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VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS

An Anthology

and Causes	Theories and Trends
Responses	Intervention Models
	Practical Issues

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Edited by Robert J. Martin

Paul DeMeo
Richard S. Wilson

U.S. Department of Justice
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**VIOLENT
JUVENILE
OFFENDERS**

An Anthology

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OFFENDERS**

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Edited by:

Robert A. Mathias

Paul DeMuro

Richard S. Allinson

Violent Juvenile Offenders, An Anthology

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
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FOREWORD

By Alfred S. Regnery
Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Justice Department

The Violent Juvenile Offender (VJO) Program is but one phase of a multi-pronged attack by my office on the problem of serious youth crime. This attack is concentrated on the small group of chronic offenders who commit most of these crimes.

What we are seeking from the VJO Program are answers. Answers to questions that have long plagued the juvenile justice system. Questions such as: Who are these juveniles that commit crimes of violence? Why do they commit these crimes? and What can we do to stop them and prevent new generations of offenders from taking their place? Other issues too demand inquiry. Issues such as the relative merits of punishment and rehabilitation, alternative correctional settings, and the effectiveness of private sector programs vis-a-vis traditional institutional programming.

Conceptually and programmatically, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has moved well beyond the status offender issues that were targeted for action in the mid-seventies; now our focus is fixed firmly on violent crime. By carefully testing programs to deal with juveniles committing those crimes, we should be able to answer some of those perennial questions about youthful offenders and shed new light on the controversial issues involving program modalities. This will permit decisions regarding the future course of juvenile justice to be made on a rational basis, i.e., what works best in dealing with violent offenders so that when they are returned to their communities they will function as law-abiding citizens.

This anthology is one of the early fruits of the VJO Program and contains some of the answers we are seeking. Every day we get more information about the how and the why of juvenile crime. Down the road, we feel that this program and the others being supported by OJJDP will provide better answers about the most effective ways to deal with violent offenders in order to ensure the tranquillity of society to which we are all entitled.

INTRODUCTION

In a real sense, violence is senseless; a truly violent act numbs the brain and defies logical explanation. Recall our response to the assassinations of President Kennedy, Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy 20 years ago, or our sense of outrage in the autumn of 1983 when over 200 United States Marines were murdered while they slept by a terrorist attack in Lebanon.

It is difficult for us to understand or come to terms with a single act of violence. We like to think of ourselves and our actions as being ruled by law, by a sense of reasonableness and fairness. A single violent act, therefore, not only threatens our individual safety, it also undermines our collective trust in the ability of our traditional public institutions to protect us and to sustain a society ruled by law.

Violence committed by young people is particularly troublesome. Granted that a victim of murder is no more or less dead if he is killed by a bullet from a 13-year-old's Saturday-night special, or from a 33-year-old, hardened, armed robber's weapon. But in the case of the 13-year-old, we wonder how such an act can be done by one so young. Some would argue that we are dealing with a new breed of delinquent — a teenage monster who is beyond the control of our traditional system of law enforcement.

In the late 1970's the real and perceived problems implicit in the juvenile justice system's handling of violent juvenile offenders, and the public debate about the number of such offenders, caused a number of states to follow New York's lead and begin to rely increasingly on the adult system of justice (i.e. criminal court and adult corrections) to control juvenile crime. This trend, coupled with the popularized version of Martinson's finding that "nothing works" — that, in the main, our efforts at rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system have been a failure — began to erode the public's confidence in our juvenile justice system.

In January of 1980, the Federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) began planning a national research and development effort aimed at testing an intervention strategy to handle violent juvenile of-

fenders within the juvenile justice system. Although many of the essays in this anthology describe the work of the Violent Juvenile Offender Program (VJO), this volume does not contain the final results of the research evaluating that effort. That research will not be concluded for a number of years.

Anthologies by their very nature tend to be incomplete and uneven. Perhaps more than others, this anthology reflects these traits because of the wide range of topics covered, the different orientations of the contributors, and space limitations. The book is organized into four sections and an epilogue. We begin with the more general and theoretical issues — such as trends, definitions and theories about violent offenders — and then examine the responses of various societal institutions — such as the juvenile justice, corrections and mental health systems — to the problem. Next, we detail some common elements found in intervention models and programs for treatment of the violent juvenile offender, and describe several such models.

Finally, we move on to the practical issues involved in the day-to-day operation of programs for violent juvenile offenders. We feel this section is somewhat unique to anthologies of this nature because the articles were written by practitioners who actually work in programs with violent juveniles. The articles explore the philosophies and techniques these practitioners use in daily interaction with violent juveniles. In order to make this section as useful as possible, we have tried to keep these articles concrete and practical, and most of the authors have interlaced their narratives with actual examples and case histories from their experience to illustrate their points. We feel that this section will be valuable to those who want to get a clearer idea of what it is really like to work effectively with violent juvenile offenders.

Part One, *The Extent and Causes of Violent Juvenile Crime*, begins with a detailed examination and analysis of recent national trends (Chapter 1) indicating that serious juvenile crime seems to have peaked in the mid-70's, and that the current spate of punitive legislation may well be a response to a perceived crisis that, in fact, no longer exists.

Along with the issue of the number of violent crimes committed by young people, the question of exactly what constitutes a "violent juvenile offender" has critical implications for policymakers at all levels of government who must respond to the problem. Chapter 2 attempts to answer the question by examining a number of possible definitions and positing an acceptable, comprehensive one that can be used as a basis for discussion and policy formulation. The definition arrived at was ultimately adopted by OJJDP's VJO Program.

In Chapter 3, we summarize and critically examine a range of theories about the origins of delinquency and violence. This process was used in developing the model that is currently being tested by the VJO Program. The model itself is described fully in Chapter 11, which details structural

elements, treatment approaches, and issues involved in implementation.

A further exploration of the medical and sociological factors associated with violence is provided by Chapter 4. The chapter indicates that neurological impairment and family violence and criminality weigh heavily in violence in very young children. Conceivably, the findings could be extrapolated to adolescents who become violent juvenile offenders.

A partial answer to the question of just who are those violent juveniles is provided in Chapter 5, which draws on extensive data gathered by researchers from the URSA Institute on both experimental and control youths taking part in the VJO Program. The empirical portrait painted by this data indicates that violent juvenile offenders share a significant base of similar experiences, circumstances and attitudes that bear important implications for policies to both prevent and treat violent crime.

Part Two, *System Responses to Violent Juvenile Crime*, explores several responses to the problem of violent juvenile crime by society's various institutions. Thus Chapter 6 examines juvenile justice system processing of violent offenders by presenting and discussing data compiled in five urban jurisdictions in connection with the VJO Program. Among the data that are presented in detail are actions taken on instant offense, prior offense histories, processing time, and the major factors that lead to the attrition of violent juveniles from the juvenile justice system.

In addition to the problem of attrition because of system processing, there is a marked trend toward the increasing reliance on adult sanctions for violent delinquents. As we have already noted, this trend toward waivers of juveniles out of the juvenile justice system to criminal court and adult corrections came to prominence with New York's Violent Offender Law in the mid-1970's. With many states now resorting to this method for dealing with violent juveniles, this is a topic that deserves more extensive treatment than we have been able to afford it in this volume. Among the factors that merit further critical examination are: the number of jurisdictions moving to automatic transfers, obviating the need for juvenile court concurrence; lowering the age of eligibility for transfer; granting prosecutors more discretion in the waiver process; and targeting specific offenses or combinations of crimes for automatic transfer. Should these trends continue unchecked, the role of the juvenile justice system in dealing with violent delinquents will continue to diminish. This has important implications for the future course of both the juvenile and adult justice systems.

Moving from the juvenile court to the response of the correctional system to violent juvenile offenders, Chapter 7 uses the Massachusetts experience of the last decade as a case study to make the point that although violent offenders are the smallest portion of the delinquent population, they often "drive" and shape correctional systems' responses and programs for all delinquents generally.

If violent offenders are a small subset of the delinquent population, then the number of mentally ill, violent juveniles might well be infinitesimal.

Yet, such offenders do exist, although in what numbers or to what degree of mental illness is difficult to establish because of the paucity of programs and research efforts in this area. Chapter 8 attempts to define the scope of the problem, examines alternative placements, and summarizes the research in this area. It concludes with a recommendation about what research still needs to be done to ascertain appropriate responses by the mental health and correctional systems to this problem.

Part Three, *Treatment Intervention Models for Violent Juvenile Offenders*, begins with some basic elements that should be considered in developing appropriate alternative placements for violent offenders (Chapter 9).

We then move on to review common elements found in some of those alternative, community-based programs that have been implemented to deal with serious offenders throughout the United States (Chapter 10). Though many of these programs deal with less serious as well as violent offenders, this comprehensive summary of ingredients necessary for operating such programs should prove valuable to those who must design and operate similar programs.

As noted earlier, Chapter 11 discusses fully the VJO Model implemented under the federal program. At this point it is worth noting that although a number of articles in this anthology stem directly from those involved in the VJO Program, the book does not intend to portray the approach of that program, or any other approach, as the only, or "ideal" way to deal effectively with violent youths. Indeed, though the VJO Model is a rigorously derived, comprehensive approach that can be contoured to deal with individual youthful offenders, there are other apparently effective approaches that stress elements that are minimally present, if found at all in that model. There is, for example, the sense of family, immediate and extended, as well as the strong spiritual basis in the operation of the House of Umoja, which is described in Chapter 12.

Part Four, *Practical Issues in Programs for Violent Juvenile Offenders*, embodies the ideas and techniques of practitioners who work with violent juveniles in both VJO and non-VJO programs. It begins with a letter to a newly appointed director of corrections (Chapter 13), which provides detailed advice about exactly how to design and implement a program for violent juvenile offenders. Here, the author opts for a Community Board-Case Management Team Model as the treatment of choice, and illustrates her rationale with two case studies.

The major factors involved in continuous case management with violent offenders are thoroughly explored in Chapter 14, which details the essential functions, central implementation decisions, and the importance of maintaining continuity in programs. A number of practical case management issues are discussed, such as behavioral contracts, and a detailed example of a sample contract is provided.

The critical area of education within programs receives a somewhat unconventional treatment in Chapter 15, which recounts the experiences and

practices of the teacher who heads the educational component of the Memphis VJO project. The role of the educational component within the overall program, and a discussion of how to design a successful, open educational environment, are illustrated with concrete examples from the author's experience.

As we have noted, the VJO Program is not the beginning and end of approaches to violent juvenile offenders. Chapter 16 is the first of three chapters that deal with the practical issues and benefits of working with this population within a therapeutic community. The community under discussion is the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center (CATC) in Denver, and this article details and illustrates the role of group therapy in treating the violent juvenile offender.

Therapy is also the subject of Chapter 17, wherein experience garnered at the VJO's Phoenix project provides the basis for a discussion of "action-oriented" as opposed to more traditional "verbal" therapies. After discussing real-world barriers to successful therapy with violent youths, the article moves on to discuss practical strategies for implementing more cognitive, reality-oriented strategies.

Among the realities of dealing with violent juvenile offenders in any type of program is the necessity for discipline. Chapter 18 (the second of the CATC articles) deals with this topic by providing an illustrative discussion of the distinction between punishment and discipline, the relationship between discipline and other program components, techniques for flexibility and reinforcement, and the critical factor of staff attitudes.

Discipline with a shade of difference is also a topic of Chapter 19, which explores the Robert F. Kennedy School in Massachusetts, i.e. how it came to be, the constituencies which it (and every other similar program) has to satisfy, and the steps that went into designing and developing its "school" model. From this article, it is apparent that a violence-free atmosphere can be established via an overriding ethos that imposes responsibilities on both staff and youths, respects individual rights, and demands equal treatment for and from all program participants.

Chapter 20 starts the process of shifting our focus and that of the youthful offender from the world of the program setting to the real world of the community where he must ultimately function. Among the elements necessary to successful functioning is a well-paying, productive job. Thus, this chapter thoroughly explores practical issues in vocational education by detailing, in blueprint fashion, the techniques of the much-imitated New Pride, Inc. of Denver, Colorado. Program administrators wishing to develop a component that will not only train and educate their charges, but will create viable opportunities for employment in the community should find this chapter invaluable.

One of the most difficult subsets of violent offenders to work with and return successfully to the community is the juvenile sex offender. Chapter 21 provides a rare, intimate look at the CATC's sex-offender program and discusses in detail a comprehensive method for treating the adolescent sex

XX Introduction

offender which has yielded positive results.


With Chapter 22 we come to the final and most critical phase of all programs that deal with institutionalized juveniles, community reintegration. Arguing for a reintegrative orientation in all phases of all programs, this chapter notes that such a focus is possible in a variety of program settings. Important issues in reintegrative programming, such as making appropriate program placements for individual offenders, and maintaining adequate security are discussed.

The *Epilogue* brings us to our final chapter, which provides an overview of the issue of violent juvenile crime, examines some current trends and proposals for dealing with the problem, and proposes some alternative approaches that could possibly be undertaken with profit in programs and research efforts.

In closing, we would like to note that the editors of this book have not tried to "edit out" theories, beliefs, or practices with which we might personally take issue. Instead we have attempted to provide an evenhanded presentation of the latest, best, and most practical information that was available to us from those authorities and practitioners in the field who were willing to contribute to this effort. Though this anthology is clearly not the exhaustive or complete volume on the topic of violent juveniles, we hope that the efforts of our contributors will be of practical use to those who must design, operate and work in programs that deal with that most troubling phenomenon, the violent juvenile offender.

**Robert A. Mathias
Paul DeMuro
Richard S. Allinson**

Part One



**EXTENT
AND CAUSES
OF VIOLENT
JUVENILE
CRIME**

CASE HISTORY*

Raymond
W.

Name: Raymond W.
Age: 17
Family Composition: Mother
Brothers (two, aged 21 and 10)
Father (whereabouts unknown; departed 12 years ago);
Stepfather (of youngest brother; also listed as "where-
abouts unknown" by mother to avoid "hassles" by the
Welfare Department; actually a local community resi-
dent, but not residing in the home).
Family Income: Public Assistance
School: No known attendance since age 9
Residence: Inner-city housing project
Age First Arrest: 10
Current Charge: Homicide

Raymond's school history was marked with turbulence; he was suspended at age 9 for repeatedly fighting with other students, and the suspension ran several weeks past the legally permitted period because his mother never responded to written requests from the school authorities to come down and discuss the situation. There was no follow-up by the school, and the home was never visited.

The only available report card from Raymond's school was from the second grade. He received a marking of *S* (for Satisfactory) in all subjects, including Deportment.

At age 10, Raymond was arrested inside a sporting goods store; he had apparently been boosted over the transom by older boys, but he refused to identify them to the police. Taken to the detention center, he was attacked

*The case histories which introduce each section of this book are reprinted by permission of the publisher, from *The Life-Style Violent Juvenile* by Andrew H. Vachss and Yitzhak Bakal. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company. Copyright 1979. D.C. Heath and Co. It is important to note, as the authors do, that: "These histories do not purport to amount to a typology of the violent juvenile offender, and there is no claim that they are based on statistical data culled from thousands of files. The intent is only to provide a more intimate view of the violent juvenile offender and his special characteristics."

RECENT NATIONAL TRENDS IN SERIOUS JUVENILE CRIME

Paul A. Strasburg

by a group of older inmates who were awaiting trial on armed robbery. The actual motivation for this attack is still unknown; however, Raymond acquitted himself so favorably that the other inmates desisted without the need for intervention by the guards.

Because of his "recalcitrant attitude" and because his mother told the juvenile court judge that she "couldn't do nothing with him," Raymond was sentenced to a state training school. His training school record shows repeated "disciplinary action" (unspecified) for fighting, and Raymond once spent 10 days in "isolation" for another unspecified offense. He was paroled at age 12 and returned to his home.

Raymond was returned to the same training school about 6 months later; this time the charge was mugging. Again acting in concert with older boys, Raymond was attacking elderly people on the streets of the downtown business district. Although linked to a series of such crimes, and a suspect in a number of push-in muggings within his housing project, Raymond was actually convicted ("found to be delinquent") of only one offense. Again, he refused to name the other participants.

Back in the training school, Raymond was moving up in the institutional hierarchy. He had grown considerably since his last incarceration, and the crime for which he was returned was higher in status than his original offense. This institutional period was marked by his overt membership in an exploitative institutional gang, and he spent almost half of his two year incarceration in the school's disciplinary cottage. According to the training school's records, he was too disruptive to be allowed to attend classes, and he was a suspect in the gang rape of another inmate. Again paroled, Raymond returned to his home community.

Returned to the same institution for a violation of his parole (being a passenger in a stolen car), Raymond quickly proved to be beyond the control of the institutional authorities and he was transferred to a high-security installation in another part of the state. Once more, he joined an institutional gang, and once more he became totally enmeshed in the institutional subculture. Raymond now sported tattoos on both arms, (his initials on one arm, and the name of the institutional gang on the other), and he continued to physically mature. When asked about his period of adjustment to the new training school, Raymond told an interviewer:

When I first got to (Training School), I was the littlest there, but I wasn't the littlest with my hands. . . I had to show those suckers that I wasn't goin' for lollypops (sexual seduction) or rip-offs (forceful sexual threats or actual rape), and I knowed how to do that. But when I got to ("Secure" Training School) I already had a rep behind the Dragons (the gang from the first institution) and there was like already a place for me.

At age 16, Raymond shot and killed a rival gang member in a dispute over the proceeds of a narcotics transaction. He had been out on parole less than 3 months.

In the late 1950s, the curve of serious criminal activity in the United States began to turn upward after nearly a century of more-or-less steady decline. As usual in such events, awareness of the change did not fully penetrate the public consciousness until much later. By 1967, the year the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice issued its landmark report, the growth in crime was accelerating rapidly. The violent crime rate that year was double the 1963 level, and by 1973 it had doubled again (Skogan, 1979, p. 375). The Commission's report focused national attention on criminal justice issues and stimulated a decade of intense activity at all governmental levels designed to dry up the rising tide of criminal behavior at its source or, failing that, to reinforce society's legal and administrative levees to keep the flood where it would do least harm.

Once aware of the problem, public opinion soon identified youth as its source. No doubt the headline grabbing activities of student radicals, hippies and other young rebels of the 1960s predisposed some adults to this view, as did a more general mistrust of adolescents commonly found in industrialized societies. But there was also a factual basis to support the

belief that the plague of violence was to a large extent a youthful phenomenon. Between 1960 and 1975, juvenile arrests grew by nearly 300%, more than twice the adult rate, with the largest growth occurring in the most violent crimes: robbery, 375%; aggravated assault, 240%; and homicide, 211%. Although children of juvenile court age (7 through 17) made up only 20% of the nation's population in 1975, they accounted for 43% of arrests for the seven most serious ("index") crimes in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports that year (Strasburg, 1978, pp. 12-13).

In retrospect, it appears that the high water mark of the juvenile crime wave had already been reached in 1975. At that point, however, the drive for remedial action had just begun to gain momentum. A host of legislative and administrative initiatives was about to be launched, some of which will be discussed in later chapters of this book. More to the immediate point, public opinion was being shaped to believe that an all-out war on youth crime was necessary to bring the burgeoning statistics under control. As late as 1982, 87% of people polled in a national public opinion survey agreed that "there has been a steady and alarming increase in the rate of serious juvenile crime."¹ Yet the truth is that the large increases in juvenile arrests seen in the 1960s and early 1970s began to level off and, in some respects, decline seven years earlier.

We are thus confronting another lag in the perception of changing facts. This one threatens to steer public policy in a direction largely irrelevant to the basic problem and possibly harmful to the long-term public interest in integrating youth more securely into the national social fabric. This essay will attempt to clarify some of the basic facts about the extent and nature of juvenile crime — particularly violent crime — during the past six to eight years and, in a cursory way, place these developments within a longer historical framework. The evidence summarized points to a conclusion that the frightening stereotypical images of youth crime which dominate public discussions are often inaccurate and exaggerated, and that drastic changes in law and policy to crack down on youth crime are not justified by the available facts.

DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS

The scope chosen for this review is national, which immediately reduces the sources of basic information to two: the FBI's annual Uniform Crime Reports, which summarize reported crime and crimes cleared by arrests in more than 12,000 law enforcement districts across the country; and the National Crime Survey, a random sample survey of the population undertaken annually since 1972 by the Bureau of the Census on behalf of the Justice Department to determine the extent and nature of victimization, whether reported to law enforcement agencies or not. There is an almost unlimited supply of other studies of juvenile crime, but with rare exceptions empirical

research is restricted to one jurisdiction or a few and is not repeated systematically over a period of years, for the obvious reason that it is extremely expensive to do either. Time- and place-limited studies provide valuable checks on the validity of trends that appear in the national data, and some probe much more deeply into important details of criminal behavior than the national surveys are able to do (Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin, 1972; Hamparian *et al*, 1978), but their usefulness for the purpose of this review is limited.

To say that the UCR and NCS have the virtue of geographic and historical scope is not to suggest that they are unimpeachable. The shortcomings of the UCR, in particular, have often been described in criminological literature (Strasburg, 1978; Zimring, 1978, 1979; Sparks, 1981). Its major drawback, reliance on reported offenses and apprehended offenders to the exclusion of the majority of criminal acts which go unreported and unsolved, is precisely the problem the NCS was instituted to address. Even within the framework of crimes cleared by arrests, however, the UCR has flaws. Definitions of some offenses — robbery and aggravated assault, for example — are so broad as to render all but impossible a useful analysis of the underlying criminal behavior. Uneven reporting from local agencies from year to year also undercuts attempts to discern meaningful trends within the geographic, race, age, sex and crime categories covered by the UCR.²

By addressing crime from the point of view of the victims who experience it, whether or not they report the crimes officially, the NCS fills the largest void left by the UCR. It also adds data of immense value concerning the true nature of such offenses as robbery and aggravated assault in terms of their consequences for the victim. Yet it, too, is far from perfect (Sparks, 1981). Especially with regard to the characteristics of offenders, the NCS leaves much to be desired because it relies on the perception and memory of the victim, who may be under too much stress at the time of the event to note or recall exactly such crucial details as the ages or races of offenders. Perhaps the greatest drawback of the NCS from the viewpoint of our present needs is the long delay between collection of data and its publication in a readily usable form. The only detailed information we have on juvenile crime from the NCS, as of mid-1983, is current through 1977.

The frustrations of the researcher in trying to make sense of criminal behavior from these reports are great (Blackmore, 1981; Cohen and Lichbach, 1982). They will become apparent to the reader, too. Yet it would be as wrong to dismiss these major resources because of their deficiencies as it would be to overlook the deficiencies. The UCR, after all, though far from perfect, provides a reasonably coherent and consistent set of data on national crime covering many years. The NCS, while having a much shorter history, employs a generally accepted method of examining crime trends and is, despite some methodological problems, considerably more thorough than any prior attempt to measure the incidence and nature of crime in the

United States (Sparks, 1981). Neither can be relied on to provide a precise picture of criminal behavior in America (indeed, in our pluralistic and constantly changing society, there probably is no such thing as a prototypical "American criminal"); but both are of value in examining broad patterns of criminal activity over time, patterns which have to be understood if society's response to crime is to have any rational elements at all.

This essay deals primarily with the question of how the violent behavior of youth has changed over time. For this purpose, the definition of violence will be limited to that employed by the UCR (crimes of homicide, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault), although the discussion will be extended occasionally to other offenses when doing so might add to our understanding of a particular issue.

A similarly restricted definition of the term "youth" will also be employed. The upper age limit will be 17, which corresponds to the upper limit of juvenile court jurisdiction for the great majority of infractions in the great majority of states. At times the statistics presented will cover all children from age 7 (usually the minimum age of eligibility for juvenile justice processing) through 17. More often they will deal with a narrower band, ages 13 through 17, excluding younger children who, with rare exceptions, are unlikely to be involved in the most serious kinds of crime. The other end of the youth spectrum, ages 18 to 20, is where the highest rates of violent crime are found and where one might logically focus an intensive review of youthful violence. That age group, however, is almost universally defined as adult by the criminal codes of our states. Because our ultimate concern is for juvenile justice policy, it is best not to confuse this analysis by including young people over 18 with the under-18 age group.

BROAD TRENDS IN YOUTH VIOLENCE

American youth are substantially more crime-prone than adults. Table 1.1 shows that in 1981, the juvenile arrest rate for serious property crimes exceeded the adult rate by nearly 6:1, and the juvenile violence arrest rate

TABLE 1.1: Arrests per 100,000 population by age group, 1981

	<i>Violent Index Offenses</i>	<i>Property Index Offenses</i>
Juveniles (13-17)	447	3283
Young Adults (18-20)	649	2768
Adults (21+)	210	567

Source: 1981 *Uniform Crime Reports*; Census Bureau Reports, Series P-25, No. 917, 1982

doubled the adult rate. Although young adults (ages 18 through 20) had the highest violence arrest rate of all, juveniles passed them, too, in property offending.


The level of juvenile crime has undergone important changes in the past two decades, however. In marked contrast to the 1960s and early 1970s, when juvenile arrests for serious crimes rose an average of about 5% each year, serious juvenile crime has dropped in recent years. Arrests of juveniles for seven "index" offenses (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, larceny, burglary and auto theft) decreased 9.8% between 1977 and 1981 (UCR 1981, p. 167). Arrests went down another 5% in the first six months of 1982 compared to the same period in 1981 (U.S. Department of Justice, 1982), and although separate age-group figures are not available as of this writing, it is most likely that juveniles shared in this further improvement.

While numbers of arrests provide an indication of the changing impact of youth crime on society, an understanding of changes in youth behavior is better conveyed by arrest rates, which take account of our shifting population structure. The nation's juvenile population (ages 7 through 17) declined by 11% between 1970 and 1981: in 1970, juveniles constituted 22% of the population, in 1981, only 17.4% (Census Bureau, 1982). One would expect the number of juvenile arrests to go down as the juvenile population declines, but a more interesting issue is whether the likelihood that an individual juvenile will be arrested for a serious crime has changed. Figure 1.1 shows clearly that it has. The solid line plots juvenile arrests for all index offenses per 100,000 children age 13 through 17.³ Between 1970 and 1975, the juvenile arrest rate for all serious offenses climbed 19%, with the largest increase occurring in 1974.⁴ After 1975, arrest rates went down, then up, then down again, finishing in 1981 5% lower than the 1975 rate.

Figure 1.1 also shows essentially the same trend for the serious property offense subcategory. That property arrest rates and total arrest rates should be so closely linked is not surprising, since property offenses make up between 85% and 90% of all charges among juvenile index offenses. Arrest rates for violent offenses, which constitute the minor part (10% to 15%) of serious juvenile crime, are shown separately in Figure 1.2. A comparison of the two charts reveals that violence arrest rates have behaved differently from property arrest rates in the recent past. Since 1978, violence arrest rates have held fairly steady at the relatively high level they attained in 1974-75. Property arrest rates, on the other hand, began to decline after 1979, and in 1981 they reached their lowest level since 1973.

There is no obvious explanation for this recent divergence in juvenile property and violence arrest rate trends. Data from the National Crime Survey (NCS) show a general pattern of stability for both property and violent offenses between 1977 and 1979, in contrast to increases in arrests reported in the UCR, but separate details on juvenile crime are not yet available. NCS juvenile data do provide an interesting counterpoint to the UCR data for the

FIGURE 1.1: Arrests per 100,000 population ages 13 through 17, property index offenses and all index offenses, 1970-1981



Source: 1970-1981 Uniform Crime Reports; Census Bureau Reports, Series P-25, No. 917, 1982.

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
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FIGURE 1.2: Arrests per 100,000 population ages 13 through 17 for violent index offenses, 1970-1981



Source: 1970-1981 Uniform Crime Reports; Census Bureau Reports, Series P-25, No. 917, 1982.

period from 1973 to 1977, however. Whereas arrest rates for both violence and serious property crimes rose in those years, as seen in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, data from the NCS indicate that *offending* rates, as reported by victims, actually declined by 11% in that period (McDermott and Hindelang, 1981, p. 13). It would be wise to await further analysis of NCS data before drawing final conclusions about recent changes in juvenile violence rates. Yet not even arrest data suggest that they are still growing and it seems a safe bet that additional information will confirm that the wave of juvenile violence of the past two decades has finally peaked.

The absence of reliable data on juvenile crime extending farther back in history than two decades leaves us in the unfortunate position of treating this burst of juvenile criminality as an isolated phenomenon, the final outcome of which can only be guessed. Nevertheless, research on historical patterns of homicide by Ted Robert Gurr provides some indirect reassurance that the outcome will be a favorable one. Gurr found that homicide rates in England were approximately ten times as high in the 13th century as they are today, and that murder arrests in Boston declined from a level of more than 7 per 100,000 population in 1860 to less than 2 per 100,000 in 1950. The assault arrest rate in Boston dropped by four to one in the same period. In other words, our culture has experienced a sustained decrease in levels of violence of enormous magnitude dating back at least seven centuries. The sudden resurgence of violence that occurred in the 1960s — not only in this country but worldwide — appears to be a temporary aberration in an otherwise inexorable trend. Gurr notes that similar aberrations have occurred before in history but have always abated, leading him to speculate that "crime, like economic growth and population size, has finite limits. Call it a law of social gravitation: what goes up beyond supportable limits will eventually come down" (Gurr, 1979, pp. 356-371).

PATTERNS OF OFFENDING

The dominance of property offenses among the serious crimes of the young, already noted, can be seen clearly in Table 1.2, which gives the distribution of index-level arrests by crime category in 1981. This distribution has changed little over time (Strasburg, 1978, p. 130). Larceny and burglary together encompass 80% of juvenile arrests. Among the violent crimes, only robbery and aggravated assault are of any statistical consequence (rape and homicide together make up less than 1% of all juvenile arrests for serious crimes), and robbery stands out sharply as the dominant violent crime of juveniles. Almost half (49%) of all juvenile arrests for violence were robbery arrests in 1981. It is the only violent crime whose share in juvenile arrests (6%) approaches its share in adult arrests (6.5%), and it is the only index crime for which the total number of juvenile arrests grew significantly (by 6.4%) between 1977 and 1981 (1981, UCR, p. 167).⁵

TABLE 1.2: Percent distribution of arrests for serious crime, by offense and age group, 1981

	AGE GROUP		
	13-17	18-20	21+
TOTAL VIOLENCE	12.0	19.0	27.0
Homicide	0.3	0.7	1.4
Rape	0.6	1.2	1.9
Robbery	6.0	8.0	6.5
Aggravated Assault	5.1	9.1	17.3
TOTAL PROPERTY CRIME	88.0	81.0	73.0
Burglary	27.6	25.1	15.9
Larceny-Theft	52.4	49.3	51.9
Auto Theft	7.1	6.0	4.3
Arson	0.8	0.6	0.8
TOTAL INDEX OFFENSES	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: Errors in totals due to rounding


Source: 1981 *Uniform Crime Reports*, pp. 171-172

Figure 1.3 illustrates the same general point from a somewhat different perspective. While juveniles (and young adults) are arrested out of proportion to their share of the population in all crime categories, the disparity is greatest by far in property offenses and robbery. On the other hand, the juvenile disparity is relatively small for the crimes of homicide, rape and aggravated assault.⁶ The direction in which these statistics point — increasingly serious consequences of crime as age goes up — has been confirmed in the NCS victimization studies (Hindelang and McDermott, 1981, p. 72).

At this point it is necessary to introduce another cautionary note about arrest figures that will become a central theme as the discussion proceeds. Figure 1.3 describes age-group shares of *arrests* for the various offense categories, but not the age-group shares of *crimes* committed. If we examine the percentage of crimes cleared by arrests in which only persons under 18 were arrested, a different conclusion about the scope of juvenile violence can be reached. In 1981, 9.8% of all cleared violent offenses involved the arrest of persons under 18 only (UCR, 1981, p. 158). In other words, the share of violent *crimes* (9.8%) attributed to juveniles is significantly *less* than their share of the population (17.4%) taking the entire 7-17 age group, and only slightly larger than the population share (8.3%) occupied by the most crime-prone juvenile ages of 13-17. It is certainly less than the juvenile share of *arrests* (17.2%) for violent crimes.

Some of this difference may be attributable to variations in record keeping for cleared offenses and arrests (including, perhaps, the exclusion from the cleared juvenile offense category of crimes for which a mixed group of juveniles and adults was arrested), but the most important factor is prob-

FIGURE 1.3: Age-group share of arrests for violent and serious property crime, 1981 (in percent)



Source: 1981 Uniform Crime Reports, p. 171; Census Bureau Reports, Series P-25, No. 917, 1982.

ably the greater propensity of juveniles to commit crimes in groups. Group criminal activity, which will be discussed further below, gets glossed over in statistics based on the number of persons arrested. Since arrests are the most common unit of measurement, a significant distortion is thereby introduced into the public's understanding of the scope of juvenile crime.

Sex-Group Differences

One of the well-established facts about violent crime is that it is far more characteristic of males than of females. Overall, about 90% of arrests for violent crime involves males. The distribution of offenses between males and females is influenced to some degree by age, however. When victims identify adults as their aggressors, they name men 14 times more often than women. For young adult offenders, the ratio is 15 to 1. But for juvenile offenders, the ratio drops to 4 to 1 (Hindelang and McDermott, 1981, p. 42). This difference between older and younger females does not appear in arrest data, however. Approximately 10% of each age group's arrests for serious violence in 1981 were arrests of females. On the other hand, 21% of juvenile arrests for simple (non-index) assaults involved females, compared to only 13% of adult arrests. Again, one can only speculate on the reasons why victim survey data portray a relatively more active female role in personal crimes among juveniles than among adults when arrest data do not. It may be that victims are more reluctant to report crimes by younger females to the police (but not to surveyors!) than they are to report male or older female offenses, or that police are more lenient when it comes to arresting and charging girls.

Girls' arrests for violent offenses rose faster between 1977 and 1981 than did boys' arrests (Table 1.3), a change inconsistent with other offending patterns. In that period, girls' arrests for index-level property crimes and for all crimes together *dropped* at a faster pace than boys' arrests for the same offenses.

TAB 1.3: Percentage change in juvenile arrests, by sex and offense category, 1977-1981

	Boys (18)	Girls (18)
VIOLENT CRIMES	+3.8	+5.2
Homicide	+11.8	+8.7
Rape	+4.6	-35.0
Robbery	+6.6	+4.5
Aggravated Assault	-0.1	+6.2
PROPERTY CRIMES	-10.8	-13.2
ALL INDEX OFFENSES	-9.2	-12.2
TOTAL ARRESTS	-7.6	-12.8

Source: 1981 Uniform Crime Reports, p. 166

Boys and girls are also differentiated by the kinds of offense each tends to commit. Whereas robbery is the most common and fastest growing violent crime by boys, girls' violence typically involves aggravated assault. Two-thirds of all violence arrests of girls in 1981 were for aggravated assault. In theory there should be some logical relationship between crimes labelled aggravated assault and homicides, since both involve the use (or threat of using) weapons or extreme force in an attack on another person, and it is only the outcome that separates events into the two categories (Zimring, 1979). With this in mind, it is interesting to examine the ratio of arrests for aggravated assault to arrests for homicide among various population groups, as shown in Table 1.4. The assault-to-homicide ratio for girls is twice as high as the boys' ratio and three times the ratio for both male and female adults. This suggests strongly that girls are either less willing or less able to carry their violent attacks to a fatal conclusion.

TABLE 1.4: Aggravated assault and homicide arrests, by sex and age, 1981

	Men (Age 18)	Women (Age 18)	Boys (Age 7-17)	Girls (Age 7-17)
A. Aggravated Assault	201,793	27,823	31,530	5,802
B. Homicide	16,144	2,430	1,702	156
RATIO OF A TO B	12.5:1	11.4:1	18.5:1	37.2:1

Source: *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1981, pp. 173-177

In sum, violence by girls remains relatively uncommon, although more common apparently than violence by older women. When violence by girls occurs, it tends more toward interpersonal conflict without the economic motive found in robbery, and its consequences are lethal far less often than the consequences of violence by boys or adults.

Racial Differences

The disproportionately large role of black offenders in American crime has been widely reported and analyzed. The National Crime Surveys of 1973 through 1977 produced reported black offending rates that were five times

white rates in all age and sex groups. For violent crimes, the gap was narrowed to 3:1, but for theft it was vastly larger — from 11:1 to 16:1. So great indeed was the disparity between the two races that, among juveniles, black females were found to have higher offending rates than white males for robbery, assault and larceny (Hindelang and McDermott, 1981, p. 46).

Similar racial differences show up in official arrest statistics. Arrest rates in 1981 for adults and juveniles of both races are presented in Table 1.5. For violent offenses overall, black juvenile rates surpass white rates by 7:1, or more than twice the ratio of black/white violence reported in the NCS. The disagreement is largely semantic, however. Robbery is considered violence in the UCR data but put into the personal theft category in the NCS. Black juveniles' robbery arrest rate exceeds the white juvenile rate by 12:1, within range of the theft offending rate ratios reported in the NCS. If robbery is excluded and simple assault included, to bring the UCR violence categories fully in line with the NCS categories, the spread between the resulting "modified" violence arrest rates of black and white juveniles reduces to approximately 3:1, or the same relationship that emerged from the victim surveys. Despite contrary evidence in some earlier self-report studies (Gould, 1969; Hirschi, 1969; Williams and Gold, 1972; Gold and Reimer, 1975) the close agreement between national arrest data and victim survey data strongly supports the presence of a racial effect in juvenile violence that cannot be dismissed.

TABLE 1.5: Arrests per 100,000 population, by age, race and offense, 1981

	Juvenile (ages 7-17)			Adult (ages 18 and over)		
	White	Black	Black/White Ratio	White	Black	Black/White Ratio
ALL VIOLENCE	127.4	834.2	7:1	153.4	1008.9	7:1
Homicide	2.9	17.1	6:1	6.8	54.9	8:1
Rape	6.0	46.8	8:1	9.8	72.0	7:1
Robbery	43.4	518.8	12:1	32.7	363.6	11:1
Aggravated Assault	75.1	251.5	3:1	104.1	518.4	5:1
PROPERTY CRIME	1578.7	3371.5	2:1	549.7	2328.9	5:1
TOTAL INDEX OFFENSES	1706.1	4205.7	2:1	703.1	3337.8	5:1
NON-INDEX (Simple) ASSAULT	168.7	471.6	3:1	189.9	755.5	4:1

Source: 1981 *Uniform Crime Reports*; *Census Bureau Reports*, Series P-25, No. 917, 1982.

These calculations also underscore the unique role of robberies by black juveniles, chiefly boys. Two-thirds of juvenile robbery arrests nationally in-

volve blacks; one-third of *all* juvenile arrests for violent offenses are robbery arrests of black youth. Although black juveniles made up only 2.6% of the total population in 1981, they were charged in over 19% of robbery arrests of all age groups, compared to 5.5% of arrests for other violent crimes and 4.8% of total arrests. Figure 1.4 shows arrest rates for both black and white juveniles from 1970 through 1981 for the crimes of robbery and aggravated assault, which together account for over 90% of all juvenile arrests for violence. In addition to the outsized role of black youth in robbery, Figure 1.4 illustrates another important point — the great volatility over time of robbery arrests of black youth. Swings in the black juvenile arrest rate for robbery are much more pronounced than for any other violent offense. Why this should occur is not evident, but it seems plain that such variations have a significant impact on the overall juvenile arrest rate (as shown in Figure 1.2, above), and through it an important influence on the public's perception of juvenile behavior.

While we do not yet have victim survey data to compare with arrest data for the years after 1977, what we do have for 1973 through 1977 has a less than perfect fit with arrest statistics. The NCS reports, it will be remembered, indicated an overall decrease in the juvenile offending rate of 11% in that period. Further decomposition of the data revealed that the entire reduction could be traced to a drop in black juvenile offending. The offending rate for white juveniles went up slightly in those years, while the reported black juvenile rate decreased by more than 40%. The decline was steady in both urban and suburban areas, and prevailed in rural areas, too, though irregularly (Hindelang and McDermott, pp. 52-53).⁷

Arrest rates of white juveniles for aggravated assault and robbery did increase between 1973 and 1977 (as can be seen in Figure 1.4), but not by a great amount. Similarly, the black juvenile arrest rates for these offenses did, on the whole, come down, but not by any means in the heroic proportions indicated by the NCS data, nor by any means evenly.

Sorting through all the possible explanations for the variation between UCR and NCS results is a trying and unrewarding exercise. Definitional inconsistencies, variations in reporting and clearance rates, and imprecise measures of seriousness in aggravated assault and robbery make neat cross-study comparisons virtually impossible. A reasonable alternative measure of changes in violent behavior over time may be the homicide rate — or (more problematically) the homicide arrest rate (Gurr, 1979; Zimring, 1979, pp. 75-78). Murder almost always comes to the attention of the police, sooner or later; the nature of the crime and its consequences are relatively immune to definitional obfuscation; and clearance rates are by far the highest (72% in 1981) of all the violent offenses. Despite the fact that murder is not numerically significant among juvenile offenses, and it is more typically a group crime for juveniles than for adults (Zimring, 1979, pp. 75-76), it nevertheless offers an interesting and useful alternative test of real changes in juvenile violence.

FIGURE 1.4: Arrests per 100,000 population ages 7 through 17 for robbery and aggravated assault, by race, 1970-1981




Figure 1.5 plots homicide (and rape) arrest rates for black and white juveniles from 1970 through 1981. The results are plainly consistent with the trend appearing in the 1973-77 NCS data. In those years, there was a drop of 19% in the homicide arrest rate of black juveniles and an increase in the white juvenile arrest rate of 41% (albeit from a much smaller base for whites). Since 1977, homicide arrest rates have held reasonably steady for both groups, save for a moderate increase for black youth in 1981. Homicide data, therefore, lend credence to the NCS perspective, namely that black juvenile violence diminished substantially in the mid-1970s, and they also support an argument that there has not been a significant reversal of those gains since.

An interesting glimpse of the role in violent crime of another minority group, hispanic juveniles, is provided by the UCR data on homicide. In 1981, hispanic youth and adults alike accounted for about 10% of both index and non-index arrests.⁸ The most significant departure from this level of participation occurred in homicide and aggravated assault by juveniles: 23.6% of juvenile homicide arrests and 16.4% of juvenile aggravated assault arrests involved hispanic youths. In the absence of accurate population figures for hispanic juveniles, it is not possible to calculate corresponding arrest rates for comparison with other racial and ethnic groups, but a preliminary conclusion that hispanic youth violence tends disproportionately toward homicide and aggravated assault rather than robbery, as in the case of black juveniles, would not be unwarranted.

Geographic Variations

Violent crime is much more an urban than a suburban or rural phenomenon in the United States. Cities with 1 million or more inhabitants had per capita rates of reported violence that exceeded suburban rates by 5:1 and rural rates by 10:1 in 1981 (UCR, 1981, pp. 144-145). Victim surveys show a similarly skewed distribution of violence toward the cities (Laub and Hindelang, 1981). Contrary to popular belief, however, the juvenile role in violence does not increase as cities get larger. Instead, the percentage of violent crimes cleared by arrests involving only juveniles was smallest in the largest cities in 1981, smaller even than the juvenile share of violence arrests in suburban and rural areas. The small to medium cities (10,000 to 100,000 inhabitants) had the largest juvenile representation (12% to 13.3%) in cleared violent offenses (UCR, 1981, pp. 158-159).

If violence is predominantly urban, robbery is the preeminent urban crime. Reported robbery rates in cities over 1 million population exceeded suburban rates by 10:1 and rural rates by 50:1 in 1981 (UCR, 1981, pp. 144-145). Urban juvenile robbery rates reported in the National Crime Survey were five times the comparable rural rate (Laub and Hindelang, 1981, p. 25). Aggravated assault, in contrast, is much more evenly spread

across geographic boundaries. Data from the 1973 to 1977 NCS show that the aggravated assault rate per 100,000 population in urban areas is only twice the rural rate. Assaults (both aggravated and simple) totalled 82% of personal crimes reported in rural areas compared to 65% of personal crimes reported in urban areas (Laub and Hindelang, 1981, pp. 25-27).

Groups, Weapons and Consequences of Violence

In probing the subsurface of juvenile violence, arrest data are of little further assistance, because their description of events consists almost exclusively of legal labels applied at the time of arrest. For more detail at the national level, we have to rely on the National Crime Survey of victims, which provides a rich though not fully up-to-date series of data on group activity, use of weapons, injury, financial loss and other important aspects of the national crime picture. Supplemental information from local and regional analyses generally tends to support the conclusions of the national survey. The discussion that follows is, therefore, principally a summary of the results of the 1973-1977 National Crime surveys, as analyzed and reported by Michael Hindelang and his colleagues at the Criminal Justice Research Center in Albany, New York (Hindelang and McDermott, 1981; McDermott and Hindelang, 1981; Laub and Hindelang, 1981).

Crime by juveniles is more likely to take place in groups than adult crime, as we have already noted. The younger the offender, the higher the proportion of offenses that are committed in concert with others. Group offending occurs most often in robbery, where 34% of juvenile offenses, 30% of young adult offenses, and 22% of adult offenses involve three or more offenders. The relationship between age and group offending did not change significantly over the five years studied (McDermott and Hindelang, 1981, pp. 17-21). Data from the 1979 victim survey show that groups composed of juveniles only were responsible for 43% of all multiple-offender crimes that year, more than any other age or mixed-age group (U.S. Department of Justice, 1981, p. 9).

The impact of group offending by juveniles on official statistics is not trivial. We saw earlier that juveniles appear in violence arrest statistics at nearly twice the rate they appear in statistics on violent crimes cleared. Since robbery is the most common juvenile crime of violence, and also the crime in which group offending occurs most frequently, robbery arrests contribute most to an exaggerated perception of the amount of crime being committed by juveniles. It is also worth recalling that juvenile robbery is predominantly an offense of black youths. Consequently, the number of crimes committed by black youth in particular is likely to be overstated if measured only by arrests.

Juveniles are less likely to use weapons in their crimes against persons than are either young adults (ages 18 through 20) or adults. Aggregate data

from 1973 through 1977 indicate weapon use by juveniles 27% of the time, compared to 36% by young adults and 41% by adults. There was virtually no difference in weapon use by age for aggravated assault, but weapons are a major definitional element in that offense. For robbery, juveniles used weapons half as often as adults (30% compared to 60% of robbery incidents), with young adults in between (49% of incidents). Rape by juveniles involved weapons 11% of the time, compared to 30% for both young adults and adults.

Adults and young adults are approximately four times as likely as juveniles to use guns in their offenses, but there is very little variation by age for knives and other weapons. Juveniles used guns in about 5% of robbery incidents, young adults 20% and adults 28%. In aggravated assault, guns were used 15% of the time by juveniles, 20% by young adults and 35% by adults. Survey data also showed no tendency over the five years toward an increase in weapon use by juveniles (McDermott and Hindelang, 1981, pp. 21-27).

One might think that the relatively rare use of weapons, and especially the deadliest weapon, by juveniles would have a bearing on the seriousness of harm they inflict on their victims. There appears to be very little variation in the rate at which offenders in each age group injure their victims. Approximately 30% of the victims of each group report injuries sustained in the course of the attacks on them. There is, however, a slight tendency for injuries to be more serious (that is, to require medical attention) as the age of the offender goes up: 7% of crimes by juveniles require medical attention to the victim, 9% of crimes by young adults, and 11% by adults. The difference is most significant for robbery, in which victims of adults require medical attention at a rate (15% of all robberies) that is two and one-half times the juvenile rate (6%). There was no change in the relationship of offender age to injury over the five years of the study (McDermott and Hindelang, 1981, pp. 27-38).

All in all, the 1973-77 victim surveys leave an unequivocal impression that personal crime by juveniles is substantially less serious than personal crime by adults. While juveniles act in groups and gangs more frequently than adults, they tend to use weapons less often and less deadly weapons when they do. Juveniles injure their victims about as often as adults, but the injuries inflicted tend to be less serious. When juveniles take property, which they succeed in doing less frequently than adults, the value of the property tends to be lower than that of the property taken by adults (McDermott and Hindelang, 1981, 38-47, 54-61). It should be noted, however, that the bulk of personal crimes (60% in each age group) involve *neither* injury *nor* loss of property. In other words, most crime attempts by juveniles as well as adults are not successfully completed (McDermott and Hindelang, 1981, p. 48).

Robbery in particular, the most common violent crime of the young, takes on a different aspect when viewed in terms of its consequences to the victim. Weapons are used in juvenile robbery less than a third of the time, guns

only 5% of the time. Only 6% of robbery incidents involving juvenile offenders resulted in injuries to the victim requiring medical treatment. On each of these counts, the typical adult robbery, which could be described as an encounter with a lone assailant armed with a gun, would have to be judged as a much more significant criminal confrontation.

VICTIMS OF JUVENILE VIOLENCE

For the population as a whole, the risk of being victimized by an adult is approximately two and one-half times as great as the risk of being victimized by a juvenile, but that risk is not evenly distributed across all ages. By far the most likely victim of a juvenile offender is another juvenile. The rate of victimization by juvenile offenders is nearly seven times higher for juveniles (ages 12 to 19) than for the next age group of victims (ages 20 to 34). This is an unsurprising finding if one takes the view that an offender would look for the most vulnerable victims and that most adults would probably appear less vulnerable to young offenders than other juveniles. The logic of this viewpoint is foiled at the upper end of the age scale, however, where the elderly — presumably more vulnerable than younger adults — are no more likely to be victims of juvenile offenders than people aged 35 to 64. Elderly people, in fact, are more than twice as likely to be victimized by an adult as by a juvenile (Hindelang and McDermott, 1981, p. 17).

If the elderly do not seem to be special targets of juvenile crime, women apparently are. In all age groups the male risk of victimization by young adult and adult offenders is higher than the female risk. However, only males in the 12 to 19 age group are at higher risk of being victimized by juvenile offenders than females. The victimization rate of women exceeds the male rate slightly after age 19, and the ratio increases moderately with the age of the victim. In other words, juvenile offenders, unlike their older counterparts, seem to have a preference for attacking women rather than men, and the preference gets stronger as the age of the victim increases. When juveniles attack women, however, the consequences tend to be slightly less serious than when men are the victims, unlike crimes by older offenders in which the consequences are about equal for victims of both sexes (Hindelang and McDermott, 1981, pp. 15-24).

Blacks in America are overrepresented in the population of victims as well as in the population of offenders. The black victimization rate is 4,368 per 100,000 population, compared to 3,148 per 100,000 for whites. The difference between the races is greater when adults are the offenders, less with juvenile offenders and least when young adults are the offenders. Blacks are not only victims more often than whites, they are also victims of more serious crimes regardless of the age of the offender. For example, the victimization rate of blacks by juvenile offenders is about 1.25 times the white rate when frequency alone is measured, and goes up to 1.5 times the white rate

when the victimization score is weighted for seriousness of the offense committed (Hindelang and McDermott, 1981, pp. 24-28).⁹ Further analysis of the survey data reveals that whites victimize whites almost exclusively in all offender age groups, whereas blacks victimize whites in the majority of cases — more so for juvenile and young adult offenders (67% white victims for both age groups) than for adult offenders (55% white victims). The analysts point out that an important factor in this finding is that the number of potential white victims is much larger than the number of potential black victims in this country (Hindelang and McDermott, 1981, pp. 62-65).

In general, the 1973-77 victimization surveys indicate an inverse relationship between family income and the risk of victimization: poor people are more likely to be crime victims than rich people. This pattern does not hold for the victims of juveniles, however. The poorest income group is no more likely to be victimized by juvenile offenders than the richest, and the income groups in between have higher victimization rates than either the poorest or the richest. Here again there may be less than meets the eye. It is possible, as the analysts acknowledge, that lower income groups, being more frequently the targets of crimes, are less likely to report offenses (especially minor ones) by juveniles than are the more affluent, in whose lives even a minor assault by a juvenile may be a less routine and therefore more memorable (and upsetting) event (Hindelang and McDermott, 1981, pp. 28-32).

The NCS surveys showed, finally, that juvenile offenders are more likely to have a prior relationship with their juvenile victims than with their adult victims. Juvenile offenders were strangers to their juvenile victims in 54% of all offenses and to their older victims in 76% of all offenses. This variation did not exist for adult offenders, who were strangers to their victims in about two-thirds of all crimes regardless of the age of victim. What this means is that randomness in the choice of victim, a quality generally viewed as raising the seriousness of an offense, is less common in the most frequent kind of face-to-face crime by juveniles, namely attacks on other juveniles (Hindelang and McDermott, 1981, pp. 65-68).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The picture of American juvenile delinquency conveyed by official arrest statistics has changed remarkably little over the years. Its basic features are by now thoroughly familiar to students of this subject. Adolescents are significantly more crime-prone than adults, but juvenile violence is rare in comparison to juvenile theft. Among the young who are arrested for violence, boys, blacks and urban dwellers are all heavily overrepresented. Nothing in recent statistics suggests that these general patterns are going to change soon.

Ninety percent of officially recorded juvenile violence consists of robbery

and aggravated assault — offenses so vaguely defined and variously interpreted that a meaningful evaluation of differences over time, across jurisdictions, or among age groups, has, until recently, been virtually impossible. The National Crime Surveys begun in 1972 have shed some valuable though still partial light on these issues, revealing what many observers have long suspected, that juvenile violence is considerably less serious in the aggregate than violence by adults. Juveniles use fewer weapons and less deadly weapons in their crimes and inflict less injury and financial loss on their victims. The surveys also make clear that the victims of juveniles are predominantly other juveniles who, almost as often as not, have a prior relationship to their attackers. Contrary to widespread popular belief, the elderly are not disproportionately singled out as victims by the young. Finally, the victim surveys emphasize the fact that juveniles act more often in groups, which makes official arrest statistics a misleading basis on which to judge the real role of juveniles in violent crime in this country.

In short, while the demographic profile of the typical violent delinquent — an inner-city minority boy — remains as true as ever and bears a strong resemblance to the popular stereotype, the nature and consequences of his crimes do not correspond well with the most terrifying images that emerge from newspapers and television to haunt the public.

Yet it was perhaps not so much a perceived change in the character of juvenile violence that ignited public anxiety in recent years as it was the explosion in raw numbers of reported crimes and arrests that occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s. Even though the dramatic statistical upsurge was, in the words of two observers, "neither unprecedented, nor inexplicable, nor without remedy" (Graham and Gurr, 1979, p. 349), it far surpassed the experience or recollection of most people at the time and by its very size tended to generate panic. But panic was never warranted and is even less appropriate today, when the curve of juvenile crime appears to be flattening out. Juvenile arrest rates, in the main, have stopped growing since 1974 or 1975. A gradual decline in property offense arrests has prevailed since 1979, an encouraging change, although it is too soon to predict with confidence that it marks the beginning of a long term drop to the lower levels of earlier years.

The stubborn persistence of violence arrest rates at the high levels attained up to 1975 is a source of concern, but beneath the surface of global statistics there are encouraging signs, as well. Most forms of juvenile violence have remained stable since 1978, even as measured by arrest rates. Only robbery arrests of black juveniles have shown a tendency to keep increasing, but even this trend is obscured by sharp fluctuations in the curve from year to year and by the relatively large number of multiple-offender crimes in this category. From the victim surveys we know, too, that robbery is the category of offense in which the disparity between adult and juvenile behavior is the greatest. Whether rising or falling, robbery arrest rates in themselves almost certainly exaggerate the amount of serious violence be-

ing committed by juveniles. The numerical weight of robberies by black juveniles in the overall pattern of juvenile violence makes it imperative that we understand clearly what this crime is all about. In particular, future studies need to disaggregate the homogenous category of "black youth" to find out with greater precision just who these young robbers are, what their crimes consist of, and under what circumstances they occur. Only when armed with that kind of information can we begin to develop intelligent programs to deal with this critical aspect of the juvenile violence problem.

If the moment is not yet at hand to declare the passing of this wave of juvenile violence, a longer historical view of crime patterns reassures us that it is bound to arrive. Gurr's analysis of long-term homicide rates suggests that the current wave is simply another temporary reversal of a more powerful secular trend toward reduced violence in our society. He identifies as the mainspring of this trend the gradual and selective socialization of people to "control and displace anger" — in a word, "civilization" (Gurr, 1979, pp. 356-371). Despite the magnitude of the upsurge in violence that has afflicted America since the 1960s, there is no evidence to support an alarmist view that it signals a permanent end to the process of civilization.

Because even temporary aberrations cause substantial pain, however, their causes need to be understood. Why, after nearly a century of gradually increased "civilization," did America suddenly experience a regression of such large proportions? Gurr rejects the notion that the explanation lies in such factors as improved police practices or better crime reporting. He focuses instead on three factors of much more global significance: modernization, war and the size of the youth population. All three were relevant to America of the 1960s and 1970s, but the third, a sudden increase in the youth population, was an especially dramatic and tangible force. The baby boom of the post World War II years generated an unprecedented 50% increase in the American adolescent population during the 1960s, five times the average increase of the previous seven decades. Similar disproportionate increases in the youth (notably male) population have correlated with outbreaks of violence in other times and other places. London in 1841, for example, recorded a growth in the number of adolescent males to 13.5% of the total population, a level not equaled since, and experienced a major coincident crime wave. A contemporary example of the phenomenon in reverse is offered by Japan, where the youth population remained virtually constant between 1946 and 1971 and where, unlike the U.S. and many other industrialized countries, no crime wave appeared (Gurr, 1979, pp. 367-368).

Acknowledging the power of major social forces over our daily lives requires a certain humility. If we accept that war, demography and modernization have a substantial influence on crime rates, we must also admit that they themselves lie well beyond the influence of most public and private organizations seeking to reduce crime. Neither the police, nor the courts, nor the Justice Department, nor state legislatures can take any meaningful

steps to affect the birth rate, international relations or economic and technological progress. At the same time, because these institutions are charged with protecting the public welfare, they feel enormous pressure to act when faced with a sudden large increase in crime. Their concern is not what makes 20th century America different from 13th century England but what makes one community safer than another or one child more antisocial than his peers. Confronted by vast social changes, they have to cope.

What a longer historical view has to offer, in addition to the hope of better things to come, is a standard against which to measure the programs these institutions develop to combat crime. That standard is this: if reduction in violence within our society has been brought about by "civilizing" forces, do proposed anticrime measures help those forces or hinder them? Do they encourage the "control and displacement of anger," or do they enflame passion, stimulate conflict, and shut off legitimate channels for self-development and self-expression? There was a time when justice based on an "eye for an eye" was compatible with the existing level of civilization and understanding of human nature, but that time was long ago. Today we know that our power to reduce crime directly by enacting harsh repressive measures is limited. The wiser course seems to be to hold fast to civilizing values while we ride out the wave.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Public Attitudes Toward Youth Crime," a national public opinion survey conducted by Opinion Research Corporation for the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, the University of Minnesota School of Social Work, and the Field Institute, April 1982. A similar result emerged from a study conducted in the San Diego, California area. Although police contacts with and arrests of juveniles for major offenses decreased 21% between 1977 and 1981, and reported school violence declined by 42%, a majority of personnel in the juvenile justice systems of the area perceived that both the number and seriousness of violent crimes by juveniles had increased in that period. (Pennell and Curtis, 1982)
2. In 1974, for example, the peak year in UCR-recorded arrest rates, there was a sharp drop in the number of agencies reporting and the population covered, which renders that year's figures suspect. Reporting agencies represented only 63% of the estimated population in 1974, compared to between 73% and 93% for other years between 1970 and 1980. In addition, Zimring reports that the 1976 UCR did not include data from Chicago (Zimring, 1979, p. 88), an otherwise unremarked omission that raises doubts about the quality of the data base for other years.
3. Arrest rates are calculated by applying the estimated age-group population in the year in question, adjusted to reflect the proportion of the population covered by the relevant UCR statistics. This introduces some imprecision, especially in the description of behavior of population subgroups, such as urban dwellers, girls or black youth, but on the whole it permits useful comparisons.
4. Arrest data for 1974 are particularly unreliable. See note 2, above.
5. Homicide arrests increased by 11.5% in that period, but the base was very small. The difference amounted to 188 arrests nationwide (1981 UCR, p. 167).

6. Arson has not traditionally been considered a violent crime, yet in the extreme its consequences can be among the most violent of all. The UCR began including arson among Part I offenses only in 1979. It is an important crime to take note of in any discussion of serious juvenile criminality because of the heavy involvement of youth in arson arrests. In 1981, 42.4% of all arrests for arson involved youth under the age of 18, the second highest juvenile share of arrests, after burglary, among all index offenses. Even more notable, 26% of all arrests involved juveniles under the age of 15 — nearly twice the share of burglary and larceny arrests of such young offenders. The clearance rate for arson, 15% in 1981, is among the lowest of all index offenses, so arrest data provide only a rough first estimate of the real role of youth in arson.
7. The offending rate for blacks aged 18 to 20 also decreased, but not as markedly as that for black juveniles. The white 18 to 20 year-old rate went up even more sharply than the white juvenile rate (Hindelang and McDermott, 1981, pp. 52-53).
8. Because of the way UCR data are reported, it is not possible to compare hispanic arrest rates to rates for other racial or ethnic groups. The hispanic count potentially includes offenders identified as both black and white elsewhere in the report. In the 1980 census, 5.2% of the population identified itself as hispanic (Census Bureau 1982).
9. The racial discrepancy in victimization rates holds true for all "face-to-face" (personal) offenses except simple assault, for which the reported white victimization rate is higher than the black rate (Hindelang and McDermott, 1981, p. 28).

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STRATEGIC PLANNING IN JUVENILE JUSTICE — DEFINING THE TOUGHEST KIDS

Jeffrey A. Fagan
Eliot Hartstone

There is general agreement from a wide range of theoretical and philosophical perspectives that "swift and sure" court action is an important part of an overall delinquency policy. For many youths, unpredictable responses of the juvenile court are an important factor in the onset and perpetuation of juvenile crime (Roysner and Edelman, 1980). Control and strain theorists, for example, argue that the absence of effective mechanisms for sanctioning delinquent behavior reinforces delinquent conduct and thereby erodes positive social bonds (Weis and Hawkins, 1979). Deterrence theorists contend that delinquency can be reduced if we "routinize and make predictable the consequences of delinquent behavior" (Wilson, 1975). Incapacitation policies are based on the presumption that removal and confinement of chronic juvenile offenders will eliminate opportunities to commit crimes and thereby reduce the volume of delinquency (Greenwood, 1982).

Each of these perspectives has been cited recently to support significant changes in juvenile justice policy where the precepts of "aid, encourage-

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ment, and guidance" are being replaced by the principles of punishment and "just desserts." Throughout the land, the rehabilitative ideals of the juvenile court are being reviewed and overshadowed by concerns with community protection, punishment, retribution, and, increasingly, secure confinement (Miller and Ohlin, 1980).

These concerns stem from a growing public perception that the juvenile court cannot blend punishment with treatment for delinquent youth. Conservative critics of the juvenile court cite its inability to sanction juvenile offenders, and in turn its failure to achieve the dual goals of rehabilitation and individualized treatment (Currie, 1982). Increasingly, the public is demanding that the juvenile court "get tough," especially for "serious," "repeat," or "violent offenders" (Miller et al., 1982). "Get tough" usually implies either mandatory incarceration in the juvenile system or presumptive transfer or referral to the punishment-oriented adult court (Fagan et al., 1981). Finally, several critics have suggested that the juvenile court be abolished, or its jurisdiction redefined, arguing that the interests of neither the public nor youth are served by its *parens patriae* philosophy (Feld, 1981; Zimring, 1981; Fisher, et al., 1982).

The emphasis on serious and violent juvenile offenders results from several factors. First, it is now well known that a small but "violent few" account for a disproportionately large percentage of serious and violent juvenile crime (Wolfgang et al., 1972; Wolfgang, 1977; Hamparian et al., 1978; Shannon, 1980). Second, despite their small numbers, the public perceives violent juvenile offenders as a major threat to community safety (President's Task Force on Violent Crime, 1982). Third, they are the most problematic population in the juvenile court, requiring at once the most intensive services and secure confinement. In this regard, they "drive" the juvenile courts and correctional agencies, consuming the most resources and public attention (Miller and Ohlin, 1980). Finally, serious and violent crime is at the center of the ideological conflict between proponents of the juvenile court philosophy and advocates of a retributive or punishment-oriented system (Coates, 1981). As such, legislation requiring longer sentences and harsher sanctions has been targeted at this population.

Regardless of whether social responses to juvenile crime emphasize specialized treatment or harsher punishment, responsibility has been placed squarely on the juvenile justice system to identify, adjudicate, and respond to those juvenile offenders who pose the greatest threat to society and require the strongest interventions and sanctions. However, in order to effect either treatment or control policy, we must first define those offenders and offenses we wish to target for the system's scarce resources. Then, we must find those youths who meet these criteria (McDermott, 1982). Unfortunately, there is little agreement among researchers, judges, clinicians, or legislators (i.e., the public) as to who is a "serious" or "violent" offender, and which offenders are deserving of harsher sanctions. Moreover, the juvenile court procedures for identifying "serious or violent" offenders and

for invoking severe responses are little understood and need to be examined in detail (Fagan et al., 1981).

This paper examines the issues and problems in defining and targeting violent juvenile offenders. It begins by reviewing the current debate about the definition of "serious" and "violent" juvenile offenders, and identifying principles and considerations in formulating a definition. The importance and role of definitions, the consequences for youths who are so defined, and the empirical literature are surveyed. The discussion offers guidelines for defining violent juvenile offenders which attempt to reconcile varying perspectives and incorporate empirical, theoretical, and ethical considerations. A case study of a major federal initiative is then discussed which highlights the problems encountered in operationalizing and applying the definition. The paper concludes with an analysis of policy issues and perspectives on the juvenile court's role in responding to serious and violent juvenile offenders.

THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINITIONS

While there is no consensus as to which individual acts or offense patterns are "serious" or "violent," there is general agreement as to the importance of establishing a definition in terms of social policy and consequences for youth. But that is where consensus ends. Definitions vary widely depending on their source and the purposes they serve. McDermott (1982) offers three such perspectives: research, legislative, and treatment. These three perspectives provide divergent or even conflicting definitions. Moreover, differences occur within perspectives. Among researchers, for example, definitions vary depending on the nature of the task, the questions to be studied, and the researcher's professional discipline. Among practitioners and public officials, definitional perspectives are influenced by ideology, profession, and responsibilities. Judges and practitioners, for example, are concerned with treatment placements, secure confinement, and public safety. These as well as other considerations influence the definitions they propose.

Definitions and criteria convey the real world applications of social policy. For example, although "violent crime" may be specifically identified as the focus of proposed delinquency legislation, what various interest groups may label as "violent" can include behaviors ranging from fistfights or schoolyard "shakedowns" to homicide. Defining violence means not only distinguishing among person offense types but also between "violent" and "non-violent" offenses (Zimring, 1978). A case in point is burglary of an occupied dwelling. Many consider this a violent act, although the intent is to gain property, but not necessarily from a person.

When the debate expands to consider "serious" offenses we also must weigh a variety of public opinions regarding the relative impacts of crimes

such as vandalism, auto theft, larceny, and burglary. Although none of these crimes involves bodily injury to their victims, the public nevertheless demands accountability for, and protection from, such acts through "special measures" for "serious" delinquents.

Various perspectives also include a youth's history as part of a definition. Criminologists contend that severity of offense is less important in typifying delinquent careers than is the frequency of delinquent acts. Several states have "habitual offender" statutes, where an offender is labelled due to a pattern of offenses. However, there is considerable variation across states regarding the number or nature of prior offenses which qualify for the category of "chronic" offender. Once labelled, though, the "violent," "serious," or "chronic" offender may be subject to special scrutiny and handling by the juvenile court. Such labels and definitions may have a cumulative effect, influencing decisions made in subsequent contacts with the justice system. The fairness and accuracy of "habitual offender statutes" may thus be limited, and the policy goals of such statutes undercut.

The definition of serious or violent offender conveys not just theoretical perceptions of causes and remedies, but ideological perspectives on social control. Zimring (1981) characterizes youth violence as a central theme of the politics of crime control, while Coates (1981) identifies the serious juvenile offender as the ideological battleground between supporters of harsher policies and proponents of deinstitutionalization. Although every social and political institution which proposes to address youth crime will have to face these issues, the juvenile court in particular has become the focus of the debate. Moreover, the debate about harsher punishment for juveniles has been generalized from the "serious" offender in the juvenile court to all delinquents (Feld, 1981; Hamparian, 1982). Therefore, the future of the juvenile court (and the rehabilitative ideal) arguably is related to its ability to define and effectively handle "serious" and "violent" juveniles. In turn, that future may rest on the resolution of this ideological question.

Consequences of Definitions and Discretionary Decisions

In general, each state has defined those acts or juvenile offense histories which merit "special considerations" or extra-precautionary measures (Coates, 1981; McDermott, 1982). And those special considerations are the practical and programmatic applications of social policy: special services, intensive treatment or supervision, secure confinement, or transfer to adult court. By linking certain types of offenses with special considerations, such legislation expresses two themes. First, the offense categories convey what society views as the most pressing delinquency problems: violent crime, "repetitive" crime, or "serious" crime (which usually includes property

and/or drug sales). Second, the special measures suggest an analysis of cures, if not causes: incapacitation, removal from the "rehabilitative" juvenile jurisdiction to a "punitive" criminal system, mandatory intensive treatment, or even psychiatric care.

Discretion and Disparity. Regardless of which policy or definition is adopted, implementation inevitably raises numerous practical problems. Discretion characterizes those justice system decisions which are not codified, including arrest, charging, plea negotiations, and dispositions. In some cases, delinquency research may better describe the behavior of the juvenile justice system than that of the youths. Given the consequences associated with definitional issues, discretion plays a crucial role in dictating how a case is resolved and how severely a youth is punished. With discretion come issues of fairness and due process.

Discretion is a major factor at every point in the defining process. The selection of offenses and behaviors to be identified as "serious" involves legislative discretion. However, the application of that definition is also subject to the discretionary interpretation of each decision-maker and gatekeeper, depending on his or her interests and goals. The discretion points vary across jurisdictions by court organization and local norms. It is not surprising, then, that issues of disparity and fairness arise.

Legislative discretion can give rise to disparity across states. For example, two states may differ in their consideration of offense history in the waiver decision, or in their consideration of which offenses are serious and for what age groups. The 16-year-old auto thief may be transferred to criminal court in State A but remains a delinquent in State B. Where youth violence is targeted, the purse-snatcher who doesn't injure his or her victim may be placed mandatorily in secure juvenile confinement in State A, on probationary supervision in State B, or charged in criminal court as a felon in State C. From a broad social policy perspective, seemingly arbitrary criteria of seriousness and age, which have such a heavy impact on the lives of juvenile offenders, lack empirical support or practical meaning (McDermott, 1982).

Disparity within or across states can occur by virtue of prosecutorial discretion. Consider the cases of two youths charged with similar property offenses. The first juvenile charged with a burglary may be automatically transferred to criminal court depending on statute. This youth is no longer considered a juvenile and is thus typically seen as beyond (or excluded from) rehabilitation. Therefore, it is no longer relevant that the "cause" of the burglary may have been peer pressure or youthful impulsiveness. Society has spoken — the 16-year-old charged with burglary is deemed ready to be punished as an adult. However, a second 16-year-old charged with petty larceny is still regarded as a juvenile and, therefore, afforded the more extensive array of rehabilitative services usually available to the juvenile court. Does a charge of burglary (a discretionary prosecutorial determination) imply maturity that the shoplifter apparently has not yet attained? Does it suggest full capacity and moral development? And, most important,

does it merit qualitatively different and harsher responses?

Juvenile courts vary widely in terms of court organization and their bearing on case outcome (Ito and Stapleton, 1982). Where a prosecutorial function is strong, the chances of informal handling decrease if a case is charged "felony" or "serious." Exactly who prepares the petition and prosecutes the case varies across or within states. Thus, although charged as a serious offender, a youth may be treated quite differently depending on the political history of a given jurisdiction and the court organization which has grown around it.

Once transferred, the informality which characterizes the juvenile court is replaced by a seemingly more formal and due process-oriented adult court. The first-time juvenile burglar is likely to be handled informally in juvenile court, without a finding of guilt or innocence, and often with a treatment or service component to the case outcome (Ito and Stapleton, 1982). In adult court, the transferred juvenile is more likely to become enmeshed in the plea bargaining mechanisms which often substitute for adjudicatory proceedings. By pleading to a lesser charge, the "serious" juvenile offender now has begun the process of building a criminal record which is likely to influence future discretionary decisions in the justice system.

In some cases, the reality of criminal processing may work against the goals of the transfer policy. Plea bargaining and lengthy case processing may obscure the connection between act and sanction, neutralizing both deterrent effects and the inherently stronger social control of the adult system. Also, transferred youth theoretically are subject to the full retributive power of the criminal court. In reality, though, a wide variety of sanctions are imposed, from probation to incarceration (Roysner and Edelman, 1980). Often, a juvenile appearing for the first time in criminal court will be perceived as far less "serious" than his adult counterparts who have longer records, and as a result the youth often receives the minimum sanctions. McDermott (1982), citing experience with the New York Juvenile Offender Law, points out that not only is there inconsistency in the transfer process (e.g., who is transferred, for what offenses), but "targeted youth are elected through processes that are unreasonable and unfair." Roysner and Edelman (1981), examining the same law, found considerable sentencing disparities across jurisdictions for youths in adult court. Where transfer is discretionary, it may be used as a plea bargaining device to obtain a finding of guilt in juvenile court. Therefore, those youths with the fewest resources may be more likely to be transferred to adult court or plead guilty in juvenile court.

Consequences of Discretion. Not all consequences of being labelled as "serious" or "violent" are well understood. There are consequences for the offender who remains in juvenile court and is labelled as "violent," "serious," or "chronic." Several states have either passed legislation or developed administrative guidelines mandating minimum periods of secure confinement for these offenders. In general, the statutes specify a

minimum length of stay which is longer for labelled youths (Fisher et al., 1982). These offenders, once institutionalized, are likely to be assigned to the most secure facilities available or deemed in need of the strongest treatment regimens. Among the institutional population, a "violent" offender may be regarded as the toughest kid in the facility, possibly leading to more frequent confrontations with other youths or staff.¹

Not only will a label affect the immediate consequences for the youth, but a youth defined as "violent" or "serious" may also be regarded differently in future dealings with the authorities. Once subjected to more intensive scrutiny and surveillance, seemingly minor rule infractions which go undetected for other youths might carry far graver consequences for the so-called "violent" offender. For example, the number of "technical violations" for youth on intensive parole supervision was greater than for comparable youth on regular caseloads (Waldorf, 1972). Other discretionary decisions might be similarly affected. Incidents normally screened out at intake for other youths might result in a court hearing or even transfer for the "serious" offender, since political pressure often accompanies such cases (Zimring, 1978). Plea bargaining and dispositional decisions, each involving similar discretion, could be similarly affected.

The consequences of such definitions also apply for youths deemed "dangerous" or "violent" based on clinical or treatment perspectives. Steadman (1977) documented that indicted felons suffering from mental disorders and defined as "dangerous" were placed in state prisons, whereas those not defined as dangerous were placed in state mental health facilities. Steadman found a major qualitative difference in the institutional care received by these two groups as a result of placement decisions based on the "dangerous" label.

Finally, given the consequences of assigning "violent," "dangerous," or "serious" offender labels to these youths, it is crucial that such labels be applied prudently and accurately. Mislabelling a youth as a violent offender may promote the behavior that the justice system is seeking to stop.

TOWARD A DEFINITION OF VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS

The task before the juvenile justice system is to identify and sanction those offenders who meet the definition of "serious" or "violent" in the local jurisdiction. Such definitions help the court hold youths accountable for their behavior. The purpose is to link dispositional decisions to treatment needs with legal sanctions, and to allocate the most restrictive (and scarce) treatment resources to those youths who threaten public safety. Ultimately, the court is concerned with predictions of which offenders will go on to commit further offenses. The assumption, then, is that some combination of rehabilitation and punishment will change behavior. Given the potential

consequences of so defining a young offender, we must be particularly cautious about both the targeted behavior and the prediction of subsequent behavior.

A brief review of the literature provides no sound empirical basis for constructing a definition of "serious" or "violent" offender. If the definition in large part depends on its purposes, then definitions of "serious" will vary according to treatment, research, or legislative perspectives (McDermott, 1982). Moreover, there is no consensus as to which acts are serious. For example, Coates (1981) argues that only violent offenses be considered. Smith et al. (1980) are alone in adding drug sales. The OJJDP legislation includes several property offenses. Sellin and Wolfgang (1972) define "seriousness" to include injuries inflicted or property lost. Also, there is no consensus as to whether a youth who commits one such act is a serious offender. Finally, there is no agreement whether arrests or adjudications should be the standard, and how many of either is an appropriate criterion. What follows is an analysis of several definitional components, particularly as they relate to treatment decisions and system processing. A definition is offered which reflects concerns of consequences and philosophy and incorporates empirical knowledge of delinquent careers.

Type of Behavior: Violent or Serious?

The literature on delinquent careers provides little help in identifying those youths who merit the special handling which accompanies the "serious" or "violent" label. Rojek and Erikson (1982) found no evidence of "violent" offense specialization among a large court intake sample. In this sample, a youth arrested for a violent offense was more likely to have committed a non-violent offense or no offense than another "violent" offense. Hartstone, Jang, and Fagan (1983) found a wide variety of serious (both property and violent felonies) and non-serious offenses among a sample of adjudicated violent offenders. Fagan, Hansen, and Jang (1982) found some evidence of emphasis on property or violent crime in self-reported delinquency among 65 adjudicated violent delinquents. However, violent delinquency is better predicted than other criminality (Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982; Wolfgang et al., 1972).

Clearly, there are a variety of behaviors which one can choose to define as "violent" or "serious," depending on one's philosophy, experiences, and interests. Yet society does not have the resources to afford special measures for all youths deemed "serious." The overwhelming number of property offenders in the juvenile court poses problems in identifying and targeting those who might merit such special measures. The consequences of so labelling a youthful property offender suggests that the definition be restricted to those who pose the greatest threat to public safety and cannot be handled by other than extraordinary precautionary measures. In other words, ethical and practical considerations impel us to select violent youth.

We agree with Coates (1981) that violent delinquency should be the behavior to be targeted for such special measures.² It is the only behavior which can be "predicted" from analyses of delinquent careers. Youth violence poses the greatest conflict between the best interests of the youth and the safety of society. It therefore poses the greatest challenge to the juvenile justice system. By focusing its scarce resources and attention on violent youths, the juvenile justice system will respond to a major source of criticism and concern.

Chronicity of Violence

Once the behavior has been specified, the next issue is determining how often the specified actions must occur. Should the term "violent offender" include youths who engage in one violent act, or should the term be more restrictive and include only those youth who repeatedly engage in violent acts ("chronic offenders"), or should it be some combination of "violent" and "serious" acts?

It is our contention that the juvenile justice system should focus its scarce resources on the chronically violent offender. Cohort studies suggest that there are a *small number* of such offenders and that these individuals are responsible for a disproportionately large amount of the violent crime committed in this country (e.g., Wolfgang et al., 1972; Wolfgang, 1977; Hamparian, 1978; Shannon, 1980). For example, Hamparian found in the Columbus, Ohio cohort study that only 2.3% of the boys were arrested for violent crimes and only 16.5% of these boys were arrested more than once. Wolfgang and colleagues, in the classic Philadelphia birth cohort study (1972), found that only 6% of the cohort (and 18% of the delinquents) accounted for 71% of the homicides known to be committed by the delinquents, 73% of the rapes, and 69% of the aggravated assaults (Wolfgang et al., 1972).

However, the cohort studies cited above have identified a considerable number of youths who commit only one violent offense. This phenomenon, termed *desistance* by Wolfgang et al., 1972, suggests that one offense is not indicative of a forthcoming career. These comprehensive cohort studies also found that a history of violence is the best predictor available of subsequent violence. Among violent offenders those reoffending were equally likely to commit a non-violent or violent offense (Wolfgang et al., 1972). In other words, past violence is the strongest among several weak predictors of future violence. It is this small number of youths who repeatedly (though not exclusively) engage in violent behaviors that we propose be targeted for special programs, *not* those youths who only episodically participate in a violent act.

We propose a definition which requires a measure of chronicity and excludes the youth who has engaged in only his initial violent offense. Adjudication for at least two violent offenses should be the criterion.³ Such of-

fenders are termed by Coates (1981) as *dangerous offenders*. But that label itself may provoke responses beyond the rehabilitative/punishment concerns of the juvenile justice system. We prefer *chronically violent offender*, a more accurate descriptor of the youths in need of special attention. Again, the scarce resources of the juvenile justice system should be strategically allocated among a wide range of demands. Incarceration or special treatment, the most expensive of all measures, should be reserved for those young people who cannot be placed in less expensive alternatives and who arguably present a threat to public safety. Two-time violent offenders do conform to this criterion. Whether one's philosophical grounding is in deterrence, incapacitation, or control perspectives, sound empirical and theoretical arguments support a focus on the chronically violent offenders.

Standards of Proof: What is an "Offender"?

Having defined the behavior patterns to be targeted, the next step is to determine a standard of proof that such behavior actually occurred. Again, the standard depends on both the purposes of the definition, and the consequences which result. For researchers, concerned primarily with counting, the consequences do not weigh heavily. For treatment staff, judges or legislators, as well as young people, the consequences are far more serious and immediate. Treatment staff confront an additional concern: that youths placed into programs be those for whom the treatment is designed. In the past, problems in matching violent delinquents with treatment modalities have undermined treatment effectiveness (Fagan et al., 1981).

The available choices for certifying reported behaviors can be roughly divided into two types: legal criteria (arrest, court petition, adjudication or conviction); and clinical or actuarial predictors. Each is discussed below.

Legal Criteria. Various definitions of serious or violent offenders have relied on arrests, court referrals, or adjudications, for specific or generic charges. The cohort studies cited earlier, for example, used police contact or police arrest data to identify violent young people. These studies agree that actual behavior is the best predictor of subsequent behavior, yet we remain cautious about using arrest data either as predictors or standards of proof. Official records, particularly arrests or contacts, are not completely reliable. Aside from the traditional discretion applied in arrest and charging, organizational factors in law enforcement agencies often have an impact on arrest decisions. McCleary (1981) showed extreme variability in police arrest data due to administrative practices in three urban police departments. The charging function in juvenile court intake and in particular by juvenile prosecutors is also little understood, yet may influence the targeting process.

Ethical considerations also dictate caution in use of arrests (or court contacts) as the standard of proof. Given the consequences of being defined as

"violent," we must be assured that youths are not placed, confined, or stigmatized for offenses which they *legally* have not committed.

In lieu of arrests, a recent study by Chaiken and Chaiken (1982) suggests that adjudications may be a more useful predictor of subsequent violence. They showed that robbery commission rates of young adult offenders can be "forecast" by three factors:

- frequent violent juvenile crime (adjudication for violent crime before age 18;
- early onset of juvenile crime (especially violent crime before age 16); and
- a number of prior adult robbery convictions.

Of importance here is the identification of *convictions and adjudications*, not *arrests*, as predictors of subsequent violence. While imperfect (their false positive rate was 30%), these data suggest that earlier problems in prediction research may be lessened by substituting adjudication for arrest as the criterion variable. The implications for defining serious and violent juvenile offenders are also clear: those adjudicated for at least two violent acts are the dangerous offenders in need of the extraordinary measures which accompany the definition of serious or violent.

Social and Behavioral Assessments. In lieu of legal processing (petition, adjudication) or chronicity, it has been suggested by some that a violent offender can be defined by intake or treatment staff based on his/her assessment of the youth and his behavior. It has been argued that assessments done by clinicians based on the youth's personality, family, childhood behavior, or even demographics are more accurate in assessing a violent youth than are legal criteria. We will argue that this is not the case.

Several cohort studies have attempted to identify the non-offense (e.g., demographic) predictors of repeated or chronic juvenile violence (Polk and Schaefer, 1972; Wolfgang et al., 1972; Hamparian et al., 1978; Strasburg, 1978; Lefkowitz, 1980; Shannon, 1980). Sample differences and variations in definitions distinguish these studies. However, some common themes emerge. Age at onset of criminal activity was not found to be a reliable predictor in two of these studies (Hamparian et al., 1978; Shannon, 1980). In contrast, Polk and Schaefer (1972) found that it predicted adult crime, irrespective of the level of prior violence. Other variables suggested as strongly predictive of juvenile violence include sex, race, socio-economic status, and, to a lesser extent, educational achievement, IQ, and residential mobility (Wolfgang et al., 1972). A limited recidivism study did not substantiate the predictive power of any of these variables at the individual level (Schlesinger, 1978). For example, only one youth in every 20 predicted to become violent actually becomes violent (Wolfgang, 1977). In addition, using background characteristics which do not reflect wrongdoing on the part of the individual to determine punitive sanctions is extremely unethical.

Some childhood development studies have claimed that adult violence is predictable from such childhood variables as pyromania, enuresis, and cruelty to animals (Hellman and Blackman, 1966); fighting, temper tan-

trums, school problems, and inability to get along with others (Justice et al., 1974); and maternal supervision and discipline, and family cohesion (Glueck and Glueck, 1950). A more recent study by Lefkowitz et al. (1977) found that aggression at age 8 is the best predictor of aggression at age 19. Several studies have found strong relationships between abuse as a child and later aggressiveness and violence (Fagan et al., 1980; Kuhl, 1981), and specifically during adolescence (Alfaro, 1978).

Several attempts have been made to clinically predict recidivism on the basis of psychologically diagnosed "dangerousness" (Kozol et al., 1972; Cocozza and Steadman, 1976). A scale combining "legal dangerousness" (clinically-predicted violence propensity) with age (Cocozza and Steadman, 1974) has resulted in similar problems of over prediction, generating between 54 and 99% false positives.

Other problems persist in using "clinical" factors to identify serious or violent offenders. Variables or traits such as enuresis or verbal aggressiveness are difficult to uniformly operationalize and measure. When interpreted by court intake or treatment staff, they are subject to wide variability and discretion. Moreover, these factors are generally only weak correlates or descriptors, and are not very strong predictors of violence. Nor are they necessarily linked to illegal behaviors. The resulting questions of fairness or disparity would test the limits of ethical standards, particularly in view of the potential consequences of such labelling.

As Monahan has noted in his review of prediction research on violent and serious juvenile behavior, "prediction of future behavior is an integral part of the 'rehabilitative ideal,' and the 'rehabilitative ideal' is the essence of juvenile justice" (1977: 148). The findings of such research should be pivotal information for both dispositional and intervention decisions. However, as shown here, prediction studies have not been able to identify correlates or descriptions of serious offenders that predict initial, random, or career violence or delinquency by juveniles. For these reasons, we reject clinical criteria of "dangerousness."

A Combined Behavioral-Legal Approach. A more recent approach combines both behavioral and legal approaches. Greenwood (1982) proposes an incapacitation policy which would target chronically violent ("predatory") offenders based on both legal criteria (prior arrests and/or convictions for violent and drug-related crimes) and socio-demographic characteristics (sex, unemployment history, marital status). Aside from the general prediction problems with such non-legal factors, incarcerating offenders based on social structural variables (e.g., unemployment) raises serious legal and constitutional issues.

Whitaker (1982) has argued that a violent offender could be identified not only by a chronicity of offenses but also through the clinical assessment of "situational chronicity" (defined as situations in which the violence involved in the instant offense is sufficiently extreme to remove most doubts concerning the extent to which the involved youth is only episodically, and not

routinely, violent). According to Whitaker, "situational chronicity" possesses either:

- *non-instrumental violence* — violence not as means to an end (steal money) but an end in and of itself (enjoyment unrelated to goal attainment), or
- *excessive violence* — violence is used above and beyond that required to accomplish the goal, though "enjoyment" is not always present, or
- *aggravated violence* — premeditated violence which is prolonged and deliberate.

According to Whitaker, the presence of any of these characteristics would enable a trained person to identify individuals who are as violent as (and perhaps even more violent than) some youths who have multiple adjudications for violent offenses. However, both the Whitaker and Greenwood approaches raise concerns which apply equally to this combined approach and to behavioral criteria: reliability, "creaming," and validity.

Reliability requires consistent interpretation and application of behavioral traits which may be difficult to objectify and measure. Moreover, the setting of a threshold becomes extremely problematic. For example, what is "excessive" or, conversely, "normative" violence? Would screeners similarly define "enjoyment" or "excessive"? What standard of proof would be applied to ensure that these ephemeral features of the act actually occurred? For example, will the offender's "mood" or "pleasure" be adjudicated as well as his behavior?

Second, for treatment programs, there is a natural and understandable selection process whereby clinical staff would, given choices, identify youths who would further the program's interests. It is not surprising that program staff might reject disruptive or aggressive youths with histories of treatment failure. Such youths are difficult to manage and jeopardize the chances of demonstrating success. Such "creaming" in juvenile treatment programs is not uncommon (Cressey and McDermott, 1973).

Finally, for evaluation or knowledge purposes, there are several dangers attendant to internal validity. Discretionary or qualitative criteria, particularly in this case, risk the false identification of an episodically violent youth as chronic. These criteria minimize chances of missing "truly" violent youths (i.e., false negatives), but they increase the risk of erroneously labelling youths who might otherwise commit no further acts of violence (i.e., false positives) and, by a legal definition, would be excluded. There are several consequences of this practice for researchers, practitioners, and youthful offenders:

- youths may be falsely stigmatized and/or subject to more restrictive placements;
- research is less likely to demonstrate treatment impact because youths inappropriate for the treatment model might be selected;
- attempts to generalize research findings to "other" multiple offenders would be open to attack, thereby undermining the importance of the treatment/research effort.

We reject the combined approach. The addition of socio-demographic factors or behavioral criteria to legal criteria may marginally improve the ability to accurately target dangerous offenders. But the potential human and social costs outweigh the limited gain in predictive efficacy. The concept of selective incapacitation, as proposed by Greenwood, raises serious equal protection constitutional issues. Whitaker's approach, while more benign, poses major problems in "fairness" of interpretation, operationalization, and measurement, particularly when implemented in several jurisdictions.


In summary, we agree with Coates (1981) that chronically violent juvenile offenders should be targeted for the extra-precautionary measures of special treatment or secure confinement: a youth with at least two adjudications for a violent crime. Figure 2.1 shows an operational definition constructed for a major federal initiative on treatment interventions with violent juvenile offenders. Clinical, social, or behavioral criteria are not acceptable given the purpose and consequences of such definitions. The next section presents a case study of a major federal research and development initiative which operationalized and implemented this definitional format in several urban juvenile courts. This experience generates hypotheses to explain the perceived crises in juvenile justice system responses to chronically violent delinquents.

DISCUSSION

The future of the juvenile justice system may rest on its ability to respond to serious and violent juvenile offenders through a marriage of the time-honored rehabilitative ideals of *parens patriae* with the growing interest in punishment for juvenile offenders. If the court cannot blend punishment with rehabilitative concerns, the legislatures will continue to turn to the adult system to handle its "toughest" cases. Given the need for strategic planning of scarce resources, juvenile justice agencies need to fashion appropriate dispositional alternatives and allocate them to youths whose risk to public safety requires the most intensive care and restrictive placements. This is the primary policy purpose in defining a special class of juvenile offenders. Failure to do so may prompt legislatures to reduce or eliminate juvenile jurisdiction (Feld, 1983). The question remains: given the large volume of cases and the legacy of discretion and informality, can the juvenile justice system provide "swift and sure punishment" and treatment to serious or violent offenders by applying precise definitions and differentiating these cases from an omnibus delinquency policy?

This paper has reviewed the principles and considerations needed to formulate such a definition. The role of definitions and the consequences for youths so defined were discussed and the empirical literature was surveyed. The definition offered relies solely on multiple adjudications for

FIGURE 2.1: VJO Program Eligibility Criteria



violent offenses, and poses a challenge to the juvenile justice system: Are the goals of "swift and sure" punishment and treatment, common to a range of delinquency and crime control theories, attainable when the juvenile court and prosecutors bear primary responsibility for identifying and targeting chronically violent juvenile offenders? Through a case study of a major federal initiative focusing on chronically violent delinquents, we observed the responses to this challenge.

In 1981 the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention implemented Part I of the Violent Juvenile Offender Research and Development Program.⁴ The initiative was designed to test an experimental program for chronically violent juvenile offenders. The original program criteria which defined a youth as a "chronically violent juvenile offender" emerged from the considerations articulated in this paper. The criteria required two court adjudications for violent offenses (murder⁵, rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, arson of an occupied structure).

These criteria were implemented when the five violent juvenile offender projects opened in January, 1982.⁶ However, the early history of the program was marked by an extremely slow intake of eligible youths. The first four months of operations resulted in only 12 youths satisfying the criteria across the five sites. One site (Denver) was terminated due to the absence of any eligible youths. As a result of the slow intake, the criteria for the Violent Juvenile Offender Program were expanded on three occasions. The current eligibility criteria includes youths with a prior adjudication for a felonious property offense (see Figure 2.1 for complete description of VJO eligibility criteria).

In applying a rigorous definition, relying on adjudications for violent acts, we found that there are far fewer youths adjudicated repeatedly for violent offenses in the juvenile justice systems than is generally believed by the public, legislators, juvenile justice practitioners, and the media. For example, only nine adjudications for target offenses were recorded in a four month period in the Denver juvenile court. One wonders, then, exactly what implicit or formal policy governs the use of juvenile corrections' special resources, if the "toughest" kids are not systematically identified and placed there.

Is the definition too restrictive? The answer is no, not if one assumes that the justice system should hold youths accountable for their acts by adjudicating cases on their merits, and that there is an economic logic to placement policies. One must periodically return to the reason for classifying chronically violent youth: to afford them access to limited resources and special measures of the juvenile justice system. The definition, then, serves a strategic planning purpose for juvenile justice agencies. The rigor of the definition is consistent with these policy goals. To understand the apparent inability to apply the definition, we must turn not to the component criteria but to juvenile crime and to the justice system practices for identifying chronically violent youths.

Two possible explanations can be offered for the low number of violent youths identified. First, there may be less violent juvenile crime than is generally thought. While violent juvenile crime certainly is not increasing (Howell, 1981), the VJO experience suggests it may actually be lower than during 1976-80, when this initiative was planned and designed. Second, violent juvenile offenders may be referred to the juvenile justice system, but the system is not processing them as such. While there is some truth to the former explanation, it is difficult to study and subject to arbitrary judgments. The VJO experience suggests that the latter explanation is more relevant. Data collected for this study suggest that there may be processes in the juvenile justice system whereby the omnibus delinquency policy of *parens patriae* results in an inability to distinguish chronically violent youths from other offenders. The reasons for the attrition of violent juvenile offenders from the juvenile justice system is examined in a separate chapter in this book (see Chapter 6, Fagan, et al.).

The Violent Juvenile Offender Program experience does not, as some suggest, demonstrate that a definition of chronically violent juvenile offenders that relies on adjudications for violent felonies with felonious priors is inappropriate. Rather, it has painfully demonstrated to those involved in this initiative, that a definition of "violence" or "seriousness" no matter how well grounded empirically, ethically and politically, can not in and of itself achieve the goals of any delinquency policy. The juvenile justice system must take the initiative to define legally and hold accountable those youths who meet the criteria through court action and appropriate treatment interventions which embody theory and policy. Given limited resources, the strongest interventions must be strategically targeted at those youths whose offense histories and treatment needs merit special considerations. The first step in the implementation of this policy is the development of a definition. This paper suggests some directions for legislators and the justice system.

FOOTNOTES

1. Field notes from on-site researchers at OJJDP Violent Juvenile Offender Projects suggest that these youths are known in the institutions and widely regarded as the paragon of "toughness." As such, they are targets for confrontation by both other youths and staff.
2. Specifically, we would classify the following offenses as violent: murder, attempted murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, attempted rape, aggravated assault, armed robbery, arson of an occupied structure, and kidnapping.
3. Some may argue that two violent offenses do not display chronicity. However, our research uses a standard of adjudication, not apprehension or petition. Youths in the VJO study (which requires two adjudications for eligibility) average 10.5 petitions of which 3.2 are for violent offenses. Thus, while further study is needed in this area, the VJO Program experience suggests that where two adjudications for violent offenses are the eligibility criteria, only chronically violent offenders will in fact be included.

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4. This effort is explained in detail in Chapter 11, Intervening with Violent Juvenile Offenders.
5. A murder adjudication was the lone exception and satisfied the eligibility criteria without a prior adjudication.
6. The five original VJO Program sites were Boston, Denver, Newark, and Phoenix (state juvenile corrections agencies or departments), and Memphis (juvenile court).

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TOWARD A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR INTERVENTION WITH VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS

*Jeffrey A. Fagan
Sally Jo Jones*

Delinquency theory and research historically have viewed juvenile crime as a continuum of behaviors ranging from status offenses to major felonies, emanating from a common set of causal factors. As recent research has focused on the "violent few" (e.g., Hamparian, et al, 1978), it is apparent that theory and practice for this subset of juvenile offenders should depart from earlier views. Indeed, one of the sources of past failure in program and research may be linked to "unicausal" theories of delinquency. Knowledge and practice developed successfully for a global delinquent population have been ineffective for violent youths. The result is a growing concern with the ability of the juvenile justice system to respond to violent delinquents (Roysner and Edelman, 1980), and a need for theory to "drive" the design of interventions for this population.

The purpose of this chapter is to review and assess the major research and theories on the causes of juvenile violence, and to develop a theoretical perspective to design interventions which build upon existing theory and knowledge about violent juvenile offenders.

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THEORIES OF DELINQUENCY AND VIOLENCE

Over the past thirty years and particularly during the past decade, a number of theories have been advanced and modified to explain the causes of juvenile delinquency and, to a lesser extent, violence. Although there are several major schools of etiological thought and, often, many variations within each, two primary thrusts dominate both past and present research. One orientation focuses primarily on the individual personality. In this view, youth become delinquent through a predisposition (physical or psychic) and/or developmental trauma. This psychogenic thrust is evident in positions that ascribe the motivation for delinquency to such causes as faulty family interaction patterns, instinctual aggressiveness and neurological dysfunction. The second orientation stresses the contribution of social, economic, cultural, and situational factors in the development of delinquent behavior. These sociogenic theories address the correlation of high delinquency rates with rapid population turnover, minority and low-income status, and social disruption as reflected in broken homes, suicide, alcoholism, and child abuse and neglect.

More recent theoretical research and development has tended to borrow from both orientations, as will become apparent in the following review of the four major schools:

- biological theories;
- psychological theories;
- sociological theories; and
- learning and behavioral theories.

Biological Theories

The social and behavioral branches of biology have provided a number of theories about human aggression and violence. Foremost among these is the ethological perspective, which holds that urban violence has the same biological basis as instinctive territorial fight of animals (Lorenz, 1966). According to this school of thought, the weakening of the social structure and of ties between the child and adult in family, school, religion, and government creates a cultural vacuum in which aggressive instincts are no longer controlled.

Sociobiological theories view delinquency and violence as products of interaction between brain dysfunction and environmental factors (e.g., Rothman et al., 1976). Recent research in this view has focused on the links between delinquency and learning disabilities resulting from brain dysfunction (Unger, 1978; Bernstein and Rulo, 1976; Sawicki and Schaeffer, 1979; Podboy and Mallory, 1978; Kvaraceus, 1965) and between violent behavior and substance abuse (Ewer, 1968; Boe, 1971; Andrew et al., 1976; Wenk,

1976; Tinklenberg, 1979). Research on this theory orientation is fairly recent, and there is little data to elaborate or validate this model.

Psychological Theories

Traditional psychological studies of delinquency and violence have been concerned with intellectual structure, physiological constitution and personality characteristics. Recent research indicates that while delinquents do not differ significantly from non-delinquents in general intelligence (Siebert, 1962; Caplan, 1965), they do exhibit specific differences in cognitive functioning. Delinquents, for example, use relatively few perceptual categories in viewing the outside world, are less able to tolerate ambiguities, and tend to deal with others as if they were "mirror images" of themselves (Baker and Sarbin, 1956). Homicidal youth appear to rely quite a bit more on emotion than logic to interpret the world (King, 1975). Physiological research has found some evidence of physical difference among delinquents, including a physique tending toward the mesomorph (relatively muscular) (Sheldon, 1949; Glueck and Glueck, 1950b), physical immaturities (Stafford-Clark, 1951), and neurological disorders (Ostrow and Ostrow, 1946; Lewis et al., 1979).

Personality studies have characterized delinquents as highly "present-oriented" (Seligman and Hager, 1972), emotionally disturbed (Hathaway and Monachesi, 1953), inadequately socialized, less responsible and self-perceived trouble-makers (Dinitz et al., 1958). Quay (1965) has categorized delinquents into three types — socialized, neurotic and psychopathic — that, he maintains, differ from each other and have distinctive personality characteristics. Studies of violent juveniles have revealed a comparative lack of impulse control (Sorrells, 1977; Russell, 1973), social alienation and desire for immediate gratification (Vachss and Bakal, 1979), an overpowering fearfulness (Sorrells, 1980), and greater needs for personal space (Boorhem et al., 1977).

Perhaps most useful for intervening with violent juvenile offenders is psychology's classic causal theory of violence. Similar to the biological view, Freudian-based theory holds that humans possess a basic instinct-aggressive drive, controlled in most individuals through the actions of the ego and superego. In some individuals, however, childhood trauma or other developmental problems disable these psychic control mechanisms. According to one version of this analysis, the violent youth cannot control his or her own aggressive impulses due to poor ego strength, ego decomposition, or immature (underdeveloped) ego (Schoenfeld, 1971). A more recent theory positing the episodic discontrol of aggressive impulses may be a more powerful explanation of juvenile violence (Sorrells, 1977).

Sociological Theories

Three major classes of sociological theory are relevant for conceptualizing the genesis of serious juvenile offenses:

- Structural/strain theories, exemplified by the concept of differential access to opportunities;
- Cultural theories, represented by the ideas of subcultures of violence and differential association; and
- Control theories, which view criminal conduct as a product of the breakdown in ties to the conventional order.

A fourth class of sociological theory, the societal reaction (or labeling) concept, does not address causal issues but views delinquency as a result of the processing of youths by the juvenile justice system.

Structural/Strain Theories. Built on Merton's general anomie theory of deviance (1957), the structural/strain approach assumes that delinquent behavior is a result of socially induced pressures rather than individual pathological impulses. According to Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) formulation, delinquency arises out of the discrepancy between socially generated desires and the socially structured opportunity for their gratification. Experiences of blocked opportunities, primarily among lower-class youth, result in intense frustration, alienation, and exploration of nonconformist alternatives such as delinquent behavior. The limited application of this theory to youths of lower social class — its main weak point — has been overcome in the more recent work of Elliott and Voss (1974), who focus on individual goals as well as opportunities. This extension of strain theory cites self-report delinquency data showing that middle-class youth are as likely as lower socio-economic status youth to aspire beyond their means and, thus, to experience aspiration-opportunity disjunctions leading to frustration.

Empirical tests of strain theory are generally supportive, indicating that these hypotheses explain as much as 30% of delinquent behavior (Elliott and Voss, 1974; Brennan and Huizinga, 1975). Still, there is much delinquent behavior that it does not account for, including violence. Even borrowing the frustration-aggression hypothesis from psychology, research has not proven conclusively that frustration leads to general aggression (Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967) or to particular violent acts, e.g., homicide (Henry and Short, 1954).

Cultural Theories. A second group of sociological theories conceptualizes delinquent and violent behavior as the outgrowth of conformity to a distinctive set of cultural beliefs, values or definitions. The most sophisticated expression of this approach is the theory of subcultures of violence. Composed of young-adult, non-white males and accounting for much of both serious crime and homicides, these subcultures are natural social groups that conform to cultural values emphasizing violence. According to Wolfgang and Ferracuti, "the greater the degree of integration of the individual into this subculture, the higher the probability that his behavior will

be violent in a variety of situations" (1967: 152). Central to this theory is the proposition that the "development of favorable attitudes toward, and the use of, violence in a subculture usually involve learned behavior and a process of differential learning, association, or identification" (160).

While this theory helps to account for the phenomena of gang violence and prevalence of violent delinquency in minority ghettos, it is not supported by empirical research, which shows that valuing violence does not necessarily result in violence (Ball-Rokeach, 1973) and that the value systems of violent and nonviolent youth offenders are basically the same (Foland, 1978). Further, subculture and differential association theories cannot adequately explain anomalies such as the non-delinquent youth from a high-crime neighborhood or the serious offender from a "good environment."

Control Theories. Social control theory views delinquent behavior as the result of a lack of internalized normative controls (i.e., beliefs and attitudes), the attenuation of previously established controls (i.e., external social restraints), and/or conflict between controls to criminal behavior. According to Hirschi, these "control theories assume that delinquent acts result when an individual's bond to society is weak or broken" (1969: 16).

One version of control theory identifies a "neutralization" process whereby youth who are committed to conventional views of morality learn certain rationalizations that free them from the constraints of such views and create a suspended condition in which misconduct becomes a viable option (Sykes and Matza, 1957; Matza, 1964). This approach is highly situational, depicting the delinquent as adrift in a moral vacuum in which immediate contingencies and pressures shape illegal behavior. Rationalization before the commission of a delinquent or violent act enables youths to neutralize moral or legal controls and, therefore, to act out illegally. While it is thus able to account for much violent behavior, the theory does not adequately conceptualize why neutralization occurs, given that the "will to delinquency" arises after, rather than before, neutralization (Hirschi, 1969). Neutralization does, however, explain data describing violence as a random occurrence in a general pattern of delinquent behavior.

The containment approach focuses on defective socialization to account for the lack of insulation from deviant cultural "pulls." Reckless (1967) has identified both inner (personal) as well as outer (social) controls that constrain or restrain criminal temptation. A number of delinquent characteristics — poor self-concept, lack of commitment to long-range legitimate goals, unrealistic or extravagant aspirations, low tolerance of frustration, a hostile set of beliefs toward the law and its agents — are cited as evidence of inadequate inner controls. External, or social, controls refer to the role of sanctions from family, school, peers, and the law in the socialization process.

Perhaps the most complete statement of control theory is Hirschi's (1969) argument that attachment to conventional persons, commitment to conven-

tional pursuits, involvement in conventional activities, and belief in conventional values reduce the likelihood that a youth will engage in delinquent conduct. Hirschi found that attachment to parents is strongly associated with resistance to delinquency, and that involvement in conventional activities such as doing homework is negatively related to involvement in delinquent acts. Moreover, Hirschi reports that boys tend to "have friends whose activities are congruent with their own attitudes," (159) such that boys with a large stake in conformity tended not to have delinquent friends and, even if they did, not to commit delinquent acts. On this evidence, Hirschi argues that inadequate socialization leads to having low stakes in conformity, which in turn leads to the acquisition of delinquent friends and to delinquent behavior. Low stakes in conformity result from weakened bonds (attachment, commitment, belief, involvement). Youngsters are then free to engage in delinquent behavior because the socialization process has not developed bonds of sufficient strength to reinforce conformity.

Labeling or Societal Reaction Theory. Focusing primarily on the identification and processing of offenders by the juvenile justice system, societal reaction theory does not explain the behaviors that lead to the application of labels (or to the initiation of a reaction). Rather, assuming that a particular act has brought a youth to the attention of this system, societal reaction theory is concerned with differential processing or treatment of such offenses and its effects on future behavior.

Thornberry (1973) found strong evidence of significant differences in the dispositions of juveniles by the police and juvenile court on the basis of race and socio-economic status. Interestingly, for offenses of high seriousness, differential treatment on the basis of race does not hold for juvenile court intake screening but does for police decisions to charge or dismiss (among serious offenders, 70% of blacks vs. 49.6% of whites were referred to juvenile court) and for ultimate court disposition (42.8% of the serious black offenders vs. 25.6% of the whites were incarcerated rather than given probation) (263). Similar tendencies appear with respect to high and low socio-economic status (265). Contrary findings indicating no significant differential treatment on the basis of race and/or socio-economic status have been reported in a number of studies of decision-making at different stages in the juvenile system (McEachern and Bauzer, 1967; Black and Reiss, 1970; Terry, 1967; and Weiner and Willie, 1971). Whether such differential treatment is predictive of subsequent violent behavior has not been empirically tested.

Learning and Behavioral Theories

Learning and behavioral theories of violence and aggression propose that people are not born with repertoires of aggressive behavior but learn this behavior largely through observation, which is refined through reinforced practice (Bandura, 1977). That is, delinquent behavior is learned when it is

rewarded or reinforced through social interactions. According to these theories, children learn to use violence as an interpersonal strategy and tactic modeled by their parents, peers, and social milieu (Bandura, 1969; Staats, 1975; Conger, 1976; Akers, 1977; Kozol et al., 1977).

Researchers who have studied familial determinants of anti-social activity report a higher incidence of familial aggressive modeling for delinquents than for non-delinquents (Glueck and Glueck, 1950; McCord et al., 1959; Sorrells, 1977). Parents who engage in violent acts, such as harsh discipline or child abuse, teach violence to their offspring (Silver et al., 1969; Hoffman, 1960; Lewis and Pincus, 1979; Farrington, 1978).

The youth's subculture provides a second important source of aggression. Various studies have located the highest rates of aggressive behavior in environments where aggressive role models abound and where aggressiveness is a valued attribute (Short, 1968; Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967).

A third source of aggressive behavior according to learning theories is the mass media, which provide symbolic models on which youths pattern their activities. Much empirical research has shown that exposure to televised violence increases interpersonal aggressiveness in youth and adults (Friedrich and Stein, 1973; Leyens et al., 1975; Parke et al., 1975; Steuer et al., 1971), although it appears that situational and personal factors affect individual responses and susceptibility (Crawford et al., 1976).

THEORY BASE FOR INTERVENTIONS

The foregoing review of delinquency theory and supporting research shows that the current competing explanations of the causes of violent juvenile delinquency are in need of further elaboration and integration. Juvenile delinquency and violent juvenile crime are complex phenomena involving interactional, individual, situational, and environmental influences (Sadoff, 1978; Earls, 1979). Hawkins and Weis (1980), for example, reviewed ten self-reported delinquency data sets and concluded that there are multiple correlates and causes of delinquency operating within the institutional domains of family, schools, peers, and community. To the extent that any theory or set of theories fails to take into account each of these influences, its explanatory power — and, thereby, its usefulness as an intervention model — is limited.

Attempts to Integrate Theory

There have been several attempts recently to integrate theoretical explanations of juvenile delinquency. One common interface has been between social learning theory and control theory (Johnson, 1979; Akers, 1977; Conger, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979; Hawkins and Weis, 1980); others have integrated strain with control perspectives (Elliott and Voss, 1974). Elliott et al.

(1979) have proposed a combination of the control, strain and social learning approaches. The dynamic relationships among the variables and processes of these integrated models present opportunities to intervene with both the "causes" of delinquency (via control theory) and the manner in which these causes operate in the social development context (via social learning theory).

In attempting to compensate for deficiencies in individual theories, however, these integrated approaches have been criticized for new weaknesses. Perhaps the most serious of these is the application of theories incorporating macrosociological variables (i.e., social conditions such as unemployment) to explain behavior at the individual level. Both strain theory and control theory, as originally conceived, apply systemic conditions to explain delinquent behavior in the aggregate, not the delinquency of individual youth (Kornhauser, 1978, 1979; Short, 1979). But data on individual differences indicate that individual behavior is mediated by other factors at the individual level (e.g., family, peers) (Conger, 1980).

Other critics have viewed integrated theory as a general theory subsuming partial theories, which will probably be very powerful but non-specific with respect to the range and types of behavior explained (Hirschi, 1979). Finally, integrated theory assumes that many of the explanatory variables (i.e., the causal factors) are independent of each other — an assumption that is risky. For example, socialization experiences vary with respect to social class. Thus, the process by which youths become delinquent or violent may not be independent of social-structural conditions. These relationships must be present in a fully developed theory (Conger, 1980).

Despite these criticisms, an integrated theory is best able to provide a valid explanation of violent delinquency by incorporating both empirical tests of the various theoretical perspectives as well as the multiple factors and correlates specific to the target population of violent youth. An integrated theory can best address the following critical concerns for intervention with violent juvenile delinquents:

- Intervention theory should address both causal factors and behavior-change processes.
- Intervention theory should address *only* those factors that are identified *both* by current research on offenses and characteristics of violent juveniles *and* by the theory base(s) (thereby avoiding the criticism of integrated theory that it accounts for everything and explains nothing).
- Intervention theory must closely specify the outcome variable (i.e., violent behavior as distinct from other types of antisocial and illegal behavior) and accommodate critical contextual variables and individual differences in psychosocial development that may influence the likelihood of violent acts.

AN INTERVENTION MODEL

An integrated theory that addresses these concerns and is responsive to the criticisms outlined above includes both psychological and sociological approaches to violent behavior. It relies on properties of both the individual and the environment to explain behavior, and simultaneously identifies factors on which to focus treatment and intervention. It specifies both the factors that underlie violent delinquency and the processes by which youths may become delinquent and/or violent. A diagram of this proposed theoretical scheme is shown as Figure 3.1.

The proposed model integrates control, strain, and social learning theories of delinquent behavior (as in Elliott et al., 1979). It identifies salient factors on which to focus intervention by describing the processes that govern both socialization and delinquent behavior development (Hawkins and Weis, 1980), and by specifying a motivational component (Conger, 1980). The incorporation of individual differences addresses those causal roots of violence that cannot be easily explained within a broad conceptualization of delinquency. Thus, by specifying *violence* as the behavior to be studied, the intervention theory necessarily incorporates psychosocial factors unique to a population of violent youth (Sorrells, 1977; 1980).

Control theory informs the model with its two types of *bonds* — *integration* and *commitment* — which are the elements of socialization. (Elliott et al. reformulated Hirschi's original statement of bonds.) Integration or external bonds include such variables as social roles, participation in conventional activities, and the presence of effective sanctioning networks. Subsumed in these variables are involvement in, and attachment to, conventional groups such as family, schools, careers, peers, etc. (Elliott et al., 1979). Commitment or internal bonds include such variables as conventional goals, norms, and values; personal attachment to parents and peers; social identification; and feelings of control.

Strain and learning theory lend their focus on the processes (i.e., the specific experiences or conditions) that strengthen or weaken social bonds and allow for the "learning" of criminal values and behavior patterns vs. conventional values and behaviors. Attenuating processes include delinquent learning, negatively reinforcing failure experiences in conventional activities, blocked opportunities, and the effects of social disorganization at home, in school, or on the streets that threaten the stability and cohesion of one's conventional social groups. The learning component is also informed by certain labeling theorists who have noted the learning involved in the assignment of a negative label (Becker, 1963; Schur, 1973).


Psychosocial factors that account for many of the individual variables that distinguish violent youth as a subset of delinquent youth include such predisposing variables as violent families (Kuhl, 1980; Fagan et al., 1980; Alfaro, 1978), lack of empathy, and emotional disturbance (Sorrells, 1980).

By including a process of delinquent socialization that is not tied to social

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FIGURE 3.1: A Theoretical Model for Violent Juvenile Delinquency Program Interventions



class, this integrated model accounts for the distribution of self-reported delinquency data across social classes (Elliott et al., 1979). It prescribes factors on which to focus intervention: goals and opportunities, and the bonds of integration and commitment. It also prescribes a behavioral component (social learning) for intervention in the process of involvement in delinquent behavior. Finally, the inclusion of psychosocial factors introduces predisposing variables that may account for violent behavior in youths with either strong or weak bonds.

The intervention model suggests that youth become delinquent and/or violent in one of two ways. First, individual psychological factors or early socialization experiences can precipitate outbursts of violence — the episodic dyscontrol described by Sorrells (1977; 1980). Second, youths can become delinquent and/or violent by a process of inadequate socialization. In this framework, social and personal bonds to "conformity" are underdeveloped or weakened, and youths are socialized (i.e., reinforced) to a delinquent lifestyle through peer influences. Hirschi (1969), in his formulation of control theory, suggests that peer influence is an important supplement to explain *why* delinquent behavior occurs when social bonds are weakened.

Social bonds develop in the units in which socialization occurs: family, school, law, and peers. Social class and ability are exogenous variables which affect the development of social and personal bonds (Wiatrowski, Griswold, and Roberts, 1981). If youths fail to develop social bonds within each of these units, they become free to associate with and be influenced by delinquent peers. Under such conditions, given individual factors, violent delinquency may occur. Even where youths have developed strong bonds, violence may occur due to individual factors.

How do strong bonds develop? Strong *external* bonds result from positive labeling and reinforcement through school or job achievement, involvement in activities perceived as important, and a positive family environment. Strong *internal* bonds develop from an effective sanctioning network, setting and attainment of personal goals, and a belief in self-determination and control over one's environment. These processes will be affected differentially by early socialization experiences (e.g., violence as model behavior) and psychosocial development (e.g., child rearing practices, child abuse, family cohesion). Violence can occur either when positive social bonds are weakened and the influence of violent delinquent peers becomes the youth's primary social bond, or when learned violent behavior from adult role models takes over under feelings of stress or conflict.

In summary, the intervention model identifies four underlying principles which operate on both internal and external bonds. As such, these processes are the natural strategies for intervention:

- **Social Networking**, including both socialization experiences and development of personal attachments, which together comprise internal bonds. This process specifies the development of positive role models and relation-

ships with non-delinquent peers, personal and institutional or programmatic resources for support and assistance in times of stress, and development of alternative behaviors and cultures for social interactions.

- **Provision of Youth Opportunities**, including development of opportunities to successfully engage in positive behaviors and availability of roles and behaviors that can be positively recognized and reinforced. These are the units of external commitment. Interventions targeted at this process include such themes as empowerment, self-determination for aspired goals, creation of realistic opportunities for vocational and educational achievement, and involvement in community institutions and activities.

- **Social Learning**, including the processes by which socialization occurs and methods for strengthening both external and internal bonds. Social learning processes include positive labeling and reinforcement, and negative sanctions for illegal behaviors.

- **Goal-Oriented Interventions**, which specify the behavioral component of the intervention strategy, requiring setting behavioral goals that are realistic and achievable and specific to the youth's needs and abilities. This element also requires identification of special individual behaviors that may underlie violent delinquent behaviors (e.g., substance abuse, poor communication skills, self-defeating behaviors, sexual aggressiveness) and psychological problems.

Editor's note: As a result of the process described in this chapter an intervention model was developed and is being tested currently by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's Violent Juvenile Offender Program. For a discussion of that model and the issues involved in its implementation, see Chapter 11, Intervening with Violent Juvenile Offenders: A Community Reintegration Model.

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4

HOMICIDALLY AGGRESSIVE YOUNG CHILDREN: NEUROPSYCHIATRIC AND EXPERIENTIAL CORRELATES

*Dorothy Otnow Lewis
Shelley S. Shanok
Madeleine Grant
Eva Ritvo*

Of 55 children admitted to a children's psychiatric service, 21 were homicidally aggressive. Psychiatric symptoms and diagnoses did not distinguish these children from the nonhomicidal children, but the homicidally aggressive children were significantly more likely to 1) have a father who behaved violently, often homicidally, 2) have had a seizure, 3) have attempted suicide, and 4) have a mother who had been hospitalized for a psychiatric disorder. The authors explore explanations for the contribution of these factors to juvenile violence.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we shall report a high prevalence of homicidal behaviors in a 1-year sample of young children hospitalized on a child psychiatry inpatient unit. Second, we shall attempt to identify neuropsychiatric symptoms and experiential factors associated with these homicidal behaviors.

In a previous study on violent adolescents (1), we found that adolescents sent to a hospital psychiatric unit were as violent as adolescents who were

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sent to a correctional school. We also found (2) that extremely violent behaviors in adolescents were associated with psychotic symptoms and neurological impairment. Especially violent adolescents also had both witnessed and been the victims of severe physical abuse. Little, to date, has been reported regarding the neuropsychiatric status of extremely violent young children. We wondered whether young children hospitalized for psychiatric disorders were as aggressive as their adolescent counterparts and whether aggression in young children was associated with neuropsychiatric or experiential factors similar to those for adolescents.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Murder by young children is a rare event. Hence, there is a paucity of literature on the subject. In 1961 Easson and Steinhilber described 8 cases of murderous aggression by male children and adolescents, only 1 of which resulted in death. They focused on the apparent psychodynamics of the acts and concluded that one or both parents had fostered or condoned murderous assault. Michaels (1961), reviewing Easson and Steinhilber's clinical data, reported enuresis in 6 of the 8 boys, epilepsy in 3, and a history of abuse by a parent in 3 cases. More recently Walshe-Brennan (1975) described 11 children convicted of homicide and noted that many of the boys had overly dominant mothers. According to Walshe-Brennan, these youngsters had normal intelligence and personality and were healthy and free from epilepsy. Sargent (1962) described 5 murderous children and hypothesized a family conspiracy in which the child who killed acted out an unconscious parental wish. Tooley (1975) described 2 children who, he believed, killed their siblings while acting out maternal wishes. Probably the best study of homicide by young children is Bender's report (1959) of 33 young murderers evaluated over 24 years. Of the 33, 12 were eventually diagnosed as schizophrenic, 7 as having chronic brain syndrome without epilepsy, 3 as epileptic, and 3 as intellectually defective. Noteworthy is the fact that, of the first 16 children, none were considered schizophrenic at the time of their initial evaluation although 5 were subsequently so diagnosed. Bender also called attention to environmental factors, such as extreme violence in the family.

Most studies have focused on the small number of children who have actually killed others and have made inferences regarding psychodynamic influences. Instances of homicidal aggression that have not resulted in death have been ignored. Given the sparseness of the literature, we welcomed the opportunity to review the hospital records of an entire 1-year sample of young children hospitalized for psychiatric disorders both to assess the prevalence of homicidally aggressive behavior in them and to learn which clinical and experiential factors were associated with such behavior.

METHOD

Our setting was the child psychiatry inpatient service at a midtown hospital in a major city, a ward of 18 beds for children aged 3 to 12 years. It is primarily a diagnostic service, on which patients remain an average of 90 days. Our sample consisted of all children (N = 55) admitted to the service in a single year in the late 1970s. Data on socioeconomic status were incomplete; however, the facility serves primarily children and families from classes IV and V (Hollingshead, 1958) and a few from classes I-III. There were 24 (44%) black, 23 (42%) Hispanic, and 8 (14%) white children in the sample. There were 42 boys and 13 girls.

Data were obtained from hospital records, which, because of long stays and the teaching functions of the service, included detailed developmental, family, and medical histories; psychiatric evaluations; physical examinations, including neurological assessments; psychological testing (Gesell Developmental Schedule, WISC-R); educational assessments (Gray Oral Reading Test, Wide Range Achievement Test); and, in most cases, EEGs. The use of hospital records has advantages and disadvantages. Data are not uniform or complete because they are not collected primarily for research purposes. On the other hand, data obtained from retrospective chart reviews of symptoms and behaviors are unbiased by the possible prejudices of the investigators.

All symptoms and signs, past and present, that were mentioned in the charts were recorded. Specifically, the following signs and symptoms were noted: visual or auditory hallucinations; loose, rambling, illogical thought processes; paranoid ideation; isolation or withdrawal; sadness or crying; enuresis; sleep problems (e.g., inability to fall asleep, wandering at night); minor neurological signs (e.g., coordination problems, choreiform movements, synkinesis); ever having had a seizure of any kind; and a diagnosis of reading or mathematical disability. A symptom or sign was considered present if a clinician so stated and documented it with an example. Similarly, any reference in the chart to the following behaviors ever having occurred was recorded: suicidal behaviors (e.g., jumping from windows, trying to hang or stab self, mention of suicidal ideation), serious assaultiveness other than occasional fist fights with peers (e.g., attacking a child or adult with an object, attempting to choke someone, stabbing or threatening with a knife, setting fire to another person), cruelty to animals, fire setting without obvious homicidal interest, and deviant sexual behaviors (e.g., frequently exposing genitalia, molesting younger relatives).

Diagnoses were made throughout hospitalization by several different clinicians from different disciplines who had varying levels of expertise. Most children received several diagnoses. Admission and discharge diagnoses and all others mentioned in the chart were recorded. Considering the many diagnoses given each child, the validity of any diagnosis remains in question. (We are currently studying the validity of these diagnoses and

their relationship to symptoms, behaviors, treatment, socioeconomic status, and race.) Diagnoses were categorized as follows: psychosis other than autism (e.g., childhood schizophrenia, pervasive developmental disorder, psychotic episode), attention deficit disorder (including hyperactivity or minimal brain dysfunction), retardation, conduct disorder (including sociopathy or unsocialized aggressive reaction), neurosis or adjustment reaction, organic brain syndrome, epilepsy (including grand mal and petit mal), and autism.

We also reviewed the doctors' order sheets and nursing notes to determine the kinds of medications that had been prescribed. Medications were categorized as follows: antipsychotic (e.g., phenothiazines, butyrophenones), stimulants (e.g., amphetamine, methylphenidate), and antiepileptics (e.g., phenytoin, phenobarbital, carbamazepine). Other categories of medication were so rarely mentioned that they were not reported for this study.

Assessment of Homicidally Aggressive Behaviors

Any mention in the chart of a child's current or past aggressive, withdrawn, peculiar, or otherwise maladaptive behaviors was recorded verbatim. Four independent raters were then required to rate whether or not the child had ever been homicidally aggressive, using as the criterion whether or not the child's act was so violent that, had it been performed by an adult, it would have resulted in death or serious injury. Threatening with a potentially lethal object or weapon was also rated as homicidally aggressive. Accidental injury to another was not rated as homicidally aggressive. Fire setting alone was not considered homicidal unless it involved deliberately setting fire to another person. If a child had set fire to a person, he was counted as positive for both homicidal aggression and fire setting. For a child to be categorized homicidally aggressive, 3 of 4 raters had to agree on the rating. In all cases aggression was longstanding, as well as a current problem leading to admission, and no child rated homicidally aggressive had committed only a single seriously aggressive act.

RESULTS

Clinical and Behavioral Differences

Of the 55 children, 21 were judged to have been homicidally aggressive, and 30 were considered not homicidally aggressive. Agreement could not be reached about 4 children, 3 boys and 1 girl (all of whom had threatened homicide or carried weapons but had not threatened with weapons), so they were excluded from the study, which left 51 children. Of the 39 boys, 44% (N = 17) were rated homicidally aggressive; of the 12 girls, 33% (N = 4) were

rated homicidally aggressive. These proportions did not differ significantly.

Of the 21 homicidally aggressive children, 9 had attacked siblings, 5 had attacked mothers, 5 had attacked peers, 3 had attacked teachers, and 4 had attacked other relatives or acquaintances. Of note, none had attacked his or her father and only 2 had threatened or expressed a wish to do so. The homicidally aggressive acts and other violent behaviors of each child are presented in table 4.1.

The homicidally aggressive children did not differ significantly from the nonhomicidal children in terms of the diagnoses they had received. Similar proportions of homicidally aggressive and nonhomicidal children, during or before hospitalization, had received diagnoses of psychosis (38% and 40%), attention deficit disorder (48% and 52%), conduct disorder (52% and 37%), neurosis or adjustment reaction (29% and 23%), and retardation (26% and 29%). The proportion of homicidally aggressive children who had been diagnosed epileptic was higher than that for nonhomicidal children (29% versus 7%), and autism was somewhat less prevalent in the homicidally aggressive group (5% versus 30%), but these differences did not reach statistical significance. There was also no significant difference between the two groups when we considered discharge diagnoses only.

Pharmacologic treatment also did not distinguish the two groups; 70% of the homicidally aggressive and 66% of the nonhomicidal children had been treated with antipsychotic medications, 29% and 18% with stimulants, and 26% and 10% with antiepileptic medications.

The homicidally aggressive and nonhomicidal children had surprisingly similar symptoms. Similar proportions had experienced visual hallucinations (30% and 32%), auditory hallucinations (55% and 41%), looseness of associations (30% and 31%), paranoid ideation (40% and 32%), isolation or withdrawal (29% and 40%), sadness or crying (14% and 20%), neurological soft signs (80% and 83%), learning disabilities (48% and 60%), and enuresis (35% and 21%).

The proportions of homicidally aggressive and nonhomicidal children with histories of cruelty to animals (14% and 3%), fire setting (33% and 19%), and deviant sexual behaviors (16% and 17%) were not significantly different. The most significant behavior distinguishing the homicidally aggressive from the nonhomicidal children was suicidal behavior (57% versus 23%; $X^2 = 4.681$, $p = .031$). For example, 1 child allegedly threw himself down a flight of stairs at age 1½ years and subsequently attempted to jump out of a window; another deliberately stood in front of a moving bus; another expressed the wish to kill himself, ran into traffic, and put his hand in a box of broken glass; another tried to set herself on fire; another tried to stab herself with a knife and also tried to jump off a roof; another, aged 3¾ years, was found with an extension cord around his neck; and another twice tried to take a drug overdose and once jumped from a second story window. The most common form of suicide attempt in this group was jumping from a window or roof; 8 of the 21 homicidal children had tried this method.

TABLE 4.1: Homicidal Acts and Other Violent or Deviant Behaviors of 21 Homicidal Children

Patient	Sex	Age (years)	Homicidal Behaviors	Other Violent or Deviant Behaviors
1	F	12.5	Strangled sister until she turned red; tried to choke cousin, says witch's voice told her to do this.	Bites children in school
2	M	8.4	Set fire to couch where mother was sleeping, singed mother's hair	Fights with peers; set fires in home 3 weeks before admission
3	M	8.9	Attempted to stab home-maker with knife, says he "wanted to see her dead"; wants to kill mother, father, grandmother and to "cut off my sister's tit"	Carries pocket knife "for protection"; fights with teachers; knocked out peer's teeth in fight over cookies
4	M	10.4	Tried to stab brother 3 or 4 times with knife and fork	Put penis in mouth of 2-year-old cousin; drew picture of boy having head cut off by Devil; set fires in trash can, igniting entire apartment
5	M	9.9	Tried to choke boy on hospital ward; hit brother on head with bunk bed ladder	In kindergarten fought with teachers and peers, needed to be restrained at ankles and wrists; bit and punched staff members on ward
6	M	10.2	Tried twice to kill mother, stood over her with hammer and turned on gas jets in house; wanted to kill boy with kitchen knife	Threw brick from roof of treatment center, angry that someone messed up art work
7	F	6.6	Taunts older brother with knife, threatening to cut off his head	Uncontrollable at home and school; fights with siblings and friends; plays with matches
8	M	11.4	Threatened to kill mother; tried to strangle brother and sister with hands	Scratched mother on face and chest when she tried to separate him in fight with another boy
9	M	3.9	Threw scissors at mother and visitor, held knife to mother's throat while she slept	
10	M	9.9	Threatened to kill mother; threatened brother with butcher's knife twice; threatened to poke out teacher's eyes; hit teacher with rubber bat	Throws furniture; fights with peers

TABLE 4.1: Homicidal Acts and Other Violent or Deviant Behaviors of 21 Homicidal Children (continued)

Patient	Sex	Age (years)	Homicidal Behaviors	Other Violent or Deviant Behaviors
11	M	11.3	Drew kitchen knife on mother	Hits and throws objects at mother; fights with friends; lit fire after voices told him to do so; cruel to family dog
12	M	8.3	Choked children at school, had to be pulled away	Fought and threw chairs on ward
13	M	9.9	Threatens to kill people with knives; threatened foster mother while playing with knives	Provoked children on ward
14	M	9.3	Attempted to awaken mother by hitting her on head with hammer	Hit children on wards; performed fellatio with another child; punched boy in nose; put cat under hot water; fire setting since age 3
15	M	12.0	Threatened sister with knife; slept with it under pillow	Fights in school with peers and teachers; exposes genitalia; touches other people's penises; urinates in school staircase; set fire to papers, nearly burned house down
16	M	9.2	Tried to "immolate" a classmate; tried to hit another boy over head with heavy equipment	Threatens brothers with screw drivers; hides knives under bed; tried to break teacher's glasses and pulled hair from her head; wanted to hurt father with knives; set fire to house
17	F	7.9	Attempted to choke classmate	Fights with peers; provoked peers on ward
18	M	9.1	Tried to stab brother with butcher knife	Collects knives; fights with peers; set fire to kitchen carpet
19	F	12.6	Gave pills to 5-year-old brother, resulting in hospitalization	Tried to attack boy and staff on ward; throws chairs
20	M	5.0	Hit teacher with rubber bat, stating he wanted to kill her	Hits and bites people; scratched face of hospital staff member; throws and breaks furniture
21	M	11.3	Unprovoked attack on teacher with rubber hose, requiring several men to restrain him; pulled knife on peers who had beaten him up	Several attacks on teachers

Suicidal ideation was also significantly more prevalent in the homicidally aggressive group of children (80% versus 30%; $Xy^2 = 10.083$, $p = .002$).

Seizures

One of the major factors distinguishing the homicidally aggressive from the nonhomicidal children was a history of seizures. Of the 21 homicidal children, 48% ($N = 10$) definitely had a history of seizures, compared with 7% ($N = 2$) of the 30 nonhomicidal children ($Xy^2 = 10.092$, $p = .002$), and an additional 10% ($N = 2$) of the homicidal children probably had seizures. Of the 10 homicidal children with definite seizures, 1 had had grand mal and petit mal seizures and a seizure following concussion; 1 had had meningitis with coma and seizures; 1 had had seizures secondary to lead poisoning; another had had posttraumatic epilepsy and subsequently had coma and seizures associated with measles; 1 had had grand mal only; 1 was retarded and had had "seizures in early childhood"; and 1 had had both febrile seizures and seizures following a concussion. Three children had had febrile seizures only. Of the 2 children with equivocal histories, 1 had had "episodes of leg stiffening in infancy" and "was followed in pediatric neurology clinic," where a brain scan was performed. The other had episodes of falling to the ground, losing consciousness, twitching, and having no memory of the event.

Of note, although having had seizures significantly distinguished the groups, EEG abnormalities did not. Of the 16 homicidally aggressive children on whom EEGs were performed, 38% ($N = 6$) had EEGs that were reported to be abnormal, compared with 48% ($N = 10$) of the 21 nonhomicidal children for whom EEG data were available. The data were insufficient to compare types of EEG abnormalities.

A high proportion of children in both groups had histories of perinatal problems, 79% of the homicidal group and 66% of the nonhomicidal. There was a tendency (n.s.) for more of the homicidally aggressive children to have a history of head injury (57% versus 30%) and to have averaged a greater number of head injuries as well.

Family Violence and Psychopathology

Almost all of the children in both groups had a biological mother in the home, 95% of the homicidal group and 87% of the nonhomicidal group. On the other hand, few households in either group had a biological father living at home (5% versus 27%; $Xy^2 = 2.710$, $p = .100$). Nevertheless, records indicated that when the fathers of the homicidal children did appear, their presence was often literally "felt"; in 62% of the households of homicidal children, the fathers had been physically violent to the mothers, compared

with only 13% of the households of nonhomicidal children ($Xy^2 = 11.020$, $p = .001$). In fact, 37% of the fathers of homicidal children had themselves been homicidal, as had 13% of the fathers of nonhomicidal children. For example, 2 fathers were in jail for manslaughter, 1 was wanted for murder, 1 had been deported from the United States for stabbing a man, 1 father had attempted to drown his son, 1 father threw his infant daughter against a crib, and 1 father was charged with assault after beating his wife so severely that she was hospitalized for 2 weeks.

Alcoholism was also significantly more common in the fathers of homicidally aggressive children (52% versus 10%; $Xy^2 = 9.115$, $p = .003$). Moreover, although similar proportions of children in each group had been physically abused by someone (55% and 45%), abuse by fathers specifically was more common in the homicidal group (29% versus 7%). In spite of the greater prevalence of violence among the fathers of the homicidal children, similar proportions of fathers in each group were said to be known to the courts or police (33% and 30%).

In contrast to the fathers, only 10% of the mothers in each group were known to have been in trouble with the law. Of the mothers of the homicidally aggressive children, 25% had physically abused their children, as had 26% of the mothers of nonhomicidal children; 33% and 26% of the respective groups were alcoholic; and 19% and 3% had been violent toward their husbands. None of these differences was significant. However, when these women were violent, they were very violent; 2 of the mothers of homicidal children had stabbed their mates in the chest. The most significant factor distinguishing the mothers of homicidally aggressive children from the mothers of nonhomicidal children was a history of psychiatric hospitalization; 43% and 7%, respectively, had been hospitalized for psychiatric disorders ($Xy^2 = 7.544$, $p = .007$).

Multiple Regression Analysis

We wondered which combination of the many symptomatic, behavioral, family, and experiential variables most clearly distinguished the homicidally aggressive from the nonhomicidal children. We therefore conducted a stepwise multiple regression analysis, using homicidal aggression and its absence as the dependent variables. We used as the independent variables those factors that seemed to distinguish the groups from each other on chi-square tests and analyses of variance — namely, suicidal behavior, seizures, numbers of head injuries, abuse by one's father, father's violence toward the mother, father's alcoholism, and mother's admission to a psychiatric hospital. We found that the following combination of factors significantly distinguished the groups: father's violence toward the mother, seizures, suicidal behavior, and mother's admission to a psychiatric hospital. These factors together accounted for 57.5% of the variance. The father's violence

toward the mother accounted for 27.5% of the variance, seizures for 15.7%, suicidal behavior for 9.2%, and the mother's admission to a psychiatric hospital for 6.9%.

DISCUSSION

A constellation of physiological, behavioral, and experiential factors seems to have contributed to extreme violence in these psychiatrically impaired children. Whether or not this constellation is characteristic of most extremely aggressive young children is uncertain and awaits replication studies.

How might these factors operate to engender violence? Having a seriously psychiatrically impaired mother is likely to contribute to a child's violent behaviors in several ways. Obviously, the fact that a mother has been hospitalized for a psychiatric disorder from time to time suggests that a child has experienced loss and inconsistent, erratic mothering. Moreover, a seriously disturbed mother is likely to have been emotionally unavailable even when physically present. In addition to their own psychopathology, over 60% of the mothers of the homicidally aggressive children had married violent, physically assaultive men. Thus the households in which these children were raised were filled with violence. Many of the chart descriptions of the fathers indicated that they were as psychiatrically impaired as their wives, but their violent, often psychotic behaviors were perceived by society as merely antisocial. Hence they were rarely hospitalized for psychiatric disorders.

Having one or two psychotic parents also suggests that many of the homicidally aggressive children may, themselves, have been vulnerable to periodic psychotic disorganization (Heston, 1966; Rosenthal, et al., 1968). This predisposition to pervasive psychiatric disturbance may explain in part their bizarre patterns of homicidal and suicidal behavior. Both completed suicidal acts and completed homicidal acts are extremely rare for young children (Bender, 1959; Shaffer, 1974). Suicide attempts are somewhat more common (Mattson and Hawkins, 1969). When seen separately or together, they often indicate severe psychopathology (Bender, 1959; Inamdar, et al., 1982).

The finding of a history of seizures in almost 50% of the homicidal children came as a surprise, especially because many had experienced only febrile seizures. The literature (Hauser, et al., 1977) suggests that early febrile seizures do not have significant sequelae. The relationship of violence to seizure disorders remains an area of active debate (Pincus, 1981; Delgado-Escueta, et al., 1981; Gunn, 1982; Pincus, 1982). It was impossible in these cases to determine whether any of the violent behaviors reported were temporally related to a seizure. However, given the prevalence of head trauma and/or perinatal problems in this sample, it seems that the sig-

nificance of seizures is primarily an indicator of CNS dysfunction. This kind of CNS vulnerability is often associated with lability of moods and impulsivity (Cantwell, 1975; Rutter, et al., 1970). We speculate that CNS dysfunction combined with a vulnerability to psychotic disorganization contributed to the children's impulsive self-destructive and homicidally aggressive behaviors.

Whatever the importance of CNS vulnerabilities and/or a predisposition to psychosis, the most significant factor contributing to violence seems to have been experiential, namely, having a violent father. In what ways might paternal violence encourage violent aggression in children? First, a violent father furnishes a model for behavior. Second, when directed toward the child his violence often causes the very CNS vulnerability to impulsiveness about which we have spoken. Finally, witnessing and being the victim of irrational violence engenders a kind of rage and frustration that, when directed inward, expresses itself as suicidal behavior. When directed outward and displaced from the father, it manifests itself as homicidal aggression.

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THE VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDER: AN EMPIRICAL PORTRAIT

*Eliot Hartstone
Karen V. Hansen*

Recent studies have shown that there are a small number of violent youths who are disproportionately responsible for a large amount of the juvenile violence committed in this country (Wolfgang et al., 1972; Shannon, 1976; Hamparian, 1978). However, despite the fact that violent juvenile offenders constitute a relatively small and identifiable group, juvenile courts and corrections agencies have largely neglected to differentiate these youths and failed to provide unique dispositions and services for them (see Chapter 6, Fagan et al.).

Given limited resources, high caseloads, and minimal empirical data, the juvenile justice system has, for the most part, handled these youths much like nonviolent offenders, using treatment approaches based on theories of delinquency causation and rehabilitation which assume all delinquent acts share common causal factors and etiological roots. Programs specifically targeted at violent juveniles are extremely rare (Neithercutt, 1978). Not surprisingly, lacking the necessary resources and information, these traditional facilities and programs have, for the most part, been unsuccessful in helping these youths refrain from violent and delinquent behaviors upon their return to the community (Robison and Smith, 1971; Lerman, 1975;

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Lipton et al., 1975; Vitner, et al., 1975; Greenwood et al., 1983).

The failure of the juvenile justice system to respond effectively to violent juveniles can be traced, at least in part, to the absence of both empirical knowledge on violent juveniles and theories of the causes of violent delinquency. The purpose of this article is to contribute to the development of an empirical data base on violent youths which can be used by the juvenile justice system in the development of programs, treatment modalities, and services which are designed for violent juveniles and their particular needs. Specifically, this paper presents descriptive data on a sample of violent juvenile offenders selected from four large urban areas in four different states. Data are presented on the youths' delinquent careers, family backgrounds, school and employment experiences, peer group delinquency, gang involvement, and drug/alcohol abuse.

METHODOLOGY

The data on violent juveniles analyzed in this paper have been collected as part of the URSA Institute evaluation of Part I of the OJJDP-funded Violent Juvenile Offender Research and Development Program (VJO Program).¹

The data presented below are for the 114 violent juvenile offenders randomly assigned to experimental or control groups in the four test sites² between February 1, 1982 and March 31, 1983. The data presented were obtained from three sources — the Intake Assessment form (IA), the Youth Admission Interview (YA) and the Family Interview.³

The IA form was used to abstract information from official records contained in the subject's case folder which document the youth's court involvements, prior placements, and family history. The IA has been completed for all 114 youths admitted prior to March 31, 1983. The YA is a structured interview conducted with the youth immediately after project assignment. The interview focuses on self-reported delinquency, education and employment experiences, peer relations, drug/alcohol use, and family context. The interview takes approximately two hours to complete, and was conducted with 113 of the 114 youths. The Family Interview was conducted with the youth's mother or mother figure (e.g., grandmother). In those situations where the youth had no mother figure, another family member (e.g., father, sibling) was substituted. The Family Interview focuses on the family context and the parent's perceptions of the youth's pre-offense behaviors and activities. Interviews with the subjects' mothers were difficult to schedule and have resulted in a current data base of 65 Family Interviews (57%). This interview requires about one-half hour to complete.

It is our intent to administer the Youth Admission and Family Interviews to a sample of non-offenders and a sample of non-violent delinquents in 1984. This will allow for a comparison of client and family self-report variables with our violent offender sample. However, since these data have

not been collected as yet, this paper is limited to describing the violent juvenile offender.

Before describing the youths in this study, it is important to present to the reader the criteria for admission into the VJO Program which, therefore, qualifies a youth in our study sites as a "violent juvenile offender." A youth must have: 1) an instant *adjudication* for a "target violent" crime against the person; and 2) have a *prior adjudication* for a *felonious crime* against person or property. Youths adjudicated for murder are the one exception and do not require a prior offense history to be program eligible. A complete description of the VJO Program criteria is presented in Figure 5.1. These criteria were developed to insure that youths admitted into the VJO Program were found legally to be guilty of an excessively violent offense against the person, and were repeat offenders (that is not engaged in their first and only serious crime). The implementation of these criteria insured that the project did not admit "false positives." In establishing the criteria it was recognized that some violent youth would be excluded from the project due to the formal criteria imposed ("false negatives"). However, this was tolerated in order to guarantee that all of the youths admitted into the program were, in fact, violent and repeat offenders.

After more than one year of operation, it is clear that these criteria have resulted in the selection of those youths who are the most serious and violent juvenile offenders in the local juvenile justice systems. It is this group of violent and repeat offenders which this paper describes.

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA


As noted earlier, the VJO Program consisted of four test sites during its first funding phase — Boston, Memphis, Newark and Phoenix. Of the 114 youths assigned to these four sites as of March 31, 1983, 41 (36%) were from Newark, 27 (24%) were from Boston, 24 (21%) were from Memphis, and 22 (19%) from Phoenix. The average age of the youths at the time of assignment was 16.3; the youths ranged from 14 to 18 years of age. The study is restricted to males only.

Most of the youths meeting the eligibility in the four study sites were black (73%); a sizeable number were white (18%); and a few were either hispanic or chicano (10%). Almost all of the hispanic or chicano youth (90%) were identified in Phoenix.

DELINQUENT CAREERS

This section of the paper presents data on the delinquent careers of the violent juveniles in this study. Specifically, data are presented on three issues central to developing and selecting treatment services for violent

FIGURE 5.1: VJO Program Eligibility Criteria



youths — the extent of delinquency in general and violence in particular; the presence or absence of violent crime specialization; and the age of onset of violent offenses.

In order to determine how to treat violent juvenile offenders, it is important to learn about the nature of their illegal behaviors. While it is crucial to make treatment decisions for individual clients based on that individual's specific history, it is equally important for program planners and juvenile corrections practitioners to have a generalized portrait of the "typical" offender's delinquent career so that types of treatment and service interventions which will most regularly be needed can be anticipated, developed, and operationalized.

The delinquent career portrait which is presented in this section is based on two data sources — official records of the subjects' court involvement, and self-report data obtained through the Youth Admission interview. The official record data shows the history of official court contact and action taken for all 114 study youths. The number and nature of court petitions filed and resultant adjudications are presented. Although official record information is the usual data source of a discussion of delinquent careers, several studies (e.g., Wolfgang, 1977; Hindelang, et al., 1979) have shown the value of examining self-reported data obtained from the subjects themselves. While there is reason to have a certain amount of scientific skepticism regarding the accuracy of self-report data, these data are an important supplement to official records in that they provide information on "hidden crime" which the juvenile justice system is not aware of or chooses not to act on (Hood and Sparks, 1970; Nettler, 1974; Hindelang et al., 1979, 1981). Wolfgang (1977) found that youths in his Philadelphia cohort study reported engaging in 8 to 11 serious index crimes for every arrest. It is our view that data derived from official records and self-report surveys have different strengths and weaknesses and, therefore, complement each other in efforts to describe offense histories. As such, this section of the paper includes information obtained from personal interviews with the 113 study youths on their illegal activities.

Baseline self-report data on the youth's delinquent involvement were gathered in the Youth Admission Interview by using the self-reported delinquency items derived in the National Youth Survey (Elliott et al., 1981). Included in this survey were 31 items on a wide range of delinquent behavior which focused on three general categories of delinquency — property crime (13 items), violence (13 items) and drug use (5 items). (For specific items see Table 5.8.) The youths were asked how many times they engaged in each particular act during the preceding 12 months.

Extent of Delinquency

Information obtained from both official records and self-report interviews document extensive delinquency and violence on the part of the study

youths. While the official records show that subjects had repeated contact with courts, the self-report data suggest that the official court contacts reveal just a small percentage of the number of crimes in which these youths participate.

Data on the extent of official delinquency engaged in by the study youths are presented in Table 5.1. Table 5.1 demonstrates the chronic nature of the official delinquent involvement of the youths. As seen in Table 5.1, these youths were charged with an average of 10.5 offenses which resulted in an average of 5.7 formal court adjudications per youth. Almost 85% of the youths in the study were charged with five or more offenses. Table 5.1 also shows the repeat nature of the violence engaged in by study youths. The 114 youths in the study averaged 3.2 petitions for violent crimes against the person which resulted in an average of 2.7 formal court adjudications. Almost 60% of the youths were charged with, and 40% of the youths adjudicated for, three or more violent crimes.

TABLE 5.1: Official Records Data on Extent of Delinquency

Court Action Taken	Number of Incidents					Total				
	1-2		3-4		5-11		12 or more			
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)		
<i>Petitions</i>										
Any Type ($\bar{X}=10.5$)	11	(9.6)	7	(6.2)	56	(49.1)	40	(35.1)	114	(100.0)
Violent ($\bar{X}=3.2$)	47	(41.2)	52	(45.5)	15	(13.3)	0	(0.0)	114	(100.0)
<i>Adjudications</i>										
Any Type ($\bar{X}=5.7$)	13	(11.4)	28	(33.3)	58	(50.8)	5	(4.5)	114	(100.0)
Violent ($\bar{X}=2.7$)	69	(60.5)	36	(31.6)	9	(7.9)	0	(0.0)	114	(100.0)

As one would expect based on findings from other self-report delinquency studies (e.g., Wolfgang, 1977), the information derived from self-report data indicates an even greater prevalence of delinquent conduct than was reported in the official records. Table 5.2 collapses the specific offenses reported in the self-report survey into one of the three general categories (violence, property, drug) and records the number of times each youth stated he engaged in any of the items within each crime category during the 12 months prior to the instant offense arrest. The number of offenses were collapsed into six levels of frequency: none; 1-3 times; less than once a month (4-11 times); 1-4 times a month (12-51 times); at least once a week (52-103 times); at least twice a week (104 times or more). As seen in Table 5.2, the 113 youths averaged approximately one violent, one property, and one drug offense per week. For each of the three categories of crime, approximately half of the youths said they engaged in a crime from that offense type at least once a month (violence, 45.2%; property, 59.2%; and drug, 47.8%). Thus, these data portray much more delinquency and violence than displayed in the official records, which documented the youths

being charged with 10.5 offenses and 3.2 violent offenses during their entire delinquent career.

TABLE 5.2: Self Reported Delinquency (12 Months Prior to Instant Offense)

Type of Delinquency	Frequency of Delinquent Activity											
	None		1-3 Times		<once a month	1-4 Times a month	\geq once a week	\geq twice a week				
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)				
Violent Offense ($\bar{X}=51.4$)	16	(14.2)	21	(18.6)	25	(22.1)	23	(24.4)	14	(12.4)	14	(12.4)
Property Offense ($\bar{X}=55.6$)	11	(9.7)	18	(15.9)	17	(15.0)	33	(29.2)	17	(15.0)	17	(15.0)
Drug/Alcohol Offense ($\bar{X}=56.2$)	28	(24.8)	16	(14.2)	15	(13.3)	14	(12.4)	22	(19.5)	18	(15.9)

TABLE 5.3: History of Court Contact

Offense Type	\bar{X} No. of Petitions ¹	\bar{X} No. of Adjudications ¹
Target	2.46	2.13
Lesser Violent	.69	.55
Other Person	.26	.08
Serious Property	2.98	1.63
Other Property	2.13	.62
Others (e.g., drug, weapon)	1.97	.67
TOTAL	10.49	5.68

¹ Means are each based on an N of 114

Crime Specialization

Table 5.3 shows for the 114 study youths the types of offenses processed in juvenile court. As seen in Table 5.3, these youths averaged a total of 3.41 person offense petitions (target, lesser violent, other person),⁴ 5.11 property petitions, and 1.97 "other" offenses (e.g., drug, weapon). Consistent with the petition data, the youths averaged 2.68 person offense adjudications, 2.25 property adjudications, and .67 adjudications for other kinds of crimes.

These data suggest that the study youths were brought into and processed by the juvenile court for a mix of violent and nonviolent offenses. Table 5.4 provides further support for this conclusion. Table 5.4 shows for all youths the number of violent and property petitions filed. As seen in this table, there are only a few youths whose official records display habitual violent behavior without corresponding property offenses. For example, of the 15 youths with five or more petitions for violent offenses, 12 (80%) had at least seven petitions for property offenses. On the other hand, there are a greater number of youths in the study who are "violent offenders" but are primarily participating in property crimes. For example, nineteen of the study youths (16.7%) had petitions for seven or more property crimes and only one or two petitions for violent offenses.

TABLE 5.4: Relationship Between Violent and Property Offenses Official Record Data

Property Petitions Filed	Violent Petitions Filed									
	1-2		3-4		5-6		7-8		9 or more	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
0	11	(23.4)	2	(3.9)	2	(18.2)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)
1-2	8	(17.0)	13	(25.0)	0	(0.0)	1	(33.3)	0	(0.0)
3-4	6	(12.8)	12	(23.1)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)
5-6	3	(6.4)	10	(19.2)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)
7-8	6	(12.8)	4	(7.7)	3	(27.3)	0	(0.0)	1	(100.0)
9 or more	13	(27.6)	11	(21.1)	6	(54.5)	2	(66.7)	0	(0.0)
TOTAL	47	(100.0)	52	(100.0)	11	(100.0)	3	(100.0)	1	(100.0)

X² = 36.53
df. = 20
p ≤ .01

Consistent with the official records, the self-report data display a mix of person and property crimes with the study youths having committed slightly more property ($\bar{X} = 55.6$) than violent ($\bar{X} = 51.4$) crimes during the past 12 months. As seen in Table 5.5, youths who stated they committed a large number of violent offenses also said that they engaged in a large number of

property offenses. For example, of the 17 youths who stated they committed violent acts at least twice a week, 13 (76.4%) said they also committed property offenses at least once a week. The relationship between the number of property and number of violent crimes reported by the youths is statistically significant at the .001 level. However, like the official records, the self-report data presented in Table 5.5 show a number of youths who qualify as violent offenders but who primarily engage in property crimes.

TABLE 5.5: Relationship Between Violent and Property Offenses Self Report Data

No. of Self Reported Property Offenses	No. of Self Reported Violent Offenses											
	None		1-3 Times		< once a month		1-4 Times a month		≥ once a week		≥ twice a week	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
None	6	(55.5)	4	(22.2)	3	(17.7)	3	(9.1)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)
1-3 Times	4	(36.4)	5	(27.8)	4	(23.5)	6	(18.2)	2	(11.8)	0	(0.0)
< once a month	1	(9.1)	6	(33.3)	6	(35.3)	8	(24.2)	2	(11.8)	2	(11.8)
1-4 times a month	0	(0.0)	1	(5.6)	3	(17.7)	13	(39.4)	4	(29.4)	2	(11.8)
≥ once a week	0	(0.0)	2	(11.1)	1	(5.9)	3	(9.1)	3	(17.7)	5	(29.4)
≥ twice a week	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	6	(35.3)	8	(47.0)
TOTAL	11	(100.0)	18	(100.0)	17	(100.0)	33	(100.0)	17	(100.0)	17	(100.0)

X² = 81.38
df. = 25
p ≤ .001

Onset of Violence

The last delinquent career issue addressed in this section is the age at which the youths were charged with their first violent offense. Consistent with other research efforts (Wolfgang et al., 1972; Rojek and Erickson, 1982) the data presented in Table 5.6 reveal that most violent youth are charged with violent crimes relatively early in their delinquent career. Despite common sense assumptions that violent youth only become violent after building up to such offenses through a series of nonviolent crimes, we found 52 of our 114 study youths (45.6%) were charged with a violent offense on the very first petition, and 85 of the 114 youth (74.6%), were charged with a violent offense by their third petition. Thus, our study produced no evidence to sug-

gest that delinquent careers escalated from trivial or nonviolent to violent or predatory offenses.

TABLE 5.6: Career Location of First Violent Petition

<i>Incident Number</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>(%)</i>
First Petition	52	(45.6)
Second Petition	18	(15.8)
Third Petition	15	(13.2)
Fourth Petition	9	(7.9)
Fifth Petition	4	(3.5)
Sixth Petition	9	(7.9)
Seventh (or later) Petition	7	(6.1)
TOTAL	114	(100.0)

Thus, the official and self-report data on the delinquent careers of the violent youths in the study displayed in this section show that these youths typically: engaged in extensive amounts of delinquent and violent behaviors; participated in a mix of person and property crimes; and initiated violent behavior early in their formal delinquent careers.

FAMILY BACKGROUND

Many sociologists and criminologists consider family background and experiences to be an important factor in juvenile delinquency. As noted by Haskell and Yablonsky,

The social configuration that usually exerts the most profound influence on every human being is the family. Dislocation in a youth's family, the absence of the family's potentially positive effects, or any severe disturbance in one or both parents can produce devastating negative impacts — certainly including juvenile delinquency (1978: 91).

A variety of explanations on how family background and experiences potentially translate into delinquent behavior have been offered. One school of thought focuses on the relationship between the parents and the youth. Andry's (1971) research lead him to conclude that delinquent youth differ from the non-offender in the delinquent youth's negative perceptions of his father's role and the lack of love he feels he has received from the father. Nye (1958) found that rejection of the youth by the parents and the rejection of the parents by the youth were closely related to delinquent

behavior. Other criminologists have stressed parental discipline (Glueck and Glueck, 1950; Farrington, 1978), broken homes (Shaw and McKay, 1942; Monahan, 1957; Datesman and Scarpitti, 1975), and family disruption (Chilton and Markle, 1972). Chilton and Markle concluded that juvenile delinquents "live in disrupted families (more often) than do children in the general population. In addition, the study suggests that children charged with more serious conduct more often come from incomplete families than children charged with less serious delinquency" (1972: 98).

Another aspect of family life thought to have an impact on juvenile delinquency is family violence. It has been suggested that child abuse (Sorrells, 1977; Alfaro, 1978; Strasburg, 1978; Garbarino and Gilliam, 1980), spouse battering (Alfaro, 1978) and parental criminality are all possible factors contributing to juvenile delinquency.

A more global interpretation of the relationship between the family and delinquency is contained within control theory (Hirschi, 1969). According to control theorists the strength of the youth's bonds to conventional society and its social institutions is related to the likelihood of delinquent involvement. "Attachment to conventional pursuits, involvement in conventional activities, and belief in conventional values reduce the likelihood that a youth will engage in delinquent conduct" (Fagan et al., 1981). The youth's attachment and commitment to his family is seen as particularly important. For example, Hirschi states that,

... the closer the child's relations with his parents the more he is attached to and identifies with them, the lower his chances of delinquency. . . . The more strongly a child is attached to his parents, the more strongly he is bound to their expectations, and, therefore, the more strongly he is bound to conformity with the legal norms of the larger system (Hirschi, 1969: 94).

Due to the importance that the family appears to have for a youth's behavior, this section of the paper examines the family background of the violent offenders in our study. Specifically, this section examines the study youths' family composition, socio-economic status, family violence, and family contact with the law.

Family Composition

At the time of the interview with the mother, only 22% of the youths' biological parents remained married. An additional 22% were separated, 22% divorced, 22% never married and 12% were widowed. When asked who was the one person primarily responsible for raising the youth, 79% of the youths identified their mother and only 4% said their father. When asked what people other than the primary caretaker had been involved in rearing them, the father was again typically defined as uninvolved. Only 32% of the youths identified their father as involved in rearing them. In fact, almost as

many of the youth identified siblings (31%) and grandparents (26%) as identified their fathers.

Consistent with the data on marital status and primary caretaking, only one out of five of the study youths (20%) lived with both their biological mother and father. This is in sharp contrast to national figures which show 76.6% of all children under seventeen living with both natural parents (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 366, 1981). While the figure for black families is lower (42.2%) than the national average, it remains dramatically different from the youths in the study. Forty-seven percent of the study youths reported living in single parent families (41% living with the biological mother only and 6% living with the biological father only). Twelve percent of the youth reported they lived with their biological mother and a stepfather. No one lived with his biological father and stepmother. Other youths lived with their siblings or other relatives (e.g., grandparents).

The youths in the study had an average household size of 4.9 people. They averaged 5.1 siblings (biological and step) with 2.6 siblings living in the home. Other household members largely included grandparents and other relatives.

Family Socio-Economic Status

Based on the interviews with the youths' mothers, the primary source of household income for 60% of the families was either full-time (49%) or part-time (11%) employment. The second most common primary source was public assistance — approximately one-third of the youths' households receive AFDC, SSI, Food Stamps, State Disability, or some other form of transfer payment as their primary income source. The reported average family income in the sample was \$11,560 per year. While this figure is above the national poverty level (\$9,287 in 1981) (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-60, No. 140, 1981), it is approximately half of the median family income (\$22,390) for the United States and 13% less than the median family income for Blacks (\$13,270) (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-60, No. 137, 1983).

Clearly, for many of the study youths' families the low income figure reflects, at least in part, the fact that the family is headed by a single parent — the mother. The study youths typically come from families which have approximately half the national median family income and, thus, would have to be defined as coming from economically disadvantaged family backgrounds. Nationally, a mother raising two children brings home a median annual income roughly one-third of that made by a couple raising two children (\$8,314 vs. \$23,000). Although some experts on the family (e.g., Cherlin, 1982) argue that it is the lack of a father's wage rather than the absence of a father, per se, which contributes most stress to the family, at this point the argument is inconclusive. The outcome remains, however, that the youths in this study are faced with stress conditions associated with low income status.

Seventy percent of the youths' mothers were unemployed. Over 40% of the employed women held unskilled labor positions (e.g., domestic labor, assembly line work), 17% were employed in semi-skilled positions, 17% in clerical jobs, and 17% in sales. Only 8% of these women held professional/technical positions. The distribution of the fathers' (or father figures')⁵ occupational categories were slightly different. The fathers were concentrated primarily in the semi-skilled labor positions (47%) and only secondarily in skilled (e.g., carpenter) positions (18%). Only 8% of the fathers were in professional/technical positions. It is interesting to note that 80% of the youths' mothers said they did not know the occupation of the youths' natural father.

Family Violence

Family violence is a serious national problem which has always existed, but has received increasing political and academic attention in the last decade (Schechter, 1982). Family violence encompasses violence between adults as well as violence to children. Between 1.4 and 2.3 million children have been "beaten up" by a parent at some time during their childhood (Straus et al., 1980). Violence among spouses is equally, if not more, prevalent. "In any one year, 1.8 million wives are beaten by their husbands" (Straus, 1978). The vast majority of the time, it is women who are the victims of "spousal violence," therefore we refer to this type of violence as wife battering. Given the prevalence of violence in many Americans' everyday lives, we would expect to find it in the homes of the study youths as well. Some researchers hypothesize a relationship between violence experienced or witnessed in an individual's childhood environment and the likelihood of acting violently as an adult (e.g., Fagan et al., 1983). For these reasons we examined the extent of violence in the homes of study youth.

Information was collected on wife battering, child abuse, and sexual abuse for all of the study youths through both the Youth Admission Interviews and the Intake Assessment forms.

Overall, 30% of the study youths were found to have at least one of the three forms of family violence noted above in their families. The most frequent type of family violence uncovered was wife battering. Twenty-three percent of the youths either stated in their admission interviews or had evidence in their case folders that their fathers had engaged in wife battering. Fifteen percent of youths had suffered from child abuse, and 2% of youths were found to be sexually victimized in the home.

Given the common underreporting of family violence in both client case folders and face-to-face personal interviews, we believe the 30% figure noted above is a conservative estimate of the percentage of study youths who experienced violence in their families.

Family Contact With the Law

Data on the contact of the youths' families with the law were obtained from both interviews and the youths' case folders. Data were collected on the legal system involvement of the youths' father, mother, and siblings.

The most informative finding on the families' illegal involvement is the apparent high rate of legal system contact of the subjects' biological fathers and stepfathers. Almost 40% of study youths stated that either their biological or stepfather had been arrested; of these youth, 60% (22% of the youths overall) reported that their father had served time in jail or prison. Lower figures were found in the clients' case folders (16% arrested). However, the discrepancy can probably be attributed to incomplete information on family legal involvement contained in the youths' case folders. The case folders appeared particularly to lack information on stepfathers.

As one would expect, the youths' mothers were found to participate in considerably less crime than the fathers. Only eight of the youths (7%) said their mothers or stepmothers had been arrested and only four youths said their mothers had served time.

Information obtained from Youth Admission interviews revealed that a high percentage of the study youths had siblings who were also involved with the legal system. Fifty-eight percent of the youths in the study had a brother and/or sister who had been arrested (10% had both). Furthermore, 40% of youths had a brother and/or sister who had "served time."

The data presented on youths' family background show that they typically come from homes in which there was only one biological parent (usually the mother); homes that were economically disadvantaged; and often had other family members (father, siblings) in trouble with the law. In addition, at least 30% of the youths had some form of violence occurring at home within the family (child abuse, wife battering).

SCHOOL AND EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCES

As discussed in the section on family, "control theories assume that delinquent acts result when an individual's bond to society is weak or broken" (Hirschi, 1969: 16). "Whenever youths' attachment to agencies presumed to control their behavior are weak, the controls will be ineffective and, therefore, misconduct emerges" (Arnold and Brunghardt, 1983: 138). When a youth is bonded to school and/or work, control theorists would argue he is less likely to engage in delinquent behaviors.

School

Research studies have shown that "youths identified as delinquent by either official or self-report measure are, on the average, not doing as well

in school as those who are less delinquent" (Arnold and Brunghardt, 1983: 138). The relationship between school performance and delinquency remains even when social class is held constant (e.g., Gold, 1963; Polk and Halferty, 1966; Kelly and Balch, 1971). While different hypotheses have been argued to explain this relationship, the explanation most frequently accepted is that proposed by control theory.

According to Hirschi,

The boy who does not like school and does not care what teachers think of him is to this extent free to commit delinquent acts. Positive feelings toward controlling institutions and persons in authority are the first line of social control. Withdrawal of favorable sentiments toward such institutions and persons at the same time neutralizes their moral force. Such neutralization is, in a control theory, a major link between lack of attachment and delinquency (Hirschi, 1969: 127).

While we do not have data from the schools on the youths' academic performance levels, we did ask the youths a variety of questions about their commitment and attachment to school. Consistent with control theory, the data revealed that the study youths, for the most part, lack a commitment to school.

Over one-quarter of the youths in the study (28%) report that they were not enrolled in school during the six months on the street prior to being arrested for the instant offense. Of those enrolled, one-third reported attending school "about half the time" or less. Thus, less than half of the youth (49%) were attending school on a regular basis during the time immediately prior to their instant offense.

While 75% of those in school thought grades were very important, 39% said they "didn't really try" or only "tried a little" in school. Sixty-nine percent of the youths both liked and respected most of their teachers. In spite of this, almost half (46%) "didn't care much" what their teachers thought of them. One-fourth, however, said they "cared a lot." Overall, 27% report being "very satisfied" with school, 52% "somewhat satisfied," and 21% "not at all satisfied." Although this portrait of school life shows some variation amongst the study youths, the data indicate that many have at best a limited commitment to or involvement in school.

Employment

Like school, the employment experience of a juvenile would appear to be an important factor regarding the individual's participation in illegal behaviors. Participation in and commitment to one's employment seems to militate against illegal involvement. Conversely, a poor work experience and resultant lack of commitment to achievement in one's work would, according to control theorists, increase the likelihood of illegal behavior.

The relationship between poor employment experiences (e.g., unemployment, low salary) and adult criminality has been empirically documented for adults. In a study of a sample of habitual felons, Petersilia found that the "better employed" offenders (offenders at work 75% of their street time and making at least \$50 per week as a juvenile or \$100 per week as an adult) compared to other offenders in the sample "tended to be less active in overall adult crime, and were inclined to commit fewer crimes against persons . . ." (Petersilia et al., 1978: 91). Further, Petersilia stated that the adult felons in the study saw lack of employment as their greatest problem (Petersilia et al., 1977: IX). West and Farrington (1977) found that a sample of young adult offenders had held menial jobs which required little training, had been fired at least once, and were frequently unemployed and looking for work. Other studies have likewise found a strong relationship between post-incarceration recidivism and post-release employment (Glaser, 1969; Knudton, 1970).

While the relationship between employment experience and criminality for adults is more conclusive, the relationship between the employment of juveniles and delinquency/criminality requires further research. If control theory is valid, it is logical to assume that juvenile employment and commitment to the job act to militate against youths engaging in delinquent behavior. This would appear to be particularly true for those youths who have not developed a commitment to school or higher education (Hirschi, 1969; Kelly and Pink, 1973). Further, it seems logical to assume that the development of job skills, employment experience, and commitment to the work ethic as a juvenile would be beneficial to one's adult employment experience and, therefore, would influence the likelihood of adult criminality. The data presented below, based on interviews with the study youths, provide some insight into the employment experiences of a sample of violent juvenile offenders.

Of the 113 youths interviewed, 18% said they had worked full-time within the six-month period preceding their instant offense for an average of 41 hours per week. An additional 29% reported they had worked part-time for an average of 18 hours each week. Some of those youths who did not hold down paying jobs did participate in vocational training programs. Nine percent of the subjects said they were participating in a vocational training program for an average of 25 hours per week.

Table 5.7 displays the extent to which youths employed (or in a vocational training program) were satisfied with their vocational experience, and reports the regularity with which they reported to their job. As seen in Table 5.7, the majority of youths working did not have strong feelings about their jobs — about half of the working youths (full or part-time) defined their jobs as simply "OK." Twenty-three percent of the youths working defined their jobs as "great" and 3.7% as "terrible." Youths who were participating in vocational training programs were more satisfied with their vocational experience. Forty percent of these youths said they thought their program was "great" and an additional 40% said it was "good."

TABLE 5.7: Vocational Experience

	(N=20) Full-time job		(N=33) Part-time job		(N=11)* Vocational Training		TOTAL	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
<i>Job Satisfaction</i>								
Great	5	(25.0)	7	(21.2)	4	(40.0)	16	(25.4)
Good	3	(15.0)	7	(21.2)	4	(40.0)	14	(22.2)
OK	10	(50.0)	18	(54.6)	2	(20.0)	30	(47.6)
Not Good	1	(5.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	1	(1.6)
Terrible	1	(5.0)	1	(3.0)	0	(0.0)	2	(3.2)
<i>Report to Work</i>								
Always	15	(75.0)	24	(75.0)	7	(70.0)	46	(74.2)
Almost always	4	(20.0)	7	(21.9)	3	(30.0)	14	(22.6)
Sometimes	1	(5.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	1	(1.6)
Rarely	0	(0.0)	1	(3.1)	0	(0.0)	1	(1.6)
Not at all	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)

*There is missing data for one youth participating in a vocational training program

Table 5.7 also shows how regularly the youths said they reported to their job or training program. As seen in this table, youths showed up regularly, as 96.8% of the youths said they reported "always" or "almost always." In contrast with the school attendance rate discussed earlier (49% of those enrolled attended regularly), the study youths were much more regular in reporting to work than school.

All study youths were asked how satisfied they were with their job skills. The youths who were most satisfied were those youths involved in vocational training programs (50% very satisfied, 30% somewhat satisfied, and 20% not satisfied at all). Youths who were working (full- or part-time) appear for the most part to be satisfied (46.2% somewhat satisfied, 32.7% very satisfied, and 21.2% not satisfied at all). Not surprisingly, the youths who were the least satisfied with their job skills were those youths who were not employed or participating in a vocational training program during the six months prior to the instant offense (31% not satisfied at all, 48.3% somewhat satisfied, and 20.7% very satisfied). When coupled with the general "job satisfaction" question, these data demonstrate the value that youths attribute to vocational training programs. Unfortunately, only a small number of the study youths (8.8%) participated in job training programs during the six-month period prior to the instant offense.

Youths were also asked two questions regarding their relations with their co-workers. They were asked how much they respect their co-workers and how many co-workers they were friendly with. The responses to these questions are interesting. The majority of the youths said they respected all of their co-workers (55.6%) and an additional 23.8% said they respected

"some" or "a lot" of their co-workers. On the other hand, 33.9% of the youths said they were not friendly with any of the people they worked with and another 12.9% said they were friendly with hardly any of their co-workers. Thus, these data show that while the youths in our study respected the people they worked with, for whatever reasons, friendships typically did not develop between the study youths and their co-workers.

Overall, the data presented on the youths' school and employment experiences suggest that most of the violent youth in our study do not possess strong bonds to school but appear to have some commitment to work. We do not, however, as yet have the comparable information on non-offenders in our study cities to contrast with these data.

PEER GROUP

A factor frequently described as contributing to juvenile delinquency is the youth's peer group and the support such peers give to illegal behaviors. While theorists discuss the peer group in different terms depending on the perception of the intensity of illegal involvement of the peers (gangs, delinquent subcultures, subculture of delinquents), most sociologists acknowledge the importance of the peer group as a contributing factor to juvenile delinquency (Cohen, 1955; Miller, 1958, 1975; Matza, 1964; Sutherland and Cressey, 1970).

This section of the paper discusses the extent to which study youths perceive their peer group as engaged in delinquency and violent behavior and to what extent the study youths are involved in gangs.

Peer Group Delinquency

The peer group serves as a powerful reference group influencing an individual's behavior. Most sociologists believe a major factor contributing to the likelihood of a youth engaging in delinquent behavior is the support his peers give to such misconduct.

In order to find out the extent of the delinquent involvement of the youths' friends (hence rendering an atmosphere where delinquency is endorsed, or at least not discouraged), we asked the study youths two series of questions concerning the illegal involvement of their friends. It is important to keep in mind that the youths' reports of their friends' illegal activities are based solely on their perceptions. The subjects' perceptions, while admittedly not an objective indicator of crime involvement, are important even if they were found to be poor estimates. In fact, it is quite possible that a youth's perceptions are more important in influencing his or her behavior than the actual peer group delinquency. The first series of questions repeated the 31 delinquency items previously discussed and used for self-

report purposes. The interview asked the subject how many of his friends participated in the offense during the past 12 months — none, hardly any, some, nearly all. These data are presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9.

TABLE 5.8: Friends' Delinquency (12 Months Prior to Instant Offense)

TYPE OF DELINQUENT ACT	Number of Friends							
	None		Hardly Any		Some		Nearly All	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
<i>Drug Offenses</i>								
Used drugs	45	(41.3)	14	(12.8)	30	(27.5)	20	(18.3)
Sold drugs	56	(50.9)	14	(12.7)	29	(26.4)	11	(10.0)
Drank liquor	32	(29.1)	10	(9.1)	35	(31.8)	33	(30.0)
Drove car high	50	(45.5)	15	(13.6)	38	(34.5)	7	(6.2)
Attended school high	37	(33.9)	13	(11.9)	40	(36.7)	19	(17.4)
<i>Property Offenses</i>								
Damaged family property	80	(74.1)	11	(10.2)	14	(13.0)	3	(2.8)
Damaged school property	62	(58.3)	11	(10.2)	27	(25.0)	7	(6.5)
Damaged other property	44	(40.7)	15	(13.9)	42	(38.9)	7	(6.5)
Bought stolen goods	29	(26.9)	10	(9.3)	45	(41.7)	24	(22.2)
Sold stolen goods	22	(20.6)	9	(8.4)	49	(45.8)	27	(25.2)
Grabbed purse and ran	65	(58.6)	16	(14.4)	28	(25.2)	2	(1.8)
Stolen from purse/wallet	49	(45.0)	20	(18.3)	34	(31.2)	6	(5.5)
Took goods from store	37	(34.3)	15	(13.9)	47	(43.5)	9	(8.3)
Broke into building to steal	39	(35.1)	8	(7.2)	48	(43.2)	16	(14.4)
Stole a car	37	(33.9)	15	(13.8)	40	(36.7)	17	(15.6)
Broke into car to steal something	40	(36.0)	14	(12.6)	46	(41.4)	11	(9.9)
Stole money from family	83	(76.9)	13	(12.0)	10	(9.3)	2	(1.9)
Stole at school	59	(53.6)	13	(11.8)	32	(29.1)	6	(5.5)
<i>Violent Offenses</i>								
Threatened to hurt someone unless gave him something	55	(50.9)	13	(12.0)	28	(25.9)	12	(11.1)
Threatened an adult	40	(37.0)	16	(14.8)	36	(33.3)	16	(14.8)
Hit a parent	94	(86.2)	9	(8.3)	5	(4.6)	1	(.9)
Hit a teacher	61	(56.5)	20	(18.5)	23	(21.3)	4	(3.7)
Forced someone to have sex	95	(88.8)	8	(7.5)	4	(3.5)	6	(5.3)
Beat someone till need M.D.	39	(36.4)	18	(16.8)	39	(36.4)	11	(10.3)
Used physical force to get something	48	(44.4)	18	(16.7)	30	(27.8)	12	(11.1)
Carried a weapon with intent to use it	30	(27.5)	14	(12.8)	39	(35.8)	26	(23.9)
Pulled weapon to show meant business	33	(30.3)	18	(16.5)	43	(39.4)	15	(13.8)
Threatened adult with weapon	53	(48.6)	11	(10.1)	34	(31.2)	11	(10.1)
Used weapon to get something	46	(43.0)	10	(9.3)	40	(37.4)	11	(10.3)
Shot someone	63	(57.8)	21	(19.3)	21	(19.3)	4	(3.7)
Killed someone	83	(76.9)	10	(9.3)	15	(13.9)	0	(0.0)

As seen in Table 5.8, the study youths report that their friends engaged in a considerable amount of delinquent behavior. For 19 of the 31 items, at least half of the study youths said they had friends who had committed the activity during the past 12 months. For seven offenses (i.e., carried a weapon with the intent of using it, stole a car, sold stolen goods, bought stolen goods, attended school high, used drugs, drank liquor) at least 15% of the respondents said "nearly all" of their friends engaged in the behavior

TABLE 5.9: Delinquency of Study Youths and Friends (Self Report Data)

	Study Youths			Friends		
	% said participated last 12 months	Rank order of % participating	Rank order of frequency of participation*	% said friends participated	Rank order of % participating	Rank order of % of "Nearly All" participating
<i>OFFENSE</i>						
Sold stolen goods	64.0	1	2	79.4	1	2
Carry weapon with intent to use it	57.5	2	16	72.5	3	3
Threatening an adult	54.0	3	5	63.0	12	8
Drinking liquor	52.8	4	1	70.9	4	1
Bought stolen goods	52.2	5	9	73.1	2	4
Pulled weapon to show meant business	46.9	6	7	69.7	5	10
Beat someone badly (need M.D.)	45.1	7	17	63.6	11	13
Threatened adult with weapon	44.2	8	14	51.4	19	15
Broke into building	43.4	9	10	64.9	9	9
Damaged property (not family's or school's)	39.8	10	6	59.3	13	19

*Rank order of Frequency of Participation was derived by ranking all 31 items according to the percentage of youths engaging in the offense at least once a month

during the past 12 months. While we have no comparable data from non-delinquent youths in our target cities, the data in Table 5.8 clearly show the youths in our study believe a large number of their friends are engaging in a wide variety of delinquent activities.

In order to better examine the relationship of perceived peer group delinquency to delinquent youth conduct, Table 5.9 displays the subjects' perceptions of peer group delinquency for those crimes committed most frequently. As seen in this table, there appears to be a strong relationship between the offenses the youths participate in and those in which they claim their friends engage. Four of the five offenses the subjects most often said they engaged in (sold stolen goods, carried weapon with intent of using it, drank liquor, bought stolen goods) were also four of the five offenses the youths were most likely to say their friends committed.

A second series of questions concerning peer delinquency involved contact with the juvenile justice system. Subjects were asked how many of their friends had contact with the juvenile justice system. The responses to these questions are presented in Table 5.10. As seen in Table 5.10, most of the youths said that they had friends who were questioned by the police (84%), held in custody by the police (63%), placed on probation (77.8%), and sentenced to "serve time" (65.8%). Furthermore, 16% of the youths said "nearly all" of their friends had been questioned as a suspect by the police, and 11.1% said that "nearly all" of their friends had been placed on probation. These data suggest that the violent offender's peer group has, for the most part, had a variety of contact with the juvenile justice system.

The data presented in this section provide some empirical support for the theories which speak to the importance of law-violating peers as influencing juvenile delinquency.

**TABLE 5.10: Friends' Contact with Juvenile Justice System
(Youth Interview Data)**

	Number of Friends			
	None N (%)	Hardly Any N (%)	Some N (%)	Nearly All N (%)
<i>Type of Juvenile Justice System Contact</i>				
Questioned as suspect by Police ^x	17 (16.0)	21 (19.8)	51 (48.1)	17 (16.0)
Held in custody by Police ^{xx}	29 (26.6)	26 (23.9)	46 (42.2)	8 (7.3)
Placed on Probation ^o	24 (22.2)	25 (23.1)	47 (43.5)	12 (11.1)
Sentenced to Time ^{oo}	38 (34.2)	36 (27.0)	40 (36.0)	3 (2.7)

x — missing data (don't know, didn't answer) for 7 cases, average computed on an N of 106

xx — missing data for 4 cases, average computed on an N of 109

o — missing data for 5 cases, average computed on an N of 108

oo — missing data for 2 cases, average computed on an N of 111

Gang Involvement

Gang involvement is typically viewed by both criminologists and the public to be a major factor contributing to juvenile violence. Based on a study of 12 of the nation's largest cities, Miller found that for 1972-1974, the five cities with the largest gang problems averaged a minimum of 175 gang-related killings a year, and 13,000 gang member arrests per year, with half of these arrests for violent crimes (Miller, 1975: 76). Given these findings and other data from his study, Miller concluded,

Youth gang violence is more lethal today than ever before, that the security of a wider sector of the citizenry is threatened by gangs to a greater degree than ever before, and that violence and other illegal activities by members of youth gangs and groups in the United States of the mid-1970s represents a crime problem of the first magnitude which shows little prospect of early abatement (Miller, 1975: 76).

Given the above findings and the consequences of gang involvement in planning for program services, we included questions on gang involvement in the Youth Admission Interview.

Table 5.11 displays the number of study youths who stated in their interviews that they had ever belonged to a youth gang. As seen in Table 5.11, approximately one-third of the study youths (36.6%) said they had belonged to a gang at some time. A closer look at this table reveals major differences across sites. In two of the four sites (Memphis and Phoenix) approximately half of the study youths claimed gang involvement, while in one site, Boston, only 15.4% of youth said they had ever been in a gang. In addition, we asked the youths questions concerning the relationship of gang involvement and the instant offense. Somewhat surprisingly, the youths in our study rarely stated that their instant offense was a result of gang membership. Eighty-nine percent of the youths said the instant offense was *not* committed with gang members, and 94.5% said the offense was *not* the result of gang membership.

TABLE 5.11: Gang Involvement (Self Report Data)

VJO PROJECT SITE	YOUTHS WHO BELONGED TO GANG (EVER)			
	Yes		No	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
MEMPHIS	13	(54.2)	11	(45.8)
PHOENIX	11	(50.0)	11	(50.0)
NEWARK	13	(32.5)	27	(57.5)
BOSTON	4	(15.4)	22	(84.6)
TOTAL	41	(36.6)	71	(63.4)

Our data on gang involvement and peer delinquency suggest that the violent youth in our study have friends who they perceive to be engaged in extensive delinquency. While the number of youths with gang involvement varies by city, in none of our sites did the youths typically state that their instant offense was related to gang involvement or committed with other gang members. However, we should note that none of our target areas are cities researched by gang studies. Therefore, despite the fact that the gang involvement and activity is low relative to extant juvenile gang research, it is not clear how extensive the problem is in the target cities and how each study population compares to its respective city as a whole.

ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE

The use and abuse of alcohol and drugs by juveniles has increased considerably during the past fifteen years. The National Council on Alcoholism found the percentage of high school students who drink, more than doubled between 1969 and 1976. According to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, the number of city youths under 18 years old who were arrested for narcotic drug laws increased from 13,904 youths in 1967 to 79,449 youths in 1975. Further, "the growing use and abuse of all drugs among an ever younger age group [and] a spread of drug use from inner city urban areas to small town and rural environments," has been documented (Smith et al., 1980: 395-790).

While the increase in the use of drugs is clear, the role such use plays in the amount of violent crime committed by the country's juveniles is less clear. The literature review by Smith et al. (1980), concluded that different drugs contributed differently to the amount and type of crime committed and that the impact of drugs on an individual was affected by the individual's background and psychological predisposition. On the other hand, Smith et al. stated, "the onset of substance abuse during adolescence is a direct spur to subsequent delinquency and serious criminal behavior" (p. 438), and "alcohol intoxication was present in a considerable, if not major, proportion of serious crimes, particularly violent crimes" (p.374).

A sizeable number of youths in our study stated they had experienced problems due to drug or alcohol use, that the use of alcohol or drugs contributed to their acting violently, and that they used at least one of the two immediately prior to the instant offense.

Youths were asked if they felt at any time during the past 12 months they had experienced either a drinking or drug problem. Fourteen percent of the youth said they believed they had experienced a drinking problem and 15% said they experienced a drug problem. Overall, 22% of the study youths said they experienced at least one of these two substance-abuse problems. Youths were also asked to specify if their use of alcohol or drugs ever caused them problems in school, at work, or in the home. While only a couple of

youth said either drug or alcohol use caused problems at work, 16% of the youths said their drinking had caused problems with their family, and 14% said taking drugs had caused family problems. In addition to family difficulties, drug and alcohol use caused major problems in school, especially drug use. Almost one in five youths in the study (19%) said drugs had caused them problems in school, and almost one in twelve (8%) said alcohol caused them school problems.

The problems associated with alcohol and drug use appear to have even more significant implications for violent behavior than for the family or the school. One out of every three youths in our study (33.3%) said that their taking drugs contributed to their acting violently. Twenty-nine percent said their drinking contributed to their violent behavior. Overall, half of the study youths (50%) said that either drug or alcohol use contributed to their violent behaviors. In addition, over one-third of the study youths (34.4%) said that they had used drugs immediately prior to the instant offense and 17% said they were drinking right before the offense. Overall, 41% of the violent youths in the study said they used drugs, had been drinking, or both immediately prior to their instant violent offense.

The above data suggest that the use of drugs and alcohol are a major problem in the lives of many of our study youths. It appears that substance abuse and the problems it creates for these youths is an important factor contributing to their violent behavior.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper provided descriptive data on a group of violent juveniles in order to aid program planners in their efforts to develop and select treatment programs, modalities, and services which respond to the needs of violent youth and the factors which contribute to their violent behaviors. To this end, data were provided on a sample of 114 violent youths in four states meeting legally defined "violent offender" criteria over a 14-month period. Data were presented on the youths': delinquent career, family history, school and employment experiences, peer group and gang involvement, and drug/alcohol abuse.

The major findings on the violent youth discussed in this paper are:

- Based on data collected from both official court records and self-report interviews, the study youths have extensive delinquent careers. Official record data show the youths have an average of 10.5 petitions and 5.7 formal adjudications. Personal interviews with the youths reveal even more extensive delinquent involvement. The majority of youths stated they averaged at least one monthly offense in each of the offense categories (violent, property, and drug offenses).
- Official record and self-report data both indicate that violent youths do not, for the most part, specialize in violent offenses. Of the youths' average

10.5 petitions, 5.11 were for property offenses, and 3.41 were for person crimes. Self-report data reveal the youths averaged 55.6 property crimes, 51.4 violent crimes, and 56.2 drug offenses during the 12 months prior to the instant offense.

- For the most part, study youths participate in violent offenses early in their delinquent career — 74.6% of the youths were charged with a violent offense by their third petition.
- The youths' family experience is characterized by the lack of involvement of the biological father, low family SES, a high rate of court and correctional contact by other family members (i.e., father, siblings), and a considerable amount of violence within the family (i.e., abuse, wife battering).
- The study youths, for the most part, lack a high degree of commitment to involvement with school. Twenty-seven percent of the youths were not enrolled in school during the six months prior to the instant offense, and one-third of those who were enrolled attended school half of the time at most. Overall only half the study youths were regularly attending school during the six months immediately prior to their instant offense.
- Youths participating in vocational training programs were more satisfied with their work experience and the skills they had developed than youths working. However, only 8.8% of the study youths were participating in vocational training programs during the six months prior to the instant offense.
- The youths have peers who, they believe, engage in a considerable amount of delinquent behavior (both violent and property crimes) and typically have been processed by the juvenile justice system. While gang involvement varied by site, almost all of the youths stated they did *not* commit their instant violent crimes as a result of gang involvement (94.6%).
- Although less than one quarter of the youths (22%) said they had either a drug or alcohol problem during the past year, half of the study youths said that drinking or taking drugs had contributed to their engaging in violent behaviors. Furthermore, 40% of the youths said they had used drugs or alcohol immediately prior to the instant offense.

Policy Implications

It is our hope that the data presented in this paper will aid individuals responsible for planning, operating, and working within facilities and programs treating violent juvenile offenders to make difficult decisions concerning allocation of scarce resources for the treatment of this difficult population. While the data presented in this paper do not speak to all violent youths and cannot be used to determine treatment practices at the individual level, these data suggest certain patterns of background characteristics and experiences which should be helpful in identifying treatment and service needs of violent juveniles.

Some of the policy implications which appear to emerge from the data are:

1) While most juvenile delinquents only occasionally participate in violent offenses, there are a number of youths who repeatedly, and sometimes habitually, engage in violent offenses against the person. Given the prevalence of the violent behaviors of the study youths and the large number of court contacts experienced, it would appear that past efforts to respond to these juveniles have not been particularly successful. We submit that there is a need to develop treatment programs or services which are more tailored to this subgroup of juvenile offenders to better meet the special needs of this population.

2) Most juvenile violent offenders do not specialize in crimes of violence, but engage in property crimes as well. Thus, while treatment efforts need to focus on the factors precipitating violent behavior, these efforts should also seek out and respond to those factors which contribute to committing property offenses.

3) Efforts to treat the violent juvenile offender must acknowledge the need to focus on the youth's ties to the community (family, school, peers), and direct increased resources to these areas if we are to expect treatment program impacts to be maintained once the youth is returned to the community.

4) Treatment efforts for violent juveniles will for the most part need to focus on the youth's family, as well as the youth. It is important to learn what is happening within the family (e.g., parental/sibling court involvement, father absence, family violence) and then have qualified staff help the youth and his family with the problems which emerge.

5) We should question why there is lack of bonding to the school and examine whether it is something in the violent youth's school experience which needs attention or something in the school program in general. Work needs to be done on improving the relationship between these youths and their schools.

6) The use of vocational training programs should be expanded. More programs should be developed and youths should be encouraged to enroll.

7) The impact of delinquent peers seems to be quite important. The study youths perceived their peers as engaged in many property and violent crimes. Thus, it would seem that a major challenge of treatment programs is to redirect, develop, and strengthen youth bonds to those juveniles who do not support the juvenile's illegal and violent activities. It seems likely that unless more constructive friendships are developed, programmatic gains accomplished in a facility may be wiped out upon the youth's return to the community and his old friendships. Efforts should focus on all youths' peer groups not only on those who are gang members.

8) Services should be available to help the youth learn to identify and deal with drug and alcohol problems. Administrators planning for facilities and programs for violent youth must anticipate these needs and arrange for the

availability of qualified staff to help youth deal with these problems.

Clearly, more information on the violent juvenile offender and his special needs is necessary for programs and facilities to approximate their full potential in responding to these youths. Without such data, we should expect these youths to continue to receive the same treatment and services received by non-violent juvenile offenders and, thus, we should anticipate a continued low success rate in helping the youths stay out of trouble. We hope this paper contributes to this knowledge-building effort.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a description of this research and development program see Chapter 11, Fagan et al.
2. The four sites are: Boston, Memphis, Newark and Phoenix.
3. We wish to acknowledge and sincerely thank the field researchers who expertly collected the data discussed in this article: Susan Guarino, Gregory Halemba, Karen Rich, and Linda Sheridan. Also, without the aid and computing skills of Michael Jang, this analysis could not have been undertaken.
4. Target offenses are specified in Figure 5.1. "Lesser violent" offenses refer to non-target violent crimes against the person which are defined as felonies by the state criminal penal code (e.g. assault, robbery). "Other person" offenses refer to those crimes which are committed against a person but are treated by the state penal code as a misdemeanor (e.g. simple assault, sexual misconduct).
5. Information on the occupations of youths' fathers has been recorded for whichever father (natural or step) is living at home with the youth. If no father or father figure is living in the home, then the occupation of the natural father (living outside the home) has been included.

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
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Part Two



SYSTEM RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME

CASE HISTORY

CHRIST

Name: Chris T.
Age: 16
Race: Hispanic
Family Composition: Mother
Father (unknown)
Brother (25; now serving a sentence of 10-20 years in the state prison for armed robbery).
Sister (22; current whereabouts unknown)
Family Income: Public Assistance
School: Completed 5th grade
Residence: Shares 3-room basement apartment with mother in large tenement.
Age First Arrest: 12
Current Charge(s): Arson, Homicide (Felony Murder)

Chris was first arrested at age 12 for a series of push-in muggings in his community; he was also charged with the attempted rape of one of his victims, and rape and sodomy charges against him were dismissed after another victim failed to testify.

He was sent to a state training school and served an uneventful two years. Since his release, he has been an active member of a local street gang and has amassed a record of 21 arrests, none of which have resulted in additional incarceration.

For a cash payment of one hundred dollars, Chris "torched" a building in his neighborhood. He was paid the money by the adult leader of another street gang, who claimed that one of the youthful residents of that building had broken the windshield of his car. The adult gang leader applied to Chris' gang president for "justice and vengeance" and this president made the arrangements.

Chris broke into the unoccupied basement of the building with a 5-gallon can of gasoline. He simply poured the gasoline over the floor, climbed out a window, and tossed a lighted rag into the basement. Three adults were trapped on the top floor of the building, unable to reach the fire escape because the protective gates on the windows had been rusted shut. Chris has been sent to a state diagnostic center to determine if the arson was part of a psychiatric pattern, and he will be sentenced to a juvenile institution when the diagnostic period is completed.

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6

SYSTEM PROCESSING OF VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT

*Jeffrey A. Fagan
Eliot Hartstone
Cary J. Rudman
Karen V. Hansen*

Wide-spread concern over the extent of serious and violent crimes committed by juvenile offenders, and the processing of these youths by the juvenile justice system is now well documented (Miller and Ohlin, 1980; Feld, 1981; Hamparian, 1982). Critics have argued that the juvenile court's emphasis on rehabilitation has tended to overshadow its concern for legal sanctions (Field, 1983) and that as a result the deterrent effects of court sanctions have been minimized (Roysher and Edelman, 1980). From these criticisms, several observers have recently recommended that the juvenile court be abolished, or its jurisdiction radically redefined to exclude serious, violent, or habitual juvenile offenders (Wolfgang, 1982; Feld, 1983).

While criticism of the juvenile justice system in general and the juvenile court in particular abounds, empirical studies which examine the processes through which the juvenile justice system selects, labels and sanctions serious and violent delinquents have been rare. Efforts to reduce and redefine the role of the juvenile court should await examination and analysis of the ways in which the court now processes these offenders.

This research was supported by Grants 80-JN-AX-0006 and 82-MU-AX-0003 from the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, OJJDP, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions are those of the authors, and do not reflect those of OJJDP. We wish to thank the researchers who meticulously gathered the data: Susan Guarino, Gregory Halemba, Karen Rich, Linda Sheridan, and Paulette Turshak. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Society of Criminology; Las Vegas, Nevada; February, 1983.

This paper examines how the juvenile justice systems in six urban areas processed 550 youths charged with violent offenses and identifies system practices which have had an impact on the case outcomes of these individuals. Based on these data, we address the critique of the juvenile justice system noted above. As such, we discuss whether the goals of "swift and sure" punishment and treatment, common to a range of crime control theories, are attainable within the confines of current juvenile justice system practices and processes. Further, we draw from the data presented to explore possible changes which may enable the juvenile justice system to better serve both the public and the juvenile offender.

THE DATA

This inquiry was conducted as part of the national research and development program testing treatment intervention for violent juveniles described in Chapter 11 (Fagan, Rudman, and Hartstone). To qualify for this research and development program, youths had to satisfy strict legal criteria which included an instant "target violent offense" adjudication.¹ In an effort to examine the reasons for the surprisingly small number of youths who satisfied the program's criteria, a sample of youths with petitions filed for target offenses was selected for examination of their court action and offense history. Data were collected in each of the five study sites (Boston, Denver, Memphis, Newark and Phoenix) for all youths processed between January 1 and April 30, 1982. At the time these data were collected, Miami was under consideration as a possible study site, and as such, identical data were collected in Miami. Overall, information was gathered on 550 youths charged with target offenses in six different cities.

These data were supplemented with qualitative data gathered through interviews and observations at each site. Together, these results present a thorough analysis of the issues and problems in targeting and identifying chronically violent delinquents in juvenile courts in six court jurisdictions.

RESULTS

Action Taken on Instant Offense

Table 6.1 shows the action taken by the juvenile justice system on all target petitions acted on during the study period.² Included in this table are those youths whom the juvenile court transfers to the adult court for disposition. Overall, 29% of all *target* petitions filed were sustained in juvenile court; and 33% were either dropped or dismissed. Most of the remaining cases resulted either in adjudications for lesser offenses (19%) or waivers/direct files (14%).

TABLE 6.1: Case Outcome for Violent Offenses Charged in Juvenile Court (January 1-April 30, 1982)

OUTCOME	Boston		Denver		Memphis		Newark		Phoenix		Miami		TOTAL	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Adjudicated for Target Offense	26	(42)	9	(29)	32	(58)	37	(19)	31	(46)	25	(18)	160	(29)
Adjudicated for Non-Target Offense	3	(5)	8	(26)	15	(27)	46	(24)	19	(28)	13	(9)	104	(19)
Suspended Adjudication	—		1	(3)	—		11	(6)	—		1	(1)	13	(2)
Waived	—		2	(6)	2	(4)	2	(1)	9	(13)	63	(44)	78	(14)
Acquitted	5	(8)	—		—		8	(4)	—		—		13	(2)
Dismissed/Dropped	28	(45)	11	(36)	6	(11)	89	(46)	8	(12)	40	(28)	182	(33)
TOTAL	62		31		55		193		67		142		550	

As seen in Table 6.1, Denver had the fewest number of youths referred (N = 31) and adjudicated (N = 9) for target offenses, averaging only 2.25 adjudications per month for target offenses. On the other hand, Newark (N = 193) and Miami (N = 142) had by far the largest number of target violent offense petitions acted on during the study period. These two sites also had the lowest juvenile court adjudication rates for target offenses with less than 20% of the youths charged with target offenses adjudicated for such offenses in each juvenile court. In Miami, the attrition is largely attributed to waivers and direct filing of the youths in the adult court — 44% of all cases. What percentage of these "waived" youths are convicted is unknown. The low adjudication rate in Newark, on the other hand, appears to result from the high percentage of target petitions which are dismissed or dropped (46%). Boston is the only other study site with a comparable percentage of dismissals and dropped charges (45%). The three sites with the largest percentage of youths charged with target offenses resulting in adjudication in juvenile court for such offenses are — Memphis (58%), Phoenix (46%) and Boston (42%).

Overall, slightly less than one fifth of all petition charges result in adjudication for a lesser, non-target charge. With the exception of Boston (5%) and Miami (9%), the adjudication for a "lesser" charge appears to be a common practice across sites (24%-28% of all cases). In Boston, however, almost all target petitions result in either target adjudications (42%), or the youth is acquitted or has his charges dropped in court (53%).

Table 6.2 shows whether cases were transferred³ to the adult system or processed in juvenile court. Those youths successfully waived or otherwise transferred are shown as "adult." Overall, 86% of all youths charged with offenses remain in juvenile court. Cases were regularly transferred in Miami (44% of target cases) and Phoenix (13% of the target cases). In fact, Miami alone accounts for 81% of the cases waived across all six study sites.

Over the four-month study period, two youths or less charged with target offenses were waived from each of the four other study sites.

**TABLE 6.2: Court Jurisdiction for Target Offenders
(January 1-April 30, 1982)**

JURISDICTION	Boston		Denver		Memphis		Newark		Phoenix		Miami		TOTAL	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Juvenile Court	62	(100)	29	(94)	53	(96)	191	(99)	58	(97)	79	(56)	472	(86)
Adult Court	0	(0)	2	(6)	2	(4)	2	(1)	9	(13)	63	(44)	78	(14)
TOTAL	62		31		55		193		67		142		550	

**TABLE 6.3: Juvenile Court Determination for Target Charges
(January 1-April 30, 1982)**

COURT DETERMINATION	Boston		Denver		Memphis		Newark		Phoenix		Miami		TOTAL	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Adjudicated for Target Offense	26	(42)	9	(31)	32	(60)	37	(19)	31	(53)	25	(32)	160	(34)
Adjudicated for Non-Target Offense	3	(5)	8	(28)	15	(28)	46	(24)	19	(33)	13	(16)	104	(22)
Suspended Adjudication	—		1	(3)	—		11	(6)	—		1	(1)	13	(3)
Acquitted	5	(8)	—		—		8	(4)	—		—		13	(3)
Dismissed/Dropped	28	(45)	11	(38)	6	(11)	89	(47)	8	(14)	40	(51)	182	(38)
TOTAL	62		29		53		191		58		79		472	

By removing transferred cases from Table 6.1, we can display the actions taken by the juvenile court with regard to target offense petitions. Table 6.3 presents the same data as Table 6.1, with *transferred* cases removed. As such, this table may provide a more accurate description of how the juvenile court handles youth charged with violent offenses. Overall, the juvenile courts in the six sites adjudicated 34% of the sample for target offenses, 22% for non-target offenses, and dismissed or dropped 38% of the cases. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that 41% of all target petitions processed in the juvenile court did not result in any type of adjudication. In three of the sites (Boston, Newark, Miami) the juvenile court adjudicated less than half of the youths charged with target offenses. Of course, we are unable to determine all the reasons underlying the pattern of case outcomes. The reasons are likely to vary, and in fact may be sound. For example, a jurisdiction may have overcrowded institutions. Other jurisdictions

may have insufficient checks on charging practices, causing the court to be the responsible entity to review petitions.

An examination of juvenile court outcomes which exclude youth transferred to adult court is obviously most important in those sites with high transfer rates. Thus, of our six study sites, Miami, and to a lesser extent Phoenix, warrant a closer examination. In contrast to Table 6.1, Table 6.3 shows that when youths *remain* in juvenile court in Miami, the rate of adjudication of target offenses increases from 18% to 32%, but the dismissal rate goes from 28% to 50%. This gives a very different picture of target adjudications and dismissals than is provided in Table 6.1

In order to contrast the severity of *charges* to *adjudications*, the adjudicated offenses were collapsed into five categories: target violent offenses, other violent (felony) offenses, property (felony) offenses, drug offenses, and other (misdemeanor) offenses. The reader should keep in mind that all youths were initially charged with target offenses. The results are shown in Table 6.4.

**TABLE 6.4: Most Serious Instant Adjudication by Site
(January 1-April 30, 1982)**

MOST SERIOUS ADJUDICATION	Boston		Denver		Memphis		Newark		Phoenix		Miami		TOTAL	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Target Violent Offense	26	(90)	9	(53)	32	(68)	37	(45)	31	(62)	25	(66)	158	(60)
Lesser Violent Offense	—		3	(18)	6	(13)	33	(40)	14	(28)	7	(18)	64	(24)
Property Offense	—		4	(23)	5	(11)	4	(5)	1	(2)	1	(3)	15	(6)
Drug Offense	—		—		—		—		2	(4)	—		2	(1)
Other Offense	—		1	(6)	4	(8)	7	(8)	2	(4)	2	(5)	17	(6)
Unknown Non-Target Offense	3	(10)	—		—		2	(2)	—		3	(8)	8	(3)
TOTAL	29		17		47		83		50		38		264	

Sixty percent of the cases adjudicated in juvenile court sustained the target offense allegation. In the four largest juvenile courts in Boston, the rate of target offense adjudications far exceeds the other sites (90%). On the other hand, Newark and Denver had charge reduction rates of about 50%. Denver had a substantial number of violent petitions which were adjudicated as property crimes. In Newark on the other hand, charges were more often reduced to a lesser violent offense than a property offense.

Next, we examined whether any particular target offenses were more often adjudicated as target offenses, and whether there were any differences across the juvenile courts in our study. Table 6.5 displays types of target petitions filed in the juvenile court, and whether the case resulted in (a) a target adjudication, or (b) some other form of court action (e.g., dropped, adjudicated for a lesser charge). The court action taken is displayed by site. It is important to note that the unit of analysis for Table 6.5 is *petition charges*, not *youths charged*, and therefore includes multiple target charges on a youth's instant petition.

When the data for all six study sites and all petition charges were aggregated, we found that only one out of three target petitions resulted in an adjudication for a target offense. Considerable variation, however, is found both across sites and offenses. An examination of the different offense types reveals that the petition charges most likely to result in a target adjudication are: kidnapping (75%), murder/attempted murder (55%), rape (45%), and armed robbery (45%). The petition charges least likely to produce target adjudications are arson (18%) and aggravated assault (24%).

Comparisons among individual sites reveal considerable variation. The "target adjudication rate" for all target charges varies from a low of 17% in Newark to a high of 61% in Memphis. These differences are even more dramatic for specific offenses. For example, Memphis and Boston adjudicate approximately two-thirds of the youths charged with armed robbery for a target offense, whereas Newark adjudicated only one-quarter of those charged with armed robbery for the original charge. Further, Memphis adjudicated 60% of those charged with aggravated assault as such, whereas Newark, Miami, and Boston adjudicated only 13-21% of their aggravated assault defendants. Memphis (and possibly Miami) also appears to adjudicate offenders for rape more regularly than any of the other sites. The ability to identify and adjudicate specific violent offenses varies widely across sites, as does the importance of doing this or incentive to do so. Since all jurisdictions except Denver examined in this survey have indeterminate commitment statutes for any adjudicated offenses, differentiation among offenders may lose its significance and importance. One must look further into the justice systems in each region to develop plausible and specific explanations.

Looking back at Table 6.3, we see that 56% of all charges resulted in adjudication (for either a target offense or a lesser offense). Table 6.6 shows the specific offense outcomes for all target offense petitions resulting in an adjudication. The percentages (in parentheses) reflect the proportion of each charge type which was adjudicated as the respective offense.

Overall, armed robbery has the highest rate of adjudication on the original charge (71% adjudicated). The most frequently reduced charges are arson (70% reduced) and aggravated assault (47% reduced). Most of the aggravated assault charges were reduced to "other violent" charges (most commonly a felonious assault, but *not* aggravated). Rape is another in-

**TABLE 6.5: Juvenile Court Action Taken on Target Petitions¹
(January 1-April 30, 1982)**

PETITION CHARGE	Boston		Denver		Memphis		Newark		Phoenix		Miami		TOTAL	
	Adj. Target ²	Not Adj. Target ³	Adj. Target	Not Adj. Target	Adj. Target	Not Adj. Target								
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Murder	2 (67)	1 (33)	—	—	0 (0)	2 (100)	1 (50)	1 (50)	1 (100)	0 (0)	—	—	4 (50)	4 (50)
Kidnaping	—	—	1 (50)	1 (50)	—	—	—	—	2 (100)	0 (0)	—	—	3 (75) ⁴	1 (25)
Rape	0 (0)	1 (100)	0 (0)	2 (100)	10 (71)	4 (29)	3 (23)	10 (77)	—	—	2 (67)	1 (33)	15 (45) ⁵	18 (55)
Aggravated Assault	8 (21)	3 (79)	7 (27)	19 (73)	15 (60)	10 (40)	18 (13)	117 (87)	24 (41)	34 (59)	11 (20)	45 (80)	83 (24) ⁶	256 (76)
Armed Robbery	20 (67)	10 (33)	2 (67)	1 (33)	7 (70)	3 (30)	15 (26)	43 (74)	8 (50)	8 (50)	15 (45)	18 (55)	67 (45) ⁶	83 (55)
Arson	—	—	0 (0)	2 (100)	1 (33)	2 (67)	1 (10)	9 (90)	1 (100)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (100)	3 (18)	14 (82)
Attempted Murder	1 (100)	0 (0)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 (100)	—
TOTAL	31 (42)	43 (58)	10 (29)	25 (71)	33 (61)	21 (39)	38 (17)	180 (83)	36 (46)	42 (54)	28 (30)	65 (70)	176 (32)	376 (68)

¹Includes multiple charges on petitions.

²Includes adjudications for any target offense.

³Includes adjudications for lesser offenses, suspended adjudications, and dismissals.

⁴Two adjudications were for other target offenses.

⁵Four adjudications were for aggravated assault.

⁶Two adjudications were for other target offenses.

TABLE 6.6: Charge Reductions (January 1-April 30, 1982)

PETITION CHARGE	ADJUDICATED OFFENSE											TOTAL N (%)
	Murder N (%)	Kidnapping N (%)	Rape N (%)	Aggravated Assault N (%)	Armed Robbery N (%)	Arson N (%)	Attempted Murder N (%)	Lesser Violent N (%)	Property N (%)	Drug N (%)	Other N (%)	
Murder	4 (67)	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 (17)	—	—	1 (17)	6 (2)
Kidnap	—	2 (67)	—	—	1 (33)	—	—	—	—	—	—	3 (1)
Rape	—	—	11 (64)	4 (24)	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 (12)	17 (6)
Aggravated Assault	—	—	—	8 (53)	2 (1)	—	—	49 (32)	9 (6)	1 (1)	10 (7)	152 (54)
Armed Robbery	—	—	—	2 (2)	65 (71)	—	—	17 (19)	3 (3)	1 (1)	3 (3)	91 (32)
Arson	—	—	—	—	—	3 (30)	—	—	3 (30)	—	4 (40)	10 (4)
Attempted Murder	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 (100)	—	—	—	—	1 (1)
TOTAL	4 (1)	2 (1)	11 (4)	87 (31)	68 (24)	3 (1)	1 (1)	67 (24)	15 (5)	2 (1)	20 (7)	280 (100)

teresting case. Sixty-four percent of those cases charged as rape are adjudicated as such. An additional 24% are adjudicated as aggravated assaults (still a target offense) — the change is probably related to the difficulty of "proving" and successfully prosecuting rape in many states.

Comparing the row and column totals, we can see which offense types characterize a sample of alleged violent offenders at two points: petition and adjudication. At petition, over half the offenders are charged with aggravated assault, and one in three with armed robbery. There were also a substantial number of petitions for rape and arson. After adjudication, these same offenders present a somewhat different, and less violent profile. Aggravated assault and armed robbery still dominate the sample, but now other violent offenses (non-injurious person crimes) are also a major offense category. There are fewer rapes, and now some property crimes enter the sample. The results suggest that the adjudicatory process reduces the apparent severity of charges represented in the original petitions. A variety of reasons or processes may explain an adjudication for a lesser offense, including plea bargaining, overcharging and statutes. Later sections of this paper examine these factors.

Prior Offense Histories

Two competing hypotheses suggest a relationship between target offense (instant) adjudications and prior offense histories. First, we hypothesized that the presence of a *prior* adjudication might actually influence the instant adjudication. Alternatively, if prior violence predicts future violence, then youths adjudicated for a target violent offense should have a greater percentage of prior violence adjudications than youths whose charges were reduced or dismissed. Table 6.7 examines this relationship.

Prior offense histories for all youths charged with target offenses in the sample have been recorded from their juvenile court files. Table 6.7 arrays those histories according to court action taken on the target offense (adjudicated vs. not adjudicated) and project site. Youths adjudicated for instant target offenses are far more likely to have prior target offense adjudications (14%) than those not adjudicated (5%). This substantial difference suggests that instant offense adjudication is related to, or influenced by, youths' prior histories. Adjudication rates vary little for those youth with "other violent" or non-violent offense histories (those with an adjudication for lesser violent, two or more violent petitions, and those with one or more prior adjudications for non-violent offenses). However, youths with no prior adjudications of any kind were more likely to have charges dismissed (60%) than adjudicated (45%). Overall, it appears that the probability of adjudication for a target offense does indeed increase for youths with a history of target violent offenses. Whether this results from the youth's behavior or the court's behavior is not known, and certainly merits empirical investigation.

TABLE 6.7: Prior Offense History of Youths Charged with Target Offenses (January 1-April 30, 1982)

PRIOR OFFENSE HISTORY	ADJUDICATED FOR TARGET OFFENSE							NOT ADJUDICATED FOR TARGET OFFENSE*						
	Boston	Denver	Memphis	Newark	Phoenix	Miami	TOTAL Adjudicated N (%)	Boston	Denver	Memphis	Newark	Phoenix	Miami	TOTAL Not Adjudicated N (%)
Prior Target Adjudication	2	0	10	6	1	3	22 (14)	1	1	0	6	2	6	16 (5)
Adjudication For Lesser Violent Offense	1	1	5	9	2	1	19 (12)	3	0	3	22	0	2	30 (10)
Two or More Petitions for Violent Offenses	1	0	0	1	0	2	4 (3)	0	1	0	4	0	0	5 (2)
One or More Prior Non-Violent Adjudications	3	1	7	10	15	6	42 (26)	4	3	10	34	9	11	71 (23)
No Prior Adjudications	18	7	10	11	13	13	72 (45)	25	15	8	86	16	34	184 (60)
TOTAL	25 ¹	9	32	37	31	25	159	33 ³	20	21	152 ²	27	53 ¹	306

¹one case missing²two cases missing³three cases missing

*Includes adjudications for non-target offenses, dismissals, acquittals, and suspended commitments.

Table 6.8 extends the above discussion to look at the effect of prior histories on the likelihood of being remanded to adult court. The totals are heavily skewed to reflect the Miami data. When comparing the Miami data in Tables 6.7 and 6.8, we see that youths with prior adjudication for a violent offense are nearly twice as likely to be waived as tried in juvenile court. Among the Miami waived youths, 15 (24%) had a prior target adjudication, while only nine youths (12%) remaining in juvenile court had a prior target adjudication. Again among waived youths, 43% had no prior adjudications, while 60% of those youths remaining in juvenile court had no prior adjudication. The data show that the probability of waiver in Miami increases considerably for youths with prior target adjudications. However, over 40% of the waived youths in Miami had no prior adjudications! Age at intake and treatment "availability" (i.e., age of juvenile jurisdiction) are often determinants of the waiver decision, and further analyses should control for age in comparing case outcomes and transfer decisions (Hamparian, 1982).

TABLE 6.8: Prior Offense History of Youths Transferred to Adult Court (January 1-April 30, 1982)

PRIOR OFFENSE HISTORY	TRANSFERRED TO ADULT COURT						TOTAL N (%)
	Boston	Denver	Memphis	Newark	Phoenix	Miami	
Prior Target Adjudication	0	0	0	0	0	15	15 (19)
Adjudication For Lesser Violent Offense	0	0	1	1	1	1	4 (5)
Two or More Petitions for Violent Offenses	0	0	0	0	0	3	3 (4)
One Prior Non-Violent Offense	0	0	1	0	5	17	23 (30)
No Prior Adjudication	0	2	0	1	3	27	33 (42)
TOTAL	0	2	2	2	9	63	78

Case Processing Time

Efficient and speedy case processing, balanced with "due process" rights, is generally accepted as part of an overall delinquency policy. The immediacy with which a sanction is applied can convey society's disapproval of the act. Delays risk the ability to link act with consequence, and the deterrent effect (or negative reinforcement, depending on one's theoretical perspective) may be lost. To determine case processing time for violent juvenile offenders, we collected and analyzed data on petition, adjudication, and disposition dates for 383 youths. Table 6.9 shows the mean case processing

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TABLE 6.8: Prior Offense History of Youths Transferred to Adult Court (January 1-April 30, 1982)

<i>TRANSFERRED TO ADULT COURT</i>							
<i>PRIOR OFFENSE HISTORY</i>	<i>Boston</i>	<i>Denver</i>	<i>Memphis</i>	<i>Newark</i>	<i>Phoenix</i>	<i>Miami</i>	<i>TOTAL N (%)</i>
Prior Target Adjudication	0	0	0	0	0	15	15 (19)
Adjudication For Lesser Violent Offense	0	0	1	1	1	1	4 (5)
Two or More Petitions for Violent Offenses	0	0	0	0	0	3	3 (4)
One Prior Non-Violent Offense	0	0	1	0	5	17	23 (30)
No Prior Adjudication	0	2	0	1	3	27	33 (42)
TOTAL	0	2	2	2	9	63	78

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time (in months) from petition to adjudication, and, for those adjudicated, to disposition. The total time, from petition to disposition, is also shown.

TABLE 6.9: Case Processing Time (Mean Number of Months)

SITE	Time from Petition to Adjudication		Time from Adjudication to Disposition		Time from Petition to Disposition ¹	
Boston	3.22	(49)	0.32	(28)	3.21	(24)
Denver	5.19	(27)	0.00	(19)	4.68	(19)
Memphis	0.90	(51)	0.15	(46)	1.00	(46)
Newark	2.45	(76)	0.54	(70)	2.70	(60)
Phoenix	1.56	(64)	1.90	(48)	3.32	(47)
Miami	1.16	(116)	0.55	(11)	1.37	(30)
TOTAL	2.00	(383)	0.68	(222)	2.53	(226)

¹The times are not additive due to the change in N. Some cases drop out before they reach disposition (e.g., "continued without funding" in Boston), and other data are missing.

There is wide disparity in case processing time across sites for all intervals. Denver is the slowest, perhaps explaining why so few cases are charged and even fewer adjudicated. Memphis and Miami are the fastest courts, despite wide variability in case outcomes. With the exception of Phoenix, the time from adjudication to disposition is short, taking no more than 2½ weeks in any of the other sites. In several courts, cases which eventually drop out may take the same time or longer than those which reach disposition. This may be due to defense requests for continuances or other legitimate adversarial procedures.

The period between adjudication and disposition is usually reserved for gathering social history information and exploring dispositional alternatives. It appears that these courts require only a couple of weeks to complete that process, a relatively short period when contrasted with other case processing intervals. Nevertheless, this shorter interval does avoid delays and thereby reduces case processing time, albeit at the price of potentially hasty dispositions.

In general, it is difficult to discern patterns in these data, since courts with similar rates vary widely in court organization (e.g., Miami and Memphis), while courts with similar organization (e.g., Newark, Phoenix, and Miami) have disparate case processing times. One may have to look either outside the court (e.g., law enforcement, intake) or to court organization or procedures for possible explanations.

System Processing: Falling Through the Gaps

There are a number of factors inherent in the way in which the juvenile justice system processes youths, which influenced the case outcomes of youths charged with violent offenses in the six systems under study. From the data presented above, as well as on direct observations of the local juvenile justice system's practices, six major sources of attrition of potential project-eligible youths were identified: charging practices, the petition process, adjudication procedures, plea bargaining, and revocations. Although each area is described below separately, it is important to recognize that a practice in one area may directly influence a procedure in another area. For example, plea bargaining may affect charging, charging may affect a waiver decision, a suspended adjudication may affect the decision to instigate revocation procedures. Consequently, the importance of the six areas varies considerably across the study sites.

Charging. This area represents perhaps the most extensive slippage in the identification of project-eligible youths. In general, the procedures for charging a youth and documenting alleged offenses were informal, lacked specificity, were highly discretionary, and without adequate review and accountability.

In Memphis, for example, youths were charged by law enforcement officers without the statutory specificity required by the state juvenile justice codes. The generality in charging was so broad that youths alleged to have committed target offenses were charged "generically." For example, armed robbery was often charged as robbery. In other cases, charges were so poorly written (i.e., generally lacking in detail) that the cases were rejected for prosecution. Similar problems were observed in Newark.

Without adequate review of charging procedures by court intake officers or prosecuting attorneys, non-perfected charges were contained in petitions which were found to be based on insufficient evidence and therefore were not sustained by juvenile court judges.

A second major charging issue was the practice of "undercharging." In some sites, the prosecutor or court intake supervisor undercharged the case because he recognized that the youth would receive approximately the same disposition and sentence for the lesser charge as he would receive for a target crime. As such, the prosecutor or court intake supervisor charged the youth with an offense for which it was easier to gain an adjudication. Often, dispositional practices and state statutes provided little incentive to file and adjudicate for the higher charge.

The best example of this practice may be Denver. In Colorado, a youth adjudicated for a second time (regardless of the offense) falls under the "repeat offender legislation" and therefore may receive the same length of commitment as a youth adjudicated for a target crime. Accordingly, there were only 31 youths charged with target crimes in the four-county metropolitan Denver area during the first four months of 1982 (see Table 6.1).

Petitions. As discussed above, in some sites charges were generic and lacked statutory specificity. When this occurs it follows that the petitions, which formalize the charges, would also be generic. The result is that a number of youths for whom evidence may have existed for a target adjudication (e.g., armed robbery) were apparently adjudicated for non-target offense instead (e.g., robbery). In the eyes of corrections agencies and for subsequent court appearances, such prior offenses may appear less serious than they really were. One result could be a less stringent placement disposition.

A more prevalent practice, evident to some extent in all sites, but most prevalent in Phoenix and Memphis, was the collapsing of multiple incidents from different time periods into one petition. The result of this practice affected the number of prior adjudications for the youth, and therefore caused youths who allegedly had committed multiple offenses to receive only one adjudication. Again, there were consequences both for the youth — lack of accountability — and for the system — an inaccurate picture of the youth's offense history.

However, even when separate petitions for incidents occurring at different times were filed, newer petitions were dropped upon the sustaining of an older petition. By virtue of sustaining *any* petition the court has the authority to deal with the youth in his "best interests" and "protect the community." Unless a "repeat offender" statute exists (as was the case in Denver), the prosecutor has little incentive to prosecute the youth for the second petition.

Adjudications. As noted earlier, in order for a youth to become project-eligible, he must be adjudicated both for a target offense and a prior offense. There is a practice, at some sites (particularly Newark, Memphis and Boston), of holding adjudications in abeyance by "suspending" the adjudication, holding the adjudication "under advisement" or "continuing the case." These procedures allow an adjudication to "remain pending" while the juvenile court judge imposes certain court-ordered conditions on the youth. If the conditions are not met, the result is the automatic adjudication of the charges contained in the petition. In some sites, the violation of court-ordered conditions results in an instant dispositional (commitment) order.

For example, in Boston we found that the juvenile court judges would frequently "continue" the youth's most serious charge and adjudicate him for a lesser charge. The judge would then monitor the youth's behavior and progress. In those instances where the judges felt the youth "messed up," he would waive the youth to the adult court for the "continued" (more serious) charge. If the youth's behavior was acceptable, the judge would drop the serious charge. There are no standards of proof for acceptable behavior. Further, the judge would also threaten the youth correctional agency with waiving the youth if it did not place the youth in secure care. As such, the judges used the violent offense for leverage to control both the behavior of the youths and the youth corrections agency.

Parole Revocations. When a youth is on parole and is accused of committing a new offense the youth may be returned to commitment by a revocation process, or a new petition may be filed for the alleged offense. If a petition is not filed and heard by the court, the youth is never legally adjudicated for the behavior in question. Moreover, parole revocation hearings varied widely in their adherence to due process concerns. In Phoenix, for example, the hearing officers are appointed by institutional staff, and youths seldom are represented at these hearings by counsel. As such, youths whose parole is revoked for an alleged target offense were not deemed "violent" offenders, since no record of an adjudication was entered.

Plea Bargaining. The plea bargaining process cuts across all the above areas and it greatly reduced the size of the target population at all study sites. As seen in Table 6.4, 40% of those cases sustained in juvenile court resulted in adjudications for lesser charges. While it is impossible to calculate what percentage of those reduced adjudications resulted from a plea negotiation process, observations of court practices suggest that plea bargaining is the primary factor behind most adjudications for reduced charges (Newman, 1977; Blumberg, 1977).

Plea bargaining may occur at any point in the youth's processing by the juvenile justice system, but the focus is primarily in the juvenile court. It may involve a plea negotiation for lesser charges in return for either a dispositional alternative or a dismissal of additional charges. The prosecutor in Phoenix routinely bargained with a waiver motion. In the other sites, target offenses were often plead down to other violent offenses (see Table 6.5). In some instances, the more severe charge (which was also more difficult to prove) was dismissed in return for a plea to the lesser charge. For example, an aggravated assault and armed robbery incident might well result in a plea negotiation to a strong-arm robbery charge. These practices were particularly pervasive in states where the commitment statutes were not linked to a label or the charge. Regardless of where and how the plea bargain process occurs, it clearly works to prevent youths from being held accountable for violent behaviors. For the court, these practices reduce the rate at which youths are adjudicated for specified violent and serious crimes. Its impact was observed on both the instant and the prior offenses for youths in this sample.

Waivers. The last way the juvenile justice system acts to remove youths from program eligibility is to simply move the kids "up and out" of the juvenile justice system by waiving (or direct filing) them to the adult court and the criminal justice system. In all of our study sites, youths charged with target crimes were eligible for waiver to the adult court. In Phoenix, the waiver motion was used as a plea bargaining tool. In two of the sites — Miami and Phoenix — a sizeable number of youths were so transferred. In fact, in Miami, 44% of all youths charged with target crimes (nearly all such youths 16 and over) were either waived to or directly filed in the adult court. In Phoenix, the prosecutor waived virtually all youths over 16.5 charged

with target crimes. The net effect was to lower the age of majority (for certain offense or offender categories) through the systematic transfer of youths to adult jurisdiction.

In recent years, the transfer of juveniles to adult court has become an important policy and research focus (see, for example: Hamparian, 1982; Feld, 1981, 1983). Only recently, though, has there been any systematic study of the determinants of the transfer decision. In these study sites, several reasons governed the decision by prosecutors to seek transfer. In two sites (Phoenix and Miami), there are either statutory or administrative "ceilings" on the length of secure confinement in juvenile facilities. In Phoenix, an Arizona Supreme Court decision limited juvenile jurisdiction to 18 years of age. In Miami, overcrowded juvenile corrections' facilities limited the average length of stay to between six and nine months. Both prosecutors, who sought longer confinement periods for "dangerous" youths, routinely requested transfers for youths 17 or older charged with violent offenses. In general, waiver/transfer in these two sites resulted from the prosecutors' perception that incarceration terms in juvenile facilities were far shorter than in the adult system. Moreover, at least one prosecutor saw the criminal court as an "easier" court to obtain convictions, regardless of sentence. This process of "building a record" was seen as ensuring that subsequent convictions would result in prison sentences.

In Miami, the criminal codes create concurrent jurisdiction in juvenile and adult court for most felonies where the defendant is 16 years or older. The prosecutor selects the court in which s/he wishes to prosecute the case. For the most part, his/her decision in violent cases is determined by the strength of the case, or where the prosecutor feels a conviction is most likely to be obtained. "Stronger" cases are filed directly in the criminal court, while weaker cases originate in juvenile court and may be transferred. Those youths below 16 originate in juvenile court and are transferred if the prosecutor seeks specialized services (e.g., substance abuse or mental health) or longer confinement than the juvenile corrections system can provide. The Miami prosecutor stated several times that the limitations of the juvenile corrections agency determined the court jurisdiction in which violent charges would be filed.

DISCUSSION

The processes described in this paper (e.g., plea bargaining, undercharging, waiver, suspended adjudication, collapsing petitions) seem to combine to undermine the ability of the juvenile justice system to identify and sanction chronically violent offenders. Nearly all components of the system are involved in these processes, from detention to charging to corrections. The omnibus delinquency policy which results from the *parens patriae* philosophy limits the system's incentive to differentiate violent young offenders from "serious" or other delinquents.⁴

These practices serve the interests of neither the public nor youths. For example, plea bargaining overpunishes the innocent and underpunishes the guilty. These and other processes serve to neutralize the juvenile justice system and undermine its credibility and effectiveness (Trojanowicz, 1983). As a result, we observe the recent criticisms and attacks on the juvenile courts. Yet these data show that court outcomes are merely the logical conclusion of a sequence of well-entrenched processes. We must understand the source of these practices and recognize the incentives and benefits for juvenile justice system actors, in order to chart another course.

The Need for System Change

A variety of systematic practices contribute to the case outcomes of youths charged with violent offenses in the juvenile justice system. The practices we observed — undercharging, consolidating petitions, suspending adjudications, plea bargaining, and transferring youth to adult court — result from two factors: incentives and resources. Each system actor has institutional incentives to continue the current processing patterns, and there is little accountability among agencies. Law enforcement need not provide extensive documentation of specific violent offenses to refer cases for court processing. Prosecutors use charging and jurisdictional discretion to maximize their chances of conviction and punishment. Defense attorneys benefit from these practices by reducing charges and gaining lesser penalties for their clients' acts. For corrections officials, it matters little why a youth was committed since indeterminacy remains the prevailing commitment approach. The court retains social control and perhaps better manages the calendar.

Moreover, there are few incentives to change. What happens in one area of the "system" affects all areas in turn. Greater specificity in charging and adjudicating may delay case processing, resulting in longer detention stays for young people and more crowded dockets for the court. Will correctional dispositions change if charges are more clearly stated? There may well be more commitments, but the fixed capacity to provide services will likely limit the quality and duration of services as well as the number of youths served.

It is precisely here where the issue of resources is important. In this study, two prosecutors seek criminal court processing for all youths 16 and older because they can obtain longer sentences or better "services." (This is particularly ironic given the philosophical differences between juvenile and criminal courts on the issue of service). The juvenile justice system has been neutralized in its ability to sanction and "treat" violent offenders because it lacks the resources to provide necessary services for them. Absent such resources, there is little incentive to either differentiate these from other cases, or to retain them under juvenile jurisdiction. In effect, what passes

for "swift and sure" response is a triage policy to save those youths who are "amenable" to its limited rehabilitative capabilities while discarding the rest to the criminal court for anticipated long-term secure care. The result is a failure to identify and treat those most in need of the scarce resources of the juvenile justice system, and a loss of public confidence in its purposes and practice.

What to Do?

The importance of change in juvenile justice system responses to violent youths cannot be overstated. The legislative responses to these youths have steadily eroded the jurisdiction, autonomy, and authority of the juvenile court, while placing greater discretion and responsibility on the prosecutorial function and the criminal court. Yet the juvenile court has borne the majority of criticism and reaction which is more rightfully directed at an interactive process involving very human decisions. Whereas in the past the juvenile justice system had only to pursue "the best interests of the child," the public now demands that punishment be blended with rehabilitation, particularly for violent young offenders. To accomplish this and restore public confidence, the juvenile justice system must make every effort to provide accountability as well as quality treatment and services to these youths. Several changes must occur.

The juvenile justice system should focus its attention on fashioning "appropriate dispositional alternatives" for violent offenders, those youths who pose the greatest threat to society and who require the most intensive services. First, a definition must be proposed which links empirical knowledge with special measures and ethical concerns. This will assist the system in identifying those offenders for whom scarce resources are to be strategically allocated. Second, the definition must be operationalized and implemented so that charges are specified and adjudicated, and, where sustained, dispositional decisions are linked to information about the offense and the offender. What can be a better foundation for rehabilitation than a system where individuals are held accountable, and accept responsibility for their actions?

Finally, resources and alternatives must be created so that the incentives are provided to undertake shifts in practice and policy. Here, leadership and vision must arise naturally from within these communities. Those who would "move" the system should use data such as these to document systemic practices and show their consequences. In this way, accountability within the juvenile justice system can develop, and political incentives can be created for change.

Decisions of prosecutors and the juvenile court are directly related to the services offered by juvenile corrections agencies. We must therefore create special treatment services to provide the incentives and resources to influ-

ence the court's decisions. These services should attempt to alter both the behaviors and adverse living conditions of these young people while addressing public safety concerns. Reform of the juvenile court, then, must be preceded by reform of juvenile corrections. Unless all three steps are accomplished — strategic planning, formal processing, expanded treatment resources — the juvenile justice system may be destined for failure and extinction.

Those who would abolish the juvenile court have yet to offer proof that viable alternatives exist. We should be cautious toward "get tough" proposals which rely on incapacitation and punishment, until empirical support emerges for such policies; they are costly, and would only marginally reduce violent youth crime. Relatively few youths in adult court are subject to incarceration, and therefore the policy goals of waiver or jurisdictional change are undermined (Feld, 1983). The processing of young offenders in criminal court has been relatively unexamined, and we lack evidence of the efficacy of adult corrections for violent juvenile offenders.

Alternatively, we have yet to test a strategy where the juvenile justice system strategically focuses its attention and resources on violent offenders through special dispositions and treatment efforts. Without empirical evidence that criminal court sanctions are more effective, and lacking a clear test of the juvenile justice system's responses to violent offenders, early pronouncement of the death of the rehabilitative ideal is premature.

FOOTNOTES

1. The violent offenses studied were: murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, forcible rape/sodomy, arson of an occupied dwelling, and kidnapping. These offenses were the instant "target" offenses for the OJJDP Violent Juvenile Offender Research and Development Program.
2. Cases which were filed but remained pending as of April 30, 1982 were excluded from the sample.
3. In Miami, concurrent jurisdiction permits filing cases in either juvenile or directly in criminal court. Cases may also be judicially waived from juvenile to adult court. Both mechanisms are included in the table. In the other five sites, all criminal court cases were judicially waived.
4. Traditionally, an omnibus delinquency policy has pervaded the entire juvenile justice system (Feld, 1981). From the declaration by the court that a youth is delinquent (as opposed to guilty of a specific offense), to the practice of indeterminate commitments (as opposed to proportional commitments), there is virtually no specification relative to the youth's committing or prior offenses. Moreover, it is deemed unimportant. If he or she is delinquent, dispositions, placements, and services are based on individual factors usually apart from the offense. However, like parole decisions, these decisions are predictions of what is necessary to avoid subsequent illegal acts.

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7

THE POLITICS OF SECURE CARE IN YOUTH CORRECTIONAL REFORM

Alden D. Miller
Lloyd E. Ohlin

This case study of changes in Massachusetts juvenile correction over the last decade makes a point of more general significance, namely that secure care programs reveal the inherent conflicts, problems, and nature of the entire youth correctional system. Furthermore, as the most severe sanction, secure care's orientation toward therapy, reintegration or, conversely, custody shapes all other programs in the system.

If it is true that the basic contradictions of a society are most clearly reflected in its jails and prisons, then the inherent conflicts of a correctional system may be most obvious in its secure facilities. Even in a community-based youth correctional system, the secure care programs lay bare problems in the entire service system that are far out of proportion to the number of youths actually contained.

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Within a youth correctional system, secure care is the threat or sanction of final resort short of waiver to the adult system. We can learn much about the larger system from the nature, frequency, and duration of that sanction. A system that truly emphasizes therapy and reintegration will have a secure care system that does also. Conversely, if the secure care begins to look custodial, it is likely that the rest of the system is becoming that way too. Our most severe sanctions are thus likely to be our smaller ones writ large. A system that begins to use secure care more frequently and with longer duration is making a statement about its assessment of youthful offenders that colors for youths and staff the underlying assumptions of all the other programs as well.

Beyond these internal realities of the correctional system there is a related but additional reason for paying special attention to secure care in the study of correctional reform. The centrality of secure care in the functioning of the system is never lost from sight in the political conflict that guides and drives correctional reform. Of course advocates of more security and control focus on it, but so do advocates of treatment and reintegration. It is the excesses and abuses of secure care that give the advocates of liberal reform their strongest ammunition to combat an overly custodial system, just as lapses in security provide conservatives with their strongest ammunition against a more open system.

The exposés that triggered the reforms of the early 1970s in the Massachusetts youth correctional system concerned scandals that occurred at the Institute for Child Guidance at Bridgewater, the institution that was the ultimate disciplinary unit. During the initial reform, much of the controversy was focused on its successor, Cottage Nine, the discipline cottage at the Industrial School for Boys at Shirley. The isolation cells in that cottage were eventually demolished by youths wielding sledge hammers in a public demonstration involving departmental officials, legislators, and the press. With Bridgewater and then Shirley the first institutions to be closed, reform thus began at the secure end of the system.

With the dawn of the 1980s, we find a conservative counterreform developing full steam. Again, the focus is on secure care, with demands for more security for larger numbers of youths. Our aim in this article is to examine this conservative movement within the context of correctional reform, and to consider likely responses to it during the next decade. We will draw upon research conducted over a ten-year period by the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, much of it reported in four volumes on youth correctional reform published in 1977 and 1978 (Miller, et al., 1977; Coates, et al., 1978; McEwen, 1978; Feld, 1977). Since 1978, the Center has been engaged in a more focused study of issues surrounding secure care in the new community-based youth correctional system.

The research before 1978 was organized into seventeen interrelated field studies. Broadly speaking, they allowed us to investigate the day-to-day operation of programs, to follow the experiences of youths as we tracked

them through the system into the community, and to study the political and organizational processes involved in the successive waves of reform and counterreform. Since 1978, the focus on secure care has led to interviews with key decision makers in correction and the courts about difficult youths, about actual and desired programs for them, and about disagreements over how to manage the youths. We also tracked for nine months a cohort of youths who entered the juvenile correctional system in the summer of 1978 to see how they were placed in programs. We were interested in what the placements were, how the decisions were made, and how the decision makers evaluated this process. A key question was what differing characteristics of the youths corresponded with the different placements. Finally, this research included a survey of both secure and nonsecure programs to determine how they were related to one another.

In the following account, we will describe how successive constituencies have driven forward the process of reform and counterreform in Massachusetts since the mid-1960s. We will then examine strategic and tactical considerations likely to affect changes over the next few years. We see change as a process that creates striking variations in the incentives to which people respond in working with youths and deciding what to do with them. These differences are crucial in understanding how policies are shaped to deal with changing circumstances.

THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS

In the 1960s, juvenile correction in Massachusetts consisted of five training schools, a small forestry program, and four detention and reception centers. A very few youths were placed in privately operated group homes. Thus, virtually all juveniles were situated in what most observers today would classify as secure settings. The detention facilities were actually more secure than the cottage-based training schools built in rural areas. However, the latter were guarded, and runners were chased and found, usually very quickly.

It is important to realize that although the system of the 1960s was almost all secure by the standards of the 1970s, it did have internal gradations of control. The Institute for Child Guidance at Bridgewater was the place where the most troublesome boys in the system were assigned; this facility contained only a small minority of the total population, just as secure programs today house only a small proportion of juveniles under correctional care.

A Constituency for Reform

In the mid-1960s, a legislator and some colleagues visited Bridgewater to look at programs for criminally insane adults. As they came out at the end of

the day, someone suggested that they take a look at the juvenile facility across the street. They did, and thus began a succession of increasingly major investigations. In 1967, the governor requested the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare to conduct an investigation and make recommendations concerning the statewide Division of Youth Services, looking at both treatment and administration. The report found many deficiencies which were confirmed in a subsequent investigation by a child advocacy agency, the Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth, and further inquiries by a legislative committee. These investigations were followed in 1968 and 1969 by the disclosure of scandals involving brutality in the treatment of youths at Bridgewater.

The constituency for reform that developed out of this increasingly public affair was led by the Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth and the grassroots Committee for Youth in Trouble, a local group that organized demonstrations to protest conditions at Bridgewater. Eventually, as public criticism of Youth Services mounted, the governor and the legislature were persuaded of the need for change. The director of the Division of Youth Services was forced to resign, and legislation was passed in 1969 reorganizing the division into a department with a mandate for reform.

On the whole, this broad constituency was not calling for radical reform. The groups involved sought to humanize conditions and to introduce more intensive mental health care in the treatment of youths.

The new commissioner of the reform administration, Jerome Miller, tried to convert the training school programs into cottage-based therapeutic communities. His first year was spent in efforts to humanize existing forms of custodial control by abolishing traditional control techniques, such as disciplinary haircuts, uniforms, marching to group activities, and doling out or withholding cigarettes as reward or punishment. After closing the Bridgewater institution in the summer of 1970, and testing staff on different assignments, Miller began to move in earnest to develop the therapeutic communities. Staff were instructed to share decision making with the young, particularly in the new group therapy cottages. Youths were encouraged to accept responsibility for rewarding and punishing each other, and for confronting and dealing with personal problems. The programs stressed learning to cope with social demands, and gaining insight into past and future problems leading to trouble with the law. There was much less concern than before with exacting outward obedience and deference to authority, or developing specific occupational skills.

There were problems. There seemed to be a limit on how far the reforms could go, given the entrenched resistance of the civil service-protected institutional staff. It seemed improbable that more than one-fourth to one-third of the institutional cottages could be converted to therapeutic communities at any one time. Furthermore, the reform constituency outside the department was fading into obscurity, as the reform activities concentrated on institutional practices within the department. In addition, reform-

oriented staff members were sorting into factions, each seeking to consolidate its control over some part of the system. The reform movement seemed to be running out of steam.

A Constituency for Replacement

Out of this situation arose a smaller reform constituency initiated by Miller himself, seeking to replace the institutions altogether with a system of services purchased from private contractors. Its objectives were repeatedly summed up in the broad injunction to "do good things for kids." The stress on action was accompanied by a willingness to let administrative concerns catch up later.

This group mobilized the department to close the training schools quickly — within a few months. This involved sidestepping the potential resistance of most members of the legislature by closing the training schools while the legislature was out of session. Although the governor was hesitant at first to get involved, as the new policies began to be implemented, he lent public support to the process. A key event in this transition was a conference at the University of Massachusetts. Youths were taken from the training schools to the university in a ceremonial motorcade, put up in dorms with volunteer college students during the semester break, and then placed in community settings around the state. This event demonstrated that young offenders could be handled in noncorrectional settings, and that other organizations could play a major role in caring for them. The university campus security chief commented afterward that these youths had been less trouble than a convention of the American Legion.

The programs of the new community-based system were diverse. Half the youths under the care of the department remained on parole, as before. Of the rest, 10% were in secure care, 20% each in group homes and foster care, and 50% were in nonresidential settings, the biggest innovation of all. There was much more emphasis on linking the youth and the community, and establishing more humane, normal social relationships in the living units.

Programs established for the 10% in secure care at this time were a pretty good indicator of the diversity of care that was available for other youths throughout the system. There were two main types of secure care: therapeutic communities, modeled on the drug-free, concept-house programs established for adult drug addicts in the 1960s; and a program featuring "straight talk" run largely by former convicts. Security in the former was largely a matter of supervision and peer pressure, with little use of locks; the latter program made use of the usual locking measures. The first type of program concentrated on developing a stable community within the program, while the second concentrated on the community outside, through discussion and making contact with resources outside. The choice provided by the

two types of programs allowed different types of youths to be placed where they would do best.

In addition, the department was interested in exploring two other alternatives. One consisted of tracking programs, in which staff members worked in the community with only two youths at a time, becoming accountable for their whereabouts and activities at all times. The other alternative was intensive foster care (Bakal and Polsky, 1979) which was much like an intensively programmed group home in that the foster parents were employed full time in the home and were backed up by professional support for counseling and other services.

The closing of the training schools was accompanied by other important reforms. Instead of relying solely on locked detention for prehearing control, the department created new alternatives, such as treatment detention (secure but with more programming), shelter care detention in YMCAs (still fairly secure but more home-like), and foster care detention, the most normalized setting of all. In addition, the use of the detention reception units to hold youths after court commitment was virtually eliminated by scheduling placement decisions earlier, during the period when the youth was still in the court process. Increasingly, efforts were made to involve the youths themselves in placement decisions.

Both of these innovations were accomplished by close work with the courts. Consequently, judicial personnel retained a sense of involvement even though the increased number of placement options available to the department made the placement or detention choice less predictable and controllable by the court.

The closing of the training schools and the build-up of alternative programs in the community greatly reduced the factionalism emerging at the end of the previous phase of reform. An example of this increased unity occurred after Miller had already left in January 1973 to attempt similar work in Illinois. True to its priorities, the replacement constituency had left administrative and fiscal detail, as contrasted with program development, to the last. However, bills were falling due that had to be paid to make the new system work. A Democratic speaker of the House, a Republican governor, the Executive Office of Human Services, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Department of Justice joined forces to build a sounder fiscal foundation under the reforms. They conducted a sympathetic investigation of the department's fiscal affairs that turned up little corruption but much ignorance among staff and the new private providers of services about how to keep books. The department and those under contract were accordingly taught better management practices. Within a few months, the department moved from being on the verge of fiscal chaos to being held up as a model of how the rest of state government should manage its administrative and fiscal affairs. This episode marked a high point in cooperative efforts aimed at "doing good things for kids."

A Constituency for Consolidation

As staff members realized the reforms had probably gone as far as they were going to go, cooperation among staff suddenly gave way to competition. Career goals quickly became important, and the structure of rank and position among staff, which had been fluid at the height of reform, showed signs of growing rigid as the spirit of reform cooled. This awakened concern for careers began to control staff members' positions on vital decisions, with "what would be best for the kids?" replaced by "what will protect my career?" as the highest priority.

Under these circumstances, the band that had implemented the reforms gradually dissolved as many moved on to job opportunities elsewhere. They were not replaced with like-minded, task-oriented people, which accelerated the drift toward the dominance of concerns about career. As a consequence, the department began to make compromises with more conservative legislators on such matters as when to close the remaining cottages of the last training school, a process that took several years instead of the projected several months. An increased emphasis on professionalism led in turn to more emphasis on the therapeutic community approach, where stricter controls were possible, and to a deemphasis on work in the community. The function of solving problems in relationships between youths and the community acquired a volunteer or paraprofessional cast, while direct treatment was viewed as more professional, and hence better for one's career.

There was also increased use of some facilities as lockups without programmed activities, as the department began to respond to pressures from legislators for more security. Ironically, there is now a tendency to see the department's secure care program as having begun with these lock-up policies. Yet they actually signaled a retreat from a more diversified and intensive set of secure care programs.

The department's quality control monitoring of programs also began to deteriorate. The unit responsible for program evaluations, and the sometimes consequent modification or termination of program contracts, came to find its recommendations disregarded and even treated as an embarrassment to the department. The increasingly strident expressions of frustration by the evaluation unit members led only to further isolation. As a result the department, without an effective quality control and monitoring system, began to lose control over the highly decentralized network of privately purchased program services.

The Situation Today: A Constituency for Secure Care

Juvenile court judges generally had supported the mandate for reform at the outset, although they were more divided in opinion on the desirability or

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success of closing the training schools and creating alternative programs. Now, however, the judges coalesced, asking for more scrutiny of and confinement away from the community for a varying but ever-increasing proportion of youths. Thus, a stronger measure of policy conflict arose between the department and the courts. The department reinstated the practice of delaying placement decisions until after court disposition. This necessitated the reestablishment of reception confinement of youths, usually in the detention centers, until the placement decision had been made (Vorenberg and Trotter, 1980). At present, in more difficult cases this decision-making process may take considerable time, because the demise of quality control monitoring has contributed to increased independence among the private programs. They now reject youths more freely, so that the department frequently has no options for a difficult youth except secure care.

Judges have countered their reduced role in placement by increasing the number of youths subject to hearings to determine whether they should be bound over to adult court, and not tried as juveniles at all. Although the number of bindovers has not increased, many youths in secure care have been placed there under a judge's threat of bindover if the department does not provide a secure placement. A few judges have experimented with setting bail for outstanding charges against committed youths, thus preventing them from participating in the more open aspects of programs (e.g., making use of weekend passes), despite what their progress or the program plan may call for. Although the department belatedly attempted to enlarge court participation in placement decisions, court personnel feel they have only had token representation in meetings where placements are decided, and that this has not given them an effective voice in decisions, since they may easily be outvoted.

YOUTHS' CHARACTERISTICS BEARING ON THE DISPOSITION DECISION

Since 1978, we have been interviewing key participants in courts and juvenile correction about the problems of working with difficult youths. We have also collected data on a large number of youths going through the correctional system to discover who gets placed in secure settings, and have surveyed a sample of programs to determine patterns of service in secure and nonsecure programs.

In the past, youths in secure care frequently were placed there because they were difficult to manage elsewhere, regardless of the nature of the instant offense. More recently, demands for more secure care have been justified on the basis of the just deserts model of punishment, where dispositions are determined mainly by current offense and offense history (American Friends Service Committee, 1971; Frankel, 1973; Fogel, 1975; Dershowitz, 1976; Von Hirsch, 1976). We wished to explore the extent to which the

struggles we have been describing in Massachusetts reflect this trend. We examined the connection between many characteristics of the youths under correctional care and the severity of their disposition. We report here the characteristics that emerged as most strongly related to disposition.

In July 1979 we classified a sample of 447 youths who entered the Department of Youth Services between July and October 1978 according to the most severe classification and secure disposition they received between the 1978 entry and the 1979 date of classification. Most had stayed in the general population. Others had been judged by caseworkers or probation workers as in need of more security, but had not been placed accordingly. Some had been put into secure care, others into Mental Health Regional Adolescent Program (RAP) units (intended for the most difficult youths), and some had been bound over for adjudication in adult court. In Table 7.1 we can see that blacks are strikingly overrepresented among the bindovers, and somewhat overrepresented in the other categories except the general population. Females are overrepresented in RAP units. Older youths are found disproportionately in the more extreme categories, and youths with two-parent families (including step-parents) are disproportionately in RAP units. Those with fathers who have skilled or higher-level employment also show up more often in the RAPs.

Over half the youths in the bindover, RAP, and secure care categories have a history of being runners. Particularly serious current offenses are most strongly represented in the bindover and secure care placements. Juveniles whose offenses involved physical injury are also concentrated in these placements and even more strongly in RAPs. Youths whose offenses involved threat with or use of a weapon are particularly prominent among the bindovers. Youths in the bindover and secure care categories are also most likely to have a self-reported history of serious crimes, committed both alone and in the company of other youths. Bindover and RAP youths are particularly likely to have been detained; and bindovers are especially likely to have been to court again during the nine months since the commitment in the summer of 1978 that brought them into our sample. Looking at the offenses for which they were committed in the summer of 1978 and any additional offenses in the nine months following, we find that those whose most serious offense was homicide, rape, arson, or armed robbery are particularly overrepresented among the bindovers.

In sum, youths committing serious crimes are most overrepresented among the bindovers, followed by secure care. Youths of lower socioeconomic status and of minority groups are overrepresented among bindovers and in secure care, while juveniles of a higher socioeconomic status and women are overrepresented in RAP. RAP youths are noticeably less likely than those in secure care or bindovers to have committed serious offenses. The offense data thus suggest that the decision-making process is sensitive to the information cited as critical by proponents of just deserts-based punishment. The social class differences are more disturbing. Although such characteristics as race and social class are clearly related to official of-

TABLE 7.1: Percentage of Youths with Selected Characteristics, by Disposition

Characteristics of Youths	Disposition				
	Bindover	RAP	Secure Care	Need Secure Care	General Population
Black	37.5	18.2	24.0	24.3	14.0
Female	0.0	27.3	4.0	10.0	10.6
16 years and over	84.4	90.0	72.0	64.7	55.1
Two-parent house	25.0	63.6	24.0	35.7	45.2
Father skilled worker or higher	35.5	72.7	24.0	45.7	46.3
Has run	62.5	54.6	68.0	49.3	31.5
Up for homicide, rape, arson, or armed robbery	41.9	9.1	40.0	8.6	11.8
Injury	38.7	45.4	31.8	20.6	18.9
Weapon	51.6	27.3	30.4	14.5	25.4
Committed alone					
Armed robbery	25.9	0.0	23.5	6.9	3.2
Robbery	37.0	11.1	38.9	25.4	16.8
Aggravated assault	25.9	0.0	27.8	3.5	4.5
Assault	29.6	11.1	26.3	17.5	12.5
Burglary	70.4	40.0	75.0	47.4	39.6
Injury	24.0	10.0	40.0	14.8	14.5
Weapon	33.3	30.0	50.0	16.4	17.3
Committed with others					
Armed robbery	32.1	11.1	38.9	10.0	9.0
Robbery	33.3	22.2	50.0	31.2	18.2
Aggravated assault	14.8	0.0	16.7	5.0	8.1
Assault	32.1	11.1	38.9	11.7	16.7
Burglary	55.6	44.4	65.0	55.0	60.3
Injury	29.6	20.0	26.3	13.8	17.4
Weapon	37.0	40.0	47.6	20.7	18.2
Detained	90.0	90.9	68.0	52.9	61.6
In court since committed	74.3	46.2	53.8	51.5	36.4
Most serious crime					
Homicide, rape, arson, armed robbery	45.4	27.3	27.8	12.2	10.8
Approximate number (varies with characteristic)	32	11	25	70	265

fense records, it is less clear in the literature that they are as strongly related to actual behavioral differences. Multiple regression analysis has indicated that in these data the race, sex, and class variables have distinct effects over and beyond what can be accounted for by the crime variables. It is also clear that the RAP units do not have the most difficult youths as reflected by offense behavior, although some caution is necessary since only a small number (eleven) of the youths in our sample found their way into the RAP units.

Caseworkers interviewed about the placement of juveniles expressed particular concern about problem youths, and a strong desire that they receive services — if necessary, through secure placement. Yet the willingness among caseworkers to resort to secure care if necessary to obtain services for difficult youths has not led to a filling of this category with juveniles committing relatively minor crimes. Youths in secure care are clearly more serious offenders than youths in the general population. What, then, are the caseworkers reacting to when they say they want secure placement in order to get service? Probably two things. At the height of the reform, many serious offenders would have been satisfactorily dealt with in less secure settings. Many of these youths are known to the caseworkers as having committed less serious offenses in the past. In part, what the caseworkers are expressing is frustration that they cannot get adequate care for a youth before he gets into serious trouble. The escalation into more serious crime and subsequent need for secure care are, in part at least, attributable to the earlier lack of adequate service.

To probe these issues and also to address our hypothesis that one can know a correctional system by its secure care programs, we conducted a program survey. Two questions were central. We wanted to know how secure care programs compared with other programs. Even more important, we wanted to know what programs were like overall, because the general character of programs is crucial in determining which youths will be placed in the secure care, RAP, or bindover categories. Inadequacies in the system as a whole will increase the number of youths who must be moved to severe categories. We interviewed 97 staff and 104 youths in 38 programs. Fourteen staff and 14 youths were in secure programs. We were less concerned with individual programs than with the general scope of the statewide system of programs assembled and administered by the Department of Youth Services. We found staff of individual programs working hard at their assigned tasks, according to their resources. But we found some problems in the system as a whole. One does not expect one program to be the answer for all types of offenders; the system of programs, on the other hand, with its possibilities for diversity and flexibility, should come much closer to doing this.

In Table 7.2, we present assessments by staff of the realism, desirability, and likelihood of various program practices, and the youths' responses to questions about the occurrence of those practices. The assessment of each

program characteristic could range from a low of 0 to a high of 5. (Youths' ratings were transformed to the 0-5 scale from an original scale of 1-3.) Slight numerical differences may thus represent considerable substantive differences.

TABLE 7.2: Mean Assessments by Staff and Youths of Program Characteristics*

Program Characteristic	Staff Say Realistic		Staff Say Want to Do		Staff Say Likely		Youths Say Actual	
	Secure	Nonsecure	Secure	Nonsecure	Secure	Nonsecure	Secure	Nonsecure
Staff inform	4.2	3.7	4.0	4.0	3.6	4.1	4.3	3.8
Counseling	4.2	4.0	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.4	3.3	3.3
Staff reward	3.8	3.7	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.0	3.3
Staff punish	3.2	3.3	2.7	3.2	3.0	3.4	4.0	2.8
Staff encourage confrontation	3.5	3.0	3.7	3.4	3.6	3.1	2.3	2.3
Staff encourage youths to reward	3.5	2.3	3.4	2.7	3.2	2.5	2.0	2.0
Staff encourage youths to punish	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.6	1.2	1.0	0.8
Staff reward in community	3.7	3.6	3.9	3.8	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.0
Staff punish in community	3.4	2.7	2.8	2.8	3.2	2.8	2.0	2.5
Staff encourage community to reward	3.4	3.4	3.6	4.1	3.1	3.7	1.3	1.8
Staff encourage community to punish	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.2	1.8	2.0	0.8	1.0

* The scale used ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 5.

Table 7.2 shows that differences between secure care and other programs are slight, numerically, except for the security aspect itself. What differences there are involve a little more rewarding and punishing by staff in secure care and an expressed interest by staff in getting youths to reward and punish one another. Perhaps this latter interest will manifest itself in the future in more developed therapeutic communities in secure care.

The much larger and more important patterns in Table 7.2 have to do with the comparative character of all programs. At the top of the table are such program activities as keeping the youth informed and providing counseling. Characteristics in the middle of the table pertain to the youths' involvement in making decisions about one another. At the bottom, characteristics concern the program's relation to the community, that is, the extent to which staff get people in the community to participate in relating consequences

constructively to youths' behavior. The ratings become progressively lower as one moves down the columns. The assessments at the bottom are about half those at the top. This table indicates that the correctional system is using programs to manage youths directly, but does not give them much responsibility for decisions in the programs; nor does it try to change the community environment. Thus, the total system of programs appears designed for youths who are not extreme problems in the first place. Youths who are problems will tend to be pushed with apparently increasing frequency into more secure care.

The nature of secure care does indeed indicate the nature of programming in general. Except for the degree of security, it is difficult to distinguish secure from nonsecure care. And in the lack of work to solve the youths' problems in the community, we see some explanations of why caseworkers feel they cannot find adequate services for youths.

Table 7.3 shows that youths consider such everyday activities as dances, school events, neighborhood and competitive sports, and fixing up cars to be possible, desirable, and something they are likely to do. They assert that vandalism, stick-ups, joy-riding, and robbery are things they do not want to do and are not likely to do. But they are also quite aware that these things are just as possible as they ever were. When the youths leave the shelter of the programs, these activities will probably regain their attractiveness. These results thus reflect the system's failure to alter the community environment.

TABLE 7.3: Mean Assessments by Youths of Activities in the Community*

Activities	Youths Say Doing		Youths Say Possible		Youths Say Want to Do		Youths Say Likely	
	Secure	Nonsecure	Secure	Nonsecure	Secure	Nonsecure	Secure	Nonsecure
Dances	2.0	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.2
School activity	1.7	2.0	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.1	1.9	2.2
Neighborhood sport	1.7	2.2	2.9	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.4
Compet. league	2.0	1.8	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.1	2.4	2.1
Fix cars	2.4	2.1	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.4	2.5	2.4
Vandalism	1.9	1.8	2.5	2.3	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.4
Stick-up	2.3	1.2	2.1	2.0	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.2
Joy-riding	2.6	2.1	3.0	2.5	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6
Robbery	2.1	1.6	2.3	2.1	1.1	1.1	1.4	1.2
Drug-alcohol	2.7	2.4	3.0	2.6	2.4	1.8	2.4	2.1
College-coll. prep	1.2	1.6	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.1	2.4
Skilled job	1.6	1.7	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.4

* The scale used ranges from a low of 1 to a high of 3.

Table 7.3 indicates that the effect of the secure programs on the possibility or even the desirability and likelihood of drug and alcohol use, in particular, is weak. On the other hand, the youths are learning that a reasonable education and job are possible, desirable, and likely, despite their prior experience.

IMPLICATIONS

We have traced a succession of constituencies, each of whom has built upon the work of the preceding one. In each case, as one constituency has achieved its immediate goal and begun to relax, a new constituency has perceived an opportunity to carry certain policies further. Thus, therapeutic community programs showed that one could "do good things for kids," and the opponents of institutionalization wanted to do more. Deinstitutionalization showed that one could manage a system in the community, and the consolidators wanted to manage it more systematically. Consolidation showed that more emphasis could be placed on security, and the secure care constituency wanted to carry that further.

Each of the various constituencies faced different problems in its political relationships. The reform constituency had to mobilize groups of citizens and officials to protest inadequacies of treatment in the training school system. Its biggest battles were directly or indirectly with the old-line staff of the training schools, who did not want to change. The replacement constituency, while benefiting from the prior discrediting of the training school staff policies, faced the political problems of community relationships. The issues ranged from working out relations with community agencies and operating community-based programs to dealing with a community's interest in having access to the patronage-controlled jobs associated with the training schools.

In addition, one of the most crucial problems in implementing the policies of deinstitutionalization was to work out viable relationships with the courts. The community-based correctional system brought youths from training schools in rural settings back into the community, which is perceived by court staff as their terrain. Under the court liaison program developed to help resolve problems of authority, a wide variety of alternative relationships emerged. Some were cooperative, with the correctional agency providing resources to be used in case dispositions jointly agreed to by correction, the court, and the youth. Others were competitive, with the courts developing their own programs as part of their probation systems. In such situations, court staff perceived correction as primarily responsible for locking up youths whom the court could not handle in its own community-based programs. Although this variety of relationships continues under the secure care constituency, many other courts fall between the extremes: The courts do not provide many community-based services, but they press cor-

rection for increased responsiveness in providing whatever amount and type of secure care they define as essential to community safety.

A new reform movement, oriented to reasserting the emphasis on community-based programs, would have to readdress the problems of relationships with the courts. The relationships developed would be very different from the competition for placement authority and demands for more security that have characterized the system under the constituency for security. Advocates of community-based programs in the future must work for programs, possibly sponsored by both the courts and correction, that feature continuing involvement of the youth in the community and constant accountability on the part of youths. Such programs should probably offer a more finely graded continuum of sanctions than are provided by traditional probation and incarceration. Our justice system and its associated social agencies must make commitments much like those of good parents — to work continuously with individual youths, in their own natural settings, and with the expectation that problems will persist during the critical adolescent years. This must be done without widening the net of official intervention and with the determination to terminate intervention as soon as the legal and practical justification for it has ceased.

Working for such a goal is complicated by the fact that as the succession of constituencies continues the key actors change — so that one has to deal with new agencies and groups in the communities, new policies in correction, and new varieties of court-sponsored programs and sanctions. Related to this parade of different actors and policies, one should expect significant changes in vested interests, goals, and strategies. During the height of the reforms, concerns about the needs of youths were paramount. Later, during consolidation, these concerns became less crucial than career-related goals. Under the emerging secure care constituency, it may be essential to address people's concerns about their careers, if one wants to promote emphasis on work in the community. In part this need arises because the advocates of work in the community are rapidly losing influence and are finding their careers as community workers seriously threatened.

In our program survey we asked not only what was happening, but also what people thought was possible and desirable. The secure care constituency is making secure programming more possible and more desirable to many workers. How would an advocate of community work try to counter this? There are many things such advocates could work for to increase the possibility and desirability of community work. We mention only a few prominent examples.

Advocates could work to change funding arrangements in order to make working with runners more feasible. In most Massachusetts programs, at present, if a youth runs, the program loses funding for that youth and is requested by caseworkers to accept a new youngster to fill his position. When the runner reappears under official control he ordinarily goes to detention to begin the placement process over again. The program is thus effectively

prevented from working with the youth and his associates in the community in connection with the running problem when it occurs.

The department could be urged to provide evaluation and technical assistance on program, not just contract, compliance. We have repeatedly had the experience of asking program staff to tell us who evaluated their program and having them reply in puzzled fashion that we were the only ones to do so. A department that does not evaluate and assist those running its programs obviously has little control over what happens there, and hence cannot respond effectively to demands about the content of programs.

Advocates also could try to get the department to pay for aftercare, and make it part of a program's contract. We have observed a number of secure programs make frustrated efforts to arrange aftercare, only to fail for lack of funds. The directors of some of these programs have told us they think their programs are having no real effect because of the lack of aftercare. In most secure programs, if there is no aftercare there will be little work with the youth in the community — where his family, work, education, and peer group problems must ultimately be resolved.

The efforts of the department and other agencies that contract with the same private vendors could be better coordinated. As it is, the various state departments of human services often undercut one another by paying private contractors higher rates or providing a more manageable clientele. From the point of view of the vendors it becomes difficult to justify to their boards the acceptance of work with more difficult youths at lower cost to the state.

The development of accountability in the relationship between the Department of Youth Services and the courts would also increase the feasibility of community-based work with youths. As long as courts feel that the department's major responsibility is to provide youths with intensive treatment in secure care away from the community, the development of collaborative programs of community-based work will be difficult. It is important to negotiate an understanding that the department and the courts will continue to work with the youth to solve his problems with the community. Then those providing the programs and simply attempting to do their jobs would not find themselves fighting the very system employing them.

Similarly, there are many ways to go about making community-based work more desirable from the point of view of program staff. Again we suggest only a few examples.

Advocates could strive to define community-based work as a highly professional occupation. Today, it is apt to be seen primarily as volunteer or paraprofessional work. Although this may be useful in the social movement phase, it does not serve well in the consolidation phase, when compared with the professional status that can be gained by doing counseling and clinical work. Program staff seeking a career naturally gravitate toward professional work of higher status and offering greater financial rewards. Community work could be elevated professionally by providing more formal

training for it, making it more central in the contract obligations, and offering competitive salaries for it.

It would also help if this type of community work was not perceived as a dead-end job. Career lines should be developed within the department and its contracted programs to allow people who excel in community work the means to expand their role in shaping organizational policy and to advance in responsibility.

Professional clinical work is now among the most expensive of human services. To make community work more desirable, the costs must be modified through the rate-setting mechanisms for programs. The new rates must make community work as professionally attractive as clinical work.

Finally, there are still large numbers of program staff who, even in the consolidation and secure care phases, have continued to be motivated by what seems best for youths. If all they can hope to accomplish is to provide a warm, safe interlude for youths in trouble, then that is what they will try to do. One of the obligations of a department purchasing private services is to draw together evidence from the whole system about what really helps youths. The department's research and evaluation staff, as well as some of the program development staff, are in a position to see and demonstrate what kind of assistance a youth really needs. Again, this means much more than simply monitoring contract compliance. If a need can be clearly demonstrated, many program staff will want to respond to it.

How much success should we expect for advocacy consistent with the foregoing examples? Probably we should anticipate only marginal gains in the immediate future, since the dominant constituency for secure care is trying to control resources and developments for quite different purposes. Today the advocate for community programming can probably hope only for small victories. However, those small victories may signal a new beginning. As part of its study of reform and counterreform, the Harvard Center has developed a theoretical model of change in correctional and other systems. That model is capable of producing projections of possible scenarios for the future, assuming that observations to date have alerted us to the relevant, determinative factors. Using that model we now expect a continued and increasing interest in security and a declining emphasis on community-based services during the next few years. However, we also expect a new series of reforms oriented toward therapy and community-based services in the not-too-distant future.

If these reforms are to happen, work must begin now to lay the groundwork for them. Judging by investigations currently being conducted by individual Massachusetts legislators into brutal conditions within institutional programs, and studies by private organizations of secure detention practices (Vorenberg and Trotter, 1980), that work has begun. So far it consists largely of publicly exposing inhumane practices and thus making it a little less possible for them to continue. If that work can be expanded to make constructive community alternatives more readily available and

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desirable to correctional staff, the foundations of a strong future movement toward these ends may be established.

CONCLUSION

A correctional system can indeed be known by its secure care programs, and those programs, like the systems they characterize, never cease changing. Those who work for more community services, or for more security, must live with the fact that their successes may never be permanent. On the other hand, they can be comforted by the fact that their losses may never be permanent either.

What happens to the youthful clients during all of this pulling back and forth? It seems, in fact, that the best prospects for the youths are in periods of most radical change. These are the times when their needs become central, when everyone is interested in what should happen to them. That was certainly true during the actual process of closing the training schools. Perhaps, in this condition of constant change, the children may win more in the end than their advocates.

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8

PROVIDING SERVICES TO THE MENTALLY ILL, VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDER

*Eliot Hartstone
Joseph Coccozza*

Research has demonstrated that most people who commit violent offenses are not mentally disordered (Rubin, 1972; Monahan and Steadman, 1982) and most people who are mentally disordered are not violent offenders (Monahan and Steadman, 1982; Coccozza and Steadman, 1976; Steadman and Coccozza, 1975; Wenk et al., 1972). Selective media reporting of those instances where mental illness and criminality appear to be linked has contributed to the impression that there is a greater relationship between violence and mental health than research efforts have found to be the case (Steadman and Coccozza, 1978). Although the relationship between violence and mental illness is not as great as commonly perceived, this does not mean that there is not a small but significant group of individuals who are both mentally disordered and violent and who possess very special treatment needs. Unfortunately, research efforts focusing on the prevalence and

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treatment of individuals who are both "bad and mad" are scarce, particularly for juveniles. While some data exist on the adult mentally disordered offender (Steadman and Monahan, 1982; Steadman et al., 1982), little is known about the juvenile offender whose violent acting out behavior is caused by or coupled with mental illness. This lack of information is true not only for violent youth but the wider delinquent population as well. As noted by Knitzer:

No good national data exist on the number of children within the juvenile justice system who have serious emotional or behavioral problems or need mental health services. . . We know of no study that systematically examines the quality of services, numbers of children served, or benefits to the children or adolescents (Knitzer, 1982:71).

This lack of attention is surprising given the tremendous problems presented by this group of youths. These are the youths that often cause the greatest difficulties to providers both because of the strain they place on the service delivery systems and the public attention they receive through the media. Indeed, juvenile justice practitioners and policymakers throughout the country must constantly confront the critical problems associated with providing care and treatment to mentally disabled juvenile offenders.

Attempts to establish an effective delivery system for providing mental health services to violent juvenile offenders have been constantly frustrated by the paucity of information available to resolve the associated programmatic and structural issues. In particular, juvenile justice administrators have to confront, without the benefit of guidance from a research base, the lack of an adequate instrument for assessing youths' need for mental health services; the general unavailability of mental health care in juvenile justice programs; the inadequate security of mental health programs; jurisdictional conflict over the appropriate agency, or mix of agencies, to provide services; and the concern for cost effectiveness in providing treatment and services. As a result of the current situation, the needs of this population are often unmet or are provided through a variety of patchwork programs developed in a desperate attempt to respond to the problems presented by such youths to the public and to existing service delivery systems.

Acknowledging the special problems faced by program planners and service providers in providing for the treatment of this population, this paper seeks to contribute to the development of an empirical data base on this issue by reviewing the research which has been conducted on this topic and by providing specific areas where future research needs to be conducted. Specifically, this paper will focus on:

- examining the scope of the problem of mentally ill, violent juvenile offenders;
- an overview of two studies undertaken on alternative placements available for mentally disordered juvenile offenders;

- an indepth examination of one experimental program designed specifically for violent, mentally disordered youths; and
- an assessment of research needs for improving the delivery of services to mentally ill, violent juvenile offenders.

Before proceeding further, it is important to first clarify the population addressed in this paper. Our primary focus is on those juveniles who are *violent offenders* (adjudicated by the juvenile court for a violent crime against the person) and *mentally disordered* (possess symptoms which warrant a DSM III diagnosis* of mental illness). However, while the population with which this paper is most concerned is limited to "violent mentally disordered youth" the literature and research reviewed in this paper is not. There has been no consistent definition of violent, mentally disordered juveniles used by either practitioners or social scientists. Some of the programs operated and research conducted have utilized broader definitions of "violent offender" and/or "mental disorder" than the one provided here. To exclude these efforts would severely limit the already limited information available. Clearly, information on all youths who possess these dual problems, even when the delinquency is not as violent or the mental health problem not as severe as to satisfy the criteria offered above, can contribute to learning about the more narrowly defined population. As such, this paper includes information provided from research conducted on the mentally disordered juvenile offender in general.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Social scientists have devoted little effort to studying the problems of the mentally disordered, juvenile offender. This is true not only for violent juvenile offenders, but for the wider spectrum of delinquents as well. Clearly, this lack of data has direct consequences for program planning and the provision of services. As noted by Bederow and Reamer:

The extent of our present knowledge base regarding the nature and degree of psychopathology in the delinquent population is an immediate and formidable obstacle to the planning and implementation of innovative programs. . . Without an accurate count, the design and delivery of special services are impeded and the complex constellation of issues that currently impinge on organizational collaboration are further compounded (1981: 4-5).

While no national data base exists, there have been several statewide studies which have attempted to determine the extent of the problem in their respective justice systems (e.g., Massachusetts, Michigan, New

*Using the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association.

Mexico, New York). These studies have, unfortunately, used a variety of methods and definitions in examining this population and as a result have produced inconsistent findings. Furthermore, only on rare occasions have these studies focused on violent youth (Cocozza et al., 1981).

One of the earliest state efforts was conducted in Massachusetts by the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services (DYS) in 1977. DYS, in an effort to determine the number of youths who needed both secure care and special mental health services from the state Department of Mental Health, took a random sample of its clients, and had an expert panel review the case folders of the sample. The panel looked at such factors as the youths' offense and placement histories, clinical diagnoses, and treatment plans. Based on this review, DYS concluded that 2.6% of the 1500 youths in its custody and 23.2% of the youths requiring secure care needed to be in secure care programs designed specifically for mentally disordered, juvenile offenders (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1977).

In 1978, the New York State juvenile corrections agency — the Division for Youth (DFY) — conducted a similar study to ascertain the number of youth in its institutions who needed intensive mental health interventions (Ingalls, 1978). In this study, DFY facility directors were asked to submit the names of those residents in their facilities, whom they felt needed psychiatric services. A total of 332 youths from 23 facilities were referred. A mental illness index was then computed for each individual which reflected the frequency and severity of symptoms and behavior which usually indicate the presence of severe mental illness. The mental illness index incorporated 28 items, with each item weighted according to the general seriousness of the item and the frequency and intensity with which the problem was displayed. Of the 332 youths surveyed, 128 (39%) were found to be free of mental illness, 50 youths (15%) had mild problems, 45 youths (14%) had moderate problems, and 109 youths (32%) had serious psychiatric problems. Thus, the study indicated that there were at least 109 youths in DFY facilities (12% of the 850 institutionalized population) who needed major mental health interventions which typically were not available in DFY facilities. This study did not specify how many of these youths required secure care or had been adjudicated for serious or violent offenses.

A subsequent interagency study (Cocozza, 1983) was conducted in New York State which examined the appropriateness of agency and facility placements for a random sample of youths placed in all levels of care in each of the six primary child caring systems in New York State. This study utilized an improved data collection instrument which included a component to assess the mental health of all youths selected for the study. The specific items and the overall scoring of the mental health section of the survey instrument were reviewed in conjunction with public and private experts in the field of mental illness. The study found that 10% of the 2,000 youths housed in DFY programs (and 7% of the 638 youths in secure care) were exhibiting moderate to severe psychiatric symptoms.

Additional information on the scope of the problem in New York State (NYS) specifically as it relates to violent offenders is available from the research conducted on the Bronx Court Related Unit (Cocozza et al., 1981). The Bronx Court Related Unit (CRU) was an experimental program for violent, mentally ill youth jointly operated by the DFY and the NYS Department of Mental Hygiene (DMH) between 1976 and 1979 and the results of this experimental program are discussed later in this article. Admission criteria for this project were strict with regard to both violence and mental illness.¹ The CRU, located in New York City, was equipped to handle 30 youths at one time. The "small" size of the program initially generated much controversy given the perceived high number of violent, mentally ill kids already within DFY care and appearing each day in family court. However, the number of youths found to be appropriate for this experimental program (both violent and mentally ill) was surprisingly low. After 33 months of operation, the unit had received a total of only 157 referrals, for an average of only 4.8 referrals per month. Of the 137 referred juveniles for whom a decision was made within the 33-month period (some referrals were withdrawn, others were pending), only 52 (38%) were diagnosed as appropriate candidates (1.6 per month) for treatment and thereby admitted into the program. As a result, the project only had slightly more than half its beds usually occupied during its first 33 months of operation. Thus, from 1976-1979 an average of only 19 youths were identified each year in the State of New York who were defined as both violent offenders and seriously mentally ill.

A third state effort to study this issue was conducted in Michigan. In 1981 the Michigan Department of Mental Health appointed a Task Force on the Mentally Ill Adolescent Offender. One objective of this Task Force was to identify clinically the population of mentally ill adolescent offenders in order to make programmatic and administrative recommendations. To meet this objective, a sample of 71 male and female delinquents were selected from two training schools to receive clinical interviews to determine the extent and nature of any mental illness. The 71 youths were *not* randomly selected, but rather "subjects were chosen for the study using a set of selection criteria designed to select the most seriously delinquent adolescents" (Michigan Department of Management and Budget, Mental Health, and Social Services, 1982:i). Included in the selection criteria was previous psychiatric hospitalization (35%). All subjects were evaluated in a structured interview format and assigned diagnosis using the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-III). Of the 71 subjects, 48 (68%) were diagnosed to have psychiatric disorders which involved a significant disturbance of mood or thought. Of those 48 youths, three were diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia, 15 as having major affective disorders (either active or in remission), 26 as experiencing borderline personality disorders, and four as suffering from a paranoid or schizotypal personality disorder. Based on their

findings and an examination of the facilities, the Task Force concluded:

This study documents pervasive and serious psychopathology in a large group of highly delinquent adolescents within two training schools. The findings raise pertinent questions concerning the delivery of appropriate psychiatric care to these youths. . . Currently, the training schools are neither mandated nor prepared to take primary responsibility for the provision of comprehensive mental health services. Occasionally, grossly psychotic or persistently suicidal youths are transferred into mental health facilities. More often, however, seriously psychiatrically disturbed offenders remain in the Department of Social Services where the extent of their psychiatric symptomatology is either grossly under-estimated or even denied (1982:50).

While this conclusion seems warranted, it is impossible to estimate from the non-randomized sample, what percentage of the juvenile offenders in Michigan actually are experiencing a mental disorder.

Like Michigan, the State of New Mexico also recently appointed a Task Force to address this issue. In 1981 New Mexico established the statewide Task Force on Secure Treatment for Violent, Mentally Ill Youth in order to determine the number of severely disturbed New Mexico adolescents requiring treatment in a secure facility. To accomplish this objective, the Task Force requested all juvenile justice, mental health and social service professionals who might see violent disturbed youth as clients on their caseload to identify all youths they had seen "whose behavior was so severely suicidal, or self destructive, or physically assaultive, or destructive to property, or bizarre, as to require, in the respondent's judgement, the youth's confinement in a secure treatment facility" (New Mexico Statewide Task Force, 1982:4). This survey produced 884 different youths. A sample of 254 was selected randomly and those professionals who had identified these 254 youths were sent a 13-page questionnaire which focused on behavior, court records, previous treatment interventions, emotional problems and personality characteristics. Based on these questionnaires the Task Force clinicians rated security needs of 254 youths and concluded that 25% of the 254 youths needed a "maximum security, lock-up treatment facility." Thus, the Task Force concluded that:

At least 221 New Mexico youths (25% of 884) require treatment in a maximum secure facility because: — their violent, assaultive and destructive behavior is a grave hazard to the community, and — they have, by repeatedly running away from non-secure facilities, evaded all previous efforts to help them" (New Mexico Statewide Task Force, 1982:1).

In identifying 221 youths, it is clear the study conducted by the New Mexico Task Force included a wide range of behaviors as "violent" and "mentally ill." It is unclear, what percentage of those 221 youths would meet strict legal criteria for "violent offenders" and strict clinical criteria

for mental illness.

There are three conclusions which can be drawn from the above literature review on the scope of the problem. First, it is impossible to use the existing research undertaken on the number of mentally disordered juvenile offenders to develop a definitive statement on the percentage of "violent" juvenile offenders who are mentally disordered. Not only have the existing studies conducted to date focused on a wider range of juvenile offenders, but the research efforts have used a variety of sampling techniques, divergent definitions or interpretations of "seriousness" and "violence," and different mechanisms for attributing mental disorders. Additional research is clearly needed on this subject. Second, most states have not conducted the type of research discussed above and would appear to have no idea how many violent youngsters are currently residing in training schools who have mental health needs beyond the professional capabilities of the staff treating them. Third, although the existing work does not enable a reliable numerical estimate to be made, the existing studies (particularly Coccozza et al., 1981) do allow us to conclude that there is a small but identifiable number of "violent" juvenile offenders who require both secure care and special mental health treatment. The way most states now operate, these youths rarely receive both of these interventions. As noted in the Final Report of the New Mexico statewide Task Force on Secure Treatment for Violent Mentally Ill Youth,

Violent mentally ill juveniles do not fit present New Mexico law which focuses primarily on punishment (confinement) or treatment. . . present statutes direct the juvenile courts to classify troubled youths and juvenile offenders as *either* delinquent (violent) or mentally ill, and to commit these youths accordingly to either a corrections facility or to a mental health facility. In the corrections system, violent mentally ill juveniles are committed to facilities which provide very limited or no mental health treatment. . . In the mental health system, violent mentally ill youths are committed to treatment facilities which do not have maximum security and do not have the requisite specialized treatment programs for violent juveniles (New Mexico Statewide Task Force, 1982:2).

Exactly what happens to juveniles who are both mentally disordered and violent offenders in the many states like New Mexico which possess no special programs for this population is unknown.

ALTERNATIVE PLACEMENTS FOR VIOLENT, MENTALLY ILL YOUTH

While most states do not have special treatment programs for the mentally ill, violent juvenile offender, there are a number of states which do. Two major

research efforts have been undertaken to identify alternative placements available in the United States for mentally disordered juvenile offenders. The first effort was funded by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) and conducted in 1980-81 by the National Center for the Assessment of Alternatives to Juvenile Justice Processing (Bederow and Reamer, 1981). The second study is currently being conducted by WESTAT and is funded by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) (Kerr, 1982). This section of the paper will highlight some of the information currently available from these two efforts to identify facilities and programs designed to care for and treat mentally ill, juvenile offenders.

The Assessment Center Study

As noted in their report (Bederow and Reamer, 1981), the Assessment Center attempted in 1980 to identify those programs established for violent, mentally disordered youths. To this end, the Assessment Center contacted the most knowledgeable individuals in criminal and juvenile justice state planning agencies and state departments of mental health. The authors acknowledge that it is impossible to know what, if any, programs they missed but they stated, "we have some confidence, however, that our research turned up most of the 'major' programs designed for these youths." Their national efforts located programs in six states — California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York and Pennsylvania. California and Massachusetts were both found to have multiple programs for this population.

Upon locating these programs the Assessment Center conducted two-day site visits to each state (except New York where the Bronx Court Related Unit had undergone a major organizational and structural change due to funding difficulties). Some of the findings revealed by the site visits were:

- The size of the programs ranged from 6 to 40 beds.
- The programs usually had waiting lists to get in, but often had a couple of beds available for crisis situations.
- The average length of stay varied considerably (from 6 to 24 months).
- With the exception of the California program, all programs visited were on the campus of a state mental hospital.
- All programs conducted a clinical screening to determine if prospective clients had a "severe psychopathology."
- Not all the programs required violence and those that did used different definitions (ranging from history of serious/violent offenses, to need for secure setting, to demonstration of aggression).
- All programs experienced at least early pressures to admit inappropriate referrals.
- All programs except Massachusetts were restricted to males.

- The programs were administered by a variety of auspices, with several operated by the state Department of Mental Health (DMH), one by the state Department of Correction (DOC), and another had joint involvement of DMH, DOC, and the Department of Social Services (DSS).

Bederow and Reamer also provided an insightful discussion of those features of programs for mentally disordered, juvenile offenders which they believe demand attention from those in a position to develop and implement programs for this population. Some of the major points they made are:

1) Program administrators need to pay close attention to the characteristics of the youths admitted since it is important to avoid admitting youths who do not require such intensive supervision. These programs are expensive (typically \$49,000 per youth each year) and, therefore, beds should be used only by those youths who cannot be handled elsewhere.

2) Since most of the youths will eventually be released to the community, programs need to pay particular attention to discharge and aftercare plans. Aftercare was seen as particularly crucial and despite the difficulty of obtaining funding for aftercare services, staff suggest that program effectiveness is seriously diluted without a strong aftercare component.

3) There appears to be no clear advantage to using the auspices of one agency over another. Where the size of the population indicates a need for only one program, it is preferable to use DMH since the DMH "are willing to accept referrals from a department of corrections" and nonadjudicated youth can not be transferred from DMH to DOC.

4) There are advantages and disadvantages to using private vendors instead of civil service employees. What is preferable depends on a number of factors (number of competing vendors, state resources to monitor vendor, etc.). However, due to the advantages that the use of private vendors may provide (e.g., increased flexibility in hiring and firing decisions, attracting quality staff), this approach should be considered.

5) For this population, community-based programs probably are not feasible due to the limited number of programs that can be established in a state. Further, it is also unlikely that this population could be permitted to participate in public school programs. However, since a high percentage of these youths come from urban areas and since programs closer to cities typically can attract better staff, it usually is preferable to locate such programs in or near large cities.

WESTAT Study

Under a grant from the NIMH Center for Studies in Crime and Delinquency, WESTAT recently conducted a survey of all facilities and programs operating in the U.S. for adult or juvenile, mentally disordered offenders (Kerr, 1982). Facilities and programs were identified during the last few months of 1980. Unlike the Assessment Center study, the WESTAT study

surveys programs for all mentally disordered, juvenile offenders regardless of the "seriousness" or "violence" of the youth's offense history. Criteria for inclusion in the WESTAT survey were:

- the program was public;
- the facility/program was primarily for care and treatment of the mentally disordered offender—programs used solely for evaluation were not included;
- the facility had a special program (with a capacity exceeding four) organized for this purpose such as a 'treatment unit,' or the facility was the only place in the state where mentally disordered offenders were sent; and
- at least 10% of the total population were mentally disordered offenders, in the case of facilities that mixed such persons with either other offenders or other persons with mental disorders (Kerr, 1982:1-2).

Based on prior facility surveys (Steadman et al., 1982; Eckerman, 1972; Scheidemandel and Kanno, 1969; Sheldon and Norman, 1978) and contacts with appropriate corrections and state mental health administrations, WESTAT located 127 facilities and units which satisfied their criteria. A preliminary review of these 127 facilities produced 98 which were for adults only, 12 which were for both juveniles and adults, and 17 which were for juveniles only.

Of the 17 programs found for juveniles only, nine were operated by the Department of Mental Health, two by the Department of Corrections, and six by the Department of Social Services or other agency (including Juvenile Correctional agencies).

The 11 states found by WESTAT to possess special programs for mentally disordered juvenile offenders in 1980 were: California, Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington State.

WESTAT is currently conducting the analysis of both an elaborate questionnaire sent to all identified programs and information obtained from a two-day site visit conducted at 10 of the juvenile programs.

THE BRONX COURT RELATED UNIT

As stated earlier, one program designed specifically to treat violent, mentally ill youths was operated in New York City between 1976 and 1979. This program was called the Bronx Court Related Unit (CRU). We feel the results of the study conducted on the CRU and its impact are particularly important because:

- the program adopted and adhered to rigid criteria which caused all youths admitted to be both violent and mentally ill;
- the program was operated jointly by the two relevant state agencies — the Department of Mental Hygiene (DMH) and the Division for Youth (DFY);

- the program was studied intensively for four years; and
- the evaluation included a "comparison group" of similar youths which was used in assessing the impact of the CRU.²

Project Description

The CRU consisted of two components: the In-Patient Diagnostic Unit (IPDU) operated by DMH, and the Long-Term Treatment Unit (LTTU) run by DFY. The IPDU was a 10-bed secure unit designed to provide short term, diagnostic, stabilization and emergency services for a period of up to 90 days. Youths admitted to the IPDU underwent extensive testing, evaluation and observation to determine the presence, nature and degree of mental illness. As part of this effort several assessments were undertaken including psychiatric and psychological testing, medical, dental and neurological examinations and educational and cognitive screenings. Such assessments were accomplished through the use of both standardized instruments and clinical observation. In addition to the evaluation, the IPDU also provided therapeutic and remedial services to youths. This included individual, group and family psychotherapy programs, as well as milieu therapy, pharmacotherapy, and educational and recreational activities. The IPDU was also responsible for offering crisis intervention and stabilization services to all program youths (IPDU and LTTU) as needed. As initially designed, these services were provided on the IPDU by 35 clinical staff (e.g., psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, recreational therapists, nurses, mental health therapy aides). Based upon the extensive diagnostic assessment and the youths response to treatment, the IPDU staff generated a treatment and disposition plan. There were three major dispositional alternatives: youth evaluated as in need of intensive long-term mental health care were referred to DMH psychiatric facilities; youths not requiring mental health services were returned to DFY for placement; and those youths assessed as suffering from "intermittent or episodic mental illness" and as potentially benefiting from treatment were placed into the LTTU component of the project.

The LTTU was designed as a 20-bed secure unit which would provide long-term treatment for a period of up to 18 months. The professional and direct care staff of the LTTU consisted of 50 staff members. The primary treatment orientation of the unit integrated behavioral principles with milieu therapy. Emphasis in treatment was placed on the total environment as a focus for rehabilitation. Incorporated in the milieu treatment approach was a socialization program based on behavior management principles which provided the opportunity for continuous reinforcement, motivation and consistent controls. The program was developed on a format of three levels through which youths progressed. As youths progressed through these levels, they were granted increased privileges and responsibilities.

158 System Responses

This program focused on both reinforcing positive behavior through rewards (points and tokens used to purchase items or obtain special privileges) and on discouraging negative behavior through the loss of points and tokens. This approach was supplemented with individual and group counseling, family therapy, remedial education and vocational, recreational and arts therapy.

A significant aspect of the CRU was the importance placed on continuity of care. Although it consisted of two separate units administered by two different agencies, it was structured both through its physical layout and procedures to increase interaction, communication and cooperation between the two units. Joint participation on intake screening committees, at staff meetings, and in discussions regarding individual treatment plans, and the use of IPDU staff and facilities by the LTTU for psychiatric emergencies were all components of the program aimed at providing better and more continuous care for the youths admitted to the program.

Research Methodology

Data discussed in this article were collected for *all* youths admitted into the CRU (N=34) or comparison group facility (N=42) as of April 30, 1979.

One of the more important methodological issues which had to be addressed in this research effort was the selection of a group of youths to compare to the CRU youths. It was not possible to select an actual control group since all youths defined as appropriate for the program were admitted. However, after considering various alternatives a group of youths were chosen who appeared to be similar enough to the CRU youths to be used as a comparison group.

The group of youths selected as the comparison group were the 42 youths who had been referred to the CRU during the first two years, had *passed* the unit's preliminary (paper) screening requirements, but who were subsequently not admitted to the unit. The appropriateness of these youths as a comparison group was supported not only by the fact that these youths were viewed as appropriate for CRU admission by the referral source and had met a preliminary, paper screening by project staff, but also by the fact that over half of them (55%) were defined as appropriate for admission by at least one member of the CRU's screening team. Although the youths selected for the comparison group should be more similar to the CRU youths than any other potential group of youths in the state, these youths clearly did not constitute an ideal control group. This is readily apparent by the fact that ultimately each of these youths was found to be inappropriate for admission on the basis of more formal and systematic assessments of violence and mental illness. Furthermore, information contained in the case files submitted to the CRU at the time of referral revealed some major differences between the two groups with regard to delinquency, institu-

tionalization and mental health. Without question the CRU youths were on the average more delinquent, more violent, and more seriously mentally disordered than the comparison group. These differences need to be considered when comparing the post-release experiences of these two groups.

Client impact data were collected in two major ways — official records and followup interviews with CRU and comparison group youths. Information on arrests and institutional placements were gathered from official state and New York City department agency records. To supplement these official records, follow-up interviews were conducted with both the CRU and comparison group youths. The interview schedule sought to obtain information on the youth's assessment of the treatment he received, and on the social and psychological adjustment of the youth as indicated by a series of questions and scales focusing on community and family integration, feelings of stigma and psychopathology. After much effort to locate these youths, interviews were conducted with two-thirds of the subjects, 24 of the 34 CRU youths discharged from the unit (71%) and 27 of the 42 youths in the comparison group (64%). Youths from both groups were typically located and interviewed in institutions, with only 17.7% of the youths interviewed residing in the community at the time of the interview.

The Impact of the CRU

Follow-up interviews conducted with CRU and comparison group youths found that the CRU youths:

- felt their stay in the CRU was helpful to them in subsequent placements;
- had more positive perceptions of the CRU than they had of other facilities they were placed in; and
- had more positive perceptions of the treatment they received in the CRU than the comparison group youths had of the treatment they received in traditional placements.

For example, 86% of the CRU youths transferred into subsequent programs said that their experience in the CRU helped them in the other placement. Over 59% of the CRU youths said the CRU provided better treatment than the subsequent placement and only 13.0% said it provided worse treatment. CRU youths were much more likely than comparison group youths to feel they had been helped by the educational program they received (66.7% to 33.1%) and by the family counseling (63.7% to 40%) provided by the program. Perhaps most importantly, CRU youths were more likely to feel the treatment they received helped them (35% helped a lot, 35% helped somewhat) in their adjustment to community living than the comparison group youth (20% helped a lot, 40% helped somewhat).

Information on recidivism was collected on 26 CRU and 33 comparison group youths who reentered the community and were, therefore, "at risk." Follow-up data on recidivism revealed that:

- proportionately fewer CRU youths recidivated than comparison group youths (69.2% to 75.8%);
- those CRU youths who did recidivate were arrested less often than comparison group youths who were rearrested (2.8 to 3.3 times);
- those CRU youths who were rearrested, were rearrested for violent crimes less often than comparison group youths (38.9% to 43.5%).

Thus, although limited by the small number of youths involved and the lack of an ideal control group, the CRU evaluation found the experimental program developed in New York State for violent, mentally ill youth to have had a positive impact on the post-release attitudes and behaviors of youths it treated. Despite the fact that the CRU youths displayed a more troubled and serious history than the comparison group, multiple indicators of post-release adjustment suggested that the CRU youths did better upon their return to the community than the comparison group youths. While these differences were slight, they were also consistent.

RESEARCH NEEDS

It is clear from the limited research conducted to date that further information is needed in order to develop, plan, and implement appropriate services and programs for mentally disordered violent juvenile offenders. Up till now, efforts of program planners and juvenile justice/mental health practitioners have been severely impeded by the lack of data available to them on this population and previous efforts to implement programs to treat these youths. Four areas where program planners and practitioners would perhaps most benefit from future research are: (1) a systematic assessment of the scope of the problem, (2) information on the characteristics of mentally ill, violent juvenile offenders, (3) an assessment of current system approaches for processing and treating this population, and (4) a systematic evaluation of the special programs which have been implemented to treat these youths.

Systematic Assessment of Scope of the Problem

As discussed previously, studies designed to determine the percentage of juvenile offenders who are suffering from mental disorder have been limited to a number of single-state studies which have utilized divergent definitions and methodologies and, as a result, have produced a considerable range in estimating the size of this population. Studies of violent, mentally disordered juvenile offenders are particularly limited.

Information on the size of this population is crucial for policy and program planners to make sound decisions on program development for this population. For example, if we find the number of youths possessing this dual symptomology (violence/mental illness) is very low, then it may not be

economically feasible to develop special programs for these youths. On the other hand, if we find that there are a large number of these youths, then special programs may not only be the preferred choice for treatment reasons but cost-effective as well. Other programmatic decisions (e.g., bedspace, choice of service provider, budget needs) are also influenced by the number of youths found to fall into this category. Clearly, the question of what needs to be done to improve the treatment of mentally ill, violent juvenile offenders cannot be answered without additional knowledge on the size of the population under consideration.

In order to obtain the necessary data on this topic, it is suggested that a multiple state study be conducted which uses a standardized mental health index for a random sample of youths meeting specified criteria as "violent juvenile offenders" in order to estimate what percentage of violent juvenile offenders are mentally disordered and in need of special mental health interventions. The selection of states should include several states from each of the different geographical regions of the country.

Characteristics of Mentally Ill, Violent Juvenile Offenders

Little work has been done in studying those youths who are both violent juvenile offenders and mentally ill. Efforts to design treatment programs for this population would benefit greatly from information on social and psychological characteristics of these youths. Data collection should include at a minimum:

- abstracting data on the offense histories of this population which specify both the frequency and nature of crimes committed;
- recording information on the family histories of these youths (e.g., child abuse, spousal battering, family mental health problems, family criminality);
- conducting a thorough diagnostic and psychological assessment of each youth; and
- obtaining placement histories and prior system responses to these youths.

While these types of data could and should be collected whenever mentally disordered violent juvenile offenders are identified, these data clearly should be collected as the second step of the multiple state study recommended above on the scope of the problem. That is, after identifying which youths in these states are both violent juvenile offenders and mentally disordered, detailed data should be collected on these youths, the factors precipitating their mental health and behavioral problems, and the prior interventions employed.

- proportionately fewer CRU youths recidivated than comparison group youths (69.2% to 75.8%);
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Current State Approaches for Identifying and Treating Mentally Disordered, Violent Juvenile Offenders

A thorough examination of the way the system traditionally responds to this population is most important if we are to improve current practices. It is crucial to understand what we are now doing with this population, what is working and what isn't, and what obstacles exist to providing more appropriate services. Specifically, information is needed on:

- the processes used by state juvenile correctional agencies or departments to identify violent offenders who are suffering from mental health problems which need special interventions, and the strengths and weaknesses of these different approaches;
- the type of agency arrangements used to provide mental health services (e.g., correctional staff, DMH staff, DMH facilities, private vendors) and the advantages and disadvantages of the different structural arrangements;
- the capacity of juvenile correctional agencies to transfer mentally disordered juveniles into the state Department of Mental Health when necessary and whether the juvenile's due process rights are protected in the transfer process.

Currently, there is no research we are aware of which has been undertaken to determine what happens in those states in the U.S. which do not possess special treatment programs for violent, mentally ill juvenile offenders. We do not know how (or if) these youths are usually identified, where identified youths are treated (or at least placed), or how receptive state mental health agencies are to receiving and treating these youngsters. It is important to study what is happening in these states, and what is working well and what is not.

To collect these data, it would seem necessary to conduct both a national mail survey to learn with what prevalence the different methods of responding to this population are employed, and an intensive look at a sample of states to evaluate systematically the relative strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches.

What Special Programs Exist for Mentally Ill, Violent Juvenile Offenders and How Effective Are They?

More information is needed on the special programs which have been established to treat this population. Data are needed which will allow statements to be made regarding such questions as:

- Is it preferable to place these youths in special programs rather than in the general corrections or mental health population? What are the advantages and disadvantages for both the kids and the systems?
- Is it cost-effective to have special programs for a small number of youths? Does the gain derived by the youths involved and the traditional programs offset the cost of the programs?

- How effective are the special programs which have been tried in treating this population? What types of programs have been most effective, with which types of kids, and in what ways?
- Does it make a difference whether the special programs are run by juvenile corrections or mental health? If so, why?
- Do these programs operate better when run by the state or through contracted providers? Why?

The work of the Assessment Center and WESTAT are a start in this direction. However, neither of the studies was funded to conduct extensive evaluations of the impact of the special programs they identified and visited. Evaluations of these programs must move beyond staff interviews, and follow clients through the program and into the community to assess the impact of the treatment and services provided. Ideally, research should be conducted on several of the more fully developed programs which would include experimental design and random assignment. Without a more extensive evaluation of such programs, it is difficult for any meaningful policy recommendations to be made on what types of programs should be developed to treat violent, mentally ill juvenile offenders.

SUMMARY

Little is known about violent, mentally ill youths. We do not know how many violent juvenile offenders are also mentally disordered, how the system now responds to this population, which state agency (Mental Health or Corrections) best provides for their care and treatment, and how effective special programs are for treating these youths.

Preliminary data suggest that there is a small and identifiable number of youths who are both violent offenders and mentally ill, that a few states have established special programs for this population, and at least some of these programs have proven to be effective. In addition a series of issues have been identified which policy and program planners need to be cognizant of and work through in developing these special programs (e.g., decision criteria, agency auspices, selections, service provider, aftercare).

For administrators and program planners to make knowledgeable decisions on the issues, and for this hard-to-treat population to receive the most appropriate services, more research is needed. A larger data base on both the youths themselves and the system's response must be developed before major progress can be made. Until such research is conducted, it is naive to expect juvenile corrections and mental health administrators to make any major improvements in the system's response to treating what is perhaps the hardest-to-treat population under state auspices.

FOOTNOTES


1. With regard to violence, the CRU's criteria required adjudication for either: murder, manslaughter, rape, sodomy, arson, kidnapping, robbery, or attempted murder. Mental illness was determined by a CRU clinical screening committee which conducted an interview with youth and reviewed the candidates' case folders.
2. For a complete assessment of the impact of this program see, "Violent Youth: The Impact of Mental Health Treatment" (Hartstone and Coccozza, 1983).

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Part Three



TREATMENT
INTERVENTION
MODELS FOR
VIOLENT
JUVENILE
OFFENDERS

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CASE HISTORY

Toby A.

Name: Toby A.
Age: 18
Race: White
Family Composition: Unknown; raised in an orphanage, then placed in a series of foster homes when not adopted; then in a "protectorate."
Family Income: Unknown (see history)
School: Completed 4th grade
Residence: Variety of state institutions.
Age First Arrest: 11
Current Charge(s): Homicide, Armed Robbery.

Toby has been a so-called "state kid" in that his entire background and upbringing have been arranged by the state authorities. Originally an abandoned child, Toby was placed in an orphanage in "pre-adoptive" status; when no adoption was forthcoming, he was placed in the state's foster care network, and he lived with seven different families, with occasional returns to a religious protectorate when his behavior proved difficult to manage for the foster parents.

At age 11, Toby ran away from his last foster home. He was arrested about 6 months later during a gambling raid on a local "after-hours" nightclub. Toby had been selling newspapers, shining shoes, and generally making himself useful to the minor league criminals who frequented the club. The police were originally willing to simply tell him to "get home," but when he couldn't give an address, he was held for investigation... which revealed his actual status. Returned to state custody, he was transferred from the foster home network to a training school, where he continued to act as a protégé of an older, more criminalized group of youthful offenders.

After an abortive "escape" attempt (during which he was captured by

one of the older inmates), Toby was placed in solitary confinement for 3 weeks. Upon emerging, he quickly distinguished himself by a willingness to fight older inmates, and was repeatedly beaten by both these inmates and the guards. The guards later explained the beatings by saying that Toby would not obey even the simplest order and had to be forced into a semblance of compliance with the institutional rules.

Toby escaped again, at age 14, and participated in a long series of "cowboy-style" armed robberies of local businesses. Again easily captured by the police, Toby loudly proclaimed next time he would "hold court in the streets," and was beaten by the arresting officers when he resisted being handcuffed.

Remanded to "secure detention" while awaiting trial for armed robbery, Toby and four other boys attempted to escape by overpowering a guard. Their escape was foiled at the outer door by an incoming "change of shift." Toby's arm was broken during a fight with the incoming guards.

Found guilty of the armed robberies, Toby was offered probation if he would reveal the names of the other participants, some of whom were apparently of adult age. Toby refused, and was sentenced to the state training school's maximum unit for an indeterminate period. Toby's behavior there was so violent that he was paroled after only 4 months, and he returned to his old haunts and old habits.

At age 16, Toby was arrested in a public park with a handgun, and several hundred dollars in his possession. He was wearing four heavy, studded rings on each hand, to give the impact of "brass knuckles" when he clenched his fists. Although the authorities were unable to connect him with any specific robberies, his parole was violated and he was again returned to the training school. His violent behavior in the institution resulted in continual threats to transfer him to an adult reformatory, but he was instead paroled at the end of 3 months.

Within 2 weeks of his release, Toby and 2 other young men were surprised by an off-duty policeman as they were backing out of a liquor store they had just robbed. Shots were exchanged and the officer and one of the youths were killed. Toby is now being held prior to trial as an adult for first degree murder.

9

APPROPRIATE ALTERNATIVES* FOR THE VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDER

Robert B. Coates

For the violent offender, community protection is the most important objective in selecting the disposition. Still, the youngster will ultimately return to the community; thus, for its long-run safety as well as to improve the offender's chances for the future, the youth should be provided with the best possible service in a secure setting. While the placement decision should be guided by the principle that the best choice is the least restrictive alternative appropriate, since this offender was very likely placed previously in one or more relatively open settings, the current disposition will probably consist, at least initially, of placement in a locked or at least closed facility. There are no foolproof answers to questions of what are the best means of changing the behavior of the violent offender, but our experience is sufficient to establish some principles regarding care for these youths.

*I am assuming that youths who are severely emotionally disturbed will be handled in a mental health system.

Excerpted from *Crime and Delinquency*, vol. 27:4 (1981), pp. 477-486. Tables have been renumbered and references adjusted. Copyright 1981, by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.

NATURE OF SETTING

The residential setting should be secure, with security established by means of a combination of mechanical devices, staff, and specific programs. The residence should be small, looking more like a house than like a jail (e.g., windows can be made secure by nonbreakable glass or see-through materials rather than by metal bars) and containing no more than ten to twelve youths. The ratio of staff to clients should be high. No uniforms for staff or clients should be permitted.

The definition of security here is crucial. Although a facility can be made relatively secure, providing a short-term community protection, security measures alone promise little in the long run. The locks on doors and screens on windows, like the locks and screens protecting our own property, offer some protection, but their psychological message is much more important. Some delinquents respond to locks and screens as if representing a personal challenge which must be overcome. For many youths, they represent a continuation of the warning and threat that have characterized responses to them in the past; no pattern has been broken. And such youngsters already know how to cope with these kinds of messages. They can become tougher, angrier, and more disruptive. They may even adapt in order to get out as quickly as possible, but nothing will have changed. Community protection is not simply built with metal and screws. Community protection is a function of people, not locks; of programs, not hardware.

NATURE OF PROGRAM

Unfortunately, we know little about the specific program content that is most effective for this particular population. Quite likely, the specifics of each program are best tailored to the requirements of each youth. However, we do have some guiding principles. First, it is important to view the client in the context of his life outside the facility. What resources does the juvenile have? Are there others in his social network who are willing and able to provide emotional or material support? Does the youth need clinical treatment? Do his needs pertain to specific problems, family relationships, or psychological adjustment? It is probable that clinical services will have to be purchased from private psychologists, counselors, and other professionals rather than be provided by a staff psychologist in residence. That is, youths do not present the same needs, an assumption upon which the latter approach is based. Furthermore, increasing contact among the youths with people outside the correctional setting can reduce, at least minimally, feelings of isolation. Finally, outside clinical services should also assist program staff by supplementing their efforts to help youths in a controlled environment.

SKILLS

What kinds of educational or vocational training are needed and desired by residents? While some remedial help can be provided by staff, here too specialists can be brought in from the outside, again broadening the services available as well as increasing the youngsters' contact with legitimate role models. To establish a fixed program for all youths shows little foresight. Instead, through flexibility in the forms of help obtained, a general program can be fitted to the unique situations facing each of the young people in the residence.

MAINTAINING CONTROL IN THE PROGRAM

Although community protection may be enhanced by locking youths inside a secure facility, this does not solve the major problem of maintaining control within the facility. Some staff believe that the only way to ensure control is to threaten youths with force or with transfer to a harsher, more secure environment if they do not behave. Again, we have the continuation of negative reinforcement. This kind of reinforcement can be useful, but threat and force are not the only weapons in our programmatic arsenal. Ultimately, a program must be seen by the youth as having some value to him — through his gaining a stake in how daily activities will be carried out, or perhaps through his desire to obtain rewards for accomplishment. Staff may share decision making with the youths, giving them a sense that they have some say about their future. By contracting with the youths to accomplish particular tasks in order to receive specified rewards, staff may foster in them an interest in the operation of the program. In one Massachusetts program, youths took the responsibility for clearing up a deserted and forgotten community pond; that pond is now used by the community for recreation. Pride in participating in a valued community project stimulated among juveniles an interest in their program.

In many community-based programs, a youth may be restricted to the residence during the first two to four weeks. This allows him time to adjust to the program and to learn what is expected. It also allows the staff to become familiar with the youngster and to see how he reacts under different circumstances. With that information, they and the youngster can decide how much freedom he can handle and to what degree he will be held accountable for his behavior. By establishing how a youngster will be rewarded for good behavior and punished for acting out, staff place the tool of negative reinforcement within a context of care, support, and accountability. Many programs operate on the basis of varying levels of responsibility or privilege, whereby youths earn or lose freedom inside and outside the residence as they work their way up or down the different levels. These systems have been described in detail elsewhere (Whittaker, 1979).

CONTINUUM OF CARE

Plans for a correctional program for violent offenders should look beyond the initial correctional placement. That first placement is most likely to be in a secure residence. After the youngster completes his stay there, he will probably be returned home or will look for a place to live independently in another community. Support and service at this juncture are as important for the client and for the community as they are at the point of the juvenile's entry into the correctional system. In the Harvard Center's study of deinstitutionalization in Massachusetts, among the most serious offenders in the sample (i.e., who had committed crimes against persons), those who left secure facilities but continued to receive forms of support through nonresidential programs did nearly twice as well in terms of recidivism as did those comparable youths who were simply returned to the community under nominal parole supervision. Thus, I conclude that youths who merely return to their social networks without continuing professional help pose a greater risk to community protection than do those who are assisted by staff to reestablish ties and negotiate their social networks. Given the high and necessary costs of care in a secure residence, this minimal extra cost is money well spent both to protect the interests of the community and to better the future of the youngster.

SOCIAL NETWORKS

Whether we think of the initial placement in a program or reentry into the community, focusing all correctional effort on the individual youth is not ultimately effective. Youths come from and will return to their own social networks. Those networks, in most cases, have more potential for promoting or impeding successful reintegration into the community than does the isolated correctional program (Coates, et al., 1978). Working with the youngster and his family, teachers, employers, local police, peers, and others important to him is much more likely to protect the community than is taking the youngster aside for six to twelve months to teach him in isolation how to cope with his world. Helping others to become more effective in supporting the youngster — which may very well include setting limits for the youth, to allow him to become more personally accountable and responsible — means the staff may act as advisors or supervisors as the youth tries to negotiate the pulls toward legitimate and illegitimate behavior.

In other words, staff have a responsibility for each youngster to contact, reinforce, and, if necessary, establish a supportive network. In doing so, staff can get a more complete and more up-to-date picture of what is happening to the youth and how he is handling the situation. This information not only is helpful for making program decisions, but also aids the staff in protecting the community. If the youngster is under intense pressure at

school, staff will know about it and how the youth typically reacts. If necessary, they can intervene, in extreme cases removing the youth before a crisis occurs. Obviously, knowledge about the youth and his situation is crucial to deciding when and how to intervene, and appropriate intervention is crucial in protecting the community and the youngster.

QUALITY CONTROL

The ability of a correctional agency to monitor the quality of programming for its charges is vital for the delivery of services and for community protection; it is especially so in programs for violent offenders. Whether services are provided by state employees or through contracts with private parties, they will be costly. A commitment to providing humane care, even for the violent offender, will require close attention to how behavior is controlled within the program setting. To control by force will only reinforce the picture of violence these youths believe must characterize their world. It is very easy for conditions in a secure facility, large or small, to get out of hand quickly. The correctional agency in charge must be in a position to monitor routinely, using outside observers, the quality of life within the program. To permit abuses to occur in this setting makes a charade out of the deinstitutionalization movement. Security, but humane security, must be the first principle of dealing with the violent offender.

Monitoring of the programs has other objectives. Full knowledge of the level and quality of services provided enables the correctional agency to supplement the resources and provide technical assistance to regular program staff. In dealing with this population of offenders, we are dealing with a number of unknowns. We must be in a position to know what is happening in each setting and in each case in order to know how best to manage our limited resources.

Clearly, we should take quality control concerns one step further. In an arena in which so few specifics are known, more research and demonstration projects should be undertaken. With a narrowly defined population, violent offenders, we have the opportunity to establish reasonably rigorous demonstration projects. At this time, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is engaged in such a demonstration, which should shed useful light on many of the questions that remain unanswered.

CONCLUSION

The real debate in correctional reform concerns how we view the large and extraordinarily diverse majority of delinquents who are neither status offenders nor the most serious offenders. Yet anxiety over community protec-

tion has catapulted issues regarding the serious offender to the forefront of juvenile justice.

That a small minority of juvenile offenders require secure correctional confinement to protect the community seems quite evident and reasonable to this observer. However, if labels that lead to extreme measures are not precisely defined, we run a great risk of doing a grave disservice to individual youths and to the community by overrestricting youngsters, breaking their positive ties to their social networks, and thereby hindering their successful return to the community.

To differentiate the most serious offender from other juvenile delinquents, I emphasize the violent nature of the offense and the youth's demonstrated willingness to engage in more than a single such crime. Thus, youngsters who have been adjudicated for two or more aggravated batteries, crimes of arson involving inhabited buildings, armed robberies, rapes, or murders would be labeled violent offenders; in such instances, extraordinary correctional measures would be justified. The label *serious offender* should be dropped from the lexicon because it remains so loose, conceptually, that there is little reason to believe that a consensus could be reached.

Finally, it is incumbent upon supporters of deinstitutionalization not only to take seriously the community concern for protection from violent offenders, but also to know how these offenders are being handled. These youths will ultimately return to their communities. The type of programming provided in secure settings should help strengthen the youths' ties with social networks promoting nonviolent and legitimate behavior. To deinstitutionalize the majority of delinquents while allowing the violent few to languish in abusive, dehumanizing conditions would make a mockery of yet another well-intentioned reform.

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10

INTERVENING WITH SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS: A SUMMARY OF A STUDY ON COMMUNITY-BASED PROGRAMS

David M. Altschuler
Troy L. Armstrong

In a recently completed study of community-based program interventions for the serious juvenile offender (Armstrong and Altschuler, 1982), we have described and analyzed the intervention strategies and models of operation for 11 programs across the country.* The study was designed to locate programs which, in the eyes of local and state authorities, provided services to seriously delinquent juvenile offenders in community-based alternative settings. The purpose of this study was to learn about the range and configuration of different models of community-based alternative programs. This knowledge is critical if we are to gain any understanding of how particular outcomes are achieved. In order to know more about the precise nature of the programs, we decided to look at them in terms of their underlying conceptualizations, the factors related to program startup and continuation (e.g., impetus, principal supporters, auspices, funding, and obstacles), and most important, the basic program operations as implemented. Emphasizing the importance of this direction in research, Austin and Krisberg (1982, p. 405) state:

Many have observed that introducing the experimental paradigm into the real world is a difficult enterprise: Frequently, unexpected

* The study was carried out at the National Center for the Assessment of Alternatives to Juvenile Justice Processing at the University of Chicago and funded jointly by the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and the Graduate Research Fellowship Program of the National Institute of Justice.

changes occur both within and outside reform programs, causing distortion in the design and structure of the "treatment" variable. Process evaluations are designed to monitor such distortions and clarify the meaning of impact results. . . Understanding exactly what was being tested requires detailed descriptions of the program's operations and, in particular, the intervention strategy. Too often, researchers have focused exclusively on impact designs, thereby failing to provide plausible interpretations of their impact findings.

Given our firm commitment to this approach, we posed several fundamental questions about crucial dimensions of programs: What are the major structural similarities and differences with respect to the design of service components? What are the commonalities and variations in techniques and styles employed in delivering these services? How can the structural features of the programs, the various components and the critical processes be combined to form particular models of operation?

METHODOLOGICAL AND DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

Sample and Instrumentation

Our study began with a nationwide search for approximately 12 community-based alternative programs to which serious juvenile offenders were being referred. We contacted the designated youth planner or juvenile justice specialist in each of the 50 State Planning Agencies (SPAs) and the District of Columbia and asked them to suggest community-based programs which they believed offered promising, commendable or innovative approaches. Intentionally, no definition of "serious" was provided. This was because one of the important questions guiding the study was what kind of offenses and/or offense histories led juvenile justice authorities to consider certain juvenile offenders in community-based programs as serious.

The survey uncovered 25 programs. We also searched the published literature and reviewed the Assessment Center's own collection of "fugitive" documents (unpublished materials). A number of federal agencies and private research organizations were asked to make recommendations. Each of the listed programs was contacted by Assessment Center staff and a fact sheet was filled out. Based on this information it became apparent that some of the initially identified programs were either not dealing with a serious enough population (in terms of severity of the presenting offense or chronicity of unlawful behavior) or were, in fact, closed institution-based facilities unlikely to yield meaningful observations and data on the nature of community-based facilities. Each program remaining in the sample was then profiled according to 14 characteristics which were felt critical to the

planned analysis: residential or nonresidential, area served, auspice, date of program startup, intake criteria and reasons for referral of current clients, current clients' demographic data, average length of stay, sources of referral, definition of "serious," program goals and notion of what the program was an alternative to, services provided, method of treatment and clinical techniques stressed, kind of followup and aftercare provided, and staff makeup.

Our final choice of programs was based on an attempt to select programs exemplifying a wide range of therapeutic and treatment techniques, staff compositions, lengths of stay, etc. In addition, we decided to exclude programs not engaged in direct service provision as distinct from service brokerage and case management in order to obtain a purposive sample of primary service providers. We finally arrived at a sample of 12 programs (one being subsequently dropped) constituting the widest range of programmatic possibilities across the 14 key characteristics. They included five residential and six nonresidential programs.

Four sets of questionnaires were designed and administered at every program site to program directors, key staff, clients, and a court or correctional agency representative knowledgeable about the local juvenile justice system. Separate versions of these questionnaires were prepared for both the residential and nonresidential formats. The director questionnaire queried policy and operational matters in such areas as referral, admission criteria, intake, client assessment, staffing and funding. The staff questionnaire focused on procedures used in practice, such as job responsibilities, program activities, community relations, degree of contact with families, peer group and schools, views on handling clients, conceptions of program goals, etc. The client questionnaire was designed to document youths' perceptions of the kinds of program activities in which they were involved, to discover what they believed their problems were, to have them describe their interactions with staff, and to identify their sense of the extent to which sources of support from the community were involved. Finally, the overview questionnaire concerned options available to police, courts and corrections in processing juvenile offenders; how the local juvenile justice system was structured in terms of the exercise of authority over delinquent youngsters; and how the "serious" juvenile offender was legally and/or customarily defined in the local jurisdiction.

Definitions

In defining the serious juvenile offender, attempts to generate meaningful categories have led to the development of a number of indicators reflecting a broad spectrum of criminal activity. Key among these definitional indicators are factors representing 1) local/regional priorities, attitudes and values; 2) the degree of severity of a specific offense; and 3) repetitiveness of

criminal misconduct. In combination, these factors can generate a number of different definitions of the serious juvenile offender. In noting this variability, we have observed where,

... the legal designation of seriousness is explicit, we found considerable variation across jurisdictional boundaries. This finding supports evidence increasingly reported in the literature — namely, that there is no common definition of the serious juvenile offender (Altschuler and Armstrong, 1981, p. 5).

In any attempt to develop eligibility criteria, design services or target potential clients for participation in specific programs, it is vital to arrive at some mutually acceptable perceptions about the parameters of the category or, at the very least, to have a shared understanding of the problems entailed in formulating acceptable definitions. At one extreme of possible definitions of seriousness are those habitually violent juveniles who are perceived as posing an immediate threat to the physical safety of the community. At the point of disposition, these "high-risk" offenders tend to be committed to correctional services and placed in secure settings. At the other end of the seriousness continuum can be found several types of offenders such as youths charged habitually with petty crimes, chronic status offenders and "system nuisances" (those never adjusting to any program setting regardless of their offense history).

In those programs we visited, client populations tended to fall somewhere between the extremes of the chronically violent and the habitual misdemeanant. Most programs contained a mix of offenders, some of whom had been referred for serious crimes against property as well as occasional violent crimes against persons. Rarely did any of these programs admit youngsters who had been adjudicated delinquent more than twice for crimes against persons. Usually clients had established arrest histories indicating a persistent pattern of criminal activity but not a pattern of violent behavior. The majority of clients were chronic property offenders who had been labeled serious in their jurisdictions but were considered to be amenable to community-based treatment.

Framework for Program Analysis

In developing the framework with which to identify, describe and analyze critical program components, features and processes, we found it necessary to incorporate the respective roles of the most abstract considerations (e.g., grand theories of delinquency causation, prevention and remediation) and the most concrete programming considerations (e.g., specific components and techniques). The designation and elaboration of essential steps within each program required a linkage of four discrete, descending levels of abstraction: 1) grand theories; 2) guiding principles; 3) models of operation; and 4) program components, specific structural features, and critical pro-

cesses. Only in this way can a deliberate effort be made to tie theory and its intervening stages to practice for the purposes of program design and operation.

It is possible to conceptualize the organizational and operational aspects of programs in a variety of ways. One promising approach is to identify those coherent constellations of activities which appear to constitute the essential aspects of any community-based program for serious juvenile offenders. As we have laid out in considerable detail elsewhere (Altschuler and Armstrong, 1983), three required aspects of organization and design comprise the basis for devising all models of operations. They are: intervention strategies, educational approaches and reintegration techniques.

Intervention Strategy. Some in the field use the term "treatment or therapeutic" approach synonymously, but this can create some confusion because of a distinction often made between treatment (referring to a focus on psychological reconstitution) and re-education/development (referring to a focus on skill acquisition, training and nurturance). However termed, intervention strategy refers to the degree of change sought and the range of client attributes targeted for attention.

Educational Approaches. Education is a key programmatic component since poor school attendance and performance are so frequently associated with the problems which delinquent youngsters have. The two approaches are in-house education components and use of community schools. We refer to education as consisting of work on basic skills in such areas as reading, writing, and arithmetic as well as other subjects and classes typically found in many conventional school programs, e.g., social studies, health and science, art and language skills. Other enrichment and cultural activities, recreational and physical education components as well as vocational training will, of course, often blend into and can be considered part of an overall educational curriculum.

Reintegration Techniques. These refer to those activities which can be used at any point in program participation to prepare, promote and test the practicality of client movement back into the community. This entails identifying and bolstering positive ties in the community, developing new and constructive contacts, maintaining involvement with family, peers and others, and establishing behavioral controls and social skills.

INGREDIENTS NECESSARY FOR PROGRAM OPERATIONS

In the following discussion we will examine those ingredients which, in combination or alone, constitute the core of program components, features,

and processes around which these models can be constructed. We have identified six categories comprising 14 separate ingredients which should be taken into consideration in designing and managing these kinds of programs. They are:

I. Case Management

1. Components which are closely coordinated, consistent, mutually reinforcing and continuous.
2. Behavioral contracting.
3. A comprehensible and predictable path for client progression or movement.
4. Each program level or phase directed toward and directly related to the next step, to all successive steps and to developing aftercare plans.
5. A rating or reporting system to measure progress.

II. Reintegration

6. The early initiation of aftercare planning in which the client is actively involved.
7. Linking clients to community experiences and providing exposure to community subsystems and clients' personal social networks.
8. Attention to in-program practices and the extent and nature of community contacts.

III. Involvement and Achievement

9. Frequent opportunities for readily obtaining some form of achievement and success.
10. Instilling in clients a sense of program ownership or involvement in decision-making.

IV. Control and Security

11. Consistent, clear and graduated consequences for misbehavior.
12. Close eyeball supervision or extensive tracking.

V. Education

13. An assortment of highly structured programming activities including education or vocational training and social skill development.

VI. Counseling

14. Various forms of counseling including individual, group and family approaches.

It is important to realize that each of these ingredients can be incorporated into programs which differ in terms of *the degree of change sought and the range of offender attributes targeted for attention* (Street, Vinter, and Perrow 1966, p. 64). Referred to as intervention strategy, they designate a residential program's relative reliance on therapeutic milieu or socialization

(Smucker, 1975) and a nonresidential program's predominate emphasis on therapeutic day treatment, intensive community intervention and tracking, or socialization (Altschuler, 1983).

On one end of the intervention spectrum were programs based more on intensive peer group and/or community dynamics (Altschuler and Armstrong, 1983). These kinds of programs tended to pursue comprehensive and intensive strategies whereby virtually all aspects of social interaction, conduct and psychological well-being were considered prime targets for intervention. In residential programs we refer to this approach as exemplifying a *therapeutic milieu* while in nonresidential programs we characterize the strategy as either *therapeutic day treatment* or *intensive community intervention and tracking*. In general, deviance or delinquency is corrected by more thoroughgoing reorientation and reconstitution. Typically, more extensive and broader changes are sought such as those relating to values, personality and behavior. While the nonresidential programs of this variety were not in a position to directly create a 24-hour living and learning environment, they still imposed extraordinarily intensive and comprehensive intervention while exerting substantial degrees of control and supervision. These programs were truly the nonresidential counterparts to the residential therapeutic milieu programs.

On the other end of the intervention spectrum were socialization programs which sought to achieve far less fundamental changes in their clients and targeted for attention a much narrower range of client attributes. In residential and nonresidential programs of this variety, emphasis was placed on providing helpful instruction, nurturance, well-rounded activities and positive role modeling. Offenders tended to be given much more leeway and, therefore, not as much emphasis was placed on trying to tightly structure and control most of the events that occurred in the course of daily living both inside and outside of the program. Generally, these programs did not routinely impose close monitoring and intensive staff-client interaction. The non-residential programs of this variety did not keep their clients for a considerable portion of the day and tended not to impose close monitoring on the time spent outside the program.

While these differences in intervention strategy were discernible in the programs, it should be pointed out that we found significant variations within the categories and we identified similarities between categories. For example, we found comprehensive intervention models built upon basic socialization features such as role modeling, nurturance and well-rounded activities. Some socialization programs, on the other hand, incorporated group counseling sessions and addressed values clarification and attitudes. These variations and similarities occurred because actual practice almost always reflects a hybrid-like quality. In spite of this, however, it was still possible to differentiate rather easily among the programs. This is extremely important when it comes to matching up offenders' needs and circum-

stances with the most appropriate program placement.

The intervention strategy, in effect, establishes how far-reaching and intensive program components, features and processes will be; it, however, does not provide much guidance on how programs will be organized and operated. It is the model of operation coupled with the intervention strategy which provides the means to differentiate among programs on the basis of what they actually do and how they do it.

The 14 ingredients represent a kind of checklist which can be used to guide the design and planning of serious offender programming in particular and correctional programming in general. Decisions on how each will be employed in a program establish the specific model of operation which will be implemented. There is no one better model or magic formula; there are no panaceas. The success of a particular model in a jurisdiction probably depends upon a combination of factors including the staffing pattern (e.g., number, job responsibilities and tasks, and open lines of communication); style and manner of staff performance; the needs, deficiencies and strengths of clients; and the youths' personalities, attitudes and behavioral repertoires.

Case Management

The first five ingredients collectively constitute a variety of features and processes which develop an unambiguous, goal-oriented set of expectations for clients concerning 1) their individualized intervention plans (i.e., goals and objectives for each program component and activity); 2) what remains to be accomplished; and 3) the relationship of achievements to overall program movement and progression. Behavioral, contingency, or social contracting with each client was a way to individualize intervention and treatment so that broad strategies were realistically fitted to the specific needs of every youth.

The programs variously provided examples of contracts which were used for school components, counseling, home visits and community behavior. Generally, the contracts were written to emphasize a small, manageable number of goals or expectations with the specification of incremental steps geared toward amelioration of problems. In the counseling component, the goal might be improving self-control by ignoring rather than fighting with provocative peers; in education, it could be improving arithmetic by spending a half-hour each day working on multiplication and division with a teacher's aide; and on home visits, it might involve adhering to a curfew and staying away from certain locations where drugs are commonly available. In effect, treatment and education plans were contracts.

These contracts, frequently co-signed by clients and staff, helped to pinpoint for the youths areas of difficulty or deficiency and strengths, what could be done about problems, and how. As a result, the youths were kept

informed about what would be happening to them in the program. This process can be a valuable incentive for youth by making them part of the problem-solving process and by identifying for them how effort and performance in specific areas result in program advancement. Client-specific contracts can decrease the opportunity for youth to manipulate staff and take advantage of mixed messages. They also reduce to an understandable level what is expected and why.

Providing youth in the programs with a comprehensible and predictable pathway for movement or progression and having a rating or reporting system to measure advancement are critical aspects of program operation and practice. While behavioral contracts tended to be organized around particular program components or features, an assortment of staging, leveling, achievement/progress and point systems guided overall advancement through the programs. These ranged from relatively simple mechanisms involving only periodic case reviews to elaborately structured token economies in which particular privileges were tied to the attainment of specific levels or stages.

Among the five residential programs, three used some form of point system, one relied on stages not involving points and one held monthly case conferences to gauge progress. Among the six nonresidential programs, one maintained a point system only for education and held weekly case reviews; one used a point system for overall advancement; one ran monthly staffings; one had three phases; one used weekly staff-client conferences; and one held regularly scheduled staff-client case reviews.

Providing a clear basis by which clients know in advance how they can progress and regularly informing them of their standing are two features which establish structure, consistency and routine feedback. It is important to continually emphasize achievements, deficiencies and expectations because that will 1) affect the youths' perception of fairness; 2) increase the chances that accomplishments will give clients a greater investment in the program; and 3) hold the youth accountable.

One program, for example, used a point system to monitor progress, to reward responsible behavior and to guide advancement through four specified levels. One to five points were earned for conduct and for participation respectively in each class, task and activity. The number of accumulated points in combination with the completion of assigned courses, peer input in group meetings, and staff approval were the criteria used to determine level advancement. As clients advanced from level to level, they were permitted more privileges and responsibility. Each student's accumulated points were placed on a prominently displayed chart. Another program used a point system only for its in-house educational program. Relied on to reward students for exhibiting positive behaviors in school-related activities, the points were not used to determine overall advancement in the program. In this instance, the points were used to encourage cooperation in the school while overall advancement was reviewed in weekly case confer-

ences with clients. Points accumulated over the week were used in regularly held auctions in which students could bid on goods donated by local department stores and businesses.

As a final example, one of the programs monitored progress and directed advancement through its use of individual counseling, which occurred at least three times a week, and monthly staff meetings. The program continually focused on clients' accomplishments and assumption of responsibility for overcoming their deficiencies and difficulties.

Whatever kind of system is used, it is important to provide the youth with frequent assessments, positive "strokes," and clarity on how to proceed and why. Together these attributes in a program take the youth along a pathway in which each step toward program completion can be built upon. Providing increasingly greater autonomy and responsibility places youths in a position where they have more at stake. As a result, an incentive to do well is engendered in them. In short, the movement toward completion is tied to new opportunities for rewards. Then, complete community reintegration becomes a transition, not an unprepared challenge.

Reintegration

Ingredients six through eight form the basis of the programs' reintegrative orientation. Discussed in detail in the community reintegration article in this volume (see Chapter 22), these ingredients refer to preparing and testing the offender and designated support systems for the development of qualities needed for constructive offender-community interaction and an offender's successful community adjustment. This definition focuses attention on an entire set of tasks and processes. These include identifying and bolstering positive supports in the community; developing new and constructive contacts; maintaining various forms of staff involvement and work with family, peers and socializing institutions; and bringing the youths to a point where they are capable of dealing with the forces and influences in the community.

In some of the programs, extremely tight control was exercised at the early stages of a client's involvement and all contacts with outsiders took place at the facility under supervision. This might include family visits, bringing in parents to participate in family sessions or orientation, using student interns as teacher aides, and allowing local residents to tour the facility. Frequently, clients had to earn the right to be granted certain privileges and to gain increased mobility. One of the therapeutic milieu programs allowed clients to become eligible for home visits after two months. This step required a home visit behavioral contract, the absence of any in-program restrictions, parental consent, notification of the probation department, and a counselor to accompany the youth home for a day on the very first visit. A residential socialization program permitted home visits after five or six

weeks but required at least two staff meetings with family, parental consent and the setting of specific conditions for the visit. Short forms were filled out by the family afterwards and, as with all of the residential programs, the home visits were used as a means of encouraging acceptable behavior and conduct in the program.

In the case of other programs, much greater freedom of movement outside the facility was extended to clients soon after admission. Some residential programs accomplished this by using community schools and closely monitoring attendance and behavior. Other programs relied on group outings, daytime privileges and use of local recreational facilities as a way to minimize isolation and to create more normalized interaction.

A comprehensive analysis of a program's reintegrative orientation requires focusing on the various kinds of relationships and interactions that both clients and staff have with all program-targeted support systems in the community, as well as on internal program practices. Together, these factors are intended to focus the client's thinking on what will happen once the program is finished, to best prepare both the clients and the various support systems for handling the interaction, and to commence and test the actual reintegration before program involvement is over.

Involvement and Achievement

Changing client attitudes and perceptions about "self" is a goal widely shared by programs engaged in the remediation of delinquent youth. Ingredients nine and ten are closely intertwined in that both are concerned ultimately with promoting the development of a positive self-image, high self-esteem and increased social competence. Making frequent opportunities available for obtaining some form of achievement and success is achieved by providing opportunities for experiencing in-program success and by granting rewards for demonstrated proficiency and progress. These practices enable clients to develop a sense of accomplishment on a frequent basis as they move through the programs. Since many of these youngsters have experienced lives already marked by repeated failure in legitimate activities, the need to break this cycle of failure and build the foundation for a positive outlook is very great. At the same time, care must be taken to realistically prepare the youth for disappointments and adversity.

In both residential and nonresidential programs, we found numerous examples where point systems were being used to encourage, reinforce and reward positive conduct. Often these systems assumed forms in which points awarded to clients were used to obtain material possessions in auctions or to be included in various fieldtrips and recreational activities. Sometimes, points which had accumulated over specified periods of time served as a basis for earning special recognition or advancing in the program.

Obtaining some form of achievement and success also applied in the educational and skill-development components of these programs. Activities were organized to pose short-term objectives which were manageable and realistic for the clients' abilities. As part of this process, clients had their curricula individually tailored so that they could progress at a speed commensurate with their abilities and be challenged at a level they had a realistic chance to meet.

Underlying the assumption that positive results flow from a sense of program ownership or involvement is the idea that clients who participate in decision-making have a much stronger investment in their program outcome. Instilling in clients a sense of program ownership or involvement in decision-making focuses on those program practices which give clients a greater stake in daily operations. These practices cover what happens to the clients themselves and their peers in the program. To insure that this process was set into motion, steps were usually taken to build into program operations a variety of points at which clients were called upon to actively participate in making various decisions.

The most noteworthy example of these kinds of practices occurred in a nonresidential program in which an egalitarian system for client participation placed considerable responsibility on each youth. Clients were given numerous opportunities to influence the program. An important part of this system was the reliance on a student government to make decisions at a number of critical junctures in the program. Officers of the student government presided over a daily meeting each morning where activities for the coming day were explained and matters of importance from the preceding day were discussed.

Clients in this program were provided with a number of opportunities where they could have significant input into decision-making. These situations included: 1) accepting new youth into the program; 2) developing their treatment plans; 3) involvement in case reviews; 4) evaluating staff; 5) participation in the maintenance and improvement of the physical plant; 6) having the student government president on the board; 7) setting rules within the facility; and 8) reviewing the cases of suspended peers for readmittance.

Evidence of these kinds of practices could also be found in other programs. For example, in one residential program which stressed marine skills and maritime recreational activities clients were granted considerable discretion in selecting courses and tasks for their school curriculum. This option to help structure their course of study placed clients in an important position regarding what kinds of specific skills they acquired in the program. This freedom to choose could significantly enhance the investment of these clients in the program.

Control and Security

Ingredients 11 and 12 constitute those program guidelines and activities directed toward establishing and maintaining control and supervision in the

programs. While all the programs had a system for providing consistent, clear and graduated consequences for misbehavior, the procedures designed to achieve this end assumed a number of forms and were put into practice in various ways.

In one residential program which relied upon milieu therapy as its intervention strategy, the progression of increasingly severe sanctions included: 1) individualized talk sessions with staff; 2) writing assignments; 3) work hours; 4) curtailment of mobility inside the facility; 5) loss of smoking or phone privileges; 6) cancellation of staff-chaperoned excursions into community; 7) loss of home visitation privileges; 8) use of stigmatizing garb (the requirement to remain in a bathrobe throughout the day); and 9) extended group sessions lasting anywhere from several hours to several days with the concurrent cessation of all other activities. The application of sanctions in this program was further supplemented by the use of a point system in which clients were assessed demerits for various rule infractions. Accumulated over a week's time, these demerit points were used as a basis for assigning chores. This system of using points as demerits rather than as rewards was found only in this one case.

In another residential program which utilized milieu therapy a similar set of procedures had been developed for sanctioning misbehavior. In order of increasing severity, these included: writing assignments, placement on work details in the facility, restriction to the building, room restriction, and denial of home visits. If clients felt that they were being unfairly penalized, a grievance procedure was available whereby a slip was filled out and the incident would be discussed at one of the group sessions.

A highly controversial sanctioning practice unique to this program was "boxing therapy." Short of termination from the program, clients who were guilty of major rule violations had to participate in boxing. The violator was required to box a series of one-minute rounds with other youngsters of approximately equal size and the same age. Only staff members and clients were allowed to attend these sessions. The practice was suspended several times by state authorities.

Among nonresidential programs, the way in which consistent and graduated consequences were imposed for misbehavior generally resembled those practices found in residential programs. The supervision and sanctioning were largely carried out by trackers who were responsible for imposing, monitoring and enforcing sanctions in the community. The consequences progressed from verbal reprimands, exclusion from recreational activities, work hours, and group meetings for the open discussion of serious problems to short suspensions from the program, lowering of curfew hours, and "grounding" at home.

A variety of techniques have also been developed by both residential and nonresidential programs to actually monitor client behavior. These techniques were used in situations involving client movement into and out of the facility, client activity outside the program, and client behavior inside

the facility. Close eyeball supervision refers to those procedures in which staff always kept clients in sight. In order to achieve this, a very high staff-client ratio was needed. One version entailed clients having to obtain permission in order to move from one room to another. The reasons offered for maintaining this level of supervision at the early stages of the program were the safety of the residents, keeping order in the facility, and holding the new program participants thoroughly accountable. This level of security lasted only from one to three weeks. Clients then entered a community-tracking phase.

A common form of monitoring and controlling client behavior and activities outside the program facility was intensive tracking. A number of forms of tracking were used in the nonresidential programs. In its most highly structured form, tracking was designed to operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis with the understanding that contact might be made by trackers with clients at any time. Clients had to make multiple, daily call-ins to the program, report any deviations from a totally pre-arranged schedule, and attend mandatory meetings at the program several times a week and on weekends. Clients were sometimes seen by trackers as many as three or four times a day. Key to this intensive approach was having outreach workers operating in teams. In this way, all nights and weekends could be covered, and a staff member was available at all times for crisis intervention.

From the perspective of those advocating the use of community-based programs for serious juvenile offenders, there are two principal security issues which must be addressed. First, public fear and anxiety over the presence of these youngsters in the community must be diffused. It is not unusual for new programs of this type to have engaged in protracted conflict with community organizations and residents over zoning regulations, building codes and other obstacles to program startup and survival. Second, there is the more programmatic consideration of how the "treatment variable" must be adapted and tailored to mesh with those constraints which must be imposed on the activities and movement of high-risk clients. Overall, we found that programs in our sample were highly successful in overcoming problems of security through the use of innovative techniques to insure adequate levels of control and supervision.

In general, the most desirable and effective methods of establishing and maintaining security was through smaller numbers of clients, adequate staffing, and program content rather than through a dependence on high levels of mechanical and physical constraints. In addition to the issues surrounding the manner of and methods for imposing security, there is also a considerable range of variation in how secure these programs must be. Some programs were highly secure for clients throughout their participation, while in other programs control and tight supervision were stressed only for new or disruptive clients. Security could then be gradually relaxed as clients progressed through various stages. In these cases security was related to the way in which clients progressed in the program. Client pro-

gression was tied to how youngsters handled and reacted to 1) newly acquired privileges; 2) greater degrees of freedom of movement; and 3) increasing levels of earned responsibility.

All of the residential programs attempted to make use of graduated systems of control and supervision in order to place greater degrees of responsibility on the youths as they moved toward complete reintegration into the community. Rarely if ever were participants in these programs kept totally isolated only to be thrust back into their own communities at the last moment. The constant probing and testing of community behavior is an important and essential feature of community-based programs for serious juvenile offenders.

Education

In the sample of programs we examined, education was usually defined to include a variety of enrichment and cultural activities, recreational and physical education components, and vocational training and skill development. These activities were blended into and considered to be a natural part of the overall educational curriculum which also included such traditional requirements as reading, writing, mathematics, and other subjects typically found in conventional school programs, e.g., social studies, health, science, art, and language skills. The considerable variation characterizing the location and structure of the educational component in these programs reflected the fact that this key activity had to be tailored to meet circumstances such as the nature of the target population, individual client learning styles, and the school system's willingness to take program clients and its ability to meet the clients' special needs (e.g., learning disabilities, short attention spans, disciplinary problems). In addition, in many programs a wide range of other activities and features were intertwined with the school curriculum to provide a constellation of logically-related services for clients. For example, a deliberate effort was frequently made to mesh educational and counseling activities. This served to overlap staff roles, to reinforce learned behavior, to promote the transferability of learned behavior and acquired skills from one component of the program to another, and to encourage a similar transference from the program to a community setting.

Programs had the option of utilizing either community schools or in-house educational components. The types of community schools relied upon included regular public schools, special education schools, and vocational/technical schools. In cases where programs were using community schools, the provision of education was itself a direct manifestation of a link with a major socializing institution. This was a clear-cut use of community resources which kept the client in regular and close contact with community influences and forces. The connection served to reduce dependency on the program and emphasized the need for youths to deal with those persons

and community subsystems which would significantly affect ultimate community adjustment.

Nonresidential programs, with two exceptions, used in-house educational components as the core feature around which to organize all other activities. Since wide disparities existed in educational achievement and in individual learning needs, programs with in-house schools contained a vast array of educational resources and techniques: remedial instruction, GED preparation, team teaching, teaching machines, and regular courses leading to a high school diploma. In most cases the structure of learning was individually tailored with clients not being placed by grade. Following testing, each youth tended to be placed on a level where he could progress at a speed commensurate with ability.

Considerable emphasis was placed on job training and skill development in many of these programs since most clients were not going to enter college and lacked the basic competence to obtain and hold jobs in the community. Furthermore, efforts were always made to link academic topics to their potential applications in work or recreational situations. For example, in a residential program stressing marine activities, short courses which had immediate application to work situations were part of the regular curriculum. These short courses included: first aid, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, survival swimming, water safety, maintenance of marine equipment, and use of basic hand tools. In one nonresidential program, clients were frequently placed in vocational schools as part of their reintegration back into the community. In another nonresidential program, clients at advanced levels were required to attend regular academic classes for one half day at the facility and to spend the remainder of the day pursuing work-related activities outside the facility.

In a number of programs, attention was directed to supplementing the regular academic curriculum with a variety of enrichment activities. These usually included various forms of cultural enrichment and guided recreation. Endeavors to provide cultural enrichment ranged from teaching table etiquette, and providing choral singing and music appreciation, to offering classes in arts and crafts, and sponsoring field trips to concerts and museums.

The other principal dimension of the enrichment process consisted of carefully guided participation in recreational activities. The argument offered for this was that well-rounded youngsters needed to possess physical skills and avocational interests. Upon entering these programs, many of the clients were poorly coordinated, possessed little sense of group interaction and cooperation, and had few outside interests.

Several programs maintained recreational specialists on their staffs to guide client participation in various forms of physical activity. In one nonresidential program, the recreational component played an extremely important role in the overall design of the program. One day per week an all-day organized recreational activity (e.g., skiing, horseback riding, bicycling,

rock climbing, hiking, etc.) took place. A second half-day during the week was reserved for a YMCA activity. In addition, one long (four or five days in length), physical challenge trip per month (river runs, use of a YMCA facility for camping, etc.) was scheduled. The premise behind maintaining this elaborate recreational component was that sport and recreational pursuits represented an acceptable and meaningful way to channel energy, vent frustration, provide excitement, enhance self-esteem, establish closer personal rapport with one's peers and counselors, motivate and reward appropriate behaviors, and discourage disruptive and uncooperative actions.

In another nonresidential program, the basic approach to recreational therapy focused not on competitive sports, which sometimes tended to produce negative acting-out behavior, but rather on activities which encouraged the development of basic physical skills such as balance and coordination. Stress was placed on physical activities such as dance and gymnastics which did not require intense competitive behavior.

Counseling

Some form of individual counseling was provided in every program; most engaged in group counseling sessions and some ran family counseling. As expected the counseling in the therapeutic milieu, therapeutic day treatment, and intensive community intervention and tracking programs tended to be extraordinarily intensive and the focal point around which all the other components and processes were organized. In one of the therapeutic milieu programs formal group sessions were held twice a week and mealtimes were also used occasionally to conduct staff-guided discussions. One of the group meetings was devoted to "snitch and bitch" where various in-house problems such as relationships with staff, relationships between residents and other complaints were discussed. The second session was generally aimed at focusing on interpersonal communication through an exploration of peer interaction and shared criticism. Each student was also assigned an individual counselor with whom he met on a formal basis once a week. This provided each student with one staff person who handled paperwork, monitored progress, supplied individualized support and advice, and guided movement through the program. While this program was not a family treatment program per se, as each youth moved toward completion, more family-staff contact generally occurred, principally through the program's outreach coordinator.

Another therapeutic milieu program used a more aggressively confrontational style of group counseling in its collective group process in order to bring about a cathartic-induced effect. Group sessions occurred three times a week. Two of these sessions were organized into three different subgroupings. Depending upon the personality and style of each youth, he was either placed into the aggressive, passive, or mixed grouping. Individual sessions

were not formally scheduled and no staff-family work was pursued, the program preferring either to retain clients as staff or to place them in independent living situations.

An especially interesting therapeutic day treatment program used individual counseling at least three times a week. Targeted at learning disabled and emotionally disturbed delinquents, these sessions were designed to be brief encounters of approximately 15 minutes. Individual counseling chiefly relied on behavioral contracting around a number of goals including improved self-control and increased responsibility toward others. Group sessions were held every day for about 45 minutes. Youngsters were grouped for these sessions around problem behaviors such as temper control, family conflict and interpersonal difficulties. At the same time that these problems were being addressed, peer relationships were developed, communication skills practiced and interdependence reinforced. Four levels of family work were used: twice a month parent-staff counseling, parental participation in their child's monthly staffing, monthly group educational sessions for families focusing on parenting and, when called for, formalized family therapy.

In contrast, counseling in the residential and nonresidential socialization programs played a less central role in the overall model of operation and intervention strategy. Consequently, counseling tended not to infuse other components and processes in the program and, thus, did not occupy as central a role. For example, in one of the nonresidential socialization programs the group counseling largely consisted of one meeting a week in which the clients vented their feelings, voiced their complaints and discussed issues of mutual interest. This meeting was facilitated by a counselor, but it remained mostly client self-directed. Two counselors were responsible for providing individual counseling to their clients at least twice a week. Family counseling was a much more important aspect of this program. Although all clients and their families were required to participate in this, the intensity, frequency, and structure of these sessions varied from client to client.

One of the residential socialization programs approached group sessions by having community mental health workers come in and work with small groups of youths twice a week, and by having counselors meet with their group of five or so clients once a week. The point is that in the socialization programs, the basis of facilitating more modest changes in their clients fell predominantly on program components and processes somewhat detached from the counseling component.

CONCLUDING COMMENT

The preceding description and analysis of the sample of programs in our study of community-based alternatives for the serious juvenile offender were based on the decision to pursue an "ingredients approach" rather than trying to delineate a number of discrete models of operation. It is our con-

viction that too much emphasis has been placed on the national replication of "exemplary" programs. Planners and practitioners would be well advised to carefully consider the whole range of components, practices and features available for achieving reintegrative programming and choose that combination which best suits the needs of their communities. The means are clearly available to provide deterrence, accountability and social control without resorting to methods which in the long run pose a serious threat to community protection.

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INTERVENING WITH VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS: A COMMUNITY REINTEGRATION MODEL

*Jeffrey A. Fagan
Cary J. Rudman
Eliot Hartstone*

Shortly after the rehabilitative ideal rose to prominence in crime policy, attacks on treatment (and its "medical model" underpinnings) quickly surfaced. Surveys of treatment impact found that for the most part, the type of treatment programs, modalities and services provided juvenile delinquents made little difference in the youths' subsequent behaviors (Bailey, 1966; Lipton, Martinson and Wilks, 1974; Wright and Dixon, 1977). The dominant view among criminologists and practitioners with respect to the treatment of offenders in the juvenile justice system became one of "no impact" (Gottfredson, 1979; 1980).

"Nothing works" has become the rallying point for opponents of correctional policies which rely on treatment methods and rehabilitative goals. Armed with empirical and public support, critics have attacked the juvenile justice system's historical philosophy of *parens patriae* and individualized treatment, arguing for harsher treatment of juvenile offenders either

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through longer periods of mandatory confinement or transfer to the more punishment-oriented criminal justice system. These arguments have been voiced most frequently with regard to violent delinquents, for they pose the most complex problems from both treatment and public safety perspectives. Lacking demonstrably effective treatment programs, which can be blended with community protection measures, proponents of the juvenile justice system face a difficult challenge in responding to calls to limit or abolish juvenile court jurisdiction.

However, to accept the "nothing works" conclusion (and consequences) is premature for at least two reasons. First, the surveys of treatment impact have found as many weaknesses in evaluation research practices as in the programs themselves. Research on rehabilitative techniques has been characterized by weak evaluation designs, problems with outcome measures, and study periods too short to detect long term gains. No proof of treatment effectiveness (due to methodological failure) is not the same as disproof. Second, a persistent problem with prior studies has been the failure of treatment programs to accurately implement the intended treatment approach. For a variety of reasons (e.g. funding, staff turnover, staff failure) it has frequently been the case that the actual treatment provided and tested failed to reflect the approach or modality as it was developed. The failure was in implementation, not necessarily in conceptual design. If the treatment was not operationalized from theory, not delivered as described, or incorrectly measured, even the strongest evaluation design will show "no impact" (Sechrest, White and Brown, 1979).

Accordingly, it may be premature to dismiss the rehabilitative ideals of the juvenile court without a thorough attempt to treat offenders and measure the impact of that treatment. The 1979 Panel on the Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders concluded that:

... the research on offender rehabilitation should be pursued more vigorously, more systematically, more imaginatively, and more rigorously. Specifically, treatments should be based upon strong theoretical rationales, perhaps involving total programs rather than weak or piecemeal treatments. In addition, the strength and integrity of all treatments should be monitored and fully documented, along with documentation of the costs of operation of the treatment... appropriate funding agencies [should] support research on criminal rehabilitation, while making the criteria for funding more rigorous with respect to experimental design, theoretical rationale, and monitoring of integrity and strength of treatment (p. 10).

Accordingly, the juvenile justice system finds itself at a crossroads in determining the types of policies and interventions best suited for violent juvenile offenders. The future of the juvenile court arguably is linked to its ability to develop dispositional programs for violent youths which blend both public safety and rehabilitative concerns. In an effort to develop and

test a program for violent juvenile offenders which incorporates community protection, accountability and rehabilitation in the best interests of the youths, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) appropriated funds in 1980 for the Violent Juvenile Offender Research and Development Program (VJO Program). Based on a thorough review of the literature on the causes of juvenile violence and delinquency (see Chapter 3) and visits to 15 programs (in 10 states) designed specifically to treat violent juvenile offenders, an intervention model was developed. The model synthesizes theory and practice, and responds to the needs and interests of both the youths and the public.

The intervention model developed for the program, currently being tested nationally, is grounded in three assumptions. First, there is no single cause of violence. Each project has identified youths with diverse backgrounds and varying treatment needs. Second, theory is best operationalized when the program design integrates theory with existing research findings and practical experience. Third, the key to effective intervention lies in the reintegration of delinquent youths into society and the communities in which they will live after correctional interventions. While most youths adjust well to institutional settings, they have problems in readjusting to the contingencies of community life. This latter point provides a name for the program design — the Community Reintegration Model.

The purpose of this paper is to describe in detail the Community Reintegration Model, an effort which provides an opportunity to develop knowledge and technology to test treatment concepts for violent delinquents. The paper also identifies several issues which bear on its implementation. The Community Reintegration Model includes a theoretical dimension (underlying principles), structural elements to provide a vehicle for service delivery and decision making, and several "treatment" approaches to address the multiple causes and correlates of violent crime.* The integration of these dimensions is important news, for it is a departure from earlier piecemeal efforts. Viewed separately, the model is a composite of existing and diverse approaches. When integrated and coupled with the focus on community reintegration, this model presents an approach to strengthen and routinize treatment interventions for youth with diverse needs over a continuum of settings.

Each dimension of the Community Reintegration Model is described below, followed by an analysis of the issues involved in implementing this innovation in delinquency policy.

* The derivation of the theory base and the strategies is described in Chapter 3 of this anthology. The structural elements and treatment approaches were based on practices observed during the developmental site visits.

UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES

The Community Reintegration Model is represented in Figure 11.1. It proposes that violent delinquency will be reduced and controlled using a social learning approach to strengthen bonds and address psychosocial factors related to violent behavior.

The model is supported by four underlying principles which incorporate the intervention theory and can be applied both to program strategies and the treatment interventions described elsewhere. The integration of theory, structure, and content is shown in Figure 11.2. The underlying principles are described below, including their linkages to the theoretical model.

Social Networking

This strategy suggests that increasing positive socialization experiences will strengthen personal bonds — "commitments" — to families, peers, schools or other social institutions, as well as to non-delinquent lifestyles. This strategy requires that alternative positive lifestyles and peer networks be available to youths, that positive role models and relationships with significant others be developed, and that these networks serve as resources upon which youths can draw in times of stress from other parts of their lives. Examples of social networking include empowerment; role development (Hawkins and Weis, 1980); development of personal goal-setting, problem-solving and decision-making skills; and opportunities for self-determination. Designed to reduce youths' alienation from and increase their involvement in social and family institutions, these tactics should be applied to several areas where personal attachments develop: family, school, job, peers, and community.

Basically, the social networking process involves the development of interpersonal skills and personal resources which will enable the individual to establish meaningful relationships. During treatment, social networking might include:

- establishment of relationships with staff most responsible for treatment, i.e., case manager, counselor, social worker, etc.;
- establishment of skills for communication, problem solving, and socializing;
- positive interactions with other youths in treatment; and
- strengthening ties to family and significant others in the community.

As the youth progresses toward reintegration into the community, social skills become even more significant. Therefore, projects may provide:

- a community liaison person from the community or family to assist youth in gaining access to employment or education;
- more frequent opportunities to visit friends and relatives;
- more leisure activities such as recreation;

FIGURE 11.1: Intervention Model for Violent Juvenile Delinquency





FIGURE 11.2: Treatment Intervention Model for Violent Juvenile Offenders



- a sponsorship program whereby one youth is responsible for a youth in a lower phase. Sponsorship implies educating new residents about program rules and procedures, "a quasi-big brother" role and other supportive roles;
- family problem-solving teams to discuss problems within the living unit. These teams should mirror family life by incorporating the people who might be involved in future family decisions involving the youth.

Social networking must promote participation of family, peers, schools and the community in the course of behavioral change. As mentioned earlier, these are the primary social units through which a youth becomes bonded to society. The processes of social networking will vary within those units, depending on phase of treatment and priority of needs.

Provision of Youth Opportunities

This strategy is designed to strengthen youths' social bonds — "integration" — to non-delinquent and conventional activities by providing opportunities for achievement, and rewarding successful participation in schools, jobs, family, and community. It requires that skills be developed to increase opportunities for success, that realistic and achievable goals and expectations be set for each activity, and that success in these activities be positively reinforced.

Largely, this principle aims at the youth's self-determination, ability to set personal goals, self-esteem, and opportunity to achieve conventional success at school or at work. A program that provides youth opportunities tends to supply:

- reward systems (to be discussed under social learning);
- youth participation in setting treatment goals;
- vocational training/placement with marketable skills leading to promotion;
- academic instruction relevant to the youths' needs and desires, marked by rewards for each milestone met, realistic and achievable goals (e.g., GED), and an individualized learning pace; and
- community service roles for the returned youth.

Examples of this strategy include education, job training, and job development interventions that provide the social and interpersonal skills necessary for success in society. Such tactics should provide not only for immediate tangible gains (e.g., diploma, training stipend, job placement) but also for enhancement of roles within these conventional spheres of activity (e.g., social mobility, job advancement). The development of skills and opportunities for success strengthen youths' social bonds by providing positive rewards, equipping youths to live in society through conventional and rewarding school- or job-related activities, and providing economic and social resources to reduce reliance on delinquent and violent lifestyles for either economic or social status gains.

Social Learning

While the above principles focus on identifying the personal and social bonds to be strengthened, social learning specifies the *process* by which these bonds are reinforced. It also specifies a process whereby youths learn accountability for their actions and to avoid reliance on violence or delinquent activity for personal or economic gain. Social learning acknowledges and addresses the role of environment and context in the development of violent behavior.

The social learning principle specifies behavioral change through positive and negative reinforcement. Positive reinforcements occur when social interactions provide personal and social rewards, facilitate personal goal achievement, and minimize environmental or social stress. Negative reinforcements occur through application of clear systems of logical consequences and sanctions for violent behavior. Positive social learning occurs, for example, when educational activity leads to incremental knowledge gains as well as a diploma or certification; when job training leads to job skills, placement, or advancement; and when job placement results in fair wages, social recognition, and opportunities for advancement. Positive social learning also occurs when social and community activities provide opportunities for decision making, problem solving, conflict resolution, and self-determination that leads to empowerment and a sense of control. Negative reinforcement for illegal and violent behavior results from the imposition of sanctioning systems that are clear, fair, effective, and consistent. "Clear" implies that punishments are consistently and explicitly tied to illegal acts or violations of stated rules; "effective" suggests that responses occur quickly and without ambiguity or contradiction; "fair" implies that sanctions acknowledge and take into account situational factors involved in rules violations or illegal acts.

By rewarding positive gains and sanctioning antisocial acts, the youth's negative behavior is directed toward a behavior more adaptable to the social world. Sanctions for violations of program rules and regulations should be clearly articulated and consistently applied. Negative sanctions might include:

- extra chores;
- early bedtime;
- room time or lock down;
- suspension of privileges;
- physical restraint for assaultive behavior;
- return to earlier, more restrictive program phase (e.g., secure center).

The use of sanctions and their duration should be proportionate to the proscribed act or rule violation, and should be explicitly spelled out in performance contract agreements. For example, harsher sanctions such as demotion to earlier phases should be reserved for the more serious prob-

lems or rule violations, such as an unauthorized absence or an assault on a staff member. Sanctions should support learning efforts, not create a punishment cycle. Finally, programs should have a client appeal procedure for particularly severe sanctions.

Reinforcements or rewards can include:

- furloughs;
- point systems:
 - treatment points,
 - work points,
 - bonus points;
- special privileges;
- special roles such as sponsorships;
- special evening programs;
- opportunity to move to higher status in program;
- early release.

These external reinforcements should be available not only to the excellent performers, but can be extended to youth who display commitment and dedication but may also have had a few setbacks during treatment. Rewards should be proportionate to progress. There should be a perceived reward for each incremental gain. The intrinsic value of a reward system is in enabling a youth to feel he is capable of managing his own life by accomplishing set goals. In addition, self-esteem is heightened, and life may seem more directed.

Goal-Oriented Interventions

Throughout all aspects of planning and programming, concrete and achievable goals must be set. They should include learning accountability for one's actions, as well as alternatives to violence or aggression. Interventions must be based on each youth's individual needs and abilities; planning requires identifying specific problem behaviors (e.g., substance abuse, poor communication skills, sexual aggressiveness) and providing the youth with the supports and treatment necessary to overcome them. Interventions may include addressing identified psychological problems by using strategies which specify behavioral objectives.

Upon intake a case manager or case management team is responsible for conducting a needs assessment. The youth is subject to oral interviewing and/or assessment techniques such as testing. Referral source data should be considered since it often summarizes the youth's previous treatment experiences and describes reasons for the referral. The needs assessment process should focus on the identification of such problem behaviors and individual treatment needs.

Individual factors are extremely important in the formulation of appropriate treatment goals for these interventions. Critical factors include

psychosocial development and early socialization experiences, which tend to distinguish violent youth as a subset of delinquent youth. They include predisposing factors such as violent or abusive families, emotional disturbance, lack of empathy, and physiological or biological disorders. These individual factors may act as predisposing variables in the onset of violent behavior in youths with either strong or weak bonds. Goal-oriented interventions should be set up with the knowledge of these factors, and should be oriented toward resolution of specific problem behaviors.

STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS

The underlying principles and processes are integrated with the program design through four structural components: case management, multi-phased program, community reintegration, and program autonomy.

Case Management

Perhaps the heart of the Community Reintegration Model is continuous case management with periodic review and (as necessary) modification of each youth's service needs and plans. Case management incorporates social learning principles through use of performance contracts. Contracts should specify the services to be provided by the project, as well as the conditions and expectations to be met by the youth. The consequences of not meeting contract requirements, including actions to be taken if the youth breaks program rules, should be stated or known in advance. On the positive side, rewards for meeting milestones or goals should also be known in advance. The Case Manager should administer this system; he or she shouldn't have to set rules for situations as they arise.

Case management serves several purposes. It ensures rational planning and continuity so that youths receive all the services they need in a timely, efficient, and continuous manner. It builds in clear and consistent expectations for youths across numerous service agencies, maintains important relationships throughout the entire correctional program, provides opportunities for rewards where gains are made, and keeps the youth in touch with the positive elements of his or her environment.

Case management separates treatment, advocacy, and control functions within one program. Thus, the contract becomes the social/legal control agent, together with the authority of corrections personnel. Treatment is provided by service providers. The case manager serves as advocate to ensure that each youth receives needed services. The case manager also provides feedback to each youth on progress and problems in meeting contract goals. The case manager position should include the following duties and responsibilities:

- **diagnostic assessments** — including coordinating and approving and/or directly conducting diagnostic assessments of each case load youth in the following general areas, using established program guidelines for the specific content and format of the information that is collected:
 - physical health,
 - mental health,
 - individual behavioral and social problems,
 - family involvement and background,
 - educational status,
 - vocational status,
 - recreational and leisure time activities,
 - life skills for community living, and
 - existing community resources and values;
- **phase placements and movement** — including participation in decision making, according to program guidelines, regarding movement between phases for each case load youth;
- **treatment plans and performance contracts** — including developing and reviewing/revising treatment plans and performance contracts;
- **arrangements for treatment services** — including identifying and arranging for appropriate treatment resources that are continuous, to the extent possible, to accomplish each case load youth's contract objectives, referring youth to these providers, and monitoring provision of adequate services through:
 - purchase of care contracts with external providers in the community, or
 - arrangements for specific services within project components;
- **information liaison** — including providing information about the project's goals and expectations and acting as liaison regarding each case load youth's progress in the project (within the guidelines for confidentiality) to:
 - each youth on the case load,
 - designated family members/significant others of case load youth,
 - appropriate actual and potential community and project service providers to case load youth, and
 - juvenile justice system representatives concerned with case load youth;
- **case records** — including maintaining current and accurate case records for each case load youth and regularly documenting progress toward treatment goals;
- **direct care and supervision of active case load youth** — including making direct face-to-face contacts a *minimum of two days a week* in all phases, but increasing the frequency of such contacts appropriately during periods of transition to new phases of the project; and
- **advocacy** — including representing case load youth to gain services for them or to resolve problems related to their performance with:
 - other project staff,
 - families and other community service providers to the youth, and

— other appropriate members of the community or personnel from the juvenile justice system.

Overall, the purpose of defined case management responsibilities and case load assignment procedures is to ensure individualized advocacy and care for each youth, continuity of support and interventions through all project phases, and a primary emphasis throughout the program on community reintegration.

Multi-Phased Program

A significant program element of the Community Reintegration Model is the implementation of a multi-phased program including: an intensive diagnostic assessment phase, a secure care phase, a transition phase, and a community living phase. The phases are distinguished from each other primarily in terms of security: balancing programmatic structure in the least restrictive environment against insuring the safety and wellbeing of program staff and the general community as a whole.

Not all youths need start in the most restrictive phase; some may be ready to test behaviors in the community setting at an early stage. However, most violent youths are placed in a secure setting initially. All program phases are connected by continuous case management, continuity in treatment and services across phases, regular staff meetings and consultations, and overall coordination by the project director. Progress in treatment goals is linked to movement to decreasing levels of restrictiveness.

The Diagnostic Assessment Phase refers to the process through which the specific needs of each youth in each phase are identified at intake. The diagnostic assessment is crucial due to the wide range of individual situations, and social factors which may have contributed to a youth's violent delinquency. It also informs the initial placement decision: In which phase will the youth be placed following assessment? Each project must have a rational process to identify the factors and the corresponding service needs of the youth. It is the responsibility of the case manager to make sure that each youth assigned to him or her receives this diagnostic assessment and that it is done properly. Each diagnostic assessment should examine the youth in at least eight general areas:

- **delinquent careers** — apprehensions/arrests, incarceration, self-report, detail on target offense;
- **family** — composition and interaction, background, criminal history, abuse and neglect, sanctioning;
- **education** — achievement, involvement, attitude, school environment;
- **peers** — gang involvement, type of friends, peer pressures;
- **coping** — support systems, accountability, reinforcement;
- **interpersonal skills** — social and sexual functioning, making friends, use of community services;

- **employment** — job skills, work experience, expectations;
- **special characteristics** — physical disability, mental health, developmental disability, learning disability, nutritional.

A Secure Care Phase should be a structured program located in a twenty-four-hour-a-day residential facility, where the overwhelming majority of the activities and treatment occurs. As in all phases the underlying principles should be applied through structured program elements expressed by the appropriate treatment intervention recorded in a treatment plan.

A Transition Phase continues the treatment plan (as updated by performance contract) in a residence located in the youth's community. The "transition" is a residential facility to which the youth has supervised independent access. Community-based activities and assumption of responsibilities are closely monitored. He may be going to school or vocational training or he may be pursuing a job in the community.

The Community Living Phase focuses on the youth independently living in an approved support structure (e.g., original home, mentor home, foster home, "own" home). The youth participates in independent community-based activities pursuant to his treatment plan and updated performance contracts. The youth should have the chance to participate in community events where he would be able to demonstrate the assumption of everyday responsibilities.

Community Reintegration

Projects should stress the eventual successful reintegration of youths into their communities, and must include follow-up with participating youth and their families through (and, if feasible, beyond) the completion of the programs. The community reintegration emphasis ensures that the intervention strategies are applied consistently throughout all phases of the program. A simple rule-of-thumb can be followed: projects should spend as many dollars on youths when they are in the community as they do in earlier phases, through supervision and purchase of services.

The same logic and rules should apply in all stages of the project. Performance contracts should be used as both treatment and monitoring tools during all phases from secure care to in-home treatment, and in all services from education to family interventions. Community reintegration will thus require special efforts by project staff to secure the continuous involvement of community agencies and resources in program design, so that the youth can expect to encounter consistent services and responses from schools, family, and other community resources during the transition to independent living.

Reintegration services are instrumental in sustaining inprogram treatment gains after the termination of court-mandated control. Traditional "aftercare," or "follow-up" services have typically been undeveloped in

juvenile offender programs, rarely amounting to anything more than control measures. Positive gains made during "treatment" have, in the past, tended to "fade out" once youths returned to their former community environments and peer influences. Youths resumed delinquent careers, possibly because new behaviors were "unlearned" or because they lacked the supportive resources to respond to environmental stresses with newly learned behaviors. Thus, the importance of community reintegration lies both in sustaining new behaviors and skills learned during treatment and in reinforcing the modification of these behaviors during adaptation to family and community life on the streets and in the workplace.

Reintegration processes should occur throughout the treatment experience, beginning the first day. As the youth moves toward return to the community, staff should:

- provide intensive youth supervision;
- gain knowledge of the culture of the community, its resources and strengths;
- develop an understanding of the family's lifestyle;
- provide opportunities for the youth to practice new skills and behavior in the community;
- identify personal living needs;
- identify and evaluate the youth's previous community ties (e.g., friends, recreation, church, other).

As the youth progresses through the program, a pre-release structure should be put in place to allow the youth a taste of future living conditions. This would include allowing youth to leave for home visits, school, work, or to participate in community activities. As the youth becomes more capable of independent living, the program can reduce checks on his whereabouts, allow flexible curfew, and encourage independent decision making. Simultaneously, parents should be trained in the techniques employed by case managers while receiving counseling on parenting methods. A contract could be made between parents and youth, clarifying expected roles and behaviors.

Schools and law enforcement officials should be informed (through a case conference) of the youth's successful treatment. This should decrease negative interactions that may result because of the youth's past criminal involvement.

Community service agencies could help by giving youths the jobs or opportunities that would benefit the youth as well as his environment. For example, a youth might tutor younger kids in a computer class. An effort toward community development, though ambitious, would help to maintain the social learning, youth opportunity and social networking environments established in earlier phases of the program. For example, project staff might train the agencies or organizations in the same underlying principles which the VJO project applies. This continuum and consistency of environment beyond the project is crucial to support the youth's gains in other

settings. This aspect of the program therefore assigns responsibility to the community for a major role in the intervention effort.

Program Autonomy

A necessary structural element to ensure the decision-making power requisite to implement a treatment interaction model for violent juvenile offenders is the discretionary flexibility, i.e. autonomy, of the sponsoring agency to operate such a program effectively and efficiently.

To ensure program autonomy, the program needs to negotiate and document agreements with the sponsoring agency about key issues that are consistent with jurisdictional guidelines and the programmatic intent of the intervention model. The agreements should include procedures for:

- movement of project youth into, out of and through the program;
- hiring and firing/transfer of staff members;
- budget allocations and expenditure of funds;
- selection and administration of rewards and sanctions (e.g., extra community activities, disciplinary lock-up, etc.); and
- selection and monitoring of subcontracts.

The commitment to autonomy is, in essence, a commitment to fully implement the theoretical assumptions of the model. It is an important and difficult commitment with political and organizational consequences. However, the commitment is necessary to ensure a full test of theory.

TREATMENT APPROACHES

Treatment approaches designed both to strengthen social and personal bonds and to address individual problems and factors related to violent delinquency must be available. These treatment approaches should, wherever possible, be designed specifically for violent delinquents and utilize techniques shown to achieve positive rehabilitative results. Treatment approaches need to utilize the program elements, especially case management, multi-program phases, and community reintegration while incorporating the underlying principles of the model: social learning, social networking, provisions for youth opportunities, and goal-oriented interventions (See Figure 11.2). The settings of treatment will include all program phases from secure care units to community residential placement (group homes), and ultimately independent living. At minimum, the range of treatment approaches must include the following:

- medical care and health needs;
- education (social learning and youth opportunity);
- job training and job placements;
- constructive living arrangements;

- individual and family counseling;
- mental health treatment approaches; and
- leisure-time activities.

Medical Care and Health Needs

Each youth should receive a complete physical and dental examination at the time he or she is admitted to the program to determine specific medical problems (e.g., physical disfigurement, speech defects, physical/motor handicaps, or chronic illnesses) and to identify other potential sources of physical stress which may contribute to violent behavior. Treatment contracts should include goals oriented toward self-maintenance which include general hygiene, nutrition, physical fitness, and other personal needs. The provision of medication should follow a formal procedure and should have a standard public policy stating conditions which warrant medication and the length of time it should be taken.

Education

The education plan should be designed separately for each individual. It should assist the youth in strengthening his life skills as well as his academic skills. The range of educational services must be from remedial education to secondary level education for the more advanced students. Romig (1978) found that effective correctional education tends to include:

- an understanding teacher experienced with this population;
- individualized diagnosis of learning skills;
- specific learning goals;
- individualized program;
- basic academic skills;
- multisensory teaching;
- high-interest material;
- sequential material;
- rewarding attendance and persistence;
- reinforcing learning performance for each youth individually;
- culmination in a GED or diploma;
- follow-up into other educational settings or job placements; and
- career planning and decision making.

For those youths who had difficulty in adjusting to the traditional public school environment, it is important to employ alternative learning processes. These alternatives should include: encouraging a positive attitude toward learning through promoting student participation in program decision making, use of individual educational goals, and the incorporation of peer teaching techniques. In addition, classroom situations could be used as a setting for practicing new roles and behaviors.

Job Training Skills and Job Placement

To ensure a more successful reintegration into the community, youth will need *marketable* skills which will lead to employment with some chance for growth and advancement. An assessment of the labor market for youth will reveal types of skills needed. Projects should seek to develop work skills for existing jobs and opportunities. Contacting employment firms and private industries with programs for youth would help in developing agreements for job placement. It is also important to identify skills and creative abilities of the young person and mold them into a marketable package. Youths should also learn job-seeking skills such as resumé preparation, interviewing techniques, and work habits. Experience in workplace socialization should be provided.

Constructive Living Arrangements

A broad variety of arrangements should be made available to youths leaving secure care. Consistent with the reintegration focus of this initiative, treatment approaches and supports should be available to youths in settings with varying levels of supervision, such as small group care, foster care, independent living in their communities or in new communities, and in-home care. The goal should be to move youths through a smooth and consistent transition to progressively less restrictive environments, with the ultimate aim of returning them to their families or enabling them to live on their own. The project should provide continuing supports to youths leaving secure care. Program staff should train staff of alternative living situations on how to apply the underlying principles of the model, so as to achieve consistency of rules and rule-setting throughout program participation.

These living arrangements should simulate the activities of the home environment. One approach is a family team for each youth. The authoritative figure may be labeled "uncle." The uncle can be responsible for managing the treatment plan and addressing emotional complications. Another approach utilizes a "mentor" in the community. Ultimately, the youth's natural or extended family should provide the same supports and structures for the youth.

Individual and Family Counseling

The results of research on programs for serious or violent youth (Romig, 1978) showed that rehabilitation programs designed to improve behavior seem to succeed if the following variables exist:

- input from client and family;
- diagnosis of the problem and problem setting;

- fixed behavioral goals;
- provisions to practice new behavior;
- direct observation of the results of practicing new behavior; and
- evaluation and modification of goals.

For the violent youthful offender, counseling should aid in:

- identifying problems of coping;
- developing skills in self-management;
- helping youths develop and state their values and beliefs;
- offering perspective on lifestyles as they support each youth's goals;
- teaching youths to evaluate their behaviors, or learn new ones, consistent with their beliefs and goals; and
- identifying behaviors which may require some intervention or change.

Counseling is also an important vehicle to reestablish the social network in which the family provides affection, emotional support, and reinforcement. Project staff must recognize, and take into consideration, that many of the youths will not have an intact family, and some youths will have no family living with them whatsoever. Project staff should be equipped to handle this situation.

Mental Health Treatment Approaches

Mental health treatment should be available to those youths whose need for it is identified through individual assessment. This should include psychological and/or psychiatric counseling for seriously emotionally disturbed and character-disordered youths. Treatment should be aimed at specific behaviors and factors contributing to violence identified during the individual assessment. Where possible, underlying causes should be addressed (e.g., child abuse, family disorganization). Therapeutic and behavior treatment should be available and should utilize goal-oriented approaches to controlling violent behavior. Contract goals should reflect the expected outcome of counseling. This approach should focus especially on the principle of social learning, whereby reinforcement of acceptable and constructive behavior (and not attitudinal change) is emphasized.

Daily sessions with the youth provide an opportunity for:

- frequent continuous interaction with staff and other youth;
- learning behavioral control and alternatives to violence or aggression;
- monitoring of performance toward behavioral goals, feedback; and
- identifying the need for special support (i.e., medication, psychiatric care and nutrition).

Leisure-Time Activities

Youths should be provided adequate opportunities for both physical recreation and nonphysical, leisure-time activities. They should be able to experience both organized activities which involve them meaningfully in community life and solitary activities which build self-sufficiency. These activities can be supplied within the program or through existing youth-serving agencies such as boys and girls clubs or nearby parks and recreation programs. Community interventions can be undertaken to help alter community conditions which may erode youths' commitment to the community and to a positive, crime-free lifestyle. For example, programs can assist local agencies to design constructive leisure-time activities, or to lobby for school disciplinary policies which keep kids in school.

ISSUES IN IMPLEMENTING THE TREATMENT INTERVENTION MODEL

The Community Reintegration Model does not exist in the abstract. Its existence depends on its application. The model only becomes viable if it is implemented with "strength and integrity" (Sechrest et al., 1979). The following section highlights key issues associated with model implementation: the commitment and ability of the implementing agency to support the testing of the model, the creation of juvenile justice linkages to provide support to the implementing agency, and the inclusion of an evaluation component to ensure model implementation, effectiveness, and assessment.

Commitment to Support and Test the Model Fully

There is a paradox in this program model. On one hand, the design draws upon several promising approaches from ongoing programs for serious and violent delinquents. In this way, practical issues of feasibility have been addressed. The unique feature of the model does not lie in any new or exceptionally difficult program elements. Rather, the program design departs from earlier practices in its unique combination of common-sense approaches and the systematic integration of theory and practice. This requires a strong commitment from the implementing agency to some practical features in order to facilitate the testing of the model.

This commitment was expressed earlier as "program autonomy." To test this design successfully, the program must be free to do things differently than traditional agency programs. It requires that the program elements be combined and concentrated. Early experience with this design suggests that for this model the whole is indeed greater than the sum of its parts. Elements such as hiring policies, reward/sanctions systems, and movement

criteria should be informed not by agency policy but by the underlying principles. The commitment to innovation and testing should also include a willingness to learn from failure and to make design adjustments which further strengthen the program model. It also requires patience — that sufficient time be allocated for program effects to be observed, documented, and disseminated. Though political forces may pressure the program for early and clear results, it is more reasonable to expect incremental gains of knowledge which, over time, will contribute to concrete policy development.

Juvenile Justice System Linkages

For the sponsoring agency to implement this model, eligible youths should be accurately and quickly identified for placement in the program. Such identification and processing of youth is handled by various components of the juvenile justice system, especially the juvenile court.

In addition, to obtain necessary access to background information about youths, the context of violent acts and other salient data which inform treatment decisions, program linkages with key juvenile justice system actors are required. Strong working relationships with such actors will not only accomplish target youth identification and information access, but also will enhance the prospects for building political support for the program across the system.

Several activities are suggested to build and maintain juvenile justice system linkages:

- program responsibility for educating key system actors about the underlying theory and principles of the intervention model;
- program initiation in developing and monitoring system involvement to ensure that program procedures provide for the smooth transition of project youth through all program phases.

Integrating Program and Research

A strong research and evaluation component should be an integral part of any treatment program, especially one introducing a new or previously untested model. Through comprehensive research and evaluation it is possible to monitor the implementation of a particular model, to assess its effectiveness and gather data to further enhance the operation of such a model. Evaluation provides a means to examine program operations empirically and pinpoint practices which work for or against program goals. Information can then be used to refine the program design. To ensure the effectiveness of an evaluation system, it should be integrated into the program design.

Because an evaluation component can inform the project on so many levels, it is essential that an evaluation design be sufficiently comprehen-

sive to address the development, operation and impact of the model. The following evaluation design considerations are suggested as providing for a rigorous and structural evaluation component:

- the underlying theories which support the model must be practically applied, in the appropriate intervention strategies;
- the intervention strategies must be susceptible to analytic methods of sufficient power and sensitivity to measure incremental as well as major effects;
- the evaluation methodology should be designed to focus on intervention strategies and their impact, controlling for extraneous factors which are not attributable to the implementation of the model.

The intent, therefore, of the evaluation component is to develop and implement a research design which "tests" treatment intervention strategies in a carefully structured and controlled program. Both the theory-based process and impact components are needed to determine first, whether theory was operationalized and, second, with what impacts.

SUMMARY

The Community Reintegration Model was constructed after a rigorous review of treatment programs, pertinent literature and evaluation findings. The developmental process began with site visits to programs around the country which were working with serious and violent delinquents. These visits helped identify specific approaches that seemed to be working, and the theoretical assumptions upon which they were based. The process included analyses of the theoretical and empirical literature on violent delinquency, and a review of evaluation findings from programs reporting "success" in treatment interventions for high risk youths. The developmental process yielded a program design which blended practical experience, sound theoretical assumptions, and empirical evidence.

Although the impacts of the Community Reintegration Model (and its underlying principles) on youths are only now being measured, the implementation of the program has provided new perspectives for addressing the shortcomings of traditional treatment efforts. It also offers several lessons for juvenile corrections in the development and testing of innovations.

First, the Community Reintegration Model is both measurable and accountable. By explicitly stating its assumptions and translating them into practice, this model invites research and evaluation which can show whether it is "working," where its strengths and weaknesses lie, and most important, how it can be modified and improved.

Second, the focus on community reintegration suggests that it is not sufficient to program only for youths in residential care. It suggests the usefulness of bringing programs, youths, and communities closer together, and preparing youths to return to their communities. Programs have gone about

this by teaching youths decision-making skills and giving them opportunities to test those skills and practice behaviors in community settings. Whereas the community phase historically has been an afterthought, it becomes in this model the primary focus of treatment interventions. Most important, programs may spend as many dollars in this phase as in residential care. This is perhaps the major policy impact of this intervention strategy.

Third, the practices and assumptions of the Community Reintegration Model may well apply to other delinquent populations. The multi-phase approach described in this paper was designed for a specific target group of youths who pose public safety as well as rehabilitative concerns. But the same principles and practices can be tested and applied to other delinquent populations. For example, the case management and reintegration components may apply equally well to first offenders, diverted youth, and court wards who usually don't require secure confinement. Also, the theories and assumptions underlying the design may shed new light on the general understanding of delinquent behavior and youth policy development.

Fourth, the program is transferable. It has been implemented in four sites with varying resources, environments and systems. For example, both juvenile courts and state juvenile corrections agencies have applied the design. The geographical regions span the country — from the industrial northeast to the Sun Belt. Both decentralized systems (with small secure care centers) and those with one or two larger institutions have integrated this design into their systems. Moreover, jurisdictions not participating in the national program have adopted aspects of the program, especially the case management and community reintegration components. Several agencies have included these features as both policy and program in their work with delinquent youths, using materials and resources from the national program.

Finally, early experiences in implementing the Community Reintegration Model illustrate the importance of agency commitment to testing innovative treatment interventions. As noted earlier, the commitments required for this innovation are quite significant. As with the program elements, there is here also a "critical mass" of elements which, if not reached, undermines implementation. These elements include the use of a rigorous research design, a willingness to "do things differently," and a spirit of risk-taking. It requires political skills and risk-taking to withstand the inevitable criticism from within and without the host agency. It requires strategic planning and appropriate timing to know when to take risks or consolidate gains (Miller, Taylor, Ohlin, and Coates, 1982).

The return on these risks can be substantial. Not only might innovation offer *empirical* knowledge to rebut the "nothing works" critique of rehabilitation, but it may contribute *technical* knowledge on how agencies can experiment with delinquency policy. The innovations described in this paper suggest that there are numerous dimensions on which social control and

treatment theories can be implemented and evaluated to determine their effectiveness. In essence, it is a model to improve services and meet legislative and public mandates. In its simplest form, implementation of innovation is a way of holding systems accountable in the same way that the systems are designed to hold the youth accountable.

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CONTINUED

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12

CALL AND CATALYTIC RESPONSE: THE HOUSE OF UMOJA

Sister Falaka Fattah

Philadelphia's House of Umoja is an impressive community-based program for young gang members. The story of its founding and how it functions in addressing the problem of violent juvenile crime is presented here as an alternative to the scientific/professionally developed Violent Juvenile Offender Model described in Chapter 11.

A distinct characteristic of African music is a call and response. Juvenile delinquency is a call for help, and the correct response is love, support, and concern. Before the Philadelphia black community learned this, our children were killing each other at the rate of 35 to 45 per year. Here at the House of Umoja, which is a black nationalist family, with extended family members drawn from 73 gangs across the city, we have made a 12-year effort to respond.

However, first let me explain that blacks did not bring gangs to Philadelphia. Philadelphia's gang problem is as old as the city itself, dating back to 1791, when waves of European immigrants reached the city of brotherly love. By 1840, Irish, German, and other ethnic groups were fighting for turf and inscribing their names on neighborhood walls. These gangs were

Excerpted from the statement of Sister Falaka Fattah, July 9, 1981, at the hearing before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Session, on "The Problem of Juvenile Crime." U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1981, pp. 24-30.

armed with clubs, pistols and knives, and caused riots which resulted in arson, shooting and murder. The gang problem has been found all over the world, in England, Japan, Germany, Austria, Scotland and Russia. In this country, there have been Polish, Irish, Jewish, Italian, Puerto Rican, Mexican-American, and African-American gangs.

Violence by youth of African-American descent rose in Philadelphia after the social gains of the 60's were taken away in the 70's. It increased until 1973, when Philadelphia's homicide rate for black males, ages 15 to 19, was 10 for every 100,000 black residents. However, in 1974, the gang deaths declined by 21% and there was also a 15% decline in gang incidents, which are defined as stabbings and shootings not resulting in death.

At the beginning of 1975, 38 of the city's 84 or 85 active gangs had agreed to stop fighting. Deaths declined to 15 in 1975, six in 1976, to one in 1977. Youth violence dropped even further in 1978, to 24.7% of all arrests for violent crimes compared with 26.7% during 1977.

REASONS FOR DROP IN VIOLENCE

Here at the House of Umoja, we spearheaded the "No Gang War in '74," and "Keep More Alive in 1975" campaign aimed at these youths. We attribute this decline to:

- a. Decisions reached by youth on their own, and peer pressure via planned conferences and during requests for peace pledges and general discussion.
- b. Concerned parents, both organized and unorganized, showing their love and taking more responsibility for caring for their children.
- c. Sensitive media coverage exemplified by black journalists such as, Acel Moore, Joe Donovan, Joe Davidson, Charles Harmon, Steve Shore, Chuck Stone, Laura Murray and Mike Boyle.
- d. Community groups, such as Network, Southwest Parents, Black United Liberation Front, Mantua Community Planners, Nation of Power Wynnefield Residents' Association, Neighborhood Crusades, and North Philadelphia Mother's Concern.
- e. Black nationalist groups, such as the Nation of Islam, the House of Umoja, and the African People's Party.
- f. Since April 1975, the Crisis Intervention Network has been aided technically by the Youth Services Commission and the Juvenile Aid Division of the Managing Director's Office.
- g. Changes within the Juvenile Justice System towards humane care, and community-based services.

We have based our findings on the work of an evaluation committee which met on January 4, 1975 to evaluate the effectiveness of the 1974 "No Gang War" campaign. The membership of that evaluation committee included lawyers, social workers, priests, probation officers, professionals

from the youth services field, state legislators, and mothers.

Collectively, they concluded that the "No Gang War In 1974" campaign had increased the consciousness of youth to the deadly results of gang warfare and thereby decreased it. The evaluation committee further stated that black youth must have a positive self-image if future gang-related deaths were to be entirely eliminated. They called for collection and dissemination of good news about youth, and in addition, they asked the House of Umoja to continue the peace campaign into 1975, and they created the slogan, "Keep More Alive in '75."

In April 1975, before the Crisis Intervention Network began its work in the streets, 50 gangs pledged peace during a Life-a-thon which the House of Umoja coordinated with WDAS Radio Station. This activity was planned to coincide with the assassination date of Dr. King, April 4, 1975, and youths were asked to pledge peace in his memory and they did. After the Life-a-thon, the first team of the Crisis Intervention Network went into the street led by team leader, David Fattah (Field Director of House of Umoja). With him were Charles Burrus, Mike Reed, Morris Manson, Robert Bethea, and Ali Robinson.

By September 1975, the numbers of peace-pledged gangs rose to 80 during the last WDAS-Umoja Life-a-thon. Yet in most media coverage of gang warfare, these peace pledges — reflecting the commitment of the youth — are rarely mentioned.

HOW UMOJA BEGAN

Back in 1969 the problem was so severe, that the news media had labeled it as the "Year of the Gun." Philadelphia was hailed as the street gang capital of America.

Our response at the House of Umoja was to invite 15 gang members to come and live with us: myself, my husband and our six sons. Prior to inviting them my husband had "took" to the streets to gain impressions of how to cope with the youth. He hung around the corners, pool rooms, bars, attended funerals of gang war victims, and made visits to hospital emergency rooms, to talk to and observe gang members. One of his conclusions was that at the root of the pathology which caused the gang conflicts was the massive disruption in family life caused by black migration to the North. This migration thrust countless numbers of families into often hostile and strange industrial urban environments. There were economic pressures which forced families to split and, among other effects, deprived the families of the ability to meet the economic and emotional needs of the youth.

Also, one of our sons was a gang member and this intensified our concern to do something about the problem. As a writer, I researched the black family structure of pre-colonial Africa and was preparing to write a book on the strengths of the tribal structures. After listening to my husband's observa-

tions about the problem, I reasoned that perhaps part of the answer to the problem was in the extended family. In an attempt to re-create this kind of kinship, we invited the 15 members of the gang, which my son affiliated with, to come and live with us. The only commitment made to these young people was to help them stay alive and out of jail.

Once in residence, we encouraged the youth to organize with our family along the lines of the African extended family. I believed that street gangs attract their members because the group can provide the individual with the same emotional and material security as the family unit. The extended family of the House of Umoja served to replace this particular gang need and gave something of equal value in its place.

By attempting to divert youth gangs from destructive to constructive activity, we at the House of Umoja have found several detectable causes of violence, namely:

- 1) Physically punitive family members
- 2) Overcrowding in Housing
- 3) Racial Oppression
- 4) Lack of personal self discipline
- 5) Absence of Hope
- 6) Romanticism re: Hustler life style

Violence as family affair had been prolonged from generation to generation. Physically aggressive parents tend to have physically aggressive children. *This is learned violence to the point where violence is expected and accepted behavior.*

THE "ADELLA" SYSTEM

Our first year together was one of hardship, but at the end of the year, no one was in jail, and we were an extended family that cared about each other. However, we began searching for some way of exporting to others some of the caring and love and concerns that we experienced at the House of Umoja.

By 1972, the (city) administration was calling for gang members to turn in their guns. It was our feeling at the House of Umoja that the gangs would not turn in their guns, and that we were not quite sure what the reaction of Mayor (Rizzo) would be if he was not successful. Also, we had noticed at the House of Umoja that each time there was a death in the streets, it affected the harmony within the House.

We were very concerned about what we could do to solve the total problem. We had developed a system at the House of Umoja, which we called the "adella system," where if anyone had a grievance against another person in the house, we would discuss it until we were able to negotiate an agreement.

Beginning in 1972, we launched a series of gang conferences bringing

together the leadership of gangs to discuss the causes of the wars and to develop agreements for peace. We were supported in this effort by the church, black social workers, the "activist" community, and the Guardian Civic League (the local black police association).

At each conference recurrent themes were raised by the youth. They wanted respect, jobs, decent recreational opportunities, and understanding, but they themselves had no respect or understanding for the value of human life. They were hopeless, but aggressive, and their frustrations and tolerance were low. We also found that they were used by everyone. They were used by politicians to get elected, and also used by government and social agencies to get money. We found that gang youth had become an economic base for the greedy, and an escape valve for the racist. However, we also found a crying need for love and willingness to communicate.

In 1973 we decided not to have a conference, but to visit gang members in prisons throughout the state of Pennsylvania, and to solicit their support in planning a final conference and all-out campaign to end gang wars.

That final conference was held on New Year's Day, January 1, 1974, with 32 gangs in attendance. One of the most significant agreements was between the Valley and Norris Street, which had been traditional enemies for years, and who were responsible for four of 1973's 44 gang deaths.

Another significant agreement came four days later at a meeting between the Zulu Nation and the 8th Diamond Street at the House of Umoja.

Their agreement was written on a "No Gang War Poster" and given to Governor Shapp by the youth themselves on January 8, 1974. The Governor responded by ordering the posters to be placed in every state store in Philadelphia.

The struggle for agreements continued throughout the year. Discussions were held in churches, police stations, on street corners, in homes, schools, and recreation centers.

Hundreds of people became involved as the catalyst for peace in the street impacted on the Philadelphia community. It was an idea whose time had come, and the youth responded to the outpouring of attention which they so badly needed.

Response ranged from the call for "instant solutions" and defeatism to cynical disbelief when the police announced a decline at the end of the year.

Despite this however, in the black community, people continued to work and devised innovative programs to save the lives of their children.

Between 1969 and 1980 we have had over 500 gang youth at the House of Umoja. We have struggled to build a home and lend a family for those who need it. No one has ever been shot or stabbed while in residence.

THE UMOJA PHILOSOPHY

We have based our existence on the following six tenets:

- 1) The problems which are addressed are not hopeless; they do have solu-

- tions; and it is worth time and money to find the solutions.
- 2) Every individual human life is worthwhile, regardless of that person's present state of mind and body.
 - 3) The extended family concept of brotherhood among residents and staff is a more direct, human, and possibly a more natural solution to the problem than the individual, nuclear family.
 - 4) The best teacher is an example set by an educated colleague or peer, and; as a corollary, practice makes perfect. Umoja believes in the brother system of "teach one, teach all"; for pressing personal problems older boys are coupled with younger ones.
 - 5) Isolation from the community for an extended period of time makes re-entry and re-adjustment that much more difficult when the time comes for such arrival. (Hence the problem of "recidivism.")

In 1977 the National Urban League conducted a national survey of programs dealing with crime prevention and selected five successful models: The House of Umoja, Inc.-Philadelphia; Providence Program Inc.-St. Louis; Project New Pride-Denver; La Puente-Colorado; Diversion of Youthful Impact Offenders-Baltimore.

What the Urban League found that all of these programs have in common is the concept that:

- 1) Youth must no longer be alienated by those institutions that formerly were supportive, such as the school, church and the family.
- 2) Government institutions are costly and unjustifiable relative to their degree of success, provide negative learning experiences, remove responsibility for delinquency from the community, and stigmatize those who are incarcerated as though they have different design goals and motivations.

CONCLUSION

I would like to suggest the use of these five action components which are available tools in every community.

- 1) Development of community council composed of elders, school, church, community and civic leaders, youth, etc. — indigenous to kinship area — who would meet regularly to work on problems through interchange of ideas.
- 2) Development of human resource skills bank composed of network of caring families and professional child care workers to provide support services to youth for their emotional, educational, recreational and economic growth.
- 3) Development of an information bank which would include identification of all services in area, number of youth in area, economic level of families, political representation, quality of housing, mental health and medical services, crime rate, community problems and needs.

- 4) Development of a community scholarship fund to help students return to the kinship community after they have completed their educations so they can provide legal services and other skills to the community.
- 5) Development of a Town Meeting which would meet to discuss the community's point of view with political representatives, school board members, etc., prior to voting on issues of community concern.

Part Four

PRACTICAL ISSUES IN PROGRAMS FOR VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS

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CASE HISTORY

Henry B.

Name: Henry B.
Age: 17
Race: Black
Family Composition: Mother
Father (whereabouts unknown)
Family Income: Mother does factory work, supplemented with Public Assistance during periodic layoffs.
School: Completed 8th grade
Residence: 4-room apartment, large multiple dwelling, inner city.
Age First Arrest: 17
Current Charge(s): Rape, Sodomy, assault (multiple counts)

A student of limited ability but above-average interest, Henry was placed in the "slow classes" in grade school and, once so tracked, was given a number of regular "social promotions" through the 9th grade. At age 14, he was arrested for an attempted burglary and placed on probation. This probation was violated several weeks later when he participated with four other boys in a purse-snatching which resulted in serious injury to the elderly victim.

One of the other boys assured Henry that this case would never come to trial, and following his advice, Henry simply did not appear on his scheduled court date. No warrant was issued for his arrest, but Henry was picked up during a "sweep" of a street corner and found to be holding a "gravity knife." This time, he was remanded to the secure detention unit and held for 3 months. Finally adjudicated a delinquent, Henry was sent to a training school and served one year, during which time he was no problem to the institutional authorities. Although placid and easily led by others, Henry appeared to spend more of his time listening to other youths than in acting out, and was generally classified as "no trouble" while incarcerated.

Upon his release, Henry became a full-time burglar, with some degree of

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success, employing techniques he had apparently learned while in the training school. At one point in his burglary career, he entered a top-floor apartment and surprised a sleeping woman. The woman was extremely frightened and begged Henry not to hurt her. . . Henry repeatedly raped and sodomized the woman, remaining in the apartment for several hours. He stole some money and a portable radio.

Henry then began a series of house invasions, and his apparent targets were women living alone. Apprehended on his way out of a project by a housing authority policeman, Henry immediately confessed to a string of 11 such rapes, and he was subsequently identified by 4 of his victims. Although Henry kept insisting that he entered the apartments to steal, he admitted that he never entered an empty apartment after the first rape.

Henry has been sent to the state diagnostic center to await an "appropriate placement."

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LETTER TO A DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS: IMPLEMENTING A PROGRAM FOR SERIOUS/VIOLENT OFFENDERS

Shirley L. Goins

Winn Doer, Director
Department of Corrections
1000 Average Street
Anywhere, U.S.A. 10001

Dear Winn,

A compliment certainly has been given by the Governor who appointed and the Legislative Body which confirmed you as the new Director of Corrections. On the other hand, I have to pause and wonder if in fact you have made some grave enemies in your state who have chosen a most adroit means to assure your demise. However, congratulations!

The dilemma in corrections today, as you noted in your letter, is extremely complex. The internal problems are so interwoven and interrelated that changing one facet of the system has a profound impact on every other part. To set a priority to deal with serious/violent juvenile offenders could possibly have broad fiscal and political ramifications.

I am flattered by your request for my thoughts regarding programs for serious/violent offenders. The extent of concern with this issue is manifested by the activity currently devoted to it. The assessment of the scope of the problem has been addressed by many thoughtful and learned individuals such as, Donna Hamparian, Lloyd Ohlin, Robert Coates, Yitzhak Bakal, Marvin Wolfgang, Kenneth Schoen, and Franklin Zimring to name

only a few with whom you are acquainted. I will certainly not try to compete with them in my response. Their attempts to enumerate and define the characteristics of the population, the criteria for defining a "serious/violent juvenile offender," the extent of the continuing behavior of those offenders into adult criminal behavior, the use of secure and specialized treatment modalities, and the statutory-legal issues are substantially documented.

Rather, I will attempt to respond to what I perceive to be the implications for the juvenile justice system when initiating a program for this group of youth. I will be as inclusive as possible, based on my experiences and knowledge of information currently available. I hope to be able to share with you some of the major factors involved in implementation, a brief program model and what I feel are the most evident causes of success and failure in this type of program. Finally, I will present two case studies for your consideration and response.

MAJOR FACTORS IN DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

Since it is imperative that the administrator be involved in the design of the program for serious/violent offenders, one of the first goals of implementation is the choice of that administrator.

When considering that critical choice, one wants to review the definition of Max Weber's ideal bureaucratic official so as not to make the mistake of appointing such an administrator: "An ideal official conducts his/her office in a spirit of formalistic impersonality, 'sine ira et studio,' without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm."

Politics can be defined as the art of who gets what, and when. The administrator of a program for serious/violent youth needs to be someone with a sixth sense regarding policies, politics, and personnel of the system. If you will excuse the cliché, s/he must be a communicator for all seasons.

My experience has been that the most effective administrators of programs similar to those we are discussing have been subordinates who have worked their way up through the system, not those individuals that were hired initially as administrators. Authority is an observable pattern of interaction and not an official definition for a social relationship. Consequently, authority is not granted by the formal organizational chart, but must be established in the course of interaction. Correction systems tend to be power oriented by the nature of assigned legal responsibility, and therefore, we tend to look for authoritarian supervisors. Empirical evidence indicates non-domination in supervision is a potent strategy, consciously or unconsciously employed, for establishing authority over subordinates. This is why the supervisor who understands individuals must feel free to exercise initiative within stated operating principles; one coming from the ranks who has already established a positive interaction pattern, is particularly

effective.

My observation and experience has led me to the assumption that the administrator has two major responsibilities that are crucial to the successful functioning of the program — delegation of discretion and consistent interpretation of goals and objectives so that staff do not lose sight of the purpose of their actions.

If adequate delegation of discretion is missing, any direction or instruction given by the administrator could overwhelm staff who have to handle the concrete situation. Likewise, inefficiency occurs when staff of an organization become preoccupied with meticulous application of detailed rules and lose sight of the very purpose of their actions.

An administrator is essentially functioning within a three-level, concentric circle of power and influence which s/he must address effectively if success is to be won. The inner circle consists of staff competency and loyalty, administrative delegation of power and financial supports. The second circle consists of community officials, government officials, legislators, and courts where the primary responsibility is the definition and clear understanding of role responsibility. The third and final circle involves the news media and the general public.

Administrators must have the power and not just the responsibility to achieve the goals assigned, specifically as they develop the relationships in the outer two levels of the concentric circles. Therefore, any responsibility of the program administrator should be understood to be that of his/her immediate supervisor also. Hopefully you have someone standing in the wings to appoint as an administrator who has all of the abilities mentioned, and with whom you can communicate effectively with a feeling of confidence and trust.

Program Location

After accomplishing the goal of choosing an administrator, it is possible to move on to the decision regarding where the program is to be developed. Will it be in the institution with a component located in the community, or will it be totally community-based?

Even with the growing concern about juvenile violence, the long era of professional debate as to how to shape the mass custody of juvenile correctional institutions into a therapeutic agent has probably passed. Such institutions are not hospitals and will not become treatment centers. The remaining justification for institutions is generally perceived as the incapacitation of a smaller core of serious offenders, particularly those who have been and persist in being violent.

It may be necessary at times to resort to incapacitation by institutionalization, or to impose other sanctions on freedom to serve the best interest of the public. Punishment may be indicated in order to deter repetition of offense

behavior. We must not forget, however, the dangerousness of institutions and continue to work toward other alternatives for all but the most serious/violent offenders.

Research shows that increases in the number of juveniles incarcerated and/or length of secure incarceration has little, if any, effect in terms of reduction in the number of crimes or enhancement of individual deterrence. Furthermore, recent research found that "juveniles respond differently to the degree of restrictiveness. In large part, the response is contingent upon how many offenses an individual has committed. The shock of total incapacitation for the first time offender may have a deterrent effect" (Greulich, Trager, Chisolm, 1982). Furthermore, the findings indicate "that for juveniles who have been convicted of at least one prior offense (violent or otherwise) less restrictive settings are more effective in reducing delinquency" (Greulich, et al., 1982). It was suggested that the fact that these individuals are recidivists enables them to learn the nuances of the juvenile justice system. This finding indicates that short-term secure settings are most effective for first time offenders and cost-beneficial in reducing their future delinquency. Such research, supporting the already existing body of knowledge, gives us more criteria with which to work when making decisions and designing programs.

OPERATIONALIZING NEW PROGRAMMING CONCEPTS FOR VJO'S

A community-based concept of programming for serious/violent offenders that is a significant departure from established correctional practices will be received with trepidation by juvenile justice agencies and the general public. Whatever rationale is publically espoused for judicial and administrative intervention in the lives of youth, it is often massively buried in public doubts about the value of services for treatment of juveniles and their families. Although many of the programs in the past have been based on humanitarian intentions, experience has demonstrated that humanitarian interest alone could not guarantee either more humane treatment or the protection of the public and the rights of the youth. Likewise, if the administrators of the juvenile justice system perpetuate policies and philosophies that tend to undermine the goals sought, the goals will become meaningless. The negative political implications of fundamental institutional change often lead administrators to tolerate defects and/or no movement in the system which proponents of system reform say is no longer tolerable.

Basic Premises

These general observations lead to four basic premises which must underlie

programs working with serious/violent youth:

- Adequate community-based treatment services must be developed to minimize the unwarranted confinement of juvenile offenders, or else the court in large measure is reduced to a punitive tool of a society lacking other alternatives;
- Consistent and vigorous efforts must be made by administrators/key decisionmakers to identify and correct basic problems in the management of juvenile justice programs which violate the constitutional, legal, or humane rights of youth, otherwise any money expended to deliver alternative services will be poorly used;
- Key decisionmakers in components of the juvenile justice system must create accountability processes to identify and rectify the defects of the system. No longer must it be possible to become an administrator without the expectation of participation in the active pursuit of institutional change;
- The program must be designed, supported and evaluated by the administrative body to prevent and/or make difficult administrative capitulation to pressures for surrender to bureaucratic and political self-interest.

Program Components

The politics of a community-based or institution-based (with a community component) program for serious/violent offenders cannot fit into the historic bureaucratic format and structure. Such a program demands an advocacy-individualized approach recognizing the dangerousness of the participants. The program components must include:

- an imaginative, broad-based service delivery system to youth, ranging from the development of grass-roots programs through the well established traditional models;
- programs which address themselves on a highly individualized basis to youth, with a goal of changing behavior through developing and strengthening coping mechanisms and defenses; and
- programs providing identified services needed by the youth's family, thereby creating opportunities at the community level for impact on those forces which impinge on the behavior of the youth.

Additional Elements

What other external and internal elements are necessary to assure adequate programs?

- written criteria for the program must be specific and exceptions non-existent;

- individualized assignment of program management of cases to avoid contradictory decisions and discontinuity;
- aggressive advocacy work on the part of staff;
- consistency in service, communication, reports, and follow-up leading to increased confidence by the judiciary and court personnel;
- emphasis on resource development: continual development and assessment of service providers based on the evaluated needs of the youth and family;
- attention to procedural detail: regular/planned staff and administrators' meetings to clarify procedure, clear lines of supervision, accurate case documentation;
- cooperation with and support of the service providers: scheduled monthly meetings, financial technical assistance, assigned liaison for contact;
- continuing administrative and fiscal support of the supervisory agency;
- willingness of all program staff to adjust to crises and shifts in schedules of the court, youth, and the program: work long hours and adjust compensatory time off around the program and youth needs.

COMMUNITY BOARD-CASE MANAGEMENT TEAM MODEL

The program model which can and must incorporate the elements enumerated above is the case-management model, which I present to you as the model of choice in establishing a program to work with the serious/violent offender.

The case-management model is a very pragmatic approach — doing what works. The activity necessary to determine what works results in a very complex and engaging behavior on the part of case managers, service providers and administrators. Role definition and discretion in decision making must be constantly monitored and re-evaluated. Since the premise of the program is coordination and cooperation among appropriate services, it is necessary to constantly review the goals and objectives not only for the individual participants, but also for the total program. This can best be accomplished with the input of a community board comprised of individuals providing the contractual services, representatives of the court, and individuals knowledgeable about youth needs and legal rights.

A Community Board can address objectively the three issues frequently raised about programs treating serious/violent offenders: risk to the public, staff competency, and adequate expenditure of dollars. In addition, together with the administration, it can become supportive to the staff.

I am sure you are aware that currently the case-management model is being rigorously tested in several areas. There should soon be information available from this project.* Also, some literature is available describing several variations of the model. Replication is difficult because of lack of precise information, but then replication is not always the answer since circumstances and situations differ. What is possible is adaptation of the process to meet your needs.

A Community Board-Case Management Team Model is the model I want to present to you. The Board would review and approve all contracts for purchase of services; deal with fiscal, programmatic and political concerns; help define goals and objectives based on their knowledge of the needs of the youth to be served; serve as a buffer between the existing system and the program; and monitor progress of the staff and program based on written goals and objectives.

Individual board members would be assigned to the identified task areas of:

- a) Political-System-Evaluation;
- b) Fiscal-Administrative;
- c) Program-Contracts.

Prior to regularly scheduled meetings, board members would receive a written agenda of issues to be discussed. At the meeting, the task force responsible for each issue would present its report and recommendations, based on information provided by the administrator at a previously scheduled task force meeting.

The Board would review and approve all new contracts, contract extensions, and contract cancellations. The service providers could appear at the meeting at the time of consideration of their contracts. The Board would deal with the formulation of the budget, spending patterns, and grants. They would evaluate the criteria for acceptance into the program and discuss concerns about acceptance or rejection of youth brought before them by the court or other youth-serving agencies. They would review management issues that were a concern to the court or the service providers, review the monitoring/tracking system report on a regular basis, and monitor the ongoing evaluation of the program. The Board would not deal with individual youth except in those circumstances where a case might have broad programmatic or political impact.

*The Federal Violent Juvenile Offender R & D model is described in Chapter 11 (Eds.).

Case Management

Each youth entering the program would have an individual plan for service, negotiated by the case-management team, the youth, and the primary and/or secondary family members. The case-management team would consist of a professional supervisor and a para-professional staff.

The number of para-professionals in a service location would be determined by the actual caseload. It would be possible for one supervisor to manage two to three service locations. However, s/he should supervise no more than nine para-professionals. The major responsibility of the supervisor would be:

- *Supervision* — asking the right questions, defining roles, informally supporting and troubleshooting for staff;
- *Planning* — developing written goals and objectives with staff and for the program;
- *Training* — conducting informal and formal training with/for staff, organizing structured training from outside sources;
- *Monitoring* — evaluation and reporting on staff and contract utilization;
- *Resource Development* — liaison to service providers and the Community Board.

The major responsibility of the para-professional would be to:

- Monitor individual youth and their programs on a daily basis;
- Log their activities and contacts on a daily basis;
- Determine with the youth, parents, and service providers, the length of service provision for individual youth;
- Maintain relationships with teachers, employers, board members;
- Respond to individual youth or service providers' crises;
- Formally re-evaluate the youth's goals and objectives on a regular basis.

This model, not extremely different from that which is being tested in the Federal Violent Juvenile Offender R&D Project, does concentrate more heavily on the use of a Community Board which I feel is a strong support system for the program. Needless to say, I did not discuss the basic problems such as: funding and fiscal support; the nuances and importance of the relationship with juvenile justice agencies such as the court and probation office; the need for expertise in grant development and contract negotiation; diagnosis/assessment of the youth; negotiation of individual plans; staff recruitment and training; board appointments; development of resources; and public relations. These are all processes that must be indigenous to your situation.

Maintaining Program Viability

It must be noted that commitment, both personal and of resources, combined with the energy to pursue vigorously the established goals and objec-

tives, will not guarantee success with this model. For one thing, outside influences seem to impinge more forcefully on these programs. Since they defy the traditional structures, they create bureaucratic and community hostility and inertia.

How radical can programs be, from the bureaucratic system perspective, without provoking hostilities that destroy them? How long is the period of grace before the struggle is given up as hopeless and the initial objectives are abandoned? When the original objective of working with serious/violent offenders in the community arouses intense hostility, the insecurity of staff and their preoccupation with creating or preserving the organization are likely to lead them to compromise their ideals to avoid annihilation.

This phenomena has often been experienced by community-based programs created to serve the serious/violent offender. Public bureaucracies have made decisions to abandon unpopular aspects of the program and enforce rigidity and low-risk decision making.

Normally when a community permits a program, if only by default, to become established and attain some of its objectives in a relatively short period, the program probably will find new fields to conquer in the course of its further development. The program may want to enlarge the population it serves, create highly specialized programs for identified populations or develop sophisticated comprehensive services for the family and youth. However, community-based programs serving this population have often found that once they have reached their major objectives, the enthusiasm of their supporters has waned. Courts, probation offices, and other youth-serving agencies withdrew their support, financial and otherwise, thereby threatening the existence of the program. An effective method for regenerating vigorous interest and keeping the program viable is to establish it in new locations, tailoring objectives to incorporate needed changes and new program approaches. This tact also renews the energy and motivation of staff in the initial program if they are involved in the design and implementation process.

Heuristic Management

It is generally accepted that there is no single program that works for everyone. Yet, interventive programs have usually been imposed on groups of individuals designated as offenders, without consideration of the offenders' awareness of any problems for which help may be needed, the depth of concern about the problems, or the motivation to work toward change in their circumstances. Lumping serious/violent offenders into a single treatment modality precludes the individualized strategies they require.

Success seems most likely to be achieved under conditions in which programs are small, not highly bureaucratized, and are administered by staff imbued with creative enthusiasm for an exciting venture; conditions ob-

viously not always replicable.

Dale Mann in his study of four treatment modalities dealing with serious/violent offender programs, found only limited success. However, he found there were similar characteristics in the programs, one being heuristic management.

Heuristic management is a process of using failure as a guide to new initiatives and eventual success. It is a method to evaluate individual performance from a problem-solving perspective through the use of trial and error. Given what is known and especially what is not known about intervening with the serious/violent offender, such a management strategy is indicated.

CASE STUDIES

Comparison of successes and failures of past cases is one way of evaluating our progress. Although numerous questionable variables are present in such comparisons, I have included such for your consideration and response.

Joseph

Long before "serious violent offenders" became identified as a class, Joseph had been frequently incarcerated in the juvenile justice system, where nothing seemed to work. Joseph was seventeen, black, a drug user, from a one-parent family. He was the oldest of eight siblings, went to school sporadically, finishing only the eighth grade. Joseph had a long history of charges starting with truancy and progressing to robbery, criminal trespass to vehicle, aggravated assault, and rape. He had been diagnosed as schizophrenic on more than one occasion. Even in the institution, where he was frequently locked in isolation, Joseph exhibited episodic violent behavior patterns ranging from attempts to hurt himself to physically attacking the spouse of an employee. This employee had the authority of final program placement. For Joseph this could include continuing isolation or eventual recommendation for transfer to the adult division, if it were determined the juvenile system lacked adequate programs.

An individualized program plan was developed including home furloughs, much staff involvement with the mother, and individual counseling for Joseph. After coordinated planning with the courts, Parole Board, and the Department of Mental Health by institutional personnel, Joseph was finally released from the institution with the court's concurrence. Three days later, Joseph raped a three-year old female. Justice was swift and exact. He was placed in the adult prison for the criminally insane.

A similar experience, I am sure, has been replicated in many states. Can

we ever become good enough predictors of behavior to make or allow this type of high-risk decision making?

What have we learned?

Charles

Charles was sixteen, black, a drug user and the oldest of six siblings. His parents were divorced. Charles attended school virtually not at all, yet by test results seemed to be exceedingly bright. He was diagnosed as schizophrenic on two occasions. Charles had a long history of charges ranging from breaking and entering, robbery, burglary, and criminal trespass to vehicle, to murder, later reduced to manslaughter. Charles was referred to a community-based program working with serious/violent juvenile offenders. Even though his charge was one of violence, the court personnel thought they saw some potential in Charles for directing his energy and abilities toward more acceptable and positive behavior, that would not be actualized in an institution.

Upon referral, the case manager assessed the situation. A plan was negotiated between Charles, the staff and his mother. The plan, presented and accepted by the court, involved Charles voluntarily agreeing to participate in the program. He had a clear understanding that failure to do so would result in his return to the court for further disposition.

Charles began his involvement with the program in a short-term residential placement, a highly structured situation which dealt with youth previously diagnosed as having some emotional disturbance. While there he was involved in educational testing as well. It was discovered he had a learning disability which prevented him from functioning up to full potential in a normal classroom. His mother was involved with individual counseling and counseling with Charles. Likewise, Charles was participating in individual and group counseling sessions.

Three months later, Charles was chosen to participate in a thirty day Outward Bound Program, to work on developing ego strengths, self-confidence, and peer relationships. Upon his return to the community, he was placed in a specialized home structured to give him a one-to-one supportive relationship with a male role-model. Simultaneously, it was demanded he take responsibility for his own behavior, and also meet the goals and objectives stated in the contract negotiated with his case manager. Charles was enrolled in academic classes to deal with his special needs. He eventually completed the high school equivalency examination.

Three months later, after several task-oriented home visits, Charles returned home. Counseling continued with him and his mother. He also was enrolled in college. Charles was discharged from the program nine months after his conviction. His criminal behavior did not resume.


What was different?

- Single case-management responsibility, avoiding discontinuity of planning and communication;
- Highly structured, coordinated and closely supervised program plan;
- Clear and concise statement of goals and objectives;
- Better understanding by the youth of the need for change in previous behavior patterns through participation in formulation of the contract with the case manager;
- Better understanding by the youth of what was expected of his performance;
- Closely supervised trial and error method of home visits;
- Greater intensity and consistency of staff involvement;
- Higher skill level of staff.

There are some successes but the potential for failure is ever present. However, given the format of the case-management model, supported by a Community Board, as well as a strong management tracking and monitoring component, crises can be identified and disasters averted. Therefore, the high risk of the decision making is reduced substantially.

Thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts and perhaps my bias regarding programs for the serious/violent juvenile offender. Again, congratulations on your new appointment. Good luck! I will look forward to your response.

With warmest regards,



Shirley L. Goins

95173

14

CONTINUOUS CASE MANAGEMENT WITH VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Jay Lindgren

PURPOSE AND DEFINITION

In most jurisdictions in the United States, a variety of agencies maintain some degree of responsibility for the control or rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. Courts, parole and probation authorities, local and state correctional agencies and, quite often, not-for-profit treatment programs may all be involved in an effort to supervise and help just one juvenile offender. One could argue that rich benefits derive to the youth from the resultant diverse services and perspectives. However, there are often inherent problems in these separations. Adjectives such as "fragmented," "unaccountable," "inconsistent," and "conflicting" have been used by critics to describe the apparent weaknesses. Unquestionably many impediments to improvement of youth corrections exist because of the separations among the different agencies.

Nowhere do these problems become more obvious than with the violent juvenile offender. This group clearly challenges the basic assumptions of the policy makers and practitioners within juvenile justice.¹ Moreover, because of the nature of their offenses violent juvenile offenders demand a correctional response that is efficient, effective and accountable. Continuous case management offers one model with such a promise.²

The continuous case management process proposed here is developed as a proactive, youth centered, decentralized, publicly accountable, and heuristic model for change with violent juvenile offenders. As such, the model attempts to involve a diverse set of resources drawn from our pluralistic democracy, although not at the expense of organizational efficiency and accountability.³

Pro-Active and Youth Centered

This case management model is pro-active in that there is a conscious attempt to influence the administrative philosophy of and practice within correctional agencies in order to insure the allocation of appropriate and sufficient resources for each offender. Case management is not simple control and treatment of the violent juvenile offender, it includes the responsibility of the case manager to act from an appreciation of the dignity and uniqueness of each youth, his family, and community. This appreciation must lead to action with the legal, public and community forces which confront each offender. Although the model is youth centered and must continually recognize the uniqueness, dignity and worth of each youth assigned to the program, the case manager works to increase and improve articulation between the agency and the cultural values of the youth's community.⁴

Decentralized and Publicly Accountable

The authority and responsibility for day-to-day operations and decisions pertaining to the youth are decentralized to the case management team. The case management team consists of the youth's case manager and the supervising case manager. The supervising case manager trains and supervises case managers. The supervising case manager's goal is to see that case management activities are compatible with the life-style and community mores of youth assigned to the program. Such a perspective seeks to identify and emphasize resources and strengths within each youth and his family and community.

The model fixes a "single locus of accountability"⁵ within a case manager for a particular youth. This accountability is to both the youth and the community. The case manager is responsible for seeing that appropriate treatment and control are provided which are clearly understood, timely, and integrated across each phase of the juvenile corrections process, i.e., institution, community residence, and aftercare.

Paralleling the decentralization of day-to-day authority for treatment and control must be a process of centralization for case manager and case management team accountability. The administrative unit responsible for general policy must set minimum standards and audit, monitor, and re-

spond to successes and failures in policy implementation.

This approach requires a strong administrative core that sets policy and minimum standards. In most instances the administrative unit must initiate the move to the proposed model. The administrative core becomes the "planning, controlling, auditing, and coordinating agency"⁶ instead of an agency caught in the grind of day-to-day operations.

The administrative core will encourage involvement by individuals and groups from the local community. Community representatives should be involved in policy and planning issues, and would represent business, academic, religious, and other community interests.

It is important to involve a broad range of individuals and groups in the planning and implementation of the case management model. First, the administrators who plan and direct the case management model need to be held accountable and to be responsive to the legitimate needs and concerns of the community. Second, to be successful, the case management approach needs to have access to a large variety of community resources so that individualized treatment plans can be implemented for each offender.

Heuristic

Within this model, informal evaluation will be improved by the increased presence of external groups and open interaction between the administrative core, the supervising case manager, the case managers, and the offender. Formal evaluation, however, will also be stressed. The model is heuristic in that it is a human problem-solving process and not a solution. The model must be dynamic and adaptive to the flow of new experiences.

ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF CONTINUOUS CASE MANAGEMENT

There are seven functions which must be provided by the case management team: assessment, planning, referral, service monitoring, youth follow-up, documentation, and evaluation.

Assessment

Assessment within this model begins immediately and is continuous. It is critical to recognize that assessment is a reciprocal process: while the case manager is assessing the youth, the youth is also sizing up the case manager and the agency. The model uses a social assessment as well as a clinical assessment. A social assessment attempts to identify the strengths rather than specifying problems of each youth. The resources of the youth's family

and community are emphasized over weaknesses. A social assessment emphasizes observable events and concrete behavior over diagnosed needs or suspected feelings. The kinds of services and resources desired by the youth and his family are clarified. All information used to determine the assessment is shared with the youth and his or her family. More importantly, the youth and his family are encouraged to react to this assessment to help shape it into a valid, helpful document.

Planning

The result of the assessment is a behavioral performance contract between the youth and the case management team. The contract should specify the overall goals of the treatment-control process. In most instances youth will move from more secure to more open settings. Treatment in secure settings that strives to be just requires an explicit agreement about what has to happen for a person to progress to a less restrictive setting. With youthful offenders the performance contract should be clearly understood as soon as possible by the youth and his family and friends as well as those in authority. A well-done performance contract is essential for an effective program with serious juvenile offenders.

Behavioral Contracting. The process by which behavior contracts are established is as important as the content of the final document. It is critical that the people who can directly affect the fulfillment of the contract (either as resources or obstacles) be part of the initial negotiation process. They should be informed of the purpose of the contract and their role in negotiating the contract, how future renegotiation can be initiated, their role in implementing and monitoring the contract, and who has final authority for establishing the contract.

For delinquent youth, the key participants should include at least: A) the youth, B) the youth's family, C) the youth's friends, D) other significant acquaintances from the youth's community, E) key staff who will work with the youth in all phases of the program. Staff include educators, specialized treatment providers, employers and individuals providing clinical assessments or legal information used in developing the contract, i.e., psychologists, law enforcement personnel, and victims.

Content of Behavioral Contracts. Behavioral contracts should be stated in specific, measurable, realistic, valid, and behavioral terms.

Specific and Measurable. Specific and measurable goals attempt to describe the desired outcome in objective and observable terms.

1. "John will achieve sixth grade reading level as measured by the Jones Test," rather than "John will learn to read."
2. "John will complete application to Tiger Tech Vocational School in auto mechanics," rather than "John will try to get into vocational training."

3. It may be necessary to state behavior that must be maintained rather than achieved. In the former instance, the time period of maintenance should be specific, i.e., "three consecutive or six total weeks of at least 90% attendance."
4. When a goal is considered essential but there is difficulty in measurement, it may be necessary to designate a "referee" to decide when it has been achieved, i.e., "John will have three successful home visits of at least 72 hours duration each, as determined by his mother."

Realistic, Valid and Behavioral. Realistic and valid goals are a function of well-done initial assessments. Well-done clinical (formal) assessments can assist in determining what a youth can do and needs to do. Again, however, the participation of the youth and of his or her family in the contract negotiation (informal social assessment) is essential to arriving at goals that are realistic and valid. Valid goals will address the issues that often lead to the "presenting problem(s)" and will help alleviate the problem(s). For example, monetary or symbolic restitution negotiated with the victim is a valid goal. Removal of obstacles to employment for youth who commit crimes of profit is another example of a valid goal.

Concrete and truly positive achievements should be identified. Some may be simple and yet meaningful, e.g., successful procurement of a driver's license or social security card, completion of a general equivalency diploma, increased reading ability, demonstrated ability to use public transportation, ability to develop and follow a budget.

Essential to each contract are specific goals developed to address restitution. With the help of the case manager each youth should be expected to establish through the "creative restitution process"⁷ specific goals for monetary or community service restitution.⁸

Goals will often have to be developed for each phase of the program. Over a long, continuous case management process, three or four phase contracts may have to be developed or renegotiated. Each phase contract should include a goal requiring a new contract for the subsequent phase.

As illustrated by Figure 14.1, the specific content of the contract should be as varied and diverse as the youths and their communities. A simple evaluation of the success of the case management process will be the degree to which the contracts reflect the rich diversity and backgrounds of individual offenders and their community rather than appearing as if they all came from the same mold.

Goals which are seen as legitimate by the youth, his family, and program staff are most likely to be completed and have lasting value to the youth. In other words, goals should be developed which the youth is motivated to complete. To the extent possible, goals which may seem desirable, but would need to be coerced by the case manager to be completed should be avoided.

FIGURE 14.1: SAMPLE CONTRACT FOR SECURE PHASE**A. Academic**

1. To prepare for and take the General Equivalency Diploma (GED) tests prior to parole (provided an age waiver is approved). Teacher will apply for waiver within two weeks.
 - a. Attain an 80% performance level on all GED preparation work.
 - b. Take GED tests once preparation work is completed and waiver is approved.
2. To meet classroom objectives in my elective areas at a satisfactory level (as measured by school averages). Teacher will provide daily feedback.
3. To complete a photography project of my work and have it displayed at the institution.

B. Vocational

- *1. Engage in vocational exploration which will be assigned by my basic education teacher. This will include investigating a variety of occupations and utilizing the computer program on job information. Author a report regarding conclusions which will be submitted to the basic education teacher.
- *2. Complete application to the Area Technical Vocational School in a chosen vocation for the fall term.

C. Specialized Treatment

1. Gain information regarding chemical use and abuse and evaluate use of chemicals by:
 - *a. Attending the full five-session drug and alcohol orientation at the institution prior to parole. List attendance at each session in daily log book. Review orientation with special counselor once all the sessions are completed.
 - *b. Viewing the filmstrip entitled "Drugs: Values and Decisions." Author a summary essay on this film regarding what was learned and how such knowledge will be used. Review essay with all cottage staff, parents, case manager, and parole agent prior to parole.
 - *c. Completing a chemical dependency evaluation to be arranged by case manager.
 - *d. Contacting in writing, at least two drug treatment programs and being accepted by one.
2. Evaluate delinquent behavior, explore the seriousness of such behaviors by:
 - a. Discussing past delinquency with all cottage staff prior to parole. List all such talks in a daily log book and review these log entries with the special counselor.
 - *b. Authoring an essay of at least 500 words regarding how delinquent behavior has affected my life and family. The essay will also discuss what consequences any future law violations would have. Review essay with case manager, parole agent, parents, and all cottage staff prior to parole.

FIGURE 14.1 (continued)

- c. Viewing the filmstrips entitled "Getting Through the Bad Times" and "Principles of Assertiveness." Author summary essays on each of these films to include what information was learned and how such knowledge can be applied. Review essays with all cottage staff prior to parole.
3. Develop leadership skills in a positive manner by assuming special responsibilities for implementation of a group activity to be conducted once a month. Write a summary of this for each monthly staffing.
4. Further enhance ability to be assertive by:
 - *a. Discussing the issue of assertiveness with all cottage staff prior to parole. Solicit methods of demonstrating assertive behavior. Document all such conversations in daily log book. Review conversations with my special counselor.
 - *b. Conducting a small group discussion on the topic of assertiveness when my special counselor is on duty. Document the outcome of this discussion in my daily log book and review this log entry with all staff prior to parole.

D. Restitution

- *1. Communicate with my parole agent in an effort to determine the total amount of restitution owed.
- *2. Save at least \$90.00 dollars in my resident account prior to parole. This money will be paid towards my restitution bill.
- *3. Author a specific plan for the payment of the balance owed on restitution. Plan must be approved by case manager and parole agent prior to parole.

E. Self-control and Discipline

- *1. No behavior that causes a major misconduct report to be issued for at least forty-five days prior to parole.
- *2. No behavior that would cause placement on disciplinary status for at least thirty (30) days prior to parole.

F. Community Contacts — Parole Plan Development

1. Communicate with parents at least once per week and with my parole agent at least bi-monthly. Keep these people informed of my progress and discuss my future plans.
- *2. Formulate realistic future plans by viewing the filmstrip entitled "Life's Goals: Setting Personal Priorities." Author a contract for the next phase. Review contract with parents, staff of drug treatment program and gain approval of contract from case manager.

*Essential goals which must be completed prior to moving to next phase. Contract should also include signature blocks for "approval" of case manager and "understanding" by remaining participants.

Contract Responsibility and Authority. A contract is an agreement between at least two parties. For youth placed in a restrictive setting, the key issue is "How do I get out of here?" The behavioral contract is an attempt to provide an early and explicit response to that question. It is essential then that contracts are designed so that all parties agree that: *When the described goals have been achieved or maintained, the expected movement will occur.*

Development and implementation of such agreements is hard work. People in restrictive settings are never totally free to agree or disagree to behavioral requests from those in authority. The stakes for the former are loss of personal liberty. The stakes for those in authority for a poorly conceived contract are also high. Granting freedom that cannot be justified to the public or denial of freedom that is a breach of contract are both to be avoided. Those in authority must strive to maintain an organizational climate that encourages full participation in the initial contract negotiation, and demands well-conceived, final documents from responsible staff.

Youth in restrictive settings have to depend on those in authority to assist in making the process of movement to less restriction understandable and manageable. For youths to gain greater autonomy and freedom they must cooperate and achieve the stated goals. Those in authority must reciprocate.

The case manager must be clear about the final authority for approval, rejection, and modification of the contracts. Again, it is central to this model to involve the youth, his or her family, and peers as essential participants in the negotiation process; however, the final document should not be democratically approved or rejected by these participants. It must be clearly announced at the outset that the case manager carries the responsibility for establishing the final document.

If there is a disagreement with the case manager on the final contract, the youth and his parents should be provided a mechanism to appeal the case manager's decision; first informally by request that the principal case manager be involved and then, if not satisfied, formally to a higher authority within the agency. In some agency structures this might be the juvenile court judge; in other jurisdictions it may be an agency administrator. Such a policy in most circumstances will only further enhance the legitimacy of the final document. It clarifies the authority and responsibility of the case manager, and diminishes the concern by the other participants that the case manager is acting arbitrarily. It also places the case manager in the position of thinking beyond the immediate situation and thereby increases the case manager's accountability. A participatory contracting process enhances the total accountability of the program.

Referral

Much of the assessment and direct services for the youth should be provided by individuals and agencies separate from the case management team.

Therefore, case managers must be active referral agents. The referral function, however, is often resisted by case managers. Most individuals who are attracted to case management positions come from a direct service background. It is natural for these individuals to fall into the role of direct service provider for youth. Case management, however, moves the case manager away from the "primary helper" role.

Informal and Formal Resources. The primary responsibility for help and support to the youth should lie with the youth themselves and next with their family and community peers.⁹ When formal resources are needed, the case manager should assist the youth and his family to look first within the immediate community for assistance and support. When resources are not available or specialized help is needed, a formal referral should be made rather than the case manager attempting to provide that service directly. Again, the youth, his or her family, and the community should take as much responsibility for the actual service as possible.

Youth Choice and Required Services. At times it may be essential that such specialized services are a required part of a contract. When this occurs, the case manager should clearly and publicly explain the parameters of the required services and should identify the variety of such services from which they can select. To the degree possible, youth should be allowed to choose the specific service provider. The case manager must anticipate early on what resources may be required and facilitate contact between the youth and his family and the providing agency. Referrals left to the last minute, with most of the work done by the case manager, often prohibit consideration of alternatives.

Diverse Services. The tendency with referrals is to identify various types of psychological help. Even though these types of services can be most helpful, often even more basic services and resources are overlooked (e.g., installation of a telephone, supplementary income, basic food and shelter, transportation, medical services, employment, etc.). Again an open social assessment and planning process with the participation of the key informal resources should encourage the identification of these real life needs.

Service Monitoring

The foregoing assessing, planning and referring process is as critical to the success of the case management effort as it is complex. The more competently these processes are managed, the more likely that case management will fulfill its fundamental purposes of control and treatment. The monitoring of services will be considerably more effective if the earlier functions

have been properly done. A potential weakness of case managers is the lack of ability or effort in maintaining service and program accountability.*

Informal Monitoring. If the assessment, planning, and referral processes have been done appropriately, the youth, his family, and community peers can aid in the accountability process. Since they or a loved one are the "consumer" of these services, they will be most sensitive to whether or not services are delivered humanely and effectively. To the extent that the case manager is successful in empowering these individuals and enabling them to advocate for their own services, much of the effective monitoring will be done through informal channels. Often, however, the case manager needs to become formally involved in a monitoring-advocacy role.

Formal Service Agreements. Again, if the assessment planning process is done properly, most of the service needs should be clearly identified. A service agreement should be developed that is specific, concretely identifying length and nature of the service to be delivered. Service contracts are fundamental to the service monitoring function. These agreements should include at least the following essential elements:

- The involvement and participation of the service provider in all important meetings and case reviews.
- The immediate reporting to the case manager by the service provider of any serious (criminal) behavior engaged in by the youth.
- A mechanism for each youth's assessment of the service.
- A formal reporting system which details the youth's progress or problems.
- Clearly defined expectations regarding the youth's behavior in the program.

The service staff must demonstrate clear concern, enthusiasm, respect for, and commitment to the youth. They must provide early and frequent feedback to the youth on both successes and negative behavior.

If the agency staff who accept the referral are part of the initial planning process, ineffective or improper service delivery will be apparent. Furthermore, if the case manager has control or influence over purchase of service funds, there is a clear ability, indeed a responsibility, to effect modification of improper or inadequate services.

* It is ironic that for all the public and professional outcry about the difficulty of "controlling kids" that the fundamental weakness of those of us who manage youth treatment and control systems is often our failure to hold ourselves and our colleagues as accountable as we hold the youth. The resources for holding a relatively powerless youth and his family accountable are obvious. A whole battalion of sanctions may be brought to bear when they fail to comply, i.e., out-of-home placement, detention, or incarceration. On the other hand, monitoring professional services involves more subtle, less direct influences, and often entails difficult confrontations with colleagues.

Youth Follow-Up

Youth follow-up and monitoring is an obvious part of the case management process. Such follow-up should be continuous. To the extent that case management is seen as a replacement for incarceration for violent juvenile offenders, the monitoring should be intense. Fundamental to intense surveillance is the random monitoring of all portions of the youth's day. The person providing the follow-up supervision should not develop a predictable routine. (This same principle holds true for service monitoring.) The case manager should cover all aspects of the youth's daily world. Such an approach will raise concerns about privacy and the relationship of trust between the supervised and the supervisor. An essential albeit partial antidote to this problem is that the ongoing "random monitoring" of daily activities should be clearly understood from the beginning by the youth, his family and community peers. Secondly, the supervision should be provided by a person whom the youth finds compatible with his or her family and community. Finally, the kinds of behavior that will be responded to with negative sanctions should be specified during the initial periods of assessment and restated frequently in as clear and specific a manner as possible. The youth, his family, and community peers must understand the maximum sanction that may be applied for negative behavior.¹⁰

Documentation and Evaluation

Since a fundamental purpose of the continuous case management process is to experiment and learn, it is essential that the activities and outcomes of the process be fully documented. Without adequate documentation, replication of successful activities will be at best extremely difficult and perhaps impossible. Practices within particular programs can only improve as both their weaknesses and successes become better understood. In the day-to-day mix of activities with youth and with youth services agencies, themes which identify weaknesses and strengths will emerge only if there is systematic documentation.

Continuous case management will work best as long as it is open and responsive to both successes and failures.¹¹ Such a heuristic orientation is essential. To the extent that the process encourages involvement of the youth, his family, and community peers, there will be a natural give-and-take, sometimes through confrontation and conflict, which will keep the process open and responsive to the humanness of those who are part of it.¹² A self-critical heuristic focus led by the supervising case manager will also motivate the staff to be open to learning from colleagues.

To be useful, evaluation must clarify what the case manager is doing and when these activities improve treatment and control and when they do not.¹³ Evaluation should be staff and system oriented as well as client

oriented. Stated simply, the program would ask the offender how the organization is performing as well as asking the organization how the offender is performing.¹⁴ The reduction of criminal behavior remains a primary goal; however the goal of control of the offender is interdependent with the goal of achieving a humane climate responsive to the dignity and uniqueness of each human being (staff and youth) involved in the program.

CENTRAL IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS

Although the purpose, definition, and essential functions discussed above are seen as being applicable to all continuous case management efforts with violent juvenile offenders, there are other decisions that depend on local circumstances. Four such decisions will be discussed in this section: direct service versus brokering of service; line authority versus staff monitoring; private or local versus state managed; and autonomous versus integrated organization. It must be emphasized that organizational realities may force those implementing a model in a particular site to choose what may be viewed in the ideal as a weaker option.

Direct Service vs. Service Broker

Most direct services should be provided through individuals other than the case manager. Furthermore, it is advantageous to have as many of these services as possible provided by a totally separate agency. The dangers of the case management agency providing most of the direct services are that the services are much more likely to be uniform regardless of the needs or requests of the youth. In addition, if only one agency is involved, services will lack the rich diversity and flexibility required to develop an individualized approach to each youth. On the other hand, the more services that are relied upon through brokering or referral for service, the more complex the case manager's monitoring responsibilities become.

Reliance on referral requires sensitive and aggressive monitoring by the case manager. If the case manager provides most of the direct services, the services have a tendency to ossify and become inflexible. A concerted effort must be made to involve the informal resources of the community to counter these tendencies.

The general rule is that the only direct services that should be provided within the case management agency are those services which cannot or will not be provided by another agency.

Line Authority vs. Staff Monitoring

Many of the issues involved in defining who provides direct services are relevant to the decision on whether the case management team should be a part of the line authority for the agency accountable for the youth's control and treatment, i.e., correctional agency or court, or placed outside of the line of authority in a staff monitoring or coordinating function. Some argue that the "police" function of the traditional probation or parole officer role should not be a part of the case management process.¹⁵

The decision is not that simple. First, with violent juvenile offenders there must be authority to detain and incarcerate; to propose or assume differently is both politically naive and irresponsible in terms of accountability to the public. The role conflict with one person attempting to provide both surveillance and service functions has been debated.¹⁶ It may be possible to assign these two roles to two separate people. However, this can be as flawed as placing *oversight* of both functions within one individual. When there is referral for specialized treatment services, there is less incompatibility between these two functions. Moreover, whether or not the person has the power to arrest or simply must, by job responsibility, report information that will lead to arrest will make little difference to the youth. Stated in youth vernacular, whether the case manager is described as "a snitch" or "the man" is not the important issue. The "police" function is inherent in case management with violent juvenile offenders. The important issue is that there are advantages and disadvantages in either choice. The advantage with the case manager providing the "police" function is that if needed, increased formal control can occur quickly; those affected by this response are dealing with a personal rather than abstract authority, and coercive action may be modified if the formal or informal resource is willing to increase social control.

Private vs. Government, Local vs. State, Autonomous vs. Integrated Organizations

The private versus government, local versus state controversy has been discussed elsewhere.¹⁷ Again, the choice often will be dictated by the political realities at a particular site. A program that is private and/or local, potentially has better ties to the youth's community. There can be more flexibility in hiring staff who are compatible with the youth's values and community. On the other hand, to the extent that a project is involved with a government or state agency, there will usually be greater influence on the administrative core and allocation of resources, i.e., correctional institutions paroling authority, probation, revocation, etc. There are fundamental and related issues which depend on whether a host organization is chosen which is separate and autonomous or integrated into a large correctional or court sys-

tem. To the extent that a project is autonomous, it is generally easier to adhere to the fundamental principles and requirements of the project philosophy and to sustain a coherent and continuous approach. On the other hand, in a larger integrated agency there may be greater ability to effect a system-wide reform.¹⁸ The fundamental issue is that cooperation must be achieved with the case management model. When there is clear agreement on agency responsibilities either organizational model can be employed.¹⁹

CONTINUITY

Poet-social critic Paul Goodman wrote "Courage to go into it. Patience to go bit by bit." This seems an essential prescription for those who would do case management. Whether the case management model directly manages an array of services or refers to other agencies, it is paramount that the services provided or chosen are those that will "hang in for as long as it takes" with these youth. A fundamental principle for the programs should be that they cannot permanently discharge youth unless the youth engages in an offense that is as serious or more serious than the original offense which resulted in his program participation, and then only if the youth will go to a more restrictive situation than the program could provide. This is fundamental in that it provides the follow-through that the case management process should for proportional control and for effective treatment.

The continuity principle is essential for violent youth, many of whom have been given up on all too often in the past. The process should not, however, become oppressive and monolithic. Such an orientation can degenerate to cruel and unusual responses to youth behavior. Occasionally, it may be necessary to *temporarily* move a youth to a more restrictive setting. It is essential that such moves be done following due process, and that the youth be returned to the less restrictive setting as quickly as possible.

Continuity must be structured then in *both* directions. As youth move through phases and their behavior progresses or regresses, there must be adequate responses to reward and control. As youth progress on their behavioral goals, they will be moved, after formal approval, to less restrictive situations. As they increase self-control and gain greater reliance on the support from their natural sources of informal social control (i.e., family and community peers), concomitantly there should be less reliance on formal social control.

Structuring Movement to a Less Restrictive Setting

At each phase there might be two bench marks where formal reviews are scheduled to assess performance on contracts. Specific resources and organizational realities will suggest when these reviews should occur.²⁰

To the fullest extent possible, treatment and control should be considered as separate issues.²¹ For example, to structure youth movement decisions within phases and from phase to phase, two formal decision dates might be set for each key decision: a "standard review" and an "early review" date.²² The standard review would be the later date of the two. On that date a youth who had met specific criteria including completion of essential offense-related goals, establishment of a viable contract for the next phase, and no recent illegal or serious rule violations, (i.e., breaks with custody provisions, serious threats, etc.) would be granted a move to a less restrictive setting. The early review would be set at an earlier date, and would establish the amount of time the youth could reduce his stay in a particular phase by completing additional, optional goals. In other words, to be released at the minimum review the youth must complete the full treatment plan and have essentially achieved full cooperation with agency expectations. Again, the later standard review date would concretely recognize those youth where there has been cooperation on essential issues.

These review dates should be established as early as possible during the assessment period, communicated to all concerned, and continue to be a part of a systematic monitoring process.

Service provider failures must be recognized at the review points and dealt with as directly as youth failures. This will improve continuity of the process as well as giving it increased legitimacy for the youth, their family, and community peers. At these reviews the contract can be renegotiated by any of the participants. The contract will be imperfect, and will need to be changed.

Structuring Movement to a More Restrictive Setting

As critical as the forward movement of youth within and between phases is the development of a formal process for backward movement to a more structured setting. Any move to a more restrictive secure setting requires minimal due process protections that adhere to the provisions of *Morrissey v. Brewer*.²³ Moreover, a move to a secure setting should provide a logical and proportional consequence to the presenting problem behavior.²⁴ The final decision should rest with a neutral and detached authority. The youth and his family should have prior written notice of the allegations, and have a right to a hearing, and to counsel or competent assistance at the hearing.

A major responsibility of the supervising case manager is to assist the case managers in developing intermediate responses. Often meetings prior to the actual hearing can be used as negotiating sessions, again involving the key and informal contract participants, to identify ways of applying an intermediate response short of return to a more restrictive setting.

CONCLUSION

The case management model proposed offers new and complex challenges. The worth of the challenge in this model is that control and treatment are provided in a climate that is compatible with principles essential to a youth moving toward adulthood within a pluralistic democracy. The paradox is that if done properly, youth who have committed some of the most egregious acts will be provided services not always available to minor offenders and non-delinquent youth.

However, as Paul Strasburg has stated, "This reversal can be justified because these are children who have been victims as well as victimizers; because they exact the greatest cost from society if something constructive is not done to and for them; and because the concept makes room for measured, appropriate punishment for their crimes, including possible incarceration, but seeks to put an end to the far more lasting and destructive punishments of neglect, delay, isolation, untreated psychological damage, and foreclosure of opportunity. It also can be justified because, as Norval Morris said in describing a special prison for violent offenders, 'If some measure of success can be achieved by reforms applied to the toughest group . . . their feasibility should be established as to the entire . . . system.'"²⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. See for example, *Crime and Delinquency* (October, 1981): entire issue. Marvin Wolfgang, "Abolish the Juvenile Court System," *California Lawyer* (November, 1982) pp. 12-13.
2. The author is indebted to Paul Strasburg for the original concept, see his *Violent Delinquents* (New York: Monarch 1978), pp. 196-211; to the staff and participants of Minnesota Department of Corrections Serious Juvenile Offender Project (funded by the Minnesota State Legislature and Crime Control Planning Board under grant #5-42-80JA) who helped develop and test these ideas; and to Paul DeMuro without whose encouragement and assistance these ideas would have remained in a file cabinet. I hope they consider their ideas and experiences well-represented and time wisely invested.
3. See John Brademas, "Cautious Aggrandizers of Power," *The New York Times Book Review* (November 28, 1982), pp. 10 and 18-19.
4. Morris Janowitz, *Institution Building in Urban Education* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). This provocatively humane and rational monograph critically examines four models of change for urban education. Janowitz's aggregate model has direct relevance for correctional organizations. Jay Lindgren, "Correctional Organization and the Community," (Mimeo, 1976).
5. Strasburg, op. cit., p. 196.
6. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 70.
7. Joe Hudson and Burt Galoway, *Restitution in Criminal Justice* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1977).
8. Albert Englash, "Creative Restitution, A Broader Meaning for an Old Term," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Sciences*, 48 (1958), pp. 619-622.

9. Longitudinal research suggests that informal networks of kin and neighbors are more highly valued by youth and are more effective in preventing future offending than professional help from formal agency representatives. See Emmy Werner, "Vulnerability and Resiliency in Children at Risk for Delinquency: A Longitudinal Study from Birth to Young Adulthood," in press.
10. Institute of Judicial Administration-American Bar Association (IJA-ABA), *Juvenile Justice Standards, Corrections Administration* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1980), pp. 166-173.
11. Seymour Sarason, *The Creation of Settings and the Future Societies* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc.: 1972).
12. Ibid. and Elliot Studt, Sheldon Messinger and Thomas Wilson, *C-Unit: Search for Community in Prison* (New York: Russell Sage, 1968).
13. Michael Patton, "Utilization in Practice: An Empirical Perspective" in Michael Patton, *Utilization Focused Evaluation* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 23-36.
14. Michael Patton, et al., *Environments that Make a Difference: An Evaluation of Ramsey County Corrections Foster Group Homes* (Minneapolis: Minnesota Center for Social Research, University of Minnesota, 1977). Rudolf Moos, *Evaluating Correctional and Community Settings* (New York: Wiley, 1975). David Street, Robert Vinter and Charles Perrow, *Organization for Treatment* (New York: Free Press, 1966).
15. Strasburg, op. cit., p. 201.
16. Elliot Studt, *Surveillance and Service in Parole* (U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, reprinted 1978). Lloyd Ohlin, Herman Piven and Donnell Pappendorf, "Major Dilemmas of the Social Worker in Probation and Parole," *National Probation and Parole Association*, II (July, 1976), pp. 211-225.
17. Donna Hamparian, "Who's Coming to the Picnic," in *The Serious Juvenile Offender* (Washington, D.C., Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1978).
18. Martin Rein and S.M. Miller, "The Demonstration Project as a Strategy of Change," in Mayer Zald, *Organizing for Community Welfare* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1967), pp. 160-191. Also Sarason, op. cit., especially pp. 37-46.
19. Responsibility charting offers a powerful technique for clarifying and negotiating complex intra-agency or inter-agency responsibility. See Thomas Gilmore and Richard Nelson, "Responsibility Charting in Corrections" (Philadelphia: Management and Behavioral Science Center, University of Pennsylvania, Mimeo, 1977).
20. IJA-ABA, *Juvenile Justice Standards: Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1980). Franklin Zimring, *Confronting Youth Crime: Report of the 20th Century Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders* (New York: Holmes & Meir, 1978).
21. Paul Lerman, *Community Treatment and Social Control* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 8-12.
22. Minnesota Department of Corrections, "Juvenile Parole Policies and Procedures" (St. Paul: Mimeo, July, 1981).
23. *Morrisey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
24. IJA-ABA, *Juvenile Justice Standards: Corrections Administration*, op. cit.
25. Strasburg, op. cit., p. 202.

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15

AN UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO PROVIDING EDUCATIONAL SERVICES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Constance M. Bobal

The Shelby County (Memphis, TN) Violent Offender Project (SCVOP) is a government funded, residential research treatment facility for youth identified by the local juvenile court as chronic violent offenders (i.e., youth adjudicated — found guilty — of violent crimes such as murder, rape, armed robbery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, or arson of an occupied structure). Unlike more traditional correctional programs, the youth at SCVOP are encouraged to demonstrate the types of behaviors they had formerly demonstrated while living at home, with the restrictions that no physical injury occurs to program youth or staff (or program property), youth do not run away from the facility, and youth do not engage in any illegal activities.

The program is structured to identify and treat abusive and/or disruptive behaviors and to provide youth an opportunity to demonstrate that they have developed the ability to avoid behaviors associated with delinquent behavior. A youth progresses from the secure phase to a variety of living settings to living back at home by accepting certain responsibilities (as outlined by his individualized treatment plan), and establishing trust with the SCVOP staff.

Eighteen behavioral areas have been targeted for improvement. In terms of program movement, the most significant are: the development of skills involving time management, conflict resolution, problem solving, stress

management and impulse control. Each youth is provided with a wide range of services in four areas: Academic, Social Learning and Social Networking, Community-Based Supports, and Provision of Youth Opportunities.

THE EDUCATIONAL COMPONENT

The SCVOP educational component of the program is entirely individualized and provides services for three basic categories of youth: those who are studying for their General Equivalency Diplomas (GED), those who will be going back into the public school system, and those who are not interested in continuing formal education but desire individual vocational-related remedial work. Typically, as each youth enters the program, it is explained to him that for approximately six to eight months he will attend school at the facility. Within a week of arrival, each youth is tested using standardized tests to determine the student's academic strengths and weaknesses. A few days after testing, I arrange an educational planning meeting which includes myself, the youth and his counselor. Together we go over the test results, explore planning possibilities, the youth's personal career goals, etc., and construct a school program for that youth. Many times our psychologist will join these planning sessions, especially when the youth's school records reflect that he had received special education services, or if a psychological report is on file that suggests limited intellectual functioning or emotional disturbance.

When the initial educational programs are agreed upon, each youth acknowledges and accepts his responsibilities as I do mine. Should he fail to accept these responsibilities there is no punishment, but rather he and I and his counselor explore the possible natural positive as well as negative consequences of his behaviors. For example, to pass from the 7th to the 8th grade, a youth knows from the beginning how much material must be sufficiently covered. He is also aware of the consequences should he choose not to meet the criterion, in this case retention in the 7th grade. Our educational programs remind me of business transactions where everyone is responsible for his part of the deal and blames no other party for his failure if he refuses to fulfill his end of the bargain.

Each youth attends classes for three hours a day and is assigned one to two hours of homework. Classes are limited to no more than six students, which results in two basic class sessions. Youth doing regular classroom work are combined with youth improving vocational-related skills and are segregated from youth working towards their GEDs. Each afternoon youth receive a daily grade on a scale of one to six, six being the best. To score a six, a youth must have accurately completed all assigned homework and actively participated in all in-class assignments. Grades are reduced corresponding to failure to demonstrate these behaviors. A five would indicate that

either a student's homework wasn't satisfactorily completed (i.e., he rushed through it or didn't finish it) and/or he failed to utilize efficiently his in-class time. Four's indicate, usually, that no homework was done or that a youth wasted a significant amount of in-class time. If a youth came to class but refused to participate at all, yet was not disruptive of others, he would receive a three. A two rating is based on the same criterion as the three rating but suggests that the youth significantly distracted other students. If a youth refuses to attend class and is not ill, he receives a one.

Biweekly tests are administered and written progress reports are issued to each youth and his counselor. These reports not only itemize the skill area being taught, but report on the youth's in-class behaviors. Youth doing regular class work receive report cards at the end of each six weeks which are transferred to their permanent public school records when they are reintegrated into the city system.

After the youth has attended six months, the standardized testing is repeated. The purpose of the testing is threefold. It assists in evaluating and revising the youth's current educational plan. It also assists the youth and his counselor in seeking community-based educational and/or vocational programs. And most importantly, it allows the youth to realize how well his hard work has paid off for him. He can clearly see how close he's getting to successfully reaching his goals. Due primarily to students' personal disregard for testing, the initial test results are often considered low and invalid measures of the students' academic capabilities. To date, on the six months re-evaluation, no youth has failed to show at least one year's gain in reading and/or math grade levels, and most average gains of two to three years. Two youth have shown gains of more than four years in one or both areas.

With the exception of a week at Christmas, a week in the spring, and two weeks in the summer, classes are conducted *all year*. Of course, the enrollment is changing constantly as youths enter and leave the program. Most youth attend the facility school for eight months which corresponds with the time it takes them to progress from the secure to the semi-independent phase of the program. When a youth reaches the semi-independent phase, reintegrating him into the community is the primary goal. At this phase the youth is encouraged to enroll in an adult GED class or in the local public junior or high school.

DESIGNING A SUCCESSFUL LEARNING ENVIRONMENT

When I first got involved with the SCVOP program, I spent a considerable amount of time thinking about how I would design a successful learning environment for the very special needs of these youth. The first negative issue that I felt needed to be addressed was the fact that these young men, at their admission, disliked school intensely. Why? Certainly there are the obvious

reasons such as emotional/social disabilities, gang influences, substance abuse, etc. There are other influences known to contribute significantly to school failure such as teacher incompetence, lack of parental or environmental/social support, social tensions, etc. To me, however, these alone do not explain these youths' serious lack of school success. It is unnecessary to discuss the effect of these variables individually or collectively for that task has been amply accomplished innumerable times by many authors since the early 1950's. The situation at SCVOP was that the youth being treated had some very substantial reasons for hating school. The problem facing me was how to design, in a very short period of time, a learning environment that would net maximum results for the students?

To date I've yet to meet a young person, no matter how obnoxious and/or tough, who didn't want to improve his academic skills. Without becoming too personal with my students, I've succeeded in convincing each of them that I am one person who is genuinely concerned that they improve intellectually. While maintaining a structured, firm approach, I've discovered it is still possible to be sensitive to their assorted personal needs without sacrificing learning. I try to respect my students as *people*. I'm not suggesting that I forget their backgrounds, but I find it easy to think of them as students rather than criminals. To me, the classroom is an equal opportunity learning environment which suggests that you cannot discriminate against a person's brain just because his behaviors are inappropriate. There are probably thousands of methodologies employed when concerned, inventive teachers design their educational programs. When asked to describe the particular approach that I have implemented most successfully, I must admit that I don't employ any specific model but rather use an eclectic approach — borrowing and combining techniques from psychological, behavioral and sociological theoretical concepts.

ESTABLISHING AN OPEN- EDUCATION ENVIRONMENT

Combs in his 1981 manuscript *A Humanistic Education: Too Tender For A Tough World?* outlined the following goals associated with establishing an open-education environment and I've tried to incorporate them into my program:

1. [it] accepts the learner's needs and purposes and develops experiences and programs around the unique potential of the learners;
2. facilitates self-actualization and strives to develop in all persons a sense of personal adequacy;
3. fosters acquisition of basic skills necessary for living in a multi-cultured society;

4. personalizes educational decisions and practices (to this end it includes students in the processes of their own education via democratic involvement at all levels of implementation);
5. recognizes the primacy of human feelings and uses personal values and perceptions as integral factors in educational processes;
6. develops a learning climate that nurtures learning environments perceived by involved individuals as challenging, understanding, supportive, exciting and free from threat; and
7. develops in learners genuine concern and respect for the worth of others and skill in conflict resolution (p. 446).

Unconventional Methods

Such an approach allows for many unconventional methods. We hold classes in a large room that is enveloped by two walls of windows and two walls of chalkboards. It is furnished only with long tables and chairs. There are no typical school desks, no teacher's desk, and no bookshelves. My students sit at the table of their choice, usually with their feet propped up. They get as comfortable as possible at my encouragement. (They are reminded, however, that when they return to "real" school the feet must stay on the ground.) Most behaviors are permitted as long as they do not distract others and/or impede the youth's progress towards mastering his assigned daily work. Within reason youth are allowed to make decisions regarding what subjects are covered and in which order. Teasing is discouraged, but humorous and jokingly critical comments are allowed as long as they are directed at, and perceived as related to the material rather than specific individuals. Let's face it, how practical do many of us consider being able to figure the volume of a cone or pyramid? A lesson such as this needs to be made as enjoyable as possible!

Often times observers have misunderstood my classroom standards especially regarding dress code. If a youth's vital parts are sufficiently covered (shorts are acceptable) I'm satisfied, which often creates conflicts with *more conservative* and traditional co-workers. Most youth wear their sports clothes (sweat pants, cut-off's, etc.), T-shirts, and occasionally hats and/or plastic caps. It's interesting to note, though, that if the issue is not pursued, as youth perform better in class, their self-concepts improve as do their dressing habits. In addition, we have no rules about addressing me. Some prefer Ms. Bobal, some Ms. B, and a few have called me Connie (but didn't seem too comfortable when they did). One youth was particularly fond of calling me Constance, and another "Connie Bobal" in a monotone, four-beat pattern. Questions are asked spontaneously without the conventional hand raising. Even though individual programs are highly structured, the overall atmosphere in the room is one of few restrictions. The results have been that youth can devote more time and effort to their skill development rather than their social effect.

Content and Format

In my classes I present textual content in a discussion format. Youth are free to share their ideas and feelings about all subject matter without fear of being humiliated. School at SCVOP concentrates on more than presenting the ABC's and 123's, it also provides experiences to learn about life without teaching morality.

I originally believed it would be difficult trying to present most types of *basic* education to these youth labeled as "chronic violent offenders," because for many reasons (too numerous to discuss here), they have literally "burned out" on the three R's. Who would ever suspect that kids labeled violent offenders would love to read classical literature? Not me! I felt it would be one of my greatest challenges, motivating these guys to read anything. To my surprise I found I've never met kids who loved reading more than these. In 18 months, besides completing our regularly scheduled Monday-Thursday work, on Fridays we have group oral reading sessions. We've read (and I believe from their displayed enthusiasm they've enjoyed) the following: *Sonny's Blues*, *The Outsiders*, *Lord of the Flies*, *Bless the Beasts and the Children*, *The Day of Last Rock Fight*, a modern translation of *Beowulf*, *The Tell-Tale Heart*, and *A&P Bad Characters*, to name a few. Vocabulary and math games are often played to "spice" up the routine and reinforce basic skills.

Since we are fortunate enough to have cable television, I've often included specific T.V. programs or movies that would encourage discussions pertinent to the youths' studies in health, social studies, and/or literature. For example, Valentine's Day, I decided the youth could benefit by doing something different because they seemed a little depressed about being incarcerated and separated from their girlfriends. Since they were all studying the major components of a novel in literature class, I designed a special study sheet, requiring each student to explain how George Lucas dealt with each literary tool (plot, theme, characters, and setting) in his film, *Star Wars*. For many of these kids it was the first time they'd seen any type of science fiction. At first they complained about the assignment, but five minutes into the film they were mesmerized. Their completed assignments were excellently done and I've overheard many youth expressing a desire to "maybe" read some other types of science fiction. Other programs or films we've seen have dealt with changing family structures, retardation, physical handicaps, prejudice, substance abuse, and stress. On several occasions the kids have come to me asking to watch a particular program and if they could successfully relate it to a subject their requests were granted.

Field Trips

I can remember one of my college professors saying that all "good" teachers try to highlight their academic programs with meaningful, educational field

trips. Without a doubt some of the most educational experiences have been shared by me and my students while on field trips. Taking seriously our program's goals to integrate the youth into as many positive community settings as possible, I've tried to weave into my curriculum as many off-campus educational field trips as possible. As with anything, some have been more educational and/or enjoyable than others, and some have been very exciting such as our trip to the local museum to see an electricity demonstration. When my students witnessed a million volts of electricity arcing over their heads, they were impressed! Other successful, less spectacular outings have included trips to local museums, planetariums, hospitals, newspaper publishers, breweries, national parks, and live theatrical productions (*The Elephant Man* and *Mr. Roberts*) as well as the art gallery and post office.

An extremely stressful but nonetheless educational incident occurred when I took several students to see *Gandhi*. During the show (the theme of which you might recall was peaceful coexistence through increased understanding), we were asked to leave before intermission by a teacher from another school. She had discovered that she and her "normal" students were sharing the theater with me and my "dangerous juvenile delinquents." A lengthy discussion occurred involving her, me, the theatre manager, and by now a few other "concerned" teachers. Their fears were identified, and no matter how I attempted to explain the program and the advanced placement of these youth, she (they by now) insisted we be segregated from the other moviegoers. I decided to leave the decision to my students.

After intermission I called my students aside and explained the fears expressed by these other teachers. Their first reaction was anger because they were unable to comprehend why *anyone* would be scared of them! After all, they were just watching a "dumb ole school film" just like four hundred other teenagers — because they had to! We discussed the reasons why the teachers felt threatened and the concept of being labeled. When it became clear that the other teachers would not consider "peaceful coexistence," we decided that we should be the ones to act maturely in an attempt to reinforce harmonious community relations rather than destroy them. Having ruled out fighting (and it would have been loud) for our equal rights to share the theatre with everyone else, we discussed the situation, staff and youth together, and identified two possible alternatives. We could return to the facility and miss the second half of the film, or we could take advantage of an offer made by the theatre manager and watch the remainder of the film from a private viewing booth. The youth chose the latter. When we returned to the facility, we held a staff-youth meeting to discuss discrimination, prejudice and labeling. We *all* learned a lesson in living that few books can provide.

Maintaining Discipline

Although there have been incidents at SCVOP which have escalated to the point of verbal and/or physical aggression, to date, I have experienced no major discipline problems in the classroom. Staff and administrators have noticed through careful scanning of our daily behavior-recording forms that some of our otherwise most disruptive youth demonstrate their best and most appropriate behaviors in the classroom. I believe there are two basic reasons for this. Each youth's educational program is highly structured and required the youth's participation in its design. At all times each youth is aware of his personal goals as well as how he is progressing. After questioning these youth about the relationship of their positive behaviors to the classroom environment as compared to other aspects of the program, most respond that they are "worked so hard" they don't have time to get into trouble.

During the first six months of our program, our bi-weekly progress reports enabled each youth to earn a "reward" (additional phone calls, extended T.V. time, later curfew, etc.) based on an overall performance average above a certain level — which was different for each youth. Our experience suggested that most of our youth seemed to be so self-motivated that even though they qualified, they often refused these tangible reinforcers.

In addition, extensive support for the school program has been shown by the program administrators, and staff. From shift to shift, each youth's daily performance is recorded and all staff either praise a youth's successful day or assist him through counsel to develop a better attitude towards his school work. Without staff support, maintaining the positive attitudes that the youth have developed towards their school progress would be impossible. I have found that success in maintaining discipline relies heavily on the development and implementation of the original education plan; with each youth and his counselor, set specific goals so that every staff person knows exactly what the student is working towards and keep all classes structured and sequenced so that the youth can see daily the progress he's making towards accomplishing his goals. This can become a creative challenge for instructors who can not easily group their students and may find themselves, as I have, with as many as six different students working on six different sets of goals all in the same class for the same three-hour period.

CONCLUSION

Of the 19 youth serviced to date, three have successfully received their GEDs. One went to Job Corp for vocational training. Two enrolled in adult school to continue studying for their GED. Two secured full-time employment in the community and discontinued their classes. Two have been enrolled in the local high school as 9th graders and eight are currently

receiving services at the SCVOP facility.

The SCVOP school program is one that changes constantly. New techniques are considered, tried and evaluated for usefulness in motivating each individual youth. I solicit advice and suggestions from staff and counselors as each youth enters and progresses through the program, and we support each other in helping the youth understand the importance of developing and improving his academic skills.

Watching students work hard and improve their thinking skills has been a tremendous reinforcer for me. It suggests that despite background, behaviors and psychological problems, these youth desire to improve and appreciate having a challenging environment in which to do it. At SCVOP, school seems to be a source of pride for most residents. Ours is truly an open educational approach environmentally, and in regards to each youth's individual learning goals and activities.

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THE ROLE OF GROUP THERAPY AND THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY IN TREATING THE VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDER

*Vicki L. Agee
Bruce McWilliams*

When Dr. Maxwell Jones pioneered a radical new approach — the therapeutic community — for treating the sociopathic patient in the late forties (Jones, 1953), it would be repeated, expanded upon, and eventually become the accepted approach in many treatment settings and with many different populations. About the same time, the Highfields Program in New Jersey was developing the concept of "Guided Group Interaction," and this concept also spread rapidly and was expanded upon in correctional, youth correctional, and drug abuse treatment programs. Delancey Street in San Francisco, Daytop Village in New York City, Elan in Maine, and Vision Quest in Arizona are all examples of such programs. Harry Vorrath and Larry Brentro were leaders in the field and described the concepts in their book, *Positive Peer Culture* (1974).

There is much similarity between the "therapeutic community" concept and that of the "positive peer culture." In brief, they both espouse the following treatment approach philosophies:

1) *The concept that the patient is responsible for his behavior.* This may not seem to be a particularly radical concept now, but in the heyday of the medical model, the patient was considered "sick" and therefore needed

"treatment" applied by doctors. The therapeutic community rests on the understanding that the patient is capable of taking an active role in his own treatment.

2) *The concept that the positive peer group is the most effective mode of treatment.* A positive peer group is a group whose values and interactions reinforce thinking and behavior which are consistent with that of the core culture (e.g., integrity, hard work, mutual support, division of labor, etc.). A negative peer group, of course, reinforces values which are not only counter to society in general, but which are usually harmful both to members of the group itself, and to others. A typical example is the "con code" which exists in some psychiatric settings. The therapeutic community is designed to create a positive peer culture which in turn confronts negative behavior in its members and teaches positive behaviors.

3) *The individual patient and the positive peer culture are held responsible for the treatment and management of the unit.* The degree to which this takes place varies considerably in different treatment settings, but all therapeutic communities reject the medical model concept of a passive patient who is cared for by nursing staff. The patient is held responsible for managing his own affairs and that of the group. In self-help settings such as the drug treatment program, Synanon, this responsibility was more or less considered to be a lifetime one. After successful treatment, patients would become treaters and continue living in the program permanently. In many mental health programs, the responsibility ended when the short term of hospitalization was over.

4) *The responsibility of the staff in a therapeutic community is to help create and maintain the positive peer culture by careful guiding of its functioning.* The staff in all therapeutic communities functions as a team and is itself expected to be a role model of a positive peer culture. The team model replaces the traditional hierarchy of the medical model, with the physician or psychiatrist making all of the decisions, the nurse supervising the implementation, and the psychiatric technician carrying out the direct care. Although the management system varies considerably from setting to setting, all therapeutic communities promote considerable input into treatment and programming at all levels of staff.

THE USE OF THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY MODEL WITH JUVENILE OFFENDERS

During the sixties and seventies it seemed that the therapeutic community-positive peer culture approach was the panacea for working with disturbed youth. The most obvious benefit was the use of peer pressure to control and, it was hoped, provide treatment to the youths in the program. The usual power struggle between adolescents and adults is magnified greatly in a population of disturbed youth. In a therapeutic community, however, the

control battle is sidestepped. The group values revolve around the philosophy of "we" rather than staff versus peers, or peers versus each other. Like an ideal extended family, problems are handled within the group, as they affect everybody. The youth who has had long-standing problems with interpersonal relationships learns how to meet the expectations of others and how to establish meaningful friendships. The youth who has successfully resisted becoming a contributing member of society, cannot avoid the social framework in the therapeutic community. It pervades his existence, and it does this during a life phase when peer influence is paramount in importance. In addition, the therapeutic community confronts and attempts to reverse negative, delinquent-subculture values in youths before they become as habitual as they are in much of the adult criminal population.

If the therapeutic community approach is so ideal for working with juvenile offenders, why isn't it in general use in institutions? And, in fact, why was it considered a failure in many programs which attempted to use it? There is no simple answer, but there are some general problems which typically arise when attempting to use the approach.

One of the major problems revolved around the conflict between the treatment philosophies of the medical model versus those of the therapeutic community. Those who espouse the medical model see their patients as primarily having intrapersonal disorders, and thus they emphasize the one-to-one relationship between the patient and therapist. The therapeutic community model was originally designed for sociopaths with a major focus on treatment of interpersonal problems. Group therapy was thus the treatment of choice. In addition, the medical model stressed the use of psychotropic medications to control behavior, while the therapeutic community model resists the use of medications because they mask the behaviors that the group must observe in order to change. Also, the medical model stresses the shortest possible treatment time, so that patients are released as soon as minimal behavioral control is achieved. Therapeutic communities, on the other hand, take time to develop and cannot thrive where there is a rapid turnover in population. Finally, the power or authority in a medical model treatment program always rests in the physician, whatever the actual formal role of that person. Therapeutic communities cannot function effectively unless the power source in the program rests in the group leader, and thus with the group itself. This is to ensure that the group can realistically meet the expectation that it is responsible for the unit — it can't be responsible for something it can't control.

These are just a few of the major conflicts between the medical model and the therapeutic community model, but it can be seen that the two do not combine well at all. Unfortunately, what occurred in many psychiatric settings was an attempt to combine the philosophies with negative results. Sacks and Carpenter in their article on "The Pseudotherapeutic Community" (1974) describe what occurred in many settings.

In addition to the conflicts with the medical model, there were similar

conflicts with the traditional correctional organization when the approach was used in youth correctional facilities. The fairly rigid hierarchy of authority and pervasive distrust of mental health staff made it almost impossible to provide the individual units with the autonomy and support necessary to establish therapeutic communities. One example is the typical division in correctional settings between "group life" and treatment staff. The former handle security, discipline and daily living experiences. The latter see the inmates on a periodic basis for "therapy" and then return them to their various living units. This usually results in the therapist being the "good guy" who is seen as a sympathetic listener, and the group life staff being the "bad guys" who enforce rules. Obviously there is no way to model a team or positive culture approach to the peer group with this type of staff structure.

For a time during the '60s and '70s, the therapeutic community approach was used with many other populations besides the "sociopaths" for which it was originally designed. The problem with this, of course, was some types of patients do not have the internal resources to be therapeutic with each other. Chronic schizophrenics, for example, may marginally exist in a therapeutic community, but they are certainly not capable of running one. Because of their thinking disorders, they are totally self-involved. Their problems are intrapersonal. Although they may learn rudimentary responses in a therapeutic community, they do not change their thinking patterns, and might even experience undue stress from the unrealistic expectations on their interpersonal skills.

At first glance, the violent juvenile offender, with his usual long history of sabotaging attempts at intervention and poor interpersonal relationships, would seem to be about as likely to benefit from a therapeutic community as a schizophrenic. The vital difference is that while the interpersonal skills of the violent juvenile offender are characteristically poor, the majority of them can be taught the behaviors necessary to be therapeutic with each other.

Unfortunately, this requires very special circumstances. Therapeutic communities are extraordinarily difficult to create and maintain, particularly with a population which appears almost magnetically drawn to creating a highly negative peer culture. Nevertheless, the approach has not only been seen to be feasible, but the treatment of choice in some settings working with the violent juvenile offender. In the following section, one of these settings will be described along with some of the program emphases which facilitate the use of the therapeutic community.

THE CLOSED ADOLESCENT TREATMENT CENTER

The Closed Adolescent Treatment Center (CATC) in Denver, Colorado, is a 26-bed facility which functions more or less as the maximum security of the

Division of Youth Services in Colorado. It is a coed unit, but usually has only four to six females in the population (which mirrors the usual proportion of male to female violent crime). The average age on the unit is 17.9 years and the average length of stay is two years. About half of the population on the unit at any one time are sex offenders (rapists, child rapists, and child molesters), a fourth are murderers or attempted murderers, and the rest have committed assorted other violent offenses. The average youth in the program has been in trouble since early childhood and has been in numerous out-of-home placements.

The staffing pattern at the CATC is a rich one for a youth correctional setting, although somewhat low for a psychiatric setting. The program was initially funded by a three-year federal grant, although it has been totally state supported for the eight years since the grant ended. It was originally designed to be a joint project between the state divisions of mental health and youth services. Although it was administratively placed with the Division of Youth Services when the grant period ended, a major objective of the program is still to provide a program which is an optimum combination of mental health and youth services philosophies. This combination is seen, for example, in the makeup of the staff. The director of the program is a clinical psychologist (the author of this paper). She, the assistant director, and the secretary are the only staff who are not direct care staff, although their offices are on the unit and they are involved in the day-to-day functioning of the unit. The rest of the staff are all direct care staff. They consist of: three psychiatric nurses, one occupational therapist, one recreational therapist, five youth services counselors, two special education teachers, and eleven youth services workers. A psychiatrist provides consultation four hours a week. There is an average of three to five direct care staff on a shift, with double coverage at night. Staff scheduling is complex and designed to provide maximum coverage at all hours of the day and evening, and on weekends, plus several hours' overlap between shifts. This was specifically designed so that treatment does not just take place from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on weekdays, which is a problem in many settings.

Since the CATC also has a very complex treatment program, it is only possible to cover some very general concepts having to do with its utilization of the therapeutic community model. Following are some of these concepts:

A Complete, Well-Designed Treatment Program

Many of the original therapeutic communities had very little, if any, structure, and, in fact, some practitioners felt structure was counter to the philosophy. Harry Vorrath and Larry Brendtro, for example, were strongly adverse to using any ancillary treatment techniques with their positive peer culture, particularly the structure of "behavior modification" or point and

level system. What structure did exist in many programs was uni-dimensional. That is, the structure was limited to daily or weekly time schedules (e.g., Community Group was held at a certain time on a certain day). If there was any written program at all, it usually gave the schedule, and the philosophy of the unit, and some rules (and there was usually little said about consequences of breaking the rules).

With the population of violent delinquents dealt with at the CATC, it was clear that an intricate, extremely structured, written treatment program was a critical adjunct to the therapeutic community. There are several complex reasons why this was done at the CATC, but the major one was the need to address the problem that the majority of the youths were character disordered and had manipulated, intimidated, or sabotaged their way out of numerous previous attempts at treatment. They were particularly expert at avoiding uni-dimensional type programs. For example, if they were in a program where it was necessary to earn points to progress through a program, they quickly became adept at "point scoring" while continuing their usual negative behaviors when there was no one around to score them down. In programs where there was a strictly group therapy approach, they often became adept at appearing very sincere and therapeutic in group, and then becoming their usual intimidating selves outside of group, or around staff that was not involved in group.

In brief, what was necessary was a "Catch 22" to snare even the most cunning manipulator. Therefore, every facet of the program has an "or else" or a system which backs it up in such a fashion that it is very difficult for a youth to avoid the pressure of critically examining his behavior. For example, a youth may earn enough points from the twice daily scoring system to qualify him to move up a level in the program. However, peer group may not approve the promotion because they feel the behavioral changes were not genuine. In this example, the youth quickly realizes that "point scoring with staff" is not enough, and he must also impress his peer group with behavioral changes. To further expand the concept, a youth may make a commitment to his group to use some positive behavior alternatives and be confronted at any time outside of group by peers for not following up on his commitments. The ideal therapeutic community is a pervasive concept. The quality of interpersonal relationships is the major focus during all waking hours, not just during formal therapy times. It is considered as important for the youths to learn how to relate while washing dishes as it is while telling their innermost secrets in group therapy. Therefore, the uni-dimensional schedule of daily activities is of minor importance. The total emphasis in all activities is on relationships — who is relating to whom, about what, and what is the quality of the interaction. This added dimension provides a depth that was missing in some previous attempts at establishing therapeutic communities with this population.

Adding further intensity to the program are such significant facets of the program as: the discipline system; the family therapy; one-to-one relation-

ships with assigned staff; the recreational and occupational therapy programs; the skills and community reentry programs; the sex-offender therapy; and the educational program. Unfortunately, it is not possible to discuss all of these program components in a short article. Again, the important point to be made is that as much as possible the treatment program needs to be all-inclusive if it is to provide the support and guidance to nourish a positive peer culture.

The Team Approach with Staff

Quality of staff (and to some extent quantity) is also a critical factor in developing and maintaining a therapeutic community. A positive peer culture cannot exist in the absence of a positive staff culture. At the CATC, great care is taken in selecting staff who are emotionally strong, mature, intelligent individuals. Although mistakes are made occasionally and incompetent people are hired, the staff culture has evolved to the point where such a person could not survive within the group for long, and would either leave voluntarily or be asked to leave. Even though hiring is done via a typical civil service system, the group culture is such that high quality people are attracted to the system and once hired usually make a long-term commitment to the unit. For example, staff turnover is only 1% per year, and the average length of stay on the job is seven years.

In addition to being personally exceptional, those who are selected must also be people who function well in a team system. There are some individuals who may be excellent therapists in their own right but who just cannot relinquish enough autonomy to function as a member of a team and therefore cannot contribute to a therapeutic community. The concept requires that staff work so closely together as to appear almost to be a gestalt organism. For one thing, they must role model cooperative interpersonal relationships to the peer group, and for another, the violent juveniles are obviously dangerous, and safety is achieved through cohesion.

Again, as in an ideal family, the parents present a united front to their offspring. In the therapeutic community the same thing must occur. Violent juvenile offenders usually have much experience at being able to split staff (and their own parents) and set them up against each other in an effort to divert attention from their negative behaviors. Ideally, in a team setting, there are very strong values against allowing this to happen, and attempts to do so are promptly confronted.

At the CATC, the team approach is very similar to the highly touted Japanese system of management. For one thing, all staff make a long-term commitment to the job. Secondly, they are all generalists. That is, no matter what one's training or experience, everyone has many of the same tasks. For example, the special education teachers conduct the education program for part of the day but also supervise daily living experiences, discipline

youth, have one-to-one caseloads, and participate in all treatment planning. Similarly, the psychiatric nurses may spend about 15% of their time on medical responsibilities, but the majority of their time is spent in treatment and supervision of the peer culture. Thirdly, all staff have input into the treatment planning and carrying it out. Although there is a hierarchy, with the Group Leader being at the apex, staff at all levels participate in decision making and planning. As with the Japanese system, administration sees its function as providing the resources for the staff to do their job in the highest quality manner possible. This provides the critical support necessary for staff to devote their energies to treatment rather than to resisting authority as they do in many settings.

A final staffing consideration which is considered a strong asset at the CATC is the matching of staff and students along certain personality dimensions. This matching concept is done on the basis of Marguerite Warren's Interpersonal Maturity Level Theory and is a complex concept (Warren, 1961). It is probably not a critical concept in the establishment of the therapeutic community, but at the CATC it seems to be extremely helpful in facilitating the treatment of the violent offender.

A Secure Facility

Among many of the old saws about treatment that have to be rejected when it comes to the violent juvenile offender is the one which states that if you have a good enough treatment program, youths will not try to escape. Actually, if by some miracle you could provide for every need and desire of the youths at all times, they would still attempt to escape. There are as many different reasons for this as there are violent delinquents, but the major reason is that they prefer criminal excitement to the stress and pressure of critically examining their behavior and changing it. The reality of the situation is that if the program is not making life fairly uncomfortable for the youth, it is unlikely to be successful in changing his behavior. Most violent delinquents have no remorse about their harmful behavior and must be pressured to develop it. Their pattern under pressure is to escape if at all possible, so it is incumbent upon the staff, program and the facility to create a setting that is as escape proof as possible. In treating the violent delinquent, it must be emphasized that the program's primary responsibility is to ensure the safety of the community.

Adequate Time for Treatment

Both because of space problems and because of the philosophy that short-term treatment is the best, most facilities do not keep the violent offender long enough to see if the surface behavior changes can withstand stress over

time. Unfortunately, a common tactic of this type of youth is to pretend to go along with the program and experience great insight until staff has seen enough progress to discharge them. If there is population pressure or administrative pressure to keep treatment time short, the youth is often discharged while he is faking improvement and once again feels that he has "won."

It is impossible to say what "adequate" time is, of course. There are some youths that the public feel (and occasionally correctly) should be locked up for the remainder of their lives. Obviously that is impossible under the juvenile court system, where short sentences are the rule, and where jurisdiction ends whenever the state laws consider them adults. At the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center, the "best guess" seems to be that two or three years would seem to be enough time to treat the violent juvenile offender. If it isn't enough time, it is probable that they are not going to benefit from any kind of treatment. Violent offenders with long offense histories are highly unlikely to really benefit from short-term intervention.

THE GROUP THERAPY SESSIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY

Therapists who work in settings which do not have therapeutic communities experience constant frustration as they see positive achievement in group therapy sessions dissipate immediately when exposed to the usual negative peer culture in an institution. Again, although the group therapy sessions are the core of the therapeutic community, the entire program is designed to follow up group commitments. The group therapy itself, however, is defined with the same reverence as the concept of family is in family-oriented cultures, and is the flywheel which drives the therapeutic community. To clarify this concept, the following will cover three examples of groups and then discuss how what goes on in group relates to what occurs in the rest of the program.

Example No. 1 — A Group on "Revenge Trips"

The nine adolescents in the group individually "ask for the agenda" (ask to be selected to have a group on them), and the one selected is a 15-year-old girl who was committed for murder. Briefly, she had argued bitterly with a male schoolmate, went home, changed her clothes, got a gun, came back to the schoolyard and shot him. She then waited, apparently calmly, for police to come and get her. On this day, the group selected her agenda as one they wanted to work on. The girl, who will be called Sally, started the group by restating her agenda, "I save up brown stamps and attempt to involve others in my revenge and 'get backs.' I need alternatives to doing this." She then starts group by again describing her crime (this is one of

several times she has done this in group). Sally then relates it to the present by saying that when she feels controlled on the unit through confrontation, feedback, or scores, she again starts to fantasize about "get backs" towards others.

The next step is for the group members to decide what technique to use to deal with this agenda. (They have learned a large repertoire of techniques from previous groups.) When the group seems to have trouble selecting a technique, the Group Leader suggests a role-play situation in which Sally is confronted by a peer and asked to go to Time Out. After the role play, the group processes or analyzes what occurred. Sally said she felt controlled by the role play, and, as usual, she only wanted to get revenge on the others in the group. The group then asked her if she had any alternatives at all to just getting angry and vengeful whenever she felt controlled. She replied that she did not. The group members then suggested some of the alternatives they had found helpful when they had similar feelings, and she agreed to try some of them. They were: (1) wait ten minutes after a conflict before responding; (2) set a goal every morning when she wakes up that she is going to handle confrontations appropriately; and (3) pick a peer from the group who is trusted enough to be a support person and will help through the process of learning alternatives.

The group set a date to review Sally's progress in five days. The Group Leader then gave the group feedback about how well the group went and how each individual's participation was. Group was then concluded.

This example is one that applies to numerous situations, but demonstrates the critical concept that there needs to be direct carryover from what occurs in group to behavior outside of group in the therapeutic community. The tasks assigned in group are not just assigned to the youth that has the agenda for that day, but to the whole group. The tasks are fairly clear, simple and behavioral even though they are directed towards thinking and behavior that are enormously complex. The system is also designed so that there is prompt feedback to the group if follow-up does not occur.

The next example is one that focuses on victim awareness, again a fairly common group topic in working with the violent juvenile offender.

Example No. 2 — Victim Awareness With a Child Rapist

Larry, a 14-year-old, asked for the agenda. He was committed to the unit for the kidnap and rape of a two-year-old girl. Several times he had attempted to have group on his crime, but was unsuccessful in doing more than a very mechanical, emotionless relating of the details. By prearrangement, he had agreed to act out the crime on a large baby doll in the hopes of bringing out more of the emotion in the situation. Larry proceeded to describe the situation in the room where he kidnapped the baby and talk about what was

going through his mind. He saw the sleeping child as a good opportunity to have sex and thought about where he could take her where he would be undiscovered. He left the home with the baby, with his hand over her mouth so she couldn't cry. He went to a nearby park, and with considerable difficulty, raped the baby, and then left her there injured. He stated he had no interest in whether she lived or died, but did feel a little scared at what he had done.

When the role play with the baby was acted out, there was clearly shock and disgust among all the group members, both male and female, and also the Group Leader. All of the group members took some physical action wherein they were trying to distance themselves from Larry, such as scooting their chairs back. One girl (who had been sexually abused herself in childhood) screamed when another youth accidentally touched her as he moved his chair back. After some difficulty in getting started, the peers expressed their shock and disgust to Larry. He had frequently stated that he had no feeling for his victim, but in this group, he seemed to be stunned by the enormity of what he had done. He listened mutely to the feelings of his peers and appeared noticeably stricken when the Group Leader also told him of his feelings of disgust for what he had done. The group concluded in somewhat of a shocked state, and one of the girls in the group asked the Group Leader to please take the doll off the unit.

It was not until two or three months later that the effects of this particular group on Larry were seen. At that time, he had a repeat court appearance, and when asked by the judge what he felt for his victim, gave an extremely moving and honest statement which showed much awareness of the harm he had done to his victim. This was in sharp contrast to his earlier behavior in court when he had been very cocky and unrepentant.

An emotionally laden group session like this has many effects on the peer culture. Youths who themselves have harmed their victims are able to see that they are not the only ones. Also, youths who themselves have difficulty with remorse can see someone else becoming aware of the consequences of their actions on their victims. Although in this particular case, there was an initial distancing from the youth, both within the group and outside of it, this was also a very real response — much more real than the very artificial adversary process in the court. In a sense, the court process helps the youth to continue to depersonalize his victim. Often it takes a group confrontation like the example described to finally give the youth insight into the consequences of what he/she has done.

The following group example was chosen because it also demonstrates the clear correspondence between what occurs in group therapy meetings and what occurs in the rest of the program in a therapeutic community. This example is again one that is common in a group of violent offenders, and that is dealing with a new admission who is physically intimidating to everyone.

Example No. 3 — Controlling Physical Violence

Stanton had been in the program about three weeks and had already caused considerable anxiety among the peers. His physical size was extremely intimidating, as he was at least 6'6" and weighed 220 pounds. In addition, he was a youth from a ghetto neighborhood, not very bright, and had learned all his life that violence was the only way to deal with conflict. Since this admission (for a series of increasingly violent assaults and armed robberies), he had responded to the other peers by discounting all confrontations, refusing attempts at establishing relationships, and being verbally and physically assaultive.

As occurs when necessary in group, the peers did not wait until Stanton asked for the agenda but decided to select him to have it, whether he wanted it or not. He obviously would not have asked for group himself, as he had refused to talk in group since his admission and had only broken his vow occasionally to physically threaten his group members or to spit at them.

Stanton again refused to talk after he had been "given" group and just sat there with his powerful arms across his chest, glaring at the group. A few members began to confront him about his negative behavior and asked him to take a look at what he was doing. He responded by getting up and attempting to leave the room. The Group Leader grabbed him as he headed out the door, and the rest of the group immediately assisted in physically holding him. By a combination of forces, it was possible to physically control this very strong youth without hurting him, nor allowing him to hurt anyone. He was held until he calmed down and gave his peers a commitment that he wouldn't hurt anyone.

The change in both Stanton and the group was remarkable, and it was able to proceed in dealing with him and teaching him alternatives. The change was attributed to several factors: (1) the group wasn't physically afraid of Stanton anymore and realized that as a group, if they worked together, even the most intimidating person wouldn't hurt them; (2) the group saw that when Stanton was not in a fighting stance, he was no different from any other group member and could be worked with in similar ways; (3) Stanton himself felt relieved, as most highly aggressive youth are covering a strong fear that they themselves will be hurt or killed; and (4) the group again realized that the Group Leader was in control of the group and would protect them when necessary.

It was made clear to Stanton by the group members that they would no longer tolerate his violent threatening behavior, either in or outside of group, and so he would have to learn alternatives in order to function. Shortly after group, Stanton again refused a confrontation and was promptly escorted to Time Out for ten minutes by his group members. The rest of the peer population voiced an instantaneous relief as they realized that Stanton was no longer uncontrollable. It must be added that there was a concurrent sigh of relief among the staff!

In addition to tasks that follow up work done in group, there is much groundwork laid prior to having the agenda in group therapy. Each youth must discuss his prospective agenda in "raps," which are one-to-one or small group discussions outside of group. This way, all of the youths in the program know what the youth is going to attempt to achieve when he gets the agenda. This helps the group members get ready to work on a problem by thinking about it beforehand. It also has the effect of allowing everyone in the peer community to have some knowledge of what each youth is working on at any one time. If the therapeutic community model is followed, there can be no "therapeutic secrets." It is obvious that, for example, if a youth does not share what is going on in family therapy with his peers, they will have no idea how to proceed when they are dealing with him in group. At the CATC, however, the only therapeutic secrecy that is followed is between the two separate groups. Personal information about group members is not allowed to be shared with members of the other group. Behavior that takes place outside of group, however, is certainly to be dealt with by members of both groups.

In discussing the relationship of group therapy to what goes on in the rest of the program, the most crucial issue is that of support. This is an admittedly vague concept but clear enough to the peers themselves. What this means is that the youth receives clear behavioral and verbal backing by his/her group members when his behavior is appropriate or when obviously under stress. This can occur at any time and may be generated by the group members or may be requested by the youth who is in need of it. It is expressed in many ways: verbal encouragement, physical contact such as a hug or pat on the shoulder, or a caring confrontation or reminder of a commitment made in group.

In many respects, the group members become a family, and what occurs in the group process is a re-socialization of each youth. Following is an excerpt from a letter written by a youth who had been released from the CATC for several years, after having been committed for a series of violent rapes. The youth not only has not recidivated but has worked his way through college. In the letter, he recalls his group as follows:

"Group was my place for learning to express feelings. I would identify and find solutions to problems. Group was family. The peers in my group knew every one of them, and when I say knowing someone, I mean knowing every one of their likes, dislikes, feelings, family problems, etc. One thing I have to say about group is when it came to nitty gritty and the heaviest of groups, we had guts. And I learned that I had them to where I feel them now."

SUMMARY

Although the therapeutic community-positive peer culture model is in many ways the ideal approach for working with the violent juvenile of-

fender, there are many difficulties in creating and maintaining a program that effectively utilizes the concept. The Closed Adolescent Treatment Center has refined its use of the therapeutic community model with violent delinquents over the 11 years of its existence. The average recidivism rate for the unit to adult corrections is 33%, and considering the severity of the offense histories of the youths, this can be considered an effective program. The unit has also been considered a model for treatment of this population, both within the state and nationally. Some of the refinements felt useful at the CATC in using the therapeutic community model are: having a structured, multi-dimensional treatment program designed around the central focus of group therapy and following up on the group in all aspects of the program; having a team approach with staff which uses concepts similar to Japanese management systems; and having a secure facility and adequate institutional time to complete treatment.

In spite of the difficulties in establishing this kind of treatment program with violent juvenile offenders, the benefits of the general program approach make a great deal of common sense. Treating violent offenders in a program based on personal responsibility, confronted and reinforced by a positive peer group, and supervised by a smoothly functioning psychiatric team is clearly preferable to the alternative of incarcerating them in the adult prison system.

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ACTION-ORIENTED STRATEGIES WITH VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Kenneth J. Goldberg

In recent years, more cognitive, reality-oriented strategies have replaced older concepts of insight development in psychotherapy. Despite these changes, the author suggests that psychotherapy with violent juvenile offenders has remained primarily a verbal exercise that has not assimilated more action-oriented techniques. These techniques can cement the therapeutic alliance and, in the general course of therapy, be a useful tool to introduce material. The author offers some practical examples of how action-oriented techniques may be implemented into a therapy program with violent juvenile offenders.

As violent juvenile crime has become more visible within society, law enforcement agencies, correctional facilities and mental health centers have been called upon to develop more effective and timely intervention strategies for "rehabilitating" the violent juvenile offender (VJO).

With cooperation from all levels of government, these agencies have responded in kind, attempting to establish responsive treatment programs to address the specific needs of youthful offenders. Programs have been expanded beyond the traditional core services such as individual therapy, family counseling, and group therapy to include newer approaches and

techniques such as client advocacy, life-skills education and more concentrated technical training.

This realignment of offered services reflects a new pragmatism in the treatment of the VJO. Both community-based and institutional mental health services have also undergone a metamorphosis of sorts. As the range of existing and available services has expanded, our consumption of mental health services has also increased. As a result, therapists have come under greater scrutiny to demonstrate more concretely cost efficiency and service effectiveness. The predominately long term model of psychotherapy has evolved into a variety of short-term and even brief interventions. Cognitive, reality-oriented strategies have replaced — to some extent — the traditional tools of the therapist such as insight development and its reliance on historical information about the client.

Despite these trends, "state of the art" psychotherapy with VJOs as well as other delinquent populations, seems to have remained more or less static (or at least less progressive). Psychotherapy with the VJO seems to represent a discipline whose practitioners are unable to decide what techniques to omit or to modify for expediency without sacrificing substance; as therapists we do not seem to utilize more fully the variety of resources and settings available for the therapist and the VJO, outside the therapist's office.

This dilemma has most probably reflected our uncertainties. As therapists, we have been unclear how to introduce old concepts such as self-awareness and insight development through cognitive and reality-oriented modes, without somehow feeling that we have watered down the process of therapy. We feel pressured to "cure" the VJO prior to his program release, but we may not be clear how to define "cure," since our professional definition of psychological health may exceed society's more basic expectation that the VJO be manageable and able to maintain himself in the community.

The solutions are at least as complex as the problems. I do not pretend to have any profound remarks or observations to make on how to provide therapy services for the VJO, but I would like to share some of my maddening, sometimes frustrating, and sometimes gratifying experiences in working with VJOs. I would also like to share some of my impressions and some of my strategies for preventing professional burn out, maintaining my interest and occasionally even helping a VJO, as a therapist with Project Phoenix.* I hasten to note that the conclusions I draw about VJOs are based upon my personal experiences at Project Phoenix whose program enrollees were predominantly urban youth with a history of poor academic success, potential gang affiliation, and fragmented or dysfunctional families.

*Project Phoenix is one of four projects that operationalized the Federal Violent Juvenile Offender Program (Part 1).

BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL THERAPY

During my eight years as a therapist, I have always been humbled by how easy it is to become inflexible, rigid, even stuffy as a therapist. As therapists, we seem to cling to time-tested techniques, rather than experimenting. Every profession has its rituals; as modern day "shamans" (Frank, 1973), perhaps therapists have a few extra rituals. Working with the VJO can sorely test our sense of competence, creativity, and endurance; it certainly has tested mine on occasion.

The therapist working with the violent juvenile offender can not remain noncommittal during the course of treatment. He/she constantly is called upon to make a judgment regarding the youth's behavior and actions, and not simply to offer an observation. The therapist must somehow establish a relationship with the youth, yet remain cognizant that he/she is also an agent of society. Attempts to remain neutral are unrealistic. The therapist may also have to tolerate restraints placed upon the length and course of therapy. The therapy does not function autonomously in a pure sense. This fact was brought home to me in the following case:

Prior to his commitment in Project Phoenix, one youth had been involved in a series of escalating crimes, eventually resulting in his assaulting a senior citizen during a robbery. Commitment to the VJO program was informally arranged between prosecutor, the presiding judge, and defense attorney, with the youth's cooperation. However, upon hearing that the youth would be graduated from the VJO program when he was ready for community re-entry, rather than according to a pre-established length-of-program guideline, the prosecutor withdrew his decision to try the youth as a minor instead of as an adult.

After a lengthy conference between all parties, including the VJO program director, it was decided that the youth would be enrolled in the program, but for a specific minimum time regardless of his progress. The youth spent several extra months in the program, despite his readiness for community re-entry earlier, because of the length-of-program stipulation. As a result, an additional therapy issue became helping the youth maintain his enthusiasm and motivation to satisfy his performance contract goals, despite feeling discriminated against and frustrated that his efforts were not more immediately recognized and rewarded.

It is obvious that circumstances beyond the therapist's immediate control may hinder establishing a therapeutic alliance with the VJO. Nevertheless, the therapist must identify strategies to defuse potential sabotages to the therapy.

Like many non-delinquent adolescents, the VJO is generally resistant to participating in a therapy program. This resistance is understandable, since the youth is not usually a voluntary self-referral. By implication, his past ex-

perience with the mental health community has probably not proven beneficial for the youth (or for the community). Undoubtedly, the VJO has been evaluated on several occasions by court-appointed psychiatrists and psychologists. The youth rarely has had (or wanted) an opportunity to establish an ongoing relationship with the evaluating professionals. At the time of the evaluations, the VJO predictably may have been defensive, or even openly uncooperative. So the court-appointed evaluator — in an attempt to complete a timely and accurate evaluation — naturally describes the youth as "angry," "poorly socialized," "disadvantaged" (in some manner), "resistant," and "defensive."

The VJO also tends to have an unsuccessful history in a therapy or counseling program prior to his court commitment. Ironically, the youth may realize that he has broken the law, violated community norms and perhaps even his own familial or personal values. The youth understands that society is angry at him. Unfortunately, all too often therapy is offered to the youth as a "last chance" to straighten out.

In these instances, the therapist has been placed in an awkward and difficult position. The therapist may be perceived by the youth as an adversary, rather than as an ally. The therapist may be viewed as society's agent to reprimand the youth, to remind the youth of his responsibilities and to warn him about the consequences of his continued criminal and antisocial behavior. So therapy comes to be viewed by the youth as a punishment, not as an aid.

There may also be cultural or ethnic barriers. The therapist is by definition educated, verbal, and probably upwardly mobile in an economic sense. The VJO is characteristically unsuccessful or an underachiever according to traditional concepts or benchmarks of success. Even a therapist who belongs to the same ethnic group as the VJO may initially be viewed with suspicion, and as having forgotten "his people." After all, how many of us who are professional therapists and who come from impoverished backgrounds return to the old neighborhood to live? So at least initially, the therapist's similarity in background coupled with his/her socioeconomic advantage may be perceived as an affront to the youth or as a condemnation of the youth's neighborhood, rather than as an inspiration or role model for the youth.

Resistance to participation in therapy is usually part of the VJO's value system. The youth tends to be action oriented and less comfortable with verbal expressions. The youth expresses his feelings through his behavior, deeds, and actions. Traditional talk therapy may seem silly to the VJO. He may feel that talking about his feelings violates some code of manhood or is simply a waste of time. Talking won't directly decrease the length of his commitment, find him a job, or change a family situation. The VJO may feel that talking is the therapist's "con game" to get the youth to admit weakness or wrongdoing; in some cases the youth may feel that the therapist is attempting to gain incriminating evidence against the youth's friends or part-

ners. Even a willing youth may be torn between "opening up" and feeling the need to protect partners:

I was once asked to meet with a youth in treatment because of gang-related crimes. In talking with the youth, it became obvious that his relationship to his peer group had critically influenced his decision to participate in the committing offense. Yet, he was unwilling to discuss the matter for fear of accidentally revealing the names of his accomplices. It seems that only he had been caught and there were outstanding warrants for his accomplices, if they were identified.

Since I am a Caucasian, Jewish therapist I would seem to have little in common with most VJOs and, beyond an existential sense, that is the case. However, in any therapeutic relationship, it is the human factors (the intangibles) that cement the relationship between therapist and client. In working with the youth, I have always attempted to find some common ground outside of the situation (that I was the therapist and he was the client). Mutual interests do create mutual bonds. I would attempt to connect through interests ranging from food, to sports, to art, but I never tried to be "cool." The youth finds this fakery appropriately offensive. (I also won't be passively complacent about exhibited antisocial behavior.) Fakery is a bad foundation on which to build a therapeutic relationship that should be based upon mutual respect, likenesses, and differences.

While I do not recommend trying to be "liberally" accepting of the VJO's subculture, I did try to be genuinely interested in learning more about the barrio, or his peer group (usually a gang). I stated my ignorance openly, placing myself in the role of student and the youth in the role of teacher. Later during therapy I would return the favor, hopefully teaching the youth more effective, adaptive, and appropriate ways of living.

When working with the VJO, the therapist must be careful not to repudiate the youth's family, neighborhood or turf, as he/she attempts to "reeducate" the youth to more socially acceptable ways of behaving. Very often behaviors that would appear inappropriate to me, might seem desirable to the youth. For example, "mad dogging" might represent assertiveness, independence, even adult status to a youth, although I might see it as stubbornness, defiance and argumentativeness. Since so much (if not all) of our daily activity is geared towards preservation of our self-images as well as maintaining physical safety, it is critical that the therapist not ask the youth to give up the "old ways," until he/she has given him equally appropriate, acceptable, and adaptable new skills that will allow him to function in the mainstream or in his subculture, if he chooses:

One youth had been enrolled for committing an accidental homicide. In meeting with the youth, it was apparent that he was ambivalent about the direction to proceed. He looked to leave the neighborhood, but felt guilty about this implicit repudiation of his family and friends.

The therapist has to be careful not to help "transform" the youth into a "mainstream" youth, only to return him to an environment in which he no longer feels comfortable. The therapist must try to help the youth through a multistep decision-making process: helping him to identify his basic values; determining their relationship to his expressed goals and expectations; identifying what community resources are available to foster those goals; and ensuring that his values are consistent with his expressed goals.

It is critical that the therapist make the therapy useful for the youth. The typical youth does not have two or three years to ponder existential questions; remembering (working through) painful experiences may take years. In the meantime, the youth must learn to function in a more successful manner in order to remain out of the criminal justice system (or worse).

Traditional therapeutic concepts such as self-awareness, insight, personal growth must relate to the youth's present situation, rather than to historical events. Cognitive restructuring, reality-oriented feedback, etc. can bridge the gap, if the therapist can demonstrate that strategies for maintaining good mental health and social relationships can be as important as finding a decent job.

THERAPY MADE PRACTICAL

Youth enrolled in Project Phoenix participated in a Life Skills class. Although the curriculum included material on independent living, cooking, household finance, home economics, human sexuality, conflict management, etc., the class was not well received by the youth. They liked the instructor, but found the material boring or irrelevant for themselves. Ironically, our attempts to provide instruction in the practical arts was in itself too academically oriented.

The therapist (and case managers, social workers, and front line staff) can also provide an educational function. Therapy, itself, is an educational process (Rioch, 1970). Therapy with the VJO should offer him some practical information that he can apply later when he graduates from the program. If our assumptions about the VJO are accurate, the youth typically lacks appropriate social role models, possesses poor cognitive skills, and enjoys few youth opportunities. If the youth is to view therapy as useful to him, the therapist must be an active "teacher," helping him acquire improved decision-making skills.

Although these decision-making skills may include material about conflict resolution, inter-personal communication and self awareness, the therapist must present material in a "real" manner, or these skills will appear academic to the youth. For example, introducing different youths to conflict-resolution material rarely decreased their bickering or fighting with one another. However, when mutual conflict resolution was associated with the avoidance of mutually unpleasant consequences such as "Ear-

ly Bedtimes" or the suspension of certain privileges, youth were more likely to cooperate and to use their skills to avoid conflict situations. (This interdependence paradigm has been the successful backbone of several programs involving inner-city youth with an Outward Bound experience.)

In working with the VJO, the therapist should heed the saying, "When you are up to your ass in alligators, who really worries about draining the swamp?" Not only does therapy need to have "relevance" to the youth, but there may also be an expectation by the youth about the immediate benefits. The VJO tends to be up to his "waist in alligators," i.e., family instability, substance use/abuse, unemployment, functional illiteracy, learning disabilities, poor self-concept, poor role models, separation from the neighborhood, etc.

The youth's primary concern is how the therapist can help him meet his basic, primary needs: laundry detergent, clothes, arrange a visit from his family, furloughs, etc. The traditional focus of therapy on insight development and increased self-awareness will obviously not gratify the youth's needs, nor will it usually offer any immediate relief from emotional chaos.

It seems unrealistic to me to expect the VJO to find benefit initially in therapy. The youth believes (or rationalizes) that everything in his life will come together if he finds a job, graduates from the program, and gets to see his girlfriend. If the therapist wants the youth to become motivated and invested in the therapy, the therapist must be willing to satisfy more directly his practical needs and wants. While the therapist can work in unison with others such as the case manager, overreliance on these other caretakers will devalue the therapist's role in the youth's daily life. The therapist must be willing to nurture the youth's physical being, as well as his psyche.

Advocacy Role. It may appear that I am suggesting that the therapist assume a "Big Brother" role with the youth. Although this may, in fact, be a good strategy, not all therapists would be comfortable becoming so related to their youthful clients. It seems more realistic to recommend that the therapist function in an advocate's role for specific purposes directly related to the youth's therapy. In this respect, advocacy can serve a variety of therapeutic purposes: as a catalyst to nurture the therapeutic alliance between the youth and the therapist; as an intervention to defuse potential sabotage to the therapy; or as a strategy to covertly help the youth deal with a therapeutic issue.

On one occasion, I found myself advocating on behalf of a youth against a disciplinary consequence that I considered excessive and potentially detrimental to therapy:

A youth who had gone AWOL for 24 hours was placed in lock-up for seven days. Lock-up consisted of the youth sitting in a sparsely furnished cell for one week with little to do, except to write on walls. Despite my protests, the student's lock-up was not terminated early. The youth never went AWOL again, but as I feared his progress was set back several months.

Although my "advocating" had little practical effect, it reaffirmed my relationship with the youth (as well as preserved my sense of professional integrity).

Role Modeling. It is very obvious that I actively foster positive transference, which I believe in turn may foster the youth's role modeling of the therapist. (I assume that if I am appropriate enough to be the therapist that I am sufficiently appropriate to serve as a role model.) Positive transference will also break down barriers to the youth's acceptance of therapy. If the youth has a positive feeling for me, I would expect that he would view my services more favorably as well:

B. was a streetwise youth who initially rejected any attempt to engage him in group therapy. B. made it clear that he did not want support or help and would not participate, even if it meant extending his length of program. Over a period of time, B. and I stopped engaging in a power struggle in the group. He also saw me help another youth whom he had befriended.

At the same time, B. was involved in individual counseling with his case manager whom B. idolized. As time went on, B. not only began to participate in group therapy but eventually began to actively function as a peer counselor for other youth. B. even made up his own professional cards, listing himself as a student counselor.

PRACTICAL STRATEGIES

As an undergraduate, I was once told by my professor that relationships were cemented at the dinner table or on the playing field. This notion was again brought home to me a few years ago when a friend joined a large accounting firm. He was immediately given a large expense account and sent to tennis camp by the firm.

In my work with VJOs, I have always attempted to use action-oriented strategies, i.e., activities, games, meal time, outings, walks, even giftgiving. I have found these "props" to be especially helpful and an enjoyable way to cultivate my relationship with the youth. It seems logical to use action-oriented techniques with the VJO who is himself action-oriented. (After all, it is his actions that led to his commitment in the first place.)

The VJO is a physical communicator. When he is happy, he "parties down" with his partners or girlfriend. When he is angry, he may use his hands or a weapon, rather than talking. Loyalties and friendships are based upon actions and not promises or talk.

Tangible Rewards. As I indicated earlier, most VJOs initially do not share my enthusiasm for therapy's potential benefits for them. They resent the imposition placed upon their time (and will tell you so). So, I build in tangible and immediate rewards for their participation in therapy.

The evaluation phase was always stressful for the youth who was picked at, put under a microscope and looked up and down. Since I coordinated the mental health evaluation, I always felt relieved when the evaluation phase was completed and the youth could be treated less like a specimen. As a general rule, I always gave the youth a gift following his promotion from the evaluation to programming phase as a way of saying "thank you" for cooperating and congratulating the youth for his promotion.

As a therapist, I generally give gifts to the youth as a way of saying "thank you" for participating, for helping, or as a way of saying to a youth that I like him. I gave gifts on special occasions, but also at other times as "just because" gifts. I rarely offered to give a youth a gift prior to making a request, and declined to promise a reward in order to get a favor. In this way, I used gifts as expressions of appreciation, rather than as an expected payoff. (According to operant conditioning, this kind of arrangement is called a variable ratio schedule. Because the payoff does not come at a fixed rate of performance, the person must perform consistently in order to receive any material payoff or reward. I might add that this schedule of training or education is most resistant to extinction.)

These rewards are a realization and acceptance that the youth initially does not care about what I can offer him. I look for a currency that he will value in exchange for the time that he will be "wasting" by talking with me. The VJO is Machiavellian in his worldview, so I use the rewards (snacks, outings, games, etc.) to motivate the youth to attend therapy. I'll wait (and hope) for the friendship and trust that develop to slowly replace the "bribes" as the primary motivator for participating in therapy.

Meeting Place. As the traditional meeting place between the therapist and the youth, the therapist's office remains a useful and much utilized therapeutic setting. It can provide a quiet and, it is hoped, reassuring environment for the therapist and the youth to establish a therapeutic alliance by sharing information with one another, by getting to know one another, by learning to trust one another.

However, the office is not neutral territory; it is the therapist's "turf." This fact may hinder the therapy's process. The VJO's adolescence and cultural/ethical background may heighten his sensitivities about maintaining control, power and personal space. The therapist may find it helpful to create other settings in which to meet the youth. An imaginative therapist may find a variety of interesting meeting places will be available to conduct more regular, less formal, and more subtle therapy:

During the secure phase of Project Phoenix, youth were constantly requesting permission to leave the cottage to go to the reception area to purchase a snack. Although I had advocated for some program regulation of sweets, I would often request (advocate) that a particular youth be allowed to get a snack. If the on-duty staff agreed, I would accompany the youth to the reception area. Sometimes during these five minute walks more was accomplished than

in a 45-minute session. The agenda for a counseling session later that day could be established. It could provide an opportunity to check with a youth about how he felt that he was doing in the program. Sometimes, youth would share private and personal information that would not have been forthcoming in my office. This technique became so useful, that I began "planning" on these walks by actually encouraging students to request permission to leave the cottage. It also became particularly useful when youth were reported for fighting or appeared depressed. It provided a mechanism to break the connection between acting out or being upset and immediately being sent to the "shrink's" office. After a while, I would do crisis intervention or conduct mental status examinations during these walks. I could evaluate at-risk potential for a variety of behaviors: acting out, fighting, withdrawing, or thinking about going AWOL.

Normalizing Experiences. The thrust of Project Phoenix's efforts (as in all VJO projects) was to help violent juvenile offenders come more fully into the mainstream through "youth opportunities." The VJO project model suggests that youth opportunities may help to construct the youth's positive relationship to mainstream society. According to the model, past disadvantages may be compensated for by the infusion of present advantages that will help "normalize" the youth's relationship to society.

Each service is directed towards this normalizing goal. As a therapist, I hope to help the youth feel better about himself, his ability to achieve his goals and to maintain himself in the community. If I am going to do "my part" to help the VJO feel normal, I need to stimulate or to create normalizing experiences that he can integrate into self-concept.

Action-oriented strategies can be employed to provide the VJO with a normalized experience in the "present," even as these techniques are used to assist the youth in understanding (and breaking) past, "out-of-the-mainstream" patterns. On one occasion, several Project Phoenix staff took enrolled youth on a northern field trip to cut down a Christmas tree for the cottage.

This particular instance stands out as a most poignant example of the action-oriented technique and its utility in working with VJOs. First, the youth had to earn the privilege of going on the field trip through their efforts in the cottage and at school for a few weeks prior to the trip. In this manner, the field trip was used as a reward to promote more successful performance in other areas. Second, finding and cutting down the Christmas tree presented the youth with a group decision-making exercise involving which tree to cut down and how to organize themselves into work crews to trim and carry the tree to the car. Third, the youth had an opportunity to experience a "family day," straight out of a Rockwell print that probably not even most mainstream youth have had. Some of the youth had never seen snow or had a Christmas tree. Fourth, the youth demonstrated that they could be trusted to leave a secure, institutional facility and return without incident.

Games and Sports. Aside from their utility as rewards (motivators), activities such as games or sports are an excellent way to observe social interaction and interpersonal dynamics. (Outward Bound, Thresholds, and Psychokinetic programs have employed "games" for years.)

Within Project Phoenix, the daily basketball games provided a microcosm of cottage life; individual youth tended to play out the same roles on the basketball court that they lived out in the cottage and back in their communities. Activities would serve as catalysts to clarify issues that could be discussed later during group therapy sessions or more privately in individual sessions:

Y. was an argumentative youth. He seemed to feel that no one would take his requests seriously. As a result, he felt that no one would take him seriously as a person either. During group activities, he would have a great deal of difficulty cooperating with other youth. He perceived them as ostracizing him. As a result, he would become critical, whiny, and temperamental. Very quickly, other youth would sense Y.'s distress and begin to become impatient with him or to tease him. Invariably, an argument would ensue with Y. being labelled as the troublemaker. Of course, other youth would assume little responsibility for their part in the argument. Finally, staff viewing these incidents decided to become involved, since the youth did not seem able to mediate among themselves. During the next cottage basketball game, the typical friction ensued. Staff immediately halted the game, explaining that the basketball court would not be used until this issue was discussed and resolved. All youth complained, blaming one another and directing a great deal of anger towards staff. A group meeting was called. During the group, Y. revealed his feelings of being overlooked or ostracized by other students. He also received a great deal of negative feedback about his reactions. Although Y. was willing to accept some responsibility for his behavior, other youth remained unwilling to accept any responsibility for "setting up" Y. In this instance, I advocated on Y.'s behalf, confronting other youth about their actions. After much heated discussion, other youth stated that Y. was a poor basketball player and Y. agreed that he also felt he was inadequate in this area. I suggested that some of the other youth work with Y. to improve his basketball skills. Initially, they objected to this, stating that Y. would not follow their advice. I then reminded them how frequently all the youth elected not to heed staff advice, for example, their unwillingness to resolve the issues with Y., which resulted in having basketball court privileges suspended. After group, Y. had several basketball instruction tutors.

Outings. I enjoy going on outings with the youth for many of the same reasons as I enjoy going for walks with the youth. It can provide an opportunity to observe the youth's decision-making and cognitive skills in practical situations and I can provide assistance if needed. Sometimes, I will

even overlook any manipulations in order to have an opportunity to do the field observation:

X. was given ten dollars by his parents. It was Christmas time, and X. wanted to buy himself some incidentals and a present for a friend. During a counseling session, X. commented that he could not find anyone to take him on the shopping trip. Despite the obvious manipulation, I elected to overlook the scheming and offered to take the youth. The youth and I went to lunch and then shopping. The youth was very relaxed and shared his anticipation about the holidays. While shopping, the youth realized that he did not have enough money to buy all the items. Although I did not offer (nor was I asked) to loan the youth money, I was able to help the youth make a decision about what to buy. A few weeks later, the youth treated me to lunch to thank me for taking him.

It is clear from this example that taking the "relationship" out of the therapist's office and into practice will facilitate developing a therapeutic alliance. My willingness to take the youth on the shopping trip — in a sense to be a custodial worker — demonstrated a sense of caring to the youth. How differently the youth may have felt, if during the session I had simply reflected on how badly the youth wanted to go on the shopping trip and how frustrated he was that there was no one to take him. (I also note that front line staff viewed my actions as helpful and appreciative of the time limitations placed on their roles.)

REFLECTIONS

I have purposely omitted discussing the violent juvenile offender with a psychiatric background. In most instances, these youth will find their ways to state hospitals, rather than correctional facilities. Although many of the action-oriented strategies may be employed with these youth, the style and quality of the interaction is sufficiently different to deserve individual attention elsewhere.

It is clear from my discussion that I considered most of the youth in Project Phoenix to be lacking in positive experiences, the building blocks of good socialization, appropriate interpersonal communication, and positive mental health. It has been my personal experience that most violent juvenile offenders are not "crazy," or "psychopaths" running around the community victimizing innocent bystanders. By and large, these youth seem angry, frustrated and overwhelmed, desperately wanting "a piece of the American Dream," but lacking the skills or experiences to enter the mainstream.

Any therapy program for violent juvenile offenders must be sophisticated enough to consider that psychopathology, sociopathy, and deviance are social as well as psychological problems. We all have our stress points (and

our breaking points). The therapist who works in a vacuum and who can not make the therapy at least a little "fun" for the youth may be doing the youth a disservice. (Personal growth should be fun, even as it can be painful.) Therapy should also be fun for the therapist. A strong relationship between the therapist and the violent juvenile offender is like a good suit of clothes: Tailor-made, but comfortable and loosefitting — not off the rack at the department store.

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**DISCIPLINE AND THE
INSTITUTIONALIZED
VIOLENT DELINQUENT**

*Dianne Gadow
Janie McKibbon*

"What the hell! Is this all the syrup I get?" This sounds like a typical response from an institutionalized violent delinquent who sees himself as not getting "fair" treatment. This situation occurred between two juveniles during breakfast at the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center (CATC), a long-term intensive treatment program for violent delinquents in Colorado. The youth serving breakfast responded to the demand by saying, "Slow down. I don't have any control over the amount of syrup the kitchen gives me, and you got the same amount as everybody else." The first youth, in an instant rage, screamed, "I'll bet! Fuck yourself!" and threw his tray at the hapless server.

During evening hygiene, Jim, another youth in the program, requested a needle and thread from the office. About three minutes after the staff member on duty in the office was asked, Jim appeared at the office saying, "Where's my needle and thread?" When the staff member said, "Just a minute, I'm busy right now," Jim erupted in righteous indignation, "Hey, man, I ain't got all fuckin' night!"

The next day, one of the school teachers was checking a youth named Steve, to see if he had completed a contract on his schoolwork. Steve im-

mediately began complaining, "Well, I really tried, but when you gave me the work, I knew it would be too hard for me to do. Then when I asked you for help on Tuesday, you helped Susie instead of me. Then Wednesday you had a meeting and couldn't help me. So it's not really my fault it's not done, is it?"

Later Brad, a delinquent who had been in treatment for about a year, was supervising the clean-up activity in the recreation room. He had assigned Jack to clean behind the radiators. In checking the work afterwards, he told Jack he had missed some dust. Jack responded to Brad by standing up and hitting Brad in the face.

That evening Babette, who had been placed on a special program by her treatment group because she was refusing to work on numerous interpersonal issues she had with her peers, asked to see the unit nurse. Babette hoped that in talking to the nurse she could get someone to help her escape from her behavioral contract. When the nurse replied that she would talk to her as soon as she had finished the tasks on her contract, Babette suddenly developed a sore throat, a bump on her head, a sore wrist, stomach pains, and a headache!

These are just a few examples of typical situations that arise daily when working with a group of violent delinquents. Behaviors ranging from passive resistance through intimidation and physical violence require staff to be expert in that vague, poorly researched, and controversial area of discipline.

All juvenile correctional facilities involved with the treatment of violent offenders are faced with several dilemmas in attempting to change these youths. The youths are sentenced by the courts to the institutions in order to be punished for a violent crime. The receiving institution's major goal is to do "treatment" and effect behavioral change. Most treatment staff are aware that punishment per se is counterproductive to behavioral change. They realize that a youth following the rules to avoid punishment will revert to his old behavior as soon as the threat is removed. They also know that, as the youths themselves say, punishment will "come back at you." That is, instead of actively dealing with their irresponsible behavior and seeking alternatives, the youths will spend most waking minutes fantasizing how to inflict retribution on those they perceive as having punished them.

In addition, youths in these institutions are the least likely to benefit from any attempts to control their behavior. In the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center, for example, the youths (male and female) in the program have been in an average of nine previous out-of-home placements before ending up in this "end of the road" facility. Fifty percent are convicted for a violent sexual offense, 25% for murder or attempted murder, and the rest for assorted other violent offenses. Most have extraordinarily long records, starting with behavior problems in early childhood. In every setting, starting with their family, their neighborhood, and their school, they soon con-

vinced people that they were beyond any attempts at control. Most had experienced physical (and often sexual) abuse as children, and seemed to have "identified with the aggressor," or modeled their own behavior after the abuser. By the time they arrive at the institution, they are unbelievably sophisticated at subverting any attempt at behaviorally controlling them. All of them, even those who have experienced severe physical abuse, arrive with the notion that no one can control them. Even if they find themselves physically immobilized, they feel in their minds that they are still in control, if only by fantasizing retribution. They have not only inculcated the delinquent subcultural values to continually resist "the Man," or authority, they also have many actual experiences, particularly those who have been abused, to reinforce their lack of trust in authority. Authority figures arouse their fears of being powerless, and thus lead them to justify easily any violent behavior as necessary to regain their own power.

Some of the dilemmas presented to treatment staff are then: How is it possible to both punish youths for their crimes and rehabilitate them so that they won't harm people again? How is it possible to change violent behavior in youths who have never responded to any attempts at control? How is it possible to establish a treatment relationship with staff when they are considered the enemy? How is it possible to satisfy the people who feel institutionalization in itself is cruel and unusual punishment, and at the same time satisfy those who think providing anything other than custodial care is coddling vicious criminals?

In the more than 10 years that the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center has been functioning, numerous attempts at resolving these dilemmas have been tried, and some have been successful at controlling and changing the behavior of the most violent youths in Colorado. The following is a general explanation of the philosophical stances that have developed around the use of discipline with this particular population.

PUNISHMENT: WHEN A PUNITIVE RESPONSE IS NECESSARY

The concept of punishment has been poorly researched and even more poorly used in treatment programs for the violent juvenile offender. The staff at the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center perceive and use the concept of punishment in a somewhat unique way. First, it is felt that a consequence becomes a punishment when it has little or nothing to do with the misbehavior. For example, a student in the program fails to complete a school contract and as a result is denied a weekend home visit. Home visits, of course, have nothing to do with not completing schoolwork. This sort of consequence is often seen by the youth as punitive and unfair.

In addition to consequences which are unrelated to the offense, the manner in which a consequence is given can determine whether it is seen as a

punishment or not. Staff attitudes can convey messages like: "I'll show you who is boss," or "My way is right, yours is always wrong," or "How many times do I have to tell you!" All adolescents, but particularly violent offenders, react to what they consider "put downs" or value judgments from authority figures. Granted that they may perceive any communication from an authority figure as a "put down," but in cases where the staff is clearly gloating over their superior authority, the resultant response from the youth is likely to be enormously counteractive.

There are situations, however, when a punishment is the only appropriate way of responding to a youth. For example, in the CATC, if a youth assaults someone, he is instantly demoted to "Monad," which means he goes to his room for 48 hours. He only comes out for hygiene and is checked every 15 minutes. He has nothing in his room for entertainment. Now obviously going to one's room has no relationship to hitting someone. It is openly defined as a punishment in the treatment program and is intended to be as punitive as possible while still maintaining a humane approach. Although it is certainly a less punitive response than the courts would give were the youth convicted of assault, it is intended to convey a very clear message of punishment. It is also intended to remove the youth from peer contact in order to maintain the safety of others.

Examples of youths who need this clearly punitive consequence are: 1) the "game player" who enjoys breaking the rules and enjoys putting stress on others; 2) the revengeful student who continually feels it necessary to retaliate every time he perceives himself as having been threatened. An example of the latter is as follows:

John was confronted by his peers for his constant attempts to intimidate Henry, both verbally and nonverbally. He accepted the confrontation, but in a sullen manner that suggested that he felt he was being unfairly persecuted. Three days later, John was sitting at a table playing cards when Henry walked by. Instantly, John stood up and hit Henry in the jaw, with no provocation.

Obviously in this case, giving a consequence such as having the youth apologize to his victim would not be enough to deter the youth from repeating his behavior whenever he felt it necessary. Also, the message to the peer culture would be that the results of violence are very minor. The actual consequences were 1) the automatic demotion to 48 hours in his room, and 2) an extended period of time (two or three weeks) on a level in the program where he has an individualized contract to complete and limited privileges. The contract was designed to reinforce repeatedly the concept of not harming others (victim awareness) and learning alternatives to violence.

In youths who have grown to feel that no one can ever control them, there will be times when punitive measures are necessary. The intent is to help the youth develop some internal controls on behavior that is potentially too harmful to use other measures of discipline. Staff must remain aware, how-

ever, that they are using punitive measures and the consequences are not entirely predictable, nor should they be the only measures used in teaching the youth to control his aggressiveness.

DISCIPLINE: A DEVELOPMENT TOOL TO GAIN INTERNAL CONTROL

As stated, the use of punishment has unpredictable consequences. In some situations and with some people, it is very useful to develop a fear response which effectively prevents the negative behavior from reoccurring. Because of its unpredictability and potential abuse, however, it is preferable to use other disciplinary techniques whenever possible. The techniques used most commonly for discipline in the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center are those which provide a learning experience and it is hoped help the youth develop some type of internal control or self-discipline that he has not developed to date. William Glasser (1965) states that one of the four basic needs of the non-addictive personality is the need for self-discipline, and this is probably the paramount need of the violent juvenile offender. What amounts to a total re-socialization process has to occur in order to achieve this, and a variety of methods, techniques, and skills are necessary.

First, it is necessary in working with the violent juvenile offender to have a treatment program which clearly spells out the structure of the program, including the rules which are designed to promote socialization and the offenses which are considered serious and not to be tolerated. The consequences for breaking these major and minor offenses are spelled out in detail in the program, in order to provide the consistency that did not occur in the childhood of the offenders. It is vitally important that this structure be very detailed and that the youths know that certain behaviors will inevitably result in certain consequences, and there is no way that they can manipulate or intimidate their way out of the consequences.

In a therapeutic community, such as at the CATC, the positive peer culture sets the standards as to what is acceptable and non-acceptable in the peer culture, although this process is guided by staff, and is done within the structure of the overall treatment program. All staff and peers are expected to confront misbehavior, whether it is behavioral or attitudinal, as soon as it occurs. This is such a strong value in the peer culture that the person who does not confront negative behavior is considered as guilty as the person who is misbehaving. The rationale of course is to teach the value that stopping people from hurting themselves or others is a caring thing to do in our society.

At the CATC there are three basic systems of discipline spelled out in the treatment program. They are: 1) the Checking and Booking System, 2) Time Out, and 3) Team Demotions. Brief descriptions of these three systems

follow below:

Checking and Booking. The Checking and Booking System is the daily procedure to consequence violation of house rules — or rules which are primarily designed to facilitate social interactions and respect for privacy within an institutional setting. They also include minor attitudinal or behavioral infractions. When such a behavior occurs, a peer or group of peers will confront the behavior by saying "Check yourself," which it is hoped is enough of a warning to stop the behavior. If the youth persists in the behavior, he will receive a booking or a ticket from the peer or peers who checked him. The peer may process the booking with his peer group if he feels it is not justified, and staff must co-sign a booking in order to validate it. This latter procedure is to rule out petty, power-play type confrontations. The booking results in the youth having to appear before Discipline Committee which is held once a day. The committee consists of one staff and one youth, on a rotating assignment. The committee meets out a short consequence that takes into consideration the offense and the individual's treatment emphasis at the time.

Time-Out. The Time-Out System is used when a youth is out of control either verbally or behaviorally anywhere "on the floor" (which means outside of group therapy). This behavior ranges from refusing a direct order to screaming verbal or physical intimidations. Youths are ordered to Time-Out by staff alone, although other peers may let staff know when it is necessary. If the youth does not go instantly to the Time-Out room, or becomes combative, he is promptly physically restrained and transported to Time-Out. The room is an empty room, and the youth is given 10 minutes to regain control. He is asked if he is ready to come out at 10-minute intervals and may come out as soon as he has regained control. The youth is expected to think about his behavior and prepare to process it with peers afterwards.

Team Demotions. Team Demotions are used for Critical Incidents. These are usually defined in the program as incidents which are clearly illegal in the community, although there are a few other Critical Incidents which are necessary for institutional management. (For example, smoking in the bedrooms is a Critical Incident because of fire regulations.) Examples of Critical Incidents are: assault, escape, taking drugs, making or using weapons, etc. The penalty for a Critical Incident is a prompt demotion to Monad (the 24- to 48-hour room restriction described earlier), and possibly a period of time spent on the disciplinary team (Team I) where they have to meet an individualized contract before being promoted.

Team demotions can be requested by a group of peers if a peer is consistently not behaving or not participating in the program. Again, peers requesting the demotion must have valid reasons for doing so and be monitored to insure that the demotion is not out of revenge. On disciplinary level teams (Team I), peers are given specific tasks to complete relative to their misbehavior, are monitored closely with all movement in the cottage, and spend less time in the general peer culture. Team I lasts for a specific period

of time and when the tasks are completed the peer may ask to come off of it. It is hoped these procedures hold a youth accountable to others and allow him to take a look at the reaction of others to his behaviors.

Time-Out is used to remove a peer from a situation for a short period of time, for peers who are verbally or physically abusive, or for specific treatment reasons — an example being always having an excuse for misbehavior. A small, secure room with no furniture is used and the peer stays there for 10 minutes, where he should be thinking about his behavior and preparing for the process that will occur. This procedure makes it extremely difficult for a peer to deny or not "own" his misbehavior, and provides an immediate consequence for the violation. The use of Time-Out is initiated and carried out by staff with peers having the opportunity to request it for themselves or another peer.

Natural and Logical Consequences

The term "natural and logical consequences" is attributed to Rudolf Dreikurs and Loren Grey (1970) in their book on child discipline. At the CATC, the concept relates to the youths being held responsible and accountable for the results of the decisions they make. The first step is for them to reach the point of "ownership," or acceptance that their problems are theirs, rather than projecting blame onto everyone else. The next step is to establish the use of good decision-making through looking at the consequences of their decisions, both for themselves and for others. Both of these steps are extremely difficult to accomplish. Violent juvenile offenders usually display what Yochelson and Samenow (1976) call the "victim stance." That is, they claim to be victimized whenever they are apprehended or even confronted for negative behavior. Insisting that they "own" their behavior is an alien thought to them. Secondly, the youths typically perceive all consequences of their behavior as punishment, or as the "system" taking away their rights.

The techniques used to develop the awareness of logical and natural consequences are necessarily somewhat artificial in an institution. In the outside world, natural consequences require no preplanning; they happen naturally. In an institution, they have to be designed into the program. As mentioned earlier, the program must contain a well-thought-out list of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors, along with reinforcements for the former, and penalties for the latter. The program should be well-known by the students, and at the CATC their orientation to it begins when they first walk in the door. They are given a quiz on their knowledge of the program by the peer group in their first Community Group after three days in the program. This begins an ongoing emphasis on knowledge of the program by all of the peers. In fact, visitors often remark on how well the youths know the program. Secondly, the penalties for unacceptable behaviors should be

appropriate to the offense as much as possible. Consequences should be given promptly, should be short in duration, and should be left in the past or not used to constantly remind the student of his transgressions.

In the beginning phase of utilizing natural and logical consequences, staff and peers need to point out even very minor refusals to follow the program to the newly admitted youth. For example, two of the minor or "house" rules are that 1) you should not leave your belongings around the unit; and 2) you need to ask for various things from staff before going to bed at night, except in emergencies. Both of these are rules which make it easier for 26 males and females to live together in a unit, and involve being considerate of others. The following is an example of the beginning phase of using the concept of natural and logical consequences in discipline:

Pete, a newly admitted youth who was committed for repeated armed robberies, has completed Entry Level, a three-day orientation team, and is on Team II, the beginning level of the unit-level system. He knows the rules of the unit, or he would not have been promoted to the team. A few days after being on Team II, he knocks on his door 15 minutes after bedtime and asks to brush his teeth and also to retrieve his towel which he left on the floor of the recreation room. The natural consequence that will be promptly explained to Pete is that he can go without brushing his teeth. The other infraction, leaving his clothing out, is a "booking offense" for which Discipline Committee the next day will probably give him a logical consequence — possibly one of running a load of towels in the washing machine and dryer for all his peers. In both, Pete is given the message very early that he will be held responsible for his behavior.

Any one of the disciplinary procedures listed earlier that is appropriate for the offense can be used to hold youths responsible for their behavior. Resistance, however, is extreme from the beginning, and the youths in the program are highly sophisticated in reacting with techniques designed to remove the pressure of having to accept consequences. It is common for negative behaviors to escalate during the earlier phases of the program as the youth goes through his entire repertoire of resistance behaviors, many of which have been successful at sabotaging treatment in the past. This is when extreme behaviors like assault, self-destructive attempts, intimidation, acting "crazy," and "jailhouse lawyer" techniques, which attempt to use the legal system as an escape, occur. This testing behavior is consequated as spelled out in the program, and eventually the youth realizes that acting out is useless, and he begins to "own" his behaviors. This process can take a short period of time, or in a very few extreme cases may never occur during the entire sentence or commitment. In the latter cases, however, at least the youth is not given the illogical consequences he frequently received in past placements — either being discharged to the community or transferred to another placement.

Part of the process of teaching a youth to accept consequences involves victim awareness. This is a process, again begun during Entry Level, where the youth is taught to be aware of what it feels like to be a victim and to gain insight into the effects of his crimes on his victims, and the ripple effect throughout society. Again, most violent juvenile offenders consider themselves the victims, and consider the real victims as somehow having deserved what occurred to them. The victim awareness concept continually emphasizes the youths learning what mutual rights and human interrelatedness signify. In addition to victim awareness, special training in values clarification is useful in helping redirect the youth away from the very "I" centered approach he has used all of his life.

What has occurred in designing the CATC program is the difficult balancing act of building in enough structure so that there is consistency, with certain behaviors always consequated, and enough flexibility so that there are occasions when disciplinary techniques can be varied to fit the situation. In the words of the old saying, it is necessary to learn to "move smoothly in harness." That is, staff and peers alike must experience enough flexibility that there are times when they can choose a technique that takes into consideration such important issues as: the youth's background; his past acting-out behavior or the number of times the misbehavior has been repeated; the degree of involvement or noninvolvement of the youth with significant others; etc. Extreme care must be taken when doing this, however, so that the youth does not perceive that he is being rescued from the consequences of his behavior. "Rescuing" youths from the consequences of their behavior gives continuing license to harm others.

TECHNIQUES FOR FLEXIBILITY WITHIN PROGRAM STRUCTURE

Basic Behavior Control

Many of the violent juvenile offenders come from extremely non-structured home environments, where little or no direction was given by the parents. They were often not given limits on very basic issues, such as being told to go to school, when to go to bed, or how or when to perform simple hygiene such as taking baths and brushing teeth. They were often not provided with regular meals, nor told when to come home at night. Such chaotic backgrounds often result in youths who are very primitive in their social development. They are generally very self-centered, and basically concerned with getting their immediate needs met. They are so unsocialized that they become very belligerent if they perceive that anyone is interfering with their goal-directed activities.

With this type of adolescent, it is necessary to establish very firm limits and be extremely consistent regarding what is acceptable and unacceptable

behavior. This is very close to a reparenting experience, and necessitates staff realizing that the youth needs to get messages in a concrete fashion as a very young child would. Techniques to achieve this are termed Basic Behavioral Control. Special programs are designed so that negative behavior receives an immediate, prompt, and short-term consequence. Positive behavior likewise is rewarded with something that the student would like to do or to have. This specialized approach is used to stabilize the student's behavior enough so that other issues can be dealt with.

Paul, a 15-year-old sentenced for rape of a 5-year-old girl, is an example of a youth who has benefited from Basic Behavior Control:

When Paul was first admitted to the CATC, he strutted and acted extremely arrogantly in dealing with peers and staff. When questioned how he felt about his crime, he replied, "Like a star!" If anything he did was questioned, even as small an issue as "Did you clean your room?" Paul would respond with "None of your fucking business." Even though small in size, Paul would intimidate and strike out at any person whom he thought would get in his way. Paul was the second oldest of five children in his family. His mother was a heroin addict and alcoholic, and his father had abandoned the family when Paul was young. He lived in California and paid no child support. Left basically unsupervised, Paul would roam the streets until the early hours of the morning, stealing what food he wanted and re-entering his home by climbing through the window. He related that a number of times he would walk into his mother's bedroom in the morning asking for breakfast and get an empty liquor bottle thrown at him. His account of the crime for which he was committed was a very matter-of-fact account of seeing the child, wanting sex, and taking it. His only feeling afterwards was feeling good because he had gotten what he wanted.

In order to stabilize Paul's belligerent behavior, the approach with him during the first six months in treatment was to give him a special individualized program which spelled out prompt, consistent consequences for his negative behaviors (intimidating, threatening, and assaultive behaviors). If he did any of these things, he was immediately removed from the peer population and sent to his room. Cooperation on room restriction was defined as being agreeable with staff who interacted with him; and not throwing food, insulting people, or urinating in his room — previous habit patterns. If he was cooperative for a whole day, he was rewarded with something from a list of reinforcers that had been established with him as things he wanted. Often the reinforcement was a talk with a favorite staff member, and this was seen as a positive sign of his learning to establish relationships with adults. After about six months on the program, Paul's behavior patterns were stabilized enough so that other forms of discipline could be utilized and he could re-enter the regular program.

Basic-Behavioral-Control methods have the drawback of setting the

youth apart from the rest of the group, although usually the behavior is so extreme that the youth is being rejected by his peers anyway. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that as long as the special program is in effect, the youth is clearly different from his peers. It is usually experienced as a great reward when the youth has earned his way off the program.

Giving Options

Many violent juvenile offenders are obsessively concerned with issues of power in all situations. They are constantly in a stance of resisting power and hypersensitive to anything they consider a "put down" or insult to their own power. One way to approach discipline with this type of youth is to give a message which respects his need for autonomy, and that is to allow him to choose an option in a disciplinary situation. Example: Jane gets angry over some incident that occurred and begins pounding on the wall of her room. A staff member then tells her that she has a choice. She may use her mattress as a punching bag, or go to a more secure room where damage to herself and the room will not be as great. In this situation, giving a choice is much more effective than simply telling the youth to quit pounding. The latter is certain to result in the anger being misdirected at the staff and a resulting power battle.

Involving Peers in Consequences

This technique, when used with care, is one of the most effective disciplinary techniques. Adolescents who have given up on adults and actively reject their interference are still usually very vulnerable to peer influence. However, even in therapeutic communities where the peer influence is designed to be positive, very close supervision must occur when peers are involved in discipline. For one thing, there is the "initiation" phenomenon which makes youths feel that because they underwent something, it is only right that everyone else should have to do the same thing. In addition, adolescents in a treatment program for violent offenders are among those least likely to be able to handle power well, nor are they likely to be "therapeutic" with their peers. It is well-known to child care workers that youths when charged with the responsibility for coming up with a discipline, will often design one that is much more punitive than the staff would impose. (This is certainly understandable in view of the role models that most of them experienced.)

However, when youths are encouraged to give input in certain circumstances into the discipline of one of their group, it can be a message that is much more attended to than one from a staff member. At the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center, for example, youths are asked for their input in

designing all programs for the disciplinary-level teams, although staff has the final control. This type of situation is particularly useful when behavioral contracts are being designed, such as a contract to perform certain tasks in order to earn a special privilege. Peer involvement in designing the contract creates a structure where the student can anticipate the results and feel secure in the consequences.

Withdrawing from the Power Struggle

An extremely effective disciplinary approach to use on occasion with manipulative, argumentative youth is to withdraw suddenly from the power struggle. Many times confrontations develop quickly into a win-lose battle which if continued would result in the youth feeling he has to win at any cost, and the staff person feeling he has to exert authority in a punitive fashion. The youth often sets up situations like this deliberately, in effect so that he can then say to the authority figure, "See, I told you you are power hungry!" or some other such "gotcha" response. This has often been an effective guilt producer with authority in the past and helped the youth to avoid responsibility. Therefore, when staff senses that this kind of battle is being deliberately created by the youth, he or she may elect to withdraw quite suddenly from the situation, thus instantly changing the "game." An example of this technique is as follows:

George Ann was committed to the CATC for assault and attempted murder. At one time in her treatment it was decided that she should begin family therapy sessions with her mother. Her one-to-one counselor presented the idea to her, and George Ann began strongly insisting that any issues between her and her mother were of no concern to the staff and had nothing to do with the crime she had committed. Her counselor attempted to explain the reason for dealing with certain issues with her mother at this point in treatment, but George Ann began talking even louder and becoming more argumentative with every point the counselor made. Finally, the counselor realized that she was being involved in a win-lose battle, and told George Ann that they needed to stop the discussion as neither one was listening to the other person. She then stated that she would return later on in the afternoon to continue the discussion.

This technique usually leaves a strong, aggressive peer surprised but willing to work on a compromise later on. Use of the technique must be limited to situations where there is no apparent harm in delaying resolution of the issue.

REINFORCEMENT — THE NECESSARY PARTNER TO DISCIPLINE

A renowned old-time horse trainer who was considered almost miraculous in his ability to tame wild horses almost instantly in a very kind and non-threatening way, summed up his talent in one sentence, "I just make it a whole lot easier for them to do it my way." This statement rather succinctly summarizes the combined effectiveness of discipline for negative behavior and reinforcement for positive. At the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center, the reinforcements, like the disciplines, are prompt, appropriate to the behavior, and are both structured and unstructured.

Much of the reinforcement system rests on Glasser's theory that another of the major needs that must be fulfilled in order to be a responsible person is the need for a feeling of self-worth. Since Glasser's initial work was done with a population of delinquent girls, he was acutely aware of the particular strength of this need in the delinquent population. Delinquent adolescents, like all adolescents, want to be "somebody"; i.e., to be looked up to and admired by their peer groups. In lieu of being admired for something that is socially acceptable, they are usually quite willing to be admired for their negative qualities; e.g., "being the baddest dude in town." What occurs in a properly run positive peer culture is that they promptly lose all reinforcement for negative behaviors and gain them for positive, or socially acceptable ones.

The reinforcements in the early stages of the program are generally concrete ones. There is a point and level system wherein youths are given points in seven different behavioral areas by staff twice a day. This is designed so that points are given for positive behaviors, and the feedback is clear, consistent and as concrete as possible. The points are then used for weekly canteen (to buy cigarettes, pop, snacks, etc.). Points also accumulate to get additional privileges and promotions to higher levels in the program similar to grades in school. At the highest levels or teams in the program, the point system is discontinued and verbal feedback alone is given.

Although the additional privileges built into team promotions are important reinforcers to the youths in the program, what seems to be a far more potent reinforcer is the respect given to high team members by both staff and peers. Since the program is designed so that it is difficult to reach these levels and to handle the responsibility and stress without reverting to previous, negative behaviors, most youths who maintain themselves on these teams are seen to have made genuine, behavioral changes. Youths who feel that they are truly and incorrigibly "bad," are encouraged when they see high team members with past histories every bit as negative, who have learned to act in ways which earn the respect of the social group. What is critical in this is that the respect is earned. Violent juvenile offenders are usually extremely sensitive to hypocrisy and they know when they are being reinforced for something that they haven't really done.

Obviously, social reinforcement from the approval of staff and peers is not limited to high team members and is used constantly to reinforce small increments in appropriate behaviors. At the CATC, the term for this is "support," and peers are taught to express this to each other either verbally or non-verbally whenever it is earned.

STAFF ATTITUDES — THE CRITICAL INGREDIENT IN DISCIPLINE AND REINFORCEMENT

The goal of all disciplinary techniques is to have the youth internalize the concepts and be able to discipline himself. Unfortunately, neither discipline nor social reinforcement will be effective if he does not develop significant relationships, both with his peers and with the people he once considered "the Man," or adult authority figures. This requires a continual process of developing and maintaining rapport with the youth. This is made extraordinarily difficult by many factors. For one thing, the youth usually has few assets or skills to present himself as "lovable," and, in fact, is usually more likely to be universally rejected. Second, the youth has committed crimes which arouse some degree of disgust in almost everyone. Thirdly, the youth has usually become quite adept at behaviors which "push others away"; e.g., rank insults; intimidations; threats; "gross" behavior such as self-mutilation, public urination or defecation; and physical violence.

Obviously, it takes a special type of person to have the maturity, strength, patience and tolerance to work with the violent juvenile offender. Most especially, it takes individuals who are convinced that discipline is an integral part of treatment and that it helps people grow into their "better selves." They must also be of the philosophy that mutual respect must be earned but is invaluable in treatment. And perhaps most basically, staff must be the kind of people who genuinely like working with adolescents.

Even with staff who have all of these qualities, the stress, disappointments and frustrations of working with the violent offender need to be taken into consideration. There are several general tactics that seem to help staff in handling the stress, most of which are fairly common in stress-reduction literature. For one thing, the use of humor seems to be a life-saver in many ways. Not only does humor occasionally diffuse a "deadly serious" youth who is acting rather silly, but when used discreetly among groups of staff can give a light touch to situations which otherwise might have been emotionally painful to the staff.

The concept of support, both physical and emotional, is of paramount importance for staff to be able to function in such a program. Staff must be able to count on each other and be able to move efficiently and rapidly together in a crisis. They also must be emotionally sensitive enough to each other to be able to provide emotional support when it is needed. Administration

must also provide support, not only by practical measures such as scheduling flexibility, pay increases, inservice training, etc., but also by providing "backup" or the feeling that staff will always be supported if they have done the right thing.

"Processing" is also an important concept in staff's functioning together as a team. Staff must be able to have enough time together to plan, rehash, give and get feedback on their performance, and give each other support. This "processing" is what allows staff to function as a team.

Outside of the unit, staff members need to develop interests, involvements, and their own support so that they can truly *leave* work when they go out the door. It is also therapeutic to have some association with "normal" adolescents in the outside world.

SUMMARY

In working with the institutionalized violent juvenile offender, it is clear that there is no way that treatment and discipline can be considered separate issues. Effective behavior changes cannot be achieved without internal self-discipline. The use of a consistent and well-thought-out system of discipline in a treatment program is the only way to encourage the development of responsible behaviors in youths who habitually harm others. Being responsible necessitates making decisions and living with the consequences of the decisions. Once the violent juvenile offender "owns" his behavior and takes responsibility for his decisions, he can begin to function as an acceptable member of society.

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ESTABLISHING A VIOLENCE-FREE ATMOSPHERE IN A SECURE TREATMENT UNIT — AN EXPLORATION OF THE ROBERT F. KENNEDY SCHOOL

G. Michael Welch

"It was as corrupt and cynical a system as I have ever encountered and it was practiced entirely without honor. If a boy showed any pride or distinction of bearing he was routinely beaten to humble him and train him to at least act as if he were frightened. . . ." This is how Malcolm Braly, in *False Starts*, describes the Preston School of Industry, the reform school to which he was committed as a youth (Braly, 1976).

Much has changed throughout the country in the past forty years, and the juvenile justice system has, thankfully, not been exempt from this change. Even the casual observer of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, today, will immediately notice a radical departure from anything that might have approached the Preston School of Industry.

The Robert F. Kennedy School, a program of the Robert F. Kennedy Action Corps, a non-profit social service agency, incorporated in Massachusetts in 1969, is a product of a commitment to the highest standards of care for children. This program is a venture of the public and private sectors, the

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Robert F. Kennedy Action Corps, Inc., and the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services.*

SATISFYING THE VARIOUS CONSTITUENCIES

To accomplish such a program, it is frequently necessary to satisfy the various constituencies that are involved in the complex process of caring for and rehabilitating the serious juvenile offender. The constituencies are many, varied and necessary. They come to our minds rapidly.

They are the community: the neighborhood demands protection; the juvenile offender has inflicted his anger on an innocent victim, unknown to him. The police want that teenager off the streets. The school system can no longer provide services to him and perhaps others, because of him. The victims and their families are demanding justice.

The courts demand action: the defense attorney wants his client's rights protected; the prosecutor wants the defendant cured, incarcerated or at least some reasonable effort at rehabilitation begun. The judge reaches out to protect our system of government, by protecting the community from the unreasonable acts of the defendant and the defendant from the possibly unreasonable demands of the community.

The adolescent's parents may wish to be a part of the process that determines their child's liberty or lack of it. They may be tired of being blamed for their child's activities; they may well be tired of being lectured and called uncaring. They may be clamoring for a voice in a strange world; often they remain unheard. They might become more actively involved, if someone were to ask them what they thought the problem was and what are their suggestions about a solution.

There is the child, the defendant, the adolescent. He may be a physical giant and yet emotionally underdeveloped. The tension between himself and society may be evident. He may be alienated and lonely yet have been a member of a gang for years. He may be handsome and physically appealing or he may suffer from untreated acne and self-inflicted messages of ambivalence with L-O-V-E and H-A-T-E on separate hands and fingers. Whatever his appearance, the probability is high that he will have been the victim of some serious and longlasting deprivation in his short life. It may have been physical or emotional or both. Whatever the circumstances, he now

*It is important both for the sake of accuracy and responsibility that the reader know the extent of continued successful collaboration between these two agencies. Although this author has no authority to speak for the commissioner of the Department of Youth Services, the principles that brought the Robert F. Kennedy School into being and those notions which have sustained it and allowed it some measure of success are not the exclusive invention or property of either the Robert F. Kennedy Action Corps or the Department of Youth Services. The continued professional relationship which binds the Action Corps and the Department is held together by the open-mindedness, willingness to compromise at times and not at others, and commitment of each party to the values that uplift and support all people, those who are troubled and those who are troublesome.

hurts and may well have trouble understanding why his hurt has caused him to hurt others. Among so many other possible characteristics his need to prove himself is, doubtless, very great. It is this troubled and troublesome adolescent whose needs must be met and whose rights must be protected.

From this group of sometimes conflicting circumstances came the characteristics that would frame the establishment of the Kennedy School.

DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING A PROGRAM

This new program had to be designed to offer rehabilitation to some of the most violent juvenile offenders in the commonwealth. It would have to be secure in that the movement of clients would have to be under close supervision. Re-entry into the community would have to be earned, a part of a treatment plan, and a matter of mutual consent of the Kennedy School and the Department of Youth Services.

It was agreed from the beginning that the Kennedy School would not participate in the process of selecting its students. It would accept those young men whom the Department decided would most benefit from the services of this program.

With this information a program was developed. It would be a secure facility that would provide care and treatment to 15 young men who would begin their residency between the ages of 14 and 17, and who had come to the attention of the Department because of their history of violent delinquency.

Some bottom-line decisions had to be made. Firstly, it was decided that it was possible to alter the criminal behavior of teenagers and that the milieu would be a powerful tool to this end. Neither extreme position would be taken. The program would not claim to be able to be effective with each student who became part of the Kennedy School community, neither would it accept the position that encourages satisfaction in helping one boy out of one hundred.

Secondly, the value bases for all the clients would be clear: each young man who entered the program was to be viewed as worthy of the program's best effort. It was not to be the role of this program to be an instrument of punishment for the client. The program's primary function was not to be custodial. Of supreme import was the notion that each person because of his birth has an integrity that demands the respect of all other persons. Consequently, rules, regulations and procedures were created that enhanced and supported the integrity of each of the clients and protected and recognized the integrity of each of the staff.

Thirdly, since the Kennedy School believed in the real possibility of change, it would be established as a change-model program. The expectations were very clear that staff would work with the young men in an effort to change the behavior that caused their arrest; the Kennedy School was not

to be a detention facility with a veneer of treatment. The clients also would have clear expectations placed on them. The program would be presented to each young man as a place to come to and become a part of. Every effort would be made to help each client become a part of the Kennedy School and all that it represents. As it was expected that some boys would have waited fairly lengthy periods of time in detention facilities, attention would have to be paid to the young man's learning the differences between the two experiences, and how he would be expected to relate differently to them.

Fourthly, the program would present one clear model of rehabilitation. Although the various tactics might be eclectic, the strategy, the model would be singularly identifiable.

The Milieu as a Tool to Effect Change

Once these basic principles were established they could have become either platitudes for the public or concrete operational practices. In selecting the latter, the program chose a difficult standard. To use the milieu as a tool to effect change, because it believed violent youth could change, it established one clearly identifiable model that would not only protect, but also enhance the dignity of all program participants, students, and staff.

The group life for the boys at the Kennedy School takes three distinct but inextricably intertwined directions: life space, educational and clinical. While each of these is further subdivided, such detail is not required to discuss the organization of the educational component or clinical services. The principles that were selected as operational standards are more easily reviewed when the life space component of the program is explored.

Perhaps life space can be defined as that activity center of the program of which the boy is a part when he is not in class or formal therapy sessions — in other words, most of the time.

Children need adults to help them grow (Trieschman, 1969). The boys need the staff to define limits, establish goals, observe and comment on behavior and to do this consistently. It is intolerable to allow each individual staff person to establish his/her own rules for student behavior. So, what must be overwhelmingly obvious is that the program has a way this is done.

At the Kennedy School, there is a basic philosophy of care which speaks to the integrity of the individual. This important message is communicated to staff during the pre-placement interviews, the offer of employment interview, brief in-service training which immediately follows employment as well as weekly staff meetings. It is brought to our students in pre-service and some printed material. But the lengthy intake processes are the best instruments of communication.

THE "SCHOOL" MODEL AND HOW IT WORKS

As the program was developed, one early decision was that the name and model would be "school." Thus, the Robert F. Kennedy School was named and launched. Axiomatically, those who attend school are students, not residents or inmates. Students behave in a prescribed manner. They do not behave like a group of inmates who are doing life on the installment plan. Nor do they behave like residents — residents are often identified as those who occupy society's least desirable institutions. The principal distinction among students, inmates and residents is that only one — "student" — has an active connotation attached to it. To be a student, one must be active, one must do something. It takes no effort to be an inmate or resident. Consequently, it is easier to respect and care for a student and, it is thought, it is more flattering to be a student.

Student and Staff Behavior

The program's design as a school with students encourages the staff to take on, with enthusiasm, the adult-parent role rather than that of a big brother or sister. It is made clear to all new workers that the students need adults who will accept adult responsibility around them. Although there certainly are places for "nice guys," one of those places is not a treatment facility for emotionally troubled young people. The care of teenagers is not an accident. The proper care that will alter their behavior demands more than good intentions. It demands expertise.

Social learning theorists will remind us of modeling; children will do what they see. Nowhere is that concept more important than in a treatment program for delinquent adolescents whose model is the school. Continuing with the notion of school and student, we must approach a level of behavioral response. That, it is offered, is middle-class American behavior with all the social graces and a number of the amenities. In such a situation, the students here must experience the behavior that is required of them. Students are not allowed to swear or cuss. Staff is similarly forbidden. Students are not allowed to smoke throughout the entire building. Staff shares this regulation. Students may only eat at specific times. Staff may not walk around with a cup of coffee or a candy bar.

More significant is the manner in which people address each other. Students will use "please" and "thank you" to staff and other students. Staff will behave in a similar manner. A student will be *requested* to help another person, sometimes because a choice exists, other times because it is the more polite form. Students are expected to request help in a like manner.

Freedom From Violence

Significant deviations are given special attention as are other significant events during the day. Students are not allowed to inflict their anger on others. A school must remain free from violence if it is to foster growth. Students must at least feel their safety is a priority of the program. It is unacceptable for one student or a group to demonstrate their frustration or disappointment by inflicting themselves on the school. Because a visit is cancelled, a boy may not rip another's clothes, or mark the wall, or certainly not harm another. Bearing this in mind, staff feels less free to demonstrate unhappiness about something that occurred at home prior to coming to work. Staff cannot pout about their poor fortune while attending to the students. And in the same way, each staff person is very sensitive about coming into physical contact with the students.

It doesn't need to be said that corporal punishment is forbidden, but more has to be said. Youngsters cannot be pushed around because someone is in a bad mood and doesn't want to listen or is in too much of a hurry. Even beyond this, each staff person is helped to develop a special sensitivity to touching students. This special physical sensitivity must come into play before you slap a boy on the back on the basketball court, or nudge him to an activity or his room.

Generally speaking, the rule is that you don't ever touch a student. However, we know this will not be obeyed. We really don't want it obeyed. The staff person puts his/her arm around a boy to comfort him, etc. However, no matter how good the intention, the staff touches a boy, at the staff's own risk. If a boy throws off the embrace of a staff, that's all there is to it, no correction is called for.

Such sensitivity demonstrates the respect the staff has for the physical person of the student. That respect is then most often shared by the student for the staff.

Meals are Significant Events

Significant events during the day demand special attention. Staff and students share the same tables at meals and the same requirements of special behavior. One or two notes are worthy of emphasis. A staff person will never be served first, at the table; the first dishes go to the students. Similarly staff will never accept seconds or specially prepared foods unless he/she is positive that all the students have had their fill. (We will all perhaps recall that as children our parents never began eating until we were served and if there were special desserts, they offered them to us, first.) A student will wait on each table and tell the table what the meal consists of, and each student and staff person will ask the waiter if he/she may have a full meal or extra meat, etc. While the meal is being eaten, staff see it as their respon-

sibility to develop conversation and help each boy talk about what is about to or has happened to him this day. When each boy is finished and wishes to leave, each will ask to be excused by those remaining.

The meal times are viewed as significant events that most visibly demonstrate our nurturance of the boys. If only for that reason, they would be significant. However, they are much more. Each meal is an opportunity for the student to have help in assessing his behavior to that point and in planning for the remainder of the day. (Too often these boys see life as a series of units; a day is good or bad. Once part of it has gone sour, it cannot be redeemed. The staff must attempt to change this view.) Further, these times provide occasions when the student may elect some activity and make some of his own choices. When he is finished eating, he may leave the table or remain and chat. When the waiter asks about his meal, each student may opt to forgo his vegetables, a decision the staff will question but eventually allow the student to decide, on his own.

The Model Enhances Security

One may inquire about the overlay of security in a program where adults and youth follow many of the same regulations. The Kennedy School contends that rather than detracting from security, this model enhances the security and safety of the building, and the staff. Tutt's work in Great Britain with institutionalized boys seems to corroborate our notion. He addresses the question of absconding and clearly indicates that young people can be cared for in such a way as to diminish much unacceptable behavior like running away. He reminds us that probably the best deterrent to running away on a cold night is a hot cup of tea (Tutt, 1974).

This does not mean that the Kennedy School is not constructed in a secure manner; it surely is. However, it is always clear where an institution views its lines of defense against absconding. First, the care must be in place. This care will create a structure, an ethic that is the most important element of security. Finally will come the brick and mortar. If these are reordered, i.e., if the pre-eminent standard of the institution is security, it has given itself an easy excuse to do nothing, and it might as well have 1500 as 15 young men in residence.

Strengthening the Structure

The structure is being rebuilt or torn down daily. The structure is not static. It is fragile. It must be protected and fortified regularly. It is protected when staff behave in a manner prescribed by the program. When a student violates a rule and must be punished (usually sitting time), he is informed of his offense, allowed to address the issue, and then if necessary told to report to the supervisor at the appropriate time. The staff person doesn't take this ac-

tion personally. Consequently, the student knows he will get the prescribed punishment. He knows the program will be punishing him, not the individual person who happened to catch him.

The structure is further strengthened by the constant attention to the stated needs of the students. The Kennedy School staff listens. The child-care workers listen to what the boys are saying — what they want, their ideas about the games they're going to play that afternoon, or about the meals and how they taste, or about their frustrations and sadness and loneliness. The social workers listen. The teachers listen. The staff asks the students what are their concerns — what do they see as the problem — what do they see as the solution? The staff believes that the students will grow in relation to their autonomy, their sense that they control their lives.

An indispensable element to the maintenance of the structure is the program decision-makers' strength of personality, their use of that strength in making decisions, and their consequent availability. Decision-makers in the program must demonstrate that they will usually seek much advice about a problem and that such consultation is not weakness. However, when a decision is made, it will be followed and the decision-maker will personally follow up on it. Consistency supports decisiveness when reasonably applied. Further, the decision-makers at all levels must be available to the students. They must be able and willing to discuss their decisions and what brought them to that conclusion.

This notion of availability, although generally directed to the upper levels of the program's administration, applies to all levels. The child-care worker cannot sidestep a question because he/she is busy counting laundry. The supervisor cannot hide at his desk and the teacher cannot just lecture all the day and then step out for lunch. The people who make any sort of statements and decisions about the students must be ready to have those statements and decisions challenged where appropriate by staff and students. The alternative is a despotic type of management system, alien to the care of any people, let alone children.

In conclusion, it must be noted that order is not achieved by avoiding the most troubling issues in the lives of the students. Order is not the only or perhaps not even the pre-eminent goal. Order shares top billing with growth and to achieve growth risks are going to be required. So, there is no lack of pricking and probing the feelings of the students, no reluctance to enter into areas that may result in explosive behavior or the necessity for extended individual care. The goal is healing. The paths to it are clear and identifiable to students and to staff.

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PRACTICAL ISSUES IN VOCATIONAL EDUCATION FOR SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS

*Thomas S. James
Jeanne M. Granville*

Successful employment experience is essential to each individual's socialization process and to the development of personal attachment to society. It has been New Pride's* experience that regardless of chronicity or severity of delinquent behavior, most juvenile offenders are motivated to work. Money is perceived by them as a means to become independent, and work is a socially acceptable way to gain it. However, without adequate preparation and training, these youth will experience difficulty in obtaining and retaining employment, and will not move beyond entry-level positions. If these youth are to be successfully reintegrated into the community, they must be able to compete effectively in the job market. This is crucial — not only to the youth's ability to become self-sufficient, but to his emotional and psychological well-being.

**Editor's Note:* New Pride, Inc. is a Denver-based, non-residential program for youth who are adjudicated delinquents by the court. Though its treatment population is made up of serious, repeat offenders, the bulk of its clients are not the chronically violent offenders discussed elsewhere in this book. However, New Pride's record of success with a hard-core population, and its innovations in the area of vocational education more than merits its inclusion in this volume.

Vocational education can play a key role in the treatment of juvenile offenders, including those youth who have committed serious or violent acts. It can provide new opportunities for youth to develop technical and social skills, and to experience the rewards of positive behavior and meaningful achievement. Further, vocational education coupled with employment offers a process by which personal and social bonds can be strengthened and reinforced.

New Pride, Inc. has been providing prevocational and vocational services to multiple juvenile offenders for the past 10 years. The primary objective of this component is to prepare the youth for meaningful employment through the acquisition of marketable skills. Prevocational training includes structured activities designed to develop the academic and social skills and attitudes necessary for employment or participation in a vocational education program. In addition, prevocational training incorporates career and vocational exploration in relation to the youth's interests, strengths, and liabilities. Job readiness and orientation to the world of work are integrated throughout the prevocational programming.

New Pride defines vocational education as "on-the-job training coupled with classroom training." This approach is particularly appropriate because of the characteristics of the target population. Typically, these youth are academically deficient, unskilled, have unrealistic expectations, have no knowledge of the work ethic, and exhibit serious behavior problems. Unless these youth are prepared academically and socially, job placement or technical skills training will have little chance for success — a waste of time and valuable resources, both human and financial. Therefore, it is suggested that these youth be trained within a comprehensive, carefully structured program. We believe that New Pride offers an effective model for working with multiple serious offender youth, ages 14 through 18 years. Designed as an alternative to institutionalization in state correctional facilities, New Pride uses a "holistic" approach and provides a wide array of services. Each of these services is considered to be a critical program element, and they include: diagnostic and needs assessment, intensive supervision in the community, individual and family counseling, employment and prevocational training, structured recreation, and cultural education. Based on results of the diagnostic and needs assessment, services are individualized to meet the specific needs of each youth and are integrated into a single treatment plan.

The typical New Pride client is a 16-year-old minority male¹ who has been extensively involved in the juvenile justice system with six or more prior arrests and one to two adjudications. The only youth who are excluded from participating in New Pride are youth who have committed forcible rape or who are diagnosed as severely psychotic. In both instances, New Pride believes that those youth should be treated in a closed setting for the protection of the community and for their own personal safety. Clients are referred to juvenile court or the Division of Youth Services² following their

last adjudication in which there was a finding of guilt. This process is used to eliminate any possibility that anyone but a serious or violent offender is served by the program. New Pride does not want to widen the net by bringing into the program youth who are not guilty of the offense charged or who are not chronic or repeat offenders.

REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF JOB REQUIREMENTS AND YOUTHS' SKILLS

Because of the age range of the New Pride target population, vocational education is essential to the acquisition of skills which will develop the youth's self-sufficiency. The majority of youth referred to New Pride initially express a strong desire to work. However, in most instances, this desire is not based on a realistic appraisal of what the job demands or the skills the youth may possess. Frequently, these youth will fail when placed on a job because of their unrealistic expectations. Therefore, it is important that New Pride carefully assess the ability of each youth prior to job placement, and work with the youth to help him: (1) identify his vocational interests; (2) identify his strengths and liabilities in relation to his interests; and (3) develop realistic goals and identify the steps necessary to achieve those goals. For example, New Pride clients often indicate an interest in vocations such as auto mechanics, law, welding, and carpentry. However, they seldom know what the job entails — what skills are necessary, educational or apprentice requirements, wage scales, etc.

A work sample is valuable as both an exploration and assessment instrument. It offers a simulation of vocations by requiring the youth to perform specific tasks related to a particular vocation. For example, as part of the work sample for 'electrician,' the youth may be required to wire a simple circuit by following a diagram or other directions. The diagnostician observes the youth's dexterity, eye-hand coordination and spatial abilities, and ability to follow directions. Although rudimentary, the hands-on experience offers inexperienced youth an opportunity to begin to explore a variety of interests, to participate in a self-assessment process, and to be motivated to further investigate vocational areas of interest. It also provides a brief but concrete introduction to vocations to which the youth may not have been previously exposed, particularly in high technology, and sets the stage for further exploration via field trips and the incorporation of more specific information into his academic program.

Motivation Critical. Once the youth begins his on-the-job vocational training, motivation becomes increasingly critical as the youth must face up to the hard realities of everyday work. It is necessary to de-glamorize the world of work and help the youth bring his expectations into line with the day-to-day operation of the work place, but this must be accomplished without eliminating the desire to work.

It has been New Pride's experience that in most instances, it is better to delay the first job placement while preparing the youth for a viable training experience. However, external pressures (i.e., court-ordered restitution, a need to contribute to the support of the family) may make it difficult to delay placement. Consequently, it is necessary to involve court officials and family members in the vocational plan. It is not atypical for family members to demand most, if not all, of a client's pay, thereby discouraging the youth's motivation to work. However, the use of a portion of a youth's salary to pay restitution or to contribute to his own support is a valuable lesson to be learned and plays an important role in preparing the youth for independent living.

PREPARING YOUTHS FOR EMPLOYMENT

The following steps are taken by New Pride to prepare its clients for employment:

1) Diagnostic and Needs Assessment. At intake, all youth receive an indepth diagnostic and needs assessment. All youth are assessed by an interdisciplinary team of professionals. When a youth is referred to the program, information is collected on two distinct levels. The first is a "Needs Assessment" and involves the collection of basic information from the youth, parents, teachers, social workers, siblings, probation officers, or anyone who plays a significant role in the child's life. It includes both subjective and objective information indicating how the youth is viewed in his environment. A formal diagnostic battery is also given to each youth. In addition to a diagnostic interview with the youth, a series of standardized tests is administered to determine academic functioning levels, vocational interests and aptitudes, psychological problems, special learning problems or handicapping conditions (i.e., specific learning disabilities). The results of the diagnostic testing are coupled with the needs assessment. The youth's functioning strengths and weaknesses are evaluated and discussed with both the youth and parent (guardian). An individualized integrated service plan is developed which outlines specific, measurable objectives in the areas of education, social adjustment, and vocational training/employment. This plan can be revised but it serves as the basic framework for all future treatment decisions, including all vocational planning. It further provides the basis for developing contracts with clients.

2) Remedying Academic Deficiencies. Ninety percent of New Pride's clients have dropped out of school prior to their referral. As part of the "holistic" approach, all youth who are academically deficient must attend one of the New Pride schools and show significant progress before they are placed on jobs. Educational programming focuses on the acquisition of basic academic, social interactional, decision-making, and life skills. Learning takes place via individual or small group instruction. Materials are used

which are low-vocabulary but of high interest to adolescents. Youth are encouraged to participate in planning individualized and group activities. Communication and social skills are developed through group interaction. Those youth who have been identified as learning disabled or who have other special needs are assisted in learning to compensate for specific learning disabilities or other handicapping conditions. Prevocational preparation is incorporated into the educational programming, depending upon the individual's needs. Volunteers and field trips are used to expose youth to a variety of role models and to enrich their knowledge of possible vocations. Although volunteers and student interns must be carefully selected and trained, they can provide a valuable augmentation of staff resources and manpower.

3) Intensive Supervision and Counseling. All youth are assigned a counselor/case manager who provides intensive supervision and counseling services. An underlying premise of the "holistic" approach is that the needs of the total child must be met. New Pride's integrated service delivery system becomes extremely important in meeting the multiple needs of targeted youth. For example, the potential benefits from a vocational experience will be undermined if the youth cannot read or write, or has no place to sleep at night. Counseling focuses on the socialization process, values clarification, the development of positive self-concepts, and emancipation. Individual and family counseling sessions reinforce prevocational training conducted in the classroom. The counselor works with the youth on job-retention skills, and in setting realistic vocational and employment goals. Assistance is given in money management and if the youth has been ordered by the court to pay restitution, the counselor supervises its payment.

Additionally, New Pride is responsible for protecting the community. Thus the concept of intensive supervision is more than just theory. The program staff must work closely with parents, probation/parole officers, and other professionals in order to ensure that the desired behavioral changes occur. Client progress is reviewed on a weekly basis by all involved staff, the youth, and parent(s), and adjustments in programming are made whenever necessary. Regular reports are made to the referring agency, and the input of the youth is obtained on a daily basis through both his performance in the classroom and individual counseling sessions.

4) Vocational Training and Job Placement. As the youth begins to adjust to the program, regularly attending the educational program and demonstrating positive behavioral changes, the vocational training plan is implemented and an appropriate job placement is made. The majority of youth have no skills, and entry-level placements are frequently used as the point of initial training.

It should be emphasized that youth in these positions often need a great deal of supervision. Although youths may be capable of performing the tasks required by the job, they often have difficulty in organization and effi-

ciency. For example, a youth in an entry-level clerical position is given the task of sorting, alphabetizing, and filing mail orders. The process for efficiently organizing and completing this task must be taught and initially supervised, particularly with those youth who have learning problems. Complex directions often need to be broken down initially into several steps and written down for the youth who may have problems remembering verbal directions.

Thus, it is necessary to have placement opportunities for youth that are flexible and permit a learning sequence that allows for both learning from mistakes and achievement. Small businesses usually work better than large companies, because they are able to be more responsive to the needs of the individual and provide more direct supervision. Prior to placement, each youth completes a World-of-Work Orientation designed to familiarize him with employer expectations and job-retention skills, and to clarify values and expectations related to the work ethic.

ON-THE-JOB TRAINING WITH SMALL BUSINESSES

New Pride has used a variety of vocational training strategies. Placement with small businesses for on-the-job training has been quite successful. Placements have included custom furniture shops, auto repair shops, medical laboratories, animal clinics, photography studios, small construction companies, etc. New Pride pays the initial three months minimum wage as an incentive to the employer who provides close supervision and intensive technical training. Supportive counseling services are provided by New Pride staff to both the youth and employer to address behavior problems and conflicts that may surfact on the job. Additional individual counseling with the youth focuses on assisting him to overcome personal barriers to gainful employment (i.e., family problems, negative peer influence, negative patterns of behavior such as poor impulse control, chronic lateness, etc.).

On-the-job training is complemented by educational programming in the New Pride classroom designed to teach specific academic and cognitive skills needed for the job. For example, new vocabulary words or expressions that are pertinent to the particular vocation are introduced in the youth's reading and spelling programs so that he is able to read and express directions and key concepts. Math lessons incorporate special skills needed such as measurement, telling time, and making change. On-the-job experiences of the youth are incorporated as subject material to develop written and verbal language skills. To the greatest extent possible, both the classroom and on-the-job training are tailored to the individual's learning style. Youth are assisted in compensating for learning disabilities or other learning handicaps in the classroom and job setting.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO PROVIDE JOB OPPORTUNITIES

The "cooperative education" approach between New Pride and small businesses has worked quite well as a means of providing technical training and job experience to the target population. However, it is increasingly problematic to provide subsidized on-the-job training in today's economy. When it is difficult to find employment opportunities for skilled workers, it is almost impossible to develop jobs for unskilled, troubled youth. Dwindling financial resources make it difficult to obtain funds for youth wages, and many small businesses cannot afford to hire unskilled labor. In order to solve this problem, New Pride believes that economic development is crucial to providing opportunities for the target population. As a result, New Pride, Inc. has developed its own businesses. Based on sound marketing and management principles, New Pride's businesses are designed to return a profit. This approach is realistic because it forces the program to make responsible business decisions that will ensure the continued success and operation of the enterprise. At the same time, structured training designed to develop marketable skills and reduce the youth's negative behaviors, is provided.

Necessary Steps When Starting a Business

New Pride maintains that the development of small businesses is a feasible venture for stable service organizations, and the benefits to the target population, organization, and community can be very rewarding. Several steps are necessary when starting an income-producing business. They are as follows:

- 1) The organization must have a product to sell. A detailed market analysis must be conducted, and the organization should have a clear idea of what products are needed within the community.
- 2) The organization must employ people with the right skills to manage the business. Frequently, non-profit organizations rely on social service workers to manage their income-producing ventures and their lack of business expertise is often responsible for the failure of the business. Additionally, many social service agencies don't manage the venture as a business and this too sets the stage for failure.
- 3) The Board of Directors must support the venture. They can be extremely useful in helping to guide the business and in recruiting technical expertise.
- 4) The organization must have an entrepreneurial attitude, or a key individual who does. The entrepreneur must be totally committed to the venture and it should be his/her primary responsibility.

5) The organization should have sufficient capital to start the business (or a line of credit) and to maintain it until it becomes profitable. The market analysis should demonstrate a sound economic basis for the business, and it should not require a large capital outlay.

Type of Business. For programs that are just beginning economic development activities, it is recommended that businesses be relatively straightforward, and as free as possible from factors that cannot be controlled by the company, i.e., weather, fluctuations in markets, fads, etc. There should be a sound economic basis for the business and it should not require a large outlay of capital. The business should be labor intensive, and the majority of skills should be easily taught. This approach would favor assembly, light manufacturing, recycling, maintenance or similar ventures that could teach the work ethic to an unskilled offender population while also generating a profit. Although not necessarily ruled out, complex businesses that require a highly skilled work force are not advisable as initial ventures.

Commitment to Profit. The organization must be strongly committed to running a profitable business. If an on-going source of jobs and training is to be available for the target population, then the business must be competitive in the marketplace. Persons with the appropriate business and technical skills are not usually available on most staffs of social service programs. Therefore, recruitment and hiring of knowledgeable individuals is very important. The business and labor force must be managed so that quality and dependability are maintained.

Realistic Time Frame. New Pride recognizes that for any business endeavor to succeed and generate profits, it needs the opportunity to establish itself. In most instances, the business must be subsidized for a period of time before it will operate profitably. If unskilled labor is the primary work force, this time span might be longer than for a company that employs a traditional work force. However, this should not be used as an excuse for failing to set realistic time frames for becoming profitable. It does require that a conscientious effort be made in the planning and marketing of products or services.

Viable Opportunities. Economics will vary from community to community, and local conditions will dictate the type of business activity that is most feasible. However, there are some conditions that are prevalent in every community, and these offer viable business opportunities. For instance, almost every community is seeking to bring rising energy costs under control. Weatherization does not require complex skills, and in many states, public utility companies provide financing. New Pride has been involved in weatherization for several years, and this venture has led to other jobs in the construction trades. Other business opportunities include product assembly, light manufacturing, and recycling.

New Pride has a construction company that uses an apprenticeship approach. At first, all newly hired youth are assigned basic tasks that do not require specialized skills such as prep work, taping, scraping, tuckpointing,

grouting, etc. They also observe and assist carpenters, painters, bricklayers, plumbers, etc. As skills are mastered, youth are assigned tasks that increase in difficulty. Pay increases are based on expertise and dependability. All work is performed under the supervision of professional staff. Supportive counseling and classroom training are provided, and are thoroughly integrated with the construction training into a single 'treatment' approach. Skilled counselors work with the employment staff and are responsible for monitoring and resolving behavioral problems.

CONCLUSION

New Pride, Inc. has served over 1,200 serious/violent offenders since its inception. The majority of these youth (90%) have remained in the community. This underscores New Pride's basic premise that these youth can be worked with safely and effectively in the community. Of those clients who complete the program, 70% are reintegrated into the public school system, and the majority of youth continue part-time employment.

New Pride's community-based treatment programs are extremely cost-effective when compared with the cost of placing a child in an institution. In Colorado, it costs \$28,000 per year to incarcerate a youth. New Pride's cost is \$4,500 per year. Consequently, the cost-effectiveness alone justifies the operation of New Pride. Moreover, the program is able to demonstrate effectiveness in changing negative social behavior and maintaining existing family units with little risk to the community. Additionally, New Pride has demonstrated that the concepts developed in Denver can be transferred with similar success to other jurisdictions. The critical program elements can be standardized and easily taught.

It has been New Pride's experience that its clients can master a variety of skills that lead to meaningful employment or continued vocational training. The program is designed to promote the development of each youth's full potential. At the same time, New Pride realizes that it is not in the best interest of youth to promote employment at the expense of other skills that the youth must possess if he is to be successful in life. This is especially true for younger youth who may have a more immediate need for behavior controls or basic education. By developing and running its own businesses, New Pride has been able to provide a constant source of training and has been able to control the learning environment so that specific needs of the youth are addressed.

FOOTNOTES

1. Less than 10% of New Pride's client population are female. Girls participating in New Pride receive an individualized program as outlined in this narrative. However, New Pride's female clients often require specific programming which addresses problems related to teen pregnancy, teenage single mothers, etc. The authors acknowledge the importance of vocational education for female offenders and are very much aware of their unique program needs. However, the complexity of the subject could not be adequately addressed in this article and the decision to speak to the majority of the New Pride client population was the authors' decision. Thus, the use of the masculine gender throughout the narrative.
2. The Division of Youth Services is a department of the Colorado Department of Institutions and has the responsibility for running Colorado's juvenile corrections facilities.

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A METHOD FOR TREATING THE ADOLESCENT SEX OFFENDER

*Sandy Lane
Pablo Zamora*

As sex offender therapists at the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center (a treatment unit for violent juvenile offenders in Colorado), we think that juvenile sex offenders can be treated successfully. This is in spite of the fact that our first experiences in attempting to treat this type of youth were disastrous. At that time we were easily convinced that the young sex offenders in our program had "reformed." After all, they showed us during their sentence at the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center (CATC) that they were better: they didn't rape while they were locked up; they decreased their assaultive behaviors in the institution; they could recite the consequences of ending up in the adult correctional system if they committed future sexual assaults; they had tearful, cathartic groups about their rage at their mothers; they learned more about their sexuality; and they *told* us they were improved. Apparently by "improved" they meant more sophisticated and manipulative. Our naiveté became suddenly apparent when one of our rapists went AWOL from a work program. While on the run, he committed a string of rapes in the western United States before being apprehended and sentenced to a long prison term.

After the initial shock, it was clear that we needed to re-examine our treatment programs. We had been following the classic psychotherapeutic techniques: helping the youths deal with poor impulse control and feelings of inadequacy; helping them identify their anger with their mothers that made them act out against women, etc. It was obvious that giving the youths

these insights wasn't helping at all, and we needed a new approach to working with them.

After reviewing the literature (sparse as it was in the juvenile field), and visiting some of the very few existing programs for juvenile sex offenders, we decided the best remaining resource to add to our learning about the subject was to study the sex offenders themselves. After we discarded some of our preconceived opinions and began to actually listen to what they were reporting about their thought patterns, we began to learn a great deal. They have taught us how a sex offender thinks, the dynamics of rape, the unique personality characteristics of the sex offender, and the pervasiveness of the youth's aggressive thought processes. Through this combination of seeking out experts in the field and studying our own client population, we have developed a set of assumptions which helped in redesigning the treatment program. The assumptions are briefly summarized as follows:

1) The act of rape is a compensatory behavior used by the sex offender to reduce or eliminate feelings of anxiety stemming from feeling out of control, helpless, powerless, fearful or inadequate. These feelings trigger instant rage responses which lead towards thinking about and eventually acting out the rape.

2) Most adolescent sex offenders have been sexually victimized (or perceived an early childhood experience as sexual victimization) during their early childhood. Their subsequent violent reaction to feelings of being controlled or powerless appear to be related to this event.

3) The act of rape is not an impulsive event. The act has been preplanned and rehearsed cognitively and in many cases parts of the plan have been rehearsed physically. Only the selection of a victim and the timing of the rape act may occur impulsively.

4) Each youth has a definable rape cycle — a set of circumstances and internal reactions that precipitate the need to decrease internal anxiety by the act of sexual assault.

5) Prior to developing rape behaviors the youth has used repetitive sexual assault fantasies to dilute the feelings of anxiety. Each of the youths we have worked with has experienced a process of gradually increasing the violent nature of the fantasies.

6) Each of our youths had committed some type of sexual assault behavior prior to his first rape, generally starting with an act that did not involve personal contact. These behaviors include violent masturbatory fantasies about a specific individual; voyeurism; exhibitionism; sexually oriented burglaries; and/or stalking a potential victim and touching or grabbing body parts.

7) Sex offenders are more comfortable with anger than with other types of feelings. They feel anger easily and frequently. They are very easily provoked and they have unstable impulse control.

8) Each youth has exhibited rigid value systems; they frequently exhibit perceptions in a "black and white" manner. They tend to see sex as bad, see

women as alternately saints or prostitutes.

9) Sex offenders have a paucity of knowledge about appropriate social interactions and have poor social skills.

10) Prior to raping, the sex offender depersonalizes and objectifies potential victims. The rapist then primarily seeks dominance and power over his victim.

STRUCTURING A TREATMENT PLAN FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Based on the above assumptions, it was decided to improve the treatment of the juvenile sex offender by adding certain treatment modalities to the existing program, particularly a separate sex offenders' group. It should be mentioned first that it is the authors' opinion that treatment should be long-term and in a secure setting for the juvenile sex offender. The juvenile sex offender must be pressured to change his behavior, and is likely to attempt to escape. The safety of the community must be a primary consideration.

At the CATC, the juvenile sex offender goes through the regular program for at least his first year. The regular program is an intensive, therapeutic community/positive peer culture design. The core of the treatment program takes place in daily group therapy. The rest of the program is designed to reinforce the changes made in the daily group meetings.

The major focus of the overall treatment program is to improve interpersonal relationships to the point where the violent youth not only stops harming others, but becomes helpful to them. Although the process is long-term and complex, it is expected that by the time the violent sex offender has reached the point of applying for admission to a special sex offenders' group, he has learned to be fairly open about giving and receiving interpersonal feedback and at least has his outwardly aggressive behavior under control.

The tests to see if these goals have been achieved are both objective and subjective. The question of whether outward aggressive behavior in the institution is under control is easy to check in records of daily behavioral points and upward movement in the unit-level system. The question of degree of openness is a subjective decision based on both peer and staff opinion and also on analysis by the sex offender group leaders of a daily journal. The youth is instructed to record all experiences, perceptions, reactions, fantasies and thoughts that occurred every day. They are particularly asked to describe situations that made them angry or left them feeling helpless or controlled. The sex offender therapists review the diaries regularly for a month before deciding whether the youth has become open enough to benefit from sex offenders' group.

The sex offenders' group, itself, is a unique feature of the CATC treatment program. It is the only group that is not open to others. What takes place in sex offenders' group is not shared with the peers in their other therapy groups. It is the only group that is all male and made up of youths with similar offenses. It is the only group in the program where the members keep daily diaries or journals. It is the only group that does not have several group leaders. There are only two co-therapists in the sex offenders' group — a male and a female.

The uniqueness of the group and particularly the homogenous grouping was felt to be a necessity in order to reduce the sex offender's ongoing fear of degrading and retributive reactions from peers. Even though the daily therapy groups they experience throughout the program can deal with many problems, and even with some sex offender issues, they never relax their defenses completely until they feel the safety of being in a group of fellow sex offenders.

Once admitted into the sex offender group, the youth continues to attend that group in addition to his daily therapy groups until he is released. Even after release, he is expected to return and attend sex offender group at least once a month.

PHASES OF TREATMENT

It is our observation that sex offenders go through five fairly distinct phases during their treatment: 1) penetrating the denial and dealing with the sexual assaults the youth has committed; 2) identifying the individual's rape cycle and working with the daily manifestations of the cycle; 3) working with unresolved emotional issues; 4) retraining in the areas of skill deficits; and 5) re-entry into the community.

These phases overlap considerably and some, particularly the first one, are dealt with as much in the first year of treatment as they are later in sex offenders' group. A prerequisite to starting any treatment with the juvenile sex offender, of course, is for him to establish a significant relationship with at least one person in the program, preferably a therapist. Sex offenders are suspicious and resentful of almost everyone, and are not open to any communication unless they have some feeling of trust from the other person. In a sense, they emotionally close their ears to all communications unless it is from someone they feel cares about them. Of course, the youth will severely test the relationship, and it takes a great deal of patience on the part of the therapist to understand and work with him during these periods. It is important that the therapist-sex offender relationship not be a "motherly" or rescuing or infantilizing one. That type of relationship would perpetuate his tendencies to use and manipulate others. The ideal relationship is more one where the therapist accomplishes the difficult task of conveying to the youth that he accepts him as a person, while rejecting his negative

behaviors plus any excuses he may give for continuing the behaviors.

It is our opinion that the ideal leadership of a sex offenders' group is provided by having male and female co-leaders. For one thing, the role modeling by the two of appropriate male-female relationships is a good learning experience for youths who think of women as objects or belongings. Secondly, the presence of a female therapist seems to trigger feelings and responses that do not arise when only the male therapist is present and, at the same time, the group does not seem to feel comfortable if the male therapist is absent. Again in our opinion, it is important for the female therapist to have the following attributes: an ability to be direct and confrontive in a caring, supportive manner; an ability to allow dependence and transference issues while recognizing the youth's autonomy needs; an ability to set limits without being excessively controlling; a willingness to allow the youth to attempt new social behaviors with her; and an openness about sexuality without being seductive. Optimum qualities of a male co-therapist include a particular need to convey a feeling of strength and confidence without seeming to be aggressive, withdrawn or excessively "macho." He also needs to be self-assured and socially aware enough that he does not relate to females as subordinates.

Obviously it requires special people and a special program to guide juvenile sex offenders through the complex phases of treatment. Their resistance is enormous throughout the process. Following is an example of the degree of resistance to treatment a juvenile sex offender can demonstrate:

George has been incarcerated in various programs for nearly six years. Prior to his transfer to the CATC he was involved in another program which he sabotaged by going AWOL nine times. Eventually he assaulted an elderly woman who was working the night shift in his cottage, and ran away again. After he was recaptured he was transferred to the CATC. For the next two years he continued to run away emotionally. He was unable to leave the secure setting so he would withdraw, appearing nearly catatonic at times. He often refused to do behavioral tasks. One of his programs included a task of talking with each individual that he had angry issues with, and he refused to come out of his room for nearly a week. He went on a hunger strike (which lasted for three meals) and tried to figure out how he could get his lawyer to get him out. Later he informed us that he believed we were setting him up to get hurt by forcing him to acknowledge to others that he was angry with them. He was so terrified that he spent as much time in his room as possible feeling safe, while fantasizing about being a gladiator or a knight, or thinking that he would make us stop our crazy demands if he could rape one of the female staff. He spent his first two years at CATC using these types of avoidance behaviors before he felt he could risk trying new behaviors and attitudes — this occurred in the last 13 months of treatment.

Phase 1 — Penetrating the Denial and Working with the Charged Act of Sexual Assault

Juvenile sex offenders, like their adult counterparts, almost always insist in the beginning that they didn't really commit the crime. It is amazing to some how youths can be caught literally with their pants down, or be found guilty in court by overwhelming evidence, and they will still enter treatment claiming to all that they didn't really do it; or if they did, it was justified. This outright denial is usually only the first of many phases of the youth's denial process during the course of treatment. For some time, the youths continue to externalize the responsibility and blame others for causing them to think or act as they do. Examples of typical excuses are: "The lady asked me to have sex with her — she looked at me over the lettuce counter." "The only reason I tied her up is 'cause she kept distracting herself by telling her kids to go outside! It's not my fault the kids watched; they probably just wanted to see their mom do it."

The first goal then becomes penetrating the initial denial to the extent that the youth admits he did the crime. The entry level or orientation to the regular program is often effective in this initial breakthrough, as the youth is required to explain to all of his peers and staff in a "Community Group" why he came to the unit. The group very matter-of-factly confronts attempts to lie, deny, minimize, or project blame for the crime, and almost always this pressure is enough to get the youth to initially acknowledge he did the crime. Later in the daily groups this will be explored much further, and once the youth enters sex offenders' group, it will be analyzed again.

Areas to be explored include such details as: precisely how he committed the assault; how the victim was selected, then how he/she was set up; type of weapon used (including acknowledgement that his physical size, his demeanor and his penis were used as weapons); what he wore, what he said and any other details pertinent to the event. This program helps the youth to begin to take responsibility for being a rapist. It also serves to provide clues for the therapist and his group members about the youth's *modus operandi* and thought processes.

The youth then is urged to identify each of the reactions, thoughts and feelings experienced during the act of rape or sexual assault as well as his perceptions about the victim. He also needs to identify post-rape reactions to enable him to begin to identify the purpose that sexual assault serves for him. During this process it is important for the therapist to provide leadership to the group members so that they assume an attitude of exploring and information-seeking. Attempting to provide too many confrontations or reality checks at this point in treatment may serve to reinforce the youth's denial, or may teach him to pre-censor information before he shares it to avoid critical or angry reactions.

The next step is one of identifying the process that occurred prior to the rape. Each rapist has an individual pattern that occurs prior to raping. This

pattern includes the following steps: repetitive rape fantasies; decision to rape; development and refinement of the ideal rape plan; emotional and/or physical rehearsal of various parts of the plan; selection of a victim; and then the actual rape. The time period for each phase varies with the individual.

We have found it is imperative for the sex offender to identify this process thoroughly because he needs to understand that the process of rape is a choice. Until he is able to admit to himself that he chooses to rape as a behavioral alternative to dealing with whatever internal reaction he is having, he will be unable to take responsibility for choosing to use other, less hurtful alternatives. The youth then needs to identify the events that were occurring in his life at the time he decided to rape. Later in treatment the youth will use this knowledge to identify situational patterns that trigger the intolerable internal reactions that start him in a rape cycle.

Herb was committed to our facility after sexually assaulting a five-year-old girl. Initially he maintained that he had uncontrollable sexual urges and was attracted to young girls. After a lengthy period of denial he admitted to himself that he had sexually victimized the girl. As he explored the preliminary aspects he learned that he had decided to rape after a public altercation with a friend from which he had run. He could not tolerate feeling like a "chicken" so he had committed sexual assault to feel dominant, important and capable. He acknowledged that he had had rape fantasies similar to the way in which he had assaulted the girl for approximately 18 months. He was able to follow the progression of his fantasies to more refined versions, how they had developed into a plan for "if ever." Of course, at the time he believed the fantasies were just good girlie magazine material. He remembered practicing parts of his plans. He used to go to elementary schools and role play giving kids candy or nickels while pushing them on the swings. He was developing the "set up," the process by which he would entice a little girl to go someplace with him, relate to him. He was doing a "rape walk."

Victim awareness, or identifying and understanding the effects of his behavior on his victim, becomes the sex offender's next step. The ideal is that the youth will feel badly about the effects he has created, but that response can take a long time to evoke, and for some youth will never occur. Initially the youth needs to speculate about how the victim felt and what effects the assault had on her family, himself and his own family. An important aspect of this process is for the therapist to encourage personalization of the victim. This can be done by requiring the sex offender to use the victim's name when he is discussing his crime, and developing her character so that the youth understands he hurt a *person*. This is important because sex offenders depersonalize their victims prior to assaulting them and continue to depersonalize them in order to justify their behaviors. Many youths describe forgetting their victims completely after raping them. The youth also needs to explore how committing a sexual assault victimizes himself in the long

term. This issue is most easily explored by evaluating the personal consequences for him matter-of-factly, confronting the youth if he tends to use this in a "poor me" manner.

The sex-offender youth also needs to explore just why society views negatively an act which is so rewarding to the perpetrator. The youths we have worked with inform us that they are influenced by sexual implications from the media; by dramatizations about rape and cultural messages that imply that men are or should be dominant even if it means subjugating another; and by societal messages (i.e., from their peers) that reinforce the notion they should be aggressive and sexually knowledgeable. They often distort this information in justifying their crimes. One youth explained, "When I raped that chick I was proud I'd finally had sex; I was a *real* man. I wanted to write *Penthouse Forum* to describe how great it was."

Sex offenders also use these perceived societal messages to depersonalize potential victims. Therefore, a critical part of victim awareness is the values-clarification component. Part of this includes media awareness to point out what messages make them think the only way to relate to females is to be "macho," aggressive and dominant. It is hoped that they learn how their own internal feelings help them distort all of society's value messages to fit their own needs.

Identification of the Rape Cycle

Once the youth has evaluated his committing offenses he has the beginning concepts that enable him to generalize information to other behaviors. He has become aware that he chose to rape, that the act was used as a compensatory alternative to some anxiety-producing event and that his purpose was to obtain a feeling of being in control. He is then encouraged to begin exploring every act of sexual assault that he has committed. As he explores each event, a major goal will be for him to identify the specific rape cycle involved. Gradually some patterns will emerge. With the assistance of the group, he learns to identify situations that are likely triggers for feeling angry and then committing sexual assault behaviors. It is not uncommon for the youth to have multiple emotional triggers; he will also have a family of aggressive behaviors and thoughts that he attempts to use before he actually decides to rape.

From a broad perspective a rape cycle seems to be comprised of:

an event or a perceived event ► an emotional response ► stimulation of an emotional response which is, for that youth, an intolerable set of feelings or reactions ► attempts to compensate with substitute feelings (thoughts, power behaviors, soliciting certain types of reactions from others, etc.) that give the youth a feeling of having or being in control ► feelings of anger, even rage ► decision to rape ► refinement of a rape plan (during this part of the cycle thoughts,

fantasies and rape walks are anxiety reducing) ► selection of victim ► selection of when and where to rape ► rape or sexual assault ► internal feelings or reactions compensating for the original event.

Our youths have reported consistently that not only do they forget about all of their problems and bad feelings during and after a rape, but they also feel a "rush" that is very gratifying. Eventually the youth will be able to identify the types of situations to which he responds angrily. Once the youth decides that he wants to change, or that it is to his benefit to change, this information will enable him to learn less maladaptive and harmful alternatives for dealing with the situations that are stressful to him.

Although the youths we have treated at CATC initially deny previous sexual assault behaviors, later they have informed us that the vast majority of the time the offense for which the sex offender is charged is not the first he has ever done. Most of them have confessed that they have raped before and not been caught, or if caught they were released without charges or charged with a less serious offense. The rest of the sex offenders have reported they either nearly completed a rape, or have committed parts of a sexual assault. The one youth who denied any previous behaviors had had several repetitive, explicit violent fantasies, had masturbated to these and been sexually aroused by the violent sexual fantasies and afterward felt better about something else that he had been angry or upset about. In fact this "thought ► relief" process becomes so reinforcing that it is repeated. It becomes more important to the sex offender than any concerns about other people or things. It is highly likely that he has done some acts of voyeurism, exhibitionism or intrusive touch. The youth needs to identify any progressive patterns, especially those involving increasing amounts of physical contact with a victim. Should the youth have a history of several molestations or assaults, he should be helped to evaluate them for patterns that might include those of increasing violence during contact with his victims, increasing cruelty, or lessening of the time between sexual assaults.

Herb, as he continued in treatment, eventually confessed to rapes and molestations of five other girls, ranging in age from three to 16-years-old. He identified a pattern progressing from stealing his father's girlie magazines at age eight to masturbate, to sitting with little girls in his lap and unobtrusively rubbing them against his penis. He spied on people when they were making love, exhibited his penis in a variety of situations and induced his sisters to expose themselves to him prior to his first rape walks. After his first few rape walks he began exhibiting intimidating and coercive behaviors to potential victims. Concurrently he was involved in almost compulsive sexual experimentation with girls nearer to his age level, 17.

The sex-offender youth does not stop raping just because he is locked up, institutionalized or in treatment. The vast majority have enough savvy to realize that if they commit overt sexual assault behaviors at this time the

consequences will be onerous. The youth develop substitute behaviors or "institutional rapes." The youth have reported to us that in their minds they equate these behaviors with rape. Institutional rapes can include such behaviors as: invasive looks, i.e., down a female's blouse, up her shorts or skirt; "accidental" touch of a female's derriere or breasts accompanied by profuse apologies; grabbing someone's hand and squeezing it hard; intimidating looks or behaviors; having to win each personal interaction with a female, no matter how insignificant the issue is to others; positioning oneself so one can surreptitiously observe the females in the bathrooms; coercing a female peer to play sexual games which usually involve sexual touch or oral sex. One of the reasons the youth gives these acts significance equal to a rape relates to the excitement of doing it without being caught, while still being able to tell himself he is in control, powerful and pretty slick. Having the youth identify these types of behaviors, then using them to have the youth identify current rape cycles, can become a potent therapeutic tool.

After the sex offender seems to be fairly comfortable exposing thought processes and reactions he should begin the process of learning to confront the violent reactions. When he uses a violent fantasy, a rape plan, stalking behaviors or "institutional rape" behaviors, he should begin telling himself STOP in whatever way is effective for him to interrupt the cognitive and behavioral process. If the youth is able to identify what he is reacting to and compensating for, he can learn immediate, successful alternatives. As the youth progresses in treatment he will become increasingly able to determine when he is in a rape cycle by paying attention to his internal reactions and identifying his triggers as they occur. He can then become adept at confronting his thoughts and controlling his behaviors.

During the latter stages of Earl's treatment, he began identifying when he was in a rape cycle and how he was acting on it. He used the following feelings for flags, or cues to himself that he was in a rape cycle: feeling victimized; loneliness; black and white thinking; masturbation to rape fantasies; avoidance behaviors; feeling rejected by his primary therapist; and feeling mad that everyone else was mad at him. One of his "institutional rapes" was to look down females' blouses to see breasts or bras without getting caught; another was to unobtrusively stalk a potential victim throughout the CATC building; and another was to win any interaction with female peers. He began wearing a rubber band on his wrist and would snap himself when he felt as if he could not control these behaviors. Eventually he was able to stop himself at any point in his rape cycle, identify the issues and consider other alternatives he could use. At times he would go through with sneaky (institutional) rapes and confront himself afterward, and at times he would try another way of dealing with the situation. Rape behaviors caused him to feel elated, as though he had achieved something and was in control. The alternative solutions he chose had to provide the same type of feeling of mastery and self-content or he would choose to revert to rape behaviors.

Working with Unresolved Emotional Issues

Each youth is influenced by past events that had a major impact on him at the time. If the impact was negative, he is likely to be hypersensitive to issues that have similar impact in the present. When these sensitivities or issues are not worked through, there often is a residual effect on the individual's attitudes and behaviors. Predominant issues that sex offenders in the CATC program have identified include: being sexually victimized; rejection or perceived abandonment; family issues; and perceived inadequacy.

Sexual Victimization. Our opinion is that the most critical issue for juvenile sex offenders to work with is dealing with being sexually victimized. Each of the youths in our program has at least a vague memory of feeling they have been molested and/or raped during their early childhood years by an authority figure. Most of the youths recall the event vividly, but a few just have vague memories. The experience usually created feelings of fear; of being controlled and not having the power to get away or successfully fight; of helplessness to stop the assault and a sense that something shameful or wrong had occurred (especially if their victimizer was male). We believe this event is the source of rapists' strong aversion to feeling helpless, being controlled, or fearful. We further believe that they make a decision that it will *never* happen to them again, thus becoming overly defensive towards attempts to control them. They also tend to distort their perceptions of others, easily assuming that someone is trying to control them. The feeling of helplessness that sex offenders experience at the time of their victimization, seems to become the basis for their learning how to make others feel helpless and controlled. It seems as if a compensation set of behaviors and perceptions evolves, based on the premise that "If I *feel* powerful, I *must* be OK." Many of the youth have never before admitted to anyone that they had been sexually victimized; some have even denied to themselves that the event occurred. Following are some examples of incidents revealed by juvenile sex offenders:

Jose recalls sexual interactions with his brother who tied him in a chair, stuck limes in his anus and forced Jose to perform fellatio. He also watched his father dress transsexually. Milt was frightened when he was about three by his mother holding him with his legs on her hips when both were nude; he also recalls his mother bathing him when he was seven and being helpless when she'd stroke his penis. Earl has a long history of being homosexually pimped by a man who became his guardian when he was eight. When Earl grew pubic hair he was encouraged to leave home and felt rejected. Henry relates that he was sexually abused when he was three, forced to endure fellatio by a drunken, yelling father. When he was seven his father and older brother tied him to a tree and held him down while they anally assaulted him. Fritz recalls being on a male's lap when he was four and being fondled, probably by his father (he recalls a male but cannot put a face to the man). Herb's uncle was a

child molester who taught his nephew the "joys" of sexual assault. George remembers nothing, but his father was involved in group sex activities and he has vague memories of being bothered one evening by a woman. Nathan was nine when his cousin forced him to try to have sex with him; he remembers feeling like his penis was trapped and would be lost in "that hole," and was terrified.

Issues of Loss. When helping youths work with issues of loss, one will generally find that they are enraged at being abandoned or at their perception of having been rejected. Current over-reactions to any type of loss indicate some past experience with loss of a significant person. Areas of inadequacies may be difficult to work with because the youth often cannot admit to inadequacies without touching off some of his emotional triggers, particularly the feeling of being out of control. It is important to assist the youth to identify these areas in order to help him learn nonaggressive substitute behaviors. As he becomes increasingly confident with the use of such behaviors as assertiveness skills, and sees results from the use of these techniques, the sex offender is able to more easily identify skills that he does not have. With some feelings of success and adequacy in his possession he will more easily decide that the areas in which he lacks skills are ones he'd better learn about as opposed to feeling he has to defend against and hide those areas.

Family Issues. Family issues fall into several broad categories and each youth will have unique, individual unresolved problems. Frequently, the youth needs to deal with anger with one or both parents for not protecting him from being sexually victimized. Most youths have to work through issues about poor identification with fathers' behaviors and mothers' ways of dealing with them. Several of our sex offenders have role modeled extremes of behaviors and socially unacceptable value systems. In addition, many youths need to work through competitive issues with their siblings.

Skill Deficit Retraining

Providing youth with a broad range of new behaviors is critical if they are to become willing to allow themselves to give up sexual assault behaviors. The adolescent sex offender seems to have a rigid, stereotypical set of responses to conflict and stressful situations.

In their daily diaries the youth frequently will describe situations that made them angry, then talk about a fantasized put-down or a depersonalization of the other person or people involved in a situation, and then a grandiose plan of how they will obtain revenge. Often, within a short period of time, the diary will indicate the youth is having a rape fantasy. This pattern is seen as a response to a variety of situations. The sex offender consistently views the other person as an enemy that he has to fight. When the youths describe the actions they take in these various situations they are generally

ineffective, passive or passive-aggressive behaviors. Their social skills are often so poor they do not know effective ways to stop situations they do not like, or how to encourage rewarding interactions. They usually have such a deficit of alternatives to interpersonal conflict that sexual assault fantasies become almost automatic responses to feeling out of control. For example, one early entry in a sex offender's diary states, "They put me in 'time-out' for nothing. . . I'll show her. I'll break out of here and blow up her damned car. She deserves to die. She'll pay — she is always messing with my head." Even after he calmed down, he could not think of any ways he could have dealt with the situation or prevented it from occurring.

It seems clear that sex offenders need training in all social skills, such as assertiveness, fair-fighting rules, conflict resolution, and the art of negotiation and compromise. The youths need to learn that it is possible for them to be assertive enough to get many needs met without any need for aggression. Ideally they gain enough confidence in interpersonal relationships that they no longer feel attacked, intimidated, controlled, cornered, rejected or helpless — all emotions which trigger the rape cycle.

Once the youth is exposed to and has practiced various alternative social behaviors, the group frequently reminds him that he is expected to use the new behaviors. During this phase, and the rest of his treatment, he is held accountable for using these alternative behaviors to deal with the situations that are problematic to him. In the early stage of this process, of course, he will need assistance from a therapist or peer while he is trying out something different. In fact, often the youth will test alternative behaviors with the sex offender group therapists during conflict situations before deciding if it is worth trying them in more critical situations.

Other areas that need retraining include: values clarification; communication skills; how to develop relationships; sex education; courtship skills; job-seeking skills; and some vocational skills. The youths also need to work in detail with how they use angry reactions and develop more efficient methods to cope with anger. They also need to receive consistent feedback about the way they perceive others vs. how others perceive them, as they tend to distort the motivation of others (often seeing them as attackers).

Obtaining information about the values of more well-adjusted people and how they make decisions and deal with situations is very important. Most of the CATC sex offenders' perceptions and concerns about others have tended to be somewhat antisocial and colored with the assumption that others are somehow antagonists; thus it is essential that the foregoing information is emphasized as a learning tool, so that these youths will not continue to try one or two ineffective solutions, then quickly revert to intimidation or power-oriented alternatives.

Transition — Community Re-entry

Transition is one of the most critical treatment phases. In our experience, it is essential to allow approximately nine months to a year for transition for

the juvenile sex offender. While they may be able to alter their behaviors, thought processes and decisions while at CATC, generalizing them to the real world is a tricky proposition. The process of transition involves spending an increasing amount of time in the community without supervision until the youth is able to work and live outside of the institution without being a danger to the community.

During the period of transition the sex offender experiences a great deal of stress. At these times sex offenders regress, often more than one would expect. The problem becomes one of helping them generalize what they have learned in the institution to the real world, particularly behavioral alternatives. Although the youths have been using alternatives consistently for a long period of time in the institution, they have tried these new behaviors with people with whom they are familiar and are able to predict their reactions. Dealing with new people, such as in a job situation, is much more unpredictable and frightening. Without accountability expectations, support, and assistance with problem solving, the youth may quickly regress to the point where he uses power-oriented behaviors to deal with conflict.

Even before transition starts, cognitive approaches can be used to help the youth anticipate life in the real world. For example, the group can help the youth think about what he'd like to do after incarceration, and then help him problem-solve how to achieve his goals. They can help him predict possible problematic situations and identify alternatives in advance. This process may need to be as concrete as exploring how one selects a dentist, or role playing what happens when an employer or teacher criticizes the youth's work. At the CATC, initial excursions to the community are supervised by staff members and at times the youth may take a fellow peer. The youth then "processes" with staff and peers after each such excursion to identify what he was feeling and what behaviors he used that were effective.

Activities involved in transition include finding resources for various needs, e.g., how does one get an I.D.; what grocery stores are near where he wishes to live and how does one shop; finding recreational resources and activities; practicing life skills; finding educational facilities; and pursuing vocational activities such as where to apply for a job, how to find a job and keep it.

We feel that the sex-offender youth needs to be placed on parole when he is released, as that provides an additional mechanism for accountability for his behavior. It is hoped by the time his parole is completed he will be functioning effectively and nondangerously and will be so satisfied with this style of living that he will not need to return to old behaviors. During at least the first six months after release from our program we expect the youths to continue to come to the unit once a week for involvement in sex offenders' session. Frequent telephone calls and visits in the community, plus "crisis intervention," also provide needed support.

EMOTIONAL COSTS OF WORKING WITH SEX OFFENDERS

Working closely with sex offenders creates numerous personal reactions for therapists. It becomes imperative for the individuals involved to be aware of and work with their reactions so they can be used therapeutically. It can be a stressful situation unless the other staff in the treatment program are willing to offer support and time for the therapists to talk.

One of the most significant areas one reacts to is seeing how a sex offender operates. Working intimately with sex offenders has contributed to our awareness of our vulnerabilities and actually contributes to feelings of paranoia at times. As we become aware of the absolute helplessness to predict sexual assault or prevent being selected as a victim, we realize the potential dangers and begin seeing sex offender characteristics in many people. The therapist frequently has to balance feelings of disgust and revulsion with learning to appreciate the individual and having some care and respect for him.

Transference issues also occur. The therapist often begins to experience feelings of helplessness in his/her own sexual and interpersonal interactions, or becomes aware of issues of interpersonal control and/or dominance. Increased feelings of aggression may occur as well as rape, rape-victim, or rape-victim-savior fantasies. Often there is a need to normalize (decrease the dangerousness and violence in one's perception) the youths' aggressive sexual fantasies in order to work with them. Therapists have experienced increased use of such self-defenses as denial, suppression, repression, and intellectualization. We have also experienced feelings of futility, depression and a tendency to withdraw from others at times. One of the most destructive situations can be becoming outraged with the sex offender when he does not progress or function exactly as we want him to. Each of these issues must be acknowledged and worked through by the therapists, while still maintaining the I-You human interaction with the sex-offender youth.

Another difficult problem arises when youths direct their aggression toward the therapists. Often the youths will have rape fantasies towards the female therapist, while still depending on her to help them. The following paragraph was written by the female co-therapist as information for a staff in-service meeting:

"Getting to know a sex offender intimately, as one does in the therapeutic process, is a disquieting experience. Myron, for example, has no physical characteristics which label him as a rapist. In fact, he looks like an average teenage neighbor. He's sociable and affable in some situations, and has a pretty good sense of humor. As you really get to know Myron, though, there are some odd characteristics. He's overly defensive. Something as simple as telling him his idea is lousy, beating him in a game of basketball or telling him

to stop a behavior right now will elicit an out-of-proportion reaction. Myron is great at making one pay for these 'controlling' behaviors. He may withdraw and sulk; he may yell with an incredible look of violence in his eyes; he may look down your blouse if you're a female, or mutter, 'You're lucky your wife isn't here!' if you're male. One begins to get an awareness of his ability to intimidate or even strike out at you. It becomes uncomfortable to hear the names he calls people. To listen to *him*, he's a constant victim; people are out to get him all the time. And the ways he's going to get even! You put him in 'time-out' or you score him down and you deserve to die or be raped! You think, 'What a stupid reaction,' but you begin to fear his irrationality. When you hear how he thinks, you are surprised by how much he sexualizes everything. You hear him talk about how 'that bitch is teasing me,' and you just see her as walking across the room. You never dreamed he had a picture of raping her to pay her back for the way she walks. If you're female, you begin to be aware that Myron watches you — watches how you move, sit, bend over, and you begin to fear what he is thinking about you. One day you confront Myron a bit too strongly, touch some of his fears, and he closes down a little — gets more defensive. Then he tells you how he will rape you, or yours, explicitly. And you still have to treat him."

SUMMARY

As we have begun to make contact with the few other juvenile sex-offender programs around the country, we have found that most programs have developed in much the same way we have. Most experienced multiple failures in their initial attempts to treat them, searched for ideas in the literature and other programs, and then created programs which were a combination of various techniques. In the Colorado Division of Youth Services, a "sister" program similar to ours was being developed at the same time as ours at the Lookout Mountain Treatment Center in Golden. Co-therapists John Davis and Connie Isaac have been conducting the revised and intensified version of their sex-offender treatment program for about the same amount of time as we have at the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center, roughly three years. The two programs have released 16 youths in the past years and there have been two recidivists. Because of the small number of youths released it is possible to maintain fairly close contact with them to assess their status after release.

Also, however, because of the small numbers we cannot claim any scientific "breakthrough." Both programs feel, however, that treatment programs they have developed are certainly more viable and effective than

anything they had attempted in the past. The rate of violent crime with juveniles continues to be extraordinarily high, and this is particularly true for the crime of rape. Because they are so difficult to treat, many settings prefer to provide only custodial care and not attempt treatment. We feel the results we have to date are encouraging enough that more programs should be attempting treatment of the juvenile sex offender. It certainly seems preferable to releasing an untreated, unchanged, dangerous youth back into society.

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COMMUNITY REINTEGRATION IN JUVENILE OFFENDER PROGRAMMING

David M. Altschuler

The community reintegration process is based on a set of assumptions which fly in the face of the practice of many decades where child care institutions of various sorts were separated from mainstream socialization influences and the local community. It was their intention first to insulate the child from these influences and then to strengthen or inculcate values conducive to law abidance and other legitimate roles. The assumptions were that (1) the youths would leave the programs appropriately immunized to survive the outside world, and (2) adjustment and progress within the programs offered some reasonably sound basis for thinking successful community reintegration would follow.

We now know that in large part these beliefs were naive and erroneous. While the assumptions allowed the programs to "treat" children freed from the intrusions of the outside world, and the local community could rely on others to handle their problems at a distance, there was not much continuity or similarity between program and community life. As a result, natural supports in the community were not cultivated, and the youths returned either less capable of functioning autonomously or more attached to their deviant peers and patterns (Coates, Miller and Ohlin, 1978; Empey and Lubeck, 1971; Haley, 1980; Shannon, 1982; Whittaker, 1979; Wolfensberger, 1972).

The research on deinstitutionalization in Massachusetts (Coates, Miller and Ohlin, 1978), for example, strongly suggests that the more a program

enhances its model of operation by improving its social climate and by increasing the extent and quality of community linkages, the less likely it is that juvenile offenders will either reappear in court or receive a severe disposition if they do reappear. In short, the study claims that the more "normalized" the setting, the better the youngster's chances of not recidivating. After having reviewed numerous studies of programs for troubled children, Whittaker (1979, p. 136) observes:

A child's later experiences in school, family, and neighborhood will largely determine whether gains achieved in the group life program are maintained. For this reason alone, the group care program needs to link itself with those powerful community institutions that will have an impact on the returning child: family, peer group, school, and others.

In addition to being concerned about the effects of isolation and not working with various potential community resources, reintegration programming is sensitive to the adverse effects of excessive regimentation; too much dependence on a single program or set of people; overly harsh treatment; negative client subcultures; degrading practices; inactivity; alienation; and the offenders' perceptions of powerlessness over their situation. As a result of these concerns and changing ideas about how best to deal with troubled youth, there has been an increase over the past two decades in the use of programs located in community settings which serve smaller numbers of clients. However, research and a variety of horror stories from across the country have shown that merely changing locations and reducing the size of client populations do not mean that the programs are working with or focusing on families, schools, peers, and local community influences and forces; or that the programs are more humane and less punitive.

DEFINING REINTEGRATION

The observations about the reintegration process which follow are based on a study of community-based programs in which serious juvenile offenders participated.* It should be pointed out that the programs in the study included juveniles with records of chronic and serious property offenses as well as youths with violent offenses. Moreover, both residential and non-residential programs were found serving this population.

Broadly conceived, reintegration is the *process* by which community contact — in its many forms and different degrees — is promoted, initiated, supported, and monitored. Accomplished through a diverse assortment of methods and styles, reintegrative programs (1) prepare youths for progressively increased responsibility and freedom in the community; (2) facilitate client-community interaction and involvement; (3) work both with the of-

*For a detailed summary of this study, see Chapter 10, *Intervening with Serious Juvenile Offenders: A Summary of a Study on Community-Based Programs*.

fender *and* targeted community support systems (families, peers, schools, employers, etc.) on qualities needed for constructive interaction and an offender's successful community adjustment; (4) develop new resources and supports where needed; and (5) monitor and test the youths and the community on their ability to deal with each other productively.

The specific ways in which reintegration is achieved, the timing with which youths attain complete and unsupervised reintegration, and the levels of supervision, security and control vary in different programs. In addition, during the course of program participation the youths either have to meet certain conditions, earn particular privileges or demonstrate they can handle responsibility. As a result, not only will there be program-to-program variation but within a certain range there will be variation among youths within a particular program. To a large extent this is the strength of having a diverse assortment of basically reintegrative programs. Youths in different situations and circumstances can be placed in the most appropriate program and the same youth, if necessary, can be shifted from one program to another.

In short, what reintegrative programs have in common is a focus upon, preparation for, and transition to open, community living. In comparison to the closed institution-based programs, security, control, and holding offenders accountable are coupled with concern for incorporating elements of social responsibility, supportive intervention, and meaningful preparation for community living. Reintegrative programming, at the very least, tries to keep the delinquent from getting worse or hardened, and at best, improves the chances that when the youth is released he or she is in the best position to become successfully reintegrated into the community.

GOALS AND OPERATING OBJECTIVES

At the beginning stages of a program, reintegration preparation requires each and every short-term objective and corresponding strategy to be clearly articulated and understood by all participants — offenders and staff — in terms of how it either directly promotes or contributes to two goals:

- 1) the linking of youths to community experiences; and
- 2) the gradual exposure of them to the problems posed and the opportunities provided by the personal, social networks and community subsystems on which they depend, and by which they are influenced.

Together, these two goals mean encouraging and working on the development of external supports which can increase the chances that behavioral, cognitive, and psychological improvements made in a program will persist.

Efforts made and actions taken by staff to encourage and establish constructive linkages can be made in three important ways. Each can be viewed as constituting an *operating objective* which defines in general terms the nature and character of the linkage being sought.

First, significant community subsystems (e.g., schools, workplace, churches, training programs) and personal social networks (e.g., family, close friends, peers in general) can be provided with various kinds of concrete services, assistance, and encouragement. In this instance, these potential sources of support can be viewed as the recipients or beneficiaries of service provided by program staff. Applied to families, for example, this might involve anything from formal family counseling or parent education training to staff assisting families to obtain financial assistance or locate child care facilities. One program in the study had four levels of family involvement: twice-a-month parent-counselor sessions, once-a-month parent education groups, parental attendance at their child's monthly staffing, and when needed, formal family therapy. The point is that services can range from traditional treatment and education to advocacy and brokerage. If the youthful offender is to return home or is living at home, then it is incumbent on the program to see that someone works with the family, prepares them to deal with the youth, and identifies for them the nature of the youth's situation as it relates to the family's strengths and problems. Even when offenders are moving toward independent living, it is unlikely the family relationship will cease. There is a role the family can play and this needs to be established. At some point the youth will leave the program and a social network of one sort or another is bound to provide guidance and support.

Programs may also provide services to offenders' friends and potential employers in the community. Providing services directed toward peers was accomplished in one program through trackers who worked extensively with both the offenders and their peers, employers, teachers, and families. Friends were also invited to participate in program-sponsored activities and outings. Staff can also work on developing or upgrading local recreational facilities and resources that might appeal to young people needing legitimate outlets to channel energy, vent frustration, provide excitement, and enhance self-esteem. As a final example, staff can provide services to potential employers willing to hire program clients. These might include screening or testing the youths for interest and aptitude, providing transportation, assisting in supervision, and helping in job training. The point is that identifying sources of external support in personal social networks and community subsystems is a significant aspect of reintegrative programming. Working with such resources can be an important step toward obtaining for the youth a stable and constructive attachment. Either reinforcing already existing supports or developing new supports can make a difference in determining whether program gains for the youth are lasting.

A second kind of linkage is using various community resources as providers of service. Here the emphasis is on involving other nonprogram people and organizations in the operation of the program. Examples are: using community schools, having student interns as teacher aides, providing peer role models, and having local employers or residents supply jobs for the

program youths. Clearly, there is some overlap with the first category; in fact, they can work hand-in-hand. A local employer might be persuaded to provide jobs in return for staff assisting the business in the ways described above. Similarly, a school might enroll program clients if staff agree to closely monitor attendance, to oversee completion of homework assignments, and to provide backup assistance in the event of behavioral problems. The point is that if local resources are available to provide services, all efforts should be made to use them. This not only minimizes isolation and helps to build supports for the youth outside the program, but it might mean that the program can concentrate its resources and staff-time in other areas or in other ways.

The benefits of using community resources as principal and auxiliary providers of service are many and varied. The thrust toward maximum offender involvement with community resources is a direct expression of the "normalization" emphasis increasingly recognized as vital to the reintegrative process (Coates, Miller and Ohlin, 1978; Empey and Lubeck, 1971; Whittaker, 1979; Wolfensberger, 1972). It rests on the idea of minimizing dependence on a particular program in which everything is done to and for the youths by the same sets of people. It also serves as a means for others not beholden to the program to unobtrusively keep a watchful eye on program practices and atmosphere. In addition, whether the locus of contact is initially in or outside the program facility, the use of community resources can be conceived as a way for the planned and selective use of normalizing contacts to maximize reintegrative potential and to begin building an external system of supports for each youth. Consequently, by using community resources in the provision of services, institution-like patterns can be minimized, more customary modes of interaction experienced, other segments of the community not typically involved in corrections can be tapped, and behaviors appropriate to community living can be practiced and tested. Finally, use of other people and resources is a valuable backup in the event of specialized problems such as substance abuse or serious emotional turmoil.

The third kind of linkage is providing time and opportunities for clients to maintain contact with family, old friends, peers in general, and other persons for personal visits, individualized leisure-time pursuits, private time, etc. This category of linkages goes beyond the more structured and organized aspects of a program. Its purpose is to allow youths to maintain ties with nonprogram people and to provide clients exposure to experiences outside the program facility which increase over time. Taking place initially inside and then outside the program facility, these contacts permit youths to explore, practice, test, and transfer interpersonal skills and learned behavior.

Particularly important for residential programs, this kind of linkage is accomplished through an allotment of a regularly specified period of time for family, friends, and others to spend some free time (though not necessarily unsupervised at first) to either indulge in conversation or make use of the

program facility. Phone privileges and home visits are also part of this kind of linkage. It is typically the case that after a predetermined period of time youths in residential programs become eligible for home visits. Generally, this is not a right automatically granted but a privilege which must be earned, and when granted, there are established understandings and sometimes signed contracts regarding behavioral expectations and conduct. Used in this way, home visits help to encourage acceptable behavior and cooperation. They can often be a powerful incentive. In contrast, family visits to the residential facilities tend to be more automatic, and do not have to be earned.

Given that positive experiences with peers and family, in school, jobs, and in the community can increase the chances that progress youths make while in programs will endure, it is incumbent on corrections officials to see that there are programs designed and implemented to link up offenders in some meaningful way with those positive forces and influences in the community. The implications are that if work on social relationships and building supports outside the program setting are not part of and do not guide overall program goals and objectives, then there is little reason to believe that changes made while in a program will persist.

The extent to which each of the three kinds of linkages or operating objectives are emphasized in different programs will vary greatly. How they are achieved will depend on the program's overall intervention strategy (i.e., degree of change sought and range of attributes targeted for attention) and organizing model (i.e., specific program components, features, and processes such as how limits are set, what sanctions and reinforcers are used, how client movement or progression through a program is directed, whether there is an in-house school component, etc.).

More specifically, intervention strategy refers to a residential program's reliance on a therapeutic milieu or socialization approach and a nonresidential program's emphasis on therapeutic day treatment, intensive community intervention and tracking, or socialization. Coupling intervention strategy with the organizing model establishes the context for understanding (1) how and in what ways different kinds of community linkages are used in particular programs, and (2) the ways the linkages are expected to contribute to the program's overall change strategy. Programs which work to establish such linkages or contacts for the offender are to varying degrees and in different ways moving in the reintegrative direction.

Internal Program Practices, Features, and Quality of Life

The goals and operating objectives thus far discussed constitute only part of the whole reintegrative picture. While focusing on the community support environment and the offenders' exposure to that environment, reintegration is equally concerned with the behavioral, emotional, and cognitive con-

dition of the youths. Reintegration conceives of the correctional mission as one directed toward the *offender operating in a community context*. Consequently, in contrast to programs based solely on deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation, reintegration targets its program efforts on the external support systems, their interrelationships and interdependencies with the youths, and the youths themselves.

An extremely important aspect of preparing youths for gradually increased contact and, finally, complete unsupervised reintegration is the psychodynamic, psychosocial, and behavioral condition of the offenders. Clearly, intervention and treatment directed to these problems cannot be considered independent of the in-program environment (i.e., the nature and quality of relationships between offenders and with staff) and its potential effect on the youths.

In short, there is a strong realization in reintegrative programming that by the time a youth has come to the point where he or she is adjudicated for committing serious crime(s), the juvenile offender may require help directed toward educational remediation as well as work on self-concept, coping with problems, self-discipline, and emotional well-being. Whatever the needs and problems, however, the offenders must be in an environment in which they feel safe and are treated humanely. The existence of linkages and outside contacts in the absence of decent and supportive treatment within a facility is unlikely to lead to the resolution of offenders' behavioral and emotional problems. The reverse is equally true; clients in a program which exhibits humane and decent treatment in the absence of external linkages and outside supports may lack the kind of continued guidance and assistance necessary for their successful adjustment to open community living.

DIFFERENTIATING PROGRAMS AND MAKING APPROPRIATE PLACEMENTS

There are several critical implications which can be derived from the proposed definitional framework. Reintegration is not an all-or-nothing concept or unidimensional. It is erroneous to assume programs are either reintegrative in nature or not, based solely on setting. Programs based in institutional settings can be reintegrative in particular ways and to various degrees. For example, some larger institutions may be more reintegrative than some highly structured and restrictive therapeutic communities. Similarly, when it comes to working with families or peers, some group homes may be more reintegrative than certain day treatment programs. Therefore, the important information to have on all correctional settings is how reintegrative they are and in what ways. This requires having information and empirical data on the extent and nature of each of the kinds of linkages des-

cribed. For example, do families and friends come to the facility? Do clients in residential programs have home visits and how often? Are community schools used? Are there opportunities for clients to interact with youths not in the program? Are community jobs available? and Do staff work with families and interact with clients' friends?

Since violent juvenile offenders, like any other category of offenders, come out of different situations, have different problems, and are "reachable" in different ways, there is a strong need to have a range of placement options available which emphasize various reintegrative approaches. This, in turn, allows placements to be made on the basis of what best suits the delinquent's situation and circumstance.

As noted earlier, programs have different intervention strategies. Some are designed to deal with virtually all aspects of a client's social interactions, conduct, and personality, while others may seek to achieve far less fundamental changes and target for attention a much narrower range of attributes. In addition, programs can be differentiated on the basis of their organizing model. When intervention strategy, organizing model, and reintegrative approach are combined to characterize a program's overall orientation, it becomes possible to distinguish finely among programs on the basis of what they can offer delinquents with different problems and needs.

Certain programs may consciously target only one or very few support systems. For example, some programs may do very little family work but concentrate on placing and monitoring clients in community schools and jobs. In contrast, other programs might strongly emphasize various forms of family involvement, in-house schooling, and intensive community tracking. The implication of these differences is that matching delinquents with the right programs requires specific information on the particular social networks and community subsystems in which the programs specialize. This suggests that a variety of reintegrative program options potentially poses the greatest opportunity for state and local jurisdictions. The emphasis programs place on various support systems has significant implications for the way in which the program will operate and for the kinds of delinquents who might be the most appropriate referrals.

Offender placement decisions, predicated on factors quite central to the reintegrative mission, could be achieved by matching program characteristics such as those described with information on (1) the nature and quality of clients' social functioning with family, peers, and in school; (2) general behavior patterns; (3) cognitive capabilities; (4) emotional state; (5) type of manifest problems; (6) prior placement history, if any; and (7) reasons for referral. This however, does require systematic and reliable information on both the potential program options and individual offenders.

REINTEGRATION AND SECURITY

High levels of security can be provided by programs which are essentially reintegrative in nature. It is the manner and methods used to establish security which differentiate the reintegrative program from the traditional institutional environment. There are a variety of ways in which security can be established. These include a high ratio of staff to clients; small client populations; constant "eyeball" supervision; checkpoints; intensive tracking; keeping clients exceedingly busy and active by tightly scheduling all tasks and activities; consistent, clear, and graduated sanctions involving loss of privileges or freedom of movement; positive reinforcements based on a comprehensible and predictable path for progression (e.g., advancing clients to a less demanding program level as an incentive and reward for acceptable performance in *and* outside the program facility); behavioral contracting or some kind of rating and reporting system; and a modicum of "mechanical" security.

Used in various combinations, these features and processes can establish several levels of security in ways which are potentially the least impersonal, isolating, and alienating while at the same time insuring a careful monitoring and protection of the offender. The intent is to provide security for the public and protection for the offender while in the facility, without losing sight of the need to provide supportive intervention and meaningful preparation for complete community reintegration. Programs which are reintegrative in nature can be designed and implemented to provide (1) quite high levels of security and supervision and (2) a clear justice system response to criminal misconduct which results in the imposition of curtailed freedom and a highly demanding form of individual accountability. Therefore, these programs are capable of deterring crime, holding the juvenile offender responsible, and insuring community protection.

DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS FOR REINTEGRATIVE PROGRAMMING

As already noted, not all programs in community settings have gone much beyond changing locations and reducing the size of their client populations. Based on experiences and numerous research efforts over the last several decades, a variety of problems, inadequacies, and deficiencies have been documented and identified.

The work of Bengur and Rutherford (1975), Coates, Miller and Ohlin (1978), Empey and Lubeck (1971), Klein (1979), Wolfensberger (1972), and Whittaker (1979), to name a few, have highlighted the difficulties and problems which can arise in efforts to plan and implement reintegrative programming. It is consistently pointed out that the tasks central to reintegra-

tive programming have either not been fully implemented or they have been undermined. As a result, some of the smaller programs located in the midst of local communities differ little from their institutional predecessors and counterparts in terms of the nature and quality of what they do and how they do it.

While space does not permit a detailed discussion of each of these works and numerous others, there is unanimous agreement on the general nature of the problems:

One can scarcely overestimate the degree of emotional commitment on the part of both institution and community in maintaining things as they were. The task, therefore, of building community linkages and community support may well be the most difficult task of all (Whittaker, p. 127).

It is clear that moving from training-school models does not necessarily mean that programs will be readily tied to local community networks. Instead of having "institution kids" we now have a new group of "agency kids." They are generally treated better, but their experience in these agencies is still quite foreign to the worlds in which they live (Coates, Miller and Ohlin, p. 173).

The result was that, although the program was located in the community, it was only relatively more involved in community life than a total institution. The task of making it an integral part of the boys' community life was not fully realized. Furthermore, when offenders and staff found themselves engaged in an intense relationship . . . there was a strong tendency toward introversion — a strong tendency to become preoccupied with internal problems and interpersonal relationships rather than with external ones (Empey and Lubeck, p. 304).

We live in a nation in which the psychotherapeutic models combine with a strong emphasis on free will and individual responsibilities. . . . We locate problems primarily within the individual rather than within his environment; we locate the responsibility for dealing with the problems within the individual as well; thus we rely upon counseling and other treatment or change strategies which focus upon the individual and his role in bringing about change (Klein, p. 168).

Although presented in a variety of ways, five major categories of problems or impediments tend to come up over and over again. While there is no single right way to prevent or solve them, they must be vigorously watched for and guarded against. Listed in no particular order of importance, these include:

- 1) not focusing on, dealing with, and exploring with youths — at the outset and throughout program participation — what they will be doing after the program ends;
- 2) program staff becoming immersed in internal program operations and in-program behavioral control as opposed to the staff preparing, assisting, and working collaboratively with *existing* social networks and community subsystems;

3) preoccupation with client psychodynamic shortcomings and client deficiencies at the expense of *generating* local support systems where none are functioning;

4) failure to make available to clients, experiences and contact with external support systems which can provide learning opportunities and social skill development to help them better cope and deal with community forces and influences; and

5) no emphasis on monitoring and testing the youth and the relevant support systems, for those behaviors and capabilities conducive to constructive client-community involvement and interaction.

It is, therefore, critical in the design and implementation of programs that the intervention strategy, organizing model, and operating objectives be spelled out in writing in relationship to job descriptions, staff performance evaluations, client case monitoring, and program assessment. While the specific intervention plan or treatment will obviously vary from case to case, the broad outlines and parameters of the program will not. Once it is established how much and what kind of emphasis will be placed on various networks and subsystems (e.g., family, peers, school, neighborhood), program planners, administrators, and staff need to decide what kind of information they can gather as a way to monitor staff performance, document program efforts and experiences, and assess achievements. There must be an internal program capability to spot early on, any developing problems or deficiencies, particularly in the identified areas.

The demands that reintegrative programming impose on staff are exceedingly high. Working both with juvenile offenders and support systems may require that different staff members specialize; some can assume primary responsibility for in-program work and others might concentrate on external systems and networks. This obviously means that continuity, collaboration, and coordination are critical staff responsibilities and that communication between staff on cases should be routinized and frequent. Other programs may become so specialized in terms of their intervention strategy, organizing model, and operating objectives that the critical responsibility is to make sure that those youths accepted into them have the kinds of problems and circumstances that those programs are designed to handle.


CONCLUDING NOTE

In conclusion, it is important to note that whatever the correctional objectives (e.g., retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation) that are emphasized in the sanctions parcelled out to juvenile offenders, the reality is that virtually all the youths will eventually return to life in the open community. Therefore, a sensible and justifiable direction to take is to utilize correctional sanctions which meaningfully prepare both the offender and the community for the delinquent's complete re-emergence into community life.

Reintegration, with its emphasis on the offender and the environment to which he or she will return, is a process which can further retributionist, incapacitative, deterrence, and rehabilitative objectives. However, ambiguity about what reintegration is, how it can be applied, in what form, with what speed, and for which offenders impedes the development of knowledge on how best to incorporate it into all varieties of correctional programs and institutions. Clarity on how reintegration goals and objectives can be fitted into various kinds of programs will, in part, determine the future of reintegration for juvenile offenders in general and violent delinquent youths in particular.

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THE ISSUE OF VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME

Jerome G. Miller

I am of the opinion that we need to concentrate efforts at reducing serious, and particularly violent crime among juveniles in the United States. However, I do not believe that juvenile crime is a phenomenon itself out of "synch" or disproportionate to crime in general, particularly among adults in the U.S. Though all crime has risen dramatically in the U.S. over the past two decades, there is little evidence to indicate that juvenile crime has risen at a disproportionate rate relative to adult crime. A study of this, presently being completed at the Academy for Contemporary Problems will conclude that the rise in violent crime, while evident, is less attributable to juveniles in 1980 than it was in 1965.

While arrests of juveniles for index crimes increased by two and one-half times from 1964 to 1979, arrests of adults increased by three times in that same period. It is true that while youth under 18 comprise 14% of the population, they make up 25% of those arrested for violent crime, (murder, forcible rape, aggravated assault, and robbery). However, this was as true in 1964 as it is today. While adult arrests increased by 7% during the early 1970's, juvenile arrests increased by 5%. The Academy studies will con-

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clude that though 1979 and 1980 will show an increase in serious crimes nationally, there was no evidence of a disproportionate rise in juvenile crime. Perhaps more to the point, is the dramatic increase in prison populations during the most recent periods of rising crime. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this may not be the correct conclusion. Though one might reason that we lock up more people because we have higher rates of crime, one can with equal validity, using the same data, conclude that we have higher crime rates because we lock up more people.

As you are aware, Texas has over 30,000 inmates in its state prisons while Pennsylvania has about 8,500 (up by 1500 in the past two years). These two states are roughly equivalent in population size. Yet, there is no evidence of a lowering of crime rates (either through "incapacitation" or as a result of the "deterrent" effect of incarceration) in Texas which continues to far outstrip Pennsylvania in its juvenile and adult crime rates.

There are a number of myths with regard to violent juvenile crime which need to be addressed as well. Those under 18 are not responsible for most violent crime. They are responsible for 9% of the arrests for murder, 16% for forcible rape, 31% for robbery, and 16% for assault. The majority of such crimes are committed by young adults in the 18-to 25-year-old age range. Therefore, those who advocate handling juveniles as adults, in order to lower crime rates, must explain why those who are already handled in the adult system, and who contribute a disproportionate share of the violent crime in our society are not better behaved. Obviously, adult handling through imprisonment, mandatory sentences, and other stratagems currently in vogue, can in no case be shown to have lowered crime rates. The studies of Sim Dinitz indicate that the use of imprisonment for incapacitation of career criminals would have a negligible, if any, effect on crime rates in a community. Although one can predict the percentage of those who are likely to engage in violent crimes, he found that to predict accurately violence in one person, he would have to *inaccurately* predict violence 94.5% of the time. To correctly identify one potentially violent juvenile offender, one would have to misidentify (and presumably incarcerate) nine offenders. He commented that one could better toss a coin.

Clearly however, one has a better chance of predicting violence in a person convicted of 5 or more serious offenses over a period of time. That is, one can identify the violent offender once he has been convicted repeatedly as a violent offender. Though one may wish to incapacitate this offender, it is Dinitz' view that even in this case, incapacitation would have virtually no effect on overall crime rates. He notes that "the smaller the town, the greater the likelihood that this would affect crime rates." However, in urban settings, removal of one "career" criminal usually results in recruitment into that unfilled role of another, one who previously waited in the wings while the role was occupied. In fact, the removal of career criminals through simple incapacitation will probably eventually result in higher crime rates since when they return to the streets they will likely resume

their previous endeavors with a vengeance. Whereas previously there was one person occupying the role, now there are two or more . . . usually more sophisticated in crime as a result of their prison experience.

While violent juvenile crime has increased dramatically in the 1960's, researchers at the American Justice Institute and the University of Chicago have noted some stabilizing of rates of violent juvenile crime in the mid-1970's. Whether the overall increase in adult and juvenile violent crime in 1980 will lead us back to the dramatic surges seen in the 1960's is highly questionable.

It is also a fact that violent crime itself does not usually result in serious injury or death. Dinitz' cohort study of 811 "violent offenders" who had reached age 18 with at least one arrest for a violent crime, showed that 73% had committed crimes which neither threatened nor inflicted serious physical harm.

Weapons are infrequently used in violent crime . . . ranging from 10% in rural areas to 17% in some urban areas. Most violent crime is not premeditated as a violent act, but is incidental to a property crime. Victims are *not*, characteristically, the old, the infirm, the helpless . . . but are more likely to be males of young adult or juvenile age. The exception to this rule are purse-snatchers.

What can we do about violent juvenile crime? We can, and should address the issue. Locking up those who have committed a series of violent crimes can obviously be justified. We should not deceive ourselves however, that it is likely to significantly affect rates of violent crime. With reference to juveniles, if we are to go that route, we should know that it is likely to lead to further, more complex problems later, not only for the juvenile, but for the community . . . while having little effect on crime rates during the period of the juvenile's incarceration.

Research developed by Robert Coates of the Harvard Law School Center for Criminal Justice produced an extremely important finding which seems to have been lost in the current debate surrounding the handling of juveniles as adults, calls for more use of incarceration, etc. Coates found that the greatest single predictor of later serious delinquency in a juvenile offender was whether or not he was kept in a locked detention center or jail early on in his delinquent career. The logical conclusion one might draw from this finding is that it simply reinforces the validity of the screening process . . . that we are more likely to lock up the truly dangerous or potentially more serious delinquent. However, when the Harvard researchers looked into this, they found that being kept in locked detention had virtually no relationship to the seriousness of the crime. Those few cases of extreme violence which resulted in detention were so few as to be statistically insignificant. They found that youngsters were locked up for two basic reasons . . . they came from families of lower socioeconomic status, and there were beds available in the detention center on the day or night of arrest.

One can justifiably draw the conclusion from this that incarceration is

itself, criminogenic, and therefore should be resorted to only as a last resort . . . with full realization that though it may give respite from an offender's crimes for a while, it will confirm, reinforce, and escalate later criminal behavior.

It is probably true that if we locked up enough juveniles or adults that crime rates would fall. However, for this to occur, we would have to lock up so many as to affect in basic and ominous ways, the underpinnings of our society. For example, the District of Columbia incarcerates at the rate of almost 900 per hundred thousand . . . with little evidence that it has lowered crime in the District significantly. If Pennsylvania incarcerated at the District's rate, Pennsylvania would have between 85,000 and 100,000 people in its prisons . . . with little evidence that it would significantly lower crime rates in that state. Now if Pennsylvania were to incarcerate a quarter million, I venture that crime rates would begin to fall. If a million were in prison there, crime would probably fall dramatically. However, in the process, the society would have been considerably altered. It is probably true that there was little crime in Nazi Germany, Maoist China, or Stalinist Russia. If lowering of crime is the only goal, there are means for attaining it which are immediately at hand. However, in so doing we tamper with things more basic than the crime we wish to suppress.

What then, do we propose be done with the violent juvenile offender? I would recommend that the federal government support efforts for dealing with violent juvenile crime which find other means of supervision and control, short of imprisonment or incarceration if that is at all possible. Incarceration should be the last resort . . . done with full knowledge that ultimately it will likely make things worse for all concerned, though it may buy temporary peace.

We must redo the present inverse system through the development of humane, decent, caring ways of dealing with violent offenders. This would mean the development of small (6- to 10-bed units) for those convicted of serious crimes of violence, and found unresponsive to other means of supervision and control. Before this conclusion is reached however, it should be shown that the same amount of resources, monies and efforts had been expended on the less extreme means (less restrictive alternatives).

For example, it hardly suffices to say that because an individual does not cease his criminal behavior while on probation, at a cost of \$50 a month, that he has failed in the "alternative" to incarceration. If, in fact, incarceration in a locked setting costs \$3,500 a month, that amount should be expended on the alternative before it is shown to "fail," calling for incarceration of the juvenile. Of course, at \$3,500 (the cost for locked settings for juveniles in the Pennsylvania system) one could purchase considerable supervision, rehabilitation, etc. for an individual offender in a variety of non-incarcerative settings . . . with less likelihood of making matters worse.

Alternative programs, as well as incarcerative programs should, for the

most part be made competitive, on a purchase-of-care basis. State-given services for persons in captive or semi-captive roles are notoriously unresponsive and ultimately brutal. I am of the opinion that corrections would be well advised to move toward performance basis contracts with private non-profit vendors, provided adequate standards and monitoring mechanisms could be maintained. In Pennsylvania, and in Massachusetts, for example, we found that the services for incarcerated youth given in small settings by private vendors were consistently of higher quality than the same services given in the state institutions . . . though the per capita costs in the state institutions were characteristically higher.

I recommend building into any supervision and treatment program for convicted, violent juvenile offenders, an outside advocacy arrangement whereby the services and supervision may be periodically monitored by someone who is neither a part of the state correctional bureaucracy nor a part of the helping professions bureaucracy. This person should have some authority to recommend removal or re-placement in another program or facility if the program in which the juvenile finds himself is found to be inadequate, neglectful, or brutal. Though freedom may not be negotiable in such cases, placement in one facility over another should be a proper subject for negotiation. State dollars should follow the youth.

Research should focus on new questions. Rather than continued and relatively unfruitful attempts to define, label and categorize the types of juvenile offenders for example, we should expend equal effort at categorizing the various types of correctional programs and facilities which appear to create certain types of violent juvenile offenders. Which prisons produce which kinds of violent persons? Which detention practices create which kinds of criminal careers, etc? We must begin to hold the child welfare and juvenile correctional systems accountable in the same ways and with the same diligence that we seek to hold the offender accountable. Why, for example would a 13-year-old Charles Manson enter a juvenile correctional system as a "runaway" and emerge from San Quentin 19 years later to be involved in unspeakable violence? Could his being raped as a 13-year-old in one of our child treatment facilities in any way be of relevance to his later rape of others in a "correctional" institution? It is a possibility.

Despite the fact that there are potentially more effective ways of understanding and dealing with juvenile violence, I fear that most will remain untried and undiscussed.

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Vicki L. Agee, Ph.D., is director of the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center (CATC) in Denver, CO, a position she has held since 1972. She is also vice-president of the Board of Directors of the Chrysalis Treatment Program for male and female juvenile prostitutes and a part-time instructor at the Metropolitan State College. Ms. Agee is the author of *Treatment of the Violent Incurable Adolescent* (Lexington, 1979) as well as a number of articles, and has given many addresses, workshops and seminars on the treatment of delinquency. Her Ph.D. is from the University of Texas at Austin.

David M. Altschuler received a Ph.D. in social service administration from the University of Chicago. As co-director of Justice Research Associates, he has been involved in providing technical assistance and training for both public and private organizations and projects. A 1979 graduate research fellow of the National Institute of Justice, he was formerly a senior research associate with the National Center for the Assessment of Alternatives to Juvenile Justice Processing at the University of Chicago. He has written numerous articles and reports on juvenile justice sanctioning and community-based programs for the seriously delinquent youth. Currently, Dr. Altschuler is a program analyst on a federal grant to the state of Illinois.

Troy L. Armstrong, Ph.D., is currently serving as deputy director of the Center for the Assessment of the Juvenile Justice System at the American Justice Institute in Sacramento, California. He is the author of numerous articles and several monographs on community-based program interventions for the serious juvenile offender and programming issues in juvenile restitution. His contribution to this volume represents research carried out jointly with David Altschuler on a three-year, OJJDP-funded project at the University of Chicago.

Constance Bobal is a certified special education teacher who earned her B.S. in Education from Memphis State University. Prior to her employment with the Shelby County Violent Offender Program, she taught 3 years with the Memphis City Schools. During that time she worked with a variety of youth including mildly retarded and emotionally disturbed adolescents. Ms. Bobal has been associated with various psychological, educational, or social service research projects since 1976. Her current research endeavors focus on classroom behavior management techniques. She is also engaged in developing computer programs that can be used with all students, regardless of educational levels or restricting handicaps.

Robert Coates is an associate professor at the School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago. Previously, he was associate director of the Center for Criminal Justice at Harvard University Law School. In addition

to numerous national and local community activities, he has published many articles and reports, and is the co-author of a number of books including *Juvenile Correctional Reform in Massachusetts: A Preliminary Report* (LEAA, 1977), and *Diversity in a Youth Correctional System: Handling Delinquents in Massachusetts* (Ballinger, 1978).

Joseph J. Cocozza, Ph. D., is executive director of the New York State Council on Children and Families, and is an adjunct associate professor at the State University of New York at Albany. His doctorate is in Sociology and he has held a variety of teaching, research and administrative positions. Dr. Cocozza has extensive experience with the research and policy issues surrounding the treatment of violent, mentally ill individuals and is the author of a number of works on this subject.

Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., principal investigator, is a principal of the URSA Institute. Dr. Fagan has conducted several studies in crime and delinquency, child abuse and family violence, and public policy issues. He has evaluated both local and national programs and conducted policy studies. He is currently completing a follow-up evaluation of intensive probation supervision for violent offenders during the transition from adolescence to adulthood. He recently evaluated the LEAA family violence program. He has published extensively on his research on criminal behavior, justice system responses, and crime control policy. Dr. Fagan received a Ph.D. in 1975 in Civil Engineering from the State University of New York at Buffalo.

Sister Falaka Fattah is executive director of the House of Umoja, Inc. in Philadelphia, PA, which she founded with her husband, David, in 1969, to address the problem of gang violence. Sister Falaka's work at Umoja with gang youth has been recognized in more than 35 awards and certificates for community service and youth development with two of those certificates coming from presidents of the United States. She has also served as an urban youth consultant for foundations, corporations and government agencies, and is affiliated with numerous civic and educational organizations.

Dianne L. Gadow has been a youth services counselor at the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center in Denver, CO, since 1977. Previously, Ms. Gadow was an assistant professor at Concordia College, Bronxville, NY. She has an M.S. degree from the University of Oregon at Eugene, and is associated with the Training Committee for Division of Youth Services in Colorado where she has conducted a number of workshops.

Shirley L. Goins, ACSW, has provided technical assistance and consultation to individuals and various units of government in the areas of administration, fiscal and program operations, evaluation, development, planning and training in social service, mental health and correction fields. She has served as an expert witness in numerous federal court cases relating to both adult and juvenile areas. Her professional administrative experience includes the positions of deputy director for the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services; administrator of field services, for the Juvenile Division of the Illinois Department of Corrections; and administrator of the United Delinquency Intervention Services (UDIS), a nationally prominent diversion program dealing with adjudicated serious/violent offenders. Ms. Goins' graduate degree in Social Work is from Loyola University, Chicago, IL.

Kenneth J. Goldberg, Ed.D., is director of Counseling and Family Resources, Ltd., a private family, pediatric and adolescent counseling and consulting service in Tempe, AZ. Dr. Goldberg was formerly chief consultant at Project Phoenix, a VJO demonstration program within the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections.

Madeleine Grant, M.D., is a recent graduate of New York University School of Medicine.

Karen V. Hansen is a research associate for the URSA Institute. She is currently program analyst and data manager for the Violent Juvenile Offender Research and Development Program. Past research projects include a national evaluation of the LEAA-funded Family Violence Programs and an historical analysis of household labor. She received her M.A. in Sociology from the University of California, Santa Barbara in 1979.

Eliot Hartstone, Ph.D., co-principal investigator, is a senior research associate at the URSA Institute. Previously, Dr. Hartstone was a research scientist with the Special Projects Research Unit of the New York State Office of Mental Health where he was the project coordinator for the national study of the "Movement of Offender Population between Correctional and Mental Health Facilities." Dr. Hartstone served as a research associate with the New York State Council on Children and Families, where he was project coordinator for the study of an experimental state program in New York City designed to treat violent, mentally disordered juvenile offenders. Dr. Hartstone has published extensively in the areas of juvenile delinquency and the interface between criminal/juvenile justice and mental health. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology at New York University in 1979.

Sally Jo Jones is a researcher and technical writer on social problems. In addition to conducting the theoretical literature reviews that inform her contribution to this volume, she has participated in the design, field research and analysis of a study of serious juvenile offenders in Contra Costa County, CA. The study, originally designed as a follow-up evaluation of an intensive probation program, is examining the development of criminal careers in the transition from adolescence to adulthood as affected by the critical intervention principles described in Chapter three.

Sandra Lane is group leader and head psychiatric nurse-specialist at the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center in Denver, CO. The position involves developing and co-leading the groups in the sex offender portion of the program. Ms. Lane has been assistant director of the Mesa County Mental Health Center in Grand Junction, CO; a school nurse; public health nurse; and head psychiatric nurse. She has attended and conducted numerous workshops on sex offenders treatment, and is group leader of a rafting program for disadvantaged youths. Ms. Lane has a B.S. from the University of Colorado at Boulder.

Dorothy Otnow Lewis, M.D., is professor of psychiatry at the New York University School of Medicine. She is co-author of *Delinquency and Psychopathology* (Grune and Stratton) and editor of the recently published *Vulnerabilities to Delinquency* (Spectrum).

Jay G. Lindgren is executive officer of juvenile release, Minnesota Department of Corrections. Mr. Lindgren was project director, Serious Juvenile Offender Program, Minnesota Department of Corrections, 1978 to 1981; and executive director, PORT of Olmsted County, Rochester, MN, 1972 to 1977. He has worked in varying capacities in juvenile and adult corrections programs in institutions and the community since 1966.

Janie L. McKibbon has been a youth services counselor at the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center (CATC) in Denver, CO, since 1975. Ms. McKibbon assists or directs a number of therapy groups as part of a psychiatric team treating violent juvenile offenders. She initiated the CATC Drug and Alcohol Program in 1976 and started parenting classes for violent offenders in 1982, based on the effective use of natural and logical consequences in disciplining children. Ms. McKibbon previously worked as a youth worker at the Philip Gilliam Center for Juvenile Justice in Denver. Her professional training includes numerous workshops, seminars and classes on various aspects of counseling.

Bruce M. McWilliams has been a youth services counselor since 1972 at the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center (CATC) in Denver, CO, where he supervises adult youth workers and youths, and conducts group therapy sessions with violent juvenile offenders. He previously worked for the Omaha Boys Club in Nebraska and served as a consultant to the state of Vermont Department of Adult Corrections and the Colorado Division of Youth Services. His professional training includes seminars on positive peer culture, reality therapy, and the treatment of sex offenders.

Alden Miller is associate director of the Center for Criminal Justice at Harvard University Law School in Cambridge, MA. He holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of North Carolina. Dr. Miller is the author of numerous articles on corrections and sociological methodology. Among the books he has co-authored are *Juvenile Correctional Reform in Massachusetts: A Preliminary Report* (LEAA, 1977), and *Diversity in a Youth Correctional System: Handling Delinquents in Massachusetts* (Ballinger, 1978).

Jerome G. Miller is director of the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, Washington, D.C. He has served as commissioner of children and youths in Pennsylvania and as director of the State Department of Children and Family Services in Illinois. Previously, he was commissioner of youth for the state of Massachusetts, where he orchestrated the closing of the training schools and the establishment of a community-based system of small therapeutic communities.

Lloyd E. Ohlin is Toureff-Glueck Professor of Criminal Justice, Emeritus, and research director of the Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard University Law School, Cambridge, MA. Prior to joining the Harvard Law School faculty in 1967, Professor Ohlin worked as a sociologist at the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet and for the Illinois Parole and Pardon Board. He has also been director of the Center for Education and Research in Corrections at the University of Chicago, and a member of the faculty of the Columbia University School of Social Work.

Eva Ritvo is a medical student at Tufts Medical School.

Cary J. Rudman, J.D., LL.M., Law and Justice Specialist, is a senior research associate at the URSA Institute. Mr. Rudman was a policy analyst for an OJJDP-funded national study entitled: "Institutional Commitment and Release Decision-Making for Juvenile Delinquents: Implications of Determinate and Indeterminate Approaches." Mr. Rudman has also served as legal analyst on an evaluation of the Indigent Defense Services for the State of Wisconsin. Mr. Rudman has lectured and published extensively about the juvenile justice system and its impact on delinquents and violent offenders. Mr. Rudman received his J.D. from Loyola University in 1970, and his LL.M. from Harvard University in 1971.

Shelley S. Shanok is a graduate student in educational psychology at New York University.

Paul A. Strasburg is former commissioner of the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice and a former associate director of the Vera Institute of Justice. He is the author of *Violent Delinquents: A Report to the Ford Foundation from the Vera Institute of Justice*, published in 1978.

G. Michael Welch, M.Ed., has served in numerous capacities in child-care and educational institutions. He was a detached worker for the Boston Youth Commission. He also worked in the Dorchester Juvenile Court. In 1973 he became principal of Sacred Heart High School, a private school in suburban Boston. He resigned from that office in 1977 and became the first director of the Robert F. Kennedy School.

Pablo R. Zamora is a youth services counselor at the Closed Adolescent Treatment Center (CATC) in Denver, CO, a position he has held since 1974. He is co-leader of sex offenders therapy group at the CATC. Mr. Zamora has been a consultant to the state of Oklahoma on developing a program for treatment of violent adolescent offenders. He has attended numerous workshops and seminars on therapy and working with violent offenders, and he has a B.A. from the University of Northern Colorado.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Robert A. Mathias is a senior editor and writer at the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD). He has written and edited a number of publications at NCCD including, Youth Forum, The Concerned Corporate Citizen, and Criminal Justice Newsletter. He has also co-authored *Controlling Prison Populations: An Assessment of Current Mechanisms*. Mr. Mathias previously served as assistant public relations director for the New York State Attorney General's Office, where he initiated a statewide Consumer Action newsletter.

Paul DeMuro is a former vice president of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. He was the first project director of the Federal Violent Offender Research and Development Program. Mr. DeMuro has developed programs for serious and violent offenders in Pennsylvania, Chicago and Massachusetts. Currently, he is serving as director of youth services for Essex County, New Jersey. He is married and the father of four children.

Richard S. Allinson is the editor and publisher of *Criminal Justice Abstracts*, a quarterly journal. He is a former senior editor and director of publications for the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. Mr. Allinson was the editor of *Status Offenders and the Juvenile Justice System: An Anthology* (1978, 1980), and has contributed articles to *Crime & Delinquency*, *Police and Corrections Magazines*, the *American Bar Association Journal*, and other criminal justice publications.

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