


National Criminal Justice Reference Service



This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on this frame may be used to evaluate the document quality.



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official position or policies of the U. S. Department of Justice.

National Institute of Justice
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20531

1/30/85

INDICATORS OF THE IMPACTS
OF ORGANIZED CRIME

Roger W. Davis
Department of Criminal Justice
Temple University

and

Charles H. Rogovin
School of Law
Temple University

U. S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice.

Permission to reproduce this copyrighted material has been granted by
Public Domain/NIJ

U. S. Department of Justice

to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).

Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permission of the copyright owner.

95265

AN EXAMINATION OF THE INDICATORS OF ORGANIZED CRIME

Introduction and Statement of the Problem

Despite an abundance of research on organized crime over the past several decades, many basic questions persist. A central issue is the controversy over an accurate and useful definition.¹ The definitional controversy continues to be a formidable stumbling block, both in social science research² and in law enforcement efforts to control and contain organized crime.³ In order to avoid the discussions which have traditionally bogged down over this issue, some professionals have relied upon a description characterizing what organized crime is and is not;⁴ others have adopted working definitions which meet short-term, specific aims of law enforcement or research ventures; still others have advanced typologies which seek to classify organized criminal activity across broad categories;⁵ and many have examined organized crime from unique perspectives, including sociology, economics, or psychology.⁶

These pragmatic solutions still pose problems for both the practitioner and researcher. For the practitioner, a broad legal definition of organized crime groups and activities may be vague and therefore unconstitutional, while a narrower one may be too specific to be workable.⁷ The social science researcher interested in studying organized crime faces similar problems. Scholarly efforts, whether aimed at a broad understanding of organized crime or undertaken to inform policy-making, should not rely on operational definitions of

"organized crime" which fail to achieve a satisfactory balance between generality and specificity.⁸

The difficulties encountered in seeking a universal definition of organized crime have been amply documented.⁹ Since it appears unlikely that consensus will be reached on the question of "what is organized crime?," perhaps a more useful question might be "what difference does organized crime make in a community?" Most would agree with Hawkins¹⁰ that:

...[organized crime] must, if it is to be regarded as significant, imply the occurrence of some concrete conditions, some specific actions, events or series of events present in our society that constitute evidence for it.

The identification and investigation of those "concrete conditions" and events is neither a new question nor one that is easily answered.¹¹ The discussion takes various forms, and has been addressed in terms of costs, effects, symptoms, or indicators of the presence of organized crime.¹² Some observers have attempted to classify the various costs associated with organized crime into economic, social, and political consequences.¹³ However, the assumed impacts are not easily documented and are not easily linked to organized crime. The problem resembles the difficulties of medical diagnoses: patients' symptoms may be easier to identify than the causes of the disease.

In much the same way, Cressey, in examining the symptoms of the presence of organized crime in our society, emphasizes that direct causal links between observable events in everyday life and organized crime will be difficult to establish:

... the fact [is] that organized criminals already are exacting tributes from most Americans, and, by means of political corruption, organized criminals have already deprived many of their right to cast an effective vote, to experience fair trial, or, generally, to be honestly dealt with in political and economic relationships.¹⁴

Thus, a major difficulty in the search for organized crime indicators is the invisibility with which organized crime generally operates.¹⁵ Since indicators are quite fluid over time, and may contradict common sense expectations, the search is hindered even further. Consider loansharking as an example. For some time, loansharking and violence have been seen as directly related. However, the researcher trying to measure the relationship between the two observes many causes of violence, of which organized crime is only one. Additional complications arise in the measurement task because loansharking has apparently changed over the years and relies less on violent enforcement of debt collection. The current relationship between organized crime involvement in loansharking and violence may be an inverse correlation.¹⁶

Several implications result from the complicated factors which hamper inquiries into the social, economic, and political consequences of organized crime.¹⁷ One overriding fact is that, as a result of scattered information, the public and law enforcement personnel are afforded only fragmentary glimpses of organized crime. Because factual information about organized crime is difficult to collect and analyze, myths and stereotypes assume unwarranted importance. As a result, if one were to construct a graph charting the levels of public interest, scholarly effort, and governmental action, the curve over time would appear as a series of peaks and valleys. Such cyclical interest has

produced an erratic history of appropriations and allocations of anti-organized crime resources.¹⁸ Thus, law enforcement may find itself continually wishing that "'the public' could be made aware of its own plight"¹⁹ in order to avoid the constant shifts in support and priorities. One reason for the fluctuations in interest may be the general lack of success in documenting links between organized crime and specific consequences. Although some efforts have been undertaken to demonstrate the impacts of organized crime, they have rarely been of utility to those in anti-organized crime law enforcement programs. The factors which have traditionally been viewed as indicators of organized crime are explored in the following discussion of recent research.

Research on Organized Crime Indicators

Studies on the effects of organized crime vary in scope and method. All share the difficulties of tracing the existence and strength of the connections between organized crime's presence and economic, social, political, and legal impacts. This section briefly reviews the major studies examining this relationship.

Three methods were used by the Illinois Institute of Technology²⁰ to ascertain the magnitude and scope of organized crime activities, and public perceptions and attitudes. First, interviews were conducted with law enforcement personnel, judges, businessmen, legislators, union officials, religious and community leaders, and representatives of the news media, soliciting their knowledge of the scope of organized crime involvement in rackets, politics, government, labor, and legitimate business. Second, data were compiled from federal and state prosecutions of persons reputedly involved in organized crime-related activities. The third data collection method, a random survey sample of 1,200 households, investigated the public's involvement in gambling and heroin use and general attitudes toward the impact of organized crime.

The Illinois study is significant both in terms of its results and method. Data from the two surveys and the review of court cases supported the belief that the wounds from organized crime's presence are in some ways self-inflicted. The public

...wants and uses the services offered by organized crime, but the vast majority of these citizens deplores its presence and its suspected corruption of their²¹ public officials and public servants.

The survey data highlighted specific economic conditions, such as the diversion of income, the loss of tax revenue, and the elevated costs of services and consumer shelf-prices, and suggested that these impacts are the result of organized crime's presence.

The data also underscored that organized crime exerts intangible, less observable influences through fear, anxiety, and distrust. If organized crime erodes the public's faith in the ability of governmental, legal, and political institutions to resist widespread corruption, the public may distrust its major institutions.

The Illinois study is also important for the research methods employed in exploring indicators of organized crime. While the specific findings of the study could not be generalized, the methodology was broadly applicable to future investigations. In particular, the study called for special surveys on

...the ownership and practices of certain types of businesses that, by their nature, lend themselves as attractive candidates for infiltration by organized crime.²²

The central methodological lesson from the Illinois survey was that since organized crime is a sensitive subject matter about which respondents may be reluctant to talk to interviewers, specialized techniques may be required to ensure cooperation and valid responses.²³

A study by Ianni and Reuss-Ianni²⁴ enlisted the aid of community residents in conducting field interviews dealing with organized crime's extent and structure as well as its provision of services to the community. In addition, the study examined its impact on the community in general and the public's attitude toward its presence. The research approach relied on persons from the community because of the authors'

belief that those who are most affected by the problem of organized crime must be at the center of remedial attempts.²⁵

Analysis of the Ianni and Reuss-Ianni interview data revealed organized crime as the prime supplier of illegal goods and services sought by community residents. Although the respondents were aware of the costs of such criminal activities, they were ambivalent about the effects of organized crime. The authors concluded that their data pointed to the need to initiate both attitudinal and behavioral changes among community residents,²⁶ but did not address the basic question of how these goals should be accomplished. The dilemma broadly resembles the task facing psychologists who seek to correct undesirable behavior. Attitudes must be changed, and then supportive behavior must be inculcated as a result of those changed views. Although research on organized crime emphasizes the need for public awareness in order to counter effectively the presence of organized crime, a clear demonstration of its effects, which could instill behavioral and attitudinal changes, continues to elude researchers.

Lasswell and McKenna²⁷ made significant strides in linking attitudes about organized crime with behavioral changes. They constructed a social process model based upon a policy sciences approach in an examination of organized crime activities in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area. By introducing a scientific approach through the use of theory construction, model development, and hypothesis testing,²⁸ Lasswell and McKenna attempted to link societal values and impacts of organized crime upon institutions. The components in the model were power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection and respect. Institutions examined included schools, law, government,

businesses, and the family.²⁹ To develop their model, Lasswell and McKenna examined data on case dispositions from the New York City Police Department, and organized crime-related statistics from New York City's Narcotics Register, Board of Education, and Medical Examiner. Data were also compiled from the IRS, Census Bureau, and from federal law enforcement agencies. The approach had two advantages over other research in this area. First, the model indicated specific ways in which these impacts might be exhibited. Second, the impacts were pinpointed to target groups. The inherent difficulty with this study, however, was that the indicators of organized crime potentially reflected other, non-organized crime phenomena. For example, in attempting to link the impacts of organized crime with a community's well-being, defined as the comfort, health, and safety of citizens, and measured by such indicators as the crime rate or provision of medical services to the community, any conclusion of a causal relationship would be very problematic. A host of factors (including organized crime activities) may be equally plausible as causes of a community's crime rate. Nevertheless, the Lasswell and McKenna method suggested the direction for research efforts, even if the proposed data sources obscured the conclusions needed to convince the public or legislators of the impact of organized crime.

With all the valuable research that has been conducted, there is still much more to be done. Despite the strides made in measuring organized crime's impacts, additional studies are needed to convince "...a much broader segment of society...that the cost of the services provided [by organized crime] is too high."³⁰ The "cost of the services" must count not only the simple, direct effects, but also

second- and third-order effects. For example, when loanshark victims are businessmen who find themselves unable to repay loans, pressures to engage in corrupt practices, or the take-over by organized crime figures of the business may ultimately lead to the demise of the business. As a consequence of this and other businesses going under, the tax base may diminish and community resident's quality of life may decline.

Crucial studies of the impacts of organized crime will still be limited by the astonishing absence of data sources. In the present study, (See p. 11 ff.) an effort ³¹ was launched to uncover the existence of any data base that addresses or could be used to assess the impacts of organized crime. This exhaustive search concluded that "a major problem with existing data bases is that they do not include measures of the impact of organized crime."³² In the absence of such data bases, the question of the impacts of organized crime will have to be addressed rather haphazardly--depending entirely on the researcher's creativity in putting together data sources for a particular community. Without measurement sources, impacts will continue to be the subject of speculation, and the public will remain unconvinced that organized crime has demonstrable consequences. A continuing organized crime data base--which would include primary source data from criminal justice, business-related statistics, and public opinion surveys measuring general and organized crime-specific issues--is absolutely essential in assessing the differences that organized crime makes in a community.

Finally, any attempt to convince the public that organized crime adversely affects it will not succeed without an appropriate method for studying the impacts of organized crime. An enumeration is needed of both the various impacts presumed to stem from organized crime and those

that clearly do not, along with a corresponding list of the various ways that each of these impacts may be measured. The review of prior research suggested that law enforcement as well as the research community would benefit from such a research effort. The inability to document the impacts of organized crime has affected law enforcement's ability to measure with accuracy the effectiveness of anti-organized crime efforts.³³ A detailed examination of those impacts would be useful to law enforcement in defining what is meant by "success" and "failure" in organized crime control programs.³⁴ Traditional measures of effectiveness commonly used by governmental agencies in assessing organized crime programs, such as conviction rates and the number of organized crime cases initiated and closed, fall short as accurate evaluative yardsticks.³⁵ Thus, the development of indicators of organized crime could lead to standardized techniques for measuring law enforcement's effectiveness.

The interested research community also stands to benefit from the indicator-measurement task. The ability to point to specific indicators reflecting organized crime's influences will assist research efforts in theoretical as well as policy-oriented studies.

The Feasibility Study

The Organized Crime Research Program at Temple University School of Law was a two-year project funded by the National Institute of Justice. The project sought to address organized crime issues from legal and social science perspectives. To accomplish this goal, ten discrete projects were designed to examine different aspects of the organized crime problem. As the work progressed, it became apparent that a study was needed to identify the indicators of organized crime activities.³⁶ One part of the study would be an identification and comparison of cities afflicted by organized crime problems with those free of its influence.

The feasibility study rejected pre-existing measures of what ought to reflect the presence of organized crime in favor of an alternative approach. This alternative resembled the Delphi Technique, which is a "quasi-empirical forecasting technique" that uses expert knowledge.³⁷ This consensus-seeking approach usually involves administering survey questionnaires over extended periods of time. Although the research design of the feasibility study borrowed the main concept of the Delphi technique, modifications were made. We sought to replace prior speculation on the indicators of organized crime with the results from this conference.

In order to benefit from the opinions of law enforcement experts currently directing or assisting in the direction of anti-organized crime efforts, eight experts were chosen from a list of approximately 20 candidates. The study was planned as an intensive two-day conference which would bring experts together for discussion, while assuring them

of anonymity before, during, and after the conference.³⁸ Although the participants knew each other's identity, a departure from the format of the Delphi Technique, the advantages of the adopted approach far outweighed any disadvantages of group conformity pressures. The attempt to obtain a consensus from the experts was a reliable method of ascertaining objective criteria for arriving at indicators that are both externally and internally valid; the method enabled the discussants to check each other's perceptions.³⁹ This approach also facilitated the classification of cities in a way that avoided the pitfalls of circular reasoning, in which the designation of cities as "organized crime-afflicted" would presume the existence of reliable indicators without any formal study to determine whether the indicators are actually present.

Experts' views were solicited in order to collect data on two closely-related questions:

- o What type and extent of evidence would convince you that organized crime was operating in your jurisdiction to the degree that control efforts were required to nullify certain impacts or results?
- o Given these indicators (and other factors coming out of group discussion with other experts), how would you proceed to classify cities along the dimension of organized crime involvement?

Prior to the group discussion, tentative indicators/impacts were developed to stimulate discussion in three areas: Licit and Illicit Business Attributes, Governance Issues, and Community/Quality of Life. The results focus on how experts define and use indicators and data sources. The cities identified as organized crime-afflicted will not be reported here but will be employed in subsequent research.

Results of the Conference

For ease and consistency of presentation, the results are presented in three tables, comparing the anticipated and actual indicators in the Business, Governance, and Community areas.

INSERT TABLES 1,2,3, HERE

These comparisons of "leading organized crime indicators" list the major indicators, demonstrate their interrelationships, and highlight the areas in need of further research.

One point may require clarification at the outset. As a term of reference, "indicators" perhaps suggests a level of precision not yet established in this field. Caution is a guiding principle for law enforcement officials (as for social scientists) in the attempt to avoid "sins of omission or commission." An anti-organized crime program may suffer equal damage if reliable indicators are rejected as false as when invalid, unreliable indicators of organized crime activity are accepted as true. For these reasons, conference participants were asked to identify "triggers," as well as indicators, since the term indicator implies more precise, relatively reliable methods of measuring and documenting "hunches." The term "triggers" on the other hand, refers to the events, activities, or persons of sufficient interest to law enforcement officials as to warrant closer attention to a possible organized crime problem. Although it is possible to make an artificial distinction between the two terms, they will be used interchangeably in this paper to reflect their use at the conference.

TABLE 1. INDICATORS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE BUSINESS SECTOR

<u>ANTICIPATED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
<p>A. <u>Structure of Legitimate Business</u></p> <p>Patterns regarding size, (e.g., franchise) nature of industry (e.g., retailing) soundness (e.g., bond ratings).</p> <p>Decisions to expand, transfer ownership and relocate, or cease operations</p>	<p>Appearance of cash-basis business, profit skimming, and pressures on business decisions</p> <p>Businesses' decisions to relocate, conduct business, avoid ventures</p> <p>Pressures on owners to accept ancillary services (loan payments, rejection of loan application)</p>
<p>B. <u>Direct Organized Crime Involvement Licit Business</u></p> <p>Patterns regarding size, types and practices among banks (e.g., scams).</p> <p>Trends within specific industries, such as service (e.g., cartage) transportation (e.g., rapid transit) entertainment, (e.g., videogame), insurance, (rates, redlining).</p>	<p>Questionable loans for risky ventures; rate of turnover among loan officers</p> <p>Uniformity in display, packaging, and price of pornographic material</p> <p>Proximity of video arcades with pornography shops</p> <p>Trends in pricing and distribution of tapes/records</p> <p>Hijacking of delivery trucks; food establishments as fronts</p> <p>Appearance of new companies, purchases and/or bankruptcies of existing cartage companies; rise in price of trash or waste removal</p>
<p>C. <u>Direct Organized Crime Involvement (Illicit Business)</u></p> <p>Patterns among black market services. Nature, level and patterns of crime rates. Violent crime, arson, murder, property crimes, auto theft, con games).</p>	<p>Violence associated with entry into pornography industry</p>
<p>D. <u>Nature of Union Activities</u></p> <p>Patterns within pension fund operations. Nature of contract negotiations and solutions. Patterns among types of business, and the structure and type of union.</p>	<p>Interruptions, stoppages, by labor unions in food and service-related businesses</p>

TABLE 2. INDICATORS OF ORGANIZED CRIME
WITHIN THE GOVERNANCE AREA

<u>ANTICIPATED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
<p>A. <u>Law Enforcement Activities</u></p> <p>Patterns regarding staffing, development, hiring/firing, salaries, and presence of union. Patterns with respect to reporting and arrest rates, bail setting practices, and processing from indictment, dismissals, mistrials, pleas entered, immunity granted, and sentences.</p>	<p>Law enforcement support among top officials</p> <p>Personnel decisions (transfers, turnover, promotions, firings)</p> <p>Weak or absent law enforcement campaigns</p> <p>Active law enforcement campaigns</p> <p>Frequency of arrest and level of person arrested</p> <p>Vigor and frequency of prosecutions</p> <p>Budget cuts, lack of commissions, enforcement tools</p>
<p>B. <u>Corrections Activities</u></p> <p>Patterns in staffing in the admissions, segregation and releases of inmates, and the extent and degree of disruptive behavior.</p>	
<p>C. <u>Nature and Structure of Political Process</u></p> <p>Patterns within campaign financing, candidacies, and voting. Activity within legislatures. Patterns within political appointments.</p>	
<p>D. <u>Management of City/State Functions</u></p> <p>Trends with respect to licensing and inspections procedures, contract-letting, taxing procedures, and vehicle regulations and enforcement.</p>	<p>Appearance of businesses requiring licensing</p> <p>Unusual speed in granting licenses and zoning variances</p> <p>Irregularities in licensing, health and fire code inspections</p> <p>Frequency/vigor of hidden ownership cases by liquor control board</p>

TABLE 3. INDICATORS OF ORGANIZED CRIME AFFECTING
THE COMMUNITY AND QUALITY OF LIFE

<u>ANTICIPATED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
A. <u>Resident Perception of Environment</u>	
Fear of crime (attitudes and preventive behaviors, and their link to organized figures' residences). Confidence in future. Decisions to remain or relocate. Level of "informedness" Involvement in Civic activities	Attitudes of residents toward organized crime problem and control Reluctance of citizens to report irregularities to authorities Fear among jurors to return guilty verdicts
B. <u>Resident Economic and Familial Stability</u>	
Patterns of employment/career opportunities. Existence of informal legal adjudication methods.	Effect on quality of life where pornography shops exist Fear of intimidation among business community Fencing outlets for stolen/counterfeit tapes/records
C. <u>Resident Perception of Community Services</u>	
Patterns of housing rental/sales. Patterns of housing start-ups rehabilitation. Availability and condition of public housing. Quantity and quality of health care services and facilities. Patterns in public and non-public transportation. Quality and quantity of social services.	Survey of residents toward salutary effects (safe streets, low prices) and harmful effects (increased prices, taxes as a result of kickbacks to public officials)
D. <u>Community Economic Planning and Development</u>	
Disbursement of city/state/federal funds. Size of tax base and budgets. Extent and innovation of planned change.	Deterioration of recent construction (buildings, roads)

I. Business Indicators

Several licit businesses were discussed by the law enforcement experts, including pornography, vending and video games, tape and record production, distribution, and counterfeiting, solid and toxic waste removal, food and related service industries, labor unions, and the banking industry.

When asked to list triggers or indicators of organized crime involvement in pornography, the conference participants were quick to offer possibilities; tentative evidence, or triggers, include a marked similarity in the type and price of material,⁴⁰ as well as in modes of display and packaging. In addition, the close proximity of video arcades,⁴¹ a negative effect on the community's quality of life, the growth of employment opportunities in the pornography industry,⁴² and the rapid granting of zoning variances are all potentially linked to organized crime's involvement.⁴³

Business practices are potential indicators of control of these markets although they may be more obvious when organized crime is involved at the retail level. When organized crime directly owns pornography shops an indicator of market control may, for example, be a marked consistency in display and managerial practices. But when organized crime's involvement in and impact upon the pornography industry is at the production and distribution level, reliable indicators may be less apparent.⁴⁴

While the level of organized crime's involvement in a market affects the reliability of indicators of market control, when we look for indicators of organized crime's entry into a market, the wide variety of entry techniques complicates the search.⁴⁵

One means of entrance may be through actual violence or its threat. Since organized crime has successfully used violence to enter other markets such as loansharking, a reputation for violence may be so well-established that actual use of force is unnecessary to move into new areas such as pornography. On the other hand organized crime may gain a foothold in this (or other) market(s) by possessing both substantial capital and a lack of inhibitions against investing in the particular business. The observer searching for indicators of organized crime may be led astray by focusing exclusively on market entry achieved through violence since dominance in a market may stem from different sources. In the pornography industry, and perhaps in others, organized crime may have decided not to exert force, not out of weakness but out of strength.⁴⁶

During the discussion of the vending machine business and the video game industry, it became apparent that these two industries may share common elements. If this is so, law enforcement might benefit from drawing upon those similarities to combat or contain the movement of organized crime into new and related industries. For example, the vending business is characterized by the presence of substantial cash, the skimming of profits, the need for licensing, and the potential for violence and corruption in the placement of machines. Can law enforcement forecast similar "triggers" or indicators in related industries, such as the video game business?⁴⁷ The question assumes even greater importance in law enforcement's efforts to trace the investment of profits from the video business⁴⁸ into other areas.

In discussing the tape and record business,⁴⁹ the participants mentioned several indicators of organized crime involvement, but noted

the limitations of these indicators. They noted that the price structure, the fencing of stolen and counterfeit tapes and records, the existence of not-yet-released records, and the location in which such items are sold would move law enforcement to investigate further. A direct economic effect of this involvement, although an inconclusive indicator, might appear as reduced industry profits, as well as diminished state and federal tax revenues. However, increased public demand for these goods complicates the search for reliable indicators of organized crime's involvement. For example, when stolen and counterfeit items are commingled with legitimate recordings, sales and profits figures may be misleading.

The participants focused their attention on the occurrences that would alert them to possible infiltration of the solid and toxic waste removal industry. The sudden appearance of a new company, the initiation of lower bids, the purchase of other hauling concerns, the rise in the cost of garbage or waste removal,⁵⁰ or the bankruptcy of other companies in the competitive area⁵¹ are all triggers of organized crime's presence.

A traditional strong-hold of organized crime, the food and service-related industries present a host of reliable indicators reflecting organized crime's presence. This broad category includes bars, restaurants, product manufacturing such as cheese, and suppliers either of products (liquor, linens) or ancillary services to those industries. Several of the indicators that the participants mentioned were found to overlap with indicators in the governance area. These indicators include: (1) the sales of liquor establishments by realty companies which also handle the disposition of clearly identified

organized crime-owned bars;⁵² (2) the frequency and vigor of investigations involving hidden ownership cases before liquor control boards;⁵³ (3) the practices of labor unions within these business areas; (4) the securing of licenses and the frequency and thoroughness of health and fire inspections;⁵⁴ and (5) undue pressure to accept placement of vending machines or to use a variety of "lifeline" services controlled or influenced by organized crime. Examples of this fifth category include threats of interrupted liquor deliveries, the inability to secure crucial loans, or sudden demands for full payment of loans from organized crime-influenced finance companies.⁵⁵

Progressions, or chains of events, must be considered when searching for organized crime indicators. For example, although organized crime's presence in certain bar and restaurant operations is immediately apparent from the above-mentioned indicators, there are other measures that reflect more long-term effects, such as schemes to hijack liquor trucks, to reinvest profits into other ventures, or to use a bar as a front for illicit and licit activities.⁵⁶

Deterioration in the quality of work and materials is a common indicator of organized crime involvement in labor unions, particularly in the construction industry. Included is the shortweighing of asphalt, the poor quality of paved roads, and a rapid deterioration of streets and highways. These triggers both intersect with and point to other possible indicators, such as corruption in granting licenses and in inspection procedures. They also overlap with community/quality of life measures discussed in a later section, such as the existence of unsafe buildings, which result from the use of inferior materials in construction.

The last topic in this section is pension fund deposits and the banking industry. High loan activity for questionable borrowers or risky ventures, and a turnover of bank loan officers as part of organized crime's scheme to gain control over bank operations are activities that might suggest organized crime involvement in these areas.⁵⁷

Not all of the indicators discussed at the conference were specific to an industry. Decisions by businesses to locate in a new area, move from a community, or to refrain from conducting business in particular locales might also reflect the presence of organized crime. Although such decisions may be less directly linked, they are nevertheless related to organized crime, and may result from the desire to avoid labor problems or risky markets.⁵⁸ This point was evident in the quote below:

Does organized crime impact upon the perceptions held by businesses with respect to such decisions and the "way" to do business, or does it exert a direct effect on the actual conduct of business?⁵⁹

It is important to emphasize that the conference participants focused on indicators of organized crime in the licit business sectors. Apart from a brief discussion of the ties between organized crime and illegitimate businesses, there was scant mention of the implications of organized crime control of illicit businesses (See Table 2). It is interesting to note that during the discussion of union activities, while we expected extensive attention to direct organized crime manipulation of unions, the participants dwelt on the notion that unions present varied means to a great many ends. Thus, there was discussion of manipulating union pension funds and payoffs to secure union health and dental service contracts, or using unions as weapons against

third-parties, such as when influencing Teamster elections toward an outcome favorable to organized crime. In short, this divergence between our expectations and the results we obtained from the practitioners, underscored the utility of the research method being employed.

II. Governance Indicators

Discussions of indicators of organized crime within the "governance" area focused on law enforcement activities and staffing, prosecution efforts, political processes, and the management of city and state functions.

Within the law enforcement area, we find both a wide and confusing variety of indicators. A visible and active law enforcement program, and a conspicuous absence of action against organized crime by law enforcement⁶⁰ are two seemingly contradictory indicators; how could organized crime's involvement be indicated by both the presence and the absence of vigorous anti-organized crime efforts? The frequency with which organized crime persons are arrested and their position in the organization,⁶¹ the vigor and nature of prosecutions undertaken,⁶² and the number of unsolved cases are indicators that exist in either situation. An example in the area of gambling may resolve this paradox. If organized crime controls a variety of bookmaking, numbers, and illegal casino operations in a city, law enforcement may be characterized by an effort to arrest low-level gambling employees. The structure of organized crime traditionally has successfully insulated top echelon figures; low-level employee arrests would be an indicator of organized crime's involvement in gambling activities. The link between

gambling arrest activity and organized crime's presence would also be evident if the arrests were related to the solicitation of payoffs and kickbacks in exchange for subsequent inattention by law enforcement. On the other hand, an absence of enforcement campaigns in the form of investigations and arrests may occur as a result of attempts to avoid the potential for corruption associated with pursuit and arrests of low-level gambling figures.⁶³ Hence, both the presence and the absence of law enforcement activity may be direct indicators of organized crime, and this contradictory enforcement pattern may have the same implications for narcotics enforcement and other crimes.

Dividing the law enforcement category into smaller components, the participants proceeded to examine personnel decisions. Although transfers, turnovers, firings, and promotions⁶⁴ were mentioned as potential triggers, linking these outcomes directly with organized crime appears to be a difficult task. Personnel indicators are not always reliable since personnel changes can also result from lack of support from top enforcement officials; limited resources coupled with pressures to cut budgets;⁶⁵ and the ambivalent attitudes of community residents toward organized crime control efforts.⁶⁶ One means of establishing the causes of such personnel practices is the use of surveys. Data could be collected on law enforcement personnel decisions, and the survey results compared between cities that have been identified as organized crime or non-organized crime cities.⁶⁷

Budget cuts and personnel changes that affect key members and activities of organized crime units, specifically intelligence-gathering units,⁶⁸ could be exceptionally reliable indicators of organized crime involvement. Such changes may result from organized crime pressuring

top administrative officials to remove what may be viewed as "unpopular" or "sensitive" people or programs.⁶⁹

An effective measurement of a good organized crime effort is when [an individual] gets fired as the chief.... That's when you know you've had an impact. Somebody's pissed off. You hit a sore nerve when you get those phone calls, and if you keep going, ...somewhere you're having impact. So, it may be that the number of firings might be an indicator of success.⁷⁰

Other potential indicators or triggers of organized crime include an absence of commissions or councils investigating or holding hearings on organized crime as well as the lack of effective enforcement tools such as electronic surveillance laws⁷¹ or racketeering statutes. Once again, the absence of investigatory commissions or tools does not permit a conclusion that organized crime is the root cause. The problem is that these same tools are used for prosecuting corporate executives, politicians, and radical groups, which society or powerful special interests may not want investigated.⁷² It is difficult to separate questionable, criminally-motivated objections to the use of such tools from civil libertarian concerns. Further complications in the search for indicators arose in that the existence of anti-organized crime enforcement tools may be tied to personnel practices. Promotions may be a device to place into power those corrupt officials who, under a pretense of preserving the Constitution, serve organized crime's interests. A similar ambiguity may exist in the situation where a prosecutor has an erratic record of prosecutions against organized crime figures; he may be corrupt or he may simply be shifting his limited resources into more traditional crime areas.⁷³

As has been mentioned, interesting indicators appeared in the area of political decision-making. Discussions about the morality of public

officials raised the issue of how such a concept may be measured as an organized crime indicator.⁷⁴ Corruption among public officials was seen to be closely related to public attitudes about organized crime and corruption.⁷⁵ Although the public may be concerned over payoffs to corrupt officials to overlook such things as the lack of safety measures in the construction industry, the public may be less aroused about payoffs to government officials to avoid red tape or to obtain an "edge" in securing such contracts. Instances in which public officials solicit such payoffs underscored the point that the public "has varying views of what organized crime does in these areas and of the relative seriousness [this implies]...."⁷⁶

Most people don't give a damn. Most people want an edge. There are very few people who frankly say: I don't want you to have an edge, and I don't want to have the edge.... Most people say: I want the edge.

Throughout the discussion of governance indicators, an area in which the participants were quite interested was the potential impact and resulting indicators of organized crime within law enforcement activities. These ranged from the general attitudes among top enforcement officials toward the fight against organized crime, to the more specific patterns in arrests and prosecutions. In addition, the discussants pointed out contradictions among the indicators which led to a discussion of reliable sources of information through which hunches or triggers in the governance area might be validated. The experts agreed on the problem posed by the lack of regularly-collected information and the resulting inability to obtain periodic and confirming analyses.

III. Community and Quality of Life Indicators

Indicators of an organized crime presence within the community included both economic and social costs.

...conceptually, you can somehow figure out what the cost being imposed on this city by the organized crime control of some variety of licit and illicit industries is. That cost would have at least two major components. To some extent it's an economic cost.... Secondly, there is a cost to the social fabric, I mean the cost of imbedded corruption; there is the cost of fear; of intimidation of small businessmen.... One somehow must value that, and you can't put a dollar cost on it,⁷⁸ but it's part of the cost in the broader sense.

Traditionally, the focus in assessing the economic damage from organized crime has been on the public as consumers. Valid indicators of organized crime exist both in decreases and increases in prices of goods and services. As an example of lower prices benefitting consumers, the processing and distribution of boxed beef is illustrative. Beef was slaughtered, frozen and shipped to New York from the Midwest. Due to the loss of profits this situation posed for individual butchers, importation of pre-cut beef was not a welcomed practice. Meat companies bribed meatcutter union officials through organized crime figures so that boxed beef was brought into New York for processing. As a result, the consumer benefitted by paying lower beef prices.⁷⁹ In other markets as well, lower costs may be the result of organized crime involvement. Such has been the case in the redistribution of stolen property,⁸⁰ and the cheese industry.⁸¹ In these situations, organized crime benefits large numbers of community residents while harming only a small proportion.⁸²

More frequently, however, organized crime is advantageous to a select few and costly to a substantial portion of the public. One expert at the conference commented:

[s]uppose organized crime hijacks a load of TV sets. The people who buy those sets are going to benefit, right? They're going to pay half the price for a TV set. There is going to be an increase in the cost of insurance that's going to be passed on to the consumers, so everybody will pay a penny more and a few people will pay one hundred and fifty dollars less. But everybody knows they have that one chance of getting the set for one hundred and fifty dollars less, so they don't mind paying the pennies more.⁸³

Organized crime affects the community in other salutary ways, for example by ensuring safe streets,⁸⁴ particularly in those neighborhoods in which organized crime figures reside. Nevertheless, there are clear detrimental impacts, including higher prices or increased taxes as a consequence of kickbacks that may inflate state budgets.⁸⁵ As one discussant said, "...the thing about these economic questions is it's very hard to know who the winners and losers are."⁸⁶

The public's concern with the economic costs attributable to organized crime cannot compete with the public's more direct economic concerns, such as inflation or rising interest rates.⁸⁷ As a result, it may be difficult for law enforcement to demonstrate to the public the economic harms flowing from organized crime:

[i]n 1972 and 1973, we had those p.r. programs to educate the public. In Florida, one of the promos that they put on the TV screen was a picture of a guy driving up to a gas station and getting some gas and the attendant saying: "Hey, would you like to buy some golf balls? You can get three for a dollar and a half." At the time they cost a dollar and a quarter apiece. The guy says: "Yes." And then the voice would come on: This is organized crime in action. And in connection with these ads we had a survey that went out, and the reaction to the ad is: "Where's the gas station?"⁸⁸

The discussion of organized crime indicators in the community

raised the issues of the effects of public tolerance, apathy, and ignorance on control efforts by law enforcement. Are people bothered by high prices, tainted or inferior meat sold as quality grade, low-cost stolen cigarettes, or by a general deterioration of roads and buildings that may result from the influence of organized crime?⁸⁹ Does the public believe that these conditions actually affect their lives?

In addition to the economic costs, organized crime has an intangible effect on the social fabric of a community. This impact is even more difficult to demonstrate to the public because "measuring the social costs in a particular community may have nothing to do with the physical presence of syndicate members in the community."⁹⁰ The causal connections between organized crime and the social fabric are difficult to establish:

...in the 1970's when you had the gambling statutes passed which the FBI hit very heavily...one of the types of techniques we would use as investigators to get cooperation from the citizens was to explain to them how placing a numbers bet in a steel mill... would ultimately go into the coffers of organized crime used for narcotics or other illegal activities. They refused to believe it...because, to them, the guy they're placing the bet with is the guy right down the stall from where [they worked]... and they saw no relationship between what they were doing, or what they were contributing to, and the "big picture."⁹¹

Fear among community residents can also indicate an organized crime problem. For example, there may be a reluctance to report organized criminal activity to authorities and to return guilty verdicts at trials.⁹² In this regard, law enforcement experts tend to view their role as assuaging the public perception that the power of organized crime rivals that of the government, police, and courts.⁹³ In short, one indicator of organized crime's effects on the social fabric of the

community is the residents' perceptions of who controls the community. This issue is an empirical question which could be examined through surveys and polls of groups within the community.⁹⁴

The discussion of the indicators of organized crime's effect on a community and its quality of life uncovered two difficulties. The indicators search is complicated by the fact that since organized crime's presence occasionally has a beneficial effect on a community, and the public often willingly avails itself of a variety of its services, relying on broad data sources to detect organized crime indicators in this area may not produce accurate measures of either the harmful or beneficial effects. In addition, it is difficult to document the less tangible social costs of organized crime's presence. For these reasons, many of the conference panelists suggested that surveys of the affected community groups were a useful way to detect these indicators accurately.

IV. Sources of Information

The experts at the conference were concerned about verifying their assumptions about organized crime:

How do we know [and how good is that knowledge] that organized crime is in the things we've always said and believed it to be.⁹⁵

The search for information sources is critical to law enforcement because containment strategies and resource allocation rest in part upon a clear articulation of the need for control efforts.⁹⁶ Ideally, important decisions should not depend on "educated speculation." As noted, however, relevant data sets are quite rare, and, even where available, may be of limited utility.

Despite the shortcomings of existing information sources, some data sources are perceived to have potential for researching the impacts of organized crime. Foremost among these is the use of electronic surveillance.⁹⁷ Wiretaps and monitoring devices can be invaluable information collection devices because they capture actual conversations, often revealing criminal networks and relationships.⁹⁸ Because of current legal restraints,⁹⁹ the quality and quantity of information now being obtained is not equal to that collected during the FBI's massive electronic surveillance program directed at the Mafia in the early 1960s.¹⁰⁰ Thus, law enforcement may be more knowledgeable of the potential impacts of the traditional organized crime groups than of new and emerging organized crime groups.¹⁰¹

Restrictions on electronic surveillance as data sources may result in a greater reliance on other information devices, such as human informants.¹⁰²

Informant information is viewed as an essential data source,¹⁰³ whether for stimulating examination into an area or confirming leads from other sources.¹⁰⁴ There appears to be strong reliance on "targets of opportunity." Frequently, these are identified by persons who fortuitously volunteer information to a law enforcement agent. Such a situation is to be distinguished from the decision to target a particular person, group, or operation as a consequence of a deliberate analytical process.¹⁰⁵ This reliance apparently is a natural consequence of pressure from top officials, the public, and the media for rapid results.¹⁰⁶

It's a combination...of some discretionary decisions, targeting [of] industries, looking at your established informants, asking them new questions and finding out things, and, to some extent, it's maybe consciously deciding to branch into a new area, develop informants and seek information that wouldn't have walked in your door. And then there's what does walk in your door.¹⁰⁷ [emphasis added]

Perhaps as valuable as wiretaps or informants is the exchange of information among law enforcement agencies.¹⁰⁸ This information occasionally provides leads or spin-offs from ongoing organized crime investigations or prosecutions in other locales.¹⁰⁹

According to the participants, the media may also provide interesting and sometimes useful data on organized crime activities.¹¹⁰

It's good lead information, I think... You can't look at it as truthful; you've got to look at it as lead information.¹¹¹ We usually send somebody to follow it up.

The other data sources that law enforcement officials look to are quite varied.

There are things like Congressional hearings. There are whole test cases, books that are written by people who've turned. I think there's also other things...like the Wall Street Journal, talking about business trends which take you into new industries and ideas. If interest rates go up, you know there's likely to be closing of sources of financing, which means increased loan-sharking, which means more businesses being taken over, which means bust-outs and bankruptcies....¹¹²

While these potential data sources may require analyses of markets, examination of bank, corporate and bankruptcy records, the time and money to conduct these searches restricts law enforcement's use of such methods:

...I mean it's not that people are sitting around with lots of discretionary time on their hands. I mean we're struggling to develop very high quality cases with what we've got, so it's not like we were really out there making those sorts of [resource] investment decisions that one can make in theory.¹¹³

These pressures add to the tendency to rely heavily on informant information.¹¹⁴

Finally, the participants mentioned that surveys are potential sources of data for determining indicators of organized crime. At various points during the conference, the suggestion was made to question a variety of respondent groups, including small businessmen, public officials, and the general public, in order to get information on a variety of organized crime-related issues.¹¹⁵

V. Conclusion and Summary

"Assessing the implications [of organized crime] is one of the unmet needs of organized crime-related research."¹¹⁶ Any first-stage effort such as the feasibility study described here inevitably raises more issues than it resolves. Nonetheless, at least three major results of the study should be discussed: 1) a review of the indicators uncovered at the conference and their significance; 2) the benefits of the research approach adopted; and (3) the need for future research arising from this study.

First, the indicators identified at the conference support prior speculation and theorizing about organized crime indicators. For example, conference discussions of one impact of organized crime, a diminished tax base, parallel similar points made earlier in Schelling's classic work comparing the legitimate and underground economy.¹¹⁷ In that work, Schelling traced the connections between organized crime involvement in gambling, uncollected revenues, and the potential effects upon the salaries of law enforcement officials. Similarly, the conference panelists' discussion of organized crime's tactical maneuvers to secure lucrative contracts in the construction industry through union connections corroborates Blakey and Goldstock's thorough examination of organized crime's impacts on labor practices.¹¹⁸ Such practices include sweetheart contracts and union pension fund manipulations.

A comparison of the indicators obtained from the experts with those based upon prior research and theorizing reveals some rather surprising results as well. Within the Business sector, the bulk of the indicators discussed deal with specific legitimate enterprises rather than illicit

businesses, and the structure of those industries. One explanation for these unexpected results may be the assumption by conference panelists that black and grey market activities have received sufficient attention in prior research. The finding may, however, reflect the progression of traditional organized crime groups into increasingly sophisticated, legitimate enterprises. Of course, the focus on licit businesses to the virtual exclusion of illegitimate ones may simply forecast the need for further research to identify indicators of organized crime in illicit businesses. Given the difficulty in detecting indicators in the licit sector, it is easy to see the increased complications inherent in searching for accurate measures of organized crime's presence in illegal ventures.

Unexpected results are also found in the Governance area. Most of the indicators suggested deal with law enforcement activities and management of city and state functions. As is apparent in Table 3, less attention was given to the influence of organized crime on the political process or on the corrections segment of the justice system. It may be that the indicators of organized crime within the political realm are more easily discerned at earlier stages in the system; corruption of law enforcement officers may be easier to detect than that of other public officials. The absence of indicators within the corrections area may be similarly explained.

The indicators within the Community and Quality of Life area suggested by the experts bear upon residents' perceptions of the social climate in which they live; the lack of attention to indicators in other areas may mean that additional research is needed to uncover them. As previously discussed, survey research appears to be one

potentially effective method to tap these attitudes. Broadly speaking, the results for all three areas provide some very promising and specific indicators deserving further research and development.

Beyond the rather straightforward cause and effects relating to organized crime impacts, we found a series of interrelationships among business, governance, and community indicators.¹¹⁹ For example, the presence of organized crime's involvement in the pornography business may be evident from certain business practices, such as licensing procedures, employment opportunities, or general quality of life measures. These joint influences present the most intriguing aspect of the search for indicators and, potentially, the most useful avenue for law enforcement.

The second conclusory observation to be made as a result of this study involves the benefits of the research approach employed here to the law enforcement and research communities. Group discussion as a research method produced a set of indicators derived from the experience of law enforcement experts in the organized crime field. Consequently, the conference results do not simply reiterate theoretical predictions of the impacts of organized crime, but instead are grounded in the beliefs and actions of officials who confront daily the effects of organized crime's presence.¹²⁰ While the issues of validity and reliability of the derived indicators must ultimately be resolved through further research, this study's approach has demonstrated that useful results may be produced through joint efforts by law enforcement officials and social scientists. Cooperation, let alone collaboration, has not been characteristic of organized crime research.¹²¹ One advantage to joint ventures such as this is that the results are

directly relevant to law enforcement officials, while the research method is straightforward and may be easily employed by social scientists contemplating research in the area of organized crime indicators. An example taken from the conference discussion on the effects of organized crime on personnel decisions among law enforcement units is illustrative of the significance of research for both law enforcement and research communities. On one level, the indicators appear to be very objective: rate of turnover, firings, transfers, or promotions. On another level, the indicators may be more subjective: the extent to which enforcement units suffer from the interruption of sustained efforts against organized crime, or from the loss of organized crime information and expertise as a consequence of personnel losses.

The indicator(s) selected for subsequent investigation is a crucial decision for the research and law enforcement communities. For the researcher, the decision affects the direction and form to be pursued by subsequent research. These decisions in turn may ultimately affect the policy recommendations forwarded to practitioners. The selection of indicators is also a serious matter for law enforcement. At stake may be the degree of success in highlighting the dangers stemming from an organized crime problem, the ability to marshal support for budget requests, and the judicious allocation of existing resources and personnel. In this regard, the matrix of potential indicators may be of utility to both newly-developed organized crime enforcement programs and more established units as they attempt to launch new investigations or develop new leads. Both types of programs may compare events occurring within their jurisdiction with the potential triggers listed in the

Tables. These comparative analyses may generate further investigations, or reinforce the need for data sources in assessing the potential indicators.

The third and final conclusion from this study entails what is commonly called the "need for future research." A next stage should include refinement of what have emerged as indicators of the presence of organized crime. Using traditional research terminology, this study has made strides in developing hypotheses; empirical research is needed to determine the validity of these indicators.

The conference confirmed that existing data sets through which appropriate and sensitive tests of validity could be undertaken are simply not available. Nevertheless, the selection of cities characterized by their degree of organized crime affliction may be useful as survey sites within which survey research may be conducted using an instrument derived from the conference-obtained indicators. As the conference data suggest, survey research is an appropriate technique for measuring the attitudes of law enforcement officials toward anti-organized crime programs, the beliefs held by small businessmen about the structure and behavior of certain industries, and the attitudes of the public toward the consequences of organized crime's presence. Surveys, building upon the present research effort, would continue to enhance the ability of practitioners and researchers alike to persuade the public and each other of the consequences of organized crime's presence, and would begin to establish a data base for further identification and testing of organized crime indicators.¹²²

FOOTNOTES

1. M. D. Maltz, "On Defining 'Organized Crime': The Development of a Definition and a Typology," Crime and Delinquency 22, (1976): 338-346.
2. G. Tyler, "An Interdisciplinary Attack on Organized Crime," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 347 (May 1963): 105-113.
3. G. R. Blakey, R. Goldstock, and C. H. Rogovin, Rackets Bureaus: Investigation and Prosecution of Organized Crime (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1978).
4. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Organized Crime (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967). (Hereinafter President's Commission.)
5. M. D. Maltz, supra note 1.
6. See, for example, D. C. Smith, "Some Things May Be More Important to Understand about Organized Crime than Cosa Nostra," University of Florida Law Review, 24 (1971), 1-30.; T. Schelling, "Economic Analysis and Organized Crime," in President's Commission, supra note 4; F. A. Ianni, "Mafia and the Web of Kinship," The Public Interest (Winter 1971): 22.
7. See Blakey, supra note 3, at 107-109.
8. See F. A. Ianni and E. Reuss-Ianni, "A Community Self-study of Organized Crime," in The Crime Society: Organized Crime and Corruption in America. (New York: New American Library, 1976), pp. 367-373.
9. See H. Abadinsky, Organized Crime (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1981), pp. 1-6; G. Hawkins, "God and the Mafia," The Public Interest 14 (Winter 1969): 24-51; D. Smith, supra note 6, at 3-8.
10. G. Hawkins, supra note 9, at 33.
11. See President's Commission, supra note 4, at 1, especially footnotes 6, 7, & 8; and G. R. Blakey, "Organized Crime in the U.S.: A Review of the Public Record" Organized Crime Research Program (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1983).

12. See, for example, E. Johnson, Jr., "Organized Crime: Challenge to the American Legal System," The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 53(1962): 400-415. N. Philcox, An Introduction to Organized Crime (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1978); P. Reuter and J. Rubinstein, "Fact, Fancy and Organized Crime," Public Interest 53(Fall 1978): 45-67; President's Commission, supra note 4, at 1; H. Ruth, "Why Organized Crime Thrives," Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science 374(1967): 113-122.
13. See G. R. Blakey, "Organized Crime in the United States," Current History (1967): 327-333, 364-___; J. Gardiner, "Wincanton: The Politics of Corruption," in President's Commission, supra note 4, at 61-79; T. Schelling, supra note 6, at 114-126.
14. D. Cressey, "Methodological Problems in the Study of Organized Crime as a Social Problem," Annals 374(1967), 107.
15. President's Commission, supra note 4, at 1.
16. M. Walsh, "An Overview of Organized Crime," Organized Crime Research Program, (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1983), pp. 50-51.
17. H. Ruth, supra note 12, at 115.
18. See President's Commission, supra note 4, at 15-16.
19. See D. Cressey, supra note 14, at 106.
20. A Study of Organized Crime in Illinois. Executive Summary, Report prepared by the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute: (Chicago, 1971). (Hereinafter Illinois).
21. Id. at 3.
22. Id. at 371.
23. The Illinois study used the Randomized Response Technique, which is designed to "provide the necessary degree of privacy needed to reduce the likelihood of evasive answers to an acceptable level" (Id. at Appendix C, 6.).
24. Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, supra note 8.
25. Id. at 372.
26. Id. at 371.
27. H. D. Lasswell & J. B. McKenna, The Impact of Organized Crime on an Inner City Community (New York: Policy Sciences Center, 1972).

28. See, for example, Walsh, supra note 16; A. Anderson, "Organized Crime: The Need for Research," University of Florida Law Review 24 (1971): 42. D. Cressey, supra note 14.
29. Supra note 27, at 144-181.
30. D. Cressey, supra note 14, at 107.
31. See N. Parisi, "Sources of Data That Identify and Measure the Impacts of Organized Crime," Organized Crime Research Program (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1983).
32. Id. at 22. One remedy would be the inclusion of organized crime-related questions in periodic victimization surveys or as part of the Census.
33. See D. Cressey, supra note 14, at 108.
34. C. L. Pagano, J. J. Dintino, and F. T. Martens, "Organized Crime Control Efforts," The Police Chief (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1983).
35. Maltz, M. D., "Measuring the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Efforts," Organized Crime Research Program (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1983).
36. Several alternative strategies were explored, including the use of non-organized crime-related "proxy" measures. Also, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations recently developed and circulated a survey to law enforcement agency heads in an effort to collect current data on the scope and nature of organized crime in their jurisdiction. Examination was made of these data and questionnaires for their applicability to the present tasks of deriving indicators and selecting cities, however, the data were covered by confidentiality guarantees that prevented examination and use by outside sources.
37. H. W. More, Jr., "Delphi Analysis of Police Corruption," Journal of Police Science and Administration 8(1980): 109. See also N.C. Dalkey, The Delphi Method: An Experimental Study of Group Opinion RM-588-PR (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, June 1969); T. E. Jones, Options for the Future: A Comparative Analysis of Policy-Oriented Forecasts (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), see especially Chapter 2.
38. The conference was recorded verbatim through several microphones, and was transcribed by Daily Verbatim Reporters, College Park, Maryland. The use of microphones, and cards which identified speakers, in addition to the keying of the text by the operator ensured a complete and accurate transcript.

39. External validity refers to the degree to which the components of a study permit generalizations beyond the confines of the research conditions, and thus relate to the questions of representativeness and relevance. Internal Validity deals with the extent to which the effects under study are in fact a result of intended variations and are not a consequence of extraneous variables and influences. See D.T. Campbell and J. C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), pp. 5-6.
40. Transcript of the Conference on the Indicators of Organized Crime, Temple University Law School, February 10-11th, 1982. Day I, p. 31, lines 1-11. [Hereinafter, entries will represent Day, page, and line].
41. I, 45, 13.
42. I, 42, 9-12; 19-20.
43. I, 36, 1-4; 14-17.
44. I, 32, 1-4.
45. I, 41, 1-3; 19-20.
46. I, 109, 9.
47. I, 43, 8ff.
48. I, 48-49.
49. I, 52, 2.
50. I, 68, 1ff.
51. I, 95, 5.
52. I, 111, 8.
53. I, 80, 12.
54. I, 83, 12.
55. I, 86, 16
56. I, 92, 1-5
57. I, 97, 8; I, 99, 13; I, 204, 21.
58. I, 195, 20.

59. I, 203, 1511.
60. I, 76, 3; I, 96, 16.
61. I, 182, 18.
62. I, 127, 2. (I, 113).
63. I, 182, 1+13.
64. I, 153; I, 175-179;
65. I, 175, 1; I, 158, 6-14.
66. I, 171, 6; I, 184-185.
67. I, 184-185; 199, 1.
68. I, 175, 20.
69. I, 153, 5-10.
70. I, 175, 10-17.
71. I, 158-159.
72. I, 177-178.
73. I, 181, 1.
74. I, 199, 1.
75. I, 200, 10-17.
76. I, 207-209.
77. I, 144, 6-10.
78. I, 123, 10-22; 124, 1.
79. I, 139, 10-20.
80. I, 139, 22.
81. I, 140, 13-14.
82. I, 140, 17.
83. I, 148, 14.
84. I, 128, 18-21.
85. I, 141, 13.

86. I, 144, 8-10.
87. I, 141, 5.
88. I, 144-145.
89. I, 143, 1-3,
90. I, 134, 3-15.
91. I, 127, 12.
92. I, 187, 6-8.
93. I, 149, 16-21.
94. I, 162, 10-11, 17.
95. I, 30, 5-6.
96. I, 62, 22.
97. I, 30, 15; I, 37, 18-19; I, 71, 15; I, 102, 3; I, 115, 11ff; I, 128, 15-16; I, 174, 7-8; I, 211, 5-10; II, 11, 21-II, 14.
98. II, 12, 7-9.
99. Restrictions include demonstrations of probable cause, of the exhaustion of other avenues, and restrictions against intelligence information-gathering. The experts gathered here estimated that approximately 130 requests for surveillance were granted in 1981, excluding consensual monitoring. See II, 14, 1-6.
100. I, 211, 8-10.
101. I, 211, 13.
102. See also R. W. Davis, "Policy Implications of Employing Protected Witnesses in Organized Crime Enforcement," Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology, Toronto, November 1982.
103. I, 30, 15-16; I, 37, 18-19; I, 53, 13; I, 62, 22; I, 71, 15; I, 97, 8; I, 213, 3-11; I, 253-254; II, 2, 18-19; II, 40, 11-13.
104. I, 47, 11-16, 19-21; I, 53, 13.
105. There are "journeyman" informants with information on routine criminal activities, organized crime informants who were engaged in or associated with such activities, and top echelon figures who are able to report on leadership activities. See I, 255, 6-20.

END