


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D R A F T

A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO POLICE CORRUPTION
DEFINING ITS NATURE AND CAUSAL VARIABLES

VOLUME I

Criminal Justice Center
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A Systems Approach to Police Corruption
Volume I
Defining Its Nature & Causal Variables

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ACQUISITIONS

A Systems Approach to Police Corruption

Volume I

Defining Its Nature & Causal Variables

August 1, 1979

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Chapter I

Introduction

There has been a widespread, although often implicit, agreement among students of police corruption that the causes of corruption must be located and understood before corruption can be fought in a meaningful way. Studies of the origin and etiology of corruption are not merely conducted to satisfy intellectual curiosity; rather, they are recognized as being of great practical importance, for theories as to the causes of corruption have immediate practical implications for the police administrators attempting to curtail it. It is the recognition of these implications which underlie the sometimes fierce, sometimes humorous, debate over the importance of the proverbial free cup of coffee; thus, if corruption is viewed as a quagmire into which the staunchest officer may be gradually but inevitably pulled if he so much as steps in the quicksand, then departmental energy spent in eradicating this "police perk" is not only legitimate but efficient. By preventing these small instances of corruption the department saves itself from having to contend with the larger cases which inevitably follow from them. If, however, individuals have their own innate moral standards

which dictate which levels of improbity they will not engage in, then a department which has recruited officers with high levels of morality may decide to permit these free coffee breaks, secure in the knowledge that the officer will distinguish the citizen's sign of gratitude and friendliness from attempts to get the officer to misuse his authority in return for private gain. It is for reasons such as these that time and effort is spent in the attempt to locate the seat of corruption.

One approach locates the basis of corruption in the individual. It argues that certain people attracted to police work are - not necessarily corrupt - but corruptible. This corruptibility is actually a set of traits which are a part of the individual's personality or psychic make-up and can be discovered through appropriate testing. The implications for police administration are obvious. Pre-employment screening becomes a necessity; included are not only the need to provide reliable and valid tests as well as the properly-trained professionals to administer the tests, but also to convince courts and civil service commissions that a low score on the test is such a reliable predictor of corrupt behavior that such a score should be considered a sufficient reason to refuse an applicant permission to the police service. A further implication

is that if low-scoring applicants are hired, it is necessary and desirable to assign them to posts which offer a minimum of corruption opportunity.

A second approach finds the locus of corruption not in the individual, but in the process which converts the individual into a member of the group. In a police department or unit where corruption is practiced widely, a rookie must join in those corrupt practices before he is considered a full-fledged member of the group. The newcomer's values and ethical standards are slowly eroded as he is provided with rationalizations for the ever-increasing levels of corruption in which the group encourages him to participate. A newcomer who resists this process is subjected to peer-group pressure which threatens to leave him a perpetual outsider if he does not conform to group standards. This type of pressure is particularly potent among the police, who often feel themselves cut off from civilian society and dependant upon their fellows for support, understanding, and possibly even their physical safety.

This approach also has implications for police administration. Rather than reliance on pre-employment screening, this view of the source of corruption demands

attention to the early stages of the police career. Care would be taken to be sure that young police officers spend the first parts of their careers in the company of older officers known for their probity. Group solidarity need not be built around the knowledge of shared illicit behavior; police in Britain and Japan, for example, seem to take pride in their shared moral superiority to the citizenry, as many American police agencies do.

A third view of police corruption locates corruption in the interaction of the police organization and the community. Here the emphasis is not so much upon the behavior of the individual officer or of small groups, but rather upon the social context in which the police department operates.

Communities vary in the extent to which they provide corruption opportunities. Such opportunities abound in large impersonal communities where one group has embodied its moral code into legislation which does not reflect the morality of large numbers of citizens; laws regulating or prohibiting liquor, drugs, and commercial sex are good examples of these. Traditions of municipal corruption and distrust of the efficacy and integrity of the criminal justice system also produce police corruption. Small communities with little

opportunity for anonymity, culturally homogeneous populations, and a tradition of probity in municipal affairs offer few temptations to the police officer. The obverse side of this situation is the extent to which the police department makes it difficult for the officer to take advantage of whatever corruption opportunities do exist. Accountability, supervision, a proactive approach to corruption detection and prevention, and good examples from the police leadership make it easier for the honest officer to stay honest, just as they make it difficult for the citizen who wishes to corrupt the police to find a target. The kind of administrative actions which encourage honest behavior are easiest to implement when the community demands that they be implemented. A community can indicate to its elected officials that it desires a high level of honest law enforcement; these officials can then meaningfully demand such behavior from police administrators. On the other hand, a community can also indicate that it does not want all its laws enforced or, at least, that it does not want them all enforced upon all members of the population. A police administrator demanding a high level of honesty in such



a community not only has a very difficult task, but may also find that his tenure in office becomes more vulnerable as his anti-corruption measures become more successful.

Corruption opportunities can be described as deviant or illegal conditions extant in the community about which there is some tolerance on the part of the public, for this study indicates that corruption opportunities cannot exist without tacit approval or apathy on the part of the citizenry. A police response policy sensitive to community attitudes relies upon intermittent selective enforcement to keep the levels of these activities within the bounds of community tolerance.

In the absence of precise guidelines regarding the use of discretion (written guidelines regarding the non-enforcement of laws are practically unheard of) officers often make their own policies. For the most part, however, department policy in these areas is informal and verbally communicated. These mandates are reinforced through the observed consequences to officers who take it upon themselves to violate them. Vice operations, for example, are protected in many communities by prohibiting uniformed police from conducting inspections or making arrests in licensed establishments. In

many cities restaurant patrons are provided convenient but illegal parking by providing free meals to key members of the department. Officers who cannot function in such a system seek out support assignments in the clerical area or the training academy. Those that will not acclimate themselves to the system are banished to obscure areas promising little opportunity for advancement. Chapter 3 provides an indepth perspective on the community variables which affect the ethical levels of a police agency.

Department leadership contributes greatly to the forms and the levels to which police corruption accedes. Where systemic corruption exists in an agency's middle level, its managers and even the lower level of the executive corps are aware of it. They are in fact able to distinguish between corrupt and non-corrupt officers (Shealy 1974).

In a systemically corrupt department there are active and passive forms of corruption. Active corruption occurs where the officer either initiates the contact with the perveyor of the illegal service and induces him to provide a pay-off or intentionally places himself in a position where it must be offered to him if the individual wishes to continue to operate. Passive

corruption is, for the most part, low level, easier for the individual officer to rationalize and generally unreported by members of the public involved. Many officers explain away free meals, free admission to theatres, Christmas gifts and other gratuities on the basis of friendship. The meaning of the east coast expression, "The guy really loves a cop" has its roots deeply embedded in the history of police corruption and has its counterpart in almost every area of the country. Few officers will acknowledge that even in these interactions there is involved an implicit element of coercion.

The Knapp Commission Report distinguished between these two forms of corruption by labeling the active seekers of corruption "meat eaters" and the passive ones "grass eaters". The Report presents a tenable case for the proposition that the more serious forms of coercive corruption could not exist without the base of pervasive low-level improbis activities. The grass eating type of corruption has a binding or socializing effect on the officers involved and enhances the need for secrecy and peer solidarity. Those involved in low level corruption are in no position to "turn in" their more ambitious meeting eating peers. Since most corrupt activity takes

place in low visibility situations between individuals who have a mutual interest in keeping the transaction hidden, there is little chance of it being reported - except by one's fellow officers. Within an environment such as this the possibility of serious disciplinary action being taken against an officer is remote. If forced to act, the administrator is most likely to deal informally with the matter by imposing a minor fine or, in very serious cases, by allowing the individual to resign. If the report of corrupt activity is internally generated - an officer reporting his peer - the likelihood of the reporting officer experiencing more dire consequences than the transgressor is quite high.

It should be noted here that despite considerable internal pressure to maintain the "code of silence" there are differing and measurable tendencies to report peers within police agencies. The project methodology for measuring these tendencies as well as the analysis of factors contributing to the levels of community opportunity and internal department discipline will be discussed later.

It is clear that there are relations among all these factors. For example, a community with a long history of corruption tolerance will produce a pool of

applicants for police work who, as a result of experience in that community, will be more innured to corruption than applicants raised in an atmosphere of municipal integrity. A police officer with low moral standards will have difficulty in partaking in corrupt activity if there is little such activity in his jurisdiction. And an officer severely tempted to perform a corrupt action will be less likely to do so if he is convinced that if he is discovered he will also be reported and punished.

In spite of these relations, however, it is possible to conceptualize three separate approaches to the study of the locus of corruption and it was as three separate studies that Phase II began; it was only as Phase II progressed that the less obvious relations between the approaches became apparent and that the synthesis so clear at the culmination of the project came into being. The following Chapters present a theoretical description with some statistical support* for each of the major factors which impact on police corruption, i.e., community variables, organizational variables and individual officer traits

*See Volume II, "A Systems Approach to Police Corruption: A Statistical Report" for detailed analysis.

Chapter II

Major Project Perspectives and Instruments

Initial efforts of the researchers in connection with this project consisted of three separate theoretical orientations, each of which had different implications for police administration. The first was based on the belief that police corruption could be measured and therefore police agencies could be rated and compared as to the amount of corruption existing. One aim related to this approach was the development of a diagnostic/prescriptive package to address specific problems in specific areas. This orientation followed directly from work carried out in Phase One of the project, during which the McCormack/Fishman Improbity Questionnaire was developed and field tested in six police agencies. The results were promising in terms of measuring levels of corruption, but only preliminary efforts were made to develop a classification system based on the measurements. No work was done relative to diagnosing causes or indicating remedies based on the data.

A second theoretical perspective viewed morality as an individual trait which is acquired as part of

personality development in early childhood. This perspective hypothesized that people recruited to police work carried the seeds of their own eventual corruption. For anyone lacking a high degree of moral maturity, the opportunities offered within the police environment were sufficient to entice them along the path to corruption. If individuals in this category could be reliably identified in the screening of police candidates and eliminated at that point, the subsequent related problems could be avoided or at least minimized.

The third and final theory was that police corruption and police ethics were a function of the police socialization process. It hypothesized that when a police officer entered a negatively socialized environment in which there was a considerable amount of low level corruption and perhaps some criminally coercive activities, he quickly acclimated to the system. Soon he was able to rationalize and perhaps engage in at least low level "mooching". It was theorized that perhaps not only was this opportunity provided by the system, but required as a "rite of passage" for the police recruit. There were thought to be "critical junctures" in a police career when decisions were made regarding the degree of participation in the corruption process. Should the

socialization theory be empirically verified, administrative procedures could be developed which would provide a more positive environment and make corruption less likely. All of these approaches were modified during the course of the project, in order to accommodate the grouping awareness of the importance of community variables and opportunities for corruption.

Methodology and Instruments

Initially, each of the three projects described above had its own theoretical orientation and measuring instruments. (They will be referred to hereinafter as the Measurement, Trait, and Socialization Projects respectively). Each will be described separately.

Measurement Project Methodology

The original methodological tools of the "Measurement" Project included:

a) Newspaper Survey

The newspaper survey involved a two year review of all articles in the two major dailys relative to political corruption police corruption or abuse of police authority. In one instance a municipality had only one major local daily newspaper; in several others two papers existed but they were owned by the same publishing

firm. The survey was conducted over a two year period immediately prior to the site visit. A content analysis of this data was planned prior to the visit to provide the researchers with a fundamental understanding of police-community relations in the broadest sense of that term.

b) Commanders Corruption Hazard Profile

A Commanders Corruption Hazard Profile was developed based on a similar instrument developed by the New York City Police Department (NYPD, 1975). The open-ended questionnaire, distributed before the site visit (by project staff), requested information from commanders of various units in the agency regarding possible corruption hazards they were aware of. The purpose of the survey was to determine the extent to which commanders are aware of corruption problems in their area of responsibility. The following instructions were provided for each commander:

- a) Indicate on attached sheets conditions in your command which are, or may

become, a corruption hazard.

(Indicate conditions, not locations.)

- b) Are records and reports maintained on a regular basis?
- c) Do the reports indicate how the corruption hazards manifest themselves? (double parking, frequent visits by officers - no reports filed, etc.)
- d) Do commanders make policy guiding subordinates responses to corruption hazards? (order, memos, roll call training sessions) Are there department wide guidelines in these areas?
- e) What initiatives have been undertaken in your command to reduce the problems caused by corruption prone locations and conditions?
- f) Have the initiatives been effective? How is the effectiveness or lack of it indicated?

A set of more specific directions were included in the Commanders Profile "kit" in which the open-ended questionnaire format was presented. Each commander was requested to list all corruption hazards in his command according to the following categories:

a) Corruption hazard or condition

Briefly define: example, acceptance of free meals from restaurant owners in area to overlook violations of parking regulations in vicinity of premises.

b) Observable indicators of the hazard

Example, numerous illegally parked vehicles in area - few summons served. Premises frequented by officers on meal periods on a regular basis.

c) Command initiatives to control

Example, supervisory checks to insure enforcement of traffic regulations and to supervise meal periods of subordinates.

d) Command accountability

Final responsibility for anticipating and counteracting corruption hazards is the responsibility of the commander of the area. This responsibility and commensurate authority is in some cases

delegated to subordinates. To whom is this responsibility delegated in your command for each of the corruption hazards listed (if not delegated, indicate self).

Each was also reminded that there might be a possibility that internal corruption hazards existed dealing with such activities as days off, moonlighting, filing inaccurate reports, property custody, overtime arrests, etc. It was requested that these hazards, if they existed, be listed in the Profile.

c) Police/Public Questionnaire

As was indicated previously, a McCormack-Fishman Improbity Questionnaire was developed in Phase I to be administered to police and the public in each survey city. The most important parts of the questionnaire were the three scales of improbus or corrupt behavior which listed eight activities thought to be prototypes of police corruption generally. The scale was developed to represent a range of improbus behavior which would be easy or difficult to justify according to one's own standards of honesty.

The comments that follow deal exclusively with three major segments of the questionnaire, the McCormack-Fishman Improbability Scales, which are based on the theory of Guttman Scaling. Simply stated this theory maintains that if respondents are given a series of three or more activities related in some way to a variable under consideration (in this case unethical behavior) some of the activities may prove to be "harder" indicators of what variable than others. If, after being tested among several groups, an order or scale of "hardness" among items emerges that has a coefficient of reproducibility of 90% or over (in 90 cases out of 100, groups will arrange the activities in the same order), it constitutes a Guttman scale for that sample of respondents and they may be rated

This scaling technique and its use in the analysis of the project questionnaire data are described in detail in "Measuring Police Corruption," by Janet Fishman, New York: The John Jay Press, 1977.

or scored in relation to it. Based on this theory the project questionnaire listed eight improbable activities which the researchers felt would be understandable within the general frame of reference of police officers throughout the country. The activities were listed randomly in the questionnaire as follows:

1. diff. easy a. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner in your area.
2. diff. easy d. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.
3. diff. easy e. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate.
4. diff. easy f. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes.
5. diff. easy g. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.
6. diff. easy h. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman in your patrol area.
7. diff. easy i. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use.
8. diff. easy j. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre.

Questionnaires were administered in six police agencies in Phase I of the project (1975,1966) and eight additional departments in Phase II (1977-1979.) The sample size was between 50 to 150 depending on department size or a total of approximately 750 officers in Phase I and 1200 in Phase II. The first Scale on the questionnaire asked the respondents if in terms of their own standards of honesty it would be difficult or easy for them, as police officers, to justify the above activities. In each case they were to circle "difficult" or "easy" on the questionnaire. The random display above was reordered by the respondents according to the level of seriousness they attached to each activity. For example, 95% of the respondents in a department might consider accepting a free cup of coffee as being easy to justify as opposed to only 40% who might be able to justify taking a \$10 gift at Christmas time. In each of the six departments the reordering of the eight items was identical. The results - number 1 activity easiest to justify and 8 the most difficult - are as follows:

1. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner in your patrol area
2. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area
3. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area
4. using your police badge or ID badge to gain free access to a movie theatre
5. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman in your patrol area
6. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes
7. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use
8. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate

While the reordering of the individual activities was identical in each of the agencies surveyed, the mean number of respondents who selected one or more items as being easy to justify varied. Using the total survey population within a department, score for the agency was determined.*

*Ibid.

The second scale used the same eight activities above and asked the respondents to indicate which of the activities they would be disciplined for if it became known to their immediate supervisors that they were engaging in them.

The reordering of the items in scale II was identical to the reordering in scale I, and the mean score by department for each scale, while not exactly the same, was similar for scale I and scale II. In other words, departments whose officers had a higher improbity reading (high reading indicates less ethics) in terms of their own standards of honesty (scale I) also scored a high reading on the disciplinary scale II (the higher the reading the higher tolerance for unethical behavior by supervisors).

A third scale was developed late in the project to determine at what level of observed improbis behavior one police officer would report his peers. Once again the same eight activities were used

and the respondents were asked to indicate if they would report a fellow officer whom they observed engaging in them.

Preliminary data indicates that even in police departments registering low levels of unethical activities, the tendency among officers not to report unethical behavior on the part of their peers is high.

It should be made very clear at the point that the researchers did not attempt to specifically identify the entire scope of unethical opportunities afforded in the police milieu. As was indicated before the scales simply represent a range of improbis police behavior from least to most serious and are prototypes of other corrupt or criminal activities. The significance of each of the McCormack-Fishman typologies as prototypes are indicated as follows:

Typology #1: Accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner in your area.

This activity is used to signify acceptance free of any small item or privilege (newspapers, parking spaces, etc.) on a routine basis.

These items involve those for which the public is normally charged a fee and where such privilege is based solely on one's status as a police officer.

Typology #2: Accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.

This activity is the prototype for police officer acceptance, at discount, any item or service for which the general public is charged full price when such privilege is bestowed solely on the basis of police officer status.

Typology #3: Accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.

This activity is used to signify police acceptance, at no cost, of more significant items or services than these indicated in typology #1 - for example, free dry cleaning, cigarettes, drinks, for which the general public normally pays full price, and are bestowed upon police solely on the basis of the police officer status.

Typology #4: Using your police badge or ID to gain free access to movie theatre

This activity is representative of pro-active attempts on the part of officers (usually on off duty time) to gain access to entertainment and exhibition areas at no cost where the general public is required to pay an admission fee.

Typology #5: Accepting \$10 at Christmas time from a business man in your patrol area.

This typology signifies accepting any gift or service on a periodic basis (once or twice a year) as a reward or "tip" for performing routine patrol duties.

Typology #6: Accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes

This activity typifies situations in which a police officer takes advantage of his official capacity to provide preferential treatment to business or professional persons (lawyers, bondsmen, undertakers, etc.) who are not entitled to such service. A gift or fee is expected and received by the officer in connection with such activities.

Typology #7: Discovering an open business at night and removing merchandise for personal use.

This activity typifies situations in which police officers abuse their public trust to engage in acts of theft and other opportunistic criminal acts (ex., removing property from a dead human body or injured person, rolling drunks, etc.).

Typology #8: Accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate.

This activity is used to signify accepting money, sexual favors, drinks etc., from individuals conducting business outside the legally prescribed rules as established by the community.

An almost identical questionnaire was sent to a randomly selected group of 500 citizens in each locality.

d) Ride Along Surveys

In an effort to determine the reliability of the questionnaire to measure levels of improbis behavior within an agency a series of structured ride along interviews were planned. It was felt that these interviews along with other independent indicators of corruption previously mentioned would support the data generated by the McCormack-Fishman Improbability Questionnaire. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. In every case officers were interviewed singly. If an officer was assigned to a two man unit his partner was assigned to another vehicle while the interview was being conducted in order to provide privacy.

Ride alongs were conducted in each city in the following manner:

Prior to the Ride Along

Immediately after roll call questionnaire administration, a list of those officers present and going on duty was obtained from the Commanding Officer of the watch. Each officer was given a number starting with one.

A set of small cards similarly numbered and prepared in advance were drawn to determine which of the officers would be interviewed. A schedule of "drop offs" and "pick ups" was established so that time between interviews would be minimal. In each city a goal of eight interviews per day was set. Since the total number of interviews in each department was to be twenty, the third day "on-site" provided several extra hours to make up this total if the daily goal was not met. The above procedure differed only slightly in the decentralized departments. In these situations the researchers selected districts at random and made selections for interviewees in the manner described above.

In-car Interview Procedures

As indicated each ride-along interview lasted approximately 1 hour. The interviewer sat in the front seat of the patrol car and a second researcher who was to record the interview sat in the rear behind the police officer/driver. The officer was promised anonymity

and informed that the second researcher would be taking notes during the interview. Permission to conduct the interview under these conditions was requested in each case and with few exceptions, granted. The interviewers spent the first 10 to 15 minutes developing a rapport with each officer by discussing general police procedures. Once the tension of the interview situation eased, the subject of the roll call questionnaire administration was introduced and over the course of the remaining time each of the items on the questionnaire was addressed. The interviewees were not asked to indicate which of the activities they themselves participated in but, rather what they felt most of the officers in the department generally engaged in. They were also asked which of

There were two interviewers and one note taker involved in the 180 interviews conducted in Phase II of the program. Both interviewers had been ranking officers in a major city police department and had approximately 40 years experience in law enforcement between them.

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C. J. ...

of the activities they felt they would be disciplined for if they were discovered engaging in them, and which activities they would report their peers for. As each interview concluded, the officer requested a "meet" with the next scheduled interviewee and the same procedure was then repeated.

e) Interviews with Middle Management Personnel

In each of the departments surveyed interviews with middle management level personnel were also conducted. Two areas in which these interviews took place in every department were the internal affairs unit and the property clerk's office. Experience in Phase I of the program indicated that these units acted as barometers for the level internal administrative leadership and efficiency, and that carelessness or inattention to the functioning of these two units was an indication of equally inefficient field supervision and control. Generally, it is not difficult to develop efficient procedures for assuring adequate public access to the departments complaint machinery.

Trait Project

The second theoretical orientation of the Anti-Corruption Management Program was that candidates entering police service have a well developed set of individual characteristics that make them more or less immune to the corrupt environment in which law enforcement sometimes operates. The trait orientation as proposed in this project does not entirely negate the impact of situational variables or the individual actions but, in fact, is a synthesis of the two theories. The following are the theoretical positions regarding determinants of behavior generally, and the rationale for the synthesis of Trait and Situational theories in terms of this study of police corruption:

a) Trait Theory

Trait theory holds that behavior is primarily determined by personality traits, inherited characteristics or habits. An important corollary of this position is that trait-determined behavior should be relatively consistent across situations and therefore predictable if the trait can be measured.

An extreme example of this position is instinct theory and the recent revival of this in the form of sociobiology.

b) Situational theory

This orientation holds that behavior is primarily determined by situational variables. It is diametrically opposed to trait theory. A corollary of this viewpoint is that behavior can best be predicted by measuring characteristics of the situation in which it is to occur rather than by measuring characteristics of the person. A further implication of this position is that on-the-job behavior would not be predictable from pre-employment screening tests. An example of this position is the pure socialization hypothesis as the cause of police corruption. Situational theory has been supported by American learning theorists, e.g., B.F. Skinner, who are anti-instinctivists.

c) Interactionism

This viewpoint holds that behavior is determined by a combination of personal characteristics or traits and situational characteristics. One version of this model holds that traits (either acquired or inherited) predispose one to behave in certain ways in certain situations. A

corollary of this position is that on-the-job behavior could best be predicted by a combination of pre-employment screening tests which measure predispositions and situational measures.

It has been posited by one behavioral scientist (Dr. David Saunders, Princeton) that the best we could hope to predict from pre-employment screening would be approximately 35% since roughly 65% of behavior is situationally determined. Another practical implication of the interactionist position is that behavior might best be controlled (e.g., police corruption) by predicting predispositions to respond in certain ways in certain situations and manipulating situations that are least conducive to modeling low integrity behavior and socialization into the corrupt role.

Trait Project Methodology

There is evidence that the level of police corruption in an organization is partly determined by the moral maturity

of recruits at the time of entry into the organization. According to Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development the five concepts "which explain a considerable range of moral behavior are:

- a) moral knowledge
- b) socialization
- c) empathy
- d) ethics of personal conscience vs. ethics of social responsibility
- e) autonomy

In order to measure various aspects of moral development the Moral Maturity Scale was developed by Hogan & Dickstein (1972).* The scale is a brief, semi-projective measure which consists of 15 statements. The subject is asked to write a response to each statement assuming that it has been made by a person with whom the subject is having a conversation.

Scoring of the scale consists of rating each item to determine if one or more the following elements are present in the responses:

*Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 1972, Vol. 39, #2, 210-214, by Robert Hogan and Ellen Dickstein

- 1) concern for the sanctity of an individual
- 2) judgments based on the spirit rather than the letter of the law
- 3) concern for the welfare of society as a whole
- 4) capacity to see both sides of an issue

Scoring in our studies followed the Hogan & Dickstein procedure of assigning two points if any one of the four elements is clearly present, one point if any one could be easily and readily inferred, and zero points if none of the concepts were present or easily inferred. The inter-rater reliability of the scale was found to be .88.

It was found that persons who were rated as morally mature on this scale tended to be sensitive to injustice, well socialized, empathic and autonomous, and based their judgments on an intuitive understanding of morality rather than a rational understanding. Shealy (1977) found the scale to discriminate significantly between rated corrupt and non-corrupt police officers.

At the time of the commencement of Phase II of the Anti-Corruption Management Program a considerable amount of data had already been generated through independent research. The research associate directing this phase of the survey had screened police recruits in two major

Southern Metropolitan
Coastal Gulf Urban
Southwest Urban

Methods of Administration and Results

(Final data analysis is still being conducted. The following questions indicate the structure this section will take.)

1. What resulted in the analysis of Hogan Data on recruits versus veterans?
2. What correlation exists between Hogan, McCormack/Fishman, and Peer Relations?
3. Was there any variance between departments?
4. What percentage of police corruption can be explained by the Hogan, et. al?
5. What use will it be as a part of the diagnostic prescriptive package ?

Socialization Project Methodology

The third and final theoretical orientation of the police corruption program focused on police corruption socialization.

A model of a process of corruption through socialization has been presented in an article entitled "The Psychology of Police Corruption: Socialization of the Corrupt (Bahn, 1975)." This model was based on two primary data sources. One was a series of interviews with police officers who have been found to be corrupt. The other consisted of works written by observers of corruption and by corrupt officers who describe the process by which the police officer moves from upholding the law to subverting it.

This study goes beyond this primarily anecdotal data and develops objective data based on questionnaires administered to police officers in selected cities in various parts of the U.S.

In order to develop a questionnaire that would measure socialization, it was necessary to define the specific dimensions of socialization that might be relevant. While socialization is a term that is used quite extensively in both social psychology and sociology, it is often ill defined. For instrument development, the definition used

by Middlebrook (1974) was adopted:

Socialization - The process of internalization by the individual of the values, beliefs, and acceptable patterns of behavior in a group.

However, studies of socialization generally related to groups other than occupational groups. There are only a few studies of occupational socialization. Such studies include Bell and Price's (1975) work entitled "The first term: A study of legislative socialization," where it becomes apparent that occupational socialization relates not only to values and norms but also to increasing sophistication about the informal social structure of the occupational group and the dominant and formal procedures and practice of the individual within the group.

In order to construct a refined socialization scale, a sample of police officers, organizational consultants, college students of criminal justice, sociologists, and police administrators were asked to suggest brief statements that would reflect learning and incorporating the formal and informal values, practices and policies of a police department. These statements were to be used as a stimulus for response along an agree-disagree continuum. In addition, items were requested and created that appeared to measure other components of socialization identified in studies of

other occupations than police. In all, eighty-seven items were gathered in this way and then were analyzed so as to eliminate those that were ambiguous or redundant.

The resulting set consisted of twenty-one items and these, constituting a tentative scale, were administered to a sample of 59 police officers in a cooperating urban department. The responses by the police officers to the 21-item scale was subjected to various statistical analyses including reliability analysis, the creation of an inter-correlation matrix, factor analysis varimax rotated, principal factor with iteration, and cluster analysis by the average distancing method. As a result of these analyses, it was possible to reduce the 21-item scale to a ten-item scale with a simpler factor structure and high reliability, although with two discriminate sub-factors apparent in the scale. The first of them was knowledge of the format and informal rules, procedures and policies of the department. The second was called "imbeddedness" in the department for it linked pride in the occupation, strong occupational identity, and expressed reliance on the occupational group as a source of norms and values.

The ten-item scale was entitled the Police Peer Relations Scale to avoid biasing responses by a more specific title. This scale was appended to the questionnaire administered by the corruption study project in six of the sample cities. In all, responses were obtained from 888 police officers in the sample cities.

It was planned that the questionnaire be administered in two western cities and the results computed and analyzed. The analysis would include correlations of the socialization scale with other integrity measures as well as tests of significance of differences of mean scores of both specific items and on the total scale for the two different studies.

Initially, the results indicated that the socialization scale, did, in fact, relate to those integrity items to which it should logically relate and that it discriminated between the two cities in conformity to the hypothesized direction of change. That is, for the city in which the integrity measures are higher, the measure of occupational socialization was somewhat lower. However, where the integrity measures were somewhat lower, socialization was significantly higher. This would imply that the kind of socialization measured in our instrument, that is the acceptance of the peer values and willingness to go along with them, can be identified as related to a somewhat lower level of departmental integrity. Further use of the scale, however, showed that the relationship is actually more complicated.

Perhaps most significant, there was significant correlation between socialization and the dimension identified as "typology," which reflects the individual's appraisal of

improbis practice within the department. There was also a significant inverse correlation between socialization and the individual's willingness to report various improbis behaviors set forth to the hierarchy. The more socialized the officer, the less likely he would be to report improbis behaviors to the hierarchy.

Thus it becomes apparent that the scale measures a dimension that is closely related to police impropity and corruption and it appears to validate the notion that in a department where the dominant values tolerate or encourage impropis behavior that police officers in that department, through the years of their tenure are socialized to accept those values and ultimately to behave in accordance with them. It is also clear that there is variability among officers in the extent to which they are socialized by this process. The mean standard deviation in the total socialization score for all subjects was approximately 4.7 with an average mean score of 36.

It can therefore be concluded that the socialization measure reflects both the departmental influence and the individual's susceptibility. It can further be concluded that the socialization explains corruption in part, as had been speculated. The results of this study indicate that where impropis practice takes place, most officers are highly socialized so that the values and norms of their peers become the operative basis of their behavior.

POLICE-PEER RELATIONS SCALE

PLEASE WRITE THE CORRECT LETTER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED AT THE LEFT.

1. The amount of time and effort devoted to orientation into this police department is:
 - a) none b) very limited c) limited d) adequate e) extensive
2. My personal knowledge of the formal structure (Commissioner, Chief, chain of command, names of the units, etc.) of this police department is that I know:
 - a) all of it in detail b) most details c) some details
 - d) only the general picture e) very little, almost nothing
3. My personal knowledge of the formal procedures (ways of doing things) in this department is that I know:
 - a) all of it in detail b) most details c) some details
 - d) only the general picture e) very little, almost nothing
4. My personal knowledge of the informal structure of this department (who has "clout", leaders of informal groups, etc.) is that I know:
 - a) all of it in detail b) most details c) some details
 - d) only the general picture e) very little, almost nothing
5. My personal knowledge of the informal procedures (ways of actually doing things) in this department is that I know:
 - a) all of it in detail b) most details c) some details
 - d) only the general picture e) very little, almost nothing
6. In terms of knowing the values (what really counts in this department) I know:
 - a) all of it in detail b) most details c) some details
 - d) only the general picture e) very little, almost nothing
7. As far as the recent history of this department is concerned (major events, changes, problems, etc.), I know:
 - a) all of it in detail b) most details c) some details
 - d) only the general picture e) very little, almost nothing

8. When I am not in uniform or on duty, I feel that I am first and foremost a police officer:

- a) all the time b) most of the time c) some of the time
- d) occasionally e) almost not at all

9. My own feeling about the police image is that I am:

- a) very proud of it b) mostly proud of it c) proud at times
- d) not very proud of it e) somewhat ashamed of it

10. My ideas of what is right and wrong are:

- a) very individual, different from most officers in the department
- b) somewhat individual, most different
- c) individual in some cases, like other officers in some cases
- d) mostly like those of other officers in this department
- e) completely like those of other officers in this department

Findings

Introduction

The project perspectives and the instruments generated by them were applied to the subject cities (see Appendix for description of these cities). From these studies, three sets of variables - community, individual, organizational - were identified. It is the integration of these variables which produced what is conceptualized here as the "system approach."

Community Variables

The Knapp Commission identification of "meat eaters" and "grass eaters" has been extended by this study into a complex typology of forms of police corruption. These definitions force us to focus not only upon the very obvious legislative and societal conditions which lead to corruption but also upon the active role played by many corrupt police officers in exploiting opportunities to engage in unethical and corrupt behavior.

The most common measures of police corruption have related to bribery, vice, organized crime, illegal businesses, and the need to uphold the moral standards of the community. Although the problems of police corruption cannot be separated from these activities, the research in this study has revealed that the problems of police corruption are considerably broader and more complex in terms of their interrelationships with the opportunities available for corrupt police behavior in the community, as well as in the ethical disparity between the police and the communities in which they work.

In this chapter we will be focusing upon the community variables and measures which affect police corruption. These classes of measures take into account both active forms of corruption (where the officer either directly or subtly initiates the conditions for corruption) and passive forms of corruption (where the officer receives small favors as an inducement for remaining friendly or cooperating with specific

members of the community.) These variables can be summarized as follows:

- . opportunity for corrupt behavior
- . population
- . land area
- . density
- . income level
- . community and criminal justice processes
- . respect for private property
- . community expectations
- . community sensibility i.e. willingness to report corrupt police actions
- . community morality.

Although the relationship of police corruption to many of the variables mentioned above are well known, the impact of community variables on the level of corruption must be viewed as a major finding of this study. This finding came about as a result of attempts to explain the relative lack of corruption in a community where the department's level of discipline was not particularly strong and where the ethical standards of the members of the department were moderately low compared to those of other departments in this study. Further, the greater geographical area from which the officers were recruited has previously sustained some of the most serious corruption within the country. It should also be

noted that the willingness of the members of this department to report their peers for corrupt activities was the second lowest of any city studied.

However, this particular jurisdiction appeared to be one of the least corrupt of all the cities studied in terms of our direct ride-along measure of corruption. Efforts to develop an explanation for this dichotomy between 1) an absence of corrupt behavior and 2) low values on McC-F Improbability variables measuring personal standards of honesty, willingness to report other officers, and level of discipline led to the identification of the concept of "opportunity." Further analysis indicated that our original measure of opportunity, which was developed from the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire, was more complex than was originally thought. This further analysis revealed that two variables impacted our measure of opportunity. The first was a measure of "community sensibility" or the willingness to report corrupt behavior on the part of police officers. The public surveys using McC-F improbity Questionnaires provided this measure in a very direct manner as it asked the public respondent to indicate those corrupt acts by a police officer which he or she would report.

The second measure was that of "community expectations." This measure is less direct in that it requires analysis of the ethical standards of the public respondents and their

answers to the personal standards question series in the McC-F Improbability Questionnaire as well as the responses to the same items of police officers from that community.

Although these variables measured by the Improbability questionnaire have a clear meaning in the context of the impact of community variables upon police corruption, the measure was initially developed from a paired-comparison ranking of the responses of the Commander's Corruption Hazard Profile. This measure and its supporting statistical evidence is the topic of the following section.

Corruption Hazards

A. Opportunities for Corruption Within the Community

The study methodology provided that this questionnaire be distributed by the chief law enforcement official of the community to his commanders. The questionnaire requested information on 1) possible corruption hazards within the agency or the community and 2) suggested remedies. It attempted to elicit specific internal and external conditions having the potential to be sources of corruption or which were already sources of corruption. The questionnaires asked the officers to identify the following types of items:

- . conditions which were or might become a corruption hazard
- . the currency with which reports and records were maintained
- . the contents of reports to indicate how corruption hazards might manifest themselves (lack of active

- reports filed, unenforced parking violations, frequent officer/car out-of-service conditions, etc.)
- . existence of departmental guidelines with respect to corruption hazards and their usage, including the source of policy guidelines to assist officers in responding to corruption hazards.
 - . identification of specific commander initiatives to reduce problems which might be caused by corruption hazards
 - . the effectiveness of such command initiatives and how that effectiveness or its lack had been indicated.

Discipline and Commander Corruption Hazard Profiles as a Ride-Along Proxy

An important aim of the study was to develop a measure of police corruption using a questionnaire-type format. Although it was accepted that the ride-along technique which utilized interviewers who had been ranking officers in major city police departments and therefore had both perspective and a shared sense of values with the officer being interviewed provided a relatively accurate measuring device of the degree of corruption among the police departments studied, it was too cumbersome and time-consuming for general use. In attempting to find a proxy for the ride-along scores, the concept of opportunity became an important issue.

In the McC-F Improbability Questionnaire, the questions

relating to discipline initially appeared to be the most important in terms of finding a proxy for the ride-along. However, the use of the Commander's Corruption Hazard Profile to provide an initial measure of opportunities for corruption within the community was also very important in the development of the proxy measure. This opportunity measure turned out to be the second most important variable, increasing the statistic from $F = 10.839$ to $F = 15.328$ over that which would obtain by regressing the McC-F disciplinary question responses. Although it is recognized that the expectations of a community with respect to the standards of behavior expected of the police are more closely related to the discipline series of questions, the degree to which these variables may exhibit autocorrelation did not affect the very important result that 1) the two variables alone described 92.6% of the variation on the ride-along scores (multiple R) and that and R^2 of .858 and an adjusted R^2 of .0802 were obtained with a very significant value for the F statistic and 2) the degree to which there were corruption opportunities in the community was an exceedingly important determinant with respect to the level of corruption which existed in the community. (Refer to the statistical report for more specific details).

Analysis of Corruption Hazard Profile Results

This commander's survey provided a broad conceptual view of the range of police corruption. From the analysis of the survey results it was possible to develop a relatively strong

taxonomy of the types and forms of police corruption. It should be noted that it is very difficult if not impossible to separate a departments' view of corrupt behavior from those items which they perceive to be corruption hazards. This is itself is not surprising, as the notion of the relative nature of deviance or the setting of boundaries and cutting points has been a key conceptual issue with respect to a definition of police misbehavior.

Leslie Wilkins has cogently stated this issue. "A society in which a large proportion of the population regularly practice a given form of behavior will tend to permit the behavior and not define it as "deviant." According to this interpretation of the term "deviant" it is impossible to conceive of any action being classified as deviant when the majority of the population within a culture regularly practice that action. However, owing to inertia within social systems, the official definition of deviance may fall out of line with the definitions of individuals. "

One of the major conceptual issues we must face in attempting to identify those community variables which relate to corruption is the need to recognize the rather wide variations among the sets of behaviors which are considered acceptable in each community. In departments where "grass-eating" types of corruption were quite prevalent, offers of free coffee or free meals were not viewed as corruption hazards; in other

departments, they were seen as serious opportunities for corrupt behavior.

Extensive analysis of conditions throughout the study cities indicated that there were some important community variables which led to the existence or non-existence of corruption. These variables were initially classified as opportunities or lack of opportunities for corruption. Further in-depth analysis using data from the Commander's Hazard Profile led to the development of a broader classification. This framework is formed by expanding the original active-passive notion of police corruption as follows:

- Continuing Corruptive Relationships

- . active, "meat-eating" - high prevalence
- . active, "grass-eating" - low prevalence
- . passive, "grass-eating" - high prevalence
- . passive, "meat-eating" - rarely if ever exists

- Opportunistic Corruptive Behavior

- . active, "meat-eating" - low prevalence
- . active, "grass-eating" - low prevalence
- . passive, "meat-eating" - can occur with generally honest officers
- . passive, "grass-eating" - highest prevalence

Each of these two major classes - continuing and opportunistic behaviors - are discussed in the following two subsections.

Continuing Corruptive Relationships

The types of continuing opportunities for corruption relate to more than vice, alcohol and the problems of licensed establishments, but extend to a wide variety of interactions with the public which lend themselves to "grass-eating" forms of corruption. They include:

- Regulation of taxi-cabs
- Paying towing trucks
- Relations with bonding companies
- Improper access and/or distribution of criminal reports and records.

Although the above are indicative of the kinds of corruptive behavior available to officers who desire or are induced to undertake such behavior, there are more subtle forms of continuing corruptive relationships which even the most astute earlier observers have not seen as serious matters.

These areas, although they do provide significant continuing opportunities for corruptive behavior, are among the few opportunities which 1) are directly subject to the internal control by the department and 2) which are only slightly affected by the community and its expectations. Among these kinds of continuing activities are the following:

- Favoritism to vendors or suppliers
- Diversion of supplies
- Use of police as go-betweens for pay-offs to

correctional officials to provide favoritism or special considerations for prisoners.

The likelihood that the community and the public will become aware of these forms of corrupt activity is considerably less likely than is the case with other continuing forms of potential corruption.

An officer's participation in these types of corrupt activities may come to the attention of very few other people. Such participation does not involve members of the wider public, nor does it necessitate the cooperation of a large number of police officers. This fact is important because it affects the major means by which corrupt behavior is controlled. Departmental discipline, peer group pressure, and community disapproval can act as deterrents only when there is a fairly high probability that the corrupt behavior will become known to at least one of these sanctioning groups. In these cases of these continuing corruptive relationships which do not involve the community at large, this possibility is even lower than it is with most forms of corruption.

Opportunistic Corruptive Behavior

Opportunistic corruptive behavior has the characteristic that the participants are exposed to the officers' corrupt behavior on a mere chance or random basis. Most of the types

of activities which lend themselves to such opportunistic corruptive behavior relate to the following:

- Traffic violations
- Driving while intoxicated
- Consumption of vice
- Recovery of stolen property
- Theft of goods at a crime scene

Many officers who would not engage in the virtual selling out of the department which accompanies the typical "meat-eating" corruption might quite willingly take home a part of a side of beef from a truck that has been wrecked or hijacked. To a great degree, this type of corrupt activity occurs under the following conditions:

- It takes place in relatively low visibility situations
- there is little chance of the activity being reported
- the possibility of serious disciplinary action being taken is low, and more important,
- the officer is able to rationalize the corrupt behavior in terms of:
 - . his salary
 - . the danger to which he is exposed on a regular basis
 - . the public attitude towards the police, and/or
 - . the lack of resultant harm to any individual.

Very often the police officer justifies these forms of corruption with the rationalization that they do not hurt the affected members of the community. Another rationalization provided by the community is a distinction between bribery on the scene and the promise of future favors -- i.e., a lawyer stopped for drunk driving who promises to "help the officer out" if he runs into any legal problems in gratitude for either driving the lawyer home or calling him a cab.

In situations like these, "respectable" members of the community encourage the police to engage in improbus activities which have little chance of being detected and which are easy to justify in terms of community values. The need to understand these issues drew the study team to investigate the concepts of community expectations and community sensibility which are the topics of the following section.

. Police Expectations and Community Expectations - Commonality

Interestingly enough, for most departments there was a considerable divergence between what the individuals in the department expected of themselves and their peers and what the public expected of the members of the department.

Although the data was available for only a limited number of cities with respect to a direct comparison of the responses of the citizens and local police to the same questions, in two areas we found some considerable agreement.

Two hundred and thirty-two police officers and one hundred and sixty-three civilians from the same communities were asked to respond to the statement "The public has a right to expect officers to have higher ethical standards than themselves." In each city, police and public agreed that the ethical standards of police officers should be higher than those of the community they serve.

This was, however, in striking contrast to another series of questions which related to items such as the following:

- . The willingness of officers to give up their off-duty time
- . The right of police officers to strike
- . The right of the public to be critical of police errors in judgement
- . The need for police officers to have some college education prior to employment
- . The duty of the police to professionalize themselves through higher education and training

In response to these more specific items, there was little or no agreement. In each of the four cities tested with this measure, the public's demands upon the police were considerably higher than the demands that the police made upon themselves.

Community Sensibility

In attempting to measure Community Sensibility the police/public surveys were extended. This extension required that the members of the public surveyed in each city answer the "Personal Standard of Honesty" and "Reporting of Police Behavior" questions asked of the police in the same city.

The questions relating to discipline (For which activities would you be disciplined if your supervisor determined that you had undertaken such activities?) were not appropriate for the public group, as it was felt that members of the public would not have sufficient knowledge of internal police affairs to provide a useful comparison with police officer responses.

Over all, there is considerable divergence between the responses of the citizens with respect to their personal or public standards of honesty and those of the police.

However, there are two rather interesting characteristics. In a Southwest metropolitan suburban city having relatively low levels of corruption as measured by the ride-along score, there were a means of 9.37 for the 143 public members surveyed and a mean of 9.56 for the 206 police officers surveyed.

With respect to reporting improbis behavior, however, considerable variance was displayed. The public group would report activities with a mean of 4.5 as compared with the police group which would report activities with a mean of 8.07. The variance estimates (both pooled and separate were 0.0, which means that the distributions were so divergent that we can state with considerable certainty that the response came from considerably different groups. Apparently most

of the officers and citizens believe that relatively petty things such as free cups of coffee or providing discounts on meals are not serious matters. . . . police officers indicated that they did not usually report the taking of free meals, but, given our typology, they would report anything which exceeded this level. The public sensibility with respect to reporting was considerably lower and would allow all but items such as taking money from gamblers, towing companies or merchandise from stores to go unreported. Not surprisingly, the above data fits very closely with the level of corruption found within this city.

This city is relatively free of major corruption, although some "grass-eating" types of corruption do exist. It would appear that the department has been able to move its members' behavior well above the community expectations as measured by the "Would you report," series of questions. This is further reinforced by a review of the officers' response to the discipline question, wherein the 206 officers responding had a mean of 10.54 with a relatively small standard of error of .372, which implies rather considerable reliability and consistency among the responses. In this case the findings of our study for the city are rather consistant. Specifically,

- . the city has a moderate to medium level of corruption
- . members of the community and of the police department have personal standards which

are slightly higher than these which our observers in the ride-along discovered, but

- . the willingness of the citizens to report (used as an indication of their expectations of police behavior) is relatively low
- . the level of organizational integrity as measured by the discipline questions is exceptionally high and this is reflected in the considerable difference between the public expectations as measured by their responses to the reporting questions and the willingness of officers to report their peers as measured by the police officer responses to the reporting questions.

For another city also having moderately low corruption, we have an entirely different profile. Again, the public standards and police standards of honesty are quite similar.

- . The overall level of standards of honesty in the two cities are considerably different
- . In this eastern metropolitan suburban city, there is almost a full percentage difference between the two groups

- . Further, the moderately low level of corruption within the city as measured by the ride-along scores can be attributed to what we have found to be a lack of opportunity for corruption as opposed to willingness to engage in corrupt behavior. This is further collaborated by the relatively low willingness of the public to report.

However, in this case the level of organizational integrity as measured by the discipline questions was considerably lower than the reporting scores, implying simply that it would be impossible to commit certain activities and that the likelihood of being disciplined may not be significant deterrent in an of itself.

Although a formal model which incorporated community sensibility as measured by the public response to the personal standards of honesty question and community expectations as measured by the public response to the reporting question has not been developed as a part of this study, these two variables taken from the Commanders Profile have a significant power as an explanatory mechanism, particularly when coupled with comparative analysis using police responses to questions on reporting, honesty, and discipline.

Understanding of the Role Corruption Hazards Have on Creating Opportunities for Police Corruption within the Community.

In this section we discuss our understanding of the role each of the three classes of opportunity/corruption hazards plays in police corruption and the changing hazard profile while occurs when activities which are either illegal or only marginal legal become prevalent, are no longer an object for enforcement, or become legal and subject to governmental regulation.

From the least corrupt city to the most corrupt, there was considerable concern on the part of the command officers completing the Corruption Hazard Profiles with respect to sexually oriented business establishments and activities. Sexually oriented hazards are a concern of all commanders, from the most corrupt districts within the most corrupt

cities to the least corrupt districts within the least corrupt cities. This occurs because sexually oriented activities provide opportunities for corruption at all points along the following continuum:

- . illegally based criminal activities
- . marginally legal and regulated business
- . legal activities having opportunities for corruptibility of police officer and agencies.

The key is that all police activities in which even legal behavior is regulated or laws are enforced, provide officers with significant opportunities to exercise discretion. This is most obvious in "meat-eating" types of corruption which involve the forbearance or inaction by an officer and in which his culpability is clear. But even in these types of activities it is often possible for the officers to cooperate with the corruptively-based or the illegally based-criminal activity without directly exposing themselves. In many cases, the officers' major risk and exposure occurs when they receive payment for the cooperative effort. With marginally legal activities and many regulated business, the police officers can very often claim that their activities were proper and were in fact consistent with the desires of the community as a whole or at least with the acceptable behavior for the neighborhood for which they were responsible. And where

the officer is primarily engaging in oversight, inspection, and regulation of these activities with respect to local civil ordinances or misdemeanors as opposed to more serious types of criminal violation, it is often difficult to strike the appropriate balance between public service, reasonable enforcement of ordinances where there is a scarcity of police resources and the promotion of economic well-being of the community vis-a-vis the fight against corruption of the department and the diversion the scarce law enforcement resources.

This leads to some severe concern with an exceptionally common measure used to indicate an absence of corruption, one which was cited by many of the district commanders responding to the questions in the Corruption Hazard Profile. This measure states that, in the words of one commander, "Officers of my unit or under my command made no bribery arrests and there was no complaint of corruption reported or otherwise relative (sic) to an officer of my command over the last 12 months." Given that our data suggests that the evidence necessary to indicate corruption is difficult to obtain when the police officers are not apprehended in the possession of physical evidence which clearly demonstrates culpability, measures which rely upon the absence of conviction or complaints have little or no validity. It appeared interesting that those departments and districts where the district

commanders had the most to be defensive about with respect to potential and actual corruption were the major proponents of this measure and usually this type of response immediately followed the question on command accountability and was appended as a note to the questionnaire.

One of the more significant aspects of corruptive behavior is the degree to which command personnel are able to cope with its existence and to rationalize their responses to it through the selection of measures of corruption which are extremely stringent. This behavior, although understandable, is a key to the understanding of the role corruption plays within the community.

1: The Role of Denial of Corruption by Command Officials

A major reason for the apparent lack of interest in problems of corruption by a significant number of command officers can be found in their ability to accomplish organizational objectives under what are often extremely tight resource constraints.

The talents that provide officers in command positions with the ability to allocate scarce resources effectively are often the most important key to their ultimate success or failure in their careers. Fighting corruptive behavior provides little personal reward for these command officers and utilizes precious resources. Among the reasons officers

will give very low priorities to the investigation and ultimate prosecution of corruptive activities, whether they be of the "meat-eating" or "grass-eating" variety, are the following:

- . It uses scarce personal resources of the command officers and rarely can be delegated because of the sensitive nature of the task and the possibility that the investigation may be compromised by other individuals
- . Individuals and organizations engaged in corruptively based criminal activities often have significant legal resources and may have powerful connections within the community who are capable of affecting the command officers career and promotability
- . The forces who might most reasonably object to many of the activities of the marginally legally and regulated business and their impact upon the community are often citizens and citizen groups having very little political power and who may lack significant credibility because of their vociferousness and continued agitation
- . The command officer may feel these individuals are difficult to deal with and cannot be depended upon to compromise or to negotiate in good faith

- . The selective provision of resources and enforcement meets demands which are placed on the command officer by citizens requesting additional protection or special privileges.
- . The command officer may tend to overlook certain type of "grass-eating" corruption, recognizing that the officers are providing services which he would like them to provide irrespective of the manner in which the officers are induced to selectively provide this protection or enforcement.

It should be recognized that the command officers have an exceptionally difficult time in obtaining cooperation from the operational/patrol officer. They may have two or three levels of supervision between themselves and the field personnel. Additionally, command officers receive direction from their own superiors as well as direct requests from the members of the community to provide the services which the "grass-eating" type of corrupt officer may be providing; hence, they cannot be overly enthusiastic about eliminating the free cups of coffee or meals which induce the self-directed field officers to work a little harder to provide extra services to specific members of the business community.

With respect to the more serious forms of corruption the command officers have a number of other options:

- . to pretend that those activities do not exist
- . to assure themselves that none of their own colleagues undertook those activities when in a similar first line/field position and therefore there is no reason to think that any current officers would undertake such activity
- . that if any of that is going around it would obviously have been reported either by a citizen or member of the department or command.
- . detection of corruption is a responsibility of internal investigation and they have not found any serious problems in "my district" or,
- . our officers' pay is so low and the risks that they undertake so great that little indiscretions such as free meals, cups of coffee or even accepting gifts of a small nature help the men's morale a lot. There is also a rather significant degree of animosity on the part of some of the command officers due to the fact that city officials in other departments are very often allowed to accept gifts of value less than \$25.00 at Christmastime, with only the police excluded.

The key to understanding the command acceptance of officers who provide special privileges to specific organizations or individuals is that the law can at best be enforced selectively

and henceforth in an inconsistent and perhaps discriminatory way. This is in no small part due to the ambivalence a community has towards the enforcement of its laws. This ambivalence results in the community attitude that the officers ought not to be enforcing traffic laws and parking violations, or otherwise depriving "good" business men of their livelihood by making it difficult for them to operate, but should be focusing on crimes of physical violence and property theft. The politicians' ambivalence is manifested in the constraints, both in terms of resource allocation and enforcement objectives, which are placed upon the police.

2. Illegally Based and Corruptably Based Criminal Activities

Each of the forms of "meat-eating" types of police corruption have numerous ramifications for productivity and efficiency of the police department. These activities include the following:

- . Illegal businesses which include operation of loan sharking, protection rackets, extortion from individuals and businessmen, distribution of hijacked and stolen goods, and distribution of bootleg liquor and cigarettes.
- . Sexually based corruptive criminal activities, which include organized prostitution, red light district operation, operations that use children as sexual objects, and rackets which include compromising individuals coupled with implied or

- direct extortion or theft
- . Organized crime, including gambling, narcotics, diversion and theft of drugs from physicians and pharmacies, theft of valuable commodities such as artwork, credit cards, jewelry, securities, as well as counterfeiting and many other activities which rely on the forbearance of law enforcement for the opportunities to exist
 - . Entrepreneurly based criminally corruptive activities including the individual criminal oriented entrepreneur, whose activities include pimping, small numbers operations, bookmaking provided as a "service" for customers of other businesses and many of the aspects of distribution of drugs and narcotics.

The relevant issue with respect to all of the above forms of criminal behavior is that their continued existence relies on explicit cooperation by at least individual if not groups of law enforcement officials. This tacit or implicit cooperation operates in a number of ways:

- . tip-offs of impending police action
- . selective and discriminatory enforcement so as to restrict the activities of criminally oriented entrepreneurs, allowing other criminals performing the same activities to continue to operate.

- . errors in arrest procedures which result in an inability to prosecute
- . release of confidential data of the department including names of witnesses which allow for intimidation
- . destruction of police records and theft or destruction of evidence
- . covert and overt participation by members of the department in any of the above illegal or corruptively based criminal activities.

The major problem with each of these activities is that the loyalties of the officers becomes strained and their dependence on large amounts of cash and/or favors becomes so great that the public becomes aware of it, which seriously impairs trust in the police and the willingness of the public to perform their own roles in crime control. There will be little or no community cooperation with the police when members of the community fear retribution or feel that their actions are futile.

The second factor in reducing police department productivity and efficiency is the diversion of resources by officers who engage in corruption-related activities while on duty. A related problem is that the honest members of the department may spend considerable time and effort on standard police investigations which are then compromised by the corrupted officers.

It is clear that a police department does not only operate in a particular community, it is also an integral part of that community. The ethical standards of the department and of its officers are consistently being measured against those of the public which they serve and any sizable disparity in either direction will impede efficient and honest law enforcement. Only when police and community agree on a high level of integrity will such a level be enforced consistently, just as a low level will be enforced consistently when that is the wish of both parties. Having examined the role of the community in dictating the applicable standard of police probity, it therefore becomes necessary to look at the relevant factors pertaining to departmental organization and individual ethics.

Organizational Variables

Any organization, aside from its formal functional structure, is also a social entity which finds its principal definition in an informal structure. Peter Drucker (1973), in fact, defined work as providing a social and communal bond for people. "Not only does it determine status, but work satisfies man's need for belonging to a group and for a meaningful relationship to others of his kind" (Drucker, 1973, p. 107).

In police agencies or organization, the tendency toward social bonding is markedly stronger than in other work groups, because the police identity tends to separate its incumbents from the general population and causes them to find solidarity with their fellow police officers.

An individual officer can belong to several informal groups. One is a group which has a common supervisor; another is a group engaged in a common task or function; another is a friendship clique, composed of officers who have a liking for each other; another is an interest group of employees, who "share a common economic interest and seek to gain some objective relating to the larger organization" (Sayles, 1957).

It is important to recognize all these possible peer groups in police agencies, because they exert formidable influence on the individual police officer.

In the pioneer Hawthorne studies it was found that "the values and customs of the group were more important to individuals composing it than any cash benefits (Brown, 1954, p. 81). Subsequent studies, through the years (Bakke, 1953; Seashore, 1954; Asch, 1955; Dearborn & Gunderson, 1969; Estabrook & Sommer, 1972) have further demonstrated the influence of the work group on the attitudes, values, and perception of the individual.

If a police organization is to accomplish its purposes, every person in it must be molded to some degree into the image of the organization. Bakke (1953) has suggested that the process by which this fusion is attempted be labeled the formal socializing process.

The police agency has a position, that of police officer, to which has been delegated certain formal tasks or functions. To attain that position, a police applicant takes a battery of tests and is screened by interviewers and by a pre-employment check. If his score on the test is high enough, if he meets the physical requirements, and is able to qualify through the pre-employment screening and interview, he is then selected. His induction into the police agency is a formally planned process that usually starts with an address by the Chief of Police, Mayor or other official. He is issued a uniform, and in the case of large police agencies, it may be a special uniform that

indicates his probationary status. He enters a training program or academy whose minimum hours of training are mandated by State law. Within the training program, he usually encounters personnel specialists, firearms experts, detectives, line managers, police surgeons, chaplains, and other agency officials, all of whom assert that they are helping him to fit into the department as a well coordinated and highly motivated employee. He learns the laws and regulations and procedures that rule the formal work process. A key initiation occurs when he is given a weapon, and oft times, the badge is given in an equally formidable and significant ceremony, sometimes even as part of the graduation from training. He is now expected to assume the position assigned to him and to function as defined. As he works, he will be continually reminded of the organizational duty at the daily roll call by his "duty" Sergeant.

At the same time that the formal organization is trying to make a police officer out of the individual for the accomplishment of agency purposes, the individual is trying to mold the organization for the accomplishment of his personal aims and to flesh out and realize his conception of himself as a police officer. He may bargain for specific assignments and for special conditions. When he gets on the job, he will emphasize the functions he likes

to perform and will minimize those that he does not like. He will form a conception of the personal behavior or conduct which he expects of himself and a conception of the standing which is appropriate for him as an officer to occupy. The process by which the person tries to impose his image on the formal job has been called "the personalizing process."

While he takes on the identity of a police officer, he sees himself becoming separated from civilian society. Friends, even relatives, relate to him in new ways, are curious about his role and function, and a barrier develops between him and those with whom he was close. Part of what he learns in training is, in fact, secret police lore, sometimes because of its legitimate relationship to criminal investigation procedures or data, sometimes because of a history of in-group secrecy that has a protective and binding function. As a novice, he cannot always tell the basis of the oaths of secrecy that are directly or implicitly elicited from him. But he feels constrained in talking to friends and relatives, and can be at ease only when conversing with fellow officers.

The rites and emotional significance of firearms training and target practice are sufficiently jarring for most recruits that this part of training builds a solidarity. Aggressive impulses, carefully harnessed and controlled, now find an outlet of considerable immediacy. While the purpose

of training is, in fact, to help in achieving control both of the weapon and its use, the internal struggle can be best understood by those who experienced it, while maintaining the same required mask of stoic acceptance.

When he begins to work on the street as a police officer, whether on foot patrol, motorized patrol or in stationhouse duty, he meets people for the first time in his new role. Slowly he begins to acquire the appropriate suspiciousness of "civilians" that is part of the stance of the police officer. He learns that, in real life, the first person in an incident who comes forward with a complaint is as likely to be perpetrator as he is victim. The new officer also learns that, given the discretion that is vested in a police officer, the regulations that he learned in the academy offer alternatives, not clear prescriptions for behavior. Also, preconceptions about police work generally are not helpful in preparing someone to actually fill the role, deriving, at worst, from the distortions of the media, and, at best, from the selective emphases and colorations of accounts from close relatives or friends.

The social structure of police work has specific effects as well. Unlike work in a factory, shop or office, most police work is carried out by individuals or pairs on patrol. While patrol covers a given sector, in most departments there is some discretion given to the officer(s)

about the specific route and how much time or attention should be given to each sub-sector. Supervision, therefore, is inevitably remote, although most police officers are monitored via portable radio. This work site isolation of the police role makes the new officer particularly susceptible to influence from fellow officers, from the reference group or work group that commands the officer's attention. The most obvious source of what we can term informal socialization is the senior police officer or experienced partner to whom raw recruits are assigned by most police agencies. Throughout life our initial source of information about role-related behaviors usually comes from observing other people in these roles. When we like or respect or in other ways identify with the person that we are observing, that person becomes a "role model." Experienced police officers, going through the routines of a regular tour of duty, are often role models, socializing the neophyte to the police function.

Yet, the influence of other officers should not be underestimated. If there is strong cohesiveness between the members of a group who work for a specific supervisor, or who have a specific function, traffic, narcotics, vice, property clerking, etc., then any member of the group can exercise influence on the newcomer, even through a few chance comments offered in casual conversation. It the

newcomer finds an affinity based on economic interest with his peers in the academy, or fellow member of an ethnic group, or any other way, then these officers can be influential.

Now, one influence that is exercised is not simply a definition of how to behave, but also includes how and when not to behave, what to think and feel, and extends to the area of basic work values.

Most police officers who have been identified as corrupt, particularly those tried and convicted for corruption, describe an early influence process of this kind. They remember cynical asides from senior officers whose opinions they respected. Most of them also describe the movement through successive stages of improbable behaviors beginning with minor and insignificant violation of the formal rules that could easily be rationalized, and proceeding sequentially through more and more serious violations that required more elaborate rationalization and value shift with each stage. Along the route are the landmarks of gifts, solicited gifts, graft, bribes, and, in some cases, the extremes of overt, deliberate criminal activity. The landscape on this route is marked by the notions of clean money, dirty money, opportunity too "good" to be turned down, and finally the rationalization that "everyone is doing it, anyway."

Not only is the introduction to this system determined,

in part, by the influence of the reference group in the informal social structure, but movement through the successive stages often requires additional socialization both of behaviors and attitude. A New Yorker magazine cartoon of some years ago shows a long haired artist, with a beret and a portfolio of paintings asking the reception in a plush suite of corporate offices, "Where do you go to sell out?". Not only is corruption a moral decision, but the individual has to learn how, where and with whom he may be corrupt.

The formal organization of the police agency provides a backdrop that either facilitates or inhibits this process of socialization to corruption. A poorly administered police agency tends to maximize the individual discretion of each officer and to allow so much freedom and autonomy that any concept of accountability will be lacking. While the converse is not true, that tight and effective administration will eliminate corruption it is true that tight administration will limit many opportunities for corruption, both by monitoring the individual officer's performance and by keeping the officers busy with legitimate police work.

Leadership is sometimes defined as the capacity to influence the behavior of subordinates. Police leadership must be defined this way, for the social structure of police work, allows the individual officers to ignore or evade leadership behaviors that are inappropriate. When

a leader is effectively articulating the goals of the agency, planning its use of resources in meeting these goals, and developing timetables and procedures for goal attainment, then the leaders become prime role models and strong influences. Some social psychologists have even suggested that leaders must embody and articulate the highest ideals of the group, ideals which because of their very mobility and transcendence cannot be articulated by members of the group without their seeming naive and unrealistic to their peers. All too often, police officers are passive in the area of goals and planning, and are silent with regards to ideals. When police agencies are primarily responsive, activity is initiated by others and ideals are discussed only in the context of defending the agency against charges.

Policy is most effective when it is clear, available, and relevant. Some police administrators believe that integrity is and should be an unspoken value in work. They see no need to develop, print and distribute policies defining the borderline between probus and improbus police behaviors. In the gray area of no man's land between the two, individual police officers must then supply their own evaluation and definition in accordance with their understanding and reasoning or rationalization. This is particularly serious because it is an open invitation to begin

the process of becoming corrupt. This one framework is one which the free cup of coffee is significant. Police authorities have debated and still debate the value and appropriateness of banning or allocating the free cup of coffee. But the absence of any clearly written, stated or promulgated policy on this subject is implicit license to the individual officer to make up his own mind about this, and other gifts. While successive steps of corruption often involve violation of the law, it is clear that there are times when a free cup of coffee, or free meal, or gift, can also be part of a pattern that clearly breaks the law. The difference between a gift and a bribe rests with its timing, purpose, and with the understanding of past or future reciprocity held by one or both parties.

Specialized units with police departments have an augmented capacity to socialize the newcomer for good or ill. Often the specialization means the existence of a cohesive group, separated not only from the public but even other police officers. Specialized police units tend to be created around either administrative needs or around particular crime areas of great sensitivity. In both general contexts, the information under the control of these units has an actual or potential value to others, whether it is criminal records, crime reports, investigative data, or group activity reports. In some of the sensitive

areas, prostitution, gambling, robbery, bunco, homicide and particularly narcotics, the monetary or other stakes may be so high as to breed active corrupters. Oscar Wilde once remarked that he could resist everything but temptation. There are many specialized police areas where temptation is always great. Even police engaged in traffic duty can allocate work to towing companies with a heavy profit potential. Specialized units are corruption vulnerable because of their social isolation, abundant opportunity, and internal social organization that maximizes secrecy and solidarity.

When police agencies are highly decentralized, even some of the less specialized units will share this vulnerability. They will gain a social autonomy that breeds secrecy and solidarity, will become increasingly isolated, and all that may be missing is abundant temptation and opportunity. This lack of comparative opportunity is not much of a safeguard when all other conditions foster corruption because, given the power and discretion of the police role, ingenuity can offset the lack of obvious opportunity.

The other end of the scale, extreme centralization is not necessarily an antidote for often the very rigidity of central structure increases the isolation of those far removed from headquarters. When centralization

removes local responsibility and accountability, it also minimizes effective control of individual behavior, a process that facilitates corruption. It's easier to deceive an impersonal system than it is to deceive a local manager. It would appear that a mixed or intermediate model would be more effective in minimizing corruption because it would limit the individual officer's or individual commander's complete autonomy, while nevertheless retaining responsibility and accountability at a level sufficiently local to be effective in monitoring informal behavior.

Corruption hazards for the individual police officer involve being left on his own, exposed to the blandishments of a corrupt fellow officer, or exposed to the strong conformity influences of an isolated or specialized sub-group that has developed group standards and values that are below those of the organization. The individual officer on his own, without appropriate guidance, supervision, or policy directives is virtually a corruption hazard on his own.

Other corruption hazards are implicit not in the social structure of the police agency, but in the context within which the police function.

Use of Police Peer-Relations Scale

Hypothesis

It was hypothesized that socialization would correlate with measures of corruption, assuming that in those cities in which the department score indicated a high level of improbable behavior, that a high level of socialization would also be found. The notion was that for improper practices to go on, it was necessary to have the compliance, either active or passive, of fellow police officers who would either approve, or in disapproving remain silent. Where socialization was high, therefore, the compliance of fellow officers was assumed to be not only more likely, but also predictable.

It was further hypothesized that the opposite would also be true -- that low socialization, or higher individualism, would have a limiting effect on improbable behavior.

Results

In order to identify results with greatest precision, it was decided that the Socialization Scale analysis would be undertaken using the two identified sub-factors on the 10 item socialization scale, these were:

Socialization A - consisting of items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 and Socialization B - consisting of items 1, 9, 10 (see page 7)

Socialization A provides a measure of the individual's officers purported knowledge of the lore, policies and practices of his police department, both formal and informal. Socialization B measures the extent to which the officer claims an "imbedded" police identity, and the extent to which he derives his values and standards from his peers.

These two sub-scales were then correlated with each of the other variables in the study, identified for the purpose of the analysis as possible dependent variables. The reasoning was that socialization, in terms of either identity as measured in Socialization B, or knowledge of the agency's rules and procedures, as measured in Socialization A, might explain some of the variance in other study factors.

The key analyses were, of course, related to the various corruption measures since socialization had been hypothesized as an independent variable that might contribute to the variance in either personal standards, disciplinary expectations, or perceived peer improbis behaviors.

Data was available for 888 police officers in six of the project cities, although the actual number of scores for each correlation was different due to missing scores in individual protocols.

The significant correlations, at at least the .05 level for Socialization A and personal history variables were:

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Pearson Correlation Coefficient</u>	<u>Level of Significance</u>
Age	.1171	.001
Education	-.0646	.033
Years in Department	.1642	.001

Thus the identity component of socialization was significantly correlated with age and years in department. The older the officer, and the longer the service in the department, the greater the sense of deriving one's personal identity from the police role. Educational level had an inverse relationship with the strength of occupational identity.

For Socialization B, the significant correlation, at the .05 level or better, were:

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Pearson Correlation Coefficient</u>	<u>Level of Significance</u>
Ethnicity	-.1268	.001
Years in Dept.	-.1233	.001
Field or Staff	-.1155	.001

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

The greater the knowledge of the formal and informal practices of the department, the more likely that it was that an officer was white, had served for a longer period of time in the department, and was in a staff rather than a field department.

These were, however, only the correlations between socialization dimensions and personal testing variables. Of greater interest were the correlations between the socialization dimensions and the improbity variables. The correlations between socialization and personal standards were not significant, nor were the correlations between socialization and willingness to report a given level of improbity.

However, the correlations between both of the sub-dimensions of socialization and the disciplinary expectations scores were indeed significant, as follows:

	<u>Correlation Coefficient</u>	<u>Level of Significance</u>
Socialization A and D15	.0561	.048
Socialization B and D18	.0781	.010

While it might be expected that Socialization B, knowledge of the formal and informal practices, would correlate significantly with the heightened perception of disciplinary levels in the department, it was less expected that Socialization A, the extent of derived police identity, would also correlate at a significant level with heightened

disciplinary expectations.

Overall, however, despite the expected correlations with personal variables related to longevity and tenure, and the somewhat unexpected correlations with disciplinary expectations, the dominant finding is the lack of significant correlation with other variables related to improbous behavior.

Discussion

This finding would imply that the elements of socialization, reassured in the scale that was developed for this study do not contribute to the variance in either personal standards of honesty nor in willingness to report perceived peer improbous behavior. This would appear to contradict the notion that socialization to the police role within a given police department leads both to the adoption of the values of that department and to increasing deterioration in personal standards or to growing awareness of improbous behaviors on the part of fellow officers. However, it must be recognized that even the bifurcated socialization scale measures only two gross dimensions of socialization. It does not take into account the size and nature of the reference groups actually involved in the socialization of the individual officer. Nor does it take into account the possibility of changes in department values, in their ambiguity in a given department, or in their level of clarity within a particular department.

There may also be a problem of level of measurement. Although, appropriately, the level of measurement in the study was centered on the individual police officer, (measured by product moment correlations of individual scores), the greater differentiation, indeed the differentiating level, was in department means. The point, simply stated, is that in the least improbus department there might well be an individual officer whose scale scores were at the extremely improbus end of the scale. The adverse is even more apparent, that in the department with mean scores showing a high level of improbus behavior, that individual officers score as models of probity and integrity. Individual variability with a department thus vitiates the correlations of socialization with probity dimension. At the same time, the mean socialization scores of each department are sufficiently affected by the mean age of the officers, and mean tenure within the department, to be less valuable as measures of imbeddedness, identity strength, or intra-department sophistication. Yet, presumably, it is these underlying socio-psychological factors that might influence probity.

From this perspective, it might be suggested that a future study partial out the effects of longevity in the department (which could have the effect of partialling out age as well) from the socialization score before studying the correlations between this factor and the other study variables. The results would then demonstrate the extent to which officers of equal age and departmental tenure differ

with regard to their socialization, in terms of "imbeddedness" or of knowledge of the formal and informal rules and practices of the department. This comparison might be a better predictor of the various probity scale scores.

However, a suggestion of the curvilinearity of the integrity dimension comes through strongly when a city by city examination of the correlations is made. In Table 1, it becomes apparent that in the more extreme cities, socialization does correlate at a significant level with the report variable, age, education, years in department and salary. This includes both the high integrity and the low integrity departments. In the middle of the range of departments, significant correlations are less likely to be found.


This suggests that in more extreme departments socialization plays a larger role deriving from age and tenure, than it does in moderate integrity departments.

Table 1
CORRELATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS OF TOTAL SOCIALIZATION SCORES AND OTHER VARIABLES BY CITY IN RANKED PROBITY ORDER

		<u>COPSN</u>	<u>CODIS</u>	<u>CORPT</u>	<u>AGE</u>	<u>SEX</u>	<u>RACE</u>	<u>EDU</u>	<u>MARSTAT</u>	<u>YRSDEPT</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>SAL</u>
Highest Integrity City	R	.0031	-.0821	-.1344	.2499	.0028	.0172	-.1254	-.0300	.3055	-.04886	-.0282
	S	.484	.141	.039	.001**	.480	.412	.05*	.349	.001**	.265	.361
High Integ		-.2015	-.0868	-.1951	.0409	.0225	-.1677	.6286	.0855	.1813	.0286	.1404
Mod High Integ		-.1813	-.1426	.0002	-.0148	.0133	.0477	.0371	.1718	.0036	.1214	.3949
Mod Low Integ		.076	.130	.499	.455	.459	.356	.386	.091	.489	.172	.001**
Low Integ		.1230	.0883	-.1863	-.0578	-.0537	.1062	.2279	.1103	.0800	.0626	.0432
Lowest Integ		.102	.182	.027*	.279	.293	.140	.009**	.131	.209	.288	.333
		-.0263	.1162	.0826	.0247	-.0028	.0140	.1480	-.1200	.1543	.0151	.1822
		.365	.063	.138	.168	.485	.0428	.025*	.058	.022*	.422	.011*
		.0152	-.0178	.0450	.2392	-.0516	-.2649	-.365	-.0650	.317	.3425	.3421
		.429	.417	.298	.002*	.247	.001**	.334	.223	.011*	.001**	.001**

*Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .001 level

R=Correlation
S=Significance Level



B. Interviews and case studies of former corrupt police officers.

1. Theoretical perspective

Corruption is a complex phenomenon, involving covert behaviors, attitudes and perceptions. Questionnaires, no matter how carefully constructed, could only measure related variables, either independent or dependent. The interview method on the other hand has been identified as flexible, comprehensive and non-restrictive in its approach. By achieving rapport, the skilled interviewer is able to elicit sensitive and complex information from the subject. Thus, it seemed desirable to augment the study of socialization to corrupt police behaviors with a sample of interviews that would detail the process by which the individual moved from probity to improbity in the performance of police duties.

2. Methodology of the interview.

It was decided that the only possible subjects that might be available for interviews describing socialization to police corruption were those who had been convicted for such offenses and were now willing to discuss what had happened. Accordingly, contact was made with police chiefs from a neighboring state that had been the site of several major police corruption scandals. The chiefs were asked whether it might be possible to telephone former police officers who had been dismissed for improbity and solicit their participation in the study. Of the ten chiefs who were queried, seven had the names of officers in this category, and calls were made to over thirty former police officers who had either been dismissed or convicted for improbity who might be willing to serve as respondents. After calling and talking to these officers, nine respondents were identified and interviewed. The interviews

were at least of an hour's duration and one that lasted for over three hours. Six involved face-to-face meetings, three had to be conducted over the telephone. The specific complaints that had resulted in the dismissals or convictions ranged from misuse of police authority (obtaining merchandise without payment) to participation in a burglary ring. Three of the nine officers had been dismissed for taking bribes from gamblers in a single city.

3. Initial expectations.

It was hypothesized that all of these former police officers would identify a process of drifting values and practices that led them to the behaviors for which they were either dismissed or convicted. It was further hypothesized that these officer-respondents, on the basis of their willingness to serve as respondents, would see themselves as having been seduced by circumstances and group pressure to participate in behaviors contrary to their personal values. Having been caught and punished, they would be motivated to talk about their experiences as a warning to fellow officers equally vulnerable.

4. Interview results.

The first hypothesis was confirmed. Not a single one of the respondents asserted that the behavior for which they were dismissed or convicted was an isolated incident, unrelated to their usual police behaviors. Nor did any of the respondents say that the improbable behavior had been part of their repertoire of police behavior from the start of their careers. On the contrary, these respondents all told of a gradual process of erosion of standards

that they had upheld at the start of their police careers. They described the erosion as consisting of a sequence of steps, involving silent acquiescence at the misdeeds of others, participation in behaviors of questionable probity, and finally a process of rationalization that antidoted the emergence of the improbable behavior in question. In every case, they cited constant pressures that moved them in the direction of improbity, including a growing awareness of the mendacity of the public at large, a feeling that the public and their fellow officers alike expected them to "look out for themselves" and an awareness that fellow officers were engaged in a variety of borderline, if not engaged in a variety of borderline, if not outright improbable behaviors.

"My first reaction was that I was unlucky because I got caught. After all, there were many others who did exactly what I did. Even during my first year on the force, I heard that it was possible to pick up something extra if you worked in the _____ sector. There was plenty that I saw before I began to feel that it was all part of the job."

One respondent, at least, specifically said that he had been exposed to behaviors by the group that represented the informal practice of his department.

Thus, despite their limitations, these interviews confirmed a developmental pattern of police corruption and described an influential process of socialization.

Seven of the nine respondents specifically stated that other officers had persuaded them to accept as routine practice that contravened departmental regulations. The other two respondents while denying these value influences, described a personal process of moving from rationalizing less serious improbity to rationalizing more serious improbable.

5. Limitations.

It must be borne in mind that the respondents were a selected sample of former police officers whose whereabouts were known to the local chief of police and who were considered as potentially cooperative respondents. They not only constituted a minority of the population of police officers discovered as corrupt, but were a selected sample as well. At that, three of the interviews were not face-to-face encounters, but were simply extended telephone conversations. Finally, the testimony of individuals who have been punished because of their misdeeds has the double limitation of being suspected of being self-serving and of coming from an established untrustworthy source. Caution should therefore be exercised on generalizing how these few interviews, although they do tend to confirm other accounts by corrupt officers such as William Phillips and by honest ones such as Frank Serpico.

Chapter 5 Individual Variables

(Pre-Employment Predispositional Variables)

I. Introduction

A. Rationale

This chapter focuses on the question "To what extent is police corruption related to the individual police officer's morality or integrity?" rather than determined by forces impinging on a police officer after he or she is hired into the police role. While it is generally assumed that police corruption, like most behavior, is largely determined by social or situational stimuli, it is also generally assumed among behavioral scientists that there are some cross-situational forces on behavior. An extreme view of this position is the instinct theory which posits that behavioral patterns are genetically determined. Modern instinctivists, called sociobiologists, propose that social behavior is primarily determined by genes present in the individual at birth. A sociobiologist's view of police corruption might then be that this behavioral tendency was present in the corrupt officer at birth and anti-corruption methods should aim toward identifying these individuals and screening them out of police work. A related but less extreme position is trait theory which posits that behavioral tendencies (e.g.,

extroversion) are determined early in the development of a person and are resistant to change in adults. An example of this position which is relevant to police corruption is the trait theory of moral development. Lawrence Kohlberg, a developmental psychologist, is well known for his extension of Piaget's Model of cognitive development to morality and purports that moral conduct patterns of an individual are largely determined before a person reaches adulthood. Robert Hogan, a clinical psychologist at John Hopkins University, has devoted his career largely to developing scales to measure the constructs believed by Kohlberg to account for a wide range of moral conduct. It is this theoretical position and measures derived by Hogan which will be applied to police corruption in this portion of the project.

Rather than taking a pure trait theoretical position, this project segment has adopted an interactionist position. Interactionism holds that behavior, including moral conduct, is determined partly by predetermined trait patterns or predispositions to respond in certain ways. This predisposition combined with situational pressures determines behavior. In the case of police corruption, the position is that the moral maturity of a police recruit interacts with peer or socialization pressures in the police role to determine whether or not that individual police officer becomes corrupt. A

corollary of this position is that moral maturity is fixed and measures of this construct should show little change across time in adults.

B. Previous Research Upon Which This Project Was Based

In 1976 a monograph was published by the Criminal Justice Center which describes earlier research in detail. Following is a summary of that research.

A sample of corrupt and non-corrupt police officers in a Southeastern municipal police department was identified by having experienced administrative officers rate each officer in the department on likelihood of being corrupt. A paired-comparisons rating method was used so that each officer was rated in comparison with each other officer after an initial identification of those thought to be corrupt by the internal affairs division. Reliability of ratings was replicated and it was found that there was a high degree of agreement across three independent judges as to who was corrupt and who was non-corrupt. Following this identification of the two samples, scales which were designed by Hogan to measure the constructs posited by Kohlberg's theory of moral development were administered to the two samples. The constructs measured included an Empathy scale, a Socialization scale, a Survey of Ethical Attitudes scale and a scale measuring overall moral maturity or Moral Values.

This last scale discriminated between the two groups at an acceptable level of statistical significance. (Table 1 & 2) The four constructs used in scoring responses on this scale are (1) Judgments based on the spirit of the law rather than the letter of the law, (2) Ability to see more than one side to a situation requiring a moral judgment, (3) Respect for the sanctity of an individual, and (4) Judgments based on the good of society as a whole. The non-corrupt group scored higher on this scale.

The research program to be reported on here is a follow-up of this original study.

II. Goals

A. General Goals

The overall goals of this portion of the Anti-Corruption Management Project, Phase II was to continue research investigating the degree to which police corruption is related to moral maturity, a personal trait assumed to exist and be measurable when applicants apply for positions as police officer.

B. Specific Goals

1. To conduct a follow-up on the original study in the Southeastern city in order to:
 - a. Determine how many corrupt officers had become non-corrupt, how many had been terminated or resigned, and how these events relate to moral maturity.

- b. Determine the degree to which moral maturity scores change when the scale is administered two years after the first administration. This would provide a measure of stability of the moral maturity scale as well as indicate the amount of change in the corrupt and non-corrupt group scores over a two-year period.

- c. Determine if the group of corrupt officers have a different set of general values as compared to the non-corrupt group.

2. Based on the identification of relatively corrupt and non-corrupt police departments as measured by the McCormack-Fishman Improbability Scale and the Ridealong technique, to determine if the mean level of moral maturity of police officers with two or more years of experience in corrupt departments is different from the level of moral maturity in a similar sample of officers in non-corrupt departments. Based on trait theory, a finding of significantly lower scores on officers in corrupt departments would suggest that police corruption measured at an organizational level is in part determined by the traits of individual officers, determined before entry into the

- organization. Also to determine if general values are different in experienced officers in corrupt and non-corrupt departments.
3. To administer the moral maturity scale to a sample of applicants or recruits in the corrupt and non-corrupt organizations in the eight-city sample to:
 - a. Determine if more corrupt departments are attracting applicants and recruits who are more predisposed to corruption than applicants or recruits in non-corrupt departments. If police recruits in non-corrupt departments are more morally mature this suggests that a portion of the corruption could be accounted for by this pre-employment predispositional variable. Conversely, this analysis would also indicate the extent to which police corruption is determined by post-employment socialization processes.
 - b. By comparing recruits and experienced officers on level of moral maturity, determine the degree to which there is a "moral values gap" between recruits and experienced officers and relate this difference to socialization processes as measured in those departments by the Bahn Socialization Scale.
 4. To administer the moral maturity scale to a sample of non-police citizens in communities

- of each corrupt and non-corrupt department from which moral maturity measures were taken in order to:
- a. Compare the moral maturity of recruits, experienced officers, and non-police to determine if police moral maturity is reflective of the moral values of the community.
 - b. Determine if applicants to corrupt police departments are less morally mature than a non-police sample as compared to citizen-police differences in non-corrupt departments.
5. To administer the moral maturity scale to all applicants to all law enforcement agencies in a county of a Southeastern state (including an 800 member municipal police department, a smaller county sheriff's department, and 10 small suburban municipal police departments) over the 18-month grant period in order to:
 - a. Develop a data base which could be later used for a longitudinal predictive study.
 - b. Determine the degree to which this information would be used in hiring decisions when incorporated into a pre-employment psychological screening report.

III. Methods and Findings

A. Follow-Up Study of Corrupt and Non-Corrupt Samples in Southeastern City

1. The director of the Internal Affairs

Division in this police department in 1978 at the time of this follow-up testing, had been one of the paired-comparisons judges in the original 1976 study. He was contacted and asked to determine current (1978) corrupt or non-corrupt status for those officers still on the force and to determine the number of officers from each of the two groups who had retired, resigned, or been terminated. It was found that of the original non-corrupt group, no officer had been terminated, six officers had retired, and one had resigned. One officer in this group was judged to have become corrupt. Of the original corrupt group, two officers had been terminated, one for corruption and the second for conduct. Three officers had resigned and three had retired. Four officers in this group were judged to have become non-corrupt; the three of these "turn-around" officers who were retested in 1978 showed an increase in moral maturity

scores, while the one officer who became corrupt showed a decrease. Both officers who were terminated in the corrupt group had an original moral maturity score well below the mean of even the corrupt group.

2. The subjects of the 1976 study were again contacted and those who agreed to participate for this retesting were again given the moral maturity scale and the Rokeach Value Survey. In the original study, thirty officers in the original non-corrupt sample and twenty-nine officers in the corrupt group participated. In the 1978 retest, the number of participants decreased in each group, twenty-two in the non-corrupt group and thirteen in the corrupt group. Again, the difference between the two groups was statistically significant (p.01) (Table 3) with the corrupt group scoring lower. It is interesting that the corrupt group scored even lower in 1978 (11.1) as compared to 1976 (12.6) and the non-corrupt group scored slightly higher in 1978 (15.2) as compared to 1976 (14.8). These within-group changes across time, however, were not statistically significant suggesting that the measure of moral maturity has reasonably

good test-retest reliability as would be hoped for with a trait measure. (Table 4)

3. Data analysis from the Rokeach Value Survey will be presented at a later date. We are still attempting to develop a way to statistically treat these rank order data. Preliminary analyses suggest no robust differences in general values between corrupt and non-corrupt officers.

B. Testing of Experienced Officers

1. Of the eight police departments studied by the Anti-Corruption Management Project, the two least corrupt and the two most corrupt were chosen for the moral maturity aspect of the project. A sample of officers with a minimum of two years of uniformed experience, all at the patrol rank were given the moral maturity scale and the general values survey. The total number sampled in the two relatively non-corrupt departments was 63 (N=40, 23) and the total number tested in the two relatively corrupt departments were combined into one sample and compared with the corrupt sample which was constituted of a combination of the two corrupt departments. The results

indicate that experienced officers in corrupt departments have significantly lower moral maturity (M=11.4) than experienced officers in non-corrupt departments (N=14.3) (Table 7) This suggests that the organizational level of corruption could be in part accounted for by the individual trait of moral maturity. One disturbing finding was that most of the difference between the two groups was caused by one of the corrupt cities (M=8.0) since the remaining corrupt city was not significantly different (M=13.3) from one of the two non-corrupt cities. (Table 6) However, both corrupt cities had means that were lower than the mean of either non-corrupt city. The finding that one corrupt city had officers with high moral maturity suggests that relatively high moral maturity of individual officers does not "immunize" an organization against corruption.

2. The Rokeach Value Survey data have not yet been analyzed but preliminary analyses indicate no general value differences between experienced officers in corrupt and non-corrupt organizations.

C. Testing of Applicants and Recruits

1. The testing of applicants was accomplished in only one of the four cities described above. This department was the one of the two corrupt organizations which had a relatively high moral maturity mean score. Few conclusions can be drawn because of the lack of comparison samples, however in this one city, applicants did not differ from experienced officers. (Table 8) Since it is already assumed that the corruption in this department is not a function of low moral maturity of the individual officers, it is not surprising that applicants' scores were not low.
2. Police recruits were tested in the training academy in both corrupt departments and in one of the two non-corrupt departments. Neither applicants nor recruits were available in the remaining department because of a hiring freeze resulting from the "taxpayer revolt". Perhaps the strongest argument against the moral maturity trait determinant of police corruption is found in the comparison of recruits moral maturity in the corrupt vs. non-corrupt departments. When the two non-corrupt department samples are combined and compared with the corrupt department

sample, there is no significant difference between the two (Corrupt Cities Mean = 13.3, Non-corrupt Mean = 14.8). (Table 9) This suggests that the different levels of corruption is not a function of moral maturity differences in recruits. However, when the corrupt department with high moral maturity scores is not combined with the remaining corrupt department sample and this remaining sample of recruits is compared with the sample of recruits to the non-corrupt department, the corrupt department's recruits are significantly lower in moral maturity ($M_s = 12.5, 14.8$). (Table 10) This supports the hypothesis that in some departments, corruption or the lack of it, may be a function of the moral maturity of recruits. However, as stated earlier, high moral maturity of recruits does not prevent a department from having a relatively high degree of corruption. It may well be that given exceptionally high opportunity for corruption, lack of administrative controls, poor morale, and generally questionable leadership (all found in this particular department), corruption exists no matter how morally mature the individual morality of its experienced officers and recruits.

3. Another argument against pre-employment moral maturity being a major determinant of organizational corruption is found in the comparison of recruits with experienced officers across corrupt and non-corrupt departments. In the corrupt cities combined sample, the recruits had a significantly higher mean moral maturity score (M=13.3) than the experienced officers (M=11.4). (Table 11) In the non-corrupt city in which recruits were tested, there was no significant difference between recruits and experienced officers (Table 12) although recruits in the non-corrupt city were slightly higher in moral maturity (M=14.8) than recruits in the corrupt cities (M=13.3). (Table 9) One of the two corrupt departments had recruits of much higher moral maturity (M=12.5) than its experienced officers (M=7.7). This "moral values gap" between recruits and experienced officers might be accounted for by socialization and organizational pressures which could result in the attrition of officers with higher moral maturity who don't fit in with the model moral values in that department. An alternative explanation for this difference is that moral

maturity is not immutable by adulthood but is itself more subject to social and situational influence than moral development theory has posited.

TABLE 1

Summary Table of Means
of Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
for Corrupt Group and Non-Corrupt Group
in a Southeastern City
Obtained in 1976 and in 1978

	<u>Non-Corrupt Group</u>	<u>Corrupt Group</u>
1976	14.8 (N=30)	12.6 (N=29)
1978	15.2 (N=22)	11.1 (N=13)

TABLE 2

Summary Table of t-Test
on Means of Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between Non-Corrupt Group and Corrupt Group
Obtained in 1976

<u>Non-Corrupt Group</u>	<u>Corrupt Group</u>
14.8 (N=30)	12.6 (N=29)

t = 1.83

df = 57

p 0.05

TABLE 3

Summary Table of t-Test
on Means of Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between Non-Corrupt Group and Corrupt Group
Obtained in 1978

<u>Non-Corrupt Group</u>	<u>Corrupt Group</u>
15.2 (N=22)	11.1 (N=13)

t = 2.50

df = 33

p 0.01

TABLE 4

Summary Table of t-Test
on Means of Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between 1976 and 1978
for Non-Corrupt Group and for Corrupt Group

<u>Non-Corrupt Group</u>	
1976	1978
14.8 (N=30)	15.2 (N=22)

t = 0.32

df = 50

p 0.40

<u>Corrupt Group</u>	
1976	1978
12.6 (N=29)	11.1 (N=13)

t = 0.99

df = 40

p 0.25

TABLE 5

Summary Table of Means
for Three of McCormack Improbity Scale
and Means of Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
for Experienced Officers in Four Cities Tested

	<u>Southwest Metro Urban</u>	<u>Northwest Urban</u>	<u>Southern Metro</u>	<u>Coastal Gulf</u>
Personal Standard of Honesty	2.8	2.9	9.5	16.6
Typology	30.28	31.4	28.0	26.3
Socialization	31.52	34.6	33.1	34.9
Hogan Moral Judgment	15.3 (N=23)	13.7 (N=40)	8.0 (N=22)	13.3 (N=41)

TABLE 6

Summary Table of Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
for Experienced Officers, Recruits, Applicants
and Nonpolice Samples in Different Cities

	<u>Southwest Metro Urban</u>	<u>Northwest Urban</u>	<u>Southern Urban</u>	<u>Coastal Gulf</u>
Experienced Officers	15.3	13.7	8.0	13.3
Recruits	14.8	-	12.5	13.9
Applicants	-	-	-	12.8
Citizens				18.0

TABLE 7

Summary Table of t-Test
 Between Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
 of Experienced Officers of Non-Corrupt Cities
 (Southwest Metro Urban and Northwest Urban Combined)
 and Corrupt Cities (Southern Metro and Coastal Gulf Combined)

<u>Non-Corrupt Cities</u>	<u>Corrupt Cities</u>
14.3 (N=63)	11.4 (N=63)
t = 3.07	
df = 124	
p 0.0025	

TABLE 8

Summary Table of t-Test
 on Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
 Between Applicants and Experienced Officers
 in One of Corrupt Cities (Coastal Gulf)

<u>Applicants</u>	<u>Experienced Officers</u>
12.7 (N=25)	13.3 (N=41)
t = 0.43	
df = 64	
p 0.40	

TABLE 9

Summary Table of t-Test
 Between Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
 of Recruits of Non-Corrupt City (Southwest Metro Urban)
 and Corrupt Cities (Southern Metro and Coastal Gulf Combined)

<u>Non-Corrupt City</u>	<u>Corrupt City</u>
14.8 (N=50)	13.3 (N=70)
t = 1.48	
df = 118	
p 0.10	

TABLE 10

Summary Table of t-Test
 Between Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
 of Recruits of One of Non-Corrupt Cities
 and One of Corrupt Cities

<u>Southwest Metro Urban</u>	<u>Southern Metro</u>
14.8 (N=50)	12.5 (N=28)
t = 1.87	
df = 76	
p 0.05	

TABLE 11

Summary Table of t-Test
on Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between Recruits and Experienced Officers
in Corrupt Cities (Southern Metro and Coastal Gulf Combined)

<u>Recruits</u>	<u>Experienced Officers</u>
13.3 (N=70)	11.4 (N=63)

t = 1.95
df = 131
p 0.05

TABLE 12

Summary Table of t-Test
on Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between Recruits and Experienced Officers
in One of Non-Corrupt Cities (Southwest Metro Urban)

<u>Recruits</u>	<u>Experienced Officers</u>
14.8 (N=50)	15.3 (N=23)

t = 0.43
df = 71
p 0.40

TABLE 13

Summary Table of t-Test
on Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between Hired and Non-Hired Male Applicants
in a Southeastern City

<u>Hired Male Applicants</u>	<u>Not-Hired Male Applicants</u>
17.1 (N=68)	15.6 (N=96)

t = 2.20
df = 162
p 0.025

TABLE 14

Summary Table of t-Test
on Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between Hired and Not-Hired Female Applicants
in a Southeastern City

<u>Hired Female Applicants</u>	<u>Not-Hired Female Applicants</u>
15.4 (N=14)	13.9 (N=22)

t = 1.52
df = 34
p 0.10

Chapter 6

The Development of a Systems Approach:Integration of the Measurement, Trait and Socialization Projects

When Phase II of the Anti-Corruption Management Project began in November of 1977, it was comprised of the three previously mentioned related but essentially independent studies. The Measurement Project bore the most severe time constraints and work in this area began almost immediately. By mid-February, 1978, the first two agencies had been surveyed and arrangements to survey the remaining agencies had been confirmed. Simultaneously, work on both the Trait Project and the Socialization Project was commenced. Since the Trait Project had been underway as an independent project previously, and had measuring instruments and a methodological approach which proved effective in the past, research in this area progressed with no great difficulty. The Socialization Project questionnaire despite its pilot implementation required some refinement before the final draft for field implementation was completed.

At the first staff and Advisory Board Meeting, there was discussion regarding the interrelationship of the three studies and the possibility of integrating certain aspects of each. During this initial period the target cities for each study (Measurement, Trait and Socialization) were different in almost every case. It rapidly became clear that by gathering data for each of the projects on the same sample populations, much more meaningful correlations could be made. For example, in a department which had a high reputation for integrity each

of the project questionnaires could be administered to personnel in that agency. If the hypothesized relationships among the three studies did in fact exist, this could then be demonstrated by correlations among the various measuring instruments.

As the project staff gained more confidence in the validity and reliability in the Measurement Project's Primary tools, the McCormack-Fishman Improbability Questionnaire and the structured Ride Along Interviews, the Police-Peer Relations scale was added and in several departments the Hogan Moral Maturity Questionnaire was added also. The results in some cases were surprising. The most highly socialized departments, for example, were departments with both the highest and lowest levels of integrity. This indicates that positive and negative peer pressure are equally strong. There were also indications that, regardless of the moral maturity level of individuals recruited for police service, the internal ethos of the department and the resulting working milieu were stronger predictors of an officers' eventual conduct.

The merging of the three projects eventually led to the development of the Police Corruption Correlation Matrix. This Matrix is predominantly situationally oriented in that individual traits, as indicated above, apparently impact less on the three major Matrix elements than does the total police environment. According to this Matrix, described on page , the three major factors contributing to or inhibiting the growth of corruption in a police agency are: (1) the level of corrup-

tion opportunity within the community, (2) the probability of being detected and reported upon engaging in corrupt activities and (3) the consequences expected as a result of being detected. The Matrix results from the combination of the results of all three major projects, since each of them provided increased insight into the police corruption phenomena and explained anomalies in the overall data that would not have been possible had they remained independent studies.

General Conclusions

As data was compiled as a result of questionnaire administration and ride along interviews, each city was compared against the others. A high correlation between the McCormack-Fishman Questionnaire data and the ride-along scores emerged. As a result the following statements -- supported by empirical data are offered regarding the Measurement Phase of the project:

- 1) The questionnaire has been validated:
 - a) it accurately measures the levels of impropus and corrupt behavior within a police agency
 - b) the measurements are scalable and can be used to distinguish between agencies in terms of levels of impropus behavior and corruption

c) scores on the questionnaire may be used to classify agencies as being in high, high-medium, low-medium or low categories, in terms of impropus behavior and corruption

2) The questionnaire may be used as a diagnostic tool

- a) the scale has diagnostic value in terms of the direction (positive or negative) and intensity of the internal socialization process (peer reporting scale) and the disciplinary expectations or officers who engage in impropus or corrupt activities (disciplinary scale)
- b) the scale combined with the Commanders Corruption Hazard Profile (a measure of the degree of community opportunities that admittedly needs further refinement) a matrix can be completed which explains systemic police corruption according to its three major contributory factors i.e., community opportunity, chance of detection, and prospects for and seriousness of discipline if uncovered.

c) that based on the correlation of data from this matrix, the relative degree of import of the three contributory corruption factors can be determined and addressed in each specific agency.

3. The Questionnaire is a Proxy for Ride-Along Interviews

a) that the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire may be used as a proxy for patrol ride along scores, thereby reducing data gathering and agency inconvenience to a minimum.

For a complete analysis of the above data see the companion report entitled A Systems Approach to Police Corruption: A Statistical Report.

In order to illustrate the relationship between the three major contributory factors in police corruption, i.e., opportunity, detection and discipline, a Police Corruption Correlation Matrix has been developed. In this matrix opportunity refers to those opportunities provided within the community setting. Detection is measured by the degree of agency peer reporting and discipline by the overall expectations of the officers of the department.

POLICE CORRUPTION CORRELATION MATRIX

		- OPPORTUNITY		+ OPPORTUNITY	
		-	+	-	+
+ DETECTION	+	0	1	2	3
	-	4	5	6	7
----- DISCIPLINE -----					
- DETECTION	+	8	9	10	11
	-	12	13	14	15

MATRIX KEY

- Where "0" is the theoretical situation in which there is absolutely no opportunity for undected corruption to occur (based on the items on the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Scales), where should such improbus behavior occur it would be reported by a peer to the administration of the agency in 100% of the cases, and where when reported disciplinary action of some nature would be taken in every case.
- A "1" correlation would indicate the slightest possibility of opportunity, with still 100% assurance of being reported if detected, and where certainty of discipline if detected was close to 100%.
- A "15" correlation would indicate an agency which was operating in an environment in which there are no limits to the opportunity to commit improbus acts, in which peers would not report to the administration of the agency any unethical acts they became aware of, and where should these acts be reported no disciplinary action would ever be taken.

Conclusions of a Systems Approach

Police Recruits may be socialized into corruption as a result of either community socialization influences or organization influences. The relationship between moral maturity in recruits, veteran police officers and citizens and the interaction of these may determine the areas of vulnerability to corruption. The following schema illustrates these interactions and hypothesizes outcomes:

1. Community - High Moral Maturity
- Police Recruits - High Moral Maturity
- Police Veterans - High Moral Maturity

In this situation, there would be the lowest probability of police corruption. The high level of moral maturity in the non-police community would be related to low opportunity (e.g., few bribes offered by citizens) and very low tolerance for police corruption. There would be no "moral values gap" between the police and the community. The police would be socialized into the broad community which would have the additional effect of decreasing the functional needs for police corruption as outlined by Bracey. (Bracey, D.H. A functional approach to police corruption. Criminal Justice Center Monographs, New York: John Jay Press, 1976). The high moral maturity of veteran police officers would be related to a positive socialization process so that recruits, regardless

of their individual level of maturity would not be exposed to organizational socialization pressures to become corrupt. In this situation, most applicants and recruits would be high in moral maturity, at least to the extent to which they are drawn from the population of that community. Recruits who are low in moral maturity would be socialized into non-corruption or would be forced out of the organization. This is the ideal anti-corruption climate and may exist only as an ideal.

2. Community - High Moral Maturity
- Police Recruits - High Moral Maturity
- Police Veterans - Low Moral Maturity

In this situation, there would be a relatively high degree of police corruption among police veterans. Police recruits would begin with a high level of moral maturity but would be vulnerable to socialization processes toward corruption. Also, police recruits with high moral maturity may leave the organization voluntarily because of the socialization pressures or may even be forced out of the organization because of their intolerance of corruption. While the mean level of moral maturity in the community is high and tolerance of police corruption therefore low among the citizenry, there may be a subset of the community which creates unusually high opportunity and tolerance for corruption. For example, a city

with a population subset of low morality tourists which might be tolerated by the community for economic reasons.

3. Community - High Moral Maturity
- Police Recruits - Low Moral Maturity
- Police Veterans - Low Moral Maturity

This model represents the self-selection hypothesis. Recruits of low moral maturity are attracted to an organization known to have low levels of morality among the veteran officers. Socialization would occur at the pre-employment stage and police applicants would not be drawn from the general community population. This model might also represent the far-flung possibility of a corrupt screening program, perhaps in collusion with a corrupt police administration. This model would require a strong and perhaps charismatic low moral maturity administrator. A reform police chief would have difficulty but could succeed in reforming the department with citizenry support.

4. Community - High Moral Maturity
- Police Recruits - Low Moral Maturity
- Police Veterans - High Moral Maturity

This model represents the self-selection of low morality recruits who are either positively socialized into a non-corrupt department, or who are not tolerated by the police

department. It is hypothesized that such a situation would have a high turnover rate. There would be strong socialization pressures both from the community and the organization toward non-corruption. As in the model above, police applicants in such a situation would not be drawn from the broad community but rather from a subset of the population.

5. Community - Low moral Maturity
- Police Recruits - High Moral Maturity
- Police Veterans - High Moral Maturity

In this situation there are socialization pressures in the community such as high opportunity and tolerance of corruption. However, the intraorganizational socialization pressures are toward non-corruption. Recruits of high morality perceive a non-corrupt organization and are attracted to it perhaps from another community or from a subset of the general population.

6. Community - Low Moral Maturity
- Police Recruits - High Moral Maturity
- Police Veterans - Low Moral Maturity

In this situation both community and organizational corruption socialization processes are at work. High morality, perhaps idealistic recruits are socialized into police corruption. This model is supported as feasible by the lack of empirical support for the hypothesis that high moral maturity immunizes recruits from becoming corrupt.

7. Community - Low Moral Maturity
 Police Recruits - Low Moral Maturity
 Police Veterans - High Moral Maturity

This situation represents the selection of low morality recruits from a community with low moral maturity into a high moral maturity organization. The police organization is able to resist community opportunity and tolerance socialization pressures and has maintained a positive socialization process within the organization. Low morality recruits are either forced out or are socialized into non-corruption. This model would also be associated with a high turnover rate. Such a situation might exist with a strong non-corrupt leader who has active corruption management controls to offset opportunity and tolerance in the community.

8. Community - Low Moral Maturity
 Police Recruits - Low Moral Maturity
 Police Veterans - Low Moral Maturity

This model represents the most corruption-fostering situation. Corruption results from community socialization processes, self-selection of low morality applicants and intra-organizational corruption-fostering socialization processes. In such a situation, a reform administrator would likely be alienated from the organization in general as well as have

difficulty being accepted by the citizenry. With such little support, it is unlikely that a reform chief would be successful. It is also unlikely that recruits of high moral maturity would be tolerated or would tolerate the socialization pressures within the organization.

Not only is the introduction to this system determined, in part, by the influence of the reference group in the informal social structure, but movement through the successive stages often requires additional socialization both of behaviors and attitude. A New York magazine cartoon of some years ago shows a long haired artist with a beret and a portfolio of paintings asking the reception in a plush suite of corporate offices, "Where do you go to sell out?". Not only is corruption a moral decision, but the individual has to learn how, where and with whom he may be corrupt.

The formal organization of the police agency provides a backdrop that either facilitates or inhibits this process of socialization to corruption. A poorly administered police agency tends to maximize the individual discretion of each officer and to allow so much freedom and autonomy that any concept of accountability will be lacking. While the converse is not true, that tight and effective administration will eliminate corruption it is true that tight administration will limit many opportunities for corruption, both by monitoring the individual officer's performance and by keeping the officers busy with legitimate police work.

Leadership is sometimes defined as the capacity to influence the behavior of subordinates. Police leadership must be defined this way, for the social structure of police work, allows the individual officers to ignore or evade leadership behaviors that are inappropriate. When a leader is effectively articulating the goals of the agency, planning its use of resources in meeting these goals, and developing timetables and procedures for goals attainment, then the leaders become prime role models and strong influences. Some social psychologists have even suggested that leaders must embody and articulate the highest ideals of the group, ideals which because of their very mobility and transcendence cannot be articulated by members of the group without their seeming naive and unrealistic to their peers. All too often, police officers are passive in the area of goals and planning, and are silent with regards to ideals. When police agencies are primarily responsive, activity is initiated by others and ideals are discussed only in the context of defending the agency against charges.

Policy is most effective when it is clear, available, and relevant. Some police administrators believe that integrity is and should be an unspoken value in work. They see no need to develop, print and distribute policies defining the borderline between probus and improbus police behaviors. In the gray area of no man's land between the two, individual

police officers must then supply their own evaluation and definition in accordance with their understanding and reasoning or rationalization. This is particularly serious because it is an open invitation to begin the process of becoming corrupt. This one framework is one which the free cup of coffee is significant. Police authorities have debated and still debate the value and appropriateness of banning or allocating the free cup of coffee. But the absence of any clearly written, stated or promulgated policy on this subject is implicit license to the individual officer to make up his own mind about this, and other gifts. While successive steps or corruption often involve violation of the law, it is clear that there are times when a free cup of coffee, or free meal, or give, can also be part of a pattern that clearly breaks the law. The difference between a gift and a bribe rests with its timing, purpose, and with the understanding of past or future reciprocity held by one or both parties.

Specialized units with police departments have an augmented capacity to socialize the newcomer for good or ill. Often the specialization means the existence of a cohesive group, separated not only from the public but even other police officers. Specialized police units tend to be created around either administrative needs or around particular crime areas of great sensitivity. In both general contexts, the information under the control of these units has an actual or potential

value to others, whether it is criminal records, crime reports, investigative data, or group activity reports. In some of the sensitive areas, prostitution, gambling, robbery, bunco, homicide and particularly narcotics, the monetary or other stakes may be so high as to breed active corrupters. Oscar Wilde once remarked that he could resist everything but temptation. There are many specialized police areas where temptation is always great. Even police engaged in traffic duty can allocate work to towing companies with a heavy profit potential. Specialized units are corruption vulnerable because of their social isolation, abundant opportunity, and internal social organization that maximized secrecy and solidarity.

When police agencies are highly decentralized, even some of the less specialized units will share this vulnerability. They will gain a social autonomy that breeds secrecy and solidarity, will become increasingly isolated, and all that may be missing is abundant temptation and opportunity. This lack of comparative opportunity is not much of a safeguard when all other conditions foster corruption because, given the power and discretion of the police role, ingenuity can offset the lack of obvious opportunity.

The other end of the scale, extreme centralization, is not necessarily an antidote for often the very rigidity of central structure increases the isolation of those far removed

from headquarters. When centralization removes local responsibility and accountability, it also minimizes effective control of individual behavior, a process that facilitates corruption. It's easier to deceive an impersonal system than it is to deceive a local manager. It would appear that a mixed or intermediate model would be more effective in minimizing corruption because it would limit the individual officer's or individual commander's complete autonomy, while nevertheless retaining responsibility and accountability at a level sufficiently local to be effective in monitoring informal behavior.

Corruption hazards for the individual police officer involve being left on his own, exposed to the blandishments of a fellow officer, or exposed to the strong conformity influences of an isolated or specialized sub-group that has developed group standards and values that are below those of the organization. The individual officer on his own, without appropriate guidance, supervision, or policy directives, is virtually a corruption hazard on his own.

Diagnostic /Prescriptive Anti-Corruption Package

The project has now reached the stage at which it can be asserted that it has developed and validated a measurement of police corruption that can be applied to any specific police agency or group. Not only is such a measure at hand, but the project has also developed an appropriate mode of self-administration.

The positive results with regard to the predictive strength of some of the measures suggests that a sequential diagnostic/prescriptive package could be developed for field testing. The package, combining the systems approach, would work in the following way:

PACKAGE A: The initial phase would be the self-administration of the basic measurements alone by the department in question. These would include the Ride-alongs and the Basic Questionnaire. The ride-alongs, although requiring the use of outside observers, could be arranged by the department in accordance with guidelines outlined in the project manual. The specific number of ride-alongs required for any specific department can be determined by formula, since through the project there is an estimate of the population variance and the population mean.

The distribution of the Basic Questionnaire, which yields scores for the three variables of Personal Standards, Discipline, and Reporting is a straight-forward procedure usually done at roll calls in a police department that takes less than ten minutes.

The data from these two sources produces a measurement that allows for the classification of the department as a whole into one of four categories of corruption proneness: High, High Moderate, Low Moderate, and Low.

For departments that fall within the low proneness category, there is no need to proceed any further, although it would be recommended that there be another self-administration after a five-year period.

For those falling in the other three categories, the recommendation (with varying weight) would be for the contracted administration of Package B, the diagnostic/prescriptive measures.

These include:

- GROUP Hogan Moral Maturity Testing (Veteran officers) Training Evaluation (Interviews, analysis of type and amount of Ethical Awareness Training) Labor Pool Analysis (Applicants and Trainees)
- GROUP Community Citizen Survey (Questionnaire) Environmental Analysis (Commanders Profile of Hazards)
- GROUP 3 Analysis of Property Clerk's Office, Internal Affairs Analysis

From Package B results, it would be possible to identify for the chief or commissioner the extent to which the contributing factors were in the area of:

- 1) selection and training of police officers
- 2) community attitudes
- 3) supervisory procedure and process

The results from Group would thus indicate to the chief or commissioner the apparent relative contribution of each of those areas, and therefore, it would tell him where he had to allocate the efforts to effectively combat police corruption. The application of the diagnostic/prescriptive package in this selective and sequentially phases way will enable police officials to:

- 1) Obtain an overall measurement of the extent to which corruption proneness prevails within their department at a given point in time.
- 2) If some level is established that merits further consideration, then the chief or commissioner can learn from where the problem appears to be stemming, and consequently, where remedial efforts would be most effective.

For a more complete description of this tool, see Volume III.

SAMPLE CITIES

City A - Eastern Metro Suburb

City "A", the suburb of an Eastern metropolis, has a population in the 70-80,000 range in an area of approximately ten square miles. Its department, which is comprised of a decentralized force of neighborhood patrol teams, numbers just under 200 sworn personnel. The city government is headed by a city manager.

The city has been aptly described by one police officer as a "goldfish bowl," i.e., it seemed to him that everyone, both in the department and the city, either knows him or can easily recognize him by the number on his squad car. This high visibility factor seems to have cut down greatly on the individual officer's willingness to get involved in impropus behavior.

There are no pornographic theaters or book stores, massage parlors, street walkers, etc., although there is evidence of some bookmaking operations. This definite lack of opportunity, along with the high visibility of the police officers, seems to have limited corrupt acitivity.

City B - New England Urban

City "B," which is in the New England area, is approximately 20 square miles in area and has a population in excess of 150,000. The day time population swells to well over one million, but when the work force leaves for the suburbs each night, the population diminishes to the aforementioned figure. The city is governed by a city manager.

The decentralized police department has over 400 sworn officers.

The team policing concept has been introduced and, even though there have been decreases in manpower, major crimes in the city have stabilized at the same level for the third straight year. The department has several federally funded projects in effect, including a Community Development grant, a Multi-Service Center and a Regional Access Frequency.

The city, whose population is approximately 50% Black and 30% Hispanic, has few movie theaters (neither pornographic nor family), porno book stores, massage parlors, etc. However, prostitution (primarily Black) is evident on the street. There are many bar/restaurant establishments in the city limits, also.

City C - Northwest Urban

City "C," which is located in the extreme Northwestern part of the country, is approximately 100 square miles in area and has a population of almost 400,000. The police department, which is decentralized (to three stations), has a sworn force in excess of 700, over 90% of whom are Caucasian.

The department, which seems to function in an atmosphere that promotes cooperative innovation, has an in-house computer capability for research work. Almost all of the sworn personnel have at least an Associate's degree, with a majority having a B.A. or B.S. degree.

City "C" has few pornographic theaters, and those are located in the downtown area of the city, although there is no obvious "red light" district as such. There are no gambling houses,

although they are legal (and present) in the adjacent municipality. There is a large homosexual population, and their activity is limited to several bars in the downtown area.

City D - Suburb of Southwest Metro

Governed by a city manager, City "D" has a population of approximately 350,000 in an area of 50 square miles. Its police department, which numbers 600 sworn officers and 350 civilians (with a large complement of CETA employees), maintains area policing with a centralized headquarters and area offices.

This suburb has a definite waterfront "strip" where licensed premises (X-rated theaters, massage parlors, pornographic book stores, etc.) flourish. There are also such establishments (along with many bars) in other sections of the city. The city, whose Black and Hispanic population is less than 20%, has some affluent sections.

City E - Southern Coastal Urban

A city of approximately 75,000 in an area of 20 square miles, this Southern Coastal municipality is governed by a mayor and a city council. Its ethnic breakdown is almost 50-50, White to Black. Typical of the Old South, the city retains much of that period's charm.

The police department has 200 sworn officers, and is decentralized. The team policing concept has been introduced.

There are after hours clubs, as well as some pornographic theaters. A prostitution ring is known to utilize one of the city licensed taxi services for soliciting customers.

City F - Southern Metro

This Southern metropolis has a population of 600,000 in an area of over 800 square miles. Its police department has almost 950 sworn personnel.

The obvious problem is the lack of close supervision of police officers due to the incredibly large area patrolled. Police officers keep their squad cars on off-duty time, with the city picking up both the gas and insurance expenses. Free rent is also available to those officers willing to act as a security officer for certain housing areas in which they live.

There is no real "red light" district, but rather a scattering of regulated premises throughout the city limits.

City G - Coastal Gulf Urban

A gulf port with a population in excess of 600,000, City "G" has an area of 350 square miles. The population is a mix of White, Black, Hispanic and Indian.

The police department, which is decentralized, has over 1500 sworn personnel. There are six precincts in which the men are deployed.

There is a definite red light district, as well as an extremely heavy tourist trade.

City H - Southwest Urban Metro

Governed by a city manager, City "H" has a population of almost 800,000 spread out over almost 400 square miles. The city is predominantly White (80%) with almost an equal mix of Black and Hispanic (8% each).

The police department is currently centralized, although decentralization is presently being considered. Sworn personnel number over 1100, with approximately 350 civilian employees currently engaged.

The city has a relatively small area where the pornographic theaters and bookstores operate (as well as prostitutes), and this is located in the downtown section. This area is heavily policed in proportion to the rest of the city, much of which is beach/resort area.

END