


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National Institute of Justice
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20531

1/4/85

DETECTIVES, IN CROSS NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Final Report.

Grant #81-IJ-CX-0073
Police Division
Office of Research Programs
National Institute of Justice

NCJRS

AUG 3 1984

ACQUISITIONS

Submitted by the Police Foundation
Suite 400
1909 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

George L. Kelling, Ph.D.
Harvard University
Principal Consultant

March, 1984

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DETECTIVES

Introduction

It is almost reflexive that when one conjures up images of the police, the uniformed police officer comes to mind. It is he or she who has come to symbolize the state's commitment to regulate, protect, and provide assistance to citizens. Their activities, distinctive dress, and felt presence, have evolved for over 150 years in common law countries and have become part of the elaborate ritual of contemporary urban life. It is almost unthinkable to conceive of urban life without them. There is hardly a service they have not provided. They regulate traffic, provide emergency medical services, assist in fire emergencies, deal with emotionally unstable persons and inebriates, give information, clean streets (e.g., after an accident), provide moral instruction (both informally, especially in disputes, and formally, as, for example, in "officer friendly" programs), rescue animals, care for lost children -- the now well known chronicle of their activities could go on and on.

The conspicuous and distinctive dress of police officers has become a trademark of police service. Although there have been challenges to the idea of a uniform on the basis that it is an oppressive military symbol, for the most part, the consensus is that when policing is at its best, the uniform becomes a readily visible symbol of trust, reliability, and predictability more akin to the uniforms of nurses and airline pilots than soldiers. As will become

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apparent later in this volume, the idea of having the police in uniforms was controversial but came early in the development of publically financed bureaucratic police. But just as now, it was not the case that public uniformed police were the only police agents operating in society. The "new" police did not replace the "old" police but rather grew up along side an elaborate entrepreneurial system, which remains to this day. Constables became "detective police": "thief takers," private police; and the lines between private and public police were and remain permeable rather than being clear boundaries. What is normally thought of as "the police" are a relatively small part of a police system in the United States. In a large part this can be said for England, Canada and Australia as well as the U.S. In addition to what are normally thought of as police, that is, public uniformed police, there are both a proliferation of private police, detectives, and security agents, and a network of public regulatory and police agencies including border patrols, drug enforcement agencies, postal agents, etc. What makes it even more complicated in the U.S. than other systems derived from English law, is the fact that the police are extremely decentralized. The result in almost all countries, but especially in the U.S., is a complicated overlapping network of public police agencies intertwined with public regulatory and police agencies, finally laced with private police agencies. Their coordination, or lack of it, ebbs and flows depending on particular circumstances, individuals, presenting problems, etc. The bias towards the uniformed patrol officers as representative of

police not only affects the layperson's view of police. Patrol has also received the most attention of researchers, police reformers, and police theorists. Private police, undercover operations, special tactical units, detectives, state police, federal police, etc., have all but been ignored.

This monograph will deal with but one small portion of those unexplored areas -- detectives (or criminal investigators) in urban police. It will address the history of detectives, their current functions, and what is now becoming known about their effect.

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to use existent secondary sources to critically examine what is, and is not known about the early history of detectives. The chapter will end at the formation of detective units (mid and late 1800's) in England and the United States. Hopefully it will be suggestive for future historical research, as well as instructive about the current circumstance. In a broader sense, the purpose will be to look at one approach to dealing with crime and public disorder, criminal investigation, which went through substantial changes in the late 1800's, the functions it was to serve, the controversies which surrounded its modification, and which exist today.

For those interested in the evolution of the Anglo-American criminal justice system, the period between 1790 and 1850 is one of intense interest. The new police were established in London in 1829.

Pentonville, the model of the new penal system, was completed in 1842. The role of the new police in bringing prosecution relieved victims of that responsibility. In England, transportation of convicts to Australia ended in 1853. The extensive capital punishment laws were all but eliminated by 1860.

This system had its roots in pre-Norman times. It was modified after the Norman conquest, and flourished until the late 1500's. In the nineteenth century, it was overlaid with a system which established new standards of public order, redefined the right of the state to intervene in citizens' lives, and created a whole new set of institutions and institutional relationships. Exactly what impact these new institutions had on rural and urban life is hard to determine, yet it does seem reasonable to conclude that at least part of the credit for the fact that both in England and the United States crime and public disorder were less of a problem in 1900 than in 1830 must go to them.*

*The question of the impact of this system on crime and public order or how much the ostensible changes can be attributed to other social changes will not be discussed in this paper. For a discussion of these issues see R.D. Storch "Crime and Justice in Nineteenth Century England" in History Today, A Political History of Urban Crime and Conflict, Safe Publications, Beverly Hills and London, 1977; and R. Lane Policing the City: Boston, 1822-1885, Atheneum, New York, 1975 (esp. Appendix I: A Note on Criminal Statistics, pp. 225-229).

These new institutions did not just suddenly spring out of a general consensus. They challenged basic beliefs about the relationship of citizens to government. Conflict over them was intense, both prior to their creation and afterwards. The tensions attending their birth continue to the present.

Early Policing

Detectives stem from the parish constable system in surprisingly direct ways. That system has its roots in the Saxon-Frank pledge system of reciprocal social obligation. In it, males were grouped into tithings headed by a hundredman who served both as the administrator and judge. This system of social obligation was further expressed in the responsibilities inherent in hue and cry; all members of the community were obligated to join in the pursuit of a wrongdoer. Those who did not were subject to penalties.

The Norman Conquest of 1066 introduced the constable. Originally an officer of the royal court, by the late thirteenth century the constable became a local officer of the manor or parish and was recognized by the crown as having the responsibility to oversee what was to be called the watch and ward system.*

*Although some authors suggest that the watch referred to the night watch and the ward to the day, the Oxford English Dictionary indicates that there was no such differentiation. Ward is an emphatic synonym.

The Statute of Winchester in 1285 codified this system and formed the basis of the English and American police systems. Critchley (1967) identifies five basic principles of the system.

- 1) It was a duty of everyone to maintain the King's peace, and it was open to any citizen to arrest an offender.
- 2) The unpaid, part-time constable had a special duty to do so, and in the towns he was assisted in his duty by his inferior officer, the watchman.
- 3) If the offender was not caught red-handed, hue and cry was to be raised.
- 4) Everyone was obliged to keep arms with which to follow the cry when required.
- 5) The constable had a duty to present the offender at court tests. (page 7)

The focus of any crime "detecting" function in these early stages was in the office of the constable. It was his responsibility to present to court all who had violated the law, including law violations ranging from not hanging out a light to serious criminal matters. Prosecution was the responsibility of the aggrieved person.*

*For a fascinating description of this system operating in medieval England see The Justice and the Mare's Ale by Alan MacFarlane (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1981) which is a case history of the criminal careers of a gang.

Watchmen were, in effect, a preventive force which operated primarily during the night, at first guarding city gates but later "lighting lamps, calling the time and reporting unsanitary conditions" (Repetto, 1978, p. 3). Pursuit of criminals was accomplished by the hue and cry.

The system in place during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was a direct descendent of the Statute of Winchester and consisted of a decentralized justice of the peace and constable-watchman system, and some "spontaneous adaptations to the new situations" (Hall, p. 585), e.g., thief takers, lay protective agencies, rewards, small specialized forces, moral reform efforts, and occasionally, the military. In America most small communities were self-policed (Richardson). In large cities Sheriffs, elected constables and watchmen

operated in the same traditional patterns as their namesakes in England.*

*Many issues in the development of police in the United States remain unexplored. In some respects it is more complex than the English story. As Walker (1977, p. 4) has pointed out, most of the histories of the police in the United States focus on northeastern cities. New York is generally credited with forming the first U.S. police department in 1845, yet many southern cities had routine foot and horse patrol as a means of controlling slaves well before that.

Private solutions were highly developed. In both England and the United States payment of fees to justices of peace and constables was firmly established. Citizens with no other recourse offered rewards for return of stolen property. Communities paid private citizens for capture and conviction of thieves. A system of Stipendiary Police (Lee, 1901, p. 191) developed in which a fairly standard set of fees was established. The source of fees for this system included public rewards, insurance companies and commercial houses, funds raised by subscription, individuals and/or organized citizens, and prosecuting associations (Radzinowicz, 1956, p. 12). It was not only constables and justices who could earn those fees and rewards. Any citizen could become a "thief taker" or "common informer." The notorious Jonathan Wild is a noteworthy example because, although he was not the first to abuse the system, he was able to turn it into a gigantic racket. He

organized the London underworld, systematically arranging to have goods stolen, and selling them back to the original owners. Those thieves who wished to remain independent Wild delivered to the authorities (and ultimately the gallows). He came to be known as the "Thief Taker General." After seven years he, too, wound up on the gallows. This system was based on at least three basic principles: social obligation of each citizen for the other; crime solution as a private, rather than a public responsibility; and political decentralization.

Historians who deal with the historical development of police are fairly unanimous about what led to the demise of this system. Critchley (1967) identifies three factors: the corruption of the constables, the corruption of justices of the peace, and the breakdown of the law and order (pp. 18-21). The rationale for these arguments generally were as follows. First, regarding the constables, they were placed under the justices of the peace and thereby became an inferior office. Persons of property and upper classes were excused from service. Persons who could afford to do so, hired substitutes. Soon, especially in populated centers, only the poor, aged, and decrepit were available to serve.

The second, the corruption of the justices of the peace, resulted from the fact that the criminal justice system was self supporting through a complex fee structure. This, according to most police historians, not only tended to corrupt the justices, but also further

reduced the reputation of constables and gave rise to the success of criminals like Jonathan Wild.

The final issue, the breakdown of law and order, is generally related in the literature to the vast demographic changes taking place in England, the end of the feudal society, industrialization overlaid on an agrarian society, the erosion of the belief in the justice of the rule of the gentry, the English propensity for riots, the impersonal conditions of urban life, jurisdictional limitations on watchmen and constables, the growth of the organizational structure of British capital which relied on promissory notes -- making the system extremely vulnerable to fraud (Hay, 1975; Repetto, 1978). These circumstances, it is suggested, led to high levels of crime, extensive rioting, and great public disorder. Literary accounts by Dickens and diaries like those of Mayhew supplement official debate and records.

In America, circumstances have been portrayed as similar (Johnson, 1979; Repetto, 1978; Lane, 1975; Richardson, 1974). In the early 1800's there was increasing concern about crime, cities were rapidly expanding, immigration was massive, racial issues were already explosive, urban riots were becoming an increasingly serious problem and industrialization was straining traditional patterns. In other words, American cities are portrayed as being affected by the same range of difficulties as were English cities. Likewise historians tend to identify the same reasons for the breakdown of the constabulary system: corruption and inadequacy of the system to meet urgent challenges to law and order.

The English, at least in so far as historians have recorded it, initiated change/reform in the methods of dealing with crime and disorder, and Americans adapted English reforms.

The names of the reformers are well known: Henry and John Fielding, William Pitt, Patrick Colquhoun, Jeremy Bentham, Edwin Chadwick and Robert Peel.

Briefly, Henry Fielding was a novelist, one of the founders of the English novel, playwright, essayist, and criminologist who became the Chief Magistrate of Bow Street in 1748. Different from many of his London contemporaries, he would not become involved in "trading justice" (using his office to make illicit profit, as was fairly standard, at least in London) and in 1750, formed a small group of "thief takers." Although primarily they were supported by "blood money" (as rewards and fees were known), they did receive a small and brief government grant (Critchley, p. 33). Later this group was to become known as the "Bow Street Runners." After his death, Henry Fielding was succeeded by his brother, John. Although the forerunners of the Bow Street Runners continued, and there was a brief experiment in government funded horse patrol, by the time of John's death the total force he commanded was six men.

The Gordon riots* inspired William Pitt's interest in police. Convinced

*The Gordon riots were named after Lord George Gordon who headed an anti-Roman Catholic mob which marched to petition Parliament. In the

riots that ensued, Catholic churches were destroyed, the houses of Catholics attacked, rioters set fire to Newgate prison, attacked distilleries, sacked the residence of John Fielding, attacked the Bank of England, attacked Irish laborers, and literally ran wild for almost a week. It was only ended when King George III intervened and brought in the army, a move for which he was later criticized --so ingrained was the suspicion against use of any army or police force for domestic purposes. Christopher Hibbert's London the Biography of a City, (Longmans, Green, and Co., Ltd., London, 1969) provides an account of these riots.

of the need to revamp policing, Pitt went beyond the Fieldings and proposed that the link between the justices and the police be broken. The constables were to be under the control of the ministers of the crown, were to patrol, be armed with powers of search and arrest and not to receive tips or rewards (Critchley, p. 36). Memories of the Gordon Riots notwithstanding, Pitt's proposals were vigorously opposed by the press, justices, and by officials of the City of London (as distinguished from the metropolitan area).

In 1797, Colquhoun, a magistrate, advocated the new science of policing in Police of the Metropolis. He further refined the ideas of the Fieldings, offered new plans for remunerating the police (special fees based on their success), proposed reorganizing them, distributing them throughout the metropolitan area, and separating police and political authority (Hall, p. 581). Also, developing an idea of Henry Fielding, he proposed a Police Gazette which would publish information about known offenders to aid in their capture. Finally he developed the Thames River Police. Jeremy Bentham, a utilitarian philosopher and Colquhoun's friend, restated utilitarian philosophy in terms that were more compatible with the concept of a governmentally paid and directed police agency. Chadwick, also a utilitarian, further refined the concept of a preventive police. Both Colquhoun and Chadwick will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a time of intellectual fervor. The utilitarians were pushing political and legal reform in the name of efficiency and with an eye to England's

domination of world economics. Public order and the maintenance of political stability were at the heart of their concerns. When Sir Robert Peel initiated his efforts Parliament, considerable progress had been made in conceptualizing and creating the idea of a publically financed preventive police force, in fact, many of the organizing principles already were in operation as evidenced by the Bow Street Runners, foot and mounted patrol, the river police, the constables, and the watchmen.

The Bow Street Runners, Thames River Police, Horse Patrol, etc. can all be viewed as experiments conducted in the late 1700's and 1800's which attempted to reconcile traditional values and modes of operation with the requirements for order and crime control generated by industrialization, urbanization, the declining role of the church, the development of the railway, etc. The experiments consisted of: 1) public financing of the police; 2) centralizing the police authority; and 3) preventive policing. These innovations did not operate in isolation; they overlapped, interconnected, and interacted with each other.

Public Financing of the Police. The traditions of private initiative were deeply imbedded in the English tradition and the resistances to public funding of police were both normative and practical. It was simply axiomatic that public funds were not to be used to support a system of justice. Crime resolution was a private matter; that was the norm and tradition. Raising of taxes was a practical issue. These combined when as early as 1785, Pitt had

proposed police reform which would have forbidden police to receive tips or other rewards. However, in spite of rioting, there simply was little enthusiasm for increased governmental power and higher tax rates, especially in rural areas. Yet, at least in the urban areas, experiences with "trading judges" and stipendiary police gave little promise of relieving the perceived problems of morality, crime and public disorder. As Radzinowicz has noted, the Bow Street Runners came to be "The epitome of the system" (Vol. 2-263) and presented serious problems as a consequence of how they were financed.

Bow Street Police Officers or Bow Street Runners, as they were commonly called, were the most perfect creation and ultimately the most complete travesty of the system of incentives. The notoriety of the rule that at the Bow Street Office "parties must pay" tended to confine their services to persons of fortune or influence. In addition, the constant practice of paying officers for extra duty, zeal and exertion, was a cause of jealousy between them and constables attached to other establishments where such payments were less frequent and certainly less lavish. The Bow Street Office soon became "a pecuniary establishment to itself," the headquarters of a closely knit caste of speculators in the detection of crime, self seeking and unscrupulous, but also daring and efficient when daring and efficiency coincided with their private interest.

Slowly some pre-1829 attempts at police reform experimented with compromises between the values associated with private initiative and the problems threatening established order. A major feature of these compromises was that the police would be paid a retaining fee, but rewards and incentives would stay in place. Although some public funding for the Bow Street Runners was briefly tried and abandoned, the first major innovation with public funding was the Thames River Police.

The Thames River Police grew out of the problems with crime that plagued the London port, at that time the world's largest. To combat those circumstances, the West India Trading Company, with Colquhoun providing the rationale, created the Marine Police in June 1798, with Colquhoun as director, a permanent staff of 80 and an on-call staff of 1120. Two features of the Marine Police were unique. The first, that patrol was to be preventive, will be discussed shortly. The second was that they were not to be stipendiary police. Instead, they were to be salaried, with strong proscriptions against fee taking. "You are to receive no fee or gratuity from any person whatsoever, for any duty you perform. Neither are you to receive any reward for services however meritorious, unless with the previous consent of the Magistrates" (Radinowicz, Vol. 2 p. 368). The West India merchants were apparently delighted with the success of the venture. Reported crimes dropped appreciably. Based on this success, in July of 1880 a bill was passed by the House of Commons making the Marine Police a publically financed organization. Of this Critchley writes "... and the Thames River Police thus became the first regular professional police force in London" (p. 43).

As significant as this move was it did not end the tension between stipendiary and public police. Even the creation of the Metropolitan police failed to resolve that tension.

Following the establishment of the New Metropolitan Police in 1829 a spate of police orders, instructions and memorandum was issued, each one forbidding something. In time their cumulative effect was to transform a policeman into a public servant. But well into the middle of the nineteenth century, he was much more a member of a liberal

profession, whose fortune and standing in life depended on the goodwill of his private clients (Radinowicz, Vol. 2, p. 255).

As is clear, the Metropolitan Police Act was one more step in the transition from a stipendiary to a publically funded police, but it was not the radical break with the past as is so often assumed or presented. It was a substantial move in that direction, but policing, especially detective policing, was to remain primarily a stipendiary system for years to come. The Bow Street Runners existed for ten years after the creation of the new police. The appointment of constables in parishes was mandatory until 1872 (Philips, p. 59).

Political Centralization

The second experiment was with political centralization; that is, the transfer of power from the magistrates to the Home Department. By a series of successive approximations the central government expanded from limited influence over the Bow Street Runners, to a fairly close supervision of the Thames River Police, to complete control over the Horse Patrol (founded in 1805). This represented a substantial shift of governmental power away from the justices of the peace. Two arguments supported this transfer of power. The first was based on the veniality of the magistrates. The portrayal of the justices of the peace as corrupt, and therefore leading to an equally corrupt system of justice is found both in contemporaneous portrayals of the city drafted by reformers and in fiction. For example Dickens' Bleak House portrays a dismal system of justice, a treadmill that perpetuated itself at the expense of justice.*

The second justification for this centralization was the increased crime and public disorder and the inefficiency of the police in dealing with them the latter an affront to the Utilitarian goal of efficiency.

Interestingly, when the later move to incorporate the rural areas into a centralized system (1839) was proposed, the focus included the need for efficiency, but a different line was taken regarding the magistrates. As Critchley summarizes:

... First being country gentry, the magistrates were too remote from the working classes from whom most criminals came and so, lacking knowledge and a just appreciation of the gravity of the problem, they failed to appoint enough constables to grapple with it; second, being generally wealthy men, they were in a position to protect their own property and had little interest in protecting that of others, particularly the valuable property in transit through Cheshire on railways and canals; third, the Commission insisted that, whatever the position might have been in the past, the judicial and executive functions of the magistrates were constitutionally distinct and essentially incompatible. (p. 73)

The reformers stated it both ways. In the cities the magistrates were too bad to administer police; in the rural areas they were too good.

But the central theme was efficiency, and it was the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham who reconciled the basic precepts of that philosophy with the idea of a national centralized police. Bentham, whose primary interest was the reform of law, also evidenced concern about how that law should be administered. In some respect a stalking horse for more conservative schemes, Bentham not only called for a system of preventive police, but also strongly advocated a national police information system both organized along the lines of the French

police and making extensive use of criminal informants. Although his closest student and collaborator in the area of criminal reform, Chadwick, was to become the architect of preventive policing, he pulled back considerably from the extreme of Bentham's position. But Bentham's use of Utilitarian thought to justify a strong centralized government legitimated a heretofore unacceptable thesis: government, to provide the greatest good to the greatest number, required a strong centralized police to prevent crime and maintain order.

The Metropolitan Police Act was one more step in the continuing trend toward the centralization of police authority. But there were subsequent steps as well.

The chief national landmarks in the introduction of police forces were the Metropolitan Police Act (1829), establishing the first paid, uniformed police for the London metropolitan area; the Metropolitan Cooperations Act (1835), which made it obligatory for all incorporated boroughs to set up police forces under the control of a Watch Committee appointed by the Borough Council; the County Police Acts (1839 and 1840), which were permissive Acts, allowing but not compelling, county Quarter Sessions to set up professional county police forces; Three Inspectors of Constabulary were appointed under this act, to assess the efficiency of all the forces and make annual reports to Parliament; forces certified efficient would qualify for a Treasury grant of one-quarter of the cost of the pay and clothing of the force (Philips, p. 54).

The 25 percent grant for efficiency worked to centralize control under the Home Department.

The debates over these developments were vigorous. The Edinburgh Magazine for example referred to the establishment of the rural police as follows:

It has a new origin, new functions, and new and very extraordinary powers. It adds the cutlass and the pistol to the truncheon and the baton; it spurns at local control; it is to know no sympathy with the People; it is arrayed in almost formal hostility against the poor. (Quoted from Radzinowicz, Vol. 4, p. 262.)

The Constabulary Commission of 1839, armed with Bentham Utilitarian arguments rejected the opposition to centralization of power in the national government.

The great mass of evil indicated in our Report is ascribable not to the abuse, but to the neglect and disuse of beneficial powers. The chief and people objection, as we conceive, to the police forces abroad are, that they act on powers which are arbitrary: the force which we propose could only act on powers which are legal, and for which they would be responsible to the courts of law, and ultimately to parliament. (Quoted from Critchley, _____)

Centralization of police authority meant something quite different in the United States. Until well into the twentieth century centralization meant the transfer of authority from justices of the peace to majors and common councils (Levett, 1975). Centralization of police authority to the national government to the extent that it has occurred was, for all practical purposes, a twentieth century phenomenon in the United States. This will be discussed later in some detail.

Preventive Policing

The final experiment was with preventive as opposed to detective police. As was indicated earlier, it was Colquhoun who conceived and later administered the Thames River Police. His conceptualizations of

preventive policing went far beyond what is generally perceived as preventive police.

Operating out of Bentham's frame of reference, his proposals included reforms to: extend the scope of criminal laws, change the penal system, establish public prosecutors, appoint stipendiary magistrates, extend rewards, fees and other incentives, and have police supervise and regulate public and lodging houses, places of amusement, certain trades, Jews, gypsies, servants, ballad singers, prostitutes, convicts, and the uncontrollable poor (Radzinowicz, Vol. 3, Chapter 10). Prevention of crime and public disorder were to be obtained through the establishment of an elaborate regimen in which the police were to be but one, albeit central, agency. The important point here is that the original idea of a "preventive" police did not just view police officers' conspicuously walking a beat and by their presence deterring or intercepting crime. Instead, preventive policing was originally conceived as a highly developed set of supervisory and regulatory tasks with supporting legislation giving police rather extraordinary powers, including, for example, the right "to search houses or workshops of coiners at night and suddenly to force open doors or windows" (Radzinowicz, Vol. 3, p. 272). Additionally, other supporting systems, e.g., penal, were to be mobilized to support such activities.

Chadwick, also a follower of Bentham, and a pioneer in preventive health and the creator of a new poor law system, focused more on the activities of police alone. However, for him as well, preventive

policing included adjustments in the law, emphasis on citizen responsibility for reporting crimes and disorders, street lighting, wider pavements, as well as police tactics such as flexible geographic assignments for police officers based on crime occurrences, and targeting on known offenders. As Colquhoun, he wanted to keep the incentive system intact.

The concept of preventive policing was also developed to distinguish the British policing proposals from detective policing which was the subject of much concern in England.

Chadwick, for example, in his 1829 writings went out of his way to contrast preventive policing with the French system which emphasized detection.

Now we venture confidently to assert that these conclusions are never erroneous; that the French system of police neither is nor ever was a preventive system; that it neither is or was a good system; and that there is nothing in the political success of any portion of it which could number any rational government desirous of possessing a similar instrument. (Radinowicz, Vol. 3, p. 470.)

The concerns of the English were, of course, political. The rumblings of the French Revolution and what were considered to be the excesses of the French police made them particularly sensitive to the idea of detective police. This system had survived both the Revolution and Napoleon. The assertion by Sartines, lieutenant-general of police from 1759-1774, that when three people on a street conversed, at least one worked for him, was repeated in the early 1800's by Fouce. Whether it was true or not was beside the point. "Police agents or spies, eighteenth-century Parisians believed, were

everywhere -- ubiquitous ears that caught each small hint of discontent." (Williams, p. 109.) As Williams (1979) points out:

It suited the police that stories like this should circulate. According to Lenoir, the common belief that nothing which happened in Paris went unnoticed by the police was far more helpful to him than a host of paid undercover agents could have been. To nurture this useful popular conviction, he says the Lieutenant of police made a practice of feigning 'to know what many persons acting without calculation or commission came to tell him.'" (p. 109)

The potential of this system, and the beliefs about it, to stifle dissent and be abused was enormous. The great fear of the English was that such a system would be created in England.

It was also in the early 1800's that Vidocq became famous (or infamous, depending on one's point of view). Vidocq was the prototype of the reformed thief as thief-taker. He formed the Surete on the basis of the principle that only a thief can catch a thief.

... he directed a network of spies, informers, and exconvicts like himself, in a war against crime which was completely successful. His unrivalled knowledge of the underworld and its ways, his reliance on criminals to catch criminals, his unprecedented files of criminal records, his daring raids on criminal strongholds were all reasons for this success. In 1817 with only twelve full-time assistants he was responsible for over eight hundred arrests. (Hibbert, p. 290).

In England opponents of detective police accused Vidocq of instigating many of the crimes he solved (Hibbert, p. 291).

These then were the converging trends that led to the creation of the Metropolitan Police: the move away from a stipendiary system, a move towards centralization of political power, and the definition of the police task as preventive as opposed to detective. These were associated with a variety of economic, social, and political changes.

Ideologies were adapting to new economic and political realities. Utilitarian philosophy aside, it is easy to speculate that the West India merchants were pragmatic enough to be more than happy to have government pick up the cost of the Thames River Police. Rural resistances to the development of a new police were not hard to understand. In many respects the system worked very well for them. That their taxes should be raised for a problem in London was not exactly an idea about which one could expect much enthusiasm.

This latter issue deserves comment. Most of the evidence about the inefficiency of the constable system comes from the London area and consists of justifications for a centralized, public, preventive police from active reformers who were pushing for wide ranging reforms. It seems fair to suggest that just as one can argue that the nature of the contemporary crime and public disorder problems and the efficiency of the police in dealing with them have been distorted for a variety of organizational and political ends (Kelling, 1981), so similar arguments can be developed regarding seventeenth and eighteenth century England. Recent historical accounts of rural areas shed light on this; Philips (1977) is a good example. In his discussion of crime in Black County from 1835-1860, Philips raises challenges to the standard conception of the "increase" in crime.

We opened this book with quotations from observers in the 1830's and 1840's about the frightening increase in crime which they had witnessed from the beginning of the century. We are now in a position to try to assess the validity of their fears. Generally, the evidence we have dealt with casts doubt on the usefulness or even the validity of using a blunt concept such as 'increasing crime.' Certainly, recorded crime increased from the beginning of the

nineteenth century, but this, we have seen, was closely related to changes in police and prosecution.

Likewise he challenges the standard perception of the constables.

Most police histories have followed the Royal Commissions on County Rates (1836) and on the establishment of a Constabulary Force (1839) in the view that the constable was usually illiterate and "most commonly an uneducated person from the class of petty tradesman or mechanics" (quote from R.C. on County Rates, 1836, p. 8) who held office for one year only. This was not true of the Black County constables of the 1830's: as has been mentioned, they tended to be long-serving; and examination of the depositions of constables ... shows that the overwhelming majority of them could sign their names ... and this in an area in which over 50 percent of adult males were unable to sign their names. (p. 62.)

Moreover Philips challenges the prevailing view that the constables were overwhelmingly inefficient and ineffective. Predicting what contemporary evaluative research is now establishing about contemporary police. Referring to the constables:

But it is possible for them to have been seen as inefficient in some respects (notably in the repression of large scale public disorders, in finding the perpetrators of crimes of which victims could not name the offenders, and in preventing the commission of offenses) and relatively efficient in others (such as breaking up small disorders, and dealing with thefts, assaults or robberies where the victim either knew, or had a fairly strong suspicion, who the offender was).

Speck (1977) comes to similar conclusions about the prevalence of crime.

Judging by indictments, the crime rate in rural Surrey and Sussex seems to have actually declined in the century 1660 to 1760. In the metropolitan areas of Surrey, on the other hand, there seems to have been a slight increase in the rate in the first half of the eighteenth century, which confirms that contemporaries were right in thinking that the incidence of crime was higher in London than in the provinces, but scarcely supports their view that they were experiencing a massive and almost uncontrollable crime wave." (p. 86)

These conclusions suggest that the circumstances regarding crime and public disorder and the constables were far more complex than has been generally suggested in the historical police literature. It is highly probable that the portrayal of the extent of crime, the venality of the justices of the peace, and the ineptness of the constables are political caricatures both having both elements of truth and distortion. What seems highly likely is that it more accurately portrayed the circumstances in London where crime, as always in highly urbanized areas, was more of a perceived problem than in rural areas, but where, also, the political instability associated with crowds was more of a threat than in rural areas. As Gash (1968, p. 14) points out, "After 1830 it was reasonably certain that at least the national legislature would not be exposed to direct popular violence." So in 1829 with little debate and no opposition, the Metropolitan Police Act was passed. Sir Robert Peel, basing this Act on the work of Fieldings, Colquhoun, Chadwick, and others, skillfully maneuvered the act through Parliament. The Act itself was a greatly circumscribed model of preventive policing with no provision for detective policemen. Although watchmen, Bow Street Runners, Constables, etc., were invited to join the new police, many did not. Some continued in their entrepreneurial activities; this was true both in England and the United States. As discussed earlier the new system overlaid the old, with constables, Bow Street Runners, etc., continuing to provide detective policing in the traditional stipendiary ways. This will be discussed in more detail later.

The circumstances both were similar and different in the United States. They were similar in that the system of policing had been directly inherited from the British. The principles of social obligation and crime solution as private rather than public responsibility were every bit as ingrained in the Americans as in the English, if not more so. The constable, the hue and cry, the night watch, the fees and incentives were all part of early American attempts to deal with crime and disorder. Likewise, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, urban problems were being acutely felt. Urban disorder, riots and crime were being increasingly identified as serious problems.

But there were also significant differences from England. Central government involvement in issues of urban crime and disorder were non-existent. Immigrants, especially German and Irish, were adding ethnic behaviors, norms and more to cities. The impact of slavery and relations with native American Indians created unique circumstances. There simply was no capacity for or interest in intercity enforcement capacities. Moreover, in America the debate about police simply did not attract the intellectual elite as it did in England. No Bentham or Mills were to develop grand ideas of preventive policing. Reading the history of American policing gives the impression that what discussions there were, focused on limited organizational and operational issues. The American response, until well into the nineteenth century, was to tinker with the constable and night-watch system (Bacon, 1939). If anything the Americans were even

more reluctant than the British to develop a standing para-military capacity. Clearly they were aware of the English experiments and the reforms of Peel (Johnson, 1979; Richard, 1975). M'Ilvaine was proposing a regular police system in Philadelphia in 1833. As Johnson (1979) points out "But their recommendations also indicated a sensitivity to peculiar American circumstances which would prohibit a similarly sweeping reform in Philadelphia" (p. 17). M'Ilvaine argued that the efficiency of the new police would be derived from their organization and systematic operation rather than their new power. But most Americans, as the English, were less than fully enthusiastic about these proposals, as watered down as they were, and only modest changes were made.

In the U.S. the extent and scope of the crime and disorder problem was not as self evident as political rhetoric would have on believe, reflecting as much "official" as "real" rates (Lars, 1979).

But slowly, with New York City first in 1845, American cities, as much with an eye to each other as to the English experience, began individually to consolidate their various police services into one organization accountable to the Mayor and/or common council.

As the proposed 1833 Philadelphia reforms demonstrated, the concept of preventive policing, however, was significantly different not only from the idea of Colquhoun and Chadwick, but from those of the Metropolitan Act as well. There were few calls for radical reform of penal codes or integration of policing into such grand reform

designs. Local control and voluntarism were simply the norms of the day. The local debates posited that current schemes were not working to deal with crime or disorder. Something had to be done. In spite of opposition to the concept of a standing police organization, consolidating police into one agency, having them work 24 hours a day, restricting their authority, and making them politically accountable was the standard after 1850.

This does not mean that serious and tough political issues were not involved. The accounts of Bacon (1939), Lane (1979), Levitt (____), Johnson (____), Wood (____), and others gives evidence that they were. If the historical interpretation of Lane (____) is correct the critical immediate task of the police were "the reestablishment of political and social control over a population wracked by ethnic and economic rivalries between the 1830's and the late 1850's" (p. 120). Moreover struggle for political control of the police would be the dominant theme of the history of United States police (Fogelson).

The real policing experiments in the United States were not to come until the twentieth century when the federal government began systematically to involve itself in law enforcement at all levels.

In summary, during the period 1750 to 1850 a model of policing which emphasized:

- o social obligation,
- o decentralized control (justices of the peace),
- o voluntarism,
- o fees, rewards and stipends,
- o private solutions, and
- o detective policing,

was overlaid both in the U.S. and England by a system which incorporated:

- o bureaucratic control,
- o centralized control (in England the Home Department; in the U.S., mayors and common councils),
- o salaried personnel,
- o uniformed personnel, and
- o preventive policing.

Elements of the old system were left intact. Citizens were expected to aid the police. Magistrates and constables continued to function. Rewards, fees and incentives continued. Constables served their detecting function. As will be seen, to a greater or lesser extent, most elements of the earlier period continued to operate in one form or another.

In the final analysis three arguments were made for revamping of police in England and America; efficiency, effectiveness, and equity. New police would be better managed and thus more efficient. This efficiency would lead to greater public order and crime control and, since policing was public service, would provide protection regardless of wealth or social standing.

Detectives

In 1832, Sergeant Popay of the Metropolitan Police was discovered in the role of an "agent provocateur" in the National Political Union (NPU). Critchley concludes his discussion of the event as follows:

A Parliamentary committee exonerated the authorities from connivance in Popay's conduct, which they condemned as "a practice abhorrent to the feeling of the people and most alien to the spirit of the constitution." Popay was dismissed, but the damage was done. (p. 55)

Miller discusses Popay as "an overzealous patrolman (who) in plain clothes joined the radical National Political Union and acted as an agent provocateur." Radzinowicz's account, however, presents an elaborated picture:

... Lord Melbourne instructed the Metropolitan Police Commissioners in 1831 to keep him informed of the Union's (NPU) activities, and was sufficiently interested to look at some of the reports and to note that the information was not unimportant and must not be lost sight of. The information had been collected by Sergeant Popay, to whom, with the approval of the Commissioners, Superintendent M'Lean had delegated the tasks of watching the Union.

Contrary to the impression often given Popay had not acted on his own. He was operating on instructions that were initiated by Lord Melbourne and which came down the chain of command. His reports were reviewed by Melbourne himself. In spite of the apparent rejection of the concept of detective policing, within two years of the formation of the new police at least one agent had been assigned a detecting role that was not crime related, but rather was for the purpose of political surveillance and maintaining public order. A parliamentary inquiry followed and issued the following ambiguous statement:

"with respect to the occasional employment of policemen in plainclothes, the system was laid down by the heads of the police department affords no just matter of complaint, whilst strictly confined to detecting breaches of the peace, should these ends appear otherwise unobtainable. At the same time, the committee would strongly urge the most cautious maintenance of those limits, and solemnly deprecate any approach to the employment of spies, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, as a practice most abhorrent to the feelings of the people, and most alien to the spirit of the constitution," (Quoted in Lee pp. 255-56)

Hibbert (1963, p. 292) associates this incident with dashing the hopes for the early establishment of a detective force in the

Metropolitan Police. Whether Hibbert is correct or not, the establishment of a detective capacity was the subject of great debate. The constables and Bow Street Runners were still operating, but some, like Dickens, described the Bow Street Runners negatively. Others, including the press, compared the Runners favorably with the new police. The Metropolitan Police, ostensibly acting in response to this controversy formed an investigative branch of two inspectors and six sergeants in 1842. But as Radinowicz points out (Vol. 4, p. 188) prejudice against a detective unit remained strong and even though there was a shortlived attempt to expand the number of detective police in 1845, the total detective force remained no larger than 16 for 25 years after its creation. Yet controversy did not subside. Punch "dismissed it (the Detective Department) as the Defective Department" (Critchley, p. 161). A second incident, much like the Popay affair, occurred in 1845. Finally in 1877, three of the four inspectors were found guilty of corruption.

"They were charged with passing information on police matters to a gang of racing swindlers, who had tricked large number of people out of their money by allowing them to share in the work of an "infallible" system. They had felt it worth obtaining protection from police interference by bribery."

Surprisingly the response to this incident was not only to end the Detective Department, but also to create the Criminal Investigation Department under the direction of Howard Vincent. Two hundred and fifty men were assigned to the unit and within six years that number rose to 600.

As in England after the creation of municipal police, the ongoing need for an investigative capacity in America was met by constables-investigators (Johnson, 1979; Levett, 1975). But as the next chapter will discuss it was not long after the creation of municipal police that they formed detective units. Boston formed a detective unit in 1846 (Lane); New York, 1857; Philadelphia, 1859; and Chicago, 1861. As in England, the creation of investigative units was not without turmoil. Chicago ended its unit in 1864 (Johnson, 1979, p. 66); Boston in 1870 (Lane, pp. 155-56), both after scandals. New York had major scandals in 1877.

Conclusion

The beginning of the Victorian era was a period in which new standards of social and political order were developing. To a greater or lesser extent, the intellectual and political elites were convinced that the then current order maintenance and crime control capacities were no longer adequate to deal with political and urban realities. In the name of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity they skillfully overlaid a new system on the old. It was done gradually after a series of experiments and in the face of serious opposition. This opposition greatly abated many ideas of the reformers. The motives of the reformers no doubt were plural. As in the mid-twentieth century, concern for crime was genuine. That the level of crime and the inadequacy of the constables was exaggerated, especially the depictions of the rural areas for political reasons, seems quite likely. It came as no accident or, probably, surprise that the most obvious and immediate impact of the police was in the maintenance of political order. The pitched battles with, and ultimate street victory over, the Chartists, (in Birmingham as well as London) by the Metropolitan Police, as well as the Popay incident, gives evidence of another primary concern: political stability. Gash's () cryptic statement that at least parliament was safe in 1830 adds more evidence of the importance of political motivation. Philips discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the constables and the fact that what they were not good at was crowd control, allows for even further inference. Peel's often quoted "primary purpose" of the police notwithstanding,

one doesn't have to take a Marxist or revolutionary point of view to be quite confident that just as crime is the rallying cry for support of the police today, so too it was then. To those less disenchanted with capitalism it is not hard to see the new police as a "good idea", one which did have some impact on crime as well as public order (Kelling, 1980). The push for centralization and efficiency, as well as new standards of order, especially urban order, may well have been requirements of industrial capitalism. But the purpose of this discussion is not to reflect positively or negatively on the motives of the reformers or the shape of policing function as it went through its historical transformations. The purpose is directed to another point. The general perception, and one easily gained from the literature on the history of policing is that a decaying, corrupt, and ineffective system was overthrown and replaced by an efficient, effective, and equitable system. It was a radical but wise departure from the past. The difficulties and dangers inherent in police were recognized by the reformers and early police administrators and the wisdom of the "new" system became self-evident. While only Reith has presented this caricature of the events as boldly as they are stated, other histories (Critchley, Dilnot, and others included) come uncomfortably close to presenting such a propagandistic point of view.

The debates, political compromises, reforms, and counter reform efforts created a policing system which was highly pluralistic. Public police were created, but the stipendiary system remained,

initially for public as well as private police. Some police functions became highly centralized, others decentralized. Preventive policing, a modified restricted version of Bentham's and Chadwick's, was introduced, but detective policing remained. While the primary arguments used to justify the police pertained to crime, in fact their immediate use was political crowd control and the first known use of detective policing by the Metropolitan Police was for political intelligence gathering. The fact that none of these issues was resolved creates a legacy that is with us to this day. In fact, an efficient system was never created. The debates, with more or less rancor, continue. To what extent should police be centralized? What functions should be centralized? Does consolidation of services in the United States make sense? What services should be consolidated? Is a more pluralistic system, such as in the U.S. when compared to England, more politically accountable or do political machines distort policing for their own ends? What is local control? If not local control, if not local political control? What is the relationship of private sector policing? To what extent do the principles of social obligation still exist? How large an enterprise is private sector policing? How ought public and private police relate? To what extent should private police be regulated? How is equity of police services (both protection and regulation) accomplished in a private-public police mix? What is the relationship of preventive and detective policing? What ought the mix be of public/private activity in

preventive policing? In detective policing? What is the role of detective policing in the maintenance of order?

The answers of the Victorian reformers came about as a result of a series of experiments, one of which was the new police. It was radical in the sense that a standing body of uniformed officers was created and deployed. It was conservative in that the ancient system was maintained. And, although in England more so than in the United States, the pendulum has swung more widely to the side of a centralized, public police, elements of the old system have always operated. Constables became detectives and their heirs expanded private law enforcement to preventive security work (preventive policing) as well as "thieftaking".

But the central point is that in England and the United States the arguments put forth to justify public, centralized, preventive policing were efficiency, effectiveness, and equity. Concerns about these outcomes persist.

DETECTIVES: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this section of the report is to review the literature which addresses the current nature of detective operations and to identify those issues about detective work which need further attention.

As Simpson (1976) notes, the literature on the current nature of detectives and detecting is quite recent, most of it products of the 1970's. That a significant amount of material has appeared in a relatively short time is no doubt attributable to the interest that developed in policing "problems" during this period and the availability of research monies. Detectives have shared the research stage with patrol officers perhaps because each group symbolizes what are perceived to be major missions of policing; patrol officers represent order maintenance and crime prevention while detectives represent crime solution and criminal apprehension. Each group was assumed to play a significant part in the "war against crime" waged during the 1970's.

While detectives may have been assumed critical to successful police operations, they have been viewed by many police administrators as constituting an organization and management problem. Goldstein has noted:

The job (and often the higher salary) attracts competent personnel away from much more important police tasks. The officer performing basic patrol work tends to get downgraded to the role of a 'report-taker.' The myth that detectives are capable of solving all crimes encourages them, on occasion, to engage in illegal and improper practices in order to satisfy public expectations (such as extorting information through physical force or the threat of arrest and prosecution). (1977:57).

As a police executive, Murphy has been very candid about the detective "problem":

An important part of any sizeable police department was the detective bureau. But it was often important for reasons which were not exactly well advertised. Two hushed-up propositions, known to many police administrators, were involved. One was that in almost any police department the worst corruption might very well be located in the detective bureau. A second was that for all their splash, panache, and uncanny ability to make headlines and friends, especially in the press corps, detectives tend to make arguably insignificant contributions to the control of crime. (1977:138)

The common belief that police departments can't get along without detectives coupled with these suggestions that they can't live very comfortably with them merely add to the fascination of a job which traditionally has projected an image of mystery and esoterica.

The research which has been directed at detective work or which is at least relevant to it has addressed the following issues: the nature (content and methods) of detective work, the organization of detectives, conditions and characteristics of the job, skills and qualifications of detectives, training, supervision and management, and evaluation. While a separate topic has seldom been the focus of an individual work, the subjects are ones which represent recurring and central themes in the literature.

THE LITERATURE

The literature is of diverse nature; it is largely empirical in that it represents someone having "taken a look" at a detective operation. In some cases the view reflects the personal impressions of one individual who has examined a single organization; in others it represents systematic, quantified data gathered within a single organization or across several. When appropriate, a distinction will be made between the material which offers insight and that which tests it.

The Nature of the Work: Content

Several authors have suggested general descriptions of the content of detective work: Banton (1964) defines their work as that of "law officers", concerned with criminal matters; Irving describes the job as the "..... identification, arrest and subsequent interviewing of one or more suspects" (1980:111); Laurie (1970) similarly asserts that the job is to determine who committed a crime and find the evidence to prove it; Pogrebin adds to these notions the recovery and return of stolen property.

The content of the work can also be understood either in terms of the type of crime which the detective is to handle or in terms of the objectives to be accomplished in handling the crime. In departments in which detectives specialize by crime type, there might be a number of detective units comparable to the number of major categories of crime. The number of these substantive specialties may represent both the complexity of the environment* in which the department functions and the administrative philosophy of the police executive. A department might, for example, divide its criminal investigation division into two major sections representing crimes against persons and crimes against property with there being specialty units within these sections. The crimes against persons section might, for example, include a homicide unit, sex crimes unit and robbery unit. When the volume

*Tifft (1971) states that specialization is one means by which an organization may seek to survive in a complex environment; the more complex the environment, the more specialized the organization.

of cases warrants it or community pressure or organizational concern calls for it, there may be additional specialization, e.g., a unit to handle child abuse cases or crimes against the elderly. Not all detective work performed by police is directed toward criminal events or criminally suspicious circumstances; detectives might also be assigned to the traffic division to investigate accidents, to the personnel division to do background checks on job applicants or promotion candidates, or to the internal affairs division to conduct investigations of complaints against officers. Figure 1 reports the types of crime-related investigative units which exist in the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department and indicates the time each unit spends on various types of cases (Greenwood et al., 1975:54).

FIGURE I

THE WORK OF POLICE INVESTIGATORS

BREAKDOWN OF TIME SPENT ON CASES
(In percent)

<i>Homicide Unit</i>	
Homicide	51.2
Aggravated assault	26.6
Dead body	7.3
Common assault	6.4
Suicide	1.1
All other	7.4
<i>Robbery Unit</i>	
Robbery	69.9
Homicide	16.9
All other	13.2
<i>Sex Crimes Unit</i>	
Rape	68.9
Felony sex	10.7
All other	22.3
<i>Auto Theft Unit</i>	
Auto theft	85.4
Other auto crimes	8.7
All other	5.9
<i>Residential Burglary and Larceny Unit</i>	
<i>Residential burglary specialist</i>	
Residential burglary	79.2
Miscellaneous burglary	9.0
Larceny	7.9
All other	3.9
<i>Residential burglary and larceny (mixed)</i>	
Residential burglary	40.5
Miscellaneous burglary	6.5
Larceny	39.0
All other	14.0
<i>Commercial Burglary Unit</i>	
<i>Safes specialist</i>	
Safe burglary	29.3
Commercial burglary	15.4
Residential burglary	12.9
Miscellaneous burglary	32.7
Larceny	8.5
All other	1.2
<i>Commercial burglary specialist</i>	
Commercial burglary	27.9
Residential burglary	14.0
Miscellaneous burglary	44.4
All others	13.7
<i>Other detectives in commercial burglary unit</i>	
Burglary	43.0
Larceny	51.4
All other	5.6
<i>General Assignment Unit</i>	
<i>Arson specialist</i>	
Arson	70.2
Bombing	3.9
All other	25.9
<i>Fraud, forgery specialist</i>	
Fraud/embezzlement	25.4
Forgery/counterfeit	45.4
All other	29.2
<i>Fraud, bunco, larceny specialist</i>	
Fraud/embezzlement	39.3
Bunco	10.2
Other larceny	30.7
All other	19.8
<i>Shoplift, pickpocket specialist</i>	
Shoplift	41.5
Other larceny	45.6
All other	12.9

Source: Greenwood, Peter W., Jan M. Chaiken, Joan Petersilia and Linda Prusoff, *The Criminal Investigation Process III: OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS*. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation (1975:54).

While ultimate goals of the job may include the conviction of offenders and the recovery of property, job content can be more specifically interpreted as the major processes necessary to accomplishing these goals; these appear to include:*

- determination of whether a crime actually has occurred **
- collection and collation of relevant testimony and evidence
- identification of a suspect or suspects
- location and apprehension of suspects or clearance without arrest
- case preparation
- case presentation/testimony

Wilson (1978) describes the nature of the job as dependent on the type of information available about an incident or suspect; four types of detective work are identified as case management, identification and apprehension of offender, instigation and intelligence work. Case management is all that is required when a suspect has been apprehended and the detective has adequate information about the suspect. Identification and/or apprehension constitute the job when the detective has reason to believe the crime has occurred but lacks either the identity and/or the custody of the suspect. Instigation is involved when the detective has reason to suspect a person of illegal behavior but has no concrete evidence of that behavior; the detective

*Greenwood and Petersilia (1975) have outlined the processes related to handling a case as: incident report and preliminary investigation; evidence collection and processing; screening and case assignment; follow-up investigation; clearance and arrest; and supporting activities.

** resulting perhaps in the "unfounding" (Skolnick, 1966) of the complaint.

either keeps the person under surveillance or encourages/instigates a criminal act by the person. Narcotics detection, for example, is often instigative work. Finally, when the detective lacks both a suspect and proof of a crime but believes "something is going on," the job is one of intelligence work and is as likely to be "paper work" as "street work." This is the nature of the job when crimes such as fraud, tax evasion or embezzlement are involved. Some have agreed that more narcotics work could and should be intelligence work.

Repetto (1978) acknowledges Wilson's distinctions and suggests two additional ones: that of the neighborhood level criminal investigator who tends to be responsible for a territory more than a specific type of crime and that of the administrative detective whose job is essentially the clerical one of case preparation. Repetto states that although the people who perform this type of work are not functionally detectives, they frequently hold the title of detective.

The Nature of the Work: Methods

Several writers have dispelled the myth of detectives using exciting, dangerous or exotic methods to solve crimes; in fact, most of the methods are routine and boring and have little to do with crime solution. Goldstein has written:

It borders on heresy to point out that, in fact, much of what detectives do consists of very routine and rather elementary chores, including much paper processing; that a good deal of their work is not only not exciting, it is downright boring; that the situations they confront are often less challenging and less demanding than those handled by patrolling police officers..... (1977:55)

Similarly the Rand study (Greenwood, et al. 1975) reports:

It is....not appropriate to view the investigator's role as that of solving crimes. Investigators do not spend much time on activities that lead to clearances, and most of their work in this connection could be performed by clerical personnel. (1975:83)

Pogrebin (1976) and Laurie (1970) make very similar observations.

The specific methodology of the work depends on the nature of the task - a point made in the previous section by Wilson and also made by Manning who states that "Narcotics agents must 'work forward' from information on a potential or known violator rather than 'backward' from the alleged or established facts of crime..." (1980:45). In other words, the detective, working in an investigative capacity may need to construct rather than reconstruct the crime.

The methods repertoire from which all types of detectives choose appears to include the following: forensic aids; formal, technical information systems; informants; interviews; interrogations; instigation and surveillance. All of these, of course, may be used in the discovery and interpretation * of information.

*Sanders (1977) argues that "interpretive work" is a critical aspect of investigative work. Facts often do not speak for themselves and can only be understood in the content of other facts or circumstances. The detective must know the context in order to understand the facts or evidence.

The literature addresses the role of each of these methods.

Forensic Aids. Quite a bit of information exists about the role of forensic aids (e.g., fingerprint files, crime labs). Parker (1963) found crime lab evidence to be used in less than two per cent of all criminal cases; Rosenthal (1968), Parker and Peterson (1972) and Zuniga (1969) all reported similar findings of between one and six percent. In a 1970 study of burglary and robbery investigations, Greenwood found physical evidence to be used in less than 5 percent of the cases, a finding which was supported by the later Greenwood et al. (1973) study of burglaries and the Feeney et al. (1973) study of robbery cases. Bottomley and Coleman (1980) found that special police enquiries, including forensic tests, accounted for only two percent of the cases detected. Irving cites a senior British detective as reporting that "...in his experience forensic evidence of itself resulted in about two suspects per investigating officer being charged each year." (1980:116-7). He suggests, however, that the possibility of the use of forensic evidence is a useful motivator during police interrogations of suspects and that police, therefore, would regret the criminal population knowing how infrequently forensic evidence actually is used.

The fact that forensic evidence is seldom used does not mean that it is not potentially more important to case resolution and conviction than currently appears to be the case. Greenberg et al. (1973) argue that physical evidence, if properly used, could be much more useful in the handling of burglary cases. Ward (1971), Parker and Gurgin (1972) and Peterson (1974) have argued the significance of laboratory evidence for drug cases. Inslaw (1981) also notes the importance of physical evidence for obtaining convictions.

If forensic evidence is potentially of greater use, why is it not more frequently developed? Benson et al. (1970) and Ward (1971) argue that detectives lack the time to thoroughly search a crime scene. Parker and Peterson (1972) find that detectives often dismiss as useless physical evidence that they do manage to locate at the scene. Peterson (1974) later developed a screening model for physical evidence which represents police decision-making about the utility of physical evidence at several states of the investigative process. The screening model may reflect the fact that police deal with too many crimes with too few resources to be able to process all available evidence.

The greater utility of forensic evidence depends, of course, on the validity of the evidence. In an experimental study of the validity of findings produced by a sample of crime laboratories, Peterson (1978) found frequent incorrect identification of evidence such as hair and blood type.

Formal Information Systems. We have found no data - and little discussion - of the impact of formal (i.e., systematized or computerized) data systems on detective effectiveness. Laurie (1970) cites police records as one of three broad information channels which contribute to arrest productivity but asserts that they are of minor importance as compared to informants. A lieutenant in a Midwestern police department has reported to the author that late night warrant checks on automobiles with defects (e.g., headlight or tail light burned out, missing license plate, etc.) will produce a 25 percent "hit rate" for outstanding warrants. While computerized information systems are theoretically of great value in predicting crime patterns, documenting modes of criminal operation, and in providing rapid checks of

fingerprint files against even partial prints, Chaiken (1975), Colton (1975, 1978), Reinier (1977) and Barnett (1978) have all concluded that the computers which have been installed in police agencies are not being used in ways or degrees which represent the potentials of the systems. In short, there is little firm evidence of the value of formalized records for police investigations.

Informants. The investigative literature is rife with testimony to the importance of informants to the detective. Laurie (1970:180) contends that informants are the most important source of information leading to an arrest. "The essence of it all is acquiring snouts." (184). "Informants are a London detective's bread, butter, and reputation." (188). Manning (1980) stresses the reliance of narcotics officers on informants, as does Wilson (1978). Manning writes:

Narcotics work is really impossible without informants. Thus the recruitment, interrogation, working and protection of informants is a focal or key activity in narcotics work. (1980:47)

Skolnick (1966) makes the same argument for other types of crime as well, especially burglaries, and argues that the prosecutor also acknowledges the importance of informants in the way he handles the case. Wilson (1978) points to the importance of informants for FBI agents who seldom work undercover and must therefore rely on second hand information rather than extensive surveillance. Westley writes that "The stool pigeon and the informant are the life blood of the good detective in Department X." (1970:40) With Manning, both Wilson and Skolnick emphasize the importance of protecting the identity of the informant. Although one of Westley's detectives claimed that the solutions of 40-50 percent of the tough cases were attributable to informants, there has been no independent evaluation of the effect of informants on investigative

effectiveness.*

There have, however, been discussions of the impact of police/informant relationships on the police organization itself and on the administration of justice; these will be discussed later in the chapter.

Interviews. The methods of interviewing and interrogation are often treated in the literature, as Morris (1980) has noted, as being the same (e.g., Irving, 1980). They are addressed separately here because we suspect they require different skills and usually have different types of persons as their subjects. For purposes of distinction, interviews will be viewed as those conversations conducted by police for the purpose of obtaining information which persons are not, especially reluctant to give. Interviews probably are most often conducted with victims, witnesses, stool pigeons and informants, although Irving (1980) notes that an interview to determine the suspect's willingness to cooperate may constitute the first stage of an interrogation of a witness. If one includes as an interview the initial questioning of victims and witnesses (which typically is more likely to be conducted by patrol officers than detectives), the interview is extremely important to case solution. Virtually every study of the investigation process acknowledges that it is the initial information provided by victims or witnesses which is the best predictor of arrest or case clearance. Feeney (1973) found the most important predictor of arrests in robbery cases to be the information provided by citizens. In Sweden, Nilsson and Sjöberg (1979) found that the cases most likely to be cleared are those in which a suspect is named. Steer (1980) drew the same conclusion in England. Greenwood (1970) concluded this was the reason why crimes against persons were more likely to

*This is an evaluation which would be difficult to conduct since detectives will attempt to write reports and present evidence in a way which will obscure the role of an informant.

be solved than crimes against property. Tifft (1971) acknowledges the importance of the information provided by the public as does Reiss (1971). Greenwood et al. (1973) found that the information provided to patrol officers by citizens was the major determinant of case solution. Bottomley and Coleman (1980) found that police questioning produced 26 percent of detected cases while information from citizens produced 24 percent of the detections. Presumably, "questioning" is more akin to what we specify as interrogation and the information from citizens is produced by interviews.

Interrogations. Interrogation is the special case of interviewing which requires particular skills in order to draw information from a person-- usually a suspect--who initially is reluctant to provide the information. It is another method which is touted - at least by detectives - as critical to their success (e.g., Wald, 1967; Witt, 1973; Irving, 1980). The empirical evidence, however, does not support the importance of interrogations for the solution of the case for which the suspect was apprehended. Sobel (1966) found interrogation to be essential in only 10 percent of serious felony indictments. Morris (1980) reports Wald et. al. (1967) as reviewing ".... a number of studies which imply that investigative alternatives to interrogation are successfully used by law enforcement agencies." (Morris:13) Wald et.al. (1967) found interrogation and subsequent confession to be critical for the solution of 4 out of 49 cases. Softley asked detectives who he observed conducting investigations:

...what they would have done if the suspect had refused to answer questions. In 56 percent of cases officers said they would have relied on the evidence already available, in 32 percent of cases they said that they would have tried to obtain additional evidence, and in only 8 percent of cases did they say that they would have dropped the case. (1980:87).

Most of these studies assume the importance of the interrogation to be the confession which might come out of it. While a confession might not be necessary for conviction, several authors suggest it may serve other purposes. Irving (1980) proposes that it may assure a detective who is uncertain in his/her own mind whether the suspect is guilty; that it may serve to corroborate other but inconclusive evidence; and that it greatly reduces the amount of court preparation time required for the case. Laurie (1970) makes the latter point as well and further argues that the confession serves to bolster the detective's self concept. Independent of the confession, Irving suggests that the interrogation may provide an opportunity to clear up other offenses, to develop intelligence information or "...simply to keep abreast of activities on one's 'patch'". (1980:115)

Instigation. Instigation is a term Wilson has used to describe a specific practice type of policing in which

...a law enforcement officer who, by assuming the role of a criminal, provides an opportunity to commit a consensual crime for a person who is ready, willing, and seeking an opportunity to do so. (1978:22)

Wilson distinguished instigation from entrapment, the latter being behavior which induces a person, who would not otherwise be motivated to do so, to commit a crime. Skolnick (1966), Wilson (1978), and Manning (1980) all make clear that the instigative buy/bust activity of narcotics units is one of the common means of catching drug sellers. Vice units have used decoys in order to catch would-be customers for prostitution services. Apart from these specific examples, the writers reviewed make little mention of instigation as a method of detectives. Instigation has been used by decoy units to snare

street robbers and sexual molesters, by special units conducting fencing operations in order to catch sellers of stolen goods, by federal agents posing as bribers in order to identify corrupt politicians. The New York Police Department has tested the honesty of officers by dropping billfolds containing money on sidewalks. Some of these examples have been the work of patrol officers or special non-detective units, but all represent types of operations detectives could conduct in order to increase the probability of apprehending offenders in the act. The fact that instigation as a method receives little attention in the literature on detectives may mean that it is very infrequently used which would be the case if most detective work is done in response to reports of crimes which already have been committed.

Surveillance. Surveillance is the other method Wilson (1978) identified as being used when there is a reason to suspect that a particular person commits crimes but when the police lack evidence of the person's actual activities. Surveillance might consist of either visual or aural (direct or electronic) monitoring of the individual. Again, because much of detective work is reactive, this may be a method which is infrequently used and yet it is one which could conceivably be of utility if detectives do, indeed, get information from informants about planned crimes and as computerized crime analysis provides better predictions of probable times and locations of crime. Greenwood et al (1975) report the percentage of case time by type of Part I crime spent in surveillance. In Kansas City, robbery cases have a higher percentage of case time spent on surveillance than do other types of crime. Among all robberies, 7.2 percent of case time was accounted for by surveillance, with commercial robberies receiving the most

(12.8 percent of case time). Apart from this study there is little information about the conditions under which or the effectiveness with which detectives use this tactic or - also of interest - the extent to which detectives might advise patrol units to perform surveillance.

The extent to which any of these methods are used is suggested by Table 2 which reproduces the Greenwood et.al. (1975) findings for Kansas City. The frequency with which the methods are used has to be understood in the context of the total amount of investigative work which detectives do. Reiss (1971) contends that they do relatively little and that investigative work as such is directed primarily at the location of a known offender rather than at the identification of an unknown offender. His observation concurs with that of the Rand study (Greenwood et al., 1975) which determined that most of a detective's work occurs after an arrest already has been made. This can be seen by combining the "arraignment," "reports," "procesutor," "courts," and perhaps "interrogation" columns of Figure 2; the point is made more clearly by a comparison of the "average time before clearance" and "average time after clearance" columns of Figure 3. Among cases in which an arrest has not already been made, detectives are likely to choose to work on the ones in which enough information exists to allow for easy solution and/or arrest. Detectives do little to ferret out the information--other than the suspect's location--which leads to arrest.

Conditions And Characteristics of the Job

Apart from the substance and methods of the detective job, there are conditions and characteristics of the job which serve to differentiate the working lives of detectives from those of other members of the department.

FIGURE 2
THE WORK OF POLICE INVESTIGATORS
BREAKDOWN OF ACTIVITIES ON CASES
(Percentage of time on each activity)^a

Crime Type	Interrogation	Interview	Arrest	Arraignment	Reports	Surveillance	ATL	Crime Scene	Prosecutor	Court	Administration
<i>Homicide unit</i>	7.5	36.0	1.3	1.4	26.5	4.7	11.5	5.9	0.0	1.7	3.3
Homicide											
No arrest	2.6	35.3	—	—	16.0	5.7	23.0	4.1	—	—	13.2
Arrest	8.5	34.0	0.0	1.4	21.9	7.6	13.1	6.5	0.0	2.9	3.0
Aggravated assault											
No arrest	2.5	47.2	—	—	30.5	2.8	11.6	5.1	—	—	0.0
Arrest	11.9	33.1	3.2	3.5	35.2	1.6	4.6	3.7	0.0	2.4	0.0
Common assault											
No arrest	4.6	46.3	—	—	37.8	5.1	5.1	0.0	—	—	—
Arrest	15.5	29.1	6.0	2.1	37.1	1.1	6.6	1.0	—	1.1	0.0
Dead body	0.0	44.1	—	—	31.5	0.0	3.3	19.4	—	—	0.0
Suicide	—	39.6	—	—	35.5	—	—	24.9	—	—	—
<i>Sex crimes unit</i>	6.7	34.1	1.5	2.2	19.2	0.0	28.1	2.2	1.5	2.1	0.0
Rape											
No arrest	3.1	35.7	—	—	15.6	0.0	41.5	1.9	0.0	—	1.0
Arrest	7.5	31.0	2.2	3.8	20.7	0.0	24.5	2.8	1.8	3.1	1.0
Felony sex crimes											
No arrest	6.8	48.8	—	—	23.3	—	16.7	—	2.1	—	2.1
Arrest	14.9	39.3	3.7	2.0	21.3	2.5	8.9	—	1.2	5.3	0.0
Kidnapping											
No arrest	4.5	42.7	—	—	23.6	—	16.9	12.4	—	—	—
Arrest	4.4	38.5	—	2.2	20.0	—	23.7	2.2	5.2	—	—
<i>Robbery</i>	12.3	31.3	0.0	3.8	27.9	7.2	6.0	4.8	0.0	1.8	0.4
Bank											
No arrest	—	35.7	—	—	14.3	—	14.3	35.7	—	—	—
Arrest	19.0	26.7	—	5.7	35.2	—	1.9	11.4	—	—	—
Residence											
No arrest	4.8	41.6	—	—	26.2	7.1	5.0	14.0	—	—	—
Arrest	11.4	30.1	1.3	7.5	29.0	6.9	6.0	7.5	—	—	—
Taxicab											
No arrest	11.6	22.3	—	—	28.6	7.1	30.4	1.8	—	—	—
Arrest	23.8	31.6	—	6.2	30.1	—	8.3	—	—	—	—
Miscellaneous											
No arrest	2.6	33.8	—	—	22.6	25.2	2.6	12.2	—	—	—
Arrest	17.7	34.9	—	9.0	30.8	—	1.0	3.3	1.3	—	0.0
Concealed weapon											
No arrest	36.4	12.1	—	—	46.4	1.4	—	1.4	—	—	—
Arrest	25.9	15.5	3.4	12.1	43.1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Commercial											
No arrest	3.9	33.3	—	—	23.5	12.8	9.6	16.1	—	—	0.0
Arrest	12.4	26.9	1.6	6.8	26.0	6.0	4.9	8.0	0.0	6.2	0.0

^a May not add to 100% due to categories not shown: warrants, subpoenas, extradition.

Source: Greenwood, Peter et al. (1975)

FIGURE 2 - continued

Crime Type	Interrogation	Interview	Arrest	Arraignment	Reports	Surveillance	ATL	Crime Scene	Prosecutor	Court	Administration
<i>Robbery (cont'd.)</i>											
Pursesnatch											
No arrest	29.2	33.3	—	—	29.2	—	8.3	—	—	—	—
Arrest	25.5	34.9	—	3.0	35.3	—	—	—	—	0.0	—
Strongarm											
No arrest	9.2	50.4	—	—	31.8	5.6	7.7	0.0	—	—	—
Arrest	21.6	26.8	2.0	4.9	31.2	2.4	2.6	3.8	—	0.0	2.4
Strongarm-outside											
No arrest	5.7	40.8	—	—	28.3	7.2	12.4	7.1	—	—	—
Arrest	18.9	27.1	1.4	6.4	31.0	4.1	4.3	2.4	0.2	2.8	—
<i>Crimes against property</i>	<i>16.7</i>	<i>28.4</i>	<i>2.0</i>	<i>4.3</i>	<i>24.1</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>9.7</i>	<i>7.3</i>	<i>0.6</i>	<i>4.5</i>	<i>0.5</i>
<i>Auto</i>											
Auto theft											
No arrest	4.2	33.9	—	—	26.6	2.3	20.7	9.4	—	—	1.7
Arrest	19.7	15.0	3.1	8.1	27.7	3.0	4.6	3.0	0.9	11.5	0.0
Accessories											
No arrest	7.5	33.7	—	1.6	31.3	—	11.5	6.7	—	4.8	1.2
Arrest	24.2	17.8	2.6	6.0	35.6	0.7	2.4	2.2	—	8.2	—
Other auto											
No arrest	1.3	48.3	—	—	37.8	1.3	3.3	5.0	1.7	—	—
Arrest	7.8	23.5	7.8	11.8	41.2	—	—	7.8	—	—	—
<i>Nonresidential burglary</i>											
Safes											
No arrest	3.8	33.5	—	—	11.1	0.3	32.5	17.6	—	—	1.2
Arrest	15.7	29.3	2.2	5.0	16.3	0.6	20.4	7.2	—	2.5	—
Other commercial											
No arrest	7.8	40.6	—	—	—	1.5	21.8	8.7	0.7	—	0.8
Arrest	21.7	21.5	2.0	9.0	—	0.2	8.7	1.8	0.3	6.4	—
Miscellaneous											
No arrest	10.1	32.7	—	—	18.6	2.7	25.1	9.1	0.4	—	0.3
Arrest	20.3	20.4	2.8	7.5	21.8	3.3	8.2	3.5	0.5	8.8	0.3
<i>Residential burglary and larceny</i>											
Residential burglary											
No arrest	10.6	48.1	—	—	24.0	4.6	7.9	2.9	0.6	—	0.4
Arrest	24.0	25.8	3.7	6.4	27.8	1.1	3.1	1.3	0.8	4.9	0.1
Larceny											
No arrest	6.9	40.4	—	—	23.3	1.0	25.8	0.9	—	—	1.1
Arrest	18.7	24.7	2.0	3.2	26.7	7.2	9.3	0.8	1.5	3.4	0.7
Larceny bicycle											
No arrest	8.7	49.2	—	—	36.8	—	3.7	—	—	—	—
Arrest	27.1	25.9	0.9	1.5	43.6	—	0.5	—	0.5	—	—
Theft from auto											
No arrest	6.3	47.2	—	—	32.7	—	11.3	2.5	—	—	—
Arrest	29.2	21.5	0.9	1.4	40.8	0.9	2.8	—	1.4	—	—

*May not add to 100% due to categories not shown: warrants, subpoenas, extradition.

FIGURE 3

NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS OF DETECTIVE WORK

Crime Type	All Cases ^a (avg. time)	Uncleared Cases ^b (avg. time)	Cleared Cases			Initial Patrol Arrest (avg. time)
			No Initial Patrol Arrest		Total	
			Avg. Time Before Clear	Avg. Time After Clear		
Crimes against persons	5.4	8.4 ^b	4.6	8.8	13.4	7.9
Homicide	144.0	212.3 ^b	46.2	117.5	163.7	27.3
Aggravated assault	5.9	5.2 ^b	2.4	5.4	7.8	4.7
Common assault	3.6	3.0 ^b	1.6	3.1	4.7	2.8
Rape	20.2	18.3	13.6	15.2	28.8	12.8
Felony sex crimes	7.7	5.8	3.8	6.1	9.9	5.9
Robbery						
Bank	13.2	4.3	10.9	13.1	24.0	4.3
Residence	11.4	10.1	6.1	9.7	16.0	4.3
Taxicab	7.0	4.4	2.6	5.4	8.0	14.9
Concealed weapon	3.6	3.9 ^b	0.0	2.0	2.0	3.5
Commercial	13.2	10.2 ^b	7.3	12.9	20.2	19.0
Pursesnatch	5.5	4.1 ^b	1.1	3.9	5.0	7.8
Strongarm	8.3	6.7 ^b	1.7	7.3	9.0	9.3
Outside/street	7.6	5.9	2.3	6.3	8.6	9.3
Miscellaneous	10.2	10.0	2.0	9.3	11.3	9.6
Suicide	5.5					
Dead body	5.2					
Kidnapping	10.0	6.3	3.4	12.6	16.0	(c)
Shootings	7.9	7.5			(c)	8.5
Crimes against property	5.4	4.6 ^b	2.4	5.7	8.1	7.9
Auto theft	4.2	2.9 ^b	1.8	7.3	9.1	6.7
Auto accessories	3.7	2.7 ^b	1.2	3.3	4.5	4.4
Theft from auto	2.9	2.3 ^b	0.7	2.3	3.0	3.4
Other auto	2.3	1.8	0.3	6.1	6.4	(c)
Burglary						
Safe	18.3	18.0	13.7	12.7	26.4	9.7
Residence	6.8	5.4 ^b	2.1	6.6	8.7	7.6
Commercial	9.8	9.4 ^b	3.9	7.4	11.3	8.7
Miscellaneous	10.5	9.4 ^b	3.8	7.0	10.8	12.6
Larceny (all except below)	6.3	4.9	2.9	8.9	11.8	5.0
Larceny bicycle	3.5	2.8 ^b	0.8	3.8	4.4	3.8
Larceny commercial	4.9	2.9	1.9	4.9	6.8	4.9
Crimes assigned to general assignment unit	5.3	4.5	2.6	5.5	8.1	4.3
Destructive acts						
Arson	10.1	10.8 ^b	4.4	5.8	10.2	6.3
Destruction of property	5.3	5.2	2.1	4.8	6.9	4.1
Bomb or threat	4.1	4.4	0.0	3.6	3.6	(c)
Fraud and larceny						
Fraud/embezzlement	6.0	5.0 ^b	2.8	6.0	8.8	5.2
Forgery/counterfeit	6.7	4.5	3.6	6.6	10.2	7.0
Extortion	10.8	9.7			(c)	(c)
Larceny by deceit	9.8	(c)			(c)	(c)
Larceny other	6.2	6.0 ^b	1.3	5.9	7.2	5.8
Bunco	8.3	8.1	3.4	6.7	10.1	4.6
Shoplifting	4.3	4.9 ^b	1.2	4.7	5.9	3.3
Execute warrants	2.7	2.6	0.8	4.5	5.3	2.2
Crimes assigned to youth-women's unit	3.4	3.3 ^b	0.4	3.4	3.8	3.0
Trespassing	3.3	2.9 ^b	0.0	3.3	3.3	3.4
Disorderly conduct	2.7	3.0 ^b	0.0	2.3	2.3	2.9
Incorrigible	2.9	2.7 ^b	0.3	3.4	3.7	2.2
Protective custody	2.5	2.4 ^b	0.4	2.6	3.0	2.0
Possess drugs	5.1	9.4 ^b	0.5	3.9	4.4	3.4
Miscellaneous youth	4.0	4.5 ^b	0.8	3.7	4.5	3.0
Miscellaneous women's	2.9	2.4 ^b	0.3	3.2	3.5	2.4

SOURCE: Kansas City Case Assignment File, cases received during May-November 1973.
 NOTE: Uncleared cases account for 40.2% of all detective casework time; cleared crimes account for 12.4% before clearance, 47.4% starting with clearance.
^a Includes only cases on which detectives reported some time worked.
^b Time spent on unclear cases is significantly higher than time spent prior to clearance on cleared cases with no initial patrol arrest.
^c Insufficient data.

Source: Greenwood, Peter et al. (1975:59)

Clarity of role expectations. Wilson (1968) and Laurie (1970) point out that the job content of detectives is much more limited than that of patrol officers and that the role expectations for detectives are therefore less conflictual than those for patrol officers.

Prestige. Westley (1951), Neiderhoffer (1967) and Saunders have all commented on the high prestige within the police organization of detectives. Despite these observations, 51 percent of Dallas officers have evaluated patrol as a highly desirable assignment while only 25 percent rated the criminal investigation division as highly desirable. Sterling (1972) found that police recruits rated the jobs of patrol officer and dispatcher as more important to the police mission than the work of detectives. Sterling reconciles these apparently different findings by suggesting that different factors contribute to perceptions of prestige and functional importance. The reputed prestige may be attributable in part to the fact that detectives are closely identified with criminal apprehension, the most glamorous police tasks. Both Manning (1980) and Sanders (1977) have noted that among detectives themselves, prestige is related to the type of crime the detective works with homicide being the most important and larcenies and nearly all juvenile crimes having far less import.

Access, freedom and control. Westley (1970) suggests that prestige may be explained in part by the detective's greater access to important actors (both criminal and non-criminal) and information. Major crime attracts the "outsiders."

Court personnel such as the judge and the prosecutor, members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Police reporters, attorneys, and politicians are constantly coming and going from this (the detectives') room.
(1970:37).

Additionally, in the department Westley studied, the detectives are likely to be friends of the Chief and to have far more information than patrol officers about the activities and rumors associated with the Chief's office.

The detective is viewed also as having substantial freedom to control

his/her own schedule and whereabouts. Westley (1970) and Manning (1980) note that the detective can arrange the day's schedule, the sequencing of cases worked, the timing of contacts and can usually offer a credible excuse for being in strange places at strange times with strange people. Manning (1980) points out that detectives can use a higher level of discretion than patrol officers; narcotic detectives, at least, are relatively free to work or terminate cases as they see fit. And there are numerous other ways in which the detective is "freer" than the patrol officer: the detective has greater choice of hair and dress styles, can drink during working hours and generally behave in a less restricted manner than uniform officers, and can be out of touch with the dispatch center. Most observers report detectives as being relative free of supervision.

Irving (1980) argues that the detective is somewhat constrained in the scheduling of cases and workload by the fact that most cases come to the detective units from the patrol division, so that the number and nature of cases wanting attention at any time is determined by the activities of patrol officers rather than detectives.*

Workload. Ward (1971) argues that detectives carry workloads so heavy that they frequently lack the time to cover a case thoroughly. He estimated that the average detective handles "...an average of one case every two 'working' hours." (1971:96). Benson et al. (1970), Ward (1971) and Peterson (1974) all suggest heavy caseload as one explanation for the failure of detectives to make frequently use of forensic aids. Greenwood et al (1975),

*Wilson notes that this is not the case for the FBI agent.

His workload consists of those cases that Bureau policy requires him to accept or those cases, that within Bureau guidelines, he has chosen to accept. (1978:29)

however, present a somewhat different view of the situation. Although detectives reported to these researchers that they typically carried a very large caseload, they very seldom represented it as an excessive burden. The researchers found that although a detective might commonly have 50 "active" case folders on his desk, only some of these are "active" in the sense of being given continuing attention. Many others are "active" only in the sense that they have not been solved, but there is no new information (and in many cases, no prospect of any new information) which might draw attention to the case.

The net result is that the average detective does not actually work on a large number of cases each month, even though he may have a backlog of hundreds of thousands of cases that were assigned to him at some time in the past and are still theoretically his responsibility. (1975:56).

One implication of this finding is that any comparison, across detective units, based only on reported caseload figures is highly questionable. Comparison is meaningful only if "active" cases are similarly defined by all units. Wilson (1978) discusses the significance of caseload for the FBI which relies on these figures as a means of determining distributions of resources among local offices. An experimental effort to increase FBI productivity by reducing the caseload to only those cases which should (could realistically) receive additional attention produced ambiguous results; one plausible explanation is that many cases included in the count prior to the experiment were not "active" in the sense of receiving on-going attention and therefore had no effect on productivity to begin with.

Case Selection. Greenwood, et al. (1975) found that some cases are selected for inattention from the beginning - an observation made also by

Sanders (1977). While some departments use formal case screening procedures to predict the probability of solving a case through additional work, other departments make similar judgments through informal decision-making among detectives or detective supervisors. While the application of a formal procedure may reduce discretion (and perhaps some undesirable discrimination) exercised by detectives using informal procedures, Sanders (1977) reports that the informal criteria can be quite clear such that student observers were able, in the department he studied, to select with high reliability the cases the detectives would actively pursue. Case selection is based primarily on the availability of useful information, although serious crimes which arouse public concern may receive active attention even though the objective indicators suggest a very low probability of solving the crime.

Case Assignment. O.W. Wilson (1963) advocates assigning cases according to a detective's familiarity and experience with the substantive nature of the case. Knowledge about a geographic area also has been acknowledged as a criterion for case assignment. However, Westley (1970) found that in at least one department cases were assigned by the supervisor on the basis of personal preference for individual detectives. The favored detective got the "big" cases likely to result in prestige and/or the cases which were easy to solve, regardless of the detective's area of specialization.

Relationships Among Detectives. Most studies portray detectives as individual actors rather than team members. Savitz (1971) suggests that detectives are motivated more by personal than by group or organizational goals. The number of cases cleared is the most common indicator of performance and cases typically are assigned to individuals; consequently any

*Stanford Research Institute (Greenberg, et al., 1975) created a formal model for the screening of burglary cases which was tested and validated by several departments in a project managed by the Police Executive Research forum (Eck, 1980)

pressures to produce logically result in competition among detectives. Westley (1970) portrayed a "cutthroat" spirit among detectives which would cause them to hoard information even though it might be relevant to cases which other detectives in the unit were handling. Detectives were likely to be suspicious and jealous of one another. Bittner (1970), Laurie (1970) and Manning (1980) also discuss the tendency toward secrecy and personal control of information.

Pressure to Produce. Organizationally external pressures to solve a particular crime fall on the detective(s) to whom the case has been assigned. Individual evaluations and comparison based on case clearance rates produce another type of pressure to "solve" a case. Skolnick (1966), Manning and Redlinger (1975) and Goldstein (1977) have all suggested that pressures to make arrests and produce convictions may encourage behavior on the part of detectives (police generally) which does not meet the requirements of legal due process. Manning and Redlinger (1975) argue that pressures to produce arrests may cause narcotics detectives to fabricate evidence and lie in court. Skolnick hypothesized that

...the standard of efficiency employed in police departments may not only undermine due process of law, but also the basic standard of justice - that those equally culpable shall be given equal punishment. (1966:181).

Skolnick bases his argument about the inequality of punishment on the fact that some offenders are given lighter punishment or allowed to go entirely free in trade for information that may lead to the arrest of others. Westley (1970) makes a similar observation.

Opportunities for Corruption. Almost from their inception, detective units have been infamous for their vulnerability to corruption and other forms

of misconduct (e.g., Skolnick, 1967; Judge, 1972; Rubenstein, 1973 and Manning and Redlinger, 1975). Murphy has written that "...in almost any police department the worst corruption might very well be located in the detective bureau." (1978:138). This vulnerability may be due in part to the types of opportunities made available by the types of cases worked; these include burglaries in which additional property can easily be removed and reported stolen; drug cases in which some part of the recovered drugs need never be reported as having existed; deaths in which the victim is unable to report the removal of money or the property from the body or premises; any vice case which is worked "proactively" so that there is no complaint to "unfound" should the officer decide to accept money or service in return for willingness to overlook the illegal behavior. A second factor may be the characteristic lack or laxity of supervision of detectives. A third may be ^{that} the detective provides a critical link between arrest and prosecution and has substantial discretion to pursue or drop a case (Manning, 1980), thus making him/her a logical point at which to attempt to influence the legal process.

Relationships with Other Units. Westley (1970) observed competition between patrol and detective ^{units for the} credit, publicity and prestige associated with solving case; in the department he studied, patrol officers seemed to feel they were likely to receive little credit for the work they had done once the case was turned over to the detectives. Pogrebin (1976) perceived a better relationship between detective and patrol units in the department he studied and attributed it to the tendency to credit patrol officers for any contributions they had made to a case. In a third department Sanders (1977)

observed the organizational distance between patrol officers and detectives maintained by the secretary for the detective unit who routinely queried patrol officers about their reasons for being in the office.*

Manning (1980) argues that detectives can best be understood in comparison to patrol officers and the contrast he draws would suggest that a certain amount of tension, based on jealousy alone, could be expected. Detectives have more organizational prestige, more money, wear street clothes, control the time and location of their work, are typically free of the radio and other forms of supervision, and generally handle the more "glamorous" work of the organization.

In addition to the preceding conditions and characteristics of the job, there is information in the literature about the organization of detectives, the skills and qualifications needed for the job, training supervision, and evaluation.

Organization of Detectives. O.W. Wilson stated that it was appropriate for detectives to constitute approximately 10-12% of a department's sworn personnel. In 1976 the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department and the Police Foundation surveyed 50 departments serving cities with populations of at least 25,000 persons (Heaphy, 1976). The percentage of officers holding the rank of inspector or detective ranged from .08 in Philadelphia to 28.02% in Wichita; the average was approximately 12%. The figure of .08 does not

*The researcher, who might be expected to be perceived as the real outsider, eventually was exempt from the challenge.

indicate that there are virtually no officers performing detective-type work in Philadelphia. Data on the percentage of personnel assigned to a detective unit (excluding vice and internal affairs) show 9.88% of Philadelphia personnel in such a unit and the range across departments is from 4.94% in Washington to 22.91% in Akron, with an average across departments of 12%. A Rand survey of 153 departments in cities with over 100,000 population found that in the "average" department, 14.5% of sworn personnel were classified as investigators. (Greenwood and Petersilia, 1975).

Repetto (1978) cites a survey conducted in the late 1970's of 172 police departments in cities of more than 100,000 persons as finding a decrease between 1967 and 1977 in the proportion of detectives in 13 percent of the departments; 31 percent of the departments reported an increase in the proportion of detectives.

As indicated previously (p. 3) the organization of detectives may reflect both function and geography. A detective may be a generalist (handling several types of crimes), a specialist (handling primarily one type of crime) or both and may be housed either at department headquarters or in a decentralized location (e.g. precinct or beat station). If geographically decentralized, detectives might work as a separate unit or be assigned to work with teams of patrol officers. Geographic decentralization has been advocated variously as a means of increasing contact between patrol and detective officers, as a means of increasing detectives' familiarity with neighborhoods and as a way of increasing control over detectives. In 1976, the Administrative Survey (Heaphy, 1978) reported 13 departments as having decentralized at least 25% of its criminal investigators and 7 others as having decentralized some

smaller percentage, four departments had decentralized any vice officers and one had decentralized any intelligence investigators. Although several researchers have advocated the formation of patrol/detective teams (e.g., Greenwood, et al., 1975; Bloch and Bell, 1976; Elliott, 1978), Repetto (1978) reports that by 1977 only 10% of 172 departments in cities of over 100,000 population had combined both patrol and detective operations.

The use of generalist/specialist models of policing has been advocated by Greenwood et al. (1975) but no data about the percentage of detectives who are generalists were located. Repetto (1978) suggests that detectives who function at the precinct level may be more likely to function as generalists while those assigned to headquarters may be specialists; this may explain the disparity between the findings of the Rochester (Bloch and Bell, 1976) and the Rand studies (Greenwood et al., 1975) with respect to the effects of the organization of detectives. Bloch and Bell found that teams of patrol officers and detectives were more effective at the precinct/neighborhood levels than were the more traditional detective units. Greenwood et al. (1975) concluded that organization made no difference, but Repetto suggests this finding may be relevant to detectives housed at headquarters who specialize in major crimes. More research could be done to separate the effects of specialization, decentralization and work structure (i.e. integration with patrol).

Skills/Qualifications. O.W. Wilson specified the qualifications of a good detective as:

...an abundance of physical and nervous energy; considerably more-than-ordinary persistence; imagination and ingenuity, with the initiative and force to apply them; and a broad background of experience with special reference to information sources. (1963:).

O.W. Wilson (1963), Laurie (1970), Tiffet (1971) and J.A. Wilson (1978) all emphasize the detective's ability to talk with people - to skillfully conduct interviews and interrogations. Sanders (1977) stresses the value of memory.

Goldstein, on the other hand, questions "...whether special skills and knowledge are required for detective work..." (1977:56) and Steer (1980) also argues that "...little of what detectives do requires special skills..." (1980:71)

Training. The issue of training is, of course, tied to that of the necessary skills. If no special skills are required, then the training necessary to do the job may be minimal. And, indeed, the training may be minimal. From a survey of 200 departments, Ward (1971) found that 50% of the departments offered no formal training for investigators; at that time it was true even for a department as large as San Francisco. J.Q. Wilson (1978) has pointed to the small amount of interviewing training provided F.B.I. and D.E.A. agents.

But what does it matter? Training is one of the variables which Greenwood et al. (1975) found to be unrelated to investigator effectiveness. There could be at least three explanations for this finding:

1. indeed, training makes no difference;
2. there was insufficient variance in the quantity or quality of training for an effect to be indicated; and
3. there was insufficient variance in the case ^{outcomes} examined for and effect to be indicated.

With respect to the latter possibility, Greenwood et al. (1975) examined those cases which essentially were self-solving. It is conceivable that training might affect the handling of the most difficult cases - those which presumably require "real" detective work.

Supervision. The literature speaks to both the importance and the difficulty of supervising detectives. O.W. Wilson wrote:

The nature of crime investigative duties emphasizes the need for a close and continuous supervision of detectives, if satisfactory results are to be obtained. (1963:294)

J.Q. Wilson (1978) also emphasizes the importance of first line supervisors, while at the same time acknowledging (as do Tifft, 1971; Manning, 1980) that the tasks performed by detectives do not lend themselves to close supervision. The reward system, too, mitigates against supervision since it rewards individual productivity and thus encourages the hoarding of information (Laurie, 1970 and Manning, 1980) even to the point of withholding it from the supervisor. The Rand study (Greenwood and Petersilia, 1975) found that investigative supervisors typically do not participate in decisions about cases and generally do not know what the investigators are doing on a daily basis.

Evaluation. Evaluation and supervision are closely related since only the supervisor who has, in fact, actively supervised an officer is in a position to evaluate that officer's performance. At the same time O.W. Wilson saw evaluation as an important tool for the supervisor.

It (supervision) is made possible by continuous review of the daily work of each man and appraisal of his accomplishments in terms of clearances, recoveries, arrests and convictions. (Wilson, 1963:294).

It was O.W. Wilson's emphasis on measures such as clearances and arrests which marked the beginning of a debate about the appropriate way of evaluating the work of detectives. As noted previously, Skolnick (1966) and Goldstein (1977) have pointed to the conflict between pressures to produce and the observation of due process. Emphasis on clearance rates can lead either to the manipulation

of those rates (Ward, 1971), therefore destroying their use as a measure of performance and/or to the trading of justice/punishment for clearances which may or may not represent the actual commission of crime (Skolnick, 1966). Both Ward (1971) and Greenwood et al. (1975) have noted the lack of correlation between clearance rates and arrest rates, an observation which casts doubt on either rate as a measure of performance. Several authors (e.g., Reppetto, 1978; Wilson, 1978; Manning, 1980) have noted that the evaluation system may encourage detectives to work on larger numbers of cases which are easier to solve and perhaps "smaller" than to work on cases which are more difficult and perhaps more important. Clearance rates and arrests rates do not differentiate between major and minor cases, between hard or difficult ones, or between legal and illegal means of solving the cases. Sanders (1977) suggests that arrest and clearance rates have less impact on detectives in the major crimes unit where every case is a "big one" which needs to be solved; however, the pressures to break the "big" one may create its own type of tension with due process requirements.

How should detectives be evaluated? As Manning (1980) points out, evaluation measures should be relevant to the daily work of the people evaluated and consistent with the goals and means of the organization. Wilson (1978) notes that the data collected will indicate to the officers what is expected of them organizationally. Ideally, detectives like all officers would be evaluated in terms of the effort and the quality of work which is directed toward a case and these measures would be independent of the actual case outcome which may depend on many factors other than investigative effort. Such evaluation would, of course, be dependent on the supervisor actually knowing

what the detective is doing. The "continuous review of the daily work" with an examination of which cases are being worked and which steps are being taken in each case might replace "clearances, recoveries, arrests and convictions" as the core of the assessment. It is not inconceivable that the evaluation score could include points determined by the detective's willingness to provide information both to the supervisor and to other investigators. Individual ratings could reflect "team assists" as well as individual case successes.

It is ironic that detectives should reputedly be so weakly supervised when the organizational characteristics of the job are such that it should be one of the easier police functions to supervise and evaluate in a meaningful way. Detective units are typically small and work fixed shifts; this condition should make it relatively easy for the supervisor to be familiar with personnel. Detectives typically work out of an office where the supervisor might expect to encounter them regularly; while detectives may spend a substantial amount of time out of the office there is no logical reason why department regulations should not require them to spend some portion of each shift in the office, in review with the supervisor. Although the tasks may be difficult for the supervisor to observe directly, they can be reviewed orally by the detective and sergeant. If the detective were expected to report where and with whom he/she had spent time, it would be possible for the supervisor periodically to verify these accounts. Evaluation could depend, in part, on the extensiveness and accuracy of the information provided about daily activities by the investigator. If, as several authors suggested, interview and interrogation skills are critical, it should be appropriate for the supervisor periodically to observe interrogations or to review tapes of the interrogations. The

point is that it seems quite possible to devise means of checking and evaluating the procedures used by detectives. Not only does detective evaluation seem possible but it is potentially quite meaningful since detective positions are typically appointive such that poor evaluations could more easily be translated into job transfer for detectives than they could for patrol officers.

The fact that detectives are inadequately supervised and evaluated may have less to do with the nature of the job than with the image of "detective-as-great-artist" which has evolved from the myths about detective work. The objective assessment of the nature of the job made available by the Rand report, the development of evaluation criteria based on the realities of the job, and the recruitment, supervision and evaluation of investigators based on these criteria should make it possible (which is not to say "easy") to structure and manage investigative units or teams which are both more efficient and more accountable than most are now reputed to be.

Evaluation of Detectives and Detecting. To this point the literature has been reviewed which deals with the nature of detective work and the conditions and characteristics of the job. There is an additional body of literature which addresses the question of the value of detectives as an organizational group, an issue quite distinct from that of the performance of individual detectives. An individual may be a very "proper" detective but is a detective a proper thing to be? Do detectives contribute significantly to the goals of the organization and to the needs of the society for which the organization was created?

With respect to either the discovery of crimes or the identification of a suspect, research indicates that detectives play a relatively small role. The vast majority of crimes known to the police are known because they have

been discovered and reported by citizens (Reiss, 1971;) and a great majority of the crime complaints which result in arrest do so either because the suspect is still at the scene or because of identification information provided by citizens (Reiss, 1971; Conklin, 1972; Feeney, 1973; Greenwood, et al., 1975; Bottomley and Coleman, 1980 ; Nilsson and Sjöberg, 1979; Steer, 1980)

"Solving" a crime can, of course, be defined in ways other than the arrest of a suspect. Arresting the right person (the only proximate measure of which is conviction) is a somewhat more refined definition, and studies of detective effectiveness have not examined the role of detectives in achieving convictions. There are, however, suggestions that the role is potentially greater than currently is apparent. Greenwood and Petersilia (1975) found thoroughness of case documentation to be related to the case dismissed rate in a comparison of two jurisdictions. Inslaw (1980) found the presentation of physical evidence to be positively related to case convictability. These findings may suggest that training and supervision designed to improve case documentation and to increase the use of physical evidence might increase the impact of the work of detectives on case conviction rates.

"Solving" a crime is sometimes defined as simply determining the identity of the offender even though the offender may be arrested for another crime entirely or, indeed, may never be arrested at all. A clearance without an arrest indicates that the crime has been solved to the satisfaction of the police, and the evidence for this conclusion is weaker than that required for an arrest and much weaker than that required for conviction. Although the

meanings and purposes of clearances may be various, the production of the numbers and result of methods which are not always comparable, and the interpretations subject to debate, it is possible to consider the impact of detective's work on clearance rates. Greenwood and Petersilia report that approximately 97% of all crimes that now get cleared can be cleared by the very routine procedures that are appropriate to "easy" cases; very few of the cases are cleared as the result of special investigative skills or initiative. (1975:14). In seeming contradiction, Steer found in England that interviewing or interrogation accounted for between 17 and 24% of clearances (depending on the type of crime) (1980:74). The difference might be attributable to several factors including the ability of the English police to arrest on weaker evidence (and therefore to question more suspicious persons) and the possibility that Greenwood and Petersilia may view many acts of interviewing as routine and simple behavior which could be performed by officers who had neither special training nor special status.

The issues of the effectiveness of detectives has to be viewed within the context of the effectiveness of the total amount of detecting (detective or investigatory work) conducted by the police department. If detecting as a function is defined as an effort to collect and utilize information for the purpose of solving a known crime, the function might be performed by anyone who collects information from victims and witnesses and discovers and/or notes relevant physical evidence. Several of the studies of formal investigative units have determined that much of the investigative work done by the police organization is typically performed by the first departmental employee on the scene, and this employee normally is a patrol officer.* (See, for example, Block and Bell, 1975; Greenwood, et al., 1975; Glick and Ricci, 1979).

Glick and Riccio (1979) contend that detectives might do as well as patrol officers in acquiring new information about cases if they were the first at the scene. However, this point begs the question of whether the detectives could do any better at the scene and, therefore, whether their attendance at the scene is justified at all.

Finally the effectiveness of all police detecting (and within that, the effectiveness of detectives) must be considered within the context of the effectiveness of the total detecting function. Just as detectives are not the only police who do "detecting work", so police are not the only persons who detect. Citizens also perform the detecting function. As reported previously, most known crime is reported by citizens and the solutions of most crimes which are solved are dependent on information provided by citizens. But, in fact, only some percentage of crimes are ever reported (

) and a small percentage of known crimes are ever solved (). This suggests that the total police role in solving crimes is not large* (see Wycoff, 1981, for a discussion of police crime effectiveness) and the role of persons formally designated as detectives is even less significant.

*To determine the extent to which the investigative function as performed by all police currently contributes to the handling of crime, it would be necessary to have patrol officers (or telephone receptionists) do nothing more to acquire information than record that information which is actively offered by citizens and to have detectives do nothing more than to act upon the recorded information. In the extreme this would mean that detectives would initiate no efforts to locate the suspect beyond going to whatever address might be volunteered by citizens and, if an arrest was made, would do no interviewing or interrogations (con't.)

It may be inappropriate to tie an evaluation of the role of detectives to only numbers or percentages of cases "solved" by detectives. The same question of quantity vs. quality can be raised here as in the evaluation of individual detectives: how many major crimes would a detective unit need to solve through the use of special skills in order to be organizationally justified? Greenwood and Petersilia report that only about 10% of the burglaries, robberies, and homicides which are solved are the result of "special action" (efforts that are not routine) on the part of investigators. Is this an insignificant number? The answer depends less on data than on personal judgment.

It may also be inappropriate to evaluate the role of detectives only in terms of current and not potential performance. If detectives are, as the data suggest, poorly trained, poorly managed and often inappropriately organized for the tasks they must perform, what might their impact be if these conditions were remedied? Although Greenwood et al. (1975) report that differences in detective training and organization were unrelated to outcome variables, it was previously noted that the apparent lack of effect might be due to the lack of variance in either the predictor or outcome variables.

of the subject and would make no efforts to corroborate evidence presented by citizens; the detective (or a clerk) would simply write an arrest report based on the information obtained from the citizens and on the arrest action taken by the detective. Were this approach used under experimental conditions, it would be possible to assess the effect on crime rates, arrests, clearances and property recovery of the detective function as performed by the police. If an effect of police investigation/detection were demonstrated, questions would still remain as to the necessity of using specifically trained and/or separately organized officers to perform the function.

A better way to examine this question than through the use of aggregate data is by experimentation so that the detective units examined can be clearly distinguished in terms of the predictor variables. Additionally, the outcome variables should include "success at solving the tough ones;" to evaluate detectives only in terms of cases which are essentially self-solving may be to evaluate only that aspect of their work which could be done by most police officers, while to evaluate their performance on cases which are genuinely difficult to solve may be to evaluate that aspect of their work for which, theoretically, they were created.

While it would be worthwhile to test experimentally the potential crime-effectiveness of detectives, it is also possible to consider the potential for greater effectiveness by examining the constraints on success which are inherent in the crime itself. Goldstein acknowledges that the reason detectives do nothing in many cases is because there is nothing to do.

This is so because, in case after case, there is literally nothing to go on - no physical evidence, no description of the offender, no witness, and often no cooperation, even from the victim. (1977:56).

The works of Reiss and Bordua (1967), Press (1971), Conklin and Bittner (1973); Reiss 1974; Reppetto (1974), Boydston (1975), Eliot et al. (1975), Wilson (1978) and Skogan and Antunes (1979) all support the view that the nature of many crimes severely limits the impact that police - under the best of conditions - could hope to have on them.

So far this discussion of the organizational value of detectives has focused on only their crime-solving function. Goldstein suggests that a

primary function of routine follow-up investigations (which are essentially redundant of the initial patrol investigations) may be "...to maintain good public relations." (1977:57).

One cannot dismiss lightly the public relations value of detective work. It may fully justify the police resources that are invested. Persons treated sympathetically may offer greater assistance to the police in the future. The advice detectives provide victims (for example, suggesting that they get new locks) may effectively prevent a repetition of the crime. But we must see these objectives for what they are and not delude ourselves into believing that detectives spend all of their time solving crimes. (Goldstein, 1977:57).

Evidence that detectives currently serve an important public relations function still would beg the question of whether patrol officers or public service officers could not serve this function as effectively and more economically than detectives. In an evaluation of patrol investigative teams in Syracuse, for example, Elliott (1978) determined that citizens did not express a desire for their crimes to be investigated by non-uniformed detectives. Goldstein's main point, however, is an important one: any evaluation of the utility of detectives should take into account the possibility that both the current and potential function of detectives may be broader than crime-fighting.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES

There are many unresolved issues about both the function of detecting and the value of specially designated "detectives" within the police organization. The existing literature is a rich one, especially if one acknowledges

the relatively brief period in which it has been produced. Yet it is empirically thin with respect to many issues. Most of the studies which have been done are based either on observational cases studies or on aggregate data; there are not enough experimental studies or comparisons of extreme types to permit firm statements about the effects of different types of structure, training and supervision on detective effectiveness. Nor has there been sufficient examination of detective effect on case convictions. Detectives frequently are the principal link between the arrest and the prosecutorial functions and more attention should be paid to the impact of detective work on case outcomes beyond arrest and clearance.

There are, however, two issues which we would like to highlight in this review: the first is a substantive issue and the second, a conceptual one.

The substantive issue has been partially addressed in the prior discussion of the need to examine the effectiveness of detectives in dealing with tough cases. Several observers and the Rand report in particular have drawn attention to the fact that much of what detectives currently do is either interviewing which often is redundant of work already done by patrol officers or routine clerical work which could be done by non-sworn personnel. This focus on the type of work which goes into the handling of "common", and/or easy-to-solve crimes^{needs to be viewed in the context of the fact} that most crimes are common (i.e., not publicly spectacular) although many may not be easy to solve. Overlooked is the fact that some crimes are spectacular and although some of these are easy to solve (homicides are typically the easiest), others are indeed solved by the kind of work of which detective myths are made. While most persons who have come to be labeled "detectives" may not evidence these skills and may never handle these types of cases, it would seem premature

to assume that there are no detective skills which are critical for critical cases. Morris and Heal make this point:

On the basis of evidence from American and British studies, there can be little doubt that the detection and clearance of the commoner forms of crime depends for the most part upon the willingness and ability of the public to report criminal incidents to the police. Unfortunately, in their eagerness to make this point, authors, perhaps with the exception of Steer, have failed to draw on their research to identify those areas within which police skills may play some part. The detective has a variety of skills. (1980:33)

We agree that future research might profitably include efforts to identify and evaluate those special skills.

The conceptual point has to do with the way in which we think about detecting and detectives and the language we use to frame the issues. We have noted the need to differentiate between evaluations of detectives as job holders and evaluations of detecting as a function. Reppetto (1978) has pointed to the need to distinguish between headquarters and precinct detectives and Wilson (1978) identified four separate types of agents, all of whom might be called detectives. Early in the chapter we noted several general types of tasks (e.g., verification of crime, identification of offender, preparation of case) which might be subsumed by the general function of detecting. Several different goals can be identified as legitimate to this function: the discovery of crime, the identification, apprehension and conviction of offenders and the reassurance of victims and the public. That what one means by "detective work" must be clarified in terms of actors, structures, methods and goals is a sufficient dilemma for researchers who share a common language; it may be very critical one

for researchers who wish to communicate cross-nationally with multiple languages. The language problem underlines the need to develop a conceptual framework of the detecting function which clearly distinguishes what is meant by detecting and who is meant by detectives. The translation, discussions, and re-translations of the conceptualizations at this stage of cross-national investigation would insure a better basis for interpreting the work that has been done and for designing comparative work for the future.

John Eick
March 1982

Criminal Investigations in the United States

MAR 09 1983

For the general public, the police investigative function can inspire fear, awe, security, suspense and mystery. It has been the subject of countless novels, innumerable movies and too many television plots. For many, investigations are synonymous with police. Yet, despite the public's fascination with the investigators of crime, until very recently, very little was known about how crimes are solved by investigations. Most of what was known was based on a combination of detective experience and media myths.

The detective is viewed as the archtypical investigator, but the detective is a controversial figure in police history. As servants of the ruler's plain clothed officers were originally more responsible for maintaining the political order than for detecting common criminals. Indeed, it was the fear of abuse of power by plain clothed police that kept the detective branch of the newly formed London Metropolitan Police small for over 50 years. The fears were demonstrated to be well founded when in 1877 three of the four Metropolitan Police detectives were found guilty of corruption.

In the United States, the plain clothed detectives major role began with the enforcement of vice laws. However, the regulation of criminal enterprise was generally devoted more toward serving the interests of the local political machine than strict law enforcement. Indeed, it is clear from Raymond Fosdick's account of the haphazard

methods of case assignments in detective bureaus of the early Twentieth Century that investigating citizens complaints of crimes had a low priority.

Although the crimes detectives are now normally engaged to investigate are less controversial (burglaries, robberies, larcenies, rapes, assaults, homicides, etc.), detectives are still often a source of problems within modern police agencies. Detectives often represent, or have the potential to represent, an alternative source of power within police agencies. Reporters and politicians seek them out because they are often knowledgeable about critical events and crimes that affect the police agency or the city. Having greater discretion and lower visibility than uniformed patrol officers, detectives are sometimes viewed by police executives as being sources of problems. Finally, assignments to specialized investigative units are often seen as increases in status, so even if there is not differentiation by virtue of rank or salary (which their often is), patrol officers and detectives see each other as occupying different niches in the department pecking order. Thus, internal unit rivalry can create problems associated with detectives.

The fact still remains that detectives are typically the central part of the investigative function, and as such are the only portion of the police agency that is almost exclusively devoted to fighting crime. Only 20 percent of the calls to the police handled by the patrol division are crime related (Scott, 1981); yet this

division is the largest single unit of most police agencies. Specialized investigative units comprise 10 percent of the typical agency's officer, but ^{these officers} are usually almost totally engaged in crime control activities (Survey of Police Operations and Administrative Practices) ⁻¹⁹⁸¹.

For all of these reasons, public perception, controversy regarding operations, intra-organizational problems, and crime fighting role--the study of investigation, and particularly detectives, is important. Without a clear understanding of how the police go about solving crime it is impossible to evaluate the role of the investigations functions in law enforcement work.

Table 1

Median Percent of Personnel
Assigned to Units by
Jurisdiction Size

Jurisdiction Size (x 1000)	Patrol	Investigative
500 +	48.8	8.1
250 - 499	44.1	10.7
150 - 249	41.9	12.0
50 - 149	45.7	10.5

Source: Survey of Police Operations and Administrative Practices - 1981

Organization

The investigative function in larger police agencies in the the United States is usually divided between the patrol division and an

2

3

investigative division. However, other units such as records, communications, administration, and special services also contribute to investigations. Table 1 shows the median percent of law enforcement personnel assigned to patrol and detective divisions for agencies serving jurisdictions of 50,000 or more people. From this table, it can be seen that roughly 45 percent of agency personnel are assigned to the patrol division and 10 percent to the investigations division.

Traditionally, the patrol officers role in the investigative function has been to serve as a report taker. Once the report is taken a detective takes over and does the investigative work. This approach is changing in the United States as an increasing number of police agencies assigning more investigative duties, for a wider variety of offenses, to patrol officers. In many agencies, patrol officers investigate all misdemeanors, and in some agencies the investigation of certain felonies (such as burglary and larceny) are handled exclusively by these officers. In agencies where patrol officers are provided the largest role in investigating offenses, detectives still investigate the most serious and complex offenses.

Still, most large police agencies ^{split} ~~share~~ the responsibility for the investigation of felonies between the patrol and detective divisions. The patrol officer handles the initial stages of the investigation, often call the preliminary investigation, and the detective handles any further, or follow-up, investigation. The types of activities patrol officers engage in during preliminary investigations

of burglaries and robberies are shown in Table 2. This information shows that interviewing victims and checking the crime scene are the two most common activities. All other activities are much less common. Although this pattern of activities may be in part due to the fact that other activities are usually inappropriate or needless, it is evident that the preliminary investigation is still largely a matter of report taking. Investigative activities such as checking files, interviewing informants and interviewing suspects are relatively infrequently conducted.

Table 2
Frequency with which Activities are
Conducted by Patrol Officers During
Preliminary Investigations

<u>Activities Conducted</u>	<u>Burglary</u>	<u>Robbery</u>
Interview Suspects	7.7	11.8
Interview Victims	90.4	96.0
Interview Witnesses	16.9	44.7
Interview Informants	0.4	0.0
Interview Others	17.2	7.2
Check Crime Scenes	89.1	64.9
Canvass for Witnesses	18.5	22.0
Stakeouts	0.4	0.0
Physical Evidence Collection	12.6	9.2
Discussions with Detectives	6.6	33.4
Discussions with Patrol Officers	9.9	15.6
Discussions with Supervisors	13.9	40.3
Discussions with Others in Department	10.3	3.8
Check Department Records	2.9	6.1
Check Computer Files/NCIC	1.9	3.2
Check Other Files or Records	0.6	2.1
All Other Information Gathering Activities	3.3	5.0

Source: Eck (1983)

Once the patrol officer has completed preliminary investigation, a decision must be made if further investigative work is required or useful. In the past, the decision was left up to the detective who received the case, and no formal rules were used to assist the detective in this decision. Over the last decade, police agencies have increasingly adopted formal case screening. In 1981, over 83 percent of the agencies serving 50,000 or more people used some form of case screening (Survey of Police Operational and Administrative Practices - 1981).

Some agencies provide guidelines to patrol officers or patrol supervisors for case screening, but the most common method is to have case screening conducted by a investigative supervisor. Guidelines tell the supervisor which cases are to be assigned to detectives and which are not to receive any follow-up investigative effort. The case screening guidelines vary from suggestions as to what factors may be taken into account when making such decisions, thus, allowing a great deal of discretion, to statistically derived lists of factors with numerical weights that must be used, thus, allowing little discretion. These factors include leads that may result in suspect identification and arrest, crime seriousness, and crime type. Research on the use of these screening guidelines has demonstrated that those permitting the least discretion have the potential for improving investigative unit efficiency by focusing resources on those cases that can be solved (Eck, 1979; Williams 1979; and Eck, 1983).

What detectives do during investigations has not been described by most research on the subject. Greenwood and Petersilia (1975) demonstrate that detective actions relating to the solution of crimes are most often standard police procedures not the strange and fantastic actions of the detective mythology understood by the public. However, Greenwood and Petersilia looked at solved crimes, and since most offenses are not solved, this provides a distorted picture of what actions detectives do take.

Table 3 shows the frequency of actions taken by detectives during the follow-up investigations of burglary and robbery. The data was collected from logs completed by detectives investigating these offenses at three jurisdictions (see Eck, 1983). The most common activity is the victim interview, but aside this action no other activity is particularly common. This suggest that the pattern of activities conducted by detectives varies from offense to offense, depending on the nature of the leads available.

Indeed, when these actions were organized by the investigation day on which they occurred, it was found that the longer the investigations are active, the more diverse the actions became (Eck, 1983). On the first follow-up investigation day victim interviews and crime scene checks predominate, and the most frequent actions suggest that the focus of the investigation is on information sources outside

Table 3.

Frequency with Which Activities are
Conducted by Detectives During Follow-up Investigations

<u>Activities Conducted</u>	<u>Burglary</u>	<u>Robbery</u>
Interview Suspect	17.8	16.5
Interview Victims	76.1	74.0
Interview Witnesses	15.5	23.1
Interview Informants	2.5	3.2
Interview Others	13.9	18.0
Check Crime Scenes	23.3	18.6
Canvass for Witnesses	10.8	19.6
Stakeouts	1.0	0.4
Physical Evidence Collection	3.5	5.5
Discussions with Detectives	15.5	27.2
Discussions with Patrol Officers	6.2	23.0
Discussions with Supervisors	6.9	15.0
Discussions with Others in Department	4.7	5.2
Check Department Records	16.9	22.0
Check Computer Files/NCIC	3.9	7.1
Check Other Files or Records	5.0	7.0
All Other Information Gathering Activities	4.1	7.7

department control such as victims, witnesses and the crime scene. By the third and later follow-up investigation days there is no action that predominates, but the most frequent activities are directed at information sources within department control, such as records, other detectives, patrol officers and suspects. Indeed, investigations have moved from being victim-oriented to being suspect-oriented. This is in part due to the rapid attrition to cases wherein leads have been exhausted, and in part due to the fact that the leads in the remaining active cases forces detectives to take different actions on each of these remaining cases. These leads point to suspects, so the investigations, while becoming more diverse, also become more suspect-oriented.

Sources of information within the control of the department become more important as early leads are checked. Victims become less important (unless they have witnessed the offense) because, ~~unless they have witnessed the offense,~~ they have little to contribute after they have been interviewed early in the investigation. Thus, a portrait of how investigations progress can be made, despite the absence of a typical pattern of specific actions.

Solving Crimes

Much attention has been paid by researchers to the productivity of detectives. Of particular concern have been issues regarding how investigators solve crimes and the relative contributions of patrol officers and detectives to crime solution. Based on this previous research, two apparently contradictory hypotheses can be discerned.

The first posits that investigative results, such as arrests, are the result of circumstances beyond police control; whether a witness was present, whether stolen property was marked and recorded by the owner, the presence of physical evidence, and the ability of the victim to identify a suspect. If the circumstances are not favorable then no arrest can or will be made. Under favorable circumstances an arrest can be made. The role of the patrol officer is critical because he or she determines whether the necessary leads are present and, as a consequence, whether conditions are favorable for the investigation to result in an arrest. Detectives are engaged in processing the case and completing paper work, according to this hypothesis. Little investigative work (in the normal meaning of the term) is performed.

The detective picks up and interrogates the suspects identity during the preliminary investigation, and prepares a case for prosecution.

Two quotes articulate this hypothesis well.

[The] solution of any particular property crime is a chance event, insensitive to the amount of investigation conducted.

(Greenwood, 1970: 37)

On how cases are solved: The single most important determinant of whether or not a case will be solved is the information the victim supplies to the immediately responding patrol officer. If information that uniquely identifies the perpetrator is not presented at the time the crime is reported, the perpetrator, by and large, will not be subsequently identified.

(Greenwood and Petersilia, 1975: vii)

This hypothesis is call the Circumstance-Result Hypothesis.

Evidence supporting it can be found in studies by Issacs (1967), Greenwood (1970), Greenwood and Petersilia (1975), Greenberg, et. al. (1973), Greenberg, et. al. (1975), and Eck (1979). Among police researchers during the last decade, the Circumstance-Result Hypothesis has been the predominant explanation of how crimes are solved. However, the evidence supporting it is far from conclusive. Issacs (1967) used highly aggregated data comprised of many offenses, and did not measure the effort of investigators, or describe what they did to solve offenses. Greenwood (1970) used precinct level data and did not collect data on case characteristics and investigator effort. The study by Greenwood and Petersilia (1975) reviewed only cleared cases,

making it impossible to distinguish between cases that did and did not result in an arrest. Finally, Greenberg, et., al. (1973), Greenberg, et. al. (1975) and Eck (1979) did not collect data on what investigators did after the preliminary investigation. None of the studies that lend support to the Circumstance-Result Hypothesis were able to describe the actions of detectives during the investigation of solved and unsolved crimes. Thus, how much investigative actions contribute to crime solution cannot be determined by these studies, and little concrete support exists for the Circumstance-Result Hypothesis.

In direct contrast stands the Effort Result Hypothesis.

According to this hypothesis the investigative work of patrol officers and detectives contributes substantially to crime solution. Looking for witnesses, interviewing victims, checking records, cultivating informants and other activities constitutes investigative efforts that can increase the chances a crime may result in an arrest. Actions taken based on initial leads can produce further leads and arrest. While circumstances outside police control can certainly play a significant role during investigations, the Effort-Result Hypothesis asserts that investigative effort contributes substantially to those successful investigations.

Although supported more by investigators than researchers, this hypothesis is plausible and not totally devoid of support from the research community. Both Ward (1971) and Folk (1971) suggest such a description in their research. However, unlike research supporting the

Circumstance-Result Hypothesis, the research of these authors takes the Effort-Result Hypothesis for granted, and does not attempt to test its validity.

In 1979, a study designed to describe how investigations are conducted was begun by the Police Executive Research Forum (Eck, 1983). Using logs completed by patrol officers and detectives, official reports, and direct observations of investigations, data on the investigative function in three jurisdictions was obtained. This data described actions taken by patrol officers and detectives investigating burglaries and robberies, the time taken and information produced by these actions, and the results of this investigative effort. Data was collected on individual cases. Thus, a detailed account of how burglary and robbery investigations are conducted from the preliminary investigation through arrest or suspension of investigative effort was acquired.

The findings provide an interesting portrait of the investigative process. During the preliminary investigation and the early stages of the follow-up investigation, the most common activity is the victim interview. Indeed, the investigation process begins by being victim-oriented, and activities are directed at sources of information outside of police agency control, such as victims, crime scenes, and witnesses (if available).

However, case attrition during this early phase of the process is large. Almost 50 percent of the burglary cases were

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screened out prior to assignment for a follow-up investigation, and 75 percent of all robberies and assigned burglaries had no more than one day of follow-up investigative effort devoted to them. The lack of useful leads takes its toll quickly.

For those cases remaining in the process, the nature of investigations has changed. No single activity can be designated as typical. Instead, a large variety of activities are conducted with small frequencies. However, suspect interviews increase in frequency as investigations progress. Generally, the investigative process becomes more suspect-oriented, and activities directed at sources of information under agency control (other detectives, patrol officers, informants, suspects and records) are conducted with increasing frequency.

Additional findings describe the influence of detective effort on case solution. Only cases that were actually assigned to detectives to be worked were used to determine what actions taken by detectives influence arrests. Using multivariate analysis it was discovered that detectives action such as witness interviews, informant interviews, discussions with departments members, and checking files and records were strongly related to arrests, even when preliminary investigation information was accounted for. In other words, detective actions contribute to case solution.

Interestingly, victim interviews by detectives were found to be unrelated to suspect arrests. Indeed, victims were found to be a poor source of suspect names and descriptions, and related crime information (three types of information strongly associated with case solution). Informants, witnesses and department records were all much better sources of this information, despite the fact that these sources were used less frequently than victims. Victim interviews by detectives were found to be uncorrelated or negatively correlated with actions that were related to arrests. Thus, victims were found to have no direct or indirect influence on whether their case is eventually solved.

These findings provide support for both the Circumstance-Result Hypothesis and the Effort-Result Hypothesis. Many cases are dropped from the lack of leads; a phenomenon strongly suggested by the Circumstance-Result Hypothesis. The Effort-Result is supported by the fact that detective actions do influence whether an arrest is made. The absence of a relationship between victim interviews and arrests also supports this hypothesis is so far as proponents of the Circumstance-Result Hypothesis have claimed that such a relationship exists.

It is clear that although both hypotheses are supported by the data, neither offers a complete description of the investigative process. In fact, the two hypotheses appear contradictory. What is needed is a synthesis of the two hypotheses that can explain the *investigative*

process without the apparent contradictions. Such a hypothesis is the Triage Hypothesis.

The Triage Hypothesis removes the contradiction by differentiating types of cases. According to this hypothesis, "the investigative process implicitly works to divide cases into three groups" (Eck, 1983). These groups are:

1. Cases that are insoluble with a reasonable amount of investigative effort;
2. Cases solved by circumstances, requiring only that the suspects be arrested, booked, interrogated, and a prosecutable case prepared; and
3. Cases that may be solved if a reasonable level of investigative effort is applied to them, but will not be solved otherwise.

The investigative process implicitly divides cases because police agencies have no policies (with possible one exception) to promote such a division. Instead, detective using their knowledge based on experience, and acting independently, create this division without setting out to do so. The one exception is case screening prior to cases being assigned to detectives.

The Circumstance-Result and Effort-Result Hypotheses can be viewed as special cases of the Triage Hypothesis. The Circumstance-Result Hypothesis focuses on differences between Group 1 and 2 cases, while the Effort-Result Hypothesis focuses on differences between Group 1 and Group 3 cases.

The differences among these three groups are not as distinct as has been suggested so far. In fact, it may be more useful to think of these three groups as representing ranges of cases on a continuum. Still, the hypothesis makes it clear that cases, even of the same crime type, must be differentiated on the basis of the amount of investigative effort required to solve them. Group 1 cases require extraordinary effort, and possibly an infinite amount of resources, to be solved: far beyond the level that can be afforded. Group 2 cases required very little investigative effort to achieve solution (although post-arrest processing effort may vary). Group 3 cases fall into the middle range of investigative effort.

The Triage Hypothesis allows distinctions to be drawn among law enforcement agencies as to how they implicitly divide cases. Agencies with few resources, poorly trained led and motivated investigators, or having a low priority on investigations may implicitly assign more cases to Group 1 at the expense of Group 3. For these agencies Group 2 cases will makeup the majority of solved cases. Agencies with a great many investigative resources, well-trained led and motivated investigators, or with a high priority on investigations may do the opposite. Many cases that for most agencies would be Group 1 are implicitly assigned to Group 3. Consequently, a greater proportion of solved cases may belong to this last group.

Differences in investigative strategies, tactics and organization may also influence the relative sizes of these groups. Agencies that have patrol officers conduct extremely thorough preliminary

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investigations, have well organized and accessible records, search for witnesses, and collect and process physical evidence may have a greater proportion of Group 2 and Group 3 cases than agencies that do not. If following-up on leads can be made easier and less expensive, then the resources required to solve cases will be less.

The Triage Hypothesis provides a solution to the dilemma of evidence supporting two apparently contradictory hypothesis. While resolving this problem by providing a manner to differentiate among cases, on the basis of investigative effort needed to solve cases, it also offers a method for developing a better understanding of how agency differences influence investigative outcomes. Thus, this hypothesis offers a new perspective on how investigations are conducted and managed, as well as a framework for further research.

Future

The investigation of crimes by the police is not going to disappear until crimes themselves disappear, or the private sector reasserts its former dominance in this field. Neither of these possibilities are likely. Further, the basic nature of investigations will not change dramatically, unless the characteristics of crimes and how they come to the attention of the police also changes. Talking to citizens--victims, witnesses, informants, suspects and others--has always been and will continue to be the mainstay of investigations.

Improvements in record systems, physical evidence utilization, and other technological innovations may make improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of investigations, but the interview will remain the dominant method of obtaining useful information.

What has been, and will continue to change, is the manner in which investigations are organized and managed. Since the early 1970's law enforcement officials have increasingly become concerned with how they could improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their investigative functions. Three major trends have developed.

The first involves establishing formal investigative priorities for offenses based on available leads and other factors. The foremost exemplar of this trend has been the dramatic growth of formal case screening policies. Although no records exist to substantiate this claim, it is safe to assert that in 1970 few, if any, police agencies had such policies, or even considered them. Now, more than 80 percent of the large agencies, in the United States, and uncounted numbers of smaller agencies have formal case screening policies. Lest, this trend can be seen as being isolated to investigations, it is important to realize that other aspects of policing are also increasing use of screening and priority setting policies, most notably in the communications/dispatch function (see Farmer ed., 1981). As police agencies as a whole become more cost conscious and attempt to maintain levels of productivity under increasing resource constraints, the use of screening and priority setting policies will continue to advance.

The second trend is improvements in the collection, storage, retrieval, analysis and dissemination of information in investigative work. Giving the uniformed patrol officer increased responsibilities for conducting preliminary investigation has been advocated, and adopted, in order to obtain more leads earlier in the investigation. Many police agencies have made improvements in their crime report forms and upgraded the investigations training of patrol officers in order to assure that leads are recognized, and recorded in a method that permits retrieval. At the other end of the investigative process, improvements continue to be made in how police prepare cases for prosecution. Although more attention should be paid to this, law enforcement officials are beginning to develop procedures for assuring that prosecutors received the information they need to obtain indictments and convictions. Finally, crime analysis methods are being put to use to aid investigations process. Though primarily used to allocate patrol services, the analysis of offense data from police records is being put to greater use in the investigations process.

The third trend is the increased use of novel investigation strategies that do not rely on traditional follow-up investigations. Examples of such efforts include "sting" operations that create a phony fencing operations to identify property offenders, career criminals units to identify and arrest high volume, serious offenders, anti-fencing squads to shutdown criminal receivers, and crime pattern analysis to deploy stakeout units to high risk crime targets. Some of these strategies are controversial and evaluation and research of these strategies has yet to demonstrate how effective they are. However,

frustration with traditional practices has led to an increasing willingness to adopt new approaches. Whether this willingness to explore new strategies will continue, or whether these strategies will be found wanting and then abandoned is impossible to say at this time.

There are innumerable facets of investigations in need of additional research. Little research has been conducted on how homicide, rape, assault, auto theft, arson, larceny and misdemeanors are investigated. Since most research has been conducted on burglary and robbery this has limited our knowledge of investigations, and has led us to overlook issues that appear during the investigations of other offenses.

The issue of how many detectives are needed to effectively work a caseload of a given size has received scant attention. Despite the fact that such research can be extremely valuable to police agencies when trying to allocate resources. Greenwood (1970) found no relationship between arrests and cases per detective for burglaries, but found a negative relationship for assaults. However, he did not distinguish between burglaries and assaults that were actually investigated and those that received only cursory treatment. Thus, the actual workload of detective with many cases was over estimated. Further research needs to be conducted that accounts for investigative effort and the difficulty of cases.

Researchers have usually been careful to distinguish among types of offenses (burglary, robbery, homicide, larceny, etc.) but have paid scant attention to investigative difficulty differences within these crime types. As suggested by the Triage Hypothesis, distinctions based on difficulty are critical for understanding how investigations are conducted and offenses solved. Using offense types as a measure of case difficulty is meaningless because case difficulty can vary so widely within these broad categories. Until researchers develop and refine measures of investigative difficulty and use these measures in their research, little substantive progress will be made in this field.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION: RESEARCH IN ENGLAND AND WALES¹

by John Burrows, Roger Tarling and Kevin Heal (Home Office Research and Planning Unit, London)

Background

Over the last fifty years there have been various reports and studies carried out in England and Wales dealing with crime investigation. Indeed the framework of the present system of investigation was largely laid down after government enquiries - notably the 1938 Committee on Detective Work and Procedure and the 1968 Committee on the Detection and Prevention of Crime - that went to some lengths to explore investigative practices at those times. More recent years, however, have witnessed changes both in the character and content of these studies: the watershed perhaps being typified most clearly by Martin and Wilson's 1965/6 systematic examination of police officers' activity. This study, which Cordener (1979) has labelled one of the earliest and most comprehensive explorations of police manpower and detective workloads, represented a clear break from an earlier tradition where studies were conducted by police officers who looked primarily to the management lessons of their work. In the last decade, in particular, the study of crime investigation has tended to gather momentum and to draw on more elaborate empirical evidence than the work that preceded it. Various pressures and influences have fed this development.

As in other countries, the main driving force behind police research, and the influence that has loosened the purse-strings of government and other funding agencies, has been growing public concern about law and order. Other factors -

¹ Notwithstanding many common characteristics, there are also essential differences between the criminal justice systems of England and Wales, and Scotland. Smith (1983) assesses the comparability of the criminal statistics of the two jurisdictions, and gives attention to the different clear-up and police manpower statistics of each.

notably changing perceptions about the fairness of police operations, on the one hand, and their cost and effectiveness, on the other - have of course played a substantial role, but these influences are likely to have had little impact were it not for the widespread belief that crime had rapidly increased. Whether or not this is a legitimate assessment is a complex question: but this has been the message relayed by police statistics of recorded crimes, which rose by nearly 60% in the decade 1970-1980, to reach 3.25m crimes in 1982.

Recent publication of the main results of the first nationwide victim survey (Hough and Mayhew, 1983) has served to put these statistics of recorded crime in some context. Consistent with the findings of its counterparts elsewhere, the survey found recorded offences form but part - if a generally more serious part - of all crime, with survey estimates suggesting that about four times more offences involving property loss and damage occur than official statistics indicate, and around five times more offences of violence. Of course the full significance of the survey will not accrue until repeats provide an assessment of the extent of change. Nonetheless there are indications that the proportion of crime recorded by the police can vary over the years. This relationship between recorded and survey-reported crime may not be dissimilar to that now widely reported in the United States, where increases indicated by police statistics in many forms of crime have not been matched by increases in survey-reported offences. Public responses to a question recorded for some time in the General Household Survey about household burglary, for example, have shown that between 1972 and 1980 victimisation increased only by about one tenth despite the fact that police statistics in the same period rose by about one third. It has been suggested that one reason for this discrepancy may be that the police increasingly display a propensity to record reported incidents (Home Office 1982). Whether or not this is a principal factor, it is increasingly coming to be recognised that police statistics may not provide an altogether reliable indication of long-term trends in crime.

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Even so, concern about crime has led to the belief that more must be done to bring offenders to justice. Investigation - and the extent to which the police meet with success in this activity - has thus increasingly come to be a matter of public concern. Again, from the viewpoint of the official statistics, it is apparent that though the number of crimes 'cleared up' by the police routinely increases from year to year, the clear up rate has declined, particularly since 1973. There are of course wide variations between forces, so that while in 1981 the national rate stood at 38% of recorded crime, the rates for individual forces ranged from 57% to 17%. In recent years particularly the achievement of low clear up rates have given rise to sensationalism in press reporting, and to acrimony between police officers and their critics.

The spiralling costs of the criminal justice system - well over half of which are channelled to the police service - in a period when other public sector services have been subjected to severe restraint has also served to provoke research interest. Successive governments in the 1970's sought to ensure that there were more police officers in relation to the population at large: the number of serving police officers per head of the population as a result rose by some 20% in that period. Of course the demands made on the police - of public order as well as crime² - have changed in this time, as well as the working arrangements (and overtime) of serving police officers, but the result has been that expenditure on the police has risen to total some £1,817m in 1980/1. A natural corollary to this policy has been to fuel both researchers and funding agencies with a common desire to gauge what benefits accrue from the investment in this public service. For a time investigative work remained one

² Thus the number of people per serving police officers in the Metropolitan Police District is 275, whereas outside this area it is 457; the overall rate is 423.

area of policing relatively shrouded from the eyes of the outside observer, but the late 1970s saw the publication of several important general studies on the subject (eg Bottomley and Coleman, 1980 and 1981; Mawby, 1979; Steer, 1980), as well as work casting some doubt on the assumption that investigative effectiveness would improve in direct ratio to the resources made available for this task (Crust, 1975).

The police service, of course, has not been insulated from some economic restraint, or unmindful of the desire for re-appraisal of investigative activity. The burgeoning workloads facing many detectives, which has led some to argue they merely 'process' rather than investigate reports (the increase in recorded crime has outpaced even the large increases in establishment) has been another factor prompting critical review. During the 1970's, detectives' overtime payments proved obvious candidates for economies, though this restraint was much criticised by detectives. Other forces responded with organisational and administrative changes, common reactions being experimentation with the establishment of specialist squads, reductions in the administrative work conducted by detectives, and the allocation of less serious 'beat' crimes for investigation by uniform officers.

The impact of corruption is a further influence that cannot be disregarded when looking, from a historical perspective, at the factors leading to research in this area. For many years, the police service has come to expect some degree of corruption as an invidious, but nonetheless enduring, result of police activity but in the early 1970s - particularly from 1972, when commissionership of the Metropolitan Police passed to Sir Robert Mark - the subject became the focus of considerable public debate, largely focused on this force. In the first three

years of his office alone, Mark's initiatives against corruption in London had led to the dismissal - or voluntary discharge of those under criminal or disciplinary enquiries - of 385 officers, whereas in the years preceding him such losses accounted for an average 16 officers a year (Cox et al, 1977). Whether in direct response to corruption problems of their own or simply from a general desire to exercise more direct managerial control of their men, at about this time senior officers in many forces sought to undermine the autonomous position occupied by the detective hierarchy: outside police headquarters these would more often than not operate in parallel structure with the uniformed establishment, but with a measure of independence from these officers. Latterly it has become more common for the senior detective at divisional³ level to be directly answerable to the uniformed divisional commander. Another response, designed in part to erode earlier conceptions of the elevated status of the detective, is that it has become more frequent for such officers to be required, on promotion, to transfer to uniform duties for a specified period. The net result has been that in the country as a whole criminal investigation departments tended in the 1970s to come under closer supervision of the uniform branch: arguably a development that made such departments more open to outside scrutiny.

A final, but by no means less substantial, development that has had the effect of making police investigative activity more widely researched has been the polarisation of views in the debate about police powers and civil rights. There have been various strands to this debate, that is too complicated to describe in detail here, but in the first half of the 1970s particular issues that perhaps attracted most attention were questions about the fairness of police treatment

³ Police force areas are traditionally divided into a number of geographical units - divisions - and these into smaller sub-divisions. London's Metropolitan Police District (MPD) is an exception, for there the larger units are labelled 'districts', and the areas within them 'divisions'.

of black minorities (Humphry, 1972), the reliability of identification evidence (Devlin, 1976), the value and feasibility of tape recording suspect interviews (Home Office, 1976) and - not surprisingly in the light of Mark's efforts at Scotland Yard - the credibility of a police complaints system conducted by the service itself. Behind these separate issues lay a long standing commitment by government to rationalise the myriad of laws and rules affecting police powers: as early as 1964, the Criminal Law Revision Committee - a group of judges and lawyers - had been asked to consider this problem. This group reported in 1972 but for a considerable time no action was taken over their recommendations. Two factors contributed, probably above all others, to prompt this interest anew: Mark's trenchant criticisms of the restrictions on police powers, on the one hand, and - on the other - an enquiry into police actions in the course of a celebrated murder case, that of Maxwell Confait (Fisher, 1977), which was critical of the conduct of the police officers involved. These factors, as well as many others, led in 1978 to the government establishing the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP) to look in detail at criminal proceedings and the vexed question of police powers: the Commission itself funded several research studies that are described later in this paper.

The organisation of crime investigation in England and Wales

The structure of the police forces of England and Wales has been one of the principal influences dictating the style of research on investigation, and indeed the subject matter of these endeavours. For this reason it is salutary, and likely to be of assistance in understanding research findings, to outline briefly the key features of that structure and some of the practices, and the constraints, on detectives working within it.

The most significant feature - especially when compared with the pluralism of US policing - is the relative uniformity of the system. There are 43 police forces only, which of course range in size and composition⁴, but which overall have criminal investigation departments (CID) which comprise some 15% of all officers⁵. Within these forces it is customary for a proportion of the force detective manpower to be deployed at force headquarters (typically administration and central squads serving all areas), but the large part to operate at divisional, or sub-divisional, level. Notwithstanding a high degree of force autonomy, detectives are able to draw on some nationally-established services, like the forensic science service or detective training facilities, and will co-operate with regional crime squads - of which there are nine - which operate across force boundaries.

Within broad bounds the procedures followed on receipt of a crime complaint are similar to those practised in many other countries. Generally speaking, preliminary enquiries about the circumstances of an incident will be performed by a uniformed officer who will submit a report to the CID, to whom responsibility for investigation will then fall. At this point, a senior detective will allocate the case in question to one of his staff: the latter enjoys considerable autonomy in the conduct of his work, but is required to submit written details of the action he has taken to his superior officer in a prescribed time. It is the job of this supervisor to accept or reject the detective's recommendations

⁴ According to common convention these can be divided into two distinct groups: on the one hand the London Metropolitan Police - which comprises some 27,000 officers - and six other Metropolitan forces - which variously comprise from 3 to 7,000 officers, and on the other the remaining 36 non-Metropolitan forces - the smallest of which employ 900 officers but which more typically have complements of about 2,000.

⁵ The range is from 12 to 25% of the force strength.

on the case, in the light of his own judgement and having consideration to force standing orders (these are laid down by the Chief Constable, and may - for example - require all detectives to visit the scene of burglaries), or instructions contained in circulars from the Home Office, the central government department with overall responsibility for policing.

This said, there are however many common variations to the general system. One is that the CID will retain control of investigations in principle only, and will either redirect less serious cases to the uniform branch for investigation, or conduct the case with considerable assistance from such officers. As in other countries, detective squads are sometimes established to focus their attention on target crimes, and when this is the case initial complaints thought to be of interest to them are often received direct, prior to any preliminary investigation being performed. Squads themselves may however vary substantially: some may simply perform routine 'reactive' investigations of a given type of offence, while others may incline towards more 'proactive' duties, conducting surveillance of known suspects, high risk cases, and so on. A number of forces retain central support units not specifically concerned with any particular form of criminality, but adopting more of a 'trouble-shooting' role, in the sense that the unit can be directed to deal with any disturbing incident, or series of incidents, occurring within their force area.

In international terms, one unusual feature of the system of investigation in England and Wales is the fact that in a majority of less serious cases the decision to prosecute suspected persons rests with the chief constable, and not an independent prosecutor (although following the report of the RCCP, the

possibility of a public prosecution system is under review). This authority allows the chief constable to prosecute a suspect identified by his officers, or - if guilt is admitted - to caution⁶, or decide to take no further action against him. More often than not chief constables retain their own professional staff of prosecutors to advise them on such questions. In specific serious cases the chief constable is required to submit details of his officers' investigations to the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and a decision to prosecute rests in the hands of this authority; such cases, however, represent a very small proportion of those dealt with by the police.

A final point that warrants mention - because of its direct consequences on the shape of research efforts - is that police forces are required to provide the Home Office with various kinds of statistics. Importantly, the method by which these statistics should be collected, interpreted and recorded is dictated by an extensive set of counting rules issued by this department. The application of these rules does not, of course, ensure a uniform nationwide system of data collection: indeed various research studies have looked to the different ways the police interpret these rules, and these provide firm grounds for believing substantial differences do exist between forces. Even so the requirements on forces to provide statistics in accordance with the rules - statistics that are published annually, as are other statistics relating to very many structural and social facets of each force area - facilitates comparative research in a way that is not easily possible in other countries where police structures are less uniform.

⁶ The caution almost invariably takes the form of an oral warning by a senior uniformed police officer about the offender's conduct and about the possibility of future prosecution if a further offence is committed. It can only be given if the offender admits his guilt, if the police are satisfied they have a provable case, and if the complainant does not insist on a prosecution (cf. Ditchfield, 1976).

RESEARCH ON CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION: AN OVERVIEW

Restricting an overview to, say, the period since 1965 it is possible to identify some distinct traditions in research on investigation in England and Wales. Two in particular have dominated the research literature: that of the comparative study - facilitated by the relative uniformity of police organisations - and that of the ethnographic study, in-depth enquiries into one particular force or area. The latter studies have not claimed to produce results representative of other forces but their findings, taken together, have led to many similar conclusions about investigative work. By comparison with research products in the United States in this same period, there have been few 'experimental' studies executed - like evaluations of team policing, and none controlled specifically with the ends of research in mind.

The following sections describe, in a necessarily selective manner, the principal findings of this body of research. First attention is focussed on research that has examined how investigations are pursued and how investigators spend their time. The second section looks at an issue that has been addressed by most researchers working in this area: how crimes are cleared up. Under this broad heading, particular attention is given to the importance of interrogation and forensic evidence on achieving crime detections, and to the credibility of the clear-up rate as a measure of investigative performance. The third and final section summarizes research that has sought to establish what factors affect that performance.

A. The work of detectives

Various studies have helped to resolve two key questions about crime investigation: who typically conducts these and how police time allocated to this activity is spent. These studies have largely taken the form of activity analyses, many executed to serve management purposes: as Miller and Weeks (1972) have pointed out, knowledge of the time spent investigating different types of crime, and of what the police actually do, can prove essential "management tools", enabling decision-makers to arrive at better informed decisions about the uses to which police resources may be put.

One popular conception undermined by work in this area has been that all investigations fall to CID officers. The point is made, for example, by Martin and Wilson (op.cit) who conducted a study of some thirteen police forces. They found beat officers had a significant commitment to crime work - carrying out some 25% of that work - while members of the CID were responsible for a little under 60%. Other departments dealt with such matters only to a very small extent.

Crust (op.cit), who surveyed investigatory work carried out by both uniformed and CID officers in 26 representative police divisions, provides comprehensive information that confirms this earlier research. His study focused particularly on differences in the amount of time devoted to the investigation of detected crimes, as opposed to those remaining undetected, and according to the type of incident being investigated.

Crust indicated that in most instances crime investigations are joint ventures undertaken by CID and uniformed officers in conjunction: Table 1 summarises the percentages from all divisions according to the nature of the enquiry, and suggests that while CID and uniform branch each perform about one fifth of investigations alone, in the remaining three-fifths they do so together. Nonetheless the survey made it clear that there are substantial differences depending on the type of area policed: whereas uniformed officers performed over one third (35.6%) of all investigations alone in rural divisions, they did so in very few instances (2.1%) in urban divisions. In all likelihood this substantial variation between rural and urban areas has diminished in recent years, as urban forces have moved to allocate more routine 'beat' crimes to uniformed officers for investigation.

TABLE 1. Who carries out investigation (percentages)

Offence Group	CID Only	Uniformed Branch Only	Both
Violence against the person	27.0	22.6	50.4
Sexual Offences	16.7	22.9	60.4
Burglary	19.2	17.0	63.8
Robbery	27.1	-	72.9
Theft and Handling Stolen Goods	18.8	25.1	56.2
Fraud and Forgery	64.9	10.5	24.6
Criminal Damage	8.9	33.7	57.4
Other Offences	50.0	25.0	25.0
TOTAL	19.4	22.5	58.1

(Source: Crust.P.E, 1975)

Another issue addressed by the Crust survey was the amount of time spent on investigation. Taking the combined efforts of both uniformed and CID officers, it was shown that crimes that are detected are given more police attention than those undetected, primarily because of the administration involved as a consequence of detecting offences; an average 7.7 hours was spent per detected crime (comprising 4.5 hours investigation and 3.2 on administration) and 3.5 hours per undetected crime (comprising 2.8 to investigation and 0.7 to administration). It was found too that there was considerable variation according to the type of crime being investigated, both in the gross amount of time spent (detected robberies warranted 37.5 hours investigations, against 8.3 devoted to domestic burglaries, or 2.3 to shop-lifting) but also in the relation between detected and undetected crimes. For example in the case of offences of violence against the person, there was little difference between the time spent on detected and undetected offences and undetected sexual offences warranted more investigation time than such offences where detections were made.

An alternative approach to that adopted in Crust's work, which focused on the time spent in investigation of specific crimes, has been to look at how detectives themselves describe the activities they undertake during their time at work. Activity analyses of detectives' work have been carried out by various forces for management purposes, and Tarling and Burrows (1983) drew on some of these, where detectives were typically asked to record (for each quarter of an hour during their duty) the task on which they had been engaged.

TABLE 2. Time spent by detectives on different activities: four police forces

Activity	Percentages			
	Hampshire Constabulary	Merseyside Police	Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)	Sussex Police
Total investigation, comprising:	47	46	30	34
a. Interviewing prisoners, suspects, witnesses, complainants	-	(15)	(12)	-
b. Enquiries and visiting scenes of crime	-	(24)	(18)	-
c. Meeting and cultivating informants	-	(4)	(1)	-
d. Other	-	(3)	-	-
Report writing	26	31	25	27
Patrol and observation	1	6	8	3
Court attendance	5	6	4	2
Briefing/debriefing discussions parading	3	3	8	4
Travel	-	-	10	8
Refreshment	9	7	7	7
Other duties	10	1	8	15

- denotes that the activity was not included in the study

(Source: Tarling R and Burrows J, in press)

The table shows that, notwithstanding the difficulties of comparison - particularly the different categorisations chosen by each force, and the very different crime problems each has to face - there was some similarity between them in the amount of time spent on different activities. The main finding is that about one third of detective time is spent on investigative work and a further 10% travelling in the course of that work (the "total investigation" times for Hampshire and Merseyside included time spent travelling, which was separately recorded in the other two forces). From the evidence in the two forces which classified investigative activity in more detail, it appears this time is principally divided between interviewing and making enquiries. The other large block of work performed by detectives is report writing: between a quarter and one third of detective time is devoted to this task. The other major tasks between them account for the remaining time but each, individually, occupies proportionally less time by comparison.

Tarling and Burrows drew on these results to suggest that police administrators could utilise this approach with a view to shedding or reducing the time detectives spend on some, less fruitful, activities, especially perhaps unnecessary report writing. In particular they argue that the substantial time spent report writing re-emphasises the need for forces to perform periodic reviews to assess the value of the reports prepared and that these do not duplicate one another; indeed, they suggest that the experience of the forces that have conducted the surveys provide a good illustration of these benefits. They have, amongst other things, experimented by making greater use of civilian clerks, by delegating the preparation of initial case papers to the uniform officers carrying out enquiries, and by establishing specialist teams ready to take over the preparation of more complicated case papers.

The studies explored here, though providing a useful background knowledge of investigative activity, focused primarily on an easily quantifiable aspect of investigation - time - rather than attempting to distinguish the tactics employed by investigators or their methods of collecting intelligence. This is a topic discussed in the following section.

B. How crimes are cleared-up

Research which has examined how crimes come to be cleared up has taken a number of forms. Some studies have looked to the formal statistics produced by police forces as a means of throwing light on this issue. Each force in England and Wales derives, on an annual basis, a clear-up rate to denote its performance in identifying those responsible for notifiable⁷ crimes and, as with the recording of crime, detailed guidelines dictate those circumstances in which a crime can be said to be cleared. Thus an offence can be said to be cleared up if a person is prosecuted, or cautioned for that offence, if it is taken into consideration (Tic) by a court on sentencing an offender found guilty on another charge, or if a number of other conditions are met.⁸ Police forces in England and Wales are required to indicate what proportion of crime cleared by them each year were dealt with by each of these individual 'disposals'; these latter statistics, while not published centrally, have on a number of occasions been drawn on by researchers in the course of their work.

⁷ Notifiable offences - previously labelled serious or indictable - comprise offences of violence against the person, sexual offences, burglary, robbery, theft and handling of stolen goods, fraud and forgery, criminal damage and small number of other offences.

⁸ These "other" clearances - denoted in the text as cleared "otherwise, without proceedings" - include offences where there is some technical or other obstacle to prosecution or caution (the offender may have died or may prove to be a child under the age of criminal responsibility) or where further action may serve "no useful purpose" (the offender may already be in prison).

Such accounts, however, provide merely a skeletal assessment of investigative work, and one that can be misleading if care is not taken. In the first instance the broad breakdown produced by police forces distinguishes the disposal by which the police dealt with the offender in question, rather than the strategies detectives employed - or the information they gathered - that initially led to his identification. This basic point is commonly overlooked, especially by commentators referring to crimes cleared when taken into consideration by offenders sentenced on other, generally more serious, charges. Many such offences come to light in the course of the interrogation of those already in police custody who wish for a 'clean slate' after having served their sentence. It is misleading, however, to assume that all such clearances derive from interrogation: for example, it sometimes happens that the criminal incident cleared by Tic was one where careful enquiries led to the initial identification of an offender, but that the offender's subsequent admission of more serious chargeable offences persuaded the police to dispose of the lesser offence by this means.

A second, and closely related, weakness of the formal classification of cleared offences is that these fail to specify the degree of skill or expertise demanded of the officer investigating crime. As in other countries, the 1970s proved "hard times for the detective mystique" (see Anderson, 1978) in England. For example, Mawby (op.cit) was able to label less than a quarter of all detections in a study in Sheffield as "police detections", attributable to police investigatory efforts. Earlier, Woodley (1976) had noted the relatively small proportion of cases (around 20%) in which clearances could be said to have been obtained by "scientific deduction factors". Such conclusions were usually derived from

ethnographic studies looking in detail at how samples of cases were investigated, and owed little to the police's own breakdown of the disposals meted out to apprehended offenders. A substantial body of research built up in this tradition, work aimed at establishing what strategies detectives employ and which of these proved the most successful; it also served as a basis of judging how far detectives employed skills not commonly found among other police officers.

This section recounts a number of the key findings of research on this wide issue. It falls in two parts. First attention is given to the formal police statistics that recount the disposals given to offenders, and to the credibility of the clear-up rate as a measure of investigative performance. A second - more lengthy - part draws on studies that have sought to distinguish the strategies used by investigators in their work, the effectiveness of their different tactics, and the extent to which police skills contribute to investigative results. Some detailed attention is given here to the value of interrogation and forensic science in police investigations. The next main section then describes what factors determine the clear-up rates achieved by police forces.

(I) The clear up rate and methods of clearance

Notwithstanding the wide variation in clear-up rates nationally, Burrows and Tarling (1982) have indicated that the rates for individual forces fluctuate little from year to year. The same can be said to apply to the methods employed by separate forces to clear crime. These authors have shown that in 1977, over the country as a whole, some 54% of cleared crimes were cleared when an offender was charged or summoned, 12% by an offender receiving a formal caution, 26% by

being taken into consideration,⁹ and 8% "otherwise, without proceedings."

Supporting the views of those who contend that many specific offences only come to light when an offender is detained, they indicate that over half (54%) of those cleared up by Tic applied to offences not known to the police before the suspect responsible for them was apprehended.

An important determinant of the clearance method employed in a specific case - or, more accurately, the way in which particular offenders are dealt with - is of course the nature of the offence in question. Table 3, derived from a special returns made by forces to Burrows and Tarling, gives a breakdown of clearance disposals by crime type.

Table 3

Methods by which crimes were cleared-up by the police, by offence group. 1977 (28 forces).

Percentages

Type of Offence	Method of Clearance			
	Charge/ Summons	Taken into consideration	Caution	Otherwise without proceedings
Violence against the person	83.4	0.5	5.5	10.7
Sexual offences	62.1	9.9	19.0	9.0
Burglary	42.9	33.2	4.5	19.5
Robbery	85.8	4.5	3.6	6.2
Theft and handling stolen goods	51.1	24.9	14.6	9.4
Fraud and forgery	50.3	44.5	2.1	3.0
Criminal damage	74.8	8.4	6.9	10.0
Other indictable offences	74.4	7.9	3.8	13.9
Total	52.8	25.7	10.5	11.0

(Source: Burrows and Tarling, 1982)

⁹ It is a requirement that offenders having offences Tic'd - like those being cautioned - admit their guilt, and that the police have evidence available to support a prosecution if the court requires.

Thus offences of violence and robbery were only infrequently cleared by means other than a charge or summons, and in fact the only offence categories where anything approaching half of all cases were cleared by alternative means were those of burglary, theft and fraud. A considerable proportion of the latter three categories of offences were cleared by Tic and, in the case of burglary, 'otherwise without proceedings'. Cautions tend to be given by the police when clearing sex offences - a category which includes a significant number of cases of unlawful sexual intercourse, where in many instances there may be mutual consent between an 'offender' and 'victim' aged under 16, and thefts - where many shoplifting and other minor offences are committed by juveniles.

A common criticism has been that the clear-up rate constitutes a poor measure of investigative performance. Notwithstanding the central co-ordination and direction in compiling these statistics, those referring to them - researchers as well as police officers - have done so with considerable ambivalence, referring at one moment to the clear-up rate's weaknesses and at others ignoring these piecemeal. The controversy surrounding detections obtained by being taken into consideration at court (Tic) - most of which are derived from the questioning of suspects in custody, and more than half of which are probably unknown to the police prior to the offender's arrest - is a case in point.¹⁰ This has naturally led many to assume that because of the dependence of force rates on these and other 'paper' detections, comparison between forces will inevitably be an artefact of the effort devoted to practices such as police questioning.

¹⁰ Another common police practise is that of visiting offenders in prison who are willing to admit to undetected offences. The prison "write-off" is recorded amongst those offences cleared "otherwise without proceeding" (ie. "no useful purpose" is served by preferring charges on someone already serving a custodial sentence).

Burrows and Tarling therefore aimed to assess whether such criticism invalidated the overall clear-up rate as a general indicator of effectiveness, and to examine whether other more reliable indicators could be identified.

To do so, the researchers drew on the available evidence distinguishing the disposals by which individual forces dealt with offenders. In the absence of comprehensive data about how the police identified such offenders, this information was employed to provide a general indication of the different methods each force adopt: the methodology employed was to derive 'refined' measures (excluding all Tics, or simply those not previously known to the police, for example) and to examine the strength of the correlation - and the extent of variance - between refined and overall rates. A similar methodology was also employed to examine other hypotheses: for example it has been argued that different police forces can manage to extract more clearances despite dealing with approximately the same number of offenders (c.f. Greenwood, 1970) or that they boost force rates by focusing heavily on 'self-detecting' types of crime which are effectively cleared on their discovery - like shoplifting.

The main finding to emerge from this analysis was that the clear-up rate is a reasonably robust measure, to the extent that most refinements correlated closely to the overall rate itself. The study did not show that the traditional criticisms of the clear-up rate are without substance - the exclusion of clearances obtained by the more contentious methods does corrupt clear-up rates to a degree - but that such strategies tend to have a random impact on force rates rather than producing systematic bias (not all forces with high rates, for example, achieved these by contentious methods). Moreover, the analysis identified two particular refinements to this measure which, although still strongly correlated with the overall rate, did produce something of a dissimilar ranking in performance

across forces: an index based on the number of persons dealt with by each force, and the clear-up rate with both Tics and clearances by 'other' means excluded. The authors employed these measures, as well as the overall clear-up rate, in a second stage of this study designed to identify those variables which affect police performance: this however is discussed, together with other studies of a similar type, in the next main section (p30).

Work of the type described here has the merit of providing something of a 'global' perspective of general police practices across the country. It has, however, required more detailed examination of the activities of individual forces, or units within them, to glean a fuller understanding of the part played by the investigator in achieving crime detections. The next section examines this area of study.

(II) Investigative Strategies

The research examining investigative strategies has been dominated by the ethnographic study, where observers have typically drawn on a range of sources - discussions with officers, observation, case studies and a wide variety of general police records - to assess police practices. Laurie's (1970) work with the Metropolitan police can be said to be one of the first such studies to focus primarily on the detective function. However, other more specific approaches - notably Zander's (1979) study of cases appearing before the Old Bailey Central Criminal Court, and Woodley's (op.cit.) method of asking investigators to explain what attributes of a given case assisted detection - have yielded useful information.

The work carried out by Bottomley and Coleman (1981) - a documentary study of police records on a sample of investigations - serves as a useful introduction to this subject area. Table 4 identifies the ways that crime detections were achieved in the city they studied. This indicates that admissions during questioning - together with information provided by the public - prove the most important means of police detections. These aside, the only other significant means of detection, each accounting for some 10% of all those considered, were those where offenders were discovered directly by the police or where they were made by special (non-police) agents.

Notwithstanding obvious difficulties of comparison, this picture is certainly not dissimilar from that reached by other studies. Mawby (op.cit.) calculated questioning to be an even more important source of detections - a little under 40% in his study of police records in Sheffield - and police respondents to Woodley's survey (op.cit.) collectively assessed that the most frequent attributes leading to detections were the offender's own admission or his being detected for another offence. Other researchers indicate that in cases cleared by "citizen information" more often than not it is the victim (Mawby; op.cit.) or others intimately affected, rather than the bystander, that assists police enquiries: in 48% of the cases reviewed by Zander the defendant had some prior relationship with either the victim, or someone able to give the police information about the offence. Finally Mawby, among others, makes the point that "special agents" like shop security officers account for about 10% of detections.

Table 4: Source of detection and type of clearance: a Northern City

Source of detection	Charge	TYPE OF CLEARANCE			Total (%)
		Taken into Consideration	Other*		
Police observe/discovery	82	10	22	114	(11)
Offender at scene	17	2	4	23	(2)
Surrender	14	2	2	18	(2)
Detained by special agent	85	6	6	97	(10)
Detained by citizen	35	2	7	44	(4)
Citizen information	191	10	41	242	(24)
Enquiries	12	-	5	17	(2)
Set up or plant	14	2	-	16	(2)
Police vigilance	30	-	2	32	(3)
Information received	39	3	13	55	(5)
Admit under questioning	48	218	17	283	(28)
Not known	57	3	19	79	(8)
Totals	624	258	138	1020	
(%)	(61)	(25)	(13)		

* Includes cases where charges were refused (32 cases), were admitted by those already in custody (15 cases) or where offenders were cautioned, under the age of criminal responsibility, etc. (91 cases). The source of detections for cases in these separate categories are shown in Bottomley and Coleman, p140.

(Source: Bottomley K and Coleman C; 1981)

Table 4 also distinguishes how crimes cleared by the police were dealt with in the city studied. The proportion of total crime cleared by each disposal resembles the national pattern described in the previous section, except that a marginally greater emphasis on charged offences is compensated for by a lesser emphasis on cautioning and 'other' clearances (the two categories are subsumed). Two other points deserve mention: first, that while some 85% of the offences that were taken into consideration were admitted under questioning, a small but

significant minority were not. Second that - this feature aside - the type of clearance, or disposal, selected by the police cannot be easily predicted from how the police identified the offender.

Informative though it is, however, knowledge about the general factors that lead to detections can foster a misleading picture of how the typical enquiry proceeds.

In the United States, Eck's (1983) recent work has underlined the importance of looking to strategies employed by detectives that do not prove successful as well as those that do. Eck's study explored this aspect of investigation with an eye to detail - such as differences between police and uniformed officers in their methods of gathering information, or how these methods change in the course of an investigation - not matched by any research in this country.

Nonetheless Steer (op.cit.) gave attention to the issue in his study of crime in the Thames Valley police force area. Table 5, which is extracted from his report, distinguishes 'successful' from 'unsuccessful' strategies in two groups of crime, samples of serious and less serious indictable offences.

Table 5 The investigation of offences initially recorded as known to the police in the Oxford Division during 1974*

	Sample of less serious offences			Sample of serious offences		
	Unsuccessful Strategies	Successful Strategies		Unsuccessful Strategies	Successful Strategies	
	No.	No.	%	No.	No.	%
Interviewed other connexion	64	97	24.1)	30	14	17.6)
Search of property	21	57	14.2)	41.5	14	1.2)
Implicated by prisoner already in custody	1	13	3.2)		1	1.2)
Offender caught red-handed		75	18.7)		2	2.5)
Identity known from outset	8	43	10.6)	3	15	18.8)
Description from victim etc.	57	22	5.4)	40	13	16.3)
At scene/search of area	151	19	4.7)	44	10	12.5)
Ready access/obvious motive	95	18	4.5)	47.0	51	15.1)
House-to-house inquiries	155	5	1.2)	61	1	1.2)
Offender gave himself up		4	1.0)		4	5.0)
Observations	37	3	0.7)	11		
Trap	2	1	0.2)			
Scene of crime examination	141			61		
Places of disposal	88	15	3.7)	34		
Stop/check	7	10	2.5)	9		
Information	24	9	2.2)	36	3	3.7)
Fingerprint search	13	7	1.7)	8	1	1.2)
Photograph albums	23	2	0.5)	11.5	11)
Local police knowledge	12	2	0.5)	10	2	2.5)
Known association with suspect	1	1	0.2)			8.6)
Modus operandi	10	1	0.2)	1)
Check of collator's/ intelligence records	17			18	1	1.2)
Criminal Record Office check	9			7		
Total number of crimes	959	404	100.0	174	80	100.0

* Excluding recording errors subsequently written off as 'no crime'

(Source: Steer D, 1980)

Though a table of this sort cannot indicate the extent to which detectives pursue each strategy, it does provide key pieces of information. It shows - in the less serious sample - the importance of police searches, either of the person in custody or his home and - on the other hand - that house-to-house enquiries and area searches are almost always fruitless as a means of detection. Steer calculated that in the average less serious incident the police employ 1.4 strategies, as opposed to 3.0 in serious cases, indicating that serious cases do warrant more effort by the police regardless of the leads provided (a finding endorsed by Crust). However this finding underlines the small number of strategies tried in each case: "few strategies are tried, either because one promises success from the outset, or because the offence is what was known to the CID as a 'dead-ender' with no obvious leads and little time to pursue them" (Steer, p.74).

Table 5 also re-emphasises some familiar findings of research on investigation. It is clear from the cumulative figures, amalgamating successful strategies, that most effective strategies are those typically completed very soon after an incident is reported. This is consistent with Zander's study, which found that in 87% of the cases reviewed the identity of the accused was reasonably clear from the outset of the police enquiry, and that in 45% the police interviewed the ultimate defendant within two hours of the offence having been committed. The table also stresses that interrogation is an effective means of detection: this being the most successful and second most successful strategy employed in the less serious and serious samples, respectively.

The importance of interrogation to the policeman in England and Wales is a characteristic to be expected given the Chief Constable's unusual status as prosecutor as well as investigating authority. It is at the point that the suspect is apprehended that most policemen in England and Wales, unlike their counterparts in Scotland and most other countries, are faced with having to

establish a case for presentation in court. This being the case, it should come as little surprise that recent work on criminal investigation has also dealt with wider aspects of this activity. Research studies commissioned by the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure have looked at the issue of interrogation from a variety of viewpoints: for example Morris (1980) provided the Commission with a review of social science literature in this field, and Irving and Hilgendorf (1979) prepared a critical study of the psychological literature on interrogation techniques and theory. Other studies have assessed the value of interrogation to police investigations and the fairness of the police during questioning, and while these findings are probably only of major interest in the context of the British legal system, it is nonetheless interesting to note the judgements made by them.

Softley (1980), who with a team of Home Office researchers attended police interrogations in four police stations, found that nearly half of the suspects who were interviewed by the police made a confession and over two-thirds gave information which would help secure a conviction. These findings suggest the considerable value of this process to the police. However when officers were interviewed, and asked whether they would have stopped the case if the suspect had refused to answer questions, only 8% said that this would have been necessary: 56% would have relied instead on evidence already available. The study found that one-fifth of suspects volunteered information about cases which they had not been detained for, a point that led the author to argue "if the powers of the police to question persons in their custody were curbed.... the detection rate would tend to fall".

Something of the ambiguity surrounding whether interrogations help secure convictions against those charged is also revealed in research by McConville and

Baldwin (1982). This showed, to an even greater extent than Softley's work, that written or verbal confessions are obtained by interrogation: only a quarter of defendants failed to make damaging statements against their case. However these researchers then put case papers to independent assessors, who took the view that only about one-fifth of the cases would have been fatally weakened without the defendants statements. They therefore argued that confessions are obtained by the police largely in cases where the evidence against the accused is usually strong, and in many instances overwhelming. Mitchell (1983), drawing on a random sample of Crown Court cases, makes the point that while obviously the large majority of those who are attributed with confession evidence are subsequently convicted, the likelihood of defendants who dispute police charges being acquitted - despite confessions being recorded against them - is by no means negligible. In fact 14% of such cases resulted in acquittal by a judge or jury. A study of the outcome of contested cases tried in magistrates' courts by Vennard (1982), however, found that only 6% of charges which were supported by confession evidence ended in acquittal.

McConville and Baldwin advocate an interesting perspective on interrogation. They suggest - much in the same style as Ericson (1981) in the context of detective work in Canada - that the interrogation of suspects provides the police with an essential means of attaining a selective version of events for presentation to the court, and psychological assurance to officers that the suspect is indeed guilty. "Questioning", they argue, "has come to dominate police work and, as a result, police perceptions of reality have come to dominate the criminal process". As an adjunct to this argument, the authors press the case that the process of taking offences into consideration has been left largely unregulated by the courts - in particular the assurance that the police could, if so required, present sufficient evidence in respect of each 'Tic' to secure a separate conviction. Though this has been a suspicion voiced on several occasions in the past (see for example, Whittaker, 1964) there has as yet been no concrete evidence, either way, to confirm or deny its validity.

Before turning from the question of how crime detections are achieved, it is appropriate to refer to how researchers in England and Wales have assessed the part played by physical evidence - and particularly forensic examination of that evidence - in this process. Table 5, drawing on Steer's study in Oxford, gives an indication of the concensus view: this shows that fingerprint searches revealed the identity of suspects in less than 2% of the cases in each of the crime samples studied, and that other "scenes of crime" examinations made in the course of these investigations never proved successful. This finding is in accord not only with Bottomley and Coleman's work (op.cit.) - where physical evidence at the scene of crimes led to initial identifications of suspects in only six of some 732 cases considered - but also with US literature on this issue.

Though physical evidence may provide the police with initial suspect identifications only infrequently, both these studies nonetheless suggest that such evidence can be useful in determining which of a number of strong suspects in a case the police should proceed against, and which eliminate. The value of physical evidence in eliminating suspects from enquiries, a frequently overlooked question, is also shown in an unpublished study of the returns to two of the country's eight forensic science laboratories. Here investigating officers estimated that in 9% and 12% of the cases under consideration at each laboratory, returns were instrumental in eliminating suspects from their enquiries, which were in fact the approximately same proportions of cases where officers assessed that returns were instrumental in making them charge particular individuals (in many instances the cases may have been the same ones). The general picture to emerge from this review was that while in about 90% of the cases to each of the laboratories the police had a suspect before sending exhibits (and in well over a half had already charged that suspect), and that in the majority of the cases the evidence

provided was not viewed as essential, it was nonetheless viewed by the police as generally supportive (ie "useful") of the other evidence they produced at court.

C. Factors affecting investigative performance

One central feature of policing in England and Wales is that, notwithstanding the relative uniformity of force structures and organisation, crime clear-up rates vary substantially from one force to the next. This disparity has long belied ready explanation, despite the obvious concern of administrators to establish how far such rates are the product of differences in the investigative workloads facing officers in different parts of the country, and thus able to be manipulated by changes in the level and distribution of police manpower. This particular issue was first addressed as the object of a specific study by Anderson (1970). He used the opportunity afforded by a murder hunt in one police area to examine whether two adjoining forces that provided manpower assistance suffered deteriorations in their clear up rates in consequence. However the study brought ambiguous results, for a deterioration in clear-up rates was only evident in one of the areas. The same question was addressed some years later, and using different methods, by Burrows and Tarling (op.cit.). Having derived seemingly appropriate measures (see p.20), they undertook analyses to identify factors which affected police performance in clearing up crime. This part of the research built on earlier work by Crust (op.cit.), Greenhalgh (1966) and Carr-Hill and Stern (1979) - in fact the simultaneous equation model developed by the latter was adapted for the analyses.

The authors anticipated that differences in investigative performance between forces could be attributable to various influences, which were grouped together

under three main heads: the area's crime - its rate and seriousness - its demographic and social characteristics, and aspects of the forces' resources, strength and organisation.¹¹ They therefore aimed to explore, by the construction of a model, the influence these variables exercised both on the overall clear-up rate and alternative indices of effectiveness.

The regression analyses revealed that social variables were generally not significantly related to the clear-up rate or its alternatives. 'Crime mix' was found to be the most important variable regardless of the measure of police performance used, indicating that it is the type of crime that the police have to investigate rather than the volume of crime per se that affects performance. Two measures of police resources, police workload (crimes per CID and uniform officer) and police presence (police per capita) were related to clear-up rates. However, the relative strength of these two variables changed depending upon which other variables were included in the analysis.

The equation with just the three variables - crime mix, police workload and police presence - included was the best possible combination, as well as the most parsimonious, in explaining the variance between force clear-up rates. For example, Table 6 shows the results of the regression analysis when the overall

¹¹ A wide range of variables were examined under these broad headings. Crime variables included the crime rate and 'crime mix' - the proportion of more easily detectable crimes (offence categories with a national clear-up rate of over 75 per cent). Demographic and socio-economic variables included total population, and indices to give an indication of age distribution, the proportion of the area urbanized, unemployment, earnings and class structure. Various measures of police resources and organisation were included. Police presence in an area was denoted by the number of officers per capita, but the workload of officers by various alternatives (crimes per CID officer, per CID and uniform officer, per all officers). The proportion of the force in the CID, as well as expenditure per officer (to denote overtime and a level of capital investment in a force) were also considered.

clear-up rate is the dependant variable. This equation explained 61 per cent of the variance.

Table 6: Determinants of the clear-up rate (1977): results of the regression analysis.¹²

Variables to be explained	Explanatory variables			
	Constant	Police per capita	Crimes per Police Officer	Crime Mix
Clear-up Rate				
Coefficient	-.18	.89	-.07	.69
Standard error	(.26)	(.23)	(.08)	(.12)
t. statistic	.68	3.81	-.94	5.64

(Source: Burrows J and Tarling R, 1982)

Table 6 clearly shows the importance of crime mix. Though it would be unwise to place too great an emphasis on exact figures, the findings also suggest that a one per cent increase in police manpower (which at 1980 prices would cost £12.8 million) would not increase the clear-up rate by quite the same amount. This relationship is not dissimilar to that found in a number of other studies, and the comments of Crust (*op.cit.*) probably best typify their findings: he cautioned that the cost of additional manpower that would be required to make significant inroads into the clear-up rate could be considered "unrealistic".

The direction of future research

The study of police clear-up rates represented the first step in a programme of research by the Research and Planning Unit (RPU) of the Home Office designed to

¹² In common with similar studies a log functional form was chosen, that is the natural logarithm of the variables was analysed. The coefficients can therefore be interpreted as 'elasticities'.

examine the investigative process. It portrayed force clear-up rates as generally credible measures of investigative performance which are not invalidated by the different methods of clearance used across the forces, or blunt efforts to record only 'self-detecting' types of crime. Nonetheless it is important that this finding should not be misinterpreted to imply that such rates are not subject to other more subtle manipulation by police officers, or that researchers - or police administrators - should for a moment rely solely on this means of assessment in favour of other indicators reflecting a rather broader range of investigative objectives. It is appropriate that while questions surrounding the clear-up rate should continue to occupy prime of place in future research, attention will need to be directed to looking to alternative measures of the investigative performance of the police.

It is equally important to note that, notwithstanding the relative success of the clear-up rate study in accounting for the variance in rates, and the consistency of its findings respecting the effects of police strength with those of other studies, there is still much to be learnt about the role the police play in crime detection. A significant portion of the variance in clear-up rates was unaccounted for by this preliminary study. Moreover, a perusal of individual force clear-up rates - or refinements of this general measure - indicate that apparently similar forces, faced with very much the same policing problems, continue to report dissimilar results from their investigative efforts. It therefore remains central to research on investigation to resolve this paradox, and evident that to do so requires more comparative analysis and observation of how investigations - particularly of one type of offence - are actually carried out in different police jurisdictions.

Major differences in police organisation - and particularly the role of specialist investigative squads - may provide some explanation of disparity in

clear-up rates. In Britain, as elsewhere, opinion is divided over the use, efficiency and cost effectiveness of the specialist squad: the RPU therefore spent some time in 1982 exploring the extent of their use in dealing with burglaries, evidence of their effectiveness and the feasibility of evaluating them. For various reasons this preliminary work was not followed up. It became evident that force squads took such varied forms, each suited to local circumstances, that a study employing an experimental design would not be either feasible or representative. It also became plain that though the procedures and organisation of the CID varied considerably across forces, this did not always include the establishment of squads. Finally it was realised that by focusing on one aspect of investigation, mainly organisation - which Greenwood et al. (1977), after all, found had little impact on police performance - research could overlook other less immediate determinants of that performance.

The project on investigation now underway retains key features of this earlier work on squads, especially recognition of the need to look at the investigation of one crime - burglary - in considerable detail in a small number of investigative units. The design of this study started from a general review of the available statistics from all forces in England and Wales. This review subdivided the country's forces into those experiencing high, medium and low per capita rates of burglary. Within each of these three groups, a pair of forces have been selected that achieve markedly different clear-up rates for this crime. In a similar vein, the next step will be to identify sub-divisions within each of these forces that apparently experience similar burglary problems, notwithstanding their differences in clear-up rates.

The study will examine various aspects of these sub-divisions' work in close detail. The type of burglary in an area will be explored by carrying out a

detailed analysis of a sample of crime reports in each sub-division: this survey will yield information about the type of property burgled (privately owned, rented or local authority property; detached, terrace, etc), the value and nature of property stolen, the extent to which burglaries involve thefts of electricity meters, and the methods of entry typically used. It will also indicate the extent to which stolen property is successfully returned to burglary victims. To throw light on differences in how burglary investigations are conducted - particularly on the time spent on investigation and whether this is carried out by CID or uniform officers - those investigating burglaries will be asked to provide details of their enquiries to the research team. Consideration will be given here to the leads offered to investigators at the outset of the enquiry, and to the methods the police use to pursue these enquiries and (if appropriate) clear offences. This part of the survey will reveal the different costs of an average burglary investigation in each area and, as Eck (op.cit.) has done, to serve to distinguish effective from ineffective strategies. A survey of burglary victims in each area will also be carried out to explore victims' actions and expectations on reporting offences to the police and to provide an alternative assessment of police investigative performance.

The form of the next stage of the research will be subject to whether or not these first factors account for substantial variation in the effectiveness between sub-divisions. If they do so, the study would be broadened to encompass a national survey, designed to examine whether the relevant factor(s) can account for national discrepancies in rates. Failing this, the study will proceed to focus more closely on one matched pair of the six sub-divisions and examine other possible determinants of their performance. This will include looking at 'recording' effects, by following up a sample of complaints alleging that a break-in has occurred, in order to compare how these are interpreted.

Other possible influences on performance will be examined by structured interviews with relevant police officers and by observation.

In summary, the first steps made by the RPU in this field, which comprised a nationwide comparative survey, are to be followed by detailed examination of several aspects of the burglary investigations performed in different sub-divisions. This research is designed to provide a detailed profile of the differences in the burglary problems faced by different forces, how these are investigated and the impact this has on burglary victims as well as in apprehending offenders.

In the longer term, there remains a wide range of issues that research in this area will want to examine. Recent developments within the police forces of England and Wales make three of these topics, in particular, likely candidates for future research. Following the recommendations by the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure - particularly those concerning police powers, the tape recording of interviews with suspects and that an independent prosecution service be established in England and Wales - these issues are now receiving close consideration. The changes could have a considerable impact both on the nature and content of police investigative work and may require further scrutiny by research. The two remaining topics concern the management of criminal investigations and of those who carry them out. The first is the question of formal case screening: for some years police forces in this country showed a marked reluctance to adopt this concept but now further economic stringency, and the growing understanding that investigative performance is not simply a product of the resources made available to this task, have combined to change the situation. This being the case, there will certainly be pressure to assess the impact of formal screening procedures, both in terms of police workloads and

output, and in terms of the complainant's views. The second, closely related, issue concerns the advantages and disadvantages that accrue from the traditional split between the uniformed and investigative arms of the police service. Current moves towards the greater involvement of 'beat' officers in investigation - though it has been suggested in the context of Crust's findings (p11) that these may simply represent a breakdown of the last bastions of 'CID monopoly' - are one of a number of changes signalling that the service as a whole seems to be moving away from the concept that investigation can be performed only by those trained and skilled in this field. If this is the case, research will almost certainly be required to monitor both the extent and impact of this change.

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*200 The five papers presented focus on various aspects of criminal investigations.

*300 The history, current functions, and effects of detectives in urban police are examined. The emergence of present-day detectives are traced from the introduction of the constable following the Norman Conquest of 1066 to the formation of detective units in England and the United States in the mid-1800s. The methods repertoire from which all types of detectives choose include forensic aids; formal, technical information systems; informants; interviews; interrogations; instigation; and surveillance. Data indicate that detectives are, for the most part, poorly trained, poorly managed, and inappropriately organized; ways to examine what the impact of detectives might be if these negative aspects were remedied are suggested. Criminal investigations in the United States, England, and Wales are discussed, and developments in crime and criminal investigations in the Netherlands are examined. A 344-item annotated bibliography is presented that focuses on public and private detectives and detective units and agencies. Also included are some materials on forensic science and criminologists, as well as some articles on detective fiction. Numerous references are presented, as are one block diagram, 8 tables,

Crime and criminal investigation; developments in the Netherlands

by: Hans Spickenheuer and Liesbeth Nuijten -Edelbroek
(researchers of the Research and Documentation
Centre (RDC) of the Ministry of Justice)

1. Background

The steady rise in the crime-rate is exercising the minds of a considerable number of people in the Netherlands as elsewhere. Top police officials, local and national policy-makers, politicians and special committees are all attempting, from their own different angles, to answer the question of how the police can operate more effectively and so do something about it. A wide range of possible solutions has been proposed, varying from increasing the number of police officers, making organisational changes such as the redistribution of work and personnel among police departments, to establishing priorities in police work and coordinating the policies of the police, the judiciary and local government. Organisational consultants and research institutes have been called in to get changes in the police machinery off the ground and to investigate their effects.

There are two ways of halting the rise in crime. Firstly there is the traditional idea that by acting after the event - i.e. arresting and punishing offenders - both they and others will be deterred from committing offences in future. Secondly, preventive action may be taken to ensure that potential offenders do not actually commit a crime. Without wishing in any way to minimise the importance of prevention, this chapter will discuss the solution of those crimes committed, and is therefore primarily concerned with the role of criminal investigation. The final section deals with the question of whether the customary assumptions concerning the relationship between detection and crime control are correct.

Since the Second World War, the number of officers in both the national and municipal police forces has increased, in line with the size of the population, in accordance with a set formula.

It was only in the seventies, when forces began to reach full strength, that anyone gave any thought to the question of numbers and whether the size of the population was the correct criterion for them. Two studies on the municipal police, both instigated by the Ministry of Home Affairs, have played an important part in answering this question and in discussions on the position and role of the police: a closely related topic.

The first report, "The Changing Police" (1977) initiated a fundamental discussion on the role and position of the police in the community. The concept of welfare was a central element in this report, which outlined what implications this had for the organisation of the police. The authors believed, like people in other countries, that the emphasis in organisation should be on such key concepts as a job and district-oriented approach, decentralisation, despecialisation and a general task for officers. Internal democratisation and work consultations are also relevant (1).

The second report, "Police Manpower" (1979) dealt with the question of whether and in what way police forces should be expanded. The most important conclusion was that at least for the time being a halt should be called to expansion and more effort put into increasing effectiveness and efficiency through internal changes in the way the police were organised (2).

Both reports encountered a good deal of comment, in the beginning mainly negative, but later more positive too. A small number of municipal police forces initiated a process of change in the second half of the seventies, assisted by organisational consultants, some incorporating research and evaluation. There are considerably more forces where policy plans for the future involve change, but putting these plans into practice is, at the moment, not always easy. One reason for this is the considerable resistance to change to be found among the lower and middle ranks in the organisation. Unfortunately, such policy plans also are often very vague and abstract and give no indication at all of how they are to be implemented in terms of actual police work and specific activities.

The "Police Manpower" report was criticised by the then Minister for Home Affairs (responsible for municipal police forces) and by police representatives. The police themselves in particular regard increasing their numbers as the answer to the problems they are confronted with, namely the rise in crime, falling percentages of cases solved, increasing numbers of requests for assistance, aid and mediation, and increasing concern with traffic matters. They are also aware that they are supported in their call for more police officers by the public, who feel less safe as a result of the growing crime rates.

Nevertheless, the expansion of police forces is still a sensitive matter with some sections of the public. Research results support people's doubts: other

reports on local forces as well as the "Police Manpower" report have revealed a lack of effectiveness and internal efficiency in the police organisation as a whole. This finding has increasingly influenced political decisions with the results that expansion of the police is no longer considered desirable. The economic recession has also had its effects on the police; as part of the cuts introduced by the government the amount of overtime allowed has been greatly reduced and, except in the four biggest cities in the Netherlands: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, staffing levels within police forces have been frozen at their present levels.

The growth of the police up to the beginning of the eighties has not prevented crime in the Netherlands increasing. In 1981 an estimated one and a half million crimes were committed, the majority of which may be classed as petty crime (theft, vandalism, burglary). National victim surveys have shown that only about 50% of such crime is reported to the police (3). Table 1 shows the number of petty crimes brought to the notice of the police in the years 1979-1981, constituting more than 90% of all offences under the Criminal Code reported to and registered by the police (4). The increase in crime which the table indicates does not imply that the police had a great deal of success in preventing crime during the period in question, but what would the situation be if there were no police?

Table 1: Reported petty crime (Criminal Code), 1979-1981

Type of crime	1979	1980	1981
Non-aggravated theft (excluding shop-lifting and pick-pocketing)	223,201	249,555	278,695
Burglary	143,445	171,777	214,903
Aggravated theft (excluding burglary)	16,907	19,595	25,778
Vandalism	58,115	69,779	75,792
Shop-lifting	26,056	31,206	36,037
Assault	13,407	13,409	14,319
Pick-pocketing	6,936	10,782	12,452
Total	488,067	566,103	657,976
Percentage of total reported crime	92	93	93

Increases in crime mean that more criminal investigation work has to be done. The growth in the size of the police - and therefore of the criminal investigation departments which constitute 15% of forces - has not prevented the percentage of crimes solved dropping in recent years, though in absolute terms the number solved has risen. Table 2 indicates the number and percentage of petty crimes solved (4).

Table 2: Petty crime solved (Criminal Code), 1979-1981

Type of crime	1979		1980		1981	
	solved	%	solved	%	solved	%
Non-aggravated theft (excluding shop-lifting and pick-pocketing)	20,155	9.0	23,130	9.3	24,412	8.8
Burglary	27,494	19.2	29,989	17.5	36,576	17.0
Aggravated theft (excluding burglary)	6,793	40.2	6,591	33.6	8,228	31.9
Vandalism	11,902	20.5	13,099	18.8	13,089	17.3
Shop-lifting	20,204	77.5	22,984	73.7	27,011	75.0
Assault	9,863	73.6	9,977	74.4	10,482	73.2
Pick-pocketing	461	6.6	405	3.8	512	4.1

The work load of criminal investigation departments has also increased because of the emphasis which has recently been placed on tackling certain types of crime. For example, the Public Prosecutors Department which is the authority responsible for criminal investigation, has been giving more and more attention to combating fraud, particularly with regard to social security legislation. This new and specialised area makes great demands on CID staff because it calls for special expertise and is very labour-intensive, and this has made the work load considerably heavier. Such investigations are also often not restricted to one area and are therefore carried out by teams of detectives who may be detached from their local forces for quite long periods. Solving one fraud case may result in a larger number of petty crimes going unsolved, leading to a drop in the overall percentage of cases solved.

As staffing levels have been frozen and certain conditions of employment have been made less attractive - particularly financial ones - while the growing work load has turned a great many detectives into merely clerical staff, considerable dissatisfaction has grown amongst detectives. Amsterdam detectives have already expressed their dissatisfaction by "striking" -

taking simultaneous sick leave - and further action cannot be ruled out. Although little research has so far been carried out on the subject of criminal investigation in the Netherlands, there are strong indications that the existing doubts about the effectiveness and efficiency of criminal investigation departments and the need for staffing levels to be raised are well grounded. The studies discussed below have shed more light on the work of CIDs, and made an end to the myth of the detectives work. In the following section we shall look at the most important findings of these studies and suggest a number of possibilities for reducing the CID workload without increasing the number of police officers involved. These suggestions concern both the internal functioning of criminal investigation departments and the involvement of other departments within the force, including uniformed officers, and the coordination of investigative activities by CIDs and prosecution by the judiciary. One important aspect looked at in this context is the establishment of priorities for criminal investigation. Suggestions are made as to how and under whose authority such priorities could be drawn up, both in general and using an actual example for illustration. The paper ends with a number of points for discussion.

2. Research on criminal investigation

CID of
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Within Dutch police forces, the task of tracing suspects and solving crimes is allotted to criminal investigation departments, which comprise about 15% of the total number of police officers. Besides investigation as such, back-up provided by an identification and information service. Depending on the size of a force the CID may include a number of specialist sections, dealing for example with juveniles, drugs, firearms and so on, although of course the general criminal investigations section will be the largest. Dutch criminal procedure does not require suspects to be assisted by legal counsel when questioned by police. Furthermore, legal evidence has to be provided by the police and laid down in an official report. The Public Prosecutors Department may decide at its own discretion whether it is expedient that prosecution should go ahead or the case would be dismissed.

Having outlined the organisational structure of the police we would now like to move onto of important findings from studies of criminal investigation; the following two questions are of particular importance:

1. What factors are involved in the solution of crimes by the police and by criminal investigation departments in particular?
2. Is it possible for CIDs to achieve better results and if so, how?

2.1 Factors relevant to the solution of crimes

Both in foreign and Dutch studies the following two factors have been found to be important in the solution of crime:

1. the amount of information provided when the crime is reported;
2. the time a detective has for investigative work once the crime has been reported.

These two factors will now be discussed using material from studies. Suggestions will then be made as to what changes could lead to better results without assuming in advance that the number of officers should be increased.

Amount of information provided

Little research has been conducted in the Netherlands on the amount of information provided when crimes are reported, only three studies being known. An internal study in the Utrecht CID involving a random sample of cases indicated that almost two thirds (60%) of all reports contain no direct information which can be followed up and therefore no investigative work is carried out (5).

The rest, where useful information is provided, are investigated. However, because of the enormous work load, half of these cases are not completed and therefore remained unsolved. Of those cases which are solved only 50% result in an official report being drawn up, the others concluding only with a warning or reprimand. Of all crimes reported, therefore, 40% are investigated, 20% solved and 10% recorded in an official report. The small number of reported crimes which finally result in an official report being drawn up is confirmed by an RDC (Research and Documentation Centre) study of the criminal investigation department in Enschede; of 374 crimes of which the police were notified in the course of a month only 31 resulted in an official report (6).

An RDC study of the Utrecht police force revealed that an important factor in those cases which were solved was that when the crime was reported, information was provided which could be followed up; three times as much useful information was provided than when cases were reported which remained unsolved (7).

minutes?

study showed, however, that only 15% of the reports of burglary and theft (excluding shop-lifting) included useful information.

An as yet unpublished observation study of the general criminal investigation department of Leiden municipal police conducted by the RDC showed that in taking reports of crimes detectives rarely (15% of cases) asked those making the report about the names of possible suspects, witnesses, the existence of any clues or other information. In most cases (85%) the person making the report was left to tell his own tale or questions were only asked about the crime itself (damage, location, date, time and so on). This may well be one reason why the name of the suspect was given in only about 10% of cases and a vague description of the offender in another 15%. In the end, in 90% of the cases where the suspect was unknown, very little information was provided on which further investigations could be based.

By and large, these studies confirm findings in other countries (8). Many reports of crimes contain little if any information which can be followed up, while this is exactly what is important for the initiation and successful conclusion of criminal investigations.

Time available for investigations

The second important element in the solution of crime is the time a detective spends on investigations after a crime has been reported. How time is allotted to investigations has been studied in a number of ways in the Netherlands. As part of their study of staffing levels in the Netherlands police the Project Group on Organisation Structures conducted research into time allocation in three forces; Utrecht municipal police force has conducted similar research internally and the RDC has done the same with regard to the criminal investigation departments in Leiden and Enschede (9).

Although various methods were used in the different studies they all revealed more or less the same thing:

1. 30-35% of the time of the CID (excluding back-up sections) is devoted to investigative work: taking reports of crimes, taking statements from those making the report and from witnesses, making arrests, taking statements from suspects, placing suspects in pre-trial detention and conducting house searches;
2. 25-30% of the time is devoted to clerical activities: drawing up and finalising official reports, completing forms;
3. 5-10% of the time is devoted to information work, patrol duty, picketing

special objects;

- 4. 5-10% of the time is devoted to consultations with colleagues, superiors, the Public Prosecutor, lawyers, other departments and other forces.

Besides the fact that detectives spend the majority of their time working at the police station, the Enschede study also revealed that most of their efforts are devoted to the more serious crimes against property or involving violence against persons. Relatively speaking much less time and energy is devoted to the less serious offences in both these categories. Vandalism, theft and aggravated theft are usually dealt with briefly, by simply taking a record of them.

The Manpower report came to similar conclusions: three quarters of the time available is devoted to 5% of the total number of crimes (serious cases), leaving only a quarter for less serious offences, which greatly outnumber serious ones. It was also revealed that in the management of the criminal investigation departments the emphasis was very clearly on serious crime, with even information work, both for internal use and for the public, being mainly concerned with it. If capacity remains the same this method of management will have considerable consequences for the flow of work, as backlogs will build up and cases will take longer to process. The authors of the report warn against an alteration in standards in determining what attention should be given to what cases, for example by reducing services to the public, increasing the number of cases in which no record is taken, increasing the number of offences which are dealt with purely administratively and reducing the average length of time spent investigating a crime.

The authors of the report go on to say that there is no guarantee that increasing the staffing levels of the criminal investigation department would mean that crimes would be dealt with in a more balanced manner. In fact the expectation is that given present management policy this would only lead to even more emphasis being placed on serious crime. A continuing increase in this tendency would only push less serious crime even further into the background.

In conclusion it can be said that, particularly in the case of petty crime, criminal investigation departments spend a relatively small amount of time on investigation, that most attention is devoted to serious crimes, that a relatively large amount of time is taken up with various clerical activities, that detectives devote little time to the provision of information, both for

police purposes and for the public and that they rarely if ever find time to make investigations outside the police station.

3. Proposals for change

In the preceding paragraph, a number of shortcomings have been noted relating firstly to the information-content of reports of crimes for the police and secondly for the actual investigations carried out by criminal investigation departments. We believe that the following proposals would assist in changing and improving internal management to some extent.

Information content of reports to the police:

1. As investigators of crime, officers must obtain information on crimes more quickly and above all they should obtain more of it. The public can help greatly here by providing the police with information and by contacting them as quickly as possible about crimes which have been committed, and attempts should therefore be made to encourage them to do this. It is also to be recommended that detectives and officers on patrol duties should be better trained in asking specific and relevant questions of persons reporting crimes and of witnesses.
2. The information obtained from persons reporting crimes and from witnesses should be better recorded in writing, for example by using a standard form containing as many relevant questions as possible.
3. There should be more contact between the patrol division and CID in order to ensure that each is fully aware of what the other is doing and of the information they require.
4. The sources of information available within the police force should be better used.

Time available for investigations:

1. Improvement of CID management so that more time is available for investigative work. This could perhaps be done by having a central reporting point, which would mean that detectives time would be divided up in a less fragmentary fashion, or by having a coordinator within the CID to watch over the progress of investigations and put a stop to them when there is no further chance of success. The chances of solving crimes should also be considered systematically and if these appear non-existent little or no time be spent on the cases concerned. One alternative form of management might be to work in teams to deal with serious recurrent offences, under the supervision of a team coordinator and in cooperation with the patrol division.

2. A second improvement might involve reducing and simplifying various clerical procedures and employing civilians to deal with some of them.

4. The results of a criminal investigation project

Some of the proposals made above have gradually, if cautiously, been implemented in the Netherlands, including the use of a computer, simplification of clerical procedures, the involvement of the patrol division in investigations and working in teams on certain projects. However, little research has yet been carried out into how these methods have altered the effectiveness of criminal investigation departments. As far as we know there has been only one study of the results of a burglary project conducted by Utrecht municipal police force (7).

Internal discussions in the Utrecht force had been going on for some years on the function of the force and the most appropriate form of organisation. One of the results of these discussions was the extension of the responsibilities of patrol officers to include investigative work and the prevention of crime, and traffic control. In this way patrol officers came to carry out duties which had previously been reserved for special sections, such as the criminal investigation department or the traffic division. In preparation for these changes various studies were made within the force, including one in the CID on work load, allocation of time, case management and the percentage of certain crimes solved. The results of these studies were instrumental in deciding to carry out the changes within the CID before doing so in the whole force. The purpose of this was threefold:

1. to solve more burglaries and thefts;
2. to ensure more effective investigations, i.e. to spend relatively less time on solving one crime;
3. to acquaint the uniformed division with investigation work and train them in it.

In order to achieve these aims a team of detectives and patrol officers was chosen to be specially responsible for solving burglaries and thefts.

Arrangements were as follows:

- a. members of the team were freed from normal duties and their time was not fragmented by constant interruptions;
- b. a project leader was responsible for job distribution, overall control and supervising and coordinating the team members; several members of the team worked together on one case;

- c. information from the internal information department was used more systematically; the team also built up their own information system specially concerned with burglary and theft;
- d. clerical support was provided;
- e. clerical procedures were simplified, particularly for the drawing up of official reports on cases solved;
- f. the team was composed of on average 4 to 5 detectives and 6 to 8 patrol officers, though the figures varied.

RDC research into the results obtained in the first six months of the burglary team's existence revealed that the percentage of burglaries solved rose to 24.6% in comparison with 17.1% and 17.4% in the same period in the preceding two years. More than half had been solved by the team. The percentage of thefts solved remained the same at about 11%.

However, two thirds of the crimes solved by the team involved assault, robbery and other offences rather than burglary. The crimes solved tended also to be more difficult; in the majority of cases the team had little information to work on and few of the cases involved offenders being caught in the act. It was also discovered that official reports had been drawn up on more offenders, thereby showing that the chances of being caught had increased.

One further tentative conclusion was that on the average it had taken the team less time (than usual) to solve individual crimes.

In general the burglary team appeared to have achieved its objectives. The percentage of burglaries solved increased and crimes were solved more quickly. Furthermore, both the detectives and patrol officers taking part were positive about the experience. Points which found particular favour were coordination by the project leader, the internal information system, the experience of investigative work on the part of patrol officers and the amount of time available exclusively for investigative activities. The team did, however, feel that there was a danger of too much emphasis being placed on burglary and theft and nothing else.

Despite the positive results achieved with the burglary team, further improvements are probably still possible, in such areas as the participation of the detectives and patrol officers, (the problem of keeping them motivated over a longer period, for example, and the interaction between the police and the judiciary

included in the report. The resulting free time could then be used to

(particularly the Public Prosecutors Department)) When the burglary team arrested people who had committed many offences, for example because of drug addiction, attempts were made to persuade them to confess all of them and they were then listed in detail in the official report sent to the Public Prosecutor. A great deal of time and effort can be saved here if consultations take place between the Public Prosecutor and the detective before the official report is drawn up on how many and which of the crimes committed by the offender in question are to help solve other crimes. Other improvements might also be possible in the sphere of clerical and administrative back-up and procedures, particularly in the present age of automation.

5. Coordination of CID work and the policy of the Public Prosecutors Department

Besides changes which are primarily concerned with the organisation of the police themselves there have also been calls for better coordination between CID work and the policy of the judiciary in the Netherlands in recent years. As mentioned above, criminal investigation departments are responsible, under the supervision of the Public Prosecutors Department, for the actual investigative work. Under the terms of the Netherlands Code of Criminal Procedure the Public Prosecutors Department may decide at its own discretion whether proceedings should be instituted in respect to a particular offence or not. One reason for dropping charges is the existence of technical faults in the official police report, for example if there is no legal proof or not enough. They may also be dropped as a matter of policy on the part of the Public Prosecutors Department: for example it may be considered that certain offences are not sufficiently serious to warrant prosecution. The Department has internal guidelines on this and there are also rules concerning the grounds on which charges may be dropped. Such authority is of course restricted to the Department.

Research has revealed that the Public Prosecutors Department does not prosecute in a considerable number of cases: between 40 and 50% of cases reported by the police never come to court. The percentages which do come to court vary of course from crime to crime, being extremely low for theft but somewhat higher for aggravated theft. A study of crime files in Enschede has revealed that the reasons for dropping charges are also connected to the type of crime. Cases involving aggression (vandalism), embezzlement or fraud, for example, are often not brought to court because the evidence is insufficient or non-existent. Where theft is concerned, however, charges are often dropped because the judiciary does not consider it a serious enough offence.

It will come as no surprise that criminal investigation departments are highly critical of this policy, particularly in the light of the falling percentages of crimes being solved. To some extent their criticism is also quite understandable as they feel that much of the time and energy they devote to investigating crimes and making official reports is wasted. This impression is increased by the fact that the criminal investigation departments often do not even know what criteria the Public Prosecutors Department employs. The Department defends itself against this criticism by maintaining that the fact that no prosecution takes place does not mean that nothing at all happens, reference being made to the possibility of offenders receiving verbal or written reprimands from the Public Prosecutor. The fact is however that according to the annual report of the Public Prosecutors Department for 1981, in a considerable proportion of cases where charges are dropped the offender receives no reprimand; in other words, once the police have finished their investigations and submitted their official report the offender hears nothing more from the judiciary.

However, developments are currently underway which might lead to improvements in coordination between criminal investigation departments and the judiciary. In some districts in the Netherlands, for example, it is customary for the Public Prosecutor to inform detectives why a certain decision was taken or had to be taken in a particular case if they inquire about it. This often gives detectives some sort of future guideline. The duration of investigations and the length of official reports are also under discussion. Detectives with a natural tendency to get all they can out of a suspect and to commit all offences to paper in great detail often submit official reports of some length whereas the requirements of the Public Prosecutors Department would equally well be met if one or two were described in detail with the rest mentioned only briefly. Consultations are also taking place on the introduction of more concise official reports in straightforward cases and they have already been introduced in some districts. One completely new development which is currently being tested in two districts in Amsterdam is the idea of regular prior consultation between the Public Prosecutor and detectives where cases are discussed systematically.

The partial transfer to the police of some of the authority of the Public Prosecutors Department to make decisions is being increasingly discussed. This is legally impossible at present, but the Public Prosecutors Department in one district wants to reduce the annual number of official reports submitted (10,000) by about 30% which would in fact mean that the police would be responsible for certain decisions previously being the exclusive prerogative

of the Department.

This last development is closely connected with the fact that despite falling percentages of crimes solved the police are submitting more official reports each year. Increases in the number of crimes solved and in the number of suspects do however have repercussions on the rest of the judicial apparatus and the Public Prosecutors Department is struggling to cope with an increasing work load just as the police are. Preventive detention is often not possible and it is difficult to impose prison sentences as houses of detention and prisons are already overcrowded.

The idea is therefore gaining ground that if things are not simply to become worse a solution must be sought through establishing priorities. Whether the crime problem as such can be solved in this way is doubtful but the first thing to be considered in establishing priorities will be which offences should be dealt with with the most urgency. The immediate question then of course is by whom and on what grounds such priorities should be established. This will be discussed in the following section.

6. Establishment of priorities: a project in Enschede

For some time now there have been official tripartite consultations between the chief public prosecutor, the burgomaster and the chief of police in municipalities in the Netherlands*. As they involve the two authorities responsible for implementing policy, this would seem to be the most appropriate forum in which to establish priorities for combating crime. It will of course be of the utmost importance that all those taking part are adequately informed, and the police, as the party with the most information, will be particularly responsible for providing it.

They must not only indicate what the problem areas are but also explain what they can and cannot do with regard to the implementation of certain decisions.

Up to now little systematic information has been collected which could contribute directly to the establishment of suitable priorities within local tripartite consultations. Often the only basis on which it would be possible to work could be the results of national studies into such things as crime trends, the prosecution policy of the Public Prosecutors Department and internal police studies. There is, however, a real need for appropriate information, whether or not based on research, if local policies on crime problems are to be worked out. In so far as it provides an understanding of the way in which the police function, such information might also form a basis for organisational changes.

As yet the desire of local policy makers to take decisions on crime control on the basis of systematic information is far from practicable. The police, as the providers of the information, often lack the opportunity and the instruments to supply the necessary information. Scientific research might help in this to determine which information is essential and how the police themselves can collect it systematically in order to identify the problems and evaluate other methods.

* The chief public prosecutor has authority over the police with regard to criminal investigation and the burgomaster with regard to public order.

The establishment of priorities in the investigation and solution of crime was considered in the local tripartite consultations in Enschede (140,000 inhabitants) a few years ago. Discussions of the crime problem in the city led to request of the municipal police collection and provision of information to allow a satisfactory priority plan to be drawn up in the tripartite consultations.

The Enschede municipal police then sought the aid of the RDC in collecting the necessary information and conducting research on the following four aspects:

1. local crime (trends) and percentages of crimes solved, using police statistics and a victim survey.
2. the prosecution policy of the Public Prosecutors Department;
3. CID methods;
4. the relationship between the police and the public.

The research material was collected by means of discussions with detectives, an examination of police and Public Prosecutors Department files, a time allocation study of the CID and a public opinion poll. The overall conclusions were as follows.

First of all it was established that theft forms a considerable proportion of all crime in Enschede. This was confirmed both by police statistics and by a victim survey. Contrary to the initial impression suggested by police records, the study also revealed that aggressive crimes, particularly malicious damage, vandalism and street violence against persons also formed a considerable proportion of local crime. This information was obtained from the victim survey, which also revealed that very few of these crimes were reported. Detectives did point out that much crime in Enschede was of a violent nature but it is possible that the level of violence is nevertheless considerably underestimated by both the police and the judiciary.

Furthermore, it was found that little attention was given to the less serious forms of violent crime (malicious damage, vandalism) in terms of investigation and prosecution. Most of the CID's efforts are directed towards more serious crimes involving property or violence rather than those which are less serious. The results in terms of the clear-up rate is as one might therefore expect: about 10% in the case of theft and vandalism as against over 50% for other crimes. Most probably this is connected with the limited time for investigative work outside the office like further investigation on the scene, picketing, house searches and neighbourhood searches. These activities take up a quarter of the time available. The rest of the time is for a large part devoted to complete investigations and various written work at the police station. Complaints about the amount of written work are often heard within the CID.

In the view of the public in Enschede considerable improvements could be made to the way in which the police deal with less serious crimes in general and those involving violence in particular. They believe that these crimes are common and that the police should devote more time and attention to them. This belief is also one of the reasons why the victims of violent crime do not report it to the police; they believe that the police will not do anything anyway and that they can solve the problem better themselves.

With regard to coordination between the police and the judiciary the study revealed that a considerable number of crimes solved by the police are not prosecuted by the judiciary. It was discovered that the Public Prosecutors Department frequently dropped charges in the case of aggressive crimes in particular, mainly because of insufficient evidence in the official report. Often no action was taken against theft because it was not considered a serious enough offence.

The report and the results of the study have since been submitted to the three parties to the consultations and there are now two main questions with regard to the priority plan. The first is which offences

are to be dealt with as priority cases and the second is how police and judicial policy can be coordinated as much as possible in the process. Once these points are settled, it will be necessary to determine the direct consequences both for the organisation of the police who are responsible for actual investigations and for the Public Prosecutors Department which is responsible for prosecution. The way in which the chosen approach is put into practice is of great importance here. The consequences for both the police and the Public Prosecutors Department will differ depending on the choice of a mainly investigative or preventive method. Finally there is the question of how methods and measures from the administration can be introduced into the policies of both the police and the judiciary.

Naturally a priority plan has the most far-reaching consequences for the police. If it is assumed that police capacity is to remain the same, any priority plan will have to indicate what items are to receive less priority as a result. If it is decided that the police should devote more attention to certain types of crime, this means that other crimes or police activities will receive less attention. Within their own limits, each of the parties concerned will be involved in the decision by making proposals and indicating the likely internal and external consequences. Obviously a priority plan can only succeed if proper coordination of the policies of the police, the judiciary and the local authority has first been achieved through consultation between the three parties.

In order to work out the details of the priority plan in Enschede a preparatory body was formed from representatives of the police, the judiciary, the local authority and the RDC to formulate objectives, coordinate proposals from all parties and make practical recommendations, using the study as a basis. Once this results in a suitable priority plan the tripartite consultative body will be responsible for finalising it. It is expected that this will take place in the autumn of 1983. Finally, the preparatory body is also responsible for making recommendations with regard to the evaluation of the priority plan.

7. Discussion

In this chapter we have attempted to give some idea of the situation in the Netherlands with regard to crime control by the police. Without wishing to minimise the contributions of other sections of the police organisation we have concentrated on criminal investigation departments as it is they in particular who are facing an ever-increasing work load; a considerable rise in the number of reports made by the public as well as greater nationwide attention for certain types of crime such as fraud are the causes of this. The result is falling clear-up rates, particularly in the case of petty crime.

The measures under discussion with a view to halting this trend range from expanding criminal investigation departments and changing the way in which the police are organised to coordinating the policies of the judiciary and the police and establishing priorities for investigative work. The first of these proposals seems hardly feasible at the present time, not only on account of the current financial restrictions but also because research has shown that the police are not by any means as efficient and effective as they should be.

The discussion on the role of the police in society and their effectiveness and efficiency only really got underway in the Netherlands after the publication of the reports, "The changing police" and "Police Manpower" in the late seventies. Police plans have since been drawn up in a number of police forces and changes have been initiated.

Nevertheless the process of change in the police organisation, particularly where criminal investigation departments are concerned, is a difficult one. People brought in from outside and higher ranking police officials all too often face considerable resistance and often there is no support at all for the changes at lower levels. It will therefore come as no surprise that there have been very few large scale changes within the Netherlands police. People are constantly talking about reducing the burden of criminal investigation departments by transferring simpler aspects of investigative work to the patrol section or by introducing a district-oriented approach,

thereby partially dismantling central CID's but in practice little has as yet actually been done about it. Where efforts have been made in this direction, in experimental form or not, they have foundered primarily on account of resistance from criminal investigation departments themselves. This happened most recently in Delft where a district team police project had to be called off after a short time (10).

It is not, however, only such more or less fundamental changes which have been so unsuccessful up to now. Because detectives have always been able to determine what they do themselves, without having to be responsible to anyone, it is hardly surprising that they begin to defend their territory when their superiors wish to take more control of detective work by setting up, for example, some form of central coordination in order to assist the distribution of work and to check on the progress of investigations.

One of the few studies of CID work, the burglary project in Utrecht, did however reveal that internal changes are possible and, moreover, that they had positive results. A more efficient and better coordinated approach to detective work involving both detectives and patrol officers was not only welcomed by those taking part but also led to an increase in the absolute and relative number of crimes solved.

A second topic under discussion at the moment, which is more far-reaching than internal changes in police practice but which is linked to them, is the coordination of investigative work and the prosecutions policy of the Public Prosecutors Department. This is of vital importance to both parties, particularly as the police are continuing to solve more crimes each year and their constant endeavour is to improve the clear-up rate.

There have therefore been a number of developments in recent years aimed at improved coordination. These have included retrospective discussion of decisions taken by the Public Prosecutors Department and prior consultation on the cases being dealt with by detectives, and the Department transferring or delegating powers to the criminal investigation department in certain instances.

As little research has as yet been done on these forms of coordination little can be said on the effects they have either internally, for the CID and the Public Prosecutors Department, or externally.

Finally, the most far-reaching innovation currently being discussed is the establishment of priorities. Research in this field has so far been limited to defining problem areas of crime so that priorities can be established; it is however possible to measure the effects of such an innovation.

The crime project in Enschede described in section 6, which is still in its infancy, offers a number of new possibilities. Firstly, the project raises the point that if one wishes to devote more attention to certain areas others will obviously receive less. Secondly, the research shows that organisational changes are possible within criminal investigation departments and that coordination between investigative work and policy on prosecution can be improved. This is not all however. Crime control here is not simply a matter for the police and the judiciary, but also involves the local authority which, as a partner in the tripartite consultations, must commit itself to the priority plan and take whatever measures are required within its own sphere.

Clearly the future project in Enschede will, relatively speaking, have the most serious consequences for police work and the police as an organisation. Because experiments and changes in the police have often faced considerable resistance from the lower ranks, a great deal of time has been set aside in Enschede to prepare the ground for the project within the force. Only time will tell what effects a priority plan has on crime control, the organisation of the police and coordination between the police and the judiciary.

The final question remaining concerns the relationship between crime and police presence. Many people are of the opinion that increased police presence or police presence in a different form will reduce the level of crime.

We believe, however, that this assumed causality is at best doubtful. The growth of the police in the last decade was unable to prevent crime rising to the great extent which it has. Police experiments involving the uniformed branch (project patrols, foot patrols etc.) have also revealed that this has little effects on the crime rate(11). This is further confirmed by research in the United States.

The presence of the police is intended to prevent people committing crimes and to increase the chances of those who do so being caught. The former may have some effect on the crime rate but it is surely an illusion to expect that potential criminals would be restrained from criminal activities simply by the presence of the police, at best they might postpone such activities for a while. It is much more likely that other social factors such as drug abuse, unemployment and greater uncertainty about the concepts of right and wrong have far more effect on the behavior of potential offenders than police presence. Where increased changes of being caught are concerned it is true that the clear-up rate may rise but the crime rate as such will remain very much the same.

In making any changes to the way in which criminal investigation departments work we must be fully aware of these factors. It is therefore of considerable importance for those carrying out research to investigate carefully what criteria should be used in future studies of the police to determine effects.

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Strafverfahren, Strafverfolgungsorgane und Polizeiforschung

in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

von Heinz Leineweber, ^{Minister (Adm. Justiz)} Regierungsdirektor im Bundeskriminalamt

I. Das deutsche Strafverfahren

Aufgabe der Strafrechtspflege in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist einmal der Schutz der Allgemeinheit und des einzelnen gegen Straftäter, zum anderen diese der gerechten Strafe zuzuführen. Hierzu dienen das ^{strafrecht} Strafrecht, das die Straftaten aufzählt und mit Strafe bedroht, das Strafverfahren, in dem die Ermittlungsbehörden den Straftäter ermitteln und das Gericht für bewiesene Straftaten die angedrohte Strafe festsetzt sowie die Vollstreckung der verhängten Strafe.

1. Strafverfahrensrecht und Strafrecht

Das Strafrecht begründet den ^{staatlichen} strafrechtlichen Anspruch für bestimmte menschliche Verhaltensweisen, an die rechtliche Sanktionen (wie Strafen und Maßregeln der Besserung und Sicherung) geknüpft sind. Dieses Rechtsgebiet des materiellen Strafrechts wird in verschiedenen Gesetzen geregelt (z.B. im Strafgesetzbuch, Jugendgerichtsgesetz und in ^{sonstigen} Strafrechtlichen Nebengesetzen).

Das Strafverfahrensrecht stellt die Regel für die Feststellung und Durchsetzung des strafrechtlichen Anspruchs auf, mit anderen Worten: es regelt das Verfahren zur Verwirklichung des materiellen Strafrechts. Das Verfahrensrecht ist formelles Recht und bildet somit eine notwendige Ergänzung des materiellen Strafrechts, denn ohne die Möglichkeit der Realisierung des staatlichen strafrechtlichen Anspruchs wäre dieser ein untaugliches Mittel der Verbrechensbekämpfung. Materielles Strafrecht und Strafverfahrensrecht bilden also eine Ein-

heit. Zum Strafverfahrensrecht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zählt weiter noch die Strafvollstreckung.

Das Strafverfahren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat zum Ziel:

- 1. die materiell richtige,
- 2. prozeßordnungsmäßig zustande gekommene und
- 3. Rechtsfrieden schaffende Entscheidung über die Strafbartigkeit des Beschuldigten.

In adf to *sentencing* Neben der Verurteilung des Schuldigen ist weiteres Ziel des Strafverfahrens der Schutz des Unschuldigen, die aller Willkür entrückte Justizförmigkeit des Verfahrens und die Rechtsbeständigkeit der Entscheidung, aber auch der Schutz unbeteiligter Dritter sowie des wirklichen oder mutmaßlichen Täters.

2. Strafverfahrensrecht und Grundgesetz

Das Strafverfahren unterliegt ständig dem Spannungsverhältnis zwischen den Interessen des Staates an einer effektiven Strafverfolgung und Verbrechensaufklärung sowie den Interessen des einzelnen Bürgers an dem Schutz seiner grundgesetzlich garantierten Rechte. D.h. das Straf-

verfahrensrecht steht in direkter und aktueller Abhängigkeit zur Verfassungsordnung. Inhalt und Grenzen des Strafverfahrensrecht werden also durch die Grundrechtsnormen des "Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland" (GG) mitbestimmt. So ergeben sich für das Strafverfahrensrecht Auswirkungen insbesondere aus folgenden Wertentscheidungen dieses Grundgesetzes:

Die Achtung der Menschenwürde (Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG) und das Recht auf freie Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit (Art. 2 GG) setzen der Sachaufklärung erhebliche Grenzen. Ausdruck dieser Grundrechte ist insbesondere § 136 a StPO mit dem Verbot bestimmter Vernehmungsmethoden. So äußert das Grundrecht der freien Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit seine aktuelle, die Ermittlungsbehörden beschränkende Wirkung beispielsweise bei der Verwendung sog. technischer Ermittlungshilfen (wie *tape records* oder *listening devices*), die in der Lage sind, in den Privatbereich des einzelnen einzudringen. *Invasions* Eingriffe in die Intimsphäre sind unzulässig, weil sie den Wesensgehalt des Grundrechts des Art. 2 GG verletzen. Soweit der Kernbereich der Persönlichkeit nicht betroffen ist, muß in jedem Einzelfall zwischen dem Anspruch des einzelnen auf Schutz seiner Persönlichkeit und dem Interesse des Staates an der Aufklärung von Straftaten eine Interessenabwägung vorgenommen werden. Hier bestimmt der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit die Grenzen.

Eine Reihe von Folgerungen leiten sich aus dem Rechtstaatsprinzip des Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG her. Hier ist insbesondere der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit zu betonen. Obwohl er in der Strafprozeßordnung nur in einigen Vorschriften

ausdrücklich genannt wird, beherrscht er über einzelne Regelungen hinaus das gesamte Strafverfahrensrecht. Jeder staatliche Eingriff in die Grundrechte untersteht damit dem Gebot der Verhältnismäßigkeit. Der an sich zulässige Eingriff wird im Rahmen der Güterabwägung zwischen den Interessen des einzelnen und denen des Staates begrenzt.

Das Verbot des Übermaßes bringt zum Ausdruck, daß jeder zulässige Eingriff sich an dem im öffentlichen Interesse unbedingt Erforderlichen orientieren muß (z.B. für den Bereich der Personenfahndung gilt, daß die Veröffentlichung eines Lichtbildes in der Presse aus dem Gesichtspunkt des Schutzes der Persönlichkeit unter Berücksichtigung der Intensität und Schwere der aufzuklärenden Straftat zu erfolgen hat). Es ist also eine Mitte-Zweck-Relation, d.h. eine Verhältnismäßigkeit zwischen prozessuellem Mittel und prozessuellem Zweck erforderlich.

Ein wesentliches Moment des Rechtsstaatsprinzips ist auch der Grundsatz der Beschleunigung, der die Strafverfolgungsbehörden zwingt, ein Strafverfahren in angemessener Zeit durchzuführen.

Besondere Bedeutung im Strafverfahrensrecht hat auch der Gleichheitsgrundsatz des Art. 3 GG. Seine Konkretisierung findet sich im Legalitätsprinzip (§ 152 Abs. 2 StPO), wonach beim Verdacht einer Straftat ein Ermittlungsverfahren einzuleiten ist ohne Rücksicht auf die Straftat oder die Person des Beschuldigten.

Das Sozialstaatsprinzip des Art. 20 Abs. 1 GG ist für den Staat Auftrag und Aufgabe auch im Strafverfahren. Ziel des Strafverfahrens (hier im Bereich des Strafvollzugs) ist nicht nur die Repression, sondern auch die Resozialisierung des Täters. Der Staat wird verpflichtet, dem Verurteilten eine Chance der Wiedereingliederung in die Gesellschaft zu geben. Ausschluß dieses Prinzips sind z.B. gesetzlich aufgestellte Fristen, nach denen frühere Verurteilungen im Strafregister zu tilgen sind und damit nicht mehr im Strafverfahren verwertet werden dürfen.

3. Strafverfahrensrecht und Polizeirecht

Die Unterschiede zwischen Strafverfahrensrecht und Polizeirecht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland dürfen nicht außer acht gelassen werden, auch wenn durchaus Zusammenhänge und Parallelen erkennbar sind. So ergeben sich Verknüpfungen von Strafverfahrensrecht und Polizeirecht daraus, daß in beiden Rechtsgebieten vielfach gleichartige Maßnahmen angewandt werden können. So kommen Vorladungen, Festnahmen, Beschlagnahmen, Durchsuchungen, erkennungsdienstliche Behandlung und Untersuchungen sowohl im Strafverfahren als auch im Polizeirecht vor. Die Maßnahmen der einen wie der anderen Art können sich an ein und denselben Vorgang anschließen. Der Akt im polizeilichen Handeln kann für das Strafverfahren von Bedeutung sein, wie umgekehrt der Akt des Strafverfahrensrecht für polizeiliche Maßnahmen. Trotz der Gleichartigkeit beruhen die Akte auf verschiedener Grundlage. Die Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen werden ergriffen, weil der Verdacht einer Straftat besteht, die Tat aufgeklärt und der Täter zur Verantwortung gezogen werden soll. Dies sind also Maßnahmen repressiver Art. Die polizeilichen

Maßnahmen werden getroffen, um die Sicherheit oder Ordnung zu gewährleisten, um künftigen Schäden (präventiv) vorzubeugen. Will man eine getroffene Maßnahme im Hinblick auf ihre Zulässigkeit und Rechtmäßigkeit bewerten, so muß also immer sorgfältig geprüft werden, um was für eine Maßnahme es sich handelt. Fälle, in denen eine derartige Prüfung notwendig wird, sind solche des polizeilichen Eingriffs, da hier die doppelte Möglichkeit besteht, daß die Polizei als Verfolgungsbehörde im Strafverfahren oder als Verwaltungsbehörde aus polizeilichen Gründen tätig wird.

Die Eingriffsbefugnisse der Polizei im Bereich der ^{Authority} Strafverfolgung sind in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ausschließlich in der Strafprozeßordnung geregelt. Die sicherheitspolizeilichen Aufgaben der Polizei (die Aufgaben der Gefahrenabwehr) finden ihre Rechtsgrundlagen in den Polizeigesetzen der Länder. Beide Rechtsbereiche sind streng voneinander zu trennen. Es kann also z.B. nicht auf Grundlagen des Polizeirechts ausgewichen werden, um im Interesse der Strafverfolgung Lücken im prozeßrechtlichen Eingriffssystem zu schließen.

4. ^{Legal Principles} Gesetzliche Grundlagen

Die wichtigsten Quellen des Strafverfahrensrecht sind die Strafprozeßordnung (StPO), das ^{Prozessual Law} Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) und das Jugendgerichtsgesetz (JGG). Diese zentralen Gesetze werden durch ^{higher order laws} weitere Gesetze ergänzt, wie z.B. durch das Deutsche Richtergesetz, das Deutsche Auslieferungsgesetz, das ^(regularly) Gesetz über das Bundeskriminalamt, das Rechtshilfegesetz, das Bundeszentralregistergesetz (u.a.)^{etc}. Weitere prozessuale Bestimmungen finden sich z.B. im Grundgesetz, in der Menschenrechtskonvention, im Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz sowie in zahlreichen Verwaltungsanordnungen, in denen Details des Strafverfahrens geregelt sind.

5. ^{Outline} Gliederung des Strafverfahrens

Entsprechend der Aufgabe des Strafverfahrens, den staatlichen Strafanspruch festzustellen und gegebenenfalls durchzusetzen, ^{break down into} zerfällt das Strafverfahren in zwei große ^{procedural phases} Verfahrensabschnitte, das Erkenntnisverfahren und das Vollstreckungsverfahren, das sich bei rechtskräftiger ^{attach sein} Verurteilung anschließt. ^{legal}

Das Erkenntnisverfahren besteht aus drei großen Abschnitten:

- das Vorverfahren ^{preliminary proceedings}
- das Zwischenverfahren ^{intermediate}
- und das Hauptverfahren. ^{main}

- Das Vorverfahren
Das Vorverfahren dient der ^{Investigation} Ermittlung, ob der Beschuldigte der Tat hinreichend verdächtig ist und daher bei dem zuständigen Gericht der Antrag auf Eröffnung des Hauptverfahrens gestellt werden soll.

In Gang kommt das Vorverfahren dadurch, daß die ^{D.A.} Staatsanwaltschaft von dem Verdacht einer Straftat - sei es durch Anzeige, Strafantrag oder auf anderem Wege - Kenntnis erlangt und daher die Ermittlungen aufnimmt. Das Ermittlungsverfahren wird grundsätzlich vom Staatsanwalt durchgeführt, der sich dabei der Hilfe der Kriminalpolizei und, soweit richterliche Handlungen erforderlich sind, des Amtsrichters bedient. Ergeben die Ermittlungen genügend Anhaltspunkte dafür, daß der Beschuldigte die ihm zur Last gelegte Straftat begangen hat und erscheint seine Überführung möglich, so erhebt der Staatsanwalt grundsätzlich Anklage beim Gericht oder beantragt - bei ^{a lesser offense} leichteren Delikten - den Erlaß eines Strafbefehls. Anderfalls ^{otherwise} verfügt er die Einstellung des Verfahrens.

- Das Zwischenverfahren

An das Vorverfahren (Ermittlungsverfahren) schließt sich nicht unmittelbar das Hauptverfahren mit der Hauptverhandlung an. Vielmehr hat das Gericht zunächst in einem Zwischenverfahren nachzuprüfen, ob der Beschuldigte der Straftat hinreichend verdächtig ist und es ihm deshalb zuzumuten ist, die mit einer Hauptverhandlung notwendig verbundenen Unannehmlichkeiten und Rufschädigungen auf sich zu nehmen. Bejaht das Gericht hinreichenden Verdacht, so beschließt es die Eröffnung des Hauptverfahrens, indem es die Anklage zur Hauptverhandlung zuläßt. Andernfalls lehnt es den Antrag des Staatsanwalts auf Eröffnung des Hauptverfahrens ab.

- Das Hauptverfahren

Mit dem Eröffnungsbeschluß wird in das Hauptverfahren übergeleitet. Dieses besteht in jeder Instanz aus zwei Abschnitten:

- der Vorbereitung der Hauptverhandlung, wie z.B. Ladung der Prozeßbeteiligten, Anberaumung des Verhandlungstermins, Herbeischaffung der Beweismittel usw.
- der Hauptverhandlung selbst. In der Hauptverhandlung untersucht das Gericht, ob der Angeklagte einer Straftat schuldig ist. Das Hauptverfahren endet durch Urteil.

Wird gegen das Urteil ein Rechtsmittel eingelegt, so schließt sich nunmehr das Rechtsmittelverfahren (Berufung, Revision) an. Auch das Rechtsmittelverfahren ist noch Teil des Hauptverfahrens, das erst mit dem rechtskräftigen Urteil endet. Die Einlegung eines Rechtsmittels hindert den Eintritt der Rechtskraft und führt grundsätzlich zu einer erneuten Hauptverhandlung und Entscheidung durch ein höheres Gericht. Ist der Beschuldigte rechtskräftig zu einer Strafe verurteilt, so wird die Strafe von Amts wegen vollstreckt. Dies geschieht im Rahmen des Strafvollstreckungsverfahrens.

Strafvollstreckungsverfahrens | *das Rechtsmittelverfahren*

II. Die Strafverfolgungsorgane

1. Die Staatsanwaltschaft

1.1 Allgemeines

Mit der Einsetzung der Staatsanwaltschaft wurden die Aufgaben der Strafverfolgung im Gegensatz zum früheren Inquisitionsprozeß verteilt. Dem Staatsanwalt obliegt es, im Vorverfahren festzustellen, ob ein hinreichender Verdacht vorliegt; in dem daran anschließenden Hauptverfahren muß das Gericht die Täterschaft und Schuld feststellen. Dadurch wurden die wesentlichen Mängel des Inquisitionsprozesses beseitigt.


Die Staatsanwaltschaft ist eine staatliche, zur Strafverfolgung berufene Behörde. Darüber hinaus ist sie aber auch zur doppelten Kontrolle der Staatsgewalt berufen: Als "Wächter des Gesetzes" hat sie den Beschuldigten sowohl vor richterlicher Willkür als auch vor der der Strafverfolgungsbehörden zu beschützen. So hat die Staatsanwaltschaft die Ermittlungen sowohl auf die den Beschuldigten belastenden als auch entlastenden Umstände zu erstrecken. Sie kann auch Rechtsmittel zugunsten des Beschuldigten einlegen. Die Staatsanwaltschaft ist nicht "Partei" des Strafverfahrens; sie wird als die "objektivste Behörde der Welt" bezeichnet. Damit repräsentiert die Staatsanwaltschaft den Rechtswillen des Staates und ist somit eine Justizbehörde. Der rechtsprechenden Gewalt (der Judikative) gehört die Staatsanwaltschaft schon deswegen nicht an, weil ihr richterliche Aufgaben nicht zugewiesen sind. Diese sind im Rahmen der Aufteilung der Strafverfolgungsaufgaben ausschließlich dem Richter vorbehalten.

1.2 Aufbau und Weisungsrechte

Staatsanwaltschaften bestehen beim Bundesgerichtshof, bei den Oberlandesgerichten und den Landgerichten unter der Leitung des Generalbundesanwalts (Staatsanwaltschaft beim Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]), der jeweiligen Generalstaatsanwälte (Staatsanwaltschaft beim Oberlandesgericht [OLG]) und (Leitenden) Oberstaatsanwälten (Staatsanwaltschaft beim Landgericht [LG]). Bei den Amtsgerichten sind keine Staatsanwaltschaften eingerichtet. Die dortigen Aufgaben nimmt die Staatsanwaltschaft des jeweiligen übergeordneten Landgerichts wahr.

Kraft ihrer Zugehörigkeit zu den Justizbehörden untersteht die Bundesanwaltschaft dem Bundesjustizministerium, die übrigen Staatsanwaltschaften den Landesjustizministerien.

Bei den Staatsanwaltschaften ist ein externes und ein internes Weisungsrecht zu unterscheiden. Internes Weisungsrecht ist dasjenige innerhalb der Staatsanwaltschaft (z.B. das Weisungsrecht des Generalstaatsanwalts gegenüber den Beamten seines Bezirks). Externes Weisungsrecht nennt man das des jeweiligen Justizministers.



Die Beamten der jeweiligen Staatsanwaltschaft haben den dienstlichen Anweisung ihres Vorgesetzten nachzukommen. Die Staatsanwaltschaft ist eine hierarchisch aufgebaute, von den Gerichten unabhängige, selbständige Justizbehörde. Der einzelne Staatsanwalt handelt also immer als Vertreter des Behördenchefs.

Dieses Weisungsrecht der Staatsanwaltschaft besteht jedoch nicht uneingeschränkt. Es findet einmal eine Grenze im Legalitätsprinzip. Der Staatsanwalt muß anklagen, wenn hinreichender Tatverdacht besteht (§ 170 Abs. 1 StPO). Kommt er dieser Verpflichtung nicht nach, so kann er sich wegen Strafvereitelung im Amt strafbar machen. Umgekehrt darf er zur Wahrung seiner Verpflichtung zur Objektivität nicht weiter ermitteln, wenn er von der Unschuld des Betreffenden überzeugt ist.

1.3 Die Staatsanwaltschaft als "Herrin des Ermittlungsverfahrens"

Besteht der Verdacht einer Straftat, so werden im Ermittlungsverfahren alle Umstände erforscht; die zur Bestätigung oder zur Widerlegung dieses Verdachts erforderlich sind. Damit dient das Ermittlungsverfahren zur Beiführung einer Entschließung darüber, ob die öffentliche Klage zu erheben ist.

Nachdem im Jahre 1974 die gerichtliche Voruntersuchung abgeschafft wurde, gibt es grundsätzlich nur noch das staatsanwaltschaftliche Ermittlungsverfahren. Wenn auch im Rahmen dieses Verfahrens sowohl richterliche

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Untersuchungshandlungen als auch polizeiliche Ermittlungen betrieben werden können, so ist doch die Staatsanwaltschaft alleinige Herrin des Vorverfahrens.

Trotz seiner Stellung als Herr des Ermittlungsverfahrens führt der Staatsanwalt die Ermittlung in der Praxis nicht selbst durch, obwohl er aufgrund der Regelung in der Strafprozeßordnung dazu berechtigt ist. Weil der Staatsanwaltschaft ein eigener Vollzugsapparat fehlt und sie nicht über die notwendigen kriminalistischen Kenntnisse verfügt, bedient sie sich zur Durchführung ihrer Ermittlungen "der Behörden und Beamten des Polizeidienstes", die verpflichtet sind, dem Ersuchen oder Auftrag der Staatsanwaltschaft zu genügen.

Wenn die Polizei dem Gesetz zufolge grundsätzlich auf Anordnung der Staatsanwaltschaft tätig, so hat sie gleichwohl die Pflicht und auch ein eigenes Recht zur Erforschung der Straftaten und hierbei insbesondere das "Recht des ersten Zugriffs" zur Vornahme aller Maßnahmen, die zur Verhütung der Verdunklung unaufschiebbar sind. Aber auch hier handelt die Polizei stets als Hilfsorgan der Staatsanwaltschaft. Dies ergibt sich u.a. daraus, daß die Polizei sämtliche Ermittlungsvorgänge ohne Verzug der Staatsanwaltschaft übersenden muß, damit diese alsbald ihre Funktion als Herrin des Ermittlungsverfahrens wahrnehmen kann.

1.4 Das Weisungsrecht der Staatsanwaltschaft gegenüber ihren Hilfsbeamten

Eine besondere Gruppe von Polizeibeamten im Sinne des § 163 StPO bilden die durch Rechtsverordnung der

Landesregierung oder den dazu von den jeweiligen Landesregierungen ermächtigten Landesjustizverwaltungen die sogenannten "Hilfsbeamten der Staatsanwaltschaft" bestellen Polizeibeamten. Daneben gibt es solche, die diese Stellung aufgrund besonderer gesetzlicher Bestimmungen (also Hilfsbeamte kraft Gesetzes nach Bundes- wie nach Landesrecht) erlangt haben.

Der Bestellte erhält mit der Bestellung zum Hilfsbeamten bestimmte Anordnungs- und Zwangsbefugnisse, die Polizeibeamte, die nicht Hilfsbeamte sind, nicht besitzen (z.B. körperliche Untersuchung des Beschuldigten, Beschlagnahme oder Durchsuchung bei Gefahr im Verzuge anzuordnen). Neben diesen besonderen Befugnissen haben alle Hilfsbeamten die Rechte, die jedem Polizeibeamten zustehen. Sie können also insbesondere auch Festnahmen nach § 127 Abs. 2 StPO und Vernehmungen durchführen.

2. Der Ermittlungsrichter

Obwohl die Staatsanwaltschaft Herrin des Ermittlungsverfahrens ist, hat das Gesetz die Vornahme besonders wichtiger und den Beschuldigten im Regelfall besonders belastender Ermittlungshandlungen von der Entscheidung des Ermittlungsrichters abhängig gemacht. Die Verfahrensherrschaft der Staatsanwaltschaft kann sich jedoch hier nicht in Weisungsrechten gegenüber dem Ermittlungsrichter niederschlagen, sondern lediglich in der Befugnis, nach § 162 StPO bestimmte richterliche Ermittlungshandlungen zu beantragen, deren Vornahme dann allein von der Entscheidung des Richters abhängt.

§165 StPO begründet die Pflicht für den Richter, bei Gefahr im Verzug die erforderlichen Untersuchungshandlungen auch ohne Antrag nach § 162 StPO, also wenn ein Staatsanwalt nicht erreichbar ist, vorzunehmen. Es handelt sich hier um eine eigene Tätigkeit des Ermittlungsrichters als "Notstaatsanwalt".

BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DETECTIVES

by

George L. Kelling
Debbie Danielpour
Susan Michaelson

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clear - 1/2*

Program in Criminal Justice Policy
and Management
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

AND

The Police Foundation

This is an early draft. Please do not circulate. This work was supported by National Institute of Justice Grant #80-IJ-CX-0029 to the Police Foundation. The opinions expressed are entirely those of the authors and do not represent the Police Foundation or the National Institute of Justice.

INTRODUCTION

This is a bibliography on detectives. It is intended to be of use to scholars and practitioners. The authors have made only limited attempts to summarize the contents of the materials, feeling that summaries often lend themselves to distortions and oversimplification. Instead, through comments about the articles, the authors have attempted to provide information about the general subject matter of each piece. For example, scholars interested in the history of detectives can, by a rapid perusal of the comments, identify relevant source material.

We have attempted to focus on public and private detectives (criminal investigators) and detective units and agencies. While some materials on forensic science and criminologists are included, especially those from the journal of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, we have not attempted an exhaustive bibliography in these areas. The bibliography in the Simpson (1976) paper is perhaps the most exhaustive we have identified.

Because fiction about detectives has had an impact on public perceptions of detectives, we have included articles about detective fiction. With the exception of the earliest detective novels (Poe, Dickens, and Collins) which established the basic format for the genre, we have not included fictional works.

As with any literature about a field, the quality of the works cited vary widely, indeed, extremely widely. We have attempted to identify the most significant works, or sections, in our comments about them.

A great many persons have made contributions to this bibliography, but several persons deserve special comment. Dr. Ronald Clarke of the Research Branch of the Home Office, England, provided many additions to an earlier draft. Dr. Richard Ward of the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle and Dr. David R. Johnson of the University of Texas-San Antonio, both of whom have published extensively about detectives, were generous in sharing their files. Mr. Steven Edwards of the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, called many works to our attention and tolerated the scavenging of his personal library. Ms. Anita Moulton, administrative assistant in the program, contributed to the effort, both substantively and by facilitating our efforts. Finally, Ms. Shirley Melnicoe of the National Institute of Justice receives our thanks for her enthusiastic support of the project.

*Poe + Dickens
are not listed,
however*

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Browne, Douglas G. The Rise of Scotland Yard: A History of the Metropolitan Police. Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press, 1956 and 1973.

To be reviewed.

Brown, William P. "Police-Victim Relationships in Sex-Crime Investigations," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXVIII, no. 1, Jan. 1970, pp. 20-24.

Humanitarian advice to the investigator on how to investigate sex-related crimes. Informative guidelines illustrate a typical handling of such a case.

Cain, Maureen E. Society and the Policeman's Role. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Boston, 1973.

An excellent book on English police with several brief but interesting sections on the Criminal Investigation Division (CID).

Canhy, Donald F. "Homicide Investigation," The Police Chief. Vol. XII, no. 4, April 1974, p. 67.

Using structure of a two-week refresher course in homicide investigation established by the New York City Police Department's detective unit, author explains the specialized skills of the homicide investigator.

Carlin, Francis. Reminiscences of an Ex-Detective. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1927.

A personal account, by a British ex-detective, heroically portraying his practices in specific cases. Stories are well-written and historically interesting. Some chapters are devoted to more general discussions, such as criminal psychology.

Carson, Andrew F. Team Five. Unpublished term paper, May 1970 (provided by Dr. Richard Ward, University of Illinois - Chicago Circle).

A brief interesting description of detectives working a case.

Cerullo, Vincent. "Criminal Investigation Techniques as Applied to the Investigation of White-Collar Crime," The Police Chief. Vol. XLVI, no. 5, May 1979. pp. 32-35.

An informative article on the nature of white-collar crimes. Author provides general guidelines for the investigator, including sample analyses and information on sources of information.

Chamberlin, Arthur N. "An American Sherlock Holmes," The Literary Digest. Vol. 118, July 14, 1934, p. 20.

A story of the life of Assistant Chief Inspector John J. Sullivan of New York. Focus on department personnel procedures and salaries.

Chathas, Alice L. [Book Review of The Criminal Investigation Process, by Peter Greenwood et. al., Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath & Co., 1977, pp. XX, 326, (commissioned by The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California)]. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. Vol. 68, no. 4, pp. 665-666.

A brief and favorable summary of the work.

Cherrill, F. Cherrill of the Yard. London: Harrap, 1954.

To be reviewed.

Chibnall, Steve. "The Metropolitan Police and the News Media," The British Police, ed. Holdaway, Simon, Edward Arnold, Ltd., London, 1979

Description of media handling of corruption in the Criminal Investigation Division (CID). Should be read in tandem with Sir Robert Marks' In the Office of the Constable (See citation).

Cobb, Belton. The First Detectives and the early career of Richard Mayne, Commissioner of Police. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1957.

An interesting book that combines historical material with the exploits of particular investigators. When read with Critchley's The History of the Police in England and Wales, it is especially informative. Chapter 4 is supportive of Johnson's thesis in Policing the Urban Underworld; namely that the activities of criminals played a crucial role in determining how the police organized and performed.

Coke, Charles T. "Detective Work," The Police Review and Parade Gossip. December 24, 1902, p. 614.

An editorial comment claiming that a good detective is born, not made. Intuition necessary in investigative analysis is seen as a gift.

Collins, Robert L. "Improved Crime Scene Investigations," The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science. Vol. 52, no. 4, Nov.-Dec. 1961. pp. 469-470.

A discussion of team crime-scene investigating based on scientist-investigator teams used in the Southfield, Michigan Police Department.

Collins, Wilkie. The Moonstone. Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, Ltd., 1980 (first published in 1858).

One of the earliest detective novels, The Moonstone portrays the eminent Sergeant Cuff of the Detective Police (London) as a somewhat eccentric but perspicacious investigator - held in awe because of his ability, but disdained because of the nasty work he has to do. In contrast is Superintendent Seegrave of the local police, more attractive and gracious than Sergeant Cuff but incompetent.

"Contrasting Problems of French and British Detectives," Literary Digest, Vol. 104, Feb. 1, 1930, pp. 401.

Taken from a French journal, an analysis in four areas of differences between British and French investigative systems, methods, and attitudes, concluding with the assertion that French and British detectives are equally effective.

Cook, David J. Hands Up; or Twenty Years of Detective Life in the Mountains and on the Plains. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958.

Written by the creator of the Rocky Mountain Detective Association, this is an interesting and detailed collection of stories describing the criminal history of the Far West.

Cottell, L. C. New York City Police Department - Detective Bureau: Workload Analysis-Interim Report. New York: New York City Police Department, 1973, p. 108.

A study of the amount of time detectives spend in investigating various cases to determine optimum manpower allocations for each squad, district, borough and entire NYC detective bureau. A statistical analysis devises a more equitable performance measurement scale based not solely on clearance rate but upon the difficulty of the case.

Crawford, Kenneth G. "J. Edgar Hoover," The Nation. Vol. 144, Feb. 27, 1937, pp. 232-234.

A discussion of Hoover as a hard-driving bureaucrat. Success of the bureau is attributed to his strict standards although difficulty emerges on the part of employees subordinate to him. Employee turnover has been calculated at 70% a year.

Crawley, F. J. "The Technique of Investigation of the English Detective," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 145, no. 234, Sept. 1929, pp. 219-222.

Citing law machinery of both England and the U. S. as almost identical, author attributes success of the English detective to the superiority of the British law enforcement system where public cooperation is normal and evidence-gathering is geared toward strict courts; and to the British detective's methods where training is more extensive and information and communication systems are more organized and decentralized.

The Criminal Investigative Process: A Dialogue on Research Findings, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Wash. D.C., April 1977.

A summary of the Rand report, the critique of the report printed in The Police Chief (July 1976), and the responses to the critique printed in The Police Chief (Dec. 1976). A valuable document bringing together the Rand report and its most vociferous critique.

Critchley, T. A. A History of Police in England and Wales, Constable, London, 1967.

The definitive history of English police. Essential for understanding the constable system. Actual history of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) is dealt with rather tersely but when read in tandem with Cobb's The First Detectives (see citation) a fairly detailed history of the CID emerges.

Cronin, John J. "The Fingerprints Identification as the Basic Police Science," Pioneers in Policing. Philip John Stead. Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1977.
History of the development of fingerprinting.

Danckworth, Edward T. "Techniques of Child Abuse Investigations," The Police Chief. Vol. XLII, no. 3, March 1976, pp. 62-64.
A report on General Investigative techniques in child abuse cases.

Davis, Rex D. "Investigative Breakthrough: Explosives Tagging," The Police Chief. Vol. XLV, no. 5, May 1978, pp. 55-58.
A report on an explosives tagging program developed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

Derrick, Charles D. "Interrogation by Hypnosis," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXVI, no. 3, p. 26-29, March 1959.
Citing three cases, author provides research and development of hypnosis techniques in criminal investigations.

"Detective Agencies Licensed," Police Chief's Newsletter. Vol. XIII, no. 12, December 1946.
A report on a new law in Kansas which requires all private detective agencies to obtain a license, and all investigators obtain a permit and pay fees.

(No Author). "Detectives in Fiction," Living Age. Vol. 330, Sept. 18, 1926, pp. 638-643.
A study of detective stories as a relatively new genre in fiction - their authors' methods, their relation and influence to actual detectives, and their heroes. Author suggests the new literature has contributed to public confidence in detectives, and that the new genre is a fortunate departure from stereotypes. He predicts such literature will be popular since fewer people now stick with the underdog and rather support the law.

Dienstein, William. How to Write a Narrative Investigation Report. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1964.
Guideline and instruction on writing criminal investigation reports. College-level.

Dilnot, G. The Story of Scotland Yard. Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin, 1927.
An early history of Scotland Yard with several chapters on the history and functioning of detectives.

"Director Hoover Discusses the Common Task of Law Enforcement," Police Chief's Newsletter. Vol. VII, no. 9, Sept. 1940, p. 4.
A report on Hoover's news on subversive activities in criminal investigations. Hoover is said to argue that crimes requiring espionage should remain in the hands of the law enforcement officer and not become public domain.

Donnelly, Richard C. "Police Authority and Practices," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 339, Jan. 1962, pp. 90-110.
Relevant sections on informers, entrapment, confessions, etc.

Dougherty, George S. "Meet the Real City Detective," The Saturday Evening Post. Vol. 197, Sept. 13, 1924, pp. 44, 158.
Article is an assimilation of studies, conducted by the author, of detective departments across the world. Facts and stories illustrate the reality of detective work in New York, London, Paris, and Berlin.

Douglas, William. (Chief Inspector, Detective Department, Glasgow) "Suggested Association of Detective Officers," The Police Review and Parade Gossip. June 17, 1898, p. 279.
Based on the claim that the detective department is the most important branch of police organization, author promotes formation of an association of detectives.

Eck, J. E. The Burglary Investigation Decision Model Replication, Vol. 1, Analysis. Police Executive Research Forum, 1979.
A replication in 28 cities of decision-making models for case assignment.

Edwards, Samuel. The Vidocq Dossier. The Story of the World's First Detective. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977.
A fairly brief biography of Vidocq, "the world's first detective."

Ericson, Richard. Making Crime: A Study of Detective Work. Butterworth, Toronto, February 1981.
A forthcoming study of detective work. Preliminary discussions with the author suggest this will be a very important work dealing with both the process and outcome of detective work.

Fairfield, William S. and Charles Clift. "The Private Eyes," The Reporter. Vol. 12, Feb. 10, 1955, pp. 14-29.
An informative, well-documented illustration of all aspects of private detective work, written by two detectives. Article discusses methods of investigation, sources of information, the business and its profits, the growing trend of specialization, the nature of cases, tendencies toward corruption, and qualifications for obtaining a license in New York.

Firth, Alan. "A Detective is Born," The Police Review. Vol. 84, May 21, 1976, p. 651.
A history of England's Criminal Investigation Departments, demonstrating the extent to which initial ideas concerning detectives have changed. Sketch starts from 1829.

Firth, Alan. "A Detective - Just a Uniform Officer in Plain Clothes," The Police Review. March 19, 1976, pp. 345-346.

A formal statement demonstrating the disadvantages of disharmonious relations between uniform and investigative officers.

Fisher, Jacob. The Art of Detection. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1948.

A general discourse on investigating. Specific sections include: 1) Defining the investigation; 2) The investigation; 3) Science in investigation; and 4) Evidence in white-collar crimes.

"Five Years: Five Volumes," Police Chiefs' News Letter. Vol. V, no. 11, Nov. 1938, p. 4.

A British survey report on the results of a committee established in 1933 on Detective Work and Procedures, submitted in 5 volumes in 1938. Issues discussed include: 1) Centralization or Cooperation?; 2) The Selection of Detectives; 3) Detective Training; and 4) Scientific Crime Detection. Representative of the state-of-the-art at the time.

Fogelson, Robert M. Big City Police. Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 1977.

A path-breaking historical study of police reform dating from 1890. While material regarding detectives is scanty, there nevertheless is evidence that detectives were in the avant garde of those creating the conditions in need of reform.

Forsyth, Raymond W. and Orbie L. Adams. "Investigative Aide: Extension of the Paraprofessional," The Police Chief. Vol. XLVI, no. 5, May 1971, pp. 28-29.

Article demonstrates the success of the use of four investigative aides in a Michigan police department and suggests the concept as a tool in increasing efficiency of investigative units.

Freeman, John C. [Review of the two reports by the Law Reform Commission of Australia: No. 1 - Complaints Against Police and No. 2 - Criminal Investigation.] The Law Quarterly Review. Vol. 94, October 1978, pp. 606-607.

A summary and review of both reports. Report #1 is concerned with protecting officers' rights and liberties; report #2 reviews specifics of criminal investigation, including arrest, custody, questioning, release and bail, search, use of intelligence data and minority groups.

Ritz, Kathlyn Ann, Ph.D. Patterns and Perceptions of Homicide in Detective Novels. [Dissertation, Ph.D.] Yale University, 1975.

A fascinating and revealing analysis of the beliefs and ideas concerning deviance expressed in detective novels. A basic assumption is that detective fiction, as a cultural product, reflects the views and values of the culture in which it is produced and read, and therefore that the views on deviance found in fiction have wider reference in culture.

Gates, Daryl F. and Lyle Knowles. "An Evaluation of the Rand Corporation's Analysis of the Criminal Investigation Process," The Police Chief. Vol. XLII, no. 7, pp. 20-24, 74-77, July 1976.

A highly critical review of the Rand study. Although authors do not support the investigative status quo and believe useful data has been generated in the Rand study, they maintain findings and recommendations are supported by inadequate data due to methodological problems, insufficient data bases, and errors in drawing conclusions. Unchallenged, it can have a harmful effect on the investigative process.

Gibbons, Redmond P. "Criminal Investigations," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. Vol. XXXIII, no. 1, May/June 1942, pp. 84-94.

A historical perspective on the ideal criminal investigation process. Contents: I. Definition of Criminal Investigation; II. Attitude; and III. Components of the Investigation.

Gilbert, Elliot L. "The Detective as Metaphor in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Popular Culture 1(3), 1967, pp. 256-262.

An attempt to explain the popularity of the detective in the late 1900s on the basis that the detective was the example of reason - the apostle of reason - in an age which emphasized rationality.

Gilbert, James N. "The Future of Criminal Investigation," The Police Chief. Vol. XLVI, no. 5, May 1979, pp. 24-26.

A review of XXXXXX on the investigative function with suggestions for improving departments such as administrative reorganization, special evidence processing, and improved communication between patrol and detective units.

Glick, B. and L. Riccio. "Productivity of Detectives: A Study of the Investigative Function of Police Juvenile Units," Journal of Police Science and Administration. June 1979.

A study of investigation productivity.

Goldstein, H. Policing a Free Society. Ballinger, Cambridge, 1977.

A basic work in American police literature which summarizes detective effectiveness research in Chapter 3.

Gordon, Thomas J. and Jerry J. Tobias. "Managing the Psychic in Criminal Investigations," The Police Chief. Vol. XLVI, no. 5, May 1979, pp. 58-59.

Gray, Paul, and William R., Heitzman. "A Detective Allocation Model," Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 341-346. Winter 1976.

Based on the assumption that the primary purpose of investigative detectives is to solve cases, this research report/mathematical model serves to allocate detectives among divisions in large urban police departments so as to maximize the city-wide clearance rate.

Greenberg, Bernard, Carola V. Elliott, Lois P. Kraft, and Steven H. Proctor. Felony Investigation Decision Model: An Analysis of Investigative Elements of Information. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, Feb. 1977.

The original SRI model--that is, the decision-making model for efficient case assignment to investigators. A basic work.

Greenbert, Ilene, and Robert Wasserman. Managing Criminal Investigations. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, August 1979.

Authors justify the development of Managing Criminal Investigations (MCI) programs, as they remedy investigative deficiencies documented by SRI and Rand reports.

Greenwood, Peter W. "The Rand Study of Criminal Investigation: The Findings and Its Impact to Date," The Effectiveness of Policing, eds. Clarke, R.V.G. and Hough, J. M., Grover Publishing Co., Ltd., Westmead, Farnborough, Hants, England, 1980, pp. 35-43.

A restatement of the Rand findings and an assessment of their impact by one of the authors of the Rand study.

Greenwood, P. W. and J. Petersilia. The Criminal Investigation Process, Vol. I, Rand Corporation, R1776, DOJ, October 1975.

The classic Rand study of investigative effectiveness.

Greenwood, P. W., J. M. Chaiken and J. Petersilia. The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. "Response to: 'An Evaluation of the Rand Corporation's Analysis of the Criminal Investigation Process,'" The Police Chief. Vol. XLII, no. 12, Dec. 1976, pp. 62-71.

A defense against the July article by Daryl Gates and Lyle Knowles demonstrating why their review is misleading, and claiming that no evidence yet exists to contradict the report's conclusions. Article is a systematic rebuttal. Bibliography.

Gupta, Anandswarup. The Police in British India, 1861-1947. Concept Publishing, New Delhi, 1979.

A fairly dry but straightforward account of colonial policing with some insights and information regarding detectives.

Hall, Jerome. "Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant," Harvard Law Review. 49:566-592, 1936.

A very good, early discussion of the historical context within which police and ultimately detectives developed.

Hay, Douglas. "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," Albion's Fatal Tree. Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England edited by Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E. P. Thompson and Cal Winslow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1975.

An important historical work which, while not targeted on detectives, provides the context for understanding the emergence of "preventive" and "detective" police.

Haycraft, Howard. Murder for Pleasure: The Life and Times of the Detective Story. D. Appleton-Century Co., New York and London, 1941.

A history of the detective novel starting with Poe's The Murders in the Rue Morgue in 1841 through the 1930s in the United States, England and the Continent.

Heindl, Robert. "The Technique of Criminal Investigation in German," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 145, no. 234, Sept. 1929, pp. 223-236.

A sketch of the division of authority within a German criminal investigation and of private vs. police detective work. By law, federal prosecutor is decision-making body, with detectives doing only legwork, yet, most investigators do most work independently. Private detective work extremely different from that of criminal investigators, as they are concerned with investigation of reputation and financial status.

Hibbert, Christopher. The Roots of Evil: A Social History of Crime and Punishment. Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1963.

A general and well-analyzed history of the social forces behind crime and changing penal systems. Focus on the problems of each time period, from the feudal ages to date. Part V deals solely with the detection of crime.

Higgins, George V. "The Private Eye as Illegal Hero," Esquire. 78:348-351.

A look at the myths surrounding the "private eye."

Higgins, Robert. In the Name of the Law. London: John Long, Ltd., 1958.

Interesting stories of ex-Detective Superintendent John Higgins' life as a detective.

Holcomb, Richard L. "Iowa's Course in Homicide Investigation," Police Chief News. Vol. XVI, no. 12, Dec. 1949, p. 26.

A descriptive article, promoting the value of specialized courses such as a program at University of Iowa on homicide investigation.

Hoover, J. Edgar. "How Wise is a Crook?" American Magazine. Vol. 116, December 1933, pp. 36-38.

Hoover's demonstration of why criminals will fall prey to well-trained investigators. Mostly examples in detective-story form.

Horan, James D. and Howard Swiggert. The Pinkerton Story. New York: Putnam, 1951.

A factual and descriptive account of the history and activities of the Pinkerton Detective Agency.

Hunt, Morton M. "Private Eye to Industry," Harper. November 1961, pp. 223-27.

A factual review of a private investigation company called Investigations, Inc., of 60 East 42nd in New York City, which caters to investigating crimes within business. Author posits a significant change in American ethics fuels the success of owner/manager Dr. Jasper's business, which uncovered "inside dishonesty" amounting to \$60 million in 1960 and nets him an income of \$2 million annually.

"My Husband is a Detective," American Magazine. Vol. 125, no. 4, April 1938, p. 51+.

Personal account of the stress on a detective's family, with wife ultimately proud of her husband's position.

Inbav, Fred E., Director and the Committee on Criminal Law. "Bar Committee's Polygraph Report," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXVI, no. 2, Feb. 1959, p. 34.

Review of a report which found evidence to conclude: 1) 95% of results of polygraph are due to the capabilities of the operator, and 2) 5% of accuracy of results is due to machine itself. Discussion and precautionary suggestions regarding further use of the polygraph.

Inbav, Fred E. "'Fair Play' in Investigations and Prosecutions," The Police Chief. Vol. XXVII, no. 5, May 1961, pp. 4-5, 30-37.

An editorial discussion of how best to treat the need to both investigative criminal activity, and maintain an ethical system.

Inbav, Fred E. "Popular Misconceptions Regarding Police Interrogations of Criminal Suspects," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXII, no. 9, Sept. 1965.

A rebuttal of some predominant misconceptions regarding interrogations, with author maintaining that the function of policing the police is a matter for the executive and not the judicial branch of government. Author favors improving competence of investigators rather than restricting their manner of interrogation.

"Indoor Detectives," The Police Review. Vol. LX, no. 3087, March 7, 1952.

A report of complaints received by the Oaksey Committee (an organization overseeing police regulations for criminal investigation departments) from "indoor specialists" who argue that they should receive the same pay, opportunities for promotion and recognition as outdoor specialists. No decision has been reached.

"International Exchange of Fingerprints," Police Chief News. Vol. XVIII, no. 9, Sept. 1951, p. 29.

A report on the first international exchange of fingerprints involving 82 countries, including the United States and in cooperation with the F.B.I.

Intovre, Joseph V. (Book review of scientific police investigation by Fred E. Inbav et. al., part of the "Inbav Law Enforcement Series," 1972) in Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science. Vol. 63, no. 4, April 1972.

A summary of the book describing it as pertinent to the officer called upon in court.

The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove. Center for Research on Criminal Justice, Berkeley 1975.

Sections on police surveillance and private security from the standpoint of radical criminologists.

Jackson, Bruce (Junior Fellow, Harvard University). "Exiles from the American Dream: the Junkie and the Cop," The Atlantic Monthly. Vol. 219, no. 1, Jan. 1967.

A report on first-hand experience to emphasize the symbiotic relationship between drug addicts and narcotics detectives. Author addresses article to academics, stressing how control is not always in hands of the law enforcer.

Jackson, Robert. The Crime Detectors. London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1966.

The stories demonstrating the crucial role of pathologists in criminal investigations.

John, Alva. "Profiles. Private Detectives," New Yorker (Series of three articles): July 3, 1943, 19:26-34; July 10, 1943, 19:26-30+; July 17, 1943, 19:26-32.

A detailed journalistic account of Raymond Schindler, a private investigator, who started his own detective agency.

Johnson, David R. "Intercity Criminal Organizations: The Formative Years, 1880-1920," paper presented to the Organization of American Historians, April 1980.

An important paper for understanding the development of detectives in the United States.

Johnson, David R. Policing the Urban Underworld. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1979.

An extremely valuable work in establishing the history of detectives in the U.S. - especially Chapter 2.

Jordan, Kevin Ernest. Ideology and the Coming of Professionalism: American Urban Police in the 1920s and 1930s. Unpublished dissertation, Rutgers University, 1972.

A general history of the police with a focus on changes during the 1920s and 1930s. Relevant to detectives in its discussion of the importance of the F.B.I. and the creation of the popular myths of the "G-Men."

Kakalik, James S., and Wildhorn Sorrel. The Private Police: Security and Danger. Crane Russak, 1977.

Although somewhat outdated, this remains the best description of contemporary private policing.

Kamisar, Yale. Police Interrogation and Confessions. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1980.

An essentially law-oriented discussion of the implications of judicial decisions regarding police interrogation. Table of Cases, Bibliography.

Katz, Howard A. "Narcotics Investigations: Developing and Using Informants," Police Law Quarterly. Vol. VII, no. 3, April 1978.

Admitting the controversies involved in using informants, article outlines the cautions that can be taken to enable investigators to use them effectively. Informants are not a substitute for, but facilitate investigations, particularly narcotic-related. Focus on ethical and legal problems, functions of informers, precautions, and the investigator-informer relationship.

Kay, Forest E., Jr. "Detecting Deceptions During the Criminal Interview," The Police Chief. Vol. XLVI, no. 5, May 1979, pp. 56-57.

A critical evaluation of the validity of polygraph results. Author suggests a familiarity with kinesics (body language) functions as a necessary supplementary tool for the investigator.

Kennedy, John B. "Plainclothesman," Collier's. Vol. 87, Feb. 14, 1931, p. 25+.

A reporter's account of a night tour with a Newark detective. Mostly details of various cases and how they are solved.

Kennedy, J. P. Police Investigative Process. U. S. Department of Justice: LEAA, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. 1971, 67 pages.

A study aimed at determining the procedural steps in police investigations and the amount of time devoted to each step. Focus on identifying areas appropriate for future research.

Kimura, Yoshitaka. "Electronic Fingerprinting," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXI, no. 8, August 1964, pp. 40-44.

A scientific discussion of the use of electronic fingerprinting in criminal investigations.

King, B. Santa Monica Police Department Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test Program Report. Santa Monica Police Department, 1978.

A report on how and why the department's new MCI program works effectively.

Kirk, Paul L. Crime Investigation. 2nd ed., edited by John L. Thornton and Marjorie Doyle. New York: Wiley, 1974.

A basic, professional-level textbook with an emphasis on criminalistics.

Kirk, Paul L. "Progress in Criminal Investigation," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 291, Jan. 1954, pp. 54-67.

Article updating developments in training, criminalistics and forensic science.

Kooken, Don L. "Post War Intelligence Upon Criminal Investigation," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. Vol. XXXV, no. 6, March-April 1945.

A descriptive analysis of the impact of the war on criminal investigators, departments and public opinion. Main focus on the newly developed scrutinizing public attitude toward police infringements on constitutional liberties.

Lane, Roger. Policing the City: Boston, 1822-1885. New York: Atheneum, 1975.

A basic historical work about U. S. policing with relevant material on the problems inherent in the formation of detective units.

Larson, John A. (Ph.D., M.D.). "Psychology in Criminal Investigation," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 145, no. 234, Sept. 1929, pp. 258-268.

A critique of suspect tests in criminal investigation (association tests, hypnosis, drugs, respiratory, blood pressure) as evidence to be used in court.

Lee, Donald, and Floyd A. Bowman. "Criminal Investigation: A Productivity Evaluation Model," The Police Chief. Vol. XLIV, May 1977, no. 5, pp. 54-55.

A model of measurable standards and effective evaluation methods for the criminal investigation process. Prompted by the Rand Corporation study, intent of this model is to place the investigative process in a cost-effective framework. Focusing on classification of cases and standards of performance.

"Legalize Undercover License Plates," Police Chief's Newsletter. Vol. VII, no. 3, March 1940, p. 1.

A report on the legalization of the use of regularly issued license plates by undercover law enforcement officers in California.

Levie, Robert C., and Lou E., Ballard. Writing Effective Reports on Police Investigations. [The Holbrook Press Criminal Justice Series] Boston: Holbrook Press, Allyn & Bacon Inc., 1978, 428 pages.

This book serves as a form of instruction and guidance for investigators, instructors, attorneys and laymen. Contents: 1) Writing the Report; 2) Sample Reports; Appendix A) Some Common Flaws; Appendix B) Writing Reference.

Laurie, P. Scotland Yard. London: Penguin, 1972.

A journalistic description of Scotland Yard, including a chapter on the Criminal Investigation Division. A fairly broad overview. See Chapter Seven.

Lee, Melville. A History of Police in England. Originally printed in 1901, Methven and Company, reprinted 1971 Patterson Smith Publishing Corp., Montclair, New Jersey.

This classic historical work is helpful in understanding the transition from the constable system to the new police in England and the early development of the Criminal Investigation Division in the Metropolitan Police.

Levett, Allan Edward. Centralization of City Police in the Nineteenth Century United States. Unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan, 1975.

Chapter Two, "Entrepreneurial Police," deals with the development of the constable/detective role in the U. S. during the mid-1980s.

Levine, Jerald Elliot. Police, Parties and Politics: The Bureaucratization and Professionalization of the New York City Police, 1870-1917. Unpublished dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971.

Some sections which deal with efforts to reform detectives "avarice" in New York City.

Lipsyte, Robert M. "The Case of the Public Eye," The New York Times Magazine. Feb. 11, 1962, pp. 30, 82, 86.

Through sketches of a NYC detective, the reality of detective life is emphasized focusing on arrests, paperwork, private life, informers and the type of working involved in investigating.

Lively, Richard E. "Developing Proactive Investigative Programming Within Law Enforcement Agencies," The Police Chief. Vol. XLVI, no. 5, May 1979, pp. 44-45.

Author's conception of a realistic, cautious method for proactive investigative techniques. Research based on observations of a small police department in Michigan. Bibliography.

Louwage, F. E. "Police Methods," International Criminal Police Review. No. 88, pp. 137-138, May 1955.

In response to public criticism of police methods, such as cruel interrogations, brutality, etc., author outlines necessary police attitudes.

Mabie, Janet. "J. Edgar Hoover: Crime's Nemesis," Christian Science Monitor, Weekly Magazine. July 29, 1936, p. 3.

A favorable report of Hoover and the FBI, concurring with the popular belief that Hoover is responsible for the success of the organization. Hoover is characterized as both humanitarian and merciless. The FBI is sketched as an anomalous bureaucracy since promotion is strictly "meritocratic."

MacDonald, John and Dan Brinnan. "The Investigation of Robbery," The Police Chief. Vol. XLI, no. 1, Jan. 1974, pp. 68-75.

A descriptive examination of the detective's personal role in investigating robbery.

MacMurray, R. S. "Use of Sedatives in Lie Detection," The Police Chief. Vol. XXIII, no. 4, April 1956, pp. 24-25.

A case study, promoting the use and experimentation of sedatives in lie detection for criminal investigations.

Manning, Peter K. The Narc's Game. Organizational and Informational Limits on Drug Law Enforcement. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1980.

An excellent observational study which, like Wilson's The Investigators (See Citation), sheds much light on the investigative process and its administration.

Mark, Sir Robert. In the Office of Constable. London: Collins, 1978.

Sir Robert Mark's account of his administration with interesting accounts of his struggles to get control of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID). Should be read with Murphy's Commissioner (See Citation).

Markle, Arnold. Criminal Investigation and Presentation of Evidence. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1976.

A book designed to demonstrate to police how and why they must be students of law in order to effectively investigate cases and have them presented in court. Largest sections are devoted to the law relating to confessions and relating to evidence, with specific references to cases. A Table of Cases is indexed.

Martin, Pete. "The Private Life of a Private Detective," Saturday Evening Post. Vol. 219, August 24, 1946, pages 22-23, 78.

Based on an interview with private detective Benjamin Kerin, article contrasts the work of the actual private detective and that of the fiction or celluloid investigator. A personal, factual, and revealing account.

Matheson, Duncan (Captain of Detectives, San Francisco). "The Technique of the American Detective," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. CXLV, no. 234, Sept. 1929, pp. 214-218.

A critique of the uniquely clever, self-styled American detective. Article claims that common sense and business methods applied to police work are sufficient requisites for an effective department.

McKee, Roger A. "The Polygraph and the Police," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXVIII, no. 2, Feb. 1971, pp. 52-54.

This article updates the court's stance on whether or not policemen have the right to refuse an order to take a polygraph test. Based on G. Roux vs. Louisiana Court of Appeal, where a policeman suspected of a murder was asked to take a polygraph test.

McLevy, James. The Casebook of a Victorian Detective. George Scott - Moncrieff, ed. Edinburgh: Canongate, 1975.
Memoirs of a famous detective.

McWatters, George S. Knots Untied: Ways and By-Ways in the Hidden Life of American Detectives. Hartford: J. B. Burr and Hyde, 1871.
Exploits of early detectives.

Meehane, Thomas. "The Case of the Private Eye," The New York Times Magazine. Sept. 15, 1959, p. 34+.

A thorough characterization of various types of private investigators focusing on their qualifications, and statistics concerning salaries, personnel, and type of work. New law restricting the private investigator (requiring all private detectives to be licensed and not carry a badge) is seen as a hinderance to their effectiveness.

"The Methods of a Real Detective," Literary Digest. Vol. 45, October 26, 1912, pp. 746-748.

An editorial comment, agreeing with novelist, Arthur Train, that there exists a great discrepancy between colorful, romantic detectives of fiction and practical, actual detectives. Illustrated with a story from Dr. Train's book, emphasizing the qualities of "real" detective work.

Miller, Daniel R. "Undercover Fencing: Big City Technique with Small Town Possibilities," The Police Chief. Vol. XLVI, no. 7, pp. 52-53, July 1979.
A patrolman's analysis of how sting operatins can be employed in small police departments.

Miller, S. I. "A Model Detective Training Program" (Published also in The Australian Police Journal), International Criminal Police Review [Official publication of the International Criminal Police Organization]. No. 281, October 1974, pp. 210-219.
A detailed outline of basic education and training of a criminal investigator, with criminal investigation defined as "a search for the truth, in the interests of justice and in accordance with the specifications of the law."

Miller, Wilbur R. Cops and Bobbies. Police Authority in New York and London, 1830-1870. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973, 1977.

A valuable comparison of early XXXXXXXX of policing in New York and London with materials relevant to illustrating early detective work and units.

Monaglian, George P. (Commissioner NYPD). "The Narcotics Investigation," The Police Chief. Vol. XX, no. 1, pp. 10-14, January 1953.

A guide for narcotics investigators, stressing the function of knowing about the narcotic world.

Monroe, Keith. "California's Dedicated Detective," Harper's Magazine. Vol. 214, June 1957, pp. 57-59.

A descriptive account of why chief investigator for the Public Defender, Bliss, investigates and protects the accused.

Morn, Frank Thomas. "Allan Pinkerton Private Police Influence on Police," in Pioneers in Policing. Philip John Stead, ed., Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1977.

A brief article on Pinkerton with fairly generalized comments on his impact on American police.

Morn, Frank. The Eye that Never Sleeps: A History of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, 1850-1920. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1975.

One of the better hisories of the Pinkerton agency.

Morish, Reginald. The Police and Crime Detection Today. London: Oxford University Press, 1955.

A non-scientific general discourse on the functions of a detective. A quite basic, common-sense guide, yet historically illustrative.

Murphy, Barbara G. [Book review of the Criminal Investigation Process sponsored by the Rand Commission] Law Library Journal. Vol. 71, no. 2, 1978, pp. 375-376.

A brief review, intended for law libraries, concluding that the book is readable, despite numerous but helpful tables of statistics, and provides an ample bibliography. Recommends book to libraries serving police science.

Murphy, Patrick V. Commissioner, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1977.

An interesting account of the "politics" of law enforcement, with an especially interesting, albeit acerbic, view of detectives and detective units. In respect to detectives, should be read in tandem with Sir Robert Mark's In the Constable's Office (See Citation).

Murphy, Patrick V. "John Edgar Hoover; the Federal Influence in American Policing," in Phillip John Stead, ed. Pioneers in Policing. Montclair, N. J.: Patterson Smith, 1977, pp. 262-279.

An account of Hoover's impact on American policing with suggestions of the importance of Hoover's reform efforts on a federal level for the improved image of all detectives.

Murray, John Wilson. Memoirs of a Great Detective. Incidents in the Life of John Wilson Murray. Victor Speer, ed. New York: The Baker & Taylor Co., 1904, 1905.

Self explanatory title.

Nash, Edwin W., and Oscar I. Tosi, Ph.D. "Identification of Suspects by the Voiceprint Technique," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXVIII, no. 12, December 1971, pp. 49-51.

An editorial comment, based on selected university studies and experiments, promoting the use of voiceprint technique of speaker identification as a reliable tool in the crime lab.

Neely, John. "Investigating Violations of the Social Security Act," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXII, no. 6, June 1965. pp. 55-58.

A cost-benefit defense of investigating Social Security Act violations.

Nnadi Noh, Harford I. (Ph.D.). The Investigatory and Pre-Trial Phase in English and American Law: A Comparative Study. [Dissertation, Ph.D.] New School for Social Research, 1975.

An inquiry into the investigatory and pre-trial phase of criminal justice systems in England and the U. S., with the purpose of drawing a comparable evaluation. Data were collected through relevant literature, employment of case-study technique, direct courtroom observation of the handling of this phase in both countries, and through interviewing law enforcement officials in England and the U. S.

"No Badges for Private Detectives," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXVI, no. 11, November 1959, p. 27.

A report on legislation enacted in New York in March 1959, prohibiting private detectives in the state from wearing badges or using the title "detective."

Nolan, J. T. "Managing the Police Demand," The Police Chief. Vol. 45, no. 2, Feb. 1978, pp. 70-74.

A management plan responding to the demand for efficient allocation of police services and increased productivity. Emphasis on utilization of communication networks, screening of complaints and distribution of cases.

O'Brien, Thomas M. [Book review of: Blye, Private Eye: The Real World of the Private Detective, by Nicholas Pilegg; Playboy Press, 747 3rd Ave., New York, 218 pages, \$10.] Trial Magazine. Vol. 13, no. 5, May 1977.

The book review characterizes the work as a revealing explanation, ideal for lawyers of the processes of detective work and what facets of investigation do not require detectives. The book characterizes detective work as relatively uninteresting and contrasts this with the picturesque image of detectives. Includes informational aids for lawyers and investigative journalists.

Oldham, Charles C. "Police Forum: Subject - The Polygraph," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXVIII, no. 8, August 1961. p. 14.

A highly negative response to a May 1961 Police Chief article by the American Academy of Polygraph Examiners, which promoted the use of the machine in criminal investigation and screening employees.

Osterburg, James [Book Review of: An Introduction to Modern Criminal Investigation, by S. S. Krishan, Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1978, 380 pages.] Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 8, no. 1, 1980.

Book is critiqued as an unbalanced treatment of criminal investigation under the pretense of a comprehensive textbook on criminal investigation, with legal issues neglected and physical evidence overemphasized.

Osterburg, James [Review of: Detective Work: A Study of Criminal Investigations, by William B. Sanders, The Free Press, New York, 1977.] Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 6, no. 4, Winter 1978, pp. 364-366.

Reviewer evaluates the piece as the best current writing on criminal investigation and measures it in direct and favorable contrast to the Rand Corporation's study on the criminal investigation process.

Osterburg, James W. "Selection of Criminal Investigators in Law Enforcement Agencies," The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science. Vol. 53, no. 2, June 1962.

A research report discussing various aspects, including training, evaluation, and a general job description of current practices in the selection of criminal investigators. Data is based on a questionnaire sent to 50 states and 5 federal agencies. Bibliography.

O'Toole, George. The Private Sector: Private Spies, Rent-a-Cops, and the Police-Industrial Complex. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978.

An analysis by a non-police related, non-academic author, based on personal and statistical research of the function, activities, and political connections of private police and detectives.

"Our Detectives," The Police Review and Parade Gossip. Feb. 12, 1897, p. 75.

An argument against the public attitude which praises the criminal investigator for solving cases. Citing "the Railway Mystery," uniform officer is argued, in fact to function as the most fundamental link in solving a criminal investigation.

"The Passing of the Detective," Living Age. Vol. 248, Feb. 17, 1906, pages 437-439.

The thesis of this academic essay is that the detective in literature is passing into decay. He enjoyed great popularity because of an image of trained intuition, but specialization and new methods have overtaken that image, leaving it behind the times.

Paul, Forest S., Jr. "A Dollar Evaluation of the Polygraph," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXI, no. 8, August 1964, pp. 45-46.

A highly favorable evaluation of the use and benefits of the polygraphy in criminal investigations. No discussion of legal and moral aspects of machine's use.

Parker, W. H. "Surveillance by Wiretap or Dictograph: Threat or Protection? A Police Chief's Opinion," The Police Chief. Vol. XXIII, no. 3, March 1956, p. 16.

A defense of the use of wiretapping and other surveillance techniques in criminal investigations. An optimistic view of the public, government, and police themselves as regulators of abuse.

Pennekamp, J. D. "Edgar Hoover and the Press," [A reply to the Aug. 13, Collier's article, "Death in Headlines" by Quentin Reynolds] Newsweek. Vol. 12, August 22, 1938, p. 29.

An editorial response, by the editor of the Miami Herald severely critiquing Hoover's contentions that reporters' forays and premature publication of leads hampers the FBI and endangers the lives of victims.

Pincomb, Ronald. [Book Review of: Criminal Investigations: Basic Perspectives, by Paul B. Weston and Kenneth M. Wells, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970, Ppxi, 291, \$9.95] The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science. Vol. 62, no. 1, March 1971.

Review makes a brief but favorable summary and evaluates the piece as a good learning book, as it provides provocative discussions and exercises throughout.

Post, Richard S. "A Study of State Requirements for Investigating," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXVI, no. 7, July 1969, pp. 31-32.

A research project surveying all 50 states to determine if private security personnel are controlled, the respective license fees for each type of officer, and other license requirements and personal qualifications.

Price, Barbara Raffel, Ph.D. The Rhetoric of Professionalism: A Comparative Study of Police in Three Historical Periods. [Ph.D. dissertation] The Pennsylvania State University, 1974.

A study of the use of the rhetoric of professionalism by police in the U. S. in defense of their occupation while under attack from critics. A conceptual model reveals the form of police rhetoric moving sequentially from concerns of basic social and economic interests to concerns about techniques for improving performance and then to concerns about the importance of the occupation in the larger society.

"Priorities in Crime Detection," The Police Review. Vol. LXXI, no. 3683, August 16, 1963.

An editorial comment citing the less than one in three detection of offenders rate as a signal to alter priorities in detective forces. New priorities should establish offenses against people as most important.

Pringle, Patrick. Hue and Cry. London: William Morrow and Co., 1955.
A story of Henry and John Fielding and their Bow Street Runners. Historically illustrative.

"Public Private Eye," Time Magazine, 89:91, April 7, 1967.

A brief journal article on current practices in private security.

"The Reality Behind Detective Fiction," Literary Digest. Vol. 91, October 16, 1926, pp. 62-64.

A brief, analytic article concerning the writings of Algernon Blackwood, English writer of psychological fiction, who has also discussed recent literature on detective methods used in several European countries, and maintains that both in reality and fiction each country's investigative method is a product of its psychology.

Richard, Maximilian Ivan. The Origins of Urban Police: Freedom and Order in Antebellum St. Louis. Unpublished dissertation, Washington University, 1975.

An unusually detailed account of the transition from constables to police. Since this transition and its implications for detective policing are not well understood in the literature, this is an important work.

Reisner, Martin. "Hypnosis as a Tool in Criminal Investigation," The Police Chief. Vol. XLII, no 2, November 1976, pp. 36-40.

Case studies, supporting the use of hypnosis in criminal investigations. Bibliography.

Reith, Charles. The Police Idea: Its History and Evolution in England in the 18th Century and After. London: Oxford University Press, 1938.

A detailed history of 18th century crime problems and the development of law enforcement forces in England.

Repetto, Thomas A. The Blue Parade. New York: The Free Press, 1978.

An interesting work with information on the history of detectives scattered throughout the book. Chapter 8, "The Secret Agents," is especially important in understanding the history of federal and private investigators.

Repetto, T. "The Detective Task, State of the Art, Science, Craft?" in Police Studies, Vol. L, NO. 3, September 1978, pp. 5-10.

Review of studies of detectives which concludes that most studies, so far, are management studies asking limited questions.

Repetto, Thomas A. "The Uneasy Milieu of the Detective," in Arthur Niederhoffer and Abraham S. Blumberg, eds. The Ambivalent Force: Perspective on the Police. 2nd ed., Hinsdale, IL.: Dryden Press, pp. 130-136.

An assessment of the current role and functioning of detectives.

Reynolds, Quentin. "Death in Headlines," Collier's. Vol. 102, August 13, 1938, pp. 9-11.

Based on an interview with J. Edgar Hoover and illustrated with the kidnapping case of Charles Mattson, this article asks for restraint on the part of the press in covering cases under investigation.

Rhodes, Henry T. F. Clues and Crime: The Science of Criminal Investigation. London: J. Murray, 1933.

A professional's guide to scientific crime detection, focusing on history, reconstruction of crime, and criminalistics.

Rich, Edwin Gile. Vidocq. The Riverside Press, Cambridge, MA, 1935.

An updated version of Vidocq's memoirs. Vidocq is generally considered to be the world's first detective and was the originator of the French Surete. Vidocq, a reformed criminal espoused the idea that to detect crime one had to have been a criminal.

Richardson, James F. The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

One of the basic histories of U. S. police, with material on early detectives.

Richardsn, James. F. Urban Police in the United States. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1974.

A basic historical text about the police, however only limited material on detectives.

Richards, Peter R. "The Feasibility Study: A Rational Method of Choice in Selecting Organized Crime Investigations," The Police Chief. Vol. XLIV, no. 9, pp. 24-26, Sept. 1977.

A theoretical "feasibility study" aimed at selecting the most productive cases and methods in investigative alternatives, and, therefore, maximizing the commitment of resources to investigations which ultimately prove to be unproductive.

Ridgeway, James. "Spying for Industry," New Republic, 154:10-11, May 14, 1966.

Journalistic account of "new" private security.

Riedd, A. E. "Scientific Detection," Police Chiefs' Newsletter. Vol. XIX, no. 10, October 1952, pp. 37-39.

A discussion of psychological tests, narco-analysis, and lie detector machines as tools in criminal investigations, attributing the success of all scientific detection methods on examiner's skill.

Rothenberg, David. [Book review of J. Q. Wilson's The Investigators, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978, 228 pages] Crime and Delinquency. Vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 115-117, Feb. 1979.

A highly critical review, claiming the focus of the book is too specific to be pertinent to anything, the analyses lack hard facts advice and in-depth discussion, writing is arid and stylistically unclear, and conclusions are simplistic and superficial.

Sanders, William B. Detective Work. The Free Press, New York 1977.

One of a very small number of studies into detectives using participant observation methodology. A very important work. Some information on European detectives.

Sanders, William B. "The Methods and Evidence of Detectives and Sociologists," in Sanders, William B., ed. The Sociologist as Detective: An Introduction in Research Methods. New York: Praeger, 1974, pp. 1-18.

An introductory essay to this edited collection of essays, explaining the similarities between detectives and sociologists in terms of theory, evidence, problems of research, reliability-ethics and analyses. Useful bibliography.

Sanders, William B. The Sociologist as Detective. Praeger, N.Y. 1976.

An extremely interesting book on social science methodology which compares detectives and social science methods. Of special interest are "Introduction" (pp. 1-21) and Chapter 8 (Sanders, William B., and Howard C. Daudistel, pp. 186-203).

Schwartz, William J. "Fairness in Criminal Investigations Under the Federal False Statement Statute," Columbia Law Review. Vol. 77, 1977, pp. 316-331.

A comprehensive examination of rationale employed by lower courts to circumvent the Federal False Statement Statute (18 U.S.C. 1001) in cases involving statements made to criminal investigators and a suggested standard by which the courts can accomodate their concern with fairness.

Seedman, Albert A., and Peter Hellman. Chief. Avon Books, New York, 1974.

The "war stories" of a detective administrator. Typical of the "genre."

Shaneley, John B. "Objectives of the Police Intelligence Unit," The Police Chief. Vol. XXXI, no. 5, May 1964, pp. 10-11, 50.

A very general study of objectives of investigative squads concerned with organized crime.

Sherman Detective Agency. Industry, Society, and the Human Element: A Few True Detective Stories that are Interesting and Instructive. Boston, Mass: Sherman Detective Agency, Inc., 1917.

Accounts of various investigators, explaining and promoting this private agency's step-by-step technique. Historically valuable, revealing an attitude of certainty toward the results of investigation.

Silbcoman, Charles E. Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice. Random House, New York, 1978.

A competent "pop" review of police literature with some material on detectives.

Simpson, Anthony E. "Criminal Investigation: A Selective Review of the Literature." Unpublished paper of the Criminal Justice Center, John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the Forensic Sciences Foundation, 1976.

A well done summary of the literature with a very good bibliography. While recent historical, observational and administrative studies of detectives have dated this piece somewhat, it is an interesting and worthwhile starting point.

Simpson, Anthony E. "The Detective as Law Enforcer: An Historical Approach to the Development of the Urban Police Function," a paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Philadelphia, PA., November 1979.

A very good provocative "think piece" using the history of detectives to make certain theoretical points.

Skolnick, Jerome H. Justice Without Trial. 2nd ed. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1975.

One of the classics in police literature with important material on investigations, informants, making cases, etc.

Soderman, Harry, and John J. O'Connell. Modern Criminal Investigation. New York & London: Funk and Wagnalls, Co., 1935.

A textbook/handbook designed for the investigator and lawyer, on all aspects of the criminal investigation. First chapter traces the history of criminal investigation and police science. Bibliography.

Souchon, Henri. "Alphonse Bertillon Criminalistics," in Pioneers in Policing. Philip John Stead, ed., Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1977.

A history and description of the first scientifically based identification system developed by Bertillon.

The Southwestern Law Enforcement Institute, Dallas, Texas. Institute on Criminal Investigation. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1962, 132 pages.

Textbook of independently written articles on all aspects of the investigative process.

Stead, P. J. Pioneers in Policing. Montclair, N.J., Patterson Smith, 1977.

A collection of essays by several authors about significant contributors to the development of modern policing. Includes chapters on Patrick Colquhoun; Peel, Rowan, and Mayne; Allan Pinkerton; Hans Gross; the Fingerprinters; J. Edgar Hoover; and other contributors to professional policing.

Stead, Philip John. The Police of Paris. Staples Press, Hamlet, London, 1957.

A valuable book, unfortunately out of print, for understanding the traditions of French police, with the emphasis on intervention and surveillance, and the Anglo-American response to such traditions.

Steer, David. Uncovering Crime: The Police Role. Research study, No. 7, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, H.M.S.O. London, 1980.

A soon to be published study which systematically shows how offenses come to be known to the police, how they are defined, and how they are investigated. The important role of the public in crime solution is again emphasized.

Steeves, Harrison, R. "A Sober Word on the Detective Story," Harper. Vol. 182, April 1941, pp. 485-494.

An academic discourse on the relatively superficial nature of detective stories and the tenuous future for their survival. Author praises detective fiction in good form, yet argues it is rare and treats the genre as a narcotic. Excessive decoration and flippancy signal the genre's decline.

Stenning, Philip, and Clifford Shearing. "Private Security and Private Justice," British Journal of Law and Society. Vol. 6, no. 2, 1979, pp. 261-271.

A discussion of "The Private Security Industry: A Discussion Paper (1979; H.M.S.O. Home Office) which emphasizes the need to deal with issues such as privacy, civil rights, control of private police, etc.

Stewart, James K. "A Management Plan: Effective Criminal Investigation," The Police Chief. August 1980, pp. 71-78.

A management plan designed to increase investigator effectiveness. Based on the premise that proper management is essential to this goal, author suggests a clarification of goals and objectives, re-defining investigative competence, case classification and allocation, screening criteria, maintaining information systems, evaluating investigator performance on cases and in divisions, establishing systems of reinforcement, recognition and reward, and improving the work environment.

Storch, R. D. "Crime and Justice in 19th Century England," in History Today. Vol. 30, Sept. 1980, pp. 32-37.

Although there is little directly relevant to detectives, a valuable brief article, discussing the historical context in which "detective policing" grew up alongside of "preventive policing."

Stratton, John G. "Police Stress and the Criminal Investigator," The Police Chief. Vol. XLVI, Feb. 1979, no. 2, pp. 22-26.

A theoretical examination of several stresses particularly applicable to the criminal investigator. Author suggests practical attitudes and actions for investigative superiors, and methods of organizational response.

Summerson, H. R. T. "The Structure of Law Enforcement in 13th Century England," The American Journal of Legal History. 23:313-327, 1979.

An important historical work for understanding the XXXXXX between early law enforcement and the later development of detectives.

Surface, Bill. "Keen Private Eye," New York Times Magazine.
Dec. 11, 1966.

Journalistic accounts of the exploits of the private "eye" who investigated Ralph Nader for General Motors.

Thorwald, Jurgen. The Century of the Detective. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964.

A popular history, perhaps more appropriately titled "The Century of the Forensic Scientist." Introductions to many chapters do have interesting historical materials about detectives.

Tiffany, Lawrence P., et. al. Detection of Crime. Frank Remington, ed., Boston: Little Brown, 1967. 286 pages.

A general examination of police practices in the detection of crime with emphasis on the detection of victimless crimes, notably vice crimes. Part I - Stopping and Questioning, Part II - Search and Seizure, Part III - Encouragement and Entrapment.

Train, Arthur. "Detectives and Detective Work," Collier's. Vol. 47, no. 8, August 5, 1911, pp. 22-26.

An extensive, descriptive essay on detectives' personality, work and on public opinion concerning criminal investigators. Definitions of detective work, rebuttals of misconceptions, and descriptions of a detective's ideal qualities make the essay a revealing historical work.

Train, Arthur. "The Private Detective's Work," Collier's. Vol. 48, no. 9, Nov. 18, 1911, p. 377.

Information on private detectives for the consumer. Issues discussed: when private detectives are used, alternatives to a detective, the meaning of fees.

Turner, William W. Case Investigation, Part I. Rochester, N.Y.: Bancroft-Whitney, Co., Aqueduct, Books, 1965, pp. lx, 283, \$9.50.

An informative guide for law enforcement personnel, mainly concerned with identification, investigation and effective court presentation of crimes.

Turner, Ralph, F. [Review of The Criminal Investigation Process by Greenwood et. al., Rand Corporation] The Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 6, no. 3, Fall 1978, pp. 270-272.

A generally unfavorable review of the Rand study, maintaining that although data describing how criminal investigators spend their time is impressive and useful, relevant literature is not well-researched, definitions are unclear, and historical perspectives are neglected. Author recommends departments use caution in treating the study as an impetus for restructuring detective divisions.

Turner, Ralph F. "Hans Gross: The Model of the Detective," in Pioneers in Policing. Philip John Stead, ed., Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1977.

A brief account of one of the early forensic scientists and an assesment of his input on detectives.

Ungar, Sanford J. FBI: An Uncensored Look Behind the Walls. Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1975.

A good look at the FBI organization and its people, with an emphasis on its history and development.

"U. S. Supreme Court Bans Indirect Use of Wiretapping Evidence in Federal Trials," Police Chiefs' Newsletter. Vol. VII, no. 1, Jan. 1940, p. 1.

A report on the December 11, 1939 Supreme Court decision which ruled that the use of evidence obtained by either interstate or intrastate wiretapping, in federal criminal trials is illegal.

Vaughn, John J. "Major Crime Investigation Team," The Police Chief. Vol. XLVI, no. 5, May 1979, pp. 30-31.

A simple, general article, demonstrating how a small police department established team investigation to more effectively and efficiently clear cases.

Walker, Samuel. A Critical History of Police Reform. D. C. Heath & Co. Lexington, MA and Toronto, 1977.

Although a generalized history of police, Chapters 1 and 6 have materials relevant to the emergence of detectives and the FBI.

Ward, Richard. "Series of Articles," Law Enforcement News. Vol. I, no. 2 - Vol. II, no. 9, Oct. 1975 - Sept. 1976.

A series of ten articles applying modern administrative theory to contemporary investigative practices.

Ward, Richard H. "Viewpoint: Defending Detectives," Police Magazine. May 1978, p. 55.

A XXXX that current criticism of detectives should not be allowed to overshadow their contributions.

Ward, Richard, and Richard Natoli. "A Systems Analysis of the San Francisco Police Department Bureau of Inspectors." Unpublished paper, Dec. 1969.

An interesting "early paper" which anticipates many of the later studies on investigator effectiveness.

Ward, Richard, and Carl Wedeman. "Comparative Crime Statistics and Clearance Rates: A Methodological Study." Unpublished and undated paper. John Jay College of Criminal Justice.

An empirical examination of the usefulness of clearance rates as a measure of investigative effectiveness.

"We Never Sleep," Newsweek. 58:64-5, July 31, 1961.
Contemporary practices in private security.

Weiss, Robert. "The Emergence and Transformation of Private Detective Industrial Policing in the United States, 1850-1940," Crime and Social Justice. Spring-Summer 1978, pp. 35-48.
An interesting historical account of the role private police played in labor disputes.

Westley, William A. Violence and the Police. MIT Press, Cambridge and London, 1970.

A classic work with a valuable descriptive section on detectives and detective units. Pages 36-43 are basic, but most of the other materials are relevant for understanding detective and police operations.

Wilkes, Paul. "Matter Investigated Pending Further Developments. Case Closed," New York Times Magazine. April 19, 1970.

A journalistic account of the administrative problems which keep detectives from "doing their job."

Weston, Paul B., and Kenneth M. Wells. Criminal Investigation. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1974, 462 pages. Index. Bibliography.

A college-level textbook on many facets of investigation, with an overriding theme of the legal significance of evidence.

Williams, Alan. The Police of Paris, 1718-1789. Louisiana State University Press, 1979.

A detailed history of the police of Paris including extensive information about detectives, spies, and informers.

Williams, Valentine. "The Detective in Fiction," Fortnightly Review. Vol. 134, Sept. 1930, pp. 381-392.

An academic discussion of the present popularity of detective fiction with references to Doyle, Dupin, Poe and Vidocq. An attempt to define the genre reveals the scope of writers and readers who involve themselves with the detective novel.

Willmer, M. A. P. "Criminal Investigation from the Small Town to the Large Urban XXXXXXXXXXXX," British Journal of Criminology. Vol. 8, pp. 259-274, 1968.

Wilson, James Q. The Investigators: Managing FBI and Narcotics Agents. New York: Basic Books, 1978.

A detailed description of the investigative process and its administration in the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Agency. Although its relevance for local police investigators has to be deduced, it is an excellent model for similar studies in local law enforcement.

Winks, Robin W., ed. The Historian as Detective: Essays on Evidence. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

An enlightening collection of well-written essays concerning the similarities between historians and detectives. Focus on the development of fundamental practices in historiography and criminal investigation.

Woods, Joseph Gerald. The Progressives and the Police: Urban Reform and the Professionalization of the Los Angeles Police Department. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1973.

A fascinating account of the history of the Los Angeles Police Department with a great deal of material relevant to detectives.

Wycoff, M. and G. Kelling. The Dallas Experience. Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation, 1978.

An account of the problems of organizational reform and the important role the detective unit has in undermining the reform.

Younger, Evelle J. "Scientific Progress: Investigative Services Branch, California Department of Justice," The Police Chief. Vol. XLII, no. 12, Dec. 1976, pp. 56-57.

A detailed explanation of origin, development, and present effectiveness of the general investigative services laboratories in California.

END