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
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE MONOGRAPH

The Change Process in Criminal Justice

This monograph consists of papers on related topics presented at the Fourth National Symposium on Law Enforcement Science and Technology, May 1-3, 1972 conducted by:

THE INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND CRIMINOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

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June 1973

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

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This publication is one of a series of nine monographs extracted from the Proceedings of the Fourth National Symposium on Law Enforcement Science and Technology.

The principal Symposium theme of "Crime Prevention and Deterrence" was chosen by the National Institute as a reflection of LEAA's overall action goal - the reduction of crime and delinquency. Whereas previous Symposia examined methods of improving the operations of individual components of the criminal justice system, the Fourth Symposium was purposefully designed to look beyond these system components and focus on the goal of crime reduction.

A major conference subtheme was "The Management of Change: Putting Criminal Justice Innovations to Work." The Institute's overall mission is in the area of applied rather than basic research, with special attention being given to research that can be translated into operational terms within a relatively short period of time. We have therefore been interested in exploring the obstacles to the adoption of new technology by criminal justice agencies. Many of the Symposium papers identify these obstacles - attitudinal, organizational, and political - and discuss how they are being overcome in specific agency settings.

The titles of the nine Symposium monographs are: Deterrence of Crime in and Around Residences; Research on the Control of Street Crime; Reducing Court Delay; Prevention of Violence in Correctional Institutions; Re-integration of the Offender into the Community; New Approaches to Diversion and Treatment of Juvenile Offenders; The Change Process in Criminal Justice; Innovation in Law Enforcement, and Progress Report of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.

This monograph considers the process of criminal justice change, with emphasis on the interchange between managers of change and research organizations or other groups attempting to act as "change agents." A discussion of two major LEAA attempts to introduce systematic change - the Pilot and Impact Cities Programs - is included. Also included are the Fourth Symposium plenary addresses by Richard McGee and Arthur Bilek, which summarize recent criminal justice achievements and point toward future directions.

Readers concerned with the general problem of transforming innovation into operational reality will also be interested in the Symposium monograph entitled Innovation in Law Enforcement.

Martin B. Danziger
Assistant Administrator
National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice

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INTRODUCTION

The Fourth National Symposium on Law Enforcement Science and Technology was held in Washington, D.C. on May 1-3, 1972. Like the three previous Symposia, it was sponsored by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The Fourth Symposium was conducted by the Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology of the University of Maryland.

These Symposia are one of the means by which the National Institute strives to achieve the objective of strengthening criminal justice in this country through research and development. The Symposia bring into direct contact the research and development community with the operational personnel of the law enforcement systems. The most recent accomplishments of "science and technology" in the area of criminal justice are presented to operational agencies - law enforcement, courts, and corrections - in a series of workshops and plenary sessions. The give and take of the workshops, followed by informal discussions between the more formal gatherings, provide the scholar and researcher with the all important response and criticism of the practitioner, while the latter has the opportunity to hear the analyst and the planner present the newest suggestions, trends and prospects for the future. In the case of the Fourth Symposium, these opportunities were amply utilized by over 900 participants from across the country.

The specific theme of the Fourth Symposium was "Crime Prevention and Deterrence." The content and the work of the Symposium must be seen against the immediate background of the activities of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, which was appointed several months earlier and by the time of the Symposium was deeply involved in its mammoth task. Another major background factor was the National Conference on Corrections, held in Williamsburg shortly before. More generally, of course, the Symposium was one of many activities in the all-encompassing national effort to reduce crime embodied in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and the subsequently established Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

A twelve-member Symposium committee made up of representatives of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology of the University of Maryland was responsible for planning and arranging the Program. The program, extending over three days, was organized around three daily subthemes which were highlighted in morning plenary sessions. These

subthemes were further explored in papers and discussions grouped around more specific topics in the afternoon workshops.

The first day was one of taking stock of recent accomplishments. Richard A. McGee, President of the American Justice Institute, reviewed the progress of the last five years, and Arthur J. Bilek, Chairman of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, addressed himself to criminal justice as a system, the progress made toward coordination, and the ills of a non-system. The six afternoon workshops of the first day dealt with recent accomplishments in prevention and deterrence of crime around residences, violence in correctional institutions, control of street crime, court delay, community involvement in crime prevention, and the reintegration of offenders into the community.

The subtheme of the second day was formulated as "The Management of Change - Putting Innovations to Work." This is a reference to the frequently noted fact that the findings of many research projects all too often do not result in operational implementation, in spite of the funds, energy and competence invested in them. New methods that are adopted often prematurely die on the vine, with the old routines winning out and continuing on as before. The objective of the Symposium sessions was to identify the obstacles to change and to explore ways of overcoming them. Thus two papers given in the morning plenary session by Robert B. Duncan of Northwestern University and John Gardiner of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice dealt, respectively, with attitudinal and political obstacles to change. The five afternoon workshops developed this theme further by discussing the change process within specific law enforcement and correctional settings. From there attention shifted to the role that public service groups play in the process of change, the pilot cities experience, and the diversion of juvenile offenders from the criminal justice system.

The third day of the Symposium was turned over to the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. The daily subtheme was listed as "Future Priorities." More particularly, however, this was a series of progress reports on the all important activities of the Commission, presented by the Executive Director, Thomas J. Madden, and representatives of the Commission's four Operational Task Forces on standards and goals for police, the courts, corrections, and community crime prevention.

Finally, there was a presentation on the management of change within the eight "Impact Cities" - a major program of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration - by Gerald P. Emmer, Chairman of LEAA's Office of Inspection and Review.

By reproducing the contributed papers of the Symposium, the Proceedings admirably reflect the current intellectual climate of the criminal justice system in this country. It should be kept in mind that the majority of these papers present the results of research and demonstration projects - many of them experimental and exploratory - which have been funded by State and/or Federal agencies and private functions. Thus these papers do not only reflect the opinions of their authors, but are also indicative of the total climate of action, thought, and quest for new solutions regarding the crime problem in this country.

No reproduction of the papers of a professional meeting can fully reflect the flavor and the total contribution of the event. The questions and remarks from the meeting floor, the discussions in the workshops, the remarks exchanged in the corridors, over meals, or in the rooms of the participants often represent the major accomplishment of such a gathering. New face-to-face contacts and awareness of things done by others - both individuals and agencies - is often the most important byproduct the participant takes home with him. This Symposium was rich in all of this. Close to one thousand persons from all over the country, representing all component elements of the criminal justice system mingled together for three days under the aegis of a major Federal effort to do something about crime and delinquency, which have risen to unprecedented prominence over the last decade. The Symposium provided the needed national forum for all those engaged in the crime prevention and control effort.

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MYTHOLOGY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE:
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE BEHAVIOR OF STAFF

by

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Introduction

An attempt to change inevitably involves personal and
organizational risks and requires that we face crucial uncertain-
ties: when we deal with human beings, we have to accept the fact
that ultimately there can be no right answers. The point that we
want to make in what follows is this: very often, those who are
charged with responsibility for bringing about change ignore or do
not sufficiently and honestly address risk and uncertainty in their
efforts to induce change. In ignoring those crucial issues, very
often they behave in ways which appear to have been designed to
impede change rather than to support it. We are hoping to offer
some alternatives to those who honestly seek change, and yet are
terminally frustrated, or who are perplexed by some of the negative
reactions to their efforts.

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Let's begin by describing a "game" that we've seen played many times with surprising results.

The game involves a "gamesman" and eligible players. With each play, the eligible player has an equal chance of making nothing (i.e., losing his stake) or $10.00. He must put down a stake each time he plays; and he can play an indefinite number of times.

There is one other rule: not everyone is eligible to play. The gamesman determines who can play by asking each person how much he is willing to stake before the first time he plays. If he thinks the offered stakes are too low, the gamesman won't let the person play.

The game begins when the gamesman asks each person what his stake would be: $1.00, $3.00, $5.00, etc. Invariably, he hears a few low stakes ($1.50 or so), and a few high stakes ($5.50). Most people are willing to stake about $3.50.

And those are very surprising results. Why? Because the game, put more simply, is an offer of a guaranteed return of $5.00 on the stake for each play. (If there is an equal chance of making nothing or $10.00 on each play and if the player can play for an indefinite period, he will average $5.00 per play.) Most of the players staked less than $4.50. Yet anything under that amount gives a usurious return on the investment.

Because of the way the game is described, most players think that there is a real risk in playing. The gamesman could have said: how much will you give me on repeated occasions, if I will give you back $5.00 each time. As originally described, the game sounds riskier than it is. Now, why do we describe such a silly game here?

Almost daily, we see staff people go into criminal justice agencies and offer "sure things," or very risky proposals to agency heads. When they leave frustrated, they say, "why that old stick in the mud. I offered him an answer to some of his problems, and he wouldn't invest more than 5 percent of his time for it."

Most people do not like the risk and will go some distance to avoid it. The chance of loss is a powerful incentive to inaction, or at the least, hedged commitments. Our efforts in the process of change need to address risk and uncertainty directly, not as an unpleasant by-product. We cannot afford to sidestep this major impediment to change or to fall back on moral outrage, saying "Ain't it awful" that they aren't willing to take the actions we know they ought to take.

Most of the roles which we provide, however, create a perception of risk and uncertainty in the person to be changed, and rest upon assumptions about people which are inconsistent with attempts to accomplish change.

Notice that throughout the following discussion we draw a clear distinction between "staff" and "line" personnel, meaning the helper and the helped. This is an oversimplification, and not infrequently the roles as we draw them are reversed or confused. In addition, there are several quite different types of staff. We will continue to draw the clear distinction, however, as if it existed that way, in order to simplify our major points.

Figure 1 shows a simplified version of a negative change encounter. Note that we are not talking about encounters where the line response is positive. There, at least in theory, we have no problem.

What role do we cast for the line official presented with an opportunity to change? The line official is a recalcitrant, bull-headed stick in the mud. He is behind the times; he is moved only by crises; and he is uninterested in improving himself or his agency. He vacillates and compromises; he indulges in patronage and politics.

Of course, under pressure, we might be forced to admit that his agency usually has managed to keep its head above water; he does survive most crises; he at least partially commands the respect of tens, hundreds, or sometimes thousands of men; and surprisingly often, he's a pretty likable guy.

But his intentions are confused; he is not a professional. He's not a well-educated man, and he makes decisions off the top of his head. He's technically unsophisticated and that cannot lead to excellence; or can it?

We give this guy a rather limited set of lines with which to respond to a suggested change. He can say:

1. "We are working on the problem already, and we don't want your assistance;" or

2. "We don't have any problems that are out of the ordinary here;" or

3. "We know what our problems are, and we know what we have to do about them. Now, if you will only give us X more personnel and Y more money, we'll stop wasting each other's time and get to work;" or

4. "We sure need a new way to go about this . . .but your idea is no damn good, because . . .;" or

Figure 1. A "Change Encounter"

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
5. "Ain't it awful" that we are in such a sad state
of affairs; that the courts don't so their job;
that the personnel we have are so underqualified;
that we are so overworked; that we haven't had
talent such as yours available to us;" this state-
ment to be immediately followed by, "Well, gee,
it sure has been nice talking to you, and I sure
hope you'll come back soon."

We don't give the guy much credit in this model, and some
extremely questionable assumptions underlie this characterization.

What kinds of roles do we cast for the staff participant in
the encounter?

He is most often a young, well educated, professional. He is
aggressive, intelligent, full of insight, energetic, and possesses
bright ideas.

Of course, under pressure, we might be forced to admit he may
also be naive, nosy, and callous. His reach may exceed his grasp;
or, his life experience may be limited. He may not know about the
"real world."

But overall, we know that at least his intentions are good,
and that he is someone who, if we can tolerate and control him, may
be able to help. He is the opposite of the political hack; he abhors
politics; he believes in objective data. That can only be good, can
it not?

The range of roles and lines available to the staff man are
more complicated than those of the line official because he is the
one who is imposing himself, trying to sell himself, in an encounter
designed to bring about change.

Staff Roles

The staff member can behave in a number of ways with regard
to change activities.

1.   The professional staff role rests upon a body
of established information--that which he has learned
in school and from books. The professional offers
answers to problems through a collection of the right
data, analyzed in the right ways. He says, "If we can
resist political pressure and spend our time and money
in the right ways, then we will really be able to do
something about your problems," or, "If only they would
collect the data we need, we would be able to really
help them."

2.   The reformer is following a semi-religious calling.
You can see it in his eyes. If only you will follow
his teachings, he will show you the way. He does not
trust anyone in the existing structure, because it is
always corrupt and/or incompetent. He says very little
and can be arrogant and authoritarian. This is a
relatively rare staff role, because in a staff position
it is all but impossible to gain the real power required
by the role.

3.   The manipulator assumes that if he is just clever
enough and plans carefully and properly, he can change
anything. He seeks or develops complex power structures;
the power to withold money, to tie up essential papers,
or to block access to the ears of powerful politicians.
He says, "If you want our money, you will do the job
our way," or with a broad smile on his face, "We really
want to get your program started. Now, will you just
answer a few questions?"

4.   The contractor's role is very simple in theory, and
very complex in actual practice. As the name suggests,
when implemented successfully, his role is one half of
an open and honest contract between two people. The
contractor agrees to work, with a pre-agreed set of
ground rules, upon his counterpart's terms. In the
best sense, this is a political role; the contractor
says "Scratch my back. Trust me and let me work with
you on an equal basis. In return, I'll scratch yours;
I'll work for you." He says, "Give me a call and I'll
come--not to reform, professionalize or give you the
answers, but to help in any reasonable way I can, in
accordance with your instructions."

Obviously, this Dr. Jekyll can be a Mr. Hyde, and
Mr. Hyde can be immoral and can contribute greatly to
the problems on which he works.

The important point for the contractor role is that it is inherently

amoral. There is no inherently moral or correct outcome to be expected

from using the role. The staff person choosing it must explicitly

acknowledge that the outcome depends upon the wisdom and morality of

the user.

On the other hand, the other three roles don't guarantee, and

usually don't even cause moral or good results in a change process,

either.

Professionalism, in some professions, has come to mean insulation

from outsiders, excessive attention to personal prestige, and the

creation of a special language understood only by members of the

profession. The potential for bad outcomes from the efforts of reformers

and manipulators should be obvious.

We hope that these role descriptions have not been too brief,

too flippant, or too oversimplified for you to see some truth in

them. This business of change is an old one, and we are engaging

in it with sometimes new and high-sounding words. In the process

of the encounter, in the heat of a good fight, we often forget some

basic things.

The frequency with which the first three roles reappear, played

by different people, and the consistency from person to person of

some of the words and phrasing used in change encounters, suggest

to me that there are some underlying assumptions commonly held by those

playing these roles.

Underlying Assumptions of Staff Roles

Although the following list is not exhaustive, it is meant to

be illustrative of staff assumptions that restrict staff/line cooperation.

1. We will begin with the assumption that decision-
    makers do not have any ideas, or the capacity to develop
    ideas to get themselves out of their dilemmas. Direct
    and indirect references to the assumption surround us.
    The word innovative is a nemesis to agency officials.
    It means risk, criticism, prior incompetence, and a
    variety of other really troublesome things to the one
    who supposedly needs it. Yet how many genuinely inno-
    vative ideas or procedures have been developed in the
    last few years? An example came up in a recent lunch
    with a police chief who is working on one of the
    national task forces: he pointed out, from his
    perspective as a chief of a small department, that
    the basic ingredients of team policing have existed
    in his department for years and are essentially the
    same as those of the old beat cop, who we put on a
    centralized dispatch system, to improve efficiency,
    a decade or so ago.

    The suggestion is not that fresh ideas aren't
    needed. However, we tend to make a subtle leap in
    logic, from the perception that we need fresh ideas,
    to the unstated, but entirely different assumption
    that we need new ideas because we don't have any ideas.
    On the same first assumption, notice that the term
    needs, meaning a line official's ideas, as an ingredient
    in a change process, is generally viewed with scorn.
    It is regressive. Needs are not good, unless there
    has been an objective survey of specific problems and
    a formal analysis of alternatives to these problems
    preceding the statement of needs.

    We suggest that our underlined assumption above is
    most often a poor one; incorrect, insulting to its object,
    and a partial source of the mistrust which line officials
    often have for staff which hold the assumption. To
    believe that there are not many good ideas, hidden or
    otherwise, in agencies with problems, is to increase
    the uncertainty of decision-makers about how much they
    can trust those who say they wish to help.

2. A second commonly held assumption is that the present problems in an agency result in large part from their making bad decisions, and that therefore we have to improve the quality of the decisions made, to improve the agency. In extreme cases, all ideas from a line agency are discounted before an honest discussion about them has occurred. Ideas are discounted because, "he has always been wrong to date," or because, "they haven't done anything right in years." This assumption is based upon the premise that we are dealing with decision-makers who frequently arrive at bad decisions, and so we need to provide them with skills to make better decisions. Most of the time, this assumption is incorrect, and more importantly, it is a damaging assumption to hold as we are working with someone who has the capacity to effect change.

Let's begin with why the assumption does damage: We believe that you are wrong; the decisions you have been making for years have been wrong; and your life's work is for naught. How do you feel about that? You should be feeling a certain resistance to listening to me. Only a masochist would enjoy such treatment, whether it is delivered directly, or indirectly and inferentially, as so often happens. The assumption that someone's problems result from his own bad decisions is damaging because it cannot be hidden: the line official knows what the person sitting opposite him thinks, and so the assumption impedes any honest interchange. It increases dramatically the resistance of the line official to accepting help from staff.

We also have said that the assumption was often wrong as well as being counterproductive. More often than making "wrong" decisions, decision-makers either:

A. Postpone needed decisions because of the apparent risk involved; or,

B. Make basic decisions but fail to follow up with a series of smaller but equally important decisions needed to implement the primary decision; or,

C. Fall into rigid patterns of decision-making because of a complex desire to avoid risk ("It worked once, therefore it ought to work again.").

Early in his career, I am told that B. F. Skinner ran an experiment in which he provided some individuals with a lighted panel with a number of buttons. Each subject was told to find the button which most frequently lit the light. Unknown to the subjects, Skinner had wired random chance into the button-light relationships. The predominant behavior pattern among the subjects was to go back and forth across the buttons, and finding one that lit the light a couple of times, to settle upon that one and continuously push it. They moved only sporadically away from it.

One of the points that we are making here is that inaction is a far more frequent offender than poor action; and risk and uncertainty are powerful incentives to inactivity. The number of useful and productive decisions an experienced and mature decision-maker, in a supportive environment, can make off the seat of his pants is staggering. To make a decision, to take action requires the actor to take a risk, and avoiding a decision is facilitated by saying we are uncertain about it; we need more data. Such an excuse, however, ignores the fact that we will always be uncertain, even after the decision is made, if it was the best possible decision.

I have to digress here for a moment. Many of you, at this point, will be saying to yourselves, yes, but what about this guy who I have been trying to work with who really does make bad decisions; who is an obstinate S.O.B.; and who really doesn't have any productive ideas about how to help himself? There are such people, and when you come

to work with them in a staff capacity, you have to make a basic

decision about whether or not you like wasting your time. When

such people hold real power, they cannot be changed without first

wishing it themselves. It is convenient to think that no one but

one's self is competent, because then we have the whole world to

reform. The truth is that such people are really rather rare, and

far more common are mistrustful people who have problems derived

primarily from sources other than original sin.

When working for really negative people, the options open to

different staff types vary considerably. A planner who works with

agencies to which he does not administratively report has more options

than staff working within an unyielding line agency. Job security,

age, pension structures, and the lack of lateral entry in this field

all act to limit options. Even the most dedicated staff people in

this position sometimes have no effective choice but to wait, hope,

waste their time, or give in.

3.   Our third assumption says: <u>There is something wrong with a less than wholehearted response to an offer of help</u>. The characterization we made earlier of the line official is a pretty common one; the most common response of a line official faced with a suggestion that he ought to change is suspicion, recalcitrance, and a variety of other negative signals.

The assumption that is problematic here is that there is something really wrong with someone who responds with less than complete openness in a change encounter. The man who responds initially to outside staff with complete openness and total honesty is either a thoroughly extra-ordinary human being, or quite foolish, or he is putting the staff man on; the latter ought to be suspicious. Staff are inconsistent when upset, irate, angry, or the like with a less than

wholehearted response in a change encounter. None of our commonly understood role definitions allow us to respond positively to the perceived risk and uncertainty which underlie less than open responses. Most of the common responses embody the opposite effect: Get some power over the guy so you can force him to change; "The S.O.B. doesn't want our help; he doesn't think he has a problem; he really doesn't want to do a good job."

Faced with intransigence it is all too easy to back the line official up against a wall, or bury him in data showing what a poor job he is doing. After all, the staff man usually has the correct answer in his bag of tricks, doesn't he? Far more difficult than to dig into a bag of tricks is to listen and try to help.

4.   A fourth assumption is that <u>seat of the pants decisions are inherently inferior, even undesirable, because they are not backed up by formal objective information</u>. From two root problems we bring ourselves to a point where we attempt to <u>choose</u> between intuitive and objective data. First, because objective data ought to reduce the uncertainty we have with our answers' correctness, and in the case of perfect data--reduce to zero the risk involved in change, we naturally gravitate to more data. And second, because intuitive judgements incorporate unclean components--politics and personal gain--we try to substitute objective information. The assumption is misleading.

We have to begin with the recognition that there are no singularly right answers in human endeavor; we will have to further recognize that the intuitive mechanism is far more sophisticated than any analytical machinery yet developed. Factual data is extremely important; we have to both acquire and use more information about what we are doing. Ultimately, however, all of our key change decisions are going to be made somewhat arbitrarily in the face of ultimate uncertainty about whether we are right or no.

It is as unreasonable to use the tools of planning and analytical research as our sole guidelines to change, as it would be to judge an architect solely by his use of dividers, ruler, and compass.

Perhaps those in staff positions need also to recognize a certain exceptional disinclination to risk

and uncertainty which usually characterizes those of us who choose staff instead of line responsibilities.

We have a special problem with data in the criminal justice field. Because the business of criminal justice is so serious, we try not to guess about the arrest, trial, and prison. We carry that necessary reluctance to operate on less than complete information over to planning for the administration of justice, where more circumstantial data does less harm. Nearly everyone is developing comprehensive information packages covering all arrests, all prisoners, all trials, etc. Almost no one, however, is regularly using sampling techniques to develop planning information.

To postpone action until all the information is in may contribute to a series of basic inpediments to change itself; it is easier to work on data than to work with people on their problems. We need to use data more extensively, but let's use it wisely and with an eye to its limits, rather than a wish that it were better.

5.　　Fifth, we assume that <u>duplication of effort is wasteful and to be avoided where it doesn't exist, and stamped out where it does exist</u>. Consolidation of police departments reduces duplication of effort; sometimes regional planning does the same; and funding a program in one community when a statewide system for the problem is being developed is duplication of effort. The assumption is not always accurate. All too often, we are failing to differentiate between duplication in routinized activities, and duplication in learning or change processes.

There are some terrible ironies in this area in the Safe Streets Act, for example. Unfortunately, but accurately, most proposal review under the program is routinized, and involves little learning for either party involved. What do we do? We have duplication of effort galore.

On the other hand, there is substantial evidence that duplication has positive, and sometimes essential value where it relates to the introduction of changes. we would like to believe that, for example, we can develop a model computer program for control of data and resources in a large criminal justice agency,

which can be transferred to other agencies. For years, in computer sales jargon, we have heard of a mythological library of prepackaged basic computer programs. In the case of basic programs, however, it just doesn't work. Each agency has to develop its own, and although it can usefully build upon or use the work of others in that process, essentially the effort is always duplicative, and always new.

Finally, we want to propose for your consideration the beginning of an alternative set of working assumptions which we can use when working for change in the criminal justice field.

Alternative Working Assumptions

We now present some alternative assumptions we have used ourselves over the last two years in working with officials in the largest cities and counties in the country. They have not been evaluated and are not susceptible to objective analysis. They are really intended as working assumptions. They are neither right nor wrong. They do seem to be useful, and help to develop more productive change encounters.

1.　　The first working assumption we propose is that <u>trust between the helper and the helped is essential to almost all change processes</u>. Put most simply, you have the best chance of getting some of your own ideas used if those who can use them trust you. The idea is to provide support for the process of change, not to provide the particular result you desire. Unless a staff man is trusted by a line official, that staff is an unknown commodity, unpredictable, and risky to deal with; the line official will not generally talk sufficiently about what the details of his problems are, and what ideas he has about them, for the staff really to be able to help.

Developing trust is an extremely demanding and complicated process, but absolutely necessary if support for change is the desired function or result.

2.   The second assumption we have already talked about:
<u>make an explicit, working assumption that the line</u>
<u>officials worked with have specific ideas about what they</u>
<u>can do to change, and that they are capable of making good</u>
<u>decisions</u>. It is impossible to hide the fact that you hold
the opposite assumption if you do, and it is crippling. By
contrast, the contribution that can be made to a trusting
relationship by a positive assumption is very exciting.
Beginning with this assumption, it very often becomes
possible to really help someone with an idea they haven't
been able to figure out how to implement; which idea they
wouldn't even mention if they didn't trust the listener.

      If it turns out to be a bad working assumption after
a reasonable period of time, then change the assumption.
With the changed assumption the staff man should recog-
nize that he is then in a position where there is little
or nothing that he can do unless and until the line
official wishes to change.

3.   The third working assumption is that <u>neutral, passive,</u>
<u>or even negative or recalcitrant behavior on the part of</u>
<u>line officials is normal in a change encounter</u>. The appro-
priate staff response is one of acceptance and honest
support of the needs of the line official. Offer to help,
express honest disagreements while attempting to understand
risks from the line official's perspective. Above all,
don't act as if there were something wrong with a line
official for not offering open arms to all new ideas.

4.   The fourth working assumption is that <u>duplication</u>
<u>of effort is an essential ingredient of many change</u>
<u>processes and should be designed into new programs</u>.
Extensive on-side assistance should be provided; and
people who can answer the question, "How did others
do this?" should be put in contact with the line officials
involved.

      We must not continue to fail to differentiate between
what is genuinely wasteful duplication, and what duplica-
tion, being part of a learning process, is necessary and
desirable. People must be allowed and encouraged to try
things that may be mistakes. There are also places where
duplication ought to be avoided, as in routinized opera-
tions. However, our definitions ought to be pretty
flexible on this issue. What is routinized for one
person may be chaotic and risky for another, until they
have tried it.

5.   Finally, let's begin to accept the fact that data
doesn't provide answers, and major decisions will
never be answered by the right data collected in the
right ways. "Objective" data is a misnomer; there is
no such thing. Observed data ought to be used in
support of the intuitions of decision-makers at all
levels of the hierarchies with which we work.

We will conclude by quoting a passage from R. D. Laing's book,

<u>Knots</u> , which seems to me to summarize, painfully, some of the most

important points we have tried to make:

There must be something the matter with him
      because he would not be acting as he does
      unless there was
      therefore he is acting as he is
      because there is something the matter with him

He does not think there is anything the matter with him
because
      one of the things that is
      the matter with him
      is that he does not think that there is anything
      the matter with him
therefore
      we have to help him realize that,
      the fact that he does not think there is anything
      the matter with him
      is one of the things that is
      the matter with him
there is something the matter with him
because he thinks
      there must be something the matter with us
for trying to help him to see
that there must be something the matter with him
to think that there is something the matter with us
for trying to help him to see that
      we are helping him. . .

THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE IN LEAA'S IMPACT PROGRAM

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Introduction

In keeping with the general theme of the Symposium, I have been invited to discuss the LEAA Impact Program as an example of a major federal program which seeks to effect a variety of changes. I will outline the origins and nature of the program, identify the several types of change sought, and speak briefly about the kinds of obstacles which the program has encountered in its brief history.

The stated intent of this program is to make an ascertainable impact on crime by reducing the incidence of stranger-to-stranger street crime and burglary in each of eight cities by five percent in two years and 20 percent in five years. These crimes were selected for attack because of their frequency, cost, and cause for public alarm. "Stranger-to-stranger crime," for the purpose of this program, is defined as "those robberies, rapes, assaults, and homicides which occur outside of a social situation between persons unknown to each other, or acquainted only by accident." For purposes of initial measurement and city selection, robbery was used as a

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surrogate for all stranger-to-stranger street crime because of a lack of UCR data corresponding to the definition.

Cities were considered for participation in the program if they met the criteria of having a population within the range of 250,000 to 1,000,000 and an overall index crime rate greater than 5,000 per 100,000 persons with a combined robbery and burglary rate of 2,500 per 100,000. An additional criterion was that no more than one city should be selected from any federal region. As a result of applying these criteria, the following cities were invited to participate: Newark, Cleveland, St. Louis, Baltimore, Atlanta, Denver, Dallas, and Portland.

Over a period of three years, each of these cities may qualify for up to 20 million dollars in LEAA assistance. They may receive as much as $5 million in the first year, $10 million in the second, and $5 million in the third. The allocation of these sums is contingent upon each city's ability to develop a program of action which is based upon a thorough analysis and comprehensive plan to reduce burglary and stranger-to-stranger crime.

Planning and the Impact Program

From the point of view of managing change, perhaps the most important aspect of the Impact Program is its emphasis upon analysis and planning. The planning process which is being followed in the Impact program differs from the approach which LEAA has encouraged in the past. Instead of taking the criminal justice system as the point of departure for planning, a method is proposed in which crime

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is identified as the problem. In this approach, the reduction of a specific crime is established as an objective. Taking crime as the starting point not only requires a thorough analysis of the present role and performance of the criminal justice system; but also it demands a complete investigation of the crime selected for attack. Of necessity, the event, victim or target, and the offender should be of major consideration. Thus, specific recommendations for change in the system are based upon an examination of crime and the response of criminal justice agencies to that crime.

Until recently, LEAA's planning and programming has not been based upon the concept of crime analysis. Instead, it has been guided by two closely related ideas. The first is that crime and criminal behavior may be affected at large; that is, by instituting programs designed to reduce crime as a whole. The second assumption has been that the best way to accomplish crime reduction is to foster programs that will enable criminal justice agencies to perform more comprehensively and efficiently.

Consequently, the agency's objective has been to improve or upgrade police, courts, and corrections. Since this was our overall strategy, it followed that we were interested in projects which provided such services as improved police communication, a greater number of prosecutors, more and better trained correctional officers, and so forth. The assumption implicit in the "system-improvement" approach is that better staffed, better equipped criminal justice agencies will reduce crime. The goal of "system improvement" is

based upon the rationale that it is possible to effect a reduction of crime in general by supporting specific changes in the operations of criminal justice agencies.

There are several weaknesses in this approach. First, crime reduction is the reason for existence of this program, and hence, its ultimate goal; current system practices and proposed innovations must be evaluated in terms of their contribution to crime reduction. System changes are a means to an end, not an end in themselves. Second, it is very difficult to subdivide the goal of system improvement into a series of manageable problems which lend themselves to comprehensive planning. We now order the criminal justice system by reducing it to its institutions, police, courts, and correction; or, we subdivide it into particular functions, prevention, deterrence, detection, adjudication, rehabilitation and so forth. Such a subdivision is a necessary and a rational process, and we must continue to do it. However, if we seek changes in these institutions and functions individually, without reference to an organizing principle or concept which can tie them together, then we cannot plan systematically for the criminal justice system as a whole. We will continue to produce plans which have parts unrelated to one another, and which are as fragmented as the present criminal justice system itself.

We can plan individual changes and link them together at the same time, only if we define crime as the problem and use it to organize and structure our actions. But what is true of the criminal justice system as a whole is also true of crime as a whole; neither is a manageable problem.

However, we can order the universe of crime as we cannot that of criminal justice and also promote planning which is systematic and reasonably comprehensive. This is so because it is possible to subdivide the problem of crime into a series of specific offenses, or into groups of like offenses, each of which has substantially different characteristics. By proceeding in this way, criminal justice planners should be able to define an array of problems which are individually manageable and collectively meaningful. In addition, since a planned attack upon specific crimes will involve all components of the criminal justice system; the plan of attack will function within a framework which integrates individual operations. This method can lead to comprehensiveness with respect to crime and the criminal justice system.

In addition to promoting more rational problem selection and a more systematic form of comprehensive planning, a crime-specific planning method will produce several other desirable effects. It will focus the attention of the criminal justice system on output; output being some measure of crime reduction. A parallel benefit may be that efforts to evaluate programs will be successful in relating system changes to changes in the crime rate. This can occur if programs are designed to reduce a particular crime; if they set an objective which is logically related to that goal; and, if they include indicators of performance which represent the cause and effect relationships upon which the entire program is based.

Finally, planning for the reduction of specific crimes should facilitate the selection of priority areas of activity for the criminal justice system. As data which will indicate more about the social costs associated with particular forms of criminal behavior becomes more reliable and complete, criminal justice planners will be in a position to recommend a pattern for the allocation of resources which responds to the severity of various crime problems.

By now, it should be clear that it is not LEAA's intention to induce, stimulate, or manage change through the Impact Program by presenting cities with a list of ready-made programs from which they may choose those that appear most applicable to their own situation. On the contrary, program development and selection is the responsibility of the city. Except for some very broad controls and guidelines, decisions regarding resource allocations will also be the concerns of individual cities. In sum, the shape of each city's overall program is to be locally determined; LEAA requires only that individual proposals form a rational and coherent whole, that planned changes be related to the reduction of stranger-to-stranger street crime and burglary.

Change Objectives in the Impact Program

I have argued that the planning process is itself central to the management of change in the Impact Program. It is important in two ways. First, as a method, it is the basis for comprehensive programming and systematic change in general. Second, planning is

necessary to achieve those specific types of change which are crucial to the implementation of an overall program design. The management of change in this program requires two types or levels of planning; one is strategic, the other is tactical.

Let me try to explain the difference between the two. In doing so, I hope to illustrate the variety of changes we anticipate as part of the Impact Program.

Each city will be planning a comprehensive program for the reduction of burglary. The plan will be comprehensive insofar as it is based upon an understanding of all facets and dimensions of the burglary problem. Depending upon what is revealed by an analysis of the nature of the event, target and offender, a number of general strategies will appear promising. Among these strategies may be some which attack those causes or conditions thought to promote burglary. Thus, programs may be instituted for convicted burglars which are designed to affect their motivation--remedial education, job training, drug rehabilitation, and the like. In the area of control, the general strategies of reducing opportunity and increasing risk may be pursued. Target-hardening, changes in police surveillance, and altered court procedures might be typical of control measures.

Taken together, these strategies will constitute the general framework of a comprehensive plan. Again, the changes recommended will vary from city to city, since information discovered about the problem of burglary and the present nature of criminal justice

operations will differ. In each case, it is likely that the strategies which give the program its basic direction will involve the entire criminal justice system and call for the participation of non-criminal justice agencies as well. This, in turn, should lead to the development of an entire range of specific actions; activities which will be recommended to implement basic strategy.

It is at this level of action, the level of tactical development, where new practices are tried and traditional approaches revised, that the program becomes truly operational. It will be at this point, also, that opportunities to initiate several other forms of change should be present. Change in the direction of greater inter-agency and inter-governmental cooperation, should occur. These, too, are objectives of the Impact Program; they are examples of second-order or second-level change objectives. Their fulfillment will be essential to the achievement of the program's basic objectives: the introduction and practice of a crime-specific planning method, and the absolute reduction of street crime and burglary.

The analysis of a specific crime problem should reveal that its causes and means of control are complex, and that no single agency nor even all criminal justice agencies are capable of dealing with it comprehensively and effectively. In planning and carrying out specific activities to deal with a particular crime, police, courts, and correctional agencies will not be able to ignore the effects

which changes in their own practice will have upon each other's ability to perform. An obvious example of this kind of relationship within the criminal justice system is presented by the case in which increased police activity against burglary results in a greater number of arrests; this in turn leads to a greater number of cases for the prosecutor's office, which then may place an additional burden on the courts. Finally, the effect will be felt in the correctional institutions, where an increase in population will add to the burden of a facility which is perhaps already overcrowded.

Chain-reaction effects such as this will have to be anticipated and accounted for in planning. The need to maintain balance in the criminal justice system will be especially important in this program. To make what we loosely refer to as a criminal justice "system" function with greater unity of purpose is a principal objective of the Impact Program because it is an essential factor in implementing planned change as well as being a form of change itself.

Another objective of the Impact Program is the promotion of improved intergovernmental relations in the field of criminal justice. At the local government level, the opportunities for cooperation are numerous. In fact, many instances of change in the relationships among agencies within the criminal justice system will also find parallels in cases of intergovernmental cooperation. Although the

target area for crime reduction is the city, a division of responsibility for criminal justice system functions between city, county, and state governments is quite common. Courts and correctional agencies are often outside the jurisdiction of the city. Nor would the participation of other city, county, and state agencies be unlikely. Departments of Human Resources, Education and Manpower agencies might be involved in cooperative programs with criminal justice agencies in the Impact Program.

Closer ties among federal agencies with interests and programs related to the Impact Program is also a valued objective. The potential is certainly present for federal joint funding of a number of specific efforts. Both criminal justice and non-criminal justice agencies could be eligible for assistance. The chances for cooperative federal programming under the auspices of the Impact Program appear quite good, but they essentially depend upon generation of the data and evaluation of the strategies which bear on the objective. It is clear that exploiting combined federal programming will depend upon a competent plan.

Let's address now some of the obstacles to change which have already surfaced and some others which we expect will appear in the near future. It is important to note at the outset, that there are maximum opportunities for obstacles to change under this program because of its purposeful lack of explicit guidelines and heavy reliance on intergovernmental partnership in planning and programming.

Obstacles to Change

Interagency Conflict.--We anticipate conflict through compe-
tition among local criminal justice agencies, but we do not expect
much until the program passes the stage of initial planning and
reaches the point when alternative programs and projects are being
considered. We are hopeful that some of the obstacles to change
which arise because of inter-agency conflict can be overcome by
arguments based upon conclusions of the crime analysis. While we
are not so naive as to expect that the analysis of street crime
and burglary will produce clear and self-evident conclusions about
what needs to be done, we do expect that it will be thorough enough
to serve as a basis for sound judgment regarding appropriate action.
To the extent that the analysis is able to rule out some alterna-
tives which would quite obviously be unworkable in light of the
evidence, a number of potential conflicts may be avoided completely;
when disagreement occurs over matters in which there is much room
for judgment, we anticipate that the results of investigation will
be influential in determining the outcome. If the findings of
research alone do not lead to conflict resolution, their existence
should at least elicit debate and perhaps cause political decisions
to rest on an analysis of the facts.

Intragovernmental Conflict.--There has been tension between
mayors and city councils over the issue of how authority will be
shared in decisions regarding program selection and resource allocation.

Political disputes of this sort may create a deadlock which can
hold up the progress of the program, and in extreme cases, defeat
it altogether. So far, the risk of losing federal assistance seems
to have been sufficient to promote a mutual adjustment of interests
within city government. If it appears to most elected officials
that none of their political competitors will gain a great relative
advantage over them as a result of the program, or that all con-
cerned may benefit from the program, or that their own losses may
be large if federal aid is withdrawn due to their opposition, then
cooperation can be achieved. To date, this has been the case--at
least within the cities themselves.

There has also been an instance of conflict between the mayor
and council together versus a powerful criminal justice agency of
city government. This is an example of how patterns of intra-
governmental influence which were well established before the Impact
program continue to operate.

Intergovernmental Conflict.--There have been some instances of
city-county conflict. Issues have arisen regarding county represen-
tation on policy boards and task forces, and in general, on the
county's role in the Impact Program. Some county officials feel
slighted, since the program is aimed at the city, where the inci-
dence of stranger-to-stranger crime and burglary is higher than in
the county. Nevertheless, county cooperation is crucial to the
success of the program, since the existence of county courts and
correctional agencies assign the county a major role in the local
criminal justice system. If jurisdiction of the county as a whole

is not included, then it must be persuaded to cooperate either by offers to participate in the policy-making process, or by arguments that the criminal justice agencies of county government should benefit substantially from the program.

If such positive inducements are not enough, the county may be moved by the prospect that an Impact Program without its involvement may mean more funds for the agencies of city government. Even worse, if the city police department should become more successful in apprehending offenders due to increased support, county courts and correctional institutions would face an additional burden and cost. Such a development could arouse county voters who are not city residents as well as those who are. In any event, most of the city-county disputes which have arisen so far have been resolved at least temporarily. In those cases, where the program is still threatened by serious disagreement, the outlook for an amicable settlement now appears good.

Emerging intergovernmental conflicts can sometimes be antici-pated and resolved by adapting the planning process to accommodate them. In one instance, conflict between the city and county con-cerning the role of each in the planning process was resolved in part by constructing a crime-analysis team composed of professionals from both the city and the county.

A slightly different example of joint participation is the case in which intergovernmental conflict was avoided by designating an

existing metropolitan criminal justice planning agency as the crime analysis team. Both city and county representation serve on the board which governs the activities of this planning agency; and so this case may be cited as an instance of indirect participation; and as one which illustrates the potential value of the role that a respected third party can plan in stemming conflict.

Group Pressures.--Another case is one which illustrates interracial conflict and the potential role of policy boards in resolving conflict situations. It is also an example of the kind of political solution which is applicable to a number of situations; namely, it involves expanding the representative character of those agencies responsible for planning and implementing the Impact Program, so that divergent political and professional views can be accommodated.

In one city, shortly after the program was announced, repre-sentatives of a sizable minority group expressed concern over the intent of the Impact Program. They were aware of the fact that a large proportion of street crime and burglary was concentrated within the boundaries of their community; and they also realized that depending upon the content of the program, the entire effort could have a harmful or beneficial effect on the lives of its residents. While the Impact Program seeks a balanced attack on street crime and burglary, these community leaders were naturally troubled by the prospect that too much emphasis might be placed upon detection and apprehension, and too little upon prevention and

rehabilitation. Thus, a campaign in opposition to the program appeared likely, based on the fear that the Impact Program might become an instrument of suppression.

If this opposition and the demands which accompanied it had gone unanswered, a serious obstacle would have been placed in the path of the program. Fortunately, concern was raised early enough so that action could be taken to assure adequate representation of minority interests on those policy boards which will be making recommendations in a number of program areas. It now appears as though what might have been an obstacle was really an opportunity, since the entire program will benefit from the insights of minority participants as well as from their increased cooperation.

Other Conflicts

In at least two cities, individual criminal justice agencies represent an obstacle. In both cases, each agency has been especially aggressive in exerting political pressure on the mayor and city council in order to obtain early program commitments in their own behalf. Such requests are, of course, premature, since cities are still in the process of initial problem analysis. Yet, the elected officials of these cities are in the awkward position of having to respond to the pressure of these demands; and, since each agency has considerable political influence, there is a strong temptation to yield.

In order to relieve city officials of this type of pressure, at least in the short-term, it may be possible to shift the burden of

responsibility to federal officials, who are not as susceptible to local influence. This can be done if city politicians will argue that the matter of specific program commitments is really out of their hands at this point, since federal authorities will not approve action which is not justified by careful analysis. If a convincing argument can be made that the mayor and council are powerless to make such decisions at this time, then pressure should subside, at least until the report of the analysis team is received.

By the time the analysis is completed and pressure again mounts, the officials responsible for program decisions will be able to respond in a number of ways: first, they may indicate that the analysis does not substantiate the particular action proposed by the agency; they may argue that a different kind of agency response would be more appropriate; or finally, they may again argue that a program which includes the proposed action cannot be justified and will, therefore, not be approved by federal officials.

Summary

In summary, the Impact Program in each city faces a number of obstacles: intergovernmental conflicts between city and county and city and state concerning their respective roles; intragovernmental disputes at both the city and county levels, both among agencies of the criminal justice system and between the legislative and executive branches; community-wide political and professional differences concerning the direction and emphasis of the program as a whole, which

results in disagreement over the role of the crime analysis team, and over the functions and powers of the various policy boards and task forces which have been established to make program recommendations.

A final obstacle is simply resistance to planning itself. This resistance is based on a number of factors: a fear that analysis and planning will lead to recommendations for revising established agency practices; a fear that planning will result in a reallocation of resources which could alter an existing pattern of influence; and the belief that planning is unnecessary because agencies already know what action needs to be taken.

Many of these obstacles also present an opportunity for managing change. If the program can demonstrate the value of planning in reducing specific crimes and show that an individual agency's influence may increase as a result of more effective performance, then the opportunity we were seeking to promote a crime-specific planning method will have been realized. Likewise, if the obstacles presented by political and professional conflict over program choice and emphasis results in a thorough consideration of alternatives and a discovery of those programmatic approaches which are most effective, then the program will have exploited another opportunity: the chance to effect change by bringing the elements of the criminal justice system together with those other agencies and interests in the community whose participation in an effort to reduce crime is essential.

Finally, those forms of intergovernmental and intragovernmental conflict which can be obstacles to change also present an opportunity. If the Impact Program is an occasion for establishing more regular channels of communication and creating more examples of cooperative program development among criminal justice agencies, then it may serve as a model for future action. If the program is successful in stimulating change in the direction of greater system cohesion, it will have capitalized upon its greatest opportunity.

THE PILOT CITIES EXPERIENCE

Robert C. Cushman, Project Director
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Introduction

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) has established eight demonstration sites throughout the nation to participate in a national strategy designed to mount an intensive, scientific program to test and to demonstrate new methods for reducing crime in America. The national program is known as Pilot Cities.

This paper introduces the pilot cities program. It then establishes the program as a distinct national crime control strategy. It then traces the development of the program in perspective with current parallel programs in the public and private sectors.

Purposes of the Pilot Cities Program

The Pilot Cities Program began as an effort by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice to establish "real world" laboratory settings in which to conduct comprehensive research, development, testing, evaluati-n and dissemination, technology transfer, programs. The experience of the San Joaquin Model Community Correctional Program (Grant 227--Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice) served as the basis for the Pilot City Program design. This project was conducted during 1967-1969 by the American Justice Institute, formerly known as the Institute for the Study of Crime and Delinquency, Sacramento, California.

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The design for the Pilot Cities Program was developed during 1969-1970; and the first Pilot City, San Jose-Santa Clara County, was funded in May 1970. Since then, seven additional Pilot Cities have been established, and eventually, there should be at least one Pilot in each LEAA Region.

The Pilot Cities Program seeks to build within each city-county demonstration area a system-wide and community-based research, development, and action program capable of identifying major criminal justice problems, and implementing coordinated pilot projects that test, demonstrate, evaluate, and disseminate solutions to those problems through the application of the most current knowledge and technology.

A second major purpose of the program is to develop improved methods and tools and to demonstrate improved criminal justice programs for the express purpose of transferring the new knowledge and experience to other communities.

Thus, the focus of the program is both internal and external to the host community. It addresses local criminal justice problems and involves local people. At the same time, it has an external focus which involves complementing rather than supplementing existing regional, state, and local criminal justice efforts by producing research tools/methodologies, and demonstration programs which will be useful to the rest of the nation. These results must be transferable.

Once developed by the local pilot city/county teams, the program results should be made available to other jurisdictions

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through LEAA regions, state planning agencies, and the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.

Inherent in the process is a test of the ability of an interdisciplinary team of action-oriented research/practitioner personnel to significantly improve the capability of the local criminal justice system to reduce crime over the five-year program period.

This requires a community development process to improve local capabilities so that independent research and analysis can be carried forward after the pilot team is withdrawn; it requires institutionalizing change.

Another major goal emanates from the community development process: to understand more clearly the process by which changes take place in the criminal justice system so that more effective means can be devised for the dissemination and implementation of well-tested innovations.

Typical Activities of a Pilot City Team

Characteristically, there are three basic thrusts in each Pilot City:

1. Pilot Research

Pilot research is conducted to help diagnose and define criminal justice problems. The emphasis is to concentrate on common problems in a real life setting and to develop tools, measurement techniques, and methodologies which will be transferable to other jurisdictions. Pilot research has included: victimization surveys, community attitude surveys, simulation studies, longitudinal studies of offenders, tracking of offenders through the system in order to identify problem areas, research in community organization, developing prediction tables for recidivism; for predicting jail overcrowding, and other efforts.

2. Demonstration Projects

Each pilot city/county is eligible for non-competitive discretionary funds each fiscal year. Five hundred thousand dollars per year is earmarked for each city. Ideally, these funds should be used to support carefully conceived, pioneering demonstration programs that can serve as "models." There are cases in which activity "A" must be accomplished before activity "B" can begin. If activity A represents some necessary upgrading to move to B, this rationale is normally sufficient. Programs being pioneered in one pilot may not be pioneering for the nation, or in another pilot, since each system has its own weak spots. Demonstration projects all have strong evaluation components built into them to assure assessment of impact. This in itself can qualify a project as "pioneering" in some instances. In each of the pilot cities, therefore, observers should find exceptionally well-designed projects, with strong evaluation components—projects which are attempting to show the way as models—somewhat on the leading edge of the state of the art.

Examples of Pilot Cities demonstration projects run the gamut: a computer simulation program, methadone maintenance, halfway house research program, crime specific law-enforcement projects, community-based diversion models, prosecutor/defender training, and internship, pretrial release program and others.

3. Technical Assistance

Technical assistance is more difficult to describe because it is less visible and does not normally result in a product. It can be properly described as a process of community development to (a) improve criminal justice agency planning skills, (b) improve criminal justice agency management capabilities, and (c) improve criminal justice system research and evaluation capabilities.

As a result of the five-year program effort,
there should be planning, management, research,
and evaluation capabilities within the criminal
justice system and the community far superior to
what they were at the program's inception.

Organization, Functional and Funding Relationships

The pilot cities, as participants in a national research and
demonstration program, are not intended to only serve the host city
or county or state. Clearly, if LEAA wished merely to augment the
resources of a local jurisdiction with talent and extra LEAA dollars,
it could easily find jurisdictions with greater need than the city/
county(s) which were selected. The Pilot Cities Program is, in this
sense, a break from the criminal justice tradition of placing the
most money where the biggest problem exists. LEAA has deliberately
sought out jurisdictions with relatively well developed criminal
justice agency services so that, as opposed to expending great effort
to bring existing services up to standard, LEAA could concentrate
Pilot City resources on pioneering, on research and on developing
program models that hopefully will show the way for the country.

The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
(NILECJ) has developed criteria for the selection of candidate Pilot
Cities and counties and the LEAA Administration makes the final
selection.

Each LEAA regional administrator is responsible for the operation
of the Pilot City and county project in his region. National
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) funds
are used to support the Pilot City staff, for pilot research studies,

or surveys by subcontractors and assistance from nationwide
consultants. The NILECJ funds are line-item amounts provided
to each LEAA Regional Office. Up to $400,000 is provided for
each of three 20-month budget phases. Each regional office with
jurisdictional responsibility for a Pilot City/County also
receives $500,000 in discretionary funds to support pilot demon-
stration projects each year. The NILECJ funds are passed to the
grantee, a non-profit institute or college or university, while
the discretionary funds are awarded to the host city/county as
meritorious projects are developed and funds are requested by
the Pilot City team and local units of government.

These activities are undertaken with the knowledge of the
host state planning agency and coordinated with the program plans
of the state's regional criminal justice planning unit. The
relationship of the grantee to units of local government, a local
criminal justice council, or a regional criminal justice planning
board will differ depending upon the situation in each city/
county. It is the responsibility of the LEAA regional adminis-
trator to guide the appropriate working relationship.

The Pilot Cities as an LEAA Innovation

The Pilot Cities Program is a significant innovation in and
of itself. It represents a distinct departure in federal strategy
in many ways that, at first, are not very obvious.

1. Selection of the Pilots

"Front runners" were selected as Pilot Cities.
This runs counter to the more traditional approach
of placing the most money where the biggest problem

exists. It recognizes that major developments will occur primarily in those agencies and jurisdictions identified as "front runners" or "champions for change."

2. Implementation Strategy

Implementation was guided by the principles set forth by the Organization For Social and Technical Innovation (OSTI 1967) in their report to the President's Crime Commission entitled Implementation.

". . . start small, but without the penalties of smallness; i.e., start small but be perceived as part of a large and significant program . . ."

"The first steps should involve building local competence . . . mutual understanding between federal agencies and local and state institutions should be gained through personal contact . . . take advantage of local initiative . . . provide central consulting, guidance and help . . . establish a cumulative data base to provide continuing learning from the first instances . . ." and finally, "the project's first undertaken should be part of the design of a long term process of change whose basic lines are spelled out, still maintaining a flexible enough form to permit it to take advantage of what initiative emerges at the local level." The need for a nurturing process was recognized and the need for program continuity over a significant period of time.

The decision to adopt these principles was a good one; they stand the test of time.

3. Five-Year Program

LEAA commitments were made to each city/county for a five-year effort.

4. Scope

A Pilot City is not really a Pilot "City" at all. In all eight projects, both a city and a county have been jointly designated as the demonstration site. Perhaps, they were originally called Pilot Cities because of the perspective of crime as an urban problem; however, in most city/county criminal justice systems

the municipal police are the only criminal justice agencies located at the city administration level. The courts and most of the detention and corrections functions of the criminal justice system are operated by the county level of government. The joint city/ county designation reflects the fact that the county is probably the basic planning unit and to establish a flexible mandate for the Pilot team to range across the entire system. The scope is broadly interpreted as system-wide, including not only police, courts, and corrections but the community and allied interfacing "systems" as well; e.g., welfare, education, public health, as they relate to crime control.

5. The Grantee

The grantee is always a non-governmental agency. In San Jose and Dayton, the first two Pilots to be established, the grantee is a private non-profit institute, in the others, a college or university. This has been done deliberately in order to compensate for the absence of adequate and coordinated action-oriented mechanisms at the local level. The grantee is not a unit of local government which provides some independent, apolitical entity as trustee for the program over the project period.

6. The Pilot Cities Staff Team

The composition of the Pilot City staff varies considerably among the eight projects. Police, court and corrections disciplines are consistently included, with an emphasis on persons who have many years of experience as practitioners but who also have academic credentials and experience in research. Depending upon the Pilot, the staff may also include persons with degrees or experience in city planning, demography, computer sciences, systems analysis, operations research, and the behavioral sciences. The emphasis is on a small interdisciplinary staff which has project funds for access to specialized consultants from throughout the country. Each project also has a small amount of subcontract money to support data processing, survey work, and other efforts needed to back up the pilot research.

Since the grantee is a non-profit institute or a college or university, there is normally more flexibility in being able to find, attract, hire, and retain highly specialized staff.

There are three important aspects to this federal strategy: (a) The Federal Government has sought assistance from outside of the governmental structure; i.e., from a private non-profit organization, or college or university; (b) the Federal Government chose small, locally based research organizations as opposed to the large government "think tanks"; and (c) traditionally in federal programs the talent gravitates to the top; i.e., locates in the executive branch of government in Washington. The Pilot Cities strategy emphasizes placing the talent at the bottom, so to speak, or in the community where the rubber meets the road.

These three factors describe the organization and staffing of the Pilot Cities Program as a distinct innovative departure for the federal government.

All of these factors represent a different style of public administration for the federal government. This also makes the Pilot Cities Program a significant LEAA innovation in and of itself.

The following four paragraphs are excerpted from an article the author prepared for the San Diego Law Review, Vol. 9, Issue 4, June, 1972 entitled "LEAA's Pilot Cities" - A Model for Criminal Justice Research and Demonstration":

"The Pilot Program represents a highly flexible organizational model, which is unique in the field of criminal justice. It is a highly adaptable, temporary organization, apolitical in nature and independent of local government. It is shielded from the day-to-day operating demands agency personnel must face. This provides the opportunity for thoughtful and often time consuming analysis of law enforcement problems, but this function is performed in a local setting not apart from it. It is an action-oriented organization designed to serve the criminal justice community, but it is advisory in nature, and relies solely on the authority of competence and performance. While it has no formal jurisdictional authority, it is a guest in the community and is totally dependent upon the coopera-

tion of local government and local law enforcement agencies.

It is a "low profile" organization which functions in a staff capacity to local agencies with a perspective that serves to link jurisdictional segments of the system. It links police, court, corrections, and community segments of the system; and it links city and county jurisdictions through a person-to-person technical assistance effort by practical problem solving professionals in criminal justice with specialized skills normally not present in a local criminal justice system. It is a "starter", an organizer, an initiator. It deliberately seeks out "movers" in the community-- agencies and individuals who are "front runners" and leaders. It attempts to find out where they are headed, then help them get there.

The Pilot Program is organized to react quickly to opportunities to improve the criminal justice system. A change in agency leadership, a local government crisis, a shift in community sentiment may provide these opportunities. Timing is often a crucial ingredient in this process.

The Pilot Program is the antithesis of a huge bureaucratic organization. The large government organization is helpful because it can build up tremendous momentum and apply its huge manpower and financial resources. In this sense, the Pilot Program is designed to complement the LEAA effort and the efforts of units of local government."

Drucker, in writing The Age of Discontinuity, puts his finger on the need for new organizational forms . . .

Large organizations cannot be versatile. A large organization is effective through its mass rather than through its agility. Fleas can jump many times their own height, but not elephants. Mass enables the organization to put to work a great many more kinds of knowledge and skill than could possibly be combined in any one person or small group, but mass is also a limitation. An organization, no matter what it would like to do, can only do a small number of tasks at any one time. This is not something that better organization or "effective" communications can cure. The law of organization is concentration (Drucker, 1969).

The Pilot Cities are the organizational analogy to the "fleas" Drucker describes. The LEAA Pilot City innovation is "flea-ism." It has been created and is being sustained. Thus, at least in my mind, the innovation of the Pilot Projects has been in the field of public administration, not crime control per se.

In other words, the innovation has not resulted in new more effective projects to reduce burglary or other crime as much as it may have developed a way of organizing resources through which these projects might be discovered, designed, tested, implemented, demonstrated and transferred to other places.

The process may be more important than the projects. Reform of the criminal justice system seems to be in large part a political process. To reform criminal justice, we need to know more about political processes. Secondly, change in the criminal justice system, to be carried out, depends upon public administration. "Process" improvements may be requirements which need to be met before the "projects" will emerge, take root, and sustain themselves so as to provide better crime control.

Certainly, the gap between what we know about effective crime

control and the lesser degree with which we are able to put that knowledge to work in actual practice is so obvious as to be self-evident. This is certainly true of the efforts to improve the procedures of the administration of criminal justice.

The Model Community Correctional Program taught us ". . . given the most pessimistic outlook about the ability of the correctional client to change, there is clearly a great deal that can be done to help the system do what it is now doing more efficiently, less expensively, more humanely, and probably more effectively."[1]

Lewis (1971) sums it up ". . . one reason national policies sometimes do not have the desired effect is that adequate knowledge of the implementation processes they must go through where they ultimately have to have impact doesn't exist . . . national policies . . . (need) . . . to be constructed so as to have desired effects."[2] The Pilot City experience is providing some of the needed knowledge about these processes.

Based upon our experience so far, I believe we have some observations which might have important policy implications for the LEAA program. As I go out on this limb, I go by myself. These interpretations are offered primarily to illuminate what I think are a few of the key issues.

1. Institute for the Study of Crime and Delinquency, Model Community Correctional Program, Summary Report, Sacramento, California, 1969.

2. Lewis, Joseph H. "Policy Sciences and the Market," Urban Institute, D.C.

The basic questions are--How can the Federal Government influence state and local government and best assist them to upgrade law enforcement capabilities? How can national policies and programs be constructed so that they will have the desired impact and effect?

To find the answer to these questions implies that we have the knowledge of the steps and procedures which must take place for national policy to take hold at the local level. Further, it implies we know something about the administrative mechanisms which should be used. Unfortunately, we know too little in these areas.

There is a dilemma involved in establishing crime control as a national priority. Historically, the nation reacts strongly to centralized government involvement, especially in law enforcement which has long occupied the position as a bastion of local control This concern severely limits the options of federal policy makers.

The option which was selected appears to have been to choose the block grant concept as the vehicle for implementing federal policy, and an LEAA "layer cake" was constructed as the administrative mechanism for implementing that policy--Washington, D.C., LEAA Region, State Planning Agency, and local regional planning units.

This administrative organization, though its options were limited, appears to be a reasonable one and consistent with the state of the art in public administration; however, it falls short of meeting the requirements.

> The relationships between levels of government, with respect to domestic functioning, are not hierarchial. The model is well known not to be a layer cake as it was once popular to call it. Marble cake, implying sharing of functions and powers, was better but implies more sharply defined and perceivable boundaries to the shares than realism often permits. Lower levels of government are not simply caretakers and executors of policies and programs determined at higher levels. Government can affect but is not the arbiter of social costs and gains (Lewis, 1971).

The recent LEAA reorganization is an improvement in the LEAA "layer cake" in that it decentralizes operations of the LEAA to 10 regions throughout the United States. More importantly, it is evidence that a responsive evolution in administrative organization has occurred.

State planning agencies, and in many cases, regional planning units have been established as conduits for federal LEAA funds. In return, regional planning units and state planning agencies prepare comprehensive law enforcement plans which are returned through the "layer cake" through the same conduit. This arrangement is euphemistically referred to as the Federal-State-Local partnership.

Stanley Vanagunas, writing in Public Administration Review, observes:

> There are serious problems with State comprehensive criminal justice improvement planning, and these have had three planning periods to surface: 1969, 1970, 1971 . . . State Comprehensive Law Enforcement Plans, as called for by LEAA, have been largely meaningless as any kind of real blueprints for the systematic improvement of the criminal justice system of the states . . . the fault stems from the inherent lack of viability in the planning concept as promulgated by LEAA (Vanagunas, 1972).

This commentary is, in my mind, more a reflection of the state of the art of public administration than it is a criticism of LEAA or their local counterparts.

As Lewis (1971) points out, domestic issues are far more complex national priorities to address than is national security or the space program; issues which are external to the nation. In addition, national defense is the unquestioned prerogative of the Federal level of government. Policy, goals, objectives, and the administration of

many national programs are concentrated in the hands of relatively few people, largely within the executive branch of government at the federal level.

In contrast, addressing domestic issues "must be characterized as disaggregate, diffuse and compared to the national security affairs market, puny in resources. Goal setting is likewise complex, distributed, continuing. It is the essence of politics and the mass sum of private choice, not the uncluttered 'rational' design of a few charged with policy responsibility and free of 'interference'."

"This suggests . . . that when the public interest is high from sensed peril or has been stirred to heights by those who would claim its resources for a domestic purpose, the process of securing goal consensus and translation to agreed objectives will be at its most diffuse, vigorously political peak."

Since federal programs are vertically administered through the "layer cake" by function, at the local level the LEAA dollar conduit lays next to many others--HEW, HUD, etc. Who, by consensus, is responsible for the horizontal integration of funds and programs and the "comprehensive" plans which must be completed for the steward of each conduit.[3] It is too easy for an isolated federal official, who spends full time on crime control problems, to fall into a trap that all a big city mayor has to worry about is crime control. Trying to get an appointment with a big city mayor or looking at his stack of reading material sobers such thoughts. The impact of the dollars can be overestimated. In Santa Clara County, for example,

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3. The author should credit the Federal Government for creating Federal Regional Councils and for initiating other coordination mechanisms. For example, the annual arrangement is a Federal effort to provide this kind of horizontal integration and to provide continuity over fiscal year funding periods - this is progress.

annual expenditures for police, courts and corrections total over $50 million per year and have been increasing at about 10 percent per year. The total annual income from LEAA, including Pilot Program funds, amounts to less than half of the annual increase. With these funds we are to reduce crime and carve out a disproportionate amount of the time and attention of busy public officials?

"We have become accustomed to the applicability of the fable of the blind men and the elephant . . . . In more recent years, we have been increasingly brought to realize the strong and widespread interdependencies among the functions in society and the widespread indirect and secondary effects our attempted remedies can have. This suggests that it is not one but a tangle of elephants we would address. Our brief and simple description of the domestic policy decision universe suggests that a tangle of blind men addressing a tangle of elephants may be an appropriate figure overall (Lewis 1971)."

The "layer cake" method of organizing is inadequate to deal with the way the problem is organized. The public administration requirements for policy implementation must be better understood so the "process" can be developed which will produce the "projects". As a change agent, the question is what is the best leverage point to operate from? Should one locate in the executive branch of the Federal Government? At the LEAA Region? In a State Planning Agency? In a Regional Planning Unit?

"Where in the structure should the change agent stand? Next to whose ear and fountain pen, if he is an advisor; sitting at what controls, if he is an operator. There are not a small number of

points from which writs run to manage the domain (Lewis, 1971)."

If the change agent locates at the local level . . . "as things are now, except for a handful of cities and states, this is not where the money is to reward new excellence nor inclination to seek it out, nor the climate for the use of it (Lewis, 1971)."

I believe the Pilot Cities, as an LEAA strategy, address that most critical problem very directly.

The domestic issues then are far more complex national priorities to address. Even Federal policy makers with experience at AID or with the Peace Corp, though they have experience with local government kinds of problems, obtained that experience in programs which were external to the United States. To successfully address the domestic issues will require new organizational forms, new administrative methods, new forms of public administration. The phrase, "War on Crime" or "War on Poverty" are symptomatic of the vestiges of the tendency of the Federal government to administer a domestic program as if it were an external threat to the nation. Obviously, none of us want to make war on ourselves.

Perspective on the Pilot Cities Strategy--Parallel Crime Control Developments in the Private Sector

The Pilot Cities Program can be placed within a larger environment that serves as commentary on the "changing" change process in crime control policy making.

What is most significant about these developments is that most of them have occurred very rapidly starting perhaps 20 years ago and gaining momentum very rapidly during the past six years.

We have come a long way from the Prisoner Aid Societies. Many of these are still active, primarily in the mid-West and Eastern portions of the United States. They were the early pioneers in criminal justice reform.

For many years change was left to the professional associations; i.e., the American Correctional Association, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the American Bar Association. They represent examples of professional membership organizations which advocate changes through professional channels.

The number of people and the number and type of organizations which now interact around criminal justice research, policy formulation and implementation has changed radically--and the pace seems to be quickening. First, there are the "professionals," important leaders whose names are closely connected with universities or private non-profit organizations. They conduct criminal justice research; they write, and their organizations, though small, serve as intellectual centers for criminal justice reform. Next are the "providers,"

people who provide the funds for criminal justice studies and who support criminal justice research. These too have grown in number. The Ford Foundation has been a contributor for a long time and through the Police Foundation headed by Charles Rogovin, has substantially increased support for criminal justice research and demonstration. The Center For the Study of Crime and Delinquency, headed by Saleem Shah, at the National Institute of Mental Health, has supported significant work in the criminal justice area.

The most profound change has been in the numbers of professionals working for the LEAA program at the federal, state, and local level.

Third, are the "proponents," or officials representing units of local government. Though present in the past, they are more interested and more informed than ever before.

Lastly, there are the "profit makers," the many profit making companies which have been attracted to crime control as a market area. They, too, are making valuable contributions.

It is the interaction of the four--the professionals, the providers, the proponents, and the profit makers--that make up an infinitely intricate network of communication and exchange resulting in the formulation and implementation of crime control policy.

What follows is a quick review of what has happened in recent years:

The concern with the system as a whole has been a recent one. Significantly, it has been the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, which grew out of a professional membership organization, that first took an aggressive interest concerned with the whole field of criminal justice.

NCCD is an independent non-profit organization. It is governed by a Board of Trustees that is composed of more influential citizens each year and fewer professionals. The NCCD Citizens' Action Program established State Crime and Delinquency Councils in some 23 states. NCCD has a research center and a national information service.

On the academic front, recognition of the need for professional preparation in criminology is also relatively new. Until recently, criminology was taught as a course in Sociology Departments. The first School of Criminology was established at the University of California, Berkeley, about 20 years ago. It has a separate dean and faculty. Later, universities established Departments of Criminology, for example, the Florida State University has a Department of Criminology and Corrections. Both the School of Criminology at Berkeley and more recently, the School of Criminal Justice of the State University of New York at Albany under the leadership of Dean Myren, have been producing professionals specifically educated in advanced studies in criminology and criminal justice. The John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York should also be mentioned here as an institution specifically designed to prepare people for careers in criminal justice.

Within the last three years, there has been a very noticeable tendency for state colleges and community colleges to broaden the curriculum across the criminal justice system. Police Science departments at the junior college level in California have changed noticeably for example. Many have even changed their names to reflect this

changing emphasis.

There have also been a number of university based centers established to focus attention on part or all of the criminal justice system. Many of these are affiliated with law schools. The Ford Foundation has been quite active in providing supporting funds to get these centers started. Ford has provided funds to the Center on Administration of Criminal Justice, headed by Floyd Feeney at the University of California, Davis Law School; the Center for the Advancement of Criminal Justice, headed by James Vorenberg and Lloyd E. Ohlen at Harvard; the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice at the University of Chicago Law School, headed by Norval Morris and Hans Matick; the Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure at Georgetown University Law Center, headed by Sam Dash.

Other active university based centers include the Center for Study of Crime, Delinquency and Corrections at Carbondale, Illinois, under the direction of Charles Matthews; the Center for Studies in Crime and Criminal Law at the University of Pennsylvania, headed by Marvin Wolfgang; the Southeastern Correctional and Criminology Research Center at Florida State University, headed by Gordon P. Waldo, and the Youth Studies Center at the University of Southern California, headed by Alex McEachern. The Vera Foundation, headed by Herb Sturz, serves as a model in and of itself; it is not university based. It is a private non-profit organization closely connected with very highly regarded work toward reform in New York City. They have also received support from the Ford Foundation.

A number of other independent private non-profit organizations have been formed in recent years including our own American Justice Institute, headed by Richard A. McGee. AJI is distinct; first, because it is one of the relatively few institutes which is not university based; secondly, because the Board of Directors and the staff is composed of practitioners, most of whom have many years of practical experience in criminal justice, but who also have the academic qualifications normally found in persons associated with universities. The American Justice Institute, as an organization, represents a different kind of link between the academic community and operating criminal justice agencies in the field.

I have mentioned these organizations and these names intentionally. These are the men and the organizations who for the most part are the intellectual leaders of criminal justice reform. They are the thinkers. They have been conducting much of the research. These men formed the backbone of the content of the President's Crime Crommission publications. They are keynote speakers at important criminal justice conferences. Their names and their work appear in the professional journals, and they comprise the membership of many federal, state and local crime commissions. The group is still small enough that most of its members know one another. A highly complex but informal network of communication and exchange of thought exists to tie them together.

The number of people and the number of organizations is expanding rapidly. Private profit making organizations have sprung up, indirectly stimulated by LEAA funds. They bring many new disciplines

to the field: economics, political science, engineering, and particularly, people from aerospace with high technology skills, systems analysis, operations analysis. The private sector has adapted quickly to the shift in national priorities from national security and the space program to the new domestic priorities, including crime control. The early preoccupation with hardware was a vestige of past marketing approaches, I think, and again analogous to the "war on crime" approach more appropriate to methods used to approach external priorities rather than domestic ones. The successful profit making firms are making the needed adjustments so we see evolution in the private sector which has great momentum.

These four change agents, the professionals, the providers, the proponents and the profit makers, provide a growing pool of resources. If any trends are becoming clear, it seems as if the universities are no longer "cloistered," and that private non-profit and profit making organizations are moving into the community where crime can be dealt with at the local level. Significantly, because LEAA funding policies channel funds primarily to local government, the professionals, the private non-profit and profit making organizations are linking up with local government as a source of support rather than the Federal government. The relationships are varied, dispersed; new organizational arrangements are developing. It is too soon to tell whether these will meet the requirement of flea-ism --whether they will serve to complement or thwart the more traditional organizational mechanisms that have been established to achieve crime control.

There are parallel developments in government programs in other domestic priority areas; the HUD-HEW Urban Observatories appear to be a university based counterpart of the Pilot Cities Program. The Department of Housing and Urban Development and the United States Office of Education in the Department of Health have collaborated in establishing several United States cities as Urban Observatories. The program is directed by the National League of Cities. The program appears to be a successful mechanism through which city administration and universities can establish practical problem-oriented working relationships.

This trend will probably continue but also include similar arrangements with private non-profit groups and profit making organizations as well.

The preparation of people specifically trained to conduct research in criminal justice has also changed. The training ground has moved from Sociology Departments and Law Schools, to specialized Schools of Criminology. Centers affiliated with universities now serve as a practical training ground.

There are more recent indications that criminal justice centers will also develop alongside Schools of Public Administration. A program is currently under development at the University of Southern California for example. This is a most significant development, for it casts the job of criminal justice reform in terms of an analysis and definition of the process through which change needs to be achieved--on political science, on problems in public administration, and on public policy analysis. It gets at the issues of implementation.

In conclusion, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the attachment. Each of the pilot project directors has a commitment to technology transfer. The names of key contacts at each pilot, at the LEAA Region, and at the National Institute, are provided in the appendix. These people are willing to host visitors and, within the limitations of their budgets, they are willing to disseminate published material. They are also available for telephone contacts. On behalf of the pilot project directors, I would like to extend our invitation to you to make use of the Pilot Cities as a resource.

Notes to Table - "Guide To LEAA's Pilot Cities and Their Technology Transfer and Dissemination Resources"

1. Note that all of the Pilots are listed in the order of initial grant award date and that they have varying lengths of project experience. The first five Pilot Program Directors listed participated in the workshop, "The Pilot Cities Experience."

2. The LEAA Region contact which has been listed is the person who has had the most contact with the Pilot City and is most familiar with the program. In most cases, the National Institute contact is the person who was responsible for initiating the Pilot and for early contacts in the host community.

3. All of the Pilots view their technology transfer and dissemination functions as important. While Pilot Project personnel are not available to travel from the Project site for consultation, person to person contact on-site is encouraged. Telephone contact and correspondence provide other tehcnology transfer vehicles.

4. Dissemination of publications is limited. Each Pilot produces dissemination documents in quantity within budgetary limitations. We rely on the NILECJ Technology Transfer Division for National dissemination. Some Pilots reserve the right to request reimbursement of costs of reproducing dissemination materials.

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ATTACHMENT

GUIDE TO LEAA'S PILOT CITIES AND THEIR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND DISSEMINATION RESOURCES

Location of Project	San Jose, California	Dayton, Ohio	Charlotte, North Carolina
Official Project Title:	Santa Clara Criminal Justice Pilot Program	Dayton/Montgomery County Pilot Cities Program	Mecklenberg Criminal Justice Pilot Program
Grantee Organization:	American Justice Institute, Sacramento	Community Research, Inc., Dayton, Ohio	Institute of Government University of North Carolina
Project Director: Address of Project:	Robert C. Cushman 106 East Gish Road San Jose, California 95112	John L. Scroggins Room 444, 333 W. 1st Street Dayton, Ohio 45402	Doug Gill Institute of Government University of North Carolina P. O. Box 990 Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Telephone:	(408)299-2087	(513)224-9656	(919)933-1304 or (704)334-1017
Grant No.	NI-70-023; 72-NI-09-0001	NI-70-094; NI-72-05003	NI-71-020
Date of Grant Award:	May 7, 1970	July 1970	January 1, 1970
LEAA Region Contact:	Gwen Monroe Region IX, LEAA (415)697-4046	James Bain, Jr. Region V, LEAA (312)353-1203	Carol Blair Region III, LEAA (404)526-3556
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice contact	David Powell (202)382-6001	Paul Cascarano Richard Linster (202)382-6001	Richard Linster (202)382-6001
Willing to host visitors for technology transfer purposes?	Yes	Yes	Yes
List of publications available?	Yes	Yes	Yes

GUIDE TO LEAA'S PILOT CITIES AND THEIR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND DISSEMINATION RESOURCES

Location of Project:	Albuquerque, New Mexico	Norfolk, Nirginia	Omaha, Nebraska
Official Project Title:	University of New Mexico Criminal Justice Pilot Program	Norfolk Metropolitan Area Criminal Justice Research Project	Omaha-Douglas County Metropolitan Criminal Justice Center Program
Grantee Organization:	University of New Mexico	College of William and Mary Williamsburg, Virginia	University of Nebraska at Omaha
Project Director: Address of Project:	William Partridge Institute for Social Research & Development University of New Mexico Albuquerque, New Mexico 87106	Warren Heemann (Acting Director) College of William and Mary Williamsburg, Virginia 23185	Malcolm E. MacDonald 235 Aquilla Court Room 1615 Howard Omaha, Nebraska 68102
Telephone:	(505)277-3422	(703)229-3000, Ext. 391	(402)345-9247
Grant No.	NI-71-050G	NI-72-005-G	NI-72-004-G
Date of Grant Award:	February 15, 1971	September 7, 1971	September 8, 1971
LEAA Region Contact:	Ron Cook Region VI, LEAA (214)749-2958	Charles Rinkevich Region III, LEAA (215)597-9440	Marc Dreyer Region VII, LEAA (816)374-4503
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Contact:	David Powell (202)382-6001	Richard Linster (202)382-6001	Walter R. Burkhart (202)382-6001
Willing to host visitors for technology transfer purposes?	Yes	Yes	Yes
List of publications available?	Yes	Yes	Yes

GUIDE TO LEAA'S PILOT CITIES AND THEIR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND DISSEMINATION RESOURCES

Location of Project	DesMoines, Iowa	Rochester, New York
Official Project Title:	DesMoines/Polk County Metropolitan Criminal Justice Center Program	Rochester Metropolitan Area Pilot City Project
Grantee Organization:	Drake University DesMoines, Iowa	
Project Director: Address of Project:	W. J. Durrenberger Drake University 2700 University Avenue DesMoines, Iowa 50311	
Telephone:	(515)271-3861	
Grant No.	NI-72-003-G	
Date of Grant Award:	September 8, 1971	
LEAA Region Contact	Sheila Perlaky Region VII, LESS (816)374-4501	Bernadette McEvvady Region II, LEAA (212)264-8987
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Contact	Paul Cascarano (202)382-6001	
Willing to host visitors for technology transfer purposes?	Yes	Yes
List of publications available?	None at present.	None at present.

THE QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF IMPROVEMENT NEEDS:
THE ALBUQUERQUE PILOT CITIES EXPERIENCE

William R. Partridge, Director
Fred W. Koehne, Assistant Director
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Institute for Social Research and Development
The University of New Mexico

Introduction

This paper presents the methodology employed and the results of an initial research project aimed at the following:

- Definition of basic criminal justice system objectives.

- Definition of relative importance of objectives.

- Assessment of the high priority needs for improved methods of achieving objectives.

- Definition and assessment of the relative importance of basic criminal justice system functional activities.

Planning is often based on the opinions of a few agency professionals and planners. In some instances, the relatively small group of people allowed personal bias to impact on planning results. This project was undertaken to provide a framework within which planning for system-wide improvement would reflect a response to high priority needs defined from a broader viewpoint. The project involved solicitation of the opinion of approximately 100 members of the community-at-large and professionals within the criminal justice system.

The purpose of this project was to apply an orderly method of soliciting and correlating the opinions of people in regard to criminal justice improvement needs. The results we intended for use as but one of the tools necessary to effective planning. There is no pretense of absolute definitions as might be implied by quantification. The results should be interpreted only as indicators of areas of high priority needs.

The methodology and results associated with this effort are summarized in subsequent sections.

Basic Criminal Justice System Objectives

The Criminal Justice Program staff developed a listing which reflected the fundamental objectives of a criminal justice system. This listing was reviewed with qualified professionals and refined. The following thirteen objectives were the result of this effort:

1. Prevent crime through community action which minimizes the motivation and opportunity for criminal acts.

2. Deter crime by increasing the probability of apprehending the criminal.

3. Ensure through community participation and other means of public awareness of criminal justice problems and operations.

4. Ensure that the law conforms to community norms and is enforceable.

5. Recognizing that a small percentage of persons arrested are brought to trial, establish policies and controls governing the selection of alternatives to trial.

6. Ensure humane treatment of all persons by criminal-justice personnel.

7. Maximize the number of offenders who are brought to trial.

8. Increase the rate of convictions of guilty persons for offenses committed.

9. Provide quality legal representation for all defendants.

10. Provide defendants a speedy trial.

11. Assure consistent sentencing practices appropriate to the crime and the offender.

12. Protect the community by detention of dangerous offenders.

13. Reduce the re-entry of offenders into the criminal-justice system by providing appropriate community based treatment of non-dangerous offenders, rehabilitating incarcerated offenders, and providing constructive supervision of probationers and parolees.

Relative Importance of Objectives

Representatives of the community and criminal justice agencies were asked to provide their assessment of the importance of the criminal justice system objectives. The method used involved ranking the objectives from 1 through 13 in a manner which reflected their opinion of the relative importance of each objective. The consensus is presented below:

1. Prevent crime through community action which minimizes the motivation and opportunity for criminal acts.

2. Reduce the re-entry of offenders into the criminal justice system by providing appropriate community based treatment of non-dangerous offenders, rehabilitating incarcerated offenders, and providing constructive supervision of probationers and parolees.

3. Ensure through community participation and other

means a public awareness of criminal-justice problems and operations.

4. Deter crime by increasing the probability of apprehending the criminal.

5. Provide defendants a speedy trial.

6. Ensure humane treatment of all persons by criminal-justice personnel.

7. Ensure that the law conforms to community norms and is inforceable.

8. Provide quality legal representation for all defendants.

9. Assure consistent sentencing practices appropriate to the crime and the offender.

10. Recognizing that a small percentage of persons arrested are brought to trial, establish policies and controls governing the selection of alternatives to trial.

11. Protect the community by detention of dangerous offenders.

12. Increase the rate of convictions of guilty persons for offenses committed.

13. Maximize the number of offenders who are brought to trial.

Assessment of High Priority Needs for Improved Methods of Achieving Objectives

It cannot be assumed that the relative importance of objectives correlates directly with the need for improvement. A system objective may be very high in relative importance, but it might currently be accomplished in a satisfactory manner. Therefore, the community and the criminal justice representatives were asked to assess the need for improvement in the achievement of system objectives.

The method used for this assessment was the distribution of 100 points among the thirteen objectives. The consensus is presented below:

		Number
1.	Reduce the reentry of offenders into the criminal justice system by providing appropriate community-based treatment of non-dangerous offenders, rehabilitating incarcerated offenders, and providing constructive supervision of probationers and parolees.	19
2.	Prevent crime through community action that minimizes the motivation and opportunity for criminal acts.	17
3.	Deter crime by increasing the probability of apprehending the criminal.	11
4.	Provide defendants a speedy trial.	8
5.	Ensure through community participation and other means a public awareness of criminal justice problems and operations.	8
6.	Provide quality legal representation for all defendants.	7
7.	Ensure humane treatment of all persons by criminal justice personnel.	6
8.	Protect the community by detention of dangerous offenders.	5
9.	Ensure that the law conforms to community norms and is enforceable.	4
10.	Recognizing that a small percentage of persons arrested are brought to trial, establish policies and controls governing the selection of alternatives to trial.	4
11.	Assure consistent sentencing practices appropriate to the crime and the offender.	4
12.	Maximize the number of offenders who are brought to trial.	4
13.	Increase the rate of convictions of quilty persons for offenses committed.	3
		100

Relative Importance of Basic Criminal Justice System Functional Activities

Objectives are achieved through the effective action of people. Thus, if methods of improvement are to be identified, it is necessary to define functional system activities, relate them to system objectives, and assess their contribution to achievement of the objectives.

A list of 43 basic criminal justice activities was developed. The next step was to determine which of the activities relate significantly to each of the thirteen objectives. When this was completed, criminal justice agency professionals were asked to assess the relative contribution of the listed activities. This was accomplished by assigning 100 points among the listed activities associated with each objective. The results of this effort are presented below:

OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES

Objective 1: Prevent crime through community action that minimizes the motivation and opportunity for criminal acts.

Activities

	Activity Contribution Weights
1. Provision of alternatives to criminal motivation through employment, educational, medical, and social welfare programs	39
2. Early identification and treatment of potential offenders	23
3. Reducing the profit incentive for criminal acts	14
4. Motivation of the public to positively participate in the reduction of crime (informants or witnesses)	13
5. Reducing opportunity by making the targets of criminal acts less vulnerable	11
	100

Objective 2: Deter crime by increasing the probability of apprehending the criminal.

Activities

	Activity Contribution Weights
1. Preventive and tactical police patrol	20
2. Motivate the public to positively participate in the reduction of crime (informant or witness)	13
3. Reduction of opportunity by making the targets of criminal acts less vulnerable	13
4. Intelligence gathering and tactical investigation	11
5. Cooperation among the agencies of criminal justice at all levels of jurisdiction and operation	10
6. Specialized investigation of crimes involving juveniles	8
7. Response to calls for police service and preliminary investigations	7
8. Follow-up investigation of reported crime	7
9. Utilization of scientific aids to investigation and evidence analysis	7
10. Traffic control and enforcement	4
	100

Objective 3: Ensure through community participation, and other means, a public awareness of criminal justice problems and operations.

Activities

	Activity Contribution Weights
1. Motivation of the public to positively participate in community based programs aimed at prevention and rehabilitation	37
2. Response to calls for police service and preliminary investigation	17

	Activity Contribution Weights
3. Specialized investigation of crimes involving juveniles	16
4. Public information and community relations programs	16
5. Follow-up investigation of reported crime	14
	100

Objective 4: Ensure that the law conforms to community norms and is enforceable

Activities

1. Continuing legislative review of criminal law	36
2. Assessment of the community attitudes, cost, and relative benefits related to enforcement of selected criminal statutes	30
3. Screening, investigation, and charging by the prosecutor	21
4. Appeal processing	13
	100

Objective 5: Recognizing that a small percentage of persons arrested are brought to trial, establish policies and controls governing the selection of alternatives to trial.

Activities

1. Screening investigation and charging by the prosecutor	52
2. Juvenile court intake evaluation of referrals	48
	100

74

Objective 6: Ensure humane treatment of all persons by criminal justice personnel

	Activity Contribution Weights

Activities

1. Supervision of probationers and/or parolees	19
2. Preventive and tactical police patrol	13
3. Processing of complaints and review of general conduct of criminal justice personnel	10
4. Supervision and control of incarcerated offenders	9
5. Pretrial release (Bond and ROR)	9
6. Response to calls for police service and preliminary investigation	7
7. Specialized investigation of crimes involving juveniles	7
8. Screening, investigation, and charging by prosecutor	6
9. Maintain privacy of information concerning reformed offenders so as to avoid stigmatizing the individuals	5
10. Follow-up investigation of reported crime	5
11. Restoration of full citizenship through the granting of pardon	3
12. Traffic control and enforcement	3
13. Monitoring and control of defendants, witnesses, jurors, and physical evidence	2
14. Plea negotiation	2
	100

Objective 7: Maximize the number of offenders who are brought to trial.

Activities

1. Training of law enforcement personnel in criminal law	14

75

2. Motivation of the public to positively participate in the reduction of crime — 12

3. Screening investigation and charging by prosecutor — 12

4. Cooperation among agencies of criminal justice at all levels of jurisdiction and operation — 8

5. Continuing legislative review of criminal law — 8

6. Preventive and tactical police control — 7

7. Intelligence gathering and tactical investigation — 7

8. Specialized investigation of crimes involving juveniles — 7

9. Response to calls for police service and preliminary investigation — 6

10. Utilization of scientific aids to investigation and evidence analysis — 6

11. Follow-up investigation of reported crime — 5

12. Juvenile court intake evaluation of referrals — 5

13. Traffic control and enforcement — 3

100

Objective 8: Increase the rate of convictions of guilty persons for offenses committed.

Activities

1. Trial procedure and tactics — 13

2. Motivation of the public to positively participate in the reduction of crime (informants or witnesses) — 13

3. Utilization of scientific aids to investigation and evidence analysis — 12

4. Screening investigation and charging by prosecutor — 10

5. Follow-up investigation of reported crime — 9

6. Juvenile court intake evaluation and referrals — 9

7. Grand jury or preliminary hearing — 9

8. Indictment or filing of criminal information — 7

9. Intelligence gathering and tactical investigation — 5

10. Plea negotiation — 5

11. Specialized investigation of crimes involving juveniles — 4

12. Monitoring and control of defendants, witnesses, jurors, and physical evidence — 4

100

Objective 9: Provide quality legal representation for all defendants.

Activities

1. Appointment of counsel in all phases of the process — 49

2. Juvenile court intake evaluation of referrals — 26

3. Provide the services and facilities needed to establish effective defense (investigators, etc.) — 25

100

Objective 10: Provide defendants a speedy trial.

Activities

1. Case calendaring — 21

2. Appointment of counsel in all phases of the process — 18

	Activity Contribution Weights
3. Trial procedure and tactics	17
4. Arraignments	12
5. Juvenile court intake evaluation of referrals	7
6. Screening investigation and charging by prosecutor	7
7. Monitoring and control of defendants, witnesses, jurors, and physical evidence	7
8. Pretrial release (Bond and ROR)	6
9. Plea negotiation	5
	100

Objective 11: Assure consistent sentencing practices appropriate to the crime and the offender.

Activities

	Activity Contribution Weights
1. Presentencing investigation and reporting	28
2. Sentencing	16
3. Verdict	15
4. Trial procedure and tactics	14
5. Monitoring and control of defendants, witnesses, jurors, and physical evidence	11
6. Plea negotiation	8
7. Appeal processing	8
	100

Objective 12: Protect the community by detention of dangerous offenders.

Activities

1. Sentencing	18

	Activity Contribution Weights
2. Supervision of probationers and/or parolees	12
3. Presentencing investigation and reporting	10
4. Pretrial release (Bond and ROR)	9
5. Plea negotiation	8
6. Intake and classification of sentenced prisoners	8
7. Decision to grant parole	8
8. Juvenile court intake evaluation of referrals	6
9. Screening investigation and charging by prosecutor	6
10. Supervision and control of incarcerated offenders	6
11. Physical arrest and/or issuance of citation	5
12. Appeal processing	4
	100

Objective 13: Reduce the reentry of offenders into the criminal justice system by providing appropriate community-based treatment of non-dangerous offenders, rehabilitating incarcerated offenders, and providing constructive supervision of probationers and parolees.

Activities

	Activity Contribution Weights
1. Counseling and rehabilitative programs for probationers and/or parolees	18
2. Prisoner rehabilitation programs	17
3. Supervision of probationers and/or parolees	14
4. Sentencing	10
5. Juvenile court intake evaluation of referrals	8

	Activity Contribution Weights
6. Presentencing investigation and reporting	8
7. Intake and classification of sentenced prisoners	6
8. Supervision and control of incarcerated offenders	6
9. Maintain privacy of information concerning reformed offenders so as to avoid stigmatizing the individuals	5
10. Decision to grant parole	5
11. Restoration of full citizenship through granting of pardon	3
	100

The next step in the process was to develop an overall index of the importance of functional activity to program improvement. This was accomplished through a "weighted matrix" procedure described below.

It is noted that weights adding to 100 were used in discussions with the participants in this assessment, since experience has shown that the general public finds it easier to work with the percentage concept. Computation requires decimal fractions adding to 1.

1. Each of the thirteen system-wide objectives was subjectively weighted as to its importance relative to the other objectives in such a way that the total of the weights of all of the objectives add up to 1.

Example: If two objectives are assessed, and the second is felt to be somewhat more important than the first, these might be reasonable weights:

		Objective Weight
Objective	1	.40
Objective	2	.60
	Total	1.00

2. Each of the forty-three major system activities was rated subjectively as to its relative contribution to the accomplishment of each of the objectives. Again the rule was used that the total of the ratings of all of the activities in supporting any one objective must equal 1.

Example: This example uses the objectives and objective weights of the previous example and assumes that three activities are necessary to achieve the objectives. All three activities contribute about equally to Objective 1, but activity C is slightly less important to achieving Objective 1 than is A or B. Activity B is much more important in the achievement of Objective 2 than either A or C.

		Objectives	
		I	II
Objective Weights--		.40	.60
Activities	A	.35	.15
	B	.35	.70
	C	.30	.15
Totals		1.00	1.00

3. A relative weight for each activity can than be calculated by summing up, for each activity, the products of the activity contribution to each objective multiplied by the weight of the objective.

Example: Using the sample weights of paragraph 2 above, the weights of Activities A, B, and C can be computed as follows:

	Objective 1	Objective 2	Resulting Activity Weight
Activity A weight =	.35 x .40 +	.15 x .60 =	.23
Activity B weight =	.35 x .40 +	.70 x .60 =	.56
Activity C weight =	.30 x .40 +	.15 x .60 =	.21
Total (this provides a check for computation errors)		=	1.00

The result of this procedure is presented in the listing presented below. For ease of understanding, the decimal points were moved so that the listing can be considered in terms of percentages.

IMPROVEMENT PRIORITY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACTIVITIES

		Importance Weighting
1.	Motivation of the public to positively participate in the reduction of crime (informants or witnesses)	7.35
2.	Screening investigation and charging by the prosecutor	6.13
3.	Provision of alternatives to criminal motivation through employment, educational, medical, and social welfare program	6.04
4.	Juvenile court intake evaluation of referrals	5.63
5.	Supervision of probationers and/or parolees	5.02
6.	Appointment of counsel in all phases of the process	4.72
7.	Sentencing	4.27
8.	Early identification and treatment of potential offenders	3.60
9.	Counseling and rehabilitative programs for probationers	3.58
10.	Reduction of opportunity by making the targets of criminal acts less vulnerable	3.17
11.	Preventive and tactical police patrol	3.17
12.	Presentencing investigation and reporting	3.13
13.	Prisoner rehabilitation programs	3.02
14.	Specialized investigation of crimes involving juveniles	2.84
15.	Response to calls for police service and preliminary investigation	2.77
16.	Follow-up investigation of reported crime	2.68

		Importance Weighting
17.	Trial procedure and tactics	2.42
18.	Reduction of the profit incentive for criminal acts	2.14
19.	Continuing legislative review of criminal law	1.94
20.	Supervision and control of incarcerated offenders	1.83
21.	Case calendaring	1.76
22.	Provide the services and facilities needed to establish effective defense (investigators, etc.)	1.71
23.	Intelligence gathering and tactical investigation	1.60
24.	Utilization of scientific aids to investigation and evidence analysis	1.55
25.	Intake and classification of sentenced prisoners	1.52
26.	Plea negotiation	1.48
27.	Cooperation among the agencies of criminal justice at all levels of jurisdiction and operation	1.45
28.	Pretrial release (Bond and ROR)	1.44
29.	Assessment of the community attitudes, cost, and relative benefits related to enforcement of selected criminal statues	1.37
30.	Public information and community relations programs	1.29
31.	Decision to grant parole	1.24
32.	Monitoring and control of defendants, witnesses, jurors, and physical evidence	1.17
33.	Maintain privacy of information concerning reformed offenders so as to avoid stigmatizing the individuals	1.12
34.	Appeal processing	1.10
35.	Arraignments	.85
36.	Restoration of full citizenship through granting of pardon	.69

		Importance Weighting
37.	Traffic control and enforcement	.69
38.	Verdict	.59
39.	Processing of complaints and review of general conduct of criminal justice personnel	.55
40.	Training of law enforcement personnel in criminal law	.54
41.	Grand jury or preliminary hearing	.33
42.	Indictment or filing of criminal information	.26
43.	Physical arrest and/or issuance of citation	.25
		100.00

Conclusion

The above results suggest a methodology and the outcome of its use in the quantitative assessment of criminal justice priorities. While the rankings and weighting will vary in different geographical areas, we suggest the procedure as a useful one to establish more rational grounds for establishing funding and activity priorities. In our case, this method has moved us to place a greater emphasis on the public's role in the criminal justice system and the development of alternatives to community and institutional placement.

AMERICA'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM--A DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS

Arthur J. Bilek
Chairman, Illinois Law Enforcement Commission

Introduction, The Criminal Justice System--What Can We Expect Of It?

The criminal justice system in America exists in an atmosphere of pervasive criticism. We have been deluged with books, magazine articles, public statements, and newspaper stories about how poorly it operates. The criminal justice system has been blamed for the rising crime rates, especially in our cities and excoriated for its utter failure to control the crime problem in our nation.

In a recent article, Sigurdson, McCarter and McEachern (1971) pointed out that from both a theoretical and a practical point of view, a system of criminal justice does not exist in the United States at this time. A report issued last month by the American Bar Association Special Committee on Crime Prevention and Control entitled New Perspectives on Urban Crime (1972, p. 1) refers to a "non-system" of criminal justice.

This criticism raises several important questions:

First, what can we reasonably expect the criminal justice system to do?

Second, since it is generally acknowledged on all sides that the criminal justice system's ineffective and inefficient operation

exacerbates the problems of high crime urban areas, what are
the prime causes of this inefficiency and how can they be
remedied?

Third, what steps are being taken or sought to be taken by each
component of the criminal justice system; namely, the police,
the prosecutors, defense counsel, the courts and corrections,
to improve the quality of justice in the system?

Limitation of the System

It is natural for the public in this moment of crime crisis to
turn to the criminal justice agencies to solve the problem. The Mayor
of Detroit has said that crime is the number one problem in the urban
areas. Each year over five million major offenses are reported to the
police. Vandalism, the threshold of the criminal career, has reached
a point in which the damage to school buildings alone now totals one
hundred million dollars a year. Crime losses to American business
operations exceed fifteen billion dollars a year.

Crime control is clearly a very complex problem. For one thing,
crime itself has numerous meanings. Crime, to the vast majority of
people, means violent crime, or "street crime," such as murder, assault,
rape, robbery, and mugging. This kind of crime is the type people
fear most today. However, there are also so-called "white collor
crimes"--tax evasion, price fixing, employee theft, swindling, and
consumer fraud, among other examples. In addition, there are sensa-
tional crimes, such as organized crime, revolutionary and terrorist
acts, corruption in public office, and violation of health and safety

CONTINUED

1 OF 3

exacerbates the problems of high crime urban areas, what are the prime causes of this inefficiency and how can they be remedied?

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regulations. Finally, there is conduct categorized by some as immoral, but subject to criminal sanction in many states--gambling, prostitution, alcohol and drug abuse, profanity, fornication and obscenity.

The criminal justice system itself has become a giant enterprise with over 46,000 separate agencies on the city, county and state level. This total includes about 25,000 police and sheriffs departments, 13,000 courts, and 7,600 corrections agencies (U.S. Department of Justice, 1970A). Well over eight and a half billion dollars are annually expended to operate the system and pay its 750,000 employees (U.S. Department of Justice, 1970B).

But, it is totally unrealistic to charge this massive albeit fragmented criminal justice system with the responsibility for controlling and dealing with all types of criminal behavior. In the first place, the criminal justice system does not impact the diverse social, economic, and psychological factors which motivate people to commit criminal acts. Secondly, fear of punishment for crime is generally highly overestimated as a deterrent to criminal behavior.

There is no evidence that those who fear punishment most are the so-called "white-collar criminals" who are often persons of position and responsibility.

In contrast to a fear of punishment, public exposure and condemnation of their crimes may result in personal disgrace and suffering to their families. It is reasonable to assume that an effective system of criminal justice might operate as a deterrent to those predisposed to commit "white-collar crime."

But, what of the person who commits a violent crime in the streets?

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A typical profile of such a criminal is that of a young, poor Black man who is unskilled and uneducated, a slum area resident of a large urban center, often addicted to, or at least using, narcotics with little or no family and lacking in roots and a feeling of responsibility to the community in which he lives. He is a person who has nothing by contemporary cultural standards and is woefully untrained in the skills, which would enable him to live by legitimate means.

The criminal justice system does not control or even affect the environmental factors, which significantly cultivate and contribute to this type of criminal. The threat of criminal sanction alone is not a significant deterrent to the person who has little to lose by violating the laws. Even if the police were to saturate a high-crime area with law enforcement personnel, unless the community removes the cause and the sustaining environment of this form of criminal conduct, at best, there will be increased arrests, a temporary suppression of crime, and a dispersion of potential criminals to other areas where they may pursue their victims with less risk of apprehension. To attempt to control crime in this manner is patently a case of treating the symptoms, but not the disease.

This is not to say that the criminal justice system is completely helpless in controlling street crime. It can be an important factor in that control, but it can never be and should never be the only factor. The controlling factor is a national commitment to eliminate in America's major cities the socio-economic ills, which are the genesis and support the breeding ground for street crime.

The Proper Role of the System in Crime Control

The criminal justice system deserves criticism, not for failing to accomplish what it alone can never do, but for failing to do what it can, and should do, in improving control of crime. It must also bear strong criticism for failing to speak out pointedly on the issue of what anti-social phenomena are within its parameters of control and what social problems are beyond its realm. County prosecutors often publicly announce a war on street crime but rarely, if ever, do we hear the local police chief respond that winning such a battle is beyond his agency's capabilities.

An effective criminal justice system could accomplish the following things:

First, it could, with reasonable certainty, prevent and deter some types of crime and identify and apprehend certain classes of criminals.

Second, it could insure that legally proper charges are placed against persons apprehended and that their guilt or innocence be realistically determined on the basis of such charges.

Third, it could insure that the accused is brought to a fair and just trial with reasonable promptness, but without compromising his right to sufficiently prepare the defense.

Fourth, it could finally "bite the bullet" and demand that the punishment factor of sentencing be equitably and rationally dispensed for all defendants and that the correction period not be neutralized or corrupted by combining the almost mutually exclusive concepts of punishing and correcting.

Why the System is Faltering

It is painfully and tragically apparent that the criminal justice system is seriously failing in all of these appropriate and realistic objectives, especially in America's metropolitan areas. Police

apprehend only a minuscule percentage of serious law violators. The vast majority of crimes are never solved. Significant numbers of those arrested are released or discharged for one reason or another prior to, during or at the completion of trial. The majority of the defendants remaining are permitted to plead guilty to lesser offenses than their original charge, to plead guilty to their stated charges in return for lenient sentencing, or sometimes to plead guilty to offenses that they have never committed. Overburdened prosecutors and courts are totally and completely unable to provide trials for the volume of pending cases. The negotiated plea thus becomes the escape route from an unmanageable case load even though this technique produces contempt for the entire criminal justice system by the defendant, his family, the public, and even the members of the criminal justice system itself (ABA, 1972).

Administrative inadequacies and inefficiencies and political boondoggling commonly render our courts incapable of processing the cases coming before them with reasonable dispatch. This results in an inordinate delay between the apprehension of the offender and the determination of his guilt or innocence. It must be noted, however, that in those states, such as Illinois, with minimum trial dates rules, it is the defendant and defense attorney who must bear the brunt of criticism for the delay. The criminal justice system cannot effectively deter crime unless the commission of it is followed by swift apprehension, adjudication, and punishment.

Jails alone, of which there are over 4,000, on a given day hold 153,000 adults and almost 8,000 juveniles. Only a handful of jails in the entire country engage in any type of program or service involving rehabilitation and 52 percent of these inmates are awaiting trials (U.S. Department of Justice, 1970C).

In the mammoth Cook County jail with its 5,300 inmates, over 65 percent are not sentenced but are awaiting trial or arraignment. This incarceration for lack of bail has a dangerous statistical reality. A study of 900 cases in Manhattan revealed that these who stay in jail for lack of bail are much more often convicted, go to prison more often, and get longer prison sentences than those who make bail. A first offender who does not make bail is three times as likely to be convicted and twice as likely to go to prison as a defendant who is free on bail (New York Times, 1972).

Finally, all too frequently, because of public apathy and lack of resources, the penitentiary inmate receives only meager or token rehabilitative help. Consequently, he serves his sentence in idleness and bitterness and returns to society as an angry and resentful person. To deny that to this day prisoners are brutally subjected to violence, intimidation and sexual assault in almost every state in America is to become a co-conspirator with the sheriffs, wardens, and guards who do not prevent such incidents and the savage inmates that perpetuate the acts. Almost as brutalizing and dehumanizing is the continuation beyond any good reason of the antiquated disciplinary practices and officious, overharsh regulations that are the operational cornerstones of jails and prisons across the land.

Offenders put on probation or parole, also receive little in the way of meaningful help and supervision. Most probation officers,

while well-meaning, have almost no professional education, or train-
ing. Some probation officers carry caseloads of over three hundred
offenders. The modern-day management concepts of professional super-
vision of employees, long-range planning, research and development,
and personnel training are all but non-existent in probation and parole
agencies.

These deficiencies and ills are only a few of the reasons why the
criminal justice system performs as poorly as it does and why it is
held in such low contempt in America and elsewhere. But, more perva-
sive than these failings are two basic and crippling defects.

(1) Lack of coordination

First, the criminal justice system is woefully lacking in co-
ordination. All three branches of government play vital, significant,
and meaningful roles in this system. The state legislature defines
the conduct which society deems criminal, creates the agencies de-
signed to deal with the anti-social conduct, and prescribes the sanc-
tion or range of sanctions applicable to it. Agencies of the execu-
tive branches of city, county, and state government are charged with
apprehending, prosecuting, and correcting persons who violate the
criminal law. The judicial branch has the responsibility of deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of the accused, selecting a punishment,
and exercising supervisory authority over persons on probation. While
it is clearly neither an appropriate nor a desirable function to be
burdening still further the extremely vital and sensitive adjudica-
tion process, the administration of probation is still much debated
and zealously guarded by the judiciary.

Separation of powers in the criminal justice system came about
on the theory that it provided the requisite machinery for the protec-
tion of society from criminal acts, while providing a safeguard
against abuse of governmental power. However, the price of protecting
individual rights is an inherent consequential inefficiency in the
system.

A criminal justice system cannot be completely efficient except,
perhaps, in a totalitarian society. However, if the various components
of the system were better coordinated, it would operate with far
greater effectiveness and efficiency and success and respect than it
does at the present time.

The criminal justice system is fragmented into a number of totally
independent components—the police, detention, the prosecutor, the
defense counsel, the courts probation corrections and parole. Each
operates under the pressure of proving performance in its assigned
task. As a result, the overall objectives of the criminal justice
system are obscured by each agency's competitive efforts to demon-
strate real or statistical success. Police departments respond to
growing citizen concern over rising crime by increasing arrests. This
results in more arrests being made on questionable bases, which in
turn, reduces the possibility of obtaining convictions. Prosecutors
and courts seek to relieve their concomitant heavy case loads by accept-
ing reductions and dispositions of serious criminal charges which do
not, either in the short or long run, serve the ends of justice. De-
fense counsel observing this faltering system manipulates it so as to
delay as long as possible the day of adjudication for clients who face

a strong prosecution. Finally, corrections personnel are split into two groups, one defensively attempting to maintain discipline and detention through force and regulations and the other fighting frustratingly to obtain and develop resources, programs, and opportunities for the rehabilitation of their clients.

As a result, we all too often see legislators, policemen, prosecutors, judges and corrections personnel angrily pointing a finger at one another as being primarily responsible for the sorry state of the criminal justice system. This individualistic, antagonistic approach besides being totally non-productive also completely misses the point. All members and components equally share the responsibility for the failure of the system. Attempts to fix degrees of blame are a waste of time and energies in a situation and at a moment in which there is no time to waste.

The time has come and, in fact, is long overdue, for a commitment to be made by all components of the criminal justice system to improve, not only liaison and communication, but coordinated working relationships with each other, both at the operational and at the administrative levels. This can be accomplished without sacrificing the essential independence of these agencies. By such action, the nation's criminal justice mechanism could be converted at all levels from a diffused group of fragmented agencies, each acting independently and without regard for each other, into a unified system in which they can act on a coordinated basis to achieve the two-fold common goals of crime reduction and improvement of the quality of justice. One highly meritorious suggestion that has been made to convert the badly

fragmented system in large urban areas into a viable one is to establish multi-agency units statutorily authorized to coordinate the activities of the criminal justice agencies within such areas, but with safeguards against interference with the traditional prerogatives, responsibilities, and process of decision-making within those agencies (ABA, 1972).

Great benefits would be gained by establishing interdisciplinary education and training centers where police officers, prosecutors, defense counsel, judges, and corrections professionals can learn how their responsibilities interrelate as an arrested subject moves through the system. If the police officer is aided to understand the legal restrictions by which the prosecutor is bound, he can make better arrests and prepare sounder cases. If both the officer and the prosecutor understand and accept the rules the judge must abide by, and the judge, in turn, gains an understanding of the difficulties the others encounter in assimilating and functioning under these rules, they should all respect and help one another more and recognize the futility of trading back and forth useless accusations.

Communication barriers will be bridged only when criminal justice system members are willing to expose their own professional responsibilities and limitations to the scrutiny of their team members. Each, in turn, must offer helpful criticism and limitations, the wisdom of their experience to those in other disciplines. The most aggravating intrasystem problems can be identified and resolved if they are discussed candidly, and the ability to discuss them intelligently depends upon knowledge, understanding and acceptance of each man's job (Bridge, 1972).

(2) Over-criminalization

The second most vexing problem in the criminal justice system is over-criminalization. This problem illustrates a distorted set of priorities within the system. The public desires the police to be more effective in apprehending the criminal who commits violence in the streets. At the same time, the community dilutes police manpower by asking them to arbitrate family arguments, rescue treed cats, and collect public drunks. The courts are criticized for long delays in bringing criminals to trial, but judges are required to spend time on minor traffic offenses, municipal ordinance violations, and in processing alcoholics. Crowded jail facilities are roundly condemned, but they are used to warehouse public drunks and detain the non-dangerous offender who is unable to raise the needed bail for release.

The problem of over-criminalization is an excellent example of misplaced priorities. Over-criminalization is the application of the criminal sanction to what are commonly known as victimless crimes. These are offenses in which the participants act voluntarily and do not consider themselves to be hurt or to be hurting anyone else. Social attempts to suppress morally objectionable behavior through application of the criminal sanction has never resolved the problem. The corruption that occured during prohibition placed a serious drain on the severely limited resources of the criminal justice system, but it did not slow the sale or lower the consumption of alcoholic beverages.

Laws defining victimless crimes are a result of the legislature's response to the wish of a segment of society to be protected from a specific type of conduct believed to be undesirable. However, by yielding to public sentiment in this way, the legislature imposes additional burdens on already overloaded criminal justice agencies that they are ill prepared to handle. One of the worst results of over-criminalization has been in creating situations causing satellite criminality of a more dangerous and victimizing type (ABA, 1972).

Laws relating to the sale and possession of narcotics are a good example of this practice. Few persons would want to see narcotics drugs distributed freely in this country, but the existing stringent narcotics laws only rarely result in the apprehension of the importer of such drugs or the "wholesale" distributor of large quantities of them. If the laws enabled the criminal justice system to put such people out of business, they would be greatly beneficial. However, enforcement of the narcotics laws is directed primarily against the addict who possesses the drugs for his own use and the local pusher who sells them for profit, often to support his own addiction. The upshot of all this is that a lucrative black market is created dealing in heroin which drives the price up to very high levels. Time and again we see the addict committing such crimes as robbery, burglary, and theft to obtain the money required to support his narcotic habit. In effect, we have encouraged criminality as a result of the laws prohibiting the sale and possession of narcotics, not to mention the growing and widespread lack of respect for law growing in America's young, the police corruption, the overloaded courts, and the jails

filled with persons convicted of possession of marijuana or hard narcotics. Experimental programs in methadone maintenance and half-way houses for addicts show more promise in breaking the vicious cycle of addiction and criminality than do stiffer laws and penalties with regard to possession and sale of narcotics.

To alter the laws concerning narcotics addicts in no way implies approval of those who abuse drugs. It is simply an honest recognition that the pattern of enforcement of the drug abuse laws has resulted in the creation of a far more serious type of criminal behavior instead of lessening the drug addiction in this country.

The enforcement of laws against public drunkenness is another example of wasted criminal justice resources. Arrests for drunkenness consume much more than police resources. The arrest precipitates the involvement of detention units, prosecutors, defense counsel in many cases, judges, probation officers, and correctional personnel. Statistics indicate that arrests for drunkenness result in disproportionately high conviction rates. If the enforcement policy led to a reduction in the number of offenses, the cost might be worthwhile. However, there is absolutely no evidence that the criminal justice system has served as a deterrent to public drunkenness. The reason is simple; public intoxication laws are most frequently enforced against alcoholics who are clearly far more ill than criminal but who receive no treatment for that illness in the criminal justice process. This is not to suggest that society should shun the alcoholic and his illness, rather to point out that the criminal justice system is not the appropriate societal agency to provide alcoholics with the care and treatment they need.

It is apparent that a thorough reordering of criminal justice priorities is needed to remove victimless crime enforcement from the system and to shift to other governmental and private agencies the regulation of certain types of conduct now the subject of numerous criminal statutes. Only in this way, can the criminal justice agencies and resources now fruitlessly diverted, be redirected toward the much more important task of reducing the frightening totals of violent urban street crimes.

These illustrations represent a diagnosis of the many major illnesses and numerous aches and pains that plague the criminal justice system. The problems are many and varied, but the outlook is far from a totally bleak one.

Some Initial Steps to Address the Problems

Any prognosis regarding the patient would have to stress the recent effects of the Congress-passed Omnibus and Safe Streets Act of 1968. To illustrate the potential for recovery, improvement and effective functioning of the criminal justice system, a microcosm of the effects of one state planning agency operating under the Act can be cited. The Illinois Law Enforcement Commission was created by the first Executive Act of Governor Richard B. Ogilvie in January, 1969. In addition to the federal funding available through the U.S. Justice Department Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Governor Ogilvie and the Illinois General Assembly have provided millions of dollars in state aid to serve as an impact on the state's crime problem and a stimulus to the criminal justice system. The Illinois Law Enforcement

Commission has, through grants of federal and state crime control funds, initiated a number of programs which offer visible success in curing some of the ills of the criminal justice system.

State-wide Criminal Justice Planning

To deal with the basic defect of lack of coordination, the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission has created twenty-one regional planning units each composed of a cross-section of the criminal justice system in the geographical area covered by the planning unit. Each functioning council contains area police chiefs, sheriffs, prosecutors, defenders, judges, probation and juvenile officers, corrections officials, representatives of units of local government of crime prevention and offender rehabilitation agencies, private citizens, and businessmen.

For the first time in the history of Illinois, representatives of each segment of the criminal justice system as well as city and county government and the general public are meeting monthly to identify problem areas, assess the available resources, discuss approaches to the resolution of existing crime problems, and criminal justice system deficiencies, and select a blue-print or strategy designed to achieve crime reduction and improve the quality of criminal justice. Each of these units is staffed with full-time professional criminal justice planners; each unit is required to develop a yearly plan identifying shortcomings and needs. In addition, staffs are responsible for proposing remedies and improvements to take care of diagnosed problems.

While each of these units presently exist as either non-profit corporations or governmental planning commissions, they are a visible first-step towards achieving legislatively created criminal justice coordinating councils in Illinois. In the meantime, they are performing the same function and achieving the desired goals through funded grant programs and voluntary cooperation and liaison.

Improving Law Enforcement

A start has been made to remedy the disservice to citizens caused by the diversification and fragmentation of police agencies in Illinois. The coordination of police services through regionalization and contractual arrangements is underway. Some larger cities have entered into contracts with smaller nearby communities to furnish police services. In one community, to establish a close liaison with the police departments and yet allow students to police themselves, a local college has contracted with the city to create an unarmed student police force supervised by the city's police officers. A landmark in progressive policing is the disbanding of several police agencies in one Illinois county and the formation of the first single county-wide police department in Illinois. Those communities that disbanded have been able to contract with the county agency for police service at a higher and more professional level than they could have attained independently. Eight additional counties are now moving to replicate this model project.

The assignment of social workers to police departments to handle domestic altercations and other problems of a social service nature has

freed policemen for law enforcement duties. This project, now in its second year, upon demonstration of initial success, is being expanded to serve additional departments.

Police community relations bureaus are being created in numerous police departments·in Illinois. The recipients of these grants agree to send the assigned men to an approved police community relations institute. With increased sophistication and dedication to police community relations as a necessary police function, the hard line "gun and night stick" approach to policing is changing in Illinois.

Rehabilitating and Diverting Offenders

In corrections there have been over one hundred separate programs designed to improve the potential of rehabilitation and decrease the likelihood of recidivism. Area-wide probation studies have been initiated to determine the most optimum approach to serving offender clients in both rural and urban settings. Wholesale penal reform has been led by a complete revision of the·state corrections code, elimination of arrest, and conviction records as a bar to future state licensing for over fifty separate positions, ranging from barbers to stock brokers, and the introduction of rational operational rules in prisons. replacing antiquated, integrity-stifling regulatory controls.

Two projects however, transcend the internal improvements and program innovations in corrections. The first is diversion of the socially and morally ill from the criminal justice system, and the second is the referral out of the system of delinquent youths who otherwise would enter the chain-step progression from vandalism to delinquency,

to auto theft, to burglary, to robbery, all the time moving from training school, to reformatory, to jail, to penitentiary.

Several programs have been initiated in Illinois to divert both adults and juveniles who commit offenses that are not appropriate for processing through the criminal justice system. The object is to relieve the burden of processing these persons from police, courts, and correctional resources. Three detoxification programs have been funded, and two more are pending. Persons coming to police attention because of public intoxication are taken to detoxification centers for care and treatment rather than arrested and processed through the court and corrections systems.

Fifteen youth service bureaus have also been funded. The primary aim of these bureaus is to provide police with an alternative to court referral of juveniles apprehended for petty offenses and non-criminal behavior such as running away and truancy. Much behavior of this nature is indicative of underlying family, emotional, and school problems rather than criminal intent. The youth service bureau attempts to identify and secure needed social service for youngsters referred to it, instead.of initiating the first step on the cyclical treadmill of arrest, conviction, and detention. Now, the tragic commonplace reality of deliquency as a first step into a lifetime of criminal careers can often be averted.

Detoxification units and youth service bureaus have not been in existence long enough in Illinois for a determination of their effectiveness as diversion techniques. They represent, however, initial concrete efforts to address the problem of the overburden on the

resources of the criminal justice system.

Upgrading the Prosecutorial Function

The criminal problem explosion with its increase in crime and increase in arrests has had an immediate impact on the state's attorney. Understaffed and under-budgeted, and with volume case load unequated historically, he has to cope with a maze of increasingly technical and sophisticated legislation and case decisions. The problems are many and the remedies elusive, but the public will no longer tolerate a defensive and apologetic posture. In Illinois, a multi-million dollar state's attorney's comprehensive project has been created to aid the prosecution on both the trial and appellate levels. Through a series of experimental model offices, state's attorneys in Illinois can utilize project services in all areas of criminal work, including investigation, research, juvenile court matters, and grand jury assistance. The project also has a strong training and special programs component which permits it to conduct its own training sessions, as well as, providing financing for state and national seminars.

Public hearings have been held throughout the state of Illinois to elicit the views of the people regarding the question of whether legislative and geographic limitations of the state's attorney should remain the same, be expanded, or be reduced.

It is again time to realize the true function of the prosecutor. He is and should be a community leader, a spokesman for improvement and reform. He should initiate and recommend legislation, for no one

is in a better position to do this. Far too often, those in the state's attorney's office are interested primarily in their own political advancement. The political stepping-stone must be substituted with a career ladder. A strong merit system must be established to encourage career prosecutors.

Improving the Court System

Funding, under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, through the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, is intended to assist in bringing about improvements in each component of the criminal justice system, courts, police and corrections.

What Chief Justice Burger referred to two years ago as a case of "deferred maintenance" in the courts has, in some cities, reached a point of necessitating complete overhaul. The business of the courts is a sensitive and delicate matter. The functioning of our courts cannot be allowed to become purely symbolic, as is the case in some of our metropolitan courts where plea-bargaining has all but replaced adjudication. The most difficult task in attempting to bring about court improvement is determining what is really wrong. Case backlogs, for example, are one of the most frequently decried ailments of courts, throughout the nation. Yet, of themselves, backlogs are merely symptoms of underlying, often indistinct problems, which only searching, critical analysis will disclose.

Illinois has the advantage of having a unified, state court system, with administrative and supervisory authority over all the courts, vested in the Supreme Court. Such a system makes comprehensive study and planning possible. Despite some initial misgivings over the

unprecedented, untried concept of the state judiciary participating in a federally funded program, the Illinois Supreme Court in 1970 established the Committee on Criminal Justice Programs. The court charged that committee with the responsibility to plan, coordinate, and supervise grant funded programs designed to improve criminal and juvenile justice, in those areas where the judicial branch of government has primary responsibility. The committee includes representatives of judiciary, prosecution and defense, lawyers in private practice, and members of the business community.

With the ILEC funds awarded to the committee, a staff has been hired that is currently engaged in an in-depth evaluation of the quality of justice being administered in the trial courts, reviewing courts, and agencies directly related to the courts.

The committee is presently studying for four major areas:

1. Court management and records
2. Judicial education and court personnel training
3. Probation
4. Court facility improvement

Although, adequate funding to solve all the problems of the courts cannot be provided by LEAA, as a result of the creation of the Supreme Court Committee and funding of its activities, the Illinois courts are now fully involved in problem definition and seeking of solutions. A beginning has been made.

The prognosis for the courts, at this time, appears to be one of guarded optimism. Court reform is in the air. Outside of Illinois,

many jurisdictions and agencies have begun systematic diagnosis and treatment in court problems. The Institute for Court Management at the University of Denver Law Center has been established and is training court executive officers. The National Center for the State Courts, established in 1971 with the support of President Richard M. Nixon and Chief Justice Burger, has become a focal point for those determined to improve the operation of the judicial system. The National College for the state judiciary at the University of Nevada is providing continuing education for the judiciary.

The application of modern business techniques and the use of advanced technology is being looked to more and more to aid the judicial system. This is being done to solve the complex management and operational burdens of large courts.

Setting of judicial priorities is occuring with greater frequency. The determination of innocence or guilt in criminal cases is much too important to society and the accused to be subordinated to the processing of automobile damage cases, for example. Diversion of certain classes of cases is being implemented, in many jurisdictions, as a partial solution to relieving overburdened courts.

The need for vastly increased resources is slowly being recognized. If society wants vast improvement in the quality of justice administered by its courts, it must be willing to commit the kinds of resources it has in reaching many of its other goals.

However, let us not be misled into thinking that federal assistance or outside influences will, alone, bring about court reform. The basic ingredient for such reform lies within the judicial system. Those responsible for the administration of justice, the judges them-

selves, must respond. It is only with a renewed dedication on their part to make the court system work efficiently and justly, that inordinate delay can be eliminated, constitutional rights observed, and confidence in the courts restored.

How rapidly and to what extent these reforms and improvements are having an impact on the problem is difficult to judge at this relatively early date, but in Illinois' two largest cities--Chicago and Rockford--crime is actually decreasing. Statewide, the crime increase this year, some 6 percent, was 50 percent below last year's increase (UCR, 1970).

Important as it is, money alone will not provide all the solutions to the problems in the criminal justice system. More than anything else, we need a renewed commitment to the concept of ordered liberty and impartial but effective justice.

Conclusion

In making a diagnosis and prognosis of the American criminal justice system, several basic facts must be confronted:

1. Crime is a multiple, many faceted problem that no single solution or approach will resolve.

2. Social, moral and cultural reform is more important in dealing with America's crime problem than criminal justice system improvement.

3. Change and improvement is essentially and immediately needed in all phases, elements and agencies of criminal justice.

4. Neither the public nor the criminal justice agencies themselves should accept the illusion that criminal justice reform will bring public safety to this land.

In any review of criminal justice, it is vital to analyze the underlying rationale that justified the process. Essentially, all men look to government to provide an atmosphere of peace and safety. The criminal justice system cannot insure such humane tranquility, but its central task is to deal promptly, efficiently, effectively and equally with transgressions of the harmony.

It is unsound and hopeless to expect that the criminal justice system will prevent anti-social action on the part of man. Such wholesale antidotes and remedies fall within the social system, the moral code, cultural taboos and internal self-restraints. The best that a criminal justice system can do is deal competently with the social system's failures; this competency on the part of the criminal justice system is all that we have a right to expect. Whether the criminal justice system will fulfill this role depends upon what the public asks and expects, and whether the criminal justice system will be able to analyze its ills and take its medicine in a mature, professional manner.

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HOPE AND DESPAIR MAKE THE

SCENE IN CRIME PREVENTION

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Introduction

The planners of this Fourth Annual Symposium on Law Enforce-

ment Science and Technology have chosen as the theme of the con-

ference: "Crime Prevention and Deterrence".

While noble in precept, these are both negative terms, diffi-

cult to define, and impossible to prove. The word "deterrence"

has been omitted from the title of this paper, not because I mean

to ignore it, but rather because it can properly be included,

along with many other things, under the rubric of crime prevention.

The criminal justice field has always been one fraught with

controversy, philosophical conflict, misinformation, and frustra-

tion. Every person views the scene colored by his own particular

biases and perspectives. The school boy story of the "Blind Men

and the Elephant" is particularly relevant in this field.

Through several centuries in which organized society has

attempted to find rational and effective responses to the crime

problem, we have gone through a long series of wrong assumptions leading to wrong answers.

Models of Crime Control

Dr. Clarence Schrag, in his recent Monograph entitled, "Crime and Justice: American Style" suggests that over the last few centuries we have passed through several ages. In each of these society's approach to crime was the product of man's explanations for criminal behavior and his resultant responses to it.

First, there was the "Age of Revenge," when it was commonly believed that criminals were possessed of evil spirits which had to be driven from the body of the offender, usually through physical punishment. "To beat the devil out of someone" is still a common idiom in our language.

Then came the so-called "Age of Reason" during the late 18th and early 19th centuries. In this more recent effort to explain and find answers to the crime question, the assumption was made that man is endowed with an innate knowledge of right and wrong, that he possesses a free will, and that a crime is a deliberate act, the result of malicious intent and a perverse will. Under this concept we developed the motto, "Let the punishment fit the crime". Since it was during this period that the main body of the criminal law in Western Civilization was being developed, this idea of retributive punishment still remains the central trunk of the administration of criminal justice.

Newer ideas of prevention, of deterrence, human compassion, and the rehabilitation of offenders even now have not entirely displaced the basic concept of retributive punishment, but have merely been superimposed upon it, often with little regard to the conceptual conflicts involved.

Schrag points out that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries we began diverging in many ways from the rigid ideas of the previous period by allowing wide discretion among police, prosecutors, courts, and correctional authorities in the disposition of cases. As a result, a new motto became prevalent: "Let the treatment fit the individual offender". This he has referred to as the "Age of Reform."

There is much evidence to support the idea that Western Countries, including America, are now in the early stages of another revolution in their beliefs and practices concerning crime and corrections. This has been designated as the "Age of Reintegration". Here the central concerns are to 1. maintain the peace and good order by preventing crime, and 2. to place special emphasis on turning the known offender into a non-offender, and 3. to reintegrate him into the fabric of social and economic life as a self-supporting and participating member of society.

In this formulation, we have assigned to ourselves a task far more difficult than that of any previous age. In addition to the already formidable task of trying to deter and reform offenders, we are now asked to begin directing our attention to the entire community, its institutions of government, business, education, health,

welfare, religion, recreation, or any other forces relevant to the mission of reducing the incidence of anti-social deviance.

As a result, we have the emergence of concepts and practices, identified by such terms as decriminalization, diversion, bail reform, increased use of citations, halfway houses, work furloughs, psychiatric clinics for parolees and probationers, increasing use of alternatives to incarceration, use of volunteer services at all levels, the reluctant demise of the rural fortress prison, and the increased use of "community-based" corrections.

In this welter of changing practices and concepts, controversy rages between the traditionalists who would preserve the status quo or even turn back the calendar of change, and those who would tear down the whole system before new alternatives have been devised and tested.

Correctional Change and Social Change

There are many reasons for our continued groping and seeking for new solutions, not all of which are based upon the failures and frustrations of the past and the present. The most obvious set of contemporary considerations is to be found in the constantly accelerating social and economic changes of our times.

During the brief history of our country we have changed from an obscure colony of a European power to the richest nation in the world; we have changed from an agricultural economy to the most sophisticated industrial country ever known. In the last century and a half we have changed from a nation made up principally of

untutored semi-illiterates to one in which persons without a high school diploma are labeled "drop-outs" and already marked for failure. There are more persons enrolled in colleges and universities than there were in high schools a bare generation ago.

We have moved from the country to the cities and back again to the suburbs, leaving the core cities to become ghettos and breeding grounds of every kind of social ill known to man. The very foundations upon which our social, political, and economic institutions have been built are changing. In the face of all this, can we adapt our thinking, our practices, and the organization of our service delivery systems in time to avoid complete collapse? That is probably the real question before us.

A graphic presentation of this phenomenon of crime related social ills was made in an extensive report prepared for the Youth and Adult Corrections Agency of the State of California by Space General Corporation in 1964. A detailed analysis by community was made of Los Angeles County, which then had some seven million people. Five factors known to be concommitants but not necessarily causes of crime were analyzed by census tracts. These were: median family income less than $5,000, Negro population 75 per cent or more of the residents, population density of 10,000 or more persons per square mile, maximum school drop-out areas, and finally, maximum crime rate measured on the bases of 100 or more arrests annually for each 1,000 persons in the 10 to 17 age group and 28 or more arrests per 1,000 total population. Each of these five factors was colored in black

ink on transparent sheets and then laid one upon the other. Their boundaries were not precisely identical, but together they formed a black spot squarely in the middle of the county.

It would be futile to discuss the question of which of these rather gross measures is the cause of one or more of the others, but it is significant to observe that they all tend to grow together in the same neighborhoods.

Public Policy and Crime

It is also interesting to note in 1972 that this study was made and the facts well known a year before the Watts Riot and also that this same study recommended that there be a state coordinating or planning council with representation from all branches of criminal justice and local governments to attempt to bring into sharper focus some of the inadequacies of the system.

This study and related recommendations revealed little that was not already known to knowledgeable students and practitioners in the field, but it was one of a number of manifestations of a growing realization that crime in our country and in our time was getting to be too important a matter to be left entirely to the narrow horizons and limited powers of criminal justice practitioners.

On the national scene, the President established on July 23, 1965, by Executive Order, the Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The studies and recommendations of this Commission, which were published in February, 1967, in the volume entitled "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society" together with

many related documents, have furnished the basis and the background for much of the national effort in the last five years.

For those who are very young or who have weak sense of history, it may be worth pointing out that in spite of the extensive nature of these reports and their high quality, national and state "Crime Commissions" were by no means a new phenomenon. Perhaps, the most famous earlier report of a similar nature was issued by the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement in 1931. This commission was chaired by the Honorable George Wickersham, and its report has been generally referred to as the "Wickersham Report". Governor Lehman of New York State convened a similar commission and issued an extensive report about five years later. Governor Earl Warren of California appointed a series of Special Crime Study Commissions between 1948 and 1952.

Since the 1967 report, we have had two other related and well publicized national commissions - the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, with the so-called "Kerner Report", published in March, 1968, and the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, chaired by Milton Eisenhower, with a report published in 1969.

The enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control Act in 1968 and the birth of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration provided the most ambitious effort made so far by the national government to exert its power and influence in the crime control field.

Now, we have the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, which will make a preliminary report to us here

on Wednesday.

Such reports are often scoffed at and referred to as boondoggles, political tactics for delay, and speechwriters handbooks. It seems to me, however, that in this decade there is a difference, the principal ingredients of which are money and serious attention from the highest political leadership in the land.

It has been said that in order to accomplish almost anything in government, several ingredients are necessary: first, an idea and a plan; second, the authority to carry out the plan; third, people to execute the plan, and fourth, money to support it.

The idea that deliquency and crime has reached a stage where the national government must begin taking a more effective hand has been growing slowly now for fifty years. It took a major leap forward with the enactment of the 18th Amendment in 1920 and the Volstead Act providing for its enforcement. Since then there has been a steady proliferation of federal criminal statutes involving such diverse crimes as kidnaping, auto theft, narcotics, prostitution, bank robbery, income tax evasion, selective service violations, and hijacking, to name a few.

Inevitably, this has been accompanied by vast expansions of federal investigative and enforcement agencies. We are all familiar with the F.B.I.'s phenomenal growth since the early 1920s. The federal prison system has grown from three penitentiaries in 1928 to 32 correctional facilities in 1972. During the last dozen years the federal judicial system has rot only grown to match the load produced by new laws, but has also begun to apply federal interpre-

tations of the criminal law to state criminal procedure.

All three branches of the federal government have been approaching the American crime problem on a piecemeal basis - case by case - statute by statute - agency by agency - always being careful to re-iterate that law enforcement and the administration of justice is basically a state and local government function.

The expanding role of the federal government in all fields tends to follow a breakdown or at least a highly visible degree of failure by state and local governments to meet apparent needs. As examples, of this phenomenon, we need only to be reminded of federal growth in such other functions as public welfare, unemployment insurance, public health, and elementary education.

The idea of crime as a national concern is abundantly clear. The plan for its implementation is far from clear at this point in time. We are still groping to find the most acceptable and _effective division of responsibilities and resources among the myriad of federal, state, and local agencies_.

But clearly, and perhaps inevitably, the federal government is moving deeper and deeper into the crime field. The subject is raised here not to argue for or against this, but to point out that it is high time for us to take a systematic look at the drift with a view to developing a viable plan rather than merely to ride the current. We need to define the respective roles of each of the authorities in the total system in such a way as to produce an end result which is just, legal, and effective.

As a nation we continue to express a growing concern about crime, but do we really have a national strategy - the kind of grand scale planning, goal setting, balancing of risks and the commitment of human and material resources designed and required to achieve realistic objectives? In spite of both rhetoric and new injections of money, the answer as of now has to be: No! That we seem to be getting closer raises hope; that the goal is not in sight engenders despair. So, let us look briefly at our five-step formula for achievement: Idea - Plan - Authority - Personnel - Money.

A National Plan for Crime Prevention

The last item, Money, is always discussed first because without it, nothing else in the sequence happens. Contrary to popular belief money alone will produce no miracles by itself. plan, power and people are the ingredients that translate money into achievement. I believe this country can and will provide all the money needed when and if the rest of the formula is placed in position for action.

The idea that we must prevent and control crime seems clear and acceptable enough. But is it really? Are criminal justice leaders and the society they serve willing to come to grips with some of the hard decisions involving value judgments which are necessary before really viable plans can be made? To illustrate:

How much individual liberty are we willing to sacrifice for security? How much privacy for enforcement effectiveness? How much "due process" will we trade for administrative efficiency? How much retribution for offender resocialization? How much costly institu-

tionalization will we give up for less expensive alternatives? How much local autonomy for fiscal support from federal and state coffers?

Answers to questions of this kind must of necessity be compromises, but unless they are arrived at, at least for limited periods of time, no workable plan can be carried out because the participants in the system will be working at cross purposes expending more energy quarreling among themselves than in fighting the enemy.

As for plans, the authors of the omnibus crime statute and the administrators of the act have recognized from the start the need for planning, but unfortunately, the state and regional plans so far too often have been descriptions of 'what is" rather than expressions of "what ought to be". This is so partly because crisis-ridden administrators have little time or capacity to plan. An even more formidable obstacle to effective planning lies in the notorious fragmentation of the criminal justice system itself, to say nothing of differences among the fifty states and gross differences within each of them - differences of population density, differences of urbanization, differences of ethnicity, differences in per capita wealth.

Then there is that other old bugaboo - the need for bureaucracies to survive. Any plan or proposed plan which threatens consolidation of police departments, of jails, of courts, of prosecutors offices, of probation departments, no matter how well such a move might serve the public, will usually be resisted with death struggle ferocity. It is interesting to observe, too, that the uneasy equilibrium which is maintained among these status quo interests in practice also appears

within the membership of most of the State Planning Councils.

It is only honest to say that <u>integrated system-wide crimi-</u><u>nal justice planning</u> at this point in time is a phrase, not a reality. This is not to say that there is no planning going on or that any or all of it is bad, but it continues to be fragmented, piecemeal, and certainly not comprehensive in the best meaning of that term.

<u>Now as to authority</u> - <u>authority</u> to carry out any comprehensive criminal justice plan must come ultimately from the legislative bodies of the states as well as from the Congress. Certainly, authority to carry out a non-existent plan is an empty power. It begins to seem to this observer that we either must be prepared to see efficient criminal justice planning delayed for many years while it grows and matures or legislative power must be exerted to force-feed it with something stronger than a few million dollars of federal money. In our system of federated states the authority of the federal government is sharply constrained. State governments seem to me to be the key link in the authority chain.

<u>Personnel</u>, the fourth ingredient of our formula, seems to be faring better than the comprehensive planning or the mobilization of authority. A recent LEAA report states that during last year the number of full time equivalent criminal justice employees went up from 729,000 to 775,000, an increase of 6 1/4 per cent, and the funds expended increased by 14.4 per cent for a total of $8,571,000,000. Since the major cost of criminal justice is employee compensation,

it would appear that we are not only increasing the number of workers but that their compensation is growing faster than their numbers. That this improvement was brought about largely by the injection of federal money is questionable, however, because the distribution of both expenditures and employees among federal, state, and local governments did not change. It remains 8 per cent federal, 22 per cent state, and 70 per cent local.

What can be established, on the other hand, is that the federal funds for training are causing a dramatic increase in the number of trainees and training opportunities in the field. This may well be the most hopeful development growing out of the LEAA program In the long run, it will be competent, well prepared people working in the many aspects of criminal justice that will move the total system to greater effectiveness. In a field characterized by many points of view and great controversy, there is one area of almost universal agreement - that of the need for and the desirability of better educated and better trained workers and leaders.

It is gratifying also to note that this is leading to a more critical examination of the nature and the content of training programs at all levels - pre-employment college courses, induction training, in-service instruction, refresher institutes, middle management courses - all are undergoing reevaluation and revision. This, in turn, has raised questions about the validity of much ongoing training. In other words, does it in fact produce the attitudes,

skills, knowledge and role perceptions that the job requirements of today's world demand?

The STAR Project, funded largely with federal money and being carried on by the American Justice Institute under contract with the Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission of California and three other states is an example of a significant effort to examine by empirical methods the roles, skills and knowledge required by the seven entry level jobs in the major phases of criminal justice practice. These kinds of efforts over time cannot help but affect in a positive way the quality of personnel performance across the board in police, courts, and corrections.

Another hopeful sign on the professional horizon is the growing acceptance of research methods as a tool of management--not merely an academic pursuit of new knowledge. Decision makers in government are beginning to demand hard facts as a basis for policy making and action. In criminal justice agencies, the systematic gathering, recording, and analysis of objective information is complex and expensive, but it is just as essential as cost accounting and market analysis in a manufacturing or a life insurance business.

We are still far from that kind of standard in the nation as a whole or even in the handful of state and local jurisdictions where baseline data are collected routinely and evaluative research on an ad hoc basis are comparatively well developed. In a field where we have operated for generations on unsupported convictions, it is as difficult for traditionalist executives to adopt new methods as it was for "bush pilots" who flew by the seat of their pants to get

used to flying aircraft by computer controlled navigational systems. The change calls for a new state of mind as well as new technology.

This leads to the much discussed question of "technology transference". Why is it that when a new and better way of doing something is developed in one agency or one part of the country, its transfer elsewhere is so slow? Perhaps, it is because, what we, in criminal justice agencies, have to transfer is not technology in the sense of a new medical treatment, a manufacturing process, or a new method of water purification. Rather, it is a complexity of concepts, skills, and systems. It is at the same time a philosophy, an art, a science, an administrative system, a political strategy, campaigns for molding public opinion, and finally, a mobilizing and co-opting of related community resources.

The development of new knowledge, new principles, and new experience is important, but the usual channels of transference such as professional journals, formal training of practitioners, and the unsystematic exportation of a few professionals from one jurisdiction to another are not enough unless we are willing to wait for generations for a kind of slow osmosis. The question is, how can successful experience be replicated by a planned strategy rather than through the accidental congruence of favorable circumstances and the fortuitous appearance of effective and purposeful leaders?

Experience has taught us that need, technical knowledge, and money are not enough to produce change in the form of effective action. Favorable climate, positive political power, strong

professional leadership, and public support are equally essential. The strategy is clear--all systems must be "go" at the same time. There is evidence that in jurisdictions where there appears to be an atmosphere of general readiness it is possible to bring "all systems" to the "go" position by the intervention of the right kind of change agents.

The pilot cities projects of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice are promising examples of the application of this strategy. The "Impact Cities" program contains some of the ingredients of this plan. It can be confidently predicted, however, that the success of these efforts will not be uniform simply because the degree of readiness and the quality of local leadership will vary from city to city. We will all watch with interest and hope, and even if the successes are not spectacular, we undoubtedly will learn from the experience.

Immediate Crime Prevention Activities

Speaking now more specifically of crime and delinquency prevention, it seems to me that a new perspective is beginning to develop. As we have intimated earlier, it is not only a negative term, it is also "everybody's business" and hence too often "nobody's business".

We need to decide how the basic responsibility for prevention should be divided. The church, the family, the schools, the chamber of commerce-every private institution of our culture has a piece of the action. As these institutions of social control have weakened, we have tended to look more and more to public agencies, including courts, police,

and corrections, to fill the void. It is necessary here to differentiate between direct prevention, which has always been a criminal justice function, and the indirect efforts of other social institutions to develop character, good habits, and social responsibility. There is, however, a third force which has been given little attention in the literature on prevention. That force is made up of the efforts of potential victims of crime to protect themselves by making it more difficult to commit certain kinds of delinquent and criminal acts. Rudimentary evidences of these kinds of efforts are seen in burglar alarms, automatic cameras in banks, the chain link fence around a factory, and campaigns to encourage people to lock their automobiles. But more about that later.

There is one publicly supported agency which could do more than any of the others if it only would: The public school, with rare exceptions, processes through its system every child of compulsory school age. Most of the criminals of 1980 to 1990 are in the elementary schools today. The opportunity and the technology are at hand to identify the small percentage of these children who display symptoms of vulnerability. To label such children at an early age and mark them as high potential deliquents patently would be wrong. But to identify them for special educational and developmemtal programs within the school system might well be the most effective approach to delinquency prevention available to us. Advantage of this great opportunity is either being missed entirely or certainly not being exploited to any significant degree. Criminal justice leaders are in the best position to prod the schools to move in this direction.

Now to come back to victim self-protection. The vast bulk of crime is some kind of stealing. Much to the chagrin of the criminological theorists of a generation or two ago, it turns out that the increasing abundance of material goods and the reduction of both the severity and the incidence of poverty have been accompanied, not by a reduction in property crimes, but by great increases instead. Parenthetically, this finding is world wide. Affluence is accompanied by waste, disrespect for property, and carelessness by property owners. We leave our $5,000 cars unlocked; we leave huge inventories of goods unguarded at night, and our retail merchants make shoplifting so easy that it almost seems a crime to some people not to take advantage of it.

Instead of letting the costs of thefts be passed on to the general public in the form of increased prices and higher insurance rates, we might begin treating the careless potential victim of theft in the same way we do the property owners who endanger their fellow citizens by failing to observe fire prevention laws and regulations. This may seem a perverse and amoral way to look at the prevention of theft, but reducing opportunity might just be far more effective than increasing penalties for the pitifully few who are apprehended and convicted.

To do this we must begin thinking of crime prevention not only in terms of character development and intimidation of the thief but also in terms of specifics and not just specific classes of crime as defined in the penal code as burglary, robbery, forgery, car theft, and the like. We need to zero in, for example, on armed

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robbery of gas stations, of liquor stores, of food markets, or burglary of residences, of appliance stores, of warehouses, and so on and on, matching specific criminal acts with specific classes of potential victims. Each crime-victim relationship could be researched to identify common factors of vulnerability and then provide potential victims with programs of prevention. This kind of practical hard-headed approach to property crime prevention might well be far more effective than such conventional remedies as doubling the number of patrol cars, increasing penalties, or building bigger jails.

But what of crimes against the person? These are less numerous by far, but it is these that frighten the law abiding citizen and subtract from his right to freedom from fear. Most of these crimes, as we all know, are committed by young males who in our culture are taught from childhood the virtues of physical courage and are initiated into the cult of masculinity, which is equated on every hand with fighting, shooting, and sexual prowess. This evidence includes our love of violent drama, our devotion to firearms, our glorification of criminal folk heros. Our children sit glued to television spending a fourth of their waking hours watching someone killed or assaulted every few minutes. If we have raised a generation of young males a large proportion of whom think they can solve most of their immediate needs by physical force, we should not be surprised.

A very recent national poll reports that 41 per cent of men and

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women over 18 years of age are apprehensive about leaving their homes at night because of the prevalence of crime, so their alternative is to stay home and watch more of it on the "tube". Of course, it has not been proven by any scientifically controlled study that the pre-occupation with crime by our mass media is a significant contributing factor in the growth of crime, but there can be no question of the fact that crime, and especially violent crime is uppermost in the minds of the American public. Since offenders are a part of the public, we may be sure that this constant bombardment of crime news and crime entertainment can only suggest to the crime-prone that almost everybody else is doing it so why not me?

There are many rather obvious preventive measures which could reduce crimes of violence dramatically if we were only willing to impose them. There has been so much said and written on the subject of weapon control that I shall not bore you with the stale arguments on both sides of the question. For purposes of keeping the subject alive, though, I suggest once more that we:

-- (a) Register all firearms.

-- (b) Prohibit hand guns except for police and
       military.

-- (c) Institute measures for government control
       of all manufacture, sale, and importation
       of firearms.

-- (d) Prohibit the manufacture, sale, or po-
       ssession of switchblade and similar type

knives which have no legitimate use
except as weapons.

These ideas are not new, but unless we as a nation reach the point where we are willing to trade a little inconvenience for a large dividend in violent crime reduction, we should be willing to live and die quietly with the consequences. We surround our-selves with both the sounds and the instruments of violence and so, as Norval Morris has said, "The United States may or may not be the land of the free, but it is certainly the home of the brave."

A little less bravado and an increased measure of wisdom and common sense in the area of dangerous weapon control has the potential of being the most potent single strategy for the preven-tion of violent crime.

THE RESEARCH PROCESS AS A FACTOR IN IMPLEMENTATION
OF DESIGN FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE CHANGE

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Introduction

Groups without specific criminal justice operating responsi-
bilities can play a direct role in developing a climate for change
but only an indirect or supportive role in the implementing or
institutionalizing of change. Whether such groups are assemblages
of action oriented citizens, researchers operating from non-academic
or academic bases, or philanthropic agencies seeking to foster
system improvement, this poses special challenges. The vehicle for
any such group promoting change must be a change design which is
justified by study or experiment, or to be tested by the acquisition
of knowledge.

Obstacles To Change

It is a commonplace saying that there are rooms filled with
shelves, all heaped high with research reports and recommendations
gathering dust. That this generalization is oft-repeated does not
mean that it is unjustified. It is noteworthy that the generalization
is applied not only to studies commissioned by criminal justice agencies
themselves but also to externally funded research efforts.

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Generalities are coined because they represent what is thought
to be true in a very large number of instances. It does not follow,
however, that generalities carry within them the explanation for
the phenomena observed. The fact that most studies do not result in
the implementation of recommendations does not justify the conclusion
that the research was poor, or naive, or not the subject of competent
and effective technology transfer techniques. If the failure of
change, in instances in which public service groups participate,
was due only to the role played by such groups, it is a fair as-
sumption that the nature of the remedy would be clearer than it is.
It is probably the better course to assume that there are charac-
teristics of the process, whereby the change design is commissioned
and brought to the point of implementation which impede or inhibit
the change process.

In examining the change process, we must look at agency
personnel on the firing line who must implement change, their
superiors who must make the decision to implement, the criminal
justice agency which must make the legal and financial decisions to
allow change to occur, those who commission or fund the design of
change (the criminal justice agency or an external public or private
agency or group), and those who design change, in-house or outside
researchers or planners.

Worthwhile change often escapes notice. It is probably initiated
without fanfare by internal processes within some agency of the

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criminal justice system. Operating personnel and their supervisors confer on conditions which they perceive to be major or minor problems. Innovations are worked out with some form of rough analysis and testing. Change is often based on a priori conclusions. Goals are consistent with innovative thinking--all parties involved understanding what is to be done and why. Successes are relatively unheralded, and failures generally are not noted. Public service groups do not have any serious role in this process, unless called in for supportive research or to marshal community support for the change.

Where the process of problem solving is more formal, there is usually a marked decline in the degree of interaction between operating personnel and the designers of change; a decreased likelihood of successful implementation of recommendations for change often results. It is fair to assume that there is a relationship between the lack of such interaction and the failure to produce change. Is it also fair to speculate that one important reason for the lack of such interaction is the environment in which research is commissioned? I believe it is.

It is commonly recognized that research will not produce action or change unless it responds to the needs felt by managers and workers who must implement change. Yet, these are rarely the individuals who actually decide whether outside help is going to be brought in to contribute to the solution of problems. Instead the needs of implementers of change, those on the firing line, are

customarily filtered through layers of administrative superiors, or research and development offices; then legal and contracting officers take over. The commissioning of a problem solution may be via an R.F.P. (Request For Proposals), which often means that the problem has gone through an administrative "massaging" which can distort the staff articulation of its needs--and responses to an R.F.P. usually have major evaluation inputs by those who will not have to implement the results. The situation is only somewhat better where research is conducted inside an operating agency. Organizational lines can also be barriers to effective communication and interaction.

The process of research authorization would appear to be the point at which the likelihood of implementation of the results will be largely determined--or, at least, it is the point at which many impediments to implementation may be eliminated. While this is essentially the responsibility of agency research and development officers or of managers who have similar functions, it is a responsibility which they will find difficult to meet without increasing resources in both dollars and people.

Research or problem solving must be seen by both the operating agency and the researcher as a continuing process, rather than as a task with a clear beginning, middle, and end. The implementer is too involved with his day-to-day problems to do more than pose the problem, and the research manager is almost always understaffed and

handicapped in moving back and forth between the demands of current funding, the monitoring of research projects already funded, and planning for the next research cycle.

Another impediment to implementation of research, built in at the commissioning stage, is the common emphasis on allocation of dollars for research, and the lack of dollars allocated for development or adaptation of research findings for implementation. In a sense, this is analogous to the problem faced in the acquisition of computers, where the hardware itself is so costly that many purchasers of such services stinted on the software which could make the acquisition of such services cost effective. Whether research is conducted within an agency or externally, an implementation plan should be required in a research budget. Under present procedures, dollars allocated will often make possible no more than a quick brainstorming session at which guesses will be made on implementing tactics or procedures--with only rare inputs from the managers who will actually be implementing change.

The Implementation of Change

The failure to realize change suggests that it is necessary to increase the practitioners awareness of the need to plan for research results. However, again we meet the fact that both operating agency and researcher are trapped by the concept of "research" as a limited process to deliver a product. Thus, there is often a high degree of interaction and communication between manager and researcher prior to

authorization of research. Following this, there is a contract, grant, or internal work order. Then, suddenly there is no longer an interactive intellectual exchange process. The researcher is now alone with his task; the manager can turn to his day-to-day problems or if a research manager, to commissioning of other research. "Monitoring" has now replaced the creative process which gave birth to the problem-solving task, and the first organized step in problem solution has become the barrier to interaction.

Another serious problem in implementing change is that research or design of change is a time-consuming process. By the time a study is completed and implementing recommendations prepared, the results may no longer be useful for any one of a number of reasons. With the passage of time, the nature of the problem may have been altered, requiring new solutions or reworking of the study in light of changed circumstances. The manager of change, faced with pressing and urgent problems on a day-to-day basis, while awaiting research results may reach his own conclusions and act thereon. Therefore, the proposed new innovations may be inappropriate or face a higher level of hostility to change than is normally the case. In some instances, implementation is successful; but the explanation may sometimes be that the research was commissioned to rationalize a prior decision for change by operational managers; consciously or unconsciously, the researcher's labors may have been invoked as an imprimatur or justification.

Lastly, in a large number of instances, outside researchers or planners fail to influence operating agencies because they do not really understand the system they are attempting to help. This may be the result of inadequacies in research, but often it reflects the failure of researchers to interact with operating personnel in very basic human terms. Assuming, however, that research results in a timely and desirable design for change; other impediments to change come into play.

Change makes very real demands on agency personnel with no guarantee of success. Change always involves risks. The substantive issue addressed may not respond to the prescribed treatment, and the managers of change may not be able to handle new and unexpected problems which could surface, notwithstanding assurances of the researchers and the confidence of their own superiors who accepted study recommendations.

Even though proposed innovations may ultimately benefit the managers and personnel involved in the proposed change, almost all change will initially hurt some, though ultimately aiding others.

A really good piece of research will often raise a host of new problems, many of which are not within the jurisdiction or managerial reach of the implementer. For example, research commissioned by a correctional agency may point to innovations which require the participation or cooperation of police prosecutors, courts, or welfare agencies. Even within the correctional area, a program for community-based corrections may require that certain

preparatory innovations take place in prisons or jails. The action necessary to implement innovation in one area may be inconsistent operationally or as a matter of budgetary priorities with innovations elsewhere.

Research organizations are rarely permitted involvement in putting findings to work. To the extent that there is interaction between criminal justice agencies and researchers or designers of change, such interaction rarely survives the delivery of recommendations for change and the supporting research. There seems to be no common acceptance of a process such as "aftercare" provided by a surgeon.

The Public Service Group and Change

Thus far, this discussion has been concerned with the general problem of innovating change. This is necessary groundwork for a discussion of the role of public service groups defined for our purposes as non-governmental organizations. These groups would appear to fall into three categories with inevitable overlaps among them: (1) those which fund or support research, (2) those which conduct research, and (3) those which spur the activities of funding groups and operating agencies to promote system change.

The Russell Sage Foundation can serve as an example of an organization involved in an overlapping role. It is funding and conducting research in the area of evaluations. Local citizens' crime commissions may arrange for funding and also conduct studies or investigations to promote change in dramatic ways.

Public service groups, which fund or arrange for funding of research, are in a position to ignore the organizational boundaries which inhibit the implementation of change. For example, a citizens' crime commission can address the narcotics problem by research which involves federal and local law enforcement, as well as courts, prosecutors, and police. Such groups can promote designs which go beyond narrow organizational or administrative confines. In contrast, it is highly unlikely that any unit of government, on any level, will commission or promote research which will question the appropriateness or boundaries of its operational responsibilities.

Public service groups which are in a position to fund the design for change are in a position to address fundamental questions which do not have immediate payoffs; a luxury rarely available to agencies with operating responsibilities. Such fundamental research may well provoke questions which open new paths to successful implementation of change, as in the case of very creative work now being done to develop new evaluation methodologies.

Public service groups, which must rely on outside sources of support for their research efforts, must find ways to adapt the process of support solicitation to the goal of making their end product an agent for constructive change. This is a challenging and difficult task for an academic institution, for non-profit research organizations or for profit-making bodies. These groups are in a key position. Not only are they the ones usually called upon to produce the studies and recommendations which can promote

change, but also they can powerfully influence the client agency's potential for change by the manner in which they respond to the client's perceived needs. While this group cannot control variables, such as the adaptability of the operating agency to recommended change, they can work to develop a product and operational environment, which will increase the likelihood that innovative recommendations will be adopted.

In order to influence the adaptability of operating agencies to innovation, researchers must undertake introspective examinations of their own attitudes and attempt to alter the environment in which research results and recommendations are received.

This suggest that the researcher must attend to the following issues:

First, researchers must be very clear as to the identity of their customer. The customer is an agency or group of agencies which will have operational responsibility for implementing change. The customer must be served, not the researchers' peer groups.

Second, the positive effects of research should not be counter-balanced by substantial and new negative effects. In corrections, it would not be desirable to effect a 10 percent drop in average recidivism rates by a treatment and processing procedure which, in fact, caused a substantial rise in recidivism on that part of the correctional population which had a low rate of recidivism prior to putting the change to work. A procedure, which eliminates court delay but fails to provide an avenue for prosecutor and court to creatively use delay to further rehabilitation would invoke a host of tactics on the part of all those involved in the court process to amend the innovation in practice, and thereby unintentionally sabotage the proposed change.

Third, the constructive change is that which can be implemented by people, rather than by idealized stereotypes. It will do little good to devise treatments which depend for their success on very special and very highly motivated personnel, when such personnel do not exist in sufficient numbers in operational agencies and cannot be hired. Change requires that we challenge the potential of personnel by considering what will motivate them to operate over a long period of time. We should allow for human frailties and for problems of human adaptation. Put another way, to put change to work also requires innovations to redirect and intelligently motivate the staff we rely on to achieve the desired results.

In their proposals to agencies of the criminal justice system, those involved in the design of change must engage in the following activities:

First, recognize that time changes problems. To a greater extent, research should more and more be conducted co-extensively with demonstrations which involve risk taking by managers of change because there is rarely any guarantee of success.

Second, maintain continuous relationships with the implementers of change.

Third, identify the agents or change. Are they the operational heads of agencies? Community groups? Staff labor unions? Client or prisoner groups? It is usually desirable that they make their inputs into the design of innovations, and that their roles and futures are taken into account.

Fourth, make implementation part of the research task. This will require funding of the implementation task. To a tremendous extent, the task of research budgeting is concentrated on making certain that every "i" is dotted and "t" crossed--with respect to "research." This should continue. But also, specific budgeted time for liaison and joint planning with managers should be urged for what it is, a vital necessity

if research is to result in constructive change. Why should we expect research implementation to succeed when undercapitalized, more than any other new venture?

Fifth, work to develop an educated and responsive audience for the innovation and to ensure that all elements of the audience are involved in implementation. If prosecutors prosecute more cases because they can be processed, it will do little good to expand a court's capacity to move cases. Nor would it be helpful to make a particular treatment so attractive to judges that they make more commitments and thus more criminal records.

It is also necessary to keep in mind that the audience is broader than the components of criminal justice agencies. Community acceptance may well spell success or failure for innovative change. We should remember, for instance, that for community-based corrections to succeed, we have to be able to put facilities in communities.

Sixth, work on all levels to create acceptance of the costs of change. This should be a major role for public service groups not involved in the research process. Some with deep insight in the field of corrections say that nothing has been shown to work. We should always consider, however, whether the changes, which failed, were faulty in conception, in administration, or in financing. For example; in a city with poor public transportation, can a halfway house or work release program succeed without the special expense of arranging in some way for the resident to get to his job? If a particular experiment appears to succeed in a city, such as police family-crisis-intervention units, will there be funds for follow-up replication or expansion or will the successful unit be isolated and finally abandoned? It is important to stress the educational role of public service groups. The educational role of public service groups must extend to the question of budget justification. Such groups must be able to demonstrate not only that it is desirable to adopt change but also that, in the last analysis, it will cost more in dollars and trouble not to adopt change.

Finally, they must identify those who will
perceive themselves hurt by proposed innovations,
whether managers, staff, subjects, or clients.
This is not to say that change should be sup-
ported only if it makes no one uncomfortable;
but, if we know whose ox is being gored, we may
find that some of the "goring" is unnecessary.
It might be possible to avoid or minimize it.
We may be able to abate the degree of resistance
to change; or, if necessary, after consultation
with managers of change at an appropriate level,
we may be able to more intelligently confront
such difficulties head-on. We might even discover
that the hurt inflicted is too high a price to
pay for the benefit to be realized.

If public service groups are to contribute to the adoption of

constructive change in criminal justice systems their efforts must

involve more than measuring. They must, in some way, contribute to

the understanding of the problems faced by those with operational

responsibilities, demonstrating improved ways of achieving organi-

zational objectives, and, where possible, managers' personal goals

of meaningful service.

CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM: A RATIONALE FOR DETERMINING PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES

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Introduction

Perhaps, at no other time in our country's history has the need to
modernize and update the correctional system been more clearly evident.
Our system has developed like patch work into a complicated network of
contradicting procedures and practices manned by virtually an army of
"caretakers" and presents an almost insurmountable challenge to coordinate
even under the best circumstances. Most conspicuous has been the ab-
sence of a conceptual framework and philosophy to give guidance and
meaningful direction to our various efforts. More specifically, there
is the need for a sound perspective which will help us to create a range
of meaningful programs taking into account not only the changing needs
of individual offenders, but also the increased knowledge concerning the
social and cultural influences on behavior. This preliminary statement
is an effort to formulate in broad outline some basic concepts which will
hopefully help to establish the rationale for determining program alter-
natives.

The Role of Normal Social Processes in Rehabilitation

Any rationale for altering service directions at this point in time would most likely call for radical changes. Although viewed on many levels, perhaps the most comprehensive change would be in the kinds of resources which should be involved in the provision of services. It is the position of this paper that since the main objective of any correctional program is primarily aimed at rehabilitating and reconstructing life experiences to help offenders resume "normal" responsible community behavior, the ideal treatment should make as much use of normal on-going social processes as is possible. This principle applies as long as normal social functioning continues to be the major goal to be achieved.

For the most part, the public sector has traditionally assumed the major share of the responsibility for providing correctional services. More often, these were offered in a manner which reflected an admixture of public ignorance, apathy, and fear. As a result, the services were less likely to be based on sound empirical knowledge and experience but were more subject to changes in public sentiment and interests. The public approach to the offender has proven to be narrowly conceived and often reflected an unrealistic view of how man functions in his private every day community life. (Witness, for example, some of the unrealistic expectations of probationary and parole prescriptions regarding behavior.)

Basically, there needs to be a movement towards a new kind of sharing of responsibility involving a greatly enhanced role for the private sector. This would "open up" service options across the entire continum from the early law-enforcement stages through the later termination supervision stages. It will put more responsibility on family, neighborhood, and community institutions which are so intimately affected. But, most important for our argument is that private involvement will in the long run be most effective and efficient in terms of our major goal of maximizing normal social functioning of the offender.

The delegation of a social program area as pervasive and all encompassing as criminal deviancy to a limited segment of specialists for public supervision is short-sighted. In the final analysis, the very process which is responsible for the articulation of deviant behavior must assume responsibility for ameliorating that behavior. This is another way of saying that man is responsible for his fellow man and cannot delegate to the specialist total responsibility--especially where the major resource for dealing with the problem lies in the social interaction of men. As long as the average citizen plays a prominant role in setting the stage for defining and labeling deviant activities, he must be part of the processes in the search for new acceptable forms of behavior. The offender can never assume normal social functioning in a society which does not provide the means for reversing this labeling process in his behalf. It follows that the attitudes of the average person must change to allow for a new role in the correctional processes.

The rationale for community responsibility has been corroborated in recent years with the successes of community-based programs in such areas as mental health and retardation. One way these programs succeeded in helping people remain in their own community settings has been throughgreater involvement and acceptance of more local responsibility for the mentally disturbed and retarded. Communities involved

in these efforts have naturally begun to think in terms of prevention.
Similarly, communities may also be helped to relate more realistically
to primary prevention in relation to delinquency and criminal behavior.
This will be more possible as it becomes evident that the community itself
can be changed so as to be less instrumental in "creating" deviant
behavior in the first place.

Changing Perspectives Regarding Treatment

In our view, the treatment of choice in most cases should be an
approach which is least likely to interrupt the normal social function-
ing of the offender. Institutionalization, while necessary and useful
when the protection of society and the individual are at stake, should
be considered as a last resort. Not only does it isolate the offender
from his family, friends, neighborhood and community relationships which
are essential to maintain him, but more importantly, it will very often
subject him to "negative" relationships in the artificially created in-
stitution of offenders. Closed institutions by their very nature offer
limited positive strengths and supports for their residents. Hence, as
critics have repeatedly stressed, the system itself often produces and
maximizes the same deviant behavior it is designed to correct or eliminate.

Secondly, the evaluation of success cannot be limited to the public
sector alone. Involving the private sector will bring about different
criteria regarding successful tratement. As the criteria for assessing
successful treatment changes from the public institutions to the
community-based programs, new dimensions for measuring growth and change
may be discovered. To illustrate, an offender who function success-
fully in a modified "planful" manner in his own community circumstances

has demonstrated more progress and potential compared to an inmate who
has been a "model" inmate in many of even our finest correctional insti-
tutions.

Thirdly, a new involvement of private resources should challenge
certain assumptions which are often taken for granted. For example, it
is generally held that institutionalization is the most effective means
to attain maximum control of individual behavior and offers the best
means for protecting the public. But, it has been seen that in certain
neighborhoods, sub-cultural codes of behavior may offer controls far
more limiting of behavior than is generally recognized. Consider, for
example, the closely controlled behavior so characteristic of the small
close-knit neighborhoods such as "Little Italy", and "China Town", etc.
Furthermore, sub-cultures such as have emerged among drug addicts, homo-
sexuals, and among the militant autonomous groups have achieved a measure
of control on their members which may exceed similar efforts in the
artificially created climate of incarceration.

As for the claim that society is always best protected by incarcer-
ating dangerous offenders, the argument is not convincing when examined
in a time perspective. Although it may be true that temporarily at least,
the criminal is isolated from opportunities to engage in illegal activi-
ties, upon release (which occurs well over 95 percent of the time) he
will be back in the community. What internal controls have been developed
which will serve in a sense as a protection for society is a moot ques-
tion (witness, for example, the high recidivism rates).

Probation, as it traditionally operates, offers generally little or
at best minimal supervision and controls as well as making minimal use

of private sector resources. For roughly 75 percent of probationers, this has been enough; but the other 25 percent do not adequately respond to this "treatment" and get into further difficulty leading to incarceration.

This leads to another fallacy which is revealed in the notion that treatment in a correctional facility should always start from the most intensely controlled environment passing through stages to the least. The "flow" then is from the maximum security to moderate and eventually minimum security leading to freedom. The development of half-way houses, work release, and a variety of pre-release programs reflect this trend. Although rigorous research is still needed, we recognize that reports concerning graduated release programs are most promising. At issue here is not the concept of gradual changes in programs, but rather the assumption that this be in one direction only.

That the flow should be viewed as moving only from the maximum to minimum control seems to be self-defeating for a number of reasons. In the first place, as stated above, the very processes of incarceration for certain individuals creates a new set of traumatic experiences which, in effect, impede such a transition. The isolation and newly forced relationships create a host of social and psychological stresses and strains, family crises, new economic burdens, etc. Hence, to place an individual out of the mainstream, as the beginning point for providing more controls than present day probation, creates many more problems than it solves. How ironic that this simple fact has been ignored in our traditional methods of treatment. It may be that the treatment sequence that we have come to cherish must be drastically revised. For example, a period of testing one's

self in the community with modified restrictions may be a useful index to determine more realistically just what kind of "special" environment facility (if any) needs to be utilized to treat him. If a sharing of responsibility could be worked out between the public and private sector, the offender would likely move from the community based program to the total institutional life in a planful manner, (if need be) than to resume normal community life at a later point. To be sure, such a procedure implies the existence of a wealth of human and material resources which are most often unavailable. Developing a sound approach, however, should not be handicapped by any current restrictions on resources.

A Taxonomy of Program Alternatives

Based on our discussion, Figure I utilizes two major dimensions for assessing program alternatives within the Criminal Justice System: (1) degree of control exercised—maximum, moderate and minimum; and, (2) the the differential utilization of resources—public and/or private.

Generally, there are six points of entry based on these dimensions: (1) Maximum Control within Public facilities; (2) Maximum Controls within Communities; (3) Moderate Controls within Public Facilities; (4) Moderate Controls within Communities; (5) Minimum Controls through Public Supervision; and (6) Minimum Controls within Communities.

The services within each of these characteristically differ according to certain features: Maximum institutionalization refers to total incarceration and behavioral controls. Offenders who are so incarcerated vary considerably in terms of personal resources, motivation, and capacity for effective social functioning. The criteria used appear to be related

CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM: A RATIONALE FOR DETERMINING PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES

FIGURE I. Private-Public Sponsorship Flow Chart

Private............Sponsorship............Public

Degree of Control

Maximum

PERMANENT CUSTODIAL RESIDENCE

I Public
"Maximum Security
Prisons"

II Private
"Community-based
sub-cultures

Moderate

PARTIAL CUSTODIAL RESIDENCE

III Public
"Federal Release
Centers"

IV Private
"Private Half-
way Houses"

Minimum

NON-RESIDENCE

V Public
"Probation and
Parole"

VI Private
"Diversionary
Sponsorship"

JOINTLY SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM
"Nara"

"Project Crossroads"

Flow or Movement can start at ANY point and move to any other point.

Placement Option to be based on offense, danger, psychologial history, future potentials,
Opportunities, Motivation, Capacity, Commitment, etc.

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to the nature of the crime rather than anything else. Maximum controls in the community setting is virtually an untapped resource usually overlooked in the traditional correctional services. The potential here should be explored in light of the assumptions challenged above; namely, that control can only be maintained within "total institutions." For example, social controls approach dramatic proportions in certain curren-subcultures such as communes, drug sub-cultures and in "natural" organizations such as the "organized crime families," Black Panthers, and the Ku Klux Klan. Can the same measure of control be established and maintained to advance a rehabilitative ideology within the community setting? Moderate control within public facilities is beginning to become more evident with the development of group homes, day-care centers, and other kinds of partial custodial residences. Moderate control within communities, although appearing to be similar can be vastly different by virtue of the kind of sponsorship involved. Under private "quasi" voluntary participation, group homes, day-care centers, community center programs, etc., may "piggy-back" on normal on-going private services which are relatively free of the stigma so often attached to the public sponsorship of programs for offenders. It may prove more economical to subcontract services into any number of "quality" private social agency programs such as those offering services to families, drug addicts, alcoholics, the homeless, and alienated segments of our population, etc. Especially helpful may be multi-service centers which have demonstrated successful treatment programs which integrate various problem areas. The minimum controls through public supervision are traditionally evidenced in probationary and parole practices in dealing with offenders. Basically, these are often a

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kind of "trial" period of time in which the individual functions in the community—under public direction—to prove himself capable of complete autonomy. The minimum controls within communities appear to be an unexplored potential with the exception perhaps of such programs as the Volunteer Sponsorship Programs where citizens have taken on new responsibilities to help offenders (usually in cooperation with the courts). There is potential here for voluntary involvement of private counseling, informal educational, recreational, employment services which can be a source of on-going help to offenders.

The offender, through such privately-sponsored activities, then is not totally autonomous and alone in the community.

Most significant in this scheme is the area in which public and private resources may be combined to launch new forms of jointly sponsored and controlled services in behalf of offenders. In some cases, private facilities may be used to demonstrate an approach to specific problems which will reveal new dimensions for public responsibilities. In other instances, the public services may best be enhanced through sub-contractual arrangements with established private agencies. Differing "blends" of cooperative services may prove useful. Most exciting would be programs where there is a genuine integration of resources into a smoothly functioning effort, maximizing the most positive contributions of each. Project Crossroads represents a current example of a well-known effort to achieve such a goal.

Flexibility in Treatment

As is made clear in the adage, "Different strokes for different folks," each individual must, at some point in his involvement with the criminal justice system, be evaluated with regard to where they belong in the system of services provided. As their involvement with the system moves over time, they must continually be re-evaluated in some way. This means that there is a fluid and flexible system all the way from probation through parole and at all points in between. Flexibility which allows individuals to progress in any direction is one of the keys to meaningful and successful control over the treatment process. Moreover, it is equally important that continued evaluation be possible regardless of public vs. private involvement. In other words, it is imperative that ways be found to provide for a continuity of evaluative efforts by a variety of agencies without "fragmenting" the client. Although this may raise a number of questions in such sensitive areas regarding confidentiality, jurisdictions, etc., this sharing of knowledge in behalf of the recipient is crucial.

Our basic theses then is that each person's initial positioning, movement, and disposition cannot be pre-determined in advance by the presently established criteria, if any exist at all. Nor, should this be left to chance. Resources must be developed to provide for tailor-made planning for each individual. The major problem is to establish at critical places throughout the system dependable means for continual evaluation to detect progress or deterioration. These evaluations will help in decision-making regarding further treatment plans and determine any changes that may be indicated regarding necessary controls. Joint participation of public and private resources will be a critical factor. The role of the offender in participating in his own treatment plan is another important consideration most often overlooked in current correctional systems.

So, the schema proposed here would mean an individual could start out by being placed in a community-based program with moderate controls. Continual re-evaluation may dictate that he be placed in an institution because of a deterioration in his functioning; or, it may reveal dramatic improvement and indicate that he be released from any further involvement with the correctional process. In a similar vein, someone originally placed in an institution with moderate controls may, upon re-evaluation, move to an institution providing maximum controls or to a community based program. Correctional flow can be in either direction.

There are many obstacles; personnel may not be equipped to function differentially at each of the stages in handling problems of evaluation and making decisions. Prejudices may not be eliminated entirely. Chance factors doubtless will continue to influence the kinds of decisions being made. At this point in time, existing knowledge may not be sufficient to help in making responsible predictions without careful long-term research, which will also be generated by using this proposed schema.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have questioned the assumption that the major rehabilitative functions remain solely within the realm of public agencies of social control and have stressed the necessity of utilizing private resources to maximize normal social processes as a major treatment tool. This obviously requires changing perspectives regarding how our society treats offenders. In this regard, we have emphasized the need to create regular community-based services in behalf of offenders reserving institutionalization only as a last resort. We have argued that planful graduated program alternatives can be used not only in terms of release

but also as an instrument to facilitate diagnostic and placement functions. A tentative taxonomy of program alternatives was presented which took into account differential degrees of control and program sponsorship. And finally, it was noted that traditional ways of doing things most likely would stand in the way of initiating new ways of functioning. Massive attitudinal changes will undoubtedly be required on the part of the public, caretakers, and offenders as well.

THE APPLICATION OF MAGNITUDE-ESTIMATION SCALING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIORITIES FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS

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Introduction[1]

The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, requires that each state establish a planning agency and a governing board with statewide representation from criminal justice and community agencies. Most states have elected to utilize regional criminal justice coordinating bodies, and many large individual jurisdictions have taken the initiative to establish such committees. The result is a plethora of boards, councils, commissions, committees, etc. across the nation, all charged with creating criminal justice plans and reviewing corresponding grant applications.

A problem shared by all of these boards, whether addressed explicitly or not, is the requirement for priority-ordering of proposed criminal justice programs. Usually, the programs are in competition either for limited financial resources or sequence and timing of implementation.

Normally, the boards have available a variety of techniques that can be used to set the priorities:

1. Debate leading to a consensus, either arrived at informally or by vote. This technique is subject to the influences of dominant personalities, procedural maneuvering, political pressures, and a tendency to favor the inclinations of employment superiors.

2. Ranking of programs by participants with or without arbitrary averaging or weighting. These techniques normally have little structure and as a result lack assurance that the competing programs were considered in a uniform, unbiased way by the participants.

3. Structured Value Analysis (SVA) which is a complex technique involving the construction of a model based on available data. Lack of data or data of questionable reliability limit the utility of SVA. Unfortunately, these data constraints generally prevail with respect to criminal justice programs.

4. Magnitude-Estimation Scaling (MES), a technique described more fully in this paper.

Background of Project

The Fairfax County Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) was established in July, 1971, by the County Board of Supervisors. One of the Council's purposes was to develop a county-wide comprehensive criminal justice plan.

An initial draft of the plan for fiscal years 1973-1977 was submitted to the Board of Supervisors on December 1, 1971. Among other subjects, the plan contained a list of some 20 proposed program areas which were intended to improve the administration of criminal justice within the county. In submitting the plan, the Council acknowledged its responsibility for providing at a later date a priority ranking for the 20 program areas.

In late November, 1971, Forge Aerospace, Inc, in view of its prior experience, was queried by the Council relative to the possibility of utilizing Magnitude-Estimation Scaling as a means of establishing the requisite priority ranking.

Magnitude-Estimation

The approach described is based on a unique application of Magnitude-Estimation Scaling. This is a technique whereby a large number of recognized authorities, representative of a broad spectrum of interest, background, and experience with respect to the subject in question are solicited to reflect their perceptions. A specially designed and administered questionnaire is used to record individual responses. The experts' responses are then aggregated to form a quantitative set of weighting factors which, in turn, can be used for assessment and analytical purposes.

Some of the primary advantages to be derived from using the technique are:

a. Otherwise unmeasurable subjective factors can be quantified.

b. Highly dissimilar items can be related on a common scale.

c. The derived weighting factors can be added since the method utilized a ratio scale. (Stevens, 1966)

The basic method, evolved from psychological testing techniques, has been used in the past to describe the seriousness of urban crime (Sellin and Wolfgang, 1964) and insurgency in Thailand (Kaplan, et al, 1967, 1967A and 1968). The results obtained in these experimental applications were highly convincing, defensible, and consistent. Experience gained during the prosecution of the work reported by the latter three references gave insight into additional areas of application; e.g., setting of priorities, resource allocation, environmental requirements analysis, and material evaluation for source selection.

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In order to apply Magnitude-Estimation Scaling to the ranking of the proposed programs, several preliminary steps had to be taken:

a. Review of the data base, i.e., proposed programs

b. Review credentials of prospective respondents with respect to establishing expertise

c. Develop the questionnaire

Data Base Review

The raw data base consisted of the 20 proposed program areas. Each item was reviewed according to the following criteria:

a. Each program area must be a singularity; i.e., each item must refer to one and only one subject.

b. Each item must have a comprehensive yet terse definition. The subject should be sufficiently described to insure the respondent's understanding without ambiguities.

c. Each description must be free of any inadvertent material which might bias the respondent. Dollar values of the programs, for example, must be eliminated.

Upon examination, it was concluded that the existing data base could not satisfy the criteria and that certain modifications would be required.

In order to achieve singularity, the 20 program areas were expanded to a total of 25. The Council's Staff Assistant provided short, descriptive paragraphs for each new program area. Since the respondents were generally familiar with the details of the programs, the brief descriptions were included primarily for refresher purposes.

Respondents. -- One of the essential requirements in Magnitude-Estimation Scaling is the selection of the group of experts of respondents. It is mandatory that they be exceptionally well

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qualified to discuss all aspects of the subject being examined.

The Council, by virtue of their intimate knowledge of the subject gained during establishment of the programs, appeared to be the most qualified to set the priorities. Expanding the number of respondents to include non-council members such as Fairfax County Police Force members, court officials, citizens association members was considered but discarded on the ground that their comprehensive experience might be insufficient to cover each of the program areas.

The experience levels of the Council members are as shown in Table I. The "Direct" category refers to experience gained as paid participants or employees of criminal justice programs; e.g., police, lawyers, judges, probation officers. "Indirect" refers to citizens who, by virtue of interest or participation in study groups, civic associations, etc., have extensive knowledge regarding the problems of administering criminal justice.

Table II lists the composition by occupation of the Council members who responded to the questionnaire.

Table I

SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXPERIENCE

Type	No. of Members	Years Total Experience	Average Years/Member
Direct	10	96	9.6
Indirect	5	40.5	8.1
Direct & Indirect	2	6 Direct / 26 Indirect	3 Direct / 13 Indirect

Table II

OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL MEMBERS

Supervisor, Board of Supervisors

Chief Judge - Circuit Court

Court Administrator - County Court

Court Administrator - Juvenile - Domestic Court

Commonwealth's Attorney

Chief Deputy Sheriff

Deputy Chief of Police

Representative - County Attorney's Office - (an attorney)

Director, County Planning Division

Representative - County Office of Management and Budget

Defense Attorney - County Bar Association

Chief Probation Officer - Northern Virginia

Defense Attorney - Offender Aid and Restoration Organization

    plus

5 Private Citizens:

      1 Minister
      1 Representative - Planning District Commission
      1 Representative - Chamber of Commerce
      1 Representative - League of Women Voters
      1 Representative - Federation of Civic Association

Questionnaire Development. -- The descriptions of the 25 program areas formed the questionnaire. Each area was assigned an alphabetic code number and typed on an individual sheet of 5 ½" x 8 ½" paper. The ordering of the pages was randomized by shuffling to prevent biasing by position. A sheet of standard instructions was stapled as a cover to form a booklet.

Administration of the Questionnaire. -- The questionnaire was administered to most of the respondents at a meeting of the Council on January 19, 1972. Those members not present at the meeting were polled individually by the Council's staff assistant on January 20 and 21.

The respondents were asked to indicate their years of "direct" or "indirect" criminal justice experience on the cover. The group was asked to read the instruction sheet and to ask questions before proceeding.

It should be noted that the respondent's anonymity was preserved through the use of an identification code number. The latter was essential only for data processing purposes.

Each respondent was asked to rate each succeeding program area as to relative importance with respect to his first or reference item. The subsequent scores could be higher or lower, but not negative or zero, than the reference item which was arbitrarily scored at 10.

The technique of referring all items to a common base establishes the ratio scale, an essential feature of the technique which provides the mathematical logic for justifying the additive qualities of the weight (Stevens, 1966).

Results

At the completion of the rating phase, the respondents' scores were mathematically aggregated by program area to establish weighting factors. The geometric mean provided the basic scores which then were normalized by the lowest numerical value. Normalized weights were rounded off to the nearest whole number and arranged according to value. Those program areas with identical scores were maintained in descending decimal order. The normalized results in descending order are shown in Table III by title and code.

The "real" score refers to the unabridged results as derived directly from the questionnaires. The "alternate" score reflects an adjusted rating based on the elimination of one raw score from a single respondent. Compared to his others, the score 10^{-7} was of such inordinately low magnitude that it biased the relative emphasis by a factor of about 2.5 to 1. Rank ordering, however, was not affected by the removal.

Normally the characteristics of the technique; i.e., the use of a large group of respondents and the geometric mean, tends to minimize the effects of extreme responses. In this application, however, the relatively small group, only 18, was insufficient to compensate fully for the unusually low response.

It should be noted that three additional individual responses were eliminated from the calculation of both the "real" and "alternate" scores on the basis of technical error, e.g., omission of responses and strike-outs, the latter being indicative of a violation of instructions.

Interpretations

The listing contained in Table III not only represents the group recommendations for the rank ordering of the programs, but also establishes the group's perceptions as to the relative importance of each. For example, rank order 12, Drug Abuse Prevention, has been judged as being only half as important as rank order 3, Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Program, with scores of five and ten, respectively, on the "alternate" scale. Similar ratios can be drawn between any two program areas.

The fact that Magnitude-Estimation Scaling is based on the ratio scale establishes a relationship among the items. This factor provides the logic which permits mathematical manipulation of the weights, e.g., addition, subtraction.

An approach might be the measurement or comparison of the relative importance of functional groups of programs, e.g., (Re: Table III)

Juvenile Package		Drug Package	
Item 3 (N)	10 pts.		
Item 4 (O)	10 pts.	Item 11 (K)	6 pts.
	20 pts.	Item 12 (J)	5 pts.
			11 pts.

Here, the implications for resource allocation are clear. Competing packages can be weighed, one against the other or individual items can be selected and compared as required.

Basically, the weighting process can be viewed primarily as guidance for the allocation of resources. Care must be taken, however, not to confuse the relative emphasis values with the true cost of an individual program area. For example, a low-ranking program may far exceed the cost of a higher rated item.

Table III

PRIORITY - EMPHASIS RANKING
OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM AREAS

	Title	Code	Real Score	Alternate Score
1.	Alcohol & Mental Health Detention	D	27	11
2.	Comprehensive Justice Center	E	26	11
3.	Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Program	N	26	10
4.	Juvenile Treatment	O	25	10
5.	Community Relations/Public Education	D	23	10
6.	Police Management	R	19	8
7.	Adult Misdemeanant Post Conviction Services	A	19	7
8.	Criminal Justice Information System	H	18	7
9.	Regional Programs	V	16	7
10.	Training	X	14	6
11.	Drug Rehabilitation	K	14	6
12.	Drug Abuse Prevention	J	13	5
13.	Equipment	L	13	5
14.	Commonwealth's Attorney	C	12	5
15.	Courts Management Study	G	12	5
16.	Violations Bureau	Y	12	5
17.	Management Research & Development	P	8	3
18.	County Court Administrative Office	F	8	3
19.	Highway Safety	M	8	3
20.	Recruiting	U	8	3
21.	Organized Crime	Q	8	3
22.	Public Defender	T	7	3
23.	Pretrial Detention System	S	5	2
24.	Riot Control	W	3	1
25.	Criminal Justice Library Services	I	1	1

(1) The authors present this paper in the hope that the method and experience described will assist those charged with the difficult task of establishing priorities for criminal justice and other programs.

The kind cooperation of Mrs. Blythe Persil, Chairwoman of the Fairfax County Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, and Mr. John Rick, Staff Assistant of the Fairfax County Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, are gratefully acknowledged. No less essential was the patient and diligent participation by all members of the Council.

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POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO CHANGE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES: AN INTERORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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Introduction

The problem of managing change or "putting innovations to work" is complex, a problem with many facets. Yet, if the process of change is to be either understood or managed, the problem needs to be broken down into digestable chunks. This paper attempts to consider such a chunk--political obstacles to change--in terms of interorganizational mechanisms of dependence, influence, and power. "Political" is used here in the sense of factors influencing change and involving interaction among organizations. The focus is not on partisan politics, but on small "p" politics--conflicts over the goals, methods, and activities of criminal justice agencies.

The success of innovative programs requested by administrators of police departments, courts, or correctional agencies is often influenced by a variety of outside forces--mayor's office, legislature, police benevolent association. Conditions of dependency among organizations prescribed by law and those based on values, attitudes, or pressures both limit the flexibility, for instance,

of a court administrator seeking change and provide him with
opportunities to use these relationships to build support for his
programs. This paper explores interorganizational dependence
relationships and their influence on change in criminal justice
organizations.

Sources of Dependence

The criminal justice system involves more than just a police
chief, or district attorney or warden. A complex network of formal
and informal organizational interactions have been developed to deal
with the criminal and the victim. These interactions help to create
conditions of dependence between a criminal justice agency and the
other organizations included in this network. Dependence refers to
the requirements of one agency for the resources of another; a
state prison, for instance, is dependent on the legislature for
financial resources. The nature of a dependence relationship,
however, depends upon its extent and form.

Extent of Dependence.--A police department is totally dependent
on a city council, if the city council is the sole source of funding
for the department. In contrast, if the department has an alterna-
tive source of funding, its dependence on the city council is not
complete. The police chief may find support for a project that
council cannot or will not fund from another source. In short, the
extent of dependence is determined by whether or not there are
multiple opportunities to obtain the same resource. If there are,
the extent of dependence is proportionately diminished. If revenue

is confined to a single source, the agency does not have the
capacity to choose among alternative resources and is limited as to
the programs it can attempt to develop. (Thompson, 1967:30)

Forms of Dependence: Legal-Authoritative.--A police department
or prison is embedded in a legal web of authority and responsibility
that includes local, state, and federal levels of control. However,
the primary level of authority and responsibility varies from agency
to agency. Cities and towns, by and large, control the police.
Counties bear major responsibility for the courts. The states most
often operate the correctional institutions (ACIR, 1971, Chapter 4).
As a result criminal justice organizations, are entwined in an array
of legal-authoritative relationships (mayor's office-police department)
which determine responsibility for the activities and constrain the
actions of justice organizations.

Forms of Dependence: Legal Transactional.--While operating,
criminal justice agencies receive their managerial direction and
financial support from various levels of the government hierarchy;
they interact on a transactional basis as the offender is processed
from arrest through the courts into prison. A discrepancy exists,
therefore, between the direct authority of the local government over
the law enforcement agency and the reality of daily interaction
among justice agencies. This discrepancy can create conflicting
pressures involving legal-transactional and legal-authoritative forms
of dependence. When a criminal justice administrator finds himself
in the crossfire of these dependency relationships, he is faced with

the dilemma of satisfying conflicting interests. The situation may lead to his abstaining from innovative solutions to law enforcement problems.

Forms of Dependence: Normative Influence.--Normative refers to the values, norms, or views held by individuals and organizations in a community; influence refers to the exercise of pressures to conform to these views. The reference to normative-influence, thus, relates to the community organizations, professional associations, reference groups, and individuals that potentially might exert pressure and influence on the policies of criminal justice agencies (Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970). These organizations derive their influence from their ability to mobilize community support to influence the actions of partisan political organizations. The mobilization of public interest groups or community organizations occurs primarily on an ad hoc basis, as a response to perceived difficiencies in the justice process.

A justice organization is dependent for financial, informational, and other forms of support on a set of organizations (Evan, 1966). This organization-set can be subdivided to reflect the distinguishing characteristics of its members. This analysis is useful for understanding how dependence influences change.

Consequences of Dependence

When one organization depends upon others to satisfy its resource needs, it loses a portion of its independence. This loss of autonomy

is acute in the criminal justice area, because agencies have few alternative resource sources. This suggests that the forms of dependence characterizing an agency's relationship with other agencies affects its relative power. The agency's capability for defining and implementing changes is, thus, reduced.

Consequences: The Obstacle of Conflicting Goals.--Any government unit having authority over a justice agency may control not only its purse strings but also job placement, promotions, and agency operation in general. In contrast, the transactional flow of offenders involves operating relationships among police department, district attorney's office, courts, prisons, and the probation office.

Change efforts that attempt to either reduce the incidence of crime or improve attempts at its solution have to be directed at an operating agency. Yet, justice agencies are managed by different centers of political and governmental power, which often operate to achieve contradictory ends. These contradictory ends inhibit the acceptability of change, each center of power working against innovations supported by the other. Donald Cressey's discussion of the conflicting goals of criminal justice agencies illustrates this conflict. ". . . police are charged with the duty of keeping the crime rate down and tend to look with disfavor upon prison programs which might reduce the degree of security against escapes . . . social welfare and educational groups become upset when changes in custodial routines threaten to disrupt programs of treatment and training"

(Cressey, 1966:1030). A justice organization may, then, be diverted from its crime reduction efforts by the goals of another governmental organization. Change efforts directed towards alleviating crime may be lost in political conflict. This complex system of interdependencies creates barriers to change already existing ones that are constructed to prohibit basic communication about solutions to law enforcement problems. In short, the criminal justice organization loses the flexibility and adaptability that comes from autonomy.

Consequences: Power of Community Organization.--While the relationships between governmental units and criminal justice agencies may hinder innovation in operating agencies, the influence of community organizations may at times be used to facilitate change. These organizations are devices for bringing together individuals in response to some issue or problem in the community. They obtain their influence and power from their ability to motivate sufficient numbers of people to donate their time and money for the support of the "organizational viewpoint" (Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970). Only, if sufficient resources are obtained will governmental administrators be convinced that the issues involved are politically significant. Without the resource of strength in numbers or finances, the community organization will have little power to either promote or hinder change in law enforcement agencies. Yet, the fact remains that a criminal justice administrator may turn to such community interest groups to obtain support for his programs. This strategy

of informal absorption of community interests into the justice agency, cooptation, utilizes one form of a dependency relationship, normative-influence, to lessen the constraints of another, legal-authoritative.

Consequences: Dependence as an Obstacle.--A major problem in dealing with organizational change is that the contexts of organizations are constantly changing (Emery and Trist, 1965). All criminal justice administrators are faced with the consequences of social events, riots, supreme court decision, and elections, over which they have little control. The onslaught of crises continually facing justice agencies create obstacles to change by using resources for firefighting that might otherwise be available for creative responses to problems. These crises are not changes in the way of altering the formal structure and mode of operation of an agency. Rather they alter the character of inputs to the organization (Terreberry, 1968:601). Since he must continually call upon his limited resources to fight fires--citizen demands to reduce robbery in a particular neighborhood, employee dissatisfaction, etc. --- the administrator enthusiastic about innovation often finds few resources available to buy support for it. A dilemma results because while the agency is faced with a need to cope with its turbulent environment, it often does not have the resource capabilities necessary for responding. Because the justice agency is so highly dependent on organizations in its environment, it does not have the option of the ostrich or turtle and sooner or later must respond in some fashion.

Strategies for Interaction.--All criminal justice administrators have a basic awareness of the relationships of their agencies to others. After some reflection, an administrator will probably be able to develop a complete statement of these relationships. Once this has been done, he can use his knowledge to win support for his change programs. In short, the various dependency relationships have to be understood if they are to facilitate change (Emery and Trist, 1965). A strategy may be formed that uses centers of power to either promote change or generate new ideas for attacking problems of crime. The relevant centers of power will vary from situation to situation. Most often they will include the government agency responsible for the budget and supervision of the justice agency. They may also include community organizations with influence in both government and law enforcement agencies. A justice unit, itself, may be included because of the charismatic qualities of its leader. Whatever the case, an administrator may find that he can use centers of power to get support for change. If a police chief, for example, decided upon a strategy of altering change proposals to fit the views or requirements of a city council member or the mayor, the proposal when it is accepted may by chance still substantially meet the department's requirements. If the required alterations are so substantial that the change is valueless, an indirect approach can be attempted.

As an alternative, an administrator may try to get support from both those affected by the change and those with the power to influence it. A warden can involve his guards in the development and implementation of a change. If he obtains their support, he can use it to convince the commissioner of corrections to accept the change. Employee groups such as police benevolent associations, or bar groups can be used by allowing them to participate in planning and implementing the change to pressure these centers of power (Katz and Kahn, 1966, Chapter 13). An administrator can, alternatively, attempt to develop community support for his programs. A district attorney, for instance, can publicize his suggestions for change in bail procedures. He can also attempt to get the support of community organizations for his program by actively seeking their acceptance of it. In any case, the support of either professional association, community organization, or some other reference group can only be obtained by working for it continuously. Yet, such support will only be effective if it is sufficient to convince the leadership of controlling organizations that the change is warranted.

Facilitation of Interaction.--A different set of problems faces an organization such as a state planning agency, regional planning council, or criminal justice coordinating council. These agencies fund projects designed to improve the ability of justice units to deter crime or apprehend offenders. Any funding organization has the option of encouraging requests for project funding and assisting

in the development of ideas for change by local law enforcement units. If it chooses to follow this option, the agency needs to develop a strategy for achieving these ends. The following outlines such a strategy.

All of the components of the strategy deal with the development of mechanisms for using dependence relationships to facilitate change. First, the channels of communication that facilitate the flow of ideas, information, and influence from one organization to another need to be developed (Hudson and Hudson, 1969). In order to get an idea to these places where it will receive due consideration, mechanisms of transfer need to be established. More than the simple mailing of a letter or report is needed. A communication channel involves complex personal interactions that not only develop a climate for interchange of ideas, but encourage the translation of these ideas into improvement in the operation of justice organizations (Katz and Kahn, 1966, Chapter 9). The idea is not necessarily to formally structure the communication channel, in the sense of a computer system; it is important, however, for the organization to develop a systematic approach for handling communication.

A unit charged with communication and other responsibilities for managing interdependence is needed to make these communication linkages work. Persons operating this function can serve as links in the process of change in law enforcement agencies (Merton, 1965). They can tie the resources, for instance, of a funding organization—a state law enforcement planning agency—to the needs of the criminal

justice system. This unit, thus, can function to transfer ideas designed to attack criminal justice problems to law enforcement agencies. In addition, the unit can work with local agencies, combining the unit members' knowledge in the technical and social sciences with the expertise of local justice personnel, to develop solutions for law enforcement problems (Lefton, 1970). These proposals may then be directed to another subunit of the state planning agency for evaluation and, perhaps, funding. The important point is that those who are affected by a change proposal in a law enforcement problem area need to be brought into this process of planning for change (Zalezenik and Jardim, 1971). This unit can manage this process.

Once a plan has been accepted, there is still the problem of implementation. The focus of the discussion has been on how to get acceptance and support for a change idea under conditions of interdependence. Once acceptance has been obtained and implementation of the change begun, there is still a need to see how the change is altering dependence relationships. When a change effort is comprehensive enough to alter these relationships, there is a likelihood that the affected agency will serve as an obstacle to the change. That is, unless the agency is aware of the change and has been included in efforts to plan and carry it out, its lack of involvement and knowledge may hinder the achievement of the change goals. For instance, by considering how change in the police department affects the operations of the district attorney's office, a police chief may

be able to improve his relationships with that office on both political and operating levels. Thus, political obstacles to change may also be reduced by the establishment of ongoing cooperative relationships among criminal justice agencies (OSTI, 1967).

Conclusion

This discussion has dealt primarily with obstacles to change brought about through the interdependencies of criminal justice organizations with the other organizations in their contexts. This focus was chosen because of interests in (1) how an administrator can effect change where his organization is highly dependent on other organizations for support, and (2) how a unit channelling funds to local justice agencies can use the power of its dollar to help reduce crime and apprehend criminal offenders. The strategies suggested for dealing with obstacles resulting from dependence are necessarily general. The idea was not to state once and for all how to manage change. The knowledge necessary for this sort of statement does not exist. Besides, the individual administrator needs to develop a strategy to suit his problems. These strategies were, however, presented to show the importance of community involvement in criminal justice change and the participation of law enforcement personnel in any attempts, for instance, to reduce crime.

Too many discussions of obstacles to change convey the impression that change is good. In fact, change may be good or bad.

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The quality of change depends on factors that are organizational as well as political. Any discussion of change must remember that some changes need to be slowed down, prevented, or more clearly thought out. Efforts to understand or manage change are not directed towards implementing every change, but only at getting proposals or ideas for change to the point where they can be considered for their own merits. The proposal for change needs to get to the point where the promising idea can be developed into a plan for change by and for those it will affect. By understanding and using power and dependence relationships existing in a given law enforcement setting, political obstacles to change could possibly become facilitators of change.

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