


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11/9/83

THE ROLE OF CUBA IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
THE ROLE OF CUBA IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND
SUBVERSION

FEBRUARY 26, MARCH 4, 11, AND 12, 1982

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THE ROLE OF CUBA IN INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION

Intelligence Activities of the DGI

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Also present: Senator East.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milling, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator DENTON. The hearing will come to order.

The chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Thurmond, is hospitalized due to a pinched nerve in his back. Otherwise he would have attended the hearing this morning. He wanted me to make that known. Senator East will be arriving shortly and Senator Biden has indicated to me that he will come if he can break away from other commitments this morning.

I would like to welcome Señor Gerardo Peraza who has, with great personal effort, managed to appear here this morning.

Today we begin a series of hearings in which the subcommittee will receive testimony about the role of Cuba in international terrorism and subversion. Much of this activity, according to testimony previously given before this and other congressional committees, is conducted through the Cuban Intelligence Service, Dirección General de Inteligencia, commonly called the DGI.

In the April 24, 1981, hearing entitled "Terrorism: Origins, Direction and Support," this subcommittee undertook an overview of the problems of worldwide terrorism. From the outset and throughout the hearing, the involvement of Cuba, its intelligence officers, and their agents in international terrorism was repeatedly cited.

The first statement on Cuban involvement before the subcommittee came from William E. Colby, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who testified about the Soviet use of Cuba as a proxy to extend and enhance its own efforts to train and supply elements engaged in "wars of national liberation" around the world. In response to the question, "During your term as Director

of the CIA, did you see evidence to support those conclusions on the Soviet role in international terrorism?", he replied, "Certainly, training in Cuba with Soviet support of a variety of terrorists, revolutionaries from various parts of Latin America."

Claire Sterling, self-styled communist while she was in college, left of center by her own self-designation, and one of the leading authorities on terrorism, also highlighted the Cuban role. She told of a meeting in 1966 between the leader of the Tupamaros, often extolled as a model for other terrorists or revolutionaries, and Fidel Castro. At that time, it was arranged to provide guerrilla training in Cuba for the Tupamaros.

Mrs. Sterling further testified that various groups which emerged around 1968, and which were committed to revolution by violence, "were given first access to the guerrilla training camps in Cuba, around Havana, which had opened first for guerrilla fighters from Latin America and Africa." She made the additional point that bringing these groups together, as in Cuban training camps, was the beginning of the interlocking linkage that we see among them today. She pointed out that the terrorist training camps in Cuba were supervised by Col. Vadim Kotchergine of the Soviet KGB.

Several other references to Cuba in Mrs. Sterling's testimony point to the pivotal role Cuba has played in the organized emergence of the terrorist and so-called national liberation movements. She said that this emergence of Cuba's pivotal role originated on January 3, 1966, at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana. At that meeting, 513 delegates from Asia, Africa, Latin America, Eastern and Western Europe, the United States and Canada gathered, as they stated in their resolution, to devise a global strategy against American or Western "imperialism." It was within a few months of that conference that the first important network of guerrilla training camps was set up around Havana and the "guerrilla international" began to take form.

Prior to this conference, there was an initial period of direct infiltration into many countries from Cuba. During that period, from 1959 to 1965, attempts were made to set up revolutionary cells in Latin America and in Africa. These early guerrilla attempts failed in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. In addition, the infiltration work was severely hampered by a shortage of Cuban resource. I would add that although those guerrilla attempts failed, it gave those countries a taste of communist guerrilla terrorism which they have not forgotten.

After January 1966, the drive became systematic, more powerful, and more dangerous. The Soviet Union officially participated in the creation and the work of the AALAPSO (African, Asian and Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization), the LASO (Lao-tian American Solidarity Organization), and the CLASO (Continental Latin American Student's Organization). Moscow provided money and "advisors." The agenda approved at the 1966 meeting of the Tricontinental was a program and a schedule for the well-planned and equally well-financed terrorist and destabilization operations which have occurred since that time.

The second part of the agenda covered "burning issues of the struggle against imperialism in the countries of the three continents," particularly in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, the Congo, the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia, southern Arabia and Palestine, Laos, Cambodia, South Africa, Korea, Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, Cyprus, Panama, South West Africa, and North Kalemonton. The Tricontinental organization also provided active material and propaganda support to the Communist forces in Vietnam. Thus we can see the thoroughness and the deliberateness of this transcendent worldwide organization.

In the subsequent 15 years, most of these countries have suffered direct Cuban involvement in their internal affairs. The Cubans have widely spread their subversion and terror network in a continuing effort at destabilization.

One of the Venezuelan Communist Party members who attended the Tricontinental Conference was Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, better known as "Carlos the Jackal." Carlos' name came up recently with respect to a plot to assassinate our President and other important members of our Government. I was dismayed to find at this meeting of a very important committee of the Congress that not one member of the committee had any idea who Carlos was. It is regrettable, in my opinion, considering his activities and those of another Carlos, Carlos Marighella, that in this body and in the House of Representatives the existence of these men is not even known. It would be mind-boggling to the citizens of the nations that have suffered the terrorism which these men have been so active in. I find it regrettable that the testimony we have had in these hearings has not been publicized more, because these men and the others like them are a great threat to civilization.

Mrs. Sterling testified that some of the most important figures on the terrorist scene, including Carlos, were trained in Cuba. Carlos began his training at Camp Matanzas immediately after the Tricontinental Conference. From there he went to Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.

Mrs. Sterling's testimony also revealed an interesting connection between Fidel Castro and Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, the Italian millionaire terrorist. He provided large sums of money to various terrorist groups and was the first to put together a fully operational terrorist network in Europe.

According to Mrs. Sterling, Feltrinelli was a hero worshipper of Castro, Che Guevara, and the Cuban concept of Third World revolution. He was present at the Tricontinental Conference, and he visited Castro many times. When he returned to Italy, Feltrinelli featured in his bookstores the Italian edition of Tricontinental Magazine. That magazine, Castro's first official voice on the continent, offered among other things the first full text of Marighella's "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" in Italian and French. The "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" is found in Canada, the United States—any place in the world where terrorism occurs. It is the standardized text from which these people operate.

Mrs. Sterling's testimony revealed that the United States is not immune from Cuban activity. She showed that a Puerto Rican terrorist group was trained and equipped in Cuba and that members of the Weatherman organization made frequent trips to Cuba.

I believe that the testimony we have received thus far about Cuban involvement in Puerto Rican independence and terrorist groups is but the tip of the iceberg. It shows merely the outer surface of a very extensive program of support and manipulation of terrorist groups, often amounting to control, to advance Cuban and Soviet strategies for destabilizing and ultimately destroying the United States.

Cuba's unremitting effort in the United Nations to separate Puerto Rico from the United States is not coincidental or the act of a benevolent sister state. At subsequent hearings, the subcommittee will focus in greater detail on Cuban involvement in Puerto Rico and Havana's true objectives in its manipulation of the issues of statehood and independence.

In our hearing on June 26, 1981, entitled "The Role of Moscow and Its Subcontractors," the testimony of Robert Moss, a British journalist, confirmed Cuba's massive involvement in international espionage and terrorism. He detailed Cuba's role in training and equipping groups, from throughout the world, in camps in Cuba, Algeria, South Yemen, Libya, and Africa. These terrorists are very active now, increasingly so, and have a great deal to do with the destabilization which has resulted in the overthrow of governments throughout the world. Considering the rate of overthrows in the years since the Tricontinental Conference, and the number of people that have been subjected to communism, we should be alarmed not only because of the human tragedy but also because of the strategic and economic consequences.

Mr. Moss told of a meeting of Central American revolutionaries held last July in Monimbo, Nicaragua, to celebrate the overthrow of the Somoza regime. This meeting was attended by Fidel Castro and Manuel Piniero, former DGI chief and now head of the Department of America. Castro boasted that his agents in the United States were so industrious and well placed that they had the capacity to create race riots at a moment of his choosing—race riots on a scale that, he said, would make the Miami troubles look like a sunshower.

Further testimony revealed that when two leaders of the Puerto Rican Independence Movement, who were arrested in the fifties for plotting the murder of President Truman, were released from jail in October 1979, they were given a hero's welcome in Havana at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party.

Finally, Mr. Moss referred to Philip Agee, a CIA turncoat who has made it his business to attack the Agency and his former colleagues by systematically disclosing the names of alleged American agents around the world. According to Mr. Moss, Agee has had more than 30 confirmed meetings in London with the local station chief of the Cuban DGI.

Mr. Agee, whose activities border on treason—and I consider that an understatement—is still quoted by major U.S. newspapers on important issues such as El Salvador. This is despite his outspoken support of and association with Cuba and other Communist states. He is generally identified only as a former CIA officer. There is rarely an effort to present his known connections with hostile countries.

Too many in our country still adhere to the belief that Fidel Castro is a romantic revolutionary who is simply carrying the standard for the poor and oppressed people of Cuba. The mass exodus of 130,000 Cubans from the port of Mariel to the United States in the spring of 1980 should help enlighten them. This event was totally orchestrated by Castro. It has been estimated that 18 percent of the total number, or 23,000 individuals, are criminals; 1,538 are in prisons in the United States; and 469 are still being detained in camps. Even more important, there is no way to accurately estimate the number of DGI agents who entered under this guise of refugees to join those already in place in the United States.

We must note the disruption and confusion the exodus caused in this country. We must consider Castro's refusal to take back the criminal element and the dramatic increase in crime rates in those areas where these Cubans have settled. We should note the high unemployment rate among the refugees and the burden this places on local, State, and Federal Governments and agencies. We must take seriously Castro's recent threat to repeat this callous act, and we must consider Cuba's clandestine and overt terrorist activities throughout the world. These factors should convince even the most skeptical or idealistic of the true intentions and policies of Fidel Castro and Cuba toward this country.

I just returned from Panama, where I was briefed by the commander of the Southern Command and his staff and by a number of diplomats from all over Latin America. Their unanimous opinion was that unless the trends in Venezuela and El Salvador and the other chain of events which it portends are stopped, the previous exodus of refugees into the United States will be minuscule compared to what is going to happen. They predicted there will be people walking from South America to the United States and crossing the border at Mexico, at any risk to their lives, just to get out of the situation they are in, much like the boat people in Southeast Asia.

In the series of hearings which we begin this morning, the subcommittee will examine the role of Cuba in international terrorism and subversion, focusing specifically today on the intelligence activities of the DGI. We have the benefit of the testimony of a former DGI officer.

Gerardo Peraza was born on February 22, 1938, in Havana, Cuba. On September 27, 1958, he joined Fidel Castro's rebel forces in the Sierra Maestra. In early January 1959, having reached the rank of second lieutenant in the Revolutionary Army, Mr. Peraza returned to Havana and, after spending a few months as a policeman, joined the G-2 security service.

In September 1960, he became a member of Section U of the G-2's successor organization, the Department of State Security (DSE) of the Interior Ministry. There he worked to recruit agents for the DSE from among the members of Revolutionary Defense Committees (CDR). After further training, he was assigned to the Counterintelligence Section of Military Intelligence and became chief of the Investigations Bureau.

Mr. Peraza held that position until August 1965, when he left Cuba as part of a select group of Cuban officers to attend an ad-

vanced intelligence training course in Moscow. After returning to Havana, Mr. Peraza became chief of the General Staff's Communications Bureau, in which capacity he was responsible for detecting "treasonable" activities by general staff personnel. In 1967, he transferred to the General Directorate for Intelligence (the DGI) as chief of the Signals Bureau, which worked against the Central Intelligence Agency and monitored counterrevolutionary activities among Cuban exiles.

Later, Mr. Peraza was assigned to the DGI center in London, England, as a member of the Cuban Embassy with the cover title of Second Secretary. He was responsible for counterintelligence as well as for the physical security of the Embassy premises. He sought refuge in the United States in November 1971.

We will be employing two interpreters this morning, although Mr. Peraza speaks some English. He has indicated that he would prefer to testify in his native tongue.

Mr. Peraza, please stand and raise your right hand while I administer the oath.

[Witness sworn.]

Senator DENTON. I would ask the interpreters to rise and be sworn, Mr. Theodore E. Herrera and Mr. Alfonso Tarabochia.

[Interpreters sworn.]

Senator DENTON. Thank you. Please be seated.

TESTIMONY OF GERARDO PERAZA, THROUGH INTERPRETER ALFONSO TARABOCHIA

Senator DENTON. Mr. Peraza, would you briefly give us the reasons why you left the service of the Cuban Government in 1971?

Mr. PERAZA. The fundamental facts are these: First, there was a law which was promulgated in the intelligence service of Cuba making it mandatory to belong to the Communist Party. And second, the intelligence service of Cuba was transferred directly to the services of the Soviet intelligence service.

Senator DENTON. Was "responsible directly to"?

Mr. PERAZA. Was transferred.

Senator DENTON. "Transferred"?

Mr. PERAZA. It was directly responsible.

These were the two reasons, the fundamental reasons.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. I understand the two reasons were that within the intelligence service they issued two instructions: One, that it would become mandatory to belong to the Communist Party; and two, the intelligence service henceforth would be directly responsible to the Soviet Union, presumably the KGB.

Mr. PERAZA. Yes. The Cuban intelligence service's structure was placed under the KGB.

Senator DENTON. Then I would have to infer you either were not a Communist or you did not want everyone to be required to be one.

Mr. PERAZA. I belonged to the intelligence service of Cuba, but I do not—I did not belong to the Communist Party of Cuba.

Senator DENTON. I would like to welcome my distinguished colleague from North Carolina, Senator East. If you want to make an

opening statement, Senator East, please feel free. I have only asked one question.

Senator EAST. I would not interrupt you. Please go right ahead.

Senator DENTON. Mr. Peraza, you departed in November 1971. That would indicate that you had a career as an officer in the intelligence service of Cuba of about 12 years. This would appear to give you a deep understanding of the organization.

[Mr. Peraza nods in the affirmative.]

Senator DENTON. Would you describe the various departments of the DGI and their respective functions?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes. The principal function of the Directorate of Intelligence was penetration and recruitment in the United States of America. For this reason, it was divided—before the Soviet Union took over the control of the intelligence—in three main sections.

Section 3 was the one which worked directly against the CIA. It worked with the principal center in New York; and the other centers in Canada and Puerto Rico.

Senator DENTON. Excuse me; I missed that. The other centers were where?

Mr. PERAZA. The other center or the other station which worked Canada and Puerto Rico, because Puerto Rico is considered, for the intelligence service of Cuba, as part of the penetration into the United States. It is also considered as part of the operations of the Department of Liberation.

In essence, there are two groups operating against Puerto Rico, the Department of Intelligence and the Department of Liberation. This in broad lines is what the Department of the Intelligence was.

After it was taken over by the Soviet Union, the structure of the Cuban intelligence service was changed, adopting the same structure of the intelligence service in the Soviet Union. They opened the first Department of Economic Intelligence against the United States, the Department of Military Intelligence against the United States, the Department of Political Information, and the Department of Foreign Counterintelligence.

And, at that moment, the Cuban intelligence service made a turn of 90 degrees, taking advantage of a period of inactivity of the intelligence service of the United States between the years of 1965 to 1970. This gave to the Cuban intelligence service the possibility to recruit a number of officers and to prepare itself for the change that came about in 1970.

In 1970, with the financial resources given to it by the Soviet Union—because up until that moment Cuba didn't have sufficient resources. In those days, in 1970, they were able with that large financial aid to train about 100 intelligence officers in 2 weeks, to buy cars, equipment, and conduct the various operations of placement.

Senator DENTON. May I ask a clarifying question here?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Recruited 100 intelligence officers in 2 weeks, is that what you said? Did you say produced or recruit?

Mr. PERAZA. Recruit.

Senator DENTON. From where? From the United States?

Mr. PERAZA. These officers were trained—myself among them—to leave together at the same time to go to different countries like England, the United States, Italy, France, and other countries.

Senator DENTON. I want to understand this. The weakness in intelligence on our part in the years 1965 to 1970 gave the opportunity to install those people. Is that the idea? To install them in this country?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes. The problem was that when the Cuban intelligence service had nobody to obstruct its work, there was no activity detected. There was no possibility, no way that the United States could do anything against Cuba. All the forces were directed to prepare the penetration and the intelligence work against the United States from different countries.

And they opened up new departments, because they had never attempted to collect military information against the United States, because we were not prepared for that. We were not prepared to collect economic information. We were not prepared to collect technical information.

Senator DENTON. This was before the rubles came from the Soviet Union and the reorganization?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes. Prior to the Soviet Union's taking over the DGI, the DGI underwent a process of preparation. One of these orders to prepare was to make it mandatory for the members of the DGI to belong to the party, to have gone through schools, intelligence schools in Moscow and in Cuba.

Senator DENTON. All right. Thank you very much. Are you finished with that?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Senator East, I will be happy to defer to you at this point or continue questioning.

Senator EAST. You go ahead and finish your questions.

Senator DENTON. It appears from your testimony thus far that the Cuban DGI is oriented by organization, at least up through 1971, against the United States principally.

Mr. PERAZA. The Cuban intelligence service has always been against the United States.

Senator DENTON. Principally or exclusively?

Mr. PERAZA. Exclusively. All the other countries where they work, they do it to direct the activity against the United States. Because Cuba doesn't have any intelligence interests—I don't know about the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union utilizes Cuba because of its great potential in the intelligence field against the United States.

The Soviet intelligence officers always saw in the Cuban intelligence service a great potential of penetration in the United States, because Cuba is a small country, not a great power, and many people in the United States feel a certain sympathy toward a small country.

Senator DENTON. I wonder if you could confirm an impression I have received from previous testimony to the effect that Fidel Castro himself, for a considerable period of time, was ambitious about spreading communism with all the Cuban intelligence apparatus connected thereto, into Latin America. However, at a time roughly corresponding to Che Guevara's death, and possibly be-

cause of the economic burden associated with these activities, he became less ambitious. The Soviet Union at this stage tried to first persuade Castro and, failing that, imposed economic pressure on him to coerce him into continuing his efforts to communize Latin America—there followed the installation of the KGB general and the takeover of the DGI.

I have that general impression and wonder if you have any comments.

Mr. PERAZA. There are certain events which took place at that time, before the KGB took over control completely. In effect, Cuba, for economic reasons, could not maintain an intelligence service by itself. If Cuba tried to develop an intelligence service greater and more powerful than the one it had, then it would have created a problem for the economy.

Then there is a division operation which took place in Communist Cuba in order to be able to direct more effectively all the forces against the United States. And it was for this reason that the various sections of intelligence work were created in Cuba, for the reason that we know. The Soviet Union needed military, economic and political information from the United States. The Cuban intelligence service had the possibility to provide this information to the Soviet Union, and it is for this reason that the Cuban intelligence service changed and passed directly into the hands of the Soviet intelligence service.

For this reason, the Soviet Union did some favors to Cuba. One of them was to provide financial aid to other fields of the economy. The second, in trying to bolster Fidel Castro's ego, they gave him the power or the freedom to work against the Latin American countries, such as Nicaragua, El Salvador. They allowed Castro to take Manuel Piñero away, and name him head of the Department of Liberation, and the intelligence service remained under the orders of Colonel Simonov.

It is then that the division of tasks began. The other part, which concerns Africa, the Department of Liberation in Palestine, which is operated in conjunction with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Socialist countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other countries.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. In other words, you have corrected my impression by your testimony, in that Castro was not pressured or forced; he was permitted the means to carry out his own ambitions about communizing in Latin America as long as he served the Soviet Union's specific aim of rolling over the United States.

Mr. PERAZA. There you can see that the economic aid of the Soviet Union to Cuba is different. Specifically as regards the intelligence service, you can say that the intelligence service of Cuba can count on any means, but the Department of Liberation of Latin America and Africa has a limited amount of money and a limited quantity of weapons and other means.

For instance, the Cuban intelligence service has no limits as far as money, armament and equipment. This happened after 1971.

Senator DENTON. I am confused on one point. I presume that there are DGI activities in Africa.

Mr. PERAZA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. And many other countries, other localities.

Mr. PERAZA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Thus it seems to be going too far to say that the exclusive target of the DGI is the United States, unless one can place it into this context: The DGI response to the KGB and the Soviet Union's principal objective is to destroy our system. As a means to that end, they undertake activities in every nation of the world, which could account for the DGI operating in those countries.

Is that what you meant by the United States being the exclusive target?

Mr. PERAZA. We don't disagree. What appears difficult, outside of the intelligence service, to be able to define which activity is directed directly against the United States or directly against some other country.

For example, when we went to London, the plans of intelligence work were directed toward certain British citizens. But the central or main objective was to utilize these people in one way or another to penetrate the United States, which is the principal objective of the intelligence center in London, the penetration of the American Embassy in London, and all the efforts were directed toward that center.

For instance, in the case of Spain, Cuba detected that the United States was directing certain activities from Spain and all the group of the CIA that worked—I mean, of the Cuban intelligence that worked against the CIA were transferred to Spain to work against Spain. But the principal objective was to detect the activities of the U.S. intelligence in Spain, with the objective of penetrating the United States, with, in other words, all the activities of the intelligence service directed toward the penetration of the United States, which is the main objective.

This is the reason for being of the Cuban intelligence service.

Senator DENTON. How many illegals, nondiplomatic types, have come into the United States, in the sense of penetration, while you were working for the DGI?

Mr. PERAZA. The orders were for Cuban penetration on a limited level of infiltration. But notwithstanding this, when we talk about something limited, when we talk about limited infiltration, we talk about an agent, as in the case of Camarioca, when—I don't remember the exact year, 19—I don't remember the exact year. I think it was 1965, or around then, when this great group of Cubans came to the United States.

We had prepared a group to infiltrate this exodus about a year before. We took the names from the lists of the Cubans who wanted to leave Cuba, and they recruited within those who thought of coming to stay, and they infiltrated agents with their names and their relatives.

Many times this group of agents is great in number, but when they come to the United States, many of them do not continue the work, because in addition to the living conditions, they don't have the proper preparation. This did not happen in 1971, when they opened the first illegal center in the United States. When we talk about the first center of illegals in the United States, we are not talking about regular agents; they are officers of the intelligence service, officers who come under different names. And they came

prepared, after having taken a special course of preparation in the Soviet Union.

Senator DENTON. We have been told that there are now about 300 DGI officers and agents in the Miami area alone.

Do you believe that number is accurate? Why would such a large intelligence presence be required there?

Mr. PERAZA. The objective of these 300 agents, and possibly more, does not touch directly the work of the intelligence service. One of the objectives is to distract the counterintelligence services of the United States when they send such a number of agents.

The true agents, the legal center of intelligence, receives the real support because those officers are much better prepared, more organized. And the counterintelligence agencies, because of the small number of agents, have no possibility of detecting the true agents.

In addition to the legal center, which would be a support activity, the great number of refugees per se are used as ideological agents, creating difficulties and problems and make more acute this type of problem. As agents-provocateur, in other words.

Under those circumstances, the FBI does not have the time to detect the real agents. This is reason why, for instance, that my professor of intelligence in Moscow spent 20 years in an illegal center in the United States, and claimed to have never been bothered.

Senator DENTON. I will turn it over to Senator East.

But it reminds me of the fact that aerospace warfare for the defense becomes very difficult when decoys are launched. Is that correct? Is that an accurate analogy?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Senator East.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN P. EAST

Senator EAST. Thank you, Senator Denton.

Mr. Peraza, I wish to thank you for coming this morning and sharing your valuable testimony with the subcommittee. And I also would like to publicly mention the great leadership the chairman is giving in this subcommittee and particularly in this whole vital area of security and terrorism.

I am somewhat intrigued, Mr. Peraza, in your testimony to try to get a finger on the key strands of your contribution here. In the DGI Soviet connection, at least while you were there and on which you could speak with particular authority, from what I gather from your testimony, it is not merely a case of Soviet and DGI cooperation, a certain coequal, that it is not then a matter of mutuality or coequal partners, it is a matter of Soviet dominance. In short, it is not a partnership, it is a subordinate role the DGI is playing.

Mr. PERAZA. I can explain. Between the years 1959 to 1970 there was between Cuba and the KGB a cooperation of intelligence. For this reason, in the year 1968 a committee of the chiefs of the intelligence service of Cuba went to the Soviet Union to offer the intelligence that they had obtained in the United States. This information was given to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Korea, and other countries that I do not remember.

But beginning from 1970, the intelligence service of Cuba was placed under the direct orders of a general or a colonel—a Russian General or Colonel Simonov. When we left to go to London, we had to discuss the operational plans with him. He was the one who approved the money and the different activities which we were going to perform in England.

Prior to 1970 the intelligence plans were approved by the chief of intelligence, the Cuban chief of intelligence. After 1970 the budget of the intelligence service was prepared by Simonov and was sent to the Soviet Union to be approved.

The 100 officers who went out in 1970, we had to send a copy of the plans of penetration and infiltration to the Soviet Union. We also had to send to the Soviet Union the names of all the agents who worked in the United States.

Up to that point we had sent their pseudonyms, but we had never sent their real names. And from that moment on we had to send the names, the operational plans, all the activities, contacts. And they changed the activities of the principal center's legal centers of operations, like the United Nations, the activity that dealt with transferring weapons and money, explosives, to Puerto Rico.

It was forbidden by the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union worked on the premise that the activity of the center in New York and the United States had to be directed toward the collection of military, economic, and political information, placing more emphasis on the economic aspect because the best intelligence officers of Cuba were transferred to the Directorate of Economic Intelligence.

Senator EAST. So what you have suggested here, obviously, in this response is that as you saw it and understood it, it certainly then was not a matter of equals cooperating to achieve specific ends; but it was clearly a dominant Soviet role and a subordinate Cuban role. That, in short, you have given very good evidence to suggest that conclusion. Am I correct in drawing that conclusion? At least that is the one that I do draw.

Mr. PERAZA. Yes, sir.

Senator EAST. To move on to a second point. In this Soviet-Cuban connection, and perhaps this is a question difficult for you to answer from the role you were performing, did you have any evidence or did you have any opportunity to know whether the Soviet Union used the intelligence arm of any other country quite as extensively in terms of worldwide scope that from your testimony as it is using, or was using the DGI?

In short, is the DGI the apple of their eye in terms of subversive terrorist activity in the underdeveloped world, Africa, Asia, Latin America, certainly in Latin America and Africa? The Cuban DGI had a very unique role here? Or were there lots of other intelligence services of other countries, Soviet-connected, that were also utilized in this fashion and extensively?

Mr. PERAZA. When I took the course in the Soviet Union, together with us there was a group of Vietnamese, a group of Poles, a group of Czechoslovaks. But there existed a difference in what was the preparation of those groups and those of Cuba. In other words, there was a different emphasis placed on the preparation of the instruction given to the Cubans and the other groups.

We could see as student officers of intelligence in the Soviet Union that we were the apple of their eye, we were the preferred ones. We had more access to information. We had more access to what concerns public relations, public information.

We were able to visit places that other students of intelligence were not allowed or could not visit. Really, at that moment the Soviet Union considered us as part of their own intelligence service. With all that, there was a difference. They were looking at us from the top and we from the bottom. Yes, that is right.

Senator EAST. So then, on the basis of your—

Mr. PERAZA. In other words, they were looking down at us and we had to look up to them.

Senator EAST. You are suggesting that, one, your role was a clearly subordinate one, the DGI to the Soviet Union. We have established that.

And then, second, even though they were, of course, training and utilizing intelligence entities from other countries—you mentioned Vietnam and so forth—that there was this very unique position of the DGI and of the Cubans who were in a preferred position with the Soviet Union, I would assume in the sense of not only what you have said in terms of instruction, but in terms of the Soviet Union anticipating utilizing the DGI extensively wherever it might be appropriate to carry on this kind of activity, be it in Central America, South America, be it in Africa?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes. This is definitely so.

Senator EAST. Why do I not relinquish to you, if you would like? I think I have had adequate time here. I can come back.

Senator DENTON. Oh, no. We will turn it right back to you, Senator East.

Senator EAST. No, you go right ahead.

Senator DENTON. I just had one or two very specific questions I wanted to make sure were asked.

Mr. Peraza, do you have any personal knowledge that the following diplomats assigned in the United States have DGI connections? The first two were in Washington: Teofilo Acosta and Ricardo Escartin? The third man was in the United Nations. We have a photo of him which I will refer to you after your answer. His name is Julian Torres Rizo.



Photograph of Julian Torres Rizo


Mr. PERAZA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Do they have DGI connections?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes. They were intelligence officers. In the specific case of Washington and the United Nations, it is not necessary to ask if they are intelligence officers or not because the rules of the DGI are that all the diplomats who come to the United States or to New York have to be members of the intelligence service, including when, for instance, someone is recruited as an agent of the intelligence service. Rizo was a reporter for Prensa Latina. He was recruited and prepared as an intelligence officer at least for 2 years before he left to come to the United States.

Senator DENTON. Is the other photograph one of Rizo also?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes. It is of Rizo. He was not actually a reporter for Prensa Latina but he worked in Prensa Latina. He was connected with Prensa Latina when he was recruited for the intelligence service.



#1 Julian Torres Rizo, one of the most active DGI officers both in Cuba and the United States (3 years at the U.N. DGI station in New York), in the company of Georgina Chabau (#3), also an active DGI agent in the Venceremos Brigade Camps.— Photo was taken March 7, 1970, at Aguacate, Havana, during a meeting of the second contingent of the Venceremos Brigade.

Senator DENTON. And Rizo was at the DGI station in New York for 3 years, as I understand it.

Mr. PERAZA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. He was an active DGI agent in the Venceremos Brigade camps?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes. This was his first intelligence job. His first intelligence job was to recruit members of the Venceremos Brigade. He had also connections with many North Americans, preparing himself to come to the United States. And he continued directing the work of these agents in the United States.

Senator DENTON. The second photograph shows him with the youth of the Venceremos Brigade at Aguacate in Havana during a meeting of the second contingent of the Venceremos Brigade.

Would you tell us what the Venceremos Brigade was, what it was composed of and what its general mission was?

Mr. PERAZA. The Venceremos Brigade brought the first great quantity of information through American citizens that was obtained in the United States, because up to the moment when the brigades came into existence—I do not remember the exact year, around 1969—the amount of information that we had on American citizens came from public sources, and it was confusing.

One of the first jobs that we gave them, very simply, was to obtain the telephone books of the United States with the objective of identifying and verifying the identity of certain people. And the Venceremos Brigade helped by sending those telephone books and information, including the U.S. Senate, because among the members of the brigade there were persons who knew some Senators and relatives of Senators.

With the brigade there was an extraordinary emphasis placed on the Senate of the United States and it appears with quite a bit of success in some cases.

Senator DENTON. Very interesting. We will follow up on that statement in a closed session.

Do you know whether Julian Rizo served as Ambassador from Cuba to Grenada?

Mr. PERAZA. I understand that he is down there. And the fact that he is down there is that, after all the publicity he received, it is logical that he would be sent to occupy a diplomatic post.

Senator DENTON. So he is a DGI agent acting as an Ambassador in Grenada now?

Mr. PERAZA. There are many ambassadors who have been intelligence officers. You have to keep in mind that the Ambassador is the highest representative of the government in that country.

For instance, in the case of the Japanese Ambassador, he was the chief of center of Canada for many years. It was the Cuban Ambassador in Japan who was the chief of center in Canada before he went to Japan as an Ambassador.

Senator DENTON. Is it true that the present Ambassador to Nicaragua is Julian Lopez Diaz, the man to whom we referred previously as a DGI agent?


Mr. PERAZA. I cannot identify him by the name he uses. All the officers of intelligence use pseudonyms.

Senator DENTON. The man Rizo you did identify by photograph, and he is the Ambassador in Grenada. We will supply you with photographs of Julian Lopez Diaz, and Ulises Estrada, who was the Ambassador to Jamaica, and try to ascertain if they are DGI agents in your knowledge.

Mr. Peraza, I have a photograph of two handgrenades, Russian made antipersonnel weapons, which were found in Miami. Three have been exploded in Miami, causing considerable damage. One was exploded as recently as Monday of this week.

Have you seen this type of grenade, and, if so, does the DGI use it or issue it to its agents?

[Photograph is handed to the witness.]



Mr. PERAZA. Yes. It is the typical model used by the technical department, which once was called the M-1. Today it is called Technical Department of the Intelligence. This is the department which supplies the intelligence service with different types of grenades and explosives. All this armament, including North American types of weapons, are found in Miami. This is very common.

Senator DENTON. In North Vietnam we had a Cuban who was in charge of one of the most inhumane torture programs in our prison camps. We nicknamed him "Fidel." [Laughter.]

I just mention that in passing.

While you were in the Soviet Union for training, you had a number of experiences which would be interesting to this subcommittee. Would you outline in some detail the nature of your training while you were in the Soviet Union?

Mr. PERAZA. The training in the Soviet Union was based primarily in the knowledge of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other organizations of intelligence in the United States, the different working methods of the FBI. The course of penetration was given by the teacher who had spent 20 years in the United States as an illegal, and a considerable amount of time, hours, on explosives.

More though was general knowledge and communications channels. This is in general terms the type of training. The fundamental emphasis was on the organization of the CIA and the FBI and the other intelligence organizations, all the intelligence community of the United States. Also, among others, the Senate of the United States; a briefing on the economic, political conditions, and evaluation of certain individuals, political leaders of the United States which they obtain from public sources.

They gave briefings on the chiefs of the intelligence agencies their background, the means and the methods of recruiting agents used by the intelligence services of the United States, and the importance of the illegal centers, and what, at that time, they prepared us for to set up the illegal centers.

Senator DENTON. Senator East, would you like to continue?

Senator EAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Peraza, in pursuing the line of reasoning here of the Soviet-DGI connection and their obvious activities in the Third World, particularly of course in Central America, Latin America, and in Africa, you have in this dialog put some focus now upon the connections activity here in the United States. You mentioned the Venceremos Brigades of a decade ago. I gather from what you're saying, clearly they were manipulated by Soviet-DGI connections.

Were there and are there, if you can answer that, other organizational connections of this kind that are being utilized or exploited by the Soviets and the DGI to enhance their impact here in the United States? In short, what other evidence do we have at this time of a fairly active Soviet-DGI activity in the United States.

Mr. TARABOCHIA. Pardon me, sir? I didn't understand you.

Senator EAST. What evidence do we have of current Soviet-DGI activity in the United States beyond the Venceremos Brigades? Would we have reason to believe that there is more and continued activity of that kind?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes. Let's look at the intelligence service as it develops. For instance, the Cuban service sent to the Soviet Union 25 intelligence officers, 20 to 25 officers for the illegal center, 30 officers of the military counterintelligence, for the internal counterintelligence service from 30 to 50 officers, and this is out of the country.

Within Cuba, you have the military counterintelligence school, with Soviet officers who train officers of the military counterintelligence at the rate of about 200 officers per year. This military counterintelligence school is probably one of the most advanced counterintelligence schools on the continent. It not only uses Soviet instructors; they have instructors from the PLO and other terrorist organizations.

This school of military counterintelligence has been visited by the most famous terrorists in the world. For instance, Carlos himself, that Senator Denton referred to, visited that school after having gone to the Patrice Lumumba School in Moscow, because that school has the capability to train a group, an individual, or a leader of the highest level, such as Allende who visited that school, Amilcar Cabral of Cape Verde and São Tomé Islands, the former Portuguese colony.

Thousands of terrorists have gone through that school for training or a special training. This explanation was necessary in order for you to get an idea of the reasons. If this intelligence organization is to grow from year to year, it's an organization that needs a great number of agents working to survive.

For instance, how many officers are there in the United States at this moment? In New York, 20; in Washington, 4 or 5. Every intelligence officer makes a contact. He has to make a contact with at least one agent, every 3 days.

You see, if we add to that the legal center which operates in the United States, with 10 years of operation at this moment, there are 25 officers per year for 10 years, and how many illegal centers are operating in Miami? How many in New York? How many are there here in Washington?

For instance, the dream of the Cuban intelligence service was to send intelligence officers to Washington in order to be able to attend to a considerable number of friends and agents who before had to be taken care of from New York. Now it is much easier to do it here.

Senator EAST. So as you see this Soviet-DGI connection, not only of course active in the Third World, as we've already noted, but by reference here then to the United States, beginning with this contact of the Venceremos Brigade, you see this DGI connection in the United States as alive and well and presenting a threat of serious proportions. Just give me your brief judgment on that.

I gather from what you're saying you do so evaluate it? I don't want to put words in your mouth.

Mr. PERAZA. We can say that the Cuban intelligence has taken over parts of the work of the Soviet intelligence.

Senator EAST. Here in the United States?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes. The problem is, for instance, that the counterintelligence services of the United States always pay more attention to the Soviet intelligence officers. For example, a Cuban intel-

ligence officer, if he makes a contact with an American who has access to high, to classified information in the United States, he can do it much more easily.

When Soviet intelligence officers become active in New York or in Washington, you can see the counterintelligence focused on the Cubans decrease.

We made an experiment. The center of the Soviet intelligence in New York made an experiment, a joint operation on a certain day between Cuba and the Soviet Union. That day the Soviet officers in New York and the Cuban officers went out to see if they detected a lessening in the pressure on the Cuban intelligence officers. It almost disappeared when the Soviets began to move within their network.

Senator EAST. I gather then from what you're saying, the Soviet-DGI connection in the United States is obviously alive and well.

I would, Mr. Chairman, like to ask one final question and then regret, because I have found the testimony valuable and intriguing and enlightening, that I must go.

Since you have seen this conflict from the other side, I am one of course who has not been able to do that, I am intrigued with the question of how do the Soviets, the DGI, those people working in the field you are familiar with, how do they perceive us as an adversary? Obviously they perceive us in an adversarial role.

Do they perceive us as being strong-willed and perceptive? Or do they perceive us basically as weak and confused? Or perhaps somewhere in between? How would you characterize their perception of us as a nation, in view of this threat that they are conjuring up for us?

Mr. PERAZA. Taking the Communist theory that the Soviet Union uses as a point of departure, you have to take the ideological point of view. For instance, in the case of the CIA, the infiltration of the intelligence organizations has detected or knows of some weaknesses. One of them is the change of political parties in the Government or the political party system that changes the administration.

For instance, Cuba has an operational plan for intelligence for the next 20 years. In 1964 or 1965, the American intelligence ceased working. But they didn't place emphasis on the fact that they knew that the CIA had slowed down. They were trying to place emphasis on the CIA as being an organization extremely powerful, because they also presupposed that the policy might change. And for this reason, the intelligence organizations—both the Cuban and Soviet—took advantage of that moment to develop their intelligence officers and to obtain more information through technical means.

For example, there has been a unit in Cuba since 1960 that has monitored all the information from the United States. When the intelligence activities slowed down that year, the Soviet Union increased its equipment and increased the size of the intelligence office in Cuba. They increased the contacts in Cuba with agents of other countries. In Cuba there were contacts between Americans and Soviet intelligence officers.

In other words, they take advantage of the changes in policy.

Senator EAST. But as concisely as you can in just a word or two on my question of how they perceive us as an adversary? I regret that I must leave. If he could make that as concise as he could.

Senator DENTON. Do they think we're smart or dumb?

Mr. PERAZA. With many technical resources; very, very dangerous from the technical point; very strong economically at the time, but not being able to utilize the human resources, because they place much more emphasis on the technical resources.

For instance, in the case of the intelligence services, one is prepared more against technical services than the individual, per se.

Senator EAST. Excuse me. If I could just interrupt. They perceive us as strong in the economic sphere and the technical sphere, but in terms of ideas and will and understanding of the threat, weak? Would that be a correct conclusion?

Mr. PERAZA. Ideologically, the intelligence organizations are oriented toward certain tasks. For instance, to develop the drug addiction. Any type of weakness that existed, corruption that exists in the United States is an intelligence activity. For this reason, they use the 300 or 400 agents they have floating around. That's their task, to make more acute the internal problems that exist. For instance, the racial problem in the United States.

Senator EAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know you have some further questions. Thank you very much.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Senator East.

I think Senator East was trying to find out whether the KGB and DGI people see us as vulnerable because our public and perhaps our Government do not understand how the game is being played in the terms of ideological warfare, intelligence operations and the terrorist operations connected thereto.

Mr. PERAZA. I don't understand the question.

Senator DENTON. OK. Senator East tried two or three times. I have tried once. I'll go to my next question.

Do you have any personal knowledge of efforts by the DGI or the KGB to penetrate the various Government agencies in the United States or in England?

Mr. PERAZA. Yes. One of the plans was the American Embassy in England. Another of the plans of the Cuban intelligence is the penetration of the American intelligence. For this reason, they try to obtain the names and the backgrounds of the individuals. The objective is to recruit them to work for them.

For instance around all the organizations, American organizations in foreign countries, they do the operation of placement. It is nothing more than an expediency, where they try to obtain all the information about the organization, the people who work there, and those who have relations with that organization.

This information is very easy to obtain sometimes. For instance, the American Embassy in London, you ask for the list of the diplomats who work there. You ask a reporter, who are those who work for the intelligence agencies and who are the diplomats. They already have the information. It's not very difficult. Then they begin to start conversations at parties with you.

Senator DENTON. Senator Thurmond, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, has sent us this question. He recognizes, he says, that Mr. Peraza has no specific knowledge of the DGI after Novem-

ber 1971, but wants to know if Mr. Peraza has any comment on the frequent speculation in the U.S. press that Orlando Letelier was in contact with DGI agents. As you know, Letelier was the Ambassador to the United States during the Allende years in Chile.

Mr. PERAZA. The only information, actual information that I have is about Allende. Allende, he was not—before becoming President, he was not an agent of the Cuban intelligence service, but he was a very, very good friend of them—he visited the Cuban organization.

Senator DENTON. Are you personally aware, Señor, that there were any successful placings of high-ranking DGI or KGB agents within the U.S. intelligence service or any defense or security-oriented agencies?

Mr. PERAZA. The information existing on this case is in the hands of the organizations that—

Senator DENTON. I did not want names. I just wanted to know if he had knowledge that there were some.

Mr. PERAZA. Yes, definitely. We can use as an example the Senate.

Senator DENTON. I imagine we better have a closed session on that.

Mr. PERAZA. Yes, yes.

Senator DENTON. I am familiar with the considerations you have had to face in making the decision to appear before this subcommittee and I would like to congratulate you on your bravery. Thank you for your testimony. I also want to thank Mr. Tarabochia for his excellent interpretation, and Mr. Herrera for standing by.

Mr. HERRERA. Yes.

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much. This hearing stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 10 a.m. on March 4, 1982.]

THE ROLE OF CUBA IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION

Terrorist and Intelligence Activities of the Cuban Government in South Florida

THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:24 a.m., in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milling, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator DENTON. This hearing will come to order.

I want to welcome our witnesses, Sergio Pinon and Daniel Benitez, special agents with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, who, in the midst of the press of urgent duties, have found the time to come to Washington, D.C., and testify in front of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. They will be testifying on terrorist and intelligence activities of the Cuban Government in south Florida.

In an April 24, 1981, hearing entitled "Terrorism: Origins, Direction and Support," this subcommittee undertook an overview of the problems of worldwide terrorism. From the outset, the involvement of Cuba, its intelligence officers and its agents in international terrorism has been repeatedly cited. It is not my intention now to detail again the testimony that was offered on that occasion.

Last Friday, February 26, 1982, Gerardo Peraza, a former senior official of Cuban intelligence, the DGI, appeared before this subcommittee. Mr. Peraza joined Fidel Castro's rebel army in 1958, rose through the ranks of Cuban intelligence, and received training in Moscow.

His final assignment was at the DGI center in London as a member of the Cuban embassy staff, with the cover title of Second Secretary. In 1971, Gerardo Peraza sought refuge in the United States. His testimony before the subcommittee was his first public appearance since leaving Cuba.

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Before going any further, I would like to welcome Jose Delgado, a Third Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section, who is attending the hearing this morning.

[Delgado was seated in the audience at the press table.]

Mr. Peraza testified that between 1958 and 1970, the Cuban DGI and the Soviet KGB cooperated on intelligence collection. In 1968, a committee of chiefs of the intelligence service personally offered intelligence that the DGI had collected in the United States to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and other countries in the Soviet Bloc.

Beginning in 1970, the Cuban intelligence service was placed under the direction of the KGB. It was directly supervised by a Soviet colonel, Viktor Simenov. Prior to Peraza's departure for his assignment in London, he was required to discuss his operational plans with Simenov, who controlled the expenditure of funds for operations. Before 1970, intelligence plans were approved by the Cuban chief of intelligence. After 1970, the DGI budget was prepared by Simenov and was sent to the Soviet Union for approval.

Before 1970, Cuba lacked adequate resources to mount a major intelligence offensive against the United States. However, in 1970, with financial resources furnished by the Soviet Union, the DGI was able to recruit about 100 intelligence officers in 2 weeks.

A substantial amount of Soviet money was used to buy vehicles and technical equipment and to pay for the expenses of placing the agents. In effect, the DGI now had what amounted to an unlimited budget.

Each of the 100 intelligence officials who left Cuba in 1970 for assignment abroad had to provide a copy of his infiltration plan to a Soviet officer. In addition, the DGI officers had to provide Soviet officers with the true names of all their agents working in the United States. Prior to that point, only the pseudonyms of the agents had been provided to the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Peraza also stated that the DGI is in no way a partner of the KGB; it is a subordinate entity, taking its direction from agents of the Kremlin.

Mr. Peraza stated that, in exchange for financial support of its intelligence apparatus, Cuba was required to direct its operations toward collection of intelligence information of interest to the Soviet Union. This included intelligence, military, economic, and political matters. According to Peraza, the Cubans were more readily able to obtain this type of information than were the Soviets, for the Cubans were not so easily detected.

Mr. Peraza said that during the late 1960's and early 1970's the DGI exploited weaknesses it perceived in the U.S. intelligence community to install agents in the United States. He further indicated that the United States could not detect that activity and that all Cuban intelligence forces were ordered to prepare penetrations against the United States in any country in which there was an identifiable U.S. intelligence target.

He testified that DGI agents in Great Britain had the principal mission of spying on British citizens in order to penetrate the U.S. activities in the United Kingdom. DGI operatives in Spain spied on citizens there, with the principal objective of penetrating the United States.

Mr. Peraza confirmed that even the Cuban involvement in Angola was seen primarily as a step toward the defeat of the United States, which is the ultimate and exclusive target of all Soviet and Cuban operations.

Peraza stated that he was personally aware of successful infiltration of high-ranking DGI agents into the U.S. Government. He claimed even the U.S. Senate had been penetrated.

In the testimony to be received today, we turn to an investigation of Cuban Government-sponsored terrorist and intelligence activities in south Florida. Earlier testimony and many public sources point to a large Cuban intelligence presence in the Miami area. This is due, in part, to the geographical proximity of Miami to Cuba, the Caribbean, South and Central America, and to the large Cuban American population in that area.

We hope to get a better understanding of the Cuban intelligence apparatus and of the threat it presents to the national security of the United States through an examination of its methods and operations in this major American city and surrounding area. The preliminary indications of the size and scope of these activities are most alarming. It is vital that we know the reality of what is going on so that our Government can take appropriate countermeasures.

It is a pleasure to welcome our witnesses, Special Agents Sergio Pinon and Daniel Benitez of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, who are presently stationed in Miami. Among their primary duties are intelligence gathering, supervision of informants, and investigation of terrorist and bombing incidents.

They also conduct major investigations of narcotics and organized crime, and since this subcommittee has the oversight of the Drug Enforcement Administration, we are also interested in their insights in these areas. Both these officers are highly capable career policemen with extensive experience in dealing with subversive and terrorist groups in the Miami area. They are working-level investigators who are close to the problems that we will examine today.

As respected members of the Latin community, they also bring to the subcommittee valuable insights into the feelings and perspective of the Miami Cuban community toward Castro's efforts.

Before you begin your opening statement, I want to make it clear for the record that the testimony you will present represents your personal views and not necessarily the views of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.

Before I ask you if I am correct, I will swear you in. Would you stand and raise your right hand, please?

Do you swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir.

Senator DENTON. Please be seated.

Am I correct in my premise that these are your views and not those, necessarily, of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes.

Mr. PINON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Agent Pinon, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. PINON. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. You may proceed with your statement.

STATEMENT OF SERGIO PINON AND DANIEL BENITEZ, SPECIAL AGENTS, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of Commissioner James W. York of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, who, by being cognizant of the special problems facing the State of Florida, has provided an atmosphere where the investigative initiative of field personnel is respected and valued; also, on behalf of Special Agent-in-Charge Joe H. Clark of the Miami Operations Center, who, in recognition of the special problems in Miami, has consistently afforded us the time and special resources necessary to do in-depth investigations and intelligence gathering in the areas of criminal activities and terrorism which have so much affected south Florida; and, further, on our own behalf, we would like to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity given us to appear here today and to make this presentation. Our presentation will relate to this subcommittee's area of interest: terrorism and national security.

As members of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Special Agent Benitez and I have obtained a first-hand knowledge of the problems of terrorism and subversive activity occurring in the United States and, more specifically, in south Florida where we are currently assigned.

Due to the nature of our law enforcement assignment, the ability to obtain a total picture of these activities has been established. Our experience includes service with law enforcement agencies of other political subdivisions within the State of Florida. This has given us the background and insight of the problems face to face, and this now allows for an expanded, broad view of the regional problems.

The problem is the fact that a large amount of criminal activity occurs in south Florida, and this activity is, in part, of a terrorist nature and, in part, of a subversive nature. We will address the terrorist nature of the problem first.

During the last 10 years, a large number of bombings, shootings, and homicides, many still unsolved, have taken place in south Florida. Much of the activity has taken place in Dade County, although other neighboring counties have been affected. The largest number of incidents within Dade County have been reported in the city of Miami.

Approximately 59 percent of the population of the city of Miami is Latin, most of Cuban origin, and the total population hovers at around 1½ million. Population figures are not constant due to the tourist trade and the transient nature of tourism.

The terrorism problem is based on a divergence of opinions as to how to achieve a common goal, which is the removal of Fidel Castro from Cuba; on the other hand, there are a multitude of self-professed anti-Castro organizations fighting for position within the

community along with other organizations which claim to be anti-Castro, but are, in fact, anti-American socialists in their ideals.

These groups have taken advantage of the popular notion that being anti-Castro is synonymous with being anti-Communist, anti-Socialist and pro-American. The ability of these groups to exist, solicit funds, influence the political process, et cetera, is mostly based upon the partial ignorance of the public at large.

Some segments of the local and Federal Government disagree as to what its organizations do, how they do it, and who its members are. Some groups are only in agreement that Castro should be gotten rid of, and they believe that socialist-Marxist theories will work if someone other than Castro were to implement them. Their struggle is not with the system, but with the system manager, and their goal is to replace the manager with one of their own choosing.

The second part of the problem in the area of subversion is closely linked to what we just spoke of—groups using their anti-Castro posture as their only credential in order to obtain the much-needed acceptance and funding.

If one accepts the premise that the United States has funded, trained, and protected several anti-Castro groups, one must also accept that other foreign powers would fund, train, and support their groups. These groups by publicly taking a strong anti-Castro posture were accepted with open arms in the Cuban community in the United States, and especially in south Florida.

The social, economic, and political intercourse in an open and democratic society like ours will allow crossing over of ideas but, more importantly, personnel. The effects of this phenomenon over a number of years will yield a maximum penetration of the large segment of the real anti-Castro groups. The legitimate anti-Castro groups' infiltration chronologically coincided with the withdrawal of support by the U.S. Government of some anti-Castro groups.

Left without any active groups to infiltrate and subvert, the full attention was diverted to subverting the whole Cuban community, the plan being that once the Cuban community was totally penetrated and once polarization of groups and ideals occurred, this same Cuban community would then serve to polarize and split the larger Anglo communities in south Florida.

The approach was simple and direct: First, split the Cuban groups as to different methods to carry out their goals; example, military actions as opposed to dialog; conducting raids against Cuba and Cuban targets in other South American countries, as opposed to carrying out urban disruption in major metropolitan areas under the guise of hitting Castro targets in the United States.

Another example, the FLNC, which is the Cuban National Liberation Front, during the mid-1970's—as to disruption of their anti-Castro war, several groups were expelled by the majority of the groups with the FLNC coalition. The groups started to break up over ideological reasons. This, coupled with all the common problems of working towards a common goal, made it easier for the breakups to occur.

Without direct government funding and a lack of central control, some groups came up with goals and directions as varied and diverse as the people within the groups. When the factor of Latin

personalities and machismo are thrown in, the result was that some groups were involved in almost open warfare in the streets of Miami.

An example of the lack of cooperation was the agreement that was reached for three groups to jointly carry out a bombing. The group that built the bomb set it to explode prematurely. The group that provided the manpower lost a man, Juan Felipe De La Cruz. In this way, one group beat another in making the press release. The mere fact that the groups were in turmoil within themselves served as a basis to confuse the Anglo community.

Persons who, all of a sudden, were propelled to public life and who came up with easy and definite solutions to complex problems were able to gather support within the Anglo community. They were able to use that community support to achieve professional infiltration.

Due to the problems involving the public use of names of persons or businesses, we have picked from the best-known examples—the ones in which arrests, indictments, convictions or public records can be used to prove the incidents mentioned.

During the year 1980, the Reverend Manuel Espinosa denounced Fidel Castro and his government. He also publicized his own association in covert work for the Castro government. Because Espinosa was the only exile whom Fidel Castro made public reference to, Espinosa's ability to penetrate Cuba's inner sanctum was well established.

Espinosa's revelations have for the most part been proven and stood the test of time. During his conferences, Espinosa named numerous persons as being Castro agents and denounced them as alleged infiltrators into government agencies.

Lourdes DoPico, also known as Lourdes Rey DoPico, had an active participation in the running, ownership and management of the firms Cuba Travel and Canaveral Travel. Both of these travel agencies were providing tours to Cuba from the mainland of the United States of America. Both of these corporations were under investigation until late February 1982, when Canaveral Travel was indicted for Trading With the Enemy Act violations.

According to newspaper articles published as a result of those indictments, Lourdes DoPico was indicted on the same charges, and also charged with illegally transferring funds to Cuba.

Lourdes DoPico and her husband, Vicente DoPico, were also members of the Areito magazine, a socialist-communist publication, printed in New York City, and allegedly funded by Cuba. This publication is distributed in the United States.

According to Espinosa, while working at Jackson Memorial Hospital, a county-owned hospital in Dade County, Lourdes DoPico was getting information of patients in their mental ward. The person who provided information for transmission to Cuba is alleged to be Elsa Prieto. Due to the nature of mental illness these records are protected by State laws and Government guidelines, and usually only upon court order or personal waiver and release, can the information be obtained by a third party. The access of this type of information to suspected or actual Castro agents is of a great concern to all. Imagine if you will, what a fantastic tool for extortion or manipulation a foreign government would have by having this

information. Let us ask you, how would you feel if you, your relatives, or assistants had a history of mental illness, and if this information was leaked to Cuba or any other country? Can you imagine the pressure that they could exercise over you?

Elsa Prieto was identified by Manuel Espinosa during his first conference on January 31, 1980 as a member of the Antonio Maceo Brigade. The brigade openly admits to its communist ideals. The Antonio Maceo Brigade has had several of their members allegedly involved and linked with convicted black activist, Al Featherston, convicted during the early 1970's for teaching young blacks to fire-bomb schools in the black community. He recently was indicted by a grand jury on aggravated assault charges stemming from the shooting of some Mariel refugees at his home.

The Antonio Maceo Brigade has been active at Florida International University in Dade County in attempts to recruit and sign up persons to avoid the new draft laws issued by President Reagan.

Featherston is a self-proclaimed Marxist. While we are talking about infiltration into professional fields, several other examples come to mind. Again, Lourdes DoPico was involved in working at Central Credit, a credit-rating firm for businesses. According to Espinosa's disclosures, an effort to obtain information in reference to the credit potential and buying ability of exiled Cubans in Miami was underway by the Castro government.

Reverend Espinosa himself has stated that he worked at Equifax, which is a retail credit-reporting firm. The ability of a foreign government to establish the financial abilities of its exiles is of value to them to determine what requests can be realistically made of those exiles. The fact that the United States had an economic blockade as well as a trade embargo against Cuba, both of which are openly violated, makes knowing the economic potential of exiles in the United States of value.

For example, we have seen during the Mariel boatlift, the establishment of price ranges was in accordance with the real financial abilities of these exiles. If too high a price was asked for the release of relatives still held in Cuba, the boatlift would have failed, since most exiles would have been excluded. By making it affordable for a large majority of Cuban exiles, the large number of persons participating would create public opinion favorable to going through with the boatlift. The impact on the economic picture of south Florida, having hundreds of thousands of dollars in embargoed trade goods taken to Cuba, would cause the exiled community to be in total debt.

Second, once the Mariel refugees were in the United States, the exiles responsible for bringing them were economically unable to support them, having spent all their savings and exhausted their loan capacity to bring them in the first place. These newly arrived "Marielitos" would now become a burden not supported by the Cuban exiles. They immediately became city, county, State and Federal problems, thus creating a drain of U.S. funds and resources which was unplanned and unbudgeted.

As you can plainly see, the consequences of a few well-placed agents in the professional fields can eventually, if allowed to operate, cause a serious financial drain to the community and the

Nation during a time when such a drain can adversely affect our national security.

Other benefits were also accrued by Castro. For example, the previously good name of exiled Cubans as hard-working individuals was besmirched by the actions of several thousand newly arrived Cubans. Individuals with serious criminal backgrounds and inmates from mental institutions were released to the United States by Castro for the very reasons stated above.

Let us look at the reasons that the Mariel boatlift was able to get such a good reception in the Cuban community in Miami. In order to do this, one must go back to the late 1960's when an earlier boatlift had been tried with very little success. This attempt was called Camarioca.

It is reported that the reasons why the exodus failed were economic and political. The newly arrived exiles did not possess the financial means to fund, on their own, a massive exodus. Due to their short time in the United States, most exiles were still struggling to get on their feet financially. Exiles did not have the political clout to cause the elected officials to subsidize such an undertaking. Although several thousand were swindled with promises of having their families brought over, no great boatlift occurred. Because of this failure in the past, the knowledge of the exiled community's economy was essential.

Twelve years later, the exile community was economically and politically mature enough to support such an undertaking. Any person who saw the Mariel boatlift developing could have predicted it; we, in fact, did.

Similar attempts had been made in the past—at one time, one by a Cuban exile, Ramon Donestevez, the then-owner of Pirahna boats. The exile climate was not ready for Donestevez' open talks with the Castro government. Although hidden in the best of motives—that of family reunification—Donestevez was denounced as a Castro puppet by the community, and as a result, Donestevez was the victim of several bombing attempts and two detonated bombs. Donestevez became the victim of a terrorist-style murder which still remains unsolved. Donestevez bodyguard for several years was a man by the name of Rafael Contreras, who was the owner of a small TV repair shop located in Hialeah, a city with the second largest Cuban exile population in Dade County.

During the late 1970's, after the Donestevez murder, the Reverend Manuel Espinosa was one of the few who dared to again propose the reunification of Cuban families, but this time the climate in the exile community was much more liberal and this type of political view was shared by many.

However, it is not coincidence that Espinosa had as one of his bodyguards the same Rafael Contreras. Several years later, Reverend Espinosa, during his denunciations, admits having been a principal player in a Cuban-organized and controlled plan to cause the exile community to travel to Cuba. Espinosa plainly admits to having been doing Castro's bidding. Castro, in one of his speeches, urged Cubans in the United States to follow Espinosa's guidance. So, we can plainly see that the same persons move with each others in the same roads to reach present goals within the United States.

Espinosa's bodyguard, Rafael Contreras, was publicly identified by Espinosa as a lieutenant in the Cuban intelligence service. Contreras was later convicted in criminal court of making threatening phone calls to persons in Miami. One of those calls was made by him from Cuba and in it he threatened the Reverend Espinosa with Cuba's retaliation if Espinosa did not desist of his treachery, by publicly denying Castro's plans to cause chaos in the United States. While this was happening, several companies were opened to travel to Cuba. Some offered the exile tours to Cuba for an amount paid in full in advance, while it offered a much cheaper fare for the same tour to American citizens of non-Cuban descent. Here again we see the polarization of Cuban and Anglo communities in order to exacerbate already tense relations. The old adage of divide and conquer seems to be at work here; only in a more subtle manner but just as effective. The division of the community and the polarization still continues today.

Let us examine the companies that offered these tour packages to Cuba beginning with a brief history of Havanatur. In 1979, it was expelled from the United States for doing illegal business with Cuba and for being an illegal agent of Fidel Castro.

The owner of Havanatur was Carlos Alfonso Gonzalez. He has been identified by the U.S. State Department as a Cuban intelligence agent. Havanatur's president, Charles Romeu, has along with Carlos Alfonso Gonzalez, been indicted by a Federal grand jury for violations of the Trading With the Enemy Act.

Once expelled, Havanatur changed its operation to a company named Travel Services; it was also expelled and it left its concessions to American Airways Charter. American Airways Charter is owned by Fernando Fuentes Cova and Roger Dooley. Both have been indicted by Federal grand juries in Miami for violations of the Trading With the Enemy Act, according to public records.

Canaveral Travel, Cuban American Enterprises, and several other corporations held or owned by those already named were also involved.

Let us not belabor the point; suffice it to say that these companies, their ownership and ties to Cuba were on several occasions publicly denounced by Reverend Espinosa and others.

One of the points we wish to make is that the operations of these companies were in no way secret. The whole community knew they existed; they knew what was done by these companies. Still, they were not only tolerated, but also heavily patronized.

If we are to stop this kind of activity, new and strong legislation must be enacted to not only prohibit these companies from trading with Cuba, but also to provide for legal sanctions for those who choose to patronize them.

Gentlemen, let us not be fooled by thinking that a few indictments of these companies have solved the problem. The fact is that many more companies and persons are still in business. Due to the legal restrictions placed on law enforcement at all levels not only in the investigative arena but within the intelligence gathering and information dissemination areas, most of the information cannot be collected, recorded or disseminated. Therefore, we cannot publicly provide you with names of persons or corporations unless

these persons have been arrested or convicted or are a matter of public record.

Other persons who assisted in setting up the stage for the boatlift were named by sources of our department. One of these persons is Hildo Romeo, currently a convicted felon and Federal fugitive for his fraudulent activity in the Mariel boatlift. Romeo was denounced as a Castro agent by Espinosa during his interviews. He also made admissions about his Cuban intelligence connections at the time of arrest.

Romeo operated with such impunity that it is almost incredible. For example, he would set up meetings in strange areas and demand that the U.S. currency be brought to him in paper sacks as payment. He often gave no receipts or guarantees. Whenever pressed for receipts, he would draw initials or a star or similar item upon a small postage stamp size piece of paper and would issue this. The payments were to obtain his help in gaining release of Cubans from Cuban jails, et cetera. After his arrest, Romeo admitted having diverted hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars to Cuba.

Romeo is a good example of the openness and total disregard for our laws that Castro agents working in this country exhibit. During his first arrest, Romeo, while in handcuffs at the police department building and facing several felony charges, was brazen enough to threaten me and Special Agent Benitez. He said, "You guys should be nice to me, and be careful because Cuba is going to come after you for bothering me." When reminded he was the one in handcuffs and we were able to go home after we booked him, he said, "You cannot hurt me; I am too big for you."

The point is that Romeo is not the most brazen; he, in fact, is a quiet man compared to some of the others we have dealt with. If one really looks at it, he really did beat us. We convicted him in court; he fled, served no time, and is in some other country, or even in the United States, enjoying the money he stole, perhaps waiting for others to do it again.

Romeo made the following statements to us during an interview immediately following his third arrest on worthless checks and fraud charges. Mr. Romeo stated that the Mariel boatlift was a plan conceived by Cuba and carried out by agents of Cuba's Directory of General Intelligence, DGI, working within the United States.

Romeo pointed out that the Mariel boatlift was led by Napoleon Vilaboa, a captain of Cuba's intelligence, and others working within Havanatur Travel Agency, operated by Colonel Carlos Alfonso, also of Cuban intelligence. Mr. Romeo confirmed working for Cuba's intelligence, but denied being an actual officer, unlike the following persons which he identified as being actual agents of Cuba that were involved in the Mariel boatlift: Col. Carlos Alfonso of American Airways; Col. Jorge De Bassa; Lt. Col. Fernando Fuentes Cova, American Airways Charter; Capt. Napoleon Vilaboa, DGI, and boatlift coordinator; Capt. Eduardo Lastra, heading covert operations in the United States and the Caribbean; Col. Charles Romeu, American Airways Charter; Juan Carbonell, Cuban Interest Section in Washington; Lt. Eduardo Rueda, DGI, and assisted in the boatlift; Lt. Col. Jose Ignacio Marquez, DGI in Cuba; Rafael

Correa, DGI, and assisted with the boatlift; Marcos Raul Correa, DGI, and assisted in the boatlift; Albor Ruiz, DGI, and also a member of the Antonio Maceo Brigade; Estevan Martin, DGI, and photographer, and also assisted in the boatlift; Orestes Aleman, DGI, Cuban American Enterprises.

Romeo requested that this information be kept confidential due to Cuba's infiltration within many Federal and State law enforcement agencies. The above information had already been received by other sources and, in fact, several of the above individuals have already been indicted by a Federal grand jury for trading with the enemy; others are still under investigation.

You can plainly see the infiltration by Cuban agents who are planted not only to gather information but also to cause distrust and fear of Cuban exiles within the United States.

For example, let's look at infiltration into the Government service area. It has been alleged, although not independently corroborated by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, that the affirmative action program has been used successfully by suspected Castro agents using race as a hiring criteria. This provides access to Government jobs when other criteria for employment is lacking, such as job knowledge, and other skills.

Let's examine advisers to boards and other quasi-governmental agencies. During 1979, while the Rev. Manuel Espinosa was working with Castro agents and reporting directly to Cuba, he held the 26th of July party at this residence. The 26th of July is one of the biggest Cuban revolutionary holidays and is only equal in pomp and might to the May Day parade in the U.S.S.R.

The guest list at Espinosa's 26th of July party was noteworthy. Attending the party were two of the highest ranking Cuban exiles within a major political party. These men were not only fundraisers but also served as advisers to some of the highest political figures in the south Florida area. It has been alleged that when consulted as to the possibility of stopping the Mariel boatlift, these persons provided high Government officials with statements that the Cuban exile community would riot, if not allowed to go to Cuba and bring their relatives. The power of these types of statements coupled with the recent riots that had rocked Miami during the same period provided an atmosphere conducive to community sentiment. It is easy to see why nothing was done to stop the boatlifts.

Let's focus our attention to other areas of equal importance. Earlier, we spoke of anti-Castro groups who flaunt their anti-Castro credentials, thus creating the illusion of being anti-Socialist and anti-Communist. For argument sake, let's just see if any group of such political or ideological persuasion should be allowed to become involved in such a legitimate government function as census taking.

A group known as Abdala was involved in the taking of 1980 census with the city of Miami. It is still not known if Abdala, as a group, was contracted or if merely a large group of its members were individually contracted on a personal basis because of existing friendships and/or political connections. Regardless of the group's ideology or how the contract was awarded, questions have arisen. There exists a serious doubt as to the accuracy of the census in some areas of Dade County. This is according to census supervisory

personnel contacted. Litigation is pending over the accuracy of the figures reported. One must wonder if it was not planned for this group to be involved and possibly precipitate doubts as to the census' accuracy? Could it have been an accidental happening, the sole work of coincidence? No one will ever know. The traditional Federal and local intelligence gathering units did not know it or predict it. Investigations are not in progress to find out more about it.

Gentlemen, if the possibility exists that the census can be sabotaged and, therefore, the balance of State and local government adversely affected, does not this tie directly to national security? We believe that it does, but you, ultimately, must be the judges.

We can only present the facts as they are known or reported to us. We do not reach conclusions from these facts.

At this time, we would like to present several examples of how well-planned and well-coordinated use of infiltrated agents and collaborators has helped to create chaos in our society.

The first example we would like to present is the Mariel boatlift. Let us first say that any of these examples we have chosen, due to their magnitude and significance, can serve to illustrate several points. Even so, they were chosen to represent a picture of a specific area of concern.

The Mariel boatlift included all types of problems in the criminal area. It comprised conspiracy to defraud, larceny and even attempted murder. Politically, it created a new voting bloc by raising the potential bloc from 54 percent to 59 percent within a geographic area.

Approximately 2 months before the actual boatlift took place, sources of our department provided the information that certain travel agencies had received orders to contact Napoleon Vilaboa to start with the plans for a boatlift. Right after this, the rumors began to circulate that Cuba would begin to release prisoners to the United States.

The rumor came by telephone calls and letters received from Cuba. The majority of these telephone calls and letters named persons within the Cuba exile community. These persons, for a certain fee, would use their contacts in Cuba to obtain the release of Cubans still held in Castro's jails.

The rumors hit the exile community like wildfire. The persons named were allegedly Napoleon Vilaboa, who fled; Hildo Romeo, who was convicted; Estevan Martin, who fled; Rafael Correa; Armando Rodriguez; Sandra and Jaime Franco, who were indicted; Nelly Gonzalez, Sandra's mother; Marcos Raul Correa; and three reverends who were later indicted by a U.S. attorney.

These persons were instantly transformed into extremely powerful figures; they were sought by exiles to assist them in getting their relatives to the United States. Store fronts were opened to accommodate the large crowds that wanted to pay these people to bring relatives back. Frequently, transactions were made on a cash basis only; no receipts were given. A flaw in Florida law was taken advantage of. This flaw precluded the use of a future promise not fulfilled from successful fraud prosecution. As a matter of fact, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement through legislative liai-

son, requested and obtained an introduction of corrective legislation after the Mariel experience.

After the investigation commenced, the victims were told by the person involved in the fraudulent activities that they (the victims) were committing a Federal crime by conspiring to bring unregistered aliens to the United States; that if arrests ensued from the transactions, it would be a one-on-one situation and they could equally be prosecuted. Victims were also told that police, judges, and politicians had been paid off, so no one should be trusted, as they worked for the Castro agents. This was a lie, but it created such distrust that no one would come forward to testify for several months after the end of the Mariel boatlift.

While this was ongoing, marches and rallies were held. The Spanish media and the new Cuban self-styled leaders appeared on radio shows and were featured in public meetings in the written Spanish press, all urging the people to go to Cuba and pick up their beloved ones.

All this went on for several weeks. At the end, Castro announced that he would release anyone who was requested in person through intermediaries, but only if the request was made by someone willing and waiting to take the persons from Cuba to the United States. The statement brought Cubans from as far as New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and California, to Miami. Everyone wanted boats to go to Cuba—all sizes, all shapes, no matter the cost.

For 15 days, the boats left and headed for Mariel harbor in Cuba. Boats could be seen everywhere in south Florida. Highway U.S. 1 to Key West was jammed by vehicles towing boats to be used to go to Cuba and bring back relatives, friends, et cetera. The Florida Keys motels were booked solid by Cubans to await their relatives' return. A routine 4-hour trip from Miami to Key West took more than 1 day to complete due to the jammed-up streets. This was the biggest wave of humanity to have hit south Florida.

Due to the airlines being booked solid and because no one was able to drive, Special Agent Benitez had to rent a plane to fly to Key West, along with a department pilot and other agents, in order to report back to supervisors and coordinate some State efforts. When the Marielitos started arriving, the situation became impossible, as twice the amount of people were now jammed into the Florida Keys.

The stories of the boatlift can fill books as to the reasons and the aftermath. However, a few well-placed persons at the right time had unleashed a community that had been underestimated as to its ability and resourcefulness to violate the law. After the first few days of the boatlift, the President declared it unlawful to go to Cuba to bring unreported aliens. The boatlift continued for over 1 month after that order. The aftermath is well known, from the detention camps to the high criminal activity that the boatlift left in its wake.

Attempts to prosecute the guilty were almost impossible. Enough legal research had been done to permit persons to be exempt from the laws as they were written, although they were clearly included by their acts in that the spirit of the law had been broken—the manner of operating was a fraud.

Persons paid in cash for the release of their relatives still held in Cuba. Of course, the Cubans never came; instead, Cuban prisoners, inmates from mental hospitals, unskilled laborers, the sick, and some of the criminal elements were sent by Castro to the United States.

Enough of the wanted relatives and ex-political prisoners were released by Cuba to preserve the hope and expectations of the Cuban exiles waiting for their relatives. Many of the ones that came were hard-working, decent persons who availed themselves of the quickest way out. Once they had arrived in the United States, they quickly became productive citizens.

Due to the community outcry over the wide scope of the reported fraud, the Department of Law Enforcement undertook an intense investigation concentrated on the investigation of suspects, victims, and monetary value of the reported fraud. Extensive resources were permitted to the investigation which resulted in the identification of numerous suspects and hundreds of victims with an approximate monetary value exceeding \$1 million. The investigation was coordinated jointly with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. Prosecution was through both State and Federal courts which resulted in the convictions of several individuals for violations of Federal and State laws. However, it should be noted that successful prosecution was not obtainable in all cases due to lack of prosecutable evidence and defects in the applicable Florida statute. Some prosecutions were successfully instituted, one against Hildo Romeo, one of the largest violators.

During the boatlift all types of problems were encountered from lack of forms and supplies to register the new immigrants, to lack of food, beds, phones, manpower, et cetera. Even persons to interview these newly arrived exiles were lacking. Many were given the address of U.S. Immigration and a date to report for processing, then let go without further screening.

Government agencies had been warned; they chose to ignore the problem and completely underestimated the ability and willingness of the Cuban community to bring back who they thought were their relatives, in spite of legal threats not to do so.

A year and a half later there is talk of a second Mariel or possibly an airlift, this time to Orlando, Fla., area, home of Disneyworld. That community has almost one-half of the resources available that Dade County had for the Mariel boatlift which nearly bankrupted Dade County because of its sheer magnitude.

Let us now turn our attention to another problem which is well known in south Florida as well as in the rest of the United States. This problem is drug trafficking. For several years law enforcement agents in south Florida have received information of Castro ties to the illegal drug traffic in the United States.

The people who can provide the information are trade criminals, many with standing convictions; their credibility and motive can be questioned. Second, the other problem is the protection of potential court material. It is a commonly known fact that within the underworld, the Government and law enforcement can only pose as obstacles to criminal activity. The code of the underworld is much more strict and more effective; it provides no appeal and is just as far reaching as our Government. These problems present great ob-

stacles to those who seek to provide an incentive to persons in the know who could assist law enforcement by their cooperation. In very simple words, they fear the Government but they are more fearful of other criminal elements and, as a result, witnesses stay quiet.

The effort to overcome these obstacles has taken several years to bear fruit, but at this time, sources known to the Department of Law Enforcement have provided information which links some of the drug traffickers to Cuba. For example, intelligence information indicated that Cuba has guaranteed the Colombian drug shipments to persons who the Castro government will from time to time designate. Not having to pay for the drug shipment and being able to sell it on consignment enables well-chosen drug dealers to become rich, powerful, and influential quickly at small risk and without a large capital investment. The immediate advantage of this activity gives the new drug smuggler a great potential for fighting over this preferred treatment. At any time, one new group could be told to wipe out an existing group for any reason, and then take its place. We have not seen the beginning of drug wars should this happen.

Sources also state that Castro provides safe haven and harbor to those mother ships loaded with drugs traveling through Cuban waters. Allegations are also that he charges a toll for the use of Cuban waters, Cuban patrol escorts, and the unlawful use of Cuban flags to prevent boarding and seizure by U.S. authorities.

We have sources that not only have reported this information but also claimed to have been involved in their planning and execution.

The problem is that these witnesses and sources are very fearful for their lives and the lives of their families due to the widespread corruption as well as the violence that drug smuggling organizations are known to take.

Before progress is made, law enforcement must regain the confidence of the public. We will provide a copy of a transcribed tape obtained by Special Agent Benitez and me from a source who was involved in some smuggling operations and its connections in Cuba. Other sources have stated that Cuba is currently harvesting marijuana to provide some competition to Colombia and Jamaica. This information is not verified but if it is true, it would point to a larger involvement by the Cuban Government than previously thought. Although no more concrete proof can be presented at this time as to Cuban ties to narcotic traffic in the United States, we are hopeful that what we have presented will be used as the basis to provide resources and manpower in order to properly investigate this alleged activity of the Cuban Government. By so doing, the solutions to this problem can be implemented.

In 1979, a known anti-Castro revolutionary Cuban exile, Reinol Rodriguez, was shot at by an unknown assailant from a moving vehicle as he approached his home. The shots were fired from a silenced machinegun, but missed the victim, Rodriguez, as he dove down to the floor of his vehicle.

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement has received several unconfirmed reports from sources that Cuba holds Mr. Reinol Rodriguez responsible for the assassination of Carlos Muniz, a suspected Cuban agent who was also involved in a travel agency

which sponsored flights to Cuba and Puerto Rico. The assassination of Carlos Muniz was credited to Omega-7, a secret, anti-Castro terrorist organization in the United States and Puerto Rico.

According to reliable sources, a retaliation plot was in effect on the man Cuba thought had been directly responsible for the incident. During a press conference held by Jenaro Perez on February 15, 1980, Perez denounced many Cuban agents whom he had met while covertly working as head administrator of Havanatur Travel Agency, which was forced to close down after being identified by Federal agents as being a Cuban intelligence operation front.

Jenaro Perez makes reference to a conversation between himself and Col. Charles Romeu that shortly after the shooting attempt at Reinol Rodriguez, Mr. Romeu stated that Cuba has begun to settle its accounts, meaning the attempt was carried out by orders of Cuba.

It should be noted that Mr. Charles Romeu was one of the individuals indicted for trading with the enemy, and the State Department has confirmed that Mr. Romeu was, in fact, a Cuban intelligence official.

At this time, I would also like to read a newspaper article which appeared in the Miami Herald on February 19, 1982, regarding four firms, or I can submit it for the record.

Senator DENTON. You may submit it for the record and it will be published.¹

Mr. PINON. This newspaper article includes the indictments of the eight persons by the Federal grand jury in Miami involving the travel agency. This article clearly shows that some of those same individuals that were identified by Reverend Espinosa and Mr. Jenaro Perez as being Cuban intelligence agents were, in fact, investigated for those charges and the investigation was brought to a successful conclusion.

Some of the same witnesses and sources used can be made available to this committee in furtherance of this investigation.

Let us go on to other incidents. In November 1980, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement uncovered an alleged plot by Cuban agents to assassinate Reverend Espinosa for his betrayal of Cuba by the series of denouncements which he made beginning on January 31, 1980. One of the three agents was apprehended by me during an ongoing surveillance of Reverend Espinosa, and this same subject subsequently turned informant. During the debriefing, the source made statements confirming that he was an agent of the Cuban Government, trained in subversion and terrorist tactics, and sent abroad to the United States to infiltrate the young anti-Castro revolutionary organizations.

This subject explained that Castro would not forgive Reverend Espinosa and had given orders to kill him. This individual also brought out an interesting point about the Peruvian Embassy takeover in Havana which later led to the Mariel boatlift. He stated it was, in fact, an effort to divide the Cuban exile community, creating havoc at a difficult time nearing a recession.

The subject pointed out that at first, the plan was meant for the Venezuelan Embassy, but was suddenly changed. This is in direct

¹ The newspaper article submitted by Mr. Pinon is on file with the subcommittee.

conflict with the community's belief that the Peruvian Embassy takeover was a spontaneous incident instead of being part of a well-organized plot instigated by the Castro government.

Three separate polygraph examinations were administered by a police officer and polygraph examiner of the Miami Police Department, thus confirming the veracity of the above information.

I have a copy of a newspaper article which came out in the Miami Herald in regard to the above-described incident. I have it here and I would like to include that, also, in the record.



Senator DENTON. So ordered.¹

Mr. PINON. To further illustrate the links possessed by foreign agents in south Florida, we will refer to other cases made by other agencies involving the illegal sale of weapons to persons or corporations who will make them available to governments unfriendly to the United States. This specific information was received from Joseph Benitez, the coordinator of the President's Task Force of Florida Crime chaired by Vice President George Bush. Joseph Benitez is currently assigned to the Treasury Department. Due to the sensitivity of these cases, only very general information will be released at this time. However, more complete information can be released during an executive session. A certain gunshop linked to Cuba has been involved in the illegal sale of guns and machine-guns to foreign countries. Indictments of both Cubans and Americans have been obtained for conspiracy to deal, ship, and transport firearms from Miami, Fla., to foreign countries between August 1, 1979, and January 29, 1979, without being properly licensed. The firearms ultimately were sent to Nicaragua leftist guerrillas. Information was also received involving a Russian agent who was involved in buying and shipping over 150 firearms to a leftist group attempting to overthrow the present government of Jamaica.

On January 13, 1982, I assisted Special Agent Juan Perez of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration in the recovery of two explosive devices. Upon arriving at the scene, we noted that the devices were two oval-shaped grenades, steel casing, smooth finish, with a seam in the middle—fully active explosives with unidentifiable content weighing 9 ounces each. The grenades were identified as being U.S.S.R. RGD-5 hand grenades made in 1976. Intelligence sources reported that the grenades were brought into the United States by an alleged Cuban DGI agent who was also involved in smuggling narcotics via Cuba, from Colombia to Miami.

[Photographs of Russian grenades follow.]

¹ The Miami Herald newspaper article is on file with the subcommittee.



Mr. PINON. According to sources, these grenades were part of a shipment of over 200 that were brought into the United States. Sources further indicated that the agent is involved with the M-19 Colombian terrorist organization and has taken shipments of weapons from Cuba to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador and Nicaragua. One source reported that the illegal profits of narcotics was being used to finance subversive and terrorist activities.

At present, we have had three separate bombings in the city of Miami involving Russian RGD grenades, and a possible fourth incident still not positively identified. The first bombing occurred on October 2, 1980, at E'oy Motors, 1479 Southwest Sixth Street, Miami, Fla., at approximately 4:05 a.m. I have copies of those reports and photographs which I also would like to submit for the record. Here is a copy of the original incident report made by the Miami Police Department, and included with this are the photographs of the bomb scenes, which I also would like to include in the record.

Senator DENTON. So ordered.

[Submitted incident report and photographs are being retained in subcommittee files.]

Mr. PINON. The second bombing occurred on September 29, 1981, at a bar at 2898 Northwest Seventh Ave., Miami, Fla., at approximately 2:45 a.m. But this time, a person inside the bar received numerous lacerations and wounds throughout the body and was subsequently transported to the hospital for treatment. I also have that report right here, including the photographs, describing the scene.

The third bombing occurred on February 22, 1982, at a private residence located at 2740 Northwest Sixteenth Terrace, with damages to a parked vehicle. I have the report here, and also photographs of the scene, which I would like to include into the record.¹

Mr. PINON. These cases are still under investigation by the Miami Police Department.

These incidents were allegedly perpetrated by assailants under the guidance of Cuban agents for no apparent reasons, but positively to cause the authorities to concentrate on anti-Castro groups, thus enhancing their capability to continue their intelligence work. There is still in excess of 200 Russian grenades somewhere in the United States to be used any time in the future for the sole purpose of creating death or destruction.

In closing we would like to say that we have made several observations:

One, how some of the anti-Castro groups were infiltrated.

Two, the ability of persons who work for foreign governments to penetrate not only professional fields, but also Government agencies, as well as other social service agencies, allegedly including law enforcement agencies.

Three, we have seen how a few persons given the right timing and the resources, can precipitate incidents that will cost millions of dollars to the taxpayers and produce problems that will take years to solve.

¹ Reports and photographs are on file with the subcommittee.

Four, the access to the Latin media and the manipulation, by certain self-professed leaders and other persons of questionable motives of this medium has been shown. The ability of members of the Spanish media to shape public opinion is very real.

Five, the Cuban connection to drug traffic, and how the moneys derived from this lucrative business can establish social empires with real political clout.

Six, finally the connection of Cuban agents who are able not only to do Castro's bidding openly with the United States, but how they have the capability to bring to the United States certain Russian-made explosives.

Never before has such open criminal behavior been carried out by agents of foreign governments. This concludes our statement.

We have other materials which we can provide to the committee. I have a copy of the report which I made when I recovered the grenades, when I went along with the special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and I also have the photographs describing the grenades. I have nine photographs showing the grenades that I recovered, fully active [indicating].¹

We will now answer questions of the subcommittee.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Pinon. I notice that there have been rhetorical and grammatical corrections, and some omissions from the original prepared statement which was given to us last evening.

Could you explain the reason for these changes?

Mr. PINON. Well, the first statement that we made was actually a rough draft of what we wanted to present, and it had not been reviewed by our legal counsel and our department. Therefore, there were many errors found in grammar and they corrected some of it and asked us to make the corrections.

Senator DENTON. Well, I will be asking you some questions that are taken from the earlier statement which was submitted to the subcommittee.

For example, we had previous testimony before this subcommittee to the effect that Fidel Castro had boasted that he could cause a race riot in the United States at any time and in any place of his choosing. In your original prepared statement, you had a statement to the effect that the Antonio Maceo Brigade has been active at Florida International University in Dade County in attempts to recruit and sign up persons to avoid the new draft laws issued by President Reagan.

You mentioned a man named Featherston as being connected with this operation, and you say that Featherston was convicted for teaching young Miami blacks to firebomb schools in the black community.

Are those true statements that I just made?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENITEZ. Senator, if I may, I had a little bit of involvement with the Featherston case earlier in my career. The statements and the allegations that have been made and information that we have received are that members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade are actu-

¹ Photographs submitted for the record are on file with the subcommittee.

ally not only at Florida International University. We mentioned that one because it is a State-supported university.

Senator DENTON. Would you put the microphone closer to your mouth, please, sir?

I have Florida International University; that is the only one.

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir, Florida International.

Senator DENTON. OK.

Mr. BENITEZ. There are other members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade that attend other schools, and they are actually engaged in trying to get people not to sign up for the new draft law, or the proposed new draft law, if and when it becomes implemented.

Mr. Featherston was, in fact, convicted and was released from jail approximately 3 or 4 years ago. He is currently under indictment for another incident in which he was involved in shooting some Mariel refugees that were at his residence.

As a matter of fact, there was a rather extensive article in Tropic Magazine, which is the Miami Herald's Sunday edition magazine, dealing with Mr. Featherston and some of his claims and some of his ideologies. We would like to introduce that to the committee for inclusion in your record.¹

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Benitez.

This testimony is mind-boggling to me, and I thought I knew something about terrorist activity in the United States. We have a case here of a man who is a DGI affiliate, if not an agent. He is engaged in teaching young Miami blacks to firebomb schools in the black community, and is also associated with an institutionalized effort in more than one university to recruit people not to sign up for the draft, is that correct?

Mr. PINON. That is correct.

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir, it is.

Senator DENTON. Reportedly, the Department of State has evidence that links the Cuban Government to drug smuggling activities in the United States. They cite the case of Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian now in jail in Mexico, who claims to have funneled arms and money to a Colombian leftist group in return for Cuban aid in smuggling marihuana shipments to the United States.

Have you, in the course of your investigations, come across evidence or information indicating that Cuba is actively involved in any way in drug smuggling into the United States? If so, would you please describe that evidence or information?

Mr. PINON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We have one source whom we arrested on narcotics charges. This source was involved, also, in the Mariel boatlift with subjects that we arrested. He has made several trips to Cuba. This same subject provided information advising us that narcotics trafficking was coming via Cuba from Colombia.

Specifically explained, when the boats left Colombia, they left with the Cuban flag in order to let the Cuban Government know that they were coming in friendly. The Cuban Government boats would come to the mother ships to escort them into the Cuban key, which is called Cayo Paredon Grande; that is the name of the key. The mother ship will be escorted there and it is met by Cuban officers, who will then view the exchange when boats coming from the

¹The newspaper article referred to by Mr. Benitez appears in the appendix to this hearing.

United States would come to Cayo Paredon Grande to transfer the narcotics from the mother ship into the smaller vessels.

Those boats are escorted to a limit close to the United States, possibly around the 10-mile limit, where they will take the Cuban flag and throw it into the water. The Cuban Government has advised these drug smugglers that as long as they fly the Cuban flag, the U.S. Coast Guard will not interfere so as not to cause an international incident.

Senator DENTON. Let me see if I have this straight. A ship comes from Colombia loaded with marihuana and passes around to the north side of Cuba. Is not Cayo Paredon Grande on the north side?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir. There is an area between the Bahamas—about a 12- to 17-mile area between the Bahamas and Cuba, and that is where that key is located.

Senator DENTON. As a signal, that ship, which is Colombian, hoists the Cuban flag to indicate that it is friendly, and is escorted into the rather protected waters of the key, Cayo Paredon Grande. Other smaller craft come alongside; the marihuana is transferred to them.

Is there something that goes from the smaller craft to the Cuban Government? These smaller craft are coming from the United States. Are they giving up anything?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir. At times, the smugglers will provide the Cuban officials with goods coming from the United States, such as televisions, Betamax machines. Anything that they will request from them, they will bring them to the government officials in Cuba.

We do not know if that is part of the payment or if that is just a compliment to continue their operations.

Senator DENTON. Are there ever any weapons, small arms, included in that?

Mr. PINON. According to our sources, as soon as they get near the Cuban waters, when the two Cuban boats come to escort them in, they have to surrender their weapons. When they leave Cuba and they get escorted away up to the proximity of the United States, which is approximately a 10-mile limit, or probably a little further away, they will give the weapons back and they will come to the United States.

Senator DENTON. So, there are no shipments of small arms included in that, per se—no shipment of small arms?

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may answer that, according to the knowledge of this particular individual, we do not know of other shipments.

I would also like to see if you would accept for introduction a translation and transcription of a taped interview which I took of this person on June 30, 1981. I have a rough copy, but I will provide the actual translation and transcription for inclusion in your record, in which some of these questions are asked and a reply is given.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. We will accept that and insert it in the record.¹

¹ Translation and transcription of a taped interview mentioned by Mr. Benitez is on file with the subcommittee.

Do these ships leave Colombia with the Cuban flag, or do they only hoist that Cuban flag as they get near Cuba?

Mr. PINON. That is correct. When they get near Cuba, they put up the Cuban flag.

Senator DENTON. Who unloads these ships? Who oversees the unloading? Are there any Cuban officers present?

Mr. BENITEZ. It is alleged that there are Cuban patrol boats present all the time, but they do not get involved in the offloading; they merely watch it. It is also alleged that they charge money for the actual amount transferred. They weigh it, or they supervise its being weighed, and then they charge accordingly.

Senator DENTON. In other words, the Cuban Government allegedly is receiving money for overseeing and permitting that operation?

Mr. BENITEZ. That is correct; providing safe harbor and, at the same time, charging a toll.

Senator DENTON. Do you have any idea what kind of money is involved, how much?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir. There is a figure that was quoted to us; I would have to take a minute to look for it. Excuse me. [Pause.]

I have found it. The figure of \$50,000 for any vessel which is larger than 10 tons—excuse me, no larger than 10 tons—is what I have on my notes.

Senator DENTON. Fifty thousand dollars for a 10-ton vessel, more or less?

Mr. BENITEZ. More or less.

Senator DENTON. Ten tons is pretty small. Are you talking about the mother ship which is bringing the marihuana or the smaller vessels which are coming from the United States?

Mr. BENITEZ. It is not exactly clear, but I believe that the smaller vessels are the ones that pay as they are loaded. By "smaller vessels," we mean yacht-size vessels, as opposed to mother ships.

Senator DENTON. That could be a pretty good sum on just one operation. Could it not?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. In connection with these offloadings and loadings, have you heard the names of the following Cuban officers: Colonels Angel and Gustavo?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir, Angel and Gustavo.

Senator DENTON. What do you know about them?

Mr. BENITEZ. They are alleged to be agents in Cuba of the Ministry of State, and these are the code words that the vessels radio to obtain a Coast Guard patrol boat escort when they get near Cuban waters.

Senator DENTON. What role did the source who gave this information play in the operation?

Mr. BENITEZ. He has been directly involved in at least two off-load operations and the planning of several others.

Mr. PINON. He was the boat captain.

Mr. BENITEZ. He was the boat captain, and he has been involved in other smuggling operations.

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, if I may, also, this same source was also involved with Mr. Romeo, so he had established a relationship with these two colonels. Now, he only knew them by first name; he

did not know them by last name. But he had met with them on several occasions.

Senator DENTON. Mr. Peraza indicated that one of the aims of the DGI was to attack institutions in the United States; "all institutions," I believe were his words. Did this informant overhear any Cuban official indicate that the Cuban Government was trying to sponsor, not only for profit but for other means, the introduction of drugs into the United States?

Mr. BENITEZ. I believe he made a comment about it, but it is not a part of the tape transcript that I brought and I would rather not go into it at this point.

Senator DENTON. Would you describe your respective involvements with the people who came into the United States during the Mariel boatlift in 1980? What percentage, in your opinion, of the people were DGI agents, hardened criminals, mental patients, homosexuals?

Mr. BENITEZ. There was a rather large amount of difficulty in establishing the figures because the persons were being handled at several points and by several different groups due to the amount of people that came in at any given time. They had many teams working on them around the clock, and it is hard to put together what these teams obtained.

Also, the only statements that we have is their actual admission that they were at the time they were interviewed. And you have to realize that due to the volume of people that came, only a few minutes were allotted per person for debriefing and interview.

Senator DENTON. I am not as well read on the subject of the Mariel boatlift, I am sure, as most of the people who live around Miami. Would you confirm or negate the validity of these impressions I have received?

There was much fraud involved; in other words, after the Cuban community got to a certain size, having escaped from Cuba, their financial means were deliberately estimated by the DGI. When it looked as if there would be enough money involved to make it interesting, and also for the purpose of hitting the United States with a massive exodus from Cuba of undesirables who would cause a financial burden to the Federal and local governments as well as provide a massive crowd in which to immerse agents, Castro deliberately imposed this upon the United States. Is that generally true?

Mr. BENITEZ. That appears to be the trend or the pattern that was set, Mr. Chairman. Some of the people were, in fact, lied to and told that they would have their relatives returned from Cuba if they paid money. The actual collection of the money was usually done on street corners or in some of the private residences of the persons involved in the fraud. They took advantage of a flaw within the State law that allows you to make an unfulfilled promise as a contract and you cannot be charged criminally for it. That has been corrected.

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, if I may, during the debriefing of Mr. Romeo, he explained to us that the Cuban Government was charging \$1,500 for each person that was coming to the United States from Cuba. Mr. Romeo was charging approximately \$2,000, making a \$500 profit on each person.

He also explained that depending on the person, the price may go up. If it was a doctor or somebody in a professional field, then the price would go up. One particular individual paid \$12,000 to get a brother out of Cuba, who was a doctor.

Senator DENTON. A good deal of this money went to the Cuban Government?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir. Mr. Romeo explained that he delivered cash to Cuba. He took it in airplanes and on boats to the Cuban Government. He delivered cash, U.S. dollars, which is a violation of the trade embargo. Mr. Romeo also sent many goods to Cuba—he admitted to that, also—tires and many, many other appliances which the government requested from him.

Also, there were other people known as Sandra Franco, Dr. Jaime Franco, and Nelly Gonzalez. These people were interviewing the Cubans in the community that wanted their relatives to be brought to the United States, and they made threats to the people by saying that they were backed by the Cuban Government; that if they made any statements to the authorities in the United States, their families would be killed in Cuba and they would be dealt with here in the United States because they had connections with authorities here in the United States, and people were afraid to talk.

When we began the investigation and made the arrest of Hildo Romeo—and I have the newspaper article here—when we made the arrest of Romeo, then people began to come forward, and we received numerous, numerous calls. We had something like an approximate figure of close to a million dollars that people had been defrauded of, that they had given to these people to bring their families over. In fact, their families were never brought.

Senator DENTON. Now, that figure is only those who were defrauded. Were some actually rewarded by the relatives arriving?

Mr. PINON. That is correct. Well, the people that reported this fraud were the people whose families did not come to the United States. They had paid the amount, and they were told that the person they paid the amount to did not have control over it; that the Cuban Government would send other people in the boat, and that they tried it and they did their best at it. But these people that paid the money never got the services.

Senator DENTON. So, we do not know the sum of money involved in those who did get relatives back, because they would have no reason to complain or admit they effectively bribed a foreign government to send them in. Is that generally true?

Mr. PINON. That is correct.

Mr. BENITEZ. That is correct, and one other thing; it was explicitly brought out to them that they were involved in a conspiracy to smuggle in illegal aliens; therefore, the persons were very, very fearful of being arrested and charged so they would not come forward.

If they were lucky enough to get a relative in, they just more or less forgot about it. On several occasions, we found out about it, and we tried to interview them, and they really did not want anything to do with law enforcement agencies or Immigration or anybody else. They just wanted to be left alone.

Senator DENTON. And this Romeo is the man who was arrogant enough to essentially thumb his nose at you and say he was bigger

than you are. And although the evidence against him was massive, he eventually did prove able to get out from under, as it were. What did he do, jump bail?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. PINON. Yes, after the third arrest.

Mr. BENITEZ. He is currently a State and a Federal fugitive.

Mr. PINON. The threats took place during the first arrest. When we arrested him the second time and the third time is when he finally gave us a statement and he wanted to cooperate with us. We could not make any deals with him because of the number of people he had defrauded. We had over 300 persons that were witnesses against him, and we could not make any deals. So, he bonded out and fled the country.

Senator DENTON. In your statement, you referred to Russian grenades being exploded and found in Miami within the last year. Do you have any information on these Russian grenades? Were any recovered, and where and by whom?

Mr. BENITEZ. There have been some recovered by Special Agent Juan Perez and my partner, Special Agent Pinon of our department. Agent Perez, by the way, is an agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration. They recovered them intact from some persons within the community that had access apparently to many more, and who now have gotten rid of some of them. And they floated through the community to a point where we were able to locate some and retrieve them.

Senator DENTON. Prior to the recovery to which you refer, was any law enforcement agency given notice of the existence of those hand grenades, and if so, with what response did that law enforcement agency react to that notification?

Mr. BENITEZ. To the best information we have, there were allegations that other agencies were aware of it. What response they gave, I do not exactly know, but they were, in fact, retrieved by other agents at a later time.

Senator DENTON. Did the Drug Enforcement Administration have prior notice?

Mr. BENITEZ. Part of the allegation states that they did.

Senator DENTON. And what is your knowledge of their action in response to that notification?

Mr. BENITEZ. Well, I do not have an actual response. What I do know is that they were retrieved almost a year later by members of the Drug Enforcement Administration and members of my own department.

Senator DENTON. Why was there such a long time lag of 1 year, considering the notification?

Mr. BENITEZ. I am not personally acquainted with the intricacies of the investigation on the Drug Enforcement side. I will ask Mr. Pinon to see if he has any more knowledge on that aspect.

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I can really state is that as soon as the informant informed the special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Juan Perez, of the grenades, he immediately called me and asked me to respond and assist him, due to my expertise in bombs. And together we responded immediately and recovered them.

The informant was the one that made the allegations that he had already advised other agents in the past about it, but we do not have any direct knowledge of that.

Senator DENTON. Did he offer any reason for the grenades not being taken at that time?

Mr. BENITEZ. To my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, if there was any reason, it was not offered for our benefit.

Senator DENTON. How did the grenades get into the country? Do you know?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir, they were brought in by an individual who was a suspected agent of the Cuban Government. We would like to refrain from identifying him because of ongoing investigation still pending. But according to the informant, this individual is also involved in large-scale narcotics smuggling into the United States, and the informant specifically stated that this individual has been taking shipments of weapons to El Salvador and Nicaragua during the former government of Somoza, supplying leftist guerrillas with weapons.

The source also informed us that this subject went to Cuba on several occasions with him and actually obtained weapons from the Cuban Government, and these grenades were brought into the United States some time in 1979 by this same subject.

Senator DENTON. Would it be fair to infer from what you know that there is a large-scale Colombia-Cuba connection on marijuana introduction into at least southern Florida and that there are probably many more weapons than you have specific knowledge of; and with the training which you know about and the subversion in terms of not registering for the draft and the subversion in terms of teaching youth to bomb schools, that there is a growing and much greater potential in that area for terrorism than has been so far demonstrated?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would think that there is a much greater potential than has been demonstrated at this time.

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, I will also add another interesting point that became known to us through a separate source who is still out there in the field working for us. He advised us that presently, the Government of Cuba has been providing marijuana to the smugglers that has been grown in Cuba, and the Cuban boats are using a radar system to detect the U.S. Coast Guard in order to find a clear way into the United States to assist them in the smuggling. And this source is still working for us out in the field.

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add that this information is unverified at this time and we have it as an allegation only, and because of the budgetary, manpower, and jurisdictional restraints placed on State policing, we are unable to verify it further at this time.

Senator DENTON. What would you ascribe as the purpose for the hand grenades and that sort of weapon? Would it be as protection within the drug-running racket, or for terrorism?

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, it has been my experience in dealing with explosive devices that hand grenades are strictly an anti-personnel device, and unless they are projected at a fairly good distance, the person doing the throwing will also be involved in the explosion, or be at the center of the explosion. They would best

serve a terrorist-type operation rather than a narcotics-type operation, in which they usually use rifles, shotguns, and the traditional handguns for protecting their investment and protecting their loads.

Senator DENTON. Does the informant indicate that he was directed by the DGI to attempt to blow up any public facilities?

Mr. BENITEZ. I am unaware of that. Maybe Mr. Pinon—

Mr. PINON. That is correct, sir. The informant reported that he was not given any reasons as to why he was to throw the grenades. He simply complied with the request of his superior, which was this agent. He was told to throw it at the specific location which it was thrown; he complied.

Senator DENTON. Was a public park one of those locations?

Mr. PINON. That is correct; it was an empty parking lot. Excuse me; that was a different incident. I was referring to the empty parking lot in which a grenade was thrown and there was nobody there.

The informant was also told to throw a grenade at a public park which is at Southwest Eighth Street and 13th or 14th Avenue; it is called the Domino Park. In this park, there are usually 50 or 60 elderly persons that sit there and play dominoes and play cards. And the informant was told to throw the grenade at that, apparently to create destruction and put blame on the anti-Castro groups, which were the ones that had been doing most of the bombings.

Senator DENTON. So, there is a pattern, not only of these racial incidents, which can cause black/white tension, but also of major efforts to discredit the anti-Castro elements or to accredit them with activities which they did not perform. This is a pattern which you have noticed throughout. Is that correct?

Mr. PINON. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Do you see any correlation between the increased hijackings which occurred subsequent to Mariel and the people who came into the United States at that time?

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, I would think the only correlation is, because of the increased numbers and possibly the fact that displaced persons were not able to actively become involved in the pursuit of work and their own home life, they decided to go back and avail themselves of this means of hijacking to return.

Senator DENTON. In your professional judgment, based on your training and experience as intelligence officers for the State of Florida, did the Cuban DGI play a role in guiding or directing the Liberty City riots in Miami, which occurred immediately prior to the Mariel boatlift, or in guiding or directing the riots in Dade County which occurred immediately after the Mariel boatlift?

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, I cannot give you a definite answer on that. We do know, and we have allegations, of some contacts between members of the black community, some of which were involved in the rioting, and members, for example, of some of the Cuban community; for example, Mr. Featherston and the Antonio Maceo Brigade. Outside of that, it would be supposition or guesswork on our part.

Senator DENTON. Are you aware of any attempt by the Cuban Government to obtain radio tapes or other materials showing the

Liberty City riots for the purpose of retransmission to achieve propaganda objectives?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir, I was particularly impressed by that. I had a person working within the news media that had been involved in filming the Mariel exodus from the Cuban mainland, and this person was approached by persons unknown to him and asked if he would provide them with the film clippings and the material that his station had on file on the riots; that they would give him unrestricted access to filming the Mariel boatlift from the Cuban side.

Of course, he declined, and so did his network, but he came to me and advised me that the offer had been made.

Senator DENTON. I am going to ask several questions which Senator Thurmond has submitted. Before I do that, just a general question: In your overall experience in law, do you consider the situation in the Miami area extremely alarming, and do you think that the law enforcement people and the legislation now in existence—how would you rate it in its sufficiency to cope with or eliminate the problem?

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, I would liken it to finding termites in a building. By the time you see the first termites, they have already been there several years and have done a lot of damage.

If, after you see them, nothing is done, you will have further damage. We are now beginning to see some of these people and some of their activities surface, and I am of the belief that they have been here for a while and that they have been setting the stage for what they would like to do in the future.

I am of the opinion that a more concentrated effort is going to have to be made to stop them.

Senator DENTON. Mr. Pinon, do you agree with that?

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add something to that. I did a report as to the homicide rate in Dade County, and we found that since the Mariel boatlift, the homicide rate has gone up 50 percent, and crime as a whole has gone up approximately 50 percent.

[A breakdown of homicides in Dade County follows:]

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

JAMES W. YORK
COMMISSIONER

P.O. BOX 1489
TALLAHASSEE 32302

TELEPHONE
403-7800

3 February 1982

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC Joe H. Clark
Miami Operations Center

VIA: Chain of Command

FROM: SA Sergio Pinon
Squad "B"

SUBJECT: Breakdown of Homicides in Dade County

	Dade		Miami		Hialeah		Miami Beach	
	1980	1981	1980	1981	1980	1981	1980	1981
JAN	32	46	15	24	0			2
FEB	36	64	12	25	3			1
MAR	39	60	11	27	8			1
APR	27	60	9	18	1			2
MAY	65	56	28	19	6			0
JUN	53	41	24	16	2			0
JUL	53	49	28	18	4			6
AUG	51	56	19	21	4			2
SEPT	60	51	35	13	3			2
OCT	42	45	15	15	4			1
NOV	65	52	20	10	2			3
DEC	49	39	28	19	3			0
TOTAL	572	619	244	225	40			20

Dade County Medical Examiner's Office shows a total of 614 homicides during 1982, thus conflicting with Dade County Public Safety's total of 619. The difference of 4 is due to unclassified deaths by the Medical Examiner's Office.

Dade County shows an increase of 47 deaths or 12 percent since 1980.

City of Miami shows a decrease of 19 deaths or 12 percent since 1980.

It should be noted that in 1979, there were only 365 homicides in Dade County thus possibly attributing a high increase rate of approximately 59 percent as compared to the figure of 572 in 1980.

SP/jp

Senator DENTON. These questions are from Senator Thurmond. In view of the significant problem caused Florida State law enforcement officials by the Cuban intelligence service, how often does the FBI provide counter intelligence briefings to you?

Mr. BENITEZ. Senator, the FBI has a particular problem with dissemination of information. They are precluded by law and by certain policies, either of themselves or placed upon them by other agencies that they work for; as a result, they do not have a lot of information that they can give us.

Senator DENTON. So, effectively, never?

Mr. BENITEZ. Well, I have been to very few in the last few years myself.

Senator DENTON. And the information received has not been that helpful?

Mr. BENITEZ. It has been helpful in some instances, but like I said, I have not been to that many in the last few years. They are precluded by law from divulging most of their information.

Mr. PINON. That goes the same for myself.

Senator DENTON. In connection with the Soviet grenade incident you have described—and this is another question from Senator Thurmond—please state for the record whether any Federal law enforcement official was aware of the presence of Soviet grenades in Miami prior to the information coming to your attention; and, if so, identify that official and state what action he took with respect to the prior knowledge he had obtained.

I realize that that is similar to a previous question I asked.

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would like to decline answering that question and would defer its answer to executive hearing, if you may accept that.

Senator DENTON. We will plan an executive hearing, then, with you, as well as with Sr. Gerardo Peraza.

Again, two more questions from Senator Thurmond; first, based on your professional judgment and on your experience and training, do you see a pattern in the bombing incidents which have occurred in Dade County, and specifically in your professional judgment, is there a pattern of activity which suggests that the Cuban DGI may be planning a series of arbitrary terrorist attacks in retaliation, perhaps, of U.S. efforts to establish Radio Free Cuba, which is Radio Marti, or to combat Cuban Soviet-sponsored communist terrorists in Central America?

There are other parts to that question; I will pause at that point.

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, we have received sketchy information. There are allegations at this point—they have not really been verified—that there is projected in the future to have groups involved in random violence. We do not have enough information to assess the actual objective. This has been stated to us as one of the objectives by persons we speak with. It is very difficult to assess it without more information.

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, however, I would like to point out that the pattern of anti-Castro organizations up until now has been that when they commit any terrorist acts, they do claim responsibility for their acts. And there have been numerous incidents where no one has taken credit for those incidents.

Up until now when we have found these Russian grenades and we have done investigation into them—now the possibility exists that other incidents might have been caused by other groups.

Senator DENTON. Senator Thurmond's question goes on. Does the presence of over 200 Soviet grenades somewhere in the Miami area suggest to you, in your professional judgment, the possibility that the Soviets, through the Cubans, are planning terrorist activities to counter U.S. opposition elsewhere in the hemisphere?

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, that would be judgment on our part, or guesswork on our part, but it does make you think that it could be the intention.

Mr. PINON. That would be our opinion.

Senator DENTON. This is the final question from Senator Thurmond. Please identify for the record the name of the intelligence and counter terrorist coordinator for the Drug Enforcement Administration in the Miami area.

Mr. BENITEZ. I am aware that there is one. I would like to defer answering that question for executive session, if I may.

Senator DENTON. I thought that that would be a matter of public record.

Mr. BENITEZ. It may be; I do not know. I would not like to disclose the name unless I have been given prior clearance from the Drug Enforcement Administration. It may place the person in personal jeopardy or professional jeopardy.

Senator DENTON. Do you have any information which indicates that the DGI has been successful in penetrating law enforcement agencies in the Miami area?

Mr. PINON. We have basically received information from sources which was actually confirmed by other sources and through persons that we have used as informants after arrest, such as Mr. Romeo, for example. He made statements to us that the police departments had been infiltrated and were working for the Government of Cuba—several agents.

We have seen some connection between some agents and some of the travel agencies that are sponsoring these trips to Cuba. However, there is no definite information that we have or any proof; otherwise, we would have taken action already. We do have merely allegations.

Senator DENTON. Are you aware of any efforts by the DGI to recruit law enforcement officers and support personnel?

Mr. PINON. Well, I do not have any direct information as to that. However, I have found through my experience working in the field that most Cuban agents, or at least the ones that we know, do want to become informants, for the simple reason that in the process of giving us information, they can also obtain information. And these same agents believe that if they do work for the authorities, they have a certain type of protection. They can also justify their existence in their fields.

If they were to be questioned by another agency as to what they were doing, they would come up and say, "I am working for such-and-such, with another agency," and they would justify their existence. At the same time, they will use it as a tool to withdraw information from the agents that they are working for.

Senator DENTON. So, in playing sort of a double agent, they get indications of what information you have by judging your questions and by assessing the scope and thrust of your questions. Is that what you mean?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir. Also, it is my personal opinion—again, I have to state this on my own—that these individuals also are involved in disinforming agencies in order to create problems between the agencies, and distrust, and in order to divide and conquer; that is basically it. They want to divide the agencies from cooperating with each other.

If they create a cloud on me or a shadow of a doubt, then the other agent will not talk to me and will not pass the information on to me. They have been pretty successful.

Senator DENTON. So, disinformation, which is a Soviet-originated term, is used in an attempt to deceive members of respective agencies to cause distrust among them?

Mr. PINON. This is another question on Senator Thurmond's behalf. Do you have any information which, in your professional judgment and based on your own experience, would cause you to believe that the Government of Panama, through Panamanian intelligence, was or is involved in supplying weapons to Communist terrorists in Nicaragua or El Salvador, or other locations in Central America?

Do you feel, based on your experience, that there is an arrangement between Panama and Cuba? If so, what is the nature of that arrangement?

Mr. PINON. Sir, I was involved in a particular operation involving a major sale of weapons on behalf of the Panamanian Government to be sent to the guerrillas in El Salvador and Nicaragua. This is going back to 1978 or 1979.

This investigation did not have positive conclusions due to certain problems that we had. However, I did meet with agents of the Panamanian Government and we did establish the weapons that they wanted from us, and it was going to be an approximate deal for \$10 million of weapons which was going to be sent to El Salvador.

However, I would request that any further information can be supplied in an executive hearing due to the sensitivity of this case and other agents involved.

Senator DENTON. I am aware that it would probably be erroneous, due to the complexity and the changing situation in Panama, to make a categorical statement that the Panamanian Government is in favor of this or that with regard to El Salvador, because the Panamanian Government is composed of a number of different individuals with different inclinations, and these inclinations change as time goes by. I imagine the same thing could be said about other Latin American countries.

This is the impression I got from a visit to Panama last week and from continuing discussions with people informed on it. I appreciate the fact that it is a sensitive subject and we would have to discuss it in executive session.

Mr. PINON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. The Committee of 75, an organization of businessmen and clergy with significant representation of members of

the Cuban community, attempted to coordinate and encourage better relations between the United States and Cuba, hopefully culminating in trade and economic exchange.

There have been some allegations that the Committee of 75 is, in fact, a DGI operation. Do you have any information or opinion on this?

Mr. PINON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We have—Mr. Benitez has also been involved in this with me—sources that were members of the Committee of 75. I can give you an approximate estimate of at least five that were members of the Committee of 75. These sources have reported to us that the Committee of 75 was actually a committee formed by the Cuban Government and approved by the Cuban Government, and they selected and approved the personnel to be involved in this.

I have documents which were turned over to me by sources which clearly state that the Committee of 75 was formed in Cuba, and it was signed by the Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, himself, plus other members of the state council.

In these documents, it clearly shows the purpose and the way they were supposed to operate. I have those documents; I do not have them with me right now, but I could make them available to the committee at a later date.

Senator DENTON. Please submit these so we can insert them in the record.¹

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir.

Senator DENTON. With your experience with disinformation and recognizing the sophistication with which one must address information such as you have just mentioned pertaining to the Committee of 75, how would you assess the likelihood that the documents discrediting the committee are a disinformation effort or, on the other hand, an actual indication of proof that the committee is indeed a Cuban operation?

Mr. PINON. I am not really sure I understand the question properly, sir.

Senator DENTON. Do you consider the evidence that it is a Cuban Government-sponsored organization to be valid?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir.

Senator DENTON. Please describe any information you have pertaining to DGI propaganda efforts in the Miami area, such as radio and television broadcasts, including short wave? To the extent possible, identify the broadcasting media involved.

Mr. PINON. They have publications which are printed and distributed within the United States, one of them being *Areito*. There is another publication by the name of *Granma*. *Granma*, according to our information, is printed in Cuba and is brought into the United States and distributed in the United States, and specifically, I believe, at Miami University.

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, it is available at the University of Miami.

There is another publication that has not been published since approximately 1974 or 1975, but it was available for a while, and that is called *Cuba Va*, meaning "Cuba Goes." And several persons

¹The documents were subsequently submitted for the record and are on file with the subcommittee.

that are involved in quasi-government jobs and quasi-political positions have been involved in writing for some of those magazines or periodicals.

Senator DENTON. How about electronic media—radio, for example?

Mr. BENITEZ. During some of the incidents that we have had, it has been reported that the electronic media—basically, the Spanish media—has been involved in adding something to the mood of the public or to the mood of the people involved, rather than objectively reporting what is actually happening.

Mr. PINON. One of the Latin media, in my opinion, was advocating violence during these particular incidents, and right now is under investigation.

Senator DENTON. I am going to have to excuse myself for a few moments. I will turn this over to Mr. Joel Lisker, my staff director.

Mr. LISKER. Can either of you gentlemen identify the electronic media involved—the call letters of the radio stations?

Mr. PINON. I would like to defer that to the executive session due to the fact that they are being investigated right now.

Mr. LISKER. I see. These are Spanish-language stations broadcasting to the Cuban population in Miami?

Mr. PINON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. LISKER. Prior investigation and testimony has disclosed that much of the intelligence collected is collected by so-called "front groups"; that is, organizations which have an ostensible legitimate purpose, but in reality have a more sinister purpose.

Could you describe any organizations—you have already mentioned the Committee of 75, and I presume that your characterization leads you to conclude that that is a front.

Mr. PINON. Yes.

Mr. LISKER. Could you describe any other organizations of which you are aware that actually are fronts for the DGI?

Mr. PINON. Well, for example, the Antonio Maceo Brigade; we believe that that is specifically sponsored and headed by the Cuban DGI. There may be members of the brigade that may not know exactly what their purpose is, but it is being led by them.

There are other brigades, like the Venceremos Brigade, which is also sponsored and led by the Cuban DGI. We have BMMM, which is the Black Afro Militant Movement. This group is headed by Alfred Featherston. Although there are basically American blacks involved, members of this group have been meeting with members of the Antonio Maceo Brigade, as witnessed by us during surveillances.

They have met, and we have received reports from informants that they have received money from the Antonio Maceo Brigade to supply the blacks with their militant movement.

Mr. LISKER. In your opening statement, you mentioned Havana-tur, American Airways Charter, Cuba Travel, et cetera. Those are also—

Mr. PINON. That is correct, sir. Central Travel, which was one of the agencies—it is a retail credit front which was used to funnel money to Cuba. That firm is being indicted right now for trading with the enemy.

Mr. LISKER. Mr. Benitez.

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir. I wanted to say there was another group that was involved in sending young students to travel to Cuba for religious reasons. They were called the Ismaelillo Brigade, if I am correct. This no longer exists, but some of the members are still in the community.

Mr. LISKER. Is there any coordinated intelligence effort—and this relates to a question Senator Denton asked a few moments ago—is there any coordinated intelligence effort among the various law enforcement agencies to keep current on the groups active in Miami?

Mr. BENITEZ. At this time, I do not believe there is a coordinated effort, no, sir.

Mr. LISKER. How many law enforcement groups with overlapping jurisdictions are in the south Florida area?

Mr. PINON. In Dade County, there are 27 municipalities.

Mr. LISKER. Twenty-seven municipalities, each with their own police department?

Mr. PINON. That is correct.

Mr. BENITEZ. Most of them with their own police department. Some of them receive support in some of the detective or investigative functions, such as narcotics investigation, intelligence-gathering, bombings or homicide investigation, and laboratory work and other types of assistance, from a larger department or the sheriff's office.

There are in excess of 40 agencies with total jurisdiction, being State, Federal, county, city, involved in the south Florida area.

Mr. LISKER. How do these agencies coordinate on matters of mutual interest?

Mr. BENITEZ. Well, that is basically a management problem and it is handled at a higher level than we are involved in.

Mr. PINON. Basically, at our level, we do communicate; at the agent's level, we do communicate and get assistance from each other during different incidents. We are talking about State level now.

Mr. LISKER. Based on what Agent Benitez has said in describing the dearth of briefings he has received from the FBI over the last several years, in your personal opinion does the FBI have current information on the various terrorist groups in the Miami area?

Mr. PINON. Yes. In my opinion, they do have current information, just as we have current information.

Mr. LISKER. As I understand it, you furnish your information to the FBI; it just does not work the other way.

Mr. PINON. At times, yes, we do furnish the information that we think that they do not have. We do receive certain information from them, although we do not receive as much as we think they probably know. This has been the problem.

Mr. LISKER. So, in your view, the FBI has current information on all of the groups now operating in the Miami area?

Mr. PINON. I would say so.

Mr. LISKER. I think you alluded to this in your opening statement, but what impact, if any, has the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act had on the ability of local law enforcement to gather intelligence information on terrorist groups from your perspective?

Mr. BENITEZ. It has definitely curtailed—for example, the Privacy Act curtails a lot of the gathering of information that we can do. We have some rulings that we have to abide by not only in collecting, but storing and disseminating the information.

We have, for example, deadlines as to purging of information. We also have a problem with the Freedom of Information Act, in which this information is available on request to some of the persons that we are engaged in investigating.

Mr. LISKER. This is under the State Freedom of Information Act?

Mr. BENITEZ. Well, they can request any information that we have shared with other agencies, and therefore have access to us. Once that agency says, "We have that information," then they can come after us and get it.

Mr. LISKER. In a previous public hearing, the FBI testified that there was no evidence, no indications, of Cuban training of Puerto Rican independence people. Now, from what you said earlier, it appears that one of your sources, at least, advised you that such training does take place, or at least he believed that such training does take place, in Cuba.

Could you explain the basis of that belief?

Mr. BENITEZ. One of the persons that has provided information to our department in the past at one point stated that he had been advised by Cuban agents or Cuban Government personnel that they were indeed looking for Puerto Rican citizens or Puerto Rican descendants to train in Cuba. This information has not been verified. I personally could not ask the Cuban Government to verify it at my level.

Mr. LISKER. But the information that was communicated to you by the source was that such an offer was extended to the source?

Mr. BENITEZ. That is correct. The source has been reliable in the past and I have no reason to doubt this part of the information.

Mr. LISKER. Well, is this a source that would not be ordinarily available to the FBI?

Mr. BENITEZ. I would not know if it would be available or not to them. I do not know if they have contact with them or not.

Mr. LISKER. Did you disseminate to the FBI the information that the source disseminated to you about the offer to train him in Cuba?

Mr. BENITEZ. I believe I did, in general conversation.

Mr. LISKER. Do you have any understanding as to whether that information was communicated by the Miami field office to the FBI headquarters?

Mr. BENITEZ. I have no knowledge of how they operate and how they communicate.

Mr. LISKER. When did you disseminate that information to the FBI?

Mr. BENITEZ. Approximately at the time I got it; within a few weeks, I would say, in general conversation, I made the statement to agents.

Mr. LISKER. When would that be in point of time?

Mr. BENITEZ. It would be approximately 1 year ago, or perhaps a little less.

Mr. LISKER. The FBI testified 3 weeks ago that they had no information or indicators relating to this kind of training. That would

at least be at variance with what you furnished the FBI field office in Miami.

Mr. BENITEZ. I have no explanation. Perhaps they do not believe the information, or they have not been able to follow it up or verify it on their own.

Mr. LISKER. OK, thank you.

In the early part of your statement, you discuss the infiltration of the Anglo community. Could you elaborate with respect to who is doing the infiltrating, which organizations are being infiltrated and which agencies are being infiltrated, and, in your view, how extensive and effective this infiltration has been?

Mr. BENITEZ. Could you repeat the question?

Mr. LISKER. Yes; in the early part of your statement, you discuss infiltration of the Anglo community, or you mentioned it, rather. Could you elaborate on, from your perspective, who is doing the infiltrating—I presume you mean the Cuban intelligence service—what organizations and agencies are the targets of the infiltration, and, in your judgment, how extensive and effective this infiltration has been?

Mr. BENITEZ. In my opinion, all segments of government and our community at large are the target of it. There have been some groups that have been involved in and have access to the larger community outside the Cuban community in south Florida, and these groups have made contact with other groups and with members of other ethnic backgrounds.

An example is the Antonio Maceo Brigade at the university. They will recruit anybody who does not wish to register for the draft for this purpose.

Mr. LISKER. At the Federal level since 1976, the FBI has had foisted upon it a set of guidelines known popularly as the Levi guidelines, or, among law enforcement agents, unpopularly as the Levi guidelines.

Are there guidelines at the State level which obstruct, in your opinion, the adequate collection of intelligence by your agency or any other Florida law enforcement agency with respect to terrorist activities?

Mr. BENITEZ. The guidelines in effect are based on State law, and the State law is fairly broad and general in that respect. We have to be careful of what we do and that we do it according to State law; it is reviewable by several other systems or mechanisms within government.

Mr. LISKER. Are these guidelines found throughout the State code, or are they collected or compiled in one place? Do you have a book with a set of regulations in it called Guidelines?

Mr. BENITEZ. No, sir, not per se, not in that fashion pertaining to intelligence gathering.

Mr. LISKER. So, you simply mean that you cannot violate the law in carrying out your investigative objectives?

Mr. BENITEZ. That is correct. There are some laws that particularly apply to intelligence-gathering and the conduct of investigations.

Mr. LISKER. Well, is there a law that says if a group has not yet engaged in terrorist activity, but espouses the rhetoric of overthrow of the Government, that it can be investigated under Florida law?

Mr. BENITEZ. I believe under Florida law, it could be investigated, but we have to be able to examine and determine that there is a violation of the law of some sort being performed by this group or by members of the group. We cannot independently decide to investigate one group and start doing so.

Mr. LISKER. So that if an organization says we should all get guns and go and kill blacks, or we should all get guns and go and kill whites or we should all get guns and go and kill Anglos, that would not serve as a predicate for you to investigate that organization?

Mr. BENITEZ. It could serve as a predicate. It depends on where and how they say it, and to the intent we can predict on their potential future actions based on their past actions.

Mr. LISKER. Well, does there have to be evidence that a crime has been committed? Does the language itself inciting individuals to commit criminal activity serve as a predicate for an investigation or not?

Mr. BENITEZ. I am not an attorney, but I would not think so.

Mr. PINON. In my opinion, at the State level, now, if a particular group is not involved in any violations of law, we are really not empowered to investigate. That would be up to the Federal authorities, and on that I am not really sure of the law either, but I believe that they have to be involved in some particular act.

Mr. LISKER. Thank you.

There have been assertions that some of the terrorist organizations maintain intelligence files on law enforcement officers in the Miami area. Has your experience led you to conclude that that is a true statement?

Mr. BENITEZ. I am aware of a personal incident in which I was involved—the arrest of a young Latin man involved in a series of bombings. As a matter of fact, our department at the time and the FBI did a joint investigation and executed Federal search warrants upon the house of that person. And from that house, a lot of information was brought out in files.

This person had kept, for example, copies of arrest reports and other such material that he could get as public documents, to more or less identify the police officers and the departments that were engaged in arrest and investigation of these persons.

Mr. LISKER. Do they photograph law enforcement officers? Is there an interchange of information among organizations?

Mr. BENITEZ. Not belonging to one, I cannot tell you that there exactly is. I have been advised that they do photograph and that they do—in fact, I have seen several attempts to photograph other agents and myself when we are working some of these meetings and crowds.

Mr. LISKER. In your opening statement, you gave an example of activity, and you mentioned the name of Lourdes DoPico. Do you remember that?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LISKER. Is her maiden name Lourdes Casals? Do you know her maiden name?

Mr. PINON. Her maiden name is Lourdes Rey.

Mr. LISKER. Rey?

Mr. PINON. Rey.

Mr. LISKER. Thank you very much.

In a 1976 hearing held by another subcommittee dealing with the problem of terrorism in the Miami area, testimony was received indicating that dynamite and explosives were readily accessible in Miami. Now, you have given the example of the 200-or-so hand grenades. Is that still the case with respect to the dynamite and other explosives, C-4, and so forth?

Mr. BENITEZ. Yes, sir, if I may be permitted, I was personally involved in some of the investigations as part of my duties involving the oversight of laws designed to control the explosives used in the trade.

South Florida is a very large area in which rock quarry-type of work is done—the digging of canals and lakes, and what not. And being a very rocky area—basically, all coral rock—it requires a high amount of explosives to be on hand to deal with this problem. These explosives sometimes fall into the wrong hands; that is a fact.

There are some laws designed to prevent this, and sometimes they are violated by others, and they do have access to the explosives and do get on the street.

Mr. LISKER. Well, are there large caches of explosives maintained by terrorist groups?

Mr. BENITEZ. In the recent past, I cannot remember any seizures I have been involved in myself. There were several seizures in the past 10 years in which fairly large amounts were seized.

Mr. PINON. We can go back to 1976-77. We knew that the groups had members of the organization who were working in construction companies and they had access to the explosives. Recent information, we do not know because there have been a lot of changes in these organizations and they have formed new groups. Members that were formerly friends have split into other factions, and we really right now at this time do not know.

Mr. LISKER. At one time, there was an antiterrorist target committee, staffed by Federal, State and local agencies, to combat terrorism particularly in the Miami area. Is this organization still in operation?

Mr. PINON. No; it is not.

Mr. LISKER. Do you know why it no longer exists?

Mr. PINON. I do not know. I was part of the task force at the time, and Agent Benitez was also part of that task force. It included the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs, the Miami Police Department, and the Dade County Public Safety Department. The task force ran for 1 year and after that, it was dissolved.

Mr. LISKER. When was it dissolved?

Mr. PINON. I believe it was 1978.

Mr. LISKER. Has terrorism and terrorist activity increased or decreased in Miami since that time?

Mr. PINON. I would say it has—it is hard to say. The hardest years we had were 1976 and 1977. After that, terrorism in Miami has gone down a bit, but we still have a high level of incidence.

Mr. LISKER. Let me ask you this. In your dealings with the Federal agencies involved in the areas of your jurisdiction—that is, dealing with subversion and terrorism—is it your judgment that the representatives of those agencies with whom you deal and who, in

turn, deal with the people directly involved—that with regard to their nationality and their own background, they are competent people in the field?

Let me give you an example. I do not think it is any secret that the Cubans in Miami have a disdain for Mexican Americans, so that if I were an FBI supervisor, I would probably be using bad judgment, or could be accused of using bad judgment, to send a Mexican American agent who spoke Spanish to interview a Cuban. That is the illustration that I am giving.

In your judgment and from your experience in dealing with these agencies, is this an unusual problem or is it an isolated problem?

Mr. PINON. Well, as far as we know, within the local State agency, the units which are responsible for the investigation of those terrorist acts or any intelligence work are basically staffed with different members of different groups, such as the public safety department, the Miami Police Department, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. They all have Cubans that are members of these units in order to be able to penetrate and deal with the community.

I believe—I am not sure—that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has two agents stationed in Miami that are Cuban.

Mr. LISKER. Two agents to deal with these problems in all of Miami who have a Cuban background?

Mr. PINON. Yes; to the best of my information, they only have two Cuban agents stationed in Miami. I could be wrong, but that is as far as our knowledge is concerned.

Mr. LISKER. Does it make a difference in the quality of the relationship that exists between the agent and the source if the agent is of non-Cuban background?

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir, it does.

[Senator Denton returned to the hearing.]

Senator DENTON. I will ask you to submit a list of terrorist incidents, of which you are aware, that have occurred since 1976, the date of the last Senate hearing on this topic by the Internal Security Subcommittee—May 6, 1976—giving a description of each incident and the name of the groups or individuals claiming responsibility or believed to be responsible.

I do not want to unduly overburden you with that, and you can take as much time on it as you want, but just for bringing this subcommittee into a better position in terms of documentation, it would help if, from your vantage point, you would supply us with information.

Mr. PINON. Yes, sir, we cannot for all of the incidents.

Senator DENTON. I want to thank you both very much for coming. I realize and acknowledge again the tremendous work you are doing and the integrity with which you are doing it.

Do you have any closing comments that you would care to make?

Mr. PINON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to bring out one more point that I did not go into during the statement. I have three statements here which are the press conferences given by Reverend

Manuel Espinosa, and I would like to put that into the record for the subcommittee's review.¹

Also, I would like to make reference to the second conference. Mr. Espinosa related a conversation which took place between him and another gentleman in California, identified by the name of Ruben. And a conversation took place between them, and I would like to relate to it because there was an incident that we would also like to put into the record.

Senator DENTON. All right. You do not have to name those; I will accept them and they will go into the record, because the rules now require, with a live quorum call back to the Harrison Williams case, that we not be conducting any hearings at this time.²

We will receive any other information you care to submit in writing, and we will be transmitting additional questions to you in writing.

Again, gentlemen, thank you very much.

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Chairman, in closing I would like to say one thing. I do not personally wish to create—either by direct statement or by allusion—that the persons in charge of law enforcement in the south Florida area, whether they be of State, city, county or Federal agencies, do not care or are not doing their job.

The problem is big. The restrictions placed upon us at all levels are very, very burdensome. We have a lot of hard-working persons at all levels, and we have managers and supervisors that are caring and are knowledgeable of the problems. We also have a lot of other crime problems equally as pressing and we have to divide our resources in order to account for that.

So, any of the statements we have made here are not to cast aspersions on any individual agent or any agency that they may work for. It is merely to illustrate the problems that we have had in the past and that we continue to deal with in our everyday contacts.

Senator DENTON. I appreciate that, and I can assure you that there is no intent on the part of this Senator to do that either. I recognize that all of our law enforcement agencies are overburdened. I think you probably have one of the most, if not the most, overloaded and volatile situations in the country, and I respect very much the way you are going about your duties.

We will recess these hearings until Thursday, March 11, at which time the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. Fred C. Ikle, will testify.

This hearing stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene on Thursday, March 11, 1982.]

¹ The press conference statements of Rev. Manuel Espinosa are on file with the subcommittee.

² Material referred to is on file with the subcommittee.



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The following pages (67-75) contain material protected by the Copyright Act of 1976 (17U.S.C.): The Fugitive: The Miami Herald, January 31, 1982

He was drinking early one evening last March when a car drove into the church yard. Featherston saw two Mariel refugees get out.

Featherston, who had been eating some chicken on the church steps, shouted at them, "You can't park here."

But the men had arrived with two VISTA volunteers who lived at the church. One of them, Patti Fressola, says when Featherston saw them, he yelled, "OK, they're with you. Well, then I'll tolerate them."

But suddenly, she says, he began ranting, in Spanish and English, about how Marielitos were "the garbage of Cuba, traitors to the revolution."

That started an argument. Featherston ran upstairs and returned with a 12-gauge shotgun. He fired one shot into the air, another into the ground.

"I thought I had missed them. I wasn't shooting at them. I guess they weren't moving fast enough. . . . I wasn't ready to kill anybody. In fact, I'm not usually ready to kill anybody."

When the police came, they handcuffed him and locked him in the patrol car. He complained the handcuffs were too tight, but they ignored him and went inside. Featherston kicked out the window with his feet.

Rev. Olson says that when he arrived at the jail, he heard several policemen whispering that there was Featherston, the cop killer. His attorney, Michael Von Zamft, saw it too: "My feeling was that this was being treated differently from a normal case by the State Attorney's Office and the police. Homicide detectives were brought down, when there had only been a shot in the toe. They seemed to know who he was."

Featherston was charged with assault, aggravated battery, criminal mischief, using a firearm in the commission of a felony and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Christmas Day: he talks about how he is a bit of a Walter Mitty, a man who compensates through fantasies.

"I look at certain sons of bitches, and I could contemplate killing them. I didn't say I could kill them, but I could contemplate killing them. I've never killed anybody out of vengeance, but I think it would be a lovely sensation, you know. It would be the best high in the world. 'God damn,' I'd say. 'You did it at last.' You know—a Judge Baker." That's Paul Baker, one of the judges at the BMM trials, who died in 1978. "I would have loved to go in while he was dying of cancer and in the height of misery, and pull a tube out. And say, 'How do you feel, judge?'"

"But those are my fantasies, and sometimes I can purge myself of real bitterness with the fantasies."

His dead Pinto, however, is not a fantasy. The problem is the starter.

The car has stick shift, meaning it can be started with a push. Perhaps he could hire a kid to come along with him, and push it whenever necessary.

But what about the money? He doesn't know. And he doesn't say which border he will cross. Perhaps he hasn't decided.

Late in the evening, he stands in the small lobby of the old hotel, and gives a final message to his friends in Miami.

"Tell them," he says, "Al's surviving, but he's catching hell."

EPILOG

New Year's Eve: he calls a friend's house in Miami. He has crossed the border—he doesn't say where—and he's speaking from a bus station. At the last moment, some friends in Miami had sent money and some folks at the hotel had advanced some, too. Not a lot, but he's hanging in there. A year before, he had been at a Miami party, consisting mostly of whites, and he had gotten falling-down drunk, even vomiting on the host's pillows. Now, he is isolated and sober. Doesn't he feel lonely tonight? "No," he says. "If I were there, I'd probably be alone, too."

Thursday, January 7: there is a collect call to the TROPIC office from Al Featherston.

"They caught me."

"I'm in the Cameron County Jail. It happened about an hour ago."

He's in Brownsville, Tex. For days, after he had gotten the visa renewed, he had been going back and forth between the Mexican and American sides. Driving sometimes. Walking sometimes. The Pinto had been repaired in a Brownsville garage. It needed a new ignition. He crossed again from Mexico into Texas.

"It was a just a fluke," he says. "Maybe I overplayed it. Maybe I made too many trips."

Frances Legere of U.S. Customs says Featherston was not caught by a Federal Government computer—the paperwork that would have put out his name as a Fed-

eral fugitive had never been done. What caught him was a routine check with the computer of the National Crime Information Center, which links local police departments around the country. "There was no prior information," he says.

Ray Martinez, the Brownsville cop who made the arrest, says Customs officials stopped Featherston because they noticed an area of his windshield where there obviously had been a Mexican tourist sticker, necessary for cars that have been in the Mexican interior for long periods of time. Those kind of cars are checked much more thoroughly than American cars that just cross the border for a few hours. It looked like Featherston was avoiding an inspection, and that led to the computer check.

And so it was over for Al Featherston, the man of contradictions, who was hiding and yet not hiding, who always talked of violence but complained he couldn't carry out his own preachings, who had said, "I have no intentions of going down again. I went like a good nigger boy last time, but I wouldn't do it again. There is a time in life where a man must take a position and say this is it." In the end, he went quietly.

**THE ROLE OF CUBA IN INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION**

**Terrorist and Subversive Activities of the Cuban
Government in Latin America**

THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m., in room 2228 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Also present: Senator East.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milling, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator Denton. This hearing will come to order. The Senate will be considering Senator Williams' case at 11 or 11:30. However, Senator Baker has indicated that he will not call for any rollcall votes prior to 12, so we have at least until that time for this hearing.

Senator East has indicated his intention to be here. The other members of the subcommittee will be on the floor because of the Senator Williams discussions.

I want to welcome to the subcommittee a man whom I respect and admire, Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Appearing with him are Mr. Robert Turner, Dr. Ikle's special assistant; Col. Heyward Hutson, the Regional Planner for Latin America; and Mr. Talbot Lindstrom, also special assistant to Dr. Ikle.

Today and tomorrow we will continue the hearings of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism on the role of Cuba in international terrorism and subversion. Today we will hear testimony on the extent to which the Cuban Government, as a proxy of the Soviet Union, is directly involved in exacerbating and exploiting the social and political conditions that exist in Central America—principally this is accomplished through terrorism. The purpose of the Cuban effort is to contribute to destabilization of the area with, as earlier testimony has clearly established, the ultimate objective of bringing about the destruction of the United States. This objective is mandated to them by the U.S.S.R through the KGB which controls the Cuban intelligence service, the DGI, as was made clear

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in the testimony of Gerardo Peraza. I expect that the testimony today will help place in perspective the specific information we have received during earlier hearings.

A landmark in the context of today's subject is the address to the OAS on February 24 of President Reagan who reminded us of the importance to our own country of the security of other Western nations, particularly those in Central America.

In that speech, the President said "In the face of outside threats, security for the countries of the Caribbean and Central American area is not an end in itself, but a means to an end." Because that sentence contained the first step toward a basic understanding of the issues in the region, I repeat his statement today. The President's observation corresponds to my own view, a view reached as a result of some study and immersion in international affairs since I was in my late teens, some experience that I have had, including living in a Communist country as their "guest" for nearly 8 years, and extensive briefings that I recently received during a visit to Central America on the critical situation in that vital part of our hemisphere.

It is only when a nation is secure—free of both Communist tyranny and terrorism—that the application of the principles of democracy can develop and grow. When terrorism is rampant, the Government must try to take whatever action is necessary to end that terror. Communist states are ruled by terror, as Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, and others are imploring us to understand. They are ruled by terror so that the presence of externally applied or sponsored terrorism is nearly impossible; it's virtually a contradiction in terms to talk about external terrorism in a Communist-run government.

But for a non-Communist government, more or less democratic, the term "whatever action necessary," to end the terror generally leads to repression; repression often leads to revolution. And, I must emphasize, revolution is the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union, its allies, and its agents.

The Soviet Union is well on the way to its goal. Moscow employs a routine technique, which is not only evident, but boringly evident to any reasonably objective student of foreign affairs. Part of that technique is based on the simple observation that if there is repression, the road to revolution is relatively more easy. And the way to get the repression is to cause, encourage, and support terrorism. It is a tragedy that this fact is not being made part of the knowledge of the American public.

If terrorist-caused revolution results in a leftwing or Communist government, the nation is easily and shortly absorbed into the Soviet orbit. That nation is lost to the free world and to any prospect of freedom for its people.

If the revolution—again, terrorism-caused—results in a rightwing government, that government is held up for world denunciation, for castigation by its friends as well as by its enemies, and it becomes the target for the application of further terror, which is characterized as a struggle against an antidemocratic force. We can think of Diem, we can think of the Shah of Iran, we can think of many rulers in South America. This often succeeds in bringing about that government's overthrow and replacement by a leftwing

regime, sometimes with the unwitting or shortsighted assistance of those whose best interests clearly mandate that they staunchly oppose exactly that result.

The Soviet campaign to undermine and overthrow all governments that are not under its control has made great progress in this hemisphere. Cuba is a wholly controlled surrogate of Moscow; Nicaragua has slipped away. El Salvador and Guatemala teeter on the brink. Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay have been on the brink.

It is clear that Soviet-supported—and in the case of Latin America—Soviet-directed terrorism seeks to cause repression in order to produce a dictatorship, ideally of the left. However, a rightwing regime soon becomes the target for a counter effort calculated to produce a revolution of the left.

All dictatorships—left or right, militarist, Socialist, or Communist—fear democratic ideals and sincerely held religious commitment.

Our media, however, seem oblivious—and this is a general statement, not all in the media are under these illusions—to the fact that it is much easier to replace or to influence a rightwing dictatorship which has only limited local resources than it is to replace or even influence a leftwing dictatorship supported by the iron link of a Moscow-Eastern Europe-Havana supply of weapons, training, money, and propaganda. This is made painfully evident by the most casual review of reports appearing in U.S. media. It is an increasing mystery to me how liberals can still call themselves liberals and ignore the fact that if we are to have more liberalism and respect for human rights in South America, it will not happen through leftwing dictatorships held secure by the Moscow-Havana link.

Although several administration witnesses have testified before congressional committees on events in El Salvador and on the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan supply of arms, the journalists who reported on these hearings and commentators who organized the news reports implied that there was no proof to support the statements and that the testimony was merely a vehicle to instill fear in order to justify direct U.S. intervention in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Moreover, some Members of the Senate and House of Representatives have become advocates for the Sandinistas and the Communist terrorists operating in El Salvador, apparently prepared to accept, without challenge, the views of agents of regimes now serving as surrogates of the Soviet Union with the mission of extending the influence of communism throughout Central and South America.

Well, we now have seen some of that proof, the stunning photographs so effectively presented and described on Tuesday.

What is so superficially attractive about these peoples regimes that it blinds us to the stark realities of what happens once the Communists seize power? Who speaks for the human rights of the Miskito Indians forced by the Sandinista regime into resettlement or worse? Where are the teams of human rights observers in North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Cuba, and even Poland? When will this absurd hypocrisy end?

Where are those people now who were screaming that the Ho Chi Minh government would be a better government than the Diem government or the Thieu government, now that the Communist buzzards, the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists are fighting over the spoils, the human and natural resource spoils, of Southeast Asia?

An article on page A17 of the Washington Post today is particularly striking to me. About one-quarter of the article, dealing with what the headline indicates; namely, "Reagan Designates March 21 to Honor Afghan Resistance"—about one-quarter of the article deals with this, and this is a quote:

Asked by reporters as he left the room whether there was a difference between U.S. claims of Soviet interference in Afghanistan and Soviet claims of U.S. interference in Nicaragua, Reagan said "As I said before, they have a different standard of morality than we do: we tell the truth."

How can this writer believe or think that the American public is so naive as to compare the divisions of Soviet troops in Afghanistan with what the United States has going in Nicaragua? An overt, naked aggression, the first since 1939, against a sovereign power by a superpower—he compares that directly to our interference in Nicaragua. Now, what kind of journalism is that?

I wonder when there is going to be a sense of shame that comes from honest journalists to overcome that kind of lie and misconception?

In a recent interview, Alexander Solzhenitsyn spoke of this problem when asked why it is so fashionable to praise the regimes in Nicaragua and Vietnam and the partisans in Salvador. He replied:

That is the *fatal historical mistake of liberalism*—not to see the enemy on the left, to consider that the enemy is always on the right, and that there is no enemy on the left. [Emphasis added.] It is the same mistake which ruined Russian liberalism in 1917. They overlooked the danger of Lenin. And the same thing is being repeated today—the mistake of Russian liberalism is being repeated on a worldwide scale everywhere.

It is not that liberalism is wrong; it is this flow or mistake of liberalism in the international field which is tragically wrong.

In Central America, as in Vietnam, there are needs for social and economic progress, and there are people who are legitimately disaffected. But, as in Vietnam, we now see the creation of a myth that there flourishes in El Salvador a revolutionary movement free of outside aid or influence, that commits no violence on its own initiative, that is interested only in building schools and hospitals, that all the people in its free zones support universally and with an enthusiasm that one can only rarely, if ever, find in the real world.

How can this myth continue to exist after the holocaust in Cambodia, Laos? How can George McGovern, Jane Fonda, and the writers who brought that victory for the Communists after we won a military victory sit calmly with their conscience or face themselves in the mirror without confessing, as Joan Baez has, how wrong they were? Now we are dealing with another situation; namely, El Salvador which is in our own backyard.

This is despite the fact that Vietnam has sent captured American military supplies to the guerrillas—despite the fact that Yassir Arafat has admitted the presence of PLO operatives in El Salvador—despite the fact that, although political parties from the far

right to the socialist left have agreed to participate in elections, the rebels are working to sabotage those elections—despite the fact that the Soviet Union orchestrates and sends aid directly and keeps up a flood of propaganda notable more for its enthusiasm and quantity than for its accuracy or originality.

Those who are familiar with the history of Vietnam, with the propaganda that presented the National Liberation Front as little more than a group of simple, indigenous agrarian reforming opponents of a cruel dictatorship will find alarming and enlightening similarities in the propaganda about the "resistance" in El Salvador. What is it about American journalists that makes them so credulous of Potemkin villages and assertions of goodness and good intentions that would furrow the brow of a saint?

Some may be motivated by a sincere belief that the poor will be better served by a different political system. I believe they have failed to recognize what should be obvious: in every nation where communism has been instituted, the standard of living relative to non-Communist nations has declined.

Prerevolutionary Russia was the world's largest exporter of grain and had the most rapid rate of industrial growth in Europe. Now the Soviet Union is unable to feed its own people since communism brought with it 50 straight years of "bad weather," and its economy is unsuited to the production of anything other than military hardware designed to deprive others of freedom and to obtain grain and scarce resources from others. I note in today's paper that they are now going on credit to buy that grain.

The breadlines in Poland are a direct result of the Soviet Union bleeding off her production and of an unworkable economic system imposed from afar by Moscow. Consider Czechoslovakia, the tool-maker of Central Europe, whose standard of living declined atrociously and whose people, like those in Hungary and elsewhere, were driven to revolt against the tanks of the Soviet oppressor. Consider also the example of Cuba, a nation of 10 million which can barely feed 7 million, and which now survives as a nation only with massive economic and military assistance and whose people will seize any opportunity to flee. Cuba's dependence upon Moscow is not unrelated to its willingness to do Moscow's will.

So those who support Communist-sponsored rebels as a way of helping the poor do not help the poor at all. Their position is understandable but wrong. They are unthinking opponents of imperfect governments without considering the alternatives, the consequences.

Every Latin American diplomat I met at a large reception in Panama supports the election in El Salvador, and the role of the Latin American nations could be critical in helping resolve the turbulent situation.

Latin American states such as Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and others have the capability to insulate Central America from the growing traffic of arms and advisers coming through Cuba and Nicaragua. Yet they are reluctant to have anything to do with it. They are reluctant to even speak above the table. They tell us under the table: you better do something there, or the end has come. But they are intimidated against speaking because of the threat of terrorism within their own countries, which they have

been all too familiarized with in the past. Those are facts. Why has the American public been totally shielded from those facts?

Those South American countries which I mentioned are reluctant to speak up or do anything because they fear the reticence of the United States to defend and support them when the terrorists move again onto their territory. Look what happened to the Shah. He was perceived by the world as not liberalizing fast enough, and by his own nation as liberalizing too fast. The alternative was the great bearded prophet in Paris. What happened?

These Latin American states have been at the brink caused by domestic terrorism and if the United States did not try to push them over, our policymakers did not exert much effort to pull them back. The examples of Iran and Vietnam, of Afghanistan and Angola, even of their own experiences in recent years, do not encourage these nations to take actions which would be in our interest as well as in their own.

Our most serious problem in providing for the security of this Nation stems from a lack of understanding rather than from a basic lack of will. Since our experience in Vietnam, we have been progressively paralyzed by misinterpretation and misinformation.

We suffered an inability to do that which had to be done to protect American interests and the cause of freedom in the world. What I call "the Vietnam syndrome" was largely responsible for the decline in our ability to protect ourselves and our allies from Soviet aggression and imperialism. It's a mental thing, it's a psychological thing; it is not a matter of will.

For a long time I have feared that we would be like the man who hopes that if he feeds his brothers to the crocodile, the crocodile will eat him last. Will men conclude 100 years from now that we fed our brothers to the crocodile to delay but also to assure our own demise?

The media are full of comparison of Vietnam and El Salvador. Much of the comparison is ill informed, some is ill advised, but it is right in one essential respect: the crocodile now is not in faraway Southeast Asia but on our doorstep, in Central America.

Today, the subcommittee is delighted to have as a witness Dr. Fred Ikle, who was sworn in as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on April 2, 1981. He has worked with the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, and with the Rand Corp. He has been associated with the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, and held a chair as professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Dr. Ikle served as Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1973 until 1977.

From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Ikle was active in private business and as a consultant on national security affairs. He was the chairman of the Conservation Management Corp. and director of several other corporations and foundations.

Dr. Ikle, it is an honor and pleasure to have you with us today. I hope you will pardon the length of my opening statement, but I believe you can understand the sense of urgency I feel about the necessity to get a true perspective on what is going on.

Would you please stand and raise your right hand so that I may swear you in? [Secretary Ikle stands.]

Do you swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Secretary IKLE. I do.

Senator DENTON. Please be seated. Do you have an opening statement, sir?

TESTIMONY OF HON. FRED C. IKLE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT TURNER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY IKLE; TALBOT S. LINDSTROM, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY IKLE; AND HEYWARD G. HUTSON, REGIONAL PLANNER FOR LATIN AMERICA

Secretary IKLE. I do, sir.

I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that you invited me to appear before your committee. You have asked me to discuss, among other things, the role of Castro's Cuba in promoting violence, terrorism, and armed opposition movements. The purpose of such Cuban intervention in other countries is to undermine governments that seek economic and social progress within a democratic framework, or to extend the global reach of the Soviet military establishment, or both.

With its population of less than 10 million and a land area of about 44,000 square miles, Cuba is involved globally, providing military and technical advisers and assistance thousands of miles away, as this chart which we have here will show you, in Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, the Congo, Mozambique, and Vietnam, among others. Castro currently has about 60,000 Cubans serving overseas, including 35,000 military and 25,000 civilian technicians. Cuba has about 20,000 troops in Angola alone, and about 12,000 troops in Ethiopia.

[Chart No. 1 showing global Cuban military involvement follows:]


Given these farflung interventions, Cuba's military capability is obviously far in excess of any defensive needs. Its army of 225,000 includes 9 active and 18 reserve divisions. In addition, there are hundreds of thousands of reserves, militia, and other paramilitary forces. Cuba has 650 tanks, over 200 Mig fighters in its air force, including a recently arrived second squadron of Mig-23's. Cuba's navy includes 50 torpedo and missile attack boats, 2 attack submarines, and a frigate.

Overall, 2.3 percent of Cuba's population is in the regular armed forces, and about 1 of every 20 Cubans participates in some kind of security mission. By comparison, Mexico, with seven times Cuba's population, maintains regular defense forces half the size of Cuba's and involving less than two-tenths of 1 percent of its population. We in the United States have less than 1 percent of our people in the regular Armed Forces.

How does Cuba sustain such large forces on a faltering economy? It relies, as it has for twenty years, on the Soviet Union to keep it afloat. In 1981 the Soviets provided \$3 billion in economic assistance, and at least \$500 million in military assistance. The U.S.S.R. sent three times more military equipment to Cuba in 1981 than in 1980 and more than in any year since 1962. The U.S.S.R. shipped about 66,000 metric tons into Cuba in 1981. The next chart will show you the trends in this assistance. See the rising curve there in Soviet military assistance and deliveries to Latin America. It speaks for itself, Mr. Chairman.

[Chart No. 2 showing Soviet military assistance to Cuba follows:]

CHART NO. 2—SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO CUBA



Senator DENTON. Could we let the press and the audience just see that for a minute, Dr. Ikle?

[Chart was turned so press and audience could see it.]

Senator DENTON. I notice one interesting thing, Dr. Ikle, and that is the drop of those supplies after the Cuban missile crisis when a Democratic President looked the crocodile in the eye and that dip took place—John F. Kennedy.

Secretary IKLE. That is when the pressure was on for this supply to be curtailed.

Senator DENTON. How his brother can now be, along with a Republican, calling for a freeze when they have a 6-to-1 nuclear advantage is incredible to me.

Secretary IKLE. Now, why, Mr. Chairman, is the Soviet Union willing to expend such resources on Cuba? Because the Soviets realize the importance of their position in Cuba as a threat to the Atlantic Alliance; they realize it more fully than do many Americans and more fully than most Europeans. Moscow knows that in time of war half of NATO's supplies would come through our gulf ports. They are aware that 44 percent of all foreign tonnage, and 45 percent of the crude oil for the United States, pass through the Caribbean. They understand the importance of the Panama Canal and the South Atlantic sealanes of communication that carry about

two-thirds of west Europe's petroleum and nearly half of our imports.

But perhaps more importantly the Soviets seek to change our southern borders from the peaceful conditions of the past by building potentially hostile forces in Central America and the Caribbean. They may expect that we will have to divert our attention and forces from other interests elsewhere. It is high time, Mr. Chairman, that our allies overseas begin to recognize this strategy.

Take Grenada; a highly visible ongoing Cuban project is the construction of their airport capable of accommodating advanced jet aircraft and a naval facility. In December 1981, Grenadian Minister of National Mobilization, Selwyn Strachan, publicly boasted that Cuba will eventually use the new airport in his country to supply troops in Angola. And ominously he added that because of its strategic location, the airport may also be used by the Soviet Union.

Senator DENTON. Would you repeat that sentence, the relationship between the airport in Grenada to supplies in Angola?

Secretary IKLE. This was the Minister of National Mobilization, Selwyn Strachan, who boasted that Cuba will eventually use the new airport that is being built in Grenada with Cuban and Soviet help to supply troops—yes, to supply troops to Angola, to move out to Angola from Cuba. And then he added that because of its strategic location, it may also be used by the Soviet Union to come into the Caribbean presumably.

Senator DENTON. It could be used by the Soviet Union to come into the—

Secretary IKLE. Caribbean area.

Senator DENTON. The Caribbean area.

Secretary IKLE. Or the Cubans to move out via Grenada to Africa.

Senator DENTON. It could also be used to bring into the Latin American area a military air force presence which would be a very interesting factor in the balance.

Secretary IKLE. That is right.

Now, by relying on Cuban mercenaries as surrogates, the Soviets are able to carry out their interventionist policies without risking the hostile reaction, or at least the same hostile reaction, from the America people and the Third World that a direct involvement of Soviet troops and personnel would engender. That is the advantage from their point of view.

Latin America provides an excellent microcosm of how the Soviet-Cuba partners cooperate in tandem. As U.S. advisers with Latin American countries were cut back from—and listen to these numbers—from 516 in 1970 to 70 in 1981.

Senator DENTON. That's on the chart, and would you say again—the abscissa and ordinate—what are those?

Secretary IKLE. The number of military advisers in Latin American countries, and you see the decline—the blue column there declining steadily from 1970, 516, to 70 in 1981. These are the advisers we have for the area to the south of the United States.

Senator DENTON. Would you mind letting the press see that, for whatever use they care to make of it? [See Chart No. 3.]

[Chart No. 3 was turned so press and audience could see it.]

Secretary IKLE. The gray ones on top are the Cuban and U.S.S.R. advisers that have moved into the area, while we moved out. And you might show it to the press.

So 1981, as this chart shows, Soviets and Cubans had 50 times as many military advisers in Latin America as the United States—Mr. Chairman, 50 times. Moreover, from 1962 to 1981, the Soviets provided more than twice as much security assistance to Latin America as did the United States, roughly \$4 billion for the U.S.S.R. compared with \$1.5 billion for the United States. [See Chart No. 4.] Again, you see here the blue line, the U.S. security assistance to Latin America declining, particularly after 1975, and the red line rising, the Soviet assistance to Latin America.

[The charts referred to follow:]

CHART NO. 3—MILITARY ADVISORS WITH LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES





CHART NO. 4—SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA
(\$ IN MILLIONS)



Senator DENTON. With respect to your chart showing the Latin American advisers and to place in perspective the comparison with Afghanistan, in which the Soviet Union has division upon division, to our involvement in Nicaragua, how many advisers do we have in Nicaragua?

Secretary IKLE. In El Salvador?

Senator DENTON. I think they compared it to—

Secretary IKLE. El Salvador, I'm sure. In Nicaragua, of course, we just have the Embassy personnel.

Senator DENTON. They compared it to U.S. interference in Nicaragua, sir.

Secretary IKLE. Oh, right, but they would not call those advisers. But, in any event, the people cannot tell the difference between 50 and 90,000 maybe. We have 53 advisers, up to a maximum of 53 advisers in El Salvador, and there are over 80,000 Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

So we need not wonder that totalitarianism is making inroads; it is receiving far more support than democratic pluralism. Not only 50 times as many military advisers, but a far higher level of military assistance.

Mr. Chairman, the Castro regime is linked to the Soviet Union not only through its tools but also through its methods. Castro has not only been armed with all this weaponry by his Soviet masters, he has also been inspired and tutored in the methods of totalitarianism by experts in Moscow. I would like to illustrate this for three issues that are of central concern to your committee.

First, the use of terrorism to spread totalitarian control has been practiced in strikingly similar fashion by the Soviet Union and by Fidel Castro.

Second, the use of deception, particularly deception to mislead Western media, has been developed to a fine art by both Castro and the Soviets.

Third, there is the destruction of the chances for democratic elections by the entrapment of Western democracies into alleged negotiations which become a process for the totalitarians to seize the monopoly of power.

Let me add some more details to describe each of these three practices.

First, on terrorism. A great deal of the current debate has been about the question of Soviet control over various terrorist groups. This is, of course, a question of some importance. However, it is by no means the only important issue in determining Western policy toward terrorist groups. In the first place, terrorism is an assault on the most basic human rights, an attack on civil society. In the second place, terrorism is usually associated with a political program. It is a device for seizing power and maintaining it, foreclosing for the indefinite future any substantial expansion of elementary political liberties. Third, even if terrorist "armies" are not directed from Moscow, their acts may lead to the expansion of Soviet influence and control, and indeed, in some cases, they aim precisely at destabilizing a government, allied or otherwise associated with

CONTINUED

1 OF 3

the United States, at detaching it from the open Western world and forcing it into the closed Soviet orbit.

Senator DENTON. In previous hearings of the subcommittee, we have established our awareness of the fact that the evidence does not indicate that the Soviet Union by any means exercises complete and detailed control over terrorism globally. She has just made a gross bet on the side of terrorism, black or red, left or right, as being to their net advantage.

But in some areas of the world, such as Latin America, they have relatively direct control over the degree, kind, and direction of terrorism. This is the case with the Moscow-Havana link where a Soviet general exercises control over the intelligence service of Cuba, the DGI.

Secretary IKLE. Right, this assessment is correct.

Senator DENTON. We have also brought out, sir, that since the Tricontinental Conference in 1966, there exists a marked commonality among terrorist groups, a commonality that extends even to textbooks, such as the "Mini-Manual for Urban Guerrillas" which can be found in Czechoslovakia, in the Sudan, in Libya, in New York City, as well as in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere. It is a coordinated effort, blatantly similar in terms of tactics, direction, and technique, a technique which, as I said before, is boringly evident to anyone who takes more than a casual look at it. Yet, this is not known in the United States. In fact, when the name Carlos was brought up with respect to the Qadhafi threat against the President and other officials, the members of the Foreign Relations Committee who were present did not know who Carlos was. To me, this is incredible but understandable in that what has been revealed in this subcommittee as fact has not been reported to the American public.

Secretary IKLE. Adding to what you just said, Mr. Chairman, let me introduce a particular example of Soviet-controlled terrorism which has received little attention. One of the most dangerous and most neglected of all the terrorist movements, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). It has formally announced that its strategy is to gain control of the eastern third of Turkey, our ally, to "free" it so called from the Turkish Government and to unite it with the Soviet Union. This is an area of the world which is, of course, critically important for the eastern Mediterranean and for the southern region of NATO. It is also critical for Egypt and Israel and the rest of the Middle East.

It does not matter very much whether the Armenian Secret Army is directly commanded by Moscow. It is an efficient and brutal executor of the murder of innocent civilians. It has intimidated governments allied with Turkey and law-abiding Armenian communities as well. If it were to be successful in its aims, it would lead directly to the expansion of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps more than any other terrorist movement, it illustrates the irrelevance of some of the issues that have preoccupied the debate in the West on terrorism. Whether the Armenian terrorist movement is acting on its own, or under Moscow's direction, if it succeeds, it will come down to the same thing. Here lies a lesson for our current concerns in Central America.

Let me turn now to the related question of deception. Marxist guerrillas in Latin America have been largely recruited from the upper and middle classes and the student population. They use deception to make it hard for domestic or foreign intelligence agencies and—an important point—even harder for the press to identify and track them. The guerrillas disguise themselves often as peasants, and sometimes as government soldiers. Government uniforms serve as cover for an assault on the government, or as cover for terror against the population in their campaign to destabilize the country and to have the government forces blamed for the terror. It serves to confuse domestic and foreign opinion. And the terrorists disguised as peasants can lead even a carefully controlled government counterattack to be misdirected at the real peasants, or appear to be misdirected to the media observers when it hits guerrillas in peasant costume.

So Marxist guerrillas, using terror to inspire counter terror and to disrupt civil society, create a Catch-22 situation for any regime attempting to improve civil rights and specifically to introduce elections. The guerrillas say that fair elections are impossible in a situation of great civil disorder, while they do everything they can to create such disorder.

Guerrilla disguises do not include only their dress, but also their words. Rebel leaders argue for negotiations and political solutions instead of an election. The phrase political solution should be understood as a code word for a coalition, sometimes encouraged by friendly as well as hostile outside powers, in which the rebel leaders will dedicate themselves ruthlessly to eliminate all other members of the coalition, and in particular those who favor progress toward a representative government and civil rights. The so-called broad-based coalition will then narrow to the rebel leaders themselves. This is the process, of course, that has been happening in Nicaragua.

Senator DENTON. And it is the process by which they approached the so-called unconditional negotiations in Vietnam.

Secretary IKLE. Right. Guerrilla leaders in Latin America sometimes sound like democrats when they protest oppression of freedoms in current traditional authoritarian societies or even in democracies. This should not confuse us, Mr. Chairman. Castro, for example, has been entirely frank in identifying democracy as an anachronism. Speaking in Chile at the time of Allende when he visited down there, Fidel Castro said that anachronisms such as elections and freedom of the press are doomed by history. They—and I am quoting Castro—"exist as long as the people do not have enough strength to change them."

Now, this leads to my third point, Mr. Chairman, the substitution of alleged negotiations for genuine elections so as to eliminate the possibility of free elections ever thereafter. This was the method chosen to cover up the Stalinization of Eastern Europe, and this is the method now being peddled in this country—including, Mr. Chairman, here on Capitol Hill—to cover up the Stalinization of Central America.

Far too often have the governments of the great democracies used their influence to press moderate leaders into coalitions with Marxists where they were unlikely to survive since the Marxists

were intent on seizing the monopoly of power. Sometimes we seem to have trusted Marxist assurances that liberty would be introduced in due time, as Harry Hopkins relied on Stalin's assurances about freedom in Poland. Sometimes, eager to get Soviet cooperation on other matters, we used a coalition as a face-saving way of abandoning support for democracy. So, at the close of World War II, American and British leaders gradually pressed the Polish Government in exile in London, which included socialists and a wide range of political views, to enter the Soviet-controlled Lublin government with the result we see persisting four decades later. Something similar happened in each of the six East European countries.

DEMISE OF COALITIONS BY MARXISTS

In Romania, for example, the Allied Powers meeting in December 1945, agreed that the Government should not be broadened to include members of the opposition, but the opposition leaders that counted were excluded at the insistence of the Soviet Union. The two opposition parties were represented by two carefully selected nobodies. The coalition government then proceeded to exclude them by giving them no ministerial portfolios, and then by excluding them from cabinet meetings. The United States and the United Kingdom protested to no avail. An election was eventually held under general conditions of intimidation, with the inevitable outcome. Then a mass trial of 91 dissidents modeled on the Moscow trials.

When Somoza was replaced in Nicaragua by the Sandinistas, the OAS was promised there would be elections. Now these elections have been indefinitely postponed and the repression of opposition groups and of freedom in Nicaragua is going on with full force.

Constraints on civil rights, poverty, and inequities, all too frequently exist in developing societies. They are not, however, the cause of Marxist attempts to overthrow the government. And when the Marxist guerrillas succeed, they do not improve civil rights—they worsen them. Nor do they improve the economic situation, as we well know. Cuba had one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America—indeed, it was No. 3 in the hemisphere before Castro came in; I think it is now No. 12. Castro's economic policies have been an unmitigated disaster. And in Eastern Europe the economic failure of the Communist economic bloc is plainly visible today.

We know that Cuban subversive activities are not confined solely to El Salvador. Cuba has coordinated clandestine support organizations in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. Cuban subversive activities have surfaced in virtually every Caribbean basin country. Even Mexico, which thinks it has good relations with Cuba.

In South America, Cuba provides advice, safe havens, communications training, and some financial support to many clandestine organizations that employ violence, including Colombia's M-19, Uruguay's Tupamaros, Argentina's Montoneros, and Chile's MIR.

I think you know, Mr. Chairman, the Cubans became involved with known arms smugglers in supplying the Nicaraguan revolutionaries prior to the ouster of Somoza in July of 1979. They found that connection mutually profitable and expanded their ties to in-

clude known drug smugglers who had the contacts and the equipment necessary to facilitate arms shipments. One of the Colombian drug dealers was involved on behalf of Havana in a clandestine shipment of arms to the Colombian M-19 in an operation that involved hijacking a Colombian cargo plane. Cuba provided the funds used by the dealer to purchase the arms and transport them to Colombia. In return, Cuba facilitated the drug dealer's marijuana traffic to Florida. Just recently, this drug dealer was arrested in Mexico after he had arrived there with \$700,000 which the Cubans had given him to purchase arms for the Colombian M-19.

And the Cuban connection with the PLO is well-documented. In recent years there have been dozens of contacts between Cuba and PLO leaders. In fact, on November 17, 1981, PLO leader Yasir Arafat sent a message to Castro reaffirming his support for Cuba.

Before concluding, let me try to dispose of a fallacy about our relations with Castro that is fairly common in Europe, and even has its defenders here. It is sometimes argued that Fidel Castro became a pawn of Moscow out of necessity, that he has been hostile to the United States simply in reaction to our hostility toward his regime. Implicit in this line of thinking is that if we would only be nice to him and try to understand him, he would moderate his behavior. We have a test of this theory. The previous administration conducted a test.

They made significant efforts to improve U. S. relations with the Castro government. The previous administration opened an interest section in Havana and permitted the Cuban Government to do the same in Washington. It relaxed travel restrictions on Cuban diplomats and lifted the restrictions on vessels which had called at Cuban ports, formerly restricted from calling on U.S. ports. The Carter administration also encouraged increased cultural exchanges, lifted the ban on travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba, and permitted the resumption of charter flights between Cuba and the United States.

It is worth recalling the response of Fidel Castro to those friendly overtures. During the Carter administration Castro increased the number of Cuban military personnel in Angola by more than 40 percent, from about 14,000 to 20,000. He introduced the Cuban presence in Ethiopia, reaching a high of 17,000 men in 1978. He initiated a massive effort to subvert non-Communist regimes in Latin America. These actions hardly support the contention that a more conciliatory approach by the United States to United States-Cuban relations will make Castro our friend.

Mr. Chairman, some of your distinguished colleagues in both Houses seem to be suggesting that we should deny help to the Government of El Salvador, a government that is now trying to hold genuine elections and to build and protect a democratic order. Some suggest that instead of elections there should be negotiations, a compromise with those who are ideologically opposed to the very idea of elections.

I wonder if those who offer such counsel know what sort of precedent they are suggesting. They are saying, are they not, that President Truman made a mistake in supporting the Government of Greece against Communist terrorists, and that we should have had negotiations to bring the totalitarians into power in Greece, like in

the rest of Eastern Europe. They are saying, are they not, that it was a mistake for Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter to support Israel against the terrorist onslaught, and that instead we should have negotiations with the PLO.

This is the large issue of principles, Mr. Chairman, that is at stake.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Dr. Ikle. I want to recognize my distinguished colleague from North Carolina, Senator East, and wish him good morning. As usual, his questions and comments will be valuable.

Senator East, if you would care to make an opening statement, we would invite it at this time.

Senator EAST. I would at some point like to engage in a little dialog with our distinguished witness this morning, but I shall forego an opening statement, thank you.

Senator DENTON. All right, sir, I will give myself 10 minutes and then you 10 minutes for questions.


Senator EAST. All right, we will have a good time that way, I think.

Senator DENTON. Dr. Ikle, it is my understanding that you have some prepared charts showing the countries which have come under Communist domination since World War II. It is being postulated that too many people are seeing Communists under every rock, that there is no real threat here, that the Soviet Union is just another superpower like the United States in its aspirations and goals.

Would you mind showing these charts which I trust will assist us in seeing and understanding that there truly is a threat even when viewed simply from a geographical perspective.

[The charts referred to by Senator Denton follow.]


 **COMMUNIST EXPANSION**



PRE-WORLD WAR II

-  **USSR**
-  **MONGOLIA**

COMMUNIST EXPANSION




100

1940-1949

-  USSR
-  MONGOLIA
-  LATVIA
-  LITHUANIA
-  ESTONIA
-  NORTH KOREA
-  EASTERN EUROPE
-  CHINA


COMMUNIST EXPANSION



1950-1969

- USSR
- MONGOLIA
- NORTH VIETNAM
- CUBA
- LATVIA
- LITHUANIA
- ESTONIA
- NORTH KOREA
- EASTERN EUROPE
- CHINA

COMMUNIST EXPANSION



1970-PRESENT

- | | | | | |
|------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| ■ USSR | ■ LATVIA | ■ NORTH VIETNAM | ■ SOUTH VIETNAM | ■ LEFTIST/MARXIST STATES |
| ■ MONGOLIA | ■ LITHUANIA | ■ CUBA | ■ LAOS | ■ NICARAGUA |
| | ■ ESTONIA | | ■ KAMPUCHEA | ■ GRENADA |
| | ■ NORTH KOREA | | ■ AFGHANISTAN | ■ ANGOLA |
| | ■ EASTERN EUROPE | | | ■ ETHIOPIA |
| | ■ CHINA | | | ■ BENIN |
| | | | | ■ CONGO |
| | | | | ■ MOZAMBIQUE |
| | | | | ■ SOUTH YEMEN |

Secretary IKLE. We don't have enough charts to show the full historic development. We show here the Soviet Union in—pre-World War II—1939, which, of course, does not show the prior situation before the Moslem areas in the south, in Outer Mongolia, were annexed by the Soviet Union in pursuit of the czarist-imperialist tradition.

What happened since then I think will demonstrate to you, Mr. Chairman, that you have always been right in your concern about communism; there is really a problem. We will show it to you in the next chart.

Senator DENTON. Please show that to the press on the right side of the room.

[Chart was turned so the press could view it.]

Secretary IKLE. I think the next overlay—here it is, right.

Senator DENTON. That is sort of the beginning, as it were.

Secretary IKLE. Since then, of course, it is important to recognize amongst the Communist countries the very important schism between China and the Soviet Union—we fully recognize that.

It is also worth recognizing, in this context—and that relates to the words "Better red than dead"—that the most brutal wars, the wars that create the most killing, the most dead, are the ones fought among the reds—in Cambodia, for example.

Senator DENTON. A frightening example of not only wars fought among Communists—I believe it can be established as a fact that the United States in retaliation to a Soviet first strike would be able to cause fatalities among a proportion of the Soviet population which is less than the proportion which the Stalin regime, in the purges after 1917, caused within the Soviet Union itself. In other words, they have killed more of their own people percentagewise than we would be able to get in a return strike now.

So those who think there is not a strategic imbalance, when you realize they can get about 70 percent of us, a figure even the left-wing think tanks agree with, had better think twice before dismissing all this as a myth.

Secretary IKLE. The final overlay will show the expansion of the empire that has taken place in more recent years. In other words, there has been a geostrategic trend in that many areas of the world, which were friendly and less developed countries, are now available to the Soviet military or are military outposts for the Soviet Union.

Senator DENTON. One thing that the chart does not show is the potential for terrorism, for strikes, for destabilization, which now exists in countries colored white on the chart which is a tremendously inhibiting factor, for example, in South America. They have experienced it, they know what will happen were they to become more open with respect to their foreign policy statements.

In a recent interview, published in the March 8 issue of U.S. News & World Report, CIA Director William J. Casey was asked: "Does what is happening now in Cuba violate the 1962 Kennedy-Kruschev agreement ending the Cuban missile crisis?"

His response was: "Oh, sure, it does, because the 1962 agreement said the Soviets would send no offensive weapons, and it also said there would be no export of revolution from Cuba."

I would like to insert the full text of Director Casey's interview into the record, as it bears directly on this inquiry.¹

Another example for insertion in the record is a press article disclosing that a Soviet strategic submarine base has been built at Cienfuegos, complete with a nuclear warhead handling facility. It appeared in *The New York Post* on March 11, 1982, and is entitled "Nuke Bases in Cuba."²

In part, it states there have been many visits of Soviet *Golf* and *Echo* class submarines to Cienfuegos carrying strategic nuclear weapon warhead-equipped missiles. This compares to the violation that occurred with respect to Japan when we got a ship in there that had some kind of reported nuclear support equipment aboard.

There have been accounts of TU-95 Bear bombers regularly flying to Cuba, reports of 66,000 tons of Soviet military equipment shipped to Cuba in 1981 alone, three times more than in 1962 when we took this to the summit. The nuclear-missile-equipped Soviet naval task force tours of the Caribbean in 1981 threatened vital oil-fields. There are reportedly 40 nuclear-capable Mig-23's and Mig-27's now in Cuba, at least one Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

[See exhibit A in appendix to this hearing.]

If, in fact, these press reports are accurate—and we have other reasons to believe that they are—in your opinion, have the Soviets engaged in a clearcut violation of the Kennedy-Kruschev agreement of 1962?

Secretary IKLE. There are two observations to be made. One, in direct answer to your question, that agreement has been constantly eroded so that there is very little left of it, indeed if there is anything left. Second, it is really not an actual agreement; it is a juxtaposition of unilateral positions, and one of the conditions, the verification condition of President Kennedy, was never fulfilled.

So, in that sense, their part of the bargain at the very outset was not completed. But even apart from that, what remained of their promises, as I said, has been constantly eroded.

Senator DENTON. During the period 1970 to 1971, is it true that Henry Kissinger conducted negotiations with Dobrynin and Berentsov on the so-called Kennedy-Krushchev agreements concerning the basing of strategic offensive arms in Cuba? Were similar negotiations conducted during the Carter administration, and, if so, what concessions were made to the Soviet Union?

Secretary IKLE. I could not be here in the open session to testify about these negotiations. In any event, Mr. Chairman, I believe the State Department would be a more appropriate department to provide a witness on these negotiations.

Senator DENTON. We shall ask that question of Secretary Enders who is to appear tomorrow.

Do the 70 or so Russian military advisors in Nicaragua carry rifles? How about the more than 2,000 Cuban advisors, the East Germans, the members of the PLO?

Secretary IKLE. Well, many of these Communist advisors and supporters are heavily armed; others, of course, are disguised and

¹ The article appears as exhibit B in the appendix to this hearing.

² The newspaper article appears as exhibit A in the appendix to this hearing.

are not armed or less armed. Deception is often more important than the actual arming of people involved.

Senator DENTON. Defense Secretary Weinberger stated—and you have reiterated today—that the Soviet influence in Cuba is all-pervasive. The subcommittee has received testimony in support of that view from several witnesses who say that the Cuban intelligence service, the DGI, is totally controlled and directed by the Soviet KGB, as I said previously.

In your opinion, or in the Department's opinion, is there any area in which the Cubans are given a free hand? Are all activities of the Cuban Government—economic, military, intelligence—directed by the Soviets? How total and complete is the Soviet grasp on Cuba, from your understanding and point of view?

Secretary IKLE. There probably is a certain degree of freedom given both by the distance of the island from Moscow and the temperament of Fidel Castro, and particularly it is clear that the style used by Fidel Castro is obviously quite different from the style that the leadership in Moscow tries to practice.

Indeed, that has been one of Castro's assets that he is adept at practicing a style that beguiles many people here into feeling that they are seeing a true revolutionary in the sense of a person who introduces reform and brings in a new and better life for his people—in the sense that we understand revolution in our classic history. Whereas, in fact, he is really a promoter of a totalitarian anachronism, an imperial reach of Cuba into Africa and other parts of Latin America, which, if you wanted to find parallels, you would have to go back maybe to imperial Portugal, that established its outposts in Macao and Brazil and so on. Yet at the same time, he's able—for Castro has undoubted skill in his relations with the media—to pose as a reformer-type revolutionary.

Senator DENTON. Senator East.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN P. EAST

Senator EAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to just make a few observations, and I wish to commend you for holding these hearings and helping us to get a firmer understanding of what is occurring in the world in terms of the Soviet-Cuban connection, as well as others. So I, as one colleague, greatly appreciate and respect your leadership in this area.

I would like to thank the witness, the Under Secretary, for coming this morning and taking his valuable time to share this testimony with us.

To me, as a freshman Senator, in view of the world as I see it and understand it, it is refreshing to have a colleague like Jeremiah Denton chairing a subcommittee of this kind, and it is extremely refreshing to hear someone from the executive branch, like yourself, come over and begin to talk candidly about the world as it is rather than how the visionaries have been assessing it in recent years and decades.

I think that our problem is an educational one, and you are helping perform that role, and so is Senator Denton—and I would like to say publicly I think your chief man over there, the Secretary of Defense, is doing extremely well, and trying, in a very civil and

rational way, to explain the realities of the world to the American people in this area of defense and Soviet and Cuban intentions in our own hemisphere, and elsewhere.

I noticed in the immediate past issue of U.S. News & World Report there is an interview with him there in which he talks intelligently and with a profound sense of realism about what is going on in the world. Again, I will not read this verbatim, but it talks about the Soviet-Cuban connection, it talks about the impact of this in our own hemisphere. He makes the point, which would certainly come within the purview of the comments that you are making, that if we do see achieved in Central America on the mainland there a Communist bastion, as he calls it—he says, “It would make the defense of the United States infinitely more difficult”—and he speaks of American security.

And, again, this is refreshing; we have simply not had this from Washington; we have been constantly on the defensive.

One frustration I have, as a new Senator—and I am not faulting them, I am simply stating a fact, I appreciate the great time restrictions under which the national media work—but, for example, if Members of our body who take another point of view on this matter go down to Central America, a great deal of attention is lavished upon them, and the impression is given that they represent the U.S. Senate, they speak for the majority sentiment here. And I would like to reassure you, that is not true. And we appreciate what you are doing and what the Secretary of Defense is doing—and Senator Denton’s point of view, and that is why I greatly value his leadership here, is infinitely more representative of a strong sentiment in the U.S. Congress to do something about this.

And the first task we face is to educate the American people. I am somewhat subjecting you to a bit of a minisermone here—you don’t need it, I am preaching to the choir—but what I would like to try to do with you is to underscore that I as one person deeply appreciate the leadership that you are obviously giving here, and also the Secretary of Defense. It is refreshing; it goes to the heart of the matter. And, as it ought to be in a democracy, the fundamental problem we have is educating the American people to the realities of Soviet intentions and Soviet power in the world. We are deeply dependent upon the media to try to give a balanced view of this assessment. I am not quite sure that has been done. That isn’t a place to belabor you.

But there is a point of view that feels that the Soviet Union is using Cuba and other proxies clearly to subvert the underdeveloped part of the world; it’s part of a new colonialism, the new colonialism in Africa via Cuban troops, the new colonialism in Central America via Cuban troops, the new colonialism in Southeast Asia via Vietnamese troops—Cam Ran Bay is today a Soviet naval base.

And I would submit, Mr. Chairman, in Central America we are seeing the Caribbean being turned into a predominantly Soviet-Cuban area of influence, if we do not manage to stop this. Africa has increasingly seen Soviet and Cuban incursions. It is even occurring in the Middle East via the PLO and Cuban troops in South Yemen.

Now, for those who are willing to look at facts and are willing to take off the ideological blinders and are willing to look at the real

world of power politics, it is clear what the Soviet Union is doing. And the frustration is to try to get the American people to understand that.

To my point, I think the executive branch is in a unique position to do this. They can obtain the forum, the President can obtain it, the Secretary of Defense can obtain it. I regret to say it is not possible for U.S. Senators who share that point of view to get that kind of attention. It will be, as I repeat, lavished upon those of the contrary point of view, those who recently went down there. You know who they are as well as I do—from the House and the Senate. Fine gentlemen, I respect their integrity and the point of view, but it is one monolithic point of view—negative, pull out the rug, get out, let it go, none of our business, there is nothing going on here but agrarian reform. We have heard that scenario over and over and over and over and over again since 1945.

And the cycle is being repeated again. And every time the Communists take over, the bloodbath is enormous, as it was in Southeast Asia, as it is everywhere where these people have taken over.

And it is just an enormous frustration that that kind of message cannot be communicated to the American people, because I am thoroughly convinced, Mr. Chairman, if they knew what these gentlemen are saying, and what the administration is trying to say and the Secretary of Defense—and, I might note, the Secretary of State—I think we could genuinely stem this and begin to turn the tide in favor of antitotalitarian philosophies and points of view.

I would submit as important as the economy is, and it is vital and we are greatly preoccupied with it these days, certainly of equal importance or a very strong second is this one, what’s occurring in the world in terms of the enhancement of Soviet power via its proxies like Cuba, and a certain naivete and indifference to it on the part of many people in this country.

And I like to avoid emphasizing the problem of how fair the media has been with it. I don’t think it’s a matter of fairness; I think it’s just a matter of trying to get out the other point of view on it, from Senators and Congressmen and others who do not agree with these other people who go down there and come back with this message and receive all the attention that is lavished upon them. Maybe I’m wrong, maybe it merely is happenstance, it’s inadvertence, no great design to do it—I am not impugning any motives, I am simply saying what anyone can observe on television, the major networks, who watch it night in and night out. I have not seen a Senator on there or a Congressman who would share your point of view. But night in and night out, in the morning television shows and in the evening, I see a constant point of view of the other one; we are constantly told that there is growing a strong opinion in the Congress against what the President is trying to do. It is simply not so. It is simply not so.

And there are those who deeply appreciate what you are trying to do and share your frustration. And, again, Mr. Chairman, I commend you for trying, doing a noble and valiant effort here to try to continue to push this issue. The problem is fundamentally an educational one.

So I really do not ask a question; I simply state a point of view. And often witnesses who come over here are badgered by commit-

tees and insulted and pommeled and their integrity questioned, so I would maybe like to be a little more refreshing today and say we appreciate what you are doing. And keep plugging, have patience—it's tough. And keep in mind that we live in a free society, a democratic society—we are trying to keep it that way against the totalitarian forces in the world today. And it is an educational problem, getting our fellow Americans to understand what is occurring. The totalitarian systems have an enormous advantage over us: they simply repress all opposition and do what they want to do and be done with it, as the Soviets are doing wherever their activities are going on.

But we don't work that way, fortunately, and the problem is educational, and we all must keep working at it, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Senator East, for those enlightening comments from a man who has spent so much time in academe and is such a respected political scientist in his State.

I believe the only hope for this country lies in the education you are talking about. I believe the American public is not difficult to educate; all they have to have is the information. And that information has to be at least somewhat balanced.

And I think that the hope for this country lies in its media. It is either going to transmit some kind of balance, or it is not; if it does not, I don't see how we can save ourselves.

I share the admiration which Senator East expressed toward you, sir, and the patience and frustration he's acknowledged that you all must feel. I share his belief that you should be assured that Senator Pell's and Senator Leahy's visit to El Salvador and the attention given to it is not representative even today of that which is the belief here in the Senate.

I mention some naivete with respect to terrorism, because I myself have learned a great deal that I did not know. It has boggled my mind to learn the degree to which terrorism is now such an effective sector of the spectrum of Soviet influence in the world. And it is not surprising that my colleagues as yet are somewhat naive about that.

But, again, we face the barrier of people not reporting what has been revealed in these hearings. They are saying we are not having unfriendly witnesses—we have had some. But why we can't get anything reported through here without a challenge to the fact that they are facts, they simply don't report it—it makes it somewhat frustrating, and I am going to try to continue to work on the hope that the press will pass it through—and the electronic media.

There has been extensive press coverage of Secretary Haig's discussion with Mexican officials concerning the Mexican proposal for a so-called negotiated settlement in El Salvador. And I recognize that the Secretary of State has to deal with what the consensus is as he approaches such proposals, rather than deal from what he sees the situation to be.

But from the perspective of the national interest of the United States and secondarily from that of El Salvador, what advantage, if any, do you see in U.S. support for the Mexican suggestion?

Secretary IKLE. I would not want to comment, Mr. Chairman, on the negotiations between the Secretary of State and the Foreign

Minister. The State Department witnesses would be the appropriate people to ask about that.

Senator DENTON. Excuse me, sir. I have to announce that the Senate is in recess until 12:45. There will be no further floor action until 12:45.

Go ahead, Dr. Ikle.

Secretary IKLE. But relating to the subjects we have been discussing, that I have discussed in my testimony and in response to your statements, there is, of course, the proposal that was publicly described by Castaneda, the Foreign Minister of Mexico. And since the Foreign Minister chose to express these ideas in our newspapers, it is probably not improper, in all respect for the Mexican Government, to look at what he said in the public arena for our public debate, and that relates, indeed, to what Senator East said about the public debate.

We are engaged in a public debate. It is open. We are delighted to have the contribution in one of our largest newspapers, the New York Times, from the Mexican Foreign Minister. I do not know whether it would be welcome if Secretary Haig put his view into the Mexican newspapers. I assume it would be.

The contribution of the Mexican Foreign Minister in our public debate, in the New York Times—and I stress again that I am not talking about private, diplomatic negotiations, obviously—is, as I say, a welcome one, to have the ideas clearly there. But it does underline the problem I mentioned of getting caught in this idea of negotiation as a substitute for election.

This piece by the Mexican Foreign Minister, for example, talks about the idea of dismantling the bands of Somoza guards operating along the Honduras-Nicaragua border on the one hand, and on the other hand the piece remarks that the junta in Salvador was itself the product of a coup. Well, that leads us to ask of the Mexican Foreign Minister whether the Sandinistas were put in there by elections when, in fact, as we know, they were not.

And if you talk about negotiations for the junta, which the Mexican Foreign Minister says was as a result of a coup in El Salvador, why shouldn't there be negotiations for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua—if that is the result of a coup, why shouldn't they negotiate with these alleged bands of Somoza guards or with the Miskito Indians that they drove out of their homes into refuge in Honduras?

If negotiation is good for El Salvador, with the opponents of the Government in El Salvador, why isn't it good for Nicaragua, with the opponents inside and outside of the regime of Nicaragua?

There is a further point, which I stressed before, the idea of negotiations with the totalitarians, that would then, as this piece by the Mexican Foreign Minister says, culminate in elections versus a continuation of the bloodbath. This flies in the face of the position taken by those who now oppose elections in El Salvador by violence and force and who very often, as I cited in my opening statement, come out publicly that they are, in principle, opposed to elections, either now or later. It is this kind of confusion or deception or illusion that is so troublesome. It is very important, therefore, that we keep the record straight.

Senator DENTON. Have you seen any evidence that guerrilla training of insurgents targeted in Central America has occurred in

Mexican territory, and if so, would you describe the extent of such training and the nature of such evidence?

Secretary IKLE. I'm having difficulty with your question, Mr. Chairman. I don't know whether these things can be confirmed or denied or whatever the case may be in on-the-record testimony.

I did recognize that Admiral Inman gave extensive testimony or a presentation the day before yesterday, and I understand more presentations will be given to the public about these matters. So perhaps your question will be answered there. If not, I suggest you may want to get a classified briefing on that issue.

Senator DENTON. If the so-called Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements have eroded away to practically nothing, is there any commitment on the part of the United States to the Soviet Union against the Soviet Union's invasion of Cuba? Is there any commitment remaining whatever now with respect to the Monroe Doctrine or the 1962 agreements or the Rio Treaty? Is there any commitment on the part of the United States to the Soviet Union not to invade Cuba?

Secretary IKLE. The 1962 agreements, as I said before, are really not formally valid agreements. A part of the bargain was never delivered at that time. The rest of the bargain, as I said, eroded over the last 20 years. Therefore, one cannot talk about a formal commitment relating to an alleged agreement on the part of the United States. I think it is important to keep that straight.

On the other hand, as you indicated in your question, it is worth looking back at the Monroe Doctrine and what it said about European imperialist interference in our hemisphere and how that has eroded. Of course, we have replaced, in coordination and consultation with our friends in the hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine by the Rio Treaty. That, in itself, in its principal provision, is now being put to test.

Senator DENTON. Information has come to my attention, and perhaps yours, sir, that Soviet transport planes have been stopping in Gander, Newfoundland, to refuel, then proceeding directly over the east coast of the United States to Managua, Nicaragua, with military equipment and supplies. Apparently, the Soviets have the option of running these supplies through Cuba or dealing directly with the Nicaraguans themselves.

Would you comment upon these reports?

Secretary IKLE. This is an important question, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to get you an answer for the record on it, if I can.

Senator DENTON. Yes, sir. We will accept it as part of the record.

Several references have been made by DOD in recent statements and reports concerning the role of East German policy experts and police in assisting Cuba and its efforts in various parts of the world.

What role do you see East Germany playing in the Soviet-Cuba effort in the Caribbean?

[Subsequent to the hearing, a classified answer was furnished to the subcommittee.]

Secretary IKLE. As far as we can tell, the East Germans are particularly adept at setting up totalitarian police systems. Maybe that's something that goes back to the Gestapo days, I don't know. They have been doing that in a number of places, in South Yemen,

in Ethiopia, and they are also advising, and that's ominous, in Nicaragua.

Senator DENTON. Are they in influential positions in southern Africa, for example?

Secretary IKLE. I believe they are present in Angola and Mozambique.

Senator DENTON. Could you describe the duties of civilian advisers from Cuba which are present in large numbers in countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Grenada, that is, advisers in addition to military personnel which have been reported there?

Secretary IKLE. It differs somewhat from country to country. In Ethiopia they help to prop up the rather ruthless regime that incidentally is suppressing a genuine war of liberation, the Eritrean Liberation Movement, and the Cubans, in a true imperialist tradition, find themselves on the other side.

In Angola they are, of course, supporting the Central Government there that is fighting, as we know, against genuine indigenous movements to free the country of foreign influence. The Cubans are involved as military experts and advisers, some having been captured in that connection.

In Grenada, they are supporting the Government there to help it become more entrenched, and we assume they are involved in funneling assistance for the airport expansion.

Senator DENTON. While I was in Panama, I was introduced to diplomats from all over Latin America. I would say over two-thirds of them are well to the left in their orientation politically, which I think is natural in view of the fact that there are valid reasons for disaffection with respect to the needs for land reform and so forth. They can't be judged from a purely U.S. perspective; they have to be judged from the historical perspective in which those nations have come along. I acknowledge, as the President did, that we have been somewhat exploitative in our own history in South America and neglectful there, but we were doing it in an era in which everyone else was doing it, as it were.

Acknowledging all of that, those diplomats down there realize that the United States is an extremely benevolent nation. I had Communist captors, officials, agree with me, that the United States has been the most compassionate nation in international affairs in the world. But they see where the strength lies; they see which way the tide is flowing.

I find it most frustrating that our press do not go down there and talk with those diplomats, because they will express to them what they did to me, as long as they are not named, as long as you don't use their names. Terrorism in other parts of the world, such as in Turkey and Italy, has been better contained, compared to what has gone on in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and those places, where the government is relatively less capable of assimilating that degree of terrorism. It seems that somehow our media would become aware of the threat. Whatever rulers in South America feel toward terrorism, the potential exists in a much greater degree in those countries for it to be released if they become too overt in saying things like "We've got to do something about El Salvador." They can't say it overtly. They can say it under the table, and they said it unanimously. They are all in favor of the election but there

is an unwillingness on their part to send observers to the election for the reasons I have just stated.

Senator East.

Senator EAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think, Mr. Chairman, in getting the testimony here from the Under Secretary, that a compelling point as one looks at all the documentation, it is so easy to go back from there and to look at the Leninist and Maoist view of the world in terms of what they very explicitly said ought to be the strategic approach. Marx, in his theory, you will recall indicated that totalitarianism, a la Marxism, would prevail first in the great industrial democracies of Europe and the United States.

The modification that Lenin and Mao made to Marxist thought was that the better way to accomplish the goal was, of course, to subvert the underdeveloped part of the world, as Lenin called them, the soft underbelly. That is the Leninist contribution. Mao raised it to a high level of perfection, and Castro is a contemporary manifestation of it.

The whole network that you are very carefully documenting here for us, via your statement and elsewhere, is simply a practical example and implementation of the Leninist strategy, that you take the soft underdeveloped continents, subvert them, and then, as they put it, the major industrial democracies would fall. That's the worldwide strategic concept that Lenin very explicitly articulated.

I would submit that in any region where they have engaged in their activities, they use it on a tactical basis. They take the rural areas—they did in Vietnam—and then choke off the urban areas, like Saigon, and they become Ho Chi Minh cities. Then the great blood bath begins and the boat people and the whole cycle repeats itself.

I appreciate anything of this kind, and the critics will say, "Well, you oversimplify and you see too much simplicity in it." Well, I would submit that that could be. There is always a risk in summarizing and trying to discern the broader patterns. But I would submit that in any college debate on the subject I would much rather have to take the position of showing that what you have shown us here is really a practical implementation of the basic Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theory. It is the great compelling international event of our time and will be for the balance of this century. The stakes are enormously high.

Because at some point, I would submit, Mr. Chairman, the balance shifts against you, against us. I'm not saying it has occurred. I don't know where the point is in the great geopolitical world, the great chessboard of geopolitics, I don't know that anyone can say when that occurs. Maybe it has already occurred. Solzhenitsyn thought it occurred in Vietnam. He may be wrong. I don't know. No one knows, I suppose.

But it is like the health of an individual. At some point you go beyond the point of no return. The terminal illness plays its way out.

I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that this is really what is occurring in the world of our time. And on this Central American question, which the Secretary of Defense, and you, and the Secretary of State are now focusing in the administration—and I give them great credit for it, because they face enormous odds—this is going

to be one of the most fundamental breakthroughs in the implementation of the Leninist-Maoist scheme; namely, within our own hemisphere, that the Soviet Union and Cuba managed to convert the Caribbean principally into a Soviet colonial sphere. That's what is occurring. To me, it's that elementary.

I submit again and again—and I don't wish to go on ad nauseam—but I am firmly convinced, Mr. Chairman, that if the American people could get it in that kind of perspective and could hear this gentleman and the others who are trying to make the point, that a deep sense of realism and commitment could develop in this country. But we have a long way to go with it.

But I do want to make that observation, Mr. Chairman. I don't wish to monopolize your time because you have many excellent questions here and building the record. But I wanted to make that observation and again thank the Under Secretary for coming.

I would like, for one, since Senators can only speak for themselves, I would certainly like for you to take back to the Secretary of Defense my personal appreciation for the great job that I think he is doing, not only in the technical sphere of restoring America's national defense and holding firm, and doing it in a very effective way, but in trying to relate this to the broader policy concerns—and that's your specialty, too. Defense, as a technical matter, is fundamental, but it has to relate to the broader strategic concerns, the policy dimension of it, as your title suggests.

I would submit, trying to play the political scientist for a moment, he is among the most effective members of the President's Cabinet in doing that. I would like for you, please, to convey that sentiment back to him and to let him understand. As I had the opportunity to explain to the Secretary of State the other day, there are a lot of people in the U.S. Congress and in this country that appreciate the position they are taking and the job they have, and they ought not to be deterred and discouraged by a constant drum beat from the other side.

This business gets discouraging, particularly when you cannot get a balanced coverage. It's discouraging. But the great consolation we have is that there is great support, I am convinced, among the American people for what we're trying to do, to understand where we're going and the spirit in which we are doing. So again, it is a refreshing period in American politics, as far as international relations go, to get the kind of candor we're getting out of the State Department today and out of the Defense Department. So it does brighten my day a bit.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Senator East.

I made a statement of support for the President's program yesterday. I spent about 50 hours on that speech. A speech by Senator Hollings, a man whom I admire and respect and who is a friend, which he says he made up in about 3 minutes and gave in 2 or 3, was covered in great length. A speaker in the House yesterday, who again spoke off the top of his head to an empty Chamber, was given a great deal of coverage because he was speaking in opposition to the things which we are propounding today.

Not a line of my speech was covered. I feel no sense of personal loss, but I do feel a sense of loss in terms of the aims which brought me to this body.

One of the points I made was that the perception is being transmitted through much of the media that we are making a choice between the welfare of our citizens and defense. It seems a tragedy to me that we are unaware of the economic effects in the United States of forfeitures in the international field due to lack of military power, or due to the lack of the proper perspective on when to use it. For example, in Vietnam, having lost the economic abilities for trade which otherwise would have existed, how much oil availability did we lose? How much are we losing now in the way of trade in Western Europe which is leaning toward the East rather than the West in such matters as the pipeline. How many trade opportunities which otherwise would exist as a result of the Caribbean Basin initiative on the part of the President will not exist because of intimidation in that area? Clearly, our economic well-being is directly related to our military preparedness and strength yet so few people seem to understand this fundamental relationship.

For example, I would ask this question. On March 4, 1982, before the House Committee on the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jones, testified as follows: "The Soviets are now the dominant military power in the Caribbean by a wide margin." I have the question by Congressman Kemp and the answer by General Jones, but do you agree with that assessment?

Secretary IKLE. I would certainly not disagree with the chairman's assessment. We work on these evaluations together.

The U.S. strength, however, should not be underestimated. I know, obviously, the chairman didn't have that in mind at all. Potentially, we can pull together our strengths and bring it to bear to maintain the peace and to deter aggression and that is what we are doing.

Senator DENTON. When I spoke about the economic effect, I did not mean it in imperialist terms. I simply meant it as a fact. If we had the advantages economically which would be accruing to us now, had we not forfeited the situation in Vietnam, and were we not forfeiting the situation in other parts of the world such as Africa and Central America, we would have so much additional economic advantage that we wouldn't have the current economic situation.

For example, the welfare of our people would be served by more revenues which would be accruing and we wouldn't have this problem. There is a relationship between the military, foreign affairs, and economics and welfare. This situation is escaping many people and it is escaping them to our great disadvantage.

A Reuters news article dated March 8, 1982, states that two Nicaraguan pilots defected to Honduras by flying a C-47 to protest the Marxist-Leninist course that Nicaragua's Sandinista leaders had taken. They claim that Fidel Castro rules Nicaragua through advisers, giving as an example that each of the nine members of Nicaragua's ruling National Directorate have two or three Cuban advisers whose instructions are unquestionably followed.

Can you furnish the subcommittee with more complete information on this incident, and are there any comments you would care to make on it?

Secretary IKLE. Mr. Chairman, let me propose—I know there are a lot of important questions of this kind that we try to furnish answers to you, and you or your staff may have additional questions, and we would prepare as much as we can on the answers. We will sort out what is classified and what is not and brief you in either category as appropriate. I think that would be more economical in regard to your time.

[The following was subsequently submitted for the record by Secretary Ikle:]

As I testified in December 1981, there are now between four and five thousand Cuban civilian advisors and about 1,500 Cuban military and security advisors in Nicaragua. Cuban advisors are believed to be serving in key posts throughout the government in which they exert considerable influence.

Senator DENTON. In that regard, I am sure you are as delighted as I, that we are making a tremendous effort to declassify as much as possible without compromising sources to bring the facts before our media, and thus before the public. I hope that we continue this effort and the evidence that our Government agencies have is passed on to our public without so much tongue-in-cheek as to destroy the credibility of our Government.

The flow of refugees was a subject which came up in my recent visit to Panama. They said—and these were leftists as well as people who we would consider sort of in the middle—"If you think you have seen something with the boat people, if you think you have seen something with the Cuban and other refugees from the Caribbean, wait until you see what happens from South America if El Salvador goes." They said that the train of events within a couple of years would result in millions of people walking from Latin America across Mexico, across our borders, taking the same kinds of chances with their lives that the boat people took after the benign Ho Chi Minh oriented regime took over to the delight of the so-called liberals. What is liberal about what is going on in Southeast Asia?

Would you give the subcommittee the benefit of your assessment of the present status of the refugees from those countries in which Cuba and Cuban-sponsored or supported insurgents are active and trying to take over the government? Does DOD have any information showing the flow of refugees into any of these countries where Cuba is active?

Secretary IKLE. I certainly agree with you, Mr. Chairman, of the fact of the enormous flow of refugees, which was expressed so vividly by the President in his speech, that comes from the areas where totalitarian communism took power, and the flight is always in the direction toward the large Western democracies and, of course, this country.

The point, I think, is sinking in now among the public here, that if the spread of totalitarianism continues in Central America, the flow as well as the pressures on this country would be enormous. And we like to keep our borders rather open. The costs imposed on this country in maintaining security along that border and caring for the people would outweigh by a factor many, many times the

kind of assistance that the President has asked for from you and your colleagues in Congress.

Senator DENTON. I think the President asked for \$351 million for the entire area, which is a figure that is tossed around in my Subcommittee on Aging, Family and Human Services like it's a nickel.

With all due respect to the immediate needs of our needy, I am convinced that 5 years from now, if we have failed to provide financial support for Central America, giving them a belief that we will invest in their security and prosperity, our needy will be much worse off because we will have that much less resource from which to dispense our compassion toward them, again a fact which is tragically being ignored.

I am going to ask you one more question, sir, and then we will adjourn at 12. I know about your schedule and my own has a limitation, too. But, we will submit further questions and ask you to sort them out in terms of classification.

Secretary IKLE. Certainly, please do.

Senator DENTON. I have an article published in the New York Times magazine, October 4, 1981, entitled "Cuba's School for Exporting Marxism."¹ It is about the so-called Isle of Youth, which is the new name for the former Isle of Pines. It is a small island 30 miles off the southwest coast of Cuba, as you know.

According to the article, since 1977 some 26,000 children from Cuba, Africa, and Central America have been brought to this Cuban island for a controversial "work and study program" that is a mixture of general education and Marxist indoctrination. There have been reports for several years that not all the children on the island, especially those from Africa, are there voluntarily. I might mention at this point that the subcommittee will be holding hearings beginning March 22, 1982, at which time we will examine, among other things, the so-called Communist volunteerism in Africa.

But, these children are not there voluntarily, according to some reports. For instance, Jonas Savimbi, on the occasion of his recent visit to the United States, stated that many Angolan children had been abducted and sent to the Isle of Youth without knowledge or consent of their parents.

Do you have any information you can furnish in an unclassified manner concerning this island, and especially concerning these allegations of child abduction? Before you answer, I want to insert a copy of the article that I mentioned in the record.

Secretary IKLE. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, it is much more than allegations. It's facts, though the actually precise statistics, of course, are hard to obtain. But as we see the data, 3,000 Ethiopian students and, indeed, children, ages 9 to 18, are trained in ideological indoctrination on this island. Also teachers and others are going with them, and children from other countries and young students as well.

It is quite a remarkable undertaking that has been reported here, and it would be interesting to speculate the kind of interest that would be stirred up if such an island were set up by some

¹Senator Denton's submission for the record is found in the appendix as exhibit C.

other government, the Government of Chile or some other government that often comes under criticism for human rights violations.

But I think it is rather unique—of course, the Soviet Union has been doing that and back in Nazi Germany when they imported youths to give them ideological training, and we are now seeing Castro doing it.

Senator DENTON. I want to thank you, Dr. Ikle, and Colonel Hutson, Mr. Turner, and Mr. Lindstrom, for your testimony this morning. It will constitute an important part of our findings. I do hope they will find their way somehow into the public domain as part of a balanced presentation of news.¹

Thank you very much.

Secretary IKLE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me, and thank you for the kind remarks from Senator East. My time is always available to Members and it was a pleasure to testify here.

Senator DENTON. This hearing stands in recess. The subcommittee will continue an examination of these issues tomorrow, March 12, 1982, when our witnesses will be Ambassador Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, and Mr. Daniel James, a journalist and specialist in Latin American affairs for more than 25 years.

[Whereupon, the subcommittee recessed at 12:03 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, March 12, 1982.]

¹For additional correspondence with the Department of Defense see exhibit D in the appendix of this hearing.

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT A

[From the New York Post, Thursday, Mar. 11, 1982]

SOVIET NUKE WAR BASES IN CUBA—THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY GREATER THAN MISSILE CONFRONTATION OF 1962

SITES BEING READIED FOR SUBS, JETS, SAYS REPORT

(By Niles Lathem, Correspondent)

WASHINGTON.—The Soviet Union is building bases for nuclear submarines, strategic bomber planes and chemical weapons in Cuba in a steady and flagrant violation of 1962 accords signed by the Kremlin in the aftermath of the missile crisis, The Post has learned.

Intelligence reports were obtained by The Post last night as tension between Cuba and the United States increased over El Salvador and Nicaragua.

Many Pentagon and CIA analysts have concluded that the threat to the security of the U.S. from Cuba and its partner Nicaragua is now much greater than it was in 1962 when President Kennedy sent out a worldwide alert and demanded that the Kremlin withdraw nuclear missiles and offensive bombers it had stationed in Cuba.

The new reports give a startling picture of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba, just 90 miles from the coast of Florida.

They reveal:

The Soviets are building a strategic submarine base in Cienfuegos where Soviet Golf and Echo subs armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic and cruise missiles frequently stop.

The base apparently also has a "nuclear weapons handling facility" representing an "instantaneous strategic offensive threat" to the United States.

Some Russian-built surface-to-air missiles have been modified to include "strap-on booster stages" which give them a much longer range than is required for defense.

Many analysts believe that with the addition of the boosters, these anti-aircraft missiles could strike targets in the Southern and Eastern U.S.

The Soviet Union is flying and basing versions of the sophisticated TU-95 bomber, which can also carry nuclear weapons, in Cuba.

According to some intelligence reports the Soviets have established a secret airfield near Havana.

The Soviets claim the TU-95s in Cuba are not equipped for offensive purposes and are used only for reconnaissance.

But U.S. officials note they are far more sophisticated than the IL-28 jets President Kennedy demanded the Soviets withdraw from Cuba in 1962 and can easily be "retooled" for bombing missions.

Cuba also recently received a shipment of about 40 nuclear-capable MIG-23 warplanes, although sources say they probably do not have atomic weapon on board.

The Soviets may have recently sent equipment and ingredients for chemical and biological weapons to Cuba.

Once made, these weapons can easily be deployed on MIG or TU-95 fighters, modified SAM rockets or submarine-launched missiles—equipment Cuba already has.


Cuba received 66,000 tons of Soviet military hardware in 1981—a figure three times higher than was dispatched by the Kremlin in 1962.

The reports also noted that early last year a fleet of Soviet ships sailed, virtually unchallenged by the U.S. around the Caribbean and Gulf Coast near oilfields in Mexico, Venezuela, Texas and Louisiana.

Rep. Jack Kemp (R-NY) has joined Sens. Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Steve Symms (R-Idaho) in demanding that the State Department releases all documents on the

1962 Krushchev-Kennedy accords and possible changes in them that were negotiated by Henry Kissinger during the SALT talks.

"The Soviet Union's record of an extensive military buildup in Cuba and its systematic expansion of Cuba's position to serve as a base for aggressive action (in Nicaragua and El Salvador) leads me to believe it has violated its pledge not to place offensive weapons in Cuba," Kemp said.



NEW RED BUILDUP: Map shows site of major nuclear base for Soviet submarines being constructed in Cuba, according to secret Pentagon sources. Bombers with nuclear capability are already operating, the report says, and chemical war supplies are being brought in.

National Criminal Justice Reference Service

ncjrs

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United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20531

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EXHIBIT C

[From the New York Times Magazine, Oct. 4, 1981]

CUBA'S SCHOOL FOR EXPORTING MARXISM

By Jo Thomas¹

Since 1977, some 26,000 children from Cuba, Africa and Central America have been brought to a Cuban island for a controversial work-and-study program that is a mixture of general education and Marxist indoctrination.

For reasons best known to themselves, the Cuban revolutionaries who took over the Colony Hotel in 1959 did not disturb the mural on the wall of the lobby that had welcomed American gamblers to the island hideaway. The painting shows Long John Silver watching his fellow pirates bury treasure while cabin boy Jim Hawkins looks on.

Scholars disagree over whether the island where the hotel stands is the "Treasure Island" immortalized by Robert Louis Stevenson, but during the 16th and 17th centuries this piranha-shaped island 30 miles off the southwest coast of Cuba was the hiding place for Sir Francis Drake, Henry Morgan, Calico Jack Rackham and other pirates of the Spanish Main. Since then, it has been a penal colony, a haven for American expatriates during the early 1900's and a tourist resort. It has had many names; Christopher Columbus christened it Evangelista, and it was subsequently known as Santiago, Reina Amalia and the Isle of Pines. Three years ago, Fidel Castro renamed it *Isla de la Juventud*, the Isle of Youth.

Several miles down from the now seedy Colony Hotel, on a road that cuts through pine trees, pink clouds of oleanders and rows of grapefruit trees, small boys in work clothes and bright blue rubber boots recently filed off a school bus, lined up to be issued child-size machetes and marched off to begin an afternoon's work in a setting as remote from their former lives as Treasure Island was for the fictional Jim Hawkins.

The island was renamed for these children, and for some 26,000 like them, from Cuba, Africa and Central America. During the past four years, planeloads of students have been brought to the island for schooling in mathematics, chemistry, physics and Marxist ideology, all of which they are expected to apply when they eventually return to their homelands. It was not until three years ago that the island began attracting international attention. Even then, the effort to sow Cuban influence was overshadowed by reports in the Western press that some children had been brought to the island against their will.

"It really is a very 21st-century kind of thing," said Prof. Riordan Roett, director of the Latin American studies program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. "Some people who aren't out of the bush even a generation are learning the elements of physics and how to play soccer."

Professor Roett visited the schools established for students from Namibia and Mozambique—each participating nation or territory is assigned its own school—and said afterward that he believed that Cuba's effort to gather primary- and secondary-school students from all the nations where there is a Cuban presence is unique.

According to Professor Roett, the schools—which he called "a wise move on Fidel Castro's part"—follow a trend the Cubans began immediately after the revolution in 1959, with campaigns for literacy, public health and "short-term substantive alterations in living conditions that demonstrate that socialism can function in a humane sense. This is an important lesson the Russians forgot a long time ago."

He saw, however, "no guarantee that the Cubans will win over this generation once they are back in their countries. There's no doubt they'll go back as Marxists, but there are many kinds of Marxists. I think the Cubans are whistling Dixie if they think Cuban Marxism will dominate Africa."

A high-ranking State Department official knowledgeable about Cuba agreed that the project on the Isle of Youth is "an unprecedented effort" which officials in Washington have been watching with concern.

"It shows the kind of priorities that Cubans give to their long-range commitment to international solidarity and wars of national liberation," he said. "The shame of it is that this kind of education is extremely limited, rather poor and highly politicized. What you're creating are low-level technicians with no real faculties to test propositions they learn in the classrooms. It's different from bringing a guy on a

¹ Jo Thomas is chief of The Times' Caribbean bureau.

Fulbright to the United States. He may or may not be pro-American when he leaves, but he has a greater capacity for testing what he learns."

The project on the Isle of Youth, the official observed, is only one part of a large and sophisticated educational program under which foreigners of many ages are brought to Cuba for courses which range from six months of guerrilla training to instruction in agitation, propaganda and party organization.

"Even though Cuba is a developing country, it is willing to devote this kind of money to an educational program that, in its kindest view, is rather deficient and at its worst is training guerrillas and terrorists," he said.

Whether the purpose of the program is education or indoctrination, or both, the magnitude of the Cuban effort is impressive. There are more than 9,000 foreign students and 17,000 Cuban students on the Isle of Youth. All the foreigners and 14,000 of the Cubans are enrolled in what are called "basic secondary schools in the country," live-in schools for seventh, eighth and ninth graders who range in age from 12 to 18. All of the students are on scholarships, for which they qualified either by winning in academic competitions or through the recommendation of political groups in their home countries.

Before the revolution, 11,000 people lived on the island, including some White Russians and Chinese who, ironically, had come seeking refuge from Communism. Now, with Cuban and foreign students (who are not universally popular with the locals), the population of the island is about 80,000.

The Angolans who were the first of the foreigners to arrive, have 2,300 students enrolled. There are a like number from Mozambique and Ethiopia, 1,100 from Nicaragua, and smaller groups from South-West Africa, also known as Namibia; Congo, and Guinea-Bissau. Each country has its own school buildings and a teaching staff that includes a small number of its own nationals.

The schools, whose buildings resemble stacks of concrete wafers, are set apart from one another by groves of citrus trees. These trees thrive on land that for many years yielded only pine trees, but now, under relentless irrigation, bears thousands of grapefruit trees. The fruit is grown for export and for juice designated for Cuban hospitals, schools and day centers. Each school cultivates about 1,200 acres. Before the revolution in 1959, there were only 1,730 acres in citrus on the entire island, which measures some 32 miles north to south and 39 miles east to west. Now there are 59,280 acres in citrus and the ultimate aim is 98,800 acres.

In the years before the Cuban revolution, the island was best known for its marble quarry, its crocodiles, its parrots, its isolation and its prisoners. José Martí, who became the leader of the Cuban struggle for independence from Spain, was deported there in leg irons at the age of 17, in 1870. Fidel Castro and others who attacked the Moncada army barracks at Santiago de Cuba during the reign of Fulgencio Batista were imprisoned in the cruelly named Model Prison from 1953 until an amnesty freed them 20 months later. The prison, now empty, is a shrine to the Cuban revolution, as is the narrow bed hung with mosquito netting in which Castro slept in isolation in a hospital which had been converted into a jail. The guides on tours through these places speak with some passion about the inhumanity of the torture cells and the tiers of tiny cells without bars—the easier to hurl inmates to their deaths in the courtyard below—but do not mention the thousands who were imprisoned on the island after Castro came to power.

Visiting journalists almost always ask school officials whether the island is not still, for some, a prison, referring to reports for the last two years that some African students had been brought to Cuba against their will and/or without the consent of their parents to do hard field labor and to spend years being indoctrinated as revolutionaries.

"That was a false rumor constructed to provoke us, to denigrate us," insisted Médard Momengoh, the Congolese Ambassador to Havana, whose country was the focus of the stories. If the Young Communist Pioneers, "instead of going to Cuba, had gone to France or England or the United States," he said during a recent telephone interview in Cuba, "the press wouldn't have criticized it."

"The President came to Cuba in early September 1979" for the conference of non-aligned nations in Havana, the Ambassador said. "The Pioneers left Congo at the end of that month. It was impossible for him to bring 600 Pioneers with him."

A version of the "rumor" printed in the March 14, 1980 issue of a British magazine said that the Congolese President, Col. Denis Sassou Nguesso, had been accompanied on his trip to Cuba by 25 children who did not return to Africa when he did. These children, according to this report, were soon followed by about 600 other Congolese youngsters, whose parents had been told that their offspring were being given a Cuban holiday in recognition of their exceptional abilities. When the youngsters boarded their planes for the flight to Havana, Air Afrique crew members found they

did not all have written statements from their parents giving consent for the journey, an international requirement for children under the legal age traveling on their own. Two foreign-born pilots were reported to have refused to make the flight, and departures were delayed for some time until substitutes could be found.

A State Department official familiar with Cuban matters noted that after these reports and rumors surfaced, a number of African governments rushed to Cuba's defense and denied the allegations. "We honestly don't know whether these rumors are true," a State Department official said, "but the rumors persist."

Ambassador Momengoh contended that twice as many students applied for scholarships at the Isle of Youth schools as were accepted. Those now studying on the island, he says, include the nephew of the Congolese President as well as the children of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Public Works and the Minister of Labor. His own daughters, Paule, 15, and Chantal, 13, also attended. "If we weren't in this seriously," he said, "I personally wouldn't have sent my own daughters there." The Ambassador said he had four other children in Cuban schools and that "if I had to go home tomorrow, I would want to leave my children here."

At first, he said, some of the Congolese students did not like the work at the school. Later, he said, they adapted. The Cuban education, he said, "strips petit-bourgeois pretensions. The students understand the need for a person to put himself in the service of his country."

Although there are college-level study programs in East Germany and the Soviet Union, the Congolese Ambassador said that "without fear of being mistaken, Cuba has united the realities of the Third World and the realities of Africa. Perhaps it's not unique, but it responds most closely to the realities of our country."

The two countries have agreed, Ambassador Momengoh said, that Congolese students will go on to Cuban universities and that "each will be directed according to his abilities. Some will have to fit our needs for engineers and doctors, and for the military."

It is difficult to learn with absolute certainty the true circumstances under which any of the foreign students have come to the Isle of Youth, a difficulty compounded when a visitor is from the United States, which is the target of a good amount of adverse propaganda on the Island. In a series of interviews, some at random, all the children said they had wanted to come here to study, and school officials could produce documents showing either a parent or a teacher having apparently given permission for each child to come. A number of children, however, said they had run away from home and that their parents did not know where they were. Many others said that one or both parents were dead.

Erica Shajudah was 17, one of some 600 Namibian students at Hendrick Whitbooi School, named for the tribal chief who is considered the George Washington of Namibia.

Like many of her compatriot students, Erica made her way to the Isle of Youth through the refugee camps in neighboring Angola.

She slowly revealed, in answer to many questions, that she was one of seven children of a farmer in Ovambo, where her family lived in a house of "grass and sticks." She and a group of school friends left Namibia of their own free will in 1977 with guerrillas belonging to the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). "My mother didn't see me leave," Erica said. "Afterward, it was impossible to communicate."

"I was in Cassinga," she continued, "a refugee camp with children, women and old men. In the morning time, while we were preparing to go to school, the South African airplanes were bombing us. I started to run away to hide myself. I went to the trenches. I was just pretending like a person who was dead." She lay in the trench for about 11 hours, until friendly soldiers came.

A poster on the wall of her school reported that the 1978 attack left 165 men, 294 women and 300 children dead, and 200 missing at Cassinga, which at the Whitbooi school is a synonym for "massacre."

"We were 12," said Erica of the group with whom she first set out from Namibia. "Five of them are dead. Some of the others, they are here. Although my friends are dead, I will continue fighting. I want to be a doctor. In Namibia, it would be impossible."

Doesn't she miss her family, so far away now?

"The South African regime has propaganda," her 15-year-old classmate Ruana Hanghuwo answered. "They say all the kids, they died in Cassinga. We don't think about our families."

Erica said nothing.

Bernard Kamwi, a member of SWAPO, was, at the time of this reporter's visit, one of six Namibians on the faculty of the Whitbooi school, which had 32 Cugan instructors teaching mathematics and the sciences and supervising farm work.

The 31-year-old Mr. Kamwi said he had degrees in sociology, sales management and marketing, law, adult education and public relations. "I taught at the police college in Zambia—a law instructor—for four years," he said. "I was also the founder of the television program 'Police and You.'" He brightened considerably as he described his television career, which ended at the request of SWAPO. "When they want you," he said, "they get you." SWAPO sent him to teach in Zambia in 1976, then to a school in Angola and after that to the Isle of Youth.

"Education in Namibia is run by the racist South African Government," Mr. Kamwi said, explaining the advantage of studying in Cuba. "A peasant in the Kavango region will be taught in that dialect. A peasant in Kaokoveld will speak that dialect." In Cuba, he said, the children learn that they have one homeland—Namibia—and one language—English—as an aid in uniting the different tribes under one tongue.

In a math class, Pedro Fernández, a Cuban, was instructing the students in square roots. A teacher of great enthusiasm, he punctuated his lecture with questions: "Yes or no? Truth or lie?" The classroom was quiet and cool, the air flowing through slatted windows. The children were so attentive that at times they seemed to be holding their breath.

The library of the Whitbooi school contained the works of Marx and Stalin. On its shelves could also be found Sinclair Lewis' "Main Street," the stories of Edgar Allan Poe and Jack London, Maxim Gorky's "The Mother" and Alexandre Dumas' "The Three Musketeers." The biography section featured, among others, Charlie Chaplin, Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, Salvadore Allende, Ho Chi Minh, José Martí, Lenin and Malcolm X.

One student was reading a paperback, with a flowered cover, "Let Peace Rule," by Leonid Brezhnev. Another was painstakingly copying and learning, for an English class, these comparisons:

as easy as A B C	as vigilant as a star
as slippery as a reed	as brave as a soldier
as soft as butter	as wise as Solomon
as shy as a schoolgirl	as stupid as a donkey
as dark as the night	as patient as Job
as white as the snow	as lucky as a lark

In spite of some of the lesson's biblical allusions, there is only one title—three copies of "The Roots of Religion"—on the shelf labeled "Mythology and Religion."

A third child was writing an essay: "My name is Izamba Stukmgo. I am a girl. I am 14 years old. I go to school every day. I am tall and fat. I live in a house. My father is rich. My country is Namibia. I love my country very much. Our motherland is not free. It is under colonialization. Racist South Africa is ruling our country by force. SWAPO is a revolution of many of the Namibian people. Comrade Sam Nujoma is our leader. We are fighting for our independence. I am a student, but I am a freedom fighter, too."

"We are not interested in forming parasites who despise physical work, but men capable of respecting work and what it can accomplish," declared José Ramón Fernández Alvarez, the Cuban Minister of Education.

Mr. Fernández, a tall man with a gravelly voice and a gentle manner who was a former vice minister of the Cuban armed forces, had fought on the side of the victorious Cubans at the Bay of Pigs. A 1953 graduate of the United States Army Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Okla., he was one of *Los Puros*, or the Pure Ones, a group of military officers imprisoned on the Isle of Pines for conspiring against Batista.

"We have 14,000 students in Cuba from 30 different countries, although not all in large quantities," he said. In addition to those on the Isle of Youth, there are 1,000 in universities, 1,000 in technical schools and the rest in primary and secondary schools."

Of the 54 schools on the Isle of Youth, 17 are for foreigners. They are, as Mr. Fernández explained, expensive to operate: Each school costs \$1.7 million to build and \$572,000 a year to operate. The cost per student—for food, medicine, books and teachers' salaries—is \$950 a year. Participating countries contribute teachers, but the Cuban Government pays their salaries, as it does all other operating expenses.

"We are poor," Mr. Fernández said. "We take the little we have and give it to others who are poorer than we are and need it more than we do. It's not like charity from some eccentric millionaire who is giving his money away."

Although many of the students on the Isle of Youth say they hope to become doctors, their course of study will depend not only on their own wishes and abilities but also on the needs of their countries.

Some will become skilled workers, some technicians, and others will be asked to study those professional specialities most needed by their countries: agronomy, veterinary medicine (vital in the agricultural economy of third-world countries), teaching, engineering and medicine.

"It is sad to see a country like Angola with six or seven million inhabitants and 130 Angolan doctors," Mr. Fernández said, reflecting over coffee in a small suite in a Havana hotel where high-ranking officials occasionally meet or receive guests. "Guinea-Bissau has three doctors. In truth, I can tell you there is neither justice nor humanity when for a million inhabitants there are three doctors. There are people who have never seen a doctor in all of their lives."

"We do not want to Cubanize them," he said of the foreign students. "We want to maintain their cultural roots, languages, artistic expressions, knowledge of history and love for their ancestors. We don't want to make them into Cubans, only into professionals who will be more useful to their countries."

Is there any fear that some students will want to remain in Cuba, as so many foreign students do in the United States?

"If any of them stays here, it would be a failure for us. They are needed over there."

"The literacy rate?" asked Mohammed Yimer, a teacher at Mengistu Haile Mariam School, one of four for Ethiopian students. "In Ethiopia, it is better to speak of the illiteracy rate. That is 93 to 97 percent. In many provinces, the literacy rate is zero. Practically, you could say we didn't have any schools."

There were 554 students at this school, and many said they had lost their fathers. "My father was a patriot and was killed in battle," said Alemayehu Haile Selassie, 18, "I want to study in a university. I'd like to study medicine. There has never been a doctor in my family before."

There was a small museum in the school. It contained models of Ethiopian houses, weapons, harps, and shields. It will be years before some of these children return home.

"We are doing our best not to forget our country," Mr. Yimer said.

At the Carlos Fonseca School for Nicaraguan students, the teachers did not yet have books with an acceptable version of their country's history; the names of some of the places in their country have changed, making geography lessons a bit complicated. But the teachers seemed delighted to have their students in Cuba.

"We have much in common," said José Antonio Ramírez Aubert, 28, one of five Nicaraguan teachers at the school. "Cuba freed itself from illiteracy in 1971. Illiteracy is an inheritance that the Somoza regime left us, a great malignant legacy. After the military war, the war which follows is to construct the revolutionary socialist regime. Cuba has had 22 years since its revolution. The experience of their 22 years will help us move."

Still, there had been quite a flap with the Nicaraguan students over religion. Many of the girls had arrived carrying religious statues under their arms and had been shocked when told that the Cubans forbade religious gatherings in the schools. (Nicaragua is a devoutly Roman Catholic country, and the Bishop of the Nicaraguan capital of Managua has visited the island and the school.) A compromise was reached. The Cubans agreed to take the Nicaraguan students to Nueva Gerona, the main town on the Isle of Youth, and drop them off at the Roman Catholic church so they could attend mass. (Elsewhere on the Isle of Youth, the Lutheran church has been turned into a science museum.)

There were no sophisticated educational aids—no computers and only the most basic equipment in biology and chemistry labs. For students of this age, there did not seem to be any military training although, when they assembled for their morning and afternoon inspections, they lined up in military formation.

At the Fifth of February School, named for Congo's Fifth of February Movement that Ambassador Momengoh credited with returning democratic process to his country, the dormitories were spartan, with a slight military air to them. As at all the other schools, each bed had a cheap suitcase alongside it and a few clothes hanging in an open closet at the foot of the bed. On top of each bed was a towel twisted into the shape of a hook. There was no privacy, and there were few personal possessions.

The students spent half of every day but Sunday caring for citrus and, at a few schools, other crops. Their labor clearly has an economic value but does not, Cubans say, cover their expenses. They work because the Cubans believe that work and study belong together.

For the 469 boys and 104 girls, aged 12 to 15, at the Fifth of February school, the day began as it did at all the other schools, with a flag-raising ceremony just as the sky started to redden. Half the children were in work clothes and half in school uniforms. The first group worked in the citrus groves in the morning while the second studied. After lunch, the two groups changed places.

The closely planned day had its escapes. At midday, a mock sword fight with sticks was under way near the cafeteria. The solitary tree in a bare field nearby was full of children who had climbed up into its shade, out of the burning sun. Now and then, students had wandered away from their schools and upset local farmers by digging up and eating their yucca plants.

Although school officials said some students have had to be sent home for a variety of reasons, including disciplinary problems, they would not provide details and said the number was "very few."

Students were not allowed to leave the school area by themselves, but they did go in groups to the beach, to athletic competitions between schools and to dances. On Saturday nights, the streets of Nueva Gerona were so full of students "you can't get a car into the street," said Jorge Romero Cordero, a principal of one of the Angolan schools.

When the school year ends each June, students from Cuba can go home for the months of July and August, as can the Nicaraguans. There is as yet no established policy for home visits for African students, whose homes are so much farther away.

"The Namibian students have been here for two years," said Jorge Romero Cordero. "What are they going to see when they go there? A refugee camp? Their parents dead?"

But last summer, all the students from Angola, who had been in Cuba for two years, did go home for a visit. At the end of the vacation, one of them was gamely trying to finish a forbidden bottle of Havana Club mint-flavored rum as his plane made its final approach to Nueva Gerona. He looked ill and unsteady, and the Cuban passengers laughed and looked sympathetic.

In all of the schools on the Isle of Youth, there were pictures of national heroes and also of Cuba's (Ché) Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos, one of Castro's most popular lieutenants. There were, however, no photographs of Fidel Castro, and the libraries, at his request, did not carry books about him because, he insists, he does not want a "personality cult." Nonetheless, on one of the ruler-straight roads that slice across the Isle of Youth there was a billboard displaying Castro's picture and one of his sayings: "Our causes will triumph because they are just."

Castro has visited the island frequently. It is a favorite place to bring high-ranking visiting dignitaries. Groups of foreign teachers and farmers also come to the island to see the schools and are greeted by students who may perform a dance or a little skit, often attacking Western "imperialism."

There is a ceramic factory on the Isle of Youth, part of an industry the Government of Cuba is trying hard to encourage and expand as a way to earn tourist dollars and foreign exchange. In an office at this factory hangs another version of the Treasure Island mural in the Colony Hotel.

In it, six Young Communist "Pioneers" are getting off the sailing ship to establish a beachhead in a jungle. Instead of a treasure box, they carry a red flag.

EXHIBIT D

QUESTIONS OF SUBCOMMITTEE AND RESPONSES OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE¹

March 12, 1982

Dr. Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
2010 Glenbrook Road
Washington, D.C. 20014

Dear Dr. Ikle:

On behalf of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, I want to express our appreciation for the candid and illuminating testimony you presented at our hearing yesterday. Your testimony was a very valuable contribution to our overall understanding of the activities of the Cuban government and their Soviet mentors.

The visual exhibits which you presented were excellent, especially the one showing the expansion of communism since World War II.

I have enclosed a set of questions which I request be answered and returned to the Subcommittee within three weeks. Some of these questions may have been asked at the hearing but I want to afford you the opportunity to furnish full and complete answers for the record, which the time-constraints of the hearing may have prevented.

Thank you again for your fine support and cooperation in this effort.

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton
United States Senate

JD:pf

Enclosure

^{1/} Questions were submitted after March 11, 1982 hearing. All of the responses were classified except for the answers to questions 13 and 14, which are being included in the record.

The listing of questions includes some questions that were asked at the hearing. However, please use this opportunity to supplement the answers given at the hearing so that the Subcommittee has the benefit of full and complete answers.

If, in your view, a question has already been fully answered, please so state.

If an answer, or part of it, is classified, please have it declassified, to the extent possible for the public record.

Please furnish, to the extent possible, any photographs, letters, reports, or other documents that document and support your answer.

1. Defense Secretary Weinberger stated (and you have reiterated today) that "the Soviet influence in Cuba is all-pervasive." The Subcommittee has received testimony from several witnesses that the Cuban intelligence service, the DGI, is totally controlled and directed by the Soviet KGB.

In your opinion, or in the Department's opinion, is there any area in which the Cubans are given a free-hand; are all activities of the Cuban government -- economic, military, intelligence -- directed by the Soviets? How total and complete is the Soviet grasp on Cuba?

2. Information has come to my attention that Soviet transport planes are stopping in Gander, Newfoundland to refuel; they then proceed directly over the east coast of the U.S. to Managua, Nicaragua, with military equipment and supplies. Apparently, the Soviets have the option of running these supplies through Cuba or dealing directly with the Nicaraguans themselves.

Please comment on this report.

3. Question omitted.

4. Several references have been made by DOD in recent statements and reports concerning the role of East German policy experts and police in assisting Cuba in their efforts in various parts of the world.

What role does East Germany play in the Soviet/Cuba effort in the Caribbean?

In Southern Africa? Angola and Mozambique?

Elsewhere in the world?

In what ways do they supplement or assist in the overall effort?

5. Reference has been made to the civilian advisors that Cuba has sent in large numbers to countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Grenada, in addition to military personnel.

What duties do the civilian advisors perform? In what areas do they function in the host countries?

Is it not a fact that many or all of these so-called civilian advisors are intelligence agents or military personnel operating under cover?

6. A Reuters news article dated March 8, 1982, states that two Nicaraguan pilots defected to Honduras by flying a C-47 transport there to protest the Marxist-Leninist course that Nicaragua's Sandinista leaders had taken. They claim that Fidel Castro rules Nicaragua through advisors, giving as an example that each of the nine members of Nicaragua's ruling National Directorate have two or three Cuban advisors, whose instructions are unquestionably followed.

Can you furnish the Subcommittee with more complete information on this incident? Are there any comments you care to make?

Do the allegations square with information within DOD concerning the extent of Cuban involvement and control in Nicaragua?

7. Reportedly, the Department of State has evidence that links the Cuban government to drug smuggling activities in the United States. The Department cites the case of Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian now in jail in Mexico, who claims to have funneled arms and money to a Colombian leftist group in return for Cuban aid in smuggling marijuana shipments to the United States.

Does DOD have evidence or information indicating that Cuba is actively involved, in any way, in drug smuggling into the United States? If so, please describe.

8. You have testified of Cuba's extensive effort to undermine the governments in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and it has further been stated that convincing evidence of Cuban subversion activities surfaced in virtually every Caribbean Basin country.

Please list the countries and cite the evidence referred to in this statement.

9. With reference to the Isle of Youth which we discussed at the hearing, please furnish the Subcommittee with any information concerning this island and the activities conducted there.

Please furnish any information you have bearing on the allegations that there are children there who have been taken there against their will or without the knowledge or consent of their parents.

10. Are you aware of training given, or offered, to the Puerto Rican terrorist groups by the Cubans? Please furnish any information pertaining to this issue.

11. In the report issued in the early part of 1982 by Defense Secretary Weinberger, and in your testimony today, it has been said that yearly arms shipments to Cuba from the

Soviet Union "have almost doubled" since Cuba began its intervention in Angola in the mid-1970's.

Please explain in more detail the relationship between Cuba's intervention in Angola and the Soviet Union's doubling of arms shipments to Cuba.

12. What is the status of discipline, morale and effectiveness of the Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia?

Have there been defections and desertions from the ranks?

The Cubans have said that the first military contingents to reach Angola were elite Ministry of Interior units. What has become of these units?

13. In an article which appeared in the Baltimore Sun on February 7, 1982, it is alleged that the United States has established a secret counter-terrorist force with elements similar to the Italian police commandos who freed Brigadier General James Dozier from Red Brigades kidnapers last January. It is further alleged that the organization is a kind of national SWAT team formed in the aftermath of the unsuccessful attempt to rescue the U.S. hostages in Iran.

Please comment on this article.

What other specialized resources are there within DOD to respond to acts of terrorism?

14. Let us assume that the Soviets and Cubans are successful in their efforts to install totalitarian, Marxist-Leninist governments which are aligned with or controlled by the Soviet/Cuban bloc in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and other countries in Central America.

I know you have touched on this in your opening presentation, but please elaborate on what the consequences are for the United States, in terms of our national security, if this expansionism, this slow constant creep of Communist domination progresses unchecked.

What are the military consequences?

What are the economic consequences?

15. In previous testimony, you made mention of the Soviet intelligence stations in Cuba. Please describe the nature and extent of these Soviet intelligence operations, both in Cuba and elsewhere in Central and South America.

Please furnish the Subcommittee with any unclassified information that DOD has concerning Cuban intelligence activities in South and Central America.

In South Africa.

OJCS, J-3, SOD
2 April 1982

13. (U) In an article which appeared in the Baltimore Sun on February 7, 1982, it is alleged that the United States has established a secret counter-terrorist force with elements similar to the Italian police commandos who freed Brigadier General James Dozier from Red Brigades kidnapers last January. It is further alleged that the organization is a kind of national SWAT team formed in the aftermath of the unsuccessful attempt to rescue US hostages in Iran. Please comment on this article. What other specialized resources are there within DoD to respond to acts of terrorism?

Answer: (U) The article appears to be based in part on published unclassified testimony during hearings on Counter-terrorism Programs before the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense of the House Appropriations Committee by DoD witnesses on 24 June 1981. It appears further to make liberal use of unverifiable quotes from anonymous "sources" to engage in flights of fancy and some pure speculation. The Counter-terrorist Joint Task Force (CTJTF) was established in October 1980 with the specific responsibility of countering acts of terrorism. The location, forces and procedures of the CTJTF are classified. This is primarily to prevent hostile groups from gaining specific information about the CTJTF and to protect individuals who are assigned to its components.

Prepared by: Lt Col R. L. Jones, USAF
OJCS, J-3, SOD
X78583

OASD(ISA)/IA
12 April 1982

14. Let us assume that the Soviets and Cubans are successful in their efforts to install totalitarian, Marxist-Leninist governments which are aligned with or controlled by the Soviet/Cuban bloc in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and other countries in Central America. I know that you have touched on this in your presentation but please elaborate on what the consequences are for the United States, in terms of our national security, if this expansionism, this slow constant creep of communist domination progresses unchecked. What are the military consequences? What are the economic consequences?

Answer: Such expansionism could lead to an extensive Soviet permanent presence in the Caribbean Basin that would have significant adverse military consequences, especially if it involved the introduction of weapon systems capable of striking the United States. It would reduce the effectiveness of

current US tactical warning systems (north looking) by establishing a more significant threat from the south where little or no early warning capability exists. It would increase significantly Soviet strategic capability, especially if strategic weapons or submarines were based in the Western Hemisphere or if bomber bases were developed or made available. It could provide air and naval bases as well as missile sites for launching attacks with short and intermediate range missiles against the United States and for recovery of Soviet aircraft after strategic missions. It would provide bases which could be used as staging areas for operations, especially covert, against the United States and within the Hemisphere. Terrorists and saboteurs could operate with impunity across our southern borders, forcing the United States to invest heavily in guarding our borders at great cost. It would allow the Soviets expanded opportunities for use of the forward basing concept to pre-position Soviet equipment, supplies and ammunition for their potential use later. It would provide facilities which could enable both the Soviet Pacific and Atlantic fleets to operate for extensive periods without returning to the USSR.

Such assets would greatly enhance Soviet naval power projection capabilities. It would increase the threat considerably to our sea lines of communications (SLOCs) which are critical to the economic well-being of the United States and to US capabilities to reinforce Europe in time of war. The vulnerability of the Panama Canal, a vital transit link, would be magnified. It would increase the vulnerability of substantial US refining capability located in the Caribbean. It would jeopardize access to critical strategic minerals which either come from or must transit the Caribbean Basin. Moreover, it would provide Soviet access to strategic resources and SLOCs previously controlled exclusively by Hemispheric nations. In wartime, it would provide the Soviets a strategic area of operations to disrupt US warfighting capability in Europe and the Far East. It would increase significantly Soviet military influence in the Hemisphere through the further introduction of communist bloc weapons, personnel and intelligence collection capability. It would reduce significantly US freedom of operations in an area in which training and operations have been relatively free from observation or interference. It would increase significantly requirements for US military forces in the region, including ship days and flight hours to monitor Soviet activities and relocation of

defense forces and resources to provide deterrent capability. It would provide the Soviets with electronic countermeasure platforms to interfere with or neutralize US strategic command and control systems, and operating bases to support increased surveillance of US military tactics, space exploration and weapons test ranges. Soviet/Cuban influence could lead to an increasing level of hemispheric destabilization. Perhaps most importantly, Soviet/Cuban expansionism in Central America would require significant alteration in current US strategy for forward deployment, since a major threat would now exist in an area previously considered militarily secure. Such changes would, in turn, require additional resources at significant cost and diversion of resources from other areas.

Other Departments could probably more effectively address the economic consequences than DoD. If Mexico were included with the countries of Central America, the economic impacts of Soviet/Cuban expansionism would likewise be significant. In recent years, Central America and Mexico have imported over \$12 billion from the US and exported about the same to the US. US direct investment in Central America and Mexico in 1979 was \$8 billion. The presence in Mexico alone of substantial proven oil reserves of 57 billion barrels and probable oil reserves of 250 billion barrels makes the economic stakes quite high.

Prepared by: COL Heyward G. Hutson
OASD(ISA)/IA
X53607

THE ROLE OF CUBA IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION

Terrorist and Subversive Activities of the Cuban Government in Latin America and Puerto Rico

FRIDAY, MARCH 12, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, commencing at 10:43 a.m., Senator Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Also present: Senator East.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milling, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator DENTON. This hearing on the terrorist and subversive activities of the Cuban Government in Latin America and Puerto Rico will come to order.

Senator East has indicated that he would be here this morning.

I wish to welcome our first witness, Ambassador Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Mr. Daniel James, journalist and specialist in Latin American affairs, who will be our second witness.

I have a brief opening statement. Then I will ask Ambassador Enders for his statement.

Today the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism concludes its initial hearings on the issue of Cuba and its activities as a proxy of the Soviet Union. This relationship, as we have seen, extends from the use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy to the targeting of U.S. persons or interests for purposes of intelligence collecting.

Today's session will conclude the first series of hearings on this subject; however, the subcommittee will hold subsequent hearings on this issue as additional information becomes available. Specifically, we plan a closed session to examine allegations made by Gerardo Peraza, a former DGI officer, concerning Cuban penetrations of the U.S. Senate and other government institutions.

In his address to the OAS on February 24, President Reagan reminded us of the importance to our own country of the security of other Western nations, particularly those in Central America.

The President said, "In the face of outside threats, security for the countries of the Caribbean and Central American area is not an end in itself, but a means to an end."

Because that sentence contained the first step toward a basic understanding of the issues in the region, I repeat his statement. The President's observation corresponds to my own personal view and I am sure this is the view of our first witness today.

It is only when a nation is secure—free of both Communist tyranny and terrorism—that the application of the principles of democracy can develop and grow. When terrorism is rampant, the Government must try to take whatever action is necessary to end the terror. Communist states are ruled by terror, so the presence of externally applied or sponsored terrorism is nearly impossible, virtually a contradiction in terms. But for a non-Communist government, more or less democratic, whatever action is necessary to end the terror leads to repression; repression often leads to revolution. And, I must emphasize that revolution, world revolution, incrementally, nation by nation, is the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union, its allies, and its agents.

The Soviet Union is well on the way to its goal. Moscow employs a routine technique, which is not only evident, but boringly evident to any reasonably objective student on foreign affairs. Part of that technique is based on the simple observation that if there is repression then the road to revolution, nation by nation, is relatively more easy.

This tactic is not a randomly employed tactic around the world. The tactic is made clear in the all-purpose "Mini-Manual for Urban Guerrillas" published in 1969 by Carlos Marighella. You can find this urban guerrilla handbook in New York, Detroit, Vienna, and in the Sudan. You can find it all over the world.

The author, Marighella, was an apparatchik in Brazil's pro-Moscow Communist Party for 40 years. I want to quote his words that are known by heart by those who use this handbook, the terrorists around this globe.

It says: "The urban guerrilla must use revolutionary violence to identify with popular causes, and so win a popular base."

I would interject that there are many popular causes in Central America, South America, with which one could identify violence.

Then, the quote:

The Government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police roundups, house searches, arrests of innocent people, make life in the city unbearable.

The general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents. The political situation is transformed into a military situation, in which the militarists appear more and more responsible for errors and violence. When pacifiers and right-wing opportunists see the militarists on the brink of the abyss, they join hands and beg the hangmen for elections and other trips designed to fool the masses.

These are Marighella's words and these words were almost the same as Castro's quoted yesterday.

I continue Marighella's quote:

Rejecting the so-called political solution, the urban guerrilla must become more aggressive and violent, resorting without letup to sabotage, terrorism, expropriations, assaults, kidnappings and executions, heightening the disastrous situation in which the government must act.

These carefully articulated steps, concludes Marighella, are bound to end with "the uncontrollable expansion of urban rebellion."

In Claire Sterling's book entitled "The Terror Network," she reminds us that the Tupamaros were the first group outside Marighella's native Brazil to apply his words literally.

We should keep in mind throughout this hearing today that almost every country in Central America, as well as Italy and Turkey, which are fairly large countries, have been subjected to this technique. The United States has not yet been subjected to it but other countries have been. In Latin America, the results of this technique are very much in the minds of those that are in the diplomatic or governmental fields. The question of what will happen if this kind of terrorism is instituted again, whether it be in Argentina, Brazil, or other countries that have been on the brink due to terrorism, is uppermost in their minds as they decide what they will say and what they will do with respect to situations like Nicaragua.

So we can see that if terrorist-caused revolution results in a leftwing or Communist government, the nation is easily and shortly absorbed into the Soviet orbit. It is lost to the free world and to any prospect of freedom for its people.

More specifically, if such a revolution results in a rightwing government, that probably short-lived government is held up for world denunciation, castigation by its friends as well as by its enemies, and the application of further terror which is characterized as a struggle against an antidemocratic force. This often succeeds in bringing about that government's overthrow and replacement by a leftwing regime, sometimes with the unwitting or shortsighted assistance of those whose best interests clearly mandate that they staunchly oppose exactly that result.

Among those who seem blind to this routine technique are our media in general, who seem oblivious to this fundamental and essential fact. If you are a liberal, examine this fact. It is much easier to replace or to influence a rightwing dictatorship, which has only limited local resources, than it is to replace or even influence a leftwing dictatorship, supported by a Moscow-Eastern Europe-Havana supply of weapons, training, money and propaganda.

Now why cannot this fact sink in the minds of our people? I do not regard liberals as enemies. I regard them as a point of view which is absolutely necessary to the survival of this country. If you are a liberal, why can you not understand the obvious fact? What is so superficially attractive about these people's regimes that it blinds us to the stark realities of what happens once the Communists seize power. Who speaks for the human rights of the Miskito Indians forced by the Sandinista regime into resettlement, or worse? Where are the teams of human rights observers in North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Cuba, and even Poland? What of yesterday's shocking revelation, at least to me, that thousands of children are being removed against their parents' wills, from the Continent of Africa and brought to the former Island of Pines, now the Island of Youth—and there indoctrinated with Communist propaganda. Why was

that not printed by the press? Suppose Argentina had done that? It would have been on the front page, the top headline.

In a recent interview, Alexander Solzhenitsyn spoke of this problem when asked why is it so fashionable to praise the regimes in Nicaragua and Vietnam and the partisans in Salvador?

He replied:

That is the fatal historical mistake of liberalism--not to see the enemy on the left, to consider that the enemy is always on the right, and that there is no enemy on the left. It is the same mistake which ruined Russian liberalism in 1917. They overlooked the danger of Lenin. And the same thing is being repeated today, the mistake of Russian liberalism is being repeated on a worldwide scale every day.

Those who think they are helping the poor by supporting the Communist-sponsored rebellions are not helping the poor. Their position, that rationale, is understandable but wrong. They are unthinking opponents of imperfect governments without considering the consequences or the alternatives.

Our most serious problem, in my opinion, as a U.S. Senator, and I think this is one of the reasons I ran for this office, stems not from a lack, a basic lack of will, but from a lack of understanding. Since our experience in Vietnam, we have been progressively paralyzed by misinterpretation and misinformation. We suffer an inability to do that which has to be done to protect American interests. What I call the "Vietnam syndrome" is largely responsible for the decline in our ability to protect ourselves and our allies from Soviet aggressions and adventurisms.

For a long time, man has hoped that the crocodile will eat him last, after it has eaten his brothers. A hundred years from now will men conclude that we fed our friends to the crocodile for delay but in the process also assured our own demise?

Yesterday we heard the excellent and illuminating testimony of Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Today we have as our first witness, Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inner-American Affairs, a career Foreign Service officer who has served in the Foreign Service since 1958, through eight administrations.

Ambassador Enders might be suffering from jet lag. He only yesterday returned from Chile and we greatly appreciate his appearance today.

We will also be hearing from Daniel James, a journalist and specialist in Latin American Affairs.

I would like to swear both of you in at the same time, gentlemen, if you will.

So if you, Mr. Ambassador, will stand, and Mr. James.

Please raise your right hand.

[Whereupon, Ambassador Enders and Mr. James were sworn in.]
Senator DENTON. Please be seated.

Ambassador Enders, you may proceed with your opening statement.

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS O. ENDERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. ENDERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I very much appreciate the opportunity to come testify before the subcommittee.

The administration shares your concern about the growth of terrorism and violence in today's world. I very much welcome this opportunity to address the issue of Cuban terrorism and the promotion of violent revolution in Latin America and the Caribbean.

I have a statement, Mr. Chairman, which is not as short as I wish it and yet this is a substantial topic and, with your indulgence, I will move through it as quickly as I can.

For some 10 years following the death of Che Guevara on an Andean hillside, Cuba attempted to portray itself as a member of the international community not unlike others, carrying out state-to-state relations through embassies and emphasizing trade and cultural contacts.

It is true that Cuba never stopped glorifying violent revolution and during an entire generation, Cuba had carefully nurtured agents and contacts with groups committed to violence in the Americas, often providing ideological and even military training to several groups in the same country.

But in 1978, almost without notice at the time, Castro began to implement a new strategy, a strategy of uniting the left in the countries of the hemisphere for the purpose of using it, a resulting unified movement, as a tool for the violent overthrow of existing government and the establishment of more Marxist-Leninist regimes in this hemisphere.

In 1978, Cuba helped unite the three Sandinista factions, then committed itself militarily to the rebellion in Nicaragua.

At first, it was not apparent to many that a new Cuban strategy was in operation, for Nicaragua seemed like a unique case, but then Cuba began to try the same thing in El Salvador, in Guatemala, in Colombia; now it is repeating the pattern in Honduras, and Costa Rica is exposed to the threat of externally backed terrorism.

Now, it is quite clear, Mr. Chairman, that Cuban intervention is not the only source of terrorism in the hemisphere. Violent conflict in Latin America has many origins, including historical social and economic inequities which have generated frustrations. Especially in the Caribbean Basin, economic crises have recently subjected fragile institutions to additional stresses, increasing their vulnerability to radicalism as well as violence.

However, Cuba's readiness to foment violence to exploit such situations imposes serious obstacles to economic progress, democratic development, and self-determination.

I delivered to Congress a special report on Cuban covert activities in key countries.¹ What I would like to do today is review and update some of the specific cases with new evidence.

Senator DENTON. Ambassador Enders, would you care to submit that report to which you just alluded?

Mr. ENDERS. Yes. The immediate danger, obviously, is in Central America. But the pattern is also present in South America as well.

In Chile, for example, Cuban training of MIR guerrillas has increased substantially in the past 18 months. In January, the Chil-

¹ The report entitled "Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in America" can be found as exhibit A in the appendix to this hearing.

ean Communist Party leadership met in Havana. A handful of senior Cuban officials attended, and pressed hard for unity of all opposition forces in Chile and intensification of all forms of struggle, including violence.

But the most prominent South American case, however, is Colombia. In February 1980, Colombian M-19 terrorists seized the Dominican Embassy, holding 18 diplomats—including the American, Mexican, and Venezuelan Ambassadors and the Papal Nuncio—and they held them hostage for 61 days. As part of the negotiated settlement, the terrorists were flown to Cuba and given asylum. That summer, Cuban intelligence officers arranged a meeting among M-19 members with representatives of two other Colombian extremist organizations, the ELN and the FARC. Full unification was not achieved, but practical cooperation increased. In November 1980, the M-19 sent 100-200 activists to Cuba for military training. This group was joined by M-19 terrorists already in Cuba, including Rosenberg Pabon Pabon, the leader of the Dominican Embassy takeover. The Colombians were trained by Cuban instructors in explosives, automatic weapons, hand-to-hand combat, communications, and rural guerrilla tactics.

Then about a year ago, in February 1981, their Cuban training completed, these guerrillas infiltrated into Colombia by boat along the Pacific Coast. The attempt of these urban terrorists at an armed uprising in the countryside failed. Pabon himself was captured. Cuba denied involvement in the arming and landing of the M-19 guerrillas, but not in training them.

But there was clear evidence of Cuba's role and that led Colombia to suspend relations with Cuba on March 23. President Turbay commented in an August 13 New York Times interview:

... when we found that Cuba, a country with which we had diplomatic relations, was using those relations to prepare a group of guerrillas, it was a kind of Pearl Harbor for us. It was like sending ministers to Washington at the same time you are about to bomb ships in Hawaii.

In an interview published in September 1981, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the Cuban Vice President, told the German news magazine, *Der Spiegel*: "We did not deny that we trained the M-19 guerrillas." This, he said, "holds true for the Salvadorans as well."

Neither the anger of President Turbay nor the M-19's failure has deterred Cuba. A new and sizable group of M-19 guerrillas are today in Cuba receiving military training. We do not know that they will go back to Colombia to attempt new acts of terrorism, perhaps directed against the Presidential elections this coming May, but it seems to us a reasonable speculation.

The M-19 has already gone on record—in a declaration distributed to the media in January—condemning the elections and claiming that "civil resistance, popular combat, and armed warfare are the only roads left open to the people." This document, which was distributed under the signatures of the M-19's national directorate, pledged that the M-19 would oppose the elections "with all our force." This statement was repeated in late February when M-19 leaders rejected the government's latest amnesty proposal.

For the first time, Mr. Chairman, we now also have detailed and reliable information linking Cuba to traffic in narcotics as well as arms. Since 1980, the Castro regime has been using a Colombian

narcotics ring to funnel arms as well as funds to Colombian M-19 guerrillas. This narcotics ring was led by Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombia drug-trafficker now in custody in Mexico. He has admitted to working for Havana in purchasing arms for the M-19. We have information that Guillot traveled twice to Cuba since October 1981 and that on the second visit he received \$700,000 from the Cuban Government to purchase arms for the M-19 guerrillas. Last October, he played a principal role in transferring the arms he purchased from a ship to a Colombian plane hijacked by the M-19. In addition to arms, Guillot reportedly also transferred funds to the guerrillas through an employee of a Panamanian bank. He maintained contact with the Cuban diplomatic mission in Bogota, including the Ambassador, until that mission was closed.

In return for Guillot's services, the Cubans facilitated the ring's trafficking by permitting mother ships carrying marijuana to take sanctuary in Cuban waters while awaiting feeder boats from the Bahamas and Florida. According to a relative of Guillot, one such mother ship detained by Cuban authorities was released when Guillot protested to the Cuban Ambassador in Bogota.

Guillot himself has also admitted that a future shipment of arms was to be sent to an unspecified group in Bolivia. These arms, according to Guillot, were to be supplied by an individual in Miami named Johnny. Johnny has been identified as Johnny Crump, a narcotics and arms trafficker now detained in Miami on narcotics charges.

We will continue, Mr. Chairman, to follow this case with extreme interest since it is the first firm information we have which implicates Cuba in narcotics trafficking. It also confirms through an independent source what we have suspected, that despite Cuban denials, Cuba has provided arms to the Colombian M-19 guerrillas in addition to training them.

In Central America, the pattern we know well from Nicaragua and El Salvador can be seen now from Guatemala to Honduras and Costa Rica.

Guatemala exemplifies Cuba's systematic efforts to unify, assist and advise Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. In the fall of 1980, the four major Guatemalan guerrilla groups met in Managua to negotiate a unity agreement, Cuban and Sandinista officials attended the signing ceremony. We have obtained copies of the actual secret agreements which make clear that the four guerrilla groups consider themselves a Revolutionary Vanguard, and believe that Marxism-Leninism establishes the ideological parameters of the Guatemalan revolution.

The secret agreements emphasize the importance of creating a national front, whose leadership would be approved by the self-proclaimed Revolutionary Vanguard, and the necessity of building international solidarity for the Guatemalan revolution. They spell out the intention of the guerrillas to control decisive political and military power, and fundamental economic power, should the Guatemalan Government be overthrown.

Later last fall, the leadership of the four Guatemalan guerrilla organizations were called to Havana to work further on developing effective unity. In January 1982, they issued a public statement to the people of Guatemala and world opinion, calling for a broad Na-

tional Patriotic Unity Front. They laid out a deceptively moderate program for a new revolutionary government which would be non-aligned, guarantee freedoms of expression, and respect the people's right to elect their own representatives. But the front, they made clear, would be under their leadership as the Revolutionary Vanguard.

Now it is interesting that the Marxist-Leninist parameters of the Guatemalan revolution laid out in the secret accords are not mentioned in this declaration. Nor is the intention of the Revolutionary Vanguard to control decisive political and military power. It does not take a great deal of imagination to see why the class struggle and Marxist-Leninist ideas so prominent in secret agreements were deleted from the public declaration.

A similar process appears underway in Honduras: The Cubans currently are using Honduran leftists to transport arms and provide support to insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala. Nevertheless, the Cubans are looking to the day when guerrilla warfare can be initiated in Honduras itself. Honduran authorities raided several guerrilla safehouses in late November 1981. Captured documents and declarations from detained guerrillas, including several Nicaraguans, revealed that the group was formed in Nicaragua at the instigation of high-level Sandinista leaders, its chief of operations resided in Managua, and members of the group had received military training in Nicaragua and Cuba. Among the captured documents were classroom notebooks from a 1-year training course held in Cuba in 1980. The documents also revealed that one of the three guerrilla bases discovered was responsible for transporting arms and munitions from Esteli, Nicaragua into Honduras. We can expect to see the familiar ritual repeated in an effort to bring down the new democratic government which was inaugurated barely 2 months ago.

In Costa Rica, terrorism had been virtually unknown until March 1981 when a vehicle bearing three U.S. Embassy guards was blown apart. In June, three Costa Rican policemen were shot down.

This year an investigation by the police uncovered at least 20 terrorist cells of the Central American Party of Revolutionary Workers, one of which was involved in an attempted kidnaping in January of the Salvadoran businessman Roberto Palomo. Also uncovered was a "people's prison," well supplied with arms, food, and other stores. According to documents found during the investigation, the purpose of the terrorists was to undermine Costa Rica's democratic institutions. Two Salvadorans and one Costa Rican were arrested; they told police they had been given extensive training in Nicaragua and false identity documents.

I think if I could put this in perspective, Mr. Chairman, the covert strategy for exporting armed revolution and terrorism is more sophisticated than Cuban efforts in the 1960's. The new Cuban approach no longer centers support solely on armed forces, but combines support for revolutionary groups with propaganda, youth training courses, scholarships, and bilateral economic/technical assistance. They have some flexibility in tactics but the main-spring of Cuba's policy remains the development of strong paramilitary forces in target countries like Colombia to provide the

muscle for revolutionary groups regardless of the path to power they choose.

Of course, Nicaragua is now collaborating in the attempt to impose new Cuban-style regimes in Central America. Such regimes are so incompetent, economically, and so repressive of individual liberties that their citizens will see their only hope in flight, often to the United States. The rapidly growing number of Indian refugees—now more than 12,000—who have fled Nicaragua to Honduras are just the most recent manifestation of the despair which moves people to abandon their communities for safety elsewhere.

We know the human tragedy of refugee movements. We also know the enormous social and economic burdens they place on the societies which receive them. We ourselves have seen the crime, the skyjackings, the huge welfare costs and social tensions the Mariel migration brought to the communities of this country. For small countries in Central America or even Mexico, the consequences could be too much to accommodate. The pressures can easily destabilize the weak, creating the chaos that gives revolutionaries new opportunities. Whether or not it is part of the design to export revolution, it at least serves that purpose.

I think it is worthwhile remembering that Cuba's investment of energy, money and agents would not be possible without Soviet help. Soviet assistance, now totaling well over \$3 billion a year, which is the equivalent of a quarter of Cuba's GNP, enables Cuba to maintain the second largest and the best equipped military force in Latin America and to channel significant resources to insurgencies and terrorism abroad. Cuba's new offensive since 1978 has been accompanied by ever-increasing Soviet arms buildup in Cuba including Mig-23 Floggers and 66,000 tons of supplies in 1981 alone. Having such a sophisticated military establishment enhances Cuba's ability to foster and export revolution.

We must be clear about Cuba. It is a Soviet surrogate. Its support for subversion derives from its own deeply based ideological conviction. It is a fundamental tenet of the Cuban revolution.

The Cuban leadership today is made up largely of the veterans who 23 years ago came to power through violent revolution. They have developed "armed struggle" into an ideological precept and way of life. Promoting "armed struggle" is not just a tactic of foreign policy, it is what reassures them that they are still revolutionaries.

This deep-seated drive to re-create their own guerrilla experience elsewhere is strengthened by hopes of creating allies and keeping Washington's attention focused away from Havana. Hoping that the United States will be domestically and internationally hamstrung on El Salvador, Cuba seeks to compound our problems by creating new ones—for example, in Guatemala or Colombia. This drive, however, makes Cuba increasingly prone to rash decisions and tactical mistakes, and more willing to sacrifice the lives and resources of foreign guerrilla groups in operations that may prove disastrous to the guerrillas but advantageous to Havana.

We must make no mistake: The Castro regime has made a business of violent revolution. Our response is also clear. We will not accept, we do not believe the countries of the region will accept

that the future of the Caribbean Basin be manipulated from Havana. It must be determined by the countries themselves.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your patience and tolerance in letting me use my entire statement.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. That was most illuminating. I recognize with pleasure Senator East, my distinguished friend and colleague from North Carolina and offer him an opportunity to make any remarks at this time.

Senator EAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just wait until I have an opportunity for some questions.

Thank you.

Senator DENTON. As the chairman of the subcommittee, I have been learning a great deal. I had no idea that the Soviet-Cuban activity to promote world revolution was as all pervasive and as active as it is. Your statement today adds to my education.

Having visited Panama recently and having gotten a briefing from the unified commander in that area and having attended a reception which was attended by diplomats from all over Latin America, I have added to my understanding of these issues. What you say today makes me even more alarmed about what is going on and about the vast difference between what is actually taking place in Central America and what our public perceives and understands about that situation.

In Panama, it was estimated by the business community, by left-wing political functionaries and aspirants for government positions, that the Soviets are subsidizing at least 1,000 Panamanian students at their university in Moscow.

In previous hearings, we have brought out that the KGB normally and without any attempt at disguise runs the DGI, the Cuban intelligence agency.

You have put in perspective the amount of aid that Cuba is getting from the Soviets—did you say \$3 billion a year?

Mr. ENDERS. Yes; \$3 billion a year.

Senator DENTON. One-third of Cuba's gross national product?

Mr. ENDERS. One-quarter, sir, is what we estimate.

Senator DENTON. When we combine that with the report yesterday from Dr. Ikle of how that translates into advisers, military equipment, and so forth, it is mind boggling to me the difference between that which is really going on and that which is perceived.

One thing all of these diplomats from South America emphasized to me was the U.S. failure to follow through on commitments such as in Vietnam. Diem is a good example, whose assassination we effectively acquiesced in.

Chou and his government is another example. After we did win a military victory there and got a four-point agreement, by virtue of pressures which were unremitting both from the media and from Congress, we managed not to follow through on our commitment to him. We permitted the North Vietnamese divisions to crush South Vietnam and to take over their country with the resulting economic and sociological consequences.

The South Americans are not unaware of what happened to Diem and the Shah of Iran. In the case of Iran, the prophet, the great bearded Ayatollah, who in Paris was portrayed as the savior

of the situation, has not improved the situation in Iran, has not improved U.S. interests in Iran. The South Americans are well aware of this unrealistic and disturbing element of U.S. foreign policy.

Mr. Ambassador, with reference to the four major Guatemalan guerrilla groups that met in Managua, you mentioned having copies of the actual secret agreements made during that meeting.¹ Could you furnish the subcommittee—

Mr. ENDERS. With pleasure.

Senator DENTON. Without objection, these documents will be entered into the record. I did mention that there has not been terrorism in the United States like that which has occurred in other nations. But for your information, Mr. Ambassador, in our second to last hearing we had two policemen, special agents, from the Miami area who testified concerning Cuban Government involvement in drug traffic into the United States. They also testified that they knew of 240 U.S.S.R.-manufactured grenades in the Miami area alone. When you think what a man with a pistol and one or two shots can do in a hotel in Washington, D.C., and start thinking about the thousands of Cuban agents that are in the Miami area alone, one can see the potential for terrorism and the potential for destruction in the United States. Thank God it has begun to become more widely understood.

Have you seen any evidence, sir, that guerrilla training of insurgents targeted against Central America has occurred in Mexican territory and, if so, would you describe the nature of such training and the nature of such evidence?

Mr. ENDERS. Mr. Chairman, could I first comment a bit on your first remarks about the problem of the leftwing and the rightwing dictatorial or violent regimes. Obviously, one of the most difficult problems in foreign policy—I think we have all been impressed by the fact that Nicaragua has swung from a repressive rightwing regime to a repressive leftwing regime and seems, in spite of all of the efforts of the United States and a number of other countries to, say, present economic assistance and political connections—after all, Nicaragua has received, over the last 2 years, \$600 or \$700 million of economic assistance from the free world countries, including a \$125 million cumulative from the United States. But it has marched steadily toward a one-party state without any remission. I think a great many Americans see this as a dilemma for our foreign policy.

I would say this, that when you have in front committed to a rightwing or strong military ruler, such as the Shah, and you then urge him on toward reform, it is quite possible that sometimes you weaken rather than strengthen him and it would be arguable this is what happened in Vietnam or arguable that this is what happened in Iran.

Senator DENTON. Weaken in what way, by pushing him too fast or by just the conspicuousness of our apparent help?

Mr. ENDERS. Very often our effort to get such a ruler to embrace our values, our political values, makes him—undermines the basis on which he holds power. But that, I say, is when a commitment

¹ The secret agreements, along with additional responses to subcommittee questions, appear as exhibit C in the appendix to this hearing.

has been made. But when you have a country that wants to change itself—and this is the case of El Salvador—wants to change itself by reforming, to get out of the dilemma of the extreme right or extreme left, you move away from an old-line military regime, then you have a different situation. I say El Salvador is different because the old-line military regime, not unlike that of Somoza, not unlike that of Guatemala, came in determined to implement a land reform on a very broad scale and political reforms and to create democratic institutions. We got behind those reforms under the last administration and under this one. We did not impose them. We did not organize the reforms for them. We did not tell them they should do it. But we got behind them giving them economic and military aid because the revolution speared reforms and the immediate reaction from the violent left was to go into and act as insurgents.

In another case, Mr. Chairman, Central America, Guatemala, where the polarization is much greater, we have refrained from active and substantial support to the Guatemalan Government. We know that that Government is being challenged by a Marxist-Leninist organization. It is organized and supported in Cuba. We know that civil strife has been going on in that country for 25 years and that this is the third wave of it, third and very dangerous wave.

On the other hand, we have told the Guatemalan Government repeatedly that we do not see how they can ultimately stabilize the situation if it appears in their own country that everybody that is not actively for them is potentially regarded as an enemy by them and that the situation polarizes and those who wish to develop an alternative in the center are not permitted to move forward. We take the Guatemalan situation very seriously. But we have not committed the government in the way we have in El Salvador.

So I think it is important in thinking about the dilemma that you speak of, Mr. Chairman, to see where we are going before we commit a great country like the United States because we should carry through on commitments once they are made; therefore, we have to be particularly careful before in fact we engage ourselves.

Senator DENTON. I by no means meant to imply that the Shah of Iran and Duarte were comparable. Duarte is far from a rightwing leader, which is another mystery to me, as to the way he is being portrayed. He has been trying to institute reforms. He is far left in his orientation from what we would choose to have, I would imagine. He is certainly not considered a rightwinger down there and the way he is portrayed in the American press astounds me. I just meant that the consistency of Americans following through on commitments to back certain rulers trying to deal with difficult circumstances, such as rampant terrorism, is a dismaying situation.

Mr. ENDERS. Well, I think the Cuban revolutionaries and the Soviet revolutionaries behind them want to put us in that dilemma and they want to have us in the position in which it is either—we either stick with Somoza or we have to take the Sandinistas. We should not permit ourselves to be locked into that choice. I think the fundamental objective of our policy in the region should be precisely to give ourselves the alternative choice of some social and political change.

Senator DENTON. Would the Department's position be to see that the relatively young nations of Central and South America, with their revolutions coming in the late 19th century and early 20th century still going on, to see that they provide for the land and social reforms necessary to permit a sense of public confidence or assurance that their government is doing the best they can. Is that not generally the wish of the United States?

Mr. ENDERS. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. But I think we have to be aware that the countries are very different. There were three countries with traditional military style rightwing authoritarian governments: Guatemala, Nicaragua, and in the past, El Salvador. But Costa Rica is very different. You know, it overthrew such a military government 30 years ago and has had 30 years of model democracy. Honduras had a military government for the last 12 years. But in an election with 80-percent turnout, pretty good figure from an American point of view, 80-percent turnout, they elected a moderate center democratic regime. The small country of Belize, just now independent, is a democracy. Panama is a country of mixed institutions but not a repressive country. So each country has different problems. There was a particularly harsh land problem in El Salvador, partly because it is the most heavily populated country in the area and the man-to-land ratio is very unfavorable and partly also because so much of the land was in the hands of a relatively small number of people, creating an explosive social situation. Similar but not so severe conditions existed in Nicaragua. Thus, each of them have to be taken differently.

But you have, on the one hand, while trying to deal with economic and social problems of those countries as they mature, the problem of outside interference that has got to be dealt with too. Not only Cuba engaging in uniting the left and organizing the threats against the government, as you and I have both described, but also what you might call the ripple effect in Central America. When the challenge was being mounted against Somoza in Nicaragua, the Cuban consulate in San Jose, the capital of the neighboring state of Costa Rica was used as the commander in control post and it was from there that the orders, the communications, and the logistics were organized.

Now that the struggle is going on in El Salvador, it is in Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, that the commander and control apparatus is present and the logistics is organized and the training is organized.

As you mentioned earlier, we have given the evidence which we have for this, which we regard as irrefutable, to the two Intelligence Committees, and the chairmen of the two intelligence committees have testified to its convincing character.

Senator DENTON. I will turn this over to Senator East but before I do, I did not mean to characterize the governments as all rightwing, all in need of that much push by us to reform. What I meant to draw out is that the United States is not simply in favor of a bunch of rich autocratic dictators staying in place so that we can capitalize on trade with them at the expense of the poor peasants. We are, in general, inclined toward the same view as the liberals are with respect to that area and we must recognize that there are

countries down there doing almost superhuman—making almost superhuman achievements in that direction.

The big point I was trying to make, that this outside supply of military equipment, terrorist propaganda, technique, wherewithal, must be cut off.

Senator East.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN P. EAST

Senator EAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your coming this morning, Mr. Secretary, and sharing your thoughts with us.

I would just like to make several quick observations and pursue them with you, pertinent to your recent trip to Chile.

First, I would like to commend the Department of State and the Secretary of State for what I think has been a very effective and forceful statement of our position in Central America and El Salvador. I took the liberty the other day to call the Secretary of State and tell him personally I thought he was articulating this very well and that it needed to be done and he had the forum to do it and I wished him Godspeed in continuing to do it.

So I think the State Department has shown good leadership, and personally I support the administration on the general thrust of that policy in El Salvador at this time.

I would like to underscore to you that frequently it might be unclear how much support in the Congress the State Department enjoys. I would submit to you it might be infinitely more than what might appear on first blush because frequently our colleagues, as distinguished as they are, in the House and the Senate, who do go down there with a position that is contrary to yours, receive, and perhaps understandably so, a great deal of attention. Those of us who are in perhaps a more conventional role of supporting the administration do not quite enjoy that kind of exposure. Again, I am not suggesting any great conspiracy against us. Perhaps it is looked upon as particularly newsworthy because you are stating that position and then there are the critics and so they are trying to give some sort of balance that way. And I appreciate the dilemma the media find themselves in. Though I think one component that is inadvertently left out is perhaps a failure to communicate to the American people that there is strong support in the U.S. Senate, in the House of Representatives, for the general thrust of the administration's policy in Central America and, frankly, in many other parts of the world as well.

So I would like to take the liberty here simply to stress to you, you do not stand alone in terms of the State Department-administration versus a unanimously hostile Congress. It is just simply not true and it would not be an accurate understanding of the situation.

I find, of course, enlightening and useful your evaluation of the Soviet-Cuban connection and what it suggests for the world as a whole as well as Central America and Latin America, and as I have understood the facts and seen them and they keep gushing out, it is a sound analysis. I do not think it can be denied. One wants to keep an open mind but, again, I think your general analy-

sis of what is occurring in the world is realistic. It is accurate. It is not an exaggeration. It is not overblown. It is not simplistic. It comports with the real world of international relations as I see it and understand it.

And Cuba has grown increasingly as a surrogate of the Soviet Union to represent, I think, a genuine threat to peace and stability and freedom in the world, in so many parts of the world, not only Central America but Africa, the Middle East—Cuban troops in South Yemen and even in Afghanistan.

So the patterns are there. I am reminded of Senator Fulbright who at the time was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate who used to remind us that Cuba was no more than a nuisance and one that we ought not to be worried about. Certainly one cannot say that today. In our time it has played a major role as a surrogate for the Soviet Union and its designs in the undeveloped parts of the world.

Having made those general observations, just to give you a little feel for my general sympathy of what you are trying to do and my general position, one thing I would like to pursue with you, I have some questions about, is the so-called human rights test that I noticed in the Post this morning, an article about your trip to Chile. This human rights test has become a component of our foreign policy in many parts of the world.

As I understand it, the point seems to be that it came out of the Carter administration to encourage countries on the road to some sort of model democracy, I guess, of pluralism, of diversity, that we are willing to have relations with the country along the way provided they are showing some improvement and moving toward that general direction.

I would like to state as concisely as I can some reservations that I have about that, and I would appreciate your response to it because it seems to be a very significant facet of the State Department's and administration's policy in Latin America as well as the rest of the world. I have no quarrel with wanting to encourage countries, be they of the left or right, of moving toward greater pluralism and diversity. But there are enormous limits to that, frankly, in the real world of international relations. Democracy is a concept, an institution that is rare and fragile. We are used to it in the Anglo-American tradition and, to some extent, in Western Europe. But, candidly, it is not a uniformly understood or accepted form of government. When you get into the problems of culture and history and tradition—it reminds me of that famous play, "The Teahouse of the August Moon," where the Department of the Army sent in troops with manuals to instruct the local natives on how democracy works. The point was that it was ludicrous because we did not understand the local culture and the history and the tradition.

So I first question, as a practical matter, however desirable it is, you could impose democracy in so many cultures in the world, whether it be tribal cultures in Africa or cultures of great history and tradition in Central America or Asia.

So I question whether it is not a somewhat naive goal, as desirable as it might be. But in the real world of international relations,

one has to handle that with a great deal of the sense of realism about what is attainable and what is practical.

Then I question whether we do not apply that with a very selectively double standard. It is frequently pointed out—for example, we are trying to continue improved relations with Communist China, yet I do not see any human rights policy being applied there, but they must show progress to a model democracy in Communist China before we will continue to increase trade.

Other examples with Egypt under Sadat. As former president of Egypt, he was not a model of democracy and generally understood not to be so, but we continued to improve relations there. We are trying to do it with Saudi Arabia. With all respect to the Saudis, democracy is not part of their culture, history, and tradition. I do not see any human rights policy there. We are trying to improve relations with Jordan and Hussein. I do not quarrel with that or of trying to build a consensus in the Middle East. But clearly you could not go in and lecture King Hussein or the Saudis, you could not have lectured Sadat, and I gather we are not lecturing the Communist Chinese on the model of democracy and the need for them to move in that direction before we would improve relations with them, diplomatic relations, let alone military.

So I am troubled when I see a human rights policy in Central America or Latin America being applied, obviously rather selectively, to governments perceived to be to the right, whether it is the Duarte government or others, the government in Chile.

You say we have opted out of Guatemala. Why? It seems to be a polarized situation. I just query, if that is the basic thrust of our human rights policy, evolving out of the Carter administration and not being substantially altered in the Reagan administration, I ask the question, and would appreciate your reflection on it, whether it is soundly analyzed, frankly, as a matter of political theory, as a realistic understanding of international relations.

In World War II we were allies with the Soviet Union under Stalin. Certainly, in doing that, the Roosevelt administration was not endorsing the government of Josef Stalin. No democrat with a little "d" could possibly do that. Nor was there any evidence that Stalin was moving toward a pluralistic society, which Russia has never known and is never likely to know.

Why would we do that? We were doing it to overcome a great evil at that point, namely, the threat of Nazi Germany. Going back in history, it has been a cycle, a pattern where you have to enter into relationships with countries and leaders, and it does not mean you are endorsing every whit and tittle of their government. It simply means those are the realities you are confronted with in terms of defending your security and your national self-interest. This human rights concept I find sometimes funny in terms of its naiveté, but it does pose enormous problems for us if we seriously pursue it, because I think it will lead to our undoing in many parts of the world, where we will not accept allies to the right of center or in the center unless they run model democracies. That is not going to occur and, obviously, it means then you cut yourself off from that potential side of support and have to deal strictly with the left or left of center, and it plays right into the hands of the

Marxist guerrillas. So it is self-defeating. In short, we are hung up on the weakness of our own policy, it occurs to me.

Mr. ENDERS. Let me make several remarks. First, in the United States we have always been a government of values, of human and political values, as well as a government of interests. We have both in the world. I do not think that the concern for democracy and human rights is a concern which should be identified with one American administration only. Indeed, I think that it was the Congress that took the lead very vigorously at the start of the 1970's in promoting human rights policies and this Government, this administration, has recognized human rights policy as a permanent interest, the phrase used, of the United States. I think that is really common ground for all of us. I agree with you.

Senator EAST. Excuse me. How would we, for instance, describe our desire to continue to improve relations with Communist China?

Mr. ENDERS. Perhaps I could go on.

Senator EAST. Go ahead.

Mr. ENDERS. The second thing I would say about that is, I would agree with you here, is that it is nonsensical to over value our influence abroad, to believe that our views on what kind of political institutions one should have, our particular social arrangements, are the model to which everybody else must comply. Sometimes in the past, Americans have had that kind of assurance. I would agree with you that it is wrong to have that.

That said, I would say—and the third remark I would make, that with regard to Latin America, that the idea of democracy is a very strong one in the Americas. That two-thirds of the countries in the area are democracies in some form and almost all of those that are not feel they must recognize democracy as the ideal. Exceptions, of course, are Cuba which does not feel that it must recognize that as the ideal and we feel now Nicaragua, becoming every day a more repressive state.

But others, even when they are not democracies, feel they must recognize that the rule of law and democratic institutions are an ideal and people want to return to that.

The fourth thing I would say is that we agree very much that we should not attempt to use our relationship as somehow a kind of pressure point on human rights issues. There is a kind of internal inconsistency here. Somehow you say that 'you know, that if you are interested in changing human rights patterns in a given country, if you do not—if you are not present, if they have no stake in the relationship with you, there are no common goals, no sense of commitment one to the other, that it is very hard to achieve the kind of improvement that as one goal of our policy we have been seeking in human rights.

So, in contrast to some of the tactics applied earlier, we have, in fact, cultivated the relationships we have throughout the continent and I did not mean to suggest earlier that we are not cultivating our relationship, diplomatic and political relationship with the Guatemalan Government or other governments in the hemisphere, that we are trying to keep them at arms length. Only by doing so, it seems to us, that countries will feel that they have a commitment to the United States, that there are common goals and when we make observations, as we have in a number of countries, that

human rights issues, do we have some chance of having people react that there is some reason why we should pay attention to what the United States has to say.

In other words, we have attempted to create relationships of solidarity in which these problems can be addressed rather than antagonistic ones.

I would share very much your view that the United States does not have the influence, does not have the power, does not have the authority to dictate and should not attempt to dictate to other countries what their practices will be. But it is a permanent value of this country and, therefore, we do pursue it in relationships with many of the countries in which problems exist.

Now I would, finally, agree with you very strongly that, and I would like to talk about my area only, that human rights violations by leftwing governments must be as vigorously exposed by the international community and human rights organizations as those by rightwing governments. That has not always been the case in the past and it is one of the reasons why we have felt it necessary to go to such efforts on the Miskito Indians. The chairman mentioned that at the start of the session, because it was not becoming clear that in fact a massive repression was underway against an ethnic group in Nicaragua, an ethnic group that could not threaten Managua.

Of course, all the Miskito Indians were not going to take over the country. They wanted to be left alone and also to be free to not agree with the government in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas, to do what they wanted to do. Twelve thousand refugees crossed the border into Honduras, as a result of the repression.

So, yes, the human rights violations on all sides must be known.

Senator EAST. Then I would simply make this point: I can appreciate your area is Central America and Latin America and you are not going to be expected to speak for the rest of the world in terms of the administration's policy. But it strikes me the administration today, as well as the Carter administration, runs into some very, very difficult problems with the so-called human rights test. I think, as a composite of a whole lot of other things to consider it is useful, but to make it the litmus test of a viable relationship between our country and other countries, I would submit, as a matter of political reality in the world, is hopelessly unworkable. Again, I do not see it being applied in the Middle East as regards Saudi Arabia and Jordan. I do not see it being applied in the Far East, as regards Communist China.

It seems to be applied very fully and selectively in a very high profile in your area of Latin America and Central America and I am not sure, Mr. Secretary, to our disadvantage in that we are asking for the impossible. We are asking for the unworkable, that which has never been, and, unknowingly, unwittingly, it works clearly to the advantage of the very thing you say we have to be concerned with in terms of the security of this country, which this subcommittee is concerned with, namely, the Soviet-Cuban connection in Central America and in Latin America.

Then I will end on this note; not to place all of the blame, if blame is the right word, on this administration—I think they are

part of the policy that evolved out of the previous administration, to some extent, somewhat a captive of it.

But I notice the Mexican Government continues to build its relationship with Cuba or with the Sandinistas and I do not see it insisting on human rights—granted, you are not representing the Mexican Government. But suppose they were working with Mexico to achieve those ends that we see that the Mexican Government is seeking to attain, utilizing that standard. They utilize it with respect to the governments they see to the right. As for those to the left, Portillo embraced Castro.

Candidly, it strikes me that it is very selectively applied and always to those governments perceived as being right of center. I think, if the human rights concept is not to bring itself into a position of a totally laughable concept, it will have to be universally applied and to Communist China, for example.

I submit, once you start to do it, it will be as clear as a bell that it is totally unrealistic. The realities of international relations cannot be reduced to a slogan such as human rights and elevated into the first principle of foreign policy.

I think in the real world of international relations, it will come to our undoing and I think to some extent it has contributed to the undoing, in Latin America.

Mr. ENDERS. Senator, I meant to say we were a government both of value and interests. After your last remarks, I would say we were a government of interests as well as values too. We must have both together and I think we must have both together for the reason that there is in fact great political strength in the development of democratic values and human rights but that cannot be the only concern of our foreign policy. One of the things that in the past might have happened in Latin America, we have had an a la carte approach. We deal with countries in the area on the basis of one item that we are particularly interested in and then we ignore all of the rest of the concerns, including a lot of their concerns.

We ought to have policies with countries that address them as countries, as well as address some single category of relationship and I would agree that you must put them all together and, above all, you should have the cultivation of a relationship over a long period of time as an important goal and that applies to something on both sides about what can be done in relationship with a country.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. I certainly understand the importance of the principle that this country has interests in the sense of vital national interests, selfish interests, which are of great importance, which we try to apply in international affairs. I think that is the best possible heading that could be placed upon such important anomalies as our dealing with Red China because in the long term our policies are all contributing toward that which is pragmatically conducive to the preservation of our own freedom in this Nation and to the longer range threat to freedom possible throughout the world. I believe occasionally we have to make arrangements which, on the face of it, and taken in isolation, appear to be counter to human rights, such as whatever interests we might have with Red China at this time.

But, over the long term, for one pragmatic reason or another, it seems we serve both ends but it is often not obvious. I hope that is not totally cryptic.

Mr. ENDERS. I understand very well.

Senator DENTON. Turning to my earlier question, which you adroitly avoided, regarding terrorist activity in Central America—terrorists operating in Central America being trained in Mexico, I realize that we have a very sensitive set of relations around the world, including those with Mexico. To the degree that there may be any terrorist activity or any terrorist training in Mexico, I would ascribe it to Mexico's leadership's feeling the necessity to walk a tightrope, similar to that which Torrijos was walking. So I do not ask you that question with an intent to bruise our relations or to assign guilt to Mexico, but we do have the situation in which they are asking for sort of unconditional negotiations with the rebels in El Salvador. In addition, we have our Secretary of State saying, well, he can go along with the serious discussion about that but it does—from the Mexican point of view, it does omit one of the important policy requisites of ours, namely, that the external aid from the Moscow-Havana thing be cut off.

I would be interested in any comment you would care to make with regard to what you know about terrorist activity, terrorist training in Mexico because it looks like a double-tongued position we are taking.

Mr. ENDERS. Well, I would not wish to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that there are any activities which are being fostered or supervised by the Mexican Government. I take it that your question did not refer to that.

Senator DENTON. Not necessarily, no, sir.

Mr. ENDERS. But it is a fairly open society and that we have in fact had reports that this open society and fairly open territory have been used in the past for the passage of arms certainly to some of the revolutionary movements in Central America, in neighboring Guatemala. But also some further south, too. So, indeed, there are such reports, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. As an experienced Foreign Service officer, how would you estimate the impact of the success of terrorist technique which Marighella outlined? Suppose the terrorists were to be successful in El Salvador? What would be your assessment of its impact regarding Latin America?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, two things: I think, first of all, the pressure on the neighbors would be enormous and immediate. You know, Costa Rica has no army. So if you have got two states associated with Cuba in the central part of Central America, you would find that it would not be long before you would get a progressive, I am sure it would be called, social-political change in Costa Rica, although the great majority of the—practically everybody in Costa Rica would be against that.

It is not very far, as we know, to Panama with its canal. It is not very far to cross Honduras which has suffered from a severe economic problem, as has Costa Rica. It is not very far across there to Guatemala where there is a major insurgency underway. So there would be no obstacle for that insurgency almost immediately and, of course, Guatemala is on the southern border of Mexico and

shares its—its people share many of the languages and ethnic traits of the people in southern Mexico.

So you have a—I spoke earlier of a ripple effect. You would have a ripple effect of some real power underway.

I think the second thing that would be said would be that the United States has shown the will or the power to influence events to outcomes which are compatible with United States interests and they would draw the conclusion from that that the way in which they regarded the United States and their willingness to identify with and work with the United States. I think that they would then begin to recalculate their own interests.

Senator DENTON. The testimony yesterday from Dr. Ikle indicated that the time schedule of these shifts in military power as well as, say, the psychological effect of the installation in El Salvador of the Nicaraguan-type government—you said the military situation there seems to be on the verge of great changes; in other words, the balance of power in that area, even with respect to the U.S. capacities to deal with it we effectively have a 1½-ocean navy for a 3-ocean commitment. If you have the Caribbean and the Gulf, we have a 1½ navy for a 4-ocean commitment. Such things as Soviet Mig's utilizing runways now under preparation and so forth, I believe, from a military point of view, would represent another factor of great importance other than the psychological effect which you just mentioned.

Mr. ENDERS. Yes. You know, we have never had to be worried about a major threat on our borders, either north or south. This has been a uniquely favorable geographic position which of course is not shared by the Soviet Union. It has to be worried about its southern border and indeed it has 1 million men on the Chinese border. The United States already must be concerned about the buildup in Cuba. We are well aware of the fact that if in fact there were a crisis in Europe, that the resupply of Europe would have to be largely through the Gulf and the Caribbean area and that there is the possibility that it could be challenged or threatened by Cuba and that the diversion of resources would be required for that, substantial resources.

If, in fact, we were to face the same kind of buildup in Central America, the impact on our military situation would be yet graver.

Senator DENTON. I believe that in one of the hearings I attended in the Senate Armed Services Committee last week, Admiral Hayward testified that 40 to 50 percent of the seaborne traffic necessary to reallocate, redistribute the military climate of our forces, 40 to 50 percent of that would have to flow through the Panama Canal were there to be such a European development. With the change in military balance, which seems pending within the next matter of a few months, I am amazed at the context in which this whole matter is being placed for the American public's consumption by those who are the sole transporters of perspective.

You have said that the Department of State has evidence that the Cuban Government has engaged in drug smuggling activities in the United States, citing the case of Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian now in jail in Mexico, who claims to have funneled arms and money to Colombian leftist groups in shipping arms shipments to the United States. You described that in your opening statement.

Can you talk more about the evidence apart from the Jaime Guillot Lara case? There have been press reports that Guillot received \$700,000 from Raoul Castro himself. Does the Department of State have any evidence as to who gave Guillot arms or anything else you can state with regard to this?

Mr. ENDERS. Mr Chairman, we do not have further information to put in the public record. However, we would be happy to work with members of the subcommittee on a classified basis.

Senator DENTON. We shall submit other questions in that vein and look forward to receiving the responses.¹

I referred in my opening remarks to a New York Times article about Cuba's school for exporting communism. The article referred to the Isle of Youth, formerly the Isle of Pines. As you know, it is a small island 30 miles off the southwest coast of Cuba.

According to the article, since 1977, some 26,000 children from Cuba, Africa, and Central America have been brought to this island, this Cuban island, for controversial work and study programs that are a mixture of study and Communist indoctrination. There have been reports for several years that not all of the children on the island, especially those from Africa, are there voluntarily.

General Simon stated that many children are abused and sent to the island without the knowledge or consent of their parents.

Do you have any information to be furnished concerning this island and the allegations that some of these children were abducted? Yesterday, I inserted a copy of this article into the record and we did receive an affirmative response from Dr. Ikle saying these were not just rumors. These were facts.

Do you have anything to add to that?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, I think it is probably quite true, and as far as we can tell, in a number of cases has been true, that young people have been taken to the island without the consent of their parents. Whether they have in fact been taken there without their own consent is less easy to determine. But we have heard reports of that. But I am on much surer grounds on the former from what I know, Mr. Chairman, than on the latter.

Senator DENTON. The ages of those children range from 9 years old up. We will be having hearings beginning March 22, which will be revelatory regarding some of the Communist activities in Africa and how "humane" some of these activities are.

In view of your schedule, Mr. Ambassador, we will submit the rest of our questions to you for the record. We thank you very much for your most informed and enlightened testimony.

Would you please furnish the subcommittee with copies of the documents you mentioned in your statement concerning insurgency in Honduras and captured documents and declarations which demonstrate the true motive and origins of the guerrillas there. You mentioned a school book from a 1-year training program held in Cuba in 1980. We would very much appreciate inclusion in our record of those documents and reports.

Mr. ENDERS. We will.

¹ Ambassador Enders' answers to subcommittee questions appear as exhibit B in the appendix to this hearing.

Senator EAST. I too would like to thank the Secretary for coming. We appreciate your patience and being very helpful.

Mr. ENDERS. Thank you, Senators.

Senator DENTON. You have been sworn in, Mr. James. We want to welcome you again to this hearing and ask you if you have an opening statement.

TESTIMONY OF DANIEL JAMES, JOURNALIST, SPECIALIST IN LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. JAMES. Yes, Mr. Chairman; yes, I do.

I will present only a summary of the statement I have submitted in writing and that you and your staff have in their possession.

I appreciate very much this opportunity to appear before you on the crucial question of terrorist and intelligence activities conducted in the United States by intelligence and security organs of the Cuban Government.

Cuban-directed and Cuban-inspired terrorism and intelligence activities in this country are increasing, unfortunately, and constitute a grave threat to it.

Less than 3 weeks ago, on February 28, four bombs were exploded on Wall Street. They were thrown by the FALN—the Armed Forces of National Liberation—a Puerto Rican terrorist group, which claimed responsibility for the bombings. It calls them "a strike against the imperialist forces that are suppressing the Puerto Rican people."

The FALN, Mr. Chairman, is a creature of the Cuban Government's General Intelligence Directorate, or DGI, which organized that terrorist group on American soil in 1974. The DGI, in turn, is a satellite of the Soviet intelligence service known as the KGB.

I learned of the FALN's true origin during a trip I made to Puerto Rico last November. I also learned then that President Reagan has been singled out for assassination by the island's proliferating terrorists. The FALN, it was believed by knowledgeable informants in Puerto Rico, was the terrorist group most likely to be entrusted with that dastardly assignment.

I had gone to Puerto Rico, I should explain at this point, to continue a study of DGI activities underwritten by the Fund for Objective News Reporting, which provides grants for investigative research and the reporting of major news events. No strings were attached. Some news reports have been syndicated by the Scripps-Howard organization known as the Independent News Alliance of New York, and I am asking that two of those articles be inserted in the record, if you please, Mr. Chairman. One is from the Chicago Tribune of August 28, 1981, and the other is the copy as sent to newspaper editors by INA dated December 11, 1981.¹

Senator DENTON. Without objection, that is ordered.

Mr. JAMES. FONR invited me to do a study of the DGI because of my special background, as an author and journalist who has been covering events in Latin America since 1953. My interest in Cuban intelligence, in particular, dates from 1961, in the course of researching and writing a book, "Cuba: The First Soviet Satellite in

¹ The articles were received for the record and appear as exhibit D in the appendix to this hearing.

the Americas." I then learned that the Castro regime had made contact with Soviet intelligence as early as July 1959, when it sent the head of the rebel army's intelligence section, G-2, on a secret mission to Mexico to meet with the Soviet ambassador and KGB officers there. That emissary was Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, who today controls all Cuban security and intelligence activities as Minister of Interior. Valdés' contacts with the Soviets, when the Cuban Revolution was scarcely 6 months old, effectively disposes of the myth that we "pushed" Castro into Moscow's arms by such unfriendly acts as the trade embargo, which, of course, had not yet been initiated.

My study of the DGI began with its activities in the continental United States, and what I learned essentially is that Cuban President Fidel Castro has been following a two-track policy with regard to this country. One track, which a DGI defector named Genaro Pérez described to me as "Plan Alfa," "or A", calls for the normalization of United States-Cuban relations while the other, "Plan Bravo", or "B", is aimed at destabilizing the United States should normalization fail to come about.

Plan A was followed by Cuba during most of the Carter administration, when the normalization process reached its highest point to date with the establishment of "Interest Sections" in each of the two nations' capitals. They were manned, respectively, by U.S. diplomats in Havana and Cuban diplomats here in Washington. The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, however, turned out to be largely a cover for intelligence operations with the "vast majority" of its 20-member staff, and I am quoting a State Department source, consisting of intelligence agents. The section's very chief, Ramón Sánchez Parodi, doubles as head of the DGI in this area and reports to the DGI's overall chief in the United States, Mario Monzón.

A central objective of plan Alfa was also to split the Cuban-American community in the United States and that, unfortunately, has been largely achieved.

Much of the DGI penetration has been done by front groups organized by Cuban intelligence or persons cooperating with them. Among them are the Center for Cuban Studies, the Cuban-American Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba, and the Antonio Maceo Brigade.

Cuban intelligence, aided and abetted by persons who may not be agents but are at least willing dupes, also penetrated respectable American organizations such as the Latin American Studies Association. I attended its 10th national meeting in Washington, D.C., only last week, and I was struck by the overwhelming degree to which this once respected professional group has been infiltrated by pro-Castro elements. Even Cuban officials are regularly given a platform by the LASA.

Our business community, as well, is penetrated by DGI agents and supporters who seek to influence it to violate the trade embargo against Cuba. To encourage normalization, President Carter, in February 1977, announced that he would lift the embargo if Castro would withdraw his troops from Angola. That galvanized the DGI, through the Cuban Interests Section here, to woo U.S. businessmen with special ardor, and they began visiting Cuba in droves. In fact,

the Cuban Interests Section was so aggressive in pursuit of U.S. businessmen to encourage them to violate the embargo that the Carter administration, desirous as it was to encourage normalization, became upset. It threatened the DGI officer in charge of that operation, one Sergio Martínez, with deportation but Martínez voluntarily departed these shores before action was taken.

One DGI agent in the Interests Section who did get caught was Ricardo Escartín, who held the rank of First Secretary. Formally charged with being an intelligence officer engaged in violation of the embargo, he was expelled by the U.S. Government in February 1981. Nonetheless, the DGI remained undeterred. Last summer it incorporated in Panama a business front called Comercial Muralla which, operating outside of normal trade channels, manages to smuggle into Cuba U.S.-made auto parts, radios, TV sets, and heavy equipment. Recently a Miami grand jury indicted several business fronts engaged in illicit travel and other illegal transactions with Cuba.

Senator DENTON. If I may interject, Mr. James, this subcommittee's hearings are frequently visited by a man whom I neglected to welcome on this occasion, Jose Delgado, from the so-called Cuban Interests Section, the second secretary.

Mr. JAMES. I noted with interest his presence at this hearing.

Senator DENTON. He was here but appears to be no longer with us.

Mr. JAMES. Unfortunately for him. He will miss something.

The DGI normalization drive was almost crowned with success in 1977, with the formation of a group of prominent Cuban-Americans calling themselves the Committee of 75. Its real organizer and manipulator was a DGI colonel named Jesús Arboleya Cervera, who was at the time listed as Second Secretary with the Cuban Mission to the United Nations.

One leader of the Committee of 75, Rev. Manuel Espinosa, went to Jamaica to deal with the DGI station chief there. This was when Prime Minister Michael Manley, a friend of Castro, was in power. He was personally recruited into the DGI by the Cuban consul, Juan Carbonell, who was really DGI's station chief.

Subsequently, a Cuban-American banker named Bernardo Benes led a Committee of 75 delegation to Havana, to negotiate with Castro himself for the release of 3,000 political prisoners. That was eventually achieved, bringing normalization even closer. But there was one big obstacle. Castro, notwithstanding some sort of assurance to the Carter Administration that he would withdraw his troops from Angola, reneged. The administration retreated from the normalization process. Thus the DGI failed to achieve its main objective through the Committee of 75 and other fronts.

It did, however, attain the objective I indicated before, and perhaps this is more important in the long run, of splitting the Cuban-American community here in the United States in its opposition to Castro. Younger members of the community, who had never suffered personally the rigors of life under the Castro dictatorship, rejected their parents' assessment of the dictatorship as tyrannical and some even became pro-Castro.

The second track of Cuban policy, plan B, went into operation following the failure of plan A. Castro launched a massive effort to

destabilize this country and at the same time relieve himself of an unwelcome segment of the Cuban population, when he shipped to these shores 130,000 Cubans from the Port of Mariel in April of 1980. The impact on Miami and South Florida of that boatlift is too well known to dwell upon. I understand you have had witnesses testifying to that effect.

I should like to touch now on another little-known aspect of the DGI effort to destabilize this country, and that is the use of Puerto Rican terrorists to create trouble both on the island and here on the mainland. By trouble, I mean practically nothing is excluded, including threats to the lives of the President of the United States and other high U.S. officials. Such a threat was actually uttered in public last July by the reputed "godfather" of Puerto Rican terrorism, 72-year-old Juan Antonio Corretjer. Corretjer denounced Mr. Reagan as having "tortured" and "bribed" a member of the FALN, Alfredo "Freddy" Méndez, to squeal on 10 other FALN members who were being tried for seditious conspiracy in Chicago and were ultimately convicted to long prison terms. Instead of condemning Méndez, who squealed, Corretjer, said he pitied him. In public he stated, and here I quote from Corretjer:

Who deserves contempt? Who deserves punishment? Poor Alfredo Méndez? No. The President of the United States, the CIA chiefs, the FBI chiefs, the warden of Pontiac [Illinois] prison, the public prosecutors Margolis and Sullivan in the Federal office of the Chicago District Attorney, and the detectives and police of Chicago.

Corretjer denounced the President as "humanity's worst enemy."

Intelligence officers in Puerto Rico consider Corretjer's utterance as a call to assassinate the President and the others he mentioned. They note that Puerto Rican terrorists have been known to take revenge before for real or fancied acts against them.

The same Corretjer applauded, for example, the killing of 2 Navy officers and the wounding of 10 other Navy personnel at Sabana Seca Communications Center by terrorist groups as avenging the alleged murder of, member of his socialist league, Angel Rodriguez Cristobal, in a Tallahassee jail.

The FALN, some intelligence officers hold, was "connected" with the attempted robbery last October of a Brink's armored truck near Nyack, N.Y., by the Weather Underground and black terrorists. Two policemen and a guard were killed. FBI agents working on the case suspect that "foreign organizations" may have been linked to that attempt which some take to mean the DGI.

The fact is that the FALN was organized by a Puerto Rican agent of Cuban intelligence named Filiberto Inocencio Ojeda Ríos who is wanted on the island for jumping \$2,000 bail. In 1967, Ojeda founded the first of Puerto Rico's new terrorist groups, the Independent Armed Revolutionary Movement, or MIRA, whose members received training and arms in Cuba. After a series of bombings, the police finally broke up MIRA and Ojeda was arrested. Jumping bail, he headed for New York and was assigned to the DGI station there operating under cover of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations and organized the FALN with remnants of the old MIRA group.

The Cuban Mission to the United Nations, Mr. Chairman, is honeycombed with DGI and other Cuban intelligence personnel. An estimated 75 percent of its normal 50-person staff, which is itself un-

usually large for a country the size of Cuba, is estimated to belong to the DGI and other Cuban intelligence agencies such as the Americas Department, the Cuban Institute for Friendship with People (or ICAP), and so on.

At least two Cubans listed as "political counselors" to the mission are, in fact, DGI officers. One is Mario Monzón, who heads the DGI in the United States, and the other is Alfredo García Almeida, who runs the Americas Department in this country. Almeida works for the man Castro has entrusted with organizing and/or aiding and abetting revolution in the Americas, primarily in Central America just now, who is Manuel Piñero Losada, long known as Redbeard. He heads the America Department in Havana and once ran the DGI.

As you know, the State Department has issued a research document lately, I think it was back in December, which detailed the activities of Mr. Piñero and his aides throughout Central America. But Monzón, the man in New York, is not the sole boss of Cuban intelligence in the United States. Besides reporting, of course, to his own Cuban superiors in Havana, he must also answer to the KGB station chief in New York who is in charge of Soviet intelligence operations in this country. Thus, the two intelligence services, Cuban and Soviet, work hand in glove with each other but with the Cuban subordinate to the Soviet service, even as Cuba itself is a satellite of the Soviet Union. There is, however, a division of labor between them which is significant.

The DGI concentrates on wooing Third World members of the United Nations, who constitute the overwhelming majority of that body and can be decisive there. One of its special U.N. missions is to line up votes for the independence of Puerto Rico in the U.N.'s Committee of 24 or so-called Decolonization Committee. It has succeeded for the first time in getting the Puerto Rican issue placed on the General Assembly's agenda this fall.

DGI agents, of course, possess the distinct advantage over other Soviet satellite intelligence services, as well as the KGB itself, of being indistinguishable from millions of U.S. citizens and residents of Latin descent. Thus they can pose, with relative ease, as Nicaraguans or Mexicans or Puerto Ricans or Salvadorans and can mingle more freely with our population than Soviet or Polish or East German agents.

Because of their Latin ethnicity, these Cuban DGI personnel are being used, according to Genaro Pérez to incite Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and blacks, as he told me in an interview.

Needless to say, it would be very much in the interests of the Soviet Union to have Cuban agents incite Americans of black or Latin origin to riot, to stage demonstrations, to commit acts of sabotage and terror in our key cities.

Aware of these and other uses of the DGI, the KGB began to restructure the Cuban intelligence service quite early in the game. It is structured along the lines of the KGB and I describe that in the statement that has been submitted to you.

The DGI and other Cuban intelligence and security organs enjoy a very high priority in Cuba, Mr. Chairman—one much higher than, say, our intelligence services enjoy here. Those organs appear to be supervised closely by the very top leadership of the Cuban

Government, meaning President Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl who is heir apparent as First Vice President of Cuba and is also Minister of the Armed Forces, and meaning also Ramiro Valdés, who besides being Minister of Interior is a Vice President of Cuba. These three men, Mr. Chairman, are officially ranked among the top five in Cuba, and head the list of the 16 members of the Cuban Communist Party's Politburo as well as the National Assembly, Council of State, and Council of Ministers of the Cuban Government.


Through Raul Castro, whose decisive role has been grossly underestimated, there has always been a close link between the Cuban Armed Forces and the Ministry of Interior, which controls the country's intelligence services. In a very real sense, Cuba's formidable intelligence/security apparatus is basically his creation although his older brother, Fidel, always has the last word, of course. To facilitate his control over that apparatus, Raul was instrumental in organizing in 1961 the Ministry of Interior, under which all intelligence/security units were put. He then had named as head of the new Ministry his old friend, Ramiro Valdés, who continues to occupy that post today after a hiatus during which he held other important government jobs.

Cuba has set up what is in effect a high command of the Latin American revolution, in the form of an organization called the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta, in Havana. The JCR consists of the DGI and the Americas Department, making it a joint enterprise of Government—the DGI coming under the Ministry of Interior—and Party—the Americas Department being an arm of the Cuban Communist Party. The JCR is in charge of providing arms, training, guidance, and intelligence to revolutionary organizations throughout Latin America.

I have a chart here, Mr. Chairman, which provides as complete a breakdown as can be obtained of the far-flung machinery Cuba has organized to generate and support revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere, not excluding the United States, and which describes the role of the JCR and the Cuban Communist role. I would beg your permission to insert this in the record.

Senator DENTON. It shall be so inserted.

[The following chart was received for the record:]



Mr. JAMES. Perhaps most alarming of all for the United States is that Cuban intelligence has also succeeded in uniting some eight of nine terrorist groups in Puerto Rico, following the same pattern it has been pursuing in Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and other Latin American countries. Specifically, the Puerto Rican-born DGI agent I mentioned earlier, Filiberto Inocencia Ojeda Ríos, was the one who united the Puerto Rican terrorist groups under a joint operations command—Mando de Operaciones Conjuntas (MOC)—according to my informants. "He was the genius behind it," as one of them put it. He was at that time in charge of Caribbean activities for the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta.

Ojeda's career illustrates the overlapping between DGI and Americas Department activities, as well as the inner workings of Puerto Rican terrorism and the grave threat, grossly underestimated by some elements of our own intelligence community, that it represents to the United States.

He organized the FALN, from his vantage point as a member of the Cuban UN Mission, in early 1974. He trained the FALN's first cadres in handling explosives and urban guerrilla tactics, but never commanded the organization. By the spring of 1974 the FALN, going operational, "reopens the second front of the struggle by bringing the armed struggle for Puerto Rican national liberation to within the borders of the United States, at a higher level," according to the terrorists' own "Chronology of Armed Struggle in Puerto Rico and the U.S., 1967-1980." The "reopening" of the "second front" took the form of firebombing three New York City department stores on as many consecutive days. Then, in September and October of that year, the FALN bombed the Newark, N.J., City Hall and Police Headquarters, and five more prominent places in New York City.

Ojeda met with several extremist leaders, including Juan Antonio Corretjer, the "godfather" of Puerto Rican terrorism, as I called him before—the same one that publicly threatened President Reagan—and returned to Cuba to report that armed struggle on the island was a feasible objective. He then went back to Puerto Rico for further meetings with Corretjer and other extremists, as a result of which the Revolutionary Commandos of the People—or CRP—was formed in 1976 to conduct urban guerrilla warfare. I am aware that in your previous remarks you quoted Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian expert in urban guerrilla warfare, and you said something to the effect that this so far has not been introduced into the United States, which is true of the mainland; unfortunately, I think this has already begun to happen on the island of Puerto Rico.

Senator DENTON. For your information, another Carlos, "Carlos the Jackal," is reported to have been arrested yesterday in Mexico.

Mr. JAMES. Well, this morning's television news said that is not so.

Senator DENTON. I have a dateline writer's dispatch. I have no idea what credence to put on it. It is the other Carlos, "Carlos the Jackal," for your information, which over half of the members of a committee in this Congress which should know Carlos, when being briefed on the fact that he might indeed be in the United States in connection with the Libyan hit teams, not one member of that committee had ever heard of Carlos. One of these gentlemen is probably going to be running for President.

Mr. JAMES. Are they waiting for him to write a book?

Senator DENTON. It is amazing it is not a byword on the lips of every schoolboy in the United States, yet I can understand why it is not.

Mr. JAMES. That is extraordinary.

By the way, Ojeda, the organizer of the FALN, also went to Paris where this joint coordinating command had headquarters, and there he did meet "Carlos the Jackal" as well as leaders of the PLO. So there you have some connection between Puerto Rico and Cuban terrorism and our friend Carlos and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Mr. Chairman, 1976 was a banner year for the proliferation of terrorist groups in Puerto Rico, chiefly as the result of the defection of 3,000 members of the Popular Socialist Party, led by an admitted Marxist-Leninist, Juan Mari Bras, who I interviewed in Puerto Rico last November. They defected following their disillusionment in the PSP's abysmal showing in the gubernatorial election. An estimated 600 of that batch had had varying degrees of guerrilla training in Cuba and now turned to urban guerrilla warfare. Soon thereafter, the principal terrorist groups operating today surfaced in connection with violent acts of one kind or another.

The first to be organized was the Armed Forces of Popular Resistance, or FARP, which promptly engaged in such activities as robbing banks and shooting up places frequented by U.S. Navy personnel, such as La Hacienda near Roosevelt Roads.

FARP's organization was soon followed by that of one of the most notorious of all Puerto Rican terrorist groups, Los Macheteros, formally called the Boricua Popular Army (EPB), after

Puerto Rico's original Indian name, Borinquen. At least 11 of the original Macheteros had received training earlier from Chile's far-leftist MIR during the rule of Salvador Allende, and later at a Cuban camp located between Havana and Pinar del Rio for 4 months. In August 1978, soon after their return from Cuba, they launched their first operation, in which they killed a policeman. Acknowledging that act, they revealed for the first time their identity as Los Macheteros.

Among Los Macheteros' most notorious exploits was the Sabana Seca ambush of a Navy bus in December 1979, which they carried out together with the FARP and still another terrorist group, the Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVRP). A Soviet-designed AK-47 automatic rifle was found by Federal officials among the weapons used to fire on the bus. It was the first time in his experience, an FBI spokesman said, that the AK-47—which is usually made in Czechoslovakia—had been used in Puerto Rico.


In January 1981, the same three groups teamed up to firebomb nine Air National Guard jets, worth \$45 million, at Isla Verdes Air Base near San Juan. I have seen a videotape of the Macheteros' preparations for the firebombing, produced by them for publicity purposes, which they claim was carried out in only 7 minutes, 40 seconds—ample testimony to the terrorists' high level of precision and efficiency.

In all, from 1975 through 1981, Puerto Rican terrorist groups have perpetrated 260 acts of violence on the island and up to 100 on the mainland, most of the latter by the FALN. Something like 9 Puerto Rican terrorist groups have proliferated over the past 15 years—an average, Mr. Chairman, of about 1 per every 400,000 inhabitants of Puerto Rico—and that incredible total may not be complete. Only five of them are considered truly important: CRP, FARP, OVRP, Macheteros, and FALN. These are the groups which Ojeda appears to have unified under a single joint operations command (MOC), which in turn comes under the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta run by the DGI and Department of Americas out of Havana.

I have here another chart showing the layout of these different Puerto Rican terrorist groups which come under this command that they have set up, if you would be so inclined as to insert this in the record.

Senator DENTON. We shall insert it into the record.

[The following chart was received for the record:]



Mr. JAMES. Allied ideologically with the terrorist groups, and forming, in effect, a substantial support force, are an estimated 10 "open" political organizations—organizations, that is, which unlike the clandestine terrorist units, participate overtly and legally in the political life of Puerto Rico, some of them even putting up candidates in elections. The principal ones are the Puerto Rican Communist Party (PCP; pro-Moscow); the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (Mari Bras' PSP; oriented toward Havana); Partido Nacional de Puerto Rico (PNPR, formed by the old nationalist Albizu Campos); Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR, orthodox Leninist); Puerto Rican Socialist League (Corretjer's LSP); Internationalist Workers League (LIT; Trotskyist); Movimiento Socialista Popular (MSP; followers of Che Guevara). These organizations are reckoned by intelligence officers to have a total membership of between 12,000 and 17,000—a formidable support army for the terrorists in a total population of only 3.5 million.

The motive force of all the groups I have mentioned here, both clandestine and "open," is independence—all of them want, demand, independence from the United States, even though all together they represent less than 6 percent of the Puerto Rican electorate, according to the 1980 gubernatorial election returns. The latter, however, do not tell the whole story. Independence possesses a certain mystique for many Puerto Ricans who might have voted against it as a political solution; to them, it is a cultural banner to emphasize and protect their Hispanic origins and to enable them to resist what they regard as an Anglo-Saxon cultural invasion. The vast majority of Puerto Ricans, including even the far left, accept, of course, such American exports as medical science, technology, industrial know-how and even fast food outlets; but they do not do so entirely without reservations, fundamentally fearing what the "invasion" might do to their language, their literature, their folk-

ways. The Puerto Rican people suffer, at bottom, from an almost permanent crisis of identity, at one and the same time wanting profoundly to be Americans yet feeling a strong pull toward their Latin heritage—and their Latin neighbors. Consequently independence, though perennially a big loser at the polls, is potentially an explosive issue, one which the terrorists and their accomplices in the "open" organizations constantly exploit as do the sinister forces behind them, in Cuba.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, it is a misnomer to speak of terrorist groups in the strictest sense, for although they exist to commit acts of terror and violence, it is also true that they do so within an ideological framework that transcends pure terror: "national liberation." Considered from that point of view, Puerto Rico's so-called terrorist groups are really—and this is how they regard themselves—as the armed forces which they believe will "liberate" the island from "Yankee imperialism," and so they act as though they were in a state of war with the mainland and that any means are justified to win that war, as is the case in all war. Bombings and assassinations are, then, simply acts of war and not of terror, and they are resorted to at this stage of the struggle because conditions are not yet ripe for conventional acts of war or even irregular warfare like that in El Salvador. But, as they see it, they are approaching that stage, and so they consider themselves to be in a state of urban guerrilla warfare, as Corretjer explained it to me.

They spend their every waking hour studying and absorbing the teachings of all the experts in insurrection and urban guerrilla warfare, ranging from Friedrich Engels to V. I. Lenin to Che Guevara to Carlos Marighella, the late Brazilian author of the famous "Mini Manual on Urban Guerrilla Warfare." A manual called *The Urban Guerrilla*, produced by Corretjer's LSP in 1980 and based largely on the Marighella work, goes into considerable detail on strategy and tactics. So then, Mr. Chairman, what we are talking about in Puerto Rico when we discuss the so-called terrorist groups and their DGI mentors is not something out of "Carlos the Jackal," but, much more significant, the training of a guerrilla army which intends to do battle on a large scale with the United States both on the Island of Puerto Rico—in itself a strategic objective with its vital location and naval installations—and on the U.S. mainland. We are speaking, in other words, of a two-front war, with Fidel Castro aspiring to be the generalissimo directing it from Havana.

Such a prospect obviously could be far more menacing to the United States than even the current hostilities going on in Central America. It is time, I believe, that not only the American intelligence community but the administration at its highest levels begin to understand, prepare for, and meet the threat posed by the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence and particularly its Puerto Rican spearhead.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Thank you.

Your testimony and your background, what I know of it, remind me of Claire Sterling.

Would you describe your political orientation as you came along in life, as liberal or conservative?

Mr. JAMES. I am neither, Mr. Chairman. I happen to be an independent. I am an eclectic as well, as you can gather from my writings and from what I said here today. I am, of course, utterly against communism. I regard it, in the words of that recent convert to our cause, Susan Sontag, as equivalent to fascism, and I do think we regard it as revolutionary. It is not. It is reactionary.

Senator DENTON. That is the confusion that I would give my life to eliminate in this country, and we do not have much time.

Much of what you have brought forth is in greater detail than we have ever received before. We have had similar testimony from Gerardo Peraza, Claire Sterling, Judge Webster of the FBI, and Robert Moss, another journalist.

I cannot help reflecting that having lived in one of those societies which is ruled by terrorism, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—North Vietnam in those days—as the Soviet Union is ruled by the KGB, I was more sympathetic toward the plight of the citizens, even the soldiers, particularly the female soldiers whom I observed, than I was toward my own prisoner colleagues. I am not wearing my POW experience on my sleeve. I am simply saying I lived among them for almost 8 years, and every colleague of mine shared the same sympathy.

I wish to see fewer human beings falling under that type of tyranny and I hope the United States avoids that fate. But I am not particularly optimistic.

You have mentioned Alamar Associates, a Washington consulting firm, specializing in investing in Cuba. This is Kirby Jones. Are you aware of that?

Mr. JAMES. Correct, sir, yes, I am.

Senator DENTON. Could you give us a fuller description of the activity of Alamar Associates conducted on behalf of Cuba, and do you see those activities as falling rather specifically under Plan Alfa as you have outlined?

Mr. JAMES. Well, I am not sure of the extent to which Alamar Associates is active today. But during the Plan Alfa period, when the mobilization drive was on, it was quite active and it helped to organize visits of businessmen to Cuba for purpose of investing in the country and, in effect, really circumventing the trade embargo which was still on at that particular time. I am not saying that Alamar Associates was deliberately out to violate the embargo, but the effect, in preparing for investment and other economic involvement in Cuba, was a violation of the trade embargo. Furthermore, I do happen to know that sessions conducted by Alamar Associates for the purposes of orienting U.S. businessmen as to their opportunities in Cuba—he invited the head of the Cuban Interests Section here, Ramón Sánchez Parodi, to deliver orientation. I have identified Mr. Sánchez Parodi.

Senator DENTON. Do you know of any connections of Kirby Jones with any officials of our Government in the past?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir, I do not know of any specific connection. But I imagine he must have been working with somebody in the administration.

Senator DENTON. In your prepared testimony and elsewhere, references have been made to Mexico in discussing Cuban activities. For example, Mexico was the site of the first meeting between the

Cubans and Soviet intelligence services in 1959; Castro and his men set sail for Mexico in November 1956, in the "Granma", to begin the Cuban Revolution; Mexico's diplomatic ties and friendly relations with Castro and Cuba, recently and in the past; and last night, the reported arrest of "Carlos the Jackal" there, as well as our allegations that Mexico is the site of training and safe houses for various Cuban-supported groups. The previous witness has associated that kind of history with the fact that Mexico is a relatively free society and these types of things can take place in a free society.

Would you give us your assessment of the role Mexico has played in the past and plays now vis-a-vis Cuba's plans and activities in Latin America and elsewhere? In other words, what part does Mexico play in the Cuban scenario?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Chairman, I resided in Mexico for 22 years and I covered Latin America from there, and I have two children that were born in Mexico. I think it is stretching it a bit to call Mexico an open society. I think it is moving in a certain direction but, after all, it is a kind of one-party state. The party in power has been there since the early twenties, officially and formally since 1929, and is called the Institutional Revolutionary Party. It is not, however, a monolithic party but, rather, a coalition of factions of one sort or another. But the PRI, nevertheless, has governed Mexico consistently since 1929 without interruption, and all of the Governors of all of the states of Mexico are members of the party, as are usually all the senators and practically all of the members of the lower house of the legislature.

I submit that this is hardly the visage of an open society. The press also is very much under the control, directly and indirectly, of the government.

At the same time, I would not classify Mexico, as a totalitarian dictatorship. It is something sui generis. It is a unique creation of its own. I do not think we ought to knock it, but I do not think we ought to admire it, and we ought to be very realistic about it.

From the point of realism, and as a result of living there, I do know that the Soviet Embassy in Mexico is one of Moscow's largest embassies in the world, and this Embassy has a large contingent of KGB personnel. This is all very well known. I am not saying anything people in Mexico do not know. They engage in overt as well as covert activities. At various times, members of the KGB have been thrown out of Mexico for stepping over the bounds.

I also know that Fidel Castro himself started his revolution from the base he organized in Mexico. Obviously, the Mexican Government must have known about it. Certainly leaders of the dominant Mexican party knew about it, and Lázaro Cárdenas, former President of the country, actively aided and abetted Castro, who trained his guerrillas at a camp just outside Mexico City. I have documented this in a book that I wrote, "Cuba: The First Soviet Satellite of the Americas."

Before and since that time, all kinds of revolutionary groups have found haven in Mexico. During the regime of President Luis Echeverría, after Allende was overthrown in Chile, all kind of Chilean Marxists came to Mexico and were even given jobs in the government. This was the subject of open complaints on the part of

Mexicans. They resented the fact that these foreigners would come in—most of them Marxists-Leninists or other kinds of radicals—and spend their time not working for the Mexican Government but trying to organize for their return to Chile, hoping to overthrow the regime of General Pinochet.

The Nicaraguans have always had bases in Mexico, bases in the sense that they could meet and organize and funnel arms and money back and forth from Mexico City to Nicaragua. This is also well known. We know now, for example, that the Salvadoran democratic Revolutionary Junta (FDR)—a complete misnomer since it is neither democratic nor revolutionary—has its headquarters in Mexico City. So does the FMLN, the Marxist-Leninist guerrilla armed force, of which the FDR is the political arm. Those guerrilla leaders go in and out of Mexico frequently in order to confer with Guillermo Ungo, the figurehead FDR president, and, I suspect, confer with others who are not Salvadorans and are probably Mexicans. Through the dominant party, the PRI, Mexico has been funneling all kinds of support to the Sandinistas, and I think—this is only my informed guess—also and to the Salvadoran guerrillas. This is part of the PRI's function as a member of the Socialist International.

So you have had and continue to have, Mr. Chairman, a great deal of activity in Mexico City on behalf of foreign Marxist-Leninist movements. I daresay it is probably the major headquarters outside of Managua for the guerrilla insurrectionary and terrorist activities going on in Central America.

Senator DENTON. I was impressed with the complexity of Somoza. He was perceived by many who could be called relatively neutral observers to be an obnoxious ruler. The support that was given to the Sandinistas included some rather remarkable countries. There were some pretty realistic reasons to want his overthrow. But the tragedy was that in his overthrow, there resulted therefrom the destruction of the institution from which democracy could have been promoted, developed and nurtured. We forfeited the opportunity again entirely to the Moscow-Havana-now Managua line. That is a travesty.

Is that an oversimplification? Would you comment on it?

Mr. JAMES. It is a very complex thing. You have in me a person that is not sympathetic to Somoza. Quite the contrary. Over the years, I have written many articles criticizing him and his family. I knew him, his father, and an older brother, and I think they were greedy, too greedy, too cruel, too repressive, not moderately repressive. Of course, extreme feeds extreme and, sometimes a moderately repressive regime can open a window toward democracy, but sometimes it can lead to something worse, more repressive, like a totalitarian Communist government. This, I think, is the unfortunate state that Nicaragua may yet experience. This is the tragedy. I blame Somoza for the Sandinistas. If Somoza had, during all the years when there was no Castro around and the Communists were not a serious force, tried to make something democratic in Nicaragua, tried to make its economy viable, did not steal the people blind but tried instead to raise their standard of living, not a single Sandinista would be in power today, sir. I think the way we have to analyze the situation is that of course, if I had been given the

choice at that time, of whether to live under Somoza or communism, I would have had to prefer Somoza; but I would not wish to be put into the position of having to choose between the lesser and the greater evil since, after all, they are both evils.

I am afraid somewhat the same situation is rapidly developing in Guatemala. The Guatemalan military are so blind, so stupid, so ignorant, so greedy, that they are going to pave the way for communism. You know, communism was destroyed there back in 1954. I covered that period as a newsman, and it saddens me to see how they, the Guatemalan military, have wasted the past 28 years. They had ample opportunity to make a delightful country out of Guatemala which has rich natural resources. They have messed it up, and now we are left with the unenviable task of trying to pick their chestnuts out of the fire. That is what it amounts to.

Senator DENTON. How do you regard the efficacy of a policy which purports that security is means to the end? In other words, is it not true that prospects for democratic governments and peace in Central and South America will have a better chance for favorable results if we were to interrupt the flow of terrorist direction, arms, supplies, and so forth, from Cuba and/or the Soviet Union?

Mr. JAMES. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think we must utilize every means at our disposal, without involving ourselves in a war, to halt the flow of arms and money and terrorists into the countries to the south of us. I think we run a risk, yes, of being forced into situations which we would not welcome. They must be avoided. However, I do think that we ought to use whatever influence we have, for example, in the case of Guatemala, to try to drum some sense into the military people there and get them to broaden their government, to form some sort of coalition, to bring civilians into it, to initiate a series of reforms, not extreme radical reforms but reasonable ones that will bring the Maya Indians into the mainstream. Now they are being alienated. This is one of the most serious situations in Guatemala and may degenerate into a racial war.

Senator DENTON. Moving from Guatemala to El Salvador, do you believe that Duarte has done that which might be expected under the realistic conditions in El Salvador, considering that he is being confronted with the terrorist technique outlined in the beginning? Do you think he has made a reasonable effort?

Mr. JAMES. I believe he has. I have interviewed Duarte here and read a good deal about him. I think he has done as well as can be expected under the circumstances.

Senator DENTON. Well, from what I have learned, and I have truly talked to more leftwingers down there, that is not the impression that is being transported to America. Democracy cannot function, perhaps survive, without an informed electorate, without an informed consensus upon which foreign policy can be based. And that is my concern at this moment.

You, in your prepared statement, appear to have relied to some extent on information from Genaro Pérez, a DGI defector. Please give us a description of him and his background.

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Pérez worked for a Castro travel agency called Havanatur, and he was one of the top executives in Havanatur. This operated a couple of years ago during the time of the release of the political prisoners and then the normalization campaign.

And he had a lot to do with getting Cubans in and out of Cuba and was exercising surveillance over Cubans when they were there. He himself was very often subjected to surveillance by the DGI, even though he worked with them. He told me that his room, and I think he always got room 14 in the Havana Libre Hotel where they have all the machinery set up so they could listen to everything he said, eavesdrop on him. Pérez also told me that, as a general rule, they would put certain Cuban visitors in rooms which were bugged keeping them under constant surveillance. Now that operation is not direct responsibility of the DGI, because the DGI operates only externally, but rather of the ICAP, the Institute for Friendship with Peoples and, probably to some extent, the Americas Department. They come under another part of the Interior Ministry, the Department of State Security, an internal organism. And so they would bug these rooms and use the information they gleaned to threaten or pressure Cuban visitors and make them work for the DGI, once they got back to the United States. So that many Cuban residents of this country—we do not know exactly how many, and I do not think Pérez knew exactly either—who visited Cuba and returned here became, either willingly or unwillingly, dupes or informers and even agents of the DGI.

Senator DENTON. You have testified of the recent 10th national meeting of the Latin American Studies Association held in Washington, D.C., on March 4-6, 1982, where members of the Castro regime and of the Soviet Union were panelists.

Can you tell the subcommittee in a little more detail of your experiences there?

Incidentally, I know one of the gentlemen who attended, Dr. Arias, who is the president of the Christian Democratic Party in Panama, and serves as president of a growing number of Christian Democratic Parties in Latin America. He gave me a very interesting perspective on the region.

Could you tell the subcommittee a little more of your experiences there at that meeting?

Mr. JAMES. Well, I spent the day there just exactly 2 weeks ago, I think it was, and, of course, after all these years of being in Latin America and writing about communism and interviewing lots of Communists from one end of the area to the another, you develop a sense of smell and you know that what walks like a duck and talks like a duck and quacks like a duck must be a duck. As you went through the lobby of the Shoreham Hotel here in Washington, you saw there were an awful lot of ducks there. Then, when you went into the area, a large one, where there was a great display of literature, you came across all kinds of literature, pamphlets, books, professional papers, you name it, all serving one pet cause or another of the Marxist-Leninists in one Latin American country or another.

I picked up a stack of these things, which I still have in my possession, a stack about this high [indicating], and they did not come cheap. But I think it was well worthwhile as it enabled me to gain a further insight into what these people are up to. There were American front groups such as the North American Committee for Latin America, and others such as the Washington Office for Latin America which lend themselves, perhaps unwittingly, to extreme

leftist causes, each of them with their literature on stands they had rented, and they predominated. So it was quite clear, judging from the program and the general tendencies and by the literature and by checking with people, that you have a very large infiltration. I do not say that LASA is controlled but it is heavily infiltrated by pro-Castro people, and probably a good number of intelligence agents.

Senator DENTON. But you would not necessarily assign evil motive by appearance at such a meeting by someone apparently objectively interested in developments in Latin America such as Dr. Arias?

Mr. JAMES. No, not necessarily at all. One thing I deplore, Mr. Chairman, and I think this ought to come up for consideration before the appropriate Government body at some point or another, is the extent to which the few Latin American departments we have in educational institutions, especially institutions of higher learning, are just riddled with people of these tendencies, and this does not bode well for the future. And they are behind a lot of the protest movements. They are behind the formation of public opinion in this country against policies of the Government which may be good policies, which I believe is the case at present.

Senator DENTON. That reminds me of the thousand, at least, scholarships the Soviet Union is giving to Panama. I found out that the Soviet Union, as is characteristic of their strategy, chooses to concentrate in areas where there are opportunities.

On a related matter, it has been alleged that one of the successful fronts used by the Cubans in its plans to destabilize the United States and other target countries has been the academic community, especially the university setting. Using the University of Puerto Rico as an example, will you describe how this works, the purposes it serves and how effective the infiltration of the academic community has been?

Mr. JAMES. The Federation of Pro-Independence University Students [FUPI] who favor independence, as its name makes clear, has played an active role as a spawning ground for terrorists and, in general, for the far left in Puerto Rico. It has been a powerhouse and still is. When I was there last November it was conducting a strike at the University of Puerto Rico over tuition fees, and, had nothing to do with wanting to run the university at that moment, anyway—or with putting forward any political demands of any kind. Nevertheless, the FUPI succeeded from the beginning of the school term until well after I left, in paralyzing all academic activities on the campus of the University of Puerto Rico and even affecting Puerto Rican life in general. Now a man who is a known Communist, everyone knows him as such, and who was then president of the FUPI was the leader of that strike. The FUPI has conducted similar activities over a long period of time, 25 years, as a matter of fact. It just celebrated its 25th anniversary. I repeat, this is the spawning ground of extreme leftism, probably the most important, in Puerto Rico. I do not know what can be done about that. After all, there is academic freedom. But there is something wrong with a situation where academic freedom is constantly abused by the far left to serve its particular ideological aims, not the aims of academic freedom.

Senator DENTON. So with 5 or 6 percent, you say, of the population interested in their independence, we have a disproportionate emphasis in the academic world of even terrorism, in that connection.

Is that correct?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir, less than 6 percent voted for independence in the last election.

Senator DENTON. You have spoken of the close ties between Cubans and Puerto Ricans, especially the FALN. Do you have any specific information concerning the training of Puerto Rican terrorists by Cuba, in Cuba or elsewhere, and what is the specific information and the source of that information?

Mr. JAMES. Well, for years now, Mr. Chairman, there has been a lot of traffic between Puerto Rico and Cuba. Little of it known in this country I spoke with Juan Mari Bras, the leader of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, and he confessed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist—the word Socialist in the party's name is just an euphemism. He enjoys the closest relations with Cuba and has sent any number of his youthful members there. I mentioned in my testimony that some 600 of them received training of one sort or another in Cuba. Those 600 have now become dispersed among the various terrorist groups on the island of Puerto Rico.

Much of this information, Mr. Chairman, comes from the intelligence community in Puerto Rico and they have followed it for the last few years.

Senator DENTON. Is Gen. Pérez the only source of your information?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir. I am saying the intelligence community has much information on this.

Senator DENTON. Do you know anything about Puerto Rican terrorists having been trained or supported in any way by the Soviets, Libyans, PLO's, East Germans, or Czechs?

Mr. JAMES. I know of contacts. I mentioned this man Ojeda who was the organizer of the FALN. There was a friend and comrade of his who came out of one of the earlier terrorist groups, called Pagan. He was working at the time for the Western Hemisphere section of the East German Security Police. There have been various other contacts because many of these people do find their way to East Europe and even to Moscow. Again, I would refer you to intelligence sources if you require any further details.

Senator DENTON. I, like you, would not like to be in a position of having to choose between a Somozan Government or a Somozan-like government and a Communist government. I see the United States in realistic perspective historically as having had to deal with Latin America more from principle than from vital national interest in terms of its priorities, its involvements, World War I, World War II, Vietnam, NATO alliance that sort of thing. I have been through years of trying to sort out priorities in considering, as you say, the rather limited resources we have in the U. S. coffers to deal financially, stick and carrotwise, with these nations.

Now with our own principles driving us more toward liberalization year by year, free enterprise, compacts, reacting to friction in terms of the rights of blacks, the rights of women and so forth, and all this being a generally rough but progressive road—I see the

United States turning toward the South now with much more interest than principle. In other words, the Secretary had said that we are a Nation of principle, we are a Nation of interest. We now would be turning there more with interest than principle. We have to turn there now as a matter of necessity. I think President Reagan's Caribbean initiative plan is a manifestation of that. As you know, we have had one President after another make some sort of gesture to the area. We should remind ourselves that we freed Cuba after freeing them from Spain. We are not an imperialistic nation. We do have principles that have been applied. My Communist guards, as I say this again, in times of true candor—they had to admit that they never knew of a more compassionate administration in international affairs but now we are thinking more of compassion. You have said that you agree that we must do that which is prudent and necessary to preserve the security of those nations as a means to an end. You have said that you thought we should lean on the military governments there, such as Guatemala, to bring more sense to them. You have heard the Secretary say that sometimes when we lean on them we do not have much effect and then sometimes we lean on them and it brings the opposite effect or brings them to disadvantage.

So it seems to me we do face a complexity in terms of choices, but it seems to me the one thing we must see as an obvious necessity at the moment is to do that which is prudent and I hope that which is economic and diplomatic, to keep those nations secure as the means to the end.

You do not have any particular disagreement with that, do you, sir?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir. I do not. I would simply add this: I agree with Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick who has said that she regards Central America and Latin America in general as the most important part of the world to us. I have held that opinion now for nearly 30 years. I am glad to welcome Ambassador Kirkpatrick aboard I think perhaps the fundamental problem we have faced, and continue to face, is our lack of understanding and therefore of involvement in Latin America, understanding the culture, the nature of the people down there, their institutions, and taking all of them seriously and putting the area on a much higher priority basis than it exists now.

We have too often tended, Mr. Chairman, to be what I call Eurocentric and, by extension, that has led us into those adventures in Asia that have been so ill-founded. I think it is time we formulated an American policy, thinking in terms of the Western Hemisphere first and foremost. This does not mean I am advocating neoisolationism and forgetting about our interests and commitments in the Middle East and Europe; but I think it is time that we did set up a list of what our priorities in the world are and that we put Latin America very high up on that list where it belongs. From that would flow a series of actions on the part of our Government, and that means not just the administration that happens to be in office today but any U.S. administration, because what we need is a bipartisan policy and what we need is a long-term policy and a consistent one that will be operative no matter who is President and what party happens to be in power. I say these are the

needs we are faced with now and, yes, you are right, necessity may be the mother of that new policy, necessity meaning our national security is very much at stake.

Senator DENTON. We will submit further questions to you, sir, and ask that the replies be addressed to me in written form within the next 20 days.¹

I want to thank you for your most illuminating testimony. I hope we maintain contact. I consider you an extremely valuable source of information on this subject.

[The prepared statement of Mr. James follows:]

¹ Mr. James' answers to questions of Senator Denton appear as exhibit E in the appendix to this hearing.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL JAMES

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee on the crucial problem of terrorist and intelligence activities conducted in this country by intelligence and security organs of the Cuban Government. Unfortunately, as I shall indicate in some detail, those activities are increasing and constitute a grave threat to this country.

Less than two weeks ago, on Sunday, February 28, four bombs were exploded at as many different locations on Wall Street. Although minimal damage was done and nobody was killed or injured, luckily, the bombings clearly represented a concerted effort at terrorizing America's financial community. They were committed by a Puerto Rican terrorist organization known by its initials as the FALN, which stand for Armed Forces of National Liberation. The FALN claimed responsibility for the bombings in a note it left for the Associated Press in a New York City telephone booth, which characterized them as "a strike against imperialist forces that are suppressing the Puerto Rican people."

The FALN, Mr. Chairman, is a creature of the Cuban Government's General Intelligence Directorate, or DGI, which organized the terrorist group on American soil in 1974. The DGI, in turn, is a satellite of the Soviet intelligence service known as the KGB. That, Mr. Chairman, is the bottom line of my testimony today.

I learned of the FALN's true origin during a trip I made to Puerto Rico last November. I also learned at the time that non other than President Reagan has been singled out for assassination by the island's proliferating terrorists. The FALN, it was believed by knowledgeable informants in Puerto Rico, was the terrorist group most likely to be entrusted with that dastardly assignment. It boasts the dubious distinction of being the principal Puerto Rican terrorist organization operating on what is called "enemy territory" -- the continental United States.

I had gone to Puerto Rico, I should explain at this point, to continue a study of Cuban DGI activities underwritten by the Fund for Objective News Reporting. The Fund -- or FONR, to use its acronym -- was established for the "major purpose" of providing "grants to deserving journalists for the investigative research and reporting of major news events," according to its prospectus. FONR "assists in financing the type of investigative reporting now being done solely by the mass circulation media," its prospectus continues, naming as examples of the latter the New York Times and the Washington Post. Needless to add, no strings were attached to FONR's generous grant, and I have been completely free to undertake the study and write about it exactly as I please; FONR, that is to say, exercises absolutely no influence over the study and of course the conclusions I have reached are my own. These have been published in newspaper articles syndicated by the Independent News Alliance of New York, a Scripps-Howard organization. I would request that copies of two of them be inserted in the record, one as it appeared in the Chicago Tribune on August 23, 1981, the other as it was sent out to editors by INA on December 11, 1981, for which unfortunately I do not have a clipping.

I suppose that FONR invited me to do a study of the DGI because of my special background, as an author and journalist who has been covering events in Latin America since 1953. My interest in Cuban intelligence, in particular, dates from 1961, when in the course of researching and writing a book, CUBA: THE FIRST SOVIET SATELLITE IN THE AMERICAS, I was fortunate to obtain, and be able to publish, data on the DGI's origins based on first-hand information supplied by some of the first defectors from the Cuban Revolution, all of them once Castroites. The Revolution's first intelligence service and precursor of the DGI functioned under the innocent title of the Rebel Army's Information Office -- DIER were its initials in Spanish -- which was in reality its secret service. DIER then became G-2, Rebel Army Intelligence, and was headed by one of Fidel Castro's most trusted aides and a particular protege of his brother Raul, named

Ramiro Valdes Menendez. I mention Valdes' name here, Mr. Chairman, not only because he is one of the tight inner circle that runs Cuba today and heads off of its intelligence and security agencies as Minister of Interior, but primarily because he was the earliest link between Cuban intelligence and its Soviet master. In my book, I was able to document the fact that Ramiro Valdes made the Castro regime's very first contact with the Soviets, back in July 1959, when he flew secretly to Mexico City to meet with the Soviet Ambassador and KGB officers there. This fact needs to be emphasized here, Mr. Chairman, to establish two points: one, that Cuban intelligence commenced its relationship with Soviet intelligence when the Cuban Revolution was little more than six months old; and two, the Castro government was never "pushed" into the arms of the Soviets by allegedly inimical U.S. policies such as the trade embargo -- which of course had not yet been initiated -- but sought ties with the Soviet Union from the very beginning, impelled by its own (then secret) ideological affinity with Marxism-Leninism.

My FONR-supported study of DGI activities started, of course, with what the DGI has been up to in the continental United States. What I learned, essentially is that Cuban President Fidel Castro has been following a two-track policy toward this country, involving the DGI and other Cuban intelligence agencies. One track, which a DGI defector named Genero Perez described to me as "Plan Alfa," or "A," calls for the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, while the other, "Plan Bravo," or "B," is aimed at destabilizing the U.S. if normalization failed to come about.

Plan A was followed by Cuba during most of President Carter's term of office. Symptomatic of the apparent desire of both the Carter Administration and the Castro government to normalize relations was the establishment, in each nation's capital, of "Interest Sections" manned, respectively, by U.S. diplomats in Havana and Cuban diplomats in Washington. Not quite legations, they were seen as a kind of halfway house on the road toward restoring full diplomatic relations.

The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, however, turned

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out to be more of a cover for intelligence operations than a true diplomatic representation, the "vast majority" of its 20-member staff -- in the phrase of a State Department official -- consisting of intelligence operatives. The Section's very chief, Ramon Sanchez Parodi, doubles as head of the DGI in the Washington area -- again according to State Department sources -- and reports to the DGI's overall chief in the United States. The latter is Mario Monzon, whose cover is "political counselor" to Cuba's Mission to the United Nations in New York, about whose activities I shall have more to say later.

Sanchez Parodi is typical of a new breed of Cuban intelligence agent who is radically different from the old. U.S. intelligence officers say they could almost always detect a Cuban counterpart because he was usually uncouth, with little formal education, revolver conspicuously bulging through his ill-fitted suit, capable of roughing up an adversary but not good at work requiring some subtlety and discretion. Now all that has changed. Sanchez Parodi, for example, is slim, sleek, well-dressed, well-educated, quiet-mannered, almost scholarly in speech, sociable -- the very anti-thesis of the old DGI officer. Yet he has been a dedicated Communist since his youth and knows how to, and when, to get tough. His varied talents have gotten him invitations to capital cocktail parties, and even one to President Reagan's Inaugural. During the heyday of Plan Alfa, he lobbied Republican and Democratic legislators with equal fervor, trying to sell both parties the normalization line. He "works a lot on blacks, particularly the Black Caucus in Congress," I was informed by a State Department source. It goes without saying that he and his staff make a particular effort to cultivate Hispanics above all Cubans, who live here.

Indeed, one of Plan Alfa's central objectives was to split the Cuban-American community in the United States, and that has largely been achieved. Once almost monolithic in its opposition to Castro and Communism, that community today contains groups and individuals of some importance who are openly pro-Castro or at least tolerant of his dictatorship, thanks to penetration of it by DGI agents and informers.

Much of the DGI's penetration of the Cuban-American community has been done through "front" groups organized by Cuban intelligence officers or persons cooperating with them. Among these are the Center for Cuban Studies, the Cuban-American Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba, the Cuban Coalition, the Circulo Cubano de Cultura and the Antonia Maceo Brigade, in addition to such recognized Cuban organisms as the Casa de Americas and the Venceremos Brigade. Further information on these groups appears in an article of mine published in the October 31, 1981, issue of Human Events, which I would request be inserted in the record.

Cuban intelligence, aided and abetted by persons who may not be agents but are willing dupes, at least, has also penetrated respectable American organizations such as the Latin American Studies Association. I attended its 10th National Meeting in Washington, D.C., held on March 4-6 of this year, and was struck by the overwhelming degree to which this once-respected professional group has been infiltrated by pro-Castro elements including members of the Castro regime itself. Thus a session on "Socialist and Non-socialist Perspectives on Revolutionary Change in Central America and the Caribbean" was sponsored -- and so listed in the formal program -- by Areito, a clearly pro-Castro magazine which catalyzed the Antonio Maceo Brigade, in turn a Castro front headed by a known DGI agent. Among the panelists were two representatives from the Center of Studies on America, in Havana, a Cuban governmental organism, as well as one from the Latin American Institute, Academy of Sciences, USSR. As an example of how cleverly Castro followers disguise themselves, the Coordinator of the session, Max Azicri, was identified as follows: "Political Science, Edinboro State College, Pennsylvania"; no mention was made of the fact that he is a member of the Board of Directors of Areito. Another panelist was Nicaragua's alternate permanent representative to the United Nations, making a total of four out of five speakers (not counting the Coordinator) who were identifiable as Marxists.

Indicating that Castro has not quite given up Plan A, seeking normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, one panel at the Latin American Studies Association meeting sponsored by the Instituto de

Estudios Cubanos, another front, dealt with "The Dialogue Between the Cuban Government and the Cuban Community Abroad." Confirming that impression was the fact that the president of the Cuban-American Committee for the Normalization of Relations With Cuba, Manuel R. Gomez addressed another panel of "Hispanics and United States Foreign Policy in the 1980's"

Booths displaying books, magazines and other literature on Latin America at the LASA meeting were dominated by leftwing publishers and organizations, which openly propagandized in favor of such pet causes as Sandinista Nicaragua, El Salvador's Marxist-Leninist guerrillas, as well as Cuba of course. Prominently displayed were books, pamphlets and even films praising Castro's efforts to educate his people, liberate Cuban women, and fight "Yankee imperialism." There one could find the magazine Areito which, as I have indicated, is used to penetrate the Cuban-American community and a new companion publication, Cuba Times.

Our business community, as well, is penetrated by DGI agents and supporters who seek to influence it to violate the trade embargo against Cuba. At the height of the normalization campaign in this country, in February 1977 President Carter announced that he would lift the embargo, as a major step toward normalization, if Castro withdrew his estimated 25,000 troops from Angola. That galvanized the DGI, through the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, to woo U.S. businessmen with special ardor and they began visiting Cuba in droves, looking for opportunities for investment and -- unfortunately -- for circumventing the embargo pending normalization of bilateral relations. Their visits were usually arranged by a Washington consulting firm specializing in Cuba called Alamar Associated. Its head, Kirby Jones, would brief businessmen desirous of exploring business opportunities in Cuba on such subjects as, "U.S. Business and the Future of Trade with Cuba," with such Cuban officials as Sanchez Parodi, head of the Cuban Interests Section, invited to give talks. Even as late as 1981, with the chances of normalization under the new Reagan Administration considerably dimmed, front groups such as the Cuban-American Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba, supported by such

innocent-appearing publications as Cuba Times, were singing siren songs of the attractions of trade with Cuba. "U.S.-Cuba Trade: Possible and Profitable," was the title of a typical propaganda piece circulated by the Committee through its quarterly newsletter, U.S.-Cuba Bulletin, reprinted by Cuba Times and other publications tied into the Castro propaganda network in this country. Cuba Times claimed that the Committee's newsletter "goes to the House and Senate, hundreds of business, civic and religious leaders" in the United States, and "supplements contacts with Congressional leaders as well as participation in public talks, roundtables, local and national television interviews and the printed media." If the Chairman is so disposed, I offer here a copy of the Summer 1981 issue ^{of} Cuba Times with the aforementioned article for insertion in the record.

The Cuban Interests Section in Washington -- dominated, remember, by DGI agents beginning with its head, Sanchez Parodi -- was so aggressive in its pursuit of U.S. businessmen to violate the trade embargo that the Carter Administration, desirous as it was to encourage normalization, grew upset. It threatened the DGI officer in charge of the operation, Sergio Martinez, with expulsion, but Martinez voluntarily departed from these shores in December 1980 before the Administration could act.

One DGI member of the Interests Section involved in the businessmen's operation who did get caught, however, was Ricardo Escartin, who held the rank of first secretary. He was formally charged with being an intelligence officer engaged in violating the embargo, and expelled in February 1981.

The DGI, nonetheless, remains undeterred. Last summer, it incorporated in Panama a business front called "Commercial Muralla" which, operating outside normal trade channels, manages to smuggle into Cuba U.S.-made auto parts, radios, TV sets and heavy equipment. In the past few weeks, a grand jury in Miami has indicted several other business fronts engaged in illicit travel and other illegal transactions with Cuba; I understand, Mr. Chairman, that you have already heard ample testimony in that regard.

The DGI's normalization drive was almost crowned with success

in 1977, with the formation of a group of prominent Cuban-Americans calling themselves the "Committee of 75." Its primary purpose was to initiate a "dialogue" with Cuba -- a term said to have originated with Fidel Castro himself, as a ploy to encourage normalization -- and specifically, to secure the release of some 3,000 political prisoners in Castro's jails.

Although headed by respectable Cuban-Americans, including two clerics and several businessmen, the Committee was inspired by the DGI. Its real manipulator, behind the scenes, was a DGI colonel named Jesus Arboleya Cervera, who was then listed as a "secondary secretary" with the Cuban Mission to the United Nations. Arboleya had served the DGI in the United States perhaps longer than any other known Castro agent, and as of last fall was reportedly attached to the Cuban interests section in Washington. Interviews with DGI defectors suggest that the "dialogue" may have started concurrently in two countries, Jamaica and Panama. One of the defectors, the Rev. Manuel Espinosa, has revealed that he made several trips to Jamaica -- then ruled by pro-Castro Prime Minister Michael Manley -- to work out arrangements with the DGI's station chief, Juan Carbonell, officially accredited as the Cuban Consul in Jamaica. Espinosa states that in fact he personally was recruited into the DGI in Jamaica, and served it as an agent until he broke early in 1980. Meanwhile, a Cuban-American banker, Bernardo Benes, went to Panama to confer with the late strongman, Gen. Omar Torrijos.

Subsequently, Benes went to Havana at the head of a six-man commission of the Committee of 75, to negotiate with Fidel Castro himself. After a number of one-on-one meetings with Castro, Benes, by late 1978, had succeeded in obtaining the release of the 3,000 political prisoners from jail. This made everyone happy -- the Carter Administration, Castro, the prisoners, their families, and the Committee of 75 -- and normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations seemed about to become a reality.

But two obstacles made that impossible. The first was that Castro, notwithstanding some sort of assurance to the Carter

Administration that he would withdraw his troops from Angola, refused to do so: obedience to Soviet policy requirements, above all the need to continue using Cuban armed forces as a spearhead of Soviet expansion in Africa, took precedence over an understanding with the United States. The second was that Benes -- unjustly, as it turned out -- was suspected by leading Cuban-Americans of being in reality a Cuban intelligence agent since he enjoyed such intimate ties with Castro. Actually, the banker had conducted the negotiations with Castro with the full knowledge of the FBI, to which he reported his activities all along, and of the State Department. Indeed, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance seems to have tacitly approved Benes' dealings with Castro, writing Benes later to thank him for his "services."

Thus Arboleya and the DGI failed to achieve normalization through their Committee of 75 -- a severe disappointment to Castro, for the Cuban economy was being severely hurt by the trade embargo, as the Cuban dictator himself admitted in a speech before the Cuban Communist Party in December 1979. They did, however, achieve the objective, perhaps more important in the long run, of splitting the hitherto united Cuban-American community over the issue of normalization and a range of other questions, some of them philosophical, hence deeper, involving an ideological reevaluation of the Castro regime. Younger members of the community who, never having suffered personally the rigors of life under the Castro dictatorship since they were born or raised in America, rejected their parents' assessment of the dictatorship as tyrannical and unjust, they preferred to think that it had many "good sides" and could be the "best thing" for the Cuban people.

The second track of Cuban policy, or "Plan Bravo," surfaced to the forefront following the failure of "Plan Alfa," to achieve normalization. Plan B, never exactly quiescent but never fully activated, either, was now put into operation. It called for the destabilization, as already noted, Mr. Chairman, of the United States.

The instrument selected by Castro to launch a massive effort to destabilize this country was the more or less openly disaffected segment of the Cuban population itself, those Cubans who were so fed up with Castro that they would run any risk to leave the country. We now know most of the details of the unhappy story of the 130,000 Cubans who left Cuba for these shores, in April 1980, via the port of Mariel -- the famous Mariel boatlift -- so there is no need to go into them here. I understand, further, that you have taken testimony as to Castro's ulterior motives in unleashing those tens of thousands of Cubans upon us -- that is, to destabilize the United States -- so I need not dwell upon that. Instead, I shall touch upon another aspect of Castro's destabilization plan which goes beyond its effects upon the Miami area, and South Florida in general, and that is the prong of it that would utilize Puerto Rico in two ways to achieve the same end.

During my trip to Puerto Rico last fall, I learned that Castro's twin objectives are to create unprecedented turmoil on the island, and make it too hot a potato for the United States to handle, and at the same time use the Puerto Rican extreme left to create trouble on the U.S. mainland. When I say "trouble," I mean literally nothing is excluded, even the assassination of high public figures, beginning with President Reagan himself.

In my December 1981 syndicated piece offered here for the record, Mr. Chairman, I produced evidence that Mr. Reagan and other high U.S. officials are on a Puerto Rican terrorist hit list. My article suggested that the Puerto Rican terrorists are more to be feared, perhaps, than Muammar Qaddafi's, who at the time were also threatening the President's life, because the former would be far more difficult to detect than the Libyans since they look like millions of other Hispanics who are law-abiding people. I was glad to learn that the Secret Service, as it developed in a phone call one of its members made to me subsequently, took substantially the same view (while by no means dismissing the Libyans' hit capabilities) and have taken the necessary precautions.

The pertinent aspect of the threat I would like to highlight here is that the FALN is at the heart of it. Eleven members of the FALN were found guilty by a Chicago grand jury, in February 1981, of seditious conspiracy, and were sentenced to long prison terms. The case concerned the armed seizure, in March 1980, of President Carter's campaign headquarters in Chicago and GOP Presidential candidate George Bush's in New York City, on the same day, allegedly by FALN members. All but one of the latter, Alfredo "Freddy" Mendez, denied belonging to the FALN and refused even to defend themselves in court on the ground that they were "prisoners of war" and were therefore entitled to be judged by an international tribunal.

The only one of the "Chicago 11" who admitted to being an FALN member, Freddy Mendez, cooperated with the authorities in the hope of having his sentence reduced. Specifically, they sought information from him on an alleged FALN "bomb factory" in Queens, L. I., which exploded in 1978 and was said to have supplied bombs for 31 unsolved bombings in Manhattan possibly committed by the FALN. Curiously, instead of being condemned by fellow terrorists for "singing," Mendez was pitied by them as an alleged victim of "torture" and "bribes" committed personally by none other than President Reagan himself, to force him to confess. Crazy as this sounds, the charge was uttered by the reputed "godfather" of Puerto Rican terrorism, 72-year-old Juan Antonio Corretjer, in a public speech, in July 1981, several months after the "Chicago 11" were sentenced. It should be recalled at this point that Corretjer, in his youth, was the secretary and devoted disciple of Pedro Albizu Campos, founder of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico and intellectual author of attempts on the life of President Harry Truman and members of Congress in the 1950s. Corretjer, who told me in a taped interview, "I am a Marxist-Leninist, a Communist," has been advocating terrorism for the past fifty years and believes that Puerto Rico is engaged in a "people's war" against the United States in which no holds are barred. His accusation that President Reagan personally "bribed" and "tortured" Mendez was designed to lay the philosophical basis for charging that the United

States is a "fascist" state engaged in "genocide" against the people, and therefore its leaders must be summarily disposed of. Thus, in the speech referred to above, he thundered:

"Who deserves contempt? Who deserves punishment? Poor Alfredo Mendez? No! The President of the United States, the CIA chiefs, the FBI chiefs, the warden of Pontiac [I11.] prison [where the FALN seditionists were held], the public prosecutors Margolis and Sullivan in the federal office of the Chicago district attorney, and the detectives and police of Chicago!"

The President, he continued, is "humanity's worst enemy."

Intelligence officers I interviewed in Puerto Rico regarded the Corretjer speech as a call to Puerto Rican terrorists to summarily "punish" the President and the law enforcement officials Corretjer listed -- which was, in effect, a hit list. They noted that Puerto Rican terrorists have committed acts of vengeance before.

Thus in December 1979, three terrorists groups ambushed a U.S. Navy bus en route to Sabana Seca Communications Center, near the capital of San Juan, killing two petty officers and wounding 10 other naval personnel. In a communique they issued claiming responsibility for the shootout, they said they were avenging the alleged murder of a comrade, Angel Rodriguez Cristobal, who was found hanging in a Tallahassee, Florida, prison cell and listed as a "suicide." Corretjer exulted publicly, after the Sabana Seca killings, "His [Rodriguez Cristobal's] death is avenged."

Now it is believed by some in the U.S. Intelligence community that Puerto Rican terrorists will try to "avenge" the "bribing" and "torturing" of Freddy Mendez by attempting to kill the President and/or other top U.S. officials.

It should be kept in mind, Mr. Chairman, that still at large as a suspect in the Chicago case is the FALN's bomb-making expert, William Morales, currently a fugitive.

The FALN, some U.S. intelligence officers hold, was "connected" with the attempted robbery last October of a Brink's armored truck near Nyack, N.W., by Weather Underground

and black terrorists. Two policemen and a guard were killed in the shootout following the attempt. The FBI's No. 2 man in New York, Kenneth P. Walton, stated at the time that the joint Federal-New York City Terrorism Task Force he heads is looking into possible links between the Brinks robbers and the FALN and "possibly some foreign organizations" as well.

The "foreign organizations" are regarded by intelligence sources to mean Cuba's General Intelligence Directorate, or DGI. The fact is, Mr. Chairman, that the FALN was organized by a Puerto Rican agent of Cuban intelligence named Filiberto Inocencio Ojeda Rios, who is wanted on the island for jumping \$2,000 bail. In 1967, Ojeda founded the very first of Puerto Rico's new terrorist groups, the Independent Armed Revolutionary Movement, or MIRA. MIRA's members received training and arms in Cuba and became operational early in 1969, when they bombed a police station, a bank, and other enterprises.

After many more bombings -- it is credited with 35 in New York alone in 1970 -- MIRA was finally broken up by the police and Ojeda was arrested. Jumping bail, Ojeda headed for New York, was assigned to the DGI station there operating under cover of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, and organized the FALN with remnants of the old MIRA group.

It is pertinent to note here, Mr. Chairman, that the Cuban Mission to the UN, like the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, is honeycombed with DGI and other Castro intelligence personnel. In the first place, the Mission staff normally totalling about 50 -- and rising to 80 persons on special occasions such as General Assembly sessions -- is the second largest in the UN, although Cuba ranks among its smallest member countries. Why such a large mission? Cuba scarcely needs upwards of 50 people to perform functions at the UN that bigger countries do with half or less that number. The truth is that an estimated 75 percent of those accredited to the Mission are not diplomats at all but agents and other personnel belonging to the DGI and other Cuban intelligence or security agencies.

Some are officers of, for example, the Department of State Security, or DSE, the counterpart of the DGI inside Cuba which

controls internal security; they perform no discernible diplomatic function. Others belong to the Department of America and the Cuban Institute for Friendship with Peoples, or ICAP, intelligence agencies which handle visitors to Cuba and there maintain them under surveillance; they scarcely qualify as diplomats, either. Consequently, it should not be surprising that many of the DGI, DSE, ICAP and America Department people on the Cuban Mission's roster of personnel don't bother to show up for regular UN duties.

One of the persons listed as a "political counselor" of the Mission, a highranking post, is in fact the chief of all DGI operations in the United States. He is Mario Monzon, a handsome man over six feet tall -- taller than the average Cuban -- about 38 or 39 years old. Another "political counselor" is also in reality a top intelligence officer, Alfredo Garcia Almeida, who heads the American Department in this country; he is thus the right arm here of the man Castro has entrusted with chief responsibility for organizing revolution in the Americas, primarily in Central America, Manuel Pineiro Losada, otherwise known as "Redbeard," who runs the America Department in Havana. Although both men are of apparently equal diplomatic rank, Monzon has authority over Almeida, indicating that in the United States the America Department may be subordinate to the DGI. Monzon also directs, of course, the activities of this people in the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, which means, in effect, the Section itself, since its chief, Ramon Sanchez Parodi, is also in charge of DGI operations in the capital.

But Monzon is not sole boss of Cuban intelligence in the United States. Besides answering, of course, to his own Cuban superiors in Havana he must also answer to the KGB's station chief in New York, who is in charge of Soviet intelligence operations in this country. Thus the two intelligence services, Cuban and Soviet, work hand in glove with each other, but with the Cuban subordinate to the Soviet service -- as it has been for many years -- even as Cuba itself is a satellite of the Soviet Union. There is, however, a division of labor

between them which has major significance for this country.

The DGI, notwithstanding the fact that it is rated among the five best intelligence services in the world and its officers are considered "very professional" by their U.S. counterparts, is not entrusted with such key tasks as military or industrial espionage since it lacks the technical capability for them. The DGI concentrates, rather, upon wooing Third World members of the United Nations, who constitute the overwhelming majority of that body and can be decisive in making policy and spreading propaganda, to follow Soviet policies in opposition to the West. Another one of its special UN missions is to line up votes, year after year, for the independence of Puerto Rico in the UN's Committee of 24 or so-called decolonization committee; there, it has succeeded for the first time in getting the Puerto Rican issue placed on the General Assembly's agenda this fall. At the same time, the DGI plays the double role of organizing and instigating such Puerto Rican terrorist groups as the FALN, as part of its "Plan B" to destabilize the United States.

DGI agents, of course, possess the distinct advantage over other Soviet satellite intelligence services, as well as the KGB itself, of being indistinguishable from millions of U.S. citizens and residents of Latin descent. Thus they can pose, with relative ease, as Nicaraguans, or Mexicans, or Puerto Ricans or Salvadorans -- except in the presence of such nationals, who can readily spot differences in accent and mannerisms -- and can mingle more freely with our population than Soviet or Polish or East German agents. U.S. intelligence officers are particularly worried over the DGI's capability, because of its Latin ethnicity, to stir up trouble among not only Puerto Ricans but also other Latin members of the U.S. community. They are equally concerned about its capability, since a fair number of Cubans are of African origin and black in color, for stirring up trouble among U.S. blacks. That is a crucial part of the design of "Plan Bravo," according to the defector Genaro Perez.

"They [the DGI] are going to incite Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and

blacks, Perez told me in an interview. "Especially blacks."

Needless to say, it would be very much in the interests of the Soviet Union and the KGB to have Cuban agents incite Americans of black or Latin origin to riot, to stage demonstrations, to commit acts of sabotage and terror in our key cities and in key industrial areas containing defense-related plants.

Aware of these and other uses of the DGI, the KGB began to restructure the Cuban intelligence service along its own lines quite early in the game. In 1962, reportedly at the request of Fidel Castro himself, the Soviets named as their first ambassador to Cuba a senior KGB officer, Alexander Alexeyev -- whose real name is said to be Alexander I. Shitov -- and he brought with him to Havana five KGB comrades to make over the DGI in the image of their own organization.

Like the KGB, the DGI is structured functionally into seven lineas -- "lines" -- or departments. Operations in the United States, the DGI's No. 1 target, come under the Political and Economic Intelligence Division, or linea, which also embraces the United Nations, Canada, Mexico and Puerto Rico. Although nominally the Division's basic function is to collect political and economic information -- mainly through the Cuban UN Mission and the Cuban Interests Section in Washington -- such information is used of course for carrying out the DGI's central objective of destabilizing this country through acts of terror, sabotage and subversion.

The DGI and other Cuban intelligence and security organisms enjoy a very high priority in Cuba, Mr. Chairman -- one much higher than, say, our intelligence services. Those organisms appear to be supervised closely by the very top leadership of the Cuban government, meaning President Fidel Castro and his brother Raul, who is heir apparent as First Vice President of Cuba and is also Minister of the Armed Forces, and meaning also Ramiro Valdes, who besides being Minister of Interior is a Vice President of Cuba. These three men are officially ranked among the top five in Cuba, and head the list of the sixteen members of the Cuban Communist Party's Politburo as well as the

National Assembly, Council of State and Council of Ministers of the Cuban government.

Raul Castro, whose decisive role in Cuban affairs is usually overlooked by observers, has made intelligence virtually his own preserve. He may well be the Kremlin's key man in the Cuban hierarchy with respect to intelligence as well as to policy. He was a dedicated, Moscow-lining Communist in his youth and recognized as such from the beginning of the July 26th movement, the predominantly middle-class organization Fidel created to bring about the Cuban Revolution. Raul, along with Che Guevara -- the two known Communists in the then ruling triumvirate headed by Fidel -- then proceeded to destroy the July 26th movement and recreate in its stead the hitherto moribund Cuban Communist Party, once the Revolution was won. It was early in the process of thus communizing Cuba that Raul dispatched to Mexico City his trusted aide, Valdes, to contact, for the first time, the Soviets and specifically the KGB. Raul was then chief of the Rebel Army and Valdes head of G-2, its intelligence arm.

Through Raul Castro, there has always been a close link between the Cuban Armed Forces and the Ministry of Interior, which controls the country's intelligence services. In a very real sense, Cuba's formidable intelligence/security apparatus is basically his creation although his older brother, Fidel, always has the last word, of course. To facilitate his control over that apparatus, Raul was instrumental in organizing in 1961, the Ministry of Interior, under which all intelligence/security units were put. He then got named as head of the new Ministry his old friend, Ramiro Valdes, who continues to occupy that post today after a hiatus during which he held other important government jobs. Valdes was given one of the most sensitive positions in the Cuban Government, because, in addition to his other attributes as a professional intelligence officer, he is one of only 13 survivors of the original expedition that set sail from Mexico in the "Granma", in November 1956, to make the Cuban Revolution; thus belongs to a very special clique that in some respects is above party and

government. When Valdes became Minister of Interior, in 1961, various units which had been engaged in intelligence abroad, such as G-2, and in internal security at home, were merged into a Department of State Security, or DSE. Foreign intelligence was assigned to a General Directorate of Intelligence -- DGI -- or "Department M," as it was known in the Interior Ministry.

Powerful as the DGI is, and though in many respects it is the Cuban counterpart of the KGB, it nevertheless does not enjoy with respect to the Cuban regime and Cuban policy the power that the KGB does with respect to the Soviet government and its policies. If Raul Castro and Ramiro Valdes are leading figures in Cuba, it is not because of the DGI; rather the contrary, the DGI commands power and respect to the degree that the younger Castro and Valdes desire it to. Considered in those terms, the DGI must be evaluated as certainly a powerful foreign intelligence arm of the Cuban Government but not the only one: competing with it, though also cooperating with it is, above all, the America Department, and further below in importance the ICAP.

Cuba has set up what is in effect a High Command of the Latin American Revolution, in the form of an organism called the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta (JCR), in Havana. The JCR consists of the DGI and the America Department, making it a joint enterprise of Government -- the DGI coming under the Ministry of Interior -- and Party -- the America Department being an arm of the Cuban Communist Party. The JCR is in charge of providing arms, training, guidance and intelligence to revolutionary organizations throughout Latin America.

I have a chart here, Mr. Chairman, which provides as complete a breakdown as can be obtained of the far-flung machinery Cuba has organized to generate and support revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere, not excluding the United States. It might be useful if inserted in the record.

Briefly, it shows that the JCR maintains close liaison and in many cases probably supervises revolutionary groups, including guerrilla forces, in four of the five Central American republics -- Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador -- in at least four Caribbean island countries -- Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico,

Haiti and Guadalupe -- and in seven of the ten South American republics -- Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia. The JCR also has its tentacles in Mexico and the United States, in the latter primarily through four Puerto Rican terrorist organizations including the FALN.

Further, as the chart shows, the JCR maintains contact with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the DGI having, of course, its own direct line to the KGB and the Czech and East German intelligence services.

The State Department, in a research paper on "Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America," presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs on December 14, 1981, provides much detail on how Cuba coordinates its aid to Latin revolutionary movements through such covert agencies as the DGI and America Department. Though it claims, mistakenly in my judgement, that it is the America Department which "brings together the expertise of the Cuban military and the General Directorate of Intelligence," rather than the joint Coordinating Revolutionary Junta, it does stress that they run "a farflung operation that includes training camps in Cuba and abroad, and sophisticated propaganda support." Nowhere is the evidence more blatant, particularly in the field of propaganda, than in Central America. Typical of the whole effort was the operational base Cuba's intelligence personnel established in Costa Rica, which funneled arms and other military aid to the Sandinista in Nicaragua on such a vast scale that that may well have decided their ultimate victory over Somoza.

It should be stressed that arms alone did not decide that victory. A key ingredient of it, and indeed a pre-condition for receiving military aid from Cuba, was the unification of the various guerrilla factions in Nicaragua which Fidel Castro insisted upon and which, according to the State Department, was carried out in person by his national-liberation chief, Manuel Pineiro, "Redbeard." Pineiro subsequently unified the warring Salvadoran guerrilla factions using the raw power of Cuba, after which the latter turned on the spigot that

produced the arms flow to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. More recently, Cuban intelligence, in the person of Pineiro again, has repeated the same performance in Guatemala, which today boasts a new National Patriotic United Front embracing four different guerrilla factions.

Perhaps most alarming of all, for the United States, is that Cuban intelligence has also succeeded in uniting some eight or nine terrorist groups in Puerto Rico. Specifically, the Puerto Rican-born DGI agent I mentioned earlier, Filiberto Inocencia Ojeda Rios, was the one who united the Puerto Rican terrorist groups under a Joint Operations Command -- Mando de Operaciones Conjuntas (MOC) -- according to my informants. "He was the genius behind it," as one told me. Ojeda was then in charge of Caribbean activities for the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta.

Ojeda's career illustrates the overlapping between DGI and America Department activities as well as the inner workings of Puerto Rican terrorism and the grave threat, grossly underestimated by some elements of our own intelligence community, that it represents to the United States.

Ojeda organized the FALN, from his vantagepoint as a member of the Cuban UN Mission, in early 1974. He trained the FALN's first cadres in handling explosives and urban guerrilla tactics, but never commanded the organization. By the Spring of 1974, the FALN going operational, "reopens the second front of the struggle by bringing the armed struggle for Puerto Rican national liberation to within the borders of the U.S., at a higher level," according to the terrorists' own "Chronology of Armed Struggle in Puerto Rico and the U.S., 1967-1980." The "reopening" of the "second front" took the form of firebombing three New York City department stores on as many consecutive days. Then, in September and October of that year, the FALN bombed the Newark, N.J., City Hall and Police Headquarters, and five more prominent places in New York City including Rockefeller Center.

"The intelligence community feels that Ojeda really sent the FALN on its way," a Puerto Rican intelligence officer of long

experience with terrorism told me. "He is the father of the FALN." Subsequently, Ojeda was transferred to the Department of America, under Pineiro, and put in charge of Puerto Rican terrorist groups. In December 1974, he was sent into Puerto Rico clandestinely -- he was still wanted by the police for having jumped bail -- to organize acts of sabotage during a strike at the government's Aqueduct and Sewer authority staged by extremists. The union which had organized the strike was controlled by the Popular Socialist Party, a legal party which officially eschews terrorism and sabotage as means of winning political power. It's leader, Juan Mari Bras, freely admitted in an interview with me that he is a Marxist-Leninist with close ties to Cuba.

What Mari Bras did not acknowledge, I might add parenthetically, is that, under the pseudonym "Alfonso Beal" (the surname is an acronym of the two independence movement heroes, Betances and Albizu), he had formed his own Armed Commandos of Liberation (CAL) back in 1965. Nor that CAL members received guerrilla training in Cuba as members of the Venceremos Brigade, and that when they returned to Puerto Rico they proceeded to bomb U.S. companies located there and a U.S. Governors' Conference. They also killed a U.S. Marine, in retaliation for the alleged murder of a comrade, and sabotaged five military helicopters. But in 1972, Mari Bras announced he would thenceforth try to gain power through electoral means and in the following year disbanded the CAL.

Ojeda met with several extremist leaders, including Juan Antonio Corretjer, the "grand old man" of Puerto Rican terrorism, and returned to Cuba to report that armed struggle on the island was a feasible objective. He went back to Puerto Rico for further meetings with Corretjer and other extremists, as a result of which the Revolutionary Comandos of the People -- or CRP -- was formed in 1976 to conduct urban guerrilla warfare. The CRP almost immediately submitted itself to the supervision of the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta and designated Ojeda as its representative on that body. In that capacity, Ojeda traveled to Paris, which the JCR was using as a meeting place. There he met with "Carlos the Jackal," the infamous international

terrorist born Carlos Ilich Ramirez in Venezuela, got to know leaders of the PLO, and touched base with an old Puerto Rican comrade, Roberto Todd Pagan, who was then in charge of the Western Hemisphere desk of the East German intelligence service, SSD.

Now made head of the JCR's Caribbean activities, Ojeda came into contact with Dominican Republic revolutionaries interested in working jointly with their Puerto Rican counterparts, since the two islands are only 60 miles apart. The principal Dominican terrorist organization, Dominican Resistance -- or RD -- joined the JCR in Paris and Ojeda coordinated its activities with Puerto Rican terrorists. In 1976, three RD members arrested by the Puerto Rican police admitted that they had received training from the PLO and were conducting combined operations on the island with Puerto Rican terrorists. One of the three, Victor Morales Santana, who had been in personal contact with "Carlo's the Jackal," is still in prison serving a 12-year sentence for armed robbery.

1976 was a banner year for the proliferation of terrorist groups in Puerto Rico, chiefly as the result of the defection of 3,000 members of the Popular Socialist Party following their disillusionment in the PSP's abysmal showing in the gubernatorial election. An estimated 600 of that batch had had varying degrees of guerrilla training in Cuba and now turned to urban guerrilla warfare. Soon thereafter, the principal terrorist groups operating today surfaced in connection with violent acts of one kind or another.

The first to be organized was the Armed Forces of Popular Resistance, or FARP, which promptly engaged in such activities as robbing banks and shooting up places frequented by U.S. Navy personnel, such as La Hacienda near Roosevelt Roads.

FARP's organization was soon followed by that of one of the most notorious of all Puerto Rican terrorist groups, Los Macheteros, formally called the Boricua Popular Army (EPB), after Puerto Rico's original Indian name, Borinquen. At least 11 of the original Macheteros had received training, earlier, from Chile's far-leftist MIR during the rule of Salvador Allende,

and later at a Cuban camp located between Havana and Pinar del Rio for four months. In August 1978, soon after their return from Cuba, they launched their first operation, in which they killed a policeman. Acknowledging that act, they revealed for the first time their identity as Los Macheteros.

Among Los Macheteros' most notorious exploits was the Sabana Seca ambush of a Navy bus in December 1979, which they carried out together with the FARP and still another terrorist group, the Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVRP). A Soviet-designed AK-47 automatic rifle was found by Federal officials among the weapons used to fire on the bus. It was the first time in his experience, an FBI spokesman said, that the AK-47 -- which is usually made in Czechoslovakia -- had been used in Puerto Rico.

In January 1981, the same three groups teamed up to firebomb nine Air National Guard jets worth \$45 million, at Isla Verde Air Base, near San Juan. I have seen a videotape of the Macheteros' preparations for the firebombing, produced by them for publicity purposes, which they claim was carried out in only seven minutes, 40 seconds -- ample testimony to the terrorists' high level of precision and efficiency.

On July 14, 1981, Los Macheteros destroyed three FAA navigational stations and a Coast Guard navigational beacon with bombs, disrupting air traffic between the United States and Latin America. An exception to the understanding that the mainland is FALN "territory," Los Macheteros have carried out at least one foray into the United States setting off six simultaneous bomb explosions in Puerto Rico and Chicago, in October 1979.

In all, from 1975 through 1981 Puerto Rican terrorist groups have perpetrated 260 acts of violence on the island and up to 100 on the mainland, most of the latter by the FALN. Something like nine Puerto Rican terrorist groups have proliferated over the past 15 years -- an average, Mr. Chairman, of about one per every 400,000 inhabitants of Puerto Rico -- and that incredible total may not be complete. Only five of them are considered truly important: CRP, FARP, OVRP,

Macheteros and FALN. These are the groups which Ojeda appears to have unified under a single Joint Operations Command (MOC), which in turn comes under the Coordinating Revolutionary Junta run by the DGI and Department of America out of Havana.

Allied ideologically with the terrorists groups, and forming in effect a substantial support force, are an estimated ten "open" political organizations -- organizations, that is, which unlike the clandestine terrorist units participate overtly and legally in the political life of Puerto Rico, some of them even putting up candidates in elections. The principal ones are the Puerto Rican Communist Party (PCP; pro-Moscow); the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (Mari Bras' PSP; oriented toward Havana); Partido Nacional de Puerto Rico (PNPR, formed by Albizu Campos); Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR, orthodox Leninist); Puerto Rican Socialist League (Corretjer's LSP); Internationalist Workers League (LIT; Trotskyist); Movimiento Socialista Popular (MSP; followers of Che Guevara). These organizations are reckoned by intelligence officers to have a total membership of between 12,000 and 17,000-- a formidable support army for the terrorists in a total population of only 3.5 million.

In addition, the terrorists can find support and sympathy among nominally nonpolitical groups of a radical nature such as the electrical workers' union, UTIER, which is Communist-controlled and a breeding ground of terrorism. Last year it conducted a protracted strike that strained Puerto Rico's electric-power facilities to a disturbing degree. The strike, curiously enough, was backed by the Macheteros and other terrorist groups, who frequently bombed power plants and caused blackouts in San Juan.

An even more important example is the Federation of Pro Independence University Students (FUPI), which recently celebrated its 25th anniversary as the principal spawning-ground for Puerto Rico's far-left revolutionaries. Recently, it inspired a student strike at the University of Puerto Rico, the leader of which was a known Communist.

The motive force of all the groups I have mentioned here, both clandestine and "open," is independence -- all of them want,

demand, independence from the United States, even though all together they represent less than 6 percent of the Puerto Rican electorate, according to the 1980 gubernatorial election returns. The latter, however, do not tell the whole story. Independence possesses a certain mystique for many Puerto Ricans who might have voted against it as a political solution; to them, it is a cultural banner to emphasize and protect their Hispanic origins and to enable them to resist what they regard as an Anglo-Saxon cultural "invasion." The vast majority of Puerto Ricans, including even the far left, accept of course such American exports as medical science, technology, industrial know-how and even fast-food outlets; but they do not do so entirely without reservations, fundamentally fearing what the "invasion" might do to their language, their literature, their folkways. The Puerto Rican people suffer, at bottom, from an almost permanent crisis of identity, at one and the same time wanting profoundly to be Americans yet feeling a strong pull to their Latin heritage -- and their Latin neighbors. Consequently independence, though perennially a big loser at the polls, is potentially an explosive issue, one which the terrorists and their accomplices in the "open" organizations constantly exploit as do the sinister forces behind them, in Cuba.

It is a misnomer to speak of "terrorist" groups in the strictest sense, for although they exist to commit acts of terror and violence it is also true that they do so within an ideological framework that transcends pure terror: "national liberation." Considered from that point of view, Puerto Rico's so-called terrorist groups are really -- and this is how they regard themselves -- as the armed forces which they believe will "liberate" the island from "Yankee imperialism," and so they act as though they were in a state of war with the mainland and that any means are justified to win that war, as in the case in all war. Bombings and assassinations, then, are simply acts of war and not of terror, and they are resorted to at this stage of the struggle because conditions are not yet ripe for conventional acts of war or even irregular warfare like that in El Salvador. But, as they see it, they are approaching that

stage and so they consider themselves to be in a state of urban guerrilla warfare, as Corretjer explained it to me.

Corretjer's Socialist (by which he means Communist) League has designated the present stage of the so-called "struggle against Yankee imperialism" as one of urban guerrilla warfare. His LSP, and other "open" organizations who think the same way, spend their every waking hour studying and absorbing the teachings of all the experts in insurrection and urban guerrilla warfare, ranging from Friedrich Engels to V. I. Lenin to Che Guevara to Carlos Marighella, the late Brazilian author of the famous "Mini Manual on Urban Guerrilla Warfare." They also study and absorb the lessons of both successful guerrilla movements, such as the Sandinistas, and unsuccessful ones, such as Uruguay's Tupamarus, not to speak of the experiences of the father and hero of Puerto Rican terrorism, Pedro Albizu Campos. Their absorption in such studies is by no means purely theoretical: they focus, essentially, on military and paramilitary strategy and tactics. A manual on "The Urban Guerrilla," produced by Corretjer's LSP in 1980 and based largely on the Marighella work, goes into considerable detail on strategy and tactics. So then, Mr. Chairman, what we are talking about in Puerto Rico when we discuss the so-called terrorist groups and their DGI mentors is not something out of "Carlos the Jackal" but, much more significant, the training of a guerrilla army which intends to do battle on a large scale with the United States both on the island of Puerto Rico -- in itself a strategic objective with its vital location and naval installations -- and on the U.S. mainland. We are speaking, in other words, of a two-front war, with Fidel Castro aspiring to be the generalissimo directing it from Havana.

Such a prospect, obviously, could be far more menacing to the United States than even the current hostilities going on in Central America. It is time, I believe, that not only the American intelligence community but the Administration at its highest levels begin to understand, prepare for, and meet the threat posed by the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence and particularly its Puerto Rican spearhead.

Senator DENTON. Before I would recess this hearing, I want to announce 5 days of hearings beginning on March 22, 1982. These hearings will disclose the role of the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba in fomenting terrorism in Southern Africa. We will have as witnesses former members of the African National Congress and SWAPO regarding their training in the Soviet Union and East Germany. The stories of these young people, all black Africans, should convince even the most skeptical of the true intentions of the U.S.S.R. and their surrogates.

Some of these witnesses are on death lists ordered by the African National Congress and SWAPO. Rather elaborate security precautions will be needed and, for this reason, their names will not be released prior to the time of their testimony.

The hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT A

Special
Report No. 90

Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America

December 14, 1981



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is the text of a research paper presented to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Department of State, December 14, 1981.

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PREFACE

Any formulation of U.S. foreign policy for Latin America and the Caribbean would be incomplete without in-depth analysis of Cuba's role in the region. Some of Cuba's international activities have received publicity and attention, but much has taken place out of the public view. While understanding the full range of Cuba's activities abroad is obviously essential for governments engaged in foreign policy planning, the general public is often uninformed about the nature and extent of Cuba's involvement in other countries. This study of Cuban activities in Latin America and the Caribbean is being issued in the interest of contributing to better public understanding of U.S. foreign policy and developments in the region.

The focus of this study is Cuba's activities in the Americas. It does not attempt to give a description of conditions in the countries in which Cuba is active or to analyze why violent groups develop, but instead examines the degree to which Cuba is directly engaged in efforts to destabilize its neighbors by promoting armed opposition movements. Cuba is clearly not the sole source of violence and instability in the region, but Cuban activities militarize and internationalize what would otherwise be local conflicts. In a region whose primary needs are for economic development, social equity, and greater democracy, Cuba is compounding existing problems by encouraging armed insurrection.

This report describes Cuban activities that are either publicly known or can be revealed without jeopardizing intelligence sources and methods. Cuban involvement is not limited to the examples contained in this study.

SUMMARY

A country-by-country examination of Cuba's activities in Latin America and the Caribbean makes clear that Cuba has renewed its campaign of the 1960s to promote armed insurgencies. In particular, Cuba has stepped up efforts to stimulate violence and destabilize its neighbors, turning away from its earlier policy of strengthening normal diplomatic relations in the hemisphere.

Since 1978, Cuba has:

- Worked to unite traditionally splintered radical groups behind a commitment to armed struggle with Cuban advice and material assistance;
- Trained ideologically committed cadres in urban and rural guerrilla warfare;
- Supplied or arranged for the supply of weapons to support the Cuban-trained cadres' efforts to assume power by force;
- Encouraged terrorism in the hope of provoking indiscriminate violence and repression, in order to weaken government legitimacy and attract new converts to armed struggle; and
- Used military aid and advisers to gain influence over guerrilla fronts and radical governments through armed pro-Cuban Marxism.

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Unlike Che Guevara's attempts during the 1960s, Cuban subversion today is backed by an extensive secret intelligence and training apparatus, modern military forces, and a large and sophisticated propaganda network. Utilizing agents and contacts nurtured over more than 20 years, the Castro government is providing ideological and military training and material and propaganda support to numerous violent groups, often several in one country.

Cuba is most active in Central America, where its immediate goals are to exploit and control the revolution in Nicaragua and to induce the overthrow of the Governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. At the same time, Cuba is working to destabilize governments elsewhere in the hemisphere. Cuba provides advice, safehaven, communications, training, and some financial support to several violent South American organizations. In the Caribbean, Cuban interference in the post-election period has been blunted in Jamaica, but Grenada has become a virtual Cuban client.

Cuba's new drive to promote armed insurgency does not discriminate between democracies and dictatorships. And attempts by Cuba to destabilize governments occur in spite of the existence of diplomatic ties.

This long-range campaign is directed by the Cuban Communist Party, which oversees farflung operations that include secret training camps in Cuba, intelligence officers abroad, training programs for select foreign students, networks for covert movement of personnel and material between Cuba and abroad, and propaganda support.

Cuba's enormous investment of energy, money, and agents in this campaign would not be possible without Soviet help. Soviet assistance, now totaling over \$8 million a day, enables Cuba to maintain the best equipped and largest per capita military forces in Latin America and to channel substantial resources abroad. In return, Cuba usually is careful not to jeopardize ongoing government relationships in Latin America important to the Soviet Union.

The scope of Cuba's activities in the hemisphere has prevented Cuba from always keeping covert operations hidden. For instance, during 1981 alone:

- In Nicaragua, Cuba has quietly increased its presence to 5,000 personnel, including more than 1,500 security and military advisers.
- In El Salvador, Cuba's key role in arming the Salvadoran guerrillas was exposed and Castro admitted supplying arms.

- In Costa Rica, a Special Legislative Commission documented Cuba's role in establishing an arms supply network during the Nicaraguan civil war and found the network was later used to supply Salvadoran insurgents.
- In Colombia, Cuba was discovered to have trained guerrillas attempting to establish a "people's army."

Cuba's new policies abroad and its reaction to emigration pressures at home have reversed the trend in Latin America toward normalization of relations with Cuba. During the last 2 years, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Jamaica suspended or broke relations with Cuba. Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador withdrew their ambassadors from Havana.

Cuban intervention is, of course, not the sole source of instability. The origins of occasional violent conflict in Latin America lie in historical social and economic inequities which have generated frustrations among a number of people. Sustained economic growth over the past 20 years and resilient national institutions, however, have limited the appeal of radical groups. But in some countries, particularly the small nations of Central America, dislocations resulting from rapid growth compounded existing tensions, leading to the emergence in several countries of radical movements, which often originated with frustrated elements of the middle class.

Subsequent economic reversals have subjected already weak institutions to additional stress, making these countries more vulnerable to the appeals of radical groups backed by Cuba.

Cuba is quick to exploit legitimate grievances for its own ends. But its strategy of armed struggle is not based on appeals to the "people." Instead, Cuba concentrates on developing self-proclaimed "vanguards" committed to violent action. Revolutions, according to this approach, are made by armed revolutionaries.

Cuba's readiness to train, equip, and advise those who opt for violent solutions imposes obstacles to economic progress, democratic development, and self-determination in countries faced with growing economic difficulties. The spiraling cycle of violence and counter-violence which is central to Cuba's policy only exacerbates the suffering of ordinary people and makes necessary adjustments more difficult.

Cuba's renewed campaign of violence is of great concern to many countries, including the United States. Cuba should not escape responsibility for its actions. Exposing Cuba's efforts to promote armed struggle will increase the costs to Cuba of its intervention.

I. POLICIES

When it first came to power, the Castro regime had its own theory of how to spread revolution: to reproduce elsewhere the rural-based guerrilla warfare experience of Castro's 26th of July Movement in Cuba. In Che Guevara's words, the Andes would become the Sierra Maestra of South America.

Initial attempts to repeat Cuba's revolution elsewhere failed decisively. During the late 1960s, the Castro regime gradually reined in its zealots. Without abandoning its ideology or its ties to radical states and movements, Cuba began to pursue normal government-to-government relations in the hemisphere. By the mid-1970s Cuba's isolation in the Americas eased, and full diplomatic or consular relations were reestablished with a number of countries.

But diplomacy proved unable to satisfy the Castro government's ambitions. First in Africa and now in Latin America and the Caribbean, Cuba's policy has again shifted to reemphasize intervention.

On July 26, 1980, Fidel Castro declared that the experiences of Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, and Bolivia teach us that there is no other way than revolution, that there is no other "formula" than "revolutionary armed struggle." Castro's statement was an attempt to justify publicly what Cuban agents had been doing secretly since 1978: stepping up support for armed insurgency in neighboring countries.

This study traces the development of this latest phase in Cuba's foreign policy.

Early Failures. The original Cuban theory held that a continental Marxist revolution could be achieved by establishing armed focal points (*focos*) in several countries. Operating in rural areas, small bands of guerrillas could initiate struggles that would spread throughout the continent.

In 1959, Castro aided armed expeditions against Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. During the early and mid-1960s, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia all faced serious Cuban-backed attempts to develop guerrilla *focos*.

In seeking indigenous groups with which to cooperate, the Cubans rejected the orthodox Latin American Communist parties, which they regarded as ineffectual. Instead, they lent their support to more militant groups dedicated to armed violence even when their Marxism was not fully articulated.

The Soviet Union was suspicious of Cuba's policy of inciting armed violence, preferring to work through established Moscow-line Communist parties. Disagreement over this issue was a serious point of friction for several years. Cuba denounced the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" as a fraud, arguing that it implicitly undercut the legitimacy of aiding "national liberation" struggles. At the 1966 Tricontinental Conference, Cuba sought to enlist North Vietnam and North Korea and create a more aggressive revolutionary internationalism.

None of the Latin American insurgencies fomented by Havana, however, aroused much popular support. The most severe blow to Cuba's policy during this period came in Bolivia in 1967, when Che Guevara's guerrilla band was opposed by both the peasantry and the Bolivian Communist Party.

After this maverick approach failed to establish a continental revolution, Cuban foreign policy moved into closer conformity with that of the Soviet Union. Castro endorsed the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and accepted Soviet views on East-West relations. Within the hemisphere, Cuba generally conformed to the Soviet approach of fostering state-to-state relations with several Latin American countries.

The Turn to Africa. In the mid-1970s, Cuba renewed its penchant for direct intervention, not in Latin America but in Africa.¹

- In Angola, 20,000 Cuban troops, supported by Soviet logistics and materiel, assured the supremacy of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which had the strongest ties to Moscow of the three movements competing for power after Portugal's withdrawal.

- In Ethiopia, the integration of Soviet and Cuban operations was even more complete, with the Soviets providing overall command and control, materiel, and transport for 13-15,000 Cuban troops fighting against Somali forces.

¹Cuba's military and political activities in Africa are intense and widening. Cuba still maintains expeditionary forces of at least 15-19,000 in Angola and 11-15,000 in Ethiopia. Cuba has military and security adviser contingents in a number of other African countries and in South Yemen.

The Moscow-Havana Axis. These African operations gave evidence of Cuba's military value to the Soviet Union. In areas of the Third World where the Soviets were under constraints not binding on Cuba, Havana could portray its actions as an outgrowth of its own foreign policy of support for "national liberation movements."

Cuba's extensive and costly activities overseas would have been impossible, however, without Soviet aid. The Cuban armed forces, some 225,000 strong, with new sophisticated weaponry from the Soviet Union, became a formidable offensive military machine. Soviet aid and subsidies to the Cuban economy have climbed to more than \$3 billion annually or about one-fourth of Cuba's gross national product. In December 1979, at a time when Soviet oil deliveries to Eastern Europe were being cut back and prices raised, Castro announced that the Soviet Union had guaranteed Cuba's oil needs through 1985 at a price roughly one-third that of the world market. The Soviet Union also pays up to four and five times the world price for Cuban sugar.²

In return, Cuba champions the notion of a "natural alliance" between the Soviet bloc and the Third World in the nonaligned movement. At the Cuban Communist Party Congress in December 1980, Castro explicitly endorsed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and defended the Soviet "right" to intervene in Poland. He also reiterated that Cuba is irrevocably committed to communism and to supporting "national liberation" struggles around the world.

Cuba's policies abroad are thus linked to its relationship to the Soviet Union. By intervening in behalf of armed struggle in Latin America, Cuba injects East-West dimensions into local conflicts.

²According to the World Bank, Cuba's per capita annual growth rate averaged 1.2% during the period 1960-78. Cuban economic performance ranked in the lowest 5% worldwide and was the worst of all socialist countries. Only massive infusions of Soviet aid have kept consumption levels from plummeting. Cuba today depends more heavily on sugar than before 1969. The industrial sector has been plagued by mismanagement, absenteeism, and serious shortages in capital goods and foreign exchange. The economic picture is so bleak that in 1979, and again in October 1981, the Cuban leadership had to warn that 10-20 more years of sacrifice lay ahead.

II. METHODS

Even when pursuing an open policy in the 1970s of establishing normal diplomatic relations with a number of Latin American countries, Cuba retained its clandestine ties with remnants of the insurgents and other pro-Cuban elements in Latin America, providing asylum, propaganda, some training, and other support. Between 1970 and 1973, Cuba's security services moved arms and agents into Chile. At the same time, Cubans helped organize President Allende's personal security and trained many leaders of the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left.

Cuba's renewed campaign to promote insurgencies draws on these contacts and experiences and combines several different elements.

Sophisticated Strategy. Learning from Che Guevara's failure in Bolivia, Cuban doctrine now emphasizes the need to enlist support for armed struggle through advanced training of local guerrilla cadres, sustained aid and advice, and extensive propaganda activities. The *foco* approach of the 1960s—when a Cuban-sponsored team in the field was considered enough to spark insurrection—has given way to a more sophisticated strategy involving extensive commitments and risks.

Soviet Support. A major difference from the 1960s is that, instead of throwing up obstacles, the Soviet Union generally has backed Cuban efforts to incorporate nondoctrinaire groups into broad political-military fronts dedicated to armed struggle. Particularly in Central America, Soviet ties to local Communist parties and bloc relationships have been used to favor insurrectionary violence. For example, a senior Soviet Communist Party functionary traveled to Panama in August 1981 to discuss strategy for Central America with Cuban officials and leaders of Central American Communist parties. The Soviet Union has also used its extensive propaganda network selectively to discredit governments and build support for armed opposition groups.

Allowing Havana to take the lead in the hemisphere enables Moscow to maintain a low profile and cultivate state-to-state relations and economic ties with major countries like Brazil and Argentina.

Cuba, in turn, is generally cautious not to undercut the Soviet Union where the Soviets have established valued relationships. In Peru, for example, Cuba has been careful to exercise restraint to avoid prejudicing the status of the 300 Soviet officials there or jeopardizing the Soviet Union's arms supply arrangement.

Central Control. Most of the covert operations in support of this strategy are planned and coordinated by the America Department of the Cuban Communist Party, headed by Manuel Pineiro Losada. The America Department emerged in 1974 to centralize operational control of Cuba's covert activities. The department brings together the expertise of the Cuban military and the General Directorate of Intelligence into a farflung operation that includes secret training camps in Cuba, networks for covert movement of personnel and materiel between Cuba and abroad, and sophisticated propaganda support.

Agents of the America Department are present in every Cuban diplomatic mission in Latin America and the Caribbean—in at least five recent instances in the person of the ambassador or charge d'affaires. America Department officials frequently serve as employees of Cuba's official press agency, Prensa Latina, of Cubana Airlines, the Cuban Institute of Friendship with People, and other apparently benign organizations. When too great an identification with Cuba proves counterproductive, Cuban intelligence officers work through front groups, preferably those with non-Cuban leadership.³

Cuban military intelligence personnel selected for clandestine operations in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East go through an elaborate training program conducted by Cuban, Soviet, East German, and Czech instructors in Havana, with special sessions in surrounding cities. In addition to the language and customs of the area to which they are assigned, and typical intelligence operations such as infiltration procedures and photography techniques, the Cubans are instructed in handling explosives. To disguise their true occupation, the intelligence agents are also instructed in civilian skills such as automotive mechanics, carpentry, and heavy equipment operation.

³Cuba maintains some front organizations set up in the 1960s. One of these, the Continental Organization of Latin American Students, still holds irregular congresses of student leaders from Latin America and the Caribbean (the most recent in Havana in August 1981) and publishes a monthly journal distributed by the Cuban Government.

Armed Struggle. The new Cuban offensive relies heavily on violence. In outline, Cuba's strategy is to:

- Unite traditionally splintered radical groups behind a commitment to armed struggle with Cuban advice and material assistance;
- Train ideologically committed cadres in urban and rural guerrilla warfare;
- Supply or arrange for the supply of weapons to support the Cuban-trained cadres' efforts to assume power by force;
- Encourage terrorism in the hope of provoking indiscriminate violence and repression and generalized disorder in order to weaken government legitimacy and attract new converts to armed struggle; and
- Use military aid and advisers to gain influence over guerrilla fronts and radical governments through armed pro-Cuban Marxists.

The application of this strategy is demonstrated in detail in the case studies that follow. It should be noted, however, that Cuba sometimes emphasizes certain tactics over others. In pursuing its long-term strategy, Cuba concentrates initially on building a network of loyal cadres. When local extremist groups are not capable or committed to armed struggle, Cuba generally draws on them in support of active insurgencies elsewhere while developing their capacity and willingness for agitation in their homeland. In addition, foreign policy concerns may deter Cuba from promoting armed struggle in a particular country. For example, Cuba attempts to avoid activities which could jeopardize its relations with the Mexican Government since Castro seeks Mexico's support to avoid isolation in the hemisphere.⁴

Propaganda. Cuba's extensive cultural exchange and propaganda activities are tailored to support covert operations and elicit support for armed

⁴Although Cuba is not involved in actions directly threatening to Mexican internal stability, Cuba has taken advantage of Mexico's open society and its extensive presence there—Cuba's Embassy in Mexico City is its largest diplomatic mission in the hemisphere—to carry out support activities for insurgencies in other countries. Mexico is a principal base for Cuban contacts with representatives of several armed Latin American groups on guerrilla strategy, logistical support, and international activities.

struggle.⁵ For example, during the past year, Cubans have used Mexico as a base for coordination of propaganda on behalf of insurgents in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. Radio Havana and other Cuban media recently have publicized statements by Chilean Communist Party leaders urging unity of the Chilean left and calling for armed action to topple Chile's government. Radio Havana has directed broadcasts to Paraguay urging the overthrow of the Paraguayan Government.

Sports competitions, youth and cultural festivals, and special scholarships to Cuba provide channels to identify potential agents for intelligence and propaganda operations. In Ecuador, Cuban Embassy officers in Quito used their ties with Ecuadorian students to try to orchestrate pro-Cuba demonstrations when the Government of Ecuador threatened to suspend relations after Cuba's forcible and unauthorized occupation in February 1981 of the Ecuadorian Embassy in Havana, following its seizure by a group of Cubans seeking to leave Cuba.

Military Training. Witnesses and former trainees have described several camps in Cuba dedicated specifically to military training, including one in Pinar del Rio Province and another near Guanabo, east of Havana. The camps can accommodate several hundred trainees. Groups from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Colombia, Grenada, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, Chile, and Uruguay have been trained in

⁵Prensa Latina, the press agency of the Cuban Government, has field offices in 35 countries, including 11 Latin American and Caribbean countries, and combines news gathering and propaganda dissemination with intelligence operations. Radio Havana, Cuba's shortwave broadcasting service, transmits more than 350 program hours per week in eight languages to all points of the world. Cuba also transmits nightly mediumwave Spanish-language broadcasts over "La Voz de Cuba," a network of high-powered transmitters located in different parts of Cuba. In the Caribbean alone, Radio Havana's weekly broadcasts include 14 hours in Creole to Haiti; 60 hours in English; 3 hours in French; and 125 hours in Spanish. Prensa Latina and Radio Havana, in close coordination with TASS and Radio Moscow, regularly use disinformation to distort news reports transmitted to the region, especially those concerning places where Cuban covert activities are most intense.

these facilities during the past 2 years.⁶

Recruits are normally provided false documentation (sometimes Cuban passports) by Cuban agents in third countries and are flown to Cuba on civil aircraft under cover as "students" or other occupations. Panama has been used as a regular transit point for Central and South Americans to and from military training in Cuba.⁷

Once in Cuba, trainees generally are taken immediately to the guerrilla training camps where they usually are grouped according to nationality and the organization for which they are being trained in order to promote a sense of cohesiveness and esprit de corps.

Training normally lasts 3-6 months and consists of instruction by Cuban cadres in sabotage, explosives, military tactics, and weapons use. Although military training is frequently tied closely to operational requirements—the M-19 guerrillas who landed in Colombia in early 1981 did so immediately upon completion of their military instruction in Cuba—witnesses report that political indoctrination is also included in the curriculum.

Many Cuban instructors are active military officers and veterans of Cuban expeditionary forces in Africa. Soviet personnel have been reported at these camps, but they apparently do not participate directly in the guerrilla training.

Political Training. Each year Cuba offers hundreds of scholarships to foreign students. All Cuban mass organizations operate schools in organizational

⁶Latin Americans are not the only trainees. In a May 1978 Reuters interview published in Beirut, Abu Khalaf, a leader of the military branch of Al Fatah, confirmed that Palestinian agents have received training in Cuba since the late 1960s. Palestinian organizations, with Cuban assistance, have reciprocated by training various Latin American groups in the Middle East. Libya, which hosted a meeting of Latin American "liberation movements" January 25-February 1, 1979, also has trained some Latin American extremists.

⁷Public exposure in March 1981 of the use of Panama as a transit point for Colombian guerrillas trained in Cuba led to sharp criticism of Cuba by the Panamanian Government. Panama imposed greater controls on activities of exiled Central and South Americans, and the transit of guerrillas through Panama appears to have ceased, at least temporarily.

work and indoctrination open to carefully selected foreign students.⁸ In addition, some 11,000 non-Cuban secondary school students, mostly teenagers, were enrolled in 1980 in 15 schools on the Isle of Youth alone. Cuba does not publicize complete foreign enrollment statistics nor does it release the names of those trained. From the eastern Caribbean alone, close to 300 students are currently in Cuba studying technical and academic subjects. The study of Marxism-Leninism is compulsory in many courses, and military affairs is compulsory in some. When governments have turned down Cuban scholarship offers, as occurred recently in Belize and Dominica, Cuba has gone ahead and concluded private agreements. Local Marxist-Leninist groups with ties to Cuba play a major role in selecting those students who receive scholarships.

In sum, the infrastructure for Cuba's intensified revolutionary agitation in Latin America is a multifaceted yet carefully coordinated mechanism. The Cuban Communist Party, through its America Department, provides cohesion and direction to a complex network that consists of intelligence officers, elements of Cuba's foreign ministry, armed forces, mass organizations, commercial and cultural entities, and front groups.

This extensive apparatus is designed to support one objective: a systematic, long-range campaign to destabilize governments.

⁸Courses in agitation and propaganda open to foreigners include the Central Union of Cuban Workers' Lazaro Pena Trade Union Cadre School and similar courses run by the Union of Young Communists, the Cuban Women's Federation, the National Association of Small Farmers, and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Even the Cuban Communist Party offers special courses for non-Cubans in party provincial schools and in the Nico Lopez National Training School, its highest educational institution. The Cuban press reported graduation ceremonies July 17, 1981, for this year's 70 Cuban graduates and announced that 69 foreigners had also attended advanced courses at the Nico Lopez school. Foreign students represented political organizations from Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Chile, Grenada, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Sao Tome y Principe, and South Yemen. Official Cuban Communist Party newspaper *Granma* labeled their presence "a beautiful example of proletarian internationalism." Courses of instruction at the Nico Lopez school, which is chaired by senior party leaders, include "political training for journalists," "political training for propagandists," economics, and ideology.

III. CASE STUDIES

The Cuban activities described in the case studies which follow must be considered to understand developments within the countries in question. However, the focus of the case studies is Cuban involvement in each country. Readers should, therefore, guard against assuming that the cases below provide a comprehensive picture of the general situation in the country where the events described have taken place.

Central America

Nicaragua. In July 1979, internal and external factors converged to bring about the triumph of the anti-Somoza insurrection and the subsequent domination of the new Nicaragua Government by the Cuban-trained leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). These events provided a key test for Cuba's new mechanisms and strategy for promoting armed pro-Cuban movements in this hemisphere.

Opposition to Somoza's authoritarian rule in the late 1970s was widespread. The 1978 killing of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, publisher of Nicaragua's most respected newspaper, *La Prensa*, converted many Nicaraguans to the armed opposition of which the FSLN was the core; FSLN assurances on democracy and pluralism were accepted by newly allied political moderates and private businessmen. Internationally, sympathy for the struggle against Somoza led Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica to aid the insurgents, while Somoza stood practically without friends.

This environment enabled Cuba to disguise the extent of its support for the FSLN and avoid disrupting the fragile alliances between the FSLN and other opponents of Somoza. Behind the scenes, Cuba played an active role in organizing the FSLN and in training and equipping it militarily.

Cuba had provided some training and arms to the FSLN in the early 1960s. Until late 1977, however, Cuban support consisted mainly of propaganda and subversion.

In 1977 and early 1978, a high-ranking America Department official, Armando Ulises Estrada,⁹ made

⁹Ulises Estrada was given his first ambassadorial post in Jamaica following the July 1979 victory of anti-Somoza forces (see Jamaica case study). He is currently Cuba's ambassador to South Yemen.

numerous secret trips to facilitate the uprising by working to unify the three major factions of the FSLN. Stepped-up Cuban support to the Sandinistas was conditioned on effective unity. During the XI World Youth Festival in Havana in late July 1978, the Cubans announced that the unification of the three factions had been achieved and urged Latin American radicals present at the meeting to demonstrate solidarity with the FSLN by staging operations in their own countries.

At the same time, Estrada concentrated on building a supply network for channeling arms and other supplies to guerrilla forces. International sympathy for the struggle against Somoza provided a convenient facade for Cuban operations. In preparation for the first FSLN offensive in the fall of 1978, arms were flown from Cuba to Panama, transhipped to Costa Rica on smaller planes, and supplied to Nicaraguan guerrillas based in northern Costa Rica. To monitor and assist the flow, the America Department established a secret operations center in San Jose. By the end of 1978, Cuban advisers were dispatched to northern Costa Rica to train and equip the FSLN forces with arms which began to arrive direct from Cuba. FSLN guerrillas trained in Cuba, however, continued to return to Nicaragua via Panama.

In early 1979, Cuba helped organize, arm, and transport an "internationalist brigade" to fight alongside FSLN guerrillas. Members were drawn from several Central and South American extremist groups, many of them experienced in terrorist activities. Castro also dispatched Cuban military specialists to the field to help coordinate the war efforts. Factionalism threatened Sandinista unity again in early 1979, and Castro met personally with leaders of three FSLN factions to hammer out a renewed unity pact.

When the insurgents' final offensive was launched in mid-1979, Cuban military advisers from the Department of Special Operations, a special military unit, were with FSLN columns and maintained direct radio communications to Havana. A number of Cuban advisers were wounded in combat and were evacuated to Cuba via Panama.

The operations center run by the America Department in San Jose was the focal point for coordination of Cuba's support. After the triumph of the anti-Somoza forces in July 1979, the chief of

the center, Julian Lopez Diaz, became Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua. One of his America Department assistants in San Jose, Andres Barahona, was redocumented as a Nicaraguan citizen and became a top official of the Nicaraguan intelligence service.

Castro has counseled the Sandinistas to protect their Western ties to keep the country afloat economically. But to insure that the FSLN could move to dominate the Nicaraguan Government, Cuba has acted quickly to build up Sandinista military and security forces.

Since July 1979, Cuba has provided substantial military, technical, and political assistance. Some 6,000 Cuban advisers, teachers, and medical personnel work at all levels of the military and civilian infrastructures.¹⁰ Of this number, more than 1,500 military and security advisers are actively providing military instruction and combat training; instruction in intelligence and counter-intelligence activities; instruction on security protection for the FSLN leadership; and advice on organization of the Nicaraguan police force. In addition, Nicaragua has received within the past year approximately \$28 million worth of military equipment from the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and Cuba. This has included tanks, light aircraft, helicopters, heavy artillery, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft weapons, hundreds of military transport vehicles, as well as tons of small arms and ammunition.

Cuba presently is using Nicaraguan territory to provide training and other facilities to guerrillas active in neighboring countries. The Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua and other America Department officials frequently meet with Central American guerrillas in Managua to advise them on tactics and strategy. Individual Sandinista leaders have participated in such meetings and have met independently with Guatemalan and Salvadoran insurgents. The FSLN also

¹⁰The very quantity of Cuban advisers has caused resentment among nationalist Nicaraguans, leading to sporadic outbursts of anti-Cuban feelings. On June 3, 1981, the FSLN announced that 2,000 Cuban primary school teachers presently in Nicaragua would return to Cuba in July, at the mid-point of Nicaragua's academic year. The Nicaraguan Education Minister announced on June 18 that 300 of those departing would return in September after vacations in Cuba, while Cuba would replace the other 1,200 teachers in February. By November 1981, however, all 2,000 Cuban teachers had returned to Nicaragua.

has cooperated in a joint effort by Cuba and Palestinian groups to provide military training in the Mideast to selected Latin American extremists. Some Sandinistas were themselves trained by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which maintains an embassy in Nicaragua.

Between October 1980 and February 1981, Nicaragua was the staging site for a massive Cuban-directed flow of arms to Salvadoran guerrillas. Arms destined for Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas continue to pass through Nicaragua.

El Salvador. Before 1979, Cuban support to Salvadoran radicals involved training small numbers of guerrillas, providing modest financial aid, and serving as a political conduit between Salvadoran extremists and Communists outside the hemisphere.

During the Nicaraguan civil war, Cuba concentrated on support for the FSLN. After the fall of Somoza, Cuba began intense efforts to help pro-Cuban guerrillas come to power in El Salvador. When a reform-minded, civil-military government was established in October 1979, Cuba's first priority was to tighten the political organization and unity of El Salvador's fragmented violent left. At first, arms shipments and other aid from Cuba were kept low as the Cubans insisted on a unified strategy as the price of increased material support. To forge unity, Cuba sponsored a December 1979 meeting in Havana that resulted in an initial unity agreement among the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), and the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), which had itself formed an armed wing at Cuban and Soviet insistence. In late May 1980, after more negotiations in Havana, the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) was admitted into the guerrilla coalition.

The new combined military command assumed the name of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU). During this period, Cuba also coordinated the development of clandestine support networks in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, sometimes using arms supply mechanisms established during the Nicaraguan civil war.

With unified tactics and operations now possible, Cuba began to assist the guerrillas in formulating military strategy. Cuban specialists helped the DRU devise initial war plans in the summer of 1980. The Cubans influenced the guerrillas to launch a general offensive in January 1981. After the offensive failed, guerrilla leaders traveled to Havana in February 1981 to finalize a

strategy to "improve our internal military situation" by engaging in a "negotiating maneuver" to gain time to regroup.¹¹

Cuba provided few weapons and ammunition to Salvadoran guerrillas from its own resources but played a key role in coordinating the acquisition and delivery of arms from Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Eastern Europe through Nicaragua.¹² After the unmasking of this network, Cuba and Nicaragua reduced the flow in March and early April. Prior to a guerrilla offensive in August an upswing in deliveries occurred. The arms flow continues via clandestine surface and air routes. In addition, the Cubans over the past year have established a network of small ships to deliver arms to Salvadoran insurgent groups.

Cuba also assists the Salvadoran guerrillas in contacts with Arab radical states and movements to arrange military training and financing for arms acquisitions. In September 1980, Cuba laundered \$500,000 in Iraqi funds for the Salvadoran insurgents. In March 1981, the Salvadoran Communist Party Secretary General, Shafiq Handal, visited Lebanon and Syria to meet with Palestinian leaders. Cuba also coordinates the training of a relatively small number of Salvadoran guerrillas in Palestinian camps in the Mideast.

Cuban training of Salvadoran guerrillas increased sharply in 1980 as Cuba concentrated on building a trained army able to mount major offensives. A typical 3-month training program included courses in guerrilla tactics; marksmanship and weapons use; field engineering; demolition; fortification construction; land navigation; use of artillery and mines. One observer reported seeing groups up to battalion size (250-500 men) under instruction, sug-

¹¹A guerrilla document outlining this strategy was found in Nicaragua in February 1981. Guerrilla representatives later confirmed its authenticity to Western Europeans with the disclaimer that the strategy elaborately developed in the paper had been rejected.

¹²The Cuban role as arms broker to the DRU since 1979 has been documented in the Department of State's Special Report No. 80, *Communist Interference in El Salvador*, February 23, 1981. In April 1981, when Socialist International representative Wischniewski confronted Castro with the evidence in the report, Castro admitted to him that Cuba had shipped arms to the guerrillas. In discussions with several Inter-Parliamentary Union delegations at the September 1981 IPU conference in Havana, Castro again conceded that Cuba had supplied arms.

gesting that some guerrillas trained as integral units.¹³

Cuba has provided selected guerrillas more intensive training on specialized subjects. A former FPL guerrilla who defected in fall 1981 reported that during 1980 he had received 7 months of military training in Cuba, including instruction in scuba diving and underwater demolition. Soviet scuba equipment was used. The group trained as frogmen called themselves "combat swimmers" and were told that their mission was to destroy dams, bridges, port facilities, and boats.

Cuba also gives political, organizational, and propaganda support to the guerrillas. Cuban diplomatic facilities worldwide help guerrilla front groups with travel arrangements and contacts. The Cuban press agency, Prensa Latina, has handled communications for guerrilla representation abroad. Cuba and the Soviet Union have pressed Communist parties and radical groups to support the insurgency directly, and through solidarity organizations with propaganda and facilities (office space, equipment, etc.).

The Salvadoran insurgents have publicly stressed the importance of solidarity groups. A member of the FPL, Oscar Bonilla, who attended the Fourth Consultative Meeting in Havana of the Continental Organization of Latin American Students (OCLAE), a Cuban front group, told Radio Havana in August 1981 that OCLAE "has been the most important means of solidarity of all the peoples and has gotten us ready to form an anti-interventionist student front in El Salvador, Central America and the Caribbean. . . . We believe that it is good to carry out immediate plans for actions which will permit us to stop an imperialist intervention in El Salvador. In this respect, the students of Latin America will have to confront and attack U.S. interests so that the United States will see how the Latin American and Caribbean student movement responds to an aggression by imperialism in El Salvador."

With Soviet assistance, Cuba has orchestrated propaganda to distort the realities of the Salvadoran conflict. Unattributed foreign media placements and efforts to organize protests against the Salvadoran Government and U.S. policy, which have accompanied official propaganda, stress the theme of U.S. in-

¹³Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez tacitly admitted that Cuba was providing military training to Salvadoran guerrillas in an interview published in *Der Spiegel* on September 28, 1981.

tent to intervene militarily in El Salvador.

Unfounded claims and accusations originated by the Salvadoran guerrillas are routinely replayed to a regional and world audience by Cuba's Radio Havana or Prensa Latina, then echoed by the official Soviet Press Agency TASS, Radio Moscow, and Eastern European media. For example, a false report of a U.S. soldier killed in El Salvador that resounded widely in Cuban/Soviet propaganda during 1980 was traced finally to the Salvadoran Communist Party. This rumor was to support an even bigger lie: that hundreds of U.S. soldiers were in El Salvador, building U.S. bases, and herding peasants into Vietnam-style strategic hamlets.¹⁴

Guatemala. Castro has stepped up Cuba's support to Guatemalan guerrillas whom he has aided with arms and training since he came to power.

As elsewhere, Cuba has influenced divided extremist groups to unite and has conditioned increased Cuban aid on a commitment to armed struggle and a unified strategy. During 1980, discussions about a unity agreement were held among leaders of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), and the dissident faction of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT/D). At the invitation of Sandinista leaders, representatives of the four groups met in Managua under strict security to continue discussions. In November 1980, the four organizations signed a unity agreement in Managua to establish the National Revolutionary Union (with a revolutionary directorate called the General Revolutionary Command—CGR). Manuel Fineiro Losada, Chief of the America Department, and Ramiro Jesus Abreu Quintana, head of its Central American Division, represented Fidel Castro at the signing ceremony. Following the signing of the unity agreement, representatives of the CGR traveled to Havana to present the document to Castro. ORPA publicized the agreement in a communique issued

¹⁴At the time these reports first appeared, the United States was providing neither arms nor ammunition to El Salvador. In January 1981, the United States responded to the Cuban-orchestrated general offensive by sending some military assistance and later sent American military trainers, whose number never exceeded 55. There are no U.S. combatants, bases, or strategic hamlets in El Salvador. TASS continues to report falsely that "hundreds" of U.S. military personnel are in El Salvador and participate in combat.

November 18, 1980. All parties agreed it was significant that the unity agreement was the first such document signed on Central American soil.

After this unity agreement was concluded, Cuba agreed to increase military training and assistance. A large number of the 2,000 or more guerrillas now active have trained in Cuba. Recent military training programs have included instruction in the use of heavy weapons.

During the past year, arms have been smuggled to Guatemala from Nicaragua passing overland through Honduras. The guerrilla arsenal now includes 50mm mortars, submachine guns, rocket launchers, and other weapons. Captured M-16 rifles have been traced to U.S. forces in Vietnam. On June 26, 1981, Paulino Castillo, a 28-year-old guerrilla with ORPA, told newsmen in Guatemala that he was part of a 23-man group of Guatemalans that underwent 7 months of training in Cuba, beginning around February 1980. His group was divided into sections for urban and rural combat training in explosives and firearms use. To get to Cuba, Castillo traveled to Costa Rica from Guatemala by public bus. In Costa Rica, a go-between obtained a Panamanian passport for Castillo to enter Panama. In Panama, other contacts equipped him with a Cuban passport and he continued on to Cuba. Castillo returned to Guatemala via Nicaragua to rejoin the guerrillas. He later surrendered to a Guatemalan army patrol.

Guatemalan guerrillas have collaborated with Salvadoran guerrillas. In January 1981, the EGP, ORPA, FAR, and the PGTVD circulated a joint bulletin announcing the intensification of their activities in support of the general offensive in El Salvador. The Salvadorans in turn have provided the Guatemalans with small quantities of arms.

Unity has not been fully achieved, as the four groups have not yet carried out plans to establish a political front group. The joint military strategy, however, is being implemented. The guerrillas have stepped up terrorist actions in an effort to provoke repression and destabilize the government. For example, the EGP took responsibility for placing a bomb in one of the pieces of luggage that was to have been loaded onto a U.S. Eastern Airlines plane on July 2. The bomb exploded before being loaded, killing a Guatemalan airport employee.

Costa Rica. Cuba took advantage of Costa Rica's strong popular and governmental opposition to Somoza's authoritarian government and of Costa Rica's open democratic society to estab-

lish and coordinate a covert support network for guerrilla operations elsewhere in Central America. The apparatus was established during the course of the Nicaraguan civil war and maintained clandestinely thereafter. Costa Rica was well disposed toward groups that opposed Somoza, including the Sandinista guerrillas. Aid provided by Panama and Venezuela was openly funneled through Costa Rica to the Nicaraguan rebels. Cuba, however, kept its role largely hidden.

A Special Legislative Commission established in June 1980 by the Costa Rican legislature revealed Cuba's extensive role in arming the Nicaraguan guerrillas. The commission determined that there were at least 21 flights carrying war materiel between Cuba and Liano Grande and Juan Santamaria Airports in Costa Rica.¹⁵

Costa Rican pilots who made these flights reported that Cubans frequently accompanied the shipments. Although Cubans were stationed at Liano Grande, their main operations center for coordinating logistics and contacts with the Sandinistas was set up secretly in San Jose and run by America Department official Lopez Diaz. The Special Legislative Commission estimated that a minimum of 1 million pounds of arms moved to Costa Rica from Cuba and elsewhere during the Nicaraguan civil war, including anti-aircraft machine-guns, rocket launchers, bazookas, and mortars. The commission also estimated that a substantial quantity of these weapons remained in Costa Rica after the fall of Somoza in July 1979.

The Special Legislative Commission concluded that after the Nicaraguan civil war had ended, "arms trafficking [began], originating in Costa Rica or through Costa Rican territory, toward El Salvador, indirectly or using Honduras as a bridge." Through 1980 and into 1981 traffic flowed intermittently through Costa Rica to El Salvador, directed clandestinely by the Cubans.

In the summer of 1979, the Cubans and their paid agent, Fernando Carrasco Illanes, a Chilean national residing in Costa Rica, along with several Costa Ricans previously involved in the logistics effort for the FSLN, agreed to continue smuggling arms to Salvadoran guerrillas. The Cubans arranged for acquisition of some of the arms and ammunition remaining in Costa Rica from the Nicaraguan airlift to supply the Salvadoran insurgents.

¹⁵The commission's report was issued May 14, 1981.

This new Cuban operation was coordinated from San Jose, first from their secret operations center, then later directly from the Cuban Consulate. The major coordinator, until his expulsion from Costa Rica in May 1981 following the break in consular relations between Costa Rica and Cuba, was Fernando Pascual Comas Perez of the America Department. Comas worked directly for Manuel Pineiro and had the cover title of Cuban Vice Consul in San Jose. Cuban agents made arrangements to store arms for transshipment to El Salvador and to help hundreds of Salvadoran guerrillas pass through Costa Rica in small groups on their way to training in Cuba. Cuban operations have been facilitated by Costa Rica's three Marxist-Leninist parties, which have provided funds, safehaven, transportation, and false documents.¹⁶

Terrorism had been virtually unknown in Costa Rica until March 1981 except for scattered incidents of largely foreign origin. The first Costa Rican terrorists made their appearance in March when they blew up a vehicle carrying a Costa Rican chauffeur and three Marine security guards from the U.S. Embassy in San Jose. In April, four terrorists from the same group were captured after machine-gunning a police vehicle. In June, the group murdered three policemen and a taxi driver. Costa Rican authorities have arrested some 20 accused terrorists and are continuing to investigate leads linking them to South American terrorist groups such as the Argentine Montoneros, the Uruguayan Tupamaros, and Colombia's M-19, and to Cuba itself. Two of the accused terrorists are known to have received training in the Soviet Union.

Director of the Judicial Investigation Organization Eduardo Aguilar Bloise told a press conference August 12 that captured terrorist documents indicated that two Costa Rican peasants had been given "ideological/military training" in

¹⁶In a recorded interview broadcast by Radio Havana on June 16, 1981, Eduardo Mora, Deputy Secretary General of Costa Rica's Popular Vanguard Party (the Moscow-line traditional Communist party, the least disposed to violence of the country's several Marxist parties and splinter groups) explained his party's position: "We establish ties with all revolutionary organizations in Central America. We have close ties and are willing to give all the aid we possibly can in accordance with the principles of proletarian internationalism because we believe that the struggle of the Central American people is the struggle of our own people."

Cuba and returned to work in the Atlantic coastal zone of Costa Rica. The documents indicate that the two were in Cuba from 8 to 12 months—possibly in 1978—and were financed by the terrorist group known popularly in Costa Rica as "the family." Aguilar said he did not discount the possibility that others had been trained in Cuba.

Although most of Costa Rica's Marxist-Leninist parties have advocated a peaceful line in respect to Costa Rica, one group with close ties to Cuba—the Revolutionary Movement of the People (MRP)—while disavowing responsibility for terrorist acts, has spoken of them as "well intentioned." Some of the arrested terrorists are known to have belonged to the MRP at one time. On November 5, the Office of National Security announced the discovery of a terrorist cell clearly connected with the MRP. Among the arms and terrorist paraphernalia confiscated was an Uzi submachinegun with silencer. Earlier, the authorities had confiscated a "plan for Guanacaste" from an MRP official which noted such objectives as "prevent the electoral process from developing in a festive atmosphere" and "the taking of power by the armed people." The head of the MRP has traveled many times to Cuba, and Cuba has given training to other MRP leaders.

Honduras. Cuba provided para-military training to a small number of Hondurans in the early 1960s, but relations with Honduran radicals were strained until the late 1970s. Cuba then resumed military training for members of the Honduran Communist Party (PCH) and integrated them into the "internationalist brigade" fighting in the Nicaraguan civil war. After the war, PCH members returned to Cuba for additional training.

Since then Cuba has concentrated primarily on developing Honduras as a conduit for arms and other aid to guerrillas active elsewhere in Central America. In January 1981, Honduran officials discovered a large cache of concealed arms intended for Salvadoran guerrillas, which included M-16 rifles traced to Vietnam. Smuggled arms have continued to be intercepted.

While considering Honduras a useful support base for insurgencies elsewhere, Cuba is also working to develop the capacity for insurrection within Honduras. In the normal pattern, Havana has urged splintered extremist groups in Honduras to unify and embrace armed struggle. While holding back from levels of support given to Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas, Cuba has in-

creased its training of Honduran extremists in political organization and military operations. Cuba has also promised to provide Honduran guerrillas their own arms, including submachine-guns and rifles.

On November 27, Honduran authorities discovered a guerrilla safehouse on the outskirts of Tegucigalpa. Two guerrillas were killed in the resulting shootout, including a Uruguayan citizen. Nicaraguans as well as Hondurans were captured at the house, where a substantial arsenal of automatic weapons and explosives was seized. Incriminating documents, including notebooks which indicate recent attendance in training courses in Cuba, were also confiscated. One of those arrested, Jorge Pinel Betancourt, a 22-year-old Honduran, told reporters the group was headed for El Salvador to join Salvadoran guerrillas. Two additional guerrilla safehouses located in La Ceiba and San Pedro Sula were raided on November 29, and authorities seized sizable arms caches, explosives, and communications equipment. These arms may have been destined for use within Honduras.

The Caribbean

Jamaica. In the late 1970s, Jamaica became a special target for Cuba. Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials developed close relationships with important members of the People's National Party, which governed Jamaica from 1973 until 1980. Cuban security personnel trained Jamaican security officers in Cuba and Jamaica, including members of the security force of the office of the Prime Minister. Cuba also trained about 1,400 Jamaican youths in Cuba as construction workers through a "brigadista" program. Political indoctrination in Cuba formed part of this group's curriculum. A considerable number of these Jamaican youths received military training while in Cuba, including instruction in revolutionary tactics and use of arms.

During this same period, the Cuban diplomatic mission in Jamaica grew. Most of the embassy staff, including former Ambassador Ulises Estrada, were Cuban intelligence agents. Ulises Estrada, who had served as a deputy head of the America Department for 5 years, had a long history of involvement in political action activities and intelligence operations and went to Jamaica in July 1979, after playing a major role in Cuba's involvement in the Nicaraguan civil war.

Cuba was instrumental in smuggling arms and ammunition into Jamaica. A Cuban front corporation (Moonex International, registered in Lichtenstein, with subsidiaries in Panama and Jamaica) was discovered in May 1980 to be the designated recipient of a shipment of 200,000 shotgun shells and .38 caliber pistol ammunition shipped illegally to Jamaica from Miami. Jamaican authorities apprehended the local manager of the corporation, accompanied by the Jamaican Minister of National Security and Cuban Ambassador Estrada, as the manager was attempting to leave the country, in defiance of police instructions, on a private plane. The manager subsequently paid a fine of U.S. \$300,000 set by a Jamaican court.

In 1980, weapons were reported stockpiled in the Cuban Embassy for possible use by Jamaicans during the election campaign. M-16 rifles then appeared in Jamaica for the first time and were used in attacks against supporters of the opposition Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the security forces. Over 70 of these weapons have been found by Jamaican authorities. Some of the M-16s found in Jamaica have serial numbers in the same numerical series as captured M-16s shipped to Salvadoran guerrillas from Vietnam.

Ambassador Ulises Estrada was withdrawn from his post in November 1980, at the request of the newly elected JLP government. In January 1981, the Jamaican Government terminated the "brigadista" program and recalled Jamaican students remaining in Cuba under this program. The government decided to maintain diplomatic relations but warned Cuba to stop its interference in Jamaican affairs. Cuba continued to maintain some 15 intelligence agents at the Cuban Embassy in Kingston. On October 29, the government broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, citing Cuba's failure to return three Jamaican fugitive criminals as the immediate cause for this action. On November 17, the government publicly detailed Cuba's role in providing covert military training under the curtailed "brigadista" program.

Guyana. In 1978, as many as 200 Cuban technicians, advisers, and medical personnel were stationed in Guyana. However, while claiming fraternal relations with Guyana's Government, Cuba maintained contact with radical opposition groups. Guyanese authorities suspected the Cubans of involvement in a crippling sugar strike. In August 1978, five Cuban diplomats were expelled for involvement in illegal activities.

Cuban military advisers have provided guerrilla training outside Guyana to members of a small radical Guyanese opposition group, the Working People's Alliance. Five of the seven members of the Cuban Embassy are known or suspected intelligence agents.

Grenada. Cuban influence in Grenada mushroomed almost immediately after the March 1979 coup led by the New Jewel Movement of Maurice Bishop. Bishop and his closest colleagues were Western-educated Marxist radicals, and they turned for help to Fidel Castro, who proved willing to provide assistance.

To allow close Cuban supervision of Grenadian programs, a senior intelligence officer from the America Department, Julian Torres Rizo, was sent to Grenada as ambassador. Torres Rizo has maintained intimate relations with Bishop and other People's Revolutionary Government ministers, such as Bernard Coard.

The Grenadian Government has followed a pro-Soviet foreign policy line. Cuban and Grenadian voting records in international organizations have been nearly identical, so much so that they alone of all Western Hemisphere nations have voted against U.N. resolutions condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Cuban aid to Grenada has been most extensive in those areas which affect the security of its client government and the island's strategic usefulness to Cuba. Cuba has advisers on the island offering military, technical, security, and propaganda assistance to the Bishop government. Many Grenadians have been sent to Cuba for training in these areas. Last year journalists observed Cuban officials directing and giving orders to Grenadian soldiers marching in ceremonies in St. George's.

Cuba is aiding the construction of a 75-kilowatt transmitter for Radio Free Grenada. Grenada's state-controlled press, enjoying a government-enforced monopoly, currently heeds to a strict "revolutionary" line. Indications are that the new transmitter will continue this emphasis while providing facilities for beaming Cuban and Soviet-supplied propaganda into the Caribbean and South America.

Cuba's largest project in Grenada is the construction of a major airfield at Point Salines on the southern tip of the island. Cuba has provided hundreds of construction workers and Soviet equipment to build the airfield. This airfield, according to Grenadian Government statements, is required to bring tourism

to its full economic potential and will be used as a civilian airport only. Many questions have been raised, however, about the economic justification for the project. The Grenadian Government has ignored requests for a standard project analysis of economic benefits. The planned 9,800-foot Point Salines runway, moreover, has clear military potential. Such an airfield will allow operations of every aircraft in the Soviet/Cuban inventory. Cuba's MiG aircraft and troop transports will enjoy a greater radius of operation. The airport will give Cuba a guaranteed refueling stop for military flights to Africa.

Bishop himself has given an implicit endorsement of future military use of the airfield. A March 31, 1980 *Newsweek* report quoted Bishop's comments to a U.S. reporter: "Suppose there's a war next door in Trinidad, where the forces of Fascism are about to take control, and the Trinidadians need external assistance, why should we oppose anybody passing through Grenada to assist them?"

Dominican Republic. With its renewed commitment to armed struggle, Cuba's interest in the Dominican Republic has revived. Since early 1980, the Cubans have been encouraging radicals in the Dominican Republic to unite and prepare for armed actions. Cuban intelligence officials, like Omar Cordoba Rivas, chief of the Dominican Republic desk of the America Department, make periodic visits to the island.

The Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Communist countries have mounted extensive training programs for Dominican students. In July 1981, the Moscow-line Dominican Communist Party (PCD) for the first time publicized the Soviet scholarship program. Some 700 Dominican students are currently studying at Soviet universities, principally Patrice Lumumba University, with another 75 in five other Communist states (Bulgaria, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Romania). The PCD itself selects the more than 100 students who begin the Soviet program each year.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has been pressuring the PCD to unite with other extreme left organizations. The PCD and the pro-Cuban Dominican Liberation Party receive funds from both Cuba and the Soviet Union and send significant numbers of their members and potential sympathizers for academic and political schooling as well as military training in Communist countries. Cuba also has given military instruction to many members of small extremist splinter groups like the Social

Workers Movement and the Socialist Party.

South America

Colombia. Since the 1960s, Cuba has nurtured contacts with violent extremist groups in democratic Colombia. During the 1970s, Cuba established full diplomatic relations with Colombia; Cuban involvement with Colombian revolutionaries was fairly limited, although Cuba provided some training to guerrilla leadership. Many leaders of the April 19 Movement (M-19), including the founder, Jaime Bateman—who also attended a Communist cadre school in Moscow—were trained in Cuba. Leaders of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Moscow-oriented Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) also received Cuban instruction.

Cuban assistance to Colombian guerrillas was stepped up after the February 1980 seizure of the Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota. A number of diplomats, including the U.S. Ambassador, were taken hostage by M-19 terrorists. As part of a negotiated settlement, the terrorists were flown on April 17, 1980 to Cuba, where the remaining hostages were released and the terrorists were given asylum.

During mid-1980, Cuban intelligence officers arranged a meeting of Colombian extremists, attended by representatives from the M-19, FARC, ELN, and other Colombian radical groups, to discuss a common strategy and tactics. The M-19 had previously held talks with the Nicaraguan FSLN on ways to achieve unity of action among guerrilla groups in Latin America. Although the meeting did not result in agreement by Colombian guerrillas on a unified strategy, practical cooperation among the guerrilla organizations increased.

In late 1980, the M-19 set in motion a large-scale operation in Colombia with Cuban help. In November, the M-19 sent guerrillas to Cuba via Panama to begin training for the operation. The group included new recruits as well as members who had received no prior political or military training. In Cuba the guerrillas were given 3 months of military instruction from Cuban army instructors, including training in the use of explosives, automatic weapons, hand-to-hand combat, military tactics, and communications. A course in politics and ideology was taught as well. Members of the M-19 group given asylum in Cuba after the takeover of the Dominican Republic Embassy also participated in the training program.

In February 1981, some 100-200 armed M-19 guerrillas infiltrated into Colombia from Panama by boat along the Pacific coast. The guerrillas' mission to establish a "people's army" failed. The M-19 members proved to be poorly equipped for the difficult countryside, and the Cuba-organized operation was soon dismantled by Colombian authorities. Among those captured was Rosenberg Pabon Pabon, the M-19 leader who had directed the Dominican Republic Embassy takeover and then fled to Cuba. Cuba denied any involvement with the M-19 landings but did not deny training the guerrillas.¹⁷

Cuba's propaganda support for Colombian terrorists was impossible to deny. When a group apparently consisting of M-19 dissidents kidnaped an American working for a private religious institute, Cu' implicitly supported the terrorists' action through Radio Havana broadcasts beamed to Colombia in February 1981, which denounced the institute workers as "U.S. spies." Radio Moscow picked up the unfounded accusation to use in its Spanish broadcasts to Latin America. The American was later murdered by the kidnapers.¹⁸

Colombia suspended relations with Cuba on March 23, in view of the clear evidence of Cuba's role in training M-19 guerrillas. President Turbay commented in an August 23 *New York Times* interview: "... When I found that Cuba, a country with which we had diplomatic relations, was using those relations to prepare a group of guerrillas to come and fight against the government, it was like sending ministers to Washington at the same time you are about to bomb ships in Hawaii."

Chile. After Allende's fall in 1973, Castro promised Chilean radicals "all the aid in Cuba's power to provide." Although Cuban officials maintained regular contact with many Chilean ex-

iles, divisions among the exiles inhibited major operations. The Moscow-line Chilean Communist Party (PCCH), holding the position that revolutionary change could be accomplished by non-violent means, was critical of "left-wing forces" like the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) with which Cuba had close relations.

Throughout the 1970s, members of the MIR received training in Cuba and in some cases instructed other Latin American revolutionaries. This training ranged from political indoctrination and instruction in small arms use to sophisticated courses in document fabrication, explosives, code writing, photography, and disguise. In addition, Cuban instructors trained MIR activists in the Mideast and Africa.

With its renewed commitment to armed struggle, Cuba increased its training of Chileans beginning in 1979. By mid-1979, the MIR had recruited several hundred Chilean exiles and sent them to Cuba for training and eventual infiltration into Chile. At the same time, members of the MIR who had been living and working in Cuba since Allende's overthrow began to receive training in urban guerrilla warfare techniques. The training in some cases lasted as long as 7 months and included organization and political strategy, small unit tactics, security, and communications.

Once training was completed, Cuba helped the terrorists return to Chile, providing false passports and false identification documents. By late 1980, at least 100 highly trained MIR terrorists had reentered Chile, and the MIR had claimed responsibility for a number of bombings and bank robberies. Cuba's official newspaper, *Granma*, wrote in February 1981 that the "Chilean Resistance" forces had successfully conducted more than 100 "armed actions" in Chile in 1980.

By late 1979, the PCCH was re-evaluating its position in light of events in Nicaragua, where the fragmented Nicaraguan Communist Party emerged from the civil war subservient to the FSLN. In December 1980, PCCH leader Luis Corvalan held talks in Cuba with Fidel Castro, who urged Corvalan to establish a unified Chilean opposition. During the Cuban Party Congress that month, Corvalan delivered a speech which sketched a new party line calling for armed struggle to overthrow the Chilean Government and for coordination of efforts by all parties, including the violent left. In January 1981, Corvalan commended MIR terrorist acts as "helpful" and stated that the PCCH was willing not only to talk with MIR repre-

sentatives but also to sign agreements with the group. Several days after this offer, Corvalan signed a unity agreement with several Chilean extremist groups, including the MIR.

Until January 1981, when the new PCCH policy evidently had been ironed out and validated by the agreement for a broad opposition coalition, Corvalan's statements were issued from such places as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Cuba, and Peru—but never from Moscow. Within 2 weeks of the agreement, however, Moscow showed its implicit approval of the policy change and began broadcasting in Spanish to Latin America—and to Chile in particular—PCCH explanations of the new policy and calls for mass resistance and acts of terrorism to overthrow the Chilean Government.

Terrorist activities by MIR commandos operating in Chile have increased substantially during the past year. These have included increased efforts by MIR activists to establish clandestine bases for rural insurgency, killings of policemen, and a number of assassination attempts against high government officials.

Argentina. The Cubans have a long history of association with, encouragement of, and active backing for terrorism in Argentina. The Cubans were linked to the two groups responsible for unleashing the wave of leftist terrorism that swept Argentina in the early and mid-1970s, the Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). Cuba backed these organizations with advice on tactics and instructions on recruiting operations and with training in Cuba in urban and rural guerrilla techniques. During the height of Argentine terrorism, the Cubans used their embassy in Buenos Aires to maintain direct liaison with Argentine terrorists.

The Argentine terrorists were virtually defeated by 1978. In that year, Castro permitted the Montonero national leadership to relocate its headquarters in Cuba. Today, the Montonero top command, its labor organization, and its intelligence organization, among other units, are all located in Cuba. The Cubans facilitate the travel and communications of Montoneros, supplying them with false documentation and access to Cuban diplomatic pouches. Montoneros have been among the Latin American guerrillas trained in guerrilla warfare over the past year in the Mideast as part of a cooperative effort between Palestinian groups and Cuba.

Following the move of their high command to Havana, the Montoneros made repeated attempts to infiltrate

¹⁷Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez explained in an interview published in *Der Spiegel* on September 28, 1981 why Cuba had not denied training the M-19 guerrillas: "We did not deny this because in the past few years many people came to our country for various reasons to ask for training. We did not deny this desire. If a revolutionary for Latin America wishes to learn the technique and organization of resistance for his own self-defense, we cannot refuse in view of the brutal oppression. This also holds true for the Salvadorans."

¹⁸The U.S. citizen killed, Chester Allen Bitterman, was working for the Summer Institute of Linguistics, a religious group which develops written forms of indigenous languages.

Argentina. In late 1979, small groups of infiltrators eluded detection and were able to carry out several terrorist actions, including four murders. Subsequent attempts by the Montoneros to infiltrate terrorists in early 1980 proved unsuccessful.

With Cuban support, Montoneros are active outside Argentina. Cuban-trained Montoneros were among the members of the "internationalist brigade" that Cuba supported in Nicaragua in 1979. This connection was highlighted when Montonero leader Mario Firmenich attended the first anniversary of the July 1979 victory, wearing the uniform of a Sandinista commander. Montoneros have been active elsewhere as well. Montoneros largely staffed and administered Radio Noticias del Continente, which broadcast Cuban propaganda to Central and South America from San Jose until it was closed by the Costa Rican Government in 1981, after war materiel was discovered on its installations.

Uruguay. After the failure of the urban insurgency organized in the early 1970s by the National Liberation Movement (MLN-Tupamaros), several hundred Tupamaros went to Cuba. During the mid-1970s, Cuba provided some of them with training in military and terrorist tactics, weapons, and intelligence. Several of these former Tupamaros subsequently assisted Cuba in running intelligence operations in Europe and Latin America. Some participated in the Cuban-organized "internationalist brigade" that fought in the Nicaraguan civil war.

Cuba continues to provide propaganda support for the Tupamaros and the Uruguayan Communist Party. Radio Havana reported on June 30, 1981 that the leader of the Communist Party of Uruguay attended a ceremony "in soli-

darity with the Uruguayan people's struggle" at the headquarters of the Cuban State Committee for Material and Technical Supply in Havana. Pro-Cuban Uruguayan leaders are given red carpet treatment when they visit Havana and are usually received by at least a member of the Cuban Politburo.

IV. POSTSCRIPT

Cuba's renewed campaign of violence has had a negative impact on Cuba's relations with its neighbors. Cuba's policies abroad and its reaction to emigration pressures at home have reversed the trend in Latin America toward normalization of relations. Although the Castro government has developed close ties to Nicaragua and Grenada, Cuba finds itself increasingly isolated throughout the Americas.

Peru nearly broke relations and removed its ambassador in April 1980, when the Cuban Government encouraged Cubans eager to leave the island to occupy the Peruvian Embassy. After more than 10,000 Cubans crowded into the embassy compound, Castro thwarted efforts by concerned governments to develop an orderly departure program and opened the port of Mariel to emigration, also expelling many criminals and the mentally ill, and ultimately allowing more than 125,000 people to leave under sometimes perilous conditions. But Cuba still refuses to issue safe conduct passes to the 14 Cubans who remain cloistered in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana today.

Cuba's neighbors were further shocked when Cuban MiG 21s sank the Bahamian patrol boat "Flamingo" on May 10, 1980 in an unprovoked attack in Bahamian coastal waters. Subsequently, four Bahamian seamen were machine-

gunned while trying to save themselves after their vessel sank. Their bodies were never recovered. U.S. Coast Guard aircraft were harassed by Cuban MiGs while searching for survivors at the request of the Bahamian Government.

Relations between Venezuela and Cuba deteriorated badly in 1980, principally over the asylum issue, to the degree that Venezuela removed its ambassador from Havana. In November 1980, Jamaica expelled the Cuban Ambassador for interference in Jamaica's internal affairs and in October 1981 broke diplomatic relations. Colombia suspended relations in March 1981 over Cuba's training of M-19 guerrillas. Cuba's handling of an incident in which a group of Cubans demanding asylum forcibly occupied Ecuador's Embassy in Havana prompted Ecuador to remove its ambassador from Cuba in May 1981. Also in May, Costa Rica severed its existing consular ties with Cuba, expelling Cuban officials active in coordinating support networks for Central American insurgents.

Today, outside the English-speaking Caribbean, only Argentina, Panama, Mexico, and Nicaragua conduct relatively normal relations through resident ambassadors in Havana. Use of Panama as a transit point for Colombian guerrillas, however, led Panama to reassess its relations with Cuba and resulted in sharp public criticism of Cuba's "manifest disregard for international standards of political co-existence" by a high Panamanian Government official. ■

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EXHIBIT B

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

APR 15 1982



Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of March 15 to Ambassador Enders requesting additional information related to testimony before the Subcommittee on March 12 on the subject of Cuban support for terrorism and insurgency in the Western Hemisphere. I know Ambassador Enders welcomed the opportunity to lay out in some detail the nature of the threat as we view it. We also welcome this opportunity to expand on those activities.

I am enclosing our answers to your questions for the public record. While we have tried to be forthcoming, we were unable to answer certain questions due to the sensitive nature of the information. In those cases, we have indicated our willingness to provide the Subcommittee a classified briefing. On some other questions, we have indicated that we are continuing our research and will forward complete answers under separate cover as soon as research is completed.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Alvin Paul Drischler
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

The Honorable
Jeremiah Denton, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism,
Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

Enclosure.

1. Q: Information has come to my attention that Soviet transport planes are stopping in Gander, Newfoundland to refuel; they then proceed directly over the east coast of the U.S. to Managua, Nicaragua, with military equipment and supplies. Apparently, the Soviets have the option of running these supplies through Cuba or dealing directly with the Nicaraguans themselves. Please comment upon this report.

A: We do not have evidence that the Soviets are shipping arms to Nicaragua via Gander and the East Coast of the United States. Reports on shipments of arms to Nicaragua involve sensitive collection methods and sources. We would be pleased to arrange a full briefing on this subject at your convenience.

We do know, however, that the Soviets have shipped some military equipment directly into Nicaragua although most is transitted via Cuba and other third countries.

2. Q: Reference has been made to the civilian advisors that Cuba has sent in large numbers to countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Grenada in addition to military personnel. What duties do these civilian advisors perform? In what areas do they function in host countries? Is it not a fact that many of these so-called civilian advisors are intelligence agents or military personnel operating undercover as advisors?

A: Most Cuban civilian advisors in developing nations are involved in technical assistance programs such as public health, road construction, agricultural assistance and other infrastructural projects and establishing ministries and bureaucracies. This includes political advisors and teachers as in Nicaragua and elsewhere. Such assistance promotes Cuban influence and Cuban policies, and often sets the stage for Cuban military and security advisors. While undoubtedly some of these civilian advisors are intelligence and military personnel, it is difficult to determine to what extent civilian advisors are involved in intelligence activities. We are prepared to give you a classified briefing on that subject, if you so desire.

3. Q: Do the 70 Russian military advisors in Nicaragua carry rifles? How about the more than 2000 Cuban advisors? The East Germans? The members of the Palestine Liberation Organization?

A: We are unable to confirm at this point whether any of the above groups carry rifles in their daily activities. However, in the past the modus operandi of the Soviets, Cubans and East Germans has been to carry arms.

4. Q: Please give the Department's assessment of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. How many personnel does it have? How many are actually intelligence agents of the DGI or other Cuban intelligence services? What restrictions are placed on the activities of these personnel while in the United States?

A: The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. has been very effective in establishing journalistic, academic, and congressional contacts as well as in its contacts with other diplomatic missions in Washington. It has been effective also in making contacts with minority groups elsewhere in the U.S. Members of the Cuban Interests Section are not restricted to Washington.

Under bilateral agreement between the United States and Cuba each nation is limited to 20 personnel in its respective Interests Section. The Cuban Interests Section is not always up to full strength. As to how many of the members of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. are suspected intelligence agents, I have to refer you to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. There are no special restrictions on Cuban mission personnel in Washington other than those which apply to all diplomats, namely that they must abide by the terms of their visas and not conduct business incompatible with their diplomatic status. Violation of that status by Cuban or other diplomatic personnel can result in expulsion or revocation of visa. One diplomat assigned to the Cuban Interests Section, First Secretary Ricardo Escartin, was expelled in February 1981.

5. Q: Please give us the Department of State's assessment of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations. How many personnel does it have. How many are actually intelligence agents of the DGI or other Cuban intelligence services? What restrictions are placed upon the activities of these personnel while in the United States? Does the number of members of the Mission remain constant during the year or does it fluctuate at times? If it

does fluctuate, please give specifics and give the Department's assessment of why this occurs.

A: The Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) has a 45 person diplomat staff and is the fourth largest such mission in New York. This representation, disproportionate to Cuba's size as a nation, reflects, at least in part, Cuba's active involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement and other multilateral bodies and the fact that the Cubans accredit all their personnel, including service staff, on the diplomatic list. Other missions to the United Nations rate the Cubans as very active and effective, particularly on procedural questions. We share that assessment.

We refer you to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on how many members of the Cuban staff may be suspected intelligence agents. There are no travel or other restrictions on the Cuban Mission to the UN. They are, however, subject to the conditions of their visas since they are admitted to perform UN diplomatic duties in New York. As with all UN missions they are not supposed to violate their status. The number of members present at the CMUN fluctuates according to how many issues of concern to Cuba are before the international body at any given time. As with many countries, Cuban representation swells during the General Assembly session.

6. Q: How does the size of the Cuban diplomatic staff in countries in Latin America compare with diplomatic staffs from pro-Western countries or with the US? In Southern Africa? Elsewhere in the world? Is the same true of diplomatic staffs of the Soviets Union and other communist countries?

A: We are currently researching that subject and will deliver a study to your committee under separate cover as soon as it is complete.

Q: What is the size of the U.S. Embassy staff, diplomatic and otherwise, in Moscow? Are these all Americans? What is the size of the Soviet staff in Washington? Are they all Soviets?

A: The American staff at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow numbers 162. Of this number, 128 are recognized by the Soviet Government as having diplomatic

rank. The remaining 34 Americans are members of the Embassy's Marine Security Detachment and government contractors working on the construction of the new Embassy in Moscow. Under the terms of a bilateral agreement we have with the Soviet Union, the Marines and contractors are accorded full diplomatic privileges and immunities by the Soviet Government. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow employs 190 Soviet nationals. These Soviet employees fill non-sensitive positions in the Embassy, working as maintenance men, drivers, charwomen, clerks, etc.

The staff of the Soviet Embassy in Washington total 263. The State Department lists 136 of these employees as having diplomatic rank. Under the terms of the same bilateral agreement referred to above, members of the support staff enjoy full diplomatic privileges and immunities in the United States. The Soviet Embassy employs no Americans.

A number of factors contribute to the disproportionate number of Soviet employees at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The Soviets elect to bring all of their own support personnel to the U.S. Consequently, a large number of the Soviet Embassy's support staff serve in such jobs as maintenance men, mechanics, charwomen, etc. The Department of State, for convenience as well as financial reasons, has a world-wide policy of employing local nations in non-sensitive positions in its diplomatic missions overseas. This policy has been extended to our missions in the Soviet Union. To replace the Soviets now employed at our Embassy in Moscow with Americans would not only result in far greater operating costs, but would also require far more housing than the Embassy presently can obtain. Moscow has a housing shortage, and our Embassy has a continuing problem in obtaining adequate apartments for the staff that is already assigned to Moscow. Recruitment and hiring of US citizens to serve at our Embassy in the Soviet Union in these employment categories would, in addition, raise considerable practical

and policy difficulties (e.g., the Department does not have positions, hiring authority, or career possibilities for hiring personnel overseas in such categories.)

7. Q: It is alleged that the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. is located on the highest point geographically in the area whereas the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is located on the lowest point.

Please compare the relative facilities and locations of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow with those of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. How did this situation occur? Please furnish the complete background on this deplorable situation.

In the Department's view, what are the relative merits and demerits of this apparently inequitable situation?

What recommendations does the Department have to correct the inequities which exist in location, staff, and facilities of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow relative to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.?

- A: During the 1960's the U.S. and Soviet Governments held a series of negotiations to exchange properties so that new Embassy complexes could be built in the respective capitals. A site in the Mt. Alto area of Washington was made available to the Soviet Embassy here, and we received a similar area of land in Moscow on which we are now constructing a new Embassy complex. All U.S. Government intelligence agencies concerned were consulted before a decision to offer the Mt. Alto site to the Soviets was made. Both plots of land were offered and accepted by each country on a rent-free basis for a period of 85 years. Since the initial decision was made, a continuing and close liaison between the Department of State and the Intelligence Community has been maintained regarding the sensitive security-related aspects of this project.

Of the various properties viewed by the Department officials in Moscow, only two sites were considered satisfactory -- the present site and a second one located a considerable distance from the center of Moscow. The decision to select the present site was made primarily because of its closer location to the Kremlin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other Soviet Government

agencies. Intelligence Community views were included among the factors which led to this decision. The selected site is situated approximately 100 yards west of our present Embassy location, which is within the central Moscow business district. In the immediate vicinity of the site of our new Embassy are located the headquarters of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA) and the recently constructed building which houses the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic Council of Ministers.

Disparities in the circumstances of our Embassy in Moscow relative to those of the Soviet Embassy in Washington are the subject of continuing review in the State Department, in liaison with other Government agencies. The purpose of such review, based on the principle of reciprocity, is to improve the circumstances of the Embassy and staff in Moscow while striving to preclude any unilateral advantage. The Soviet Act, which is presently before both Houses of Congress, will contribute significantly to the Department's ability, in conjunction with other agencies, to impose tighter restrictions on the Soviet Embassy and its operations here, as directed by the principle of reciprocity.

8. Q: Could you explain whether the hierarchy of the Cuban foreign service has been coopted by the DGI. To what extent? Please describe how the DGI and other Cuban intelligence services use diplomatic cover to gather intelligence, posing as diplomats, military attaches, journalists, trade representatives, scientific specialists, etc.
- A: The Department will provide you a classified briefing on that subject if you so desire.
- Q: Soviet personnel expelled from the U.S.
- A: Public records reflect that 52 Soviets have been expelled from the United States since 1950. These include persons assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Soviet Mission to the UN, and persons employed at the UN. We are compiling data for pro-Soviet and Eastern Bloc personnel.

Q: How many Cuban diplomats, embassy personnel, mission or consulate personnel or UN personnel or other Cuban members of international organizations have been expelled from the United States for intelligence activities since 1959? for any other reasons? Soviet, pro-Soviet, or other Eastern Bloc diplomats, Embassy personnel, mission or consulate employees or UN personnel?

A: We are researching this question with regard to the UN and will have an answer for you shortly. Ricardo Escartin, Cuban Interests Section First Secretary, was expelled in February, 1981 for encouraging covert business relationships with Cuba in violation of Cuban Assets Control Regulations issued under Trading With The Enemy Act in addition to engaging in intelligence activities.

9. Q: Does the Department have information indicating that the Cuban or Soviet intelligence services have offices or agents or other personnel working in the U.N. or any of its various organizations?

A: I have to refer you to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Q: Please give the Department's assessment of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Include an analysis of its membership and indicate whether it has become a pawn or moughpiece for the Soviet/Cuban, Marxist-Leninist point of view.

A: The Human Rights Commission completed its 38th session on March 12 after successful passage of a resolution on Poland which reflected worldwide concern over the human rights situation in that country. The resolution called for the end of measures restricting human rights and fundamental freedoms, release of prisoners detained without charge, and a review of sentences proposed under martial law. The resolution also requests the Secretary-General to undertake a study of the human rights situation in Poland for presentation to the next session of the HRC.

The Department considers passage of the Polish resolution a notable victory. It was the first time in its 38 years that the HRC has spoken out on human rights violations in an East European country, demonstrating that Poland is not merely an East-West issue, but a matter of worldwide concern. The success of these efforts

reflected strong Western cohesion, and a commitment to reaching out to Third World countries which won out through three difficult procedural resolutions and the final substantive vote.

The Human Rights Commission is composed of 43 States Members of the United Nations. Michael Novak was appointed by President Reagan as head of the U.S. delegation, with Richard Schifter and Warren Hewitt acting as his principal alternates. The chairmanship of the Commission rotates each year among the five regional groups. This year Bulgaria provided the Chairman representing the Eastern European region. Membership in the 38th session of the Human Rights Commission (which is elected by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations) including 11 African states, 10 countries from Western Europe, 8 from Latin America, 5 each from Eastern Europe and East Asia, and 4 countries representing the Near East region.

The record of achievement by the 38th session of the Commission included a broad range of items, most of which were carry-overs from previous sessions. These included items relating to human rights in the Israeli-occupied Middle East territories, human rights in Chile, El Salvador, Bolivia, and Guatemala, human rights in South Africa, and a general item relating to the realization of economic human rights and a so-called right to development. USG efforts toward greater even-handedness in international bodies were rewarded by the HRC vote of 37(US)-7-4, an improvement over last year's vote, on a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and for a political settlement based on that withdrawal. It also voted 28-8-5 for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea, and called for free and fair elections under UN supervision.

During its last week the HRC also voted on a resolution dealing with El Salvador. Although we lost that vote (25-5 (US)-13), several countries

changed their "yes" votes to abstentions on a resolution which the US considered was intended to undermine the electoral process in El Salvador. Within days of passage of the resolution, Venezuela called for a special session of the OAS Permanent Council to complain about UN interference in a regional matter. The USG hopes that this move is a precursor of greater willingness by regional bodies, such as the OAS, to undertake responsibility for significant issues which now primarily confront the United Nations.

In general, the HRC remained critical of human rights conditions in Latin America, criticizing Chile, Guatemala, and Bolivia in the public sessions, in addition to the resolution on El Salvador. The US strongly supported a resolution to have Chile moved from a separate agenda item to inclusion under Item 12, the general umbrella item for consideration of human rights violations anywhere in the world. Many delegations equated US interest in inscribing Poland as a separate agenda item with continuing Chile in a similar category. There is, however, growing sentiment in Western delegations to eliminate the separate agenda item on Chile. A Uruguayan amendment to this effect was defeated 13(US)-22-7; a similar proposal by the FRG last year was rejected 12(US)-19-12. The Commission then adopted 128-6(US)-8, a resolution once again extending the mandate of the public Special Rapporteur. A strong resolution on Guatemala passed 29-2-12(US), and a balanced text on Bolivia was passed without a vote.

The USG continues to be troubled by HRC treatment of the right to development issue, questions dealing with apartheid, and the Middle East. The Human Rights Commission considered two Arab resolutions on the Middle East dealing with the Golan Heights and alleged human rights violations in occupied Arab territories.

US success in gaining passage of the Polish resolution, passage of the Pakistani resolution on Afghanistan, and a resolution dealing with

Kampuchea, reflects a movement, albeit slow, toward evenhandedness with regard to human rights violations throughout the world. We look forward to carrying these gains through to the Spring session of ECOSOC, which must approve the financial implications of the Polish resolution passed by the HRC.

10 Q: What is the Department's assessment of the UN Decolonization Committee? Are there any restrictions on the members of the U.N. Secretariat? How many members or staff are from Soviet, Cuban, Eastern bloc or pro-Soviet countries?

A: While we have placed travel controls on certain Missions of the United Nations, including the Soviet Mission, there are no travel controls on Secretariat Personnel. These employees are the responsibility of the Secretary General. Their official duties often require that they travel throughout the world. We have considered it inappropriate to restrict the movement of international civil servants, and we doubt the value of such restrictions in terms of U.S. national security.

Below are United Nations statistics on numbers of Secretariat officers and staff in New York for the Soviets, the Cubans, and the East bloc countries.

Soviet Union	254
Cuba	34*
Poland	13
Romania	11
Yugoslavia	10
East Germany	6
Czechoslovakia	4
Hungary	4
Bulgaria	3

*This figure may be misleading. 13 of these have "professional" status (statisticians, lawyers, etc.) and another 14 have "General" status (clerks, secretaries). Some of the "P" and "G" status members as well as an additional 6 maintenance personnel may be Cuban-born (exiles) rather than residents of Cuba. We are trying to get an accurate breakdown and will forward it to the Subcommittee.

The UN Special Committee of Decolonization, known as the Committee of 24 (although it now has 25 members), is mandated by the General Assembly to carry out the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" contained in UN Resolution 1514 and adopted by the UNGA on December 14, 1960. The US and UK, original members of the committee, decided to leave in 1970 after changes in the makeup of the committee resulted in its adoption of increasingly radical positions on decolonization. Since then additional changes in the governments of some of the long-time members of the committee have tilted the balance even further. The more moderate members of the committee, however, still command respect, and since most of the committee's decisions are reached by consensus, the moderates still play a significant role in the committee's work. For example, the Australian and Scandinavian representatives (one seat rotates among Norway, Sweden and Denmark) have modified resolutions in the drafting stage to make the less objectionable to the US. During votes, however, most of the moderates tend to abstain on certain resolutions rather than to appear to oppose the principle of decolonization.

Cuba has frequently used the Committee of 24 to attempt to embarrass the US, particularly in regard to Puerto Rico. The vote in 1981 on a hostile resolution on Puerto Rico reveals the current complexion of the committee vis-a-vis the US. In the chart below, negative votes favor the US, positive votes are against the US:

Vote on 1981 C-24 Resolution on Puerto Rico

Yes: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Tanzania, USSR (11)

No: Australia, Denmark (2)

11. Q: Please give the Subcommittee the benefit of your assessment of the present status of the refugees from those countries in which Cuba and Cuban-sponsored or supported insurgents are active in trying to take over the government. Does DOS have any

information showing a flow of refugees into any of these countries where a Marxist-Leninist totalitarian government is in power?

- A: El Salvador and Guatemala are the two source countries in Central America for refugees fleeing violence at least in part caused by Cuban-supported insurgents. Most Salvadoran refugees have fled to Honduras, although some have gone to Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, and Panama. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) administers camps in Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. We estimate that there are some 60,000 to 75,000 Salvadoran refugees outside of El Salvador in Central American. (The UN Human Rights Commission uses a higher figure of 200,000 Salvadoran refugees. That figure includes all Salvadorans out of the country, whereas our figures include only those who left specifically for political motives.)

Honduras is presently home for about 13,500 Salvadoran refugees, down from 18,500 three months ago. The decrease in numbers is apparently due to the UNHCR - Government of Honduras effort, which we support, to resettle the refugees from the border area with El Salvador to a safer site further inland. Some refugees have apparently decided to return to El Salvador rather than be resettled away from the border area. The resettlement effort is designed to protect the refugees from any spill-over from the violence in El Salvador, while ensuring that future arrivals will be protected through the establishment of refugee reception centers, staffed in part by UNHCR representatives, at key points along the border. The Department has urged the UNHCR to complete the movement of the refugees as quickly as possible. To date some 4,800 Salvadoran refugees have been relocated with perhaps 2700 more yet to be moved in one area. An additional 5-6,000 refugees do not require immediate relocation. Refugee resettlement away from the border will also reduce the Honduran Government's concern that the Salvadoran insurgents may be obtaining support from the border refugee sites.

We consider that the UNHCR is doing a credible job thus far, although we have told its representatives that a greater effort needs to be made to speed up the resettlement of the refugees. The Honduran Government deserves praise for its unselfish and generous acceptance of the refugees despite its own economic problems.

Our estimates of Salvadoran refugees in other countries of the region are as follows: Nicaragua - 12,000 to 15,000; Costa Rica - 12,000; Belize - 4,000 to 5,000; Guatemala and Mexico - 12,000 to 15,000; Panama - 1,500. All but approximately 400 in Costa Rica and 600 in Nicaragua are outside of camps and rely on the local economy and donations from private and UNHCR sources of subsistence needs.

The UNHCR may shortly begin providing emergency food and medical assistance for some 6,000 Guatemalan refugees located in the Mexican state of Chiapas in addition to the aid it now supplies to about 800 Guatemalan refugees in Honduras.

- Q: What do you predict the refugee problem to be if the Soviet/Cuban bloc is successful in spreading their form of Marxist-Leninist totalitarian rule in Central America?
- A: Secretary Haig pointed up the significance of refugee flows from Communist regimes and terror in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 2 and in his address before the National Governor's Convention on February 22 when he addressed the impact of totalitarian regimes in Central America where there are unprecedented flows of immigration. The Secretary pointed out that in 1980 alone there were 1.5 million undocumented emigres, most fleeing communism, and expressed concern at levels which might be reached if radicalization of the Hemisphere were to continue with the advent of additional totalitarian States. Secretary Haig concluded that the U.S. has an important responsibility to deal with the social, economic, and humanitarian

aspects of the crisis--the human misery--which outside powers exploit.

The imposition by force of Marxist-Leninist governments in Central America could lead to massive flows of people from this region to the United States. Cuba is a good example. Since Castro came to power in 1959, 1 million Cubans have emigrated out of a population of ten million and perhaps as many as two million more Cubans would leave given a chance to do so. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas came to power promising free elections and a pluralist society. Consequently, the majority of Nicaraguans who had taken refuge in nearby countries from the violence of the civil war returned to their homes. As the Sandinistas move closer to the consolidation of a totalitarian state modelled on that of Cuba, we are watching closely the effects this may have on migration. Should the private sector of the economy fall to state control and political freedoms continue to erode in the face of the emergency decree, we could expect to see an exodus first of the middle class and then, as the economy worsens under state control, of the working class intent on finding better economic opportunities. The size of the exodus would depend in part on the ability and desire of the Nicaraguan Government to control its borders.

We have already seen some of the effects of Nicaraguan Government attempts to restrict traditional rights enjoyed by the Miskito Indians. Some 12,000 Miskitos have fled to Honduras rather than submit to a new government imposed resettlement scheme.

Elsewhere in Central America violent Marxist-Leninist takeovers could produce massive flows of people; some fleeing political reprisals for their association with previous governments, and others pushed on by the repression of a violent totalitarian government and the deterioration of the economy.

12. Q: What is the status of the discipline, morale and effectiveness of the Cuban troops in Angola

and Ethiopia? Have there been defections and desertions from the ranks? The Cubans have said that the first military contingents to reach Angola were elite Ministry of Interior Units. What has become of these units? Please furnish the subcommittee with the Department's complete assessment of Cuban involvement, military and otherwise, in Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Zaire and Ethiopia. Please give a separate answer to each country.

A: The Department is preparing a detailed answer to this question for the subcommittee.

13. Q: Are you aware of any evidence that the Communist Chinese are assisting any of the insurgent movements in Central America, and, if so, please describe the extent and nature of that assistance and the nature of the evidence of the same. How about personnel from North Vietnam, North Korea, Angola, Mozambique?

A: We have already dealt with this question to some extent in our reports on El Salvador. The Department is prepared to provide the subcommittee with a classified briefing on this subject.

14. Q: What role is the French government playing, if any, in supporting communist terrorism in Central America? Please describe that role in detail.

A: French policy toward Central American has differed from ours, but the French government is not supporting communist terrorism there.

15. Q: A Reuters news article dated March 8, 1982, states that two Nicaraguan pilots defected to Honduras by flying a C-47 transport there to protest the Marxist-Leninist course that Nicaragua's Sandinista leaders had taken. They claim that Fidel Castro rules Nicaragua through advisors, giving as an example that each of the nine members of Nicaragua's ruling National Directorate have two or three Cuban advisors, whose instructions are followed unquestionably.

Can you furnish the Subcommittee with more complete information on this incident? Are there any comments you care to make?

Do the allegations line up with information that DOS has concerning the extent of Cuban involvement and control in Nicaragua?

A: On March 7, Octavio Barrera and Gustavo Quezada, pilots in the Sandinista Air Force, took a C-47 on a test flight and defected to Honduras. Accompanying them were Quezada's wife Julia and his 3-year-old daughter Martha.

It is difficult to determine the extent of Cuban influence on the Sandinistas. However, it is clear that Cubans occupy key positions as military and security advisors, and that relations between the FSLN and Cuba are excellent. There are currently approximately 1800-2000 Cuban military and security advisors in Nicaragua plus an additional 3500 Cuban civilian advisors and Cuba has been actively involved in arming and training the Sandinistas.

16. Q: Let us assume that the Soviets and Cubans are successful in their efforts to install totalitarian, Marxist-Leninist governments which are aligned with or controlled by the Soviet/Cuban bloc in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and other countries in Central America.

I know you have touched on this in your opening presentation, but please elaborate on what the consequences are for the United States, in terms of our national security, if this expansionism, this slow constant creep of Communist domination progresses unchecked.

What are the economic consequences?

Were the assumption posed to become fact we would have to develop a costly military shield where today we have none. This would impose heavy new burdens on our defense budget or force us to divert American defensive strength from Europe and somewhere in the world.

Economically, it is important to realize that nearly half of our crude oil imports--in fact nearly half of all our exports and imports--pass through the Caribbean sea lanes which would be threatened by the extension of Soviet military power implied in the assumption stated in the question.

17. Q: Please describe the present status of travel between the United States and Cuba? What restrictions exist on travel to Cuba and to what category of people do these restrictions apply? Have these restrictions been modified recently? Please explain? What restrictions exist on travel to the US by citizens of Cuba?

For the years 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982, list the number of US citizens and permanent resident aliens who have travelled

to Cuba and the reasons for such travel. For the years listed above, give the number of Cubans who travelled to the U.S. and the reasons for such travel.

A: The Department of State places no restrictions on travel to Cuba by American citizens at this time. We advise Americans visiting Cuba that they are subject to Cuban law while in that country. The United States Government may restrict the travel of American citizens to designated countries for reasons of the safety of the traveler, or to enforce U.S. law or regulations pertaining to such travel.

The travel of Cuban citizens to the U.S. is governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act. Security namechecks are conducted on all Cuban applicants. Cuban officials are presumed to be ineligible for U.S. visas under Section 212 (a) (28) of that law, and thus require waivers to enter the U.S. Under the McGovern Amendment to the Immigration Act, the Secretary of State should recommend to the Attorney General that he grant a waiver so that the visa may be issued, unless the Secretary determines that the entry of a specific alien is contrary to the security interests of the U.S. In such cases he notifies the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

We are currently researching the number of Cubans travelling to the U.S. for the years in question. Following are U.S. Government figures for U.S. citizen and U.S. resident travel to Cuba from the United States.

1977	14,865
1978	23,864
1979	176,594
1980	74,923
1981	38,134

More than half of these are Cuban-Americans resident in the United States. Family reunification visits by Cuban-Americans, resumed in 1977 after a fifteen year gap, have been destabilizing to the Castro regime in that they dispel propaganda about the United States fed by the Castro government to the Cuban people.

Exhibit C



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 21, 1982

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am enclosing additional material related to your March 15 request for information on the subject of Cuban support for terrorism and insurgency in the Western Hemisphere (Assistant Secretary Enders' testimony of March 12).

The data which we are now providing was promised in our initial submission of April 7 in which we responded to your seventeen questions on this subject and requested additional time to research some of the answers. We regret that in some instances, we have still been unable to come up with the requested data. We will, however, continue to furnish material as it becomes available.

We are also enclosing copies of two documents which you had requested during the March 12 hearing and which Ambassador Enders offered to provide. They consist of copies of public statements made by four Guatemalan guerrilla groups and copies of a secret agreement uniting Guatemalan guerrilla groups. Ambassador Enders also offered to make available copies of documents captured from a Costa Rican "people's prison" and copies of documents captured by Honduran authorities which include classroom notebooks used by guerrillas. We are in the process of obtaining the latter documents, and will provide them under separate cover as soon as we receive them.

I hope that what we have provided will be of use. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

With cordial regards,

Sincerely,

Powell A. Moore
Powell A. Moore
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

Enclosures: As stated.

The Honorable
Jeremiah Denton, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism,
Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

6. Q. How does the size of the Cuban diplomatic staff in countries in Latin America compare with diplomatic staffs from pro-Western countries or with the U.S.? In Southern Africa? Elsewhere in the world? Is the same true of diplomatic staffs of the Soviet Union and other communist countries?

A. We regret that we are unable to provide an answer to this question due to the lack of a data base.

8. Q. How many Cuban diplomats, embassy personnel, mission or consulate personnel or UN personnel or other Cuban members of international organizations have been expelled from the United States for intelligence activities since 1959? For any other reason? Soviet, pro-Soviet, or other Eastern Bloc diplomats, Embassy personnel, mission or consulate employees or UN personnel?

A. We do not have a complete compilation of Cubans who have been expelled from the United States. A search of our records, however, indicates that the following Cubans have been expelled from the U.S.:

Mr. Mario Monzon Barata (CMUN), July 4, 1982 for violation of Trading With the Enemy Act. Also identified as head of Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations.

Mr. Jose Rodriguez Rodriguez (CMUN), July 4, 1982 for violation of the Trading With the Enemy Act. Also identified as attache and secretary for Mr. Monzon Barata.

Mr. Ricardo Escartin (CUBINT), February 11, 1981 for violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations issued under the Trading With the Enemy Act. Mr. Escartin was also identified as an intelligence agent who engaged in intelligence gathering activities while in the U.S.

Mr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez (CMUN), October 9, 1979.

Mr. Orlando Prendes Gutierrez, (CMUN), October 9, 1970.

We noted in our previous correspondence that 52 Soviets have been expelled from the United States since 1950.

We also have on file that 18 Eastern Europeans have been expelled from the United States since 1949. This statistic includes: 7 Poles, 4 Czechs, 4 Romanians and 3 Hungarians. We are continuing research to see if there are other Eastern Europeans expelled from missions to the United Nations and other International Organizations.

As we receive more information on this subject, we will forward it to the subcommittee.

12. Q. What is the status of the discipline, morale and effectiveness of the Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia? Have there been defections and desertions from the ranks? The Cubans have said that the first military contingents to reach Angola were elite Ministry of Interior Units. What has become of these units? Please furnish the subcommittee with the Department's complete assessment of Cuban involvement, military and otherwise, in Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Zaire and Ethiopia. Please give a separate answer to each country.

A. Angola

The elite Ministry of Interior units (Tropas Especiales--Special Troops) that were hastily introduced into Angola in November 1975 were the first Cuban combat units sent to fight there. Their immediate mission was to prevent the South African and local forces from overrunning some 2,000 Cuban military technicians and advisory personnel who had

arrived in Angola in late September and early October to assemble and maintain the large amounts of Soviet weapons that had been pouring into Angola since March and to train the MPLA in their use. The ultimate objective of Cuban military involvement was of course to install a pro-Soviet/pro-Cuban faction in power.

This initial group of about 2,000 advisors-- apparently made up primarily of cadets in their final year at Cuba's military academies--was to provide advice and technical assistance, not engage in combat. Rapid and unanticipated changes in the battlefield situation, however, found this group caught literally in the front lines within days of its arrival and the Castro regime was faced, in late October, with the decision of either writing it off, trying to evacuate it, or reinforcing it heavily.

President Castro could not write it off. The First Party Congress was coming up in December 1975 and he could not admit to the Congress that he had abandoned the graduating classes of the military academies. Neither could he evacuate the force. He had no shipping in the area to accomplish an evacuation. He, thus, chose to reinforce, and he used the most combat-ready troops -- also the most readily transportable--available in Cuba, which were the Special Troops. They were airlifted to Angola in November with the mission of buying time until other Cuban combat units, composed largely of reservists, could be sent by sea and air. By the time the Special Troops

came home sometime in the spring of 1976, Cuba had shipped some 36,000 military personnel to Angola.

The Special Troops seem to provide a variety of unique services from protecting Castro himself to fighting secretly alongside the Sandinista forces in the latter stages of the revolt against Somoza in Nicaragua. They are the troops Castro has used, for example, to storm foreign diplomatic missions in Havana that have been seized by armed Cubans willing to use desperate measures to emigrate. The Special Troops are in excellent physical condition, are trained in a broad range of weapons and tactics, and most are karate experts. Although critical circumstances required their deployment as combat units in the Angolan experience, they apparently are normally intended to be used in small teams. They probably are headquartered in the Havana area and we suspect a number of them are used to train foreign insurgents in the skills of guerrilla warfare.

Most Cubans who have served in Angola in the armed forces are reservists and many have served more than one tour there. The losses Cuban units sustained in Angola in late 1975 and 1976 caused them to reduce their role in combat--a reaction that has been the source of some friction with the Angolans. Cuban forces remain well disciplined but morale reportedly is low. Conditions for Cubans serving in Luanda especially are grim and relations with the Angolan population in general are not good. Conditions for troops

in the field, although primitive, are acceptable. There have been only a few defections by Cuban personnel. There are not many opportunities to defect. Personnel (both military and civilian) are transported to Angola by Cuban aircraft; the one refueling stop--Cape Verde--is very secure. There are always Cuban security personnel interspersed with the regular "internationalists" and soldiers, which keeps defections to a minimum.

At the present time we believe there are 20,000 - 25,000 Cuban troops in Angola. There was an increase last fall after South Africa launched Operation Protea. The Cubans have established a defensive line in southern Angola to protect against South African incursions deep into the country. However, South African forces operate at will against SWAPO guerrillas south of this line, and Cuban forces have not been directly involved in combat against South African forces.

Cuban forces play an important role in providing logistical and direct combat support to Angolan forces in the ongoing struggle with UNITA. Cuban forces may have become more involved in combat against UNITA forces during the past few months, and the Cubans are apparently taking an increasing number of casualties. Cuban civilian presence in Angola is believed to be between 5,000 to 9,000. This number is expected to increase during 1982. These personnel

are construction workers, transportation workers, teachers, and medical personnel.

Ethiopia

There are now between 11,000 - 13,000 Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia. The military presence is down from a high of about 17,000 troops in early 1978, when Cuban forces played a decisive role in the successful Ogaden campaign. After completion of these operations, Chairman Mengistu tried to persuade Havana to help Ethiopia with the fighting taking place in Eritrea. Castro refused, partly because he wanted no further casualties and partly because he believed the political costs would be too heavy and cause friction with Cuba's radical Arab allies. (Havana also had had ties with the Eritrean Liberation Front for many years.) The Cuban military presence was reduced in late 1978 and remains at about 11,000 - 13,000 today. Cuban forces do not see much action now, play mainly support and logistic-support roles and remain in garrisons most of the time.

Havana would like to increase its civilian role in Ethiopia, mainly to earn hard currency, but so far these efforts have been unsuccessful. There are several hundred (perhaps 600 - 700) Cuban civilians in Ethiopia.

Zaire

In January 1981, Havana appointed its first ambassador to Zaire since 1977. (At that time, President Mobutu suspended diplomatic relations

after accusing Cuban military personnel of leading an invasion force into Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province from Angola.) Because of the underlying distrust of Havana by Mobutu, the relationship is a wary one. The Cuban presence in Zaire is small although it expanded in 1981 with the arrival of the ambassador and several staff people. Although Zaire maintains a very healthy distrust of Cuban activities and goals in Africa in general, and Zaire in particular, Zairian-Cuban relations superficially could be described as a thawing somewhat from the earlier freezing point. As a result of the Cuban presence in neighboring Angola and Cuba's continued support of the FLNC, Zaire keeps a very close watch over the Cuban mission in Kinshasa. Despite this climate, Zaire received a delegation of Cuban technical experts last fall for exploratory discussions on possibilities for bilateral cooperation in agriculture, sports, culture, etc. No agreements were signed.

Zimbabwe

After Zimbabwean independence and after the election of Robert Mugabe, Cuba has been very cautious in its dealings with the government. Havana's support during the revolutionary struggle for Mugabe's rival Joshua Nkomo put Cuba under a cloud as far as Mugabe was concerned. Because of this support, and probably because of Mugabe's underlying suspicion about Cuban intentions, the relationship between the two countries can now be described as friendly but not especially close. Havana has attempted on several occasions to

broaden the relationship, but so far has been unsuccessful. There is a small Cuban diplomatic mission in Harare and there have been a few low-level visits exchanged, but there is no Cuban technical or military presence in Zimbabwe.

Zambia

Cuba and Zambia have had diplomatic relations since 1972 and there is a Cuban diplomatic presence of about 20 in Lusaka. There are no Cuban civilian or military advisors in Zambia.

The visit in February of a senior delegation from Cuba's Communist Party and Havana's recent decision to fill its long-vacant ambassadorial post in Lusaka reflect a modest warming in relations. Bilateral ties declined after Cuba intervened in the Angolan civil war in 1975 and sided against a faction Zambia supported. In the past few years, Zambian-Cuban relations have gradually improved as Lusaka has come to accept the Cuban-backed regime in Angola. Presidents Castro and Kaunda, moreover, have made common cause on a number of Third World issues in recent years, including that of majority rule in Southern Africa.

Botswana

Cuba and Botswana established diplomatic relations in 1977, but an ambassador was not actually accredited until 1979. He is resident in Lusaka, Zambia. We have no information on other bilateral matters. There is no Cuban military or civilian presence in Botswana, and none is foreseen.

Mozambique

Relations between Cuba and Mozambique are cordial. The two countries established diplomatic relations on 25 June 1975, the day Mozambique became independent. There has been a Cuban civilian technical assistance program in Mozambique since 1976. The program has increased over the years to include public health, education, fishing, agriculture, communications, and transportation technicians. We estimate there are at least 500 Cuban civilian personnel in Mozambique.

In addition, there are at least 2,000 Mozambican students studying on Cuba's Isle of Youth, and a few hundred more are in Cuban universities and technical schools. The two Chiefs of State are personal friends. President Machel has made two visits to Cuba, most recently in late May 1982.

The following pages 249-265 are poor quality for microfilming.

ncjrs

While portions of this document are illegible, it was micro-filmed from the best copy available. It is being distributed because of the valuable information it contains.



ACUERDOS DE LA COMANDANCIA GENERAL REVOLUCIONARIA
SOBRE LA TACTICA GENERAL PARA LA PRESENTE COYUNTURA

I. LA COYUNTURA

La coyuntura política nacional está determinada fundamentalmente por una mayor agudización de la crisis de estructura socio-económica del país que es producto de un largo y deformado proceso de desarrollo -dentro de un capitalismo incipiente- que depende centralmente del imperialismo norteamericano y de un reducido grupo de oligarcas nacionales, mientras en el lado opuesto crecen extraordinariamente durante los últimos veinticinco años, la población trabajadora, sus necesidades y las del país. En la coyuntura política actual esta situación es mucho más grave porque inciden sobre ella nuevos y poderosos factores nacionales e internacionales.

En lo nacional, una camarilla de grandes terratenientes-burgueses nacionales y extranjeros y de nuevos millonarios, acaparan todas las riquezas en las actividades agro-exportadoras, industriales, petroleras, financieras y comerciales y han sumido al país en una crisis sin precedentes, mientras, las grandes masas del campo carecen de tierra y trabajo permanente; en las ciudades los obreros sufren desempleo, sub-empleo, bajos salarios y junto con las capas medias asalariadas cargan sobre sus espaldas con todas las consecuencias de una inflación sin precedentes en el país, con la devaluación del poder real del Quetzal, del desbocado endeudamiento externo e interno, del alza constante de los precios del petróleo, de la disminución de los precios y de las exportaciones de ciertos productos, de la creación de nuevos impuestos, de la carestía de la vivienda y de todos los productos de consumo diario. Y la imposición de una política de precios y salarios, que liberaliza los precios y excluye los salarios.

En lo político-social, las clases explotadoras y opresoras que encabeza el gobierno de Lucas, alarmadas por el crecimiento de la lucha popular en general y principalmente de las luchas político-armadas, generalizan e intensifican la represión contra todos los sectores populares y democráticos.

La gran victoria popular nicaragüense sobre el somocismo y el heroísmo victorioso de la lucha guerrillera salvadoreña en Centroamérica, influyen aún más en la desesperación y ferocidad de la reacción reaccionaria, pero también la decisión de lucha de las masas oprimidas.

Y al mismo tiempo, el sistema se agrieta y debilita debido a sus contradicciones que como resultado del desenvolvimiento de la lucha nacional, regional y continental, se manifiesta ya en él, tanto en los planos económico, social, político, militar y hasta frente al imperialismo norteamericano que ha jugado con los "cambios", "reformas" y con la bandera de los "derechos humanos" y con el chantaje y las amenazas intervencionistas.

En lo internacional, el Proceso Revolucionario Guatemalteco se enmarca dentro de la dinámica que impone el avance y el desarrollo del socialismo revolucionario, las luchas de la clase obrera de los países capitalistas desarrollados y el avance indetenible de los movimientos de liberación nacional, dentro de cuyo contexto realizamos nuestra práctica revolucionaria, recibiendo su estímulo y solidaridad, así como de otras fuerzas democráticas mundiales.

Esas tres fuerzas, que fundamentan la contradicción fundamental de nuestro tiempo, socialismo contra capitalismo, delineando una estrategia y una táctica anti-imperialista que dificulta los planes guerrilleros de éste, favorecen nuestras luchas y van cambiando de manera cualitativa la correlación de fuerzas en favor del campo revolucionario, reafirmando el carácter de los grandes cambios sociales en nuestra época y eventando el grado de las contradicciones del imperialismo en lugares que, como Asia, Africa y América Latina principalmente en Centro América, habían sido sus centros de poder indiscutidos.

La presente coyuntura es, pues, altamente favorable para el avance y desarrollo de la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria en nuestro país.

II. SU APROVECHAMIENTO

Esta coyuntura tenemos que aprovecharla al máximo para lograr que el proceso de la guerra desemboque en un triunfo para las fuerzas revolucionarias, con el que modifiquemos sustancialmente la correlación de fuerzas en favor del pueblo, tomando el control de la parte decisiva del poder militar y del poder político, y de lo fundamental del poder económico. Ello permitirá continuar la lucha por la conquista de todo el poder para la Revolución, mediante una paralela y simultánea acción política, pero en una situación cualitativa totalmente superior, a partir de la instauración de un gobierno con hegemonía de las fuerzas revolucionarias, lo que permitirá garantizar el control acelerado del poder político y militar en todo el país. La amplitud, la flexibilidad, la participación de una amplia pluralidad de fuerzas, son algunos de los rasgos característicos más importantes de la presente coyuntura.

III. LA UNIDAD

La unidad alcanzada por nuestras cuatro Organizaciones Revolucionarias, que se materializa en la constitución de la UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL -URN- y en la integración de la Comandancia General Revolucionaria -CGR-, es el factor que nos permite impulsar una táctica común, y la piedra angular para su culminación victoriosa. Sin la unidad dicho planteamiento táctico carecería de sentido y no tendría ninguna posibilidad de éxito.

IV. LOS OBJETIVOS

Nuestros objetivos tácticos generales son:

- DERROCAR AL GOBIERNO DE LUCAS Y DESPLAZAR DEL PODER A LAS FUERZAS POLITICAS Y MILITARES REPRISIVAS QUE LO SOSTIENEN, E
- INSTAURAR EL GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO, POPULAR Y DEMOCRATICO.

V. SU REALIZACION

Para lograr dichos objetivos generales es necesario cambiar decisiva y aceleradamente la correlación de fuerzas militares y políticas en favor de la Revolución. Para ello debemos desarrollar, cambiar, complementar y armonizar ocho factores tácticos fundamentales:

1. DESARROLLAR Y ARTICULAR, EN UN PLAZO CONCORDANTE CON LA ACTUAL COYUNTURA, UN NIVEL DE GUERRA REVOLUCIONARIA QUE PERMITA CONSEGUIR LA DESTRUCCION Y NEUTRALIZACION DE LAS PRINCIPALES FUERZAS MILITARES ENEMIGAS.

Siendo el factor militar el elemento decisivo en la actual coyuntura, es el que requiere mayor dedicación y esfuerzos por parte de la URN.

- 1 Su táctica principal contempla dos fases características, encaminadas, la primera a proseguir, acentuar y profundizar la dislocación, desgaste y desmoralización de las tropas enemigas, determinando con la puesta en total situación defensiva del enemigo.
- 2 Pasando después a una siguiente fase de combates, aniquilamiento, confrontación decisiva y disputa y ocupación de territorio, que permita, tomar la ofensiva general al movimiento revolucionario y que lo conduzca a la victoria.

El elemento básico para proseguir la primera fase está dado en la generalización de la guerra de guerrillas en el país. Lo que significa que a plazos muy cortos, debe darse el incremento, tanto en su magnitud como en su periodicidad, de las operaciones guerrilleras en las zonas ya existentes, como también el establecimiento y puesta en combate de nuevos frentes, en las zonas en que de existan las condiciones necesarias.

Como fruto de esa acumulación general por parte del movimiento revolucionario y del desgaste de las tropas enemigas, se irán dando los pasos para las transformaciones cualitativas de las fuerzas guerrilleras y entonces poder concentrar los contingentes que sean necesarios para librar las batallas decisivas contra las principales fuerzas militares del enemigo.

La resolución conjunta y unitaria de los problemas logísticos crea la base material indispensable para llevar adelante, en los plazos necesarios, el proyecto general.

La elaboración por parte de la CGR del plan unitario general en lo militar, es la garantía para poder concentrar los recursos, medios y fuerzas para conseguir los resultados buscados en el tiempo necesario.

2. CONDUCIR AL MOVIMIENTO DE MASAS A NUEVAS Y MAYORES LUCHAS, MEDIANTE NUEVAS FORMAS DE ORGANIZACION Y DE ACCION.

El desarrollo acelerado de la guerra permite reactivar la lucha de las masas en sus diferentes niveles. En base a la utilización de formas de organización cada vez más secretas, de métodos de trabajo cada vez más cuidadosos, del uso generalizado de las formas paramilitares de lucha y de la generalización de la autodefensa combativa, la CGR trazará los lineamientos generales que permitan a las masas populares desarrollar e incrementar sus luchas en las condiciones actuales de represión extrema.

Dadas las características de la presente coyuntura, impulsaremos la participación activa de las masas en tres niveles diferentes:

- a) Estimular las luchas, espontáneas o no, de los sectores más amplios de las masas por sus reivindicaciones más sentidas, en los momentos favorables para ello. Trabajar en el desarrollo de la concepción y en la preparación de las insurrecciones de las masas.
- b) Promover las luchas de los sectores populares que se encuentran agrupados en organizaciones amplias, aprovechando las mínimas posibilidades para este tipo de acción y preparándonos para aprovechar las condiciones que genera el mismo desarrollo de la guerra.
- c) Dirigir las luchas combativas de aquellos sectores de las masas populares que hemos ido organizando alrededor de objetivos políticos revolucionarios más explícitos y claros. Priorizar las formas paramilitares de acción de las masas, para el hostigamiento, el sabotaje y el desgaste permanente y cotidiano de las fuerzas, las instituciones y los recursos del enemigo. Orientar e impulsar la autodefensa combativa hacia la calidad de autodefensa armada de las masas, de manera creciente.

El contenido político de la lucha de las masas en sus diferentes niveles lo sintetizamos en ocho banderas de agitación principales:

- La lucha por los objetivos tácticos generales: derrotar al gobierno de Lucas e instaurar el gobierno Revolucionario, Popular y Democrático.
- La lucha contra la represión y la generalización de la autodefensa combativa de las masas.
- La lucha de los campesinos por el derecho a la tierra, con reivindicación fundamental a nivel nacional.
- La lucha por las reivindicaciones inmediatas políticas, económicas y sociales más sentidas de la clase obrera, de todos los sectores populares y medios del país.

- La lucha contra todas las formas de opresión y discriminación a los pueblos indígenas.
- Las luchas de los trabajadores del campo contra el reclutamiento forzoso por parte del ejército enemigo, para satisfacer una importante reivindicación de las grandes masas campesinas y limitar la capacidad del enemigo para reponer y reforzar sus fuerzas militares.
- La lucha por la defensa de la soberanía nacional y de nuestros recursos naturales y económicos ante la rapiña y el entreguismo del gobierno de Lucas y de los sectores políticos y militares que lo apoyan.
- La solidaridad combativa con la lucha del heroico pueblo salvadoreño y la defensa de la victoriosa Revolución Sandinista.

3- CONSTITUIR LA MAS AMPLIA ALIANZA DE TODOS LOS SECTORES REVOLUCIONARIOS, POPULARES Y DEMOCRATICOS, ORGANIZADOS EN UN FRENTE NACIONAL.

- a) Esa amplia alianza se impulsará a partir de la proclamación que hará la CGR de la necesidad y factibilidad de alcanzar los objetivos del derrocamiento de Lucas y de la instauración del gobierno Revolucionario, Popular y Democrático. La CGR planteará la necesidad de unificar los esfuerzos de todos los sectores en un frente en el que participará en primera línea la URN, al lado de organizaciones populares de obreros, campesinos, pobladores, empleados, maestros, estudiantes, cristianos, artesanos. Y de agrupaciones de técnicos, profesionales, empresarios progresistas que acepten el programa del gobierno Revolucionario, Popular y Democrático, militares patriotas no comprometidos con la represión y los partidos o agrupaciones políticas democráticas.

El eje central de dicha alianza será el Programa de transformaciones y realizaciones del gobierno Revolucionario, Popular y Democrático, en el que se sintetizarán las principales reivindicaciones, compatibles entre sí, de todos los sectores populares y democráticos que participan en la lucha por el derrocamiento de Lucas y en el amplio frente nacional.

Junto a la URN y a las agrupaciones populares y democráticas, participarán públicamente en el frente un grupo selecto de personalidades de conocida militancia en las luchas revolucionarias, populares y democráticas. Deberán ser representativas de sus respectivos sectores y tener un reconocido prestigio nacional e internacional. La CGR deberá aprobar la participación de cada una de estas personalidades.

- b) Con el impulso del frente nacional, la CGR trata de dar solución al problema de la participación activa de las capas populares y los sectores democráticos. En el interior del país, dichos sectores constituyen una fuerza importante y en el exterior mantienen sólidas y amplias relaciones con bloques tan importantes como la Social Democracia Internacional. El Movimiento de los No Alineados, los países árabes y otros sectores, incluidos algunos dentro de los Estados Unidos.

En ese contexto valoramos la participación, junto a otros sectores y agrupaciones, de los cristianos que luchan en la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria con sus propias reivindicaciones y de los partidos políticos socialdemócratas, sin descartar ni rechazar la posible participación de algún desprendimiento de izquierda de la Democracia Cristiana.

4- IMPEDIR QUE EL GOBIERNO DE LUCAS Y LOS SECTORES POLITICOS Y MILITARES QUE LO SOSTIENEN PUEDAN REALIZAR UNA NUEVA MANIOBRA ELECTORAL.

Una nueva maniobra electoral, con la consiguiente posibilidad de recambio, incluida la variante de un gobierno civil, constituye una importante carta política para el gobierno de Lucas, para la oligarquía, para el ejército y para el imperialismo yanqui. Para alcanzar nuestros objetivos tácticos generales, impedir dicha maniobra resulta un factor táctico fundamental.

5- ACENTUAR LAS CONTRADICCIONES EN EL SENO DE LAS FUERZAS ENEMIGAS.

La CGR debe orientar dentro de sus planes militares, políticos y diplomáticos, acciones que tiendan a agudizar las contradicciones de carácter económico entre el régimen y aquellos sectores que han resultado afectados por el enriquecimiento y la rapiña de los grupos de políticos y militares ligados al gobierno y a los altos jefes militares. Aprovechar las contradicciones de carácter político que se establecen con aquellos sectores de la burguesía a quienes el régimen ha bloqueado en sus planes y pretenciones por contar con sus propias expresiones políticas. Entender, aprovechar y agudizar las contradicciones entre el régimen y determinados sectores del imperialismo yanqui que estén en desacuerdo con los métodos con los que el gobierno de Lucas trata de controlar la situación en Guatemala.

Especial importancia da la CGR a la agudización de las contradicciones en el seno del ejército enemigo. En nuestra política al respecto tomamos en consideración los antecedentes históricos del papel que han jugado en nuestro país militares democráticos y revolucionarios; el planteamiento de una perspectiva dentro del proceso para aquellos militares no vinculados a la represión; y la distinción de las jerarquías dentro del ejército, evidenciando la principal responsabilidad de la represión y del genocidio en los altos jefes militares. Haremos una amplia divulgación de nuestra política hacia los oficiales, clases, especialistas y soldados no comprometidos con la represión. Sobre el respecto a la vida y la integridad física de los prisioneros de guerra. Y aprovecharemos también en el exterior nuestra política respecto al ejército.

6- AISLAR CADA VEZ MAS AL GOBIERNO DE LUCAS EN EL CAMPO INTERNACIONAL Y BUSCAR LA SOLIDARIDAD CON NUESTRA LUCHA.

En la orientación del trabajo internacional, la CGR busca el aislamiento cada vez mayor para el gobierno de Lucas; el reconocimiento a la validez y justicia de nuestra lucha o cuando menos a la inevitabilidad del triunfo; y la solidaridad concreta con la lucha del pueblo de Guatemala.

Cultivamos y desarrollamos la solidaridad e identificación con nuestra gran retaguardia estratégica, el campo socialista y el movimiento comunista internacional. Al mismo tiempo, mediante una política independiente, amplia y flexible, establecemos relaciones y buscamos solidaridad concreta con la Social Democracia Internacional, el Movimiento de los No Alineados, los países árabes y otras fuerzas progresistas, que están y estarán dispuestas a ayudarnos en la medida en que demostremos que constituimos una alternativa real de poder y que vamos a triunfar.

Priorizamos nuestras relaciones con los pueblos, las organizaciones y los gobiernos revolucionarios y progresistas del área Centroamericana y del Caribe. Con las fuerzas avanzadas de Panamá, Costa Rica, Venezuela y otros países del Caribe. Son determinantes las relaciones fraternales y estrechas con las revoluciones triunfantes de Cuba, Nicaragua y Granada. Atención política prioritaria damos al trabajo con México, nuestra retaguardia geográfica más importante. Y orientamos el trabajo necesario para lograr el reconocimiento y la solidaridad con nuestra lucha en el interior de los Estados Unidos, apoyándonos en las fuerzas y personalidades contrarias a la política agresiva del imperialismo y dispuestas a apoyarnos en nuestra lucha, o cuando menos a buscar con el gobierno Revolucionario, Popular y Democrático relaciones de coexistencia sobre nuevas bases.

7- HACER FRACASAR LAS MANIOBRAS DEL IMPERIALISMO POR EVITAR EL TRIUNFO REVOLUCIONARIO.

Desde el triunfo de la Revolución Sandinista en Nicaragua y ante el avance victorioso de las luchas populares de El Salvador y de Guatemala, el imperialismo hará todo lo posible por impedir nuevos triunfos revolucionarios en el área. Por lo tanto, dentro de los planes de la CGR, hacer fracasar dichas maniobras imperialistas constituye un factor táctico fundamental, para lo que es necesario: desarrollar la más amplia campaña internacional de denuncia; buscar la solidaridad internacional en contra de la in-

intervención; preparar a las masas populares y a las capas medias de nuestro país para resistir ante la posible agresión imperialista; y prever dentro de nuestros planes militares, las acciones necesarias para enfrentar a las fuerzas imperialistas mediante los métodos propios de la guerra del pueblo.

8- IMPEDIR LA INTERVENCIÓN DEL EJERCITO DE GUATEMALA EN EL SALVADOR.

Una de las posibles formas de intervención del imperialismo yanqui en El Salvador para tratar de evitar el triunfo de nuestro heroico pueblo hermano, es la intervención directa del ejército de Guatemala. Dicha intervención, de producirse, tendría graves consecuencias sobre la Revolución Sandinista y sobre el desarrollo de nuestra propia lucha, ya que entre otros efectos, prepararía las condiciones para una intervención extranjera mayor, para la internacionalización del conflicto y para la intervención del propio ejército yanqui. Para evitar dicha intervención trabajaremos en los campos político y diplomático, pero partiendo de que la principal forma de evitar dicha intervención es el desarrollo de nuestras fuerzas militares, la generalización de la guerra en todo el país y los golpes cada vez mayores al ejército enemigo, con lo que fijaremos sus fuerzas definitivamente, dentro del territorio nacional.

HASTA LA VICTORIA SIEMPRE!
EJERCITO GUERRILLERO DE LOS POBRES
E G P

A VENCER O MORIR POR
GUATEMALA, LA REVOLUCION Y
EL SOCIALISMO!
FUERZAS ARMADAS REBELDES
F A R

VIVIMOS PARA LUCHAR,
LUCHAMOS PARA TRIUNFAR!
ORGANIZACION DEL PUEBLO EN ARMAS
O R P A

POR GUATEMALA, LA REVOLUCION
Y EL SOCIALISMO!
PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO
P G T



NORMAS Y PROCEDIMIENTOS PARA EL FUNCIONAMIENTO DE LA COMANDANCIA GENERAL REVOLUCIONARIA Y DE LA UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL

10. La unidad alcanzada por el Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, Organización del Pueblo en Armas y Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, cuyos principios y alcances generales han sido definidos en el documento titulado "Principios Generales" y los acuerdos de la Unidad de las Organizaciones Revolucionarias E. G. P., O. R. P. A. y P. G. T. "llevará el nombre de Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional, y sus siglas serán URN.
20. El máximo organismo ejecutivo de la URN es la Comandancia General Revolucionaria (CGR).
30. La CGR se guiará estricta y permanentemente por los principios establecidos en el documento mencionado en el numeral 10.

Funciones y Atribuciones de la CGR (En la actual fase)

1. La CGR está constituida por los máximos dirigentes de las cuatro Organizaciones que integran la unidad, los cuales son electos o designados por cada Organización, según su propia estructura. Ellos son los miembros titulares de la CGR, cuya composición se completa con cuatro adjuntos, uno por cada miembro titular.
2. La CGR es el máximo organismo ejecutivo de la URN en la conducción política-militar de la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria y del proceso de unidad revolucionaria en Guatemala.
3. La CGR elabora, aprueba o modifica los planes militares de la URN en función de la táctica general y la línea de la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria.
4. Le compete a la CGR determinar la inversión, uso, distribución, combinación y concentración de medios, recursos y fuerzas de las cuatro Organizaciones en función de la prioridad táctica, estratégica, política y militar que ese organismo unitario decida, en cumplimiento de los principios de la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria y la Revolución.
5. La CGR no podrá tomar acuerdos de cumplimiento práctico en relación a aquellos temas sobre los cuales no exista una homogeneidad o identificación de criterios en las cuatro Organizaciones.

En relación a estos temas la CGR podrá tomar acuerdos para mover el estudio, el análisis y la discusión de los mismos por parte de las Direcciones Nacionales de las cuatro Organizaciones y solamente con base en los resultados procederá a tomar acuerdos de orden práctico.

Sobre la Constitución de la CGR

1. Los miembros de la CGR y sus adjuntos representan en este máximo organismo unitario a las Organizaciones que componen la URN y, por lo tanto están sujetos en lo individual a los principios, normas y disciplina de sus Organizaciones respectivas.
2. La sustitución de los miembros titulares de la CGR por caída en combate o por cualquier otra razón de gravedad, solamente podrá ser efectuada...

tuada por la Dirección Nacional de la Organización a la que representa.

3. Los adjuntos no son sustitutos de los miembros titulares de la CGR, son componentes ejecutivos encargados de mantener el funcionamiento práctico de la CGR, de aportar y complementar el trabajo de los miembros titulares y de cubrir ausencias temporales de los mismos, para que el funcionamiento de la CGR sea continuado e ininterrumpido, requisito indispensable de que cumpla con su papel.
4. La categoría de adjunto, en tanto que miembro de la CGR, no conlleva ningún cargo militar.
5. Los adjuntos actuarán en todos los casos en cumplimiento de mandatos otorgados por sus miembros titulares, según sea la modalidad de cada Organización.
6. Los adjuntos serán nombrados por la Dirección Nacional de sus respectivas Organizaciones, las que tendrán, asimismo, el derecho de removerlos de sus funciones previa explicación a la CGR de las razones que eventualmente tengan para tomar esta medida.
7. La CGR puede, por su parte, solicitar a la Dirección Nacional de las Organizaciones que forman la URN la remoción o traslado de alguno de los adjuntos, en atención a sus calificaciones, o a la conveniencia de que cumpla para las CGR, otro tipo de funciones.
8. La Dirección de cada Organización, miembro de la URN, nombrará un suplente que ocupe, cuando sea necesario, de manera temporal, las funciones de adjunto a la CGR. La responsabilidad de éste suplente será limitada y en el desempeño de sus funciones será supervisado por el miembro titular respectivo de la CGR, o por el adjunto. La responsabilidad por la conducta y disciplina del suplente, en tanto no esté desempeñando las funciones mencionadas arriba, serán de la Dirección Nacional de la Organización que lo designó.

En ausencia definitiva del adjunto (salvo objeciones o recomendación de parte de la Dirección Nacional de su Organización) el suplente ocupará sus funciones, quedando su organización comprometida a nombrar un relevo en el plazo más inmediato posible.

Relaciones Exteriores

1. Las relaciones internacionales de la CGR deberán desarrollarse e impulsarse con la tendencia a que las que cada Organización mantiene actualmente en particular, se conviertan en relación unitaria donde la CGR juzgue que ésto sea necesario y posible.
2. En los casos en los que, por razones de amplitud, o especialidad de los nexos, sea conveniente mantener vinculaciones particulares con vistas al cumplimiento de objetivos tácticos o estratégicos, la CGR orientará sobre las condiciones y los términos dentro de los cuales ésto sea factible sin menoscabar los principios unitarios.

Representatividad Oficial

1. La representación internacional de la CGR, como máximo organismo de la URN, se expresará en tres modalidades posibles:

- a) Representación unitaria centralizada
- b) Representación mixta
- c) Representación particular

La primera categoría corresponde plenamente a los objetivos unitarios y a la meta del desarrollo del proceso de unidad.

La segunda categoría corresponde a aquellos casos en los que por razones de conveniencia táctica, dos o tres de las cuatro Organizaciones puedan unificar su representación, pero sea recomendable, por las razones apuntadas arriba, mantener una representación particular paralela a la de las otras.

La tercera categoría corresponde a situaciones en las que, por distintas razones consideradas válidas por la CGR, sea conveniente

mantener representación de las Organizaciones componentes de la URN de manera particular.

2. En todo caso, el control de la representación internacional estará controlado por la CGR y sujeta a los acuerdos que en consideración de la política y la estrategia adopte este organismo. La integración de los organismos, agencias o cuadros de las cuatro Organizaciones que en la actualidad se encargan del trabajo internacional, se deberá normar de manera que sea objeto de un proceso de complementación e integración gradual, armónica y acelerada.
3. En todos los casos mencionados la CGR deberá estar permanentemente informada del trabajo internacional que se haga por medio de los organismos particulares en cumplimiento de sus acuerdos, mandatos y principios.
4. Los mandatos especiales deberán ser limitados, por parte del CGR, con precisión y claridad para evitar contradicciones o ambigüedades que en esta fase son susceptibles a producirse.
5. La designación de cuadros para cumplir tareas internacionales, que de alguna u otra manera involucren los planes de la CGR y al proceso unitario, deberán ser aprobados por la CGR en base a las propuestas de las Organizaciones particulares, las que deben garantizar la confianza, constancia y capacidad revolucionaria de los candidatos.

Funcionamiento de la CGR

1. En las condiciones de desarrollo actual del proceso unitario, los acuerdos políticos y militares serán adoptados por consenso. El desarrollo del proceso unitario irá requiriendo y determinando formas más avanzadas de decisión.
2. Si alguna de las Organizaciones particulares no comparte el acuerdo de las otras, de manera parcial o total, ante un determinado problema, se dará un plazo de tiempo adecuado para que la Dirección Nacional de dicha Organización revise su posición ante la fundamentación de las otras y tome una resolución definitiva al respecto. Si ésta resolución es la de ratificar su desacuerdo, se dejará constancia escrita de su posición y de la argumentación que lo fundamenta.
3. Cuando una de las Organizaciones no esté en capacidad de cumplir en la práctica un acuerdo tomado, deberá informar oportunamente a la CGR de ésto hecho y de las razones y explicaciones necesarias.
4. En caso de que en circunstancias excepcionales de orden práctico determinaran que algunos de los miembros de la CGR, dentro del espíritu de los principios y acuerdos de éste organismo, tuviera que tomar decisiones militares imprevistas, perentorias, de carácter concreto, y que por falta de tiempo o de medios no pudiera consultar de inmediato con el pleno de la CGR, tiene la opción de hacerlo bajo su responsabilidad, siempre que consulte y obtenga la aprobación de otro miembro titular de la CGR. La decisión tomada deberá ser explicada y fundamentada a la CGR posteriormente, a la luz de los principios de la URN y de la CGR, y en base a las circunstancias que motivaron su decisión.

La CGR determinará, haciendo el balance respectivo, si la decisión adoptada en casos como el mencionado, como excepción fue correcta o incorrecta y definirá las responsabilidades correspondientes. La conclusión de la CGR deberá enviarse a las Direcciones Nacionales para su consideración y opinión.

5. En general, es obligación de la Dirección de cada Organización particular, mantener informada a la CGR, a través de sus miembros, de los aspectos generales, de su desarrollo, problemas internos, planes de trabajo, y en particular, de todo aspecto que pueda interferir, directa o indirectamente, en la planificación general de la CGR, o en la de cualquiera de las Organizaciones que forman la URN.
6. En lo que respecta a problemas internos, que surjan en el seno de las Organizaciones, la CGR debe ser informada, y por su parte tiene el derecho de indagar con la Dirección Nacional respectiva. La CGR tendrá opción de manifestar, en éstos casos, recomendaciones, medidas preventivas y según sea la gravedad del caso, llegar a tomar

acuerdos que no afecten la integridad independiente de cada Organización, pero que garanticen la seguridad de la URH y eliminen condiciones que vayan en detrimento de la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria y del proceso popular Revolucionario.

7. Es obligación de cada Organización mantener informada a la CGR por medio de su representante, del cumplimiento de los acuerdos tomados unitariamente, de la manera más objetiva, aportando todos los datos necesarios, y sin omitir elementos que impidan por parte de la CGR la formación de un balance objetivo del trabajo.
8. Las Direcciones Nacionales de las Organizaciones están comprometidas a respaldar los acuerdos que adopte la CGR, y deberán garantizar al máximo, la transmisión de los mismos a toda su ramificación orgánica, para que el cumplimiento de aquellos se produzca efectivamente a todo nivel.
Cada miembro de la CGR tendrá el derecho de plantear, en el seno de este organismo, a instancias de su Organización, posibles revisiones o modificaciones de acuerdos aprobados dentro de un plazo de tiempo prudencial, el que según las circunstancias será determinado por la CGR. Una vez transcurrido este plazo, no habrá lugar a revocatoria y la Organización o el miembro de la CGR que incurra en retrasos u omisiones serán los responsables de las consecuencias que de ellas se deriven.
9. En general, los recursos, medios, fuerzas y cuadros de las cuatro Organizaciones estarán, en esta fase, supeditados a los acuerdos que la CGR adopte a dos niveles: a) En observancia a los principios suscritos en común, y, b) En observancia de los acuerdos concretos y específicos políticos y militares que tome la CGR.
10. La CGR funcionará, en las actuales condiciones, por medio de reuniones de sus miembros titulares, de comunicaciones entre ellos y por medio de las reuniones periódicas de los adjuntos o suplentes de éstos.
11. Conforme se vayan creando las condiciones materiales para ello, los miembros de la CGR irán preparando el terreno para funcionar en un territorio que les permita reunirse constantemente.
12. Las reuniones de los miembros titulares de la CGR se tendrán a cualquier hora que haya necesidad de tratar asuntos que por su magnitud o por la importancia de los acontecimientos se requiera.
La reunión podrá ser hecha por la convocatoria de cualquiera de sus miembros, el cual deberá señalar expresamente el tema de la misma.
13. Posibles problemas que puedan surgir entre dos Organizaciones deberán ser informados de inmediato a la CGR por las respectivas Direcciones Nacionales, con el máximo de objetividad y antecedenencia, a fin de que ésta emita resoluciones que normen la conducta de las mismas en función de la unidad de la URH y de la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria y la Revolución.
14. Cada paso del proceso unitario que vaya tomando forma debe ser evaluado por la CGR y comunicado a las diferentes Direcciones Nacionales a fin de que se consigne y se fundamenten las modificaciones en favor de la consolidación de la unidad que vayan teniendo lugar y se hagan propuestas para que la CGR las considere y apruebe.
15. La documentación general de trabajo de la CGR será exclusivamente del conocimiento de este organismo y de los organismos superiores de las diferentes Direcciones Nacionales. Aspectos secretos concretos, serán manejados exclusivamente por la CGR, según acuerdos.
16. La CGR tendrá un archivo general único, que se organizará en microficha y se depositará en manos de la Dirección del Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, para su custodia, de manera que éstos documentos, al mismo tiempo estén a disposición de la CGR en el momento que sea necesario consultarlos.
17. La CGR constituirá, con el aporte de las cuatro organizaciones, la infraestructura segura y necesaria para su funcionamiento eficiente, funcional y continuado. Motivo especial de atención deben ser las

comunicaciones, que ocupan un lugar prioritario en este funcionamiento.


18. Las Direcciones Nacionales particulares serán responsables ante la URH y la CGR del manejo impropio de materiales, o de declaraciones no acordadas, anticipadas o hechas fuera de los lineamientos aprobados por la CGR, o bien por aquellos que afecten aspectos de la Unidad o a la integridad de cualquiera de las Organizaciones particulares, que puedan hacer organismos o miembros de sus estructuras.

Enmiendas

1. Los cambios o modificaciones podrán ser hechos por la CGR, instintivamente a propuesta de uno o varios miembros de la misma. Para hacerlos efectivos, será necesario el consenso de los miembros de la CGR.
2. Estas normas y procedimientos podrán ser enmendados solamente en caso de que las enmiendas reflejen efectos de la realidad objetiva del proceso revolucionario de nuestro país.
3. Las enmiendas a las normas del presente que haya necesidad de tenerlas que éstas normas no reflejen todavía, experiencias que demuestran reiteradamente la inconveniencia o falta de funcionalidad de algunas de ellas y por cambios en la coyuntura.
4. Todos los cambios o modificaciones deben ser efecto del desarrollo táctico de la estrategia de la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria.

11 de Noviembre de 1980

COMANDANCIA GENERAL REVOLUCIONARIA



PRINCIPIOS GENERALES Y ACUERDOS DE LA UNIDAD DE LAS ORGANIZACIONES
REVOLUCIONARIAS FAR, FAP, OPEA Y PGT

INTRODUCCION

Este documento, que resume las consideraciones políticas básicas que cada una de nuestras organizaciones ha elaborado para hacer realidad la Unidad de las Fuerzas Revolucionarias Guatemaltecas, los principios generales de esta Unidad que hacen posible en común, y los acuerdos concretos iniciales por medio de los cuales esa Unidad se hará práctica y cobrará vida, es el fruto de años de esfuerzos, varias experiencias, intercambios de opinión, discusiones, y evaluaciones bilaterales y de conjunto.

La Unidad de las Fuerzas Revolucionarias Guatemaltecas, es una necesidad histórica y una demanda y un anhelo profundo y sentido de los diferentes sectores de nuestro Pueblo a todo nivel, que la ve como la garantía de que esta vez sus esfuerzos, luchas y sacrificios sí serán coronados por la victoria popular definitiva.

El Pueblo guatemalteco ha logrado repórtese en los últimos 26 años de dos derrotas temporales que lo han costado miles de vidas y millones de dólares de bienes. Con esa garantía el pueblo y sus feroces lacayos crímenes, pretendieron aplastar las justas luchas populares por construir una Patria verdaderamente libre e independiente, una sociedad completamente diferente y una vida mejor, liberada de la explotación, la opresión y la discriminación. Pero a pesar de estas luchas, la dispersión de sus fuerzas de vanguardia, que fue un factor decisivo de las derrotas sufridas, no le habían permitido a nuestro Pueblo entrar suficiente seguridad en su victoria.

Por eso, este documento, además de ser un planteamiento de decisivo valor estratégico para la Revolución guatemalteca, y un alto de calidad en la práctica revolucionaria en su conjunto, representa también la una de nuestras organizaciones un serio compromiso político y moral, de pleno cumplimiento deberes que no sólo ante la Historia de nuestra Patria, sino ante los Pueblos Hermanos de Centro América, del Caribe y del resto de América Latina.

Por su carácter, y por las consideraciones tácticas derivadas de una coyuntura en la que es necesario promover una acción de conjunto, el texto de este documento es estrictamente secreto. Pero debe ser un instrumento de trabajo de uso constante para las respectivas direcciones de nuestras organizaciones, del cual derivan la orientación básica de sus actividades y acciones; los elementos necesarios para la formación y educación de nuestras militancias en el más sólido espíritu y más profunda conciencia unitaria actual y en perspectiva; y los elementos de divulgación pública, necesarios para fortalecer la confianza de los diferentes sectores de nuestro Pueblo en el triunfo definitivo de la Revolución; así como para afianzar las relaciones de solidaridad e internacionalismo revolucionario.

Somos conscientes de lo que este compromiso significa y estamos resueltos a honrarlo hasta sus últimas consecuencias.

CONSIDERACIONES GENERALES

La Unidad de las cuatro Organizaciones Revolucionarias Guatemaltecas es una necesidad histórica del Movimiento Revolucionario de nuestro país y de la lucha de los Pueblos de Centro América. Y por lo tanto constituye un deber y una responsabilidad del EJERCITO GUERRILLERO DE LOS POBRES, de las FUERZAS ARMADAS REBELDES, de la ORGANIZACION DEL PUEBLO EN ARMAS y del PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO.

La Unidad responde a las necesidades e intereses del Pueblo de Guatemala y representa un factor fundamental para superar la dispersión ideológica, política, orgánica, militar, táctica y estratégica del movimiento revolucionario en general. Dicha dispersión constituye una de las causas fundamentales que le han impedido a las fuerzas revolucionarias guatemaltecas cambiar a su favor la correlación interna de fuerzas y presentar un sólido frente contra el enemigo nacional e internacional y conquistar la victoria.

La agudeza que asume la confrontación de clases y la lucha revolucionaria en Centro América y el Caribe, la interdependencia de los procesos y su necesaria solución de conjunto frente a un enemigo común -las clases explotadoras y opresoras de cada país y el imperialismo yanqui- y el forzoso desenlace militar que esta confrontación conlleva en la mayoría de los casos, en el actual momento histórico, representan una tarea de enorme magnitud para los revolucionarios. Enfrentar este complejo y exitosamente exige que nuestras cuatro Organizaciones Revolucionarias unifiquen sus esfuerzos en todos los aspectos y los coordinen con las fuerzas revolucionarias y las luchas de los Pueblos Centroamericanos y del Caribe.

Necesidad apremiante del Movimiento Revolucionario Guatemalteco es por lo tanto, unificar en la Unidad la ideología marxista-leninista, acerca de los fundamentos políticos, tácticos y de los objetivos de la Revolución en nuestro país. Y sobre la base de la estrategia de la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria, trazar la táctica para la toma del poder, en el contexto de la lucha de los Pueblos de Centro América y el Caribe, y de América Latina en general.

Para ello es indispensable la construcción de una VANGUARDIA REVOLUCIONARIA UNIFICADA que, en un proceso que parte de la existencia de nuestras cuatro Organizaciones Revolucionarias cumpla todas esas tareas. Que oriente, dirija y ejecute la acción práctica indispensable para su realización.

Nuestras cuatro Organizaciones Revolucionarias consideran como su perspectiva histórica en el futuro, su conversión cualitativa, mediante un proceso, de Vanguardia Revolucionaria en VANGUARDIA DE CLASES.

Necesidad del Movimiento Revolucionario Guatemalteco es, así mismo, definir las etapas de la Revolución y dirigir las acciones necesarias para alcanzarlas. En lo inmediato nos corresponde luchar por la instauración de un Gobierno Revolucionario, Popular y Democrático que resuelva los problemas más urgentes de las masas populares y de los sectores democráticos, que desarrolle al país y que a lo largo de un proceso construya las bases para la edificación del socialismo en Guatemala, eliminando para siempre la explotación y la opresión del hombre por el hombre y el dominio económico y político del imperialismo.

Es necesaria la existencia del Programa Revolucionario, síntesis unitaria de las concepciones, propósitos, tareas, alianzas y objetivos del Movimiento Revolucionario en la etapa de lucha por la toma del poder y la instauración del Gobierno Revolucionario, Popular y Democrático. Transcurrido el período de transición con todas las transformaciones que el proceso exige y que la situación de la correlación de fuerzas haga necesaria a nivel de área y de América Latina, la Vanguardia Revolucionaria deberá considerar las modificaciones o cambios programáticos para la etapa de la construcción del socialismo.

Necesidad del Movimiento Revolucionario Guatemalteco, es finalmente, definir la ideología y políticamente en el contexto de la lucha de clases mundial. El Movimiento Revolucionario Guatemalteco, es parte del movimiento revolucionario y de liberación nacional a escala mundial, y en su perspectiva está su incorporación al movimiento del proletariado revolucionario internacional.

El Movimiento Revolucionario Guatemalteco ve en la lucha de todos los pueblos por su liberación, y especialmente en el desarrollo y los éxitos de los países socialistas revolucionarios, su propia lucha y sus propios éxitos. Somos parte del movimiento revolucionario mundial en lucha contra el imperialismo y el colonialismo, y por ello ponemos también nuestras preocupaciones y esfuerzos por la unidad de tal movimiento y por la práctica del internacionalismo revolucionario, ya que ello favorece y desarrolla la lucha de todos los pueblos explotados y oprimidos contra sus explotadores y opresores, nacionales e internacionales.

Importancia decisiva reviste para el Movimiento Revolucionario Guatemalteco su estrecha vinculación con las revoluciones victoriosas de Cuba, Nicaragua y Granada con la lucha de los demás Pueblos de Centro América y el Caribe, particularmente la del heroico Pueblo Salvadoreño.

LA UNIDAD CONDICION INDISPENSABLE DEL TRIUNFO REVOLUCIONARIO

La unidad de las cuatro Organizaciones Revolucionarias que nos hemos colocado a la vanguardia de la lucha revolucionaria en nuestro país, es indispensable porque:

a) La victoria es inalcanzable sin la unidad del pueblo.

Las diferentes fuerzas sociales y políticas empeñadas en lograr un cambio revolucionario en Guatemala (la clase obrera urbana y agrícola, el semiproletariado, el campesinado trabajador, los artesanos, los pueblos indígenas, las capas medias urbanas, principalmente las capas medias asalariadas, la intelectualidad progresista y otras fuerzas sociales), no pueden, de manera aislada, darle cuerpo al poderoso torrente que se necesita para derrocar el poder de las clases dominantes y del imperialismo y provocar el derribo del sistema de explotación, opresión, represión y discriminación.

Las fuerzas sociales y políticas de nuestro país deben organizarse unitariamente para la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria en múltiples formas, adecuadas cada una de ellas a los diferentes tipos de lucha, a los diferentes sectores social-clasistas y a los diferentes niveles políticos en que esa lucha tiene lugar. La mayor expresión de ese esfuerzo unitario global, se materializará en la construcción de la más grande alianza revolucionaria, popular y democrática en la historia de nuestro pueblo, y cuya expresión orgánica será un frente nacional.

b) Porque la victoria es inalcanzable sin la construcción de la vanguardia revolucionaria.

Para llevar organización a la lucha contra el enemigo a las diferentes fuerzas revolucionarias de nuestro pueblo y conducir las a la toma del poder a través de la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria, es necesaria, mediante un proceso, la construcción de la vanguardia revolucionaria. Un paso fundamental en dicho proceso, es la constitución de una dirección unitaria que dirija, conduzca y organice la lucha revolucionaria, popular y democrática en su conjunto y que encabece las batallas políticas y militares de la Revolución.

La dirección unitaria orienta y dirige política y militarmente, a nuestras cuatro organizaciones, en base a acuerdos concretos tomados por consenso y a planes de trabajo y de campaña que combinen la actividad coordinada con la acción conjunta de nuestras cuatro organizaciones.

Cada una de nuestras organizaciones y sus organismos de Dirección supeditarán sus propios planes de trabajo y de campaña a las orientaciones y directrices emanadas de la dirección unitaria.

c) Porque, en una necesaria previsión para el futuro, afirmamos que:

Una sociedad nueva sin explotadores ni explotados, una sociedad independiente del imperialismo, sólo se puede lograr y garantizar si la vanguardia de la Revolución está unida y constituida por revolucionarios que se orientan en la lucha por la ideología del proletariado revolucionario: el marxismo-leninismo, y lo aplican creadora y consecuentemente en la práctica.

Sosteneamos que el proceso revolucionario será irreversible sólo si conduce, a través de sus diferentes etapas, a la expropiación de los medios de producción que se hallan en manos de los explotadores nacionales y extranjeros y se organiza la producción de manera que el producto del trabajo social beneficie a los productores. La garantía de que esto se logre está en que el poder del Estado pase a las manos de obreros y campesinos.

En el poder, al mismo tiempo, debe resolverse de manera revolucionaria la contradicción que se deriva de la existencia, el desarrollo, las diferencias y los derechos desiguales de los pueblos indígenas y del pueblo ladino. Sin embargo en la definición del contenido de dicha contradicción, y en consecuencia en la visualización de sus alcances y de las medidas revolucionarias que requiere para resolverlas, existen todavía puntos de vista polémicos entre nosotros que deberán ser resueltos con el mismo espíritu unitario con el que hemos solucionado otras discrepancias.

d) Porque el objetivo principal de la presente etapa de la lucha de nuestro Pueblo, la lucha por el derribo del gobierno de Lucas y su pandilla militar reaccionaria, y la instauración del Gobierno Revolucionario, Popular y Democrático, sólo podrá ser llevado victoriosamente a la práctica mediante el esfuerzo unitario de nuestras cuatro Organizaciones Revolucionarias.

e) Porque como un elemento indispensable para el desarrollo de la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria en el interior de nuestro país, tenemos que crear unitariamente un frente internacional que promueva y canalice hacia el interior la solidaridad con nuestro proceso revolucionario y que a la vez nos permita ejercer la solidaridad con otros pueblos en lucha, a la luz de los principios del internacionalismo revolucionario.

LA UNIDAD OBJETIVO ESTRATEGICO

Las cuatro Organizaciones Revolucionarias que en la presente etapa de lucha de nuestro Pueblo concurrimos al proceso de unidad revolucionaria, enarbolamos los caros intereses, demandas y sentimientos populares. Representamos la más genuina voluntad de lucha de ese pueblo que ha sido vilipendiado, explotado, oprimido y discriminado durante siglos, por explotadores nacionales y extranjeros. Tenemos toda una trayectoria reconocida de lucha junto a las causas populares y hemos pasado durante muchos años por duras y distintas experiencias. De ellas hemos extraído conclusiones que nos son comunes.

Expresamos en conjunto la necesidad histórica de transformar la sociedad por la vía revolucionaria y representamos la voluntad conciente de lograrlo mediante una estrategia político-militar que se sintetiza en la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria. El método de lucha principal de la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria es la guerra de guerrillas generalizada, combinada con las otras formas y niveles de la lucha de las masas. Esa es nuestra característica común y lo que al momento constituye la base más sólida para la unidad.

Nuestras cuatro Organizaciones Revolucionarias tienen sus raíces históricas en la voluntad de lucha demostrada por nuestro Pueblo en todas las batallas que ha librado por su libertad desde la conquista hasta nuestros días. Nuestros actuales esfuerzos por la unidad del Movimiento Revolucionario Guatemalteco tienen antecedentes importantes en las luchas políticas y militares, que desde 1944 ha librado nuestro pueblo contra las clases dominantes y contra el imperialismo yanqui. Nos consideramos herederos del ejemplo y los esfuerzos de los héroes y mártires revolucionarios que han caído en combate durante los veinte años de lucha guerrillera revolucionaria que ha librado nuestro Pueblo.

Nuestras cuatro Organizaciones encuentran las raíces de su ideología en el ejemplo y en la influencia de los revolucionarios comunistas que difundieron en nuestro país las ideas del marxismo-leninismo y señalaron los parámetros ideológicos de la revolución guatemalteca.

Ampliamos nuestras cuatro Organizaciones Revolucionarias reconocen y valoran el influjo y aporte fundamental, en lo ideológico y político, que para ellas ha significado las Revoluciones Victoriosas de Cuba y Nicaragua.

Pero al mismo tiempo constatamos que cada una de nuestras Organizaciones constituye una vertiente distinta del Movimiento Revolucionario Guatemalteco, que poseen estructuras relativamente diferentes, que nos nutrimos de experiencias igualmente ricas pero que varían entre sí y que nos orientamos por conceptos y postulados ideológicos que, siendo revolucionarios, necesitan contrastarse multilateralmente y ser sometidos a la práctica, a fin de constituir un cuerpo común de ideas rectoras que garanticen el futuro revolucionario de nuestro Pueblo.

Diferentes son también, por razones de distinto tipo, la composición social clasista del grueso de las fuerzas de base, de los cuadros y de los dirigentes de nuestras Organizaciones. Diferentes son el grado de desarrollo que en los planos orgánicos y militar tiene cada una de nuestras Organizaciones. Y diferentes sea también, por todo ello, las capacidades reales político-militares que cada organización tiene en la actualidad. Ninguna de estas diferencias debemos perder de vista si queremos avanzar en un proceso en el que, basándonos en lo que nos une, nos permita superar dialécticamente lo que hasta el momento nos diferencia. Pero lo más importante a este fin es poner el acento en lo que nos une y no en aquello que nos separa.

El proceso unitario, por ello, debe observar una gradualidad que equilibre en su dinámica y en su práctica las realidades objetivas de las que partimos y las necesidades de aceleración del proceso que la lucha revolucionaria exige. Esa gradualidad dependerá de la apreciación particular y conjunto que en cada momento seamos capaces de hacer en relación a lo que es posible y a lo que es necesario.

Las formas y niveles orgánicos y políticos unitarios que a lo largo del proceso vayan siendo alcanzados por nuestras Cuatro Organizaciones, deberán ser motivo de definición conjunta en cada fase. La dirección unitaria es el organismo superior de las estructuras unitarias. Corresponde a dicha dirección definir, normar, estructurar y orientar a los distintos organismos unitarios que resulten necesarios para el cumplimiento de sus funciones.

PRINCIPIOS DE FUNCIONAMIENTO DE LA UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA

En la presente etapa de la lucha revolucionaria, las cuatro Organizaciones Revolucionarias que participamos en el proceso unitario somos entidades independientes. Pero al alcanzar un mismo propósito y al guiarnos en lo fundamental por

una misma estrategia, una misma táctica general y una misma ideología, somos conscientes que nos encaminamos a la formación, en un proceso, de una VANGUARDIA REVOLUCIONARIA ÚNICA.

En el proceso unitario cada una de nuestras cuatro Organizaciones tiene igualdad de derechos y deberes. Contamos de igual poder de conservación e iniciativa. Y en la responsabilidad moral y política, cada una de ellas tiene el deber de actuar, ante el Movimiento Revolucionario de Centro América y el Caribe y ante el Movimiento Revolucionario Internacional.

Pero del actual desarrollo desigual de nuestras Organizaciones se desprende que cada una de ellas está llamada a aportar en magnitudes diferentes al proceso. Esto en términos de magnitudes orgánicas y militares. Reconocerlo así, no significa, sin embargo, que las diferencias se traduzcan en mayores derechos para quien tenga mayor desarrollo ni en menores deberes para quien lo tenga menos.

LA UNIDAD DE LA CONVICTIÓN UNITARIA IMPLICA NECESARIAMENTE EN CONTRA DE LA FUERZA COMO SIMPLES DE ELEMENTOS INDIVIDUALES Y NO COMO SUMA DE ELEMENTOS PARTICULARES QUE ENTORPECEN LA LUCHA CONTRA EL ENEMIGO. LA UNIDAD NO ES UNA SIMPLE SUMA DE FACTORES, SINO UNA MULTIPLICACIÓN ORGANICA, POLITICA, MILITAR E IDEOLOGICA.

La unidad revolucionaria no tiene como objetivo proponernos que cada Organización alcance en un momento determinado igual desarrollo y capacidad en los aspectos estructural-orgánicos y militares. Tiene como objetivo complementar las capacidades que cada Organización tenga o pueda llegar a tener realísticamente.

Nuestra actividad unitaria es una actividad para luchar, para trabajar, para impulsar colectivamente el combate al enemigo. No es una actividad para disputar posiciones, para regatear derechos, para reclamar privilegios, sino para asumir responsabilidades colectivamente. En la práctica unitaria se confirmará qué aspectos de línea resultan validados por la realidad, por la vida. Ante esa constatación no importa quién o quiénes tengan el mérito del acierto. Lo importante es reconocer el acierto como tal y adoptarlo colectivamente.

Para que la unidad sea sólida e irreversible, nuestros esfuerzos unitarios deberán hacerse complementando las discusiones, clarificaciones y acuerdos por la cúpula, con la educación a las bases de nuestras respectivas organizaciones en el espíritu y en la perspectiva unitaria.

En la práctica de lucha colectiva revolucionaria valoraremos verdaderamente nuestras convicciones unitarias, profundizaremos en su necesidad, apreciaremos lo que nos una y estaremos en capacidad de reconocer nuestras diferencias para superarlas dialécticamente. Los acuerdos unitarios, pues, no se deben reducir a la discusión teórica, a la consignación de propósitos, a la suscripción de proyectos. La aplicación correcta en la práctica de los acuerdos, constituye el verdadero cumplimiento de los mismos y su apreciación indispensable.

CRITERIOS Y PROCEDIMIENTOS GENERALES A OBSERVAR EN EL PROCESO UNITARIO

Avanzar en el conocimiento mutuo dentro del principio de comprensión y conciliación revolucionaria. La honestidad, la lealtad, la franqueza, la fraternidad, la consecuencia y la disciplina, así como la iniciativa, son parte de los principios revolucionarios y deben estar presentes en nuestro esfuerzo unitario.

Colaborar, cooperar, y apoyarnos mutuamente dentro de la perspectiva de crear gradualmente las condiciones para alcanzar formas y niveles superiores de unidad orgánica.

Garantizar el desarrollo y cumplimiento de nuestros planes y esfuerzos prácticos, garantía inicial del avance revolucionario. Coordinar y unificar actividades en todos los campos en que sea posible, oportuno y necesario, sobre todo en aquellos aspectos que de manera más inmediata nos permitan avanzar y acelerar la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria.

Las actividades unitarias deberán mantener un ritmo y una sistematización acorde a las exigencias generales y coyunturales del proceso revolucionario, a juicio de la dirección unitaria. Consecuentemente, las actividades unitarias no deben sujetarse a condiciones circunstanciales.

La dirección unitaria deberá usar, cuando lo considere necesario, la declaración, el manifiesto, el comunicado nacional e internacional con el objetivo de crear a estos niveles, confianza y crédito en nuestras fuerzas unidas.

ACUERDOS UNITARIOS

1. Se acuerda constituir como máximo organismo unitario de dirección la COMANDANCIA GENERAL REVOLUCIONARIA (C.G.R.).
2. La COMANDANCIA GENERAL REVOLUCIONARIA está integrada por los cuatro dirigentes máximos de nuestras Organizaciones y por cuatro Adjuntos.
3. Se acuerda elaborar y aplicar una táctica general única para lograr el objetivo principal de la presente etapa de la lucha de nuestro pueblo, el derrocamiento del gobierno de Lucas, y la instauración del Gobierno Revolucionario, Popular y Democrático. Asimismo se acuerda, en función del objetivo táctico, la elaboración y divulgación de una plataforma programática adecuada a la presente coyuntura.
4. Se acuerda elaborar de inmediato planes de campaña y de trabajo, para el impulso de la actividad unitaria en los campos: militar, de masas, internacional y de la propaganda.
5. En el caso de que pudieran presentarse discrepancias, fricciones, desacuerdos o contradicciones dentro del proceso unitario se acuerda que dichos problemas se conozcan, se aborden y se ventilen conjuntamente, únicamente a nivel de la COMANDANCIA GENERAL REVOLUCIONARIA. En los casos en que se vean involucrados niveles que no sean de dirección, se debe garantizar la práctica del espíritu unitario mientras los asuntos se esclarecen y se resuelven al máximo nivel.
6. Se acuerda coordinar o unificar, según el caso, las actividades en el Frente Internacional, bajo la conducción centralizada de la COMANDANCIA GENERAL REVOLUCIONARIA.

Managua, Nicaragua, 2 de Noviembre de 1980

HASTA LA VICTORIA SIEMPRE
EJERCITO GUERRILLERO DE LOS POBRES
E G P

LA VENCER O MORIR POR GUATEMALA,
LA REVOLUCIÓN Y EL SOCIALISMO
FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS
F A R

VIVAMOS PARA Luchar,
Luchemos PARA TRIUNFAR
ORGANIZACIÓN DEL PUEBLO EN ARMAS
O R P A

POR GUATEMALA, LA REVOLUCIÓN
Y EL SOCIALISMO
PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO
P G T

EXHIBIT D

[From the Chicago Tribune, Aug. 23, 1981]

CASTRO PLAN TO DESTABILIZE U.S. MAY BE BROADENING

(By Daniel James)¹

DEFECTOR REVEALS CASTRO PLAN TO DESTABILIZE THE UNITED STATES

NEW YORK.—A recent defector from Cuba's General Intelligence Directorate (DGI) says that the April, 1980, flood of 125,000 refugees from the port of Mariel was part of a plan to destabilize the United States and relieve Cuba of "excess" population it could not support.

In an interview, defector Genaro Perez said that this "Plan Bravo" was conceived by Cuban President Fidel Castro and the DGI. Before defecting last year, Perez operated under cover of Havanatur, a DGI-run travel agency in Miami that maintained surveillance of Cuban-Americans visiting Cuba and tried to recruit intelligence agents from among them.

In June, 1980, the CIA testified before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that it had warned the State Department, National Security Council, "and higher" authorities as early as Jan. 31, 1980, of Castro's intention to unload large numbers of new refugees on the U.S. The CIA added that Castro's removal of security guards from Havana's Peruvian embassy on April 4, 1980—causing thousands of Cubans to invade that embassy—"was probably calculated to precipitate a crisis and force the U.S. . . . to accept sizable numbers of new refugees."

Perez charges that Plan Bravo would "unleash violence in the U.S.—riots, disturbances, bombings, shootouts, assaults on banks—in an effort to terrorize the American public and government."

He adds that Puerto Rican terrorists are vital to Castro's plan and would encourage violence "in all parts of the U.S.—not only in New York or Chicago but also Washington, Miami, Los Angeles." In addition, Perez says, the plan involves the incitement of racial conflict among Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and "especially blacks."

U.S. intelligence officers express concern about the increased activities of Puerto Rican terrorists aided and abetted by the DGI. And, intentional or otherwise, Miami—where most of the Mariel refugees ended up—became the scene of riots as unemployed blacks protested not just the brutal murder of a black by white police, but the refugees' alleged seizure of available jobs.

These troubles discouraged tourism, contributing to a serious decline in Miami's economy while fanning blacks' and whites' resentment toward the new refugees and toward Cubans in general.

Tomas Regalado—a respected reporter whose "Cuba Today" radio program on Miami's WHRC is listened to widely in Cuba—adds another charge. Under cover of the chaotic boatlift, he says, Castro sent "hundreds" of new intelligence operatives to the U.S.

The State Department estimates that more than 200,000 Cubans hold exit visas and are ready to sail for the U.S. upon Castro's signal. However, Perez believes that Castro would prefer to succeed with another plan—the first priority "Plan Alpha." Its goal is to normalize relations with the U.S., beginning with removal of the 20-year trade embargo against Cuba.

Although his failed Marxist programs made a shambles of the Cuban economy, Castro has made the embargo his whipping boy and the keystone of the U.S. policy. The embargo choked off international credit to Cuba, without which the country cannot buy the capital goods required for economic survival. Therefore, Castro is attempting to secure normalized relations while simultaneously using U.S. businessmen and DGI commercial fronts to violate the embargo and bring in forbidden products.

This and all other DGI operations in the U.S. are directed from the Cuban mission to the UN in New York. Although Cuba is among the smallest members the mission, with a staff of 50 to 80, is the second largest in the U.N. As many as 75 percent of those accredited to the mission are not diplomats, but officers of the DGI, and other Cuban intelligence agencies.

Some of them are officers of the Department of State Security, or D.S.E., which controls Cuba's internal security. Others belong to the Department of America and

¹ Daniel James is the author of "Cuba: The First Soviet Satellite in the Americas."

the Cuban Institute for Friendship with Peoples, or ICAP, intelligence agencies that keep visitors to Cuba under surveillance.

Not surprisingly, many of these members of the Cuban mission don't bother to show up for regular UN duties. At least two ranking members who are listed as "political counselors" are actually high intelligence officers. One is Mario Monzon, 38, chief of all DGI operations in the U.S. The other is Alfredo Garcia Almeida who heads the America Department here and performs ICAP functions.

Monzon answers not only to his superiors in Havana but also to Moscow's intelligence organization, the KGB, through its station chief in New York. The KGB created the DGI in the early 1960s and, though still a satellite of the Soviet agency, is rated professionally as among the world's top five intelligence services, after the KGB, the CIA, Israel's Mossad, and Britain's M16.

The DGI has special value for the KGB because its officers, accredited diplomats, are allowed complete freedom of movement in this country, while Soviet and other Soviet-bloc emissaries are restricted to a 25-mile radius around New York and Washington.

"The Soviets parcel out the intelligence pie," said a State department official, "giving all kinds of functions to the DGI."

U.S. business is a central target of the DGI's Washington activities, with agents encouraging businessmen to circumvent the trade embargo. After Carter's February, 1977, announcement that he would lift the embargo if Castro withdrew his troops from Angola, U.S. businessmen flocked to Cuba in search of trade and investment opportunities.

Cuba's push for circumvention of the embargo was so aggressive that it upset even the generally sympathetic Carter administration, which threatened to expel the DGI officer in charge of the operation.

Undeterred, the DGI continues to flout the embargo. Last summer it incorporated in Panama a front that smuggles U.S. auto parts, radios, TV sets, and heavy equipment into Cuba. The DGI also uses scheduled airlines to smuggle desperately needed items like sugarmill parts to Panama and Nicaragua, from which they are shipped to Cuba.

The DGI has a special interest in tourism as a source of dollars and intelligence agents. Havanatur was the DGI's most important tourism agency in Miami until agent Genaro Perez, posing as a Havanatur executive, broke with it and exposed it last year.

Perez claims that the agency fleeced Cuban-Americans anxious to visit relatives in Cuba of \$100 million in surcharges and "commissions." But more sinister, he said, was agents' secret videotaping of the tourists' Havana hotel rooms to learn whether they could be blackmailed into working for the DGI. Agents would threaten to harm Cuban relatives if the tourists did not "cooperate" with the Castro regime upon returning home.

The DGI's normalization drive was nearly successful in 1977, when a group of prominent Cuban-Americans formed the Committee of 75 to initiate a "dialog" with Cuba and to secure the release of some 3,000 political prisoners in Castro's jails.

The Committee of 75, which soon grew to 100 or more, was actually run by DGI officers. Bernardo Benes, vice president of Miami's Continental National Bank, went to Havana at the head of a six-man commission of the Committee of 75 to negotiate with Fidel Castro. He had several meetings with the prisoners, which made their families and the Carter administration happy.

Normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations seemed well on the way to becoming a reality until Benes' personal dealings with Castro made anti-Castro Cuban exiles suspect that he was an intelligence agent. Soon after breaking with the DGI, Manuel Espinosa charged him publicly with being a DGI operative.

But Benes had conducted the negotiations with Castro with the knowledge of the FBI, to which he reported his activities almost every step of the way, and of the State Department. The State Department seems to have tacitly approved of his role and later Cyrus Vance, then secretary of state wrote Benes and thanked him for his "services." In short, Benes had functioned virtually as an extra-official, one-man State Department. This might merit investigation because, in the course of it, Benes, a private U.S. citizen, concluded an agreement with a foreign state, with the U.S. government's tacit agreement, that led to 3,000 foreigners' immigration to the U.S.

Although the DGI and committee of 75 failed to achieve "normalization," they did attain another desirable objective: the breakup of the hitherto-solid anti-Castro bloc presented by the Cuban-American community. Until now, no administration has dared normalize relations, fearing that the increasing Cuban-American vote in south Florida might turn against it—as happened to Carter in November, 1980. But

thanks to DGI agents, normalization is acquiring a growing constituency among Cuban-Americans, particularly those who have had relatives freed by Castro.

Most disturbing to the first anti-Castro exiles is the emergence of a generation that never knew the Cuban communist dictatorship. They do not share their parents' anti-communist attitude and have developed a tolerance or even a preference for Castroism. Some of the more radical young people have formed the Antonio Maceo Brigade—named after a hero of Cuba's 1958 war of independence—which critics like Gustavo Marin, 33, claim "is an idea of the Cuban intelligence service." Marin, head of left-of-center group that is a rival of the Maceo Brigade, says that some of the brigade's members are DGI agents.

Agents in Puerto Rico, he says, have joined the extreme-leftist Puerto Rican Socialist Party, which is known to have close ties with the Castro regime and sends members to Cuba for terrorist and guerrilla training.

The older Venceremos Brigade seeks to recruit idealistic young Americans, not necessarily of Cuban origin, offering them trips to Cuba to labor alongside the peasants. It is a creature of the America Department, the intelligence service that, in the 1970s, made serious inroads through Venceremos among such U.S. radical groups as the Weathermen, many of whose members attended Cuban guerrilla-training camps.

A top-secret FBI report, now declassified, says that the DGI's "ultimate objective" with regard to Venceremos was to recruit "individuals who are politically oriented and who someday may obtain a position, elective or appointive, somewhere in the U.S. government, which would provide the Cuban government with access to political, economic, and military intelligence."

But, above all, there is fear that since the Reagan administration is unlikely to accept normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations under present circumstances, Castro eventually will unleash the full Plan Bravo upon this country. This fear is shared by some U.S. intelligence officers, who worry that Puerto Rico—troubled economically, politically, and socially—might become the first victim of a Castro destabilization effort.

Just such an objective may be the principal goal of the DG through Cuba's UN mission, which pressed for Puerto Rico's independence again—as it does every year—in the "decolonialization" committee last Thursday.

Communist, African, and Asian nations joined in the committee and voted to send the question of Puerto Rican independence to the UN General Assembly for the first time.

[From the Independent News Alliance, Dec. 11, 1981]

PUERTO RICAN TERRORISTS MAY BE REAL THREAT TO REAGAN

(By Daniel James ¹)

SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO.—Although the focus has been on Libyan hit men, Puerto Rican terrorists may pose a more immediate threat to the lives of President Reagan and top U.S. officials, say intelligence officers here.

Interlocking Puerto Rican terrorist groups, supported by leftist elements abroad, have waged a long, vocal and violent campaign to destroy U.S. "imperialism" and gain the island's independence. Earlier this week, in an act of what they termed "international solidarity," Puerto Rican, Salvadoran and Venezuelan leftists hijacked three Venezuelan airliners. According to released passengers, the hijackers demanded Puerto Rican independence as well as the release of Venezuelan political prisoners and an end to Venezuelan support of the Salvadoran junta.

In bringing their "people's war" to the United States, Puerto Rican terrorists have several advantages over Mummur Qadafi's hit men: As U.S. citizens they face no risk in crossing borders, and they can move freely, blending in with the millions of other Hispanics living stateside. Furthermore, the Puerto Rican terrorists are as well-trained, fanatical and reckless as their Libyan or other foreign counterparts.

In a recent speech, their reputed "godfather," 72-year-old Juan Antonio Corretjer, announced the terrorists' intention to "get" Reagan and his top aides.

Corretjer, a revolutionary firebrand for a half-century, praised 11 members of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) found guilty of seditious conspiracy by

¹ Daniel James is the author of "Cuba: The First Soviet Satellite in the Americas" and "Che Guevara, a Biography." Research for this article was underwritten by the Fund for Objective News Reporting.

a federal jury in Chicago and charged Reagan personally with bribing and torturing one of them, Alfredo Mendez, into betraying his comrades. Corretjer denounced U.S. authorities and Reagan—who, he said, is "humanity's worst enemy."

Intelligence officers here regard the speech as a call to Puerto Rican terrorists to punish Reagan and the law-enforcement officials involved in prosecuting the FALN Chicago Eleven, a case still on the books.

There is more than ample evidence of acts of vengeance committed over the years by the terrorists, whose actions are condemned by the vast majority of Puerto Rico's people.

In December 1979, three terrorist groups ambushed a U.S. Navy bus en route to Sabana Seca Communications Center, near San Juan, shooting and killing two petty officers and wounding 10 other naval personnel. In a communique, the terrorists took responsibility for the attack and said they were avenging the alleged murder of a comrade, Angel Rodriguez Cristobal, who was found hanging in a Tallahassee, Fla., prison cell and listed as a suicide. After the sailors were killed, Corretjer announced that "his (Rodriguez Cristobal's) death is avenged."

Last January, the same three terrorist groups—the Macheteros, Armed Forces of Popular Resistance (FARP) and Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVRP)—joined in firebombing nine Air National Guard jets worth \$45 million at Isla Verde Air Base near San Juan as part of their ongoing "people's war of national liberation" against "Yankee imperialism." The firebombing was carried out in only seven minutes, 40 seconds—ample evidence of the terrorists' high level of precision and efficiency.

Since 1975, Puerto Rican terrorist groups have committed 260 acts of violence on the island, according to official count. These range from bombing banks, post offices and U.S. business enterprises to blowing up electric power plants and assaulting military installations and personnel. An estimated 70 or more violent attacks were committed on the mainland during the same period, mostly by the FALN. Federal authorities have revived their investigation into 31 unsolved bombings in New York City alone, based on new information supplied by Alfredo Mendez.

The FALN is the only Puerto Rican group operating in "enemy territory"—as Corretjer characterizes the continental United States—and probably would be the logical one to entrust with forming a hit squad to "get" the president and other high U.S. officials.

The FALN was formed in 1974 to open a "second front of armed struggle for Puerto Rican national liberation"—the first front being the island itself. It opened this "second front" by bombing five prominent Manhattan locations, including Rockefeller Center, on Oct. 26, 1974. Several weeks later it killed a policeman in reprisal for the alleged murder of a Puerto Rican activist poet "by the racist New York Police Department."

Perhaps the FALN's most notorious act was the bombing of historic Fraunces Tavern in Lower Manhattan in January 1975, killing four and injuring more than 60 people.

In March 1980, armed FALN members seized President Carter's campaign headquarters in Chicago and GOP presidential candidate George Bush's in New York City on the same day. Eleven of the group were caught in Evanston, Ill., three weeks later, and all have been sentenced to long prison terms. Only Alfredo Mendez admitted FALN membership, apparently hoping to get his 75-year sentence reduced.

Another suspect in the Chicago case—and, as the FALN's bomb-making expert, perhaps the most dangerous of the lot—is William Morales, who is currently a fugitive.

U.S. intelligence officers believe the FALN was connected with the October robbery of a Brink's armored truck near Nyack, N.Y., by Weather Underground and black terrorists, during which two policemen and a guard were killed. The FBI's No. 2 man in New York, Kenneth P. Walton, has stated that the joint Federal-New York City Terrorism Task Force he heads is looking to possible links with the FALN and "possibly some foreign organizations" as well.

Intelligence sources take "foreign organizations" to mean Cuba's General Intelligence Directorate (DGI)—Fidel Castro's worldwide espionage service, whose principal aim is to destabilize the United States. Puerto Rico is high on the DGI's destabilization target list.

The "father of the FALN," and, in a sense, of Puerto Rico's modern terrorist movement, is Filiberto Inocencio Ojeda Rios, a 42-year-old Puerto Rican agent of Cuban intelligence who founded and led the first of Puerto Rico's new terrorist groups, the Independent Armed Revolutionary Movement (MIRA), in 1967. MIRA members received training and arms in Cuba and began activities in early 1969,

when they bombed a police station, destroying two police cars, a bank and other enterprises.

After many bombings—35 in New York City alone during 1970—MIRA was broken up by the police and Ojeda was arrested. He jumped \$2,000 bail, headed for New York, was assigned to the DGI contingent attached to Cuba's U.N. mission and formed the FALN with old MIRA members as the nucleus.

Although wanted by the Puerto Rican police, Ojeda, a master of disguise, slips in and out of the island undetected. In 1979, on one of his last known visits, he, Corretjer and another old comrade unified Puerto Rico's five principal terrorist groups under a single command—repeating the Cuban pattern of unifying armed revolutionary factions, as in Central America. Under this command, known as the CRN, are the FALN, the Macheteros (formally named the Boricua Popular Army, after the island's Indian name, Bornquen), FARP, OVRP and the People's Revolutionary Commandos (CRP).

Over the Puerto Rican unified command is a Cuban group, the Havana-based Coordinating Revolutionary Junta (JCR), whose Eastern Caribbean section is headed by Ojeda. The JCR—set up by the DGI and the Americas Department, the Cuban Communist Party's national liberation-intelligence unit—provides arms, training and guidance to revolutionary organizations throughout Latin America, including Nicaragua's Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas.

Other foreign organizations with which Puerto Rican terrorists may be connected include the PLO and the band around the infamous "Carlos the Jackal"—born Ilich Ramirez in Venezuela—with which Ojeda made contact during a stint for the JCR in Paris before moving to Havana.

In an interview, Corretjer acknowledged that ties have long existed between the FALN and other Puerto Rican extremist groups and the Weather Underground. He added that he fully sympathized with the Brink's attackers and revealed that his Puerto Rican Socialist League, an "open" Marxist-Leninist organization, maintains contact with U.S. black extremists and some Chicanos in Colorado.

Another island group, the Marxist-Leninist Puerto Rican Socialist Party, has had ties to the Weather Underground, principally through trips to Cuba sponsored by the Venceremos Brigade. The Brigade, whose activities were embraced by Weather leaders such as Katherine Boudin, is the creation of the Cuban Communist Party's Americas Department.

The Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP) has maintained a quasi-diplomatic "mission" in a house in Havana's luxurious Vedado section for many years, its secretary general, Juan Mari Bras, told the writer. Since the PSP pays neither rent nor, presumably, upkeep, the mission virtually is subsidized by Castro. The PSP supplied 600 Cuban-trained youths to terrorist groups after its abysmal showing in the 1976 gubernatorial elections, which caused them to abandon the electoral route to independence preached by Mari Bras after 1970 and to embrace "urban guerrilla warfare."

Mari Bras says he eschews "terrorism" while embracing "armed struggle," yet local intelligence sources say he organized one of the earliest terrorist groups, the Armed Commandos of Liberation (CAL), in 1965. CAL members received guerrilla training and arms in Cuba and committed many acts of violence, including the bombing of a U.S. Governors Conference in San Juan, until the group disappeared in 1972-73.

Nine terrorist groups have proliferated in Puerto Rico over the past 15 years. That figure may be incomplete and does not include legal "open" support groups such as the Socialist League, PSP and the Federation of Pro-Independence University of Puerto Rico student strike that has gone on since the beginning of the school year, precipitating rioting and other campus violence and twice compelling Gov. Carlos Romero Barcelo to have police units occupy the university.

Although contemporary Puerto Rican terrorism began during the relatively prosperous mid-1960s, the past year has seen a record rise in violence. This may be attributed in part to widening discontent over the island's sharp economic decline.

Twenty-one percent of the labor force and a massive 38.2 percent of youths aged 20 to 24 are unemployed. Inflation is around 11 percent and is expected to rise even higher as the rate of imports doubles that of the island's exports. The export of sugar has all but disappeared because Puerto Rico can no longer produce it economically—and as sugar production has plummeted, so has employment in the industry.

The economic crunch is expected next October, the beginning of fiscal year 1983, when federal food and nutrition assistance may be cut by 25 percent. With 60 percent of the island's 3.2 million people officially estimated to be on food stamps, this

could provoke something close to revolution unless Washington takes remedial action beforehand.

This threat to living standards has hardly made President Reagan the island's most popular figure. In addition, Puerto Ricans are confused about their political status.

Many Puerto Ricans perceive the commonwealth status they have enjoyed since 1952 to be an economic failure. But the statehood alternative, advocated by Gov. Romero's New Progressive Party, is supported by only 45 percent of the people and is seen by the rest as worse than the commonwealth: Citizens would be subject to state taxes and less federal aid, and statehood might endanger their Spanish heritage.

Pro-independence forces polled less than 6 percent of the vote in the 1980 gubernatorial election, yet independence remains a potentially explosive issue. Cuba, which sees it as an opportunity to pursue destabilization, has championed the "liberation" of Puerto Rico from "Yankee imperialism" and has had the island's "colonial" status placed on the U.N. General Assembly's 1982 agenda.

The United States thus faces a two-front war over Puerto Rico: the diplomatic one in the United Nations, led by Cuba and backed by the Third World and the island's extremists; and the terrorist front, which has assumed the character of a "people's war" or urban guerrilla warfare.

The principal target is now military. "We want to get rid of every imperialist military installation on this island," says Corretjer, adding that he and his supporter will go to every length to attain their objective.

Cuba is fully in accord with that objective, aware of Puerto Rico's strategic importance in the Caribbean. Some 60 percent of U.S. imported oil is shipped through the Caribbean. In addition, major naval installations like Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico may become decisive if Washington goes all-out to stop the flow of arms and military forces from Cuba and other Soviet-bloc countries to Central American guerrillas.

Aiding the Puerto Rican terrorists is the island's history of violence. In 1950, the nation was shocked when members of the Nationalist Party tried to assassinate President Harry Truman; in 1954 they opened fire in the House of Representatives, wounding five congressmen.

Four of the Nationalists involved in those attempts were released from federal prisons two years ago and live in Puerto Rico. Lolita Lebron, perhaps the most famous of them, has said, "We have done nothing to cause us to repent," adding, "I cannot disavow people who use bombs. I hate bombs, but we might have to use them."

Lebron's fanaticism was engendered by Nationalist leader and hero Pedro Albizu Campos, who attempted an insurrection on the island in 1950, coinciding with the attack on Truman. It has infected today's Puerto Rican terrorists, who have wedded Albizu Campos' nationalism to Marxist-Leninism, and they gladly accept the material and political support of the Soviet Union and such client-states as Cuba.

This implies an abundance of material resources and sophisticated techniques. It might also suggest that the Libyan threat to Reagan could be executed not by Libyan assassins, but rather by Puerto Rican counterparts believing in the same objectives.

EXHIBIT E

RESPONSES OF DANIEL JAMES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR DENTON

Q. The FALN, you have stated, was organized by the DGI, through a Puerto Rican DGI agent named Filiberto Inocencio Ojeda Rios.

Has it at any time been a "legitimate" independence movement or has it always been a pawn of the Cuban DGI, engendered and nurtured to carry out Cuban directives?

Does the FALN operate in the continental United States only, or does it also conduct operations in Puerto Rico?

A. The FALN, to my knowledge, having been founded by the DGI agent Filiberto Inocencio Ojeda Rios, has never been a "legitimate" independence group although advocacy of Puerto Rican independence is, of course, central to its professed program. I am not certain that it can be characterized today as a "pawn" of the DGI; it may, that is, enjoy a certain amount of autonomy, perhaps choosing its own hits, for example.

The FALN does not appear to be exclusively operational Stateside, and has been known to organize or join in organizing terrorist attempts in Puerto Rico. On Oct. 27, 1975, for example, it engaged in "a simultaneously-coordinated attack against Yama, government and monopoly capitalist institutions in New York, Washington, D. C., Chicago, and Puerto Rico," according to P. R. terrorist sources. I understand that in the last two years or so it has engaged in terrorist acts on the island but I have not been able to identify the occasions, thus far.

Q. In your statement, it was said that, as part of the Plan Bravo, the DGI "are going to incite Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and blacks, ... especially blacks."

Are you aware of specific incidences where this has occurred?

A. The most glaring instance of the incitation of U. S. blacks by the DGI is, of course, the Mariel boatlift and its aftermath in the case of Miami and Dade County where the overwhelming majority of "Marielitos" settled. That has given rise to much friction between the Cuban and black communities there.

Also, the Cuban Interests Section chief in Washington, D. C., Ramon Sanchez Parodi, reportedly a DGI operative, seeks as deliberate policy to cultivate the Black Caucus in Congress for the purpose of opposing U. S. policies.

Q. Besides the company in Panama mentioned in your statement, are you aware of other ways in which Cuba, through American businessmen, or otherwise, circumvents the trade embargo?

A. The U. S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued, on Apr. 9, 1982, a "partial list of designated nationals" consisting of 30 companies registered

in Panama and 4 in Florida charged with being Cuban commercial fronts that have been violating the U. S. trade embargo against Cuba. Included are Comercial Miralla, Havanatur, and American Airways Charter, which I have previously indicated as Cuban business fronts.

Q. Could you explain whether the hierarchy of the Cuban foreign service has been co-opted by the DGI -- to what extent?

Please describe how the DGI and other Cuban intelligence services use diplomatic cover to gather intelligence.

Do you have any personal knowledge that any former diplomats or diplomatic personnel in Washington like Teofilo Acosta (former Cuban Interest Section - 1st Secretary) or Richard Escartin (Cuban Interest Section) have DGI connections? Any Cubans with the United Nations? Any Cubans in the Cuban Mission to the United Nations? Please give specifics.

How many Cuban diplomats, embassy personnel, mission employees or UN employees have been expelled from the United States for intelligence activities since 1959?

A. The DGI, Americas Dept. and INCAP, all Cuban intelligence services, use Cuban diplomatic cover for their work as a matter of course, probably wherever Cuba maintains diplomatic relations. Among the more notorious examples is that of the Cuban Consul in Costa Rica, Julian Lopez, and several of his aides who, as Americas Dept. operatives, supervised the airlift of an estimated 30 plane loads of Cuban arms to the Sandinistas during their revolution in 1978-79; Lopez, presumably still working for the Americas Dept., is now Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua, and it is reasonable to assume that he supervises the activities of his country's numerous intelligence agents in that country. He also supervises their activities in other Central American countries, for example, Costa Rica, where several DGI and/or Americas Dept. agents entering from Nicaragua have been spotted.

The Cuban Embassy in Panama, with 50 persons is the second largest in that country; an estimated half or thereabouts of that number are DGI or Americas Dept. agents. The Cuban Ambassador himself is reported to belong to Cuban intelligence, and a former Cuban Ambassador to Venezuela is said to be the top DGI agent in Panama but does not operate under cover of the local embassy.

Concerning Cuban intelligence agents who may be in the UN Mission or Interests Section in Washington, I have already mentioned their names in print (see two articles of mine accompanying my testimony as exhibits); I know of no others. Your last question, on how many Cuban diplomats, etc., have been expelled from the U. S. for intelligence activities, should be directed to the State Dept.

END