are exposed to.

Despite the expenditure of billions of federal dollars and the emergence of private security as one of the leading growth industries during the last decade, crime rates in the United States have continued to soar. The overall direct and indirect costs of crime are frequently estimated as high as \$90 billion annually. Nowhere is the impact of increasing crime rates felt more sharply than in the retail sector. Some authorities estimate that crime losses are a leading cause of small business failure in the U.S. today, and that fully one-third of all business closings can be attributed to employee theft alone.

Traditional crime suppression and crime prevention practices, based on theories of reactive policing, have failed to check this spiraling increase in victimization, lost incomes, and failed businesses.

In order to examine the impact of crime on small retail businesses, and to test concepts that might reduce such businesses' vulnerability to crime, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice funded the

Commercial Security Field Test in Long Beach California; Denver, Colorado; and St. Louis, Missouri.

The basic purpose of the Commercial Security Field Test is best described in the preface to the Commercial Security Test Design, published by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice:

"The Commercial Security Program is designed to reduce the vulnerability of small commercial establishments to burglary, robbery and larceny through the cooperation of businessmen and police in the conduct of crime prevention surveys and subsequent implementation of survey recommendations. The program will be tested in three cities having populations over 250,000 and evaluated by NILECJ. Both the process of implementation and its outcomes will be evaluated. Basically, the field test has two objectives.

- . To assess the impact of this crime prevention program on commercial crime and its associated effect; and
- . To determine if the program merits widespread replication in other jurisdictions."¹

The sponsoring agency for the Denver, Colorado component of the Field Test was the Denver Anti-Crime Council (DACC), an independent city agency under the Mayor's Office with the primary mission of administering federal anti-crime grants and providing professional, technical, and research assistance to the various components of the City's criminal justice system. Physical resources and staff support for the project were also furnished by the Crime Prevention and Community Services Bureau of the Denver Police Department.

The Test evaluated the effectiveness of a crime prevention survey program among small businesses, characterized by a joint participation of businessmen and police in the development and implementation of strategies to encourage merchant compliance with survey recommendations. The Denver project was limited to a two year research effort involving 715 businesses. Program methodology included the identification of commercial areas within Denver consisting of twenty or more small businesses surrounded by residential neighborhoods, and having recognizable geographical identities. Detailed data collection activities were undertaken in each area. The areas were tentatively pair-matched based on collected data, and each pair was randomly separated into a test and a control component. Comprehensive crime prevention surveys, and survey compliance activities were undertaken at each business in the test components. In addition, project staff also participated in the formation of business associations in each test area.

¹ National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Commercial Security Test Design, Washington, D.C., 1979, page iii.

Victimization data for selected commercial crimes were collected in each test area and in each control area. Data from the test areas suggested that by participating in the crime prevention survey and survey compliance program, businesses were less likely to be victimized as frequently and as severely as were businesses in the control areas. In comparing the test areas to one another, it was noted that the test area having the highest percentage of compliance with security survey recommendations had the lowest incidence of criminal victimization. Conversely, the test area with the lowest level of compliance with survey recommendations had the highest incidence of victimization among all of the test areas.

One of the most unique aspects of this program was the cooperative nature of the crime prevention survey and follow-up compliance activities. The civilians and police officers on the project staff actively involved themselves in the formation of business associations in each of the test areas. The issue of crime was an excellent catalyst to bring together the merchants within a particular area. From this beginning, the associations moved on to tackle other problems such as lighting, zoning, parking, area beautification etc., while the project staff continued to serve as liaison between the associations and city government. One group organized so successfully that it was able to obtain group medical insurance for its membership. Association members were recruited in each test site to meet with merchants, to encourage compliance with survey recommendations, and to serve in an advisory capacity to the project staff. By involving merchants in the survey process, individually and collectively, a greater sense of responsibility for the achievement of survey recommendations developed.

Repeated formal and informal compliance visits, formation and utilization of merchants' associations and neighborhood improvement groups, distribution of window decals to participating businesses, and the involvement of "key" businessmen in each area helped merchants to identify with the program and to begin to think in terms of an identifiable business "community" within their geographical area. Additionally, as businesses started assuming primary responsibility for risk-management and loss prevention, they came to view the police as a resource agency which led to a marked improvement in police-business relationships.

The Commercial Security Field Test was unique in the sense that it was the first crime prevention research effort to stress compliance activities as an integral part of the survey process and that it was the first National crime prevention program to be subjected to a rigorous statistical evaluation. Side benefits of the program have included the development of a vulnerability assessment instrument which provides an objective numeric rating of a building's vulnerability to burglary, and the development of a large national data base of small business characteristics.

Several key ideas, generic to any loss prevention or crime prevention program, were reinforced by the Commercial Security Field Test:

- 1) To have a reasonable chance of success, any such program must be both crime specific and site specific. Avoid squandering limited resources by "shotgunning" programs to cover large number of crimes and vast audiences. Concentrate on specific crimes or vulnerabilities at specific locations.

- 2) Do your homework. Conduct a thorough analysis of available crime data for the site or area you select. You may well find that despite the fact that your clientele are concerned about burglaries, there is a relatively low incidence of burglary in that area, and the crimes of shoplifting, employee theft, or even vandalism, may be the most prevalent and costly crimes in that area. You may find that 10% of the locations account for 80% of the reported crime in a given area, and it may be more efficient to focus your limited resources on such "hot spots," rather than addressing relatively secure sites with little or no loss history.
- 3) Identify and utilize key people from the area in the program's design and implementation. Not only do you develop access to "inside" information, you also gain insights into local power structures, political relationships, and problems that were not defined in your data analysis. The effort will have more chance of success when those affected by it have a stake in the decision-making process and the program's ultimate outcome.

Project staff are convinced that the methodology utilized in the Commercial Security Field Test represents a cost-effective means of reducing the vulnerability of small businesses to crime losses. The final evaluation report of the project's operations and findings will be available from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in the Fall of 1982.

I. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMERCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM

Historically, our urban centers have consisted of well-defined commercial hubs which were the focal point for the subsequent development of surrounding retail and residential areas. The integration of these areas and other special use districts in a spatial sense, has varied widely from city to city and has been dependent on factors as diverse as ethnicity, geography, transportation systems, government policy, religion, economics, utilities and a host of other factors. The integration of these areas in a functional sense however, has been remarkably consistent up through the first half of the twentieth century. Residential areas were generally high density-in nature and in close proximity to the commercial and manufacturing districts whose work force they housed. Retail districts which served both the commercial hub and the residential areas were again, proximate to the daytime and nighttime markets. The development of all weather roads and the horse drawn and later, electric trolley, resulted in some early diffusion of population and growth of strip commercial development along transportation corridors. Post World War II emergence of the automobile as a generally available means of transportation, and access to abundant, affordable suburban housing has radically altered not only traditional spatial relationships within the city, but has affected the functional relationship between retail, commercial and residential districts as well. The retail markets that have survived, have moved with population shifts to suburban shopping centers or relocated along major transportation arteries.

Within the center city, the retail businesses which survive are disproportionately represented by chain stores, franchises, and food industry outlets. The remaining small retail businesses must compete with suburban shopping malls for their market share. Because they are often unable to meet the pricing structure that volume buying brings to the chains and larger stores, the small inner city retailer relies on his proximity to a residential neighborhood to provide a sufficient volume of business. However, long-term demographic trends in urban areas suggests that this market is slowly eroding as residents gradually diffuse to the suburbs and are replaced by less affluent successors. Prevailing high interest rates and the tight money market contribute to the retailer's woes when he needs to recapitalize or revitalize his business. The unchecked rise in urban crime rates has a two fold impact on the urban retail operation: It affects the shoppers' perception of the city as a "safe" (hence desirable) place to shop; it affects the merchant's ability (and desire) to stay in business in the face of continuing property damage, inventory loss, and security costs. Finally, given the mobility of the modern shopper, the argument that a small retail business or a "neighborhood" commercial strip best serves the needs of the neighborhood appears weak.

The potential buyer with multiple purchases to make must scurry from one specialty shop to another, or head for a department store or shopping mall where a variety of goods and services are consolidated.

The foregoing discussion isolates and illuminates some of the major economic issues facing the small, independent, urban, retailer from a historical perspective. If current trends continue, the character of small urban businesses will change significantly. The Commercial Security Program is an attempt to provide assistance to these businesses in reducing their vulnerability to crime losses and stabilizing their operations.

Commercial crime has long been regarded as a major concern by law enforcement agencies around the country, and indeed, throughout the world. The origins of many police departments can be traced back to nighttime private patrols of the commercial district by citizen groups and hired watch forces. Unfortunately, approaches to the control of commercial crime have not changed significantly since these early beginnings. The police response to crime for the past 200 years has been predicated on reacting to crime, after the crime occurs. The entire criminal justice apparatus is mobilized to identify, apprehend, adjudicate, and incarcerate an offender after a crime takes place. Not only is this system slow, expensive, and discordant, it is virtually worthless insofar as preventing the occurrence of the offense in the first place, and deterring similar events. The criminal gambles that the return is worth the minimal chances of apprehension. Table 1-1 and 1-2 suggest that his gamble pays off:²

TABLE 1-1

Overall Estimates of Crime Impact

Sector	Losses (in billions \$)		
	1974	1973	1971
Retailing	\$ 5.8	\$ 5.2	\$ 4.8
Manufacturing	2.8	2.6	1.8
Wholesaling	2.1	1.8	1.4
Service	3.5	3.2	2.7
Transport	1.9	1.7	1.5
TOTAL LOSS	\$16.1	\$14.5	\$12.2
PREVENTION	3.9	3.5	3.3
TOTAL IMPACT	\$20.0	\$18.0	\$15.5

(This table excludes "white collar" crime losses which are reported separately in table 1-2)

² U.S. Chamber of Commerce; "White Collar Crime," 1974

TABLE 1-2

Assessment of White-Collar Crime Losses

Type of Loss	Annual (billions of \$)
Bankruptcy Fraud.....	\$ 0.08
Bribery, Kickback, Payoff.....	3.00
Computer Related.....	0.10
Consumer Fraud.....	21.00
Consumer Victims.....	\$ 5.5
Business Victims.....	3.5
Tax Revenue Lost.....	12.0
Credit Card & Check Fraud.....	1.10
Credit Card.....	0.1
Check.....	1.0
Embezzlement & Pilferage.....	7.00
Embezzlement.....	3.0
Pilferage.....	4.0
Insurance Fraud.....	2.00
Insurer Victims.....	1.5
Insured Victims.....	0.5
Receiving Stolen Property.....	3.50
Securities Thefts & Frauds.....	4.00
ESTIMATED TOTAL	\$41.78

Tables 1-1 and 1-2 suggest that the overall economic impact of crime in the private sector eight years ago was nearly \$62 billion. Given the double digit inflation of the past few years, increasing rates of reported crimes, and underreporting of crime as measured by victimization surveys, it is safe to assume that this figure may have doubled by the time of this report (1982).

The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NIJ) of the U.S. Department of Justice developed the Commercial Security Field Test to determine if a cooperative effort between police and small retailers could successfully identify and reduce commercial security vulnerabilities and criminal opportunities through a cooperative security survey program in three cities having populations in excess of \$250,000.³ In March of 1980,

³ National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice; *op.cit.*; pg. iii

NIJ selected the cities of Denver, Colorado; Long Beach, California; and St. Louis, Missouri to participate in the Commercial Security Field Test under the auspices of Grant #80-IJ-CX-0010. The grant was awarded for the period of April 15, 1980 through October 15, 1981, and subsequently extended through June 15, 1982. The three cities were selected on the basis of their applications and their conformation to the characteristics of the proposed test sites outlined in the Commercial Security Test Design.⁴

The Denver grantee was the Denver Anti-Crime Council, an independent city agency under the Mayor's Office which administered federal anti-crime funds for the city and provided professional, technical and research assistance to other elements of the City's criminal justice system. An independent outside evaluation contractor (Public Systems Evaluation, Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts) was funded by NIJ to conduct and report on a rigorous statistical examination of the project's impacts and results..

Public Systems Evaluation (PSE) will provide a quantitative analysis of the Field Test's final results in the fall of 1982. The remainder of this report will be devoted to describing the methodology employed by the project staff in establishing and implementing the Denver component of the Commercial Security Program, and the successes and failures of that approach in respect to future program replication and institutionalization. Each remaining chapter is devoted to one of the five major project tasks (Project Organization, Data Collection and Site Selection, Crime Prevention Surveys, Compliance Activities, and Technology Transfer) and concludes with recommendations for replication. The final chapter consists of the personal observations of the project staff.

II. PROJECT ORGANIZATION

The staffing plan in the initial grant application called for a Project Director, two Detectives, a secretary, and two part-time data collection clerks. In order to strengthen the application and to provide greater access to other levels of city government, the Director position was changed to that of a full time project coordinator and a senior level city administrator was added at 60% time as the Project Director. This latter position was funded 100% by the city to demonstrate the City's strong commitment to the project.

The Project Director's position was filled by the former Director of the City's Motor Vehicle Division who was employed as the Criminal Justice Project Director for the Denver Anti-Crime Council (DACC). This individual had an extensive administrative background, strong ties to the Police Department, Mayor's Office, and City Council and had extensive contacts in the business community.

The Project Coordinator's position was filled by an individual with previous law enforcement experience who had an extensive training and programming background in crime prevention.

The two Detective positions were filled by the Chief of Police with the concurrence of the commander of the Community Services and Crime Prevention Bureau. The Project Director and Coordinator were not involved in the selection process. One position was filled by an experienced burglary Detective. The other position was filled by a Patrolman with a strong community services background who was promoted to Detective upon assignment to the project.

The Project Secretary was hired from another city agency through the City's Career Service Authority promotional system.

Two part-time Data Collectors were hired under contract at different times by the project for data collection, analysis and encoding. Although both individuals had worked for DACC in the past and came highly recommended, the quality of their work was found to be unsatisfactory in both instances.

The Project Coordinator had been trained in crime prevention methodology at the National Crime Prevention Institute, the Texas Crime Prevention Institute, and the California Crime Prevention Institute. The Project Director had no prior formal crime prevention training and attended the two-week basic course at the Texas Crime Prevention Institute prior to assuming his duties. The two Detectives had both participated in a forty hour in-service training program on crime prevention conducted by the

⁴ Ibid.

Police Department in 1978. Both officers were sent to the Texas Crime Prevention Institute's two week basic course in order to standardize the training background and level of comprehension among all of the field staff.

Due to a lack of available downtown city office space, the project leased an office at a site that was equidistant between a number of the proposed test locations.

During this phase of project operations, one major task that was not accomplished was the formation of a Project Advisory Committee. As originally conceived, the Project Advisory Committee would consist of representatives of City Agencies with which the project expected to interact (Planning, Zoning, Community Development, etc), representatives of the business community and representatives from the test sites. Because final site selections and designation of test and control areas were not yet accomplished, identification and selection of test area representatives had to be delayed. Additionally, because the project was sponsored by DACC, the decision was made to chair the Advisory Committee with a member of the DACC Citizens Council, appointed by the Mayor. Unfortunately for the project, the Council was in a period of transition while appointments were being re-evaluated. As a result of both of these situations, formation of the Project Advisory Committee was delayed until January of 1981. At that time, an Advisory Committee was formed which consisted of a representative from each of the test sites. The Committee was chaired by an appointed member of the Anti-Crime Council who worked in the private security field and who had prior law enforcement experience. The Committee met on a quarterly basis to review project operations and to evaluate proposed compliance strategies. Committee members also participated in the project's Technology Transfer Conference in February of 1982 (see Chapter VI). Committee members were originally envisioned as being actively involved in communicating project activities to their fellow businessmen in each of the test sites and encouraging merchant compliance with survey recommendations in their areas. In later phases of project operations, the members of the Advisory Committee did address these functions with some limited success. The Test Design had pre-supposed that there were established lines of communication between businesses in each of the test sites, and that the business districts were relatively stable areas where most of the businessmen knew each other. Our experience indicated that this was not the case. All of the test areas were very fluid in the sense that there was a great deal of mobility among small businesses moving in, moving out, failing, and expanding. What networking existed among businesses, consisted of knowing the businessman next door and perhaps the merchant across the street. The vast majority of business owners and managers lived some distance away from the business site, and most lived in the suburbs.

Formation of a Commercial Security Program Police Advisory Committee was much easier. Chief Arthur G. Dill of the Denver Police Department consented to chair the Committee and host the meetings. Committee membership consisted of representatives from the FBI, DEA, Traffic Bureau, each Police District containing a test or control site, the Organized Crime Strike Force, Vice and Narcotics, Special Services Unit, Special Crime

Attack Team, Project E.S.C.O.R.T. (Eliminate Street Crime on Residential Thoroughfares), the Community Services and Crime Prevention Bureau, the Juvenile Bureau, and the Pawn Shop Detail. The basic purpose of the Police Advisory Committee was to establish communications between the project and other law enforcement programs, to document potential outside impacts on the test and control areas, to avoid contamination or invalidation of test results, and to avoid exposing any on-going undercover operations in the test and control areas. This Committee also met on a quarterly basis and arrangements were made with the Traffic Operations Bureau and Special Crime Attack Team to receive monthly written reports of their areas of operation. These two units were the most visible and active police units represented on the committee, and their high visibility and high level of activity were felt to have the greatest potential impact on criminal activity in or around a test site.

The final major organizational issue that the project addressed in the early phases of operation was the identification of major tasks and the development of work plans to address those tasks. In June of 1980, a planning conference for all three cities was held in Denver. At this Conference, preliminary discussion of task organization led to the development of a 90 day work plan, supported by a Gant Chart,⁵ for each city. The Denver experience indicated that all of the sub-tasks identified in the start-up phase of the project were easily accomplished within the allotted 90 day period, although some tasks took longer to accomplish than anticipated and others were completed much sooner than called for in the plan. At the conclusion of the 90 day work plan, a 12-month work plan was prepared which addressed survey, compliance, monitoring, and technology transfer issues in detail.⁶

Due to budgeting constraints, in December of 1981 the Project Director's position and Project Secretary's position were terminated and the project relocated with the DACC main offices in downtown Denver. The Project Coordinator assumed the Director's responsibilities and DACC support staff provided the necessary clerical assistance to see the project through its final phase.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Personnel Selection: Any program which includes large amounts of time devoted to field work and client contact demands personnel with well developed interpersonal skills. Our experience indicated that personnel with minimal administrative skills or aptitude, but who possessed positive attitudes and outgoing people-oriented dispositions were best suited for utilization in this type of program. Such individuals can be taught administrative skills much easier than a bureaucratic functionary with a poor temperment can learn how to get along with people. It is imperative that personality characteristics be an integral part of applicant screening. Much of the job of convincing merchants to adopt security recommendations is a "sales" job, and a positive, outgoing personality is a major asset.

⁵ See Appendix

⁶ Ibid.

2. Start-Up Period: In developing a project work plan, sufficient time must be reserved at the outset to address organizational issues such as staffing, officing, initial equipment and supply acquisition, training, and detailed planning. Our experience suggested that a 90-day warm-up period is not unreasonable.

3. Advisory Committee: The Project Advisory Committee frequently provided staff with valuable insights and corrected many misconceptions about small business organization and operations. The real value of an advisory committee lies not in the role of providing an air of legitimacy by rubber stamping staff decisions, but by bringing "real world" analysis and input to the decision-making process. It is strongly recommended that the establishment and utilization of a broad based program advisory committee be made a priority task at the outset of any major project which espouses citizen involvement.

III. DATA COLLECTION AND SITE SELECTION

Although the Commercial Security Program was designed as a research project, perhaps one of the most important lessons learned from the effort was the importance of thorough data collection, data analysis, and site definition in respect to not only the research issues, but the operational aspects of effective program management as well. By targeting specific crimes, by defining specific, limited target areas and target types, and by investigating previous crime patterns and MO's, the project was able to zero in on well-defined problems with precise and exact solutions geared to a particular geographical location. This in depth, crime-specific, site specific approach to crime prevention programming defied the popular tendency to "shotgun" programs and provide shallow services to large population bases.

The first element of this project task was site selection. The Test Design called for identifying commercial areas consisting of twenty or more small businesses surrounded by residential neighborhoods, and having recognizable geographical identities.⁷ This task was approached in a number of ways. The first step involved examination of the City's master zoning plan to identify areas of commercial development. At the same time, the Community Development Agency and City Planning Department were asked to evaluate these areas on the basis of the limits imposed by the Test Design. After an initial list of 21 potential sites was developed, the sites were inspected aerially, using the police helicopter, to examine their spatial relationship to surrounding neighborhoods and other site locations. The sites were then inspected on the ground to determine suitability from the standpoint of occupancy and business type. Financial institutions and large chain or department stores which had their own security program were eliminated from consideration. Additionally, small shopettes which were anchored by a major chain or grocery store were also eliminated because their economic viability was closely tied to the anchor store, and could not be independently assessed. Finally, each site was analyzed in terms of other existing or anticipated programs which could impact or compound the effects of the Commercial Security Program. Several highly desirable locations, including many minority businesses, were rejected because of present or impending Urban Development Action Grants, Community Development Grants, and other public and private assistance programs.

The next step to be addressed was how to define the surrounding neighborhoods that were served by the commercial areas. An underlying premise in neighborhood definition was that successful reduction of criminal opportunities in the commercial areas may displace crime into the surrounding residential neighborhoods. For the sake of consistency, and because geographical and land use conditions varied from site to site, the Denver project staff

⁷ National Institute of Law Enforcement & Criminal Justice; op.cit; pg. 17

chose to define the neighborhoods in terms of a two block radius in all directions from the commercial strip or cluster. Residences interspersed with businesses were considered part of the residential neighborhood and not the commercial zone.

After the neighborhoods were defined, the proposed test sites and neighborhoods were numbered and mapped. Each site was plotted on a master city map provided by the Planning Department and separate, enlarged maps were prepared for each site which detailed the block subdivision into individual lots.⁸

Public Systems Evaluation, Inc. provided each city with a detailed data collection instrument⁹ to be utilized in gathering information which would enable the project to pair-match sites for ultimate designation as "test" and "control" areas. Elements of this data collection instrument included: site mapping, a four year history of commercial offenses in each commercial area (commercial burglary, commercial robbery, shoplifting, employee theft, and other larceny); a four year history of Part I and Part II offenses for each commercial area and neighborhood, and analysis of commercial establishments and economic viability in each commercial area (business types, vacant storefronts, business starts for the preceding two years and business failures for the preceding two years); neighborhood characteristics (total population, sex differentiation, ethnicity, age by category, family type, median household income, unemployment rate, land area, length at address, and number of residential units per structure); traffic patterns (traffic direction - one way/two way, number of traffic lanes, number of traffic signals, metered parking and public transportation); general characteristics of the commercial areas and surrounding neighborhoods (type of streetlighting, average distance between lightposts, lighting levels, viability of area business and community associations if any, previous experience with police community relations and crime prevention programs, experience with redevelopment programs in the past, public building construction, recent street and sidewalk improvements, the number of individual security surveys previously conducted in each area, specialized police patrol programs in the area, the number of patrol beats which overlap each area, and the number of patrol cars assigned to each area on a 24 hour basis); and for each commercial establishment, the name of the business, the number of years the business had been at that location, the number of employees at the business, the annual sales volume for the past two years, and the real estate taxes paid for the last two years.

Data sources and data bases for the collection of this information were not always compatible. Some data were available based on census block figures, other data were based on neighborhood planning areas, and crime data were based on police precinct (beat) information. Geographically, all three bases are dissimilar and many adjustments and assumptions had to be made to make the information even roughly harmonious. Some data could not be accessed (tax records) and some information was simply not available (business starts and failures). Nevertheless, after several passes, sufficient data were collected and organized to identify and match potential test sites with like characteristics.

⁸ See Appendix

⁹ Ibid.

After the "in-house" pair matching was completed, the suggested matches were submitted to PSE for further review. PSE refined the pair-matching and finalized the selections. Each suggested match of sites was then subjected to a coin toss to randomly determine which site would be a "test" area and which site would be a "control" area. Four "test" sites were "conditionally" matched with four "control" sites. Each of the test sites would be subjected to crime prevention survey, compliance, and business association development activities by the project staff. Project staff would not visit the control areas but would continue to collect crime data and monitor other activities within the control areas. In Denver, a unique "triad" match was developed where a third site was added to one previously matched pair. Project staff would conduct security surveys and make recommendations to businessmen in this third site, but would not conduct any follow-up compliance activities or business association development activities in this area. All of the site matchings were "conditional" because of the paucity of data and the assumptions that had to be made regarding like characteristics between test and control areas.

In later phases of the program's operations, it became apparent to PSE that even with all three cities lumped together, the number of businesses involved in the project and the incidence of criminal victimization in these businesses, were both mathematically too small to be able to make statistically significant statements as to the success of the methodology. For example, the crimes of shoplifting and employee theft were so infrequent and so underreported, that in order to see a statistically significant change in crime rates, the incidence of the crimes would have to dip below zero.

In order to address this problem, two other approaches were developed. In the first approach, an instrument to numerically rate a structure's vulnerability to burglary was developed.¹⁰ Each building was rated before the building was surveyed and again after the inspector had completed the sixth and final compliance visit at the end of the program. This technique was designed to measure the effectiveness of the project's methodology and specific survey recommendations in reducing vulnerability to a specific crime. The second technique, which was developed toward the end of the program, consisted of separating all of the test area businesses as a group, into three classifications: The first classification would be "untreated" and would consist of those businesses where few or no security recommendations were needed or made. The second classification consisted of businesses where a number of recommendations were made and where the business complied with all or a majority of the suggested changes. The third group was composed of businesses where a number of survey recommendations were made, but compliance with survey recommendations was very low or nil. The three groups would be compared to determine if there were statistically significant differences between high compliance businesses, low compliance businesses and relatively secure businesses with respect to criminal victimization over the course of the project.

The final element of this project task was the on-going collection of data in both the test and control areas. Throughout the duration of the project, the staff ran a monthly computer program to measure reported crime

¹⁰ Ibid.

in each test and control area. This information was also utilized in the project's compliance activities.¹¹ In addition to these monthly crime summaries and the information provided by the Police Advisory Committee, project staff also collected newspaper articles and information from other sources which related to activities taking place in test and control areas. For example, a tavern in one test area was a motorcycle gang hangout and several shootings at this bar resulted in press coverage and increased police attention to the area. In another test area, one businessman lost half of his work force in an afternoon raid by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the wife of one of the F.B.I.'s ten most wanted fugitives (both were members of an underground extremist bombing group) was arrested at a neighboring business where she worked as a manager. Examples of such extra-normal law enforcement activities needed to be documented to assess their impact on the local crime situation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. File Organization: Each business should be given an individual file number and if a project will be implemented in more than one location, the files should be set up and coded on an area by area basis. Each area should have a general area file to store mailing lists; address, ownership, and contact lists; general information on characteristics or events unique to that area; and a master index of code numbers and business sites.

2. Site Selection and Crime History: Before initiating a commercial anti-crime project, the personnel involved must make a commitment to specificity. The issues which are initially targeted and the issues which are uncovered as the project continues are complex and require time to properly address. If a project is initiated which tries to address all crime problems in a general area, it is doomed to failure. Given the limited resources that most agencies have to work with today, it is far more rational to pick one or two priority problems in a limited geographical area where you stand some chance of making a measurable impact. If a program can demonstrate that it has effectively mitigated a targeted program in a targeted area, program continuation is more likely and program results are apt to be more long term. A thorough and comprehensive analysis of past crime problems is the first step. If geographical locations have not been pre-selected, this is a first step toward defining the areas that the project will work in. Crime analysis will also pinpoint the most frequent crimes in an area, provide some indication of MO patterns, and frequently suggest which offenses are most costly in terms of dollar loss and property damage. Businessmen in a particular area may be overly concerned with robbery or burglary, whereas a thorough crime analysis may indicate that the frequency and dollar loss of vandalism, shoplifting, and/or employee theft are the greatest problems. In addition, a crime analysis may pinpoint "hot spots" or individual businesses in a given commercial district which account for a majority or disproportionate share of all the crime in that area. It may be more cost-effective to concentrate limited resources on these businesses individually, rather than taking a collective approach toward all of the businesses in that district, many of which have never had a crime problem or have very limited vulnerability. For a program to have a fighting chance at success, it must be both site specific and crime specific.

3. Documentation: There is a tendency among many otherwise responsible practitioners to dispose of security survey forms or to not keep copies of surveys that have been completed. The most frequent excuses for this behavior are "it's a blueprint for a burglary," and "I don't want to be held liable if they get ripped-off." Both attitudes are shortsighted and highly unprofessional. Security surveys are sensitive documents, but most public and private agencies have procedural and physical safeguards for protecting sensitive information. These safeguards can be easily expanded to include security surveys. The issue of liability should never arise if the practitioner takes time to explain that compliance with survey recommendations does not guarantee that the recipient will be safe from victimization. Implementation of the recommendations simply corrects previously existing criminal opportunities; and thus reduces vulnerability and the likelihood of victimization. By retaining copies of survey recommendations, an agency has documentation of proactive measures that it has taken to reduce crime, and can frequently point out to the later crime victim that had he complied with the documented recommendation(s), he would not have been victimized. The record of the crime prevention survey recommendations puts the responsibility of loss prevention where it belongs, squarely on the shoulders of individual merchants.

¹¹ See Chapter Five

IV. CRIME PREVENTION SURVEYS

The crime prevention security survey was the heart of the Commercial Security Program. The survey process was divided into a pre-survey and a survey phase, with specific tasks delineated under each phase.

The pre-survey phase was devoted to laying the ground-work for conducting the security surveys, and familiarizing project staff with the security survey instrument.

After the test sites were selected, project staff collected information on business names, business types, addresses, and ownership in each test area as part of the initial data collection effort.¹² This information was transferred to the security survey forms which were coded with the file numbers assigned to each area. Files were also developed for vacant storefronts in each area, but were color coded to separate them from active businesses. The prior crime history information collected during the data collection period was recorded on each security survey form and copies of the original police offense reports were placed in each individual business file. (By having a summary of previous loss history as part of the survey form, inspectors had some idea of existing vulnerabilities and prior MO's when they conducted the security survey).

The next step in the pre-survey phase was the development of a letter from the Chief of Police, briefly outlining the project's goals and operations. This letter included an invitation to the businessmen in each area to a local meeting introducing the project staff and explaining the program in more detail. These letters were hand signed by the Chief of Police and delivered individually to each targeted business by a uniformed officer. Each letter was individually typed on Police Department stationery and personally addressed. These techniques were used to stress the importance and high level commitment the City Administration attached to this particular project, as opposed to mailing out impersonal form letters. Despite the time and effort devoted to promoting these meetings, attendance averaged just under 10% of all of the businesses contacted in each area. At the meetings, project staff introduced themselves and discussed the forthcoming survey program by stressing that the particular business district was selected to participate in a national program from business areas all over the country. No mention was ever made in any test area during the course of the project of control areas from which project services would be withheld.

The next step in the pre-survey phase was staff familiarization with the survey instrument. The Commercial Security Test Design discussed the development of the survey instrument by saying:

¹² See Chapter III.

"Crime prevention survey instruments come from many different sources and vary widely. Some are simple checklists for perimeter security to protect against burglary. Others are more comprehensive, pertaining to interior space and preventative behavior, and are intended to protect against a range of offenses. To be workable, survey instruments must be applicable to establishments that vary widely in size, space, and organization. They must be complete enough to detect any major vulnerabilities, yet short and straightforward enough to be used efficiently by people who have had some training but are not necessarily security experts.

For the purposes of the test, a standard survey instrument has been designed based on these and other criteria. The instrument synthesizes others collected from police departments across the country, the National Crime Prevention Institute, the Texas Crime Prevention Institute, and the Mitre Corporation. It is intended to detect security shortcomings in both physical and procedural arrangements.

The physical arrangements surveyed include target hardening measures, such as the installation of special locks on doors and windows; access control measures, such as the separation of customer entrances and exits; and surveillance measures, such as the installation of lighting and the removal of obstacles to visibility. Procedural arrangements surveyed include the behaviors by store personnel required for the physical arrangements to function properly--e.g., locking doors and maintaining key control, stationing cashiers at customer exits, and keeping an eye out for shoplifters.

Accompanying the instrument are a set of instructions and recommendations to reduce specific vulnerabilities identified by the survey. To facilitate program transferability and maximize compliance, the emphasis of the recommendations is on effective low-cost alterations rather than on expensive physical changes or equipment."¹³

Project staff from all three cities had input into the final design of the survey instrument. The final project consisted of a thirteen page document,¹⁴ which was divided into three parts: general business and survey information, commercial crime history at this address (recorded and un-recorded), and recommendations to improve security. The survey form was designed for later encoding and keypunching, and as a result, every item had to be completely filled in. If particular information was unavailable, it was coded NA; if the respondent did not know the answer, it was coded DK; and if the respondent refused to answer, it was coded RA.

¹³ National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice; op.cit.; pgs, 13 and 14.

¹⁴ See Appendix

Because the security survey form was as much a data collection instrument as a tool for analysis and recommendation-making, it contained elements to which the project staff initially objected. However, as the survey was used more and more, the value of these elements became more apparent. Specifically, questions dealing with building rent, sales history, inventory and equipment valuation, cash on hand, and average sale value were perceived as not necessarily functional. However, in assessing the overall vulnerability of an enterprise, and the likelihood of recommendations being viewed as cost-effective and actually implemented by the respondent, the merits and relevance of these questions became obvious. These were the only survey questions (especially sales history) where staff encountered any reluctance or refusal on the part of respondents to cooperate.

As part of the security survey instrument package, a separate self-carboning set of recommendation sheets which included a form to log later compliance visits, was also developed. One copy of the recommendation sheet went to the business and the other copies stayed in the business file as part of the compliance log.

The final element of the pre-survey phase was to field test the security survey instrument package. The survey instrument was field tested by each inspector in suburban jurisdictions with the cooperation of local law enforcement agencies. Suburban locations were chosen to avoid possible contamination or sensitizing of test and control areas within the city. The field testing enabled staff to time the survey process and to develop in-house methodology for processing, reviewing, typing, and filing the forms.

The first element of the actual survey phase was scheduling surveys with businesses. The police officers on the project staff went to one area at a time, in uniform, and scheduled surveys for the entire staff. The presence of a uniformed officer established immediate credibility and helped to overcome objections from merchants who were inclined to refuse to participate in the program. Having field tested the instrument, the staff realized that the average survey would take at least 40 minutes. Some surveys took half this time, and in cases of a particularly complex structure or a particularly garrulous respondent, the survey could take up to an hour and a half. Civilian staff members obtained Police Department civilian employee identification cards to enhance their acceptance by the business community. Merchants were highly suspicious of civilians from DACC, believing them to be alarm salesmen at best, and city sales tax inspectors at worst. In some instances, teams of uniformed officers and civilians were challenged by merchants who thought they were marketing a security product. Officers in plain clothes were also asked to produce identification during this period. The problem of credibility evaporated after inspectors got to know the individual merchants on a name basis, usually by the second or third visit. Virtually none of the businessmen had ever heard of the Denver Anti-Crime Council or understood what the agency was when it was explained to them. It became more expedient to introduce civilian staff as employees of the Police Department, because all of the merchants knew what the Police Department was. Despite efforts to educate the shopowners as the project progressed, a number of merchants are convinced to this day that the civilian staff were actually detectives. This problem of agency identification and credibility was unique to Denver which was the only city to

utilize civilian staff as part of the survey team. Admittedly, the Denver staff sidestepped the issue by not directly confronting it, and it is a problem that remains to be addressed in program replication involving low profile public agencies. Along these same lines, project staff took pains to notify the radio room and the district stations when project personnel were to be working in an area for an extended period, in the event that suspicious merchants called to verify the inspector(s) credentials. Local beat officers were only told in very general terms that Community Service and Crime Prevention Bureau personnel may be encountered in their areas. If the local precinct patrolmen were aware of a special project operating in their beat, the evaluation team was concerned that they would be sensitized to the locale, and thus confound the evaluation results.

The next step in the survey phase was conducting the physical security survey. Exclusive of travel time, the actual surveys averaged 40 minutes apiece on-site, as noted previously. Inspectors found that it was more expeditious to sit down with the respondent at the outset to collect background information and discuss procedural security issues, before proceeding with a physical inspection of the premise.

The vulnerability assessment instruments, which were used in later survey operations, took approximately fifteen to twenty minutes to fill out, and were considerably less complicated than the total survey package. However, in order to accurately assess elements of procedural security using this form, the inspector had to refer to the portion of the survey instrument which dealt with operating procedures and policies in order to get a firm grasp of the vulnerability issues.

Survey inspectors attempted to schedule all surveys with the store owner or store manager. On those occasions when an owner or manager was not available, inspectors attempt to work with a senior clerk, family member, or long time employee of the business.

The surveys and subsequent visits to all of the participating businesses were conducted in civilian clothes. This decision was primarily an evaluation consideration. It was reasoned that the constant presence of uniformed personnel in a commercial area over a period of several weeks would impact the evaluation of the effectiveness of the survey recommendations. In addition, some personnel argued that civilian attire was more business like and would enhance the professionalism and credibility of the inspectors.

Inspectors found that on the average they could conduct four or five surveys per day and still have enough time left to allow for travel to and from the sites and writing up their survey recommendations at the office. Aggressive scheduling would permit an inspector to conduct eight surveys per day allowing time for travel, but excluding office time for preparing recommendation sheets.

Initially, the Denver component had about 269 active, participating businesses in the original test areas. During the scheduling process, a number of businesses were identified that declined to participate in the program. The files on these businesses were color coded to indicate their status and the staff continued to collect crime data and other incidental information for these files. By the end of the project,

approximately 215 of the original 715 business addresses in both the test and control areas were found to be vacant, or the business at that location had failed, relocated, or declined to participate in the program.¹⁵

The initial security surveys of the original test areas commenced in late October of 1980 and were completed by the first week of January in 1981. At the conclusion of the project, the remaining staff began to conduct surveys of the businesses in the control areas, alternating a complete survey versus a partial survey coupled with a complete vulnerability assessment for every other control site business. Vulnerability assessments were conducted for all test site businesses before inspectors tackled the control sites. Due to the fact that the project spent the first half of the 1982 project period preparing and conducting a Technology Transfer Conference; conducting a final compliance check and vulnerability assessment at each of the test sites; and scheduling surveys in the control sites; the initiation of the control site survey program was impeded. In addition, the actual field staff was cut in half (two inspectors instead of the original four) and affected by pre-scheduled military leaves and vacations. Finally, because control site businesses were not dropped when a new business succeeded an old one, the number of control site businesses substantially outnumbered the test site businesses. At the time of this report (May 1982), three of the four control sites were completely surveyed and field staff were scheduling the fourth for surveys. The only differences in methodology between the control site surveys and test site surveys were that recommendations were mailed to the control site businesses and no informational business meetings were held in the control sites prior to the survey start.

In the test areas, the recommendation sheets were typed at the project office and hand returned by the inspector to the survey respondent. This technique gave the inspector an opportunity to highlight his survey findings and to discuss recommended changes in detail with the respondent. The recommendations were prioritized as "high," "medium," and "low." High priority recommendations were directed at vulnerabilities that in the inspector's opinion would lead to an immediate probability of loss if the cited vulnerabilities were not reduced or eliminated. Medium priority recommendations were made where the risk indicated a moderate probability of a loss or criminal offense occurring if the risk remained uncorrected. Low priority recommendations were made in situations where the risk of loss or victimization existed, but in the opinion of the inspector, the nature of the threat was not immediate or readily apparent.

The final aspect of the survey phase of the project was a follow-up survey or inspection at previously surveyed businesses which were subsequently victimized. The original inspector would obtain a copy of the offense report and re-inspect the business with the respondent, or at least interview the respondent regarding the event. The inspector then prepared a memorandum for insertion in the individual business file which detailed the circumstances of the offense as they related to survey recommendations and compliance, or noted if the survey had no relationship to the incident.

¹⁵ 194 test site businesses were still active at the project's conclusion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Training: Prior to initiating any crime prevention or security survey field work, the actual inspectors need to be thoroughly trained in the concepts of risk-management and cost effective loss prevention analysis. Prior experience has indicated that when inspectors make one major recommendation that is clearly not cost-effective, auxiliary recommendations will be rejected along with the unpalatable suggestion. This tendency is overcome in part, by prioritizing recommendations; but the inspectors must also take into account the respondent's attitude, business volume, prior loss history, and economic position when analyzing vulnerabilities. In Denver, project staff averaged nearly nine recommendations per business compared to three for Long Beach and four for St. Louis. Speculation as to this discrepancy includes building construction variations, a number of grossly insecure buildings in Denver, and training level variations between the three cities' staffs.

2. Pre-Testing the Survey Instrument: By pre-testing the survey, project staff were able to develop realistic scheduling patterns and to identify problem questions that required unique approaches. The inspectors were also able to develop an administrative process to expediently review type, file and return survey recommendations. As a general rule, the turn-around time on recommendation sheets averaged two working days from the time the sheets were submitted to the time they were returned to the respondent.

3. Involvement of Local Officers: Due to the research considerations of the Commercial Security Program, local precinct officers were not involved in project operations to avoid contaminating test results. In a "real world" program, it is highly desirable to sensitize the beat patrolman to special projects in his area of responsibility. A heightened level of interest among the patrol force should naturally compliment the efforts of the specialists working in the target area.

4. Uniforms: Again, because of test considerations, surveys were conducted in plain clothes. The law enforcement officers preferred working in plain clothes because it made them less conspicuous. It also contributed to some of the problems of credibility discussed earlier. Again, in the "real world," the heightened, conspicuous presence of uniformed officers in a target area, over a period of time, may well compliment the survey effort. One sub-goal of the Commercial Security Program was to improve the relationship between businessmen and the police. When businessmen conceptualize the "police," especially in a negative connotation, they are not thinking of detectives and technicians. They are thinking of the uniformed, symbolic, patrolman isolated and inaccessible in a moving patrol car. By making this figure approachable and reducing the symbol to human dimensions in the form of the survey inspector, the communication gap is bridged and the basis for improving perceptions and the overall relationship has been established.

5. Use of Civilians: The Denver experience indicated that civilian specialists can function just as effectively in a crime prevention program as police officers. On the other hand, programs utilizing civilians face

severe handicaps in credibility and identity verification. A civilian expert may be more competent than a police officer, but the police officer is initially perceived as more knowledgeable and experienced. Any program which uses civilians in cooperation with the police may want to stress the relationship of the civilians to the police agency to avoid suspicions on the part of the target audience. Another possible solution is to establish a strong pre-survey program of identifying the civilian agency and emphasizing the legitimacy of its program and employees, before embarking on the survey phase.

V. COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES

"Given the importance of implementing survey recommendations, it is essential in this test that active steps be taken to maximize compliance. A variety of measures have been tried or proposed to accomplish this purpose. Some cities have enacted commercial security codes which require that certain minimum standards be met. Insurance companies often provide premium reductions for security measures, although the extent of reduction varies from company to company, city to city, and even from agent to agent, because of the discretionary judgement agents can exercise in writing policies. Personal follow-up visits by police are the compliance method most widely used, and police crime prevention units report that it is effective.

For purposes of this test, personal follow-up visits appear to be the most promising means of encouraging compliance, and hence are considered integral to the program. The objective of the visits is to persuade proprietors that it is in their interest to make the changes recommended by the surveys. The number, characteristics, and timing of the visits will be decided by the participating cities, consistent with this objective.

Since past experience with crime prevention surveys has shown that people are most receptive to survey recommendations after a crime has occurred on the premises, surveys will automatically be conducted in target-area stores after the commission of burglaries, robberies, or major cases of larceny.

As suggested earlier, group meetings between target-area merchants and key project personnel to discuss survey findings may also help promote compliance. Another approach would be to negotiate with local insurance offices for premium rate reductions tied to specific security changes. Participating cities may consider other means of offsetting the costs of security equipment and appropriate physical changes in stores; however, because of the desirability of developing a program that is transferable, and hence not excessively dependent on Federal funds, LEAA will not offset the cost of physical changes or equipment as a part of this test."¹⁶

¹⁶ National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice; op. cit.; pg. 15.

The development, implementation, and evaluation of compliance strategies was a major task of the Commercial Security Program. A wide variety of compliance strategies were proposed and analyzed. With the active assistance of the Project Advisory Committee, a number of compliance strategies were selected for implementation and testing in the test areas.

Before discussing the Denver experience in developing compliance techniques, two of the suggestions mentioned in the previous quote from the Commercial Security Test Design deserve attention: The concept of developing security codes as part of an overall building code has some merit in respect to long term vulnerability reduction. In terms of this particular program, the idea was patently ridiculous. In the first place, the average age of a building in this country is 70+ years. The vast majority of commercial buildings that were involved in the Denver project were at least 25 years old, and many were turn-of-the-century structures. The Commercial Security Field Test dealt with existing structures, not new construction. A building security code, even if standards were to be applied retroactively, would have to permit at least a five year grace period to bring buildings up to standard, which goes far beyond the span of this project. If a city council could enact a sufficiently strong security code based on performance standards, over the objections of builders and developers (who would pass increased building costs on to the owners), it is doubtful that the same legislative body would have the requisite fortitude to mandate that all commercial structures be retrofitted to meet code standards in a given period of time. The much ballyhooed Oakland, California security ordinance is generally regarded by security professionals as weak and ineffectual. The bottom line to any code program is a strong and effective enforcement program, which implies another level of government. In these days of cut-back management, it would be virtually impossible to justify the creation of an inspection and enforcement program, given the uncertainty of the long term return on investment, and the prevailing attitude that less government is better government.

The second suggestion from the Test Design was that insurance companies would provide premium reductions based on the implementation of security measures. On the surface, this appears to be a reasonable idea to encourage merchant compliance with survey recommendations. However, the process of conducting security surveys and working with the Project Advisory Committee revealed that vast numbers of small businesses carry no crime insurance or are grossly underinsured for crime loss. Most businesses carry fire insurance and restaurants are required to carry liability insurance, but the prevailing attitude toward crime insurance was that potential crime losses were not as serious risks as were potential fire losses. In addition, a wide variety of insurance companies, mostly represented by independent agents, served the small business insurance market. It would have taken far more time and effort than was available within the scope of this project, to coordinate an effective insurance premium reduction program among the multitude of companies and agents servicing the businesses in the four test areas. Finally, existing residential premium reduction programs do not appear to demonstrate that the value of the reduced premium (usually less than 10%) would be a particularly exciting incentive.

The implementation of compliance strategies began with the inspector's first visit to the business to schedule the security survey. During the

course of this visit, the inspector gave the merchant a copy of the Ad Council's booklet How to Crimeproof Your Business, from the "Take A Bite Out of Crime" series.¹⁷

When the inspectors returned the survey recommendations to the individual businesses, they also supplied the businessman with a package of reference materials that was compiled by the project staff. Chief among these items was an excellent resource book prepared by the Mitre Corporation for NIJ, entitled, Security and the Small Business Retailer.¹⁸ In addition to this book, the following items were also distributed to the merchant at this time:¹⁹

- 1) A two sided window decal for the Commercial Security Program.
- 2) Price lists for security hardware from various area merchants.
- 3) Denver Police Department suspect identification forms (Help Catch a Crook).
- 4) A form outlining characteristics of bad checks.
- 5) Forms from the Small Business Administration outlining steps for applying for counseling and aid.
- 6) Descriptive information dealing with the Federal Crime Insurance Program.²⁰
- 7) A list of suppliers and vendors for various types of security hardware.

One of the most effective compliance techniques that the project developed was a quarterly newsletter that was mailed to each participating business in the test areas. A separate newsletter was used for each area. The newsletter generally contained some basic information about the Commercial Security Program and the current project status, followed by general anti-crime information. The next section of the newsletter summarized all of the offenses reported by participating businesses in that commercial district since the last newsletter. These summaries discussed the offense in terms of the security recommendations and the MO of the offender. Names and brief descriptions of any arrestees were also published so store owners would be familiar with these people if they reappeared in the area. A special effort was made to highlight attempted offenses and crimes that were foiled because of good security measures, and/or compliance

¹⁷ Office of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statistics; U.S. Department of Justice; Washington, D.C.; 1979.

¹⁸ National Institute of Justice; U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; 1979.

¹⁹ See Appendix.

²⁰ Only two merchants purchased Federal Crime Insurance.

with survey recommendations. The newsletters generated and maintained a great deal of interest in the project in each of the commercial areas, and also facilitated the development of communication linkages between businesses. Whenever project staff were visiting an area, they could expect to be questioned as to when the next newsletter would be published, or questioned about the details of a particular crime reported in the newsletter. Each newsletter concluded with a short "crimestopper" which discussed in detail, preventive measures to take against a particular crime.

The most important and most effective compliance activity undertaken by the project staff was the development of a formal compliance inspection program. Utilizing the compliance log sheet that was part of the survey recommendation package, each participating business was visited six times to measure compliance with survey recommendations. All of calendar year 1981 was devoted to compliance activities which revolved around the formal compliance check as a measure of program success. In the early stages of the program, many merchants exhibited a tendency to agree with all of the survey recommendations without making a commitment to implement the changes. Inspectors encountered this attitude of feigned cooperation in a number of instances where it was quite apparent that the respondent was only being polite and giving the appearance of cooperating with the police. By the time these merchants had been visited for the third or fourth compliance check, they realized that they were not going to be able to simply "kiss off" the inspector, and they grudgingly implemented at least some of the changes. Merchants, who at the time the recommendation sheet was first returned, very straightforwardly disagreed with a particular recommendation, generally would implement most of the other changes over the course of the project. The formal compliance check, coupled with informal visits to the shops was in reality a form of low-level harassment. However, when the merchant realized that the inspector was not going to "get off his back," and would continue to return and measure compliance, there was an incentive to do something, to make some changes, just to avoid incurring the inspector's displeasure on the next visit. There were very few cases where a merchant refused outright to comply with any changes. In most cases where no compliance was measured, the merchant consistently made excuses to the effect that "the parts are on order," or "I've talked to the landlord and he will get around to it." During the course of the formal compliance visits, inspectors got to know many of the businessmen on a first name basis, and this perhaps more than anything else, helped to enhance the development of better police - business relationships. In many instances, inspectors were able to act as a resource or contact person for a merchant to resolve a long standing dispute or misunderstanding with the police or another city agency. Inspectors were also able to follow-up cases that merchants had been involved in previously and discover the case disposition. Outside of conflicts with individual patrolmen, the lack of follow-up communication (and implied lack of interest) by the police department, investigators assigned to cases, the District Attorney and the Courts, was the biggest stumbling block to better business relations with the criminal justice system. To address this problem, one newsletter contained a massive flowchart of the City and County of Denver's Criminal Justice System, to help explain the complexity of the crime problems that merchants could see only from the victim's standpoint, which was just the tip of the iceberg.

Another compliance activity that was essentially mandated by the Test Design, met with only mixed success. As noted previously,²¹ the Test Design presumed the existence of well established formal and/or informal communication linkages between businesses in the test areas. Project staff were to utilize these linkages to form or interact with business associations for the purpose of enhancing compliance with survey recommendations and improving police-business relationships. Where existing business organizations were found, they were either inactive or their boundaries were not compatible with the limits of the test areas. Project staff utilized the Project Advisory Committee, the newsletter, and special invitations to area-wide meetings to help form and organize business associations in the test areas. In Area 12 (Tennyson Street), the project was able to mesh with a revitalization of a formerly dormant group. This particular group eventually organized so successfully that it obtained a small grant from the city for area beautification, qualified for a group medical insurance program, and held street fairs. As a general rule, in the other three test sites, attendance at attempted organizational meetings averaged about 10% of the invitees. Near the end of the project, the area representative on the Advisory Committee from area 13 (East Colfax) managed to form a steering committee that made some significant strides toward putting together a formal organization. In Area 7 (South Pearl Street), the same people would show up at each organizational meeting, but no one would seize the initiative in the absence of the project staff to follow through. In Area 3 (East Evans), which was the largest test area, attendance dwindled from thirteen to three by the last meeting. In this test site, after it became apparent that merchants were not going to band together, project staff worked with a local property owner to try and organize other owners and landlords. This technique did not prove successful either, and the effort to organize this area was abandoned. In areas 12 and 13, the fledgling organizations that did manage to get underway had some initial success in improving lighting and addressing parking and zoning issues. It appears that this technique may have some merit, but its impact on survey compliance was minimal.

A final compliance technique that the project experimented with was utilizing members of the Project Advisory Board to encourage compliance with survey recommendations in their representative test sites. The success of this technique was also mixed. Again, the representatives in Areas 12 and 13 appeared to be the most active. The success of this technique appears to be dependent upon the personality of the Board Member, the amount of time he can take away from his business, his physical location within the commercial site, and the representative's commitment to the goals of the Commercial Security Program.

In Denver, inspectors made an average of 8.8 recommended changes per business. The average compliance rate for these business owners was 4.9 changes complied with per business. Overall, Denver merchants complied with 55.74% of all the recommended changes. An initial review of compliance by category of recommendation indicated that no-cost and low-cost procedural changes were complied with far more readily than changes that required physical repairs, replacements, or installations. The percentage of changes

²¹ See Chapter II.

complied with varied widely by test site as well. In Area 3 (East Evans) the compliance rate was only 44.81%; in Area 13 (East Colfax), the compliance rate was 57.64%; in Area 12 (Tennyson Street), the compliance rate was 62.75%; and in Area 7 (South Pearl Street), it was 67.86%. In Area 9 (Federal Boulevard and Mississippi), which was the test site in the experimental triad where no compliance activities were undertaken, the compliance rate was 29.51%. Based on the difference in compliance percentage between Area 9 and the other test areas, it appears that the compliance strategies utilized by the project staff had a significant impact. The reasons for the spread in compliance rates between the other test sites is an evaluation issue that will be addressed by Public Systems Evaluation, Inc., in their final evaluation report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

General: In the opinion of the inspectors who participated in the compliance activity phase of the project, the three most successful compliance techniques were the formal compliance visits, the quarterly newsletter, and the distribution of decals to participating merchants.

The personal, one-to-one continuing contact of the compliance checks was extremely significant in terms of reinforcing the respondent's perception of loss-prevention as a managerial issue. After a degree of rapport developed between inspectors and merchants, many of the storekeepers would eagerly greet the inspector on subsequent visits to display the changes they had implemented.

The newsletter served as further reinforcement by informing participants how the merchant up the street prevented a break-in by installing a burglar bar, or how a neighboring business was victimized by failing to correct an obvious security weakness. Because the newsletters were site-specific, the message hit home with greater impact. In addition, the newsletter also drove home the social reality of the crime problem in that particular commercial area. Not only did it confirm or dispel rumors of recent crimes, it also discussed MO's, offenders, and recent trends.

The distribution of decals to participating merchants helped to enhance merchant identification with the Commercial Security Program, and also helped to define the test site as a distinct commercial zone.

Project staff recommend that replication efforts include these three techniques. The development of effective business organizations as part of an overall anti-crime strategy holds great promise. It is questionable if the average law enforcement agency can successfully become involved in community development type programs without outside technical assistance. The Denver experience with business associations suggested that the associations can make significant changes in their geographical locale by speaking to city government in a collective voice. The key to harnessing this energy and turning it inward to address local crime problems depends on organizing skills and the development of effective inter-business communications channels.

VI. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

The last major task accomplished in the Commercial Security Program was the transfer and dissemination of program technology and methodology to other interested parties.

During the course of the project, the staff went to great lengths to ensure that program operations remained very low key and did not generate any publicity. Because of the nature of the research design, if businesses in control areas or in other commercial districts around the city were aware of the Police Department effort to provide free, extraordinary services to small businesses, the increased demand for such services in these areas would have complicated the controlled nature of the experiment and would have created a series of political and administrative headaches. On the one or two occasions when news media inquired about the program, project staff were able to enlist their cooperation in suppressing program publicity until the conclusion of the project.

The major strategy devised to implement the technology transfer process was to host a dissemination conference in each city for the purpose of sharing the program's experiences with other jurisdictions and practitioners.

In Denver, the Technology Transfer Conference was held on February 17, 1982. More than 220 people registered for the conference and approximately 194 people representing 104 agencies and businesses actually attended the conference. Representation was divided between ten Colorado Sheriff's Departments, seven Federal Agencies, six State Agencies, 45 Colorado Police Departments, and 36 Colorado businesses. The Conference focused on problem definition and an overview of the national program; the implementation of the Commercial Security Program in Denver; planning issues; security surveys; and compliance activities. (A copy of the program agenda and a summary report of conference activities are included in the Appendix for additional information.)²² Although a formal evaluation of the conference was not conducted, informal comments from participants and the volume of requests for additional information and materials from attendees suggests that the conference was very well received. To date, however, project staff are unaware of any formal attempts at project replication throughout the State.

Three additional Technology Transfer operations were conducted near the conclusion of the project:

The project staff conducted a "mini-seminar" and provided an after-dinner speaker for a monthly meeting of the Denver Mile-Hi Chapter of the American Society for Industrial Security, which has upwards of 200 members.

²² See Appendix.

Television Channel 9, KBTV in Denver, which has the largest local news market share in the nation, filmed a segment of their evening news program "9 Crime Beat" with project staff. This tape included examples of inspectors conducting a physical survey of a business, discussing procedural security issues with a proprietor, interviews with business owners, and interviews with project staff. This production was aired for approximately one-week on the noon, 5:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. news. A copy of this video tape was furnished to Public Systems Evaluation for their reference.

Project staff also provided an overview of the program's operations to the annual meeting of the Colorado Crime Prevention Association in Colorado Springs, in May of 1982.

RECOMMENDATIONS

General: Technology Transfer efforts were essential to this program because it was designed to measure and evaluate a specific crime reduction methodology. Unfortunately, due to the fact that project operations terminated before the final evaluative report was distributed, the transfer efforts fell far short of providing decision-makers with the hard data they need to measure the benefits of such a program against anticipated costs, when considering local replication. The technology transfer efforts were highly successful insofar as discussions of workable and unfeasible aspects of the methodology were concerned. The idea that crime prevention programs should be grounded in analysis, be site specific, be crime specific, and involve the participation of service recipients was a valuable program outcome. On the other hand, this information is meaningless if the methodology is shown to be ineffective or not cost-effective in terms of the ultimate outcome--- the reduction of targeted crime in the test businesses.

It is suggested that a strong effort be made to thoroughly convey the final program results to interested practitioners when that information is available. At the same time, all future distribution of program methodologies (including this report), for the purposes of encouraging program replication or institutionalization, should include a note of caution to the effect that the final quantitative results of this program are as yet, unknown.

VII. STAFF OBSERVATIONS

The final chapter of the project report is devoted to the personal observations of the project staff in regard to the relative merits of the program and the methodology employed in project operations. Each remaining staff member was asked to provide a brief summary of their subjective feelings toward the project.

Manual Alvarez
Detective
Community Services & Crime Prevention Bureau
Denver Police Department

I feel that the project has been a tremendous success regardless of how the final statistics may turn out, whether or not we can honestly say that the Commercial Security Program has in fact reduced crimes.

It has been a tremendous public relations tool and has done much for the citizens and the Denver Police Department. It has done much to help change the image of how the merchants perceive Denver Police Officers.

As long as I have been with the Police Department, I feel that small businesses have been neglected by our Department and I feel very strongly that the Commercial Security Program should continue to do as much as possible for the people that want to get involved and ask for our assistance. I know that we can, and have been effective in reducing crime to those merchants that have been victimized.

I don't believe that we can alter the feelings of those merchants that have not been victims, that really feel that crime will not affect them.

If I had to do the program again, I would be even more selective in the businesses that would be involved. For one thing, all businesses that would be surveyed would have to meet all the criteria for the initial program. The businesses selected would have to be vulnerable to all four areas of crime: robbery, burglary, internal theft and shoplifting. Business offices should be completely excluded. I don't think it was necessary to ask questions pertaining to income of business, and compliance checks should be limited to approximately three visits.

John C. Costigan
Detective
Community Services & Crime Prevention Bureau
Denver Police Department

This is the first time a comprehensive crime prevention program specifically oriented toward small business has been developed. Even though many of the security recommendations will never be implemented, some will, which will reduce the chance of some crimes occurring. In this instance, something truly is better than nothing.

The newsletter published in the target areas was well received and served to alert the businessmen of crimes that happened in their neighborhoods and which could have happened to them.

It was an excellent idea to send out advance notice to the target businesses. Where the businessman recalled the notice, our job was made much easier.

All the sites should have been contiguous small businesses such as Tennyson Street; Evans Avenue which had offices, medium-sized plants and warehouses in addition to interspersed small business, should have been excluded, or cut down to only include the small businesses.

Compliance checks didn't really serve a purpose after the third visit. If a business intended to make changes, it usually did by the third visit or had started the changes. Three visits (one every two months) would have been more practical. In one instance, a businessman accused a surveyor of harassing him by making the compliance checks.

The survey form did not follow the established crime prevention survey format; i.e., introduction, site identification, perimeter barriers, exterior barriers, interior controls and conclusion. The survey question groups (burglary, robbery, etc) could have been better organized. For example, all questions dealing with robbery and checks should have been together and not scattered in different sections.

We had difficulty orienting the form for businesses other than traditional general merchandise retailers. Examples are restaurants, gas stations, repair garages, professional or white collar type businesses. More research should have gone into making the form more adaptable for surveying their problems.

Compiling business background information for the evaluators, especially the building owner/leasing agents' names, amount of rent paid, sales history and estimated assets were sensitive questions which some businessmen felt were an invasion of their privacy and wouldn't answer.

When surveying a chain or franchise store, a decision-making person from the company should be present while the survey is done so that the reasons for making recommendations are understood. Usually, the store manager while understanding and agreeing with the recommendations, had no support from above to implement changes because the manager could not (or sometimes would not)

adequately explain the reasoning for the suggestion. Unless the decision making person is present, the survey will probably not accomplish anything.

Businesses, especially white collar offices, seemed to be only concerned if they had been previously victimized. In leased property businesses, the response was "the landlord won't do anything and I'm not going to spend my money improving his property" even though the business would clearly benefit from a reduced crime risk.

Businessmen's Associations that the project attempted to start were mostly a failure because the businessmen could not be convinced that it would benefit them to organize. Also the diverse business types, such as an auto body shop, real estate agency, equipment rental agency, motel, laundromat and bars did not contribute to a feeling of commonality among them.

A formal course in "Crime Prevention through Environment Design" would have been very helpful background for the surveyors to make their decisions.

Crime Prevention will not become truly effective until its principles become mandated in code form such as the fire code or health code. Unfortunately, most people feel that because they have never been victimized, why change (or why tempt fate!). Others feel that no matter what they do to try to prevent a crime from happening, it probably will anyway so why waste time and energy because it won't do any good.

In summary, the Commercial Security Project in Denver is a qualified success because of the above reasons.

Michael Wagner
Crime Prevention Specialist
Denver Anti-Crime Council

The Commercial Security Program was an attempt to demonstrate that police and businesses, working together in a comprehensive security survey program, could effect measurable reductions of targeted crimes in participating businesses.

The program's impact on the targeted crimes, remains to be seen. The program's impact on police-business relations, has been, in an overall sense, very positive. This improvement in attitude is due not so much to the technical aspects of the survey program, as to the opportunity that developed for the inspectors and recipients to communicate over a period of time in a positive environment and in a proactive context.

Businesses that were frequently victimized appeared to be characterized by overall poor management. Similar type businesses in like structures in the same geographic area could have varying crime rates. The attitude of management toward loss prevention as a managerial function seemed to be the key factor in terms of each business' loss history. The more professionally a store was managed, the cleaner it was; the tighter the internal controls were; the more attentive the employees were; the less likely the store was to be victimized.

Generally speaking, the people who had been victimized in the past, were the most likely to implement survey recommendations. The more recent their victimization, the more positive their attitude toward the program and the survey.

The formation and utilization of business associations as a compliance activity may be beyond the scope of many police department crime prevention units. The degree of communication and cooperative effort among businesses is far less than imagined. The amount of time and the special skills needed to put together the networking that this strategy calls for, are simply not available in the context of this program. This is a community development function which should be addressed by community development professionals as part of a larger, overall economic revitalization program, of which the Commercial Security Program should be one segment.

The opportunity for the institutionalization of a Commercial Security effort is present within the Denver Police Department's Community Services and Crime Prevention Bureau. The probability of formal institutionalization is nil. The Denver Police Department's commitment to crime prevention outside of directed patrol activities, remains grounded in a "community relations" model that is essentially directed toward public image building and providing a liaison for various interest groups and neighborhood groups throughout the city. This effort has served the needs of the Community and the Department very well; but the establishment of a directed and tightly controlled crime prevention program would threaten the resources, manpower, and underlying philosophy of the Bureau.

The long term solutions to the victimization of small urban businesses extend far beyond the criminal justice system to the political and economic arenas. However, three areas in which law enforcement agencies must actively involve themselves to address long term issues, appear to be: 1) the development and enforcement of building security codes; 2) formal involvement in the local planning and site review process, from the broad policy-making level at the top, all the way down to the review of individual building design plans; and 3) generating the involvement of the insurance industry in the security field, to the extent that it now impacts fire safety.

APPENDIX

TASK DEFINITIONS --- EXPLANATION OF TERMS
TWELVE MONTH WORK PLAN --- DENVER COMPONENT

TASK I: Task I, originally titled "Organize Project Team & Businesses" has been retitled "Support Activities". This change reflects the fact that the majority of start-up and purely organizational activities described in the 90-Day Work Plan have been completed.

The term "Support Activities" describes functions that are ancillary to compliance and survey activities. The specific sub-tasks under "Support Activities" are discussed below:

1.1.1 Develop Action Plans for Groups and Participants: The function, responsibility, and organization of all major advisory, support, and business groups directly associated with the operation of the field test at the local level, will be described by individual action plans. Each plan will briefly describe the group's anticipated function in terms of task assignment and anticipated completion date.

1.1.2 Form and Meet with Project Advisory Committee: The chairman of the Denver Anti-Crime Council will appoint a sub-committee from the Council's membership to act in an advisory capacity with the Commercial Security Field Test.

1.1.3 Form and Meet with Police Advisory Committee: The Chief of Police will establish an advisory committee composed of representatives from each major division of the Police Department and any special bureaus within the Department which may impact the Commercial Security Field Test. This committee will meet on a quarterly basis to assess the project and will establish a method to exchange information regarding police operations affecting the project.

1.1.4 Form Other Support Groups: As the need arises, specific short-term task forces may be organized to address issues or provide assistance to the project staff. For example, it may be necessary to put together a task force of management or accounting specialists to provide businesses with bookkeeping, accounting, or auditing assistance.

1.1.5 Councilmanic Briefings: Project Staff will provide City Council representatives with an overview of the Field Test Design and

provide specific information and updates to councilmen/councilwomen representing districts which include experimental sites.

1.1.6 Identify/Create/Meet with Business Associations: Project staff will identify and meet with existing business organizations in the experimental sites. If no organization exists in a particular site, project staff will encourage the formation of such a group. The purpose of these meetings will be to explain the program, encourage participation and compliance, and to create and enhance an atmosphere of positive communication between the business community and the Police Department.

1.1.7 Develop Newsletter Format and Mailing List: All businesses in the experimental sites will be mailed a monthly newsletter developed by project staff. This particular sub-task deals with the development of the newsletter format and a computer generated mailing list of each affected business by name and address. The newsletter is discussed in more detail under Task IV.

1.2.1 Utilize Manpower Assistance from Crime Prevention Bureau: Trained crime prevention officers from the Community Services and Crime Prevention Bureau may be used to assist in data collection and the conduct of security surveys.

1.3.1 Maintain Communications with Support Groups Relative to Project Status/Changes/Results: This on-going support activity includes formal liaison activities, frequent informal contact, and regularly scheduled meetings or briefings with both long-term and short-term support groups. We plan to continue to provide information and evaluation results to these groups until the final termination of the project.

TASK II: Task II, Data Collection Activities, includes the development, refinement, and implementation of organized efforts to collect, collate, file, and summarize data elements essential to the project's evaluation. Specific sub-tasks are discussed below:

2.1.1 Maintain Liaison with Staff Systems Specialist: On-going data-collection efforts should be routine after the necessary programs have been written. The staff Systems-Specialist will provide assistance

in preparing and verifying these programs. In the event that evaluation requirements change, or problems are encountered in data collection, the Systems-Specialist can be called on for further help.

2.1.2 Refine and Test Computer Programs: The programs used in the monthly collection of address-specific crime data will be checked for accuracy and modified as necessary to achieve the desired levels of specificity and veracity.

2.1.3 Initiate Data Collection of Other Criminal Justice Activities in Test and Control Areas: The project staff will develop files for each experimental and control area that will contain information from police and news sources regarding law enforcement activities in those general locations which may affect the project.

2.2.1 Run Monthly Data Collection Programs: During the survey phase, computer runs of address-specific crime data in the test and control areas will be run on a monthly basis.

2.2.2 Collate and File Monthly Crime Data in Address Specific Files: The data generated by the monthly computer runs (2.2.1) will be collated by address and filed by report number in the individual business file for each location in the experimental and control areas.

2.2.3 Continue Monitoring Criminal Justice Activity in Test and Control Areas: Information from police and news sources regarding other law enforcement activities in the experimental and control sites will be chronologically filed in the site files developed under sub-task 2.1.3.

2.3.1 Continue Monthly Address-Specific Computer Runs for Test and Control Areas: The on-going collection of data in the experimental and control sites (sub-tasks 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) on an address-specific basis will continue until the final evaluation report.

2.3.2 Prepare Summary Reports on Site/Address Specific Crime Data: The information generated by the monthly computer runs will be compiled in a brief summary report for each test and control area, and for specific addresses where significant changes in victimization rates are noted. These comparative reports will be used as a basis for the final project report.

2.3.3 Summarize the Effects of Other Criminal Justice Activities in the Test and Control Areas: The information collected and filed under sub-tasks 2.1.3 and 2.2.3 will be used to prepare brief summary reports for each experimental and control area, quantifying the amount and nature of non-routine police activity in each. These summaries will be used in the final evaluative report to assess the impact of outside police activities on the project.

TASK III: Task III, Security Surveys, addresses those activities which project staff will undertake to provide comprehensive crime risk assessments for each business in the experimental areas. An explanation of the specific sub-tasks follows:

3.1.1 Complete In-Service Training: All project staff will complete formal training at the Texas Crime Prevention Institute and will conduct a number of practice surveys in suburban jurisdictions utilizing the formal survey instrument.

3.1.2 Complete Records Management System: A comprehensive records management system consisting of address specific files for each business in the experimental and control areas will be established. In addition, general area files for each test and control area will be developed (sub-task 2.1.3). Appropriate control forms for each records system will be developed and used to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the files.

3.1.3 Schedule Sites and Addresses for Surveys: This sub-task implies that the surveys will be conducted in an organized manner, and on a site-by-site basis. Each business will be contacted to set up a specific time and date for the survey.

3.1.4 Confirm Survey Dates with Businesses: All survey dates scheduled above (3.1.3) will be reconfirmed by telephone to help manage the survey time-frame and to reinforce businessmen's attitudes toward the project.

3.2.1 Conduct Surveys: Surveys will be initially conducted by teams of two and will be confined to one site at a time.

3.2.2 Schedule Follow-Up Visits with Lists of Recommendations: At the conclusion of the survey, the survey team will schedule a follow-up visit of fifteen to twenty minutes to discuss the survey results with

the businessman and to provide him with a typed copy of recommendations. Usually, this meeting will be one to two days following the survey.

3.2.3 Edit and Type Recommendation Sheets: Recommendation sheets will be completed, edited and typed at the project office prior to being delivered to the merchant. It is essential that this one document provided by the police to the businessmen convey an impression of professionalism, authority, importance, and accuracy.

3.2.4 Conduct Follow-Up Visits with Recommendations: The follow-up visits scheduled in 3.2.2 will be conducted one to two days after the survey and the recommendations referred to in 3.2.3 will be discussed with, and presented to the individual businessman.

3.3.1 Resurvey Test Sites that have been Victimized since Original Survey: When information from the on-going monthly computer runs of address-specific crime data (sub-task 2.3.1) indicates that a previously surveyed site has been victimized since the original survey, a follow-up survey will be scheduled. The follow-up survey will ascertain if the characteristics of the M.O. had been previously identified as a risk factor on the original survey; or if the vulnerability had been overlooked. The re-survey will determine if the vulnerability had been identified, the recommended corrective measures complied with and defeated, or if the recommended corrective measures were complied with at all.

TASK IV: Task IV, Compliance Activities, is composed of a series of sub-tasks directed at encouraging surveyed merchants to implement survey recommendations. The specific sub-tasks under this heading are:

4.1.1 Develop and Refine Compliance Strategies: Although a number of concepts for encouraging merchant compliance were generated from the 90-day work plan, the development and refinement of compliance strategies is an on-going function that will continue until the final evaluation.

4.1.2 Compile Vendor and Resource Inventories: Project staff will identify and list local vendors and sources of security hardware in order to advise survey recipients where specific items can be obtained.

4.1.3 Compile Hardware Price Range List: Project staff will compile a list of common security-hardware items that are frequently used to enhance perimeter security. Local vendors will be contacted to determine

a price range for each item and this information will be provided to survey recipients in order to better estimate costs of implementing compliance recommendations.

4.1.4 Identify and Contact Technical Assistance Organizations and Resources: Project staff will locate and interface with groups, individuals, and organizations capable of providing technical assistance in the areas of small business management and/or retail security. These groups/persons will be listed as resources available to survey recipients to assist in achieving compliance objectives.

4.2.1 Provide Survey Recipients with Lists of Vendors, Sources, Costs; and Contact Information for Technical Assistance, Discounts, and Rebates: During the follow-up visits of the survey phase (sub-task 3.2.4) when compliance recommendations are first discussed with the merchant, the lists compiled under sub-tasks 4.1.2, 4.1.3, and 4.1.4 will be provided. Specific hardware recommendations can then be discussed in terms of price range and availability, and sources of specific technical assistance can also be identified.

4.2.2 Initiate Newsletter Distribution: The newsletter developed under sub-task 1.1.7 will be distributed to merchants in the experimental sites when the survey phase of the program begins. The newsletter will include general information about the project and specific information about the overall crime problem, crime patterns, and crime characteristics in each of the experimental sites. The newsletter will provide a means of reinforcing merchant identification with the project and help to maintain a state of "security consciousness" among participants.

4.2.3 Explain and Promote Incentive Programs and Cost-Benefit Concepts to Business Associations: As part of both the compliance effort and the effort to enhance police-business communications, project staff will work to establish award-incentive programs (decals, plaques, etc.) within each business association, and will provide speakers to each organization to discuss risk-management from the dollars and cents cost-benefit approach.

4.2.4 Enlist Local Business Assistance with Compliance Activities: In each experimental area, project staff will recruit key merchants who display an interest in the projects' success, to work with project staff in encouraging compliance by other merchants.

4.3.1 Formal Compliance Visits: Approximately four to five weeks after a site has been surveyed, project staff will schedule a formal compliance inspection to measure compliance to date. Local businessmen identified in sub-task 4.2.4 will be asked to accompany staff on the visit in the hopes of utilizing peer pressure to encourage compliance. Additional formal inspections will be scheduled with the merchant, after the first visit.

4.3.2 Unscheduled, Informal Compliance Visits: Project staff will make an effort to "drop-in" at frequent intervals at businesses where compliance is low. These visits will be undocumented and informal in nature, but should serve to demonstrate to the merchant our continuing interest in helping to overcome his security deficiencies. Key local businessmen identified in 4.2.4 will be encouraged to conduct these informal visits independently and on their own initiative.

4.3.3 Newsletter and Other Informational Activities: The newsletter distribution initiated in sub-task 4.2.2 will be continued on a monthly basis and other informational activities (such as speeches, workshops, the crime prevention van, etc.) will be utilized on an as-needed basis through the end of the project.


4.3.4 Award Incentive Programs: An award incentive program (see 4.2.3) will be initiated at the end of the survey phase. Awards such as decals, certificates and plaques will be provided to merchants who meet stated compliance objectives. Toward the end of the project, these awards will be publicized to encourage other businesses in the experimental areas to complete their compliance activities.


4.3.5 Other Compliance Activities: As new compliance strategies are developed, and as established strategies are evaluated and modified (sub-task 4.1.1), they will be implemented or phased in.

TASK V: Task V, "Monitoring and Evaluation," consists of those activities performed by the Denver Anti-Crime Council, the National Institute of Justice, Public Systems Evaluation, and University Research Corporation which assess the project from both a procedural and end-product perspective. The Denver Anti-Crime Council's professional staff, through the project monitor, deals primarily with operational aspects of the program. This monitoring is an on-going function comprised of formal site visits

and informal contact. All correspondence and formal reports from the project to NIJ, PSE, or URC are copied to the project monitor. Public Systems Evaluation now has an on-site evaluator who will monitor critical data elements and keep PSE apprised of developments. NIJ and URC are recipients of formal reports and also participate in the Project Directors' Meetings which provide feedback on operational and quantitative aspects of the program. Aside from formal meetings and informal contact with these organizations, the primary responsibility of project staff under this task is to adhere to the established reporting schedule for the submission of quarterly programmatic and fiscal reports, and to provide regular updates of the Twelve-Month Work Plan.

TASK VI: Task VI, "Technology Transfer," deals with imparting the experiences of this project to other agencies, including the St. Louis and Long Beach components. This objective will be accomplished by two primary vehicles: The Project Directors' Meetings and Site Visits (6.1), are a means of exchanging information, strategies, experiences, and methodologies with the Project Coordinating Team and the other cities. The second vehicle is a series of dissemination conferences (6.2) to be conducted near the conclusion of the project. These conferences will provide other interested agencies with an overview of the project's methodologies; an analysis of the utility of security surveys as a crime prevention tool in the small business environment; an appraisal of how this component addressed the issue of police-business communications; and a discussion of which compliance strategies have the most potential for encouraging the retailer to adopt police-generated suggestions for target hardening and risk reduction.





APP. III: SECURITY SURVEYS

OCTOBER 1980 NOVEMBER 1980 DECEMBER 1980 JANUARY 1981 FEBRUARY 1981 MARCH 1981 APRIL 1981 MAY 1981 JUNE 1981 JULY 1981 AUGUST 1981 SEPTEMBER 1981

Pre-Survey Phase


- 3.1.1 Complete in-service training
- 3.1.2 Complete records management system
- 3.1.3 Schedule sites and addresses for survey
- 3.1.4 Confirm survey dates with businesses

Survey Phase

- 3.2.1 Conduct Surveys
- 3.2.2 Schedule follow-up visits with list of recommendations
- 3.2.3 Edit and type recommendations sheets
- 3.2.4 Conduct follow-up visits with recommendations

Post-Survey Phase


- 3.3.1 Resurvey test sites that have been sized since original survey




TASK IV: COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES

OCTOBER 1980 NOVEMBER 1980 DECEMBER 1980 JANUARY 1981 FEBRUARY 1981 MARCH 1981 APRIL 1981 MAY 1981 JUNE 1981 JULY 1981 AUGUST 1981 SEPTEMBER 1981


Pre-Survey Phase



Survey Phase



Post-Survey Phase



OCTOBER 1980 NOVEMBER 1980 DECEMBER 1980 JANUARY 1981 FEBRUARY 1981 MARCH 1981 APRIL 1981 MAY 1981 JUNE 1981 JULY 1981 AUGUST 1981 SEPTEMBER 1981

Denver Anti-Crime Council




on-going routine program

National Institute of Justice

To Be Determined

Public Systems Evaluation



On-site evaluator---PSE staff


University Research Corporation


To Be Determined

	OCTOBER 1980	NOVEMBER 1980	DECEMBER 1980	JANUARY 1981	FEBRUARY 1981	MARCH 1981	APRIL 1981	MAY 1981	JUNE 1981	JULY 1981	AUGUST 1981	SEPTEMBER 1981
Project Directors' Meetings/Site Visits												
Dissemination Conferences												

To Be Determined

To Be Determined










12





Public Systems Evaluation, Inc.

COMMERCIAL SECURITY FIELD TEST: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT FOR MATCHING TEST AND CONTROL SITES

This data collection instrument has been developed by Public Systems Evaluation, Inc., for the express purpose of facilitating the collection of site-matching data. The categories of data required reflect the site-matching characteristics described on page 20 of the Commercial Security Test Design.

PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS

1. Until test and control sites are established, the security surveys of commercial establishments cannot begin. Therefore, it is essential that each city complete this instrument as soon as possible. However, completeness and accuracy of your responses are equally vital to the ultimate success of the field test.
2. Please try to provide the data and information in the requested formats. If an item of information is available only in a somewhat modified form, come as close as possible and explain any deviations.
3. PSE staff will be available to assist you in the completion of this instrument. The staff will be revisiting each city shortly and will be available by telephone at all times. Call (617) 547-7620 between 9:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. Eastern Daylight Savings Time.
4. For convenience and consistency you are also asked to number the test sites consecutively from 1 to n. Then you can refer to the *Commercial Area* and *Neighborhood* associated with each test site by its number. As an example, if "Willow Creek" is designated as test site #7, you can identify the Willow Creek *Commercial Area* as A7 and the Willow Creek *Neighborhood* as N7.

PART I: DEFINITION OF COMMERCIAL AREAS AND NEIGHBORHOODS*

2.

Each proposed test site is in reality a *Neighborhood* served by a *Commercial Area*. You have already identified a number of proposed *Commercial Areas* and it now remains for you to identify the surrounding *Neighborhoods*. In the spaces below, draw a small but sufficiently detailed map which defines the *Commercial Area* by street(s) and the *Neighborhood* by its borders. An example is provided.

<p>Test Site # n : Willow Creek</p>	<p>Test Site #1: _____</p>
<p>Test Site #2: _____</p>	<p>Test Site #3: _____</p>
<p>Test Site #4: _____</p>	<p>Test Site #5: _____</p>

*Please provide as Appendix 1 to this instrument an 8½" x 11" map of your city with each proposed test site indicated by its assigned number circled. An example is attached as Appendix 1.

PART I: (cont.)

3.

<p>Test Site #6: _____</p>	<p>Test Site #7: _____</p>
<p>Test Site #8: _____</p>	<p>Test Site #9: _____</p>
<p>Test Site #10: _____</p>	<p>Test Site #11: _____</p>
<p>Test Site #12: _____</p>	<p>Test Site #13: _____</p>

PART I: (cont.)

Test Site #14: _____	Test Site #15: _____
Test Site #16: _____	Test Site #17: _____
Test Site #18: _____	Test Site #19: _____
Test Site #20: _____	Test Site #21: _____

PART 2: CRIME PROBLEM

2.1 Number of Commercial Offenses

Offense Category	Commercial Area																			
	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10A	A10B	A11	A12	A13	A14	A15	A17	A18	A19	A20
Commercial Burglary	////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	6	3	21	10	4	1	1	7	13	22	11	16	18	3	1	13				
1979	7	1	29	6	10	2	6	20	4	38	18	18	21	4	1	11				
1978	13	8	23	19	25	10	11	23	11	42	22	21	20	7	3	8				
1977																				
Commercial Robbery	////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	1	0	5	8	5	0	2	1	0	1	0	3	1	10	0	1				
1979	2	1	18	8	5	2	8	1	3	5	0	2	6	7	1	3				
1978	2	1	9	13	7	2	2	6	3	2	0	2	5	12	0	2				
1977																				
Shoplifting	////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	1	0	3	4	39	0	1	5	3	15	0	0	0	2	0	5				
1979	3	1	3	2	11	0	0	4	3	15	0	0	0	2	0	13				
1978	4	0	2	4	17	0	1	8	3	19	0	4	0	0	1	1				
1977																				59
Employee Theft	////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
1979	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
1977																				
Other Larceny	////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	3	5	21	29	12	1	1	26	3	27	5	4	13	6	0	4				
1979	7	3	35	12	24	2	1	30	6	19	5	8	57	13	0	3				
1978	12	8	44	32	62	3	5	28	7	19	7	10	38	5	3	4				
1977																				
Till Tap	////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0				
1979	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0				
1978	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1				
1977																				

2/2 (continued)

Offense Category	Commercial Area/Neighborhood																			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10A	10B	11	12	1-3	14	15	17	18	19	20
Larceny	//////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	8	6	27	36	59	1	9	41	12	58	11	15	25	16	4	19				
1979	11	3	53	16	40	5	11	50	11	66	16	24	69	22	4	26				
1978	17	13	64	31	51	11	11	55	18	73	15	26	43	13	4	8				
1977																				
Auto Theft	//////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	0	0	3	1	4	0	0	11	0	5	3	5	2	4	2	4				
1979	1	2	6	0	2	1	1	21	1	12	4	5	3	2	3	3				
1978	0	1	7	9	2	6	4	16	3	11	7	5	3	0	1	7				
1977																				
Arson	//////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	2	0	2	0	1	0	0				
1979	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	4	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	2				
1978	0	1	10	6	1	0	1	3	0	4	2	3	2	0	1	0				
1977																				
Simple Assault	//////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	1	0	0	0				
1979	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	2	3	0	0	1				
1978	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	1				
1977																				
Vandalism	//////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	0	1	9	4	3	2	8	13	4	17	4	17	14	2	5	3				
1979	5	1	13	7	10	1	6	9	4	22	6	20	29	7	4	6				
1978	0	3	15	7	9	4	6	22	3	23	11	15	9	3	1	9				
1977																				

7.

CONTINUED

1 OF 3

2.2 (continued)

Offense Category	Annex Area/Neighborhood																			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10A	10B	11	12	13	14	15	17	18	19	20
Purse Snatching	////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0				
1979	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
1978	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0				
1977																				
A1? Part II	////																			
1/1/80-6/30/80	48	19	68	31	60	28	33	43	64	56	28	82	56	24	31	27				
1979	70	17	107	52	83	43	36	58	118	121	51	152	92	57	55	62				
1978	70	18	121	59	110	56	70	115	104	134	58	122	57	41	58	52				
1977																				
																				65

CRIME DEFINITIONS

(Refer to Denver Police Department coding sheets previously supplied.)

Commercial Crimes: The target commercial crimes were defined by both Offense Code and by M.O. Code. The following M.O. Codes were deleted in order to select crimes from or at premises only:

A01	A63	B10	B37
A10	A90	B30	B38
A11	A91	B31	B39
A12	A92	B32	B60
A35	A93	B33	
A36	A94	B34	
A48	B02	B35	
A60	B05	B36	

The following Offense Codes were included in each of the cited commercial crime categories:

<u>COMMERCIAL CRIME CATEGORY</u>	<u>OFFENSE CODES INCLUDED</u>
Commercial Burglary	2616, 2619, 0505, 0510
Commercial Robbery	0311, 0321, 0340, 0351
Shoplifting	0645
Employee Theft	1210
Other Larceny	0630, 1010, 1030, 1110, 1120, 1125, 1130, 1135, 1140, 1150, 1152, 0660, 0690

Part I and Part II Offenses, Commercial Areas/Neighborhoods: Part I and Part II offense information was defined by Offense Code only.

The following Offense Codes were utilized to define each of the cited offense categories:

<u>OFFENSE:</u>	<u>OFFENSE CODE(S) UTILIZED:</u>
Murder	0101, 0102, 0111, 0112
Rape	A11 0200's
Robbery	A11 0300's
Aggravated Assault	0411, 0412, 0413, 0414, 0415
Burglary	2616, 2619, and all 0500's
Larceny	A11 0600's except 0645
Auto Theft	A11 0700's
Arson	0910

Simple Assault	A11 0800's	
Vandalism	1410	
Purse Snatching	0645	
All Other Part II Offenses	A11 1000's	A11 2000's
	A11 1100's	A11 2100's
	A11 1200's	A11 2200's
	A11 1300's	A11 2300's
	A11 1500's	A11 2400's
	A11 1600's	A11 2500's
	A11 1700's	A11 2600's
	A11 1800's	A11 2700's
	A11 1900's	A11 2800's
		A11 2900's
		A11 3000's
		A11 4000's

In cases of multiple victimization, only one incident was recorded.

PART 3: TYPES OF COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS* AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY

Commercial Category	Commercial Area																			
	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10A	A10B	A11	A12	A13	A14	A15	A17	A18	A19	A20
Business Type	//////																			
Liquor Store/Tavern	0	2	4	3	1	0	3	2	2	4	5	3	2	1	2	2				
Barber/Beauty Shop	2	5	2	8	9	3	6	0	3	1	0	4	7	2	4	4				
Grocery	0	3	2	2	3	1	1	0	1	2	0	1	0	1	1	1				
Retail	34	23	22	33	30	17	15	39	18	17	3	9	36	12	9	12				
Service/Repair	6	11	16	10	7	11	7	15	10	26	5	13	24	7	0	5				
Recreation	0	3	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	5	1	0	1				
Medical	1	2	2	1	3	0	3	1	3	3	0	0	0	0	4	0				
Auto Sales/Parts	0	2	0	3	0	3	0	4	1	5	1	0	1	1	0	0				
Gas Station	0	1	6	2	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0				
Restaurant	3	3	2	16	12	3	2	2	4	4	0	5	3	2	3	2				
General Office	2	4	14	0	2	4	5	2	2	7	4	2	7	0	4	1				
Financial Institution	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
Manufacturing/Wholesale	3	1	3	0	1	1	3	0	0	11	11	6	5	0	0	1				
Laundry	0	0	0	6	4	1	4	2	0	0	0	0	3	2	1	1				
Other	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0				88
TOTAL	51	54	73	85	78	46	49	67	48	84	31	43	96	28	29	30				
Vacant Storefronts	3	2	0	4	1	0	6	3	2	18	2	6	9	0	0	5				
Business Starts	//////																			
1979																				
1978																				
Business Failures	//////																			
1979																				
1978																				

* You should include as Appendix 2 of this instrument a detailed listing of all the establishments in each *Commercial Area* with the addition of some descriptive information about each establishment. Please be careful to separate the listings by *Commercial Area* starting each on a new page. A form for this information appears at the back of this instrument. You may Xerox additional forms in order to complete Appendix 2.

Data not available relative to business starts and business failures.

PART 4: OTHER CHARACTERISTICS*

4.1 Demographics

Demographic Category	Neighborhood																			
	N1	N2	N3	N4	N5	N6	N7	N8	N9	N10A	N10B	N11	N12	N13	N14	N15	N17	N18	N19	N20
Population	1260	855	6080	1350	4960	3440	3960	1290	2250	1215	945	3760	2380	2050	2000	1280				
Sex	////																			
Male	45.6	45.6	45.6	49.2	49.2	50.5	50.5	50.5	46.4	45.8	45.8	45.8	47.8	45.9	47.8	47.8				
Female	54.6	54.4	54.4	50.8	50.8	49.5	49.5	49.5	53.6	54.2	54.2	54.2	52.2	54.1	52.2	52.2				
Ethnicity	////																			
Anglo	92.8	92.8	92.8	92.7	92.7	74.7	74.7	74.7	49.2	35.1	35.1	35.1	75.6	88.1	75.6	75.6				
Black	3.8	3.8	3.8	2.9	2.9	1.7	1.7	1.7	3.0	2.3	2.3	2.3	--	6.4	--	--				
Hispanic	3.4	3.4	3.4	4.4	4.4	23.6	23.6	23.6	47.8	62.6	62.6	67.6	24.4	5.5	24.4	24.4				
Other	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--				
Age	////																			
under 18	16.7	16.7	16.7	14.0	19.0	22.4	22.4	22.4	31.5	33.5	33.5	33.5	19.1	18.8	19.1	19.1				
18-44	47.6	47.6	47.6	49.4	49.4	45.9	45.9	45.9	39.0	36.0	36.0	36.0	35.9	46.9	35.9	35.9				
45-64	21.7	21.7	21.7	23.6	23.6	17.5	17.5	17.5	18.3	17.8	17.8	17.8	23.8	22.7	23.8	23.8				
65+	14.0	14.0	14.0	8.0	8.0	14.2	14.2	14.2	11.3	12.7	12.7	12.7	21.2	17.6	21.2	21.2				
Family Type	////																			
M/F	16.7	16.7	16.7	23.9	23.9	18.0	18.0	18.0	23.8	23.5	23.5	23.5	21.9	18.2	21.9	21.9				
SW/C	3.5	3.5	3.5	2.9	2.9	5.6	5.6	5.6	10.1	11.3	11.3	11.3	3.6	4.1	3.6	3.6				
One	17.7	17.7	17.7	14.7	14.7	21.0	21.0	21.0	14.0	18.6	18.6	18.6	17.5	23.2	17.5	17.5				
Other	62.1	62.1	62.1	58.5	58.5	55.4	55.4	55.4	52.7	46.6	46.6	46.6	57.0	54.5	57.0	57.0				
1. Median Household Income	16m	16m	19m	16m	15m	12m	14m	10m	13m	6m	6m	10m	12m	18m	12m	12m				
Unemployment Rate	5.2	5.2	5.2	4.7	4.7	6.1	6.1	6.1	9.4	14.0	14.0	14.0	5.8	3.8	5.8	5.8				
Land Area (square miles)	.28	.19	.76	.30	.62	.43	.44	.43	.30	.27	.21	.47	.30	.25	.25	.16				

* If any of the data required for this part cannot be precisely identified for the specified *Commercial Area* or *Neighborhood*, but are available for some larger geographic entity (e.g., census tract, block group, reporting area, etc.), please provide it by the most closely defined entities and explain how it was derived on the reverse side of the page.

1. Median Household Income in Thousands..

For the demographic characteristics, the following resources were available:

1. The Denver Community Renewal Program Report, published in 1972 by the City Planning Office of Denver. It reports 1970 Census data by statistical planning areas (neighborhoods).
2. Profile of Denver Residents, published in 1979 by the Office of Policy Analysis of Denver. It reports the results of a 1977 random sample survey by councilmanic districts.
3. The Denver Atlas, published in 1978 by the University of Denver Geography Department and the Denver Planning Office. It reports data accumulated in 1977 by various city agencies and projection from 1970 Census data. Data are reported for census block groups - contiguous city block groups of approximately 1,000 residents and similar land area.

Each of the demographic characteristics were chosen from one of the above sources for all 15 neighborhoods. For each demographic characteristic, potential data sources are listed, arguments are presented for determining which source would be cited, and method of calculation for the specific neighborhood are described.

1. Total Population.

Options: Denver Atlas 1970 Census data

Arguments:

It would be virtually impossible to determine 1980 population

in specific neighborhoods from 1970 Census data. First, our neighborhoods fall inside of from 1 to 4 different census areas, so population density would have to be known in order to interpolate. Secondly, the census figures are seriously out of date. The Denver Atlas has 1977 population density figures for contiguous neighborhoods, so this source was selected for determining population.

Methodology:

The Denver Atlas gives a density range based on gross area (e.g. 6,000 - 10,000 persons per square mile). The mid point of this density range was selected and was multiplied by the actual land area of each neighborhood to estimate the population. These figures should be viewed with extreme caution.

2. Sex.

Options: 1970 Census Data

1977 Profile of Denver Residents

Arguments:

The 1970 Census Data was eliminated for the same reasons cited for population. Since variations on these statistics from neighborhood to neighborhood are likely to be negligible, councilmanic districts appear to provide an adequate indication of population by sex.

Methodology:

All neighborhoods in our study fall entirely inside a councilmanic district, therefore the figures for the entire district were reported. Note that figures are given as percentages of the population rather than actual numbers.

3. Ethnicity.

Options: 1970 Census Date

1977 Profile of Denver Residents

1977 Denver Atlas

Arguments:

The Denver Atlas shows significant changes in ethnicity of neighborhoods between 1970 and 1977. In particular, there is a considerable shifting of the hispanic population in at least 6 of the 15 neighborhoods so 1970 data is entirely obsolete. The Denver Atlas was eliminated because only black and hispanic population statistics are reported, thus councilmanic districts were selected from Denver Profile.

Methodology:

Same as Sex above.

4. Age.

Options: 1970 Census Data

1977 Profile of Denver Residents

Arguments:

Again, census data is obsolete and it is unreliable to extrapolate figures for neighborhoods that cross census tracts. Therefore, the Profiles data appears better.

Methodology:

Age was reported by appropriate councilmanic district for the following age ranges:

- under 18
- 18 to 44
- 45 to 64
- 65 +

Ages are given as percentages of the total population.

5. Family type.

Options: 1970 Census Data

1977 Profile of Denver Residents

Arguments:

The 1970 data is out of date and it does not give as definitive breakdowns as are requested on the data collection sheet. The Profiles breakdowns are slightly more definitive than required and certainly more current.

Methodology:

Data for family type were reported by appropriate councilmanic district. Data was broken into the following groupings:

M/F = Male/Female Families with children under 18

SW/C = Single Parent Families with children under 18

One = One person household (single without children)

Other = Multi-person households without children under 18

Data are reported as percentages of the total population.

6. Median Household Income.

Options: 1970 Census Data

1977 Councilmanic Districts

1977 Denver Atlas

Arguments:

With inflation and population shifts 1970 data are unreliable. The Denver Atlas reports median household income as a range for very small neighborhood groupings and reports the overall Denver median family income as 14,400. The Profile report gives median income for councilmanic districts and reports the overall Denver median family income as 12,200. The method of calculation for the Atlas appears to yield more accurate findings and the neighborhood breakdowns more closely approximate our sample neighborhoods, so Denver Atlas information was used.

Methodology:

The mid-point of the range was reported when a site neighborhood fell entirely within an Atlas boundary. When a neighborhood crossed Atlas boundaries, the ranges were combined proportionately and a mid-point was calculated.

7. Unemployment.

Options: 1970 Census Data

1977 Profile of Denver Residents

Arguments:

Unemployment, being a very changeable figure, 1977 data were selected over 1970 statistics.

Methodology:

Same as Sex. Percentages are given for rates.

8. Land Area.

Options: 1970 Census Data

Arguments:

Using actual maps representing the precise cites, was preferable to estimating neighborhood size as a percentage of a census tract.

Methodology:

Scaled maps were measured in square inches and converted to square miles.

9. Length at Address.

Options: 1970 Census Data

1977 Profiles of Denver Residents

Arguments:

The Profiles data are given as length of time in Denver rather than length of time at this address. Census data more closely approximated the information requested on the data collection sheet.

Methodology:

Census data for mobility are broken into the following 2 groups:

- different residence (latest 5 years)
- same residence (5 + years)

Data are given as percentages.

When a sample neighborhood fell entirely inside of a census neighborhood, the figure for the entire neighborhood was given.

Some neighborhoods fell into more than one, and in this case appropriate percentages of each neighborhood were taken as follows:

#	Sample Neighborhood	Ratio	Census Neighborhood
	32nd/Lowell	1/1	Sunnyside/Highland
	E. Colfax	1/1	South Park Hill/Hale
	3rd Avenue	5/1	Cherry Creek/Country Club
	Evans/Holly	6/1	Virginia Village/Goldsmith
	Evans/University	4/4/1/1	Washington Park/University/ Cory Merrill/University Park
	Federal/Mississippi	1/1/1/1	Westwood/Athmar Park/MarLee/ Ruby Hill
	Pearl (Alameda)	4/1	Washington Park West/Speer
	Pearl (Evans)	4/1	Platte Park/Rosedale
	Broadway	6/8/3/4	Overland/Platte Park/South Platte/Rosedale

10. Units in Structure.

Options: 1977 Denver Atlas

1970 Census Data

Arguments:

Denver Atlas only gave the percentage of single family dwellings in each neighborhood. The census data for this item would not be so obsolete and it more closely approximated the data collection form requirements.

Methodology:

Same as Length at Address.

4.2 Traffic Patterns

Issue	Commercial Area																			
	A1	A2	A3*	A4	A5	A6	A7	A8	A9	A10	A11	A12	A13	A14	A15	A16	A17	A18	A19	A20
Direction of traffic on the main street 1 - one way 2 - two way	X	X	2 way 2 way	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					
How many traffic lanes are there on the main street?	2	2	2 4	6	4	2	2	4	4	3	2	2	4	2	2					
Number of traffic signals on the main street	2	0	3 4	5	7	0	1	3	1	7	6	2	1	1	1					
How many off-street parking lots serve the area?	7	1	3 14	6	10	2	0	8	4	4	6	8	5	7	3					
Is there metered parking on the main street?	No ⁺	No	No No	No	No	No ⁺	No ⁺	No ⁺	No	No	No	No ⁺	No ⁺	No	No ⁺					78
Is there public transportation service to the area?	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes					

* = 2 streets, South Holly in upper left; East Evans in lower right.

+ = Street parking limited by time ---- usually 1-2 hours.

Information is not readily available relative to the number of business and community associations serving each neighborhood and commercial area

4.3 (continued)

Issue	Commercial Area/Surrounding Neighborhood																			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Has the Commercial Area/surrounding Neighborhood received any major (\$50,000 or above) federal or state development funds* in the past three years? **	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N					
	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO					
Has there been any public building constructed in Commercial Area/surrounding Neighborhood in the past five years? **	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N					
	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO					
Has there been any major street or sidewalk improvement in the past three years? **	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N					
	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO					
Indicate how many security surveys have been conducted in each Commercial Area/surrounding Neighborhood in the indicated time period	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	A	N	A
1/1/80-6/30/80	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0

* For example, Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG), Economic Development Administration (EDA), etc.

** For every "yes" answer, please provide details on the reverse side of the page.

N = Neighborhood

(See reverse)

A = Commercial Area

ITEM 1: Federal and State Development Funds: The North part of Area #10, Santa Fe from 6th to 14th Streets, which we designate as area 10-A, is participating in a \$400,000.00 U.D.A.G. project. The South portion of Area 10 which we call 10-B (Santa Fe from 1st to 6th) is excluded.

Area 15, 32nd and Lowell, is being studied for a community development grant. This grant would not be operational until after the field test has terminated.

ITEM 2: Public Construction: A new fire station was constructed two years ago in Neighborhood #11.

ITEM 3: Street/Sidewalk Improvements: No major street improvements such as widening, curbing, etc. have taken place in any of these areas. All areas have been affected to some extent by annual resurfacing, resealing, and pot hole repair.

4.3 (continued)

Issues	Commercial Area/Surrounding Neighborhood																			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1. Are there any current or planned crime prevention programs which potentially affect the Commercial Area/surrounding Neighborhood? See attached sheet	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c					
	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes					
2. Are there any specialized patrol programs or patrol experiments currently being conducted or planned in the Commercial Area/surrounding Neighborhood (e.g., team policing, ICAP, directed patrol, etc.)?*	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c					
	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes					
3. If "yes," does the program or experiment have any current or potential future impact on one or more of the Commercial Areas/surrounding Neighborhoods?*	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c					
	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes					
For each Commercial Area/surrounding Neighborhood identify the number of patrol beats which overlap it.	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c	c					
	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	4	3	2	1	2	3	2					
	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n					
	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	4	5	2	2	2	3	4					

* For each "yes" answer, please provide details on the reverse side of the page.

Ch

1. Current operational crime prevention programs which may impact project sites include:

Operation Identification
Neighborhood Watch
Whistlestop

Operation Identification (marking valuable property with a uniform owner applied number) is operational city-wide. The program is in a passive phase, potential participants pick up engraver and materials at neighborhood fire stations. One in three Denver households are currently enrolled in the program, and project staff feel this ratio is roughly accurate for all selected neighborhood areas.

Neighborhood Watch is an information exchange program through which neighbors exchange telephone numbers, vacation plans, car descriptions and family data; and then agree to monitor the neighborhood for suspicious, irregular, or criminal activity, and call the police department. In Denver, blocks in which 70% of the households participate in both Operation Identification and Neighborhood Watch are designated "Neighborhood Watch Blocks" and warning signs to that effect are placed at each end of the block. Although several Neighborhood Watch Blocks are located close to selected neighborhood areas, none are located within the neighborhood area perimeters.

"Whistlestop" is the District Attorney's crime prevention program which coordinates and promotes Operation Identification and Neighborhood Watch. Neighborhood meetings are held to enroll participants and develop neighborhood cohesiveness. The number of Whistlestop meetings held from 1978 to date in each neighborhood area is listed below:

<u>Neighborhood Area</u>	<u># of Meetings</u>
N1	1
N2	8
N3	5
N4	3
N5	4
N6	17
N7	28

N8	22
N9	11
N10	Data Not Available
N11	5
N12	12
N13	33
N14	5
N15	5

The number of meetings is a reflection of many factors, such as:
The skill of the neighborhood organizer assigned to an area; population density; residents' perception of the crime problem; neighborhood cohesiveness; past neighborhood experience in organizational activities; viability of communications networks; etc.

2. The Denver Police Department has three specialized patrol programs. ESCORT, small motorbike patrols, concentrate on street crime in high density areas and do not operate in any of the target areas. SSU, the special services unit, operates independent patrols on a city-wide basis, focusing on felony car stops and responding to major crimes. SCAT, is a directed plain clothes and uniform patrol program which concentrates on specific precincts, based on the past frequency of selected target crimes.
3. ESORT will have no impact in any of the target or control areas. The impact of SSU operations should be minimal, since these operations are non-directed and are spread city-wide on a completely random basis. SCAT operations will impact any target or control area where their officers are assigned. SCAT will keep project staff advised of their operating areas so that their activity can be documented.

APPENDIX 2: IDENTIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

COMMERCIAL AREA A _____

PART 5: GENERAL QUESTIONS

1. Are there any other programs or anticipated events which might impact on the Commercial Security Field Test Program? (E.g., building codes, insurance, community development efforts, . . .)

None anticipated at this time

2. What are your suggested test site matchings (pairwise or greater)?

See Below

3. Which *Neighborhoods* (if any) are contiguous? The North East Corner of Area 4 touches the South West corner of Area 3. There is a one block separation between Areas 5 and 6, 6 and 8, and 6 and 7. There is a two block separation between Areas 12 and 14.

4. Other comments _____

Suggested site matchings will be mailed within 3 days.

Name of Establishment	No. of Years at Location	No. of Employees	\$Sales Volume		Real Estate Taxes Paid	
			1979	1978	1979	1978

File #: - -

Business Name: _____

Inspector ID#:

Date: / / 8 2
 Day Month Year

**CSFT OBJECTIVE VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT**

Instructions

- The attached forms will be used to objectively assess *vulnerability* (i.e., the ease with which a burglary could be perpetrated, given an attempt); *cost* (i.e., the loss due to a successful attempt); and *likelihood* (i.e., the probability that one or more burglaries will be attempted). The emphasis is on vulnerability since the CSFT Program's primary goal is to reduce the vulnerability of the test establishments. However, the Program could potentially impact the cost of loss due to burglary and to a lesser extent the likelihood of a burglary attempt. Therefore, these issues are addressed as well.
- The vulnerability section consists of five subsections. Within each you are asked to rate, on a scale of 1 to 5 (i.e., "1" is very low vulnerability; "5" is very high vulnerability), the vulnerability of the premises before and after compliance with respect to a number of items. Where appropriate, the rating scale is defined (e.g., a solid wood door would receive a score of "2" for its composition). Use the rating scales as a guide and point of reference as you assess the premises. Note that several of the subsections permit you to assess more than one assembly or unit (e.g., you will be rating each exterior door assembly as well as each window unit.) If the item is not applicable (e.g., an exterior door assembly has no auxiliary locking device--such as a jimmy bar--put on "x" in the "N/A" column).
- The cost and likelihood sections should be completed in the same way you assessed vulnerability. There are no fixed scales in these sections due to the nature of the items to be rated.
- Please complete the entire instrument carefully. Remember, the absolute ratings you give are not as significant as the change in ratings due to compliance with the security recommendations.
- Please remember to enter the file number on each page of the instrument.

File # - - _____
 (Business Name)

1 VULNERABILITY TO BURGLARY (BEFORE/AFTER COMPLIANCE)

1.1 EXTERIOR DOORS*

	Door Assembly										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	N/A
Composition	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Hinge Unit	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Lock Unit	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Frame	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Overall Condition	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Auxiliary Locking Devices	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/

<u>Composition</u> ¹	<u>Hinge Unit</u>	<u>Lock Unit</u> ²	<u>Frame</u>
• Metal 1	• Secured Hinge Pin 1	• Deadbolt (1"+) 1	• Metal 1-2
• Solid Wood 2	• Interior Hinge 1	• Deadbolt (under 1") 3-4	• Wood 3-5
• Hollow Wood 4-5	• Auxiliary Pin 1	• Lock-in-Knob 4-5	
• Glass 5	• Removable Hinge Pin 3		

¹ If door has a window, increase rating by 2 points, up to a maximum of 5.

² If strike inadequate, increase rating by 2 points, up to a maximum of 5.

1.2 WINDOWS*

	Accessible Window Unit										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	N/A
Configuration	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Glazing	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Hardware (Incl. Hinge & Lock)	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Frame	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Overall Condition	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Auxiliary Protection	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/

<u>Configuration</u>	<u>Glazing</u>	<u>Frame</u>
• Fixed 3	• Bulletproof Laminate 1	• Gridded Metal ³ 1
• Operable 3-5	• Polycarbonate 1-2	• Metal 1-2
	• Glass 3	• Wood 3-4

³ Less than 12" spaces

1.3 WALLS*

	Wall Unit				
	1	2	3	4	N/A
Exterior	/	/	/	/	/
Interior Premise Divider	/	/	/	/	/

<u>Construction</u>
• Cinder Block 1
• Brick 1-2
• Frame 2-5
• Sheet Metal 3-4

*ALL RATINGS ARE ON A SCALE OF ONE (1) TO FIVE (5):
 1 - Very Low Vulnerability, 2 - Low Vulnerability, 3 - Moderate Vulnerability
 4 - High Vulnerability, 5 - Very High Vulnerability

1.4 OTHER EXTERIOR ACCESS POINTS*

	1	2	3	N/A
Skylight	/	/	/	
Roof Hatch	/	/	/	
Vent	/	/	/	
Common Attic	/	/	/	
Sublevel	/	/	/	
(other)	/	/	/	

1.5 MISCELLANEOUS*

Key Control	/	N/A
Closing Procedures	/	

2 COST OF LOSS DUE TO BURGLARY (BEFORE/AFTER COMPLIANCE)

2.1 DUE TO ACCESS TO VALUABLE ITEMS*

Safe (Incl. Location & Security)	/	N/A
Cash Storage	/	
Display Cases	/	
Inventory Access (Interior)	/	
Valuable Merchandise in Display Window	/	
Locks (Change & Rekey)	/	

2.2 DUE TO REDUCED DESIRABILITY*

Tag & Mark Equipment	/	N/A
----------------------	---	-----

2.3 DUE TO REDUCTION IN BURGLAR'S TIME ON PREMISES OR INCREASED CHANCE OF APPREHENSION*

Address Display	/	N/A
Intrusion Alarm	/	

3 LIKELIHOOD OF BURGLARY ATTEMPT (BEFORE/AFTER COMPLIANCE)

3.1 LIGHTING*

/	N/A
---	-----

3.2 ACCESS TO PREMISES*

Fencing	/	N/A
Roof & Second Story	/	

3.3 POLICE PRESENCE (Incl. Patrol)*

/	N/A
---	-----

* ALL RATINGS ARE ON A SCALE OF ONE (1) TO FIVE (5):

- | | | |
|---------------|-----------------|------------|
| 1 - Very Low | } Vulnerability | |
| 2 - Low | | |
| 3 - Moderate | | Cost |
| 4 - High | | Likelihood |
| 5 - Very High | | |

FILE # - -

COMMERICAL SECURITY FIELD TEST
CRIME PREVENTION SURVEY INSTRUMENT

BUSINESS NAME _____
ADDRESS _____

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

- BEFORE THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF THE SURVEY, YOU SHOULD ATTEMPT TO COMPLETE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF:

PART I -- SECTIONS A, B, C, D
PART II -- SECTION F
- A NUMBER OF SURVEY ITEMS REQUIRE THE IDENTIFICATION OF A TIME OF DAY -- PLEASE USE MILITARY TIME (E.G., 1300 INSTEAD OF 1:00 P.M.)
- PLEASE COMPLETE ALL ITEMS OF THE SURVEY EITHER BY USING ONE OF THE INDICATED RESPONSES OR BY SPECIFYING ONE OF THE FOLLOWING THREE CODES:

NA -- INFORMATION IS NOT AVAILABLE
DK -- BUSINESS RESPONDENT DOES NOT KNOW ANSWER
RA -- BUSINESS RESPONDENT REFUSES TO ANSWER

1. VISIT LOG

	DATE			TIME	INSPECTOR ID #	COMMENTS
	DAY	MO.	YR.			
a.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	_____			
b.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	_____			
c.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	_____			
d.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	_____			

2. CHECK MOST APPROPRIATE STATEMENT

- SURVEY COMPLETED
- SURVEY PARTIALLY COMPLETED
- UNABLE TO CONDUCT SURVEY

EXPLAIN (IF NOT COMPLETED) _____

GENERAL INSPECTOR COMMENTS _____

PART I: GENERAL BUSINESS AND SURVEY INFORMATION

A. SURVEY INSPECTION INFORMATION

1. SURVEY INSPECTOR(S)
 - a. ID# ; NAME _____
 - b. ID# ; NAME _____
2. DATE SURVEY COMPLETED / /
DAY MO. YR.
3. TIME OF SURVEY:

	VISIT 1	VISIT 2	VISIT 3
a. START	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
b. FINISH	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
4. NAME OF RESPONDENT _____
5. TITLE OF RESPONDENT _____
6. YEARS EMPLOYED AT LOCATION
7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER -
8. NAME(S) OF BUSINESS OWNER(S) _____
9. a. BUSINESS LICENSE # _____
b. EXPIRATION DATE /
MO. YR.

B. BUSINESS OPERATION

1. TYPE OF BUSINESS (MAJOR PRODUCT) _____

PART I (CONTINUED)

B. BUSINESS OPERATION (CONTINUED)

2. IS BUILDING OWNED BY BUSINESS?
 - a. YES NO IF NO, ANSWER THE FOLLOWING:
 - b. NAME OF BUILDING OWNER/AGENT _____
 - c. MONTHLY RENT \$,
3. BUSINESS AFFILIATION:

CHAIN OR FRANCHISE	<input type="checkbox"/>
INDEPENDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>
ONE OF SEVERAL LOCAL STORES	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. AT PRESENT LOCATION SINCE /
MO. YR.
5. HOURS OF OPERATION:

	NOT OPEN	OPEN	CLOSE
a. MONDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
b. TUESDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
c. WEDNESDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
d. THURSDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
e. FRIDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
f. SATURDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
g. SUNDAY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

PART I (CONTINUED)

B. BUSINESS OPERATION (CONTINUED)

6. ARE THERE SEASONAL VARIATIONS IN THE STORE HOURS?

a. YES NO

b. IF YES, EXPLAIN _____

7. WORK HOURS:

a. TOTAL PERSON-HOURS PER WEEK

b. OWNER/MANAGER ON-SITE HOURS PER WEEK

c. HOURS PER WEEK WHEN ONLY ONE PERSON IS PRESENT

8. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL PRESENT DURING STORE HOURS:

a. MAXIMUM

b. AVERAGE

c. MINIMUM

9. APPROXIMATELY WHAT PERCENTAGE OF YOUR TOTAL NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES ARE REPLACED ANNUALLY? %

10. SINCE 1/1/79 HOW MANY EMPLOYEES HAVE YOU TERMINATED FOR CAUSE? EXPLAIN _____

PART I (CONTINUED)

B. BUSINESS OPERATION (CONTINUED)

11. HAVE THESE PREMISES HAD A PREVIOUS SECURITY SURVEY?

a. YES NO IF YES, ANSWER THE FOLLOWING:

b. DATE OF MOST RECENT SURVEY /
MONTH YEAR

c. WHO CONDUCTED THE SURVEY?

POLICE

OTHER (SPECIFY) _____

d. LIST RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTED _____

e. COMMENTS _____

C. BUSINESS PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

1. TOTAL FLOOR SPACE OCCUPIED BY THIS BUSINESS (SQUARE FEET)

2. NUMBER OF LEVELS (INCLUDING BASEMENT):

a. IN BUILDING (TOTAL)

b. USED BY THIS BUSINESS

PART I (CONTINUED)

C. BUSINESS PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS (CONTINUED)

3. NUMBER OF BUSINESS/DWELLING UNITS IN BUILDING:

	TOTAL AVAILABLE	CURRENTLY VACANT
a. BUSINESSES	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
b. DWELLING UNITS	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

4. BUILDING CONSTRUCTION:

- BRICK SHEET METAL
 CINDERBLOCK FRAME
 OTHER _____

5. BUSINESS ACCESS:

- a. NUMBER OF EXTERIOR DOORS
 b. NUMBER OF WINDOWS
 c. NUMBER OF SKYLIGHTS

ALARMS CURRENTLY IN USE -- PLEASE FILL IN ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION

6. DOES THIS ESTABLISHMENT HAVE AN INTRUSTION ALARM?

- a. YES NO IF YES, ANSWER THE FOLLOWING:
 b. MAKE AND MODEL # _____
 c. IS THERE ZONE PROTECTION? YES NO
 IF YES, HOW MANY ZONES?

PART I (CONTINUED)

C. BUSINESS PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS (CONTINUED)

6. d. SIGNAL TYPE: LOCAL (AUDIBLE)

CENTRAL STATION

POLICE STATION

e. IS ALARM REGULARLY TESTED? YES NO

IF YES, HOW OFTEN (PER YEAR)?

f. HOW IS THE ALARM ACTIVATED? _____

7. DOES THIS ESTABLISHMENT HAVE A ROBBERY ALARM?

a. YES NO IF YES, ANSWER THE FOLLOWING: ⁷⁶

b. MAKE AND MODEL # _____

c. IS THERE ZONE PROTECTION? YES NO

IF YES, HOW MANY ZONES?

d. SIGNAL TYPE: LOCAL (AUDIBLE)

CENTRAL STATION

POLICE STATION

e. IS ALARM REGULARLY TESTED? YES NO

IF YES, HOW OFTEN (PER YEAR)?

f. HOW IS THE ALARM ACTIVATED? _____

PART I (CONTINUED)

C. BUSINESS PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS (CONTINUED)

8. DOES THIS ESTABLISHMENT HAVE A FIRE ALARM?
 a. YES NO IF YES, ANSWER THE FOLLOWING:
 b. MAKE AND MODEL # _____
 c. NUMBER OF SENSORS
9. DOES THIS ESTABLISHMENT HAVE ANY OTHER ALARMS OF A TYPE NOT DESCRIBED ABOVE?
 a. YES NO
 b. IF YES, DESCRIBE _____

10. TOTAL NUMBER OF FALSE ALARMS (ALL TYPES) IN LAST 12 MONTHS

D. ASSESSMENT OF FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY

1. ANNUAL SALES HISTORY:
 a. 1977 \$, ,
 b. 1978 \$, ,
 c. 1979 \$, ,
2. APPROXIMATE VALUE OF AVERAGE SALE \$,

PART I (CONTINUED)

D. ASSESSMENT OF FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY (CONTINUED)

3. ESTIMATED ASSETS
- | | DAILY AVERAGE | MAXIMUM |
|-----------------|--|--|
| a. CASH ON HAND | \$ <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> , <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | \$ <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> , <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b. INVENTORY | \$ <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> , <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | \$ <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> , <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| c. EQUIPMENT | \$ <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> , <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> | \$ <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> , <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
4. DOES THIS BUSINESS HAVE CRIME INSURANCE?
 a. YES NO IF YES, ANSWER THE FOLLOWING:
 b. AMOUNT OF COVERAGE \$,
 c. INSURANCE COMPANY _____
 d. DOES THE ABOVE INCLUDE FEDERAL CRIME INSURANCE? YES NO

E. GENERAL BUSINESS COMMENTS (PROBLEMS/SOLUTIONS) _____

PART II: COMMERCIAL CRIME HISTORY AT THIS ADDRESS

F. RECORDED CRIMES

1. NUMBER OF RECORDED COMMERCIAL CRIMES AT THIS ADDRESS IN THE PERIOD 1/1/77 TO THE PRESENT:

	BURGLARY	ROBBERY	SHOP- LIFTING	EMPLOYEE THEFT
a. 1/1/77 - 12/31/77	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>			
b. 1/1/78 - 12/31/78	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>			
c. 1/1/79 - 12/31/79	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>			
d. 1/1/80 - PRESENT	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>			

COPIES OF ALL ASSOCIATED INCIDENT REPORTS SINCE 1/1/79 SHOULD BE IN THE ADDRESS FOLDER AND SUMMARIZED BELOW

2. a. COMPLAINT #
- b. DATE //
- c. TIME
- d. CRIME _____
- e. INJURIES YES NO
- f. VALUE OF LOSS \$,
- g. PROPERTY DAMAGE \$,
- h. REPORTED BY _____

PART II (CONTINUED)

F. RECORDED CRIMES (CONTINUED)

2. i. IS CRIME RECALLED BY RESPONDENT? YES NO

j. COMMENTS (M.O., SUSPECTS, EMPLOYEES PRESENT . . .) _____

3. a. COMPLAINT #

b. DATE //

c. TIME

d. CRIME _____

e. INJURIES YES NO

f. VALUE OF LOSS \$,

g. PROPERTY DAMAGE \$,

h. REPORTED BY _____

i. IS CRIME RECALLED BY RESPONDENT? YES NO

j. COMMENTS (M.O., SUSPECTS, EMPLOYEES PRESENT . . .) _____

PART II (CONTINUED)

F. RECORDED CRIMES (CONTINUED)

- 4. a. COMPLAINT # [][][][][][]
- b. DATE [][] / [][] / [][]
- c. TIME [][][][]
- d. CRIME _____
- e. INJURIES YES NO
- f. VALUE OF LOSS \$ [][][] , [][][]
- g. PROPERTY DAMAGE \$ [][][] , [][][]
- h. REPORTED BY _____
- i. IS CRIME RECALLED BY RESPONDENT? YES NO
- j. COMMENTS (M.O., SUSPECTS, EMPLOYEES PRESENT . . .) _____

5. ADDITIONAL COMPLAINTS ON ATTACHED PAGES

G. UNRECORDED CRIMES

1. PLEASE CHECK ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

- THERE WERE NO UNRECORDED CRIMES FOR THIS BUSINESS AT THIS ADDRESS FOR THE PERIOD 1/1/79 TO THE PRESENT
- UNRECORDED CRIMES ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW

PART II (CONTINUED)

G. UNRECORDED CRIMES (CONTINUED)

UNRECORDED CRIMES AT THIS ADDRESS FOR THE PERIOD 1/1/79 TO THE PRESENT

- 2. a. DATE [][] / [][] / [][]
- b. TIME [][][][]
- c. CRIME _____
- d. INJURIES YES NO
- e. VALUE OF LOSS \$ [][][] , [][][]
- f. PROPERTY DAMAGE \$ [][][] , [][][]
- g. REPORTED TO POLICE? YES NO IF YES, DESCRIBE POLICE RESPONSE _____
- h. COMMENTS (M.O., SUSPECTS, EMPLOYEES PRESENT, NEW SECURITY PROCEDURES/EQUIPMENT . . .) _____

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- 3. a. DATE [][] / [][] / [][]
- b. TIME [][][][]
- c. CRIME _____
- d. INJURIES YES NO

PART II (CONTINUED)

G. UNRECORDED CRIMES (CONTINUED)

- 3. e. VALUE OF LOSS \$,
- f. PROPERTY DAMAGE \$,
- g. REPORTED TO POLICE? YES NO IF YES,
DESCRIBE POLICE RESPONSE _____

h. COMMENTS (M.O., SUSPECTS, EMPLOYEES PRESENT,
NEW SECURITY PROCEDURES/EQUIPMENT . . .) _____

4. a. DATE / /

b. TIME -

c. CRIME _____

d. INJURIES YES NO

e. VALUE OF LOSS \$,

f. PROPERTY DAMAGE \$,

g. REPORTED TO POLICE? YES NO IF YES,
DESCRIBE POLICE RESPONSE _____

PART II (CONTINUED)

G. UNRECORDED CRIMES (CONTINUED)

4. h. COMMENTS (M.O., SUSPECTS, EMPLOYEES PRESENT,
NEW SECURITY PROCEDURES/EQUIPMENT . . .) _____

5. ADDITIONAL CRIMES ON ATTACHED PAGES

6. REASON(S) FOR NOT REPORTING CRIME(S) TO POLICE _____

H. GENERAL CRIME COMMENTS (PROBLEMS/SOLUTIONS) _____

86

PART III: SURVEY RECOMMENDATIONS

I. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY (INCLUDE LOCATION AFTER EACH ITEM CHECKED AND DELETE INAPPROPRIATE TERMS)

EXTERIOR

- 1. IMPROVE LIGHTING _____
- 2. PROTECT LIGHTING _____
- 3. FOCUS LIGHTING ON ENTRY POINTS _____
- 4. INSTALL/REPAIR FENCING _____
- 5. TRIM SHRUBS/TREES _____
- 6. REMOVE DEBRIS _____
- 7. LIMIT ROOF/SECOND-STORY ACCESS _____
- 8. DISPLAY ADDRESS _____
- 9. OTHER (SPECIFY) _____

DOORS

- 10. REPAIR/REPLACE DOOR _____
- 11. REPLACE/PROTECT GLAZING _____
- 12. REPAIR JAMB(S)/FRAME(S) _____
- 13. REPLACE/INSTALL STRIKE _____
- 14. MODIFY HINGES _____
- 15. INSTALL DEADBOLT _____

PART III (CONTINUED)

I. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY (CONTINUED)

DOORS (CONTINUED)

- 16. REPAIR/REPLACE LOCK _____
- 17. PROTECT BOLT _____
- 18. INSTALL PADLOCK/HASP _____
- 19. INSTALL TRACK FILLER _____
- 20. UTILIZE CHARLIE BAR _____
- 21. INSTALL FLUSH BOLTS _____
- 22. SECURE WITH BAR AND LOCK _____
- 23. SECURE PERMANENTLY _____
- 24. ESTABLISH KEY CONTROL _____
- 25. OTHER (SPECIFY) _____

WINDOWS

- 26. REPAIR/REPLACE HARDWARE _____
- 27. INSTALL LOCKS _____
- 28. REPLACE GLAZING _____
- 29. INSTALL BURGLARY-RESISTANT GLASS _____
- 30. SECURE PERMANENTLY _____

PART III (CONTINUED)

I. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY (CONTINUED)

WINDOWS (CONTINUED)

- 31. PIN _____
- 32. PROTECT WITH BARS, SCREENS, OR GRILLS _____

- 33. OTHER (SPECIFY) _____

SKYLIGHTS, VENTS, AND ROOF HATCHES

- 34. PROTECT WITH BARS, SCREENS, OR GRILLS _____

- 35. COVER WITH STEEL _____
- 36. IMPROVE ATTACHMENT TO ROOF/WALL _____

- 37. PROVIDE LOCK _____
- 38. OTHER (SPECIFY) _____

PART III (CONTINUED)

I. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY (CONTINUED)

ALARMS

- 39. ROBBERY ALARM:
 - a. INSTALL
 - b. REPAIR
 - c. ADD ADDITIONAL ACTIVATOR(S)

- 40. INTRUSION ALARM:
 - a. INSTALL
 - b. REPAIR
 - c. ADD OR CHANGE SENSOR(S)

- 41. FIRE ALARM:
 - a. INSTALL
 - b. REPAIR
 - c. ADD OR CHANGE SENSOR(S)

- 42. DEVELOP TESTING PROCEDURE _____
- 43. TRAIN EMPLOYEES IN ALARM USE _____
- 44. OBTAIN ALARM SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS _____

100

<p><u>PART III (CONTINUED)</u></p> <p>I. <u>RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY (CONTINUED)</u></p> <p><u>ALARMS (CONTINUED)</u></p> <p>45. <input type="checkbox"/> SECURE LINE _____</p> <p>46. <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (SPECIFY) _____</p> <p>_____</p> <p><u>MISCELLANEOUS</u></p> <p>47. <input type="checkbox"/> SECURE CHUTES/SERVICE OPENINGS _____</p> <p>48. <input type="checkbox"/> SECURE UTILITY TUNNELS _____</p> <p>49. <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (SPECIFY) _____</p> <p>_____</p> <p><u>SAFES</u></p> <p>50. <input type="checkbox"/> CHANGE LOCATION _____</p> <p>51. <input type="checkbox"/> LIGHT SAFE _____</p> <p>52. <input type="checkbox"/> ANCHOR/SECURE AGAINST REMOVAL _____</p> <p>53. <input type="checkbox"/> PROTECT AGAINST FIRE _____</p> <p>54. <input type="checkbox"/> CHANGE SAFE COMBINATION REGULARLY _____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>55. <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (SPECIFY) _____</p> <p>_____</p>	<p><u>PART III (CONTINUED)</u></p> <p>I. <u>RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY (CONTINUED)</u></p> <p><u>INTERIOR SIGHT LINES</u></p> <p>56. <input type="checkbox"/> REMOVE SIGNS _____</p> <p>57. <input type="checkbox"/> PROVIDE LIGHTING _____</p> <p>58. <input type="checkbox"/> LOWER DISPLAYS _____</p> <p>59. <input type="checkbox"/> RELOCATE OFFICE/CASHIER _____</p> <p>60. <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (SPECIFY) _____</p> <p>_____</p> <p><u>SPECIAL SECURITY</u></p> <p>61. <input type="checkbox"/> INSTALL MIRRORS _____</p> <p>62. <input type="checkbox"/> USE PRICE TAGGING PROCEDURE _____</p> <p>63. <input type="checkbox"/> USE ELECTRONIC TAGGING _____</p> <p>64. <input type="checkbox"/> TAG/MARK BUSINESS EQUIPMENT _____</p> <p>65. <input type="checkbox"/> INSTALL SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS _____</p> <p>66. <input type="checkbox"/> USE MORE SECURE DISPLAY CASES _____</p> <p>67. <input type="checkbox"/> OBTAIN GUARD SERVICE _____</p> <p>68. <input type="checkbox"/> USE BAIT MONEY _____</p> <p>69. <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (SPECIFY) _____</p> <p>_____</p>
--	--

PART III (CONTINUED)

I. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY (CONTINUED)

INVENTORY CONTROLS

- 70. DECLARE EMPLOYEE THEFT POLICY _____
- 71. CHECK INVOICES/SHIPMENTS _____
- 72. RESTRICT INVENTORY ACCESS _____
- 73. CONDUCT INVENTORY SPOT CHECKS _____
- 74. EXAMINE AREAS FOR CONCEALED INVENTORY _____
- 75. OTHER (SPECIFY) _____

ACCESS CONTROL

- 76. ESTABLISH SEPARATE CUSTOMER ENTRANCE/EXITS _____
- 77. ENCLOSE CASH REGISTER _____
- 78. OTHER (SPECIFY) _____

PROCEDURES

- 79. SCREEN NEW EMPLOYEES _____
- 80. TRAIN EMPLOYEES IN SHOPLIFTING PREVENTION _____

PART III (CONTINUED)

I. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY (CONTINUED)

PROCEDURES

- 81. TRAIN EMPLOYEES IN EVIDENCE PRESERVATION _____
- 82. TRAIN EMPLOYEES IN WHAT TO DO IF ROBBERY OCCURS _____
- 83. REPOSITION EMPLOYEES TO INCREASE SECURITY _____
- 84. DEVELOP SHOPLIFTER ALERT CODE/WARNING _____
- 85. INSTITUTE CASH CONTROL/RESTRICTION _____
- 86. STAMP CHECKS "FOR DEPOSIT ONLY" _____
- 87. INSTITUTE IRREGULAR CASH DEPOSIT PRACTICES _____
- 88. IMPROVE OPENING/CLOSING PROCEDURES _____
- 89. REMOVE VALUABLE MERCHANDISE FROM DISPLAY WINDOWS AFTER CLOSING _____

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FILE # - -

PART III (CONTINUED)

I. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY (CONTINUED)

PROCEDURES (CONTINUED)

- 90. SEARCH PRIOR TO CLOSING _____
- 91. ESTABLISH KEY CONTROL _____
- 92. USE AFTER-HOURS LIGHTING _____
- 93. CHANGE LOCKS/COMBINATIONS _____
- 94. INSTITUTE CHECK-CASHING PROCEDURE _____

- 95. DECLARE SHOPLIFTER PROSECUTION POLICY _____

- 96. DECLARE EMPLOYEE PURCHASE POLICY _____

- 97. DEVELOP DISBURSEMENT PROCEDURE _____
- 98. OTHER (SPECIFY) _____

103

CONFIDENTIAL: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

File #

Business Name _____

Inspector _____ Phone _____

Recommendations were:

Mailed on / /
Day Mo. Yr.

Hand Delivered

Total Number of Recommendations

Commercial Security Field Test

**Survey Recommendations
and
Compliance Record**

Survey Recommendations

INSPECTOR COPY

File #

Business Name _____

Inspector _____ Phone _____

Recommendations were:

Mailed on Day / Mo. / Yr.

Hand Delivered

Total Number of Recommendations

Recommendation Number	Survey Item Number	Number of Changes	Description of Recommended Changes	Estimated Cost (Optional)	Priority (High, Medium, Low)	Comments/Possible Resources
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						

103

Survey Recommendations

BUSINESS COPY

File #

Business Name _____

Inspector _____ Phone _____

Recommendations were:

Mailed on Day / Mo. / Yr.

Hand Delivered

Total Number of Recommendations

Recommendation Number	Survey Item Number	Number of Changes	Description of Recommended Changes	Estimated Cost (Optional)	Priority (High, Medium, Low)	Comments/Possible Resources
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						

906

Compliance Record

File #

Business Name _____

Inspector _____ Phone _____

Recommendations were:

Mailed on Day / Mo. / Yr.

Hand Delivered

Total Number of Recommendations

COMPLIANCE VISIT LOG							
Visit	Day	DATE		Time	Inspector ID #	Able to Inspect?	
		Mo.	Yr.			Yes	No
1	<input type="checkbox"/>						
2	<input type="checkbox"/>						
3	<input type="checkbox"/>						
4	<input type="checkbox"/>						
5	<input type="checkbox"/>						

Recommendation Number	Survey Item Number	Number of Changes	Description of Recommended Changes	Progress by Visit (F=Full, P=Partial, N=None)					Comments	Total Cost or Hours of Effort
				1	2	3	4	5		
1										
2										
3										
4										
5										
6										
7										
8										
9										
10										

Item	Instructions										
Inspector's Assessment	This section should be completed only once for each establishment inspected.										
Vulnerability to Offense	For each target crime, indicate your perception of the ease with which that crime could be committed if the survey recommendations are not implemented.										
Estimated Cost	For each target crime, estimate the expected value of the loss resulting from a single incident (include expected property damage losses for burglary incidents).										
Anticipated Compliance Percentage	Calculate an expected implementation percentage by dividing the number of recommendations expected to receive full or partial compliance, by the total number of recommendations made, and multiplying by 100— Example: <table style="margin-left: 20px;"> <tr> <td>Recommendations where full compliance expected =</td> <td style="text-align: right;">3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Recommendations where partial compliance expected =</td> <td style="text-align: right;">4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total recommendations made =</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Implementation Percentage =</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>$(7 \div 10) \times 100 = 70\%$</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Recommendations where full compliance expected =	3	Recommendations where partial compliance expected =	4	Total recommendations made =	10	Implementation Percentage =		$(7 \div 10) \times 100 = 70\%$	
Recommendations where full compliance expected =	3										
Recommendations where partial compliance expected =	4										
Total recommendations made =	10										
Implementation Percentage =											
$(7 \div 10) \times 100 = 70\%$											

*Inspector's Assessment

1. It is my opinion that this business establishment is at the stated risk levels should it fail to implement the survey recommendations.

Vulnerability to Offense


	Very High	High	Moderate	Low	Very Low
BURGLARY	<input type="checkbox"/>				
ROBBERY	<input type="checkbox"/>				
SHOPLIFTING	<input type="checkbox"/>				
EMPLOYEE THEFT	<input type="checkbox"/>				

Estimated cost of a single:

BURGLARY	\$	<input type="text"/>	,	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
ROBBERY	\$	<input type="text"/>	,	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
SHOPLIFTING	\$	<input type="text"/>	,	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
EMPLOYEE THEFT	\$	<input type="text"/>	,	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

2. Given my knowledge of this business establishment, I expect the percentage of survey recommendations implemented to be %.

**This Section for Internal Use Only*



SEARS

- DOUBLE CYLINDER DEAD BOLT LOCK - \$20.99 - M56674
- SINGLE CYLINDER DEAD BOLT LOCK - \$17.99 - M56671
- BARS AND GRILLS - See Attached Page
(STEEL FRAME WINDOW GUARDS)
- RIM LOCK - \$14.99 - #M57135
- MORTISE LOCKS - \$4.99 - #M5989
- SASH LOCK - #3.95
- OFFSET GUARD PLATES - \$2.00 - \$4.00 *
- RE-INFORCING STAINLESS STEEL GUARD - \$4.00 - \$5.00 *
(INSTALL-A-LOCK)
- CYLINDER GUARDS - Unknown
- HOOKBOLT - DEADLOCK - \$25.00 - \$35.00 *
- HINGEPINS - \$.60 - \$1.00
- DOOR VIEWERS - \$2.00 - \$5.00
- PADLOCKS - (SECURITY TYPE) - Discus-\$10.99 - Brass Case-\$8.99
Unicon-\$13.99 - Round Case-\$16.99
- SOLID CORE DOORS - Unknown
- MERCURY VAPOR LIGHTS - \$25.00 - \$40.00
- 3/8 WELDED CHAIN - \$2.29 ft.
- ANTI JIMMY PLATES - \$.50
- SLIDING WINDOW LOCKS - \$3.95

* - Unknown-But Approximate Cost.

All costs are estimates as of October, 1980. Prices may vary and are subject to change.

HANDY DAN

DOUBLE CYLINDER DEAD BOLT LOCK - Kwikset 885 K.S.P. \$28.99
SINGLE CYLINDER DEAD BOLT LOCK - Kwikset 880 K.S.P. \$24.99
BARS AND GRILLS - * See Bottom of Page
(STEEL FRAME WINDOW GUARDS)
RIM LOCK - Db1. Cylinder \$13.49 - Sing. Cyl. \$9.99
MORTISE LOCKS - \$6.00
SASH LOCK - \$3.99
OFFSET GUARD PLATES - \$2.00 - \$4.00 *
RE-INFORCING STAINLESS STEEL GUARD - \$4.00 - \$5.00 *
(INSTALL-A-LOCK)
CYLINDER GUARDS - Unknown
HOOKBOLT - DEADLOCK - \$25.00 - \$35.00 *
HINGEPINS - \$.60 - \$1.00 *
DOOR VIEWERS - 160°-\$2.29 180°-\$5.99
PADLOCKS - (SECURITY TYPE) - Master 5D \$7.89 17D \$8.99
SOLID CORE DOORS - \$40.00
MERCURY VAPOR LIGHTS - Itt-Yard Light - \$44.99
3/8 WELDED CHAIN - \$3.00 sq. ft. (approx.)
ANTI JIMMY PLATES - \$.69 ea
SLIDING WINDOW LOCKS - \$3.49

* - Unknown-But approximate cost.

All costs are estimates as of October, 1980. Prices may vary and are subject to change.

HUGH M. WOODS

DOUBLE CYLINDER DEAD BOLT LOCK - Kwikset 885-KSP \$27.54
SINGLE CYLINDER DEAD BOLT LOCK - Kwikset 880 KSP - \$20.64
BARS AND GRILLS - See Attached Page.
(STEEL FRAME WINDOW GUARDS)
RIM LOCK - Lori-#1250-1520 SC-1200-\$10.40
MORTISE LOCKS - \$4.99 - \$10.99
SASH LOCK - \$3.64
OFFSET GUARD PLATES - \$2.00 - \$4.00 *
RE-INFORCING STAINLESS STEEL GUARD - \$4.00 - \$5.00 *
(INSTALL-A-LOCK)
CYLINDER GUARDS - Unknown
HOOKBOLT - DEADLOCK - \$25.00 - \$35.00 *
HINGEPINS - \$.60 - \$1.00 *
DOOR VIEWERS - Fortress-160°-\$2.34 -. (one for \$1.89)
PADLOCKS - (SECURITY TYPE) - Master SD \$7.12 17D \$8.14 Master Hasp & Lock - \$7.40
SOLID CORE DOORS - \$36.00
MERCURY VAPOR LIGHTS - ITT-Yard Lite - \$34.15
3/8 WELDED CHAIN - \$3.15 foot
ANTI JIMMY PLATES - \$.44 ea
SLIDING WINDOW LOCKS - \$3.64
PIN LOCK (WINDOWS) - \$1.46

* - Unknown-But Approximate Cost.

All costs are estimates as of October, 1980. Prices may vary and are subject to change.


Help catch a crook!

FILL IN ALL THE BLANKS

and give to the first police officer on the scene.

- RACE _____
- SEX _____
- AGE _____
- HEIGHT _____
- WEIGHT _____
- HAIR _____
- EYES _____
- SCARS OR MARKS _____
- HAT (COLOR, TYPE, ETC.) _____
- SHIRT _____
- COAT _____
- PANTS _____
- SHOES _____

- VEHICLE LICENSE, MAKE, COLOR _____
- DIRECTION OF ESCAPE _____
- METHOD OF ESCAPE
 FOOT _____
 VEHICLE _____
- NUMBER OF SUSPECTS _____
- ACCENT _____
- SPEECH IMPEDIMENTS _____



REPORT
CRIME
IMMEDIATELY!


SPEAK CLEARLY

STAY ON
TELEPHONE....

DON'T HANG UP!

DENVER POLICE DISPATCHER
575-2011

OR
911




NAME OF PERSON FILLING OUT THIS FORM _____

113 DATE _____
TIME _____

Security

10 KEY POINTS FOR DETECTING BAD CHECKS



1. FEEL THE EDGES FOR PERFORATIONS. With the exception of government checks, there should be perforations on at least one edge.
2. LOOK FOR COLOR PHOTOCOPIES. Beware of raised, shiny letters on the surface of the check. This is especially noticable in magnetic numbers.
3. BE CAREFUL OF LOW SERIES NUMBERS OR TEMPORARY CHECKS. Checks numbered from 101 to 150 usually indicate a new account open less than one year.
4. EXAMINE THE DATE. Do not accept checks dated ahead of current date.
5. DO NOT ACCEPT CHECKS ALTERED IN ANY MANNER OR WRITTEN IN PENCIL.
6. DO NOT ACCEPT OUT OF STATE CHECKS AND AVOID CHECKS FROM OUTSIDE YOUR STORE TRADING AREA.
7. BE SURE THE NUMBER AMOUNT AND THE WRITTEN AMOUNT AGREE. Banks usually pay the written amount or return the check for correction.
8. EXAMINE THE MAGNETIC NUMBERS. They should have a dull finish.
9. BE SURE THE CHECK IS SIGNED. Check the signature against the identification presented.
10. REQUEST PROPER IDENTIFICATION. Compare the signature on the identification with the signature on the check. Compare the photograph with the person presenting the check. Be sure to verify the expiration date on the identification.



City and County of Denver
Commercial Security Program

88 STEELE STREET, ROOM 303 • DENVER, COLORADO 80206

TELEPHONE (303) 322-7768

W.H. McNichols, Jr., Mayor

C. Robb Fuller, Jr., Director
 Michael Wagner, Coordinator

MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE SOURCES

- 1) S.C.O.R.E. - Service Corps of Retired Executives (Part of U.S. Small Business Administration).
 Approximately 275 retired executives and independent businessmen who volunteer their business advice when asked by another businessmen. This is a free service but a request form has to be completed by the businessman. (Sample application attached).
- 2) A.C.E. - Active Corps of Executives (Also part of U.S. Small Business Administration).
 A group of working businessmen who provide business advice in areas that the S.C.O.R.E. program does not. This is also a free service requested on the same form as for S.C.O.R.E. Assistance.

The assistance provided by these two programs must be requested thru the Small Business Administration. The address to mail the request form is:

Small Business Administration
 Denver District Office
 U.S. Custom House
 721 19th St.
 Denver, Colorado 80202
 Attn: Management Assistance Division
 Telephone: 837-3984

- 3) Denver Chamber of Commerce can possibly provide business advice on an as needed basis if S.C.O.R.E. and A.C.E. cannot. Contact Det. John Costigan, Commercial Security Program, 322-7768, for assistance from this source.



SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
REQUEST FOR COUNSELING

I request appropriate management or technical assistance from the Small Business Administration.

It is understood that such assistance will be provided to me free of charge and that I incur no obligation to reimburse SBA or its counselor(s) providing such assistance.

I authorize SBA to furnish information and data concerning me to the counselor(s) providing such assistance.

I understand that the counselor(s) providing assistance to me have agreed that they will not:

- (1) recommend the purchase of goods or services from sources in which he has an interest, or represents, and
- (2) accept fees or commissions from third parties who have supplied goods or services to me on their recommendations

This request may be withdrawn at any time upon written notice to SBA unless I am an SBA borrower.

In consideration of the furnishing of management and technical assistance to me, I waive all claims against SBA personnel or counselors arising in connection with this assistance.

Type of Service Requested (Check Appropriate Box)							
<input type="checkbox"/>	SCORE-ACE	<input type="checkbox"/>	SBI	<input type="checkbox"/>	406	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prof. Assoc.
Complete Below and Sign							
Name of Company						Telephone	
Address (Include ZIP Code)							
Referred to SBA By				Type of Business			
Signature and Title of Company Official						Date	



W. H. McNICHOLS, JR.
Mayor

January 8, 1982

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER

DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY

DENVER POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICE ADMINISTRATION BLDG.
1331 CHEROKEE STREET
DENVER, COLORADO 80204
PHONE (303) 534-2424

Dear Colleague:

The Denver Anti-Crime Council, in cooperation with the Denver Police Department and the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice has spent the past nineteen months conducting a "Commercial Security Field Test" in selected Denver business areas. This test was a scientifically designed research project which assessed the vulnerability of small businesses to selected commercial crimes, and measured the effectiveness of integrated police and business sector crime prevention activities designed to reduce such vulnerability.

We are pleased to take this opportunity to invite you to participate in a Training and Technology Transfer Conference to discuss the background, development, implementation, outcome, and reproduction of this program.

The Conference will be held in Denver on Wednesday, February 17, 1982, at the Regency Hotel, 3900 Elati Street (I-25 exit #213), starting at 8:30 a.m. There is no charge for any conference expense, including the luncheon. In addition, we have reserved and will pay for a block of rooms for out of town participants who plan to arrive Tuesday night.

Attendance will be limited to the first 200 registrants. To reserve a place at the Conference, please write or call:

Commercial Security Program
Denver Anti-Crime Council
1445 Cleveland Place, Room 200
Denver, Colorado 80202
(303) 893-8581

Please indicate whether you will need a room, your arrival time, and the number and names of people staying in each room. Written confirmation of your registration and an agenda will follow receipt of your reply.

Again, we must stress that attendance is limited to the first 200 respondents, so please reply at your earliest opportunity.

We look forward to seeing you in February

Sincerely,

Arthur G. Dill
Arthur G. Dill
Chief of Police

Michael Wagner
Michael Wagner, Project Director
Commercial Security Program

Ace Hardware - 2700 So. Colorado Blvd.	756-4751
Bear Valley Ace - 3100 So. Sheridan	934-5614
Arvada Hardware - 5701 Wadsworth	424-5434
Barnett Co. - 3800 Wynkoop	534-2323
Boulevard Hardware - 1641 So. Colorado Blvd.	757-2934
Clarks Hardware - 4034 Tennyson	455-9282
Economy Lumber - 975 W. Mississippi	744-6161
Fairfax Sentry Hardware - 5225 E. Colfax	320-6551
Handy Dan - 3910 Wadsworth	423-8820
Handy Dan - 1955 So. Sheridan	988-7890
Harts Hardware - 5201 W. Mississippi	922-9026
Jensen Hardware - 1316 E. Evans Ave.	777-7860
L&E Hardware - 506 So. Federal Blvd.	934-0811
Hugh M. Woods - 5700 Federal	455-5204
Hugh M. Woods - 1417 So. Holly	758-4024
Hugh M. Woods - 2085 So. Sheridan	988-3475
Modern Hardware - 4345 Wadsworth	424-1940
Jensen Hardware - 1316 E. Evans	777-7860
Colo. Doorways - 2050 W. 7th Ave.	573-6442
Colo. Hardware - 5355 E. 38th Ave.	388-5987
United Supply - 555 So. Jason	778-8041

COMMERCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONFERENCE

DENVER, COLORADO

FEBRUARY 17th, 1982

A G E N D A

8:00 a.m.	Registration	Churchill Lobby
9:00 a.m.	(Coffee and Donuts)	
9:00 a.m.	Welcome Introductions	Palladium
9:30 a.m.	(Charles D. Weller - Denver Anti-Crime Council) (Chief Art Dill - Denver Police Department) (Project Staff)	
9:30 a.m.	Problem Definition and Program Overview	Palladium
10:10 a.m.	- National Issues - The Test Design (Joe Bunce, University Research Corporation Washington, D.C.)	
10:10 a.m.	Break Period	Churchill Lobby
10:20 a.m.		
10:20 a.m.	Film - "Robbery Prevention Techniques"	Palladium
10:44 a.m.		
10:44 a.m.	Program Implementation	Palladium
11:10 a.m.	(Michael Wagner, Project Staff)	
11:10 a.m.	General Discussion of Program Issues	Palladium
11:20 a.m.	(Project Staff)	
11:20 a.m.	Break Period	Churchill Lobby
11:30 a.m.		
11:30 a.m.	Luncheon	Grand Salon
1:00 p.m.	- Speaker - Lee Bennett Colorado Retail Council/Frank Abagnale & Associates, "Identification and Detection of Fraudulent Checks"	
1:00 p.m.	"A" Workshop - Program Planning Issues	Palladium
1:50 p.m.	- Facilitator: C Robb Fuller, Jr. Security Consultant, Denver, Colorado	
	"B" Workshop - Premise Survey Documents	Winston I
	- Facilitators: Detective John Costigan, Denver Police Department; Joe Bunce, University Research Corp., Washington, D.C.	
	"C" Workshop - Compliance Activities	Winston II
	- Facilitators: Detective Manuel Alvarez, Denver Police Department; Officer Larry Rhodes, Long Beach California Police Department	
1:50 p.m.	Break Period	Churchill Lobby
2:00 p.m.		
2:00 p.m.	Workshop Rotation	Palladium
2:50 p.m.		Winston I Winston II

CONTINUED

2 OF 3

2:50 p.m.	Break Period	Churchill Lobby
3:00 p.m.	(Refreshments)	
3:00 p.m.	Workshop Rotation	Palladium
3:50 p.m.		Winston I
		Winston II
3:50 p.m.	Break Period	Churchill Lobby
4:00 p.m.		
4:00 p.m.	Overview and Summaries	Palladium
4:15 p.m.	(Project Staff)	
4:15 p.m.	Awarding of Certificates	Palladium
4:30 p.m.		
4:30 p.m.	Social Hour	Churchill Lobby
	(Cash Bar)	



City and County of Denver
Denver Anti-Crime Council

1445 CLEVELAND PLACE, ROOM 200 • DENVER, COLORADO 80202
 TELEPHONE (303) 893-8581



W. H. McNichols, Jr., Mayor

Paul V. Murray, Chairman
 Minoru Yasui, Vice-Chairman
 Charles D. Weller, Exec. Director

February 23, 1982

MEMORANDUM

To: Fred Becker
 Joe Bunce
 Michael Cahn
 Paul Herman
 Larry Rhodes
 C.D. Weller

From: Michael Wagner *MW*

Subject: Training and Technology Transfer Conference

Our Training and Technology Transfer Conference was held on February 17th. Enclosed you will find a list of attendees and agencies represented, and a packet that was distributed to participants. The attendee list is short by about 15 names of people who arrived and registered after the seminar had begun. The packet also included a pen and legal pad.

Although a formal evaluation process was not implemented to measure participants' attitudes toward the conference, observation and comments indicated that the program was well received and that participants found the material useful. A number of people specifically commented on the workshops, the luncheon speaker, and the handout material. The luncheon itself was very successful and the quality of the meal was also widely praised.

As you will note from the enclosed attendee list, a wide variety of agencies and businesses were represented. Eleven Chiefs of Police and/or Sheriffs attended the conference. The vast majority of the remaining law enforcement representatives were Captains, Lieutenants, Sergeants, and Crime Prevention program managers.

A particularly useful aspect of the program appeared to be the utilization of Project Advisory Board members (particularly businessmen from the experimental sites) as deputy facilitators in the workshops. The businessmen, who were actual recipients of project services, provided a unique insight into workshop discussions and added to the credibility of the workshops topic.

Certificates of completion, signed by the Chief of Police and the Project Director, were provided by the Police Department and distributed to attendees. Utilization of the Executive Director of the Anti-Crime Council and the Chief of Police to introduce the conference and welcome participants demonstrated the City's high level of commitment to the program and provided attendees with a broad executive overview of the program's utility.

Joe Bunce, representing the Project Coordinating Team and N.I.J., discussed the program's development from initial conception to implementation. This discussion focused on problem identification and definition, as well as a review of literature and earlier related research efforts. Of particular interest, was the emphasis that this program placed on compliance activities and qualitative evaluation as opposed to previous projects. In addition, Joe's talk also covered criteria for city selection, funding, site selection and pair-matching within the three cities, and the structure of the research design.

The project director discussed the program's implementation with a special emphasis on the development of a close working relationship between the project staff and the affected businesses. This talk covered, step by step, the client-contact scheme that the staff used to develop this relationship in the pre-survey and compliance phases. A minimum of nine face-to-face contacts were made with each business. The formation and utilization of formal business associations as a compliance activity was reviewed. Finally, the development of a sense of self-awareness regarding loss-prevention responsibility on the part of the merchant, was identified as a key factor in the successful implementation of the program and in the achievement of compliance objectives.

Mr. Lee Bennett, Executive Director of the Colorado Retail Council, addressed the luncheon session with a slide presentation on fraudulent, forged, and no account checks. This particular presentation was very highly regarded by both merchants and law enforcement personnel, who found the material of immediate usefulness.

The three afternoon workshops focused on what the project staff identified as the three most important elements in program replication: Preprogram Planning; Survey Forms and Survey Conduct; and Compliance Activities.

Preprogram Planning included a review of such activities as site selection, crime histories and data analysis, personnel selection, scheduling activities, and administrative support.

Survey Forms and Survey Conduct reviewed the survey form used in the Commercial Security Field Test with an eye toward modifying the format for use in a non-research, pure service delivery type of program. In addition, techniques and issues which were found to either enhance or impede the survey effort were identified and discussed with participants.

Compliance Activities included a review of all of the compliance activities that were used in the Denver Component of the field test, and an evaluation of the relative merits of each. Special attention was paid to the development and utilization of area-specific newsletters which were found to be an excellent vehicle for enhancing communication between staff and businesses, and among businesses as well.

As a special point for our colleagues in Long Beach and St. Louis, it should be noted that all of us shared a great many misgivings about conducting a Technology Transfer Conference where we would be unable to provide participants with any substantive evaluation measures of the program's success or failure. Our experience in Denver indicated that these misgivings were unfounded. By focusing the conference at the outset on process

issues related to program duplication, and by explaining that an in-depth statistical evaluation would be available in the fall of 1982, we avoided any direct confrontations over program effectiveness. Each speaker and workshop leader stressed that our individual and collective experiences indicated that the program was successful in reducing crime and in improving police-business relationships.

In summary, the Technology Transfer Conference succeeded in meeting the goal of providing participants with the tools and techniques to replicate the Commercial Security Program locally, beyond the expectations of project staff.

Commercial Security Program Technology Transfer
February 17, 1982

George Ackerman
Ackerman, O'Brien & Associates

Dave Bryant
Montgomery Wards

Lindol Amey
Security West Inc.

Deanna Buck
Fort Collins Police Department

Joe Antonio
Summit County Sheriff

Merle Robison
Evans Police Department

Mike Arden
Clear Creek County Sheriff

Marcella Cain
Southglenn Development Company

Larry Baker
Fairfax Hardware

Ed Camp
Longmont Police Department

William Bankenstein
J. C. Penny

Neil Cantwell
Steamboat Springs Police Department

Mark Bella
Broomfield Police Department

Robert Cavalli
Leadville Police Department

Tom Bettencourt
Telecheck Company

Nora Cavelli
Auraria Department of Safety

Don Black
Aurora Police Department

Calvin Chappell
Larimer Sheriff's Department

William Blake
Steamboat Springs Police Department.

Burdy Christian
Arvada Police Department

Ron Bland
Adams County Sheriff

Michael Cochran
U.S. Treasury Department

Chuck Bowman
Glendale Police Department

Regis Colasanti
Safeway, Inc.

Curtis Bridges
Denver Dry Goods

Richard Colin
Estes Park Police Department

Charles Brock
Pinkerton, Inc.

Maude Cooper
Dacona Police Department

Butch Brown
Castle Rock Police Department

Ted Cooper
Edgewater Police Department

Tom Cucullu
Downtown Denver, Inc.

Ron Davies
Summit County Sheriff's Office

John Davis
Fort Collins Police Department

Marla Carpenter
Kremmling Police Department

Jim Head
American Cable Security

Mick DeSantis
Aurora Police Department

Larry Dowdell
Frederick Police Department

Cecil Dressel
Denver Police Department

Ron Duley
Greeley Police Department

Gary Ensign
Hugo Police Department

Robert Evers
Grand Junction Police Department

Stu Ferguson
Gunnison Police Department

Robert Ford
Colorado State Patrol

Terry Foulke
Golden Police Department

Ben Franco
Lamar Police Department

Daniel White
Evans Police Department

Robert Galloway
Thornton Police Department

Ron Garcia
Denver Dry Goods

Kelly Gilstrap
Valley Petroleum Company

Marty Greeson
7-11 Stores

Robert Hall
Englewood Police Department

Pat Hallock
Target District Loss Prevention

Berry Halsey
Drug Enforcement Agency

Mark Hanna
Jefferson County Sheriff's Office

Dave Hause
Colorado Division of Parks & Outdoor Rec.

Stan Helmkamp
National Convenience Stores

Denny Hemphill
City of Castle Rock

Joe Hurtado
Frederick Police Department

Darwin Hibbs
Salida Police Department

Gene Hill
Montrose Police Department

Steve Garner
Glendale Police Department

Norman Howey
Sheriff, Park County

John Hughes
Aurora Police Department

Jack Humphrey
Wheatridge Police Department

John Humphries
Federal Protective Service

Jack Hurst
Fort Lupton Police Department

Larry Iverson
Woodland Park Police Department

David Jensen
Honeywell, Inc.

Leonard Johnson
Public Service Company

Julius Toporek
Boulder Police Department

Bill Wilson
Boulder Police Department

Joe King
7-11 Stores

Larry Kinion
Boulder Police Department

Gary Kirchmar
Denver Police Department

John Kish
University of Colorado Police Department

Fritz Krutsche
University of Colorado Police Department

Mary Lewis
Aurora Police Department

Gene Lillard
Montrose Police Department

Elmer Lindner
Commerce City Police Department

Dennis Lindvay
Fort Collins Police Department

Donetta Lowe
Aurora Police Department

Greg Luke
Target District Loss Prevention

Bill Johnson
Division of Criminal Justice

Brian McCormack
National Convenience Stores

Ken Hartman
American Cable Security

Dave McKinley
Dictograph

Bill Mael
Fort Collins Police Department

Diana Martin
Jerry Martin
Fowler Police Department

Jean Martine
Women's Self Defense Council

Elfido Martinez
Monte Vista Police Department

Frank Martinez
Monte Vista Police Department

Ray Martinez
Fort Collins Police Department

Roger Mauck
Longmont Police Department

Larry Merkl
Merkl's Service

Arnold Miller
ALM Associates

Betsy Mills
Drug Enforcement Agency

Steven Miranda
Colorado Springs Police Department

Art Montoya
Department of Justice

Ered Moore
Radio Shack

Dennis Munger
Henderson Security

Jerry Murphy
Pueblo County Sheriff's Office

Rolland Kuhn
Money Mart

Al Nieto
Fred Schmidt Appliances

Roy Nordgulen
Colorado Springs Police Department

Joseph Olson
Alamosa Police Department

Roy Orton
Alamosa Police Department

Joe Padilla
Westminster Police Department

Mark Payne
Henderson Security

James Pelloni
Northglenn Mall

Margie Pessin
Target District Loss Prevention

Gary Peters
Telecheck Co.

Richard Phillips
7625th Security Police Sq/SPA

Anton Pohl
Security West Inc.

Don Polk
Aurora Police Department

Leonard Post
Salida Police Department

Joan Christopher
General Services Administration

Nick Prego
Longmont Police Department

T. J. Price
Lafayette Police Department

Art Quintana
Brighton Police Department

Nancy Randall
Lerner's Inc.

Jim Adamcik
U.S. Treasury Department

Joan Reber
Colorado Springs Police Department

Del Reeves
Pueblo Police Department

Larry Renzelman
Arvada Police Department

Luanne Richie
Denver District Attorney's Office

Dick Ritchey
Fountain Police Department

John Killam
U.S. Postal Service

Gary Robinson
Douglas County Sheriff's Office

Tom Root
Avondale Village Apartments

E. Lee Ruark
Adams State College

Dan Sandy
Weld County Sheriff's Office

Bob Sapp
Colorado Springs Police Department

James Sawinska
Longmont Police Department

Mike Sellman
Aurora Police Department

Robert Shaudt
Frederick Police Department

Michael Shephard
Central City Police Department

Sherryl Shecora
Englewood Police Department

David Shipley
Larimer County Sheriff's Office

James Smith
Thornton Police Department

Joseph Smith
ALM Associates

Betty Soderlund
Colfax Terrace Apartments

Steve Sopata
Pinkerton, Inc.

Ronald Spong
El Paso Sheriff's Office

Bob Steinbach
Denver Police Department

Daniel Stocking
Littleton Police Department

Bob Stockwell
Burlington Railroad

John Target
Colorado Springs Police Department

John Michaels
Windsor Police Department

Billy Thompson
Burlington Rail Road

Wayne Thurber
Marshal of Fairplay

Dave Teich
Aurora Mall

Terry Vice
Greeley Police Department

Tom Vigil
King Soopers

Jim Vincent
Fort Collins Police Department

Robert Walker
Littleton Police Department

Rick Wallingford
Pueblo County Police Department

George Ward
Brighton Police Department

Jim Burke
U.S. Drug Enforcement

Dave Whitney
Woolco

Rube Goeringer
Boulder Police Department

Lynn Hill
Downtown Hobbies

H. E. Williams
Williams International

Jim Wilson
Littleton Police Department

Richard Wilson

Wes Wilson
Commerce City Police Department

Lee Frausel
Fort Collins Police Department

Sammy Whittmer
Canon City City Planner

Robert Wolf
Eaton Police Department

Mark Woodward
Pueblo Police Department

Geoffrey Wodell
Miller International Inc.

Gary Younger
Douglas County Sheriffs Office

END