


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✓ A FOUR SITE ASSESSMENT OF THE
INTEGRATED CRIMINAL APPREHENSION PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ICAP Program

A growing demand for public services combined with a trend toward fiscal austerity forced many public agencies in the 1970's to recognize the need for planning and implementing programs which could result in greater productivity from available resources. Like other public agencies, police departments have been affected by this trend. Local police agencies experimented with a number of programs including community oriented policing, investigative case screening, improved allocation methods and crime analysis in order to better utilize available resources. In addition to these local efforts, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) sponsored the development, implementation and transfer of these as well as other promising managerial techniques for improving police service delivery.

The Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP) sponsored by LEAA represented a comprehensive effort to introduce several state-of-the-art planning, patrol and investigative programs to a wide range of police agencies across the country. ICAP drew upon research sponsored by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) and operational programs sponsored by the Office of Criminal Justice Programs (OCJP), as well as the efforts of individual police departments, to develop improved systems of service delivery. The ICAP program developed over a period of several years. When it was initially conceived, ICAP was aimed largely at improving patrol operations. Although this emphasis remained at the heart of ICAP, the program expanded to include the investigative process, warrant service and a serious habitual offender component. It must be emphasized that ICAP was not a static program, but one that changed over the course of its existence.

The objectives of the program were to increase:

- the amount of solvability and apprehension information gathered by the police from preliminary investigations,
- directed patrol activities based upon crime analysis and strategic planning, and
- apprehension of less serious felons as well as career criminals.

The program components of the ICAP model were designed to offer police managers a range of managerial and operational procedures they could adopt to improve departmental efficiency and effectiveness. The components, which

addressed field operations and support services fell into four categories: analysis, patrol management, investigations management and serious habitual offender apprehension.

Analysis, as specified in the ICAP model, utilized information derived from departmental records to identify significant enforcement issues and to develop tactical plans. ICAP encouraged departments to undertake two types of analysis - crime and operations analysis. Crime analysis was a set of systematic, analytical processes designed to provide police managers with timely and pertinent information about crime patterns and trends. In addition, ICAP encouraged departments to develop suspect oriented strategies through the analysis of field interview reports and career criminal files. Operations analysis involved the continuous collection and analysis of information related to police service delivery. Operations analysis provided police managers with information relative to the call for service and crime workload, personnel available to meet workload demands, and the assignment of departmental personnel.

The **patrol management** components of ICAP represented a comprehensive effort to increase the productivity of patrol by focusing the resources of patrol upon crime prevention, deterrence and apprehension. It was based upon the philosophy that departments could systematically match deployment to workload conditions and manage service calls to increase the portion of patrol resources directed to perform specific anti-crime activities and use crime analysis information to determine the time, location and the portion of patrol resources that could be tactically directed to specific crime problems.

Investigative Management was based upon materials prepared by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. The materials outlined steps necessary to develop an improved system of investigative management. These steps were generally designed to identify those cases that had the greatest potential for solution and to focus department resources on these priority cases. Although each of the MCI program components was incorporated into the ICAP model, only two were emphasized during implementation. These were (1) greater participation of patrol officers in the investigative process and (2) the early closure of those cases which had little or no possibility for a solution based upon analysis of solvability factors.

The **serious habitual offender** component of ICAP was to focus the department's attention upon career criminals and to coordinate police prosecutor initiatives in this area. ICAP identified two law enforcement functions that could support the prosecutor's career criminal program. These were the development of a special investigative function to aid departments in the early identification, investigation and case processing of crimes involving serious offenders and a warrant service component designed to reduce the large warrant backlog faced by many departments.

ICAP was initiated in 1976. During the course of the program over 50 police and sheriff departments across the country participated. In addition, similar programs were developed by state level criminal justice planning agencies. Total federal grants to each department averaged approximately \$800,000 over a three phase grant period and total costs of the federal program were in excess of 40 million dollars.

The Evaluation Design

The purpose of the national evaluation was to conduct a process and impact assessment of the ICAP model as it developed in four of the 52 departments that participated in the program. It must be cautioned that the information reported in this volume cannot be viewed as representative of the ICAP experience in other departments. Because of the flexibility of the program, departments had substantial opportunities to choose the parts of the program they wished to pursue and the extent to which they implemented each component. Thus, program emphasis and implementation varied substantially across the 52 participating departments. The complexity of ICAP, the flexible LEAA implementation strategy, the evolving nature of ICAP and the duration of the national evaluation affected the research design. Because of the variety of project activities found across ICAP sites, the flexible use of a variety of evaluation methods was adopted. An initial project survey indicated that a formative evaluation of ICAP as practiced in the field was necessary in order to determine which parts of the ICAP program model were, or were not, being translated into the reality of everyday police operations. Consequently, the first phase of the evaluation was primarily a process-oriented implementation assessment. The process evaluation focused upon the key components of the program - crime analysis, patrol operations, investigations management and the serious habitual offender. In addressing the implementation of these components, the evaluation explored:

- the extent to which various activities were implemented;
- the level of resources committed to these activities; and
- the extent to which ICAP activity was integrated into the routine of the department.

The process evaluation served several purposes. First, it presented information about a complex program in a holistic fashion and in the context of the police operating environment. Second, it allowed the evaluators to assess the extent to which ICAP was implemented in each of the sites. This was imperative given the scope of the national program and the fact that sites could tailor the program to local needs. Third, the process evaluation

clearly delineated the linkages, or lack of them, between ICAP goals and objectives and the activities implemented by the departments. This permitted identification of the manner in which the main activities might contribute to the program's goals. Finally, the process evaluation provided a framework for understanding and interpreting the impact results.

The outcome assessment focused upon the extent to which the various program components, especially crime analysis, were able to support the criminal identification and apprehension goals of the program. To detect the way that routine police operations as well as specific ICAP innovations affected the apprehension process, a detailed analysis of 3,152 felony cases was conducted. Approximately half of these cases involved arrests. The cases were chosen during the latter stages of each department's project when ICAP implementation was most extensive. Analysis involved a detailed assessment of factors which led to the identification and arrest of suspects. Particular attention was paid to the role that citizens, patrol officers and crime analysts contributed to this process. The detailed felony case analysis was designed to identify ICAP and non-ICAP factors which affected apprehension outcomes. The findings of the outcome assessment are the subject of this report.

The four ICAP departments that participated in the research are listed below:

Department	Sworn Officers	Officers per 1000 population	Part 1 crime rate per 1000 population	Cumulative ICAP Awards
Memphis, TN	1196	1.8	81	\$1,703,000
Norfolk, VA	593	2.2	78	\$ 963,000
Springfield, VA	174	1.3	100	\$ 821,000
Stockton, CA	242	1.6	112	\$1,301,000

MAJOR FINDINGS

Issues in Implementation

Program implementation is almost always a difficult and complicated process involving not only the kind of program or technology being implemented, but also the methods used to introduce the new program into host

agencies. This process of innovation was perhaps doubly difficult in the case of ICAP because of the scope of the changes that were being introduced. Participating departments had to deal not only with new and unfamiliar concepts, but also with a range of activities that could affect all of the major operating and support service units within an agency.

Federal design of the program affected the acceptance and implementation of ICAP by local participants. First of all, federal monetary support was generous. Sites funded for the full five year period usually received approximately \$800,000. Thus, the funding level and duration provided a stable atmosphere in which the participants could embark upon innovation. Theoretically, this enhanced the opportunities for implementation as well as the integration of the innovations into the routines of the departments. While the lengthy implementation period fostered stability, it may have also fostered some complacency. Over the course of the projects the departments tended to emphasize project maintenance activities rather than the aggressive implementation of new ICAP activities. Also, as ICAP progressed, more and more of the ICAP staffs' time was devoted to program maintenance activities rather than innovation.

The scope of the federal program affected implementation. ICAP offered a comprehensive set of activities to focus police resources upon crime control issues. From a pragmatic point of view, the program was also extremely appealing to police officials because of its breadth and flexibility. ICAP offered a virtual smorgasboard of activities which addressed a broad range of general police issues. While this approach allowed departments to meet their own internal needs, it did not guarantee that essential features of the criminal apprehension aspects of the program would be implemented. Omissions by the departments were most notable in the operational areas designed to identify and apprehend active criminals (directed patrol and career criminal activities).

As originally conceived, the federal assistance offered a three-pronged effort involving the preparation of program guides, technical assistance and monitoring to support local implementation. These important technology transfer activities fell by the wayside as administrative funding for LEAA was reduced. The first part of the technology transfer effort embodied the development of a detailed program and the dissemination of prescriptive materials. Manuals for selected aspects of ICAP were prepared. A second federal support activity was the provision of direct technical assistance to the participants. This usually involved an annual site visit by federal managers or contractors to review the projects, offer implementation advice and make recommendations. When the technical assistance contract expired in 1979, virtually all on-site federal activity ceased. Communication between the federal managers and local sites was largely conducted by telephone, newsletters and periodic conference meetings where the federal program monitor could meet with individual grantees. The final part of the federal

ICAP technology transfer effort involved the development of a monitoring system. A quarterly reporting system to capture qualitative and quantitative information was established. However, monies were never allocated to aggregate and analyze the data in these reports so they could be used to monitor either the implementation progress or the ongoing impact of ICAP in the departments. In effect, the rather ambitious and necessary technology transfer process was only partially implemented.

Irregardless of how well the planned federal technology transfer effort was implemented, the scope of implementation in each jurisdiction was determined by the ability and willingness of police managers to participate in the ICAP change process. Although ICAP quite ambitiously assembled various police innovations into a single program, all of the activities were feasible. In fact, many of the activities were quite old and firmly recognized as good management practices. Nevertheless, it was also true that some of the activities directly and profoundly threatened established procedures and power relationships in the participating departments. When the changes were perceived to be too great or too painful, some components of ICAP were postponed to later grant periods or, sometimes, dropped completely by the participating departments.

Perhaps the most significant determinant of successful ICAP implementation was the active commitment of the chief of police. Several roadblocks to change consistently required action by the chief to facilitate implementation. First, it was necessary during the planning process for the chief to assert his commitment to ICAP and to indicate his expectations regarding the pace of change as well as those responsible for implementing various activities. Second, whenever ICAP specified some type of inter-agency cooperation, the chief's attention was critical. Third, the chief's active intervention was frequently needed when project activities required the cooperation of different divisions in the police department.

In each of the departments the ICAP project director played a key role in the program. Once an ICAP agenda was established, the project director had to conduct himself as a planner, change agent and trouble shooter. The project director was responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the program. While conducting these ICAP activities the project director often had other managerial responsibilities within the department. In addition, as time passed and ICAP activities were institutionalized, the project director became the manager of the new departmental activity, usually the crime analysis unit. The addition of these new responsibilities frequently detracted from the project director's ability to act as the principal change agent responsible for the implementation of new aspects of ICAP.

Because ICAP affected most operations in a department, it was critical that it be located at a high level in the department. If the project director

reported directly to the chief (or a deputy chief in a larger department), implementation was generally facilitated. If, on the other hand, the project director was located in patrol or support services, for example, those aspects of ICAP tended to develop while other aspects of the program lingered.

Whether or not the project director was a sworn officer or a civilian did not seem to greatly affect the implementation process. The particular skills that an individual brought to the job were more critical. The job demanded substantial interpersonal skills to "sell" the program as well as more technical planning and management capabilities. From time to time each of the departments used a task force approach to facilitate implementation. These task forces sometimes acted as advisors to the entire ICAP effort while at other times they were assembled for a specific purpose. The task force approach frequently brought key personnel into the ICAP process at an early stage of project development and generally fostered an approach to change which involved those who would be most affected by it. In effect, key personnel were offered an opportunity to do something for themselves rather than have something done for them. As a change strategy, the task force approach generally worked quite well in introducing managers to ICAP and customizing the ICAP activities to the departments.

Crime Reporting and Apprehension Process

In order to assess the potential impact of ICAP on any police program, an understanding of the arrest context is necessary. The purpose of this section is to describe the general circumstances surrounding crime reporting and apprehension, based upon a detailed analysis of data collected in the four sites. The analysis was based upon a detailed review of investigative case files in the four study departments. The findings generally support earlier research by the Rand Institute (*The Criminal Investigative Process*) and the Stanford Research Institute (*Felony Investigation Decision Model*) regarding the investigative process.

1. The police are heavily dependent upon victims and witnesses for information to make apprehensions. The police usually arrive at the crime scene well after the crime has been completed. In nearly half of the cases, police arrived at the scene to take their offense reports two hours after the crime occurred. The primary reason for this time lag was citizen delay in discovering the crime and in reporting the incident to the police.
2. In the vast majority of offenses the police are not provided with the kind of information and evidence needed to identify a suspect and make an apprehension. In approximately 45% of all offenses examined, there was no known suspect, no suspect vehicle information, no witnesses and no physical evidence available to the police. Furthermore, 39% of all offenses lacked even a minimal description of a suspect.

3. The apprehension process is dominated by citizen reporting and direct action. Approximately one-half of the apprehensions studied occurred as a direct result of a citizen call for service to the police. In approximately one-third of these cases, the suspect was detained by a victim, witness or security guard prior to the arrival of the police.
4. A majority of arrests occur during the first hour after a crime has been committed. As the time period between the crime and the report increases, the likelihood of an arrest drops considerably. Many of the arrests that occur 24 hours after the completion of a crime are the result of a previously issued warrant in which a specific suspect was identified.
5. A substantial number of the arrestees in the data base had prior contact with the police. In most instances this prior contact involved an arrest in the jurisdiction of the current arrest.

Implications

ICAP efforts to design apprehension tactics based upon method of operation information were limited by the amount and quality of this information on the offense reports. The relative lack of this information affected the ability of crime analysts to identify specific patterns of crime and to link specific suspects to unique crime characteristics. Moreover, because of the limited amount of suspect related information on offense reports, crime analysts were usually restricted to the temporal and geographic aspects of crime when identifying crime patterns. While these patterns may facilitate the deployment of patrol personnel during high crime times and in high crime areas, specific apprehension opportunities using such gross analyses are limited.

The secretive manner in which criminals operate and the critical role which citizens play in the crime reporting, suspect identification and apprehension process suggest that efforts to encourage citizens to improve their crime reporting and to play a larger role in the protection of their property and life is warranted. Yet, crime prevention was seldom a part of ICAP projects. Each of the departments revised their offense reports to insure that maximum information was gathered during the preliminary investigation. Less effort was expended by the departments to improve citizen crime reporting and to encourage citizen crime prevention activities.

The extent to which the four departments had information about former offenders and suspicious persons in criminal history and field interview files suggests that it is possible to identify serious offenders and, if warranted, develop proactive suspect-oriented surveillance and apprehension

strategies. Because only one of the four ICAP assessment sites (Stockton) developed a formal mechanism for reviewing these possibilities, the opportunity for an ICAP impact was limited.

Crime Analysis Assessment

The development of a crime analysis unit was the major component of ICAP in terms of program budget and personnel assignment. It represented perhaps 50% of the entire program. However, crime analysis was only a very small part of the total law enforcement effort in each department. The number of analysts ranged from .5 analysts per 100 sworn officers in Memphis to 1.2 analysts per 100 officers in Springfield. Crime analysts assisted in the suspect identification and apprehension process by alerting operations personnel to crime patterns and by screening departmental records to identify potential suspects in unsolved cases.

Specific results of the crime analysis assessment include:

1. The level of confirmed crime analysis assistance to the identification and arrest of suspects varied considerably among the departments. Crime analysts provided support to approximately six percent of the sampled arrests across the four departments. The crime analysis arrest assistance ranged from less than one percent of the arrests in Memphis to nearly 12% in Springfield.
2. The relative level of crime analysis assistance may be greater than suggested above, given that approximately half of the arrests were the direct result of a citizen call for service and half occurred within one hour of the crime. If these cases are dismissed as not being particularly susceptible to crime analysis assistance, the proportional contribution of crime analysis to what might be defined as "workable cases" would increase in each of the sites.
3. The limited impact of crime analysis can be attributed, in part, to the lack of operational support from patrol officers and investigators. None of the sites developed a directed patrol that routinely used crime analysis information to develop tactical plans. Only Stockton periodically deployed a specialized patrol strike force that used crime analysis information to plan operations.

Implications

Given the low levels of crime analysis support to cases with arrest in Memphis and Norfolk, it is unlikely that crime analysis had any impact upon overall departmental arrest productivity. In Springfield and Stockton, crime analysis support was provided to more than 10% of all cases with arrest, suggesting that, in these smaller sites, crime analysis was better utilized.

part of investigators. Special operations by investigators accounted for only a very small proportion of investigator arrests.

4. Because investigators frequently dispatch patrol officers to physically make their arrests, a better indicator of investigator productivity than actual arrests is the extent to which they identify a previously unknown suspect. The data indicate considerable variability across the sites. Investigator identifications ranged from a low of 8% in Memphis to 24% in Norfolk. The average for the four sites was 16%.

Implications

Analyses of the circumstances surrounding arrests strongly suggest that ICAP proactive activities by patrol officers and investigators played only a minimal role in the suspect identification and apprehension process. The finding that most arrests were response oriented coupled with the fact that, except in Stockton, proactive tactics were not routinely implemented suggests that the ICAP failure to impact patrol and investigative operations was an implementation rather than a program design problem.

Crime and Arrest Trends

The basic goal of ICAP was to increase apprehensions and deter crime. In the two sites with available data, time series analyses of crime and arrest data were conducted to measure changes in these trends.

1. Although Part I crime rates in the four cities increased during ICAP, there was substantial variability in the increase among the four sites. Reported Part I crime rates between 1976 and 1981 rose 4% in Norfolk, 7% in Stockton, 11% in Memphis and 28% in Springfield.
2. When Part I crime rates among 31 ICAP participants for the 1976-1981 period were analyzed, similar variability was found. During this period the crime increase among cities over 25,000 population was 11% compared to 13% in 31 ICAP cities. Sixteen ICAP departments were above the national average while 15 departments were below the national average.
3. Changes in the crime/arrest ratio in the cities varied both in direction and intensity over time. In Memphis, the total Part I arrest rate declined during the pre-post ICAP period. The arrest rate declined from 13% in the pre-ICAP period to 8% in the post-ICAP period. In Stockton, the departmental arrest rate increased from 12% to 14%. Similar analysis was not possible in the other sites because of missing data.

Implications

Considerable caution must be used in interpreting crime and arrest time series data. Crime and arrest rates are heavily influenced by factors beyond the control of the department. Hence, police have a limited capability to affect these measures. Furthermore, ICAP was only a very small part of the total enforcement effort in each department. Other factors complicated the interpretability of time series analysis. Although crime and arrest rate changes were tracked over time, it was difficult to link these changes to ICAP intervention activities. The difficulties encountered included problems in accurately defining the time when activities were implemented, the intensity of their implementation and their duration. Furthermore, numerous factors extraneous to the program confounded the interpretability of the time series data.

Factors Contributing to Arrest

A large part of ICAP, especially the crime analysis component, was predicated on the basis that the collection of more complete offense information would increase the probability of apprehension. To this end, all of the departments revised their offense reports and three of the four increased the amount of information requested in a preliminary investigation. Particular attention was placed upon gathering additional suspect and MO information. Case information was analyzed to assess the extent to which various types of information collected during initial investigations contributed to arrests.

1. Both univariate and multivariate analysis methods suggest that only the availability of specific suspect-identifying information (name, address, vehicle) on the offense report was consistently related to a subsequent arrest.
2. For each site, discriminant analysis suggested that at least one indicator of investigative follow-up activity was a significant predictor of arrest even after the predictive ability of suspect identifying information was taken into account. The significant investigative variables varied across sites but included: the number of victim interviews, the number of witness interviews, whether detectives were present when the offense report was taken and whether detectives identified a previously unknown suspect.

Implications

The research findings suggest that the ICAP offense report changes which simply increased the amount of general information on offense reports was of limited value in increasing apprehensions. The findings emphasize the importance of the preliminary and follow-up investigations in obtaining specific suspect information directly from victims and witnesses. When this

type of informational support is lacking - as it is in a majority of cases - the probability of arrest is quite small.

FACTORS LIMITING THE EFFECT OF ICAP

Several factors have been empirically identified which limit the ability of the police, in general, and a program like ICAP, in particular, to deter crime and increase apprehensions. Some of these pertained to the way the participating departments operated, while others were related to the design of ICAP and were clearly beyond the control of the operating agencies. The following factors limited the ICAP impact upon the arrest process.

1. Police work under severe handicaps. Criminals are, on the whole, quite successful in conducting their activities in a secretive manner. Thus, in the majority of crimes, except for knowledge that a crime occurred, there is very little evidence which might lead to the positive identification and arrest of a suspect. Where evidence is available, it is usually supplied by either the victim or witnesses. Thus, the police are largely dependent upon a criminal making an overt mistake or a victim or witness providing some specific information about the suspect. Furthermore, there is very little the police can do to increase the amount of specific suspect-identifying information available from victims or witnesses. Only with such information do post-crime investigations lead to positive arrest outcomes.
2. A second set of factors inhibiting ICAP impact was the failure of any site to fully implement the program and the nature of the implemented activities. As ICAP moved from recommending administrative and organizational changes to recommending changes in the way patrol and investigative tasks were conducted, the degree of implementation was reduced. This was particularly detrimental in regard to some of the patrol tasks. For ICAP to improve police performance, it was necessary that patrol officers change their usual procedures of responding to service calls and conducting random patrol. ICAP recommended that the departments encourage first line supervisors to use operational and crime data to plan daily operations. Norfolk was the only site which appeared to have increased the latitude given first line supervisors in detailing patrol officers to short term directed activities. But none of the four evaluation sites developed an aggressive directed patrol program which was integrated with other ICAP elements. Only Stockton developed a strike force (assembled periodically to conduct special anti-crime activities) which regularly used crime analysis products. This type of activity had potential for improving probabilities of arrest. Yet, three of the departments did not make any substantial or lasting effort to restructure patrol work tasks so that they would be target oriented.

3. The general failure to integrate ICAP activities with departmental routines was another factor limiting the ICAP potential. The purpose behind many ICAP program activities was to forge or improve the links between various departmental operations. The ICAP premise was that, by improving the coordination between various units of the department, the effectiveness and efficiency of police operations would be improved. Project activities, as implemented, varied greatly in the extent to which they were integrated into department operations. Perhaps the most glaring failure was the inability of the departments to use crime analysis information to develop some regularly planned tactical operations. With the exception of the Stockton Strike Force, crime alerts from crime analysis units were largely ignored by operations personnel.

4. A fourth factor which inhibited achievement of LEAA's crime control objective for the program concerns the chain of assumptions which link various program/project activities to their proposed outcomes. More specifically, some local project activities involved a tenuous and lengthy set of assumptions relating the influence of that activity to improved law enforcement. Of particular note are those project activities that were designed to improve the departmental efficiency as opposed to enforcement effectiveness in the community. ICAP project activities which were primarily efficiency oriented (i.e., their immediate purpose was to accomplish such things as improving organizational workflow reducing duplication of effort, improving the match between resources and service demands, and streamlining operations) were less likely on both theoretical and practical grounds to have an impact on ICAP's major goal - the control of crime and the apprehension of suspects. Many of the ICAP activities had an efficiency focus. The limited number of direct, outcome related activities probably reduced any potential ICAP enforcement impacts.

Logical linkages between efficiency and effectiveness also could not be demonstrated empirically. In particular, ICAP asserted that, by improving efficiency through such things as improving temporal and geographic patrol deployment, increasing the use of one rather than two officer units and eliminating duplicative investigator effort by instituting early case closure procedures, time would be created so that officers could focus more of their attention upon crime control. Each of these activities may have improved efficiency and generally provided officers with greater flexibility to engage in planned anti-crime activities. However, with the exception of the Strike Force in Stockton, none of the departments made a concerted effort to capitalize upon any time which may have been created. In the absence of a strong managerial initiative, such time was used as individual officers saw fit. In many instances, this meant a reduced workload rather than increased effort to control criminal activity.

FUTURE RESEARCH INITIATIVES

This assessment of ICAP not only addressed that particular program, but also examined some issues in police performance. In general, it has painted a rather discouraging, but realistic, picture of police identification and apprehension capabilities. It is with this in mind that the following research recommendations are made.

Topic 1: Research: Assessment of Police Efficiency - ICAP embodied a number of activities designed to improve the efficiency of police operations. These included service call management techniques like telephone reporting and call prioritization, patrol management techniques like the greater use of one officer units, community service officers and improved temporal and geographic deployment and improved investigative management techniques like early case closure. While some of these activities may lead to improvements in effectiveness, they are primarily methods designed to provide service more efficiently and, perhaps, lower the costs for police service.

In the past several years cut-back management have become the watch-words of state and local governments. Local police agencies have experimented with a number of activities designed to cut the costs involved in providing law enforcement services. The National Institute of Justice has supported this process by providing cut-back management seminars and preparing prescriptive materials. These initiatives are justified given trends in federal, state and local budgets. Since the mid-1970's municipal employment has been declining while budgets have been increasing rapidly. As a consequence, the number of police sworn personnel nationwide has been declining since 1974. It is unlikely that this trend will be reversed in the near future. As municipal and police executives find that they are unable to maintain personnel levels, there will be a growing need for information about the extent to which various cut-back management techniques can allow an agency to restrain budget increases yet maintain service levels. While the various cut-back management techniques identified by NIJ and others have been helpful, there is no quantitative information available about the extent to which various techniques affect law enforcement costs. A systematic inquiry into the way in which and the extent to which efficiency improvement activities affect agency costs and performance is needed. The development of an economic model relating police operational procedures and improved management techniques to service delivery costs would go a long way toward providing police administrators with the information they need to make informed decisions.

Topic 2. Research/Demonstration: Crime Analysis System Development - Although the assessment of the ICAP crime analysis component in this report indicates a mixed impact, crime analysis may still have substantial potential. The ability to capture and use information for operational decisions will expand

as computer technology itself improves. The constraining factor in the use of information by the police is not the computer hardware, but the inability of police personnel to imaginatively use this information to improve their effectiveness. Several major shortcomings were observed in the way the ICAP crime analysis groups operated. The development of experimental demonstration crime analysis units, coupled with research components in several departments, could provide solid information upon which to develop and demonstrate effective crime analysis techniques. Such demonstrations could provide basic information upon which to develop model crime analysis systems and techniques.

Topic 3. Research Demonstration: Improved Post-Arrest Case Development - The evaluation indicates that the ability of the police to make arrests is limited because of the extent to which they are dependent upon citizens for suspect-identifying information. Furthermore, it does not appear that the ICAP strategy, which focused upon increasing the number of arrests made by the police, was successful in this regard. This occurred both because of flaws in the design of the program, and because the departments failed to implement some of the program's basic components. One weakness was that the four sites did not strongly stress the efforts to enhance the quality of the cases in which arrests were already made. Furthermore, investigators seldom aggressively attempted to improve the amount of evidence available in the post-arrest period. Case enhancement could improve the chances that these cases would receive a favorable prosecutorial review and a positive judicial outcome. Studies of arrest case outcomes by INSLAW and others strongly indicate that a large number of cases submitted to the prosecutor are not accepted. These circumstances have disastrous consequences for the criminal justice system. Criminals are actively aware that their chances of either apprehension or prosecution are extremely low. Thus, crime does not carry a great deal of risk. Victims and witnesses soon learn that the criminal justice system affords little protection. The development of a research demonstration to explore the feasibility of making stronger and broader cases against persons already arrested could improve the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. This could be done in two ways. First, special effort could be made to obtain additional witness and victim information and physical evidence in arrest cases. Second, investigators could more fully explore the extent to which arrestees may be linked to additional crimes.

Topic 4. Research: Case Attrition and Degradation - Although police are the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system, it is the prosecutor who usually determines the charges that will be filed against a suspect and which cases will be accepted for adjudication. In this regard, prosecutors have enormous discretion in determining whether and how to prosecute criminal complaints. ICAP and other studies of the criminal justice system suggest that police/prosecutor cooperation has been limited. Even more disturbing is the lack of police knowledge concerning the reasons why cases are dropped by

prosecutors. Prosecutors frequently argue that police make arrests that will not stand up to prosecutive standards. Others argue that prosecutors are overburdened and must drop some cases completely or reduce charges in other cases. Finally, the police frequently plead ignorance of what standards of evidence the prosecutor needs and the reason why "solid" cases are dropped. Despite these various points of view, it is clear that many cases are completely dropped or reduced to lesser charges. This occurs in the case of serious habitual offenders as well as others. Given that police apprehension rates are low, it is important that cases with arrest be given the fullest consideration. As a consequence, there is a need to examine the attrition process more extensively than previous research has done. The proposed research would identify factors affecting case attrition and develop mechanisms to ensure that police present thorough cases to the prosecutor and that prosecutors clearly delineate their adjudication priorities and evidentiary needs.

Topic 5. Research: Police Crime Prevention Activities - The original ICAP grant guidelines called for the creation of a crime prevention unit in participating departments. The guidelines recommended that such a unit represent one percent of the sworn strength. As ICAP developed, this staffing requirement was dropped from the guidelines and little serious emphasis was given to an ICAP crime prevention initiative. Given the large and important role that citizens play in the apprehension process and the limited ability of the police to affect apprehension rates, a greater focus upon developing police/citizen crime prevention strategies would seem to merit research consideration. The use of the National Evaluation Program (NEP) format to gather descriptive and evaluative information about police crime prevention strategies could be an important initiative.

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