


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
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# PUBLIC DRUNKS AND THE LAW

*The Effects of  
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Project on the  
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Justice System*

*A Report Submitted  
to the  
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Public Drunks and the Law

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# PUBLIC DRUNKS AND THE LAW

## *The Effects of California's Public Inebriate Project on the Criminal Justice System*

*A Report Submitted  
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National Institute  
of Justice*

*by Jack Reynolds, Ph.D.  
Center for Human Services  
Washington, D.C.*

1982

U.S. Department of Justice  
National Institute of Justice

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### PART ONE: INTRODUCTION (Chapters 1-4)

In late 1977 the State of California sponsored a Public Inebriate Demonstration Project in Sacramento and Humboldt counties which ran through the end of 1979.

The project attempted to find an effective way to reduce the effects of public inebriacy on the community, and particularly, the criminal justice system. The three principal objectives of the project were to reduce the visibility of public inebriates, their arrests, and their involvement with the criminal justice system. The strategy adopted was very similar to that advocated in the Uniform Alcoholism and Treatment Act--diversion rather than arrest, provision of a "continuum of care," and voluntary acceptance of treatment.

University Research Corporation was contracted by the State to evaluate this project. When it came to an end, the Center for Human Services (URC's non-profit affiliate) received a grant from the National Institute of Justice to continue collecting data through 1980 and to conduct an analysis of the impact of the demonstration project on the criminal justice system. The central objective of this study was to answer the question: did the approach taken by the demonstration project reduce criminal justice involvement? To answer that question, changes were measured in complaints to the police about public inebriates, apprehensions, diversions to the project, arrests, arrest patterns, frequency of arrest, characteristics of arrestees, releases of arrestees, arraignments, sentences, time involved in handling public inebriates, costs to the criminal justice system, and criminal justice policies, practices and procedures.

Both Sacramento and Humboldt carried the demonstration out as intended, and both made adjustments which appear to have increased effectiveness and decreased costs. Both projects were very active and succeeded in attracting, enrolling, and serving a large number of the principal target group, the "hard core" public inebriates in their counties. But neither project had the expected effect on the criminal justice system.

### PART TWO: FINDINGS (Chapters 5-11)

1. There was no significant change in criminal justice procedures for handling public inebriates, except that the project provided the police with a non-mandatory alternative to arrest (diversion to the project).
2. Public complaints did not decline enough to make much difference to the police. They remained high because public inebriates continued to be visible. As a result, the police had to continue responding to complaints.
3. Apprehensions did not decline, they increased because the police saw the projects as a place to take public drunks in order to get them off the streets, and they picked up more rather than fewer.

Figure E-1  
Criminal Justice Disposition of Apprehensions for Public Drunkenness, Sacramento County, 1977-1980





Figure E-2  
Criminal Justice Disposition of Apprehensions for Public Drunkenness, Humboldt County, 1977-1980



4. The most notable impact the project had on the criminal justice system was to increase diversions and decrease arrests. Although the police apprehended more drunks, they diverted from one-third to two-thirds of them to the projects, and arrests were much lower as a result.
5. Arrests of the principal target group, the chronic police-case inebriate, were clearly reduced because of the project. Fewer of this group were arrested and the frequency of arrest also declined. That definitely contributed to a reduction in criminal justice involvement.
6. However, these people constituted a minority of the population arrested for public drunkenness. The system still had to deal with the large number of occasional drunks, the majority of whom were not part of the target population and were not affected at all by the projects. Arrests of this sub-population appear to have risen, which contributed to an increase in criminal justice involvement.
7. The burden on the sheriff was reduced only slightly in Humboldt and actually increased in Sacramento. The number held for court was higher during the project years than either before or after--and arrests by the sheriffs increased.
8. Court involvement varied by county. The number of arraignments, sentences and the total number of days of sentence increased in Sacramento and declined in Humboldt during the project. When the demonstration ended court involvement in both counties reverted to about what it had been before the projects began.
9. Time involved in handling public inebriates declined slightly in both counties.
10. The costs to the criminal justice system of handling public inebriates declined slightly in Humboldt and actually increased in Sacramento, due largely to the increased number of public inebriates held and sentenced.
11. The police in Humboldt did not charge public drunks with other misdemeanors just to get them off the streets. The Sacramento Police did, however, as a way to make sure they were held and sentenced. This did not have a great effect on time but it increased costs because sentences were severe, and that resulted in a jump in jail expenditures.

#### PART THREE: ANALYSIS (Chapters 12-15)

Thus, with the exception of the increase in diversions and the resultant reduction in arrests--particularly of the target population--criminal justice involvement either remained about the same or increased in every other way.

As discouraging as these findings are, the post-project data show that things got worse when the project closed down. Humboldt provided the clearest example. When the Drydock closed in June, 1980, arrests, releases, complaints filed, sentences, time, and costs all increased dramatically. Thus, one could

argue that criminal justice involvement might have been greater in 1978-79 without the projects, and the data seem to support that argument. But that is not the central issue. California was looking for a way to reduce or eliminate criminal justice involvement in public drunkenness, not just slow down the rate of increase. The projects were not able to achieve that objective.

Criminal justice involvement remained high in these two counties for two main reasons.

1. The most important was VISIBILITY. The projects were not able to reduce visibility to the point where it was no longer a problem. People still saw drunks and they complained about them. The police tried to reduce visibility by arresting those who would not stay off the streets, and the sheriffs and courts by keeping them in jail.
2. The second reason was the need to control the "NON-PUBLIC INEBRIATE DRUNK," those people who occasionally became drunk in public and posed a potential threat to themselves and others. Although they were not the target of the demonstration, and apparently were not affected by it to any significant degree, they made up the majority of the individuals arrested for this offense, and consequently were responsible for a large share of criminal justice involvement.

Several policy and program implications can be drawn from these findings.

1. The project demonstrated that diversion was a viable alternative to arrest and that the police would divert large numbers of public inebriates.
2. It also showed that the service components which were most effective in reducing criminal justice involvement were the Drop-In Centers and Sacramento's Sleep-Off Unit.
3. It demonstrated that the social model of treatment was just as effective and far less expensive than the medical model.
4. The "all voluntary" approach did not work. Both projects learned that someone must have the authority to pick up and hold those who get drunk in public and refuse to go to the project voluntarily. If the projects do not have this authority, the only recourse is the police.
5. Both projects learned that few of their clients were willing or able to use the "continuum of care." Most wanted, and desperately needed, caretaking services--food, shelter, safety. Criminal justice activity seemed to vary in inverse relation to the availability of these services.
6. The "public inebriate problem" was not exclusively, or even largely, an alcohol problem. Many of the public inebriates were not alcoholics, and many of those arrested for public drunkenness were not "public inebriates." Few of the project's target population were interested in alcohol treatment services.

7. Decriminalization probably will not reduce public drunkenness or police involvement. Data presented in this report also raise the question of the desirability of decriminalization, given that the police often use these laws not only to control the offensive behavior of the "town drunks," but also to control and prevent drunk driving, disorderly conduct, and perhaps more serious alcohol-related misdemeanors and felonies.

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The conclusions and views expressed in this report are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of the sponsoring agencies or the individuals cited.

Jack Reynolds  
Chevy Chase, Maryland  
April, 1982

## PART ONE: INTRODUCTION\*

### CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND

#### 1.1 The Problem

Americans have been searching for a legal way to control public drunkenness for over 350 years--without much success.

Since the first written law in North America making public intoxication a criminal offense was established in 1619, the number of persons processed through the criminal justice system for this crime has ranged from one-third to one-half of all offenders (Friday, 1978).

In 1978 the FBI Uniform Crime Reports estimated that there were over 1 million arrests in the United States for public drunkenness, and another 1 million for liquor law violations and disorderly conduct--offenses for which public inebriates are disproportionately charged (NASADAD, 1980). Clearly, this has been a massive and sustained effort to control public drunkenness. Yet most people would agree that it has not worked. For example, Commissioners appointed to review the Prison and Reformatory Act of Ontario in 1891 stated:

It is admitted on all sides that the present mode of dealing with those arrested for drunkenness is not effectual as a means of prevention of drunkenness and that as a means of reclaiming those who have become addicted to the excessive use of strong drink it is another failure. The imposition again and again of a paltry fine with the alternative of a few days, or few weeks imprisonment, has no serious effect either reformatory or deterrent, and a cry against the continuance of this absurd system has arisen in every country in which drunkenness is prevalent (NASADAD, 1980).

Sixty years later things were no better. David Pittman and Wayne Gordon used the metaphor of a "revolving door" to describe the process of arrest for public drunkenness, detention for a few days, release, and rearrest.

Some individuals have been arrested 100 or 200 times and have served 10 to 20 years in jail on short-term sentences. The recidivism rates clearly indicated the futility of the system . . . (Pittman and Gordon, 1958).

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\*Much of Part One is adapted from Jack Reynolds and Gary Smith. Drunk in Public: An Evaluation of California's Public Inebriate Demonstration Project, A Report to the State of California, Health and Welfare Agency, Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs, May 1980, pp. 17-39 (to be published by the Department).

This phenomenon of "life sentencing on the installment plan" has been dramatically documented in a suit brought against the City and County of Los Angeles by Robert Sundance and four others.

Robert Sundance spent an average of 226 days in jail each year from 1965 to 1975; another plaintiff in the suit, 345 days per year during the same period . . . (Lang and Burns, 1981, p. 22).

Not only has this "absurd system" been ineffective in controlling public drunkenness, it has also placed an enormous burden on the criminal justice system. In 1967 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice concluded that:

The great volume of these arrests (for public drunkenness) places an extremely heavy load on the operations of the criminal justice system. It burdens police, clogs lower criminal courts and crowds penal institutions throughout the United States (Task Force, 1967, p. 9).

Spradley estimated that in some large cities, up to 70 percent of police time has been spent on this offense, and 80 percent of the jail population is public drunks (Spradley, 1970). And, of course, the costs are high. For example, in 1979 the city of Gallup, New Mexico, which only has a population of 18,000, made 26,000 arrests for public drunkenness. The police chief said that about 40 percent of his \$950,000 budget was devoted to public drunks (Katel, 1980, p. 54). One estimate puts the national cost to the criminal justice system of handling public drunks at \$300 million annually (Lang, 1981, p. 15).

### 1.2 The Decriminalization Movement

Not much was done about this problem until the 1960s, when several currents came together and a movement began to decriminalize public drunkenness. First, the medical community began to look at drunkenness as a symptom of a health problem. Several states and municipalities, starting with the Oregon Alcoholism Program in 1943, began to organize programs to provide alcoholism treatment and prevention services (Gillespie, 1979). In 1951 the World Health Organization declared alcoholism a disease, and the American Medical Association followed suit five years later.

At the same time, there was a growing awareness that the criminal justice system was using an enormous quantity of resources to control public drunkenness and was getting nowhere. Several alternatives were developed and tested, beginning with the St. Louis Detoxification and Diagnostic Evaluation Center, which started in 1966 under a one-year grant from the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (NILE&CJ), 1972, p. 12). This was the first program in the United States specifically designed to divert public drunks to detoxification in lieu of arrest and jail.

Concurrently, the courts began to look into the effects of police and judicial practices on the rights of the public drunk. Two landmark cases were decided in 1966. In Driver vs. Hinnant the court ruled that it was cruel and unusual punishment to convict a homeless alcoholic for being drunk in public, since that person had no place to go but the streets. In Easter vs. the District of Columbia the court held that a chronic alcoholic could not be punished for being drunk in public since that person was suffering from a disease and

could not control his drinking. Subsequent court decisions extended protection to alcoholics who had homes and to public inebriates who were not, strictly speaking, suffering from the disease of alcoholism. Then in 1967 the Task Force on Drunkenness issued its historic report recommending that public drunkenness be treated as a health rather than a criminal problem.

Drunkenness should not in itself be a criminal offense. Disorderly and other criminal conduct accompanied by drunkenness should remain punishable as separate crimes. The implementation of this recommendation requires the development of adequate civil detoxification procedures (Task Force, 1967).

The following year (1968), the Congress passed the Alcohol Rehabilitation Act (P.L. 90-574), which said that:

The handling of chronic alcoholics within the system of criminal justice perpetuates and aggravates the broad problem of alcoholism whereas treating it as a health problem permits early detection and prevention of alcoholism and effective treatment and rehabilitation relieves police and other law enforcement agencies of an inappropriate burden that impedes their important work, and better serves the interests of the public.

In 1969 the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association issued a joint policy statement which included a recommendation that States treat alcoholism as an illness rather than a criminal offense (NASADAD, 1980, p. 3). In 1970 the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) was established. One of its priorities was funding Public Inebriate Programs. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) also funded detoxification demonstration programs for public inebriates. The intent of these programs was to divert public inebriates from the criminal justice system to the public health system.

In 1971 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted a model law, called The Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxification Act, and recommended that each state adopt it. The Uniform Act includes four important elements:

1. decriminalization of public drunkenness;
2. provision of a "continuum of treatment" for alcoholics;
3. voluntary acceptance of treatment; and
4. protection of rights of due process.

In 1974 Congress provided financial incentives to encourage states to adopt the Uniform Act. By mid-1980 31 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands had adopted the Uniform Act and three others had decriminalized but had not established treatment systems (NASADAD, 1980, p. 4).

### 1.3 California's Position

California is one of the 16 states that has not decriminalized public drunkenness.

A number of states have stopped short of complete decriminalization and have instead enacted diversionary laws designed to reduce the number of offenders processed criminally. Judicial diversion of the chronic alcoholic is authorized by statute in Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, and Indiana. Other states have enacted laws which make diversion primarily a police responsibility and California falls within this category (Goodman and Idell, 1975, p. 269).

Prior to 1960 state law mandated involuntary confinement for public drunkenness. The California Penal Code stated that:

Every common drunkard . . . is a vagrant and is punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars (\$500) or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months or by both such fine and imprisonment (PC 1647.11).

The California Supreme Court declared this statute unconstitutional in 1960 and the State legislature passed PC 647(f), which has remained the principal enforcement statute to this day. It states that:

Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor:  
. . . (f) Who is found in any public place under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . in such a condition that he is unable to exercise care for his own safety or the safety of others, or by reason of his being under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . interferes with or obstructs or prevents the free use of any street, sidewalk, or other public way.

California police, like those in most states, traditionally had a good deal of discretion when it came to arresting someone for public intoxication. This was formalized in 1957 when section 849(b)(2) of the Penal Code was enacted:

(b) Any police officer may release from custody, instead of taking such person before a magistrate, any person arrested without a warrant whenever:

(2) The person was arrested for intoxication only and no further proceedings are desirable.

In 1971 police were given the authority to place public inebriates in "civil protective custody" for 72 hours, which had the effect of allowing the police to divert public drunks instead of arresting them (647(ff)). This statute complemented Section 5170 of the Welfare and Institutions Code which had been passed in 1969 as one of California's reactions to the recommendations of the Presidential Commission's Task Force on Drunkenness.

When a person is a danger to others, or to himself, or gravely disabled as a result of inebriation, a police officer, member of the attending staff . . . or any other person designated by the county, may . . . take . . . the person into civil protective custody and place him in a facility designated by the county and approved by the Alcohol Program Management as a facility for the 72 hour treatment and evaluation of inebriates.

About this same time, statewide goals and priorities were set and legislation was passed suggesting that detoxification centers be set up at the county level, which would give the police a place to which they could divert public inebriates. In 1973 California's Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP), using funds from LEAA, supported four demonstration projects in Monterey, Sacramento, San Mateo, and Santa Clara counties designed to divert persons found drunk in public from the criminal justice system to detoxification centers.

Evaluations of these demonstration projects showed mixed results. The police did divert public inebriates to the centers and arrests for public drunkenness declined as a result. But the same drunks who used to go in and out of the jail were now going in and out of the detox centers. In the Sacramento project, for example, almost half of those who entered the Detoxification Center returned to it at least four times in a seven and one-half month period. Only one-fourth of the involuntary admissions and one-fifth of the voluntary admissions went on to longer-term treatment. The Sacramento evaluation concluded that the after-care program was inadequate and suggested that more and better-tailored after-care was essential if type of program was to have any success (Lockhart and Desrys, 1974).

Related findings began to emerge from studies in other parts of the country. A report on the impact of the Uniform Act stated that there was significant variation in its application. Law enforcement practices and treatment varied significantly from one jurisdiction to another within the same state. The report concluded that no application of the Uniform Act had provided a solution to the problem so far (CSTAA, 1976). Paul Friday concluded that:

decriminalizing public intoxication will not eliminate its existence. Indeed, it may not even reduce its incidence. The police, therefore, will continue to be involved, either directly or indirectly . . . The greatest danger lies in raising false expectations of success. The public or skid row inebriate may not even be an alcoholic . . . and to treat his drinking through detoxification is to completely ignore the basic societal causes of his present condition . . .

One must be cautious not to over-sell detoxification; the experience of other areas has shown the dropout rate to be high and the recovery rate low . . .

In conclusion, too much should not be expected from shifting the responsibility for dealing with the public inebriate to a public health model and facility.

The biggest shortcoming will lie in unrealistically embracing a new and largely unproven program for a population which is little understood and highly intractable. In the long run, more emphasis needs to be placed on preventive efforts, on the social milieu, opportunities for the public inebriate and on long-term care and followup programs (Friday, 1969, pp. 37-39).

## CHAPTER 2. CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC INEBRIATE DEMONSTRATION PROJECT

### 2.1 The Authorizing Legislation

By the mid-1980s, California was leaning toward decriminalization and the establishment of treatment services for public inebriates. A California Senate Select Committee on Laws Relating to Alcoholic Beverages issued its report in August, 1974 and recommended decriminalization, concluding that:

Testimony by various law enforcement officials indicates that as much as 40 percent of the time of local law enforcement officers is spent in arresting, processing, and prosecuting common drunks.

There is no evidence to indicate that this practice serves any useful public purpose.

The Committee recommends that the crime of common drunkenness be eliminated from the statutes (California Select Committee, 1974, Volume I, p. 13).

The Committee also recommended increasing excise taxes on alcohol and earmarking a portion of this revenue for local alcohol treatment centers. A bill to that effect was passed by both houses of the California legislature in 1975 but was strongly opposed by the alcoholic beverage industry and subsequently vetoed by Governor Gerald Brown.

However, Governor Brown promised to provide funds for services for public inebriates in the next budget. In 1976 \$2 million was appropriated to set up a two-year demonstration project in one large and one small county in California.


The legislation made clear that it did not expect the projects to eliminate public drunkenness. The intent was to reduce the problem by offering "an alternative to the criminal justice system or a locked facility." The bill required the demonstration projects to provide a "continuum of services" that would attract public inebriates, thereby reducing their visibility, arrests, and involvement with the criminal justice system, while also helping them deal with their drinking problems and life styles. The legislation required that the demonstration projects include a 24-hour drop-in center, "social-model" detoxification units, recovery homes, and non-residential services. Thus, with the exception of decriminalization, the bill followed the recommendations of the Uniform Act, particularly the most critical one, the provision of a "continuum of treatment." This was the element that most states which adopted the Uniform Act have not provided, and the element that the evaluation of California's last demonstration project suggested was essential if this type of program was to have any success.

The legislation specified four goals, which clearly indicated that the principal concern was to find a way to reduce the effects of public inebriacy on the community, and particularly on the criminal justice system:

VISIBILITY	Reduction of the number of visible indigent alcoholics from public places;
ARRESTS	Reduction of the number of arrests of such persons;
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT	Reduction of the amount of time now spent by various elements of the criminal justice system in arrests, detention, and adjudications regarding such persons; and
REHABILITATION	(Increase in) the number of such persons entering a continuum of care and successfully addressing their alcoholism problem (SB 1410:320:280.1, 1976).

Rehabilitation of public inebriates was a secondary concern. In fact, legislative, department, and project staff all agreed that very few public inebriates were likely to be rehabilitated. What they hoped was that the demonstration projects could find a humane, non-coercive way to get drunks off the streets so that they would not have to be arrested. Once enrolled in the project, they hoped to be able to help those who were ready to deal with their drinking-related problems. Figure 2-1 illustrates the strategy.

Figure 2-1  
Demonstration Project Strategy



The concept of the demonstration project differed from previous efforts in several important ways. It stressed voluntarism, provision of a continuum of care (two of the key features recommended in the Uniform Act), community involvement, and a social model of treatment.

VOLUNTARISM	There was to be no coercion by the police or project staff. The project was to attract public inebriates by offering services that they needed and wanted.
CONTINUUM OF CARE	Previous projects had relied heavily on detoxification services. This project developed a series of inter-related services starting with transportation from high visibility areas to a social drop-in center, intake into alcohol treatment services, referrals to recovery homes and other community services, and after care.
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT	Various agencies, including the police, sheriff, Salvation Army, university hospitals, the business community, welfare department, and other key community groups were to be involved to ensure community support and coordination of services.
SOCIAL MODEL OF TREATMENT	Instead of relying heavily on medical detoxification and hospital-based treatment, the project was to stress social approaches, including a social detox unit, social facilities to encourage public inebriates to get off the streets, and social mechanisms for influencing behavior.

## 2.2 The Project Sites - Sacramento and Humboldt Counties


Winning proposals to conduct these demonstrations came from Sacramento (a "large" county with almost 700,000 population) and Humboldt (a "small" county with just over 100,000 population). Both counties had public inebriate problems.

Like many other large counties, Sacramento county's public inebriate population was concentrated in its principal city, also called Sacramento. The city underwent major redevelopment in the early 1960's and urban renewal meant urban "removal" of the city's public inebriates from Old Town, also known as the "West End," where they had lived largely unnoticed. They migrated to the Mall in the center of the city. The previously hidden skid rower became visible, particularly to merchants. Arrests for public drunkenness soared to almost twice what they had been in the previous decade.

Sacramento opened a detoxification center in 1973, which helped reduce arrests, visibility, and criminal justice involvement. But space was limited in the center and the police had to arrest those who could not be diverted. By 1977 arrests had risen to over 9,000 per year, close to what they had been before the detox center opened.

Although much smaller, Humboldt county had a similar problem. Most of the public inebriates in the county lived in the principal city, Eureka. Arrests had increased as redevelopment in the downtown area, again in the Old Town section, had made public inebriates more visible. By 1977 arrests had risen to over 1,300 per year, the highest they had ever been.

Figure 2-2  
California: Sacramento and Humboldt Counties



### Sacramento's Objectives and Strategy

The downtown Sacramento area was selected as the target area for the project. Using the Jellinek formula and data from the detox unit, the project staff estimated that there were about 2,000 public inebriates in the county. Detox data showed that 543 individuals had been in the center 13 to 75 times, and this number was used to estimate the "hard core public inebriate" population.

Three sub-groups of the public inebriate population were identified in the Sacramento proposal:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>EXPECTED OUTCOMES</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>%</u>
I. Motivated wants help with drinking problem	Will accept recovery program	900	45
II. Cannot help self--chronic medical and psychiatric disorders	Beyond help	40	2
III. Doesn't want help	Unable to commit self to program	1,060	53


Thus, Sacramento expected to serve 2,000 individuals in the first year and to help 45 percent of them get started on the road to recovery. The majority, however, were not expected to be willing or able to address their alcohol problems. For these people the major objective was to keep them off the streets and out of jail.

Figure 2-4 shows the general structure of the project. Two components were proposed to attract public inebriates, that is get them off the streets and reduce their visibility: a 24-Hour Drop-In Center and a Citizen's Patrol. The Drop-In Center was to be large enough to accommodate 200 persons at any given time. It was to be conveniently located downtown near the areas where public inebriates congregated. It was to be attractive, comfortable, non-coercive, and completely unstructured. Individuals would be able to come and go as they pleased. Staff would be available to provide information about food, lodging, welfare, community and alcoholism services.

The Citizen's Patrol was to be a van that would patrol the downtown area looking for individuals who were likely to be picked up for public drunkenness. The van would operate 12 hours per day, seven days per week. Two alcoholism counselors and volunteers were to be assigned to the unit. They would be based at the Drop-In Center and would work closely with the police. The patrol was to offer transportation to the Screening and Evaluation Unit (located in a separate section of the Drop-In Center) for those persons found drunk in public. Also, the alcoholism counselors would talk to likely candidates they met on the streets and try to motivate them to take advantage of project services.

Individuals would be admitted to the project through the Screening and Evaluation Unit. Staff would interview those brought in by the police, the Citizen's Patrol, and "walk-ins" who wanted to be admitted to the treatment part of the project. Following the interview, those enrollees who needed it would be

Illustration 1




Sacramento: Plaza Park



Sacramento: J Street

Figure 2-3  
Demonstration Project Target Area: Sacramento



//// Target Area

⊗ Drop-In and Sleep-Off Location

Figure 2-4

Sacramento's Proposed Project Components

Citizen's Patrol and Outreach Counseling  
24-Hour Drop-In Center

Project Administration  
Screening and Evaluation (Intake Unit)

Detoxification Units

Social Model  
Modified Medical Model

Recovery Homes

Primary Recovery Homes  
Longer-term Recovery Homes

Out-patient Counseling

Non-residential Services

referred to detox, to begin treatment. Others would be referred to community agencies where they could get the medical, housing, financial, or other help they needed.


The project administrative offices were to be located in a separate section of the Drop-In Center and client records were to be kept there. One of the key tasks of the administrative unit was to develop a tracking system for enrollees so that project staff could follow the progress of the clients.

Two types of detox units were to be established. Persons who were intoxicated but did not have any obvious medical problems were to be referred to a social detoxification unit. Those who required "medically-oriented observation and some medical management during detoxification" would be sent to the modified medical detox unit. Persons with acute medical symptoms requiring medical attention would be sent to the Sacramento Medical Center.

Once detoxified, the clients would be encouraged to take some action to deal with their drinking problems. Some would be referred to one of several recovery homes in the area. A primary recovery home would provide up to 30 days of residential services to those who were willing to begin to deal with their long-term recovery needs. Staff would discuss physical restoration and re-socialization, motivate the clients to accept sobriety, and help them develop a plan for re-entry into the community.

Other recovery homes would provide residential services for one month to one year. The homes would emphasize peer support, counseling, educational, recreational, health, vocational, and employment programs.

Figure 2-5  
Demonstration Project Target Area: Eureka



Target Area

X Drydock Location

Outpatient and non-residential services were also to be built into the project so that individuals who successfully completed a recovery program could reinforce their commitment to sobriety and get needed counseling and support. The Sacramento Alcoholism Center was to provide outpatient counseling and the Drydock Sober Activity Center was to offer supportive, recreational, and vocational services.

A key element of the project was coordination and community involvement. A Public Inebriate Committee was to meet quarterly to provide input to the project. That committee was to include representatives from the police, community, target population and alcoholism service providers. Also, providers were to meet monthly with the project director to exchange ideas and promote coordination.

#### Humboldt's Objectives and Strategy

Humboldt set no specific objectives in terms of the numbers of individuals to be enrolled, referred, or rehabilitated. What the proposal did was describe six components and their functions. Most were similar to those proposed for the Sacramento project.

Figure 2-6

#### Humboldt's Proposed Project Components

Drop-In Center

Administration  
Screening and Evaluation

Social Detox

Women's Recovery Home

Redwood's United Workshop

The principal vehicle for attracting public inebriates was the Drydock Drop-In Center, an existing facility located on the fringe of the skid row area in Eureka. The proposal sought funds to expand staff so that the Drop-In Center could be open 24 hours per day, seven days a week. Screening and Evaluation was to be located in the Drop-In Center.

The component that Humboldt wanted most was a social detox unit. The proposal asked for funds to develop an eight-bed facility.

The most unique component of Humboldt's proposed project was the Women's Recovery Home. Funds were requested for a six-bed facility where women could stay from one month to one year. The proposal justified this component as follows:

At the present time in Humboldt County, there are only two out of thirty recovery home beds for women and they are in a primarily male

recovery home. Furthermore, in 1976, 84 women accounted for 114 arrests for public intoxication. These (facts) clearly point out the need for a Women's Recovery Home for this neglected population.

Finally, Humboldt sought support for an ongoing component, the Redwood's United Workshop, a sheltered workshop that helped disabled adults, including public inebriates learn how to produce wood products. The proposal asked for funds to expand the number of slots for public inebriates from ten to twenty.

Two existing recovery homes, which were already supported by the county or through fees charged to clients, were not formally included in the demonstration project. However, they were open to public inebriates and, therefore, no funds were requested to develop additional recovery home facilities for men.

Coordination and community involvement were also included as key elements of the Humboldt proposal. The Eureka Mayor's Committee on Alcohol Abuse was to meet monthly. This committee consisted of representatives from the police, churches, welfare department, a downtown business association, alcohol and drug service providers.

#### Schedule

The projects were expected to begin in June 1977 and terminate in June 1979. Sacramento expected to have its existing programs begin operations in June, but new components were to be added over a six-month period: Primary Recovery in July, the first social detox in August; the Drop-In Center, Screening and Evaluation, and Citizen's Patrol in September, and so on. The project was to open formally in September and be fully operational by the end of December 1977. Humboldt also expected to open in September and be fully operational by the end of the year.

Although the project would last two years, it was expected that it would be fully operational for only 18 months. The most critical period was to be the calendar year 1978. A report on that full year of operations was to be prepared and delivered in February 1979 in time for consideration by the Legislature. It was expected that at that time the Legislature would decide what its next step would be.

#### 2.3 Revisions in the Design

The demonstration project was carried out almost as planned. But there were some significant changes in the schedule and the design.

#### Schedule Changes

Both projects took much longer to get started than had been expected. The official opening date was pushed back to October, and then to January. Project staff decided to call the first quarter of operations (October-December, 1977) a "Transition Quarter."

Although some components were operational in October, others which were considered key project components, were not. In Sacramento, the Drop-In Center, a detox unit, and a pre-recovery home were not ready until April of

Illustration 2



Sacramento: The VOA Courtesy Van

1978. Humboldt, on the other hand, was fully operational by the middle of November.

Although the Sacramento project did not become fully operational until April 1978, staff agreed that it was important to measure project effectiveness for the full calendar year. Thus, both projects officially began on January 1, 1978.

In the Spring of 1979 project staff began lobbying for additional time. They argued that the demonstration was planned to run for two full years and that they had barely been operational for one year. They asked the legislature to appropriate funds for an additional year. The legislature eventually agreed to do that but the Governor cut the extension back to six months, arguing that the projects would have completed two full years of operation by the end of 1979.

At the end of December 1979, Humboldt closed most of its project. However, it was able to obtain funds from the City of Eureka to continue its Drydock Drop-In Center through June 1980, when it also closed. Humboldt has had no services for public inebriates since. Sacramento county was able to come up with enough funds to keep most of its project going through June 1980. However, some components were either eliminated or downgraded. As of July 1, 1980 all services except the Drop-In Center (and "Sleep-Off" unit) had closed, and even those services had been cut back.

Figure 2-7 shows the actual schedule of the project between 1977 and 1980. As it turned out, both projects went through transition phases at the beginning and also at the end as they gradually cut back on services. These schedule changes, and particularly the transition periods, are important to keep in mind when analyzing the impact data. Arrests, for example, were generally higher in the transition periods than in the periods of full operation.


#### Design Changes

Both projects experimented with different mixes of components. The changes were made after careful assessment of the effectiveness, efficiency, and need for various services. In general, these design changes appear to have lowered costs without reducing needed services. Here are the most significant changes made in the original project design.

#### o Sacramento

1. The Drop-In Center, which included the Screening and Evaluation Unit, was moved from its original downtown location to a site outside of town in December 1978. This move was forced by the Sacramento County Board of Supervisors in response to complaints made by residents who lived near the Drop-In Center. The new location was approximately three miles from the target area in downtown Sacramento.
2. An Extended Evaluation ("Sleep-Off") Unit was added in February, 1979. This Unit was located adjacent to the Screening and Evaluation Unit. It consisted of a large room with vinyl-covered, foam rubber mats that could be distributed to needy clients to rest upon until they

Figure 2-6  
Project Phases and Significant Events



became sober. Staff felt that this would reduce the use of detox by those inebriates who mainly wanted a safe place to stay for a few hours while they slept off their drunk. During this period of "extended evaluation," the inebriates were under observation at all times in case complications arose. Once they were sober enough, staff felt the clients would be more able and likely to make a voluntary, rational decision regarding referral to detox or other services.

3. The Modified Medical Detox Center was dropped from the project in August of 1979. The County Board of Supervisors voted to use the funds to continue other public inebriate services, including a social model detox. Most of the alcoholism community in Sacramento, particularly the public inebriate agencies, were in favor of dropping the modified medical detox unit because it was absorbing a high proportion of project funds and had not demonstrated that it was any more effective than less expensive social detoxification approaches.

o Humboldt

1. The Women's Recovery Home was closed on June 30, 1978. It had not been able to attract or retain clients.
2. The project added a 30-day Residential Program in December 1978. It was designed to fill a gap in the continuum of services caused by the lack of recovery home beds and post-detox services for public inebriates who were preparing themselves for entry into long-term recovery homes. The program provided individual and group counseling as well as education related to the effects of alcohol use, nutrition, and independent living. This program was subsequently dropped from the demonstration project in July 1979 because of its inability to recruit both staff and clients.

Final Project Design

The design that eventually emerged consisted of three types of components, as shown on the following flow charts. First, there were agencies which cooperated with the projects, but which were not formally part of the projects. These included the police, hospitals, missions, and so forth.

Second, there were project components that were part of the "continuum of care," the components that were concerned primarily with providing alcoholism treatment services. These included an intake unit, detox units, recovery homes, and outpatient services.

Third, there were other project components that were concerned with getting the public inebriates off the streets and into social settings where they would be safe and out of the way of the criminal justice system. These components included foot patrols, transportation services (especially from high visibility areas to project facilities), and social drop-in centers.

Sacramento had the more elaborate system; Humboldt a much simpler one. The two counties had similar core components: they both had drop-in centers, intake units ("Screening and Evaluation"), detoxification units, and recovery

Illustration 3



Sacramento: Extended Evaluation (Sleep-off)



Sacramento: Sleep-off

homes. Sacramento also had a foot patrol, a transportation unit (the VOA Courtesy Patrol), and outpatient services.

What follows is a brief description of the flow of inebriates through the Sacramento project. The Humboldt project was similar in structure, but much more limited in scope and smaller in size.

Public Inebriates came in contact with the project in one of several ways. First, as walk-ins; second, the police might pick them up and take them to the project; third, the VOA courtesy patrol might spot them and transport them to the project. Sometimes a welfare agency, hotel manager, or merchant might refer them to the project.

Many public inebriates visited the Drop-In Centers, a non-drinking, social facility where up to 250 people could gather at any one time for socialization, recreation, and social services. The primary objective of this component was to reduce the visibility of public inebriates by providing them with an attractive alternative to the streets. It was open 24 hours a day, seven days a week; provided free food, coffee and juice, clothes and shoes as needed. It had TV sets, books and magazines, comfortable tables and chairs, clean washrooms and showers. It was completely non-coercive. No sign-in was required, no screening was done, and people could come and go as they pleased.


Public inebriates entered the continuum of care when they were enrolled in the project. Enrollment was done at the intake unit, Screening and Evaluation, which was physically located in a building close to the drop-in center. Some inebriates admitted themselves, either directly from the street, or from the drop-in center. Others were brought in by the police or VOA Courtesy Patrol. The main purpose of the intake unit was to evaluate the needs of all incoming inebriates and then to make appropriate referrals for services. This unit was open seven days a week from 9 a.m. to 1 a.m.

One of the most visible components was the Volunteers of America Courtesy Patrol and Roving Counselors. Counselors made rounds in areas where public inebriates were known to congregate. They tried to talk the inebriates into going to the Drop-In Center or to enter the continuum of care. They also responded to merchant telephone calls and came to pick up inebriates before the police were called. Transportation to the Drop-In Center was provided by the Courtesy Patrol's van, which was equipped with a CB radio that was used to dispatch the Patrol rapidly to areas where public inebriates were found. The principal function of the Courtesy Patrol was to help the public inebriates get off the street before the police came to arrest them.

Clients who entered the project very drunk were kept under Extended Evaluation in the Sleep-Off unit until they were sober. Those who needed detoxification were sent to one of the Detoxification Units after being screened and evaluated by one of the counselors. The project experimented with a modified medical model and a social model, which were not only expected to be more effective, but also less expensive than medical detoxification. Eventually, even the modified model was dropped and the project relied solely on the social model detox. The project also found it could get by with far fewer detox beds than originally thought. At the end of the project, Sacramento had two social detox units with a total of 40 beds. Humboldt had one unit with eight beds.

Figure 2-8


Flowchart of Sacramento's Public Inebriate Demonstration Project\*



\*Based on components are part of the Project

Figure 2-9

Flowchart of Humboldt's Public Inebriate Demonstration Project\*



\*Boxed components are part of the project

Those inebriates who needed other services were referred to such non-project components as the university hospital, welfare agencies, the Salvation Army, and so forth. Generally, these referrals were made by the Screening and Evaluation Unit, or by one of the detox units when the client was released.

A few public inebriates were referred to Recovery Homes, either after completing detox or directly from Screening and Evaluation. The recovery homes consisted of a 30-day "pre-recovery" stay at one unit followed by referral to a long-term recovery home for those individuals who sustained their commitment to deal with their drinking problems.

The last component in the continuum of care was Outpatient Services. These were supportive and counseling services for individuals who had successfully completed a residential program. One agency provided alcoholism and vocational counseling. Another was a social center that provided social and

recreational opportunities for sober public inebriates who were attempting to recover from alcoholism or alcohol abuse.

#### 2.4 Project Budgets and Expenditures

##### Project Budgets

Humboldt estimated that its project would cost approximately \$250,000 annually. Sacramento estimated its annual cost at \$1.6 million. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 show the total budget for the two and one-half years of project operations. Approximately 40 percent of this money came from Public Inebriate Demonstration Project funds, the remainder came from existing county and other funding. Initially 40 percent of the budgeted funds in Sacramento were allocated to detox units and 27 percent to recovery homes. By the end of the project only 32 percent was allocated to detox (none to modified medical detox) and 12 percent to recovery homes (none to primary recovery homes). Outpatient services were also discontinued, but the Extended Evaluation Unit was added to Screening and Evaluation.

Table 2-1

Budgeted Project Costs, Sacramento, July 1977 - December 1979

<u>Component</u>	<u>Dollars</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Administration	\$ 328,598	8.4
Screening and Evaluation	349,254	8.9
Drop-In Center	549,639	14.0
Citizen's Patrol	162,089	4.1
New Life (Social Detox)	320,292	8.2
TAP (Social Detox)	315,890	8.0
CARE (Modified Medical Detox)	1,007,662	25.7
Sacramento Alcohol Center (Outpatient Counseling)	24,549	0.6
Drydock Sober Activities Center	50,717	1.3
Primary Recovery Homes	284,954	7.3
Supportive Recovery Homes	<u>532,985</u>	<u>13.6</u>
Total	\$3,926,629	100.1

Sources: Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs; Project Records

Demonstration project funds were requested from the State to establish the Screening and Evaluation Unit, the Drop-In Center, Outreach Counseling, and Primary Recovery Homes. Funds were also requested to expand two social detox units and outpatient counseling, and to provide for administrative costs.

Humboldt calculated its project would cost \$254,800 for the first year and requested \$229,320 of that from the state. The remaining funds were to come from the city, county, and existing funding for the Redwoods United Workshop.

In the beginning, Humboldt also planned to put its emphasis on a detox unit and recovery home. By the end of the project it had dropped the women's recovery home, and a 30-day residential program. The other components were funded as originally proposed.

Table 2-2

Budgeted Project Costs, Humboldt, July 1977 - December 1979

<u>Component</u>	<u>Dollars</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Administration	\$ 60,783	9.0
Drydock Drop-In Center	158,556	23.4
Social Setting Detox	234,354	34.6
30-Day Residential Program	94,984	14.0
Women's Recovery Home	68,750	10.2
Redwood's United Workshop	<u>59,040</u>	<u>8.7</u>
Total	\$676,467	99.9

Source: Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs; Project Records

##### Project Costs

Actual expenditures were lower for the project than had been anticipated mostly because of delays in startup. At the end of the first year (June 1978) Humboldt had spent 89 percent of its budgets and Sacramento 97 percent. The unspent funds were carried over to the next year.

At the end of two and one-half years Sacramento had spent over \$3.4 million (Table 2-3). The county spent almost half a million dollars less than budgeted. As the balance column shows, most of these "savings" came from lower costs than expected in Administration, Screening and Evaluation, and the Drop-In Center. But significant savings occurred in almost every component except the Sober Activities Center and the Courtesy Patrol.

Table 2-3

Comparison of Budgeted and Actual Project Costs, Sacramento  
July 1977 - December 1979

Component	Budget	Expended	Balance	
			+N	+%
Administration	328,598	192,780	-135,818	-41.3
Screening and Evaluation	349,254	201,327	-147,927	-42.4
Drop-In Center	549,639	464,684	- 84,955	-15.4
Citizen's Patrol	162,089	173,993	+ 11,904	+ 7.3
New Life (Social Detox)	320,292	320,284	- 8	- 0.0
TAP (Social Detox)	315,890	259,334	- 56,556	-23.0
CARE (Modified Medical Detox)	1,007,662	982,430	- 25,232	- 2.5
Sacramento Alcohol Center (Outpatient Counseling)	24,549	-0-	- 24,549	0.0
Drydock Sober Activities Center	50,717	82,968	+ 32,251	+63.6
Primary Recovery Homes	284,954	254,572	- 30,382	-10.7
Supportive Recovery Homes	532,985	503,188	- 29,797	- 5.6
Total	3,926,629	3,435,560	-491,061	-12.5

Sources: Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs; Project Records

Humboldt spend just under \$630,000 over the two and one-half years, about seven percent less than budgeted (Table 2-4). The bulk of the savings can be attributed to the early closing of the Women's Recovery Home and the 30-Day Residential Program. All of the components except the detox spent less than was budgeted.

Table 2-4

Comparison of Budgeted and Actual Project Costs, Humboldt  
July 1977 - December 1979

Component	Budget	Expended	Balance	
			+N	+%
Administration	60,783	50,716	-10,067	- 5.2
Social Setting Detox	234,354	270,475	+36,121	+15.4
Women's Recovery Home	68,750	49,983	-18,767	-17.3
30-Day Residential Program	94,984	44,024	-50,960	-53.7
Drydock Drop-In	158,556	155,313	- 3,243	- 2.0
Redwood's United Workshop	59,040	58,530	- 510	- 0.9
Total	676,467	629,041	-47,426	- 7.0

Sources: Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs; Project Records

## CHAPTER 3. STUDY OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

### 3.1 Objectives

In 1978 most observers expected that California's Public Inebriate Demonstration Project would be continued for several years, and perhaps, replicated in some way throughout the State. But two events changed that. One was the passage of Proposition 13, which led to cutbacks in State and county programs. The other was the electoral defeat of the State Senator who had been the chief advocate of the demonstration projects.

By mid-1979 it became clear that the projects would not be continued beyond the end of the year, and that the Governor would not even consider replication statewide. The odds were that Sacramento and Humboldt would not be able to continue the projects on their own and, therefore, services for public inebriates in these two counties would revert to their pre-project status.

These unexpected events produced a "natural experiment," and provided a unique opportunity to measure the effects of the projects on the criminal justice system. In spite of the attention that has been given to pioneering programs for public inebriates in St. Louis, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, New York and elsewhere, there have been few systematic studies of the effects of these programs on the criminal justice system. Most reports on projects have been prepared by project staff and based on vignettes or case histories rather than statistics. Among the few studies on this topic are two that were conducted by the Addiction Research Foundation in Toronto. These were analyses of the effects of medical detoxification services and referrals on arrests (Annis and Smart, 1975; Smart, et al, 1975). A study by Deming (1977) looked at the effects of decriminalization on public drunkenness arrests and criminal justice costs. Studies in Atlanta and Baltimore included data on actual and projected costs of processing public inebriates through the criminal justice system (Human Ecology Institute, 1974); and studies by Rubington (1975) and Owens (1973) examined police officer attitudes toward detoxification and decriminalization.

Thus, while there have been a number of studies of public inebriates and services for public inebriates, there have been few that have concentrated on the effects that comprehensive programs have on the criminal justice system, and none that we know of that are based on an analysis of pre-program, program, and post-program data. In 1977 the California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs awarded a contract to University Research Corporation/The Center for Human Services (URC/CHS) to evaluate the demonstration projects. That evaluation concentrated on the impact of the projects through 1979\* on visibility, arrests, criminal justice involvement, and rehabilitation. In 1980 the National Institute of Justice provided funds to permit CHS to gather the additional criminal justice data needed and to conduct an analysis of trends over a four-year period, from 1977 through 1980.

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
\*Reynolds and Smith, 1980, op. cit.

The central objective of this study was to answer the question: did the approach taken by these projects reduce criminal justice involvement? To answer that question, changes were measured in:

- Complaints to police about public inebriates
- Apprehensions of public inebriates
- Diversions by law enforcement personnel to the project
- Arrests of public inebriates
- Arrest patterns
- Frequency of arrest
- Characteristics of people arrested
- Releases of persons arrested
- Complaints filed against persons arrested
- Arraignments
- Sentences
- Criminal Justice personnel time devoted to public inebriates
- Costs to the criminal justice system
- Criminal justice policies, procedures and practices.

### 3.2 Methodology

The study was based on a quasi-experimental, time-series design. Data were gathered quarterly over a four-year period and truncated, using 1977 as the pre-project period, 1978 and 1979 as the project period, and 1980 as the post-project period. This division of periods only approximates reality. Unfortunately, the projects didn't begin and end neatly on New Year's Day.



Where possible, we have included quarterly data to give a more accurate picture of pre-post changes. In some cases it was possible to use the State of California as a control. For example, arrests, releases and complaints filed for public drunkenness are shown for 1977-1980 for Sacramento, Humboldt, and California. Thus, three types of comparison were made: (1) before, during, and after within each county; (2) between the demonstration projects and the State; and (3) between the demonstration projects. An interesting comparison can be made between Sacramento and Humboldt in the second half of 1980 when the former continued its Drop-In and Sleep-Off but the latter closed completely.

Data were collected from a number of sources in Sacramento and Humboldt counties. Chief among these were California's Bureau of Criminal Statistics, the police departments, sheriffs' offices, municipal courts, and demonstration projects in the two counties. Data on complaints to the police were collected from police logs kept by the Eureka Police Department and from a special computer run of Sacramento Police Department records. Diversion data were taken from project records. All clients entering the projects were included in the Client Tracking System. Intake and referral forms were completed whenever an admission or referral took place. Specific data were collected on such characteristics as age, sex, employment history, years of problem drinking and

entered in the computer for statistical analysis. Arrests, releases, complaints filed and arrestee characteristics were obtained quarterly from the Bureau of Criminal Statistics. Several special computer runs were made of arrests, releases and complaints filed between 1977-1980. These runs were made principally to gather data on frequency of arrest. Data on arraignments, disposition of cases and sentences were obtained from court dockets in Sacramento and Humboldt.

The data used to determine whether criminal justice involvement had changed were collected through surveys of criminal justice procedures. These surveys were conducted once before the projects began in September 1977 and four times thereafter in July 1978, January 1979, July 1979, and January 1980. Actual processing of public inebriates by the police, sheriff, and courts was observed and described in detail. The time required to process public inebriates was measured by counting how long it took police, sheriff, and court personnel to carry out all public inebriate related functions from the time of initial pickup to the time of incarceration and final release.

Cost data, including salaries and support costs were obtained from the police, sheriffs, and municipal courts in both counties. Statistical data were compiled quarterly. Open-ended interviews were conducted semi-annually with key informants who represented criminal justice (police, sheriffs, courts), alcoholism service providers, merchants, and public inebriates.

It bears repeating that this report is primarily concerned with assessing the effects of the demonstration project on the criminal justice system. A previous report (Reynolds and Smith, 1980) provides complementary data, including assessments of the projects' impact on the visibility of public inebriates, the rehabilitation of public inebriates, the effectiveness of the various components of the projects, and the attitudes of the communities toward the projects and their clientele.

## CHAPTER 4. PROJECT ACTIVITIES

Before assessing the effects of the demonstration projects on the criminal justice system we need to determine whether they reached a significant number of public inebriates in the first place.

### 4.1 The Target Group

Exactly what is a public inebriate? Unfortunately, neither the legislation nor the Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs defined what they meant by a public inebriate or what type of public inebriate the demonstration project was to serve.\*

A public inebriate is, strictly speaking, anyone who is found drunk in a public place. But the demonstration project was concerned with a subgroup of that population, namely, the indigent who was likely to be arrested for being drunk in public. That excluded middle-class people who would be sent home instead of to jail; indigents who got drunk in their hotel rooms and remained out of sight; and skid row residents who did not get drunk.

Operationally we first attempted to define public inebriates by socio-economic characteristics and drinking behavior. This turned out to be a fruitless approach because there was no agreement on which characteristics accurately identified a public inebriate (income, residence, occupation, length of abstinence?) and no feasible way to measure them. We decided to focus on the issue that is at the core of the problem, not the status of indigency or inebriacy, but the act of being arrested. For the purpose of this study we defined a public inebriate as anyone who: (1) has been arrested for public drunkenness under Penal Code 647(f); or (2) would be arrested if not diverted under 647(ff) or 5170 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

Thus, the public inebriate that we believed the project was trying to reach was the individual who was arrested for being drunk in public or diverted to the project instead of being arrested. Project staff estimated that there were about 2,000 of these individuals in Sacramento and 200 in Humboldt.

### 4.2 How Many People Were Served?

Public inebriates were not considered "served" by the project until they were formally enrolled and admitted to the continuum of care. That occurred when an individual passed through the Screening and Evaluation Unit. At that

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\*However, in December, 1979, after the project ended, the Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs issued a "Report to the Legislature" which contained this definition of a public inebriate: "... any person: (1) Who, on occasion, is intoxicated in a public place; (2) Who is periodically or continually indigent; and (3) Whose behavior and appearance related to combined intoxication and indigence brings that person on occasion to the attention of: (a) law enforcement agencies, and/or (b) public service agencies, and/or (c) the general public." (p.6)

time an interview was conducted, a history taken, and a referral made. Public inebriates who merely used the Drop-In Center were not considered enrolled or admitted to the project.

An individual was enrolled only once. But he or she might be admitted many times. That is, the first time a public inebriate went through Screening and Evaluation he or she was enrolled, the next time that individual was readmitted. We collected data on the number of individuals enrolled in the project, the number of individuals admitted, the source of referral to the project, and the characteristics of the individuals enrolled. These data demonstrate that both projects were very active and effective in attracting a large proportion of the target population.

Enrollees

The demonstration project enrolled a large number of individuals during its two years of operation (1978-1979). Table 4-1 shows that together both counties enrolled close to 7,000 individuals. Sacramento accounted for 85 percent of the enrollees, and Humboldt 15 percent. These data show that the number of public inebriates in each county was much greater than the original estimate of 2,000 in Sacramento and 200 in Humboldt.

The data also show that a majority of the public inebriates were enrolled during the first year of the project, which is what one would expect. Close to seven out of every ten enrollees first entered the project during 1978, but close to a third did not. Why? Were they holdouts or were they new to the counties in 1979? Apparently there were some of both types. In each year roughly half of the new enrollees had resided in the county for a year or more and half for less than a year. That is, half of the 1979 enrollees could have enrolled in 1978, but did not. The implication is that although a project can

Table 4-1

Enrollees (First Admissions) to the Demonstration Project, 1978-1980

	<u>Sacramento</u>		<u>Humboldt</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1978	3,206	56.0	505	55.0
1979	<u>1,358</u>	<u>23.7</u>	<u>272</u>	<u>29.6</u>
Subtotal	4,564	89.7	777	84.6
1980	<u>1,162</u>	<u>20.3</u>	<u>142*</u>	<u>15.4</u>
Total	5,726	100.0	919	100.0

Source: Project Records

\*First six months of 1980

expect to enroll a majority of the public inebriates in its first year of operation, there will always be residents and newcomers to enroll in subsequent years. Thus, a public inebriate project will probably continue to enroll new clients even after it is well established.

The enrollment data for 1980 would tend to confirm this. Even as the projects wound down they were still enrolling new clients. Humboldt, which was only able to survive for six months in 1980, kept pace with its 1979 enrollment rate. Sacramento, which managed to continue its Screening and Evaluation Unit for all of 1980, enrolled only 14 percent fewer individuals than in 1979.

Admissions

Many public inebriates were admitted to the project more than once. Table 4-2 shows that there was an extremely large number of admissions, particularly in Sacramento. Of the nearly 48,000 admissions, in 1978-1979, Sacramento had 94 percent of them. Humboldt's admissions declined 19 percent in the second year and were declining at an even faster rate in 1980, but Sacramento's admissions increased almost 50 percent in 1979 and 61 percent the following year. This reflects a change in Sacramento's admission and enrollment policy. Prior to September 1979, individuals who were sent to the Extended Evaluation (Sleep-Off) Unit were not formally admitted to the project. Thus, they were not counted. Beginning in September they had to be formally admitted so that the project could legally hold them under protective custody.

Table 4-2

Total Admissions to the Demonstration Project, 1978-1980\*

	<u>Sacramento</u>		<u>Humboldt</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1978	18,100	20.6	1,611	49.0
1979	<u>26,770</u>	<u>30.4</u>	<u>1,299</u>	<u>39.5</u>
Subtotal	44,870	51.0	2,910	88.5
1980	<u>43,084</u>	<u>49.0</u>	<u>376**</u>	<u>11.4</u>
Total	87,954	100.1	3,286	99.9

Source: Project Records

\*Does not include 1,252 admissions to the Sacramento project and 127 admissions to the Humboldt project in the Transition Quarter (October-December, 1977).

\*\*First six months of 1980

Thus, the number admitted from the last quarter of 1979 on reflects this change in policy (Table 4-3).\*

Humboldt showed a decline in the number of admissions in 1979 and 1980. In part, this reflects a decline in demand, but it also reflects a decline in the need for project services by those public inebriates who were beginning to control their drinking.

The quarterly admission data show the seasonal character of admissions to both projects, greater activity in the spring and summer and less in the fall and winter. These statistics also demonstrate that admissions to Sacramento's project were increasing steadily, even as the project entered the transition period, while Humboldt's admissions were steadily decreasing from mid-1979 through closing.

Table 4-3

Quarterly Admissions to the Demonstration Project 1978-1980\*

		Sacramento		Humboldt	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1978	January - March	3,257	3.7	342	10.4
	April - June	4,705	5.3	473	14.4
	July - September	5,750	6.5	455	13.8
	October - December	4,388	5.0	341	10.4
1979	January - March	4,258	4.8	297	9.0
	April - June	5,797	6.6	375	11.4
	July - September	8,376	9.5	363	11.0
	October - December	8,339	9.5	264	8.0
Subtotal		44,870	51.0	2,910	88.5
1980	January - March	10,304	11.7	188	5.7
	April - June	10,142	11.5	188	5.7
	July - September	11,105	12.6	-	-
	October - December	11,533	13.1	-	-
Total		87,954	99.8	3,286	99.8

Source: Project Records

\*Does not include 1,252 admissions to the Sacramento project and 127 admissions to the Humboldt project in the Transition Quarter (October-December, 1977).

\*Note: Sacramento's admission policy changed in the last month of the July-September 1979 quarter. If it had changed at the beginning of the quarter, the number of admissions would have been much higher that summer.

Table 4-4 provides another indicator of project activity. The average public inebriate who enrolled in the project was admitted over 15 times in Sacramento and close to four times in Humboldt between 1978-1980. That is about one admission every two months in Sacramento and one every six months in Humboldt. Admissions per enrollee increased in 1980, which is a reflection of the change in the admission policy and the absolute increase in admissions as other components of the demonstration project were closed. Humboldt had the opposite experience. There were only 376 admissions for the 919 enrollees in 1980.

Table 4-5 provides another perspective on project activity. Sacramento averaged 80 admissions per day over the three years, Humboldt averaged 3.3. Again, Sacramento's activity level actually increased in the 1980 post-project phase, while Humboldt's decreased. Recall that these are formal admissions to the continuum of care. They do not include individuals who only went to the Drop-In Centers, which was a considerable number. Table 4-6 gives an indication of the total volume of activity at each project during phase-out. For example, there was an average of 79 people in the Sacramento Drop-In Center every hour--this is in addition to the 80 who were admitted to the program each day. In Humboldt approximately 300 people made 4,200 visits to the Drydock each month, which is about 150 visits each day. Put another way, each of these 300 individuals dropped into the Drydock every other day, on the average. Thus, even though admissions fell in Humboldt, the project was heavily utilized.

#### 4.3 Who Was Admitted to the Project?

Were these enrollees representative of the target population? When these people were enrolled in the project the Screening and Evaluation staff gathered information about their demographic, ethnic, and drinking characteristics. These are presented in Table 4-7.

In general, the typical enrollee in both projects was a poor, white, middle-aged male with many years of problem drinking. But there were some differences between the counties. Humboldt had a larger percentage of females, younger inebriates, Native Americans, well-educated individuals, single and married persons, long-time residents, employed persons, and craftsmen. Sacramento had a larger percentage of inebriates over 50, Hispanics, blacks,

Table 4-4

Frequency of Admission, 1978-1980

Admissions Per Enrollee	Sacramento	Humboldt
1978	5.6	3.2
1979	5.9	1.7
1980	7.5	0.4
1978 - 1980	15.4	3.6

Source: Project Records

Table 4-5

Mean Number of Admissions to the Demonstration Projects, 1978-1980

	Sacramento			1978-1980
	1978	1979	1980	
Daily	49.6	73.3	118.0	80.3
Weekly	348.1	514.8	828.5	563.8
Monthly	1,508.3	2,230.8	3,590.3	2,443.2
Quarterly	4,525.0	6,692.5	10,771.0	7,329.5
Annually	18,100.0	26,770.0	43,084.0	29,318.0

	Humboldt			1978-1980
	1978	1979	1980	
Daily	4.4	3.6	2.1	3.3
Weekly	31.0	25.0	14.5	23.5
Monthly	134.3	108.3	62.7	101.7
Quarterly	402.8	324.8	188.0	305.2
Annually	1,611.0	1,299.0	752.0	1,220.7

Source: Project Records

\*Based on first six months of 1980

Table 4-6

Selected Project Activity Statistics

Sacramento (July 1, 1979 - June 30, 1980)

Average hourly head count, Drop-In Center	79
Persons transported by Courtesy Patrol	16,544
Referrals made to detox units	2,811
Cups of coffee served	270,900
Cups of juice served	121,280
Articles of clothing issued	3,660

Humboldt (January - March, 1980)

	January	February	March
Number of clients served	301	287	292
Number of visits	4,598	4,193	4,367
Visits per client	15.3	14.6	15.0
Telephone calls logged	277	299	288
Drop-ins of heavily intoxicated individuals	322	302	319

Source: Project Records

Table 4-7

Selected Characteristics of New Project Enrollees, 1978-1980

	Sacramento		Percent*	
	1978-1979 (N = 4,564)	1980 (N = 1,162)	1978-1979 (N = 777)	1980** (N = 131)
Male	94.0	99.2	87.0	93.0
Aged 40 and over	65.9	57.7	56.3	61.0
White	66.0	65.5	80.4	75.8
Unmarried	89.2	88.0	83.2	83.5
County residents <sup>1</sup>	49.2	43.2	61.8	76.1
Problem drinkers <sup>2</sup>	74.7	99.6	80.8	79.3
No wages/salary	85.3	NA	77.5	NA

Source: Project Records

\*Excludes "Don't Know"

\*\*Six months only

<sup>1</sup>One year or more in county<sup>2</sup>One or more years of problem drinking

persons with less than eight years of education, divorcees, transients, unemployed persons with no income and farm laborers.

Over the two years of the project there were few changes in the characteristics of the public inebriates who were admitted, except that there was an increase in the number of young public inebriates. This trend continued in 1980 in Sacramento, but was reversed in Humboldt.

Some of the most interesting statistics are those relating to "Years in County" and "Years of Problem Drinking." These data indicate that the majority of the individuals enrolled in the project were long-term residents, not transients. Almost 62 percent of the Humboldt enrollees had lived in the country for more than a year, and almost 41 percent had lived there for over ten years. The figures for Sacramento were much lower, but still impressive. Almost half of the enrollees had lived in the country for over a year, and almost one-quarter for over ten years.

Table 4-8

Characteristics of Public Inebriate Clients Admitted to the  
Sacramento and Humboldt County Projects, 1978-1980

	<u>Sacramento</u>		<u>Humboldt</u>	
	<u>1978-1979</u> (N = 4,564)	<u>1980</u> (N = 1,162)	<u>1978-1979</u> (N = 777)	<u>1980*</u> (N = 131)
Sex				
Male	94.0	99.2	86.9	90.8
Female	6.0	0.8	13.0	6.9
Don't know	0.0	0.0	0.1	2.3
Age				
Under 20	0.5	0.3	1.5	0.0
20-29	11.7	18.2	19.9	15.3
30-39	21.6	23.8	20.9	19.8
40-49	26.4	27.2	23.7	19.8
50-59	25.4	21.3	17.5	28.2
60+	13.4	26.5	13.4	6.9
Don't know	0.8	0.0	3.1	9.9
Ethnicity				
White	64.9	65.6	79.2	74.0
Hispanic	15.6	11.9	2.2	5.3
Native American	7.0	9.6	15.1	17.6
Black	10.1	13.0	1.3	0.8
Other	0.7	0.0	0.8	0.0
Don't know	1.7	0.0	1.5	9.9
Education				
0-5	6.6	11.6	2.2	6.1
6-8	15.2	13.5	10.0	11.5
9-11	20.5	13.5	21.5	16.8
12	26.9	27.5	39.9	38.9
12+	22.4	16.0	20.1	17.6
Don't know	8.4	17.9*	6.3	9.2

\*Most of these "Don't know" responses were recorded in the last half of 1980 when certain project data ceased to be collected.

Table 4-8  
(Continued)

	<u>Sacramento</u>		<u>Humboldt</u>	
	<u>1978-1979</u> (N = 4,564)	<u>1980</u> (N = 1,162)	<u>1978-1979</u> (N = 777)	<u>1980*</u> (N = 131)
Marital Status				
Single	31.2	34.3	41.3	51.1
Married	10.3	9.8	16.2	15.3
Divorced	35.5	22.8	24.7	13.0
Separated	11.6	10.3	7.1	9.9
Widowed	6.6	4.9	6.8	3.1
Other	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.0
Don't know	4.6	17.9*	3.3	7.6
Years in County				
Less than 1	50.5	46.6	38.2	20.6
1-5	14.0	11.9	14.3	16.8
6-10	7.7	3.4	6.7	10.7
Over 10	27.3	20.2	40.8	41.2
Don't know	0.5	17.9*	0.0	10.7
Employment/Income				
Unemployed	73.4	NA	61.6	NA
No wages/salary	85.3	NA	77.5	NA
No other source of income	66.9	NA	66.2	NA
Years of Problem Drinking				
Less than 1	23.2	0.3	19.2	19.8
1-10	26.5	24.1	34.1	28.2
11-20	25.0	12.4	23.0	7.6
20+	24.9	31.3	23.7	35.9
Don't know	0.3	31.9*	0.0	8.4

Source: Project Records

\*Most of these "Don't know" responses were recorded in the last half of 1980 when certain project data ceased to be collected.

The number of enrollees who were problem drinkers was also significant. Seventy-five percent of the Sacramento enrollees and 80 percent of the Humboldt enrollees had a drinking problem for a year or more. Almost half of the enrollees said they had been problem drinkers for 11 or more years.

#### 4.4 Conclusions

These data clearly demonstrate that:

1. Both demonstration projects were very active;
2. They both attracted, enrolled, and served a large number of the public inebriates in their counties;
3. The people who were attracted to and enrolled in the project included a significant number of the principal target group of the project, that is, the resident, "hard core," public inebriates;
4. Many of these people were admitted to the "continuum of care" a number of times. They were not automatically rehabilitated once they enrolled, nor did they drop out of the program completely. They tended to admit themselves to the program over and over again.
5. In Humboldt, as the project came to a close, enrollments of new clients remained steady but admissions dropped. Had the project continued, it is likely that these trends would have continued.
6. In Sacramento, where most of the demonstration project except the Drop-In Center and Sleep-Off Unit were dismantled by early 1980, enrollments and admissions continued to increase, partly due to relaxation of the definition of "admission," and partly because the detox components closed and public inebriates began to rely more heavily on the remaining services.

Thus, overall,, we can conclude that the demonstration projects did reach and serve a significant proportion of the public inebriates in Sacramento and Humboldt counties.

## PART TWO: FINDINGS

### CHAPTER 5. APPREHENSIONS AND DIVERSIONS

#### 5.1 Criminal Justice Procedures for Handling Inebriates

Before the project began we diagrammed the steps followed by the police, sheriff, and courts in processing persons arrested for public drunkenness. Figure 5-1 summarizes those steps. The only significant differences in the two counties were: (1) Sacramento sent convicted inebriates to a county correctional facility while Humboldt sent them to the county jail; and (2) Humboldt did not have a diversion track, while Sacramento sent some public drunks to an existing detox unit.

During the demonstration period both counties had a diversion track. Instead of arrest and jail, law enforcement personnel could divert public drunks to the Screening and Evaluation Units. They did not have to divert them, they could arrest them. Aside from providing that alternative there were few, if any changes in the procedures. The principal steps in the processing of public inebriates by the criminal justice system before, during, and after the project remained the same. Once a public inebriate was apprehended the police decided whether to divert or arrest the subject. If diverted, the public inebriate was formally turned over to the staff at Screening and Evaluation and admitted to the project, and that concluded the public inebriate's involvement with the criminal justice system. If arrested, the public inebriate would be taken to jail, booked, held by the sheriff for 4-6 hours and released. If the police filed a complaint the public inebriate would be held in jail overnight (or over the weekend) and taken before the judge the next day. In Humboldt some were released on their own recognizance. Public inebriates were usually brought to court as a group and read their rights. The judge would then take each person in turn, read the complaint and ask for a plea. Most plead "guilty" and were sentenced to time served. Some were sentenced to 40 days (they would get 10 days off for good behavior, making the effective sentence 30 days). Some were sentenced to 5, 15, or even 90 days. Those who plead "not guilty" were usually given a trial date 30 days hence and taken back to jail. When their trial came up the case would be dismissed "in the interest of justice," since the defendant had already served a 30-day "sentence."


Initially, we expected criminal justice involvement to be reduced in all of these areas. If the projects were successful, there should have been fewer apprehensions, arrests, complaints filed, and sentences.

#### 5.2 Complaints About Public Inebriates

Public inebriates came to the attention of the criminal justice system in two ways: through police observation and from complaints made to the police by citizens. Citizen complaints are a sensitive indicator of public inebriate visibility and are directly correlated with criminal justice involvement because they require a police response. Thus, the fewer the complaints, the less time the police need to spend on public inebriates.

Figure 5-1

Criminal Justice Processing of Public Inebriates,  
Sacramento and Humboldt Counties



Legend:

Diversion track - - - -  
Arrest track \_\_\_\_\_

Table 5-1 shows that citizen complaints declined 8-12 percent in the first year of the demonstration project, but then they stabilized in Humboldt in the second year, and returned to their pre-project level in Sacramento. In 1980 they rose significantly in both counties.

Table 5-1

Total Public Drunkenness Complaints to the  
Sacramento and Eureka Police Departments, 1977-1980

	Sacramento			Eureka	
	Number	Percent Change From Previous Year		Number	Percent Change From Previous Year
1977	8,613	-	777	-	
1978	7,928	-8.0	683	-12.1	
1979	8,686	+9.6	672	-1.6	
1980	10,430	+20.1	893	+32.9	

Sources: Sacramento and Eureka Police Departments

Table 5-2 shows that the number of complaints varied seasonally. There tended to be more complaints during the spring and summer when the weather was warm and public inebriates were outside more often. That pattern was maintained in Sacramento in both 1978 and 1979. But a large decline in complaints occurred in the first quarter of 1978, just after the demonstration project got underway, and an enormous jump occurred in the first quarter of 1980, just after the project ended. That same pattern can be seen in the data for Humboldt--a significant drop in complaints in the last quarter of 1977, when the project opened, and an increase in the first quarter of 1980, when the project closed.

These data indicate that the demonstration projects had only a limited and temporary effect on public inebriate visibility. The number of complaints remained high throughout the project period, largely because the projects were not able to keep the public inebriates off the streets in large enough numbers and for long enough periods of time--people complained.\* The drop that occurred after the projects opened was not sustained, but things became worse after the projects ended. Complaints rose quickly because public inebriates were even more visible than before. Thus, the police in both counties continued to

\*Evidence from the project evaluation shows that visibility declined only slightly during the demonstration, and it was not enough to squelch complaints from the communities, particularly the merchants in the downtown areas (see Reynolds and Smith, Chapter 6, op. cit.).

Table 5-2

Total Public Drunkenness Complaints to the Sacramento and Eureka Police Departments by Quarter, 1977-1980

	Sacramento			
	1977	1978	1979	1980
January - March	2,116*	1,898 <sup>1</sup>	2,222	3,210 <sup>2</sup>
April - June	2,111*	2,032	2,280	2,566
July - September	2,114	2,212	2,270	2,610
October - December	2,271	1,786	1,914	2,044
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,613</b>	<b>7,928</b>	<b>8,686</b>	<b>10,430</b>

	Eureka			
	1977	1978	1979	1980
January - March	169	198	151	196 <sup>2</sup>
April - June	216	175	187	203
July - September	228 <sup>1</sup>	154	172	246
October - December	164 <sup>1</sup>	156	162	248
<b>Total</b>	<b>777</b>	<b>683</b>	<b>672</b>	<b>893</b>

Sources: Sacramento and Eureka Police Departments

\*Estimate

<sup>1</sup>Project opened

<sup>2</sup>Project closed

receive and have to respond to a large number of complaints. The demonstration projects did not reduce their workload in this area to any significant or lasting degree.

### 5.3 Apprehensions And Diversions

Figure 5-1 and Table 5-3 show that apprehensions of public inebriates dropped slightly in Sacramento in the first year of the project, and then rose in the second year and again after the project ended. In Humboldt there was a significant increase in apprehensions during the two project years (see Figure 5-2), and then a decline in 1980. This was entirely unexpected, but there is a simple explanation. During the project years the Eureka police had somewhere to take public inebriates other than to jail, so they apprehended more of them in order to keep the streets clean. When the project closed they lost that option and had to arrest everyone they apprehended. Sacramento's Drop-In Center and Sleep-Off Unit stayed open after the demonstration project ended,

Figure 5-1  
Public Drunkenness Apprehensions and Diversions,  
Sacramento County, 1978-1980





Figure 5-2  
Public Drunkenness Apprehensions and Diversions,  
Humboldt County, 1978-1980



which meant that the police retained their option, and they continued to apprehend and divert more public inebriates.

Thus, rather than reduce police involvement, the demonstration projects actually stimulated it. Table 5-3 also shows that the police took advantage of the projects; they diverted large numbers of public inebriates to the Screening and Evaluation Units. Both the number and proportion diverted rose each year in Sacramento. The number of diversions was large before the project began because the county operated a detoxification unit to which the police could divert inebriates; but diversions were even greater when the project concluded because the Sleep-Off Unit remained open and could hold many more people than the detox unit.

Table 5-3

Diversions of Apprehensions for Public Drunkenness by  
Law Enforcement Agencies, Sacramento and Humboldt, 1977-1980

		Sacramento		Humboldt	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1977	Apprehended	13,941	100.0	1,562	100.0
	Diverted	4,878	35.0	45	2.9
1978	Apprehended	13,239	100.0	2,399	100.0
	Diverted	7,408	56.0	1,175	49.0
1979	Apprehended	14,094	100.0	2,025	100.0
	Diverted	9,017	64.0	726	35.9
1980	Apprehended	14,334	100.0	1,890	100.0
	Diverted	9,864	68.8	287*	15.2

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics and Demonstration Project Records. These data are for all law enforcement agencies in the counties (police, sheriff, etc.).

\*First half of 1980

NOTE: Apprehensions were calculated by adding diversions and arrests. Not included in these figures are police contacts with public inebriates that resulted in some other disposition, such as transporting the individual home, to a mission, or to the county line.

As Table 5-4 shows, Humboldt's story was the reverse. There was no facility before the project began and none after it ended, thus there were no diversions.

Table 5-4

## Law Enforcement Diversions by Quarter, 1977-1980

	Sacramento		Humboldt	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1977 <sup>1</sup>				
January - March	968	3.1	-	-
April - June	1,338	4.3	-	-
July - September	1,394	4.5	-	-
October - December	1,178	3.8	45	2.0
1978 <sup>2</sup>				
January - March	1,230	3.9	226	10.1
April - June	2,090	6.7	329	14.7
July - September	2,566	8.2	344	15.4
October - December	1,522	4.9	276	12.4
1979 <sup>2</sup>				
January - March	2,220	7.1	163	7.3
April - June	2,649	8.5	230	10.3
July - September	2,325	7.5	206	9.2
October - December	1,823	5.8	127	5.7
1980 <sup>2</sup>				
January - March	2,264	7.3	144	6.4
April - June	2,649	8.5	143	6.4
July - September	2,833	9.1	-	-
October - December	2,118	6.8	-	-
Totals	31,167	100.1	2,233	99.9

Source: <sup>1</sup>Police Department Statistics<sup>2</sup>Project Records

Table 5-5 shows that in the first year of the project, law enforcement personnel accounted for almost 41 percent of all admissions to the Sacramento project. In Humboldt the percentage was even higher, almost 73 percent. These percentages dropped off the following year, not because there were fewer law enforcement diversions, but as Table 5-6 shows, because there were more self-referrals to the projects. By the last quarter of 1979 half of the admissions in Humboldt and seven out of ten in Sacramento were from self-referrals, which would indicate that as the projects became established and known more public inebriates came in voluntarily.

Another interesting point that can be inferred from this table is that the Courtesy Patrol played a particularly significant role at the beginning of the project and apparently relieved the police in Sacramento of having to pick up and transport a large number of drunks. Humboldt, which did not have this component, had to rely on the police to perform this function right from the beginning. As time went on, the Courtesy Patrol became less important as a source of referral. When the project ended, the Courtesy Patrol accounted for only seven percent of the admissions.

Table 5-5

## Law Enforcement Diversions to the Demonstration Projects, 1978-1980

	Sacramento		Humboldt	
	Number	Percent of All Admissions	Number	Percent of All Admissions
1977	4,878	NA	45	35.4
1978	7,408	40.9	1,175	72.9
1979	9,017	33.7	726	55.9
1980	9,864	22.9	287*	76.3
Total (1978-1980)	26,289	29.9	2,188	66.6

Source: Project Records

\*First half of 1980

Table 5-6

## Source of Referral to the Demonstration Projects by Quarter, 1978-1980

	Law Enforcement	Sacramento		Humboldt		
		Courtesy Patrol	Self	Other	Law Enforcement	Self
1978						
January - March	38	41	14	7	72	28
April - June	44	20	30	6	74	26
July - September	45	17	34	4	78	22
October - December	35	18	40	7	60	40
1979						
January - March	52	21	18	9	55	45
April - June	46	16	36	2	60	40
July - September	28	12	60	-	57	43
October - December	22	7	72	-	48	52
1980						
January - March	22	7	71	-	77	23
April - June	27	5	71	-	76	24
July - September	26	5	69	-	-	-
October - December	18	4	77	-	-	-
Total	30	11	57	2	67	33

Source: Project Records

#### 5.4 Conclusions

The data indicate that:

1. The projects had no effect on criminal justice procedures, other than to provide the police an alternative to arrest;
2. The projects had only a limited and temporary effect on public inebriate visibility. Citizen complaints remained high, and that meant the police workload in this area was not affected to any significant or lasting degree;
3. Things got worse when the projects ended because public inebriates became even more visible, and this added to the police workload;
4. Still, the demonstration projects were heavily utilized by the police;
5. Rather than reduce police involvement, they actually encouraged it. The police saw the projects as an alternative to jail, and they used it. They apprehended more public inebriates and diverted significant proportions of them to the demonstration projects; and
6. The effect of shutting the projects down is graphically shown in the contrast of Humboldt's and Sacramento's post-project experiences. Humboldt had no alternative but jail and both apprehensions and diversions dropped sharply. Sacramento continued to operate its Drop-In Center and Sleep-Off Unit, and apprehensions and diversions remained high.

#### CHAPTER 6. ARRESTS FOR PUBLIC INEBRIATES

Arrest data are particularly important for a study of this nature because the arrest is the entry point to the criminal justice system. If there were no arrests for public drunkenness, the police would have little, and the sheriff and courts almost no involvement with public inebriates. We are fortunate to have complete and reliable data on arrests, not only for Sacramento and Humboldt, but also for the State and, to a lesser degree, for each county in California. These data are analyzed in a number of ways in the next three chapters and provide a comprehensive view of the impact of the demonstration projects. This chapter focuses on the total number of arrests and the arrest rates between 1977-1980.

Arrests for public drunkenness dropped in both counties because of the demonstration projects. Declines occurred in both the total number of arrests and the arrest rates, but the declines were greater in Sacramento than in Humboldt. When the demonstration projects ended, arrests continued to decline in Sacramento, but they rose in Humboldt.

##### 6.1 Number of Arrests

Prior to the start of the project in 1978, Sacramento averaged almost 9,000 and Humboldt about 1,000 arrests each year for public drunkenness. The State averaged over 218,000 such arrests each year.

Table 6-1 shows that the number of arrests per year had declined rapidly in the state through 1973 and then began to rise again. In Sacramento, arrests remained in the 9,000 range through 1972 and then dropped dramatically. These declines coincided with a change in the Penal Code which allowed counties to divert public drunks to detoxification centers instead of sending them to jail. Several counties, including Sacramento, established detoxification centers around this time and that was a major reason for the decline in these arrests (Lockhart and Desrys, 1974). Humboldt was one county that did not.

After 1973 arrests began to increase. In 1977, just before the demonstration project began, they reached a peak. In Humboldt, arrests for 647(f) were the highest they had been in ten years. In Sacramento they were back to the 9,000 level. And in the state as a whole they were up to 228,000, the highest they had been in five years. Between 1973 and 1977, arrests increased 40 percent in Sacramento and almost 72 percent in Humboldt, a rate that was much more rapid than the 12.5 percent increase for the State as a whole.

During the two years of the demonstration project the number of arrests for public drunkenness declined in both counties and in the State as well. But as the percent change figures in Table 6-2 show, the declines were greater in the demonstration counties. Sacramento arrests in 1978 were almost 36 percent below the 1977 baseline year. In 1979 they declined another 13 percent. Humboldt's decline was much smaller, 19 percent in 1978 followed by a six percent increase in 1979, slightly greater than the increase for the State as a whole.

When the projects ended, Humboldt's arrests increased another 23 percent, which was much greater than the increase in the State. Sacramento's arrests

Table 6-1

Adult Arrests for Public Drunkenness in Sacramento and Humboldt Counties and the State of California, 1970-1980

Year	Sacramento	Humboldt	California
1970	10,424	861	245,343
1971	9,666	802	233,551
1972	9,074	776	211,252
1973	6,468	884	202,976
1974	6,816	964	206,658
1975	8,020	1,132	209,251
1976	8,259	1,274	212,708
1977	9,063	1,517	228,250
1978	5,831	1,224	214,255
1979	5,077	1,299	222,809
1980	4,470	1,603	230,466
Total	83,168	12,336	2,417,519

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics

Table 6-2

Percent Change in Adult Arrests for Public Drunkenness in Sacramento and Humboldt Counties, and the State of California, 1977 - 1980

	1976-1977	1977-1978	1978-1979	1979-1980
Sacramento	+9.7	-35.7	-12.9	-21.7
Humboldt	+19.1	-19.3	+6.1	+23.4
California	+7.3	-6.1	+4.0	+3.4

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics

declined another 22 percent. The explanation for the increase in one county and the decline in the other is that Sacramento continued to operate a Drop-In Center and Sleep-Off Unit in 1980 and Humboldt did not. The police in Humboldt no longer had an alternative to arrest, the police in Sacramento did. Table 6-3 shows that Humboldt's surge in arrests coincided with the closing of the Drydock in June, 1980. Arrests by the Eureka Police more than doubled in the following quarter (July-September, 1980).

Figure 6-1  
Adult Arrests for Public Drunkenness,  
Sacramento County, 1977-1980





Figure 6-2  
Adult Arrests for Public Drunkenness,  
Humboldt County, 1977-1980



### 6.2 Projections for 1978, 1979 and 1980

If the 1973-1977 trends had continued, there would have been many more arrests in Sacramento and Humboldt than there were. We estimated that Sacramento would have reached 9,715 arrests in 1978, 10,378 in 1979, and 11,042 in 1980. Humboldt would have reached 1,627, 1,785, and 1,942 respectively.\* Table 6-4 shows the difference between the projected trends and the actual number of arrests for these three years. These data indicate that the drop in arrests was large and statistically significant in both counties. The statewide decline was smaller and not statistically significant. Thus, it is clear that arrests declined dramatically in both Sacramento and Humboldt. Although the 1980 arrests in Humboldt were increased over 1979, they were still lower than the figure projected.

Table 6-3

Adult Arrests for Public Drunkenness in  
Sacramento and Humboldt Counties by Quarter, 1977-1980

		Sacramento		Humboldt		California
		County	SPD	County	EDP	
1977	January - March	1,811	1,595	358	228	48,714
	April - June	2,961	2,665	433	274	53,560
	July - September	2,223	1,994	417	255	57,348
	October - December	2,058	1,788	309	187	52,828
1978	January - March	2,136	1,842	284	159	52,874
	April - June	1,591	1,303	311	245	52,750
	July - September	1,213	865	335	186	55,154
	October - December	891	588	274	1,511	53,477
1979	January - March	1,164	795	352	148	54,715
	April - June	1,065	697	352	208	55,750
	July - September	1,509	1,038	361	226	57,217
	October - December	1,339	945	324	167	55,127
1980	January - March	1,140	779	269	176	54,718
	April - June	1,046	620	295	161	57,857
	July - September	1,019	590	553	380	60,227
	October - December	1,265	817	486	326	57,664

SPD = Sacramento Police Department  
EPD = Eureka Police Department

\*See Appendix for calculations.

Table 6-4

Projected and Actual Arrests for Public Drunkenness in Sacramento and Humboldt Counties  
and the State of California, 1978 and 1980

	Sacramento			Humboldt			California		
	1978	1979	1980	1978	1979	1980	1978	1979	1980
Projected	9,715	10,378	11,042	1,627	1,785	1,942	228,948	234,602	240,268
Actual	5,831	5,081	4,470	1,224	1,299	1,603	214,255	222,809	230,466
Number Difference	3,884	5,279	6,572	403	486	339	14,693	11,793	9,802
Percent Difference	-40.0	-51.0	-59.5	-24.8	-27.2	-17.5	-6.4	-5.0	-4.1
Significance	11.29	15.40	19.10	5.65	6.80	4.77	2.23	1.79	1.49

Significant at .01 with 3D.F    Significant at .01 with 3D.F    Not significant at .01 with 3D.F

Source: See Appendix

### 6.3 Arrest Rates

Although the decline in arrests is a strong indicator of program impact, it is possible that there is some other explanation for the declines. For example, if population declined there would be fewer people to arrest and, therefore, arrests would also decline. But this was not the case in either Sacramento or Humboldt. Population actually increased in both counties in 1978, again in 1979, and 1980 (see appendix for mid-year population estimates).

Also, we can adjust for these changes in population by calculating the number of arrests per 1,000 population per year, the "arrest rate." Table 6-5 shows that arrest rates had actually been increasing in both counties for several years before the projects began. In Humboldt the rate went up over two points per year between 1975 and 1977. If that trend had continued, the arrest rates should have been even higher in 1978 and 1979. But they actually declined. Although the rate also declined in the State as a whole, the decline was much larger in both project counties. When the project ended, the rate in Sacramento continued to decline while that in Humboldt increased markedly.

Thus, the data demonstrate that both arrests and arrest rates declined significantly during the project period in both demonstration counties and that their declines were larger and more statistically significant than the declines in the State.

Table 6-5

Adult Arrests for Public Drunkenness (647(f)) per 1,000 Population in Sacramento County, Humboldt County, and the State of California

<u>Year</u>	<u>Sacramento</u>	<u>Humboldt</u>	<u>California</u>
1970	16.4	8.6	12.3
1971	14.9	8.0	11.5
1972	13.6	7.8	10.3
1973	9.6	8.6	9.8
1974	10.0	9.3	9.9
1975	11.7	10.8	9.9
1976	11.7	12.1	9.9
1977	12.8	14.3	10.4
1978	7.9	11.4	9.6
1979	6.7	12.1	9.8
1980	5.7	14.8	9.8
<u>Decline</u>			
1977-1978	4.9	2.9	0.8
1978-1979	1.2	+0.7	+0.2
1979-1980	1.0	+2.7	0.0
1977-1979	6.1	2.2	0.6

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics

#### 6.4 Arrests in Other Counties

Although the statewide decline in arrests was not statistically significant, it was 4-6 percent below what we had projected. If the decline were uniform statewide, that would indicate that some other factor could have accounted for the decline in the demonstration counties.

But as Table 6-6 shows, the decline was not uniform statewide. The principal contributor to the statewide decline was Los Angeles. Between 1977 and 1978 arrests dropped over 23,000. In 1979 they went down another 4,600. Other significant declines occurred in San Joaquin in 1978 (-5,200), Sacramento in 1978 (-3,200), and San Diego in 1979 (-5,400) and 1980 (-5,397). Significant increases occurred in Alameda, Riverside, San Francisco, and a number of other counties. Arrests in San Francisco climbed rapidly through 1979 and then dropped in 1980.

Table 6-6

Counties with Largest Decreases and Increases in Arrests for Public Drunkenness, 1977 - 1980

	Total Number of Arrests			
	1977	1978	1979	1980
<b>Largest Decreases</b>				
Los Angeles	88,581	65,166	61,805	59,428
San Joaquin	10,117	4,903	5,450	6,722
Sacramento	9,063	5,831	5,081	4,470
San Diego	19,098	20,393	14,920	9,523
<b>Largest Increases</b>				
Alameda	6,489	7,849	13,392	14,789
Riverside	1,814	4,358	6,976	8,482
San Francisco	11,393	15,568	16,358	12,514
Santa Clara	3,823	6,753	7,921	9,875
Fresno	16,011	18,132	19,198	19,668

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics

Table 6-7 lists 38 California counties which had 500 or more arrests during one or more years between 1977-1980. The table shows the percent change in arrests for public drunkenness. Among the 10 large counties (those with a population over 500,000) the largest declines in 1978 were in Sacramento, Los Angeles, and Contra Costa. Sacramento was in second place in 1979 and third in 1980.

Table 6-7

Percent Change in Arrests for Public Drunkenness, Large and Small Counties, 1977-1980 (500 or More Arrests)

#### Counties Over 500,000 Population

	1977-78	1977-79	1977-80		1977-78	1977-79	1977-80
Sacramento*	-35.7	-12.9	-21.7	Orange*	+22.0	-7.2	+15.6
Los Angeles*	-26.4	-5.2	-3.8	San Mateo**	+6.8	+21.3	-0.4
Contra Costa*	-29.4	+10.6	+72.3	San Francisco**	+36.6	+5.1	-23.5
San Diego*	+6.8	-26.8	-36.2	Alameda*	+21.0	+70.6	+10.4
San Bernardino*	-5.7	-11.7	+47.9	Santa Clara*	+76.6	+17.3	+24.7

#### Counties Under 500,000 Population

	1977-78	1977-79	1977-80		1977-78	1977-79	1977-80
San Joaquin*	-51.5	+11.2	+23.3	San Mateo**	+6.8		
Yuba*	-34.8	+36.6	+6.5	Sonoma*	+2.7	+30.6	+7.4
Humboldt*	-19.3	+6.1	+23.4	San Luis Obispo**	+12.1	+14.1	+21.3
Yolo	-0.2	-4.7	+21.8	Tulare	+14.7	+16.0	+11.9
Mendocino*	0.0	-16.8	-3.2	Shasta**	+8.7	+23.5	+9.7
Placer**	-15.5	+34.3	+35.7	Stanislaus**	+11.9	+26.3	+8.0
El Dorado	-5.7	+5.4	+65.2	Imperial	+14.8	+22.5	+50.4
Santa Barbara**	+8.1	-9.7	+13.6	Madera	+19.6	+25.0	+37.2
Kern	-6.4	+14.8	+20.7	Marin**	+20.2	+26.0	+24.9
Monterey*	-10.3	+24.3	-0.9	Kings	+32.0	+10.6	+14.6
Ventura	-7.6	+23.0	+10.9	Sutter**	+37.4	+25.6	+47.8
Solano*	-9.7	+34.5	+10.6	Butte**	+30.5	+7.5	+11.6
Merced	+21.3	-10.1	+46.9	Santa Cruz*	+23.7	+91.4	+14.7
Fresno*	+13.2			Riverside	+140.2	+60.1	+21.5

\*Counties with programs specifically for public inebriates.

\*\*Counties without programs but which provide services to public inebriates.

Among the smaller counties (less than 500,000 population) the largest declines in 1978 were in San Joaquin, Yuba, and Humboldt. Humboldt slipped to fifth place in 1979 and to 18th place after the project ended.

These data also show that there was no uniform pattern throughout the state. Arrests increased in some counties and decreased in others, and by very different amounts.

While we do not know why these changes occurred in each county, we do know that the change in Los Angeles was unique to that area and had no effect on Sacramento or Humboldt.\* Changes in several other counties, including San Diego and San Francisco, appear to be due to changes in local police policies and had no effect on the demonstration counties. In San Diego the police began diverting public inebriates to a local drop-in center (San Diego, 1977 Wynne, 1982). In San Francisco police began to round up public inebriates, apparently in response to pressure from local merchants (DADA, 1979, p. 27).

Thus, from the above data we can conclude that there was no significant factor operating statewide that would have affected arrests for public drunkenness in either Sacramento or Humboldt counties. As we noted previously, California has not decriminalized public drunkenness and each county is relatively free to deal with this problem in its own way.

#### 6.5 Conclusions

It seems clear that both projects had a significant impact on arrests:

1. The number of arrests declined significantly in both counties; much more so than in the State as a whole;
2. Arrest rates also declined, again much more than in the State;
3. When the demonstrations ended arrests and arrest rates increased in Humboldt but continued to decline in Sacramento; and
4. The key factor was the continuation of the Drop-In Center and Sleep-Off Unit. Sacramento continued to have a place where public inebriates could go, Humboldt did not.

\*In December 1977 Superior Court Judge Harry L. Hupp issued an opinion on the Sundance case. In March 1978 he issued his final judgment, which had the force of law as to the Los Angeles municipal courts and police department. The judgment placed significant constraints on police discretion and imposed higher standards for jail accommodations for public inebriates. The effect was to reduce L.A.P.D. arrests more than 60 percent in 1978. The Sundance decision had its major impact on the L.A.P.D. Other jurisdictions, even within Los Angeles County, were largely unaffected. Stevens, op. cit. pp. 63-65.

## CHAPTER 7. ARREST PATTERNS

There were several changes in arrest patterns which add support to the conclusion that the demonstration projects had a significant impact on the arrests of public inebriates.

### 7.1 Arrests by Type of Law Enforcement Agency

Table 7-1 shows the proportion of arrests made by the police, sheriffs and other law enforcement agencies between 1977-1980. In 1977 the Sacramento Police Department (SPD) made almost nine out of every ten arrests for public drunkenness. That dropped each year, to about eight out of ten in 1978, seven out of ten in 1979, and close to six out of ten in 1980. At the same time

Table 7-1

Arrests for Public Drunkenness by Police\* and Sheriffs,  
Sacramento and Humboldt, 1977-1980

		Sacramento		Humboldt	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1977	Police	8,042	88.7	944	62.2
	Sheriff	639	7.1	267	17.6
	Other	382	4.1	306	20.2
	Total	9,063	99.9	1,517	100.0
1978	Police	4,598	78.9	741	60.5
	Sheriff	806	13.8	239	19.5
	Other	427	7.3	244	20.0
	Total	5,831	100.0	1,224	100.0
1979	Police	3,475	68.4	749	57.7
	Sheriff	1,218	24.0	281	21.6
	Other	384	7.6	269	20.7
	Total	5,077	100.0	1,299	100.0
1980	Police	2,806	62.8	1,095	68.3
	Sheriff	1,268	28.4	261	16.3
	Other	396	8.9	247	15.4
	Total	4,470	100.1	1,603	100.0

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics

\*Sacramento Police Department and Eureka Police Department

that SPD arrests were declining, those made by the Sheriffs' Department steadily increased, proportionately as well as absolutely. By 1980 the number of arrests made by the Sheriff had doubled (from 639 to 1,268) and accounted for 28 percent of all arrests for public drunkenness (up from 7 percent in 1977).

This is another indicator of the success of the project in the target area, downtown Sacramento, and in gaining the support of the police, who increasingly preferred to divert rather than arrest public inebriates.

### 7.2 Location of Arrest

These conclusions are corroborated by the data in Table 7-2, which show the location of arrests in 1977, 1979 and 1980.\* The target area in Sacramento was from Third to Thirteenth Streets between I and L Streets. Before the project began 56 percent of the arrests were made in this area. In 1979 this had dropped to 30.8 percent, and in 1980 it was down to 16 percent. Each year more arrests were made outside the target area, and many of these were made by the Sheriff, not the police.

We have already mentioned three factors which contributed to this shift: (1) the existence of the Drop-In and Sleep-Off components; (2) the willingness of the police to divert public inebriates to those facilities; and (3) the willingness of the public inebriates to go to these components before they were picked up by the police. There are three other factors that contributed to the pattern. The first was the location of the Drop-In Center. When the project opened it was located at 7th and E Streets, just a few blocks from the target area. Public inebriates became more visible around that area and on the routes from downtown to the Center. When the Drop-In Center was moved to Front Street, about three miles from the target area, the public inebriates became more visible there and on the routes from downtown. Thus, the number of arrests on the main route (Broadway between First and Sixteenth Streets) increased.

The second factor was the closing of five, low-priced hotels in the target area in 1980. Urban renewal spread slowly down the mall, gradually pushing the poor and homeless out of that area, and in the process gradually reducing the number of visible public inebriates.

The third factor was the adoption of a tougher policy by the Sheriff toward public inebriates, which led to an increase in arrests, particularly outside the city limits.

The pattern in Humboldt was quite different. The proportion of arrests made by the police declined only slightly (less than five percentage points between 1977-1979 compared with a drop of over 20 percentage points in Sacramento). The number and proportion of arrests made by the Sheriff increased only slightly. When the project ended, the number and proportion of arrests made by the police increased significantly.

\*Those data were obtained from annual systematic samples of police logs (1:20 in Sacramento and 1:7 in Eureka).

Table 7-2

Public Inebriate Arrests in Sacramento and Humboldt Counties for 1977 and 1979, by Location of Arrest

	P E R C E N T A G E S <sup>1</sup>		
	1977	1979	1980 <sup>1</sup>
Sacramento	(N=425)	(N=208)	(N=286)
Third to Fifth Streets between I and L	1.4	1.0	0.7
Sixth to Eighth Streets between I and L	14.1	7.7	7.7
Ninth to Eleventh Streets between I and L	33.4	18.3	3.8
Twelfth to Thirteenth Streets between I and L	0.7	9.1	4.9
*Broadway between First and Sixteenth Streets	0.7	9.1	4.9
Other area	43.3	60.1	79.0
Humboldt	(N=170)	(N=111)	(N=181)
First to Third Streets between A and E	37.1	34.2	40.3
First to Third Streets between F and N	21.2	25.6	8.3
*Fourth to Sixth Streets between A and E	8.2	13.1	6.1
Fourth to Sixth Streets between F and N	6.5	8.9	12.7
Other area	25.9	18.2	32.5

Source: Systematic sample of Sacramento and Eureka Police Department logs.

\*Location of Drop-In Center

<sup>1</sup>July - December, 1980

The location of arrests in Humboldt did not change as significantly during the project period as it did in Sacramento, partly because the Drop-In Center in Eureka was located in the downtown area. But there was a slight shift. After the Center opened, public inebriates became more visible in that area and on the routes to the target area. When the project closed, arrests in that area declined rapidly, and those outside the target area increased, indicating a slight dispersal of the public inebriate population.

### 7.3 Arrests by Time of Day

Table 7-3 shows arrests by time of day for three sample periods--before, during, and after the demonstration projects.\* The most dramatic change occurred in Sacramento between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. when arrests declined and 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. when they increased. That corresponds to the times when the Screening and Evaluation Unit was open, from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. That is,

\*These data were obtained from the same systematic sample used to gather information on location of arrests.

Table 7-3

Public Inebriate Arrests in Sacramento and Humboldt Counties  
for 1977 and 1979, by the Time of Day

	P E R C E N T A G E S		
	1977 (N=425)	1979 (N=208)	July - August 1980 (N=288)
Sacramento			
12 a.m. - 6 a.m.	8.7	24.0	25.3
6 a.m. - 12 p.m.	22.8	3.8	3.1
12 p.m. - 6 p.m.	37.2	19.7	16.0
6 p.m. - 12 a.m.	31.3	52.4	55.6
Humboldt	(N=170)	(N=111)	(N=186)
12 a.m. - 6 a.m.	6.5	5.4	16.7
6 a.m. - 12 p.m.	23.5	23.4	22.0
12 p.m. - 6 p.m.	31.2	35.1	21.5
6 p.m. - 12 a.m.	38.8	36.1	39.8

Source: Systematic Sample of Sacramento and Eureka Police Departments logs

the police were able to divert public inebriates to the project during that time, but had to arrest them at other times. As the data for 1980 show, this pattern continued after the project ended. That was because the county continued the Screening and Evaluation Unit.

Humboldt showed no similar change after the project opened because the Screening and Evaluation Unit was open 24 hours per day. Thus, the police could divert public inebriates to the project at any time of day. After the project ended the proportion of arrests made after midnight increased, while those made after noon decreased. This may reflect increased pickups of public inebriates who were spending the night on the streets, but who would have been at the Drydock had it remained open.

#### 7.4 Characteristics of Arrestees

The typical stereotype of the public inebriate has been a white, middle-aged male. This was the case in California before the projects began, and it was still the case after the projects ended. However, there were a few changes. In Sacramento there was an increase in the proportion of women arrested for public drunkenness. There was a similar change in the State, but not in Humboldt.

In both counties and throughout the State, the proportion of young public inebriates rose steadily. There was an increase in arrests of people under 29

Table 7-4

Adults Arrested for Public Drunkenness by Sex,  
Sacramento and Humboldt Counties and the State of California, 1977-1979

	P E R C E N T					
	Sacramento		Humboldt		California	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
1977	96.6	3.4	88.8	11.2	93.2	6.8
1978	94.8	5.2	88.4	11.6	92.4	7.6
1979	91.1	8.9	88.5	11.5	92.2	7.8
1980	88.8	11.2	89.5	10.5	92.0	8.0

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics

years of age and a decrease in arrests of those 40 and over. There was a steady increase in the proportion of arrests of those between 30 and 39 in California, which appears to have been masked in the demonstration counties by the projects. The data for 1980 indicate that the older public inebriates in Humboldt began to be arrested more often after the projects ended. But in Sacramento, where the Drop-In and Sleep-Off components remained open, this did not happen--arrests continued to decline among the older target group.

Table 7-5

Adults Arrested for Public Drunkenness by Age Group,  
Sacramento and Humboldt Counties, and the State of California, 1977-1979

	P E R C E N T								
	Sacramento			Humboldt			California		
	Less than 30	30-39	Greater than 39	Less than 30	30-39	Greater than 39	Less than 30	30-39	Greater than 39
1977	20.1	18.1	61.8	37.9	16.0	46.1	37.1	20.0	42.9
1978	26.4	18.0	55.6	43.5	21.2	35.3	42.5	20.8	36.7
1979	38.9	17.9	43.2	45.6	24.0	30.4	46.4	21.2	32.4
1980	48.9	19.9	31.2	40.5	23.6	35.9	47.1	22.8	30.1

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics

Table 7-6 shows that several changes occurred in the ethnicity of arrestees, particularly in Sacramento where the proportion who were white increased steadily from 1977, and the proportion who were Hispanic decreased steadily. Most of the remaining changes were small and no specific patterns stand out.

Table 7-6

Adults Arrested for Public Drunkenness by Ethnicity,  
Sacramento and Humboldt Counties and the State of California, 1977-1979

		P E R C E N T		
		Sacramento	Humboldt	California
1977	White	51.1	75.9	51.3
	Hispanic	26.1	2.9	30.4
	Black	10.0	1.1	13.3
	Other	12.9	20.0	5.0
1978	White	55.7	77.1	53.3
	Hispanic	23.7	2.0	30.0
	Black	12.5	1.0	12.6
	Other	8.1	19.9	4.2
1979	White	60.5	72.3	54.0
	Hispanic	20.8	2.4	30.1
	Black	13.0	1.2	12.0
	Other	5.7	24.2	3.9
1980	White	63.3	76.4	51.8
	Hispanic	18.6	4.1	33.2
	Black	12.0	0.6	11.5
	Other	6.0	18.9	3.5

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics

### 7.5 Conclusions

Data in this chapter lend further support to the conclusion that the demonstration projects had a significant effect on arrests and also point out that:

1. The location of the Drop-In Center had an effect on arrest patterns--arrests tended to be concentrated in the target areas, around the Drop-In Center, and on the routes between the two;
2. The hours the intake unit was open had an effect--arrests tended to be lower when intake was open and higher when it was closed, and that

3. Arrests patterns were subject to other intervening variables, including changes in the Sheriffs' policies, urban renewal, and changes in the target population itself (e.g., the increase in younger public inebriates).

## CHAPTER 8. FREQUENCY OF ARREST

As far as we know, there has been no study of the frequency of arrest of individuals for public drunkenness. Many of the vignettes which have been reported give the impression that a small number of individuals account for a majority of the arrests. If this were the case, then it follows that removal of these people from the criminal justice system would reduce criminal justice involvement to a minimum. Our data indicate that this was not exactly the case in Sacramento and Humboldt.

### 8.1 Individuals Arrested

The Bureau of Criminal Statistics (BCS) agreed to make a special computer run of all persons arrested in Sacramento and Humboldt counties for public drunkenness (647(f)) from 1977 through 1980. That run produced a printout which listed all arrestees alphabetically by last name for each year by county. We counted the number of times an individual's name appeared in the printout and tabulated the results. Selected demographic characteristics, date of arrest and other information which appeared next to each entry were used to check for duplicate entries and other potential problems. The fact that some individuals were listed over 20 times led us to conclude that aliases were rarely used and that the list provided an accurate picture of the frequency of arrests for public drunkenness.

Although the number of arrests in Sacramento dropped steadily from 1977 through 1980, Table 8-1 shows the number of individuals arrested dropped sharply in 1978, then rose in 1979 and leveled off in 1980. One would have expected a significant and sustained decline, but this did not happen.

Table 8-1

Number of Individuals Arrested for Public Drunkenness  
Sacramento and Humboldt Counties, 1977-1980

	<u>Sacramento</u>	<u>Humboldt</u>
1977	4,448	894
1978	3,408	855
1979	3,691	854
1980	3,624	933
Mean	3,793	884

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics, special computer run.

Humboldt's pattern was much more consistent with its total arrest trend, a decline in 1978, no change in 1979, and a significant increase in 1980. Yet in neither county was the change in individuals arrested as great as the change in total arrests (see Table 8-2).

**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 2**

Table 8-2

Percent Change in Total Arrests and Individuals Arrested for  
Public Drunkenness in Sacramento and Humboldt Counties,  
1977-1980

	Percent Change			
	Sacramento		Humboldt	
	Total Arrests	Individuals Arrested	Total Arrests	Individuals Arrested
1977-1978	-35.7	-23.4	-19.3	-4.4
1978-1979	-12.9	+8.3	+6.1	-0.1
1979-1980	-21.7	-1.8	+23.4	+9.3

Source: Tables 6-2, 8-1

Arrests and individuals arrested did not vary similarly, and the total number of individuals arrested was much more stable than one would have expected, particularly in the first three years in Humboldt and the last three years in Sacramento.

### 8.2 Frequency of Arrest

Table 8-3 shows the number of individuals arrested distributed by the number of times they were arrested. For example, in 1977 there were 3,418 individuals who were arrested once in Sacramento, 337 who were arrested twice, 14 who were arrested 10 times, and so forth. What is surprising is the large number of individuals who were arrested only once. As Table 8-4 shows, these people accounted for 75-88 percent of the individuals arrested for public drunkenness. That is, the vast majority of people arrested for public drunkenness were not "chronic, police-case inebriates." They were not the target group of the demonstration project, and apparently were not significantly affected by it. The number of individuals arrested once dropped sharply (23.3 percent) in Sacramento in 1978, but still made up the same percentage of arrestees as in 1977. Both the number and the proportion arrested increased in 1979 and 1980.

In Humboldt the number of individuals arrested once followed the course of the demonstration project, but the changes were slight. It dropped two percent in 1978, remained unchanged in 1979, and rose 4.5 percent in 1980. Throughout the four year period the proportion of all arrestees who were arrested only once remained high (78-80 percent) and relatively stable.

The "chronic police-case inebriates," say those individuals arrested five or more times a year, made up only five percent of the 1977 arrestee population in Humboldt and nine percent of the population in Sacramento.

Table 8-3

Frequency of Arrest

Number of Arrests	Sacramento				Humboldt			
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1977	1978	1979	1980
1	3,418	2,622	3,080	3,202	703	687	687	718
2	337	350	348	265	95	97	82	110
3	202	153	106	78	37	26	40	39
4	110	74	63	25	12	15	14	23
5	77	50	28	15	9	13	11	11
6	66	36	19	13	10	6	3	77
7	45	20	11	8	6	1	2	3
8	38	29	6	2	4	5	4	3
9	18	13	10	4	3	2	3	3
10	14	23	6	2	2	-	-	1
11 - 19	85	46	13	10	10	1	5	8
20+	38	1	1	1	4	2	2	6
Highest Number of Arrests	(42)	(24)	(23)	(20)	(34)	(29)	(25)	(32)
Number of Individuals	4,448	3,408	3,691	3,624	894	855	854	933
Number of Arrests	9,063	5,831	5,077	4,470	1,517	1,224	1,299	1,603
Arrests/Individuals	2.04	1.71	1.38	1.23	1.70	1.43	1.52	1.72

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Special Computer Run

Table 8-4

Number of Individuals Arrested by Frequency of Arrest

P E R C E N T A G E S

Number of Arrests	Percent Distribution of Arrestees							
	Sacramento				Humboldt			
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1977	1978	1979	1980
	(4,448)	(3,408)	(3,691)	(3,624)	(894)	(855)	(854)	(933)
1	76.8	76.9	83.4	88.4	78.6	80.4	80.5	77.0
2	7.6	10.3	9.4	7.3	10.6	11.3	9.6	11.7
3	4.5	4.5	2.9	2.2	4.1	3.0	4.7	4.2
4	2.5	2.2	1.7	0.7	1.3	1.8	1.6	2.5
5	1.7	1.5	0.8	0.4	1.0	1.5	1.3	1.2
6	1.5	1.1	0.5	0.4	1.1	0.7	0.4	0.7
7	1.0	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.1	0.2	0.3
8	0.9	0.6	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.4
9	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.3
10	0.3	0.7	0.2	-	0.1	-	-	0.1
11-19	1.9	1.3	0.4	0.2	1.1	0.1	0.6	0.9
20-+	0.9	-	-	-	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.6

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Special Computer Run

If a stricter definition were adopted, say more than 10 arrests per year, the percentage would drop to one and three percent respectively. Thus, in both counties the chronic police case inebriate, the target of the demonstration project, made up a very small portion of the offending population--those who were arrested for being drunk in public.

Although the data in Table 8-3 indicate that the projects did not have much impact on the number of individuals who were only arrested once or twice, they did have an impact on those who were arrested more frequently, particularly those who were arrested most often. The highest number of arrests for an individual in Sacramento was 42 in 1977. That dropped to 24 after the project opened. In 1977 there were 38 people who were arrested 20 or more times, and 85 who were arrested 11-19 times. Those figures dropped

significantly after the project opened. A similar pattern occurred in Humboldt, which leads to the conclusion that both projects had their greatest impact on the population they were trying to serve, the chronic inebriate who was frequently arrested. It appears that many of these people were arrested much less frequently, principally because they were diverted to the projects. The rise in the frequency of arrest in Humboldt after the project closed tends to add support to this conclusion. Table 8-5 shows the dramatic increase in the number of individuals arrested and the frequency of arrest after the services closed in June, 1980.

Table 8-5

Frequency of Arrest, Humboldt County, 1980

Number of Arrests	Number of Individuals Arrested		Percent Change
	January-June	July-December	
1	187	531	+184.0
2	26	83	+219.2
3	9	30	+233.3
4	7	16	+128.6
5	1	10	+1,000.0
6	-	7	
7	3	-	
8	1	3	
9	-	3	+600.0
10	-	1	
11-19	-	8	
20+	-	6	
Highest Number of Arrests	(8)	(32)	(+300.0)
Number of Individuals	234	484	+106.8
Number of Arrests	328	1,275	+288.7
Arrests/Individual	1.40	2.63	+87.9

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Special Computer Run

Thus, although the projects had little or no impact on the one-time and two-time arrestee, they had a significant impact on their target group, those individuals who tended to get arrested frequently for being drunk in public. This, in turn had an effect on the total number of arrests, because these people accounted for a significant proportion of total arrests for public drunkenness.

### 8.3 Distribution of Arrests

Table 8-6 shows that in 1977, before the projects began, one-time arrestees accounted for only 37.7 percent of all arrests for public drunkenness in Sacramento and 46.3 percent in Humboldt. Less than one percent of the arrestees accounted for over 11 percent of the arrests in Sacramento, and less than seven percent accounted for almost 40 percent of the arrests. In Humboldt four percent of the arrestees were responsible for almost 28 percent of all arrests. That is, a small number of public inebriates (4-7 percent) accounted for 28-39 percent of the arrests.

During the demonstration project there was a significant change, which was most noticeable in Sacramento. The percentage of arrestees with six or more arrests dropped from 6.9 percent in 1977 to 4.6 percent in 1978, to 1.8 percent in 1979 and 1.0 percent in 1980. And their share of total arrests dropped also, from 39.1 percent in 1977 to 7.6 percent in 1980.

Humboldt did not have as dramatic or as sustained a drop, in fact, the percentages started to rise in 1979 and by 1980 were close to the 1977 pre-project figures.

These data clearly show that the projects had their greatest impact on the public inebriate target population.

An unexpected finding, also shown in Table 8-6, is that the proportion of one-time arrests continued to rise as the proportion of multiple arrests fell. By 1980 in Sacramento individuals arrested only once accounted for 71.6 percent of all arrests. That was because arrests of these individuals rose steadily after 1978, while arrests of the target group fell. Thus, the gain made in keeping chronic drunks from being arrested were at least partially offset by arrests of other people found drunk in public.

### 8.4 Arrests of Project Enrollees

An attempt was made to measure the effect of the project on enrollees by counting the number of times a sample of individuals was arrested one year prior to and one year after the date of enrollment in the project. The working hypothesis was that if the projects were successful, arrests should have declined after enrollment. Tables 8-7 and 8-8 show that this is what happened. Frequency of arrest declined in both counties as did the total number of arrests for each sample. An interesting and important finding is that the majority of the enrollees had not been arrested at all during the year prior to enrollment and fully three-fourths of the enrollees in both counties had been arrested no more than once.

These data have to be interpreted cautiously for two reasons. First, they are based on a 25 percent systematic sample of incomplete records. Only 33

Table 8-6

Number of Arrestees and Arrests by Frequency of Arrest,  
Sacramento and Humboldt, 1977-1980

Number of Arrests	Sacramento Percentages							
	1977		1978		1979		1980	
	Arrestees (N=4,448)	Arrests (N=9,063)	Arrestees (N=3,408)	Arrests (N=5,831)	Arrestees (N=3,691)	Arrests (N=5,077)	Arrestees (N=3,624)	Arrests (N=4,470)
1	76.8	37.7	76.9	45.0	83.4	60.7	88.4	71.6
2-5	16.3	23.2	18.5	29.2	14.8	27.7	10.6	20.8
6-10	4.1	14.6	3.3	14.7	1.4	7.7	0.8	4.4
11-19	1.9	13.3	1.3	10.7	0.4	3.5	0.2	2.8
20+	0.9	11.2	-	0.4	-	0.5	-	0.4

Number of Arrests	Humboldt Percentages							
	1977		1978		1979		1980	
	Arrestees (N=894)	Arrests (N=1,517)	Arrestees (N=855)	Arrests (N=1,224)	Arrestees (N=854)	Arrests (N=1,299)	Arrestees (N=933)	Arrests (N=1,603)
1	78.6	46.3	80.4	56.1	80.4	52.9	77.0	44.8
2-5	17.0	26.0	17.6	30.3	17.2	30.4	19.6	30.2
6-10	2.6	11.3	1.6	8.3	1.5	7.7	1.9	8.2
11-19	1.1	9.4	0.1	1.1	0.6	5.3	0.9	6.9
20+	0.4	7.0	0.2	4.2	0.2	3.7	0.6	9.9

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Special Computer Run

percent of the Sacramento sample and 56 percent of the Humboldt sample could be used because of incomplete information. Second, some individuals may not have been arrested after enrollment because they were out of the county, dead, or still in jail. This second factor would tend to underestimate both the number of arrests and the number of individuals arrested.

Table 8-7

Frequency of Arrest of Sacramento Project Enrollees One Year Prior and One Year Following Initial Enrollment

Number of Arrests	One Year Prior to Enrollment		One Year Following Enrollment		Net Change	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
0	108	62.4	116	67.0	+8	+7.4
1	20	11.6	25	14.5	+5	+25.0
2	10	5.8	12	6.9	+2	+20.0
3	7	4.0	6	3.5	-1	-14.3
4	9	5.2	2	1.2	-7	-77.8
5	2	2.9	5	2.9	+3	+66.7
6-10	10	5.8	4	2.3	-6	-60.0
11-+	7	4.0	3	1.7	-4	-57.1
Total Number	173	100.0	173	100.0	-	-
Total Arrests	334		170		-164	-49.1
Mean	1.93		0.98		-.95	

Source: Project Records, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Special Computer Run

Table 8-8

Frequency of Arrest of Humboldt Project Enrollees One Year Prior and One Year Following Initial Enrollment

Number of Arrests	One Year Prior to Enrollment		One Year Following Enrollment		Net Change	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
0	60	(58.3)	62	(60.2)	+2	+3.3
1	15	(14.6)	18	(17.5)	+3	+20.0
2	8	(7.8)	8	(7.8)	-	-
3	11	(10.7)	6	(5.8)	-5	-45.5
4	3	(2.9)	3	(2.9)	-	-
5	-	-	1	(1.0)	+1	+00
6-10	3	(2.9)	4	(3.9)	+1	+33.3
11+	3	(2.9)	1	(1.0)	-2	-66.7
Total Number	103		103		-	
Total Arrests	155		110		-45	-29.0
Mean	1.50		1.07		-.43	

Source: Project Records, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Special Computer Run

### 8.5 Enrollment of Arrestees

We attempted to deal with these problems by taking a sample of arrestees and checking project records to see how many had been enrolled in the project. This could only be done for Humboldt because the Sacramento project did not have a master list of enrollees, which the sampling procedure required.

Table 8-9 is based on a 1:5 systematic sample of all persons arrested once plus a 100 percent sample of all persons arrested more than once in a given year. This sampling procedure yielded Ns of 331 (1977), 297 (1978), and 299 (1979) which was about 35 percent of the individuals arrested each year. No sample was drawn for 1980 because Humboldt did not continue to record the names of enrollees after the project ended in December, 1979. The names of the persons arrested were compared with the project enrollment list, and those arrestees who were found to be enrolled were noted and tabulated by year of arrest. Thus, Table 8-9 shows how many of the people who were arrested that year were ever enrolled in the project. That is, was the project able to attract people who were arrested for public drunkenness? Over the three years about

Table 8-9  
Arrestees Ever Enrolled in the Demonstration Project,  
Humboldt County, 1977-1979

Number of Arrests	1977 (N=331)		1978 (N=297)		1979 (N=299)	
	Enrolled	Not Enrolled	Enrolled	Not Enrolled	Enrolled	Not Enrolled
1*	10 (7.1)	130 (92.9)	14 (10.9)	115 (89.1)	15 (10.6)	127 (89.4)
2	25 (26.3)	70 (73.7)	30 (30.9)	67 (69.1)	26 (31.7)	56 (68.3)
3	12 (32.4)	25 (67.6)	14 (53.8)	12 (46.2)	12 (32.0)	18 (70.0)
4	5 (41.7)	7 (58.3)	11 (73.3)	4 (26.7)	9 (64.3)	5 (35.7)
5	7 (77.8)	2 (22.2)	11 (84.6)	2 (15.4)	8 (72.7)	3 (27.3)
6-10	15 (62.5)	9 (37.5)	12 (85.7)	2 (14.3)	13 (100.0)	- -
11 and over	12 (85.7)	2 (14.3)	3 (100.0)	- -	7 (100.0)	- -
Total	86 (26.0)	245 (74.0)	95 (32.0)	202 (68.0)	90 (30.1)	209 (69.9)

Source: Project Records, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Special Computer Run

30 percent of the arrestees were enrolled in the project. In general, those who were arrested more frequently were more likely to enroll. Of the 75 individuals who were arrested 6 or more times, 62 (82.7 percent) were eventually enrolled in the project. By contrast, of the 411 individuals who were arrested once, only 39 (9.5 percent) were enrolled. This is further evidence that the project was able to attract and reduce arrests among members of its target group, but it had little effect on the large number of individuals who were only occasionally drunk in public.

#### 8.6 Conclusions

The data presented in this chapter lead to some unexpected conclusions:

1. The projects had no effect on the vast majority of individuals who were arrested for public drunkenness, and therefore, did not relieve the police of the burden of dealing with these people.
2. The projects had a significant effect on the very small minority of chronic, police-case inebriates who were their target population, and that, in turn led to a significant reduction in the frequency of arrest of these people, the total number of arrests, and consequently, police involvement.

3. A majority of those enrolled in the projects did not appear to have had many, if any arrests for public drunkenness. Thus, they were not a significant burden to the police in the first place.
4. Even if all arrests of the target population had been eliminated, the police still would have had to deal with the occasional drunk who made up 90 percent or more of those individuals arrested for being drunk in public.

CHAPTER 9. RELEASES AND COMPLAINTS FILED

Public inebriates were turned over to the sheriff after they were arrested. In 1977, before the demonstration project began, the sheriffs in both counties generally kept drunks in a holding cell for about four hours, or until they became sober. Many public inebriates were then released under statute 849(b)(2), if "the person was arrested for intoxication only and no further proceedings are desirable." In Humboldt, the sheriff sometimes released public inebriates on their own recognizance, but they had a return on a specified day for arraignment.

9.1 Releases and Complaints Filed

Table 9-1 shows that as arrests increased in the State as a whole, releases also increased and the number of complaints filed decreased. The proportions changed also. As arrests went up, the proportion released also went up. The opposite was expected for the demonstration counties. If the projects were successful and arrests declined, releases and complaints were expected to fall because there would be fewer people to release and hold for court. The proportion released was expected to remain steady.

Table 9-1  
Arrests by Disposition, 1977-1980

	Sacramento		Humboldt		California	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1977 Arrested	9,063	100.0	1,517	100.0	212,450	100.0
Released	7,224	79.7	282	18.6	72,710	34.2
Complaint Filed	1,834	20.2	1,234	81.3	136,846	64.4
Other Disposition	5	0.1	1	0.1	12,894	1.4
1978 Arrested	5,831	100.0	1,224	100.0	214,255	100.0
Released	3,501	60.1	217	17.7	84,643	39.5
Complaint Filed	2,328	39.9	1,006	82.2	126,564	73.1
Other Disposition	2	0.0	1	0.1	3,048	1.4
1979 Arrested	5,077	100.0	1,299	100.0	222,809	100.0
Released	2,275	44.8	305	23.5	92,593	41.6
Complaint Filed	2,787	54.9	993	76.4	127,048	57.0
Other Disposition	15	0.3	1	0.1	3,168	1.4
1980 Arrested	4,470	100.0	1,603	100.0	230,466	100.0
Released	2,360	52.8	419	26.1	103,761	45.0
Complaint Filed	2,109	47.2	1,184	73.9	122,725	53.3
Other Disposition	1	0.0	0	0.0	3,980	1.7

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics

The expected patterns occurred in Humboldt. Releases and complaints dropped in 1978 and the proportion released dropped only slightly. The following year, with arrests rising slightly, releases increased again and complaints dropped slightly. When the project closed in 1980 arrests, releases and complaints filed all increased, as expected.

Sacramento did not follow the expected pattern. Although the number released declined dramatically during the project years, the number and proportion of complaints filed increased--from 1,834 in 1977 to 2,328 in 1978 (up 27 percent), and in 1979 to 2,787 (up 18 percent). This unexpected phenomenon seems to reflect a "crackdown" by the Sacramento sheriff on public inebriates. During the project years the sheriff released fewer and fewer public inebriates who were arrested for public drunkenness and held more for court.

Table 9-2

Releases and Complaints Filed, by Quarter, Sacramento and Humboldt, 1977-1980

	Sacramento		Humboldt	
	Released	Complaint	Released	Complaint
1977 January - March	1,440	369	55	303
April - June	2,546	413	65	367
July - September	1,738	494	126	311
October - December	1,500	558	56	253
1978 January - March	1,393	742	70	214
April - June	1,064	527	37	294
July - September	698	514	50	285
October - December	346	545	60	213
1979 January - March	541	509	47	215
April - June	461	604	85	266
July - September	626	883	77	284
October - December	647	691	96	228
1980 January - March	694	446	75	194
April - June	574	472	67	228
July - September	447	572	148	405
October - December	645	619	129	357

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics

This is reflected in Figure 9-1, which shows the pattern of complaints. There was an obvious drop in Humboldt after the Drydock opened, and for the remainder of the project period there were seasonal variations followed by a sharp increase after the Drydock closed in June, 1980. There was also a significant drop in Sacramento after the Drop-In and Detox opened in April, 1978. But complaints jumped markedly in mid-1979, plunged in early 1980 and then rose sharply. This erratic pattern seems to reflect the more volatile political

Figure 9-1  
Public Drunkenness Releases and Complaints Filed,  
Sacramento County, 1977-1980





Figure 9-2  
Public Drunkenness Releases and Complaints Filed,  
Humboldt County, 1977-1980



climate in Sacramento. Periodically the police and sheriff would respond to public pressure to "do something" about the drunks, and a "crackdown" would ensue for a period of time. For example, In February, 1978 the Sacramento police complained that the sheriff's policy of releasing 80 to 90 percent of the public inebriates was causing a serious problem because the police had to pick up the same inebriates over and over again, sometimes several times each day. The Sheriff's Department then issued a directive which stipulated that arrested public inebriates were not to be released unless: (1) the arrest took place on the weekend (court was in session only Monday through Friday); or (2) it as that person's first arrest for public drunkenness.

The immediate effect of this directive was to reduce the number and proportion of public inebriates who were released (from 478 in January to 324 in February), and increase the number held for court (from 186 in January to 256 in February). The directive was discontinued in March and the number of released inebriates climbed back to 591. In November and December the merchants, City Council and police complained again and the directive was reinstated. In November the sheriff released only two of 117 people arrested.

Table 9-1 also shows an interesting contrast between the two counties. In 1977 Sacramento released about 80 percent of those arrested and held about 20 percent. Humboldt did the opposite, released about 20 percent and held about 80 percent. Over the years Humboldt did not change as much as Sacramento. By 1980 Humboldt was releasing about one-quarter and holding three-quarters of the arrestees. Sacramento was nearing the 50-50 mark in 1980. Thus, Humboldt was more conservative to begin with and remained that way. Sacramento was more liberal and became more conservative. While releases decreased somewhat, the more significant fact was that complaints filed remained relatively stable in Humboldt and increased in Sacramento.

### 9.2 Conclusions

These data indicate that the projects did not have the effect they expected on the sheriffs. Neither project was able to control visibility enough to quell complaints about public drunks. Pressure was put on the sheriffs to hold those public inebriates who were arrested. Thus, instead of going down significantly, the burden on the sheriff decreased only slightly in Humboldt and increased in Sacramento.

CHAPTER 10. ARRAIGNMENTS AND SENTENCES

When the police filed complaints, public inebriates were usually held in jail overnight and then arraigned before a judge of the municipal court. But many were released before going to court because the District Attorney dropped the charge "in the interest of justice." Also, when a defendant was charged with more than one offense, for example, disturbing the peace and public drunkenness, the judge usually dealt with the first count and dismissed the second. Thus, many public drunkenness complaints were dropped. Figures 10-1 and 10-2 show the number of cases dropped, dismissed, or suspended.

10.1 Arraignments

Table 10-1 shows that before the project started in Sacramento, the number of cases dropped by the District Attorney or not heard by the judge was

Table 10-1

DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS COMPLAINTS FILED,  
SACRAMENTO AND HUMBOLDT COUNTIES, 1977-1980

	<u>Sacramento</u>							
	1977		1978		1979		1980	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Complaints Filed	1,834	100.0	2,328	100.0	2,787	100.0	2,109	100.0
Dropped	906	49.4	964	41.4	1,342	48.2	1,177	55.8
Arraigned	928	50.6	1,364	58.6	1,445	51.8	932	44.2

	<u>Humboldt</u>							
	1977		1978		1979		1980	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Complaints Filed	1,234	100.0	1,006	100.0	993	100.0	1,184	100.0
Dropped	495	40.1	385	38.3	422	42.5	400	33.8
Arraigned	739	59.9	621	61.7	571	57.5	784	66.2

Sources: Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Municipal Court Dockets

Figure 10-1  
Public Drunkenness Cases Dropped, Dismissed, or Suspended,  
Sacramento County, 1977-1980




Figure 10-2  
Public Drunkenness Cases Dropped, Dismissed, or Suspended,  
Humboldt County, 1977-1980




Table 10-2

DISPOSITION OF COMPLAINTS FILED,  
SACRAMENTO AND HUMBOLDT COUNTIES,  
1977-1980, BY QUARTER

	Sacramento			Humboldt		
	Complaints	Dropped	Arraigned	Complaints	Dropped	Arraigned
1977 January - March	369	221	148	303	117	186
April - June	413	270	143	367	156	211
July - September	494	170	324	311	106	205
October - December	558	245	313	253	116	137
1978 January - March	742	237	505	214	107	107
April - June	527	231	296	294	72	222
July - September	514	334	180	285	103	172
October - December	545	162	383	213	93	120
1979 January - March	509	146	363	215	105	110
April - June	604	309	295	266	108	158
July - September	883	465	418	284	102	182
October - December	691	322	369	228	107	121
1980 January - March	446	231	215	194	76	120
April - June	472	299	173	228	92	136
July - September	572	351	221	405	124	281
October - December	619	296	323	357	110	247

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Municipal Court Dockets

just about the same as the number arraigned. In Humboldt about two cases were dropped for every three arraignments.

During the demonstration project, the number and proportion of dropped cases remained high in both counties--in fact, they increased in Sacramento, which might be interpreted as a positive impact of the project, except for the fact that the number arraigned also increased during the project years. In Humboldt, the number dropped declined during the first year of the project, then rose, and then declined after the project ended. Perhaps more important, the number arraigned in Humboldt declined during the project years and then rose in 1981, which would support the notion that the project reduced court involvement.

But the overall impression is that the projects had relatively little impact on the courts. Arraignments clearly increased in Sacramento during the project years and although they dropped in Humboldt, they remained high--falling about 15 percent in the first year and another 8 percent in the second project year.

10.2 Sentences

Table 10-3 shows that the Sacramento court reacted differently than expected. Theoretically, if the project had been successful, sentences should

Table 10-3

COURT DISPOSITION OF DRUNKENNESS CASES,  
SACRAMENTO AND HUMBOLDT COUNTIES, 1977-1980

	Sacramento							
	1977		1978		1979		1980	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Arraigned	928	100.0	1,364	100.0	1,445	100.0	932	100.0
Sentenced	494	53.2	882	64.7	935	64.7	435	46.7
Dismissed	129	13.9	153	11.2	101	7.9	181	19.4
Suspended	217	23.4	217	15.9	168	11.6	21	2.3
Other	88	9.5	112	8.2	241	16.7	295	31.7

	Humboldt							
	1977		1978		1979		1980	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Arraigned	739	100.0	621	100.0	571	100.0	784	100.0
Sentenced	500	67.7	380	61.2	268	46.9	395	50.4
Dismissed	229	31.0	212	34.1	284	49.7	306	39.0
Probation	10	1.3	20	3.2	15	2.6	22	2.8
Other	-	-	9	1.4	4	0.7	61	7.8

Source: Municipal Court Dockets

have decreased. That is what happened in Humboldt. The number sentenced dropped from 500 in 1977 to 380 in 1978, a decline of 24 percent. That was followed by an additional drop of 29 percent in the following year and then, when the project ended, sentences increased 47 percent. The experience in Sacramento was almost the reverse. Sentences increased an amazing 79 percent during the first project year (from 494 in 1977 to 882 in 1978), increased slightly the next year, and then dropped 53 percent when the project ended. The proportion sentenced also increased during the project years and then declined in 1980. This completely unexpected curve was a reflection of the court's reaction to the continuing public inebriate problem. Visibility had not been reduced enough, complaints were still being made, and pressure was put on the courts to do something to keep the drunks off the streets.

Figure 10-3  
Sentences for Public Drunkenness, Sacramento County, 1977-1980





Figure 10-4  
Sentences for Public Drunkenness Humboldt County, 1977-1980



Some of these reactions are reflected in Table 10-3. In February, 1978 the Sacramento police complained that the sheriff's policy of releasing 80 to 90 percent of the public inebriates was causing a serious problem because the police had to pick up the same drunks over and over again, sometimes several times each day. The Sheriff's Department responded by issuing a directive which stipulated that arrested public inebriates were not to be released unless: (1) the arrest was made on the weekend (when court was not in session); or (2) it was that person's first arrest for public drunkenness. The immediate effect was to reduce the number of public drunks who were released and increase the number held for court. At about the same time an agreement was made with the District Attorney and the Municipal Court Judge to prosecute and sentence those public inebriates who were considered by the police to be persistent problems. The result was an increase in the number held for court, arraigned, and sentenced.

But these crackdowns only occurred periodically, and they were short-lived. The Sheriff's directive was discontinued in March, 1978 and the percentage of released inebriates climbed as the number of those sentenced declined. The merchants, City Council and police complained again in November and the directive was reinstated, with predictable results. A similar scenario was played out in the third quarter of 1979. Releases declined and sentences rose.

Humboldt also showed a change in sentencing, but that was due to a change in judges. As Table 10-4 shows, sentences dropped off sharply after the project opened. Then in 1978 a new judge took over and sentences increased for a time. The judge was the former District Attorney, and he instituted a much harder line than his predecessor. He was particularly severe with recidivists, and he had an agreement with the local police that if certain chronic inebriates were arrested and held for court they would be sentenced. The short-term effect was to increase the number of public inebriates held for court, arraigned, and sentenced.

### 10.3 Length of Sentence

Table 10-5 shows that the number of individuals sentenced to jail and the average (mean) duration of sentence actually increased in Sacramento during the first year of the demonstration project, and then began to decline. But the total number of days doubled in the first year of the project and dropped only slightly in the second year. There was a significant drop the year after the project ended. Thus, instead of reducing the burden on the Sacramento jail and Correctional Center, the project indirectly contributed to a doubling of that burden.

In Humboldt, the number sentenced declined, as did the total number of days of sentence, which dropped 39 percent in 1978. Both rose after the project ended. This can be seen clearly in Table 10-6. After the Drop-in Center closed in June, 1980, the number sentenced for public drunkenness in the subsequent quarter jumped from 75 to 163. Thus, although it did not come anywhere near eliminating the jailing of public drunks, Humboldt's project did contribute to a significant reduction of jail time for public inebriates.

Table 10-4  
SENTENCES FOR PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS,  
SACRAMENTO AND HUMBOLDT COUNTIES, BY QUARTER,  
1977-1980

	Sacramento			Humboldt		
	Araigned	Sentenced	Percent Total	Araigned	Sentenced	Percent Total
1977 January - March	148	84	56.8	186	121	65.1
April - June	143	66	46.2	211	145	68.7
July - September	324	162	50.0	205	154	75.1
October - December	313	184	58.8	137	80	58.4
1978 January - March	505	329	65.1	107	67	62.6
April - June	296	211	71.3	222	146	65.8
July - September	180	91	50.1	172	99	57.6
October - December	383	251	65.5	120	68	56.7
1979 January - March	363	217	59.8	110	51	46.3
April - June	295	178	60.3	158	87	55.1
July - September	418	300	71.8	182	81	44.5
October - December	369	240	65.0	121	49	40.5
1980 January - March	215	83	38.6	120	50	41.7
April - June	173	60	34.7	136	75	55.1
July - September	221	114	51.6	281	163	58.0
October - December	323	178	55.1	247	109	44.1

Source: Municipal Court Dockets

Table 10-5  
LENGTH OF SENTENCE FOR PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS  
SACRAMENTO AND HUMBOLDT COUNTIES, 1977-1980

	Sacramento			
	1977	1978	1979	1980
Number Sentenced	494	882	935	435
Number Days	15,931	30,676	27,384	11,321
Mean	32.2	34.8	29.3	26.0
Mode	40	40	40	40
	Humboldt			
	1977	1978	1979	1980
Number Sentenced	500	380	268	395
Number Days	3,117	1,897	1,327	1,960
Mean	6.2	5.0	5.0	5.0
Mode	1	1	1, 2	5

Source: Municipal Court Dockets

Table 10-6

LENGTH OF SENTENCES FOR PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS,  
BY QUARTERS, SACRAMENTO AND HUMBOLDT COUNTIES,  
1977-1980

	Sacramento			Humboldt		
	Sentenced	Days	Mean	Sentenced	Days	Mean
1977 January - March	84	2,984	35.5	121	886	7.3
April - June	66	2,149	32.6	145	1,037	7.2
July - September	163	4,209	25.8	154	881	5.7
October - December	186	6,589	35.4	80	313	3.9
1978 January - March	329	11,894	36.2	67	214	3.2
April - June	211	7,479	35.4	146	709	4.9
July - September	91	2,705	29.7	99	718	7.2
October - December	251	8,598	34.3	68	257	3.8
1979 January - March	217	6,327	29.2	51	235	4.6
April - June	178	5,398	30.3	87	518	6.0
July - September	300	8,130	27.1	81	471	5.8
October - December	240	7,529	31.4	49	104	2.1
1980 January - March	83	2,167	26.1	50	182	3.6
April - June	60	1,429	23.8	75	208	2.8
July - September	114	2,581	22.6	163	569	3.5
October - December	178	5,144	28.9	109	1,000	9.2

Source: Municipal Court Dockets

#### 10.4 Conclusion

The available data show that the demonstration projects had different effects on the courts. In Humboldt the number of arraignments declined about 16 percent after the project began, and increased about 37 percent after the project ended. The number sentenced dropped 24 percent and the number of days of sentence dropped 39 percent during the first year of the project. When the project ended sentences rose 47 percent and the number of days of sentence rose 33 percent. Thus, the Humboldt project had a significant impact on all aspects of court involvement with public inebriates.

But in Sacramento the reverse happened. During the first year of the demonstration arraignments went up 47 percent, sentences 79 percent, and days of sentence 93 percent. This reflected a hard-line attitude taken by the courts toward those public inebriates who refused to take advantage of the demonstration project and stay off the streets. Ironically, when the demonstration ended, court activity returned to just about what it had been before the project began. Arraignments dropped 36 percent, sentences 53 percent, and days of sentence 59 percent.

So far we have examined the impact of the demonstration projects on different criminal justice functions--apprehensions, arrests, and so forth. In this chapter we attempt to measure the overall impact of the projects on the criminal justice system. To do this we calculated the amount of time criminal justice personnel spent handling public inebriates before, during and after the projects. We also calculated the cost to the system of carrying out these functions. Our working hypothesis was that if the projects were successful there should have been a significant decrease in both time and costs during the demonstration period.

#### 11.1 Methodology

Unfortunately, there were no readily available statistics that could be used to measure changes in time and costs. Therefore, before the project began we observed and recorded the steps followed by the police, sheriffs, and courts in processing public inebriates through the criminal justice system, from initial contact through apprehension, arrest, booking, arraignment, sentencing to release from jail. We identified 32 steps in Sacramento's system and 23 in Humboldt's. These observations were repeated each year to identify changes in the procedures.

The time required to process public inebriates was observed and measured for each step. Multiple observations were made to allow for variations by day of week, time of day, and personnel. These measurements were also made each year. The data were then used to make estimates of the amount of time different criminal justice personnel spent in processing public inebriates. For example, police in Humboldt spent an average of 7 minutes on an apprehension, 10 minutes transporting an arrestee to jail, 14 minutes filling out reports, and so forth. Once the times were computed, the total amount of time spent on a function (such as apprehensions) was calculated by multiplying the number of apprehensions by the average police time spent on one apprehension.

Salary data were collected from the police, sheriffs, and courts and used to calculate the direct personnel costs of each function (apprehensions, arrests, etc.) and the total costs to each department. Some other direct costs were included where it was possible to do so.

These data are estimates. It was not possible to compute exact times or costs for a variety of reasons. For example, sometimes the police picked up several drunks at the same time and processed them as a group, sometimes they were processed individually. We did not estimate the amount of time police spent patrolling areas, searching favored haunts for drunks, responding to false complaints about drunks, and encouraging drunks to "move along." Cost data do not include support and overhead expenses, which average about 200 percent of direct personnel costs. In general, both the time and cost estimates are conservative. Actual time spent on handling public drunks and the costs of that involvement could be double what we have estimated, if all indirect and supportive time and expenses were included. For a more detailed explanation of the calculations summarized in this chapter, see the Appendix.

### 11.2 Time Involved in Processing Public Inebriates

Before the demonstration began we calculated that the Sacramento criminal justice system had the equivalent of almost 19 full-time staff doing nothing but processing public drunks. The Sacramento Police Department operated a paddy wagon 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, with a crew of two to three officers per shift. Adjusting for time off, that meant that the police had 13 full-time officers assigned solely to the "public inebriate beat." In addition, other SPD beat officers, particularly those in the downtown target area, spent a portion of their time dealing with public drunks. As one veteran patrolman remarked to us, somewhat bitterly,

"That's what they pay me for--to run off the drunks and keep the streets clean."

Since the police had no jail, they turned arrested inebriates over to the sheriff. As Table 11-1 shows, the Sacramento Sheriff's Department had the equivalent of over four officers working on public drunkenness in 1977.

The judge and other court officers (district attorney, public defender, etc.) spent relatively little time on public drunks, about 15 minutes per court session, hearing pleas and sentencing them, which amounted to under one-half of a full-time worker.

Humboldt's level of activity was much lower, amounting to just over one full-time equivalent staff for the entire criminal justice system in 1977. Most of the time was spent by the sheriff in booking and taking care of those sentenced to the county jail.

As Table 11-1 shows, the demonstration project did have a slight impact on both Sacramento's and Humboldt's systems. The number of full-time equivalent staff in Sacramento devoted to processing public inebriates dropped slightly in 1978 but did not change the following year. All of this decrease occurred at the Sheriff's Department. The police continued to operate the paddy wagon with its full crew, and there was actually a slight increase in police involvement between 1977-1980. Court involvement increased slightly because the number of arraignments for public drunkenness increased. Overall, the impact was small, however, amounting to a drop of less than four percent in 1978, and nothing in 1979. Interestingly, involvement dropped another five percent after the demonstration ended. Again, most of this was due to a continued decline in bookings.

Table 11-1 also shows that there was a dramatic shift in function. The amount of time devoted to diversions increased significantly as the amount of time devoted to arrests and bookings decreased. The increase in court activity during the demonstration was also significant. More complaints were filed, more individuals arraigned, and more sentences handed down during the demonstration than either before or after that period.

The impact on Humboldt's system was also slight, but clear. There was a drop in 1978 of about three percent in total time devoted to public inebriates, a five percent drop the following year, and then an increase of 13 percent when the project ended. Police involvement increased somewhat during the demonstration, largely due to increased diversions. The declines came in the Sheriff's Department and the court, due to decreased bookings and arraignments.

Table 11-1

CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO PROCESS PUBLIC INEBRIATES,  
SACRAMENTO AND HUMBOLDT COUNTIES, 1977-1980

	Sacramento			
	1977	1978	1979	1980
Police	13.72	13.91	14.08	14.14
*Sheriff	4.48	3.41	3.18	2.46
Court	0.39	0.57	0.60	0.39
<b>Total*</b>	<b>18.59</b>	<b>17.89</b>	<b>17.86</b>	<b>16.99</b>
Diversions	4.39	7.61	9.20	10.10
Arrests, Bookings	12.27	8.10	6.40	5.33
Releases	0.65	0.31	0.20	0.20
Held for Court	0.45	0.57	0.69	0.53
Court Action**	0.83	1.30	1.37	0.83
<b>Total*</b>	<b>18.59</b>	<b>17.89</b>	<b>17.86</b>	<b>16.99</b>

	Humboldt			
	1977	1978	1979	1980
Police	0.33	0.42	0.38	0.38
Sheriff	0.80	0.66	0.67	0.78
Court	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.08
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.21</b>	<b>1.17</b>	<b>1.11</b>	<b>1.25</b>
Diversions	0.01	0.16	0.10	0.04
Arrests, Bookings	0.50	0.40	0.43	0.53
Releases	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05
Held for Court	0.41	0.35	0.34	0.36
Court Action	0.26	0.23	0.20	0.27
<b>Total*</b>	<b>1.21</b>	<b>1.17</b>	<b>1.11</b>	<b>1.25</b>

Source: See Appendix

\*Totals may not sum due to rounding.

\*\*Includes processing in and out of correctional facility by Sheriff.

These data also support the observation that has been made repeatedly in this report that Sacramento's decision to keep the Drop-In and Sleep-Off Centers open explains why criminal justice involvement continued to decline in that county even after the demonstration project concluded. Criminal justice involvement in Humboldt returned to its pre-project level, largely because the

Drop-In Center closed and the police had no alternative but to arrest public inebriates. As arrests rose, all parts of the system had to devote more time to processing public drunks.

### 11.3 The Cost of Handling Public Inebriates

The costs shown in this analysis are direct expenses only. They do not include fringe benefits (which add approximately 21 percent to direct personnel costs) or support costs (which could be as much as 200 percent of direct personnel costs). More detail on these computations can be found in the appendix.

Table 11-2 shows that costs actually increased in Sacramento during the project period, in both current and 1977 constant dollars, and dropped when the project ended. Humboldt's experience was just the opposite--costs declined in Humboldt during the demonstration, by 19 percent in the first year (1978) and another 24 percent in the second year. When the project ended, criminal justice costs increased 34 percent.

Table 11-2

ESTIMATED DIRECT COST TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
OF HANDLING PUBLIC INEBRIATES, SACRAMENTO AND HUMBOLDT COUNTIES,  
1977-1980, IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT DOLLARS

	Sacramento			
	1977	1978	1979	1980
Current Dollars	\$603,467	\$876,434	\$940,625	\$681,423
Percent Change	-	+45.2	+7.3	-27.6
1977 Dollars	\$603,467	\$832,176	\$795,967	\$515,669
Percent Change	-	+37.9	-4.4	-35.2

	Humboldt			
	1977	1978	1979	1980
Current Dollars	\$124,420	\$102,363	\$79,356	\$107,872
Percent Change	-	-14.3	-22.5	+35.9
1977 Dollars	\$124,420	\$100,667	\$76,213	\$102,295
Percent Change	-	-19.1	-24.3	+34.2

Source: See Appendix

Table 11-3 provides a breakdown of these costs and shows that in both counties the largest expenditure was for the jails (and Correctional Center in Sacramento). The daily cost of housing an inmate was very expensive, ranging from \$19-24 in Sacramento to \$29 in Humboldt. Sacramento spent over \$280,000 in 1977 just to hold public inebriates in the jail and Corrections Center. That amounted to 47 percent of the total criminal justice expenditures on public

inebriates. In 1979 the county spent almost \$510,000 on jail costs, 54 percent of the total expenditures for the year. Court costs also increased during the project, but when sentences dropped in 1980, the effect on jail and court costs was dramatic. Jail expenditures went down to \$265,000, about 39 percent of total costs for the year. Court costs dropped 33 percent in 1980. The

Table 11-3

ESTIMATED DIRECT COST TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
OF HANDLING PUBLIC INEBRIATES, SACRAMENTO AND HUMBOLDT COUNTIES,  
1977-1980, IN CURRENT DOLLARS BY COMPONENT

	1977	Sacramento 1978	1979	1980
Police	195,370	221,217	256,695	283,500
Sheriff	56,789	51,920	51,735	44,255
Court	52,308	89,930	103,065	69,025
Paddy Wagon	18,000	18,600	19,200	19,200
Jail	75,377	109,938	141,063	97,776
Correctional Center	205,623	384,829	368,868	167,664
Total	603,467	876,434	940,625	681,423

	1977	Humboldt 1978	1979	1980
Police	4,313	6,208	5,878	6,402
Sheriff	9,962	8,869	9,314	11,361
Court	10,495	9,203	9,252	13,656
Jail	99,650	78,083	54,912	76,453
Total	124,420	102,363	79,356	107,872

Source: See Appendix

Sheriff's Department showed an overall decline in personnel expenditures related to public inebriacy. The steady increase in police costs over the four years reflects salary adjustments more than increased activity. Between 1977 and 1980, direct police salaries rose 41 percent; total costs of police involvement with public drunks rose 45 percent.

Humboldt's experience was somewhat different. All criminal justice expenditures, except police costs, declined during the first year of the project. In the second year police costs declined, courts remained steady, and the Sheriff's increased. Police expenditures increased initially because of the increase in apprehensions and diversions to the project. As in Sacramento, the most significant cost item was the jail. In 1977 Humboldt spent almost \$100,000 to hold public inebriates in jail, 80 percent of the total criminal justice expenditures on public drunks that year. In 1978 actual costs had dropped to \$78,000, but that

still amounted to 76 percent of the total costs. Progress continued to be made in 1979, when actual jail costs dropped another \$23,000, to 69 percent of the total. When the project ended, jail costs rose again and constituted 73 percent of Humboldt's criminal justice expenditures on public inebriates.

These data indicate the importance of the Drop-In Centers. As public drunks were diverted to these facilities, the need to jail them declined, and that resulted in significant savings to the criminal justice system. However, when the diversion option disappeared in Humboldt, the effect was noticed immediately. More drunks were arrested and sentenced, and that not only led to an increase in police involvement, but to a significant increase in sentences and the costs resulting from those sentences. In Sacramento the inability of the demonstration project to hold public inebriates led to an increase in sentences, which had an enormous effect on costs. When the project was given the authority to hold drunks, the need to sentence these people declined markedly, and this led to a significant reduction in costs.

#### 11.4 Conclusions

The overall impact of the demonstration project on the criminal justice system was slight.

- o The amount of time spend on handling public inebriates dropped only about four percent in Sacramento and nine percent in Humboldt by the end of the second year of the demonstration.
- o The costs to the criminal justice system increased in Sacramento during the demonstration project but dropped in Humboldt. In both cases the changes in sentences accounted for most of the changes in costs.
- o Time and costs continued to decline in Sacramento after the project ended, but increased in Humboldt. A principal reason for the different experiences was that Sacramento continued to operate its Drop-In Center and Humboldt did not.

## CHAPTER 12. DRINKING IN PUBLIC

There is a loophole in the Uniform Act that has bothered its advocates. Since public drunkenness would be decriminalized under the Act, the police might arrest public drunks for disturbing the peace, loitering, vagrancy, or a number of other misdemeanors, just to get them off the streets. Did they do that in the demonstration counties?

Although California did not decriminalize public drunkenness, the demonstration project provided all of the services that the Uniform Act recommended and police were encouraged to divert public drunks to the project. But as we have shown, they retained the discretion and the authority to arrest them. Thus, the police had no reason to arrest drunks on other charges.

As far as we can tell, the police in Humboldt did not charge drunks with other misdemeanors just to get them off the streets. If a person were found drunk and was unwilling to go to the Drydock, that person could be, and often was, arrested for public drunkenness (647(f)).

The policy was the same in Sacramento until late 1978 when a great deal of pressure was put on the system, not to arrest more, but to keep public drunks in jail longer. The Sheriff had the right to release an arrestee after about four hours, or when the Sheriff felt that the individual was sober and no longer posed a threat to anyone. That is what the Sheriff did. When the merchants, police and others began to complain about this policy, the Sheriff did not respond. So the police found their own loophole. They began to arrest inebriates for "drinking in public" under two city ordinances:

#### Sec. 26.24 Intoxicating beverages--Drinking in public places.

No person shall drink beer, wine or any intoxicating liquor on any street, sidewalk, alley, highway or public court. (Ord. No. 3527, Section 1)

#### Sec. 27.51 Regulation of consumption of alcoholic beverages.

In addition to the restriction imposed by subsections (a) and (2) of section 27.50, consumption of alcoholic beverages may be prohibited as follows:

When the chief of police determines that the consumption of alcoholic beverages in parks as defined in subsection (1) of section 27.30 has frequently resulted in disturbing or unnecessary noise, physical altercations, throwing of bottles or cans, or other activity which jeopardizes the safety of other persons or in any other way interferes with the use and enjoyment of the park by other persons and that such activity is likely to continue unless the consumption of alcoholic beverages is prohibited in certain areas within such a park, then the chief of police is hereby authorized to designate such an area as one in which the consumption of alcoholic beverages is prohibited and in so acting shall post or cause to be posted such sign or signs as may be necessary to provide reasonable notice thereof. It shall be

unlawful for any person to drink beer, wine or any intoxicating liquor in any place so designated. (Ord. No. 3527, Section 2)

Since this was a City, rather than a State offense, the arrestee could NOT be released under 847(b)(2). The individual had to be held for court. Thus, this gave the police a mechanism for keeping public drunks in jail and off the streets when everything else failed.

12.1 Arrests, Arraignments and Sentences

Table 12-1 shows that the police began using this alternative seriously in 1979. Arrests for public drinking (not public drunkenness) increased 375 percent in 1979, and another 50 percent in 1980.

Table 12-1  
ARRESTS FOR DRINKING IN PUBLIC  
(SCC 26.24 AND 27.51),  
CITY OF SACRAMENTO, 1977-1980

	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
January - March	6	10	110	104
April - June	12	27	153	209
July - September	6	35	129	172
October - December	<u>15</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>141</u>
Total	39	89	423	626
Percent Change from Previous Year	-	+128.2	+375.3	+50.0

Source: Sacramento Police Department

The courts also responded by arraigning and sentencing a large proportion of those arrested. Table 12-2 shows that in 1979 the District Attorney arraigned almost 90 percent of those arrested for drinking in public; and the judge sentenced 70 percent of those arraigned. In 1980, 66 percent of the arrestees were arraigned and 63 percent of those arraigned were sentenced. This was a remarkably high prosecution rate, especially in contrast to the disposition of public drunkenness cases. In 1979 only 28 percent of those arrested for 647(f) were arraigned, and in 1980 the figure was only 21 percent (see Tables 6-1 and 10-3).

Other statistical comparisons illustrate how seriously the court reacted. In 1979 the judge sentenced 18 percent of those arrested for public drunkenness but 62 percent of those arrested for drinking in public.

Table 12-2  
ARRAIGNMENTS AND SENTENCES FOR DRINKING IN PUBLIC,  
(SCC 26.24 AND 27.51),  
CITY OF SACRAMENTO, 1977-1980

	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Dropped	14	29	46	211
Arraigned	15	60	377	415
Sentenced	5	17	263	260
Percent Sentenced	33.3	28.3	70.0	62.7

Source: Sacramento Police Department

Table 12-3  
ARRAIGNMENTS AND SENTENCES FOR DRINKING IN PUBLIC,  
(SCC 26.24 AND 27.51),  
CITY OF SACRAMENTO, 1977-1980, BY QUARTER

	<u>Arraigned</u>	<u>Sentenced</u>	<u>Percent Sentenced</u>
1977 January - March	-	-	-
April - June	4	2	50.0
July - September	5	1	20.0
October - December	6	2	33.3
1978 January - March	5	1	20.0
April - June	20	3	15.0
July - September	26	13	50.0
October - December	9	-	-
1979 January - March	66	50	75.8
April - June	146	105	71.9
July - September	104	72	69.2
October - December	61	37	60.7
1980 January - March	57	48	84.2
April - June	161	124	77.0
July - September	137	61	44.5
October - December	60	26	43.3

Source: Sacramento Police Department

Table 12-4 shows that the judge sentenced these offenders to lengthy terms, averaging around 32 days, which was slightly more than the average for public drunkenness sentences (29.3 days in 1979, 26.0 in 1980--see Table 10-5). The total number of days of sentence for drinking in public rose from 62 in 1978 to 8,350 in 1979, a jump of 13,368 percent!

Table 12-4

LENGTH OF SENTENCE FOR DRINKING IN PUBLIC,  
CITY OF SACRAMENTO, 1977-1980

	1977	1978	1979	1980
Number Sentenced	5	17	263	260
Number Days	116	62	8,350	8,513
Mean	23.9	3.6	31.7	32.7
Mode	10,40	1	40	40

	Number Sentenced	Number Days	Mean
1977 January - March	-	-	-
April - June	2	80	40
July - September	1	16	16
October - December	2	20	10
1978 January - March	1	40	40
April - June	3	7	2.3
July - September	13	15	1.2
October - December	-	-	-
1979 January - March	50	1,448	29.0
April - June	105	3,797	36.2
July - September	72	1,871	26.0
October - December	37	1,234	33.4
1980 January - March	48	1,726	36.0
April - June	124	4,374	35.3
July - September	61	1,651	27.1
October - December	26	762	29.3

Source: Sacramento Municipal Court

12.2 Effect on the Criminal Justice System

As harsh as this reaction was, it did not add a great deal of time to that already spent by criminal justice personnel in handling public inebriates. Table 12-5 shows that the total amounted to about one-half of a full-time person in 1979 and 1980. Most of that increase occurred in the Sheriff's Department because more people were held in jail.

Table 12-5

CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO PROCESS PERSONS  
ARRESTED FOR DRINKING IN PUBLIC,  
CITY OF SACRAMENTO, 1977-1980  
(FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS)

	1977	1978	1979	1980
Police	.002	.006	.032	.062
Sheriff	.021	.052	.335	.427
Court	.002	.006	.041	.045
Total	.025	.064	.408	.534
Arrests, Bookings	.007	.024	.093	.152
Held for Court	.011	.023	.100	.159
Court Action*	.007	.017	.221	.224
Total	.025	.064	.408	.534

Source: See Appendix

\*Includes processing in and out of correctional facility by sheriff.

Table 12-6 shows that the economic impact was more significant. Costs jumped 3,500 percent in 1979, due largely to increased jail time. In 1978 the

Table 12-6

ESTIMATES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS OF HANDLING ADULTS  
ARRESTED FOR DRINKING IN PUBLIC, CITY OF SACRAMENTO,  
1977-1980

	1977	1978	1979	1980
Police	\$ 30	\$ 93	\$ 591	\$ 1,246
Sheriff	296	794	5,481	7,702
Court	218	1,020	6,932	7,924
Jail	1,324	1,791	16,412	29,736
Corrections Center	1,135	571	124,373	135,720
Total	\$3,003	\$4,269	\$153,789	\$182,328
Percent Change	-	+42.2	+3,502	+18.6

Source: See Appendix

combined jail and correctional center expenses for offenders convicted of drink-in public were only \$2,362. In 1979 they rose to \$140,785, an increase of 5,860 percent. Expenditures for police, sheriff and court personnel also rose, but accounted for only about nine percent of the total expenditures in 1979 and 1980.

Adding these costs to those for public drunkenness increases criminal justice expenditures for handling drunks 16 percent in 1979 and 27 percent in 1980, to approximately \$1.1 million and \$.9 million respectively.

Table 12-7

ESTIMATES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS OF HANDLING ADULTS  
ARRESTED FOR PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS AND DRINKING PUBLIC,  
CITY OF SACRAMENTO, 1977-1980

	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Drunkenness	\$603,467	\$876,434	\$940,625	\$681,423
Drinking	<u>3,003</u>	<u>4,269</u>	<u>153,789</u>	<u>182,328</u>
Total	\$606,470	\$808,703	\$1,094,414	\$863,751

12.3 Conclusion

Arrests for drinking in public increased dramatically in 1979, as did arraignments and sentences. This did not have a great impact on criminal justice involvement, but it did have a significant impact on costs because sentences were severe and incarceration costs rose accordingly.

PART THREE: ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 13. CONCLUSIONS

California's Public Inebriate Demonstration Project attempted to find an effective way to reduce the effects of public inebriacy on the community, and particularly, the criminal justice system. The three principal objectives of the project were to reduce the visibility of public inebriates, their arrests, and their involvement with the criminal justice system. The strategy adopted was very similar to that advocated in the Uniform Alcoholism and Treatment Act--diversion rather than arrest, provision of a "continuum of care," and voluntary acceptance of treatment.

Both Sacramento and Humboldt carried out the demonstration as intended, and both made adjustments which appear to have increased effectiveness and decreased costs. Both projects were very active and succeeded in attracting, enrolling, and serving a large number of the principal target group, the "hard core" public inebriates in their counties. But neither project had the expected effects on the criminal justice system.

1. There was no significant change in criminal justice procedures for handling public inebriates, except that the project provided the police with a non-mandatory alternative to arrest (diversion to the project).
2. Public complaints did not decline enough to make much difference to the police. They remained high because public inebriates continued to be visible. As a result, the police had to continue responding to complaints.
3. Apprehensions did not decline, they increased because the police saw the projects as a place to take public drunks in order to get them off the streets, and they picked up more rather than fewer.
4. The most notable impact the project had on the criminal justice system was to increase diversions and decrease arrests. Although the police apprehended more drunks, they diverted from one-third to two-thirds of them to the projects, and arrests were much lower as a result.
5. Arrests of the principal target group, the chronic police-case inebriate, were clearly reduced because of the project. Fewer of this group were arrested and the frequency of arrest also declined. That definitely contributed to a reduction in criminal justice involvement.
6. However, these people constituted a minority of the population arrested for public drunkenness. The system still had to deal with the large number of occasional drunks, the majority of whom were not part of the target population and were not affected at all by the projects. Arrests of this sub-population appear to have risen, which contributed to an increase in criminal justice involvement.
7. The burden on the sheriff was reduced only slightly in Humboldt and actually increased in Sacramento. The number held for court was

higher during the project years than either before or after--and arrests by the sheriffs increased.

8. Court involvement varied by county. The number of arraignments, sentences and the total number of days of sentence increased in Sacramento and declined in Humboldt during the project. When the demonstration ended court involvement in both counties reverted to about what it had been before the projects began.
9. Time involved in handling public inebriates declined slightly in both counties.
10. The costs to the criminal justice system of handling public inebriates declined slightly in Humboldt and actually increased in Sacramento, due largely to the increased number of public inebriates held and sentenced.
11. The police in Humboldt did not charge public drunks with other misdemeanors just to get them off the streets. The Sacramento Police did, however, as a way to make sure they were held and sentenced. This did not have a great effect on time but it increased costs because sentences were severe, and that resulted in a jump in jail expenditures.

Thus, with the exception of the increase in diversions and the resultant reduction in arrests--particularly of the target population--criminal justice involvement either remained about the same or increased in every other way.

As discouraging as these findings are, the post-project data show that things got worse when the project closed down. Humboldt provided the clearest example. When the Drydock closed in June, 1980, arrests, releases, complaints filed, sentences, time, and costs all increased dramatically. Thus, one could argue that criminal justice involvement might have been greater in 1978-79 without the projects, and the data seem to support that argument. But that is not the central issue. California was looking for a way to reduce or eliminate criminal justice involvement in public drunkenness, not just slow down the rate of increase. The projects were not able to achieve that objective.

## CHAPTER 14. FACTORS AFFECTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT

There were a number of factors that affected the involvement of the police, sheriffs and courts. The demonstration project took many of these into account, but there were some that were beyond the projects' control, and a few that had not been considered.

### 14.1 Visibility

Probably the most important set of factors were those which affected visibility. The legislation and the projects made conscious efforts to reduce public inebriate visibility, and they succeeded to some degree--but it was not enough. The public, the merchants, the City Councils, and the police continued to complain about public drunks. As long as the complaints continued the police tried to reduce visibility by making arrests, and the sheriffs and courts by keeping the drunks in jail.

The projects tried a number of devices to reduce visibility. Easily the most effective of these were the Drop-In Centers and Sacramento's Sleep-Off Unit. They provided an alternative to the streets for public inebriates who were sober as well as for those who were drunk. They also provided the police with a diversion option. These facilities were heavily used, both by public inebriates who came in voluntarily, and by the police. They were clearly the most important and effective components in the projects.

Both counties lobbied heavily to keep these components going, and were willing to give up the remainder of the services to do so.

Humboldt managed to raise enough money to keep the Drydock open for six more months but it finally had to close in June, 1980. Sacramento provided enough funds to keep both the Drop-In Center and the Sleep-Off Unit going. They are open to this day, albeit at reduced levels.

Inadvertently and unexpectedly, Sacramento found that visibility was less of a problem after the Drop-In Center was moved away from the downtown area. Humboldt's Drydock remained downtown and visibility was not affected as much. Thus, the location of the Center was an important factor. Public inebriates tended to be more visible around the Drop-In Center and along the routes to the downtown target areas.

The hours the intake unit was open also was an important factor. Sacramento's unit was closed from 10 p.m. to 8 a.m. and arrests were higher during those hours because the police could not divert drunks to the project. Humboldt's intake unit was open 24 hours a day, so that was not a factor there.

Sacramento's Courtesy Patrol was a very important factor at the beginning of the project. The van responded rapidly to calls from merchants, police and concerned citizens, picked up public drunks and took them to the Drop-In Center. This was a very visible and popular unit, but it became less needed as the project became established, partly because more clients came to the project voluntarily, and partly because it lacked the authority to pick drunks up, which was a serious limitation. The Courtesy Patrol could not require public

drunks to go to the project, they had to get into the van voluntarily. Thus, if a drunk refused to go the police had to be called because only they had the authority to apprehend drunks and take them to the project or jail.

Both projects found that the voluntary principle was a factor that contributed to visibility. There were times when drunks refused to go to the project, and some who were taken there walked away before they were sober. This frustrated the police and project staff and led both counties to abandon the all-voluntary approach.

Eventually, they developed holding policies to deal with this problem. When drunks were brought to the project, they were formally admitted through the Screening and Evaluation Unit. Then they were referred to a service component. Some were referred to the Drop-In Centers and told to remain until they became sober. If they left before they were sober, project staff alerted the police who would then arrest them.

In Humboldt the police filed complaints to make sure that the judge would sentence the arrested inebriate to 30 days in jail. Sacramento followed a similar policy from time to time.

Toward the end of the project (November, 1979), the Sacramento Screening and Evaluation Unit was designated a "5170 facility," permitting staff to hold clients under protective custody until they were sober. The project obtained an intoxilyzer to check sobriety on admission and when people tried to leave before they appeared to be sober.

This holding policy encouraged many public inebriates to stay in the Screening and Evaluation Unit until sober, and that helped keep both visibility and arrests down. As one Sacramento police official told us:

The project was modified so that inebriates are not held until their B.A. (blood alcohol content) drops below .10. This has helped keep the drunks off the street. Before that time we picked up the same drunk several times a day.

Thus, the presence or absence of project authority to require drunks: (1) to go to the project, and (2) to stay there until sober was an important factor that affected visibility. Without this authority, only the police could get uncooperative drunks off the streets, which, of course, increased criminal justice involvement.

Visibility was also affected by a number of other factors which the projects did not control.

One of the most important was criminal justice policies. Visibility rose and fell in direct relation to the fluctuating policies of the police, sheriffs, and courts. In Sacramento, when the police "cracked down" on public inebriates, for example during the Christmas shopping season, more were picked up and arrested, which reduced visibility. More were picked up when the Sacramento police began arresting people for drinking in public. This reduced visibility, particularly when the judge imposed stiff sentences. At one time the sheriff's policy was to keep the jail population down and more public inebriates were released, which also increased visibility. When the judge who regularly

sentenced public inebriates to a work farm became sick, visibility went up as substitute judges dismissed cases or suspended sentences and released more public inebriates. Obviously, criminal justice involvement rose and fell with changes in policies.

Variations in police officer attitudes and behavior were also important. Some police officers ignored public drunks, others were quite vigilant in enforcing the law, and some practiced "preventive" law enforcement by picking up known inebriates before they became drunk.

Another factor affecting visibility was the public inebriate population itself. Numbers swelled during the spring, summer, and fall, and declined during the winter. Obviously, that affected visibility. Some public inebriates walked voluntarily from the downtown sections to the Drop-In Centers, thus reducing visibility in the downtown target area but increasing it on the route to and around the Drop-In Centers. Some public inebriates were loud, obnoxious, and vulgar in public and attracted attention to themselves, thus making themselves more visible.

Environmental factors also affected visibility. There was heavy rain in the winters of 1977, 1978, and 1979. The 1978 winter was particularly cold. Both of these factors decreased visibility.

There were several features about the downtown target areas that contributed directly to visibility in those areas. One was the existence of inexpensive housing, particularly several cheap hotels in downtown Sacramento. When some of these closed, the visible public inebriate population declined somewhat. Another factor was the easy availability of liquor. Beer, wine and hard liquor are sold daily, from 8 a.m. to 2 a.m. in markets as well as liquor stores in California. A number of shops in the target areas catered to the public drunks, stocking small bottles of cheap wine which were sold liberally.

Finally there was public perception. This project received a lot of publicity in the press and on television. Our own surveys may have made people more aware of public inebriates. Both of these factors probably increased apparent visibility. Also, most of the public (including we professionals) cannot accurately identify a public inebriate. When the public sees such undesirable people as derelicts, panhandlers, tramps, even the elderly poor and homeless, there is a tendency to stereotype some of them as public drunks when they are not. This increases perceived visibility.

In general, visibility was affected by several factors, including the demonstration projects, the criminal justice system, the public inebriates themselves, the environment, and public perceptions. These factors affected visibility individually or in combination with one another. For example, the police cracked down on public inebriates, picked them up, but then took them to the Drop-In Center rather than to jail. This occurred in both counties and was an important reason for decreased visibility.

We can also conclude that, although the demonstration projects reduced visibility somewhat, they were not able to reduce it to the point where it was no longer a problem. People still saw public drunks, or at least thought they did. This bothered them, and they complained about it. Given more time, both projects should have been able to reduce visibility further, but both

agreed that it was unrealistic to expect them to eliminate visibility, which meant that criminal justice involvement could not be eliminated, only reduced.

#### 14.2 The Non-Public Inebriate Drunk

Perhaps the second most important set of factors which affected criminal justice involvement were those related to the apprehension and arrest of the "non-public inebriate drunk." Although not as visible as the "chronic police-case inebriate," those people who occasionally became drunk in public accounted for a large number of arrests and made up the majority of the population of individuals arrested for this offense.

No specific efforts were made during the demonstration period to deal with this sub-population, hence, those who could not be handled by friends and relatives, ended up being taken care of by the police.

Although this group was not the subject of this research, several observations made during this study may guide future research in this area. It appears that many of these arrests were not simply for public drunkenness, but were related to other violations, either potential or actual. Chief among these were disturbing the peace and drunk driving. Police responded to numerous complaints from friends, neighbors, relatives and bartenders about drunks who were either causing a disturbance or seemed on the verge of doing so. If the disturbance were minor or merely potential, the police could deal with the problem by charging the individual with being drunk. Similarly, this charge was used to prevent people who were drunk from driving; which included passengers of drunk drivers, drunks leaving parties and bars on the way to their cars, and drunks who threatened to get into their cars and drive away.

Non-public inebriate drunks were not the target of the demonstration project and apparently were not affected by it to any significant degree. Yet they were responsible for a great proportion of criminal justice involvement. We can conclude that even if the demonstration projects had been able to remove the chronic police-case inebriate completely from the criminal justice system, the police, sheriffs and courts still had this other population to deal with, and criminal justice involvement would have remained high.

## CHAPTER 15. POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS

These data have shown that California's Public Inebriate Demonstration Project did not reduce criminal justice involvement, but not because it was poorly executed. On the contrary, it was carried out according to plan and the modifications that were made seem to have improved that plan, not detracted from it. The projects demonstrated that diversion was a viable option to arrest and that the police would divert large numbers of public inebriates. They also demonstrated that the social model of treatment was just as effective as and far less expensive than the medical, or even the modified-medical treatment models. But despite those successes, the projects did not work, and that was because a number of the key assumptions upon which they were based were incorrect.

### 15.1 Voluntarism

The legislation and both projects assumed that coercion would not be necessary if the projects offered an attractive alternative to the streets and provided services that public inebriates needed and wanted. This all-voluntary approach worked for some, but not enough public inebriates. After two years drunks were still visible in public places, a significant number refused to go to the project voluntarily, and many who were taken there walked away before they were sober. The reactions in both counties were remarkably similar, and supported by both Project Directors. The all-voluntary approach was dropped. Individuals brought to the projects had to remain until sober or face arrest. Individuals apprehended more than once in a specified period of time were arrested and jailed. Hard core offenders were sentenced. The policy implication is that projects must have authority to pick up and hold those who get drunk in public and refuse to go to the project voluntarily. Without this authority the only recourse is the police. Thus, criminal justice activity will probably remain significant as long as the all-voluntary approach is maintained.

### 15.2 Continuum of Care

The legislation and both projects also assumed that the missing element in previous projects was a continuum of services. If provided, more public inebriates would be attracted and "rehabilitated," and criminal justice involvement would be reduced.

What the projects learned was that few of their clients were willing or able to use the continuum. Most were content to use the system for immediate, short-term gain--food, shelter, medical attention, safety--and were not interested in recovery services. The reaction in both communities again was quite similar. They scaled down the continuum of services and changed the projects to concentrate on the immediate, short-term needs of the majority, and they continued to offer the treatment and long-term support services to the few who were ready to deal with their alcohol problems.

The policy implication is that the continuum of care is not that significant a device either for fostering rehabilitation or for reducing criminal justice involvement. What is most needed for this population are caretaking services,

particularly shelter. Criminal justice activity will probably vary in direct relation to the availability of these services.

### 15.3 Alcoholism

There was also an assumption that the root problem was alcoholism. This assumption was forced on the alcohol community--which readily accepted it--by years of rhetoric, court decisions and declarations by such eminent bodies as WHO, the AMA, and the ABA. This was the case in California. The program was sponsored, after all, by the State's Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs. To be fair, the legislation, the Department and the projects pointed out repeatedly that alcohol was not the only problem public inebriates had. There were social, housing, medical, financial and other problems that were an integral part of a very distinct lifestyle, they said. The experiences of the demonstration period confirmed this. But they also raised challenges to the assumption that public inebriacy is basically an alcohol problem.

The project showed that there are really three broad types of problems:

1. Social control: public inebriates were often a nuisance. The public wanted, and expected that nuisance to be brought under control.
2. Caretaking: many public inebriates needed non-alcohol-related services, such as food, shelter, security, and so forth.
3. Alcoholism and alcohol abuse: many--but not all--public inebriates had serious drinking problems and needed counseling and treatment.

The projects also learned that many of the public inebriates were not alcoholics, and data presented in this report show that many of the people who were arrested for public drunkenness were not "public inebriates."

The policy implication of these findings is that the "public inebriate problem" is not exclusively, or even largely, an alcohol problem. It is more complex, with social control and caretaking the major problems and alcoholism minor by comparison. Alcohol abuse is clearly a significant problem but perhaps more a symptom than a cause. If the larger problem is to be dealt with effectively, it will require much more than the alcohol community can, or perhaps should, provide. Three types of services seem needed:

1. Social control: services to eliminate the nuisances caused by public inebriates and the danger posed to the community by the "non-public inebriate drunk;"
2. Caretaking: services to meet the basic life-support services of public inebriates, i.e., food, shelter and other non-alcohol-related services; and
3. Alcoholism and alcohol abuse: education, counseling, and treatment services for those individuals willing and able to address their drinking problems.

Unless some alternatives are found, the most likely provider for the first two services, social control and caretaking, is the criminal justice system.

### 15.4 Decriminalization

Although this was not part of the demonstration project, it was a long-range objective. Perhaps more important, it is the keystone of the Uniform Act. Our data support Paul Friday's prophetic warning that decriminalization will not reduce public drunkenness or police involvement. Someone will have to take responsibility for the social control function. At a minimum some non-criminal justice agency would have to be given the authority to apprehend and detain public inebriates at least until they become sober. Otherwise, the police will have to continue to perform this role.

Our data also raise the question of the desirability of decriminalization. Given that most people arrested for public drunkenness in both counties were not public inebriates, how will the danger these people pose be contained? Public drunkenness laws appear to play a supportive role in controlling and preventing drunk driving, disorderly conduct, and perhaps more serious alcohol-related misdemeanors and felonies. Decriminalization could have serious repercussions if not replaced by enforceable authority to: (1) pick up and keep public inebriates in protective custody; and (2) keep the occasional persons who are drunk in public from harming themselves or others.

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Appendix  
Table 6-4.1

California: Projection of 1980 Arrests Based on Arrests for 1973-1977

Year (x)	Arrests (y)	xy	x <sup>2</sup>
1 (1973)	202,976	202,976	1
2	206,658	413,316	4
3	209,251	627,753	9
4	212,708	850,832	16
5 (1977)	228,250	1,141,250	25
x = 15	y = 1,059,843	xy = 3,236,127	x <sup>2</sup> = 55
$\bar{x} = 3$	$\bar{y} = 211,968.6$		

$$B = \frac{5(3,236,127) - 15(1,059,843)}{5(55) - 225} = 5,659.8$$

$$= \frac{1,059,843 - (5,659.9)(15)}{5} = 194,989.2$$

Predicted number of arrests for 1978 and 1979

$$y_{1978} = 194,989.2 + (5,659.8)(6) = 228,948$$

$$y_{1979} = 194,989.2 + (5,659.9)(7) = 234,602$$

Predicted number of arrests for 1980

$$y_{1980} = 194,989.2 + (5,659.8)(8) = 240,268$$

Mood's t for 1978 =  $\frac{214,255 - 228,948}{\frac{6}{5} + \frac{9}{10} 20,584,091} = 2.23$

Mood's t for 1979 =  $\frac{22,809 - 234,602}{\frac{6}{5} + \frac{9}{10} 20,584,091} = 1.79$

Mood's t for 1980 =  $\frac{230,466 - 240,268}{\frac{21}{10} (20,584,091)} = \frac{9,802}{6,575} = 1.49$

Not significant even at .20 level with 3 DF

Appendix  
Table 6-4.2

Sacramento: Projection of 1980 Arrests Based on Arrests for 1973-1977

Year (x)	Arrests (y)	xy	x <sup>2</sup>
1 (1973)	6,468	6,468	1
2	6,816	13,632	4
3	8,020	24,060	9
4	8,259	33,036	16
5 (1977)	9,063	45,315	25
x = 15	y = 38,626	xy = 122,511	x <sup>2</sup> = 55
$\bar{x} = 3$	$\bar{y} = 7,725.2$		

$$B = \frac{5(122,511) - 15(38,626)}{5(55) - 225} = 663.3$$

$$= \frac{38,626 - (663.3)(15)}{5} = 5,735.3$$

Predicted number of arrests for 1978 and 1979

$$y_{1978} = 5,735.3 + (663.3)(6) = 9,715$$

$$y_{1979} = 5,735.3 + (663.3)(7) = 10,378$$

Predicted number of arrests for 1980

$$y_{1980} = 5,735.3 + (663.3)(8) = 11,042$$

$$\text{Mood's } t \text{ for 1980} = \frac{4,470 - 11,042}{\frac{(21)}{10} (56,361.67)} = \frac{6,572}{344} = 19.10$$

$$\text{Mood's } t \text{ for 1978} = \frac{5,831 - 9,715}{\frac{6}{5} + \frac{9}{10} (56,361.67)} = 11.29$$

$$\text{Mood's } t \text{ for 1979} = \frac{5,081 - 10,378}{\frac{6}{5} + \frac{9}{10} (56,361.67)} = 15.40$$

Both 1978 and 1979 t values are significant at the .005 level of 3 DF; 1980 t significant at .001 level with 3 DF.

Appendix  
Table 6-4.3

Humboldt: Projection of 1980 Arrests Based on Arrests for 1973-1977

Year (x)	Arrests (y)	xy	x <sup>2</sup>
1 (1973)	884	884	1
2	964	1,928	4
3	1,132	3,396	9
4	1,274	5,096	16
5 (1977)	1,517	7,585	25
x = 15	y = 5,771	xy = 18,889	x <sup>2</sup> = 55
$\bar{x} = 3$	$\bar{y} = 1,154.2$		

$$B = \frac{5(18,889) - 15(5,771)}{5(55) - 225} = 157.6$$

$$= \frac{5,771 - (157.6)(15)}{5} = 681.4$$

Predicted number of arrests for 1978 and 1979

$$y_{1978} = 681.4 + (157.6)(6) = 1,627$$

$$y_{1979} = 681.4 + (157.6)(7) = 1,785$$

Predicted number of arrests for 1980

$$y_{1980} = 681.4 + (157.6)(8) = 1,942$$

$$\text{Mood's } t \text{ for 1978} = \frac{1,224 - 1,627}{\frac{6}{5} + \frac{9}{10} (2,425.33)} = 5.65$$

$$\text{Mood's } t \text{ for 1979} = \frac{1,300 - 1,785}{\frac{6}{5} + \frac{9}{10} (2,425.33)} = 6.80$$

$$\text{Mood's } t \text{ for 1980} = \frac{1,603 - 1,942}{\frac{(21)}{10} (2,425.33)} = \frac{339}{71} = 4.77$$

Both 1978 and 1979 t values are significant at the .01 level with 3 DF. 1980 t significant at .05 level (but not at .01) with 3 DF.

Appendix  
Table 6-5

MID-YEAR POPULATION (THOUSANDS)

	<u>Sacramento</u>	<u>Humboldt</u>	<u>State</u>
1970	636.6	101.0	20,030
1971	651.5	99.7	20,265
1972	661.9	100.3	20,524
1973	671.4	99.8	20,741
1974	683.0	102.3	20,933
1975	691.6	103.7	21,113
1976	702.8	104.4	21,520
1977	721.5	106.6	21,896
1978	738.5	107.4	22,297
1979	756.7	107.7	22,694
1980	785.3	108.4	23,616

Source: State Department of Finance, Population Research Office, State of California

Appendix  
Table 11-1

ESTIMATES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE TIME DEVOTED TO  
HANDLING PUBLIC INEBRIATES, SACRAMENTO COUNTY, 1977-1980

NOTE: N = Number, H = Hour

		<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
A.	Time				
F*	<u>Paddy Wagon/1/</u>				
D	Apprehensions/Diversions	N 7,677	13,421	16,203	17,783
A	Apprehensions/Arrests	H 16,851	11,107	8,325	6,745
	<u>Other Law Enforcement/2/</u>				
D	Apprehensions and Diversions to Project (23')	N 1,220	1,852	2,254	2,466
		H 467.67	709.93	864.03	945.3
A	Apprehensions and Arrest (13')	N 1,021	1,233	1,602	1,664
		H 221.22	267.15	347.1	360.53
A	Booking, First Arrest (15')/3/	N 385	554	983	1,191
		H 96.25	138.50	245.75	297.75
A	Booking, Repeat Arrest (15')/3/	N 636	679	619	473
		H 159	169.75	154.75	118.25
	Subtotal	H 25,472.17	25,813.33	26,139.63	26,249.83
F*	<u>Sheriff</u>				
A	Paddy Wagon Booking/4/	N 8,042	4,598	3,475	2,806
		H 5,110	2,921	2,208	1,783
A	Booking, Other Arrestees, First Arrest (26')	N 385	554	983	1,191
		H 166.83	240.07	426.0	516.1
A	Booking Other Arrestees Repeat Arrests (16')	N 636	679	619	473
		H 169.6	181.07	165.07	126.13
R	Releases (10')	N 7,224	3,501	2,275	2,360
		H 1,204	583.5	379.17	393.33
H	Complaints Filed (25')	N 1,834	2,328	2,787	2,109
		H 764.17	970	1,116.25	878.75
H	Case Dropped (5')	N 906	964	1,342	1,177
		H 75.5	80.33	111.83	98.08

Appendix  
Table 11-1

ESTIMATES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE TIME DEVOTED TO  
HANDLING PUBLIC INEBRIATES, SACRAMENTO COUNTY, 1977-1980  
(Continued)

NOTE: N = Number, H = Hour

		1977	1978	1979	1980	
C	Arraigned (15')/5/	N	928	1,364	1,445	932
		H	120	177.91	186.85	120.52
C	Sentenced, Returned to Jail (5')	N	494	882	935	435
		H	41.17	73.5	77.92	36.25
C	Dismissed, Suspended, Other Disposition (15')	N	434	482	510	497
		H	108.5	120.5	127.5	124.25
C	Transport to and from Correctional Center (160')/7/	N	494	882	935	435
		H	52.7	94.2	99.8	46.3
C	Process In and Out of Correctional Center (60')	N	494	882	935	435
		H	494	882	935	435
	Subtotal	H	8,306.47	6,324.08	5,878.69	4,557.71
C	Court/6/					
	Arraigned, Sentenced, Dismissed (15')	N	928	1,364	1,445	932
		H	720	1,058	.5	.25
TOTAL	HOURS		34,498.64	33,195.41	33,139.02	31,530.54
	DAYS/8/		4,312.33	4,149.43	4,142.38	3,941.32
	YEARS/8/		18.59	17.89	17.86	16.99

\*F = Function: (D) Diversion, (A) Arrest, (R) Release, (H) Held for Court, (C) Court Action.

1. The paddy wagon operates with a crew of 2 or 3 police officers, depending on the shift. It operates 24 hours/day, 365 days/year. Total police officer time assigned to the paddy wagon = 2.8 officers x 24 hours x 365 days = 24,528 hours ÷ work hours/patrolman/year = 13.2 full time equivalent patrolman/year. Assume the paddy wagon made 60-80% of the "police arrests" and 75 percent of the "police diversions" to the project (see Tables 5-3, 7-1). Thus, in 1977 the distribution of paddy wagon time between diversions and arrests was:

Diversions (Table 5-3)  $4,878 \times .75 = 3,659 = 31.3\% \times 24,528 = 7,677$   
Arrests by Police (Table 7-1)  $\frac{8,042}{11,701} = 68.7\% \times 24,528 = 16,851$

2. Sheriff, State police, University police, other.
3. Assumed to take same amount of time as in Humboldt (see Table A.11-2).
4. Paddy wagon delivered groups of public inebriates to the sheriff for booking. In 1977 the wagon delivered an average of 7 groups/day. Booking time for the sheriff = 1 hour x 7 groups x 2 deputies x 365 days = 5,110 hours/year. Booking time in 1978, 1979, and 1980 was assumed to vary in direct proportion with "police arrests (see Table 7-1). For example, in 1978  $4,598 \div 8,042 = .572 \times 5,110 = 2,921$  hours.
5. Prisoners were brought to court in a group twice a day when court is in session, Monday through Friday, 240 days/year @ 15'/session in 1977 = 120 hours.
6. Six court officers @ 15'/session x 2 sessions x 240 days = 720 hours in 1977. Assumed to vary in subsequent years in direct relation to the number of cases.
7. Transport one group in and one group out each day x 240 days x 80' = 320 hours x 2 deputies = 640 hours. Assumed to vary with changes in size of group and as proportion of total number of prisoners transported. Number transported averaged 25, public inebriates averaged 2.06 (1977), 3.68 (1978), 3.9 (1979), 1.81 (1980).
8. See note 3, Appendix Table 11-2.

Appendix  
Table 11-1

ESTIMATES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE TIME DEVOTED TO  
HANDLING PUBLIC INEBRIATES, SACRAMENTO COUNTY, 1977-1980  
(Continued)

NOTE: N = Number, H = Hour

	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
<b>B. Actual Costs</b>				
<b>Police</b>				
Rate	\$ 7.67	\$ 8.57	\$ 9.82	\$ 10.80
x Hours	25,472	25,813	26,140	26,250
= Cost	\$195,370.24	\$221,217.41	\$256,694.80	\$283,500.00
<b>Sheriff</b>				
Rate	\$ 7.58	\$ 8.21	\$ 8.80	\$ 9.71
x Hours	7,492	6,324	5,879	4,558
= Cost	\$56,789.36	\$51,920.04	\$51,735.20	\$44,258.18
<b>Court</b>				
Rate/1/	\$ 72.65	\$ 85.00	\$ 91.94	\$ 95.47
x Hours	720	1,058	1,121	723
= Cost	\$52,308	\$89,930	\$103,064.74	\$69,024.81
Paddy Wagon	\$18,000	\$18,600	\$19,200	\$19,200
<b>Jail Cost</b>				
Released N =	7,224	3,501	2,275	2,360
@ 4 hours, Days =	1,204	583.5	379.2	393.3
Dropped & Dismissed N =	906	964	1,342	1,177
@ 1 day =	434	482	510	497
Days Sentenced	1,440	3,741	4,370	2,007
Total Days	3,984	5,771	6,601	4,074
x Rate	\$ 18.92	\$ 19.05	\$ 21.37	\$ 24.00
= Cost	\$75,377.28	\$109,937.55	\$141,063	\$97,776
<b>Correctional Center Days</b>				
Rate	\$ 18.92	\$ 19.05	\$ 21.37	\$ 24.00
x Hours	10,868	20,201	17,261	6,986
= Cost	\$205,622.56	\$384,829.05	\$368,867.57	\$167,664.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$603,467</b>	<b>\$876,434</b>	<b>\$940,625</b>	<b>\$681,423</b>

Sources of Cost Data: California Judicial Council, Sacramento County of Personnel Management, Sacramento Police Department, Sacramento County Sheriff's Department.

1. Hourly rate for six court officers.

Appendix  
Table 11-2

ESTIMATES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE TIME AND COSTS  
DEVOTED TO HANDLING PUBLIC INEBRIATES, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, 1977-1980

NOTE: N = Number, H = Hour

		<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
<b>A. Time</b>					
<b>F* Police</b>					
D	Apprehensions and Diversions to Project (15')	N 45 H 11.25	1,175 293.75	726 181.5	287 71.75
A	Apprehensions and Arrests (17')	N 1,517 H 429.82	1,224 346.8	1,299 368.0	1,603 454.18
A	Booking, First Arrests (8')	N 703 H 93.73	687 91.6	687 91.6	718 95.73
A	Booking, Repeat Arrests (6')	N 814 H 81.4	537 53.7	612 61.2	885 88.5
	Subtotal	H 616.2	785.85	702.28	710.51
<b>Sheriff</b>					
A	Bookings (13')	N 1,517 H 328.68	1,224 265.2	1,299 281.45	1,603 347.32
R	Releases (13')	N 282 H 61.1	217 47.0	305 66.1	419 90.78
H	Complaints Filed, /1/ First Arrests (40')	N 571 H 380.67	564 376.0	525 350.0	530 353.33
H	Complaints Filed, /1/ Repeat Arrests (25')	N 663 H 276.25	442 184.17	468 195.0	548 228.33
H	Case Dropped (13')	N 495 H 107.25	385 83.42	422 91.43	400 86.67
C	Arraigned (12')	N 739 H 147.8	621 124.2	571 114.2	784 156.8
C	Sentences (16')	N 500 H 133.33	380 101.33	268 71.47	395 105.33

Appendix  
Table 11-2

ESTIMATES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE TIME AND COSTS  
DEVOTED TO HANDLING PUBLIC INEBRIATES, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, 1977-1980  
(Continued)

NOTE: N = Number, H = Hour

			1977	1978	1979	1980
C	Dismissals, Suspended,	N	239	241	303	389
	Other Dispositions (13')	H	51.78	52.21	65.65	84.28
	Subtotal	H	1,486.9	1,233.53	1,235.3	1,452.84
			<u>Court</u>			
C	Arraigned, Sentenced,	N	739	621	571	784
	Dismissed (12')/2/	H	147.8	124.2	114.2	156.8
TOTAL	HOURS		2,251	2,163.66	2,051.78	2,320.15
	DAYS/3/		281.36	270.46	256.47	290.09
	YEARS/3/		1.21	1.17	1.11	1.25

- Used data from Table 8-6, which shows percent of individuals arrested once. Thus, in 1977 46.3 percent were "new arrests" and 53.7 percent were "repeat arrests."
- Six court officers @ 2' each per case.
- Based on 8 hours/day and 1,856 average work hours/police officer/year (memorandum from Commander A. Millsap, EPD, 04/21/80).

\*F = Function: (D) Diversion, (A) Arrest, (R) Release, (H) Held for Court, (C) Court Action.

Appendix  
Table 11-2

ESTIMATES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE TIME AND COSTS  
DEVOTED TO HANDLING PUBLIC INEBRIATES, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, 1977-1980  
(Continued)

NOTE: N = Number, H = Hour

			1977	1978	1979	1980
			<u>B. Actual Costs</u>			
			<u>Police</u>			
	Rate		\$ 7.00	\$ 7.90	\$ 8.37	\$ 9.01
x	Hours		616.2	785.85	702.28	710.51
=	Cost		\$4,313.40	\$6,208.22	\$5,878.08	\$6,401.70
			<u>Sheriff</u>			
	Rate		\$ 6.70	\$ 7.19	\$ 7.54	\$ 7.82
x	Hours		1,486.9	1,233.53	1,235.3	1,452.84
=	Cost		\$9,962.23	\$8,869.08	\$9,314.16	\$11,361.21
			<u>Court</u>			
	Rate		\$ 71.01	\$ 74.10	\$ 81.02	\$ 87.09
x	Hours		147.8	124.2	114.2	156.8
=	Cost		\$10,495.28	\$9,203.22	\$9,252.48	\$13,655.71
			<u>Jail</u>			
	Days Sentenced (Served)		2,891	1,807	1,316	1,960
	Dismissed @ 1 Day		239	241	303	389
	Dropped @ 1/2 Day		247.5	192.5	211	200
	Released @ 4 Hours		58.7	45.2	63.5	87.3
	Subtotal Days		3,436.2	2,692.5	1,893.5	2,636.3
x	Jail Rate		\$ 29.00	\$ 29.00	\$ 29.00	\$ 29.00
=	Cost		\$99,649.80	\$78,082.5	\$54,911.5	\$76,452.70
TOTAL			\$124,420.71	\$102,363.02	\$79,356.22	\$107,871.42

Appendix  
Table 12-1

ESTIMATES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE TIME DEVOTED TO  
HANDLING ADULTS ARRESTED FOR DRINKING IN PUBLIC, SACRAMENTO, 1977-1980

NOTE: N = Number, H = Hour

			<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
<u>Police</u>						
A	Apprehensions and Arrest (13')/1/	N	8.5	23.2	129	247.3
		H	1.8	5.0	27.9	53.6
A	Booking, Repeat Arrest (15')/1/	N	8.5	23.2	129	247.3
		H	<u>2.1</u>	<u>5.8</u>	<u>32.3</u>	<u>61.8</u>
	Subtotal Police	H	3.9	10.8	60.2	115.4
<u>Sheriff</u>						
A	Booking, Repeat Arrest (16')/1/	N	39	89	423	626
		H	10.4	23.7	112.8	116.9
H	Complaints Filed (25')/3/	N	39	89	423	626
		H	16.2	37.1	176.2	260.8
H	Case Dropped (10')/2/	N	24	29	46	211
		H	4.0	4.8	7.7	35.2
C	Arraigned (2')/4/	N	15	60	377	415
		H	0.5	2	12.6	13.8
C	Sentenced, Returned to Jail (5')	N	5	17	263	260
		H	0.4	1.4	22	21.7
C	Dismissed, Suspended Other Disposition (15')	N	10	43	114	155
		H	2.5	10.8	28.5	38.8
C	Process In and Out of Correctional Center (60')/5/	N	5	17	263	260
		H	<u>5</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>263</u>	<u>260</u>
	Subtotal Sheriff	H	30.0	96.7	622.8	793.2
<u>Court</u>						
C	Arraigned, Sentenced, Dismissed (12')/6/	N	15	60	377	415
		H	<u>3</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>75.4</u>	<u>83</u>
	TOTAL HOURS		45.9	119.5	758.4	991.6
	DAYS (: 8)		5.7	14.9	94.8	124.0
	YEARS (: 1,856)		0.02	0.06	0.41	0.53

Appendix  
Table 12-1

ESTIMATES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE TIME DEVOTED TO  
HANDLING ADULTS ARRESTED FOR DRINKING IN PUBLIC, SACRAMENTO, 1977-1980  
(Continued)

FOOTNOTES

1. Assume no new arrests, and 20-40% arrested by non-paddy wagon SPD (1977 = 21.7%, 1978 = 26.1%, 1979 = 30.5%, 1980 = 39.5%)
2. Number arrested--number arraigned. Assume no releases.
3. Assumed to equal arrests because there were no releases.
4. Arraigned with 647(f) group. Only extra time would be 2'/case to hear plea and make decision.
5. Assume no extra time for transportation to and from correctional center since this was group transportation.
6. Assume court time also equal 2'/case x six court officers.

Appendix  
Table 12-2

ESTIMATED DIRECT COSTS OF HANDLING ADULTS ARRESTED  
FOR DRINKING, SACRAMENTO, 1977-1980

	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Police				
Rate	\$ 7.67	\$ 8.57	\$ 9.82	\$ 10.80
x Hours	3.9	10.8	60.2	115.4
= Cost	<u>\$29.91</u>	<u>\$92.56</u>	<u>\$591.16</u>	<u>\$1,246.32</u>
Sheriff				
Rate	\$ 7.58	\$ 8.21	\$ 8.80	\$ 9.71
x Hours	39.0	96.7	622.8	793.2
= Cost	<u>\$295.62</u>	<u>\$793.91</u>	<u>\$5,480.64</u>	<u>\$7,701.97</u>
Court				
Rate	\$ 72.65	\$ 85.00	\$ 91.94	\$ 95.47
x Hours	3	12	75.4	83
= Cost	<u>\$217.95</u>	<u>\$1,020.00</u>	<u>\$6,932.28</u>	<u>\$7,924.01</u>
Paddy Wagon (no extra cost)				
Jail Cost				
Dropped (1 Day)	24	29	46	211
Dismissed @ 1 Day	10	43	114	155
Days Sentenced	<u>36</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>608</u>	<u>873</u>
TOTAL Days	70	94	768	1,239
x Rate	\$ 18.92	\$ 19.05	\$ 21.37	\$ 24.00
= Cost	<u>\$1,324.40</u>	<u>\$1,790.70</u>	<u>\$16,412.16</u>	<u>\$29,736.00</u>
Correctional Center				
Days	60	30	5,820	5,655
x Rate	\$ 18.92	\$ 19.05	\$ 20.61	\$ 24.00
= Cost	<u>\$1,135.20</u>	<u>\$571.50</u>	<u>\$119,950.20</u>	<u>\$135,720</u>
TOTAL	\$3,003.08	\$4,268.67	\$153,789.60	\$182,328.30

**END**