


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# OJJDP Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN

U.S. Department of Justice • Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention • National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

## Runaway Children and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act: What Is the Impact?

NCJRS

OCT 9 1984

#ACQUISITION

Well over one million children will run away from home this year. More than half will run from physical maltreatment inflicted by family members; a third will run from sexual abuse.<sup>1</sup> Many will be "pushouts" or "throwaways," children whose parents encourage, even demand them to leave and never return. They may join thousands of other runaways who live on the streets or in abandoned buildings and cheap hotels. The vast ma-

those who remain at large for a s will resort to theft or prostitu- method of self-support.<sup>2</sup> They ably abuse alcohol and drugs r from poor mental and physical any runaways will survive this ears. Some will not survive at



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No one has ever counted the runaways and homeless children in this country. The U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has estimated that there are approximately 2 million, but it is a difficult number to ascertain.<sup>3</sup> While some are successfully reunited with their families and others stumble upon an assistance program, an alarming number of runaways slip through the cracks of the system. A statistical survey conducted in California found that only one in six runaways is reported missing by parents or guardians.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, HHS was "consistently" advised in interviews with police and juvenile authorities that only one in every four or five runaways and homeless children is ever arrested or detained.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the remaining 75 to 80 percent of these youth are never officially acknowledged. A runaway's anonymity is further enhanced by the throng of the streets, the comfort of being but one face in a thousand, or by the screen of bogus identification. Some of them never surface. Some join the estimated 2,000 unidentified children's bodies buried annually by police.<sup>6</sup>

The current attitude of the juvenile justice system towards runaways can be described as one of apathy—more specifically, apathy by statute. The fault lies behind the well-intentioned passage of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.<sup>7</sup> In an effort to correct the ills of a juvenile justice system which incarcerated youth convicted of minor offenses, Congress effectively tied the hands of juvenile authorities, leaving runaways, quite literally, out in the cold.

The Act calls for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, juveniles who commit acts which would not be considered criminal if committed by adults. Truancy, incorrigibility, and alcohol consumption are status offenses, as is running away from home. The Act created the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), giving it, in the last several years, the considerable

force of \$40 million annually in non-discretionary funding to award States which comply with its mandate. A State is entitled to funding when it accomplishes a number of reforms, including deinstitutionalization, to OJJDP's satisfaction. Fifty-three States and territories are currently participating in the Act's deinstitutionalization mandate, with 44 of them officially found in full compliance. Consequently, the national total of status and nonoffenders held in secure facilities has been reduced by 88.5 percent over the past 5 to 7 years.

While the motive behind deinstitutionalization was indeed noble, the blanket application of this "either/or" statute has not been without its darker consequences. Compliance means that the decriminalization of status offenses has been given the indiscriminate force of law. In other words, running away is legal. The question which needs to be asked is whether or not it is in the best interest of children to afford them such a right.

Less than 10 percent of all runaways are "ready for emancipation," according to a 1983 survey conducted by HHS.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, this small fraction of youth may have the capacity for judgment necessary to make informed decisions concerning their futures. These are the children who are responsible enough to care for themselves, to return home, or to voluntarily remain in a nonsecure facility. Unfortunately, the HHS estimate indicates that 90 percent of the runaways and homeless children in this country are *not* ready to act responsibly.

A "substantial number" of runaway and homeless youth "are emotionally troubled and a very high proportion of them have either attempted to end their lives or have thought of doing so," according to a study conducted in New York by the State Psychiatric Institute.<sup>9</sup> The Wisconsin Juvenile Female Offender Study Project concluded that of the chronic runaway girls in that State who had run away three or more times,

72 percent had attempted suicide.<sup>10</sup> Obviously, many runaway and homeless children are deeply disturbed and incapable of caring for themselves.

If given the freedom to run away, many children will exercise it, if only out of their inability to recognize the consequence of such a decision. Once on the street, their needs for food, shelter, clothing—and even a convincing facsimile of love—are willingly provided by a score of individuals who profit from the brutal exploitation of children: pimps, pornographers, drug dealers, and pedophiles. It has been estimated that of the runaways who remain at large for 2 weeks, almost 75 percent will have already begun supporting themselves by theft, drugs, prostitution, or pornography.<sup>11</sup> In fact, runaways are believed to be the main supply for the forced prostitution and pornography industries. In the U. S. alone, approximately 1.2 million children under 16 are engaged in prostitution, and child pornography accounts for a sizable portion of the \$2 billion to \$4 billion pornography industry.<sup>12</sup> The statistics not only indicate that runaways have been left to fend for themselves, but also that they are not capable of doing so.

OJJDP recently conducted a series of interviews around the country in order to examine how local authorities respond to the runaway problem. These onsite interviews focused on regional statutes and facilities, and most importantly, on a few of the runaways with whom local officials have had contact. We present this report at face value; it is not intended as a definitive work on deinstitutionalization, or on the work of OJJDP. But we believe it does point out what we consider to be one of the shortcomings, one of the unintended consequences, of deinstitutionalization, and we present it to inform the public about one of the costs of such Federal mandates.

Alfred S. Regnery, Administrator  
Office of Juvenile Justice and  
Delinquency Prevention

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### California

Penny ran away from home when she was 11 years old. She was placed in a residential home in the Los Angeles area and ran away again. She moved into an apartment with another minor and three adults, but was accidentally discovered when authorities showed up with an eviction notice. She returned to the residential placement and ran away again. A short time later, Penny turned herself over to the police. Once again, she was placed in a residential home and, once again, Penny ran away.

In June of 1983, Penny was living in a disreputable Hollywood "crash pad." A common type of haven for runaways, "crash pads" are adult residences that house children for purposes of sexual exploitation. Later in the year, Penny was arrested for theft. The authorities did not prosecute and she again found her way back to the street.

Within a period of 3 years, Penny received six placements and ran from each one.

The handling of Penny's case was based on California's compliance with the Federal deinstitutionalization mandate. As a result of the State bill passed in 1976, local runaways cannot be securely held for more than 12 hours. Runaways from another country or State can be held for 24 to 72 hours, depending on the proximity of their homes to the jurisdiction where they are picked up. Once a runaway has been confined for the maximum amount of time allowed by law, the authorities are required to release them to a nonsecure facility.

The Los Angeles County police have even less authority to deal with runaways than State law provides. The County has never opened a secure facility to hold runaways for the few hours California's deinstitutionaliza-

tion bill allows. Instead of secure confinement, the County probation department contracts private homes to serve as temporary shelters under the design of the Status Offender Detention Alternatives Program (SODA). Runaways are free to stay at SODA facilities until they are returned home or until other permanent arrangements can be made. Unfortunately, they are free to leave as well, and many of them do. The police in Los Angeles County are faced with the disturbing legal reality that all they can do is place a runaway in a SODA home and hope the child remains.

Penny was within her legal rights every time she walked away from her placements. The Los Angeles County authorities could not hold her simply because she was a runaway living on the streets. That was not reason enough. In time, however, Penny came up with a reason good enough to warrant confinement in a secure facility. She was arrested for prostitution, reclassified from status offender to delinquent, and detained in Juvenile Hall.

Detective Delores Schley of the Los Angeles Police Department has followed Penny's case since 1981. According to Schley, the fate of a runaway like Penny can be attributed to the national deinstitutionalization effort. She believes that "truancy and running away are pre-delinquent acts. These are the kids who are likely to become delinquents." Yet the current policy is to ignore them until they do. Schley said that the police tend to "view picking up runaways as a wasted effort. It takes a good 4 hours of an officer's time to process a juvenile runaway, and the kids are sometimes back out on the street before the officers finish their reports."



Officials must close their eyes to the runaway problem at every level of the justice system, according to Lt. Ray Gott of the County Sheriff's Youth Services Bureau. In a newspaper interview, Gott said that enacting California's deinstitutionalization bill was as if the State said, "We are going to deal with serious, hard-core juvenile criminal offenders, but, in essence, also tell the status offender: 'Go away, we don't want to be bothered with runaways. When you commit a crime then come back and we'll rehabilitate you.'" That, Gott said, "is insanity."<sup>13</sup>

From the time she was 11 years old, Penny was on her own. The law could not prevent her from leading the kind of life that often turns a child to prostitution. The law could only provide Penny with an alternative to street life. It was up to her to choose and, just like thousands of other children, Penny made the wrong choice.

A 15-year-old girl from Missouri came to the attention of the County probation department when she was found stabbed in a downtown Los Angeles hotel. Since she had only been at large for 3 weeks, she was not what a probation official described as a confirmed street youth. Typically, intervention at

such an early stage can prevent a child from becoming too ingrained in street life. On a Friday afternoon, County officials arranged for the girl to go live with her aunt in Oklahoma. She agreed to go but, for administrative reasons, she could not be sent until the following Monday. Therefore, she was taken to a SODA facility and disappeared sometime during the weekend. Unless

picked up again, the chances of which are slim, this 15-year-old might well be on her way to becoming a permanent member of L.A.'s runaway and homeless community. Unfortunately, the longer such children are at large, the more difficult they are to help. Juvenile authorities recognize the futility of trying to reform a child accustomed to street life, and sometimes act accordingly.


Consider the fate of a 14-year-old runaway in San Francisco. She had once been a ward of the court, but ran away so many times that the Department of Social Services simply ended her wardship. According to Inspector Richard Hesselroth, the head of San Francisco's two-man runaway unit, the police consider it practically useless to pick up children who have been on the street for a long period of time. Such youth have probably been picked up before, know they cannot be held, and will run from a voluntary facility as soon as they are taken there.

The Youth Guidance Center is San Francisco's answer to the SODA. It is a nonsecure facility used mainly to house runaways on a temporary basis. There is a secure section to hold youth from outside the city for the maximum time limit, but overall, runaways from the Center are common. Consequently, the Center's ability to respond to the needs of chronic runners and street youth is extremely limited. Dennis Sweeney, Executive Director of the

Center, indicated that the system is a disaster for such youth. "The more chronic the kids are, the deeper they are into the street, the more they know our limitations, the quicker they leave," he said.

Kelly, a runaway from Seattle, was taken to the Youth Guidance Center five times. The first time, Sweeney had her flown home, where she was placed in a nonsecure facility. Kelly was back in San Francisco within 30 days. The four other times she was brought to the Center, she was detained for the 72-hour legal limit. On each occasion, Kelly left as soon as her time in secure detention had expired.

Kelly was a drug addict and a prostitute. She died last year from a drug overdose, which homicide detectives believe may have been involuntary. Kelly was 15 years old.



"When you are dealing with children you just can't let them do whatever they want to do if that is ultimately going to hurt them. If a kid is going to run away again and again and get into a... mess in the Times Square area, or some other area where he

will be exploited and hurt and maybe killed, I think society has a responsibility to restrain that child even if he hasn't committed a crime."

Irving Cohen, Department of Juvenile Probation

**New York City**

Jenny sat in the squad room of the New York Police Department (NYPD) one evening. Earlier in the day she had been arrested for "loitering for the purpose of prostitution." Although the arresting officer thought she was an adult, Jenny was 14.

Jenny ran away from her home near Minneapolis and had been on and off the street for 2 years prior to her arrest. Whenever she decided to return home, she lived with her mother. Whenever she decided to go back to the street, she lived with her pimp.

Jenny's pimp provided her with the bare necessities to keep her alive and working—food, shelter, clothing and a false identity. In return, Jenny thought of the pimp as her boyfriend. To please him, Jenny relinquished all control over her life and became a prostitute.

When arrested, Jenny did not use her false identification. For some unknown and fortunate reason, she told the arresting officer her real name, age and address. This information placed her in the NYPD Runaway Unit, but it did not necessarily ensure her safety.

In compliance with the Federal deinstitutionalization mandate, New York State law forbids authorities from holding runaways in secure facilities for more than a few hours. If attempts to reunite a runaway with his parents or guardian fail, the police have only one option: the child must be placed in a voluntary shelter.

When Jenny was sent to the Runaway Unit, Detective Warren McGinniss was assigned to her case. From his experience with runaways, McGinniss knew that it was risky to assume Jenny

would voluntarily remain in a non-secure facility overnight. He called her mother and a social service office in her hometown. Jenny was subsequently booked on a flight home that evening, courtesy of a ticket prepaid by a Minneapolis child welfare agency.



An hour before Jenny's flight was scheduled to leave, McGinniss discovered that her ticket had not been paid. He tried to reach the welfare agency, but it had closed for the day. He called Jenny's mother, but she lacked the funds to pay for the flight. It was beginning to look as if McGinniss would have to take Jenny to a non-secure facility and hope for the best. Jenny might have decided to stay in a voluntary shelter. Her pimp might have been willing to forget her and the \$400 she earned for him every night. The pimp might not have tracked her to the shelter, though once he had followed her all the way to Minneapolis to get her back. Perhaps this time he would leave her alone.

Jenny's case was a relatively easy one for McGinniss, at least from a short-term perspective. She could have withheld her identity. She could have waited until she was dropped off at a shelter and then returned to the street. But because Jenny wanted to go home, she made things "easy" for McGinniss. Thus, after the problem with her ticket had been resolved, Jenny was returned to Minneapolis that night.

In the long term, however, Jenny could not be considered an easy case. She was a chronic runner. Her wish to return home did not mean she would want to stay once she got there. She knew she was free to do as she chose. Of particular concern to McGinniss was something Jenny said before she left New York. Even though she was anxious to get home, she refused to give up the "relationship" she had with her pimp—a man who had brutally beaten her only a few hours before.

According to McGinniss, the job of getting runaways off the street has been made "almost impossible" by current law. Some of the runaways with whom



he maintained regular contact have been at large for several years. Even though he may know where they are and the dangers they face, he is virtually powerless. He may be able to take them off the street for a few hours, but he is unable to stop them when they decide to return.

McGinniss has known Linda since she first ran away from her home in Massachusetts at the age of 13. At 17, she was a seasoned prostitute. During her 4 years on the street, she was picked up several times and either sent home or placed in a variety of nonsecure facilities. She ran away each time. McGinniss described Linda as a child "as beautiful as a movie star" with "the mind and maturity of a 5-year-old." The system "had nothing to offer" Linda. "She could make as much on the street in one night as she could in a week in any normal job she

was qualified for," McGinniss said. Even though her pimp only gave her subsistence money, her fantasy of great wealth was more alluring to her than the prospect of a stable home. Since the choice was Linda's, she is still on the street. Soon she will graduate to the jurisdiction of the adult criminal justice system.

Joanne's story illustrates what happens all too often to veterans of the street like Linda. The Runaway Unit first came in contact with Joanne when she was 11 years old. Her family lived in New York, but only permitted the child to come home for visits. During the next 7 years of her life, Joanne ran away from a variety of court-ordered, though voluntary, placements. Today Joanne is a legal adult, a heroin addict with a felony conviction, and a fugitive from the law.

**"Under the current system kids have to meet certain criteria for badness before they get serious attention. They have to fail repeatedly before they are helped."**

*Lucy Berliner, Social Worker, Sexual Assault Unit, Harborview Medical Center*

**Seattle**

A 14-year-old runaway, fairly new to the street, worked as a prostitute in one of Seattle's notorious red light districts. A customer beat the girl and drove her to the city's waterfront. At knife-point, the man forced her to perform sodomy. He repeatedly told her he was going to kill her. As he dragged the young girl to a secluded area, her piercing screams caught the attention of a passing police car. The patrol stopped and probably saved the girl's life.

Detective Tom Dittmar, of the Seattle Vice Squad, knows of several other stories that have not ended so fortunately. A recent series of related homicides in the Seattle area claimed the lives of at least five juveniles. "Pimps, child molesters, and child murderers are taking advantage of lack of law enforcement involvement in the [runaway] problem," Dittmar said.

In Seattle, law enforcement involvement is perhaps even more systematically limited than in California and New York. Seattle police can take runaways into custody, but it is illegal to detain them in excess of the amount of time needed to transport the child home or to a shelter. Most runaways, however, are handled by a special, "noncoercive," civilian branch of the police department. Referred to as Community Service Officers (CSO), the members of this special unit are not permitted to take children into custody against their will. But whether taken off the street by the police or coaxed off by a CSO, runaways in Seattle are placed in one of two types of temporary, nonsecure facilities: publicly operated shelters or receiving homes.

Most runaways are taken to receiving homes, temporary foster care facilities much like the SODA home in Los Angeles. If a runaway decides to stay at a receiving home, he will find little more structure than he found on the street. These homes are "not set up to monitor kids' activities or intervene in their lives," according to Rebecca Roe of the King County Prosecutor's Office. Many receiving homes have no rules at all. Some require the children to stay out of the house during school hours, even if they are not in school. Typically, receiving homes are so poorly monitored that some tenants are able to actively recruit other children for their pimps. Roe has "little doubt" that children "who have not been previously involved in prostitution become involved when they are sent" to such facilities. In fact, the Prosecutor's Office strongly suspects that at least two Seattle homes are actually fronts for prostitution. The persons running the homes may or may not be aware of these operations.


The absence of structure in receiving homes is the last thing runaways need, according to Lucy Berliner, a senior social worker on the staff of the Harborview Medical Center Sexual Assault Unit.

Runaways and homeless children "want somebody to be in control. Most of them have a desperate, sad, pathetic need to have parents. . . . You never lose kids by taking an authoritative stance. . . . It is a relief to them to know there is someone out there who is going to do what needs to be done."

Attempts to do what is necessary for a runaway named Anne have been frequent but woefully ineffective. Anne has been in and out of foster and group-care facilities since she was removed from her home at the age of 8.

She had been physically and sexually abused by her father, her stepfather, and her mother's boyfriends. Anne became a chronic runaway shortly after arriving at her first placement. Within 2 years, Anne virtually lived on the streets.

Now Anne is a 16-year-old prostitute. She was recently raped for the second time. She has been seriously assaulted twice. Sergeant Dick Ramon, of the Seattle Police Department's Special Assault Unit, explained that Anne's case is the type which clearly requires public intervention. However, "public agencies have had to ask Anne to allow them to intervene." In the last 3 years alone, Anne has had 27 contacts with the police and other agencies. If she is left on her own, Ramon believes "she is going to die. . . . It is insane to expect that a child like this. . . is in a condition to decide her own destiny."



**Conclusion**

An overwhelming majority of the authorities interviewed agree that deinstitutionalization has had an adverse effect on the runaway problem.

- Sergeant Richard Ruffino, who operates a nationally recognized missing persons bureau in Bergen County, New Jersey, agrees that many runaways, even "easy" cases, are being lost due to deinstitutionalization.
- Irving Cohen, a senior official in the New York City Department of Juvenile Probation, indicates that there is general frustration over deinstitutionalization's revolving door, which encourages authorities to ignore any responsibility towards runaways.
- Father Bruce Ritter, the founder of Covenant House in New York, believes that deinstitutionalization is a "great concept if it is a complete concept. . . . Sometimes kids are so out of control and incapable of making an informed, mature decision in their best interest that adults have to make that decision for them. It is criminal not to."

Deinstitutionalization has emancipated children, essentially allowing them to live wherever and however they choose. It has prevented authorities from effectively controlling and protecting runaways. Deinstitutionalization has too often meant, not transferring youth from reform schools to caring environments, but releasing them to the exploitation of the streets.

Moreover, youth may be spared a criminal record for the act of running away, but life on the street often leads to the same end. Many runaways are arrested and ultimately enter the judicial system, no longer as status offenders, but as criminal offenders—facing charges for crimes committed in order to survive. In other words, deinstitutionalization may only be postponing the in-

evitable for many of these youth. By intervening at an earlier point, the law enforcement system could help prevent these children from subsequent criminality.

According to many of the authorities interviewed, a runaway is occasionally charged with a more serious offense in order to do the child the favor of taking him off the street. The use of such discretion by law enforcement personnel may be well-motivated, yet it fosters the very situation the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act was designed to correct.

By no means do all runaway and homeless children need to be confined. But some do, if only for their own protection. Unfortunately, the Federal deinstitutionalization mandate prevents the juvenile justice system from providing that which many runaways need most.

The funds OJJDP provides to States are insufficient to cover the full cost of deinstitutionalization. Thus, States are not carrying out this mandate because of Federal money, but because it is believed to be the right thing to do. Those States which have adopted the philosophy of the Act will continue to deinstitutionalize with or without Federal funding. There is no reason to assume that the States will retreat from this commitment in the absence of Federal inducement or regulation. Rather, the removal of blanket deinstitutionalization requirements will allow States the latitude to more effectively protect local runaways.

**Footnotes**

1. Based on estimates made by the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, as quoted in "Runaways: The Average Age is 15 and Most Depend on Prostitution or Theft to Survive," Doison Rader, *Parade*, February 1, 1982 (reprinted in hearing record, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, July 22, 1982, p. 71).
2. Hearing record cited above, p. 71.
3. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG), "Runaway and Homeless Youth: National Program Inspection," October 1983, p. 5.
4. Dorothy Miller et al., *Runaways — Illegal Aliens in Their Own Land*. J. F. Bergin Publishers, Inc., New York, 1980.
5. HHS-OIG, p. 5.
6. Peter A. Redpath, "Help Me! My Child is Missing! A Missing Child Handbook and Child-Saver Guide for Parents and Children." Child-Savers, New York, 1984.
7. P.L. 93-415 as amended by P.L. 94-273, P.L. 94-503, P.L. 95-115, and P.L. 96-509.
8. HHS-OIG, p. 2.
9. Sheila Rule, "Many Runaways Found to Have Tried Suicide," *New York Times*, January 22, 1984.
10. Richard J. Phelps et al., "Wisconsin Juvenile Female Offender Study Project," Youth Policy and Law Center, Inc., Madison, Wis., 1982, p. 2.
11. Normal Elliot Kent, "No Place to Turn: A Study of Runaways in America," June 1, 1984, p. 6.
12. U. S. General Accounting Office, "Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Problem of Unknown Magnitude," April 20, 1982, p. 4.
13. "Helping Runaways Find a New Life," *Reno Gazette Journal*, Saturday, February 11, 1984, p. 2D.

### National Resources

For further information on runaway and exploited youth, the following national resources will provide services or referrals to youths or their families.

National Network of Runaway and Youth Services, Inc. (NNRYS)  
905 Sixth Street SW., Suite 612  
Washington, DC 20024  
(202) 488-0739

NNRYS is the national center for runaway issues and referral.

National Runaway Switchboard  
2210 North Halsted Street  
Chicago, IL 60614  
(800) 621-4000 (toll-free outside of Illinois)  
(800) 927-6004 (in Illinois)

The Switchboard provides counseling and referral services on a 24-hour, free, confidential basis.

Runaway Hotline  
Box 52896  
Houston, TX 77052  
(800) 231-6946 (outside of Texas)  
(800) 392-3352 (in Texas)

The Hotline provides confidential relay of messages from youth to parents without revealing locations.

National Center for Missing and Exploited Children  
1835 K Street NW., Suite 700  
Washington, DC 20006  
(202) 634-9821

The National Center will provide assistance to parents and law enforcement agencies in locating missing children and preventing child exploitation.

### Further References

The documents cited in this reference list serve as an introduction to the subjects of runaway and exploited youth. Through the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse/NCJRS, further information can be obtained on these subjects. For further information on availability of documents or other pertinent information, contact: Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse/NCJRS, Customer Services, at (301) 251-5500, or toll-free (800) 638-8736, or write to Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse/NCJRS, Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20850. (Please enclose your phone number with written inquiries.)

*On the Run — A Guide for Helping Runaway Youths in Transportation Centers.* By Arthur D. Little, Inc. Sponsored by U. S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration. 1980. 28 p. Availability: Superintendent of Documents, GPO stock number 050-005-00032-1, NCJRS Microfiche. NCJ-85167

*Runaways.* Eds. F.I. Nye, C. Edelbrock. *Journal of Family Issues*, V.1, N.2 (June 1980), complete issue. 1980. 168 p. NCJ-85511

*Runaways and Non-Runaways in an American Suburb — An Exploratory Study of Adolescent and Parental Coping.* By A. R. Roberts. Sales Agency: John Jay Press, 444 West 56th Street, New York, NY 10019. 1981. 127 p. Also available in NCJRS Microfiche. NCJ-81322

*Runaway Teens.* By A. Madison. Sales Agency: Elsevier/Nelson, 2 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016. 156 p. NCJ-59472

*Problems of Runaway Youth — Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, July 22, 1982.* 1983. 110 p. Availability: NCJRS Microfiche. NCJ-88876

*Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Male and Female Juveniles and the Juvenile Justice System — A Conceptual Paper and a Preliminary Plan for a National Symposium.* By D. K. Weisberg, D. J. Berkman, C. P. Smith. Sponsored by National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 1979. 92 p. Availability: NCJRS Microfiche. NCJ-87566

*Sexual Exploitation of Children — A Problem of Unknown Magnitude.* By U. S. General Accounting Office, Human Resources Division. Sales Agency: U. S. General Accounting Office, Distribution Section, Room 4522, 441 G Street NW., Washington, DC 20548. 1982. 72 p. NCJ-83835

*Children in Chains.* By C. L. Linedecker. 1981. 330 p. Availability: NCJRS Microfiche. NCJ-79983

*Teenage Prostitution as a Product of Child Abuse.* By V. L. Seymour. Sales Agency: ERIC Document Reproduction Service, Box 190, Arlington, VA 22210. 1977. 12 p. NCJ-78511

*Sexual Victimology of Youth.* By L. G. Schultz. Sales Agency: Charles C. Thomas, 301-327 East Lawrence Avenue, Springfield, IL 62717. 1980. 432 p. NCJ-66033

*Entrance Into Juvenile Prostitution — Final Report.* By J. James. Sponsored by U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Institute of Mental Health. 1980. 132 p. Availability: NCJRS Microfiche. NCJ-78398

*Juvenile Prostitution and Child Pornography.* By J. Lowen. Sponsored by National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 1979. 23 p. NCJ-77813

*Hidden Victims — The Sexual Abuse of Children.* By R. L. Geiser. Sales Agency: Beacon Press, 25 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02108. 1979. 202 p. NCJ-59109

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